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Terror management theory and the effects of mortality salience, cultural affirmation, and cultural threat on the evaluation of individuals from similar and dissimilar cultures

Hasler, Joseph Francis, Ph.D.
The University of Arizona, 1990
TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY AND THE EFFECTS OF MORTALITY SALIENCE, CULTURAL AFFIRMATION, AND CULTURAL THREAT ON THE EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUALS FROM SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR CULTURES

by

Joseph Francis Hasler

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In the Graduate College
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GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read
the dissertation prepared by Joseph Francis Hasler
entitled TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY AND THE EFFECTS OF MORTALITY
SALIENCE, CULTURAL AFFIRMATION, AND CULTURAL THREAT ON
THE EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUALS FROM SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR
CULTURES

and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the
candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate
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ABSTRACT

This study investigated the tenets of "terror management theory," a theory based primarily upon the writings of Ernest Becker. According to Becker, cultural belief systems are designed to lessen the existential fear and anxiety which result from human beings' conscious awareness of their physical vulnerability and eventual death. If people obey the rules of their culture, they are promised protection from harm and immortality; they are therefore highly motivated to promote and affirm their particular world view. An opposing world view, on the other hand, is perceived as a threat and must be defended against, particularly when physical vulnerability and mortality are made salient. It was therefore hypothesized that a reminder of mortality would cause American subjects to be more attracted to a member of their own culture and less attracted to a person from the middle-east. Additionally, it was expected that bolstering the subjects' world view following a reminder of death would alleviate the aforementioned tendencies, while a direct cultural threat following mortality salience would exacerbate them.

Eighty-three American college students served as the subjects for this study. Prior to evaluating two target individuals (one U.S. citizen and one Lebanese citizen), one-half filled out a mortality attitudes survey; the other half did not. Following the mortality salience manipulation, one-third read an interview which highly praised the U.S. political system, one-third read an interview which harshly criticized it, and one-third read a neutral interview which was unrelated to politics. The targets were then evaluated through the Interpersonal Judgment Scale (IJS), a series of trait endorsements, and
a social distance scale.

Although none of the hypothesized effects emerged and there was no direct support for terror management theory, there were several subtle indicators of prejudice toward the Lebanese target. It was concluded that the validity of the findings was significantly affected by a high degree of suspicion on the part of the subjects, coupled with a general unwillingness to openly express prejudice; this made it difficult to accurately evaluate the plausibility of the theory.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

One of the most troublesome conditions of human life is the existence of diverse world views and value systems; from the beginning of history, people with different perceptions of reality have had difficulty getting along with one another. A few have looked upon the earth's cultural multiplicity and concluded that one world view is probably as valid as the next, but humanity in general has completely rejected the notion of cultural relativity. Instead, people tend to embrace a particular value system as being the only "true" one, and perceive systems other than their own as being false, and in some cases, evil.

Terror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1988) explains such tendencies by assuming that cultural world views are designed to assuage the fear and anxiety which result from the awareness of one's physical vulnerability and eventual death. By affirming and obeying prescribed cultural rules, members are assured of safety and immortality, and any threat to the validity of these rules (e.g. an opposing world view) is seen as a threat to this immortality. Thus, people are strongly motivated to promote their own conceptions of reality and defend against opposing conceptions, especially when vulnerability and mortality are made salient. The purpose of this study is to test some of the tenets of terror management theory by examining the effects of death salience, cultural affirmation, and cultural threat on the evaluation of those who are perceived to have similar or opposing world views.
Theoretical Basis for Terror Management Theory

Terror management theory is derived primarily from the work of Ernest Becker (1971, 1973, 1975), who attempted to provide an integrated overview of human behavior and motivation by bringing together similar insights from the various social sciences. Drawing heavily from disciplines such as psychology, sociology, philosophy, and religion, Becker proposed that most of the problems inherent to the human condition are the result of a unique existential paradox. On one hand, only human beings are capable of self-reflective and symbolic thought, which allows them to stand high above the rest of the creatures on this planet. As Becker explains:

Man has a symbolic identity that brings him sharply out of nature. He is a symbolic self, a creature with a name, a life history. He is a creator with a mind that soars out to speculate about atoms and infinity, who can place himself imaginatively at a point in space and contemplate bemusedly his own planet...this self-consciousness gives to man the status of a small god in nature...(Becker, 1973, p. 26).

On the other hand, unfortunately, this self-consciousness also allows humans to reflect on their own creaturiness; of all the beings on this planet, they alone are aware of the fact that they are temporal, physical entities which will eventually die. Furthermore, they are aware of the apparent randomness and ruthlessness of events in the world, which may result in a premature and unexpected death. This is quite a bind to be in. As Becker states, humans are half symbolic, half animal; their symbolic capabilities take them far beyond the realm of the physical and allow them to visualize concepts such as perfection and immortality, yet they can never escape their animal nature and the specter of their ultimate death.
The Striving for Immortality

According to Becker, one must understand this paradox to fully understand the driving forces behind human behavior. Given the awareness and anticipation of an ultimate, and possibly premature and senseless death, people would be absolutely terror-stricken and unable to function unless they could somehow devise a scheme to ensure their personal safety and secure a chance for immortality. It is the striving for safety and immortality, therefore, which primarily motivates human behavior, as Becker states that "everything man does in his symbolic world is an attempt to overcome his grotesque fate" (Becker, 1973, p. 27). If one is to truly understand human beings, one must understand that they are animals who, above all else, are obsessed with overcoming their animality and mortality.

The Need for Self-Esteem

Becker and terror management theory assume that human immortality schemes are based on the acquisition and maintenance of self-esteem. The urge toward self-esteem begins in infancy and childhood, long before the awareness of death becomes a conscious and understandable construct. The infant is a hopelessly dependent creature whose greatest anxiety is "object loss," as the loss of the protection and nurturance of the mother would result in nonexistence. However, the child quickly learns that this anxiety can be eliminated by obeying the wishes of the seemingly omnipotent parents; if it behaves properly, then all its wishes are magically granted. Being so well nurtured and protected by those who apparently control the world naturally promotes a feeling of primary importance and self-value in the child; no physical harm could
ever come to someone so important. As long as the child exhibits the behavior desired by the all-powerful parents, self-perpetuation is guaranteed. Thus, we have the foundation of the all important behavioral equation: proper behavior = self-esteem = anxiety-free action and self-perpetuation. Although the behavioral modes for maintaining self-esteem change as the child's consciousness develops, the striving for self-esteem must continue throughout life to ensure freedom from anxiety.

As mentioned above, the child is forced to change the way it acquires self-esteem for obvious reasons. As one becomes aware of one's own inevitable mortality, the mortality and limitations of one's parents, and the actual potential for unexpected physical annihilation, one realizes that mere parental approval can no longer ensure personal survival. As the developing child becomes aware of its creaturliness and vulnerability, it risks being overwhelmed by fear and anxiety unless it can somehow find a way to guarantee personal safety and perpetuation. This is no easy task, given the stark reality of an animal body and an inevitable physical demise. However, as discussed earlier, human beings are also symbolic creatures who are able to conceptualize a meaningful universe governed by permanent and immaterial forces; thus, they are able to shift the source of their self-esteem from the physical realm (parents) to the symbolic realm. In this way, the promise of personal safety and immortality can still be maintained despite the physical limitations of human beings and the potential terror of human existence.

Culture as the Vehicle for Self-Esteem

The symbolic vehicle used for the continuation of the striving for
self-esteem and immortality is the man-made system of beliefs and customs known as "culture." Although obviously diverse, all cultural world views serve to allay anxiety and promote self-esteem in a number of similar ways (Becker, 1971; Solomon et al., 1988). First of all, all cultures provide a scheme which attributes meaning, order, permanence, and stability to the universe. Furthermore, all cultures seem to have a sophisticated code of "proper" behavior (e.g. customs, roles, taboos) through which members can live good and meaningful lives.

Secondly, cultures attempt to minimize the fear associated with death by providing the promise of some kind of immortality. This can be either a religious/spiritual "life after death" immortality, or a cultural/symbolic type of immortality obtained through culturally sanctioned "immortality symbols" such as monuments or wealth. In either case, however, such immortality is available only to those who obey the cultural prescriptions for behavior. It is not enough to simply exist within a cultural framework; fear of death can only be minimized by the feeling that one is a valuable contributor to a meaningful universal scheme, and is thus worthy of being protected from annihilation by the powers that be.

Culture, therefore, allows the continuation of the anxiety-reducing formula learned in infancy: proper behavior = self-esteem = safety and immortality. As described above, self-esteem within the cultural context is the feeling of primary importance one obtains from making valued contributions to a meaningful universe; Becker refers to such meaningful contributions to one's culture as "heroism." Thus, the role of culture in human motivation cannot be underemphasized; it
provides a structure of belief and behavior which allows for the continuous achievement of heroism and self-esteem, which in turn allows terror-free functioning and the hope of immortality. Because of the important anxiety-assuaging and immortality-assuring functions it serves, Becker argues that culture is essentially sacred, and that religion and culture are synonymous.

Obviously, not all members of a society derive meaning and security from the dominant world view; each culture usually has within it a number of subcultures and countercultures. However, as long as a given value system has a code for heroic behavior, the urge toward self-esteem can be pursued, and anxiety can be controlled. In a more general sense, then, culture can be understood as the behavioral prescriptions which enable the attainment of self-esteem, recognizing that people will differ somewhat in their interpretations of heroism.

If one loses faith in a particular cultural hero system, there will be a strong and immediate urge to find another value system which restores a sense of equanimity and hope (e.g. conversion to a cult or a different religion), as Becker posits that a person will be unable to function effectively without a mechanism for heroism. Furthermore, he argues that mental illnesses such as depression and schizophrenia are in large part due to "failures in heroism," meaning that the individual is unable to derive self-esteem from the available cultural schemes, and is forced to resort to private heroic strivings which are maladaptive in nature (Becker, 1973). Simply stated, without culture, there would be no terror-free functioning.
Basic Assumptions of Terror Management Theory

Because culture is the vehicle through which the hope of immortality is maintained, one of the obvious assumptions of terror management theory is that people are highly motivated to uphold and promote their cultural belief system, especially if reminded of what they fear most - death. No matter how elaborate and convincing belief systems may be, none are able to completely protect against the fear of annihilation; human beings are constantly reminded of their own mortality by such day to day occurrences as war, murder, accidents, and illness. It stands to reason, therefore, that self-esteem requires constant bolstering through cultural means in order to ensure terror free action; affirmation of one's culture must be a continuous, lifelong process.

However, if cultural participation and affirmation were all that were necessary for the acquisition and maintenance of self-esteem, human interaction would be far more harmonious. This brings us to the second assumption of terror management theory; in addition to the need to uphold one's own cultural world view, there is also a strong need to defend against and derogate alternative world views. Different cultural orientations from one's own are simply not tolerable; the culture in which one lives is "right," and all other interpretations of reality are "wrong."

Why is this so? As Becker (1971) explains, it is due to the symbolic nature of culture. Because cultures are created by human beings, they are, by their very nature, fictional and relative. Thus, the mere existence of an alternative world view is a direct threat to
the validity of one's own, and is therefore a threat to one's vehicle for immortality. In essence, the existence of other cultures is just as threatening as the awareness of the possibility of senseless and random annihilation, because without the assurance of absolute cultural truth, one's life has no more meaning or guaranteed safety than any other animal. In other words, if it is possible that your culture is not the only "true" one, then it is also possible that you will die.

Furthermore, because of the "life threatening" nature of alternative world views, they are often perceived as "evil" and must therefore be neutralized in order to ensure safety and immortality (Becker, 1975). This can be accomplished in several ways (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Solomon et al., 1988). The most simple and common method is to derogate different cultures and dismiss their views as inaccurate; people will seek to associate with those who uphold their beliefs, and will react negatively toward and stay away from those who hold opposing beliefs. Another way to deal with an anxiety-producing alternative world view is through convincing those who are different to adopt your own perspective (e.g. missionary work). Conversely, it is also possible to reduce the threat of dissimilar others by incorporating portions of their world view into your own cultural scheme. By far the most extreme and frightening alternative, however, is the elimination of threatening world views through the physical destruction of those who hold such views.

Becker (1975) has addressed in detail the atrocities which human beings inflict upon one another in an effort to achieve immortality. Although a comprehensive discussion of his thoughts in this area is far
beyond the scope of this review, there are a few key points which are
directly relevant to the understanding of terror management theory,
particularly the phenomenon known as "scapegoating." As mentioned
earlier, no matter how successful a culture is at promoting self-esteem
and buffering anxiety, people will always remain on some level uneasy
due to an awareness of their animal nature and the uncontrollability of
life events. It becomes convenient, therefore, to project all of the
undesirable aspects of human existence onto a more tangible and
controllable source, i.e. a culture with an opposing world view. Thus,
we have the creation of "arch enemies" who are the agents of all evil in
the world, and without whom the world would be a perfect and safe place
(e.g. Hitler's attitude toward the Jews, Iran's attitude toward the
U.S.). Intercultural conflicts are better understood, therefore, as
clashes of immortality schemes rather than actual political or economic
disputes (Lifton, 1983; Solomon et al., 1988).

Becker goes on to point out that the attempted annihilation of
enemies is most likely to occur if a culture's belief system becomes
embattled or tenuous, as he notes that an immediate solution to internal
strife is to project the source of all problems onto an external enemy.
Wars therefore serve a dual purpose; in addition to being attempts to
rid the world of evil enemies, they also are effective ways to
strengthen and reunite weakened cultures. By making the Jews
responsible for all that threatened the Arayan race, Hitler was able to
culturally fortify a depressed Germany. Through mass murder of the
perceived enemy, he attempted to secure immortality for his own people.

While such wholesale destruction of human life appears on the
surface to be grossly aberrant behavior, Becker points out that the annihilation of the enemy has been employed throughout history as a method to affirm one's own immortality. The major difference between then and now is that historical man lacked the technology to match the killing power of his modern counterpart. As inhuman as it may seem, the physical elimination of another is the most powerful way to assert one's universal specialness and immortality; it provides a feeling of power over the forces of life and death, and is empirical proof that the gods favor "me" and not the enemy. Although such practice is admittedly the most extreme and least employed method of neutralizing the threat posed by an opposing world view, there is no better illustration of the strength of the drive toward immortality.

In summary, the process of human terror management is somewhat unsettling; self-esteem comes not only from the affirmation of those who are valued, but through the derogation (and sometimes the destruction) of those who are dissimilar. From this theoretical framework, the inability of disparate cultures to peacefully coexist is an easy problem to understand but a difficult one to solve, because as strange as it may seem, enemies are an integral part of the immortality schemes which fundamentally guide human behavior.

**General Empirical Support of Terror Management Theory**

Because terror management theory per se is a fairly recent formulation, only a few recent studies have directly investigated its assumptions (these will be discussed in a separate section). However, since terror management in general has always played a significant role in human behavior, there are findings from a variety of research areas
(e.g. death anxiety, self-esteem, interpersonal attraction) which support the validity of this theory.

**The Fear of Death as a Motivator of Behavior**

Despite the fact that the human capacity to anticipate death is a widely discussed topic in philosophical and religious literature, psychological researchers have demonstrated a notable lack of concern for investigating death's influence on human behavior (Alexander, Collery, & Alderstein, 1957). Why there has been so little research in this area is an interesting question; perhaps some of it is due to the fact that few people admit to being overly concerned with their own mortality when polled directly by questionnaire. Despite the overt denial of death anxiety among experimental subjects, however, more subtle assessments have suggested that the fear of death is indeed significant. Studies using word association tests have demonstrated that response latency and autonomic arousal (measured by GSR) are much greater for death related words than for neutral words, suggesting that reminders of mortality do in fact produce an increase in anxiety (Alexander et al., 1957; Alexander & Alderstein, 1958; Meissner, 1958).

More recent studies have also shown mortality salience to have a significant effect on behavior. Osarchuk & Tatz (1973) found that a presentation of slides and tapes of death related scenes to subjects with deep religious beliefs resulted in an increased affirmation of belief, supporting the idea that reminders of death increase the need to uphold one's values. A study by Paulhus and Levitt (1987) demonstrated that exposing subjects to death-related words significantly affected self-evaluation through the endorsement of trait adjectives; those
exposed to such words showed a much greater tendency to endorse positive
traits and deny negative ones, suggesting that the awareness of
mortality increases the need to bolster self-esteem.

The Need for Self-Esteem

Many authors and researchers have noted the strong and pervasive
need to acquire and maintain self-esteem, and the influence of this need
on human behavior (Allport, 1937; Bowerman, 1978; A. Freud, 1981;
Horney, 1937; James, 1890; Kaplan, 1982; Kohut, 1977; Rank, 1959;
Rochlin, 1965; Rogers, 1959; Solomon et al., 1988; Sullivan, 1953;
Tesser & Campbell, 1980). The research additionally suggests that self­
estem deficits are associated with a variety of psychological disorders
(see Wylie, 1979), especially chronic anxiety (French, 1968; Truax,
Schuldt & Wargo, 1968; Winkler & Myers, 1963). Furthermore, studies
have demonstrated that when self-esteem is threatened, people will
employ a variety of cognitive and/or behavioral shifts in order to
protect it (see Solomon et al., 1988).

Culture as the Vehicle for Self-Esteem

Much of the social psychological literature is supportive of terror
management theory's assumption that self-esteem is derived and
maintained through cultural means. Social comparison and consensual
validation are the main modes through which people evaluate themselves;
without a social basis for comparison, subjective evaluations tend to be
unstable (Festinger, 1954). Thus, a positive sense of self can only be
obtained through upholding the behavioral prescriptions of one's
reference group, and constant positive social feedback is necessary to
affirm the validity of one's beliefs. Research in areas such as
conformity, obedience, and social approval seeking has conclusively demonstrated the anxiety-buffering effect of being accepted by other members of one's culture (Asch, 1958; Gergen & Wishnov, 1965; Milgram, 1974).

Additionally, terror management theory assumes that any direct threat to the validity of one's culture is a threat to one's mechanism for self-esteem, and therefore needs to be defended against. Evidence for this assumption is found in a study by Batson (1975), who showed that those with strong Christian beliefs became even more committed to their faith when presented with plausible evidence that Jesus was not in fact the son of God.

Since culture is the vehicle through which self-esteem is obtained, the lack of a firm and tenable belief system should result in a significant degree of anxiety, and should motivate an individual to seek reduction of this anxiety through a more acceptable belief system. Ullman (1982) has noted that stress and anxiety seem to characterize the childhood and adolescence of religious converts, and that postconversion functioning is often characterized by a rigidity of beliefs not seen prior to the conversion. Furthermore, it has been shown that following religious conversions, people report an increased sense of purpose in life, and a greater sense of overall equanimity (Paloutzian, 1981).

Evaluations of Similar and Dissimilar Others

Much of the support for terror management theory comes from examining the factors directly related to the reduction of death anxiety, i.e. the positive reactions toward those who bolster our self-esteem through validation of our world view, and the negative reactions
toward those who threaten our self-esteem by holding opposing world views. Research in the areas of intergroup relations (see Tajfel, 1982) and interpersonal attraction (see Byrne, 1971) unequivocally demonstrates a human tendency to be attracted to those perceived as similar and reject those perceived as different; it seems fairly clear that individuals attempt to maintain self-esteem by positively evaluating and conforming to the social groups to which they identify, and distinguishing themselves from and discriminating against groups to which they do not belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975).

It has also been shown that the tendency to react negatively toward dissimilar others (i.e. members of different races or cultures) is primarily based on the perception that they hold different values and belief systems rather than on outward differences in appearance (Byrne & Wong, 1962; Moe, Nacoste, & Insko, 1981; Rokeach, Smith & Evans, 1960; Stein, Hardyck, & Smith, 1965; Taylor & Guimond, 1978); moreover, if subjects are led to believe that racially dissimilar individuals share their important values, evaluations become much more positive. Such findings generally support the notion that the threat to immortality posed by alternative world views is the underlying factor in human conflicts.

Furthermore, if terror management theory is correct, then any kind of direct threat to one's self-esteem or belief system should exacerbate the tendency to positively or negatively react to similar or dissimilar others. Support for this assumption can be found in several areas of research. For example, it has been shown that people react quite negatively to those who violate social norms and values (Miller &
Anderson, 1979; Schacter, 1951), and toward those who openly deviate from group opinion (Levine, 1979). Studies have also demonstrated that threats to self-esteem or personal safety result in heightened expressions of racial prejudice (Cowens, Landes, & Schaet, 1959; Feshback & Singer, 1957) and intensified attitudes toward outgroups (Katz & Glass, 1979). Interestingly, the Feshback & Singer (1957) study found that only threats of a personal nature (i.e. divorce, mental illness, personal injury) tended to increase prejudice; no such increases were observed when the threat was a "shared" one, such as a nuclear explosion. Again, this suggests that the more people feel they have in common, the less they will negatively evaluate one another.

More recent research has continued to support the aforementioned observations. Meindl & Lerner (1984) found that lowering the self-esteem of English-speaking Canadians resulted in more negative reactions toward Francophone Canadians and more positive reactions toward those of their own culture. A study by Cooper & Mackie (1983) threatened the political beliefs of Reagan supporters during the 1980 election by asking them to write arguments in support of Carter; this led to a much greater tendency afterward to derogate Carter supporters.

**Direct Empirical Validation of Terror Management Theory**

Several recent studies have been specifically designed to test the validity of terror management theory, and have produced supportive results. All are based on the general assumption that if the fear of death is the major factor behind the need for self-esteem and cultural affirmation, then making physical mortality salient should result in attempts to strengthen the cultural world view. Moreover, the
bolstering of self-esteem following exposure to death related stimuli should lessen an individual's experienced anxiety.

Mortality Salience and Self-Esteem

In a study designed to demonstrate the anxiety-assuaging properties of self-esteem (Greenberg, Rosenblatt, Burling, Lyon, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1986), subjects were exposed to an anxiety provoking videotape which included scenes from autopsies and an electrocution. Prior to viewing this videotape, subjects had been provided with personality feedback which was either highly positive or generally neutral. Consistent with the predictions of terror management theory, only those in the neutral personality feedback condition demonstrated an increase in self-reported anxiety. Those in the positive feedback condition reported much higher levels of self-esteem, supporting the idea that self-esteem buffers the anxiety induced by mortality salience.

Mortality Salience and Reactions to Violators and Upholders of Norms

Another series of five experiments examined the effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who violate or uphold cultural values (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989); it was expected that making death salient would increase subjects' tendencies to positively evaluate those who uphold cultural values and negatively evaluate those who deviate from cultural values. In the first of these experiments, a group of municipal court judges were asked to set bond for an alleged prostitute. Prior to receiving the information about the moral offender, half of the judges were asked to fill out a brief open-ended questionnaire which asked about their thoughts and feelings concerning the prospect of their own death. As
expected, the judges who were reminded of their mortality recommended significantly higher bonds for the prostitute.

The second experiment was designed to test a further refined prediction of terror management theory. As mentioned earlier, although most people function within a general cultural scheme, each person has his/her own specific interpretation of heroic (and nonheroic) behavior. Thus, while mortality salience may generally increase the tendency to react unfavorably to a prostitute, it should especially do so in those who hold a particularly negative view of prostitution. Prior to participating in this study, subjects completed a premeasure of attitudes toward prostitution, and those with the most favorable and most negative attitudes were used in the primary analysis. As with the judges, half were given the mortality salience questionnaire before recommending bond for the alleged prostitute. As expected, there was an overall tendency for the death salient subjects to more severely punish the prostitute. More importantly, however, the mortality salient/negative attitude subjects assigned a significantly higher bond than those in the mortality salient/positive attitude condition.

The third experiment attempted to demonstrate that not only will mortality salience increase the tendency to punish a moral transgressor, but will also increase the tendency to react favorably toward those who uphold cultural values. Thus, in addition to asking subjects to set bail for the prostitute, subjects were also asked to recommend a reward for a woman who helped police apprehend a criminal. As in the previous experiments, half the subjects filled out the death questionnaire before making their decisions. Again, the results were as expected; not only
did mortality salience increase the recommended bond for the prostitute, but also resulted in the recommendation of a larger reward for the hero.

The fourth and fifth experiments were designed to see if factors other than mortality salience contributed to the tendency to recommend a stiffer punishment for the prostitute. Study 4 examined the possibility that the findings of the first three experiments were the result of heightened self-awareness brought on by the death questionnaire, as it has been suggested that elevated self-awareness encourages individuals to increase their level of cultural conformity (see Buss, 1980; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Wicklund, 1975) and defend self-esteem (Hull & Levy, 1979; Kernis, Zuckerman, Cohen, & Sparafora, 1982). This experiment, therefore, included a self-awareness manipulation (a mirror) as well as the various mortality salience conditions.

Study 5 investigated the possibility that punishment effects were actually mediated by physiological arousal produced by the death questionnaire, as it has been demonstrated that arousal tends to intensify reactions to both positive and negative stimuli under some conditions (Paulhus, 1987; White, Fishbein, & Rutstein, 1981; Zillman, 1971). Subjects in all conditions of this experiment were therefore monitored for arousal by physiograph. However, in neither study did the alternate explanations for the subjects' behavior (self-awareness, arousal) contribute significantly to the increased tendency to punish the prostitute.

Mortality Salience and Reactions to Similar and Dissimilar Others

Further direct support for terror management theory comes from still another group of three studies which investigated the assumption
that mortality salience should increase favorable reactions toward those who consensually validate one's beliefs and unfavorable reactions toward those who consensually invalidate one's beliefs (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland, & Lyon, in press). The first study examined the effects of death awareness on evaluations of ingroupers (those perceived to be culturally similar to oneself) and outgroupers (those perceived to be culturally dissimilar). A group of Christian subjects were asked to evaluate both Christian and Jewish target individuals using the Interpersonal Judgement Scale (IJS) (Byrne, 1971). Prior to performing these evaluations, half of the subjects were given the death questionnaire described earlier. As hypothesized, those who were reminded of their own mortality gave more positive IJS ratings to fellow Christians and more negative IJS ratings to Jews.

If the rejection of outgroups is based on the belief that they hold highly dissimilar values and therefore fail to provide the consensual validation needed to instill faith in one's world view, then those within one's culture who hold dissimilar values should pose an analogous threat. The second experiment, therefore, investigated the likelihood of mortality salience to increase positive reactions toward those perceived as attitudinally similar to oneself, and intensify negative reactions toward those perceived to be attitudinally dissimilar. Subjects were assigned to work together on a task, and through bogus feedback were led to believe that their partners had values which were either quite consistent or conflicting with their own. Half of the subjects were then given the mortality salience questionnaire, and then all subjects were given the IJS to evaluate their partners.
Interestingly, death salience increased positive and negative evaluations of similar and dissimilar others only in subjects identified by premeasure as being highly authoritarian. This is consistent with terror management theory in that authoritarianism is thought to be a defensive stance designed to control fear and weakness (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950).

The third experiment examined the effects of mortality salience on reactions toward those who directly criticize one's culture; if negative reactions are heightened by indirect threats to one's world view (e.g. outgroupers, dissimilar others), then a direct attack on one's cultural beliefs should produce an even more severe reaction. After the usual mortality salience manipulation, subjects were asked to read one of three interviews in which the interviewee expressed views toward the United States; these views were either highly positive, mixed, or extremely unfavorable in nature. Subjects were then questioned concerning their liking for the interviewee and their agreement with his remarks. As expected, mortality salience did in fact amplify positive reactions to the person who praised the U.S. and negative reactions toward the person who criticized it.

**Rationale for Present Experiment and Hypotheses to be Tested**

To date, direct empirical investigations of the validity of terror management theory have provided fairly strong support for this theory's assumptions that 1) increasing self-esteem reduces the anxiety induced by mortality salience, and 2) that mortality salience results in attempts to bolster one's cultural world view through a heightened tendency to react favorably toward those who consensually validate one's
beliefs and negatively toward those who threaten them. However, no study has examined a third hypothesis derived from this theory; if the anxiety produced by mortality salience intensifies reactions to similar or dissimilar others, then bolstering one's world view through direct cultural affirmation following a reminder of death should reduce anxiety and lessen the need to react favorably or unfavorably toward those who uphold or threaten one's beliefs. Conversely, a threat to one's cultural belief system following a reminder of mortality should result in even more intense anxiety, and thus further exaggerate reactions toward similar and dissimilar others.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to test the hypotheses that 1) the favorable evaluations of ingroups and the unfavorable evaluations of outgroups caused by mortality salience will be significantly reduced or eliminated if subjects are given an opportunity to affirm their cultural world view prior to evaluating target individuals, and 2) that direct cultural threat will intensify the anxiety induced by mortality salience and result in even more extreme reactions to ingroups and outgroups.

For the purposes of this study, the ingroup is represented by an American college student; the outgroup is represented by a student from Lebanon. A middle-eastern country was chosen as the outgroup not only because people from that area are generally perceived to hold extremely different values from Americans, but also because of the tense relations between the middle-east and the United States. This experiment generally follows the procedure of experiment 1 of the Greenberg et al. (1988) study, with the addition of a cultural affirmation manipulation.
CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Overview

The design was a 2 (mortality salient, nonsalient) x 3 (cultural affirmation, no affirmation, cultural threat) x 2 (ingroup, outgroup target) factorial. The ingroup/outgroup distinction was a within subjects variable, with the order of presentation counterbalanced. All subjects initially filled out background, personality, and attitude questionnaires. Next they were given the mortality salience manipulation; half of them filled out a questionnaire which asked about their thoughts and feelings concerning death, while the other half filled out a short personality questionnaire. Then came the cultural affirmation manipulation; one-third of the subjects read an interview about the United States which was extremely favorable, one-third read a filler interview which had nothing to do with the U.S. political system, and one-third read an interview which was harshly critical of the United States. All subjects then read background and attitude questionnaires which they believed to be filled out by two other subjects, one Lebanese (who was an experimental confederate) and one American. They were asked to rate their present mood, and then give their impressions of the target individuals.

Subjects

The subjects were 83 (62 female, 21 male) introductory psychology students who were participating in psychological research as part of their course requirements. Data from four additional subjects were not used in the analysis; three identified themselves as being born and
raised in countries other than the United States, and one communicated suspicion upon debriefing that all subjects were being asked to evaluate one American and one foreigner.

**Procedure**

Three or four subjects plus the confederate participated in each session. They were told that the study involved personality and attitude variables which influence the impressions people form of one another, and that as part of this study they would be asked to evaluate two other people. Subjects were assured that all their responses would be anonymous. Additionally, it was explained that they would fill out their questionnaires in individual cubicles to control for extraneous factors which may influence their impressions of fellow subjects.

Upon arrival at their cubicles, subjects found waiting for them a packet which contained some preliminary questionnaires, the mortality salience manipulation, and the cultural affirmation manipulation, all of which are described in detail below. When they finished filling these out, the packets were collected by the experimenter, who told them that he would be back shortly with a few more questionnaires. The experimenter returned with two packets for each subject to read and evaluate; each packet consisted of background and attitude questionnaires which they believed to be either those of subjects who were presently in the other cubicles, or those of subjects who had participated in the study at an earlier date. These packets also contained the assessment instruments through which the target individuals were to be evaluated. Subjects were told to read the packets in a specific order, and to fill out the first impression
assessment immediately after reading the first packet; they could then proceed to read and evaluate the material in the second packet. Upon completion, they were told to put their evaluations in an envelope, leave it on the desk in the cubicle, and return to the main room. All subjects were then probed for suspicion and thoroughly debriefed.

**Instruments**

Preliminary Questionnaires. The first part of the packet filled out by the subjects contained background, attitude, and personality questionnaires. First, the background questionnaire asked for demographic information such as age, sex, etc.; it also asked for country of origin to establish cultural identification. Next, subjects filled out two filler questionnaires designed to resemble personality scales; one was a questionnaire which asked subjects to give as many answers as possible to the question "who am I," and the other was a social issues survey which asked them to indicate on a 10-point scale how much they agreed with some controversial statements such as "the decision about whether or not a pregnant woman should have an abortion should be left up to the woman and her doctor."

Mortality Salience Manipulation. The mortality salience manipulation followed the preliminary questionnaires. The packets of the subjects in the mortality salient condition contained a mortality attitudes survey which made 18 statements about death, such as "I am not afraid of long, slow dying" and "the sight of a corpse does not make me anxious." Subjects used a four-point scale (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree) to rate their agreement with these statements. The subjects in the control condition filled out the Speilberger Personality
Survey, a 20-item list of statements such as "I am happy" and "I am a steady person." As with the mortality attitudes survey, subjects used a four-point scale (1 = almost never, 4 = almost always) to endorse each item.

**Cultural Affirmation Manipulation.** The final item in the initial questionnaire packet was the cultural affirmation manipulation, which consisted of three different interviews. One-third of the subjects read a one page interview in which the interviewee gave an extremely favorable evaluation of the U.S. political system; the purpose of this interview was to affirm the subjects' cultural orientation. Another third read an interview of similar length in which the interviewee was highly critical of the U.S. political system; this was designed to exacerbate the anxiety induced by mortality salience. The final third served as a control condition; they read an interview which criticized television's coverage of presidential elections, but had nothing to say one way or the other about the U.S. political system. In all conditions, the interviews were preceded by a brief biographical sketch which led subjects to believe that the interviewee was a highly credible professor of political science named John McKay. Following the interview, subjects were asked to rate on a nine-point scale (1 = not at all, 9 = completely) how much they agreed with John McKay's views, how disturbing they found these views, and how much they thought they would like him.

**Targets' Questionnaires.** The materials on which the evaluations of the supposed fellow subjects were based were the background questionnaire, the "who am I" questionnaire, and the social issues
questionnaire. Subjects were led to believe that these were actual forms completed by their counterparts, but in actuality, these forms always presented two male targets, one American, the other Lebanese. The background and "who am I" questionnaires of the two targets were fairly similar, while the social issues questionnaires reflected one fairly liberal and one fairly conservative position; this was done to ensure that the targets appeared to be distinctly different types of people. The presentation of liberal/conservative social views was counterbalanced among American and Lebanese, as was the order of American and Lebanese targets for consideration by the evaluators.

**Dependent Measures.** The impression assessments of the targets began by asking subjects to rate their mood; this was done by having them fill out the PANAS scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which asks subjects to indicate on a five-point scale (1 = very slightly, 5 = extremely) how accurately various words reflect how they are feeling at the present moment. This scale contains 20 words; ten are intended to measure positive affect (enthusiastic, interested, determined, excited, inspired, alert, active, strong, proud, attentive) and ten are intended to measure negative affect (scared, afraid, upset, distressed, jittery, nervous, ashamed, guilty, irritable, hostile). Subjects then evaluated the targets by filling out the Interpersonal Judgement Scale (IJS) (Byrne, 1971), which asked them to rate the target's intelligence, knowledge of current events, morality, adjustment, and the extent to which they would enjoy working with the target. Next, subjects were asked to indicate on a nine-point scale how applicable (1 = not at all applicable, 9 = extremely applicable) each of the following
characteristics were to the target: honest, cheerful, reliable, trustworthy, argumentative, intelligent, warm, patient, kind, ambitious, stable, sleazy, introverted, spineless, impulsive, stingy, arrogant, manipulative, snobbish, obnoxious, friendly, and ignorant. Finally, subjects filled out a ten-item social distance scale which asked them to rate on a nine-point scale (1 = very uncomfortable, 9 = very comfortable) how comfortable they would feel in a variety of social situations with the target; these situations ranged from nonintimate (sitting next to him in class) to very intimate (sharing an apartment as roommates).
CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

There were two counterbalanced variables, order of presentation (Arab first/American second vs. American first/Arab second) and political orientation (Arab liberal/American conservative vs. American liberal/Arab conservative). Because initial statistical analyses revealed significant order and orientation effects on some of the dependent measures, the analyses reported here are based on three different mixed-model ANOVAs: 1) a 2 (mortality salient, nonsalient) x 3 (positive, neutral, negative interview) x 2 (Arab first, American first) between x 2 (Arab target, American target) within ANOVA to report order effects, 2) a 2 (mortality salient, nonsalient) x 3 (positive, neutral, negative interview) x 2 (Arab liberal, Arab conservative) between x 2 (Arab target, American target) within ANOVA to report political orientation effects, and 3) a 2 (mortality salient, nonsalient) x 3 (positive, neutral, negative interview) between x 2 (Arab target, American target) within ANOVA to report all effects not influenced by order or orientation. Although a single ANOVA which included all variables would have been optimal, such an analysis was precluded by small cell sizes (n < 5). It should be noted, however, that all the significant effects reported by the three-way ANOVA were also significant in the four-way ANOVAs; the three-way results were used as a way to eliminate the slight discrepancies in F-ratios between the two four-way analyses.

Interpersonal Judgment Scale (IJS)

The six items of the IJS were summed to produce a single value,
with a high score indicating a high attraction to the target. Although none of the hypothesized effects were observed, there were several significant two- and three-way interactions. A two-way interaction was found between the target's nationality and political orientation, $F(1,71) = 6.88$, $p < .011$. The means for this interaction (shown in Table 1) suggest that the liberal target, regardless of nationality, was liked better than the conservative target. However, pairwise comparisons showed only two significant differences; the American was liked significantly more than the Arab when the Arab was conservative, $t(39) = -2.08$, $p < .045$, and there was an increased attraction to the American target when the Arab was conservative, $t(81) = -1.97$, $p < .053$.

Another significant two-way interaction was between the type of interview read by the subjects and the order of presentation of the target, $F(2,71) = 4.25$, $p < .018$; the means for this interaction are also given in Table 1. Pairwise comparisons show differences between the interview conditions only when the Arab is presented first, with the lowest ratings in the neutral interview condition and the highest ratings in the negative interview condition (positive vs. neutral, $t(25) = 2.33$, $p < .029$; positive vs. negative, $t(24) = -2.14$, $p < .043$; neutral vs. negative, $t(27) = -5.14$, $p < .001$). Additionally, only in the negative condition are the IJS ratings significantly higher when the Arab is presented first, $t(27) = 2.64$, $p < .014$. It should also be noted that the IJS ratings reported here are combined target ratings; no distinction is made between the ratings of Arab and American targets.
Table 1
Two-way Interactions on the IJS

Target Nationality by Political Orientation Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arab Liberal</th>
<th>Arab Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>American Conservative</td>
<td>American Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Target</td>
<td>28.25</td>
<td>26.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Target</td>
<td>26.95</td>
<td>28.82</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Interview by Order Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview:</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab First</td>
<td>28.08</td>
<td>25.83</td>
<td>30.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American First</td>
<td>27.28</td>
<td>27.69</td>
<td>27.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Means on the IJS could range from 6 (low attraction) to 42 (high attraction).
A three-way interaction was found between the target's nationality, mortality salience, and the type of interview read, $F(2, 77) = 4.69, p < .012$; means for this interaction are shown in Table 2. An interaction between nationality and mortality salience was observed only in the neutral interview condition, with the means suggesting a preference for the Arab when mortality was salient, and a preference for the American when it was not. Pairwise comparisons showed two significant differences; the American was liked significantly more than the Arab in the nonsalient condition, $t(12) = -2.45, p < .031$, and ratings for the American increased significantly from the mortality salient to the nonsalient condition, $t(26) = -3.03, p < .006$.

A marginal three-way interaction was observed between target nationality, mortality salience, and political orientation, $F(1, 71) = 3.90, p < .053$. As can be seen in Table 2, the two-way interaction between target nationality and political orientation which reflects a preference for the liberal target now appears only in the control (mortality nonsalient) condition. Again, pairwise comparisons show the American to be liked much more than the Arab when the Arab is conservative, $t(20) = -2.67, p < .015$, as well as a significant increase in the American's rating from the Arab liberal to the Arab conservative condition, $t(40) = -2.77, p < .009$. 
### Table 2

**Three-way Interactions on the IJS**

#### Mortality Salience by Interview by Nationality Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview:</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Death Salience:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Target</td>
<td>27.25</td>
<td>27.00</td>
<td>27.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Target</td>
<td>28.75</td>
<td>27.71</td>
<td>24.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Mortality Salience by Orientation by Nationality Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Death Salience:</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Target</td>
<td>28.31</td>
<td>27.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Target</td>
<td>27.31</td>
<td>27.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trait Applicability Ratings

The 22 traits were summed to produce a single value; the higher the score, the higher the overall positive trait ratings. Once again, there were no effects in the hypothesized directions; in fact, no significant main effects or interactions were observed for any of the independent variables.

In order to see if the traits were grouped together to form factors which suggested positive and/or negative stereotypes, a principal components factor analysis of the 22 traits was performed for both the first and second targets. The factor structures for each target were very similar; both produced two distinct factors. A single subscale was developed for each factor; in order to be included in the subscale, an item had to load .50 or higher on the same factor for both targets. The first factor consisted only of positive traits: trustworthy, reliable, patient, kind, honest, warm, friendly, cheerful, and stable. The second factor consisted entirely of negative traits: arrogant, snobbish, obnoxious, manipulative, argumentative, ignorant, and sleazy. The items in each factor were summed together to produce a single score, with a high score reflecting high positive traits for the first factor and high negative traits for the second factor. As was the case with the IJS ratings, none of the hypothesized effects occurred; however, there were several significant main effects and interactions.
Factor 1 (positive traits). A two-way interaction was observed between the target's nationality and order of presentation, $F(1, 70) = 5.33, \ p < .024$. Although the overall pattern of the means (shown in Table 3) suggests that the target who is evaluated first received the higher rating, the only significant pairwise comparison showed a significant decrease in the Arab's ratings from the Arab first to the American first condition, $t(80) = 2.21, \ p < .03$. Additionally, there was a trend in the direction of the American receiving the higher ratings when presented before the Arab, $t(41) = -1.72, \ p < .093$.

There was also a significant three-way interaction between nationality, mortality salience, and political orientation, $F(1, 70) = 4.31, \ p < .042$. The pattern of the means (also shown in Table 3) closely replicates the pattern produced by the IJS, and suggests a preference for the liberal target only in the control condition. The two significant pairwise comparisons are also similar to those of the IJS, with a significant difference existing between the Arab and the American when the Arab is conservative, $t(20) = -2.84, \ p < .011$, and a significant increase in the American's ratings from the Arab liberal to the Arab conservative condition, $t(40) = -2.79, \ p < .009$. 
Table 3
Interactions on Factor 1 (Positive Traits)

Two-way Interaction Between Order and Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arab First</th>
<th>American First</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Target</td>
<td>51.05</td>
<td>46.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Target</td>
<td>48.57</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three-way Interaction Between Mortality Salience, Political Orientation, and Target Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Target</td>
<td>48.85</td>
<td>48.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Target</td>
<td>48.76</td>
<td>47.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Means on Factor 1 could range from 9 (lowest positive trait ratings) to 81 (highest positive trait ratings).
Factor 2 (negative traits). A significant main effect was observed as a function of which interview was read, with the (combined) target receiving the highest negative ratings in the neutral interview condition, $F(2, 74) = 4.19, p < .019$. The cell means were as follows: positive interview = 19.58, neutral interview = 24.41, negative interview = 19.12. Pairwise comparisons showed significant differences between the neutral and negative condition, $t(53) = 2.54, p < .014$, and the positive and neutral condition, $t(51) = -2.29, p < .027$.

A two-way interaction was observed between the nationality and political orientation of the target, $F(1, 68) = 13.84, p < .001$. Contrary to the patterns of the IJS and Factor 1 interactions, the cell means (given in table 4) show higher negative ratings for the liberal target. Ratings were higher for the Arab when the Arab was liberal, $t(40) = 3.75, p < .001$, and marginally higher for the American when the Arab was conservative, $t(38) = -1.93, p < .062$. Negative ratings for the Arab decreased when the Arab was conservative, $t(79) = 2.34, p < .022$, and increased for the American, $t(79) = -2.56, p < .013$.

Another two-way interaction was observed between mortality salience and political orientation, $F(1, 68) = 4.13, p < .046$. The means for this interaction (also shown in table 4) suggest that the target (regardless of nationality) receives higher negative ratings when the Arab is liberal in the control condition, and when the Arab is conservative in the death condition. However, only one pairwise comparison approached significance; target ratings were higher in the control condition when the Arab was liberal, $t(39) = -1.98, p < .056$. 
Table 4
Two-way Interactions on Factor 2 (Negative Traits)

Nationality by Political Orientation Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arab Liberal</th>
<th>Arab Conservative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arab Liberal</td>
<td>Arab Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>American Conservative</td>
<td>American Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Target</td>
<td>24.36</td>
<td>19.51</td>
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<td>American Target</td>
<td>17.39</td>
<td>23.23</td>
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</table>

Mortality Salience by Political Orientation Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Arab Conservative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arab Liberal</td>
<td>Arab Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>American Conservative</td>
<td>American Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Salient</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>22.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Nonsalient</td>
<td>22.90</td>
<td>19.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Means on Factor 2 could range from 7 (lowest negative trait ratings) to 63 (highest negative trait ratings).
Social Distance Scale

The social distance scale items were summed to produce a single score, with a high score reflecting a high degree of social attraction/low degree of desired social distance. Again, none of the hypothesized interactions materialized; the only significant finding was a main effect for the target, with the American target (mean = 47.91) receiving a higher overall score than the Arab target (mean = 41.77), F(1,74) = 13.35, p < .001. No other main effects or interactions approached significance.

Mood Measures

The 10 "positive affect" and 10 "negative affect" items of the PANAS were summed to produce single scores for positive and negative affect; the higher the score, the higher the degree of positive/negative affect. Although a higher degree of negative affect was expected in the mortality salient and negative interview conditions, no such patterns emerged. There were, however, several significant main and interactive effects.

Positive affect. No main effects or interactions were observed.

Negative affect. A main effect was produced by the type of interview read, with the highest negative affect (regardless of target) in the neutral interview condition, F(2,77) = 4.09, p < .021. The cell means were as follows: positive interview = 13.48, neutral interview = 16.17, negative interview = 12.84. Pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference between the negative and neutral essays, t(55) =...
2.39, \( p < .021 \), and a marginally significant difference between the positive and neutral essays \( t (52) = -1.85, p < .07 \).

A marginal two-way interaction between the interview and the order of presentation showed this pattern of higher negative affect in the neutral interview condition only when the Arab was presented first, \( F (2,71) = 3.04, p < .055 \). The means for this interaction are presented in Table 5. Pairwise comparisons show the neutral condition to be significantly higher than negative condition only, \( t (27) = 2.88, p < .008 \). Additionally, there was a trend in the direction of higher negative affect in the neutral condition when the Arab was presented first, \( t (26) = 1.79, p < .086 \).

Another two-way interaction was observed between target nationality and order of presentation, \( F (1,71) = 5.62, p < .021 \). The cell means (also given in Table 5) show a significant decrease in negative affect from the Arab first to the American first condition for the Arab target only, \( t (81) = 2.37, p < .021 \). Additionally, negative affect was higher prior to the evaluation of the Arab target when this target was presented first, \( t (40) = 2.13, p < .04 \).
### Table 5

Two-way interactions on the PANAS Negative Affect Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview by Order Interaction</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab First</td>
<td>14.37</td>
<td>18.26</td>
<td>12.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American First</td>
<td>12.71</td>
<td>13.76</td>
<td>13.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality by Order Interaction</th>
<th>Arab First</th>
<th>American First</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Target</td>
<td>15.95</td>
<td>12.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Target</td>
<td>14.09</td>
<td>13.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Means on the PANAS could range from 5 (lowest negative affect) to 50 (highest negative affect).
Interview Reactions

Reactions to the three post-interview questions were examined individually, with a high value reflecting high agreement with the question. Since these questions were asked prior to the presentation of the targets, the analysis used was a 2 (mortality salient, nonsalient) x 3 (positive, neutral, negative interview) between ANOVA. The results partially supported the hypothesis; although there were no effects as a result of mortality salience, all three questions showed a main effect for interview, with the most unfavorable reactions in the negative interview conditions.

Question 1: "How much do you agree with John McKay's views?"
The means for the three interview conditions were as follows: positive = 6.50, neutral = 6.93, negative = 4.14, F (2,77) = 16.36, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons showed the negative condition to be significantly lower than both the positive condition, t (53) = 4.00, p < .001, and the neutral condition, t (55) = 5.03, p < .001.

Question 2: "How disturbing to you were J. McKay's remarks?"
The means for the interviews were: positive = 3.08, neutral = 3.32, negative = 5.48, F (2,77) = 9.14, p < .001. The rating for the negative condition was significantly higher than both the positive and neutral conditions, t (53) = -3.79, p < .001, and t (55) = -3.24, p < .002 respectively.

Question 3: "How much do you think you would like J. McKay?"
Interview means were: positive = 6.04, neutral = 5.86, negative = 3.79, F (2,77) = 11.96, p < .001. Again, the negative condition was
significantly lower than both the positive ($t (53) = 4.47, p < .001$) and neutral ($t (55) = 3.89, p < .001$) conditions.
Mortality Salience and Interview Effects

None of the hypothesized two- or three-way interactions emerged; there was no evidence whatsoever that mortality salience or the negative interview resulted in more negative evaluations of the Arab and more positive evaluations of the American, nor was there any evidence that the positive interview served as a buffer against the anxiety produced by a reminder of one's mortality. In fact, the only three-way interaction between mortality salience, the type of interview, and the nationality of the target was in the opposite direction of the hypothesis; the neutral interview condition of the IJS showed that the Arab was liked better in the mortality salient condition, with a significant preference for the American in the control condition.

In searching for reasons for the lack of significant findings, one of the most obvious explanations for the observed results is that the suppositions of terror management theory are wrong. It could be that Becker's ideas are completely erroneous, and that the fear of death has little influence on human behavior. There are several factors, however, which make such a definitive conclusion objectionable. First of all, the aforementioned studies in this area have provided some convincing support for the tenets of terror management theory. Secondly, it is highly likely that this study did not accurately assess the effects of the independent variables, making the results themselves questionable.

The design of the experiment itself was probably a significant contributor to the lack of significant findings, because subjects were
expected to give honest evaluations of the American and Arab targets. This may have been an unreasonable expectation, as social psychology research tells us that displays of prejudice are generally considered gauche among today's sophisticated collegians, and that subjects are generally quite unwilling to negatively evaluate an outgrouper (Myers, 1987). However, the fact that subjects are reluctant to express prejudice does not necessarily mean that prejudice does not exist; several studies have indicated that when subjects are duped into believing that a machine is capable of discerning their true feelings, they are much more likely to express prejudice than when they believe that their actual beliefs cannot be monitored (Allen, 1975; Jones, Bell, & Aronson, 1972; Jones & Sigall, 1971; Sigall & Page, 1971). Since this study took no extreme steps to ensure the honesty of the subjects' responses, it is unlikely that their evaluations accurately reflected their true feelings; even a reminder of death coupled with a negative statement about the United States failed to result in any kind of prejudicial expression.

Furthermore, if all subjects were responding honestly, it seems reasonable to assume that the American target would have received more favorable evaluations overall, simply because it makes intuitive sense that one would like a member of one's own culture better than an outgrouper. However, only the social distance scale showed this main effect; none of the other dependent variables showed an overall preference for the American. Subjects were willing to admit being uncomfortable in social situations with a foreigner, but unwilling to go a step further and give one a less favorable evaluation than an
American.

It is also possible that a high degree of suspicion on the part of the subjects contributed to their lack of expressed prejudice. Although only one subject voiced any kind of suspicion during debriefing that the targets were actually manipulations of the experimenter, it seems plausible that a commentary on the U.S. political system followed by the presentation of one American and one Lebanese target may have aroused the suspicion of many subjects. Support for this notion was provided by the fact that the only IJS condition in which the Arab was disliked significantly more than the American was the neutral interview/no mortality salience condition, the one which would have provoked the least amount of suspicion. One could speculate that the low amount of suspicion resulted in the most accurate expression of the subjects' true feelings: a positive evaluation of the American, and a negative evaluation of the Arab.

Because of the likelihood that subjects were less than honest in their evaluations of the target individuals, it is difficult to know whether or not the mortality salience and cultural affirmation manipulations actually had any effect. As discussed earlier, previous terror management theory research has provided some solid evidence that questionnaires about death do in fact result in poorer evaluations of those perceived as dissimilar. Although interview reactions were nearly identical for the positive and neutral conditions, subjects in the negative condition openly admitted that they were disturbed by the interview and didn't like or agree with John McKay; it seems clear that the negative interview was effective as a cultural threat, even though
the hypothesized differential evaluation of targets did not materialize. Unfortunately, as far as the overall plausibility of terror management theory is concerned, the questionable validity of the subjects' responses makes it impossible to draw any conclusions one way or the other.

Effects of Counterbalanced Variables

Interpretation was further complicated by the two counterbalanced variables, the order of presentation and political affiliation of the target. Three of the dependent variables which measured reaction to the target (IJS, Factor 1, Factor 2) were significantly influenced by political orientation, with an interaction between nationality and political orientation on both the IJS and Factor 1 suggesting a preference for the liberal target, regardless of country of origin. However, this interaction on Factor 2 showed that liberal targets of both cultures received higher ratings on the cluster of negative traits as well. Why the liberal target would receive both favorable and unfavorable ratings is a difficult question to answer.

Interestingly, three-way interactions between mortality salience, orientation, and nationality on the IJS and Factor 1 showed the preference for the liberal target to exist only in the control (mortality nonsalient) condition, with a reminder of death eliminating the superior liking of the liberal individual. Although this is certainly an indication that the mortality salience manipulation had an effect on subject responses, the reasons why are anything but clear. One possible explanation could be that most of the subjects were actually conservative in orientation, but pretended to espouse a liberal
point of view in the control condition. The anxiety produced by the death questionnaire, however, shifted their preference toward the target who was actually more similar to themselves. This explanation is admittedly tenuous; however, an assumption that most of the subjects were politically conservative could also explain the higher attribution of negative traits to the liberal target.

The observed order effects were no less confusing. An interaction between the type of interview and order of presentation on the IJS showed that combined target ratings were lowest in the neutral condition and highest in the negative condition, but only when the Arab was presented first. A similar interaction between these variables was observed for the negative affect scale of the PANAS; the neutral condition showed the highest level of reported negative affect (and the negative condition the lowest) only when the Arab was presented first. It is possible that the higher negative affect in the Arab first/neutral interview condition was responsible for the low IJS ratings, especially since both targets were evaluated unfavorably. However, it is unclear why the combination of the Arab first and neutral interview would produce a significantly higher degree of negative affect. It seems unlikely that the neutral interview was in any way responsible; only the negative interview evoked any kind of distress or disagreement from the subjects. If there was something upsetting about the Arab being presented first, then why was it not evident across all interview conditions? Again, it could be that subjects were most likely to express prejudice in the condition where suspicion was the lowest (neutral interview) and least likely to express prejudice in the
condition where suspicion was the highest (negative interview); however, this does not explain why the American also received a relatively poor evaluation in the low-suspicion condition. The possibility cannot be ruled out, therefore, that a disproportionate number of people who just happened to be in a relatively bad mood were assigned to the Arab first/neutral interview condition by chance.

Further evidence that there was indeed something upsetting about the Arab being presented first came from the interaction between the nationality and order of presentation of the target on the negative affect scale of the PANAS. Negative affect was highest prior to the evaluation of the Arab target when this target was presented first; there was then a significant reduction in negative affect when the American target was evaluated. Furthermore, when the American was evaluated first, the negative affect ratings for the Arab were slightly (but not significantly) lower than those of the American, supporting the notion that the Arab target evoked higher negative affect only when presented first. This interaction also suggests that the mere process of evaluating the first target may have lowered the amount of negative affect prior to the evaluation of the second target; perhaps the evaluation process itself was somewhat cathartic and anxiety-reducing. However, it was also clear that the presentation of the Arab first resulted in the highest level of negative mood, which further supports the idea that prejudice was present despite the fact that it was not directly expressed.

Another interaction between the nationality and order of presentation of the target emerged on Factor I, with the target who was
presented first receiving the higher positive ratings. Although it is tempting to conclude that subjects simply seemed to like the first target better than the second and paid no attention to nationality, this pattern did not show up on the other three evaluative measures. Furthermore, the assumption that subjects were more attracted to the initial target is inconsistent with the pattern of negative affect, which was usually higher prior to the evaluation of the first target.

As stated earlier, the observed order and orientation effects did little to enlighten us about terror management theory; however, they did point out further weaknesses in the experimental design. Not only did they provide some additional evidence that subjects were not totally honest in their responses, they also suggested that the political background of the targets often influenced subject evaluations more significantly than the country of origin.

Summary and Conclusions

The data provided no support whatsoever for terror management theory, and the significant effects which did materialize were inconsistent and sometimes uninterpretable. The lack of findings in the hypothesized directions were probably due to an unwillingness by the subjects to express their true feelings, rather than an actual absence of preference for members of their own culture or the ineffectiveness of the independent variables. This study did, however, contain some subtle indicators of prejudice; reports of negative affect were higher when the Arab target was presented first, and IJS ratings of the Arab target were poorest in the condition which contained no experimental manipulations and was the least likely to arouse suspicion and discourage honesty.
Although there was some evidence to suggest a preference for the liberal target (regardless of nationality), this pattern was not consistent across all conditions or dependent variables.

Unfortunately, this study contained some significant flaws in design which made it impossible to accurately evaluate the tenets of terror management theory. A high degree of suspicion was inherent to the procedure, and there was no way to ensure or assess the accuracy of subject responses. Additionally, the independent variables often interacted with the counterbalanced variables, resulting in even greater interpretive confusion. Although the results of this study did not provide support for terror management theory, they did not detract from its possible validity either; if nothing else, this study was an example of what not to do when conducting research in this area. Designs which utilize foreign targets are apparently too obvious and evoke too much suspicion; the more subtle approaches which have produced supportive results in the past seem much more appropriate for testing this theory.

Social Implications of Terror Management Theory

Despite an eloquent and cogent presentation, Becker’s ideas remain largely ignored. One of the reasons for this is probably the air of pessimism they convey; if terror management theory is true, then the viability of the human race is definitely in doubt. As mentioned earlier, many immortality schemes are based on the reckless accumulation of wealth and power, as well as the subjugation or destruction of others (Becker, 1975). Up until now, the bounty of nature has allowed such practices to continue without any wholesale threat to the human race; however, we are now faced with an environment which is seriously
crippled by our wasteful actions, as well as an arsenal of weapons capable of destroying life on this planet several times over. Although these problems could be solved if reason could somehow prevail over fear, many factors stand in the way of this happening. According to Becker, human beings need their immortality schemes to deal with the sheer terror of being a conscious organism; in order to keep from going mad, people must limit their scope of reality and depend on a "fictional" belief system which provides order and safety. Unfortunately, it is precisely this practice which prevents humanity from having the overall understanding needed to control for this shrinkage of experience. In other words, the terror management strategies which keep people feeling safe on an individual level are a threat to the overall survival of the human species. Needless to say, this is an unsettling set of circumstances.

However, even though the human capacities for self-awareness and abstract thought have threatened our continued existence, Becker also acknowledges that these abilities may also be used to solve the many problems we now face. Although people must always have a vehicle for heroic behavior in order to make meaningful contributions to their value system and thus secure a sense of universal importance, their immortality schemes need not be the wasteful and materialistic. If the human race is to survive, there must be a shift toward hero systems which are less destructive and more geared toward the promotion of general welfare. Additionally, more adaptive value systems would be those which recognize the paradoxes of human existence as fundamental motivators of behavior; relativity, uncertainty, and contradiction would
be accepted parts of life rather than things which need to be eliminated. Optimally, cultures of the future would provide self-esteem and material security for as many members as possible without inflicting damage upon those with different views.

Although one may argue with Becker's views of the future, no one can deny the fact that human beings are an endangered species who can no longer continue their present ways if they hope to survive. There is also little doubt that we need to have a much more integrated and comprehensive understanding of human behavior than we have now if we are to solve our many problems, and terror management theory is, at the very least, an ambitious step in that direction; Becker has provided an unprecedented interdisciplinary integration which addresses the human predicament as never before. Regardless of whether or not his ideas turn out to be true, they are definitely provocative and serve as a springboard for thought, discussion, and a greater understanding of the human condition. Any theoretical proposal which causes us to think hard about the motives behind our behavior is inherently valuable, and Becker's ideas as expressed through terror management theory are certainly worthy of due consideration by those who desire a better understanding of human nature.
APPENDIX A

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

This questionnaire is designed to give us some information about your background, beliefs and goals. None of this information will be connected with your name.

Age_________Sex_________

Place of birth (City or Town or State)____________________________________

____________________________________

Parent's Religious Affiliation(s)

Parent's Income (or your own if you are no longer their dependent.)
Circle one response.)
a) less than $15,000          d) $35,000 to $45,000
b) $15,000 to $25,000        e) $45,000 to $55,000
c) $25,000 to $35,000        f) more than $55,000

Number of Years of Education for your Parents (count high school graduation as 12, college graduation as 16 and add or subtract as necessary.)
Father_________        Mother_________

Number of Brothers_________       Number of Sisters_________

Please indicate how characteristic each of the following statements is of you by circling the appropriate number along the following scale:

1 2 3 4 5
not at all slightly somewhat fairly extremely

a. Maintaining a good GPA is very important to me.    1 2 3 4 5
b. My religious beliefs are very important to me.     1 2 3 4 5
c. Good friendships are important to me.              1 2 3 4 5
d. I could describe myself as being very patriotic.   1 2 3 4 5
e. I think education is very important.                1 2 3 4 5
f. I expect to be fairly successful in my chosen career. 1 2 3 4 5
g. I am generally a leader, not a follower.           1 2 3 4 5
h. I try to keep a balance between my studies and social life. 1 2 3 4 5
i. Sometimes I am not sure which career I want to pursue. 1 2 3 4 5
j. I am fairly satisfied with myself at this stage of my life. 1 2 3 4 5
k. It is easy for me to become friends with individuals of the opposite sex. 1 2 3 4 5
l. My parents have had a great deal of influence on me. 1 2 3 4 5
APPENDIX B

SELF-ATTITUDE ASSESSMENT

Directions: There are twenty numbered blanks on the page below. Please write twenty answers to the simple question, "Who am I?" in the blanks. Answer as if you were giving the answers to yourself, not to somebody else. Write the answers in the order that they occur to you. Don't worry about logic or "importance." Go along fairly fast, for time is limited.

1) ____________________________________________
2) ____________________________________________
3) ____________________________________________
4) ____________________________________________
5) ____________________________________________
6) ____________________________________________
7) ____________________________________________
8) ____________________________________________
9) ____________________________________________
10) ____________________________________________
11) ____________________________________________
12) ____________________________________________
13) ____________________________________________
14) ____________________________________________
15) ____________________________________________
16) ____________________________________________
17) ____________________________________________
18) ____________________________________________
19) ____________________________________________
20) ____________________________________________
APPENDIX C

SOCIAL ISSUES QUESTIONNAIRE

Please use a 1 to 9 scale to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. A rating of 1 would mean that you totally disagree, a rating of 5 would mean that you moderately agree, and a rating of 9 would mean that you totally agree with the particular statement. Put your ratings for each statement in the blank space at the end of the statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Totally Disagree</th>
<th>Moderately Agree</th>
<th>Totally Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) All hand guns currently owned by Americans should be registered.  
   ________________________

2) The decision about whether or not a pregnant woman should have an abortion should be left up to the woman and her doctor.  
   ________________________

3) Sex education should not be offered in schools; it should be left totally to the parents.  
   ________________________

4) Federal taxes on businesses and industries are too high and keep our nation's economy from growing as rapidly as it would otherwise.  
   ________________________

5) If a male and a female are in love, an extramarital affair is acceptable.  
   ________________________

6) Homosexuality is a sin and should be discouraged in every possible way.  
   ________________________

7) All Americans should be paid a guaranteed annual wage to assure them of a reasonable standard of living.  
   ________________________

8) In order for our legal system to work adequately, we need to have capital punishment available as the ultimate punishment.  
   ________________________

9) If there is a conflict between economic development and protecting the wilderness, protection of the wilderness should generally have the highest priority.  
   ________________________

10) Children in our public schools should participate in daily, organized prayer.  
    ________________________
APPENDIX D

MORTALITY ATTITUDES PERSONALITY SURVEY

Recent research suggests that attitudes toward death tell us a considerable amount about the individual's personality. Please circle the letters corresponding to your level of agreement with each of the following statements.

SA = Strongly Agree  
A = Agree  
D = Disagree  
SD = Strongly Disagree

1. Graveyards seem to upset many people but they do not bother me.  
2. The idea of never thinking again after I die frightens me.  
3. The idea that I may die young does not affect me.  
4. The feeling that I will be missing out on so much after I die disturbs me.  
5. I do not mind the idea of being shut into a coffin when I die.  
6. Some people are afraid to die, but I am not.  
7. The pain involved in dying frightens me.  
8. The idea of being buried frightens me.  
9. Not knowing what it feels like to die makes me anxious.  
10. I am not afraid of a long, slow dying.  
11. I have moments when I get really upset about dying.  
12. Coffins make me anxious.  
13. Being totally immobile after death bothers me.  
14. Never again feeling anything when I die upsets me.  
15. The sight of a corpse does not at all make me anxious.  
16. I am not at all disturbed by the finality of death.  
17. The total isolation of death is frightening to me.
18. What will happen to my body after death does not concern me.
APPENDIX E

SPEILBERGER PERSONALITY SURVEY

DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel.

1 = Almost Never  2 = Sometimes  3 = Often  4 = Almost Always

1. I feel pleasant ........................................ 1 2 3 4
2. I tire quickly ........................................ 1 2 3 4
3. I feel like crying .................................... 1 2 3 4
4. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be ...... 1 2 3 4
5. I am losing out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough .................................. 1 2 3 4
6. I feel rested .......................................... 1 2 3 4
7. I am "calm, cool, and collected" ...................... 1 2 3 4
8. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them ................................. 1 2 3 4
9. I worry too much over something that really doesn't matter .................................................. 1 2 3 4
10. I am happy ............................................. 1 2 3 4
11. I am inclined to take things hard ........................ 1 2 3 4
12. I lack self-confidence ................................ 1 2 3 4
13. I feel secure .......................................... 1 2 3 4
14. I try to avoid a crisis or difficulty .................. 1 2 3 4
15. I feel blue ............................................. 1 2 3 4
16. I am content .......................................... 1 2 3 4
17. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me ........................................... 1 2 3 4
18. I take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them out of my mind ........................................ 1 2 3 4
19. I am a steady person .................................................. 1 2 3 4
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests ...................... 1 2 3 4
On the following page is an interview concerning political issues. We would like you to read it and then answer a few questions concerning your reactions to it. In this way, we can assess your political attitudes. The interview was taken from Political Science Quarterly, March, 1985 and included the following biographical information about the interviewee:

John McKay

Current Position.

Full Professor, Harvard University

Education.

   Major: Liberal Arts
Ph.D. (1975) Harvard University
   Major: Political Science

Awards.

Distinguished Faculty Award, Harvard University.
Elected Member, National Academy of Science.

Activities.

President, American Political Science Association.
Chair, National Task Force on Political Science.
President and Founder, Political Science Consultants, Inc.
APPENDIX G

POSITIVE INTERVIEW

Q: You've recently made some surprising statements about our country's political system.

McKay: You mean what I said in Geneva?

Q: Yes, would you care to clarify what you meant?

McKay: Well, I'd obviously be the first to admit that our system has its problems, and that there are parts of our governmental system with which I do not agree. However, I really believe that our system is controlled by the people. For example, President Reagan was elected to do three things: cut income taxes for the middle class; improve the economy; and spend money to revamp and strengthen the military. He did all three and fulfilled the public mandate. Whether or not you agree with the consequences of the goals or with what he did, you have to admit he did what the people asked.

Q: But how do you reconcile this with some of the sharp criticisms you've made about the system?

McKay: Well, I believe in the criticisms I've made, but I also believe in the positive aspects of the system. I strongly feel that what we have here is a government of the people, and that's what I've been arguing for all along although from a different perspective. Our system is a great experiment in rule by the people; I just do what I can to raise whatever problems I see that can be corrected so that the great experiment can succeed. You hear plenty of positive things about this country; I consider it my role to point out the problems, even if, in reality, our system is surprisingly the closest thing that exists to what I believe in: government by the people.

Q: So you play a specific role in our system; by pointing out other viewpoints, you help keep the system in line.

McKay: Exactly. You can tell how much I believe in the general system by my willingness to work within it. You don't see me, or people who feel the way I do, blowing up buildings or trying to assassinate the president. Instead, we write papers, speak with reporters, or even try to get elected. It's our belief in the value of the system as a whole that allows us to feel we can change certain parts of the system. After all, where else in the world would I be able to say the things I say, and write the things I write without the fear of retribution? In this country, the people and not the government will be the final judges of the value of what I have to say. This is what makes this country a great place in which to be a free thinker.
APPENDIX H
NEUTRAL INTERVIEW

Q: You've recently made some controversial statements about the impact of television on the presidential campaign.

McKay: You mean my editorial in U.S. News and World Report?

Q: Yes, would you care to clarify what you meant?

McKay: Television, and the two candidates themselves, gave us one of the worst presidential campaigns in modern history. Many have pointed to the campaign's occasional sleaze and viciousness as the primary reason, but I believe that the real problem was the nature of the medium itself.

Q: What do you mean, exactly?

McKay: The style of televised communication of late has become a barrage of short, fast-paced "impact" messages. In trying to align itself with what the public has become accustomed to, presidential campaigning via TV was nothing more than a series of snappy 20-second segments which were extremely superficial in nature. Instead of addressing the real issues and policies of each candidate, the ads were nothing more than emotional attacks on the "image" of the opponent.

Q: Are you saying that television is no longer the proper medium for presidential campaigning?

McKay: Oh no, not at all. Television has a wonderful gift to offer us, and it has done it from time to time. Nothing but television could have brought home so vividly to everyone the personalities and the issues in the Army-McCarthy hearings or the Watergate hearings. It is absurd that so many millions of dollars have to be raised and squandered in America for meaningless political commercials. In other democracies, television offers the candidates free time. All our networks could have simultaneously offered a weekly series of 10-minute slots to both candidates to explain their policies on the big issues, with 5 additional minutes for questions.

Q: Wouldn't the networks lose a lot of money if this procedure was adopted?

McKay: Yes, but they would all lose it equally. They don't really suffer by allowing some free use of the nation's airwaves, and in such critical times the companies that now control them would be wise and patriotic to put the national interest ahead of their immediate financial interest. ABC's refusal to carry a debate in lieu of Olympic coverage was particularly greedy and shortsighted and deserves national condemnation.

Q: What do you see happening if we continue along the present lines?

McKay: If we go on in the present vein, the nation will be voting on images, responding to the image makers who are best capable of creating stunts staged to capture a few seconds of free time. Candidates will no longer offer anything of merit, and public confidence and support will continue to decline. This is unfortunate, because America has the right to a dialogue, to see its candidates pressed on the issues. The TV networks have a great opportunity, as well as a responsibility, to make sure we get better answers - not imitation answers, not counterfeit
answers, not the appearance of answers, but answers that clarify the direction for the country.
APPENDIX I
NEGATIVE INTERVIEW

Q: You've recently made some controversial statements about our country's political system.
McKay: You mean what I said in Geneva?
Q: Yes, would you care to clarify what you meant?
McKay: The system has never been controlled by the people; it has always been controlled by the power elite. Republican or Democrat, our presidents have always been multi-millionaires who are controlled by even wealthier corporate men whose bottom line is the profit margin.
Q: Is there any historic or current rationale for what you're saying? Do you feel any of this is reflected in our policies?
McKay: Well, our country was founded for economic purposes rather than moral or ideological ones. We broke away from England because they were costing us too much money with their taxes. The civil war was about economics, not slaves. Lincoln went to war over the south's cotton and the south wanted to get rid of the liability created by the financially beleaguered north. Lincoln did not care about the slaves; slavery was just a politically and emotionally charged excuse. Even today, blacks and the poor are second class citizens with few more rights than the slaves of old. If you're poor and commit a crime, you will go to jail. If you're wealthy and commit a crime, you'll buy a good lawyer and either get off entirely or work out some kind of deal. Justice is not blind when it comes to money. Our foreign policy is entirely a matter of protecting our economic interests. The U.S. supports many dictatorships and fascist regimes. The CIA has a longstanding record of terrorist activities, including the overthrow of governments in Chile and the current support of the Contras in Nicaragua. In the case of Chile, the U.S. helped a regime come into power that was more friendly to the U.S.'s economic interests but that was even a worse violator of human rights than the economically unfriendly regime the U.S. overthrew. This is especially true in the Middle East. Our strongest ally there is Saudi Arabia, yet amnesty international reports that their violations of human rights are worse than even those in Iran. The reason why we consider Iran an enemy has nothing to do with the Ayatollah being a fascist dictator or their kidnapping a few Americans; we're just upset because they won't sell us their oil. Morality has absolutely nothing to do with our foreign policy. That's why the idea that the U.S. is a promoter of world democracy and freedom is a total sham.
Q: So, if we're just operating according to economic interests, why do people bother to vote?
McKay: Half the people don't. They know there's no point.
Q: Any solution to attain a true democracy?
McKay: The unfortunate truth is that the only way to really change the system is to overcome the power of money, and the only force capable of doing that is well-organized mass violence. I am not a violent person, but this conclusion seems to me to be unavoidable. The system is too far corrupt and tightly controlled to allow real change from within; violent overthrow is the only way the people will ever wrest control of
their own nation from the capitalist powerbrokers. Saddest of all, I believe this lofty goal can only be accomplished with the help of outside influence from other powerful nations.
APPENDIX J

INTERVIEW REACTION ASSESSMENT

1. How much do you agree with John McKay's views?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
   not at all  somewhat  completely

2. How disturbing to you were John McKay's remarks?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
   not at all  somewhat  completely

3. How much do you think you would like John McKay?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
   not at all  somewhat  completely

Please now knock on your door and wait for the investigator to return to your cubicle.
APPENDIX K

INITIAL IMPRESSION ASSESSMENT (PANAS SCALE)

Your current mood can affect how you feel about a person. The following list consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Before giving your initial impressions of the target person, indicate to what extent these words reflect how you are feeling at the present moment, using the scale below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very slightly</td>
<td>a little</td>
<td>moderately</td>
<td>quite a bit</td>
<td>extremely</td>
</tr>
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</table>

___ interested  ___ irritable
___ distressed   ___ alert
___ excited      ___ ashamed
___ upset        ___ inspired
___ strong       ___ nervous
___ guilty       ___ determined
___ scared       ___ attentive
___ hostile      ___ jittery
___ enthusiastic ___ active
___ proud        ___ afraid
APPENDIX L

INTERPERSONAL JUDGMENT SCALE (IJS)

Please indicate your initial impressions of the individual who you are evaluating on the following scale. Please give careful consideration to each item and be as frank as possible.

1. Intelligence (check one)
   ___ I believe that this person is very much above average in intelligence.
   ___ I believe that this person is above average in intelligence.
   ___ I believe that this person is slightly above average in intelligence.
   ___ I believe that this person is slightly below average in intelligence.
   ___ I believe that this person is below average in intelligence.
   ___ I believe that this person is very much below average in intelligence.

2. Knowledge of current events (check one)
   ___ I believe that this person is very much below average in his (her) knowledge of current events.
   ___ I believe that this person is below average in his (her) knowledge of current events.
   ___ I believe that this person is slightly below average in his (her) knowledge of current events.
   ___ I believe that this person is average in his (her) knowledge of current events.
   ___ I believe that this person is slightly above average in his (her) knowledge of current events.
   ___ I believe that this person is above average in his (her) knowledge of current events.
   ___ I believe that this person is very much above average in his (her) knowledge of current events.

3. Morality (check one)
   ___ This person impresses me as being extremely moral.
   ___ This person impresses me as being moral.
   ___ This person impresses me as being moral to a slight degree.
   ___ This person impresses me as being neither particularly moral nor particularly immoral.
   ___ This person impresses me as being immoral to a slight degree.
   ___ This person impresses me as being immoral.
   ___ This person impresses me as being extremely immoral.

4. Adjustment (check one)
   ___ I believe that this person is extremely maladjusted.
   ___ I believe that this person is maladjusted.
I believe that this person is maladjusted to a slight degree.
I believe that this person is neither particularly maladjusted nor particularly well adjusted.
I believe that this person is well adjusted to a slight degree.
I believe that this person is well adjusted.
I believe that this person is extremely well adjusted.

5. Personal feelings (check one)
I feel that I would probably like this person very much.
I feel that I would probably like this person.
I feel that I would probably like this person to a slight degree.
I feel that I would neither particularly like nor dislike this person.
I feel that I would probably dislike this person to a slight degree.
I feel that I would probably dislike this person.
I feel that I would probably dislike this person very much.

6. Working together in an experiment (check one)
I believe that I would very much dislike working with this person in an experiment.
I believe that I would dislike working with this person in an experiment.
I believe that I would dislike working with this person in an experiment to a slight degree.
I believe that I would neither particularly dislike nor particularly enjoy working with this person in an experiment.
I believe that I would enjoy working with this person in an experiment to a slight degree.
I believe that I would enjoy working with this person in an experiment.
I believe that I would very much enjoy working with this person in an experiment.
APPENDIX M

TRAIT APPLICABILITY RATINGS

Below are 22 words which describe personality characteristics. Please indicate your impressions of the target person by indicating how applicable each of the following words seems to be to that individual. Place a number between one and nine in the space next to the word to indicate how much you feel that it characterizes the target person. The numbers will indicate the following:

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<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not at all applicable</td>
<td>moderately applicable</td>
<td>extremely applicable</td>
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1) Cheerful
2) Honest
3) Stingy
4) Sleazy
5) Intelligent
6) Reliable
7) Impulsive
8) Spineless
9) Stable
10) Manipulative
11) Introverted
12) Kind
13) Ambitious
14) Patient
15) Arrogant
16) Argumentative
17) Trustworthy
18) Warm
<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
<td>19)</td>
<td>Snobbish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20)</td>
<td>Obnoxious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21)</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22)</td>
<td>Ignorant</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX N

SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

Below are some brief descriptions of some social situations. Imagine yourself and the person you have learned about in each. We realize that you still know little about the target person but, based on what you have learned thus far, please rate how comfortable you would feel in each of the situations given. Use the following scale:

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<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very uncomfortable</td>
<td>Moderately comfortable</td>
<td>Very comfortable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

1) Sitting next to him or her in a class.
2) Working together on a group project.
3) Sharing a table at the Fiddlee Fig at lunch.
4) Having him or her move in next door to you.
5) Introducing him or her to your current best friend.
6) Recommending him or her for a job.
7) Taking him or her to a party given by a friend of yours.
8) Double-dating with him or her.
9) Introducing him or her to your parents or closest relatives.
10) Sharing an apartment as roommates.
REFERENCES


