

PRISONS AND PATRIOTS: THE “TUCSONIAN” DRAFT RESISTERS AND
CITIZENSHIP DURING WAR II

by

Cherstin M. Lyon

Copyright © Cherstin Marie Lyon 2006

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2006

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Cherstin M. Lyon

entitled Prisons and Patriots: The “Tucsonian” Draft Resisters and Citizenship during World War II

and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Karen Anderson Date: December 19, 2005

Sarah Deutsch Date: December 19, 2005

Jack Marietta Date: December 19, 2005

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

Dissertation Director: Karen Anderson Date: December 19, 2005

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder.

SIGNED: Cherstin M. Lyon

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to all those who have influenced this project over the past six years, many of whom are not listed here. I owe many thanks to the members of my committee, Karen Anderson, Sarah Deutsch and Jack Marietta, for the hours they spent reading and commenting on multiple draft of this project. I owe a special thanks to Sarah Deutsch for bringing the topic to my attention in the first place and for the extra lengths to which she went to support the completion of the project. I am indebted to Mary Farrell. It was at the invitation of Mary Farrell, Nicole Branton, and Peter Taylor from the Heritage Office of the Coronado National Forest that I first became acquainted with the Tucsonians. This project has received generous funding from the California Civil Liberties Public Education Program (CCLPEP); the Coronado National Forest; the Charles Redd Center for Western Studies; both the Graduate College and History Department at the University of Arizona; Phi Alpha Theta; and the PEO. Thanks to Jane Beckwith, Frank Chin, Frank Emi, Art Hansen, Erica Harth, and Gary Okihiro for their formal and informal comments on my research. I also owe a special thanks to Carlos Aguirre, Matthew Dennis, and Peggy Pascoe, each of whom helped me mature as a historian. Finally, I must thank those who influenced this dissertation the most, without whom this dissertation would not be possible: Joe and Tee Norikane, Noboru Taguma, Hideo Takeuchi, Susumu Yenokida, Ken and Kay Yoshida, Harry Yoshikawa, Takashi Hoshizaki, Yosh Kuromiya, Frank Emi, and Gordon Hirabayashi.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the Tucsonians:

Archie Amate, Dix Asai, Fred Asai, James Heya, Irvin Hirabayashi, Harry Ioka, Flu Inaba, George Ishimoto, Harry Ishimoto, Tak Ishimoto, Yoshiharu Ishikawa, Iwaharu Isomura, Hideo Ito, George Izuno, Joe Kashiwagi, Jim Kawasaki, Thomas Kawasaki, Yoshi Kubo, Kazuo Kunitake, Sadao Nadabayashi, Yoshitatsu Nakaguma, Joseph Nakahira, Bill Nakasaki, Frank Naruto, Joe Norikane, Noboru Taguma, George Takahashi, Frank Takamoto, George Takamoto, Hideo Takeuchi, Riyuo Uyeda, Terry Uyemoto, Hiroshi Yamauchi, George Yamazumi, Ben Yenokida, Min Yenokida, Sam Yenokida, Susumu Yenokida, Ken Yoshida, Sock Yoshida and Harry Yoshikawa

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	7
ABSTRACT.....	8
INTRODUCTION.....	9
A Footprint in the Sands of Time.....	14
CHAPTER 1, NISEI CITIZENSHIP: “BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA”.....	16
Issei Immigration and Exclusion	18
Nisei Birth and Citizenship.....	21
Distinct Generations of Nisei	27
Issei and Nisei Expectations	36
Americanization and Citizenship in Public School	40
Unintended Lessons in Citizenship	44
CHAPTER 2, NISEI CITIZENSHIP TRANSFORMED	49
Pearl Harbor	50
Loyalty Versus Citizenship	53
Nisei Behind Barbed Wire	62
Nisei Citizenship under Attack	65
Military Service and the Nisei	68
JACL Collaboration	74
CHAPTER 3, LOYALTY AND RESISTANCE: REINVENTING NISEI CITIZENSHIP	80
The Broader Context of Wartime Citizenship	82
Propaganda and Resistance	84
The Yoshida Family’s Response to Registration	107
The End of the Registration Crisis at Topaz	111
Unexpected Results of Registration: Prisons and Patriotism	113
CHAPTER 4, THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP	120
Restoration of the Draft and Protest at Topaz	121
Response to the Draft at Amache	125
Creating Heroes: The Propaganda of Patriotism	147
Heroes in Death: Memorializing Fallen Soldiers	153
CHAPTER 5, PRISON AND PUNISHMENT	158
From County Jail to the Tucson Road Camp	160
Coming “Home” a Felon	179
Returning “Home” to California	184
CONCLUSION, HISTORICAL MEMORY AND RECONCILIATION: THE TUCSONIAN DRAFT “RESISTERS OF CONSCIENCE”.....	189
Reunions, Redress, and Reconciliation	190
REFERENCES.....	207

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1, Nisei Births from 1910 to 1930.....	35
Table 2, Issei and Nisei Populations Compared, 1910 to 1930.....	35

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the lives and wartime resistance of a group of forty-one Nisei men (Americans of Japanese ancestry) who resisted the draft as a means of protesting their incarceration during World War II. While serving time in the same federal prison for violating Selective Service laws, they became acquainted for the first time and remained life-long friends after the war's end. They supported each other for more than sixty years amidst pressure to hide their identities as resisters, because the majority of Nisei preferred to forget this chapter in American history. This group called themselves the "Tucsonians," and this dissertation begins to tell their story. This study is based on oral histories and archival research and examines citizenship as a contested relationship between individuals and the state.

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the lives and wartime resistance of a group of forty-one Nisei men (Americans of Japanese ancestry) who resisted the draft as a means of protesting their incarceration during World War II.¹ While serving time in the same federal prison for violating Selective Service laws, they became acquainted for the first time and remained life-long friends after the war's end. They supported each other for more than sixty years amidst pressure to hide their identities as resisters, because the vast majority of Nisei preferred to forget this chapter in American history. This group called themselves the "Tucsonians," and this dissertation begins to tell their story.

In the first year of World War II, Nisei lost their citizenship in symbolic and practical ways. Selective Service reclassified them as "enemy aliens" despite the fact that they were American-born citizens. The Western Defense Command of the Army had euphemistically called them "non-aliens" in official proclamations ordering all persons of Japanese ancestry to evacuate their homes and turn themselves over to federal authorities for "relocation." The War Relocation Authority held them, along with their alien parents, under armed guard without due process of law.²

¹ A note on terminology: Nisei means second generation. These were the American-born children of Japanese immigrants. The first generation are called "Issei," third generation "Sansei," and fourth generation "Yonsei." "Nikkei" is a Japanese word for all Japanese Americans and does not differentiate between Japanese-born and U.S.-born persons of Japanese ancestry. "Kibei" refers to Nisei whose parents sent them to Japan for an education. When using the term Japanese American, the author has chosen to follow the school of thinking that leaves out the hyphen to escape the negative connotations of "hyphenated" Americans. For an example of a scholar who disagrees with this interpretation and instead urges scholars to hyphenate Japanese-American, see: William Hohri, ed., *Resistance: Challenging America's Wartime Internment of Japanese-Americans* (Lomita, California: The Epistolarian, 2001), 7-8.

² Even though scholars continue to refer to the ten War Relocation Centers as "internment camps," the only internment camps fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and only housed enemy aliens and those the government could prove posed a national security threat. The War Relocation Authority called their camps "Relocation Centers." President Roosevelt called them concentration camps. But an old sign

It was under these conditions that the War Department restored the most burdensome obligations of citizenship to the Nisei, but restored virtually none of their rights.³ In February 1944, Nisei men began receiving notices from their draft boards to appear for pre-induction physical examinations. The government demanded that young Nisei men fulfill their obligations as citizens without first restoring their rights of due process and their freedom to return to the evacuated zones along the West Coast and in Southern Arizona. In response, three hundred and fifteen young men refused the draft and chose prison over partial citizenship. The Tucsonians were among them. They resisted the draft from inside the Central Utah Relocation Center, popularly known as “Topaz,” and the Granada Relocation Center in Colorado, popularly known as “Amache.”⁴

that used to mark the perimeter of Topaz, one of the War Relocation Authority Camps called it a “Prison Camp,” which seems the most appropriate designation even though it exposes the camps as constitutionally problematic. Concentration camps seem to be the most popularly used alternative to internment camps, but after the end of World War II, concentration camps have developed such a strong association with the German extermination camps, that many balk at the term when applied to the camps for Japanese Americans. Therefore, this study will refer to the facilities as “camps” or “WRA camps” as the least value-laden term available. Those who lived in the camps are often referred to as “evacuees,” diminishing the forced nature of their incarceration. This study will refer to them as detainees instead. Finally, the author uses terms such as detainment and incarceration interchangeably to emphasize the fact that although there were ways in which detainees could leave the camps, they could not do so without official permission. For a more thorough discussion of the history and significance of the various terms that have been used by the government and by scholars to define the camps, often times inappropriately, see: Roger Daniels, “Words Do Matter: A Note on Inappropriate Terminology and the Incarceration of the Japanese Americans,” in *Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 190-214. For a full study of all of the forms of detention used for suspect citizens and enemy aliens during the war, see: Tetsuden Kashima, *Jugement Without Trial: Japanese American Imprisonment during World War II* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2003).

³ For an excellent discussion of the differences between the rights and obligations of citizenship, particularly relating to women’s history, see: Linda Kerber, *No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998). This study contributes to the work that Linda Kerber has done on women’s citizenship by examining government distinctions in men’s citizenship obligations versus their rights along lines of race.

⁴ In addition to the resisters from Amache and Topaz, one resister came from the Colorado River Relocation Center, otherwise known as “Poston,” and an unknown number came from outside the camps, particularly from the state of Colorado and Chicago, Illinois. One resister from Chicago, Harry Yoshikawa, was interviewed for this project, but his story and that of others who resisted the draft from outside the

This dissertation is based on archival research and oral interviews with some of the last surviving Tucsonians: Joe Norikane, Susumu Yenokida, Ken Yoshida, Noboru Taguma, Harry Yoshikawa, and Hideo Takeuchi. Their stories provide the narrative framework. The bulk of this study, though, is based on archival research in the records of the War Relocation Authority, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the Japanese American Citizens League, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Each source helped answer two central questions: Why did some Nisei resist the draft and what specific pressures prevented more Nisei men from doing the same?

The diary of Joe Norikane especially benefited the study, and shaped its central thesis, which is: Citizenship is a contested relationship between individuals and the state that changes over time and evolves over an individual's life.⁵ Historians have long noted

camps remains a topic in need of further research.

⁵ This interpretation of citizenship as a relationship rather than something that can be earned, granted or possessed is based on Robert Park's 1926 argument that civilization is a relationship. In Park's essay on the west coast as America's racial frontier, he argues that civilization is what happens when races and nations interact through trade, diplomacy, etc. Civilization is not an inherent characteristic that one group possesses and another does not. Robert Park, "Our Racial Frontier on the Pacific," *The Survey Graphic*, 56, no. 3 (May 1, 1926), 192-196. See also: Stanford M. Lyman, *Militarism, Imperialism, and Racial Accommodation: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Early Writings of Robert E. Park*. (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1992). The analysis of citizenship presented in this study represents a starting point for rethinking the relationship between citizenship, loyalty and prisons in my own research. But the literature on citizenship is extensive and this dissertation does not revise what has already been written, but adds to it by investigating the issue in terms of Japanese Americans during World War II, which has not been done in the larger context of the literature on citizenship and prisons. For the classic study on citizenship, see: TH Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952). Marshall explains that the rights that state's grant to citizens are closely related to the privileges of social class. Rogers Smith surveys U.S. history from the Revolutionary War through the end of the 19th century. He notes that citizenship is granted either automatically to white men or needs to be earned by all others. His analysis stops at the turn of the century, though. Rogers Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). Linda Kerber also notes that the relationship between rights and obligations create a stratified system of privilege and class that in her studies is based on gender and the state. When viewed in combination with this study, we can see that race and gender create classes of citizenship. Linda Kerber, *No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998). For a brief introduction to this idea that gender and race create a variety of classes of citizenship that change over time, an article that provides a basis for my own argument, see: Eileen Boris, "The Racialized Gendered State: Constructions of Citizenship in the United States," *Social Politics* 2 (Summer 1995): 160-180. For the most thorough examination of military service as the ultimate form of citizenship, defining all citizens'

that individuals' interpretations of their own rights, or demands for greater rights have led them into conflicts with state authority. At times, these conflicts have led to surprising triumphs of the least powerful groups over what appears to be overwhelming odds of state authority. The most sophisticated work on this topic seems to come out of Latin America, where historians have found that indigenous and peasant groups shaped the way that the newly independent nations of Peru and Mexico defined citizenship.⁶ In this way, the central thesis of this study is not new. Clearly, definitions of citizenship change over time, often in response to agitation from below. What is new about this interpretation of citizenship is the fact that this study defines citizenship not as a set of rights or obligations to be granted, won, or lost. Instead, citizenship it is the *relationship* between citizens and the state. It is the relationship between individuals and the state that is redefined over the life of the individual and in response to changing political needs of the state.

This study is organized into five main chapters. Chapter one introduces Americanization training that the Tucsonians received in the public schools during the 1920s and 1930s that formed the basis of their understanding of citizenship and the Constitution. Chapter two explains the process by which Nisei lost their rights of

relationship with the state either as soldiers or mothers of soldiers, see: Theda Skocopol, "Did the Civil War Further American Democracy? A Reflection on the Expansion of Benefits for Union Veterans," in *Democracy, Revolution, and History*, edited by Theda Skocopol, et al, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp 73-101; *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

⁶ The most sophisticated work on this topic seems to come out of Latin America. Three books are particularly important in demonstrating the power of native peoples, the least possessed in early national countries of Mexico and Peru, to expand their rights and count themselves as citizens in nations reluctant to grant them that right or privilege. See: Florencia Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Mark Thurner, *From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997); Peter Guardino, *Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero, 1800-1857* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

citizenship during the first year of war. It also explains why the year ended in violent conflicts among Japanese Americans as they struggled to respond effectively to their devastating loss of property and rights. Chapters three and four explain the ways in which the JACL collaborated with the War Department and WRA to squelch resistance within the camps, and to coerce, if necessary, young Nisei men into accepting military service as their only means of restoring their citizenship rights. Finally, chapter five analyzes the experiences that the resisters faced once they refused the draft. The Tucsonians' time in prison represented a brief respite from punishment for their "crimes" of civil disobedience that started before their trials, and resumed when they returned to their families and communities as felons.

A Footprint in the Sands of Time

Late one evening, early in May 2002, I sat in a hotel room with a colleague, historical archaeologist Nicole Branton, after a very long day of traveling and conducting interviews. Together, we read from a wartime diary that Joe Norikane so generously lent to us. Joe Norikane had been one of the more outspoken of the Tucsonian resisters. He stood defiantly against the government's attempts to force the Nisei to accept partial, second-class citizenship. We read his diary from 1943 through 1944 with great anticipation of uncovering the idealistic mindset of a young man preparing to take on his government in a courageous act of civil disobedience. What we found was a book full of doubt and insecurity, not regarding the war, or the draft, or his civil rights, but about a girl. We read page after page about his social life, sports, and a whole lot of dancing.⁷

When we met with Norikane the next day to record an interview, he apologized that he had not written about more important issues in his diary. Our impression was quite to the contrary, we assured him. He wrote about the most important issue he was facing as a young man. He recorded the life of a young man coming of age, and he focused on what might be seen as typical obsessions of a young man despite the fact that he was coming of age behind barbed wire. We assured him that what he wrote was far more important and eye opening than treatises on civil rights or the injustices of the draft ever could have been.⁸

⁷ Joe Norikane died in March 2003. His wife, Tee Norikane retains possession of his diary.

⁸ Joe Norikane, Interview with the author, Miyako Inn, San Francisco, May 11, 2002.

Joe Norikane, like the rest of the Nisei draft resisters of World War II, did not resist the draft in a vacuum. His decision to challenge the government's partial restoration of his citizenship was shaped by the totality of his life experiences in combination with the external pressures he felt at the moment he refused to obey the draft. His resistance represents a complex, nuanced choice to defend a personal definition of his citizenship rights that stood in direct conflict with the state's understanding of his obligations. In his mind, when he resisted the draft, he had become both a prisoner and a patriot. According to a federal judge, he became a convicted felon.

As Norikane sat down to be interviewed about his life and his resistance, he recalled that when he was in jail with some of the other resisters from Amache, none of them believed that they would get a fair hearing. In fact, all agreed that their struggle for civil rights would probably be forgotten. For decades they were forgotten, but Norikane always hoped that the stand he took in defense of his constitutional rights during the war might someday be remembered. If we “leave a footstep in the sand of time,” Norikane said, “somebody might look back on what was going on during the war and get curious.” He hoped historians and students alike might preserve the memory of his wartime stand for civil rights and, someday, finally understand what he stood for during World War II. He stood against the draft not as a coward, or a draft dodger, but based on his belief that the Constitution should be color-blind and should protect all Americans equally and without prejudice. Joe Norikane died in the spring of 2003 before this manuscript was complete. This study is dedicated to him and to all of the Tucsonians.⁹

⁹ Ibid.

CHAPTER 1
NISEI CITIZENSHIP: “BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND
THE DEEP BLUE SEA”

When Joe Norikane was in third grade, his family moved from Yuba City to Walnut Grove, California. Before the move, Norikane had been one of only four Asian children in the school. He never felt out of place, and was never aware that his ancestry could somehow make him different from the other kids. He participated in school plays, had Caucasian friends, and got along fine. When the family moved, his father took him to school in Walnut Grove for the first time. He said, “ Joe, this is your school. It’s the Oriental School.” Norikane did not know what “Oriental” meant, but he went in and found that everybody had black hair and no children had “white” hair at all. It took him a while to learn what segregation meant, and that this was a segregated school. Joe’s initiation into the segregated world typified the gradual process by which Nisei children came to understand the contradictions between the ideals and the limits of their American citizenship.¹⁰

¹⁰ Joe Norikane, interview with the author, Miyako Inn, San Francisco, May 11, 2002. The idea that children learn about racial exclusion, segregation and discrimination gradually is drawn not only from interviews conducted by the author with Nisei about their experiences growing up, but also on a large body of ex-slave narratives, many of which repeat the same shock and horror children experienced the first time they realized what it meant to be a slave. Ira Berlin, Marc Favreau and Steven F. Miller, eds., *Remembering Slavery: African Americans Talk about their Personal Experiences of Slavery and Freedom* (New York: The New Press, 1998). See also: *Slave Narratives* (New York: Library of America, 2000). For a book devoted entirely to the topic of “growing up Nisei,” see: David K Yoo, *Growing up Nisei: Race, Generation, and Culture among Japanese Americans of California, 1924-49* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000). For an introduction to literature on children and adolescents as historical agents, see: Eliot West and Paula Evans Petrik’s edited collection of essays, *Small Worlds: Children and Adolescents in America, 1850-1950* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992). For additional references on adolescents, popular culture, identity formation and second-generation immigrants between WWI and

Citizenship is not static state policy or law. It is a dynamic, dialectical relationship between individuals and the state that changes over the life of a single individual. Citizenship adapts to the changing needs of the state. Citizenship is a process, a construction, and a complex relationship negotiated between individuals and the state. This chapter reveals the circumstances under which individual Nisei first learned the meaning of their citizenship and some of the unintended lessons the very young Nisei learned about their citizenship in the California public school system. As a whole, this dissertation demonstrates the ways in which individual Nisei and the state negotiated their rights and responsibilities with each other, both in peacetime and in war, resulting in a dynamic and contested relationship we call citizenship.

WWII, see: Valerie Matsumoto, "Desperately Seeking 'Dierdre': Gender Roles, Multicultural Relations, and Nisei Women Writers of the 1930s," *Frontiers* 12 (1991): 19-32; and Matsumoto's "Redefining Expectations: Nisei Women in the 1930s," *California History* 73, no. 1 (1994): 44-53. See also: Vicki Ruiz, *From Out of the Shadows: Mexican Women in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 51-71; and David Yoo, *Growing up Nisei: Race, Generation and Culture among Japanese Americans of California, 1924-49* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000). On the general topic of "growing up" in America, see: John Modell, *Into One's Own: From Youth to Adulthood in the United States, 1920-1975* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); and Elliot West, *Growing up in Twentieth Century America: A History and Reference Guide* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996). Finally, the literature on Americanization and Indian Boarding Schools offers valuable insights into the many unintended consequences of Americanization efforts and the agency that children and teens exercise in the face of coercive and sometimes violent programs of assimilation. Some examples of this literature include: Karen Anderson, *Changing Woman: A History of Racial Ethnic Women in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 17-66; K. Tsianina Lomawaima, *They Call it Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); and Wendy Wall, "Gender and the 'Citizen Indian,'" in *Writing the Range: Race, Class and Culture in the Women's West*, edited by Elizabeth Jameson and Susan Armitage, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 202-229.

Issei Immigration and Exclusion

Kohei and Saki Yoshida first met in Tokyo where Kohei graduated from the university. They married and immigrated together to the United States in 1920.¹¹ When they arrived in Tacoma, Washington, they settled in a nearby mill town where Kohei taught Judo at night (as the first judo instructor in the United States) and worked in the sawmill during the day. Saki cared for their daughter Toshiko, the first of the couple's seven children.¹²

Like other Japanese immigrants, Kohei and Saki sacrificed much in their efforts to make a living and raise a family in the United States. While each family's story is unique, and few had university educations, most shared humble beginnings. In the mill towns of Washington, many Issei lived in small wooden homes built from scrap lumber. Families commonly got by on whatever food they could grow, gather or catch, purchasing only white rice and green tea. Kids would contribute to the family diet by catching fish and gathering watercress, wild blackberries, matsutake mushrooms, *yuki* and *warabi*, and dandelion leaves. Even though some immigrants conserved everything they had, with the intention of going back to Japan, most Issei made America home for the rest of their lives.¹³

¹¹ Ken and Kay Yoshida, interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, 2001 and San Mateo, California, 2002.

¹² Martha Nakagawa, "Kohei Yoshida: Judo Pioneer," *Pacific Citizen* (December 1999), 59.

¹³ Frank Chin, *Born in the USA: A Story of Japanese America, 1889-1947* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002); Joe Norikane, Noboru Taguma, Hideo Takeuchi, Ken Yoshida, and Harry Yoshikawa, Group interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, November 6, 1999; Noboru Taguma, interview with the author and Nicole Branton, Tucson, Arizona. August 26, 2001; and Susumu Yenokida and Harry Yoshikawa, interview with the author and Nicole Branton, Tucson, Arizona. August 25, 2001.

When Kohei and Sakiko arrived in Tacoma, Washington, they entered a world ordered by increasing immigration and naturalization restrictions, strengthened alien land laws, and overt racial hostility. Japan agreed to prevent further emigration of laborers from Japan to the United States through the Gentleman's Agreement, signed in 1907 and put into effect in 1908. Anti-Japanese exclusionists argued this agreement did not go far enough. Chinese exclusion laws laid the foundation for total exclusion of immigrants from Asia just four years after the Yoshidas arrived in Tacoma. A year after Kohei and Sakiko's immigration, Washington State legislators passed the Alien Land Law strengthening the state's constitutional ban on the sale of land to aliens ineligible to become naturalized citizens. Washington's 1921 law applied the constitutional ban on sales to leases, rentals and renewed leases as well.¹⁴

Washington was not alone in passing restrictive legislation. Like Washington, California strengthened its alien land law in 1920 barring Asian immigrants from purchasing land and limiting leases to three-year contracts. Oregon, Idaho and Montana followed suit, passing alien land laws of their own in 1923. In 1924, the Johnson-Reid Act, otherwise known as the National Origins Act, limited immigration to a mere 2 percent of immigrant populations residing in the United States in 1890. By backdating the standards for future immigration to the population in the United States in 1890, the law drastically limited further immigration of Jews, Slavs, Greeks, Italians and Poles. It

¹⁴ Gary Okihiro and David Drummond, "The Concentration Camps and Japanese Economic Losses in California Agriculture, 1900-1942," in Roger Daniels, et al, eds., *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress* (University of Washington Press, 1991), 168-169; and David A Takami, *Divided Destiny: A History of Japanese Americans in Seattle* (Seattle: Wing Luke Asian Museum and University of Washington Press, 1998).

also extended Chinese exclusion laws to exclude Japanese immigration entirely and virtually all other Asian immigrants as well.¹⁵

The Supreme Court added to the legal discrimination against Japanese immigrants when it ruled that because Japanese were not “white,” they could not become naturalized citizens of the United States. The first naturalization law of 1790 had allowed only “free white persons” the privilege of citizenship. After the Civil War, Congress amended the law opening naturalization to all persons of African descent. As a result, this 1870 revision of the naturalization law defined citizenship in terms of black and white.¹⁶ Between black and white, though, remained tremendous ambiguity. In response, immigrants from all over Asia contested this biracial definition of naturalization rights in the courts, sometimes winning, sometimes losing, but all the time forcing the courts to define more clearly who could and who could not claim “whiteness” as an avenue to U.S. citizenship.¹⁷ In 1922, the Supreme Court ruled definitively that Japanese immigrants

¹⁵ The quota system for European immigrants was not put into effect until 1929, but Asian exclusion was put into effect immediately. For one of the most important analyses of the effects of the 1924 Immigration Act to date, see: Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” *Journal of American History* 86, no. 1 (June 1999), 67-92. The one group that could not be uniformly excluded was Filipinos because of the United States’ occupation of the Philippines and Filipino status as U.S. nationals. This changed in 1934 when the Tydings-McDuffie Act stripped Filipinos of this U.S. national status and set an annual quota of 50 for the Philippines. This act also set July 4, 1946 as the day when the Philippines would gain its independence. For more information about Asian Exclusion, particularly how exclusion laws affected Chinese, Japanese and Filipinos comparatively, see: Harry H. L. Kitano, *Asian Americans: Emerging Minorities* (Upper River Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001). For an excellent overview of the decade as a whole, see: David J. Goldberg, *Discontented America: The United States in the 1920s* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 159-65. John Higham’s *Strangers in the Land* remains one of the best sources on the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act. Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism*, 2nd edition, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 1988).

¹⁶ Act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat.L, 256).

¹⁷ Court cases determined who could and who could not claim whiteness as a means of obtaining U.S. citizenship. In the case, *In re Ah Yup* (1 F. Cas. 223, CCD Cal. 1878), a California court determined that Chinese were not white, setting a legal precedent that other courts followed. In the case *In re Saito* (62 F. 126, C.C.D. Mass. 1894) a Massachusetts court determined that Japanese were not white, but as many as 420 Japanese nationals successfully applied for naturalization before the State Department brought an end to the practice in 1906. Japanese immigrants continued to test whether they could be counted as white for

were not white and could not become citizens of the United States through naturalization.¹⁸

Nisei Birth and Citizenship

In these times, when anti-immigration sentiments in the United States climaxed and membership in the Ku Klux Klan peaked, the Nisei were born. The Klan's "100 percent Americanism" slogan primed its national membership drive and in the early 1920s brought over three million Americans onto its rolls. Former President Theodore Roosevelt preceded the Klan's 100 percent Americanism campaign by several years in a speech delivered before the Knights of Columbus on October 12, 1915, when he said, "There is no room in this country for hyphenated Americanism." Roosevelt's declaration was one less of racial purity than of allegiance, but the intricacies of the message were overshadowed when Roosevelt stated quite clearly, "The only man who is a good American is the man who is an American and nothing else."¹⁹ President Coolidge seemed to endorse a racial interpretation of American purity when in 1924 he declared

naturalization purposes until the Supreme Court ruled in 1923, in the case of *Takao Ozawa v. United States*, that Japanese were not white and were ineligible for naturalized citizenship. See: Ian Haney-Lopez, *White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race* (New York: New York University Press, 1996).

¹⁸ *Ozawa v. United States*, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). The literature on whiteness, naturalization and Asian exclusion is extensive. For an introduction, particularly to the various ways in which individual immigrants used the courts to test exclusion laws and definitions of whiteness, see: Haney-López, *White by Law*; Charles McClain, *In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle against Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Charles McClain, ed., *Chinese Immigrants and American Law* (New York: Garland Pub., 1994), and *Japanese Immigrants and American Law* (New York: Garland Pub., 1994); Lucy E. Salyer, *Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

¹⁹ Philip Davis, *Immigration and Americanization* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1920).

“America must remain American,” as he signed into law the strongest exclusion law to date that for the first time outlawed Japanese immigration entirely.

At the same time that the legal, political and social climate in the United States transformed Japanese immigrants into permanent aliens, lawmakers began scrutinizing the legal status of the Nisei.²⁰ Up until 1924, Japanese citizenship law granted citizenship to all children of Japanese nationals regardless of their place of birth.²¹ The United States, on the other hand, granted citizenship to all persons (except for American Indians) born in the United States, regardless of ancestry.²² These two different methods of granting citizenship gave Nisei children dual citizenship. Lawmakers, many of whom already assumed that Asian immigrants could not be assimilated into America racially, began questioning the legal status and loyalty of Nisei dual citizens, who were by law if not by loyalty divided between the country of their birth and the country of their ancestry.

²⁰ Mae Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law;” and U.S. Congress. House. Hearing at Seattle, Washington before the House Sub-Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 27 July 1920.

²¹ In legal terms, this is one of two principle ways of determining citizenship. Japan followed a model of granting citizenship generally characterized as an imperialistic model, granting citizenship in relation to the citizenship of parents regardless of place (*jus sanguinis* or the right of blood). Germany and Italy are notable examples of other countries that followed this same model of citizenship. The United States, on the other hand, granted citizenship in relation to where a person was born (*jus soli* or the right of the soil). All persons born in the United States, by virtue of the 14th Amendment were citizens, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Children of citizens born abroad could also inherit the U.S. citizenship of their parents, but this was not automatic. They would have to return to the U.S. before or soon after coming of age, and if they did not return to the U.S. once they turned 17, they would have to register with a U.S. consulate office to declare their intentions to retain their citizenship, establish residency in the U.S. in a timely manner and declare an oath of allegiance to the United States. *Yep Suey Ning v. Berkshire* (73 F. 2nd 745, 1934) tested this provision for children of citizens born outside the United States, when children of a U.S. citizen who were born in China presented themselves to U.S. immigration officials as citizens of the United States. Even though this case itself ruled against the applicants because of what the court called “significant” discrepancies in the testimonies of the individuals applying for entrance, raising doubts as to the legitimacy of their claim, it did not call into question the law itself (8 USCA § 6).

²² There were some notable exceptions to this rule, such as the citizenship status of Native Americans who were excluded from automatic citizenship rights until 1924.

In 1920, with hearings on the West Coast Congress investigated problems related to immigration. In these hearings, congressional representatives considered the “problem” of Nisei dual citizens. Some political leaders argued with a fair amount of hysteria that Japan’s policy of granting automatic citizenship to the children of emigrants offered proof that it was planning a social if not military invasion of the United States as part of Japan’s attempts to expand its empire.²³

When the House committee investigating immigration interviewed one future Nisei leader, James Sakamoto, about his dual citizenship, he described it as a mere legal technicality that did not interfere with his loyalty to the United States. When questioned before the House investigating committee in 1920, Sakamoto explained that he did not know the status of his dual citizenship nor did he care much about it. Seattle was his home and the United States his country. If ordered to serve in the Emperor’s military, Sakamoto replied glibly, he would “get out of it,” but if called upon to serve the United States, he assured the committee that he would serve without hesitation.²⁴

Nisei dual citizenship was a matter of great concern to lawmakers, who already questioned whether or not Nisei were capable of assimilating to American ways. The fact that as adults, Nisei men in particular would be bound by Japanese law to serve the Emperor of Japan and United States law the United States seemed to complicate the immigration situation in their eyes. Even the emphatic claims of loyalty and patriotism

²³ Klancy Clark De Nevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist: Karl Bendetsen, Perry Saito and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2004); and U.S. Congress. House. Hearing at Seattle, Washington before the House Sub-Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 27 July 1920, as reprinted in T. Iyenaga and Kenoske Sato, *Japan and the California Problem* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1921), appendix L, 203-229.

²⁴ U.S. Congress. House. Hearing at Seattle, Washington before the House Sub-Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 27 July 1920, as reprinted in T. Iyenaga and Kenoske Sato, *Japan and the California Problem* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1921), appendix L, 203-229.

that Sakamoto offered the committee did not resolve their fears of a growing population of citizens, who remained legally divided between two nations.

In 1924, the same year Congress shut the door on legal immigration from Japan, the Japanese government revised its citizenship laws so that the Nisei born after this date would no longer gain automatic Japanese citizenship. Parents who wished to pass their citizenship on to their children had two weeks to register their desires with a Japanese consulate, and children who wished to renounce their Japanese citizenship could do so with far fewer restrictions. Before Japan revised its citizenship laws, young men of military age (over the age of 17) could not renounce their citizenship and, if resident in Japan, were obligated to serve in the military. After the law changed, they could renounce their Japanese citizenship, and thus free themselves from any possible military obligation to Japan.²⁵

In the wake of changes in Japanese citizenship law, the number of Nisei dual citizens declined steadily between 1924 and 1941. From 1924 to 1930, only one out of three children were registered with the Japanese consulate. During the same period, 40 percent of Nisei born before 1924 took advantage of the new provision for dual citizens to renounce their Japanese citizenship. After 1930, fewer and fewer parents declared Japanese citizenship for their children, and Nisei born before 1924 continued to renounce their Japanese citizenship. On the eve of World War II as many as 70 percent of Nisei retained U.S. citizenship alone.²⁶ With the strongest legal barrier to Japanese

²⁵ Philip M. Glick, Memorandum to Dillon S. Myer, "Domicil: A Factor in regard to dual citizenship," Manzanar, California, 9 April 1943. NARA RG 210/16, box 229, folder 31.009 #1; Carey McWilliams, "Dual Citizenship," *Far Eastern Survey* 11, no. 23 (November 1942): 231-233.

²⁶ Edward K. Strong, *The Second-Generation Japanese Problem* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), 142-43; Philip M. Glick, Memorandum to Dillon S. Myer, "Domicil"; and Carey McWilliams,

immigration in place and Japanese citizenship law revised, lawmakers seemed satisfied that Nisei dual citizenship had been resolved, at least for a time.

Congressional leaders may have concerned themselves with the relationship of Nisei to Japan, but American courts were concerned first and foremost with the relationship of Nisei to U.S. laws and citizenship. In the 1920s, the courts played a significant role in clarifying Nisei citizenship. The courts did not rule on the issue of dual citizenship, but on the property rights of the Nisei. They ruled that Nisei were indeed citizens by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment and by legal precedent.

In 1922, the California State Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision regarding the right of a two-year-old Nisei child, Tetsubumi Yano, to hold property in the State of California despite laws forbidding her parents from the same. The California State Supreme Court affirmed that the children of Japanese immigrants were citizens by birth and that their parents had equal rights to guardianship over their children despite the fact that they were aliens. The case emerged when Hayao Yano received a notice from the superior court of Sutter County, California, denying him the rights of guardianship over the estate of his two-year old daughter, Tetsubumi. His daughter was the owner of fourteen acres of land. Hayao Yano and his wife cared for this property as her parents. Prosecutors claimed that the only reason why Tetsubumi owned these acres was because her parents were aliens, ineligible for citizenship, and prohibited by California State law from owning land themselves. They had, the prosecution argued, purchased land in their daughter's name in a deliberate attempt to skirt the law.²⁷

"Dual Citizenship," pp 231-233.

²⁷ Estate of Tetsubumi Yano, 188 Cal. 645, 648 (206 P. 995).

In deciding the case, the court ruled that Tetsubumi was a citizen. Despite her youth and the motivations of her parents, she was privy to all of the rights of property assured other citizens of the United States. It also ruled that being an alien did not mean that Hayao Yano had forfeited his right as a parent. Citing the Fourteenth Amendment and the legal precedent set in the case of *Yick Wo* the court ruled that Tetsubumi's parents' were protected by equal protection of the law and thus could not be denied guardianship over her estate.²⁸

Tetsubumi's case provided a powerful legal precedent for Nisei rights to property and their birthright citizenship despite the permanent alien status of their parents. It also gave the Nisei a powerful role in Japanese families. The Nisei could offer their parents some degree of legal security in a nation in which they could not become citizens. In upholding Issei parental rights, the courts had created a form of derivative citizenship for the Issei, so long as they retained parental control over their children. The citizenship of their children in combination with their children's youth gave Issei rights that state laws in Washington, Oregon and California sought to proscribe.

²⁸ The court case *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* (169 U.S. 649, 1898) determined that race was not a factor in determining birthright citizenship, even when the parents of the child were specifically excluded from citizenship, as was the case with Wong Kim Ark, who was born in the United States to Chinese parents. The case of *Yick Wo v. Hopkins* (118 U.S. 356, 1886) determined that even aliens ineligible to citizenship, like Yick Wo of San Francisco, were guaranteed the equal protection of law and specifically in this case the equal implementation of the law. Yick Wo's attorneys had discovered that Chinese immigrants were the only ones denied licenses for laundries in wooden buildings, even though the law forbid all laundries in wooden buildings. The court ruled that this was an unfair application of the law and deemed it discriminatory under the 14th Amendment. Courts upheld the constitutionality of the alien land laws when applied to the Issei. *Terrance v. Thompson* (44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15); *Webb v. O'Brien* (44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112). For more information on the Alien Land Laws, see: Daniel P. Johnson, "Anti-Japanese Legislation in Oregon, 1917-1923," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 97, no. 2 (1996): 176-210; Eiichiro Azuma, "Japanese Immigrant Farmers and California Alien Land Laws: A Study of the Walnut Grove Japanese Community," *California History* 73, no. 1 (1994): 14-29; Bruce A. Castleman, "California's Alien Land Laws," *Western Legal History* 7, no. 1 (1994): 25-68; and Yuji Ichioka, "Japanese Immigrant Response to the 1920 California Alien Land Law," *Agricultural History* 58, no. 2 (1984): 157-178.

Besides the legal protections of citizenship and property rights, Nisei became bridges between their alien parents and American society in other ways. Many Nisei children were the first in their families to learn English, and thus they became interpreters for their parents. Nisei children went to public schools, where they learned about American culture as well. Some even suggested that Nisei should take on the role of cultural and social interpreters on a much broader scale, not just bridging the gap between American society and their alien parents, but educating Americans at large about the “mysteries” of the Orient. They hoped that work such as this might break down the barriers between East and West and reduce racial tensions in the United States as well.²⁹

Distinct Generations of Nisei

Although historians have often treated Nisei as a group, Nisei births spanned historically distinct eras. The first children born to Japanese immigrants in the United States came of age during and shortly after the first Great War. By contrast, the majority of Nisei grew up during the Depression of the 1930s and came of age during the Second World War. Each group of Nisei came to understand the world, politics, their rights as citizens and the ideals of the Constitution in radically different ways depending on when they were born and when they came of age.³⁰

²⁹ Yuji Ichioka, “A Study in Dualism: James Yoshinori Sakamoto and the *Japanese American Courier*, 1928-1942,” *Amerasia* 13, no. 2 (1986-87), 56-57; Yoo, *Growing up Nisei*.

³⁰ For an example of scholarship that emphasizes the similar historical experiences of Nisei as a generation in contrast to other immigrant groups, which persists as the most prevalent interpretation throughout the Asian American historical literature, see Henry Yu, *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 103-104. For a far less common example of scholarship that emphasizes the differences between the earliest Nisei and later-born Nisei, see: Paul R. Spickard, *Japanese Americans: The Formations and Transformations of an Ethnic*

Nisei who grew up and entered high school, or even graduated from high school in the 1920s were keenly aware of legal restrictions that hindered their parents' economic security and of the debates surrounding their place in America socially and legally. They were exposed to post-WWI fears of immigration and political radicalism, and to 100 percent America campaigns. James Sakamoto, for example, graduated from a high school in the suburbs of Seattle, Washington just as WWI was ending, and by the time he was an adult, he had adopted anti-communist leanings of his own. In the 1930s he editorialized in his own newspaper, the *Japanese American Courier*, that the Communist Party should be banned from elections in the United States. He believed that the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) had become too militant in advocating the rights of labor, and that the 1935 Wagner Act was too friendly to labor as well.

James Sakamoto became a major figure in Nikkei history when he organized an early version of what would become the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). He hoped that his organization would help Nisei "blaze the trail into American life."³¹ As the JACL matured into a national organization, it acted out his anti-labor, anti-communist politics. In this drive against un-American activities, JACL members turned in names of suspected Issei Communists. Between 1931 and 1934, the government deported seventeen Issei from the United States whom JACL members had identified as communists. Leaders of the JACL, like Sakamoto, opposed the Wagner Act of 1935,

Group (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 6. Spickard divides Nisei into the older and younger generations in relation to World War II, though, and treats those Nisei born between 1900-1915 the same as those born between 1915-1925. Perhaps in combination with Spickard's breakdown there really were more than two Nisei generations. For the purposes of this study, though, suffice it to say that there were at least two leading up to the war.

³¹ *Japanese American Courier*, 13 September 1930; 30 August, 6, 20 September and 4 October 1930, as quoted in Ichioka, "A Study in Dualism," 54.

arguing that protecting the right of unions to bargain collectively would hurt the peaceful relationship between labor and industry. In the long run, the JACL argued, unionization would hurt Issei employers, and Nikkei interests in general.³² But underlying these actions was a desire on the part of early JACL leadership to present themselves as if they were more than 100% Americans, even 110% or even 200% Americans.³³

From its inception, JACL activities and politics divided Japanese Americans. The JACL by definition was exclusive. It was an organization open only to citizens. Issei were automatically excluded from membership. Nisei sympathetic to labor interests, involved with the Young Democrats, or who were not interested in super-patriotism as their ticket to acceptance into mainstream American society found the JACL did little to address their needs or interests. The JACL never meant to represent the interests of the entire Nikkei community. It represented one current of Nisei thought and politics in the pre-war years. Nisei organizations that existed outside the umbrella of the national JACL blossomed in the 1930s, but remained deeply divided over the direction Nisei leadership should take.

A significant number of Nisei chose a more progressive political path during the 1920s and 1930s. Larry Tajiri organized the first group of Nisei Young Democrats in San Francisco in the 1930s and issued a monthly publication, *Nisei Democracy*. This organization was, in Tajiri's estimation, anti-progressive. It was a counter-move against the JACL. Instead of being exclusionary, though, they held joint meetings with the Chinese American progressives and with their own pocket money printed 5,000 political

³² Ichioka, "A Study in Dualism," pp 54-55.

³³ Group interview with the Tucsonians, Tucson, Arizona, November 20, 1999.

handbills opposing anti-labor and anti-New Deal initiatives in California state politics. Tajiri criticized leaders of the JACL for their anti-union, anti-progressive stance, and helped foment much of the opposition that the JACL faced in the late 1930s.³⁴

John Kitahara, columnist for the Los Angeles-based progressive bilingual newspaper *Doho* encouraged young Nisei to join with other progressives instead of reactionary groups such as the JACL, or more leftist groups Kitahara characterized as “Reds.” He was especially critical of groups such as the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, the Nisei Voters League, and JACL for what he saw as their outright refusal “to take action on the issues of discrimination and segregation.” Instead, he urged Nisei to associate with progressives and take on the most pressing issues facing Japanese America.³⁵

Some Nisei progressives and liberals joined the JACL instead of reacting against it in an attempt to move the organization more to the left. Ken Akazuki was one of them. In the 1930s, he had grown dissatisfied with the “110 percent Americanization” mantra popularized by JACL leaders. “Keeping quiet,” Akazuki felt had done little to help Nikkei issues or advance civil rights in general. Instead he wanted to mobilize young Nisei politically and take direct action to address problems of discrimination. Early in 1940, this movement became quite successful. Younger leaders infused the JACL with a more liberal vision through annual membership drives and began challenging the “Old

³⁴ Letter from Larry Tajiri to Fred Fertig, Salt Lake City, (November 24, 1943), MSS 67/14, “JACL”, reels 83-84, Bancroft Library.

³⁵ Jere Takahashi, *Nisei/Sansei: Shifting Japanese Americans Identities and Politics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 69.

Guard” leadership making a more progressive JACL. The JACL, however, never lost its core assimilationist agenda.³⁶

Nisei who grew up around the same time as Sakamoto had ample opportunities to reflect on their own Americanism as they became the subject of numerous studies that alternately labeled their position in America a question, a problem or worst of all, a tragedy. In 1924, Anglo-American missionaries in California had grown increasingly concerned by the anti-Japanese hysteria in the state and in the nation and commissioned a sociological, scientific study of race relations on the West Coast in an attempt to “educate” racial exclusionists and quell the fears of those whites they believed to be merely uneducated, and therefore bore limited responsibility for their prejudice. These missionaries selected Robert Park, renowned sociologist from the University of Chicago, to direct what became known as the Survey of Race Relations. This survey combined the scholarly resources and expertise of social scientists from universities throughout California, particularly UCLA and Berkeley, with a team of sociologists from Park’s institution, the University of Chicago. Around the same time Park directed the Survey of Race Relations (1924-1926), Nikkei scholars in the U.S. and Japan wrote as much or more than Park and his associates about the unique dilemmas that the Nisei faced growing up in America in the 1920s and 1930s, often framing their studies within the language of modern social science research. Much of this research, including that published by Anglo-American social scientists like Robert Park and Nikkei scholars,

³⁶ Ibid.

suggested that race relations evolved in cyclical patterns beginning with contact and competition, ending in accommodation and assimilation.³⁷

Many social scientists, some of which were Japanese American, wrote that Nisei should solve the problems of racial conflict themselves by assimilating to American social and cultural norms, but not all agreed that Nisei would benefit from deliberate Americanization. Instead, some scholars lamented what appeared to them to be an erosion of Japanese identity, manners and dignity that came with Americanization. One author even characterized assimilation as a terrible “tragedy.” The Americanization process, he wrote, had eroded Nisei morals and created insurmountable barriers between children and parents to such a degree that otherwise respectable Nisei young adults had even resorted to suicide to end their own suffering.³⁸

In practice, Nisei had more options than assimilation or their parents’ version of Japanese cultural identities. Kazuo Kawai wrote in 1926 in one of the final published findings of Robert Park’s *Survey of Race Relations* that when he was “placed between the devil and the deep sea,” he chose a third road. He refused quiet resignation to the power of race discrimination. Lose his soul in an attempt to achieve complete assimilation?, he asked himself. He would not do so for a goal that, due to white resistance, appeared increasingly impossible. Likewise, he refused to give up and flee to the country of his parents’ birth, a country for which he held no personal affection.

³⁷ Robert Park, “Our Racial Frontier on the Pacific,” *Survey Graphic* 56, no. 3 (1926). See also: Yu, *Thinking Orientals*; and Lyman, *Militarism, Imperialism, and Racial Accommodation*.

³⁸ Kanichi Niisato, *Nisei Tragedy*, translated by Eiji Tanabe and Carl Kondo, (Tokyo, Japan: Shinposha, 1936). See also: Kiyoshi Karl Kawakami, *The Real Japanese Question*, reprint 1978, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1921); and Paul Spickard’s article on what he calls the “Nisei underclass,” or those Nisei who wore zoot suits, were “rowdy and tough,” and “scandalized other Japanese Americans by jitterbugging lewdly.” Spickard, “Not Just the Quiet People: The Nisei Underclass,” *Pacific Historical Review* (1999), 78-94.

Instead, he would stay in the United States and try to change the conditions that made life so difficult for Nisei in the first place.³⁹

Sociologists studying race relations along the West Coast between 1924 and 1926 responded to the obvious difficulty that Nisei experienced trying to make a place for themselves in the United States. These sociologists made a daring suggestion in 1926, when they argued that the new exclusion laws would make it easier for the Nisei to assimilate because those whites who feared immigrants the most could now relax and begin accepting the Nisei as Americans rather than part of a larger threat. Missionaries who funded the survey balked at the idea that social scientists would seemingly condone laws that legally supported racial discrimination and exclusion. In response, they cut funding and the Survey of Race Relations ended before it was completed. Critics of Park's sociologists correctly pointed out that racial hostility and violence did not end with the 1924 exclusion laws. Exclusion laws did, though, have a material impact on the lives and generational divisions among the Nisei in other ways.⁴⁰

The younger generation of Nisei who were too young to remember the debates leading up to the landmark legal changes in 1924 grew up at a time when debates over Nisei dual citizenship seemed to disappear, because for a time, at least, the issue seemed as though it had been settled by the revisions in Japanese citizenship law and by the strict exclusion of immigration from Japan and Asia more generally. As a result, most Nisei of

³⁹ Kazuo Kawai, "Three Roads," *The Survey Graphic* 56, no. 3 (May 1, 1926). Typical representations of Nisei focus on the trauma of their divided lives, and the difficulties Nisei faced as they tried to fit in socially and culturally. Spickard, *Japanese Americans*.

⁴⁰ For an excellent critique of Park and the Survey of Race Relations, see: Henry Yu, *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). For an analysis of Park's early writings and the origins of much of his sociological theories, see: Stanford M. Lyman, *Militarism, Imperialism, and Racial Accommodation*.

the younger generation, born shortly before 1920 continuing through 1924 when Japanese laws changed, grew up not knowing if they were dual citizens. They were less aware of the old laws that would have made them automatically dual citizens, and few knew for sure whether their parents had registered their births with the Japanese consulate. The most important thing the younger Nisei knew about their citizenship was that they were Americans.⁴¹

After 1930, the effects of legal changes passed by lawmakers in Japan and in the United States in 1924 can be seen in the demographics of Japanese America. In 1910, when James Sakamoto was a small child, the census records indicate that Nisei were a small and yet conspicuous minority among the entire Nikkei population. They accounted for only seven percent of the total and the Supreme Court had not yet upheld their right to citizenship.⁴² By 1919, the percentage of Nisei among the overall Nikkei population had grown to twenty-four percent, one hundred percent of whom were dual citizens of the U.S. and Japan. This growth in population combined with their dual citizenship contributed to lawmakers' questions about Nisei loyalty to America. By 1930, Nisei accounted for half of the entire Nikkei population but a steadily decreasing percentage of Nisei were dual citizens.

⁴¹ None of the Nisei I interviewed in formal or informal conversations knew what their parents had done about their citizenship. They had never discussed the matter with their parents. While my sample is small, this indicates to me that few parents discussed this with their children.

⁴² In 1922, the Supreme Court ruled that Nisei children are guaranteed the rights of citizenship and thus the right to own property and to the protections of state law regardless of age or the ancestry of their parents. *In re Tetsubumi Yano's Estate*, (188 Cal. 645, 206 Pac. 995) cited *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* (1898) as legal precedent and was upheld by *Morrison v. California* (291 U.S. 82) in 1934.

Table 1: Nisei Births from 1910 to 1930⁴³

<u>1910 to 1920</u>	<u>Nisei Births</u>	<u>1921 to 1930</u>	<u>Nisei Births</u>
1910	719	1921	5,275
1911	995	1922	5,066
1912	1,467	1923	5,010
1913	2,215	1924	4,481
1914	2,874	1925	4,408
1915	3,342	1926	3,597
1916	3,721	1927	3,241
1917	4,108	1928	2,833
1918	4,218	1929	2,355
1919	4,458	1930	2,220
1920	4,971		

Table 2: Issei and Nisei Populations Compared, 1910 to 1930⁴⁴

<u>Population Composition</u>	1910		1919		1930	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Total Nikkei Population	54,980	100	73,924	100	92,390	100
Issei	51,029	93	56,366	76	46,100	50
Nisei	3,951	7	17,558	24	46,290	50

⁴³ Source: Tsutomu Obana, "The Changing Japanese Situation in California," *Pacific Affairs* 5, no. 11 (November 1932): 959. Obana statistics were drawn from Statistical Reports of the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Dept. of Public Health, State of California, 1910-1930.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 960.

Issei and Nisei Expectations

As Issei parents raised their children in the United States, many tried to instill in their Nisei children certain values and expectations that would allow them to assimilate into American society and yet retain the most important core values of being Japanese. The most important values Issei taught their children included obligation and respect for the family and for one's country, stoic perseverance in the face of adversity, empathetic kindness and humanity, and modest humility.⁴⁵ Many of the first immigrants from Japan also brought with them a sense of racial superiority that immigrants referred to as *Yamato damashi*, or *Yamato gokoro*. Translated this means "the Japanese spirit," or the "Soul of Old Japan." For many, this set Japanese nationals apart as racially and culturally superior to other Asian nations, and positioned them as at least equal if not superior to Europeans and Americans. A racially superior people, early Japanese immigration leaders argued, could assimilate American ways without threatening their Japanese identities. Selective assimilation could improve Issei and Nisei chances of economic and social success.⁴⁶

Nikkei made strategic choices to assimilate to American ways based on a foundation of core Japanese cultural values and their own sense of racial superiority.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ For an excellent summary of Issei values, see Paul Spickard, *Japanese Americans*; and Yuji Ichioka, *The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885-1924* (New York: Free Press, 1988).

⁴⁶ Lafacadio Hearn, *Japan, An Attempt at Interpretation* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904), 160; Paul Spickard, *Mixed Blood: Intermarriage and Ethnic Identity in Twentieth-Century America* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 60-61; Yoo, *Growing up Nisei*, 83; Yuji Ichioka, "A Study in Dualism: James Yoshinori Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier, 1928-1942," *Amerasia* 13, no. 2 (1986-87): 57; and Frank Chin, *Born in the USA: A Story of Japanese America, 1889-1947* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

⁴⁷ Some scholars are beginning to rethink the origins of the "model minority" myth that positioned Japanese Americans as the most assimilable yet quietest ethnic group who was least likely to challenge white dominance during the civil rights era. David Yoo notes that these ideas appear during the 1930s when educational psychologists studied the success of Nisei children in the public schools. David Yoo, "Testing Assumptions: IQ, Japanese Americans, and the Model Minority Myth in the 1920s and 1930s," in

Along with this strong sense of pride in being Japanese, Issei parents passed onto their children values that had an enduring impact on the way Nisei children interpreted their own experiences growing up. They taught their children to value education and to obey authority. Children also learned that duty and loyalty should start at home and radiate outward. Children learned that they must perform their duties of loyalty and service to family first, *ken* or community second, and nation third. Seen in this light, selective assimilation chosen by some Nikkei represents a different way of thinking about assimilation that emphasizes the agency and power of those who chose assimilation on their own terms based on racial pride, not on their acceptance of dominant scripts that told them they must assimilate because of their racial inferiority.⁴⁸

Children applied the lessons that they learned about obedience, education, and good behavior in public school. Susumu Yenokida remembered that his parents' first expectation for him was to behave, or in other words, not be a "troublemaker at school." Second, he was to listen to his teachers and do what they asked. Finally, he was supposed to learn whatever lessons his teachers expected him to learn. For Yenokida, this meant learning English, which was very difficult for him as a child. With the generous assistance of his teacher and the support of his parents, Yenokida stayed after

Remapping Asian American History (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2003). Even though this new periodization corresponds with my own observations, it still puts Anglo-Americans in control of the origins of the "model minority" idea. Evidence gathered for this study supports the notion that Nikkei believed they might be able find greater security and avoid the mistakes or at least the problems faced by Chinese immigrants if they selectively assimilated and outperformed their Anglo American counterparts. This seemed to be based in part on their fundamental belief in their own national and perhaps even racial superiority. For an example of another study that tends to support this thesis, see also: Benny Joseph Andrés, Jr., "Power and Control in Imperial Valley, California: Nature, Agribusiness, Labor, and Race Relations, 1900–1940" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 2003). This argument is more fully developed later in the chapter.

⁴⁸ Spickard, *Japanese Americans*, 72-73.

school every day for several years to practice his English rather than going home to help on the family farm. If learning English was what Yenokida needed to do in order to get ahead, or at least keep up in school, his parents believed that was where he was needed more than performing chores at home.

With all the support his parents lent to his early education, Yenokida remembered that before the war he expected to go on to college after graduating from high school. Yenokida was not alone. Contemporary studies of the Nisei in the 1920s and 1930s note their success in school and tendency to stay in school. Some Nisei remember that higher education was a value and an expectation that both they and their parents shared. This was but one expectation that shifted dramatically after the United States entered World War II.⁴⁹

Some parents, educators and Nikkei leaders urged the Nisei to surpass their white counterparts in school and at work. In 1930, this belief was published as an editorial in the *Nikkei Shimin*. The author wrote, “in technical or commercial vocations, we cannot afford to work with talents *inferior* to Americans.” “It is not enough to be their equals,” he continued, “we must *surpass* them—by developing our powers to the point of genius if necessary.” The author opined that those who complained about racial discrimination and prejudice were misguided and their complaints merely revealed their own lack of initiative and inferior talents. Nikkei authors published their support of an early version

⁴⁹ Susumu Yenokida, interview with the author, August 2001, Tucson, Arizona; Strong, *The Second-Generation Japanese Problem* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934). Yoo noted that before the war, almost half of the graduates from Jerome High School indicated that they had planned on going to college, but this dropped to only 14 percent after the same group graduated from school in the wartime concentration camps. Most cited finances and family concerns as their reasons for changing their minds about pursuing a higher education. Yoo, *Growing up Nisei*, 108.

of the “model minority” ideal or myth in both journalistic and academic writings. The myth was that the way to beat discrimination was to surpass whites. It was up to the Nisei, they argued, to make sure that America would accept them based on their superior talents and skills. Some scholars added that Nisei efforts to assimilate could only go so far and that at some point America would have to accept Nisei efforts in order for full assimilation to take place. Yet the idea that it was up to Nisei to initiate the process of assimilation and acceptance into American society remained strong in Nikkei authored literature from before the 1920s through the early 1930s.⁵⁰

Nisei were not the only ones who learned in school and from family that selective assimilation and excelling beyond the achievement standard of their white counterparts could help them succeed later in life. Chinese Americans learned this early version of the model minority myth, too. Joe Norikane attended Japanese school for an hour or more each day after grammar school. Whenever there was a test coming up at the Japanese school, children would use their big American Geography textbooks to hide their Japanese books while they studied for their exams. The teacher, Norikane remembered with some amusement, thought they were studying geography, until one day when she discovered they were really studying Japanese. Norikane recalled the scene many years later:

⁵⁰ Nikkei Shimmin (15 July 1930); as quoted in Strong, *Vocational Aptitudes of Second-Generation Japanese in the United States* (Stanford University Press, 1933), 13. See also: T. Iyenaga and Kenoske Sato, *Japan and the California Problem* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1921), 149-50, 163-75; and James Sakamoto’s 1921 testimony before Congress as reprinted in appendix L, 203-226; and Yamato Ichihashi, *Japanese Immigration, its status in California* (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1970 [1913]) and Ichihashi’s *Japanese in the United States* (New York: Arno Press, 1969 [1932]). Other Nikkei authors defending immigration to the United States in the face of racial-exclusionists’ claims that Japanese immigrants and their children could not assimilate fully into American society include: Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, *The Real Japanese Question* (New York: Arno Press, 1978 [1921]); and Kiichi Kanzaki, *California and the Japanese* (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1971 [1921]).

I think it was in 7th or 8th grade, the teacher caught us and said, “You people don’t need another language. All you need to learn is English.” And this Chinese boy, Richard Chang, I remember him, he stood up and said, “I think you’re wrong, teacher. If I’ve got the same ability as the white person, and I go out and fight for a job, you think the white person is going to give a job to a Chinaman? To Chinese or to the white person? White person’s gonna get it, you know. If I want a job, I have to be better than the white person to get a job, that’s how it is. By learning another language, I’m ahead, so I could get a job. So, if they’re going to communicate with Chinese people I’ll be able to get a job after that.” The teacher never did say anything after that.

When Norikane went home and told his mother about the incident, she replied, “Gee, the Chinese people teach that, too?” Norikane was familiar with this lesson. He learned it in Japanese language school where his teachers told him “there is always discrimination, so you’d better prepare for it.”⁵¹ They would have to become more qualified, or as the editorial in the *Nikkei Shimin* said, the Nisei would have to “surpass” whites. It would not be enough to become their equals.

Americanization and Citizenship in Public School

At the same time Issei parents and Japanese Language School teachers taught the younger generation of Nisei that they would always experience discrimination in their lives, the Nisei also learned in public schools that the United States stood for principles of democracy and equal citizenship. California was one of the most progressive states educationally and whole-heartedly embraced progressive educational reforms. Ever since the end of World War I, California had experienced constant influxes of new immigrants

⁵¹ Norikane interview.

and rapid urban growth. In step with, and at times ahead of reform movements throughout the country, the California schools attacked problems associated with growth and immigration by intensifying Americanization programs in the schools.⁵²

In 1929, California initiated its own study of the problems of public school education in the state and outlined recommendations for reform. The study concluded that citizenship education was of paramount importance to any reforms. In a survey of state laws throughout the nation, California was already one of fifteen states that required training in patriotism, citizenship, American ideals and the Constitution in its public schools. Included in the list of states that required citizenship training by law were Oregon, Washington and California. In 1929, as a result of this study, California revised its own statute. The new statute declared it was the duty of all teachers to educate students in the principles of morality, justice and patriotism. This new emphasis on a moral basis to education included basic lessons in honesty and work. Inculcating in students a sense of patriotism, the new law declared, could be done if teachers could help students truly comprehend the “rights, duties, and dignity of American citizenship.”⁵³

Far from embracing white supremacy, racial inferiority, or American values to the exclusion of all else, the final recommendations of the state’s report encouraged educators to teach international understanding and sympathy. California had experienced firsthand the increasing interdependence of nations. Because of the growing national

⁵² Yoo, *Growing up Nisei*, 21; Frank Van Nuys, *Americanizing the West: Race, Immigrants, and Citizenship, 1890-1930* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002). See also: Edward K. Strong, *The Second-Generation Japanese Problem* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934); and Reginald Bell, *Public School Education of Second-Generation Japanese in California* (New York: Arno Press, 1978 [1935]).

⁵³ School Code (1929), section 5.544, p. 272; *Report of the California Commission for the Study of Educational Problems* (Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1931).

diversity in its schools, the Commission strongly suggested that schools make a commitment to help their students comprehend the nature of this diversity and to develop a sympathetic understanding of the living and working conditions of people from around the world.⁵⁴

Educators in California facilitated a “trickle down” of modern racial ideologies through these reforms. Universities like Stanford and Berkeley supported research to reform California public school education. The University of Chicago, which trained and/or worked closely with the faculty and students in universities throughout California and the West. Robert Park was prominent among Chicago School Sociologists. He proposed that culture was not determined by race.⁵⁵ Children, if educated properly could become, in the words of one elementary school principal, 100 percent Americans regardless of race or ancestry.⁵⁶ While it took longer for this new and seemingly egalitarian vision of race, culture and assimilation to reach the public at large, educational reforms brought these ideas quite quickly to young children growing up in California public schools in the 1930s.

⁵⁴ *Report of the California Commission for the Study of Educational Problems* (Sacramento: California State Printing, 1931); Edward Strong, *Second-Generation Japanese Problem*, 5, 18, 20, 59, 158-59; and Emory Bogardus, “Some Causes of Prejudice,” *Los Angeles School Journal* 23 (21 December 1928), 16-17 as cited in Yoo, *Growing up Nisei*, 23-24. Office, 1931), 11-15; 26-28.

⁵⁵ Peggy Pascoe, “Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of ‘Race’ in Twentieth-Century America,” *Journal of American History* 83, no. 1 (June 1996): 47. Pascoe notes that the “trickle-down” theory of modern racial ideologies usually leads from universities in the 1920s to the courts in the 1940s and 1950s and to government in the 1960s. In this case we see a trickle-down reaching even further down very quickly as new racial ideologies spread from universities to educators to the public schools in California by the mid-1930s. We need more thorough studies of the public school system as a conduit of transferring new ideas from universities to broader audiences through the education of children. For an excellent survey of the broad and immediate influence of the Chicago School on the education of Asian Americans going to college in the 1930s, see Yu, *Thinking Orientals*.

⁵⁶ Norikane interview.

For the Nisei enrolled in the public schools, the lessons that came out of California education reforms taught them that despite social discrimination, as citizens they retained an unalienable claim to all the “rights, duties and dignity of American citizenship,” regardless of their ancestry or race.⁵⁷ They were American citizens. As minors, they were too young to shoulder the responsibilities of citizenship, but they could enjoy some of the rights of citizenship and begin untangling for themselves the contradictions between the equality of citizenship and the social inequality of race.

Learning about the rights of citizenship and the dignity of being Americans by birth made a deep impression on young Nisei. The effect of citizenship training in the schools was especially strong on those Nisei who entered school after these reforms were in place. Nisei children born after or near 1924 not only missed the debates over dual citizenship and loyalty, but they also entered public schools during the years of the Depression and New Deal politics, after liberal educational reforms in California were in place, and at a time when the older generation of Nisei were organizing politically. The debates raging over Nisei leadership, and conflicts between JACL Americanism and Nisei progressives did not trickle down to Nisei in the grade schools as easily as did the new ideologies of equality of citizenship taught by their teachers.

⁵⁷ School Code (1929), section 5.544, p. 272; *Report of the California Commission for the Study of Educational Problems* (Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1931).

Unintended Lessons in Citizenship

Educators were well intentioned in their efforts to accelerate the pace of Nisei assimilation through citizenship training, but they could not resolve the conflicts between equal citizenship and social discrimination that children faced every day. By teaching children patriotism, or love of country through the lens of equal citizenship and what they called 100 percent Americanism (which carried a different meaning than that used by the Klan), teachers invited criticism from students and inadvertently taught young children to discern for themselves the difference between the ideals of their citizenship and the reality of a racially ordered society. This launched a set of citizenship lessons no educational psychologist could control.

Nisei children passed along to their friends some of the most powerful, and yet unintended lessons of citizenship. Joe Norikane witnessed one of the lessons when his friend, Charles Shishida, dared to confront his principal about the incongruity of teaching 100 percent Americanism in a segregated school. After a fight broke out between Chinese and Japanese students at the Walnut Grove Oriental School, where a Japanese student had called a Chinese student a “Chink,” the school principal tried to instruct the students in equality and racial understanding as she broke up the fight. The principal said, “You’re no Chink and you’re no Jap! You’re 100% American, so I don’t want you to ever call names, you understand that?!” Remembering the scene, Norikane said a classmate, Charles Shishida stood next to him, and when he began to speak, the principal inquired, “Yes, what do you want?!” So Shishida stated what was obvious to the rest of

his classmates, “If we’re 100% American, why aren’t we in the other school up there?” referring to the all-white school only a half-mile away. Norikane said she was so stunned by the question, the principal hardly knew how to respond. “None of your business!” she replied in a sharp tone. “Give that boy an ‘F’ in deportment!” “That’s just how it is”, she said, “and it’s going to stay that way,” and then she just left the room. To this day, Norikane said, he still could not figure out why Shishida got an “F” in deportment, a general category determined by a student’s demeanor, attendance, and overall “citizenship” in school.⁵⁸ By ordering Shishida a failing grade in deportment, this principal passed on a very powerful message to all students who witnessed the scene. It was not good manners to point out the obvious contradictions between the lessons in 100 percent Americanization students learned in school and the obvious forms of race distinction that were all around them.

The contradictions between Americanization in the schools and real life did not end when segregation ended. Schools in Walnut Grove were only segregated up to high school; then the children attended an integrated school. This, according to Norikane, set up Asian students for even more problems. One day the gym coach asked Norikane and his friends, “What’s the matter with you Orientals? You’re cliquish. . . . You never mix.” Norikane remembered none of them had the nerve to stand up to him, but if they did, they would have asked, what do you expect?

They put you in a segregated school from the beginning, and they show you that’s where you belong. You don’t belong with the whites. And then all of a sudden you go to high school and they expect you to mingle with

⁵⁸ Norikane interview.

them? So we just always stayed together. When we graduated from grammar school we [were] always together.⁵⁹

There seemed to be no end to the contradictory lessons learned by the Nisei. Stay separate. Integrate. You are all equal, but not equal enough to attend the same school or get the same jobs.

Not everyone experienced such striking contradictions between the ideal of equal citizenship and the reality of second-class citizenship for Nisei children. Ken Yoshida remembered cooperation more than conflict. When Ken was about eight years old, the family moved to the Santa Maria valley in southern California. In the first town he lived in, Guadalupe, about 90 percent of the population were Japanese. But Guadalupe did not have its own school, so Yoshida and the other children were bussed to the nearby town of Santa Maria. By the time Ken was in high school, he estimated that the school was made up of at least 40 percent Japanese. “We got along alright,” because as Ken said, they were all farmers. Cooperation and friendship characterized race relations in Ken’s school experience. “In fact,” Ken said, “in the town of Guadalupe they had so many Japanese, they used to bring rice balls to school... and their Caucasian fellows would bring their sandwiches, and when they’d eat together, they’d trade off.”⁶⁰ He went about his business, until WWII changed it all. It was not until the family was forced to move to the Tanforan Assembly center in 1942 that Ken got his first taste of overt race discrimination.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ken and Kay Yoshida, Interview with the author (Tucson, Arizona, 2001).

Yoshida's shock when the government began treating him like an "enemy alien" during the war, after getting along fairly well while growing up, is a common story among Nisei. Many Nisei grew up for some time without a clear understanding that their ancestry could limit their civil rights. They had become accustomed to some forms of social inequality, but still believed in the Constitutional guarantees of civil rights.⁶¹

The Issei and oldest Nisei first felt the effects of exclusionary laws and growing racial hostilities that climaxed in the 1920s. Together, they tried to pave the way for the young Nisei, the majority of Nisei, to become Americans and enjoy a better life.⁶² No matter how diverse life was for Nisei children growing up, whether they experienced racial discrimination first hand or not, World War II would change everything and not a single Nisei would escape feeling the effects of wartime evacuation orders.

Public school education, whether in segregated or integrated settings, had a profound influence on how children learned their place in the nation. Educators intentionally shaped their lessons around changing ideas about race and citizenship. Their lessons gave children a sense of equality and their rights as citizens, laying the foundation for wartime civil disobedience.

Growing up in peacetime, Nisei became acquainted with a rights-based introduction to citizenship. As children, they exercised their right to a public school

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² One of the most comprehensive works on the history of the Issei as a generation is Yuji Ichioka's *The Issei*. See also: Denis Ogawa, *Kodomo No Tame Ni--For the Sake of the Children: The Japanese American Experience in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978); Gary Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Linda Tamura, *The Hood River Issei: An Oral History of Japanese Settlers in Oregon's Hood River Valley* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993). Lauren Kessler, *Stubborn Twig: Three Generations in the Life of a Japanese Family* (New York: Random House, 1993); David K. Yoo, *Growing Up Nisei* (2000); and Evelyn Nakano Glenn, *Issei, Nisei, War Bride: Three Generations of Japanese American Women in Domestic Service* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986).

education, but lacked the political rights of the vote and the obligations of service to the state. The courts had upheld their right to property and to equality before the law, and as children they passed on a sort of derivative citizenship to their parents in the form of parental rights to guardianship over them and their estates. It was under these circumstances that Nisei children established their first introduction to citizenship based on equality, justice and their legal and civil rights.

For Joe Norikane, his childhood lessons in the complicated nature of his own citizenship became all the more ironic when his family was placed in a racetrack suited better for holding animals than humans. As he stood in the assembly center, Norikane remembered the incident in the gymnasium of the Oriental School when his friend challenged the principal on the real definition of 100 percent Americans. Her words rang loudly in his ears as he tried yet again to reconcile for himself what it meant to be 100 percent American at a time when citizenship offered no protection against incarceration for wearing the face of the enemy. He said, “So this is what it means to be 100 percent American? That’s a bunch of bull,” and he started down his own path of personal resistance, demanding that his birthright citizenship should be good enough, even in times of war.⁶³

⁶³ Group interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, November 1999.

CHAPTER 2

NISEI CITIZENSHIP TRANSFORMED

It was a Saturday morning in California only a few months after Japan had bombed Pearl Harbor. A young boy heard a knock at his door. When he opened the door, he found a police officer standing on the porch. The officer could sense the boy's fear and began joking around to put him at ease. The child's father joined them. The boy and his father were relieved that the policeman had not come to take the man away. The FBI had taken many other fathers from their homes in the hours and days following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. This policeman explained that he was inspecting the homes of Japanese families to see if there were any firearms that he needed to confiscate. The man had one gun that had been given to him as a gift, but which he had never fired. The policeman told him that if he had a son that was of age, the father could turn the firearm over to this son, but since the man did not, the policeman had to take it.⁶⁴

It is ironic that the policeman would have been satisfied leaving the gun in the home of an Issei, an enemy alien, if he could have turned the gun over to his citizen son. Most historians of internment interpret such stories as the beginning of a transfer of power from the Issei to the Nisei.⁶⁵ Often overlooked is the confidence many Americans had in the power of citizenship at the beginning of the war. It was not a foregone conclusion that Nisei would end the year locked up in camps under government control.

⁶⁴ "Little Citizens Speak: 7th Graders of '43," *All Aboard* (Spring 1944), p. 27, Field Basic Documentation, RG 210, Central Utah, Publications Folder, reel 4.

⁶⁵ Paul Spickard, "The Nisei Assume Power: The Japanese-American Citizens League, 1941-1942" *Pacific Historical Review* 52 (May 1983): 147-74; Donna K. Nagata, *Legacy of Injustice: Exploring the Cross-Generational Impact of the Japanese American Internment* (New York: Plenum Press, 1993).

Even as rumors spread of an evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast, government officials, JACL leaders and private individuals debated the extent to which Nisei rights should or could be proscribed in the name of military necessity.

When World War II began, Nisei had little reason to renegotiate their relationship with the state as citizens. Then the state changed the rules of citizenship, recasting Nisei as non-alien and even as enemy alien. This chapter explains the crisis over Nisei citizenship as it evolved over the first year of war. It provides an overview of the legal transformation of their citizenship. Most important, this chapter shows how Nisei became divided over meaning of these changes and the official language of euphemism that cloaked it. Violence erupted as Japanese Americans struggled to find an appropriate and effective response to the gradual erosion of Nisei citizenship.

Pearl Harbor

When Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, most people living on the mainland could not locate Pearl Harbor on a map, and fewer still understood the implications of this attack. Nisei youth were no different. An attack by Japan against a remote naval base in the Pacific seemed of little relevance to their lives. Joe Norikane was playing basketball near his home in California when he heard the news. At first, he did not even believe what he had heard. When a member of the opposing team repeated the story, he realized that it was true. But there was a game on and even his friends said, "Hey, we can't be talking

about that let's play basketball!" The news may have seemed irrelevant then, but Norikane recalled years later, that night it became a nightmare.⁶⁶

The nightmare began when the FBI put into motion a plan to arrest a prepared list of Japanese Americans whom intelligence agencies believed might pose a threat to national security. Many families responded to these arrests with fear and trepidation. Some tried to anticipate the arrests by removing cause for suspicion. Families buried or burned anything that demonstrated their ties with Japan. Tee Norikane remembered the day her family decided to burn anything Japanese. They had books, dolls, and kimonos. Tee Norikane lamented the loss of her dolls the most. She could get rid of a doll, though. She could not change her face or the fact that she was Japanese, too. Fear of arrest and fear of drawing accusations of Japanese loyalty led some young people to stop speaking Japanese even at home, frustrating their parents who could speak little English. Some families even stopped eating rice and instead ate hamburgers and stews in an effort to appear more American.⁶⁷

As Nikkei families defended themselves against accusations of national disloyalty, they also became aware of a growing crisis of suspicion and divided loyalty

⁶⁶ Group interview.

⁶⁷ Norikane interview. The fear and shame that young children felt about being Japanese during the war left lasting scars that prevented some from talking openly about their experiences for years after the war. See: Stephen S. Fugita and Marilyn Fernandez, *Altered Lives, Enduring Community: Japanese Americans Remember their World War II Incarceration* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 3, 200-208; Tomi Kaizawa Knaefler, *Our House Divided: Seven Japanese American Families in World War II* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 8-9, 17; Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, *The Salvage: Japanese American Relocation and Resettlement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946 [1954]), 330-350; Mary Tsukamoto in J. Tateishi, ed., *And Justice for All: An Oral History of the Japanese Detention Camps* (New York, 1984), 7. See also interviews available online through the Densho project: www.densho.org. Similar changes in behavior took place in German and Italian communities during the war. See: Nancy C. Carnevale, "No Italian Spoken for the Duration of the War': Language, Italian-American Identity, and Cultural Pluralism in the World War II Years," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 22, no. 3 (Spring 2003); 3-33.

within their own communities. Rumors grew that Japanese Americans were turning in names of other Japanese Americans they suspected of disloyalty. Susumu Yenokida grew up in a JACL dominated town. In Turlock, California, there were men who stood out as community leaders, who fit the profile of those the FBI had been arresting all over California, but who were left untouched. Yenokida remembered that these men who had not been arrested had sons who were prominent JACL leaders. The families of those who lost their fathers and husbands became suspicious, and to many the correlation between those who were not arrested and JACL membership became startlingly clear. As a result, some Issei men actually found relief in being arrested by the FBI. At least they would not be suspected of spying or of being a government stooge or *inu*.⁶⁸ Yosh Kuromiya's family made a joke of the situation. They even packed a bag for their father and kept it near the front door in case he, too, was arrested. They told him, "Well, this is your care package when they come after you." The Kuromiya family did not expect their father would be arrested, though, since he was not much of a leader. As Yosh put it, he was always too busy trying to make a living. Preparing for the unknown, though, gave the family at least a small sense of control over an unpredictable situation.⁶⁹

Informants deflected criticism that they were betraying their own people with arguments that they were merely acting out of patriotic duty and in the interest of national defense. This did not change what looked like betrayal to many Nikkei.⁷⁰ By turning

⁶⁸ *Inu* is a Japanese word for dog, which represents a pejorative accusation that one is a stool-pigeon or in this case a spy or informer.

⁶⁹ Susumu Yenokida interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, August 2001; Yosh Kuromiya interview with Pete Taylor, Tucson, Arizona, November 1999.

⁷⁰ Nikkei is the Japanese word for Japanese American. It does not distinguish between Japanese nationals and U.S. citizens. It is a word that conveniently groups all persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States together. See footnote 1 in the introduction for a more complete explanation of terminology.

over Issei names to U.S. Intelligence agencies, JACL leaders like James Sakamoto and Mike Masaoka fostered bitter resentment between Japanese Americans at large and the JACL. Few understood the implications of this early cooperation between the JACL and the government, and even fewer could foresee the full-scale evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast that loomed large on the horizon.⁷¹

Loyalty Versus Citizenship

The War Department justified evacuating all Japanese Americans from the West Coast based on the claims of prominent military leaders that there was no way to determine which Japanese Americans were loyal to the United States and which were not. It became clear early in the war that these same leaders believed that citizenship provided little proof of loyalty. As early as January 4, 1942, General De Witt declared that it was the citizen Nisei whom he most suspected of disloyalty. He looked to his legal assistant, Colonel Karl Bendetsen, for assistance in creating a legal means by which he could exclude all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast. Bendetsen was a military lawyer and had been assigned to help De Witt manage his role as commander over the Western Defense Command. In Bendetsen's legal opinion, certain areas of the country could be off limits to anyone, "whether they are citizens, white or Jap or black or brown." Individuals without permits to enter the area could be prohibited. Thus, the exclusion of

⁷¹ Frank S. Zelko, *Generation, Culture and Prejudice: The Japanese American Decision to Cooperate with Evacuation and Internment during World War II* (Monash Publications in History, 1992).

all Japanese from the West Coast would be a military decision, based on the assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry were suspects and potential saboteurs.⁷²

In the face of government claims that there was no way to differentiate loyal from disloyal persons of Japanese ancestry, the JACL went to great lengths to prove their organization staunchly loyal to the United States. Some observers even charged that JACL members became overzealous, even belligerent, in their attempts to prove their loyalty.⁷³ At the first wartime convention of the JACL held on January 11, 1942, the convention voted to require all members to sign the following loyalty oath:

I _____, do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I hereby renounce any other allegiances which I may have knowingly or unknowingly held in the past; and that I take this obligation freely without any reservation or evasion. So help me God.⁷⁴

This oath provided a means for Nisei to declare their allegiance to the United States and forswear allegiance they may or may not have held to the Emperor of Japan by way of dual citizenship. The JACL leadership remained keenly aware of the fears that pervaded Congressional debates in the 1920s over Nisei dual citizenship. Taking the lead in this

⁷² For a thorough study not only of Bendetsen as architect of the concept of military necessity, but also of his career and prediction that subsequent War Department programs to determine evacuee loyalty would undermine any Constitutional basis for evacuation, see: Klancy Clark De Nevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist: Karl Bendetsen, Perry Saito and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2004). See also: Peter Irons, *Justice Delayed: The Record of the Japanese American Internment Cases* (Middleton, Conn: Weleyn University Press, 1989).

⁷³ John A Rademaker to Edward H. Spicer, February 16, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, M 1342, roll 15, Field Basic Documentation, War Relocation Authority.

⁷⁴ JACL loyalty oath as quoted in, Frank Chin, *Born in the USA: A Story of Japanese America, 1889-1947* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

debate, the JACL oath provided one way for Nisei to be proactive in reaffirming their loyalty to the nation of their birth, the United States.

The issue of dual citizenship was far more important in determining government policy for the Nisei than the current historical literature would indicate.⁷⁵ Even before the United States officially entered the war, the War Department was concerned about what it called problems with dual citizenship. When the Army sent Karl Bendetsen to inspect the “Japanese” situation in Hawaii and to survey sites that might be suitable for the future detention of aliens if war with Japan erupted, Bendetsen took note of the extensive population of dual citizens. In a note scribbled on his travel itinerary, he estimated that the island was home to at least 134,000 dual citizens. From this he concluded that the “Jap controls this very political island.” He believed that the high number of citizens who could vote but who also supposedly held ties to Japan would cause what he called “good Americans” to give Japanese on the island the benefit of the doubt even during wartime.⁷⁶ The Nisei on the West Coast would not be so fortunate. Their numbers were

⁷⁵ The more recently published literature on internment rarely mentions dual citizenship at all. The most notorious exception is Tetsuden Kashima's *Judgment Without Trial*. In his book, Kashima wrote that dual citizenship “received little recognition or emphasis during the war.” This may be true among individual Nisei, but the issue appears repeatedly in official reports at all levels of government and was a major issue of debate throughout the war (Kashima, p. 240, fn 73). The subject is more commonly discussed in older literature such as, tenBroek, et. al., *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* states that dual citizenship is one of the legal distinctions cited in the *Hirabayashi* case as a possible indicator of disloyalty or at least a propensity for disloyalty on the part of citizen Nisei. (tenBroek, Jacobus et. al., *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 271-273). Hirabayashi mentioned in an interview that this was one reason his parents were brought from Tule Lake to Seattle for his initial trial for refusing to obey the evacuation and curfew orders. The prosecution wanted to establish how “Japanese” Hirabayashi's parents were and to settle any questions about Hirabayashi's dual citizenship. Hirabayashi interview with the author, November 1999, Tucson, Arizona.

⁷⁶ Bendetsen as quoted in de Nevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist*, 63. As Bendetsen predicted, persons of Japanese ancestry retained their right to live freely in Hawaii except for those on the FBI and Naval Intelligence lists of suspected aliens.

small, particularly those who could vote, and their political and economic presence offered them no protection.

On October 1, 1941, the War Department sponsored legislation that would force Nisei to choose between their U.S. and Japanese citizenship. If this law passed, all persons with dual citizenship would have to take a formal oath of allegiance to the U.S. and denounce allegiance to other foreign governments, or lose the right to vote. The bill was introduced to the House and moved on to the Senate, but died in committee. It was a bill that had garnered a fair amount of support. It could not pass into law though. Japanese Americans were not the only citizens who retained citizenship in two nations. Germany and Italy, as well as Russia, Turkey, Switzerland, Greece, Bulgaria, Persia and the Netherlands granted citizenship to children born to nationals abroad. The political and economic power of these ethnic groups doomed any attempts to curtail the citizenship of the Nisei with generalized legislation before the war began.⁷⁷

Even though early attempts to curtail the citizenship rights of Americans of Japanese ancestry failed, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor became a catalyst for a series of policies and laws that severely limited the rights and freedoms of all Nikkei. After Pearl Harbor, the first policy changes that redefined the state's relationship with Japanese Americans removed Nisei obligations to serve in the military. On January 5, 1942, Selective Service reclassified Nisei from Category 1-A—citizens eligible for the draft, to IV-C—enemy aliens. This was not done on a case-by-case basis but was applied

⁷⁷ John J. McCloy to Mr. E.M. Rowalt, Acting Director of the War Relocation Authority, September 1, 1943, NARA RG 210/16, box 229/31.009, folder 1; Carey McWilliams, "Dual Citizenship," *Far Eastern Survey* 11, no. 23 (November 1942): 231-233; "Dual Citizenship Status," *Rocky Shimpō* (June 2, 1944).

to all Nisei. Many of those Nisei already in the military were either dismissed or reassigned to non-combat duties such as kitchen staff.⁷⁸

On February 4, the military established a curfew for enemy aliens. This restricted the freedom of movement of the Issei but not of the Nisei. Enemy aliens would have to remain in their homes from 8 at night until 6 in the morning and remain within 5 miles of their homes. At the same time, the military encouraged all who were able to move voluntarily away from the West Coast and resettle further East. A few chose to resettle voluntarily but not many. Most preferred to stay in their own homes as long as possible and abide by the curfew law.⁷⁹

On February 19, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 allowing military commanders to designate military zones from which “any or all persons may be excluded.” In practice this meant all persons of Japanese ancestry. On February 26, the evacuation began, but only in specific areas, such as Terminal Island off the coast of California near Los Angeles. On March 2, General De Witt created military zones along the West Coast and declared that all German and Italian aliens and both Japanese aliens and non-aliens could be forced to evacuate these zones if necessary.⁸⁰

In response to growing restrictions against the Issei and to reassert Nisei loyalty, leading officers of the JACL testified before the Tolan Committee early in March.

⁷⁸ For an excellent overview of the policies affecting Japanese Americans in the months following Pearl Harbor, see Greg Robinson, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996); and *Concentration Camps U.S.A.: Japanese Americans and World War II* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

Instead of resolving concerns about loyalty and sabotage, their testimony actually reinforced critics' fears that one could not tell who among Japanese Americans was loyal and who was not. On March 7, 1942, Tokie Slocum, Togo Tanaka, Sam Minami, Fred Tayama and Joseph Ninoda all appeared before the Tolan Committee as members of the United Citizens Federation, and as prominent members of the JACL. Tokie Slocum explained that as a veteran of the First Great War, he realized that there was no price that was too high to win the war. Even if evacuation became necessary for Japanese to prove their loyalty, Slocum declared, "I'll lead them." "No one appreciates the spiritual value of citizenship more than I do," Slocum continued. If the nation needed all Japanese off the West Coast, Slocum believed the sacrifice would be worth it to support the war effort. In response to Slocum's enthusiasm, investigators asked if he was not overplaying his hand. One investigator warned: "Beware of Greeks bearing gifts." Gushing declarations of loyalty might be used to hide the intentions of those who plotted against the United States.⁸¹ Nisei had no credibility once they had become racialized suspect citizens in the eyes of lawmakers.

James Sakamoto, former president of the JACL, agreed with Slocum that if necessary he would support limited freedoms for Japanese Americans if necessary to curb growing fears of Japanese sabotage. He testified before Congress that it might help the United States Government and Japanese Americans to cooperate against growing racial hysteria if Japanese Americans voluntarily placed themselves under protective custody. He said:

⁸¹ Testimony before the House of Representatives, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Washington, D.C., March 7, 1942, as quoted in Chin, *Born in the USA*, 278-281.

Let me say, incidentally, that this public hysteria, if we do not watch out, is going to cause disunity, and that is what Hitler is looking for, and I believe that is what Japan is looking for, too. Now if it is going to help to curb public hysteria, and if it will help the end of national unity, why not put all of us under protective custody? Or, better still, if you care to, why not place the alien Japanese parents of ours under our custody? For instance, I can give you one concrete plan. We can have a registration system where every alien must report, let us say, twice a week, to our Japanese-American Citizens League headquarters, and if they do not come in to register twice a week, we will report those persons to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a check-up will be made.

One investigator asked Slocum how the government could rely on the JACL to police the Japanese alien population themselves. It was not just aliens, after all, who Congressional investigators suspected of disloyalty. He asked, “Do you have any members—I am speaking of your national organization—do you have any members who have what is called dual citizenship?” Sakamoto replied, “Yes; I believe we have some who are still called dual citizens, although I will have to say this much for them,” and he proceeded to repeat what he had told the committee two decades earlier. Most Nisei knew little about their citizenship with Japan and only held allegiance to the land of their birth: the United States. There might be JACL members who were dual citizens of Japan and the U.S. by law. By feeling and patriotism, though, they were only Americans.⁸²

Toward the end of March, despite JACL public claims of extraordinary loyalty and their suggestions that the JACL control surveillance over their alien parents, government policies closed the door even tighter on Nikkei rights and freedoms, initiating the most drastic transformation of Nisei wartime citizenship. On March 18,

⁸² James Sakamoto, JACL officers' testimony, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, *National Defense Migration. Part 30: Portland and Seattle Hearings: Problems of Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones*, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., 2 March 1942, pp 11472-73.

Roosevelt created the War Relocation Authority. On March 21 Congress imposed penalties for any who refused orders to evacuate the military zones. On March 23, DeWitt issued his first Civilian Exclusion Order giving “aliens and non-aliens” of Japanese ancestry one week to evacuate Bainbridge Island in the Puget Sound of Seattle, Washington. On March 24, Public Proclamation 3 included the Nisei in curfew restrictions. Once Nisei became “non-aliens” and became subjected to the same exclusion and curfew orders as enemy aliens, they became in a very practical sense non-citizens.⁸³

By the end of March, it became clear that Nisei were gradually losing their citizenship. In response, James Sakamoto appealed to the President, demanding that he remember his promises to protect four basic freedoms throughout the world. In this letter, Sakamoto explained:

We, the American Citizens of Japanese parentage in these United States, have taken seriously your various statements on the Four Freedoms. We were reassured when war broke out and heard your directions as to the treatment to be accorded aliens of enemy countries. We felt those were commands upon All American citizens to pull together for a common objective.

Sakamoto wrote that the JACL had volunteered to go anywhere the government needed them to go, to relocate from the militarily sensitive zones along the West Coast in support of the war effort and in a display of patriotism. To avoid the possibility of concentration camps for Japanese Americans, Sakamoto urged the President to consider an alternative. He wrote that the JACL had “complete confidence in the all-seeing eye of the Federal

⁸³ See: Robinson, *By Order of the President*; Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*; and Daniels, *Concentration Camps, U.S.A.*

Bureau of Investigation” to weed out those who posed a real threat to national security. JACL members all along the West Coast had cooperated with the FBI, and assisted them in collecting information. Sakamoto promised they would continue these efforts. It was not necessary to incarcerate everyone of Japanese blood.⁸⁴

In what appears to be a last ditch effort to prevent involuntary incarceration of all persons of Japanese descent, James Sakamoto promised continued support and loyalty “under all but impossible conditions.” His proposal is telling and stands in sharp contrast to those that fellow JACL leader Mike Masaoka would suggest in private. Sakamoto made this proposal to Roosevelt:

Mr. President, we have protested our loyalty in the past. We have not been believed. We are willing to assume the burden of continuing to demonstrate it under all but impossible conditions. . . . Give us some refuge in the heart of the country far removed from even the suspicion or possibility to do harm. We have helped to feed the nation in the past. Let us continue to do so now that it is needed [even] more. Only let us do so freely and not under that compulsion made notorious in an enemy country. We do not have to be driven to work for a country in which we believe for ideals more precious than our life-blood.

Sakamoto's petition for continued voluntary relocation is important. Forced removal could only reinforce the implicit guilt of all those affected. Through voluntary compliance, Nikkei could demonstrate loyalty and patriotism.⁸⁵

At the same time Sakamoto requested a voluntary resettlement program, Mike Masaoka proposed the formation of an all-Nisei suicide squad. He believed that there were two ways in which Japanese Americans could “illustrate the extremes to which they

⁸⁴ Letter from James Y. Sakamoto to President Roosevelt (March 23, 1942), JERS, Bancroft Library.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

were willing to go” to safeguard their homes and demonstrate their loyalty. A “suicide battalion,” Masaoka suggested, “would go anywhere to spearhead the most dangerous missions.” “To assure the skeptics that the members of the 'suicide battalion' would remain loyal,” Masaoka continued, “the families and friends of the volunteers would place themselves in the hands of the government as 'hostages'.” The War Department rejected Masaoka's plan. It was “not the practice of the government to require 'hostages' or to sponsor such suicide battalions.”⁸⁶ The War Department may have rejected Masaoka's plan at first, but the idea of an all-Nisei combat team eventually took hold.

Nisei Behind Barbed Wire

Efforts to prevent the complete erosion of Nisei citizenship rights seemed to fail when all up and down the West Coast the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army Wartime Civil Control Administration began posting notices ordering all persons of Japanese ancestry, aliens and non-aliens, to prepare for mandatory evacuation.⁸⁷ Heads of family units were ordered to report for further instructions at civil control stations where each family would be assigned an identification number. Then families packed all

⁸⁶ Masaoka, “Final Report,” JERS, Bancroft and as quoted in Deborah K. Lim, *Lim Report*, Section IC, p. 2, courtesy of Joe Norikane.

⁸⁷ The JACL did little to try to prevent evacuation. In fact, key leaders actually suggested evacuation, but did not expect that Nisei would be treated the same as their Issei parents. Other groups and individuals, especially individual lawyers with the ACLU (who defied the ACLU national leadership's decision to avoid these cases), lawyers with the American Friends Service Committee, and some University administrators and clerical leaders, fought evacuation more directly. See: Robert Shaffer, “Cracks in the Consensus: Defending the Rights of Japanese Americans During World War II” *Radical History Review* 72 (September 1998): 84-120.

that they could carry, sold what they could not for pennies on the dollar, and made final arrangements to store what was left. The first stop for most evacuated families was a temporary Assembly Center where detainees waited for the more permanent camps to be built. In all, approximately 120,000 individuals moved into concentration camps under government custody for what many believed would be the duration of the war.

Once in camp, the guilt associated with incarceration transformed Nisei from citizens to enemy aliens in a profoundly personal way. For Kay Yoshida, it was not until her family entered into the Tanforan Assembly Center that she internalized a sense of shame for being Japanese. She recalled wondering why the government had forced Japanese into racetracks and fairgrounds hastily converted into holding facilities. “Who’s out there that’s going hurt us?” she thought. Kay laughed when she remembered thinking that, because she soon realized it was she the government deemed dangerous. When “you see a nervous young man,” Kay recalled, “a soldier having his gun pointing at you, you begin to realize . . . You’re in some kind of prison.” Her next thought was quite natural. She wondered what terrible thing she had done to deserve being there. The transformation of the Nisei generation from citizens to detainees in government camps created deep-seated guilt that many carried with them for the rest of their lives.⁸⁸

Life in America's concentration camps was not easy for anybody. Incarceration, for young people just coming of age or those who had just entered into their adult years,

⁸⁸ Kay Yoshida interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, August 2001; Tomi Kaizawa Knaefler, *Our House Divided: Seven Japanese American Families in World War II* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 19. See also: Stephen S. Fugita and Marilyn Fernandez, *Altered Lives, Enduring Community: Japanese Americans Remember their World War II Incarceration* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004); Erica Harth, *Last Witnesses: Reflections on the Wartime Internment of Japanese Americans* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Lawson Fusao Inada, *Only What We Could Carry: The Japanese American Internment Experience* (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2000).

seemed especially difficult. For most Nisei, their forced evacuation from the West Coast and incarceration as “enemy aliens” stood in sharp contrast to their prewar associations with Americans of all backgrounds and races. Being isolated and confined just when they expected their lives might take off in exciting directions was more than many could bear.⁸⁹

For most Nisei, the confinement experience forced them to adjust their expectations for the future. They had to redefine what it meant to be Nisei and what it meant to be American citizens. One young woman wrote: “Why can't the public differentiate between the people actually responsible for this war and Us?” Some continued with their plans to go to college, determined to make their lives better despite the war. Others lost hope. Almost half of the graduates from Jerome High School indicated that they had planned to go to college before the war. But only 14 percent still planned to attend college once they arrived in Jerome, one of the two WRA camps located in Arkansas. Most cited finances and family concerns as their principle reason for changing their minds. Others gave up on the future entirely. In Colorado, analysts asked Nisei between 16 and 22 years of age about their concerns. One young man said thinking about the future was just a “waste of time,” and three teenage girls explained they simply did not know what to do. Life seemed so uncertain.

Paul Kusuda summarized the feelings of many Nisei and their dwindling faith in the power of their American citizenship and the U.S. Constitution. In a letter to his former teacher, he wrote:

⁸⁹ “Our Younger Citizens,” *Trek* (June 1943).

Time and time again, I have argued that America is not a democracy for white people only . . . Was I wrong? God help us all if I am or was because what a future is in store for everyone in a false democracy!

Blind faith in the promise of American democracy and citizenship could not last long in camp.⁹⁰

Nisei Citizenship under Attack

Nisei like Paul Kusuda had good reason to wonder if American democracy really was only for white people. During the summer of 1942, both the Native Sons of the Golden West and the American Legion filed lawsuits designed to deny not just Japanese Americans, but all non-whites, except for African-Americans, the right to vote. On July 2, 1942 John T. Regan, grand secretary of the Native Sons of the Golden West filed suit against Cameron King, registrar of voters in San Francisco. The suit aimed to force King to eliminate all Japanese names from the voting rolls. James Fisk of the American Legion in Alameda County filed a similar suit demanding that all Japanese Americans be dropped from voting rolls. Former California Attorney General Ulysses Webb represented Regan and Fisk. He argued that the government never intended to grant citizenship to children of Asian immigrants. Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment as reparations for slavery, not to provide excluded classes with the rights of citizenship.

⁹⁰David Yoo, *Growing up Nisei*, 108; "Nisei Problems and Behavior," October 30, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, Colorado River, Roll #10, M1342; Paul Kusuda to Mrs. Afton Nance, May 27, 1942, as quoted in Yoo, *Growing up Nisei*, 109.

He criticized the Supreme Court decision that expanded interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee equal citizenship to children of Chinese immigrants born in the United States. He called *U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark*, “one of the most injurious and unfortunate decisions” ever handed down by the Supreme Court.⁹¹

Critics attacked Webb, Regan and Fisk for targeting Japanese-Americans' citizenship rights on racial grounds, particularly during a war against fascist states where such overt discrimination might actually be sanctioned. Charles R. Garry spoke out against Webb on behalf of the National Lawyers' Guild, and reminded the court that when the nation was at war, international opinion must be kept in mind. He said: “What would our Allies think if we came out today and said, 'only those are Americans who are whites'?” The *Pacific Citizen*, the newspaper of the JAACL denounced the lawsuits, calling them “a bitter Hitlerite attack against the right of Asiatics to hold American citizenship.” Both the lower court and the Federal Court of Appeals denied the suits as unconstitutional citing the very case Webb declared deplorable, *Wong Kim Ark*. The lawsuits may not have succeeded in ending Nisei suffrage, but word spread quickly among Japanese Americans that groups like the Native Sons were in the process of attacking their citizenship directly. Those seeking to take away Nisei suffrage kept the lawsuits alive until the Supreme Court finally upheld the lower courts' rulings May 17, 1943.⁹²

⁹¹ Webb as quoted in “U.S. Court Asked to Ban Nisei Citizens, 'Fascist' Attempt Threatens Democratic Rights of Persons of Asiatic Ancestry in America,” *Pacific Citizen*, July 2, 1942; and *U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark*, (1898).

⁹² *Regan v. King, Registrar*, 319 U.S. 753; 63 S. Ct. 1168; 87 L. Ed. 1706 (May 17, 1943). The Federal Appeals Court cited as precedent: *U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark*, (1898); in addition to cases directly related to Nisei citizenship, *In re Tetsubumi Yano's Estate*, 188 Cal. 645, 206 Pac. 995 (1922); *Morrison v. California*, 291 U.S. 82 (1943). See also: “Nisei Citizenship Rights Upheld by Court,” *Pacific Citizens*

Perhaps more threatening than the pending *Regan v. King* lawsuit was a Constitutional Amendment introduced by Senator Rufus C. Holman, Republican from Oregon. If ratified, this amendment would end dual citizenship entirely by prohibiting children of immigrants from automatic citizenship as provided under the Fourteenth Amendment. As with the case of the 1941 War Department sponsored bill, the Hollman bill would threaten the citizenship of a much larger and more powerful voting block of Americans: German and Italian Americans. Yet the bill's mere presence in Congress, combined with the lawsuits designed to disenfranchise Nisei, posed a serious threat to their security in the nation.⁹³

Dual citizenship remained a crucial and yet poorly understood issue throughout the war. During the first year of WRA administration of the camps, attorneys wrote several summaries of the citizenship status of the Nisei to clarify questions for administrators and local project attorneys. Much of this literature focuses on what dual citizenship was, how many Nisei retained dual citizenship, and how they could renounce their Japanese citizenship if they so desired. These reports debunked myths that all Nisei were dual citizens, but they were not widely circulated and did nothing to protect Nisei from ongoing attacks on their citizenship.⁹⁴

(February 25, 1943). Memorandum to the Director of the WRA from the Office of the Solicitor, Opinion No. 63, April 9, 1943, Barnhart Papers, box 1, binder 2, University of Arkansas Special Collections; and Forrest T. Hoyt to Philip Glick, "Discussion of the doctrine of dual citizenship and its applicability to Japanese in the United States," (July 8, 1942), NARA RG 210/16, box 229, folder 31.009 #1.

⁹³ "Holman Bill Challenges Nisei Citizenship, Amendment is Proposed to Constitution," *Pacific Citizen* (September 24, 1942).

⁹⁴ Hoyt to Glick, "Discussion of the doctrine of dual citizenship," (July 8, 1942); and War Relocation Authority, Office of the Solicitor Opinion No. 63, "Acquisition of United States Citizenship by Persons of Japanese Ancestry," April 9, 1943. See also Meeting in Washington, D.C., in which General DeWitt cites problems with determining how many dual citizens are on the West Coast on the assumption that Japanese families would have destroyed all legal documents when war was declared with Japan. DeWitt quoted in de Nevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist*, 92-93.

Military Service and the Nisei

Not long after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, military leaders realized that they would need to recruit Japanese language specialists to fight the war in the Pacific. Recruiting Japanese-Americans for military service on a limited basis became essential, particularly those with basic skills in Japanese, despite the contradictions it created when these recruits came from the WRA camps. On July 17, 1942, Lieutenant Colonel Kai E. Rasmussen began his tour of WRA facilities to recruit candidates for the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Language School in Savage, Minnesota. He was interested first and foremost in candidates fluent in Japanese with at least an elementary knowledge of written Japanese. Rasmussen was looking for U.S.-born Japanese schooled in Japan, able to read Japanese newspapers, but with a solid academic background in English. Ironically, this profile fit the most suspect population in the camps: the Kibei. By the end of 1942, the MIS had recruited 179 candidates for the MIS language program.⁹⁵

Between June and July, individuals within the War Department debated the possibility of recruiting Nisei on a massive scale. Some suggested that offering young people a way out of camp (and into the military) might diminish the alienation and disillusionment many Nisei were suffering as a result of their confinement. Juvenile delinquency had become a major concern for WRA administrators and the FBI within the first few months of the camps' existence, and both agencies wrote that the confinement of

⁹⁵ Bill Hosokawa, *Nisei: The Quiet Americans* (New York: W. Morrow, 1969), 394-399.

young men had become particularly worrisome. Scott Rowley, Project Attorney for the WRA at Poston, Arizona, suggested that the conditions in camp were to blame for the problem. Young people did not have enough meaningful work or activities with which to fill their time. He charged the WRA with failing in its “obligation to boys” in particular. Most Nisei young men would arrive at manhood while in the camps and would not be able to learn about manhood from “practical experience.” J. Edgar Hoover lamented the fact that the vast majority of detainees were between the ages of ten and twenty-five. He wrote, “some of them are now embittered because they are United States citizens and are being handled as they are.” The growing problem in the camp, Hoover concluded, was not disloyalty. The major problem was a rise in what he called criminal behavior and delinquency.⁹⁶

On July 17, 1942, Captains Moffitt and Shepard and Major Wall discussed the effect that incarceration was having on the Nisei. Their report was troubling. It stated: “By keeping them in relocation projects for the duration without giving them a chance to die for their country in combat and at the same time maintaining them on the fat of the land is absolutely destructive of any possibility of generating patriotic morale.” This statement is revealing in many ways. First, it reminds readers that for those living through the war, their most recent experience was with the Depression and New Deal government programs. This led many to criticize the WRA camps in ways that were reminiscent of Depression era criticisms of the dangers of government dependency.

⁹⁶ Scott Rowley to Philip Glick, (September 12, 1944), NARA RG 210/16, box 258, folder 37.106 #8; J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Tolson, Mr. Tamm and Mr. Ladd, (September 1942), RG 65, box 81, folder 62-69030.

Observers warned that the camps might create a population permanently dependent upon government aid. Some even compared the WRA camps with American Indian reservations. Especially revealing were both military and FBI warnings that the camp environment was particularly damaging to the morale of young men. In the context of a total war, young men across the country were coming of age in the military. Military leaders criticized the camps for keeping young men idle when they should be serving the country, even giving their lives if necessary. Seemingly lost on these critics was the possibility that Nisei being placed in the camps without due process might destroy their patriotic morale more rapidly or with more certainty than restricting the same young men from serving in the military.⁹⁷

Critics within the military argued that prohibiting Nisei from military service for the duration of the war might permanently alienate a population that in all likelihood remained loyal to the United States even after their forced evacuation from the West Coast. Furthermore, all seemed to agree that allowing some Nisei to remain in the military (those who were already in the service prior to Pearl Harbor and who were not discharged), while denying others the same chance to serve their country created an irreconcilable contradiction in policy. General John DeWitt argued further that without some opportunity to serve in the military, Nisei would never recover from the stigma or the alienation of their wartime treatment. He wrote to Colonel Koenig:

If no further Nisei are accorded an opportunity to serve in the armed forces, though they may be of troop age and otherwise physically

⁹⁷ Phone conversation with Captain Moffitt, Captain Shepard, and Major Wall, July 17, 1942, reprinted in Daniels, ed. *American Concentration Camps, Volume 9, June 1942-May 1944, Raising Japanese American Troops* (New York: Garland, 1989).

qualified, it is highly probable that a stigma will thus attach which can never be overcome and that the possibility of future useful citizenship will be virtually concluded. If this condition arises and the United States then had within its borders a group of persons whose loyalties have been thus alienated, the solution of the problem must rest with Congress, because of the social-political aspects of the problem.

The same man who most strongly supported the claim that there was no way to distinguish a loyal from a disloyal person of Japanese ancestry ironically noted the possible long-term effects of alienating such a large number of healthy military-age citizen men. In doing so, they acknowledged that the vast majority of Nisei were probably loyal to the U.S., but might not remain loyal if kept in the WRA camps for the duration of the war.⁹⁸

On July 22, 1942, members of the Western Defense Command staff wrote a Memorandum on the problems that would arise from disallowing Nisei into the military. They called the present policy “indefensible.” They addressed their concerns to Chief of Staff General Joseph T. McNarney:

The present treatment of persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States is to preclude almost every possibility of future serviceable citizenship. Some intelligent action looking to a chance must be made to provide an opportunity for these persons to demonstrate their loyalty and their right to live as free people in this country after the war. This must be done or they must all be returned to Japan after the war. If this is done then as many as are sent become added to our enemies abroad.

Pushing the ultimatum further, the report stated that if Nisei in the camps were declared permanently ineligible for service, those already in the military would have to be

⁹⁸ Ibid.

discharged, reassigned to the reserve corps and placed in the WRA camps for the duration of the war.⁹⁹

The problem remained that there was no way, according to some, to test Nisei loyalty.¹⁰⁰ Lieutenant Colonel William A. Boekel, assistant to Colonel Bendetsen, proposed a solution. He suggested a program of segregating the “presumptively loyal Nisei” from the potentially disloyal Kibei and Issei. The Nisei should then be afforded “all the rights of citizenship as quickly as possible,” Boekel continued, “inclusive of the rights, as well as the corresponding obligation to serve in the armed forces.” General DeWitt's staff agreed with Moffitt's emphasis on segregation. They added that the Nisei could prove themselves loyal through military service while the Kibei would remain in custody until they proved that they were not disloyal – a task that would be nearly impossible from behind barbed wire.¹⁰¹

The international propaganda value of readmitting Nisei to military service prevailed as the most popular justification. The Japanese government had already used the segregation of Japanese-Americans into WRA camps as evidence that racial lines were clearly drawn in the United States, much as they were being drawn in Germany. When the United States “does not recognize [Nisei] as being good enough to fight alongside Caucasian troops,” the United States only reinforced Japanese propaganda.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, July 22, 1942, reprinted in Roger Daniels, ed., *American Concentration Camps, Volume 9, June 1942-May 1944, Raising Japanese American Troops* (New York: Garland, 1989), n.p.

¹⁰⁰ Phone Conversation with Captain Moffitt, Captain Shepard, and Major Wall, July 20, 1942 and Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, July 22, 1942, as reprinted in Daniels, *American Concentration Camps*.

¹⁰¹ Letter from William A. Boekel, Lt. Col., F.A. Asst. A.C. Of S. to Colonel Bendetsen, July 20, 1942, reprinted in Daniels, *American Concentration Camps*.

¹⁰² Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, July 22, 1942, as reprinted in Daniels, *American Concentration Camps*.

Elmer Davis, Director of the Office of War Information, agreed that allowing Nisei to volunteer for service would disprove Japanese propaganda circulating in the Philippines and in Burma suggesting that the United States was fighting a race war. After passing individualized tests of loyalty, Davis suggested, Nisei should be allowed to enlist in the Army and Navy. It must be a matter of choice, he emphasized, not a matter of conscription. "It would hardly be fair to evacuate people and then impose normal draft procedures," Davis wrote, but "the voluntary enlistment would help a lot." The government had to take action to counter Japanese propaganda.¹⁰³

President Roosevelt was swayed by the propaganda value of allowing Japanese Americans to volunteer for the military, but remained deeply skeptical of their loyalty. He suggested that a compromise solution might be to keep them stateside. He asked military leaders for their reactions. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson responded quickly. He wrote: "The effect on India and elsewhere of the yellow man voluntarily fighting for the white would be substantial." But keeping Nisei stateside, he wrote, would be a "faint-hearted compromise." Any propaganda value the military hoped to gain by accepting volunteers would be lost if they were not used in full combat.¹⁰⁴

When Roosevelt asked Secretary of Navy Frank Knox for his reaction to the proposed induction of Japanese Americans, he stated clearly and emphatically that he would not accept Nisei under any circumstances. His decision remained policy throughout the war and became a major point of contention among the Nisei. Why, they asked, if they were loyal enough to serve in combat for the Army could they not serve in

¹⁰³ Elmer Davis, October 2, 1942 as quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, 189.

¹⁰⁴ Stimson to Roosevelt, October 14, 1942, as quoted in Robinson, 163-66.

all branches of the military? The limited basis on which Nisei were eventually admitted back into military service became the principle basis of some future resistance to the draft. If deemed loyal enough to serve in combat units, why not allow Nisei in all branches of the military? When put in these terms, few could deny the continued distrust of Nisei, even those in the military, on the basis of racial prejudice.¹⁰⁵

JACL Collaboration

At the end of November 1942, the Japanese American Citizens League held an all-camps summit in Salt Lake City, Utah to discuss the future of the JACL and the problems that were arising in the camps. In this meeting, representatives suggested that the government should restore normal Selective Service procedures for citizens of Japanese ancestry, even those in the camps. The idea, simply put, was to allow Nisei to serve their country on the same basis as other Americans and thus prove their loyalty in combat. More importantly, JACL delegates hoped to prove extraordinary loyalty of Nisei who would be willing to accept their most basic obligation of citizenship even while their rights had been suspended. This position was not popular among the general population of Nikkei in the camps. It only reinforced the strong reputation the JACL had acquired for cooperating with the government instead of defending the civil rights of Japanese Americans. Selective Service had already reduced Nisei to the category of enemy aliens.

¹⁰⁵ Secretary of Navy Knox to President Roosevelt (October 17, 1942), as quoted in Robinson, *By Order of the President*, 163-64.

Yet JACL leaders insisted military service remained the best way the Nisei could demonstrate loyalty and earn their citizenship rights.

Delegates representing the JACL from all of the ten WRA camps voted unanimously in favor of requesting that Selective Service apply to Japanese Americans on the same basis as other citizens, and forwarded this resolution in a telegram to President Roosevelt.¹⁰⁶ What they did not know was that the War Department had already decided to readmit Nisei for service. Now it was just a matter of determining the best way to recruit soldiers. In a phone conversation between Colonels Bendetsen and Pettigrew on November 6, 1942, both agreed that organizing a military unit of Japanese Americans would be an excellent idea. They knew that the Assistant Secretary of War, General John McCloy, was personally interested in the idea and was making plans to implement the program. Pettigrew mentioned that initially only single men, and predominantly 18-19-year-olds would be drafted. To clarify, Bendetsen said: “You are viewing it not only from the standpoint of conscription but also from a voluntary basis, both ways.” “Oh yes,” Pettigrew replied. Conscription would be put back for a while. “I think a damn good recruiting campaign will get a lot of them to volunteer,” Pettigrew said. The draft would come eventually. Pettigrew continued: “As a matter of fact, the way conscription is going to work before long any single man is going to be a prime suspect anyhow.” “However from a morale standpoint,” he qualified, “the more people we can get to enlist [voluntarily] the better.” Pettigrew asked Bendetsen for his help in

¹⁰⁶ Telegram to President Roosevelt as quoted in Frank Chin, *Born in the USA*, 304; and “Japanese American Citizens League,” War Department, Military Intelligence Division, (January 2, 1943 [December 17, 1942]), as quoted in Chin, 307-308.

gathering the final data so the plan could be put into operation. Bendetsen agreed and assured Pettigrew he would put men on the project immediately.¹⁰⁷

For the time being, the War Department's decision to draft Nisei remained a military secret, but news of the JACL's petition sparked outright violence among detainees when the delegates returned from the summit meeting. Masked assailants attacked Fred Tayama, prominent JACL leader, when he returned to Manzanar. In Poston, Saburo Kido, national JACL president, was beaten nearly to death. It all came to a head when on December 6, one day before the one-year anniversary of Pearl Harbor, a large crowd gathered near the Manzanar jail to demand the release of Harry Ueno. Project administrators had arrested Ueno on false accusations that he had been one of Fred Tayama's attackers. Most suspected that the motivation for his arrest was retaliation for Ueno's investigation into food shortages and possible black market dealings of camp administrators. The crowd sang Japanese songs as they awaited Ueno's release. They sang the Japanese national anthem and the Imperial Japanese Navy marching song. In retrospect, both were poor choices of songs considering the looming anniversary of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor that was just a few hours away.¹⁰⁸

Many of the young soldiers guarding the jail had been transferred from the front lines in the Pacific to work in the WRA camps and the actions of the crowd put them on edge. Interpreting this conflict not as a protest against a wrongly imprisoned American,

¹⁰⁷ Telephone conversation, Colonel Bendetsen and Colonel Pettigrew, (November 6, 1942), reprinted in Daniels, *American Concentration Camps*.

¹⁰⁸ Brian Masaru Hayashi, *Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 134-35; Lon Kurashige, "Resistance, Collaboration, and Manzanar Protest," *Pacific Historical Review* 70, no. 3 (August 2001): 387-417; Emiko Omori, *Rabbit in the Moon: A Documentary/Memoir* (PBS, 1999); Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 121-27.

but as a conflict between Japanese prisoners and American soldiers, some guards shouted, “Remember Pearl Harbor—Hold your line!” The soldiers first used tear gas to disperse the crowd. But a nervous soldier fired a shot. More shots followed. James Ito was killed instantly. Eighteen other detainees were wounded, one fatally, leaving two dead.¹⁰⁹

In the aftermath, administrators at Manzanar began segregating the camp on political grounds. Detainees believed to be responsible for agitating violence as well as those who risked retaliation for their collaboration with administrators were sent to smaller isolation facilities. On December 17, General DeWitt proposed that 5,600 undesirable inmates be arrested and sent to a high security segregation facility. Dillon Myer rejected this proposal and called it “needlessly punitive.” Instead, administrators sent one hundred and sixty of their detainee collaborators to a CCC camp near Death Valley for protection while they awaited permanent relocation into free society beyond the evacuated zone. The FBI transferred sixteen men whom Manzanar officials identified as “troublemakers” or agitators to a segregation facility in Moab, Utah.¹¹⁰

The Manzanar incident was publicized widely in newspapers, particularly in the Hearst papers as a pro-Japan celebration in anticipation of the anniversary of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Nativist groups like the Native Sons of the Golden West along with congressional leaders and the FBI questioned how the WRA had allowed things to get so out of hand. Kentucky Senator Albert B. Chandler led an investigation into the administration of the camps and accused Myer of coddling inmates. Assistant Secretary

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Hayashi, 135; Weglyn, 125-57.

of War John J. McCloy testified before Chandler's investigative committee that the segregation of agitators from the general population of loyal inmates at Manzanar needed to be implemented by the WRA throughout the camps. Senator Mon Wallgreen of Washington argued instead that administration of the camps should be handed over to the War Department. He introduced a bill that would abolish the WRA completely. Everyone agreed that the camps were becoming a liability and a public embarrassment, but none could agree how to solve the crisis.¹¹¹

Looking back on the events of the past year and pondering their future, Nisei could not know that the War Department had already decided to draft them into the military. For many Nisei, military service was the last thing on their minds after losing so much. Nisei had begun the year with confidence that their citizenship would protect them during the war. They had become “non-aliens” and did not yet know the outcome of Congressional bills and court cases which threatened to make them enemy aliens. The JACL had tried to prevent a forced evacuation of citizens, but in their efforts drew criticism and suspicion for being too patriotic. In desperation this organization proposed the most extreme solutions of voluntary confinement. Their petition to restore the draft for incarcerated citizens became the most notorious of these desperate attempts to prove Nisei loyalty. A growing number of detainees accused the JACL of “selling the Japanese community down the river.”¹¹² Whether or not the JACL was responsible for “selling”

¹¹¹ Omori, *Rabbit in the Moon*; Robinson, *By Order of the President*, 182; Jacobus tenBroek, et. al., *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 160-161; Michael J. Wallinger, *Dispersal of the Japanese Americans: Rhetorical Strategies of the War Relocation Authority 1942-1945* (Ph.D. diss, University of Oregon, 1975), 86.

¹¹² Arthur Hansen, “Peculiar Odyssey: Newsman Jimmie Omura's Removal from a Regeneration within Nikkei Society, History, and Memory,” in *Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura (Seattle:

Japanese Americans down the river for their collaboration and according to some critics, overly zealous cooperation with government policies restricting Nisei rights sparked a debate that would last for at least sixty more years. Japanese Americans asked, whose fault was the evacuation? Could the JACL have done anything to stop it? Or was collaboration the only way to prevent even worse abuses of Nikkei rights? These were questions no one could answer for certainty, but they did create major rifts within families and communities that would take in some cases more than a life time to heal.

CHAPTER 3

LOYALTY AND RESISTANCE: REINVENTING NISEI CITIZENSHIP

Life was going its calm and orderly, if somewhat unnatural, way in Topaz, Utah, on the afternoon of January 28, 1943... The teletype stuffed away in a corner of the telephone exchange room in administration building "A" began to clatter out a message. A few moments later, the operator laid a message before Mr. Hughes who studied its wording carefully. Then suddenly he began to act. Telephone bells jangled in the offices of the division chiefs. It was as though an electric current on the loose was flashing through Topaz.¹¹³

The teletype message that set off a flurry of activity in Topaz on January 28, 1943 came from Secretary of War Stimson. He announced that the War Department had created a combat unit exclusively for Nisei. Nisei volunteers could enlist for military service during a loyalty registration program. War Department representatives would come to Topaz in two weeks to begin the process. Shortly after Stimson's announcement, the WRA announced that it would conduct its own loyalty registration program for all Nikkei seventeen years of age and older. The War Department and WRA hoped their registration programs would work in tandem to accelerate efforts to clear detainees for relocation and hasten the eventual closure of the camps.

Nikkei detained at Topaz organized resistance to those aspects of registration that most threatened their citizenship rights. Issei leaders persuaded the War Department to revise the loyalty registration questionnaire in a way that would not force them to choose between loyalty to the United States and their Japanese citizenship. Nisei threatened non-

¹¹³ Russell A Bankson, "Registration at Topaz," (Topaz, Utah: War Relocation Authority, n.d.), Field Basic Documentation, Central Utah, Project Reports Division, reel 6.

compliance with registration until the government restored their civil rights. Together, both Issei and Nisei thwarted government attempts to begin the registration process. Their organized resistance elicited a combination of repression and patriotic propaganda as interdependent mechanisms of suppressing wartime dissent. In the process, government and individual Nisei negotiated the terms of a gradual restoration of Nisei citizenship.

This chapter uses Topaz as its central focus for two reasons. First, resistance against registration took place in all of the camps but to different degrees. The most studied examples are Manzanar and Tule Lake. Few if any historical studies even mention resistance at Topaz. Yet during registration, some observers believed that resistance at Topaz was the most dangerous. This might indicate that efforts to suppress dissent at Topaz ended up being more successful in the long run than was the resistance itself. The fact that resistance to registration at Topaz has all but faded from historical memory makes the analysis of the event in this chapter important on its own terms. The second reason Topaz is important to this particular narrative is because only four men resisted the draft from this camp. With a camp that exhibited such spirited resistance against a segregated military just one year before, this small number of draft resisters serves as one example of how successful government and private individuals were in suppressing dissent in this case. By contrast, even though residents of Amache questioned registration and voiced their concern, they did not organize any broad-based resistance efforts until the draft was reinstated the following year. Amache is the principle topic of the following chapter on the draft. Together, Topaz and Amache serve

as striking examples of the variety of forces that government and civilians used to quiet dissent and encourage overt patriotism in the face of civil rights abuses and a diminishing civil society.

The Broader Context of Wartime Citizenship

During World War II, all levels of government redefined citizenship in ways that restricted who could assert the rights and privileges of citizenship.¹¹⁴ The best-known example of government denial of citizenship rights to due process is the forced exclusion and detention of Japanese Americans. When the President signed Executive Order 9066 and the War Department created military zones within which both aliens and “non-alien” of Japanese ancestry could be excluded, both branches of government reassigned the Nisei to a new category of non-citizenship, stripping them of their Constitutional rights in the process. When the War Department approved the plan to re-open the military to Nisei volunteers, they initiated a process by which some citizenship rights would be restored to those Nisei who could prove their loyalty to the United States.

Some historians treat the government’s seemingly schizophrenic and unconstitutional taking and then partial restoration of Nisei citizenship rights as a strange and unprecedented wartime policy. Others point out that the wartime policies of exclusion and relocation actually fit into a long history of anti-Japanese and anti-Asian racial hatred and exclusion laws.¹¹⁵ There are other, less recognized ways in which the

¹¹⁴ Nationality Act of October 14, 1940 (Effective January 13, 1941 as 54 Statutes-at-Large 1137).

¹¹⁵ Roger Daniels makes this argument in *Concentration Camps, U.S.A.*, where he argues that the evacuation and detainment of Japanese Americans fits into historical trends rather than standing out as a

government's treatment of Japanese Americans coincided with other government revisions in citizenship policy and law during the war.

Just before the United States entered World War II, the government began requiring demonstrable evidence of loyalty and patriotism on the part of some citizens whom the government suspected were not sincerely loyal to the United States. For example, on October of 1940, Congress passed a revised nationality act that for the first time withdrew U.S. citizenship from children born abroad to U.S. citizens unless those children established residency in the United States before they turned twenty-one years of age.¹¹⁶ During the heat of the war, in 1943, the courts ruled that the United States could revoke the citizenship of an individual based on accusations of disloyalty. It could even take away the derivative citizenship of minor children on the basis of their parents' alleged disloyalty. Even though these policies only threatened the citizenship of naturalized citizens whose loyalty was suspect, it did set a precedent for reexamining the rights and privileges of citizens, even revoking their citizenship, when the political climate shifted or suspicions of disloyalty emerged.¹¹⁷

historical anomaly. Daniels, *Concentration Camps U.S.A.: Japanese Americans and World War II* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ *United States v. Schotfeldt*, 136 F. (2d) 935 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943); *United States v. Wursterbarth*, 249 Fed. 908 (D.N.J. 1918). In two additional cases, the majority opinions of the court ruled that the strength of allegiance and loyalty should increase over time, becoming stronger the longer an individual resides in the United States. Subsequent acts of disloyalty, then, indicate that the original oath was invalid because “the seeds of such feeling were fertile within him at the time of his naturalization, and the burden shifts to the defendant,” to prove that his oath of allegiance was sincere at the time and his/her feelings of disloyalty materialized after naturalization. *United States v. Herberger*, 272 Fed. 278, 291 (W.D. Was. 1921); see also *United States v. Wezel*, 49 F. Supp. 16, 19 (S.D. Ill. 1943) and *United States v. Kuhn*, 49 F. Supp. 407, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); as cited in “Aliens. Revocation of Certificate of Citizenship for Subsequent Acts of Disloyalty Manifesting Mental Reservation at Time of Naturalization. Deprivation of Derived Citizenship,” *Columbia Law Review* 4, no. 1 (January 1944): 80-83.

In the context of world war, state definitions of citizenship mimicked contracts that could be terminated if the individual citizen harbored feelings of disloyalty or refused to make the United States his or her permanent home. In 1943, the War Department's registration of Nisei loyalty became a prerequisite for restoring citizenship rights and responsibilities which the government had taken away based on mere suspicion of disloyalty and misunderstandings of Nisei dual citizenship. The loyalty registration program, then, became one example of a larger trend in U.S. citizenship that, when applied on such a broad scale, produced many unpredicted results.

Propaganda and Resistance

Before registration was introduced to residents in the camps, the Office of War Information and the War Department began a propaganda campaign to prevent resistance to registration. The government launched the first phase of this campaign with a statement from the President of the United States. President Roosevelt signed a letter to Secretary of War Stimson on February 1, stating most famously:

No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry. The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry This is a natural and logical step toward the reinstatement of the Selective Service procedures which were temporarily disrupted [for citizens of Japanese ancestry] by the evacuation from the West Coast.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Roosevelt to Stimson, February 1, 1943 as reprinted in Daniels, *American Concentration Camps*.

This message defined military service as a political right the government owed its loyal citizens, rather than a duty that free citizens were obligated to perform for the state. Conflating the rights and duties of citizenship proved a powerful tool in countering resistance that erupted in Topaz followed Stimson's announcement.

The President did not write this letter, though. The Office of War Information's Elmer Davis and the WRA's Dillon Myer worked collaboratively to draft one of the most famous letters of Presidential offering conditional support of Nisei loyalty. Both Davis and Myer were interested in maximizing the propaganda value of the War Department's decision to readmit Nisei to the military. They believed this decision proved that the United States was not fighting a race war of its own. For the propaganda to work, though, the government would have to back it up with willing Nisei participants. A strong statement of support from the President, they hoped, would prevent protest that might sabotage the new program for an all-Nisei volunteer combat team.¹¹⁹

On the same day Roosevelt signed the letter, the WRA issued instructions to project managers to begin their own internal propaganda campaigns.¹²⁰ Topaz administrators and residents had already joined forces to create a positive environment for the registration program. In special editions of the *Topaz Times*, administrators announced that President Roosevelt, Dillon Myer and project director Ernst were all very pleased with the program and believed that this was the first step towards a complete restoration of Nisei rights. A smaller side article released the names of those who had

¹¹⁹ Daniels, *Concentration Camps, U.S.A.*; DeNevers, *Colonel and the Pacifist*; and Robinson, *By Order of the President*.

¹²⁰ Memorandum from John C. Baker, Chief from Office of Reports, WRA to all Project Directors, February 1, 1943, WRA Field Basic Documentation, reel 6.

recently supported the national JACL with monetary contributions, implying that JACL attempts from the previous year to restore Nisei rights to join the military had finally succeeded.¹²¹ Local support for voluntary enlistment from JACL members would become one of the most important components in the WRA and War Department's efforts to turn widespread resistance into patriotic support for the war effort.

Tsune Baba, Chairman of the Community Council, organized a fact-to-face meeting between administrators and camp residents that quickly moved beyond the positive propaganda. Citizens and their Issei parents were anxious to find out how the program would affect them, to air their grievances, and ask administrators tough questions. At the meeting, director Myer and administrator Cornwall both spoke for a few minutes and explained what residents might expect to encounter during registration. They then opened the floor to questions. Many wanted to know why the Secretary of War was not making an attempt to right "all the wrongs which affected all the individuals through evacuation" rather than asking citizens to make the ultimate sacrifice for the war effort while they still lacked their basic rights.¹²²

The meeting between administrators and residents crystallized opposition to registration and revealed the two main concerns of the Nisei. First they questioned the segregated nature of the combat team. Why would Nisei only be allowed to volunteer for an Army combat unit? Why not allow Nisei into all branches of the military. Why

¹²¹ "Six Residents give to JACL National Fund," listing Y. Sakai and D.T. Uchida as donors of \$25 each and S. Suzukawa, Kay Hirao, Nobumitsu Takahashi and James Odagiri as donating between one and five dollars each. *Topaz Times*, January 31, 1943. Bankson, p. 5.

¹²² United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Summary of Information: War Relocation Authority and Japanese Relocation Centers," August 2, 1945, p. 25, RG 65, box 84, 62-69030; Bankson, "Registration at Topaz," pp 10-11.

segregate them like Negro troops, and why only combat duty? The administration had no answer. Their second concern was for their families. What would happen to the parents of those who volunteered, especially now that the registration program was being extended to them as well? Would they be forced to leave the camps? Who would support them while their sons were away? Would dependents' benefits be extended to the families of the Nisei even while still detained by the WRA? A Nisei sociology major commented that Stimson's announcement was "like a delayed bombshell exploding in a midst of unsuspecting citizens." "Loyal citizens were hoping for some form of recognition from the government enabling them to exercise their full rights of citizenship," he continued, "but never did they expect to receive their answer in such a way." The Nisei had a list of serious questions and the administration had few if any answers.¹²³

Some Nisei felt the government was too late in offering its faith in Nisei now that they were already behind barbed wire. They accused the government of blatant race discrimination with the formation of what some began calling a "Yellow Battalion." An outspoken and prominent Nisei said when Pearl Harbor was bombed, the Nisei wanted to stand up and be counted as loyal citizens. At that time, as he said though, "they called us Japs and put us behind barbed wires." The War Department wanted the Nisei to register as loyal and volunteer for combat, but as this Nisei said, now, "it's too late." "Why didn't they publicly say we were loyal then when we dearly wanted to be called loyal Americans I still pledge my loyalty to the U.S. because this is the only country I know, but I shall not bear arms." Speeches like this one had a "surging influence" on the

¹²³ Bankson, "Registration at Topaz," p 13.

rest of the group making everyone “consciously alert” to the stakes involved in accepting the government's offers to volunteer for the military. It was clear early on that many Nisei, not a mere agitating minority, read beyond the government’s propaganda of restored rights. Instead, they saw a continued pattern of race discrimination in the War Department’s disingenuous offer to allow loyal Nisei to volunteer for a segregated combat team.¹²⁴

Because the Issei had faced a long history of race-based discrimination, they spoke up early and loudly against the War Department's attempt to recruit volunteers. One Issei asked quite frankly, “Which way are you going to aim the gun?” Nikkei had been told that they were being evacuated for their own safety. Yet when they arrived in camp they were quick to notice that the guns were pointed inward, as if to prevent the escape of dangerous criminals, not outward in a posture of defense. Why would the military be any different? Where would the deceit end? A Nisei queried, why should enlistment be voluntary? “Our lives will be thrown into a battle of contradicting principles,” he said, “and not for the cause of any liberation.” The meeting had done more than raise two simple questions or create a forum for airing general grievances. It opened up a sophisticated list of concerns that could not easily be answered because the program had created its own contradictions.¹²⁵

When the War Department’s representatives arrived in Topaz, administrators and residents alike hoped they would have the answers that local administrators had been unable to provide, but many of the answers they offered were flat-out lies. Lt. Tracey,

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

head of the registration team, presented the program in the most positive light possible, hiding or even denying aspects of the program that might appear distasteful to the Nisei. He said he was not leading a recruiting team, and there was no quota to fill. He and his team were merely in Topaz to conduct a loyalty investigation and as a bonus, provide Nisei the chance to volunteer for military service. Tracey observed that in his opinion the resistance that was beginning to form at Topaz was not a threat. Instead, it “helped to start the boiling process which would undoubtedly indicate who in Topaz wanted to be loyal citizens of the United States and who preferred to have their citizenship elsewhere.” Although Tracey put it in nonchalant terms, what he really meant was that to resist this government loyalty registration program was nearly a treasonous act. Resistance or compliance would separate those who would retain citizenship from those who might lose it.¹²⁶

Some Topaz residents responded critically to Tracey’s tactics, arguing that segregation was not compatible with American democratic principles. Segregation was the one aspect of the loyalty program no amount of propaganda could hide. In an editorial published in the *Topaz Times*, the author wrote on behalf of many Nisei who felt that segregation was “alien to the principles of American democracy.” It did not matter its form, or where it was practiced. The sacrifices of the volunteers might demonstrate Nisei loyalty, but this kind of public relations scheme, the author commented, contradicted the democratic principles for which they would be fighting. The author hoped that instead the government would “remove the onus of segregation from [this]

¹²⁶ Bankson, pp 14 and 57.

group of American citizens,” and allow them to demonstrate their loyalty in a manner compatible with the American traditions they would be fighting to defend.¹²⁷

As speculation ran rampant among the Nisei and Issei debating the possible consequences of registration, local members of the JACL organized in support of registration. They held rallies and later organized a media campaign of their own under the title of “Volunteers for Victory.” Organizers hoped that this might encourage other Nisei to join them in embracing the program and greeting the War Department with volunteers, not questions.¹²⁸

Even though only Nisei were being accepted for military service, all adults had been asked to register their loyalty. A small group of young Issei started to petition for the right to do more than sign a piece of paper to demonstrate their loyalty. They, too, wanted the right to serve in the military. Their petitions were rejected by the War Department, though. Ironically, the incident furthered local JACL efforts to advertise Nikkei patriotism and highlighted the fact that citizenship did not alone determine loyalty to a nation. These Issei argued that despite their lack of U.S. citizenship, they wanted to volunteer for the military as a way of demonstrating that loyalty knew no bounds of citizenship. They argued that citizenship was a mere accident of birth, but loyalty, which they held strongly for the United States, was a matter of the heart. This group declared that they would rather give up all citizenship in order to align themselves with the global struggle to defend the four freedoms Roosevelt had claimed for all humans. The War

¹²⁷ “A Test,” *Topaz Times*, February 6, 1943. “Army Registration,” Selective Service folder, Field Basic Documentation, reel 4

¹²⁸ *Topaz Times*, February 5, 1943. Organizers of the JACL rally included Ernie Iiyama, Vernon Ichisaka, Harumi Kawahara, Walter Nakata, Henry Tani, and John Yoshino.

Department flatly refused the petition, stating that Japanese nationals would not be accepted at that time.¹²⁹

Henry H. Ebihara, a young Issei, wrote an open letter to Secretary of War Stimson and President Roosevelt protesting the government's decision not to accept Issei volunteers. His letter served JACL efforts to highlight their organization's extraordinary patriotism. Ebihara said that it was unjust for a democratic nation to deny him the right to serve in active combat because of a technicality like birthplace. This was a fight for free men throughout the world, which the President had already said was not a matter of color or race. Why not allow all loyal men, regardless of citizenship, to contribute to the struggle?¹³⁰ In response, the War Department assured that they would make every effort to allow Issei volunteers at some point in the future, but did not say when.

Propaganda supporting enlistment and JACL pronouncements of member loyalty filled the camp newspaper in the days leading up to February 10, the day when registration was to begin. The *Topaz Times* republished Ebihara's open letter to Washington along with an editorial comment that the War Department had promised to consider Ebihara's request. The newspaper also published a complete draft of President Roosevelt's letter to Secretary of War Stimson. The powerful propaganda value of the President's letter cannot be overstated. Some volunteers remember his words to this day as the primary reason they decided to accept military service.¹³¹ Yet as both administrators and patriotic supporters of registration would soon find out, a positive

¹²⁹ Bankson, p. 18; "Volunteers for Victory," Field Basic Documentation, Topaz, reel 6.

¹³⁰ "Volunteers for Victory," Field Basic Documentation, Topaz, reel 6; and Bankson, p. 18.

¹³¹ Interview with Senator Daniel Inoye, *Time of Fear* (America Productions, PBS, 2005); "Invitation" February 6, 1943, Field Basic Documentation, Topaz Project Reports Division, Reel 6; Bankson, pp 19-20; "President Endorses Combat Team Plans," *Topaz Times* February 8, 1943; and Bankson, p 9.

propaganda campaign was not enough to thwart resistance in a democratic society, even within a population that was not wholly free.

Unknown to local administrators, a counter-propaganda effort had also been published in the Japanese language sections of the newspaper. The Japanese language section of the *Topaz Times* was supposed to offer Issei a direct translation of the contents of the English section of the paper. But two editors decided to add a pro-Japanese spin on the news, urging their readers to declare loyalty to Japan, instead of the United States. Camp administrators did not discover the discrepancy until some members of the Young Democrats in the camps began complaining that the Japanese section had been causing agitation among detainees. Administrators hired translators to analyze the paper for several days. They concluded that “a very deliberate program of misrepresentation was being carried out by these Japanese editors.”¹³² What looked like misinformation to some was a biting criticism of the contradictions of a government program that encouraged racial discrimination against the Nisei and did nothing to repair the damage caused by their forced evacuation from the West Coast.

The most productive debates over registration did not take place in the newspapers, but in democratically organized meetings held by Nikkei residents of Topaz. The night before registration was scheduled to begin, block managers met for an independent discussion of the new program. Issei block managers expressed grave concern over the “loyalty question.” It read: “Will you swear unqualified allegiance to

¹³² Bankson, p. 48. When Bankson discovered the discrepancy, he asked for the resignations of the editors. He found out later that both registered negative answers to the loyalty question. A similar case appeared in Gila River when the Japanese language sections reported events in a more negative light than did the English language sections. See: *Gila News-Courier* (1943-1944), Field Basic Documentation, WRA.

the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor, or to other foreign government, power or organization?" This was meant to establish the loyalty or disloyalty of registrants and to force Nisei dual citizens to choose between their Japanese and U.S. citizenship. But for Issei Japanese nationals, to answer this question in the affirmative would leave them stateless.

Issei organized a committee of nine to present their grievances to the project director and request that something be done to change this "loyalty" question. The committee of nine took a statement to Project Director Charles Ernst's office, which read: "We, the Japanese alien residents of Topaz, hereby resolve that it is absolutely impossible for us to properly answer question No. 28 of the WRA form 126, revised. We, therefore, request the proper authorities of the War Relocation Authority to reconsider the said question."¹³³ Ernst assured them that while he would take the matter up with Washington, this question was being asked of all residents in all ten of the camps. He also assured them that they could answer the question in any way they saw fit and should not feel bound to a simple "yes" or "no" response. They could qualify their answer in whatever manner represented their sentiments best.¹³⁴ Ernst called Washington to inform them of the petitioners' concerns, and Issei leaders left his office to continue their discussions in private.

Ernst's assurances that every detainee would have to answer the same question did not satisfy the Issei representatives in Topaz. The chairman of the committee of nine returned to Ernst's office to reiterate the shock with which Issei had received the news

¹³³ Bankson, p. 21.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

that they would be asked to forswear their Emperor as the only means by which they could establish loyalty to the United States. Ernst did not have the power to solve this conflict. He promised that there would be some way to resolve the matter, and requested that the chairman keep him informed of any further questions as Issei leaders continued to debate the loyalty question.¹³⁵

On the morning of the tenth, registration did not begin as scheduled. The Issei leaders had strengthened their stance, refusing to register until administrators could offer them a loyalty question that would not deprive them of their Japanese citizenship. Issei collective disobedience forced administrators to respond with action rather than vague assurances. The Issei committee of nine presented Ernst with a stronger petition. This one read: “We, the Japanese nationals, residents of Topaz, do hereby resolve absolutely not to answer question 28 in WRA Form 126, Revised. We, therefore, request the proper authority to delete the whole question No. 28. Signed, Japanese National Residents of Topaz.”¹³⁶ Ernst immediately responded with a teletype-message to the Washington offices of the WRA. The ultimatum set by the Issei leaders was beyond Ernst’s authority and he needed directions. He wrote:

Japanese aliens have raised the question concerning number 28 on WRA form 126. . . . to answer an unqualified yes places them in the position of losing such protection as they now have under the Spanish Consul, and because they do not have status of Americans citizens, they consider they will be without the protection of any country with its rights, privileges, and protection. Japanese aliens feel that they have demonstrated over the past generation that they have wanted to conduct themselves in a manner loyal to the United States and would like to continue to have that reputation without a question being raised which would deprive them of all citizenship.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Bankson, p. 22.

¹³⁷ Bankson 22-23.

With the committee still in his office, Ernst called Myer on the phone to follow-up. While Ernst was waiting to be connected, he answered a call from the WRA offices in San Francisco.

The Issei at Topaz were not alone in complaining about the loyalty question that required them to renounce their Japanese citizenship. Ernst received a call from Robert Cozzins at Manzanar to consult with him about possible alternatives to the Issei loyalty question. They were working on the same problem at Manzanar and had drafted a substitute question, which Cozzins read to Myer: “Are you sympathetic to the United States of America and do you agree to faithfully defend the United States from any and all attacks of foreign enemies on our domestic shores?” Ernst read the statement to the members of the committee. They were not quite satisfied with this alternative. They said they still wanted a component that would allow them to express the fact that they had been loyal to the United States for a “great many years and that they wanted to continue to do so.” But they would not surrender their only citizenship in the process. Ernst continued to hold for a connection with Myer.¹³⁸

Finally, Ernst reached Dillon Myer on the phone. Myer was the only man with the authority to change the language of the loyalty questionnaire. Myer's staff in Washington began drafting an alternative question.

Issei leaders were pleased that their concerns had not only been taken seriously, but their resistance had forced the government to change the questionnaire. In response, they requested permission to withdraw their ultimatum to eliminate any impression that

¹³⁸ Bankson, 23.

they were placing undue pressure on administrators. Ernst, however, refused their request to withdraw. His administrative style had been one of cooperation and compromise whenever possible and he saw this as concrete proof of his ability to resolve even the most serious of conflicts. “There would be no question of face-saving,” Ernst told them. Instead, he requested that Issei leaders continue to inform him whenever they felt a policy had produced “an unnecessary hardship,” so they could work on a solution together.¹³⁹ Ernst gained a strong reputation for his fair and even handed support of democratic principles in Topaz. But democracy came with a price.

Bolstered by the Issei's successful drive for a revised loyalty question, Nisei began organizing their own resistance, which took shape over the next few days. They insisted that government fully restore Nisei civil rights before anyone would comply with registration. At first, Nisei conducted informal bull sessions in the showers, bathrooms, and mess halls to discuss their unique situation. Their list of concerns and questions seemed endless. What should they do? Should they volunteer or wait for the draft? If they waited for the draft, would this label them as disloyal in some way? They had already been told they could demonstrate their loyalty by cooperating with evacuation. What would it take now? Why try to settle this question of loyalty after evacuation anyway, especially when the future seemed so uncertain for themselves and their families?¹⁴⁰ They may have been less organized than the Issei at this point, but they were talking.

¹³⁹ Bankson, 24.

¹⁴⁰ “At the Shower Room” February 11, 1943, Field Basic Documentation, Central Utah, Project Reports Division, reel #6.

Successful resistance for the Nisei would be much more difficult to organize because their complaints and concerns were more diverse and could not be satisfied with a mere bureaucratic revision of the loyalty questionnaire. Their demands would require changes that the government was not prepared to grant.

In addition to the Issei and Nisei, another group was organizing their response to registration: the Kibei. Instead of demanding new questions or requesting civil rights, a group of Kibei voted for a strategy that appeared treasonous to some. On February 11, Kibei met to discuss the loyalty question as well as the preceding question 27, which asked if they would be willing to serve in combat wherever called. They would not draft petitions or present the administration with ultimatums. Instead they decided they would simply register their lack of confidence in the United States by answering both questions with a simple and defiant 'No.' Some explained, Japan was their real country, and their only future after the war would be in Japan, not in the United States.¹⁴¹ They argued that their citizenship in the United States had become somewhat of a farce, and they would never be afforded equal rights in the United States. Registration would give them a chance to register a formal vote of no confidence in the United States and instead declare their allegiance to their ancestral homeland.

The day after Kibei voted to take a hard line against both the loyalty and military service questions, Issei received word that an alternative version of the loyalty question had been prepared and approved by the War Department. It read: "Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and take no action which would in any way

¹⁴¹ FBI, "Summary of Information: War Relocation Authority and Japanese Relocation Centers," August 2, 1945, p. 25, RG 65, box 84, 62-69030.

interfere with the war effort of the United States?” The new question still did not offer Issei an official way to declare their long-standing loyalty to the U.S., but at least it did not force them to choose between disloyalty and becoming stateless. It would have no affect on their citizenship at all. When the committee of nine reported back to the general meeting of Issei leaders with the news, they all agreed that this was a good sign. They voted to take word back to all the blocks that registration could officially begin.¹⁴²

The Issei may have been satisfied with the results of their organized resistance and the Kibei satisfied with their decision to answer “no-no,” but the Nisei still faced a dizzying list of questions and unresolved concerns. When word spread to Issei leaders that the Nisei had organized their own meeting, they called off their plan to notify all blocks that registration could begin. Instead, they decided to wait until the Nisei had time to debate their own concerns.¹⁴³

Tsune Baba, Chairman of the Community Council, called an official “all-citizens’ meeting,” hoping that citizen Nisei and Kibei could arrive at a consensus as to whether they would or would not register.¹⁴⁴ The Kibei in attendance immediately expressed their resolve to answer “no-no” to questions 27 and 28 if they registered at all. The majority in attendance, though, could not reach a consensus.¹⁴⁵ Community Council Chairman Baba was unsatisfied with the results of this meeting and called another for the following day. Kibei representation dominated the second meeting, too. They read prepared statements pleading with Nisei to declare loyalty to Japan or at least refuse to register until their civil

¹⁴² Bankson, 25 and Exhibit “O.”

¹⁴³ Bankson, 26.

¹⁴⁴ “Summary of Information: War Relocation Authority and Japanese Relocation Centers.”

¹⁴⁵ “Summary of Information”; Bankson, 27 and Exhibit “P.”

rights had been restored. When one Nisei stood with an opposing point of view, he was told to sit down and “shut up.” One Kibei tried to mediate. He asked for compromise, calling on the more militant Kibei to think of those who were going to stay in the United States after the war and could not take such a strong stand. Finally, a Nisei stood up and asked bluntly: So is it going to be? Are we going to register or not? Or will we fight for civil rights first? The majority voted to refuse registration until the government restored their civil rights.¹⁴⁶

Camp administrators were already three days behind schedule and were self-conscious of the fact that Topaz was the only camp out of ten where the entire camp had refused to register. Ignoring the results of the most recent Nisei meeting, administrators set the following morning, February 13 as the tentative start date for registration and hoped for the best. They scheduled blocks 11 and 13 to register first. A handful of individuals did show up to register on Saturday morning, though none appeared from blocks 11 and 13. The number of registrants did not exceed a dozen for the entire day. Administration attempts to force registration failed miserably.

As opposition to registration intensified, director Ernst feared the worst. On Sunday afternoon, he called the Army stationed at Fort Douglas, Utah and asked that they remain on high alert until Monday. He worried that the trouble brewing in Topaz might require military intervention. The commander at Fort Douglas observed that indeed there had been a breakdown in authority at Topaz.

By Monday morning, word of the resistance at Topaz spread to upper-levels of the War Department and to the Western Defense Command headed by General DeWitt.

¹⁴⁶ Bankson, 29.

Even though resistance was spreading at all of the camps, military leaders agreed that Topaz represented the “only major trouble.”¹⁴⁷ Colonel Bendetsen reported to DeWitt with some surprise that the entire population had forced the War Department to delay registration for several days. Far less organized resistance had arisen at Manzanar. Instead of stalling registration as a whole, 45 percent of each block at Manzanar had requested repatriation or expatriation to Japan rather than registering loyalty to the United States. When Bendetsen finished reporting on the situations at each camp, he declared, “Isn’t that amazing?” He had predicted that the program would cause trouble and even expose contradictions in government policy that might destroy any legal basis the government once had for the entire program of evacuation.¹⁴⁸ Yet both he and De Witt appeared a bit surprised at the range of resistance Nikkei had mustered against registration, particularly the well-organized camp-wide protest at Topaz.¹⁴⁹

The WRA responded to the crisis in Topaz by sending their top social scientist, Dr. John Embree. He was an expert on Japanese folk traditions and had published extensively on rural Japanese culture and Japanese American acculturation in Hawaii throughout the war years. He arrived in Topaz just before another citizens’ meeting was

¹⁴⁷ Phone conversation General Joyce, Commanding Officer, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah with General DeWitt, February 14, 1943 as reprinted in Daniels, vol. 9.; Colonel Meek and Major Moffitt, February 15, 1943, as reprinted in Daniels, *American Concentration Camps*.

¹⁴⁸ Roger Daniels and De Nevers both demonstrate quite clearly that Bendetsen warned that launching a loyalty registration program when the forced evacuation of Japanese from the West Coast had been based on the claim that there was no way to distinguish loyal from disloyal Japanese would eventually expose the program as unconstitutional and might force the government to accept responsibility for a grave injustice. This prediction played out when in the 1980s, Japanese Americans were successful in litigating for a reversal of Hirabayashi and Korematsu’s convictions and achieved redress. Because of fears that a loyalty registration program might undermine the constitutionality of evacuation, documents were shredded to hide evidence in the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases from the prosecution. See: De Nevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist*; and Daniels, *American Concentration Camps*. See also: Peter Irons, *Justice Delayed: The Record of the Japanese American Internment Cases* (Middleton, Conn: Weleyan University Press, 1989).

¹⁴⁹ Colonel Bendetsen and General De Witt, February 13, 1943, as reprinted in Daniels, *American Concentration Camps*.

scheduled to begin on Sunday afternoon, February fourteenth. He met briefly with Ernst beforehand and suggested ways that Ernst might regain control over the situation at Topaz without military intervention.¹⁵⁰

When Nisei representatives gathered on Sunday night to present the results of the camp-wide vote, Ernst took control of the meeting and declared all citizens who refused registration to be in violation of the Espionage Act.¹⁵¹ Ernst read the Espionage Act to the audience and explained that as American citizens instructed by their government to register, they could and would be prosecuted for obstructing the government in its attempt to raise an army if they refused to comply.¹⁵² This marked a serious shift in Ernst's strategy. Up to this point he had welcomed open discussion and compromise. Now he began the tactic that would succeed throughout the registration and forthcoming draft crises. He declared that registration was a Selective Service procedure the government demanded of all citizens and organized non-compliance would result in prosecution under federal law. It was now up to Nisei to decide on an individual basis

¹⁵⁰ John F. Embree, "Registration at Central Utah, 14-17, February, 1943," War Relocation Authority, Project Analysis Series No. 1, November 1943, Leflar Papers, box 2, folder 4. Embree wrote his dissertation for a degree in Anthropology at the University of Chicago on the Suye Mura village in Japan and was in the process of transcribing, annotating and translating peasant songs from the same village for publication. John Embree, with Ella Embree and Yukuo Uyehara, *Japanese Peasant Songs* (Philadelphia: American Folklore Society, 1944). See also, John F. Embree, *Acculturation among the Japanese of Kona, Hawaii* (Menasha, WI: American Anthropological Association, 1941); and *The Japanese*, War background studies; no. 7 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1943).

¹⁵¹ "Summary of Information: War Relocation Authority and Japanese Relocation Centers;" and John F. Embree, "Registration at Central Utah, 14-17, February, 1943," War Relocation Authority, Project Analysis Series No. 1, November 1943, Leflar Papers, box 2, folder 4. The reports seem to conflict on this point – Embree says that the blocks seems evenly split to him while Bankson reported that it was clear most wanted to fight for civil rights first. Embree does not conclude, however, that if a vote were taken at that Sunday afternoon meeting of the representatives it probably would have gone to the negative, with a majority voting not to register. See also Bankson, 31.

¹⁵² The Espionage Act of 1917 was revised several times both in peacetime and during World War II. The most recent version Ernst may have read was based on the WWI act of 1917, revised on June 25, 1942 and again on January 1, 1943 (J 1.2: ES 6/943; HR 1054, pp 4788; 4868 and HR 6340). See also Senate Judiciary Committee 77th Congress, 6753 and 78th Congress 208.

whether they would become felons, or would instead submit to the demands of their government as compliant, but not wholly free citizens.¹⁵³

The Nisei representatives did not give up right away. They tried to take the matter over Ernst's head with a set of resolutions and an ultimatum they prepared for Secretary of War Stimson. Nisei organized a "Committee of 33" from which a smaller committee of nine was selected to draft the first set of resolutions. They went to work immediately, foregoing dinner and finally presenting their draft for ratification by the larger representative body of Nisei at 9:45 pm. A general meeting was called in every block at 10:00 pm to consider the resolution and at 11:30 pm the committee of nine reported back to Ernst with the results of their collaborative efforts.

Representatives met with Ernst, Embree, Hughes and Bell in Director Ernst's apartment and requested that their set of resolutions be sent to Secretary of War Stimson. The committee continued to make registration contingent upon a restoration of rights, so Ernst refused to send the letter. They would have to take out any references to registration in their demands for civil rights, or Ernst warned no government official would pay attention to any of their resolutions.¹⁵⁴ More important, Ernst told them that it was not the Secretary of War's job to deal with civil rights. They would have to choose a different audience as well. Only the Secretary of State or the President himself could address citizens' rights. The Secretary of War's job was to raise an army. With a weakened set of resolutions, the committee still insisted that their demand for civil rights be forwarded to the Secretary of War Stimson. The Secretary of War may not be in

¹⁵³ John F. Embree, "Registration at Central Utah, 14-17, February, 1943," War Relocation Authority, Project Analysis Series No. 1, November 1943, Leflar Papers, box 2, folder 4.

¹⁵⁴ Embree, "Registration at Central Utah;" and Bankson, 32-33 and Exhibit T.

charge of civil rights, but it was the War Department that was asking the Nisei to give service in the absence of their most basic rights. Ernst agreed to send their modified set of resolutions to Stimson and Myer first thing the following morning, and the meeting disbanded well after two o'clock a.m.¹⁵⁵ As Embree later commented, Ernst had averted a crisis of major proportions.

Ernst's shift in tactics was successful, even though Nisei continued to agitate for civil rights.¹⁵⁶ If Nisei refused to register, they would face criminal prosecution.

Violating the Espionage Act was a felony offense that entailed not only fines and prison terms, but a loss of basic political rights such as the right to vote, serve on juries or the right to bear arms. With the threat of felonies, Ernst won control over the situation and maintained that control by refusing any further discussion about registration.

When Dillon Myer received the resolutions drafted by the "Committee of 33," he dismissed them as petty and unimportant, responding that this was "not the time to quibble or bargain." He said that registration was a crucial test to be taken seriously. He suggested the very demands made by the Committee of 33 might be obtained if they would take this first step toward restoring their own citizenship. The Secretary of War had made this policy change in "good faith," Myer said, and until the residents of Topaz demonstrated their willingness to comply, Stimson would not be able to consider any

¹⁵⁵ Embree, p. 2-3; Bankson, pp 32-33.

¹⁵⁶ This tactic was used most famously to squelch and punish dissent during World War I under the original Espionage Act of 1917. For example, see *Schenck v. United States* 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Hundreds of political and labor radicals, anti-war protesters, and intellectuals were arrested and prosecuted under the 1917 Espionage Act of 1917, laying the foundation for its use as a powerful weapon against wartime dissent.

further action on their behalf. “It is my hope and my belief,” Myer concluded, “that they will not fail this crucial test.”

As administrators and Washington officials took a hard line with the Nisei, Issei leaders brought a new grievance to Ernst. This time there was a problem with the title of the questionnaire. Filling out a form titled “Application for Leave Clearance,” particularly in a program touted as a demonstration of loyalty and an opportunity to contribute to the war effort concerned Issei who intended to return to Japan after the war. They did not want to appear to have requested this questionnaire. Ernst agreed to rename the form simply “Questionnaire.” The demands of the Issei continued to be easier for Ernst to satisfy than those of citizens.¹⁵⁷

Once the Issei had satisfactorily resolved their own complaints, some Issei began to speak out on behalf of the Nisei. They argued that the Nisei should not voluntarily enlistment when they lacked their basic rights. They based this new set of complaints on the basis of their own experiences with race discrimination and broken promises during the First World War. One Issei pointed out that during war, promises are sometimes made that cannot or will not be kept. He said, “During the last war, India was promised independence, but that was not given.” He raised his concern that the volunteer service of the Nisei may become futile. “They are expected to do their duty as citizens of the United States,” he said, “but at the same time, they may not be given the freedom” their citizenship implied. He asked on behalf of the Nisei that their future and citizenship must be clarified now.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ “Summary of Information: War Relocation Authority and Japanese Relocation Centers”; and Bankson, 36-37.

¹⁵⁸ Bankson, Exhibit V.

Issei parents knew from experience that the United States had fought to make the world safe for democracy in the past, but had not in practice kept its promises. Issei soldiers who volunteered to fight during World War I with the promise of citizenship as their reward had to fight for more than fifteen years to get their citizenship. Some Issei veterans did, in the end, get U.S. citizenship in 1935, but without mounting a sustained struggle, they knew that the government would not have voluntarily given this status to veterans who under any other circumstances would have been ineligible for citizenship. Issei warned younger Nisei, who lacked these personal memories of broken promises, to be cautious of the government's offer of restored citizenship rights in return for voluntary combat duty.¹⁵⁹

When confronted with such serious allegations of fraudulent government promises and a persistent plea from Issei leaders to restore the civil rights of the Nisei, Ernst repeated his warning of criminal prosecution for any who refused to comply with registration. "The War Department has nothing to do with civil rights," he said. The War Department "is not engaged in anything but war now." To this someone replied, "If the Nisei do not register on the scheduled date," will they or will they not be prosecuted under the Espionage Act? Ernst responded that the Espionage act would be in force against "anyone who willingly obstructs and hurts a country."¹⁶⁰ This was not a very precise answer, but indicated Ernst's attempt to maintain the threat of prosecution for any further resistance against registration, from the Nisei or the Issei.

¹⁵⁹ Hosakawa, *Nisei: The Quiet Americans* (New York: W. Morrow, 1969), 91.

¹⁶⁰ Bankson, Exhibit V.

As the administration killed the momentum and effectiveness of Nisei resistance to registration, a new movement took its place that worked hand-in-hand with the response of the government. This movement was organized by those in camp anxious to demonstrate their patriotism and distance themselves from those who had challenged the government's absolute authority during wartime. In the early hours of Wednesday, February 17 a new committee approached Embree for assistance with their petition. They took exception with the resolution drafted by the Committee of 33 and wanted to formalize their dissent with a counter-resolution. With Embree's help, they wrote:

We feel that loyalty to our country is something to be expressed without reference to past grievances or wrongs. We feel that in according us the right to the second article of the Bill of Rights that it is the right of every man to bear arms in the defense of his country the War Department has in good faith started the first step to restore us all rights as citizens of the United States. We feel that the issue of expressing our loyalty has been confused. We believe in fighting for our country and our ideals is the most important thing when our country is at war trying to uphold those ideals for which we stand. We shall register, we are loyal, we shall fight for the United States.
Signed, other residents of Topaz¹⁶¹

The Committee of 33's smaller representative committee of 9 became incensed when they heard about this petition. They had been democratically elected and felt that this unofficial resolution undermined their authority. They complained to Ernst that they should be the only group allowed to speak for the Nisei of Topaz. To this Ernst said they would have to lodge a complaint with the Community Council.¹⁶² Embree encouraged a smaller group's efforts to project their patriotism and skirt the democratic process. By combining threats of criminal prosecution while at the same time stimulating patriotism,

¹⁶¹ Petition reprinted in the *Topaz Times*, February 17, 1943.

¹⁶² Bankson, 40-41.

Embree demonstrated the power of these two coercive powers in ending the registration crisis at Topaz.

Resistance against registration ended dramatically when Block 5 flooded into administration offices on Wednesday, February 17 to register their loyalty. A large number of leading pro-U.S. Issei and patriotic Nisei lived in block 5, so their turnout was not a complete surprise. For the first time registration seemed to be reality. Word spread throughout the camps that registration had begun. After this massive response from one block, those who had resisted in the past began showing up for their own turn to register.¹⁶³

The Yoshida Family's Response to Registration

Ken Yoshida registered on February 18, 1943. The form was entitled, "Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry." A U.S. Selective Service symbol was at the top of the form and a statement at the end warned that any who gave false information would be in violation of selective service laws. This was no simple form, and most Nisei understood so when they appeared for registration.¹⁶⁴

The questionnaire began simply, asking for basic biographical information, but the questions became progressively more complicated. The questionnaire first asked for the former place of residence, names of Caucasian acquaintances, family members and occupations and whether or not the registrant was a registered voter. The form asked for

¹⁶³ Bankson, p.43.

¹⁶⁴ "Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry," NARA RG 210, Evacuee Case Files, box 7187, file 12484, Ken Yoshida.

information about education, employment, foreign travel and relatives living in Japan. It also asked for language skills, sports and hobbies, foreign investments, clubs, organizations, magazine subscriptions, and so on. Yoshida's record demonstrated little connection with Japan. He boasted an American education. And his employment history was lengthy. It would appear there was nothing unusual or problematic about his questionnaire thus far.¹⁶⁵

Unknown to detainees, the military evaluated the answers to most questions on a point scale depending on how "Japanese" or how "American" registrants seemed based on the simple facts of their lives.¹⁶⁶ For example, if a registrant marked that he or she was Christian, he or she would earn 2 points, but if a registrant marked that he or she was Buddhist, he/she would lose 1 point. Any registrants who identified themselves as Shintoists would be automatically classified disloyal. Registrants could even earn or lose points by association as well. Those with relatives in the U.S. military could earn one point, but those whose fathers had been interned in Department of Justice Camps would lose 3 points. If registrants were members of a Judo or Kendo club, they could lose three points, but if a member of the JACL, they would earn one point. Registrants would earn three points if they were members of the YMCA, Masons, Rotary Club or Boy Scouts of America.

Ken Yoshida had been falsely identified as a member of the JACL, which would have given him one positive point. He indicated that he donated money to the Red Cross

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Point system for questionnaire in author's possession, courtesy of Chizu Omori. See also: Emiko Omori, *Rabbit in the Moon: A Documentary/Memoir* (PBS, 1999).

occasionally, which may have counted positively on his behalf. One of his pastimes, though, was Judo, possibly deducting three points from his loyalty score. Had his father, a high ranking Judo instructor, been found by the FBI following Pearl Harbor as they had intended, Ken's score would have been at least five points in the negative even before answering the loyalty questions.¹⁶⁷

The most famous, or infamous final two questions on loyalty and military service caused Nisei lasting concern. Question 27 asked if individuals would be willing to serve in the armed forces wherever called. Many balked at this question. It seemed to some like an underhanded way of getting people to volunteer for the military. Question 28 asked registrants to declare unqualified allegiance to the United States and forswear allegiance to the Emperor of Japan. The Issei had already agitated for a replacement question, but Nisei were still required to answer this question, implying that they had once been loyal to Japan. Ken Yoshida answered “yes” to both questions, even though personally, he did not believe it was necessary to disavow allegiance to the Emperor of Japan.

Questions 27 and 28 received the most attention during the war and from historians after the war, but one additional question deserves closer scrutiny: the dual citizenship question.¹⁶⁸ Question 25 asked: “To the best of your knowledge was your birth ever registered with any Japanese government agency for the purpose of

¹⁶⁷ Ken Yoshida, personal communication with the author; “Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry,” NARA RG 210, Evacuee Case Files, box 7187, file 12484, Ken Yoshida; Point system for questionnaire, courtesy of Chizu Omori. See also: Emiko Omori, *Rabbit in the Moon: A Documentary/Memoir* (PBS, 1999).

¹⁶⁸ Of the historians who have addressed the registration crisis, none to my knowledge mention anything about questions designed to resolve Nisei dual citizenship. For the most thorough study of the registration crisis, see: Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*, pp. 134-155.

establishing a claim to Japanese citizenship?" "If so," the question continued, "have you applied for cancellation of of such registration?" Together, these questions functioned as a method to resolve once and for all the citizenship of Japanese Americans. Congress killed two attempts to pass legislation forcing dual citizens to renounce one of their allegiances. This registration form supplanted the failed Congressional legislation and could be applied to the Japanese Americans, eliminating the problems associated with treating German and Italian Americans with the same law that was designed to address fears of Japanese disloyalty. Even so the questions as written were flawed. The questionnaire did not ask those Nisei nineteen and older in 1943 if they had renounced their dual citizenship. Their citizenship in Japan had been granted automatically and did not depend on their parents registering their births with any Japanese agency. Ken Yoshida rightfully reported on his questionnaire that his birth had not been reported to the Japanese government. Unless he or his parents had renounced his Japanese citizenship, though, he remained a dual citizen. By answering yes to question 28, as far as the U.S. Government was concerned, he had renounced his allegiance to the Emperor of Japan and his dual citizenship no longer had any bearing on his obligations to the U.S. Military.

Ken Yoshida's name was forwarded on for further processing by Selective Service as a potential candidate for the draft if and when it would be reinstated for Nisei. But he and his family made other plans. Many families responded to the bitterness they felt at the end of the registration crisis by filing for repatriation to Japan for the parents and expatriation from the United States for their children. The principle goal of most families when they chose this option was keeping the family together at all costs. Ken

Yoshida's father was not content to sit back and see what the future would bring to him and his wife, his five sons, and two daughters. He instructed the family to file for repatriation and expatriation to Japan after the program of registration was complete. He had been active in pro-Japan circles of Issei men in camp before registration and believed that the United States had demonstrated quite clearly that it would not defend even the rights of his citizen children. He held some property in Japan and in an effort to protect his family's financial welfare and keep the family together, they all filed for repatriation or expatriation.¹⁶⁹

The Yoshida family was not alone in their request for repatriation or expatriation. After registration the number of repatriation requests increased from little more than a thousand at the end of 1942 to nearly five times that many by the end of 1943. Unlike the requests in 1942 that came almost entirely from Issei, the requests in 1943 came from Issei and Nisei as entire families made the choice to seek their fortunes in Japan after the war where they hoped to find greater economic security and full citizenship.

The End of the Registration Crisis at Topaz

On February 19, the day after Ken Yoshida registered, and two days after the first successful registration of block 5, the official representative body of Nisei received a response to their petition from the Secretary of War. It marked the end of an experiment

¹⁶⁹ Evacuee Case Files, box 7187, file 12484, Ken Yoshida.

with democracy at Topaz. The response came through Colonel Scobey and was received by residents of Topaz with surprise and excitement. He wrote:

Public pronouncement has already been made by the President of the United States and by the Secretary of War. It is only by mutual confidence and cooperation that the loyal Japanese Americans can be restored to their civil rights. The present program is not complete rehabilitation but is the first step in that direction. The United States government has evidenced its faith in the loyal Japanese Americans giving them the opportunity to serve their country. This is their opportunity to demonstrate to the American people that they have faith in America.

This was nothing new to residents, but the mere fact that democracy had worked in this case, that individual citizens had been able to appeal to a high-ranking government official such as Secretary of War Stimson and get a response and assurances that more civil rights would come made many in camp very happy. One observer wrote: "Word quickly flashed through the center that the answer had come That night pans were banged and gongs were rung in almost every block of the center, calling people to listen to the announcement of the committee that the Secretary of War had answered their questions and that now everyone should register." This observer concluded that from his point of view a very important civil right had been restored. This was the right of citizens to make themselves heard and get a response directly from one of the "highest ranking government officials, which gave them the assurance they needed." "That was democracy at work," he wrote. For others, this version of democracy was far less than perfect. It had done nothing to restore real rights, but instead had resolved some grievances and suppressed attempts to agitate for real democratic change. A few may have welcomed Stimson's response as evidence that their petition was heard, but many

more probably realized that no matter how organized their resistance, their citizenship rights and obligations would remain out of balance likely for the duration of the war.¹⁷⁰

The Committee of 33 responded in their own way to Stimson's letter. They announced that it was time for all the residents of Topaz to register. The registration crisis at Topaz had officially come to an end. It appeared as though all legal means of protest had been exhausted.

Stimson's letter did little more than reiterate the propaganda that the War Department used to launch registration in the first place. This was a first step in restoring the responsibilities of citizens, but it was no guarantee that rights would follow. The organized resistance at Topaz demonstrated that citizens lacked the ability to force specific change because of their citizenship. They were required as citizens to comply with Selective Service procedures under penalty of the Espionage Act. Unless they were willing to move their protest from democratic dissent to criminalized disobedience, their only recourse would be to petition for a promise that someday their rights would be restored.

Unexpected Results of Registration: Prisons and Patriotism

When registration in Topaz was complete on February 27, little more than three percent percent of those eligible volunteered for service.¹⁷¹ The few who had volunteered

¹⁷⁰ Bankson, p. 45.

¹⁷¹ Lt. W.L. Tracey indicated that Nisei "are showing by their questionnaires that they are determined to prove to the nation that faith in the loyal, patriotic American citizens of Topaz is justified." Gives "special credit" to certain blocks for their "fine registration records." The blocks noted were 4-6, 8, 10 and 12. Bankson, p. 47 and Exhibit Z, *Topaz Times*, (February 22-27, 1943.) See also, Hayashi, *Democratizing the*

organized a grassroots effort to recruit their peers. Their efforts paid off. The numbers of volunteers quickly increased by twenty new recruits. They increased their efforts by holding open meetings. Some volunteers shared their enthusiasm for the war effort with women who were considering volunteering for the WAACs. On March 6 volunteers organized a formal committee designed to recruit even more volunteers and called it the “Resident Council for Japanese American Civil Rights.” They prepared a pamphlet explaining to male citizens reasons why they should volunteer. On March 7, with the help of a growing number of enthusiastic women supporters, the committee organized a group called the “Volunteers for Victory” and held a large banquet and dance. The Committee of future WAACs hosted the event and invited 130 guests. In just three days following the dance and banquet, 112 additional Nisei volunteered, meeting the final March 10 deadline for voluntary recruitment for the new combat team.¹⁷²

The Topaz “Volunteers for Victory” turned their recruiting effort into a propaganda campaign of Nisei loyalty in hopes of changing public opinion about the Nisei. They met with political, ecclesiastical and business leaders of the state of Utah. They sent their own “Volunteers for Victory” pamphlet to Congressmen, ministers, educators and JACL leaders nationwide. Most recipients of the pamphlet wrote back congratulating the group on their support of the war effort, and some even pointed out how well they used propaganda for their own purposes. The JACL requested that the “Volunteers for Victory” let them use portions of their pamphlet for their national image campaign.

Enemy, p. 144 and “Number of Blocks 100 Per Cent in Current Registration,” *Topaz Times* (February 23, 1943).

¹⁷² FBI, “Summary of Information: War Relocation Authority and Japanese Relocation Centers.”

As a result of the vigorous national campaign of the “Volunteers for Victory,” and the ultimate failure of Topaz Nisei to force any concrete changes in government policy regarding their civil rights, by the end of 1943, few remembered the trouble that registration had caused at Topaz. The efforts of individual Nisei to promote patriotism in combination with government threats of felon charges of espionage to crush the resistance turned memories of registration at Topaz from that of the most organized site of resistance to one of the most patriotic of the camps.¹⁷³

The registration program and the “loyalty” questionnaire had provoked the first widespread resistance to the War Department's decision to restore Nisei obligations of military service without first restoring their rights. Topaz led this early resistance as the only camp to stall registration for an entire week.¹⁷⁴ Even though residents of Topaz eventually lost their fight to delay registration permanently until Nisei rights were restored, some continued the resistance in more personal ways, such as answering the loyalty questions “no-no,” or registering for re/expatriation. Most important, just because registration finally got underway and 100 percent percent of all draft-age Nisei men in Topaz complied with registration did not mean that all were satisfied with the results of their resistance. For some this was only the beginning of their continued fight for a full

¹⁷³ The organized resistance to registration at Topaz remains remarkably absent from not only from surveys of the registration crisis, but most remarkably from those books that focus exclusively on Topaz. See: Sandra Taylor, *Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Leonard J. Arrington, *The Price of Prejudice: The Japanese-American Relocation Center in Utah during World War II*, second edition (Delta, Utah: Topaz Museum, 1997).

¹⁷⁴ The most thorough examination of the registration crisis and an excellent starting point for anyone interested in understanding the politics of internment, including one of the first books to examine seriously the resistance that government policies like registration incited in the camps, see Michi Weglyn's *Years of Infamy*.

restoration of civil rights.¹⁷⁵ One hundred percent of male citizens 17 and older registered, totaling approximately 1,450, but several hundred of these men replied ‘no’ to the loyalty question and a large number asked for expatriation. Of all adults that registered, 83 percent percent responded positively to the loyalty question, 12 percent answered ‘no,’ less than 5 percent simply left the answer blank.¹⁷⁶

Statistics across the camps were equally if not more indicative of continued individual resistance than those from Topaz. Only 1,208, less than 6 percent of eligible Nisei, enlisted. This number fell far short of the quota the War Department had set for itself to start with 2,500 Nisei volunteers from inside the camps, and later a reduced goal of 2,000. Seventeen percent of all registrants and approximately 20 percent of all Nisei answered loyalty questions in the negative. Most shocking to WRA administrators was the sharp rise in applications for repatriation and expatriation to Japan. Late the previous year only 2,255 individuals had requested repatriation to Japan, and most of these were Issei. By 1943 this number shot over 9,000 and most new applicants were citizens. The trend continued into 1944 when the number of re/expatriation requests topped out at nearly 20,000, or 16 percent of the total evacuated population.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ Those who reacted to the registration crisis as the final blow against their rights as citizens and chose to give up that citizenship rather than jump through any more administrative hoops are the subject of Donald Collins’ book, *Native American Aliens: Renunciation of Citizenship by Japanese Americans during World War II*, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1985).

¹⁷⁶ United States, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians* (Washington, D.C.: Civil Liberties Public Education Fund; Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).

¹⁷⁷ Of 19,963 Nisei of military age, 6 percent volunteered (1,181) and approximately 800 of the 1,181 volunteers passed loyalty test and physical and were inducted into the original 442nd; 24 percent answered no to 28 (4,783) -- little more than 50 percent answered no at Manzanar – only 2 percent at Minidoka. Of general population – or overall, 6,700 answered no to 28 and an additional 2,000 qualified their answers. 65,000 provided unqualified “yes.” Minutes of “Meeting held to discuss results of investigation,” April 9, 1943. RG 65, 62-69030, box 81, item 97; Ng, pp 58-61; Hayashi, *Democratizing the Enemy*, p. 144.

The War Relocation Authority, the FBI, War Department, and even a special Senate Committee all tried to explain the results of registration. War Relocation Authority psychologists and sociologists argued emphatically that negative responses to the loyalty questions served as a final means of protest against evacuation. Negative responses did not, in their eyes, constitute any concrete proof of disloyalty.¹⁷⁸

Registration produced many unexpected problems and revealed frustrations and anger among the Nikkei population that could not easily be contained by either state repression or the propaganda of patriotism. The War Department had planned at first to house all those who fell into the “disloyal” category in a small isolation facility located in Southern Utah. It became clear that this plan would not work after 3,000 individuals at Tule Lake refused to register and the registration process fell apart in that camp. As a result, Tule Lake, the largest WRA facility became the new segregation center. Even then the camp became overcrowded and could not accommodate all those who filed for expatriation and repatriation over the coming year. Six thousand of the original residents of Tule Lake remained in the camp once it became a segregation facility to house “disloyal” Nikkei. More than 11,000 individuals were sent to Tule Lake from other camps, bringing the “disloyal” population up to 18,000 total. The pressures of overcrowding and the lack of tolerance exhibited by administrators for dissent led to rioting, and eventually military repression and control of the camp. Tule Lake represents one of the darkest stories of the registration crisis.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ FBI, “Summary of Information: War Relocation Authority and Japanese Relocation Centers.”

¹⁷⁹ CWRIC, p. 208; Ng, p. 58

Congress conducted its own investigation of the results of registration and responded by passing the first wartime law that allowed citizens to renounce their citizenship. Many had already accused the WRA of incompetence after the riots and deaths in Manzanar late in 1942. After the registration crisis, Congressmen interpreted resistance on the part of detainees as proof that large numbers of Japanese Americans were loyal to Japan. On July 1, 1944, Congress passed Public Law 405, allowing citizens to renounce their citizenship. In October of the same year, instructions were sent to all the camps to help facilitate the process.¹⁸⁰

President Roosevelt was equally concerned about the disastrous and unexpected results of registration and asked an old friend, Milton Eisenhower (the original director of the WRA) for his reaction. Eisenhower replied that the negative response should not have been unexpected. After all, nothing in the democratic training of young Nisei prepared them for the conditions and decisions they faced in the camps. He wrote in a letter to President Roosevelt:

Persons in this group find themselves living in a situation for which their public school and democratic teachings have not prepared them. It is hard for them to escape a conviction that their plight is due more to racial discrimination, economic motivations and wartime prejudices than any real necessity from the military point of view for evacuation from the West Coast.¹⁸¹

Eisenhower wisely noted that a young person schooled in democracy may very well balk at the idea of being treated like an enemy alien, but perhaps he was confused on just one point. Perhaps the democratic training of children in the public schools prepared them

¹⁸⁰ Public Law 405. Procedures announced by Attorney General in 9 Federal Register 12241. See also, Memo, October 12, 1944, RG 210, Entry 16, 31.009, box 229, "citizenship" folder; and Ng, 60-61.

¹⁸¹ Letter, Milton Eisenhower to President Roosevelt, April 13, 1943 as quoted in Robinson, *By Order of the President*, 188.

very well for the problems they encountered in the camps. They learned to respond with dissent, petitions, non-compliance, and an extensive list of personal and creative forms of civil disobedience.

The most important result of registration was the division of Nisei into “loyal” and “disloyal.”¹⁸² One Nisei student related a saying in response: “The army, being the cowboys, and us Japs (that’s what they call us and I don’t like it) as cattle, rounded up and sent to a place where they will be separated from the good ones and the bad ones, (loyal and disloyal ones) and slaughter the good ones and leave the old ones to die.”¹⁸³

¹⁸² J. Edgar Hoover, Memorandum for Mr. Edward J. Ennis, Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit, March 4, 1943, RG 65, box 81, 62-69030, folder 95.

¹⁸³ Letter to Fisher, (n.a.), February 10, 1943, Fisher Files, JERS, Bancroft Library, MSS 67/14 (reel 83).

CHAPTER 4

THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

Therefore, we should devote ourselves... to make every man understand that unless he in good faith performs his duties he is not entitled to any rights at all.

Theodore Roosevelt¹⁸⁴

On January 20, 1944, Secretary of War Henry Stimson announced that Selective Service had restored Nisei eligibility for the draft. Stimson declared that the draft gave Nisei the chance to restore their citizenship and repair their public image as loyal Americans. The government had demonstrated its faith in the Nisei, Stimson said, now it was time for Nisei to demonstrate their faith in America.¹⁸⁵

Just one month later, on February 22, fifty-three Nisei men were scheduled to take the train from Amache to Denver for their pre-induction physicals, but five refused to go. They became the first Nisei to resist the draft, but they were not the first to protest. In Topaz and Amache, as in other camps, residents organized against the draft much as they had against the loyalty registration program the year before. Groups held meetings, filed petitions, sent letters, and tried to negotiate for a full restoration of Nisei rights before they could be drafted.

¹⁸⁴ Theodore Roosevelt, Knights of Columbus speech, October 12, 1915 as quoted in Emory S. Bogardus, *Essentials of Americanization* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1923), 410.

¹⁸⁵ Sandra Taylor, *Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 171.

Japanese Americans protested against the draft in diverse ways, including direct civil disobedience. Most detainees could see that the draft, when applied to an incarcerated population of citizens, did nothing to restore Nisei rights. Those who refused to comply with the draft represent the remnants of a broad-based attempt to force the government to restore rights along with responsibilities.

In an attempt to squelch resistance, government officials and organizations like the JACL marginalized protesters with accusations of criminality while at the same time promoting patriotic compliance as the only appropriate response to the draft.

Restoration of the Draft and Protest at Topaz

Restoration of the draft for Nisei unleashed confusion at all levels of government and prompted an immediate response within the camps. At Topaz, the Millard County draft board identified 121 individuals it deemed acceptable to the army, but two of those listed were women, and fifty were no longer living in the camp.¹⁸⁶ Some began receiving notices from their original draft boards asking them to report for pre-induction physicals in California. Yet military restrictions forbade anyone of Japanese ancestry from entering the restricted zone along most of the West Coast and lower third of Arizona. Detainees in all of the camps met in mess halls, in the latrines, anywhere they could get together to plan how they would respond to the impending draft. Was it really

¹⁸⁶ Ralph C. Barnhart to Philip M. Glick, February 3, 1944. Robert A. Leflar Papers, MC 206, University of Arkansas Special Collections, Fayetteville, box 2, folder 1.

constitutional, most wondered, for the government to restore only the obligations of citizenship and none of the rights?

Topaz residents were among the first to send Washington a formal list of questions regarding the draft. The draft-age Nisei of Topaz wanted to know why they had been classified IV-C in the first place? Could those honorably discharged regain the right to travel freely anywhere in the U.S., including California? Why would they be drafted only into combat teams in the Army? Why would they not be allowed to serve in other branches of the military? Was this merely a publicity stunt? Why would the parents of Nisei servicemen not receive citizenship like Chinese veterans' parents had been promised? Why were women and aliens appearing on the list of those acceptable for service?

Some organized a group called the "Topaz Citizens for the Principles of American Democracy." They wrote Washington, insisting that the principles of American democracy were incompatible with segregated units. The committee recommended that the President and War Department not use Nisei draftees as replacements for the all-Nisei combat team that had been created with the volunteers recruited through the loyalty registration program of 1943. Instead, draftees should be assigned to units throughout the U.S. military services. Finally, the citizens of Topaz reminded the president that Nisei had a stake in two wars: the war against fascism abroad and the war against prejudice at home. Friendships made on the battlefield, regardless of race or ancestry, would translate into better race relations after the war. The citizens of Topaz requested a "redress of grievances prior to their being inducted into service."¹⁸⁷ They wanted the

¹⁸⁷ "Topaz," *Rocky Shimpō*, February 19, 1944.

government to restore their citizenship fully before they would be willing to enter into military service.¹⁸⁸

The “Topaz Citizens” were joined by their mothers in their protest. The Mothers of Topaz sent resolutions and recommendations to the President, as well as to Dillon Myer, Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop and Eleanor Roosevelt. When the mothers of Topaz met to draft their resolutions, some women proposed that they withhold the service of their sons unless the rights of their children were first restored. When the women considered the details of their petition, most thought such an ultimatum would go too far. The final resolution contained no ultimatum, but still demanded that something be done to rectify the undemocratic circumstances under which their children would be drafted.

In a petition signed by 1,141 women, they wrote:

We mothers of American citizens of Japanese descent have fully cooperated for years with the American educational system so that our children would be worthy American citizens. We have taught our children to affirm their loyalty especially in time of a National emergency. This ideal is in keeping with the traditional spirit of Japanese mothers. As you may know, before the evacuation we did not in one instance oppose the drafting of our sons, but willingly sent them with our encouragement.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ Frank Yamasaki and Seiko Yakahi, “Recommendations of Topaz Citizens for the Principles of American Democracy (Non-Segregated Units),” February 26, 1944. RG 210, Field Basic Documentation, Central Utah, reel #4, Selective Service Folder. Frank Yamasaki, Chairman of the Citizens Committee of Topaz, “Our Fight for Equal Rights,” February 26, 1944, RG 210, Field Basic Documentation, Central Utah, reel #4, Internal Security, Reports Publications Folder. For reactions to the draft in other camps, see: Community Analysis Reports, Colorado River, M 1342, roll 10, item 145; and Community Analysis Report, “Chronology of the Draft,” February 17, 1944, Granada #53, M 1342, roll #15. The Topaz Citizens’ reference to a war abroad and a war at home is very similar to the Double V campaign popularized by the *Pittsburgh Courier* beginning with its February 7, 1942 edition with an eagle resting on a banner that said “Double Victory.” See: Frederick Voss, *Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute, 1994); James G. Thompson, “Should I Sacrifice to Live ‘Half American’?” *The Pittsburgh Courier*, January 31, 1942; and “The Courier’s Double ‘V’ For a Double Victory Campaign Gets Country-Wide Support,” *The Pittsburgh Courier*, February 14, 1942.

¹⁸⁹ “Statement from Mothers of Topaz, W.R.A. Center,” March 11, 1944. Field Basic Documentation – Central Utah, Internal Security Report, Reel #4. Mrs. Wakako Adachi appeared as the principle signer of the resolution. Women in Amache also organized a petition. The Blue Star Mothers and the Women’s

How could these mothers send their sons into battle so willingly under the present circumstances? Until the War Department restored more than just the right to die for the country, until the War Department also restored citizens' rights to free travel and to serve in all branches of the military, these Japanese mothers wrote they could not in good faith send their sons into harm's way. They would only do so under protest.

In response to the Topaz Mothers' petition, Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop reminded the mothers that they had no right to dictate military decisions. It had long been the policy of the War Department to use inductees where they were most needed to win the war, wrote Dunlop, and the War Department needed replacements for the Nisei units. He appreciated the mothers' desire to see fair treatment for their children and promised that every effort would be made to eliminate inequities in policies affecting their sons.¹⁹⁰

Dillon Myer responded to the Mothers of Topaz with sympathy and a warning that they avoid any appearance of espionage. He wrote that he appreciated the mothers' devotion to democratic principles, but in their devotion they needed to be aware of the

Federation of Amache filed a joint resolution, drafted by Kay Sugahara (a male JAACL leader), calling for the restoration of Nisei citizenship rights. "Amache Women to File Petition," *Rocky Shimpō* March 13, 1944. Leland Barrows to Mrs. Wakako Adachi, March 22, 1944, reprinted in "Mothers' Petition Answered," *Topaz Times*, April 12, 1944. For a thorough analysis of the relationship between motherhood, citizenship and soldiers, see: Theda Skopol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1992). See also: Linda Kerber, *No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998); Kerber, ed., *Toward an Intellectual History of Women: Essay* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Laura McEnaney, "He-Men and Christian Mothers: The America First Movement and the Gendered Meanings of Patriotism and Isolationism," *Diplomatic History* 18 (1994), 47-57.

¹⁹⁰ Robert H. Dunlop to Adachi, March 24, 1944, reprinted in "Mothers' Petition Answered," *Topaz Times*, April 12, 1944; Leland Barrows to Mrs. Wakako Adachi, March 22, 1944, reprinted in "Mothers' Petition Answered," *Topaz Times*, April 12, 1944; and "Three Answers to Mothers' Petition Here," *Topaz Times*, April 18, 1944.

time that it takes to make important changes like the ones the mothers were demanding. Myer urged the mothers to see the draft as a first step in the gradual restoration of their children's citizenship. He also gave them a stern warning when he wrote: "I am certain that you want to take no step which would interfere with the progress toward complete restoration of civil rights," Myer wrote, "and the recognition of your children as loyal American citizens." His corrective tone prevailed in official responses to all forms of resistance, particularly those that hinted at an ultimatum.¹⁹¹

Response to the Draft at Amache

Some in Amache proposed that if the entire population of Nisei resisted the draft, none of them could be prosecuted. This sentiment had a very popular following. The Community Council requested that the entire camp vote on how they should respond to the draft, especially whether or not they would threaten mass resistance. Five blocks voted to withhold Nisei service entirely. Other blocks declined to vote on the issue. Still others voted by an overwhelming majority to avoid making threats. All twenty-nine blocks agreed unanimously to send some sort of resolutions to Washington protesting the draft, but they would not send them in the form of an ultimatum. Those who chose to resist the draft would have to act individually.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ Dillon Myer to Adachi, March 27, 1944, reprinted in "Mothers' Petition Answered," *Topaz Times*, April 12, 1944.

¹⁹² John A Rademaker to Edward H. Spicer, February 16, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, M 1342, roll 15.

The idea of total resistance to the draft may not have won the support of the majority of detainees at Amache, but it is still significant that the camp took the idea under consideration. It shows that far more considered the possibility of civil disobedience than actually faced criminal prosecution. It also demonstrated to WRA administrators that if they did nothing to counter the growing unrest, they could have a crisis even larger in scale than they had faced during registration.

Administrators did not understand detainee objections to the draft and they looked to their resident community analyst for answers. This analyst was John T. Rademaker. He had been hired to study community relations in the camp, document the experience, analyze it, and most importantly, mediate between administrators and detainees. He had worked at the University of Washington before the war. In the 1930s, he published a study of the Japanese American community in Seattle, Washington. Rademaker described his most important role while working in Amache. He wrote that to the Nikkei, his job was to explain administrative rules and regulations. To administrators, his role was to explain Nikkei reactions.¹⁹³ This was a time when both sides needed his services as much as ever.

Rademaker wrote a lengthy report to his supervisor in Washington, renowned anthropologist Edward Spicer, explaining Nikkei reactions. Nikkei had many legitimate reasons to withhold support for the draft, including a long history of race discrimination,

¹⁹³ John A Rademaker to Edward H. Spicer, February 16, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, M 1342, roll 15. For an excellent study of the community analysts and the implications of their studies and methods, see: Lane Hiryo Hirabayashi, *The Politics of Fieldwork: Research in an American Concentration Camp* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999).

the extraordinary risks Nisei faced on the battlefield, and a seeming absence of democracy in the camps.

First, Rademaker explained the Issei point of view. Issei still harbored resentment from the first war. Alien volunteers were promised citizenship in exchange for military service. The government, however, did not give citizenship to the Issei. They had to lobby Congress for more than fifteen years to get the citizenship they were promised. Issei warned Nisei that if they accepted military service without first demanding their full citizenship, they too might be “left holding the bag” when the war was over. Rademaker wrote that it was more the Issei than the Nisei who “were not in sympathy with the idea of the draft-age Nisei going into service until their citizenship rights were restored with their duties and responsibilities.” Feelings had become so “acrimonious” that any who supported the draft might be accused of being an administrative “stooge or *inu*.”¹⁹⁴

Nisei responses to racial discrimination varied greatly. Some Nisei had attended segregated schools. Others could not swim in public pools, or patronize the same beaches or golf courses as other Americans. Some responded to these experiences with resentment and resistance. Others responded, Rademaker observed, with “excessive patriotic zeal” by becoming “belligerent” in their loyalty. Interestingly Rademaker predicted one of the most important dynamics of the draft crisis. Patriotic Nisei would become the most hostile critics of the resisters, and yet, according to Rademaker, both the resisters and the patriots responded to wartime conditions based on pre-war lessons in race and discrimination.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Rademaker to Spicer, February 16, 1944.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

Another reason Nisei were reluctant to embrace the draft enthusiastically was the unusually high casualty rate of the all-Nisei combat team. During the summer months of 1943, the 442nd combat team suffered heavy losses at a rate of 1,272 or 25 percent of the unit's total size. In addition, rumors abounded that the Nisei combat team regularly received the most dangerous missions. Rademaker wrote that nobody celebrates the draft, not even outside of the camps. Citizens accept it as an unpleasant duty, not a privilege. For those in the camps, especially those who believed the Army was drafting Nisei as replacement cannon fodder, Rademaker implied that it would be unreasonable to expect anything less than resistance.¹⁹⁶

Rademaker concluded that in his opinion, the opponents of the draft were “probably justified.”¹⁹⁷ Many had begun calling America “a benevolent dictatorship under the guise of a democracy.” Rademaker sympathized. Patriotism is hard to feel from inside a relocation center. “Democracy,” he wrote, no longer functioned “as we were taught and as we believed.” “It is small wonder,” Rademaker continued, “that few Nisei dare to raise their heads now and say, ‘we’re loyal and we’re willing to fight for the U.S.’ even though many of them feel that way.” Rademaker explained that the reluctance on the part of the majority to express their patriotism in the face of their treatment in the camps was why there had been throughout the camps what he called “a veritable flood of resolutions, requests, demands and ultimatums floating around.”¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Ibid; U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians* (Washington, D.C.: CLPEF; Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 253-57.

¹⁹⁷ Rademaker to Spicer.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

Administrators turned to social scientists like Rademaker to explain Nikkei behavior, but detainees looked to attorneys to explain their legal rights and obligations. Each camp had its own resident attorney to assist detainees with an assortment of legal needs that arose while they were in the camps, and to assist the WRA in their administration of the camps. At Amache the attorney was Donald T. Horn. Horn met several times with the community council during the first weeks of February when turmoil and confusion were at their peak. From a legal perspective, he told detainees, the draft and Nisei rights were two separate issues, and that under no circumstances should they make their acceptance of the draft contingent on a full restoration of their rights.

Persuaded by Project Attorney Horn that legally there could be no connection between the grievances of evacuation and the duty of citizens to submit to the draft, the members of the Community Council sent a letter to Washington accepting the draft as a duty and a right of citizenship. This letter, however, did not represent unanimous support for the draft.¹⁹⁹

At the same time Horn was urging the Council to accept the draft, 150 requests for repatriation and expatriation came flooding into the camp director's office. Director Lindley's office received 150 over a two day period following the announcement that the draft would be reopened for the Nisei. Only fifteen of the 150 requests came from draft-age Nisei, but because of the timing, camp administrators feared this was another attempt to avoid the draft. Lindley responded by declaring he would no longer accept any applications for expatriation or repatriation. Dillon Myer announced that there would be

¹⁹⁹ "Amache to Petition Draft Grievances," *Rocky Shimo*, February 21, 1944.

no more transfers to Tule Lake.²⁰⁰ In an ironic twist, once the draft was in place, those requesting to leave the United States would no longer automatically be classified as disloyal or even be exempt from Selective Service.

Just two years earlier the nation debated one question. Would Japanese Americans be loyal to the United States or Japan? No matter how hard Nisei tried to prove their loyalty, all persons of Japanese descent were reclassified as enemy aliens by Selective Service. All those living in the restricted West Coast were evacuated and incarcerated, along with their enemy alien parents, on the presumption that they might be disloyal. Now it seemed that loyalty was no longer a prerequisite for military service.

On February 21, Dillon Myer sent instructions to all camp administrators on how they should handle the growing threat of an outright draft resistance movement. He listed a variety of problems all camps should expect. The first would be petitions. Myer reminded camp directors of the right of every citizen to petition the state. If they received any of these, they should forward them directly to his office for his inspection. At the same time, directors should explain that the draft remains independent of other complaints. "No real or fancied grievances can be allowed to interfere with its operation," Myer warned. Second, young men who chose to file for expatriation should be allowed to do so as long as they were warned that such action would not "preclude or delay a call for induction." Requests for expatriation, Myer declared, did not provide "conclusive evidence of disloyalty." Third, some Nisei were already declaring their intention to ignore their call for pre-induction physicals. These Nisei should receive the strongest warning of all. Camp administrators were instructed to tell Nisei that they

²⁰⁰ Donald Horn to Philip Glick, February 19, 1944, Leflar Papers, box 3, folder 16, Arkansas.

would be guilty of Selective Service violations and subject to the criminal penalties of draft evasion. Moreover, Myer told camp authorities to provide local draft boards their full cooperation in apprehending and prosecuting any who carried through with their plans to resist the draft.²⁰¹

Even as Myer gave instructions how camp administrators were to handle potential resisters, he cautioned that a simple declaration of *intent* to refuse the draft was not a criminal act. He maintained that widespread draft resistance could be avoided if handled properly. He wrote in a teletype to the camp directors, “The wiser heads among the evacuees may want to talk to such young men, to their parents, and help them realize the serious consequences to the young man... and to the whole group.” Accepting the draft, after all, represented a “major step toward the restoration of the rights of American citizens of Japanese ancestry and if properly accepted can lead to the restoration of many other rights which evacuees feel they should have.” Any act to resist this opportunity, wrote Myer, would create a “serious detriment of the whole evacuee community.” Myer concluded with the hope that Nikkei leaders within the camps would do whatever they could to “avoid the drastic effect which might come from the unthinking actions of a few prospective or actual draft dodgers.” The personal penalties draft resisters would suffer by law, \$10,000 in fines, twenty years in prison, or both would pale in comparison to the overall harm that the resistance would cause the entire evacuee population.²⁰²

Project director Lindley decided that, for his part, he would make most of Dillon Myer’s recommendations public by way of an all-camp announcement. He drew up a list

²⁰¹ Teletype from D. Myer to all project attorneys, February 21, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, M 1342, roll 15.

²⁰² Ibid.

of items to be read in every dining hall throughout camp. The letter declared that no more Nisei of draft-age would be sent to Tule Lake and the five that had been sent already were on their way back to camp. He told block managers, "Please advise your young men of military age that a request for expatriation will not in itself preclude or delay a call for induction." He warned, "it cannot fail to have a serious effect on their future in the United States and indirectly on the future of the whole evacuee population." In translating the instructions from Dillon Myer, the threat of fines and prison were the least the Nisei had to worry about. The future of the entire evacuee population was at stake.

Significantly, Lindley's announcement met with resistance of an unexpected sort. Two out of five mess halls failed to read portions of director Lindley's letter. None of the mess halls read the letter in English. This bothered Lindley the most. Reading the notice only in Japanese meant that the target audience was the Issei, but it was Nisei resistance to the draft that he was trying to avert. Why not give the information to Nisei in English, so that they, too, could understand the seriousness of the situation? Lindley was baffled and upset that the Nisei, many of whom could not understand Japanese, did not get the message first hand.²⁰³

Other staff members at Amache tried their hand at encouraging Nisei to accept the draft and to dissuade those who were contemplating resistance. Amache Superintendent of Education Paul Terry reminded the Nisei that they had already reaped great benefits of citizenship in this country in the form of education. He asked in return, "What would

²⁰³ James G. Lindley, "Open letter to all Block Managers," n.d. Community Analysis Reports, M 1342, roll 15.

they say about the one-third of a million dollars being spent for the Amache school buildings?” Surely the Nisei, who had “been educated in the institutions of the West Coast” had already benefited greatly from their free education in the United States at great expense to tax payers. They continued to benefit from education in the camps. It was imperative, according to Superintendent Terry, that the Nisei give back in the form of military service. “If this program proves successful,” Terry said, “then the public will immediately recognize your loyalty. But if it should prove a failure,” Terry warned, “then they will say, ‘I told you so... They belong right where they are.’ The responsibility lies with each of you.”²⁰⁴

Despite camp administrators’ best efforts to prevent any direct disobedience to the draft, some Nisei had already made up their minds and could not be dissuaded. When the first group of Nisei received orders to appear in Denver on February 22, 1944 for their pre-induction physicals, administrators organized a banquet to honor these young men. They invited the entire camp to join in the celebration. Attendance was disappointingly low, though. Only twenty-eight draft-age Nisei attended the event, some of whom were not even among the fifty-three being honored. They were joined by thirty staff members, thirty-six of the girls glee club, and sixteen members of the High School band.

Organizers were surprised by the utter lack of support for the inductees, but the staff working under Rademaker had predicted that few would attend. The prevailing attitude, he wrote, could be summed up in just a few words: “Why get enthusiastic about

²⁰⁴ Speech of Paul Terry, Superintendent of Education, Amache, Colorado, February 20, Field Basic Documentation, “Attitudes” folder 37, reel 47.

going out and fighting unless there is something for us to fight for? If we get the benefits of citizenship, we are willing to take the responsibilities.”

Administration staff did not understand the difference between the benefits and responsibilities of citizenship. In private, they told Rademaker that Nisei complained that they couldn't enlist, and then once that privilege was restored, few volunteered. Then Nisei complained that they did not like being classified IV-C. If they were given back their citizenship status and drafted like anybody else, they would go. Unsympathetic staff concluded that now the draft was reinstated, Nisei were making up more excuses. Rademaker tried to explain. He wrote:

Now that the draft is reinstated, there are many who honestly resent being asked to die for the 'goddamn bastards in California who kicked us out and enriched themselves at our expense,' while the same Californians strongly oppose giving even the Nisei any of their civil rights or the privileges accruing to citizenship.

The Nisei and their parents would not rest until their rights were restored along with their responsibilities. Not only were these Nisei justified, Rademaker wrote, but they would make far better soldiers if their demands were met.²⁰⁵

On the morning of February 22, when five Nisei refused to go to Denver for their physicals, administrators knew they had not defeated anti-draft sentiments in Amache. An article appeared that day in the *Topaz Times* about the draft resisters at Amache in which several of the resisters explained why they did not feel obligated to obey the draft. One 18-year-old said, “I don't think I owe the United States anything after the way they have been treating us, and I don't see my future in the United States.” Another young man said:

²⁰⁵ Rademaker to Spicer, February 22, 1944.

I asked for repatriation before. I feel no loyalty to the United States. When we came to the center we lost all civil rights. The constitution says that in the United States all men are created equal, regardless of color, race or creed. I don't call this democracy.

Among the oldest of the resisters, a twenty-five-year-old said his actions were in protest to both segregation and to the fact that Nisei were being drafted exclusively into combat teams. He said, "I would like to have all the services open to Japanese just as they are to Caucasians." Each reason was slightly different and quite personal.²⁰⁶

The resisters from Amache lacked organization. They immediately came under attack from critics, some of whom supported the idea of resistance but accused these first resisters of being reckless in their statements. James Omura, editor of the English section of the *Rocky Shimpō* newspaper in Denver, Colorado, feared the message of disloyalty the resisters from Amache had sent. He responded with an editorial, "Let Us Not Be Rash." "We are in full sympathy with the general context of the petitions forwarded to Washington by the Amache Community Council and the Topaz Citizens Committee," Omura wrote, but he urged caution. "The Nisei are well within their rights in petitioning the government for a redress of grievances," but any actions beyond that, he continued, "would be treading on unsure footing." "We must not forget we are at war," he cautioned, adding, "those who are resisting the draft are too few, too unorganized and basically unsound in their viewpoints."

In looking at the first cases of resistance coming out of Amache, Omura criticized the young men for what he called foolish statements of disloyalty, just because democracy seemed to have failed this time. Instead, although the suggestion was

²⁰⁶ *Topaz Times*, Field Basic Documentation, Periodicals Folder; Rademaker to Spicer, February 22, 1944.

carefully guarded, Omura wrote that it was only through organized resistance that anything substantial could be accomplished. He urged all Nikkei to stand up for their rights and let their voices be heard, but advised that any actions against the draft should be deliberate and organized.²⁰⁷

Unlike Omura, camp administrators did not differentiate between organized and disorganized resistance. They took immediate measures to deter anyone else who was contemplating draft resistance. In a letter to Solicitor General Glick of the Justice Department, project attorney Horn explained that five Nisei had resisted the draft so far. While the general meetings held throughout the camps were a “good way to divert the emotional feelings” in the camp, he suggested that those planning draft resistance were a constant source of irritation and should not be allowed to remain in camp. He added in vague terms, “I believe the contemplated action against the five boys who did not appear will have a salutary effect.” What was this “contemplated action?” The first five resisters were sent straight to the penitentiary.²⁰⁸

Susumu Yenokida was among the resisters sent to the Englewood Correction Institute in Englewood, Colorado. The authorities picked him up along with the other four, and took them to a county jail in Pueblo, Colorado to spend the night. The next day the five young men were transferred to the Englewood. There they stayed for three months. No other resisters reported being sent straight to a federal penitentiary before trial. Most followed the normal procedures of waiting for their trials in county jail.

²⁰⁷ Jimmie Omura, “Let us Not be Rash,” *Rocky Shimpō*, February 28, 1944.

²⁰⁸ Rademaker to Harbison, April 1, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, RG 210/16, m1342, roll 15.

While the five were incarcerated in the Englewood Correctional Facility, they received letters pressuring them to give up their fight. Administrators encouraged parents to write to their sons and ask them to reconsider their positions. Director Lindley sent letters to the resisters advising them of the cost of their decisions.²⁰⁹ If they would just agree to be inducted, they were promised all charges against them would be dropped.²¹⁰

It was Joe Grant Masaoka and Min Yasui, national leaders of the JACL, who put the real pressure on the resisters at Englewood.²¹¹ They asked prison officials to place the resisters in solitary confinement for a few days, at the end of which time they would personally interview each one. Susumu Yenokida remembered that they asked if he would consider changing his mind. He would not. He did not believe that telling them his plans would accomplish anything, so he simply kept his mouth shut. Even though Masaoka and Yasui were not able to persuade Yenokida to accept the draft, they did convince two others. George Satoshi Marumoto, age twenty-five, and Mitsuye Oshita, eighteen, were both released from Englewood after agreeing to join the Army.²¹²

Those who refused to change their minds, including Yenokida, were eventually released from Englewood and sent to the Denver County Jail to join the growing number of resisters awaiting trial. By the middle of June, there were twenty-seven Nisei from

²⁰⁹ Rademaker to Harbison, April 1, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, RG 210/16, m1342, roll 15.

²¹⁰ Horn to Glick, February 26, 1944, NARA 210/16, box 266, folder 37.111 no. 4.

²¹¹ Min Yasui was a young lawyer from Portland, Oregon who initiated the first test case of the curfew order. He lost his case before the Supreme Court. *Yasui v. U.S.*, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). When he had finished fighting his own civil rights case, arguing that Nisei should not have been subjected to curfew rules on the basis of race, he fought with the JACL against the draft resisters. Many resisters mentioned feeling he was a hero but felt betrayed when he joined the JACL and attacked what they believed were their own battles for civil rights not unlike Yasui's own test case. See especially Noboru Taguma interview with the author, August 2001, Tucson, Arizona.

²¹² Rademaker to Harbison, April 1, 1944, and "Two Granada Draft Resisters Are Inducted," *Rocky Shimpō* n.d. Copy courtesy of Joe Norikane.

Amache being held in Denver, where the pressure to give up the fight never dissipated. Virtually all efforts to persuade the resisters to change their minds and accept military service was welcomed by government officials as even a few resisters posed a serious threat to the overall operation.²¹³

Even though Rademaker wrote openly in support of those who petitioned and spoke out against the draft, he urged detainees to think realistically about the consequences of their actions. He warned that Americans understood nothing of the injustices Nikkei had suffered during evacuation and would never understand the real causes of resistance. If the Nisei continued to resist the draft, their actions would most certainly be used against them in the newspapers without explanation of their motives. Bad publicity would only make resettlement more difficult for all Nikkei. Rademaker explained that white parents with sons serving in the military would have a hard time understanding the demands for greater rights. Rademaker concluded, “friends and foes alike will feel that the protestations of loyalty and patriotism which the Nisei have so often made are just so much propaganda and hog-wash.” It would hardly be realistic, Rademaker suggested, to expect the press to give the real story behind any resistance, and he was right. Even the JACL only publicized the seditious behavior of the resisters, writing that the selfish acts of a few put all Japanese Americans at risk.²¹⁴

To administrators, Rademaker suggested ways that they could reduce or even eliminate resistance by using modern psychological techniques to “penetrate the defense

²¹³ Horn to Glick, June 16, 1944, NARA RG 210/16, box 266, folder 37.111 no. 4.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

mechanisms” of detainees.²¹⁵ The first technique Rademaker suggested was what he called “shock treatment.” A potential resister would be isolated, perhaps even called before the Community Council in order to get his full attention, where a trained professional could break down the facts for him and explain why his actions would harm the entire community.²¹⁶ The second method Rademaker suggested was positive reinforcement. If the Community Council organized a banquet, or a dance in honor of those who accepted their call for induction, not only would the event reward those Nisei that accepted the draft, but would also encourage positive feelings in others about the draft.²¹⁷

Following Rademaker’s recommendations, a small group of local JACL leaders brought six Nisei men they suspected intended to evade the draft before an ad hoc council. On March 3, Kay Sugahare, former president of the Los Angeles JACL, Robin Kanedo, Robert Tashima, Andrew Noda, Masao Satow, Brush Arai, and Jimmy Makimoto all decided that something needed to be done to prevent more Nisei from resisting the draft. Brush Arai ordered a WRA car, and went to the apartments of each of the six suspects and brought them before the group. Sugahare and the others explained to the boys that if they refused the draft, they may be putting the future of all Japanese Americans at risk and that under no circumstances should they follow through with their intentions to disobey the law. Five of the six thanked the committee “very carefully, and

²¹⁵ John A. Rademaker to James O. Lindley, March 30, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, M 1342, roll 15, item 60.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

expressed their appreciation for the efforts of the committee in helping them with this information.”²¹⁸ The sixth was not so deferential.

When the self-proclaimed committee of community leaders interviewed the sixth unnamed Nisei in an attempt to forestall any plans he had to resist the draft, their attempts backfired. Brush Arai began the conversation, but when the young man asked what Arai thought he should do, Arai replied that he thought the young man should go into the Army. This kicked off a heated argument between the two, and when the interview ended without resolution both the young man and his father left “pretty well wound up.” Rademaker reported of the incident, “The boy and his father, residents of 6H block, I believe, were pretty well incensed.”²¹⁹ After the conflict was over, the committee decided that in the future it would ask a block manager or councilman first what the boy’s attitude might be so that they could be better prepared. Instead of calling someone who might be “hardheaded” in before a formal hearing, they would seek out a friend who might be more successful at getting him “to see reason in the matter.”²²⁰ As Rademaker suggested, when “shock treatment” would not work, a more indirect method of persuasion was needed.

The official Community Council took great exception with the actions of this group, not to mention their audacity in calling themselves “community leaders” with no authority to do so. The Community Council created its own committee similar to the one Kay Sugahare, Masao Satow, Brush Arai and the others had formed, but the tactics of this

²¹⁸ Rademaker to Donald E. Harbison, April 1, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, M 1342, roll 15.

²¹⁹ The vast majority of resisters were from blocks 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Selective Service Violations – Internal Security indexes; RG 210 Field Records; Index to Internal Security Cases, 1942-46.

²²⁰ Rademaker to Donald E. Harbison, April 1, 1944.

official committee would be a bit more restrained. The Council hoped to help the Nisei avoid the “unnecessary hardships of going to jail,” and save everyone else “the injurious effects upon American public opinion occasioned by much publicized refusals to answer the call for physical examination.” They would not “indulge in persuasion,” though. This new committee was lead by Rokuro Okubo, manager of block 7 (a block from which at least nine resisters came). He declared:

Some think they are serving the cause by making martyrs of themselves by going to jail for 20 years, whereas the fact is that such refusal casts a large shadow of doubt on the loyalty of all Japanese-Americans who had been found loyal This should be told to each draft-age Nisei.

The committee agreed that there was something much larger at stake than the personal choices of individual Nisei. Even though the committee itself would not “indulge in persuasion,” their report concluded that it “might be a good thing for someone to get out and do some real persuading.”²²¹

At the same time the Community Council took on the role of educating the Nisei on the greater consequences of draft resistance, the administration tightened up its control over public meetings. The camp director issued orders that all those wishing to hold public meetings must first obtain a permit from Internal Security. Residents feared that this new policy may have stripped them of yet more basic rights of citizenship including the right to assemble and the freedom of speech.

When Internal Security broke up an unauthorized meeting of Nisei, someone sent word to James Omura. Even though Omura publicly admonished the first five resisters from Amache for being rash and unorganized, he wrote a letter of protest to Tomlinson,

²²¹ Ibid.

Chief of Internal Security at Amache. In this letter, Omura insisted Nikkei must retain their basic First Amendment rights of assembly and free speech. Tomlinson forwarded the letter to Dillon Myer. Myer replied:

I agree with you completely as to the importance of preserving, in the relocation centers as well as outside of them, all the privileges which are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and I am extremely anxious that the administration of the centers be conducted in such a manner that no serious question can arise concerning the preservation of these rights. At once after receiving your letter, I checked with the Project Director of the Granada Relocation Center, Mr. James [C.] Lindley, to discover what the situation was.

Myer explained that Lindley had merely implemented a security measure allowing police to be present at all authorized meetings. In this way they could ensure the physical safety of those present. Myer wrote: "This is a type of regulation which is not unusual in ordinary American communities and, of course, involves no violation of Constitutional rights." He continued, "It simply affords a reasonable assurance that disturbances will not break out at times when the authorities have had no opportunity for advance preparation to guard against them." Myer assured Omura that his concern over the constitutional rights of those at Amache being violated was unfounded.²²² What Myer did not say was that the mere presence of law enforcement at any authorized meetings would create an intimidating environment, possibly squelching further support for draft resistance.

While James Omura wrote letters defending detainees' rights of assembly, the national leadership of the JACL openly attacked Omura for his sympathy for the resisters. JACL President Kido declared in an open letter to Omura, "I have a slight suspicion and

²²² Myer to Omura, March 10, 1944, Leflar papers, box 3, folder 16.

fear that anyone who follows your theories most likely will land in jail or face the firing squad.” He accused Omura of misleading the Heart Mountain group, and said that Omura had “sold them down the river.” Kido concluded, Omura simply did not know what he was writing about and yet pretended that he did. He was putting young men in danger by filling their heads with the hope that through their violations of the draft law they might be able to challenge internment. Kido suggested they would not generate a test case. Instead, they might lose their lives as traitors, not as heroes.²²³

Roger Baldwin, president of the American Civil Liberties Union, agreed with Saburo Kido that the draft resisters would not be able to generate a test case for internment as a whole as some hoped. In fact, he wrote that the resisters had no legal case at all, only a moral one. In an open letter to Kiyoshi, leader of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee, Baldwin wrote that anyone had the legal right to refuse the draft, but they would have to accept the consequences of their actions, such as serving prison sentences, paying fines, or both (not the firing squad as Saburo Kido suggested). Men who advised others to refuse the draft, Baldwin warned, were not within their rights. He supported the Heart Mountain group’s cause, but urged realism in their methods, cautioning that the “only possible way such a small minority can get its rights is through the orderly process of the courts in test cases brought under the most favorable circumstance.” Baldwin concluded, “We appreciate your feeling, but we do not think you can stand solely upon logic or justice if you are to get results.”²²⁴

²²³ Saburo Kido, JACL Bulletin #10, April 19, 1944, MSS 67/14, JACL reels 83-84, JERS, Bancroft Library.

²²⁴ Selective Service Bulletin no.49, April 14, 1944, Field Basic Documentation, Central Utah, reel 4, Selective Service folder.

For the resisters from Amache, the only result they sought was to honor their own consciences, not to change the rule of law. To honor their consciences, all they needed was to rely on justice. Justice meant they would not be forced to accept partial citizenship. For those resisters who grew up believing in the Constitution and the value of their citizenship, accepting the government's partial restoration of their citizenship would have violated their sense of justice. Drawing a hard line against second-class citizenship was the only way to remain true to their understanding of the principles for which America was supposed to stand.

Other resisters acted out of duty to their parents and their families. The war combined with a long history of racially prejudiced citizenship laws had divided families. It was unclear what would happen to the Issei after the war. Most had lost their entire lives' savings, their businesses, their homes and were too old to start over. What would happen to them when the war was over, and when the camps closed? Many knew they would be the only ones their parents could turn to for support after the war. They could not risk dying in a war that had already cost them and their families so much. Many resisters chose to maintain loyalty to their families knowing that they risked being accused of disloyalty to their country.

When Susumu Yenokida went before the judge, he presented yet another justification for resisting the draft based on his belief that as a dual citizen he could choose which nation deserved his loyalty and service. Yenokida's lawyer explained to the judge that he had "renounced his citizenship and applied for expatriation to Japan after the tragic evacuation." Yenokida "felt his rights had been taken from him and he

had been deprived the liberties to which he was supposed to be loyal.” Instead of using arguments based on full citizenship rights and due process of law, Yenokida outlined all of the reasons why he should have been ineligible for the draft. Like so many resisters concerned about their duty to their families, Yenokida explained that if he were killed or maimed as a result of military service, his family would suffer a severe financial loss from which they would not be able to recover.²²⁵

In court, Yenokida found that neither the long string of abuses he and his family had suffered nor the steps he took to renounce his loyalty to the United States would be factors in determining his guilt or innocence. The prosecution called a variety of witnesses for their case, focusing simply on the issue of induction. Miss Elizabeth Ford, clerk for the Lamar draft board; Bennie C. Garren, special agent for the FBI; Harlowe Tomlinson, Chief of Internal Security, all testified against Yenokida. According to the judge, these witnesses established that Yenokida had been notified properly of his duty to report for a pre-induction physical and for induction itself. The judge concluded that “the whole thing arises from the defendant’s default on the pre-induction notice and he must accept the consequences.” Yenokida and Kenji Akita were convicted on the same day. Both were convicted of two felony counts of Selective Service violations, and sentenced to one year in prison.²²⁶

²²⁵ “Jap Convicted as Evader in Denver Court,” *Denver Post* June 28, 1944; Yenokida, interview with the author, August 2001, Tucson, Arizona; Noboru Taguma, interview with the author, August 2001, Tucson, Arizona.

²²⁶ “Guilty” *Rocky Shimpō* June 28, 1944; “Jap Convicted as Evader in Denver Court,” *Denver Post* June 28, 1944; “Eleven Granada Nisei Convicted in Draft Cases: Sentenced to terms of 10 to 18 months in Denver Court,” *Pacific Citizen*, July 8, 1944, page 1, column 2.

Samuel D. Menin, civil rights lawyer from Denver, defended each resister from Amache in separate trials. Samuel D. Menin had a long career fighting unpopular cases in defense of civil rights. He took on cases involving the rights of Japanese Americans as early as 1941. After the war was over, he was branded a communist for defending clients who had been charged with attempting to overthrow the government.²²⁷

Instead of denying the fact that his clients refused to obey their draft orders, Menin argued that the government had exercised excessive power in applying Selective Service laws to individuals who were confined in WRA camps. The government had taken away his clients' rights of citizenship and their property, yet demanded that they fight “to uphold the principles of democracy.”²²⁸ He asked the judge where the government got the authority to evacuate Nisei, detain them in camps and then draft them into the military? The judge cited *Korematsu v. United States*. The “government’s authority to evacuate any class of people for military security” had already been upheld by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, “fairness of evacuation” would not be allowed as a consideration in the case of the draft.²²⁹ Menin did not win any cases for the Amache resisters, but his clients received shorter sentences than had the sixty-three resisters he defended from Heart Mountain. Because he suggested that resisters change their pleas from “not guilty” to “*nolo contendere*,” or mercy of the court, the resisters from Amache

²²⁷ Samuel David Menin Papers, 1931-1984, MS 29, Auraria Library Archives and Special Collections, Denver, Colorado.

²²⁸ “Four More Granada Japs are Convicted of Evading the Draft,” *Denver Post*, July 1, 1944.

²²⁹ *Ibid*; *Fred Korematsu v United States*, 323 US 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed.

received sentences ranging from six to eighteen months. Those who insisted on pleading not guilty received sentences ranging from seventeen to twenty-two months.²³⁰

Some resisters escaped sentencing entirely by agreeing to give up their cases and join the military. Chikara Kunisaka was one who changed his mind in court. When he indicated to the judge his “desire to enter the army,” he was acquitted immediately.²³¹ Ironically, though, when he appeared for his physical, he did not pass. Project attorney Horn commented that “he could have prevented serving about four months in jail if he had reported the first time he was called.”²³²

Creating Heroes: The Propaganda of Patriotism

At Topaz, resistance to the draft did not go far beyond the petitions and letters filed by the Topaz Citizens and the Mothers of Topaz. Only five individuals refused to appear for their pre-induction physicals, compared with more than thirty from Amache, hundreds from Tule Lake, Minidoka and Heart Mountain, and only one from Jerome, Arkansas. It is nearly impossible to say with any certainty why more individuals resisted the draft at some camps than at others, but one might conclude that at Topaz, resistance started early and ended early. Topaz detainees organized a camp-wide resistance to registration a year before the draft had been reinstated. But administrators brought that

²³⁰ “Seven Sentenced in Draft Law Case: Crime Never Pays,” *Denver Post*, November 30, 1944; “Eleven Granada Nisei Convicted in Draft Cases: Sentenced to terms of 10 to 18 months in Denver Court,” *Pacific Citizen* July 8, 1944, page 1, column 2; “Eight Amache Men Receive Sentences from Federal Judge,” *Rocky Shimpō*, November 6, 1944.

²³¹ “Eleven Granada Nisei Convicted in Draft Cases: Sentenced to terms of 10 to 18 months in Denver Court,” *Pacific Citizen* July 8, 1944, page 1, column 2.

²³² Horn to Glick, July 15, 1944, Leflar Papers, box 3, folder 16.

experiment with democratic resistance to a halt when Director Ernst threatened participants with prosecution under the Espionage Act. Ernst drew the line between dissent and criminal disobedience firmly and early. When Secretary of War Stimson announced the draft, protest emerged in a way that pushed the line between resistance and dissent, but never really crossed that line.

Instead of organizing direct resistance to the draft, Topaz leaders called on a prominent civil rights lawyer for counsel. They invited Abraham Lincoln (A.L.) Wirin to the camp. When Wirin accepted their invitation, he quickly learned that neither the WRA nor the Justice Department wanted him to go.

Philip Glick, Solicitor General, wrote to Wirin and suggested that he postpone his trip. Glick wrote that the situation in Topaz was “tense” after the “re-extension of Selective Service.” Glick explained:

Some of the evacuees, who are subject to induction under the Selective Service Act, have mistakenly thought that they could demand the immediate reopening of the evacuated area as a condition to their submitting to induction under the Selective Service Act. Your discussion of the constitutional rights of evacuees may indirectly serve to increase resentment. In the present excited state of opinion, it may be difficult for the evacuees to draw careful distinctions, and you will in all probability be misunderstood and misquoted.

Glick wrote that both he and Dillon Myer agreed that Wirin should put off his visit for at least two months.²³³

Wirin refused to postpone his trip. He wrote a letter to Glick to explain. First, he had already accepted the invitation from Roy Takagi, Chairman of the Legal Committee of the Topaz Community Council. He could not cancel his acceptance. Second, he wrote

²³³ Philip Glick, Solicitor to A.L. Wirin, April 29, 1944, University of Washington, Special Collections, ACLU files.

that he was “not persuaded” that his visit or his intention to discuss the constitutional rights of American citizens of Japanese ancestry would increase tensions. Instead, he wrote: “If such as tension exists I propose to do everything I can to relieve the tension, at least by stating my position clearly and unequivocally – a position which both Mr. Baldwin and I have heretofore expressed distinctly to persons at Topaz and elsewhere – namely, that wholehearted and complete compliance with Selective Service on the part of all, including American citizens of Japanese ancestry is both expected and desirable.” Wirin assured both Myer and Glick to rest assured that they had no need to worry.²³⁴

Glick agreed to allow Wirin to visit Topaz, but only if he would agree to certain stipulations. First, he was not to address large or general audiences. He could only counsel those leaders of the Community Council who had extended the original invitation—no one else. Second, he was not to interview any prospective clients unless he had their names before he arrived at the center. To this second stipulation, Wirin pointed out that he was already on the road and could not get names in advance. Still Glick insisted that any new interviews would be grounds for postponing Wirin's visit.²³⁵

With all the stipulations in place, Wirin's visit was overshadowed by a hastily arranged visit from a Nisei war hero. The WRA, War Department and the JACL all worked together to bring war hero, Sergeant Ben Kuroki to Topaz. His visit would not be limited to a small exclusive audience. Instead, sponsors brought Kuroki to Topaz and to other camps to highlight the accomplishments of Nisei in uniform and to overshadow the

²³⁴ A.L. Wirin to Philip M. Glick, Solicitor, May 8, 1944, U of W, ACLU files.

²³⁵ A.L. Wirin to Roger Baldwin, May 8, 1944; Baldwin to Glick, May 11, 1944. The May 11th letter contained copies of Western Union communication between Baldwin and Glick, May 9, 10, 11, 16, and 17, 1944, University of Washington, Special Collections, ACLU files.

efforts of those still working to disrupt the War Department's recruiting efforts by agitating for greater restorations of Nisei rights. In the case of Topaz, the timing of Kuorki's visit just days after ACLU lawyer Wirin came to consult with clients was more than ironic. It was a staged attempt to create greater enthusiasm for Nisei war heroes than a lawyer could generate for legal battles over technicalities of rights and the Constitution.

Sergeant Ben Kuroki came to Topaz just days after Wirin made his visit, and was received by a near capacity crowd.²³⁶ Kuroki told the audience of his experiences as part of a bomber crew over Europe and Africa. He visited the high school, the USO, and appeared at several luncheons and banquets. Camp analysts reported that he was received with enthusiasm, writing: "Young and old Nisei ganged up on Sgt. Ben Kuroki to get his signature in typical hero worship, American style." "With heart-warming modesty," the analyst continued, "he asked the Reception Committee not to encourage autograph seekers, because he was near to getting writer's cramps." Kuroki insisted that "he was not so important as to have so many people make a fuss over him." He was a reluctant hero, openly expressing his bitterness over having to leave his family in Nebraska for yet another camp appearance. He did mention in a speech at one of the many banquets held in his honor that he had been so warmly received at Topaz that his

²³⁶ In a letter to the Japanese American unit of the USO, Lt. Colonel and Executive Assistant to the Secretary of War, Harison Gerhardt wrote that Kuroki was a top turret gunner on a bomber that had recently returned from "a very hazardous tour of duty over Europe." Although this was just one hero of war that the War Department was prepared to send on a tour of the camps, he noted that a more extensive program was "being given consideration." The assumption was that the Nisei needed heroes whom they could admire, and role models for what the War Department hoped would be many more combatants to follow in Kuroki's footsteps of heroism. Letter from Harrison A. Gerhardt, Lt. Colonel Staff Corps, Executive Assistant to Secretary of War, to Melvin H. Harter, Director of the Japanese American Unit, United Service Organization (USO), May 25, 1944, NARA I, RG 210/16, box 325, folder 61.116 – USO.

initial resentment quickly vanished. The community analyst credited the hard work and enthusiasm of the Selective Service Committee, members of the Community Council, the Topaz Citizens Committee, the Topaz U.S.O., Girl Reserves, and the Boy Scouts for the success of Kuroki's visit.²³⁷

Kuroki became the envy of many of the camp's young Nisei men and boys. "One boy was heard to say," an observer noted, "Ever since evacuation I and another fellow tried to date Miss _____ without success."²³⁸ "Ben has been here little over 24 hours and he's walking that girl home already and I know for a fact that he doesn't know her from Adam."²³⁹ Kuroki gave young men a model for how to win respect. The analyst predicted that of those who awaited draft notices or had already been inducted but were waiting their call to serve, "many would like to duplicate Ben's success story as a fighting man for Uncle Sam."²⁴⁰ He had demonstrated enviable traits as a Nisei, as an American, but most of all, as a man.

While the Issei appreciated learning first hand what their sons were experiencing, or would likely experience once called up for service, they were far more reluctant to accept Kuroki as a hero. Many Issei remarked that Kuroki's patriotism was natural for a young man born a citizen and never subjected to the humiliation and discrimination of evacuation. Kuroki was born and raised in Nebraska and, according to some Issei, was not "too well acquainted with the Japanese and with the Post-Pearl Harbor experiences in America." The analyst reporting on his visit remarked that "some think that his position

²³⁷ Community Analysis Newsletter No. 6, May 24, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, Trend Report no.6, roll 8, NARA I, RG 210.

²³⁸ Blank to replace the girl's name in original document.

²³⁹ Community Analysis Newsletter No. 6, May 24, 1944.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

would have been much more effective in his visit to Topaz had he been evacuated and had he later served in a combat unit on the Italian front.” His experiences did not compare with the Nisei from the camps in that he was spared the evacuation experience. The Issei made it clear that while they respected Kuorki, their experience and that of their sons had been and would continue to be unique.²⁴¹

Taking war heroes on tour helped local administrators promote patriotism and quell dissent. As Rademaker suggested in the first weeks of the draft, Nisei were asking what they were fighting for. When heroes like Kuroki came to visit, they saw first hand at least one answer: a hero's welcome. The deliberate timing of Kuroki's visit to overshadow that of Wirin, gave his presence in Topaz the desired effect. He represented a role model young men could admire. He was just an ordinary guy who had joined the military and become a war hero. He had risked everything for his country, and got the girl, too.

With a pamphlet titled, “Nisei in the War against Japan,” the WRA spread stories of other Nisei heroes across the country, and, most importantly, to Nisei in all of the camps. This pamphlet contained newspaper articles that came from Baltimore, Chicago, Sacramento, Salt Lake City, Seattle, New York, and Oregon, all praising the Nisei for their heroism and outstanding service record. Articles told of unequaled valor when a “Seattle Nisei” had saved his entire platoon.²⁴² Nisei soldiers were Americans first, articles boasted, and some were even willing to fight the Japanese, calling them the

²⁴¹ Ibid. Other war heroes followed Kuroki's visit to Topaz. See: Oscar Hoffman, “Supplementary Newsletter, July 15, 1944,” Topaz Community Analysis Reports, Trend Report 9, reel 8, NARA I, RG 210.

²⁴² “Seattle Nisei Saves Platoon of Marauders,” *Times* (Seattle, Washington, March 1945).

“Nips.”²⁴³ Camp residents who read this pamphlet saw that entire families had volunteered to serve, with one family sacrificing seven sons to fight for “Uncle Sam.”²⁴⁴ A photo showed a Nisei soldier bending down to show his little brother his purple heart, becoming the greatest war hero in his little brother’s eyes. The message seemed clear. The sacrifices of soldiers were already paying off in greater acceptance, even praise, for Japanese American war heroes.²⁴⁵

Heroes in Death: Memorializing Fallen Soldiers

Wherever there were heroes there were also casualties, and the rate at which Nisei soldiers were dying was shocking to those who remained in the camps. Topaz Attorney Donald T. Horn wrote: “All the members of the staff were stunned this week at the number of casualties reported by the War Department involving servicemen from this Center. For the most part,” Horn remarked, “these boys volunteered from this Center and all of us know at least some of them.”²⁴⁶ The report came as increasing numbers of young men were receiving draft notices, leaving virtually no family untouched by the brutality of war.

At Topaz, many Issei were not sure if they should be consoling each other for their losses or congratulating each other for their great sacrifice to the nation. In

²⁴³ “Jap-American Volunteer from Tule Lake WRA Center Fights Nips in India,” *Herald and News*, Klamath Falls, Oregon (n.d.).

²⁴⁴ “Seven Nisei Brothers Serving Uncle Sam,” a title given the article by the WRA, reprinted from a *Los Angeles Times* article, “Luzon Victories Gladden Nisei,” (February 10, 1945).

²⁴⁵ “Nisei in the War against Japan,” Department of the Interior, WRA (Washington, D.C., April 1945). Spicer Collection, University of Arizona, Special Collections, Tucson, Arizona. MS 042.

²⁴⁶ Horn to Glick, July 29, 1944, Leflar Papers, MC 206, box 3, folder 16, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.

December 1944 a memorial service became a turning point for the community. The memorial service was well attended, primarily by the Issei, but as one observer wrote, those in attendance were “impressively quiet – more so than usual.” This was not a celebration as some memorial services appeared to be earlier in the year. “One could not help but feel that this was the beginning of a new era at Topaz,” the analyst concluded. Until recently, the camp had been deeply divided by those who supported the United States and those who still had feelings for Japan. But as time marched on, and as more and more young men returned in coffins, having paid the ultimate price of sacrifice in this war, the author of this report indicated that “interest had veered toward a narrower aspect of the struggle . . . , namely, their own flesh and blood or their close friends – the Nisei soldiers.” Nearly every resident of the camp had been directly affected by this side of the war, “A son, a brother, a husband, or a close friend is either at the battlefield, in training camps, or waiting to be inducted.”²⁴⁷ Whether they wanted to remain neutral or not, there was no escaping the effects of war.

The loss of loved ones closed the door on collective resistance. Topaz had become in Hoffman's words “atomized.” Each family became less concerned about the collective rights of the Nisei, and more concerned about their own sons, their own parents, and about what each individual family might face after the war.

Even in death, though, the JACL and the WRA saw opportunities to advance a public image campaign of “loyal” Japanese Americans to the general American population and to help grieving families view their own sacrifices in a positive, patriotic

²⁴⁷ Community Analysis Trend Report no.25, December 15, 1944, Community Analysis Section, Topaz, roll 8.

light. The JACL used the growing list of Nisei casualties for their own publicity campaign. The JACL sent the lists to the servicemen's home town newspapers for publication. They encouraged families to send letters to their own papers in California telling of their sons' sacrifices. The idea was that by publicizing Nisei casualties, racists on the West Coast would be encouraged to reconsider their opposition to reopening the restricted zone to Nikkei resettlement.²⁴⁸

Chaplain Masao Yamada of the all-Nisei 442nd Combat Team criticized the JACL for their self-serving publication of the sacrifices of the Nisei, while ignoring needs of the soldiers themselves. He saw the JACL working for their own interests more than their professed goal of repairing the status of all Nisei. JACL national president Saburo Kido replied that the *Pacific Citizen* had "played up" the casualties and "feats" of the 100th Battalion because they had been given little space or notice by West Coast newspapers, and the JACL wanted to "show that the Nisei were fighting for America and dying, too."²⁴⁹

In the camps, the JACL and other patriotic organizations like the USOs and Boy Scouts joined with the WRA administration to organize memorial services and other symbolic displays of sacrifice and service. Camps created honor rolls. Service flags were put on display containing one star for each individual from camp serving in the military.²⁵⁰ The purpose of these tributes, particularly memorial services, was to remind

²⁴⁸ Saburo Kido to all Community Councils and Block Managers in the camps, August 16, 1944, JERS, MSS 67/14, JACL, reels 83-84; JACL Press release, "Wrote to Home Town Papers Suggests JACL National Headquarters," August 21, 1944, JERS, MSS 67/14, JACL, reels 83-84, Bancroft Library.

²⁴⁹ Letter from Saburo Kido to Chaplain Masao Yamada, March 30, 1944, NARA I, RG 210, section 16, box 471, folder 71.505.

²⁵⁰ The idea that patriotism must be taught abounds in the literature on loyalty, Americanization, and patriotism by assimilationists and by historians looking back on the history of patriotism. The notion that patriotism during wartime must be taught by modeling how Americans were to honor the dead is an idea I

detainees that all who served in the military were patriotic heroes deserving of great honor and respect.

When Topaz first held its memorial services, the events seemed like a celebration attracting huge crowds, and an elaborate demonstration of ritualized patriotism. Each service boasted a flag ceremony, the band playing the “Star Spangled Banner,” and Issei women made a traditional Japanese floral arrangement replicating the American flag. Buddhists and Christians added to the event and detainees and administrators both offered speeches to honor the veterans. The service ended with a military salute. After one such service, attorney Horn suggested that a newsreel showing a memorial service such as the one he had observed at Topaz might effectively counter the claims of West Coast racists who continued to charge that Japanese Americans were not true Americans.²⁵¹ He clearly had a sense that this ritualized patriotism represented much more than honoring the dead. It was a performance of Americanism.

Even though memorial services provided good propaganda against racialisms outside the camps, for those detainees who attended the services, they brought meaning to a young person's death and encouraged family members to support the war through patriotic remembrance. Just as the tours of heroes like Ben Kuroki were meant to encourage young men to be like him, even in death, memorial services elevated young Nisei to a new status of manhood. In a memorial service honoring Nobuo Kajiwara,

first came across in Curti's *Roots of American Loyalty*. He argued that high minded patriotism did not come naturally even to soldiers in the field, and certainly did not come naturally to those family members who stood to lose their loved ones in the name of sacrifice to their country. The memorial service was just one of many rituals of patriotism that was an essential part of Americanism at the end of the 19th century. Merle Eugene Curti, *Roots of American Loyalty* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), 191.

²⁵¹ Horn to Glick, August 19, 1944, Leflar Papers, MC 206, box 3, folder 16, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.

killed in Italy July 11, 1944, his former reverend relayed a conversation he had with the young man shortly before he volunteered for service. Kajiwara had been greatly troubled in his attempt to decide whether to volunteer or wait for the draft, but finally concluded that it was his duty to volunteer. He explained that he had been talking to friends who had already volunteered, and he was there waiting for the draft. They were going to sacrifice all they had, even their lives, for the future of all Japanese Americans, without a thought for themselves. Kajiwara explained, "When I saw their manly attitude, I felt very much ashamed. It seemed to me that it is not good to wait until I'm drafted; it would be cowardly. I've never sacrificed myself for a noble cause; I'm disgusted with my self. Now is the chance for me to be born again as a man."

CHAPTER 5

PRISON AND PUNISHMENT

When the sheriff pulled into Topaz to arrest Ken Yoshida for not appearing at his pre-induction physical exam, he was surprised by the living conditions in the WRA camps. It was a typical day in Topaz. Dust filled the air, making it difficult to see and tough to breathe. Finding his way to Block Eleven, Barracks 3, Apartment C, the sheriff knocked on the door, hoping to find Yoshida at home, but also hoping to escape the unpleasant conditions outside. Yoshida needed a minute to get his things together. As the sheriff waited, he looked around. Dust had seeped into the tiny apartment through every crack and crevice. He asked, “Is it always this dusty?” “Is it always this bad?” When Yoshida replied that indeed it was, the sheriff declared in sympathy, “I don’t blame you for not going in!” Ken thought to himself, I’m not going to have a problem with this guy.²⁵²

When Ken Yoshida was sent to a federal prison for refusing to obey the draft, he found that prison, compared with life in a concentration camp like Topaz, was “paradise.” For two years, Yoshida had lived in a place euphemistically called the “Central Utah Relocation Center,” otherwise known as Topaz, where detainees suffered from low-quality food, inadequate nutrition, and poorly constructed housing. They suffered from extreme heat and dust storms in the summer and freezing temperatures and snow in the winter. After he was convicted of violating Selective Service laws, Yoshida was sent to a work camp in the mountains just east of Tucson, Arizona where he and the other inmates

²⁵² Ken Yoshida, group interview with the author, November 1999.

labored to build a highway to the top of Mt. Lemmon. This was a prison with no fence and no wall. The only barrier between prisoners and the outside world was a line of painted rocks marking the perimeter of the property. Prison was a place where Yoshida enjoyed good food, worked seven to eight hours a day, learned new skills, enjoyed recreation, and made life long friends. He called it “summer camp.”²⁵³

If Topaz was hell, as Yoshida described it, and prison paradise, then it is important to ask, why? What purpose did the prison system serve during the war? How was this different from the purpose of the WRA camps?

During the war, the WRA camps became an integral part of the penal system even though never classified as such. Both the WRA camps, which housed Japanese Americans until they could be relocated, and county jail, which housed resisters until their trials, functioned as opposing forces that coerced many would-be resisters into accepting military service as a more tolerable alternative to continued confinement in either of these facilities. The threat of lengthy prison sentences, fines and the stigma of becoming a felon provided the final deterrence that kept many from resisting the draft in the first place.

For those who decided to resist the draft against these pressures and were sent to the mountains east of Tucson for hard work and “rehabilitation,” prison was the least punishing of all of their confinement experiences. The Federal Bureau of Prisons stated that the purpose of the Catalina Federal Honor Camp was to put prisoners to work, teach them skills, and rehabilitate them into productive citizens. For those Nisei who came to the Catalina work camp, they learned a different lesson. They realized that the choices

²⁵³ Ibid.

each one of them had made as individuals to stand up for their rights had brought them to the same place. They came to Tucson as individual resisters, but after they left, they became a family of resisters and started calling themselves “The Tucsonians.”²⁵⁴

From County Jail to the Tucson Road Camp

Yoshida's first stop after his arrest was county jail. County jail was where he would await his trial, which in his case would be a period of nearly six months. Most resisters remember their time in county jail as the worst of all of their confinement experiences. One of the reasons why conditions in the jails were so bad was that these facilities relied on local funding and were not well regulated. As a result, county jails had become well known for their problems with under-funding, poor sanitation, inadequate food, and overcrowding. When resisters arrived, they found that the blankets were dirty, mattresses reeked of urine and vomit, rats and fleas were abundant. In some cases, they received only two meals a day of barely edible food. Many resisters waited for up to six

²⁵⁴ Group interview with the author, (Tucson, Arizona, November 1999); documents of the Tucsonian reunions, courtesy of Ken Yoshida. One of the most important books on the transformation of the geography of punishment is Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978 [1975]). Foucault's analysis of the birth of the modern prison reveals the ways in which punishment for crime reflects changes in society. While his book provides a theoretical foundation for this chapter, his analysis of prison reform ends in the 19th century. Literature on progressive reformers and prisons in the first half of the twentieth century provide the historic context for the chapter. See: Judith R. Johnson, *The Penitentiaries in Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah from 1900 to 1980* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997); Paul W. Keve, *Prisons and the American Conscience: A History of U.S. Federal Corrections* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991); and D. J. Rothman, *Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America* (Waltham: Little, Brown, and Co., 1981).

months under these conditions for a grand jury to hear their cases. It was here that the hell of their confinement led many to rethink their decisions to resist the draft.²⁵⁵

When Yoshida was booked in the Salt Lake County jail, the grand jury had just finished with its last case and would not reconvene again for six months. Under most circumstances, one would expect Yoshida to be booked and then released from jail until the grand jury heard his case and ruled on an indictment. After all, Yoshida hardly posed a flight risk. He lived in a government camp guarded by military personnel. But his continued presence in the WRA camp posed a different sort of problem. If he were allowed to remain in camp, his mere presence would prove that the consequences of draft resistance were not all that bad.²⁵⁶

At least one court, in Arizona, followed normal procedures and released the resisters back into WRA custody until the grand jury could hear their cases. In those instances, Poston administrators complained bitterly that leaving the resisters in camp caused problems. Poston's project attorney wrote to the Solicitor General to complain. Those who obeyed the law risked losing their lives in the war, he argued, while those who disobeyed were safe in camp and were causing him endless troubles. He complained in vain, because in this case, for unknown reasons, the resisters were not kept in county or city jails while awaiting trial. They were released back into the custody of

²⁵⁵ Group interview with the Tucsonians, November 1999, Tucson, Arizona; Yosh Kuromiya, interview with Peter Taylor, November 1999, Tucson, Arizona; and Takashi Hoshizaki, interview with the author and Peter Taylor, November 1999, Tucson, Arizona. On the history of jails in the U.S., see: J. M. Moynahan and Earle K. Stewart, *The American Jail: Its Development and Growth* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1980), 69-76; and on the experiences of draft resisters from other camps, see: Eric Muller, *Free to Die for their Country*, pp. 161-175.

²⁵⁶ Eric Muller makes the same observation in relation to the treatment of the resisters in Idaho. See: Muller, "The Minidoka Draft Resisters in a Federal Kangaroo Court," in *Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 171-189.

the WRA until the grand juries could convene to hear their cases more than a year later. Poston's attorney feared, and with good reason, that this lack of instant punishment sent the wrong message to young men facing the draft. In Poston at least, if you accepted your country's call to duty, you might die in battle, but if you refused, you remained in camp, idle and miserable perhaps, but in the short term without even so much as a slap on the wrist.²⁵⁷

Other administrators who complained about the resisters in camp received more favorable responses to their requests that the resisters be jailed immediately. In Minidoka, Idaho, administrators convinced the courts to raise the bail so high it was impossible for resisters to leave. They even made arrangements with the local draft board to rid the camp of suspected resisters. Administrators handed over lists of those they believed were planning to resist. The draft board would move those names to the top of their list for induction. When some did refuse the draft, they were identified and taken to the jail, removing them as potential agitators in the camp.

In the case of resisters from Topaz and Amache, the specific mechanisms used to keep them confined until trial are not clear, except in the case of the first five sent directly to the Englewood penitentiary in Colorado. These first five resisters bi-passed the jails and were sent straight to the penitentiary with the express purpose of coercing them into accepting the draft. Regardless of the methods used, all of the resisters from Topaz and

²⁵⁷ Project Attorney's Reports, Poston, Arizona, 1944-1945, Basic Field Documentation; and Leflar Papers, Arkansas. See also: Eric Muller, *Free to Die for their Country*.

Amache were confined immediately and under harsh living conditions for months until they finally saw what might be considered normal due process of law.²⁵⁸

While Yoshida waited in jail for the grand jury to hear his case, he did what he could to improve conditions there. He fixed an old washing machine in the basement and began washing all of his friends' blankets. Soon, the warden started delivering blankets from all of the other floors for Yoshida to wash. His repairs on the machine held out until he had washed the last blanket. Then it broke down for good. He also asked for chemicals to kill the rodents and pests. The warden was happy to comply and provided all that he needed to eradicate the problem. His reward was a cleaner place to live and trustee status. For good behavior, he and his friends enjoyed one pouch of tobacco per person every week. As Yoshida remembered, they had lots of fun.²⁵⁹

Not everyone enjoyed his time in jail. Mac Yoshida was the younger of Ken's two draft-age brothers. Both followed his example and resisted the draft. The entire family had made a choice after the registration crisis to stay together at all costs. All filed for repatriation or expatriation, and all three draft-age sons refused to appear for their physicals. Ken and Sakaye (“Sock”) continued on to prison, but Mac found jail so

²⁵⁸ Eric Muller, law professor at the University of North Carolina and author of *Free to Die for their Country*, notes that the confinement of the resisters in county jails runs contrary to normal due process, particularly because they posed no flight risk since they were already under federal custody. He agrees that the immediate and prolonged use of jail to hold resisters was meant to reduce the overall number of draft resisters from the camps. On the “desired effect” of immediate incarceration of the first five resisters in the Englewood penitentiary, see: Rademaker to Spicer, February 22, 1944. For evidence of a deliberate plan to increase bail as one means of keeping resisters in jail, see: Muller, “The Minidoka Draft Resisters in a Federal Kangaroo Court.” Group interview with the author, (Tucson, Arizona, November 1999).

²⁵⁹ Ken Yoshida interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, August 2001; Group interview, Tucson, Arizona, November 1999; Yosh Kuromiya interview with Peter Taylor, Tucson, Arizona, November 1999; Takahashi Hoshizaki interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, November 1999.

unbearably confining that he joined the army just to get out. County jail had the effect the U.S. desired in forcing Mac to change his mind and enter the military.²⁶⁰

The terrible conditions detainees suffered in the camps, followed by the squalor of county jail and persistent threats of long sentences in federal prisons (where some feared they might even face a firing squad) worked to deter many young men from challenging the draft.²⁶¹ Some Nisei explained that they went into the army in the first place not out of loyalty or duty, but from a fear of ending up in yet another prison. An anonymous Nisei in Poston, Arizona said: “Although I don’t especially see any reason to fight for the United States, I’d choose the army to another camp because I don’t think that I can stand another couple of years in jail or a camp.”²⁶² The WRA camps became an integral part of the penal system even though never officially classified as a prison. As one social scientist noted, by the time the draft had been reinstated, the conditions in the WRA camps alone had become so bad some Nisei accepted the draft and some even volunteered for military service just to escape the worsening conditions of their confinement.²⁶³

²⁶⁰ Rademaker to Spicer, February 22, 1944; Yoshida interview with author, San Mateo, California, May 2002.

²⁶¹ Interviews with resisters reveal that many feared the conditions and treatment they would face in prison. Gordon Hirabayashi remembered thinking the firing squad was not out of the question. But most feared retaliation from other inmates in prison, either for their draft resistance, or more likely for being Japanese. Frank Emi and his cohorts put on a Judo demonstration when they arrived in Leavenworth. He said they arranged for a very small guy to throw a large guy to the mat to show their expertise in the sport. Emi said they never had a problem with other inmates after that. Hirabayashi interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, November 1999) Group interview; Frank Emi personal conversation with the author, Boston, MA, March 2003; and Emi, et al, *Resistance: Challenging America's Wartime Internment of Japanese-Americans* (Lomita, California: The Epistolarian, 2001).

²⁶² Nisei, anonymous, July 19, 1944, Community Analysis Reports, Colorado River, M 1342, roll 10, item 145.

²⁶³ Rademaker to Spicer, February 22, 1944. On the subject of a variety of ways in which the WRA camps fit into a larger system of imprisonment during the war, see Tetsuden Kashima, *Judgement without Trial: Japanese American Imprisonment during World War II* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003).

Mac Yoshida went into the Army where he was kept in the U.S. for the duration of the war. With two brothers serving federal prison sentences for Selective Service violations and parents who had requested repatriation, Mac Yoshida became suspect. Once he was in the Army, the government kept him under close surveillance, even though he appeared to be serving as a free citizen.²⁶⁴

In some cases, it was difficult to tell the difference between the military and prison. Nisei already serving in the military were given the same loyalty questionnaire that the War Department had administered to Nisei in the camps. Some soldiers refused to fill-out the questionnaire. Other soldiers answered the loyalty questions negatively as a form of protest. They wanted to know why they were being asked to reaffirm their loyalty through the same questionnaire given to detainees in the WRA camps. Had they suddenly become suspected of committing future acts of sabotage, too? Just as detainees labeled “disloyal” after registration were transferred to isolation facilities like Tule Lake, the Army also transferred Nisei soldiers who resisted during the loyalty registration process to a special unit at Ft. Leavenworth. Stationed right next to one of the highest security federal prisons, this unit was kept under constant surveillance. The unit was eventually used to repair bridges and roads in the upper-middle South, but never escaped the feeling that they were being guarded as if they were some sort of criminals. After the war was over, the Army gave most of these young men “blue” discharges—a distinction as ambiguous as their status in the military. A blue, or not honorable discharge had a very negative effect. It prevented discharged soldiers from certain types of employment, just as if they had been dishonorably discharged. Nisei who challenged the government

²⁶⁴ Ken and Kay Yoshida interview with the author, San Mateo, California, 2002.

from within the military may not have been punished with prison terms, but they carried the stigma of a “blue” discharge for the rest of their lives.²⁶⁵

Ken and Sock Yoshida, who did not join the military, instead became felons, sentenced by a federal judge to serve nine months in prison for violating Selective Service laws. After they were sentenced, authorities transferred the Yoshida brothers by car to the Tucson road camp. They traveled in relative comfort. Ken remembered that the officer transporting them only asked them to wear cuffs when they stopped to eat, or approached a jail where they would stay overnight. But once they got back in the car, they took off their cuffs and were able to relax.²⁶⁶

The resisters from Denver had a much more difficult trip to Tucson. With dozens of prisoners to transport, authorities used train cars and treated the group like hardened criminals. Each was shackled to a buddy. They had to stay that way through the entire journey. One man remembered when he had to relieve himself, his shackled partner, who was much bigger than him, would just pick him up and carry him to the latrine. The trip to Tucson was one of the worst of their lives. The cars were hot. The trip was long. The train would pull aside anytime a another train approached, giving all other traffic on the

²⁶⁵ The Army's treatment of suspect soldiers deserves much more attention and is in need of further research. For an excellent oral history of one man's experience serving in a unit of suspect soldiers ineligible for overseas duty, see: Cedrick Shimo interview with Sojin Kim and Erick Molinar, March 19, 2001, Los Angeles, California, Japanese American National Museum, Los Angeles, California. See also John Hammond Moore's chapter on suspect soldiers in his book, *Wacko War: Strange Tales from America, 1941-1945* (Raleigh, N.C.: Pentland Press, 2001). For more information on the consequences of a “not honorable” discharge otherwise known as a “blue” discharge, see: Allan Berube, *Coming out Under Fire: The History of Gay men and Women in World War Two* (New York: Free Press, 1990). For an excellent citizenship-based analysis of the consequences of ineligibility for civil service work, see Linda Kerber's chapter “A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like American Ladies': Helen Feeney, Robert Goldberg, and Military Obligation in Contemporary America,” in *No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 221-302. On the demoralizing consequences of marginalization within the military, see: Tamotsu Shibutani, *The Derelicts of Company K: A Sociological Study of Demoralization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

²⁶⁶ Ken Yoshida interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, August 2001.

lines preference. It was not until they arrived in Tucson that their chains were finally removed.²⁶⁷

Bill Nagasaki, from Poston, Arizona, was already in prison when the first resisters from Amache arrived. He was thrilled to find that he would not be the only Nisei in Tucson. It was two o'clock in the morning when Yenokida and the others finally got settled and started to fall asleep. All of a sudden he felt someone shaking him. It was Bill Nagasaki. "Hey, I'm Bill . . . Good to see you, good to see you!" he said. The guard came in and said, "Bill, you'd better go to sleep. You can see them in the morning." He was there again first thing in the morning, as Yenokida remembered it, very early, waiting to welcome his new friends. A family of resisters had started to form in Tucson.²⁶⁸

When Ken and Sock Yoshida got to Tucson, they found that there were already more than thirty Nisei at the prison. The resisters from Amache gave them a warm welcome. "New fish" had arrived, as new inmates were called. The resisters from Amache were pleased to find out that some Nisei had resisted the draft at Topaz, too. Joe Norikane said, "Oh, you guys are here from Topaz? Good to see you!" By the time all of the resisters had been transferred to the Tucson prison, there were forty-one Nisei at this minimum-security prison. It was here that they began calling themselves "The Tucsonians," and found that their individual choices had created a common bond that for many would last their entire lives.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁷ Group interview.

²⁶⁸ Yenokida interview, August 2001.

²⁶⁹ The resisters who ended up in Tucson came from Topaz, Amache, one lone resisters came from Poston, Arizona (Bill Nagasaki) and another from outside the camps from Chicago, Illinois (Harry Yoshikawa).

Conditions at the road camp in Tucson stood in sharp contrast to the resisters' experiences in the WRA camps and county jail. Some, like Ken, began wondering which had been the worse punishment: prison or the "Relocation Center"? "If they had left me in camp," Yoshida explained, "I would have had a more miserable life" than the time he spent in prison. "I didn't tell the government that," Yoshida concluded, "They might have sent me back to camp!"²⁷⁰ The resisters enjoyed good food and good friends in a beautiful setting. They did not even have a fence to remind them of their confinement. Again, it seemed like "summer camp" to them.²⁷¹

The Nisei were not the only wartime prisoners in Tucson. The prison housed minimum-security federal prisoners serving sentences for tax evasion, immigration violations, liquor violations, and other non-violent federal offenses. But there were also conscientious objectors and draft resisters. Jehovah's Witnesses, secular pacifists, and Hopi Indians were all serving sentences in Tucson for various Selective Service violations.²⁷²

Of the draft resisters the Tucsonians met in Tucson, some became best acquainted with the Hopis. Harry Yoshikawa remembered his friendship started when he asked if one of the Hopis would show him how to weave a traditional belt. They agreed, but on one condition. Yoshikawa could not show anyone else how to make the belt, because it was a sacred art. He agreed, and his new friends taught him how to make the belts and the tools he would need to make more. Yoshikawa sent a letter to his sister asking her to

²⁷⁰ Yoshida interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, August 2001.

²⁷¹ Group interview; Yenokida interview, 2001.

²⁷² U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, *Final Construction Report, Arizona Forest Highway Project 33, Catalina Highway. Coronado National Forest* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1951).

send more thread. By the end of his prison term, Yoshikawa had made a couple dozen belts and gave most of them to family and friends.²⁷³

This was not the first time the Hopis at Tucson had welcomed Nisei as friends and fellow resisters. A year earlier, a lone Nisei had come to Tucson. He had not come in shackles. He hitchhiked. His name was Gordon Hirabayashi. He had challenged the constitutionality of curfew and forced evacuation, taking his case all the way to the United States Supreme Court.²⁷⁴ When he lost his test case, he asked the judge to send him to a road camp so he could work outside. Hirabayashi was so desperate to avoid more time in a regular penitentiary that he agreed to an additional month on his sentence so he would qualify for transfer to a road camp. He even agreed to get himself to the prison by hitchhiking, since the government could offer no transportation. It took him several weeks to hitchhike across Oregon, Idaho, Utah, a corner of Nevada and all of Arizona, and he encountered little to no resistance on his way. His most notable encounter was with a Utah highway patrolmen, who Hirabayashi remembered picked him up but nearly drove off the road when he told the patrolman where he was headed. Hirabayashi remembered he pulled over immediately and inspected Hirabayashi's papers thoroughly until he was convinced that he was telling the truth, then took him to the end of his beat and sent him on his way.

When Hirabayashi finally arrived in Tucson, the prison officials refused to admit him into their custody. They had lost his paper work and told him to go back to Seattle.

Hirabayashi refused. It had taken him so long to get to Tucson, he was not about to leave

²⁷³ Yoshikawa interview, 2001.

²⁷⁴ *U.S. v. Hirabayashi*, ; Gordon Hirabayashi, "Why I Refused Evacuation," March 1942, copy in author's possession, courtesy of Gordon Hirabayashi.

knowing he would only have to return once his papers were discovered. So the prison officials told him to beat the heat by going to a movie for a couple of hours. When he checked back, they had found his papers and were ready to take him up the mountain to the road camp.

Once at the prison site, Hirabayashi found that there were several Hopi conscientious objectors who had been sentenced to serve several years in the road camp for refusing to register for the draft. They were members of a religious order of Hopi priests, who had all taken vows never to take up arms against another nation. But that was not the basis for their conviction. They had also taken a vow of secrecy and could not reveal their vows to anyone. They appeared before the courts with no defense and some were sentenced to prison for several years for refusing to register for the draft.²⁷⁵

Within hours of his arrival, the Hopis invited Hirabayashi to their Hogan for tea. They explained that they had been stopped and searched by law enforcement officers after Pearl Harbor because they looked Japanese. When they saw Hirabayashi, they told him that they shared a common ancestral heritage, a common root language, and a common history of racial oppression. As a final ceremonial welcome, they washed Hirabayashi's hair in soap weed to honor him as their brother.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ Hirabayashi interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, November 1999; Press release from Hopi Cultural Preservation Office, August 2001, copy in author's possession, courtesy of HCPO. There is one oral history with a Hopi resister from Tuscon on file at the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office at tribal headquarters for educational purposes only that was produced in the course of this project and returned to the interviewee and the nation.

²⁷⁶ Hirabayashi interview, 1999. This ceremony is usually used for Hopi weddings. In this case, Hirabayashi was ceremonially welcomed into the Hopi family. A note on references to the Hopi resisters – because of certain restrictions placed on the information gathered from individual Hopi resisters, all of my references are based primarily on the Nisei oral histories I conducted. I avoid referring to any individual Hopi Indians deliberately to protect their privacy. For more information on the Hopi resisters, contact Stewart Koyiyumptewa, archivist at the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office.

When the Tucsonians arrived a year later, many of the Hopis who had welcomed Hirabayashi to Tucson were still there. The Tucsonians and Hopis lived together in the “mixed race” barracks. Prisons throughout the country segregated their inmates on the basis of race and types of crimes the inmates had committed.²⁷⁷ In Tucson, one barracks was reserved for whites, another just for the Jehovah's Witnesses. The Nisei shared the third barracks with Hopis, Navajos, Mexican nationals, and a couple of African Americans.

One of the African American prisoners, a man several of the Tucsonians only remember as “Tully,” challenged racial segregation in the prison. Black prisoners were segregated more than other prisoners, being forced to eat at a separate table from everyone else. He went on a hunger strike in protest. He drank only water and continued to work. As a result of his protest, he lost a lot of weight. Prison officials finally gave in and desegregated the dining facilities, but the segregated third? barracks remained unchanged.²⁷⁸

Most other aspects of life in Tucson epitomized the latest trends in federal prison reform and expansion. In 1930 the Federal Bureau of Prisons was formed by the Department of Justice to manage and regulate the growing number of federal prisons. By 1940, on the eve of World War II, the number of federal penal facilities increased from 11 to 24.²⁷⁹ One of these new prison facilities was the Catalina Federal Honor Camp

²⁷⁷ Keve, *Prisons and the American Conscience*, 205-208.

²⁷⁸ Group interview.

²⁷⁹ Pub. L. No. 71-218, 46 Stat. 325 (1930).

created in 1933. It provided cheap labor for the construction of a highway from the outskirts of Tucson to the top on Mt. Lemmon in the middle of the Catalina Mountains.²⁸⁰

The number and scope of federal prisons and detention facilities exploded after the United States entered the war. Suspect citizens and enemy aliens were housed in Department of Justice internment facilities, in some cases county jails were converted into federal facilities as temporary housing until more federal facilities could be constructed, and old CCC camps were converted into temporary holding facilities for the Department of Justice and the WRA. The WRA even used an old Indian Boarding school in Leupp, Arizona to hold troublesome Nisei after the Manzanar riot.²⁸¹ Added to this early process of converting existing facilities into holding cells for Issei community leaders was a massive program to evacuate and house 120,000 Japanese Americans from the West Coast and lower portion of Arizona. The War Relocation Authority may not have called these prisons, but they epitomized the massive expansion of the federal government's involvement in creating and managing facilities used to detain or imprison civilians.²⁸²

Progressive-era reformers had worked hard through the 1920s and 1930s to design rehabilitation programs that would make prisons function as a gateway to civilian life rather than as mere holding cells or as sources of brute punishment. They succeeded

²⁸⁰ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads. *Final Construction Report*.

²⁸¹ See chapter 2 in this manuscript. The segregated Nisei were first sent to an isolation facility in Moab, and then sent to Leupp as a more permanent arrangement. United States. National Park Service. "Department of Justice and U.S. Army Facilities," (<http://www.nps.gov/manz/ccdoj.htm>, accessed on December 6, 2005); Burton, et. al., *Confinement and Ethnicity* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

²⁸² Keve, *Prisons and the American Conscience*; and Johnson, *The Penitentiaries in Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah*; Kashima, *Judgment Without Trial*; and Federal Bureau of Prisons. "Brief History of the Bureau of Prisons," (<http://www.bop.gov/about/history.jsp>, accessed December 2, 2005).

in encouraging the newly formed Federal Bureau of prisons to provide separate facilities for women and minors, and in separating petty criminals from more serious offenders. Their major accomplishments were creating a multi-tiered system of prisons that reflected the seriousness of a person's crime. Judges gained more discretion over sentencing so that they could respond to individual circumstances. Prison officials increasingly providing inmates with opportunities for early parole, to encourage rehabilitation and good behavior.²⁸³

Perhaps no prison epitomized progressive penology more than the Catalina Federal Honor Camp. Here prisoners performed work with a purpose. They were building a road from the outskirts of Tucson to the top of Mt. Lemmon to provide local residents with quick and reliable access to this cool summertime retreat from the oppressive heat of the desert valley floor. Some of the work prisoners performed was pure drudgery. Joe Norikane commented that he thought it was only in cartoons that prisoners busted rocks. But when he got to Tucson, it was his job to do just that – bust rocks with a sledge hammer to create gravel for the highway. Others enjoyed work that was a little more prestigious. Ken Yoshida was thrilled when he received orders to work on the blasting crew. He had always been interested in engineering, and now he got a chance to use explosives to breakup difficult sections of the road.

Prison reformers, especially those in charge of the Catalina road camp, believed that it was important to give prisoners opportunities to perform what they called “meaningful work.” Building a road instead of moving rocks from while pile to another

²⁸³ Keve, *Prisons and the American Conscience*; Johnson, *The Penitentiaries of Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah*; and David J. Rothman, *Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and its Alternatives in Progressive America*, revised edition (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2002).

and then back again, was one example of work with a purpose. Through hard labor they believed prisoners would develop a sense of accomplishment and become better citizens.²⁸⁴

During war the most “meaningful work,” according to penologists, was military service.²⁸⁵ Every month, prison officials gave Nisei resisters (along with the other inmates of the prison) the chance to commute their sentences if they would join the military. For the first time in history, the army agreed to allow all but the most violent offenders to earn early release from prison if they would enlist. Although none of the Nisei resisters at Topaz accepted this offer, many other prisoners did. When the military began accepting prisoners, even non-violent felons into their ranks, they took on the role of rehabilitating citizens, blurring the function of prisons and the military.²⁸⁶

None of the Tucsonians left prison to enter the military, but some Nisei resisters at other prisons did. One example is Joe Yamakido. He was the only one who resisted the draft from Jerome, Arkansas and was sentenced to one of the toughest, most dangerous penitentiaries in Texas. Ironically, a former governor of Texas, who was also in prison at that time, told Yamakido that whether he knew it or not, as a felon he had given up his citizenship rights to vote and bear arms. The former governor told Yamakido that the only way to repair his citizenship was to join the military. So he did.

²⁸⁴ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, *Final Construction Report*; Yoshida interview, 2001; Group interview. See also: Keve, *Prisons and the American Conscience*; and Johnson, *The Penitentiaries in Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah*.

²⁸⁵ Keve, *Prisons and the American Conscience*; and Johnson, *Penitentiaries in Arizona, Nevada and New Mexico*.

²⁸⁶ “Camp Statistics,” *Roadrunner* (July-August 1945), 33.

In exchange for his enlistment, prison officials commuted his sentence and the military restored his citizenship.²⁸⁷

Those resisters who stayed in the Tucson prison continued building the highway up the Catalina Mountains, but work did not occupy all of their time. They worked on the highway seven to eight hours a day, leaving a lot of free time in the evenings and on the weekends. Sometimes they filled this time with organized recreation and educational pursuits, but at other times they enjoyed more informal play. Susumu Yenokida and Joe Norikane enjoyed playing games like *Mah Jong*. Sock Yoshida was well-known for playing his mandolin.²⁸⁸ Sometimes they played tricks on the guards. Isamura, a bunk-mate of Yoshikawa's, decided to play a trick on the guard one night as he was doing a head count. Isamura was on the top bunk. Everything was quiet. When the guard came around Isamura started shouting, "*Bonzai, bonzai, bonzai!*" The guard was so scared he ran straight to the office. He came back with several more guards thinking a riot might erupt. The Nisei thought the joke was hilarious. The guards did not find it so amusing. Another night Yenokida's brother invited some Navajo inmates to join them in a little fun. It was raining, and as Yenokida remembered it, they were feeling rather confined that night. They started into a Navajo line dance with everyone in the barracks joining the fun. When the guard came to see what was happening, once again, he was startled by what he did not understand. He threw his hands in the air and took off running.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Joe Yamakido, personal conversation with the author, San Francisco, May 11, 2002; Kenji G. Taguma, "Historic JACL Ceremony Recognizing WWII Resisters Called a 'First Step' in Reconciliation," *Nichi Bei Times* (May 14, 2002).

²⁸⁸ "Personality Portraits: 'Sock' Yoshida," *Roadrunner* (Nov-Dec 1945); Yoshikawa and Yenokida, interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, August 2001.

²⁸⁹ Yoshikawa and Yenokida, interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, August 2001.

The guards were not always so easily fooled by the inmates' antics. One night a few of the resisters even stole a couple of chickens and a turkey from the poultry pen and cooked them over a fire. They had a huge feast. It was only later they learned the guards had known exactly what was going on but had decided to let the men have their fun.²⁹⁰

Prison officials also encouraged the inmates to participate in structured recreational and educational opportunities as a part of their rehabilitation plan. Every two weeks, inmates could watch a silent film on subjects ranging from agriculture to historical biographies, from American heritage to travel and personal finance. Occasionally they offered more entertaining films. Prisoners also organized recreational activities. Flu Inaba, Sock Yoshida, and Bill Nagasaki were among those who helped organize sporting events, competitions and exhibits for the inmates. They had table tennis tournaments, boxing matches, wrestling, and a Ju-Jitsu demonstration put on by Ken and his brother Sock. Some of the most memorable events were the softball games prisoners played against teams from the area. They played teams from local military bases, like Marana and Davis-Monthan Air Bases, and even a team from the University of Arizona.²⁹¹

Prisoners also produced their own newspaper called *The Roadrunner*. Besides providing updates on the camp population, the results of recent softball games, and personality profiles of guards or notable inmates, prisoners also wrote a variety of articles for the paper, some of which commented on the injustices of the war, the world, and the

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ "Big Gym Show," *Roadrunner*, July-August 1945; "Sports Review," *Roadrunner*, July-August 1945; "Personality Portraits: 'Sock' Yoshida," *Roadrunner*, Nov-Dec 1945; "Sports Review," *Roadrunner*, Nov-Dec 1945; and Group interview.

prison system. One of the Jehovah's Witnesses wrote that the war itself demonstrated the failure of the League of Nations. A secular pacifist quoted Thomas Paine on the injustices of modern society. He wrote:

When it shall be said in any country in the world: 'My poor are happy; neither ignorance nor distress is to be found among them; my jails are empty of prisoners; my streets of beggars; the aged are not in want; the taxes are not oppressive...' When these things can be said, then may that country boast of its constitution and its government.

Another editorial, commenting on the ineffective criminal justice system in America, cited ways in which penologists were not only failing to curb crime, but were also committing crimes of their own in unfair sentencing practices. The newspaper provided inmates with a creative outlet and became one of the only surviving historical records of the prison.²⁹²

It was in the pages of the *Roadrunner* that Bill Nagasaki wrote his article, "Relocation and Its Consequences," explaining to fellow inmates the difficulties Nisei families faced as the WRA camps started to close. The restrictions against Japanese Americans entering into the West Coast defense zones had been repealed earlier that year, and Dillon Myer had just announced that the camps were to be closed no later than December 15, 1945. Unlike Horace Greeley's admonition to young men in the nineteenth Century to "go west," Nagasaki wrote that because of relocation many Japanese Americans could no longer see their future in the West. Instead, they were moving East where they hoped to

²⁹² George Luning, "They Will be Done," *Roadrunner*, July-August 1945; "Philosophical Tidbits," *Roadrunner*, July-August 1945; "Editorial," *Roadrunner*, Nov-Dec 1945. Two editions of *The Roadrunner* in author's possession and also on file at the Heritage Office of the Coronado National Forest in Tucson, Arizona. Copies courtesy of Kenji Taguma and Joe Norikane.

assimilate themselves in “the American way of life.” Yet thousands of families faced housing shortages, and still suffered the psychological and economic consequences of their evacuation and detention.²⁹³

Approximately 18,000 individuals remained in the WRA camps at the end of 1945, many of whom were family members of the resisters. They faced an uncertain future when the camps began closing. While many of them welcomed the chance to “bid adieu to camp life” once and for all, the deadline to move out by December 15 weighed heavily on those with very few resources left to start life anew.²⁹⁴

The resisters faced resettlement problems of their own, as one-by-one they completed their prison sentences and had to decide where to go. Some of their families were still being held in the WRA camps. The first Tucsonians released from the prison early in 1945 decided to do whatever it took to reunite their families. As ex-convicts, though, they met with painful and sometimes violent retaliation, and their punishment for disobeying the draft resumed.

²⁹³ Bill Nagasaki, “Relocation and Its Consequences,” *Roadrunner*, Nov-Dec 1945.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Coming “Home” a Felon

Noboru Taguma was released from the Catalina Federal Honor camp with a new suit and twenty-five dollars, as was standard for all federal prisoners. He also got a one-way ticket to his final destination. Taguma requested a ticket to Amache, Colorado where his family still resided.²⁹⁵

When Taguma arrived at Amache, he found that he could not rejoin his family. The WRA had decided that no individuals returning from prison would be admitted to the relocation centers, not even with a day pass. In a letter to the Solicitor General of the Justice Department, Project Attorney Horn reported that one of the camp’s resisters was scheduled to be paroled in the coming month and was interested in rejoining his family. Horn wrote that he was quite delighted to hear that Dillon Myer, director of the War Relocation Authority had ruled that such individuals would not be permitted to return. “It would be ironical to allow him to return,” remarked Horn, “when soldiers released from the Army with honorable discharges are not allowed to return.”²⁹⁶ But the camp administration did grant returning soldiers permits to visit family and friends. Though denied government-funded room and board, furloughed soldiers were hosted at detainee expense. The Nikkei-sponsored USOs in camp provided them with food, entertainment, and even temporary places to stay. The resisters, however, were not returning soldiers.

²⁹⁵ Yenokida, et al interview.

²⁹⁶ Horn to Ferguson, 1/27/45, Robert A. Leflar papers, MC 206, University of Arkansas, Special Collections, Box 3, Folder 17.

They were returning felons and they were not given permits to enter the camps, even for a visit.²⁹⁷

When Joe Norikane returned “home” to Amache, administrators gave him a day pass by mistake. This mistake did not go unnoticed. When camp officials realized their error, they began looking for him, as Norikane said, “to throw me out of the camp, because I was blacklisted not to go in there.” He was visiting his sister when internal security officers went to his mother’s barracks looking for him. They never found him. “The next morning,” Norikane remembered, “I walked out,” right out the front gates of camp, “and the police chief started driving by slowly, and he said, ‘Hey, you want a ride?’ ‘No, I’m gonna walk,’” Norikane replied. He remembered feeling like he had really gotten away with something that day.²⁹⁸

Other resisters who returned to Amache to be near family did not get so lucky. When it became clear that they would not be able to enter camp through official channels, they took matters into their own hands. They sneaked under the camp fence at night. They were determined not to allow the fence stand between them and their families. Joe Norikane said, “It was just like ‘Hogan’s Heroes’!”²⁹⁹

Fellow resisters, Susumu and Min Yenokida, Noboru Taguma, Joe Norikane, and Kaz Kunitake rented a house together near the camp and got jobs in and around the town

²⁹⁷ Despite efforts to create facilities to host returning soldiers, some still complained that not enough was being done on their behalf. Despite complaints, returning soldiers were allowed to visit family members freely and did enjoy some accommodations, unlike the resisters who were not even allowed inside the camps to visit family members. The most active USO was located in the Jerome Relocation Center near Camp Shelby in Mississippi, where nearly 5,000 Nisei were stationed while they trained for combat. Edward B. Marks to W. Noel Hudson, USO Regional Executive, October 13, 1943, “USO” folder 61.116, box 325, RG 210, Section 16, NARA.

²⁹⁸ Norikane interview.

²⁹⁹ Group interview.

of Granada to make ends meet so they could be near their families. They would sneak into camp at night and sneak back out before they could be detected by the camp's internal security. Their midnight escapades exposed the irony of a government camp that held their family at gun-point and let the so-called troublemakers go free. It begs the question, who were the prisoners and who were the criminals? In this case, the family members left behind, deemed loyal for all intents and purposes, remained prisoners and the ex-convict resisters roamed free.³⁰⁰

The resisters took the risk of being arrested in order to check up on their families, enjoy a little entertainment, and get some of Mom's "home" cooking. "My father told the children, 'Always be nice to each other,'" said Taguma, "because in time of emergency, nobody [else] will help you." So, when he sneaked into camp, his brothers and sisters would help him navigate his way and avoid being detected. If he wanted to go see a movie, they would watch outside to be sure there were no security guards. When he came out, his mother would have rice balls waiting for him to take back to the house to share with his friends, because as Taguma said, he and his buddies didn't know how to cook.³⁰¹ But it was not just food and entertainment that drew Taguma to the camp. "We always sneaked in to make sure our Mom was okay," said Yenokida. "That's what happened." "In our day," Taguma explained, "parents were the most important things to us. You know, they suffer too much."³⁰² Many Nisei felt a strong obligation to keep the family together and support their aging parents at all costs. In fact, some resisted the

³⁰⁰ Yenokida, et al, interview.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Ibid.

draft in part so that they could sit out the war in prison, and be available to support their parents through the relocation process after the war.³⁰³

It was not long before camp officials became aware of the comings and goings of the “blacklisted” resisters. After one close call, the visits came to an abrupt end.³⁰⁴

Yenokida and his friends had been sneaking under the fence without any problems, until one night they narrowly escaped arrest. Yenokida remembered:

One night, we were in camp, and Mom says, you’d better go out because they’re going to be looking for you. So, we went into the movie theater, which is right across the way. So, we were in the movie theater, looking at the movies, and this security officer I knew—he was a good friend of our family—he said, ‘Hey, you’d better get out of here, because they are looking for you.’ So, we ran by the stars. It was getting dark. The desert can get awfully dark at night. And we ran and ran. We ran so hard we’d fall down and run again.

They got under the wire and out of camp without getting caught, but they knew they would never be able to sneak in that way again.³⁰⁵

The next day, vandals burned the resisters’ rental house to the ground with everything in it. The four friends were left with nothing but the clothes on their backs.

While they never could prove who set the fire, Taguma and Yenokida explained that only

³⁰³ For an excellent critique of what some call Japanese culture, see Takashi Fujitani, “Cultures of Resistance: Japanese American Draft Resisters in Transnational Perspective,” in *A Matter of Conscience: Essays on the World War II Heart Mountain Draft Resistance Movement*, edited by Mike Mackey (Powell, Wyoming: Western History Publications, 2002), 21-38.

³⁰⁴ By the end of 1945, Mr. Hannan, project attorney for Amache acknowledged that the fence was less than adequate for keeping people in or out. In an attempt to force an elderly man to relocate once the camp had closed, Hannan reported that security officers had to escort one elderly man all the way to the train station, “to avoid any possibility of him coming back in under the fence.” L.J. Hannan to Edwin E. Ferguson, August 31, 1945, Leflar Papers, box 3, folder 18, University of Arkansas, Special Collections. Fayetteville, Arkansas.

³⁰⁵ Yenokida, et al.

Japanese Americans lived in the area. They were sure it was Japanese Americans who did not want resisters around, and would do anything to force them to leave the area.³⁰⁶

Not long before the fire, Taguma had lost his job because fellow Japanese Americans had recognized him as a resister. They complained that they did not want to shop at a place where a resister was employed. Taguma lost his job, and then lost everything he owned in the house fire. Years later, he remembered that he had been especially upset about losing his prison-issue suit. It was the only one he had ever owned. Susumu Yenokida and his brother Min left for Denver after the fire, where they met up with Joe Norikane and rented an apartment together. Noboru Taguma decided to try one more time to reunite his family.³⁰⁷

With very little to lose, Taguma made one final attempt to enter the camp legitimately. He went to the front gates and asked if he could please be reunited with his family. The guard was sympathetic, but could not let him in. He suggested an alternative. “Why don't you renounce your citizenship,” the guard suggested, “and then the government will send your whole family to Tule Lake?” The guard did not know that the WRA had stopped transferring renunciants to Tule Lake, and neither did Taguma. Taguma sent in his request to Washington, and then left for Denver to join his friends where he would wait for a ruling on his application. When he got there, he found that two FBI agents were already waiting for him. They arrested him. Much to Taguma's surprise, they sent him to the Department of Justice internment camp in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He had expected to be sent to Tule Lake.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid; Taguma interview; and Group interview.

³⁰⁸ Noboru Taguma interview with the author, Tucson, Arizona, August 2001.

Taguma had not been in Santa Fe long before his brother joined him. When his brother saw Taguma, he was perplexed. “What are you doing in Santa Fe?” he asked. “I thought we were going to Tule Lake!” Both Taguma and his brother had tried to reunite the family by renouncing their citizenship. Both failed.³⁰⁹

Taguma had given up his citizenship in his attempt to reunite his family, but what he got instead was indefinite internment in a Department of Justice camp. This time he was not serving a mere nine-month sentence. The Department of Justice kept Taguma in custody for two years, transferring him to Crystal City and eventually Sea Brooks Farm in New Jersey while Wayne Collins of the ACLU fought to restore Taguma's citizenship along with that of hundreds of other Nisei who had also renounced their citizenship under duress. Taguma was finally released from federal custody in 1947.³¹⁰

Returning “Home” to California

When Ken Yoshida returned to California after his release from prison, he found his parents and siblings living in the “Hunter’s Point” housing project in San Francisco. This was a temporary housing project (similar to the barracks in Topaz) built by government and charity organizations to reduce severe housing shortages. The Yoshida family moved into the project and did their best to get by on their oldest daughter's meager income from her job as a seamstress. When Ken got home, he went to work to support his parents and younger siblings.

³⁰⁹ Ibid. For an excellent source on the history of the renunciants, see: Donald Collins, *Native American Aliens: Renunciation of Citizenship by Japanese Americans during World War II* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1985).

³¹⁰ Taguma interview. See also: Omiko Omori, *Rabbit in the Moon*.

For Ken Yoshida, life after prison was not too difficult. He was used to hard work. Ever since he was a young teenager, his mother had looked to him as the major breadwinner in the family.³¹¹ He got a job right away and no one ever asked about his war record. His wife, Kay Yoshida suggested this might be because he could pass as Chinese. He was a head taller than most Nisei and had facial features that did not immediately identify him as Japanese. The questions that bothered many resisters, like “where were you for the last two years?” and “why didn't you serve in the Army?” never seemed to follow Ken Yoshida.³¹²

It was Ken's brother Mac who experienced difficulty when he returned home not as a felon, but as a veteran. Mac joined the army, leaving his two brothers behind in jail. His father had wanted the whole family to stick together. He had been pleased when his sons decided to resist the draft. Mac worried that he had disrespected his father, which was not an unreasonable fear. Taguma's father told him specifically that if he decided to resist, he had better see it through. Taguma reasoned, his father had pride, too. If his son was going to jail to defend a principle, he did not want to see him give up his fight.³¹³ When Mac was discharged from military service, he feared that he might be an outsider in his own family. He went to live in the San Francisco YMCA instead of going home. It did not take long for the Yoshida family to get word that Mac was back in town. Ken and his sister went down to the YMCA to see him, knowing that he might need an

³¹¹ Yoshidas, 2001.

³¹² Kay Yoshida, interview with the author, 2001. For a fictional account of the troubles resisters faced getting jobs and explaining their lack of military service that is based on the real life of a resister, see John Okada, *No-no Boy* (San Francisco: Combined Asian American Resources Project, 1976).

³¹³ Taguma interview.

invitation to come home. With their personal invitation and assurances that their father wanted Mac back home, the family was once again reunited.³¹⁴

When the war was over and the camps closed, Susumu Yenokida finally rejoined his family on their farm in near Cortez, California. For a short time it appeared as though life might revert to some sort of prewar normalcy. As members of the Cortez Growers' Association, the Yenokida family was able to retain their farm during the war. The entire community returned to the area together, because they had collectively hired a white manager to oversee the farms in their absence.³¹⁵

Yet, returning home proved elusive for the Yenokidas. Animosity and rivalries that had divided the group before the war were tempered by their shared experience of evacuation and confinement. But the closer the community became, the more clearly individuals within that community defined the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.³¹⁶

Japanese Americans knew they might face violent opposition when they began resettling in California. Some responded by promoting a JACL "spin" of their incarceration. They wanted reluctant white neighbors to see that they had remained loyal throughout the war and did their duty to the nation despite the injustices they faced.

Cortez had been dominated by the JACL before the war. After the war many residents perpetuated the JACL version of history that dismissed any resistance as the work of a

³¹⁴ Yoshida interview with the author, San Mateo, California, May 2002.

³¹⁵ Yenokida interview; Matsumoto, *Farming the Home Place: A Japanese American Community in California, 1919-1982* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 161-168.

³¹⁶ The communities that were able to return to California as communities are remarkable in the history of Japanese American internment and are the subject of Valerie Matsumoto's book, *Farming the Home Place*. In her research, she noted that even though old animosities and rivalries between the Buddhist section of town and the Christians were tempered by the shared experience of internment, the common experience made the community more close-knit and thus raised the level of intolerance for deviance or outsiders. Matsumoto, *Farming the Home Place*.

small minority of Kibei outside agitators and instead emphasized the loyalty and quiet obedience of the vast majority of Nikkei.³¹⁷ The presence of draft resisters in their midst threatened to expose a more complicated reality.³¹⁸

Japanese Americans' fears about returning to the West Coast were well-founded. During the first few months detainees began resettling on the West Coast, Nikkei residents of San Joaquin Valley (just south of Cortez) became victims of nearly 90 acts of violence and 19 shootings. Some families were traumatized by night-riders threatening violence and wielding Klan-like intimidation tactics. Those who had hoped to repair their lives and restore a sense of normalcy were left shaken and on edge.³¹⁹

It was in this context that the Yenokida family faced opposition to their return from an unexpected source. Susumu Yenokida recalled that his family was not welcome because he and three of his brothers had resisted the draft. Someone from the community pulled his brother aside and said, "What are you people doing back over here? You have no right to come back over here." Yenokida remembered that his brother decided it would be best to leave the area. The family left and began farming in Thornton.³²⁰ The Yenokida family was forced to leave their home at the request of their Japanese American neighbors. Unlike the war years, this time they were forced to leave and never come back.³²¹

³¹⁷ For an example of the quintessential JACL version of history, see: Bill Hosokawa, *Nisei: The Quiet Americans* (New York: W. Morrow, 1969). For an example of a history of Topaz told from the point of view that any resistance that did take place was caused by a very small, marginal group of outside agitators, see: Leonard Arrington, *The Price of Prejudice: The Japanese-American Relocation Center in Utah during World War II* (Logan: Utah State University, 1962).

³¹⁸ Yenokida interview.

³¹⁹ Matsumoto, *Farming the Home Place*, 161-168.

³²⁰ Yenokida interview.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

Even though the Yenokida family's experience was unique, more and more resisters experienced marginalization or became ostracized in symbolic ways. Some Japanese Americans called their choices cowardly. Others seemed to try to forget. The historical memory of their resistance nearly fell into oblivion.³²² When Roger Daniels returned to a community that had been torn apart over the draft, he asked why nobody bothered to mention the story in any of the oral histories he had conducted. They responded: "Oh professor, we did not think you wanted to hear about that nasty business—it was so unpleasant."³²³ Those who chose to forget the draft did so quite deliberately, hoping to make this chapter in history vanish.

The resisters who were not asked to leave the Cortez community lived much of their lives in carefully guarded silence. Like many resisters across the country, they did not tell neighbors, friends, or even family about their wartime records. Their silence contributed to the post-war myth that Japanese Americans did nothing to oppose their own incarceration.³²⁴

³²² Ibid; and Yenokida et. al. On the limits of community, exclusion and community theory, see: George S. Wood, *Conversations on Community Theory* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2002). Art Hansen says that without the oral history work of Frank Chin in the early 1970s, the history of the resisters may very well have fallen into oblivion. Michael Kammen argues that the construction of historical memory is a parallel construction of historical amnesia. Kammen, *The Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1991).

³²³ Roger Daniels' preface to *A Matter of Conscience: Essays on the World War II Heart Mountain Draft Resistance Movement*, edited by Mike Mackey (Powell, Wyoming: Western History Publications, 2002).

³²⁴ Michael Kammen argues that silences such as these are a powerful driving force in the creation of historical memory. Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory*.

CONCLUSION:
 HISTORICAL MEMORY AND RECONCILIATION:
 THE TUCSONIAN DRAFT “RESISTERS OF CONSCIENCE”

In 1947, President Harry S. Truman asked an independent review board to investigate the possibility of pardoning draft resisters. The board was directed by former Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. They reviewed 15,805 cases and determined that during the war, approximately 10,000 individuals had committed what they called “willful” and criminal violations of Selective Service. They recommended that these resisters not be pardoned. By contrast, 4,300 Jehovah's Witnesses, 1,000 religious objectors, and 500 others had all resisted the draft on religious or moral grounds. It would be much easier to make a case for these resisters to receive presidential pardons. The committee took a closer look at each case in order to make recommendations to the president.

When reviewing the case of the Nisei resisters, former Justice Roberts commented it was clear to the committee that these resisters “deeply resented” being classified as “undesireables” during the war. The board sympathized with the Nisei. They believed that they were loyal citizens who had refused the draft as a means of protesting their wartime treatment. Full presidential pardons were recommended.³²⁵

On December 23, 1947, President Harry S. Truman issued what he called a Christmas pardon for 1,523 resisters, including all 292 Nisei convicted of draft evasion, but the resisters would have to wait for 55 years for many of their fellow Japanese

³²⁵ “1,523 Draft Evaders Get Truman Pardons,” Associate Press, December 23, 1947; “Truman Christmas Pardon Given to Nisei Objectors,” *Nichi Bei Times*, December 24, 1947.

Americans to recognize the moral basis for their resistance. Truman's pardon reversed their felony convictions, restored their citizenship, freeing any who remained in prison.³²⁶ His pardon did not free the resisters from continued insults from Japanese Americans who found it more difficult to concede the moral basis of their resistance. By way of a conclusion, this chapter explains how and why the resisters were nearly forgotten between 1947 when they were pardoned by the president and 2002, when they were finally recognized by the JAACL as civil rights heroes.

Reunions, Redress, and Reconciliation

In 1947, the same year of Truman's pardon, Bill Nagasaki and Sus Yenokida's older brother, Min Yenokida, decided to organize the first reunion of the Tucsonians. They thought it was important for this group to stay in touch with one another. Together, they would be able to remember why they took a stand against the draft, even if they were marginalized within their own communities. Nagasaki and Yenokida invited all who could come to the first annual reunion of "The Tucsonians," naming their group after the nearest city to the prison where all had been incarcerated.³²⁷

³²⁶ Presidential Pardon and list of pardoned resisters, courtesy of Ken Yoshida. Eric Muller, "The Minidoka Draft Resisters in a Federal Kangaroo Court," in *Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 172; and Muller, *Free to Die for their Country: The Story of Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II* (University of Chicago Press, 2001).

³²⁷ Yenokida interview with the author, (Tucson, Arizona, August 2001; Galt, California, May 2002); Group interview, (Tucson, Arizona, November 1999); documents of the Tucsonians, courtesy of Ken Yoshida.

The idea of creating a lifelong association of resisters took hold, and for more than fifty years, the Tucsonians gathered at reunions whenever they could. In 1960, two of the Tucsonians' Hopi friends even joined them. The family of resisters was growing. Wives joined the group, and later, children. The Tucsonians kept an updated list of names and addresses for each member of the group so that they could always stay in contact with one another. They collected modest annual dues, so that they could send money to the families of resisters who died. Later, the Tucsonians started attending events organized by other groups of resisters, and invited some of the Heart Mountain group to their own gatherings.³²⁸

For decades, the Tucsonians built their friendships and gradually taught their children about the tough choices they faced during the war. Kay Yoshida, wife of Tucsonian Ken Yoshida, pointed out that few Nisei talked openly with their children about camp, not to mention about the draft. One reason she remembered was the deep shame and guilt that she and others felt at having been in some kind of prison. The shame of being incarcerated in any prison, including those called “relocation centers” by the WRA, prevented many Nisei from talking about the war years to anyone, even their children.³²⁹ The reunions made it easier for the Yoshidas to tell their kids about their father’s wartime record. Kay Yoshida explained:

We never talked to our kids about the internment camps. We were too busy trying to get our lives back together, but because of the reunions we

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Many Sansei explain that the only things they know about the camp years they learned in books, since their parents never talked about camp. Steve Koga, Sansei and son of Topaz detainees, started learning about camp as an adult, after his parents passed away and now serves as a board member of the Topaz Museum. He recalled that his parents told him nothing of their experiences and refused to talk about camp. Koga, personal conversations with the author, Delta, Utah, May 2004.

had at Tahoe, Lake Tahoe, we finally told them. Your dad was in prison. I still remember their reaction, especially our son, “Our dad was in prison?!”

Joe Norikane thought for a while when he was asked about the first time he told his son Joey about his resistance. Finally, he concluded that he had never actually told his son. He figured it out from all of Joe's involvement with the Tucsonians over the years. It had simply become a part of their family's lives.³³⁰

Ken Yoshida recalled being more comfortable than most in telling strangers that he was a resister. He was proud to say that he was the first resister from Topaz. But when he said this, it always stopped the conversation cold. He laughed when he said he did not know why. Kay teased him by saying, “He doesn't know why?! He stumps them.” Talking about camp was usually part of a brief introduction, a way to place each other, but the conversation moved quickly to more enjoyable topics. As Kay said, “you don't talk about the camp experience because you already know,” especially if someone brings up the draft.³³¹

While the resisters were busy rebuilding their lives, historians began writing about Japanese American incarceration during World War II. Few books mentioned the draft, let alone the fact that several hundred Nisei resisted it. Those books that did mention the draft minimized its importance.³³² Most perpetuated the War Department's claim that the draft represented a restoration of Nisei rights. For example, in JACL historian Bill

³³⁰ Kay Yoshida interview, San Mateo, 2002; Joe Norikane interview, San Francisco, 2002.

³³¹ Ken and Kay Yoshida, Tucson, Arizona, August 2001.

³³² *Honor by Fire* is one example of a book that details the history of Nisei serving in the military during the war that does mention the draft, but only in one paragraph. It marks a turning point in the literature from books that say nothing of the draft, including *Years of Infamy* which skips from the registration crisis to the breakdown at Tule Lake, but passes over the draft, to books that begin listing it as an event, but offer little analysis or explanation of its impact or significance. Lyn Crost, *Honor by Fire: Japanese Americans at War in Europe and the Pacific* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994); and Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*.

Hosokawa's book, *Nisei: The Quiet Americans*, (even the 2002 revised edition), the only reference to the draft is buried in a chapter that details the extraordinary heroism of Nisei volunteers on the battlefield. He wrote:

Within a year after the Army opened its ranks to Nisei volunteers, full Selective Service rights were restored to them. According to a Selective Service monograph on special groups, some 33,300 Nisei—an astonishingly large figure in view of their total numbers—served in World War II. More than half were from the mainland.³³³

While this may be accurate, Hosokawa's brief description of the restoration of the draft is misleading. It sounds as if Selective Service rights were restored to the volunteers. It is not readily apparent that additional Nisei became subject to the draft. In addition, he inflated the number of volunteers, and portrays the Nisei as visionary patriots, hiding the tortured reality of coercion and conflict that led many to accept military service. He wrote: "Nisei had the courage and vision to see beyond the watchtowers of the American-style concentration camps."³³⁴ The elimination of the draft from the historical narrative created a powerful and lasting form of historical amnesia that further marginalized the resisters. If there was no draft, there could not have been resisters.

Over time, the myth took hold that all those Nisei who served in the military did so on a voluntary basis. Even war memorials dedicated to the memory and sacrifice of the Nisei veterans portray their service as voluntary. In a memorial at Topaz, Mac Yoshida's military service is forgotten, but other Topaz Nisei are honored all as volunteers, none as a draftee.³³⁵ The National Japanese American Memorial is less

³³³ Hosokawa, *Nisei: Quiet Americans*, p. 417-418. See also: Leonard Arrington, *The Price of Prejudice* (Logan: Utah State University, 1962), 31-32.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

³³⁵ Veterans Memorial, Topaz, Utah.

specific, but equally misleading. In its brief explanation of Japanese Americans in the military, it states: “Answering the call to duty, young Japanese Americans entered into military service, joining many pre-war draftees.” It does not state how these young Nisei “entered” the service. When contrasted with the “pre-war draftees,” it is reasonable that visitors to the monument would infer that one group was drafted and the other was not.³³⁶

What caused narrators to blatantly misrepresent the past? Historian Gary Okihiro explained that the JACL had their eyes set on achieving redress for survivors of the camps. This political agenda drove what had become a complete reinvention of history to fit the present political needs of the redress movement. In 1973, he explained that the JACL-driven narrative portrayed Japanese Americans as “downtrodden victims of a racist America gone hysterical,” who rose “up from the dust of defeat to patriotic triumph when given the opportunity to prove their basic loyalty.” Okihiro criticized this version of history because it whitewashed a more interesting, complex reality—it denied the fact that the majority of Nikkei resisted becoming victims in diverse and often creative ways. But for those seeking redress, admitting that detainees resisted the government, or that some even declared disloyalty to the nation as a means of protesting their loss of rights would have been inconvenient. Instead, a more useful narrative portrayed the camps as an unnecessary use of force against an overwhelmingly patriotic group of citizens. Once redress had been achieved with passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1988 and an official

³³⁶ National Japanese American Memorial Foundation, Memorial Inscriptions (<http://www.njamf.com/>, accessed December 10, 2005).

apology from the President, the JACL version of history remained a part of the national consciousness.³³⁷

Scholars like Michael Kammen and Michel-Rolph Trouillot have noted aptly, all history represents choices people make regarding which portions of the story will be included and which will be excluded. What we forget is just as important as what we remember. Historical memory and historical amnesia work hand in hand to create a less complete narrative, but one that is more manageable. The resisters had not literally been forgotten. Their presence threatened a more useful historical narrative. Silencing one story, that of the draft and the resisters, to highlight another, the volunteers, served the political needs of the present. But political needs change, and so would the narrative.³³⁸

³³⁷ Shortly after Hosokawa published his book, *Nisei*, another group of scholars began publishing articles that ran counter to Hosokawa's JACL-centered narrative. Of them, Gary Okihiro's article, "Japanese Resistance in America's Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation," was the first. It takes a look at the ways Japanese Americans resisted their incarceration and based on what at that time was a new literature on African anti-colonialism and African American agency under slavery, he found that the myth perpetuated by the dominant JACL narratives that Japanese Americans did not resist and that those who did represented a small minority of outside agitators simply did not stand up against the historical evidence. Other articles followed that supported Okihiro's findings. Of particular importance among these include: Arthur Hansen and David Hacker, "The Manzanar Riot: An Ethnic Perspective," *Amerasia* 2 (Fall 1974): 112-157; and James Hirabayashi, "Nisei: The Quiet American? A Re-evaluation," *Amerasia* 3 (Summer 1975): 114-29. Gary Okihiro continued writing on Japanese American resistance. His articles include: "Japanese Resistance in America's Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation," *Amerasia* 2 (1973): 20-34; "Tule Lake Under Martial Law: A Study in Japanese Resistance," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 5, no. 3 (1977): 71-85; "Religion and Resistance in America's Concentration Camps," *Phylon* 45, no. 3 (1984): 220-233.

³³⁸ Michael Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1991); and Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995). Again, see Gary Okihiro's 1973 article on his assessment of the deliberate manipulation of Japanese American history to suit the political purposes of the present: "Japanese Resistance in America's Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation," *Amerasia* 2 (1973): 20-34. For an excellent discussion of the power of memory and war and an equally convincing argument that war memorials tell us more about what its creators want to remember about the past than about the past itself, see: LeeAnn Whites, "You Can't Change History by Moving a Rock: Gender, Race, and the Cultural Politics of Confederate Memorialization," in *The Memory of the Civil War in American Culture*, edited by Alice Fahs and Joan Waugh (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). See also: David Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001).

Redress did more than cement the JACL version of history in the public mind. It also reassured survivors that they had done nothing to deserve their incarceration. People like Kay Yoshida, who truly believed she must have done something to deserve being placed in a prison, began talking about their experiences more openly. Some spoke of their camp experiences for the first time in their lives.³³⁹ As surviving Nisei gained confidence in their innocence, new conversations emerged. Nisei demonstrated their willingness to discuss the complex realities that Japanese Americans had hidden from themselves and from the public for fifty years.

Two major questions emerged in the 1990s: To what extent did the JACL cooperate with the government during the war and should Japanese Americans recognize the draft resisters as defenders of civil rights? To answer the first question, the JACL commissioned its own study. In 1990, they hired historian Deborah K. Lim to investigate the history of JACL collaboration with the government during the war. The evidence Lim found was far more damning than the JACL had expected. She found that the JACL had done much more than cooperate. The JACL had not defended Nisei rights at all. It had been JACL national leaders who had suggested some of the most damaging wartime policies. In the first few months of the war, national JACL leadership suggested placing Nikkei in relocation centers. They petitioned for a restoration of the draft. Mike Masaoka even suggested the formation of an all-Nisei suicide squad. The JACL leaders had actively encouraged the government to adopt some of the most damaging policies of the war.³⁴⁰

³³⁹ Kay Yoshida interview, (San Mateo, California, May 2002); and CWRIC, *Personal Justice Denied*.

³⁴⁰ *Lim Report*, courtesy of Joe Norikane. See full report on www.resisters.com, accessed December 10, 2005.

Lim's report was suppressed. She was taken off the project, the report was trimmed down and sanitized to give a more favorable, partial admission of JACL cooperation. But in a continuing story of resistance, individuals would not allow the report to die. An informal network quickly developed among those who reproduced the original report, known as the "Lim Report," and distributed it as widely as possible, exposing some very embarrassing segments of JACL history.³⁴¹

Along with growing criticism of the JACL's role in the wartime erosion of Japanese American civil rights, emerged a growing movement among Japanese Americans to recognize the resisters for their civil rights struggle. In 1988, the same year President Reagan issued an apology to Japanese Americans and signed the Civil Rights Act of 1988 into law, the Seattle chapter of the JACL proposed a resolution to recognize the resisters. This resolution stated:

Now, therefore, be it resolved that the JACL recognize those Japanese American draft resisters of World War II who declared their loyalty to their country, but who were also dedicated to the principle of defending their civil rights, were willing to make significant sacrifices to uphold their beliefs of patriotism in a different form from those who sacrificed their lives on the battlefields; and that they, too, deserve a place of honor and respect in the history of Americans of Japanese ancestry The JACL regrets any pain or bitterness caused by its failure to recognize this group of patriotic Americans and further resolves to educate our own community and the public that loyalty is not necessarily demonstrated in any singular form, but can be manifested in other praiseworthy and admirable acts, and that by this recognition the JACL strives to promote and nurture the healing process of an issue that has divided our community.

After two years of study and review, delegates at the 1990 San Diego JACL national convention voted unanimously to adopt the resolution.³⁴²

³⁴¹ *Lim Report*.

³⁴² Ken Nakano, et al., "Draft Resisters Recognized by National JACL in 1990," *Pacific Citizen*, July 2-8, 1999, 7-8.

For some, the resolution went too far. One veteran wrote in an editorial forum for 442nd Veterans: “Never in my life did I ever think that a group of well dressed, well-educated Sansei and Nisei would compose a heap of 'horse manure' such as Resolution 13,” meaning the resolution adopted by the JACL. He continued in disgust, “To make matters worse they had to top it off with 'hog wash' when they tried to equate the 'courage' of the draft resisters to those of the volunteers who died in battle.” He called the proposal sacrilegious and suggested that a recent earthquake in the Bay area had been caused when tens of thousands of veterans buried at the National Cemetery in San Bruno rolled over in their graves.³⁴³

Despite resistance on the part of some veterans who balked at the idea of putting draft resisters and volunteers on the same pedestal of patriotism, support for the resisters became more common. In 1991, Clifford Uyeda, then president of the Japanese American Historical Society, commented that it took courage to stand up against the government and those who did so risked not only felony convictions, but also disapproval from members of their Japanese American communities. He said:

Possibly the greatest stigma to a [Japanese] family was a criminal record. Yet, these resisters were willing to go to a federal penitentiary The men who resisted and those who volunteered both did what they thought was right. We should honor both groups. They made their decisions based on what they thought was right, and took the consequences. This is the American way.

Uyeda was quoted in the concluding pages of a book on the Nisei veterans who broke away from the JACL narrative. Instead, it told a more complicated, disturbing story of intra-ethnic conflict; where Nisei suffered racism in Hawaii, and where parents in the

³⁴³ “A Sacrilegious Comparison” *Pacific Citizen*, February 8, 1991, 3.

camps derided their sons for volunteering, calling them “*bakatare-stupid*,” or as one Nisei remember his mother telling him: “*Bakatare, shinde shimau yo - shuyojo kara shigan suru kot wa nai.*” Translation: “No way, you'll get killed—you don't volunteer while being incarcerated.”³⁴⁴ George Oiye, former detainee and veteran said, it is not that anyone really forgot about these stories, or refused to tell them, he said: “It's that people weren't ready to hear them.” But in 1992, he said, people were not only ready, they wanted to know.³⁴⁵

The younger generation JACLers, specifically those in the Northern California-Western Nevada-Pacific (NCWNP) district, did not think the resolution went far enough. They wanted to see the national JACL honor those that they had started calling the “Resisters of Conscience” at “an appropriate public ceremony.” Their renewed call for an apology baffled some who thought the issue had already been put to rest. Ken Nakano, Mas Fukuhara and Cherry Kinoshita together responded to the call for a more public ceremony of recognition; they said a ceremony was redundant. They wrote that even the resisters seemed uninterested. Frank Emi told the three: “The Fair Play Committee never really asked for an apology. This all came internally from some members of the JACL—especially the younger members.” From this, the authors concluded that these young members were well-meaning, perhaps, but were looking for “a cause celebre” and had made an issue where none had existed before. Twila Tomita rebutted. He said that a public ceremony provided a rich opportunity to educate the

³⁴⁴ Frank Endo, “MIS In the Occupation of Japan,” National Japanese American Veterans Council Projects, (<http://www.njavc.org/projects/occupationessays/frankendo.html>, accessed December 10, 2005).

³⁴⁵ Thelma Chang, *I Can Never Forget: Men of the One Hundredth—Four Hundred Forty-Second* (Honolulu: Sigi Productions, 1991); Harry K. Honda, “50 Years Later: Tales of Poinancy,” *Pacific Citizen*, February 28, 1992.

public. Perhaps the resisters had not asked for an apology, but few knew about the resisters, and fewer still understood their cause. He wrote: “Wartime JACL leaders denounced them as 'cowardly' or 'deluded.’” But in 1999, Tomita said, “The resisters' stand is a model of how to deal with the infringement of civil rights.” He said the JACL of the new millennium should hold up the resisters as a model for future generations. The context had changed. Japanese Americans needed new heroes for the civil rights battles they would face in the next century.³⁴⁶

While Nikkei were still debating whether or not the JACL should sponsor a public ceremony recognizing the resisters, the Tucsonians received recognition of their own from an unexpected source. Archaeologist Mary Farrell discovered that a former prison on the Coronado National Forest near Tucson had once housed several Japanese American draft resisters, and one very famous Nisei resister, Gordon Hirabayashi. She and her husband, Jeff Burton, archaeologist for the National Park Service, were already working on a survey of the sites of Japanese American confinement during the war.³⁴⁷ Realizing that a site of such historical significance was under her jurisdiction gave her an idea. With the support of National Forest administrators, Farrell spearheaded a massive effort to rename the site in honor of Gordon Hirabayashi.³⁴⁸ Renaming a prison in honor of one of the inmates was unusual, but in 1999, the idea won instant support from a broad coalition of National Forest administrators, Japanese Americans, community activists, journalists and scholars. The Tucsonians joined Gordon Hirabayashi and together were

³⁴⁶ Ken Nakano, et al., “Draft Resisters Recognized by National JACL in 1990,” *Pacific Citizen*, July 2-8, 1999, 7-8; Twila Tomita, “Reexamining the Resisters' Resolution,” *Pacific Citizen*, July, 2-8, 1999, 7.

³⁴⁷ Burton, et. al., *Confinement and Ethnicity: An Overview of World War II Japanese American Relocation Sites* (Tucson: Western Archeological and Conservation Center, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1999).

³⁴⁸ The Gordon Hirabayashi Recreation Site, Coronado National Forest, Tucson, Arizona.

honored at a public ceremony dedicating and renaming the site. Two years later, the group reconvened for the unveiling of a kiosk that tells tourists about their struggle for civil rights.

In 2000, the JACL national delegation voted to recognize the resisters in a public ceremony. The younger generation of JACL leaders, the Sansei generation, wanted to show that they acknowledged the moral basis for resisting the draft and had put old animosities to rest. As Kenji Taguma, the son of Tucsonian resister Noboru Taguma, said, “We Sansei and Yonsei, with our liberated spirit, would probably say that we would have fought and resisted the internment order in any way we could. This is much easier said than done.”³⁴⁹ But the least they could do was honor a new group of war heroes. The younger generation voted for an apology, representing the majority of the JACL national delegation, but an older minority disagreed and walked out of the meeting in protest.

On May 11, 2002 approximately 300 people gathered to witness this historic event where Floyd Mori, national president of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) delivered a formal apology to those Japanese Americans who resisted the draft not in opposition to military service itself, but out of protest against their unconstitutional incarceration during the war. According to Ken Yoshida, one of the last surviving members of the Tucsonians, this apology marked the final chapter in a story that had begun at least sixty years before.

³⁴⁹ Kenji Taguma, “The Resister,” *National Japanese American Historical Society* (n.d. -- copy courtesy of Ken Yoshida), p. 9.

The apology may have marked the final chapter in a very long story of citizenship and civil disobedience, but it did not resolve all of the conflicts between the actors. Not all JACL members agreed with the resolution. Rumors spread throughout the Bay Area that a group of veterans planned to attend the ceremony and stand with their backs to the resisters while they were being recognized. No such demonstration took place, but support for the apology never was unanimous. Even resisters disagreed with each other about the apology. Some said it was unnecessary. Joe Norikane almost did not attend the ceremony. He said he did not need an apology. He already knew that he did the right thing. He went to recognize the efforts of a new generation who needed to state publicly that they would have done things differently had they been in charge during the war. And some, like Frank Emi (one of the seven leaders of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee) argued that the apology did not go far enough. He said:

I wish to extend my appreciation to the JACL for sponsoring this ceremony. As a civil rights organization, I believe it is a step in the right direction. Having said that, I think it would be entirely appropriate for JACL to go one step further and hold a program directed towards the Japanese American community for the excesses committed by wartime JACL leaders, such as acting as informants for the government causing many innocent people to suffer, as recorded in the *Lim Report*. I believe such action would finally put to rest JACL's unholy ghosts of the past and would be a worthy way to start the 21st Century. The United States government apologized for their wartime excesses. Can JACL do less?³⁵⁰

³⁵⁰ Frank Emi, remarks, May 11, 2002. For a summary of the ceremony and video clips, see: www.resisters.com/study/jacl_apology.htm, accessed December 12, 2005). Emi was not the first to point out that an apology to the resisters left out of a lot of individuals who had also made difficult, principled choices in defense of their civil rights during the war. Paul H. Ito wrote a letter in 1997 to the President of the JACL pointing out that few knew anything about the veterans who refused to answer the loyalty questionnaires, or the renunciants who gave up their citizenship under duress. He called for a full disclosure of Nikkei responses to their lack of rights during the war and a blanket JACL apology for not defending Nikkei rights immediately. Paul H. Ito to Helen Kawagoe, February 24, 1997, courtesy of Ken Yoshida.

For a short time the resisters gained center stage. Twenty-one resisters came to the ceremony and were recognized one at a time as “Resisters of Conscience,” each of whom took a courageous stand to defend their beliefs in patriotism.³⁵¹

What do the Tucsonians' stories tell us about the changing nature of citizenship? Nisei started out life with all the rights of citizenship and few of the responsibilities. Their teachers told them that their race would not prevent them from becoming 100percent Americans, but life taught them that they might have to work harder than their white counterparts to achieve the same level of success. Nisei learned that being Americans also meant that when their rights were taken away, they were supposed to fight to defend those rights.

The war forced Nisei to put the lessons of their childhood into practice. Would they give more than their white counterparts to prove their loyalty? Would they volunteer for service and obey the draft in the absence of their civil rights? Or would they fight, even against their own government, to defend the rights that had been theirs at birth? The war forced the issue that had been there all along. The lessons Nisei learned about their own citizenship as children were contradictory, and they chose different ways of acting on these lessons.

³⁵¹ The literature on reconciliation is vast. For a survey of issues relating specifically to Asian Americans in the latter half of the twentieth century, see: Eric Yamamoto, *Interracial Justice: Conflict and Reconciliation in Post-Civil Rights America* (New York: New York University Press, 1999). For a survey of the topic from a global perspective, see: Nigel Biggar, ed., *Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice After Civil Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001); Bjorn Kronendorfer, *Remembrance and Reconciliation: Encounters between Young Jews and Germans* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998); Wole Soyinka, *The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Citizenship is not static. Historically, the United States government has maintained two paths to citizenship: the very restrictive version based on earning citizenship and the liberal version based on mere birth in the nation.³⁵² Depending on the needs of the state at any given time, one version seems to gain preference over the other. In the 1920s, the nation needed the children of immigrants to see themselves as full citizens, as non-hyphenated Americans to defend against the growing fear that immigrants and their children threatened some core essence of Americanism. Nisei who believed they were 100percent Americans regardless of ancestry served the needs of the state and built up a reciprocal foundation of trust and loyalty. But war changed everything. All of a sudden the state needed to defend itself from enemies, both foreign and domestic.

Nisei became pawns in a dynamic process in which the state tried to decide what it needed from this group of Japanese American dual-citizens. First, they were citizens in need of protection. Then in the face of growing racial hysteria on the West Coast, the state reclassified them as non-alien, or at times even enemy alien, and forced them into camps with their alien parents. But how could a nation fighting racism abroad keep an entire population behind barbed wire? And would this not create a large population of citizen enemies? The state faced an impossible dilemma. The solution emerged gradually. The state would restore only the obligations of Nisei citizens and call them rights.

³⁵² Rogers Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

During the war, the state tried to manipulate definitions to control the terms of the debate. Nisei were not citizens, they were non-alien. They were not placed in camps the federal government would classify as prisons. The government preferred to call the camps temporary relocation centers. Nisei could earn back their citizenship by embracing their right to defend their country and die like other Americans on the battlefield of freedom. Nisei fought back against the endless creative realities.

The state cannot, even in wartime, dictate citizenship. Citizens must respond by acting on their citizenship, and the lessons Nisei learned in school provided a moral basis for civil disobedience. The state retained the upperhand, though. With the power not just to incarcerate (for Nikkei were already incarcerated), but to marginalize resisters with the stigma of criminal convictions, the state gained control and only those who refused to believe that felony convictions made their stand any less respectable followed through with their resistance. The power of criminal convictions outweighed the state's power to punish, and resisters suffered decades of punishment in the form of informal insults and historical amnesia.

Even history does not remain static. When the state itself admitted that it had made the grave error of incarcerating 120,000 civilians without due process, Japanese American youth could stand up and declare publicly that if given the chance, they would have done things differently. But this is speculation. They did not suffer that past. They were in the present, making their own version of history useful to their needs. The contests over Nisei citizenship evolved, in the form of contests over their wartime rights

and responsibilities, and over an even longer period when historians and citizens imagined, revised, and reinvented how the resisters should be remembered.

REFERENCES

PRIMARY SOURCES

Archival Collections

- Barnett, Arthur G. Papers. University of Washington Libraries, Allen Library, Special Collections, Seattle, Washington.
- Barnhart, Ralph Clayton. Papers. University of Arkansas Special Collections, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. Documents on War Relocation Authority. RG 65, Box 84, NARA, College Park, Maryland.
- Hirabayashi, Gordon. Papers. University of Washington Libraries, Allen Library, Special Collections, Seattle, Washington.
- Japanese American Evacuation Cases, 1942-1945. ACLU. Microfilm copies of Collection from Princeton University. University of Washington Libraries, Allen Library, Special Collections, Seattle, Washington.
- Japanese-American Evacuation and Relocation Study (JERS) Collection. University of California, Berkeley, The Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California.
- Leflar, Robert A. Papers. University of Arkansas Special Collections, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
- Ring Family Papers. University of Washington Libraries, Allen Library, Special Collections, Seattle, Washington.
- Spicer, Edward. WRA Collection. University of Arizona, Library, Special Collections, Tucson, Arizona.
- United States, WRA, Central Utah Project (Topaz, Utah). University of Washington Libraries, Allen Library, Special Collections, Seattle, Washington.
- Walters, Frank L. Papers. Special Collections, University of Washington Library, Seattle, Washington.

War Relocation Authority, Community Analysis Reports and Community Analysis Trend Reports, 1942-1946. NARA, Washington, D.C.

War Relocation Authority, Field Basic Documentation, NARA, Washington, D.C.

Newspapers/Periodicals

The Road Runner. Catalina Federal Honor Camp, Tucson, Arizona. July/August; November/December, 1945, in author's possession, courtesy of Joe Norikane and Kengi Taguma.

Oral Histories

Hirabayashi, Gordon. Oral interview with the author. Tucson, Arizona, November 5, 1999.

----- . Oral interview with the author and Nicole Branton. Tucson, Arizona, August 26, 2001.

----- . Interview with Roger Daniels, January 27-February 11, 1981. Gordon K. Hirabayashi Papers. University of Washington, Special Collections. Seattle, Washington.

Hoshizaki, Takashi. Oral interview with the author. Tucson, Arizona, November 7, 1999.

Kuromiya, Yosh. Oral interview with Pete Taylor. Tucson, Arizona, November 8, 1999.

Norikane, Joe, Noboru Taguma, Hideo Takeuchi, Ken Yoshida, Harry Yoshikawa. Group Oral Interview with the author. Tucson, Arizona, November 6, 1999.

Shimo, Cedrick. Interview with Sojin Kim and Erick Molinar, March 19, 2001, Los Angeles, California. Japanese American National Museum, Los Angeles, California.

Taguma, Noboru. Interview with the author and Nicole Branton. Tucson, Arizona. August 26, 2001.

Yenokida, Susumu and Harry Yoshikawa. Interview with the author and Nicole Branton. Tucson, Arizona. August 25, 2001.

Yoshida, Ken and Kae Yoshida. Interview with the author and Nicole Branton. Tucson, Arizona. August 24, 2001.

Published Primary Sources

“Aliens. Revocation of Certificate of Citizenship for Subsequent Acts of Disloyalty Manifesting Mental Reservation at Time of Naturalization. Deprivation of Derived Citizenship,” *Columbia Law Review* 4, No. 1 (January 1944): 80-83.

Bell, Reginald. *Public School Education of Second-Generation Japanese in California*. New York: Arno Press, 1978 (1935).

Daniels, Roger, ed. *American Concentration Camps, Volume 9, June 1942-May 1944, Raising Japanese American Troops*. New York: Garland, 1989.

Davis, Philip *Immigration and Americanization*. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1920.

Embree, John F. *Acculturation among the Japanese of Kona, Hawaii*. Menasha, WI: American Anthropological Association, 1941.

----- . *The Japanese, War Background Studies; No. 7*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1943.

Hansen, Arthur A. *Japanese American World War II Evacuation Oral History Project, Part IV: Resisters*. Munich: K.G. Saur, 1995.

Hearn, Lafacadio. *Japan, An Attempt at Interpretation*. New York: Macmillan Company, 1904.

Ichihashi, Yamato. *Japanese Immigration, its status in California*. San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1970 (1913).

----- . *Japanese in the United States*. New York: Arno Press, 1969 (1932).

Iyenaga, T. and Kenoske Sato. *Japan and the California Problem*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1921.

Kanzaki, Kiichi. *California and the Japanese*. San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1971 (1921).

Kawakami, Kiyoshi K. *The Real Japanese Question*. New York: Arno Press, 1978 (1921).

Niisato, Kanichi *Nisei Tragedy*, Translated by Eiji Tanabe and Carl Kondo, Tokyo, Japan: Shinposha, 1936.

Obana, Tsutomu. "The Changing Japanese Situation in California," *Pacific Affairs* 5, No. 11 (November 1932): 959.

Park, Robert. "Our Racial Frontier on the Pacific," *The Survey Graphic* 56, No. 3, May 1, 1926: 192-196.

Report of the California Commission for the Study of Educational Problems. Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1931.

United States. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians*. Washington, D.C.: CLPEF; Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.

United States. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads. *Final Construction Report, Arizona Forest Highway Project 33, Catalina Highway. Coronado National Forest*. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1951.

United States. War Relocation Authority. Records of the United States War Relocation Authority, 1942-1947, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson, Arizona, MS 042.

United States. Wartime Civil Control Administration. Records of the United States Wartime Civil Control Administration, 1940-1942, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson, Arizona, MS 239.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Abe, Frank. *Conscience and the Constitution*. Hohokus, NJ: Transit Media, 2000.

Anderson, Karen. *Changing Woman: A History of Racial Ethnic Women in Modern America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Andrés, Benny Joseph, Jr. "Power and Control in Imperial Valley, California: Nature, Agribusiness, Labor, and Race Relations, 1900–1940" Ph.D. Dissertation, University of New Mexico, 2003.

Arrington, Leonard J. *The Price of Prejudice: The Japanese-American Relocation Center in Utah during World War II*. Logan: Utah State University, 1962.

Azuma, Eiichiro. "Japanese Immigrant Farmers and California Alien Land Laws: A Study of the Walnut Grove Japanese Community," *California History* 73, No. 1 (1994): 14-29.

Berlin, Ira, Marc Favreau and Steven F. Miller, eds. *Remembering Slavery: African Americans Talk about their Personal Experiences of Slavery and Freedom*. New York: The New Press, 1998.

Berube, Allan. *Coming out Under Fire: The History of Gay men and Women in World War Two*. New York: Free Press, 1990.

- Biggar, Nigel, ed. *Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice After Civil Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001.
- Blight, David. *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory*. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001.
- Boris, Eileen. "The Racialized Gendered State: Constructions of Citizenship in the United States," *Social Politics* 2, Summer 1995, 160-180.
- Burton, Jeffrey F. et al. *Confinement and Ethnicity: An Overview of World War II Japanese American Relocation Sites*. Tucson: Western Archeological and Conservation Center, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1999.
- Carnevale, Nancy C. "No Italian Spoken for the Duration of the War': Language, Italian-American Identity, and Cultural Pluralism in the World War II Years," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 22, No. 3 (Spring 2003); 3-33.
- Castleman, Bruce A. "California's Alien Land Laws," *Western Legal History* 7, No. 1 (1994): 25-68.
- Chang, Thelma. *I Can Never Forget: Men of the One Hundredth—Four Hundred Forty-Second*. Honolulu: Sigi Productions, 1991.
- Chin, Frank. *Born in the USA: A Story of Japanese America, 1889-1947*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
- Collins, Donald. *Native American Aliens: Renunciation of Citizenship by Japanese Americans during World War II*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1985.
- Crost, Lyn. *Honor by Fire: Japanese Americans at War in Europe and the Pacific*. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994.
- Curti, Merle Eugene. *Roots of American Loyalty*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946.

Daniels, Roger. *Concentration Camps U.S.A.: Japanese Americans and World War II*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

-----, "Words Do Matter: A Note on Inappropriate Terminology and the Incarceration of the Japanese Americans," In *Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century*, Edited by Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005, 190-214.

De Nevers, Klancy Clark. *The Colonel and the Pacifist: Karl Bendetsen, Perry Saito and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2004.

Frazer, Heather T. and John O'Sullivan, "From CPS to Prison: Bent Anderson." In *"We Have Just Begun To Not Fight": An Oral History of Conscientious Objectors in Civilian Public Service during World War II*, pp. 117-18. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Translated by Alan Sheridan, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978 (1975)).

Fugita, Stephen S. and Marilyn Fernandez. *Altered Lives, Enduring Community: Japanese Americans Remember their World War II Incarceration*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004.

Fujitani, Takashi. "Cultures of Resistance: Japanese American Draft Resisters in Transnational Perspective," In *A Matter of Conscience: Essays on the World War II Heart Mountain Draft Resistance Movement*, Edited by Mike Mackey, Powell, Wyoming: Western History Publications, 2002, 21-38.

Gara, Larry and Lenna Mae Gara, (eds). *A Few Small Candles: War Resisters of World War II Tell their Stories*. Kent: Kent State University Press, 1999.

Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. *Issei, Nisei, War Bride: Three Generations of Japanese American Women in Domestic Service*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.

- Goldberg, David J. *Discontented America: The United States in the 1920s*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Guardino, Peter. *Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero, 1800-1857*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- Haney-Lopez, Ian. *White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race*. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- Hansen, Arthur. "Peculiar Odyssey: Newsman Jimmie Omura's Removal from a Regeneration within Nikkei Society, History, and Memory," In *Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century*, Edited by Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005.
- Hansen, Arthur and David Hacker. "The Manzanar Riot: An Ethnic Perspective," *Amerasia* 2 (Fall 1974): 112-157.
- Harth, Erica. *Last Witnesses: Reflections on the Wartime Internment of Japanese Americans*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Hatamiya, Leslie T. *Righting a Wrong: Japanese Americans and the Passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
- Hayashi, Brian Masaru. *Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Hershberger, G.L. *The Development of the Federal Prison System*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.
- Higham, John. *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism*, 2nd Edition. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988.

- Hirabayashi, James. "Nisei: The Quiet American? A Re-evaluation," *Amerasia* 3 (Summer 1975): 114-29.
- Hirabayashi, Lane Hiryo. *The Politics of Fieldwork: Research in an American Concentration Camp*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999.
- Hohri, William Minoru. *Repairing American: An Account of the Movement for Japanese-American Redress*. Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1987.
- Hohri, William, ed. *Resistance: Challenging America's Wartime Internment of Japanese-Americans*. Lomita, California: The Epistolarian, 2001.
- Hosokawa, Bill. *Nisei: The Quiet Americans*. New York: W. Morrow, 1969.
- Ichioka, Yuji. *The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885-1924*. New York: Free Press, 1988.
- . "Japanese Immigrant Response to the 1920 California Alien Land Law," *Agricultural History* 58, No. 2 (1984): 157-178.
- . "A Study in Dualism: James Yoshinori Sakamoto and the *Japanese American Courier*, 1928-1942," *Amerasia* 13, No. 2 (1986-87), 56-57.
- Inada, Lawson Fusao. *Only What We Could Carry: The Japanese American Internment Experience*. Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2000.
- . *Drawing the Line: Poems*. Minneapolis: Coffee House Press, 1997.
- Irons, Peter. *Justice Delayed: The Record of the Japanese American Internment Cases*. Middleton, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1989.
- Jacobs, J.B. *New Perspectives on Prisons and Imprisonment*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

- Johnson, Daniel P. "Anti-Japanese Legislation in Oregon, 1917-1923," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 97, No. 2 (1996): 176-210.
- Johnson, Judith R. *The Penitentiaries in Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah from 1900 to 1980*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997.
- Kammen, Michael. *The Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture*. New York: Knopf, 1991.
- Kashima, Tetsuden. *Judgement without Trial: Japanese American Imprisonment during World War II*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003.
- Kerber, Linda. *No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998.
- Kerber, Linda, ed. *Toward an Intellectual History of Women*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
- Kessler, Lauren. *Stubborn Twig: Three Generations in the Life of a Japanese Family*. New York: Random House, 1993.
- Keve, Paul W. *Prisons and the American Conscience: A History of U.S. Federal Corrections*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991.
- Kitano, Harry H. L. *Asian Americans: Emerging Minorities*. Upper River Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001.
- Knaefler, Tomi Kaizawa. *Our House Divided: Seven Japanese American Families in World War II*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991.
- Kronendorfer, Bjorn. *Remembrance and Reconciliation: Encounters between Young Jews and Germans*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

Kurashige, Lon. "Resistance, Collaboration, and Manzanar Protest," *Pacific Historical Review* 70, No. 3 (August 2001): 387-417.

Lomawaima, Tsianina. *They Call it Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994.

Lyman, Stanford M. *Militarism, Imperialism, and Racial Accommodation: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Early Writings of Robert E. Park*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1992.

McClain, Charles. *In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle against Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

McClain, Charles, ed. *Chinese Immigrants and American Law*. New York: Garland Pub., 1994.

----- . *Japanese Immigrants and American Law* New York: Garland Pub., 1994.

----- . *The Mass Internment of Japanese Americans and the Quest for Legal Redress*. New York: Garland Publishing, 1994.

McEnaney, Laura. "He-Men and Christian Mothers: The America First Movement and the Gendered Meanings of Patriotism and Isolationism," *Diplomatic History* 18 (1994), 47-57.

McWilliams, Carey "Dual Citizenship," *Far Eastern Survey* 11, No. 23 (November 1942): 231-233.

Maki, Mitchell, et al. *Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese Americans Obtained Redress*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999.

Mallon, Florencia. *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Marshall, T. H. *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952.

Matsumoto, Valerie. "Desperately Seeking 'Dierdre': Gender Roles, Multicultural Relations, and Nisei Women Writers of the 1930s," *Frontiers* 12 (1991): 19-32.

----- . *Farming the Home Place: A Japanese American Community in California, 1919-1982*. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1993.

----- . "Redefining Expectations: Nisei Women in the 1930s," *California History* 73, No. 1 (1994): 44-53.

Minow, Martha. *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1998.

Modell, John. *Into One's Own: From Youth to Adulthood in the United States, 1920-1975*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

Moore, John Hammond. *Wacko War: Strange Tales from America, 1941-1945*. Raleigh, N.C.: Pentland Press, 2001.

Moynahan, J. M. and Earle K. Stewart. *The American Jail: Its Development and Growth*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1980.

Muller, Eric. *Free to Die for their Country: The Story of Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II*. University of Chicago Press, 2001.

----- . "The Minidoka Draft Resisters in a Federal Kangaroo Court," In *Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century*, Edited by Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005, 171-189.

Nagata, Donna K. *Legacy of Injustice: Exploring the Cross-Generational Impact of the Japanese American Internment*. New York: Plenum Press, 1993.

- Nakagawa, Martha. "Kohei Yoshida: Judo Pioneer," *Pacific Citizen*. December 1999, 59.
- Ngai, Mae M. "The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924," *Journal of American History* 86, no. 1 (June 1999): 67-92.
- Ogawa, Denis. *Kodomo No Tame Ni--For the Sake of the Children: The Japanese American Experience in Hawaii*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978.
- Okada, John. *No-no Boy*. San Francisco: Combined Asian American Resources Project, 1976.
- Okamura, Raymond, et al. "Campaign to Repeal the Emergency Detention Act." *Amerasia* 2 (Fall 1974): 71-111.
- Okihiro, Gary. *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.
- . "Japanese Resistance in America's Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation," *Amerasia* 2 (1973): 20-34.
- . "Religion and Resistance in America's Concentration Camps," *Phylon* 45, No. 3 (1984): 220-233.
- . "Tule Lake Under Martial Law: A Study in Japanese Resistance," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 5, No. 3 (1977): 71-85.
- Okihiro, Gary and David Drummond. "The Concentration Camps and Japanese Economic Losses in California Agriculture, 1900-1942," In *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress*, Edited by Roger Daniels, et al, University of Washington Press, 1991, 168-169.
- Omori, Emiko, et al. *Rabbit and the Moon*. San Francisco: Wabi-Sabi Productions, 1999.

- Pascoe, Peggy. "Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of 'Race' in Twentieth-Century America," *Journal of American History* 83, No. 1 (June 1996): 44-69.
- Robinson, Greg. *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Rothman, David J. *Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and its Alternatives in Progressive America*, revised edition. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2002.
- Ruiz, Vicki. *From Out of the Shadows: Mexican Women in Twentieth-Century America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Salyer, Lucy E. *Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
- Schonberger, Howard. "Dilemmas of Loyalty: Japanese Americans and the Psychological Warfare Campaigns of the Office of Strategic Services, 1943-45." *Amerasia* 16, no. 1 (1990): 21-39.
- Shaffer, Robert. "Cracks in the Consensus: Defending the Rights of Japanese Americans During World War II" *Radical History Review* 72 (September 1998): 84-120.
- Shibutani, Tamotsu. *The Derelicts of Company K: A Sociological Study of Demoralization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Skocopol, Theda. "Did the Civil War Further American Democracy? A Reflection on the Expansion of Benefits for Union Veterans," In *Democracy, Revolution, and History*, edited by Theda Skocopol, et al. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998, 73-101.
- . *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

- Smith, Page. *Democracy on Trial: The Japanese-American Evacuation and Relocation in World War II*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.
- Smith, Rogers. *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Soyinka, Wole. *The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Spicer, Edward. *Impounded People: Japanese Americans in the Relocation Centers*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946.
- Spickard, Paul R. *Japanese Americans: The Formations and Transformations of an Ethnic Group*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996.
- . *Mixed Blood: Intermarriage and Ethnic Identity in Twentieth-Century America*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
- . "The Nisei Assume Power: The Japanese-American Citizens League, 1941-1942," *Pacific Historical Review* 52 (May 1983): 147-74.
- . "Not Just the Quiet People: The Nisei Underclass," *Pacific Historical Review* (1999): 78-94.
- Strong, Edward K. *The Second-Generation Japanese Problem*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934.
- . *Vocational Aptitudes of Second-Generation Japanese in the United States*. Stanford University Press, 1933.
- Takahashi, Jere. *Nisei/Sansei: Shifting Japanese Americans Identities and Politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997.
- Takami, David A. *Divided Destiny: A History of Japanese Americans in Seattle*. Seattle: Wing Luke Asian Museum and University of Washington Press, 1998.

- Tamura, Linda. *The Hood River Issei: An Oral History of Japanese Settlers in Oregon's Hood River Valley*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993.
- Tateishi, John, ed. *And Justice for All: An Oral History of the Japanese Detention Camps*. New York: Random House, 1984.
- Taylor, Sandra. *Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- tenBroek, Jacobus et. al., *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954.
- Thomas, Dorothy Swaine and Richard S. Nishimoto. *The Salvage: Japanese American Relocation and Resettlement*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946 (1954).
- Turner, Mark. *From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997.
- Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1995.
- Van Nuys, Frank. *Americanizing the West: Race, Immigrants, and Citizenship, 1890-1930*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
- Voss, Frederick. *Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute, 1994.
- Wall, Wendy. "Gender and the 'Citizen Indian'," In *Writing the Range: Race, Class and Culture in the Women's West*, Edited by Elizabeth Jameson and Susan Armitage, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997, 202-229.

- Wallinger, Michael J. *Dispersal of the Japanese Americans: Rhetorical Strategies of the War Relocation Authority 1942-1945*. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oregon, 1975.
- Weglyn, Michi. *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996.
- West, Elliot. *Growing up in Twentieth Century America: A History and Reference Guide*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996.
- West, Eliot and Paula Evans Petrik, eds. *Small Worlds: Children and Adolescents in America, 1850-1950*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992.
- Whites, LeeAnn. "You Can't Change History by Moving a Rock: Gender, Race, and the Cultural Politics of Confederate Memorialization," In *The Memory of the Civil War in American Culture*, Edited by Alice Fahs and Joan Waugh, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
- Wood, George S. *Conversations on Community Theory*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2002.
- Yamamoto, Eric. *Interracial Justice: Conflict and Reconciliation in Post-Civil Rights America*. New York: New York University Press, 1999.
- Yoo, David K. *Growing up Nisei: Race, Generation, and Culture among Japanese Americans of California, 1924-49*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000.
- , "Testing Assumptions: IQ, Japanese Americans, and the Model Minority Myth in the 1920s and 1930s," In *Remapping Asian American History*, Edited by Sucheng Chan, Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2003.
- Yu, Henry *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Zelko, Grank S. *Generation, Culture and Prejudice: The Japanese American Decision to Cooperate with Evacuation and Internment during World War II*. Monash Publications in History, 1992.