STATE FINANCES DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION:

TEXAS AND FLORIDA

By

ERICA SIOVHAN MARSHBURN

A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelors degree
With Honors in

Economics

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

M A Y 2 0 1 1

Approved by:

Dr. Price V. Fishback
Department of Economics

The University of Arizona Electronic Theses and Dissertations Reproduction and Distribution Rights Form

Name (Last, First, Middle) Marshburn, Erica, Siovhan	
Degree title (eg BA, BS, BSE, BSB, BFA): BA	
Honors area (eg Molecular and Cellular Biology, English, Studio Art): Economics	
Date thesis submitted to Honors College: May 4, 2011	
Title of Honors thesis: State Finances During the Great Depression: Texas and Florida	
:The University of Arizona Library Release	I hereby grant to the University of Arizona Library the nonexclusive worldwide right to reproduce and distribute my dissertation or thesis and abstract (herein, the "licensed materials"), in whole or in part, in any and all media of distribution and in any format in existence now or developed in the future. I represent and warrant to the University of Arizona that the licensed materials are my original work, that I am the sole owner of all rights in and to the licensed materials, and that none of the licensed materials infringe or violate the rights of others. I further represent that I have obtained all necessary rights to permit the University of Arizona Library to reproduce and distribute any nonpublic third party software necessary to access, display, run or print my dissertation or thesis. I acknowledge that University of Arizona Library may elect not to distribute my dissertation or thesis in digital format if, in its reasonable judgment, it believes all such rights have not been secured. Signed: EM Date: May 4, 2011

Last updated: Nov 15, 2009

Texas and Florida during the Great Depression

The 1930s in the United States have been characterized as the Great Depression because of the severity of the economic decline compared to other national recessions in the country's history (Stronge, 2008, 127). National per capita income, adjusted for changes in prices, was 30% lower in 1932 and 1933 than it was in 1929 before the depression began. Although economic growth resumed in 1933, per capita income did not return its 1929 level until 1940. There is a general agreement that the Depression was partly the result of a tight monetary policy instituted by the Federal Reserve in 1928 in an attempt to eliminate excessive speculation in the stock market. Other factors that may be blamed for the initial downturn in the economy include an oversupply in the housing market, the stock market crash, and poor agricultural harvests in parts of the United States. The level of aggregate spending dropped, national output dropped, and workers were laid off from their jobs. As the recession spread across the world, many countries including the United States adopted protectionist policies resulting in a reduced trade volume and adding additional downward pressure on the U.S. economy.

During this time, President Roosevelt greatly increased federal spending on a variety of programs intended to stimulate the economy and provide short-term public service jobs for the unemployed (Stronge, 2008, 139). These efforts, along with the 'alphabet soup' of new agencies put in place(i.e. FERA, WPA, CWA, CCC, etc.) were all under Roosevelt's platform of a 'New Deal' for America. Texas and Florida share many similarities in how their state governments dealt with the economic challenges presented by the New Deal. Both states chose to reject the idea of personal or corporate income taxes. Both found other sources of revenue to deal with the loss of revenue in their states. While both states accumulated a significant amount of debt during the depression, Florida's legislature worked to cut back on government spending, while Texas chose to rely heavily on federal aid and run a fourteen year deficit during the Great Depression and for some time after.

Texas: Depression Reactions

Tax or Rate Change	**Year enacted**	**Details**
Motor Vehicle Fuel Sales Tax	1929	5 cents per gallon unleaded, 6.5 cents on diesel
Cigarette Tax	1931	occupation tax for seller, 3-7.2 cents per pack
Cement Tax	1931	occupation tax on production of cement $1.25 per hundred pounds
Natural Gas Production Tax	1931	occupation tax
Chain Store Tax	1935	discouraged spread of chain stores
Alcoholic Beverages Tax	1935	Liquor Control Act changed rates
Amusement Tax	1936	10 cents on admissions to amusement places
Unemployment Compensation Tax	1936	
Carbon-Black Production Tax	1936	occupation tax with rates geared toward product's market value
Stock Transfer Tax	1936	
Motor Vehicle Tax	1941	along with other luxury taxes, paid by buyer

Table A

Percentage of Revenue	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
Highway Motor Fuel Tax %	30.0%	27.1%	29.5%	28.5%	26.3%
Ad Valorem %	23.0%	19.6%	18.9%	12.7%	11.7%

Cigarette Stamp Tax %	3.5%	3.5%	3.8%	4.3%	4.2%
Franchise Tax %	1.5%	2.0%	1.3%	1.2%	1.0%

Table B

In 1928 Texas reelected Dan Moody as governor. He was seen by voters as a very intelligent lawyer versed in administrative efficiency and dedicated to “wiping out debts and lowering taxes” (Procter). An important sales tax and source of revenue in Texas was the motor-vehicle fuel sales tax. It was imposed in 1929 with rates of 5 cents per gallon on unleaded gasoline and 6.5 cents on diesel (McCleskey, 1969, 289 and Table A). Through 1930 Texans persisted in their optimism, believing that the depression affected only moneyed “gamblers” in the stock market, and denouncing those “greedy Easterners” who tried to undermine the sound United States economy (Procter). This mind-set prevailed even in urban Texas, with both community leaders and news media indulging in unrealistic logic and provincial pride.

Local merchants, fearing that any pessimistic headlines might yield negative consequences for their businesses, filled the cities with advertisements assuring customers that it was a good idea to continue buying (Procter). The East Texas oil boom, centering around Kilgore, lessened thoughts of depression until the summer of 1931, when increased production and falling prices affected the city economy. In Houston, optimism was equally high, and although fear of depression was widespread during the first months following the crash, the *Post-Dispatch* offered a continual salve. "More and more it appears," the editor asserted on November 17, 1929, "the changes in stock prices are purely an affair of and for stock speculators." As the depression worsened across the United States in 1931 and 1932 Texans eventually had to recognize its existence and attempt to combat its devastating effects.

The first cigarette tax in Texas was adopted in 1931 as a depression era finance measure (Gantt, 1966, 229). It was designed to supplement the State's Available School Fund and thus to reduce the burden of ad valorem taxation on farms, homes, and other property. It was an occupation tax for the seller with a rate of 3 cents per pack of cigarettes weighing three pounds per thousand and 7.2 cents per pack on those weighing more than three pounds per thousand, rates just one half of the then current Federal rates. The cement tax was introduced also in 1931 as an occupation tax on the production of cement, and at a rate of $1.25 per hundred pounds. In 1931 the natural gas production tax was added as an occupation tax, and the use of and demand for this natural resource increased significantly, increasing the revenue from this tax substantially.

As Texas citizens began to feel the effects of the depression more, some groups took initiative to help those less fortunate. Private charities shouldered the burdens of the poor and desperate until funds were exhausted, whereupon city governments and community leaders intervened (Procter). In turn, businessmen in Fort Worth and San Antonio pledged to hire laborers on a part-time or weekly basis but the cities passed ordinances not to hire transients. In rural Texas economic conditions during 1931 and 1932 also deteriorated. As prices plummeted, as drought exacerbated their plight, as debts rose and foreclosures mounted alarmingly, farmers sought relief from their worsening situation. In 1933 the Texas delegation, overall, supported the National Industrial Recovery Act and emergency unemployment programs, ever mindful that a good deal of federal aid would find its way to Texas.

In late 1932 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation made substantial funds available to the governor, who, in turn, was to dispense money to counties through three regional chambers of commerce (Procter). By executive order, Governor "Ma" Ferguson, the first female governor of Texas, (1925-1927 and 1933-1935) established the Texas Relief Commission and selected

Lawrence Westbrook as director. Immediately she, her husband Jim “Pa” Ferguson, and Westbrook consolidated local relief efforts into their own organization. In May 1933, after Congress passed the Federal Emergency Relief Act, they had even more funds to allocate, with the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission specifically created by the legislature to oversee and distribute federal money through a system of county boards. Jim Ferguson, at the request of his wife, became the commission chairman, although he did not have a legal right to do so, as this position was not usually filled by governor appointment. Together with Westbrook and several appointees, he filled county boards with constituents and friends.

To avert a financial panic Governor “Ma” Ferguson boldly-and with questionable constitutional authority-declared a bank moratorium on March 2, 1933 (Procter). Rather fortunately, three days later Roosevelt sustained her decree by proclaiming a national bank holiday and promising to reopen all suspended banks that were in good shape under federal guidelines within a short time. During this period the state debt had risen to $14 million, and Governor Ferguson repeatedly but unsuccessfully proposed to the legislature both a state sales and income taxes. The only tax that was passed was a two-cent-per-barrel tax on oil, and the state could reduce deficits only by cutting appropriations. As an alternative Governor Ferguson pressured the legislature to approve a $20 million relief bond issue in the form of a constitutional amendment upon which the electorate would vote. Then she and her supporters used every possible maneuver to get it adopted. They padded government payrolls with supporters, paid poll taxes for "their voters," and financed the campaign, often with federal funds (Procter). Texans were becoming less satisfied with the Fergusons and their politics, and when elections came around in 1934, Texans elected Jimmie Allred.

Once elected, Governor Allred ensured his tenure as governor for four years by bringing New Deal money to Texas (Procter). He immediately sought permission to issue the remaining $3.5 million from the $20 million relief bonds hinting that the federal government might give matching funds for old-age pensions, although this legislation was at least two years away. Over the next several years Allred also took advantage of the federal government's increased funding of work relief through the Civilian Conservation Corps, Work Projects Administration, National Youth Administration, and Public Works Administration. As a consequence Texas received, one report stated, more than $166 million by August 31, 1936, of which Washington proffered more than $96 million; another source estimated the total to be $350 million by the end of the year. In both regular and several special sessions the legislators, at his behest, authorized a state planning board, appropriated $11 million for higher education, and set aside $10 million for rural relief. After Congress passed the National Social Security Act in August 1935, Allred pushed through complementary legislation having to do with old-age pensions, unemployment compensation, teacher retirement, and aid for needy children and the blind. At the same time the state deficit was increased to $19 million. Because he made needed reforms and provided governmental service, Governor Allred, as the New Deal governor of Texas, was popular with his constituents.

The chain store tax was enacted in 1935 and had as its underlying motive the discouragement of further spread of national chain stores in Texas (Patterson, 1948, 152). The tax was primarily regulatory in its nature and purpose, and was aimed at extending some protection to small independent merchants against the larger integrated systems. With the rapid growth in chain merchandising existing stores in Texas created great political pressure to check such expansion and thus keep existing independent stores competitive. Tax equalization was another contention. Its sponsors claimed that the personal property tax on merchants discriminated against the independents in favor of the chains because of difficulties of accurate assessments, the different cost bases of assessing inventories, and the more rapid turnover in chain business. A chain store enjoyed certain advantages as a result of its multiple units, including buying in large quantities, consolidated warehousing, larger capital, the ability to sell at lower prices, greater turnover of stock, and unified advertising (Benton, 1966, 294). The purpose of the chain store tax was to restrict the operations of multi-unit businesses while providing extra tax revenue. If this was the state's goal, it followed a convoluted bureaucratic process, and the chain-store tax likely led to higher prices for their consumers. If prices were raised, the tax seems like it was an inefficient way to benefit the public, as the primary people who benefitted were the competitors of chain stores, which were not a significant proportion of Texas citizens. In essentially the same vein, another special interest tax of ten cents per pound was levied on oleomargarine made of imported oils. The tax was high enough that no margarine was sold and and thus the tax never yielded any revenue (Gantt, 1966, 230).

The alcoholic beverages tax, dating from 1836, changed many times as to character and rates. Finally, in 1935, it was given more stable status with the enactment of the Liquor Control Act (Gantt, 1966, 230). In 1936, this tax yielded $3,144,182 in revenue and in 1937 it yielded $5,795,514 (Table 1) and included the liquor stamp tax, the wine stamp tax, the beer stamp tax. In 1936, a 10 per cent tax was placed on admissions to places of amusement and the unemployment compensation tax was instituted. The carbon-black production tax appeared in 1936 as an occupation tax, the rates being geared to the market value of the product. The stock transfer tax, adopted first in 1936, and levied through the device of stamps on notes and mortgages provided some revenue. These taxes were all likely included under occupation taxes or miscellaneous revenue (Table 1), but did not yield a significant amount of revenue.

In 1938 the state government was over $19 million in debt, the state treasury was so depleted that house members sat at their desks with umbrellas hoisted because there were no funds to pay for repairing the capitol roof (Green, 1979, 22). In 1938, O'Daniel won the governorship on a platform of tax cuts and industrialization. He also promised to block any sales tax and abolish the poll tax (which he had not paid that year) and hinted that he favored a levy on natural resources (Green, 1979, 25). To support his pension plan and provide money for a state budget, he proposed a 1.6% tax on business transactions, which was actually a well concealed multiple sales taxes that the legislature promptly rejected (Procter). O'Daniel then campaigned for a constitutional amendment whereby the electorate would vote upon the merits of a state sales tax; however, a militant minority in the House prevented its passage. Consequently, to cut costs as well as retaliate against hostile legislators, he line-item-vetoed a number of appropriations that were important to the well-being of Texans: new buildings for state hospitals, beds for epileptics, orphans, and the feeble-minded, the funds for the Texas Department of Public Safety and State Highway Department. Governor O'Daniel believed that the mere enforcement of the existing tax laws would pay all the state's expenses, especially the higher pensions to which he and the legislature were committed. After it became obvious that such enforcement would not suffice, the governor condemned such legislative proposals as a state income tax and levies on natural resources. He asked instead for a 1.6% tax on most business transactions. This plan was widely and rightly regarded as a multiple sales tax that would place its main burden on the small wage earner and the small businessman. The legislature voted the tax down. The State Highway Department had its biennial appropriation reduced by more than 50 percent. The governor even ordered a cut in state pension checks. Some members of legislature suggested that a $0.05 per barrel oil tax be adopted to pay for social security requirement, but O'Daniel had no intention of taxing the oil industry and refused. The motor vehicle sales tax of 1 percent of the sales price was enacted in 1941, and another cluster of selective sales taxes appeared in 1941, covering radios, cosmetics, and playing cards (Gantt, 1966, 230). These were termed luxury taxes. New radios were taxed at 2 per cent on gross receipts, cosmetics similarly, and playing cards five cents per pack.

Texas State Finances: A Broader View

From 1932 to 1942 gross state governmental expenditures increased from 12.4 to 45.6 billion dollars (McCleskey, 1969, 284). Federal direct general expenditures increased from 4.0 to 34.3 billion dollars, whereas state direct general expenditures only increased from 2.0 to 3.1 billion and local direct general expenditures went from 6.3 to 7.2 billion dollars. These statistics are not adjusted for inflation, but it should be taken into consideration that the dollar in 1940 was worth 2.5 times that of the 1967 dollar. The statistics quoted by McCleskey are inconsistent with the data collected from comptroller records (Texas Comptroller Records). A major source of these increases in government expenditures was the assumption of new responsibilities by the state government (McCleskey, 1969, 285). This means that entirely new programs or once-small endeavors were expanded to much larger proportions. For example, public welfare programs existed before 1929, but those developed after that time are of a fundamentally different scope and magnitude. Since the 1930s education, highways, and public welfare have consistently accounted for the bulk of state expenditures. In 1929, highways accounted for 41% of state funds and in 1942 education was only 31% of the budget, while welfare accounted for 23% of the budget. Since taxes are never very popular especially in a conservative state like Texas, the state legislature had an affinity for deficit spending, and the State's General Revenue Fund operated at a deficit for fourteen consecutive years from 1931-1944 (McClesky, 1969, 286). Dissatisfaction with the scenario of a legislature willing to spend but not to tax prompted the addition of a constitutional amendment in 1942 requiring all appropriations by the legislature to be accompanied by certification from the Comptroller of Public Accounts that tax laws already on the books would provide the necessary funds. Lacking such certification, an appropriation could not be passed until new revenues were found or other spending was eliminated. However, this policy did not end all state indebtedness, as constitutional amendments were subsequently adopted to give certain state agencies the privilege of borrowing through bond issues to obtain money for specified purposes.

Before the Great Depression, the expenditure on public welfare for the state of Texas was limited to pensions for Confederate veterans, and in 1930 this only amounted to $2.9 million (MacCorkle, 1964, 183). From its early days well into the twentieth century, the state government financed itself essentially by means of the property tax and the poll tax, along with a few occupation taxes (MacCorkle, 1964, 184). The property tax accounted for about one-third of the state's tax revenue in 1932. Starting in fiscal 1930, studies were made of the broad sales and income taxes adopted in other states, but Texas chose to increase rates on taxes already being imposed and to enact selective new taxes (MacCorkle, 1964, 186). Revenues from the state property tax dropped from $25 million in 1930 to $15 million in 1939 because of a reduction of assessed valuations by county assessors and adoption of the homestead exemption against property taxes that protected homeowners from losing their home to taxes. The tax bill of 1941 and the growth in economic activity in Texas during the war years stabilized the state's finances through the forties.

In common with some other states, Texas had a stringent constitutional limitation on the creation of debt coming into the 1930s (MacCorkle, 1964, 193). This provision states:

> *No debt shall be created by on behalf of the state, except to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, repel invasion, suppress insurrection, defend the State in war, or pay existing debt; and the debt created to supply deficiencies in revenue shall never exceed in the aggregate at any one time two hundred thousand dollars.*

The existence of this limitation made necessary the submission of several constitutional amendments authorizing specific bond issues. One example was the constitutional amendment passed by the voters in 1933 that permitted the issuance of $20 million in relief bonds to match Federal funds for financing unemployment relief.

Texas Taxes Explained

The citizens of Texas were subjected to a variety of taxes to create revenue for state affairs. Real property, including lands, houses, and tenements were subject to the ad valorem tax, which was assessed and collected at a certain percentage of property value (Benton, 1966, 279). In Texas, the nearest approach to a statewide business tax was the franchise tax, which was paid by foreign and domestic corporations and levied on the privilege of conducting business in the state (Benton, 1966, 293). The insurance premiums tax was imposed on insurance companies and measured by gross premiums collected within the state (Benton, 1966, 294). This tax was an addition to state and local ad valorem taxes that insurance companies had to pay on their real and personal property. A number of companies in Texas must pay taxes on the basis of gross receipts. This tax rate varies and is based upon a certain percentage of gross receipts. The chain store tax was a phase of the antitrust legislation levied in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

There was a tax on the manufacturing of cement administered by the comptroller's office (Benton, 1966, 295). Other miscellaneous business taxes and fees yield a small amount of revenue to the state including corporation charter fees, cigarette tax permits (for dealers), real estate fees (from brokers and salesmen), motor carrier fees, licenses and fees from the brewers of alcoholic beverages, fees from dealers in alcoholic beverages, insurance agents, and vending machine operators. Occupation taxes, other licenses and permits are included in this category as well. Among the major revenue sources in Texas, the motor fuel tax stands alone as a "benefit" tax (Benton, 1966, 297). The theory is that the recipients of special benefits, the use of highways in this instance, should pay for them. Those who pay the motor fuel tax can likely see the direct relationship between the tax paid and services received more than people can with other taxes. Since the tax is paid per gallon, it is paid somewhat in proportion to how much the purchaser uses the highways. The tobacco tax was levied on cigarettes, as well as chewing and pipe tobacco, as a depression finance measure in 1935 (Benton, 1966, 298).

Federal WPA spending plus that contributed by the state of Texas through June 1939 equaled $179,000,000, with Texas supplying 24.8% of this amount (Fishback-State Statistics). State and local share of general relief through March 1937 amounted to 27.3% and state share of general relief through March 1937 amounted to 17.9%.

Florida Government During the Depression

Governor Doyle Carlton and state legislators faced hard times in 1931. Economic news was dismal and the state's financial structure appeared ready to collapse (Gannon, 1996, 304).

As Carlton told the legislature, “In the minds of many banking presents the major issue.” No one challenged his analysis. The legislature responded with the Banking Act of 1931 which limited depositor withdrawals and directed some banks to call loans in to meet existing obligations. Florida banks, like those in other states, continued to fail in 1931. The governor and the legislature grappled with the overall economic crisis, which was exacerbated by Florida’s constitution, which forbade bonded indebtedness, prevented bankruptcy, and also prohibited emergency borrowing. At the state level, this significantly limited their ability to spend, but cities, counties, political subdivisions, and special tax districts were not as hindered. At these levels Florida’s debt liability led the nation and many governments were largely in default. The state’s lack of funds effectively barred borrowing money on a matching basis from the federal government (Gannon, 1996, 305). Even so, governors Dave Sholtz (1932-36) and Fred P. Cone (1936-40) cleverly obtained money that did not require matching (Table 3). Fred Cone was faced with a variety of welfare requests when he was inaugurated, and so he petitioned the state legislature to abolish the State Board of Public Welfare and replace it with a new State Welfare Board (Nelson, 2005, 185). Cone complained that overblown salaries, mishandled funds, and the influence of appointed personnel born in the northern United States had led to corruption and inexcusable government waste. He suggested a smaller, fiscally-sensitive board run in a business-like manner. Many people believed that Cone’s plan would jeopardize Florida’s ability to attain government grants and threatened the success of New Deal programs in Florida. Cone realized that New Deal programs offered much in the way of patronage and offered him a chance to increase his gubernatorial power by controlling state employees who would dole out the federal dollars (Nelson, 2005, 186).

In the early 1930s Governor Carlton trimmed services, recommended governmental streamlining, suggested paving roads on a pay-as-you-go basis, and argued for restricting local government bonding (Gannon, 1996, 305). He backed a sales tax to increase revenue while insisting that an income tax would cause the affluent to avoid Florida. His veto of an inheritance tax bill was sustained. The governor opposed another potential revenue source, legalized gambling, on moral grounds, but in 1931 the legislature created a State Racing Commission, legalized pari-mutuel betting, and taxation on the proceeds from the gambling. Carlton vetoed the measure; but the veto was overridden. In an attempt to fix their own fiscal crises, cities cut budgets and reduced tax rates while hoping to reduce their spending. However, they also faced a rise in the number of their citizens who were suffering from the economic crisis. Chambers of commerce urged merchants to offer bargains for citizen home-improvement projects. “Buy Now” campaigns were launched. In Jacksonville the Community Chest opened a soup kitchen for the hungry, and the city hired the unemployed on public works. Millionaire Alfred Dupont donated money to employ workers for its public parks. The state Board of Public Welfare, created in 1927, lacked resources to undertake large-scale relief. Accordingly, municipal and county relief efforts, however inadequate, were much more important before 1935 than was state aid. Many young men and women joined adult transients to ride the rails and camp in hobo jungles (Gannon, 1996, 306). Florida and its balmy climate drew them like a magnet, and relief rolls swelled. Immigration was discouraged, and for three winter seasons state policemen blocked roads and refused to let indigent transients cross into Florida. In 1932 Hoover approved a law that extended the Reconstruction Finance Corporation powers. Governor Carlton asked for $500,000, and Florida received its first relief funds later that same year.

Tax or Rate Change	**Year enacted**	**Details**

Gambling Tax	1931	dog-racing was leglized and the proceeds were taxed
Beverage Taxes	1933	after repeal of prohibition, yielded some revenue
Poll tax repealed	1937	thought to disenfranchise blacks, revenue was lost

Florida and the New Deal

Southern states such as Florida benefited from a myriad of New Deal programs, the most popular of which was the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) (Gannon, 1996, 310). The CCC engaged in various reforestation and conservation projects. Nationally it provided work for over two million young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Most were from economically impoverished families, and no state benefited more than Florida. Agricultural problems were addressed through allotment and crop reduction programs established under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The AAA affected all of Florida's farmers.

On March 4, 1933 Governor Sholtz declared a five-day banking holiday for Florida (Gannon, 1996, 309). Roosevelt then decreed a four-day banking holiday effective March 6th. Sholtz pushed the state toward a greater role but was restrained when the state supreme court declared unconstitutional his attempt to pledge Florida's value as collateral on a loan. Sholtz persisted, and in 1935 the state allocated $2 million toward its responsibility for the welfare program. Florida passed a constitutional amendment that allowed tax revenues to be applied to relief payments. Some of the money was allocated for schools, for the State Welfare Board, and for a State Planning Board. After 1935, when state participation in relief programs increased, the State Board of Public Welfare, backed by Governor Sholtz, enlarged its operations and in 1937 became the Department of Social Welfare (Gannon, 1996, 305).

Floridians welcomed a constitutional change that authorized a homestead tax exemption. State government action and recovery were further aided by the Murphy Act of 1937 (Stronge, 2008, 135). The collapse of the twenties' land boom had left much real estate abandoned and subject to delinquent taxes. Governor Cone wanted taxes collected and homesteads settled on the land. In 1937 the poll tax, a means of disenfranchising blacks, was repealed and the passage of the Murphy Act allowed the sale of tax-delinquent land for tax certificates, whereby buyers could obtain deeds at a fraction of the land value (Gannon, 1996, 208). The public benefited from this act by having the land restored to the tax rolls.

Although the South was considered by Roosevelt to be the "Nation's No. 1 economic problem" during the New Deal, Florida's citizens fared rather well when compared with the per capita income of neighboring states, as well as the rest of the nation (Stuart, 2008, 3). In fact, the per capita expenditures of the Works Progress Administration were the highest in Region 3, which consisted of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Federal WPA spending plus that contributed by the state of Florida through June 1939 equaled $83,100,000, with Florida accounting for 20 percent of this amount (Fishback-State Statistics). Florida was third in per capita expenditures of the Public Works Administration after Virginia and South Carolina (Figure 8).

Some of the success Florida enjoyed in acquiring New Deal attention may be attributed to the efforts of Florida senator Claude Pepper, who was arguably one of the most prominent supporters of FDR's administration, as well as FDR's close personal friend and ally (Stuart, 2008, 3). Roosevelt and the New Deal provided the lifeline that kept Florida afloat during the 1930s. In particular, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) provided crucial assistance for financially desperate farmers and grove owners, while likely harming the farm workers (Stuart, 2008, 4 and Figure 4). Despite and aid from the federal government, however, Florida continued to suffer greatly during the Depression. As seen in Figure 2, per capita income in Florida did not return to its 1930 level until around 1937.

Roosevelt tended to pour more money into programs in swing states such as Florida, to gain reelection in his next term (Stuart, 2008, 4). This strategy, which was successful in winning Roosevelt the state, began a strong relationship between the federal government and south Florida based upon the flow of money into the area and the signs of economic recovery and community stability that resulted (Stuart, 2008, 5). It was, however, the policy of the New Deal to spend federal money to expand existing regional economies, and local leaders often guided federal officials to specific projects. In south Florida, this federal patronage propelled the growth in tourism and construction. The large aging population in Florida required concentrated efforts by charitable organizations to coordinate with agencies supplying federal aid. Problems of administering funds throughout the state were compounded by the fact that such diverse communities in Florida had different needs and were often highly suspicious of each other.

FDR started a letter writing campaign aimed at clergymen in 1935, requesting their thoughts and opinions on the New Deal policies (Stuart, 2008, 6). Some of the clergy in Florida wrote back to the president with suggestions. Concerns about the economic health of his community prompted Miami Beach Presbyterian Church pastor William C. Cumming to write to the president in 1935 to voice his concerns about the New Deal's social welfare programs (Stuart, 2008, 8). He instructed FDR to "balance the budget. Present gains will be engulfed in coming ills if that is not done.” He also urged the president to “reduce the tax burden (rather than increase it) for it is becoming too heavy for the people.” Reverend John E. Gekeler of Key West found federal restrictions on agricultural production less than agreeable (Stuart, 2008, 9). He stated “Industry should be encouraged more and more to assume its portion of the load. The initiative of the individual, which has been such a potent factor in the development of our people, should be fostered. There are many services which government must perform; but there is a large zone of business and industrial life into which it should not enter, and from which it should withdraw. A loosening of all restrictions upon these lines of endeavor would seem to promise helpful results.” Reverend Iverson from Miami expressed his concern for “people past middle age…who have very little to live on,” and urged FDR to provide more federal assistance calling it “the duty of our national government to consider this [the impoverished elderly] as part of their responsibility” (Stuart, 2008, 11). Reverend Walker of Jacksonville complained about the impact of New Deal programs, and was most concerned with the negative effects on the local economy (Stuart, 2008, 14). “The piling up of debt and the raising of taxes are presenting a serious question as to the future.” Arthur Dimmick of Key West criticized the episodic nature of New Deal assistance seeing “that nothing of a permanently helpful sort has been done…The building of an aquarium, the weeding of a vacant lots in a tropical climate, the paving of streets, and the building of swimming pools—where the Atlantic Ocean is available as such—all provide temporary employment for several hundreds of persons; but these things are not such as to be to already great degree profit-making and wage-producing” (Stuart, 2008, 12).

Florida’s economy, originally based most significantly in agriculture, overwhelmingly depended on tourism by the mid-1920s, and this presented a number of significant challenges (Stuart, 2008, 10 and 32). The region was known for its beaches, betting establishments, and the relatively free flow of illegal alcoholic beverages. The decline of the national economy, along with the destruction caused by a series of vicious hurricanes severely damaged the Florida tourism industry (Stuart, 2008, 33). State officials then turned to agriculture to assist the economy, but the citrus crops were ravaged by a Mediterranean fruit fly infestation in 1929.

The federal government made contributions to encourage building in south Florida ranging from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration's relatively small projects to more moderately scaled projects sponsored by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) including community centers, firehouses, police stations, schools, hospitals, and libraries, and finally to the enormous projects including the Orange Bowl Stadium and the Overseas Highway to Key West (Stuart, 2008, 23). The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was one of the first agencies established in Roosevelt's New Deal administration and was a result of the president's interest as the environment as an expression of regional identity and the need to find immediate employment for tens of thousands of young men who were out of work. Specific CCC projects in the region include the Royal Palm State Park, Greynolds Park, Matheson Hammock, Fairchild Tropical Garden, and the Florida Overseas Highway.

Florida During the Depression

Florida's per capita income closely tracked the national level downward in 1930 and 1931, but the bottom Florida reached in 1932-1933 was not quite as severe as that experienced nationally (Stronge, 2008, 128). Earnings show that Florida's economy did not decline as rapidly or steeply as the national economy (Fig 2). Florida's economy held up better during the economic contraction that the national economy did. However, by a number if measures, Florida's banks experienced greater difficulties during the depression than did banks elsewhere in the nation. In 1930 and 1931 13% of the nation's banks had failed, whereas 25% of banks had failed in Florida (Stuart, 2008, 132). The greatest decline of bank deposits in Florida occurred in 1929-1930, the same year that 20% of banks in the state failed. In an effort to help the banks, the state legislature passed a Banking Act in 1931 that placed limits on withdrawals of deposits and required some banks to call in loans.

The economic downturn squeezed the revenue of local governments in Florida, pushing the state's local governments into a state of crisis because of their high debt levels (Stronge, 2008, 133). The debt of local governments per capita was about three times higher in Florida than in the other states of the nation. Local governments responded by virtually eliminating capital expenditures, sharply cutting operating expenditures, and raising funds from sources other than taxes. The great 1929-1933 depression, followed immediately by the collapse of the Florida land boom, undermined local property tax collections, forced more than 85% of public debt into default, and led to the state's many bank failures (Stuart, 2008, 134). The state government did not experience the same crisis because it was constitutionally prohibited from issuing debt. Local governments, including counties, school districts, cities, and special taxing districts were responsible for virtually all public debt in Florida.

Throughout the 1930s in Florida, 60% of the local revenue was generated by taxes, and the remainder came from fees and licenses, special assessments, and revenues from other branches of government (Stronge, 2008, 134 and Table 3). Over 90% of revenue from these sources came from property taxes, and as a result, over 50% of the local government revenue base was generated by property taxes. When property values declined by 45% from 1926 to1933, the debt services of many local governments were put beyond the limits of their taxing capabilities. Where annual debt service requirements were high, attempts to raise property tax rates to avoid default backfired. Taxpayers simply did not pay the taxes that were levied (Stronge, 2008, 135). The normal process for handling delinquent property taxes was to offer a tax certificate for sale to investors, who would pay the taxes in exchange for a lien against the property and a rate of interest on their investment, but during the economic conditions of the 1930s, few investors could purchase tax certificates so the state purchased them.

Because so many local governments could not meet their debt service obligations, they petitioned the state legislature for debt relief (Stronge, 2008, 136). In 1929, the legislature voted to use some of the revenue from the gasoline tax to liquidate road and bridge bonds that the counties had issued, but the Florida Supreme Court declared this action unconstitutional because it used a state tax to pay the expenses of local governments. In 1931, the legislature reformulated the provision as a reimbursement for expenses incurred in constructing state roads and bridges that had been constructed by the counties. This act was found to be constitutional and the ownership of county roads and bridges was transferred to the state along with their debt, amounting to 20% of the public debt of local governments.

Some bondholders sued counties to collect on defaulted bonds and interest payments, and when these cases were successful, courts ordered counties to adopt high property tax rates in order to pay the bondholders (Stronge, 2008, 136). This increased the rate of tax delinquency, and some owners were in danger of losing their homes because of the high tax rates. In 1933 the legislature initiated a constitutional amendment that provided a homestead exemption against property taxes, providing that taxpayers could not lose their homes to taxes. This did provide some relief to homeowners, but exacerbated the funding crisis of local governments. School debt, which accounted for about 10% of the total local public debt, was placed under the management of the state superintendent of public instruction, and he pooled resources from the different districts to prevent defaults. In 1932, the state began using motor vehicle license funds to fund schools. The state also provided schools with additional sources for revenue such as a portion of the tax on racing adopted in 1931, a share in the proceeds of beverage taxes imposed after Prohibition was repealed in 1933, and some revenue from retail licenses (Stronge, 2008, 138). Due to these and other efforts, by 1940, Florida's public debt, all of which was incurred by local governments, was about half the 1931 size relative to the population and personal income (Stronge, 2008, 137).

Florida Overview

The recovery from the depression began in 1933 both in Florida and in the nation as a whole, and a number of actions taken by the Roosevelt administration took a major role in bringing about the economic recovery (Stronge, 2008, 139). This includes his expansive fiscal policy and devaluation of the dollar. After federal insurance for bank deposits ended the threat of bank runs, the money supply ended its decline and expanded strongly in the early years of the recovery. Roosevelt greatly increased federal spending in the state and elsewhere in the nation, and federal expenditures in Florida rose from about $20 million in 1933 to more than $60 million in 1934, and this high level of spending was continued for the remainder of the decade. Most of the increase in federal spending was for employment relief by the Civil Works Administration (CWA), the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The CWA was initiated during the winter of 1933-1934 to provide short-term public service jobs for the unemployed. At the national level, there are seasonal decreases in employment during the winter months, but the reverse is true in Florida. CWA workers in Florida were released in the spring when the number of available jobs falls in Florida. FERA provided employment to the former CWA workers, but at reduced wages. The significance of these relief programs for Florida's economy can be seen in the fact that the $38 million expended in 1934 was equal to 9% of the total earnings in the state that year. In 1934, federal spending also increased to maintain Florida's infrastructure; spending for roads, rivers, harbors, and flood control all increased substantially, although this was partly offset by a decline in expenditures on federal buildings and Veteran's Administration (Stronge, 2008, 140).

Florida's economy actually enjoyed a stronger economic recovery than the nation and began new economic expansion in 1936 beyond the pre-Depression 1929 level (Stronge, 2008, 140 and Figure 2). Conversely, the national personal per capita income remained below its 1929 level for the remainder of the 1930s. This relatively strong economic performance can be attributed to the strength of the local economy rather than the effect of inflows of property income or personal transfers from the rest of the country. The farm sector did not decline as much in Florida during the 1932-1933 recession as it did in the rest of the country, and nonfarm per capita earnings grew more rapidly in the state than in the nation after the recession low of 1933 (Stronge, 2008, 141). A turnaround in tourism was also a major feature of Florida's economic recovery (Stronge, 2008, 142). Earnings in tourism declined more sharply than any other industry in Florida during the initial recession, but recovered more strongly after the low of 1933. This rapid decline and then recovery is unique to this industry and likely attributable to the greater flexibility in prices, wages, and employment that characterizes the industry. The industry also had few labor union members and had a common occurrence of small businesses. Labor unions often use their collective bargaining tactics to raise wages and gain benefits for themselves, often to the great expense of their employer. Because the tourism industry in Florida in the 1930s lacked many union members, employers could keep their wages flexible and pay employees what they could afford, and nothing beyond that. Lower wages also allowed companies to hire more people, allowing for more economic recovery for more people. Much of the employment is also seasonal, and many producers made hiring, pricing, and wage decisions on an annual basis. The strength of Florida's tourism sector can also be attributed to the fact that many Americans continued to go on vacations in the 1930s, particularly after the low point in 1933 had passed. From 1925 to 1935, expenditures for vacation travel grew from 6% to 8% of total consumer expenditures. The increase in tourism also stimulated hotel construction, providing much needed jobs. State and local share of general relief through March 1937 amounted to 9.6% and state share of general relief through March 1937 amounted to 0.7% (Fishback-State Statistics).

Texas and Florida: A Summary

The economic contraction of 1929-1933 highlighted the risk associated with the modern industrial economy, that family networks and home production that had cushioned households during economic difficulties were no longer prominent features in the U.S. economy (Stronge, 2008, 142). A worker need only to be divorced from his wages, and he will have nothing else to live on except savings and charity, and wage cessation is a characteristic condition of a capitalist economy. Recovery from the depression was interrupted by another recession in 1938 caused by a tightening of the federal budget deficit as a result of the passage of the Social Security tax in 1935 and by revenue acts that raised taxes in 1936 and 1937 (Stronge, 2008, 143). The Federal Reserve also tightened monetary policy by raising bank reserve requirements. Texas reacted by increasing taxes on luxury items and big-business, likely prolonging their economic recession. Corporations not only provide lower prices for consumers, but they also provide more jobs for a community, more so than a smaller business ever could. Greater taxes on any good will reduce trade and production of that good, exactly what a recovering economy doesn't need. Texas' desire to protect and benefit their citizens likely had the opposite effect and their economic recovery may have been slower than it otherwise would have been. Florida chose instead to cut back on much of their spending, reduce wastefulness, and reallocate funds to areas where they may be better utilized. The lack of union involvement in one of Florida's major industries, tourism, also helped their economy recover faster than it otherwise would have. Florida's economy outperformed the national economy during the depression as per capita income income in the state rose from 74% of the national level in 1930 to 89% of the national level in 1939. Both Texas and Florida refused to institute any personal or corporate income taxes, and this probably served them well in their state's recovery. Figure 1 and 2 show Texas and Florida at a greater per capita income than other states in their region, and this could be attributed to many different factors, but there is likely a connection between not creating disincentives to work and be productive, as an income tax does, and finding that the economy is more productive under these conditions.



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4



Figure 5



Figure 6



Figure 7



Figure 8

Receipts	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
Ad Valorem Tax	$20,559,737.71	$22,187,027.43	$ 21,528,475.09	$ 16,126,948.68	$ 18,000,243.60
Inheritance Tax	$583,423.63	$590,640.73	$ 683,960.25	$ 1,143,711.54	$ 724,143.65
Poll Tax	$1,031,766.23	$1,641,870.46	$ 1,116,967.50	$ 1,685,244.80	$ 1,085,479.29
Undistributed Receipts from Collectors		$598,249.13	$ 214,618.89	$ 441,824.95	$ 479,720.05
Gross Receipts Tax	$6,638,986.14	$8,843,706.35	$ 11,136,164.21	$ 12,255,844.91	$ 19,588,506.57
Insurance Companies Occupation Tax	$2,014,408.50	$1,959,172.50	$ 2,112,573.89	$ 2,270,492.15	$ 3,345,527.44
Occupation Tax-Other	$126,272.07	$59,721.65	$ 128,114.56	$ 191,101.79	$ 639,308.19
Cigarette Stamp Tax (net)	$3,167,064.02	$4,007,845.82	$ 4,298,978.31	$ 5,459,386.39	$ 6,440,614.55
Fur Tax	$14,426.10	$15,309.05	$ 13,493.93	$ 11,347.54	$ 17,285.73
Fish and Oyster Tax	$13,710.97	$7,762.82	$ 1,884.83	$ 935.37	$ 503.65
Liquor Stamp Tax				$ 1,731,047.55	$ 3,763,458.27
Wine Stamp Tax				$ 51,496.07	$ 281,123.67
Note Stamp Tax					$ 365,501.34
Highway Motor Fuel Tax (net)	$26,891,612.68	$30,656,059.73	$ 33,550,273.84	$ 36,242,686.72	$ 40,551,796.79
Franchise Taxes	$1,310,473.40	$2,233,716.84	$ 1,505,493.67	$ 1,587,367.41	$ 1,477,372.92
Insurance Commission Maintenance Taxes	$220,395.57	$192,900.48	$ 247,881.46	$ 218,224.15	$ 235,740.44
Beer Stamp Tax (net)		$1,073,420.81	$ 1,092,249.36	$ 1,361,639.26	$ 1,750,932.66
Licenses (Including Auto)	$4,884,030.22	$4,879,464.68	$ 5,402,336.58	$ 6,295,467.13	$ 7,301,560.10
Fees and Permits	$1,205,602.13	$2,157,145.38	$ 2,323,566.21	$ 3,570,563.53	$ 2,958,257.56
Land Sales, Rentals and Royalties	$2,258,887.67	$5,154,035.04	$ 4,280,959.77	$ 5,210,049.71	$ 7,335,750.54
Sale of Commodities and Properties	$356,642.64	$22,391.67	$ 127,326.16	$ 193,813.73	$ 148,153.16
Court Costs, Fines and Suit Settlements	$187,604.66	$198,122.25	$ 532,043.91	$ 829,865.24	$ 263,088.39
Interest	$3,575,231.00	$4,139,946.29	$ 4,439,688.31	$ 3,995,059.20	$ 4,373,807.80
Miscellaneous Revenues	$512,287.35	$989,467.29	$ 939,035.97	$ 684,130.97	$ 1,215,011.93
County, Federal and Other Aid	$13,993,656.38	$21,388,065.35	$ 18,095,933.58	$ 25,533,986.40	$ 31,777,143.61
TOTAL	$89,546,219.07	$112,996,041.75	$113,772,020.28	$127,092,235.19	$154,120,031.90

Table 1: Revenue for Texas 1933-1937

Expenditures	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
Legislative	$726,200.33	$316,494.05	$ 806,423.34	$ 325,146.56	$ 958,109.03
Judicial	$2,364,119.23	$2,067,210.11	$ 2,086,702.49	$ 2,156,849.61	$ 2,047,378.95
Executive and Administrative	$1,365,156.08	$1,432,470.59	$ 1,561,060.79	$ 2,395,933.18	$ 3,392,308.07
Protection to Persons and Property	$881,311.05	$575,488.95	$ 578,683.86	$ 934,704.23	$ 1,053,154.53
Regulation of Business and Industry	$1,366,423.01	$1,108,890.87	$ 1,207,692.66	$ 1,932,069.43	$ 2,551,023.03
Conservation of Health and Sanitation	$310,836.26	$284,785.89	$ 272,114.37	$ 521,965.98	$ 827,336.79
Development and Conservation of Natural Resources	$1,698,826.20	$2,028,615.41	$ 1,713,744.31	$ 2,211,652.91	$ 2,484,696.21
Highways	$49,589,036.00	$43,023,232.94	$ 46,107,342.52	$ 53,706,667.76	$ 53,194,207.42
Eleemosynary and Correctional	$5,421,456.31	$5,773,696.21	$ 5,818,271.14	$ 6,231,289.47	$ 7,703,596.72
Educational	$40,529,255.35	$41,790,777.30	$40,571,543.11	$43,271,051.31	$ 44,804,271.51
Parks and Monuments	$19,789.10	$13,051.64	$ 86,581.40	$ 1,718,018.30	$ 918,629.46
Pensions	$3,242,564.15	$2,861,475.45	$ 2,483,048.31	$ 4,188,977.50	$ 20,519,716.12
Relief		$10,360,007.23	$ 6,554,530.63	$ 2,849,171.84	$ 82,340.10
Payment on Public Debt		$162,958.00	$ 555,132.25	$ 2,974,391.24	$ 2,742,007.74
Miscellaneous Governmental Cost	$407,477.72	$67,141.76	$ 598,195.66	$ 276,102.91	$ 1,491,498.55
TOTAL	$107,922,450.79	$111,868,230.40	$111,003,001.84	$125,695,928.23	$144,772,211.23

Table 2: Expenses for Texas 1933-1937

Type	Receipt	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
License	General Occupational	$ 297,393.70	$ 357,780.00	$ 559,671.08	$ 814,015.88	$ 388,993.90
License	Store Licenses (from Tax Collectors)		$ 134,405.13	$ 130,775.49	$ 317,735.54	$ 1,304.00
License	Itinerant Merchants					$ 141.83
License	Chain Store Licenses (from Comptroller)	$ 98,236.92	$ 44,774.00	$ 53,218.25	$ 53.00	
License	Miscellaneous Companies	$7,742.85		$ 9,702.40	$ 10,750.06	$ 10,028.86
License	Pullman Company	$ 5,500.00	$ 5,500.00	$ 5,500.00	$ 5,500.00	$ 5,500.00
License	Railway Companies	$ 43,332.50	$ 38,786.00	$ 38,247.40	$ 37,792.90	$ 37,677.75
License	Insurance Companies	$ 72,650.00	$ 68,500.00	$ 68,100.00	$ 67,900.00	$ 68,430.00
License	Insurance Agents	$ 70,943.00	$ 68,250.00	$ 70,019.00	$ 71,085.00	$ 74,751.00
License	Coin Operated Devices				$ 292,264.00	$ 626,810.00
License	Telephone Companies	$2,076.81			$ 6,437.04	$ 7,103.10
Filing Fees	Insurance Companies	$ 3,945.00	$ 3,820.00	$ 3,920.00	$ 3,775.00	$ 3,735.00
Filing Fees	Credit Unions	$ 15.00		$ 115.00	$ 35.00	$ 160.00
Special Taxes	Insurance Companies Premium Tax (2% on gross premiums)	$ 671,793.56	$ 617,506.79	$ 687,976.76	$ 752,407.65	$ 804,560.85
Special Taxes	Pullman Company Tax (1.5% on gross	$ 3,370.72	$ 2,624.92	$ 3,020.74	$ 3,007.20	$ 3,074.17
Special Taxes	Bank Examination Taxes	$ 28,244.50	$ 13,667.50	$ 13,572.65	$ 14,730.00	$ 25,310.00
Special Taxes	Documentary Stamp Tax	$ 251,858.83	$ 326,876.62	$ 397,231.14	$ 480,521.26	$ 607,511.88
Special Taxes	Estate Tax	$ 357,723.44	$ 314,139.64	$ 1,087,237.19	$ 3,307,222.60	$ 1,059,512.13
Special Taxes	Utilities Tax	$ 464,931.15	$ 512,450.73	$ 490,120.14	$ 520,983.68	$ 572,571.56
Special Taxes	Charter Tax on Corporations	$ 47,379.14	$ 40,911.73	$ 52,388.31	$ 57,711.84	$ 65,099.93
Special Taxes	Corporation Capital Stock Tax	$ 236,390.77	$ 242,409.31	$ 243,324.08	$ 272,500.00	$ 295,000.00
Special Taxes	Intangible Tax	$ 51,985.49	$ 205,465.54	$ 246,912.31	$ 276,297.14	$ 364,801.75
Special Taxes	Lime Kiln Taxes	$ 78.64	$ 96.27	$ 91.98	$ 275.83	$ 169.09
Special Taxes	One Cent Gasoline Tax	$ 2,019,580.03	$ 2,176,473.53	$ 2,455,934.93	$ 2,672,334.54	$ 3,036,229.22
Special Taxes	Receipts from Beverage Department				$ 2,540,761.25	$ 2,879,117.28
Special Taxes	Receipts under Chapter 9338, Acts of 1923 (3c tax per bbl. on oysters)	$ 1,443.29	$ 0.48			
Taxes	Advalorem Taxes	$ 41,815.87	$ 4,287.85	$ 266,338.31	$ 256,660.08	$ 380,612.93
Interest on State	State Treasurer's Balances	$ 15,918.36		$ 18,573.09	$ 23,247.66	$ 23,167.64
Interest on State	Comptroller's Balances	$ 317.04		$ 141.34	$ 26.18	$ 203.35
Interest on State	Secretary of State's balances	$ 16.87		$ 147.48		
Fees and	Commissions from Secretary of State			$ 23,835.00	$ 13,420.00	$ 26,065.10
Fees and	Fees from Secretary of State	$ 19,664.38		$ 22,488.73	$ 25,033.39	$ 23,873.47
Fees and	Fees from Commissioner of Agriculture	$ 692.29		$ 63.10	$ 1,287.35	$ 949.87
Fees and	Fees from Governor	$ 305.00				
Fees and	Agriculture			$ 851.82		
Fees and	Fee from Candidates				$ 15,000.00	$ 2,061.60
Fees and	Extradition Fees (From Governor's Office)			$ 440.00	$ 465.00	$ 410.00
Sales-Special	Laws--by Secetary of State	$ 469.50		$ 478.96	$ 3,856.35	$ 607.13
Sales-Special	Legislative Journals--by Secretary of State				$ 95.70	$ 26.50
Sales-Special	Flags--by Secretary of State			$ 2.70	$ 25.00	$ 11.85
Sales-Special	Corporation Reports--by Secretary of State					$ 1.00
ALL	TOTAL	$ 4,815,814.65	$ 5,178,726.04	$ 6,950,439.38	$ 12,865,213.12	$ 11,395,583.74

Table 3: Receipts for Florida 1933-1937

Disbursements	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
Educational Appropriations	$2,107,236.53	$1,760,549.18	$1,738,036.50	$ 6,683,916.75	$6,292,292.05
Executive Departments	$593,954.25	$537,596.09	$ 562,582.54	$ 697,974.27	$713,119.11
Judicial Department	$835,286.60	$629,003.25	$ 630,885.12	$ 628,591.20	$655,026.50
Other Departments and Boards	$520,287.80	$723,599.13	$ 442,481.98	$ 703,776.32	$820,776.32
State Institutions	$1,071,488.54	$1,182,891.00	$ 1,694,613.42	$ 1,813,183.39	$1,803,312.24
Collection of Revenue	$ 293,624.85	$ 346,368.64		$ 301,813.48	$283,717.27
Pensions and Gratuities				$ 45,244.22	$1,920.00
Special Appropriations for Relief	$ 18,707.27	$ 4,036.86			$29,971.81
Retirement of State Officials and Employees					$5,027.05
School Teachers Pensions					$40,880.00
Parks, Forests and Memorials	$11,894.38	$13,380.60		$ 34,085.71	$82,135.64
State Appropriation for Buildings				$ 633,484.33	$550,000.00
Miscellaneous Appropriations	$ 98,857.29	$ 154,250.26	$ 866,698.93	$ 398,595.18	$ 475,804.72
Loans and Interest	$ 289,861.99	$ 140,284.01			

Table 4: Florida Disbursements 1933-1937

References:

Benton, William E. *Texas: Its Government and Politics*. 2nd ed. 1961. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966. Print.

Gannon, Michael, ed. *The New History of Florida*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996. Print.

Gantt, Fred, Jr., Irving Owen Dawsom, and Luther G. Hagard, Jr., eds. *Governing Texas: Documents and Readings*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966. Print.

Green, George Norris. *The Establishment in Texas Politics: The Primitive Years, 1938-1957*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979. Print. Contributions in Political Science 21.

McCleskey, Clifton. *The Government and Politics of Texas*. 3rd ed. 1963. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969. Print.

MacCorkle, Stuart A., and Dick Smith. *Texas Government*. 5th ed. 1949. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964. Print.

Nelson, David. "A New Deal for Welfare: Governor Fred Cone and the Florida State Welfare Board." *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 84.2 (2005): 185-204. *JSTOR*. Web. 2 May 2011. <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu/stable/30149987>.

Patterson, Caleb Perry, Sam B. McAlister, and George C. Hester. *State and Local Government in Texas*. Rev. ed. 1940. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948. Print.

Procter, Ben H. "Great Depression." *Handbook of Texas Online*. Texas State Historical Association, n.d. Web. 4 May 2011. <http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/npg01>.

Stronge, William B. *The Sunshine Economy: An Economic History of Florida since the Civil War*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008. Print.

Stuart, John A., and John F. Stack, Jr., eds. *The New Deal in South Florida: Design, Policy, and Community Building, 1933-1950*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008. Print. The Florida History and Culture series.