GLOBALIZATION, WORLD CULTURE AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF TASTE:
PATTERNS OF CULTURAL CHOICE IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I examine the link between culture consumption and globalization. The first two chapters outline the contemporary state of the theoretical field, showing it to be primarily dominated by a macrolevel perspective—the media imperialism thesis—which has recently come under increasing empirical challenge and a theoretical stance at the micro level—the cultural capital paradigm—that does not have the explanatory resources to account for transnational trends towards convergence in the cultural stratification systems of Western societies. Chapter 2 begins the task of theoretical reconstruction by proposing a synthetic “sociostructural” account as an alternative to the media imperialism thesis and an extension of the cultural capital paradigm that incorporates an institutionalist emphasis on how global cultural templates affect individual consumption patterns. In the empirical component of the dissertation I examine the implications of taking institutional theory and the sociostructural approach seriously for the study of culture consumption and taste in contemporary societies. In Chapter 3 I demonstrate, using recently compiled data on cross-national patterns of culture consumption and trade, that in comparison to the media imperialism paradigm, the sociostructural model is best able to account for most of the empirical patterns observed. In chapter 4 I apply the institutionalist framework developed in chapter 2 to examine the connection between patterns of cultural taste and certain forms of subjective geographic identification consonant with a growing “world culture”. In chapter 5 I evaluate several claims regarding determinants of “broadening tastes” in modern polities using data from 15 European Union countries, extending the agenda developed in chapters 2 and 4 to a cross-national context. Finally, in chapter 6 I expand the scope of the cross-
national analysis by examining the global and institutional correlates of aggregate musical consumption and demand for cultural goods in 72 countries. These empirical chapters serve to advance theory and research on the behavioral and ideational consequences of cultural globalization, using new cross-national data sources and innovative statistical methods. They highlight the connection between local forms of cultural practice, transnational networks of cultural exchange and patterns of connectivity into the networks and flows of the global system.
1. GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

1.1. Introduction

It is fair to say that the notion of globalization has replaced the problematic of modernity—and the subsidiary concern with the idea of “postmodernity”—as the central contemporary concern in the social sciences. However, just like its grand thematic predecessors, globalization has proven to be an idea that refuses to be conceptually delimited and neatly defined. Theoretical concern with the notion of globalization, ranging from its enshrinement as the central problem of the current period, to its dismissal as a largely exaggerated epiphenomenon has grown exponentially in recent years (Guillen 2001). However, more focused studies that combine analytical depth with empirical analyses are harder to find. This is in part related to the fact that globalization is hardly a one-dimensional process, but can instead be thought of as a “bundle” of interlinked dynamics, all having in common some increase in the level of connectivity and exchange along various dimensions across some set of predefined units (individuals, cities, states, regions, etc.) in the international system (Robertson 1990). These dimensions of the globalization process are in their turn defined by the “flows” that serve as the linkage across geographical zones, be they cultural (as in the flow of media images and cultural goods), demographic, economic, financial or ideological (Appadurai 1990).

In this dissertation I focus on cultural globalization, a substantively important facet of the globalization process. Cultural globalization can also be hard to define and delimit, since culture can refer to a heterogeneous domain of both ideal and material practices, artifacts,
objects and discourses. To avoid this problematic, I follow Crane (2002: 1) in thinking of cultural globalization as comprising “…the transmission or diffusion across national borders of various forms of media and the arts,” therefore using culture in a rather more delimited sense which encompasses shared patterns of meaning and significance embodied in form (Griswold 1987: 4). The key goal of this project is to connect patterns of cultural choice at both the individual and cross-national levels with other facets of the globalization process, both in its most generalized and seemingly ethereal forms (i.e. globalization as comprising the diffusion of cultural templates and cognitive frames) and its more material and obvious manifestations, such as transnational economic exchanges, the technological infrastructure of telecommunications and flows of people and material objects.

This more grounded concern with culture as primarily located in meaningful objects, while leaving out many things that would be considered “cultural” by other analysts, produces the added benefit of bring focus and specificity to the inquiry, and avoiding the mistake of hypostasizing such terms as “culture” and “globalization.” In his classic article on “Classification in Art” DiMaggio (1987: 440) noted how classical sociologists “viewed societal cultures as totalities.” Primarily due to the healthy influence of the “practical turn” (Bourdieu 1990), the same cannot be said about current research in the sociology of culture, which tends to conceive of culture as located and enacted within observable and specifiable (albeit sometimes only loosely bounded) networks of affiliation and identity. However, in its concern to keep the analytical lens focused on mesolevel fields of cultural practice (DiMaggio 1987, Peterson 1992, Lamont 1992, Bryson 1996), the sociology of cultural taste has had surprisingly little to add to the discussion on cultural globalization (but see Crane 2002), in contrast to our colleagues in media studies and the humanities. Thus, another
important objective of this project is to connect streams of research in the sociology of
culture and the sociology of taste with theory and research that takes a more global focus.
Most researchers on media and the arts in sociology have concerned themselves primarily
with analyses of individual patterns of cultural taste and culture consumption and
examinations of the organizational structuring of culture production and culture
dissemination fields. These studies have naturally enough, sustained a focus on the local and
national context in which consumption practices are enacted and organizational strategies
and sense-making practices are forged. These intellectual efforts have proven immensely
fruitful, highlighting the connection between patterns of taste and various sociodemographic
predictors such as education, class, gender and race (DiMaggio and Useem 1978, DiMaggio
and Ostrower 1990, Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000). Furthermore, this research has
contributed immensely to our understanding of how the dynamics of cultural stratification
are connected to wider processes of social change and macro-structural reorganization in
2002). However, most of these empirical and theoretical analyses have remained surprisingly
blind to the embeddedness of national societies (and by implication national class fractions
and identity groups) in the wider network of international flows and exchanges of interest to
the emerging field of globalization studies (Crane 2002). One of the primary goals of this
project is to open up an avenue of intellectual exchange between intra-societal and
comparative studies of culture consumption practices and the analysis of the transnational
macro-level processes usually associated with the notion of globalization.
To this end, this project brings together various strands of research theory both within
sociology, and from outside the field, drawing on global media and mass communication
studies, anthropology, and systemic approaches associated with sociological institutionalism (Meyer et al 1997, Thomas et al 1987). The empirical chapters that follow show that micro-level patterns of cultural practice and large-scale cross-national profiles of culture consumption are connected in predictable ways to larger forms of transnational exchange and connectivity. Theoretically, I expand research on the social bases of cultural taste to consider how this set of practices are embedded in a global cultural context, while “shrinking” macro-level theories of global cultural integration to consider the social uses of culture at a micro-level. This synthetic account is shown to be a superior analytical tool in comparison to theoretical perspectives that pay exclusive attention to either the large-scale distribution of global corporate power and asymmetric patterns of cultural flows or to highly contextualized processes of local interpretation and decoding of global cultural influences. In this chapter I begin by reviewing the most influential “master narratives” that are used to understand and theorize processes of cultural globalization. I distinguish between three primary set of accounts: 1) narratives that equate cultural globalization with homogenization and macro-level structuring of cultural fields dominated by transnational cultural industries, 2) narratives that highlight the potential of globalization to unlock processes of cultural hybridity, recombination and “creolization” resulting in an increase in the vitality of local cultures in the wake of the rise of a transnational global culture, and finally, 3) narratives that point to the increasing role of the state and culture producing organizations in helping to manage, canalize and buffer the cultural globalization process.

1.2. Culture and Globalization: contemporary debates
Current debates at the intersection of the sociology of culture and globalization studies pit theorists who highlight the declining significance of the nation as a shaper and arbiter of individual behavior and action against those who still emphasize the importance of region, place and space and who highlight the capacities of local actors to not only transform global cultural products for their own idiosyncratic uses, but to become important contributors to the transnational flows of ideas in their own right. For proponents of the latter perspective, this show of agency is made possible by what is perceived as the increasing mixing of the global and the local, resulting in the creation of innovative “hybrid” cultural forms, made possible through globalization.

The first group points to global trends toward cultural homogeneity, all supported by increasing economic integration, foreign financial penetration of national economies and the rise to dominance of a transnational culture production industry. These globalizing influences in culture and discourse are seen as helping to weaken local differences and leading to greater commonality of thought and behavior across national boundaries. This is what Ritzer (2003: 194) refers to as “the globalization of nothing.” The second group highlights the increasingly complex mixing of cultures under conditions of globalization, leading to “creolization”—the production of new cultural forms that incorporates both foreign and regional influences—and “glocalization,” or the mixing of global and local influences to produce new, hybrid cultural forms. From the former point of view, the link between globalization and the growth of a transnational media and mass communication industry is crucial. The most important trope is the shift from the “hard” imperialism based on military occupation or patterns of political coercion and subordination, to the “soft”
imperialism based on the transnational exportation of Western media images, cultural symbols, and ideologies. This is cultural globalization as “cultural imperialism.”

Crane (2002: 4-6) notes that the cultural imperialism perspective, originally developed as part of the Neo-Marxist critique of postindustrial capitalism and imperialism in the 1960s. Drawing on various forms of Dependencia and world systems theory (Frank 1964; Galtung 1979; Amin 1977; Wallerstein 1978, 1983) to add cultural and media-centered dominance to the traditionally considered economic and political forms of neocolonial relationship between the rich capitalist core and the dominated, periphery, the homogenization perspective on globalization survives today in what Crane refers to as the Media Imperialism perspective (Boyd-Barrett 1977; Burton and Franco 1978; Morley 1995; Golding 1998; Schiller 1976, 1989, 1992, 1998; Tunstall 1977).

Proponents of the Media imperialism point of view focus on the well known fact of a global media and popular culture industry—such as television (Li 1980; Nordenstreng 1974), film and to a lesser extent music (Laing 1986)—controlled by a handful of large, powerful multinational corporations from the U.S., Europe and more recently Japan. The key actors in this account are the large transnational media conglomerates that are seen as helping to reproduce asymmetric core-periphery relations through the production of mass produced cultural goods and technologies, controlling access to markets and disseminating products using the common manipulative “logotechniques” (Gotttdiener 1985) of advanced capitalism. The theory is in this respect similar to older “mass culture” theories inspired by the work of Adorno and Horkheimer (1979) of the Frankfurt school, but transposed to a global level of analysis, in the presupposition of a growing and globally homogeneous mass
culture which is consumed and accepted uncritically by helpless, disconnected, and powerless third world masses.

Crane (2002: 3) adds that the “…strong version of cultural imperialism theory refers to the imposition upon other countries of a particular’s nations’ beliefs, values, knowledge, behavioral norms, and style of life.” Thus, offering a model in which powerful nations dictate the cultural parameters of thought, behavior and comportment of members of weaker nations. In particular, in strong statements of this perspective, the primary motivation is seen to be political, as part of the attempt of powerful nations to reproduce and sustain their privileged hegemonic position in the system (Jameson 2000; Tunstall 1977; Schiller 1976, 1989, 1992; Herman and McChesney 1997). However, the main empirical claim of the position is the hypothesis of increased homogenization. As noted by Tunstall, [the cultural imperialism thesis maintains that] “authentic, traditional and local culture in many parts of the world is being battered out of existence by the indiscriminate dumping of large quantities of slick commercial and media products, mainly from the United States” (quoted in Cowen 2002: 3). Jameson (2000: 51) adds that “The standardization of world culture, with local popular or traditional forms driven out or dumbed down to make way for American television, American music, food, clothes and films, has been seen by many as the very heart of globalization.”

As can be easily appreciated, the cultural imperialism thesis carries over from its parentage in Frankfurt school cultural theory various assumptions that have recently come under empirical and theoretical scrutiny, including primarily a value-laden elitist rejection of popular culture (whether in domestic or global forms) as an inferior form of aesthetic production and consumption which can only lead to absent-minded acceptance of dominant
values and ideologies but which can never itself be used for purposes of resistance and contestation of the hegemonic discourse. However, as shown by a spate of contemporary research on the uses of popular culture in collective acts of resistance and mobilization, there is nothing inherent in popular culture that prevents it from being reconfigured and re-tooled to contest dominant meanings and ideologies (i.e. Hebdige 1977; Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Rocisgno and Danaher 2001).

The media imperialism approach also proffers a related view of popular culture audiences as primarily passive and as cultural products and exposure to media influences as having homogenous “effects” on those audiences regardless of the local context of reception and articulation of media messages. Contemporary research done from the “reception theory” approach however, has instead shown that the interpretation of media and popular culture message is highly variable across locales and is strictly dependent on the local discursive, cultural and relational “context of appropriation” (see Ang 1985; Radway 1984; Fiske 1987; Lull 1990; Morley 1980, 1986, for early statements of this position focused on the consumption of domestic media culture; for an application of reception theory to the globalization/glocalization debate see Garofalo 1995 and the papers collected in Golding and Harris 1997). Finally, as noted by Tomlinson (1991: 175, 1999) the cultural imperialism thesis not only tends to overstate the power asymmetry between powerful and weak countries, but also is inclined to exaggerate the extent of coordination and consensus between political, economic and culture-production agents in the developed world (Golding and Harris 1997). Insofar as the idea of imperialism carries with it the connotation of a purposeful and centrally coordinated project of domination exerted from center to periphery, the notion of imperialism can be contrasted to the more pluralist notion of
“globalization” (Giddens 1991a, 1991b, 2002) which is meant to connote a far more complex and less regulated extension of influence from global metropolises to peripheral satellites and to acknowledge the reciprocal influences going from the weaker to the more powerful societies.

1.2.1. The Media Imperialism Approach

Nevertheless as noted by Crane (2002: 4-5) the cultural imperialism thesis, when conceptualized under the more delimited parameters of media imperialism can be made relatively more consonant with empirical reality (Boyd-Barrett 1977). It is undeniable that a major aspect of cultural globalization is that which occurs under the aegis of the large multinational media giants which produce films, television programs and popular music products with an eye toward worldwide distribution and consumption. Furthermore, it is equally clear that the global media market in addition to having an oligopolistic structure is almost entirely dominated by a handful of Western countries, of which the U.S. is by far (primarily on the strength of Hollywood and American television products) the primary player (Schiller 1992; Morley 1995: 14, table 1). It is in this sense that for the most part, global popular culture continues to be a primarily Euro-American (and thus Western) phenomenon (although the Euro-American advantage is increasingly dwindling as we will see below).

Enormous gaps remain between the richer Western societies and the poorer global peripheries in terms of access to culture production and culture dissemination technologies (Golding 1998; Reeves 1993). Thus, the great majority of the world’s population is disconnected from global media flows in a very real sense, with the relative mass of media reception infrastructure (television, telephones radios) in the developed world vastly
dwarfing that which exists in the developing world (Golding 1998). In this sense, media imperialism is much less a global project of political domination, as it is part and parcel of the spread of global media capitalism (Kellner 2003), intent on expanding the profit bottom-line and global market share of the dominant transnational media industries. These vertically integrated (but internally differentiated due to their commonly shared “multidivisional” form) corporations tend to produce popular culture products that can then be broadcast through multiple media and receptions sources (film, television, cable, CD-ROM, VHS, etc.). A perennial focus of the media imperialist approach for instance, concerns the observation that the U.S. dominates the global film and television industries (Crane 2002). However, while Hollywood continues to dominate the global film market to this day it does so on the strength of action-oriented blockbuster films which carry relatively little intrinsically “American” cultural and historical material (beyond generalized allusions to individualism and the pragmatism of direct action) and which thus are able to appeal to a global public in search of a unique entertainment experience. This fact appears to be consonant with an economic rather than political basis of the media imperialism project. Thus, it is no surprise that the Austrian actor Arnold Schwarzenegger, whose 1980s and 1990s action movies epitomized the high point of this type of action genre, has been the most successful global export in Hollywood history (During 2005).

Furthermore, the global dominance of the Hollywood film industry can no longer unproblematically be projected into the indefinite future as a perennial state of affairs. Encouraged by the success of Hollywood and other market-oriented film production sites in East Asia such as Hong Kong and New Delhi, some countries, influenced by neoliberal thinking that privileges markets over state protection have dismantled “European style” state
subsidized cinematic productions systems and tried to move to a more profit-oriented style of film production (for a critical look at this development in the case of Argentina see Falicov 2000, for South Korea see Jin 2006). For reasons similar to those responsible for its dominance of the film industry (i.e. the ability to try out successful ventures in their large domestic markets and later on exporting those select shows to foreign shores [Cowen 2002]) the U.S. dominates global television markets. U.S. companies take advantage of the relative financial difficulty that poorer countries have in producing local programming (producing an enduring export advantage of American popular T.V. shows in comparison to the costs that would be entailed by an “import substitution” strategy of producing T.V. shows of comparable quality locally) to “dump” old American television series and movies into the local market; in some countries, therefore, U.S. shows account for about 50% of local television programming. However, U.S. dominance in global television programming has come under increasing challenge in recent years as regional television exporters, taking advantage of their greater ability to connect with geographically and culturally proximate populations due to their greater command of and easier access to the relevant semiotic codes, which allows them to produce cultural fare that connects with and is meaningful to regional audiences, have come to occupy an ever widening share of some domestic markets (Straubhaar 1991, 1997, Crane 2002). Mexico’s Televisa and Brazil’s Rede Globo for instance have emerged as two of the largest single exporters of television programming in the world (Hallin 1998, Falicov 2000: 329), having at its disposal the entire Latin American television market, by way of the popular telenovela (prime-time soap opera) vehicle.
Furthermore, large domestic markets for film, music and television have emerged in East Asia, with India, Hong Kong and Korea entering the fold as growing centers of film production, with India following the “American” strategy of using its large domestic markets to leverage its commercial film industry against the relative uncertainty of global markets (with diasporic immigrant “consumption communities” serving as an international extension of that domestic market). Moreover, Japan, was able to reverse trends leading to domestic dominance of American cultural products in their home market during the immediate post-war period. Today Japan is one of the countries in the world with the least amount of American programming on domestic television (standing at about 5% [Crane 2002:10) and the least amount of consumption of international popular music (UNESCO 2000a).

It is becoming increasingly clear, therefore that in the contemporary international cultural scene there is no sense in speaking of a global market for many cultural products (in particular music and television) but of regional markets, in which local cultures are consumed in tandem with international popular culture goods. World television and music markets, while in many ways still dependent on American products have now moved toward a more segmented structure organized along dominant linguistic and cultural regions with major centers in Latin America, Brazil, Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. The decreasing costs of producing films, television and in particular music, as many U.S. competitors in the developed and developing world “catch up” to the U.S. in terms of culture production technologies have been a great component of decreasing U.S. hegemony in global cultural markets.

Evidence of decreasing asymmetry in global flows can be found in the increasing number of global popular flows that come from non-Western countries into the West and from the
Global South to the Global North. For instance, Japanese cultural exports to the U.S., in the forms of game shows and animated programs, have in many ways reversed the one way flow of cultural influence initially isolated by cultural imperialism scholars. Thus, cultural imperialism theories, initially developed during the 1970s and 1980s when U.S. political power and cultural influence seemed to be at their peak, appear to have become less relevant in a post-cold war world. This is a period characterized by the waning of American cultural hegemony, the economic resurgence of East Asia and other “semiperipheral” global locations and their related emergence as relatively major players in the global popular culture market, and the turn toward hybrid and more flexible forms of cultural production and aesthetic conceptions, where American popular culture becomes as open to influences and trends from outside the West (i.e. Hong Kong and Japanese influences on cinema, Reggae and other Latin American beats in Hip Hop and Rock and Roll), as these other regions incorporate American and Western influences (Cowen 2002). This has led some to speak of a “reverse cultural imperialism” (Rogers and Antola 1985) whereby Global Southern media products come to be increasingly exported toward Northern metropolises. However, while there has been a recent reinvigoration of local media industries in some developing regions, it is important not to overstate the extent of the influence produced by this “contra-flow” of media products across core-periphery boundaries (Byltereist and Meers 2000). It is best to speak of decreasing asymmetry or to a shift from a post-war system of extreme asymmetry to a post-cold war regime of increased interdependence within a weakening asymmetric system (Straubhaar 1991, 1997).

However, it is not unfair to say that on the whole, especially in its sole conceptualization of globalization as “Americanization,” the media imperialism approach sharply underestimates
the extent to which powerful transnational markets for cultural goods have emerged at the regional level (which seriously challenge U.S. cultural influence and market-share in many developing world regions), with the emergence of large culture exporting centers in the developing world. For instance, in 2003 India produced the more films per year than any other country in the world (877). Most importantly, in recent years these films have acquired an *international* audience (composed of both Indian immigrants in other countries and exports to nearby countries). In the period of 1993-2003 for instance, Indian film export revenues increased by a factor of ten (*UNESCO 2005*: 44). In this sense, smaller, less powerful nations are not only subject to the foreign inflow of American products, but are also beginning to worry about cultural influxes from more powerful regional powers. As Appadurai (1990: 294) notes “…it is worth noticing that for the people of Iria Jaya, Indionesianazation may be more worrisome than Americanization, as Japanization may be for Koreans, Indianization for Sri Lankans, Vietnamization for the Cambodians…Such a list of alternatives to globalization could be greatly expanded, but it is not a shapeless inventory.”

### 1.2.2. Globalization as “Glocalization”

In contrast to the cultural imperialism viewpoint, another set of analysts do not equate cultural globalization with the drab sterility and homogeneity allegedly produced by what is perceived (from the media imperialism viewpoint) as an increasingly centralized, U.S.-led global popular culture industry. Instead, they point to globalization as necessarily implying and fostering the never ending process of incorporation of global influences into the rhythms and traditions of regional and local cultures; this process results in *hybridity* and
localization (Appiah 1998; Appadurai 1996; Cowen 2002; Crane 2002; Featherstone 1995; Friedman 1997; Lechner and Boli 2005; Ritzer 2003; Robertson 1992, 1995, 2001; Tomlinson 1999) instead of gray sameness. According to this camp, the homogeneity-producing influence of globalization is checked by the agency of local cultural entrepreneurs to adapt foreign cultural contents to their local situation. This is the “globalization of something” (Ritzer 2003).

Musical cultures and musical consumption provide perhaps the best example of the glocalization and hybridity process as inherent part of the globalization of cultural goods. Global musical production is in this sense very different from film and to some extent television, industries with large “fixed costs” (Cowen 2002) that lend themselves to economies of scale at the production and distribution levels and thus tend toward more strict oligopolistic arrangements and more asymmetric center-periphery flow structures. In contrast, falling musical production costs with the advent and dissemination of new digital recording and distribution technologies have allowed less affluent and smaller local producers the leeway to experiment with new styles and to develop new musical forms, some of which have staked claim to some share of the global popular music market. This has resulted in a decreasing share of the global music market that is dominated by Euro-American products (Crane 2002: 8, Garofalo 1995). As Garofalo (1995: 29) explains, “[t]o the extent that the United States is identified as the main imperialist culprit in the export of pop and rock, it must be noted that the U.S. is no longer the main beneficiary of the profits. The economic foundation of the cultural imperialism thesis has shifted so radically as to require wholly new formulation.”
Thus, world popular music in the context of globalization, is more likely to exhibit higher rates of local diversity than in a purely segmented and globally disconnected system. Musical fusion movements, incorporating Western and local popular culture influences appear to be the norm rather than the exception. Thus, the globalization of Western musical popular culture (of which rock and roll is of course the primary example) has brought, instead of a homogenous global soundscape, a more diverse and vibrant “world” popular music than ever before (Cowen 2002). This is consistent with Appadurai’s (1996: 21) observation that “consumption of the mass media worldwide provokes resistance, irony, selectivity, and, in general, agency.” As Ferreira and Mendoza (2002: 106) note:

Rock and its numerous “substyles” are important aesthetic elements in many local and national contexts…Between accusations of being a form of cultural imperialism and exaltation as a libertarian force, rock has become a global “mediascape,” transmitting diverse meanings. In particular countries, it can appear either as an imitation of imported styles or as a stimulus to the creation of hybrid styles, in which musicians blend elements from local musical traditions and add native language lyrics. Thus, rock has an artistic and aesthetic logic that has become autonomous. In part, rock’s “autonomy” and “universality” are linked to an international popular culture that is disseminated by the music industry…including sets of practices, a repertory of sensibilities, body expressions, and institutionalized emotions. These features have become a type of cultural capital and a dominant habitus in the field of popular music (p. 106).

This is consistent with most quantitative observations of the global music industry. Instead of the drab homogeneity of American inspired Rock and Roll suffocating domestic musical production worldwide, the opposite appears to be the case. While it is true that, in tandem
with the media imperialism thesis, the global music industry exhibits high degrees of market concentration with “…More than 80 per cent of the world market…controlled by the five largest transnational conglomerates: EMI, BMG, the Warner Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment and Universal/PolyGram” (Thorsby 2000: 3), the last decade of the twentieth century saw an increase and not a decrease in the share of the market devoted to domestic (local) musical consumption and a concomitant decrease on the consumption of international musical products. Throsby (2000:4) notes that “[t]hroughout the 1990s, local artists have increased their share of music sales, while the average proportion of sales accounted for by the international repertoire has declined; locally produced music has increased from a worldwide share of 58 per cent in 1991 to 68 per cent in 2000. This trend indicates an improved capacity of local music industries in a number of countries to serve their own domestic consumers.”

This observation of an increase in the production of “specialty” or “niche” goods even while the overall industry exhibits a high degree of market concentration while inexplicable from traditional “political-economy” approaches to the analysis of the mass media (of which the media imperialism approach is the global equivalent), or from the static (and short term) correlation between periods of media concentration and decline in the diversity of offerings (Peterson and Berger 1977), is in fact the staple observation of one empirically successful approach to the study of cultural (i.e. Newspapers [Boone, Witteloostuïjn and Carroll 2002] and Film [Mezias and Mezias 2002]) and other (such as Beer [Carroll and Swaminathan 2002]) industries: the resource partitioning approach developed by Glenn Carroll and his associates (Carroll 1985; Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Peli and Nooteboom 1999).
A global version of this theoretical perspective, would in fact predict that market concentration is in fact the driver and not the suppressor of the recent renaissance of regional and local folk musical cultures (Cowen 2002). According to the resource partitioning approach, while production efficiency in most industries (including cultural industries) is subject to economies of scale and increasing returns to increasing organizational size (resulting in medium-term secular trends toward industry concentration in most markets), the “market coverage” advantage of these “generalists” market leaders hinges on crafting a product that will please the “average” consumer (the media imperialist observation of increasing homogeneity brought about by increasing concentration of the global culture industry). This means that as the market becomes concentrated and the diversity of cultural offerings decreases (Peterson and Berger 1977), space opens “at the edges of niche” to satisfy consumers whose tastes gravitate away from these standardized cultural products (or who would consume both the mass produced culture and the less standardized, “craft-produced” cultural goods as in the case of “omnivores” [Peterson 1992]). This opens up potential market opportunities that can be exploited by entrepreneurial culture producers in the global music business (Peterson and Annand 2004: 323), leading to a [partial] deconcentration period.

From this perspective the trend toward concentration and homogeneity observed at the global level in music production (and other cultural industries) was never an inexorable and unstoppable process, as has been confirmed by recent counter-trends toward increasing product diversity in the global cultural field. Mezias and Mezias (2002) in their study of the early American film industry (1912-1929), find support for this hypothesis. As the field came to be dominated by large-scale producers, foundings of smaller film production
companies increased, and these companies proved to be much more innovative than the larger organizations. In the global culture production field, the case of the Jamaican music industry (Throsby 2002), which in 2002 accounted for 3.5% of global music sales is probably the clearest example of this partitioning process, being able to command a non-negligible minority share of the global music market, even under conditions of high industry concentration (Throsby 2002).

This serves to drive home the point that the old opposition, highlighted by the transposition of critical “mass culture” theories to the analysis of the globalization of culture, between “pristine” local diversity untouched by globalization and the global homogeneity produced by globalizing cultural industry trends is not warranted (Crane 2002; Cowen 2002; During 2005; Grixty 2006; Regev 1997). The same processes of local adaptation, reinterpretation and “recoding” of global cultural flows can be observed in other media as well, including literature, film and television (Ang, 1985; Lull 1990; Liebes and Katz, 1990; Morley, 1980, 1986, 1992). As Cowen (2002: 69), speaking from the point of view of a “gains from trade” market-oriented model of the globalization process, notes (in what has now become a commonplace remark by both critics and proponents of the globalization of culture) “Counterintuitively modern diversity relies on homogenizing trends to some degree.” During (2005: 440) a cultural studies analyst in many ways of opposed to traditional liberal economic models of the global market, comes to the same conclusion as Cowen, adding that “…Cultural globalization takes many forms and has many different effects...Globalized cultural technologies and networks of production and distribution have, paradoxically enough, generated more and more locally produced and consumed works.” Robertson
(2001: 462) notices the commonality between these two otherwise diametrically opposed viewpoints, pointing out that

…the ongoing penetration of the universal and the particular is the most general characteristic of global change…in this respect we have much to learn, ironically, from the discipline of business studies…Specifically, global marketing requires, in principle, that each product or service [display] calculated sensitivity to local circumstances, identities and practices…This approach to the practical implications of globalization teaches us that globalization is not an all encompassing process of homogenization but a complex mixture of homogenization and heterogenization.

There are several mechanisms (in addition to the global industry-level partitioning processes discussed above) that might explain the symbiotic (or “dialectical”) relationship between increased cultural globalization and the resurgence of local and regional cultural production and consumption. In particular we can note 1) the “audience reception” processes emphasized in ethnographic global consumption studies, which involve the culturally mediated and contextually contingent appropriation, of global cultural content into the local lifeworlds of consumers, and 2) in addition to the related hybridization, retooling and blending processes between local cultural practices, regional aesthetic traditions and global Euro-American cultural forms (thus serving to revive both local and international interest in innovative “hybrid” versions of older domestic cultural products), there are also institutional, organizational and state-centered mechanisms that may help to rekindle and revive local cultures in the wake of globalization processes.

1.2.3. World Culture, Globalization and The State
The state tends to be seen as a passive bystander in many globalization accounts (Guillen 2001), either gradually losing power and influence in the face of increased transnationalization or actively aiding global forces in helping destroy local practices and cultures. However, as noted by Crane (2002: 2, 12-15) from the perspective of her “national and urban strategies toward cultural globalization” account, when it comes to cultural globalization, the state is hardly a powerless agent or a passive bystander. Instead, states are active agents that engage in concerted and sometimes efficacious action with the goal of helping to protect local cultures and traditions. In particular state actors use their powers to enact and implement cultural policy to this end, helping to create local environments conducive to that protection while providing incentive and opportunities for local culture producers to continue or extend their work, even under conditions of global competition. Crane (2002: 13) for instance, notes that several strategies “are available for national government, urban governments, and cultural organization for preserving, protecting, and enhancing their cultural resources” even in the wake of increasing transnational flows of artistic and popular culture products.

Crane identifies three major goals that states have set for themselves in the context of the increased transnationalization of culture: 1) the protection of valued local cultural resources, 2) concern with the careful projection of favorable images of the notion to the international community, and 3) the active management of the international conditions favorable to the development of potential markets for exports of the country’s cultural goods. Thus globalization appears to spur states to (not only) protect what are increasingly perceived as “endangered” local cultural resources, (thus transposing “conservationist” world cultural principles, themselves a product of the globalization of particular ideas regarding nature and
the environment (Frank et al 2000; Frank 1997), to the realm of cultural production.) This allows local culture-disseminating organizations (whether domestic or internationally oriented non-profits) and domestic culture producers greater opportunity to enact, define and consecrate (within limits that vary across contexts) what is seen as the “cultural patrimony” and the indigenous “cultural heritage” of the society.

This set of interlinked dynamics produced by the globalization process results in the intensification of several conditions that might help the production of local culture: 1) The opening up of a political and cultural opportunity structure (McAdam 1996) for various local cultural producers to compete for the symbolic capital conferred by state recognition and state resources, 2) increased opportunities for domestic non-profits in the culture production and dissemination field to connect to new capital flows coming from the state and other funding sources, spurring the revitalization and increased structuration of culture production fields centered on the crafting of local cultural goods, 3) helping to increase the density and level of interconnection between non-profit organizations associated with the culture production, dissemination and conservation.

In the European context this renewed stance toward the production and reinvigoration of domestic culture as a desirable and important part of national identity, has led to a revival of state and public interest in art and museums, increasing artistic exchange and the creation of museums within the European Union (Crane 2002). Thus, in many ways, it can be argued that, through the activation of the organizational and institutional mechanisms outlined above, the vitality of the most important actors relevant to the production and dissemination of local cultural forms in the contemporary state system (domestic non-profit organizations
dedicated to dissemination, preservation and support of local aesthetic producers) is *enhanced*
and not debilitated by cultural globalization.

Furthermore, states are able to protect local culture against the possibility of being “overrun”
by global cultural imports by enacting quotas and imposing tariffs on global cultural imports,
and subsidizing local culture production industries when possible (Crane 2002). This is an
extension of state-centric “import substitution” economic policies popular during the 1970s
and 1980s (before the rise to dominance of Chicago-school neoliberal economics at the
global level) to the realm of cultural policy. The case to exempt cultural goods from being
subject to market-oriented treatments recommended by neoliberal proponents is easier to
make for most states in the realm of culture (France and Canada are prominent examples)
than it is for more “profane” objects and commodities that circulate in global markets.

Insofar as the domestic and indigenous cultural patrimony is framed and conceived as an
inalienable part of the identity of the state and its people (and therefore falls toward the
“sacred” of the classic Durkheimian binary), state actors can make legitimate arguments for
its rightful exclusion from the ravages and zero-sum game of market competition in the
global arena.

This conception of culture as not a commodity like any other has allowed some states—
especially the richer states of the global North and the most successful developing
economies—to “resist global culture” (Crane 2002: 14-15) and U.S. dominance of the global
popular culture industry through tariffs and subsidies of domestic culture producing enclaves
and organizations dedicated to cultural preservation and dissemination (Toepler and Zimmer
1999, 2002). This has produced the counterintuitive situation (from the globalization-
breeds-homogeneity viewpoint) of a renaissance of domestic culture production precisely as
a consequence of increased cultural globalization and domestic penetration by international cultural products. It is in this sense that “Paradoxically, globalization encourages local peoples to rediscover the ‘local’ that they have neglected or forgotten in their drive towards Western-imposed modernization during the past decades” (Shim 2006).

Surprisingly from the perspective of cultural imperialism accounts that see states and local governments as powerless in comparison to the forces of globalization, in many ways some facets of cultural globalization help rather than hinder certain state actors to “sacralize” local culture in this manner, by reframing cultural preservation and indigenous cultural forms as the patrimony of “humanity” and not simply as part of chauvinistic domestic culture framed around the older “nation-centric” logic (Anderson 1991). State agents are then able to draw on a now largely institutionalized stock of world cultural principles and frames to defend their right to protect domestic culture from potential erasure by international cultural currents. This is the reason why the rise of cultural protectionism in Western Europe and other Western offshoots directed against U.S. cultural imports (i.e. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) cannot be take as adequate prima facie evidence of the “epiphenomenal” status of globalization (“feeble” globalization as Guillen [2001] puts it). This would be the case if each state’s cultural protection policies were justified in idiosyncratic and translocally incompatible manners (i.e. appeals to communally and nationally specific interests and problems).

However, and more consistent with the world polity approach to cultural globalization (Meyer et al 1997), each state appears to justify cultural protectionism in fairly stereotyped manners, by pointing to the value of cultural diversity for diversity’s sake and by importing and transposing world cultural discourses in which the protection of national and local
cultures is seen as contributing to the patrimony of humanity as whole. Thus, insofar as the maintenance of cultural “diversity” across the world has become an important part of the goals and motives of many international organizations (including many U.N. affiliated ones such as UNESCO), the propriety of national cultural preservation projects has been enhanced and legitimated as it has risen to the status of a global concern on a par with environmental preservation and the fight against global inequality (see for instance the UNESCO World Culture Report [UNESCO 1998, 2000a]).

This is a case, as we will see below, where the globalization of scripts and schemas associated with the world society acts, not to destroy local cultural diversity, but to enhance it, even as it produces homogeneity not at the level of content (since each country attempts to exalt its own local indigenous culture as unique) but at the level of form, in what Wilk (1995: 142) has referred to as “[global] structures of common difference.” This is an example of how one of the primary binaries of the globalization literature, the of homogeneity versus difference is shown to carry very little analytical or empirical weight. The reason for this is that while it is undeniable that diversity continues to exist (and at the arts and culture production level might even be thriving) under conditions of globalization, this in no way contradicts the claim that this diversity is increasingly legitimated and in fact actively pursued and sustained on grounds that are increasingly isomorphic across locales (Frank and Meyer 2002). As Guillen (2001: 246) notes,

Taken together, the empirical evidence provided by sociologists and political scientists supports well the case for diversity, or at least resilience, in cross-national patterns in the midst of globalization. It must be admitted, however, that world society researchers also have a point, and one that is well supported by empirical evidence. The
reason behind these seemingly irreconcilable empirical results might be that world-society research has made measurements at levels of analysis and abstraction higher than the finer-grained analysis of comparative sociologists and political scientists.

Thus, globalization is not a blind and unconscious process or a inexorable trend (Guillen 2001), which works from “behind the back” of the relevant individual and organizational actors, but is a process that is defined by the myriad of actions and increasingly shared “vocabularies of motive” (Mills 1940) of all of these players as they create networks of alliance and conflict in their attempt to “get action” (Leifer 1988), in a mutually interdependent transnational context. Furthermore, it is important to note, as already emphasized above, that responses and challenges to globalization can themselves be made within the institutional and cognitive context provided by world culture itself, and are therefore not a sign of a lack or of the epiphenomenal nature of globalization but one of its most important manifestations. As Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez note:

World culture influences nation-states not only at their centers, or only in symbolic ways, but also through direct connections between local actors and world culture. Such connections produce many axes of mobilization for the implementation of world-cultural principles and help account for similarities in mobilization agendas and strategies in highly disparate countries....Explicit rejection of world-cultural principles sometimes occurs, particularly by nationalist or religious movements whose purported opposition to modernity is seen as a threat to geopolitical stability. While the threat is real enough, the analysis is mistaken because it greatly underestimates the extent to which such movements conform to rationalized models of societal order and purpose. These movements mobilize around principles inscribed in world-cultural scripts, derive their organizing capacity from the legitimacy of these scripts, and edit their supposedly primordial claims to maximize this
legitimacy. By and large, they seek an idealized modern community undergoing broad-based social development where citizens (of the right sort) can fully exercise their abstract rights. While they violate some central elements of world-cultural ideology, they nonetheless rely heavily on other elements. For example, religious “fundamentalists” may reject the extreme naturalism of modernity by making individuals accountable to an unchallengeable god, but they nevertheless exhort their people to embrace such key world-cultural elements as nation building, mass schooling, rationalized health care, and professionalization....They also are apt to reformulate their religious doctrine in accordance with typical modern conceptions of rational-moral discipline....In general, nationalist and religious movements intensify isomorphism more than they resist it. (Meyer et al 1997: 161).

Thus what many see as “anti-globalization” strategies on the part of states and other actors (such as cultural policies designed to protect the domestic cultural patrimony) can best be conceived as some of the best examples of the influence of globalization. Otherwise, the commonality of behavior, language and discourse across states would be inexplicable. Why should French, or Canadian or Kenyan culture be considered a quasi-sacred treasure and part of the human patrimony? Why should each state point to the value of its local culture and defend that value on similar grounds? In the absence of constraint from a larger institutional environment that transcends the nation-state, things could certainly be expected to be otherwise (cultural preservation for instance could instead be considered valuable only insofar as it pertains to the interest of bounded communities, not entire nations or “humanity” as a whole or states could consider their national culture as worthy of protection due to its intrinsic superiority vis a vis other cultures and not due to the fact that its preservation contributes to “global cultural diversity” and the “human patrimony”).
inability to conceive of globalization as commonality of structure and not content, prevents us from seeing that most state actors are drawing (and “transposing” [Sewell 1992]) discourses and schemas drawn from a common cultural frame that is already (at least in part) shared by most of the relevant actors. This can be taken as indirect evidence of institutional constraint and as such of the existence and operation of a cultural frame that transcends particular nation-states. For example, the preface of the UNESCO (1998) *World Culture Report* states that,

Culture shapes the way we see the world. It therefore has the capacity to bring about the change of attitudes needed to ensure peace and sustainable development which, we know, form the only possible way forward for life on planet Earth. Today, that goal is still a long way off. A global crisis faces humanity at the dawn of the 21st century, marked by increasing poverty in our asymmetrical world, environmental degradation and short-sightedness in policy-making. Culture is a crucial key to solving this crisis. That is why UNESCO decided to develop a new tool, the World Culture Report, to provide world-wide analysis on which new policies can be based.

When we speak about culture, we are looking at ways of living as individuals and ways of living together. A «living culture» is one which - almost by definition - interacts with others, in that it involves people creating, blending, borrowing and reinventing meanings with which they can identify. UNESCO is committed to preserving and protecting what its Constitution calls «the fruitful diversity of cultures».

What are the prospects for the world's diverse cultures in an increasingly interconnected world undergoing extraordinarily rapid change? Uniformity is often seen as the inevitable result of the processes of globalization that are so strongly marking the end of this century. But we are also witnessing a trend towards
fragmentation which drives people apart. What is certain is that we cannot afford to lose any of the world's multitude of cultures and that their survival depends on their peaceful and creative coexistence.

Complex systems draw their strength from diversity: genetic diversity in a species, biological diversity within an ecosystem, cultural diversity in human communities. Each culture constitutes a unique mode of interpreting or relating to a world so complex that the only hope of knowing it or dealing with it is to approach it from as many perspectives as possible. Our task is to ensure that people enjoy freedom for their own culture and have knowledge and understanding of other cultures. In both cases, this can only be accomplished through an active and positive respect for the differences between all cultures whose values are tolerant of others. It is a task we all share, from the individual level, to the governmental and international level. On the success of this undertaking depends the shape our common future will take.

The above quote is a clear synopsis of various “world cultural” themes directly related to culture consumption. In particular we find 1) the valuation of cultural diversity for its own sake 2) the rejection of the “traditional” stance toward aesthetics as the “best that the [Western] world has produced,” (Jaegger and Selznick 1964) to a more anthropological stance in which the “aesthetic disposition” (Bourdieu 1984) can be applied to any ideology, cultural practice or way of life, and to any type of cultural product whether hand crafted or mass produced. 3) the extension of “conservationist” discourses initially developed in the global environmental movement (Frank et al 2000) to the preservation of “cultural diversity” thus extending protections to various “endangered” cultural traditions and aesthetic products that would otherwise go unrecognized and implicitly leveling the genre distinctions between “consecrated” Western cultural goods and folk traditions from less economically
advantaged societies. 4) the enshrinement of the values of *tolerance for diversity, freedom of cultural expression* and the *uniqueness* of each of the world’s various cultural traditions as the primary “world cultural frames” with which to conceive and understand the global cultural field.

In this dissertation I will explore the relationship between (1) the sociological institutionalist approach to globalization and various other perspectives to the study of globalization, culture and taste, in particular (2) the “media imperialism” approach in global media studies and (3) the “cultural capital” approach in sociology. I show, through a series of theoretical arguments and empirical demonstrations that an approach that combines a sociological emphasis on the uses of culture to form and cement social relations and which also conceives of culture consumption as a *meaningful act* (shaped by the available worldviews and cognitive frames that the individual has at his her disposal) can go a long way toward explaining observed variation in culture consumption patterns both at the individual and the national levels of analysis.

1.3. Empirical and Theoretical Directions

In this introductory chapter, I have attempted to review the most widespread theoretical stances on the relationship between globalization and culture. As we have seen, the only viable macrostructural position available appears to be the “media imperialism” thesis, which, as I have shown, has come under increasing theoretical and empirical challenges from more processual and micro-level perspectives which stress a more fluid and less deterministic conceptualization of the globalization process and from recent shifts in the international distribution of power and influence in the global mass communication industry.
(moving from a highly asymmetric to a weakly asymmetric system). However, the perspectives that have been critical of the media imperialism account have failed to offer an alternative structural account of comparable theoretical generality and analytical scope. In the following chapter, I will attempt to reconstruct such a theoretical framework, by subjecting to more carefully scrutiny the various analytical assumptions and empirical implications of the media imperialism approach. I will show them to be closely tied to the old “mass culture theory” approach to the study of mass communications, the arts and media culture, long out of favor in empirical studies of the sociology of taste (Peterson and DiMaggio 1977, DiMaggio [1977]2002, 1987).

We will see that as a global mass culture theory, the media imperialism approach shares with its predecessor many theoretical weaknesses and empirical shortcomings. I will propose instead a “sociostructural” approach to the explanation of cross-national differences in culture consumption based on the work of DiMaggio (1987). Furthermore, in the following chapter I will attempt to open a line of theoretical connection between the dominant approach to the study of taste in the sociology of taste (at the micro level and “meso” level) which I label the “cultural capital paradigm” and a macro-level theory for the study of the institutional constitution and cultural construction of macro-level actors, the world polity institutionalism approach. I will argue that the inability of the cultural capital approach to explain certain converging patterns of cultural choice in the world’s most economically advantaged societies stems from its “intra-societal” bias, and that a reconfiguration of certain cultural capital theory tenets (in particular certain assumptions as to the uses of culture and the motivation to consume culture) would be of help in that endeavor.
In the subsequent four empirical chapters, I go on to demonstrate the empirical payoff of these alternative theoretical stances to the study of cultural globalization, culture consumption and cultural taste.

In chapter 3, I explore the empirical implications of the sociostructural model for the explanation of cross-national variation in both domestic and international culture consumption, and show it to be, using various cross-national data sources on culture production and consumption, more consistent with the data at hand than is the media imperialism thesis. I go on to show in chapter 4 that one of the key tenets of the world polity institutionalist approach (that of an emerging “imagined community” [Anderson 1991] referred to as world society) can help us explain the turn toward omnivorousness, in a manner that is unaccounted for under the theoretical assumptions of the cultural capital paradigm. I show that individuals who identify as “citizens of the world” are more likely to consume more kinds of culture and are less likely to express dislike toward most cultural activities than individuals who identify with more local communal entities, thus the omnivore/univore culture consumption divide is shown to be related to an emerging local/cosmopolitan gap at the level of subjective identification, and ultimately transnational social and cultural connections.

In chapter 4, I extend the geographical scope of the analysis by analyzing micro-level data on musical taste for 15 EU countries. I attempt to assess the various candidate hypotheses that have been offered to explain the turn towards “omnivore consumption” on the part of the upper middle class elites of the world’s most economically advantaged societies. I address to primary research questions: 1) Is there a taste-based division among the countries of the European Union? 2) Is this differentiation in culture consumption patterns at the societal
level homologous to local/cosmopolitan divides that separate more socioeconomically advantaged and globally connected societies from less economically advantaged and relatively disconnected polities? The results show that the answer to those questions is yes: the most globally connected Western European societies are also the ones that display the broadest patterns (and are therefore more oriented to international and global culture) of musical taste. Furthermore, the main predictors of taste openness are all associated with global connectivity and transition toward more cosmopolitan subjective value commitments, consistent with a institutionalist approach that connects increasing “omnivorization” with the spread and institutionalization of world cultural cognitive frames which exalt the value of culture consumption as a way to enact increasingly hegemonic identities and values associated with tolerance and the generalization of the aesthetic dispositions to all of the world’s cultures.

Chapter 5 extends the research model used in chapter 4 to the explanation of aggregate patterns of musical consumption for 72 countries, representing all of the world’s major regions. I find that the same global predictors of omnivore taste are also correlated with the consumption of international musical cultures in relation to the consumption of domestic culture. Global network connectivity along technological, informational, demographic and cultural lines increase the consumption of global musical culture and reduce the consumption of domestic musical culture. This is consistent with both the sociostructural model’s emphasis on the social uses of culture and the institutionalist perspective emphasis on global connectivity to the values, discourses and frames provided by world culture, as an integral enabler and component of culture consumption experiences under conditions of cultural globalization. Finally Chapter 6 serves as a conclusion, providing a summary of the
major theoretical arguments in the dissertation and reiterating their relevance for the
explanation of the main empirical findings.
2. BEYOND MEDIA IMPERIALISM AND CULTURAL CAPITAL THEORY: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACHES

2.1. Globalization and Culture: A Sociological Approach

As we saw in the last chapter, the literature on globalization and culture appears to be divided between a systemic perspective, the cultural/media imperialism thesis, and a more processual, and contextualized set of approaches that rely on ethnographic observations of situated consumption practices. The media imperialism approach pays close attention to macrostructural inequalities in cultural exchange, patterns of ownership of cultural industries and infrastructural and technological divides across the dominant and less dominant regions of the world, while decrying the end of cultural diversity and its replacement by the homogenous sterility of a U.S. dominated popular culture industry. This can without much worry about oversimplifying, be thought of as a (Marxist inspired, a la Adorno and Horkheimer [1979]) globalized version of “mass culture theory,” which as noted by Appadurai (1990) has its variants in both the left and the moderate right (i.e. McDonald 1957, Shils 1960).

Decades ago Wilensky (1964: 174) noticed a similar divide between theories of mass culture, which “tend to be pessimistic in their ideology and macroscopic in [their] sociology” and their associated critiques from more empirically minded scholars who in contrast “tend to be optimistic…in ideology and microscopic in sociology.” I submit that a similar state of affairs is currently noticeable in the current state of the field of cultural globalization studies. Like mass culture theory before it, the cultural imperialism perspective has come under fire due to
its lack of empirical adequacy by more micro-oriented global audience reception studies and by more contextual, agency-centered approaches to globalization (Appadurai 1996, Robertson 1992, Garofalo 1995). Thus, Global media theorist Annabelle Sreberny (1997: 48) is ready to abandon the cultural imperialism perspective as a useful paradigm, just like the previous generation of cultural analysts abandoned the mass culture hypothesis before it. She notes that “The notion of ‘cultural imperialism’ became one of the staple catchphrases of the field of international communication. Yet from the beginning, the concept was broad and ill-defined, operating as evocative metaphor rather than precise construct, and has gradually lost much of its critical bite and historic validity.”

However, while the more empirically oriented micro-phenomenological approaches that have recently challenged the media imperialism thesis have the advantage of being closer to the local reality of dissemination and consumption of cultural goods, they have the disadvantage of losing the systemic and macro-structural feel and intuition of the older cultural imperialism approach (Schiller 1992). Furthermore, these approaches tend to be primarily oriented to detailed empirics, while leaving the job of reconstructing a theoretical account that might help explain the actual patterns of culture consumption and media use that can be observed in the global arena largely unfinished.

In this chapter, I will attempt to introduce, by way of a sociological critique of recent work on the relationship between culture and globalization, a more systemic alternative to the cultural imperialism approach, that is consonant with the glocalization (and market-oriented Cowen [1992]) critique regarding the continuing vitality and possible resurgence of local cultural variety, even in the wake of increasing transnationalization of products, peoples and ideas. In agreement with Simon (2002), who notes that “…the theories of dependency and
cultural imperialism, which arose in reaction to ethnocentric, Cold War notions of post-colonial development and modernization, have constituted a necessary but insufficient stage of macro-level analysis” I attempt to go beyond the narrow conceptual straitjacket of the media imperialism paradigm while also noting the insufficiency of micro-empiricist critiques, which like “….more recent postmodern conceptions of “globalization” lack coherence and specificity.” However, in contrast to Simon’s proposed solution to the problem, which involves a renewed emphasis on ethnographic studies of local strategies of engagement with global media products, I propose that we need a theoretical reconstruction on a sounder sociological basis of a systemic approach to cultural globalization and global culture consumption that goes beyond the narrow localism and fragmented empiricism of ethnographic approaches and the unrealistic reductionism of the media imperialism thesis.

2.2. Media Imperialism as Mass Culture Theory

The deficiencies of the cultural imperialism approach to the study of globalization and culture are eerily similar to those that plagued older mass culture theories, of which DiMaggio (1987: 440) provides the most succinct summary. Just like cultural and media imperialism analyses, the virtue of the media imperialism thesis is that it calls attention to the systemic and global-level relationships between cultural consumption patterns and the hierarchical structure of the world system. However, like mass culture theory, the media imperialism thesis fails to describe empirical patterns of consumption because “…much of its appeal [is] ideological” (DiMaggio 1987: 440). In the case of media imperialism, the basic parameters of the approach revolved around a reworking of Gramscian notions of cultural hegemony from the perspective of a Frankfurt school inspired attention to the
possible “ideological” role played by the products of the leisure and entertainment (global) industries. In place of the domestic hegemony of the national capitalist class, the global popular culture industries were seen as sustaining the global hegemony of the American (or Euro-American) capitalist class (by promoting certain “Western” or “American” values and ideas, a notion that did carry some weight in the postwar context). However, like mass culture theory before it which “…by the mid-1970s…had been decisively rebutted on both empirical and theoretical grounds” (DiMaggio 1987: 440) the media imperialism paradigm has begun to enter a degenerative stage of increased empirical disconfirmation. Most of the recent work on heterogeneity, glocalization and the dialectic of homogeneity and difference inspired by globalizing trends, and the empirical studies of situated consumption practices of global popular culture have on the whole failed to support most of the predictions of the media imperialism thesis. However, there have been very few research endeavors that attempt to tackle the media imperialism thesis with data, such as aggregate indicators of culture distribution and cultural consumption flows across countries that are at the same analytical level with the broad systemic claims that it makes. In what follows I will attempt to do just that. But first I will delve a little more deeply into the analytical and conceptual shortcomings of the media imperialism approach.

Like the old mass culture theory, the contemporary media imperialism approach attempts to draw an unproblematic line of connection between oligopolistic and Western dominated popular culture industries and homogenizing, dehumanizing and ideological culture consumption practices on the part of dominated peripheral masses. Most research has shown that on the contrary, the consumption of Western cultural products can coexist happily with practices of resistance, opposition and even indifference toward the West on
the part of non-Western populations (Scott 1992). Furthermore, global popular culture products can be put to many unintended uses, as when Palestinian youth draw on the oppositional stylings of American Hip Hop music to make sense of and vocalize their struggle (Aidi 2002). Furthermore, media imperialism theory founders not only at the point of consumption but in its most crucial prediction at the point of production: that of increasing homogeneity. Instead we find global cultural diversity being fostered by globalization trends and transnationalization processes (Cowen 2002) as opposed to being swallowed by the global culture juggernaut.

Furthermore even the large-scale transnational culture production companies can be interpreted as fostering heterogeneity by adapting marketing strategies based on product customization, retooling, global localization, negotiated modification and postmodern upscaling strategies among others (Crane 2002: 16-17). This inattention to the continuing vitality and heterogeneity of the culture production field, is precisely the blind spot that ultimately sank the old mass culture hypothesis, as sociologists of culture demonstrated that contrary to predictions, “…considerably more diversity among artistic genres existed at the level of production than the theory held” (DiMaggio 1987: 440, italics in the original).

Ultimately the major mistake of the mass culture approach—shared by the media imperialism thesis—is to draw unwarranted inferences from the macro-level structure (oligopolistic, centralized, etc.) of the (global) popular culture industry to a) the alleged quality and content characteristics of the product (instead of thinking of the mass-craft dimension as a continuum DiMaggio [1977]2002 and therefore highly variable even within a single culture production organization) and b) the conditions of reception of those products (assumed to be same across contexts and directly determined by the characteristics of the
product). Furthermore, as we will see below, not even the usual inference from macrostructural concentration at the level of the industry organization to lack of product diversity, and decline of alternative specialist culture production outlets is valid, given more recent theoretical and empirical advances in organizational theory (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000). However, if the cultural imperialism thesis is mass culture theory in global garb, the contemporary contextual approaches based on the situated observation of consumption practices of transnational populations, while serving to provide useful empirical refutations of the media imperialism approach, leave us with no other systematic and truly global perspective to replace it. Instead of theoretical or analytic reconstruction, we are left with a plethora of disconnected observations of localized practices and consumption styles without a theory that may help explain more macro-level patterns of national and transnational cultural consumption (as was the promise of the old media imperialism approach).1

2.3. What Is Culture Good For? A Sociostructural Approach

1 This is not a worry for most of the advocates of the empirically grounded approaches, especially that draw on contemporary variants of post-structuralism, since they view skepticism any kind of general theoretical attempt at systematization. However, it is definitely a concern for those who worry that after the realization that media imperialism approaches are no longer adequate, there is no systematic attempt of equal scope left with which to understand cultural globalization. Even more mesolevel perspectives, such as Crane’s (2002: 16-17) “national and urban strategies” approach, which pay close attention to patterns of organizational activity at the city level and state activity through cultural and economic policy, while also able to better account for empirical patterns of state and organizational action in the culture production and dissemination field, fail to provide a systematic account of certain obvious commonalities of behavior, discourse and legitimating accounts that seem to cross national, geographical and local cultural boundaries, and which appear to rely on more commonly shared world-cultural discourses.
In social scientific studies of the mass media and leisure consumption, two theoretical traditions concerned themselves exclusively with these issue of the local nexus between cultural objects and consumers; in older mass communication theory they were usually referred to as the “uses and gratification” (U & G) and “media effects” (ME) approaches (McQuail 1998, Gauntlett 1998). Both the U & G and ME approaches however, are primarily psychological with U & G theory conceiving of mass media use and leisure entertainment as primarily driven by individualistic needs that are then “gratified” or “fulfilled” by specific types of media products, experiences and contents. McQuail (1998: 150) notes, U & G research “[S]tarted life in the early 1940s, as a fairly simple and straightforward attempt to learn more about the basis of appeal of popular radio programs and about the connection between the attraction to certain kids of media content and other features of personality and social circumstances.” The key goals of the approach were to understand the “motives” for media use as well as the association between different patterns of media uses and such correlates as social integration, and other uses of time.

The ME tradition became ensnared on issues associated with contradictory empirical findings regarding whether or not media use had any actual “effects” on participants, and difficulty of conceptualization and measurement regarding both the kinds of effects that were presumed to be of theoretical interest (i.e. behavioral, attitudinal, etc.) and the presumed scope and intensity of these effects (i.e. ephemeral versus longer lasting). Most meta-analyses in the social psychological literature appear to support the position that if media effects exist at all, they are of a modest nature at best and become smaller in the case of more intense and longer lasting types of outcomes (i.e. aggressive behavior as opposed to short term pro-violence attitudes). Gauntlett (1998: 120) in an article that attempts to
review the entire tradition of media effects studies of the last six decades of the twentieth
century notes that “[I]f, after over sixty years of a considerable amount of research effort,
direct effects of media upon behaviour [sic] have not been clearly identified, then we should
conclude that they are simply not there to be found.” Gauntlett goes on to criticize the
effects traditions for various methodological and conceptual shortcomings, including its
simplistic view of children’s cognitive abilities, its elitist anti-television (and popular culture)
bias, its inability to take into account the consumers active attempts to provide local
meanings to media content, and its reliance upon artificial laboratory methods to the expense
of natural observation among others.
The U & G approach on the other hand, was rightly criticized by more “political-economy”
oriented approaches as largely exaggerating the extent of control and autonomy of the
consumer over mass-media products, thus eliding an analysis of processes of production,
decision-making and distribution of cultural goods (Gitlin 1978). On the empirical side, the
psychological “needs” model ended up offering very little in the way of explanatory power,
and various analyses were deemed to lack any theoretical basis whatsoever, other than the
taxtological link from media use as gratification to imputed “needs” that were assumed to
pre-exist engagement with media products. This led to a decline of this approach in media
studies toward more “systemic” analysis of media systems and in sociology a turn toward the
“production of culture” perspective in which consumption practices faded into the
background (Peterson and Annand 2004; DiMaggio 2000, but see Peterson [2001] for an
attempt to extend the production model to consumption by way of the idea of “auto-
production”).
However, it is important to note that some conception of the relationship between the consumer and the object of consumption has to be part of any theoretical effort (however, “systemic”) to understand the structure and functioning of cultural flows in modern societies (and in the global system), whether we take a macro-level or meso-level perspective or a more grounded observational approach. For instance, the conception of the individual-cultural object link in media imperialism accounts is usually left implicit (due to its focus on large scale patterns of industry structure, ownership and product flows) although it is fairly clear that the underlying model is one of a largely passive audience (especially in film and television consumption studies), incapable of engaging in “oppositional” decodings of the cultural object (Hall 1980; Griswold 1987), and left vulnerable to the ideological encodings of the producers.

In theoretical lineage, the consumption model used in the media imperialism tradition is behaviorist, with the media flows as the stimuli and the alleged effects (i.e. consumerism, support for American values and practices) on the audience as the responses. Audiences are assumed to engage in very little higher order processing of media messages, and instead the effect of media flows on the “senses” is emphasized. This is what has been deemed the “hypodermic model” of media effects (Liebes and Katz 1990). Schiller (1998: 4) provides a clear example of the media imperialist version of culture consumption. Speaking of the ability of global corporate giants to synergistically combine their products (making novels, into films, films into TV series, etc.), he notes that

The net effect of such total cultural packages on the human senses is impossible to assess but it would be folly to ignore…In one poll, data was assembled and tables constructed on ‘What People Think
They Need.’ The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) received some of its support in Mexico…from the people’s ‘Hunger for US Goods,’ seen ‘on imported television programs and in movies.’

The worldwide impact of the transnational cultural industries, it can be argued, may be as influential as other, more familiar, forms of (US) power: industrial military, scientific…People everywhere are consumers of (mostly) American images, sounds, ideas, products and services.

This is the facet of the media imperialism approach that has come under the more withering attack by audience reception and glocalization approaches. From this alternative stance, the individual/cultural object relationship is conceived as one of radical underdetermination, with cultural appropriation of media content and messages subject to the contingencies of the local subcultural and relational micro-environment, with the meanings afforded by this content in a constant state of negotiation and indeterminacy. The basic model here is one of culture consumption as expressive, allowing local groups and individuals to enact, reclaim and sometimes transform socially constructed identities and subject positions through their consumption of global cultural objects, and their connection of local cultural practices to global cultural flows. However, the identity-social construction approach continues to carry with it an implicit version of the “theory of needs” characteristic of the old U & G perspective, with identity expression as the most important of these needs. Furthermore, insofar as identity construction and identity negotiation are seen as the most important “uses” that can be made of the media, the theoretical model tends toward exposing the ways that “subjectivities” (whether conceived at the individual or at the group level) are confronted with broader discursive practices and symbolic systems represented by global
popular culture flows. From the point of view of this neo-phenomenological approach to identity however, what tends to be understated is the extent to which the uses of culture consumption are not only relegated to expressivity and identity construction, but to social ends conceived in a more mundane way (not necessarily disconnected from identity construction), such as local interaction rituals (Collins 2005) related to conversation and “sociability” (in Simmel’s [1949] sense of interaction for its own sake).

An example of this more “mundane” social role of culture consumption is offered by communication theorist John Fiske (1987), who points to the pivotal role that arts and popular culture consumption play in facilitating social interaction—by way of serving as topic for conversation—in contemporary societies. For Fiske, while there has been a lot of critical attention devoted to “…the mass media in a mass society,”—a charge that can easily be made about media imperialism analysis when conceived as a global mass culture theory—he notes that most analysts have tended to ignore “…the fact that our urbanized, institutionalized society facilitates oral communication at least as well as it does mass communication.” Although the household is now the primary site of leisure culture consumption, it is important not forget that most individuals “…belong to or attend some sort of club or social organization. And we live in neighborhoods or communities. And in all of these social organizations we talk. Much of this talk is about the mass media and its cultural commodities.” For Fiske, these cultural commodities take on primarily expressive functions, can also help in the more everyday life work of sustaining routine social relations, enabling the representation of “…aspects of our social experience in such a way as to make that experience meaningful and pleasurable to us. These meanings, these pleasures are
instrumental in constructing social relations and thus our sense of social identity” (Fiske 1987: 77-78).

2.4. Globalization and the Sociostructural Approach

DiMaggio (1987: 442-444) provides a framework in which the social uses of culture take precedence over its more “expressive” functions and which does not suffer from the implicit subjectivism of neo-Foucauldian perspectives in which lone individuals (or entire subcultures) are seen as confronted with overarching significatory structures. Furthermore, this more socio-structural framework can help us understand the difference—sometimes elided in media imperialism accounts [and also some ethnographic observations] between the consumption of material versus media and artistic culture—the reason why this distinction is important concerns the greater facility of media and arts-related culture to figure in a more diverse array of interaction opportunities: “material goods are physically present and visible, whereas cultural consumption…is invisible once it has occurred. This evanescent quality makes artistic experience, described and exploited in conversation, a portable and thus potent medium of interactional exchange” (DiMaggio, 1987: 442-443). Moreover, certain sociostructural trends towards increasing geographic mobility of peoples, media and material and financial goods, in fact increase the importance of the “portable” knowledge produced by the media, arts and popular culture industries. This in its turn tends to decrease the importance of other less mobile markers of social position (i.e. the customized material goods of the old upper middle class [ McCracken 1991]) as generators of social interaction. In this way, material goods, become less useful as practical tools for the formation of both bridges across social positions and “fences” across socially constructed social identity
markers (DiMaggio 1987; Lamont and Lareau 1988) in comparison to portable forms of cultural knowledge.

Thus, the consumption of global media and popular culture should be expected to become most important not in unobservable processes of identity constitution but in mundane and observable conversational rituals (Collins 2005). This has the consequence that global cultural flows that are not useful to sustain local encounters and to suffuse local interaction with useful fodder for its maintenance will not figure as important in the local lifeworld of consumers regardless how “colonized” the national media is by these foreign influx of popular culture. Thus most of the “negotiation” and resignification practices enacted vis a vis global culture occur in the context of social interaction in small groups (Fine 1979). This resignification attempt can be seen as part of the local “autoproduction” (Peterson 2000, 2001) of culture, whereby individuals take initially “useless” foreign cultural material with little relevance for local interactions and transform it into socially useful culture that can be exploited in conversations with significant others. This has to do with the nature of conversation rituals which must be “about something” in order to sustain themselves. As DiMaggio puts it,

Conversation is a negotiated ritual in the course of which participants must find topics that reflect their level of intimacy and to which each partner can legitimately contribute. Persons entering into conversation seek to ‘establish co-membership’ by identifying groups to which they both belong, even when the goal of the interaction is instrumental. If conversing strangers use linguistic variants to ‘to probe for shared background knowledge’, the same is true a fortiori, of the deployment of various conversational contents. Shared cultural interests are common contents of sociable talk. Consumption of art [and popular culture] gives strangers something to talk about and facilitates the sociable
intercourse necessary for acquaintanceships to ripen into friendships (DiMaggio 1987: 443).

It is in this sense that we can connect micro-interactionist concerns with the role of culture in local relational and cultural transactions, with macro-level analyses of global cultural influences and the growing influence of transnational (and regional) popular culture industries.

It is possible therefore to extend DiMaggio’s sociostructural framework, initially formulated to explain the changing class and status bases of taste in modern postindustrial societies to explain the role of global cultural goods in the globalization process. DiMaggio’s formulation highlights the shift, among the world’s most economically advantaged societies with postwar trends toward mass education, increasing economic opportunity and the rise of the welfare state, from community-based status orders with clear boundaries among lifestyle and consumption practices that exhibited a strong correlation with local status standings, to the shift to the more mobile class status system in which the arts and popular culture take center stage as providing the younger upper-middle class elites with the type of “mobile” cultural capital, appropriate for the formation and maintenance of their now national and not community based networks of mutual recognition. In a similar way, it can be argued that across the developed and developing world, with increased urbanization and the development of more encompassing state projects as well as with the “stretching” of time and space that come with the transition to and integration into the infrastructure of information and telecommunications technology of the global “network society” and the intensification of modernization trends brought about by globalization (Giddens 1991a, 1991b, Harvey 1991, Lash and Urry 1988), that the relational reach and social expanse of
certain privileged global class strata are expanded beyond local communal circles, beginning
to extend not only to the national level as DiMaggio implies, but also to expand to the

This implies, following DiMaggio’s formulation, an increasingly important role of mass
produced global culture (both regional and local) as providing the default forms of cultural
knowledge that can be used to connect with individuals and groups beyond the local
beyond the town to the metropolis and the nation, the home becomes less important as a
focus for sociable interaction. Subjects of conversation supplant objects of display as bases of social
evaluation” (italics added). This means that “Symbols (goods or tastes) become increasingly
important to the organization of social life as the division of labor and the number of human
contacts increases” thus reconfiguring the role of the mass media and the culture production
field in the everyday lifeworld of the consumer. Instead of creating a “mass” society of
disconnected individuals the popular culture industry and the arts production field are in
charge of producing the cultural resources that increasingly bind individuals in loosely
structured interaction networks (Fiske 1987, Lizardo 2006)

The relationship between the rising role of arts and popular culture as the primary facilitators
of social interaction in modern societies can be conceptualized not as an always existing state
of affairs, but as a variable over time (an implicitly a variable across nations or regions within
a nation). The reason for this is that there is an intrinsic connection between certain sets of
structural changes in Western societies that directly affect the relational bases of status and
relational communal order (what in older modernization accounts went by the name of
“development”) and the increasing importance of the arts and popular culture as the type of
portable cultural capital that can more easily be used by more mobile upper middle class elites whose social networks are now of national (and now increasingly transnational) scope:

In advanced societies, the arts (high and popular) occupy a privileged position among identity-defining conversational currencies for several reasons, not least of which is their availability. Television provides a stock of common symbols for nearly everyone, and youth-oriented cultural forms pass easily across class and geographic boundaries. The high arts have become important status markers, for they are subject to few barriers of age, region, or gender, and are consecrated in school curricula. Consumption of high culture is associated with status throughout the industrialized world...If there is a common cultural currency, the arts (supplemented by fashion, cuisine, and sport) constitute it (DiMaggio 1987: 443).

Furthermore, in contrast to media imperialism approaches which usually talk about a fairly homogenous, consensual and hierarchical global culture, most studies that pay detailed attention to situated culture consumption and culture production practices find that global culture instead of become more and more homogenous, appears to in fact be increasing in diversity. In terms of DiMaggio’s (1987) framework of the dimensions of artistic classification systems (ACS), media imperialist approaches, like old mass culture theories (DiMaggio 1987: 441), think of the global cultural ACS as weakly differentiated (dominated by American popular culture) and highly universal (high cross-regional consensus as to the superior value of Western popular culture). However, ethnographic and more empirically oriented approaches have found that the global culture ACS is instead highly differentiated (with hybrid cultural forms and reconstitutions of old “local” cultures actually proliferating under conditions of cultural globalization) and only weakly universal in what Hannerz (1990:
...an organization of diversity rather than...a replication of uniformity,” with differentiation and de-universalization widely seen as accelerating trends.

This changing structure of global culture appears to mirror the changes that DiMaggio (1987, Peterson and DiMaggio 1979) proposed were responsible for the decline of the old ACS dominant in industrial western societies (differentiated, universal, highly hierarchical with strong ritual boundaries separating different consumption communities), in which the older status system based on community and locality, and which produced fairly strong homologies between local position and lifestyle (evident in the classic community studies of Warner and the Lynds), gave way to the a much loser relationship between social position and cultural practices in the post-war era (Holt 1997, 1998). As the bases of power and status in industrial societies shifted from leading elites whose claims to social standing (“symbolic capital” in Bourdieu’s [1990] terms) rested on local recognition by other communities members (implying a fairly bounded system of recognition based on local relationships, which was very difficult to “reconvert” [Bourdieu 1986] into other forms of capital outside of the local context) to national elites who became less attached to the community (becoming progressively more mobile) and whose network of relationship and recognition began to extend way beyond the bounded social structure of the town. This resulted in a decline in both universality and hierarchy of older systems of cultural classification and the increasing loosening of lifestyle from local status orders:

Artistic classification systems are becoming more differentiated and less hierarchical, classifications weaker and less universal. Artists revel in assaulting the limits of their forms, and critics in as disparate fields as pop music, painting, and literature bemoan aesthetic malaise and rampant eclecticism…. [This] erosion of
cultural boundaries...stems from a combination of factors: the transformation of the local...upper classes into a national elite, anchored in organization rather than community; increased influence of commercial principles of classification with the rise of the popular-culture industries; the emergence of relatively autonomous and highly competitive art worlds; and the growth of higher education and the modern state. (DiMaggio 1987: 451-452)

DiMaggio notes that such a framework can explain various empirical puzzles not explainable from other approaches (whether mass culture or more grounded “postmodern” approaches): 1) the loose relationships between class standing and the types of cultural goods that are consumed, 2) the strong association between socioeconomic status and education and culture consumption diversity, as the new elites become cultural generalists rather than specialists with their relational worlds expanding to nationwide scale since “…wide-ranging networks require broad repertoires of taste” (DiMaggio 1987: 444), and 3) the association between lack of culture consumption and indicators of social isolation.

DiMaggio’s sociostructural framework can be adapted to the study of global culture and cultural globalization. In contrast to the media imperialism approach, which posits wide general trends that have come under considerable skepticism, and the ethnographic “glocalization” perspective which is unable to provide more generic systemic accounts that can connect processes occurring across different national locales, the sociostructural approach leads to several important empirical implications that are useful in explaining variation in cross-national reception, vitality and relative degree of success of both global and domestic culture. Hannerz (1990: 239) provides a hint of the connection between global cultures and changing patterns of social relationships in the current situation that is compatible with a global version of the sociostructural approach:
As collective phenomena, cultures are by definition linked primarily to interactions and social relationships, and only indirectly and without logical necessity to particular areas in physical space. The less social relationships are confined within territorial boundaries, the less so is also culture; and in our time especially, we can contrast in gross terms, those cultures which are territorially defined…with those which are carried as collective structures of meaning by networks more extended in space, transnational or even global.

What are the empirical implications of this stance on cultural globalization? First, the sociostructural approach connects increasing differentiation at the level of culture production and decreasing connection between local status orders and lifestyle to the technoeconomic trends toward greater interconnectedness, increasing integration of telecommunications infrastructure and the digitalization of global cultural flows that are usually highlighted by proponents of media imperialism approaches. In contrast to the proponents of this approach, and in agreement with ethnographic observations of global culture consumption and production, the sociostructural approach predicts increasing differentiation of global culture with the intensification of integration and increasing interconnection of regional locales along economic, financial and information networks. This implies that the artistic classification system of those countries and regions most deeply integrated into the globalization process should decrease in hierarchy, increase in differentiation and decrease in universality.

Furthermore, the sociostructural approach allows us to predict which national societies will be more likely to connect to global culture. For instance in stark contrast to the media imperialism approach, the sociostructural account of cultural globalization leads us to predict that global cultural flows will tend to be stronger where relational demands for portable cultural capital that can be used to form and sustain transnational and (within national societies) translocal social
networks. Global cultural flows will be weakest in those regions of the world most disconnected from other facets of the globalization process (informational, economic, demographic, etc.), least urbanized, and economically advantaged, and more structured along segmented and localized ethnic, religious and communal boundaries. Thus the most globally connected societies in the world should be distinctive not only as culture producers, but also due to their disproportionate propensity to consume global culture.

The reason for this is that global cultural information will be the least relevant for those populations of the world most dependent and most oriented toward more geographically encapsulated communal networks, local status orders and more horizontally segmented standards of valuation, whose social relations are organized around the immediate household or the local town elites and not on more encompassing networks of national or possible transnational scope. We should therefore observe that the consumption of global popular culture is highest among the world’s most economically advantaged and globalized societies and lowest among the most economically disadvantaged societies. In particular, consumption of domestic cultural goods should be at its apex, in large, densely populated low income, relatively globally isolated, societies especially those organized around multietnic lines which serve to segment the population along a “mosaic” or horizontally aligned status groups. This is the social arrangement, as noted by Peterson (1992) most likely to lead to “univore” culture consumption (which is based on a high homology between group designation and consumption practices) and least likely to produce the cross-(ethnic, religious, racial) segment connections necessary to reduce the relative social value of domestic and regional cultures and increase the relational value of more decontextualized cultural forms, such as global popular culture.
All of these empirical predictions are in severe disagreement to what we would expect given the cultural imperialism, and some versions of the “national strategies” (Crane 2002) approach, which imply a positive association between the consumption of Westernized and “Americanized” global popular culture and a disadvantaged position in the world economy or the interstate system (because weaker states are assumed to be more easily bullied and manipulated by global transnational media industries or are less likely to have the [political, material, social] resources to implement policies of “resistance” against global cultural flows).

The sociostructural model, on the other hand directs our attention toward those (relatively privileged) segments of the world’s population—which Hannerz (1990, 1996), following Robert Merton’s classic distinction, calls “cosmopolitan”—as the elites most in need of portable forms of transnational cultural capital, most attuned to global popular culture (and other forms of transnational aesthetic flows), and therefore most likely to demand it by way of their comparatively superior purchasing power and access it through their greater access to global communicational and media channels.2

This framework, which connects global media and cultural flows, socio-structural changes that directly affect the immediate relational environment of the individual and social groups

2 Furthermore, the sociostructural model implies that the technoeconomic aspects associated with development, globalization and urbanization is bound to increase the inequality between connected groups with access to global cultural resources, and disconnected groups bound to local forms of cultural knowledge that cannot be cashed in within the immediate strong ties circles of the rural village or small peripheral city. Even those local actors, who have been celebrated in ethnographic studies of for their ability to engage in hybrid reinterpretations of global cultural contents and discourses, are usually members of relatively privileged class strata able to mobilize social, and material networks in their attempts at cultural innovation and syncretism.
associated with the globalization and development process (expanding their potential circle of acquaintances and weakening the local community’s monopoly of their social connections) with the social use of culture at the micro-interactional level allows us to develop a theoretical model of the globalization of cultural goods that is more congruent with what is actually observed in terms of culture consumption at the macro-level than other macro-structural frameworks such as media imperialism theory, with its primitive and underdeveloped notion (i.e. the hypodermic model) of the “effects” of media and their inability to theorize the social uses of culture at the level of interaction.

There are many additional reasons why media imperialism model is in direct conflict with the socio-structural approach developed here. First, the media imperialism approach implies that exposure to global culture should alienate those who consume, as opposed to the sociostructural emphasis on the essentially connective role (Blau 1989b), of the arts and popular culture in helping to sustain social relationships by serving as resources for social interaction (DiMaggio 1987). Furthermore, the media imperialism approach assumes that certain sets of values and behaviors (individualism, consumerism, etc.) antithetical to community and relational cohesion are spread by global cultural flows, suggesting that those with the least need for (or capacity to form) extra-local social connections would be more likely to consume foreign cultural goods (they are the peripheral “masses” in the most vulnerable position, unable to resist foreign cultural penetration). The sociostructural model on the other hand, predicts precisely the opposite: consumption of global culture should be highest among those who reside in the richest and most globally connected regions of the world, and should be weakest among those who reside in the least connected and least socially and economically advantaged regions of the world. This prediction flies in the face of media
imperialism-inspired hypotheses that posit a positive association between having a disadvantaged position in the global system (being in the “periphery” or “semiperiphery” of the world system) and the penetration (and actual consumption) of global media culture. While the media imperialism approach has come under challenge in global media and international communication studies, in the sociology of taste, a single paradigm appears to reign supreme, what I refer to the cultural capital paradigm. In contrast to the media imperialism perspective, the cultural capital paradigm has generated a productive and empirically successful research program on the social uses of taste. However, in the following three sections, I will argue that if we are to explain certain emerging global trends in culture consumption behavior, we will have to revised and extend this paradigm. It is to this task that we know turn.³

2.5. The Cultural Capital Paradigm

Starting with Bourdieu’s (1967, 1968, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1990; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) initial conceptual and empirical contributions, and continuing with the extension and revision of his original theoretical scheme to research on culture and stratification outside of France (Bryson 1996; DiMaggio 1982; DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Holt 1998; Lamont 1992; Mohr and DiMaggio 1995), cultural capital research has produced important theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding of the role of culture in the maintenance and reproduction of social stratification and inequality. However, because most of the Anglophone reception of Bourdieu’s work by empirically minded researchers has consisted

³ What follows is largely based on a previously published article (Lizardo 2005).
of drawing out and testing some of the implications of his theory of social reproduction (Brubaker, 1985), certain conceptual ambiguities related to his larger metatheoretical presuppositions have gone rather unnoticed. The most important of these consists of Bourdieu's model of the social actor, who is conceptualized as following the deeply socialized scripts inscribed in the *habitus* and simultaneously engaging in purposive strategizing action in the course of vying for advantageous positions within historically circumscribed fields. These two contrasting images of the social actor in Bourdieu's work recapitulate a homologous longstanding issue in the Anglo-American sociological tradition: the debate between the undersocialized versus oversocialized conceptions of the individual in classical social theory (Granovetter 1985; Wrong 1961). Thus, insofar as Bourdieu's work has been the most important influence in the empirical study of culture consumption and cultural taste for the last two decades, primarily under the form of what I will refer to as the “cultural capital paradigm” (Bryson 1996; DiMaggio 1982; Lamont and Lareau 1988), whatever conceptual tensions are present in his original theoretical scheme are implicitly transferred to this research tradition and surreptitiously color both the choice of questions on the part of researchers and their subsequent interpretations of the data (Kuhn 1962).

While it is possible to be satisfied with a purely conceptual or interpretive treatment of this issue, in order to better deal with this theoretical strain in the cultural capital paradigm I will

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4This statement applies to the empirical literature on Bourdieu’s theory of cultural taste. More general exegetical treatments (i.e. Alexander 1995; Evens 1999; King 2000) have pointed to important tensions in Bourdieu’s practice theory and his conception of the *habitus*, that are somewhat related to the ones that I focus on here. Bourdieu himself, of course also addressed related issues, especially in his more metatheoretical writings (1977, 1990, 1998).
take a different path. Using recently systematized developments in the conception of "actors" in modern society from institutional theory (Frank and Meyer 2002; Meyer, Boli and Thomas 1994; Meyer and Jepperson 2000), I will argue that insofar as Bourdieu’s ambiguous notion of the social actor has become an entrenched component of the cultural capital framework, then this paradigm has to be substantially revised to include a more institutionally and culturally grounded image of actorhood that sidesteps this ambiguity (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). This alternative formulation of the grounds of social action brings with it an emphasis on global cultural models that are constitutive of individuality and actorhood themselves (Meyer et al 1994).

Further, I will show how some of the empirical results that have emerged from recent research on culture consumption and that have posed problems for the traditional cultural capital paradigm (i.e. the cross-national emergence of the cultural omnivore) can be explained by this new framework. Finally, the following chapter I will demonstrate the payoff of this conceptual merging of the two research programs by testing some of the empirical implications of the conjoined approach. The analysis shows that not only is there an intrinsic connection between certain features of the “world culture” isolated by institutionalist researchers and the more prestigious patterns of cultural taste and consumption, but that the effects related to the usual predictors of the forms of cultural involvement that have been the focus of the cultural capital paradigm may be mediated by allegiance to these institutionalized world culture precepts.

Why do we tend to observe different styles of culture consumption and taste? Pierre Bourdieu offered a groundbreaking analysis of the interested consequences of disinterested behavior (Sayer 1999), such as appreciation for the arts, when he introduced the concept of
*cultural capital* (Bourdieu 1984, 1986). According to Bourdieu, people accumulate a set of implicit competences and cultural resources during the course of socialization into their designated class stratum (Bourdieu 1984). This crystallized and embodied (Holt 1997) knowledge about, and ability to “correctly” consume, cultural objects operates as a sort of social currency that can be transformed into other types of (material and social) benefits and resources (Bourdieu 1984, 1986; DiMaggio 1982; Holt 1997). The basic imagery here is one of a purposive actor that is able to utilize acquired competence in order to gain advantage over others.

While this formulation may be taken as implying a sort of “forward-looking” (Macy 1990: 811), cynical calculation on the part of the social actor, Bourdieu has argued (i.e. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) that this is a gross oversimplification of his point of view because the competences and abilities that he theorizes are operative in this context are instantiated in *practical*, not conscious-calculative, action (Bourdieu 1990, 1998), given that they emanate from the generative capacities of the *habitus*. Critics have countered that if this is the case, then he has really fallen back into objectivism, and his theory becomes just another mechanical description of systemic reproduction devoid of agency (Alexander 1995; Evens 1999; King 2000, Vanderberghe 1999). I submit that the problem with Bourdieu’s conceptual framework is not that he errs on one side or the other of the agency/structure or oversocialized/undersocialized debate (or that he is an “objectivist” in any meaningful sense of the term), but that in either case he retains an undertheorized and essentially *realist* notion of the (social) actor. That is, whether seen as strategizing within positional fields or acting out the deep scripts of the *habitus*, Bourdieu’s actors remain conceptualized as “raw agents”
(Meyer and Jepperson 2000), and not as institutionally and culturally constituted loci of agency, personhood and identities (Frank and Meyer 2002; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). This is a problem that is more evident for Bourdieu’s “generalized materialism” (Bourdieu 1980; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) which emphasizes competition, and the zero-sum striving for positions and resources within fields of action, and not necessarily for other aspects of Bourdieu’s framework, especially his conception of the habitus as both a reality maintaining and a reality generating matrix of schemes of perception and action (Bourdieu 1990). This latter formulation, which focuses on how social reality is sustained through the application of ultimately analogical and metaphorical schemes (i.e. light/heavy, dark/light, male/female) that give shape and provide specific material form (in a very literal sense) to the physical spaces and bodies of participants in those social worlds (i.e. his discussion [Bourdieu, 1990] of the embodied dispositions and automatisms constitutive of Kabyle femininity, or the cosmological meanings contained in the physical layout of the Kabyle household). This is an underexploited facet of Bourdieu’s work that has received little attention from commentators (in comparison to his conflict theory), and which is not necessarily incompatible with institutional conceptions of actorhood and action (as opposed to the habitus as “internalized necessity” or society writ small, which devolves back into Parsonian over-socialization).

In this respect, it is important to emphasize that as Loic Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and other commentators (i.e. Vandenberghe 1999) have rightly emphasized, Bourdieu’s main metatheoretical commitment is to a relational ontology whose primary elements are fields, habitus and forms of capital, not “individuals” as conceptualized in some versions of ontological or methodological individualism (i.e. Coleman 1990; Collins 1981).
As Wacquant (2000: 115) notes:

To uncover the social logic of consumption thus requires establishing, not a direct link between a given practice and a particular class category (e.g. horseback riding and the gentry), but the structural correspondences that obtain between two constellations of relations, the space of lifestyles and the space of social positions occupied by the different groups.

However, most of the relational elements in Bourdieu's schema, with the possible exception of the notion of fields as composed of relationally defined objective positions, recede to the background whenever he engages in explanatory analysis of particular empirical cases, where he ultimately relies on some version of the purposive individual (whether conceptualized as acting strategically or practically) negotiating her way through the overarching structure of the field (for the most penetrating version of this line of criticism see Mohr, forthcoming). Consequently it is not unfair to say that at least when it comes to the practical deployment of his theoretical scheme, Bourdieu remains committed to some version of “raw” individual agency, however sophisticated its “praxeological” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) elaboration may be (Evens 1999).

2.6. The Institutional Model of the Actor

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5 However, what is not the case, is the usual portrayal of Bourdieu as a “structuration” theorist who counterposes individuals to structures (as in King, 2000); it can be shown that in Bourdieu’s explanatory schema, it is the interplay of two ontologically differentiated structural orders, that of internalized (psychological) structures and the objective structures of the field that generates practical action (for more elaboration on this point, see Lizardo, 2004).
As a way to attempt to resolve some of these ambiguities, I now turn to sociological institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Jepperson 1991, 2000, 2002; Meyer et al 1994) which I argue offers a much richer conception of actorhood and agency than that found in the dominant formulations of Bourdieu’s conflict theory and implicitly inherited by his North American interpreters. According to institutional theory, conceptions of modern actorhood and individual agency represent the “devolved” legacy of a centuries-old project of diffusion, rationalization and legitimation of Western Judeo-Christian conceptions of agents and action initially believed to reside in a non-empirical spiritual realm (Eisenstadt 1986). Over time this agency was transferred from the supernatural world to secular corporate structures of political governance (Meyer et al 1994). This resulted in the diffusion and cultural legitimation of the “project of the state” (Thomas and Meyer 1984) and the post-World War II emergence of a primarily secular, individualistic world-culture with agency and the capacity for legitimate action now increasingly seen as the exclusive purview of individual “persons”. This development can in turn be seen as the unwinding and further elaboration of this very same cultural logic (Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999; Frank and Meyer 2002; Jepperson 1991, 2000; Meyer et al 1994; Meyer and Jepperson 2000), one which Weber (1968) identified with the distinctively modern process of rationalization in religious sphere and later in other institutional loci of society (Parsons 1951).

There are two basic aspects of the elaboration of individual agency during the most recent (postwar) period that are of direct relevance to cultural capital theory. First, the modern stratification system is ordered according to the enactment of legitimate form of agency (Weber 1968); that is, not all action carries the same type of capacity to confer actors with cultural standing and symbolic authority. The standards of legitimacy are ordered from pure
self-interested agency (at the lowest level) to one that is performed on behalf of universal and impersonal principles (occupying the highest level):⁶

This relative proximity to high culture, and the putatively disinterested carrying of it, helps to account for peculiar idealist features of the modern stratification system, ones not adequately addressed in the literature…the lowest status in this system is accorded to those categorized as simply self-interested actors…a little higher are those certified agent-actors with more agency, in more rationalized and universalized structures…High status is accorded to those who do not really work at all (in any conventional sense)…but rather serve the great exogenous cultural principles: the professional and the scientists who are often agents of no real principal. These are people who get the Nobel prizes or more prosaically, the highest prestige ratings in surveys” (Meyer and Jepperson 2000: 116).

Bourdieu (1984, 1998) has made a related point in arguing that in order to operate properly, cultural capital must show itself in a “disinterested” appreciation for collectively valued cultural forms (DiMaggio 1991a). However, a problem immediately arises when the possibility of “feigned disinterest” is brought to the fore. In this sense Bourdieu’s analysis is almost always bound to take the character of a “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Ricoeur 1970), in which the actor’s claims to be acting on behalf of abstract principles are unmasked and shown to be part of their self-serving attempts at advancement within fields (which Bourdieu [1998: 88-89] himself acknowledges).

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⁶ Andrew Abbott (1981) in discussing the disjuncture between intra-professional and extra-professional sources of status in occupations makes a point similar to this.
While Bourdieu was far from naïve as to the repercussions of this theoretical issue (see for example 1990, 1998) he never abandoned his original position, developed as far back as his early work on the French educational system (i.e. Bourdieu 1967), that “disinterest” is a practical strategy of domination, and that the ability to portray interested actions as disinterested is in fact one of the primary weapons that the dominant classes utilize in order to maintain their advantaged positions and the larger social and cultural order that sustains them. This system is sustained through a massive process of \textit{shared misrecognition} (which include both the dominant and the dominated [Bourdieu 1998b: 121]) through which all class fractions incorporate the schemas of perception and classification of the dominant group, resulting in the institutionalization of symbolic violence or, the imposition of ultimately arbitrary categories of perception and classification as natural modes of thought (for a related Durkheimian elaboration of this view of institutionalization see also Douglas [1986]).

Bourdieu’s empirical analyses of the artistic (1994), cultural (1984, 1995), educational (1994) and academic fields (1988) consist of extended “socio-analyses” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) of each of those social arenas aimed at showing the general applicability of this basic dictum, originally inspired by Weber’s (1993) study of the religious field (Bourdieu, 1998b). Bourdieu’s final aim was consequently to develop a general economy of symbolic goods and symbolic domination (Bourdieu 1980, 1985a) as a way of generalizing the classic Weberian problematic of rationalization and legitimation of contingent and historical cultural orders in the multiple value spheres of modern society (Brubaker 1985).

The institutional solution to this dilemma is to speak not of action, but of “enactment” (Jepperson 1991), consequently coming very close to Bourdieu’s (1990) own tendency to
refer to action as not determined by foreseeable goals, but as caused by a practical “feel for
the game”. This is also related to recent advances in institutional theorizing related to
formulations of practical action as “skillful” (Fligstein 2001), and of fluid role-taking and
role-assigning behavior in terms of “robust action” (Leifer 1988; Padgett and Ansell 1993).
However, as opposed to relying on Bourdieu’s agonic metaphor, institutional theory
construes the very practical capacity for action and the question as to what or who
constitutes an actor not as an exogenous given, but as an open question subject to the
influence of cultural models, rationalized “theorization” and cognitive elaboration (Meyer et
al 1994; Strang and Meyer 1993). To put it succinctly, while in Bourdieu’s framework the
practical capacity to play and the rules of the game are acknowledged to be socially
constructed, in institutional theory the practical capacities (for action) the rules of the game,
and players themselves, are assumed to undergo the process of cultural constitution (Meyer and
Jepperson 2000).
This drawback is most salient in Bourdieu’s theory of the state and bureaucratic structures
(Bourdieu 1994); while the state may be a site where individuals operate and deploy and
access in differential degrees the means and sources of symbolic and coercive power, the
state or some other supraindividual entity can never, as in institutional theory (Meyer, Boli,
Thomas and Ramirez 1997; Thomas and Meyer 1984) be considered a possible legitimate
actor in its own right. This is simply beyond Bourdieu’s mesolevel social ontology.
In this sense institutional theory avoids the interest and demystification problem by
considering the very capacity for agency of the focal actor to be constituted by his or her
exposure to, and embeddedness within, rationalized cultural realms. In other words, from an
institutional viewpoint, disinterest and action on behalf of impersonal cultural principles (i.e.
beauty), rather that being part of some overarching system of misrecognition serving to sustain the imposition of some arbitrary set of cultural meanings and classifications (Bourdieu 1998) and thus forcing the analyst into the realist trap of taking as given the interests of the dominant (i.e. maintenance of the current order), is itself part of the package. From this point of view, highly institutionalized (scripted) action in the realm of culture is thus an integral part of the recipe that constructs modern individuals, and ultimately their (conscious and practical) interests.

This is important, because it analytically separates the ontological meaning of culture from its significatory aspects (Meyer et al 1994: 17). Bourdieu’s emphasis in the latter role of culture has been his most influential contribution and constitutes the core of the cultural capital paradigm. From this point of view patterns of cultural involvement and modes of cultural appropriation and acquisition are construed as a sign of distinction or as communicative act of ritual exclusion and boundary marking (Bryson 1996; DiMaggio 1987; Lamont 1992), marking the separation of class fractions or other collectively recognized groups in the social field. However, in the modern stratification system, culture not only marks divisions between a given set of actors but may also be constitutive of those actors themselves (Meyer et al, 1994), that is, to borrow imagery from Peterson (2000), culture is implicated in the process of collective (auto)production of modern identities and vocabularies of motive (Mills 1940). In terms of cultural capital theory, certain patterns of cultural involvement may not only demarcate positions between different types of individuals, but may be involved in the definition of what it means to be a (certain type of) individual, allowing outside observers (and the actor herself) to match identities to actions and situations (March and Olsen, 1989): this aspect of culture is able to “[assign] reality to actors and action, to means
and ends” in addition to “endowing actor and action, means and ends, with meaning and legitimacy” (Meyer et al 1994: 17).

For instance, in the hierarchy of legitimacy of the modern stratification system, agency on behalf of impersonal ideas (i.e. good taste, aesthetic values, etc.) enjoys a privileged position over agency on behalf of the self (a curious development on its own behalf). These are two ways of demonstrating the capacity to be an actor, and not two mutually exclusive explanatory frameworks for action (that is, we are not necessarily forced to unmask agency on behalf of impersonal ideas as a masked exercise in self-serving agency). Consequently, from the institutional point of view, the capacity to enact agency cannot be separated either from the principles (truth, fairness, beauty, etc.) on behalf of which that agency is enacted, because there can be no ego-centric action without an (ultimately socially constructed) ego (Goffman 1959, 1963). Consequently, the focus of attention shifts towards the socio-cultural environment that produces the templates constitutive of those entities and (id)entities that are perceived as being endowed with the capacity to act, which includes individuals among other actors (states, organizations, etc.) in the modern system (Meyer and Jepperson 2000).

This is not to say that Bourdieu’s framework does not allow interests to be culturally constructed by the immanent logic of each field of action (the scientific, the religious, the artistic, the political, etc.); in fact he acknowledges (Bourdieu 1998: 79-85) that the particular interests exhibited by each actor are determined and circumscribed by the historically specific set of values, and schemes of action, appreciation and classification that are valued in each field:
To the reduction of conscious calculation, I oppose the relationship of ontological complicity between the habitus and the field. Between agents and the social world there is a relationship of infraconscious, infralinguistic complicity: in their practice agents constantly engage in theses which are not posed as such. Does a human behavior really always have as an end, that is, as a goal, the result which is the end, in the sense of conclusion, or term, of that behavior? I think not. What is, therefore, this very strange relationship to the social or natural world in which agents aim at certain ends without posing them as such? Social agents who have a feel for the game, who have embodied a host of practical schemes of perception and appreciation functioning as instruments of reality construction, as principles of vision and division of the universe in which they act, do not need to pose the objectives of their practice as ends.

In this respect Bourdieu sidesteps the charge of reductive economism that has been leveled against him (i.e. Alexander, 1995); because he views economic interest as simply a special case of the general species of interests that can be developed in different societal spheres (Bourdieu, 1998: 86). Further, notice that Bourdieu’s conception of the agent’s practical competences as “functioning as instruments of reality construction, as principles of vision and division of the universe in which they act” does not put him very far from the microfoundations of institutional theory which takes Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) classic text as its primary starting point (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Consequently, it can be said that by taking both actors and actions as subject to a process of “deep” cognitive constitution, institutional theory simply radicalizes an insight already present in Bourdieu’s own action theory.

2.7. The Cultural Omnivore and the Expansion of Personhood: Connecting Cultural Capital Theory and Institutional Theory
The second important point derived from institutional theory that is of direct relevance to cultural capital theory concerns the institutional analysis of modern personhood. As cultural conceptions of legitimate agency become increasingly likely to be transferred from supra-individual corporate structures (states, professions, and other collectivities) to individual actors, a process that has dramatically accelerated since World War II, the person has emerged as the central construct of an increasingly global cultural model (Frank and Meyer 2002). This modern construct of the person is characterized by its transcendence of local designations and ascriptions, and by the universal equality of all entities designated as bearers of personhood within and across geographical and political boundaries. This development is correlative with the increasing rationalization and overall expansion of available roles and identities at the socio-structural level (Frank and Meyer 2002). This has increased the supply (and demand for) of possible realizations and variations of apparently distinctive enactments of modern individuality. The modern person is consequently viewed as having an almost unlimited capacity to choose, and nearly everything can become part of an individual’s project of identity self-constitution (Giddens 1991b). Cultural objects gain increasing importance in this process, as the individual is able to use taste and culture consumption as an integral part of their “unique” identity. The fact that mass produced cultural objects (DiMaggio 1991a) are the primary elements that are used in the creation of unique identities constitutes an ironic development (Bell 1976). Meyer and Jepperson (2000) point to this as one of the integral structural contradictions of modern personhood: while the cultural model emphasizes individual uniqueness and idiosyncrasy, the rationalization of the cultural scripts for enacting agentic individuality become increasingly standardized across spheres.
This process is coupled with the imperative of egalitarianism built into the construct of contemporary personhood, which in turn requires that extant symbolic and ritual distinctions demarcating different realms of cultural expression (DiMaggio 1987) and class-related socially constructed divisions demarcating “high” versus “popular” culture realms (i.e. DiMaggio 1991b), be superseded in favor of a “postmodern” aesthetic that crosses and subverts those boundaries:

Personhood accords broadened…rights to choice and taste. For example, moderns can claim exceptionally varied tastes in food, unconstrained by religion, nationally, or class. Of course the rationalized role system constrains on some food preferences in the name of health and safety, but the ability to build secure food stratification, with and low cuisines is very limited …so also with music, art and other cultural matters, which increasingly flout distinctions of high and low taste” (Frank and Meyer 2002: 93).

This is what has been detected and labeled in recent empirical studies on cultural taste and consumption as the emergence of the “cultural omnivore” first empirically detected in the U.S. (Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson and Simkus 1992) and later in other Western industrialized countries such as The Netherlands (i.e. Van Eijck 1999), Spain (Lopez Sintas and Garcia Alvarez 2002) and Great Britain (Warde and Tampubolon 2002; Warde et al 1999, 2000), and as Peterson and Annand (2004: 325) note in their recent review of the literature, with similar results having been obtained in Canada and France as well. While initially the rise of the omnivore was interpreted as an unexplained anomaly of Bourdieu’s theory of taste and as evidence that his original framework lacked applicability outside of France (but see Holt, 1997 for a critique of this view), the cross-national evidence suggests that increasingly catholic taste and consumption patterns among the upwardly mobile cannot
be considered a phenomenon unique to the U.S., but as common to other Western European
countries as well. So far no explanation has been offered for this remarkable behavioral and
symbolic convergence among similar crass strata in different Western polities, but if
institutional theory is correct, then this is no mystery. As increasingly transnational notions
of modern individuality, personhood, and agency have become part of the global cultural
model of modern societies (Frank, Meyer and Miyahara 1995), then such a mimetic
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 151) in the relationship between individuals and
cultural objects is to be expected. As Frank and Meyer (2002: 90-91) note: “All…faces of
modern individualism are highly cultural in character, rather than idiosyncratic outcomes of particular local
situations. They are formed in very general or universalistic terms, [and] occur in forms that are scripted worldwide…” (emphasis added).
If we think of the cultural omnivorousness and the “multicultural” (Bryson 1996, Fridman
and Ollivier 2002), tolerant approach to expressions of taste as the modern institutionalized
form of individual action in the field of cultural taste and consumption, then the spread of
these similar forms of cultural involvement across a wide range of different polities in the
developed world can be explained. Without a doubt, their rise to popularity is no doubt
related to other large-scale changes in Western cultural classifications systems, which as
DiMaggio (1987: 542) notes, have “…entered a period of culture declassification…Artistic
classification systems are becoming more differentiated and less hierarchical, classifications
weaker and less universal.” To the list of socio-structural factors that DiMaggio cites in
order to explain this change, (the nationalization of previously local elites and the
subsequent decline of communal ritual distinctions, the commercialization and
industrialization of culture production and the growth of higher education), the institutional
approach would add the accompanying rise of a distinctively modern conception of individuality, personhood, and the normatively appropriate uses of culture that sustains and defines those notions of the modern actor (Meyer and Jepperson 2000).

2.8. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have analyzed and reformulated two of the most prevalent theoretical perspectives for the study of cultural globalization and cultural taste, the media imperialism paradigm and the cultural capital paradigm. In the case of the media imperialism approach, I have argued that due to its close conceptual connection to mass culture theory, the media imperialism perspective shares many of its conceptual limitations and theoretical blinders. In particular the media imperialism approach is deficient in its underdeveloped conceptualization of the relationship between culture consumers and cultural objects, conceiving of these processes as largely dominated by the “media effects” that cultural products have on culture consumers. These effects are conceived in an overly reductionist and deterministic way, while the ability to reinterpret cultural goods, and most importantly the inherently social role that mass media and arts consumption play in modern societies, as highlighted in the work of John Fiske and Paul DiMaggio, is ignored. Furthermore, the cultural imperialism thesis flounders at a more macro-level, by drawing unwarranted inferences from the large-scale organization of culture production industries, which like all industries that permit of economy of scale production benefits, is organized as a highly concentrated oligopoly, toward alleged trends toward increasing homogeneity of culture production.
I have argued that, taking a stance more consistent with recent research in organizational studies, we can think of local *diversity* in culture production as *driven* by industry concentration rather than smothered by it. Finally, drawing on a sociological approach to the social uses of culture, which in contrast to various “late modernity” perspectives on recent globalization trends, posits an *increasing dependence of social relations and network connections on mass media and artistic products*, as these come to serve as the “default” forms of cultural knowledge that serve to forge and sustain network relations beyond the closed-in confines of the local community, as the social worlds of the upper class elites of the world’s most economically advantaged societies expand to cover the entire nation, and more recently to expand beyond national borders. This perspective suggests that the consumption of global culture rather than being driven by asymmetric flows from a center to a helpless periphery, will instead be primarily the purview of residents of the world’s most economically advantaged and socially developed societies. Thus, we should expect than in addition to dominated culture *production* markets, the richest countries in the world should also be the leaders as *consumers* of transnational cultural flows.

While the media imperialism thesis is the dominant structural approach in global media studies, in the sociology of culture the cultural capital paradigm commands the most attention and intellectual weight, having produced a thriving research agenda for the micro and mesolevel study of patterns of cultural taste. In this chapter I have argued however, that if the cultural capital paradigm is going to be useful for the explanation of recent transnational trends toward convergence in the cultural stratification system of Western societies, some of its central assumptions would have to be revised. In particular the sole focus on culture consumption as a strategy of intrasocietal class struggle for symbolic capital,
will have to be complemented with a view that sees culture consumption not only as serving a *signaling* function that is useful in demarcating the identity and standing of different status groups and class fractions, but also a *constitutive* function that points to the way that modern individuals *enact*, their individuality, personhood and identity commitments, especially as these pertains to their connection to transnational cognitive frames that spouge increasingly stereotypical ways of how to be an individual in the modern system. I have argued that the phenomenon of cultural omnivorousness, can be seen as a key part of the “transnational syndrome” of beliefs, practices and assumptions that have become constitutive of modern individuality and that have come to be increasingly diffused by transnational “institutional carriers” of these templates. Thus transnational convergence (or lack thereof) in the principles of cultural stratification can in fact be tied to different degrees of connectivity of the population of Western societies to these increasingly transnational flows of ideas and institutional templates.

Having provided this theoretical exegesis, in chapters 3 and 4, I address some of the empirical implications of these reconsiderations of the media imperialism and cultural capital approach. I show that in addition to providing greater conceptual clarity, these theoretical revisions allow us to explain empirical patterns that would otherwise remain obscure or inexplicable.
3. GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1. Abstract

The media imperialism thesis is the most widespread systemic account of cultural globalization. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, various ethnographic studies of culture consumption continue to accumulate evidence that the predictions derived from this approach are not consistent with what is observed. Instead of homogeneity of consumption, we find diversity of interpretation; instead of a decline in the production of domestic local culture, we find increasing “creolization” and a revitalization of folk cultures. Furthermore I argued that the media imperialism approach, as a global version of mass culture theory, shares with it many of its analytical and empirical limitations. Nevertheless, while ethnographic approaches provide useful evidence against the accuracy of the media imperialism paradigm, they are unable to produce an alternative account of equal analytic and systemic scope. I have attempted to remedy this situation by proposing a “sociostructural” account of the process of globalization, which is consistent with recent research at the individual level in the sociology of taste. In this chapter I show that this model is also consistent with the actual evidence on transnational patterns of cultural flows and culture consumption. Using data from various cross-national sources, I show that the sociostructural account is best able to account for the observed patterns than the media imperialism thesis in almost every case, including that of transnational film imports and exports.

3.2. Examining Cross-National Patterns of Culture Consumption and Production
In the following sections, I attempt to contrast the patterns of empirical predictions that can be derived from the media imperialism account with those that are consonant with the sociostructural account sketched above. While the media imperialism thesis has come under challenge from the point of view of more ethnographic perspectives, there have been very few studies that have used aggregate data on global cultural flows (the preferred form of evidence of proponents of this account) to challenge the media imperialism thesis. I rely on cross-national data on musical consumption, film imports and exports and trade flows of various cultural commodities collected from various sources obtained from UNESCO, including the *World Culture Report* (UNESCO 1998, 2000a), *The Survey of National Cinematography* (UNESCO 2000b) and the *Cultural Trade Report* (UNESCO 2005).

### 3.2.1. Cross-National Patterns of Musical Consumption

Table 1. Domestic popular music consumption for countries in which the domestic market share of locally produced music exceeds 60%, 2000 UNESCO World Culture Report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of national market by domestic popular music</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I begin by considering data on cross-national consumption of domestic and international music. Is the transnational music consumption field clearly demarcated along international/domestic consumption lines that are homologous to the country’s position in the world economy (poor countries more likely to consume international music than rich countries) as would be expected by the media imperialism account, or do we find that the demand for popular global culture is in fact the purview of the most economically advantaged societies, as would be expected by the sociostructural model? Data from the 2000 World Culture Report on patterns of international and domestic music consumption appear to be somewhat more consistent with this last view (shown in Table 1). The primary prediction of the media imperialism hypothesis, that domestic culture consumption should be low across most peripheral countries is not confirmed. Instead supporting regional and “strong-state” versions of the cultural globalization process (Crane 2002; Guillen 2001) and the sociostructural approach’s connection between local and national status order and forms of cultural involvement, consumption of domestic music continues to be vibrant in most countries in the world reaching a high of 96% of the market in India.

Furthermore the list of countries where domestic popular music represents 60% or more of the national market is populated by several low income and developing societies, that according to the media imperialism thesis (Boyd-Barrett 1977; Schiller 1992, 1998, Herman

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and McChesney 1997), should instead be in thrall of and thus overrun by the global American popular culture industry (including Ghana, Nigeria, Honduras, Egypt, Brazil, Turkey, Costa Rica and Panama). In fact only one country that world systems theorists would consider as belonging to the “core” of the world system in terms of economic production is on the list (other than the U.S. of course): Japan. Every other high domestic music consumption country would be considered “peripheral” or “semiperipheral” (China, Russia, India, Turkey, Venezuela). This is in stark contrast of what we would expect given the media imperialism hypothesis.

Table 2. International popular music consumption for countries in which the international market share of locally produced music exceeds 60%, 2000 UNESCO World Culture Report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of national market by international popular music</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 shows the percentage of the national market captured by international popular music for countries with a domestic musical consumption rate of less than 40%. While the presence of some low income countries in this list do conform to the media imperialism hypothesis (Philippines, Slovakia and the Andean countries of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia), the important thing to note is that the majority of the countries in this list are either from the Global North (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland and Slovenia) or are relatively strong and globally connected regional economies (Chile, South Africa, Kenya, Singapore, Israel). From the media imperialism perspective however, we should expect this list to be populated by the least economically advantaged and economically dependent nations in the world, but that is obviously not the case.
Figure 1. Scatter plot of the association between the size of the international popular culture consumption market and logged per capita GNP, 2000 UNESCO World Culture Report (N=72).

Using the same World Culture Report data for 72 countries, it is easy to verify that the correlation between the country's GNP per capita and the consumption of international popular musical in relation to domestic musical culture (as given by the ratio of the market size of one to the other) is positive ($r=0.38$, $p<0.01$), not negative as would be expected from a simple media imperialism model which equates a relatively disadvantaged position in the
world economy with the degree of penetration of foreign cultural goods. Conversely, the poorer the country, the more likely it is that its consumption profile will be oriented toward domestic popular culture.

The scatter plot of the country's relative wealth versus the ratio of international to domestic musical consumption is shown in Figure 1. The horizontal line partitions the y-axis across the “even international and domestic consumption” point (where the ratio is equal to unity and the logged ratio is equal to zero), with the countries above the line disproportionately consuming international popular music and the countries below exhibiting a preponderance of domestic music consumption. The vertical line separates high income countries (at the 75th percentile or higher of per capita GNP for the year 1998) from lower income countries (below the 50th percentile threshold), with middle income (between the 50th and 75th percentiles) as the third category (gray vertical lines in the scatter plot region).

The scatter plot shows an overall positive trend (the ratio of international to domestic consumption increases with per capita national income) which contradicts the media imperialism account. While the countries in the upper-left quadrant (Ukraine, the Philippines, Kenya, Bolivia) exhibit a pattern of consumption consonant with the media imperialism thesis, this account cannot explain the fact that the majority of high income societies (located to the right of the vertical line) also display high levels of international musical consumption (they are disproportionately located in the upper-right quadrant), with the U.S. (as would be expected by the media imperialism account) and Japan (which should be subject to imperialist cultural penetration but appears to be fairly protected against it) as the most stark exceptions. (When the U.S. and Japan are not included in the calculations the correlation between per capita GNP and the ratio of international to domestic music
consumption is a robust 0.49). Furthermore, the media imperialism story has an even harder time explaining why the majority of low income societies still consume more domestic popular music than international popular music (they are disproportionately located in the lower-left quadrant).

While the media imperialism model fails to explain these results, this is exactly what we should expect given the socio-structural model. If the demand for global culture is driven by its usefulness for the formation and maintenance of extra local networks, then it stands to reason that the least economically advantaged societies, the populations of which are still relatively disconnected from global telecommunications flows and which maintain close relationships with similar others in more communal environments have much less of a need for international musical culture and are much more likely to consume domestic music, which is the type of cultural good that is useful for the maintenance of local networks of acquaintance and sociability (DiMaggio 1987; Lizardo 2006). In a similar way, the more mobile, cosmopolitan populations of the more urbanized societies of the Global North should be the primary consumers of global media culture, and that is exactly what we find. Notice that it is much harder to speak of straightforward media imperialism when the “satellite” societies are countries such as Sweden, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, since these are the nations with the most access to legal, economic, cultural and material resources.

7 It is possible to argue that the “domestic” musical cultures of many of these countries is not actually local, but it is fact composed of already Westernized or “Americanized” versions of forever lost indigenous genres. However, if local cultures are conceived as not truly local, then the distinction between regional or local cultural products and those that originate in the richer Western societies loses all meaning, and the cultural imperialism thesis becomes true by definition.
to “resist” globalization (Crane 2002). Yet, counterintuitively they seem to be the ones that resisted the least (at least in the musical realm that we have explored so far).

The mystery disappears once we realize that it is the avid demand and access of the local populations of the richer societies for a global culture which will allow them to enact and sustain translocal social relations that explains this apparent paradox. Thus, global cultural flows do not need to “kick down the door” in the richest countries in the world, since it is embraced with open arms by the local populations of the more economically advantaged societies, as is shown by the complete market dominance of the Hollywood industry (Cowen 2002) and the present data on international music consumption. This is consistent with the fact that as shown by most recent research in the sociology of taste, popular culture consumption increases with socioeconomic status in all Western industrialized societies (see the reviews in Van Eijck 2000; Peterson 2005a and Peterson and Annand 2004), in contradiction to the mass culture theory account which expects popular culture to be primarily consumed by the disadvantaged.

The sociostructural model which connects culture consumption and cultural demand to the types of local relational environments that are more likely to be faced by inhabitants of different societies explains why the consumption of global (and regional transnational) popular culture is the purview of the most privileged global strata, as they are the populations most likely to use this cultural information to form and sustain loose networks of social relations both at home and across national borders. In addition, the sociostructural account also explains why, as often noted by global media scholars but usually inexplicable from simple imperialism perspectives, in most countries in the world, especially in the large multi-ethnic, low income societies, the consumption of domestic culture continues to be the rule.
and not the exception (Ferguson 1995). Insofar as the majority of populations continue to be tied to relatively less mobile and more circumscribed networks, local cultural goods which serve to enact locally meaningful social identities and facilitate interaction in relatively relationally circumscribed communal contexts will be both as a rule preferred over less socially useful foreign fare and, by way of governmental policy and the action of local cultural organizations, will be more likely to be crafted by domestic culture-producing actors. Most research shows that the dystopia painted by imperialism scholars, of a supply of foreign cultural goods that “drown out” domestic and regional cultures seldom obtains, as local populations gravitates towards more interpersonally appropriate and socially useful regional cultures.

3.2.2. The Global Film Consumption Field

It is possible however, that music is the “easy” case to make for the sociostructural model, while the film media is the case where the imperialism account would be most at home. Of all of the global cultural industries (including television) film is the one which in its structure most conforms to a media imperialisms model, with Hollywood, and thus American film, overwhelming all other global competitors (Cowen 2002). Data from the 2000 World Culture Report confirm this view: 84% of the 72 countries for which film import data was collected imported 50% or more of their films from the United States in 1998. It is possible that in this American monopolized industry the patterns predicted by the media imperialism account will more clearly come to the fore, in comparison to musical consumption.

Table 3. Number of Imported films for countries that imported 200 or more films in 1995, UNESCO Survey of National Cinematography, 2000.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Films Imported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 shows the number of films imported by countries that imported 200 or more films in the year 1995. Consistent with the media imperialism account, we find a number of peripheral low income societies in this list. However, we also find a fairly adequate representation of developed countries, with Japan topping the list (Japan does import more
than half of its films from the U.S., UNESCO 2000), with the U.S. itself occupying the fifth spot. What are the primary country level determinants of global film imports? If the cultural imperialism account is correct, we should expect to observe a negative association between levels of economic development and the degree of foreign penetration by the U.S. film Industry.

Table 4. Negative binomial and Poisson regression models of the cross-national predictors of film imports and domestic film production, UNESCO survey of national cinematography, 2000.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region: Latin America</td>
<td>0.2721**</td>
<td>-0.0604*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.89)</td>
<td>(-1.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region: Arab Countries</td>
<td>0.4797**</td>
<td>0.1735**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15.09)</td>
<td>(5.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region: East Asia</td>
<td>0.2139**</td>
<td>-0.1965**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.27)</td>
<td>(-6.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region: Europe</td>
<td>0.3159**</td>
<td>-0.3392**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.81)</td>
<td>(-9.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP per capita (1995)</td>
<td>0.2797**</td>
<td>0.8608**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.19)</td>
<td>(4.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged Population (1995)</td>
<td>0.0768**</td>
<td>0.7416**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.91)</td>
<td>(9.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imported Films (1995)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2883*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.9028**</td>
<td>-0.6240**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(260.73)</td>
<td>(-1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chi2</td>
<td>295.53**</td>
<td>67.54**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1051.95**</td>
<td>133.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alpha</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

The first two columns of Table 4 show the coefficient estimates of a Poisson regression model with the number of imported films in the year 1995 and regional country dummies and measures of economic development and country size as predictors. The first model is a baseline specification with regional country dummies as the only predictors and African region as the baseline category. Contrary to what we would expect given a media imperialism account, Africa appears to be the region of the world with the least amount of exposure to global film culture. Every other region shows rates of film imports much higher than Africa. However, regional differences in these data are surely driven by cross-national heterogeneity in economic development and average size of the domestic audience, both of which should have noticeable impact on the amount of global film culture imported.

The model shown in the second column of Table 4 introduces the effect of national income and size. Contrary to the media imperialism thesis, the best predictor of the number of film imports is once again national income, as measured by the logged domestic product per capita for the 93 countries included in the UNESCO (2000b) *Survey of National Cinematography* and for which data on these two variables was available (other predictors such as educational enrollments, literacy rates and urbanization have no effect once national income is held constant). Thus the results are once again more consistent with a sociostructural account which connects local demand of global culture to the transnationalization of elites corresponding to the richer countries in the world. Notice that only after holding national wealth constant do the regional effects fall in line with those predicted by the media imperialism thesis, thus given their international economic position, countries in Western Europe, Asia, and Latin America import less films that expected in comparison to those in
the African region, while those in the Middle East import more than expected in comparison to Africa.

3.2.3. Global Film Culture and Domestic Film Production

Is cultural penetration by Americanized global flows deleterious for national cultural production? The media imperialism thesis would predict that the more that a country’s national market is awash with foreign cultural goods, the less likely it will be for domestic culture production organizations to find a market for local products as national tastes become homogenized and oriented toward the stereotyped products of the international (Hollywood-dominated in the case of film) culture industry. Thus, we should expect a negative association between the extent to which the local cultural market has been captured by international film and domestic film productions.

Both Crane’s (2002) cultural policy-oriented national strategies of globalization account and the sociostructural model predict the opposite result. From the “strategies” perspective, states react to market penetration by the American culture industry by attempting to regenerate local production of film and other cultural goods through subsidies, tax incentives and other forms of cultural policy aim at stimulating culture production, thus globalization ends up, by way of these policy and organizational mechanisms, increasing the production of local cultural goods (Toepler and Zimmer 1999); especially those, such as film, more deeply connected to national identity.

The sociostructural model’s prediction is similar to the “strategies” account that points to a symbiotic, and not competitive relationship between global and national film industries.

Insofar as the countries which are likely to react to the global dominance of Hollywood by
developing their domestic film industries are also the ones the most economically advantaged and globally connected societies, and insofar as domestic film industries will tend to occupy a specialist niche (Carroll 1985), specializing in the production of more aesthetically oriented (“arthouse”) and cognitively demanding products, then we should expect that the very same segment of the population that is attracted to global culture will also gravitate toward domestic film products. Thus, there should be no strong opposition between local and global in the case of film as we observed in the case of music, since “domestic” film industries are also part of a global market, but simply specialize in a different product niche. As such, there is not equivalent of “local” film (i.e. culture that is useful for enacting and sustaining extremely local identities and social relationships) as there is for music (although the “Bollywood” regional industry in India can come close to this).

Thus, from the sociostructural perspective, insofar as the domestic and global film products represents different facets of a global culture, then demands for all film-related should goods increase with socioeconomic development and the move towards a “networked” society as individuals come regard both global and domestic culture as complementary cultural resources, and are able to master both domestic and global cultural codes in order to sustain their increasingly diverse social networks which come to be composed of a mixture of local and translocal social ties (Lizardo 2006). From this perspective there is no incompatibility between taste for global culture (i.e. Hollywood) and taste for local cultural goods: both should be observe to increase and should be more prevalent in wealthier more economically advantaged societies, just as more diverse forms of taste are more likely to be found among the omnivorous upper class strata of Western societies (DiMaggio 1987, Peterson and Annand 2004). However, the sociostructural model does predict, that in analogy with the
results obtained for music, that an *imbalance* of local versus international film culture should be *negatively* associated with economic development. Notice that this is the opposite of what we would expect from either the imperialism, or “national strategies” perspectives, which equate a preponderance of domestic culture production over cultural imports with the “strength” of a nation in the global system. The sociostructural model in contrast suggests that the most economically and socially advanced populations of the world should be the most attuned to global culture in relation to domestic culture (Hannerz 1990, 1992, 1996, Featherstone 1996).

The third column of Table 4 shows the effects of film imports on the average number of films produced in the 1988-1998 period. The coefficients estimate comes from a negative binomial regression with the U.S. excluded.9 Contrary to the media imperialism thesis, but consistent with the “strategies” and sociostructural accounts, I find that the countries that are more likely to be exposed to global film imports *are also* the countries that are more likely to have a relatively active domestic film production industry (t=2.34).

This result serves to dispel simplistic accounts of the globalization process, in which states and local cultural organizations are “captive to” and powerless against the incoming flow of foreign cultural products, and which draw unwarranted lines of demarcation between global and domestic culture (under the assumption that both cannot be appropriated simultaneously by certain segments of the local population). If the sociostructural account is

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9 Poisson goodness of fit statistics rejected the null hypothesis of no overdispersion in the domestic film production counts, which is not surprising given that 54% of the countries produced zero films during the period. Excess zeros are a common cause of count overdispersion (Long and Freese 2003).
correct, we should expect that the positive association between global cultural flows and
domestic film production to be explained by the level of socioeconomic development of the
country; that is if demand for both global and domestic culture is driven by structural changes
(affecting local social networks) produced by the development process, then after holding
constant indicators of this process the association between global and domestic culture
should be attenuated.

The fourth column in Table 4 shows what happens once national wealth, population and
regional location are held constant. I find that domestic film production is highest in more
economically advantaged and populated societies, this is in contrast to what was found
regarding domestic musical consumption (which was negatively associated with GDP per
capita) but consistent with accounts that highlight the difference between the relatively low
overhead of musical production and the large fixed costs of film production (Cowen 2002).

More importantly, I find that after holding constant national wealth, the positive association
between film imports and domestic film production disappears, suggesting that the
“synergy” between global and local film products (or favorable cultural policy that stimulates
the national film industry) is a feature of the most economically advantaged societies.

I also find that consistent with global media accounts that highlight the importance of large
domestic populations in fostering domestic media production and consumption, that in
contrast to its null effect when it comes to film imports, country size (as measured by logged
population) has a strong positive effect on the vitality of the national film industry. Finally, I
find that in line with “regional markets” accounts of globalization, that there is wide regional
variation in the average vitality of the domestic film industry, with Europe (on the strength
of France, Italy and Spain) East Asia (led by India and Hong Kong) and West Asia (led by
Egypt) displaying much stronger regional film industries in comparison to the more peripheral regions of Latin and America and Africa (the reference category). The fact that national wealth has a positive effect on domestic film production suggests a version of the media imperialism model that is salvageable in explaining cross-national variability in exposure to global film culture. It is possible that small, less economically advantaged societies are the true “losers” in the global film market, with little choice but to consume American dominated film products. If this is correct, we should find a negative association between country GDP and the ratio of international film imports to domestic film production.

Table 5 shows the result of two log-normal generalized linear models with the ratio of the average number of films produced between 1988 and 1998 to the number of films imported in 1995 to as the dependent variable (the four countries that reported importing zero films are excluded from the analysis). \(^{11}\) Model 1 shows the effect of logged GDP per capita on the domestic to foreign film consumption ratio. Contrary to all expectations, national wealth has no appreciable impact on the ratio (t=-0.23). However, as noted by Cowen (2002), and as shown in the fourth model of Table 4, the main determinant of a thriving domestic film industry is the size of the potential domestic audience. Thus, large countries (with the conspicuous exception of Hong Kong, but consistent with the data when Hong Kong is

\(^{10}\) In the regional classification, the Western offshoots of Canada, New Zealand and Australia are considered part of “Europe.” The U.S. is not included in the analysis.

\(^{11}\) This variable displays considerable right skewness, which means that a standard ordinary least squares regression, which assumes a normally distributed dependent displays a noticeably worse fit (p<0.0001) than a log-normal model in which the response is transformed using the logarithmic function.
considered part of China) tend to have large film industries. Therefore holding constant this factor is important in determining the effect of country economic standing on the domestic to foreign film imports ratio.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ratio of Domestic Film Production to Film Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GNP</td>
<td>-0.0528 (-0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged Population</td>
<td>1.3403** (4.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Policy</td>
<td>3.4328** (4.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.0175 (-0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deviance</td>
<td>45.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bic</td>
<td>201.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

In model 2 in Table 5 I introduce a control for country size as measured by logged population in 1995. As expected the size of the domestic audience has a large and statistically significant effect on the domestic to foreign ratio, depressing film imports and stimulating domestic film production (t=4.89). Of even more substantive importance, in regards to national income the results are now consistent with the socio-structural model and contradict the media imperialism account. Holding country-size constant, richer
societies are more likely to consume global film culture in relation to domestic film, results which mirror those obtained for musical consumption.

In the last model of Table 5, I attempt to test the “national strategies” claim that cultural policy significantly affects the composition of the domestic production/global imports cultural bundle. I do this by introducing a dummy variable for whether the country has special legal restrictions (tariffs, quotas, etc.) on cultural imports as measured by the Survey of National Cinematography (UNESCO 2000b). If the national strategies account is correct, we should expect that the presence and implementation of such state policy strategies should increase the relative ratio of domestic to foreign culture consumption. The results are consistent with strategies account: states with special restrictions and quotas on imports (i.e. in Western Europe, France, Canada, Belgium) are more likely to have a more favorable domestic to import film ratio than states that do not. The introduction of the cultural policy control results in a significant improvement in model fit, according to both the deviance and BIC criteria. Nevertheless, notice that the introduction of the cultural policy control variable does little to affect the estimate of national income and population (increasing them somewhat) suggesting that both the domestic audience size effect and the sociostructural effect influence the consumption of global film culture through a partially independent casual pathway.

3.2.4. The Structure of the International Film Consumption Field

An important assumption of most media imperialism accounts, especially when considering television and film, is that of a highly concentrated international consumption market, which mirrors the observed concentration of production at the hand of a few Western (and
increasingly non-Western) actors. The case of film is usually pointed to as the most stark and clearest example of unbridled American dominance of global culture, insofar as Hollywood is the biggest (by all accounts whether monetary or in terms of market size) player in the international film industry. Thus, the case for globalization as homogenization can most unambiguously be made for film.

A host of other assumptions accompany this line of thinking however. Not only is it assumed that given its tremendous market size dominance will American film be consumed in most national markets, but the added assumption of an incompatibility between Hollywood global culture and global cultural exports from other regions of the world is also smuggled in. From this “globalization as homogeneity” approach (Tomlinson 1999), Hollywood movies are seen as driving out, and excluding, film products produced in other regions of the world (Schiller 1992; Boyd-Barrett 1977). The picture is therefore of a largely centralized and concentrated consumption field, which mirrors the disproportionate concentration at the level of production. From this perspective the structure of the consumption market therefore should be composed of a preponderant element or dimension completely dominated by American film, surrounded by much lesser and smaller consumption dimensions representative of the smaller regional film industries. Furthermore, American film consumption should be seen to be incompatible (by showing negative correlations with for instance) other forms of global film culture consumption (i.e. European, Asian, etc.), which should be relegated to a smaller, more peripheral explanatory role.

As we have seen, recently formulated regional vitality and multicentric approaches to the study of cultural globalization (Robertson 1990, 1995, 2004, Appiah 1996, Crane 2002) and the sociological approach to production industries derived from resource partitioning theory (Carroll
have different empirical implications. From these alternative perspectives, no straightforward conclusions can be derived from market structure to the structure of the “consumption field” (Zukin and Maguire 2004). In particular, from the point of view of resource partitioning theory, highly concentrated markets can in fact be perfectly compatible with the vitality of alternative (smaller) culture production organizations in the same industry, insofar as those products can develop, nurture and institutionalize identity categories that clearly differentiate them from the market-dominant fare, thus providing them with an important resource that helps them carve a distinct portion of the resource space (the latent multidimensional space of consumers’ tastes and preferences) away from competition from the market leader (Peli and Nooteboom 1999).

Transferring this insight to the global film industry is straightforward. As noted by Cowen (2002: 73-101) what appears to have happened in the global film industry after the post-war decline of the European film industry and the post 1960s emergence of the “blockbuster” as Hollywood’s staple product, is that European film (and other regional film making industries) began to specialize in more intellectually demanding, artistic fare, which could not easily be replicated in Hollywood, producing a mutually beneficial trading system where the U.S. imports arthouse films from Europe and other regions of the world even as they are the dominant exporters of film in the world (a national consumption pattern that is probably common to other economically advantaged societies). Furthermore, by all accounts both “Bollywood”, the Hong Kong and Japanese film based industries continue to grow in both global and regional scope and influence, taking advantage of their greater access to information regarding the tastes of their immediate local and regional markets, allowing
them to provide those audiences with forms of entertainment that cannot be matched by Hollywood fare, which is in the language of resource partitioning theory, constrained by “generalist” identity codes (similar to large brewers in the U.S. vis a vis microbreweries [Carroll and Swaminathan 2000]) which prevent its primary global product (action-oriented blockbusters) from acquiring any type of regional or idiosyncratic features that would make them tied to local specificities.

This is consistent with the fact that the U.S. is not only one of the top three exporters of film, but is also one of the top three film (and other audiovisual cultural products) importers, as shown in Table 6. While the U.S. had the world’s fourth largest domestic film industry for the 1988-1998 period (behind India, Hong Kong and the Philippines), the U.S. was also the fourth largest importer of foreign films, behind Japan, Spain and the small Andean country of Ecuador. Furthermore the other large-scale domestic producers that are not as economically advantaged as the U.S., (China, India and to a lesser extent the Philippines) display a large imbalance between their domestic production standing and their overall rates of openness toward global film culture. Japan in contrast, not only has one of the most

\[\text{11F} 12\] Furthermore the other large-scale domestic producers that are not as economically advantaged as the U.S., (China, India and to a lesser extent the Philippines) display a large imbalance between their domestic production standing and their overall rates of openness toward global film culture. Japan in contrast, not only has one of the most

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\[12\] The case of Ecuador neatly fits the media imperialism hypothesis (at least in the case of film). In fact Ecuador could be the poster-boy for a media imperialism argument; while Ecuador had only the 46th ranked domestic film industry for the 1988-1998 period (averaging only 4 domestic films per year) it imported 510 films in the year 1995 alone, which puts it in the number two spot behind Japan. However, while the case of Ecuador appears favorable to the media imperialism thesis, the overall pattern of results does not as we will see below. The correlation between domestic production rank and foreign film import rank is small but positive \((r=0.21, p<0.04)\) for 98 countries. This is in contrast to the media imperialism thesis, which predicts a steep negative correlation between these two ranks.
active domestic film industries (5th overall), but was the number five importer for the year 1995.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>Domestic Film Production rank 1988-1998</th>
<th>International Film Import rank 1995</th>
<th>Domestic-Import Rank Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes Hong Kong

The situation is similar when we look at the average trade across all types of cultural products, as shown in Figure 2, with data obtained from the UNESCO (2005). Here we can see that the countries with the most favorable trade balance are both European countries, Germany and the United Kingdom, and that the U.S. is a net importer of global culture. One may argue that this is due to the fact that European countries are able to “resist globalization” by imposing political restrictions on the flows of cultural goods across their borders. However, this is not consistent with the data. France, the European country with the strictest restrictions on cultural trade, displays an unfavorable trade balance, while the U.K., which its comparatively more laissez faire orientation to the global market does not. It is clear that the strength of the European countries in the global cultural market comes from their role as the world’s cultural export leaders. As noted in UNESCO (2005: 9), the EU 15,
were responsible for more than half of the cultural exports in the world (51.8%), while the North American region’s share of the global cultural export market declined from 25% in 1994 to 16.9% in 2002. This comparatively uneven trade balance between the rest of the world and the U.S. is inexplicable from the point of view of cultural imperialism approaches which posit a one-way flow of American culture to other regions of the world. Regional vitality accounts of cultural globalization are consistent with the resource partitioning formulation. In addition, the fact that India, Japan, France and the United Kingdom figure as some of the largest exporters of film suggest that the overwhelming centralization of the industry has completely drowned out alternative forms of production. Thus, while the case for cultural globalization as “Americanization” appears easy to make when considering certain industries in isolation (for instance the U.S. continues to have a tremendous trade imbalance in its favor vis a vis the EU when it comes to television exports, UNESCO (2005: 48), on the whole, the idea of cultural globalization as implying a one-way flow from the U.S. to the rest is implausible.
What is the structure of the international consumption market in film? To answer this question, I use data from the *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook*, which catalogues for 68 countries (the U.S. not included) the number of films imported from the top nine of the major exporting countries. To smooth-out short term fluctuations I use the average number of films imported from each of the countries from the period 1995-1999. I use an exploratory factor analytic approach, using the logged number of films imported into each of the 68 countries from each of the nine major exporters (and a tenth residual category of “other”) as indicators. The covariance among these various export flows can then be decomposed into various partially orthogonal consumption dimensions which can give an idea of the shape.
and structure of the global film consumption field (Zukin and Maguire 2004) across the 68 nations.

If the media imperialism account is correct, we should observe that the demand structure of international film should be dominated by a single U.S. consumption factor, with much smaller subsidiary dimensions accounting for the residual association among film export flows. If the regional vitality and resource partitioning explanation is on the right track on the other hand, we should find 1) a much smaller degree of concentration than that predicted under the media imperialism hypothesis, with the U.S. dominant but no excluding other specialist Western producers and with other regional exports markets displaying smaller (but still substantial) ability to account for the association that remains after the main U.S. dominated factor is accounted for; and 2) we should also observe no incompatibility between Hollywood imports and imports from other countries, especially European film. That is, contrary to the homogenization thesis, and consonant with the resource partitioning explanation, we should find that countries that are high consumers of Hollywood fare are also high consumers of more aesthetically oriented European imports (Cowen 2002).

Table 7 shows the results of a full decomposition (by way of a principal components analysis) of the correlation matrix of average film imports from each of the 10 major exporters for the year 1995 to 1999. Contrary to what we would expect from the media imperialism account the first principal factor hardly explains the majority of the covariance among the various exporters, accounting for only 36% of the total variance. This indicates that the structure of the consumption field is much less centralized than what we would expect if we extrapolated from the dominance of Hollywood in terms of sheer production. Furthermore the second, third and fourth subsidiary factors, which explain the association
left net of the first principal factors are hardly negligible, account for a cumulative 38% of the total covariance.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor1</td>
<td>3.612</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor2</td>
<td>1.579</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor3</td>
<td>1.373</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor4</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor5</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor6</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor7</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor8</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor9</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor10</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is the structure of the factors? Table 8 show the factor loadings for each of the indicators obtained from a principal components factor analysis, in which I retain the first five components, I subject the factor scores to an oblique rather than orthogonal rotation which means that the factor dimensions are allowed to be correlated (as the assumption of uncorrelated country-level cultural consumption dimensions in the world film market seems *prima facie* unrealistic). The first five factors explain (under the assumption that five factors are enough to account for the data) a full 91% of the association among the different exporting countries.

U.S. film imports load strongly on the first dominant factor as would be expected from the media imperialism perspective (0.77). However, contrary to this view, imports from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and to a lesser extent Italian imports, also load on the first dominant factor and have (in the case of French and British imports) stronger loadings on this
factor than U.S. imports. This suggests that the consumption of Hollywood film is not incompatible with the consumption of the more specialized and non-mass audience (highbrow) oriented exports from the European film industry. Furthermore, insofar as none of the other exporting countries has negative loadings on the first factor, the factor analysis results indicate that this represents a characteristically open approach to global film culture, which is dominated by Western cultural fare, but which does not necessarily reject cultural products from other world regions. Similar to findings from surveys at the individual level of analysis which usually find a dominant “omnivore” consumption factor characterized by consumption breadth and relative weakness of cultural dislikes (DiMaggio 1987; Bryson 1996; Peterson 1992). These results suggest, following the sociostructural model, that this first factor combining consumption of Hollywood film and Western European film should be characteristic of the most socially and economically advantaged societies.

Consistent with the regional vitality perspective, I find that the four factors which account for the residual association left after the main factor is accounted for are dominated by the secondary global film producers of regional scope. Thus, Japanese imports dominate the second factor, Russian imports characterize the third factor (opposed to American imports), Hong Kong imports correspond to the fourth factor and Indian imports are characteristic of the fourth factor. However contrary to the media imperialism thesis, these subsidiary dimensions account for a non-negligible portion of the variance.

The sociostructural approach predicts that the most socially and economically advantaged societies should be the ones more likely to consume both Hollywood and Western European film culture, while the media imperialism approach predicts that the countries most likely to score high on any factor dominated by U.S. imports should be the least powerful societies in the world. This last expectation however, seems prima facie implausible, since as we have shown, there is no incompatibility between the consumption of Hollywood culture and the consumption of Western European film. Figure 3, which shows the scatter plot of a measure of economic development (the “GDP Index” obtained from the 2000 Human Development Indicators Report) and the score on the first film imports factor, confirms this expectation. The results show an unambiguous positive association between economic development and score on the first film import factor (r=0.64, p<0.01). The richer the country the more likely it is to import Hollywood film and more aesthetically demanding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
<th>Factor 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Film Imports</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Film Imports</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Film Imports</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Film Imports</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Film Imports</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Film Imports</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Film Imports</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Film Imports</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong Film Imports</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Film Imports</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Logged number of films imported from each country.
Western European film products.\textsuperscript{14} Not surprisingly, almost all of the countries toward the upper right hand side of the diagram are Western European. However, we do find some other economically advantaged non-Western European countries in this group (South Korea, Slovenia, Hong Kong, Czech Republic, Australia, New Zealand), suggesting that the first factor is not driven by a Western European regional market dynamic, but is more closely tied with sociostructural changes that transform the consumption habits of the local populations of the richer societies in the world.

\textsuperscript{14} A proponent of the media imperialism perspective might object that this is not a fair test of that hypothesis, which instead predicts that it is the \textit{proportion} of the domestic market that is captured by American film that will be negatively correlated with the country’s economic position in the world system. However, as shown in the supplementary analysis displayed in the appendix, the opposite is the case. The best predictor of the proportion of the market captured by American imports for 70 countries, is national income, as measured by the GDP index, which has a positive association with the national consumption of Hollywood film, a result more consistent with cosmopolitan global culture perspectives and the sociostructural account proposed here.
goods, and the most dominant richer countries in the world, being primarily exporters of asymmetric, with low income countries playing the role of primary net importers of cultural goods. What is the structure of international trade in cultural goods? According to the media imperialist approach, we should find an international cultural trade system that is highly asymmetric, with low income countries playing the role of primary net importers of cultural goods, and the most dominant richer countries in the world, being primarily exporters of culture. The sociostructural approach on the other hand, suggests that the richer the
country, the more likely it is that it will be a net consumer (and therefore importer) of global culture, thus suggesting that the cultural trade balance of the most developed economies should be closer to even, or even imbalanced toward imports. Furthermore, insofar as local and domestic culture is more relevant for the modal social situation of the inhabitants of the least developed countries and due to increasing demands from the upper middle class elites for “authentic” forms of nonwestern global culture (Hannerz 1990), the world’s poorest nations should be net exporters and not net importers of cultural goods, especially when it comes to artisanal, or other craft (non mass-produced) forms of culture.

Data for trade in cultural goods were obtained from UNESCO (2005). To test whether the structure of global cultural trade separates cultural exporters from cultural importers in a strict way (as predicted by the media imperialism approach) or if, as suggested by the sociostructural account, the countries who dominate the cultural export markets are also the most avid consumers of global culture, I take measures of cultural trade (imports and exports) for seven broadly defined types of cultural goods, which include information for 123 national societies in 2002, and subject them to a principal components analysis. The media imperialism approach predicts that a clearly defined import factor should be found that is partially orthogonal to the export factor, while the sociostructural account predicts that most indicators should load on a single dominant import/export factor.

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15 Feature films are excluded from these cultural trade statistics.
16 A complete detailed list of the UNESCO classification of cultural goods is shown in Table 28 of the appendix.
The results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 9. Consistent with the sociostructural account, a single dominant factor explains the covariance between all of the indicators of global cultural trade. The first factor has an eigenvalue of 11.9, and explains 85% of the covariance among the fourteen indicators, in comparison to an eigenvalue of 0.47 and a 3% proportion of variance explained for the second most important factor. Looking at the factor loadings for each indicator in the last two columns of the table, I find that in accordance with the sociostructural account, the first factor is a combined import/export factor, with strong positive loadings for all indicators of cultural trade and culture consumption (the lowest loading is 0.86 for exports of “heritage” goods).

Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of the country’s score on the first factor and their GDP index score obtained from the Human Development Indicators Yearbook. The association is strong and positive (r=0.73), suggesting that the primary culture producer and consumers are the world’s most economically advantaged societies. The figure also reveals interesting deviations from the general pattern: Mexico, China and India engage in much more cultural trade than would be expected given their income levels (China and India no doubt benefiting from their strong position as regional culture production leaders and Mexico from its placement in the North American trading complex and its position as regional popular culture leader in Latin America on the strength of its music, television and cinema products); rich oil monarchies such as Bahrain and Qatar engage in much less cultural trade than would be predicted by their income levels alone in contrast. In a similar way among the ultra-rich countries, I find that the U.S. the U.K., France and Germany engage in higher than expected levels of cultural trade given their GDP index score alone.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Prop. Var. Explained</th>
<th>Cumulative Explained</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>11.91562</td>
<td>0.8511</td>
<td>0.8511</td>
<td>Heritage (Imports)</td>
<td>0.9097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>0.47473</td>
<td>0.0339</td>
<td>0.8850</td>
<td>Book (Imports)</td>
<td>0.9392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3</td>
<td>0.36951</td>
<td>0.0264</td>
<td>0.9114</td>
<td>Newspaper (Imports)</td>
<td>0.9156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 4</td>
<td>0.23279</td>
<td>0.0166</td>
<td>0.9280</td>
<td>Other Print (Imports)</td>
<td>0.9387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 5</td>
<td>0.17160</td>
<td>0.0123</td>
<td>0.9403</td>
<td>Recorded (Imports)</td>
<td>0.9449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 6</td>
<td>0.15708</td>
<td>0.0112</td>
<td>0.9515</td>
<td>Visual Arts (Imports)</td>
<td>0.9363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 7</td>
<td>0.14054</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>0.9616</td>
<td>Audio-visual (Imports)</td>
<td>0.9506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 8</td>
<td>0.11052</td>
<td>0.0079</td>
<td>0.9695</td>
<td>Heritage (Exports)</td>
<td>0.8663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 9</td>
<td>0.10578</td>
<td>0.0076</td>
<td>0.9770</td>
<td>Book (Exports)</td>
<td>0.9360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 10</td>
<td>0.08660</td>
<td>0.0062</td>
<td>0.9832</td>
<td>Newspaper (Exports)</td>
<td>0.9059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 11</td>
<td>0.08080</td>
<td>0.0058</td>
<td>0.9890</td>
<td>Other Print (Exports)</td>
<td>0.9275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 12</td>
<td>0.07165</td>
<td>0.0051</td>
<td>0.9941</td>
<td>Recorded (Exports)</td>
<td>0.9338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 13</td>
<td>0.04223</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
<td>0.9971</td>
<td>Visual Arts (Exports)</td>
<td>0.9050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 14</td>
<td>0.04054</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>Audio-visual (Exports)</td>
<td>0.9024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4. Bivariate association between the cultural trade import/export factor score and the GDP index scores for 123 countries.

However, a more direct engagement with the media imperialism account must address the issue of trade imbalance, in addition to that of overall rates of cultural trade. Figure 5 shows the “cultural trade coverage ratio”, of groups of countries classified according to the World Bank’s GNI classification scheme (detailed in the appendix) for the period covering the years
The figures show the coverage ratio pertaining to three major types of cultural goods in the global market: audiovisual media (covering film, photos and video games), visual arts (paintings, sculptures, drawings, lithographs, etc.) and recorded media (records, CDs and tapes). If the media imperialism thesis is correct, we should observe a clear arrangement of countries into net exporters and net importers according to income level in each cross-section and an overtime deterioration of the trade balance among low income countries, with their coverage ratio becoming more and more weighted toward imports over exports (thus declining over time).

Neither the patterns of results pertaining to film or visual arts trade is consistent with the media imperialism account. In the case of Audiovisual media and visual arts, I find that low and middle income countries tend to be net exporters of cultural products vis a vis high income countries, who tend to be net importers of the same products, a situation that is improving over time in the case of audiovisual media for countries classified as “lower middle income” by the world bank (these are countries, such as Brazil and China [when Hong Kong is counted as part of China] that have recently improved their position in world cultural markets by developing strong regional cultural export economies). Thus the results (in cross-section or over time) are not consistent with the media imperialism account, but are consistent with the sociostructural approach.

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17 The coverage ratio (CR) is defined as: CR=(X/M)*100, where X=exports and M=imports (UNESCO 2005: 70).
18 Audiovisual media does not cover feature films however.
19 India is counted as a low income economy in this classification.
When it comes to recorded media, the results are closer to what the media imperialism account would lead us to expect. In terms of trade music-related cultural products, all countries save for those classified as “high income” are net importers. However, contrary to the media imperialism thesis, high income economies are *not net exporters, but have an equitable balance of trade* centered at around the null value of 2 ($\log(100)=2$). This is consistent with the sociostructural account which construes the most economically advantaged countries in the world as active culture consumers, as much as they are culture producers. One over-time pattern that is consistent with the media in the case of global musical trade, consists of the observed deterioration of market position over time observed for low income economies which appear to go from a balanced trade position in the early 1990s to a fairly imbalanced position in the early 2000s, although this does not appear to be due to the fact that high income economies are improving their position as net exporters.
Table 10 shows the results of a series of log-gamma generalized linear models predicting the overall CR score for all of the countries for which data on both imports and exports was
available. The results show that there is important heterogeneity on whether rich and poor countries will be net importers and/or net exporters of culture depending on the type of cultural good in question. Holding constant country size, I find that rich countries tend to be, consistent with the media imperialism account, net exporters of audiovisual material (film primarily) and print (books). However, contrary to the media imperialism thesis, there is no difference between rich and poor countries in the case of music, with the coefficient estimate in the opposite negative direction (t=-0.93). Furthermore in the case of more craft oriented goods such as visual arts and “heritage” cultural products, high income countries are net importers, providing a more complicated picture of the flows of cultural goods in the global market from that provided by the media imperialism paradigm, which tends to focus solely on the flows of popular culture industry products (film, television, popular music), but neglects cultural flows of a non-mass produced nature.

Table 10. Log-gamma generalized linear models of the country-level predictors of the coverage trade ratio for selected types of cultural goods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Heritage</th>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Recorded Media</th>
<th>Visual Arts</th>
<th>Audiovisual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP per capita (2001)</td>
<td>-1.0681**</td>
<td>1.0634**</td>
<td>-0.1778</td>
<td>-0.6567**</td>
<td>1.6210**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.42)</td>
<td>(4.79)</td>
<td>(-0.93)</td>
<td>(-4.59)</td>
<td>(2.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged Population (2001)</td>
<td>-0.1303</td>
<td>0.4687**</td>
<td>0.0410</td>
<td>0.5926**</td>
<td>0.9904*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.51)</td>
<td>(3.60)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(7.48)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>15.8722**</td>
<td>-6.9501**</td>
<td>5.8534**</td>
<td>9.3625**</td>
<td>-12.1822*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.44)</td>
<td>(-3.44)</td>
<td>(3.38)</td>
<td>(7.12)</td>
<td>(-2.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deviance</td>
<td>307.64**</td>
<td>222.26**</td>
<td>393.59</td>
<td>239.68**</td>
<td>568.20**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 Log-gamma models are appropriate when the response variable is an unbounded, always positive, and usually highly right-skewed variable such as income or hospital visits (Hilbe 2001). The coverage ratios computed for each cultural good type display these characteristics.
3.3. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have reviewed the strength and weaknesses of the most pervasive systemic approach to the study of cultural globalization in contemporary social science, the media imperialism hypothesis, and have shown that it is found wanting in both analytical and (even more crucially) empirical grounds. I have shown that the media imperialism thesis shares the same set of assumptions and weaknesses of its long lost cousin at the intrasocietal level, mass culture theory, and as such must be replaced by a different theoretical framework that holds a greater degree of verisimilitude with the observed facts. The stark conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the media imperialism paradigm simply cannot explain the cross-national patterns of flows and consumption of global culture in the contemporary situation.

This critique of the media imperialism approach has been made by others, especially those engaging in focused ethnographic observations of local patterns of consumption of global culture in various national locales. However, very few had shown that the media imperialism thesis failed in what should be its own playground: the explanation of highly aggregated patterns of culture consumption across nation-states.

Furthermore, while most empirically driven ethnographic researchers had provided crucial empirical evidence that created doubt about the overall usefulness of the media imperialism thesis, few had gone on a more constructive route, in an attempt to provide a serious theoretical alternative to the media imperialism account that retained its analytic scope and systemic ambition. In this chapter, I have drawn on research on the sociostructural
consequences of recent trends toward urbanization, state centralization, the rise of mass
education and the advent of what some have referred as the “network society” to provide an
alternative macro-structural perspective that is compatible with the evidence at hand. I have
shown that this perspective can help us explain why the most socially and economically
advantaged countries in the world are the most attuned to global cultural flows and the
consumption of non-local culture, a pattern of results deeply at odds with the predictions
gleaned from the media imperialism perspective.
4. IS OMNIVORE TASTE A COMPONENT OF WORLD CULTURE?

EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN

4.1. Abstract

According to world polity institutionalism, an emerging world culture, centered on the value
of the individual as a “citizen of the world” has taken hold in most advanced industrial
societies. To date, there has been no systematic study of the relationship between broader
forms of subjective citizenship such as those of interest to institutional theorists, and the
patterns of cultural taste and consumption of concern to sociologists of culture. Using data
from the 1994 and 1995 CIRES surveys conducted in Spain, this chapter attempts to fill this
gap. I analyze the relationship between three different forms of subjective citizenship--
national (Spain), international (European community) and postnational (world
community)—and the propensity to display omnivorous patterns of cultural choice and to
draw symbolic boundaries through the expression of cultural dislikes. If both subjective
connections to the world polity and the turn toward inclusive forms of cultural taste and
consumption emanate from the same global cultural logic, there should be a positive
relationship between those patterns of geographic identification most closely connected to
the world polity and cultural omnivoroussness, and a negative association between world
polity identification and taste exclusiveness. Regression results support this view: in relation
to subnational forms of subjective citizenship, postnational identification is positively related
to broad consumption and negatively associated with exclusionary taste patterns. Further,
the effects of traditional cultural capital predictors are shown to be mediated by the
individual link to world culture. The results are discussed in the context of situating the cultural capital paradigm and the somewhat limited model of the social actor inherited from Bourdieu within the wider framework of an institutional theory of the production of modern personhood and legitimate individual agency through cultural taste and consumption.

4.2. Cultural Taste and World Culture

As was argued in chapter 2, modern industrialized polities have converged into an increasingly isomorphic world cultural model that is transmitted and reproduced through legitimate state (and more recently international) institutions, of which the educational system is a prime example (Benavot et al 1991; Meyer et al 1992). In addition, it is well-established that the cultural tools used to decode legitimate culture and the arts are acquired largely through exposure to formal (especially higher) education which “…increases the extent to which persons are trained in artistic classification systems and the ease with which they appropriate new artistic genres” (DiMaggio 1987: 447).

If this is the case, then there should be a direct association between certain key tenets of rationalized global culture and the accumulation of cultural capital in the form of less exclusivist taste for, and probability of, consumption of diverse forms of legitimated cultural forms (DiMaggio 1991a). One of the main components of world culture is its emphasis on an individualist ontology in which the person is seen as the primary locus of agency (as opposed to non-empirical or corporate actors) and as transcending local attachments and identification with primordial communities (Anderson 1991; Jepperson 2000; Meyer et al 1994; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). This rationalized vision of the individual as citizen of the world lies at the center of global culture (Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999). If this is correct,
then we would expect that translocal subjective citizenship, especially identification with the world community, should be related to omnivore consumption. However we should not expect identification with the nation to be related to broader patterns of consumption, as this sort of communal idea forms part of an older, nationalist, nineteenth century pre-global culture (Anderson 1991). It is also reasonable to expect the effects of the two forms of supranational subjective citizenship (world and European) not to be the same; institutional theory leads us to expect that the connection between dominant modes of enacting agency (such as the display of omnivore taste) should be more strongly related to postnational identification with the world community in comparison to international identification with a nascent continental polity such as the European Union. Because the E.U. is both a relatively late entrant into global culture and represents an extension of the older logic of nationalism, it should be more weakly connected to the individualist global culture in which such corporate structures become delegitimated as proper vehicles of political action and sources of ritual solidarity:

**H1: Individuals who think of themselves as citizens of the World are more likely to consume a wider variety of cultural forms than individuals who think of themselves as citizens of the European Union or as citizens of Spain.**

4.3. World Culture And Cultural Dislikes

As Bryson (1996) and Fridman and Ollivier (2002) have noted, following and extending the work of Bourdieu (1984) and Peterson (1992), the primary form of status distinction among the more advantaged class fractions in modern societies appears to have become one wedded to an ideology of apparent openness to a wide variety of cultural forms and
expressions of cultural taste. This is in direct contrast to the traditional closure formulation inherited from Weber (1968) and Bourdieu (1984), which emphasizes distinction and the upper class rejection of more “vulgar” lower class tastes (Simmel 1957). For Bryson (1996), punning on Bourdieu’s initial terminology, this new cultural currency may function as a type of “multicultural capital”, while Fridman and Ollivier refer the same phenomenon as “conspicuous openness” as a reference to the popular notion developed by Bourdieu’s notable predecessor (Veblen [1912]1945). Using the institutional model outlined above, I submit that the rise of openness and tolerance as the predominant taste culture of the younger upper middle class is not disconnected from the rise of a particular conception of the equality value of all cultural expressions associated with the individualized universalism of world culture (Boli and Thomas 1999). The basic component of this universalist model of individuality consists of respect for personhood as the “master identity” which supersedes all other more specific racial, national, ethnic, etc., identifications (Frank and Meyer 2002). Consequently, taste distinctions based on those older forms of corporate or group-related differentiations among individuals become delegitimized, leading to a lower likelihood of expression of exclusionary taste judgments, and openness to a (selective) diversity of cultural experiences for those who identify with the world polity. It is in this sense that Frank and Meyer (2002: 93) contend that in the modern system, “tastes, like personhood, are equal.” If this is the case, then we should expect that the attitude of conspicuous openness should be more pronounced among those individuals closest to world culture. Thus, multicultural capital should be concentrated among those who seem to identify more with institutionalized patterns of individuality and agency in the cultural field. Conversely, as the distance between the individual and world cultural precepts increases, then we should expect
the more exclusionary attitude of the “univores” discussed in Bryson (1997) to be more prevalent:

**H2: Individuals who identify as citizens of the World are more likely to express a lesser number of cultural dislikes than individuals who think of themselves as citizens of the European Union, citizens of Spain or citizens of a subnational entity.**

4.4. World Culture And Traditional Predictors Of (Multi)Cultural Capital

What are the implications of an institutional formulation of cultural involvement and symbolic boundary drawing for traditional views regarding the predictors of cultural capital and judgments of taste? If the recent spread of institutionalized models of individual agency that dictate certain patterns of involvement in the leisure culture realm constitute an alternative way of linking persons to cultural choice and taste patterns, then we should expect that the more “realist” predictors of cultural participation, such as parental class background, current class standing, education, and measures of availability of cultural outlets at the location where the individual resides, should be more strongly associated with “omnivore” patterns of cultural choice or less exclusive variants of taste for those individuals who identify with some more local form of imagined collectivity. Among those more closely connected to world culture, that is those who are more broad in their subjective identification (such as “citizens of the world”), we should expect a weaker association between realist predictors of cultural (or “multicultural”) capital and inclusive patterns of cultural involvement and cultural taste.
This is consistent with previous research on the process of institutionalization (Strang and Meyer 1993; Tolbert and Zucker 1983), which predicts a looser connection between actor-level (realist) attributes and the likelihood of displaying a specific behavior, schema or practice when the actor in question is embedded in the relevant cultural and normative environment. If the institutional approach proposed here is correct, then we should observe a similar process at work for individuals who are already connected to world culture. In sum, for individuals who are “disconnected” from world cultural models (in this case, those who identify with a local or national geographic entity) cultural capital predictors should have their strongest effects; for those who are already connected to world culture, and the putatively standardized models of individuality that it offers, standard cultural capital predictors should have a weaker effect. One possible exception to this pattern is individual educational attainment, since, as argued above, both world cultural models and tacit cultural competences may be acquired through exposure to standardized school curricula.

**H3: For individuals who think of themselves as citizens of the world, there is a weaker association between traditional (class background, respondent education, income, etc.) and structural (availability of culture producing organizations) predictors of cultural capital, and more inclusive patterns of culture consumption and less exclusive patterns of cultural dislikes.**

4.5. Data And Measures

The data for this study were obtained from the April of 1994 and February of 1995 surveys conducted by the Center for Research on Social Reality (CIRES 1994, 1995) in Spain. The CIRES survey series consisted of a series of questionnaires administered in Spain from 1990 to
1996, including special topic modules. Each survey is composed of a stratified (according to the size of autonomous regions and municipalities) random sample of all non-institutionalized Spanish citizens aged 18 and over. The studies that I selected concerned themselves with “Culture as Consumption” and “Leisure Culture”. Respondents were asked about how they spent their leisure time, and their preferences regarding the movies, the opera, galleries, and other cultural activities. They were also asked questions regarding their attitudes toward national and international political developments. I pooled the samples from the 1994 and 1995 surveys, yielding a final sample of 2400 respondents. For more details on the sampling procedures, and the makeup of the questionnaire consult CIRES (1994, 1995).

4.6. Dependent Variables

4.6.1. Omnivore Culture Consumption.

The culture modules of the 1994 and 1995 CIRES survey also contained a number of items that asked respondents whether they had engaged in various activities during the past year. Respondents are coded as 1 if they engaged in the activity in the past year and zero otherwise. I construct an omnivore consumption scale (standardized to range between zero and one by dividing by the maximum) by adding the binary responses to the following nine items (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82): 1) going to the museum, 2) going to art exhibits, 3) going to a monument, 4) going to a national park, 5) going to a book fair, 6) going to craft fairs, 7) going to a trade fair, 8) going to lectures, and 9) going to music or theatre festivals. This set of activities is similar to that used by Lopez Sintas and Garcia Alvarez (2002) in their analysis of omnivore culture consumption in Spain using the single 1994 survey. These activities
have a good representation of both popular (crafts and trade fairs, musical festivals) and more elite (highbrow) activities such as book fairs, art exhibits and lectures on intellectual topics.

4.6.2. Number Of Cultural Dislikes

The culture modules of the 1994 and 1995 CIRES survey also contained a series of questions that tapped the respondents liking of a variety of culture and leisure related activities. Respondents were asked to select from an 11-point semantic-differential scale (ranging from zero to ten) with “I don’t like it at all” and “I like it a lot” at the extremes and 5 as the midpoint. I count the respondent as not liking a particular cultural form if she gives it score of four or below. I utilize taste data that were collected for 14 forms of cultural participation and media consumption: 1) visiting galleries 2) visiting museums, 3) visiting historical cities, 4) visiting monuments, 5) going to the theater, 6) going to the opera, 7) going to the movies, 8) attending general cultural events, 9) reading the newspaper, 10) reading magazines, 11) reading “general” books and 12) reading “specific” books, 13) watching television and 14) listening to the radio. I then constructed an additive scale by adding the binary variables corresponding to each item, where one indicates expressing dislike for it. The “cultural dislikes” scale shows good inter-reliability among items with a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.89, and ranges from 0 to 14, with zero indicating expressing no dislikes and fourteen as showing dislike for all cultural forms.

4.6.3. Subjective Citizenship

The main independent variable, a measure of subjective citizenship, was obtained from an item that formed part of a recurring module on “Supranational Identification” (CIRES
1994, 1995). The specific question reads: “We all feel more attached to some groups than to others. More concretely, and from this list of geographic spaces, which do you feel more identified with? I mean, do you feel above all to be a citizen of 1) your town or city, 2) your province, 3) your autonomous community, 4) Spain, 5) Europe (EEC), 6) The West, 7) The World, 8) None.” Figure 6 shows the distributions of respondents in each subjective citizenship category.

Figure 6. Percentage of Respondents in Each Subjective Citizenship Category

More than two thirds of respondents (68.8%) identify with some sort of subnational entity. This is not surprising given the multi-ethnic history of the Iberian Peninsula, which has been home since medieval times to a host of different ethnic and cultural enclaves. Little more
than a fifth (22.6%) of all respondents report a purely national (Spanish) subjective citizenship. Only a relatively small minority report feeling a connection to a community that supersedes the nation state, with 2.06% feeling themselves to be citizens of the European Union or the West. It is notable that the number of respondents that say that they feel themselves to be “citizens of the world” is more than triple this last amount (5.7%). This indicates that world citizenship is a much more entrenched communal identity than the more recent political invention of the European union or the older “civilizational” divide that separated The West from “the rest”, supporting the claims of institutional theory regarding the informal establishment of world citizenship as a phenomenon endemic to a modernizing global culture and predating the formation of more recent international conglomerates (Meyer et al 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997).

I created three binary variables from the original geographic identification item: 1) national equals one when the respondent reports thinking of him or herself as citizen of Spain and zero otherwise. 2) International equals one when the respondent reports a political identification with either the European Union or The West and zero in any other case. Finally, 3) postnational equals one for those who claim world citizenship. The rest of the respondents (including those that respond “none”, who are less that one percent of the sample) are considered to have a local subjective citizenship and they represent the reference category.

4.6.4. Class And Status Indicators

I include the following set of variables to account for the respondent’s location in the class and prestige/status order: 1) Respondent’s income is reported as monthly income in categorical
form. There are nine income categories, ranging from a minimum 45,000 Spanish Pesetas (about $340 1995 U.S. Dollars) to 450,000 or more ($3,400 U.S. dollars) given that these surveys predated the introduction of the Euro (1999). 21 2) Respondent's Education is an ordinal that ranges from zero (unable to read) to 8 indicating the possession of an advanced (postgraduate) degree. 22 In order to take into account the intergenerational transmission of cultural resources and their well-documented effects on predicting high-status patterns of cultural choice (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Dumais 2002; Mohr and DiMaggio 1995) I use 3) Class Background is an eight-category ordinal variable that indexes the respondent’s father's education (mother’s education was not available) in the same scale as the respondent’s education. We should expect respondent’s who come from these types of more advantaged class backgrounds to be more likely to display high-status patterns of culture consumption.

4.6.5. Post-Fordist Identity Variables

Recent research in culture consumption and taste (Katz-Gerro 2002; Katz-Gerro and Shavit 2002) has brought attention to the issue of the effect of “Post-Fordist” symbolic identifications that go beyond traditional measures of class and status on patterns of cultural

21 The 9 income categories were recoded to equal their midpoint in the thousands. The “not applicable” category was treated as missing and replaced by the sample mean. In order to control for any estimation biases resulting from the mean replacement procedure, a dummy variable coded as one when the respondent was missing on income and zero otherwise, was added to each one of the regression models (not shown on tables).

22 In Spain primary education is free and compulsory (from age six to fourteen). Secondary school attendance optional, but students deciding not to attend secondary school have to attend vocational training until age sixteen.
choice. These include any form of group level identity, ranging from gender, to ethnicity and religion. In order to partial out the effect of these type of identifications from that of patterns of subjective citizenship, I include controls for 1) **Gender**, a binary variable with women coded as one; it is a commonplace in the literature to find that women report consuming and liking more cultural forms than men (Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000), so we should expect a similar result here. 2) **Religion** a dichotomous indicator that equals one if the respondent is Catholic and zero otherwise; and 3) **Ethnicity/Nationalist identity** consists of binary indicators that equal one if the respondent reports having either a “pure” basque or a “pure” Spanish identity with those who report more mixed identities as the base category. 23 If the association between cosmopolitanism and “multicultural capital” (Bryson 1996) obtains for these data, then we should expect strong ethnic or nationalist identifications to result in either narrower patterns of culture consumption and a higher number of cultural dislikes.

4.6.6. **Demographic And Structural Variables**

I also control for the traditional vectors of sociodemographic and structural variables, related to the characteristics of the respondent’s place of physical residence: 1) **Age** is a

23 This last measure is extracted from a five category item with the following categories: “only Spanish”, “more Spanish than Basque, equally Spanish and Basque”, “more [Basque] than Spanish”, and “only [Basque]”. Respondents are considered to have a local communcal identification if they answered “only [Basque]” and Spanish if they answered “only Spanish”. About 46% percent of respondents report identifying equally as Spanish and as members of their ethnic category. 26% say that they identify exclusively or almost exclusively with their ethnic or linguistic group, while 30% prefer an exclusive Spanish identity; the rest of the respondent’s were coded as either “don’t know” or missing.
continuous variable measured in years. 2) *City Size* is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 8 with 1 indicating that the respondent lives in a town of less than 2000 inhabitants and 8 for those respondents who live in Madrid or Barcelona. 3) *Geographic mobility* is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 3 with one indicating that the respondent resides in the province where she was born, 2 for those respondents who moved from the province of birth but who are living in the same province that they were living at age 15 and 3 for those respondents who are living in a province that is not the same as the one that they lived in at age 15. It is important to control for mobility, as mobile respondents may pick up cultural tastes as they come into contact with a more diverse range of social contacts (Relish, 1997). 4) *Marital status* is a binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent reports being married or cohabitating and zero otherwise. 5) *Household size* consists of the number of persons currently residing in the respondent’s household. 6) the *Availability of cultural outlets* scale is a scale obtained from adding the binary indicators of 12 items that asked respondents whether their town contained (among other outlets), a movie theatre, a theatre, a gallery, a library, a cultural center, an art foundation and a civic center. It is important to control for availability, since it is likely that respondents may develop tastes or report higher culture consumption rates simply as a function of the accessibility of organizations dedicated to the production of cultural objects and performances (DiMaggio 1991a; Peterson 1992). The scale ranges from 0 to 12. Finally, I control for *survey year*, in order to take into account any temporal trends present in the data. Table 11 shows the mean and standard deviations of all of the variables used in the analysis.

Table 11. Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables Used in the Analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>148.08</th>
<th>18.18</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>City Size</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Geographic Mobility</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Religious Identification</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ethnic Identification</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nationalist I.D.</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Monthly Income</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Father's Education</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Availability Scale</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measures to Values:

1. Reported Years of Age
2. Married or Cohabiting (1)
4. Eight category ordinal variable: 1) Less than 2,000, 2) 2,001-5,000, 3) 5,001-10,000, 4) 10,001-50,000, 5) 50,001-100,000, 6) 100,001-250,000, 7) more than 250,000, 8) Madrid or Barcelona.
5. Three-category ordinal variable: 1) never moved; 2) have not moved since age 15; 3) moved since age 15.
6. Female (1)
7. Catholic (1)
8. Think of self as “Only [local ethnic group]” (1)
9. Think of self as “Only Spanish” (1)
10. Nine-category ordinal variable: 1) unable to read, 2) able to read, 3) completed primary education, 4) completed first phase of post-primary education (for ages 6-12), 5) completed second phase of primary education (for ages 13-16), 6) completed first phase of secondary education, 7) completed second first of secondary education, 8) college degree, 9) post-graduate degree.
11. Nine-category ordinal variable: 1) 45,000 or less, 2) between 45,000 and 75,000, 3) between 75,000, and 100,000, 4) between 100,000 and 150,000, 5) between 150,000 and 200,000, 6) between 200,000 and 275,000, 7) between 275,000 and 350,000, 8) between 350,000 and 450,000, 9) more than 450,000.
12. Same as n. 10.
13. Interval variable ranging from 0 to 12.5.

4.7. Results

4.7.1. Subjective Citizenship and Omnivore Consumption
Figure 7 shows the mean score on the culture consumption and cultural dislike scales for groups of respondents classified according to their subjective citizenship category.

Consistent with the intuitions derived from the institutional account of the relationship between taste and world culture, we find that the mean number of cultural forms consumed goes up as we move to more encompassing categories of subjective citizenship (Europe, the world) and is the lowest for the most local identifiers (national, subnational). In a similar way, the number of cultural forms disliked goes from a high of 5.9 among those who identify as citizens of their town, to a low of about 2.5 (this mean difference is statistically significant) among those who identify with Europe or the West and the World. Notice that those who answer “none” are more alike subnational identifiers in terms of cultural dislikes, but consume culture at a higher rate than respondents who identify with the nation or a lower-level communal entity.
These bivariate results provide encouraging support for hypotheses 1 and 2. However, it is possible that these are spurious associations: perhaps international and postnational identifiers are more likely to have attained higher levels of education, are younger or come from more advantaged family backgrounds (factors traditionally associated with broader cultural tastes), and world culture is simply and epiphenomenon driven by these more basic variables. In order to tease out the net effect of world culture on patterns of cultural choice and taste, we have to partial out the effect of these confounding factors using multivariate analyses.
First I investigate whether there is a relationship between different forms of subjective geographic identification and broader patterns of cultural choice net of standard sociodemographic factors. The first model in table 12 shows the unstandardized coefficients corresponding to the regression of the culture consumption scale on arthe class and status indicators, the identity variables and the subjective citizenship variables. In support of hypothesis 1, the most translocal form of subjective citizenship does have a net effect on culture consumption: those who identify as “citizens of the world” are more likely to participate in a wider variety of cultural activities, in comparison to all other types of respondents. In terms of direct involvement in a wider range of cultural activities, international (those who identify with Europe or the West) and national (those who think of themselves as citizens of Spain) identifiers are no different from subnational identifiers, (who show subjective allegiances to their town, province or autonomous community). Therefore, the expectation that the effect of world citizenship would be stronger than that of international subjective citizenship is confirmed.

The effect of the class/status and identity variables on omnivore consumption is consistent with expectations and previous research in the cultural capital tradition, suggesting that the institutional and cultural capital models are not necessarily competing but complementary: coming from a more advantaged class background (as indexed by father’s education) increases cultural omnivoroussness, as does higher levels of educational attainment and income. The availability of cultural outlets also increases the breadth of cultural participation, indicating that culture-producing organizations do have an active role in determining patterns of cultural choice: as the availability of cultural outlets increases so does the propensity of respondents to consume a wider variety of cultural offerings. Finally,
older respondents and respondents who identify as exclusively Spanish and Catholic are less likely to participate in a diverse set of activities. This last effect confirms previous research on the importance of identity related variables such as religious tradition in determining certain lifestyle consumption patterns (Katz-Gerro and Shavit 2002).

Table 12. OLS Regression Models Showing the Effect of Subjective Citizenship on Culture Consumption and Cultural Taste.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Culture Consumption</th>
<th>Cultural Dislikes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0123**</td>
<td>0.0210**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.64)</td>
<td>(4.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married/Cohabiting</td>
<td>0.1204</td>
<td>-0.3636*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td>(-2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>-0.0509</td>
<td>0.1049*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.73)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Size</td>
<td>-0.0463</td>
<td>0.1090*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.85)</td>
<td>(2.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Mobility</td>
<td>0.0512</td>
<td>-0.4933**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(-3.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female=1)</td>
<td>0.0544</td>
<td>-0.4869**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(-3.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (Catholic=1)</td>
<td>-0.4923**</td>
<td>-0.3291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.90)</td>
<td>(-1.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Ethnic I.D.</td>
<td>0.1355</td>
<td>0.8857**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(3.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish I.D.</td>
<td>-0.2729**</td>
<td>0.8862**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.04)</td>
<td>(4.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.3461**</td>
<td>-0.5155**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.70)</td>
<td>(-14.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income</td>
<td>0.1539**</td>
<td>-0.2403**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.16)</td>
<td>(-4.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Education</td>
<td>0.0904**</td>
<td>-0.1803**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.89)</td>
<td>(-4.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Availability Scale</td>
<td>0.1009**</td>
<td>-0.2233**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.56)</td>
<td>(-7.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Year (1995=1)</td>
<td>0.3283**</td>
<td>0.1292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.15)</td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Subjective Citizenship</td>
<td>0.1193</td>
<td>-0.4081*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.7.2. Subjective Citizenship And Cultural Dislikes

As noted above, if “multicultural capital” can be considered part of the modern package of individuality and personhood, we should expect connection to world cultural models to inhibit the degree to which respondents engage in symbolic boundary drawing through cultural rejection. In order to test this contention, I regress the same set of independent variables shown in the first model of table 12 on the cultural dislike scale. As shown in the second model of table 12, subjective citizenship has strong effects on patterns of cultural dislikes. As suggested by the institutional hypothesis, broader patterns of subjective citizenship are associated with a lower likelihood of rejecting cultural forms. This indicates that there is a connection between the adoption of certain world cultural models and more “tolerant” attitudes toward varied cultural activities, or what Bryson (1996) refers to as “multicultural capital”, offering support for hypothesis 2.

In contrast to the culture consumption model, the cultural dislikes model shows strong effects for international identification in addition to postnational identification. Further, I also find a differentiation between those who identify with the nation and subnational identifiers, with those who think of themselves as citizens of Spain less likely to express dislike for more cultural forms than those with more local patterns of collective...
identification. Consequently, it appears that those who are the most likely to express a wider variety of dislikes are also those with the more local patterns of subjective citizenship. This suggests that the “univore” style of cultural expression (Bryson, 1997), which is characterized by a higher likelihood of rejection and dislike of certain cultural forms, may also be sustained by narrower geographic identifications (as in strong “state” based cultures of the American South [Bryson, 1997]). This impression is given more credence by the negative effect of geographic mobility on the propensity to express cultural dislikes: insofar as more mobile respondents lose their sense of strong attachment to land or territory, and are able to develop wider ranging networks of contacts, they are less likely to express a large number of cultural dislikes.

The institutional approach developed above leads us to expect a stronger effect for world citizenship in comparison to the other translocal patterns of citizenship (national and international). While the magnitude of the postnational citizenship coefficient appears to slightly exceed that of the international citizenship, F tests indicate that the coefficients are not statistically distinguishable. This suggests that the negative effect of international identification on the number of cultural dislikes is comparable to that of postnational identification. However, the fact that the postnational coefficient can be distinguished from the national coefficient (F=2.97, p<0.04, one tailed test) while the international coefficient cannot (F= 1.57, p<0.11, one tailed test), indicates that a model in which the international and national effects are equated would not lose a significant amount of explanatory power. This suggests that in their effects on cultural dislikes, the international logic is closer to the logic of national subjective citizenship than is the idea of world citizenship, as we would expect given the institutional argument.
Once again the effect of traditional cultural capital variables on the number of cultural dislikes mirror those of Bryson (1996) in her research on musical dislikes: more educated respondents and those who come from more advantaged class backgrounds are less likely to express a wide variety of cultural dislikes. Suggestively, I also find that the availability of cultural outlets reduces the propensity to express a large number of dislikes, indicating that part of the univore aesthetic of taste rejection, may be tied to the lack (or the homogeneity) of culture-producing organizations in the geographical regions where univores are more likely to be found. Since univores are more likely to possess lower levels of educational attainment and income, then this association may be mediated by the fact that low income and low education populations may be disproportionately concentrated in areas that lack access to culture-producing organizations.

Another important finding concerns the effect of strong ethnic and nationalist identification. Consistent with expectations of a negative association between cosmopolitanism and multicultural capital, respondents who think of themselves as “only Basque” or “only Spanish” are significantly more likely to express a wider range of cultural dislikes than respondents who have a mixed ethno-political identity (identification as Catholic has no significant effect). Also consistent with previous research is the finding that older respondents are more likely to express a wider range of cultural dislikes and that women are less likely to do the same as men (Bryson, 1996).

4.7.3. Predictors Of Cultural Capital And Patterns Of Subjective Citizenship

If identification with the world community constitutes part of an institutionalized complex that defines the proper way to enact individuality for modern persons, then we should expect
a looser association between “realist” predictors of omnivore consumption and multicultural capital among those individuals already connected to world culture (hypothesis 3).

Traditional cultural capital predictors, on the other hand, should have a stronger effect as the distance of the individual from world culture increases, or in this case as the pattern of subjective citizenship becomes more local. Is there any evidence that this is the case? Tables 13 and 14 show selected coefficients from six regression models identical to those shown in table 12, but estimated separately for three groups of respondents. The respondents are divided according to their subjective citizenship response: subnational identifiers (the reference category in the models shown in table 12) national identifiers and international identifiers as a single group, and postnational identifiers (those who claim world citizenship).24

If hypothesis 3 is correct, traditional cultural capital predictors, especially those associated with class background should have a weaker effect for this last group. The results shown in table 13 are mostly in agreement with this contention: class background as measured by father’s education is a significant predictor of culture consumption only among the most local (subnational) identifiers, and has a significantly negative association with the likelihood of expressing cultural dislikes only for subnational and national identifiers but not for postnational respondents (first two columns of table 14). Income follows a similar pattern, having a significant association with both omnivore consumption and cultural dislikes only

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24 I do not estimate a regression model for international identifiers only because they constitute less than 2% of the population in these data, and would result in an unacceptably low sample size.
for those respondents most disconnected from world culture (subnational citizens). The results for respondent’s education are more ambiguous however. In terms of predicting omnivore consumption, respondent’s education has the strongest effect for postnational identifiers, in contradiction to institutional expectations. However, something like this was to be expected, due to the fact that cultural capital theory and the institutional model both predict that higher levels of educational attainment would be associated with high-status patterns of cultural choice. For cultural dislikes on the other hand, the pattern followed by the effect of education is that predicted by the institutional model: for postnational respondents, the negative effect of education, while significant with at the 0.10 level, is also the weakest of the three groups, with the education coefficient being about 47% smaller in comparison to national identifiers and 54% smaller than the corresponding effect for subnational citizens.

Table 13. OLS Regression Models Showing the Effect of Traditional and Structural Cultural Capital Predictors on Culture Consumption Three Subsets of Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture Consumption</th>
<th>Subnational</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Postnational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female=1)</td>
<td>0.0632</td>
<td>0.0162</td>
<td>0.3247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-0.4088*</td>
<td>0.2627</td>
<td>-1.6236**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.16)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(-2.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Ethnic I.D.</td>
<td>0.0699</td>
<td>0.0995</td>
<td>0.5706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish I.D.</td>
<td>-0.2423</td>
<td>-0.1280</td>
<td>-1.2026*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.88)</td>
<td>(-0.73)</td>
<td>(-2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.3319**</td>
<td>0.3530**</td>
<td>0.4506**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.37)</td>
<td>(7.69)</td>
<td>(4.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income</td>
<td>0.2051**</td>
<td>0.0878</td>
<td>-0.0499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.17)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(-0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s Education</td>
<td>0.1050**</td>
<td>0.0663</td>
<td>0.1294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.99)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Availability</td>
<td>0.0959**</td>
<td>0.1233**</td>
<td>0.0856</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14. OLS Regression Models Showing the Effect of Traditional and Structural Cultural Capital Predictors on Cultural Dislikes Three Subsets of Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subnational</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Postnational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female=1)</td>
<td>-0.5812**</td>
<td>-0.2322</td>
<td>0.1312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.27)</td>
<td>(-0.78)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-0.2178</td>
<td>-0.8443</td>
<td>-0.1320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.66)</td>
<td>(-1.72)</td>
<td>(-0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Ethnic I.D.</td>
<td>0.7390*</td>
<td>2.8975*</td>
<td>-0.4668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(-0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish I.D.</td>
<td>0.9516**</td>
<td>0.8726**</td>
<td>-0.3146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.82)</td>
<td>(2.75)</td>
<td>(-0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.5459**</td>
<td>-0.4726**</td>
<td>-0.2528*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-11.47)</td>
<td>(-6.85)</td>
<td>(-2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income</td>
<td>-0.2928**</td>
<td>-0.0896</td>
<td>-0.3404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.16)</td>
<td>(-0.77)</td>
<td>(-1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Education</td>
<td>-0.2241**</td>
<td>-0.2020**</td>
<td>-0.0644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.70)</td>
<td>(-2.91)</td>
<td>(-0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Availability</td>
<td>-0.2961**</td>
<td>-0.1226*</td>
<td>0.0352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-8.09)</td>
<td>(-2.26)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r2</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1568</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 (t statistics in parentheses)

Note: All Three Models include controls for the following variables: Age, Marital Status, Household Size, Geographic Mobility, and Survey Year.

The selective effect of the availability of culture producing organizations is also in accord with the institutionalist argument, which predicts that structural factors should be less important in determining culture consumption and taste patterns for those already
embedded in the institutionalized individualism of the world polity. Consistent with this viewpoint, availability has significant effects on consumption and the expression of cultural dislikes only among those respondents that report identification with a subnational entity or Spain. For those who identify with the world, their likelihood of consuming a wider variety of cultural offerings or of expressing a larger number of cultural dislikes is independent of the structural availability factor. This indicates that, for this group of respondents, both omnivore consumption and the display of multicultural capital are less driven by the social construction of lifestyle and taste that occurs through organizational activities and more by the cultural connection to the world polity's institutional environment.

The effects of ethnic and nationalist identity, while not part of the standard arsenal of cultural capital theory, follow a similar pattern as the one noted for traditional cultural capital predictors, at least for the models predicting cultural dislikes. As we saw in the last model of table 12, strong identification as either Basque or Spanish increases the probability of expressing cultural dislikes. However, as shown in the last three models of table 14, this negative effect is only operative for subnational and national respondents; among postnational respondents, expression of strong ethnic or nationalist identity has no significant effect on the number of cultural dislikes, and in fact the coefficients are in the wrong (negative) direction. This suggests that allegiance to world cultural models of individuality may “buffer” individuals from the intolerance producing effects of stronger ethno-political identifications.

When it comes to cultural involvement, religious and nationalist identities have more complex effects than those expected given the institutional account. In the consumption models we saw that both identification as Catholic and identification as only Spanish
decreased the probability of engaging in more inclusive patterns of culture consumption. Identification as “only Spanish” and Catholic both have negative effects on omnivore consumption among postnational and subnational respondents. However, they do not seem to have a significant effect among national respondents. This indicates, as was already evident from table 12, that ethno-political identifications have a more consistent effect on the “symbolic” (as opposed to behavioral) aspects of action in the leisure culture field, especially those associated with boundary drawing through cultural dislikes. Consumption among those who identify as citizens of the world, however, appears to be affected by nationalist and religious identity.

4.8. Limitations And Directions For Future Research

This chapter represents a partial effort to show the connection between what has traditionally been thought of as discrete elements of cultural practice, subjective citizenship and patterns of taste and practice, in order to argue that they form part of a more encompassing cultural model constitutive of modern individuality. However, national-level data can only show this to be the case for one country. Future research should be concerned with pursuing this type of inquiry in a cross-national design, in order to test whether similar relationships hold in other settings. Is there cross-national variation (in the Western context) in the relationship between broad cultural taste and world subjective citizenship? Do individual level linkages to INGOs and other global institutions serve to mediate this connection? In chapters 5 and 6 I will attempt to address the limitations of the present study by providing evidence of such a connection at the cross-national level.
Another important avenue of future study would be one that aimed at further specifying the link between the ability to enact the dominant world cultural models and stratification, both at the national and individual level. This can be done by studying the interpenetration between access to world cultural resources and patterns of individual enactment of modern personhood that go beyond broad cultural taste, as this may simply be a partial component of a more global cultural complex. Other elements, such as the proliferation of rationalized “others” on behalf of which legitimate agency can be enacted such as ecological and animal rights movements (Frank 1997), the emergence of superficially local but increasingly more global and self-reflexive forms of identity and the diffusion of therapeutic models of personhood (Frank et al 1995), all play a role in both national and individual level linkages to world culture should therefore be related to other forms of material and social inequalities. Researchers should also begin to investigate different forms of cross-national convergence in individual level practices in relation to culture and other rationalized meaning systems, such as religion and science. In a related note, students of the determinants of culture consumption and taste expressions may also begin to uncover linkages between different patterns of cultural choice and these other components of modern personhood. We should expect, for instance, that other indicators of rationalized voluntarism, such as the tendency to engage in social action on behalf of modern rationalized entities (i.e. the environment), should be connected to individual level indicators of multicultural capital and conspicuous openness. Consequently, participation in organizations dedicated to this type of institutionalized rational activity in the world polity, whether it be human rights, social justice, or animal rights, should indirectly impact the way in which individuals deploy culture to as socially useful information (DiMaggio 1987), and enact individuality and modern
personhood (Frank and Meyer 2002). Conversely participation in organizational structures that look to actively disconnect individuals from the world polity (such as inward looking religious sects, or strong ethnonationalist identifications) should impact the manner in which culture is used and tastes are expressed in the opposite way, by creating more restricted consumption profiles, and increasing the chances of drawing strong symbolic boundaries across different cultural tastes that are not associated with the in-group. This approach would give us more purchase in conceptualizing the determinants of the “univore” style of cultural involvement (Bryson 1997).

4.9. Chapter Summary

The above results have established a connection between identification with a transnational world community, a key piece of the global cultural package identified by institutional theory (Boli and Thomas 1997), and patterns of omnivore consumption and cultural taste and symbolic boundary drawing, phenomena which have up to this point been thought as primarily conditioned by “realist” factors, such as respondent’s class background or educational attainment or by presumably incompatible national differences such as those between France and U.S. (Bryson 1996; Lamont 1992). The results show that connection to the world polity by way of identification with transnational geographical entities (the E.U., the world) serves as an independent predictor of broader patterns of culture consumption

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25 Pierre Bourdieu was once again a pioneer in this regard as shown in his chapter on politics in *Distinction*. The fact that his lead has not been followed in this regard, insofar as recent studies in the cultural capital paradigm have proceeded in isolation from studies of political attitudes (but see Bryson 1996), has resulted in an undue narrowing of the research subject matter in the field.
and less restrictive forms of expression of cultural taste, net of traditionally considered factors in the cultural capital paradigm and more recently conceptualized determinants, such as expression of post-Fordist identities related to gender, religion and ethnicity (Katz-Gerro and Shavit 2002).

Further, I show that for both most deeply connected to rationalized world cultural models, the effect of typical realist predictors of cultural omnivorousness or multicultural capital is muted, as is the influence of post-Fordist identifications and structural factors related to the surrounding ecology of culture producing organizations. This suggests that these newly emerging forms of consumption and taste may be connected to a wider set of institutionalized normative and ontological commitments constitutive of the individualist culture of the modern system (Frank and Meyer 2002), and are at least partially independent of the usually considered individual and contextual attributes. This is evidence for Meyer and Jepperson's (2000) paradox of an increasingly scripted and standardized enactment of individualism (at least within the relatively small percentage of the population that is connected to world culture), even as the latter calls for uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of tastes and cultural expression. In contrast, the “standard” cultural capital effects are more clearly operative for respondents who are most disconnected from world cultural models and schemas. A similar pattern of results is shown to apply to the expression of strong ethno-political identities (with some exceptions in regard to culture consumption), with allegiance to these identities having a positive effect on exclusionary expressions of taste only among those least connected to the world polity.

In this chapter I have argued for a partial reorientation of cultural capital theory and research around certain guiding concepts and orienting strategies derived from sociological
institutionalism, especially that strand of institutional theory advocated by John Meyer and his associates (Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999; Frank and Meyer 2002; Meyer et al 1994; Meyer et al 1997; Meyer et al 1997; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). This in no way entails the dismissal of established empirical findings or the replacement of extant theoretical orientations in the cultural capital paradigm with institutional concepts. Rather, the aim of the present effort is toward a productive refocusing on an alternative set of issues and questions. This may help revitalize this line of research by providing new empirical findings, alternative theoretical and conceptual puzzles pointing to new lines of future research, and theoretical integration across initially divergent theoretical traditions. The results reported in this chapter are a case in point: while we find some mediation of the expected effects of cultural capital variables, indicators derived from institutional theory do not make the persistent influence of class background disappear. Future theoretical work should continue to explore tensions and commonalities between Bourdieu’s conception of practical action and the notions of the enactment and the social construction of agency and actorhood derived from sociological institutionalism. In this manner the Weberian/Veblenian strand of Bourdieu’s work, one most clearly seen in recent attempts to interpret the rise of multicultural capital in a conflict-theoretic framework as a new kind of distinction (Bryson 1996; Fridman and Olliver 2002), can be wedded to more the institutional ideas of the “deep” constitution of personhood, individuality and action.

While this is no way will get rid of the (ultimately productive) tension between more rationalist notions of the uses of culture which emphasize a “logic of consequences” (i.e. cultural capital as part of the repository of practical strategies of group distinction and competition) versus the more normative and constitutive institutional approach which
stresses a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989), it will at least allow for an orienting strategy that recognizes this inherent duality in the way that culture is “auto-produced” and deployed at the local socio-interactional level (Peterson 2000, 2001; Peterson and Anand 2004), and how these processes aggregate in order to produce structured macro-level patterns of cultural choice and taste. One advantage of the sociological intuitionalist approach is that culture consumption and taste can in this way be situated in a more encompassing theoretical context, while moving past the fruitful but ultimately limiting “capital” metaphor (Bourdieu 1986). Instead of the entrenched dualism of culture as resource and the individual as repository, the relationship between cultural models and the social actor can be reframed in terms of the institutional metaphors of constitution (Jepperson 2000; Meyer et al 1994), co-constitution (Breiger 2000; Mohr and Duquenne 1997, Mohr and Lee 2000) and enactment (Jepperson 1991; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). The dominant modes of consuming culture can then be seen as necessarily connected to other (legitimate) forms of enactment of modern agency, such as allegiance to the basic tenets of world culture and participation in the larger project of rationalization of nature and the social world.
5. OMNIVORE TASTE, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

5.1. Abstract
The positive association between markers of high status, such as engagement in “highbrow” culture, and the consumption of a wide variety of less prestigious cultural goods, is one of the most widespread findings in empirical studies of the sociology of taste. However, while several socio-structural factors have been offered as possible explanations of the origins of this pattern of “highbrow omnivorousness,” to date no study has addressed the empirical merit of these various proposals, and the relative weight of the different factors emphasized by each explanatory account. In this chapter, using data on musical taste from 15 EU countries from the 2001 Eurobarometer survey, I examine the correlates of cross-national differences in overall rates of omnivore consumption and the strength of the highbrow-omnivore taste linkage. In addition to considering Peterson and Kern’s (1996) candidate explanations of the effect, I draw on DiMaggio’s (1987) socio-structural approach, recent studies of the association between globalization and patterns of culture consumption and world polity institutionalism to suggest that global factors may be as important as traditionally considered intrasocietal factors. The results show that a country’s position along several dimensions of globalization, both economic and cultural, do a better job of explaining cross-national differences in omnivorousness than measures of socioeconomic development. Nevertheless, cross-national differences in the prevalence of tolerant values and class inequality continue to have an effect even after global factors are held constant.
5.2. The Cross-National Emergence Of High-Status Omnivore Consumption

After the consolidation of a “high culture” production field in Europe and the U.S. in the second half of the 19th century (Bourdieu 1996a; DiMaggio 1991; Denora 1991), the cultural stratification system of Western societies became solidified around the opposition between the transcendent value of the “higher” cultural pursuits such as canonically prescribed classical music and the fine arts and the “lower” forms of popular culture, a system of cultural valuation that has been referred to as the elite/mass regime (Peterson 1997). One of the most fundamental and more recently well-documented social changes in the post-industrial West has consisted in the demise of this cultural stratification regime and its replacement by one based on the contrast between a mobile upper middle class elite conversant with both high status genres and popular culture, and a working/lower service class who shuns most forms of aesthetic pursuits with the exception of a few select cultural forms.

This is what has been referred in the recent literature as the omnivore/univore cultural stratification regime (DiMaggio 1987; Peterson 1992, 1997, 2000, 2005a, 2005b; Peterson and Simkus 1993; Peterson and Kern 1996; Van Eijck 2001; Peterson and Annand 2004). While various factors have been proposed as an explanation of this shift, to date there has been no empirically oriented systematic comparative analysis of the structural determinants of this important structural transformation of the basis of elite taste in contemporary postindustrial societies (Peterson and Kern 1996). In this chapter, I attempt to fill this gap in the literature by ascertaining the cross-societal determinants of cultural stratification centered on omnivore taste in a sample of 15 West European nations.
What is highbrow omnivorousness? The basic idea takes off from the empirical finding by Peterson and collaborators (Hughes and Peterson 1983; Peterson and Simkus 1993) and DiMaggio’s related observation and theoretical proposal (DiMaggio and Useem 1978; DiMaggio 1987) of a positive association between high socio-professional status and higher rates of participation in all types—both traditionally prestigious and popular—of leisure and arts consumption activities, with a concomitant drop-off in most types of cultural consumption as we move down the prestige ladder. In particular Peterson and Kern (1996) find, using data from the NEA-sponsored Survey for Public Participation in the Arts, that more recently born “highbrows” (defined as persons who report liking classical music and opera) became more likely to report liking a wide variety of lowbrow and middlebrow musical genres in comparison to older highbrows. They took this as evidence that the way that high status individuals approached the consumption of cultural goods had shifted from a “snob” regime in which lowbrow genres were shunned, to an omnivore regime in which there is no incompatibility between the consumption of low-status cultural forms and traditional high status offerings. This breakthrough led to a rethinking of the principles of organization of the cultural stratification system of contemporary societies, as well as a reformulation of the types of status displays and habits of cultural engagement that serve to define high status in the modern system. As Peterson (1992: 252-254) puts it:

In effect, elite taste is no longer defined simply as the expressed appreciation of the high art forms and a corresponding moral disdain of, or patronizing tolerance for, all other aesthetic expressions. In so far as this view is correct, the aesthetics of elite status are being redefined as the appreciation of all distinctive leisure activities and creative forms along with the appreciation of the classic fine arts. Because status is gained by knowing about, and participating in (that is to say, by consuming) many if not all forms, the term ‘omnivore’
seems appropriate for those at the top of the emerging status hierarchy [...] Insofar as this is a fair description of the underlying structure of tastes, the taste hierarchy does not so much represent a slim column of taste genres one on top of the other as it does a pyramid with one elite taste at the top and more and more alternative forms at about the same level as one moves down the pyramid toward its base. The most descriptive appellation for those near the base of the pyramid would seem to be ‘univore’, suggesting that, unlike the high status ‘omnivore’, members of this group tend to be actively involved in just one, or at best just a few, alternative aesthetic traditions.

The shift toward “omnivorousness” as a new basis of cultural stratification was first empirically detected in the U.S. (Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson and Simkus 1992). However, as spate of recent research has shown that the same empirical pattern of highbrow omnivorousness is applicable to other Western industrialized countries. The omnivore-univore pattern has been shown to exist in The Netherlands (i.e. Van Eijck 2001), Spain (Lopez Sintas and Garcia Alvarez 2002) Australia (Emmison 2003) and Great Britain (Warde and Tampubolon 2002; Warde et al 1999, 2000; Goldthorpe and Chang 2005), and as Peterson and Annand (2004: 325) note in their recent review of the literature, with similar results having been obtained in Canada and even France (Coulangeon 2004) as well. In fact the overall association between socioeconomic status—especially if measured by way of educational attainment—and the consumption of high status culture (classical, music, opera, the arts) coupled with openness to and actual consumption of a wider range of less prestigious cultural activities is such a robust finding that it now appears rather unremarkable to note, as Lopes-Sintas and Garcia Alvarez (2002) do in their recent study of culture consumption in Spain that “omnivores show up again.”
Given the cross-national prevalence of the omnivore-univore distinction, it seems that the time has come to move beyond simply asking whether the same status-based organization of tastes holds for yet another social setting (e.g. Warde, Tomlinson and McMeekin 2000; Lopez-Sintas and Gacal Alvarez 2002, Coulangeon 2005), and instead begin to explore the question of the cross-national social-structural bases of this new form of cultural stratification, that appears to more local national and cultural boundaries. As Peterson and Kern note, the finding of increasing omnivorousness among highbrows and among younger cohorts is an empirical generalization, but “…it does not provide an explanation for why there has been such a profound shift in the way high status is designated” (italics added). Peterson and Kern (1996) and DiMaggio (1987) propose various alternative accounts that might help to explain the shift from the highbrow/lowbrow to the omnivore/univore cultural stratification regime. In the following sections I go on to review those proposed explanations and codify their empirical implications.

5.3. From Snob To Omnivore: Proposed Explanations

5.3.1. Social And Economic Development

Peterson and Kern isolate “rising standards of living” and “broader education” as key factors in explaining the demise of the highbrow/lowbrow regime. They note that these society-level developmental factors have made it much more difficult for upper classes to sustain highly exclusionary taste regimes. In a similar way DiMaggio (1987: 452) talks about “the growth of higher education and the modern state” as one of the reasons for why contemporary American society has entered a period of cultural “declassification” and decline of older ritual boundaries erected around elite forms of culture consumption. From
this perspective, the spread of mass education is seen as having a democratizing effect allowing previously excluded groups to share in the cognitive frames and cultural competences usually monopolized by better-off elites. In this manner upwardly mobile groups in more economically advantaged social contexts, can adopt a taste for highbrow cultural forms, while retaining the proclivity and ability to consumer popular culture (Van Eijck 1997). As noted by Prior (2005: 132), the increased prevalence of changing forms of arts consumption are at least partially attributable to

…the rise of mass higher education and economic restructuring, particularly the contraction of heavy industry and the predominance of a service economy. A new middle-class fraction has emerged from this mix with less dichotomized—that is, either cultivated or popular—ways of seeing culture that fits snugly with the proliferation of ‘postmodern’ outlets of visual consumption, from shopping malls to lifestyle magazines. If this contention is correct, then we should expect to observe a cross-national divide between relatively rich societies featuring high levels of social development—especially expansive and inclusive educational systems—and less socially and economically developed societies with the former being more likely to be omnivorous than the latter:

**H1: Richer and more economically developed societies are more likely to be omnivorous.**

**H2: Societies with more advanced educational systems are more likely to be omnivorous.**

5.3.2. Class Stratification

Peterson and Kern also connect omnivorousness to social mobility across class and status groups. They note that increasing post-war social mobility in Western societies has led to a
“mixing” of people hailing from different taste cultures and class segments, resulting in the decline of highbrow culture as the single arbiter of elite taste. This is also related to the idea of omnivorosity as associated with the relative growth and influence of the public sector, and in particular the “growth of the state” (DiMaggio 1987), since the state is the primary engine of class redistribution in the modern system. It is well established that the most economically and socially advanced Western European societies are also the ones with the lowest levels of class stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990, Kenworthy 1999).

This view is consistent with recent research on the relationship between social stratification and taste. Van Eijck (1999) for instance argues that social mobility is related to omnivorosity. In a study of culture consumption in the Netherlands, he finds that members of higher-status groups, as measured by educational attainment, are more likely to participate in both popular and highbrow leisure activities in comparison to immobile members of the same class stratum. Van Eijck concludes that as upper class groups come to be composed of individuals from more heterogeneous backgrounds, ritual divisions between high and popular cultural forms weaken.

Thus, omnivore taste should be less prevalent—and thus the province of a relatively small elite—only on those societies characterized by relatively low levels of class-based stratification, where it is easier for high status groups to monopolize access to the educational system and to erect status based boundaries based on cultural exclusion in order to reserve the most desirable positions for this highly educated elite (Bourdieu 1996b, Lamont 1992). As class stratification is partially weakened through the extension of welfare state protections and the related expansion of social services, we should expect omnivore taste to cease being the purview of small, highly educated elites and to diffuse across the
social structure. If this hypothesis is correct, then there should be a positive association between the relative egalitarianism of the class structure of a given society and the relative prevalence of omnivorosity, by way of the democratization and extension of highbrow consumption to a wider subset of the population.

**H3: Societies with lower levels of class inequality are more likely to be omnivorous.**

5.3.3. Mass Media Growth

Both DiMaggio (1987) and Peterson and Kern (1996) see the rise of the mass media and the “popular culture industry” as directly tied to the decline of the older boundary separating highbrow and lowbrow taste. From this perspective, omnivorosity is a direct result of the industrialization and commodification of artistic production. For Peterson and Kern, the mass media are responsible for the introduction of the “aesthetic tastes” of different groups to out-group audiences, resulting in a rise in cultural syncretism and a decline of cultural exclusivism. This has resulted in a situation where the diverse cultures of the rest of the world “…are ever more difficult to exclude, and at the same time, they are increasingly available for appropriation elite taste makers. DiMaggio (1987) concurs with this view, citing the “…increased influence of commercial principles of classification with the rise of the popular-culture industries” as one of the primary factors that has led to the current period of cultural declassification:

**H4: Societies with larger mass media and popular culture industries are more likely to be omnivorous.**

5.3.4. Value Change And Regional Identification
Peterson and Kern note that even though structural changes provide the opportunity for less exclusivist forms of cultural distinction to emerge, “value changes concerning gender, ethnic, religious and racial differences rationalize the change from snob to omnivore.” They refer to the gradual post-war decline of group-centric, prejudicial ideologies during the 20th century and their replacement more tolerant, less exclusivist values. According to this explanation, the change from exclusionist snob to tolerant omnivore can “be seen as a part of the historical trend toward greater tolerance of those holding different values” (Peterson and Kern 1996: 905).

Bryson’s (1996) research on cultural taste and tolerant values is consistent with this viewpoint. She finds a negative association between the number of musical forms that an individual dislikes and support for less tolerant values, net of educational attainment. She suggests that in this sense, omnivoroussness can be seen as a form of “multicultural capital” which high-status persons deploy as a status display that signals their ability to accept and consume products associated with a diverse—but still selective—menu of ethnic, national and regional cultures.

As noted in the last chapter, a different set of values appears to be intrinsically connected to omnivore taste: cosmopolitan values based on dis-identification with local regions and communities and identification with broader geographical expanses (such as large transnational entities such as the European Union or the world polity as a whole). There we found that in a sample of Spanish respondents, that the wider the individual’s sense of subjective citizenship, the broader their culture consumption patterns. Thus, we should not only expect values associated with “tolerance” to be associated with expanding tastes, but we should also expect degrees of strong regional identification to be inversely related to
omnivorousness. That is, as noted by Peterson (1992), one of the primary sources of “univore” taste should be the extent to which a society is composed of segmented communities separated by strong symbolic boundaries based on language, culture and ethnicity (among other markers), as opposed to loosely collected cosmopolitan networks.

**H5a: Societies in which tolerant values are more prevalent are more likely to be omnivorous.**

**H5b: Societies in which regional identification is weaker are more likely to be omnivorous.**

In addition, if the idea of the connection between social and economic development and processes of value-change hypothesis is on the right track, not only should we find an association between the societal prevalence of values associated with inclusionism and the tolerance of diversity to be associated with the relative prevalence of omnivorousness, but we should also expect to observe—in analogy to Inglehart’s socioeconomic explanation of the origin of postmaterialist values—both support for tolerant values and levels of subjective regional identification to at least partially account for any positive association—if any—between omnivorousness and variables related to social an economic development. Since, as noted by Peterson and Kern, these latter factors are only the preconditions for the omnivore effect, but value change and processes of geographical identification is the underlying mechanism.

**H5c: The prevalence of tolerant and cosmopolitan values partially accounts for the association between omnivorousness and social and economic development.**
5.3.5. Economic Globalization

Cultural globalization may not be the only global process responsible for the rise of omnivore taste. One obvious recent trend that may also account for the cross-national convergence around the omnivore/univore model is economic globalization (Chase-Dunn et al 2000). From this perspective omnivorousness may be seen as a local consequence of societal integration into the transnational flow of capital, resources and commodities, which serve to level local cultural distinctions built around more proximate class, ethnic or geographical boundaries, thus releasing cultural choices from more traditional strictures and ritual boundaries. Thus, part of the process diversification and loss of ritual boundary potency (DiMaggio 1987) undergone by the artistic classification system of Western polities, may be due to increasing trends toward global economic integration and exposure to a wider variety of national cultural traditions made possible by economic globalization processes (Crane 2002, Tomlinson 1991). Two major perspectives on the effects of economic globalization on taste can be discerned. From the first point of view, omnivorousness can be construed as part of the homogenizing and imperialistic project of “Americanization” through globalization, or what Crane (2002: 2) refers to as the “cultural imperialism” model of the relationship between globalization and culture.

The second perspective, more akin to what Crane (2002: 2) refers to as the “networks and flows” model of cultural globalization sees the relationship between transnational economic integration and omnivore taste as one that implies homogeneity of form (the diffusion of what Peterson [2002] would refer to as a single “pattern” of cultural choice and Wilk [1995] speaks as a global structure of common difference) while allowing for diversity of content (see also Griswold and Wright 2004). From this perspective societal integration into the world
economy implies omnivorization of tastes, without resulting in a mass cultural “leveling” of contents. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter (insofar as the empirical analysis is limited to survey data on aggregated cultural choices without fine grained content distinctions) to distinguish between the finer grained empirical implications of these divergent perspectives on the relationship between globalization and cultural choice they both agree that societal integration into the world economy should result in some form—even if purely quantitative—of diversification of cultural taste, beyond that which would be expected in the absence of this integration:

**H6: Societies with higher levels of connection to the world economy are more likely to be omnivorous.**

5.3.6. The “Networked” Society

According to DiMaggio, given recent socio-structural changes, there has to be a positive connection between taste diversity and socioeconomic status. DiMaggio notes that the postindustrial upper middle classes cultivate taste diversity in order to help sustain large and diffuse social networks, which crosscut geographical and social boundaries. The social position of this new elite, in contrast to the relative stability of the status structures of the older community based elites, is sustained by being able to navigate a plurality of social worlds and by being able to adapt to a constantly changing relational environment which becomes even more fluid as we move to what has more recently been called “the network

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26 For suggestive research connecting Bourdieu’s class theory, Peterson’s omnivore/univore approach to cultural stratification with detailed interview data on the content of cultural choices, see Holt (1998).
society” (Castells 1997). Thus, the reason why study after study finds that “…the well educated and persons of high occupational prestige do and like more of almost everything” a state of affairs that is “…so at odds with conventional notions about the isomorphism of taste and class”, has to do with the fact that “…wide-ranging networks require broad repertoires of taste (DiMaggio 1987: 444).”

Thus, the changing bases of power in contemporary society, especially the rise of geographically mobile elites whose power is no longer rooted in locally circumscribed communities and clearly bounded status groups, but whose claim to social standing is now based on large scale organization, is the primary force responsible for this shift. As elite position is now defined by the ability to manage and be enmeshed in constantly shifting and largely heterogeneous social networks, cultural competence comes to be redefined from exclusivist restriction to cultural flexibility and the ability to “code-switch.” From this perspective the ability to “culture switch” when moving from one social milieu to another becomes the more valuable, and still relatively scarcely distributed, embodied form of cultural capital for the elites (Holt 1997).

Most of the changes that DiMaggio refers to can be considered to be the result of what Manuel Castells (1997) has referred to as the rise of the “network society” and Barry Wellman (2001) refers to as the “networked society.” For these authors the contemporary network society, in contrast to the traditional “pre-network” society which was anchored in direct face-to-face interaction in local communities, is instead centered on diffuse social connections whose sustenance is made possible by the diffusion of modern digital telecommunication technologies. This provides a possible explanation for the rise of the omnivore/univore divide since as DiMaggio notes, flexibility as cultural capital fits better
with the rise of spatially diffuse networked communities of national (and sometimes international) geographical scope, and the concomitant decline of the circumscribed local community as the reference group that determines relative status location. If this hypothesis is correct, societies that have advanced farthest in laying the infrastructure of the network society by connecting their populations to global digital information networks should also be the societies where omnivorousness has become more prevalent as the principal source of cultural capital:

**H7: Societies more fully connected to the digital “network society” are more likely to be omnivorous.**

5.4. World Polity And World Culture

Most of the factors alluded to above to account for omnivorousness as the new form of highbrow taste (with the exception of the network society hypothesis), such as rising standards of living, the expansion of the educational system, the nationalization of elites in bureaucratic command structures, the industrialization of popular culture production and increased levels of social and geographic mobility, can be connected at least in part to increased levels of national-level social and economic development. Thus, we can think if these theories as variants of traditional modernization theory (Inglehardt and Baker 2000, Bell 1976), as applied to the realm of culture-based status distinctions in post-war Western societies.

However, just like previous modernization hypotheses ran into trouble when trying to explain cross-national convergences in state structures, expansion of the educational system and modes of incorporation of local populations into the national polity as exclusively
driven by national differences in economic development (Meyer and Thomas 1984), any explanation of the rise of omnivorousness that only takes into account intra-societal factors would have trouble explaining the remarkable convergence of various Western polities upon the same system of cultural stratification (Peterson and Annand 2004). These considerations lead us to the conclusion that part of the explanation for the rise of the omnivore taste regime cannot be found in an intrasocietal characteristic associated with country-specific particularities of nation-level generational, class and/or status group conflict, but is instead associated with the extrasocietal economic and institutional environment in which modern polities are embedded (Meyer 1980, Meyer and Hannan 1979, Meyer et al 1997, Thomas and Meyer 1984).

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27 An explanation focused on more mesolevel organizational and institutional determinants of the shift to omnivore consumption would have the same trouble accounting for the cross-national spread of the omnivore/univore cultural stratification regime. The reason for this is that there is as much variation across modern polities in the institutional systems of culture production and delivery as there is in terms possible lines of class and status group conflict. For instance, Peterson and Kern (1996) talk about changes in artworlds and the rise of generational and status groups politics that are more specific to the U.S. case as factors that might have contributed to the rise of the omnivore taste regime. However, while these latter explanations might make sense for the U.S. case, they certainly cannot shed light on why we observe the same phenomenon in countries with a substantially different trajectories and contemporary conditions than the U.S. in terms of all of those factors. For instance, the social organization of artistic production as well as the organizational and technological mechanisms of delivery and dissemination of cultural goods (whether dominated by non-profit, state centered or a market model) is very different between the Canada, Australia the U.S. and Europe and within European nation-states (see the contributions in Crane 2002 and Cowen 2002). Canada and France for instance, have highly regulated artistic production systems in film and other plastic arts with established quotas and states subsidies for local producers in an attempt to curb competition from U.S. imports. The U.S. and England on the other hand, have relatively Laissez-faire cultural markets with comparatively little government interference, in which consumers are exposed to a qualitatively and quantitatively dissimilar mix of foreign, domestic and local cultural goods.
One way to begin to unpack the way in which institutional theory allows us to understand the rise of omnivore taste is to briefly review the institutional analysis of modern personhood. According to the institutional account, as cultural conceptions of legitimate agency (which entities are seen as the most appropriate bearers of the right to engage in action) have become increasingly likely to be transferred from supra-individual corporate structures (states, professions, and other collectivities) to individual actors, a process that has dramatically accelerated since World War II (Robertson 1990), the person has emerged as the central construct of an increasingly global cultural model (Frank and Meyer 2002). This modern construct of the person is characterized by its transcendence of local designations and ascriptions, and by the universal equality of all entities designated as bearers of personhood within and across geographical and political boundaries. Robertson (1990: 26) sees the spread of “…conceptions of individuals and humankind” as two of the primary components of the globalization process.

This dynamic is coupled with the imperative of egalitarianism built into the construct of contemporary personhood, which in turn requires that extant symbolic and ritual distinctions demarcating different realms of cultural expression (DiMaggio 1987) and class-related socially constructed divisions demarcating “high” versus “popular” culture boundaries (i.e. DiMaggio 1991b), be superseded in favor of a “postmodern” aesthetic that crosses and subverts those boundaries:

*Personhood accords broadened…rights to choice and taste. For example, moderns can claim exceptionally varied tastes in food, unconstrained by religion, nationally, or class. Of course the rationalized role system puts constraints on some food preferences in the name of health and safety, but the ability to build secure food*
stratification, with and low cuisines is very limited …so also with music, art and other cultural matters, which increasingly flout distinctions of high and low taste” (Frank and Meyer 2002: 93).

This is equivalent to Peterson and Kern’s (1996) empirical finding of the shift from snob to omnivore and DiMaggio’s theoretical proposal of a “declassification” period in the Western Artistic Classification System, which, as noted above, appears to be happening in different Western polities simultaneously. Standard modernization-type accounts have trouble explaining this behavioral and symbolic convergence among similar crass strata in different Western polities. However if the institutional account is correct, then this is no mystery. As increasingly transnational notions of modern individuality, personhood, and agency have become part of the global cultural model of modern societies (Frank, Meyer and Miyahara 1995), then such a mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 151) in the relationship between individuals and cultural objects across widely divergent local settings is to be expected. As Frank and Meyer (2002: 90-91) note: “All…faces of modern individualism are highly cultural in character, rather than idiosyncratic outcomes of particular local situations. They are formed in very general or universalistic terms, [and] occur in forms that are scripted worldwide” (emphasis added).

If we think of the cultural omnivorousness and the “multicultural” (Bryson 1996, Fridman and Ollivier 2002), tolerant approach to expressions of taste as the modern institutionalized form of individual action in the behavioral domain of culture consumption, then the spread of these similar forms of cultural involvement across a wide range of different polities in the developed world can be explained. Thus to the standard list of intra-societal changes associated with economic, class stratification, educational and general societal development, the institutional approach would add the accompanying rise of a distinctively modern
conception of individuality, personhood, and the normatively appropriate uses of culture that sustains and defines those notions of the modern actor (March and Olsen 1989, Meyer and Jepperson 2000). Furthermore the institutional hypothesis can help complement the value change hypothesis, by providing a theoretical framework from within which the transnational rise to hegemony of values associated with tolerance and openness to diversity and difference can be understood.

Using the institutional model outlined above, I submit that the rise of openness and tolerance as the predominant taste culture of the younger upper middle class is not disconnected from the rise of a particular conception of the equality value of all cultural expressions associated with the rationalized individualism of world culture (Boli and Thomas 1999, Lechner and Boli 2005, Robertson 1990). The basic component of this universalist model of individuality consist of respect for personhood as the “master identity” which supersedes all other more specific racial, national, ethnic, etc., identifications (Frank and Meyer, 2002). Consequently, taste distinctions based on those older forms of corporate or group-related differentiations among individuals become delegitimized, leading to a lower likelihood of expression of exclusionary taste judgments, and openness to a (selective) diversity of cultural experiences for those who identify with the world polity (as we saw in the last chapter). It is in this sense that Frank and Meyer (2002: 93) contend that in the modern system, “tastes, like personhood, are equal.”

Another important component of the world cultural schema consists of the concerted effort by international organizations (INGOs and IGOs) to supersede older views which viewed cultural forms as hierarchically organized from “higher” to “lower” or from more “advanced” to “less advanced” (i.e. Jaeger and Selznick 1964) and replace it with a new view
of the equal value of all forms of culture, regardless of geographical and social origin. This is important since as Boli and Thomas note, international organizations are the primary enactors and carriers of world cultural models. In this sense, the Western “artistic classification system” (1987) is now being subject to rationalizing tendencies which tend toward a weakening of ritual divisions across genres and a flattening of hierarchy. This is done by disconnecting culture production and consumption from local realities and local contexts, and reconnecting these processes to larger issues of human rights, personal freedom and individual expression. This reorientation reframes cultural access and cultural competence as universal issues of human development and social advancement (Boli and Thomas 1999). For instance the UNESCO's recent (2001) “cultural diversity” declaration - printed in six major languages (French, English, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic) states that:

*Culture is a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group. It encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, values systems, traditions and beliefs. Respecting and safeguarding culture is a matter of Human Rights. Cultural Diversity presupposes respect of fundamental freedoms, namely freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom to participate in the cultural life of one's choice.*

In a similar way, the International Music Council's (an INGO working in the cultural sector) statement of purpose clearly states that its primary goal is to

*Contribute to securing the following basic rights: for all children and adults to have access to musical involvement through participation, [and] listening…[and to] Contribute to the development and strengthening of friendly working relations between all the musical cultures of the world on the basis of their absolute equality, mutual respect and appreciation.*
Extending the preceding framework to the study of cross-national difference in the extent to which omnivore taste can be said to characterize the entire society, we should expect that omnivore taste should be more widespread in those societies more deeply connected to the world polity. From this perspective omnivorouusness may be seen as an integral part of what Lechner and Boli (2005) refer to as world culture. Notice that this if the institutional model is correct the association between societal levels connected to world culture and the prevalence of omnivore taste in the population should obtain even after holding intrasocietal levels of economic development constant:

**H8: Societies more deeply integrated into the world polity are more likely to be omnivorous.**

In analogy to Peterson and Kern’s (1996) argument regarding value change, we can view the relationship between socio-economic development and connection to the world polity as one of structural preconditions and enabling mechanisms (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998). It has been shown that most of the cross-national differences in connection to the world polity are tied to cross-societal differences in levels of socioeconomic development (Beckfield 2003). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that as societies come to advance further in levels of social and economic development, they also become more integrated into the larger institutional environment of the world polity. This would imply that holding constant levels of integration into world society, should partially account for any previous association between socioeconomic development and the prevalence of omnivore consumption.

5.5. The Relationship Between Global And National Factors
While the cultural imperialism version of the economic globalization account sees omnivorousness as a process driven by the convergence around a particular global model of culture consumption supported by the rise of globe-spanning culture industries, it fails to account for the global source of the particular values, and schemes of action that legitimate omnivorousness as the most appropriate form to display high-status. In this sense a purely economic explanation sees the convergence around of omnivorousness of the cultural stratification system of Western societies as divorced from socially constructed frameworks that give meaning to action and the accounts and vocabularies of motive that actors construct to justify their cultural choices (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Meyer et al 1992).

However, it is important to emphasize that a view that construes culture consumers as passive pawns of the global mass culture industry, is problematic on both theoretical and empirical grounds because it divorces cultural choices from their cognitive embeddedness in more encompassing cultural schemas that assign meaning to local actions (Gottidiener 1985), the selection of means and the rationalization of ends in the realm of cultural choice (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer et al 1992; Campbell 1998). Thus, connection to the global economy may not be the only source of the mimetic isomorphism that is evident in the cross-national emergence of omnivorousness as the preferred form of highbrow taste. More specifically, we should expect the source of this isomorphism across divergent societal contexts to be at least partly located in the rise of world-societal schemas and cognitive templates associated with the nexus between personhood, individuality and cultural taste (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). When dealing with the joint relationship between primarily
global and largely intra-societal factors on the other hand, we should expect the former to be the primary intervening processes helping us explain the effect of the latter:

**H9: The position of a society in the various dimensions of globalization partially account for the effect of intra-societal factors.**

5.6. **Data**

5.6.1. **The Eurobarometer Culture Module**

In order to assess the empirical validity of the above hypotheses I rely on micro-level data of the culture consumption habits of EU citizens taken from the August-September 2001 Eurobarometer (Christensen 2003). The Eurobarometer is designed to provide regular monitoring of the social and political attitudes of the EU population. Since the early seventies representative national samples in all European Union (European Community) member countries have been simultaneously interviewed in each spring and each autumn. More recent versions of the Eurobarometer (starting in the autumn of 1990) have included supplementary surveys on special issues of topical interest. The 2001 Autumn Eurobarometer (N=16,200) included such a special “module” related to participation in a wide variety of cultural activities, from mass-media (radio and television) to music and the arts. The Eurobarometer includes stratified probability samples of citizens of the EU aged 15 and over residing in the 15 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

5.6.2. Musical Taste

I use measures of musical taste as indicators of omnivore culture consumption. Using measures of musical taste has various advantages: first music continues to be one of the primary modes of engagement with mass produced media and urban culture (Crane 1993; DeNora 2000). Not only was music the first culture production field in which the highbrow/lowbrow regime took hold (DiMaggio 1991b), but it was also with respect to music that the first set of youth culture and working class culture led revolutions in taste — exemplified primarily by the rise of rock and roll and popularization of country music in the U.S.—appeared. In this sense music is and continues to be one of the primary tools used by groups to define their identity and draw symbolic boundaries in relation to other groups (Bourdieu 1984, Bryson 1996, Peterson 2000), whether these boundaries and identities are racial or ethnic (i.e. rap music, some forms of heavy metal preferred by lower working class youth), generational (rock and newer forms of youth music such as techno and house) class-based (Roscigno and Danaher 2001) and/or political (Eyerman and Jamison 1998). Peterson and Simkus for instance use a clustering procedure to rank occupational groups according to their musical taste. They find that “… that the higher status groups appreciate the so-called highbrow genres (especially classical music) more than other groups, whereas lowbrow styles

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28 Samples sizes for individual countries range from a low of 609 for Luxembourg to 1093 for Austria. For most of the other countries the sample size hovers around 1000.
(e.g. country music, blues, gospel) are mostly appreciated by the lower status groups” (Peterson 2005b).

Second, taste for classical music was the prototypical form of cultural engagement that exemplified the older regime of highbrow taste as transcendental “judgment” of aesthetic quality (Van Eijck 2000). Bourdieu (1984: 18) notes that “…nothing more clearly affirms one’s ‘class’ than tastes in music.” Thus, changes in the production of the most refined high culture musical goods and criticism have reflected the decline of the traditional division between this realm of “pure” taste and the less purified world of urban musical cultures (Crane 1993). The rise to prominence of the popular music culture industry—especially in the United States—in the middle of the 20th century, was promptly followed by the dissolution of the traditional canon in “highbrow” music (the “pantheon” of 18th and 19th century composers such as Beethoven, Mozart and Bach) with the beginning of importation (in the 1960s and 1970s) of popular culture elements derived from progressive rock, jazz, blues and—more recently—even rap, techno and other forms of ambient mixed music into traditional classical composition (Fink 1998: 154). A similar dynamic has been observed in opera—the other highly consecrated highbrow musical genre—with the rise of market pressures to “popularize” both live and mediated operatic performance by way of a strategy of crossing over both performers and themes from other more popular genres (i.e. musicals, operettas) into the genre.

Third, Musical consumption in contrast to other forms of arts participation (such as attending the museum) carries with it relatively little “overhead”, and especially when considering access to music through mass media channels (such as radio or recorded sources), is potentially available to a wider proportion of the population regardless of such
factors as age and place of residence. As noted by Peterson (2004) “Whereas the audience for the high arts is relatively homogeneous in terms of its socio-demographics, the audience for music encompasses virtually everybody. Musical preferences therefore lend themselves very well to the study of taste differentiation, because music comes in all tastes and is easily accessible through media display as well as tapes and cd's to be played whenever one feels like doing so at relatively low costs.” Thus, measuring taste using indicators of musical consumption leads to a better appreciation of the person’s actual cultural dispositions, unclouded by other extraneous contextual factors potentially orthogonal to issues of taste. Finally, the effectiveness of musical preferences as a valid indicator of generalized cultural taste has been confirmed in a variety of studies (Peterson and Simkus 1993, Peterson 2004), with strong correlations obtaining between various forms of musical taste (i.e. highbrow, popular, folk) and patterns of participation—and avoidance of other cultural activities, such as visiting a museum, going to the movies and attending the theater.

5.6.3. Description of Musical Taste Data

Each respondent in the Eurobarometer survey was asked the following question: What kind of music do you listen to? Responses were recoded into 11 broad musical categories: 1) classical music, 2) opera or operetta, 3) rock and roll and pop rock, 4) heavy metal or hard rock, 5) easy listening, 6) electronic dance music or “house,” 7) techno or ambient, 8) rap or hip hop, 9) jazz 10), folk or traditional music (including American country music) and 11) world music. The respondent is counted as having consumed the musical form if she reports having listened to a recorded performance of the genre at least once in the past month.
Table 15 shows the distribution of musical choices across 15 occupational groups for the entire Eurobarometer sample. The entry in each cell shows the odds of each occupational group to choose the musical genre in the corresponding column in relation to the average propensity of that genre to chosen by everybody else. Numbers above one indicate higher than average chances, while numbers below one indicate lower than average odds. The table shows that for the most part, musical choices conform to the expectation that traditional high-status genres such as Classical music, and opera and more recently consecrated high status genres such as jazz are disproportionately more likely to be chosen by members of prestigious occupations (i.e. Professional and Managerial groups), while less prestigious genres such as Folk music are more likely to appear to members of lower status occupational groups (Peterson 1992). Also, as noted by Peterson (1992), members of high-prestige occupations, while disproportionately more likely to consume high-status genres, show no strong propensities to reject other genres. This is shown by the fact that with very few exceptions, the odds of professional and managerial respondents to choose musical genres associated with popular and urban musical cultures is about the same as the overall average (fluctuating around one). Members of manual (skilled and unskilled) and farm occupations in contrast, as shown in the last three rows of the table, display strong patterns of aversion toward high-status genres (Bourdieu 1984). In fact members of these occupational groups—with the effect particularly salient among farmers and low skill manual workers—consume little of everything with the exception of folk music, consistent with the “univore” pattern noted by Peterson (Peterson 1992, Peterson and Simkus 1993, Bryson 1997).

Table 15. Distribution of cultural choices across occupational groups for the entire Eurobarometer sample.
Given the pattern of cultural choices shown in Table 15, I define a respondent as a *highbrow* musical consumer if he or she reports having listened to classical music and either jazz or opera at least once in the past month. This is similar to Peterson’s (2005b: 20) operationalization of highbrow taste in his recent study of arts consumption in the U.S. using the 2002 Survey for Public Participation in the Arts.\(^{29}\) Peterson shows that this measure of highbrow taste has good criterion validity, as highbrows as here defined are much more likely than other respondents who participate in other forms of high-status culture consumption, such as attending the museum, ballet and classical music concerts.

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\(^{29}\) Peterson operationalization is slightly different than the one proposed here, as he considers highbrow a respondent who reports liking any two of opera, jazz and classical music.
Following Peterson and Kern (1996) I operationalize omnivore consumption as a count of the number of non-highbrow genres that are part of the respondent’s listening repertoire. This yields a scale with 9 categories ranging from zero to eight. I recode the scale into six categories by collapsing the last three categories, with the last category being truncated at 5 or more musical genre choices.

5.7. Results

5.7.1. Analytic Strategy

In this section I address the merit of the various explanations for the emergence of omnivorousness across different societal contexts. The basic general question to be answered is the following: can the location of each society along the various dimensions defined by their levels of socioeconomic development, cultural industry size, political values and various types of globalization help explain the association between country and levels of omnivorousness? The data to be analyzed are shown in Table 16. There is a strong association between country and levels of omnivorousness. The model of independence does not fit the data well (chi2= 1129.77, p<0.0001), suggesting that important cross-national variation exists in the relative prevalence of omnivore taste.

Table 16. Distribution of respondents across countries and Levels of omnivore consumption, for 15 EU countries, 2001 Eurobarometer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Column 1</td>
<td>Column 2</td>
<td>Column 3</td>
<td>Column 4</td>
<td>Column 5</td>
<td>Column 6</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>5,576</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>2,319</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>15,895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question then becomes: what are the factors that explain this association? One way to model the relationship between the two nominal and/or ordinal variables, is through a saturated log-linear model for the r x c table formed by their cross-classification, where in this case r is the number of countries and c is the number of categories of the omnivore score. The expected frequency in the cell indexed by row i of column j would be given by:

**Equation 1**

\[ \log(m_{ij}) = \lambda + \lambda_i^R + \lambda_j^C + \lambda_{ij}^{RC} \]

Where \( m_{ij} \) is the expected frequency in the \( ij^{th} \) cell, \( \lambda \) is the table total parameter (analogous to the constant in an analysis of variance), \( \lambda_i^R \) fits the row marginals, \( \lambda_j^C \) fits the column marginals and \( \lambda_{ij}^{RC} \) is the parameter that accounts for the association between country and omnivorousness, net of the row and column marginals. The saturated model shown in (1) is not very interesting, since it reproduces the exact counts shown in table 9, and uses all of the available degrees of freedom (equal to r x c or in this case, 90). A more interesting model is one that takes advantage of information from either the rows or the column categories, to
restrict the two-way association parameter \( \lambda_{ij}^{RC} \) in a more parsimonious manner (Goodman 1979, Haberman 1974).

One way to restrict the association parameter of the model shown in (1) is to use information as to the order of the columns (Agresti 1983). Since the column categories form a scale arranged from low to high, one simple way to implement such restrictions is to use integer scoring (i.e. \( v_j = j \) for each column) for the ordinal omnivore scale (Agresti 1983: 185). The two-way association between country and omnivore consumption is then given by a country-specific row-score parameter:

Equation 2

\[
\log(m_{ij}) = \lambda + \lambda_i^R + \lambda_j^C + \tau_i^R (v_j - \bar{v})
\]

Where everything is as in (1), \( v_j \) is the integer score assigned to each column, \( \tau_i^R \) indexes the association between increasing levels of omnivorousness and belonging to country \( i \). Large values of \( \tau_i^R \) for a country indicate a higher prevalence of omnivore consumption in comparison with countries with lower values. In contrast to (1) this model uses only 34 degrees of freedom, thanks to the linear restrictions imposed on the columns scores.

It is also possible, as shown in Goodman (1979, 1986) to take both the row and column scores as unknown parameters. This yields the log-multiplicative RC model, also known as the generalized additive multiplicative main effects model (GAMMI) in biometrics (Van Eeuwijk 1995). Row and column scores can be estimated along multiple “dimensions” of the table, with those which provide the best fit for the residuals beyond independence being assigned to the first dimension, those that provide the best fit to the residuals beyond the first dimension being assigned to the second dimension, and so on. The multidimensional
RC(M) model, with M being the number of table dimensions (not to exceed MIN(R-1,C-1),
can be written as:

Equation 3

\[ \log(m_{ij}) = \lambda + \lambda_i^R + \lambda_j^C + \sum_{m=1}^{M} u_{im} v_{jm} \phi_m \]

Where \(u_{im}\) and \(v_{jm}\) are the estimated row and column scores for the \(m^{th}\) dimension respectively,
and \(\phi_m\) is the association parameter indexing the strength of the relationship between the
row and column scores for that dimension.

5.7.2. Log-Linear Model Results

Table 17 shows the fits statistics for various log-linear and log-multiplicative models fit to
the data shown in Table 16. Not surprisingly, the model of independence fails to fit the
table, suggesting that there exists substantial cross-national variation in the average breadth
of musical consumption. Model 2 is a log-linear “row effects” model, in which the column
categories are taken as being ordered and equidistant using integer scores from 1 to 5, and
row categories for the countries are estimated from the data under the assumption that
countries can be ordered in a linear continuum from their association with the linearly
restricted column variable. Even though this model makes fairly restrictive assumptions
(assuming that omnivorousness is a linear construct and that there is a single dimension
along which countries can be ordered) it results in a dramatic improvement in fit. The null
hypothesis of zero-cross-national variation in omnivore consumption can be easily rejected
\((\chi^2 = 676.59, p<0.001, 14\text{ degrees of freedom})\). Using row scores to account for the
association between country and omnivore taste results in a significant improvement in
model fit ($p < 0.01$) with the model $L^2$ being reduced by about 69%, suggesting that more than two-thirds of the association in Table 16 is accounted for by cross-national variation along a linear continuum of univore versus omnivore consumption.

Table 17. Fit statistic for log-linear and log-multiplicative models of the association between country and omnivore musical taste for 15 EU countries, 2001 Eurobarometer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>dev</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>bic</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Independence</td>
<td>1062.49</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>747.50</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.Country Effects</td>
<td>324.70</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>72.71</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.Country and Column Effects (R+C)</td>
<td>311.00</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>77.01</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.Goodman RC(1)</td>
<td>264.95</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>30.96</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.Goodman RC(2)</td>
<td>76.56</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-85.44</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.Goodman RC(3)</td>
<td>21.92</td>
<td>0.4839</td>
<td>-77.07</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 shows the country-specific association parameters indexing the relative prevalence of omnivore consumption in each country. Numbers below zero indicate a lower than average propensity towards omnivore taste and numbers above zero indicate a comparative advantage in omnivorousness. Scores that are statistically indistinguishable from zero (indicated by their confidence interval overlapping this quantity) point toward a propensity toward omnivorousness close to the cross-country average. I find that there exists substantial cross-national variation in the extent to which we can observe higher or lower rates of omnivorousness.

As shown in the figure, the basic line of division appears to separate the richer, more socially and economically advantaged Scandinavian and Northern European countries (i.e. Sweden, Finland, Denmark, The Netherlands and Luxembourg)—all of which display higher than expected rates of omnivore consumption—and the relatively less socially and economically developed Southern European societies (i.e. Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal) along with
Ireland and Austria, all of which have lower than average rates of omnivorousness. The large continental European countries, such as (France and Germany), and the United Kingdom and Belgium, display levels of omnivore consumption that can placed in between these two extremes (although France’s score is above the average for all countries). The pattern of variation shown in Figure 8 is consistent with several of the hypotheses (development, globalization, values, etc.) proposed above, since countries which are higher in those dimensions are also the ones that display a higher relative prevalence of omnivore taste.

Figure 8. Parameter estimates for the association between country and omnivore consumption.
However, even though model 2 is a substantial improvement over independence, it still fails to provide an adequate overall fit to the data ($p<0.001$). It is possible that the lack of fit may be due to the highly restrictive assumption of equal spacing for the omnivore consumption scores. Model 3 is a log-linear Goodman R+C model in which the equal spacing assumption is relaxed, with the column categories now treated as unknown parameters, but still assumed to be correctly ordered from low to high. The results show that while the model in which the column scores are allowed to unequally spaced does result in a better fit, this improvement is only marginal ($p=0.06$), suggesting that departures from linearity on the column scores are not a major source of lack of fit in the model.

Models 4-6 are log-multiplicative models in which both the row and column scores are treated as unknown parameters and the association between the row and column scores enters the model as a multiplicative term (an interaction between the row and column scores). In these models, the scores assigned to the countries and the columns are allowed to be unequally spaced and are presumed to be associated with several dimensions of association, up to the minimum of R-1 or C-1. Model 4, with one dimension uses the same degrees freedom as model 3, but results in a much better fit ($L^2=264.9$ versus 311.01 for model 3). Models 5 and 6, in which I add a second and a third dimension of association between country and omnivore consumption, respectively, display the best fit with the most negative bic scores of all the models in the table. The three dimensional RC model, while displaying an acceptable level of fit by the conventional $L^2$ criterion ($p=0.48$), does not fit as well as the two-dimensional model according to the bic criterion, suggesting that three dimensions while sufficient to account for the bulk of the association between country and omnivore consumption category in the table, may also be overfitting the data to sample
idiosyncrasies. For purposes of parsimony (Raftery 1995), I select the RC(2) model as the most desirable approximation to the association structure of the data.

What is the structure of the association uncovered by the RC models? Figures 4 and 5 show a biplot (Van Eeuwijk 1995) of the row and column scores for the estimated row and column scores for the first and second dimensions from the RC(2) model. In the biplot, the proximity between two row categories (i.e. Sweden and Finland or Spain and Greece) is related to their relative row-profile similarity. That is, the fact that two countries are close together in the diagram indicates that their respective populations display similar patterns of culture consumption. The proximity of a row to a column category, in a similar way, indicates that that column category is on average highly represented in that country. The distance between any two given row categories can conversely be read as indicating a wide dissimilarity of the culture consumption profiles, while the distance between a country and a column category can taken as an indication that that culture consumption category is underrepresented in that country. Thus the fact that Italy appears close to the zero category in figure 4, indicates a relatively high representation of individuals who report not consuming any of the musical genres included in the survey, while the fact that Greece is maximally distant from the five+ category, suggests that these highly omnivorous types of culture consumers are rarest in the Greek context.

The first—and most important, accounting for 75% of the association beyond independence—dimension, plotted in the vertical axis in the figure is, not surprisingly, that which separates the richer and more economically and socially advanced EU societies (which are also the ones that display the most expansive tastes as shown by the fact that these countries are closer to the “three”, “four” and “five+” categories) from the relatively less
developed EU countries, which are more likely to be univores and abstainers (closer to the “zero” and “one” categories).

Dimension one can clearly be considered an omnivore/univore axis of differentiation as the column categories are neatly arranged from lower to higher along the vertical axis. The secondary dimension appears to separate Italy, which displays a disproportionately high number of respondents who do not report listening to any of the musical genres included in the survey, from the other low musical consumption societies, such as Ireland and Austria, at the bottom of the axis. Towards the top the second dimension differentiates between voracious (Katz-Gerro and Sullivan 2005) countries such as Luxembourg from omnivorous countries such as Sweden and Denmark.

The question then becomes: what specific societal-level factors account for this pattern of cross-national variation along the first and most dominant dimension?
Figure 9. Biplot of country and column scores for the two-dimensions of the Goodman RC(2) model.

5.8. Cross-National Determinants Of Country Position In The Omnivore/Univore Dimension

5.8.1. Scaled Association Models
Because we are interested in how various country characteristics are associated with rates of omnivorousness, one way to proceed is to use the information given in tables [insert number here] to assign country-level scores for each of the variables of interest (i.e. development, economic globalization, etc.). This results in the model that Hout (1984) refers to as the scaled association model (see also Haberman 1974). Since, as shown in the tables, the omnivore/univore partition across the fifteen countries pertains primarily to the first dimension of the various association models, we can decompose the country-level association along this dimension using country-level scores, in effect estimating a restricted version of the RC(3) model. This model “scales” the rows of Table 16 using external country-level information to explain the ordering of countries along first dimension. To hold constant the association along the residual second and third dimensions, we use the estimated scores from a previous run of the RC(3) model. Restricting the column scores for the first dimension using the estimated scores obtained from a previous run of the RC(3) model, results in the following model:

Equation 4

\[
\log(m_{ij}) = \lambda + \lambda_j^R + \lambda_j^C + \sum_{k=1}^K \tau_{kij}^{RC} (u_{ik} - \bar{u}_{ik})v_{j1} + \sum_{m=2}^3 \phi_{mj}^{RC} u_{im}v_{jm}
\]

Where \(u_{ik}\) is a score of the \(i^{th}\) country in \(k^{th}\) country-level external covariate, \(v_{j1}\) is the fixed score assigned to each column in the first dimension obtained from a previous estimation of

\(\ldots\)

\(^{30}\)Scaled association models similar to the one proposed here also been applied to the study of educational homogamy (Unnk, Gazenboom and Robert 1996) comparative studies of social mobility (Pisati 1997: 183) and the comparative structure of sex segregation in occupations (Charles and Grusky 1996: 957-858).
an RC(3) model, the product \((u_{i1} - \bar{u}_{k1})v_{ji}\) is the score for the “linear by linear” interaction (Agresti 1983, Haberman 1974, Hout 1983: 53) between the country’s value in the \(k^{th}\) external variable and the level of omnivorousness along the first axis of association. The \(\tau_{k1}^{RC}\) are parameters (to be estimated from the data) associated with each one of those interactions. This set of parameters can be interpreted as the effect of increasing scores on the \(k^{th}\) covariate on omnivore consumption. For instance, a positive \(\tau_{k1}^{RC}\) for economic development would indicate that as countries increase in wealth, average omnivorousness scores also increase (supporting the economic development hypothesis). Scores for each country on all of the dimensions relevant to testing hypotheses 1-10 are shown in the appendix (table 30, page 273). Finally the \(\phi_{im}^{RC}u_{im}v_{jm}\) are bilinear interaction terms resulting from the product of the row and column scores obtained from a previous run of the RC(3) model, and serve to fully account for the country-column interaction for these residual dimensions, leaving only the association along the first dimension to be explained by the external country-level covariates.

5.8.2. Country-Level Scores

I score the rows using country-level scores designed to measure overall socioeconomic development using a standardized ranking based on the human development index score.\(^{31}\)

\(^{31}\) The HDI is a measure of overall social and economic development. It is an omnibus index composed of separate measures of overall expansion of the educational system (i.e. literacy rates), economic advancement (i.e. GDP per capita) and overall quality of life (i.e. life expectancy at birth). All measures are obtained from the UN Human Development Report for the year 2002.
Overall economic advancement is measured as the first as the standardized ranking score based on GDP per capita (1999).

Expansion of the educational system is the standardized ranking of countries based on the overall governmental expenses in education for the years 1995-1997.

State expansion is measured the standardized ranking of countries based on the governmental expenses in health for each country for the years 1995-1997.

I scored countries along overall levels of class stratification using the standardized ranking based on the percentage of national income shared by those in the bottom 10% of the income distribution.

Cultural industry size is given by the standardized country rank based on the factor score corresponding to a culture-industry production scale obtained from the first principal component of factor analysis of cross-national measures of book production, film production and film imports.\(^\text{32}\)

Support for tolerant political values is measured as the standardized country ranking based on the percentage of respondents that rank “tolerance” as the most important value to be taught to children.\(^\text{33}\)

\(^{32}\) The data come from the UNESCO Survey on National Cinematography which included 186 countries. Book and Film production is measured as the average number of books and films produced in that country from 1988-1998.

\(^{33}\) The data for tolerant values come from the Global Civil Society Yearbook 2002, and is part of the various measures that make up the Global Civil Society Index (Anheier et al 2002). The original item is from the 2000 World Values survey. Respondents were asked the following question: “Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?” The choices were 1)
Regional identification is measured as the standardized ranking of countries based on the proportion of respondents who report feeling closer to their region of origin in comparison to feeling closer to the EU as a whole.  

Finally, the degree of economic globalization is measured as the standardized ranking based on the average levels—converted to logged millions of U.S. dollars—of outgoing foreign direct investment coming into that country for the period of 1990-2001.  

World polity linkages are measured as the standardized ranking of countries based on the number of International non-Governmental organization memberships per million-population in 1991. 

Finally, The extent to which a society has transitioned to the “networked individualism” (Wellman 2001) of the network society is measured as the standardized ranking scores based on the number of computer users per capita.  

Table 30 in the appendix shows the country scores for all nine of the factors considered in the analysis.

5.8.3. The Effect Of Country-Level Scores On Omnivorousness

Tolerance and respect for other people, 2) Independence, 3) Responsibility, 4) Obedience, 5) Unselfishness.  

Regional identification and scores were obtained from the cumulative (Mannheim) Eurobarometer file covering the years 1970-2002.  

The FDI data come from the OECD International Direct Investment Database available online at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/3/8264806.xls. The foreign film data come from the UNESCO survey of national cinematography. 

This cross-national measure was obtained from the international networks data archive—directed by Miguel Angel Centeno at Princeton University—and is available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~ina/internet/internethosts.xls.
Table 18. Parameter estimates for scaled association model of the relationship between country-level covariates and omnivore consumption, 2001 Eurobarometer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Bilinear Term (M=2)</th>
<th>Bilinear Term (M=3)</th>
<th>Human Development Index Score</th>
<th>GDP per capita Score</th>
<th>State Educ. Expenditures Score</th>
<th>State Health Expenditures Score</th>
<th>Class Inequality Score</th>
<th>Cultural Industry Size Score</th>
<th>Tolerant Values Score</th>
<th>Regional I.D. Score</th>
<th>Economic Globalization Score</th>
<th>Network Society Score</th>
<th>World Polity Linkage Score</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Deviance</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Prop. dev. explained (M=1)</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>1.21* (14.27)</td>
<td>0.51* (7.91)</td>
<td>0.33* (11.03)</td>
<td>0.06* (2.16)</td>
<td>0.27* (10.52)</td>
<td>0.07* (2.58)</td>
<td>0.16* (6.00)</td>
<td>0.17* (-4.04)</td>
<td>0.08* (2.03)</td>
<td>-0.44* (-8.29)</td>
<td>0.08 (1.44)</td>
<td>4.82* (123.35)</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>164.44</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>1.24* (14.60)</td>
<td>0.48* (7.32)</td>
<td>0.31* (10.28)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.59)</td>
<td>0.28* (10.79)</td>
<td>0.08* (3.03)</td>
<td>0.12* (4.16)</td>
<td>-0.16* (-4.00)</td>
<td>0.04 (1.00)</td>
<td>-0.43* (-11.97)</td>
<td>0.39 (9.05)</td>
<td>4.82* (123.54)</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>132.73</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>1.23* (14.45)</td>
<td>0.48* (7.33)</td>
<td>0.27* (8.45)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.59)</td>
<td>0.24* (7.40)</td>
<td>0.22* (5.10)</td>
<td>0.14* (4.61)</td>
<td>-0.10* (-2.50)</td>
<td>0.04 (1.00)</td>
<td>-0.43* (-11.04)</td>
<td>0.39 (9.05)</td>
<td>4.82* (123.48)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>116.71</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>1.23* (14.53)</td>
<td>0.48* (7.45)</td>
<td>0.22* (5.36)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.59)</td>
<td>0.19* (5.69)</td>
<td>0.21* (4.91)</td>
<td>0.05 (1.65)</td>
<td>-0.10* (-2.50)</td>
<td>0.04 (1.00)</td>
<td>-0.43* (-11.04)</td>
<td>0.39 (9.05)</td>
<td>4.82* (123.47)</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>117.08</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>1.23* (14.49)</td>
<td>0.46* (7.04)</td>
<td>0.22* (5.36)</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.92)</td>
<td>0.13* (5.77)</td>
<td>0.13* (2.98)</td>
<td>0.06 (1.65)</td>
<td>-0.10* (-2.50)</td>
<td>0.04 (1.00)</td>
<td>-0.43* (-11.04)</td>
<td>0.39 (9.05)</td>
<td>4.82* (119.86)</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>52.59</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 6</td>
<td>1.21* (14.29)</td>
<td>0.47* (7.27)</td>
<td>0.22* (5.36)</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.92)</td>
<td>0.12* (5.75)</td>
<td>0.12* (2.75)</td>
<td>0.05 (1.65)</td>
<td>-0.10* (-2.50)</td>
<td>0.04 (1.00)</td>
<td>-0.43* (-11.04)</td>
<td>0.39 (9.05)</td>
<td>4.78* (121.75)</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>45.18</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 7</td>
<td>1.18* (13.94)</td>
<td>0.44* (6.82)</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.92)</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.92)</td>
<td>0.12* (5.75)</td>
<td>0.12* (2.75)</td>
<td>0.05 (1.65)</td>
<td>-0.10* (-2.50)</td>
<td>0.04 (1.00)</td>
<td>-0.43* (-11.04)</td>
<td>0.39 (9.05)</td>
<td>4.78* (120.91)</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>45.18</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<0.05 (t-statistics in parentheses)

Table 18 shows the parameter estimates for a series of scaled association models applied to the data shown in table 9. A baseline model, including the multiplicative interaction between...
the row and column scores for dimensions 2 and 3 estimated from a previous run of the
RC(3) association model, produces an $L^2$ of 743, thus, together the two residual dimensions
explain about 30% of the association country and omnivore taste beyond independence
(1062.49). The rest of the association that remains unexplained (70%) is that which comes
from the ordering of countries along the first and most important dimension shown in
figures 4 and 5, which separates omnivore from univore societies. Linear by linear
interaction between country-level covariates and column scores for the first dimension can
allow us to help explain and contextualize this national ordering.

In the second model, I include the linear by linear interaction between omnivore
consumption and four indicators of national socioeconomic development: the HDI score,
the GDP per capita score, the educational expansion score, and state expansion score. The
results are supportive of hypotheses 1 and 2. Consistent with the visual arrangement of EU
countries in Figure 9, the more economically advantaged societies are also the most
omnivorous societies. Furthermore, omnivorousness is more prevalent in societies with
relatively better developed and expansive educational systems, as well as societies were the
public sector expands to foster higher living standards, supporting DiMaggio’s (1987) and
Peterson and Kern’s (1996) contention that genre “declassification” processes and expansive
tastes are partially the result of state expansion and the rising standards of living that
accompany social and economic development. Not surprisingly, national social and
economic development appears to account for the bulk of the association between country
and position along the omnivore univore axis, with the three country-level scores associated
with the $L^2$ decreasing by 62% once the linear by linear interactions between this factor and
the omnivore taste column scores are introduced into the model.
In model 3 I include the effect of class inequality. In support of the class stratification hypothesis (hypothesis 3), I find that decreasing levels of class inequality, as measured by the share of national income from the bottom 10% of the population, are associated with increasing levels of omnivorousness even after holding social and economic development constant (which is important, since the most egalitarian societies in these data are also the more socioeconomically advanced). This adds credence to Peterson’s speculation that higher levels of inter-class contact and “mixing” of class cultures that occurs in more egalitarian societies are partially responsible for the rise of an omnivore aesthetic.

Furthermore, after controlling for class inequality the effect of the GDP per capita score is reduced to non-significance, suggesting that economic development results in omnivorousness only insofar as it is associated with increasing egalitarianism at the level of the class structure.

In Model 4 I introduce the linear by linear interaction corresponding to the size of the national culture industry. Hypothesis 4, which predicts a positive association between the relative size of culture industry and levels of omnivorousness, fails to receive support in this model. Instead I find that societies with larger culture industries are less likely to be omnivorous ($\tau=0.10$, $p<0.01$). This result runs against the prediction that omnivorousness is the result of culture-industry-associated mass media growth (Peterson and Kern 1996, DiMaggio 1987). In the European context, the societies with the largest and most productive domestic culture industries (France, Spain, Italy, Germany and the United
Kingdom) are not as omnivorous in comparison to the smaller northern European societies, which tend to import most of their cultural products.\textsuperscript{37}

Model 5 is a “tolerant values” model in which I introduce the effect of the prevalence of tolerant values related to regional attachment (see chapter 2). In support of hypothesis 5a, I find that increasing support for tolerant values is significantly associated with increasing breadth of cultural choice ($\tau=0.08, p<0.01$), the societal equivalent of Bryson’s (1996) finding of a negative association between tolerance and cultural dislikes in a sample of adults in the U.S.

In model 6 I consider the effect of patterns of regional identification on omnivore taste (hypothesis 5b). As expected the countries that score highest in the regional identification item (indicating a higher prevalence of individuals who strongly identify with their region of residence at the expense of more encompassing geographical entities), are also the less omnivorous societies, with the regional identification linear by linear interaction being strong and highly significant ($\tau=-0.44, p<0.00001$). The introduction of the linear-by-linear interaction term between omnivorousness and the country score for regional identification results in a substantial improvement in model fit, according to the traditional $L^2$ and Bayesian

\textsuperscript{37} It is possible that protectionist cultural policies in the larger European societies have the effect of restricting the range of tastes in the local population, while more laissez faire cultural policies result in omnivore taste expansion, a hypothesis that will be put to the test below when consider the effect of globalization (although as we will see below, a lot of regional heterogeneity is concealed by treating the larger European societies on a national level). One thing that can be concluded is that, consistent with market theories of culture production and consumption (Cowen 2002), mass media growth per se does not result in the expansion of tastes, unless that growth is also accompanied by relative societal openness toward non-domestic cultural offerings. The growth of national culture industries is as consistent with the rise of cultural chauvinism, as it is with cultural cosmopolitanism.
Information Criteria, both of which are considerably reduced. By itself, the regional identification score explains about 9% of the association along the omnivore/univore country axis. Furthermore, a look at the coefficient estimates of the national social and economic development variables after tolerant values and regional identification are held constant shows that after the controlling for the country’s scores on these value dimensions, the effect of overall socioeconomic development (as measured by the HDI score) completely disappears. In a similar way, the effect of national educational expansion is cut by about a fifth and state expansion by almost half suggesting that a substantial portion of the positive impact of socioeconomic development on omnivorousness is due to prior association between the various components of this last factor—in particular the growth of mass education—and more regional identification political attitudes and values (Meyer 1977), as would be expected if regional identification values were the intervening mechanism connecting socioeconomic development and omnivore taste (hypothesis 5b).

In model 7, I assess the contention that economic globalization (hypothesis 6), as measured by the overall outgoing foreign direct investment score, is positively associated with higher rates of omnivorousness. I find that economic globalization does have the predicted significant positive effect on omnivorousness ($\tau=0.08$), but that holding educational expansion, class inequality and support for tolerant values constant, there is no statistically significant effect of economic globalization and foreign cultural penetration on omnivore taste ($t=1.44$).

Model 7 is a cultural globalization/network society model in which country scores for both levels of connection to world society and infrastructural embeddedness in the “network society”—what (Lechner and Boli 2005) refer to as the “software” and “hardware” of world
culture, respectively—are introduced. The results are consistent with the view that omnivorousness is at least partially a result of cultural globalization processes and the transition into networked individualism (hypotheses 7 and 8). Both the density of links to the world polity and the level of connection to the network society have a strong positive effect on the odds of displaying higher levels of omnivorousness across all 15 countries, with the network society effect being particularly strong ($\tau=0.39, p<0.0001$), suggesting that the transition to networked individualism, is one of the primary drivers of the shift toward the omnivorization of cultural taste. The cultural globalization model produces a much superior fit to the data ($bic=-24.39$). Furthermore, this model, using only six country-level scores is able to account for the bulk of the association (89%) along the first (omnivore/univore) dimension of cross-national differentiation.

Notice that model 7 is also a combined national/global model in which I use both intra-societal and globalization scores to predict levels of omnivorousness. The results are consistent with a view that construes global factors, in particular levels of connection to “spaces and flows” and the cultural and informational networks (Crane 2002) of the international system, as the primary drivers of the turn toward omnivorousness (hypothesis 9). After holding cultural and economic globalization scores constant, neither levels of national educational expansion nor the size of the public sector as measured by state health expenditures is a useful predictor of country position in the omnivore/univore dimension of differentiation at the 0.05 level of statistical significance. This indicates that educational expansion only has an effect on omnivorousness by way of its prior association with world cultural linkages and the growth of tolerant values. Once we know the country scores on these last two factors, it is no longer necessary to take into account relative educational
expansion in predicting a given country’s position in the omnivore/univore continuum. In addition, the effect of cultural industry size reverts to its expected positive direction once cultural globalization factors are held constant, suggesting that the relative lack of globalization of the countries with the largest cultural industries in the EU served as a suppressor of the enabling influence of cultural industry size on omnivore taste. These results suggest that the impact of the most important intrasocietal factors—especially those associated with economic development and state expansion—on the country’s location along the omnivore/univore axis is substantially mediated by institutional and relational mechanisms related to the relative openness of the society to world culture, the degree of societal connection to the global system, and the relative degree of diffusion of more cosmopolitan values which weaken identification with local regions and move it closer to more encompassing geographical entities such as the world polity (chapter 2). The fact that cosmopolitan values play such an important role should come as no surprise. From the point of view of world polity institutionalism (Meyer et al 1997) and Lechner and Boli’s (2005) world culture perspective, this is to be expected, since cosmopolitan and tolerant values that extol the virtues of diversity and rationalize the legacy of other cultures as part of the “human heritage” are themselves an important component of the world-cultural package (Frank and Meyer 2002, Robertson 1990). This implies that in countries at similar levels of socioeconomic advancement as the richer northern European societies but without similar levels of connection to the informational and cultural networks of world society, we should not expect to find a similar degree of transition toward the omnivorization of taste.  

5.9. Omnivorousness And Highbrow Taste In Cross-National Perspective
5.9.1. Are Highbrows More Likely To Be Omnivores?

One assumption of the analysis so far is that the *same pattern of cultural stratification* is operative across all of the 15 countries included in the analysis. However, even though these are all Western European countries, it is possible to object that the relationship between highbrow taste and omnivorosness would be very different in countries such as Italy, France, Germany and Austria (traditional bastions of the classical aesthetic) than in places such as Denmark or Ireland. In this section I explore the relatively comparability (or potential lack thereof) of the cultural stratification systems of the 15 Eurobarometer countries by way of attempting to replicate the established finding of the association between highbrow taste and omnivorosness.

Peterson and Kern (1996) using data from the U.S. SPPA survey, find that highbrows are more likely to be omnivores than non-highbrows. Does the same pattern obtain in these data? In order to answer this question we have to incorporate variation along the highbrow/non-highbrow axis to the model shown in (2), which would lead an analysis of the *three-way* association between highbrow/non-highbrow status with categories \(i=1,2\), omnivorosness with categories \(j=1,2\ldots6\), and country with categories \(k=1, 2, 3\ldots15\). \(^{38}\)

Furthermore, since now we are interested in how the association between the first two factors may (or may not) exhibit variations across levels of the third (country), I turn to log-linear “uniform layer effects” models useful for ascertaining whether the linkage between two variables is constant across the categories of a third classifying factor (Goodman and

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\(^{38}\) The three-way counts are shown in Table 31 on page 274 of the Appendix.
Hout 1998). The general form of the additive formulation of the model is (Yamaguchi 1987):

Equation 5

\[ \log(m_{ijk}) = \lambda_i + \lambda_j + \lambda_k + \lambda_{ik} + \phi_{ij} \beta_k \]

Where \( \phi_{ij} \) corresponds to the row-column association and \( \beta_k \) is the term that captures how that association varies across the layers. If \( \beta_k = 0 \) for all \( k \), then the association is the same across all the layers and the simple no-three-way interaction model would be appropriate for the data.\(^{39}\)

Table 19. Fit statistics for log-linear models of the association between country, omnivore consumption and highbrow taste, 2001 Eurobarometer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Conditional independence</td>
<td>444.8</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-280.7</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Homogeneous layer effect</td>
<td>393.9</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-321.9</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Heterogenous Additive layer effect (UA)</td>
<td>163.5</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-417.0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Heterogenous Additive layer effect (RC)</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-474.7</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Linear Additive Effect (RC)</td>
<td>182.4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-475.4</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19 shows the results of fitting various association models to the three-way country/omnivore consumption/highbrow taste table. Is there an association between highbrow consumption and omnivore taste in these data similar to the one uncovered by Peterson and Kern (1996) for American respondents? Model 1 is a baseline conditional independence model which says that there is no highbrow/omnivore taste association, once

\(^{39}\) Models are estimated using the “unidiff” routine written by Mario Pisati for the Stata package (Statacorp 2005) and the LEM package written by Jeroen K. Vermunt (1997).
we fit the two-way country/omnivore taste and the country/highbrow taste marginal. If this model fits the data, then we would conclude that omnivore taste is not related to highbrow taste for this sample of EU respondents. Not surprisingly, this model can be safely rejected \((p<0.0001)\), indicating that there does indeed exist a linkage between highbrow and omnivore taste.

Model 2 is the homogenous layer effect (a version of the “no-three-way interaction”) model that allows for an association between levels of omnivore consumption and highbrow taste, with the two-way association between highbrow status and omnivorousness modeled using integer scores for both the omnivore and highbrow taste category (i.e. Goodman’s [1979] “uniform association” model, with \(\psi_{ij} = \phi_j \)). In addition, the model stipulates that this association is the same across all 15 EU countries, by restricting all \(\beta_k\) to their null value.

Thus, this model makes two very strong theoretical assumptions: in addition to assuming that a) all EU countries are subject to the same highbrow omnivorousness taste regime, it also assumes that b) there is no difference in the strength highbrow/omnivore taste association across countries. Notice that the first assumption might be true even if the latter one is false. This model results in a moderate improvement in fit, with the \(L^2\) decreasing by about 11% in comparison to the conditional independence model, however the model fails to provide an adequate overall fit to the data according to conventional criteria \((p<0.001)\) suggesting that the strong hypothesis of complete cross-national homogeneity can be safely rejected.

Looking at the parameter estimates for the restricted two-way association between omnivore consumption and highbrow taste, the results replicate Peterson and Kern’s basic finding (for
American respondents) of a higher likelihood of highbrows to be omnivores in comparison to non-highbrows. The overall association parameter across all countries between highbrow status and omnivorousness is positive and statistically significant ($\exp(\hat{\phi})=1.45$, $p<0.001$), indicating that the relative representation of highbrows increases as we move up on the omnivore consumption scale.

5.9.2. Cross-National Differences In Highbrow Omnivorousness

Does the fact that the strong assumption of cross-national homogeneity in the cultural stratification system of the 15 EU countries is not supported by data mean that each country is subject to a locally idiosyncratic taste stratification regime? Not necessarily; it is possible for instance that there exists a shared pattern of association between highbrow taste and omnivorousness across the 15 EU countries, but that each country exhibits deviations from this common pattern. According to this formulation, all EU countries are subject to the same highbrow omnivorousness taste stratification regime, but in some countries the linkage between these two forms of taste is stronger than in others.

To test this hypothesis, I specify a heterogeneous layer effect model in which the linearly restricted omnivore/highbrow association is allowed to vary additively in its overall strength across countries (Yamaguchi 1987). This model uses ($k-1=14$) degrees of freedom beyond the homogenous layer effect model (Goodman and Hout 1998: 184). As shown in the third row of the table, allowing for the highbrow omnivorousness effect to be different across countries results in a substantial improvement in fit (explaining 58% of the association left unaccounted for by the homogeneous layer effect model), suggesting the highbrow omnivorousness effect does vary significantly in strength across EU countries (the bic
statistic acquires its most negative value so far). However, this model still does not fit the data within conventional levels of significance (p<0.001). In model 4, I relax the assumption that the omnivore taste and highbrow taste categories are equally spaced by specifying this two-way interaction using an RC association structure \((\psi_{ij} = \phi u_i v_j)\). This version of the heterogeneous layer effects model fits the data fairly well \((L^2=67.1, 56 df, p<0.15)\), suggesting that the remaining lack of fit was due to the strong assumption of equal spacing of row and column categories.\(^{40}\) Thus, the more nuanced version of the homogeneity hypothesis is supported by the data: \textit{all 15 EU countries appear to be subject to the same highbrow omnivorousness regime, but the relative strength of the effect varies across countries.} These results suggests that Peterson and Kern’s (1996) highbrow omnivorousness finding is certainly applicable outside of the U.S. context, as the recent accumulation of circumstantial evidence from separate national studies indicates.

Table 20. Cross-national differences in highbrow omnivorousness, 2001 Eurobarometer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(\beta_k)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.6787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.6506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.3374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.2288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.2211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.1762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.0598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{40}\) Neither the Xie (1992) log multiplicative model, nor the Goodman-Hout (1998) “regression type layer effect” model provide a better fit to the data. As noted by Goodman and Hout (1998) the fact that the Yamaguchi (1987) model, being a more restrictive special case of their more general regression type model, provides an adequate fit to the data supports an strong version of the homogeneity hypothesis with local national deviations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parameter Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.0214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-0.1148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-0.1229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-0.1253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-0.1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>-0.3418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The parameter estimates for the country-specific deviations from the average pattern of association between omnivore and highbrow taste for each EU country are shown in Table 20. The table reveals several suggestive patterns. First, I find that some of the same Southern European countries that were shown to display lower relative levels of overall omnivorousness in Figure 8 (Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy) are the ones that display relative deviations toward a greater linkage between highbrow taste and omnivorousness than the cross-national average. Austria and Germany are distinctive in that they are the countries whose cultural stratification structure most conforms to a “snob/univore” pattern (Peterson 1992), with a weaker than average association between highbrow taste and omnivorousness and a higher than average prevalence of univores.

The countries that were shown to be the most omnivorous overall on the other hand, show some of the strongest tendencies toward a weaker linkage between highbrow and omnivore taste. In Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands and Luxembourg the association between omnivorousness and highbrow taste is weaker than average, suggesting that as omnivorousness becomes the dominant form of taste there is a less pronounced differentiation between highbrows and lowbrows based on breadth of taste. This is in contrast to the pattern exhibited by Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, which show a strong differentiation between univorous lowbrows and omnivorous highbrows. Thus, the relatively less globally connected Southern
European societies come closest to representing Peterson’s (1992) ideal type of possessing cosmopolitan highbrow elite that also partakes of a wide variety of aesthetic experiences and a taste segmented lowbrow non-elite (univores) which holds fast to more restricted taste patterns. Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg and the Netherlands on the other hand, come closest to the “postmodern” situation, in which the highbrow/lowbrow boundary loses ritual potency, with a taste structure weakly, bounded and highly differentiated, but with low consensus (DiMaggio 1987).

Are the cross-national differences in the strength of the highbrow/omnivore association explainable using some of the same dimensions of national differentiation that proved useful in the scale association models? Model 5 of Table 19 is a “linear additive layer effects” model in which the cross-national deviations from the average two-way association are presumed to be linear functions of two of the country-level scores used in the scale association models (that is, \( \beta_k = \sum_{i=1}^{s} \varphi_k u_i \), where \( s \) is the number of external scores). I use the two strongest predictors (network society and regional identification) from Table 18. This model, while not providing an adequate fit according to the \( L^2 \) criterion (\( p<0.01 \)) does produce the best fit according to the \( bic \) criterion, suggesting that looking at the arrangement of countries according to the strength of the highbrow/omnivore linkage as a function of country level scores is a parsimonious way to represent the association structure in the data. Table 21 shows the coefficient estimates for the regression of the layer effects on the external scores. The results show that, as suggested by the arrangement of countries in Table 20, weaker regional identification and stronger network society connections decrease the strength of the highbrow/omnivore linkage, consistent with a more global formulation.
of late modernity theories which point to techno-economic and detraditionalization-related
cultural factors as responsible for processes of declassification and cultural fluidity.

Table 21. parameter estimates of the effect of country-level scores on the strength of the
highbrow/omnivore taste association across 15 EU countries, 2001 Eurobarometer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Score (μs)</th>
<th>φs</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Identification Score</td>
<td>0.1593*</td>
<td>0.0195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Society Score</td>
<td>-0.0298*</td>
<td>0.0185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05 (one-tailed test)
Figure 10. Plots of the association between proportion highbrow, country-level omnivore taste score and country-level highbrow omnivorousness for 15 EU countries and Greek, French and Dutch NUTS II Regions.

5.10. Summary of the Results

The plots shown in the four panels of Figure 10 (panels a-f) summarizes the general set of findings regarding the association between highbrow omnivorousness and omnivore taste alluded to so far. As shown in panel a, there is a strong association between a country’s position in the first omnivore consumption dimension (obtained from the RC(3) association model from Table 17) and the relative size of the highbrow consumption class (r=0.76). High omnivore consumption societies are also the ones that feature a larger representation of highbrow consumers. Thus, as argued by Peterson (1992) increasing omnivorousness is not antithetical to the spread of highbrow culture consumption, but in fact appears to be symbiotic to it. As opposed to traditional elite/mass theories which posit a conflictual relationship (at the point of consumption) between craft-like artistic forms of culture production and the products of the “culture industry,” the pattern shown in the most socially and economically advantaged Western European societies shows that both can thrive and stimulate one another, as argued by market-oriented globalization perspectives on culture production and culture consumption (i.e. Cowen 2002). And by the socio-structural approach of DiMaggio (1987).

41This is course not to deny that there may exist conflictual arrangements of culture producers along the mass produced/craft axis, as argued for instance, in Bourdieu’s (1985)
Panels b and c show the association between the strength of the highbrow omnivorousness effect and 1) the relative size of the highbrow culture consumer segment and 2) the average omnivore consumption score for that country (i.e. the scores used to rank countries in the first dimension of Figure 9). Here we can see that as noted above, the least omnivorous societies are paradoxically, the ones that exhibit the tightest association between highbrow taste and omnivore consumption \((r=-0.54)\); not surprisingly, these are also the societies in which highbrow taste continues to be the purview of a small minority the population, producing a steep negative association between the omnivore-highbrow linkage and the relative popularity of highbrow culture \((r=-0.72)\). Thus, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Ireland and Italy are the countries that most stereotypically conform to Peterson’s “inverted pyramid” image of the taste stratification structure of modern societies, with a relative small segment of cosmopolitan highbrows at the top, and a large majority of univorous non-elite culture consumers segmented along the lines associated with region, age, and ethnicity, among other social markers. This means that the strongest and least ambiguous version of the omnivore/univore regime appears to be characteristic of large “unevenly developed” societies, with a history of sharp demarcation between urban centers and more rural (and ethnically and linguistically diverse) peripheries.

As can be seen in panels b and c of Figure 10, Austria is conspicuous precisely because it does not fit either of these neat patterns; instead, it shows a relatively weak linkage between field theory. The conflictual arrangement among consumers positioned in contrasting locations in social space may be based however, less on what is consumed and more on how it is consumed (Holt 1998).
highbrow consumption and omnivore taste and a relatively small prevalence of omnivorousness (coupled with relatively restricted rates of highbrow consumption). This is precisely the cultural stratification system that Peterson (1992, Peterson and Kern 1996) speculates might have been characteristic of Western society before the postwar trends that resulted in the rise of the omnivore/univore regime took off. Thus, Austria comes closest to the “traditional” image of the taste structure (at least towards the “highbrow end” of the distribution) that Peterson (1992, 1997) thinks as having been superseded by the omnivore/univore regime in the United States, with a relatively small highbrow consumer segment that is comparatively “snobbish” and a large non-elite of univorous consumers. It is possible that as societies such as Austria become more global in the multidimensional sense emphasized in this chapter, that their cultural stratification structure would shift to one that is closer to the transitional omnivore/univore form that can be observed for countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal.

As omnivorousness comes to be the norm rather than exception, the association between highbrow taste and cultural breadth weakens, with the taste structure taking the form of, not a pyramid, but of a “wide rectangle” with broad taste across the class structure. These are, as we have seen, also the societies that are most globalized along several dimensions, being tightly linked to the network society and to the cultural resources provided by world culture.

42 Univorous consumption must be distinguished from the older notion of “mass” consumption. In these EU societies, as in the U.S., univores appear to prefer to consume cultural fare that is laden with local meanings and can be used to sustain and enact local identities and draw symbolic boundaries based on ethnic and linguistic differences (characterized in these data by the relatively high prevalence of consumption of “folk/traditional” music in these countries).
and the world polity (Meyer 1980). These are the societies that most strongly conform to
the pattern predicted by “late modernity” and postmodernization theories, which talk about
“detraditionalization” and the decline of ritual boundaries based on older conceptions of
class and status, and the rise of patterns of “flexible consumption” that mirror the rise of
flexible accumulation and the level of production (Giddens 1991a; Lash and Urry 1988; Beck
The problem with these theories is that they generalize what is essentially an urban
experience characteristic of the large global cities in the world system, to the experience of all
Western national societies or the entire contemporary (i.e. “postmodern”) period. But this is
clearly not warranted, and it is not surprising that the nations that come closest to
exemplifying this model on a societal scale are the relatively rich, ethnically homogenous,
highly urbanized, globalized, and territorially undersized Northern European countries. One
empirical implication of this view is that the large continental European countries should
exhibit a center-periphery split similar to that which can be observed for the EU as a whole,
with the large urban centers looking a lot like the rich Northern European countries (high
omnivorousness and relatively widespread highbrow consumption), and the less urbanized
and globalized peripheries exhibiting a cultural stratification pattern closer to Italy, Spain and
Greece.
As shown in the plots d, e and f of Figure 10, in the case of Greece, France, and Netherlands
(societies located toward the top, middle and bottom of the regression line in panel a
respectively) this is exactly what we find. The figure shows the plot of the relative size of the
highbrow culture consumer class, against the average omnivorousness of the regional
subdivision, using the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) regional
codes for each country. We find that in Greece at the regional level, there is a strong linear relationship between relative prevalence of highbrow taste and omnivore consumption ($r=0.83$). In France, we also find a strong association between the size of the highbrow consumer segment and the average omnivore consumption score for the region ($r=0.70$), just as there is for the EU as whole, neither of these patterns is consistent with the “postmodern” hypothesis, which posits a loose linkage between traditional taste-based demarcators of status and culture consumption patterns. The Netherlands, on the other hand, comes closest to this picture, with very little regional differentiation based on the link between these two forms of taste. Among the different Dutch regions, in stark contrast to the Greek and French patterns, there is little association between the size of the highbrow culture class and average rates of omnivore consumption ($r=0.04$).

Panels $d$ and $e$ in Figure 10 also reveal that the national level analysis (which for instance puts France toward the middling average in terms of highbrow omnivorousness and overall rates of omnivore consumption) conceals important patterns of within-nation regional heterogeneity. However, this regional variation is far from random, but instead appears to be driven by the same set of facilitating factors as the pattern of cross-national variation: the more urbanized and globalized national regions—those that contain the national metropolitan centers and most global cities (Sassen 2006)—show the high-highbrow consumption/high omnivorousness pattern, while the more rural peripheries show the reverse tendency. For instance, as shown in plot $e$, Ile de France the NUTS region where

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Paris is located (and the regions adjacent to the Parisian metropolitan center), looks a lot like the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Scandinavian countries, with large scores for both highbrow consumption and omnivore taste. The more peripheral Southern and Southeastern regions of France, on the other hand, look a lot like the Southern European countries, with small highbrow elites and relatively small rates of omnivore consumption.

One difference at the regional level however, is that the strength of the highbrow omnivorousness effect is the same across all regional layers ($p=0.72$, and $p=0.23$, for the uniform layer effect model applied to the Greek and French regional data suggesting a very good fit). Thus within nations, the highbrow omnivorousness effect shows more stability than it does across nations.

Thus the omnivore/univore societal pattern observed for Europe as a whole is replicated here on a smaller scale for Greek and France, but fails to be replicated at the regional level for the Netherlands. The same patterns of results (i.e. close to those characteristic of France and Greece) can be observed for the other large EU continental societies (i.e. Germany and Italy). This suggests that the process of the omnivorization of highbrow taste is one that occurs at multiple levels of analysis, both national, regional and probably at the level of global cities. We should thus expect national analyses such as the one presented here to understate regional heterogeneity for large societies and regional or single-country analyses that concentrate on prominent global cities to overstate the level of homogeneity across national locales.

5.11. Chapter Summary
In this chapter I have attempted to shed empirical light on the socio-structural and global sources of an important transformation in the organization of the cultural stratification system of Western societies, what Peterson and Kern (1996) refer to as the shift from “snob to omnivore.” As Peterson and Kern (1996: 905-905) remark, changes in cultural fads and fashion are often transient and of little long-run consequence, however, “…a shift in the basis of taste from snobbishness to omnivorousness suggests that significant alterations in social power relationships are involved.” In a similar way, DiMaggio (1987: 542) notes that contemporary post-industrial societies have “…entered a period of culture declassification…Artistic classification systems are becoming more differentiated and less hierarchical, classifications weaker and less universal.” What are the societal-level correlates of this shift? According to the most prevalent account, the emergence of “omnivorousness” as the primary status marker of Western elites is related to concurrent socio-structural changes associated with economic development, value change, the expansion of the educational system and the postwar rise of the popular culture industry. The results show that this sole focus on intrasocietal determinants of class-related cultural exclusion strategies, this perspective cannot explain why all modern polities appear to be converging around same cultural stratification regime and why this regime has become elaborated around specific notions associated with the value of openness and tolerance for diverse cultural forms.

In order to explain this increasing isomorphism of the cultural taste structure of modern polities I have drawn on DiMaggio’s (1987) socio-structural approach to the study of artistic stratification systems and institutional theory, in particular the world society variant which construes modern societies as open systems (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Weick 1976, Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott 1998), embedded in the larger economic, institutional and
organizational environment of the world polity (Meyer et al 1997, Thomas and Meyer 1984). I propose that if the rise of omnivore taste, in addition to being driven by intra-societal developmental factors, is also connected to the cognitive schemas enacted and transmitted through the world polity, then inequality in access to the world polity should translate into differential levels of institutionalization of omnivore taste as the prevalent form of cultural status marker in a given society.

The results are consistent with this account. While standard explanations that trace the underlying source of the shift toward omnivorosity to developmental factors associated with rising standards of living and the expansion of mass educational systems appear to have some merit, the primary factors that best account for cross-national differences in fifteen EU countries are global in nature, and that it is only insofar as the more social and economically developed societies in the EU are also the ones that are more deeply connected into the “networks and flows” of the global cultural and economic system (Crane 2002), that development, is tied to the prevalence of omnivore consumption. After global factors are held constant developmental indicators are not useful predictors of a society’s position along the omnivore/univore dimension. However, key intrasocietal mechanisms facilitating the spread of omnivore taste are support for tolerant and cosmopolitan values and reduction in class inequality and income stratification. Future research should attempt to explore the cross-national generality of this finding on a larger pool of countries (unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, no micro-data on culture consumption habits exist at cross-national scale comparable to the World Values Survey, for instance). It is possible that outside of Europe or the West, different relationships may obtain between socio-economic development, global connectivity at the societal level and culture consumption habits.
I have attempted to move beyond perspectives that construe individual cultural choice as primarily shaped and driven by the omnipotent manipulation of mass culture industries (Gotttdiener 1985; Crane 2002) in order to highlight the connection between the pattern of “cultural choice” that Peterson (1992) labeled as “omnivore” and the increasingly dominant set of values and precepts increasingly dominant in the transnational network of actors that has been referred to as “world society” (Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999; Meyer et al 1997; Lechner and Boli 2005) and “global civil society” (Anheier et al 2002). From this perspective, the subversion of traditional cross-genre ritual boundaries that is definitional of omnivore taste is itself a meaningful act (Holt 1997, 1998), made in part possible by general principles and guidelines (which in the current period tend to increasingly flout national boundaries) that promote tolerance, a taste for diversity and the acceptance of difference. The often noted but largely unexplained association between cultural voraciousness and education for instance, can be given a theoretical and more properly sociological explanation along these lines—beyond those purely cognitivist and “processing” models and explanations that seen education as providing only “competences” and skills—since it is through participation in mass educational systems that most individuals come to have exposure to world cultural schemes and scripts (Meyer 1977; Frank and Meyer 2002). The results show however, that the diffusion of values and relative prevalence of institutional actors associated with world society, while important, are not the exclusive source of the omnivore effect. Required is also some form of infrastructural connection to the networks and flows of the global system made possible by the “hardware” of world society (Lechner and Boli 2005), which helps to transmit and spread those cultural templates (Castells 1997). The analysis shows that all of these dimensions of the globalization process
are important, and appear to have independent effects on the relative pervasiveness of omnivore consumption. Future research should focus on examining further the relative weight of different facets of the globalization process on patterns of cultural choice, and whether other dimensions of the globalization process are empirically relevant in the production of the “omnivore effect.” One important empirical question that remains to be answered, concerns the existence and importance of other dimensions of cultural preference beyond the omnivore/univore continuum (Peterson 2000, 2005a, Van Eijck 2000), and their possible association with societal-level and global-level processes.
6. MUSICAL CONSUMPTION ACROSS THE LOCAL/GLOBAL AXIS: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

6.1. Background

In this chapter, I continue to explore the relationship between a country’s relative degree of connection to various global resources and flows and the structure of the culture consumption choices of national populations. One of the advantages of the Eurobarometer survey is the fact that it contains microlevel data on the culture consumption choices of the citizens of each country at a fairly disaggregate level in terms of genre categories. However, one of the disadvantages is the limitation to a relatively small set of comparatively rich (on a global scale) Western societies. As noted in the last chapter however, there is no cross-national data source with the level of coverage of, for instance, the world values survey that contains micro-level data on cultural taste and consumption choices.

A second-best option is to use aggregate data on sales of different types of music, such as that which is available in the UNESCO World Culture Report. This kind of data has two major disadvantages: 1) the use of highly aggregate genres categories, 2) the inability to construct measures of culture consumption breadth (such as an omnivore scale) that is not conflated with simple segmentation of tastes at the aggregate level instead of breadth at the individual level. However one of the main advantages of using aggregate sources of data on culture consumption is precisely the ability to draw conclusions about a much more inclusive set of national societies. Furthermore, we can use our knowledge of the correlates between certain aggregate patterns of culture consumption and taste diversity at the individual level to
interpret certain patterns of effects and relationships between different countries along
several dimensions as indicating a likely connection between the prevalence of particular
sorts of culture consumption (such as high levels of consumption of international musical
forms) and “omnivore” taste.

6.2. Data Source

In the following, I use aggregate data on musical consumption choices for a set of 72
countries taken from the 2000 UNESCO World Culture Report. The data are shown in the
first four columns of Table 32 in the appendix. Data on the consumption of recorded music
are divided into three major categories (all of the year 1998): 1) International popular, which
includes all non-classical and non-operatic recordings that were not produced in that
country, 2) Domestic popular, which includes all non-classical and non-operatic recordings that
were produced in that country and 3) Classical, which includes both foreign and local
recordings of traditional Western classical and operatic musical recordings. The fourth
column of the table shows the overall musical sales for that country, which is the per capita
retail value of all CDs, cassettes and records sold in that country in 1998 U.S. dollars. The
representation of countries is fairly wide and covers every major region of the world—in
addition to Western Europe and Western offshoots (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the U.S.)—including: South America, East Asia, Africa, the Middle East and continental

44 Available online at
for six additional countries was supplemented with 1996 data obtained from the 1998
version of the World Culture Report, available online at
Asia (China, India and Russia). Thus, the world culture report data provides a very diverse selection of societies in terms of various dimensions of development and globalization but also culturally and geographically.

6.3. Estimation

Do the aggregate patterns of consumption allow us to determine an ordering of countries along recognizable dimensions of taste? In order to answer this question we have to determine whether the distribution of demand for types of recorded music across the countries serves to rank some countries closer to some of the column categories and farther from others. Treating the first four columns of Table 32 as a “table”, it is possible to order the rows according to the relative similarity of their profiles across the column categories. To do this I resort to a class of models popular in biometrics (for the study of genotype by environment interaction in two-way tables) known as Additive Main Effects Multiplicative Interaction model (Van Eeuwijk 1995). According to the usual parameterization AMMI model, the expected percentage on the $ij^{th}$ cell of the country by recorded music type table is given by:

$$E(Y_{ij}) = \alpha + \beta_i + \beta_j + \sum_{m=1}^{M} \phi_m u_m v_{jm} + e_{ij}$$

Where $\alpha$ is the OLS regression constant, $\beta_i$ is a vector of dummy variables representing the countries, $\beta_j$ is a vector of dummy variables representing the column factors (types of music consumption and overall musical sales) and $e_{ij}$ is a stochastic regression disturbance. The multiplicative term is given by the product of a set $M$ (where $M$ is determined by the analyst)
of row \((u_m)\) and column \((v_m)\) scores to be estimated from the data, with the maximum \(M\) being the minimum of \((R-1,C-1)\) or in this case two. As noted by Van Eeuwijk (1995) in its structure, the AMMI model is similar to a Goodman RC model applied to continuous data instead of counts. The model is also comparable to correspondence analysis and other multidimensional scaling techniques, except that it allows the analyst to choose the dimensionality of the solution, as opposed to providing a full decomposition of the data (see Goodman 1986 for a related approach).

6.4. Partition of Countries Across Culture Consumption Types

Table 22 shows the fit statistics for the AMMI model as applied to the music consumption data for the 72 x 4 country by music-type and music consumption table.\(^{45}\) The first model, without any bilinear multiplicative terms, includes only the main effects for the country and column categories \((\beta_i\text{ and }\beta_j)\) and the overall effect. This model accounts about 69% of the association as measured by the \(r^2\). As shown by rows 2 and 3 in the table, the introduction of the bilinear interaction terms greatly improves the fit of the models. The model that includes the first bilinear term \((M=1)\) accounts for almost all of the association that remains once we take into account the unequal distribution of individuals across column categories (i.e. the fact that the percentage that chooses classical is always of a much smaller magnitude as the country percentage for international or domestic popular), with the r-squared jumping to 0.94. However, the inclusion of the second bilinear term \((M=2)\) still results in an

\(^{45}\) The models are estimated with a statistical routine written by the author for version 9.2 of the Stata package (Statacorp 2005).
improved model fit as shown by the reduced residual sum of squares, although this model is
clearly less parsimonious as shown by the larger $bic$ statistic.

Table 22. Fit statistics for AMMI models of the country by recorded music type
consumption and overall musical consumption interaction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>$r^2$</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Residual Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$bic$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1 (M=0)</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>0.6896</td>
<td>1959.23</td>
<td>586.61</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>921.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2 (M=1)</td>
<td>56.63</td>
<td>0.9356</td>
<td>2424.62</td>
<td>121.22</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>807.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3 (M=2)</td>
<td>158.31</td>
<td>0.9765</td>
<td>2501.87</td>
<td>43.97</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>861.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is the interpretation of the dimensions captured by the two bilinear terms? Table 23
shows the estimated column scores for each of the categories of musical consumption. I
find that the first and most important dimension in the data is that which separates countries
whose populations predominantly consume *domestic popular* ($v_j=-80$) music from those whose
populations are instead drawn to *international popular* music ($v_j=.57$). Thus, this first
dimension can be interpreted as a global/local dimension, allowing us to differentiate
countries whose culture consumption publics are comparatively more attuned to the global
popular music industry, from those that are relatively more embedded in local and regional
culture production networks. As shown in the second column of the table, the second
dimension, in contrast to the first dimension which primarily differentiates between two
different *types* of popular culture consumption, separates countries which display relatively
*high* rates of overall consumption (as measured by per capita music sales) from those that do
not, representing a *voraciousness*’ dimension (Katz-Gerro and Sullivan 2005).
Table 23. Column scores for types of recorded music categories, 1998 UNESCO *World Culture Report*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Column Score (Dimension 1)</th>
<th>Column Score (Dimension 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Music Sales</td>
<td>-0.683</td>
<td>0.447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Popular</td>
<td>-0.802</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. Popular</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>-0.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical/Other</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 11. Biplot of country dimensions based on the distribution of music consumption across aggregate types.

Figure 11 is a biplot in which both the country and column scores obtained from the AMMI model with two dimensions are shown in the same space (Van Eeuwijk 1995), with dimension 1 being plotted in the vertical axis and the second dimension plotted in the horizontal axis. Along the main local/global vertical axis, the figure clearly shows a partition between large societies with strong and dominant popular culture industries (some of which are active exporters of their local popular culture products), such as Japan, India and United States. The U.S. is of course unique among this set of countries, insofar as it is not only the dominant culture producer in its own domestic market, but is also the leading force in the global popular culture industry market (although that dominance has gradually declined in the last two decades [Crane 2002]). Thus, many of the countries located at the opposite end of the diagram along the vertical axis connect to global cultural networks primarily by consuming American popular culture products.

The set of countries whose musical consumption profile is tilted toward non-local products is primarily (but not entirely) composed of relatively rich Western societies both European (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Norway) and outside of the European geographical region but of European colonial origin (Canada, Australia, New Zealand). These are all relatively cosmopolitan societies deeply integrated into the economic, financial, demographic and cultural networks and flows of the world system (Anheier et al 2002). In fact the only low and middle income societies that appear toward the top of the diagram are ones that display unusual levels of cultural and economic globalization given their economic position in the world system (South Africa and Kenya are the single two most global societies in the
African continent by all accounts, as are Malaysia, the Philippines Chile and Paraguay in their respective regions).

This is in stark contrast to the societies whose consumption profile tilts toward the domestic popular pole, who are relatively less globalized and less connected to the various cultural and organizational networks of the international system (or whose globalization pattern is very uneven, with prominent global cities surrounded by vast, relatively globally isolated and segmented rural peripheries as is the case for Beijing and New Delhi). Thus, it appears that the local global segmentation of societies obtained from their musical consumption profile is in fact homologous to the position of that country in the global network of connection of the international system.

The second dimension separates countries who are high overall consumers of either type of culture (domestic or international) from low overall consumers. If the first dimension is a qualitative dimension related to the composition of the musical consumption audience in each country, this second dimension is quantitative, related to the voraciousness (Katz-Gerro and Sullivan 2005) of the national consuming audience. Thus, the secondary dimension clearly separates the richer and more economically and socially advantaged societies of the “core” of the world system, from the less economically advantaged societies of the periphery and semiperiphery.

6.5. Hypotheses

What factors might explain the relative arrangement of countries along the (most important in terms of the amount of variance explained) local/global culture consumption axes in figure 2? In regards to the local/global divide, most of the literature on culture consumption
and globalization points to the consumption of non-local (international) culture as intimately
tied to the relative access that national populations have to global economic, demographic
and cultural flows (Crane 2002, Hannerz 1990). The media imperialism perspective isolates
cultural trade flows, or what Appadurai (1990: 296) refers to as mediascapes as the most
important factor, predicting that countries more deeply connected to global cultural trade
will have populations that orient themselves to international culture:

**H1: Countries more tightly linked to the global cultural trade network are
more likely to be placed nearer the global pole of the local/global culture
consumption axis.**

Appadurai’s (1990: 296-297) multidimensional perspective on globalization however, moves
beyond a one-sided focus on global cultural trade, pointing to various others “flows” in the
global system that are responsible for many globalization trends, including the rise of global
culture. In particular he notes that ethnoscapes, flows of people “…tourists, immigrants,
refugees, exiles, guestworkers” represent a heretofore understudied dimension of the
globalization process. However, it is through the international exchange of populations that
most societies come to become most directly tied to the global system. Thus we should
expect that those countries most intimately linked to international networks related to the
exchange of persons, and the related goods and ideas that people transport with them, to be
more likely to be towards the global of the first dimension. Conversely, we should expect
those national populations more isolated from these global networks to turn to domestic and
regional forms of culture consumption:
H2: Countries more tightly connected to global demographic, material and informational networks are more likely to be placed nearer the global pole of the local/global culture consumption axis.

As argued in the last chapter, an important dimension of globalization is that which comes from a country’s relative degree of integration into the ever growing global telecommunications system (Castells 1997, Wellman 2000), or what Appadurai (1990, 1996) refers to as technoscapes. This increasingly dense web of cross-national connections is thought to bring, in addition to easier access to news, information and new ideas from distant geographical locations, a wider exposure to cultural products that are not produced locally. This is a key component of what Castells (1997) has referred to as the “network society” and Wellman (2000) dubs “networked individualism.” With access to the new telecommunications technology, individuals are able to go beyond the cultural resources that are offered in their local regional markets and gain increasing access global cultural resources. We should thus expect that as societies become more deeply connected to this new international telecommunications system the consumption of international cultural products should increase.

H3: Countries more tightly connected to global telecommunications networks are more likely to be placed nearer the global pole of the local/global culture consumption axis.

However, as we saw in the last chapter, simple connectivity is not enough. In order for national populations to consume cultural forms that are not directly tied to local social structures and carry with them easily accessed local cultural meanings (being more likely to feature unfamiliar content and provide unusual connotations), it is important for there to
exist the possibility of a positive orientation toward the wider (global or international) cultural field. This positive orientation it was argued can only come from the spread of cognitive frames and schemas which construe of all human cultures—not just the usually valorized national cultural heritages—as equally worthy of value and appreciation. These scripts and schemas, are an important constituent part of world culture, and as such are carried by the organizational, cultural and identity-construction technologies that come along with it. This is what Appadurai refers to as global ideoscapes. Thus, we should expect that in addition to pure connectivity, (which can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for openness toward non-local cultural forms) the integration of the national polity into the larger world polity (Meyer 1980, Meyer et al 1997) should be an important determinant of the consumption of global popular culture:

**H4: Countries more tightly connected to the world polity are more likely to be placed nearer the global pole of the local/global culture consumption axis.**

From the arrangement of countries in the figure, one obvious “default” explanation for the arrangement of countries along local local/global (and highbrow/popular) axis is the relative degree of socio-economic development in the society, as the most economically and socially advanced societies should we expected to be more likely to be connected to the various global networks and flows and to also be more likely to be integrated into the world polity (as shown in Table 33 of the appendix). Thus it is important to hold constant socioeconomic development when assessing the merits of each of the hypotheses codified above.

6.6. Measures
Table 24. Iterated principal component analysis factor loadings of various indicators of globalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logged N. of INGO Memberships</td>
<td>0.1388</td>
<td>0.9325</td>
<td>-0.1540</td>
<td>-0.0063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged N. of INGO Secretariats</td>
<td>-0.0041</td>
<td>0.6418</td>
<td>0.2885</td>
<td>0.1624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged N. of International Telephone Calls</td>
<td>0.2760</td>
<td>0.2889</td>
<td>-0.0958</td>
<td>0.5405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged N. of Letters sent Abroad</td>
<td>0.3944</td>
<td>0.4117</td>
<td>0.2140</td>
<td>0.2849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged N. of Arrivals of foreign visitors p/c</td>
<td>0.7751</td>
<td>0.1180</td>
<td>0.0586</td>
<td>0.1587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged N. of Departures of Nationals Abroad p/c</td>
<td>0.5407</td>
<td>0.3869</td>
<td>0.2735</td>
<td>0.0212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged N. of PCs per 1000</td>
<td>0.1938</td>
<td>0.4397</td>
<td>0.6353</td>
<td>0.1008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged N. of Internet Hosts per 1000</td>
<td>0.4004</td>
<td>0.3193</td>
<td>0.6507</td>
<td>-0.0869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged N. of Internet Users per 1000</td>
<td>-0.0045</td>
<td>-0.2082</td>
<td>0.9375</td>
<td>0.1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Trade Score</td>
<td>0.0646</td>
<td>-0.0171</td>
<td>0.3449</td>
<td>0.6607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following analyses, I use measures of societal connection to the various global network and flows (roughly corresponding to the various “scapes” discussed by Appadurai [1990]) to represent the three major dimensions of globalization discussed above. 1) The extent of connection to the global media business and the transnational cultural industries is measured using an overall score (obtained from a principal components analysis) that is a linear combination of the following variables (all measured in the year 1997) a) total cultural trade in logged number of dollars, b) cultural trade per capita, c) cultural trade as a percentage of GNP and cultural trade as a percentage of total trade. These are the mediascapes discussed in Appadurai (1990). .The measure of the degree of 2) connection to the various informational, demographic and material global networks of each society comes from the factor scores obtained from a principal components analysis of the following five indicators: the degree of international communication exchanges as measured by a) the per capita duration (in minutes) of international phone calls for the year 1995 and b) the per capita number of letters sent abroad for the year 1995, and the degree of demographic exchange
with other regions of the world as measured by c) the number of foreign visitors to that
country per hundred population for the 1996 and d) the number of departures of nationals
from that country per 100 inhabitants for the year 1995. This last can be considered
measures of ethnoscapes (Appadurai 1990:296) as a global flow between nations composed
primarily of people.\(^{46}\) 3) The information society/telecommunications networks, corresponding to
what Appadurai (1990: 297) refers as technoscapes, measure is the factor score based on the
first factor of a principal components analysis of using the following three indicators: a) the
number of personal computers per 1000 population; b) the number of internet users per
1000 population; and c) the number of internet hosts per 1000 population. 4) The world polity
linkage measures are a) the logged number of INGO memberships per capita and b) logged
number of INGO secretariats per capita.\(^{47}\) World polity linkage, insofar as it opens up a
society to the various discourses, cognitive templates and cultural frames associated with
world culture, can be seen as a good example of what Appadurai (1990) refers to as the
ideoscapes of the global system. Finally, all models include a control for socioeconomic development
measured using the logged per capita GNP of each country for the year 1998

Table 24 shows confirmatory iterated principal components analysis of all of the
globalization indicators, the basic hypothesis is the ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes
and world society indicators load on more or less distinct underling dimensions. The results
show that all indicators do fall broadly within the four major categories discussed above

\(^{46}\) All of the data mentioned in this section come from the statistical tables of the 2000
UNESCO World Culture Report unless otherwise indicated.
\(^{47}\) Data obtained from the Union of International Associations 2004 yearbook.
(using a cutoff value of 0.40 or above), with the communications/demographic flows indicators loading strongly in the first factor, the world society linkage indicators dominating the second factor, the information society indicators characterizing the third factor and the cultural trade indicator having the strongest loading on the fourth factor. I calculate predicted values for each of the latent factors from the factor loadings shown in the table (using regression scoring) in order to use them as predictors in a linear modeling framework.

6.7. Results

6.7.1. The Effect of Globalization and Economic Development On Global Versus Local Consumption

Table 25. Ordinary Least Squares regression coefficients of the effect of cross-national indicators of globalization and economic development on the country’s location on the local/global and low/high consumption weighted axis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>0.0338*</td>
<td>0.0122</td>
<td>-0.0516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.13)</td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(-1.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Cultural Trade Networks</td>
<td>0.0137</td>
<td>0.0081</td>
<td>0.0161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic and Material Networks</td>
<td>0.0514*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0468*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Polity Linkage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0586*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Telecommunication Networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0700*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.2850*</td>
<td>-0.1025</td>
<td>0.4375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.09)</td>
<td>(-0.97)</td>
<td>(1.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r2</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>10.37</td>
<td>9.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Table 25 shows the coefficient estimates of three regression models with the country score on the first local/global dimension of the AMMI analysis as a dependent variable. Model 1
shows the effect of the country’s score on the cultural trade factor with economic development held constant on the country’s relative position on the local/global culture consumption axis. Contrary to the media imperialism thesis, with economic development held constant the intensity of the country’s participation in the global cultural trade system has no statistically significant effect on the relative propensity to consume global culture in relation to domestic culture. In model two I include the factor score corresponding to the country’s degree of connection with demographic transnational networks. The results are consistent with hypothesis 2: the more a country is connected to the networks and flows of the global system the more likely it is to be located near the global pole of the local/global culture consumption axis and the more likely it is to be a high music consumption country, net of average national income \((t=3.14)\). Together, economic development and the global networks factor accounts for about 31% of the variance corresponding to the country score in the first dimension shown in Figure 9.

In model 3 I introduce the country scores for the information society and world polity linkage factor scores. In support of hypotheses 3 and 4 I find that the more a country is connected to informational telecommunications technology network and the more deeply a country is integrated into world society, the more likely it is for the consumption of domestic cultural products to give way to the consumption of international musical cultures. A model that includes all three measures of global connections explains more than two fifths of the variation along the first dimension uncovered by the AMMI model (41%).

Notice that in model 3, after holding constant the degree of national connection to various cultural, material, informational and technological networks and flows, economic development as measured by logged GNP per capita is not longer a significant predictor of
the country's location on the weighted local/global and low consumption/high consumption axis, with the coefficient for economic development going from positive to negative. This indicates that economic development that is not accompanied by global integration into this various transnational flows will not result in an increase in global culture consumption (such as the developmental path followed by various rich oil kingdoms in West Asia or the current developmental path being pursued by China), challenging theories that only look to intra-national factors not related to global connectivity (i.e. state intervention, national wealth) when attempting to explain differences in cross-national acceptance of international versus domestic cultures. This is consistent with the results obtained in the last chapter for the EU countries in regards to omnivore taste, where it was shown that the effect of economic development on broader patterns of taste at the national level is largely mediated by world polity and information society connections.

6.7.2. The Effect of Globalization on the Demand for Cultural Goods

In this section, I shed further light on the results shown above, by looking at the effect of the global networks variables on the disaggregated indicators of overall consumption and the taste composition of the national audience. The basic hypothesis is that while overall consumption is largely driven by country wealth, we should expect audience differentiation into either domestically or internationally oriented musical consumption communities to be largely driven by the relative degree of connectivity of that society to the various global networks and flows.

What is the effect of a country's integration into the various global demographic, information and cultural network on the demand for cultural goods? Sociological
approaches to the relationship between social structure and culture consumption see
demand as largely generated by needs for sociable intercourse and the exchange of cultural
information (DiMaggio 1987; Mark 1998; Carley 1995), in the context of the differentiation
of social relations with increasing mobility and communicational flexibility, from the local
context given by the family and the communal village. Economic approaches (i.e. Cowen
2002), on the other hand, construe demand as largely driven by disposable income. Both the
sociological and economic approaches, would therefore predict that demand increases with
national income. However, the sociological approach would also add that demand will be
related to increased connection into the global system. This stance is consistent with the
view that as the more informational and telecommunications-oriented aspects of
globalization increase and as personal connections come to span wider and wider
geographical scales, the need for the consumption of cultural goods that have a more
cosmopolitan character will increase (this of course does not necessarily imply a decline in
the consumption of local culture [Griswold and Wright 2004]). The world society approach
in particular, would isolate connectivity to the global frames of world society as being
particularly important, something that is ignored by the more instrumentalist sociological
and economistic approaches.

The cultural imperialism thesis of the relationship between globalization and culture on the
other hand as noted in chapters 1 and 2, sees the connection between increasing integration
into the global system and cultural demand as largely driven by exposure and semiotic
manipulation by powerful globe-spanning cultural industries. Thus, both the sociostructural
approach and the cultural imperialism approach predict that cultural demand will be a
function of increasing integration into the global system, but differ in their prediction as to
which channel is the more likely to produce increased demand. If the cultural imperialism thesis is correct, and the connection between globalization and cultural demand is driven by exposure to global networks of economic exchange and in particular those associated with cultural trade. Therefore we should expect that integration into these networks should be the key to increasing demand for cultural goods:

**H4: Countries more tightly connected cultural trade networks (mediascapes) are more likely to exhibit greater aggregate demand for cultural goods.**

If the sociostructural approach is correct on the other hand, and cultural demand is more likely to be produced by technoeconomic and sociostructural changes that increase personal network range and the potential pool of partners that can be brought into social interaction, then we should expect globalization as access to global telecommunications networks to be more likely to result in increased demand:

**H5: Countries more tightly connected to global telecommunications networks (technoscapes) and global demographic networks (ethnoscapes) are more likely to exhibit greater aggregate demand for cultural goods.**

Nevertheless, there is another facet of the relationship between globalization and culture that has been ignored in contemporary approaches and is that which emphasizes that in addition to exposure and the role of culture in social interaction, culture consumption is also driven by socially shared cognitive frames, which provide the coordinates through which the consumption of certain cultural experiences becomes meaningful. It has been argued that in the modern system, these meaning structures, through which persons provide “accounts” (Scott and Lyman 1968) of their culture consumption experiences have become increasingly global, part of a standardized set of precepts and scripts which facilitate the aestheticization
and acceptance of an increasingly variety of cultural goods and performances as worthy of attention and aesthetic consideration. This perspective, like the two above also posits a connection between globalization and increasing culture consumption, but argues that one of the primary channels should be the extent to which the country is integrated into the formal and informal organizational and cultural network of world society, which is the cross-national arena that serves to circulate this increasingly transnational discourse regarding the primacy and sanctity of aesthetic experience and artistic products.

**H6: Countries more tightly connected to the world polity are more likely to exhibit greater aggregate demand for cultural goods.**

Table 26. OLS regression coefficients of the effect of cross-national indicators of globalization and economic development on the country’s overall level of musical consumption and the composition of musical consumption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per capita Music Sales</th>
<th>% domestic</th>
<th>% International</th>
<th>% Classical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>0.4669* (3.70)</td>
<td>0.9354* (2.18)</td>
<td>-0.6910 (-1.72)</td>
<td>-0.4388* (-2.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Trade</td>
<td>0.1172 (1.61)</td>
<td>-0.2352 (-0.95)</td>
<td>0.2520 (1.09)</td>
<td>-0.0395 (-0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Networks</td>
<td>-0.0309 (-0.39)</td>
<td>-0.7486* (-2.80)</td>
<td>0.6795* (2.73)</td>
<td>0.3069* (2.35)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Information</td>
<td>0.4323* (3.45)</td>
<td>-1.0149* (-2.37)</td>
<td>0.5669 (1.42)</td>
<td>0.7481* (3.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Society</td>
<td>0.2851* (2.74)</td>
<td>-1.0850* (-3.06)</td>
<td>0.9739* (2.94)</td>
<td>0.4835* (2.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-1.3604 (-0.37)</td>
<td>12.6466* (3.72)</td>
<td>5.0842* (2.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deviance</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05 (one-tailed tests)

Table 26 shows the results of four OLS regressions using the same independent variables as in model 3 of Table 25. The first model shows the effect of economic development and the
three globalization indicators on the logged per capita expenditures in music related cultural
goods for each country. Consistent with expectations, the primary predictor of the
(quantitative) degree of musical consumption in a given society is simply economic
development as measured by average national income. Thus, the main axis of
differentiation for the second dimension of the AMMI model separates the rich, high
consumption of the Global North, from the poor low consumption societies of the
periphery. Contrary to hypothesis 4, net of economic development and holding other
dimensions of globalization constant, degree of participation in the cultural trade system has
no effect on overall demand for musical culture; neither is the extent of demographic
exchanges with other countries. Nevertheless the sociostructural model’s prediction that
increasing connection to the technological telecommunications network increases consumer
demand for culture is borne out, more “networked” societies are more avid culture
consumers.
This is consistent with the sociostructural model’s emphasis on macro-micro dynamics that
result in the more technologically connected societies being more oriented toward the
“portable” cultural goods and tastes of the culture industry in comparison to less
economically developed societies (DiMaggio 1987). Finally, and consistent with the world
society hypothesis, societies more tightly linked to the world polity are more “voracious”
consumer of musical cultures than societies which are less tightly connected, even after
holding constant economic development and the other dimensions of the globalization
process. This suggests that consumer demand for cultural goods is not reducible to the
more instrumental factors isolated by economists (i.e. disposable income) or solely explained
by sociostructural factors, but is also affected by the degree of access to the “vocabularies of
motive” produced in the global civil arena, which expands the field of possible cultural objects that can form part of the individual’s aesthetic experience.

Model 2 shows the effect of the same variables on the percentage of the population dedicated to domestic musical consumption. The results are dramatically different from those obtained in model 1. Here all of the globalization indicators are significant predictors of the size of the domestic consumption audience, and all are in the expected negative direction, the audience for domestic genres is larger in societies relatively disconnected from the global system, net of economic development. Contrast this to the results in the third and fourth model shown in the table with the percentage to international music consumers and the percentage of classical music consumers as the dependent variable, respectively. For these two outcomes, increasing integration into the different facets of the global system have a positive effect, consistent with the results obtained using the AMMI model dimensions. As connection to the cultural, ideological, material, demographic and informational networks of the international system increases, so does the consumption of global culture, both in its popular and “highbrow” variants.48

6.8. Chapter Summary

In this chapter I have shown that cross-national differentiation across a global/local culture consumption axis is intimately connected to a country’s relative position in various dimensions associated with the globalization process. Drawing on Appadurai’s

48 Blau (1989a) has argued that classical music became the first truly global culture due to its relative homogeneity of consumption and production and its hegemonic status as the West’s “high culture.”
multidimensional model of globalization, I have shown that the globalization relevant to the explanation of cross-national differences in musical consumption patterns are the *ethnoscapes* produced by the relative degree of demographic and material exchange with other world regions (primarily composed of the flow of people across national borders), the *technoscapes* associated with increased elaboration of the technoeconomic infrastructure of the worldwide digital telecommunications network (in particular the internet), and the *ideoescapes* provided by embeddedness in and access to the increasingly globalized flows of cultural templates and institutionalized action schemas constitutive of world culture. Surprisingly, *the least* important dimension of globalization for the explanation of cross-national differences in culture consumption concerns that facet of globalization most emphasized in the media imperialism account: *mediascapes*. After holding the other dimensions of globalization constant, exposure to global media flows is only at best a factor of tertiary importance in the explanation of these cross-national differences.

Furthermore, the results show that not only is the *composition* of a nation’s musical consumption audience affected by that society’s level of global connectivity, but so is the quantitative *voraciousness* the culture consumption public. Consistent with the global sociostructural account developed in chapter 2 and the institutionalist connection between world culture and the expansion of individual’s cultural tastes demonstrated in chapter 4, I find that cultural demand increases as connection to world society and to the technological infrastructure of the network society increases.

The results reported in this chapter are consistent with those obtained in chapters 4 and 5, which demonstrated both the microlevel dependence of broader patterns of culture consumption on both the ideological (for individuals) and organizational (at the national
level) levels of connection to the world polity, and relative differences in the establishment
to the “hardware” of world culture produced in the form of the technological infrastructure
of the “information society.” In particular this chapter not only extends that framework to
more encompassing set of countries covering all major regions of the world, but reinforces
the conclusion that levels of national economic development are an important precondition
for a more favorable orientation toward global cultural flows and the possible
“omnivorization” of tastes, these outcomes are only obtained *insofar as* economic growth is
associated with increased national connectivity and subsequent integration into the various
dimensions of the globalization process and the flows of peoples, objects ideas and
information that may accompany it.
7. CONCLUSION

Culture consumption and patterns of cultural taste have become increasingly embedded in increasingly transnational networks of flows and exchanges in the contemporary system. This is what for many constitutes the core of the cultural globalization process. In the preceding chapters, I have shown how we can modify extant theoretical frameworks in the sociology of culture and taste to attempt to explain and understand cross-national variation in patterns of cultural choice. This last is an important question, since the majority of theoretical claims made by globalization theorists have direct (although often not well developed) empirical implications regarding the ordering of national societies along various culture consumption and culture production dimensions. Thus, by examining the way that national societies differ in their patterns of cultural exchange and cultural production, we can begin to determine which accounts of the cultural globalization process are more consonant with empirical reality and which ones should probably be relegated to the dustbin of interesting but ultimately unproductive ideas.

The analyses presented in this dissertation help to elucidate the role of culture production and culture consumption as both differentiating and integrating forces in the international arena. At the same time that the world’s richest societies appear to be deeply integrated into an increasingly transnational set of cultural exchanges and common patterns of consumption, they become increasingly distinguishable from the less economically advantaged regions of the world. These less advantaged segments of the world system are shown to be relatively disengaged from global cultural flows and oriented toward more locally meaningful but trans-locally isolating forms of cultural engagement and production. It is in this sense that
globalization process increases differences as much as it leads to convergence and homogeneity (Robertson 1990, 1996; Wilk 1995). I will discuss some of the most important analytical and empirical implications of these findings in what follows.

First, we can conclude that the media imperialism framework offers very limited conceptual means to understand variation in culture consumption and production in a cross-national comparative context. While initially useful as the first truly global and macrostructural attempt to understand transnational patterns of cultural exchange and cultural influence, the media imperialism perspective is ultimately shown to be too wedded to the limiting assumptions of the old “mass culture” approach to serve as an adequate conceptual tool to understand the dynamics of production and consumption of arts and media products in the current global field. Furthermore, while most empirically driven ethnographic researchers had provided crucial observational evidence that created doubt as to the overall usefulness of the media imperialism thesis, few had gone on a more constructive route, in an attempt to provide a serious theoretical alternative to the media imperialism account that retained its analytic scope and systemic ambition. In this dissertation I have attempted to provide that alternative.

7.1. Media Imperialism as an exhausted Paradigm

In chapters 2 and 3, I subjected the media imperialism theoretical paradigm—still the most dominant systemic approach in media studies and cultural globalization research—to systematic analytical and empirical analysis and found it to be deficient in both respects. To produce a different account, I drew on sociological research on the micro-relational consequences of recent trends toward urbanization, state centralization, the rise of mass
education and the advent of what some have referred as the “network society” in the world’s most economically advantaged (core) societies. These are all trends that have been highlighted by analysts who stress how recent trends that have come under the heading of “globalization” are in fact an intensification of sociostructural changes that fell under the shift toward modernity and “postmodernity” or “late modernity” in contemporary theoretical discourse (i.e. the work of Anthony Giddens [1989, 1991, 2002]). I extended and generalized DiMaggio’s (1987) sociostructural approach in the direction of the globalization literature, a perspective that also focuses on analogous “modernization” trends, to explain patterns of transnational cultural flows and consumption.

Using cross-national data on music and film consumption and flows of cultural trade, I showed that the media imperialism thesis cannot explain why the most socially and economically advantaged societies of the world are the ones most attuned to international musical culture or why the structure of the global film trade does not exhibit a strong partition and segregation between national levels of consumption of the most dominant American global cultural product (Hollywood film) and the consumption of specialized and more artistically demanding forms of film (European film). In the case of music we find a differentiation between rich Western societies characterized by high consumption of extra-local culture (with the U.S. and Japan as notable exceptions), and less economically advantaged societies largely confined to the consumption of domestic cultural forms. I argued that the preceding arrangement is explainable if we conceive of the demand for global culture as primarily driven by its relational relevance and usefulness for the formation and maintenance of extra-local networks (those that go beyond the town and that extend to the entire nation or even extend across national borders). Adopting this point of view, it is
no surprise that the least economically advantaged societies, the populations of which are
still relatively disconnected from global telecommunications flows and which tend to
maintain close relationships with similar others in more communal social environments,
have much less of a need for international musical culture and are much more likely to
consume *domestic* music, which is the type of cultural good that is useful for the maintenance
of local networks of acquaintance and sociability. This is spite of the fact that, as noted by
early developers of the media imperialism thesis, such international culture is potentially
available for consumption. The analyses in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that indeed while
economic development is a necessary precondition for increased consumption of wide
variety of cultural goods (including international musical cultures) it is only when
accompanied by increased global connectivity that demand for global cultural forms
increases.

The sociostructural model also explains another conundrum that would remain inexplicable
from the old media imperialism point of view. This is the continuing resiliency, especially
for those forms of cultural production that require little “overhead” and “fixed capital”
resources for production such as music, of domestic culture *production* in most of the
developing world. Insofar as the majority of the world’s populations, especially those that
reside in the least economically advantaged and globally connected regions, are not
transnational “cosmopolitans” (Hannerz 1990), but continue to be tied to relatively less
mobile and more geographically circumscribed networks, local cultural goods which serve to
enact locally meaningful social identities and facilitate interaction in relatively relationally
circumscribed communal contexts will be both as a rule preferred over less socially useful
foreign fare, and will thus continue to be created by local cultural producers. In addition, by
way of governmental policy and the enabling action of local cultural organizations, the
efforts of these local producers will be enhanced and facilitated.
The case of music is usually highlighted by proponents of more pluralist accounts of the
cultural globalization process (i.e. Cowen 2002) as problematic for the media imperialism
thesis. The case of film, on the other hand, is usually seen as the clearest and most stark
eexample of media imperialism at work. However, the analysis in chapter 3 shows that even
here, a close look at the data produces various empirical anomalies not explainable under a
strict media imperialism model. In the case of film I find that in analogy with individual-
level studies in the sociology of taste which find a correlation between socioeconomic status
and the consumption of all types of culture both “popular” and “highbrow”, the richest
countries in the world are high consumers of Hollywood film and more artistically oriented
film from other parts of the world, in particular Western Europe.
Thus the world’s film consumption field is not partitioned between a dominant, American-
led “mass culture” that emanates from Hollywood and that penetrates the globe’s least
powerful societies and a set of smaller and less powerful regional enclaves maintained by the
rest of the rich countries who—through state policies and state-centered strategies—protect
themselves from Americanized global culture (Crane 2002). Instead, the dominant
dimension in the world’s film consumption field is one that demonstrates a high degree of
synergy between the consumption of both Americanized popular culture and more
artistically oriented European and global cinema and a set of regional film markets led by
smaller popular film producers in the developing world who have followed the Hollywood
model of film production (India, Hong Kong, Japan). In this sense the film markets of the
least economically advantaged regions of the world are increasingly dominated not only by
American film, but also by regional imports from these increasingly prolific regional film production powerhouses.

7.2. Alternative Macrostructural Approaches to Culture Globalization

In the above analyses the media imperialism paradigm was taken to be the primary extant theoretical framework for the macro-level study and theorization of cultural flows in the world system. However, the intent of the preceding analyses was not to suggest that the media imperialism thesis constitutes the only resource for the understanding of media and culture in the international arena. Other macrolevel approaches that deserve mention in this respect are (1) pluralist “market oriented” approaches that take as their point of departure a “gains from trade” model (i.e. Cowen 2002) and (2) regional culture approaches that, like the media imperialism model, focus on the large-scale organization of transnational cultural industry systems but that see this structure as organized along a more mosaic-like arrangement of integrated regional production hubs without a true “global” (much less U.S. dominated) center (see the review in Crane 2002).

What are the repercussions of the above findings for these alternative macrostructural paradigms? A detailed and rigorous answer to this question is beyond the scope of the present study. Therefore I will limit myself to a few somewhat general remarks. The sociostructural model’s predictions of an increase in the diversity of cultural production as a result of the globalization process is indeed compatible with a market oriented perspective. This latter perspective construes global connectivity as a direct stimulant (by way of serving as an incentive) of cultural production, by providing local producers with previously
unavailable markets and culture consumption publics that transcend their local demographic base.

However, the market account works with a rather “thin” description of cultural trade (underspecifying for instance the factors that may lead some national groups to “demand” particular cultural forms and ignore others) and thus fails to account for the observed segmented structure of the world cultural trade market (i.e. as shown in the analyses in chapter 2). In this respect, the sociostructural model is an improvement since it specifies the reasons for why we should expect the global cultural market across to be partitioned according to the relative level of connectivity and economic development of its national participants. Thus this latter approach, in contrast to the unconstrained market model, is able to not only suggest that cultural trade will tend to take place in the absence of political or communicative barriers (and that such trade will tend to increase intra-regional cultural diversity), but also to predict that global cultural exchange will also tend to take place largely within world-societal “blocks” (i.e. the world’s richest countries).

These blocks, it turns out, look a lot like the traditional world systems inspired core-periphery models. The world’s cultural trade system is partitioned between a highly cultural active core of culture producers and consumers, a quasi-integrated semi-periphery (which appears to have improved its relative market position—as measured by its decreasing cultural trade “deficit”—in recent decades) and a largely culturally disconnected periphery. As shown in chapter 2, most cultural trade in both arts and popular culture is intra-core cultural trade, with periphery that is largely disconnected from this quasi-autonomous global cultural market. In this respect the world’s most economically advantaged societies come to comprise both the primary cultural producers and the principal culture consumers in the
contemporary system. While it is clear that less well-connected societies do not “lose” if
they become part of this trade system (as previous models of “imperialist homogenization”
destroying and replacing local cultures maintained) the advantages that accrue from
consumption of global culture outside of the intra-core trading system are only available for
smaller and more privileged elites of those peripheral societies. The cultural elites of richer
societies however, end up benefiting by partaking of the renewed cultural heritage of
peripheral societies (i.e. increasing their “omnivorousness” which can be parlayed as local

The socio-structural model is also not necessarily inconsistent with attempts to re-describe
the international mass-media industry system as organized along regional poles, rather than
being characterized by the dominance of a single Western (or American) command and
control economic center. The regional approach however, tends to deemphasize “world”
popular culture and to emphasize the effect of “regional” popular culture. The
sociostructural account however, suggests that these two forms of popular culture do not
serve the same role as global form of cultural capital. American popular culture (Hollywood
film, MTV, etc.) is predicted to be most in demand in the national arenas whose connection
to the international system most transcend their local regional connections (i.e. Canada,
Australia, etc.). The reason for this is that popular culture produced by regional
conglomerates is relationally useful (in terms of serving to forge translocal social
connections) in a locally delimited international arena (i.e. Latin America Televisa’s television
programs are easily recognized throughout Spanish-speaking South American and the
Caribbean), American popular culture appears to constitute the closest analogue to a truly
global (in geographic scope) popular culture, and as such it should carry a wider relational
range for the most cosmopolitan of the world’s class fractions, who are disproportionately represented in the world’s richer and most globally connected societies.

7.3. Revisiting the Institutionalist Critique of the Cultural Capital Paradigm

In chapter 4, I demonstrated the empirical payoff of the theoretical revision of the cultural capital paradigm along lines more consonant with sociological institutionalism begun in chapter 2. I showed than in addition to being driven by the usual status related dynamics isolated by analysts working under the cultural capital paradigm, patterns of culture consumption and taste are strongly affected by identification with a transnational world community, a key piece of the global cultural package identified by institutional theory (Lizardo 2005). The results show that connection to the world polity by way of rising degrees of connection to transnational geographical entities, in particular identification with the increasingly elaborate “imagined community” of the world polity, serves as an independent predictor of broader patterns of culture consumption and less restrictive forms of expression of cultural taste, net of traditionally considered factors in the cultural capital paradigm and more recently conceptualized determinants, such as expression of post-Fordist identities related to gender, religion and ethnicity. Further, I showed that at the individual level, the stronger the subjective identification with the world polity, the weaker the influence of other identity commitments and structural factors related to the opportunity structure for culture consumption, on cultural taste patterns. This suggests that the newly emerging forms of consumption and taste labeled as “omnivore” may be connected to a wider set of increasingly institutionalized normative and ontological commitments constitutive of the
individualist culture of the modern system and are at least partially independent of the
usually considered set of class-related attributes (Lizardo 2005).

Macrosociological Institutionalist arguments, especially those usually proposed by members
of the “world polity” school, are usually attuned toward and framed at high levels of
aggregation, in which national societies are equated to organizations (as constantly
exchanging resources with other entities in an “open system”) embedded in a more
encompassing “institutional” environment (the world polity). The Meyer school is in this
sense concerned with explaining commonality of behavior across putatively self enclosed
systems and regards historical uniqueness and national cultural idiosyncrasies as a less
interesting residue. This commonality is explained by way of postulating these entities
(nations and states) as cultural constructed projects which are constituted by powerful actors
drawing from a common set of deeply held precepts originating in the rationalizing mission
of Western Christendom (Meyer et al 1994). As noted by Meyer and Jepperson (2000: 106),
developing classic insights from Weber, Parsons and Merton, “Christendom had some
modest attainments as a missionary movement, but has achieved vastly greater hegemony in
its transformation into science, law, and rationalized education.”

The theory of the actor in institutional theory, in stark contrast to the practical conflict
theory proposed by Bourdieu, is, as noted in chapter 4, one in which there is little distinction
made between behavior, identity and motivation. From this perspective, a “logic of
appropriateness” rather than a “logic of consequences” rules the day, in which identity and
motivation imply one another (and both are performatively brought to being through
observable behavior) and motivation is conceived as justificatory discursive action providing a
“vocabulary of motives” (Mills 1940). From this perspective, scripts and schemes are thus
“enacted” rather than “implemented” or “deployed” in strategic action (Jepperson 1991), giving rise in a performative way to the very precepts that are interpreted by other lay actors as being their cause.

From this perspective, it therefore makes very little sense to apply the most entrenched Bourdieuan economistic metaphors of interest, investment, competition and struggle (in a social field) to such actors. Thus, from this vantage point, Bourdieu can be criticized for not going far enough in his otherwise highly “constructivist” project (Lizardo 2005), by assuming some underlying durable identity that transcended the field (usually in the forms of previously constituted “dispositions”) and which could not be seen as providing an answer to the question of why for instance cultural and economic capital constitute the bases of power and symbolic capital in late modern societies (a question that can be answered from the institutional perspective [Frank and Meyer 2002]).

Most theory in the sociology of taste therefore, following Bourdieu (1984), is couched at mesolevel of analysis in which the primary actors are individuals and class fractions embedded in an agonistic “field of power.” Tastes are structured by way of the attempts of different class and occupational groups to develop lifestyles that are designed to oppose the values of other groups, especially those most proximate in social space (Bourdieu 1984).

From the Bourdieuan perspective, the structure of social space of a given national society is taken (for the purposes of cross-sectional analysis) as a exogenous given (i.e. the difference between dominant and dominated classes) with individuals orienting their actions and choices by reference to the location of other class groups in this space (Bourdieu 1985b, 1989, 1991). The previous analyses have shown that that this assumption is problematic.
A pure Bourdieuan account of cultural choice, in which the principles of class stratification and thus social organization at the field level had to be considered the product of highly path-dependent and nationally unique histories of hierarchization and “autonomization” (Bourdieu 1985a) would have to confront the seemingly unwieldy fact that in all national societies educational capital is (along with economic capital) one of the primary axes of class differentiation (Meyer 1977). Institutional theory has no problem explaining this obdurate fact, since it views educational institutions, since their inception as part of the ecclesiastical network of European universities, as embedded in the larger Westphalian system of European states and later the world polity (Meyer 1977; Meyer et al 1977).

There is no denying that a process of autonomization and hierarchization in national societies did take place, in which educational capital was able to separate itself from its subordination to the ecclesiastical sphere in early modernity and was connected to the radical rationalizing project of the state as noted by Bourdieu (1994). However, this process was one not exclusively subject to the historical idiosyncrasies of each national society in the European system, but one that was synchronized and constrained as part and parcel of the fact that each of these societies was already embedded in an active (and interactive) world polity (Meyer 1980). It is in this respect, that as argued in Chapters 4 and 5, the problem of changing patterns of taste across highly educated strata in contemporary societies is one that may not be amenable to piece-meal analysis, one nation at a time, but one that necessitates the more encompassing viewpoint provided by the world polity perspective.

Yet this is not to deny the continued usefulness of the Bourdieuan approach, in particular its eye toward the conflictual bases of such seemingly innocuous behavior as aesthetic choices. One “level-independent” notion from Bourdieu’s corpus that can be used to
provide a more realistic account of the structuration of the world polity relevant to the study
of cultural globalization is the idea of “homology.” Can we observe homologies between
the “global field-level” structure of culture production, cultural dissemination and “meta-
cultural” discourse-producing organizations (i.e. UNESCO) and the relative openness
toward (or rejection of) the products, discourses and interpretive schemes produced by these
organizations on the part of different class fractions across national societies (as indexed for
instance by differences in the possession of educational capital)?
In this way we can acknowledge the mutual commonalities (within axes of difference, or
what Bourdieu [1991] once referred to as each national class field representing a “structural
variant” of the other) of the class structure across nation states, based on their shared
embeddedness in a single global collective project which enables a common set of resources
[i.e. education] to act as “symbolic capital” across as well as within different national social
fields. This stance provides new avenues of research and a new set of research questions
regarding the relationship between intranational class struggles for “distinction” based on
cultural choices and related orientations toward transnational cultural goods, and the
structuration of the world polity along “culture-producing” and “culture distributing
organizations” and those dedicated the accumulation of both economic (transnational
corporations) and political capital (intergovernmental organizations and military alliances) in
the global field. ‘
Thus, just as the class field of national societies is partitioned among groups whose primary
claim to standing is based on cultural capital and those who depend more heavily for their
recognition as member of high status class fractions on economic capital (Bourdieu 1984,
1985) or political capital (Bourdieu 1991b), we should observe a differentiation in the global
organizational field between those collective actors most attuned to the universalizing logic of “equality” and “uniqueness” responsible for the spread of a “multicultural” logic of choice among high status class fractions and those more economically and politically-oriented organizations most attuned to a less “catholic” logic based on “realist” state interests and continued differentiation of the global community along constructed primordial ethnic and national axes.

Finally, a combined World-Polity/Bourdieuiean approach can allow us to ask the following question: at the intranational level, which class fractions are most attuned to the “cosmopolitan” logic of world society? Which class fractions may in fact be repelled by it? Is there a commonality between the demographic composition of international organizations (the primary carriers of the “world cultural logic” of equality) and the composition of the class fractions more likely to display “omnivore” taste patterns? In this way we can begin addressing the issue of the possible relationship between patterns of ordering and influence at the most encompassing level (the world polity as a “field” of contestation among organizational and national actors) and those that have been the traditional purviews of theory and research in the sociology of taste.

7.4. Omnivorosity in Cross-National Perspective

In chapter 5, I extended the framework developed in chapter 4 to the study of cross-national differences in cultural omnivorosity, using micro-level data on musical consumption for 15 European Union societies. I reviewed the most prevalent theoretical speculations and theoretical proposals as to the origins of this change in the cultural stratification system of Western societies, which mostly focused on intrasocietal changes associated with what I
referred to in chapter 2 as the “sociostructural model” (or the national level version thereof). I argued that these development-related factors, while a necessary condition for the rise of omnivore taste, are not sufficient. In particular, attention must be paid to factors associated with global connectivity, and that is only insofar as the most socially and economically advantaged societies in the world are also the most globally connected that we should observe a correlation between economic development and omnivore taste. The results are consistent with this account.

Standard explanations that trace the underlying source of the shift toward omnivorosity to developmental factors associated with rising standards of living and the expansion of mass educational systems appear to have some merit. However, the primary factors that best account for cross-national differences in fifteen EU countries are global in nature, and that it is only insofar as the more social and economically developed societies in the EU are also the ones that are more deeply connected into the “networks and flows” of the global cultural and economic system that development, is tied to the prevalence of omnivore consumption. In particular national levels of connection to the ideoscapes of world society and the extent of infrastructural elaboration of the technoscapes of the network society play paramount roles in the diffusion of omnivore taste among a majority of the national population. Furthermore, the national-level diffusion of values associated with tolerance and cosmopolitan identification with wider geographical structures play an important role, a result that is consistent with the effects obtained at the individual level in chapter 4.

A similar set of global connectivity factors that explain cross-national differences in omnivorousness in the EU also serve to account for the partition of countries along an underlying dimension that separates high international popular culture consumption societies
versus those oriented toward domestic culture consumption. In chapter 6 I extend the framework developed in chapters 3 and chapter 5 to study aggregate patterns of musical consumption in 72 countries. I find that cultural omnivorousness and orientation toward global musical culture have the same set of global connectivity predictors, and that the bivariate correlation between economic development and the extent of international musical culture consumption obtained in chapter 3 is by and large spurious, driven by the fact that the most economically developed societies are also the more globally connected societies. This finding nicely parallels the finding obtained in chapter 5 using a more delimited set of countries. Furthermore, I find that global connectivity not only serves as a predictor of orientation to global culture, but also serves as an enabler of “voraciousness” or increased quantitative demand for musical culture, net of economic development. This is consistent with the “globalization” version of the sociostructural model formulated in chapter 2, which posits increased openness to global cultural flows and increased demands for all types of cultural goods as connected to the relational transformations brought about by recent technoeconomic developments. However, the results show that, following the work of Appadurai (1990), we have to consider not only the strictly infrastructural developments associated with the globalization process (as some recent revivals of McLuhan’s notion of the “global village” created by advances in telecommunications technology) but also consider societal connections to the ideoscapes and cultural templates for action provided by world society, which serve to orient and provide a “vocabulary of motives” that both legitimize and make meaningful the increased consumption of non-local cultural forms.
This dissertation has advanced both theory and research at the nexus of the sociology of culture, the sociology of taste, institutional theory and critical studies of mass communication and global cultural flows. I have attempted to move beyond the limitations of existing approaches by adapting research and theory designed to account for more “meso” and national level patterns of cultural taste to the explanation of cross-national variation in aggregate consumption patterns. In addition I attempted to extend the dominant micro-level framework in the sociology of taste to the study of global convergence across national cultural stratification systems using a macro-level theory of the cultural construction and institutional elaboration of social actors. By “stretching” extant sociological frameworks to the study of cultural globalization I have been able to develop more consistent and empirically fruitful theory that is consistent with the data at hand. However, this is by no means the last word on the subject as various important theoretical and empirical challenges remain and further progress is certainly needed, as part of an overarching research agenda integrating empirical studies in the sociology of taste with macrolevel work on global cultural flows. This project constitutes one step in that direction.
APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES

Table 27. Flogit regression models of the cross-national predictors of the proportion of the film market composed by American Imports, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (Average for the 1995-1999 period).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>GDP Index (1999)</td>
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<td>1.8542*</td>
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<td>(1.48)</td>
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Table 28. UNESCO categorization of cultural products.

<table>
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<th>Core cultural goods</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core cultural services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related cultural goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related cultural services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Heritage goods
  - Collections and collectors’ pieces
  - Antiques of an age exceeding 100 years
- Books
  - Printed books, brochures, leaflets, etc.
  - Children’s pictures, drawing or colouring books
- Newspapers and periodicals
- Other printed matter
- Printed music
- Maps
- Postcards
- Pictures, designs
- Recorded media
  - Gramophone records
  - Discs for laser-reading systems for reproducing sound only
  - Magnetic tape (recorded)
  - Other recorded media for sound
- Visual arts
- Paintings
- Other visual arts (statuettes, sculptures, lithographs, etc.)
- Audiovisual media
  - Video games used with a television receiver
  - Photographic and cinematographic film, exposed and developed
- Core cultural services
- Audiovisual and related services
- Copyright royalties and license fees
- Equipment/support material
  - Musical instruments
  - Sound player recorder and recorded sound media
  - Cinematographic and photographic supplies
  - Television and radio receivers
- Architecture plans and drawing trade and trade advertisement material
- Information services, news agency services
- Advertising and architecture services
- Other personal, cultural and recreational services
Table 29. Detailed World Bank’s country classification scheme by Gross National Income (GNI).

**WORLD BANK CLASSIFICATION BY INCOME GROUP**

Economies are divided according to 2002 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. Low-income economies and middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing countries and countries in transition.

**LOW-INCOME ECONOMIES - GNI PER CAPITA: US$ 735 OR LESS**

Afghanistan; Angola; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Benin; Bhutan; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Republic of Congo; Cote d'Ivoire; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Georgia; Haiti; India; Indonesia; Kenya; Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People's Democratic Republic; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Republic of Moldova; Mongolia; Montserrat; Mozambique; Myanmar; Nepal; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Rwanda; Sao Tome and Principe; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; Somalia; Sudan; Tajikistan; United Republic of Tanzania; Timor-Leste; Togo; Tuvalu; Uganda; Uzbekistan; Viet Nam; Wallis and Futuna Islands; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe

**LOWER-MIDDLE-INCOME ECONOMIES - GNI PER CAPITA: US$ 736 - US$ 2,935**

Albania; Algeria; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Bulgaria; Cape Verde; China; Colombia; Cuba; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Fiji; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Iran; Iraq; Jamaica; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kiribati; The Former Yugoslav Republic (TFYR) of Macedonia; Maldives; Marshall Islands; Federation. States of Micronesia; Morocco; Namibia; Occupied Palestinian Territory, Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Romania; Russian Federation; Samoa; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Serbia and Montenegro; South Africa; (South African Customs Union: between 1994 and 2000); Sri Lanka; Suriname; Swaziland; Syrian Arab Republic; Thailand; Tonga; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Vanuatu;

**UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME ECONOMIES - GNI PER CAPITA: US$ 2,936 - US$ 9,075**

American Samoa; Argentina; Belize; Botswana; Chile; Costa Rica; Croatia; Czech Republic; Dominica; Estonia; Gabon; Grenada; Hungary; Latvia; Lebanon; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;
Lithuania; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mayotte; Mexico; Northern Mariana Islands; Oman; Palau; Panama; Poland; Saudi Arabia; Seychelles; Slovak Republic; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay; Venezuela

HIGH-INCOME ECONOMIES - GNI PER CAPITA: US$ 9,076 OR MORE

Andorra; Anguilla; Antigua and Barbuda; Aruba; Australia; Austria; Bahamas; Bahrain; Barbados; Belgium (Belgium-Luxembourg before 1999); Bermuda; British Virgin Islands; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Cayman Islands; Channel Islands; Cyprus; Denmark; Faeroe Islands; Finland; France10; French Polynesia; Germany; Greece; Greenland; Guam; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Ireland; Isle of Man; Israel; Italy; Japan; Republic of Korea; Kuwait; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg; Macao, China; Malta; Monaco; Netherlands; Netherlands Antilles; New Caledonia; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Puerto Rico; Qatar; San Marino; Saint Helena; Singapore; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; United States Virgin Islands
Table 30. Country-level scores for external covariates used in scaled association model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>-1.38</td>
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<td>0.70</td>
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<td>-1.05</td>
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<td>-0.70</td>
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<td>-0.69</td>
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1. Human Development Index Score
2. GDP per capita Score
3. State Educ. Expenditures Score
4. State Health Expenditures Score
5. Class Inequality Score
6. Cultural Industry Size Score
7. Tolerant Values Score
8. Regional Identification Score
9. Economic Globalization Score
10. Network Society Score
11. World Polity Linkage Score
Table 31. Three-way table of counts used for the analysis reported in Chapter 3.

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Table 32. Distribution of consumption of recorded music by type for 66 countries and estimated country scores from a GAMMI model, 1998 UNESCO World Culture Report.

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<th>% Dom. 98</th>
<th>% Classical 98</th>
<th>Music Sales 98</th>
<th>Row Scores (Dim. 1)</th>
<th>Row Scores (Dim. 2)</th>
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Table 33. Correlation Matrix of the variables used in the analysis for chapter 4.

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StataCorp. 2005. *Stata Statistical Software: Release 9.2* College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.


