

IRANIANS IN BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
MIGRATION, MINORITIES, AND IDENTITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARAB
STATES

by

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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the unexplored space that Iranian expatriates occupy in Persian Gulf Arab States, specifically Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. It argues that culturally ascribed markers such as ethnicity, language, clothing, gender, religion, historical factors and nationality combine to produce hybrid Gulf Iranian identities among Iranian expatriates. The thesis performs an analysis of Iranian expatriate individuals' situations and conditions in the above societies and assesses the level of cross-interaction between Arabs and Iranians by building upon theories by Martinez, Hegel, Hobsbawm and Said. It concludes that studies of Iranian expatriates may not be performed in terms of Iranian or Gulf Arab identities but as a fluid synthesis of the two with sociopolitical implications for all Persian Gulf States. By understanding the Gulf Iranian expatriate community, or Gulf Iranians, we can move beyond analyses that are limited to national, ethnic and ideological lines to reevaluate Persian Gulf identities entirely.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

What is the difference between Iranians who live in Iran with those who live in, say, Bahrain, or the United Arab Emirates? Furthermore, how are the Iranians living in Persian Gulf Arab States different from their hosts? Such questions about identity are not simply rhetorical in the Persian Gulf but are issues of considerable import for its Arab and Iranian denizens. In fact, questions relating to identity issues are acutely sensitive for small states such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, which are surrounded by substantially larger regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. Knowing what shapes identity in such spaces plays a vital role in defining a person's ancestry and origins, ethnicity, language, clothing, citizenship, and social status as a member of a majority or minority, even their sense of history in contrast to those around them. It also shapes the perceptions about the size and fate of self-identified groups.

Much has been written and documented about the Persian Gulf Arab States, their histories, and their citizens, especially about common features shared between them in comparison to larger states like Iran. Upon a visit to any one of the small Gulf Arab monarchies, one might get the impression that individual city-states dominate the national area and population. Citizens there exhibit many similarities, including common language and ethnicity (Arabic), economy (oil-based welfare state or *rentier* state), ruling government (monarchy), societal structure (tribally-based), native population size (relatively small) and foreign population size (relatively big). In 2002, Bahrain's population amounted to approximately 650,000 inhabitants, with 37 percent or 225,000 individuals listed as non-nationals, while the United Arab Emirates total population was

4.3 million inhabitants, with 80 to 85 percent of their population, or around 3.5 million individuals counting as foreign nationals in 2004.¹ The combined population of the two states amounts to only about five million inhabitants or 7.6% the size of Iran's population of over 65 million inhabitants, according to a July 2008 estimate.² Also, these population numbers do not account or distinguish between citizens and foreign residents of the above countries, their social class, or ethnicity, which make it hard to determine the extent and influence of foreigners. For example, a recent news article claimed that 450,000 Iranians had residency within the United Arab Emirates in 2007, although it does not provide a source or information on their backgrounds.³

The most distinguishing attribute of Gulf Arab nations compared to other nations is their entrepôt emphasis, which has attracted large, diverse expatriate populations to their shores. For centuries, the littoral area of the Gulf has been a cosmopolitan hub of trade between Europe, Africa and Asia, with various ports such as Bahrain [Manama], and Muscat serving as major focal points over time.⁴ The Persian Gulf gained renown for

¹ The numbers cited are estimates provided by the Bahraini and Emirati embassies to the United States. "People and Culture" *Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrain – About Bahrain*. Available online. <<http://www.bahrainembassy.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=section.home&id=18>>. Accessed 30. October 2008; "United Arab Emirates: Facts and Figures" *Embassy of the United Arab Emirates: UAE in Brief*. Available online. <<http://uae-embassy.org/html/About/faq.html>>. Accessed 30. October 2008. Additional estimates can be found at the *CIA World Factbook* website for 2008. A word of caution should be noted: there are no reliable figures for populations in Gulf Arab states. However, such estimates can give some idea of magnitude when comparing different states demographically. See Michael Bonine "Population Growth, the Labor Market and Gulf Security." *Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century*. Eds. David Long and Christian Koch (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997): 227.

² "Iran." *CIA – The World Factbook*. 23 October 2008. Available online. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>>. Accessed 30 October 2008.

³ "Dubai's powerful Iranian business community is hurt by international sanctions" 28. December 2007. *International Herald Tribune.com*. Available online. <<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/28/africa/ME-FEA-GEN-GLF-Irans-Boomtown.php>>. Accessed 13. October 2008.

⁴ Rosemarie Said Zahlan *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman* (London: Ithaca Press, 1998): 9, 11-12.

its natural pearls for millennia, and was subjugated by European powers under the Portuguese, Dutch and British Empires for several centuries.⁵ Since the oil boom, the variety of different ethnic groups residing in Persian Gulf Arab States has included Filipinos, Moroccans, Australians, Lebanese and Sri Lankans. Expatriate populations helped build the most up-to-date infrastructures, provide highly demanded skills and expertise as well as filled many undesirable professional roles for the traditional Arab society. Gulf Arab hosts have created various spaces for outsiders within the Persian Gulf Arab States, so long as expatriates are willing to work and only reside there temporarily. For example, expatriates seeking work visas in Bahrain must find an in-country sponsor to vouch for them in order to remain there longer than two weeks, and similar laws have been enacted in the United Arab Emirates.⁶ A few Persian Gulf Arab States now embody a unique situation where their native populations are outnumbered by the number of foreigners in their midst, which provokes concern. Upon the occurrence of foreign labor riots, one Dubai security official cautioned, “the large number of expatriate workers poses a risk to national security and should be reduced.”⁷

⁵ Ibid. 10-17.

⁶ “Fragomen – Bahrain: Business Immigration Summary.” 22. March 2003. Resources – Country Summaries. *Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, LLP*. Available online. <<http://pubweb.fdbl.com/ihp8/global/media85.nsf/public-country-briefs/bahrain?opendocument>> Accessed 30. October 2008; “UAE Immigration Laws and Procedures in Dubai” *Al Tamimi & Company – Advocates & Legal Consultants*. Available online. <<http://www.zu.ac.ae/library/html/UAEInfo/documents/UAEImmigrationLaw.pdf>>. Accessed 30. October 2008.

⁷ Amy Glass “Foreigners pose ‘risk’ to UAE security” 16. April 2008. Arabian Business.com. Available online. <<http://www.arabianbusiness.com/516712-foreigners-pose-risk-to-uae-security->>. Accessed 14. October 2008. For an alternative perspective, see Salman Dosari, “Panj saad hezar-e irani-e mahajer dar emirate-e motahed-e ‘arabi” (Trans. Mani Parsa). 16. Bahman 1385. [23. January 2007] Radio Zamaneh.com. Available online. <http://www.radiozamaneh.org/morenews/2007/02/post_503.html>. Accessed 25. August 2008. Bahraini officials have also commented on the effect foreign influences have on their domestic population. See Mark Trevelyan “Bahrain speaks out against war on Iran” 26. June 2008.

One finds one of the most intriguing expatriate communities, Iranians, within this milieu. Large numbers of Iranians, defined as individuals born in Iran, possessing Iranian citizenship or descended from either of the first two categories, have traversed the Persian Gulf waters for decades to live and work in the states on its south shore for a variety of reasons, particularly Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.

Iranian expatriates have also migrated to various locations around the world and consequently there has been an increase in scholarly information published about them in various locales. Scholars such as Mehdi Bozorgmehr and Georges Sabagh have led the way in filling in knowledge regarding Iranian expatriates now residing in the United States with selected contributions in several works.⁸ Other scholars have taken up the mantle of Iranian expatriate studies in other countries from France and Germany to Turkey and Canada.⁹ Yet comprehensive research or even an introduction on Iranian migration in the Persian Gulf has been hard, if not impossible, to find.

This thesis analyzes the unexplored space that Iranian expatriates—individuals of Iranian ancestry and those with current Iranian citizenship living outside of Iran on a temporary or long-term basis—occupy in Persian Gulf Arab States, specifically Bahrain

Reuters UK. Available online.

<<http://uk.reuters.com/article/UKNews1/idUKL2544957720080626?sp=true>>. Accessed 30. October 2008.

⁸ See for example contributions in Asghar Fathi (ed.) *Iranian Refugees and Exiles since Khomeini* (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1991); Ron Kelley (ed.) *Irangenes: Iranians in Los Angeles* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Georges Sabagh and Mehdi Bozorgmehr “Are the Characteristics of Exiles Different from Immigrants? The Case of Iranians in Los Angeles” *ISSR Working Papers in the Social Sciences* vol. 2 no.5 (Los Angeles: University of California Los Angeles Institute for Social Science Research: 1986-87).

⁹ All articles referenced in this footnote come from Fathi 1991. They include Janet Bauer “A Long Way Home: Islam in the Adaptation of Iranian Women Refugees in Turkey and West Germany”: 77-101; Vida Nassehy-Behnam “Iranian Immigrants in France”: 102-20; Mino Moallem “Ethnic Entrepreneurship and Gender Relations Among Iranians in Montreal, Quebec, Canada”: 180-204.

and the United Arab Emirates.¹⁰ The work argues that culturally ascribed markers such as ethnicity, language, clothing, gender, religion, historical factors and nationality combine to produce hybrid Gulf Iranian identities among Iranian expatriates. The thesis performs an analysis of Iranian expatriate individuals and assesses the level of cross-interaction between Arabs and Iranians by building upon theories by Martinez, Hegel, Hobsbawm and Said. Ultimately, the thesis aims to provoke further research in Gulf identity studies. We should no longer think of Iranian expatriates in terms of Iranian or Gulf Arab identities but a fluid synthesis of the two with sociopolitical implications for all Persian Gulf States. By understanding the Gulf Iranian expatriate community, or Gulf Iranians, we can move beyond simplistic national, ethnic and ideological lines to reevaluate Persian Gulf identities as a whole.

The thesis is broken down into several chapters analyzing Iranians in Persian Gulf Arab States, following this introductory chapter. Chapter Two examines both Iranian and Arab identities in the Gulf by establishing a theoretical framework for studying the Iranian community of the Gulf through the lens of identity issues, incorporating previous theories from Oscar Martinez, Georg Hegel, Eric Hobsbawm, and Edward Said. Building upon and revising models constructed by these scholars to fit our Gulf Iranian case, this work will show how we can assemble a portrait of Gulf Iranian society. Chapters Three

¹⁰ This is not to say other Gulf Arab States such as Kuwait or Qatar lack Iranian expatriate communities. Statistically, Qatar has one of the highest percentages of Iranians relative to its native population, which one 1986 text stated as 23.29%. Kuwait also has a considerable Iranian expatriate population in its midst, many of whom can trace their ancestry back to an Iranian immigration wave from nearby Basra in Iraq during the late 18th century. However, we shall only examine the Iranian populations within Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates here. See John G. Lorimer *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Oman, and Central Arabia* 2 Vols. Vol. 1 – Historical (Calcutta, Supt. Govt. Print., 1908-1915. Westmead: Farnborough Gregg, 1970): 1001-02; Vol. 2 – Geographical and Statistical (Calcutta, Supt. Govt. Print., 1908-1915. Westmead: Farnborough Gregg, 1970): 1051; R. K. Ramazani *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986): 34.

and Four build upon the previous theory through a sociological analysis of the various subgroups that comprise both Gulf Arab and Iranian societies, touching upon issues such as socioeconomic status, gender, dress and history. Whereas Chapter Three focuses mainly on Iranian identity, Chapter Four looks at Arab identity in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates thus permitting us to explore factors that have shaped relations between Gulf Arabs and Iranians. Chapter Five explores the Gulf Iranian community itself, analyzing the Iranian community's contributions to Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the challenges the community faces towards eventual integration into Gulf Arab society. Chapter Six then offers some concluding remarks.

There are several reasons for studying Iranian expatriates in an extra-Iranian context such as the Persian Gulf Arab States. First, such a study offers researchers another avenue to explore the divide between Arab and Iranian cultures. This text will seek to dispel any notion of an Arab-Iranian (Persian) conflict or the dangers of a Shi'a crescent, ideas which lend themselves to an overarching, clash of civilizations paradigm.¹¹ For example, one scholar claims to have traced the origins of such animosity between sides to an earlier "Ottoman-Persian conflict" and subsequently marks as "probably one of the oldest rivalries in the history of the world."¹² Studying the peripheries, rather than the heartlands of Iranian and Arab societies, permits us to

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 72, Issue 3: 22-49. May Yamani offers an interesting analysis and history of the origins and uses of "Shi'a crescent" terminology in one short article. See May Yamani "Arcs and Crescents" *The World Today* Vol. 62. Issue 12 (2006): 7-8.

¹² Martin Kramer "The Myth of Linkage" 16. June 2008. *Martin Kramer's Sandbox*. Available online. <http://sandbox.blog-city.com/the_myth_of_linkage.htm>. Accessed 30. October 2008. Kramer gave a different edition of this same post during a presentation earlier at Harvard's Center for Middle East Studies on October 24, 2007 under the title, "Which Middle East Conflict?"

discover where Iranian society ends and Arab society begins, and the genuine degree of sharpness or starkness that exists between sides within a contemporary context. These Persian Gulf Arab States are perhaps the area where Arabs make their strongest characterizations and classifications of Iranians, often through firsthand contact with Iranians themselves. As time passes and the region changes, how does the relationship between Arab and Persian change? A study of Iranian expatriates in the Gulf can shed some light upon the dynamics of contact and affiliation in the Persian Gulf.

Second, studying the sociological situation and background of Iranians in the Persian Gulf Arab States gives us an alternative perspective into these Gulf Arab monarchies. More simply, the study offers us the opportunity to see a critique of Gulf Arab society from individuals familiar with the Gulf region to gain a more nuanced, contrastive analysis of Gulf Arab societies. By viewing the Gulf States from Iranian and Arab eyes, we can minimize and reduce the effect of outside biases to the region and instead decipher the local picture. Considerable numbers of Indians, Southeast Asians, non-Gulf Arabs and even Westerners live and work in the Gulf. While each of the expatriate communities residing in the Gulf may share some similarities to and have some affinity for aspects of Gulf society, they are still outsiders to the region whose experience is relatively new and colored by a different sense of history and identity relative to the Persian Gulf space. Consequently, this study will downplay and disregard such outside actors in order to focus upon Iranian and Arab perspectives solely and while diminishing Western filters or perspectives.

Third, an analysis of the situation of the Iranian diaspora in the Persian Gulf Arab countries allows us to dispel the notion of all Iranians being revolutionaries. Khomeini and the post-1979 Iranian fundamentalist ideology advocated the export of the Iran's Islamic Revolution to other countries and is still the subject of heated debate on both sides of the Persian Gulf. Many states logically fear the impact of these expatriates on their governments and society by potential subversive elements within the Iranian expatriate community.¹³ On the other hand, a considerable number of Iranians left their homeland for non-revolutionary aims. Do Iranians within Gulf Arab society become an asset or a liability to their hosts? This study will challenge simplistic black and white analyses of Iranians and instead show the various, complex shades of gray which they exhibit.

Fourth, the study of the Iranian expatriate community also contributes to a growing field of study in the post-modern era: the discourse on transnational communities. The adjective transnational, with its "trans" prefix indicating across or over is appropriate for describing Iranian expatriates living on the opposite side of the Persian Gulf. Transnational also helps us to identify this Iranian community as one in movement without indication as to the reasons for moving or an ultimate destination. Therefore, studying the transnational community gives us a lot of room to explore different variables exhibited within the Iranian expatriate community. Whether driven by political, economic or environmental reasons, different societies are moving away from their origins and homelands to seek out opportunities elsewhere. The effect of change upon a transnational

¹³ Dosari "Panj saad hezar-e irani-e mahajer dar emirat-e motahed-e 'arabi" 23. January 2007; Glass "Foreigners pose 'risk' to UAE security" 16. April 2008.

Iranian expatriate community living in the Gulf States and their new hosts in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates portends future changes in the determination of Gulf Arab identity. Moreover, a study focusing on Iranian expatriates in the southern Persian Gulf complements other studies of transnational communities in the region¹⁴ and will add another layer of understanding to the region's cosmopolitan mix.

A fifth major reason for studying Iranians in Persian Gulf Arab States is their proximity or immediacy to Iran. Closeness with the *vatan* or "motherland" translates into more contacts with Iran, whether economically, politically or historically over centuries. In fact, portions of the Gulf once constituted vassal-states to Iran, or were former Iranian territories. The *badgirs* of Dubai's Bastakiyah district demonstrate one sign of Iran's strong connections to the Gulf Arab States. Iranians are always just across the horizon on the northern and eastern shores of the Gulf, and control more than half of the shore available to the Persian Gulf occupants. Studying them is also unique because members comprising it come from a wider variety of socioeconomic levels than other communities. In fact, the only barrier separating Iran from every Persian Gulf Arab State is the waterway itself. Focusing on the Iranian expatriates in particular will help assess whether or not a transnational culture's proximity to its homeland translates into more bargaining power in the Arab society.

¹⁴ For example, Andrew Gardner, an ethnographic anthropologist, primarily examines the transnational experience of Indians working and living in Bahrain alongside other expatriate communities. However, Gardner also offers a comparison between these communities and Bahrain's native population, including what this paper terms as the Gulf Iranian community. See Andrew Gardner *City of Strangers: The Transnational Indian Community in Manama, Bahrain*. (Doctoral Dissertation. Tucson: The University of Arizona, 2005). See also Anh N. Longva *Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

Lastly, studying the Iranian expatriate community gives us insight into the relationship between identity and the oil-based *rentier* economy. Economies rooted in oil have enabled the small Gulf kingdoms to oversee welfare systems on par with many Western nations, as well as to close a so-called centuries old development gap between them over centuries in only decades. Almost overnight, Gulf Arabs have become richer, healthier and more mobile than their parents, challenging the traditional social mores and lifestyle through the establishment of a rentier state. In contrast, Iran has its own large oil resources but has grappled with its own unique challenges to translating those reserves into greater wealth for its citizens in its own form of rentier state. For example, the historian and sociologist Afsaneh Najmabadi has assessed the relationship between political participation and the establishment of the rentier state, and noted how Iran's large, predominantly agricultural-based population was not able to benefit from oil wealth distribution to the same extent as the demographically small Gulf Arab States prior to the Iranian Revolution.¹⁵ A recent news article also cited how Iran's oil resources may be depleted by the year 2015, and questioned the continued survival of the state under an oil-based economy without some other form of investment or diversification.¹⁶ As oil continues to form the backbone of Gulf Arab economies and spurs jobs there, Gulf Iranians continue to seek out jobs and a new life on the Gulf's southern shore.

¹⁵ Afsaneh Najmabadi "Depoliticisation of a Rentier State: The Case of Pahlavi Iran." in *The Rentier State* Eds. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (New York: Croom Helm, 1987): 211-27.

¹⁶ Roger Stern "Iran Actually is Short of Oil – Muddled Mullahs" 8. January 2007. *International Herald Tribune.com*. Available online. <<http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/08/opinion/edstern.php>>. Accessed 30. October 2008.

For these reasons, we should be keen to focus greater scholarly attention on Iranian expatriates and this thesis will shed some light on this community and their relationship with both sides of the Persian Gulf.

CHAPTER 2: APPROACHING PERSIAN GULF COMMUNITIES

In order to proceed, it is necessary to dispel any notions of a uniform Gulf society along ethnic, linguistic, or national lines. In fact, identity, rather than nationality, plays the primary factor in determining relations and interactions between inhabitants with origins on both sides of the Persian Gulf, thus questioning the idea of using commonly accepted Western constructions of ordering different societies along purely nationalistic lines. It will prove useful to employ some theoretical models to the Gulf context to understand the issues of Arab and Iranian identities, as well as how the issues of Gulf boundaries and territorial disputes have contributed to these over time. As the following section will show, the distinctions made between the various Iranian expatriate groups by Gulf Arabs carry significant ramifications for jobs, social standing, class identification, political participation and naturalization within the Persian Gulf Arab States.

Oscar Martinez set forth a model for assessing transnational interaction and fusion between countries within the borderlander or border people population in Border People.¹⁷ Historian Martinez finds his inspiration in the borderland, a peripheral area between the cores of different nations:

International boundaries have the same basic functions everywhere: to delimit one nation from another and to control the movement of people and goods from one side of the boundary to the other. Borderlands are generally situated at the periphery of nations, and to one degree or another all are subject to foreign influences. These characteristics are common to borderlanders from different parts of the globe. The

¹⁷ Oscar J. Martinez. *Border People: Life and Society in the U.S. – Mexico Borderlands* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994). Oscar Martinez was not the first person to coin or use the expression borderlands for the United States Mexico frontier area. The earliest reference I could find to borderlands came in Gloria Anzaldúa *Borderlands La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Spinsters/Aunt Lute Book Company, 1987). However, his work does a better job of making use of existing history and theory to support his study as well as incorporate individual accounts across the region into a unified picture of the borderland.

determining influence of the border makes the lives of border peoples functionally similar irrespective of location, nationality, ethnicity, culture and language. In other words, all borderlanders share the border experience.¹⁸

The key to Martinez' findings is his conclusion where the contact between groups in a mixed, environment, the frontier, far from the heartlands of states, leads to the construction or synthesis of broader transnational identities which are neither one identity nor the other, but a combination of the two.¹⁹ For example, in the US-Mexico case, the transnational synthesis taking place there leads to the creation of bilingual English/Spanish populations, and identity markers such as Mexican-American or Chicano used on both sides. Martinez further believes that even among such populations, borderlanders themselves display signs of heterogeneity, being shaped by environmental factors there, and the key is finding a way in which to quantify and assess distinct subgroups within the border region.²⁰ Through his borderlands abstraction, the historian aims to string together all collected bits of information into a greater overall picture which looks beyond and around stark boundaries of traditionally-defined nation-states and towards transnational processes of connections between different peoples.

Martinez implicitly channels Enlightenment theory of Hegel's original model of thesis: antithesis: synthesis for his transnational model. Two nations come into contact with one another and conflict ensues. Hegel maintains that the juxtaposition and violent interaction of binary oppositions (the thesis and its counter, antithesis) will continue until a position is reached (the synthesis) in The Hegelian Dialectic. Depending on which side

¹⁸ Ibid., xviii.

¹⁹ Ibid., 5.

²⁰ Ibid., xvi-xvii.

we take, whether one nation or another, the side chosen will represent the thesis in our abstraction, while the opposite side represents the antithesis, and the two remain in conflict until a resolution can be reached between them. When this happens, the result is a synthesis of the two. In Martinez' case, the synthesis created in his example is the borderland and borderlanders—the US-Mexico borderland and the various subcultures of the borderland (American, Mexican, Mexican American/Chicano)—and for our case, the equivalents are Persian Gulf States and various Gulf populations (Gulf Arab, Iranian, Iranian expatriate), respectively. Unlike Hegel, in order to reach such a “transnational” synthesis, some form of mixing or a resolution must occur between the two sides and Martinez addresses the various ways in which nations combine or fuse and at what level they do so, allowing for the presence of a synthesis amongst both thesis and antithesis. Such syntheses is not limited to physical contact alone but can take place at the level of ideas, and has been demonstrated in areas such as between Marxist and Islamic thought in Iran.²¹

Not everything in borderlands theory as set out by Martinez applies so evenly to the case between Iran and the Persian Gulf Arab States, so some adjustments and revision must be made to his theory to fit the case of Gulf as Borderland. As Martinez' work suggests, the vast space of a borderlands region should provoke variation within the borderlands culture in distinct sub regions.²² In our case, we can substitute Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates as two sub-regions of a greater Iranian-Arab borderland and

²¹ Kamran Talattof, “Comrade Akbar: Islam, Marxism, and Modernity,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 25, no. 3 (2005): 634-49.

²² Martinez 54-55.

study the distinct Iranian expatriate culture forming there as a result of specific migration paths to each country. Another major difference is that there is no land border between Iran and the two subject states, but the porous, difficult to monitor Persian Gulf waters instead. We should duly note that borderlands are not limited to land boundaries alone but can also be interpreted as areas contiguous to international waterways over which nations have no monopoly. A third major difference lies in the size of the states and in the degree and flow of migration between them. Unlike the US-Mexico case, where the brunt of migration goes from the less populated state into the larger one and from south to north the Persian case exhibits the opposite—migration is from the larger to the smaller states and north to south. While the size of the Iranian expatriate population in Persian Gulf Arab States is still smaller than the size of other expatriate communities, its effect is enough to alter the demographic makeup and place political and social pressures on governments such as those in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. However, migration which takes place in the Gulf is distinct from Martinez’ original case as Iranian expatriate integration into Arab society is currently not a solution, or at least an easy one. In fact, the Iranian expatriate experience living and working in Persian Gulf Arab States does not lead to naturalization, citizenship and ultimately, political enfranchisement in the same way performing immigration to America has done for Iranians there (along with other immigrant communities).²³

Finally, the last major difference between a Martinez borderland and the one constructed here is the degree of third party influences in the construction of border

²³ Kelley xi, xiii-xiv.

identities. Although Martinez' work does mention the Tohono O'odham and Pasqua Yaqui—two indigenous tribes also present in the border region—such groups are too small to generate a strong impact on the cultural synthesis forming between American and Mexican cultures. Therefore, his transnational model analyzing two predominant cultures straddling a borderland still holds true. The same cannot be said for the Persian Gulf, where numerous expatriate communities contribute to the Gulf borderland experience, and exert at least an indirect influence upon Gulf Arab society.²⁴ Within such milieu we may add at least one Iranian expatriate subgroup: the Baluch community, who again are neither ethnically Arab nor Iranian, and who operate within various roles in Gulf Arab society without the negative, subversive stigma attached to them such as the 'Ajam nor the potentially positive connotation of being Arab, such as Huwala, two other Iranian expatriate subgroups.

The first example of the congruence of Martinez' work with other theory comes from Eric Hobsbawm's ideas in The Invention of Tradition. Hobsbawm originally used the idea of invented tradition to illustrate how nations are created through selective, careful use of the past in order to establish or maintain bonds between people, whether or not a particular version of the past really took place:

'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.²⁵

²⁴ Gardner.

²⁵ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 1.

However, we do not quite grasp the relevance of Hobsbawm's idea until several pages later, when he elaborates on the importance of invented tradition:

There is probably no time and place with which historians are concerned which has not seen the 'invention' of tradition.... [H]owever, we should expect it to occur more frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which 'old' traditions had been designed, producing new ones to which they were not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are otherwise eliminated: in short, when there are sufficiently large and rapid changes on the demand or supply side.²⁶

Hobsbawm shows us how a group can perpetuate its values through the use of appropriated, convenient symbols and how change (i.e. transformation of society) plays a factor in establishing certain symbols to demarcate one society from another. Most importantly, Hobsbawm uses his idea to assess nations and the degree to which they are successful in the project of nation-building.²⁷ The invention of tradition therefore plays in to the establishment of boundary lines between nations, and it is within the borderland where tradition faces its greatest challenge from outside forces.

How exactly does "invented tradition" fit within the Iranian expatriate situation and the concept of cultural synthesis? Iranian Huwala frequently invoke an alleged Arab past as a mitigating factor to help integrate them into Gulf Arab society while discounting their experience living within Iranian space, a tack employed by borderlanders according to Martinez.²⁸ On the other hand, 'Ajam individuals are still considered foreign in spite of living amongst the Gulf Arab populations, over several generations. The integration of the Iranian expatriate population itself into the Gulf Arab one threatens the Persian Gulf

²⁶ Ibid., 4.

²⁷ Ibid., 13.

²⁸ Martinez 20.

Arab States' socio-political system rooted in oil-based rentier economies since the former could potentially increase the pool of individuals demanding social benefits and political rights as citizens. Further, Iranian expatriate individuals help to perpetuate less than pure Persianized identities (i.e. non-*sharif*, *la-ansab*, *bani-khudair*, etc.), which undermine the existing tribal Arab kinship links and frameworks maintained through endogamous relationships. Therefore, one immediate response to such threat is Gulf Arabs' renewed emphasis of clothing such as the *thobe* and *ageyl* to distinguish themselves from culturally-defined outside populations such as Iranians. Bahrain and the island dispute over Abu Musa and the Tunbs have served as the front lines of Iranian nationalist territorial claims in the current day both before and during the Revolutionary Era, although Iranian territory once included other parts of the Arabian Peninsula as well. Whether or not Iran's cross-Gulf claims to its southern shore or islands such as Abu Musa and the Tunbs still have validity now may not be of much concern to Iranians wistful of a more glorious past.²⁹ Hobsbawm's ideas give us additional tools with which to assess the social and political boundaries between the two sides of the Persian Gulf, how they shift over time, and the adjustments employed by the Gulf population to maintain and preserve aspects of their identity in light of such changes.

²⁹ Similar applications of ethno-national claims to territory that are rooted in history still exist elsewhere today. They include Serbian claims to the newly declared Republic of Kosovo and even Osama bin Laden's lament for the loss of al-Andalus (Spain). Bahrain had claimed Zubara, Qatar as its ancestral home and part of Bahraini territory until World Court mediation settled the issue. Khuri 1980: 27; Bratislav Panetic, "Reshaping the Balkans in the First Two Centuries: The Case of Serbia." *Journal of Design History*. 20, no.2 (2007): 1-14; Isambard Wilkinson. "Fearsome dilemma of Spain's Muslims: The country's south provides a sinister inspiration to Osama bin Laden and his followers." *The Daily Telegraph*. 17 April 2004. Available from Access World News, Record Number A20040417 -19F4-EIW,0,XML,EIW. <<http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezproxy.library.arizona.edu/>>. Accessed 03 May 2007; Zahlan 1998: 3, 47-48, 165.

Finally, Edward Said's Orientalism may also have some use within Martinez' framework for assessing the condition of Iranian expatriates.³⁰ Originally, Said applied Foucault's theories on power dynamics to demonstrate how Western nations such as Britain and France came to dominate the Middle East and the nations and groups there during the 18th and 19th centuries, through a process of constructing the "other," or the collective individual they referred to as the Oriental. If one can attribute and confer their unfavorable weaker qualities to someone else, such as another group, then distance and differentiate them from him or her for possessing the same specific qualities, one gains power over them. In the Western European case, Britain and France succeeded in establishing their superiority (at least in their minds) over an amalgamation of several cultures lumped into a form of us (West) versus all the rest (Eastern or Oriental) culture, while making no distinction between various groups.

Said's thought about the relationship between two parties and the way in which they view one another does not necessarily have to limit itself to East/West dynamics though. We could also apply it to the struggle between Iran and the Arab States for control of the Persian Gulf and the construction of the "other" between two so-called "oriental" nations in their territorial claims. Edward Said's us/them model of duality offers a contrast to Martinez' cultural synthesis framework (or Hegel for that matter) and gives us a model for assessing Arab-Iranian relations at various levels. The application of

³⁰ Edward W. Said *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). Edward Said's work spawned a new field of post-colonial research within Latin American Studies called Latin Americanism. The main difference between Orientalism and Latin Americanism lay in analyzing the relationship between Latin America and the West (i.e. Europe) rather than the Orient and West. For some examples, see Brett Levinson "The Death of the Critique of Eurocentrism: Latinamericanism as a Global Praxis/Poiesis" *Revista de Estudios Hispánicos* 31. no. 2 (1997): 169-201; Julio Ramos "Hemispheric Domains: 1898 and the Origins of Latin Americanism" *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies* 10. no. 3 (2001): 237-51.

Martinez' thought, combined with the Hobsbawm's theory, provides a template for individuals forming a transnational synthesis and the relations between a newly emerging third new party and its forebears.

In sum, by studying the Gulf as borderland and the Iranian expatriate population, we can learn about the limits of Iranian and Gulf Arab cultures through the Iranian expatriate individuals operating between them. We can also derive something about the responses or lack thereof of central governments to co-opt or alienate the populations operating on the periphery. Alternatively, we can learn about how neighboring governments respond to the choices made by the original government and how they appropriate or neglect the peripheral populations according to their specific needs, such as integrating them into their labor force and national population or accusing them of being a dangerous foreign entity. With the above theory in place, we can now turn the general issue of Iranian expatriate migration.

Iranian migration has been driven by the shifting political calculus of Iran and the other Persian Gulf States in a process of attempting to draw and secure both physical and cultural borders between them according to Western-defined standards. It is important to examine how territory was viewed in the prior era (up through the late 19th century) to understand why this is so important.

Traditionally, rights to territory had been intermingled in the southern parts of the Gulf and northern Oman, where Iranians and Omanis had lived side by side for centuries without any dividing line between them. The whole area was the frontier or the zone of contact between Iran and Oman. The offshore islands were considered by common consent to be under direct Iranian sovereignty, yet nothing prevented the tribes of the southern Gulf territories, under common ownership, from living and

working in the islands or in the northern coasts of the Gulf. People from the southern coasts could travel freely to Iran and live there indefinitely even as recently as 1945.³¹

This illustrates just how non-uniform Persian Gulf States were then if we compare them to today's delimitation of boundaries.³² Even before the Islamic Revolution, Iran and the Persian Gulf Arab States attempted to remove any ambiguity regarding an autonomous region, disputed territory or population that had previously been left unclaimed by either side. The same author had earlier described such a shift and its fallout at the state level.

Delimitation of the earliest examples of modern boundaries in the vicinity of the Gulf began in the 1870s (Baluchistan boundaries) when not only were Iran and others in the region totally unfamiliar with the legal implications and geographical sophistications of delimiting modern boundaries, but Iran's traditionally ill-defined relations between centre and periphery and her general weakness resulted in loss of territories in all directions.³³

However, our understanding of the implications of Gulf boundary disputes is limited until we examine the first-hand effects of such change.

The story becomes more intriguing when we consider how individuals living in and occupying the periphery were the first ones affected by central or core leadership from Tehran, Sharjah, or Dubai and Gulf Iranians ultimately faced a different choice than that of their revolutionary peers in 1979: that of adopting one nationality or another rather than overthrowing the government. For example, if we consider that there has not historically been one unified Baluch state but one split between Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, the boundary limitations noted above have imposed Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani 'nationalities' upon the entire Baluch population. Iran's inhabitants who were

³¹ Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf: A Maritime Political Geography* (Richmond: Curzon, 1999): 71.

³² Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974): 205.

³³ Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 12.

most liable to depart the country for the Gulf's southern shore were more likely to live on the fringes or periphery of society, both in figurative and literal senses.³⁴ Why? If we consider non-Persian speakers, this meant having to accept Persian language of the majority in place of their native minority tongues. For traditional practicing Muslim families, changes in dress as well as government intrusion into religious centers meant a loss of personal choice regarding their lifestyle in order to attain social advancement, such as the modernizing changes phased in during the 1920s and 1930s. For rural farmers and unskilled labor, agricultural neglect and inflation meant such individuals moved to find work and a means of living elsewhere, including urban areas. Such individuals had little or nothing to gain from the modernizing changes instituted in the core rather than those made on the periphery. Even had such individuals stayed through the Iranian Revolution, benefits to their ways of life would have been marginal at best. Such factors played a major part in the identity calculations of every Gulf Iranian individual and ultimately made them more susceptible to cross the newly established boundary lines.

In some cases, the resolution of territorial disputes led to voluntary expulsion rather than accepting imposed rule. Migrants from Lengeh, Baluchistan and Khuzestan provinces, Hengam Island or Sirri provide evidence of the fallout from border turmoil as a result of Iran successfully imposing its control within their ancestral homelands, and who opted to cross the waters into the Persian Gulf Arab States. These regions all comprise the outer edge or limits of Iran today, resulting in a rather autonomous character

³⁴ This is a point Martinez has also alluded to regarding borderlanders with respect to center-periphery studies. Interestingly, the author also uses the term "other" to describe the opportunism employed by borderlanders to adopt one or the other nationality depending on their needs. However, Martinez never references Said and there is no indication he knew about the latter's work. See Martinez xviii.

for such regions and enclaves, which were effectively detached from the state until the 1950s.³⁵ Such regions (with the exception of oil-rich Khuzestan) were more likely to receive less attention from the government for regional development expenditures, thus making these regions more liable to foreign social and economic influences than those areas from the core of Iran.³⁶ When emirates such as Dubai offered economic and social incentives for northern shore Iranian populations as an alternative to unwanted restrictions and scant social benefits, many individuals willingly migrated to the southern shore.

On the other hand, some members of the Iranian expatriate community established outside the newly defined Iranian state's boundaries in states like Bahrain had no choice but to accept Arab rule in other territorial disputes with little or no support from the Iranian government.

If the Iranian government did little to allay the fears of some states that it might infiltrate and eventually dominate its tiny neighbors, it can also be said that it did not take up the question of the status of Iranian immigrants in the Gulf states or pursue their interests on a diplomatic level. The Iranian government essentially left the question of Iranian emigration to resolve itself through inaction, the natural course of time, and regional developments.³⁷

In Bahrain for example, individuals who were perhaps still loyal to Iran were in for a surprise when the Iranian government abandoned its claims to the island and recognized its independence in 1971 after a United Nations administered plebiscite.³⁸ Another

³⁵ Chubin 1974: 200.

³⁶ Misagh Parsa *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989): 81.

³⁷ Chubin 1974: 211-12.

³⁸ John Duke Anthony *Arab States of the Lower Gulf* (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1976): 14; Christin Marschall *Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami* (New York: Routledge

example came during the 1930s, when some of Bahrain's Gulf Iranian individuals refused Bahraini citizenship in spite of compulsory nationality laws meant to make them pledge allegiance Bahrain instead of Iran, with the island linking the right to own land with Bahraini nationality.³⁹ Fuccaro notes in the same passage how some Iranians sold their property and left, others maintained dual nationality until Iran recognized Bahrain's independence. Still, others tried to get around the law by transferring property rights to their children and became stateless individuals as a result, thus lending complexity to the issue of nationality.⁴⁰ Apart from lightly populated Qawasim-claimed islands such as Abu Musa, there were not the same issues from a shift in territorial recognition in the United Arab Emirates although as there were for Bahrain.

When we examine each of the above cases and factor in various terms such as Huwala or Bidoon, we still see an inherent conflict between traditional ways of identifying the Gulf and its natives versus the idea of distinguishing the same individuals under modern nationalities. On the one hand, Persian Gulf residents fall under categories such as Iranian, Bahraini, Dubaian/Emirati, as one means of establishing an official identity. As another means, individuals are still liable to be characterized by overlapping non-national labels such as 'Ajam and Baluch on account of their appearance, or additional categories like place of origin.

Curzon, 2003): 8; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 133-36; Muhammed Ghanim Rumaihi *Bahrain: Social and Political Change since the First World War* (New York: Bowker Publishing, 1976): 31.

³⁹ Nelida Fuccaro "Mapping the Transnational Community: Persians and the Space of the City in Bahrain, c. 1869-1937" *Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf*. Ed. Madawi Al-Rasheed (New York: Routledge, 2005):2005: 44, 53. Fuccaro also ironically notes how in 1929, Bahrain recognized any children born in Bahrain to be Bahraini nationals, even if they were born to foreign parents unless registered at the British Political Agency, who represented non-Bahrainis since 1861.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Most people in the region were identified according to their membership of a tribe (or its sub-divisions, the clan and extended family), or according to the locality from which they originated. Such family names as Al Yamani (the Yemeni), Al Najdi (from the Najd), Al Hijazi (from the Hijaz) are common throughout the Gulf region.⁴¹

Accepted social boundaries, in addition to political ones, were just as liable to overlap and shift with time, thereby fomenting a struggle between tradition and modernity in regards to identity in all the Persian Gulf states. When the Iranian Revolution took place, followed by the Iran-Iraq War, Gulf Arabs, Iranians, and Iranian expatriates grappled with the unresolved issue of identity still further, as there was a newfound concern for even more potential shifting of boundaries. And yet, the original factors that drew Iranians towards the Gulf's southern shore, such as job opportunities, lower taxes, freedom of religious expression, and opposition to military service did not change.

So what is identity? Identity is a complex issue no matter the various theories it is framed in or quantifiable factors assigned to it. It depends on many contexts, such as the creation of national boundaries, religious preference, adaptation to a particular location, customs, history, departure and separation from one's place of origin, individual experience and more, Gulf residents can fall into a number of categories and subgroups. Identity is subjective to and determined by each individual and is liable to change based upon the unique circumstances in which each person finds themselves in relation with the people around them. Such complexity and subjectivity does not preclude us from

⁴¹ Longva 1997: 46. Fuccaro goes even further than Longva in specifically defining Iranians living within Persian Gulf Arab States. "As the first or second generations settled in Bahrain they maintained strong family links with their city of origin, and invested in houses and landed properties in their old neighborhood. While the new family line was often established under the name of the first settler in Manamah, larger groups which included different households continued to be identified with their places of origin in Iran, as was the case for the Bushehris, Shirazis, Farsis, 'Ahwazis and Bastekis.'" Fuccaro 2005: 46.

attempting to study or quantify specific groups because that is where we glean the most insight into human relations at any specific time or place or in general. As the remainder of the text will show, individual and group identities go hand in hand with construction and development of the Persian Gulf Arab States as we know them in 2008.

CHAPTER 3: IRANIAN IDENTITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARAB STATES

Iranian expatriates have consciously chosen to live outside of Iran and have begun to adjust and adapt to life away from Iran, whether on a temporary or full-term basis. Some of these individuals go back and forth maintaining dual residency on both sides of the Gulf, others seek temporary work in the Gulf Arab States while others have taken steps toward appropriating Arab identities. In short, there are a variety of ways Iranian expatriates have moved away from Iranian towards Arab society. They are not entirely Iranian or Arab but a hybrid society between the two sides.

To focusing our study, we will employ a new marker for the Iranian expatriate community—Gulf Iranian—to help indicate distinct outlook and perceived identity of such individuals living outside of Iran but still within the specific Persian Gulf context. Gulf Iranian is a suitable term because it complements the existing term Gulf Arab, which has been applied to Bahrainis, Emiratis, Qataris and other Arabic-speaking individuals indigenous to the Gulf. The following chapters will briefly delve into introductory definitions of both Gulf Iranians and Gulf Arabs in order to put our study into context.

Who exactly is a Gulf Iranian and what distinguishes them from Gulf Arabs or other Iranians? Gulf Iranians are simply any Iranian citizens or their descendants who, such as Gulf Arabs, now reside at least some of the time in one of the Persian Gulf Arab States on temporary or long-term bases.⁴² Although the definition given for Gulf Iranian seems rather simple and broad, it does not touch upon the ethnic makeup of such

⁴² This definition includes Iranians who maintain and move between residences in both Iran and the Persian Gulf Arab States.

individuals, thereby helping us to overcome the issue of ethnic non-Persian communities within the Iranian community for example. It says nothing about the socioeconomic standing of Iranian expatriates in the Persian Gulf or their social acceptance by the host Arab society. One might infer a greater variability in such population in the region due to economically less expensive relocation costs to move across the Gulf as well as shorter journey times, thus proving far less a barrier to entry than Europe or America. Still, one major factor to consider for Gulf Iranians is the problem of being accepted by Gulf Arab States and Arab society, which exerts a social cost upon them. Whether by choice or by uncontrollable circumstances, the Gulf Iranian represents the greater integration into Arab society or perhaps a synthesis of a new Gulf society.

The Gulf Iranian subgroups can be divided as follows:

Huwala⁴³ (literally “wanderer” or “migrant”) is the Gulf Arab designation referring to ethnic Sunni Arab and Persian populations who had lived on the northern Persian shore of the Gulf for an extended period of time and have become what some scholars term “semi-Persianized” Arabs.⁴⁴ They speak Arabic and may or may not know

⁴³ Taken on its own, the term Huwala (plural هواله, singular هولله) is interesting in its various spellings and transliterations into English from each author’s interpretation of Persian and Arabic. Various sources consulted in this work have used all of the following spellings: Havaleh, Huwalah, Hule, Holis, Howayla, Hawailah, Muha(w)walah, Hawla, Hoolah, hwala, Hwilah, Huwala, Hawala, al-Hawala, Hawalah and Hawali. Undoubtedly, there are additional spellings, thus creating a potential minefield for future English-language researchers of the Persian Gulf until scholars reach a common standard. This is also not to be confused with *hawala*, an unofficial money trading practice in the Gulf today. For simplification, this author will use Huwala to denote a Gulf Iranian subgroup and *hawala* for money transactions.

⁴⁴ Easa Saleh Al-Gurg *The Wells of Memory* (London: John Murray, 1998): 232; John Barrett Kelly *Arabia, the Gulf and the West* (New York: Basic Books, 1980): 164; May Seikaly “Bahraini Women in Formal and Informal Groups: The Politics of Identification” *Organizing Women: Formal and Informal Women’s Groups in the Middle East*. Eds. Dawn Chatty and Annika Rabo (New York: Berg, 1997): 130-31. The theme of a Persianized, less than full Arab community frequently turns up regarding this community throughout many works referencing the Huwala. For example, Kelly explains how the Huwala are more Persian because of their supposed non-tribal nature. Kelly also alludes to the same group’s

the Persian language, based upon whether their ancestors ever spoke Persian and if they still retain it within successive generations.⁴⁵ Mahdi Al-Tajir states that a number of this subgroup speak a language called *Bastaki*, a variant of Persian, among each other in place of Arabic.⁴⁶ Huwala tend to be divided between the Sunni Shafi'i and Maliki schools of Islamic jurisprudence.⁴⁷ Generally, the Huwala trace their roots to somewhere along Iran's southern shores and islands, ranging from Khorramshahr in Khuzestan province to the ports of Lengeh and Bandar Abbas, and even Hengam or Qeshm islands.⁴⁸

The term Huwala has been in use for some time, as Huwala populations have crisscrossed the Persian Gulf since before the advent of Islam, based upon the rise and fall of various maritime ports under Persian, Arab or Turkish control even before the European arrival. During the 18th century, Huwala groups reportedly took over and controlled Bahrain.⁴⁹ The same groups were known for alternating between manning the Iranian fleet in the Persian Gulf as well as conducting mutinies against it during the same period—making them both the official face of Iran to other Gulf Arabs as well as an anti-Iranian threat.⁵⁰ Early 20th century sources such as Lorimer have ascribed this subgroup to be part of a larger Arabian tribe called the Hawalah, and with some sources even

amorphousness and how they have also roamed the sea rather than the desert, the traditional area of the Bedouin Arab. Seikaly diplomatically refers to the group as a Persian/Arab tribe.

⁴⁵ David E. Long *The Persian Gulf: An Introduction to its People, Politics, and Economics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978): 8.

⁴⁶ Mahdi Abdalla Al-Tajir *Language and Linguistic Origins in Bahrain: The Baharnah dialect of Arabic* (Norfolk: Kegan Paul International, 1982): 7.

⁴⁷ Ibid; Fred Lawson *Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989): 4; Lorimer Vol 2: 754.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Mojtabeh-Zadeh 1999: 138; Rumaihi 27.

⁵⁰ Guive Mirfendereski, "The Ownership of the Tonb Islands: A Legal Analysis" in *Small Islands, Big Politics: the Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf* ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996): 123.

attributing the Qawasim family as a part of such tribe.⁵¹ However, the term remains problematic and open to interpretation and debate in the 21st century, especially in light of a de-emphasis on Bedouin affiliation according to some scholars.⁵² For example, Arab Shi'a with Iranian origins are sometimes included among Huwala under a greater Arab umbrella. Depending on one's viewpoint, Huwala can be seen as either a title of prestige for one's ascribed Arabness or an opportunistic way to make up for a vacillating, non-tribal background in contrast to their cohorts based in the Arabian Peninsula.⁵³

While Huwala families may not possess the same distinguished heritage and tribal links as some Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula, they often make up for this through an established middleman status between ethnic Arabs and Persians.⁵⁴ This is due to their previously established connections to Iran, whether through language or commercial ties. Depending upon their needs, Huwala can switch between "Arab" and "Persian" for greater social mobility and still maintain connections on both sides of the Gulf. As such, the term overlaps with other subgroups such as the 'Ajam which are discussed below. For example, families such as those with (Al-)Kazrooni, Eshaq and Fikri surnames that would

⁵¹ Lorimer Vol. 2: 754-55; Andrea B. Rugh *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 245; Hendrik Van Der Meulen (PhD dissertation: Tufts University) *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates* (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1997): 202-04.

⁵² Anthony Cordesman *Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE: Challenges of Security* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997): 76; John E. Peterson *The Arab Gulf States: Steps toward Political Participation* (New York: Praeger, 1988): 63; Van Der Meulen 202-04.

⁵³ One source claims that the term Huwala roughly translates as 'turncoat' and has gained a pejorative meaning over time. Regardless, other scholars have continued to use this term. See Paul Dresch and James Piscatori (eds.) *Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf* (New York: IB Tauris, 2005): 254.

⁵⁴ Rumaihi 131.

be grouped under the name Huwala in one source turn up as ‘Ajam in another; this could be because of their perceived proximity or foreignness to other Arabs.⁵⁵

In contrast, the ‘Ajam⁵⁶ subgroup used within the Gulf Arab context generally denotes ethnic Shi’i Persian populations with Iranian origins.⁵⁷ The term ‘Ajam translates as foreign, although one should note that this term is more frequently associated with this specific non-Arab population than others (e.g. Indian, Pakistani, or Thai). The ‘Ajam follow the Usuli branch of the *Ja’fari* school of Islamic jurisprudence within *Ithna Ashari* or Twelver Shi’ism, akin to most other Shi’a in the world.⁵⁸ As a rule, the ‘Ajam speak Persian as their primary language, and their Persian pronunciation influences their Arabic, thus distinguishing them from native Arabic speakers.⁵⁹ As a result, this immediately identifies any ‘Ajam as a foreigner or non-Arab. It also makes ‘Ajam as a

⁵⁵ For example Christopher Davidson’s only refers to ‘Ajam throughout his 2008 work. See Christopher Davidson *Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). For examples of Al-Kazrooni family members, see Michael Field *The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States* (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 1985): 76; Clive Holes, “Dialect and National Identity: The Cultural Politics of Self-Representation in Bahraini Musalsalat” in *Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf* eds. Paul Dresch, and James Piscatori (New York: IB Tauris, 2005): 58; Fuad I. Khuri *Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980): 160-61.

⁵⁶ ‘Ajam (عجم) is the Arabic plural form of Ijmi. Unlike Huwala, one finds less variation in the spellings of the term, with ‘Ajam or Ajam being the most frequent forms encountered in texts. Laurence Louër “The Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain” *City and Society*. Vol. 20, Issue 1 (2008): 40.

⁵⁷ Anh Longva, “Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and Practice” in *Citizenship and State in the Middle East* eds. Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis and Manuel S. Hassassian (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000): 189; Mostafa Vaziri *Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity* (New York: Paragon House, 1993): 10. Vaziri also notes how the term ‘Ajam is also used differently in Iran and the Persian language. “‘Ajam for the non-Arabs was a foreign application to their group, and its purpose of defining a congenial and common characteristic among them may have been vague and meaningless. In its Persian or Iranian context, the term ‘Ajam could apply to various ethnic groups in Iran (Lur, Kurd, Baluchi).”

⁵⁸ Lawson 4; Richard Nyrop (ed.) *Persian Gulf States: Country Studies* (Washington: American University Press, 1985): 154-55. There are two main branches of jurisprudence within Ithna Ashari or Twelver Shi’ism: the Akhbari and Usuli schools of jurisprudence. Both are practiced today in Bahrain, although the majority of Bahrain’s Shi’a follow the Usuli school.

⁵⁹ Cordesman 76.

more interchangeable term with broader markers such as Iranian or Persian by Gulf Arabs to distinguish such individuals from the *Baharna*,⁶⁰ Bahrain's native Arab Shi'i inhabitants.⁶¹ This makes it possible to include non-Shi'i Persians within the 'Ajam subgroup designation, as well as other individuals who are neither ethnically Arab nor Persian but considered Iranian by Gulf Arab culture due to their foreignness. The term 'Ajam still comes with some negative connotations in regard to their ability to speak Arabic as well as in comparison with other foreign populations.⁶² Unlike their Huwala counterparts, 'Ajam individuals can trace their roots to a much wider swathe of Iran, ranging from Azerbaijan to Mashhad, thus resulting in a varied, more diverse population. For example, one need look no further than surnames such as Daylami or Lingawi (for individuals from Daylam or Lengeh) to trace such heritage directly to one city or village.⁶³

The Baluch,⁶⁴ who are neither ethnically Arab nor Persian, are yet another significant Gulf Iranian population whose presence is noted by Arabs in the Gulf. Such as the Huwala and most Gulf Arabs, the Baluch are practicing Sunni Muslims, although

⁶⁰ Again, the term *Baharna*, (its singular form in Arabic is Bahrani) such as Huwala, takes many written forms and this particular spelling is preferred by the author.

⁶¹ Peterson 63.

⁶² Two such negative statements are quoted here: "The only nod in the direction of linguistic reality I noticed was in the portrayal of a Persian sherbet seller, who spoke in the kind of broken Arabic that is the butt of Bahraini jokes about Persians' inability to speak Arabic properly." Dresch 255; "A Bahraini adage, which shows the dislike felt for the Iranians runs '*Sharr al Baluch wa la khair al 'Ajam*' literally 'The worst of the Baluch is better than a good Persian'." Rumaihi 35.

⁶³ Holes 58.

⁶⁴ Lorimer makes the following note on the use of Baluch in its various forms: "The name Baluchi, sanctioned by English usage, is used to designate the race or tribes which form the subject of this article; but the correct form of the word in Baluchistan is Baloch (بلوچ), both for the singular and for the plural, and there the term Balochi refers only to the language spoken by the Baloch. In Arabic the name is Balush (بلوش) in the plural and Balushi (بلوشي) in the singular." Lorimer Vol. 2: 258.

they always follow the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence.⁶⁵ Baluch society, such as much of Gulf Arab society but unlike as the ‘Ajam, has also traditionally been tribally organized.⁶⁶ However, their common Sunni sectarian identity and tribal organization do not afford them any additional favor above the ‘Ajam within the Gulf Arab community; in fact they are often considered as a lower socioeconomic stratum. The category of Baluch, such as Huwala and ‘Ajam, is somewhat prone to overlap, as Gulf Iranians in certain jobs have been classified as Baluch within certain emirates even in light of evidence to the contrary.⁶⁷ The Baluch in the Gulf Arab States can trace their Iranian-based ancestors to the Makran coast, as well as to both Kerman and Sistan & Baluchistan provinces on Iran’s eastern and southeastern extremes.⁶⁸ This population is not only fluent in their native Baluchi tongue, but Arabic and Persian as well.⁶⁹ One issue that sets the Baluch apart from their ethnic Arab and Persian counterparts is that they have never had their own nation or tribal sponsor from which to draw substantial political or economic support, as noted by Abdul Hakim Baluch, a Pakistani Baluch scholar.⁷⁰ Still, this has not stopped the Baluch from serving in the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms in various roles over centuries, whether as soldiers, pearling industry workers or even today in the oil industry.⁷¹

⁶⁵ Anthony 9; Holes 58; Brian Spooner “Baluchistan – Geography, History and Ethnography” *Encyclopedia Iranica Online*. Iranica.com. Available online. <<http://iranica.com/newsite/index.isc>>. Accessed 17. October 2008.

⁶⁶ Spooner “Baluchistan – Geography, History and Ethnography.”

⁶⁷ Van Der Meulen 361.

⁶⁸ Long 1978: 14.

⁶⁹ Anthony 16-18.

⁷⁰ “Abdul Hakim Baluch – Former Government Official and Author.” 09. June 2001. Gulf News.com. Available online. <<http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/01/06/09/19313.html>>. Accessed 08. October 2008.

⁷¹ Spooner “Baluchistan – Geography, History and Ethnography.”

One can also expand a definition of Gulf Iranian to include mixtures and combinations of any of the above groups as well as with the Gulf Arab populations. The Shihuh are one good example of such mixture. Depending on one's sources, this "tribe" of the United Arab Emirates is formed of Arab, Persian, and Baluch elements at both the ethnic and linguistic levels.⁷² Many of Bahrain's original population, the *Baharna*, as well as many Emiratis, can lay claim to part Persian descent especially through a grandmother two to three generations back during the pre-oil era, which may qualify them as a new intermediate or mixed ethnic category in the future.⁷³ Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh notes that, prior to British control of the Persian Gulf in the early 19th century, other Iranian Arab tribes such as the Al-Ali, the Al Bu-Maher, and the Khamarah also migrated across the Gulf, and became recognized as tribal Arabs by other Arabs on the Persian Gulf's southern shore.⁷⁴ Frauke Heard-Bey also alludes to the presence of freed African slaves who are essentially accepted as Arabs today.⁷⁵

The above discussion serves as an introduction to the heterogeneity and complexity of the societies living within the Persian Gulf Arab States today. For this study, we will primarily focus on the three Gulf Iranian subgroups even though there are undoubtedly other Gulf Iranians with Iranian origins not mentioned here that could broaden the study's scope further. The principal reason for such omissions is the lack of

⁷² Davidson 343; Kevin G. Fenelon *The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey* (London: Longman, 1973): 110; Frauke Heard-Bey *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (New York: Longman Group, 1982): 77-80, 151-54; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 65-66.

⁷³ Paul Dresch, "Debates on Marriage and Nationality in the United Arab Emirates" in *Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf* eds. Paul Dresch, and James Piscatori (New York: IB Tauris, 2005): 141-42; Nyrop 154-55.

⁷⁴ Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 67.

⁷⁵ Heard-Bey 77-80, 151-54.

sufficient documented evidence or the existence of a small population. Out of Iran's estimated population of 65 million in 2008, one can probably find other Gulf Iranian subgroups such as ethnic Kurds or Azeri Turks among its expatriate population if examining thoroughly enough, such as within the 'Ajam community.⁷⁶ Something similar can be said for Iranians representing different religious subgroups, including Jewish, Zoroastrian and Baha'i practitioners living and working among the Gulf Arab population. Finally, there are potentially Gulf Iranian secularists, atheists and others who may have abandoned religion all together or otherwise not practiced it.

Reportedly, a number of Iranian Jews had migrated to Bahrain in the 19th century, although information today does not tell us whether or not any of the roughly 50 Bahraini Jews living there now are of Iranian descent.⁷⁷ Onley surmises that the transnational business family of Safars operating in Bahrain may have Bakhtiari origins.⁷⁸ Momen comments about a small migration of Iranian Baha'i to the Gulf Arab States after religious persecution in Iran during the 20th century.⁷⁹ In the United Arab Emirates, Baha'i adherents are counted as Muslims and information on the Baha'i faith is banned online, although the Abu Dhabi government did donate land for a Baha'i cemetery, thus

⁷⁶ "Iran." *CIA – The World Factbook*.

⁷⁷ Al-Tajir 13; "Bahraini king taps Jewish woman lawmaker as envoy to U.S." 29. May 2008. Haaretz.com. Available online. <<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/988420.html>>. Accessed 02. October 2008; "Bahreïn persiste et signe" International / Diplomatie. 08. June 2008. RadioCanada.ca. Available online. <<http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/International/2008/06/08/006-bahrein-diplomatie.shtml?ref=rss>>. Accessed 02. October 2008.

⁷⁸ James Onley "Transnational Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf: The Case of the Safar Family" *Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf*. Ed. Madawi Al-Rasheed (New York: Routledge, 2005): 64.

⁷⁹ Moojan Momen "The Baha'i Community of Iran: Patterns of Exile and Problems of Communication," in *Iranian Refugees and Exiles since Khomeini* ed. Asghar Fathi, (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1991): 23, 27.

indirectly acknowledging the presence of Baha'i who live there, although not necessarily Iranian ones.⁸⁰ While the Bahraini government does not recognize the Baha'i faith, it allows its adherents to practice their faith freely, and a similar assumption can be made regarding the unclear descent of Baha'is there, although no specific population numbers can be given for communities in either country.⁸¹ Regardless, the three main subgroups introduced above—Huwala, 'Ajam, Baluch—provide us with some idea as to the minimal extent of diversity exhibited within the Gulf Iranian population and helps to dispel the notion of a homogenous Iranian expatriate community on the Persian Gulf's southern shore.

When we examine the three groups further, such as socioeconomic standing, the picture becomes more intriguing and complex. Just as the Gulf Iranian's population is not ethnically, religiously or linguistically uniform, their professional and social roles within Gulf Arab society also vary. At the top of the social ladder is a landed merchant class, particularly among the Huwala but also the 'Ajam, who had migrated to promising commercial ports throughout the Persian Gulf Arab States. Originally, Gulf Iranian merchants served in various roles within urban areas as pearl merchants, smugglers and traders in pre-oil times although they have since diversified into other industries.⁸² Such

⁸⁰ "United Arab Emirates International Religious Freedom Report 2007." US Department of State – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 14. September 2007. State.gov. Available online. <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90223.htm>>. Accessed 02. October 2008.

⁸¹ "Bahrain International Religious Freedom Report 2005." US Department of State – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 08. November 2005. State.gov. Available online. <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51597.htm>>. Accessed 02. October 2008. One can make such assumption for this and the previous two footnotes based upon Iran's proximity to the Persian Gulf Arab States as well as the Baha'i faith's origins within Iran.

⁸² Al-Gurg 231; Molly Izzard *The Gulf: Arabia's Western Approaches* (London: Murray, 1979): 179; Rosemarie Said Zahlan *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States* (New York: Macmillan, 1978): 7.

interests include banking, automobile sales, produce sales and property.⁸³ Still other Gulf Iranians have gone into media and publishing ventures, including English language publications, which are distributed within the Arabian Peninsula.⁸⁴ Today, one finds them primarily in urban areas rather than rural ones.⁸⁵

A number of prominent Iranian merchant family names can be found in the Gulf, including the Abdullah Rostamani, Alireza, Almoayed, Darwish, Galadari, Kanoo, and Eassa Gurg.⁸⁶ While many of these families settled in one particular Gulf sheikhdom, today their interests frequently extend across multiple states, forming a transnational network spanning both sides of the Persian Gulf.⁸⁷ Many of these merchants are able to educate their children in private, non-state schools as well as sending their children to universities outside of the Gulf.⁸⁸ Generally, these individuals are able to converse using Arabic, Persian and even English interchangeably at the *suq* in their transactions in spite of any local Arab resentment towards the usage of Persian.⁸⁹ Some merchant families have built up enough influence over the years and have obtained citizenship, and even government portfolios in exchange for their long term support to the government or

⁸³ Anthony 181; Field 76-77.

⁸⁴ "Media." Galadari Brothers Company LLC – United Arab Emirates. Available online. <http://www.galadargroup.com/galadari_brothers_media.php>. Accessed 10. October 2008.

⁸⁵ Anthony 163-64.

⁸⁶ Davidson 74, 156; Field 76-77; Van Der Meulen 198.

⁸⁷ Davidson 156; Field 76-77.

⁸⁸ Munira Fakhro *Women at Work in the Gulf: A Case Study of Bahrain* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990): 42, 44-45. Coincidentally, Fakhro is identified as a Huwala surname elsewhere and the history and background of the Fakhro family namesake specific to the Gulf can be found in many sources. See Anthony 56; Dresch 254; Field 75; Izzard 106, 109, 115; Lawson 77, 90; Long 1978: 14; Lorimer Vol. 2: 754; Peterson 63.

⁸⁹ Izzard 111; Rumaihi 30.

ruler.⁹⁰ One should note although that the merchant class represents only a small portion of the total Gulf Iranian community.

Individuals within the Huwala, ‘Ajam, and Baluch populations also comprise another side of the socioeconomic spectrum, forming a lower ‘labor’ class in distinct contrast to the middle to upper merchant classes.⁹¹ In fact, the labor class has also been present in the Gulf Arab States since pre-oil times and is identified as the most culturally diverse of any group.⁹² Most Gulf Iranians, particularly Baluch, fill roles within the unskilled labor force from Dubai to Manama, including as “domestic servants, port laborers, waiters, cement mixers, porters, messengers, street sweepers and guards and maintenance men in office buildings.”⁹³ Many of the positions filled by the labor class noted above are for jobs which the respective governments are unable to fill with local Gulf Arab labor due to these positions’ perceived lack of social prestige.⁹⁴ Instead, the Persian Gulf Arab States are able to recruit foreigners, including Iranians, with temporary jobs and which have higher wages than back home. Also, the Baluch population often serves in the military forces of the Gulf Arab states, many of whom also come from

⁹⁰ For example, in Bahrain members of the Fakhro and Almoayed families have served in government cabinet posts since Bahraini independence such as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Information. Fuccaro also notes how Gulf Iranian merchants were in the position to loan money to their local rulers and expect repayment of these loans even decades later, showing the clout merchants have possessed over time. See Fuccaro 2005: 43; Lawson 76-77, 90.

⁹¹ Iranian scholarship has often focused upon a ‘bazaari’ class, especially its role within Pahlavi and Revolutionary Iran. This author refrains from classifying Gulf Iranians under such a grouping mainly because it is too broad for the scope of this paper. For a sense of the broadness of this class, here is the following definition: “A stratified organization, an Iranian bazaar consists of: wholesalers, commission agents, brokers, middlemen, merchants, money-changers, workshop owners, artisans, craftsmen, apprentices, shopkeepers, shop assistants, hawkers, peddlers and porters.” Dilip Hiro *Iran under the Ayatollahs* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985): 375n33.

⁹² Enver Koury *The United Arab Emirates: Its Political System and Politics* (Hyattsville: Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1980): 132-33.

⁹³ Anthony 14, 62.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 16-18.

Pakistan in addition to Iran.⁹⁵ This same option is not usually open to other Gulf Iranians or some members of the indigenous Arab populations (i.e. *Baharna*) for fear of insurrection or perhaps questionable loyalty to the government. While the military system in some Western nations operates as a meritocracy leading to social advancement and eventual citizenship, military service performed by the Baluch does not lead to social advancement or integration into Gulf Arab society.⁹⁶ Gulf Iranians are among the labor classes that are more such likely to work longer hours for less pay than their more skilled peers.⁹⁷ Similar to other foreign laborers, the threat of deportation by administrative order also plays a significant factor in such individuals' lives, as well as a lack of recourse to unpaid wages or abusive labor practices.⁹⁸

There is also a middle or 'professional' skilled class which operates between the two socioeconomic extremes of the Gulf Iranian community. One immediately infers that these individuals have achieved a higher level of education than the labor class, although not necessarily equal to the merchant class. According to Koury, members in this stratum include artisans, skilled laborers, and professionals within a white collar class, while Long notes more specifically how Iranians serve in fields such as trade, craft, accounting, storekeeping, banking, and engineering.⁹⁹ Iranians also worked as oil company employees as early as the 1930s, a result of the high demand for skilled labor in Bahrain

⁹⁵ Khuri 1980: 114-15; Andrea Rugh 247; Van Der Meulen 247.

⁹⁶ Cordesman 78, 81, 93.

⁹⁷ Anthony 16-18.

⁹⁸ Shahram Chubin *Security in the Persian Gulf: Domestic Factors* v.1 (Aldershot: Gower, 1982): 79-81.

⁹⁹ Koury 132-33; Long 1978: 110, 112.

and the fact that the oil industry in the Arabian Peninsula developed first in Bahrain.¹⁰⁰ The Iranian's ability to take higher-paying and more skilled jobs has drawn resentment from domestic Gulf Arab men seeking the same jobs, because such jobs also carry more social prestige.¹⁰¹ While many of these individuals do not possess the same financial clout as the merchant class, there are still a fair number of Gulf Iranian families whose members serve in advisory, caretaker and managerial roles for the rulers of several emirates as well as work for other merchants and international businesses.¹⁰²

One sensitive issue to all Gulf Iranian socioeconomic classes who have lived in a Gulf Arab country for an extended amount of time is whether or not an individual is considered a Bidoon.¹⁰³ The term Bidoon (literally "without") applies to any individual who lacks or is without political and citizenship rights in their country of residence, making them unequal in rights and duties compared to citizens.¹⁰⁴ As Bahry noted as recently as the year 2000, Bidoon individuals

Do not have legal residency and cannot hold Bahraini passports. Thus, they have no right to travel abroad, to buy houses under government-sponsored programs, or to hold government jobs. Recently, the Bahraini government issued regulations

¹⁰⁰ Fakhro 1990: 3.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., Louër 39.

¹⁰² Hendrik Van Der Meulen (1997) offers a list of notable Iranian individuals serving in various roles throughout the United Arab Emirates during the late 1990s throughout his work. One particularly noteworthy aspect shows the roles Gulf Iranian individuals play in perhaps the smaller, less recognized emirates instead of Abu Dhabi or Dubai. For example, Van Der Meulen includes information on Sharjah on pages 223-24, Ras al-Khaimah 233, Fujairah 254, Ajman 260, and Umm al-Quwain 266-67.

¹⁰³ Other spellings of Bidoon include: bedoun, bedun, bidoun and bidun. "Bahrain to Grant Nationality to 10,000" 20. February 2001. Gulf News.com. Available online. <<http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/01/02/20/10070.htm>>. Accessed 08. October 2008. Latheef Farook "Plight of Bahrain's Bedoun Family." 03. January 2002. Gulf News.com. Available online. <<http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/02/01/03/36804.html>>. Accessed 08. October 2008; Longva 2000: 188-89.

¹⁰⁴ Cordesman 76, 115; Sandra Lee "Bahrain." *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of Women's Issues Worldwide: The Middle East and North Africa*. Ed. Lynn Walter. Vol. Ed. Bahira Sherif-Trask. Vol. 4. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003): 56; Longva 2000: 188-89. Lee's mention of Bahraini Bidoon includes "poor Persian, Afghan and Baluch immigrants."

preventing them from sending their children to public schools or receiving free medical care. However, the most important problem is that they are considered foreign and can be deported at any time. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the Bahraini government has deported hundreds of biduns to Iran.¹⁰⁵

While this term is used in association with tribal Arabs in Kuwait, in the context of Bahrain one frequently finds it applied to Gulf Iranians, especially ethnic Persians ('Ajam) although it is also used to designate Baluch.¹⁰⁶

One can grasp the magnitude of the Bidoon problem among Gulf Iranians in light of a recent Bahraini government pronouncement that 30,000 Iranians were granted citizenship in the past 50 years.¹⁰⁷ Generally, Bidoon individuals are second and third generation immigrants still not recognized in their birthplace as citizens and who tend to be poor.¹⁰⁸ However, wealth and/or social status does not always determine whether or not an individual carries Bidoon status, since even Bahraini Huwala individuals have been denied Bahraini nationality due to previously vacated citizenship claims.¹⁰⁹ In 1999, Bahrain's Shaikh Hamad offered citizenship to many Bidoon in addition to an earlier round of passport granting to the group in 1995, although there are still numerous Bidoon

¹⁰⁵ Louay Bahry "The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain," *Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues*. Vol. 11, No.3 (2000): 135. Bahry is careful to note that a few of Bahrain's original Bidoon were also Pakistani.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., Van Der Meulen 70. Van Der Meulen notes how the United Arab Emirates does not have a tribal Arab Bidoon population but does not speak to a Bidoon case such as Bahrain's one. In fact, this thesis author would recommend a future study to understand the evolution of the term Bidoon within the Gulf and why there are different uses of it.

¹⁰⁷ Habib Toumi "4,971 Asians 'given Bahrain nationality in 56 years'" 04. September 2006. Gulf News.com. Available online. <<http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/09/04/10064855.html>>. Accessed 08. October 2008.

¹⁰⁸ Cordesman 76; Lee 56.

¹⁰⁹ Douglas Ray and Deo Poonwassie (eds.) *Education and Cultural Differences: New Perspectives* (New York: Garland Pub., 1992): 305-06.

today.¹¹⁰ Citizenship laws within the Gulf Arab States today require many years established residency plus satisfactory knowledge of Arabic before a person can even consider for applying for citizenship, thus potentially prolonging the Bidoon status of many Gulf Iranians for an indefinite period whether due to linguistic or other constraints.¹¹¹

Another subject to consider when looking at the Gulf Iranian community is their choice of clothing and personal appearance, a point strongly linked with identity according to Ingham.¹¹² In the early part of the 20th century, many Iranian men wore garb similar to the Arabian *thobe* or *dishdasha*, with one of the main difference distinguishing them from their Gulf Arab cohorts being a ‘gold-brocaded head dress.’¹¹³ In comparison, Gulf Arab men have worn a head cloth known alternatively as a *kufiya*, *ghitra*, or *shmagh*, which may be white or colored, along with a “rope-such as ribbon” called an *iqal* which was worn over the headcloth.¹¹⁴ Members of the Iranian merchant class have been singled out for wearing ‘broadcloth robes,’ ‘goldbraided black and brown wool cloaks,’ or even ‘the traditional caftan and yellow-thread turban’¹¹⁵ Other individuals had adopted Western style clothes that included suits and ties as early as the 1950s, with some

¹¹⁰ “Bahrain to Grant Nationality to 10,000”; Cordesman 77; Farook; Lee 56; Longva 2000: 188-89.

¹¹¹ Van Der Meulen 71.

¹¹² Bruce Ingham “Men’s Dress in the Arabian Peninsula: Historical and Present Perspectives,” Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper and Bruce Ingham (eds), *Languages of Dress in the Middle East* (London: Curzon, 1997): 40.

¹¹³ Rupert Hay *The Persian Gulf States* (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1959): 48, 121; Maureen Tweedy *Bahrain and the Persian Gulf* (Ipswich: East Anglian Magazine, 1952): 48; Izzard 81, 111.

¹¹⁴ Ingham 45; Fuad Khuri *Tents and Pyramids: Games and Ideology in Arab Culture from Backgammon to Autocratic Rule* (London: Saqi, 1990): 111-12. Ingham also makes an interesting point regarding the Arabic and Turkish linguistic origins of these headdresses.

¹¹⁵ Al-Gurg 4; Izzard 81.

adopting a combination of blazer and *thobe*.¹¹⁶ Today, some Gulf Iranians have taken up the Arab style of dress such as the *dishdasha* used in the Arabian Peninsula, thus making it hard to differentiate them from the Gulf Arabs.¹¹⁷ A cursory inspection of photos of Easa Al-Gurg's memoirs and Gulf Arab company websites shows that members of such families wear Western or Arab dress interchangeably today in multiple Persian Gulf Arab States, according to the occasion.¹¹⁸ Ingham adds one last interesting point regarding dress in the Gulf: "[F]ootwear is almost immaterial. One can appear at even the most important functions wearing either shoes or sandals or even bare-foot."¹¹⁹

Clothing allows the Gulf Iranians, along with other expatriate communities, to demonstrate their level of affinity to (or distance from) Gulf Arabs upon brief inspection.

Arab dress is far less uniform than appears at first sight, and a wealth of information can be derived about a man from a close observation of his dress. The tilt of his 'ageyl'¹²⁰, the disposition of its thin, shoelace cord, can tell where he comes from.... The line is drawn between the Gulf Arabs and the expatriate Arabs of the former Mandate territories by dress. Only the northerners keep to their trousers and jackets, once the emblems of a progressive outlook, and now paradoxically the very garments that relegate them automatically to the status of despised and precariously tolerated intruders.¹²¹

Izzard's above statement highlights how careful examination of clothing within the Persian Gulf Arab States can help Gulf Iranians make a good or bad impression as well as

¹¹⁶ Hay 48; Izzard 111; Onley 78.

¹¹⁷ "Dubai's powerful Iranian business community is hurt by international sanctions" 28. December 2007. International Herald Tribune.com. Available online. <<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/28/africa/ME-FEA-GEN-GLF-Irans-Boomtown.php>>. Accessed 13. October 2008.

¹¹⁸ Al-Gurg 1998. This autobiographical book presents several photo stills of the native Dubaian author and those around him throughout his life. Easa Al-Gurg, a prominent merchant and ambassador for the United Arab Emirates, is a member of the Huwala class.

¹¹⁹ Ingham 51.

¹²⁰ Izzard describes the *ageyl* as "the black wool camel hobble which the desert Arab loops in a chaplet on his head." This is an alternative spelling to the one offered by Fuad Khuri—*iqal*. See Izzard 80; Khuri 1990: 111-12.

¹²¹ Izzard 81.

how they are classified, a point to which Baluch are not even immune.¹²² Interestingly, Ingham also notes the flip side of Izzard's statement, such that men not wearing Arab dress can "be in the company of women to whom he is not closely related by blood or marriage."¹²³ Ultimately although, other factors such as one's accent, family name or facial appearance help to make the final determination of each individual's social role(s) and their level of integration within Gulf Arab society.

While most of the discussion so far has focused on men, Gulf Iranian women also play an active role within the Persian Gulf Arab States and have their own distinct paths towards social mobility. Depending on her family's social inclinations and wealth, some women have had the option to work or obtain high administrative posts within recent decades, especially among the merchant class.¹²⁴ As Fakhro notes, the greater a family's income, the more likely an unmarried woman would go out into the workforce.¹²⁵ Some of the richest Gulf Iranians in Bahrain allowed their daughters to manage their own boutiques, galleries and beauty parlors starting in the early 1970s, opening the door for greater women's involvement in public space.¹²⁶ Such trends corresponded with a general increase in women's' education and visible involvement in the public across ethnic lines along with a decrease in the use of the *abaya*.¹²⁷ Women in Bahrain were also known for being involved in politics, organizing non-government organizations, attending

¹²² Ingham 50.

¹²³ Ingham 49.

¹²⁴ Seikaly 1997: 135.

¹²⁵ Fakhro 1990: 22.

¹²⁶ Izzard 113-14.

¹²⁷ Seikaly 1997: 132.

discussions at the *ma'taim* and even driving cars.¹²⁸ However, women among the lower classes were less likely to have the same opportunities as their more affluent peers.¹²⁹ Iranian women were among the Emirati workforce as early as 1968, from government and oil company employees to domestic servants. Also, a small number of Iranian women have worked as prostitutes in the Emirates, thus demonstrating the range of options such women had, even in socially disreputable fields.¹³⁰

Probably one of the most significant functions that Gulf Iranian women have played is as marriage partners. Marriage has always been one valuable option for women seeking greater integration into Gulf Arab society and the promise of future benefits, including citizenship, for her and her dependents.¹³¹ Upon successful marriage to a Gulf Arab, Gulf Iranian women would be expected to care for their children, and also would gain access to the private spaces occupied by her husband's family and not open to other men. A matrimonial union might also provide political links that could be used by Gulf Iranian women to open doors to jobs, potential business dealings or sympathy for her immediate family. Generally today, only male Gulf Arab nationals can marry foreign women without renouncing their citizenship, although there have been some exceptions

¹²⁸ Ibid., 132-33, 141. *Ma'taim* is the Arabic plural form of *ma'tam*, which is a Shi'i Arab funeral house, meeting place, even a place to get some religious schooling. Fuccaro actually makes the connection between *ma'taim* and the *hosainiyehs*, similar institutions that one finds in Iran. She also notes how the *ma'taim* were not in distinct buildings but were conducted spontaneously in private residences until the 1890s. Nelida Fuccaro "Understanding the Urban History of Bahrain", *Critique: Journal of Critical Studies of the Middle East* 17/2 (2000):75.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 136.

¹³⁰ Anthony 167.

¹³¹ Dresch 141-43.

recently.¹³² Traditionally, one would almost never see a Gulf Arab woman married off to a Gulf Iranian man, especially if the woman is a member of the aristocracy, without risking social backlash and rejection by their family and peers.¹³³ As for Gulf Iranian women, this does not mean such marriages were attainable or realistic, as social prestige, blood, and inheritance issues could mar their potential unions as well.¹³⁴ Still, some marriages between the two groups often brought benefits to Gulf Arabs. In the past, such marriages between a Gulf Arab and Iranian brought prestige on *Baharna* families while giving many Bahrainis claim to Iranian descent.¹³⁵ Another issue that is not clear to the thesis author is whether or not a divorce between an Iranian woman and a Gulf Arab man results in a loss of citizenship privileges and rights for the woman.

Choice of dress and appearance also play a role in distinguishing the various Gulf Iranian women from one another. Many Iranian women chose to maintain wearing religiously-acceptable dress for the Persian Gulf region, including the veil, in places such as Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates, in spite of their prohibition within Iran from 1936 until 1941 under Reza Shah.¹³⁶ In Bahraini villages, Muslim women have been noted for wearing colorful garments called *meshmars*, clothing that both *Baharna* and Iranian women choose to wear.¹³⁷ If some Gulf Iranian men tend to adopt and wear the

¹³² Shereen Bushehri "Naturalised Bahrainis Return Home." 04. November 2002. Gulf News.com. Available online. <<http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/02/11/04/67542.html>>. Accessed 08. October 2008; Toumi "4,971 Asians 'given Bahrain nationality in 56 years'".

¹³³ For one particularly interesting example regarding a marriage between one man from a Bahraini merchant family and a female Al Khalifa member, see Izzard 129-30.

¹³⁴ Dresch 141-43.

¹³⁵ Nyrop 154-55.

¹³⁶ Muhammad Morsi Abdullah *The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History* (London: Croom Helm, 1978): 276-77; Houchang Chehabi "Staging the Emperor's New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation-Building under Reza Shah" *Iranian Studies* Vol. 26 No. 3/4 (1993): 209-29.

¹³⁷ Fakhro 1990: 76.

local *thobe* or *dishdasha*, many Gulf Iranian women have incorporated the *abaya*, the black traditional robe referred to by Munira Fakhro, an indigenous Bahraini female scholar.¹³⁸ However, May Yamani is careful to note that Gulf women have also added the *thobe* to their wardrobe as a form of invented tradition, moving away from regional dress and have appropriated Arab identity in general, starting in the 1970s.¹³⁹

It has been noted that veiling has regained some standing in more recent generations as a form of reaffirming one's religious faith.¹⁴⁰ Fakhro notes how women in Bahrain had adopted the *hijab* as late as 1990, which was not traditional dress but rather imported from other Muslim countries.¹⁴¹ Interestingly, she also notes how these different types of Islamic dress are not restricted to any specific class or religious sect on the island.¹⁴² A Western female observer describes a cocktail party, also in Bahrain and the peculiarities of the Persian women there.

There was a good deal of creamy skin, flashing eye, thinly penciled, perfectly shaped, closely met eyebrow to be seen, the famous crescent shape of the Persian miniature, translated here to well-rouged girls in pretty evening clothes, modish and elegant. They were all conscientiously dressed to make the greatest effect, plenty of jewellery, form-fitting confections of brilliant silks and gauzes, following the current fashion.¹⁴³

Although Izzard exoticizes her subjects in the previous passage to a certain degree, it helps us envision women there, especially if we consider how she specifies their ethnicity

¹³⁸ Ibid., 75.

¹³⁹ Mai Yamani "Changing the Habits of a Lifetime: The Adaptation of Hejazi Dress to the New Social Order" Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper and Bruce Ingham (eds), *Languages of Dress in the Middle East* (London: Curzon, 1997): 63-64. Yamani also makes this interesting point in the same passage. "The women who initially started the trend of wearing the men's *thob* were considered 'intellectual' since at that time they were relatively better educated and well-travelled than others. They appear to have taken the custom from Western women who wore the men's Saudi *thob* as 'ethnic' dress."

¹⁴⁰ Seikaly 1997: 139.

¹⁴¹ Fakhro 1990: 76.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Izzard 274.

rather than their nationality—Bahraini, Iranian, etc. In a visit to an open space such as a *sug* in the United Arab Emirates, Izzard also observed the contrast between public and private space. There, one could see contrasts such as the Baluch woman in brightly colored outfits, wearing silver and turquoise jewelry versus masked, black-clad Arab townswomen with gold jewelry.¹⁴⁴ The previous observations do not confirm for us whether or not the women were in fact Gulf Iranian ‘Ajam, Baluch or Huwala—although they do present two probable cases. A woman’s appearance can take various guises, based upon how she chooses to operate within society, and the social mores within her particular subgroup. The clothing a woman wears may depend on whether or not the space she occupies is public or private, and hence the familiarity she has with the persons around her.

Another important issue is the various political responses of the Gulf Iranian community to the state of Iran. During the political strife in Bahrain during the 1950s, many Gulf Iranians had already begun to accept Bahraini citizenship as well as in the United Arab Emirates. Some segments were known to “have severed all connection with their country of origin.”¹⁴⁵ During the build-up of the dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over Abu Musa and Tunb islands, the rise of pro-Iran demonstrations never materialized in Dubai in spite of the large Gulf Iranian population living there.¹⁴⁶ When Emirati Arabs demonstrated against Iranians and destroyed their property upon Iran’s repossession of the islands in 1971, the United Arab Emirate’s

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 244, 274.

¹⁴⁵ Hay 148.

¹⁴⁶ Anthony 16.

president Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan compensated the aggrieved, but still apolitical, Gulf Iranians for their losses.¹⁴⁷ Four years before the Iranian Revolution, Anthony concluded that:

Iranians historically have been less reticent about either their religious affiliation or their ties to Iran. Even so, since Bahrayn achieved its independence in 1971, the Iranian community in that shaykhdom has been less conspicuous in its nationalism. Elsewhere, the various Iranian communities have usually conformed their national and political aspiration and activities to the interests of the indigenous Arab populations.¹⁴⁸

Since the Iranian revolution, it has been noted in Bahrain how politically inactive both Iranian-descended Bahrainis were as well as Iranian expatriates throughout the Gulf, with special attention being made to not to upset the governments there during the Iran-Iraq war.¹⁴⁹ Perhaps as a result of such inaction, many Iranians, particularly ‘Ajam, earned the enmity of Bahrain’s Arab Shi’i community for not sympathizing more with local grievances.¹⁵⁰ A common theme that arises in several texts has been the greater concern given by Gulf Iranians to earning money rather than instigating any political trouble or operating as part of a fifth column.¹⁵¹ Gulf Iranians within emirates such as Dubai during the Iran-Iraq war were known to “fulfill key functions in the emirate’s economic life,” in spite of their Shi’i background.¹⁵² Even during the 1990s, Gulf Iranian individuals avoided talking about problems with the Bahraini government, or inter-

¹⁴⁷ Andrea Rugh 80.

¹⁴⁸ Anthony 16-18.

¹⁴⁹ Marschall 40-41.

¹⁵⁰ Munira Fakhro “The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment” in *The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays on Politics, Economy, Security and Religion* eds. Sick, Gary and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997): 183.

¹⁵¹ Long 1978: 110, 112; Marschall 43; Zahlan 1998: 177.

¹⁵² Charles Davies (ed.) *After the War: Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf* (Chichester: Carden, 1990):

sectarian conflict, and were noted for their support of the government, thus taking away any credence to the idea that the political loyalty of all Gulf Iranians might come under strictly sectarian lines.¹⁵³

Iranians living in the UAE could also be singled out for publicly pressuring the Iranian government regarding its ongoing territorial dispute with the Emirates. “*Gulf Today* (4 March 1998) published an open letter from the UAE’s Iranian expatriates to the Iranian President, urging him to respond positively to the UAE’s calls for a peaceful solution to the conflict over Abu Musa and Tunb Islands.”¹⁵⁴ In fact, the only correlation that any observers make regarding sympathy towards Iran and the Revolution has come from Gulf Iranian laborers, although they do not cite evidence in their specific involvement in any demonstrations there.¹⁵⁵ Even then, other authors disputed such claims by noting how such workers were more interested in making money than taking part in any subversive activities against any Gulf Arab governments.¹⁵⁶ Thus, *if* there has been any propensity of Gulf Iranians towards Iran, it has more to do with socioeconomic grievances within the Persian Gulf Arab States than any other underlying issue. It has nothing to do with ethnic or religious.

Just as Gulf Iranian identity lacks any uniformity along ethno-linguistic, religious or socioeconomic lines, their rationale for traversing the Gulf waters has varied, too. In fact, it is necessary to offer a brief view of the history of Gulf migration before addressing the more recent migrations relevant to our study of Gulf Iranians. The Persian

¹⁵³ Marschall 220.

¹⁵⁴ Andrzej Kapiszewski *Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States* (Reading, Ithaca Press, 2001): 157.

¹⁵⁵ Field 77; Marschall 42-43.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

Gulf area has had a long, documented history of continuous cross-Gulf migrations and trade since ancient times, particularly between Arab and Persian societies.¹⁵⁷ Ethnic Persian Sassanian Iran conquered and colonized Musan (the precursor to Oman and namesake behind the Musandam Peninsula) while Arabs returned the favor when they began migrating to the northern Gulf coasts even before the advent of Islam.¹⁵⁸ Newly-converted Arab Muslims invaded and settled in Sassanian lands and remained there for centuries.¹⁵⁹ As a result of these migrations and mixings, Mojtahed-Zadeh notes that:

The increased trade exchange between the two shores created a situation in which the process of cultural conglomeration and language mixture strengthened the distinct community of the Persian Gulf, while continued migration from both Iran and the Arabian Peninsula to the region and their mixture has made it quite difficult even now to say who in the Persian Gulf is of true Iranian stock and who is of true Arab stock.¹⁶⁰

Due to the mixture of the two societies, it had become increasingly important to help distinguish and divide members of this middle category into distinct, non-Arab categories. Gulf Arabs came to identify and distinguish their neighbors of Iranian origin, including by the different classifications such as Huwala or ‘Ajam, as noted earlier. Other ethnic groups such as Turks, Indians, Baluch and even African slaves brought to the Gulf traversed, if not at least resided by, the Gulf waters and were distinguished under similar categories within the Persian Gulf Arab States, even before the arrival of the Portuguese during the 16th century.¹⁶¹ By the mid to late 19th century, the major path of migration

¹⁵⁷ Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 9-10, 62-63.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 63.

¹⁵⁹ Richard N. Frye *The Golden Age of Persia: The Arabs in the East* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975): 69-71; Richard N. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia* (London: Sphere Books, 1976): 276, 287; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 67-68.

¹⁶⁰ Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 9-10.

¹⁶¹ Frye 1976: 8; Khuri 1980: 15, 51.

shifted, with the majority of Gulf migrants traveling from northern Persian-controlled shores to southern Arab- and British-controlled ones as a result of greater social and economic opportunities in the Arab shaikhdoms.¹⁶²

It is within this more recent context from the mid to late 19th century leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution that we find the most information regarding Gulf Iranian migration to the Gulf Arab States. Although there is still disagreement among scholars as to the specific number of migrations, we can highlight generally noticeable successive waves which took place during the following periods: 1) the 1860s through 1900s, 2) the 1920s and 1930s, 3) the 1950s through the 1970s. Many of these waves came from Iran's southern littoral as a result social and economic turmoil within the Iranian state, although they were later supplemented by greater migrations from the rest of Iran. Another theme within the Gulf Iranian migration is a failure on the Iranian government's part to co-opt such individuals into its plans for the reorganization of society at distinct points in time. Each wave can be distinguished from the next by certain particular patterns and features and one can use the following periods as a reference to determine different generations of Iranians within the Persian Gulf Arab States, with the period from 1860-1910 counting roughly as the first generation of migration away from Iran.¹⁶³

The pattern of migration during the first period above came primarily as a response to the Qajar government's centralization and expansion within Iran, particularly affecting several of the predominantly Arab populated Persian Gulf port cities of southern

¹⁶² Davidson 71.

¹⁶³ Jahangir Qa'emmaqami also argues that there is at least one other immigration wave that took place during the 1860s when Bahrain had established close ties to Iran as a dependent state, leading to a number of Iranians moving to the island then. See Jahangir Qa'emmaqami, *Bahrayn va masa'el-e Khalij-e Fars* (Tehran: Kitabkhane-ye Tahuri, 1962): 42-43.

Iran which revolved around the pearl and maritime-based trades. One noteworthy location was Bushehr, which not only suffered from central government encroachment, but waves of famine, cholera and smallpox outbreaks and increased crime rates, prompting large-scale migration.¹⁶⁴ The Bushehri migration to Bahrain alone caused a sharp increase in imports of specific goods which “set them apart from the local Arab population,” such as books, rosewater, tea and spirits.¹⁶⁵ A second location of note was Bandar ‘Abbas, which previously had been under Omani control, along with the islands of Qeshm and Hormuz, until 1868.¹⁶⁶

The third and most noteworthy location was Lengeh, which was then under the control of a section of the Qasimi (Qawasim) Arab tribe who were Iranian vassals, along with the island of Sirri.¹⁶⁷ During the 1880s, Iran ratcheted up pressure against Lengeh’s Arab rulers to collect taxes and bow to the government in Tehran, this being administered by the governor of Fars Province.¹⁶⁸ In 1899, the Qajar government succeeded in seizing control of Lengeh from the Qawasim and established a new customs station within the port city.¹⁶⁹ Iran’s rationale for Lengeh’s conquest was to increase tax revenues in the city and in the surrounding area, including other coastal cities such as Muhammarah

¹⁶⁴ Fuccaro 2005: 45-46.

¹⁶⁵ Fuccaro 2005: 46.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 51; Malcolm Yapp, “Part One. The History of the Persian Gulf: British Policy in the Persian Gulf” in *The Persian Gulf States* ed. Alvin J. Cottrell (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980): 53.

¹⁶⁷ Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh “Perspectives on the Territorial History of the Tonb and Abu Musa Islands” in *Small Islands, Big Politics: the Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf* ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996): 43; Richard Schofield, “Border Disputes in the Gulf: Past, Present, and Future” in *The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays on Politics, Economy, Security and Religion* eds. Gary Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997): 134.

¹⁶⁸ Abdullah 224, 230, Davidson 72-73; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 43; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 173; Yapp 53.

¹⁶⁹ Abdullah 231-32; Yapp 53.

[Khorramshahr] and the islands of Qeshm and Sirri, all for the purposes of funding the rapidly developing government in Tehran.¹⁷⁰ Although this measure was intended to help fund the necessary infrastructure to operate the country without the primary Western influences (i.e. British or Russian), it was introduced on the recommendation of another Western administrator, the Belgians.¹⁷¹ The Iranian authorities further alienated the local population: “New Persian laws were imposed on these Arab townsmen, refusing them permission to bury their dead on these islands (as had been their custom) and preventing merchants from registering new boats unless their wives agreed to stop covering their faces.”¹⁷² Many of Lengeh’s inhabitants, including merchants and individuals involved in maritime-based trade, moved to the opposite shore of the Gulf in attempts to evade the higher taxes and political unrest as a result of the Qajar Shah’s increasing reach and control along Iran’s southern frontiers.¹⁷³ During this first period, emirates such as Bahrain, Sharjah and Dubai benefited from the influx of these Gulf Iranians, principally because the Persian Gulf trade was shifted from the southern Iranian shore to the Arab one.

The second generational wave of pre-revolutionary Iranian emigrants to the Arab littoral built upon the first wave and was a response to Reza Shah’s attempts to consolidate his own control over the autonomous and restive provinces and peoples during the 1920s and 1930s. Upon the overthrow of the Qajar rulers, Reza Shah

¹⁷⁰ Abdullah 230; Davoud Bavand, “The Legal Basis of Iran’s Sovereignty over Abu Musa Island” in *Small Islands, Big Politics: the Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf* ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996): 90-91; Davidson 72-73; Zahlan 1978: 80.

¹⁷¹ Abdullah 231-32; Davidson 72-73.

¹⁷² Davidson 72-73.

¹⁷³ Abdullah 104, 231-32, Davidson 71-73; Fuccaro 2005: 45; Lorimer Vol. 1: 2134-37. Fuccaro notes that between 1894 and 1904, the majority of Lingawis left their city.

continued to expand his power in the southern ports and nearby islands. In 1924, he overpowered Khuzestan province's¹⁷⁴ Arab rulers and took control of this oil-rich region.¹⁷⁵ By 1928, the Shah's forces subdued Hengam Island and established a customs post there to the dismay of its Dubai-allied ruler.¹⁷⁶ Upon achieving control in his southern flanks, the Shah also attempted to build upon much of the same modernization and secularization measures introduced by the Qajars in the 1880s. For example, the Shah increased taxation, attempted to impose immodest (or what was seen locally as immodest) Western-designed clothing and the shaving of beards.¹⁷⁷

Unlike the previous migration period, the Shah also began "requiring local schools to teach in standardized Farsi [Persian] rather than in Arabic" and perhaps sought to counter what one Huwala source claimed was a distinctly Arab society even down to written deeds in Arabic.¹⁷⁸ However, many Iranians rejected such measures and attempted to preserve traditional Muslim identities. Seccombe notes how Baluch men left Iran, along with their wives and children to escape the bad economic situation and unpopular government in Iran.¹⁷⁹ When they could no longer maintain their way of life and language in Iran, more Iranians from Khorramshahr to Lengeh emigrated instead in

¹⁷⁴ By the 1980s, Khuzestan would assume greater importance when Saddam Hussein attempted to co-opt the province's population during the Iran-Iraq war. For more information on Khuzestan within the Iran-Iraq war context, this author recommends the following works: Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, *Iran and Iraq at War* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). Farhang Rajaee (ed.) *Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).

¹⁷⁵ Yapp 60; Zahlan 1978: 79.

¹⁷⁶ Zahlan 1978: 88.

¹⁷⁷ Abdullah 247-48; Davidson 74; Hesham Garaibeh, "Government Income Sources and the Development of the Taxation System – the Case of Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait" in *The Rentier State* eds. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (New York: Croom Helm, 1987): 200; Hay 48.

¹⁷⁸ Al-Gurg 3; Davidson 74.

¹⁷⁹ Ian J. Seccombe "Migration to the Arabian Gulf: Evolution and Characteristics 1920-1950" *Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies)*. Vol. 10. No. 1 (1983): 4-5.

the same period.¹⁸⁰ During the 1930s, the decline in the cultured pearl industry, along with the silting of Sharjah's own creek, drove more Iranians from southern Iran to Dubai, Kalba and additional mercantilist trade ports in Bahrain and Qatar.¹⁸¹ Modernizing and secularizing measures took a toll on the populations of the Iranian coasts by the 1930s, with Lengeh's population reduced to a quarter of its size in 1900.¹⁸² Such a religiously inspired migration during the second wave now may seem ironic in light of Iran's Islamic Revolution that toppled the Pahlavi dynasty. Another interesting feature of the second wave was the emergence of Bahrain as the first major Gulf oil producer besides Iran, which began attracting Iranians skilled in the oil industry to the island country.¹⁸³

A third generational wave of Iranian emigration to the Persian Gulf Arab States came as a result of growing economic and social pressures felt by all Iranians during the 1950s through the early 1970s. Many of the Persian Gulf other sheikdoms joined Bahrain in beginning to acquire great wealth through oil extraction and exploitation during the post-World War II period and sought to develop their own particular infrastructures to handle future growth. It should be noted that oil had replaced pearling by such time on both shores, leading to societal transformation in Iran and the Gulf Arab States, but with more pronounced effect on Arab society. However, the same sheikdoms had severe labor shortages and enticed foreign manpower to their states with benefits such as free health

¹⁸⁰ Abdullah 247-48.

¹⁸¹ Ibid; Anthony 56; Davidson 74; Field 60; Zahlan 1978: 11.

¹⁸² Abdullah 247-48.

¹⁸³ Louër 34; Onley 78; Seccombe 1983: 6-9; Ian J. Seccombe and R. I. Lawless "Foreign Worker Dependence in the Gulf, and the International Oil Companies: 1910-50" *International Migration Review*. Vol. 20. No. 3 (1986): 562.

care and education.¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, many rural parts of Iran fell into neglect by the Iranian administration in spite of government land reforms and increased attention, prompting internal migration towards Iranian cities in some cases while also causing other Iranians to migrate south to the Gulf Arab States instead.¹⁸⁵ Iranians in this third pre-revolutionary wave flocked to meet the labor demands of their Arab neighbors, with more than half of all foreign workers in Bahrain coming from Iran and nearby Oman by the 1960s.¹⁸⁶ By the 1970s, Gulf countries such as Bahrain saw the formation of a large middle class as a result of an economic upturn.¹⁸⁷

One significant change during the third migration period came in the form of governmental regulations to restrict the flow of Gulf Iranian migration. Iran first responded by establishing restrictions on cross-Gulf migration during the 1950s and Persian Gulf Arab States similarly responded by revising and enforcing their nationality laws to thwart Gulf Iranian (and other) migration.¹⁸⁸ The rationale on the Arab side for immigration restriction may have had to do with civil unrest caused by Gulf Iranian populations as well as the rise of Arab nationalism advocated by Nasser during the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁸⁹ In the 1960s, the Shah shifted attention to southern Iran.¹⁹⁰ The Iranian ruler began to increase road and port construction there to create jobs, then built Persian-

¹⁸⁴ Abdullah 276-77; Chubin 1974: 205.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.; Chubin 1974: 200; Nikki R. Keddie *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003):152.

¹⁸⁶ Helen Chapin Metz (ed.) *Persian Gulf States: Country Studies* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994): 130.

¹⁸⁷ May Seikaly "Kuwait and Bahrain: The Appeal of Globalization and Internal Constraints" *Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States* Ed. Joseph Kechichian (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001): 181.

¹⁸⁸ Chubin 1974: 209-10; Longva 2000: 184-85; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 71.

¹⁸⁹ Chubin 1974: 207, 213; Svatopluk Soucek *Persian Gulf: Its Past and Present* (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2008): xviii.

¹⁹⁰ Chubin 1974: 209-10.

language schools and hospitals within Iran and the Persian Gulf Arab States as a means to maintain connections between Iranian expatriates and their homeland.¹⁹¹ The Shah also greatly expanded the size of Iran's military and weapons arsenal and placed an emphasis on military service as a way of working for the state and proving oneself to be a good citizen.¹⁹² This also prompted some migration to the southern shores in order to evade conscription.¹⁹³ Still, many other Gulf Iranians were driven by job opportunities and money, religious freedom of expression, even identity preservation.

Upon the Islamic Revolution, Iranians continued migrating to Persian Gulf Arab States for various reasons and joined their brethren on the other side. Although much has been documented about the Iranian Revolution, evidence regarding cross-Gulf migration within the Gulf Iranian community and the rationale behind specific emigration there (rather than to Western nations) is hard to find. Nevertheless, a few patterns have been detected. Mehdi Bozorgmehr has adduced that some post-Revolutionary migrants left Iran to escape being drafted to fight in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, continuing the military conscription evasion of the previous migration period.¹⁹⁴ Christopher Davidson notes how the Iranian Revolution, as well as successive Iranian administrations have prompted a new wave of merchant migration across the waters with Gulf Iranians who have felt alienated by the government.¹⁹⁵ Many other Gulf Iranians who migrated to the Persian Gulf Arab States within the period did so originally with the intention to stop

¹⁹¹ Abdullah 276-77; Chubin 1974: 203; Davidson 76.

¹⁹² Najmabadi 222-23; Chubin 1974: 202.

¹⁹³ Anthony 16-18; Chubin 1974: 202.

¹⁹⁴ Mehdi Bozorgmehr "Iranian Diaspora – Diaspora in the Postrevolutionary Period" *Encyclopedia Iranica Online*. Iranica.com. Available online. <<http://iranica.com/newsite/index.isc>>. Accessed 17. October 2008.

¹⁹⁵ Davidson 76.

there only temporarily on the way to Western countries, and only later would they establish (or attempt to establish) permanent residency across the Gulf.¹⁹⁶ Bahrain's economic prosperity during the late 1980s was noted to have reached groups such as the 'Ajam, Baluch, and even Bidoon, which probably enticed further Gulf Iranian migration.¹⁹⁷ One *New York Times* article has surmised the following about emigration to Dubai in particular:

The Iranians rushing here are mainly seeking the same formula: personal freedom, political and economic stability and a break from the West's political tensions with Iran. Businessmen use Dubai's free-market zones to funnel goods across the gulf, skirting the trade sanctions in place against Iran since the 1979 revolution. Youngsters come for schooling minus the mullahs, while older Iranians come for a more comfortable and cosmopolitan life.¹⁹⁸

Apart from the presence of Iran's political tensions with the West, all of the above patterns appear to reflect previous trends from earlier migration waves. For that reason, it is better to remain focused upon pre-Revolutionary immigration waves to get a better sense of Gulf Iranian identity.

Having given some attention to the issue of Gulf Iranian identity, it is now appropriate to shift our focus and energy to analyze the other side of the identity equation: the factors determining Gulf Arab identity versus those contributing to the Gulf Iranian one.

¹⁹⁶ Dosari "Panj saad hezar-e irani-e mahajer dar emirate-e motahed-e 'arabi" 23. January 2007.

¹⁹⁷ Seikaly 2001: 181.

¹⁹⁸ Hassan Fattah "Young Iranians Follow Dreams to Dubai." *The New York Times*. 4. December 2005. 14.

CHAPTER 4: ARAB IDENTITY IN BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Our study of identity issues within Gulf borderland would not be complete without also analyzing the Gulf Arab population of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, the two selected Persian Gulf Arab States. A particular focus will be on the largely Gulf Arab populace within each state, including the prominent families holding the reins of power as well as a history of each country in contrast and relation to Iran.

Who are Gulf Arabs and what sets them apart from other Arabs? Gulf Arabs of the small Persian Gulf Arab States of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates can be distinguished from the Arabs from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere by certain characteristics. The most unique trait of Gulf Arabs in these small states is their orientation and focus towards the sea rather than the desert.¹⁹⁹ Their maritime orientation contrasts with the perhaps traditional view of the Arab Bedouin as desert nomads, although both are tribally-organized. Maritime-focused life, rather than a landward one, has resulted in the organization of Gulf Arab society in these small sheikhdoms as a sea-oriented society where livelihoods have traditionally been earned in marine industries. Before the 20th century, the center of the Gulf Arab economy came through their ability to acquire *lulu* and *morvarid*, more commonly known as pearls (as translated from Arabic and Persian respectively), which they sold in ports such as Dubai, Lengeh, Manama, and Muscat.²⁰⁰ Today, some members of Gulf Arab society continue to work in marine-based

¹⁹⁹ Anthony 38.

²⁰⁰ Richard LeBaron Bowen "The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf," *Middle East Journal* 5 (spring 1951): 165-66. Bowen incorrectly transcribes the Persian term for pearl (مروارید) into English as 'mawarid' which may lead to some confusion.

industries such as fishing, maritime commerce and trade and most recently, petroleum extraction and tourism. Another trait of Gulf Arab society is their highly cosmopolitan outlook, framed by an outward orientation towards the sea and openness to trade (and consequently dialogue) with outside groups in order to survive.

Bahrain

The Bahraini Arab population can generally be broken down into two major population groups along confessional lines: Shi'a and Sunni.²⁰¹ Population estimates given for the island's Shi'a range anywhere between 60 and 70 per cent of the native population, while Sunni Arabs and other groups constitute the remainder.²⁰² The island's Shi'i Arab population can be divided between the *Baharna*²⁰³ and *Hassawi* subgroups. The *Baharna* are the majority of Bahrain's total population and were the island's indigenous population prior to 1782.²⁰⁴ The *Baharna*, along with the *Hassawi*, follow the two branches of the *Ja'fari* school of Islamic jurisprudence, much such as the 'Ajam.²⁰⁵ In the past, the *Baharna* lived primarily inland, in rural areas of the island, but due to recent urbanization many have moved to urban centers such as Manama or have effectively become 'urbanized' due to their villages being swallowed up by expanding

²⁰¹ Some authors have gone on to note how Bahrain's Arab population can also be divided into two linguistic groups as well on account of differences between rural *Baharna* and urban *Najdi* dialects. See Al-Tajir; Holes for more information.

²⁰² Falah Al-Mdaires "Shi'ism and Political Protest in Bahrain." *Digest of Middle East Studies (DOMES)* 11 no. 1 (2002): 1; Bahry 132; Lee 43.

²⁰³ Another name that the Baharna once used to distinguish themselves from others is *halayil*, meaning either 'lawful possessions' or 'owners.' This term came up as a result of the Baharna's claims to the island versus later claims made by other Arabs and Iranians who settled the island at a later point. See Al-Tajir 8. Other references to the Baharna include spellings such as: *Bahrani* (Khuri 1980: 2) and *Bahraanis* (Gardner 254).

²⁰⁴ Al-Tajir 8; Bahry 133.

²⁰⁵ Khuri 1980: 2, 68; Lawson 4.

metropolitan areas.²⁰⁶ In contrast, the *Hassawi* subgroup represents Shi'i Arabs who immigrated to the island from the heart of the Arabian Peninsula mainly during the 19th century, particularly the al-Hasa region in eastern Saudi Arabia and directly west of Bahrain today.²⁰⁷ Both groups constitute *Ithna Ashari* Shi'a such as their Gulf Iranian counterparts.

The island's Sunni population represents a minority of the total population but nonetheless exerts a powerful influence there, primarily as a result of the ruling Al Khalifa family. The *Najdi*, which include the Al Khalifa family and their tribal allies, are also individuals with ties to the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the al-Najd region of Saudi Arabia.²⁰⁸ *Najdi* individuals are primarily coastal urban dwellers who tend to work in the same professional fields as the Huwala, but operate under the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence.²⁰⁹ In contrast, Bahrain's tribal Sunni population, including the Al Khalifa family, follows the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence.²¹⁰ When we take into account the Huwala, we see the diversity of choice of the island's Arab Sunni adherents in their particular Islamic schools of practice.²¹¹

We can also say a few words regarding social status among Bahrain's predominantly Arab population. The most important point to note is how one family—the Al Khalifa—holds the reins of political power and has determined the rules of social

²⁰⁶ Holes 58-59; Khuri 1980: 250-51; Peterson 63.

²⁰⁷ Al-Mdaires 2; Colbert Held, *Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples and Politics* (London: Westview, 1994): 322-23; Nyrop 154-55. Nyrop notes that the *Hassawi* came from Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, primarily the Al Hufuf and Al Qatif oases. Al-Mdaires adds that the *Hassawi* Shi'a came from the area as a result of Wahhabi expansion then.

²⁰⁸ Gardner 253.

²⁰⁹ Khuri 1980: 4, 68.

²¹⁰ Al-Tajir 7; Khuri 1980: 68.

²¹¹ Khuri 1980: 68, 240.

standing and economic distribution in a nearly monopolistic manner without serious competition from rival tribes or parties. A significant part of such power has to do with the discovery of oil in the country during the 1930s, a discovery that has since transformed it into a rentier state with obvious consequences for the reorganization and transformation of Bahrain's demographically small society.²¹² With their oil-based wealth, the key to such power on the island for the Al Khalifa has been to maintain quiescent sedentary citizens by distributing jobs as well as other social benefits, such as free housing, education and health care to the Bahraini Arab populace. Fuad Khuri notes how Bahraini society has traditionally divided itself into three genealogical categories in descending order of preference: the *ansab*, the *la-ansab*, and the *bani-khudair*.²¹³ The basic distinction between the three categories has involved whether or not one can prove a clear tribal Arab ancestry and not necessarily one's religious background, of which the *bani-khudair* constitute the lowest, non-Arab classes, including former slaves.

Another issue related to genealogy was whether or not a person qualified as a *sharif* or someone descended from Ismail, which played a part in determining marriage partners.²¹⁴ Ultimately, such genealogical classification has the practical effect of determining one's job prospects, as each individual has been put into a *qabili* (tribal) or

²¹² As Beblawi notes, "A rentier is thus more of a social function than an economic category, and is perceived as a member of a special group who, although he does not participate actively in the economic production, receives nevertheless a share in the produce and at times a handsome share. The distinguishing feature of the rentier thus resides in the lack or absence of a productive outlook in his behaviour." See Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World" in *The Rentier State* eds. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (New York: Croom Helm, 1987): 50. The rise of oil also parallels the decline of the pearling industry in the Persian Gulf.

²¹³ Khuri translates *ansab* to mean "clear genealogies" *la-ansab* to mean "unclear genealogies" and *bani-khudair* to mean "the sons of green" or those with unclear claims. Khuri then goes on to describe how the island's black population falls within this final category. Interestingly, the author never mentions other non-Arab populations in Bahrain nor the indigenous Baharna. See Khuri 1990: 33.

²¹⁴ Izzard 129-30.

madani (urban) class—the former track leading to military and defense, the latter leading to administrative services and technocrat positions.²¹⁵ Many of the island’s Arab Shi’i population such as the *Baharna* probably fall under a *la-ansab* heading while *Hassawi* individuals could equally fall under either *ansab* or *la-ansab* headings under Khuri’s categorization, depending on whether or not they possessed tribal affiliations. If we were to factor our Gulf Iranian subgroups into this equation, this would result in the *Huwala* representing *la-ansab* individuals while the ‘Ajam and Baluch fit within the *bani-khudair* category.

However, other outside identity formation patterns have also come into play recently that at least overlap with, if not complicate, Khuri’s proposed scheme. One such case is each individual’s ties to the greater Arab nation as a result of the rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s.

Nowadays the term ‘Arab is loosely used in Bahrain to refer to anyone who is an indigenous Arabic-speaking Sunni, whether or not he has an Arabian tribal pedigree. Strictly speaking, however, the term originally referred only to endogamous groups such as the al-Manna’i, Al Bu ‘Aynayn, Al Bu Rumayh, al-Ghatam, al-Dawasir, al-Zayyani, etc. who lived in one or other of the tribal settlements... and who had (and still have) genealogical affiliations with the tribes of mainland Arabia.²¹⁶

Another issue worth discussing regarding Arab identity is the varying layers of citizenship possessed by each Gulf resident, a consequence of Western notions of the state and citizenship as well as the presence of numerous and distinct expatriate communities. “There are commonly reckoned three circles of identity in Gulf society beyond that of *muwatin* or fellow citizen: *khaliji* or Gulf, then Arab, then *ajnabi* or

²¹⁵ Khuri 1990: 128-29.

²¹⁶ Holes 58.

foreign.”²¹⁷ Although the previous point makes no distinction of where Gulf Iranians might fit, it is probably safe to say such individuals would occupy the lowest *ajnabi* rung under such a distinction in Bahrain.²¹⁸

One of the main rationales for the existing Bahraini government’s implementation of Arab identity structure and organization on its populace is to counteract both its long historical association with Iran and Iranian society (i.e. ‘Ajam) as well as its indigenous Arab Shi’a (*Baharna*). The shared fates of Bahrain and Iran, as well as their peoples, can be traced at least as early as the 5th century BCE to the Achaemenid Empire.²¹⁹ Both sides have exerted control over the Gulf in an ebb and flow extending back millennia to pre-Islamic times, when the ancient Iranians of the Sassanian Empire controlled portions of the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, parts of which are now Arab-controlled today.²²⁰ As Svat Soucek notes, Iranian dominance of the Persian Gulf, even for the name of that body of water, went unquestioned for centuries, if not millennia, and lasted until the import of Arab nationalism from Egypt in the 1960s which brought about a new name.²²¹ The Islamic Revolution in Iran only served as a revival of the danger of expanding Iranian influence, especially in highly susceptible states like Bahrain, where Arab and Sunni identities, along with a monarchist-centered government often feel threatened by the Shi’i

²¹⁷ Paul Dresch, “Introduction: Societies, Identities and Global Issues” in *Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf* eds. Paul Dresch, and James Piscatori (New York: IB Tauris, 2005): 25.

²¹⁸ Enver Koury makes this very point in his discussion regarding the place of Iranians with the United Arab Emirates’ social structure. See Koury 132-33.

²¹⁹ Marschall 5; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 34; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 61-62; Haleh Vaziri, (PhD dissertation: Georgetown University) *The Islamic Republic and its Neighbors: Ideology and the National Interest in Iran’s Foreign Policy during the Khomeini Decade* (Washington: Georgetown University, 1995): 116.

²²⁰ Frye 1975; Frye 1976.

²²¹ Soucek xviii.

democracy of Iran. The presence of the Baharna on the island only complicates the notion of Bahrain as a Sunni Arab island.

For our purposes we shall briefly examine the Bahraini-Iranian relationship since the 17th century, which commemorates the start of Iran's modern claims to the island as well as the Al Khalifa presence there. In 1602, Safavid Iranian naval forces wrested control of Bahrain from the Portuguese, thus marking the start of some Iranian migration, including a few 'Ajam to the islands.²²² As previously noted, Huwala Arabs ruled Bahrain by the start of the 18th century and acted on Iran's behalf under Sheikh Jubbara.²²³ It appears that Gulf Iranian Huwala also helped Iran reassert control over the island during one invasion in 1736 in support of the Qajar ruler Nadir Shah, but were later overthrown in 1753 when the Omani sheikh of Bushehr, Nasir Al-Madkhur, seized it on behalf of the Iranian Zand ruler Karim Khan Zand.²²⁴ Political turmoil between Iranian Zand and Qajar ruling factions caused Bahrain to become increasingly vulnerable to other non-Iranian influences and by 1782, the Al Khalifa family and their tribal allies successfully invaded and took over Bahrain from its Omani-Iranian administrators.²²⁵ The Al Khalifa family was generally familiar with Bahrain and its nearby vicinity due to the sea-based trade they conducted there throughout the 18th century as part of the greater

²²² Al-Mdaires 2; Lorimer Vol. 1: 836; Peterson 63.

²²³ Ahmad Mustafa Abu-Hakima *History of Eastern Arabia, 1750-1800; The Rise and Development of Bahrain and Kuwait* (Beirut: Khayats 1965): 34; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 138; Rumaihi 27-28.

²²⁴ Abu-Hakima 78-79; John Barrett Kelly, "The Persian Claim to Bahrain," *International Affairs* 33 (1957): 51-70; Lorimer Vol. 1: 837.

²²⁵ Abu-Hakima 76, 80; Khuri 1980: 24-25.

‘Utub tribe.²²⁶ As early as 1716, the Al Khalifa appeared in Kuwait along with the Al Sabah family, and had taken control of Zubara (in what is now Qatar) in 1766, just a short distance east from Bahrain.²²⁷ Between 1753 and 1782, the Al Khalifa had tried to settle in Bahrain at least once but were prohibited from staying there by the Iranian-allied Bani Madkhurs.²²⁸ It was not until 1782 when the Al Khalifa family and its allies successfully took over Bahrain and established their dynasty there the following year.²²⁹

From 1783 until the present, Al Khalifa-ruled Bahrain has faced continued challenges to its sovereignty from Iran as well as been a continued recipient of cross-Gulf immigration on the part of Gulf Iranians. In 1859, Bahrain’s ruler recognized Iranian sovereignty over the island (and later Turkish sovereignty) during the same year as he attempted to play off larger, neighboring rivals.²³⁰ During the 1920s, Iran sought to have its dispute over Bahrain with the Al Khalifa referred to the League of Nations.²³¹ In 1932, the same year oil was discovered on the island, Iran offered to renounce its claims to Bahrain in exchange for recognition of ownership of the three islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, but this proposal was rejected.²³² During the late 1930s, Bahrain deported several Iranians working for BAPCO, the island’s oil company, in attempts to open up

²²⁶ The ‘Utub tribe’s three main branches included the Al Sabah family (now ruling Kuwait) the Al Khalifa family (now ruling Bahrain), and the Al Jalahima, who also participated in the 1782 invasion of Bahrain. Lorimer Vol. 2: 1917-19.

²²⁷ Abu-Hakima 66-67, 79, Khuri 1980: 23.

²²⁸ Abu-Hakima 67.

²²⁹ Khuri 1980: 25.

²³⁰ Cordesman 35; Khuri 1980: 31.

²³¹ Richard Schofield, “Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century,” in Richard Schofield (ed.) *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States* (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1994): 37.

²³² Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 50. Interestingly, the idea of exchanging recognition of Bahrain for the three islands would come up later when Bahrain achieved its independence. Also see *ibid.*, 53-54.

more jobs for the native Bahraini population.²³³ In 1957, Bahrain was declared Iran's 14th province by the Iranian Parliament and had two seats reserved for it in the chamber.²³⁴ This, along with the rise of a nationalist movement in Iran under Mohammad Mosaddeq, led to "disturbances" within Bahrain supposedly caused by Iranians living there. By 1960, at least 50 Iranians were deported as a result of fallout from such alleged actions.²³⁵ However, by 1969 the Shah agreed to a UN-backed plebiscite to help determine the future national aspirations of the island's inhabitants and the following year, Bahrainis voted overwhelmingly for self-rule.²³⁶ In 1971, Bahrain declared its independence and went from being a Trucial sheikhdom into a self-governing state. However, upon the inception of the Iranian Revolution, Bahrain under the Al Khalifa family has had to face intermittent claims to the country by Iranians claiming to represent the latest Iranian administration.

The United Arab Emirates

In contrast to Bahrain, the Gulf Arab population of the United Arab Emirates is different demographically and subsequently, has different Arab identity issues. Sunni Arabs constitute the majority of the native population while Shi'i Arabs are a minority—the opposite of Bahrain. Also, there is not one but seven separate ruling families in the country, one for each of the Emirates—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-Quwain, thus making a more complex picture. There is also

²³³ Louër 34; Seccombe 1983: 6-7. Seccombe then describes how BAPCO proceeded to hire more Iranians again after World War II.

²³⁴ Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 131.

²³⁵ Chubin 1974: 207; Rumaihi 30.

²³⁶ Marschall 8.

a much larger presence and diversity of various tribally-organized Arab groups which has been explored elsewhere.²³⁷ For our purposes, the simplest way to analyze the Gulf Arab population there would be to divide the Emirati Gulf Arab population into two broad camps: Arabs of the ruling families versus the subject population.

The most prominent Gulf Arab tribal grouping in the United Arab Emirates is the Bani Yas, whose members rule both Abu Dhabi (under the family name Al Nahyan²³⁸) and Dubai (under the name Al Maktum²³⁹)—the two largest, most influential emirates and also referred to collectively as the southern emirates. Members of the Qawasim (Al Qasimi family) tribe rule both Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah while the Na'im (Al Bu Khuraiban), Sharqiyyim, and Al Mualla (Al Ali) rule Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm al-Quwain respectively. Collectively, the other five emirates are referred to as the Northern Emirates. With the exception of perhaps the Qawasim, the UAE's ruling families can trace their origins to the Arabian Peninsula. The Bani Yas are generally Maliki, the Qawasim, Al Mualla and Na'im are Hanbali, and the Sharqiyyim are Shafi'i, demonstrating the diversity of various ruling groups' specific approaches to Islamic jurisprudence.²⁴⁰ Most of the United Arab Emirates has become heavily urbanized, especially in the Dubai-Ajman-Sharjah area, such that most members of the above tribes have taken to life in the cities.²⁴¹

²³⁷ Van Der Meulen 451.

²³⁸ The Al Nayhan are alternatively known as the Al-Bu Falah.

²³⁹ The Al Maktum are also sometimes referred to as Al Bu Falasah.

²⁴⁰ Van Der Meulen 326, 451.

²⁴¹ Sulayman Khalaf, "The Evolution of the Gulf City Type, Oil, and Globalization" in *Globalization and the Gulf* eds. John Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed al-Mutawa (New York: Routledge, 2006): 250.

The resident, non-ruling Gulf Arab population in the United Arab Emirates offers even more contrast. Previous researchers such as Lorimer, Heard-Bey and Van Der Meulen have revised lists of dozens of Emirati tribes and elucidated their connections to the various local rulers across inter-emirate boundary lines.²⁴² It should be noted that Emirati tribesmen have demonstrated a greater level of mobility than their Bahraini peers in moving between Emirates; for example, the case of a large migration of the Al-Bu Shamis from Sharjah to Dubai.²⁴³ The Shihuh comprise the third largest ‘Arab tribe’ in the seven emirates according to one census (after the Bani Yas and Sharqiyyin), and are largely concentrated in the rural villages of Ras al-Khaimah emirate, although they exercise little power there.²⁴⁴ Interestingly, *Baharna* individuals have been present within the urban areas of Abu Dhabi and Dubai for at least a century and, due to their presence as the only *Ithna Ashari* Shi’i community prior to major Gulf Iranian migration, the term *Baharna* has been used interchangeably for Arabic-speaking Shi’a, regardless of their origins.²⁴⁵ Tribes such as the Awamir and Bani Kalban also count *Ibadi* Shi’a (that is fiver Shi’i) among their numbers.²⁴⁶ Although we could go into more detail regarding each Gulf Arab tribal segment here, it is enough to say tribal diversity, as well as the confederate nature of several emirates separate Abu Dhabi and its fellow emirates from Bahrain upon first glance at the population level.

²⁴² For example, see the tribal indexes given for the following works: Heard-Bey 507-10; Van Der Meulen 321-23. Also, volume two of Lorimer (Geographical and Statistical) operates as a valuable A to Z type dictionary for the Persian Gulf area in spite of its age, with many short sections on the same tribes referenced throughout his work.

²⁴³ Davidson 84-85.

²⁴⁴ Van Der Meulen 431-32.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 359-60.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 451.

The United Arab Emirates offers a similar picture in regards to the ordering of society according to genealogy, Arab-ness, and national identity, as well as it also being an oil-based rentier state. However, given the multiple ruling tribal authorities within the United Arab Emirates and the unevenness of oil and natural gas reserves distributed between them,²⁴⁷ one might (rightly) expect some challenge or alternative perception to the rules of social ordering and mobility within the Arab community. A quick comparison between Abu Dhabi and Dubai offers such evidence.

Establishing the state involved at least two very different views of nationality. Shaykh Rashid of Dubai is supposed to have said, ‘Those who were with us when we were poor should be with us now we are rich’, implying that shared experience carried weight. Shaykh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, by contrast, looked more to *nasab*, “genealogy” of the kind claimed by Arab tribes; for his own family, the Al Nahyan, are hereditary chiefs of note among the Bani Yas.²⁴⁸

Dresch also highlights how access to Shaikh Rashid and the ruling power circle, such as an advisory role, is the ultimate determinant of one’s standing within Dubai.²⁴⁹ One’s Arab identity is not necessarily the first predictor of success, but their presence and contribution to Dubai instead. Therefore, Dubai diminished the role that tribal ties played in the particular emirate and created the potential for non-Arabs to climb the social ladder.²⁵⁰ Sharjah has also demonstrated the same tendency of selecting individuals with personal ability and shared experience over tribal affiliation, although at a smaller

²⁴⁷ “UAE Oil and Gas.” *United Arab Emirates Ministry of Finance and Industry*. Available online. <http://www.uae.gov.ae/Government/oil_gas.htm>. Accessed 31. October 2008.

²⁴⁸ Dresch 258.

²⁴⁹ Dresch 143.

²⁵⁰ Andrea Rugh 119; Van Der Meulen 173.

scale.²⁵¹ Inter-emirate competition plays a significant part in the determination of Arab identity within the various southern emirates.

Quite the opposite of Bahrain, the area that became the United Arab Emirates in 1971 is not as sensitive to Iranian identity issues primarily due to its majority Sunni population (and minority Shi'i one), as well as lack of long-standing territorial claims to it by Iran—with the exception of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. The seven former Trucial States do have their own long and distinct history of contact with Iran, although the most pertinent information concerning us comes from the 16th century onward. When we speak of Iranian-Emirati contacts then, we are primarily referring to Iran's contacts with one tribal grouping in particular, the Qawasim, until the 19th century, when the Bani Yas of Dubai opened their port city to Iranian trade. The Qawasim began to assert control on both sides of the Persian Gulf in the 18th century, at the same time as the decline of the Safavid Empire in Iran.²⁵² As such, the Qawasim have played a large role in the relationship between Iranians and the southern shore Arabs of the Persian Gulf until only recently.

The height of Qawasim power came during the 18th century. In the 1720s, the Qawasim seized Basidu, the port city of Qeshm Island although Iran would regain control by 1734.²⁵³ During conflict between Iran and Oman in 1737, Iranian forces took control of Khor Fakkan (now a part of Sharjah emirate) and subdued Qawasim forces there.²⁵⁴ In 1744, the Qawasim, in alliance with Omani forces, expelled the Iranian forces occupying

²⁵¹ Van Der Meulen 223-24.

²⁵² Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 36.

²⁵³ Amirahmadi 122; Schofield 1994: 35.

²⁵⁴ Lorimer Vol. 1: 631.

the port city of Julfar.²⁵⁵ Three years later, when the Qajar ruler Nadir Shah died, the Iranian governor of Bandar Abbas formed an alliance with the Qawasim through marriage, thus opening the door to Qawasim influence on Iran's southern shore.²⁵⁶ Qawasim forces from Julfar then landed in Bandar Abbas in 1759 and established themselves in various nearby Iranian ports.²⁵⁷ By that time, the Qawasim had become the leaders of the Huwala 'tribe' and had moved into territory on the northern Iranian shores (such as Lengeh), ruling there as semi-independent vassals for Iranian and Omani overlords.²⁵⁸

Nearby Ras al-Khaimah, also controlled by factions of the Qawasim, later became an independent port, having gained recognition for its independence from Oman in 1763, and was only one of the northern emirates to achieve such status at that time.²⁵⁹ Records dating to the 1760s show that the Qawasim/Huwala individuals were also found residing on Hormuz and Qais islands on the Iranian side of the Gulf as well.²⁶⁰ By the 1780s, the Qawasim had gained such influence that they were called in as mediators to try and resolve the dispute between Iran and the Al Khalifa family over Bahrain after the latter's successful invasion of the island in 1782.²⁶¹

However, Qawasim power waned during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as the British curtailed the tribe's maritime powers in the southern Gulf (ultimately

²⁵⁵ It should be noted that by this time, both Iranian and Qawasim forces were each allied with rival Omani factions during an Omani civil war. See Samuel Barrett Miles *The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf* (London: Frank Cass, 1966): 256, 269, 443; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 37.

²⁵⁶ Lorimer Vol. 1: 632.

²⁵⁷ Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 38.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.; Lorimer Vol. 1: 632.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.; Van Der Meulen 203n4, 389-90.

²⁶⁰ Abu-Hakima 79.

²⁶¹ Lorimer Vol. 1: 634.

assuming control over their foreign relations from 1820 until 1971²⁶²), while Iran reasserted control over its southern periphery in places such as Lengeh. By this time, other powers such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi came to assert control over the pearl- and sea-based trades at their expense.²⁶³ Gradually, the Qawasim began a process of splitting into smaller factions, with Sharjah splitting off into its own emirate first in 1867, then in 1921 and ultimately in 1952.²⁶⁴ For the purposes of Iranian-Emirati relations, such a split, along with the Qawasim decline, were important because starting in the late 19th century it would complicate the disputes between the Qawasim and Iranians over possession of the southern Iranian coastline and Persian Gulf islands.

In contrast, non-Qawasim Emiratis began to establish their own independent relations with Iran until the 19th century thanks to the rise of Dubai as a rival port to Sharjah and Lengeh for Gulf trade, especially from Iranian merchants. Members of the Bani Yas tribal grouping registered a marginal presence on the Emirates coasts until then, and were primarily land-based within the area of the Buraimi and Liwa Oases on the border with Oman today.²⁶⁵ Abu Dhabi and Dubai towns were not established as independent Bani Yas emirates until 1761 and 1833 respectively.²⁶⁶ Abu Dhabi itself only became the capital of Bani Yas domains in the 1790s (which were primarily inland away from the coasts and contact with Iranians) and by the 1830s the tribe split into two factions, with the Al Maktum asserting their independence from the Al Nahyan by

²⁶² Heard-Bey 285-86, 361-62, 367-70.

²⁶³ Andrea Rugh 104.

²⁶⁴ Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah split from one another on two occasions: first in 1867 and then in 1921. However, the two incorporated in 1900. See Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 40; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 168.

²⁶⁵ Lorimer Vol. 2: 1934-35; Van Der Meulen 372.

²⁶⁶ Lorimer adds that Dubai had already existed as a city as early as 1799 and was a Bani Yas dependency until 1825. See Heard-Bey 201; Lorimer Vol. 1: 772; Van Der Meulen 184

occupying the borderland between Bani Yas and Qawasim territories.²⁶⁷ In the early 19th century, members of the Dubai branch of the Bani Yas migrated to Hengam Island with the blessing of Oman's sultan, who supposedly held the Iranian lease for the island.²⁶⁸ However, Hengam reverted back to Iranian control, and would lead to later confrontations between Iranians and Dubai natives in 1928.²⁶⁹

By the early 20th century, at least 500 Gulf Iranians were already living in Abu Dhabi and others had moved to Dubai as well, establishing what would become the latter's Bastakiyah district.²⁷⁰ Other would-be emirates and their nearby hinterlands had deferred to Qawasim rule in exchange for joining into the tribe's maritime trade and were included within the Qawasim domains at the time.²⁷¹ In the early 19th century, however, such emirates began to assert themselves and were recognized as individual Trucial sheikhdoms by the British, including: Ajman (1820), Umm al-Quwain (1820) and Fujairah (1952).²⁷² The last three emirates, along with Abu Dhabi had little contact with Iran, thus limiting relations pre-federation to Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, and Sharjah, although each did absorb a portion of the Gulf Iranian migration both in the cities and villages.²⁷³ In summary, the relationship between many Emiratis and Iranians has been shaped by the lack of a large Shi'i population as well as competing interests between the various Emirates for Iranian trade.

²⁶⁷ It is interesting to note the close familial connections between Abu Dhabi and Dubai even today, as Van Der Meulen points out. See Davidson 10, 15; Van Der Meulen 181.

²⁶⁸ Zahlan 1978: 88.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Heard-Bey 201; Van Der Meulen 359-60; Zahlan 1978: 178.

²⁷¹ Heard-Bey 68-69.

²⁷² Van Der Meulen 248-49, 256, 263.

²⁷³ Heard-Bey 201, 227.

Cross-Gulf relations between the Emirates and Iranians during the 20th century still remained somewhat mixed. The two Qawasim emirates and Iran continued to assert their claims to various islands, including Sirri, Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb islands.²⁷⁴ As late as 1959, Iran still did not recognize the independence of the Trucial Shaikhdoms, although the former's continuing dispute with both Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah over the possession of Abu Musa and the Tunb islands probably contributed in some part to acknowledge the Shaikhdoms' existence.²⁷⁵ However, in 1971, the Shah recognized both Bahrain and the newly formed United Arab Emirates as states upon their formations.²⁷⁶ After British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in November 1971, Iranian forces took control of Abu Musa and the Tunb islands, thus provoking protest from the UAE.²⁷⁷ It was revealed by the end of the same month however that the Shah had reached a Memorandum of Understanding with Sharjah's ruler with each one respecting the other's claims to Abu Musa, although he failed to reach a similar agreement with Ras al-Khaimah over the Tunbs.²⁷⁸ Apart from such incidents, relations between the two governments and their citizens encountered little strain until after the Iranian Revolution.²⁷⁹ Although Iran and the United Arab Emirates have still not settled all of their territorial disputes through the present day, this has not precluded the two states

²⁷⁴ Van Der Meulen 202-04; Zahlan 1978: 80.

²⁷⁵ Hay 148.

²⁷⁶ Hooshang Amirahmadi "The Colonial-Political Dimension of the Iran-UAE Dispute" in *Small Islands, Big Politics: the Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf* ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996):10; Nader Entessar, "Changing Patterns of Iranian-Arab relations," *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1984): 342; Mojtaheh-Zadeh 1999: 69; Rumaihi 31.

²⁷⁷ Amirahmadi 10; Schofield 1994: 38-40; Schofield 1997: 147-48.

²⁷⁸ Amirahmadi 10; Schofield 1994: 38-40.

²⁷⁹ As John Duke Anthony attested in his work, "Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, the Ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah, told this writer in an interview shortly before the Tunbs were seized: 'I have no quarrel with the Iranian people who are living among us, nor with those in Iran. Iranians have always been welcome here, and they always will be. My problems are with the Iranian government.'" See Anthony 41.

from maintaining relations with one another nor has it curtailed the migration of Gulf Iranians to the southern shore Gulf Arab State.

CHAPTER 5: EBB AND FLOW: GULF IRANIAN CONTRIBUTIONS AND
REMAINING CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION IN GULF ARAB SOCIETY

The following section builds upon Gulf Iranian and Arab identity investigations as well as earlier theory discussion. It briefly analyzes specific contributions made by Gulf Iranian community to Gulf Arab society in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, particularly on the individual and community levels. It also assess the challenges Gulf Iranians still face in attempting to integrate into the Gulf Arab environment and society. These case studies will demonstrate the independent, active roles which distinct Huwala and 'Ajam individuals and families have played within Gulf Arab society as well as the wider community contribution by these groups. It further shows how these changes have affected and reshaped different facets of Gulf Arab culture with a new hybrid flavor, combining elements from both Arab and Iranian cultures.

One example of a prominent Gulf Iranian Huwala family in Bahrain is the Kanoo-
Almoayed family group.²⁸⁰ Members of this Arab family were originally banking
middlemen for pearl merchants in the 1880s and gradually worked their way into the
favor of the ruling Al Khalifa family.²⁸¹ By the 1920s, the Kanoo had one of the city's
richest and oldest residential districts named after them, as well as one where both
Huwala and 'Ajam resided.²⁸² The Kanoo branch diversified into shipping during the
1940s after the fall of the pearl industry, and gradually obtained a monopoly in shipping

²⁸⁰ As Molly Izzard notes, the Almoayed family is in fact an offshoot of the Kanoo family line, having changed their name to differentiate themselves from their cousins, thus provoking their combined study here. Both families share the same ancestors. See Izzard 107.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 108.

²⁸² Fuccaro 2000: 70.

petroleum resources for the United States military.²⁸³ Today, the Kanoos have also counted doctors and Bahraini National Assembly representatives among them, along with the Almoayed family members.²⁸⁴ The Almoayed branch under Yusuf Almoayed began moving into metal-based industries starting in the 1930s, including automobile and appliance sales, inspired by Yusuf plying his trade as a middleman for acquiring materials for British forces stationed on the island.²⁸⁵ Both branches of this Huwala family emphasize that they had lived only a short time on the Gulf's Iranian shore, thus asserting that they possess more Arab characteristics than Iranian ones. This attitude is related to the Iranian nationalism of the 1950s as well as political strife which took place within Bahrain then.²⁸⁶ A quick Google search using the terms 'Kanoo Bahrain' or 'Almoayed Bahrain' yields over 53,000 and 7,000 hits, respectively, including links to the various business ventures that branches within each family operate on the island and around the world.²⁸⁷ In fact, one could easily count published websites of these Huwala families as another form of Gulf Iranian contribution. Other examples of Huwala worth mentioning are the Fakhro, Khunji, Bastaki, and Ali Reza families, some of whose names allude to various place names with Iran and even common names used by Iranian Shi'i individuals.²⁸⁸

²⁸³ Lawson 54-55.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 90.

²⁸⁵ Izzard 114-15; Lawson 54.

²⁸⁶ Bahry 4; Field 75; Lawson 10.

²⁸⁷ "Almoayed Bahrain" Google Search. Available online.

<<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&safe=off&rls=com.microsoft%3Aen-US&q=Almoayed+Bahrain>>. Accessed 24 October 2008; "Kanoo Bahrain" Google Search. Available online.

<<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=Kanoo+Bahrain&aq=f&oq=>>>. Accessed 24 October 2008.

²⁸⁸ Field 76; Holes 58.

While the ‘Ajam families of Bahrain are not nearly as referenced within historical and biographical works, we can find some of their own contributions, if not at least their appearances, documented within the same society as well. Members of the al-Kazruni and Bushihri families, who worked in the boating and pearling industries, established and maintained one of the island’s *ma’tam*, the Al-Ajam (Al-Kabir) in 1892, and were also responsible for building island mosques, hospitals and even the British Political Agency.²⁸⁹ When Abdul-Nabi al-Kazruni and Abdul-Nabi Bushihri had both died, they left the administration of the funeral house to a board comprised of future generations of ‘Ajam in 1945.²⁹⁰ The two families were also responsible for bringing over and supporting other Iranian families they knew who were involved within construction-related industries starting in the early 1900s.²⁹¹ Fuccaro notes that by 1951, a majority of the Al-Ajam *ma’tam* board were descended from families that came from one specific quarter of Bushehr in Iran.²⁹² A member of the al-Kazrooni family also served as a Persian representative in the ruler’s council at the turn of the 20th century and his descendents are still known to be prominent merchants there.²⁹³ Another ‘Ajam individual, Husayn Muhammad Baqir Aryan, ran for a National Assembly position in some of the country’s first elections upon independence in 1971, although he was

²⁸⁹ Fuccaro 2005: 50; Khuri 1980: 160.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Fuccaro 2005: 50.

²⁹² Ibid., 46, 48. Also according to Fuccaro, part of the reason for this representation was that “Between 1889 and 1910 the Bushehri and Kazruni families brought to Manamah under their protection approximately 20 per cent of the total ‘Ajam population of the city.”

²⁹³ Field 75; Khuri 1980: 60.

defeated by an Arab candidate.²⁹⁴ One intriguing note is that some of the ‘Ajam families who originally established themselves in Bahrain then migrated and resettled in the United Arab Emirates, where they have since gained considerable business and political clout, including the Al-Fardan and Sayigh families.²⁹⁵

Two examples of Gulf Iranian Huwala in the United Arab Emirates are the Al-Gurg and the Darwish families, the latter whose family links spread across the Gulf through the emirates of Ajman, Dubai, and Umm al-Quwain and even into neighboring Qatar.²⁹⁶ Easa Saleh Al-Gurg, the United Arab Emirates’ former ambassador to the United Kingdom, provides one of the first autobiographical accounts of a Gulf Iranian in English in The Wells of Memory, a narrative which its editor notes could serve as an inspirational rags-to-riches story for both Gulf Arabs and Gulf Iranians, as well as future writers.²⁹⁷ Easa Al-Gurg details how his own family had originally lived in Lengeh, Iran but departed there to return to life along the Arab shore, echoing similar sentiments of the Huwala merchant families in Bahrain.²⁹⁸ The Darwish family’s principal contributions to Emirati society are through commercial ventures, banks, and utility management throughout the country.²⁹⁹ However, they, such as the Al-Gurg, Kanoo, and Almoayed of Bahrain, have acquired such clout as to earn various regional and federal government ministry portfolios within the United Arab Emirates.³⁰⁰ Besides the Al-Gurg and Darwish

²⁹⁴ Emile Nakhleh *Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976): 155.

²⁹⁵ Van Der Meulen 199.

²⁹⁶ Field 75; Long 1978: 15; Van Der Meulen 198.

²⁹⁷ Al-Gurg xiii.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 2-4.

²⁹⁹ Van Der Meulen 198.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

families, there are also other Huwala families who have established themselves in prominent roles in the various seven emirates, including the Al-Serkal and Zaruni (Sharjah), the Al-Awadi and Bahruzian (Fujairah) and the Al Jakkah (Ras al-Khaimah).³⁰¹

Members of the ‘Ajam have also made their mark in the United Arab Emirates, particularly in the entrepreneurial climate of Dubai. During the first migration wave of the 1890s, a large segment of the merchant Al-Ansari family relocated to Dubai from Lengeh and has remained there, still operating within the same role.³⁰² Before Easa Al-Gurg served as his country’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mahdi al-Tajir, was instrumental in the development of the Emirates embassy there starting in 1972 and also served as a close adviser to Dubai’s ruler, Shaikh Rashid, for many years.³⁰³ There are numerous other ‘Ajam or ethnic Persians who operate within the Emirates, and one should take note that one finds their greatest representation and influence “among the shopkeepers and souk store owners. It is at this level, rather than in the ranks of the big families, that the Persians have their strength in commerce in all the Gulf states.”³⁰⁴

Even though there has been a select group of prominent Gulf Iranian families and individuals who carved their own path away from Iran, the greater Gulf Iranian community also has played an active role in shaping their society on the Persian Gulf’s southern shores. A few examples from both Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates

³⁰¹ Ibid., 223-24, 233, 254.

³⁰² Davidson 73; Van Der Meulen 198-99.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Field 76-77.

specific to subgroups of the Gulf Iranian community will show what has been imported from Iran, particularly traditional festivities and architectural styles.

One tradition in Bahrain inspired by Gulf Iranian influence at least since the past century has been the Ashura *ta'ziyeh* or passion play performed during the month of Muharram along with the related *tamthiliyyah* or processions.³⁰⁵ Members of the Bahraini Shi'i population, whether 'Ajam, *Baharna*, or *Hassawi*, have organized a series of community events to commemorate the martyrdom of Husain (The Third Imam), who died on the plains of Karbala in 680 CE.³⁰⁶ The basis of such organization has come through individual fundraising and organization within a *ma'tam*³⁰⁷ or funeral house which serves as a community meeting place and is operated by each of the Shi'i subgroups within the island's cities and rural areas.³⁰⁸ The most elaborate of such *ma'tam*-sponsored events are the marches and processions by Shi'a to demonstrate their mourning for Husain by self-flagellation, as well as passion plays depicting the events leading up to his martyrdom.³⁰⁹

Ashura celebrations have incorporated foreign elements into them over the years. Khuri notes that during the 1890s, three of the most prominent *ma'taim* were founded by rich Shi'i merchants, including the 'al-Ajam *ma'tam*.³¹⁰ He also surmises that "the use of

³⁰⁵ Fuccaro 2005: 48.

³⁰⁶ Lawson 11.

³⁰⁷ Lawson alternatively translates *ma'tam* to meaning mourning house. Ibid.; Khuri 1980: 156.

³⁰⁸ Louay Bahry explains the significance of such places in more detail. "As a religious symbol of the Shiite community, the matams are an old and well-established institution, going back hundreds of years. There may be as many as four hundred of them in the country. Matams are meeting places where Shiites gather to mourn the death of a family member, for example, and to meet prior to or at the end of a religious procession. They are the sites of Shiite religious commemorations and social and even political gatherings." See Bahry 135.

³⁰⁹ Khuri 1980: 155-56.

³¹⁰ Ibid., 160.

chains, swords, drums, or music in these processions is believed to have been introduced by the Persian Shi'a around the mid-1930s."³¹¹ This Iranian influence not only coincides with the second wave of Iranian migration across the Gulf, both the Huwala and 'Ajam, but also with the Iranian government's modernization programs, including curtailing certain religious expressions. "Having banned in 1939 self-flagellation in public on the anniversary of Imam Hussein's death on the tenth of Muharram, the Shah tried to stop the public performance of Shia passion plays preceding the mourning, and prohibit the pilgrimage to Mecca."³¹² We also find further evidence of a connection between cross-Gulf migration and cultural mixing, thus confirming one Gulf Iranian contribution to existing Bahraini traditions as presented by Khuri.³¹³

The Ashura processions would take on further significance during the 1950s when Bahraini Shi'i adherents were attacked by Bahraini Sunnis, thus adding a political dimension to the religious ceremonies.³¹⁴ By the time of the Iranian Revolution, the processions gained even further political significance as a surrogate for political expression (in the absence of political parties) for social injustice and unrighteous rule under the Al Khalifa family for failing to uphold the Bahraini constitution as set out in 1973.³¹⁵ Such actions were not without precedent in Iran before the Revolution and given the religious training some Bahraini Shi'a received in Iran, along with the presence of

³¹¹ Ibid., 268.

³¹² Hiro 28.

³¹³ Abdullah 247-48; Heard-Bey 133. Both of these authors specifically note how the Shah's actions prompted Gulf Iranian emigration, although to the United Arab Emirates instead.

³¹⁴ Al-Mdaires 4.

³¹⁵ Bahry 130-31.

‘Ajam, one can perhaps see a stronger connection between Gulf Iranian influences and Bahraini Shi’i practice today.³¹⁶

The Gulf Iranian population has not only left its mark demographically on numerous locations throughout the Gulf but also they have left an architectural imprint along the Persian Gulf’s southern shores. In Manama, Bahrain’s capital, the Awazir district, one of its city quarters, has gained notoriety for its Persian community, especially its merchant class.³¹⁷ The same city’s al-Hurra and al-Ajam districts also historically have been known for their Persian Shi’a or ‘Ajam communities, including the *ma’taim* operated by them.³¹⁸ Neighborhoods such as the ‘Awadhiyyah were established in the 1890s by its Huwala population from ‘Awaz, while ‘Ajam immigrants from Bandar Abbas established the Zulm ‘Abad district in 1923 before moving on to Adliyya district in the 1930s.³¹⁹ The development of many of the Persian districts of the city can be attributed to patron-client relationships between rich merchants and poorer workers who immigrated to the city in search of construction jobs and eventually property investments.³²⁰ These points give us more detail as to the effect of Iranian immigration’s first and second waves on Manama’s growth as well as that city’s hidden Iranian character.

³¹⁶ Keddie 71.

³¹⁷ Izzard 101.

³¹⁸ Fuccaro 2005: 50; Khuri 1980: 250; Lawson 11.

³¹⁹ Fuccaro 2005: 51; Fuccaro 2000: 69.

³²⁰ Fuccaro 2005: 50-51. There were other Gulf Iranians who came to Bahrain outside of the patron-client system as well, which Fuccaro also mentions in the same passage.

The emirate of Dubai also has its own Persian quarters, including Deira and a district known as the Bastakiyah, a name inspired by the village of Bastak in Iran.³²¹ The Gulf Iranian connection is not limited to people although, as Iranian architecture also has taken its distinct place among Gulf Arab buildings. Wind towers known as *badgirs* that were constructed by Lingawi merchants in southern emirates during the late 19th century have been adopted by local malls such as the Madinat Jumeirah in Dubai, as well as being preserved by residents in both Dubai's Bastakiyah district and the Blue Souq in neighboring Sharjah.³²² In 2007 it was estimated that about 6,500 Iranian businesses were operating in the United Arab Emirates, although this included some cart or wheeled merchants.³²³ The continued existence of such architecture and their districts indicates the role Gulf Iranians continue to play in the Persian Gulf Arab States.

The above points when taken together do not all signify the acceptance or seamless entry of the Gulf Iranian community itself into Gulf Arab society, nor is every aspect of Gulf Arab space attractive to them. One Dubai based artist and Gulf Iranian has noted the relationship between the city's large, isolated buildings and a large multinational population in addition to the resident Arab one whose members also isolate themselves from one another—which ultimately leads to a culture-less city condemned to death.³²⁴ The same artist decries how the Gulf Arab city lacks cohesion and operates in a ramshackle manner, and he makes a comparison of his newly-adopted home to the cities

³²¹ Fattah; Izzard 242.

³²² Abdullah 118; Davidson 113; Heard-Bey 246; Peter Vine and Paula Casey *United Arab Emirates: Profile of a Country's Heritage and Modern Development* (London: Immel, 1992): 114.

³²³ Dosari "Panj saad hezar-e irani-e mahajer dar emirat-e motahed-e 'arabi" 23. January 2007.

³²⁴ Asha Shahir "Ebrahim haqiqi: dubai mahakum be marg ast." 18. June 2008. Radio Farda.com. Available online. <<http://www.radiofarda.com/Article/2008/06/18/haghighi.html>>. Accessed 25. August 2008.

across the water in Iran, demonstrating the dissonance some Iranians feel with life on the Gulf's southern shores. Gulf Iranians also must make harsh adjustments to the hot, humid climate of the Persian Gulf, particularly in the excessively hot, humid summer months, sometimes even without the luxury of air conditioning.³²⁵

The integration of Gulf Iranians into Gulf Arab society in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates can be quite difficult. One author keenly asserts an interesting feature of the Persian Gulf's states: "Not to live in a villa or a *bayt sha'bi* (not to have one's own walls, in brief) is to be less than fully a citizen."³²⁶ Gulf Arabs frequently perceive residency for outside individuals to be only temporary. What, then, can we say of nationality? "The smaller polities of the Gulf may be seen as 'ethnocracies,' in which all citizens enjoy a certain privileged status, and the distinctive identity of citizens is protected in sometimes unusual ways."³²⁷ "It also appears that Iran remains a threat to the Arab states whether it is ruled by traditional conservatives, reformists, or neoconservatives. According to a majority of Arab politicians, Iran is a trouble-making country whose decision-makers always remain the same, whoever is in power."³²⁸ While Gulf Iranians may find economic success within either the United Arab Emirates or Bahrain, they always run the risk of being associated with the present Iranian regime, or

³²⁵ Asha Shahir "Tabestan dar dubai; behest-e turistha o jahanom-e kargaran." 25. July 2008. Radio Farda.com. Available online <http://www.radiofarda.com/Article/2008/07/25/f5_dubai_summer.html>. Accessed 25. August 2008.

³²⁶ Paul Dresch, "Foreign Matter: The Place of Strangers in Gulf Society" in *Globalization and the Gulf* eds. John Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed al-Mutawa (New York: Routledge, 2006): 210.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 203.

³²⁸ Mahjoob Zweiri, "Arab-Iranian Relations: New Realities?" in *Iran's Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad* eds. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008): 122.

failing that, not quite attaining citizenship rights and all the social and political benefits which that entails to the same degree as their Gulf Arab neighbors and counterparts.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored a number of issues of the Gulf Iranians, those Iranian expatriates living in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. We explored various theories in an attempt to quantify the relationship between Gulf Iranians and the issue of political and social boundaries within the Persian Gulf Arab States. Oscar Martinez' work has shown us how within borderlands, relationships between individuals operate not so much in black and white but a grey area as occupants of the two sides attempt to navigate at the fringes or peripheries of society. Eric Hobsbawm's theory builds upon Martinez by showing how society from the core attempts to define identity in its terms, rather than those of the borderlander, as it tries to thwart hybridized, impure society. Edward Said's work firmly illustrates how demonization of the other culture takes place within the struggle to demarcate one society from another. When such factors are combined, we have the needed tools to analyze the shifting calculus of borders between Iranian and Gulf Arab society, and how they are played out with Gulf Iranians in particular at the edge or forefront of both groups. We also see the consequences of Western-imposed ideas of territoriality and citizenship upon the two populations with as yet unresolved disputes over what constitutes Arab or Iranian land or even identity. Surprisingly, we learned how individuals on the periphery can shape their own destinies and make independent, conscious decisions more so than their counterparts in the core inland areas to operate on one side of a boundary or another.

The second section, specifically focusing on identity in Chapters Three and Four, has outlined three major subgroups within the Gulf Iranian community: the Huwala, the

‘Ajam, and the Baluch. It explored the various origins of the three distinct subgroups and their original connections and origins to Iran and each other. It has delved into their various socioeconomic strata and professional roles within the Persian Gulf Arab States. Further, it has assessed a case common to members of all three groups, the Bidoon, and shown the implications their status has for Gulf Iranian integration into Gulf Arab society. We have learned about the distinctive clothing choices Gulf Iranians make within Gulf Arab society, their political inclinations, and the potential repercussions that result from such choices. We also have explored the role of Gulf Iranian women living within the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, including professional roles they occupy and the various options they exercise towards social mobility in the two states, as through marriage. Women’s choice of dress also plays a factor in establishing their identities within Gulf Arab society.

Upon examining the above factors determining identity, we have also explored the various Gulf Iranian migration waves to the Persian Gulf Arab States since the mid to late 19th century. We have discovered common themes of how various forms of modernization within Iran have played a significant factor in the choices of each successive wave or generation to consciously choose life on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. During the first wave of migration, we learned how increased taxation facilitated an exodus of Huwala merchants from southern Iranian ports such as Lengeh to other Gulf pearling ports during the turn of the century. The second migration wave has shown us how many religiously-inclined Gulf Iranians including both Huwala and ‘Ajam individuals opted to move towards more traditionally organized Muslim ports rather than

accept stringent Western clothing guidelines and other restrictions on their existing way of life. Gulf Iranians during the third migration wave were motivated again by economic incentives, especially the promise of greater income and job opportunities within these oil-producing states. We also glimpsed how military conscription played a factor in some individuals' choices to opt for life in the Gulf Arab states prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. During the fourth and most recent migration wave, we observed how revolution and war led many Gulf Iranians to join their peers across the waters for a new life. Each of the successive migration waves have built upon each another, there being overlap in the rationale for this Iranian emigration.

We also learned about Gulf Arabs and the identity issues particular to them. In Bahrain, we discovered two main divisions within Bahraini society, between a majority Shi'i population and a minority Sunni one. We also learned about the diversity within each community; whether it was between indigenous island Shi'a and their Peninsular peers, or tribally-organized Sunni, such as the Al Khalifa, versus their urban neighbors. We examined why Sunni Arab identity is important for the existing Bahraini government in its attempts to monopolize its control over the archipelago and counteract the island's long association with Iran and an entrenched indigenous Shi'i population. In contrast, we learned about the distinct nature of the United Arab Emirates in its confederation of seven smaller emirates. Such a confederation, with a more diverse Sunni population along with a relatively small Shi'i community overall, has appeared more welcoming to Gulf Iranians in comparison with Bahrain. Our historical analysis of Iranian-Emirati ties shows

the varying relations between the separate emirates and Iran, ranging from warm (Dubai) to more tense (Ras al-Khaimah).

Finally, we briefly explored some of the contributions made by Gulf Iranians to Bahraini and Emirati society in Chapter Five. We learned about some of the prominent individuals and families within Gulf Iranian subgroups and the imprints they have made in their newly adopted countries. We have ascertained the level of success of some of the above individuals in attaining important government positions and influence as well as the variety of roles they play in Persian Gulf Arab States. We began to discover the extent of distinct Gulf Iranian communities such as the Awasir and Bastakiyah, their architectural contributions to Gulf Arab society, and how they have shaped the urban character of Manama and Dubai. We discovered how specific Iranian religious traditions have shaped and influenced Shi'i society and tradition within Bahrain. We also learned about the limitations of life within Gulf Arab society, such as alienation from the Gulf Arab populace as well as the loss which Gulf Iranians feel upon departure from their homeland.

Undoubtedly, there is both a need and room for more research regarding the Gulf Iranian community, including a focus on Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. More in-depth, anthropological work focusing on the Huwala, 'Ajam, or Baluch subgroups or other Iranians is needed. It is this author's hope that this research will spur further studies and debate regarding Gulf Iranians and their relations with Gulf Arabs. It also has aimed to downplay any notions of a uniform, Iranian society driven only by revolutionary zeal and expansionist ideals. By exploring the grey areas between the various Gulf denizens, this

thesis has aspired to bridge the gap between modern Iranian and Arab studies towards a field of Persian Gulf Studies inclusive of both sides. It is at the shifting boundaries and peripheries of societies and nations where we find some of the most interesting processes of interaction, negotiation, and questioning taking place. The Gulf Iranians are evidence of such boundaries.

APPENDIX A – LIST OF GULF IRANIAN FAMILIES BY SUBGROUP

Huwala individual family references

<i>Name</i>	<i>Reference and Page Number</i>
Al-Ali (UAQ)	Mojtahed-Zadeh 67; Van Der Meulen 223
Al-Awadi (Bahrain)	Peterson 63
Al-Gurg (Dubai)	Al-Gurg; Davidson 156; Field 76; Onley 79; Van Der Meulen 198-99
Al-Hajiri (Sharjah)	Van Der Meulen 223-24
(Al-)Kaziruni (Bahrain)*	Dresch 58; Field 76; Fuccaro 2005: 48-50; Khuri 160-61
Al-Khaja (Sharjah)	Van Der Meulen 223-24
Al-Mulla (Dubai)	Van Der Meulen 198-99
Al-Serkal (Sharjah)	Van Der Meulen 223-24
Ali Reza (Bahrain)	Anthony 56; Izzard 107, 114
Almoayed (Bahrain)	Anthony 56; Dresch 254; Field 75; Izzard 106-10, 112, 114-16; Lawson 54-55, 77, 90; Peterson 63
Bastaki (Bahrain)	Dresch 58; Fuccaro 2005: 46
Darwish (Bahrain, Qatar, Dubai, Ajman, UAQ)	Anthony 56; Field 76; Long 15; Van Der Meulen 198-99
Daylami (Bahrain)	Dresch 58
Eshaq (Bahrain)*	Field 76; Izzard 106-07, 111, 115
Fakhro (Bahrain, Qatar)	Anthony 56; Dresch 254; Field 75; Izzard 106, 109, 115; Lawson 77, 90; Long 14; Lorimer 754; Peterson 63
Kanoo (Bahrain)	Anthony 56; Dresch 254; Field 75; Izzard 106-10; Lawson 54-55, 90; Long 14; Onley 62-63; Peterson 63; Rumaihi 131
Khunji (Bahrain)	Dresch 58
Kuhiji (Bahrain)	Dresch 58
Matar (Bahrain)	Peterson 63
Qasimi (Sharjah, RAK)	Mojtahed-Zadeh 67; Van Der Meulen 223-24
Safar (Bahrain)*	Fuccaro 2005: 43, 45, 48; Onley 62-64, 68
Zaruni (Sharjah)	Van Der Meulen 223-24

* = Referenced under more than one subgroup

UAQ = Umm al-Quwain

RAK = Ras al-Khaimah

APPENDIX A – LIST OF GULF IRANIAN FAMILIES BY SUBGROUP

‘Ajam individual family references

<i>Name</i>	<i>Reference and Page Number</i>
Abdullatif (Dubai)*	Davidson 73
Al-Abudi (Sharjah)	Van Der Meulen 223-24
Al-Ansari (Dubai)	Davidson 73; Van Der Meulen 198-99
Al-Fardan (Bahrain; Dubai)	Van Der Meulen 198-99
Al-Tajir (Dubai)	Al-Alkim 50, Van Der Meulen 198-99
Aryan (Bahrain)	Nakhleh 158, 160
Badri (Dubai)*	Davidson 73
Bushihri (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 44, 46-50; Khuri 160
Diwani (Bahrain)	Field 76
Farsi (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 46
Fikri (Dubai)*	Davidson 73; Field 76
Galadari (Dubai)	Field 76; Van Der Meulen 198-99
Ghulam Abbas (Dubai)*	Davidson 73
Sayigh (Bahrain; Dubai)	Van Der Meulen 198-99

*** = Referenced under more than one subgroup**

UAQ = Umm al-Quwain

RAK = Ras al-Khaimah

APPENDIX A – LIST OF GULF IRANIAN FAMILIES BY SUBGROUP

Unknown Background

<i>Name</i>	<i>Reference and Page Number</i>
Ahwazi (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 46
Al-Awadi (Fujairah—related to Bahrain Awadi?)	Van Der Meulen 254
Al-Jakkah (RAK)	Van Der Meulen 233
Al-Kharji (UAQ)	Van Der Meulen 266-67
Al-Raqbani (Fujairah)	Van Der Meulen 254
Al-Saffarini (RAK)	Van Der Meulen 233
Al-Sharafa (Ajman)	Van Der Meulen 260
Al-Zarb (Bahrain)	Onley 62-63
Ariyan (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 50
Bahruzian (Fujairah)	Van Der Meulen 254
Beder (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 47
Beljik (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 47
Dawani (Bahrain)—same as Diwani?	Fuccaro 2005: 47
Husayn Banna' (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 50
Isfandiyar (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 47
Khoory (Dubai)	Field 76
Murtaza (UAQ)	Van Der Meulen 266-67
Naboodah (Dubai)	Al-Alkim 44; Field 76
Natafji (Fujairah)	Van Der Meulen 254
Rostamani (Dubai)	Field 76
Ruyan (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 50
Sa'ati (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 50
Shahin (Fujairah)	Van Der Meulen 254
Sharif (Fujairah—related to Bahrain Sharif?)	Van Der Meulen 254
Sharif (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 48; Onley 73
Shekib (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 50
Shirazi (Bahrain)	Fuccaro 2005: 46

UAQ = Umm al-Quwain

RAK = Ras al-Khaimah

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