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## COOPERATION AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS: ASSESSING FOUR COUNTRIES

### INTRODUCTION

In his 1965 seminal work on collective action, Mancur Olson wrote about the logic or rather illogic of rational people sacrificing for a common good. He states, “Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.” Many academics have gone on to explain counterexamples like the common act of stopping at red lights or even paying taxes with theories and n-person prisoner dilemma models. However, fewer academics have expanded on the necessary condition, “unless there is coercion or some other special device.”

Coercion now has been termed as sanctioning systems, and “some other special device” implies a reference to social norms. It is true. In modern societies of millions of people, the incentive to contribute personal resources to protect the common interest is often outweighed by the temptation to free ride on others’ contributions. As the counterexamples indicate though, people still cooperate. Something compels them to do so. In the case of paying taxes, a sanction operates so that if you defect and cheat on your taxes (and get caught which has a probability of its own), you will pay a fine or go to jail. And even though a sanction exists, a norm is in place too. There is a social expectation of behavior that you will pay an amount of money every April to the government, and

whether you pay or cheat signifies the type of person or citizen that you are. The relationship between sanctioning systems and norms is a complex one but one that can possibly explain not just cooperation within a country, but also the differences in cooperation across borders.

This paper will attempt to illuminate these cross-cultural differences in cooperation in terms of enforcement mechanisms. Using survey data to create indices, the levels of cooperation, strength of norms and sanctions will be quantified in four different countries. The United States will serve as an example of the textbook individualist culture while Sweden will represent the Scandinavian region known for its collectivist culture. Germany will be used to illustrate a Continental European country, compared to Scandinavia, and finally, Russia will be included for its history of coerced cooperation during the Soviet era. After determining the relative strength of each mechanism operating within the country, I will discuss how this affects the country's ability to promote cooperation as well as its attitude toward different actors as a channel for solutions.

## MODELS OF NORMS AND SANCTIONING SYSTEMS

Any empirical discussion of a collective action problem and cooperation begins with the prisoner's dilemma model (Axelrod 1981). Given the payoffs of cooperating (e.g. contributing resources to the common interest) or defecting (choosing not to contribute while assuming others still will), a rational actor will always defect. This is the notion of free riding; players want to receive the benefits of cooperation without the costs of contributing. Linear public good experiments are also well-suited to relate the logic of cooperation problems. This model outlines a game where actors are given an endowment

with a fixed amount of assets which they can contribute to the public good. When each player makes a contribution, all other players receive a benefit. To achieve the optimal outcome, every player would contribute all of his assets but in turn receive the benefit of contribution times the number of players who contributed which in this case would be everyone. However, similar to the prisoners' dilemmas, the equilibrium is that no one contributes in hopes of receiving the benefit from contributing without the cost.

Despite the predicted solutions of defection or zero contribution for the respective models, experiments yield results of cooperation. After frequent replications of the public good experiment, several findings are generally accepted as core facts (Ostrom 2000). Players will contribute between 40 to 60 percent of their original endowment to the public good in both one shot games and the first round of finitely repeated games. In succeeding rounds of repeated games, contributions decrease but still stay above zero. Things like learning, face-to-face communication and punishment further increase the level of contribution and promote cooperation. This reality calls for further illumination to the collective action models as traditional solution concepts do not effectively explain the prevalence of cooperative behavior.

Ostrom (2000) explains the deviation from the predicted outcomes by introducing "norm-using players": conditional cooperators and willing punishers. Initial cooperation is attributed to conditional cooperators, those players who are willing initiate cooperation as long as they have a reasonable belief of reciprocation and who will repeat their actions if cooperation stays sufficiently high. Willing punishers, if given the opportunity, will use resources to punish free riders or will do so verbally by scolding them. While these types of players account for the high levels of contribution in the experiment, they also serve to

introduce norms into the game, and after repeated rounds of play, other players will learn these norms and adjust accordingly.

The importance of norms in explaining cooperation cannot be stressed enough. Where models of cooperation often fall short is their ability to incorporate these norms into their structure. Simple payoffs and assumptions of rationality do not always capture what mechanisms are operating among players. People might be vengeful after being exploited by a rational player discounting payoffs altogether, or they might be overly trusting hoping to encounter similarly trusting individuals. In Ostrom's model (2000), the rational egoist did not adequately explain the levels of cooperation; it was only until she introduced the conditional cooperator and the willing punisher, players behaving according to norms, did the cooperation in the experiment begin to make sense.

For the purposes of this paper, norms will be defined in terms of expectations of behavior and deviance from said expectations. This is the definition used by Axelrod (1986) and allows for analysis of norms within a particular social setting. He contends, "A norm exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting this way." Inherent in this definition is the existence of deviation from norms. In fact, Axelrod maintains that awareness of norms is "most intense" when norms are challenged. When a challenge or deviation occurs, the norm must then be enforced, and how the norm is enforced and maintained often contributes to its strength.

In experiments on models of cooperation, enforcement often takes the form of vengefulness. When the game allows it, a player might verbally rebuke the non-cooperator with glares and scornful remarks. Otherwise, he might change his strategy to solely punish

another player for any exploitation that occurred to him. This goes back to Ostrom's "willing punisher," the player that will contribute resources just to punish non-cooperators. In actual society, enforcement of norms happens in the same way. If a person cuts in line, the rest of the people waiting give dirty looks while the really aggressive person voices loudly to wait your turn. Axelrod goes on to describe metanorms which were particularly prevalent in communist societies. This norm calls upon people to not only punish the defector but also anyone who does not participate in or support the punishment. It is not enough to just denounce the accused but any sympathy is also seen as defection.

More formal than metanorms are external sanctioning systems by third parties. There are limits to promoting and protecting norms by relying on individuals to punish defection. As a way to regulate norms, societies will contribute resources to carry out these regulations. This is most recognizable when in the form of laws implemented and enforced by a government. While there might not be a law punishing people who cut in line, there are certainly laws against smoking in public places and evading taxes although there are social norms in place too. Just as there are limits to relying on individuals to maintain norms, there are limits to relying on external sanctioning systems to do the same. Laws can only supplement norms; they cannot initiate them and they cannot replace them (Axelrod 1986). The United States' experience with Prohibition exemplifies this point. When a norm does not precede the law which codifies it, the law will fail and will do nothing to promote the norm.

The relationship between sanctioning systems and norms becomes a complicated one, especially concerning norms of cooperation. Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) conduct three studies exploring this relationship in an organizational theory context. The first

shows that a weak sanctioning system actually results in less cooperation than when there is no system at all. Next, they show that the presence of a sanctioning system changes the framework in which decisions are made, changing the decision from being an ethical decision to a business decision. Synthesizing these effects, they found their third hypothesis, cooperation in situations framed as ethical decisions will not be influenced by sanction strength whereas cooperation within a business frame is contingent on sanction strength, to be true. The implementation of weak sanctioning systems, which in this study consists of low probability of detection and small fines, actually hampers cooperation. This conclusion echoes Ostrom's contention that mild monitoring and sanctioning systems discourages the formation of social norms. Sanctions, the very instruments intended to promote norms, might not actually result in this intended effect.

This relationship between the relative strength of sanctioning systems and social norms of cooperation suggests a sort of continuum. On one extreme, you have a society with no sanctions but very strong social norms. This extreme is not very applicable to actual countries. With the exception of failed states, there is always some sort of government operating and enforcing laws. Moreover, the strong norms implied by this sanction-less state might not be in line with norms of cooperation; they would probably resemble an every-man-for-himself type of behavior. The middle of the continuum would be this situation with weak sanctioning systems, like a government where laws are not uniformly or soundly enforced or the probability of enforcement is low. In this society, social norms of cooperation would actually be diminished by weak sanctions. Cooperation would be minimal because there are neither norms nor sanctions enforcing it. Finally, the other extreme of the continuum would be a society with very strong sanctions, such as

laws with harsh punishments for offenses. Ostrom's discussion of empirical studies suggests strong external imposed rules systems actual crowd out endogenous cooperative behavior (Frey 1994). Cooperation is enforced by the strong sanctions, but there is never any need for the norm to develop. Hence, cooperation occurs at low levels.

When a society or an entire country is labeled as a cooperative culture, what is really at work promoting that cooperative culture? For some countries and particularly Scandinavian ones, there are obvious social norms of cooperation. People are expected to pay high taxes, contribute to charitable causes and generally come together to solve large scale problems. For other countries, strong sanctions are clearly in place. For example, people living in Soviet Russia cooperated to fulfill the wishes of the communist government because the alternative was a work camp. Given a real choice, cooperation might not have been so high among the citizenry; no real norm of cooperation developed after centuries of authoritarian rule. And finally, there are countries like the United States which seem to be outliers in most facets of political science. Is the United States' remarkably individualist culture a function of weak norms and/or weak sanctions? An empirical study of survey data will answer these questions.

## METHODS

In order to determine the norms operating within a country, survey data was used. Questions thought to be the logically best proxies for indicating norms were pulled from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Programme Data (ISSP). These questions were used to illuminate different dimensions of norms. For example, the general trust level of the people, the degree of collective behavior and the

deference of individual responsibility were considered dimensions of cooperation. A weighted average was taken of the responses to the questions, and then, the averages were summed to create an overall index for each dimension. The following table sums the results. (See Appendix A for full table including all the questions used)

Table 1

Dimension	West Germany	Russia	Sweden	United States
<b>NORMS OF COOPERATION</b>				
Trust (1= least trusting, 14=most trusting)	<b>8.53</b>	<b>6.502</b>	<b>9.011</b>	<b>8.235</b>
Level of Collective Behavior (1=least collective, 42=most collective)	<b>32.217</b>	<b>32.688</b>	<b>31.78</b>	<b>35.235</b>
Level of Deference of Individual Responsibility (1=low individual responsibility, 27 = high individual responsibility)	<b>18.0053</b>	<b>15.644</b>	<b>19.0656</b>	<b>20.438</b>
Attitude toward taxes (1= much too low, 21 = much too high)	<b>14.04</b>	<b>14.8725</b>	<b>13.5255</b>	<b>14.4755</b>
<b>X</b> = most cooperative score, <b>X</b> = least cooperative score				
<b>SOCIAL NORMS</b>				
Level of Obedience (1= least obedient, 19 = most obedient)	<b>11.638</b>	<b>10.896</b>	<b>14.002</b>	<b>14.127</b>
Conflicts of Conscience (1= follow conscience, 5= obey the law)	<b>2.096</b>	<b>2.572</b>	<b>2.328</b>	<b>2.708</b>
Acceptance of Deviance (1= acceptable, 14 = not acceptable)	<b>9.542</b>	<b>8.324</b>	<b>11.674</b>	<b>11.419</b>

Preferences in a Democracy (1= democratic rights not important, 40 = democratic rights very important)	<b>35.05</b>	<b>34.218</b>	<b>34.379</b>	<b>33.393</b>
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**X** = strongest norms promoting cooperation, **X** = weakest norms promoting cooperation

## DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT

Role of Government (1= low government responsibility/ intervention, 70 = high government responsibility/intervention)	<b>43.384</b>	<b>51.608</b>	<b>46.444</b>	<b>39.4935</b>
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Opinion of Civil Service (1= low opinion of civil service, 14 = high opinion of civil service)	<b>7.9635</b>	<b>5.653</b>	<b>7.1585</b>	<b>7.7745</b>
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Role of Private Industry (1= small role for private industry, 32= large role for private industry)	<b>20.4564</b>	<b>12.0144</b>	<b>17.8449</b>	<b>24.1312</b>
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Government Spending Level (1 = much less government spending, 42 = much more government spending)	<b>27.16</b>	<b>39.759</b>	<b>33.298</b>	<b>32.942</b>
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Confidence in Government (1= no confidence, 21 = high confidence)	<b>10.1685</b>	<b>9.3885</b>	<b>11.6805</b>	<b>11.086</b>
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**X** = highest score, **X** = lowest score

## DISCUSSION

The indexes suggest that the norms of cooperation are strong in each country but in different respects. For example, Russia is the least trusting country by far, but they have a low level of individual responsibility suggesting they are willing to cede personal control to an employer or the government<sup>1</sup>. Russian respondents also believe their taxes are too high indicating a lack of willingness to contribute resources to a government to protect

<sup>1</sup> In the discussion, the country's name and respondents from the survey will be used interchangeably. Keep in mind, saying Russia has weak norms is really referring to weak norms operating with the country and the people actually being untrusting.

their common interest. However, this could possibly be a reflection of their government's effectiveness at actually protecting the common interest instead of its own interests.

Conversely, Sweden is the most trusting country yet has the lowest index for collective behavior. They are the most comfortable of the countries with their tax level yet have a high preference for individual responsibility. Overall, the United States shows the strongest norms of cooperation. They are relatively trusting and have a high preference of collective behavior which seems counter intuitive given their reputation for individualism. West Germany falls somewhere in between for all of the indexes.

The differences in cooperation between countries suggest different mechanisms are at work enforcing those norms. Sweden is by far the most trusting country, but what really makes citizens feel like they can trust one another. In one case, social norms could be the reason; if someone takes advantage of another person, they could be socially outcast or punished by other members of society. Alternatively, there could be actual sanctions in place dictating that if one person takes advantage of another, they have to pay a fine or go to jail. In this example, social norms would be most logical as the enforcement mechanism. It is not likely that every time someone feels as though they have been treated unfairly, the guilty party gets fined unless it is a formal legal matter like a contract case. It is more likely others will take note of the action and treat the guilty party accordingly.

Social norms promoting cooperation in this study are measured in terms of obedience, acceptance of deviance, and preferences in a democracy. To understand obedience and acceptance of deviance, questions are used that ask the respondent what they think of cheating on taxes and giving the incorrect information to receive government entitlements. These questions most adequately address the social norms that are operating;

if a person defects and chooses to free ride on the contributions of others, what others think of these actions indicates how they react to defection.

According to the indexes from the survey data, the United States and Sweden have the strongest norms promoting cooperation. Their indexes are an entire four points higher than Russia and three points higher than West Germany. Looking at the individual questions for the acceptance of deviance dimension (See Appendix A), respondents from these countries considering cheating on taxes to be “wrong” with averages of 5.36 and 5.238 (with 7 equaling “seriously wrong”) for Sweden and the US respectively. They are even more strongly against giving incorrect information for government benefits; these averages are 6.314 and 6.181 respectively. Russia clearly has the weakest norms promoting cooperation. Their scores on these questions are much lower, 3.568 for the tax question and 4.756 for the government benefits question. West Germany too scored lower, 4.138 and 5.404 for the same questions.

The other dimension of social norms, type of government, was meant to indicate whether or not there are any authoritarian values in a country compared to purely democratic values. If a country has relatively authoritarian values like preferences for low citizen involvement and the restriction of democratic rights by the government, this could suggest weak norms promoting cooperation. Highly authoritarian countries would have strong sanctions and in turn, weak norms. However, the indexes resulting from questions on preferences in a democracy offer little insight and are almost misleading. All the countries scored high on the aggregated scale with little variation. Also, comparing the countries, the US has the lowest (but still a high score) of the countries. This seems odd

given that the US is the oldest democracy, by centuries compared to Russia which has only had elections since 1991 and still spurs debate on whether it is even a democracy at all.

Additionally, the specific questions on whether it is important if citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience and preference on the restriction of democratic rights by government garner relatively low scores from the US. Where “should not restrict” equals 5, the US respondents scored a 3.908 compared to 4.432 in West Germany and 4.168 in Sweden. Russia actually did score lower for this question with 3.736. These results, although interesting for comparison, do not really indicate any authoritarian values at all. They are all high on the aggregated scale, and individual questions received responses of six plus on a seven point scale for the most part. Authoritarian values in these countries can not affect the social norms promoting cooperation simply because there are no strong authoritarian values. This is true even in Russia, the country with the most recent authoritarian past. Although these countries have flaws as democracies, the citizens at least have strong preferences for democratic rights and values.

After assessing the social norms promoting cooperation, the sanctions in a country must be identified in order to determine the relationship between norms and/or sanctions promoting cooperation. Ideally, a survey question asking what the respondent thinks the government or some other third party should do if someone evades taxes, doesn't vote or gives false information to receive more government benefits would indicate the people's preferences for sanctions. A second question asking what the respondent thinks the government actually would do to a tax evader would give the people's perception of the sanctions against defection in their country. Summing the responses from these questions would allow for the creation of a scale similar to the ones already generated so that the

sanctions in a country could be adequately gauged. However, no such questions exist on the values surveys used for this paper.

The best proxies for sanctions are questions that ask what the respondents think the government should do for different policy areas. Fortunately, there are many questions in the available surveys asking respondents what they think the role of government should be. If citizens think their government should be involved in controlling prices and wages, redistributing wealth, regulating business and supporting declining industries (all questions used), then it is reasonable to infer that they think government should sanction non-cooperators. Although this is not an exact measure of what the sanctions actually are in a country, it is at least a proxy for a measure of what citizens think sanctions should be. Attitudes and preferences for the scope of government are not often far from the actual scope of government within a country.

Given this, the role of government dimension serves as a proxy question and quantifies the preference of citizens regarding the size of their government. Out of a scale of 70, Russia has an index of 51.6 which is by far the highest index of all the countries. The next highest is Sweden with 46.44 followed by West Germany with 43.38. The United States is on the low end with an index of 39.49; this score represents a completely neutral answer in between “probably should” and “probably not” to a question phrased as “do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to...” These indexes suggest that preferences for sanctions among citizens would be strong in Russia and weak in the United States. Sweden would fall closer in line with Russia while West Germany would fall closer to the US.

By examining the outliers, the countries representing the majority of the lowest and highest indexes, analysis can begin on the relationship between social norms and sanctions in promoting cooperation. The survey data indicates that Russia has the weakest social norms supporting cooperation. They have a low index on the acceptance of deviance dimension meaning they do not strongly censure cheating on taxes or lying to receive more government money. Moreover, their index on the conflict in conscience dimension falls exactly in between obey the law and following your conscience signifying no overwhelmingly strong norm to obey the law (a cooperative action in itself). I have already discarded the preferences for a democracy as irrelevant based on the data. Thus, the overall level of obedience dimension demonstrates that Russia has weak social norms promoting cooperation.

Additionally, the role of government dimension suggests Russians would prefer to have strong sanctions against defection. The high index shows that Russians favor an interventionist government. Given its weak social norms and strong sanctions, Russia exemplifies the situation Ostrom describes: “In a world of strong external monitoring and sanction, cooperation is enforced without any need for internal norms to develop” (p. 147). Without these internal norms, cooperation is never encouraged. Ostrom explains this stating that norms can work just as well as external rules, but norms have staying power and encourage cooperation and its growth while external rules can quickly disappear. In the case of Russia, strong sanctions imply weak social norms promoting cooperation which in turn implies low levels of cooperation. And as the indexes show, Russia has weak norms of cooperation. They have low levels of trust, a low acceptance of their tax system and a low level of collective behavior (compared to the United States).

Now looking at the other extreme, the United States' indexes show strong norms for cooperation. They consider defection to be "seriously wrong" and are more compelled to obey the law. Furthermore, their preference for sanctions is very low compared to the other countries and an entire twelve points lower than Russia. The United States represents the logical opposite to Russia: strong social norms and weak sanctions. As predicted, these strong social norms encourage higher levels of cooperation. The United States is more trusting and has stronger preferences for collective behavior. The data serves as initial support for this relationship between social norms and sanctions in promoting cooperation.

As for West Germany and Sweden, the data at this point are too indistinct to draw strong conclusions. The indexes have no definite pattern falling at the high and low ends and often in between. At this stage, I would characterize Sweden as being closer to the US except for their preference for big government. Perhaps, Sweden represents a situation with both strong norms and strong sanctions. West Germany, however, doesn't fall into any category with this data. Better data and more accurate indexes would be needed to develop more adequate conclusions.

#### APPLICATION—PROMOTING COOPERATION

Many scholars have recognized that cultural differences influence models of cooperation. It follows logically then that cultural differences affect the promotion of cooperation as well. Chen, Chen and Meindl (1998) address this relationship between cultural values and cooperative behavior arguing that the framing and context of cooperation mechanisms for individualist-collectivist cultures affects whether cooperation

is enhanced or discouraged. For example, cooperation will increase in individualist cultures if the group identity (the cooperation mechanism) enhances personal identities while cooperation increases in collectivist cultures if the group identity complements existing group identities (p. 268).

If fostering cooperation is contingent on cultural differences, then it is reasonable to expand on the argument and contend that fostering cooperation is contingent on how cooperation is enforced as enforcement mechanisms are analogous to cultural differences. The United States' norms of cooperation appear to be enforced by social norms, not sanctions. In trying to promote cooperation by solving some collective action problem, for example, citizens probably would not respond well to a cooperation mechanism that involves sanctions and strong government intervention. The additional dimensions of government are intended to address this point: what would citizens see as the appropriate mechanism or actor to promote cooperation. In the case of the US, although citizens have a much higher opinion of the civil service and have more confidence in their government than other countries, they are more comfortable with management by the private industry rather than government. The US has the highest index by far for the role of private industry, 24.1312 (out of 32), and the lowest index for government, 39.435 (out of 70). In order to foster cooperation in this country, one would want to include an enforcement mechanism relying on social norms instead of sanctions for better results, and have a greater role for private industry over one for government.

On the other hand, Russia would need monitoring and sanctions in order to promote cooperation. One could not rely on social norms as a way to encourage cooperation because social norms of this type are not strong in Russia where as sanctions

are. Furthermore, Russians prefer an increased role for government in the economy, business sector and social services. They would expect the government to be involved in any large scale cooperation problem. They prefer a smaller role for private industry; this index is only 12.0144 which is a staggering 12 points lower than the U.S. This preference for government over the private sector seems contradictory however given that Russia has such a low opinion of the government and civil service. Their indexes for these dimensions are the lowest by several points for each although these low scores are probably more of a reflection of the level of corruption in the government and particularly the civil service. Nevertheless, to promote cooperation in Russia, one would have to rely on sanctions and the government given the lack of social norms and the low preference for the private sector.

## CONCLUSION

Cooperation is a good thing. Even in models, the cooperative solution is often the most efficient outcome where players receive the biggest payoff. And certainly in real life situations, the outcome where everyone works toward the common interest and looks out for one another is preferable to everyone being in it for themselves. In order to encourage cooperation and see more of it in a society, it becomes necessary then to determine enforcement mechanisms and whether it is social norms or external sanctions that is supporting the existing cooperation in a country. The data here support this idea that countries with strong social norms have weak sanctions, and this in turn leads to higher levels of cooperation. The data also support the opposite conclusion, that countries with strong sanctions have weak social norms which leads to lower levels of cooperation.

Similar to the advantages from knowing the cultural context, knowing the relative strength of enforcement mechanisms allows for the better promotion of cooperation. Further research and exploration of this topic should be pursued. Developing and administering a survey with questions that really address preferences for cooperation, norms and sanctions would allow for a more systematic analysis of this important relationship. The result from the knowledge of which enforcement mechanisms are really at work in a country can only be more cooperation.

## Appendix A

Question	West Germany	Russia	Sweden	United States
<b>TRUST</b>				
People take advantage or try to be fair?	4.763	3.586	4.624	4.326
Trust in people or can't be too careful	3.767	2.916	4.387	3.909
<b>Sum</b>	<b>8.53</b>	<b>6.502</b>	<b>9.011</b>	<b>8.235</b>
<b>COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR</b>				
Good Citizen: Always Votes in Elections (very important =7)	5.321	5.562	6.273	6.19
Good Citizen: Never Try to Evade Taxes	5.879	5.996	5.706	6.405
Good Citizen: Always Obeys laws	6.011	6.173	5.959	6.439
Good Citizen: Active in Associations	3.795	4.243	3.222	4.608
Good Citizen: Understand Other Opinions	5.589	5.404	5.496	5.571
Good Citizen: Help less privileged in own country	5.622	5.31	5.124	6.022
<b>Sum</b>	<b>32.217</b>	<b>32.688</b>	<b>31.78</b>	<b>35.235</b>
<b>LEVEL OF OBEDIENCE</b>				
Obey law without exception (obey = 5)	2.096	2.572	2.328	2.708
Taxpayer not report income, pays less tax (seriously wrong = 7)	4.138	3.568	5.36	5.238
Incorrect info to get government benefits (seriously wrong = 7)	5.404	4.756	6.314	6.181
<b>Sum</b>	<b>11.638</b>	<b>10.896</b>	<b>14.002</b>	<b>14.127</b>
<b>INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY</b>				
Personally choice between different kinds of jobs (employee =1)	2.808	2.916	2.184	3.48
Personally choice between different work types (private = 5)	3.24	2.416	4.04	3.768
Personally important: work independently (very important =7)	5.839	4.996	5.593	5.6325
Govt/people should take more responsibility (people = 10)	6.1183	5.316	7.2486	7.5575
<b>Sum</b>	<b>18.0053</b>	<b>15.644</b>	<b>19.0656</b>	<b>20.438</b>
<b>TAXES</b>				
Taxes for High incomes (too high =7)	3.3265	3.724	3.0925	4.004
Taxes for Middle Incomes	4.945	5.074	4.701	5.207
Taxes for Low Incomes	5.7685	6.0745	5.732	5.2645
<b>Sum</b>	<b>14.04</b>	<b>14.8725</b>	<b>13.5255</b>	<b>14.4755</b>
<b>CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE</b>				
Obey law without exception (obey = 5)	<b>2.096</b>	<b>2.572</b>	<b>2.328</b>	<b>2.708</b>
<b>ACCEPTANCE OF DEVIANCE</b>				
Taxpayer not report income, pays less tax (seriously wrong =7)	4.138	3.568	5.36	5.238
Incorrect info to get government benefits (seriously wrong =7)	5.404	4.756	6.314	6.181
<b>Sum</b>	<b>9.542</b>	<b>8.324</b>	<b>11.674</b>	<b>11.419</b>
<b>TYPE OF GOVERNMENT</b>				
Rights in a Democracy: government respects minorities (very important =7)	6.263	5.964	6.274	6.206
Rights in a Democracy: government equal treatment	6.469	6.544	6.748	6.631

Rights in a Democracy: Citizen oriented decision	6.425	6.388	6.612	6.506
Rights in a Democracy: Citizen involved decision	6.22	6.087	5.931	6.154
Rights in a Democracy: civil disobedience acts	5.241	5.499	4.646	3.988
Preference: Restriction of democratic rights by government (should not restrict =5)	4.432	3.736	4.168	3.908
<b>Sum</b>	<b>35.05</b>	<b>34.218</b>	<b>34.379</b>	<b>33.393</b>

#### ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Government should redistribute wealth (strongly in favor =7)	4.3765	5.5285	4.953	3.7405
Government should control wages	3.376	5.7795	3.5455	3.5425
Government should control prices	4.348	6.181	4.7225	3.8335
Government Create new Jobs	5.638	6.105	5.143	5.3065
Government support declining industry	5.143	4.46	4.552	4.486
Cuts in Government spending (strongly against =7)	1.9575	2.5405	3.1735	2.2475
Less government regulation for business	3.216	3.6655	3.4365	3.324
Government Responsibility: health care for the sick (definitely should =7)	5.934	6.586	6.314	5.388
Government Responsibility: provide for unemployed	4.866	5.277	5.53	3.826
Government Responsibility: reduce income differences	4.529	5.485	5.074	3.799
<b>Sum</b>	<b>43.384</b>	<b>51.608</b>	<b>46.444</b>	<b>39.4935</b>

#### OPINION OF CIVIL SERVICE

Civil servants can be trusted (strongly agree =7)	3.5875	2.763	3.0085	3.3055
Public Service: Commitment to serve people	4.376	2.89	4.15	4.469
<b>Sum</b>	<b>7.9635</b>	<b>5.653</b>	<b>7.1585</b>	<b>7.7745</b>

#### ROLE OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY

Private ownership or government ownership should be increased (government =10)	6.9784	5.4729	6.7539	7.7987
Confidence in business and industry? (complete confidence =7)	3.826	2.5735	3.883	4.0765
Government or Private: electricity (mainly private =5)	3.24	1.232	2.428	4.188
Government or Private: hospitals	2.488	1.204	1.248	3.952
Government or Private: banks	3.924	1.532	3.532	4.116
<b>Sum</b>	<b>20.4564</b>	<b>12.0144</b>	<b>17.8449</b>	<b>24.1312</b>

#### CONTRIBUTION LEVEL

Government Spending: environment (spend much more =7)	5.0645	5.809	4.967	4.6715
Government Spending: health	5.002	6.381	5.5185	5.1565
Government Spending: law enforcement	5.0425	4.3915	4.8965	4.9285
Government Spending: education	4.885	6.154	5.087	5.4855
Government Spending: defense	2.3875	5.5115	3.229	3.7735
Government Spending: retirement	4.7785	6.2475	5.054	4.799
Government Spending: unemployment benefits	4.237	5.2645	4.546	4.1275
<b>Sum</b>	<b>27.16</b>	<b>39.759</b>	<b>33.298</b>	<b>32.942</b>

#### CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT

How much confidence in parliament (complete confidence =7)	3.2215	2.656	3.4405	3.604
Confidence in courts and legal system?	3.9415	2.92	4.108	3.733
Agree: Mostly We can trust People in Government (strongly agree =7)	3.0055	3.8125	4.132	3.749
<b>Sum</b>	<b>10.1685</b>	<b>9.3885</b>	<b>11.6805</b>	<b>11.086</b>

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The survey questionnaires and data used to compile the indexes in this paper can be found at the following websites:

International Social Survey Programme

[www.issp.org](http://www.issp.org)

World Values Survey

[www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)