GENOCIDE AND UNITED NATIONS ENFORCEMENT OF UNIVERSAL NORMS:
A STUDY OF STATE INTERESTS AND CONFLICT AFTER 1945

By

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of particular variables related to United Nations intervention in genocides and other types of conflict since 1945. By examining the way in which the state interests of the five permanent Security Council members affect the response to particular types of conflict during and after the Cold War, recurring trends in United Nations peacekeeping can be observed to identify the correlation between universal principles of international law and the enforcement of these principles in practice. Three types of conflict have been included – interstate war, civil war, and genocide. Values of foreign policy interests will be attributed to each of the five states for each conflict, which consists of coercion, balance of power, ex-colony, and sphere of influence/non-interference. In order to take into account the influence of Cold War politics, these variables will be analyzed over time from 1945 to 2005. The intended result is to identify the variables that have the strongest influence on the decision to implement peacekeeping operations through the Security Council. And this can provide a better image of United Nations enforcement of universal principles of international law as it occurs in practice.
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I. Introduction

The establishment of the United Nations symbolized an unprecedented opportunity to unify the collective interests of the world through a federated organization with the capacity to defend the universal principles upon which it was founded. Where the League of Nations had failed to include the United States into the cooperative, the United Nations effectively incorporated the majority of internationally-recognized independent states. With the formation of the United Nations Security Council as the enforcement mechanism of the organization, and the membership of a majority of the international community, the interests of individual member, as well as non-member, states could be addressed through a collective organization. Through the United Nations General Assembly, conventional mediums of diplomatic discourse could now be conducted through a single, international forum. One of the most significant provisions within the United Nations charter stated that, if any member of the United Nations were to be attacked by another member or a non-member of the organization, the aggressor would face the combined resources of the member states. Collective security remained a vitally important principle since the destruction and devastated that resulted from the First World War. And the failure of the League of Nations to prevent the Second World War demonstrated that the principle of collective security should be diligently defended by all members of the international community. However, it remained unclear how the articles governing the parameters of the Security Council, as written in the United Nations charter, would be implemented in practice. As a result, what became known as “peacekeeping” to define the enforcement of international law by the Security Council was not a term contained within the United Nations charter. It was a term that developed as the United Nations was confronted with cases concerning the violation of the
universal principles of international law that the organization claimed to uphold. This suggests that peacekeeping did not develop exclusively from an objective interpretation of the articles contained within the Charter. Rather, peacekeeping evolved as the member states collectively reacted to particular events and developments in the world based upon their own subjective perceptions and ideological positions.

The establishment of the United Nations provided the platform through which the international community could, as a collective organization, identify new parameters for the enforcement and preservation of peace as exercised through international law beyond the traditional conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, represented the commitment of the international community to the promotion and defense of the right to and exercises of individual freedom. The establishment of this ideal in the form of a declaration opened the door for the evolution of universal principles as they came to be identified by the international community. Crimes against humanity, such as genocide, slavery, and piracy, have come to represent the universal principles of international law that all independent states agree must not be tolerated. The fight to uphold these principles had existed previously in the form of customary international law. The United States engaged in military operations against the Barbary pirates operating out of their patrons-states in Tripoli. And the British Royal Navy, implementing the abolitionist policies of the British Parliament, engaged in a fifty year campaign to eliminate the Atlantic slave trade. At the same time, the unique element that the formation of the United Nations has introduced into the history of international law is that, for the first time, an international organization composed of the majority of the independent states of the world possesses the capacity to enforce universal principles of international law. Therefore, there is an
important question that must be asked – one which continues to be asked to this day: What will be the role of the United Nations in the implementation of universal principles of international law, considering that, before its inception, independent states were already enforcement them?

The unavoidable problem that makes answering this question extremely difficult is that, although there is a consensus on the importance of upholding universal principles of international law, there is disagreement over how this is to be applied in practice. And this inevitably leads to a discussion over the definition of terms such as genocide, slavery, and piracy, which then must determine what cases the international community recognizes are violating these principles. Embracing the misconception that the United Nations represents the collective interests of the entire human race, although an ideal upon which the organization was based upon, will only result in the failure to recognize the inherent preconditions that are still present within the organization today. The United Nations was structured to represent the balance of power that existed after the conclusion of the Second World War. The five Allied victors in the war – the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China – compromised to attain the veto-power within the Security Council, the enforcement arm of the United Nations. Although representation within the General Assembly was established on an equitable level among the member states, the implementation of international law through the United Nations was inherently dependent upon the concession of the five veto-holding members within the Security Council. As a result, any discussion about the role of the United Nations in the course of human history must include an emphasis upon the significance of the five permanent Security Council members, who possess the capacity to prevent resolutions from passing. The foreign policy interests of these five members must therefore be taken into account as significant variable in the determination of universal principles of international law, and the way in which
they are enforced by the United Nations. This raises the question not only of the validity of the United Nations as the representative for the collective interests of the international community, but whether the definition and enforcement of universal principles of international law is overshadowed by the interests of the five permanent Security Council members.

By recognizing that the United Nations does not, in practice, represent the collective interests of the international community on an equitable level, one can begin to understand and comprehend the history of the United Nations as it has unfolded. An idealist would undoubtedly have a difficult time explaining why the United Nations would intervene in one case of genocide and not another, when the criteria for the determination is supposedly the same. If universal principles of international law are inextricably dependent upon the definition applied by the United Nations, then by inference this suggests that, in practice, the actual application of the understanding of a term such as genocide is predominantly dependent upon the viewpoint of the five permanent Security Council members. Considering that this appears to be the unavoidable reality of the political dynamics within the United Nations, one must consider which factors are the strongest determinants of the decision to implement a peacekeeping operation within the Security Council. The goal is thus to determine whether the establishment of enforcement policies is significantly dependent upon the interests of the five permanent Security Council members, and in what ways.

This study seeks does not seek to provide the international community with the answers. Rather, this study will explore various factors that may help to explain why the United Nations has arrived to particular answers given a specific set of variables. The intention is to identify general trends in United Nations intervention since 1945 that could provide a perspective from which to examine how specific variables affect these trends over time. By observing how the
effects of particular variables may have changed from the Cold War period to the Post-Cold War period, this can provide a better understanding of how Cold War politics may have had a significant affect in the decision-making process within the United Nations. And by examining international law within the context of different types of conflict, this can provide the opportunity to assess the relationship between political influence and context. An understanding of law is incomplete unless the principles upon which they are established are comprehended in terms of how they are applied in practice. Failing to recognize the relationship between ideology and practice will only impede efforts to achieve a more objective – and thus a truly more universal – understanding and implementation of universal principles of international law through the United Nations.
II. Database: Conceptual Parameters

This study will examine United Nations enforcement of universal principles of international law through the creation and analysis of a catalog containing cases of conflict since 1945. These cases will be limited to civil war, interstate war, genocide, and any combination of either type of war with genocide. The intention is to examine a single universal principle of international law – genocide – within the context of conflict after the Second World War. This will require the establishment of criteria with which to determine whether a particular conflict corresponds to one of the aforementioned categories or, in some cases, two categories simultaneously. By establishing set criteria for each type of conflict, this will provide a consistent variable to which the experimental variables can be compared; from which observable changes can be identified and analyzed. This study will apply the criteria for civil and interstate conflict as established by Kristian Gleditsch through his work in the revision of the Correlates of War (COW), which is a catalogue of different types of conflict. A different set of criteria will be applied to genocides, as provided by the Political Instability Task Force, which will, in some cases, require that a case of genocide overlap with a civil or interstate conflict. As a result, the determining criteria will require that an overlap in the time frame and location of conflict must be catalogued as a single case of conflict.

Correlates of War

In 1963, Professor David Singer, from the University of Michigan, compiled the Correlates of War, a catalog of civil and interstate conflicts according to set criteria for the definition of state and for the definition of conflict, which spans back to the beginning of the 19th...
century. In 1999, Professor Kristian Gleditsch, from the University of Essex, expanded upon Singer’s research by restructuring the criteria he used to identify states, which resulted in the inclusion of numerous other conflicts that had not qualified because they involved participants not recognized as independent states. This study will apply the criteria used in Gleditsch’s research because it is more appropriate for the context of international relations after the Second World War. A country will be recognized as an independent state if the majority of the international community recognizes its status as such. And this will often be dependent upon that state’s membership in the United Nations. Gleditsch argued that one of the deficiencies of the Correlates of War was that the definition of state was contingent upon the recognition of that state by France and the United Kingdom. As a result, many countries that were not recognized as independent states by the French or British governments could not be include in the catalog.

Gleditsch changed the criteria for independent states by expanding upon the criteria that had been established by Singer. Gleditsch recognized that, even by accepting the 1,000 battlefield fatalities as the minimum criterion for war, there were numerous other conflicts with major political implications that would be excluded. At the same time, this criterion had the benefit of setting aside minor armed engagements that would otherwise be of little significance to a study of the effects of conflict. In order to account for this discrepancy, Gleditsch maintained the criterion for battlefield fatalities at 1,000; however, a few cases of conflict, which did not meet this limit, were nevertheless included due to their significance. Concerning the types of conflicts contained within the Correlates of War, this study will only utilize two categories. The first category, *interstate war*, is a conflict occurring between two or more members of the interstate system; that is, between independent states recognized by the international community. The second category, *extra-systemic wars*, is recognized as a conflict
between an independent state and an entity that is not recognized as an independent state by the international community. This study will only address those extra-systemic wars in which an independent state is engaged in a conflict with a non-state entity within its own territory: civil wars. By adopting the more expansive version of the Correlates of War database provided by Gleditsch, this will provide a firm and well-grounded base upon which to conduct an analysis of United Nations enforcement after World War II.

Political Instability Task Force

This study will apply the criteria for genocide as established by the Political Instability Task Force at the United States Naval Academy in their work on “Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-2006,” under the direction of Barbara Harff. The data they have provided consists of the separation of internal conflicts into several categories: ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, adverse regime changes, and genocide/politicide. Because the universal norm of genocide is the subject study, only the data concerning cases of genocide/politicide have been incorporated. As stated previously, cases in which genocide occurred within the context of a civil or interstate war will be catalogued as a single case, and not a separation between a case of genocide and a case of civil or interstate conflict. The Political Instability Task Force provided the criteria upon which they based their research to identify cases of genocide:

Genocide and politicide are distinguished from state repression and terror.

In cases of state terror authorities arrest, persecute or execute a few members of a group in ways designed to terrorize the majority of the group in passivity or acquiescence. In the case of genocide and politicide authorities physically exterminate enough (not necessarily all) members of a target groups so that it
can no longer pose any conceivable threat to their rule or interests. Although this is, in itself, an arbitrary definition of genocide, what is important to recognize is that the criteria used to identify cases of genocide are consistent throughout the data. By establishing a consistent criteria of conflict after 1945, as provided by the Political Instability Task Force and the Correlates of War, a more effective analysis of the relationship between the criteria that has been established by the United Nations concerning universal principles of international law, and how that criteria has implemented in practice, can be conducted.
III. Methods

Because the decision-making process within the United Nations Security Council is inextricably dependent upon the decisions of independent member states, it is necessary to identify in what ways these actors affect the decision-making process. And this requires an examination of those variables that can have a profound effect on the foreign policy decisions of these state actors. The necessity of identifying these variables requires an arbitrary definition that is adapted to the analytical parameters of this study. As a result, the descriptions provided for these variables should not be perceived as complete definitions, or an attempt to argue in favor of a particular definition of the particular term. Each variable has been adapted to assume a definition that is more inclusive of the many possible interpretations under which that term may be invoked. The intention is to be able to accommodate the changes in foreign policy that occur over time by establishing general definitions that can make an analysis of the data much more manageable. In doing so, more emphasis can be placed upon the general intention and purpose of specific foreign policy decisions, given a specific case, instead of incorporating all of the different aspects of a particular foreign policy, which would only complicate an effective analysis. Foreign policy can change drastically from one administration to the next. And even within the same administration, these changes can occur for various internal and external reasons. Therefore, the terms have been adopted in such a way as to accommodate such influences, while at the same time maintaining the general foreign policy interests of independent states as the focus. After all, the core of this study is to examine in what way the state interests of the five permanent United Nations Security Council members affect the decision-making process concerning the implementation of peacekeeping operations.
A. Permanent Security Council Members

Central to the hypothesis of this study is the role of the only members of the United Nations Security Council who possess the power to prevent peacekeeping from occurring – Great Britain, France, United States, Russia, and China. The realities of international politics throughout the time period after the Second World War reveal a substantial lack of parity among these five states. Britain and France were decimated by the war; and with control over colonial assets severed by decolonization, foreign policy options were severely limited. The United States emerged from the Second World War as the most powerful political and economic presence in the world. Russia, continuing the aspirations for a communist state, did not possess the infrastructural capabilities to maintain current levels of development that were, for the most part, aimed at parity with the United States. And China pursued an isolationist policy that aimed at the challenging United States and Russian influence by advocating state sovereignty throughout the world. Considering the varying aspects of the different foreign policy perspectives of these five states, state interests will not be classified as a variable that recognizes what role a particular state played in a given conflict. Nor is it an attempt to differentiate between different forms of foreign policy. Rather, these are classifications of how each individual state perceived its own foreign policy interests in a given conflict, which then informed them what their role should be and what foreign policies they should pursue.

1. Balance of Power

This term serves as a general definition of the theoretical political system in which the international community was functioning during the twentieth century. That is, the general
understanding that there should be a balance of power among the different competing powers in the world. Prior to the First World War, Great Britain was responsible for maintaining the balance of power in Europe, entering on the side of a weaker coalition in order to maintain parity and avoid total war. Although the First and Second World Wars demonstrated that the international community had failed to implement a balance of power, this was still used as a basic principle during and after the Cold War. The United States and the U.S.S.R. both perceived their role within Cold War politics as an attempt to maintain a balance of power, which would serve as deterrence to armed conflict, and possibly nuclear war. This was not limited to maintaining parity between both states; rather, this included the realization that there existed two hemispheres of power (the Western Bloc, the Easter Bloc, and China as an ambiguous third) and another world below this one consisting of third world powers. As a result, it became extremely important to maintain this balance of power through the United Nations. With both sides attempting to extend their sphere of influence, the possibility of a military confrontation in a third world state became much more likely. And as will be examined in the following sections of this study, the importance of maintain a balance of power through the United Nations Security Council became an important measure against nuclear war.

2. Ex-Colony

To differentiate those conflicts in which at least one party that is involved within the conflict itself was a previous colonial territory of at least one of the five permanent Security Council members, the term ex-colony will be applied. This includes both those territories which were annexed and those that were granted as mandates, such as Britain’s mandate over Mesopotamia (which includes the current state of Iraq). In addition, the state of Liberia has been
identified as a colony in this study for the United States because it was established as a place to deport African slaves in 1822, until it attained its independence in 1847. The importance of using this broader definition of colonialism, and including mandates and Liberia, is to determine the significance of past connections to certain regions and states. That is, the purpose of this variable is to identify how states act when a former colonial territory is involved in a conflict. For example, Britain’s intervention in the nationalization of the Suez Canal can primarily be explained by the fact that Egypt was a former colonial territory, and there were still many economic connections to the country, such as the canal. And this helps to explain the reluctance on the part of the British to allow a peacekeeping mission to occur. The important distinction of the ex-colony variable is the emphasis upon significant invested interests. De-colonization did not sever all ties between the imperial power and the colonial territory. Thus, the remnants of economic and political ties to ex-colonies served as windows of opportunity, which these states may perceive as threatened if they were to allow United Nations peacekeeping forces to intervene. If a state becomes destabilized by civil war, and the United Nations is prevented from intervening, then past colonial powers may see this as an opportunity to step in and assume an increased level of influence during a time when that ex-colony is not in a strong position to defend itself.

3. Coercion

A state of coercion is identified as significant military intervention equal to or recognized as a state of war. One of the clearest examples of this is the state of war between Egypt and the British-French alliance during the Suez crisis, which consisted of the deployment of significant military resources with the intended aim - which was publicly disclosed – of reversing the
nationalization of the Suez Canal – among other internal interests. At the same time, Britain, France, and the United States have not been listed as being in a state of coercion for the Korean War for two reasons. First, intervention in the conflict by these states was under the support and direction of the United Nations, as exercised through the U.S.-led United Nations Command. Thus, the conditions for war were substantially different than most of the cases in this study in which states were already involved in a conflict before the United Nations stepped in, even though that state might later cooperate in peacekeeping efforts – as the French and British did in the Suez crisis. Second, the members of this coalition were limited to the parameters of the United Nations Command mission: to stop North Korea from invading and taking control of the South Korea. While the political motivations for each country may have been different, their foreign policy interests for this conflict were the same: to maintain the balance of power. As a result, their state interests have been identified as such.

Gleditsch provided data that included the casualties suffered by states involved within a particular conflict, although they may not have been included into the definition of the conflict to constitute a state of war. For example, Gleditsch classified the Vietnamese conflict that occurred from 1965 to 1975 as an inter-state war between the Republic of Vietnam (ROV) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). At the same time, he has noted involvement by the United States from 1965 to 1973, with the loss of 58,153 American lives for that time period. Had the United States continued its policy of providing only military aid and training to the Republic of Vietnam, and the subsequent aerial bombardments against DRV positions, the involvement of the United States in the conflict would not be identified as coercion. Until 1965, the United States wanted to maintain the balance of power between the ROV and the DRV in fear that the Russians would interfere if they perceived that the existence of the ROV was
seriously threatened. However, by April of 1965 the United States had 27,000 military personnel in the ROV, deploying missions that went beyond the protection of American bases and personnel.

Thus, coercion should not be understood simply as a state of war, in this case. Nor is it simply an interpretation of a state’s foreign policy interests in a given conflict based upon factors that include the extent of involvement – armed troops in combat is considered a much greater commitment in most cases then aerial bombardments – as well as that state’s involvement in the context of international politics. Rather, it is an analysis of these factors in conjunction with how a particular state perceived the conflict in terms of these factors. A state that identifies itself as exercising coercive foreign policy would thus have a greater interest in that conflict, compared to a state that understood its foreign policy interests within the region limited to maintaining a balance of power. The assumption in this research is that a state which perceives a conflict as an implementation of coercive foreign policy has a substantially greater affect than balance of power. In relation to the hypothesis, states with coercive foreign policy interests in a given conflict would be less willing to permit peacekeeping missions, which are more concerned with maintaining the balance of power – the stabilization of the region – than the intention of forcing particular actors to change their behavior to meet their specific foreign policy interests.

4. Sphere of Influence/Non-Interference

By the end of World War II, the United States had for some time established its hegemonic disposition over Latin America. That is, the international community understood that the Americas, as a region, were the political and economic responsibility of the United States. This can be seen through international entities such as the Organization of American States
which is similar to the United Nations in its structure, except limited to a regional focus. As stated in the UN charter, all regional conflicts must first be submitted to existing regional organizations (such as the OAS). All conflicts within Latin America were understood by the international community to be within the sphere of influence of the United States, as exemplified by the OAS. As a result, an attack on one of the states on the American continents by a power abroad would have been perceived as a breach of that sphere of influence. The Falklands War is an exception to this, for in this case the Argentine Government invaded the British Falklands; and more importantly, the United States did not act on behalf of Argentina to prevent the British Royal Navy from retaking the islands. In effect, the affairs of the Latin American countries were within the jurisdiction of the United States; and foreign powers understood that they should not interfere. At the same time, the way in which that sphere of influence was practiced was not as strict compared the hemispheric distribution of the Cold War.

The defining characteristic of the Cold War was the formation of the Western and Eastern blocs. One of the most effective ways of identifying this difference is to recognize this as a Cold War between the National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact). In many ways, this was an even much stronger conception of sphere of influence than the one maintained by the United States in Latin America. The relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was contingent upon the treaty agreement of each corresponding bloc, which stipulated that if any member or members were attacked by a member or members of the opposing side, the entire group would retaliate in response. The purpose of including this definition of sphere of influence is thus to incorporate the reality that nuclear war presented. Although nuclear weapons would be unlikely to be used outside of these spheres of influences, as a means to advance the interests of the group, the line
between the regional demarcations of influence – represented by the borders of the member states – was one that could not be crossed. The risk of violating the sphere of influence was nuclear war, which each side made clear to the other.

The sphere of influence is also used within this study as recognition of a particular context for civil war. Based upon the cases examined in this study, this will only apply to Russia and China. Each state has had numerous instances of civil war against particular ethnic or nationalistic groups that are not recognized by the international community as independent states. For example, the Russian civil war against the Chechens and the Chinese civil war against the Taiwanese are cases that are identified as internal state conflicts. One particular exception is the Chinese civil war against the Tibetans, which was identified as an interstate war by Gleditsch. This is the only case in which an exception of Gleditsch’s criteria has been made, for at the time of the conflict Tibet was not recognized as an independent state. It was considered to be a part of China. Therefore, this could not be identified as a war between independent states. Taking this exception into account, all cases of civil wars in China and Russia will not be identified as spheres of influence per se. Rather, they have been categorized as coercion within the database. And the interests of the other four member states have been classified as non-interference, to identify that the other states understood that they understood their connection to the conflict as one of non-interference, regardless of the circumstances.

B. Cold War Variables

As has already been stated, comparing the change of particular variables as they occur over time between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War era will be one of the methods by which the significance of these variables will be measured. For example, some variables may show that
Cold War politics made very little significant difference, which can be seen by a consistency of that variable through both eras, in terms of the rate of peacekeeping operations that occurred in cases in which that variable was present. As a marker for the transition from one period to another, the time period before and up to 1989 will be classified as cold war, whereas the time period after and including 1989 will be classified as post-cold war. Those conflicts that begin During the Cold War and continue after 1989 will be categorize as transition. The intention is to be able to reflect the difference of those conflicts that took place at the juncture between the Cold War and Post-Cold War period.

C. Peacekeeping Operations

Since this is primarily a study that examines the conditions for peacekeeping as a mechanism for the enforcement of universal principles of international law, the variable of peacekeeping is, in itself, a very important variable to take into account. That is why this study has categorized United Nations intervention into three gradations of peacekeeping, from the most passive to the most active: observation missions, traditional peacekeeping, and enforcement operations. There are numerous distinguishing characteristic that have been taken into account in the determination of what missions constitute which type of intervention. The strongest form of intervention, enforcement operations, is based primarily upon identifying whether peacekeeping was enabled by a Chapter VII resolution. Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII are most often implemented as a command, which compels a state to act according to the instructions contained therein. This often takes the form of economic sanctions or directions to establish a ceasefire. If the state does not comply by the designated deadline, the Security Council can vote in favor of an enabling resolution under Chapter VII, which calls for
members of the United Nations to use any force necessary to bring about the conditions that were not met. And this is the primary difference of enforcement missions to the other two forms of intervention. Observation missions and traditional peacekeeping only take place if the parties within a conflict concede to the intervention of peacekeeping forces.

The criteria used to identify observation missions and traditional peacekeeping is based upon the mission mandate and the maximum strength of peacekeeping forces for the duration of the operation. These two factors must be taken into account together when identifying a peacekeeping mission as one form of intervention or the other. The reason is that the functional application of the mission’s mandate is inherently limited to the logistical resources available for the mission. How would a peacekeeping mission effectively uphold a ceasefire with a force of only 600? Drawing this line has not been a particular problem in this study, for all of the peacekeeping operations whose mission mandate is limited to observation do not exceed the minimum troop level of 1,000 for traditional peacekeeping. Thus, there seems to be a correlation between the mission mandate and the logistical support committed. And this is the measurement by which the commitment of the United Nations to intervention is to be understood.
IV. Results

Based upon the criteria that have been selected, and the variables that have been outlined and defined, an examination of the compiled data can more effectively be conducted in order to analyze the conditions under which United Nations peacekeeping operations did and did not occur. This will provide the opportunity of analyzing the different variables in relation to each other as they occur over time. Considering that this study is based upon an extensive and complicated database compilation, it will be necessary to examine the numerous variables individually. The goal of these efforts is the identification of recurring trends that occur over time. And by analyzing these results within the greater context of United Nations peacekeeping, it will be possible to construct a more complete image of the principles upon which intervention occurs. Considering that the premise of this study is to examine how the Cold War can account for patterns in United Nations peacekeeping, all of the corresponding variables in this study must necessarily be applied to and separated by the cold war variables. In doing so, this can provide a better picture of how Cold War politics had an affect on United Nations peacekeeping by comparing in what way the other variables did or did not remain consistent after 1989. That is, are identifiable trends consistent throughout the time period after 1945; or are there significant differences in the way they have an effect on intervention after the end of the Cold War. The results will provide a clearer picture of the parameters for United Nations enforcement of universal principles of international law as they are applied in practice.
A. Cold War Correlations

The time period after 1989 provides the excellent opportunity of examining the effects of Cold War politics on United Nations peacekeeping through the use of comparison. The relatively smaller sample size of Post-Cold War cases may not provide very strong evidence; however, it can still provide a picture of the way in which certain trends during the Cold War may or may not appear to have changed after 1989. As a result, this can provide insight into the inner workings of the United Nations political system, within the context of international relations. The importance of the political rivalry between the Western Bloc (United States, France, and Great Britain) and the Eastern Bloc (Soviet Union), with China as an ambiguous third bloc, cannot be underestimated, for it is these states that held the sole veto power to prevent a peacekeeping operation much occurring within the United Nations Security Council.

Table 1. Peacekeeping According to Cold War Politics Since 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.-Russia Relations</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>13/94</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>7/22</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>18/53</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38/169</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An analysis of the Cold War variable reveals a very significant correlation between United Nations peacekeeping and the time period in which they were enabled. This dataset (Table 1) illustrates the frequency and percentage of peacekeeping missions that occurred for all conflicts within given temporal parameters. Values for Cold War are those conflicts that
occurred from 1945 and up to but not including 1989. The values for Transition are those conflicts that began during the Cold War and continued beyond the end of Cold War politics in 1989. And conflicts that occurred after and including 1989 have been attributed a value under the Post-Cold War category. Using the percentage values for each category, correlations can be made between the different values, even though the sample sizes are very different. By doing so, general assessments can be made in order to begin to identify general trends over time since 1945.

Establishing 22 percent as the average value for peacekeeping missions in correlation to the total number of conflicts, there is a notable difference between the three categories in comparison to this value. The values for the Cold War category reveal that, on average, peacekeeping missions occurred at a rate of 14 percent for conflicts that took place before 1989 – a value notably lower than the average of 22 percent. This difference becomes even more significant when compared to the 34 percent of peacekeeping missions that occurred for all of the conflicts that took place after 1989. Discounting the considerable difference in sample size between these two variables, what these results suggest is that there is a significant difference between conflicts that have occurred during the Cold War and conflicts that have occurred since 1989. When this is compared to an increase from 14 percent in the Transition category to 32 percent for the Post-Cold War category, this corroborates the assertion that there was an occurring change in the international political contexts that permitted for greater support for United Nations peacekeeping operations within the Security Council. This suggests that because there were an increased percentage of peacekeeping missions for transition conflicts compared to cold war conflicts, there is a notable shift toward greater peacekeeping cooperation near the end of the Cold War era.
Peacekeeping operations for *transition* conflicts, which began during the Cold War and continued beyond and including 1989, may have been enabled before or after the fall of the Soviet Union. As a result, these results must be corroborated with the findings in Table 1 in order to identify general trends of peacekeeping operations. By creating two tables with an examination of the conflicts in one and peacekeeping operations in the other, a more complete assessment of general trends for this period concerning Cold War politics can be made.

Table 2. U.N. Peacekeeping Missions Divided by Cold War Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Nations</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>9/38</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>6/38</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>23/38</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38/38</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This dataset (Table 2) reveals that the correlations examined in Table 1 are consistent with the trends for peacekeeping missions themselves. 60 percent of the total peacekeeping operations in the compiled database took place after 1989, whereas only 24 percent of the total peacekeeping operations occurred after the end of Cold War politics. To reemphasize, the values for *cold war* are strictly those peacekeeping operations that occurred during the Cold War and thus ended prior to 1991 – in the same way that this is used for *cold war* conflicts. The values for *transition* conflicts and peacekeeping operations must thus be looked at as an overreaching trend across the *cold war* values and the *post-cold war* values. If separated between peacekeeping operations that began during the Cold War and since 1991, the values change to 40
percent for cold war peacekeeping operations and 60 percent for peacekeeping operations in the post-cold war category.

The way that the transition value can also be interpreted is to identify the value of peacekeeping missions outside of Cold War politics. Many peacekeeping operations during the Cold War were established in order to prevent confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two leading world nuclear powers, such as the peacekeeping operations in Angola (which will be discussed in the following section, Types of Conflict Correlations). If established under this context, it is understandable why certain peacekeeping operations would end prior to 1989 and not continue into the Post-Cold War period. The transition category can thus be used to corroborate certain trends between cold war and post-cold war values. This is true both for the examination of Table 1 and Table 2. At the same time, the relatively smaller sample size of the transition category, and the difficulty of placing it within the greater scope of Cold War politics, limits its uses.

The two datasets that have been examined provide very revealing insight into the affects of Cold War politics upon the inner workings of the United Nations Security Council. Corroborating both findings, the data suggests that the cold war and post-cold war values are very significant variables. This assessment lends to the recognition that there is a general trend which can be identified: namely, that the end of Cold War politics signaled the beginning of a change in international relations, which led to greater cooperation within the United Nations Security Council. The end of Cold War politics in 1989 opened the way for greater commitment and cooperation in favor of peacekeeping operations, as the percentage values demonstrate is the case after the end of Cold War politics. However, an examination of the political dynamics behind peacekeeping operations cannot end with an examination of cold war and post-cold war
variable. There must be other variables that can account for the reason that peacekeeping operations occur for some conflicts and not others within each category of cold war and post-cold war variables.

B. Types of Conflict Correlations

Peacekeeping missions are generally a response to the need to maintain the conditions for a peaceful settlement of an occurring or reoccurring conflict. Thus, it is proper that the assessment of this compiled database continue with a breakdown of the conflicts catalogued by their corresponding type. In doing so, the proportion of conflicts that resulted in a peacekeeping operation within each category can be compared.

Table 3. Peacekeeping Operations According To Conflict Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>17/99</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War/Genocide</td>
<td>10/24</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>0/16</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War</td>
<td>11/29</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War/Genocide</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38/169</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data reveals that out of the 99 civil wars catalogued, only 17 resulted in a peacekeeping mission. Out of 24 civil wars in which genocide took place, only 10 resulted in a peacekeeping mission. Yet, out of all of the 16 genocides that did not involve civil war or inter-
state war, there was not a single peacekeeping mission enabled. Out of all the 29 inter-state wars, there were 11 peacekeeping missions. And the single case of genocide during an inter-state war did not result in a peacekeeping mission.

The intention of identifying whether genocide occurred during a civil war, an interstate war, or as a conflict in itself is crucial to the understanding of how this variable impacts the decision in favor of intervention by the United Nations. The examination of genocide as a principle of international law is, after all, the primary subject of this study. And this dataset (Table 3) reveals some very important information from which recurring trends may be drawn.

As demonstrated by this dataset, there were a total of 38 conflicts out of 169 in which a peacekeeping operation took place, a percentage value of 22 (the total average value that was asserted in Table 1). Using this as the point of reference for the entire period after 1945, it is clear that the value of 17 percent for peacekeeping operations which occurred during a civil war is very close to the value of the total average 22 percent. When the values for the other types of conflict are compared, however, there is a significant difference. Civil wars in which genocide took place resulted in a value of 42 percent, and interstate wars in which genocide did not take placed resulted in a value of 38 percent, a notable difference from the total average of 22 percent. At the same time, the 16 conflicts which have been identified as genocides that did not occur during a civil war had no peacekeeping operations take place.

This striking disparity suggests that there is a very significant different in the classification of a conflict based upon how the United Nations has responded to genocides. Why would the United Nations demonstrate a 38 percent response record to interstate wars, yet take no peacekeeping action concerning the 16 cases of genocide? Even more important, why would the United Nations demonstrate a 42 percent response record for civil wars in which genocide
took place, yet fail to intervene in the other 16 cases of genocide (not including the genocide that took place during an interstate war)? What is so unique about interstate war and genocides that occur during a civil war in comparison to individual cases of genocide, which would warrant a greater response to the former by the United Nations? To answer this question, one must take into account the nature of the types of conflict that have been identified in relation to the function of the United Nations.

Considering that the United Nations is supposed to represent the collective interests of the international community, it is only logical that decisions for peacekeeping are based upon a reaction to a conflict upon these terms. Civil wars tend to be matters of political delicacy, for there are many political elements within the international community that support the ideal of non-interference in the internal affairs of independent states. Many conflicts tended to be dealt with in terms of the balance of power between the Eastern and Western bloc. The permanent Security Council members would be unlikely to support U.N. intervention within a conflict that they believed could still be controlled by their own means, to achieve their own interests. This is evident in Chad, in which case none of the three civil wars recorded in the compiled database resulted in a peacekeeping operation. This is primarily due to the active intervention of the French, who used coercive means to bring about the end of hostilities on three separate occasions – including the defense of the country against an incursion by Libya. Had the French believed that they would be unable to maintain their foreign policy in Chad on their own terms, however, it is likely that they would have cooperated in the establishment of a peacekeeping operation. This suggests that the interests of the permanent Security Council members have a profound effect, in so far as they perceive that their interests are not threatened by U.N. intervention.
This is further supported by the dataset, which demonstrates a substantially greater rate of peacekeeping missions for civil wars in which genocide occurred as opposed to civil wars in which genocide did not occur. In general, genocides tend to be very quick and very violent; a state sanctioned policy to selectively extermination a socio-cultural group. Because of the inhumane aspects of such a policy, this leads not only to vast amounts of dead, but also to great outflow of refugees. As opposed to civil wars, in which people leave sections of the country or emigrate to escape the carnage as its effects reach them, genocide instills fear in a significant portion of the populace, making them fully aware that they are the target. It would be illogical for them to wait, knowing that they are being hunted, so this prompts many to flee in the hope of escaping the inevitable onslaught. And it is the factor of refugees fleeing the country and spreading throughout the surrounding region into other countries that prompts a crisis that is extremely difficult to mitigate by a single country, no matter what interests they are attempting to protect. This helps to explain why the United States and Soviet Union would cooperate to support a peacekeeping mission into Angola during the civil war against UNITA from 1975 to 1994. Although this country had been the chosen battleground for the competing ideologies of the Cold War – the US supported the UNITA rebels and the Soviets supported the FNLA government – the genocide that accompanied the conflict added to the slaughter that would claim over 350,000 lives by the end of the war. This is consistent with the information provided in Table 2, which demonstrates that the average number of fatalities is much higher for genocides that occurred in the context of civil war than civil wars in which genocide did not occur. The implications of regional destabilization as a result of civil wars in which genocide was occurring could not be ignored by the permanent Security Council members. And their particular interests
eventually had to be set aside, just as the United States and Soviet Union did when they approved UNAMEV in 1988, even though they were still within the context of Cold War politics.

Table 4. Battlefield Fatalities According To Type of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
<th>Fatalities (Total)</th>
<th>Fatalities (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>3,386,130</td>
<td>35,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War/Genocide</td>
<td>7,460,635</td>
<td>324,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War</td>
<td>4,932,600</td>
<td>170,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>3,379,000</td>
<td>259,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,158,365</td>
<td>113,363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the best examples of this is the Suez Crisis in 1956, involving the invasion of the Sinai in Egypt by British, French, and Syrian forces in order to reverse the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The British and the French had clear economic interests in this case, and early in the conflict they impeded attempts by the United Nations to intervene. Eventually, however, they gave way to international pressure because the situation was becoming a serious international crisis. Casualties for the war were relatively light – 3,200 killed – but the implication of a regional crisis developing even further, to the point of an international crisis, prompted the cooperation of the international community. The fact that this conflict occurred early in the Cold War – only three years after the conclusion of the Korean War – demonstrates that the international community probably recognized the importance of avoiding international crises from developing on a regional level, which could place the contending powers against each other where no one holds a claim as a sphere of influence. Thus, this would necessitate a collective
treatment of the situation in order to avoid competition by contending parties to seek their interests, which could precipitate international conflict, and possibly nuclear war. Although interstate wars are not as violent in terms of the average casualties sustained compared to civil wars in which genocide occurred, it is still substantially higher than the average for civil wars. And given the situation of two state-supported armies fighting each other, it should be assumed that in terms of damage to infrastructures and territory, interstate wars are extremely more intense. These observations support the observable recurring trend that the type of conflict matters, sometimes even more than particular state interests and rivalry during the Cold War. But this is only the case if the threat of the conflict itself is perceived to be greater than the interests that can be protected outside of U.N. intervention.

With a better picture of how the type of conflict variable can account for the decisions of the United Nations to implement a peacekeeping operation, the next step requires that these results be separated between Cold War and post-Cold War conflicts.
Table 5. Peacekeeping According To Types of Conflict During the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cold War Conflicts</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>4/48</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War/Genocide</td>
<td>1/12</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>0/11</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War</td>
<td>8/22</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War/Genocide</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13/94</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Peacekeeping According To Types of Conflict In Transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition Conflicts</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>3/12</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War/Genocide</td>
<td>4/7</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>0/3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7/22</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Peacekeeping According To Types of Conflict After the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Cold War Conflicts</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>10/39</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War/Genocide</td>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War</td>
<td>3/7</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18/53</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparing Table 5 (Cold War Conflicts) and Table 7 (Post-Cold War Conflicts), an immediately recognizable observation is that there were more peacekeeping missions implemented after 1989 than during the Cold War. The most evident increase is in peacekeeping missions for civil wars in which genocide occurred and civil wars in which genocide did not occur. Although the percentage of peacekeeping missions for interstate conflicts increased, it was not by a very significant amount, compared to the other two variables observed. This would appear to support the original observation that interstate conflicts were better dealt with by the United Nations in order to avoid a clash between the West and the East. The dataset (Table 6) for those conflicts that occurred during the transition from Cold War to post-Cold War relations demonstrate that this change is consistent, with about half of these conflicts resulting in a peacekeeping mission after 1989. This further supports the observation that the Cold War had a significant effect on the decision-making process of the United Nations concerning the implementation of peacekeeping operations.

The assessments made of the type of conflict variable, as it corresponds to the primary question of what variables are significant in the determination of the United Nations to implement peacekeeping operations, has provided valuable information for the identification of observable recurring trends. The data in this section suggests that the United Nations responds more often to those conflicts that are more likely to result in regional destabilization – namely, civil wars in which a genocide occurs and interstate conflicts. This is not uniquely inclusive of the importance of preventing the United States and the Soviet Union from coming to heads with each other, but also the critical issue of international law as it applies to the sovereign rights of states to prevent intervention in their internal affairs. At the same time, this suggests that, in support of the claim to sovereignty, states engaged in civil wars may be sufficiently strong
enough to hinder the decision to implement a peacekeeping operation in the face of such
difficulties. A peacekeeping force would not be very successful if the elements within that state
were able to resist the “blue helmets,” making the effort to enforce the peace seemingly hopeless.
Peacekeeping forces are, in general, not militarily strong enough to challenge state armies. In
addition, the situation within a country engaged in civil war, in which an intervention has been
consented to by that state, may be too complex and difficult for the United Nations to invest
personnel and resources. This is an important part of the frustration of the peacekeeping mission
in Somalia, which to this day has failed to bring about significant conditions for peace in a large
part due to the resistance of warring clans. The United Nations, after all, was a reaction to both
of the world wars, which required a strong mechanism to prevent another conflict of this sort. At
the same time, it was not powerful enough to present a significant challenge to the sovereignty of
independent states.

What do these results imply about the United Nations as an effective enforcer of
universal principles of international law? The datasets reveal that there were no peacekeeping
missions during a conflict in which genocide occurred in itself, where as civil wars in which
genocide occurred demonstrate the highest rate for peacekeeping operations. This further
supports the assessment that non-intervention in the internal affairs of states is an important issue
in the United Nations. And genocide is a state conduct that can be interpreted as strictly an
internal affair. But when genocide occurs during a civil war, the implication for the possibility
of a change in balance of power nullifies this opinion as important in favor of maintaining
stability in the region. After all, the classification of a conflict is dependent upon the decision of
the international community, represented by the United Nations, and not an objective definition.
This leads to the disconcerting assessment that United Nations intervention is overwhelmingy
contingent upon the political implications of the conflict, which determines under what conditions universal principles of international law will be enforced.

C. State Interests Correlations

Considering that the study of peacekeeping is inextricably linked to those who are willing to commit resources to its implementation, state interests become a central part of this study. To reiterate, *state interests* are used in this study to identify how the five permanent Security Council members, who each hold the veto-power to prevent peacekeeping missions from occurring, perceive their role within the context of the conflict. That is, what is the relationship between their values and their foreign policy objectives? And how do these different attitudes relate to the implementation of peacekeeping operations in some cases and not in others? If particular patterns can be identified, this can lead to a better understanding of what recurring trends exist that can help to explain the dynamics of the decision-making process within the United Nations Security Council.

1. Balance of Power

In order to evaluate the different state interests as they occur over time, there must be an effective basis of comparison from which to determine in relation to what these changes are occurring. This is why the *balance of power* variable is so important for this study. By comparing the results of the other variables to the results of this variable, this can provide a perspective from which to examine how much can be accounted for by state interests. And thus what the effects of Cold War politics had on the consistency of these recurring trends over time?
Table 8. Peacekeeping and Balance of Power According To Cold War Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Balance of Power</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>3/16</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>10/20</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15/42</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concerning the analysis of state interests, the value of 22 percent for the average of peacekeeping operations since 1945 from Table 1 will no longer be used. Instead, the value of 36 percent from these results (Table 8) will be applied to the study of these variables. By doing so, the values for balance of power can be used as the norm to which the other variables are compared to. This is not to suggest that there are no significant interests involved in this category. Rather, because this is the general foreign policy that was adopted by the international community in its treatments outside the parameters of the United Nations, this is the one value that can be attributed to the permanent Security Council members on a relatively equitable level. These results suggest that balance of power is much more receptive to peacekeeping operations after 1989, which is consistent with the findings thus far. What remains to be seen, however, is in what way this observable recurring trend relates to the other types of state interests?

2. Ex-Colonies

Although the conclusion of the Second World War signaled the demobilization of the imperial-colonial system as it had existed prior to 1945, many states continued to maintain a vested interest in their previous territorial assets. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (Zaire) from 1960-1965 occurred shortly after independence from the Dutch; recognizing that this presented an opportunity to reestablish a political hold in the Congo, the Dutch sent in forces to restore order. Had the Dutch possessed a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council, it is probable that they would have used their veto-power to prevent a peacekeeping operation. And this is precisely why it is important to examine any colonial connection that the five permanent Security Council members (United Kingdom, France, United States, Russia, and China) may have had in the past, which can help to explain why peacekeeping missions occurred in some cases and not in others.

The following dataset illustrates the distribution of peacekeeping operations that occurred out of all of the conflicts, in which one or more permanent Security Council members had maintained colonial ties with one of the parties in the conflict in the past.

Table 9. Peacekeeping and Ex-Colonial Interests According To Cold War Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ex-Colonial Interests</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>8/62</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>2/10</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>7/23</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17/95</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recalling the 36 percent overall average rate of peacekeeping operations in which all states were exercising a balance of power, the 18 percent average for peacekeeping operations that occurred during a conflict in which one or more Security Council members was involved in a colonial capacity in the past is much lower. Apparently, cases in which ex-colony is a factor
are much less likely to result in peacekeeping operations, when compared to the relatively high rate of peacekeeping operations for the *balance of power* variable.

The dataset succeeds in corroborating the general trend that Cold War politics impede cooperating for greater involvement by the United Nations, for there is a tremendous shift from a rate of 13 percent during the Cold War and 30 percent during the Post-Cold War era for the *ex-colony* results; a change that is also supported by the increase to 20 percent in the Transition category. This is to be expected, taking into account the political tension between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc that was the condition for Cold War politics. A member of NATO would not desire the participation of members of the Warsaw defensive pact in the intervention of a conflict in which the former still retained important political and economic interests in the region. And the relatively high rate of peacekeeping operations that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in which one or more permanent Security Council members had maintained colonial ties in the past, suggest that a greater tolerance for international intervention was present. At the same time, the 30 percent rate of peacekeeping operations for the *ex-colony* variable is still significantly lower than the 50 percent rate of peacekeeping operations for the *balance of power* variable, when one looks at the Cold War category in both. This suggests that the *ex-colony* variable is a greater impeding influence than the norm (*balance of power*), independent of Cold War politics, because the value for the latter are relatively larger than the former.

3. Coercion

If the *ex-colony* variable implies that a states is resistant to United Nations intervention because it is attempting to protect its political and economic interests in the conflict region, then
the *coercion* variable only serves to strengthen the determination of a state to defend its interests in a conflict in which it has already committed itself to through the use of military force. This suggests that, compared to the significance of previous colonial connections, a state engaged in coercive relations with one or more participants within a conflict should be a substantially greater influence on whether that state will tolerate intervention by the United Nations. At the same time, any generalizations drawn must be tested against the affects of the cold war variables.

Table 10. Peacekeeping and Coercive Interests According To Cold War Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coercive Interests</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>1/11</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>0/4</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2/15</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To restate, the classification *coercion* is used in this study to indicate the foreign policy interests that a specific state is exercising. This is used to differentiate the exercise of military force as part of an action sanctioned by the United Nations (in the form of coalitions, or other cooperative military action) to the exercise of military force implemented by an independent state. Although the specific foreign policy interests being addressed may be different and multifaceted for different states and different conflicts, the emphasis is on the use of force without the sanction of the United Nations Security Council.

With this in mind, a study of the effects of this variable can help to uncover the relationship between the coercive interests of the permanent Security Council members and the
decision to implement a peacekeeping operation. However, what this dataset reveals is that there is simply an insufficient amount of data to make any strongly supported claims about the effects of the *coercion* variable. The results themselves demonstrate that there were relatively few peacekeeping operations that occurred for these cases, which suggests that the *coercion* variable is an extremely strong indicator that a United Nations peacekeeping operations will not be permitted. Nevertheless, the limited amount of data for this variable prevents any further extrapolations to be made. A sample size of 15 is small enough as it is. And the necessity to separate this data according to the cold war variables makes any assertions concerning this variable unsound and inconclusive.

4. Sphere of Influence/Non-Interference

The importance of separating United States interests and Russian interests between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc was primarily a means of limiting potential contact between both states that could result in conflict, and possibly nuclear warfare. And this was established under the assumption and recognition that one would not interfere within the sphere of influence in the other. Taking this into account, how would the development of peacekeeping operations throughout the world relate to the political context of the Cold War? Balance of power could be effective in containing a conflict and preventing any one side from persevering over the other; at the same time, this also presented the risk of placing the United States and Russia in conflicting situations that could escalate to nuclear war. In situations such as these, the international community has supported the implementation of peacekeeping operations, for they offer an alternative solution to conflict mitigation that does not place the Western Bloc against the Eastern Bloc. Yet, what does this imply about conflicts that occur within the sphere of influence
of either bloc? Both sides understand that they must not interfere with the sphere of influence of the other. So what is the role of peacekeeping in this situation?

Pursuing an answer to this question requires an analysis that expands beyond cases that only include the variable *sphere of influence*. Cases in which a permanent Security Council member exercises *coercion* and the other permanent members recognize this as a conflict in which they must exercise *non-interference* must also be included.

Table 11. Peacekeeping and Sphere of Influence According To Cold War Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sphere of Influence</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Frequency)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>2/26</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5/39</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data show a noticeable shift in the percentage of peacekeeping missions that occurred after 1989 Union. At the same time, it does not appear to be a very significant difference, for it is only an increase of 5 percent. This would imply that the significance of *sphere of influence*, as a determinant variable in the decision within the United Nations to implement a peacekeeping operation, remains relatively constant. Yet, the 40 percent value of those conflicts in *transition* seems to suggest that this change is more profound. In this case it would be extremely useful to separate the values of *transition* conflicts involving *sphere of influence*, and identify whether the two peacekeeping operations in the Transition Category occurred before or after 1991. This will require the separation of these values according to when
the conflict and when the peacekeeping operation began. The results reveal that three peacekeeping operations occurred out of a total of 31 conflicts involving sphere of influence; where as two peacekeeping operations occurred out of a total eight conflicts involving the same variable. Transforming these proportions into percentage values, the results indicate a rate of 10 percent for the Cold War value and a rate of 25 percent for the Post-Cold War value. By distributing the values of transition category, this provides a stronger sample size for the other two categories, as well as more effectively illustrating the change that occurred from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War era.

What the results reveal is that the sphere of influence variable possesses a noticeably stronger deterring effect on the decision to implement peacekeeping operations during the Cold War than after 1989, which is consistent with the trends so far observed concerning the other variables. At the same time, by comparing the 13 percent peacekeeping rate for conflicts involving sphere of influence to the overall peacekeeping rate of 36 percent for the balance of power variable, this demonstrates that, overall, conflicts which involve the sphere of influence of the Western Bloc or the Eastern Bloc will result in significantly less cooperation. But this should not be seen as a general trend for the entire time span, for the 25 percent value of peacekeeping operations involving sphere of influence after 1991 is still very high – although not as high as the 50 percent Post-Cold War values for balance of power. The fact that the average rate for sphere of influence is as low as 13 percent is understandable, considering that the sample sizes is extremely disproportionate between cold war and post-cold war categories. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the transition variable is so important: is serves as a way to distribute the samples to make them more balanced and acts as an indicator of the difference between cold war and post-cold war values. The fact that for this dataset the value for transition conflicts was so
high – 40 percent – is an indicator that there was a drastic change in the way the sphere of influence variable affects the decision-making process within the United Nations Security Council. The assessment can be made that sphere of influence became a stronger impeding influence to the implementation of peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. And because there is a noticeable increase in the values after 1989, it can be argued that this influence became slightly ameliorated with the end of the Cold War. At the same time, these values are still much lower than the higher values for balance of power, which suggests that sphere of influence continues to be a very influential factor against the implementation of peacekeeping operations, independent of Cold War politics.
V. Discussion

A. Enforcement Operations

Although the United Nations was established as the upholder of the universal principles of peace and human rights, there was no preconceived notion of what form the enforcement of these ideas would take under the Security Council. It is with this in mind that the parameters of peacekeeping, as it has evolved over time, have been carefully incorporated into this study by defining the different gradations of peacekeeping, supplemented by logistical and documentary information pertinent to the mission. So far, this study has been able to identify numerous trends that have contributed significantly to the evolution of peacekeeping in practice. And although the significance of these trends appears to remain consistent, their impact upon the development of peacekeeping has changed dramatically over time. And this is one of the reasons why it has been difficult to identify a cohesive understanding of the conditions under which the United Nations determines that the “blue helmets” should be deployed. At the same time, this also proves the point that the United Nations has not remained consistent in its enforcement of universal principles of international law for the very reason that it is significantly affected by state interests. Nevertheless, it is necessary at this point to examine those few cases which stand above the rest in terms of the commitment demonstrated by the United Nations to uphold universal principles of international law. This is an important step in the attempt to identify the conditions under which peacekeeping operations take place by examining those missions that have demonstrated the strongest response of the United Nations.

The examination of enforcement operations, instead of those cases in which observation missions or traditional peacekeeping took place, is inherently important to the identification of
the precedents that have taken root in practice. And there are several reasons why this form of intervention has been specifically chosen over the others in the determination of what constitutes a significant commitment by the United Nations. *Enforcement operations* are conducted without the consent of the parties involved within the conflict, which is why it is necessary to establish an enabling resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter. As a result, the conditions under which intervention take place are significantly different to *observation missions* and *traditional peacekeeping*, which are enabled under Chapter VI, and thus with the consent of the parties involved. And the forceful nature of a Chapter VII operation necessitates an expanded mission mandate incorporating a greater role for the “blue helmets.” The importance of this distinction is critical because it excludes those peacekeeping missions that deploy a strong military presence, but are severely limited by the mission mandate. Likewise, a greater mission duration does not necessarily denote a greater commitment, for a mission may only be limited to observation or may otherwise be military constrained by the mission mandate to bring about significant change toward peace. The following is a detailed presentation of each of the five cases of enforcement operations implemented by the United Nations. At the conclusion, an assessment will be conducted of these five cases to determine in what ways they do or do not correspond to the recurring trends that have thus far been observed.

1. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

This mission was a response to the conflict in Yugoslavia, which had resulted from the efforts of Slovenia and Croatia to secede from the Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. As the fighting in Croatia intensified and the Serbian government denied that they were continuing to fight in the region, the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on Yugoslavia in
September of 1991. The mission mandate was to create the conditions for peace and security from the unstable ceasefire that had been established in January of 1992, after which the United Nations deployed peacekeeping forces in February of that year. The mandate was extended to include other regions as the fighting extended into the Bosnia-Herzegovina region, which had also declared its independence. The Serbian government of Yugoslavia continued to deny its participation in the fighting in Bosnia, which is part of the reason an Article VII declaration was necessary for the United Nations to intervene, since fighting continued to escalate throughout the region. The Security Council responded by extending the mandate to include these regions, establishing “pink zones” that included five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo, with the authorization to “use force in self-defense” of the “pink zones.” This mandate was later extended to include cooperation with NATO aerial operations and incorporate the monitoring of a cease-fire between the Bosnian government and Bosnian-Serb forces. Deployments were also conducted into the Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia as a precautionary measure. “No-fly” zones were also established with mandates to use force to stop any further bombardments. And humanitarian aid to Croatia and Herzegovina were established as well. The Security Council soluted UNPROFOR into three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations in 1995.

The estimated expenditures for the UNPROFOR operation from 1992-1995 are estimated to well over four million dollars. As of March 1995 there were 38,599 military personnel, including 684 United Nations military observers; the force also included 803 civilian police, 2,017 other international civilian staff and 2,615 local staff, which totals a peacekeeping force of 44,718. There were 213 fatalities (6 military observers, 198 other military personnel, 3 civilian police, 3 international civilian staff and 3 local staff). The commitment of the United Nations was evident from the start, with several attempts to establish a peacekeeping operation with the
consent of the parties involved and conditions for a certain level of peace had been achieved in order to send in the “blue helmets.” Eventually, the Security Council perceived that there was greater risk of waiting for these conditions to occur, which led to the Chapter VII resolution.

The conflict and the peacekeeping mission both took place after the Cold War ended in 1991. This suggests that the use of enforcement as enacted through Chapter VII resolutions were possible with more amicable relations between the United States and Russia. Neither side would have wanted to grant such authority to the Security Council if they perceived they could still do the balancing on their own. Considering that the conflict occurred in a central part of Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both sides would have had to intervene. But since Cold War politics no longer applied in the same way, the Russians could tolerate the NATO-led UNPROFOR to occur in such close proximity to their sphere of influence. Had this conflict occurred during the Cold War, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would have allowed this operation to take place so close to their sphere of influence and with such an extended mandate. Furthermore, although this conflict can be viewed as a civil war (that is how Gleditsch defines it), this could also be interpreted as an inter-state conflict, considering that the numerous seceding states were eventually granted independence and recognized by the United Nations. Nevertheless, this was perceived as a serious and violent conflict that was quickly spreading throughout the region, which was intolerable to the international community. At least 10,000 were killed from 1991-1992 during the conflict, meaning there was very intense fighting occurring. Furthermore, none of the permanent Security Council members had any particular interests in the region, such as an ex-colony or a sphere of influence. Nor were they already militarily involved through coercion. Thus, peacekeeping was useful in order to execute a balance of power in the region to put an end to a conflict that could tip the scales of power in the
region. And this is precisely what the Serbian (Yugoslavian) government was attempting to do when the attempted to force the Croatians and Bosnians to remain in the republic.

2. United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)

The invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces resulted in an immediate response by the international community. The United Nations issued an arms and economic sanction against Iraq for refusing to withdraw from Kuwait, culminating with Security Council Resolution 678 which ordered Iraq to withdraw before 15 January 1991. If they did not comply, member states would be instructed to use “all necessary means” to force Iraqi to comply. This resulted in a counter-offensive by NATO-led forces that drove the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, acting according to a Chapter VII resolution. The establishment of UNIKOM took place after the Iraqi government agreed to the cease-fire, which was passed as a Chapter VI resolution. Nevertheless, United Nations intervention has been classified as enforcement because the coalition was implemented by a Security Council Chapter VII resolution. The Gulf War, in terms of casualties, was more violent than Yugoslavia, with more than 26,000 dead at the conclusion of the conflict. However, the destabilizing impact was more widespread in Yugoslavia, which is part of the reason it was seen as a wild fire that needed to be contain by the international community.

This conflict occurred at the beginning of the Post-Cold War period. The enforcement operation took place in 1991, by which time Cold War politics had already ended. The permanent Security Council members were only interested in the balance of power for this conflict, which is understandable considering the lucrative oil economy that developed countries depended upon. The only exception is Great Britain, whose ex-colonial ties have to be
recognized because of the previous British mandate over Mesopotamia, which included Iraq. Although the results of this research have thus far suggested that the interests of ex-colony can have a significant affect, it does not appear to be the case here. Britain was granted Iraq as part of the mandate for Mesopotamia after World War I, and was not colonized in the same way as other territories such as Egypt or India. Thus, while the British did have economic interests in the region, their connections were not as solidified considering the British granted Iraq independence in 1932. Setting aside this one exception, state interests were relatively similar for both the UNPROFOR and the UNIKOM.

3. Kosovo Force (KFOR)

In 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which established the Kosovo Force to address the humanitarian crisis that had developed in Kosovo, part of the former Yugoslavia. Forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army continued to fight in the region, which created a severe refugee crisis, in addition to more than 15,000 fatalities. At its height, the Kosovo Force consisted of a force of 33,000. As of June 1999, fatalities for the KFOR have been 157 soldiers. The mission mandate is to establish peaceful conditions in Kosovo, assisting with the demilitarization and reconstruction of the country, at the same time presenting deterrence to continued violence in the region. Both the conflict and the operation took place after 1989, consistent with the findings thus far. This conflict was classified as a civil war in which genocide occurred. There were no specific state interests involved except balance of power. The peacekeeping operation is still in place today, with troop contributions at about 16,000 as of April 2007. The attention this conflict has
received by the United Nations supported NATO-command suggests that Kosovo is an area of particular interest concerning the security and peace of the region encompassing the conflict.

4. United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)

In response to the renewed violence in Burundi as of 2000, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1545 established the United Nations Operation in Burundi with the mission mandate of enforcing the cease-fire established by the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement on 28 August 2000. The continued violence between the Burundi government and Hutu rebels presented a threat to the region, which could quickly spread among the surrounding state. The operation lasted from 2004 to 2006, after which it was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) as of 2007. This conflict was classified in the compiled database as a civil war in which genocide did not take place. There were a total of 1,000 fatalities for the conflict from 2000 to 2002. The maximum strength of the peacekeeping force reached a total of 6,520 troops, with a combined loss of 24 mission fatalities. For the conflict between the Burundi government and Hutu rebels from 2000 to 2002, there were no specific state interests involved except balance of power.

5. United Nations Command (UNC)

The United Nations intervention in the Korean War is unique because it proves an exception to the trends that have so far been identified. It is the only conflict during the Cold War in which an Article VII declaration granted United Nations members the mandate of enforcement to employ against North Korea to create conditions for peace. With the defeat of Japanese forces in 1945, the United States assumed responsibility of South Korea and the Soviet
Union assumed responsibility of North Korea, with the intention of establishing a provisional government for the entire peninsula. Although relations between the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly became hostile, and contention in the Korean peninsula intensified, the eruption of hostilities between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south was responded to as an important case for maintaining the balance of power. The perception of the United States that the Soviet support for the DPRK was an attempt to challenge U.S. supremacy and influence was responded to through the United Nations. At the time, the Soviet Union was boycotting the meetings at the Security Council; therefore, unknown to them, the General Assembly considered these as abstaining to vote, and not a veto like the Soviet Union intended. Sixteen states participated in the U.N-sanctioned enforcement operation in the Korean Peninsula, which was eventually successful in bringing about the conditions for a cease-fire between the DPRK and the ROK.

This conflict deserves to be mentioned because, technically speaking, it does qualify as an occasion in which the United Nations engaged in an enforcement operation during the Cold War, which is the only such case for that entire period until after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, there is a critical detail that must be taken into account when applying this case to the overall assessment of enforcement: the Soviet Union abstained from voting. The Soviet Union protested not only to the interpretation of their boycott of the Security Council as an abstained vote, but they continued to challenge the legality of the United Nations mission into the Korean peninsula. This suggests that, had the Soviet Union perceived that a boycott did not constitute a veto, they would have attended and vetoed the movement. This was evidently a case of mistaken policy decision, the consequences of which the Soviet Union evidently did not intend.

Therefore, this case cannot be applied to the same effect as the other cases of enforcement, which
seems to corroborate the trend that *enforcement* missions were only possible after the end of the Cold War.

6. Implications of Chapter VII Peacekeeping

An analysis of the four cases of enforcement, excluding Korea for reasons already stated, suggests that the observable recurring trends so far observed in this study are supported by the findings in this section. Except for the Gulf War, all four conflicts involved only *balance of power* as a foreign policy interest for all of the permanent Security Council members. And even the British mandate over Iraq in the past can be interpreted as an exception to the rule, for the results concerning *ex-colony* variable conducted in the previous chapter suggest that previous colonial ties were not as much of an issue after 1989. All of these four cases took place after 1989, which corresponds with the findings in the previous chapter concerning the *cold war* variables. At the same time, none of these four cases involved a *sphere of influence* or *coercion*, which suggests that, where enforcement was concerned, this is a measure of peacekeeping that cannot be tolerated where these interests are present. There was one case of interstate war, two cases of civil war, and one case of civil war in which genocide occurred, which is consisted with the general trend toward United Nations intervention in conflicts that represent greater potential for regional destabilization. In conclusion, these four cases, with the exception of the Korean War and the British mandate over Iraq, corroborate the findings in the results chapter of this study. Enforcement operations are the strongest form of peacekeeping conducting by the United Nations; and the fact that these four cases corroborate the findings in the results chapter add validity to the observable recurring trends that have thus far been identified.
B. Reassessing the Variables

As stated in the beginning of this presentation, the variables adopted in this study were applied according to a specific understanding of their definition. It was the intention to accept a broader interpretation of academic terminology in order to accommodate the consistently changing and complex nature of state interests. If this had not been done, it would have been extremely difficult to examine observable trends in the data, for an increase in the number of variables would ultimately result in a greater distribution of the available data, which would mean that sample sizes for each variable would be significantly smaller. At the same time, this presents the reality that the application of the variables within this study is necessarily biased. The intention was to interpret these terms on a broad level in order to expand applicability; and that is exactly the way in which they have been applied. However, what this nevertheless fails to account for is the reality that an accurate representation of international relations requires the incorporation of the several parts that make up the whole. It is highly improbable that such a task can ever be accomplished to such an extent. And this study was not engaged with the assumption to do so. Limiting this study to the five terms used to account for state interests is a generalization of a very complex system with very intricate and interconnecting parts. This study was an endeavor to incorporate concise yet limited representation of international relations as part of the greater question concerning universal principles of international law. The way in which this representation was constructed is by no means conclusive. What this construction offers, however, is a starting point from which to begin to ask important questions. And this is not only a study to find answer; it is an endeavor to find new questions. By examining and questioning the results and conclusions presented within this study, the intricacies of
international relations can begin to unravel the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations as the enforcer of universal principles of international law.

1. Type of Conflict

The information provide in this dataset revealed strong evidence which suggests that the type of conflict is a significant determinative factor within the decision-making process of the U.N. Security Council. Although the type of conflict variables provides a limited angle from which to examine United Nations peacekeeping, the results suggest that certain biases exist in favor of intervention within certain types of conflict and not others. At the same time, utilizing this variable presents several problems, which also reveals, to a certain extent, why such gradation of commitment to certain types of conflict exists. An individual state may define a conflict different than another. Where the latter perceives a genocidal massacre being committed by a state government, the former can interpret the conflict as a matter of internal state policy, in which the international community has no right to interfere. The violence in modern Sudan, for example, is not recognized as genocide by the United States and many other countries, which can result in the impediment or delay of a peacekeeping force to address the issue as such. Furthermore, state actors may not always recognize distinctions between different conflicts within the same state occurring over time. This can result in the perception that recent violence is merely a continuation of civil unrest that, in many underdeveloped countries, seems to occur uninterrupted for years, even decades. And this is also part of the reason why individual states, and the international community when collective actions are implemented, may not act according to consist definitions of conflict when they have been identified.
For these reasons, applying an academic definition of the different types of conflict – civil war, interstate war, and genocide – is problematic, for the international community does not necessarily act according to these criteria. In addition, another difficult is the possibility that the international community may not recognize that a conflict exists because they are not aware of it. This was the case in the Sudanese genocide of 1956-1972, which occurred during the context of the civil war of 1963-1972. Due to the closed-system of the government, no foreign eyes were allowed to investigate the internal affairs of the country. And any rumors and information leaked out by journalists, who illegally crossed into the country, were overshadowed by the greater conflicts occurring in Congo and Biafra at the time. In this study, this conflict was cataloged as a civil war in which genocide took place. Yet, the international community seems to have been unaware that a serious conflict existed within Sudan at the time, which makes an analysis of their reaction to the conflict irrelevant. At the same time, this does help to illustrate the ways in which applying an academic definition to the conflict can be of limited use, when the overriding principles is the perception of the international community to the conflict – when they are aware that one exists.

2. Cold War

This study is based upon the assumption that Cold War politics ended 1989, with the expectation that the period before and the period after will demonstrate significant differences. As the result show, the findings seem to corroborate that the separation of international politics according to these two periods reflects actual significant changes. This has provided very interesting results for the examination of the other corresponding variables within this study, in addition to an analysis of Cold War politics itself. At the same time, the Cold War variables, as
used within this study, present limitations that must be recognized, if a sincere analysis of the conclusions of this study is to be achieved.

One of the most problematic aspects of the Cold War variables used in this study, in terms of the value of the results themselves, is the fact that the sample sizes for each category are quite disproportionate. There were 116 cases of catalogued conflict for the Cold War; however, there were only 53 cases of catalogued conflict for the Post-Cold War. The sample size for the Cold War is thus more than twice in size compared to the sample size for the Post-Cold War. While this demonstrates that conclusions drawn from the results of the cold war variable, any assessments made from the relatively smaller sample size of the post-cold war variable will unavoidable be much weaker. As a result, it will be necessary to wait until the sample size for the Post-Cold War period expands over time, in order to analyze whether the observable trends witnessed from 1989 until 2005 are a result of the end of Cold War politics, or other factors that may or may not have been addressed in this study.

This point bring to the forefront another issue relevant to this discussion: there has been no distinction made to illustrate the changing dynamics of Cold War politics as they occurred over time until 1989. There was a significant amount of uncertainty as to the way in which the developing relationship of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union would be played out through international politics. There had never before been two rival states with nuclear capabilities. As a result, the necessity to learn from mistakes meant that the attitudes and perceptions of both sides, as well as the other members of the international community, would repeatedly change over time according to domestic and external influences. The Soviet Union recognized the importance of remaining involved within the United Nations, after they committed the error of abstaining in the vote which could have prevented the U.S.-led coalition
from engaging North Korea. The prospect of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 provided the international community with the reminder that political rivalries could potentially destroy them all. And the different points at which independent states attained nuclear capability should be noted as extremely significant shifts in the balance of power, which provided nuclear-states with much stronger political influence.

Further dividing the time period after 1945 according to some of these markers, in order to better account for the changing dynamics of Cold War politics itself, can provide the opportunity to examine whether the observable trends identified in this study are consistent over time. Considering that the sample size for the Cold War is relatively large, it may be possible to accomplish this to a certain extent, without sacrificing the soundness of conclusions drawn from the results.

3. State Interests

The terms used to account for state interests in this study, although useful for the purposes of establishing observable trends over time, are inherently limited according to the definition according to which they have been applied. The term balance of power assumed too broad a term to accurately depict gradations in the actual involvement of independent states in the implementation of a balance of power as foreign policy. Because it has been established as the background upon which other state interests supersede when and where they apply, this fails to account for the difference between a state that exercise a policy of balance by funding one side with arms or resources, compared to another state which may recognize the need to permit the two sides to settle the matter without foreign interference. The extent to which states go to implement their policy is thus ineffectively applied. The ex-colony variable incorporates those
territories that were either acquired by force as colonies, were recognized as significant spheres of influence and not independent states, or were granted as mandates by the international community. Considering that some assets were more important than others and the type of imperial relationship (colony, influence, and mandate) that existed between the state and the possession were different, the term, as it is applied in this study, may be too broad in the incorporation of all of these definitions.

The label of *coercion* does not indicate to what extent there was a military commitment within a given conflict. While the primary participants in the war may be identified as having been involved in a very complete sense – they were committed totally to the conflict – external involvement to the conflict, such as the involvement of the United States in Vietnam, does not distinguish between military operations and a declaration of war. And the importance placed upon *sphere of influence*, although clearly delineated by geographical boundaries within this study, does not take into account the reality that some spheres of influence were more important than others. While involvement with a Latin American state may not have been perceived as a direct military threat – as evidenced by the Falkland War between Argentina and Great Britain – an attack against a member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact would have been interpreted as an act of war. As a result, United Nations peacekeeping operations in a NATO or Warsaw member state would have been a much more sensitive topic than an operation in Latin America. To conduct a study of this size would be impossible if all of these gradations were taken into account as separate variables. To do so would not only complicate the study to the extent of making it extremely difficult to identify observable trends, but it would significantly reduce the sample size for each variable to the point that assessments made from the data would not be well founded.
4. United Nations

Another very important matter that requires attention is to reexamine the role of the United Nations in relation to the implementation of universal principles of international law. As was previously mentioned, the United Nations has numerous options at its disposal with which to react to violation of international law. This study gives greater merit to those actions which take the form of meaningful intervention, with a greater emphasis upon military intervention in the form of enforcement missions. However, this should not be an indication that failure to act coercively is a failure of act at all toward the end of upholding international law. A conflict may present the opportunity be resolved through other means, such as regular diplomatic channels, international arbitration or mediation, economic sanctions, or the intervention of regional organizations such as the NATO, the European Union, or the Africa Union. Enabling peacekeeping operation of enforcement for cases in which the participants do not consent may lead to the deepening of conflict and only complicate the situation. The five cases of enforcement do not appear to indicate that this is the more likely occurrence. At the same time, except for Korea, all of these cases are relatively new. In fact, enforcement missions under the cooperation of the five permanent Security Council members did not occur until after 1991. As a result, this interpretation is more of a hypothetical examination of what can occur. And this also assumes that there was a call for a vote whether or not to implement a peacekeeping operation for each case within this study. If this can be accounted for it can add a perspective that identifies the gradation of importance that the United Nations placed on resolving certain conflicts and not others. The over-abundant attention paid to the Palestinian “problem” in the Middle East should be evidence enough of the bias in preference for particular issues of conflict
over others. And this could shed light on why the United Nations did not respond in so many cases by implementing a peacekeeping operation, especially those cases that have similar results for the variables that have been examined in this study.

5. Refugees and Displacement

Although the elements of refugees and displacement that often result from conflict have been mentioned as a possible contributor to the decision by the Security Council to implement a peacekeeping operation in some cases and not others, unfortunately this was not included within the study due to time constraints, a lack of sufficient and consistent statistics on refugees, and the difficulties of incorporating this variable into an already complex study. However, the importance of this variable cannot be underestimated in terms of its significance to the decision-making process within the Security Council. Relief effort is an important mission of the United Nations, and has often been pursued with deep concern, if not inconsistently and in many cases without much success. As a result, it may be the case that a conflict in which there is a greater refugee and displacement crisis may take precedence over other conflicts which may be more contained. That is part of the rationality that was argued in attempting to explain why there were more peacekeeping operations implemented for interstate wars and for civil wars in which genocide took place, in relation to civil wars in which genocide did not take place. The sensitivities of intervening within the internal affairs of other states dissipate once the greater concern of a regional crisis assumed the forefront of attention at the United Nations. The factor of refugee and displacement would thus be an extremely important variable to examine in any further studies of this material and in any future revisions of this research.
6. Perceptions

Although this study has used numerous terms in order to explain the behavior of state actors within a certain contexts, it is unavoidable that, in the end, the perceptions of state actors are more of a determining factor than the arbitrary values and statistical facts that have been provided. This is not limited to what states may not be aware of, such as the “Secret War” in Sudan. Rather, it extends to what states may believe are the facts in a given conflict. For example, casualty and refugee statistics for a given conflict may not be entirely accurate; in fact, they are often inflated either through human error or to serve as propaganda. Nevertheless, states will be forced to act according to what information is available at the time. And because it may or may not be entirely accurate, their reaction to different conflicts may be significantly different over time. This can, perhaps, help to explain why there is so much inconsistency in terms of which conflicts are to be responded to in particular ways. And, by interference, the issue of perception can thus be extended to any of the variables applied in this study. States may perceive the interests of other states, and even their own, in a way that does not necessarily correspond to their ideology or practice. And this only complicates the greater issue of attempting to identify the determining factors that affect the decision-making process within the Security Council.

Terms such as ex-colony, coercion, balance of power, and sphere of influence may be interpreted differently by each state. And even when particular interpretations have been established by a state, they may not always correspond to the decisions implement in practice. If the United Nations General Assembly has difficult arriving to a cohesive and consistent definition of terms such as interstate war, civil war, and genocide, it is because states themselves are uncertain how, even if a definition is established, it will correspond to the actual practice of
enforcing universal principles of international law according to these definitions. To incorporate this variable, however, would be impractical from an academic perspective because it would render sample sizes so small that any assessments would be unsound. Nevertheless, the overriding problem is that it would be almost impossible to determine *perception* as a variable because one would have to identify the term itself. What would its classification be based upon? And where does one draw the line between the ideological stance of a state and how it acts in practice? To include this variable would thus be extremely counterproductive to the efforts of a study such as this one. At the same time, the significance of perception must always be kept in mind when analyzing the conclusions drawn from the results in this study.
VI. Conclusion

An analysis of the Cold War variables revealed that there is a significant difference between the period before 1989 and the post-Cold War era. This is evidenced by the fact that there were a much greater percentage of peacekeeping missions that occurred in the latter than occurred in the former. And this suggests that the absence of Cold War politics, overall, allowed for a greater level of general cooperation within the U.N Security Council. This is also evident in the results concerning the various state interests that have been identified, which reveal that, where balance of power and ex-colonial ties are concerned, there was a significantly greater level of cooperation after 1989 in terms of the abundance of peacekeeping operations that were implemented. The relatively high value for the Transition category within each dataset suggests that this movement toward greater cooperation was already in motion by 1989. In the last years of the 1980s, the Soviet Union engaged in more amicable relations with the West, in an attempt to ameliorate the consequences that resulted from aggressive competition with the United States. And the findings for the transition variables, which are in a few cases greater than the post-cold war values, appear to corroborate these historical developments. At the same time, the increased disposition of Russia to regain an influential position within international politics helps to explain the diminished rate of peacekeeping operations that have been enabled in the last few years. And this suggests that, as Russia expands its political and economic influence throughout the world, there may be resurgence to less cooperative relations within the U.N. Security Council.

By examining the significant differences in the way that the international community reacts to different types of conflict, observable trends have been identified that help to explain
according to what interests the international community implements peacekeeping operations. Although the findings for these variables were divided according to the Cold War variables, the results did not suggest that, relative to each other, the relationship between the types of conflict variables significantly changed within or without the context of Cold War politics. The Security Council consistently demonstrated the greatest record in reacting to civil wars in which genocide occurred throughout the period after 1945. And this was followed closely by a high record of reaction to interstate wars throughout the entire time span. Civil wars in which genocide did not take place appeared to represent the least amount of concern, based upon the relatively few percentages of peacekeeping operations implemented for this category. As for genocide that occurred as part of internal state policy, there were no peacekeeping operations implemented at any time. This gradation in favor of civil wars in which genocide occurred and interstate wars strongly suggests that the international community places a greater priority on those conflicts which represent the greatest potential for widespread destruction and disorder. The chaos that ensues from genocides implemented during a civil war generally results in terrible refugee crises, which must be addressed and contained before the entire region becomes engulfed by the consequences of the conflict. And interstate wars pose a grave concern not only in terms of preventing the West and the East from being drawn into a confrontation, but because wars waged across borders by state-supported military forces tend to result in terrible devastation and bloodshed. Excluding the data for state-implemented genocides, civil wars in which genocide occurred and interstate wars ranked as the highest accordingly in terms of battlefield fatalities. The amount of deaths attributed to each type of conflict alone demonstrates a greater severity of violence suffering for these two types of conflict.
Where civil wars are concerned, the political situation for intervention becomes more delicate. There are many elements within the international community – primarily backed by China – that support a relatively strict interpretation of Westphalian sovereignty, which prohibits foreign intervention in the internal affairs of an independent state. That is part of the reason why there are relatively few peacekeeping operations implemented in states engaged in a civil war to be found in the compiled database. At the same time, the fact that a state has reverted to civil war presents the perceivable threat that the surrounding region and many other states can be severely affected as well. Rebel forces may operate in the surrounding regions outside the boundaries of the state. And some countries may willingly support one side or the other through financial, logistical, or military means. It is thus a strong possibility that where such risks are perceived, the international community may agree to an intervention, regardless of the principles of Westphalian sovereignty. At the same time, another probable explanation for the relatively few cases of intervention that have occurred in civil wars is that the state may be strong enough to prevent intervention. This is more likely the case if the state government is operating against rebel forces that are too weak to pose a serious threat. However, this explanation does help to account for the fact that no peacekeeping operations took place in state-sanctioned genocide. In these cases, the “rebels” are not necessarily a military-political unit operating within the country, but an attempt to exterminate a significant section of the population to the point that it can no longer operate collectively. And this can be interpreted as strictly a matter of internal state policy, which the international community, according to some elements, has no right to interfere with. And any attempt to implement an enforcement missions may not be adequate enough to prevent the state from implementing its policy, if the peacekeeping operation is granted such a mandate. As a result, whether peacekeeping does not occur because that state is militarily strong
enough to resist a militarily weak peacekeeping force, or the international community has voted to respect the state’s internal policy decisions, the consequences are the same: as a universal principle of international law, the prevention of genocide has not been adequately enforced. The decision whether to enforce universal principles of international law, therefore, appears to be predominantly contingent upon the political considerations of the potential for regional crisis and the preservation of Westphalian state sovereignty.

The application of state interests has yielded very astonishing results which suggest that these variables have a very determinative role within the decision-making process of the U.N. Security Council. And the results that were observed for each type of state interest identified within this study have demonstrated that such an analysis is both valid and sound. In relation to the normative value balance of power, the results for the sphere of influence and coercion variables demonstrate that these are very strong impeding factors concerning the implementation of peacekeeping operations. At the same time, there was a notably greater level of cooperation, where these two variables were concerned, for the transition and post-cold war categories. The higher rate within the transition category can be interpreted as the greater level of uncertainty that existed in the last years of the Soviet Union and a few years afterward the end of Cold War politics in 1989. At this point in time, the U.S.S.R. was attempting to seek more amicable relations with the West, for the Soviet Union could no longer effectively compete with the greater economic and political development of the United States and Europe. The United Nations was thus more relied upon to address international issues as the international political system was readjusting itself according to new balances of power. In the last few years, however, Russia has been engaged in renewed efforts of political and economic development; an attempt to regain the power-base it had once possessed. It is quite possible that as Russia attains
greater political and economic influence in the world, relations within the U.N. Security Council may begin to revert to a balance of power similar to the one that existed during the Cold War. At the same time, where ex-colonial interests are concerned, the much greater level of cooperation after 1989 suggests that ex-colonial ties will not be as contentious a factor in the future as coercion and sphere of influence have the potential to demonstrate.

In light of this evidence, it is the argument of this scholar that while there have been and continue to be very strong political factors that impede consistent and effective cooperation to the effect of upholding universal principles of international law, an examination of the United Nation’s record of those cases it has been able to implement an peacekeeping force suggests that, at the very least, an attempt is being made to take into considering universal principles. The international community is redeemed only for the fact that, considering the impediments of Cold War politics and continuously strong state interest of sphere of influence, they were still able to intervene in numerous genocides. At the same time, this does not excuse the fact that 16 genocides that occurred without civil war never experience intervention. Political motivations may help to convince states to participate in civil wars that seem to be getting out of hand; however, this then becomes a problem when the same argument cannot be made for genocides that occur as a matter of internal policy, where no state of civil war is recognized. It is thus a valid conclusion to state that state interests are only hurting the efficacy of the United Nations as an effective enforcer of universal principles of international law. And if the hypocrisy of this institution is to be corrected, the permanent Security Council member must recognize that their right of veto is at the very heart of this problem.
VII. Bibliography


