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**The linguistic turn in philosophy of education: An historical
study of selected factors affecting an academic discipline**

Potter, Eugenie Ann Conser, Ph.D.

The University of Arizona, 1988

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THE LINGUISTIC TURN IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION:
AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF SELECTED FACTORS
AFFECTING AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE

by

Eugenie Ann Conser Potter

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DIVISION OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
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In the Graduate College
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As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read
the dissertation prepared by Eugenie Ann Conser Potter

entitled The Linguistic Turn in Philosophy of Education: An Historical
Study of Selected Factors Affecting an Academic Field

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for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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SIGNED: Eugenie Potter

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

More: Why not be a teacher? You'd be a fine teacher.
Perhaps even a great one.

Rich: And if I was, who would know it?

More: You, your pupils, your friends, God--not a bad
public, that."

Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons

Completing a doctorate is the work of not one but many minds, so I first wish to acknowledge all my teachers whose choice of vocation has enriched and inspired me throughout these long years of schooling. I am especially indebted to my dissertation committee members Mike Sacken, Sheila Slaughter, and Gary Fenstermacher, whose individual and collective brilliance alternately frightened and delighted me, and will continue to light my intellectual life in the years ahead.

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ABSTRACT

From the late 1950s to about 1970, philosophers of education began to adopt a mode of philosophizing characterized as "the linguistic turn," after a similar change in general philosophy. This involved a move away from the older "isms" approach rooted in metaphysics towards linguistic and conceptual analysis. The linguistic turn has been attributed to intellectual history--the influence of ideas on a field.

The central argument of this study, however, is that during the 1950s, factors external to academia, but acting upon it, interacted with concerns by educational philosophers themselves to create the conditions for the linguistic turn. These factors included the attacks on public schooling and "educationists," the teacher education reform movement, the Ford Foundation funding of liberal arts oriented teacher preparation, and, within the academy, the concern on the part of educational philosophers for the academic legitimacy of their discipline. These factors led philosophers of education to model their discourse more closely on the reigning paradigm in general philosophy, linguistic analysis.

The attacks on public schooling were centered on progressivism for its alleged anti-intellectualism and subversive character. Philosophers of education were the particular targets of these critics. Teacher preparation in

education schools also came under scrutiny during this period. The Ford Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education underwrote major programs that centered teacher preparation in a liberal arts curriculum, with only minimal coursework devoted to professional training. In addition, the National Commission for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) supported such a reorientation, with a concomitant weakening of educational philosophy's place in teacher education programs. Philosophers of education responded by lobbying for the inclusion of their courses in certification requirements, forging an alliance with the American Philosophical Association, reducing the social activism that had characterized earlier educational philosophers' efforts, and adopting the more academically legitimate methods of general philosophy. In the short term these actions assured educational philosophy a place in teacher education programs. In the long run, however, the linguistic turn may have jeopardized the survival of educational philosophy as an academic field by creating a chasm between philosopher and practitioner.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of education has undergone a number of changes as it evolved into an academic discipline. One such change occurred during a period from the mid-1950s to about 1970. Prior to this time, philosophy of education was characterized by two overlapping modes of discourse. The first was the "isms" approach, so called because educational philosophies were categorized according to schools of thought, such as Idealism, Realism and Pragmatism. The second mode of discourse was that of moral philosophizing about the broad aims of education. Such aims, as well as the educative processes they entailed, were thought by some to be different depending on the "ism" from which they were derived.

Beginning in the mid-1950s a new approach to educational philosophizing began to appear in professional journals and papers presented at professional conferences. In this mode of discourse, the language and concepts particular to the educational enterprise were analyzed for their logical and conceptual relationships without regard for any particular school of philosophy. Indeed, by the time this analytical mode had taken over the field--circa 1970--the "isms" approach, along with moral philosophizing, seldom appeared in the professional literature. This change in the

way of doing educational philosophy has been called "the linguistic turn," an eponym derived from Rorty's (1967) characterization of a similar, earlier change in general philosophy.

Definition of the Problem and Hypotheses

The primary goal of this study is to account for the linguistic turn in philosophy of education. A number of subsidiary questions derive from this central issue. Were educational philosophers simply adopting a mode of discourse from their colleagues in general philosophy, as an intellectual historian might explain it? Were educational philosophers attempting to enhance their status and prestige in the academy by aligning themselves more closely with the methods of the more prestigious discipline of general philosophy, as a sociologist interested in professionalization might analyze the problem? Or were there factors both within and outside the academy, such as the societal milieu and the presence or absence of financial resources, that influenced the field, as a social historian might explain events?

The latter interpretation, that of social history, undergirds this study's analysis of the linguistic turn in philosophy of education. A number of studies of other disciplines informed this choice. Silva and Slaughter's (1984) analysis, for example, explores the transformation of social sciences rooted in community concerns into universi-

ty-based disciplines of expertise serving vested political interests. Ricci (1984) also details the changes in political science from a moral commitment to a workable democracy toward increased and constrained specialization as a consequence of professionalizing influences. Similarly, Sacken (1987) notes that the field of school law is focusing increasingly on technical aspects with a concomitant loss of meaning and assistance to school administrators. Sarason's (1981) critique of psychology explores the ways that the scientific canons of behaviorism moved psychology away from its humanistic base toward a discipline inaccessible to outsiders. Like these disciplines, philosophy of education began with considerations about education in relation to society. The close bond between societal concerns and educational philosophy began to disintegrate, in the view of some philosophers of education, when the discipline took its linguistic turn, thus restricting its discourse to an expert few.

Philosophy of education as an academic field has received relatively little study. As noted by Soltis in the preface to the NSSE Yearbook, Philosophy and Education, "the full history of the development of philosophy of education as a professional field in the twentieth century has yet to be written" (Soltis, 1981, p. 3 fn).

The historical studies of the field that have been done are, in the main, brief essays. Both these essays and a few

longer studies, principally doctoral dissertations, approach the topic from the perspective of intellectual lineage. None of the essays or the dissertations considers other factors influencing the field and on which this study focuses.

This study argues that professional concerns of those within the academy about the adequacy of disciplinary training of educational philosophers together with concerns expressed in the public sector about the appropriateness of pragmatism in undergirding public education served to promote an intensive self-examination among philosophers of education that eventually led to an attempt at closer identification with academic philosophy, expressed in the linguistic turn.

It is also argued that elements in the public debate about education bore heavily on the way that philosophers of education eventually came to express their disciplinary views. One such element was the anti-communist attacks on the schools, involving, as they did, corollary attacks on "educationists," especially those at Teachers College and the University of Illinois. Although a number of educational philosophers at first responded to such attacks with published protests and refutations, discourse in educational philosophy became more muted as the McCarthyites' influence increased, losing the social activist tone that characterized earlier discussion of the aims and processes of education.

The second element in the public debate that influenced educational philosophers was the attention given teacher education programs. This concern was vested in issues of adequate professional preparation as well as the post-war teacher shortage and increased school enrollments resulting from the post-war baby boom. During the closing years of World War II, social and economic planners in the Roosevelt administration recognized that American hegemony in post-war geopolitics depended, at least in part, on a strong educational system. Many schools, however, still suffered from inadequate facilities and poorly trained teachers. In addition both military service and lucrative war-related employment had seriously thinned the ranks of teachers. A presidential conference on education in 1948 sought ways to strengthen education and to encourage young people to enter teaching. Beyond moral support, however, there was little in the way of federal financial assistance to meet the growing crisis in teacher supply for a burgeoning school-age population.

Into this fiscal breach stepped the newly-wealthy and powerful Ford Foundation with a five-point plan for general social reform. Topping the list of concerns for the Foundation was the issue of education. The orientation of the Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education toward a liberal arts base and a minimum of professional education courses reflected in the Master of Arts in Teaching programs

influenced educational philosophers to argue for a place for their courses in teacher education programs on the grounds of their commonality with philosophy. Thus the engendering conditions for the linguistic turn that actually occurred in the 1960s, came together in the early to mid-1950s. These conditions included professional concerns on the part of those within the discipline, public dissatisfaction with the philosophical base of education, public and private concern about teacher education, and the presence of financial resources to support teacher education programs with a discipline-based orientation.

Historical Context

Education in America has been subject to intense public debate at least since the time of Horace Mann's Common School movement in the early nineteenth century. The debate increased during the twentieth century when, in Cremin's (1961) terms, the progressive education movement transformed the schools. The underlying educational philosophy of progressive education was pragmatism, associated with philosopher-educator John Dewey and the professors at Teachers College, Columbia University.

Not everyone agreed with the tenets of pragmatism, also termed experimentalism and instrumentalism, nor with its instantiation in progressive education. Countervailing philosophical views were expressed with increasing frequency

beginning in the 1920s. The need to taxonomize and clarify these views led the National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) to publish the first of three yearbooks on philosophy of education. This 1942 publication set out five "world-frames, or philosophies, within which the meaning of education is to be considered. ... (1) the Aristotelian, (2) the Thomistic, (3) the modern, or absolute, idealistic, (4) the realist, and (5) the pragmatic, or instrumentalist" (Reisner, 1942, p. 9).

The debate over the relative merits of these philosophies was confined largely to professional conferences and journals until after World War II, when criticism of schooling in general and progressive education in particular became a matter of broad public concern expressed in such popular periodicals of the day as Life, Time, and Atlantic Monthly. Articles in these magazines about schooling controversies contained numerous references to "educational philosophy," usually identifying the philosophy of John Dewey as the culprit ("What's Wrong," 1957; "The Deeper Problem," 1958).

In addition to the public debate, there was a concern among some in the field of educational philosophy about the adequacy of disciplinary training of those who taught philosophy of education courses in teacher preparation programs. A study conducted by Bruce Raup of Teachers College in the late 1930s found that many teaching such

courses had had no training in formal philosophy, and some had only a rudimentary survey course in educational philosophy as their background (Benne, 1987, p. 5).

The concern raised by the Raup study led to the establishment of the Philosophy of Education Society in 1941. The Society lay dormant during the war years, but immediately following the war began to sponsor efforts to improve the adequacy of disciplinary training for philosophers of education. One part of such efforts was the attempt to forge closer ties with general philosophy through the American Philosophical Association.

Thus by the beginning of the 1950s, there was movement by educational philosophers to strengthen philosophy of education as an academic field. At the same time there was increasing public debate about schooling, often centered on the allegedly malign influence of pragmatism, which was seen as promoting permissiveness, anti-intellectualism, and relativistic moral values (Zoll, n.d.; Keller, 1948; Raywid, 1962).

In 1955 Kingsley Price and Harry Broudy presented a pair of papers on philosophy of education at a special symposium of the American Philosophical Association conference. These papers engendered heated discussion that resulted in a published symposium the following year in the Harvard Educational Review (1956) on the "aims and content" of philosophy of education. In this symposium most writers

expressed a preference for a particular philosophical system as against another. A few, however, argued that the traditional way of doing educational philosophy was without logical basis and ought to be abandoned in favor of the more rigorous mode of analysis.

Although most educational philosophers continued to operate out of a traditional, metaphysically based framework for at least the next decade, by the end of the 1950s the analytical mode had begun to penetrate most discourse in philosophy of education. By the end of the 1960s there was seldom argument in the professional literature for a metaphysically based philosophic system. Rather, the central arguments then turned on such matters as definitions of educational concepts, the relation of theory to practice, and the relation of philosophy to educational policy (Wheeler, 1967, p. 5).

Method and Sources

This study relies on methods of qualitative research in which "the research design emerges, with preliminary analysis informing future data collection and analysis" (Jacobs, 1987, 34-35). In addition to verification of historical facts, some questions about the sociology of knowledge, including issues of intellectual history and professionalization, are also addressed because these issues comprise a part of the academy's response to change factors.

As an historical work, this study relies on a wide variety of primary and secondary sources. Among the primary sources are published minutes and committee reports of professional organizations, annual reports and other publications of funding organizations, diaries, memoirs and reminiscences of persons involved in the field during and after the the period of focus, and published works on substantive issues in both general and educational philosophy. Among the secondary sources used are other historical works describing the focus period, as well as periods that preceded it, institutional histories, and analyses of the socio-political context. Appendices A and B detail these sources in relation to the factors selected for analysis. In addition, a number of persons involved in philosophy of education were interviewed to obtain a general overview of the condition and tenor of the field during the focus period. The questions used as a starting point for these interviews are given in Appendix C. The inductive nature of the qualitative method used will become apparent in the following section.

Background of the Study

This study derives from a set of questions stimulated by the 1956 Harvard Educational Review's symposium on philosophy of education. That a prestigious professional journal should have such a symposium was unsurprising, but

the tone and content of some of the articles were surprising. Articles by Suzanne K. Langer and Robert Ulich questioned whether philosophy of education could even be considered an academic discipline. Raphael Demos and I. L. Kandel included in their articles thinly veiled attacks on the dominant philosophy of pragmatism. Further, Sidney Hook's article mocked some educational philosophizing as "perpetrating garrulous absurdities." All the writers attempted to somehow define the province and method of philosophy of education. There was withal a marked lack of the kind of rigorous linguistic analysis that characterized the literature in educational philosophy during the 1960s and 1970s.

The Review symposium had been constructed in response to the pair of papers given the preceding year by Kingsley Price (1955) and Harry Broudy (1955). Price asked the question, "Is a Philosophy of Education Necessary?," while Broudy asked, "How Philosophical Can Philosophy of Education Be?" The writers in the Review symposium gave a broad variety of answers, overall reflecting a sense of anxiety about their enterprise.

Thus the Review symposium and the Price/Broudy papers gave rise to several questions. Why was there any problem in defining philosophy of education as an academic discipline? What could account for the hostile tone in some articles toward established philosophical positions? What were the professional and disciplinary relations at that time between

philosophers of education and general philosophers? Why had Price and Broudy presented their papers to the American Philosophical Association conference and not to the Philosophy of Education Society? And why was the familiar language analysis missing from the Review articles?

This last question led to still another. Had philosophy of education taken a "linguistic turn" similar to that Rorty had described in general philosophy and was the Review symposium a prelude to such a turn? A search of the literature in the history of educational philosophy as an academic field revealed, as noted earlier, that there are few such studies. Among those available were a pair of articles, one in the 1981 NSSE yearbook on philosophy of education, one Broudy on the field in general, and one by Pratte (1981) on analytical philosophy.

In his brief historical review of educational philosophy between the three NSSE yearbooks of 1942, 1954, and 1981, Broudy states that "as philosophy of education shifted more of its attention to the logical and linguistic analysis of educational concepts and problems, it shifted away from the isms approach" (Broudy, 1981, p. 25). Broudy marks this shift as occurring in the 1950s when there was "heated debate" about "whether from a theory about the good in general, prescriptions for educational practice could be determined" (Broudy, 1981, p. 25).

Implicit in Broudy's article is the assumption that the turn to analysis arose in the academy in response to endogenous factors such as the "synchrony between the views entertained by general philosophers and philosophers of education," the presence of advanced graduate study in research-oriented universities, and concentration on undergraduate teacher preparation programs (Broudy, 1981, p. 25).

Pratte, in his historical summary of analytical philosophy, states that "it was not until the late 1950s that the beam of analytical philosophy of education was lit in the United States, appearing first as a small unwanted child to the older traditional view of philosophy of education" (Pratte, 1981, p. 18). Pratte sees the turn to analysis as arising from three related problems: the lack of adequate training in philosophy on the part of educational philosophers; the expansion of schooling in the 1950s and 1960s and resulting demand for teachers and teacher education, and by extension, teachers of educational philosophy; and by the professional movement in education that required educational philosophers to interpret professional rather than philosophical problems (Pratte, 1981, pp. 18-20). In Pratte's view, the turn to analysis came as a reaction against the educationists' prescriptive concerns in favor of a methodological approach that more closely resembled the work of general philosophers.

Tape recorded interviews based on the questions from the Harvard Educational Review symposium, plus a set of possible explanations from the literature on the history of philosophy of education, were then conducted with some of those either currently or formerly involved in the field of educational philosophy. The central questions were these: had there been in fact a linguistic turn in philosophy of education? If so, what were its causes? Intergenerational conflict? Interinstitutional rivalry? Desire on the part of educational philosophers to be identified with general philosophy? Factors outside the academy but possibly influencing it, such as the teacher demand cited by Pratte, or the presence of funding sources for educational endeavors?

The intent in these interviews was to derive a broad view of the field from the literature about the field through recollections and analyses of some of its practitioners, in order to concentrate on the salient aspects that might emerge from both the literature and the interviews. Those interviewed showed a clear tendency to regard the linguistic turn as a definite historical fact, and to attribute its genesis to the inner workings of the academy, especially to the influence of ideas.

This then constituted a working hypothesis with which to turn to the conference proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society in order to establish the general point at

which the turn to analysis became the acceptable mode of discourse. Although the Society has held conferences annually since the end of World War II, it did not begin publishing proceedings until 1958. These proceedings, however, contained not only the presented papers, but also conference programs, meeting minutes, committee reports, financial statements, lists of members, and the constitution and history of the Society. These materials, particularly conference programs, minutes and committee reports, indicated salient factors other than the field's intellectual history.

One clue was the educational philosophers' concern that accreditation standards for teacher education programs ensure a place for philosophy of education courses. In 1958 the Society established a Committee to respond to a 1957 article by W. Earl Armstrong, director of the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, who had opposed the teaching of history and philosophy of education as separate courses in teacher preparation programs (Philosophy of Education Society [PES], 1958, pp. 129; 132).

Another clue was the Society's umbrage at a 1958 Life magazine editorial that was perceived as misinterpreting Dewey's philosophy and implicitly impugning philosophy of education (PES, 1958, pp. 127-128). It was surprising that Life magazine would take an interest in so esoteric an area of academe as educational philosophy. Other clues were occa-

sional references to grants given to "others" outside the Society, and the Society members' struggles to obtain some sort of financial support (PES, 1961, p. 184).

A discursive search through varied literatures was undertaken to discover whether factors in addition to intellectual history might have influenced the linguistic turn in educational philosophy. Accounts of other disciplines, especially in the social sciences and philosophy were read to more fully understand conceptions of intellectual history. These accounts suggested that societal context cannot be ignored in interpretations of academic change. Particularly helpful in this regard was Kuklick's (1977) account of the "golden age" of American philosophy at Harvard in the late 19th century. While accounting for the influence of shared ideas within the academy, Kuklick also documents patterns of societal structures along the Atlantic seaboard, such as religious organizations and socioeconomic status, that permitted philosophic discourse of a certain style and level to flourish.

Histories of American education, particularly those emphasizing the twentieth century were read to better understand the context of schooling. Here Cremin's The Transformation of the Schools (1961) provided a broad insight into the triumphs and failures of progressive education and its underlying pragmatic philosophy and gave rise to a question about whether the downfall of progressiv-

ism after World War II might have led to a turning away from socially-oriented educational philosophy toward some less prescriptive mode of discourse.

Since the specter of communism dominated the 1950s, it was plausible that there was a relationship between anti-communism and schooling. Accordingly, the McCarthyite and anti-McCarthyite literature, as well as earlier anti-communist literature written before the war was read. The latter indicated a consistent hostility between the anti-communists and the most prominent educational philosophers of the period. It was conceivable that this hostility would carry forward into the 1950s and perhaps have a bearing on how newcomers to educational philosophy might regard the older philosophers.

Searching the literature on teacher education programs of the 1950s soon led to the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education (Buss, 1972; Colvard, 1959; Saxe, 1965). It actively supported a particular view of teacher education that involved four years of liberal arts education combined with one year of professional training. Explicitly in such programs were both an emphasis on a disciplinary approach and a low regard for "pastiche" courses such as educational philosophy. This perspective derived from the long-held view of the Fund's director, Robert M. Hutchins, that the liberal arts should be the cornerstone of all education.

The Fund's reports demonstrated the Ford Foundation's early interest in supporting the development of a sound educational philosophy for the schools (Gaither, 1949, pp. 90-99). The Fund appeared to enact this interest by granting more than half a million dollars to Mortimer Adler, Hutchins' co-editor of the Great Books program, for the establishment of the Institute for Philosophical Studies. The Institute eventually issued a book in support of strong liberal arts education (Adler and Mayer, 1958), an early version of The Paideia Proposal, but seemed not to have been influential within the field of educational philosophy.

More salient than the Institute was the Fund's strong movement into teacher education programs. The American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE), the dominant professional organization for teacher training institutions, greeted this effort with wariness (American Association for Colleges of Teacher Education [AACTE], 1952). Given the Fund directors' predilection for five-year programs founded on liberal arts degrees, the AACTE appeared to be attempting to safeguard its curricular territory. The relation between the AACTE's defense of teacher education programs and its attempt to accommodate to a growing emphasis on disciplinary and liberal arts orientations presented another possible link to educational philosophers' protection of philosophy of education in teacher education programs.

Other areas of speculation were considered for a time, but eventually dismissed for a variety of reasons. They included such themes as a Louis XIV syndrome (Après moi le déluge) in relation to the death of John Dewey, and the possibility that one or more philosophers of education attempted to fill the void left by his passing. A careful reading of the professional literature left no basis for sustaining this speculation. Another theme dealt with the networks of power and authority reflected in the leadership of professional organizations. A crosslisting of the officer and board lists of the Philosophy of Education Society, the John Dewey Society and the American Philosophical Association showed few overlaps. Neither did the professional status of the officers of these organizations seem to reflect any major power relationships to directions in educational philosophizing. Perhaps the sole exception was the tenure of William Heard Kilpatrick, emeritus professor of educational philosophy at Teachers College. He served as president of the John Dewey Society (JDS) from its founding in 1935 until 1959, when he was made honorary president until his death in 1962. Kilpatrick's longevity as JDS president may have owed more to respect for a founder than to his own authority in a changing field.

Another potential thematic area was the change in actual curricular content in philosophy of education courses between the mid-1950s and about 1975. Hale's dissertation

(1975), which surveyed the health of the foundations of education in colleges and universities across the country, served as the initial entry into this area. A preliminary review of the curriculum, described by catalogs from a number of Hale's selected institutions, using five year intervals to detect changes, produced inconclusive results. It was often difficult to discern from course descriptions their likely content. Further, possible discrepancies between stated content and content taught could not be accounted for through documentary analysis.

Thus through a discursive process the focus was narrowed to four selected factors, one within and three outside the academy: (1) concern about the adequacy of disciplinary training on the part of educational philosophers, (2) attacks on public schooling vested in anti-progressivist and anti-communist sentiments, (3) concern about teacher education programs, and (4) the presence of large amounts of money, especially from the Ford Foundation, to effect changes in both public schooling and teacher education.

An exhaustive review of the professional journals for educational philosophers was undertaken, including examination of all volumes from 1945 through 1965 of the Harvard Educational Review and Teachers College Record, and all volumes of Educational Theory from the initial volume in 1951 through 1965. The intent in this search was first, to

verify the historical fact of the linguistic turn, and second, to seek indications in both the content of articles and in bibliographic citations of factors contributing to the change in the field. From these latter clues evidence was pursued in other publications respecting the factors selected as salient to the linguistic turn. Appendix A contains a complete list of these resources and their relation to the selected factors.

A document that helped support the working hypotheses about influences on the field and encouraged accumulation of additional evidence for the argument was Maxine Greene's 1959 article, "Philosophy of Education and the Liberal Arts: a Proposal." Her article summarizes some of the central concerns of this study:

There is no denying the ironies and difficulties confronting educational philosophy today. The educational expansion and the teacher shortage, which ought to have opened infinite opportunities, are actually working to restrict its role in the total scene. ...Money, institutional connection, access to mass communication, all these have worked with a free-floating public anxiety to secure the upper hand of those hostile to professional teacher training (Greene, 1959, p. 51).

Greene then acknowledges the changes during the preceding decade to approaches to teacher education:

Nonetheless, I think we have to confront the fact that thousands of public school teachers are to be trained in traditional liberal arts schools and taught a rudimentary rhetoric of education in one post-graduate year. ... I do not think we ought to cede the 5th year programs ... to the Great Conversationalists [Robert Maynard Hutchins and Mortimer Adler]. The Fund for the Advancement of Education, created under the aegis of Dr. Hutchins, may promote and subsidize many of these projects, but ... the Ford Foundation's bequests do not automatically structure such patterns according to the 'one true philosophy' preached by Mortimer Adler ... (Greene, 1959, p. 51).

Greene suggests a way for educational philosophers to accommodate to the changing demand for their professional discourse (emphasis added):

I think we ought to ponder possibilities of working within the liberal arts and subject-centered patterns which appear to be dominating the picture. ... It is not too difficult to map out areas of mutual relevance, so as to find a means of relating our discipline to the various humanities disciplines without poaching on any specialized field or spreading thin particular skills. ... We ought to be able to do it without

offering our subject as another humanities course or as a professional adjunct to what exists (Greene, 1959, p. 51).

Greene's article is not a brief for adopting analytical philosophy to demonstrate technical competence. Indeed her ultimate recommendations involve demonstrating the permeating influence of various metaphysically based philosophies in world literature. The salience of her article for this study is her recognition of factors outside the academy to which those within had to bend in some fashion. For many educational philosophers, this bending took the form of the linguistic turn.

Limitations

The study focuses on the decade of the 1950s as the critical period in which a complex set of factors converged to enhance conditions for the linguistic turn. Thus the study comprises only a portion of the history of the field and not the "full history" sought by Soltis. The study also concentrates on selected factors contributing to the linguistic turn. There may well be others, such as the influence of specific figures and personalities, that could be included in a comprehensive history.

Similarly, not all instances in each of the selected factors is exhaustively considered. For example, the McCarthy hearings were an important part of the socio-

political context of the focus period, but they remain part of the background in this study. The influence of these hearings on any given academic discipline could very well constitute a dissertation in its own right. Likewise the pervasive influence of the Ford Foundation in education itself as well as in a global socio-political context deserves thorough study.

Finally, the study is limited by access to resources. Geographic distance required reliance on published documents in proximate institutional collections or available through interlibrary loan. Trips to conferences afforded the opportunity to conduct interviews with both prominent and less wellknown persons in the field, but the list of potential interviewees could provide a lifetime of work.

Organization

The next chapter sets out some evidence for the historical fact of the linguistic turn as it was perceived by some of those involved in the field. In addition the substantive issues involved in this turn are set out as background material.

Chapter three describes factors outside the academy affecting education. The attacks on public schooling, especially their anti-progressivist and anti-communist tone; the public criticism of the content and format of teacher education programs, especially the emphasis on liberal arts

and disciplinary studies; and the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education underwriting for five-year programs built on a liberal arts base are detailed. Chapter four describes the response by educational philosophers to the factors set out in the preceding chapter.

Chapter five argues that the linguistic turn in philosophy of education was one result of a complex set of factors that gave rise to conditions in which a mode of discourse perceived to be more rigorous, and, therefore, more philosophical than the mode of discourse preceding it could flourish. The study argues that adoption of rigor and alignment with general philosophy was a strategy deliberately used by educational philosophers to preserve a place for their courses in the teacher education curriculum in the face of opposition financed principally by the Ford Foundation. The study also argues that social conditions, especially the anti-communist tenor of the period, worked to weaken the more social activist type of discourse of an earlier period, leaving such discourse open to attacks about its "garrulous absurdity," whose errors might be corrigible through the methods of linguistic analysis. Chapter six concludes with a review of the evidence for the fact of the linguistic turn. This chapter also offers an interpretation of the consequences of the turn for philosophy of education as an academic field.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LINGUISTIC TURN IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Did the linguistic turn occur in philosophy of education? If it did, what was its character?

In his dissertation, Molina-Pineda (1984) details varied conceptions of analytic philosophy and describes the relation of the analytic movement to philosophy of education. Pineda concludes that philosophy of education did not take a linguistic turn such as occurred in academic philosophy but rather that the analytic outlook was adopted and expressed by only a few educational philosophers.

Carton (1979), on the other hand, asks whether analytic philosophy can be considered a philosophy of education, thus at least giving grounds for inferring that by the mid-1970s analysis had gained sufficient stature to merit critical review. Papers presented at national conferences around this time also indicate that philosophy of education passed through a period during which the tools of linguistic and conceptual analysis were used by a substantial number of educational philosophers.

Those interviewed during the early framing phase of this study were uniform in their view that there was, indeed, a turn to language analysis. Villemain, for example, said, "There was no doubt in my mind that there was a turning away from a preoccupation with social matters to the

analytic, especially as it came out of England. As I think back on it, that was thought to be the appropriate philosophic stand, the analytic stand. And anyone who did anything else was really not doing philosophy" (Villemain, 1986, pp. 6-7).

Others saw the shift as a mode brought by the newer generation of educational philosophers. Benne recalled the analytic sessions as being conducted by graduate students for other graduates because the general sessions of the Philosophy of Education Society meetings were "kind of scary" for the students (Benne, 1987, p. 4). Donahue remembered his early years in PES and said of the linguistic turn, "When I first joined the Philosophy of Education Society [in the mid-1950s], I would say the dominant school of thought, especially among the older people, would have been experimentalism or instrumentalism--the philosophy of John Dewey. Existentialism was there also. And then the younger people came along and were clearly in this analytic way of thinking" (Donahue, 1986, p. 4).

That the linguistic turn was not an easy transition was recalled by some of those interviewed. Raywid, who began attending PES meetings in 1956, said:

I remember this angry feeling of the [analytic] group being shut out but determined to be heard--at least to talk to one another. They launched the Special Interest Groups at PES really to accommo-

date that finally, but prior to this arrangement, people used to get together and read papers in each other's rooms. ...But I think the analytical literature had just a tremendous impact on standards and methodology in philosophy of education. As people worked on program committees for PES and tried to devise criteria for what is being considered as the acceptable papers, I think an awful lot of what they thought and judged as acceptable writing was derived from analytical philosophy (Raywid, 1987, pp. 1-2).

Soltis, himself a philosopher in the analytic camp, also remembered the difficulties encountered by the analytical philosophers:

I really started participating very fully in the Philosophy of Education Society in the early '60s. It was clear at that point that the Young Turks were the analytical people and when I first came in, they were real outsiders, having to meet separately from the Society before [regular] meetings. They were just beginning to become legitimate and I think it wasn't until the mid-sixties that there was any genuine legitimacy for them. It wasn't until about '70-'75 that the linguistic turn had really happened; that there

were a good number of analytical papers being done (Soltis, 1986, p. 1).

Background of the Linguistic Turn

The question about whether the linguistic turn occurred has its context in a debate that raged within academic circles for about a decade. This debate was given impetus by the publication in October 1955, of a pair of papers scheduled for presentation in a special symposium on philosophy of education at the December meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. When these papers appeared in the Journal of Philosophy, they generated an explosion of claims and counterclaims about the proper content and methods of philosophy of education. Kingsley Price's paper, "Is a Philosophy of Education Necessary?," examined the substantive divisions of philosophy and their respective processes in relation to education. Price concluded that philosophy of education is necessary to education "for it provides an analysis of its obscure terms, a metaphysical supplement to its statements of fact, and a clarification, justification, and correction of its moral recommendations" (Price, 1955, p. 632).

The paper by philosopher of education Harry S. Broudy, "How Philosophical Can Philosophy of Education Be?," argued that "the philosophy of education in the hands of both educators and philosophers boils down to a set of general

and not very illuminating statements about the good life and what, in the light of their own experience and preferences, the schools ought to do about it. Such a body of assertions and exhortations does no particular harm, but it scarcely qualifies as an academic discipline, and certainly not a philosophical one" (Broudy, 1955, p. 614). Broudy then recommended that philosophy of education engage in both theory building and theory evaluation, with the latter relying on logical analysis as its principal method. Broudy particularly favored the use of "the linguistic and conceptual analysis currently so popular" to help clear up some of the "semantic chaos" in educational philosophy "where slogans and cliches carry so heavy a burden of communication" (Broudy, 1955, p. 619).

A set of responses to these two papers was published as a special symposium in the Harvard Educational Review in Spring 1956, in which both academic and educational philosophers were invited to present their own views about philosophy of education. Of the twenty-four articles, five dealt specifically with analysis or issues of analytic method. The other nineteen ranged over definitions of educational philosophy as social philosophy related to educational practice, with varied opinions about whether educational philosophy was an autonomous discipline separate from general philosophy. In this published symposium there was no consensus about either the content or methods of educational

philosophy. Nor was there ever to be any perfect consensus on these matters, yet the Review symposium, along with the Price and Broudy papers, brought into view a change occurring in the field. The older ways of doing philosophy of education were under question, if not outright attack, and a newer mode was being advanced as a means for both conducting educational philosophy and making it "more philosophical" after the model of general philosophy.

The Substantive Issue

At the time of the Price and Broudy papers, philosophy of education as an academic discipline was scarcely half a century old. Although most major social thinkers through the ages had addressed themselves to the problem of education, especially as it related to a good and just society, their reflections were mostly as Broudy noted, "general and not very illuminating statements." With the rise of the normal schools in the nineteenth century, American schoolteachers began to receive some instruction in "moral philosophy" or "moral pedagogy," courses designed to promote the prevailing cultural norms and values and assure their transmission to the young (Johnson and Johanningmeier, 1975, pp. 28; 30-31).

John Dewey was the first major twentieth century philosopher to devote a large portion of his writings to educational issues. In effect, philosophy of education began

as an academic discipline at Teachers College, Columbia University during Dewey's time there (Cremin, Shannon and Townsend, 1954, pp. 45-46). Columbia's graduates carried it to other institutions throughout the country. In Arizona, for example, Samuel Burkhard brought Deweyan pragmatic concepts from Columbia to Arizona Normal School at Tempe in 1921, an influence that remained with the curriculum well beyond Burkhard's retirement in the mid-1950s (Hopkins and Thomas, 1960, pp. 209; 285).

By 1938-39, a study conducted by Bruce Raup of Columbia found that there were philosophy of education courses offered in more than 400 schools and colleges of education, but that there were no standards or unifying organization for the fledgling field (Benne, 1987, p. 7). The Raup study coincided with William C. Bagley's interest in the field. Bagley, also of Teachers College, was instrumental in persuading the board of directors of the National Society for the Study of Education to devote a yearbook to philosophy of education (Henry, 1942, p. vi). The 1942 NSSE Yearbook, Philosophies of Education, was a compendium of "five important world-frames, or philosophies, within each of which the meaning of education [was] to be considered. These philosophies [were] (1) the Aristotelian, (2) the Thomistic, (3) the modern, or absolute, idealistic, (4) the realist, and (5) the pragmatic, or instrumentalist" (Reisner, 1942, p. 9). The model for philosophy of education as a

social-moral philosophy derived from a metaphysical base was thereby codified by this yearbook and remained in effect for more than twenty years. A second NSSE yearbook on educational philosophy published in 1955 preserved this model although presenting the views of academic philosophers on educational issues rather than those of educational philosophers as had been the case for the 1942 yearbook.

This model set out inclusive philosophical systems that had the following interdependent components: a metaphysical view about reality, an epistemological view that stemmed from the metaphysical, and an ethical theory that depended for its substance on the metaphysical and for its recommendations on the epistemological. The metaphysical question concerned whether reality was essentially spiritual, essentially material, or essentially a combination of the two. The epistemological question dealt with whether knowledge and modes of knowing were constituted and known to exist only by the mind, whether they were derived from apprehending objects and existents outside the mind, or whether they were derived from a combination of immanence and externality. The ethical theory revolved around the ultimate purpose of human action as spiritual and eternal or material and transient, and from this, whether the aims of education were to be vested in "eternal verities" or in shaping the immediate lives and future of the society (Price, 1955; Reisner, 1942; Runes, 1962). Most textbooks in

philosophy of education followed this model in elaborating the various philosophic systems and their perceived implications for education. In some cases, a textbook author would expound the virtues of one particular "ism," but the basic metaphysical-epistemological-ethical model remained the paradigm.

The arguments arising from the comparative "isms" for the most part centered on conceptions about the aims and practices of education. The pragmatist position, which had gained hegemony in public schooling largely through the efforts of progressive educators, concurred with the Deweyan view that, first, schooling was itself life and not just a preparation for living; second, that the method of inquiry the child acquired during schooling ought to be one of continuous questioning and openness that could be applied to all of life's problems; and third, that the schools had the obligation to be exemplars, in both the conduct of their personnel and their pedagogical methods, of the democratic ideals with which they were inculcating the young. The pragmatists came into conflict with those who, for example, viewed schooling as an authoritarian enterprise in which the pupils were to be taught from a set program in a traditional rote drill-and-practice learning mode. By themselves the arguments could be viewed as the usual contention between traditionalists and non-traditionalists. What concerned some educational philosophers, such as Broudy, was

that the didacticism of the "isms" approach led many educators to make statements that were neither philosophically rigorous nor tenable in actual practice (Broudy, 1955, p. 615).

As early as 1942, C.D. Hardie had attempted to clarify conflicts about educational theory through the use of linguistic analysis applied to "what are perhaps the three most typical theories of education" (Hardie, 1942, p. xix). Hardie's book received little attention, however, until the linguistic turn had occurred in the field, more than 20 years after its initial publication. By the time of the Price and Broudy papers and the Harvard Educational Review symposium, philosophers of education were beginning to realize the value of analytical methods for clarifying terms of contention, such as "interest," "growth," "need," and "problem" (McCaul, 1958, p. 12). Most advocated the use of analytic method within the framework of the large philosophic systems.

Sidney Hook, however, fired a broadside against this approach:

There is a great deal of nonsense talked about philosophy of education. This is particularly true of claims that a metaphysical or epistemological position has logical implications for educational theory and practice....

The notion that the resolution of educational problems, whether it be the place of the project method or the role of vocational courses in a liberal arts curriculum, depends on one's 'theory of reality' is almost comical if it suggests that we cannot as educators achieve a sensible agreement about the first unless we agree about the second. If that were true, then since there is no likelihood that we will agree about theories of reality, our prospects of ever agreeing about educational matters would be remote, indeed.... To encourage philosophers as Mr. Broudy does 'to derive (a philosophy of education) from some philosophic position such as Idealism, Realism, Thomism, Pragmatism or Existentialism,' is to encourage them to perpetrate garrulous absurdities (Hook, 1956, p. 145; 148).

Hook's challenge to the traditional model, although not in itself a call to adopt analytical methods in the study of educational philosophy, opened the way for those interested in a different mode of discourse for the field. In the years following the Harvard Educational Review symposium, a growing number of books, articles and conference papers reflected an analytical bent. However, in contrast to the linguistic turn in academic philosophy where rigorous analysis of language became the reigning paradigm for the

field, few educational philosophers devoted themselves to language analysis for its own sake. Rather they remained rooted in the problems of education, using linguistic and conceptual analysis to clarify terms and assumptions.

By 1970, analytical philosophy of education had begun to suffer broadsides similar in tone, though not content, to that levelled by Hook at metaphysically-based educational philosophy. Thus between 1955 and 1970, the field of educational philosophy appears to have taken a linguistic turn, but of a character different from the linguistic turn as Rorty described it for academic philosophy. What were the reasons for the turn? Those directly involved in the field as teachers or students, and those in a position to observe the field as academic colleagues recall the linguistic turn and its engendering conditions in varied ways. Most viewed it as occurring within a framework of intellectual change brought about by the force of new ideas. Some perceived the turn as an attempt to simply become more rigorous as philosophers. Nearly all attributed the change to movement contained wholly within the academic community.

In this study a contrary view is presented, however: that philosophers of education responded to criticism from outside the academy by adopting a mode of discourse more closely allied with the academy. Further, the nature of the relation between professional schools and society--the schools as directly in the service of society--makes these

institutions particularly vulnerable to influence from exogenous variables. The following chapter describes three such factors influencing schools of education and those who taught in them during the 1950s.

CHAPTER THREE

SELECTED FACTORS AFFECTING SCHOOLS OF EDUCATION

Hofstadter and Metzger have characterized higher education since the mid-1800s as "The Age of the University," writing of an institution whose attributes differed significantly from the colleges before this time. Metzger states:

Between the years 1865 and 1890 a revolution in American higher education took place. Ideas that had been debated in pre-Civil War journals--the elective system, graduate instruction, scientific courses--became educational realities. ...Along with the establishment of new institutions and the renovation of old went the adoption of new academic goals. To criticize and augment as well as to disseminate the tradition-at-hand became an established function--a great departure for a system that had aimed primarily at cultural conservation. To serve the whole community in its vast variety of needs became a creditable aspiration--an important innovation for a system that had served mainly the limited needs of the learned professions (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955, p. 277).

The two distinct, although not inherently antithetical, notions about the appropriate character of higher education--conservator of culture or servant to the whole community--lay at the bottom of the "Great Debate" concerning teacher education during the 1950s. Rhetoricians for the conservationist position, such as Robert Maynard Hutchins and Mortimer Adler, argued that teacher education was one of the functions of the liberal arts colleges as such education was adjunct to the acquisition of a full general education. Proponents for the professional service position, such as most of the old-line philosophers of education, argued that education had become a science that professional schools were uniquely equipped to translate into practical application through appropriately trained teachers. In view of the waves of reform that continue to sweep over education, it is problematic whether the Great Debate has been completely resolved. Nonetheless, elements of the debate and other related factors influenced the curriculum in professional schools of education. One curricular area that was under direct attack during the 1950s was philosophy of education. One response to this crisis was an attempt on the part of educational philosophers to become more like their colleagues in general philosophy by adopting the analytical mode of discourse.

That intellectual history contributed to the linguistic turn in philosophy of education is undeniable. Those

directly involved in the field testify that there was a long-standing interest in improving the philosophical content in the preparation of philosophers of education and in the courses themselves (Benne, 1987; Broudy, 1981). In addition, graduate students in philosophy of education and foundations of education who took courses in academic philosophy began to import the concepts of linguistic and conceptual analysis from general philosophy to education (Donahue, 1986; Raywid, 1987). Finally, some of those most active in the professional organizations (e.g., PES and JDS) were also intrigued with and began to experiment with analytical techniques for working out problems in educational philosophy (Soltis, 1986; Fenstermacher, 1987).

In addition to a lineage of ideas, however, there were other factors that contributed to the linguistic turn in philosophy of education. Three interrelated factors are sketched in this chapter: the post-War attacks on public education, the push to reform teacher education, and the influence of the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education in the schooling and teacher education reform movements. This chapter describes these factors separately and as they overlap. The following chapter relates the factors to philosophy of education.

The Attacks on Public Schools

During the late 1940s and through the 1950s the public schools came under vigorous attack from a number of quarters. Leading the early attacks were those who sought to root out any form of progressivism from the schools. In this they were resuming a campaign begun in the late 1930s but that was slowed during the war years. These attacks centered on the alleged subversiveness of progressive educators. Such an allegation derived from the position taken by a number of prominent educators during the depression years that the schools should be used to build a new social order based on socialist principles (Counts, 1932). This position led to the listing of many educators, such as George S. Counts, William Heard Kilpatrick, and John Dewey, in anti-communist publications and to their subsequent secret investigation by the FBI (Beineke, 1987).

After the war, anti-communism was taken up by a range of concerned persons, from those genuinely worried about potential danger from Stalinist Russia to those who used the general fear of communism as a springboard to fame and fortune. Whatever legitimate concerns there may have been, anti-communism soon became a hysterical crusade that threatened to foreclose open debate about a vast number of issues, including education. The attacks on the public schools fell into several categories: first, opposition to any form of progressivism, also called "Deweyism," in the

schools; second, concern for communist indoctrination in the curriculum; third, concern about communist tendencies on the part of teachers and school administrators; fourth, concern about inculcation of correct moral values; and fifth, concern about appropriate curricular content for ensuring the economic and political competitiveness of the United States, especially vis-a-vis communist countries ("Crisis," 1958; pp. 25-35; Raywid, 1962, pp. 12-21). Other frequently cited "problems" with the schools were their cost and the prevalence of "fads and frills" in the curriculum (American Association of School Administrators [AASA], 1953, pp. 286-287).

When in 1948, Roy Larsen, president and publisher of Time, called for increased public involvement in the schools, his intent was to focus attention on the need for more qualified teachers, better physical facilities, and financial support from the federal government (Larsen, 1948). To carry out his promotion of education, Larsen established the National Citizens Commission for Public Schools whose work was applauded by the NEA (Berninghausen, 1951, p. 139). Larsen's commission was one among many citizens' committees formed at local, regional and national levels to aid the public schools. It soon became difficult, however, to distinguish between such supportive efforts and those determined to undermine the schools. In cities and towns across the country, groups with patriotic names, such

as "Guardians of American Education, Inc.," undertook examinations of textbooks for subversive content, impugned the loyalty of teachers, administrators and other citizens who fought censorship, and sought to impose rightwing orthodoxy on all aspects of schooling (Berninghausen, 1951, pp. 142-148). In addition, national organizations, such as Allan Zoll's National Council for American Education, attempted to discredit those they called "educationists," meaning professors of education, professional educational associations, and teacher training institutions. A sampling of Zoll's pamphlet titles gives a flavor of the attacks: "Progressive Education Increases Delinquency," "How Red Are the Schools?" "Red-ucators of Harvard University," and "Private Schools: the Answer to America's Educational Problems" (Berninghausen, 1951, p. 139).

One result of such bombardment was the enactment of legislation in numerous states designed to root out subversives in the school systems. For example, by the end of 1952, to conform to the provisions of the Feinberg Act, the New York State Education Department had distributed forms to 4000 school boards in the state asking that the boards report "whether they have employed persons charged with subversive activities or with membership in organizations listed as subversive" (Kandel, 1952a, p. 298). As there was no list published of either organizations or actions officially defined as "subversive," however, local boards

and the citizens' committees that influenced them were left to determine on their own the fate of thousands of school teachers and administrators.

The principal bêtes noires of the anti-communist propagandists were John Dewey and anyone perceived to be his "disciple." In this attitude the propagandists were joined by others who attacked the schools and "educationists" on grounds other than alleged communism. Father James Keller of the Christophers, for example, sought to overturn the perceived "godlessness" and lack of moral inculcation in the schools by advising librarians to "discourage books that are likely to confuse and degrade the reader Dewey's writings, in particular, express the naturalistic and secularistic philosophy of education, and his enthusiastic disciples have been following his example with the result that a very grave threat is being offered to the Christian cultural education of the youth of our country." (Keller 1948, quoted in Berninghausen 1951, p. 139).

Not all attacks came from those outside education. Two prominent authors whose books aroused heated response were Arthur Bestor of the University of Illinois and Robert Maynard Hutchins of the Ford Foundation and formerly chancellor of the University of Chicago. Bestor's book Educational Wastelands (1953), and Hutchins' Conflict in American Education in a Democratic Society (1953), both placed the blame for inadequate schools on teacher training

institutions and recommended that liberal arts colleges have exclusive control over teacher preparation. Bestor charged that the "retreat from learning" prevalent in the public schools was rooted in the "anti-intellectualism" of the "educationists" (Bestor, 1953, p. 27). For Bestor, as for Hutchins, the remedy lay in eliminating educational methods courses from the teacher preparation curriculum, absorbing educational theory courses, such as philosophy of education, into the traditional disciplines, and revising the elementary and secondary curricula along more traditional lines.

Teacher Education Reform

Intermixed with the attacks on public schooling were concerns expressed in a variety of public and professional forums about the quality of teachers in the schools. The outbreak of World War II interrupted progress in the establishment of standards for admission to teaching. As an example of the change in certification conditions, in 1921 thirty of the forty-eight states allowed public school certification without any requirements as to educational experience, whereas by 1940 the number of states having no minimum educational requirements had dropped to eight. Even at that, "minimum" for four other states meant less than a high school diploma compared with only nine states requiring college graduation (Commission on Teacher Education, 1944, pp. 11-12).

During World War II the demand for military personnel depleted the ranks of qualified teachers with the immediate consequence that emergency certification was granted to persons without qualifications to teach. According to T. M. Stinnett, a leader in the certification movement, "So much harm was done ... that there is a real question whether emergency certification should have been allowed" (Stinnett and Huggett, 1963, p. 465). After the war the problem of unqualified teachers continued as higher paying jobs in business and industry competed successfully against teaching. In addition, there was a growing tendency for women to assume domestic roles directly after high school or college rather than putting in several years of teaching, as had once been the practice for many women ("What's With Our Teachers," 1958, pp. 93-101). The post-war baby boom also began to swell the number of children in school, contributing to a situation in which a poorly qualified teacher confronted an overcrowded classroom (Curry, 1948, p. 83). Thus a number of socio-economic factors coalesced to precipitate general concerns about schooling that, within a few years, became focused on teacher education programs.

Concern about the state and quality of public education is not a new phenomenon in the United States. Both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been punctuated by episodic debates about schooling. Central to the 1950s "Great Debate" about teacher training were the questions:

What type of institution and what curriculum were best suited to the preparation of teachers? The debate was rooted in a conflict that began in the nineteenth century between liberal arts colleges and teacher training institutions.

As the Common School movement increased the numbers of elementary schools across the nation during the nineteenth century, there was a concomitant need for teachers. The first normal school was established in 1839, modeled after the French ecole normale. In today's terms it would be considered the first two years of high school, with a course or two of pedagogy included in the curriculum. As the century progressed, the curriculum in the normal schools expanded, so that by the end of the century, many had acquired the curriculum of the first two years of college. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, many normal schools served as the only means to higher education in rural areas. As such they were under local pressure to include more of the "regular" college curriculum. This put them into direct, though at times distant, competition with the liberal arts colleges (Cremin, 1953a, pp. 80-83).

The early years of the twentieth century were a time of ferment in higher education as institutions attempted to establish their own areas of dominance in the competition for students. Many of the eastern seaboard liberal arts colleges had been converted to junior colleges with the understanding that they would provide the first two years of

college work and the "senior" colleges would provide the last two. Although this had been one of the premises of the junior college concept (Cohen and Brauwer, 1982), in practice it did not work out that way. The senior institutions retained their undergraduate programs, thus contributing further to decline in the remaining four-year liberal arts colleges' enrollments.

Beginning in the 1920s, as a response to local requests, many normal schools began to be restructured as state colleges, expanding their curricular offerings to a full four years. At the same time, and in keeping with trends in other institutions, they also expanded their education departments to include courses in which the results of the "scientific movement" in educational research were taught. This two-pronged expansion was met with outrage by spokesmen of the liberal arts colleges who claimed that the normal schools-cum-state colleges had no charter to take on the liberal arts curriculum, and that the courses taught in the education departments lacked academic respectability. At the same time, the liberal arts colleges claimed that they themselves were institutions best suited for preparing teachers as what teachers truly needed was a thorough grounding in subject matter, with few, if any courses in teaching methods (Cremin, 1953b, pp. 27-30). In this view they had a powerful ally in Robert Maynard Hutchins, then president of the University of Chicago.

Hutchins proclaimed strongly and widely that the best preparation for any postgraduate career was a firm foundation in the classical liberal arts disciplines, in effect, the Trivium and Quadrivium. In his book The Higher Learning in America (1936), Hutchins stated:

What shall the curriculum be? A course of study consisting of the greatest books of the Western world and the arts of reading, writing, thinking, and speaking, together with mathematics, the best exemplars of the processes of human reason. If our hope has been to frame a curriculum which educes the elements of our common human nature, this program should realize our hope. If we wish to prepare the young for intelligent action, this course of study should assist us; for they will have learned what has been done in the past, and how to think for themselves. If we wish to lay a basis for advanced study, that basis is provided. If we wish to secure true universities, we may look forward to them, because students and professors may acquire through this course of study a common stock of ideas and common methods of dealing with them. All the needs of general education in America seem to be satisfied by this curriculum. (Hutchins, 1936, p. 85).

Hutchins' fervor about what constituted an "educated man" was matched by that of the Thomistic philosopher, Mortimer Adler. Together they drew up a program of readings from the classics, along with instructions for leading discussions, that could be used as the basis for either a college curriculum or for the the nonformal education of those who had been unable to attend college. The Encyclopedia Brittanica began publishing this program in 1942 as the Great Books series.

Concurrent with the rising battle between the liberal arts colleges and the teacher training schools was the growth of the certification and accreditation movement. This movement began in the 1920s when the infant American Association for Colleges of Teacher Education (AACTE) joined with the National Education Association (NEA) to establish standards for certification of elementary and secondary school teachers. These organizations began to pressure liberal arts colleges to include appropriate education courses in their curricula. Since the liberal arts colleges provided more than half the teachers for the public schools, their interest in retaining those students dictated acquiescence to the certification organizations. By the time World War II ended and the shortage of qualified teachers was everywhere manifest, the liberal arts colleges were having to respond increasingly to accrediting organizations, all the while sorely questioning their legitimacy and

academic respectability. The hostility between the liberal arts colleges and the teacher training institutions broke into open warfare in the 1950s, fueled by conflicting claims about the appropriate aims and content of schooling as well as about the appropriate means of preparing the teachers themselves (Cremin, 1953b, pp. 30-32).

During the 1950s numerous remedies were brought to bear on problems of teacher preparation. These included attention to certification requirements and professional standards, accreditation of teacher education institutions, selective admission to teacher education programs, inclusion of liberal arts/general education in teacher education programs, and various types of fifth-year and Masters of Arts in Teaching (MAT) programs. The principal source of funds for programmatic experiments in teacher education was the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education. One of the principal architects of the Fund was liberal arts advocate Robert Maynard Hutchins.

The Ford Foundation Influence

In the closing years of the 1940s, Henry Ford II directed a small group of men to formulate a plan for distributing the millions of dollars held in trust by the Ford Foundation, a philanthropic agency established in 1936 by Henry Ford I to avoid excessive income and estate taxes, but only made fully functional after Ford's death in 1947

("Ford," 1950, pp. 80-81). Heading the group was San Francisco attorney, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., who not only had served as wartime assistant director of M.I.T.'s radiation lab but also was instrumental in setting up the Rand Corporation for the U.S. Air Force ("The Men," 1951, p. 116). To carry out Ford's charge, Gaither's research staff spent nearly a year interviewing over 1000 persons throughout the United States about issues of greatest concern. The final staff report, issued in 1949, specified five areas in which the Ford Foundation would concentrate its philanthropic efforts: the establishment of peace, the strengthening of democracy, the strengthening of the economy, education in a democratic society, and individual behavior and human relations (Gaither, 1949, pp. 14-15).

To head the Foundation, Henry Ford II and the trustees selected Paul Hoffman, a former president of the Studebaker Corporation and then head of the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration. Hoffman in turn recruited his former professor, Robert M. Hutchins, then chancellor of the University of Chicago, as co-director. Hoffman and Hutchins established their headquarters in Palm Springs, California (immediately dubbed by media jokers as "Itching Palms" and the Fund itself as "a vast body of money surrounded by people who want some" ("Philanthropoid," 1957, pp.60; 62). The Foundation staff began setting up satellite funds focused on the five areas outlined in the 1949 policy

document. To serve the education area, Hutchins established two agencies: the Fund for the Advancement of Education, headed by Clarence Faust, from 1941 to 1947 dean of the humanities college at the University of Chicago under Hutchins' chancellorship, and the Fund for Adult Education, headed by C. Scott Fletcher, formerly of the Encyclopedia Britannica which published Hutchins' and Adler's Great Books program, itself an endeavor to infuse classical liberal arts into the popular culture. The Great Books program became a cornerstone of the Fund for Adult Education's efforts ("Philanthropoid," 1957, p. 65).

The original planning document's call for attention to "education in a democratic society" comprised several objectives, including "clarification of the goals of education and for a review of educational practices throughout the country" and "improving the quality and ensuring an adequate supply of teachers in pre-school, elementary and secondary school education, and in colleges, universities, and centers of adult education" (Gaither, 1949, pp. 79-80). In his first annual report to the Fund's board of directors, Faust described the difficulties of selecting among myriad worthwhile projects saying, "To have met all requests received during the first year of the Fund's existence would have required more than \$300,000,000. The problem ... was not whether the Fund should be selective, but on what principles it should select." (Faust, 1952, p. 5). The Ford

Foundation had granted the Fund slightly more than sixteen and a half million dollars as its first year's operating capital which the directors and officers decided to allocate to the following problems:

- (1) clarification of educational philosophy;
- (2) clarification of the function of the various parts of the educational system and the improvement of the articulation of these parts;
- (3) improvement of the preparation of teachers at all levels of the educational system;
- (4) improvement of opportunities for education in the armed services of the country; and
- (5) development of financial support for educational institutions (Faust 1952, 9).

The directors considered the clarification of educational philosophy to be "the cornerstone" of the Fund's program and the presence of "a philosophic element" as "an important criterion in the selection of projects" (Faust, 1952, p. 12). Faust reported to the trustees the process used to determine the areas in which the Fund would concentrate. This process included discussions with the Fund for Adult Education to coordinate efforts of the two Funds, and also consultation with the American Association of Colleges in an attempt to redefine the role of liberal arts colleges in American education (Faust, 1952, p. 11).

The Fund granted \$300,000 to a group of ten to fifteen liberal arts colleges to conduct self-studies "which penetrate to the philosophical basis of institutional operations." It also made a grant of \$565,000 to the newly established Institute for Philosophical Research, directed by Mortimer J. Adler, to undertake "a dialectical examination of Western humanistic thought with a view to providing assistance in the clarification of basic philosophical and educational issues in the modern world" (Faust, 1952, p. 12).

A second area of concentration by the FAE was the improvement of teaching. In setting out the rationale for the projects selected for support, Faust expressed the directors' concern about the kind of preparation teachers had been receiving. Faust stated that the Fund would support fellowships for in-service teachers "to increase their competence and especially to broaden and deepen their liberal education" (Faust, 1952, p. 21). The Fund would also actively support preservice teacher preparation oriented towards liberal arts education. The rationale for this type of support was that:

Since the beginning of the century there has been a tendency in the preparation of public school teachers to increase the attention to professional education rather than to the substance of teaching. Furthermore, the American teacher has over

the past several generations lost position relatively as an educated member of his community (Faust, 1952, p. 21).

To meet this problem, the FAE joined in designing "a promising experiment" in which "future public school teachers would receive four years of undergraduate work in liberal or general education, followed by a year of carefully directed internship and experience" (Faust, 1952, p. 22). The Fund involved the entire Arkansas educational system in this "experiment" as well as supporting similar Masters of Arts in Teaching programs at Harvard, Cornell, and the University of Louisville, among others (Faust, 1952, p. 23). In evaluating these programs two years after their inception, Faust said that these efforts had engendered valuable rethinking about teacher preparation:

As evidence becomes available, it is quite clear that liberal arts college graduates trained in these experimental programs make excellent teachers. These experiments seem to justify the belief that liberal arts college graduates who have not taken courses in professional education to earn teachers' certificates constitute a large potential supply of competent additional teachers for our public schools if programs are wisely developed to recruit and train them for the teaching profession (Faust, 1954, p. 27).

Faust's assessment nowhere betrays the storm of controversy that surrounded the Arkansas experiment, the MAT programs, and similar efforts to reduce, if not eradicate, professional education courses in the preparation of teachers. What Faust conveyed was one side of the Great Debate, that a liberal arts education, preferably in a liberal arts college, combined with internship experience, sufficed as training for teaching. On the other side of the debate the teacher training institutions adamantly claimed that a prospective teacher needed to become immersed in the study of education as early as possible in the undergraduate program, and to relate general and liberal studies to the problems of education.

In an early assessment of the Ford Foundation's work, the editors of Time magazine wrote:

Under mild-mannered, capable Clarence Faust, the Fund for the Advancement of Education has made its most important contributions in two fields: the training and recruitment of teachers, and improving the intellectual lot of the gifted student. In 1951 it launched its famous statewide Arkansas Plan to attract more public school teachers by giving liberal-arts graduates one year of training and internship instead of the tedious mishmash of courses usually doled out by schools of education. ... the fifth-year idea has spread

to more than 25 other communities and universities ("Philanthropoid," 1957, p. 65).

The Time editors summarized Foundation programs that profoundly affected the whole of American education and contributed to the Great Debate that characterized discussion about education in the 1950s. The Great Debate contained many issues and some of these shifted and changed from year to year, but at the core were the questions: What should be the aims and content of schooling in a democratic society? and, How should those who are to teach in America's schools be educated?

In the course of arguing the Great Debate, those involved in education were forced to confront some fundamental problems in their assumptions and methods. In so doing, they bore out, ironically enough, the words of John Dewey, one of the chief "villains" cited by those who attacked schooling and "educationists" on a number of grounds:

Let us admit the case of the conservative: if we once start thinking no one can guarantee where we shall come out, except that many objects, ends and institutions are doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place (Dewey, 1938, p. 123).

What finally emerged at the end of the Great Debate was a highly regulated educational system marked by concern for accreditation requirements and "professionalization." In philosophy of education the kind of societal prescriptions enunciated by the "Deweyists" and so vigorously attacked as "communistic" had given way, by the end of the 1950s, to a cool rationalism that was finding expression in the orderliness of linguistic analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR
RESPONSE TO CRISIS FOR THE FIELD

In assaying the field of educational philosophy and its prospects at a PES meeting in 1966, Broudy looked back over its recent history and recalled that attacks on educationists had been continuous since the early 1950s. Although the critics changed, "the game remained the same," but Conant's book, The Education of American Teachers (1963), carried a political influence beyond that held by earlier critics (Broudy, 1966, p. 1).

Broudy described the hearty reception of the Conant book by liberal arts professors and presidents of small liberal arts colleges "who now saw the possibility of relieving themselves of the cost of teaching those 'damned education courses' and construing the Conant recommendations as a mandate to train teachers as they saw fit" (Broudy, 1966, p. 1). The recommendations to which Broudy referred were a recapitulation of arguments made earlier by Bestor, Lynd, Hutchins, and other critics of teacher education programs. Of particular interest to PES was Conant's view that philosophy of education was possibly desirable only if done by philosophers, but even then not really necessary for the preparation of teachers. Broudy commented on the implications of this view for the security of philosophy of education in teacher preparation programs:

Coupled with the suggestion that certification of teachers be based on the approval of an institution's general worth and its program of practice teaching, Conant's remarks on philosophy of education seemed to portend the possible elimination of it from certification requirements. Also feared were a drop in the enrollment of graduate students in the field, a drop in demand for staff to teach it, possibly a drop in the membership of PES, decline in the publication of books and articles in philosophy of education, and the takeover of the field by the philosophy departments (Broudy, 1966, p. 1).

By the time of his survey, Broudy found that none of the feared effects had come to pass, but rather that philosophy of education was a strong, viable field with growing entrenchment in teacher education programs.

How did educational philosophers respond to the attacks on public schooling, to the teacher education reform movement and to the Ford Foundation's initiatives? As might be expected, individuals responded variously out of their own ideologies and predilections. As professional groups, however, they sought to refute the charges being made about subversion in the schools and in teacher training institutions. They argued for the appropriateness of professional curriculum for teachers and for the place of educational

philosophy in that curriculum. They examined closely and attempted to redefine the content and methods of educational philosophy. They struck alliances with the American Philosophical Association (APA) and the Associated Organizations of Teacher Education (AOTE), an umbrella organization of teacher training associations that was involved in establishing certification standards through the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE). They accommodated to the prevailing pressure for general education in teacher training curriculum by recasting educational philosophy as a liberal arts elective. They began to define the appropriate competencies for philosophers of education to include substantial background in general philosophy. They began to break away from or to reject outright the broad systems or "isms" approach to educational philosophy in favor of more particularistic inquiry about meanings of educational terms. In short, they adapted in diverse ways, including changing the definitional characteristics of their field in order to assure its survival.

This chapter describes some of the responses by educational philosophers to crisis for the field. These responses were concerned with the expression of philosophic views in the face of hostility to particular modes of social activism, the adequacy of disciplinary training for educational philosophers, and the drive to reform teacher

training by subsuming it in liberal arts-based disciplinary programs.

Response to Attacks on Schools and "Educationists"

In an article published in 1950, Albert Lynd scoured the "educational bureaucracy" led by an "infallible priesthood" of "superpedagogues" who were responsible for anti-intellectual "quackery in the public schools." These suspect persons were to be found in the worst of all possible academic worlds--teachers colleges. In contrast to liberal arts colleges, teachers colleges and schools of education were "intellectual bargain basements" dispensing "obvious piffle to teachers" (Lynd, 1950, p. 165). The worst of the "priesthood" were, in Lynd's view, philosophers of education, such as William Heard Kilpatrick of Columbia Teachers College (Lynd, 1950, pp. 212-254). Lynd's principal objection to the way teachers were being prepared by schools of education was threefold: first, such professional training was "free of the elements of traditional culture," second, professional courses that purported to have intellectual content, such as history and philosophy of education, were actually "eclectic mishmashes of myth and the professors' personal opinions," and, third, the dominant philosophy being promoted was "Dewey's progressivism" (Lynd, 1950, pp. 183-211). As we saw in the preceding chapter, the last

objection was also one of the aspects interpreted by the anti-communists as a form of "subversion" in the schools.

Attacks such as Lynd's and others who were even more radical put those in teachers colleges on the defensive. This defensiveness was deepened by the widening investigations of legislative committees. The attacks on the public schools soon became only one facet of professional concern for teacher educators whose own academic freedom was also at stake. In 1951, the NEA issued a policy entitled, "The Public School and the American Heritage," enunciating the Association's commitment to open learning and full participation in "constructive citizenship and democratic practices," concluding with the emphasized statement: "The educational profession stands firm in devotion to its main task--the development of free men." (National Education Association [NEA], 1951a, p. 137). The policy carried the approval of nine professional organizations, including the John Dewey Society, the American Textbook Publishers Institute, and the American Library Association--all of which also came under attack as promoting anti-American ideas. Textbooks began to be banned and even burned, as was the case in New York with Harold O. Rugg's Man and His Changing Society (Benne, 1987). Rugg, a philosopher of education at Teachers College, Columbia, was one of the "educationists" who suffered such excoriation from anti-communists that he was banned from speaking at Ohio State

University in 1953. Rugg's principal sin, besides progressivism, was his belief in socialism that the editors of Ohio newspapers chose to equate with communism (Good, 1960, pp. 223-227).

There were many who spoke out against the allegations of subversion being cast so indiscriminately. Among the objectors was Judge Learned Hand:

I believe that the community is already in the process of dissolution where each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy, where nonconformity with the accepted creed, political as well as religious, is a mark of disaffection; where denunciation, without specification or backing, takes the place of evidence, where orthodoxy chokes freedom of dissent; where faith in the eventual supremacy of reason has become so timid that we dare not enter our convictions in the open lists to win or lose (Hand quoted in Kandel, 1952a, p. 298).

Two years later the issue of preserving academic freedom in the face of congressional investigating committees was being hotly debated both within and outside academic settings. The Association of American Colleges passed a resolution supporting the investigations planned by the House Un-American Activities Committee saying, "any free and impartial inquiry would be welcomed and contribute to improving

public understanding of American higher education" (Kandel, 1953a, p. 60). Others resisted this intrusion, however. Philosopher Ralph Barton Perry objected to the idea of the investigations, calling them "Operation Inquisition" that "provide an opportunity for unscrupulous politicians to advance their selfish interests, to invade traditional liberties, and, under cover of immunity from libel, to defame those who offend them" (Perry, 1953, p. 72). On the question about whether a college or university ought to dismiss a teacher who refused to testify before such a committee, Perry stated:

No. The educational institution has its own grounds on which to determine the fitness of its faculty members for their jobs and should not surrender its own autonomy and responsibility. ... An institution which adopts refusal to testify before a government committee as the ground for dismissal excludes these broader considerations, and transfers the decision to the committee which can provide the ground of dismissal by placing the teacher in a dilemma in which he must either renounce his principles and constitutional rights, or disqualify himself for his job (Perry, 1953, p. 72).

In Perry's assessment the issues at stake were nothing less than the survival of a type of democracy in which both

individual liberty and a stable social order were protected. He concluded with a plea for safeguarding the canons of academic and personal freedom:

Let us not pillory those who are willing, for the sake of ideas, to stick their necks out, or go out on a limb. For what kind of a society would that be in which all necks were drawn in, and all limbs vacated? I submit that at least it would not be American (Perry, 1953, p. 76).

The Philosophy of Education Society had established a Committee on Freedom of Inquiry in 1951, and in 1953 this committee published a statement, "The Right to Intellectual Freedom," that echoed many of Perry's statements, warning that "A living danger to a free society exists whenever a particular interested group appropriates for itself the right to censure ideas, to determine what others may hear" (PES Committee on Freedom of Inquiry, 1953, p. 186). The Committee cited the long tradition of citizen debate about public policy and defended its necessity in the face of efforts to control dangerous ideas:

It thus becomes the duty of thoughtful citizens to protest the suppression of freedom of thought, inquiry, and communication wherever it may occur. In each instance, where the rights to hear and study and explore ideas are infringed, there is a present danger to our way of life and to the

freedom of each of us. These rights should be exercised, to be sure, in a thoughtful manner, with full regard for the obligations of personal sincerity and integrity and a commitment to the ways of a free society. Yet responsible inquiry and expression are best safeguarded and nourished when intellectual freedom is held so dear that we protect the right of individuals to express even the most unwelcome ideas (PES Committee on Freedom of Inquiry, 1953, p. 186).

The American Association of School Administrators took a somewhat different approach to meeting the attacks on the schools. In their 31st yearbook, American School Curriculum, the Association set forth ways that principals and superintendents could encourage citizen participation in the schools. The Association also described the way that pressure groups attempted to influence the schools through attacks:

It is characteristic of groups with a negative approach to separate themselves completely from the schools and to attack them, as it were, from afar off. Often the attacking group uses a name which suggests that its adherents actually are friendly toward public education even tho their whole program is designed to undermine faith in the public schools. There have been instances in

which selfish promoters have engaged in a form of racketeering by enlisting members 'to save' the schools from 'wicked forces' that threaten to influence these 'foundation stones of democracy' (AASA, 1953, p. 259).

In evaluating the effects of such attacks, the AASA saw both positive and negative values:

Altho the negative and underhanded attacks have not been widespread, they have, together with the genuine concerns of honest critics, stimulated educational forces to action and to self-evaluation. They have invited examination by competent and impartial agencies. There has been some evidence that classroom teachers have drawn away from discussions of controversial issues, have closed fields of knowledge to the learner, and have denied pupils experiences in dealing with questions they must face later in life (AASA, 1953, p. 260).

The attacks on schooling involved philosophy of education and philosophers of education in that all became "tarred with the brush" of "Deweyism" or progressivism. Teacher training institutions were likewise labeled. This indiscriminate labeling led some educational philosophers to attempt to show how their particular philosophy, e.g., essentialism, was not the same as progressivism and, in fact, supported

some of the espoused stands of the conservatives (Morris, 1954). Other chose a research route to refutation, attempting to show that pragmatism was not the only educational philosophy to be taught in teacher education programs (Freehill, 1953). Others attempted to refute some of the misrepresentations of pragmatism and of Dewey himself (Champlin, 1958).

Had the attacks on schooling been a singular problem for "educationists," these efforts might have succeeded, or the problem might simply have gone away. However, the general climate of anti-communism after World War II also led to a number of investigating committees in Congress, the most famous of which was the McCarthy-chaired House Un-American Activities Committee. When this committee's investigations were first launched, there was opposition in academia, but this became muted in time as colleagues gave names of colleagues to the Committee or the FBI as possible communists, fellow-travellers, or sympathizers (MacIver, 1955; Lazarsfeld and Thielens, 1958; Schrecker, 1986). The bases for such allegations were varied, sometimes those named actually were members of the American Communist Party, sometimes they simply held views with which the namers disagreed.

For educational philosophers, investigating methodological issues was a safer metier than advocating societal change through the schools, as the old-school pragmatists

had done. Furthermore, such methodological investigation could seem somewhat daring in the face of an established paradigm. As McClellan saw it:

What public act were we performing in and by shifting from a paradigm of pragmatism to analysis? With a large measure of deliberate self-consciousness, or so it seems to me in retrospect, we were trying to draw a line and defend it; the line was marked: Beyond this point, no more bullshit! Perhaps that isn't the most daring or politically significant stand ever taken by a self-conscious group of philosophers of education, but it was ours and we were proud of it at the time (McClellan, 1971, p. 59).

The change in attitude towards taking a public stance on volatile political issues is perhaps most saliently expressed in PES documents. In 1953, the Philosophy of Education Society published its statement on academic freedom that strongly proclaimed the right of all to free inquiry. The PES maintained its advocacy of academic freedom throughout the decade of the 1950s, including a spirited defense of one of its members in 1956-57, Obed Williamson, but in time its proclamations were less and less public, and less and less strong. At the 1961 annual meeting the Society passed a resolution to support the AAUP statement on academic freedom and tenure, but a motion to "go on record

as opposing violations of academic freedom as exemplified in the case of Leo Koch of the University of Illinois" was eventually referred to the Committee on Academic Freedom (PES, 1961, pp. 186-187). This committee reported back the following year on its investigations and recommended that the Society take no action in the particular matter, and that the Society adopt a study role in academic freedom cases. The committee stated,

It is doubtful if any members of the Society really want it to mimic the role of the AAUP in academic freedom cases. PES can certainly not play that sort of role, with no full time staff, virtually no funds, and committee members apt to be a thousand or more miles apart. Even less would the membership of the society wish to have the society commit itself to hasty actions, apart from the careful inquiry and deliberation which such matters call for (Ballinger, 1962, p. 221).

After about 1960, Society members also consistently rejected resolutions supporting direct social action. Raywid recalled that, at one point, there was considerable discussion about whether the Society should be more activist, finally resolving to maintain itself as a scholarly organization (Raywid, 1987, p. 7). To some degree it is a matter of speculation whether the atmosphere of the 1950s truly led to a cooling out of social activist propensities on the part of

educational philosophers. Yet each person interviewed who had been active during that period, when asked about the effect of McCarthyism, responded first with silence, then with an acknowledgement that "Yes, you had to be careful about what you said and who you said it to."

Issues of Professional Adequacy

In 1953, the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association approved a resolution supporting courses in philosophy as appropriate electives for public school teachers and requested that "state departments of education ... be requested to bring this resolution to the attention of those who formulate requirements for teaching credentials, and that to this end copies of this resolution be sent both to state departments of education and to heads of teacher-training institutions" (APA, 1954, pp. 102-103). Through this resolution a division of the American Philosophical Association, the principal professional association for general philosophy, entered into the debate about the appropriate preparation of school teachers. The APA made no overt recommendation about the kinds of institutions in which the teachers were to be trained; nonetheless, this statement by the APA marked the beginning of a period of sustained interest by the Association in matters relating to philosophy and philosophy of education in the preparation of teachers. This interest culminated in a 1959 report issued

jointly by APA and PES, "Philosophy in the Education of Teachers."

The APA's interest in this topic in the early 1950s coincided with a decline in enrollments in general philosophy courses, and with a measure of crisis concerning the adequacy of some graduate programs in general philosophy. The APA officers expressed profound relief that the topic was opened up by philosophers of education, such as R. Bruce Raup, who had similar concerns about educational philosophy and who sought assistance from APA (Brubacher, 1964, p. 41). One immediate result was the constitution of a special committee on Teacher Training and Recruitment in 1953. A second result was the presentation of an APA symposium on philosophy of education in 1955 at which Price and Broudy delivered the papers (discussed in earlier chapters) that generated the Harvard Educational Review debate about content and method in educational philosophy.

The APA Committee on Teacher Training and Recruitment was established to make recommendations about "maintenance of standards in philosophical teaching and the recruitment of teachers of philosophy" (Morgan, 1955, p. 55). In 1956 this committee became the special committee on Philosophy in Education, constituted to carry out inquiries in four areas: criteria for constituting a department of philosophy; the teaching of philosophy in secondary schools; philosophy in the education of teachers; and the education of teachers of

philosophy, the graduate school. Although part of the charge of the APA committee, the document on philosophy in the education of teachers was drafted primarily by members of the Philosophy of Education Society's Committee on Cooperation with the American Philosophical Association, incorporating information drawn from the APA member surveys (Hendel, 1959, pp. 78-79).

To carry out its inquiries the APA committee requested a grant of \$5000 from the Fund for the Advancement of Education. The Fund authorities were reluctant to make the grant, expressing doubt that anything more would come of the enterprise than some discussion of problems. After assurance from APA's president that the committee intended to be influential in the respective areas of the inquiries, the Fund's director, Alvin Eurich granted the funds stating, "We are pleased to have your assurance that you will do everything in your power to make sure that the study will be effective" (Eurich, 1956, p. 81). The committee resolved to publish the subcommittee's reports and distribute them widely as part of its assurance to the FAE that its work would be effective. In accepting the report of the committee, chairman of the APA Board of Directors, Charner Perry, commented on the work to be done in each of the areas of inquiry. Concerning philosophy in the education of teachers, Perry remarked, "There seems to be much more interest than I had suspected among people in education in examining

philosophical problems relating to education and also the desirability of increasing or improving the philosophical component in teacher training" (Perry, 1959, p. 82).

The joint report, "Philosophy in the Education of Teachers," covered four topics: the importance of philosophy in teacher education; the importance of philosophy of education as a specialized study; the question of how to teach philosophy in teacher-education; and the qualifications for the teacher of philosophy of education. In arguing for the importance of philosophy in teacher education, the committee began by deploring the bifurcation between liberal arts and teacher preparation:

The assumption underlying our approach to the present problem is that teachers should have as liberal an education as possible, certainly as liberal as that required for any other profession. ... We regret and repudiate the opposition which many historical factors have produced within the American educational system between liberal arts education and teacher preparation. We regret that teacher preparation has so often been thought of and treated as a sort of trade-school training, that it has, pejoratively, been sharply distinguished from 'genuine' education which is to be found only in liberal arts programs. We insist, however, against those who disparage it, that

there is also an essential body of professional knowledge relating to practice and skills within the profession of teaching (Perry, 1959, p. 139).

The committee then argued for an acceptance of philosophy in teacher education programs as part of liberal education:

Philosophy should contribute here whatever it does in any good liberal arts program. ... [W]e venture to affirm that in teacher-education programs the generally liberalizing and maturing role of philosophy must be involved in greater measure than heretofore. ... Consequently, if the teacher will inevitably need to reflect upon the nature and meaning of the process of education, taken in its relational totality, and to make and carry out professional decisions and programs in the light of that reflection, the necessity for at least a minimal philosophical experience seems quite clear (Perry, 1959, p. 140).

The committee was not arguing for the inclusion of general philosophy in teacher education programs, however. The next section of the report--a mere two sentences long--asserts the necessity of philosophy of education in teacher preparation programs:

Philosophers of education do not agree on any formula as to the precise nature of `philosophy of

education'--and it is not our task to resolve these theoretical differences--yet, it can be said, in general, that all philosophical reflection whatsoever upon the purposes of education, upon the process, and upon the issues and problems arising in matters concerning curriculum, method, and administration, belongs to the 'philosophy of education.' Such fundamental reflection on the whole of education is essential and must be included in all teacher-education programs (Perry, 1959, p. 141).

The committee then countered some prevalent arguments about how philosophy was to be included in teacher education programs:

Now it is customary to suggest two different ways in which the philosophy of education may be taught... First, it is thought that, since philosophical considerations are pervasive and touch every part of the curriculum, philosophy should be taught within and through courses in other specific subjects, no special course in 'philosophy of education' being necessary. ... But this view assumes in the first place that neither philosophy nor philosophy of education requires special competence and specific training. Anyone, it is supposed, can teach philosophy ...

So regarded philosophy is a sort of academic cracker-barrel wisdom, acquired by activity and talk and not a serious intellectual discipline with its own approach and methods and substantive content. ...

There is moreover a practical difficulty. Everyone's responsibility often turns out to be no one's (Perry, 1959, p. 142).

The remedy, as far as the committee was concerned, was to have philosophy of education included in teacher education programs as separate courses of study, preferably serving both a liberal arts and a professional function. The committee argued, "It should be noted that this sort of integration through functionally bivalent courses will help solve the problem of dividing off and limiting the professional courses in educational requirements. Specification of courses for certification should allow for courses which meet two needs simultaneously" (Perry, 1959, p. 143).

Turning to the problem of qualifications and philosophical competence for teachers of philosophy of education, the committee concluded that such teachers should have "a doctorate-level competence in philosophy," earned either through a major in philosophy, "or with a major in philosophy of education from a recognized department of philosophy or of philosophy of education" (Perry, 1959, p. 143). The committee further argued that, just as an aesthetician

required a knowledge of art or a philosopher of jurisprudence a knowledge of law, "an adequate philosophical treatment of education requires a specialized knowledge of the facts and the nature of educational history, institutions, procedures and practices (Perry, 1959, p. 143).

The full committee report received widespread dissemination to those interested in the respective topic areas. The Philosophy of Education Society distributed the report on philosophy in teacher education to heads of teacher training institutions as well as to influential persons in other professional and accrediting organizations (Henle, 1960). If there were immediate and direct action taken on the report by those who received it, this information is not readily available in the literature. What is evident, however, is that philosophy of education, far from being cast out of teacher preparation programs, became an integral part of them.

Philosophers of education themselves appeared to be keenly aware of the rising eminence of their field after a turbulent period of criticism. The minutes from the 1961 meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society show several instances of increased political action designed to persuade those both within and outside education of the importance of philosophy of education. For example, an approved motion urged AOTE "to use its facilities to get the appropriate action from the USOE [U.S. Office of Education] to broaden

the present conception of research so as to include research of historical, philosophical and critical methods and subject matters" (PES, 1961, p. 185). Another approved motion urged AOTE to study the status of philosophy of education in teacher training institutions and in state requirements for certification (PES, 1961, p. 185). That year PES also established a committee on professional standards. The following year some members of PES attempted to have the Society urge that accrediting organizations insist that anyone teaching philosophy of education "possess the equivalent of advanced degree preparation in philosophy and in education." Although this motion failed, the Society's secretary was instructed to send the joint report of the APA and PES to accrediting bodies and administrators in teacher education institutions (PES, 1962, p. 257). The Society also voted to establish a committee "to explore the prospects, opportunities, and possibilities of utilizing a philosopher of education in the U.S. Office of Education and the possibility of a pilot conference to be sponsored by the U.S. Office of Education on the place and influence of philosophy in education" (PES, 1962, p. 257).

By this time the committee on APA-PES cooperation had languished for lack of activity, its membership noted in the minutes as "to be chosen" (PES, 1962, p. 261). The shared needs that had bound APA and PES in the 1950s had so dissipated by 1966 that APA required a formal application

before considering placing a special section on philosophy of education on its program (PES, 1966, p. 303).

Although the proposal to have a philosopher of education in the U.S. Office of Education apparently did not meet with success, the USOE did grant to PES member Harry Broudy funds for a project "to identify and organize the major topics and literatures in the philosophical foundations of education" in order to "stabilize the content of the field at the topic level" (PES, 1964, pp. 167-168). A report on the project's inception also noted that "similar content-analysis projects are being contemplated by representatives of the historical foundations of education, educational psychology, and social foundations of education" (PES, 1964, p. 168). The Broudy project, published in 1967 as Philosophy of Education: An Organization of Topics and Selected Sources, included logic, semantics and language as one of the key source areas for philosophical materials and methods. The "isms" around which Broudy had written his controversial 1955 paper had become absorbed, in the 1967 book, by the broader topics of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics or value theory, while the analytical or linguistic approach was accorded its own category (Broudy, 1967, pp. 18-22).

The PES committee on professional standards established in 1961, finally issued a statement in 1980 setting out the educational qualifications for teachers of philosophy of

education courses (PES, 1980). The standards matched, in many places nearly word for word, those set out in the joint APA-PES document of 1959.

Teacher Education Reform

Although the joint APA-PES document dealt with matters involving philosophy of education in teacher education programs, educational philosophers also responded in other ways to attempts to eliminate their courses. One way was to ensure that the courses became part of teachers' certification requirements. A second way was to recast the courses as fitting into conceptions of liberal arts and general education. A third way was to align educational philosophy more closely with the methods of general philosophy. Each of these strategies proved successful, but the road to success in each case was perilous.

In 1946 the National Education Association established the National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards (NCTEPS) to develop a program for improving standards in teacher recruitment, preparation, certification, and in-service training (National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards [NCTEPS], 1956). Six years later NCTEPS joined with four other national groups (American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education, National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification, National Council of

Chief State School Officers, and the National School Boards Association) to create a voluntary agency designed to improve preparation of teachers in universities and colleges (Kandel, 1953b, p. 12). This National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) soon became the leading agency for accrediting teacher education, taking over a function that had been performed by AACTE (Wynne, 1955, p. 49). The establishment and transfer of accrediting authority to NCATE was part of a growing movement to unify accreditation standards at the national level. By the end of 1956, NCATE had achieved full accrediting authority (Stinnett, 1956, p. 380).

NCATE lost no time in carrying out its duties, including distributing a working statement on curriculum for teacher education. This document contained a number of assumptions, including this: "Teachers will continue to be prepared by a variety of types of colleges and universities," and a set of major beliefs, including these: "Some curriculum patterns are more promising of desirable results than are others," and, "Teachers should have specific preparation for their professional responsibilities" (Armstrong, 1957, pp. 231; 232; 238). Elaborations of these statements showed NCATE's support of continued diversity in teacher training institutions, thus sidestepping the controversy over liberal arts versus teachers colleges, but also accommodation to public acclaim of fifth year programs.

The "more promising" curriculum patterns, for example, are those in which professional specialization is delayed until the junior year of college or even until the graduate year. Similarly, the statement supporting "specific preparation for professional responsibilities" expressed the view that a "general or liberal education is an important part of his preparation ... [and] should not differ materially from that provided for all well-educated persons in our society" (Armstrong, 1957, p. 238) from which the prospective teacher derives general understandings whose implications are provided by professional preparation. This preparation, however, should only be that which enables the beginning teacher to function adequately on the first day of school: an understanding of children, knowledge of instructional materials and methods, and an understanding of faculty functions and responsibilities (Armstrong, 1957, p. 239). Specifically downgraded in this pre-professional curriculum is philosophy of education:

Such a curriculum will include philosophy of education, but not as a separate subject. ... Philosophy and history of education can be made more significant as subjects for systematic study only after the teacher has had enough experience to handle the elemental problems in teaching. Once having mastered these, the teacher is ready to ask why certain things are taught, what bearing they

have on our society, and how our schools happen to take the form that they now have (Armstrong, 1957, p. 240).

Although the NCATE statement was a discussion document and not the official position of the agency, it caused alarm among educational philosophers. A member of PES had earlier urged the Society to contribute more effectively to setting accreditation standards saying, "The Philosophy of Education Society as a national professional organization is interested in the problem of accreditation and certification and is morally obligated to make a special contribution to the development of whatever standards are used by the Council in its evaluation and accreditation of teacher-education programs" (Wynne, 1955, p. 52). After the NCATE document was published the Society constituted a special committee to investigate the NCATE position on philosophy of education and Society officers sent an official letter of protest to W. Earl Armstrong, director of NCATE (PES, 1958, p. 123). The Society joined with other professional associations to form the Association of Organizations in Teacher Education (AOTE) whose purpose was to pool resources and coordinate efforts to take a more active role in determining policies affecting teacher education (PES, 1958, p. 123; 1962, p.123). PES also sent members to the annual NCTEPS conferences to lobby for inclusion of philosophy of education as part of certification requirements (PES, 1965, p. 123). The

net result of these efforts was a softening of the NCATE position such that PES members passed a resolution supporting asking that AOTE "encourage widespread dissemination and understanding of the program of NCATE, with the clear understanding that the PES does not necessarily endorse any of the recommendations of NCATE" (PES, 1961, p. 184). As Broudy reported to the members of PES, by 1964, certification requirements in 21 states specified philosophy of education as part of pre-service teacher education programs, in contrast to 16 states in 1961 (Broudy, 1966, p. 9).

Gaining inclusion in certification requirements must be seen against the liberal arts/teachers colleges debate that was woven through the accreditation controversy. This debate, it will be recalled from the preceding chapter, arose in part because of the competition for students between liberal arts colleges and teacher training institutions, and in part because of the strong advocacy for undergraduate liberal arts programs by such powerful voices as Robert Maynard Hutchins and James Bryant Conant. With Hutchins able to promote his ideas through directed expenditures of the Ford Foundation, teacher education institutions found themselves confronted by both power and money. Some accommodated by accepting the fifth year program, underwritten as an experiment in Arkansas and as full-fledged programs elsewhere. The fifth year program meant that a student would complete a liberal arts degree, then take a

professional sequence that was primarily a teaching internship.

Educational philosopher I. L. Kandel criticized this program as a return to a mode discarded in the 19th century. Such a system, Kandel said, produced good craftsmen but not good educators. "To return to the apprenticeship type of training can only be interpreted as meaning that those responsible for it look upon teaching as a trade and not as a profession with its own body of knowledge" (Kandel, 1952b, p. 75). The AACTE also challenged the Arkansas experiment in a resolution at its 1952 meeting:

In the first place, its earmarks are those of almost irrevocable commitment to a pre-determined uniform pattern. No 'trial run' or pilot study in one or two institutions is contemplated; no comparative evaluation of products of the 'new' program with products of a concurrent program of any other character is proposed. ... However, a more serious matter appears in the record of the negotiations with the Fund for the Advancement of Education. This record indicates that a tax-exempt foundation controlling large sums of money is offering highly attractive financial support if a particular pattern of education is accepted--not tried out, as we have pointed out earlier, but put into operation (AACTE 1952, pp. 174-175).

As discussed earlier, one effect of the five year programs was to disenfranchise such courses as history and philosophy of education from the teacher education curriculum. Historian William Brickman was unwilling to allow teacher education programs to take over areas he saw as belonging to the academic side of the house. Of general education he said, "the best place for the prospective teacher to obtain this background is in the liberal-arts college or at least under scholars who have specialized in these disciplines. . . . Most persons are aware of the unfortunate circumstances that the standards in the academic work in teachers colleges are not comparable as a rule with those prevailing in liberal-arts colleges" (Brickman, 1956, p. 249). Nevertheless, Brickman criticized the emphasis on internship in the fifth year programs, "In their zeal to offer a highly practical program, many leaders in teacher education have sacrificed the theoretical foundations upon the altar of extreme functionalism. What they have overlooked is the demonstrable fact that a thorough grounding in theory furnishes the good educator with a firm, reliable basis for practice and for experimental work" (Brickman, 1956, p. 246).

Brickman's opinion about the lower quality of work in teachers colleges echoed that long expressed by many in liberal arts colleges. In 1952 the Council on Cooperation in Teacher Education devoted its entire meeting to a discussion

of "Agreements and Conflicts in Teacher Education" with a view to resolving discord between liberal arts and education faculties (Hager, 1952, p. 310). Six years later the arguments were continuing, but there was the beginning of detente between the parties expressed through the Second Bowling Green NCTEPS Conference. At this conference representatives from both sides met to consider educational issues. As Loren Pope, education writer of The New York Times, described the meeting:

The meeting was the first time in half a century of feuding and epithets that the school teachers and teacher education officials had met on a grand scale with the liberal arts people for a common discussion of teacher education needs. ... It grew out of a desire of a few people on both sides of a divided education world to talk things out. ...

The professional societies in the sciences and the humanities agreed to be co-sponsors, and a hundred of the nation's leading universities sent representatives (Pope, 1958, p. E7).

T. M. Stinnett, conference director and head of NCTEPS, concluded that the conference was valuable, citing five areas of rapprochement: first, the constructive nature of the discussions with few participants holding doctrinaire positions; second, a sense that all were engaged in a common task requiring common effort; third, a sense that the

conference was conducted honestly and not manipulated by either of the groups; fourth, direct contact between college professors and elementary and secondary school teachers allowing the former to revise their stereotyped views of the latter; and last, a desire to continue working together to improve teacher education and state certification requirements (Stinnett, 1958, pp. 126-128). Two subsequent conferences attempted to build on the foundation established at the 1958 conference, with a fair measure of success, although one participant from the American Council of Learned Societies complained in a report to his sponsoring organization, "All efforts to get our group to discuss the possible assistance learned societies might furnish to certification were unsuccessful, and the matter was never really considered at all" (Sloane, 1960, p. 323).

In the end NCTEPS resolved in favor of fifth year programs, with a projection that six-year programs would soon be necessary. Its report, New Horizons for the Teaching Profession, advocated a teacher education program characterized by, among other things, a broad liberal education and an internship in addition to student teaching, with state licensure based on completion of an NCATE-accredited program (Lindsey, 1961, pp. 237-240), thus running contrary to the position of PES. When NCTEPS director T. M. Stinnett presented a paper on the New Horizons report to the Philosophy of Education Society, it was met critically by the

membership. Levit called attention to the "pressure group and power politics orientation" that underlay the report and stated:

The New Horizons Report and the 1960 NCATE Standards and Guides include few provisions for making philosophy of education other than a ritualistic expression of objectives which were largely ignored in the planning, teaching, accreditation and certification problems of the professionalization movement. Yet, it is usually granted that philosophy of education has, or should have, a pervasive set of roles in education. Whether the question be one of linguistic clarity or logical consistency, whether the interest is in the examination of alternative directing conceptions and their relation to practice, whether the problem is one of knowing the criteria of knowing, philosophy of education has, in various ways, a systemic function to perform (Levit, 1962, p. 243).

Yet despite these sharp criticisms, philosophers of education had already won through adopting a different mode of discourse. An assessment of some New Horizons projects sponsored by NCTEPS reported on "one of the most exciting and ... potentially revolutionary developments in teacher education," a research project on teachers' linguistic

behavior done by B. Othanel Smith, a philosopher of education at Illinois (Sharpe, 1961, pp. 486-87). Sharpe's report also lauded Ennis's course in "The Logic of Teaching" at Cornell and Henderson's course at Illinois in "The Principles of Secondary Education," both of which "emphasize the elementary theory of knowledge and the logical linguistic processes" (Sharpe, 1961, p. 487). Sharpe elaborated his view of the importance of analysis in teacher education:

For the past twenty-five years we have tended to ignore that part of the teacher's job which has to do with logical processes. ...

It seems to me that this analysis of teaching has revolutionary implications for those of us engaged in teacher education. It provides a framework around which to structure a truly professional educational program. It suggests the basic content of this professional sequence. It identifies the basic skills which the practitioner must have if he is to qualify. ...

I am not suggesting that teachers need to have a major in formal logic. I am suggesting that they do need a better understanding of the fundamental role language plays in education and they need special skill in the logical use of language. I am suggesting that this is very legitimately the province of teacher educators and that there is a

professional use of language and logic that is peculiar to the teacher over and beyond that which other citizens need (Sharpe, 1961, p. 488).

Sharpe concluded his argument concerning the importance of analysis in practical application:

I am not suggesting that all the teacher needs is skill in formulating questions or a fluent flow of words. I am rather suggesting that the teacher needs competence in the logic of language as well as the mechanics, and this competence must be so thorough as to make him able to deal with the myriads of situations which will arise in the interplay of active minds.

In a real sense, then, our suggestion that teachers need special competence in the skills of thinking and the use of language has a much more fundamental significance than simply one of improving their methodology or skill (Sharpe, 1961, pp. 488-489).

The Fund for the Advancement of Education represented another change in attitude toward philosophy of education. In 1960 the Fund brought together a number of persons in Fund-supported projects to appraise the professional aspects of teacher education. The report issued by this group in 1962, in contrast to earlier Fund rejection of educational philosophy courses, gave an "essential" role to philosophy

of education and supported analytical philosophy as a preferred mode:

The recent emphasis in philosophy on logical analysis offers the student of education valuable techniques for framing his questions and answers in a logical and significant manner. To be able to distinguish between normative and factual elements in questions and between empirical and analytic answers, to recognize tautologies and contradictions, to understand the various uses of language, and to sustain logical and close reasoning is desirable in all intellectual inquiry, particularly so in a field as unorganized and value-ridden as the role of education in society. More significant than traditional logic for the question of education because it offers some help in the analysis of the concepts used, logical analysis should enable the teacher to avoid meaningless questions and to rid himself of excess verbal baggage (Walton, 1962, p. 25).

The report recommended D.J. O'Connor's, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, published in 1957, as an exemplary text for introducing prospective teachers to analysis and education. In outlining other ways that philosophy fit into teacher education curriculum, the report recommended study of "the ideas of the outstanding philoso-

phers who have dealt with the subject" such as Plato, Aristotle, Comenius, Pestalozzi, Dewey, and Adler (Walton, 1962, pp. 25; 27; 28). Even here, however, analytical philosophy was considered useful:

The specific contribution that traditional philosophy can make to the prospective teacher as he studies the role of organized education will derive largely from what outstanding philosophers have said about the problem; and, since traditional philosophy does not always include methods for the careful analysis of its content, the application of logical analysis is necessary (Walton, 1962, p. 27).

In a paper entitled "How Respectable Has Our Discipline Become?," John S. Brubacher, editor of both the 1942 and the 1955 NSSE Yearbooks on Philosophy of Education, noted that some institutions were already beginning to act on the joint APA-PES report by enacting standards and making joint appointments in philosophy and philosophy of education, thus both underscoring the interdisciplinary nature of educational philosophy and affirming its respectability (Brubacher, 1964, pp. 35; 36). He chided the younger educational philosophers, however, for affecting respectability by mimicking academic philosophy, saying "recently we have had numerous variations on the theme of linguistic analysis, some of them so abstract and removed from education as to

suggest a new medievalism of hair splitting logic," but then pleaded his own inadequate training as "perhaps preventing me from appreciating the educational significance of these logical discourses" (Brubacher, 1964, p. 40). Brubacher was not alone among the members of PES to feel uneasy with the turn to analysis, yet it was also clear that philosophy of education had changed, had become respectable enough to be accepted by some, though not all, former critics. The paradigm had shifted and the new world of all who would profess to be educational philosophers had become incommensurable with the old.

CHAPTER FIVE

ARGUMENT

This study began with two questions: Was there a linguistic turn in philosophy of education? If so, what could account for such a turn? Chapter two presented the evidence to suggest that there was a turn to methodological considerations, characterized variously as "analytic philosophy," "philosophical analysis," or "linguistic analysis." This chapter analyzes some factors, presented in chapters three and four, thought to contribute to that turn.

Professional concerns of those within the academy about the disciplinary training of educational philosophers appears to have coalesced with concerns expressed in the public sector about the appropriateness of pragmatism as the undergirding of public education. Together, they promoted an intensive self-examination among philosophers of education that eventually led to an attempt at closer identification with academic philosophy, expressed in the linguistic turn. Thus it is argued that although the linguistic turn actually occurred in the 1960s, the engendering conditions arose during the early to mid-1950s. These conditions include professional concerns on the part of those within the discipline, public dissatisfaction with the philosophical base of education, public and private concern about teacher education, and the presence of financial resources to

support teacher education programs with a liberal arts, discipline-based orientation. This argument, then, rests on a supposition that there is an interaction between societal context and the internal dynamics of academia that is essential to interpreting changes within academia, and that such context is particularly salient for the social sciences and the professions.

Argument

Workers in the social sciences and the professions first must necessarily define their phenomena and problems in relation to social context and, second, must interact with those outside their technical fields in the course of solving their problems. There is a presumed right among the clientele to criticize how its needs are being met and its problems perceived by those who attend to it. Therefore, when the clientele of a field is universal, as it is for education (unlike law and medicine, for example, that can legally restrict their clientele to paying customers), the potential for difficulties between professionals and their clientele is as vast as the clientele itself. When the clientele coalesces in its perceptions about certain inadequacies in the attending social science or profession, crisis for that field results.

There can be little question that the clientele of education is society. From the earliest public commitment to

schooling in America, the so-called "Old Deluder Act" of 1647 in colonial Massachusetts, the community has been integral to the establishment, continuation, and general conduct of the schools. Those in colleges of education take as their responsibility first, preparation of personnel to serve in the schools, second, empirical study of the schools, and third, prescription for improving the schools (Fenstermacher, 1986). Accomplishing all of these responsibilities requires either tacit or expressed consent of the community. The community may defer to the judgment of those whose technical knowledge surpasses it, but the community reserves the right to criticize and even renounce the expert's judgment. The response by the technical expert to such criticism or renunciation can be acceptance, accommodation, or persuasion.

Philosophy of education has been embedded from its beginnings as an academic field in translating the interplay between philosophical prescription and societal norms and values. Thus the controversy that engulfed educational philosophy following World War II was directly related to this interaction. The post-War attacks on public schooling differed from both earlier and later criticisms in that educational philosophy per se was one of the principal targets. Similarly the teacher education reform movement of this period differed from those preceding and subsequent to it in that philosophy of education was singled out repea-

tedly as an example of redundant, wasteful, and academically non-respectable curriculum. A corollary contention was that philosophy of education, even if desirable in principle as part of teacher training, ought to be taken as part of the undergraduate liberal arts coursework rather than as a professional course. When the Ford Foundation undertook to restructure teacher education through massive funding of programs that supported some of the contentions of the critics, philosophy of education as an academic field found itself under full, well-funded attack--in short, in a state of crisis.

The post-War attacks on public schooling had as one of their prime targets the dominant educational philosophy of the time, Deweyan experimentalism. That the attackers misunderstood and misrepresented this philosophy is immaterial for this study. What is material is the fact that educational philosophy, educational philosophers, and "educationists" generally were pilloried in the popular press as "subversive" and as exercising undue control over the schools. Had the attacks been mounted by only a few obviously vitriolic critics, they might have been turned back by reasoned persuasion. But such critics were joined by others, like Bestor, arguing against schools and professors of education on professional grounds, essentially asserting the supererogatory nature of education schools and advocating the primacy of liberal arts as the necessary, and even

only, background for teaching. The critics thus brought to a flashpoint the long-smouldering hostility between liberal arts colleges and education schools. Within this hostility lay the contention that those teaching in education schools, and the courses they taught, were less rigorous and less academically respectable than those on the academic side of the house.

Educational philosophers responded to these external pressures, first, by attempting to refute the attackers' charges (e.g., Champlin, 1958; Hand and Sanford, 1953); second, by attempting to define educational philosophy as an autonomous discipline necessary to the education of teachers (Broudy, 1955; Price, 1955); third, by accommodating to political realities by lobbying for incorporation of educational philosophy into certification requirements (PES, 1958) and by recasting philosophy of education as a liberal arts elective (Greene, 1959); fourth, by attempting to establish among external authorities the legitimacy of philosophy of education in its own right (Benne, 1963; Broudy, 1967).

Within academia, some educational philosophers had already begun to look for ways to upgrade the qualifications and competencies of those teaching educational philosophy (Benne, 1987). This effort assumed paramount importance in meeting critics both within and outside the academy. Second, many in the generation of graduate students undertaking

their studies during the 1950s were interested in the "new philosophizing" of linguistic analysis and attempted to promote this in their studies. Their engagement was partly intellectual but also partly a rejection of older philosophers' "preaching" (Greene, 1986; Kneller, 1986; McClellan, 1971; Raywid, 1987; Soltis, 1975; 1986). Third, circumstantial evidence from study of professional publications leads to the inference that incursions on academic freedom during the McCarthy era dampened educational philosophers' willingness to propose major social change through the schools, in contrast to earlier educational philosophers' advocacy in the 1930s, 1940s, and even early 1950s. Even those who did not abandon the "isms" turned to "cooler" modes of discourse, becoming less prescriptive and more analytical.

Among the many critics of education were several who had power and influence to carry out their views on the education of teachers. Perhaps chief among these was Robert M. Hutchins who had made The College at Chicago into a classical liberal arts institution during his tenure as president and then chancellor of the University of Chicago. When he was made a director of the Ford Foundation responsible for drawing up blueprints for the restructuring of education, he had the optimum conditions for carrying out his vision: a school system beset by material difficulties, a public call for reform of teacher education, and millions of Foundation dollars dedicated to social amelioration.

Although the Fund for the Advancement of Education was headed by Faust, who had been dean of The College under Hutchins, it was Hutchins' plan that was enacted.

The FAE-funded Arkansas experiment, begun in 1951 and ended in 1956, was an attempt to overhaul an entire state's mode of preparing teachers. It served as a pattern for other FAE projects carried out simultaneously, chief among these being the Master of Arts in Teaching programs. Harvard had begun such a program in 1936, but it languished until fed by FAE funds. Cornell, Temple, and a host of other prominent institutions began their fifth year programs under the aegis of the Ford Foundation. The primary structure of these programs was a four-year liberal arts degree combined with a fifth year internship in the schools. Under this design, the few professional courses included were concentrated on methods of teaching specific content. Courses such as philosophy of education were considered superfluous, their content subsumed by parts of the undergraduate liberal arts curriculum.

Added to the powerful influence of the Ford Foundation on teacher education was the accreditation movement that both legitimated the more responsible criticisms against teacher training institutions by threatening to withhold accreditation from schools that failed to respond to reform, and threatened philosophy of education by agreeing with its rejection from teacher education curricula (Armstrong,

1957). Under this multi-fronted attack, those in philosophy of education had little choice but to make their field more acceptable to those in the academy who could certify the field to those outside the academy. This required forging an alliance with general philosophers through the joint committee work of the Philosophy of Education Society and the American Philosophical Association, rejecting "cracker-barrel philosophizing" as the discourse of even the most rigorous of the "isms" adherents came to be called, and adopting general philosophy's dominant mode of discourse, linguistic analysis.

This response to crisis is confirmed, although out of a different interpretation, by Jonas Soltis. In a paper presented at a PES conference in 1974, Soltis explained the linguistic turn in the following way:

A broader and more inclusive view of the development of philosophy of education during the 1960s would have to recognize the attempt of most of our membership, regardless of their persuasion or age, to make philosophy of education more philosophical in the academic sense. In one important sense, the 'position' or 'school' or 'tradition' that one came from or stood on didn't matter as much as the rigor with which one philosophized. Respect for philosophically sound argument reached beyond the base of alignment with existential, phenomenologi-

cal, pragmatic, analytic or any other 'philosophy' as long as it was philosophy and recognizable as such by people rigorously trained in the philosophic tradition. Another line was being drawn: no amateurs allowed! (Soltis, 1975, pp. 16-17).

This statement by Soltis is the insider's view, but as Polanyi points out, there are perceptual problems in seeing a problem up close, in that the broader context is lost. It requires a shift in gaze to see the broader context, at which instant the immediacy of the inside view is lost (Polanyi, 1969, p.18). To accept the insider's view as the only explanation (not Soltis' argument, it must be acknowledged) means not only leaving out the broader context, but also supposing that the business of the field is unrelated to a broader context. This is clearly not the case for philosophy of education, if, indeed, it is for any field of inquiry.

In summary, then, the linguistic turn in educational philosophy can be seen as developing from a rich matrix of forces both within and outside the field. What is evident is that the linguistic turn was not only a new paradigm adopted by an enduring group of adherents, but it also became a standard for discourse in the field, whatever the content of the discourse might be. What this paradigm did for those who professed to be philosophers of education was to provide them a banner reading, "No amateurs allowed."

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapter assumed the fact of the linguistic turn while considering some of the factors that contributed to it. This chapter takes up once more the initial question about the actuality of the turn and its consequences for philosophy of education as an academic field. Here the argument is made that those within the field saw adoption of analytic methods as a way of legitimating the discipline to those both within and outside the academy, and that certification of philosophical preparation would be deemed a requisite for all who aspired to teach educational philosophy. Further, although the turn to analysis helped secure philosophy of education during this earlier crisis period, the field today may be paying a high price for its consequent distance from practitioners in education.

The Linguistic Turn in Philosophy of Education

In chapter two we saw that there is some disagreement about whether the linguistic turn did in fact take place. Molina-Pineda (1984) argues that it did not because there continued to be articles in the professional journals concerning one or another of the "isms." Raywid confirms this argument to some extent in her interview comment, "I think that most philosophers of education led dual professional lives. They did analysis in their writing while

continuing to use the "isms" in their classes" (Raywid, 1987, p.6). Some senior educational philosophers who were schooled in the "isms" approach never gave it up, believing it to be a useful method for framing concepts about education (Greene, 1986, p.4; Villemain, 1986, p.5) Yet the brief historical surveys that have been done on the field, as well as the affirmation of those interviewed, point to the historical fact that philosophy of education took a turn toward analytical method, usually ordinary language analysis, sometime between the end of the 1950s and the mid-1960s, with the period ending around the mid-1970s. However, unlike the linguistic turn in general philosophy that eschewed consideration of metaphysics and ethics, the linguistic turn in educational philosophy remained rooted in the problems of education. For most educational philosophers language analysis became a tool rather than an end in itself, although some embraced this method for its own sake as a kind of "game" (Raywid, 1987, p.6).

It is clear that there was one mode of discourse that dominated the field from at least the early 1940s until at least sometime in the 1950s--the "isms" approach that was enunciated and elaborated in textbooks and professional papers throughout this period. Moreover, during this period there seemed not to be any strong challenge to this mode of discourse. Where alternatives were offered, they conformed to the structure of the discourse, such as Brameld's

"Reconstructionism" (1951) or Wegener's "Organicism," (1956) and used the categories and language of this approach. According to some who learned this approach during their graduate years, it still forms a viable model for teaching each new generation of teachers about educational philosophy.

Within a societal context, however, one of the "isms," pragmatism, was perceived by some critics to be a dangerous and subversive threat to Americanism. Had proponents of the other "isms" wished to do so, they might have taken advantage of this condition to advocate their own philosophical school as an appropriate replacement, but there are few examples of such promotional efforts. Rather, after about 1955, a doctrinal approach appears with decreasing frequency in the professional publications, and virtually disappears from publications for practitioners in education. Thus while the "isms" approach continued to have pedagogical utility, as a stance on which to risk professional options it may have become a liability.

Furthermore, in the professional literature, there was little in the way of elaborations on the various "isms" and their respective assumptions and presuppositions after about 1965. Thus the "isms" approach appears to have lost its hegemony as the central paradigm for the field sometime in the decade of the 1960s, but was it replaced by another, specifically by linguistic analysis?

The answer to this question is not clear. Analysis gained growing numbers of adherents from the mid-1950s until well into the 1970s and even many who retained allegiance to the "isms" approach tried to employ techniques of linguistic analysis in explicating their chosen philosophies. As to the question of problems to be resolved, Carton (1979) points out that the methodology itself of analytical philosophy offered a variety of problems in addition to the substantive problems to which the analytical methods were addressed.

Was the field of educational philosophy restructured to conform to the demands of analytical philosophy? Here the evidence blurs. Villemain recalls that for a time analysis was considered to be the only appropriate method of philosophy (Villemain, 1986), yet the professional literature of the period is filled with articles that ignore analytic method, as well as many that attack analysis as sterile and unenlightening for the educational practitioner. On the other hand, the use of analytical method set a standard for discourse in the professional literature. Gowin recalls that the editors of Studies in Philosophy and Education, a journal that flourished between 1960 and 1979, more often than not selected articles written by analysts because the conceptual and expository level of these were superior to other types of submissions (Gowin, 1986). A systematic review of three journals containing large numbers of philosophy of education articles, Educational Theory,

Harvard Educational Review, and Teachers College Record, revealed that more rigorous standards came into effect toward the end of the 1950s. There is a startling difference in analytical and expository quality between articles published in 1950 and those published in 1960. Whether this difference in a single decade is owing principally to the influence of analytical philosophy remains problematic, but it is suggestive at least of a change in editors' expectations.

Another consideration was the move by some within the field to strengthen the qualifications of teachers of educational philosophy. Against the criticisms of teacher education schools and programs, this consideration took on a large importance and in a certain sense became pivotal to the continued existence of educational philosophy in teacher education curricula for it was the efforts toward achieving academic legitimacy that enabled educational philosophers to persuade accrediting organizations and even the Ford Foundation to eventually support philosophy of education in teacher education.

Restriction of discourse to colleagues in the field became evident during the period from the mid-1950s onward. Prior to this time almost anyone with an interest in educational philosophy could read the professional literature in the field (with the possible exception of Dewey's writings which many consider opaque even for technically

trained persons). As the decade of the 1950s progressed and educational philosophers increasingly occupied themselves with definitions of their discipline, the lay reader was left behind. By 1970 there were few articles in or about educational philosophy even in the publications addressed to the educational practitioner, whether teacher or administrator. As Butts remarked, "I think the field turned away from its primary constituency and became focused on its own internal concerns" (Butts, 1986, p.3).

Did analytical philosophy become requisite in programs training educational philosophers? The evidence to support an affirmative answer to this question is more implicit than explicit. Although there was continual discussion in the field about minimum competencies and qualifications for doctorates in educational philosophy, the standards proposed in the joint American Philosophical Association-Philosophy of Education Society document published in 1959 were only formally adopted by PES twenty-one years later. Both sets of guidelines call for obtaining a degree in either philosophy or philosophy of education from a recognized department, but neither specifies the exact content of the curriculum to be followed.

The way the two documents deal with the problem of defining philosophy of education, however, does shed some light on the way the field was perceived. The 1959 document states an unwillingness to resolve theoretical differences

about the nature of philosophy of education and opts for a general statement: "All philosophical reflection whatsoever upon the purposes of education, upon the process, and upon the issues and problems concerning curriculum, method, and administration, belongs to the 'philosophy of education'" (APA-PES, 1959, p. 141). By contrast, the formulators of the 1980 guidelines stepped firmly where the writers of the early document feared to tread:

Philosophical studies provide essential skills and concepts that cannot be treated quintessentially in behavioral, historical and pedagogical components of teacher education programs. Philosophy of education focuses on the principles, criteria and methods of achieving clarity and consistency in judgments, of detecting and evaluating basic assumptions, and of critically evaluating the soundness of arguments. In this critical dimension, philosophy of education is not merely an expression or development of personal opinions; it is an application of technical principles of philosophy for analyzing and evaluating meanings, premises, reasoning and arguments (PES, 1980, p. 265).

Furthermore, the tone of the 1980 statement would appear to reject as "personal opinion" the kind of "all philosophical reflection whatsoever" on educational problems that the

earlier writers considered acceptable philosophizing. In addition the 1980 statement is wholly methodological in its orientation; differing types of analysis, not just linguistic analysis, form the core of the field's enterprise.

The paragraph in the 1980 document following the one quoted above, does expand the definition of the field, however:

Philosophy of education is an activity that confronts the most basic and general conceptions used in (1) arguing about underlying causes of social and educational phenomena, as well as other questions dealing with the nature of reality, (2) analyzing contending purposes and standards for education, as well as other ethical questions, and (3) evaluating the basic principles and criteria we employ or assume when we make claims to the truthfulness of what we say. Philosophical studies may also have an integrative or synthesizing dimension, providing for the comprehensive collation and evaluation of theories, from a variety of disciplines, on general and basic questions regarding education as a fundamental cultural enterprise (PES, 1980, p. 265).

Although this portion of the 1980 statement expands the province of educational philosophy beyond just analysis, it still regards philosophy of education as an activity

involving "arguing," "analyzing," and "evaluating," in contrast to the "isms" approach that construed philosophy of education as a set of broad beliefs from which educational implications could be derived.

Finally, it is necessary to consider the interest among graduate students in analytical methods imported from general philosophy. In conjunction with the move toward higher qualifications for educational philosophers, competence in the methods of general philosophy came to be considered a hallmark of competence in educational philosophy as well. Concomitantly, there was a growing disinterest among educational philosophers to publicly proclaim their particular "ism" as a prescriptive ground for social change through the schools. Turning to method permitted educational philosophers to continue working on problems of education, but without the same degree of danger to their professional lives that doctrinal advocacy would have entailed.

Whether the narrower conception with its emphasis on method became the accepted paradigm for graduate students in educational philosophy remains problematic. Three philosophers of education whose graduate studies were done in the 1960s and 1970s recall their programs as replete with analysis, but all three took almost all of their coursework in the department of philosophy, as had been recommended by the 1959 guidelines (Carton, 1984; Fenstermacher, 1987, p.9; Podeschi, 1987, p.1).

On the whole, then, there is some basis for concluding that there was a fundamental shift in the field of educational philosophy. In an oft-quoted statement about the turn to analytical philosophy, McClellan explained the stance of those engaged in the new mode, "... in retrospect, we were trying to draw a line and defend it: the line was marked: Beyond this point no more bullshit!" (McClellan, 1971, 59). For many in the analytical camp, there was a certitude that their methods represented the transformation of educational philosophy from a field with dubious claims to legitimacy into a discipline with academic respectability.

Consequences of the Linguistic Turn for Philosophy of Education as an Academic Field

Who benefited by the linguistic turn in educational philosophy? Who paid in consequence of this shift? When I undertook this study my goal was to gain a better understanding of my chosen field, a field whose future in the curriculum of education colleges is less than secure. Now as I step back from the immediate focus of this study and view the field nearly twenty years after the linguistic turn, it seems to me that some answers to the cost/benefit questions are quite clear. For others, speculation must suffice until additional studies prove or disprove these hypotheses.

Those who benefited immediately (circa 1960-1965) were all teachers of educational philosophy whose courses were retained in teacher education programs. The various legiti-

mating and professionalizing measures undertaken by educational philosophers, together with an increased flow of federal financial resources into higher education during the 1960s and early 1970s, assured educational philosophy a place in the curriculum. Analytical philosophy contributed a disciplinary cast to educational philosophy which attracted graduate students and also permitted those who had been graduate students in the 1950s and had become faculty members in the 1960s to mold their departments along disciplinary lines. By 1975, Teachers College at Columbia University, where philosophy of education had become a distinct field of study in the 1920s and where the foundations of education came into being in the 1930s, had discarded the foundations of education approach (i.e., philosophy, history, anthropology and sociology of education as units of a single Foundations course) in favor of a disciplinary division of courses (Soltis, 1975, p. 17).

In the view of an educational historian who watched this change at Teachers College, the disciplinary approach worked as long as there were few economic constraints. With the decline in available resources after about 1978, however, questions began to arise about the advisability of carrying curriculum redundant of that offered "across the street" at Columbia University itself (McClintock, 1986, p.3). Thus in the longer term, one of the very reasons for its success in turning back earlier critics--increased

academic respectability--began to work against the field in the late 1970s.

As with other social science disciplines whose tragedy lay in attending to "the imperatives of the profession ... in maintaining professional community," rather than remaining focused on their primary subject (Slaughter, 1986, p. 220), the turn to analysis caused cognitive dissonance for some among the new generation of educational philosophers. They were schooled in technical philosophy at a time when society began focusing on large-scale normative concerns, such as the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the Vietnam War. One such graduate student, now a faculty member in his middle years, recalled his disaffection with his technical studies and his lack of preparedness for considering larger issues:

Things were happening outside, in the streets, that nothing in my studies related to. It was the same with a lot of other white, middle-class men in foundations and philosophy of education. We got jobs alright, but we didn't publish much because writing little articles for journals that only a few people would read just didn't seem sufficient when the whole world was coming apart around us. ... During the counterculture movement there was a lot of questioning about just what we were doing sitting in our offices

when we should be out on the street. ... I remember that at the Midwest Philosophy [of Education Society] conferences, we went back and forth between academic and socio-action papers depending on who was program chair (Podeschi, 1987, pp. 3; 4).

Even some who made an early commitment to analytical philosophy now look back with a sense of loss. In a recent extended "letter" to his colleagues, James McClellan, who had earlier explained the agenda of the linguistic turn as "Beyond this point, no more bullshit!," pleads for a revival of Progressivism embedded in Marxist rejection of capitalism, a social stance reminiscent of educational philosophers of the 1930s. McClellan recalls the changes in the field from his days as a graduate student in the early 1950s:

Let us speak now of those members of our Society who entered philosophy of education soon after World War II. We came into this field as one comes into a great fortune, heirs of victors. We are now about to leave the field, God help us, as the vanquished. Great dreams and hopes entrusted to our care have disintegrated. Progressive Education has gone (almost) underground, the public school movement itself is (almost) disbanded. When we began our study of this discipline, we could take it for granted that schools, even

those suffering ultra-Progressive ("Auntie Mame") excesses, would continue to become more humane, rational, democratic institutions. As we leave the practice of this branch of philosophy, schools have become an active front in our nation's escalating war against its own children. And we lack the power and will to defend them" (McClellan, 1987, p. 121).

McClellan writes of the political and economic rationality behind decisions to abandon the Progressivist cause:

The defection of our generation from the Progressivism we inherited to the analytic mode we learned from the professors we most admired in the philosophy department coincided with and, I speak here only of myself, is in part explained by the triumph of McCarthyism. Even the purely educational goals of the Progressives, as we all then recognized, did we not? lead politically in the direction of socialism. To pursue the 'social implication' of Progressivism in practice would lead one into channels incompatible with success in an academic career at that time (Or at this, except for those both lucky and especially talented). Had Henry Wallace won the election of 1948, philosophy of education (among other things)

would have taken a different turn (McClellan, 1987, p. 121).

McClellan then recalls an incident from his graduate student days in which the danger of subscribing to radical theories combined with intellectual pretense to permit discarding an older tradition of educational philosophy:

Marxism was not only dangerous politically, its Hegelian metaphysical foundations were intellectually repugnant to those of us trained in the schools of logical empiricism, nourished on Isaiah Berlin's Karl Marx and Karl Popper's The Open Society & Its Enemies. Picture the scene: a cold winter evening on the steps outside Gregory Hall, c. 1952. Our seminar, three professors and a dozen graduate students, had just completed a discussion of the Marxist theory of historical change. A student poses a final question to Professor Harry Broudy. 'Given all the criticisms, however, is there not a fundamental truth in the Marxist analysis?' Recall the unmistakable voice. 'If so, it is a truth whose time has come and gone. [Pause] And may yet come again. [Longer pause] But it is not now. Good evening.'

We had a perfect excuse to abandon the formulae, arguments, slogans of our immediate predecessors: their language was clearly defective

judged by the standards of scientific probity we learned from the English and Viennese. But did we abandon also the struggle for humane values embodied in those discarded linguistic artifacts? Did we not believe that we were but bending with the wind, confident that when the time came, we would step forward to re-enlist in the Progressive struggle to make childhood and youth a period of 'growth leading to more growth' for every American youngster? If that time has not come now, will it ever? (McClellan, 1987, p. 122).

If that time has not come now, will it ever?

As noted in chapter one, the history of philosophy of education as an academic field parallels the histories of other disciplines in their turn from social concerns to securing their place in the academic establishment. Nonetheless, philosophy of education as the normative framework for the normative enterprise of education would seem to have a particular obligation to remain close to its public. It would be easy, therefore, to judge harshly the educational philosophers who chose the safety of methodology over commitment to social amelioration through education. Yet a phrase from Merle Borrowman reminds me that, to understand the era of which McClellan writes, one must have lived through the ugliness of witchhunts "at a time when there

really [were] witches" (Borrowman, 1956, p. 186). To have been a Progressive during the 1950s, or even to have espoused any philosophical "ism" except "Americanism" was to risk all--job, colleagues, and sometimes life itself, as Kenneth Benne recalled in telling me of the politically-motivated suicide of a Harvard professor (Benne 1987, 11).

It would be equally easy to dismiss as self-serving economic rationalism the efforts of educational philosophers to assure a place for their courses--and therefore, their jobs--in the teacher education programs through political alliances and lobbying. Or to see their attempts to gain respect and legitimacy from their colleagues in the academic side of their institutions as a search for status and prestige. Yet they did succeed, for a time, in both areas. Philosophy of education courses still exist in colleges of education because of strong defensive efforts made thirty years ago. And some few professors of educational philosophy continue to also hold joint appointments in philosophy departments, heirs to old alliances.

Nonetheless, philosophy of education as an academic field today is in trouble, but unlike the struggles of thirty and more years ago, there is no clear threat from outside. Like Walt Kelly's Pogo, "We have seen the enemy, and he is us." In adopting a technical mode of discourse, even if the discourse continued to be about the problems of schooling, philosophers of education began to talk only to

each other and not to the clientele they had earlier served. Once it was usual to see articles by educational philosophers about educational philosophy in the school practitioners' publications. Now that is a rare occurrence. In his interview, Jonas Soltis said that he and Kenneth Strike recently responded to a request for an article for Instructor magazine, a publication reaching about 200,000 elementary school teachers. Soltis commented, "We felt it would be very important to show that there's a philosophical dimension to teaching" (Soltis, 1986, p. 8). Thirty-five years ago it would have been no surprise to elementary school teachers, or to the parents of their pupils, that there was a philosophical dimension to teaching.

Today the whole of education is beset by a reform movement whose tonalities resonate with the sounds of the reform period of the 1950s, but there are some curious differences. In the earlier period, philosophy of education was central to the debate about the aims and content of education. Today philosophy of education has not only lost its centrality to the debate, it has become invisible. Those who speak and write about such matters in a way accessible to the public view come from the federal government, from the statehouses, from the information media, and some few, like Hirsch (1986) and Bloom (1987) from other social science departments in universities. Where once nearly any literate American knew the names of Dewey, Kilpatrick and

Rugg, even if pejoratively, today's prominent educational philosophers are prominent only to each other and to a few persons in related professional associations. Where once philosophers of education joined with others fighting outside, moneyed forces to safeguard their concepts of appropriate teacher education programs, today the elites in the educational establishment, such as the Holmes Group, have themselves proposed the kind of programs promoted by the earlier outside reformers, such as the Ford Foundation.

I think that the question can be fairly asked, If educational philosophy is invisible to practitioners in the field--at all levels of education--will it be long before it is completely invisible? Even now in many departments there is an elision taking place between educational philosophy and "policy studies" as if the two were one and the same. Surely this cannot be what Dewey had in mind when he said, "The philosophy of education is not a poor relation of general philosophy ... it is ultimately the most significant phase of philosophy" (Dewey, 1938, p. 470).

Most of those I interviewed said that if philosophy of education is to survive as an academic discipline, it must regain its normative dimension. Reflecting on the linguistic turn in educational philosophy, Fenstermacher said:

Philosophers of education ruined themselves by going into their toolboxes for the things they wanted to fix and build, and they built things out

of their tools. ... People in the straight academic disciplines build things from their toolboxes--there is a lovely connection between the critical concepts in a [disciplinary] field and the methodology for analyzing and attacking and building on concepts. Whereas in a professional field, we have a different obligation. There has to be an ameliorative component, an improving component, a change in practice for the good (Fenstermacher, 1987, p. 8).

When I asked, "Why does there have to be that?" he replied:

Without the notion of advancement and amelioration, I don't understand the concept of education. If it were practiced somewhere else, besides a school or college of education, I don't deny that philosophy of education could have the same kind of disciplinary cast as philosophy of science, or philosophy of religion, or philosophy of law, and have an incidental obligation for amelioration and improvement. But so long as it's in the college of education, its location helps shape its obligation. ... My bias favors the tool users, the ones who look to the world of education and take philosophical tools, normative, analytic, ethical, and apply them to educational problems and situations (Fenstermacher, 1987, p. 8).

It remains to be seen whether those in the "world of education" still care about the philosopher's tools and what they can build. It remains to be seen whether there are any educational philosophers left who are capable of renewing an interest in philosophy such that it again becomes central to public debates about the aims and content of education. John Dewey has been dead nearly forty years. Those who had some personal acquaintance with him are few in number and rapidly disappearing from the scene. It is not to them that we can look for help. It is only to ourselves. If the time has not yet come, will it ever?

APPENDIX A
PUBLICATIONS

The following publications served as archival resources for information concerning the factors analyzed in the study. Letters in brackets following the publication refer to the factors: I = concerns internal to the academy; F = financial resources, e.g., the Ford Foundation; S = societal factors, e. g., Great Debate, Mc Carthyism; T = teacher education reform.

- AAUP Bulletin/Academe, vols. 16-51 (1930-65) [S; T]
- Administrator's Notebook, vols 1-25 (1952-57) [F; T]
- American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education
Yearbook, (1947-1978) [F; S; T]
- American Association of School Administration Yearbooks,
(1945-1960) [S; T]
- American Philosophical Association Proceedings and Addresses, vols. 18-36 (1944-1963) [I; F; S; T]
- American School Board Journal, vols. 7-34 (1945-1960) [S; T]
- American Scholar, vols. 15-34 (1945-1965) [S; T]
- Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development
Yearbook, (1945-1972 selected) [S; T]
- Association of American Colleges Bulletin/Liberal Education,
vols. 36-56 (1950-1970) [F; S; T]
- Atlantic Monthly, vols. 175-216 (1945-1965) [I; S; T]
- Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Reports,
vols. 41-65 (1945-1970) [F; S; T]
- Christian Science Monitor Magazine, (1945-1950) [S]
- Clearinghouse, vols. 7-34 (1932/33-1960) [S; T]

- Commonweal, vols. 42-83 (1945-1965) [S]
- Publications, continued
- Current Issues in Higher Education, (1948-1965) [F; S]
- Education Digest, vols. 2-26 (1936-1961) [I; F; S; T]
- Educational Administration and Supervision, vols. 36-44
(1950-1958) [S; F; T]
- Educational Forum, vols. 4-30 (1939-1966) [I; S; T]
- Educational Record, vols. 14-41 (1933-1960) [I; S; T]
- Educational Theory, vols. 1-37 (1951-1987) [I; S; T]
- Elementary School Journal, vols. 45-60 (1945-1960) [S; T]
- Fund for the Advancement of Education Annual Reports, (1951-1964) [I; F; T]
- Harper's, vols. 191-231 (1945-1965) [S]
- Harvard Educational Review, vols. 16-30 (1946-1960) [I; S; T]
- High School Journal, vols. 29-45 (1945-1962) [S; T]
- Higher Education, vols. 1-20 (1945-1964) [I; F]
- History of Education Quarterly, vols. 1-10 (1960-1970) [I; F; S; T]
- Journal of General Education, vols. 1-13 (1946-1962) [I; T]
- Journal of Higher Education, vols. 17-36 (1946-1965) [I; F; S; T]
- Journal of Teacher Education, vols. 1-21 (1950-1970) [I; F; S; T]
- Journal of the National Education Association, vols. 35-50
(1946-1961) [F; S; T]
- Life, vols. 19-59 (1945-1965) [I; F; S; T]
- Nation, The, vols. 160-201 (1945-1965) [F; S; T]
- National Association of Secondary School Principals Bulletin, vols. 30-44 (1946-1960) [I; F; S; T]

- National Catholic Educational Association Bulletin and Proceedings, vols. 55-65 (1958-1969) [I; S; T]
Publications, continued
- National Education Association Addresses and Proceedings, vols. 68-98 (1930-1960) [F; S; T]
- National Education Association Handbooks (1945-1960/61) [F; S; T]
- National Society for the Study of Education Yearbooks, (1942-1981) [I; T]
- National Society of College Teachers of Education Yearbook, (TEPS Conferences 1954-1965) [S; T]
- Negro Educational Review, vols. 1-11 (1950-1960) [F; S; T]
- New Republic, vols. 112-152 (1945-1965) [S]
- New York Times Magazine, (1950-1965) [F; S; T]
- Newsweek, vols. 25-66 (1945-1965) [F; S; T]
- North Central Association Quarterly, vols. 25-35 (1957-1965) [F; S; T]
- Phi Delta Kappan, vols. 13-51 (1930-1970) [I; F; S; T]
- Philosophy of Education Society Proceedings, vols. 1-28 (1958-1986) [I; F; S; T]
- Pi Lambda Theta Journal/Educational Horizons, vols. 24-44 (1945-1966) [S; T]
- Religious Education, vols. 4055 (1945-1960) [S; T]
- Review of Educational Research, vols. 16-40 (1946-1970) [I; F; S; T]
- Saturday Review Education Supplement (1956-1965) [I; F; S; T]
- School Life - official publication of the U. S. Department of Education, vols. 28-47 (1945-1964) [F; S; T]
- School Review, vols 53-73 (1945-1965) [S; T]
- Sociology of Education, vols. 31-38 ((1957-1965) [I; F; S; T]

Studies in Philosophy and Education, vols. 1-9 (1960-1979) [I; T]

Teachers College Record, vols. 47-62 (1945-1960)[I; F; S; T]
Publications, continued

Time, vols. 45-86 (1945-1965) [I; F; S; T]

U. S. Office of Education Bulletins, (1946-1960) [F; S; T]

Yearbook of Education, (1953-1965) [I; S; T]

APPENDIX B

PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DATA SOURCES

The following archival and oral history resources were used to obtain information regarding persons and institutions involved in philosophy of education. As in Appendix A, the letters in brackets signify the factors related to the respective resources: I = concerns internal to the academy; F = financial resources, e.g., the Ford Foundation; S = societal factors, e. g., Great Debate, Mc Carthyism; T = teacher education reform.

Resource: Biography*

Louise Antz (w)	[I]
George Axtelle (c; w)	[I]
Kenneth D. Benne (c; i)	[I; F; S; T]
Peter A. Bertocci (c; w)	[I]
Arthur Bestor (w)	[S; T]
Brand Blanshard (c; w)	[I]
Theodore Brameld (c; w)	[I; S; T]
Arthur Brown (i)	[I; T]
Harry S. Broudy (c; w)	[I; S; T]
Freeman R. Butts (i; w)	[I; F; S; T]
James Bryant Conant (b; w)	[T]
John R. Donahue, S.J. (i)	[I; T]
Clarence Faust (w)	[F; S; T]

*a-autobiography; b-biography; c-confessio fidei; d-diary; i-interview; m-memoir; o-obituary; w-Who's Who or the like

Personal and Institutional Data - Biography*, continued

James K. Feibleman (w)	[I]
Gary D Fenstermacher (i)	[I; F; T]
William K. Frankena (c; w)	[I]
H. Rowan Gaither (w)	[F; S; T]
D. Bob Gowin (i)	[I; F; S; T]
Mary Ellen Harmon (i)	[I; S; T]
Sidney Hook (c; w)	[I]
Maxine Greene (i)	[I; S; T]
Paul Hoffman (o; w)	[F; S]
Robert M. Hutchins (b; w)	[I; F; S; T]
Horace M. Kallen (w)	[I; S]
I.L. Kandel (w)	[I; F; S; T]
William Heard Kilpatrick (d; w)	[I; F; S; T]
George Kneller (i; w)	[I; S; T]
Arthur Papp (w)	[I]
Stephen C. Pepper (c; w)	[I]
Ron Podeschi (i)	[I; F; S; T]
Kingsley Price (c; w)	[I]
Mary Anne Raywid (i)	[I; S; T]
Israel Scheffler (c; w)	[I]
Jonas Soltis (i; w)	[I; S; T]
Robert Ulich (w)	[I]
Francis Villemain (i)	[I; S; T]

*a-autobiography; b-biography; c-confessio fidei; d-diary; i-interview; m-memoir; o-obituary; w-Who's Who or the like

Resource: Institutional History

Arizona State University	[S; T]
Harvard University	[I; F; S; T]
New York University	[I; F; S; T]
Ohio State University	[I; F; S; T]
Stanford University	[I; S; T]
Teachers College, Columbia	[I; F; S; T]
Temple University	[F; T]
University of Chicago	[I; F; S; T]
University of Illinois	[I; S; T]
University of Minnesota	[S; T]

APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The following questions served as a basis for exploratory interviews with persons familiar with the field of educational philosophy. The interviews were unstructured in that an interviewee's responses sometimes led further questions in a different direction than those stated below.

"I have searched out as much biographical information on you as is available from the usual published sources, but would appreciate having a copy of your vita for additional reference. I also have some general questions that may not be answered by your vita, such as, With whom did you study? What curriculum did you follow in both required and elective coursework? What were the unusual features of your doctoral program? What lead you to choose philosophy of education as your professional field?"

"Turning to the area of focus, the turn in philosophy of education from the large systematic "positional" approach to an emphasis on particularistic inquiry, my questions are necessarily more open and exploratory: What are your perceptions of the factors involved in this turn of the field? Who were the principal actors and what motivated them? Did interinstitutional rivalry play a role? Did external funding sources, such as the Ford Foundation, have an influence? By adopting the analytical techniques of

academic philosophy, were philosophers of education seeking respectability and legitimacy vis-a-vis academic philosophy? In your view, have the questions raised during that period largely been resolved or do they continue to be provocative? Where would you locate your own thinking during that period? Now? Where do you see the field going in the next ten or so years?"

PLEASE NOTE:

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