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Fighting sprawl and city hall: Resistance to urban growth in the southwest, 1945–1965

Logan, Michael Farley, Ph.D.

The University of Arizona, 1994

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FIGHTING SPRAWL AND CITY HALL:
RESISTANCE TO URBAN GROWTH IN THE SOUTHWEST, 1945-1965

by
Michael Farley Logan

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

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A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Michael L. Logan", written over a horizontal line.

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I am very cognizant of the debt I owe to those who have helped shaped this dissertation. Dr. Juan R. Garcia has been my kind and helpful guide throughout graduate school at the University of Arizona. The fact that I have come this far academically is due in no small regard to his interest and assistance.

The flaws in this dissertation are of my own making. I am especially grateful to Dr. Katherine Morrissey and Dr. Oscar Martinez for their critiques and guidance. Revisions suggested by them have improved this dissertation immeasurably. If errors remain, it is through no fault of theirs.

I also wish to thank my family and friends -- you know who you are -- for the unconditional understanding that has flowed so generously in my direction over these last several years. I will never be able to repay the countless kindnesses you all have shown me.

DEDICATION

**In loving memory of
Virgie Walker Logan
1923 - 1993**

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ABSTRACT

Serious resistance to urban growth in the Southwest arose at the beginning of the post World War II boom and persisted throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Most historians of the urban West ignore this early resistance. Even New Western historians truncate their studies of urbanization in the Southwest by assuming that serious opposition to development only appeared with the rise of environmentalism in the late 1960s.

Urbanization in Tucson and Albuquerque proceeded in the face of constant protest. The expressions of opposition to urban expansion arose in conservative and libertarian political critiques and in ethnic resistance to urban renewal plans that targeted barrio areas. A loosely defined environmentalism appeared in these early forms of resistance as residents fought to preserve their lifestyle and native culture.

INTRODUCTION

On September 6, 1993 Time magazine featured the cover story "Boom Time in the Rockies." Time's reporters described this latest boom in the West as predicated upon "more jobs and fewer hassles," qualities supposedly endemic to the mountainous West. The fundamental, perhaps inevitable, conundrum associated with growth in western cities appeared in this retelling of the boom story: development degrades the environment and "lifestyle" that instigated the boom in the first place. When people come in droves, they ruin the place.¹

Time's article appropriately introduces this dissertation because it discusses the West as an urban society closely related to its natural environment. The relationship between western cities and nature has always been self-conscious, a result, no doubt, of the variously daunting and awe-inspiring "nature" of the mountainous West. The mountain views, sunsets, and wide open spaces are real, and at various times cause residents as well as tourists to gawk and coo in wonderment. Water shortages and perspiration are also qualities of the "real" environment. Of course, the meanings and valuations given to these natural surroundings have shifted over time and waxed

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¹"Sky's the Limit," Time, September 6, 1993, pp. 20-27.

frequently mythological as defined by residents, visitors, boosters, environmentalists, and TV. Western cities define, to some degree, "the West," but the region appears in the public consciousness as much pastoral and natural as urban. In fact, what constitutes "the West"?

Historians periodically offer regional definitions, but debate continues on the precise formulation of "the West." Frederick Jackson Turner described the region in terms of the process of settlement on the frontier. This "process" definition had the advantage of freeing western history from rigid constraints of time and place, but added little to the definition of an identifiable "western" region. Turner's "West" migrated along with the frontier, until the frontier "closed" in the 1890s. And yet, "the West" persisted as a recognizable region. Even "the frontier" persisted, mostly in a cultural context, as a viable model for describing the process of development.²

Walter Prescott Webb formulated a geographic and environmental definition of the region. In The Great Plains

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²Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History, ed. Wilbur Jacobs, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986); Ray Allen Billington, America's Frontier Heritage (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966; Howard R. Lamar, "Persistent Frontier: The West in the Twentieth Century," Western Historical Quarterly 4 (January 1973: 5-25; Michael E. McGerr, "Is There a Twentieth-Century West," in William Cronon, George Miles and Jay Gitlin, editors, Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America's Western Past (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992), pp. 239-256.

Webb described "the West" as the arid region beyond the 98th meridian. Donald Worster characterized the region in similar terms, focusing on the scarcity of water. Criticism of this geographic and environmental definition comes mostly from within the region. Fractious subregions, moist and green, clamor for equal attention.³

Historians have also defined "the West" as a cultural phenomenon. "Shared experiences" explain the region. Native American and Hispanic traditions, legacies of ranching and mining, federal tutelage, all have added to the self-conscious perceptions that define "western" culture. Of course, these perceptions may spring from experiences more mythological than historical, but any cultural definition of the region must accommodate these perceptions as real enough today. Westerners think of themselves as unique because of their culture, defined, for instance, by an individualism bred from a closeness to nature; Barry Goldwater believed this to be true, historically factual,

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³Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1931); Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985); William G. Robbins, "Laying Siege to Western History: The Emergence of New Paradigms," in Patricia Nelson Limerick, Clyde A. Milner II, Charles E. Rankin, editors, Trails: Toward a New Western History (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 185.

and shaped his political ideology accordingly.⁴

My depiction of the "Urban Southwest" draws on all of these definitions of the broader region. The "Urban" in the title of this dissertation refers to an ongoing process of "western" urbanization, including waves of migration such as Turner might have recognized. Geographically the "Southwest" means the southwest corner of the continental United States, as described, for example, by D.W. Meinig: Arizona and New Mexico, and portions of Colorado, Texas, California, Nevada, and Utah. Topographically and environmentally, the "Southwest" refers to the range and basin country of Arizona and New Mexico, visually startling and somewhat arid. Culturally, the process of urbanization in the Southwest following World War II was shaped by the natural environment and the self-conscious perceptions of environment and culture held by established as well as newly arrived "westerners."⁵

The urbanization of Tucson and Albuquerque proceeded along remarkably similar paths. Of course each city possessed certain unique characteristics that shaped their development, but at first glance Albuquerque and Tucson fall

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⁴Martin Ridge, "The American West: From Frontier to Region," New Mexico Historical Review 64 (April 1989): 125-141; McGerr, "Is There a Twentieth-Century West?", p. 253.

⁵D.W. Meinig, Southwest: Three Peoples in Geographical Change, 1600-1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

neatly into a regional identity. Both cities began as agricultural settlements on the banks of flowing rivers in the midst of arid environments, first the domain of Native American populations, then the colonizing Spanish. Anglo presence in both locales increased dramatically with the arrival of the railroad in the 1880s: the Santa Fe in Albuquerque in 1880, the Southern Pacific in Tucson in 1881.

TABLE 1
POPULATION BY DECADE OF ALBUQUERQUE AND TUCSON

	Albuquerque	Tucson
1900	6238	7531
1910	11,020	13,193
1920	15,157	20,292
1930	26,570	32,506
1940	35,449	35,752
1950	96,815	45,454
1960	201,189	212,892
1970	243,751	262,433

SOURCE: Census of the Population, 1960⁶

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⁶Census statistics often mislead. Tucson's population was accurately counted (within the inherent inaccuracies of Census surveys) until suburbanization in the 1940s and 1950s caused the count to leave out about 70,000 fringe residents. Conversely, Albuquerque's population was consistently under counted until the 1940s, when "Old Town" and other satellite communities were brought into the city limits through annexation. Prior to the 1940s "Greater Albuquerque" contained more residents than the Census counted. For example, the Albuquerque Journal counted the population of "Greater Albuquerque" as 54,268 in 1930 (numbers derived from city directories) when the Census counted the population as 26,570. From "A Market Study of New Mexico," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, Item 86.

Both cities acquired their respective state university in the late 1880s. Tourism and the health-care industry (sanatoriums for tuberculosis patients) became central to boosters' development plans in the early 1900s. Federal expenditures fueled local booms in both Albuquerque and Tucson during and following World War II. Kirtland Air Force Base and Sandia Laboratories provided an economic influence in Albuquerque just as Davis Monthan Air Force Base and the Hughes Aircraft Plant influenced Tucson's development. Geography also dictated the direction of early suburbanization in both locales: topographically inviting terrain to the east of the original settlement.

Western historians of late have taken a decidedly nonmythological view of the development of western cities and their relationship with nature. One of the deflated myths is the boosterish idea of Triumph over Nature. Rather than a victory by stalwart Anglo pioneers over intractable nature, historians now paint the accomplishments of western developers as a "legacy of conquest." Westerners, as described by the New Western history, never saw a boom they didn't like. To these rapacious city builders the central problem with development in the West was its cyclical nature, dependent on natural resources that rose and fell in value. Bernard DeVoto, an early deflator of Western

mythology, described the West as an economic colony, subject to booms that inevitably went bust. The imperial power in this schema was, of course, the East, a view reiterated in western history by Earl Pomeroy. Gerald Nash took the next historiographical step by describing the boom following World War II as reshaping the West's relationship with the rest of the country. The period of colonial dependence ended, and the West became the "pacesetting" region for the nation. The West assumed leadership, for example, in the rising environmental awareness that made growth in western cities so problematic.⁷

The New Western history places environmentalism in conflict with the notion of "progress." The push by boosters for unlimited urban development in the West equates with their broader faith in progress, outmoded, according to New Western historians, in this post-modern age of limited possibilities. Earlier examples of a preservationist environmental critique or resistance to headlong urban expansion were doomed if they appeared amidst the pre Earth

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⁷Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988); Bernard Devoto, "The West Against Itself," Harper's Magazine 194 (January 1947): 1-12; Earl Pomeroy, "Toward a Reorientation of Western History: Continuity and Environment," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41 (March 1955): 579-600; Gerald Nash, The American West in the Twentieth Century: A Short History of an Urban Oasis (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), p. 191.

Day consensus in favor of development. Thus opposition to urbanization appearing prior to the rise of environmentalism is generally described by historians, if at all, as visionary, eccentric, or spiritually John-Muirish.

In fact serious resistance to urban growth arose at the beginning of the post World War II boom and persisted throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Most historians of the urban West ignore this early resistance. Even New Western historians truncate their studies of urbanization in the West by assuming that serious resistance to growth only appeared with the rise of environmentalism in the late 1960s.

W. Eugene Hollon and David Bingham, writing in the 1960s, identified a growing uneasiness about urbanization amidst an otherwise optimistic appraisal of development in the West generally and Arizona specifically. Hollon chronicled the amazing settlement of the "Great American Desert," primarily in urban centers, limited, in a manner echoed later by Donald Worster, by the scarcity of water. Hollon's cautionary note, explicitly respectful of individual freedom, appeared in a prognostication placed firmly in the enlightened present of 1966: "In the past Americans have demonstrated an infinite capacity to deface the environment in the name of progress. Reversing this tradition, and taking collective action that will aid the

individual without impairing his freedom, might very well become the overwhelming challenge from here on."⁸ In fact the challenge to reverse the tradition of western rapacity began in the late 1940s.

David Bingham described an uneasiness about growth in Arizona motivated by cultural rather than environmental concerns: "... in a broad cultural sense, one shortcoming, as it appears to many, has been the 'Los Angelizing' or 'Chicagoizing' of high-rise buildings in the state's two metro-urban areas (Phoenix and Tucson). Many native and adopted Arizonans, not averse to progress per se, regret what they consider to be the crass importation of 'glass and steel' architectural styles alien to the Desert Southwest or its history and traditions."⁹ Bingham described resistance to growth in terms of Arizona's "political squabbles" between cities and their suburbs, but in general denigrated the opposition to urbanization. Annexations to Bingham represented positive steps toward a "liberal" urban society, a view which placed him squarely in the camp of traditional boosterism that painted resistance to growth as culturally

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⁸W. Eugene Hollon, The Great American Desert: Then and Now (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 253.

⁹David A. Bingham, "The Impact of Urbanization in Arizona," in Clyde J. Wingfield, ed., Urbanization in the Southwest (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1968), p. 27.

elitist or simply traitorous.¹⁰

More recent historians of the urban West either dismiss the opposition to growth, or describe it as evolutionary, insignificant at first, growing noteworthy only with the rise in environmental awareness. Such views appear in Bradford Luckingham's "profile" histories of Southwestern cities: "Local citizens who advocated stringent policies regulating urban area growth were ignored, and those who wanted the latest newcomers to be the 'last settlers' and lock the gates behind them were not taken seriously. Only in the 1970s with the glaring appearance of energy and environmental problems did 'controlled growth' become a significant issue."¹¹ Luckingham related the significance of resistance to its political effectiveness, which increased to approach viability only with the rise of environmentalism. This approach limited Luckingham's analysis of conflict within the region's cities to a structural appraisal of politics. Resistance outside political parties and reform movements failed to appear.

Carl Abbott's study of sunbelt cities also ignored early resistance to growth, assuming a general consensus in favor of urban development during most of the post World War

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¹⁰Ibid., pp. 30-32.

¹¹Bradford Luckingham, The Urban Southwest: A Profile History of Albuquerque, El Paso, Phoenix, Tucson (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1982), p. 112.

II boom. As a result, Abbott's analysis marginalized opposition to urbanization. Abbott shared Bingham's faith in annexations, although the endorsement had slipped into passive voice: "Because annexation fully captures outlying residents and revenue sources for the annexing municipality, it has often been taken as a symbol of civic vitality."¹² Abbott acknowledged the gradual development of resistance to annexation and city planning efforts from the late 1950s, but his focus remained on the incredible growth of the region.¹³ Serious resistance to growth failed to materialize until the rising environmental awareness of the late 1960s fundamentally challenged the faith in unlimited development.

Peter Wiley and Robert Gottlieb offer the most traditionally political analysis of the region in Empires in the Sun. The authors sought to describe the "centers of power" in the West, and so largely ignored opposition to growth. The contestants for power included "Wall Street, the Washington bureaucracy, the energy multinationals,

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¹²Carl Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), p. 54.

¹³Or regions. Abbott described two sunbelt "subregions," one in the Southeast, the other in the far West. Ibid., p. 30.

California, (and) the interior West."¹⁴ One of the "points of conflict" in the urban West was "Bohemian Club Environmentalism," but this contentiousness over the environment appeared late in the game, simultaneously with "populism of the Left and Right"¹⁵ Wiley and Gottlieb's traditional definition of political power caused them to ignore the politically powerless, no matter how demographically or culturally vibrant.

The assumed consensus behind growth invades even conscientious efforts by historians to expand the analysis of the West's urbanization. Roger Lotchin consciously avoided bipolar models in his discussion of California's development in Fortress California, but nonetheless slipped into the bipolar view of his booster protagonists. The excerpt that follows concerns the placement of a U.S. Navy pier in San Diego harbor for the servicing of nuclear powered ships: "... the metropolitan-military complex had collected a formidable political coalition. Moreover, as so often seemed the case, it had attracted little local criticism. Some San Diegans worried that the pier would 'conflict with residential areas,' 'interfere with harbor traffic,' or provide atomic pollution, but the Navy and

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¹⁴Peter Wiley and Robert Gottlieb, Empires in the Sun: The Rise of the New American West (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982), p. xvi.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 218.

boosters deftly parried each of these half-hearted thrusts."¹⁶ Lotchin labeled the opposition to the nuclear pier half-hearted because it had failed. Lotchin thus echoed the boosters' view, considering resistance to development as eccentric until it obtained mainstream, majority standing, a circumstance never reached during the period of Lotchin's study, which ended in the early 1960s. The reader's interest may be piqued, as is mine, wondering how many residents complained about the nuclear pier, and how vigorously. Did San Diegans take the Navy to court, force a referendum election, recall city leaders? What does Lotchin mean by "half-hearted?"

Not all historians of the post World War II West ignore or denigrate resistance to development, although few give it quite the weight I feel it deserves. Coming closest is Spencer Olin's rigorous analysis of Orange County, California, which centers on "intraclass conflict" and the resistance of "local capital" groups to the changes within their communities. Olin's description of Orange County's development as a "fragmented region" places local resistance to change in conflict with international economic trends:

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¹⁶Roger W. Lotchin, Fortress California 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 304.

resistance is at the center of the story.¹⁷

Historians of Tucson and Albuquerque fit into the general historiographical trends previously described. Don Bufkin and C.L. Sonnichsen on Tucson and Howard Rabinowitz, Robert Turner Wood, and V.B. Price on Albuquerque have acknowledged opposition to urban development, although generally classifying it as evolutionary. Bufkin and Sonnichsen described the urbanization of Tucson in generally consensus terms, with development meeting minor resistance in the late 1950s.¹⁸ Both historians figuratively place resistance to growth as a footnote to the larger story of incredible expansion. In Albuquerque's case, Howard Rabinowitz described resistance in more serious terms as suburban residents resisted both annexations and efforts to consolidate city and county governments. Even in Rabinowitz's history, however, the focus was on amazing growth, citation of census statistics, and an evolving concern over the future of the city based on heightened

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¹⁷Spencer Olin, "Globalization and the Politics of Locality," Western Historical Quarterly (May, 1991); and Spencer Olin, in Rob Kling, Spencer Olin, Mark Poster, eds., Postsuburban California: The Transformation of Orange County since World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

¹⁸Don Bufkin, "From Mud Village to Modern Metropolis: The Urbanization of Tucson," Journal of Arizona History 22 (Spring 1981): 82-88; C.L. Sonnichsen, Tucson: The Life and Times of an American City (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), p. 283.

environmental and cultural awareness in the 1960s: "As elsewhere... the late 1960s brought an increased awareness of the weaknesses of uncontrolled growth. Calls for limited growth came from environmentally conscious migrants and longtime residents who claimed urban sprawl, pollution, and destruction of old landmarks were undermining the quality of life."¹⁹

Robert Turner Wood periodized Albuquerque's history in grossly simplistic terms in his dissertation, "The Transformation of Albuquerque, 1945-1965." Wood described the 1940s as "vigorous and expansive" years, proceeding into "the calm and affluent fifties and the idealistic and intense sixties on into the beginning of a return to calm in the early seventies."²⁰ In a blatantly consensus vein, Wood rendered the 1950s as mostly "happy and harmonious," dissolving predictably into "a more restless, adventurous and outgoing spirit" during the 1960s.²¹ Luckingham described the process of urbanization in Albuquerque as proceeding smoothly until environmental awareness in the

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¹⁹Howard N. Rabinowitz, "Albuquerque: City at a Crossroads," in Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, eds., Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 260-262.

²⁰Robert Turner Wood, "The Transformation of Albuquerque, 1945-1972," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1980), p. v.

²¹Ibid., p. 4

late 1960s caused resistance to mount. Rabinowitz, although to a lesser degree, also utilized an evolutionary model for describing urban resistance. This image of gradually developing opposition to urbanization appears most clearly in V.B. Price's A City at the End of the World. Price defined Albuquerque's uniqueness in environmental terms, both natural (the river, mesas and mountains) and cultural (Indian and Spanish/Mexican). Underpinning this environmental perspective was the assumption by the author that his analysis was new, reflective of a post Earth Day sensitivity toward the natural and cultural environment:

In the early 1960s, Albuquerque's leaders were unconcerned that its unique character was being threatened by uncontrolled growth. By the early 1970s, however, environmentalists, historic preservationists, and others interested in quality-of-life issues had risen to public prominence. Albuquerque found itself embroiled in what would prove to be a more-than-twenty-year struggle to conserve its New Mexican identity while continuing to benefit from the prosperity of its growth.²²

Price's analysis is top heavy, assuming that the political leadership necessarily reflects the community itself. In fact, Albuquerque's expansion, both of geographic size and governmental reach, encountered vociferous resistance in the 1940s and 1950s. Wood referred to this resistance periodically, but his analysis of the city's "transformation" required him to ignore the

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²²V.B. Price, A City at the End of the World (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992), p. xiii.

persistence of contentiousness within the community. Wood required a change in community ethos to suit his thesis of an evolving "... orientation toward groups, (and) the relaxation of authority on all levels..."²³ Price assumed that environmental awareness evolved. Rabinowitz provided the most rigorous analysis of the resistance to Albuquerque's expansion, including early annexation protests, but also relied on an evolutionary model. A more accurate rendering of Albuquerque's growth must accommodate persistent and vociferous resistance throughout the urbanization process.

As this dissertation will show, urbanization in Tucson and Albuquerque proceeded in the face of constant opposition. The expressions of opposition to urban expansion arose in conservative and libertarian political critiques and in ethnic resistance to urban renewal plans that targeted barrio areas. Perhaps it is safe to argue that a loosely defined environmentalism appeared in these early forms of opposition as residents fought to preserve their lifestyle, including a political idealism, and their native culture. A preservationism at once conservative and activist describes the resistance.

Although not phrased within an urban context, Richard White placed conflict such as appears in opposition to

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²³Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque", p. v.

urbanization at the center of the New Western History:

"There are many possible relationships between us and the land, and such meanings are contested. Despite multiple use, land cannot be simultaneously range, parking lots, and wilderness; discovering which perceptions and which uses of land prevail, and why, has become much of the subject matter of environmental history and the New Western History."²⁴

Contested meanings, explaining why and how one set of perceptions prevailed in shaping the urban West should also be part of the New Western history. Tucson and Albuquerque, as they appear today, formed in an environment of contested urbanization during the post World War II boom. One side prevailed, but not without a fight.

The description in this dissertation of political activism in the 1950s fits into the revisionist view of the decade as explicated, for example, by Paul Carter and David Halberstam.²⁵ The "happy days" of the 1950s appear less consensual and harmonious in the face of continuing urban resistance. Likewise the description of resistance on the

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²⁴Richard White, "Trashing the Trails," in Patricia Nelson Limerick, Clyde A. Milner II, Charles E. Rankin, eds., Trails: Toward a New Western History (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991), p. 37.

²⁵Paul A. Carter, Another Part of the Fifties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); David Halberstam, The Fifties (New York: Villard Books, 1993).

fringes of Tucson and Albuquerque adds to the corpus of studies that describe the multiplicity of experiences and lifestyles subsumed under the "suburban" label.²⁶ Both Tucson and Albuquerque contained neighborhood developments that fit the standard "suburban" model, as long as political contentiousness is included in the recipe.

The contentiousness created winners and losers, and the side that prevailed in the conflict over urbanization described the contest. Boosters, planners, and politicians generally characterized their opponents as nuisances, a denigrating view picked up by historians. Evidence of resistance abounds, but it must be culled from an historical record that is largely unsympathetic.

The two "parts" of my dissertation deal with Tucson and Albuquerque respectively. Each city witnessed multifaceted opposition to the urbanization that took place during the post World War II boom. The introductory section of each "part" gives a general overview of the origins, topography and development of each city prior to the post World War II boom. Regional similarities appear at the outset.

Before analyzing the resistance in Tucson and

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²⁶Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopia: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Carol O'Connor, A Sort of Utopia: Scarsdale, 1881-1981 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).

Albuquerque I have attempted in the first chapter in each "part" (Chapter One and Chapter Five) to describe the booster and governmental efforts in each city to promote development. The booster-government partnership in the two cities varied in their degree of effectiveness and cohesiveness.

With the familiar booster terrain mapped, the analysis of resistance begins. The second chapter in each "part" (Chapter Two and Chapter Six) describes the "political" resistance in Tucson and Albuquerque. Annexations and zoning reforms drew concerted opposition from mostly Anglo, middle-class, residents in both cities, primarily through standard forms of political protest: referendum elections, petition drives, and complaints lodged at city council meetings.

The third chapter in each "part" (Chapter Three and Chapter Seven) shifts the focus to a broadly defined "ethnic" resistance in each city. Hispanic residents opposed efforts to redevelop barrio areas. In the zeal for urban renewal, federal and local bureaucrats labeled barrio neighborhoods as "blighted," and called in the bulldozers. In both Tucson and Albuquerque Hispanic residents protested the destruction of their neighborhoods, and successfully caused the renewal plans to be modified to accommodate their concerns.

The fourth chapter in each "part" (Chapter Four and Chapter Eight) chronicles the increasing environmental awareness that most historians peg as the root of "slow growth" movements. The environmental critique became explicit late in the process of urbanization, and became a focal point for otherwise disparate forms of resistance. The preservationist motivation for the opposition to urbanization appeared clearly within the "environmental" framework. Once the environmental critique made its way into the lexicon of political possibilities, historians began to notice the resistance to urban growth.

An adequate job of describing the modern urban West requires a recognition of environmental perceptions explicitly directed toward nature and native cultures. Urban and environmental history intersect in this dissertation. The goal is to achieve a broader understanding of western, and American, urbanization.

Part One: TUCSON

Tucson's population grew steadily but unremarkably through the first half of the twentieth century; the average population increase by decade was 36.5 percent.¹ Tucson's prosperity at the turn of the century depended on the Southern Pacific Railroad line, the state's agricultural college, now the University of Arizona, established in 1891, and mining and ranching interests in southern Arizona.² Climactic and topographical factors dominated the town's early development. The original town (two square miles incorporated in 1877) remained on the site of the Spanish presidio near the Santa Cruz River, and the town stayed generally river bound for its first thirty years.³ The river, flowing year round until the early 1900s, provided a ready supply of water and power and some refuge from the blistering summer heat.⁴

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¹U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 1960, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 4, Arizona (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 5. The average population increase (from Census statistics) by decade from 1900 to 1950 in Albuquerque was 76.8 percent. In Phoenix it was 45.4 percent.

²Sonnichsen, Tucson, pp. 98-99, 102-104, 136-141.

³Gilbert J. Pedersen, "The Townsite is Now Secure: Tucson Incorporates, 1871," Journal of Arizona History 11 (Autumn 1970): 151-174.

⁴Peggy Hamilton Lockard, This is Tucson (Tucson: Pepper Publishing, 1983), p. 236.

The "city" began expanding generally eastward with its first small annexation in 1905.⁵ Mountains, which are close by to the west and north and twenty and thirty miles distant to the east and south, dictated the direction of expansion. Improved transportation added tourism and an allied health industry to Tucson's economic base (Tucson's dry desert air was considered a curative for tuberculosis and asthma).⁶ The Depression of the 1930s slowed growth before federal expenditures during World War II expanded it again. With the war, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base grew in importance to Tucson's economy. The addition in 1950 of a Hughes Aircraft plant further tied Tucson's prosperity to

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⁵City of Tucson Annexation Index (mimeograph), 3-5, City Engineer's Office, City Hall Annex, Tucson. As Pedersen explains, Tucson's legal designation was "village" with the approval of its federal land patent in 1874. The "city" designation applied to Tucson after its incorporation in 1877. In a cultural sense, Tucson was still a "village," or perhaps a "town," long after its incorporation, and became recognizable as a "city" sometime during its expansion -- exactly when is subject to debate. The issue is confused further by the designations of "urban" and "metropolitan" used by the Census Bureau at various times. Offering no explicit definition, I will describe Tucson as a "city" following its first annexation in 1905.

⁶John Bret Harte, Tucson, Portrait of a Desert Pueblo (Woodland Hills, CA: Windsor Publications, 1980), pp. 129-130. Tucson Medical Center originated as a tuberculosis sanatorium in the 1920s. Reba D. Grubb, Portrait of Progress: A Story of Tucson Medical Center (Tucson: Raim, Inc., 1984).

the pattern of federal and military/industrial spending.⁷ In short, Tucson was well situated for a boom in the post-World War II years.

Tucson residents both supported and opposed the boom. The boosters occupy familiar historiographical ground, most notably trod by Daniel Boorstin, while the resisters present largely unexplored terrain. Boorstin described the booster as representative of the American character in the developing West in The Americans: The National Experience.⁸ More recent studies place "boosters" within a broader "growth network" or "growth coalition," but these revisions of the booster paradigm leave Boorstin's basic polarity in place: those in favor of growth versus those opposed to growth.⁹ As mentioned previously, both Bufkin and Sonnichsen largely neglect the early resistance, or characterize it as eccentric if it is mentioned at all. As such, Bufkin and Sonnichsen support Boorstin's characterization of a cooperative community ethos, with

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⁷John Bret Harte, Tucson, p. 163. For a discussion of the regional impact of federal spending, see Gerald Nash, World War II and the West: Reshaping the Economy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990).

⁸Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The National Experience (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 113-123.

⁹See for example, M. Gottdiener, The Social Production of Urban Space (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985); John H. Mollenkopf, The Contested City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

conflict within the community interpreted as anomalous until some pressure point is reached -- in Tucson's case in the mid-to-late 1960s. Resistance to growth accompanied boosterism in Tucson from the outset. The early level of conflict did not match the boisterous battles of the 1960s and 1970s but was certainly sufficient to challenge the "cooperative" or "consensus" view of the 1950s as a period of mute acquiescence to growth.

The alternative definition of community ethos founded on conflict rather than cooperation corrects the previous oversimplification, but in fact neither model for describing communities is singularly appropriate for Tucson in the 1950s. The dichotomous representation of residents as either for or against growth misses the nuances and shifting opinions within the community. Antigrowth partisans targeted Tucson's expanding population, burgeoning city boundaries and swelling government. Only in the most general sense did they oppose "growth." Studying the resistance to urbanization quickly uncovers this fuzziness in the language. For example, the statement, "developers at times opposed growth," remains a nonsequitur only as long as "growth" remains monolithically defined. In fact, developers opposed the expansion of government's regulatory reach in Tucson. Thus the simple dichotomy that pits progrowth forces versus antigrowth forces breaks down almost

immediately. The resistance to urbanization was as multifaceted as the process of urbanization itself.

Even if reflecting something less than complete consensus within the community, boosterism nonetheless provides comforting cultural landmarks; the familiar sights appear in Tucson, along with variations of local color. Explicating the resistance to growth will offer a fresh view of the cultural landscape, but to place the resistance within the proper context requires first a description of the familiar ground. The partnership between business and government in Tucson promoted growth with single-minded determination -- at least, such has been the traditional characterization. A single-mindedness among Tucson's boosters is in fact evident, but only in the realm of the fundamental assumption that motivated them: prosperity, both civic and personal, depended upon continuing urban growth. Beneath this fundamental assumption, fractures appear.

Chapter 1: Progrowth Partnership

"The Optimistic Assumption"

Tucson's boosters appear monolithically united behind promotions of growth. Organizationally, however, the boosters in Tucson maintained three separate promotional identities targeting tourists, prospective residents, and businessmen. The effort to attract tourists, for example, sometimes conflicted with the effort to attract corporations.

The working relationship between boosters and the city government also appears monolithic, and also fractures beneath the surface. Planners at times opposed developments contrary to the desires of boosters and city leaders.

Tucson's booster-government partnership functioned at times effectively, haphazardly, or not at all.

From at least 1904 Tucson businessmen pushed for unbridled growth through the Chamber of Commerce.¹¹

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¹¹Sources differ as to the founding date of the Chamber of Commerce. According to the "Tucson Chamber of Commerce Newsletter," 20 February 1962, the Chamber of Commerce was founded in 1904. In 1938 the Chamber of Commerce issued an announcement for its thirty-sixth annual meeting, placing the founding date in 1902. James Officer puts the founding date in 1896 in James E. Officer, editor, Tucson, the Old Pueblo: A Chronology (Tucson: Tucson-Pima County Historical Commission, 1979). In part the confusion is due to the loss of early records of the Chamber of Commerce in a fire that destroyed the Chamber's offices in 1925.

Unfortunately, turn of the century boosters rarely bothered to define what sort of growth they had in mind. Blissfully self-assured, an assumption as fundamental as the earth itself grounded their politics: cities must expand to prosper. Boosters considered this idea to be common sense, with anyone arguing against this view seen as eccentric, weird, silly, or demented. Their own economic prosperity provided the bedrock for this assumption, and in a personal sense businessmen who required legions of new residents or hordes of tourists to prosper were correct in their analysis. But not all businessmen required thousands of new residents to prosper. Even within the Chamber of Commerce, that icon of traditional boosterism, divisions appeared among businessmen whose prosperity required different approaches to urbanization.

At the level of political rhetoric, however, resistance to growth remained marginalized, to say the least. Perhaps to be expected, the political hyperbole that labeled antigrowth forces in Tucson as peculiar prior to the 1960s made its way into the historical record. The eccentric

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Fortunately a copy of the "Twenty-fifth Anniversary Banquet Program," 1921, survives in the Chamber of Commerce file at the Arizona Historical Society. The program described the founding in 1896: "October 31, 1896, was the date on which five pioneer business men, interested in the development of Tucson, met and formulated an organization known as 'The Traders' National Protective Association.'" The name of the group was changed in 1897 to the 'Tucson Board of Trade.' The "board" became the "chamber" in 1902.

label came from boosters such as William R. Mathews, editor of the Arizona Daily Star.¹² The ideological power exerted by Mathews reflected, in general, the stance of the Chamber of Commerce.

Five "energetic" businessmen, then dozens, and eventually thousands, belonged to the Tucson Chamber of Commerce.¹³ The growth-is-good assumption linked individuals of varied interests and pursuits, whether real estate developers profiting from the expanses of open land, or manufacturers profiting from the supply of inexpensive Hispanic labor. Politicians, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and retail merchants also shared the assumption. These proponents of growth shared the sense of optimism and faith

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¹²For instance, the Arizona Daily Star opposed the incorporation of South Tucson in 1936. Businessmen south of the city formed a separate municipality in an effort to avoid the higher taxes that would follow annexation into the City of Tucson (this aspect of Tucson's growth will be discussed in Chapter 3). Mathews described these activists as pie-in-the-sky optimists who foolishly thought they could run a modern city "by voluntary or free services" provided by residents. Arizona Daily Star, August 9, 1936, p. 8; August 11, 1936, p. 1.

¹³Specific information about the founders is lacking, in part due to the 1925 fire that destroyed the Chamber's records. The adjective "energetic" comes from the Sunshine Climate Club subscription campaign brochure, 1941, in Special Collections, University of Arizona Library. The "chamber" was founded by "five pioneer business men" in 1896. There were 420 members in 1928, and 904 members in 1948, from the "1929 Election of Officers" pamphlet, and the "1949 Directors Nominations" pamphlet, in "Tucson Chamber of Commerce," Arizona Historical Society. Of the 904 members in 1948, 70 were women, and 45 possessed obviously Hispanic surnames.

in capitalism that describes Boorstin's 19th-century boosters. Sinclair Lewis created Babbitt to represent the more settled, but no less acquisitive booster of the 20th century, quintessentially, a real estate man. In fact, "Babbitt" expresses a sort of Chamber of Commerce archetype: waspish and middle-class. This updated image of the booster lends itself easily to the simplistic dichotomy: progrowth versus antigrowth. At times even contemporary studies of "progrowth coalitions" ignore the variations within the "class" of boosters.¹⁴

From its founding the Chamber sought to exploit Tucson's position as a regional center for mining, ranching and trading with Mexico. Hispanic businessmen played a key role in this developing commerce, although Anglo businessmen

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¹⁴The monolithic view of boosters relies on their identity within a capitalist class. Spencer Olin properly recognized the oversimplification within this schema in "Intraclass Conflict and the Politics of a Fragmented Region." Olin described variations even within the "intraclass" camps (local capital and national/international capital) so that undue lumping was avoided. Conversely, John Mollenkopf described "growth coalitions" so as to accommodate various progrowth interests, but then lumped opponents to growth egregiously and erroneously. See Mollenkopf, The Contested City, p. 216: "Where the transformation of older cities like Boston and San Francisco heightened conflict over growth and required an expanded public sector to contain that conflict, no such challenge arose in the cities of the Southwest." Historians of the urban Southwest, including Bufkin and Sonnichsen, acknowledge that conflict arose in the cities of the Southwest in the late 1960s. I maintain it arose much earlier, partly due to the fact that progrowth interests themselves were more seriously fractured than has been previously acknowledged.

dominated the commercial life of the city. As Thomas Sheridan described in Los Tucsonenses, Mexican businessmen enjoyed a relatively benign business environment in Tucson and established enterprises that "transcended ethnic boundaries."¹⁵ Prosperous Hispanic merchants and entrepreneurs belonged to the Chamber of Commerce, and also formed mutualistas, or mutual-aid societies, which fostered economic development and social solidarity within the ethnic community.¹⁶

Despite Tucson's development as a commercial center for the region, business declined in the early 1920s as part of the post World War I downturn.¹⁷ In 1922, fifteen businessmen gathered to discuss their declining prospects. At this point a fracture appears in the booster edifice, not on the basis of the underlying assumption that motivated the

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¹⁵Thomas E. Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses: The Mexican Community in Tucson, 1854-1941 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986), p. 96.

¹⁶Of the 904 members of the Chamber of Commerce in 1948, 45 possessed obviously Hispanic surnames. Since no record was kept of the ethnic identity of members, this rough estimate, certainly too low (given the inaccuracy of Census counts using surname identifiers), must suffice. Included among the Hispanic members were three Jacomes, two Ronstadts, C.B. Sedillo, representing the Alianza Hispano Americano, the most prominent of the mutualistas, and Lopez Montero, the Consul of Mexico. From "1949 Directors Nominations," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, Arizona Historical Society.

¹⁷Sonnichsen, Tucson, pp. 202-203.

businessmen, but on the means through which prosperity could best be achieved. The fifteen self-styled visionaries who "realized that Tucson really had something to shout about..." formed The Sunshine Climate Club as a branch of the Chamber of Commerce.¹⁸ Of interest is the disparaging tone implicitly cast on the other members of the Chamber of Commerce, stick-in-the-mud types who:

had lived in the city so long that they could see nothing attractive about the interesting Mexican quarter, the several Indian villages, the beautiful San Xavier Mission, the giant cactus forests, the rugged mountains, western ranch life, the proximity of Mexico with its big game hunting and excellent deep sea fishing, and last but not least, the glorious sun that makes it possible to play golf in shirt sleeves on Christmas Day.¹⁹

The Sunshine Climate Club shifted the focus toward tourism and the commodification of bits of nature and exotic "other" worlds. During the 1920s Tucson and other western cities emphasized tourism, "a new kind of western ranching," as characterized by historian Robert Athearn.²⁰ Despite ambivalence about the visitors, enterprising westerners sought to provide "wild, magnificent scenery, excitement, adventure, a bit of rusticity, and an occasional whiff of imagined danger. In other words, the chance to escape,

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¹⁸"Tucson Sunshine Climate Club," brochure, 1941, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Robert G. Athearn, The Mythic West in Twentieth-Century America (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986).

briefly to be sure, the dailiness of their [easterners'] lives."²¹ Earlier entrepreneurs had "mined the miners." Twentieth-century entrepreneurs, such as the fifteen founders of the Sunshine Climate Club, endeavored to mine the tourists. Railroad and motor tours deposited sojourners at scenic points throughout the West. By the early 1920s this "most recent gold rush" had spread to almost every western city.²²

The Sunshine Climate Club operated under the organizational umbrella of the Chamber of Commerce, but focused on this different aspect of development, occasionally arguing over budgets, resources, and methods of promotion. They remained linked by their agreement on the optimistic assumption, but unanimity amongst boosters rarely materialized. Capitalism, after all, trumpets individual achievement. Shrinking economic prospects during the Depression of the 1930s brought calls for concerted and unified action, while at the same time businessmen and residents scrambled to preserve their individual interests. The "Bank Holiday" in 1933 resulted in disruptions to the normal business routine, although the currency shortage in Tucson was alleviated through issues of script and warrants,

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²¹Ibid., p. 131.

²²Ibid., p. 149.

and the use of the barter system.²³ The banking crisis in fact led to opportunities for "enterprising businesses" such as Albert Steinfeld & Company, retail merchants who gained many new customers by accepting checks, script, and opening new charge accounts. Conversely, many businesses refused to accept promissory warrants issued by the State of Arizona even after the banks, which would redeem the warrants, had reopened. This policy left out scores of University of Arizona employees, local residents who suffered from businessmen's suspicion of the fiscal integrity of the state government.²⁴ In short, businessmen responded differently to the economic crisis depending on how they defined their individual self-interest.

The Sabino Canyon dam proposal in 1936 also displayed early fissures within the pro-development community: rhetorical unanimity convinced the federal government to support the plan to build a dam in Sabino Canyon near Tucson if city and county governments agreed to share in the cost of the project. The Army Corps of Engineers placed Pima County's contribution at \$500,000. In the face of the half million dollar price tag, support for the dam melted like snow in the desert, and recriminations flew back and forth

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²³William H. Jervy, Jr., "When the Banks Closed: Arizona's Bank Holiday of 1933," Arizona and the West X (Summer 1968): 127-152.

²⁴Ibid.

between boosters who felt either betrayed or vindicated.²⁵

Other fractures occurred as the city began aggressively annexing areas surrounding the city after World War II. At times developers resisted annexations, never challenging the underlying assumption that expansion was desirable, but questioning the timing and pace of expansion (developer resistance to annexations will be discussed more fully in Chapter 2).

The organizational separation of the Tucson Chamber of Commerce and the Sunshine Climate Club indicates an awareness amongst Tucson boosters of variations within a context of shared fundamental goals. Businessmen aimed promotional brochures at different audiences in the effort to lure tourists, residents and businesses to Tucson, sometimes the messages running afoul of encroaching development and the increasing liminality of Tucson's cultural environment. Tucson's charms were described as both "here," intricately entwined within the community, in promotions aimed at vacationers, and also described as "there," separate, perhaps nearby but distinctly segregated, in promotions aimed at prospective residents.²⁶

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²⁵David Lazaroff, "Tucson's Canyon Oasis," Arizona Highways (April 1993): 5-12.

²⁶Kerwin L. Klein, "Selling the Desert" (Masters thesis, University of Arizona, 1991).

Tucson boosters banked on the city's particular brand of quaintness, in the form of a multicultural heritage suitable for tourists' explorations, but boosters also chafed at the notion that Tucson itself was somehow provincial. In Tucson, the quaintness was to be sold as readily accessible, but not unduly intrusive. Tucson offered sophisticated accommodations and modern conveniences, so that the Old Pueblo remained both conveniently at hand and remote. Campaigns aimed at tourists advertised Tucson's climate, Old West traditions (maintained in the thirty-four dude ranches near the city²⁷), and cultural heritage in the form of Hispanic barrios, Indian villages and western ghost towns. Happy visitors rode horseback for fun, not out of necessity. Tourists were sold the Western playground image. The degree to which urban development degraded this image, perhaps inevitably, led to another sort of resistance to growth based on preserving Tucson's environment, both natural and cultural (to be discussed in chapter 4).

Campaigns aimed at prospective residents painted a different image of Tucson. The Chamber of Commerce, for example, did its best to present the city in a sophisticated, metropolitan light. "Facts for Prospective

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²⁷"The Sunshine City, Tucson, Arizona: Accommodations," 195-, brochure, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

Residents of Tucson," published in 1956, listed favorable tax rates and general information on the city's population, banks, parks, museums and schools.²⁸ The pamphlet estimated the city's population at 205,000, and described the "urban area" of the city as extending a whopping seven miles "from the downtown post office."²⁹

The valorizing tone remained in "The Answers to All Your Questions about Tucson, Arizona," issued in a series beginning in 1962 and extending into the 1970s, and the overall presentation was "slicker," information more adroitly managed and directed toward specific types of prospective residents, from married-with-children to retirees.³⁰

Provincial or sophisticated, playground or community? Tucson businessmen accommodated diverging aims, seeking ultimately to characterize the city as all of the above. A neat cleavage fails to materialize between the Chamber of Commerce's promotion of residence and the Sunshine Climate Club's promotion of tourism; reasons to live in Tucson were often the same as reasons to visit Tucson: the climate,

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²⁸Tucson Chamber of Commerce, "Facts for Prospective Residents of Tucson," 1956, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Tucson Chamber of Commerce, "The Answer to All Your Questions about Tucson Arizona," 1962, 1964, 1968, 1971, 1974, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

cultural heritage, and Old West traditions, all available for vacations as well as weekend outings by residents. In addition, promotions aimed at prospective residents mentioned small town qualities -- slower pace of life, relaxed work environment, leisure opportunities -- as often as metropolitan sophistication. Promotional efforts appear monolithic only to the degree that "growth" is defined monolithically. The booster edifice fractures beneath this level of assumption.

A third type of promotion, with its own organizational identity, appeared in 1952. The Industrial Development Department formed specifically to recruit businesses to Tucson.³¹ The Pima County Board of Supervisors assisted the Chamber of Commerce in this effort by providing an industrial engineer to recruit "... new and diversified industries that fit into the characteristics of our community and provide service for those industries that [already] have been established."³² Tucson's effort matched, somewhat belatedly, the systematic efforts by other southwestern cities to foster industrial development during

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³¹Tucson Chamber of Commerce, "Come to the Growing Southwest to Tucson for Industry and 'A Way of Life'," 1952, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

³²Ibid.

and after World War II.³³

In 1954 the Chamber of Commerce began issuing a series of pamphlets geared toward businessmen titled, "Facts and Figures: A General Survey of Tucson and Pima County, Arizona."³⁴ The first edition described the city as an "urban area" extending "about 15 miles north-and-south and 10 miles east-and-west." The favorite slogan of the Industrial Development brochures was "Come to Tucson, for Industry and a Way of Life." The 1954 brochure described the "way of life" as "informal and always friendly," presented statistics of interest to businessmen contemplating moving to Tucson, and described cultural/environmental aspects favorable to business: "Firms that have established plants in Tucson report their employees are happy here. There is less absenteeism due to sickness..."³⁵

The healthful "way of life" advertised by the Chamber of Commerce relied on nature, albeit in a 1950s context. The favorite logo, shared by the three promotional organizations, portrayed a trademark saguaro cactus framing

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³³Nash, World War II and the West; and Lochtin, Fortress California.

³⁴Tucson Chamber of Commerce, "Facts and Figures: A General Survey of Tucson and Pima County, Arizona," 1945-1956, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

³⁵Ibid., p. 12.

the scene of a city dominated by mountains. The 1950s viewer probably accepted the atomic symbol in the "industrial" logo as a shorthand representation of "progress and technology." At least that was the hope of the Chamber of Commerce.

B. "Manufacturing Industry List," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1958.

C. "Healthful Tucson... The Sunshine City," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1956.

and a Way of Life

Prospective employers heard appeals based on metropolitan sophistication and small town friendliness. Information on housing and tax rates assured employers that workers could find decent affordable housing with modest tax burdens, resulting in lower costs of living which would justify, presumably, the payment of lower wages. Likewise employers heard references to a cultural segregation in

Tucson, based once again on the Western playground image: "Ranch living has become almost standard with Tucson executives who still are within easy driving distance of all the city's commercial and industrial areas."³⁶ A photograph in the brochure showed happy, healthy, adults enjoying outdoor activities "10 minutes from downtown."³⁷

The three wings of the Chamber of Commerce appealed to different audiences -- The Sunshine Climate Club to tourists, the Industrial Development Department to businesses and businessmen, and the Chamber of Commerce itself to prospective residents -- but the promotional efforts blended together as advertising copy and slogans were modified to suit each particular audience. The various manifestations of the Chamber of Commerce's logo illustrates the difficulty of speaking of "business," and the effort to promote "growth," in singular terms.

The representation of nature in the "diversified interests" logo portrays the mixed message sometimes unwittingly conveyed in the Chamber of Commerce's promotions. The logo summarized Tucson's reliance on "climate, cattle, cotton, and copper," each of which was

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³⁶Tucson Chamber of Commerce, "Tucson... a city, an opportunity, a way of life," 1958, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library. The brochure juxtaposed a wide array of Tucson's attributes: "climate, sun, room and low taxes."

³⁷Ibid.

portrayed within the geographic setting: the sun shines brightly over a valley containing grazing cattle, plowed fields, and a copper smelter. In the foreground is a male figure, particularly messianic, surveying the scene: a tourist, or a developer? The greatest ambiguity within the logo is directed toward nature: the sun is placed within the sulfur dioxide plume emanating from the tower of the smelter.

D. "A City of Diversified Interests," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1950.

E. Tucson Chamber of Commerce Annual Dinner brochure, 1951.

In 1954 the Chamber of Commerce launched an effort to attract high technology types of business to Tucson by

trumpeting the close working relationship between the Chamber of Commerce and local government.³⁸ "Tomorrow is

TUCSON, ARIZONA

F. "Tomorrow is Today in Tucson," 1954.

**FUTURE
ELECTRONICS CENTER
OF AMERICA**

"Today in Tucson" appeared with the atomic symbol logo and the caption: "Tucson: A City Zoned for Scientific Research."³⁹ Western hospitality was given a new twist as the Chamber of Commerce advertised the government/business partnership in Tucson:

Recently, a nationally-known scientific research company came to Tucson; found an ideal location

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³⁸Tucson boosters arrived late on the scene of industrial -- in this case, high tech -- recruitment. Lotchin described the effort of Southern California boosters from the 1920s to develop a close working relationship between local government, business, and the California Institute of Technology in order to "create the kind of interface between these sectors that later came to characterize the arms industry in Southern California." Lotchin, Fortress California, p. 98.

³⁹Tucson Chamber of Commerce, "Tomorrow is Today in Tucson," 1954, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

with a building already up. Problem: one of rezoning to allow them to move in. Within **weeks** residents of the area in cooperation with the city and county officials and the Chamber of Commerce had rezoned the area and provided additional new zoning for other areas of similar nature. Result: Tucson is a city actually **zoned** for scientific research.⁴⁰

The city's internal memorandums provide support for the Chamber of Commerce's claim of helpfulness. In 1954 the city attorney advised officials to be "liberal" in their inspections of construction sites so that "construction costs will not be unnecessarily increased."⁴¹

Chamber of Commerce members expressed pride in their leadership position within the community. The Old Pueblo Club, founded in 1907 as "a 'gentlemen's club for social purposes," fairly chortled over the political and financial prominence of its members in the community.⁴² The link between the club and the Chamber of Commerce was acknowledged in 1955: "The Old Pueblo Club might as well have been called the Old Pueblo Sunshine Climate Club... because OPC members held all the important positions."⁴³

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⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹City of Tucson, "Legal Opinions, City of Tucson, Arizona: 1952-55," No. 337, November 19, 1954, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

⁴²James F. Cooper, The O.P. Chronicle: A 75-Year History of the Old Pueblo Club (Tucson: Old Pueblo Club, 1983).

⁴³The O.P. Chronicle, 15 April 1955, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

The interchange of membership was in fact routine, and appeared in self-congratulatory announcements phrased as rhetorical slaps-on-the-back. The good-ole-boy network appeared most clearly in the reference to William F. Kimball, a former president of the Old Pueblo Club who had been elected Arizona Senate Majority Leader. The jocular tone of the account expresses self-confidence bordering on hubris:

Kimball, as majority leader, was the most powerful politician in the state, with the possible exception of the governor. But that was only a 'possible exception' in those days. Much 'law' was made at the Flame Restaurant at night. Much 'law' was made at the 20-Grand Bar during the days. Much 'law' was made on the eighth floor of the Adams Hotel at any time, day or night. The eighth floor was the headquarters of the Phelps-Dodge Mining Company's lobbyists. Some 'law,' but not much, was made on the floor of the House and Senate which seemed only to approve the 'law' made elsewhere."⁴⁴

Developers who served on zoning commissions, on planning boards, and as city managers provide a more visible interconnection between the booster organizations and local government. In 1961, for example, the O.P. Chronicle announced S. Lenwood Schorr's appointment as assistant Tucson city manager.⁴⁵ Schorr had been a member of the

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⁴⁴Ibid., April 27, 1960. Kimball was Pima County's state senator from 1940 to 1955. He retired from the legislature in 1955 after failing to gain the Democratic nomination for governor. See Arizona Daily Star, May 8, 1962, pp. A-1, A-5.

⁴⁵The O.P. Chronicle, April 12, 1961.

Pima County Planning and Zoning Commission and had been a developer in the Tucson Mountain foothills. He was hired to help formulate the city's urban renewal plan. Was this a case of a fox hired to guard the chicken coop? Concerns over potential conflicts of interest -- developers regulating development -- never materialized during Schorr's tenure. Rather, the city manager cited Schorr's experience as a developer as providing the "expertise" necessary for successful urban planning.⁴⁶

In 1970, one of Tucson's newspapers summarized the 20th century link between business and government in a laudatory article which brings 19th-century boosters to mind:

A look at the real estate business in Tucson not only reveals the growth of the city; it also mirrors a segment of the business community that is fairly typical of the courageous, pioneering and at times a bit unmanageable people who have settled this area... Real estate men traditionally have served on zoning committees, as members of school and church organizations, on civic promotion boards; in short, real estate people are where the action is.⁴⁷

The article echoed Boorstin's characterization of developers as community leaders, "gregarious individuals" possessed of boundless "community spirit." The article also described the "filling in" of Tucson's wide open spaces as

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⁴⁶S.L. Schorr interview, February 21, 1992, "Urbanization of Tucson, 1940-1990," Oral History Project, Arizona Historical Society. The city manager's endorsement of Schorr appeared in Arizona Daily Star, April 12, 1961, p. C-4.

⁴⁷"Those Wide Open Spaces Are Filling In," Tucson Citizen, October 19, 1970.

happily inevitable.⁴⁸ The newspaper shared the fundamental assumption of the developers and boosters: the health of the city required ever-expanding growth: in size, in prosperity, in sophistication.

The effort to plan for Tucson's growth -- or as later opponents to the city's expansion would claim, the effort to encourage growth -- was well established by the 1950s. The planning effort began in 1930 with the city's first zoning ordinance. In 1932 "concerned citizens" formulated the Tucson Regional Plan. In 1941 the city established a nine-member Planning and Zoning Commission, which was followed in 1943 by a joint County-City Planning Department. In 1949 the state legislature passed enabling legislation allowing county-wide zoning.⁴⁹ The federal government encouraged planning efforts in the 1949 Housing Act by providing federal financing for cities' planning efforts; it became known as "the planner's full-employment act" because it mandated that grants go only to cities with "a redevelopment

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⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Bufkin gives a full account of the development of city planning and zoning in "From Mud Village to Modern Metropolis," pp. 80-84. For a more general discussion of the rise of planning and zoning nationally, see Charles Nelson Glaab and A. Theodore Brown, A History of Urban America (3rd edition; New York: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 289-295, and Donald A. Krueckeberg, Introduction to Planning History in the United States (New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1983).

strategy that conformed to a comprehensive plan for the entire locality."⁵⁰

The "growth bureaucracy" was generally in place when the city's expansion took place. At times, however, planning efforts encountered opposition from developers who resented land-use constraints suggested by planners. Likewise, government officials lost their enthusiasm for plans when perceived as too expensive or controversial. The regional plan developed by Ladislas Segoe in the early 1940s exemplifies this ambivalence toward planned growth (the plan was completed and presented to the city council in 1945).⁵¹

Segoe was a pioneer in urban planning and a nationally recognized planning consultant based in Cincinnati.⁵² In 1940 the "concerned citizens" who had formulated the first "regional plan" in 1938 hired Segoe to professionally appraise Tucson's development.⁵³ The regional plan Segoe developed for Tucson sought to rationalize urban growth by regulating both development and developers. The plan explicitly criticized Tucson's developers: "In spite of the

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⁵⁰William C. Johnson, The Politics of Urban Planning (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1989), p. 66.

⁵¹"The Regional Plan," The City Planning and Zoning Commission, 1945, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

⁵²Krueckeberg, Introduction to Planning History, p. 301.

⁵³Bufkin, "From Mud Village to Modern Metropolis," p. 82.

state platting laws designed to ensure the continuity of streets... there are clear indications that the owners of large holdings considered their subdivisions as self-contained developments rather than parts of the larger community with which the layout of these subdivisions should be coordinated."⁵⁴ Planning professionals, such as Segoe, offered a tempered version of the optimistic assumption, viewing growth as occasionally inevitable but not always beneficial. As such, planners sometimes found themselves outside the government/business partnership promoted so assiduously by the Chamber of Commerce. Planners became "hired guns," serving at the convenience of cities, their plans utilized, compromised, or discarded at the convenience of the political leadership. Beyond indicating a fracture in the booster edifice, planners often fell completely outside the pro-government partnership.⁵⁵

The gaps and fractures within the booster structure and flaws within the business/government partnership in Tucson indicate a less than monolithic force pushing development. Nonetheless, businessmen wielded considerable influence in

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⁵⁴"The Regional Plan," p. 4.

⁵⁵Bufkin described the planners as most influential during the 1950s: "When the planner was really trusted and used by the politician was in the fifties. Today the planner is pretty much downplayed in terms of his role." In, Don Bufkin interview, July 25, 1991, "Urbanization of Tucson, 1940-1990."

the city government. After having failed in efforts to buy up property in the barrio neighborhoods south of downtown, developers successfully lobbied government agencies to declare the areas "blighted." Declaring neighborhoods "blighted" facilitated condemnation proceedings and eligibility for federal funds (urban redevelopment will be discussed in detail in chapter 3).⁵⁶ The case of "urban renewal" seems to show the partnership between government (both local and federal) and developers fully functional. Renewal plans met with vociferous resistance that caused the plans to be modified, truncated or scrapped altogether. At times the urban renewal dreadnought more closely resembled a dingy.

In general, city and county governments enthusiastically supported growth (monolithically defined), despite the occasional reluctance of the urban planners. In 1953 Tucson's city attorney, Harry L. Buchanan, submitted a progrowth legal opinion to the city manager, J. Luther Davis. Davis formerly had been Buchanan's assistant in the city attorney's office, and had himself written several progrowth legal opinions before becoming city manager.⁵⁷

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⁵⁶"The Pueblo Center Redevelopment Project," 1965, Citizen's Committee on Municipal Blight, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

⁵⁷Davis became city manager in 1953, replacing Donald P. Wolfer. Wolfer was a professional manager, formerly the city manager of Albany, Georgia, and stated after being

Resistance to annexation was the subject of Buchanan's 1953 opinion:

Every annexation is a potential lawsuit and many need only an unlitigated point upon which to hang their hats for a so-called test case, which has the effect of delaying the objective we are seeking even if we should prevail... I recognize the present annexation laws are cumbersome, but only the Legislature can correct them, which we have tried to get its members to do, so far without success. Therefore we must do the best with what they have given us.⁵⁸

Of course, annexation laws were "cumbersome" only to those seeking unlimited power to annex. The city attorney thus defined resistance to growth as legally obstructionist, a pernicious nuisance the misguided legislature failed to recognize. The following year Buchanan submitted a legal opinion to the city council explicitly stating the fundamental assumption about growth:

Is annexation of the fringe areas a matter that may be deemed expedient or necessary for the promotion and protection of the health, comfort, safety, life, welfare and property of the inhabitants of the city?

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fired that the mayor was "attempting to undermine the city manager form of government both publicly and privately." Davis was 15 years younger than Wolfer (Davis was 29, Wolfer was 44, in 1953) but perhaps more sanguine to the realities of Tucson politics: Davis started his first city job as a Democrat, but switched his registration to Republican before accepting the manager's position. The mayor and council in 1953 were staunchly Republican. By 1960, Davis had moved on to become president of Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company. See "Don Hummel, unprocessed collection," Box 1, "Annexation: South and West," Arizona Historical Society, and Arizona Daily Star, August 1, 1953, pp. A-1, A-3.

⁵⁸"Legal Opinions," No. 197, December 11, 1953.

Yes.⁵⁹

Why should the city attorney address the issue of annexation in life (and presumably, death) terms? The fundamental assumption appears in the attorney's statement, less optimistic in the face of opposition to growth, but no less certain of its rectitude. Growth was not just essential for continued expanding prosperity of the city. Growth was necessary for the city's very survival.

Tucson's mayor, Fred Emery, expressed the assumption as succinctly as anyone in 1955: "In its role as the heart of a metropolitan area, the city of Tucson itself has acquired new strength and stature. The Businesses of our community will gain by this, and as they gain, all of us will gain."⁶⁰

The mayor linked Business (the mayor's capitalization) and government together in his concept of a healthy city. In terms of the optimistic assumption, the mayor was correct to link the two, but this conflation required a monolithic view of both "business" and "growth." As the city's expansion continued and as promotional efforts proliferated, conflicting goals by businessmen of different stripes surfaced. A booster's self-interest sometimes forced him to

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⁵⁹Ibid., No. 336, November 1954.

⁶⁰Fred Emery, "A City in Action, 1951-1955, Four Years of Progress," Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

oppose "growth" -- not in terms of the fundamental assumption that said "growth" is good, but in terms of individual assessments of profit margin. Thus political resistance to specific manifestations of growth surfaced, amongst those, of course, with the power and opportunity to resist.

Tucson boosters, city government, and even the planners occasionally left out in the cold, argued for "progress." The progrowth partisans shared a weltanschauung that defined history as steadily, although at times fitfully, marching forward. Linear and dynamic assumptions defined their perspective, along with a dichotomous ordering of "nature." They defined the cosmos in terms of progressive civilization versus static, unproductive, nature. Some boosters considered "nature" (defined as flat, easily bulldozed desert) as wasted unless plowed, platted, or paved. Other boosters came to realize that even flat, easily bulldozed desert had its uses -- you could put a fence around it and make rubes pay for the pleasure of walking through it -- but even this "use" remained within the assumed virtue of individual "progress." The rationalization that boosters brought to the debate over growth made the capitalist assumption that individual profits created community prosperity. Thus businessmen could describe their

individual interests in terms of the common good.

The communalism of boosters lasted until the individual interests of businessmen dictated otherwise. Variations in promotional efforts indicated an awareness among boosters that private interests diverged within a context of shared general goals. Planners also shared a faith in "progress," but their faith was tempered by a concern for rational development which sometimes ran afoul of booster profits. Politicians trumpeted "progress" most consistently. Consensus among boosters, planners and politicians varied in completeness, but opponents were defined as universally beyond the pale. How could anyone argue against progress?

The political resistance to growth in Tucson that surfaced in the early 1950s appeared amongst those who shared the boosters' Whiggish faith in progress. Boosters themselves resisted Tucson's "growth" when that growth threatened their individual interests. Later resistance to urbanization founded on an environmental critique challenged the concept of progress more directly, but political resistance offered no such fundamental critique. It appeared more as a struggle within the booster family.

Chapter 2: Political Resistance

"The Laws Serve the Majority"

Political resistance to growth appeared among white, middle-class, suburban residents of Tucson in the 1950s. Criticism of the city's expansion became so vociferous that at one point Tucson's mayor, seeking to deflect criticism with humor, wore a suit of armor to a public hearing on annexation. The resistance never succeeded in stopping the expansion of the city, but it did succeed in obstructing growth by forcing the city and county governments to maneuver around the resistance. The progrowth forces in Tucson never lost their majority status during the 1950s, but resistance to growth remained part of the community ethos.

The fuzziness in the language surrounding urbanization -- "growth" oversimplified -- defined the resistance in many cases. Developers resisted the expansion of government, if the government was viewed to be obtrusive and a hindrance to "development." In this sense, a political conservatism bordering on libertarianism surfaced amongst those who would never question the underlying assumption that "growth" was good. Increasing profits for individual developers translated into community prosperity through the immediate impact of construction jobs, and the more

sustained influence of expanding service industries and an increasing tax base, or at least such was the claim of developers. Expanding government bureaucracy, regulatory agencies, and neighborhood activism, however, were viewed with suspicion by these same developers. The spread of Tucson over the valley floor also engendered a broader resistance based on environmental and cultural perceptions (to be discussed in Chapter 4), but the early resistance to growth arose amongst individuals or small groups of individuals with personal interests and private concerns expressed in economic and political terms. Those first to resist were residents with access to political power, who felt no qualms in asking the political system for a redress of their grievances.

Tucson's physical expansion proceeded over a bumpy road during the 1950s. The "growth bureaucracy" was generally in place when the city's expansion took place but found itself serving primarily as a forum for rancorous debate among developers, politicians, homeowners, bureaucrats, horseowners, and retirees.

Tucson's population increased 368.4 percent during the 1950s, and the area within the city limits increased almost eight fold, from 9.5 to 70.9 square miles.¹ The population

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¹Census of Population, 1960, Table 5; City of Tucson Annexation Index, pp. 3-5.

increase in Tucson mirrors the general Sunbelt shift of population after World War II. Workers, both blue collar and white collar, and their families followed defense industries and manufacturing jobs to the Sunbelt. Retirees also arrived in Tucson, pursuing an amenity-filled lifestyle. These two groups of new residents possessed potentially competing world views: the one acquisitive, seeking better prospects, expansion-minded; the other conservative, seeking a stable lifestyle, stasis-minded.²

This expansion in size and population can be more clearly understood by examining the maps and table on the following pages.

As the 1936, 1950, and 1960 maps indicate, Tucson's city limits tended to lag behind the actual extent of development in the urban area. The 1936 map shows relatively few developed areas beyond the city limits, and indeed, several undeveloped areas within the city limits. By 1950, however, the situation was completely reversed, with approximately twice as many residents of the metropolitan area living outside the city limits. The county residents (primarily white and middle class) are

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²Abbott, The New Urban America, pp. 17-18; Nash, The American West in the Twentieth Century; Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

G. "Tucson and Vicinity: 1936"

SOURCE: Bufkin, "From Mud Village to Metropolis,"
p. 80.

H. "Tucson and Vicinity: 1950"

SOURCE: Bufkin, "From Mud Village to Metropolis,"
 p. 85.

I. "Tucson and Vicinity: 1960"

SOURCE: Bufkin, "From Mud Village to Metropolis,"
p. 89.

listed as the "fringe population" in Table 1.³ The 1960 map and Table 1 show that Tucson's population increase of 167,438 over the previous decade (from 45,454 in 1950 to 212,892 in 1960) consisted of many former fringe residents as well as a large number of new residents. This recognition of the fringe element of Tucson's population increase is significant for its effect on the debate in Tucson over growth in the 1950s and 1960s. It was not a

TABLE 2: Tucson Population, 1950-1960

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>Change</u>
City Population	45,454	212,892	+ 368%
Fringe Population	77,310	21,590	- 72%
Total Population	122,764	234,482	+ 91%

question of overcrowding and a decaying urban core, as defined the "urban crisis" to many scholars in the 1960s, but rather a matter of sprawling growth and the fringe problem of the suburbs. Land-rich western cities, such as Tucson, tended to spread out rather than build up during the 1950s. Tucson's effort to "fill in" vacant areas within the city boundaries ran afoul of cheaper land and building costs beyond the incorporated area, leading to low density,

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³Census of Population, 1960, Tables 11, 12; Bufkin, "From Mud Village to Modern Metropolis," p. 84.

sprawling, development.

Terms such as "fringe problem" and "new residents" must be used carefully. "New residents" might be expected to cause a mounting tension among established residents, especially if racial, ethnic, or class differences arose among the new and established residents.⁴ But in the case of Tucson, many of the "new residents" added to the city's population by 1960 were suburban residents living within the metropolitan area at the time of the previous census. Likewise, discussions of the "fringe problem" in the 1950s, reviewed by later-day urban historians, might be misinterpreted as discussions of a new problem, perhaps unsuspected, or in some way newly urgent. The phenomena of fringe growth and population decentralization were neither new nor surprising to urban planners in Tucson in the 1950s.

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⁴Tucson's expansion to the east and north encompassed mostly middle class subdivisions. Ethnic neighborhoods, mostly Hispanic, remained in the barrios near the original townsite and in the area of the City of South Tucson. Zoning and annexation disputes in the 1950s were generally free of ethnic or racial overtones. As Sheridan explained in Los Tucsonenses, "enclavement" of Mexican residents resulted from socially motivated segregation, not politically or legally mandated segregation. The "benign" environment in Tucson for Mexicans resulted largely from the vibrant cultural life that existed within Mexican neighborhoods. But Mexicans were not restricted to these neighborhoods: "... the 'barrioization' of the city's Mexican population was rarely the result of restrictive covenants, which did exclude Blacks, Orientals, and Native Americans from many Anglo neighborhoods." (p. 251) Also, affluent Mexicans were free to move out of the barrios: "Members of the Mexican elite could live where they chose..." (p. 252)

Contemporary professional journals debated solutions to the problem of decentralization, and Tucson planners and politicians drew on these sources to defend their reliance on annexation.⁵ Not simply a "common sense" solution, supporters of annexation defended the policy as professionally "rational," which placed opponents of annexation further into the rhetorical realm of the wierd.

The spread of the city to the east during the 1940s and 1950s proceeded unencumbered by topographical barriers, and the center of population of the city moved steadily eastward, sometimes rivaling the advance of the city limits. The planning bureaucracy of the city, the Board of Realtors, and the Chamber of Commerce all worked actively to encourage Tucson's "growth." Motivations included the general desire for profit by the developers and a genuine concern for orderly progress on the part of the city bureaucrats and politicians.⁶ The desire to annex was accompanied by city-sponsored efforts to upgrade the utility and transportation infrastructure.⁷ City finances also stood to gain from

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⁵For example, the city manager and city attorney referred to articles in defense of annexation by John C. Bollens, "Fringe Area Conditions and Relations," Public Management (March 1950): 50-54, and Bollens, "City Annexation Programs and Policies," Public Management (April 1950): 76-79.

⁶Bufkin, "From Mud Village to Modern Metropolis," p. 84.

⁷Minutes of the Tucson City Council, Meeting of December 3, 1953, City Clerk's office, Tucson (microfilm).

annexations, since the city's share of state tax revenue was based on its official population.⁸

A sizable, vocal, persistent minority opposed the city's expansion throughout the 1950s. These residents -- individualistic, libertarian, mostly disorganized -- opposed annexations, zoning ordinances, and changes in city and county plans. More than simply a "no growth" reaction, the resistance targeted both the physical size of the city and the increasingly arbitrary nature of the city government. This resistance to Tucson's expansion originated in private interests that crossed party lines. The record of virtually every city council meeting during the 1950s, whether controlled by Democrats or Republicans, contains some reference to rezoning requests, neighborhood plan revisions, or inquiry into the possibility of expanded city services, with each request for action accompanied by the commensurate protest demanding a halt. This debate over the desired nature of the community and its government included those thousands of fringe residents who already possessed keenly felt interests and strong opinions. Among the most noticeable of their opinions -- expressed in letters to the editor, petitions to city government, legal suits and referendum elections -- was a distrust of governmental

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⁸Ibid., Meeting of April 13, 1953.

authority. This libertarian distrust of authority motivated a wide range of complaint, protest and resistance by "individualists." A 1951 study of annexation in Tucson described the concerns of fringe residents: "Just as fringe residents usually play the dominant role in initiating annexation movements, so they usually are in the forefront of opposition to specific annexation proposals because of their fear of increased taxes, city zoning and building regulations (though some desire the latter), and of losing their identity..."⁹ The "amenities of suburban life" defined this fringe identity. Amenities included single family detached homes, better schools, open space, and freedom from governmental authority: "Some individualists will go a long way to avoid the more adequate and therefore more severe city police protection. The police patrol car, while a symbol of protection to some, is an object of suspicion and annoyance to others."¹⁰

The fragmented, contentious, and individualistic opposition targeted, for example, zoning and plan revisions. In April 1953, after the city council revoked several

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⁹Eloise McCoy Emmert, "An Annexation Study of Tucson, Arizona" (Masters Thesis, University of Arizona, 1951), p. 53.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 4. Emmert cited the reference to individualist suspicion of city police protection from a report by Joseph E. Chamberlin on annexations in Colorado Springs, sponsored by the Colorado Springs Chamber of Commerce, March 1950.

building permits in recently annexed areas, Sidney Szerlip, president of the Real Estate Board, cautioned the city council that "If we continue (this) way, we realtors will have to warn our clients that they can't depend upon zoning in areas about to come into the city."¹¹ In another vein, Mrs. Margaret McClain protested the construction of a city playground in her recently annexed neighborhood. McClain argued that the presence of children violated deed restrictions and that young people caused vandalism.¹² The ownership of livestock (primarily horses) became another issue as fringe areas fell under the purview of city regulations. "Grandfather Clause" protection for existing property uses generally failed to assuage the emotional concerns of the horse owners.¹³ Certainly the president of the Real Estate Board was not expressing a desire for a "no growth" community; rather, he sought the clarification of apparently arbitrary zoning decisions. On the other hand, horse owners, and perhaps McClain, may have been comfortable voicing a desire for "no growth." Clearly a divergence existed within the community resistance between those who sought to limit the physical growth of the city and those

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¹¹Arizona Daily Star, June 2, 1953, p. B-1.

¹²Ibid., December 16, 1952, p. A-4.

¹³Ray Leon, City of Tucson Annexation Coordinator, interview with the author, Tucson, Az., July 17, 1989.

who sought to limit the centralization of the city's government. Realtors sometimes found themselves in the awkward position of opposing government actions that were designed by city planners to foster rapid, far-reaching development. Two of Tucson's quintessential developers, Roy Drachman and Evo DeConcini, found themselves at different times opposing annexations of their undeveloped land, both arguing that such premature annexations would actually hinder development.¹⁴

By far the most visible early opposition movement, including both no-growth and anti-government forces, came in the countywide zoning fight of 1952-1953. Opponents of the proposed countywide zoning ordinance -- Lesley Allen, a local attorney, emerged as the nominal leader of the opponents -- numbered in the thousands, mounted petition drives and court fights and campaigned in a referendum election against the combined forces of city and county government, leaders of the business community, both city newspapers, and the League of Women Voters. That opponents of countywide zoning were eventually swamped in the referendum election is not surprising. The pro-growth

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¹⁴Arizona Daily Star, June 2, 1953, p. B-1; Roy Drachman to "Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council," October 29, 1953; Annexations: 1905-1968 (microfilm of annexation documents), City Clerk's Office, City Hall, Tucson.

forces in the city and county never lost their control of the mechanisms of power in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the extent and intensity of the resistance during the countywide zoning fight belies any "consensus" depiction of Tucson's growth in the early 1950s.

Prior to 1949 Arizona counties lacked the statutory authority to enact countywide zoning ordinances. The state legislature passed enabling legislation in June 1949, and Pima County, of which Tucson was the county seat, was the first to enact a countywide zoning ordinance.¹⁵ Drafts of the ordinance percolated through the county's planning and zoning bureaucracy, and public hearings began in 1951. Opposition to the proposed ordinance sprang up immediately. Supporters of the countywide ordinance (city and county government, planners, the Chamber of Commerce) described the proposal as necessary to ensure orderly growth and responsible development. Opponents "roundly attacked" the ordinance and offered their own local-option alternative.¹⁶ Local-option zoning, if enacted, would establish a system allowing property owners in areas as small as 160 acres to enact their own building and land use regulations. Countywide supporters portrayed the local-option alternative

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¹⁵Pima County's effort to adopt countywide zoning is summarized in Arizona Daily Star, February 5, 1953, pp. A-1, B-1.

¹⁶Ibid., February 26, 1953, p. A-5.

as tantamount to no zoning at all or, possibly worse, a chaotic hodgepodge of conflicting zoning. Local-option supporters protested the arbitrary extension of government regulation into the uses of private property in the county and expressed concern over the effect of suburban development on land prices outside the city limits. Land prices in fringe areas increased as development proceeded into fringe areas, causing tax assessments to increase -- a development that threatened fixed income residents. These residents, according to local-option supporters, were being forced to sell their property, admittedly for a tidy profit but without the opportunity to move onto an equivalent parcel of land near the city.¹⁷

Whereas supporters of the countywide proposal generally had a firm organizational identity, backed by the city and county government, the Board of Realtors and the League of Women Voters, supporters of the local-option alternative were individual property owners, loosely confederated in the League for Zoning by Local-Option Only (LZLOO). Lesley Allen, a local attorney and chairman of LZLOO, expressed the League's view that the countywide ordinance was being "crammed down the public's throat," and that the matter should be submitted to the public for a final decision.¹⁸

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¹⁷Ibid., February 5, 1953, pp. A-1, B-1.

¹⁸Ibid., February 26, 1953, p. A-5.

Initial resistance to the countywide proposal took the form of protest at the forty-two public hearings held by the planning commission. The Board of Supervisors considered the countywide ordinance on February 25, 1952, but, after a tumultuous meeting, postponed the vote for thirty days. Because tempers and opinions remained unsettled, the supervisors did not adopt the ordinance until August 6, 1952.¹⁹

In the meantime LZLOO had circulated petitions and gathered more than 8,000 signatures to force a referendum election offering the local-option alternative. Supporters of the countywide ordinance attempted to cancel the referendum in a court suit, arguing that LZLOO had gathered insufficient valid signatures. A seven-day trial in district court followed in which 147 witnesses testified both for and against the referendum. Finally, four days before the scheduled election, the court validated 5,384 signatures, a sufficient number to force the election.²⁰

As the court maneuvering proceeded, supporters of the countywide ordinance mounted a campaign to assure that, should the election come about, local-option zoning would be defeated. One month before the election, which was

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¹⁹Ibid., August 7, 1952, p. A-1.

²⁰The court fight is summarized in Arizona Daily Star, February 7, 1953, p. A-1.

scheduled for February 10, 1953, the League of Women Voters announced its intention to support the ordinance.²¹ The League set up booths in the lobbies of banks, distributed leaflets, and scheduled pro-countywide speakers for its regular meetings. One week before the election the Arizona Daily Star ran front page banner editorials supporting the proposed ordinance. Two days before the election the newspaper printed sample ballots on the front page with a "no" vote on local-option prominently displayed. Countywide zoning defeated the local-option alternative 4,872 to 2,176.²²

Given the organizational sophistication and general weight of support for the countywide ordinance, the defeat of the local-option alternative was not surprising. That such an effort to defeat local-option was deemed necessary, however, indicated that urban planners and promoters in the city and county were aware of the depth of anti-growth and anti-government sentiment within the community. Election returns from the fringe areas surrounding the city limits showed that the local-option alternative received majority support in six precincts and healthy minority support in

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²¹The campaign against local-option is summarized in Arizona Daily Star, January 11, 1953, p. A-1.

²²Ibid., February 11, 1953, p. A-1.

eleven others.²³ For example, the Flowing Wells precinct, composed mostly of middle-class fringe residents to the north of the city, approved the local-option alternative. The neighboring Amphitheater precinct narrowly defeated it. The degree to which this local-option support indicated no-growth or anti-government sentiment is unknown, but neither possibility could have been comforting to expansionist politicians and bureaucrats.

Annexation protests in the 1950s presented city leaders with a similar scenario. Residents protested the first four annexations in 1953 at the city council meeting enacting each annexation. In all, residents protested six of the first eight annexations. Beyond these protests of specific annexation plans, the very process of annexation virtually assured that ambivalence would characterize the attitude of many of the new city residents, since annexation laws only required the approval of the owners of fifty-one percent of the assessed valuation in the area.²⁴ The owners of forty-

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²³Local-option polled 31 percent countywide in forty-five precincts in the fringe areas. Of these forty-five precincts, local-option polled over 50 percent in six, from 45-50 percent in five, from 40-45 percent in four, and from 35-40 percent in two, for a total of seventeen precincts with a minimum of 35 percent support for the local-option alternative. Arizona Daily Star, February 11, 1953, p. A-1.

²⁴Current annexation laws require both the approval of the owners of fifty-one percent of the assessed valuation and the approval of fifty-one percent of the population.

nine percent of the assessed valuation, perhaps a majority of the population in the area, could find themselves annexed despite their active opposition. Small annexations involving few property owners were most likely to avoid protests.

Four individuals owned the ten-acre parcel that became the Bunnell addition in 1952, but no protest materialized since all four approved the annexation. Three other special cases involved no protest. These were a "railroad corridor" annexed in March 1955 to be used to display a Southern Pacific Railroad locomotive donated to the city, an annexation requested by the Sisters of St. Mary's Hospital in 1956, and the South Fourth Avenue addition in March 1957, which facilitated a street realignment.²⁵

The first annexation in 1953 was more typical. The North Campbell addition, to the northeast, entered the city with the approval of sixty to sixty-five percent of the property owners (accounting for 51.5 percent of the assessed valuation). Morris F. Baughman, a pro-annexation resident of the area, explained to the city council that the approval of sixty to sixty-five percent of the property owners was necessary because several large property owners in the area opposed the annexation. Once the owners of fifty-one percent of the property valuation approved, opposition to

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²⁵The city's annexation policies and protests during the 1950s are described in Minutes of the Tucson City Council.

the annexation became futile. In this scenario the solicitation and coordination of support for annexation became critical. The city council commended Baughman and R.R. Guthrie, the city's right-of-way agent, for their work in coordinating the annexation.²⁶ In later years the city appropriated funds for the hiring and training of persons to circulate annexation petitions, and Guthrie became even more involved in the solicitation of annexations. Conversely, opponents of the annexation criticized the city's agents for making false promises to lure residents into signing annexation petitions. Guthrie and Baughman, utilizing documentation provided by the city and published in proannexation editorials in the Arizona Daily Star, maintained that property taxes would actually decrease by six dollars per year in the annexed area. Agents also promised "free" garbage collection and regular police protection. Residents of the targeted area, including retired dentist, Nathan O. Lynn, maintained that property taxes would actually increase thousands of dollars. They also questioned the ability of the city to extend city services to thousands of new residents when city services were already strained to the breaking point.²⁷

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²⁶Minutes of the Tucson City Council, Meeting of March 2, 1953.

²⁷Arizona Daily Star, April 15, 1953, p. A-1; April 18, 1953, p. B-14.

As the city expanded to the east in 1953 annexation protests generally involved requests by property owners to be removed or excluded from an area to be annexed. Property owners expressed concern over higher tax rates and more rigorous building restrictions in the city. The uncertainty of zoning regulations and the impact of annexation on utility costs and service delivery also factored into opposition.²⁸ As the city's role in soliciting annexations became more obvious court challenges arose. Lynn filed the first legal suit in July 1953, charging that the city had made false statements to residents to induce them to sign annexation petitions. Lynn also claimed that the city's valuation figures were fraudulent. His court challenge failed, but echoes of Lynn's charges reappeared in later annexation protests.²⁹

In October 1953 Gordon Canning protested the inclusion of his Ocotillo Park subdivision in the Desert Highland addition. Canning's lawyer submitted an anti-annexation

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²⁸Emmert, "An Annexation Study of Tucson, Arizona," pp. 3-4. Concern over garbage service appeared in a 1953 letter-to-the-editor by Nathan O. Lynn: "El Encanto Estates was annexed. Owners woke up to the fact that the city refused to collect (garbage) unless the cans were waiting at the side of the street. To leave unsightly cans in front of their property or be compelled twice a week to carry them back and forth proved too much for many owners who reverted to paying a private collector." Lynn's letter reiterated the theme that taxes increased in annexed areas, but service declined. Arizona Daily Star, April 18, 1953, p. B-14.

²⁹Arizona Daily Star, July 2, 1953, p. B-1.

petition to the city council and, echoing Lynn's charge, questioned the valuation figures on the city's petitions. Canning's protest also failed, and yet the message to the city seemed clear: sticky resistance would greet any sizable annexation.³⁰

The Country Club Manor addition later that year engendered protest from a different angle. John V. Crosby, a property owner in the area, protested the annexation due to the lack of firm boundaries of the annexed area. The city maintained that the final boundaries of annexed areas could be changed after the annexation petition signatures had been gathered, thus extending or limiting the area to be annexed. Crosby's lawyer argued that only the property of those who had signed the petitions should be annexed. Crosby's protest also failed.³¹

The city accomplished only one annexation in 1954, and that came after the city took drastic action to assure its physical expansion. Using the "emergency clause" of its "Home rule charter power," the city council in November passed Ordinance 1532, providing for the establishment of

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³⁰Minutes of the Tucson City Council, Meeting of October 5, 1953. The anti-annexation petition itself is nonexistent; only the reference to it remains in the meeting minutes.

³¹Arizona Daily Star, Jan. 8, 1954, p. A-2.

its own standards for the annexation of "contiguous areas." The ordinance was necessary from the council's point of view because of recent changes by the Arizona legislature in state annexation laws. The amendments required cities to include the "personal property" of utility companies when tabulating property valuations in areas to be annexed and also increased the number of instances in which cities were required to purchase utility companies (mostly private water companies) outright. The legislature went out of its way to protect the interests of privately owned "municipal water companies" in 1954 and 1955.³² According to City Manager J. Luther Davis (the former assistant city attorney), the legislature's action made it impossible for Tucson to comply with the state law "as it is now written."³³

The city attacked the new annexation law on two fronts.

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³²In 1954 Senate Bill 107 -- the "tin pipe" bill -- forbid cities from competing with a private water company if the company in question was providing adequate service as certified by the state corporation commission. The bill also required cities to allow the courts to establish the fair market value of utilities when cities exercised their right of eminent domain. In 1955 the legislature reinforced the legal standing of private utilities by requiring cities to fork over court-mandated payments in a "timely" fashion. If cities were late or obstructionist, then they were forbidden from pursuing acquisition of the utilities for three years. J. Morris Richards, History of the Arizona State Legislature, Vol. 12, 1953-1954, Part 3 (Phoenix: Arizona Legislative Council, Arizona Department of Library, Archives and Public Records, 1990), pp. 125-126; Vol. 13, 1955-1956, Part 1, p. 130.

³³Minutes of the Tucson City Council, Meeting of November 15, 1954.

First, Tucson, under the auspices of the Arizona Municipal League, sought changes in the new annexation law, especially modification of the so-called "tin-pipe bill," that required the outright purchase of utilities. Second, arguing that the county assessor and the State Tax Commission "have not the force or funds" to provide the city with personal property valuations for the utilities, the city passed Ordinance 1532. The city still required the signatures of the owners of half the real and personal property within the area to be annexed but excluded the personal property of public utilities. The Parkside annexation, enacted immediately after the passage of Ordinance 1532, was completed only after the personal property of the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company was removed from consideration.³⁴

Ordinance 1532 significantly eased the process of annexation for the city, not only by eliminating the personal property of utilities, but by allowing the city to establish its own standards for annexation. Of course, to the opponents of annexation, the ordinance simply reaffirmed the image of the city's government as arbitrary and obtrusive.

The Southside annexation in 1956 illustrated the fully developed use of Ordinance 1532. On April 26, Mayor Don

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³⁴Ibid.

Hummel (a progrowth Democrat who had replaced Fred Emery, a progrowth Republican, as mayor in 1955) called a special meeting of the city council to announce the annexation of 1,600 acres of industrial property on the south side of Tucson. No previous public announcement about annexation plans in the area had been made. Mayor Hummel stated, "The Council prefers to announce its programs in advance, but we departed from this policy because of the importance to Tucson's future." The threat to Tucson's future appeared in the form of the City of South Tucson's expansion program to the east. Businessmen had formed "South Tucson" as a separate municipality in 1936 to avoid annexation by the City of Tucson. In 1956 the City of South Tucson had announced its own expansion program to the east, which Mayor Hummel described as so troublesome: "The effect of this would be to put the town of South Tucson between (The City of Tucson) and all of the industrial sites... that are available in the area... It was important that we not allow the southward expansion (of The City of Tucson) to be interrupted." The legality of the annexation was based, Hummel said, on the "personal assurances" of the city's right-of-way agent, R.R. Guthrie.³⁵ Such reassurances, it can be imagined, did not assuage the concerns of anti-growth and anti-government forces in Tucson. South Tucson

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³⁵Ibid., Meeting of April 26, 1956.

residents, in the meantime, accused the city of "hi-jacking" the area, and annexing "with a gun."³⁶ The City of Tucson's attorney Harold Neubauer defended the annexation as legal and binding, but apologized to the southside residents for the surprise move: "The city has not used such methods previously and does not intend to do so in the future."³⁷ Ultimately the annexation faced only rhetorical opposition. South Tucson leaders recognized that the prospective legal challenge would be long and expensive, and beyond their means. (South Tucson's role in the resistance to Tucson's expansion will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3).

Fewer in number but much larger in scope, annexations in the last half of the decade began to resemble eminent domain proceedings, irrespective of Neubauer's assurances. The Southside example was repeated. Affidavits by R.R. Guthrie replaced petitions and valuation percentages disappeared from the public record. The single annexation in 1957 (the South Fourth Avenue street realignment) appeared on the public record as "... presented and read for the first time... declared passed and adopted and signed by

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³⁶Ethnically, South Tucson was predominantly Hispanic, but the businessmen and residents opposing the City of Tucson's annexation were mostly Anglo. This situation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

³⁷Arizona Daily Star, May 5, 1956, p. A-7.

the Mayor..."³⁸ Residents Bob and Mary Barber and Rose Costano protested the 445-acre Freedom Homes annexation in 1958. They requested the removal of their forty acres from the annexation. Regardless of the protest, the city adopted the annexation with the same cut-and-dried procedure.³⁹

The large annexations completed in 1955-1956 created a new problem for city planners: the size of the additions proved to be "a bit indigestible."⁴⁰ The needs of the new additions strained city services, and the city required some time to catch up. Another factor in the 1957-1958 lull in annexations was the clearly understood resistance to annexation of northside neighbor-hoods -- on the basis of development, population, and topography, the next logical area to be annexed. Bitter protest had accompanied the Winterhaven annexation, north of the city, in 1956. At one point Mayor Hummel had worn a suit of armor -- tongue in cheek -- to an annexation meeting in an effort to deflect

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³⁸Minutes of the Tucson City Council, Meeting of March 4, 1957.

³⁹Ibid., Meeting of April 7, 1958. Tucson's archives contain no petitions or affidavits for these annexations. The "working papers" of these annexations were perhaps deemed peripheral and not saved when documents were placed on microfilm. Or, as Tucson's annexation coordinator suggested in 1989, petitions may never have existed in the first place. Ray Leon, interview with the author.

⁴⁰Ibid., Meeting of December 5, 1955.

the criticism of angry residents. The Mayor's sense of humor was sorely tested as angry residents -- the "vociferous majority" of 400 in attendance -- accused the city of attempting a "tax grab."⁴¹

The wrenching Winterhaven annexation foreshadowed the battle over the northside Amphitheater and Flowing Wells neighborhoods. The city's continued effort to expand northward dominated newspaper headlines in 1959 in a manner similar to the countywide versus local-option fight of 1952-1953. Radio talk shows broadcast loud comment, mostly negative. The mayor and council even acknowledged the existence of resistance in their announcement of the Amphitheater annexation plan: "There will be many rumors adverse to annexation circulated by those opposed to it."⁴²

The resistance to annexation involved lawsuits on both sides, charges of fraud, and a countermove by the Amphitheater, Flowing Wells, and Freehaven neighborhoods to incorporate as separate, independent communities. The presence of a Tucson Gas and Electric plant on the north side further complicated the city's efforts. The city

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⁴¹Arizona Daily Star, January 7, 1956, p. A-7.

⁴²Mayor Hummel made reference to a KOLD radio show in 1959: "The City is not given a fair chance on these programs -- it seems to be slanted in favor of the anti-annexation element." In Don Hummel, Box 1, "Annexation -- North and East" (uncatalogued material, Arizona Historical Society).

finally accomplished the annexation in a manner reminiscent of the Southside addition three years earlier. The Arizona Daily Star noted: "Moving with feverish haste, the Council took in the huge area (over 20 square miles) immediately after the County Board of Supervisors denied three petitions seeking incorporation elections that would have delayed annexation by nearly two years (beyond the next census). The Council, poised for the possible denial by the Supervisors, went into session only seconds after the incorporation moves were denied..."⁴³

The council issued a prepared statement explaining its hurried action, once again speaking of a threat to Tucson's future.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the former fringe residents continued to resist. The familiar pattern of legal suits followed, along with a petition to the city council signed by "about fifty persons."⁴⁵ Mayor Hummel viewed the court challenge as particularly obstructionist, since it interfered with the city's ability to the float bonds necessary to finance improvements in the annexed area: "This is no fault whatsoever of the Mayor and Council or of anyone in the City but must be laid directly at the door of the people who have

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⁴³Arizona Daily Star, March 27, 1959, p. A-1.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Don Hummel, "Annexation -- North and East."

challenged the legality of the City annexation."⁴⁶

Hummel criticized opponents of annexation for their lack of civic-mindedness, accusing them of allowing their own self-interest to interfere with their loyalty to the city. Despite his repeated efforts to engender more community spirit, i.e. pro-annexation spirit, opposition persisted. At least in one case, however, Hummel came to understand the resistance. Tucson businessman, Paul Robinson, had supported the city's expansion through 1959, but then had voiced opposition to the city's next annexation in 1960. Hummel initially presumed that Robinson's opposition was motivated by crass self-interest, since Robinson owned a water company in the area to be annexed. Not so, as Hummel came to understand:

After a full discussion of our differences, it was revealed that Mr. Robinson's opposition was based not on the ownership of a water company, but on Tucson's recent increase in water rates. He felt that city officials must have known that the water rates would have to be increased prior to the annexation of 1959 and that the failure to acknowledge this necessity for an increase was a breach of faith... Unfortunately, in our haste to complete annexation within the April 1 deadline, we did not take time to sit down and discuss these matters with Mr. Robinson and others similarly situated. As the City spokesman, I must take the major responsibility for the misunderstanding.⁴⁷

Hummel's apology to Robinson came after the

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⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Don Hummel, "Annexation -- South and West."

Amphitheater opponents' legal challenge had failed. The city's successful annexation of the area brought 70,000 fringe residents into the city, some of them unwillingly.⁴⁸ Although difficult to quantify, a mark of the continued independence of the area is the persistence of Amphitheater and Flowing Wells in maintaining their own school districts and water systems. According to annexation coordinator Ray Leon, the area still buzzed with animosity toward Tucson's city government into the 1980s.⁴⁹

In 1960 the city accomplished the last of its great annexations -- twenty-five square miles to the southwest, abutting the San Xavier Indian Reservation. This area was sparsely populated, but still resistance appeared (Paul Robinson, for example). Hummel overcame the resistance so efficiently even Republicans approved, as one noted in a letter to the mayor: "It is hard to understand why people want to fight this annexation, but under your term you have done an excellent job."⁵⁰ After the Southwest annexation

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⁴⁸An early indication of the north sides' independence appears in the countywide zoning vote when Flowing Wells approved the local-option alternative, and Amphitheater narrowly defeated it. Petitions, either supporting or opposing the annexations, would help determine the weight of opinion on either side of the annexation question but, unfortunately, are nonexistent.

⁴⁹Interview with Ray Leon.

⁵⁰Don Hummel, "Annexation -- South and West," letter from Jack Newman to Mayor Don Hummel, March 19, 1960.

the city reverted to its previous pattern of many small annexations.⁵¹

Opposition to the expansion of Tucson continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In the traditional sense of opposition, the affluent Casas Adobes and Santa Catalina Foothills areas resisted annexation into the 1980s.⁵² In another vein, the 1970s saw the election of "controlled growth" supervisors and councilmen under the leadership of Ron Asta, who served on the Board of Supervisors from 1972 to 1976. The "Astacrat" movement was short-lived, however, with Asta losing his reelection bid and three controlled-growth councilmen losing a recall election in 1977.⁵³ Despite these setbacks, the controlled growth movement indicated the ongoing concern in Tucson over the nature of the community. The debate continued in the 1980s, and Tucson's contentious elements became most commonly visible in a proliferation of "neighborhood associations." Zoning changes and alterations in city or county neighborhood plans presently led to effective grass roots political mobilization, a tactic attempted in the 1950s but rarely

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⁵¹City of Tucson Annexation Index, p. 5.

⁵²Sonnichsen, Tucson, p. 283.

⁵³Arizona Daily Star, November 3, 1976, p. A-1; January 1, 1977, p. A-1.

accomplished with any effect. Tactical sophistication evolved to new heights in the 1980s, but the resistance itself was nothing new.

Clearly, during the 1950s, the majority view in Tucson supported urban expansion, but this majority should not be characterized monolithically, ignoring the significant minority in the community that opposed both expanding urbanization and the government that supported it. Likewise, the resisting minority itself should not be categorized in oversimplistic terms as knee-jerk protestors or harmless community cranks. The debate over expansion in Tucson, carried out in the language of petition drives and annexation protests, involved a fundamental debate over the desired nature of the community and, as such, carried with it as many potential resolutions as there were participants in the debate. The debate continues today.

The 1950s seem to suffer a lingering classification -- at least in urban studies -- as a period of consensus and cooperation beyond that recognized by the participants in urbanization. A statement by J. Luther Davis -- city manager, former assistant city attorney, progrowth partisan -- illustrates the awareness of diverse opinions and the dilemma such diversity presented for local government: "The majority of the people in Arizona

obviously live in the urban areas, that is, the city and the areas surrounding the city. Phoenix and Tucson have found that the residents in the surrounding areas, on the whole, want annexation, but that others appear to be opposed to annexation. The question is then presented: Are the laws designed for and do they serve the majority of the people of Arizona?"⁵⁴

As annexations proceeded into the 1950s laws clearly supported the majority will, but minority opposition was always present. Annexation protests to the east and north left white, middle-class, suburban residents with a "minority" identity akin to ethnic residents more typically described as politically powerless. Politicians and boosters expressed a confident paternalism toward these recalcitrant residents. A faith in the virtues of "growth" united the political majority.

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⁵⁴Memorandum, City Manager of Tucson to Mayor and Council, May 10, 1954, in "Annexations: 1905-1968."

Chapter 3: Ethnic Resistance

"The Wrong Side of the Tracks"

The first successful opposition to Tucson's expansion appeared in South Tucson in the late 1930s, and in the southside barrio neighborhoods in the 1950s and 1960s. The early resistance in South Tucson, more purely political in nature (annexation resistance), occurred in areas with a majority of Hispanic residents, but generally without Hispanic participation. The later resistance was both politically and ethnically motivated. Political conservatives opposed the "federal" aspects of urban renewal. Hispanic residents opposed urban renewal plans that targeted their neighborhoods for destruction.

Easily recognizable within Tucson are the industrial and commercial regions, the old "downtown," ethnic neighborhoods, and the inevitable bedroom developments, each region replete with its own particular sense of community identity. Variations occur along socio-economic lines, from the haunts of the unemployed poor to the playgrounds of the exclusively hoi polloi. Tucsonans, at least since the 1950s, recognized "South Tucson" to define ethnic and class divisions, site of good Mexican food, dog racing and poverty. At times boosters found the cultural variations

pleasing: Tucson's affectionate sobriquet, trumpeting its Indo-Hispanic heritage, is "Old Pueblo." In 1950, eighteen Tucson businesses, by no means restricted to the south side, labeled themselves "Old Pueblo..."¹ The poverty of the barrios certainly pleased Tucsonans less than the city's happily casual lifestyle, but given the geographic enclavement of living patterns in Tucson, residents were able conveniently to ignore the less palatable aspects of the Old Pueblo: "dirt, disease and delinquency," as described by Mayor Hummel in 1957.²

Tucsonans also recognize other regions within the city. "The foothills" describes the residential area in the foothills of the Santa Catalina mountains to the north of the city. Mountains ring Tucson, however, and foothills containing residential developments also lie to the west and east. Why then should only one set of foothills be recognized as a definable community within the larger metropolitan entity? The answer for "the foothills" lies in definitions of both physical and cultural environment ("lifestyle," to be discussed in Chapter 4). Definitions of

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¹"Telephone Directory, March 1950, For Tucson" (Tucson: Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 1950), Special Collections, University of Arizona Library. In 1992, fifty-two businesses called themselves "Old Pueblo..." The White and Yellow Pages, August 1992/1993" (Tucson: US West Direct).

²"A Workable Program for Urban Renewal, 1957," City of Tucson, Special Collections, University of Arizona, p. 2.

class and ethnicity apply to "South Tucson," but in the same sense as the foothills, at times inappropriately. How can Tucson market its Indo-Hispanic past affectionately as the "Old Pueblo," while still considering "South Tucson" somehow to embody, culturally, the wrong side of the tracks?

Tucsonans pride themselves on the harmonious mixture of cultures in their history. As Thomas Sheridan described in Los Tucsonenses, Mexican Americans in Tucson suffered from segregation and economic manipulation by Anglos just as occurred in other Southwestern cities, but Tucson's Hispanics suffered from fewer political and cultural disabilities at the hands of Anglos. Although no Hispanic was elected mayor after the 1870s, and few Hispanics appeared in governmental service, social conditions remained relatively benign for Hispanics, especially when compared with communities in Texas and California.³ Hispanics with wealth and property could escape the barrio neighborhoods if they chose to, and were accorded status within the business community. As Sheridan explained: "Members of the Mexican elite could live where they chose, and several of these families like the Ronstadts and the Jacomes became part of

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³Sheridan in Los Tucsonenses argues that the gradual increase in Anglo population, rather than the flood of Anglos that entered Texas and California after U.S. acquisition, along with the persistent presense of a Mexican elite with strong ties to Sonora, created in Tucson a relatively benign environment for Mexicans.

the city's business and political power structure."⁴

Nonetheless, the dominant Anglo culture limited the general Hispanic population's opportunities for acquiring wealth and property by confining Hispanics to lower paying, blue-collar types of occupations. The geographic segregation of the barrios also maintained the distance between the general Hispanic population and the dominant Anglo culture. Whether or not scholars agree with Sheridan's depiction of Tucson exceptionalism, it is clear that Tucsonans would like to believe in it. Tucsonans gather annually for a celebration of the city's cultural diversity at "Tucson Meet Yourself," an outdoor fair of ethnic food and music. On the surface at least, Tucson's self-image is one of tolerance.

The "Old Pueblo" nickname symbolizes Tucson's cultural heritage, Indian and Hispanic. The specific region within the city most Old-Pueblo-like is the area surrounding "downtown," or the Central Business District, in the vicinity of the original townsite, and the barrio areas to the south and west. Tucson also harbors a legally separate municipality within its borders: The City of South Tucson, approximately one-square-mile situated slightly to the south of downtown Tucson. The City of Tucson completely surrounds

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⁴Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, p. 252. An example of the Hispanic presence in the business elite was Carlos Ronstadt's election as president of the exclusive Old Pueblo Club in 1946-1947, in James F. Cooper, The Old Pueblo Chronicle.

the City of South Tucson. Chronicling the ethnic resistance to urbanization in Tucson requires a recognition of these two regional entities within the city, one political (The City of South Tucson), the other cultural (barrios).

The expected political powerlessness that so often accompanies economic hardship failed to materialize in South Tucson and the barrios. The first successful political resistance to Tucson's growth occurred in South Tucson. The first successful neighborhood resistance also occurred in the south, not in a middle-class, affluent, suburban development resisting annexation, but in a barrio neighborhood resisting urban redevelopment. Tucson's city government labeled the barrios as "blighted." The so-called blighted resisted, preserving their neighborhoods, shaping in the process the renewal plan as it finally appeared.

The City of South Tucson incorporated in 1936 as the City of Tucson attempted to annex the area. Southside businessmen and residents, mostly Anglo, fearing the higher taxes and more stringent building codes that would accompany annexation, moved to forestall the annexation by incorporating as a separate municipality.⁵ The incorporation vote by residents of the area passed 52 to 35.

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⁵John Bret Harte, "A Feisty Town Grows Up," Tucson Citizen, June 6, 1975. p. 33.

The 87 total votes were cast from a population of approximately 1000, including about 380 property tax payers. At this time South Tucson's ethnic composition was mixed, but the organizers of the incorporation movement were almost exclusively Anglo.⁶ Hispanics remained the majority in South Tucson (see the maps, pp. 106 and 118), but in the 1930s many Mexican residents maintained a cautious distance from electoral politics.⁷

Jewish businessman Sam Knipnis served as South Tucson's first mayor. The formation of South Tucson resulted from political resistance to the encroachment of what was perceived to be an intrusive City of Tucson government. Disenchanted, "feisty," residents felt the area could be operated efficiently "without the increase in taxes which annexation by the city would have caused." The Arizona Daily Star, opposing the incorporation drive, painted the South Tucson partisans as pie-in-the-sky optimists who

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⁶The population of South Tucson in 1940 was 1066. As late as 1950 South Tucson's population was officially recorded by the Census as 7,004, of which 6,192 were "white," 223 "negro," and 589 "other." The committee organizing the incorporation movement in South Tucson was Mrs. McCormack, J.M. Glass, Sam R. Knipnis, O.A. Ellis and Roy Baker, from Arizona Daily Star, Aug. 11, 1936, p. 1. John Bret Harte identified the founders as "the owners of two tourist courts who did not want to be subjected to Tucson's building codes, and... liquor dealers who felt that the city's business licensing fees were too steep." Tucson Citizen, June 6, 1975, p. 33.

⁷Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, p. 121.

J. "Mexican Settlement in Tucson, 1920"

SOURCE: Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, p. 187.

thought they could run a modern city "by voluntary or free services" offered by residents. Organizers calculated that maintaining the county's tax rate would bring the new city \$3500-\$5500 in revenue, which would be ample financing for city services.⁸

Legal wrangling immediately occupied the fledgling city. The City of Tucson provided water to South Tucson, requiring the former county residents, now "South Tucson" residents, to "meet city building, plumbing and electrical requirements and to pay the customary (fees) for permits and inspections." Once again South Tucson organizers, mostly Anglo businessmen, challenged what they perceived to be an obtrusive policy by the City of Tucson. South Tucson's city council petitioned the Arizona Corporation Commission to supervise the sale of water by the City of Tucson, claiming that the fees and inspections required by the city were an infringement on South Tucson's sovereignty. In return the City of Tucson threatened to turn off South Tucson's water supply in 120 days.⁹

Faced with Tucson's ultimatum, a group of South Tucson

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⁸Arizona Daily Star, August 9, 1936, p. 8; August 11, 1936, p. 1. Governmental records for South Tucson begin in 1940. Prior to the passage of the town's first ordinances in 1940 no paid employees worked for the town. The town's first attorney, Harry O. Juliani, who waged many legal battles on behalf of South Tucson, volunteered his services. In "Council Packets - Ordinances," City Clerk's Depository, South Tucson.

⁹Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 29, 1937, p. 1.

residents led by businessman G.J. McElroy started a disincorporation movement.¹⁰ After disincorporation, these South Tucson dissidents planned either to remain in the county or to seek annexation into the City of Tucson. Once again the political struggle involved primarily Anglo residents, now divided over the efficacy of resistance to Tucson's expansion. To McElroy maintaining South Tucson as a separate municipality was akin, politically, to cutting off your nose to spite your face.¹¹

South Tucson's administration, in the meantime, made plans to develop their own water supply, announcing that "no alarm" was felt. The Arizona Daily Star reported the range of sentiment in South Tucson, mildly militant, and reflective of the familiar racism of the day: "As one put it, 'We are now free of Tucson's strings.' Another said, 'We are not worried at all. This is just a political squabble and reminds me of the Japs and Chinese. Instead of acting like children, both sides should get together'." South Tucson's city council displayed its militancy by voting to tax Tucson's sale of water to southside residents. As the

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¹⁰McElroy operated "Tucson Boot Works" at 2104 S. 6th Avenue in 1939. Later "McElroy's Tire Shop" occupied the same address. From Tucson telephone directories and Tucson city directories. If you can't beat them, join them: McElroy later served on the South Tucson Town Council. In "Council Packets -- Ordinances," City Clerk's Depository, South Tucson.

¹¹Ibid., Jan. 8, 1938, pp. 1, 8.

Arizona Daily Star reported, not quite tongue-in-cheek, "The South Tucson license collector will get you if you don't watch out... every Tucson business and other enterprise, which so much as pokes a foot across the border into its limits, is a possibility for collecting licenses."¹²

South Tucson dissidents, those favoring disincorporation, presented the Pima County Board of Supervisors with petitions signed by 258 South Tucson taxpayers.¹³ This effort caused a "frantic" response by South Tucson's defenders who threatened to organize a boycott against the businesses of those who had signed the disincorporation petitions.¹⁴ The South Tucson leadership had criticized the City of Tucson's threat to shut off the water as a crass and cynical effort at political manipulation. Once challenged themselves, however, South Tucson's leaders hauled out their own heavy political artillery, threatening opponents with vituperative pressure politics. Instead of one "obtrusive" government in the metropolitan area, there were now two.

South Tucson became a "ghost town" when the Board of

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¹²Ibid., January 8, 1938, pp. 1, 8; January 9, 1938, p. 4.

¹³The 258 signatures represented approximately two thirds of South Tucson's taxpayers, according to the Arizona Daily Star, Jan. 19, 1938, p. 1.

¹⁴Ibid.

Supervisors accepted the request by petitioners to disincorporate the city, but court fights followed the disincorporation and the town's legal status remained in limbo. Harry O. Juliani, South Tucson's volunteer attorney, vowed to take the issue to the Arizona Supreme Court if necessary, and in fact did so after Superior Court Judge Albert R. Thurman of Nogales ruled in favor of the Board of Supervisors' disincorporation of South Tucson. On November 28, 1938, the Supreme Court upheld Judge Thurman's decision.¹⁵

Despite the court's clearance, Tucson postponed its annexation of the area, partly due to uncertainty over the process of annexation. A Phoenix annexation had been challenged in court and was before the Arizona Supreme Court for final dispensation. Until the Supreme Court clarified annexation laws, which could take a year or longer, Tucson announced it would hold off any annexation of South Tucson. In court the City of Tucson agreed to a temporary injunction not to annex South Tucson. The injunction resulted from a suit by L. M. Calhoun, a "secondhand furniture dealer" from South Tucson. Calhoun had also sued the Pima County Board of Supervisors, asking the court to force the supervisors to hold an election to determine if residents in fact wanted to

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¹⁵Arizona Daily Star, January 20, 1938, p. 1; April 14, 1938, p. 1; November 29, 1938, p. 1.

disincorporate.¹⁶

Calhoun's county suit resulted in an election on March 27, 1939 in which reincorporation of South Tucson passed by seven votes, 70-63. Once again the Hispanic majority seems to have absented itself from the political squabble. The Arizona Daily Star reported "... great jollification among the townspeople as the word spread... After a few sashays up and down South Sixth Avenue, main artery of the town, the celebrators descended on downtown Tucson, blaring their automobile horns and shouting jubilee."¹⁷

Dissidents, accounting for those 63 "no" votes, petitioned the Board of Supervisors to overturn the election. Meanwhile, the City of Tucson had passed an annexation ordinance bringing about two-thirds of South Tucson into the City of Tucson. Of course, legal action followed Tucson's effort to annex the area and judges continued to determine the fate of South Tucson. First, Judge Phelps of Phoenix ruled that Tucson's annexation had preceded the reincorporation vote, so the election was moot and the annexation stood. Tucson, nonetheless, agreed to

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¹⁶A single reference to Calhoun's suits appeared in Arizona Daily Star, Jan. 8, 1939, pp. 1, 8, but Calhoun's name was spelled "Colquhun." L.M. Calhoun operated "Calhoun's Furniture Exchange" at 1716 South 6th Avenue in 1939. From Tucson telephone directories and Tucson city directories.

¹⁷Ibid., March 28, 1939, p. 1.

"exercise no jurisdiction" until the Supreme Court decided the entire question of in, un, and re-incorporation.¹⁸

In July 1940 the Supreme Court overturned Judge Phelp's decision and approved South Tucson's reincorporation.¹⁹

The Supreme Court confirmed South Tucson's existence, but political peace continued to elude residents. Avoidance of higher City of Tucson taxes simply required South Tucson residents to support services themselves, without enough population, industry or commerce to support "a modern city government."²⁰ City services remained strained and, to some, inadequate, although inadequacy was in the eye of the beholder. As Emmert explained in her 1951 annexation study, some "individualist" residents preferred a limited government presence. Former councilman Jesus Q. Elias

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¹⁸Ibid., Oct. 11, 1939, p. 1.

¹⁹Ibid., July 23, 1940, p. 1. South Tucson passed its first three ordinances on September 26, 1940. The three ordinances set council meeting times, established a municipal court, and created town officials, including a marshal and tax collector. In "Council Packets -- Ordinances," City Clerk's Depository, South Tucson.

²⁰Emmert, "An Annexation Study of Tucson, Arizona," 48-49. Sonnichsen, Tucson, p. 258. South Tucson's finances were shakey from the start. In 1937, twenty percent of the town's revenue came from speeding tickets issued on South Sixth Avenue, commonly recognized by Tucsonans as a notorious speed trap. South Tucson policemen were required to furnish their own motorcycles. At one point the town clerk forebore part of her salary so that the town could avoid operating at a deficit. From John Bret Harte, "A Feisty Town Grows Up," Tucson Citizen.

described this libertarian attitude when he retired from the city council in 1975: "I've been against bars (South Tucson had 50 bars and liquor stores within its one-square-mile area in 1975), but I was always overruled. Unfortunately the other fellows thought we needed the tax revenue. It hurt the town because we get the scum of the drinkers. They chase out of the city (City of Tucson) and they come down here because we don't have enough policemen..."²¹ Elias described the town as something of a haven for drunkards, but "individualists" may have also appreciated the lower property taxes in South Tucson.²²

The "individualist" attitude surfaced in 1949 on the outskirts of South Tucson when the young town attempted its first annexation. South Tucson's effort to expand met with such vociferous resistance -- "strong protest in which some of the town's new inhabitants said they were 'shang-haied'" -- that the city council rescinded the annexation two weeks later.²³ Ultimately dissidents failed to muster

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²¹Mark Kimble, "South Tucson's No Different: It Needs More Money," Tucson Citizen, June 6, 1975, p. 33.

²²South Tucson's property tax was one fourth that of the city in 1975, in John Bret Harte, "A Feisty Town Grows Up," Tucson Citizen.

²³South Tucson's town council decided not to spend its "surplus cash" on the legal fees necessary to force the annexation. "Minutes of the South Tucson Town Council," Meeting of April 27, 1949, City Clerk's Depository, South Tucson. The "shang-haied" statement appeared in Arizona Daily Star, March 13, 1956, p. A-1.

a majority to disincorporate the town, but the pattern of politically motivated resistance to urban expansion continued on the fringes of South Tucson. The 1949 annexees avoided being shang-haied by South Tucson, but they were eventually shang-haied by the City of Tucson in the 1956 annexation that encircled South Tucson. Nevertheless, the continued existence of South Tucson marked the first successful political resistance to the expansion of the City of Tucson. The Amphitheater and Flowing Wells districts attempted the same incorporation strategy in the late 1950s, but failed.

South Tucson accomplished one small annexation in 1953, and planned a larger expansion in 1956 into industrial areas to the east. A lack of industrial tax base had limited South Tucson's prospects since its incorporation in 1936, but these industrial areas were tempting targets for the City of Tucson as well. Tucson Mayor Don Hummel acted accordingly, springing the city's freshly devised annexation strategy on an unsuspecting public, and an encircled South Tucson. South Tucson residents complained bitterly, but the town government found itself unable to undertake the long and costly legal battle necessary to overturn the annexation.

The legal disputes continued into the 1960s as county

officials investigated South Tucson's governmental officials and town finances. Elizabeth Martiny, South Tucson clerk from 1946 to 1961, attributed the investigations to ambitious county attorneys seeking to generate publicity for themselves, and collusion between the county and the city, which still wanted to annex the town.²⁴

South Tucson has preserved its one-square-mile independence to this day, but does this constitute a victory? Political independence in South Tucson translated into "a strong sense of community" with an early commitment to ethnic and racial integration.²⁵ Political independence also translated into an impotent town government, surrounded by poverty, but without the material means to address the needs of its poverty-stricken residents. The political victory may have been a pyrrhic one.

By the time South Tucson confronted the City of Tucson for the second time, in the 1950s, the ethnic character of the community had surfaced in its political representation. Several Hispanics served on the town council and served as mayors in South Tucson from the 1940s. Frank Benitez was

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²⁴John Bret Harte, "A Feisty Town Grows Up," Tucson Citizen. No mention of Tucson's 1956 annexation appears in South Tucson Town Council meeting minutes, perhaps due to an ongoing county investigation into South Tucson's finances. The minutes for the May 14, 1956 meeting explain that "the County Attorney's Office has all available records."

²⁵John Bret Harte, "A Feisty Town Grows Up," Tucson Citizen.

elected mayor in 1940, and Pat Gonzales was elected mayor in 1949.²⁶

Nonhispanics maintained prominent roles in the community, primarily in the commercial sphere. The founding members of the South Tucson Chamber of Commerce in 1954 were: Ted Walker, Dr. Jack Klein, Don Gaskill, Ray Weaver, Soleng Tom (Chinese-American), Meyer L. Rutz, Don Depagh, Fred Duff, Monte Mansfield Jr., Miss Allair Bennett, Fred Dotson, and Ray Dunn.²⁷ In 1956, businessmen in the South Tucson Chamber of Commerce and Lions Club voted to support annexation of South Tucson by the City of Tucson, but nothing came of the annexation move. The political leadership of the community in 1956, predominantly Hispanic, continually protected their community's political independence.²⁸

The barrio neighborhoods, both within South Tucson and the City of Tucson, provide the "Old Pueblo" with its cultural diversity, from quaintly ethnic to distressingly "blighted." The "wrong side of the tracks" image of South Tucson springs from this perceived ethnic character, made

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²⁶"Council Packets - Ordinances," and "Council Minutes," City Clerk's Depository, South Tucson.

²⁷Arizona Daily Star, December 14, 1954, p. A-9.

²⁸Ibid., May 29, 1956, pp. A-1, D-8.

palatable for tourists only through a nostalgic haze. A 1969 Junior League guidebook described Tucson from the focal point of Sentinel Peak, "'A' Mountain," which casts an afternoon shadow over "an area inhabited by Tucson's earliest settlers, the Pima Indians..."²⁹ The guidebook directed visitors to explore Tucson's history, culture and recreational facilities "Beyond the Shadows." Barrios in this scheme lay within the shadows. No overt racism appeared in the guidebook, stereotypes more subtly conveyed as shadowy.

Before the urban redevelopment efforts in the 1950s labeled the areas south of downtown as "blighted" an ethnic transformation took place. The term "blight" itself implied a process at work as cities evolved from a state of urban health to sickness. Roy Drachman, one of Tucson's most prominent developers, described the process in terms of middle-class and Anglo flight from the barrios:

My brothers and I lived on the wrong side of the tracks during the early part of our lives in the old adobe family house.... The neighborhood on south Main Street was at one time one of the better residential districts, with many of the more affluent families in that part of town. However, by the time I was growing up all but three of the Anglo-American families had moved to other neighborhoods.³⁰

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²⁹"Beyond the Shadows," The Junior League of Tucson, Inc., 1969. In Special Collections, University of Arizona.

³⁰Roy P. Drachman, This Is Not A Book, Just Memories, published by the author, 1979, p. 20. In Special Collections, University of Arizona.

K. "Mexican Settlement in Tucson, 1940"

SOURCE: Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, p. 238.

Drachman's reminiscence sums up the image shared by South Tucson and the barrios -- one of relative poverty, more Hispanic than Anglo, and in general suffering from middle-class flight. The "blight" image applied to areas irrespective of their location in terms of the Southern Pacific railroad tracks.³¹ Perhaps there was a time when barrios were "next door," rather than "over there." Sheridan mapped the ethnic neighborhoods and described them in positive terms. Drachman described his old neighborhood as "the wrong side of the tracks." But not always so. It had become a bad neighborhood. Drachman's assessment turned on cultural assumptions that he shared with most urban planners. The "blight" image stuck to working class and ethnic areas, possessed of a different culture labeled as diseased, more densely settled than the sprawling suburbs. "Blight" made barrios targets for urban renewal. It forms an intriguing irony that the first areas in Tucson successfully to resist "development" were those areas inhabited by Tucsonans far down on the ladder of generally recognizable political status in the 1950s.

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³¹Although the railroad tracks do indicate general settlement patterns in Tucson, the boundary was never legally or rigidly enforced. Barrio Adelanto and Barrio San Antonio were north and east of the tracks in 1940, according to Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, p. 238. Anglo flight in fact did take place from the fringes of barrio areas, but overall the ethnic character of neighborhoods south of downtown have always been, and remain, predominantly Hispanic. See the maps showing Mexican settlement patterns, pp. 105 and 117.

Drachman's memoirs illustrate the misconceptions that plagued urban planners throughout the redevelopment projects. In Drachman's lexicon, affluent equaled Anglo, and neighborhoods became less desirable when they became predominantly working class and Hispanic in nature. These assumptions appeared clearly in Drachman's explanation for the "failure" of El Rio golf course and subdivision.

It was on the wrong side of the tracks. The residential lots around the golf course were not bought by those who could afford to build the kind of homes which might have triggered the successful development of a nice subdivision. The developers finally gave up on the idea of selling large lots, and sold off the land facing the golf course, in small lots, to Mexican-American families who lived in that general area. There was no sewer line to serve the area at that time, and every homeowner had an outhouse in the back of the house, facing the golf course.³²

Implicit within Drachman's prose is his definition of a "nice" subdivision: Anglo, middle-class or wealthier, no outhouses. Drachman's use of passive voice handily ascribed the lack of a sewer line to some higher cosmic order. Would the "nice" homes on larger lots have been equipped with outhouses too, or would the city government or developer have found the resources to install sewer lines? "Mexican-American families who lived in that general area" eventually purchased the lots and homes. Sheridan described the El Rio barrio after World War II as a "prosperous working-class and

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³²Drachman, This Is Not A Book, p. 239

middle-class neighborhood," but it was still, in Drachman's eyes, less than "nice."³³

Discussions of "blight" assumed demographic movements: either the "right" sort of people moved out, or the "wrong" sort of people moved in. A 1968 redevelopment study explicitly stated this assumption: "Concurrently with the deterioration of the physical environment, there develop in the deteriorating areas also economic and social problems. As the value and rental of housing in the deteriorating areas decrease, economically and socially disadvantaged families and persons are attracted to them and thus physical, economic and social problems overlap and are interrelated."³⁴ An earlier analogy of "blighted areas" as a malignant virus appeared in Mayor Don Hummel's 1957 application for federal funds to prepare an urban redevelopment project. Hummel described as one of the major

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³³Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, p. 244.

³⁴"Need for Renewal, A Part of the Community Renewal Program of the City of Tucson, Az. November 1968," Department of Community Development, Tucson, Arizona, pp. 6-7. In Special Collections, University of Arizona. This proposal described "causal factors of blight" as including improper platting; inadequate streets, sidewalks, and storm drains; inadequate control of land uses; poor construction or obsolescence; overcrowding; and "environmental deficiencies" such as noise, dust, traffic, etc. The proposal also described "social factors" which did not cause blight, but exacerbated it: low income; racial discrimination; high rental turnover, which promoted poor upkeep; lack of education and training by residents, which caused poor self-esteem.

goals the "prevention of the spread of blight into good areas of the community," blight being defined by the mayor as those areas south of downtown harboring "dirt, disease and delinquency..."³⁵ How did "good areas" fall victim to this virus? Low rents attracted the wrong sort of residents, and the downward spiral began.

These characterizations of "blight" failed to acknowledge the degree of continuity within neighborhoods and made the assumption that declension follows inexorably once middle-class, or Anglo, residents leave a neighborhood. The possibility of working class, Hispanic, neighborhoods maintaining a sense of continuity and solidarity did not occur to Drachman, the mayor, or the professional urban planners. Simply stated, they did not consider the possibility that residents in barrios liked living in barrios.

Sheridan provided a more positive image of barrio life in Los Tucsonenses:

Most Tucsonenses lived sober, industrious lives, building their homes and raising their children in relatively stable and peaceful surroundings. To them, the term barrio was positive rather than negative, embodying the virtues of social solidarity and ethnic pride. Within the barrios, Mexican culture flourished, and bonds of kinship, neighborliness, and compadrazgo enabled families to survive economic depressions and

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³⁵"A Workable Program for Urban Renewal, 1957," City of Tucson, Arizona, p. 2.

the growing dualization of Tucson society.³⁶

Roy Drachman encountered resistance in the mid 1950s when he attempted to buy property in the barrios near downtown as part of his own private redevelopment project.³⁷ Drachman, in a fashion similar to Mayor Hummel and the urban planners, thought of himself as a knight in shining armor, seeking to revitalize his old neighborhood on South Main Street by creating shops, businesses, and convention facilities. The old neighborhood would disappear, but good riddance. It had become a slum.

Tucson's city government took up the mantle of urban redevelopment in 1957, when Mayor Don Hummel successfully applied to the federal government for funds to study urban renewal. Tucson's proposed 400-acre redevelopment project was similar to hundreds of projects throughout the country. Federal money flowed into cities -- admittedly a trickle compared to the later deluge of Great Society funds -- and redevelopment projects sprouted like so many well-fertilized

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³⁶Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, p. 126 and Bonnie Henry, "Old Barrio, Its Way of Life All But Vanished," Arizona Daily Star, Aug. 23, 1992, pp. E-1, E-5.

³⁷"The Pueblo Center Redevelopment Project: Report Presented to the Central City Council of the Urban Land Institute, April 23, 1965," Citizen's Committee on Municipal Blight, Tucson, Arizona, p. 9. In Special Collections, University of Arizona.

mushrooms.³⁸ In the process cities bulldozed working-class and poor neighborhoods willy nilly, with little commensurate accommodation for the residents of those neighborhoods.³⁹ Mayor Hummel addressed the issue of displaced persons in a 1958 speech to Tucson's Rotary Club defending the renewal project. Hummel said the plan would affect 1,795 families, for which "new homes will be found... and for others, reasonable rentals."⁴⁰ The Assistant City Manager S. Lenwood Schorr, who was hired specifically to supervise the renewal project in 1961, also recognized the potential problem of displaced persons: "We fully realize our responsibilities to the people living there." He pledged that the city would assist residents to find affordable housing.⁴¹

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³⁸Hummel applied for federal funds under the 1954 act that provided for urban renewal loans administered by the "Housing and Home Finance Agency." In "A Workable Program for Urban Renewal, 1957." In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

³⁹Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964; paperback reprint, McGraw Hill, 1967).

⁴⁰The Arizona Daily Star reported in 1959 that the 400-acre project area had 5,000 people. "This figure represents 1,007 families of which 828 are Mexican or Anglo and 179 are Negro, Chinese or Indian." The overwhelming majority were Mexican, as can be seen in the maps of the barrio neighborhoods south of the Central Business District, pp. 105 and 117.

⁴¹Schorr had been an attorney in New York before moving with his family to Tucson in 1957. In Tucson he had developed a subdivision in the Tucson Mountain foothills, and also served on the Pima County Planning and Zoning

Unfortunately Hummel and Schorr failed to match these comforting assurances with concrete proposals. As Schorr later acknowledged, "that was not handled with anything like the sensitivity it deserved."⁴² Hummel outlined the city's low-cost housing program in his 1957 request for federal funds: one project, La Reforma, with 160 families, with no plan to expand the program except in "low-cost housing projects to be built by private builders." Hummel planned to rely on the private sector to provide low cost housing for 1000+ families. The Tucson Home Builder Association expressed a willingness to study "the feasibility" of building low-cost units. Also Hummel promised to "set up liaison with various civic and charitable organizations" to alleviate housing shortages.⁴³ The example offered by Hummel was the Alianza Hispano Americano, a Hispanic mutual aid organization which had been making low interest building loans to individuals since 1919.⁴⁴

Commission. With his appointment as Assistant City Manager, Schorr resigned from the Planning and Zoning Commission and the ethics committee of the Society of Planning Officials. In, S.L. Schorr interview, "Urbanization of Tucson, 1940-1990," and Arizona Daily Star, April 6, 1961, p. A-11; May 19, 1961, p. A-11.

⁴²S.L. Schorr interview, "Urbanization of Tucson, 1940-1990."

⁴³"A Workable Program for Urban Renewal, 1957," pp. 26-27.

⁴⁴Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, p. 168.

Hummel's reliance on the private sector to provide low cost housing failed to meet the needs of residents of the area to be redeveloped. It also failed to assuage the philosophical concerns of conservatives. Local conservatives quickly labeled the "public" aspects of redevelopment as "Socialistic." A former Republican city councilman, Richard V. Ageton, Jr., described the plan as outright Socialism in a speech to the Young Republicans in 1961. Ageton said the renewal plan was a "menace to property owners... Nothing can stand in the way of the bulldozers once an urban renewal plan is under way. Small businessmen, store owners who have spent a lifetime building up a small business are ruthlessly uprooted."⁴⁵ The opposition to renewal also drew on national conservative connections, as evidenced by the appearance of Bruce Alger, Republican Representative from Texas, who criticized urban renewal specifically, and President John Kennedy generally, at the 1961 Lincoln Day Dinner in Tucson.⁴⁶

Three years earlier Hummel had addressed the Socialist bugaboo:

The urban renewal project planned for Tucson has no socialistic implications... It is the purpose of the project to reclaim slum areas and return them to

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⁴⁵Arizona Daily Star, Jan. 15, 1960, p. C-12.

⁴⁶Ibid., Feb. 14, 1961, p. A-4.

profitable and legitimate use under free enterprise... Condemnation of land for slum clearance is no more socialistic than taking land for the construction of highways, a procedure which brings no objection.⁴⁷

Hummel tipped his hat repeatedly to private enterprise as he struggled to garner support for the plan, but urban planners working for the city too often let slip their enthusiasm for social engineering. Planners felt themselves working for the public good, operating on the assumption that residents in barrios were "trapped" there, unwilling prisoners in an ever declining social and economic morass. Redevelopment would break the cycle of poverty and prevent the cancerous spread of blight into "good" neighborhoods. In 1961, as the push for renewal continued, Schorr borrowed a phrase from Ageton's invective and labeled blight a "contagious menace... like a dagger pointing at the heart of downtown."⁴⁸ Unfortunately for the urban planners, conservatives like Ageton feared the menace of socialism more than they feared the menace of "blight."

Hummel and the planners also had to cope with the price tag. The federal money available for these projects generally came in the form of matching funds, which meant that Tucsonans would be forced to come up with some portion

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⁴⁷Ibid., May 8, 1958, p. B-1.

⁴⁸Ibid., May 19, 1961, p. A-11.

of the funding.⁴⁹ Politicians in general hate to raise taxes, unless of course the increased revenue benefits their constituents. The Sabino Canyon dam proposal in 1936 failed when Tucsonans managed to raise only \$600 to "match" federal money.⁵⁰ Increased recreation opportunities apparently provided insufficient justification for raising taxes in 1936. More recently Tucsonans had passed a \$14,660,000 bond issue to upgrade the city's infrastructure, an effort spearheaded by a citizen's committee backing the bond issue, led by Frank Drachman (Roy's older brother).⁵¹ Perhaps the success of the bond issue convinced Mayor Hummel and the renewal planners that taxpayers would agree to fund the urban renewal plan.

Unfortunately for Hummel and the planners, opposition simply intensified. William R. Matthews, editor of the Arizona Daily Star, led the resistance of conservatives, although other spokesmen like Ageton confronted the plan with more gaudy language. The political climate in the community and the nation made conservative opposition inevitable. Goldwater Republicanism was on the rise at the

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⁴⁹The renewal plan originally included nearly 400 acres, at a cost of \$16.5 million. Tucson's share would be \$1,150,000. In Arizona Daily Star, April 12, 1961, p. C-4.

⁵⁰David W. Lazaroff, "Tucson's Canyon Oasis," Arizona Highways, April 1993.

⁵¹Arizona Daily Star, Aug. 6, 1958, p. A-1.

time and Arizona enjoyed (or suffered from) a reputation as conservative territory. As Schorr recalled:

At that time the thing that was breaking it more than anything was, 'Oh, we don't want to have federal control. If we take federal money we'll have federal control.' To one who had recently come from Manhattan, that sounded rather ludicrous. But there was that spirit. It was epitomized in the remarks and platform of Barry Goldwater, whose star was at its highest in those years, and who had great influence locally and all over the state.⁵²

Mayor Hummel repeatedly addressed this opposition throughout the planning process.

Resistance spread. In 1961 the "Historic Sites Committee" of the Arizona Pioneer Historical Society announced that the renewal plan "does not include the preservation of certain historic sites and of an area representative of the Old Pueblo era!" The Historical Society therefore opposed the plan which the Mayor previously had described as culturally sensitive.⁵³

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⁵²S.L. Schorr interview, "Urbanization of Tucson, 1940-1990." Also, while presenting Tucson's redevelopment project at a meeting in California, Assistant City Manager Vincent Lung reported: "One gentleman from Orange County, California which, like Arizona, has a conservative political philosophy, thought that in view of our history, we have done a tremendous job to get to the present stage." In "The Pueblo Center Redevelopment Project, 1965," p. iii.

⁵³In 1959 Hummel assured Tucsonans that the "heritage of the past won't be lost, and some of the flavor of the Old Southwest retained." In Arizona Daily Star, May 15, 1959, p. B-1. In 1961 the Historical Society announced its list of fifty-nine historic sites in Tucson. The list included nine sites within the redevelopment area. In "Historic Sites Committee, 1960-61," Box 58, Arizona Historical Society.

Opposition also arose from the local chapter of the NAACP. In 1961 Schorr debated the issue of renewal with Mrs. T.D. Sprague after a regular meeting of the NAACP. In the debate Sprague suggested that "a revision of the minimum housing code could force the landowners to improve the condition of the property or else." Schorr said that such an approach would not work, except in the sense that condemnations of property would result, with the resulting "eviction of persons for whom no provisions were made."⁵⁴ Revisions of the plan after 1957 paid more attention to displaced persons, but nothing resembling a one-for-one replacement of housing ever appeared in the plan.⁵⁵

In January 1962 a bi-partisan effort by the outgoing and incoming city administrations modified the renewal plan. Don Hummel had lost his reelection bid to Republican Lew

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⁵⁴Arizona Daily Star, Nov. 10, 1961, p. A-3.

⁵⁵A report commissioned by the city in 1969 summarized Tucson's low-cost housing resources in light of continuing urban renewal plans: "It is estimated that future renewal plans will destroy 3,185 dwelling units and dislocate 10,000 to 12,000 persons over a ten-year period... Existing housing resources in Tucson are minimal when compared with this projected need for relocation. If all the planned units of public housing were completed they would not be sufficient to accommodate even the present waiting list for public housing, and the existing 362 public housing units (up from 160 in 1957) do not represent a major relocation resource." In "Housing and Relocation: Tucson Community Renewal Program, 1969" (New York: Greenleigh Associates, Inc.), submitted to the City of Tucson, July 25, 1969.

Davis, but the two cooperated in devising a modified renewal strategy. The 392-acre project was pared down to 76 acres, so as to "concentrate on the hard core of blight encroaching into the Central Business District." Planners had listened to area residents who argued for the preservation of their neighborhoods. The planners described the areas deleted from the project as containing historical sites, and most significantly, areas with "a high incidence of homes occupied by their owners..." The cost of plan was reduced to \$6.4 million, with the city's share reduced to \$523,000.

The modifications failed to satisfy the philosophically conservative and/or tax-conscious opponents, however. The public relations campaigns, on both sides, commenced again. The Citizen Urban Renewal Enterprise (C.U.R.E.) committee favored the plan, seeking "to offset rising public opposition to any urban renewal plan using tax money here." Opposing the plan was the "Citizen's Committee for Facts on Urban Renewal," which sought to distinguish between "federal urban renewal and modernization and development by private enterprise." Both sides of the issue mounted public relations campaigns, offering statistics to either prove what a boon the project would be for Tucson, or what a boon-doggle.⁵⁶

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⁵⁶Arizona Daily Star, January 19, 1962, p. A-1; February 23, p. B-3; March 14, p. A-6; March 30, p. B-1; April 25, 1962, p. A-1.

M. "The Pueblo Center
Redevelopment Project,
1965."

In the midst of all the shouting a University of Arizona sociologist conducted a poll in the targeted area so as to find out what residents thought about the plan. Dr. Julius Rivera found that 71% of property owners in the targeted 76-acre area favored renewal, and 77% of the residents favored the plan. Rivera reported, "The population in the area is rather young, hopes for a better future, and as a group favors urban renewal."⁵⁷

Even after the homeowners to the south had been excluded from the renewal project, opposition to the plan remained within the area. The city council held a public meeting on April 24, 1962 to discuss the plan. The meeting attracted an audience of approximately 800, including Luis Martinez, who owned "A A A Sign Company" at 166 South Meyer, within the project area.⁵⁸ As reported by the Arizona Daily Star, Martinez said "that statements by proponents that the minimum housing code cannot be enforced are 'so much hooey.' The fault may lie in the city inspector or fire chief or health officer or City Council, he said. Inspection and enforcing the code can cure the cancerous growth in the area."⁵⁹

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⁵⁷Ibid., April 4, 1962, p. B-1.

⁵⁸The Mullin-Kille Tucson Arizona City Directory, 1962, Vol. 29, ABCD No. 1027, copywrite by Robert Morton Baldwin, published by Mullin-Kille of Arizona.

⁵⁹Arizona Daily Star, April 25, 1962, p. A-1.

Support for the plan within the new Republican administration began to crumble. First, the mayor and council proposed a city-wide referendum on the renewal plan, but this tactic failed when the city attorney informed the council that calling a referendum election would require their endorsement of the renewal plan: a referendum could only approve or disapprove their decision, not the plan itself. At the council meeting when the attorney offered this opinion, Luis Martinez appeared to repeat his demand that "the council order city officials to start enforcing city building, trash and sanitation codes within the sprawling district." Rather than endorse the renewal plan, the mayor and council followed Martinez's suggestion to drop the renewal plan and ordered city officials to upgrade enforcement of city regulations in the "blighted" area. Two weeks later the council passed a resolution encouraging the "private sector" to undertake renewal projects in the blighted areas. With that, urban renewal ended in Tucson.⁶⁰

But not for long. Conservative fortunes crashed in 1964 as Arizona's favorite son lost in a landslide. Great Society programs flourished and the torrent of federal money into cities began.

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⁶⁰Ibid., May 8, 1962, p. A-1; May 22, 1962, p. A-1.

The 1965 effort to jump-start redevelopment chronicled the earlier failures: "... up to 3,000 acres are blighted and in need of substantial treatment whether through redevelopment or rehabilitation.... The area south of the Central Business District is by far the worst." The 1957 project had targeted almost 400 acres, but was reduced in 1961 to 76 acres due to "a lack of public support, and considerable editorial opposition from both newspapers." The project was "closed out" in 1962.⁶¹

Back again in 1965. At the outset of the renewed push for redevelopment planners sought to cultivate public support. The planning effort became professionally slick and "blighted" appeared more and more in newspaper articles describing the redevelopment area. The plan remained scaled down, however. Planners acknowledged that Tucsonans would never finance the 400-acre project. As the project was reassessed, viable neighborhoods remained exempt from the plan and the project area was reduced even further, from 76 acres to 52 acres. The activism of the residents provided clear evidence to planners that "barrios" were not synonymous with "slums." Residents approved of the redevelopment of truly blighted areas nearby. The old Gay Alley district, home of Tucson's prostitution in territorial

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⁶¹"The Pueblo Center Redevelopment Project, 1965," pp. 4-5.

days, remained part of the plan. Tucson's prostitution had long since migrated beyond the city limits, into the county where a succession of sheriffs tolerated it.⁶² However, the old cribs remained south of downtown, near the old railroad sanitorium. Barrio neighborhoods supported the removal of these eyesores.

This time redevelopment proceeded beyond the planning stage. The residents' resistance helped shaped the project. Tucson's "downtown" today shows the results of planning and compromise: community center, shopping areas, a hotel, and restaurants; also, a flourishing "Barrio Historico."⁶³

The Great Society, and earlier federal programs, provided federal money that financed many urban redevelopment projects that deprived poor and working-class residents of their homes. In Tucson, working class neighborhoods organized and resisted these redevelopment efforts, also using Great Society assistance. The efforts

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⁶²Sonnichsen, Tucson, p. 295.

⁶³The "historico" name applied to Barrio Libre and "El Hoyo" in the 1972 study, "Barrio Historico, Tucson" (University of Arizona: College of Architecture, 1972), Special Collections, University of Arizona Library. Bonnie Henry described the remnants of the barrio this way: "Pretty pastels and law offices began to dot the remaining neighborhoods. What was left of the barrio became trendy. These days 'historic' translates to 'high priced.'" In "Old Barrio, its way of life all but vanished," Arizona Daily Star, Aug. 23, 1992, pp. E-1, E-5.

to empower poor people by providing organizational assistance paid off for some of Tucson's barrio residents, who managed to preserve their neighborhoods. Opposition did not pay off for Luis Martinez, however, or any of the shopkeepers in the northernmost blocks of South Meyer. Their low-rent commercial district was leveled. As Don Bufkin described urban renewal in Tucson: "... it was social and human tragedy even though it was physical renewal for some fifty acres down there."⁶⁴

The "Old Pueblo" name signifies Tucson's cultural diversity. The Chamber of Commerce markets Tucson's Hispanic past, but only in the sense of a romanticized vision of that past. The smell of frijoles and tortillas cooking in barrio streets adds to the charm of the Old Pueblo.

But the visuals sometimes distract.

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⁶⁴Don Bufkin interview, "Urbanization of Tucson, 1940-1990."

Chapter 4: Environmental Resistance

"Bottomless Towers"

Resistance to urbanization in Tucson based on an increasing environmental awareness became explicit in the 1950s. The environmental critique became the focal point for otherwise disparate forms of resistance as residents sought to preserve Tucson's natural setting and lifestyle.

The "visuals" have been important to Tucson's growth at least since the 1920s. Boosters sold both tourists and prospective residents a lifestyle advertized as physically and morally healthful due to Tucson's "uncitified closeness to nature."¹ The slick photographs appearing in Chamber of Commerce promotional literature often focused on ranch-style homes in the foothills to illustrate the closeness to nature that Tucsonans enjoyed. Although generally absent from the Chamber of Commerce promotions, Tucson's other residents -- denizens of barrios, tract-home suburbs, or rabbit-hutch apartments -- could also claim a tie, or at least an awareness of nature in their midst due to the startling nearness of mountains ringing the city. Definitions of "nature" rarely intruded into this civic consciousness

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¹Weldon and Phyllis Heald, "Tucson: Gracious Living in the Sun," Arizona Highways, February 1958, p. 12.

during the early 1950s, but the valuation of the "environment" continued to increase, and eventually came to shape in the 1970s the argument in the community over growth.

The vociferous "slow growth" movement in Tucson that appeared in the 1970s critiqued urbanization on the basis of its inevitable degradation of the natural environment. "Slow growth" Tucsonans described Los Angeles and Phoenix as sprawling models not to be followed. The city's plan to construct a cross-town freeway repeatedly failed to gain public support, at least partly due to the negative example of Los Angeles. Bumper stickers appeared in the 1970s saying "Leaving Tucson? Take a Friend." Historians, such as Samuel Hays, argue that the first "Earth Day" in 1970 culminated a series of incidents that, together, resulted in the "environmental movement."² Bufkin and Sonnichsen described the resistance to urbanization in Tucson as an evolving movement that mirrored the growing national awareness of the environment.

Although the 1970s can be described as a watershed for

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²Hays, Beauty, Health and Permanence, pp. 52-55. Also see, for example, Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 3rd edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Stephen R. Fox, The American Conservation Movement: John Muir and His Legacy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Ronald Foresta, The National Parks and Their Keepers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins and Resources for the Future, 1983).

environmental awareness in Tucson, the origins of that awareness appear much earlier. Much of the political resistance to growth in the 1950s was based on environmental factors as urban development threatened quasi-rural lifestyles. The environmental link remained implicit, however. The loss of "natural surroundings" rarely surfaced explicitly as a motivation for resistance, at least until 1956, and even then, the addition of environmentally based resistance to the previously described political and ethnic opposition to growth still left the nay-sayers in the minority. At least since the mid 1950s, however, another voice was added to the opposition, forcing progrowth forces to maneuver around another set of objections. Perhaps the failure of the resistance to stop urban sprawl in Tucson was inevitable given the demographics of Sunbelt boomtowns: there were always too many recent residents who enjoyed Tucson just the way they had found it. By the time these new residents began to feel alarmed at the rate of change in the community -- the rate at which development degraded "natural" surroundings -- they too had been demographically pushed into the minority by the thousands of new residents, recently arrived, who enjoyed Tucson just the way they had found it.

The environmental resistance sought to preserve

Tucson's unique "lifestyle." References to "nature" fueled the debate, but activism in defense of "nature" itself came later.³ Defense of a threatened "lifestyle" motivated the first environmental resistance. As Joseph Wood Krutch remarked in 1956, "I came to Tucson because I wanted a more attractive way of life, a more natural environment..."⁴ Even boosters faced the reality that Tucson's marketability would be damaged if "natural" attractions like saguaro cacti or views of the mountains were destroyed by too much development. Even as boosters ridiculed environmentalists as "alarmists," cautionary pronouncements and programs issued forth from the Chamber of Commerce.⁵ Often the argument over growth devolved into shouting matches between "progrowth" and "slow growth" partisans, but in fact neither side could claim homogenous purity.

From the earliest tourist promotions, "natural" surroundings largely defined Tucson's "lifestyle". The Sonoran desert offered lush vegetation, but limited opportunities for casual strolls. As the cowboy song

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³For examples of "nature" defended for its own sake, see, Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects (New York: Avon Books, 1975). Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review and Random House, 1975).

⁴Arizona Daily Star, October 4, 1956, p. C-5.

⁵Ibid., Oct. 2, 1971, p. A-10.

reported, even the toads had horns: "... thorns on cactus and horns on toads... To sit down you need to have soles on your pants..."⁶ The Arizona-Sonora Desert Museum provided safe sojourns into the incredible variety of vegetation and animal life in the desert. The idea for the museum originated in 1950 out of the environmental concerns of three Tucsonans who loved the desert. Organizers, with the support of the Pima County Park Advisory Committee, created: "... an outdoor interpretive center where people from all the states could see and learn about the land itself; about the birds, reptiles, insects, mammals of the vast American desert; the plants, life!"⁷ Visitors expecting barren sand dunes were to be disappointed.

Tucson's natural surroundings also include mountains, which dominate the city on three sides, and provide a distant panorama on the fourth. The "range and basin" topography in Southern Arizona makes for startling landscapes.

Dubbed the "sunshine city" by boosters, climate was probably the most consistently marketed aspect of "nature" in Tucson. Residents and visitors alike took sunshine for

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⁶"Mean as Hell," Southwind Music (BMI); sung by Johnny Cash on "Mean as Hell," Columbia Records.

⁷Sonnichsen, Tucson, p. 300; also see William H. Carr, The Desert Speaks: The Founding, Building and Objectives of the Arizona-Sonora Desert Museum, (Tucson: Arizona-Sonora Desert Museum, 1957).

granted. More than two days in a row of rain brought howls of unfairness. Tucsonans "naturally" earned the highest incidence of skin cancer in the continental U.S.⁸

Of course, there are other ways to define "natural surroundings." The barrio environment near downtown, chickens and roosters, adobe walls, wood burning stoves, might be defined as more "natural" than the steel and glass, petroleum-fueled, sewer-served, electrified, ranch-style homes sprouting in the desert foothills. Boosters would have expressed no such ambivalence, confidently defining "nature" in its most material sense as "the desert." They valued marketable forms of nature. The climate, visual oddities like saguaro cacti, western panoramas of "wide open spaces," all appeared in the promotional literature aimed at tourists and prospective residents. The Chamber of Commerce sold Tucson's "lifestyle" in the form of shirt-sleeve golf in December and backyard barbecues in January. The desert itself held fascinations for some who, as Wallace Stegner observed, could let go of their prejudice for green. For these desert lovers the Chamber of Commerce published guides

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⁸U.S. Cancer Mortality Rates and Trends, 1950-1979, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: National Cancer Institute/Environmental Protection Agency Agreement on Environmental Carcinogenesis, 1983), pp. 364, 394, 423, 429, 435, 465, 491, 499. For rates of skin cancer in New Mexico, see, Seer Report: Cancer Incidence and Mortality in the United States, 1973-1981 (Washington, D.C.: National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1984).

to desert vegetation around Tucson, and realtors sold as "carefree" the desert landscaped suburban "lawns" of rock and cacti, which happily required no mowing.⁹

"Lifestyle" in Tucson also relied on Old West traditions.

Ranchers continue to defend their lifestyle as nearer to nature than the broader urbanized society. When economic arguments against their continuing federal subsidies hit too close to home, ranching interests trot out "lifestyle," arguing that ranching should be preserved as part of our culture, even if it makes little economic sense.¹⁰

In Tucson, the Chamber of Commerce described the contiguity of the ranching lifestyle as palpable. An interview by Barbara Walters of Joseph Wood Krutch at a working cattle ranch appearing on NBC in 1964 was trumpeted by the Chamber of Commerce as presenting a "true picture of

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⁹"Desert Vegetation Near Tucson, Arizona," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1940s; "Come to the Growing Southwest," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1952. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library. For the increasing valuation of the desert, see, Hollon, The Great American Desert: Then and Now; Patricia Nelson Limerick, Desert Passages: Encounters with the American Deserts (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985).

¹⁰Devoto, "The West Against Itself," pp. 1-12; Wallace Stegner, The Uneasy Chair: A Biography of Bernard Devoto (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974), 301-303.

the Old Pueblo."¹¹ Suburban homes became "ranchettes" if accompanied by more than a sliver of land. Thirty-four dude ranches ringed the city in 1950, and eight riding stables provided access to horses for residents hankering for a ride.¹² The "ranch" motif even worked its way into industrial recruiting brochures. The Hughes Aircraft Company described the "ranching" lifestyle as akin to their own high tech pursuits:

Arizona was settled by men who dared to be different, who rejected being part of a stereotyped pattern, and carved out a new life in their own frontier... If you are interested in not only a new way of personal life but a different concept of professional life, we would like to talk about specific opportunities for you at Hughes - Tucson.¹³

Hughes apparently had in mind the transmogrification of cowboys into aerospace engineers. Of course, the values being advertized bore little necessary relation to a careful definition of the pioneer experience (males only?) or ranch life. By "ranch living" the Chamber of Commerce had in mind less dense development, bridle trails, and panoramic views of city lights. Absent from the Hughes brochure and the Chamber of Commerce promotional literature was any reference

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¹¹"Tucson Progress, April 1964," Tucson Chamber of Commerce. In Special Collections, University of Arizona.

¹²"Telephone Directory for Tucson, March 1950," Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

¹³Hughes Aircraft Company, "Careers in the Sun... You're an Individual," Special Collections.

to spring branding, castrating steers, spur-scarred horses, or cowboys missing fingers and teeth. "Old Tucson" -- originally constructed as a movie set for the filming of "Arizona" in 1939¹⁴ -- provided a properly sanitized version of the Old West appropriate for tourist excursions.

The Chamber of Commerce rolled out hyperboles galore when marketing Tucson's "desert beauty" and Old West traditions, displaying a heightened, if somewhat tailored awareness of the environment. The following sketch of Tucson appeared in 1962:

Tucson is located in a desert valley, surrounded by ranges of mountains. Unlike the Sahara, our desert contains much natural growth, such as green mesquite palo verde and cottonwood trees. There are also many varieties of cacti, which, from April until late May, are in colorful bloom.¹⁵

Despite the Chamber of Commerce's assurances, the Sonoran desert remains primarily brown even in the midst of riotous spring. Mesquite trees are mostly black and spindly; palo verde trees offer green bark rather than green foliage; cottonwood trees huddle near streams or in canyons with subsurface water, rarely appearing on the desert floor. Cacti bloom colorfully, but delicately. Viewing the blooms

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¹⁴Sonnichsen, Tucson, pp. 258, 265.

¹⁵"The Answers to All Your Questions about Tucson, Arizona," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1962. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

of the trademark saguaro requires binoculars. Boosters' descriptions of the desert accentuated the exotic qualities of plant and animal life, such as those displayed in Arizona Highways and in photography books. Samuel Hays attributed the heightened sensitivity to the desert's beauty to the proliferation of nature photography books in the 1970s.¹⁶

The Chamber of Commerce also made grandiose claims for the healthfulness of Tucson's climate:

Tucson has much to offer in the way of good health. Located in the Great American Desert, its climate is superb -- comparable only to that of Egypt. There is glorious health-building sunshine all year around, with a minimum amount of rain and no fog, snow or ice to retard good health... no dark, gloomy days to depress spirits... Because of its warm atmosphere and mild winters, people in Tucson are fresh air and sun-worshippers and spend much time out-of-doors. This type of living always tends toward better health...¹⁷

After describing Tucson's climate in terms that seemed to assure good health, the pamphlet went on to list Tucson's eighteen hospitals and rest homes, forty-eight doctors, five osteopaths, two "chiropractic," three "chiropodists," and one "naturopath."¹⁸

The Chamber of Commerce trumpeted Tucson's sunshine at every opportunity. In 1933 the Chamber of Commerce

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¹⁶Hays, Beauty, Health and Permanence, pp. 23-24.

¹⁷"Healthful Tucson Arizona, The Sunshine City, Where Health and Recreation Go Hand in Hand," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1956. In Special Collections, University of Arizona.

¹⁸Ibid.

commissioned a brochure, bound impressively in pressed copper metal, etched with a scene of a saguaro cactus, commemorating the establishment of the Saguaro National Monument near Tucson. The copy within the brochure publicized the new monument with sunshine as a prominent selling point: "This is the Tucson Chamber of Commerce signing off -- operating under a frequency of 300 days of golden sunshine by authority of our Lord."¹⁹

The Sunshine Climate Club took the lead in publicizing Tucson's climate. In November 1950 they even managed to take advantage of an East Coast blizzard. Arthur Godfrey, host of a popular radio show, sought to distract his frost-bound listeners by reading about warmer weather as reported in the New York Times: Miami, 68; El Paso, 76; Tucson, 85. Godfrey wondered aloud if Tucson's temperature on November 28 had been "a freak." The Sunshine Climate Club responded with a telegram which Godfrey read on the air the following day: "Sincere condolences to our Eastern friends. Shirtsleeve temperature eighty-six yesterday here in Tucson no freak. Maximum temperature was above seventy-five for twenty days so far this month. You are invited to visit Tucson the sunshine city this winter. Thaw out your prostate." The Sunshine Climate Club practically crowed

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¹⁹"The Saguaro National Monument," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1933. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

over this public relations bonanza: a free advertisement broadcast to ten million listeners!²⁰

The Chamber of Commerce also marketed Old West traditions, mostly in the form of "ranch living." Acreage changed a tract home into a ranchette:

In the foothills, within 20 easy minutes from downtown, there are many suburban ranch home sites, commonly 4 acres or more in size. There is ample room for swimming pools, putting greens, shuffleboard and badminton courts, playground equipment and stables. Ranch living has become almost standard with Tucson executives who still are within easy driving distance of all the city's commercial and industrial areas.²¹

The climate allowed for outdoor living, which went hand in hand with the "ranching" image. Arizona Highways profiled Tucson in 1956, 1958, and 1965, consistently emphasizing the outdoor, western lifestyle. Residents enjoyed backyard pool parties and barbecues in the midst of natural desert vegetation. Tourists wore gaudy cowboy costumes as smiling wranglers gingerly shepherded them along spiny desert trails. Just to make sure the tourists understood what a genuine experience awaited them in Tucson, the Chamber of Commerce spelled it out in "The Guest Informant":

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²⁰"Sunshine News: Monthly Bulletin of the Tucson Sunshine Climate Club," Vol. I, #4, Dec. 1950, Tucson Chamber of Commerce. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

²¹"Tucson... A City, An Opportunity, A Way of Life," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1958.

For nine months of the year the city goes all out to cater to its winter visitors. Facilities for enjoyment of active sports are offered everywhere. The favorite pastime is riding out into the desert on old Indian trails or up into the foothills for a picnic by moonlight, western style... vistas are spacious and the western atmosphere is genuine." ²²

Hollywood even used the spacious vistas in movies. The "Old Tucson Development Company" issued a film recruiting brochure in 1972 describing the "thousands of acres of unspoiled wilderness" starting miraculously just fifteen miles from downtown Tucson.²³

Even the children of residents enjoyed the benefits of western living. "Private Schools of Tucson Arizona, 1952" described open-air classrooms in "ranch schools," where students played football on bare desert ground, and received lessons in hard work and self-reliance by doubling as wranglers.²⁴

The maintenance of Old West traditions as part of Tucson's lifestyle required an unspoiled natural environment, but even then, questions of boundaries arose. In "Selling the Desert," historian Kerwin Klein discussed

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²²"The Guest Informant, 1952-1953," Tucson Chamber of Commerce. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

²³"The Classic Country, Tucson and Southern Arizona" (Tucson: Old Tucson Development Company, 1972). In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

²⁴"Private Schools of Tucson, Arizona," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1952. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

the process by which mythical definitions of the western landscape became ingrained in the culture, still thought to be available in the public consciousness despite increasing boundaries of space and time.²⁵ The Old West became something you experienced in parks, monuments and scenic highways. Within the boosters' promotional literature, however, especially that directed toward tourists, the palpable reality of the Old West peacefully coincided with modern Tucson. Boosters sold prospective residents the notion of inconsequential material boundaries: nature and/or the Marlborough Man just on the other side of the chain-link fence: "Off for a ride in the desert! Nothing can offer sharper contrast to big city living than the care-free individualistic life of the western range, especially when the trees aren't trees, but saguaros!"²⁶

Boosters marketed nature and lifestyle with happy abandon after World War II. Whereas political resistance to growth faced boosters at this time, the environmental resistance developed later. The characterization by historians of a growing opposition to growth is based on the rise of this environmentally based resistance, founded on the growing realization that the "natural" environment

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²⁵Kerwin Klein, "Selling the Desert" (Masters Thesis, University of Arizona, 1991).

²⁶"The Guest Informant," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1953.

within and surrounding the city was degrading.

An early indication of the awareness of potential trouble in Tucson's environment appeared in scientific studies conducted during the 1950s. The Chamber of Commerce commissioned some of these studies to provide reassuring data for their promotional literature. In 1953 the Chamber of Commerce issued a pamphlet providing "The Truth About Water in Tucson."²⁷ Despite the fact that Tucson relied solely on ground water, at that time the largest American city to do so, the Chamber of Commerce deemed declining water tables to pose no threat. Eventually boosters, and Tucsonans in general, came to rely on the Central Arizona Project, a grandiose, multi-billion dollar federal project that delivered Colorado River water to Tucson in 1992.

Pollen counts began appearing in 1956, also with the assurance that no problem existed.²⁸ As late as 1968 the Chamber of Commerce still maintained that pollen levels were inconsequential: "From late November to mid-February the pollen count in the Tucson area is practically nil and even

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²⁷"The Truth About Water in Tucson," Chamber of Commerce, 1953. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

²⁸The "pollen survey" for 1955 appeared without comment in "Healthful Tucson Arizona, The Sunshine City," in 1956. Pollen counts for sixteen varieties of plants were listed, from a low of "19" for shadscale and a high of "1335" for bermuda grass.

during the spring and fall when there is a certain amount of pollen, the count is extremely low compared with that of Eastern states."²⁹ Despite these assurances, Tucsonans by 1968 sneezed with distressing regularity. The proliferation of olive trees and other nonnative plants, imported by immigrants seeking to make the brown desert more closely resemble the green landscape they had left behind, had created an allergy problem for the first time in Tucson. Eventually, in 1984, the Board of Supervisors banned the sale of olive and mulberry trees.³⁰ In the 1950s the pollen problem was still in its nascent stages, but serious enough to cause denials of its existence.

A University of Arizona researcher studied air pollution in Tucson in the mid 1960s, and also arrived at a laudatory, while cautionary evaluation. The study found that air pollution, of a sort similar to Los Angeles's smog, reduced visibility only twice in Tucson from 1959-1964. The source of the smog was automobile emissions and the emissions from the copper smelter in San Manuel, on the other side of the Catalina Mountains. The cautionary note at the end of the report recommended further monitoring of

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²⁹"The Answers to All Your Questions about Tucson Arizona," Tucson Chamber of Commerce, 1968.

³⁰The Board of Supervisors also required residents to trim bermuda grass before it went to seed. Arizona Daily Star, February 7, 1985, p. A-8.

air quality, but offered no plan for curbing or eliminating the problem.³¹

The problem of "sprawl" threatened the natural environment most directly as the city spread inexorably over the desert basin. The Regional Plan of 1945 recognized the problem of the "rapid and often haphazard subdivision of land" in the valley.³² The pattern of haphazard development continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The push for urban renewal in 1968 cited "leapfrog" development as indicative of Tucson's urbanization: "Flat topography, aggressive development of major arterials, and the availability of utilities, coupled with low density of construction have caused development to leapfrog vacant lands. Substantial scattered vacant lands thus exist throughout the community and even near the Central Business District."³³ According to Emmert as many as half the platted lots remained undeveloped within the city limits in 1951.³⁴ Developers avoided these lots, given the availability of cheap land beyond the urban fringe. "In

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³¹Quentin M. Mees, "Tucson Air Pollution, 1959-1964," Engineering Experiment Station Series Report #17 (Tucson: University of Arizona, College of Engineering), Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

³²"The Regional Plan," p. 1.

³³"Need for Renewal," 1968, p. 4.

³⁴Emmert, "An Annexation Study of Tucson," p. 3.

fill" became a campaign slogan of the "slow growth" candidates in the 1970s.³⁵

The aesthetic qualities of the community came under scrutiny in the early 1960s. The Chamber of Commerce formed "The Tucson Beautiful Committee" in 1961 to promote "parks, picnic areas, and trailways... and keep our atmosphere clean."³⁶ The committee lobbied for "effective smog control," and mounted clean-up campaigns, one of which collected "over 400 tons of tumbleweed and other debris."³⁷

In 1965 the city council appointed the "Community Goals Committee" to come up with suggestions to preserve Tucson's "... pleasant, healthful and harmonious environment."³⁸

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³⁵Factors that encouraged lateral urban development were lack of a strong central city core, relatively short travel times to and from the fringe areas, and the availability of cheap vacant land nearby, in Bernard J. Frieden, "Locational Preferences in the Urban Housing Market," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 27 (November 1961): 316-324. Factors that discouraged "infill" were neighborhood opposition to higher density housing and developers' reluctance to fill-in with low density housing except for ultra-luxury homes, in R.A. Johnston, S.I. Schwartz and S. Tracy, "Growth Phasing and Resistance to Infill Development in Sacramento County," Journal of the American Planning Association 50 (October 1984): 434-446.

³⁶"Tucson Chamber of Commerce Newsletter," Oct. 1, 1961. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

³⁷"Tucson Progress," Dec. 1968 and Jan. 1969, Tucson Chamber of Commerce. In Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

³⁸Community Goals Committee, "Goals for the Community, 1966," Report to the Tucson City Council, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

N. "Community Goals
Committee," 1965.

The trees of man and nature. Shall we take care to accomplish positive objectives, and then cancel out these gains by careless mistakes?

. . . . . or shall we simply ignore our environment?

. . . . . or shall we ensure that the means to attaining our objectives are complete in all respects?

The committee's report offered a cheerleading call to action, focusing on the need to accentuate traditional architecture and native landscaping (although the palm trees pictured in their report were decidedly non-native). The report also advocated "common sense" solutions to visual pollution, such as the placement of power lines underground. At least implicitly, urban growth took on menacing qualities: "As development has taken place, much of the Tucson basin has gradually succumbed to urban land use."³⁹ The desert succumbed to development, casting urbanization as a conquering rather than civilizing influence.

Efforts to analyze the aesthetics of urban environments proliferated in the 1960s. "The Tucson Visual Environment" drew on a methodology for studying urban landscapes developed by Kevin Lynch in The Image of the City. By the late 1960s, when the report appeared as part of continuing urban renewal programs, analysts could recognize a general uneasiness, "perceptual stress," among residents who felt their lifestyle to be threatened. The report described Tucson as:

a city of low imaginability, difficult to describe as to form, and dominated by the beauty of its surrounding natural environment... Many of the citizens indicated a nostalgic and strong attachment to the Tucson of the past -- its way of life, its architecture, and history, its 'small town character.' Unfortunately many of these citizens seemed bitter and

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³⁹Ibid., p. 32.

resentful of changes."⁴⁰

The report sought to explain the environmental degradation that troubled so many residents. Based on Lynch's methodology for determining "imagability," the report described Tucson as suffering from: low density development "resulting in monotony and disorientation," decentralized downtown area, undifferentiated grid system, perceptual stress (an awareness of increasing traffic, smog and slums), and problems of "visual quality and legibility." Legibility referred to concepts such as "bottomless towers," an idea generally applied to urban skyscrapers, whose tops define the urban silhouette, but whose entire height is rarely seen. In Tucson, residents recalled seeing the entire height of their natural skyscrapers, the mountains. As the city expanded across the floor of the desert valley the foothills and lower reaches of the mountains became obscured. The mountains became "bottomless towers." It's difficult to quantify the impact this visual change had on residents.⁴¹ Was it enough to cause another manifestation

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⁴⁰"The Tucson Visual Environment," pp. 51-52. Also, Martin N. Radbill, "Measuring the Quality of the Urban Landscape in the Tucson Arizona, Central Business District" (Master's Thesis in Geography, University of Arizona, 1968).

⁴¹In 1990 University of Arizona researchers surveyed 900 Tucson households in urban, suburban and rural areas. "All three categories of respondents favored a move to a more rural (lower density) setting if forced to move. All strongly preferred detached single-family housing..., yards or outdoor space to do with as they please, and a view of

of political resistance to growth in the 1960s? Obviously many immigrants arrived in Tucson, not out of a love for the desert, but a love of snow-free winters. Many Tucsonans pushed the desert away by planting bermuda grass and fir trees in their lawns. Desert landscaping was always acceptable in Tucson, and in some neighborhoods, the rule. But in other neighborhoods lawn mowers droned every weekend. And Tucsonans sneezed.

Although quantification of the growing awareness of environmental degradation in the 1950s proves elusive, in Tucson there was an observer who took note of the changes in the environment, and criticized them eloquently.

Joseph Wood Krutch wrote about the desert as a "naturalist" from his retirement home on the outskirts of Tucson. His earlier career in academia and as a prominent social critic gave his observations of desert life added significance. When Krutch wrote about the desert he was critiquing modern industrial society and the "modern

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desert or mountains. Advantages of location... for urban dwellers and the disadvantages of location for rural respondents seem to be relatively unimportant in influencing satisfaction with present housing or desires for new housing." In D.C. Wilkin and D.R. Iams, "Characteristics and Attitudes of Pima County Residents Related to Urban Expansion Into Rural Areas," Landscape Journal 9 (Spring 1990): 42. No such poll or survey exists from the 1950s or 1960s, but anecdotal evidence remains plentiful which supports the later survey's findings.

temper."

Krutch moved to Tucson, Arizona, from New York City in 1952. He had visited Tucson from the late 1930s, and in 1950 spent a sabbatical year in Tucson before returning to Columbia University in 1951. The following year Krutch retired permanently to Tucson.⁴²

Krutch's residence in Tucson coincided with the city's growth from a small desert town to a sprawling metropolis. Several other cities in the West also experienced rapid urbanization in the years following World War II, but few cities contained such an eloquent voice to comment on the change in urban landscape that was taking place. Nature and lifestyle drew Krutch to Tucson, but the change in the "natural environment" caused by rapid urbanization threatened the "way of life" Krutch, and many others, found so attractive in the early 1950s.

As a naturalist and social critic, Krutch decried the loss of "natural environment" within Tucson's urban fringe. But to what degree can any suburban area be considered "natural?" As with most "preservationist" critiques, Krutch offered a personal view of what constituted an acceptable intrusion upon the "natural environment." In a rhetorical sense, he resisted Tucson's growth because of suburban-

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⁴²John D. Margolis, Joseph Wood Krutch: A Writer's Life (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1980).

ization's intrusion into the pristine beauty of the Sonoran desert. Krutch's complaints joined the other resistance alive in the community, both politically and ethnically motivated. These other manifestations of resistance lacked Krutch's philosophical foundation or rhetorical eloquence, but shared in other aspects of his critique: individualistic, apolitical, and mostly ineffective.⁴³

Krutch first toured the southwestern deserts in 1938. As a naturalist, Krutch observed with fascination the exotic flora and fauna of the desert. More immediate, however, was the attraction of the southwestern climate: "... health was the decisive factor without which mere inertia would probably have persuaded me to continue in the way I had been going... to have a really good excuse for living in Arizona is just what I (had) been unconsciously waiting for."⁴⁴ Krutch brought a sensitivity and curiosity to his surroundings beyond that of the typical retiree, but

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⁴³Limerick, in Desert Passages, first correctly identified Krutch's "cheerful faith in the limited usefulness of desert property" in the early 1950s (p. 141), then incorrectly dismissed Krutch's understanding of the issues surrounding urbanization in the desert: "... the complicated problems of regulating the development of private property, or modifying the conventions of profit-centered land use, or of limiting the demands and aspirations of American consumers were by this time [early 1960s] beyond Krutch's reach" (p. 147). As the next pages will show, Krutch understood full well the character and agenda of the forces directing development in Tucson.

⁴⁴Joseph Wood Krutch, More Lives Than One (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1962), p. 307.

represented nonetheless an example of the early "snowbird" migration to the Sunbelt. In the debate over the growth of Tucson, Krutch spoke from an economically independent perspective common to the middle-class retiree. He could argue against "progress" from a position of personal security, requiring no extractive or despoiling industry to secure his living.⁴⁵ As a new resident in 1952 Krutch built a modest home on five acres of undisturbed desert beyond the city limits, joining the large number of "fringe" residents looking askance at the expanding behemoth called Tucson. By 1956 Krutch voiced opposition to Tucson's growth.

Krutch recognized the futility of arguing for "no growth," but still offered a critique of Tucson's expansion: "If we can't keep Tucson small, can't we at least keep it different?... Tucson has a community personality which we should take care not to destroy. People smile more here and are happier than in the larger cities. We should endeavor to keep the things about Tucson which are unique."⁴⁶

The natural desert surrounding his home epitomized what was unique about Tucson for Krutch. The horse owners on the fringe of Tucson might have agreed, as long as a few bridle

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⁴⁵Krutch, "Man's Mark on the Desert," If You Don't Mind My Saying So (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1964), 361-367.

⁴⁶Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 4, 1956, p. C-5.

trails through the "natural environment" were included. To other residents of Tucson, the flat easily-graded valley floor invited development, with cactus, rock and lizard as inconsequential casualties to human presence. Development proceeded unencumbered through the 1950s, but not without opposition, as the preceding chapters have shown. It was not until 1956, however, that the environmental critique was offered. After the series of large annexations were completed in 1955-1956, growth, which even city officials admitted to be "a bit indigestible,"⁴⁷ caused Krutch to speak out.

In a speech to Tucson's Rotary Club in October 1956 Krutch made his argument for preserving Tucson's uniqueness: "Whenever I see one of those posters which reads 'Help Tucson Grow,' I say to myself, 'God forbid.' I suggest that the Rotary Club adopt a new motto: 'Keep Tucson Small.'"⁴⁸

Krutch later acknowledged that his environmental concerns remained peripheral to the community at large in the 1950s.⁴⁹ The Arizona Daily Star reported his speech as

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⁴⁷Minutes of the Tucson City Council, Meeting of Dec. 5, 1955.

⁴⁸Krutch, If You Don't Mind My Saying So, p. 364.

⁴⁹Krutch, More Lives Than One, p. 360. Limerick misinterpreted Krutch's recognition of his own political marginality: "His public stance as a refined and cultivated gentleman of sensibility placed him a far distance from the trade centers, banks, real estate offices, and chambers of commerce that were directing the future of American

possibly a tongue-in-cheek exercise: "Dr. Krutch left some Rotarians wondering whether to take him seriously, or whether he was speaking more or less in a humorous vein."⁵⁰

On the same day Krutch spoke to the Rotary Club, the Planning and Zoning Commission approved a controversial rezoning request in the suburban area beyond Krutch's five acre homestead. Of the three plans proposed, the commission approved the plan for the most intensive development, increasing business zoning by 65 acres within a one-mile-diameter area, despite the protests of residents of the area "who sought to retain the suburban ranch type of zoning (then) in existence." Concern over the diminishing natural environment may have motivated the rezoning protest at some level, but on the surface at least, increasing taxes and a conflict of interest by one of the commissioners propelled the "heated 3-hour discussion."⁵¹

Krutch described his "controlled growth" ideas in "Man's Mark on the Desert" in 1962. The spread of the city

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settlement in the desert." Desert Passages, p. 147. In Tucson there was never much distance between the boosters and preservationists since tourist promotions required undisturbed desert near the city. Krutch's "partial solution" (described in the succeeding pages) indicates his recognition of the political realities in Tucson. The question was not whether to preserve the desert, but rather, how much desert to preserve, where, and when.

⁵⁰Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 4, 1956, p. C-5.

⁵¹Ibid., p. A-10.

across the desert floor had left Tucson "no longer recognizable as the town I came to live in some dozen years ago." He faulted the blind allegiance to "development" and "progress." Krutch recognized the futility of government regulation as he described the realities of zoning ordinances: "When an area is zoned as for residence only, that means merely that you can't put a commercial building there -- until someone wants to. Then the zoning will be changed." Krutch understood the minority standing of environmental awareness and found solace only in "partial solutions:"

Does all this mean that the desert, with all it has meant to many of us and might mean to generations still to come, is doomed to disappear in the not too distant future -- unless indeed a fundamental change of heart should take place in the majority of the citizens who direct our destinies? Perhaps. Perhaps, on the other hand, there is a partial solution -- namely the preservation of some sections of it as public land explicitly reserved in Parks, Monuments, and Wilderness Areas. It is far more rewarding to be able to live in the desert than merely to visit it. But that is at least better than nothing...⁵²

The Saguaro National Monument and the Arizona-Sonora Desert Museum provide examples of Krutch's "partial solution." Krutch supported the museum early and often; Sonnichsen gave him credit for naming the museum's van, used in out-reach programs throughout the community: "The Desert

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⁵²Krutch, If You Don't Mind My Saying So, pp. 362, 365.

Ark."⁵³

The Desert Museum and Saguaro National Monument remain prized assets of the community, valued by boosters as well as ardent desert preservationists. The definition of the desert's value, with or without a pecuniary element, separates boosters and preservationists, but a value attached to the desert remains. Preservation results, sufficient for some, inadequate for others.

The 1970s saw the election of "controlled growth" supervisors and councilmen, under the leadership of Ron Asta, who served on the Board of Supervisors from 1972-1976. The "Astacrat" movement espoused environmental concerns similar to those expressed by Krutch fifteen years earlier. Asta advocated restrictions on "urban sprawl" and commercial/industrial development more in harmony with the desert environment. The movement was short lived, however, with Asta losing his reelection bid and three controlled-growth councilmen losing a recall election in 1977. Once again environmental concerns surfaced in the community but then sank from view: the issues that turned the recall election were a controversial water-rate hike and a stagnant

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⁵³Sonnichsen, Tucson, p. 300.

job market.⁵⁴

Development continued into the 1980s as the sparsely settled urban fringe approached the topographical barriers of the mountains that border the Tucson Valley. Development intensified as townhomes replaced ranchettes. Even Krutch's "partial solution" became threatened in the 1980s as the debate over Tucson's expansion reached the Saguaro National Monument: how closely can the fragile ecosystem of the monument be ringed by tract homes and golf courses before the monument is destroyed both aesthetically and materially? Development has continued despite a fractious history of protests and warnings. Krutch represented one part of the resistance: "Is it not obvious that the process of mechanization has passed its optimum point when it has ceased to make life more leisurely, less tense, and more comfortable and become instead a burden to maintain..."⁵⁵

When Krutch opposed growth he opposed "progress." Superficially, this anti-progress critique put him on the fringe of resistance, considered because of his acknowledged intellect as more eccentric than lunatic. But in Tucson boosters had a stake in preserving the environment, and showed an awareness of environmental degradation early in

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⁵⁴Arizona Daily Star, Nov. 3, 1976, p. A-1; January 1, 1977, p. A-1.

⁵⁵Krutch, More Lives Than One, p. 350.

the 1950s, even if they did not admit to such an awareness in their promotional brochures. The Chamber of Commerce's first reference to pollen counts in 1956 comes out of nowhere. Why would the Chamber of Commerce even mention pollen counts unless in an effort to short-circuit concerns that were already present and circulating, or at least foreseen just beyond the horizon?

The case of foothills development perhaps displays most clearly the dynamics of environmental resistance to growth, and the limitations of local political efforts to preserve natural surroundings.

John Murphey, the developer most responsible for Tucson's spread into the Catalina foothills, often preserved natural surroundings and limited development in such a way as to create the "foothills lifestyle" that became prized as Tucson's most desirable. Murphey never opposed Tucson's growth -- as a developer he fostered it, and profited greatly from it -- but he did offer a sort of "resistance" in that he distrusted zoning regulations and politicians' long-term stewardship of the community. Murphey controlled growth through his own private business dealings, preserving much of what was considered "traditional" in Tucson. With the assistance of architect Josias Joesler, Murphey devised strict covenants and deed restrictions to make sure homes

and neighborhoods in the foothills "fit the terrain."⁵⁶ As Dave Ellwood, former county-city planner in the 1950s, recalled: "Morphey was a visionary guy and he had a built-in sensitivity to the land. He would walk or ride the whole area before he laid it out, and he took care to site houses on the land in the best way. Without him, God knows what would have happened to the foothills."⁵⁷ By creating the "foothills" lifestyle, Morphey increased his personal wealth while preserving natural surroundings. He became a model for other developers in the area who also used deed restrictions and covenants to control "such matters as the color of roofing material and placement of garbage containers."⁵⁸

The impact of Morphey's development in the foothills became more obvious after his death in 1977. The low density housing patterns preserved by Morphey's own initiative fell under the purview of county zoning

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⁵⁶For example, "It is desired that roads built shall follow and cling to these washes or other depressions of natural drainage as closely as possible." And, "The hills are covered with cacti... and have restrictions against their removal except for construction purposes. Catalina Foothills Estates owns over 5,000 acres in the district and has determined to keep it clear of all objectionable commercial enterprises." In, J.W. Morphey, MS 568, Box 9, Folder 95, Arizona Historical Society.

⁵⁷Douglas Kreutz, "The High Life: Foothills Living Part of the American Dream," Arizona Daily Star, July 12, 1987, pp. D-1-6.

⁵⁸Ibid.

regulations. Critics of the more dense development in the foothills called the county's "incremental zoning" a hodge-podge following no master plan which resulted in "a sort of aesthetic holocaust." Townhomes and condominiums sprang up, much to the chagrin of ranch-home residents, who referred to the new construction as "rabbit warrens for people."

Resorts and golf courses "'Californicated the foothills' by imposing elegance where wilderness once reigned." Denser development created resistance to further development in the late 1980s as the population in the 50-square-mile area reached about 40,000. The hew and cry increased when residents learned that zoning for the area would allow a total population of 80,000. Even Tucson's quintessential developer, Roy Drachman, voiced his dismay: "What's happened has not been pleasing to me. I am distressed to see some of the things developers have done in the foothills -- things that don't make sense. They've created scars that will take a long time to heal. Some of the developers who did this are friends of mine, but that's the way I feel."⁵⁹

Murphey had purchased 1700 acres in the foothills in the 1930s, and then had proceeded to create "the city's most prestigious residential area."⁶⁰ The Shields family had

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⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Sonnichsen, Tucson, p. 217.

owned the Flying V Ranch in the foothills since the early 1900s. They also sought to preserve the rural lifestyle of the foothills by maintaining their 830 acres as a working ranch, and of course, dude ranch. In 1979, however, the Shields sold 272 acres to The Estes Company, one of Tucson's busiest homebuilders. "We didn't have much choice," Reed Shields told the Arizona Daily Star. "The last year we had all the land, our taxes were over \$30,000. My dad said 'That's awfully expensive horse pasture.'"⁶¹

Krutch, Murphey, and Shields all expressed a sensitivity for the natural environment, although how each defined that environment, and defined an acceptable intrusion upon it, differed. Krutch spoke from a position of economic independence that allowed for a purer preservationist critique. Murphey became a millionaire as a developer, primarily in the Catalina Foothills, and in the process created a prestigious residential area that was criticized as elitist (a critique shared with environmentalism generally): "Should the foothills remain a special, protected place of wide-open spaces and top quality construction -- and thereby be the exclusive domain of the affluent?"⁶² The Shields family has managed to maintain their ranch in the foothills, sandwiched between a resort

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⁶¹Arizona Daily Star, July 12, 1987, pp. D-1-6.

⁶²Ibid.

hotel and golf course on one side, and a residential development on the other. All three, Krutch, Murphey and Shields, considered themselves defenders of the "natural surroundings."

To the distress of all three, an environmental awareness, even when combined with preexisting political and ethnic resistance to growth, was unable to stop sprawling development in Tucson. Perhaps only the surrounding mountains can.

Part 2: ALBUQUERQUE

By the 1920s an electric trolley serviced the new neighborhoods in the "heights" to the east of the Rio Grande River in Albuquerque.¹ By the 1930s neighborhoods made their first appearance on the mesa above the heights, which stretched about ten miles to the Sandia Mountains. The University of New Mexico had established its main campus on

O. Profile of the Rio Grande River Valley

SOURCE: "Albuquerque: Its Mountains, Valley, Water and Volcanoes," p. 14.

the "heights" to the east of the town, and Kirtland Air Force Base, along with Sandia Laboratories, occupied mesa land further east, originally outside the urban fringe, now well within it.²

The boom following World War II pushed development

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¹George Fitzpatrick and Harvey Caplin, Albuquerque: 100 Years in Pictures, 1875-1975 (Albuquerque: Calvin Horn Publisher, Inc., 1975), p. 69.

²Ibid., p. 107.

further onto the mesa to the northeast. The increased defense industry spending in the area brought thousands of new residents, creating a population explosion with all the commensurate housing, traffic, and social service problems. Similarities with Tucson abound, including the analysis of growth in Albuquerque, especially in the boom period following World War II, which suffers from the same myopia that marked histories of Tucson's growth.

Political contentiousness accompanied the population explosion in Albuquerque. Historians such as Robert Turner Wood and Bradford Luckingham focused on the political wrangling that resulted, for example, in a city charter change in 1972 that replaced the commission form of government with a mayor and council structure. The push for reform in city government originated with the Citizens Committee in the 1950s, composed of "technocrat" types from the eastern suburbs, described stereotypically by Wood and Luckingham as citizens employed by the efficiency-conscious defense organizations (oxymoron?). These engineers were said to abhor the old fashioned city government's inefficiency, and so pushed to replace it with a more standardized sort of bureaucracy.

This focus on political structures offers a superficial depiction of Albuquerque's development. As in Tucson, resistance to Albuquerque's growth across a broad political

P. Overview of the Rio Grande River Valley

SOURCE: "Albuquerque: Its Mountains, Valley, Water and Volcanoes," p. 2.

spectrum appeared at the earliest stages of the boom, in suburban areas to the east, ethnic neighborhoods to the west and south, and later, in environmental concerns voiced by

residents throughout the community.

Although generally comparable, the opposition to urbanization in Albuquerque manifested itself somewhat differently from Tucson's resistance. Each city's unique cultural mix, within the bounds of a similar regional identity, caused the resistance to take shape according to political, geographic, and ethnic factors particular to each city.

An early unique feature of Albuquerque's growth arose in 1880 with the arrival of the Santa Fe Railroad. Anglo dominance of Tucson and Albuquerque began with the arrival of the railroad, but in Albuquerque the railroad bypassed the original settlement near the river. More than a mile separated the town and the railroad, due to the unwillingness of inhabitants, mostly Hispanic, to grant the Santa Fe a right-of-way through the town.³ A real estate boom resulted around the tracks which eventually connected the "Old Town" with "New Albuquerque."⁴ Thus ethnic enclavement occurred in Albuquerque earlier and with more

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³Alan J. Oppenheimer, "The Historical Background of Albuquerque, New Mexico," June 1962, Albuquerque Planning Department; reprinted by the Urban Development Institute of the University of Albuquerque, April 1969, p. 33. In Center for Southwest Research, Meem Collection, University of New Mexico Library.

⁴Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 8.

Q. Development Pattern of Central Albuquerque

1. RIO GRANDE
2. VALLEY BLUFFS
3. HISTORIC OLD TOWN

4. A.T. and S.F. R.R. MAIN LINE
5. OLD CROSSROADS
6. OLD BRIDGES

7. NEW CROSSROADS
8. BUSINESS CORE
9. STRIP COMMERCIAL

10. MAJOR RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS
11. TRANSITION AREA
12. INDUSTRIAL AREA
13. MAJOR OPEN SPACE

SOURCE: "The Downtown
Plan, 1970."

geographic certainty than in Tucson. The Anglo-dominated commercial center of Albuquerque straddled the railroad tracks along Central Avenue (also known as Railroad Avenue). "Old Town" remained pastoral and Hispanic. An indication of "Old Town's" declining status appeared in 1926 when the Bernalillo County Court House moved to "New Albuquerque."⁵

The New Albuquerque grew faster and earlier than Tucson, at least until the 1950s. Factors of environment played a role in Albuquerque's earlier development. Agriculture along the Rio Grande surpassed that along the Santa Cruz. Also a climate that was cooler and less "deserty" gave the city an early advantage over blistering Tucson, at least until technological advancements softened the impact of Tucson's summer heat. Albuquerque rests on a semi-arid plain, about 2,000 feet higher than Tucson (Albuquerque at 5,300 feet, Tucson at 2,400 feet). Temperatures in Albuquerque average about 10 degrees cooler.⁶

Boosters in Albuquerque pushed the city's development with a cohesiveness lacking in Tucson, perhaps due to the greater degree of enclavement or the lack of an instate

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⁵Ibid., p. 20.

⁶John Gottberg, Frommer's Santa Fe, Taos, and Albuquerque (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1989), p. 2; Anne Christensen and Diane Sikes, Tucson (Phoenix: Valley Publishing Co., 1984), p. 3.

rival, such as Tucson faced in Phoenix. Albuquerque's self-image as the commercial center of the Southwest appeared repeatedly in promotional announcements and programs. At times the promotions made claims for the city bordering on hubris. Similarities arise between Tucson and Albuquerque promotional efforts, but in general Albuquerque's promotions started earlier and shouted louder.

Chapter 5: Progrowth Partnership

"Step Lively"

Albuquerque's developers sought to profit from their city's natural attributes. Promotions advertised Albuquerque's fertile location near the Rio Grande River, sunny climate, and Indian heritage. Tucson and Albuquerque shared these characteristics of regional development, but the specific pattern of urbanization differed as the process of development diverged in the two cities. Albuquerque's boosters enjoyed more early success than Tucson's boosters, perhaps due to the milder climate and closer working relationship between Albuquerque's boosters and the city government.

Boosters vigorously pushed Albuquerque's development from territorial days. "New Albuquerque" businessmen and developers founded the "Board of Trade" in 1882 and the "Commercial Club" in the 1890s to promote commerce in the city.⁷ The Commercial Club also served as a social organization hosting dances at the club's hall.⁸ Col. D.K.B. Sellers exemplified the early type of individualistic

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⁷Oppenheimer, "The Historical Background of Albuquerque," p. 36.

⁸Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 41.

promoter and developer in Albuquerque. In 1905 Sellers developed the Perea Addition and the Grant tracts in the valley, then went on to plat the University Heights to the east of the city, which was advertised as "the coming aristocratic residence section of Albuquerque."⁹ In the Perea Addition alone, Sellers marketed 700 lots, and the Grant tract on North 5th Street sold out in 30 days. In addition to his real estate dealings, Sellers promoted Albuquerque's "Territorial Fair" and other "city enterprises."¹⁰

Turn-of-the-century Albuquerque boosters expressed a degree of confidence remarkable even for that self-assured assemblage. As University of New Mexico buildings rose to the east of the town in 1890, a Daily Citizen editorial waxed pridefully: "Albuquerque is already recognized by the country at large as the railroad and commercial center of the Southwest, and the advance we have already made in the way of institutions of learning show that the town is to be recognized hereafter as also the educational center of the country..."¹¹ The Commercial Club also issued a pamphlet

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⁹"University Heights, Albuquerque, New Mexico," 1906, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, Item 13.

¹⁰Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 43.

¹¹Albuquerque Daily Citizen, Dec. 13, 1890, quoted in Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 3.

describing the city as "the educational center" of the region.¹²

The Commercial Club especially marketed Albuquerque as a mecca for tuberculosis sanatoriums. A series of pamphlets in the early 1900s proclaimed the city to be "the land of sunshine," and "Eden." The "Killgloom Gazette" was issued briefly in 1914 as a newsletter for patients and staff of the six local sanatoriums. The Commercial Club also issued a pamphlet in 1914 titled "Why Albuquerque, New Mexico, Will Make You Well." The reasons were clean air and "ozone."¹³

In 1916 boosters reorganized the Commercial Club as the Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce, and the expansive promotions continued full bore. The new Chamber of Commerce continued to advertise the city through a series of pamphlets describing "climatic conditions... soil of the valley, land prices, cost of irrigation, varieties of crops produced, stock raising... [and] the public lands of the state for sale and lease."¹⁴

City promoters instituted the "Step Lively" campaign in

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¹²"Compliments of the Educators of Albuquerque," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, Item 3.

¹³"Why Albuquerque, New Mexico, Will Make You Well," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, Items 22. Also Items 6 and 38. "Killgloom Gazette," 1914, is without an Item number.

¹⁴Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, Item 27.

1920, issuing a pamphlet that catalogued Albuquerque's enticements: "Sabe, Senor? Let's Go!"¹⁵ Among Albuquerque's charms were "60 miles of graded streets." In 1925 the Chamber of Commerce announced the formation of the Albuquerque Civic Council, which coordinated the spread of Albuquerque's health-resort image. The council was a non-profit organization composed of "our leading citizens," and enjoyed the benefit of financial support from the city government.¹⁶ Tax levies supported an advertising campaign that described the city as "The Heart of the Well Country."¹⁷ This early example of tax-supported boosterism departs from Tucson's experience. Many political leaders in Tucson came out of the booster organizations such as the Sunshine Climate Club and Chamber of Commerce, but in Tucson the booster organizations remained financially independent, and strapped.

Promotion efforts in Albuquerque continued into the 1930s under the enthusiastic leadership of ex-officio mayor Clyde Tingley; he served on the City Commission (except when

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¹⁵"Step Lively, the Albuquerque Way," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 122, Box 1, Item 28; also quoted in Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 67.

¹⁶"Albuquerque," 1925, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box, Item 49.

¹⁷"Albuquerque: The Heart of the Well Country," Special Collections, University of Arizona Library.

serving as Governor of New Mexico) from the 1920s into the 1950s. Tingley, along with other boosters, supported the "First America" fair and eventually the State Fair, established in 1938, which became Albuquerque's biggest annual "event."¹⁸

Predictably, the Depression years slowed growth, and strains in the booster organizations appeared. The effort to establish Albuquerque Magazine in 1939 noted "obstacles" to the enterprise as potential advertisers were "wary of pure advertising schemes [as] their generosity in sponsoring community projects had been imposed upon."¹⁹

Perhaps as a result of a flagging confidence, promotions in the 1930s slipped in their universal trumpeting of Albuquerque's metropolitan splendor. A market study prepared by the city's two daily newspapers in 1939 described "greater Albuquerque" as an area "four miles in all directions from the Post Office..."²⁰ Was the reference to the city's dimensions meant to startle the reader with images of gargantuan size, or tempt with visions

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¹⁸Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 144.

¹⁹"The Albuquerque Magazine" (Summer 1939), Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box 1, Item 87.

²⁰"A Market Study of New Mexico," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, Item 86.

of metropolitan trappings amidst small town coziness?

By the 1940s promotions regularly included references to Albuquerque's small town qualities. This mixed message was apparent in Tucson's promotions throughout the boosters' campaigns, but in Albuquerque appreciation for "smallness" appeared much later and contrasts more clearly with their earlier boasts. Metropolitan splendor remained the theme of many promotions in Albuquerque, but the solid front of big city hyperbole crumbled. As the 1941 brochure proclaimed, Albuquerque was "the most metropolitan little city anywhere."²¹

The Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce distributed 10,000 "Come Live in Albuquerque" brochures in 1942 (the subsequent wartime expansion obviated the need for such promotions throughout the war years). The allure of the city as described in the brochure was both metropolitan and Main Street. The well-known war correspondent, Ernie Pyle, offered boosters a prominent example of a new resident who had sampled life in all the great cities of the world and had decided in 1941 to make Albuquerque his permanent home. Pyle explained his decision to settle in Albuquerque in New Mexico Magazine, focusing more on small town qualities than metropolitan sophistication: "We (Pyle and his wife) like

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²¹"Pictorial Albuquerque," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, Item 89.

it because you can cash a check almost anywhere in Albuquerque without being grilled as though you were a criminal. And because after your second trip to a filling station the gas-pumper calls you by name."²²

By 1949 the Chamber of Commerce was back on stride in its promotions of the city, expressing the same sort of optimism that motivated progress-minded developers in Tucson: "Only as a community prospers... do its citizens prosper."²³ As Wood described, boosters took "immense pride" in the city as it pursued metropolitan status in the period following World War II. At times "it seemed that they regarded it as the most outstanding municipality in the number-one country in creation."²⁴

The migration of easterners "certified Albuquerque's attractiveness," and added to the city's size -- an obvious mark of health and vitality for the city. The local newspapers supported the city's claims as a health mecca. The Albuquerque Journal heralded the story of Janet Atsha, an asthma sufferer who arrived in Albuquerque at the age of

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²²Ernie Pyle, "Why Albuquerque?" New Mexico Magazine 20:1 (January 1942): 17.

²³"Only as a Community Prospers..." Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box II, folder: "Chamber of Commerce."

²⁴Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 571.

six in 1949, apparently dying. After a few months of hospital care in Albuquerque Janet had recovered sufficiently to "jump rope and climb." Declared her mother, also an asthma sufferer, "Albuquerque will be our home from now on. This must be what heaven is like."²⁵

The Albuquerque Journal championed "Headlong growth," and urged comparisons with other cities in the region, such as El Paso and Santa Fe.²⁶ The tradition of favorably comparing Albuquerque with other regional cities goes back to the earliest promotions. The health promotions of the early 1900s boasted of Albuquerque's advantages over Denver, Colorado Springs, Pueblo, El Paso, Phoenix, and Tucson.²⁷ The habit of trumpeting Albuquerque's virtues resumed in the 1950s, and as Wood noted, "There was a general feeling of disappointment when the 1950 census figures revealed that the population within the city limits had not reached 100,000."²⁸

Promotions continued in the 1950s and 1960s in a standard effort to attract tourists and develop commerce. In 1951 the Chamber of Commerce sponsored a contest for the

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²⁵Albuquerque Journal, April 23, 1950, pp. 1, 14.

²⁶Ibid., July 19, 1948, p. 4; July 19, 1953, p. 4.

²⁷"Albuquerque, New Mexico: The City of Flowers in the Heart of the Well Country," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, uncatalogued.

²⁸Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 572.

best slogan for the city: "Albuquerque -- Land of Manana -- Wonderland of Today."²⁹ In the 1950s the Chamber of Commerce also issued "Pause in Albuquerque: In the Heart of the Picturesque Indian Country" and "See New Mexico From Albuquerque," which described the city as "thriving, metropolitan" and the "gateway to these scenic wonders (Indian pueblos, mountains, and fishing)."³⁰ Starting in 1963 the Chamber issued "The Turquoise Trail," which referred to a scenic loop drive centered on Albuquerque.³¹

The hordes of new residents continued to arrive, and "population figures brought forth exultation." In 1954 Albuquerque's two newspapers published a series of brochures proclaiming themselves "New Mexico's leading daily newspapers," and promoting Albuquerque as "America's most dynamic city."³² A 1958 editorial in the Albuquerque Journal chortled over the "miracle city": "We who have been here for some time have difficulty in keeping on top of our capabilities and our potential. The outsiders see the

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²⁹Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 18, 1951, p. 2.

³⁰"See New Mexico From Albuquerque," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, uncatalogued; and Box II, folder: "Chamber of Commerce."

³¹"Albuquerque News Letter," April 26, 1963, in Center for Southwest Research, University of Arizona, Coronado Collection, "Action Albuquerque."

³²"America's Most Dynamic City," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, uncatalogued.

picture and come swarming into our midst. We live in a miracle city with many of us not realizing the magnitude of the miracle."³³ The count of residents made in 1960 brought forth editorial back-slapping: "In 200,000 Class," at last.³⁴

Albuquerque also took the lead in promoting regional comparisons which offered the Southwest as the preferred sun-worshiper destination. Both tourists and prospective residents were the target in 1964 of the "sun challenge" thrown down to Florida and Hawaii by the Southwest Sun Country Association, a booster organization composed of the Chambers of Commerce of Albuquerque, El Paso, Tucson and Phoenix. The association had no physical structure; it was purely a public relations effort, with the Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce coordinating press releases and advertising campaigns for the four cities.³⁵

Albuquerque enjoyed (or suffered from) a close working relationship between boosters and the city government. Albuquerque's city commission represented business interests in a manner typical for growing communities, but the

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³³Albuquerque Journal, Sept. 7, 1958, p. 6.

³⁴Ibid., Nov 9, 1968, p. A-6.

³⁵"Albuquerque News Letter," January 17, 1964, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Coronado Collection, "Action Albuquerque."

connection between city government and business went further than in Tucson. Examples of the cohesive progrowth partnership abound. Tax levies supported the Albuquerque Civic Council's promotions of Albuquerque as a health resort. Clyde Oden, owner of a Buick dealership, served on the city commission concurrently with his tenure as president of the Chamber of Commerce.³⁶ Although Oden lost his commission seat in the election of 1946 the business/government connection persisted. After Oden's departure from the city commission the Chamber of Commerce established a "liason committee" to "study, on behalf of the members of the Chamber of Commerce on behalf of the people of the city of Albuquerque, certain problems confronting the city..." The Chamber of Commerce asked the city commissioners to cooperate with their study committee, and the commission duly promised to do so.³⁷ No such direct connection between boosters and city government ever existed in Tucson.

The boom years following World War II changed the face of Albuquerque, but the progrowth partnership survived intact. Suburban development spread onto the mesa east of the city, and developers like Dale Bellamah became

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³⁶Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 49.

³⁷Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of August 6, 1946, City Clerk's office, Albuquerque, p. 4

millionaires. The population within the city limits increased from about 50,000 in 1945, to 96,815 in 1950, to 201,189 in 1960. Many of the new residents were veterans who had been stationed in the West during World War II, returning to Albuquerque due to its moderate climate, informal atmosphere and defense jobs.³⁸ The size of Albuquerque in 1946 was 11.61 square miles, after achieving a few small annexations during World War II.³⁹ In 1946 a "Better Government" ticket of city commission candidates swept into office on a platform of "business growth and municipal expansion." Clyde Tingley opposed rapid growth due to the financial pressures it placed on the city. Despite running against the booster tide, Tingley maintained his seat on the commission, although he lost the chairmanship and control. The Chamber of Commerce formulated the plan to expand Albuquerque's boundaries -- a product of their study committee's deliberations.⁴⁰ The resulting annexations in the late 1940s and 1950s expanded Albuquerque's physical size to about 86 square miles,

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³⁸Gerald D. Nash, The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp. 213-214.

³⁹"Annexations to the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1958, City Planning Department, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Coronado Collection, "Annexation Index."

⁴⁰Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 18, 1947, pp. 1 and 3.

engendering vociferous resistance in the process (resistance to annexations will be discussed in Chapter 6).⁴¹

The partnership between businessmen and government in Albuquerque remained in place throughout the city's development. The freeway construction plans of the 1950s serve as an indication of this fundamental alliance. Unlike Tucson, Albuquerque began construction of "criss-crossing freeways" in 1956 to solve the traffic problems brought on by the population explosion. The freeways were completed in the 1960s.⁴² The attitude toward freeway construction marks a difference between the two cities, Tucsonans repeatedly rejecting the idea of a cross-town freeway as a step toward the model of Los Angeles, a step in the wrong direction. Conversely, Albuquerque's boosters always were able to convince the city commission, if not their neighbors, to support big-city "improvements."

More unanimity of purpose marked Albuquerque's booster efforts. Individual boosters, such as Dale Belemah, went broke, but the city government and booster alliance pushed the city's growth unremittantly. Despite the solid progrowth partnership, resistance materialized in Albuquerque, but the strength of the partnership suggests

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⁴¹Ibid.; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Boundary and Annexation Study, 1970-1973 (Wash. D.C, 1975), p. 47.

⁴²Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 108.

one reason why resistance to growth was steamrolled so quickly in Bernalillo County. Even in the midst of political reform movements that attacked the old-fashioned, individualistic city government embodied in the personal management style of Clyde Tingley, the government/booster alliance continued to push for growth. Wood described these political reform movements in consensus terms, which was an accurate rendition at least within the pro-growth partnership: "Big [city] government required a certain systematic delegation of decision making; the educated and affluent defense industry workers who were moving into the eastern heights demanded order and reason in public life; the whole country seemed to be seeking a return to quietness and sanity."⁴³ Although Wood's characterization of the "whole country" goes too far, the effort to rationally confront issues related to growth did in fact occupy the reformers.

A comprehensive zoning ordinance was passed in 1953 without major protest.⁴⁴ In 1954 a reform group elected members to the city commission, pushing for efficiency and the orderly expansion of city services. The resulting increase in the city budget required the imposition of a city sales tax (one cent in 1956), and the reassessment of

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⁴³Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 129.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 178.

land values. Rapid growth had necessitated the increase in the city's budget so as to provide city services to more residents over a wider area.⁴⁵

Development in the 1960s reached the foothills of the Sandia Mountains. Other milestones appeared: the first shopping mall in 1961; redevelopment of "Old Town Plaza" in the 1960s as a tourist attraction; the annual International Balloon Fiesta begun in 1972.⁴⁶ New "company-made communities" sprang up on Albuquerque's fringes in the 1960s and early 1970s: "the people kept pouring in, many of them retirees from the east seeking a pleasanter, less congested life than they had known before."⁴⁷ A trend toward more pastoral lifestyles on the fringe of the metropolis fueled a mini-population boom in the traditional villages of Tijeras, Bernalillo, Corrales and Placitas. The "company-made towns" of Paradise Hills and Rio Rancho to the north and northwest of the city joined the older satellite communities in the 1960s.⁴⁸ On the fringe of the city "the pace of life seemed slower, traditional cultures or natural beauty was

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⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 150-151.

⁴⁶Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, pp. 157, 159, 178.

⁴⁷Albuquerque Journal, July 2, 1972, p. G-2.

⁴⁸Ibid., May 17, 1963, p. A-2.

closer at hand..."⁴⁹

Development in Albuquerque differed somewhat than Tucson's in its relatively uniform grid system for streets. New developments on the fringes tended to conform to established patterns of shape and block size, making newly developed areas as readily accessible as established parts of town.⁵⁰ The uniform pattern of development increased the liminality between the urban setting and the natural surroundings in Albuquerque: green lawns and trees set amidst the predominantly brown mesa (to be discussed more fully in Chapter 8). Conversely, the acceptability and popularity of desert landscaping within Tucson decreases the liminality between the city and surrounding environment.

The partnership between government and business groups survived the various reform movements that reshaped the city commission and ultimately restructured the city government. In 1960 the Chamber of Commerce agreed to support wealthy businessmen, each of whom donated \$1000 to a recruitment fund which was used to form the independent Albuquerque Industrial Development Foundation.⁵¹ In 1966 "dynamic and

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⁴⁹Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 326.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 78.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 257 and 260. Also, in 1963 the Chamber of Commerce established the Albuquerque Industrial Development Corporation, "... a publicly-held, broad-based community

progressive" candidates for the city commission, including Pete Domenici, took control of the city commission and continued the business/government alliance. Domenici, as chairman of the commission, assigned three city employees to work with the Chamber of Commerce, Albuquerque Industrial Development Service, and Albuquerque Industrial Foundation to coordinate the boosters' efforts to attract new industry to the city.⁵² Once again city government, in the form of tax-paid employees, worked hand-in-hand with boosters in Albuquerque. Although Tucson's city government cooperated with boosters, this degree of mutual assistance rarely appeared in Tucson.

Civic reformers like Domenici expressed a faith in the efficacy of rational growth through the management of development. In 1967 Domenici announced a shift to "planned annexations" in an effort to calm tempers raised by years of controversial expansion efforts by the city. As Domenici explained, "annexation" had become "a dirty word."⁵³ By 1971 controlled growth was an issue in the city commission

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organization for the purpose of buying, building and financing buildings and other services for industries which would like to move to Albuquerque, and existing firms that would like to expand." In "Albuquerque News Letter," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Coronado Collection, "Action Albuquerque."

⁵²Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," pp. 257, 260.

⁵³Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 15, 1967, p. A-4.

election with "none of the front-running candidates favor(ing) headlong expansion."⁵⁴ In 1971 the most significant structural reform of the city government was proposed when city commissioner Pete Domenici argued for the change to the mayor/council form of city government. Domenici hoped the new form of government would establish strong, full-time, leadership to deal effectively with the problems, including growth issues, then surfacing.⁵⁵

Did reforms in the city government indicate that Albuquerque offered a better example of planned growth than Tucson? On the surface at least planners in Albuquerque received the cooperation of businessmen and politicians. In 1953 an Arizona banker, Walter R. Bimson, gave the commencement address at the University of New Mexico, describing for the graduates a "new business code:" "An important point in all this change is that by use of traditional democratic processes we have almost done away with the old concept that the owner of property and wealth has a right to use his property any way he pleases."⁵⁶ A test of Bimson's thesis had occurred in 1950 when Albuquerque's City Planning Commission's function changed from advising the city commission on growth issues to

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⁵⁴Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 572.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 513.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 167.

regulating development. The initial impact of this change was negligible due to the commissioners' ties to the real estate and construction industries. In 1952, however, the planning commission proposed an ordinance requiring builders to pay for the installation of utilities and paving in new subdivisions. The City Commission unanimously disapproved the ordinance, but the following year the city commission passed the controversial measure due to the financial drain rapid expansion had placed on the city. In this instance financial necessity had proved to be more influential than appeals for orderly growth.⁵⁷

Although cooperation in general marked the business/growth partnership in Albuquerque, dissension occasionally surfaced among the politically conservative. When the city government "extended its reach into areas that had heretofore been the province of private citizens," conservative elements, always suspicious of government's intentions, questioned the benefits of government-sponsored enterprises.⁵⁸

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⁵⁷Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 22, 1952, p. 1.

⁵⁸For example, city trash collection in 1948, and the city's acquisition of the animal shelter from the Humane Society, in Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," pp. 108-109, 151; Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 26, 1947, p. 1; May 30, 1948, p. 1. Also, the Chamber of Commerce sponsored "Freedom versus Communism" courses in 1963, in "Albuquerque News Letter," October 4, 1963, Center for Southwest

Another example of splits within the boosters' consensus appears in the divisions in Albuquerque's commercial associations. Wood erroneously applied his theme of harmony to the early 1950s by pointing to the conjoining of the geographically diverse business groups. The groups joined together, but were never completely at peace. In 1953 the Heights Businessmen's Association (600 businessmen east of the University of New Mexico campus) joined the Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce as an affiliated organization. The North Albuquerque Association also joined the Chamber of Commerce on similar terms. The rivalry between downtown and heights businessmen "came to a head" a few years later as traffic congestion increased downtown and expansion of the city continued toward the east. Heights businessmen felt their interests diverged from those concerned with maintaining "downtown" as a viable commercial center. A "formal break" occurred on Feb. 7, 1958 when the Board of Directors of the H.B.A and N.A.A. voted unanimously to split from the Chamber of Commerce. In 1962 the two groups voted to rejoin the Chamber of Commerce, but a sense of the need for separate organizations remained prevalent.⁵⁹

Research, University of New Mexico, Coronado Collection,
"Action Albuquerque."

⁵⁹Albuquerque Journal, Aug. 19, 1953, p. 18; Feb. 7, 1958, p. A-1; Sept. 17, 1959, p. A-1.

Differences between the Heights and downtown surfaced again in 1960-1962 in the argument that developed over where to build the new city-county hall: downtown or in the heights. Predictably, heights businessmen favored a site in their own neighborhood, while downtown businessmen argued for a downtown location. Others also argued for a downtown site so as to strengthen the city's urban core. The city commission skirted the issue by appointing the Albuquerque Growth Committee in December 1961 to study the issue. Ultimately the committee recommended the downtown site.⁶⁰

Perhaps the split within business groups was inevitable given the personal judgments of profit potential related to the geographic diversity of commerce in Albuquerque. In addition to the geographic factors, a basic split between businessmen occurs in relation to growth issues. Some businessmen, such as real estate developers and home builders, require legions of new residents to assure their own prosperity. Other businessmen, such as those involved in service sector occupations with an established clientel, find their own prosperity assured given the existing population.

Despite the potentially diverging interests among businessmen, the generalization holds in Albuquerque, more

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⁶⁰Ibid., Oct. 19, 1961, p. A-2.

so than Tucson, of a remarkably uniform push for growth. Splits among boosters appeared, but the progrowth partnership steamrolled the early resistance to annexation, as Chapter 6 will show. The push for growth in Albuquerque in the 1950s was gung-ho, optimistic, self-righteous and unstoppable. Only when the boosters attempted their most grandiose annexation in 1964 -- an effort to annex the entire county -- did resistance succeed in stifling the spread of the city.

Chapter 6: Political Resistance

"Land, Lots of Land"

Political opposition to Albuquerque's expansion appeared throughout the post World War II boom. Anglo and Hispanic residents resisted continuous, aggressive, annexations by the City of Albuquerque. Some sought to preserve their culture and lifestyle. Political conservatives opposed the expansion of city government. The progrowth partnership of boosters and city government overwhelmed the early resistance, but in so doing engendered ever more harsh criticism and opposition. Annexations became so rancorous that in 1964 the New Mexico state legislature imposed a two-year moratorium on annexations by the City of Albuquerque. In 1967, city commissioner Pete Domenici admitted that "annexation" had become a "dirty word."

The spread of Albuquerque to the east encountered the same sort of inviting open spaces that marked Tucson's expansion across the desert floor. Albuquerque's natural barrier to the east, the Sandia Mountains, allowed for lots of in-fill before development reached the escarpment. As George Fitzpatrick and Harvey Caplin described: "Until the post-World War II boom started, East Central Avenue beyond

the Fair Grounds looked like this... land, lots of land."¹ Affluent residential areas appeared near the mountains in the 1960s offering views of the city's lights. New resident, Ernie Pyle, described a more pastoral Albuquerque in 1942: "... we like Albuquerque because we have a country mailbox instead of a slot in the door. We like it because our front yard stretches as far as you can see, and because Mt. Taylor, 65 miles away, is like a framed picture in our window. We like it because when we look to the westward, we look clear over and above the city of Albuquerque and on beyond, it seems, half way to the Pacific Ocean."² As development spread to the east in the 1950s pastoral scenes disappeared, replaced by suburban monotony, but the mountains still offered a visual reminder of the once open spaces.

In 1946 the recently elected, reform-minded city commissioners presented a huge annexation plan to the district court for validation. The Albuquerque Journal cast the targeted area as a helpless calf when it reported that the commissioners "flexed a gigantic legal riata with which it [hoped] to rope in all of its densely-populated suburbs." The annexation, as proposed, would double the city's population and bring the area within the city limits to

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¹Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 131.

²Pyle, "Why Albuquerque?" New Mexico Magazine, p. 17.

approximately one hundred square miles. On the commission only Clyde Tingley, the old New Deal Democrat still ensconced at City Hall, voiced opposition to the annexation plan, arguing that providing basic city services to the area would cost at least \$12 million. Within the fringe area, meantime, a "storm of protest" arose.³

At the center of the controversy over the proposed annexation was the role the Chamber of Commerce had played in creating the city's ambitious annexation policy. The newspaper's colorful language describing the annexation plan had begun: "At the behest of the Chamber of Commerce, the city commission Monday flexed..."⁴ The "suburbs" referred to in the newspaper article included the established, although not incorporated, communities of Old Town, Barcelona, Arenal, Armijo, Five Points, Los Duranes, Los Candelarias, Los Griegos, and Santa Barbara. The city commission had initiated the annexation by instructing the city attorney to petition the district court to recognize the annexation on the basis of New Mexico's 1939 annexation law.⁵ This "Roswell Law" allowed cities to annex by simple

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³Albuquerque Journal, December 31, 1946, p. 1.

⁴Ibid.

⁵The 1939 law ammended annexation statutes of 1884 and 1935, and appeared in the 1942 compilation of New Mexico statutes. At times the Albuquerque Journal referred to it as the "1942 annexation law."

resolution areas bordering the city on two or more sides, as long as the areas were "platted into tracts containing five acres or less, and has been substantially built up, and has 2 or more businesses or commercial establishments located thereon, and the inhabitants thereof are enabled to secure the benefits of the city (police, fire), or could be furnished with (light, water)..."⁶ The annexation would be accomplished when the district court filed the city's resolution. This method of annexation avoided the necessity of gathering signatures on annexation petitions. The traditional method of annexation through petitions signed by residents requesting annexation remained the most common means of bringing areas into the city limits, but the "Roswell Law" allowed city commissioners an out when resistance amongst "suburban" residents ran high.⁷ The Chamber of Commerce acknowledged this resistance in its statements in support of the 1946 annexation plan. The Chamber of Commerce's new president, C.C. Broome, painted a

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⁶New Mexico, Laws of the State of New Mexico, 1939, Chapter 204: An Act Relating to the Annexation of Contiguous Territory to Cities, Towns and Villages," pp. 500-502.

⁷The Roswell Law allowed any annexee "... feeling himself aggrieved by the action of the council, shall have the right to appeal to the District Court by filing his petition praying a review of the council's action within 30 days." The court would then decide if the annexation could proceed, considering primarily the ability of the city to provide services in a timely fashion. Ibid., "Section 3," p. 502.

threatening image of "encirclement" in Albuquerque, if fringe areas, currently with a population of 35,000, continued to grow outside the boundaries of the city. Broome also recognized that resistance to annexation ran high in the fringe areas: "...it would be impossible to get half the 35,000 to approve (i.e. sign annexation petitions) under the present circumstances."⁸

As protest against the 1946 annexation plan mounted, especially in Old Town, city commissioners disavowed their association with the plan, attributing it solely to a Chamber of Commerce initiative. Al Buck, chairman of the city commission, said, "We of the Commission have not been carrying the flag. The plan is sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce."⁹ The city commission in April had appointed an "extension committee" of twenty-five residents "from inside and outside of the city limits... to investigate areas east and north for possible annexation..."¹⁰ The chairman of the extension committee was W.C. Oestreich, president of the Albuquerque Board of Realtors. In May, Oestreich explained to the city commission the rationale for the sweeping annexation plan by quoting from the report of Ken

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⁸Ibid., February 18, 1947, pp. 1, 3.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of April 16, 1946, p. 10.

Carmichael, the committees' planning consultant: "... it would be well to consider that there would be no use in taking in only a few city blocks and therefore, I have based my city limits line on the very great possibilities of our city's future growth..."¹¹

The annexation plan obviously grew out of the government/business partnership that functioned so thoroughly in Albuquerque. Both the Chamber of Commerce and Board of Realtors influenced the formulation of the plan, with the city commission rubber-stamping their decisions.

The argument over the city's annexation plan found its way into the New Mexico legislature, where opponents of annexation had a valuable ally in Representative Joseph Montoya, Democrat from Albuquerque, and chairman of the House Taxation and Revenue Committee. Within two months four bills were working their way through the legislature, two (one each in the house and senate) seeking to facilitate annexation, and two seeking to restrain it. The bill supported by Montoya and the opponents of Albuquerque's annexation plan "would require cities to obtain the written consent of the majority of residents and property owners."¹²

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¹¹Ibid., Metting of May 7, 1946, p. 13.

¹²Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 18, 1947, p. 1 and 3. Montoya bated the Chamber of Commerce in the newspaper by comparing their support for annexation and their opposition

The hearings in the legislature provided a forum for supporters and opponents of the annexation. Broome and the Chamber of Commerce representatives described the issue in terms of progress versus silly recidivism. Opponents of the plan described Albuquerque's city commission as virtual lap dogs of the Chamber of Commerce. Gilbert Espinosa, a resident of Duranes, criticized Broome's characterization of the resistance to the annexation as crank or eccentric, fundamentally an opposition to "progress" itself. Espinosa also described the plan as "grandiose" and motivated by the desire of the city commission to raise revenues. "90 per cent of the people don't want to come in," he said.¹³

In the end, the legislature passed a "compromise" annexation bill, despite some last minute theatrics by Montoya. Two days before the end of the legislative session Montoya disappeared along with the single official copy of the compromise bill. Montoya had been "a bitter foe of every annexation plan advanced by the Albuquerque city government," and viewed this "compromise" as simply a watered down augmentation of the city's annexation powers. Montoya's family said he had traveled to California on

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to the "closed shop." According to Montoya the Chamber of Commerce supported "democracy" if it would further their anti-union drive, but opposed "democracy" in annexation disputes.

¹³Ibid.

doctor's orders following an asthma attack, but the next day Montoya appeared in El Paso, professing dismay over the brouhaha his unannounced departure had created. The "embattled law" passed on the last day of the legislative session in the Spring of 1947.¹⁴

The 1947 annexation law established arbitration boards to deal with disputed annexations. The arbitration board would be composed of seven members, three appointed by the city government and three elected by residents living in the area designated for annexation. The seventh member of the board, presumed to cast the deciding vote, would be elected by the six members, or if no consensus could be reached, appointed by the district court. The board's decision was to be based solely on "... whether the benefits of the government of the municipality are or can be available within a reasonable time..."¹⁵ As will be seen, what was "reasonable" to the city government was often unreasonable to various groups of residents.

The criteria by which the arbitration boards were to base their decision, ignoring the weight of opinion for or against annexation, indicates the sentiment of the state government behind the annexation moves of cities. After

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¹⁴Ibid., March 14, 1947, pp. 1, 3.

¹⁵New Mexico, Laws of the State of New Mexico, 1947, Chapter 211, p. 505.

1947 Albuquerque's city commission had three methods of annexation available to them: petitions, the "Roswell Law," and arbitration boards. Legislators designed the arbitration boards to forestall controversy, but the boards' operation fell short of allowing for democratic processes to function freely. The arbitration boards ended up serving as forums for fringe resident rancor.

Robert Turner Wood's thesis of harmonious growth in the 1950s required a depiction of early expansion of the city as orderly and painless. Thus annexation resistance appeared in his study more in terms of individual conflict on the city commission, as Tingley continued to resist the spread of the city due to ever-mounting financial burdens. Grass roots resistance continually surfaced, however, both against the physical expansion of the city and the intrusion of city government, thought to be in the hip pocket of the Chamber of Commerce. The 1946 effort had stalled due to the wrangle in the state legislature, but the opponents' independence was short-lived. The next year city commissioners figuratively reached across city boundaries when they voted to double the water rates for residential customers living in the county.¹⁶

In 1948 residents within the city limits across a broad

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¹⁶Ibid., Feb. 19, 1947, p. 1.

political specturm protested the city's take-over of trash collection from private contractors. In the process of acquisition the city commission had voted to raise the rates for trash collection from forty cents per month to one dollar per month. After a clamorous protest the commission lowered the rates to seventy cents per month.¹⁷ The political squabble within the city no doubt reinforced the reluctance of resistance-inclined fringe residents to join the city.

As the controversy over the 1946 annexation plan played out the city commission continued to annex smaller parcels of land using the traditional petition method of annexation. In the fifteen months from June 1946 to September 1947 the city commission enacted nineteen annexations. Twice during that period, on May 6, 1947 and July 16, 1947, the commission annexed three separate parcels at a single meeting.¹⁸

The petition method allowed the city to annex an area when the owners of half the property in the area signed petitions requesting annexation. Many of the annexations involved property under development on the East Mesa. Thus,

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¹⁷Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of May 29, 1948, p. 1.

¹⁸Ibid., Meetings, June 25, 1947 through September 9, 1947.

for instance, the March 11, 1947 annexation included "94 unsold lots."¹⁹

The first protest of a petition-based annexation appeared in 1948. On May 25 the city commission accepted an annexation petition from residents west of the Rio Grande River, forwarding the petition to the city manager for verification of the percentage of property owners requesting the annexation. On June 1, as the verification process continued, another group of residents within the area presented a "Protest" petition to the city commission arguing that the petition method of annexation was unconstitutional: "We the undersigned (94 signatures)... have a fundamental right, as American citizens, to have a voice in deciding the type of municipal government under which they are to live, and for us to be annexed merely by your consenting to said Petition would be a denial of such right."²⁰ In arguing for "fundamental" rights, opponents offered a logic for resistance akin to the "natural" rights of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson; in Albuquerque's case in the 1940s, no annexation without representation. Opponents of the annexation maintained that only those specifically requesting annexation should be annexed. The petition method of annexation ran afoul of this desire by also

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¹⁹Ibid., Meeting of March 11, 1947, p. 1-4.

²⁰Ibid., Meeting of June 1, 1948, p. 1-3.

scooping up the undesireous. Opponents described the city commission as exemplifying a tyranny of the majority, an opinion confirmed one week later when the commission annexed both proponents and opponents alike.²¹

All in all the city managed to annex about 37 square miles in the late 1940s. With these "victories" under their belt the city commission announced further plans to annex areas to the west and north: the 1946 plan revisited.

The city fought a two-front annexation war. In June 1948 the commission designated the north valley area as a target and set about establishing an arbitration board. On July 20, 1948, the commission availed itself of the "Roswell Law" and passed a resolution to annex Old Town to the west. While the arbitration process continued to the north the city struggled to contain the legal challenges that developed in Old Town. Eventually legal challenges also developed in the Northside annexation.

On August 14, 1948, the arbitration board for the north valley area approved the annexation of three square miles of "highly developed northside suburban area," bringing approximately 6,000 residents into the city limits. The board had modified the original proposal, formulated by a Chamber of Commerce committee, by eliminating "the northernmost mile of the north valley tract, which was

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²¹Ibid., Meeting of June 15, 1948, p. 2-4.

mostly farm land." The board's decision approving the annexation was based on the view that "municipal services could be extended within a reasonable time." Apparently "reasonable" meant two years, since city manager Charles E. Wells said it would take the city about two years to install sewers and water mains, provided citizens approved a new bond issue.²²

The legal challenge to the northside annexation resulted when property owners in the area (John Cox, J. Leatherwood, and "others similarly situated"), represented by attorney Martin A. Treet, questioned the constitutionality of the 1947 annexation law. The property owners maintained that arbitration boards represented an unlawful "delegation of legislative authority."²³ On June 28, 1949, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the 1947 annexation law, thus preserving the Northside annexation.²⁴

The Old Town annexation also found itself disputed in the courts. On July 20, 1948, the city commission used the Roswell Law to "ram through" the annexation of Old Town "after a long bitter wrangle." From the outset residents, mostly Hispanic, protested vigorously, terming the move "a scruff-of-the-neck" maneuver, and "the least democratic

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²²Albuquerque Journal, August 14, 1948, pp. 1, 2.

²³Ibid., June 29, 1949, pp. 1, 4.

²⁴Ibid.

method of annexation."²⁵

Opponents of the Old Town annexation, represented by former governor A.T. Hannett and attorney Milton Seligman, challenged the city's actions at the August 3, 1948, meeting, before the district court had recorded the city's annexation resolution. As a result of the ongoing protest, city commissioners voted to table the annexation for further study.²⁶ Eventually the city circulated petitions in the Old Town area and gathered signatures of the owners of half the property.

The city's pursuit of Old Town raised concerns within the old community over the preservation of their existing social ties. OldTown had remained relatively pastoral and predominantly Hispanic since territorial days. On August 24 city manager Charles Wells related to the commission a letter he had received from Gilberto Espinosa requesting information on city statutes. At issue was the status of Old Town's Sunday evening dances at the Old Albuquerque Society Hall. Espinosa had asked the city manager if the dances would be canceled if the community was annexed into the city due to Albuquerque's ordinance against public dancing on Sundays. Wells characterized the dances for the

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²⁵Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of July 20, 1948; and Albuquerque Journal, July 21, 1948, p. 1.

²⁶Ibid., Meeting of August 3, 1948, pp. 1-4.

commission: "These dances have been held at Society Hall in Old Town as far back as I can remember. They have always been conducted in an orderly manner and have been well patronized by the residents of Old Albuquerque."²⁷ The city commission eased local concerns by assuring residents that the dances would continue after the area was annexed.

In the meantime, the legal challenge of the Old Town annexation shifted to challenge the city's petition signatures. At the January 4, 1949, meeting, Hannett questioned whether the city in fact had obtained the signatures of the owners of half the property in the area. Hannett claimed three signatures had been forged, and that other signers were not "owners of record." As an example Hannett pointed to the signature of a Catholic priest, which the city had used to claim the approval for church-owned property. Hannett maintained that only the archbishop could make such an assessment.²⁸

In the end Hannett and the commission reached a compromise. The city and opponents of the annexation agreed to a variation of the arbitration board process. The commission established a three-person arbitration board to settle the issue within two weeks, with Hannett representing

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²⁷Ibid., Meeting of August 24, 1948, p. 9.

²⁸Albuquerque Journal, Jan. 5, 1949, p. 1.

opponents' views on the board.²⁹

Two weeks later, on January 17, the Old Town arbitration board asked the city commission for one more week since "... a multiplicity of problems have arisen which we are quite sure were not anticipated by the City Commission or by the protestants of the annexation..." The commission's response was to pass a resolution denying the request for more time. As a result Hannett resigned from the arbitration board, and the next day the commission passed another resolution annexing Old Town.³⁰

If the commission thought they were rid of Hannett, they were mistaken. Hannett filed a motion in district court for a restraining order halting the annexation, and on January 30, 1949, Judge R.F. Deacon Arledge placed Old Town back outside the city limits, ruling that the city in fact had accounted for less than half the property in the annexation area.³¹

The city proved to be just as stubborn as Hannett. After the setback in court the commission began another effort to annex Old Town through the standard arbitration process under the 1947 law.

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²⁹Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of Jan. 4. 1949, p. 6.

³⁰Ibid., Meetings of Jan. 17, 1949, p. 1-2; and Jan. 18, 1949, p. 2-4.

³¹Albuquerque Journal, Jan. 30, 1949, p. 1 and 2.

On April 12, 1949, Old Town residents picked their three members of the arbitration board in a local election. As the Albuquerque Journal reported, turn-out in the election was light (572 votes cast out of 2122 registered voters in the area; 26.9 per cent), but amongst those voting the overwhelming opinion was anti-annexation. The three opposition candidates more than doubled the vote cast in favor of the annexation (opponents polled 376-396 votes, the three pro-annexation candidates polled 173-176 votes). Despite the low turnout, opponents of the annexation celebrated their victory with "torchlights and speeches" in the Old Town plaza.³²

The opponents of the annexation seemed to achieve a second victory when the seventh member of the arbitration board was named by the court: Gilberto Espinosa, the Duranes resident who had opposed the annexation in 1946, and who had recently written the letter to city manager Wells regarding the Sunday evening dances. The optimism of opponents was misplaced, however. On June 30, 1949, the arbitration board voted four to three to approve the annexation, with Espinosa casting the deciding vote. Espinosa's rationale, and underlying lack of enthusiasm for the annexation, appeared in his explanatory statement: "It is inevitable that a small section like Old Town... should

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³²Ibid., April 13, 1949, p. 1.

be part of the city. It is impossible for an area to exist in an unorganized form next to an organized municipality... (But) I agree with certain things cited by the opposition, specifically neglect of certain areas and favoritism. And I am certainly not entirely satisfied with the type of city government. However... the question is whether the city benefits are or will be available (to Old Town) in a reasonable time."³³ Espinosa had grimaced and said "yes."

The disappointment of opponents flashed during the pivotal meeting. J.W. Hedges, one of the three anti-annexation board members, called city commissioners "iron-fisted Stalins and dictators." The Albuquerque Journal reported an exchange between Hedges and pro-annexation board member Moise. Moise urged Hedges to "come into the city and get rid of them (the Stalins and dictators)." Hedges responded, "Throw'em out and we'll come in."³⁴

Results of the annexation were both obvious and unforeseen. First on the city's agenda was the sale of revenue bonds totaling \$1,410,000 for sewer and water construction throughout the city, now including Old Town (\$150,000) and the North Valley (\$600,000).³⁵

Perhaps unexpected was the fate of the Sunday evening

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³³Ibid., July 1, 1949, p. 1.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., July 1, 1949, p. 1.

dances. On January 10, 1950, six months after the annexation, twelve Old Town residents presented the city commission with a "petition of grievance." The residents specifically requested police protection and street cleanup due to "malicious and unlawful deeds" following the Sunday evening dances: "... the street is cluttered up with whiskey bottles; vomiting on the sidewalk... is a common occurrence. We also request that the street be cleaned, cared for, the same as any other part of the city."³⁶

Had the dances always been such rowdy events? Not according to the city manager's recollection a few months previously. Rather it seems reasonable to suspect that the group of local residents who had sponsored the dances for so long now found themselves without the sense of community identity necessary to sustain the unofficial policing of their own community. Now it was the job of the Albuquerque city police, and Albuquerque city street cleaners. Residents now found it necessary to petition the city for better services.

The city's largest annexation occurred three months later, November 22, 1949, but without the controversy surrounding Old Town and the North Valley. Albuquerque's

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³⁶Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of January 10, 1950, p. 11.

largest annexation extended the area of the city by about eleven square miles, while adding zero new residents. The city used the petition method to annex the 7,325 acres of undeveloped mesa land to the east. Dale Bellamah, one of Albuquerque's prominent developers, advocated the annexation as an example of "planned development." Bellamah used his positions on the city planning commission and Albuquerque Home Builders Association to push for the expansion.³⁷

The Bel-Aire annexation a few months later included people, and so included protest. Residents of the Bel-Aire development, stereotypically middle-class and Anglo, petitioned the Bernalillo County Commission in December 1949 to incorporate as a village so as to forestall the city's annexation efforts. On January 17, 1950, the city announced its plan to annex the area by petition ("acreage in petition: 1701," "acreage not in petition: 1539"). This effort met with vigorous protest, including a letter to the commission from L.J. Lippett, owner of 80 acres in the annexation area: "... this so-called voluntary petition for annexation has been presented without my knowledge, signature, or consent, although the said petition included the above described land owned by me." Lippett also reminded the city commission that the area to be annexed

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³⁷Ibid., Meeting of November 22, 1949, p. 2-4; and Albuquerque Journal, November 23, 1949, p. 1 and 3.

included part of the proposed "village of Bel-Aire." On January 17 the city commission tabled the annexation due to the legal questions surrounding the annexation of a nascent village.³⁸

On January 24, 1950, the city commission annexed 3300 acres surrounding the Bel-Aire development, despite the protest by Milton Seligman, attorney representing property owners in the area (Seligman, along with A.T. Hannet, previously had represented Old Town residents). Seligman had reminded the commissioners that one and a half square miles of the addition was part of the proposed village of Bel-Aire. In response to Seligman's protest the city attorney rendered an opinion to the commissioners as follows: "1. That the areas are not identical. 2. That the proceedings for incorporation filed with the County Commission are untenable."³⁹ Why the proposed village was legally untenable was not explained, but the commissioners took their attorney's word and annexed the 3300 acres.⁴⁰ The annexation brought fewer than twenty new residents into the city, but the land annexed surrounded the Bel-Aire

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³⁸Letter from L.J. Lippett to the Albuquerque City Commission, in Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of January 17, 1950, p. 6-7.

³⁹Ibid., Meeting of January 24, 1950, p. 8-10.

⁴⁰The legal opinion itself is not included in the meeting minutes, only the reference to it. The city attorney's office has no record of it.

development, allowing for the Roswell Law to apply. Annexation quickly followed, and the village of Bel-Aire disappeared before ever appearing.⁴¹

The election of two "Better Government" city commissioners in 1950 resulted in continued head-long expansion of the city accompanied by continued "heated wrangling" between Tingley and the new commissioners.⁴² The most glaring issue facing the commission was the strain rapid growth had placed on the city's water system. The 1947 "master plan" for upgrading the water system had been rendered obsolete by the rapid growth of the city. In 1952, in the face of water shortages necessitating rationing in 1946, 1948, 1951, 1952 and again in 1953, the city's Water Board announced an "ambitious program of new construction." Tingley and the Old Guard opposed the program as too expensive, waging an I-told-you-so campaign in the commission meetings and the press. In frustration Don Johnstone, chairman of the water board, resigned. Johnstone's letter of resignation blamed Tingley specifically for the problems in the city's water system: "... (shortages were) not the fault of the master plan, or of the men who are operating the system, but of the short-

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⁴¹Albuquerque Journal, January 25, 1950, pp. 1, 11.

⁴²Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 113.

sighted, penny-pinching, obstructionist tactics in regard to financing in which you (Tingley) are indulging. It seems you are unable or unwilling to grow with the City."⁴³

Late in 1953 the commission, and the voters, approved a compromise bond issue for \$2.4 million to improve the water system.⁴⁴

In 1954 "Citizens Committee" candidates swept into office, running on a platform of orderly and efficient city government. The new commissioners passed a one-cent city sales tax in 1955, using the increased revenue to expand services commensurate with the added demand.⁴⁵

Resistance to higher city taxes surfaced in the late 1950s in areas of the city previously assumed to be acquiescent. Residents of the heights area formed the Property Owners Protective Association (POPA) in 1959 to fight an increase in their taxes to pay for flood control projects in valley neighborhoods. Development in the heights had increased the runoff into the valley, but heights residents remained unconvinced of the flood danger in the lowlands.⁴⁶

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⁴³Ibid., pp. 132, 153.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 132.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 151.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 237.

The election for city commissioners in 1959 pitted candidates from POPA versus the Citizens Committee. The Citizens Committee maintained its control of the commission, but one POPA candidate won a seat. The contentious, tax-conscious mood of voters also appeared in other results: defeat of a proposed city-county merger (13,506 against, 5,777 for), and defeat of a bond issue to build a new city-county building.⁴⁷

Voters who may have quietly acquiesced to annexation were now voicing resistance to higher taxes and an intrusive city government. Wood described this dissension as new: "Increasingly they (heights residents) were willing to clash with established authority."⁴⁸ Wood was correct to describe the protest in the heights as new, but he makes the mistake of conflating the area with its residents. The city commission had annexed most of the heights and mesa land to the east as undeveloped land. Whenever annexations scooped up people as well as land, resistance appeared. Whereas Wood describes an increasing level of contentiousness, contention marked Albuquerque's growth throughout the postwar boom.

The Albuquerque Citizen Committee voiced its awareness of opposition within the community, but seemed to ascribe

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⁴⁷Albuquerque Journal, October 7, 1959, p. 1.

⁴⁸Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 239.

the opposition to the growing size of the city: "This city is growing to such a size that we know that from now on there will be organized opposition of one kind or another."⁴⁹ What their awareness indicates is acknowledgment of organized, potentially successful, resistance. As was typical of boosters, planners, and pro-growth politicians in Tucson as well as Albuquerque, resistance became noticeable only when it posed a viable threat. The lack of political viability of the resistance in the late 1940s made the resistance invisible to later historians. In fact annexation resistance sometimes included a voting majority of the residents, but it could easily be overcome by legal fiat, and so appeared inconsequential.

Another tax controversy split the community in the mid 1960s, this time over a proposed gasoline tax to pay for road improvements, primarily in the heights neighborhoods. Opposition to the tax surfaced among valley neighborhoods and petroleum industry workers, who forced a referendum election. The tax lost 11,734 to 10,943, the narrow margin provided by valley precincts. Perhaps ominously for city commissioners contemplating reelection "significantly greater numbers" voted in the referendum than in the last

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⁴⁹Albuquerque Journal, November 13, 1960, P. A-1.

commission election.⁵⁰

The expansion of Albuquerque continued to the northwest in the 1960s with the success of the Rio Rancho development. Beyond this satellite community a pastoral vestige survived in the North Valley. Another "booming residential area" appeared to the south of the city and west of the Rio Grande River and this area became a target for annexation in the spring of 1960. The protests that surrounded the city's annexation of Old Town and Bel-Aire paled in comparison to the vociferous opposition that greeted the commissioners' new annexation plan for the Southwest Valley.

Over 1000 residents of the Southwest Valley met on April 6, 1960, to hear the city's plan explained by Dick Bennett, a member of the city planning commission. Bennett bore the brunt of the residents' ire when he admitted that their taxes would go up with annexation. Bennett also sought to reassure residents by explaining that their insurance rates would go down and their property values would go up. When pressed, Bennett acknowledged that city water and sewage service might take ten years to establish in the area. As the Albuquerque Journal reported: "A chorus of boos ended Bennett's part of the meeting."⁵¹

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⁵⁰Ibid., November 17, 1965, pp. A-1-2.

⁵¹Ibid., April 7, 1960, p. A-1-2.

Several other speakers supported the annexation, suffering the same inhospitable reaction as Bennett. One insurance agent assured residents that their rates would go down with annexation. Anonymous comments recorded by the newspaper included: "I'd rather pay double the insurance premiums than one-fourth of the tax increase and wait 15 years to get services the city is promising." "If we wanted to live in the city we'd move there. There are plenty of houses for sale in town." One recently annexed resident said: "Our taxes tripled when we were annexed. We haven't gotten very much out of it. All we have accumulated is more taxes."⁵²

Justice of the Peace A.P. Darden presided over the clamorous meeting. At one point he asked for a show of hands for or against the annexation. Only three souls raised their hands in favor of the move. Later Darden asked for a show of hands in favor of the Southwest Valley Booster Club, which had formed to lead the opposition to the annexation: "A veritable forest of hands went up."⁵³

The protest certainly got the attention of the city commission. Commissioners passed a resolution at the April 19, 1960 meeting seeking to explain their desire to annex the area. First the resolution sought to pacify the angry

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⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid.

residents: "It is not the intention of the City Commission of the City of Albuquerque to annex isolated or remote areas or lands the owners of which will not be benefited by such incorporation." Then the commissioners tried to explain the rationale behind annexation:

The growth of large cities, particularly in the eastern United States, to a point where they touch and surround small towns has created real difficulties in the way of duplicating government, overlapping functions and confusion as to responsibility so that tax money has been wasted, efficiency has been lost and the principal beneficiaries has been organized crime.⁵⁴

The city commission then moved to establish an arbitration board to settle the annexation controversy. The resolution's mention of the threat of organized crime was typical of the boosters' habit of defining opponents of growth as beyond the pale: Mafia opposition to annexation? The assertion was never repeated.

In the meantime the Southwest Boosters Club had hired attorney Milton Seligman, the old foe of city annexation plans, to begin the legal process of incorporating the ten-square-mile area as a town or village, to be known as "South Albuquerque."⁵⁵ At the meeting in which Seligman was hired, city commissioner W.W. Atkinson tried to convince residents of the folly of their move. Atkinson said a

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⁵⁴Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of April 19, 1960, p. 22-24.

⁵⁵Albuquerque Journal, April 19, 1960, p. A-2.

"South Albuquerque" would have "disastrous results. It would set a pattern for a very undesirable future." The move also made little economic sense, according to Atkinson. The per capita budget for Albuquerque was \$56. For a town with a population of 27,000, which "South Albuquerque" projected, the per capita budget would be \$66. Southwest boosters remained unconvinced.⁵⁶ The experience of South Tucson twenty years earlier seems to corroborate Atkinson's warnings, but no mention or comparison with South Tucson appeared in the South Albuquerque debate.

There was little doubt amongst city officials concerning the dominant opinion in the area. At an April 20 meeting with Seligman, city attorney Frank Horan acknowledged the desire of most county residents to live outside the city, and if an incorporation vote was held in the area so as to forestall annexation: "I have little doubt it would carry easily."⁵⁷

Finally in Albuquerque protests succeeded in stopping an annexation. On April 26, 1960, the city commission rescinded their action of April 19 and canceled the annexation:

Whereas, it has come to the attention of the City Commission that a large number of residents of the proposed area have expressed their objection to said

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⁵⁶Ibid., April 20, 1969, pp. A-1-2.

⁵⁷Ibid., April 21, 1960, pp. A-2.

proposed annexation; and
Whereas, it is not now, nor has it ever been, the
desire of The City Commission to annex to the City
areas contrary to the desire of the residents of
said area...⁵⁸

Residents of Old Town and Bel-Aire might have disputed the commission's last assertion, but the shift in policy away from forced annexations was genuine. Over a year later the commission again passed a resolution assuring residents that "...this Commission will not annex an area against the wishes of the people that live in the area."⁵⁹ In return the Southwest Valley Boosters had agreed to a "truce," promising to suspend their organizational activities for a year.

The change in policy on the city commission only applied to the Southwest Valley, and only applied to this commission. The "truce" conveniently left in place the mechanisms for facilitating annexations of tracts under development, still under the ownership and control of individual investors or corporations. In this way, the city commission, thwarted in one thrust to the south, succeeded in a second effort. In September, 1960, developer Ed Snow requested that the city annex his Hoffman City subdivision

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⁵⁸Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of April 26, 1960, p. 2.

⁵⁹Ibid., Meeting of September 18, 1961, p. 1.

southwest of the city. Snow was attempting to complete the development of 2,800 acres of the old Atrisco land grant which had been originally purchased for the purpose of development by Sam Hoffman in the late 1940s. The development had passed into Snow's hands with Hoffman's death. The trust officers for the land grant's heirs opposed the annexation into the city, arguing that they remained the owners of the vast majority of the land (land grant property rights and politics are explained more fully in Chapter 7). The trust officers claimed that so far developers (Hoffman and Snow) had only paid for 640 acres of the land. Nonetheless, the city commission annexed "Snow Vista" on September 27, 1960.⁶⁰

The annexation of Snow Vista showed the government/business partnership still fully functional despite the years of turmoil over the expansion of the city. Snow's request for annexation was only one part of a full blown proposal requesting simultaneous zoning changes and infrastructure development. Snow's construction company was paid \$184,000 for water, sewer, and paving work done within the development. And when the question of ownership arose between Snow and the trust officers of the Atrisco land grant's heirs, the city commission simply took Snow's word:

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⁶⁰Ibid., Meeting of September 27, 1960, p. 11-13; and Albuquerque Journal, September 28, 1960, p. A-2.

"... (we) must assume Snow petitioned as owner in good faith."⁶¹

Meanwhile, back at the first "southern front" opponents of annexation in the Southwest valley resumed their organizational efforts when the truce expired. Incorporation partisans forced a vote in September 1961 in the villages of Atrisco, Arenal, Five Points, and Armijo on the proposal to form an independent municipality. Residents defeated the proposal 1,903 to 443, indicating an overwhelming opposition to any municipal ties, be they to Albuquerque or "South Albuquerque."⁶²

The state government stepped into Albuquerque's annexation drive in 1963 and 1964, mostly on the side of the city. In September 1963 the legislature prohibited the incorporation of any village within a five-mile "urbanized area" surrounding an already incorporated municipality unless that municipality approved the incorporation. Village residents did receive one benefit from the state when the Attorney General rendered an opinion removing the tax motivation for annexation: "Where a village is annexed to a town, the property within the village at that time would not be subject to ad valorem taxes to retire the present general

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⁶¹Albuquerque Journal, September 28, 1960, p. A-2.

⁶²Ibid., September 20, 1961, p. A-1.

obligation bonded indebtedness of the town."⁶³

The following year the state legislature again stepped into the annexation game on the side of Albuquerque, establishing a new process for annexation: "an incorporated municipality could take in by simple resolution any unincorporated area which had been completely encircled by the municipality for five years."⁶⁴ This law, in conjunction with the "shoestring" method of annexation freshly utilized by city planners, gave rise to the largest of Albuquerque's annexation schemes: an effort in 1964 to annex the entire county.

The city's increasing aggressiveness toward annexation appeared in January 1964 with the Paradise Acres annexation, in which the city used the "shoestring" method of annexing tracts where residents approved annexation. The city's easiest way to annex was through the "Roswell Law," the simple resolution process which permitted them to annex contiguous areas to the city. If a tract was in fact separated from the city limits, the city would annex a sliver of land, a "shoestring," often along county roads and easements, in order to make the tract "contiguous."

The "shoestring" precedent had been established in 1946

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⁶³Ibid., September 22, 1963, p. A-4.

⁶⁴Ibid., July 17, 1964, p. A-21.

when the city attorney, Donald B. Moses, gave city commissioners the means to annex the Mesa del Norte development. At the time Mesa del Norte was half a mile beyond the city limits. Moses suggested that the city seek a 100-foot right-of-way along Las Lomas road from Bernalillo County, then: "Notwithstanding the fact that a very narrow corridor would connect the said land with the present city boundaries, this property would be contiguous."⁶⁵

In 1964 a convoluted "shoestring" annexation brought in the Paradise Acres subdivision, 127 acres, two miles south of the current city limits, by also annexing the right-of-way along several roads and a narrow 1,000-foot-long strip through property belonging to the Atrisco land grant.⁶⁶

The city's aggressiveness in pursuing annexations had increased in the face of mounting financial pressures on city services, along with the increased threat posed by independent utility companies in fringe areas. The sewer districts and water companies outside the city had arisen in response to state health department inspections which had

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⁶⁵Memorandum from Albuquerque City Attorney Donald B. Moses to the City Commission, November 8, 1946, in Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of November 19, 1946, p. 9.

⁶⁶Ibid., Meeting of January 28, 1964. Minutes for this meeting contained no page numbers.

shut down local wells and septic tanks in congested areas.⁶⁷ The construction of sewer lines, for example, might have been welcomed by the city, if not for the competition such independent companies offered the city's departments. Providing city services to "deprived" county residents was the primary inducement offered by city officials for annexation, but fringe areas in the Southwest valley were obtaining city-like services without being annexed. The city's policy then became the aggressive construction of sewer lines and water mains into the county, justified by city commissioners as viable "inroads" into the south valley. Central to the policy was the fact that the incursion of city services into the area would make independent water districts and sewer districts uneconomical "by denying them rights-of-way over direct paths."⁶⁸ The city commission had made it its business to drive the independent companies out of existence. This fracture in the business-government partnership cast some businessmen as outsiders. Others, such as developer Ed Snow, remained firmly connected to the city government.

Within this context of contested expansion the most incredible example of Albuquerque's growth mania came in

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⁶⁷Albuquerque Journal, September 22, 1963, p. A-4.

⁶⁸Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 466.

July 1964 when the city commissioners announced plans to annex 11,800 acres of county land, including a narrow strip along the perimeter of Benalillo County. The strip around the periphery of the county was 50 to 100 feet wide, totaling 649 acres. The purpose of this encirclement was to give the city in five years the ability to annex the entire county by simple resolution. The city justified their annexation as democracy in action: "... more than half the land being brought in was done so by petition of the owners." The "owners," however, turned out to be the city itself, the University of New Mexico, and W.W. Falls, Inc., a development company which planned to subdivide the Volcano Cliffs on the west mesa. The City Planning Department had arranged the annexation maps so that the rest of the land in the proposal was 'contiguous' to that owned by the three "owners." Also included in the annexation were strips of land, like the spokes of a wheel, projecting out from the city to the peripheral strip. All in all it was a tortured manipulation of geography. The author of the plan, "Project 1970-Plus," was city manager Edmund Engel.⁶⁹

Some of the prospective annexeas greeted the plan with howls of protest. Another land owner in the area, Rex Mattingly of Corrales, announced his intention to seek an injunction to stop the annexation. Others spoke against the

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⁶⁹Albuquerque Journal, June 24, 1964, pp. A-1-2.

plan at the June 23 commission meeting, including George Hensley, chairman of the Rural Property Owners Association. Hensley agreed with the need to control the proliferation of independent water and sewer districts, but criticized the city's methods: "... an attempt is being made to usurp the constitutional rights and privileges of some 62,000 residents around the city of Albuquerque... by merely twisting legislation."⁷⁰ Ultimately the plan would set a precedent "destroying the rights and liberties of any citizen anywhere in the United States." As the Albuquerque Journal reported, "Hensley's talk... was greeted by loud applause..."⁷¹

Once again the courts determined the outcome of an annexation controversy in Albuquerque. In July, District Judge D.A. MacPherson agreed with Mattingly and issued a permanent injunction stopping the city's plan. MacPherson based his decision on two concerns. First, the judge questioned two "nontaxpaying bodies" (the city and the University of New Mexico) uniting "to force taxpayers into the city against their will." MacPherson also based his decision on "an authority on municipal corporations" who labeled the city's plan "unreasonable": "... if the

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⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid. No reference to the protest or ensuing legal decisions appears in minutes of city commission meetings.

territory is sparsely settled, situated remotely from the thickly settled portion of the municipality, would receive no advantage or benefits from annexation but would be burdened with additional tax, and the residents of the territory prefer to remain without the municipality, it should not be annexed." Most telling to MacPherson was the fact that the peripheral strip contained no houses, and the city expressed no intention of extending city services into the area.⁷²

The city seemed to ignore this rebuke from the court and went right ahead with its aggressive annexation policy. Next the city attempted to annex 8,200 acres in the west mesa and north valley areas. To accomplish the annexation "a connecting strip of ten miles of roadway" would be annexed to make all the areas "contiguous." Two commissioners, Ralph Trigg and Emmanuel Schifani, voted against the annexation plan. Trigg remarked: "It seems to me the public feeling is about fifty to one against this. In fact, I have had only one phone call from a person favoring the annexation."⁷³ Once again Judge MacPherson ruled against the annexation, declaring it "arbitrary and

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⁷²Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 467; and Albuquerque Journal, July 17, 1964, p. A-1 and A-21.

⁷³Albuquerque Journal, September 23, 1964, p. A-2. Again no reference to the controversy appears in city commission meeting minutes.

capricious" and therefore "unreasonable." As an example of capriciousness, the judge pointed to the ten mile connecting strip, which included a "proposed" bridge over the Rio Grande River.⁷⁴

At this point the city turned to the arbitration board method of annexation for the north valley. Late in 1964 the city appointed three members to the board, and in January 1965 the residents of the designated "annex unit" elected their three members, all of whom opposed the annexation. The leader of the opposition delegation was Gerald Cornelius, former chairman of the Bernalillo County Commission.⁷⁵ The district court appointed the seventh member of the arbitration board: South Valley resident Ralph Wolf. In February, the arbitration board voted four to three against the annexation, Wolf casting the deciding vote. Cornelius defended the board's decision by pointing to an area annexed by the city eleven years earlier which still was without city water and sewer service: "They're (city officials) like a bull in the china shop. It's their way or else."⁷⁶

The furor over the city's annexation drive resulted

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⁷⁴Ibid., October 8, 1964, pp. A-1 and A-6.

⁷⁵Ibid., January 6, 1965, pp. A-1-2.

⁷⁶Ibid., February 14, 1965, pp. A-1, A-11.

later in February with the passage in the State legislature of a two-year moratorium on any further annexations by the City of Albuquerque unless the area to be annexed had the approval of 100 per cent of the property owners in the area. Ten parcels were annexed during this time, 951 acres, often on a lot-by-lot basis.⁷⁷

By the time the moratorium expired, city commissioners had come to the conclusion that bringing people into the city against their will made little sense. Ralph Trigg, now the commission chairman, announced that "there would be no forced annexations."⁷⁸

The more cautious approach to annexation became entrenched under the chairmanship of Pete Domenici in 1967. Domenici announced that the city would extend city services into county areas before they were annexed: "By utilizing planned annexation we will do away with the friction and ill will which in many cases in the past has earmarked annexation."⁷⁹ As a result, controversies over annexations died down.

Also, the general awareness of the difficulties resulting from the headlong rush toward bigness surfaced.

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⁷⁷Ibid., Martin Paskind, "Annexations Now Made Without Furious Uproar," May 23, 1965, p. A-4.

⁷⁸Ibid., June 19, 1966, p. A-4. No mention of Trigg's statement appears in meeting minutes.

⁷⁹Ibid., November 15, 1967, p. A-4.

The earliest such report appeared in 1962 when City Manager Edmund Engel chronicled problems brought on by growth in a series of newspaper articles.⁸⁰ A 1968 editorial, "Frightening Picture," worried about a recent study predicting that in the year 2000 Bernalillo County would contain nearly 1,000,000 people and 700,000 passenger cars."⁸¹ By the early 1970s "more residents seemed to worry about the growth than to brag about it."⁸²

The city governments of both Tucson and Albuquerque met vociferous opposition to their annexation drives during the post World War II boom. The reach of Albuquerque's political leadership far exceeded that of Tucson's. Nothing resembling the city commission's plan to annex all of Bernalillo County appeared in Tucson, although both cities pursued annexations in the name of planned and controlled growth. Perhaps Albuquerque's ambitious annexation policies resulted from the closer working relationship between the city commission and Chamber of Commerce. The 1946 annexation plan was formulated by the Chamber of Commerce and the commission's advisory committee, made up of business leaders, including the president of the Real Estate Board.

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⁸⁰Ibid., January 30, 1962, p. B-2.

⁸¹Ibid., January 26, 1968, p. A-6.

⁸²Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," pp. 572-573.

Tucson's boosters exerted influence on city leadership, but never, if ever, to that degree. Towing the booster line more rigorously allowed Albuquerque to expand more forcefully, resulting finally in such harsh feelings toward the city's expansion policy that "annexation" became a "dirty word."⁸³

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⁸³Albuquerque Journal, November 15, 1967, p. A-4.

Chapter 7: Ethnic Resistance

"The Enchilada Floor"

Albuquerque's Hispanic population in the 1940s and 1950s participated in the city's political activities, such as annexation resistance, to a greater degree than Tucson's Hispanic population participated in their city's political life. Nonetheless, the early ethnic resistance in Albuquerque, such as arose in the fight to keep Old Town out of the city, met with the same lack of success as greeted middle-class, Anglo, suburban, resistance. Albuquerque's Hispanic population also opposed urban renewal plans that targeted their neighborhoods for destruction. In a circumstance similar to Tucson's, the ethnic resistance to urban renewal in Albuquerque caused planners to alter projects so as to preserve viable neighborhoods.

The range of Hispanic leadership, from Joseph Montoya to Gilberto Espinosa, indicates a broader political participation by Hispanics in Albuquerque than in Tucson. Whether denoted by the European-referenced "Spanish American," or by the federally approved "Hispanic" label, Albuquerque's ethnic population maintained a political involvement from the earliest days of statehood. By 1945, Albuquerque's Hispanics composed about thirty-five per cent

of the city's 50,000 population. Their involvement in the commerce of the city was generally limited to small business, where they achieved less success than in the political sphere. The political success of Hispanics appears in the numbers of politicians elected to local, state and national offices. Also, Hispanic organizations such as LULAC and the Alianza Hispano Americano were active in the Albuquerque area. From 1950 to 1960 the percentage of Hispanics within Albuquerque declined to 27% of the 201,189 population, mainly due to the influx of new residents, including many Anglo, middle-class, defense workers. In 1970, after a slow-down in Anglo migration, the percentage of Hispanic residents increased to 39.2% of the 315,774 population.¹

Hispanics were active at all levels of political activity. Nine of New Mexico's thirty-two counties remained under the control of Hispanic political machines until the 1960s, when more radical Chicano groups began to exert influence.² A typical example of Hispanic representation

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¹Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," pp. 36, 51, 64, 96; and Census statistics.

²John Littlewood and Frederick Allen, "Joseph M. Montoya: Democratic Senator from New Mexico," Ralph Nader Congress Project (Washington, D.C.: Grossman Publishers, 1972), p. 2. Also see Francis I. Swadesh, "The Alianza Movement: Catalyst for Social Change in New Mexico," in Chicano: The Beginning of Bronze Power, eds. Renato Rosaldo, Gustav Seligmann and Robert Calvert (New York: William Morrow, 1974).

in state government can be seen in 1939, when Hispanics held the positions of secretary of state, attorney general, state auditor, and corporation commissioner. There were also two Hispanic district court judges (out of nine), four state senators (out of 24), and eighteen state representatives (out of forty-nine). The most prominent Hispanic political figure in the 1940s was U.S. Senator Denis Chavez, Democrat from Albuquerque elected in 1936.³

Hispanics consistently held offices in the state government, but they never dominated the government. An indication of their relative position appears in the "accommodation" reached over the governorship: Anglo governor, Hispanic lieutenant governor. Joseph Montoya served as lieutenant governor for eight years until 1957, when he was chosen to fill a "Hispanic" seat in Congress, left vacant by the death of Antonio Fernandez. Montoya served as a representative until 1964. He then ran successfully for the U.S. Senate.⁴

At least on a cultural level Albuquerque's ethnic identity held sway. The comparison here pits Albuquerque, the "Duke City," versus Tucson, the "Old Pueblo." Tucson

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³See the "Roster of State Officials," in New Mexico, Laws of the State of New Mexico (1939).

⁴Littlewood and Allen, "Joseph Montoya," pp. 3-4.

goes by the "Old Pueblo" sobriquet even though there was no Indian pueblo, in the sense of communitarian adobe dwellings, anywhere near Tucson. The Indian villages in the area of the original Spanish presidio and mission along the Santa Cruz river in Arizona bore little resemblance to the multi-storied structures of the New Mexican "pueblos." Albuquerque on the other hand lies in the heart of "pueblo country."

Albuquerque's "Duke City" nickname makes reference to the aristocratic, Spanish, viceroy of New Spain in the 1700s: the Duke of Alburquerque. In 1706 the governor of the province of New Mexico, Don Francisco Fernandez Cuervo Valdez, established a new settlement on the Rio Grande River, naming it after the viceroy. As Erna Fergusson described, "That extra r was dropped more than a century later by the sort of people who would still like to lose a q or two."⁵ The 1992/1993 telephone book lists thirty-nine businesses as "Duke City..."⁶ The city's AAA baseball team goes by the monicker "Albuquerque Dukes."

The pastoral heritage in Albuquerque is Indo-Hispanic in origin, and it persisted through the post World War II boom in the old villages beyond the city's fringe:

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⁵Erna Fergusson, Albuquerque (Albuquerque: Merle Armitage Editions, 1947), p. 13.

⁶"The White Pages, December 1992/93" (Albuquerque: US West Direct).

"... the pace of life slower, traditional cultures or natural beauty closer at hand, and yet access to the city only a matter of minutes by car."⁷

The architectural style of the buildings in New Albuquerque through the 1880s and 1890s remained staunchly brick with nary a trace of indigenous "Regional" influence. "Pueblo" or "Santa Fe" style buildings came as a self-conscious afterthought at the turn of the century.⁸ The two cultures in Albuquerque started with a substantial degree of cultural enclavement, unlike Tucson, where enclavement developed gradually over decades. V.B. Price, in City at the End of the World, took an optimistic view of this bicultural tradition as having created a unique urban character, endangered recently by growth. A degree of harmony actually existed within the community, despite continuing contentiousness. Much of the annexation resistance, for example, arose from the unwillingness of old communities, often Hispanic and pastoral, to come into the city.

Albuquerque's pattern of development indicated a continuing ethnic resistance. Developers initially spread

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⁷Albuquerque Journal, May 17, 1963, p. A-2.

⁸Edna Heatherington Bergman, "The Fate of Architectural Theory in Albuquerque," (Master of Architecture Thesis, University of New Mexico, 1978).

into the "northeast quadrant" to build new homes because the land there was both cheap and held with clear titles free of land-grant ties.⁹ Much of the land to the west of the river remained in the hands of the original Hispanic owners and their heirs, the primary example being the Atrisco Land Grant. These owners, possessed of a "tradition of attachment to the land," successfully resisted the incursion of "outsiders" for over 250 years.¹⁰

The Atrisco Grant occupied 51,000 acres on the West Mesa. The heirs numbered about 3,000 in the 1950s, about 1,000 of whom still lived on the grant. A board of trustees -- nine heirs, each elected to three-year terms -- administered the grant's holdings. Contentiousness generally marked the board's deliberations, as heirs aligned in "majority" and "minority" factions.¹¹

Pressure by city leaders and developers to sell large tracts of grant land mounted in the 1950s. In October 1957 the city offered to purchase 10,240 acres of grant land on the West Mesa for a new airport. The city first proposed to buy the land for \$15 an acre. After the laughter died down the city offered \$35 an acre, but this bid too was rejected as ludicrously low. Grazing land at the time was going for

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⁹Albuquerque Journal, March 7, 1947, p. 13.

¹⁰Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 308.

¹¹Albuquerque Journal, April 4, 1959, pp. 1, 2.

\$200 an acre.¹²

In 1959 developer Sam Hoffman offered the trustees \$312 an acre for 3,840 acres: \$1.2 million. Hoffman had made a fortune developing the East Mesa, but land prices there had grown prohibitive. Now Hoffman's gaze rested firmly on the West Mesa: "Hoffman City," 12,000 to 13,000 homes.¹³

The Artisco Board of Trustees approved the sale and scheduled a meeting of the heirs, who would make the final determination. Three heirs who opposed the sale filed suit to stop the meeting, arguing that the trustees had settled for less than "fair market value," which the opponents placed at \$800 an acre (the price of East Mesa land at the time). The opponents also questioned who would get the money, or more specifically, how the fortune would be divided amongst the heirs. The district court, acting in a fiduciary role for the grant's heirs, denied the suit and allowed the meeting to proceed as scheduled.¹⁴

Approximately 2,000 heirs and onlookers met on May 2, 1959 to hear the terms of Hoffman's proposal read in both Spanish and English. Hoffman was both "lauded and attacked." In general, proponents of the sale argued that the price was more than they could get from any other

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¹²Ibid., April 25, 1959, p. 2.

¹³Ibid., April 4, 1959, p. 1.

¹⁴Ibid., April 25, 1959, p. 2.

source, and that the development would raise the value of the rest of the grant's holdings. Opponents at the meeting ignored the monetary issue and referred to the grant as culturally valuable, calling for the preservation of the grant for their children, "... just as their ancestors had done for them." In the end, the heirs voted 4-1 in favor of the sale (432 for, 115 against). Only heirs who were residents of the grant were allowed to vote. 158 ballots cast by heirs who were not residents were "disqualified."¹⁵

In the end Hoffman's grand undertaking failed as regulatory obstacles mounted in 1959, and as Albuquerque's housing boom soured.¹⁶ After Hoffman's suicide, developer Ed Snow successfully completed the development, over the renewed objections of the land grant's heirs (see Chapter 6).¹⁷

Ethnic identities fractured Albuquerque's "harmony" in issues other than annexation and suburban development. In 1959 the Sandia Conservancy District dispute split the city geographically and ethnically. The problem of flooding near the river caused the city to attempt a flood control project

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¹⁵Ibid., May 3, 1959, pp. 1-2.

¹⁶Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," pp. 308-310.

¹⁷Hoffman murdered his wife, then turned the gun on himself. Albuquerque Journal, October 14, 1959, p. 1.

that would require higher taxes throughout the city. The Property Owners Protective Association formed among heights residents who protested the increased taxes when they would receive no benefit from the project. The development of the heights had, in effect, denuded the watershed, increasing runoff to the lowlands, but heights residents felt no obligation to pay for flood control.¹⁸ This dispute split Albuquerque geographically, but also ethnically since heights residents were generally Anglo and middle class, while the lowland residents remained primarily Hispanic.¹⁹

In another heights versus valley dispute, the lowland precincts provided the winning margin for opponents of the half cent gasoline tax in 1965. The increased gas tax was required to build roads, mostly in the heights. Lowland precincts swung the vote to the opponents.²⁰

As was described in the previous chapter, resistance to annexation surfaced in ethnic villages and neighborhoods along the Rio Grande River, including "Old Town," as the city expanded in the late 1940s. The old communities of

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¹⁸Ibid., p. 237.

¹⁹The downtown area remained predominantly Hispanic due to the relatively constant immigration into the city by Spanish Americans from rural New Mexico, and Mexican nationals. "Albuquerque Central Area Study," Albuquerque Planning Department, 1965, p. 21, in Municipal Development Department Library, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

²⁰Albuquerque Journal, November 17, 1965, pp. A-1-2.

North Barelás and San José also were brought into the city in 1949. The vote taken in Old Town showed a two-to-one majority opposed to the annexation, but the light turnout at the election probably indicated that many residents were willing to acquiesce to the city's annexation. Acquiescence was tempered, however, by the concerns for preservation of the community's lifestyle, as indicated by the inquiry over the fate of the Sunday evening dances. The city's assurances no doubt caused some residents to shrug off the resistance to the annexation. They can not be blamed for failing to foresee the quick demise of the Sunday tradition.

The relations between the city and neighboring communities had been generally cooperative in the 1940s. In 1947 residents of a Hispanic neighborhood just outside the city limits complained to the city commission that city wells were tapping their water supply. In a memo to the commission the city manager acknowledged that the city's nearby well field had lowered the water table below the level reached by the residents' "shallow wells." As a solution the manager recommended that the city build a water main into the neighborhood, even though it was five blocks north of the city limits. The city commission agreed and

the county residents were provided city water.²¹

From this relatively benign situation, relations between the city government and "poorer neighborhoods" deteriorated through the 1950s. By the 1960s they were "uneasy."²²

Neighborhood associations formed so as to preserve the identity and culture of the communities coming under the control of the city. The East San Jose Community Improvement Association formed in the 1950s, and seven more associations formed in the 1960s under the auspices of the Peace Corp Training Center at the University of New Mexico.²³ In 1965 the Albuquerque Journal remarked on the associations' "novel" distance from politics. The South Barelás Improvement Association's constitution stipulated that the association "shall be not for profit or for political gain." The North Barelás Community Development Association was even more explicit in its disavowal of politics: "No district precinct chairman, chairwoman or justice of the peace shall be on the board of directors of the association, and no person shall use the association in

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²¹Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of August 26, 1947, p. 11.

²²Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 260.

²³Ibid., p. 349.

- AVERAGE RANGE**
- 2.2 - 2.8 PEOPLE/HOUSEHOLD
  - 2.9 - 3.5 PEOPLE/HOUSEHOLD
  - 3.6 - OVER PEOPLE/HOUSEHOLD
- **TRAFFIC ZONE BOUNDARY**
- 515 **TRAFFIC ZONE NUMBER**

SOURCE: "Albuquerque Central Area Study," Albuquerque Planning Department, 1965, p. 28.

any manner to further his political ambitions."²⁴

Blaise Padillas, assistant director of a home improvement project in South Baretas described residents' attitude toward politics as distinctly suspicious: "The poor people here in Baretas don't trust the politician. They think of community development as their problem, and they don't want anyone to take advantage of their desire to do something. To these people a politician is your friend during his campaign. If he's elected, he's no longer interested."²⁵

As community associations proliferated in the 1960s of the Great Society, a federation of groups formed. Rudy Baca headed the federation from his position as president of the Santa Barbara-Martineztown Advancement Association. Baca described the goals of the federation as co-ordinating development projects, helping associations acquire federal funding, and making sure "... the community development associations continue to follow democratic principles [and] keep out sectarian and political groups."²⁶

A note of radicalization can be heard in Baca's "democratic" exclusiveness. The democracy within the associations manifested itself in a profound sense of

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²⁴Albuquerque Journal, September 15, 1965, pp. A-1, A-15.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

solidarity within the communities. Perhaps the best example of this neighborhood cohesiveness occurred in East San Jose. As "juvenile delinquency" increased throughout Albuquerque in the early 1970s, residents of East San Jose pointed with great pride to the lack of such increases within their neighborhood. Residents attributed their relative peace to the community's youth center. The East San Jose Community Improvement Association had raised funds to match city funds from the recreation department to build a youth center that included gymnasiums, craft shops and meeting rooms. David H. Vargas, president of the East San Jose association, defined the neighborhood's approach to improvement as "self-help." All projects in the area relied on matching funds. The "hand-outs" from Model Cities, and other federal anti-poverty programs, were steadfastly refused.²⁷ Vargas related, while conducting a tour of their new wood-working shop, one of the community's fund raising efforts: "This is what I call the enchilada floor. I call it the enchilada floor because we sold so many enchiladas to buy the cement for this floor that we almost had them coming out our ears."²⁸

Suspicion of city politicians had developed as city planners and politicians pushed redevelopment plans and

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²⁷Ibid., April 24, 1970, p. A-6; January 3, 1971, p. A-1.

²⁸Ibid., January 3, 1971, pp. A-1, A-6.

programs in the 1950s and 1960s. Barrio neighborhoods were targeted for renewal after being labeled slums. The same coalitions of urban planners, developers, and politicians attacked the problem of "blight" in Albuquerque as in Tucson, discussing neighborhoods as if they "were to be cured of a disease and the unwholesome structures in the area to be amputated."²⁹

The first effort at redevelopment in Albuquerque occurred in 1957 as local merchants funded a city planning department study seeking to cure the congestion and lack of access in the downtown area.³⁰ The resulting "Central Business District Study: Land Uses, 1957," advocated the division of downtown between office and shopping areas. Local residents, primarily Hispanic, occupying neighborhoods surrounding the downtown area (see map, p. ?), were given no place in the plan. The downtown area was to be organized as a service center for the city, accommodating a "high concentration of pedestrian traffic" in shopping areas to the north and office areas to the south. The plan ended with a salutary call for further study, and resulted in no

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²⁹Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 277.

³⁰David Walter Klein, "The Downtown Planning Process: An Analysis of the Albuquerque Experience (Master of Architecture Thesis, University of New Mexico, 1974), p. 10.

actual construction.³¹

The first area actually to come under renewal was the South Broadway neighborhood, south of downtown, some five blocks wide and twenty blocks deep. The area contained approximately 1700 houses and a population of 6,000. The estimated median income of residents was \$200-300 per month.³² The city deemed the project a "pilot program," using no federal funds for clearance or redevelopment, but rather "encouraging residents and property owners in the... area to clean up and remodel." The city's plan called for low interest loans to be issued by local lenders to stop the spread of "blight," then the city would use federal funds to "backtrack and clean up the mess where clearance programs might be called for."³³ The director of the city's effort in South Broadway was Vernon Doaks, coordinator of the city's new Urban Renewal Agency. Doaks emphasized the "self-help" nature of the program, and placed the stress "on preventative rather than curative action, with an eye toward catching deterioration in specific areas before a really

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³¹"Albuquerque Central Business District Study: Land Uses, 1957," City of Albuquerque Planning Department, p. 21. In Municipal Development Department Library, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

³²Albuquerque Journal, August 20, 1961, p. A-4.

³³Ibid., December 2, 1960, p. 1; December 12, 1960, pp. A-1, A-7.

serious situation develops."³⁴ To handle the "serious" situations the city planned to use federal funds, and so in 1960 established the Albuquerque Community Improvement Committee to formulate a plan and grant proposal. Doaks described the intention of the city to "go slow" in their redevelopment effort, so as to avoid the pit-falls encountered by other cities that had cleared large areas expecting the private sector to move in and redevelop, only to be left years later with large tracts of vacant land in their downtown areas.³⁵

Under the personal tutelage of Doaks and his two assistants, who were on a first name basis with most residents and property owners, South Broadway commenced to paint and remodel. Property owners tore down six thoroughly dilapidated houses after being condemned by city inspectors. One bank approved fifty-seven loans in the area from January to June, 1962. The city spent \$50,000 in acquiring six acres and developing a new park, and Piggly Wiggly opened a \$250,000 supermarket that took up an entire block in the neighborhood. Eight hundred tons of trash were collected during a 1960 "clean-up drive." As a result of the improvements, city leaders pointed to the decline in fire calls in the area. South Broadway's "face [had begun] to

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³⁴Ibid., August 20, 1961, p. A-4.

³⁵Ibid.

shine."³⁶

One measure of the success of the South Broadway project was the personal contact made between Doaks and his staff and the residents. As a result of efforts by planners and property owners, homes were preserved, slated for remodeling rather than destruction. Only roofless shells fell to redevelopment. At the time the Albuquerque Journal deemed the program a great success, and bemoaned Doaks' resignation in June 1962.³⁷

Perhaps the reason for Doaks' resignation was the election of new city commissioners in April, 1962. The Albuquerque Citizens' Committee had run a slate of candidates who opposed the use of federal funds for urban planning. Opposition to urban renewal had arisen among businessmen, "particularly those in the housing and real estate industries," and amongst political conservatives in general.³⁸ The Citizen's Committee candidates defy simple categorization as liberal or conservative (they defined themselves as "better government reformers"), and the particular issue of urban renewal created multiple fractures along political, economic, and ethnic lines. In general,

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³⁶Ibid., June 11, 1962, p. A-1.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 278.

however, federally funded renewal programs generated conservative resistance in Albuquerque as in Tucson.

With their election in April the majority on the city commission established the "Building Inspection Team," not to replace urban renewal, but rather to pursue urban renewal on a "self-help" basis while the city continued independently to formulate redevelopment plans. The building inspection team consisted of fire chief Simon Seligman, health director Larry Gordon, and supervisor of building and inspection A.P. Garland, whose task it was to use "strict enforcement" of codes to encourage residents and property owners in the downtown area to rebuild. Archie Westfall, chairman of the city commission, predicted that "in most, if not all, cases corrective measures short of condemnation probably will be possible."³⁹

The meager results of the inspection program resulted from "the inability of householders to obtain loans."⁴⁰ In the meantime, planning continued on several fronts, both within and without the city government. Albuquerque's planning department began to study downtown redevelopment in 1963, completing the "Central Area Study" in 1965. On a different tack, the city commission in January 1964

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³⁹Albuquerque Journal, August 7, 1962, p. A-1; and "Central Area Study," pp. 21-22.

⁴⁰Albuquerque Journal, September 12, 1965, p. C-1.

established the Albuquerque Metropolitan Development Committee to study the issue of "sprawlitis," in relation to "core" development. As Chairman Westfall explained: "For the past year and a half or so a number of people in Albuquerque have become keenly and greatly concerned over our little condition of 'sprawlitis.'" Westfall went on to explain that the commission approved of Albuquerque's spread outward, but not at the expense of the city's "core." The eight businessmen on the Metropolitan Development Committee were to develop a plan for the revitalization of downtown.⁴¹

The committee's ideas became public in 1965, and were published in 1966 as the "Albuquerque Core Redevelopment Plan." The businessmen called for open space in the downtown area, overpasses to provide easy access, and "high density residences" near downtown.⁴²

Despite the plan's formulation by businessmen, it failed to materialize in any concrete way, due, ironically, to the resistance of downtown businessmen. The Albuquerque Journal publicized this split within the business community in February 1964. Without explanation or preamble, the newspaper quoted at great length C.K. (Bud) Redd, "veteran real estate man," who explained the certain failure of all

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⁴¹Ibid., January 1, 1964, p. A-1.

⁴²Klein, "The Downtown Planning Process," p, 20.

voluntary redevelopment plans downtown. At fault, according to Redd, was the "warped philosophy" of downtown businessmen who abhorred going into debt for the sake of a high-rise downtown:

I don't know this for sure but I'll bet you that 90% of the property in what we call the downtown area is debt free, and that's an unhealthy condition. You can't build a big fine building without going into debt... They (downtown businessmen) operate on a cash basis, and they want to continue that way. This will result in a lot of one and two story buildings going up where high-rise buildings should go up...⁴³

Redd's castigation of his fellow businessmen targeted their "independence," which allowed individual property owners to "clobber a whole program." Redd reluctantly concluded that federal intervention and support for urban redevelopment was necessary: "Those boys (federal renewal agencies) have been at it for years and they know what they are doing. They have the authority to condemn property and this is what we need."⁴⁴

It was in this environment that the planning department's "Central Area Study" appeared in 1965. This study by the city's planning department echoed Redd's conclusion by explaining the failure of earlier programs as due to the resistance of individualistic businessmen. The

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⁴³Albuquerque Journal, February 13, 1964, pp. A-1, A-7.

⁴⁴Ibid.

study also described "sociological" causes: the Hispanic, mostly poor, residents in the neighborhoods immediately surrounding the central business district generally opposed redevelopment plans.⁴⁵

The Central Area Study described the surrounding neighborhoods as generally "blighted." As evidence for slum conditions, the study quoted from the 1960 Census of Housing, which described about one third of the central area's housing as "dilapidated or deteriorated" (34.2 per cent of 3,801 housing units). The lumping tendency of planners at this time appeared in this survey of the central area. Perhaps a minor inconsistency, pointing to the danger of generalizations, appeared in the study's analysis of housing conditions. First, the study described dilapidated housing as resulting from poor original construction, specifically excoriating adobe construction. When pointing to the structures in worst condition, however, frame construction appeared as the worst culprit.⁴⁶

More egregious was the study's dismissal of the needs of area residents. Housing in the redeveloped central area was to be "attractive (and) high density." None of the eight objectives in the plan acknowledged the existence of

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⁴⁵"Albuquerque Central Area Study," p. 37.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 31.

current residents.⁴⁷ As the renewal plan progressed to a specific \$2.5 million proposal, the human impact became clearer. In September 1965, the city's sanitarian, John Cordova, described the urban renewal project as including 980 families residing in 335 pieces of property "beyond repair," 240 pieces of property requiring an average \$1687.40 in rehabilitation, and 153 houses in good condition. Cordova said that most residents approved of the redevelopment plan, but acknowledged that "...quite a few older people (are) living there. There's long-time occupancy, and they don't want to move too far away."⁴⁸ A later survey of the area would show that many residents did not want to move at all.

The city commission pushed for the passage of urban renewal bonds to match federal funds for the \$2.5 million project in the April 1966 election, and were stunned when voters singled out the urban renewal bonds for defeat. City

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⁴⁷The eight objectives for the central area were: 1. "... communication center;" 2. "... major center of attraction for tourists;" 3. "... attractive high density residential development;" 4. "... employment and labor center;" 5. "... civic and cultural center;" 6. "... regional recreation center;" 7. "... a special type of regional institutional center (hospitals, research, etc.);" 8. "... a vigorous commercial and business center;" in "Central Area Study," p. 5.

⁴⁸Albuquerque Journal, September 12, 1965, p. C-1.

manager Edmund Engle "expressed extreme dismay."⁴⁹ Voters approved \$20 million in civic improvement bonds for added fire, sewer and water service, plus storm drain and street construction, which included an overpass into the downtown area. Voters defeated bonds of \$2 million for a new Hall of Justice, \$750,000 for a new museum building, and \$475,000 for the city's share of the proposed \$2,595,000 urban renewal project. The voters seemed to be saying that they desired easier access to downtown (approving the overpass), but desired to find few changes downtown once they got there.⁵⁰

"Urban Renewal" had become the evil twin of annexation.

Despite the electoral setback, city commissioners continued to push for urban renewal. As renewal planning progressed, the federal government named Albuquerque a participant in the "Model Cities" program, which in some ways overlapped with renewal. Conservative reaction was vehement. Some warned against the "perils of federal control," and one man declared "We've got to start fighting the Communists at home."⁵¹

Nonetheless, the city commission forged ahead. Next on

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⁴⁹Ibid., April 6, 1966, pp. A-1-2.

⁵⁰Klein, "The Downtown Planning Process," p. 84.

⁵¹Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 284; Albuquerque Journal, August 9, 1966, p. A-1.

their agenda was the plan to develop Old Town Plaza as a tourist attraction. City planners identified three problems in the Old Town area: first, that the area "... is hard to reach by automobile. Second is that parking near the Plaza is in short supply and few motorists like to park on dirt. And third, that there are dirt streets, unsightly utility lines, dilapidated buildings and houses, non-historic businesses, and ugly signs in the fringe area." Planners had become aware of the federal-funding bugaboo, and so explicitly downplayed the federal role in the plan. Only funds for the purpose of placing utility lines underground would be solicited from the federal government.⁵²

Even while supporting the plan, the Albuquerque Journal acknowledged the city's clumsy handling of the proposal: "True, the planners made some mistakes in both the plan itself and in the manner in which it was presented to the public. Perhaps the biggest mistake was the mere mentioning of urban renewal."⁵³ A letter-to-the-editor exemplified the "buzzsaw" of emotion that surrounded the plan. Warren Hawkins wrote: "Keep it as it is. I have been reading about urban renewal for Old Town Plaza. Preposterous! Can't we keep a few little quaint shops and at least one little old mud house in this neon-lighted world? Keep Old

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⁵²Albuquerque Journal, September 9, 1966, p. A-4.

⁵³Ibid.

Town Plaza as it is!"⁵⁴

Albuquerque's urban renewal effort came to fruition in 1968 replete with ongoing political squabbling. Factions developed as various departments debated the specifics of the plan. How many fingers were in the urban renewal pie? At various times five local and federal agencies claimed jurisdiction over urban renewal in Albuquerque: The Albuquerque Planning Department, Metropolitan Transportation Department, Urban Renewal Agency, Model Cities Administration, and Office for Economic Opportunity. At the center of the controversy were the federal regulations pertaining to urban renewal. On one side of the issue were officials who "cow-towed" to the "feds." On the other side were those who "played it fast and loose" with federal regulations. Officials on each side accused each other of skipping meetings, lying, and sabotaging planning efforts.⁵⁵ In 1968, Martha Buddecke rhetorically asked in the Albuquerque Journal, "Who Plans the Planning?"

Despite the political squabbling Albuquerque received \$25 million for the "Tijeras Urban Renewal Project" in June 1968. The project resulted from the loan and grant application (requesting \$31 million) submitted by the city's

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⁵⁴Ibid., p. A-5.

⁵⁵Ibid., May 7, 1967, p. A-4.

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DOWNTOWN IN RELATION TO PUBLIC RENEWAL AREAS

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SOURCE: "The Downtown Plan," Albuquerque Planning Department, 1970, p. 9.

Urban Renewal Agency, covered 182.6 acres near downtown, and required that "all single family residential structures that (can) not be feasibly converted to uses allowed in the plan... be acquired and cleared."⁵⁶ The type of residences foreseen after redevelopment were the "high intensity" variety, not the indigenous dwellings.

Residents of the area formed the Citizen Improvement Committee to resist the renewal program. The residential resistance created more name calling among the city and federal officials. The city commission and chairman of the Urban Renewal Agency accused local VISTA representatives of fomenting resistance in the renewal neighborhoods. John Goldsmith, VISTA supervisor in Albuquerque, explained that his workers were simply explaining the renewal process to residents (including the federal regulation requiring participation by residents in the planning process), and that residents' organizational efforts and demands for a seat on the board of directors of the Urban Renewal Agency were of the residents' own doing.⁵⁷

As resistance mounted, flaws in the Tijeras plan appeared. Specifically, the Albuquerque Journal noted that a neighborhood slated for destruction actually had a split

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⁵⁶Klein, "The Downtown Planning Process," p. 37.

⁵⁷Albuquerque Journal, October 19, 1968, pp. A-1, A-4.

personality: "The northwest corner is a slum -- mostly unpaved streets, dilapidated housing, overcrowding. The southeast corner is a quiet, well-kept neighborhood with houses built around the turn of the century." And even within the "slum" area erroneous judgments were made. The "slum" house of Mrs. Lupe Cortez was described as "ramshackle outside," but "neat and warm inside." Warmth provided by a wood burning stove apparently designated "blight." Also Cortez's status as a renter, albeit at the same address for thirty years, contributed to the "slum" designation.⁵⁸

Perhaps a clearer example to the planners was the case of Otto Van Cleave, homeowner, 77 years old, who had lived in the same house since 1903. Of the renewal plan, Van Cleave said, "I think it's crap! I want to stay here. I'll do everything in my power to keep from moving."⁵⁹

Meanwhile, residents of the Tijeras area continued to push for representation on the board of directors of the Urban Renewal Agency. Finally, in April 1969, the city commission voted to appoint Jack Candelaria to the Urban Renewal Agency. Candelaria was a resident of the San Jose neighborhood, and had recently participated in Model Cities planning. Tijeras residents had nominated James Hontas,

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⁵⁸Ibid., February 2, 1969, p. A-1.

⁵⁹Ibid.

president of the Citizen Improvement Committee, for the position on the board, but the city commission picked Candelaria as a "representative for the whole renewal area."⁶⁰

The resistance of the Tijeras residents paid off in the end. Their neighborhood had been slated for destruction so as to make room for a school complex, but federal planners ammended the project and removed the education center. Most of the neighborhood was left in place.

Typically, federal funding shrank in those areas of the project where improvement in residential areas was needed.⁶¹ In 1969 the city formally requested \$8 million for neighborhood rehabilitation, including street repair, remodeling of housing and the purchase of condemned property. The city received only \$8,900 in Model Cities funds for these projects, but robbed Peter to pay Paul in order to do some of the work.⁶² Renewal became an ad hoc affair. Smaller projects continued into the 1970s. For example, in 1971 local agencies moved approximately fifty families in the Barelvas area away from the stench of a city sewage treatment plant.⁶³

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⁶⁰Ibid., April 6, 1969, p. A-6.

⁶¹Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 288.

⁶²Ibid., p. 289.

⁶³Albuquerque Journal, May 6, 1971, p. A-8.

Perhaps the smaller size of projects allowed planners and politicians to manage renewal without trampling so thoroughly on the wishes of residents and taxpayers. Mirroring the city's turbulent annexation fights through the 1950s and 1960s, new political leadership in the late 1960s brought a softening of the city's approach to renewal.

Finally, in 1970, the Downtown Plan was approved, and in 1975 the city's Comprehensive Plan went into effect.⁶⁴ Resistance to urban renewal, both political and ethnic in origin, shaped the final outcome of redevelopment in Albuquerque. The appearance of downtown Albuquerque today bears the marks of planners' zeal and resident resistance.

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⁶⁴Minutes of the Albuquerque City Council, Meetings of December 16, 1970 and August 24, 1975.

Chapter 8: Environmental Resistance

"Sprawlitis"

The rise of environmental awareness in Albuquerque mirrored the national trends of the late 1960s and 1970s. In Albuquerque, enviromental awareness resulted in calls for "slow growth" and preservation of "open spaces" on the fringe of the city in the 1970s. A consciousness of natural surroundings appeared in the earliest booster promotions, but an explicitly preservationist critique in defense of nature failed to materialize in Albuquerque until late in the postwar boom. Earlier, a more diffuse view of natural surroundings appeared in Albuquerque than Tucson, nature placed more thoroughly "out there," rather than within the city's midst.

The presence of nature as a defining quality of Albuquerque appeared in the earliest booster promotions, but nature remained comfortably pigeonholed as a marketable commodity, a business asset to be sold and utilized, just as the fertility of the Rio Grande River had been used from the beginning of settlement. Albuquerque's promoters thought of nature in the useable forms of climate, topography and culture. A "preservationist" view of nature, such as Joseph Wood Krutch offered in Tucson, did not appear in Albuquerque

until the late 1960s. Ernie Pyle might have arrived at Krutch's nay-saying extreme had not a Japanese machine gun on Okinawa ended his life in 1945. An early description by Pyle of his home on the outskirts of Albuquerque shows a sensitivity to nature such as Krutch felt:

... the weirdest kinds of desert weeds are always springing up in our bare south lot... meadow larks hidden in the sage across the road from our house sing us awake in the summer dawn... Every night around 9 two rabbits come to nibble on our lawn. And about once a week when we rise early, there are quail in our front yard... they don't fly away with a frightened whirring of wings, they just walk slowly across the road and inside the concealing sage..."¹

Erna Fergusson was another literary figure who might have offered a preservationist argument as a native daughter of the city, but Fergusson tended to valorize nature in an indistinct fashion in Albuquerque. Sunsets and mountain views were glorious, but the surrounding sagebrush plains were "arid wastes."²

Albuquerque's boosters often spoke of the city's uniqueness, but they rarely offered a precise definition. The 1939 inaugural edition of the "Albuquerque Magazine" described the city as unique, even if residents did not recognize it as such: "... living in the very center of the most interesting part of New Mexico, our residents all too frequently think of remote points as the proper localities

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¹Pyle, "Why Albuquerque?" p. 17.

²Erna Fergusson, Albuquerque, p. 1.

to visit, and fail to appreciate the captivating possibilities of our own unique and lovable region."³ In the 1941 promotional brochure "Pictorial Albuquerque," the Chamber of Commerce displayed the city primarily through photographs of city buildings, with some additional shots of the surrounding mountains and Indian pueblos.⁴ In 1965 the city commission discussed the need to establish new taxing districts for infrastructure improvement "... to the end that this community will continue to grow as one united in the essentials yet free to express the individuality of its people thereby retaining the flavor which has caused us all to cherish this as our own and permanent home."⁵ Missing from these professions of uniqueness is a singular reference to nature. The city's plurality of cultures plays an equal, if not greater, role. Within this awareness of cultural pluralism, however, an assumption about natural surroundings remains.

In most of the promotions and self-evaluations of Albuquerque, even those focusing on cultural aspects of the community, nature appears as an inescapable element of the

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³"Albuquerque Magazine," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Box I, Item 87.

⁴"Pictorial Albuquerque," Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, MSS. 112, Item 89.

⁵Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of January 6, 1965.

community's character. Perhaps this awareness of nature is unavoidable in Southwestern cities due to the range and basin topography which makes vivid horizons the norm rather than the exception. In Albuquerque, the sun rises every morning over the mountainous eastern horizon: Sandia Mountains, Tijeras Canyon, Manzanita Mountains.

Climate also presents an obvious "natural" characteristic of the city. The earliest promotions touted Albuquerque's sunny climate as a curative for tuberculosis, much as Tucson promotions sought to lure convalescents to local sanatoriums around the turn of the century. The sunshine promotions in Albuquerque continued throughout the city's development, although not to the degree of establishing a "Sunshine Climate Club." In the 1960s Albuquerque took the lead in promoting the region's climate through the "Southwest Sun Cast." The city commission's proclamation announcing the "sun cast" started with typical booster hyperbole: "WHEREAS, the city of Albuquerque has successfully claimed and held the title of Sunshine Capital of the United States..." The proclamation went on to challenge Florida and the rest of the country to match the Southwest's sunshine at the first annual Sun Cast, "... in which representatives from the cities of Albuquerque, El Paso, Tucson and Phoenix will meet in special ceremony at the Albuquerque Sunport to present and compare respective

sunshine records, and to challenge the rest of the nation in general and the Southeastern United States in particular to match this impressive array of sunshine statistics."⁶ The city's sunshine statistics were being kept by the Albuquerque Tribune, whose "sunshine record" for December 25, 1963 announced "740 consecutive days" of sunshine (meaning 740 consecutive days when the sun had peeked through the clouds at least once).⁷

An element of Albuquerque's "natural" surroundings that differed from Tucson's was Albuquerque's continuing reliance on the Rio Grande River, still running in a steady meander. In Tucson the Santa Cruz River runs only after heavy rains. Albuquerque maintains a pastoral identity based on the nearness of the river. Farming persists, and deciduous trees stretch in a ribbon up and down the river's course. Autumn can be witnessed in Albuquerque even from the sagebrush mesas devoid of indigenous trees: there are plenty of leaves to turn and fall in the valley near the river. Tucson shrugs off most seasons in a warm monotony of dry heat.

Thus Albuquerque's "uniqueness" rests on perceptions of

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⁶Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of December 17, 1963

⁷Minutes of the Albuquerque City Commission, Meeting of December 30, 1963.

topography, climate, and culture. Mountains define the horizon in both Albuquerque and Tucson, and it would be pointless to compare the aesthetics of each city's mountainous fringe. The valleys differ plainly, however. Tucson rests amidst the Sonoran desert. Albuquerque lies on a high semi-arid plain cut by the flow of the Rio Grande. The mesas above the bluffs that front the river are covered with sagebrush, which engendered fewer defenders than the peculiar saguaro cactus, perhaps due to the former's ordinariness. Albuquerque hosts no reserve dedicated to the preservation of the indigenous bush such as Tucson's Saguaro National Monument.

Climate differs in the two cities as well. Albuquerque's higher altitude and cooler climate probably gave that city an advantage in the attraction of permanent residents in the days before air conditioning softened the desert's growl. But the coolness could be a two-edged sword at times, "mild" becoming "cold." During the winter of 1929 Jimmy Walker, Mayor of New York City, paid a visit to Albuquerque on what photographs of the occasion show to be a blustery day. The city boosters, complete in cowboy regalia, came out to greet the celebrity, presenting Walker with an Indian blanket. The mayor seemed to appreciate the gift: he promptly wrapped himself in the thick wool blanket

against the cold.⁸

Tucson brashly called itself the "Sunshine Capital," as did Albuquerque, but Albuquerque offered itself as a more reasonable locale: mild. Perhaps it was ironic then that Albuquerque, not Tucson, faced water shortages in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The rapid growth of the city outstripped the water delivery system, causing "emergency rationing measures" in 1946, 1948, 1951, 1952 and 1953. Water was available in the river and shallow aquifer, but the infrastructure required expansion.⁹ Albuquerque receives less rainfall than Tucson, but the nearness of the river and more congenial summer climate makes vegetation flourish more green than Tucson's prevalent brown.¹⁰

Albuquerque's Indian and Spanish heritage also defines the city's uniqueness in many ways, but somewhat haphazardly, as exemplified by the rise of "regional" architecture. The stolid old brick architecture that characterized New Albuquerque began to give way in 1901 to a

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⁸Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 72.

⁹Albuquerque Journal, November 5, 1947, p. 1; September 26, 1952, p. 1; July 25, 1953, p. 1; July 30, 1953, p. 1; summarized in, Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 132.

¹⁰Albuquerque receives about eight inches of rain per year. Tucson receives almost eleven inches per year. In Frommer's Santa Fe, Taos and Albuquerque, p. 2; and Lockard, This is Tucson, p. 236.

revival of Spanish Colonial and Pueblo style buildings. The first to go up were the Santa Fe Railroad Station and adjoining Alvarado Hotel in 1901. The railroad was appealing to tourism in this move: Fred Harvey offered "native" styles.¹¹

The Pueblo style appeared on the University of New Mexico campus in 1909 with the construction of the new Administration Building. The style became entrenched on the campus when the board of regents hired John Gaw Meem as architect. Meem became the primary proponent of Albuquerque's regional architecture. In later decades, as modernistic architectural styles became the vogue, and "regional" styles were criticized as inherently "dishonest," Meem continued to design and build Pueblo style structures.¹²

Boosters staged the "First America" fair in the 1930s around an Indian Pueblo facade. The pageant attempted to the recreate the history of the town from its Indian origins through Spanish and American periods to the contemporary era of hopeful prosperity. The set remained a false-front, however. Unlike Tucson, which marketed its Mexican and Old

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¹¹Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 45.

¹²Ibid., p. 65; Meem defended the Pueblo Style against "modernists" who condemned any "style" as "... ignorant, sterile, untruthful -- in fact, immoral." In Bergman, "The Fate of Architectural Theory in Albuquerque," pp. 301-302.

West heritage as palpably real, Albuquerque always seemed to wink at the rough traditions. The city's boosters, posing for a picture in front of the "First America" set, appeared in garish cowboy costumes, replete with Groucho-type moustaches and beards. The poses were comically fake.¹³

During the 250-year anniversary celebration in 1956 the city commission asked men to grow beards "in order to make the city look the way it did 250 years ago." The commission also asked women to stop wearing make-up. As Wood remarked, "The enthusiasm was dampened not at all when a researcher discovered that the men of the early 1700s were clean-shaven and grew their hair long and that the women indulged in cosmetics."¹⁴ Tucson boosters offered their promotional photographs as the real McCoy: Joseph Wood Krutch interviewed at a working cattle ranch presenting a "true" image of Tucson. In 1948 the motion picture "Albuquerque" premiered: "Blazing Guns Made History Each Day... And Warm Lips Made Memories At Night in Albuquerque... The Glory Town of Nature's Spectacular Southwest."¹⁵ The movie no doubt presented Albuquerque's "history" in florid terms. The pageant on July 4, 1956 recounted the history of Albuquerque from depictions of "Indian life" to "WWII and atomic

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¹³Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 80-81.

¹⁴Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 221.

¹⁵Albuquerque Journal, February 2, 1948, p. 10.

research" in ostensibly more realistic fashion. In all the pageant lacked a focus on environmental concerns. The impact of atomic research on the natural environment was ignored, as was typical in the 1950s. On display in the pageant was a Turnerian sense of history flowing in waves of successive settlement leading to the most recent boom, which was forecast as happily progressing, and distant from the rough beginning.¹⁶

Boosters kept the Indian heritage in Albuquerque at arms length. Quaint building patterns and festivals suitable for tourist excursions were deemed suitable. Chamber of Commerce promotions described Pablo Abieta as "Albuquerque's adopted Indian citizen," representative of the Pueblos.¹⁷ In this context Abieta was an adopted child, not a blood relation to the Anglo city. Albuquerque lay in "the heart of the pueblo country," but made no pretense of being an "old pueblo" itself.

Fringe residents in Albuquerque often described their lifestyle as rural, closer to nature. At times residents protested annexation of mesa land, but not from an explicit preservationist argument until the 1960s. Much of the mesa was annexed while still vacant in the 1940s and 1950s,

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¹⁶Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 221.

¹⁷Fitzpatrick and Caplin, Albuquerque, p. 105.

avoiding the confrontation with residents who might have offered a Krutchlike critique. The 1949 annexation brought over 7000 acres into the city, and no people.

As Albuquerque's urbanization continued through the 1950s, rural lifestyles in north and south fringe areas grew in popularity. Realtors became aware of the marketability of pastoral lifestyles in the early 1960s: "The demand for housing in the valley areas is increasing faster than elsewhere... If you want the phone to ring off the wall, just run an ad saying 'horses allowed.'"¹⁸ Despite this popularity, however, annexation protests never explicitly defended nature per se. In the vehement protest against the 1964 annexation, residents in the Rural Property Owners Association attacked the city's move on the basis of a defense of liberty and freedom from arbitrary government: "An attempt is being made to usurp the constitutional rights and privileges of some 62,000 residents."¹⁹

What did residents find appealing in the rural lifestyle outside the city limits? To what degree were residents of Albuquerque's "rurbia" nature lovers or political libertarians, or both? The East Mountain Survey in 1973 found residents in the Sandia foothills and mountains to be adamant in their desire to preserve the

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¹⁸Albuquerque Journal, May 17, 1963, p. A-2.

¹⁹Ibid., June 24, 1964, pp. A-1-2.

rural character of their lifestyle: "Over and over residents reiterated this desire. One third of the population has moved to the area during the past four years. They moved to escape from city noise, crowds, and pollution, and fear that the city will follow them to the mountains." The residents ranked the reasons for maintaining their pastoral lifestyle: 88% sought to escape city noise; 88.5% wanted fewer neighbors; 91% cited fresher air; 50% kept animals; 36.3% wanted lower taxes; 14% resided in family or childhood homes.²⁰ Nature lovers, political libertarians, or both? Perhaps "misanthropic" should be added to the list, in reference to the desire for "fewer neighbors." Concern over taxes ranked surprisingly low.

The 1973 survey may or may not indicate the opinions of residents in 1963. What is clear in the survey and in earlier accounts, however, is a fear of degrading lifestyle brought on by the growth of the city. Even city planners acknowledged the degrading conditions in Albuquerque in 1962, phrasing their call for action in urban renewal terms. The culprits were "growth, time and obsolescence."²¹ This awareness resulted in renewal efforts within the city, and

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²⁰"East Mountain Area District Plan: Part 1: Citizen Attitude Survey," Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Planning Department, 1973, p. 3 and 6. In Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Coronado Collection.

²¹Albuquerque Journal, January 30, 1962, p. B-2.

in the Project 1970 plan that attempted to bring the entire county within the city limits. The rationale for the annexation plan was to increase the effectiveness of planning efforts.

Despite the planning efforts of city departments, resident uneasiness about growth increased to the point that political leaders finally noticed the angst. In 1964 Chairman Westfall commented on residents' perception of growth: "For the past year and a half or so a number of people have become keenly and greatly concerned over our little condition of 'sprawlitis.'"²²

In 1966 the argument over development of Old Town Plaza drew a preservationist critique, in this case, directed toward the cultural artifact that was the plaza. A cultural element of Albuquerque's uniqueness was being lost, not "nature." Local columnist and author, Irene Fisher, romantically described in 1950 what Old Town represented: "That which Old Albuquerque has to offer is what New Mexico itself gives to those who seek it out -- a way of life in which many persons from varied cultures live side by side in peace and friendliness." Fisher's romanticism appeared in her dismissal of the area's poverty: "Here poverty is no disgrace; on the contrary, the 'rico' is looked on with

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²²Ibid., January 1, 1964, p. A-1.

suspicion, and must prove himself as a person before he is admitted into the casual, somewhat light-hearted group whose watchword is 'manana.'"²³ Of course, poverty is no disgrace, but it should not be described as "light-hearted." Nonetheless, a letter to the editor in 1966 advocated preserving the plaza as a genuine cultural island within a "neon-lighted world."²⁴

By 1968 the city's growth presented a "frightening picture" to some residents. The planning department projected that by the year 2000 the city's population would be 500,000, the county's population would be one million, and, most frightening of all, the county would have to accommodate 700,000 automobiles.²⁵ Pastoral settings remained in some locales, but by the 1970s new residents had to look further afield to find these rural amenities. The satellite communities of Paradise Hills and Rio Rancho flourished in the 1970s as a new wave of residents, "many of them retirees from the east seeking a pleasanter, less congested life than they had known before" migrated to Albuquerque.²⁶ The mountains remained on the horizon, golf

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²³Irene Fisher, "Old Albuquerque: Past and Present," 1950, p. 14; in Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico Library, MSS. 112, Item 101.

²⁴Albuquerque Journal, September 6, 1966, p. A-5.

²⁵Ibid., January 26, 1968, p. A-6.

²⁶Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 314.

courses interrupted the monotony of housing -- in general the natural environment was part of this "pleasanter" way of life. The traditional Hispanic culture also played a part of the "pleasanter" life in the older villages of Tijeras, Bernalillo, Corrales and Placitas, which also served as satellite communities for the migrating retirees.²⁷

In 1972 the concern over environmental degradation, in its most general urban sense, became explicit. Herb Smith, Planning Department Director, described the uneasiness within the community over continuing growth: "I can nail the environmental situation in Albuquerque down to one word. And that word is capacity." The planning department had shifted its focus, reflecting national trends, toward the definition of limits of size and growth, rather than forecasting future development so that the city infrastructure could accommodate the "new thousands."²⁸

The explicit concern over the community's health appeared in the proliferation of studies and surveys by the city and county planning departments in the early 1970s. The East Mountain Survey has already been mentioned. In addition there was the Vacant Land Survey in 1972 which determined that 14,035 "useable acres" existed within the

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²⁷Ibid., p. 326.

²⁸Albuquerque Journal, February 27, 1972, pp. A-1, A-14.

city limits.²⁹ The concerted effort to catalogue existing conditions and attitudes is reminiscent of Diocletian's survey of capets and yolks within the declining Roman Empire: in order to stop the decline you must first know where you are -- how bad is it?

Air pollution had become a concern in the early 1960s. Planners advocated an air pollution control ordinance to the city commission in 1962, seeking to nip the problem in the bud. The Chamber of Commerce opposed the ordinance "... fear(ing) that an over-zealous air pollution control ordinance will serve to restrain industrial growth."³⁰ At that time it was still possible to deny the urgency of the problem. By 1968 the problem had grown too noticeable to ignore. The Environmental Health Department began keeping monthly records on air pollution levels that year. In December 1971 the city experienced its first "pollution alert," in which "... motorists were advised to drive only if necessary, and trash burning and fireplace fires were prohibited."³¹

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²⁹"Vacant Land Study," Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Planning Department, 1972, p. 1. In Municipal Development Department Library, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

³⁰"Albuquerque News Letter," Dec. 7, 1962, in Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico Library, Coronado Collection, "Action Albuquerque."

³¹Patrick H. McNamara, A Social Report for Metropolitan Albuquerque (Studies in Urban Affairs, No. 16: Albuquerque Urban Observatory, 1973), p. 85-86.

The concerns about the consequences of sprawl brought the city to a fundamental juncture in the early 1970s. At one point a federal official accused the city of pursuing a "no growth" policy. In August 1973, Manny Sanchez, regional director for HUD in Albuquerque, said "The City of Albuquerque is apparently determined that no new annexation should occur nor will city utilities be extended beyond existing municipal boundaries. The desired effect, of course, is to prevent over-extension of the city's ability to provide municipal services and force the utilization of 'passed-over' land within the existing city limits."³²

Old habits die hard -- city planners fired back that "no growth" was definitely not the city's policy, pointing to the annexation of 2,121 acres since January 1972. Nonetheless, the city was faced with a "financial dilemma, if not crisis," trying to determine the allocation of resources toward "maintaining and upgrading older parts of the city or providing limited service to new developments."³³

By the late 1960s environmental awareness had become more obvious and open, reflecting the national trend, and

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³²Albuquerque Journal, August 24, 1973, p. D-1.

³³Bruce Alan Briggs, "Residential Infill Development in the City of Albuquerque," (Master of Architecture Thesis, University of New Mexico, 1974), p. 4.

resistance to growth from an environmental critique had surfaced. The "Grass Roots Committee" at the University of New Mexico served as a focal point for the "liberal-reform" movements that first championed environmental protection. These liberals were the most outspoken champions of environmentalism, but business and political leaders also grew more sensitive to the issue.³⁴ In 1969 a proposed paper mill near the city was nixed by the city commission because of the mill's exorbitant water needs and the threat of river pollution. The mill plan had been opposed by the executive board of the Albuquerque Citizen's Committee and the Chamber of Commerce as well.³⁵

In another environmental issue, activists began pushing in 1971 to stop the construction of a crest road in the Sandia Mountains. The activists circulated petitions and staged a small "plant-in" of trees in the path of the bulldozers on the road site. In the end, the forest service killed the road project by freezing funds, but the protest had served the purpose of rallying the forces for environmental protection. The issue of protecting the scenic qualities of Albuquerque's environment and establishing open spaces protected from encroachment by developers on the fringes of residential areas became a

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³⁴Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 344.

³⁵Albuquerque Journal, September 6, 1969, p. A-1.

popular and "unifying" theme in local politics.³⁶

The environmental movement in Albuquerque focused on the effort to acquire "open spaces." In May 1971 the City of Albuquerque, with the cooperation of the Rio Grande Council of Governments, began acquiring land in the foothills of the Sandia Mountains.³⁷ Later that summer city leaders proposed a general obligation bond for \$500,000 to acquire land for "open space." By July, the focus had shifted to the possible development of the five dead volcanos on the western horizon. A "Save the Volcanos Committee" formed, lead by Mrs. George Eisenberg, who fretted publicly: "I'm so deathly afraid someone is going to plop an ugly restaurant on top of them or put up an industrial park or load them up with towers and lights."³⁸

The "open space" idea was thoroughly ingrained in city policy by 1975 when the city adopted the Comprehensive Plan. Included within the plan was a section devoted to the acquisition of "major open space." The plan described the "functions" of open space as including the "... satisfaction of psychological needs for space... Relief from the urban environment is provided by large open spaces within or near the urban area, and the urban area itself can be made more

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³⁶Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," pp. 515-516.

³⁷Albuquerque Journal, May 30, 1971, p. A-2.

³⁸Ibid., July 27, 1971, p. A-1.

T. "Plan for Major Open Space"

SOURCE: "The Comprehensive Plan," 1975.

liveable and aesthetically pleasing by including open space as an important part of the built environment."³⁹ The concern over urban sprawl came after the city had grown to about 86 square miles, stretching from the volcanos in the west to the foothills of the Sandia mountains in the east. "Albuquerque seemed less like a rugged community thriving in the midst of natural splendor and more like a gigantic living organism expanding and adjusting its structure according to some daily perceived natural process."⁴⁰ At this stage resistance to growth became noticeable to historians. The image of the city as a giant amoeba swallowing everything in its path lead "naturally" to grass-roots political action in defense of "... the huge blue sky, the sharp peaks of the Sandia Mountains and the broad shallow ribbon of the Rio Grande..."⁴¹

Resistance to the expansion of Albuquerque explicitly in defense of "nature" was relatively new. Opposition to the growth of Albuquerque's physical sprawl and governmental reach explicitly in defense of political and ethnic "lifestyle" arose much earlier, but this political and ethnic resistance was only implicitly in defense of nature.

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³⁹"Plan for Major Open Space," Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Comprehensive Plan, 1975, p. 2. In Municipal Development Department Library, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

⁴⁰Wood, "Transformation of Albuquerque," p. 531.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 556.

A simple reason exists for the lack of an early preservationist critique in Albuquerque such as Joseph Wood Krutch provided in Tucson. In New Mexico the people most inclined to offer such a viewpoint lived sixty miles to the north of Albuquerque in Santa Fe. Despite Santa Fe's status as state capital and 1990s boomtown, it remains in image a cultural mecca for those drawn to New Mexico's natural and cultural attractions.

V.B. Price described the mutual suspicion between the two cities in City at the End of the World: "Residents of Santa Fe delight in bashing Albuquerque's working-class aura and industrial ambience. And Albuquerqueans happily admit to finding Santa Fe pretty, but inbearably chichi and small-town."⁴² Price acknowledged that the true character of each city often failed to match the image, both in ways positive and negative. Nonetheless Santa Fe continues to enjoy a national reputation as "... a Southwestern version of Beverly Hills, the 'in' city of the 1990s, a secret haven in which to hide far from the madding world -- a sort of romantic, American cultural oasis complete with cowboys, Indians, señoritas, and a 'style' all its own that clothiers, interior decorators, and perfume manufacturers can rely on to make them a fortune."⁴³

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⁴²Price, A City at the End of the World, p. 42.

⁴³Ibid., p. 43.

Santa Fe itself exemplifies contested development based on an environmental critique embodied in a "slow-growth" effort to preserve the natural and cultural identity of the community.⁴⁴ This opposition to development coincided with the general rise in environmental awareness most likely to be recognized by urban and western historians. Albuquerque also witnessed a rise in environmentalism, as discussed in this chapter, but in New Mexico, Santa Fe appeared the more likely target for preservation.

The acceptability of desert landscaped lawns in Tucson has no direct corollary in Albuquerque. If the sage brush mesa appears within the city, most likely a vacant lot is denoted. Albuquerqueans defended their lifestyle, culture, political idealism, and sense of community against threatening aspects of urbanization. In the late 1960s opponents of the city's expansion added an explicit defense of nature to the antigrowth critique. In the 1970s, city government mandated "open space" on the fringe of the city as a necessary element of the "built environment."

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⁴⁴Ibid.

CONCLUSION

The habit of earlier historians to focus on the consensus behind development in the urban Southwest during the post World War II boom required this corrective, providing a balance to the depiction of the process of urbanization. The progrowth and antigrowth stories, taken together, depict the development of Tucson and Albuquerque more accurately than either one can accomplish singly.

The temptation may arise to characterize each city as fitting into either a cooperative or contentious urban paradigm. Evidence exists stretching far back into the historical record supporting both models. Booster activities in Tucson and Albuquerque accompanied development from territorial days and earlier. Less obvious in the historical record is the resistance. In Tucson, for example, litigious opposition to development plans was present in the community at the very instance of U.S. acquisition. As negotiations proceeded which resulted in the Gadsden Purchase in 1854, Tucson residents lodged a legal challenge with the Sonoran government over the Mexican government's latest development plan. Mexico's 1848 colonization law sought to secure the northern frontier by establishing "military colonies." Establishing the colonies entailed granting arable land to former soldiers, thus

stimulating both development and security. Resistance to the colonization plan arose in Tucson when the Sonoran military commander granted land to former soldiers which was already under cultivation, and arguably "owned" by Tucsonenses. These land disputes accompanied Tucson and Tucsonenses into the United States.¹

The cooperative and contentious models for describing community ethos reflect approaches to urban history from the 1950s and 1960s. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick described a community ethos founded on the cooperative management of conflict in their 1954 article, "A Meaning for Turner's Frontier: Democracy in the Old Northwest." This update of Frederick Jackson Turner's "participatory democracy" thesis foretold of placid and orderly growth, a particularly fitting image for urbanization in the "consensus" 1950s.² Robert Dykstra's The Cattle Towns challenged this cooperative paradigm. Dykstra suggested that community conflict was not only normal, but inevitable.³ Other authors have applied this contentious urban paradigm to descriptions of the "urban crisis" of the

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¹Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, pp. 26-29.

²Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick, "A Meaning for Turner's Frontier: Democracy in the Old Northwest," Political Science Quarterly 69 (September 1954): 321.

³Robert Dykstra, The Cattle Towns (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968).

1960s and 1970s, but studies of the 1950s remain largely untouched by this contentious model. Curiously, even many New Western historians seem willing to accept the consensus view of the 1950s as a period of mute acquiescence to urbanization, even as the recent historiography of the decade broadens and deepens.⁴

Resistance to urbanization proved to be persistent and multifaceted. No simple dichotomy appears describing monolithic opposition to growth. The resistance to urbanization was as multifaceted as the booster/politician/planner forces pushing for expanded development. The accurate depiction of the process of urbanization must include both groups, both for and against growth, in all their variegated splendor.

Tucson and Albuquerque mirror each other's urbanization process to such a degree that they indicate a trend that perhaps holds true for the entire region of the Southwest. Resistance abounds. Manifestations of opposition to urban growth took the form of political conservatism, ethnic solidarity, and environmental awareness in both cities, although the mix of each varied in the two cities.

In general, Albuquerque's city government pursued

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⁴Trends within the decade of the 1950s that foreshadowed the turbulent 1960s are explicated in, for example, Carter, Another Part of the Fifties, and, Halberstam, The Fifties.

expansion with greater aggressiveness through the 1940s and 1950s, and as a result engendered more vituperative resistance than Tucson witnessed. Tucson's city government struggled with resistance to growth, but to a lesser degree than Albuquerque. The Arizona legislature never had to step in to the fray, as New Mexico's legislature did, declaring a moratorium on further annexations until tempers had cooled. Perhaps it's ironic then that Albuquerque accomplished more in the way of open space protection than Tucson. Urban sprawl has run its course in both cities, stretching to the extent of mountain foothills. But in Albuquerque city government succeeded in utilizing public money for the purpose of acquiring land to preserve open space on the fringe of the city. Open space on Tucson's fringe appears in federal, state, and county parks, none of which came into existence through actions by the city government.

The post World War II boom in the Southwest changed Albuquerque and Tucson from small towns to big cities. Thousands of residents in both cities protested the changes occurring in their communities. Boosters, planners and politicians were forced to maneuver around their resistance. That maneuvering resulted in the cities that exist today.

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