

**NEIGHBORLY GOVERNANCE:
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS AND PARTICIPATIVE
DEMOCRACY IN TUCSON, ARIZONA**

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines contemporary changes in relations and forms of urban governance by focusing on neighborhood associations in Tucson and analyzing their practices and experiences in the midst of an emerging trend that values collective action and direct democracy. This urban ethnography focuses on practices, strategies, and ideologies of neighborhood associations to discuss issues of representation, participation, and social integration. This dissertation is based on fieldwork conducted for a total of 24 months between 2005 and 2007. It combines participant observation and in-depth interviews with Tucson residents, members of neighborhood associations, and City and non-governmental organizations' officials.

This work is presented in three main parts divided into several chapters. In the first part, I provide a general review of the development of concepts of governance and representative democracy in contemporary as well as earlier times. I aim to contextualize the work of neighborhood associations within a general movement towards more direct participatory democracy and argue that a new understanding of the transformations impacting the functioning of representative democracy is crucial to its preservation as a central institution of social integration.

The second part of this dissertation presents an analysis of fieldwork data and argues that neighborhood associations are positioning themselves, at the local and global levels, as an important part of the emerging discourses and practices of civil society. Within this broad context, neighborhood associations engage in a variety of activities, pursue multiple strategies, and adopt very different ideologies. A central idea that results from this analysis is that neighborhood associations greatly value practices of direct democracy and strive to exercise greater control over processes of representative democracy in order to prevent its perceived deficiencies from thwarting their projects and corrupting their ideals.

The third part extends the data analysis and provides a political and historical reconstruction of neighborhood associations and their cultural evolution as a continuation of the counterculture movement of the 1960s. I also argue that there is a powerful drive towards the global implementation and exercise of direct democratic processes. I draw on the example of Morocco's urban governance reforms and discuss its growing neighborhood associations to show the delicate and conflicted paths they tread between their engagement with the existing system of representative democracy and their attempts to step beyond the limitations of that system to carry out some of the ideals of building a direct and participatory urban democracy.

INTRODUCTION

Representative democracy has increasingly gained global acceptance as the central mechanism of social integration. A democratic state in control of a recognized territory, representing the will of its citizens, and embodying the welfare of its community, has become the well established model for organizing and managing human societies. The democratic will of the people is expressed through regular elections of representatives who will work on advancing the communal welfare of the nation within the constraints of existing political and economic conditions. Candidates and their parties attempt to present a comprehensive approach to society's existing and predicted needs with the aim of securing a majority of votes, which in turn reflects the wide participation of the population in identifying collective priorities and approving policies to improve the general welfare of the nation. In a representative democracy, elections are the only legitimate means to acquire and exercise power.

This dissertation advances the argument that this system of representative democracy is coming under intense suspicions and mounting challenges originating mainly from the globalization of the neoliberal economic order diminishing the power of the nation-state and the emergence of a global civil society pushing for processes of direct participatory democracy.

Over the last two decades, the concerted push towards the liberalization of international markets has materialized in the founding of global governing bodies such as

the World Trade Organization and the ratification of numerous international and bilateral trade agreements all aiming at securing the free movement of capital and commodities. Although this neoliberal economic agenda enjoys the support of many nation-states, it poses serious challenges to the traditional conception of the elected representatives as being in full control over the economic activities taking place within their territories. This economic liberalization undermines the people's power as expressed through their elected representatives since the final word on some important economic issues resides outside the community all together. Defining common good and regulating economic activities are two important characteristics of sharing a common polity within a defined territory. Yet, they are increasingly displaced by increasingly remote decision making processes.

Parallel to the global liberalization of trade, widening suspicions of the existing mechanisms of representative democracy is giving way to more concrete claims for direct participatory democracy through local decision making and decentralization of nodes of power. This conception of governance proposes civil society as a viable alternative to current systems of political and economic governance. Civil society engages different social spheres to guarantee against perceived weaknesses and observed deficiencies of representative governance in the age of neoliberal globalization. Civil society comprises a multitude of groups that operate at numerous levels. The widely known ones operate at the international level pursuing different issues, mostly notably the resistance to the global trade agenda embodied by the World Trade Organization. The less known, which

constitutes the focus of this dissertation, are the local groups that engage in delicate, and sometimes conflicting, relationships with existing governing institutions and ideologies. Local, grass-root organizations such as neighborhood associations in Tucson draw their inspiration from deeply rooted practices of direct participatory democracy to critique urban governance and seek to restore local control over communal welfare. Through their work at the local level, neighborhood associations are reforming deficient mechanisms of urban governance and transforming established processes of representative democracy into more responsive and open participatory and direct systems of governance.

In the first part of the dissertation, I discuss different understandings of representative democracy, its historical evolution and mostly debated deficiencies. The idea of representative democracy as the central institution of social integration in Western democracies and elsewhere constitutes the normative framework through which I will examine the political evolution of democratic societies. I will especially focus on principles of legitimacy established to justify the idea of representation since those principles, I argue, provide key insights to this system of social integration. First, I review some of the major debates over the idea of representative democracy. I will particularly focus on one inherent contradiction central to these discussions, namely the claim that power rests in the hands of the people and the necessary condition to “desocialize” the political realm (Sinclair 1988, Manin 1997). Second, I present a historical overview of the evolution of the idea and practices of representation. I focus

here on major developments that contributed to the democratization of the idea of representation, such as universal suffrage, enfranchising excluded groups, and post-colonial mass political movements. Third, I examine the debates over the main deficiencies of representative democracy and focus on discourses of grassroots organizations, especially neighborhood associations, diagnosing the causes behind the current democratic deficit.

In the second part of the dissertation, I analyze and discuss the work of neighborhood associations in relation to the perception of the existing democratic deficit. First, I will argue that the local practices, strategies, and ideologies of neighborhood associations provide key insights to understanding the workings of civil society in its attempt to respond to the undermining of fundamental principles of representative democracy. Second, I discuss an apparent contradiction that arise from the work of neighborhood associations, namely their powerful drive towards the establishment of direct democratic practices which come into conflict with the principles of representation. I propose that neighborhood associations and city governments have to tread on very narrow paths to avoid undermining each one's legitimacy and sources of power. Third, I show how neighborhood associations are opening up the field of urban governance. I argue that neighborhood associations are transforming the forms and modalities of urban governance through their attempts to reconstruct a fragmented urban landscape into an urban commons.

In the third part of the dissertation, I examine some practices, strategies and ideologies of neighborhood associations in light of a larger historical and cultural context that has been developing over the last five decades. First, I seek to identify historical, political, and cultural links between the counter culture movement of the 1960s and the current movement of neighborhood associations. I argue here for a model of critical continuity towards perceptions of democratic deficiencies that found its most conspicuous expressions in the late 1960s and that succeeded to survive and reproduce, albeit under different forms and expressions. Second, I move the discussion to the broader debate over the emergence of democracy and civil society as ideologies of domination. I draw on the case of Morocco's recent urban reforms and the rise of neighborhood associations as local urban actors. Third, I argue for a context-based model of urban governance and review aspects of the work of neighborhood associations to illustrate potentials and limitations of such model.

In the case of civil society movements as seen through the example of neighborhood associations, I propose that the drive towards direct representative democracy is likely to undermine the principles of systematic representation and that identifying a balancing approach to this conflictual relationship is crucial to the functioning of democracy as a system of social integration.

PART ONE:
GOVERNANCE, MODERN DEMOCRACY AND THE IDEA OF
REPRESENTATION

CHAPTER I

REPRESENTATION AS A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Despite its widely recognized elitist character and its establishment of sometimes unbridgeable distances between voters and their representatives, representation came to be accepted as the fundamental matrix of social and political integration in modern times (Manin 1997: 65). In the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, elites pushed for the adoption of representative government as a political regime for the establishment of democracy. Knowledge about Athenian democracy, the Roman Republic as well as the Venetian and Florentine Republics have made it clear to scholars of political theory in the revolutionary times of Europe that voting, despite its identified inequalities, seem to be far more superior and robust as a system compared to electing officials through a lot system (Pitkin 1967, Sinclair 1988).

Proponents of modern natural law such as Hobbes, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Burke, all contributed to establishing a tradition of political legitimacy that derives from the free consent of those to be governed. The argument has been that among equal individuals, none has the inherent right to rule and none to obey. Voting, which has become a celebrated rite of modern democracies, is based on the free and consensual choice of equal individuals and translates into the agreement of those individuals to be governed by elected members of their society. In the context of modern law, the expression of free consent constitutes the fundamental basis for legitimate authority and civic duty.

The paradigm of representative government that is nowadays understood as the embodiment of democracy appeared towards the end of the 18th century, but was of a very different nature than current understanding and practice. The main difference is that pre-modern representation privileged consent to authority rather than direct participation in the exercise of authority. They are both different from the Athenian model of democracy that rotated governing responsibilities among certain citizens. The inequalities and hierarchies of Athenian democracy are well-documented (Sinclair 1988: 106-14), but in comparison to the Athenian model, modern representation puts a distance between citizens and government that is difficult to bridge despite the unfailing emphasis that it is a government of the people, by the people and for the people. Modernity seems to have moved democracy's center of gravity from the people's exercise of authority to the legitimizing of an elite to exercise that power on their behalf. In contemporary times, legitimacy is not founded on criteria of similarity in skills and resemblance in status as in the Athenian model nor is it based on direct participation in government, although the latter still constitutes one of the driving ideals of contemporary social movements such as neighborhood associations.

During the 19th and 20th centuries, the democratization of representative government was not the result of closing the gap between the elites and the rest of the population. To the contrary, separation between the two was maintained through the practice of democracy and was legitimized as a central principal of the democratic system. This was made possible thanks to the widespread perception that the original

elitist model was gradually more inclusive as it adopted universal suffrage and opened up processes of agenda setting and selection of candidates. The elitist republican model succeeded in moving government legitimacy from the sphere of divine right to the sphere of recognized expertise and competence to exercise authority. This transformation instituted a normative framework that has remained practically unmodified in that it revolves around a select political community with a forward vision and commitment to common welfare.

In the following sections, I will discuss some aspects of the normative idea of representative democracy as a mediating form of government by the people. In particular, I examine some of the principles that form the basis for representation and try to elucidate relationships of the idea of government by the people to that of a governing elite that is elected through universal suffrage to represent the majority of the people. This discussion sets the general background for examining the actions of neighborhood associations as a critique of representative democracy and an attempt to remedy crucial deficiencies of the democratic system, such as corporate lobbying and distributive inequities.

I.1. From Ancient to Modern Democracy

Direct democracy and representative government constitute the two most known forms of government by sovereign people. The difference between these two forms of government, according to Manin (1997: 61), does not emanate from the latter's small number of governing individuals representing the majority population, but from its

exclusive reliance on elections, unlike the system of direct democracy which, for instance in Athens, combined both elections and lot.

I.1.a. The Lot System in Ancient Democracy

The people's assembly constituted an important institutional function in a direct democracy system as practiced in ancient cities, but, unlike what's generally believed nowadays, it did not hold all the power and authority (Manin, 1997: 61). In Athens, many tasks that were not covered by the people's assembly were assigned by a lot through which any other citizen, under some conditions, could be designated to take part in the exercise of authority. Designated citizens could serve in the assembly, the courts, or the legislature. Besides tasks for which specific expertise was required and which were generally accessible through elections only, the rationalization of the lot system was based on the important principle of rotation of tasks. Not only were hierarchical relationships reversible, but they were also turned upside down (Manin, 1997: 47). The lot system guaranteed the successful achievement of the rotation principle, which fulfilled the vision of the City where all individual citizens are active participants in its political life and public service, with few exceptions that might require specialized expertise. Democratic liberty constituted the opportunity to command others as well as take commands from them when positions rotated. The lot system mainly took place among citizens that volunteered as candidates for public service. This reflects their awareness of the responsibilities and demands entailed in such positions. It also reflects their belief

that personal growth and development is predicated on active participation in public service (Sinclair, 1988: 30-45).

The lot was also practiced in the Roman Republic. Although they differ from the Athenians in their concern with instituting an egalitarian system among citizens, the Romans deemed the lot a neutral system immune to the power and intrigue of the palace. The neutrality of the lot system was also sought after by the Medicians in Florence who praised its potential for pacification when tensions rose around the assignment of some public functions (Manin, 1997: 26). Political thinkers of modern times were perfectly aware of the usage of the lot system and elections in previous systems. They were aware of Greek sources from Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle, all proclaiming that the lot system was the best guarantee for democratic selection (Manin, 1997: 43). They also knew that the lot was not only used for egalitarian purposes but also for its potential to pacify tenuous situations. In addition, they also knew about the Venetian model, which starkly differed from the other Italian Republics of the Renaissance, and where the election system did not result in instability since the Venetian nobility managed to remain united and immune from the votes of the majority of the population.

The adoption of representative government through elections as the primary system of social integration in modernity raises several questions about this choice. Primarily, why has the election system prevailed despite its lack of egalitarian attributes and its privileging of established aristocratic elites? Why was not the system of lot

considered since it would have, in some aspects, better served the egalitarian goals of the moderns?

I.1.b. The Election System

In the absence of extensive debates about the choice of the elective system as the main source of representation and the hallmark of modernity, different scholars have advanced the hypothesis that the elites involved in the process singled out the establishment of representative government as the main source of legitimacy for the exercise of political authority (Manin, 1997: 25). Political modernity makes consent of the people the cornerstone of legitimate authority. A freely expressed vote that reflects the will of the voter becomes the main medium for the governed to consent to the legitimate power of the government.

In addition to the legitimacy that elections confer on the exercise of power, the system also confers a strong sense of openness in the process of selecting qualified candidates to represent the people. In principle, the election system is not oligarchic, although it was only open to the nobility and other aristocratic classes in its first experiments in different contexts. To the contrary, the election system claims universality (access to all) and potential to leveling the playing field. It is, however, different from the Athenian model's political authority since it designates specific people to represent the rest. Political authority in modernity becomes the realm of specialists, which makes a certain level of elitism justifiable and tolerated. Only candidates with the best qualifications, the most aptitude, and the greatest appeal are supposed to be selected

for office. The idea of the republic justifies such elitism as essential to public interests (Dahl 1982: 47).

In the course of historical developments and reforms of representative government as a unique form of power, the election system emphasized the concepts of competence and merit as crucial criteria for the selection of candidates and, hence, succeeded in legitimizing the system's elitism in the voters' eyes. In fact, it even succeeded to mask the system's non-democratic and sometimes anti-democratic tendencies. Republican elitism is crucial to the elective system's maintenance of distinction between the electors and the elected, the governed people and the governing representatives. A distinction that enjoys wide legitimacy and is far more acceptable for its criteria of competence and merit than a distinction that rests on some sort of class, ethnicity, or other inherent privileges. In other words, elitism acquired widespread acceptability in a democratic system as long as it privileges competence and does not openly endorse an elitist conspiracy that is bent on keeping the masses away from access to power. Therefore, despite the myriad of reasons for which a candidate might be selected for office, one fact remains constant in that candidates must distinguish themselves from their fellow citizens. While the superiority of candidates might only be perceived subjectively, their difference from the rest of the population is more generally and objectively perceived. It could be said, then, that the election system selects for perceived superiority and real difference (Manin 1997: 156).

The elitism of the elective system seems to contradict Tocqueville's observation that individuals in democratic systems strive for complete and unobstructed equality. Tocqueville's account on democracy in the United States will be discussed in detail in chapter three. It is important to note here that his reports on the great passion for equality that he observed among Americans further highlights the issue of elitism as an important contradiction in the election system. On the other hand, it is equally important to emphasize the built in sanction mechanisms of the election system, namely the short cycles of the elections through which the electorate can vote out representatives and reformulate its needs and wishes. The representative system also guarantees those elected some autonomy to exercise their power and carry out their responsibilities. Elected representatives have to maneuver through numerous constraints the most prominent, for our discussion here, being the immediate demands and needs of the represented people (not to mention lobbyists and other special interests) and medium and long term concerns for the nation state as a whole (Dahl, 1982: 53).

The issue of elitism continues to plague the representative system although it has come long ways from privileging hereditary traits to emphasizing competence and merit as main sources of legitimacy. Over its historical development, the election system has acquired a central position as a system of social integration in modern democracies. Its principles and ideals have acquired widespread acceptance in different societies, yet it is far from being uniformly implemented or universally interpreted (Dahl 2006). In the context of the United States, as reflected through the work of neighborhood associations,

there is a growing disenchantment with two prominent deficiencies of the representative system. First, the distance that the system puts between those elected and the ones that elected them. Second, the persistent inequality of access to the exercise of power emanating from new forms of elitism hiding behind the legitimizing masks of competence and merit (Lappé 2006). Part II and III of the dissertation provide more detailed analysis and discussion of these different issues. The next sections of this chapter examine some of the main phases in the historical development of representative democracy.

I.2. Modern Democracy: Between Representative and Executive Mandates

I.2.a. The British Parliamentary System

The institutional logic that resides at the origin of the independent parliamentary mandate emanates from the constraints imposed by the need for a functioning deliberative assembly (Manin, 1997: 120). In England, this institutional logic did not result from doctrinal elaboration but from the observation, after a long experience, that the assembly needed to do more than just ratify or reject proposals and laws that come before it. The 1571 Bill permitting the assignment of representatives not necessarily residing in the district they represented opened the path for imagining the Assembly more in terms of the nation-state and its interests and less in the confined terms of the district or municipality (Anson, 1897: 333 quoted in Manin, 1997: 123). Although this bill was not implemented, the idea of the primacy of general national interests over local ones started to gain currency. Towards the end of the 17th century, the broad

outlines of this new paradigm from the speech of Sir Edmund Burke to his constituents in Bristol in 1777:

Parliament is not a *congress* of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of *parliament*. If the local constituent should have an interest, or should form a hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far, as any other, from any endeavour to give it effect.

I.2.b. The Idea of a Republic

Although under very different circumstances and starting from different premises, the French also concluded that the representative system must, to some important extents, privilege national interests and extract the representative officials from the confining mandates of their constituents. It was towards the end of Louis XVI's reign when major financial crises led to the passage of the 24 January 1789 law transforming the consultative role of the Department of Representatives into a more regulatory role that includes, proposing, advising, and consenting to new state measures (Rosanvallon, 2004: 13-30). This shift pushed the assembly to engage in deliberations that transcended their own district to cover broad national issues. Few months later, by July 8th 1789, the French Assembly was anchoring its newly found powers to claim mandated and indivisible sovereignty (Rosanvallon, 2004: 13-30).

In the United States, Madison and the Federalists succeeded in making the principle of elected representatives triumph over the anti-Federalist position. Madison conceived of representation as “the independent activity of trustees whose job is to form

personal opinions about people's interests and how best to achieve them" (quoted in Pitkin, 1967: 35). For Madison, the anti-Federalists' emphasis on similarities between voters and elected officials did not guarantee that the interests of voters will be protected and that concern for the common good will be promoted. Madison proposed that the representative or election system is far superior to "democracy" as understood at the time since representation is a system that is able "to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." (Madison, "Federalist 10," in the Federalist Papers, p. 82).

Representatives are therefore the guarantors of the superiority of the election system since they have the competence to identify 'real' national interests. The anti-Federalists recognized the appeal of such idea to electors but expressed their fear that it favors the elite and establishes them as holders of power. Ideally, the representative mandate requires the holding of debates, often heated debates, about matters of national interest in order to discern the best course and most appropriate policies to implement. Debates, as John Lock vigorously advocated, would clarify positions and mold differing perspectives to a common ground that can attract a majority of votes (Manin, 1997: 142). This expression of the common volition through the Assembly will, in Madison's view, be retrospectively approved or rejected through the direct vote of constituents once the next cycle comes around.

Therefore, the election system puts in the hands of the public a powerful tool to exercise its sovereignty and enforce its control over its selected representatives. This powerful tool, however, can only be deployed at specific intervals and rarely interrupts the mandate of representatives in office. This is perceived as a crucial deficiency in the election system and a serious limitation on the sovereignty of the people. Advocates of direct democracy perceive community-based organizations such as neighborhood associations as key players in processes to remedy such deficiencies.

I.2.c. Governing and Representing

The representative mandate endows elected officials with important degrees of independence to exercise their authority. The mandate, however, does not clearly resolve the tensions and possible conflicts between the interests of voters in a specific district and the national interests as formulated through the Assembly. The election system does not only allow the public to choose its representatives, it also allows it to govern and be governed through the intermediary power of those representatives. The mandate of governance that representatives are endowed with enjoys some autonomy in carrying out its governing responsibilities but is always under the specter of a voting public that might approve or disapprove of the way its mandate has been implemented. The catch here is that elected officials might end up “more representing” than “governing” if they are too wary of the watchful eyes of their constituents and worried about taking decisions that might cost them votes (Dahl, 1982: 47).

Since public action requires important compromises that would allow the formation of some unity around divergent policies, it is understood that representatives are elected in order to work towards compromises that are satisfactory to most, if not, all involved parties. Conflict, contest, and compromise have become synonymous with democratic systems where representatives are not expected to reach complete harmony in order to carry out the people's will. Political authority, in this context, is also expected to sidestep concerns about representation without overriding the electorate power, which will be expressed in the next round of elections. Through this back and forth orchestrated movement of checks and balances, democracy has become a very familiar system of social integration and governance that justifies and legitimizes the power of representatives as long as they, to the best of their abilities, fulfill the mandate of representation. The flip side of this formula is that representatives draw their legitimacy not from representing their constituents but from governing and exercising authority over them. The acquiescence and obedience of constituents to such governance end up displacing the primacy of representation as the main source of legitimacy (Dhal, 1982: 39).

I.2.d. Differences in Two Major Democratic Traditions

Although similarities in the British, French and American models of representative government are made conspicuous in the discussion above, there are also important differences in these models that inform current understandings of representative systems. The models discussed above are clearly different from the

Ancient Greek model of direct democracy. They also draw on common sources of political theories mostly developed in 17th and 18th centuries Europe. These models, however, were developed under very different socio-historical circumstances, which influenced their interpretations of democracy and differentiated their implementation of representative mechanisms. Even these models' reliance on representation as the most important source of political legitimacy does not denote unanimous conceptions of relationships between constituents and their representatives nor a unified understanding of the role of civil society or the meaning of common interest and collective benefit (Manin. 1997: 29-33).

The “common good” of the United Kingdom, the “collective interest” of the French Republic, and the “liberties” of the American Union are all rooted in specific historical and socio-economic trajectories. The political culture of these modern nation states was developing into different democratic creations where the French promoted a republican national model that emphasizes unity and rejects divisions and where both the British and the Americans adopted a Lockian vision of liberal democracy (Dahl, 1982: 60). Yet, the British did not go as far as the Americans in emphasizing the contractual nature of society and in promoting broad individual liberties.

It is possible to identify, in very general terms, a European system of democracy, on the one hand, and an American one, on the other. In Europe, despite the particular differences in political systems among different nations, the State plays a very important role in determining the “common good” and its power to protect “collective interests” is

widely accepted even at the expense of individual liberties. This role of the State is conceived differently in different European nations, but still constitutes a common normative characteristic that distinguishes them from the American system. The role of the State as the guarantor of collective interests also influences the role that political parties play in Europe. Since the State concentrates most of the power in its apparatus, it becomes incumbent upon citizens to work through different political parties in order to seize or at least be able to influence the government. Political parties in Europe become crucial mediators between State power and that of the Citizens since public politics and policies, of all sorts, are centrally localized in the administrative bureaucracy of the State.

The American model differ from that of Europe not in the sense that the State fails to exercise centralized powers, but in the sense that diffused grass-root associative movements play important roles in constituting political agendas and influencing centralized powers, often without the mediation of political parties. In the American model, the locus of “collective interest” and “common good” is lodged in a myriad of localities privileging associative organizing and engagement while weakening national policies and centralized projects. The main source of this crucial difference in the role of the State originates in the American early settlers’ fear of religious persecution episodes that they just endured at the hands of powerful rulers in Europe. For Calvinists that settled in America, for instance, the most cherished right was to freely exercise their religion and not to have to worry about the risks of government interference in their belief system. The American State, of course, is not hegemonically secular but merely

not allowed to side with one sect over another. As observed by Tocqueville, these newly acquired liberties fundamentally shaped the transformation of the State as an agent of oppression (as the new settlers experienced in Europe) into an agent of freedom that is closely monitored by constituents, their associations, and their representatives.

Both the American and European models, as well as most of the world's nation states, for that matter, would not function without an existing state structure broadly capable of maintaining law and order and providing and monitoring a myriad of other services. In the case of the United States, however, the system of checks and balances and the dispersal of centers of power regarding internal matters make it very difficult to formulate and implement coherent national policies. In such a dispersed system of representative democracy, lobbying becomes an important tool for constituents to communicate their priorities to their and other national representatives. This form of direct communication with representatives is supposed to open up the field of political influence to a wide range of constituents who are engaging procedural democratic channels of debate, consensus, and majority decision-making. What's remarkable about this procedure, as Manin observes (1997: 190-192), is that it does not regulate the form of lobbying groups nor does it control the sources of suggested legislation or projects. It, therefore, does not restrain the possibility of discussing on the Assembly's floor some very specific issues that concern only small groups of constituents. Elected representatives, however, usually try to work within a national framework in order to uphold the common good that constituents expect them to protect and expand.

CHAPTER II

THE GRADUAL DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE IDEA OF REPRESENTATION

Modern political regimes in the West have evolved through the democratization of their political institutions. This evolution was the result of universalizing principles that constituted fundamental axes of social and political integration in modern democracy (Tilly 2004). Since modern subjects are defined by liberty and equality, they all, in principle, enjoy similar rights and responsibilities as people and as citizens. They also strive towards social equality as individuals and as collective groups. Tocqueville, for instance, observed that the principle of equality was the central building block of democracy as a social state of being and that the equalization of social conditions was the principle motor of social evolution (2003 [1837]). I outlined in the preceding chapter the broad historical developments that led to the adoption of representative systems to generate and maintain democracy in some Western countries. In this chapter, I discuss the gradual expansion of the normative idea of representation as a system of social integration.

First, I broadly survey several stages of the gradual expansion of the idea of political representation as a process that aims to involve all people in deliberation and political decision-making. This gradual expansion includes, for example, the move from restricted voting rights to the institution of universal suffrage (Manin 1997). It also includes the expansion of citizen powers of sanctions and validation beyond the voting cycle into direct involvement in agenda setting and program elaboration through highly

organized political parties and other political and social groups (Dahl 1998). Second, I briefly discuss several arguments pertaining to some dilemmas and contradictions that emerged from the process of the gradual democratization of the idea of representation (Dahl 2006, Tilly 1998). Such arguments are pertinent to later analyses of criticisms of democracy and to the calls for the establishment of processes of direct and transparent political participation.

II.1. Modern Citizenship and the Ideal of Universal Accessibility to Processes of Political Decision-Making

II.1.a. The Democratization of Institutional Politics

The universal claims of political rights and inclusive appeal of formal citizenship have fostered the construction of a public sphere where political unity can transcend fragmenting provincialisms (Calhoun 1992, Rose 1998). This public sphere is structured by a formal consensus that reflects how people decided to manage their differences, how they define common good, and how they elaborate agenda and projects to act on their own society. In pluralist democracies, such arrangements are always temporary and ephemeral. Yet, the achievement of temporary arrangements itself reflects that references to the common good are widely accepted and mostly distinguished from individual and specific group interests. It also reflects the widespread acceptance of institutional processes of deliberation and consensus building (Manin 1997: 101).

A democratic nation's legitimacy lies within the abstract notion of a "community of citizens" constituted of individuals that are civically, legally, and politically equal. The abstract "community of citizens" provides both the political legitimacy and the source of social ties (Rose 1998, Bailey 1969). This abstract notion of "community of citizens" gradually took concrete shapes and meanings as a common culture of political participation started to develop acceptance for the separation of the societal from the political spheres, the existence of a plurality of interests, and the strive for the ideal of collective good (Manin 1997: 126).

The evolution of the system of political representation reflects the degrees of inclusion and exclusion in terms of access to the community of citizens that had the power to define processes of representation and principles of political participation (Tilly 1998: 43). Unlike contemporary political parties that seek wide membership across the population, the early system of representation was confined to specific social classes, generally the notables and the aristocrats, that were considered active and knowledgeable citizens as opposed to the rest of the population. The ideal of national representation that these elites claimed was often discredited by the opinions expressed in the public press that started burgeoning in England and elsewhere in the 19th century. Manin observes that the spread of these opinion movements has opened up "the possibility for a horizontal discrepancy between the superior will expressed by the whole parliament and the inferior will expressed on the streets and through the popular press" (1997: 167-8). This form of expression of public opinion – a precursor for democratic pluralism -

threatened the elite's vision of a unified political nation by bringing the discords, discrepancies, and contradictions of the representative system into the open sphere of public discussions (Manin 1997: 204).

In the general context of the progressive emergence of democracy, the "people" that were aspiring to access the representative system not only belonged to the working class but were also referred to as the "dangerous classes" (Rosanvallon 2004: 6). Throughout the 19th century, large discrepancies between the elites in control of the political system and the majority of the population were common to most nascent democracies in Europe. As these democracies gradually institutionalized processes of representation, they reluctantly opened restricted channels for voices of public opinion to be expressed in the midst of a highly controlled parliament. It was not until the institutionalization of universal suffrage that the movement for the democratization of representation witnessed a watershed event (Dhal 1998). In principle, universal suffrage indicated the inclusion of all citizens in the political process and, by default, the transformation of an elite exclusive system to a pluralistic democracy. In practice, however, and especially in its early stages, the institutionalization of universal suffrage translated to an expression of consent by the people to the legitimate authority of a class of political elites whose membership remains highly inaccessible to the general voting populace (Tilly 1998).

The other watershed event that followed universal suffrage was the constitution of political parties that draw their membership from the general population and rivaled, even

replaced, some of the existing parties with exclusive membership of aristocrats, technocrats, or other notables (Dahl 1998). The formation of popular political parties and the expansion of their membership reflected the gradual inclusion of numerous groups that were excluded from participation in the political process based on a variety of pretexts. These popular political parties substantially contributed to the democratization of representative institutions as they altered a system of representation tied to specific political figures and expanded the meaning of representation to the whole political party's agenda and ideology (Manin 1997: 142). In the course of the institutional democratization of the representative system, political parties have become a very important component of the system and essential to its organization and functioning.

II.1.b. Political Parties as Organizational Structures in Representative Democracies

Most contemporary democracies strive to guarantee equal political rights and equal access to participate in political processes to all their citizens. While the election system provides a powerful form of direct democratic participation through which individual citizens directly cast their vote for the candidate of their choice, political parties tend to channel a multiplicity of voices and an array of competing interests into a unified voice that transcends individual constituents to prioritize common good and national interests (Dahl 1998, Rose 1998). Political parties in a representative system act as mediating bodies between their members and the government. They often rely on a large militant and activist base that provides the leadership with direct links to issues and concerns that preoccupy a large section of the population. Political parties, however, are

generally careful not to be associated with particular concerns of specific social classes or economic sectors, which might be detrimental to their chances of winning elections and implementing their agendas.

Political parties also see no contradictions between developing a vision of common good that is shaped by specific ideological leanings and their abilities to provide widely inclusive political platforms that will appeal to the general public regardless of political affiliation. Once in power, a winning political party or coalition of political parties are supposed to transform their vision of the common good to one inclusive of the whole national collective interest. Political parties end up governing in the name of all even if they only represent a particular section of the population. Rosanvallon (2006: 52) notes that: “It is the party that put in place that imaginary chain of identification that led to thinking of the political direction . . . as the perfect incarnation of the people. The party eventually went beyond the function of representation: it became the very substance of the people.”

The role that political parties play in recruiting, training, and promoting politically active citizens is highly crucial to the organizing and functioning of representative democracies. In recruiting new members, political parties need to convince individuals of the validity of their vision of common good and of the viability of their plans to address particular and general issues and problems. By joining as new members of a political party, citizens adopt a particular party’s ideological stance but are also brought into the arena of competing ideologies and the realities of multiple interests within and

outside their own political party. New members are also brought into the realm of a larger political vision where individual electors are familiar with regional, national, and sometimes international contexts pertaining to a variety of issues. Therefore, a political party acts as a mechanism of social organization that integrates multiple social strata with numerous concerns and interests. While mediating between the government and society, it works on training members of the latter to someday become part of, if not leaders, of the former.

Political parties for the masses have been the primordial agents in revolutionizing participative democracy (Rosanvallon 2006). Their role as instruments in mobilizing popular will, as an organizational instrument of democracy, and as democratic organizations themselves have placed political parties at the center of the movement of participative democracy. This importance stems from the principle that all party members would have equal access to participate in the political field and to shape political agendas and programs. Modern political parties have played the crucial role of institutional mediation in representative democracies and have largely succeeded in instilling election processes as an established mode of social integration (Manin 1997).

While the role of state and non-state representative institutions as instruments of political integration in Western democracies has continued to expand, other competing modes of political and social integration have identified more direct participative processes as a more equitable alternative. Western States have continued to expand their services and political parties have continued to grow in relatively stable political

conditions and steady economic development. The Welfare State, notwithstanding substantial differences among different countries, became the model of a State that regulates its society's economic productivity and channels its society's numerous components towards the achievement of a greater good – mostly understood in economic terms (Held 2000). In parallel, the model of representative democracy has been moving from a model of social and political integration mostly based on election processes towards a model of administrative and technocratic integration where non-elected officials are in control of a majority of decision-making processes (Falk 2000). Consequently, the objective of democratic participation to integrate the population in decision-making processes has been, at least partly, disrupted by the formidable challenge of technocratic expertise that distances the general population from taking part in shaping public policies and projects (Harvey 2005).

II.2. The Expansion of the Role of the State and the Emergence of a New Mode of Participative Democracy

In the preceding sections I have discussed different established mechanisms through which citizens in a representative democracy exercise their formal political rights and participate in political processes to further their particular, but most importantly, general well being. The normative objective of representative democracy is, therefore, achieved, as long as it manages to integrate citizens into the political life of the nation through their active participation in electoral processes. This normative objective of

political integration is in continuous flux as it is constantly expanded to include previously excluded groups. This process of integration has been vastly accelerated by the growth of political parties that moved political participation from the limited realm of electoral processes to the realm of a life long political citizenry. This process has been further expanded by the development of the Welfare State whose legitimacy rested on a firm combination of political citizenry and social citizenry in the sense that all citizens must have the material means that will allow them to exercise their formal political rights (Calhoun 1992, Rosanvallon 2006, Tilly 2004).

II.2.a. Between Welfare State and Social Democracy

Both political equality and social welfare have been central objectives for representative democracies (Dahl 2006). The State's legitimacy rests in part on its capacity to respond to the needs of its society. The State's multiple interventions in regulating economic activities and providing social welfare have important implications for citizens' participation in democratic processes. The expansion of the bureaucratic State and its adoption of neoliberal corporatist strategies of management have widened the gap between citizens and the making of public policies and made these strategies one of the main culprits responsible for the current democratic deficit (Harvey 2005).

Considering the limitations, financial and structural, that the State faces in implementing various social programs in response to numerous identified needs, it is probably impossible to satisfy a large electorate with a wide range of demands. These demands, when responded to, create beneficiaries who will continue to protect their hard

won benefits and make it extremely difficult for the State to jeopardize their situation (Edgar and Russell 1998). This is an important dilemma facing the State's social interventions. The State's social programs proceed by identifying specific populations with specific needs. The categorization of potential beneficiaries and the administrative packaging of their needs are two essential processes for the conceptualization and delivery of social programs. The finer and more targeted the categories of potential beneficiaries are made, the larger is the expansion of social programs and their accompanying administrative bureaucracies. Social demands and needs become tightly linked to a consumer-oriented paradigm where numerous social programs are servicing neatly identified beneficiaries through a multitude of governmental and non-governmental agencies (Edgar and Russell 1998, Andersen and Siim 2004).

Through its control over social programs, the State holds the power of social solidarity, which contributes to the transformation of social relations. From the universality of citizenship, the State moves to inscribing a consumer paradigm where citizens mainly become clients and consumers of State services. Following the dynamics of a provider-consumer relationship, political agendas and social demands become very tightly linked in terms of their contents, modes of political decision-making, and social practices (Florini 2000, Falk 2000).

II.2.b. A New Mode of Democratic Participation

In expanding the spheres of its interventions, the State – as a body of power in control of a complex bureaucratic machine – has been adopting new modes of

governance based on negotiations with different social actors (Florini 2000). These social actors come in different shades and play numerous roles varying from known interlocutors to angry protesters. These new modes of governance are reshaping the understanding and practice of political participation as well as the bureaucratic structures of the Welfare State.

The State has for a long time recognized multiple interlocutors in society, ranging from numerous associations to labor unions and local municipalities. However, over a few last decades, the tendency has been for multiple political decision-making processes to be taking place outside the legislature or other elected institutions. The development of the dynamics of political participation has not substituted formal state institutions but has increasingly joined legislative and executive bodies in the formulation and implementation of numerous public projects (Falk 2000, Held 2000). Until the recent rise of grassroot organizations and their massive political involvement (Cohen and Arato 1992), the expression of popular sovereignty was the exclusive domain of elected bodies and the implementation of public policies was under the exclusive control of established bureaucracies. The expanding role of the State and its administration of a multitude of public projects have brought to the surface substantial limitations on the State's role and have opened spaces for numerous actors to fill in the gaps and gain the confidence and expertise valuable to their new roles. The formula, therefore, changed from a monopoly of State structures over public policies and action to a call for all kinds of participation

and mobilization of all types of expertise among all sectors representing different interests (Andersen and Siim 2004).

Recognition of particular interests has been part of the expansion of State services to a constantly increasing number of social and economic domains. The delivery of these services has required the categorization of target populations into potential beneficiaries with specific needs. The identification of target populations is a process that often includes other powerful political players such as corporations, professional associations, and labor unions. European countries, for instance, have developed different mechanisms of negotiations and consensus building, generally referred to as “neo-corporatist” (Edgar and Russell 1998) for their inclusion of specific political and social actors representing particular interests in the formulation and implementation of public policies and projects. This form of public participation does not occupy the whole field of interactions and negotiations that take place between the State and social actors. Such relationships are also channeled through numerous formal mechanisms such as legislative committees, commissions, and think tanks. There are also multiple associations and non-governmental organizations whose positions and expertise are often part of the field of public action (Cohen and Arato 1992, Dhal 1998).

II.2.c. Changing State-Society Relationships

The new types of political participation that flourished within the welfare state have been in serious competition with traditional forms of participation. The State as a representative of common interests has been using its administrative instruments to

engage in direct negotiations and interactions involving different social actors.

Regardless of the type of interaction, traditionally established mediators between the State and society, such as political parties, have seen their role more and more in decline as more direct and unmediated relationships between State and society have developed (Held 2000, Florini 2000). Political parties' traditional role of mediation has been in fact decreasing in proportion to the increasing privileging of public action that is based on the pragmatic coordination of differing interests in order to maximize management efficiency and service rationalization (Cohen and Arato 1992). The State becomes the guarantor of the formal field of these direct relationships and plays the roles of negotiator, partner, and sometimes arbitrator (Fraser 2003).

By privileging "governance" over "government" and direct interactions over elaborate third party mediations, the established form of political decision-making has been transformed to the point where new types of representative democratic practices have emerged (Brenner et. al. 2003). A shift has occurred from a rational and mostly electoral-based ideal of a society working for the common good to a deliberative society where common ideals are more open to debate and negotiation. This new context pushes different particular interests into carving out their own distinguished positions in order to achieve their own specific goals without necessarily being tied down by the complexities of national interests (Florini 2000).

The expansion of technocratic and bureaucratic structures corresponds to the institutionalization of these new modes of governance where many more social needs are

recognized and serviced. The steady replacement of a political participation articulated through elective institutions and focused on national or regional public policies by a multitude of multipolar, and often local, projects has resulted in the fragmentation of processes of decision-making and, most importantly, in the opening of significant spaces for non-elected actors to play very substantial roles in public life (Fraser 2003). The shift from a uniquely traditional mode of political regulation to a more technocratic and administrative mode of participation has closely accompanied neoliberal transformations of national and global economies (Harvey 2005). This shift has been heavily criticized by opponents of neoliberal policies as an important democratic deficit where non-elected key players, mostly corporations, have gained unprecedented access to political power. The non-elected actors end up formulating policies that have very wide impact without being accountable to the electorate. The grassroots militants' call, then, is for the rise of social movements and the revival of civil society in order to reclaim public action and public interest from increasingly un-elected technocratic and administrative governmental and non-governmental institutions (Brenner et. al. 2003, Cohen and Arato 1992).

On the other hand, the technocratic turn of the welfare state has also opened up critical mechanisms of communication for citizens to participate in public issues and closely monitor their formulation and implementation. The State's administrative apparatus is highly motivated to incorporate citizen groups in decision-making processes at different levels (Held 2000). This socialization of political processes privileges continuous and direct participation on the part of citizens as a new form of democratic

practice that complements traditional forms of electoral democracy (Rosanvallon 2006).

The socialization of politics represents a serious attempt to respond to claims about a democratic deficit where gaps are widening between citizens and their representatives and the State's management of public affairs (Fraser 2003). The socialization of politics as a new mode of governance might also be dictated in part by the prevailing neoliberal model of management where the State gradually shrinks its regulatory responsibilities and its social services with the understanding that free market processes and citizen groups would perform much better than the State (Harvey 2005).

CHAPTER III
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL

*“In democratic countries, the knowledge of how to form associations is the mother of all knowledge since the success of all the others depends upon it”
(Alexis de Tocqueville)*

Civil society is a concept widely used in national and international discourse as a referent to the self-organizing social forces that are distinct from, and in counter balance with State and market forces. It is a concept that is increasingly appropriated by official governing bodies to affirm their power through the recognition of “the necessity to better listen” to civil society and hence “the need to give more voice” and better respond to the “expectations of civil society” (Cohen and Arato 1992:10-11). This concept has been at the center of heated and spirited debates over last few decades. It often appears in different political and social discourses and is generally understood to be referring to an autonomous sphere where individuals and groups act to counter State practices and market pressures. In economic discourse, the term civil society is generally used to emphasize the dynamic role that autonomous individuals and groups (through their creativity, confidence, and sense of responsibility) play in the growth and sustainability of economic systems.

The concept of civil society has been attributed different meanings and characteristics, which has resulted in a lot of confusion and ambiguities. In fact, the notion of civil society might be one of the most ambiguous terms in the history of

political ideas (Cohen and Arato 1992). This concept remains ambiguous and ill defined because it has been subject to major semantic transformations since its inception in the stream of modern political discourses. Its significance has varied over the many decades it has been in use. A general survey of this concept's development would help in clearing up some of the conceptual ambiguities that it has accumulated over the years

In this chapter, I discuss the historical development of understandings of civil society in the context of bourgeois modernity. I focus mainly on some of the major theoretical discourses that permeate the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries with the objective of reconstructing the path or paths that have led to the current liberal approaches to civil society. This discussion proceeds from the development of the concept in the writings of Hobbes, Ferguson, and Lock. It then moves to economic understandings of civil society as elaborated by Smith and Marx, followed by Hegel's notion of civil society. It then focuses on Rousseau's vision of a unitary political body in contrast to Tocqueville's observations of a pluralistic associative model in America. Tocqueville's observations are tremendously helpful in understanding the historical roots of contemporary civic associative activities including neighborhood associations. Finally, the chapter presents a broader discussion of some contemporary debates over the components and articulations of the concept of civil society offered by Habermas and Taylor. This chapter concludes the first part of the dissertation by providing the theoretical and conceptual context to situate the work of neighborhood associations in the midst of a contested representative system and nebulous understandings of civil society.

III.1. Civil Society as Political Society

For most of the political theorists of the 17th Century, civil society was used to indicate the political and judicial organization of society as reflecting State power and sovereignty. Writing in the *Encyclopedie*, Diderot (1713-1784) states that

Civil society is a political body that men from the same State, from the same city or area, constitute together. It is the set of political relations that ties men to each other. It is also the civil commercial transactions and other relations that bring them together as subjects to the same laws and participants with the same rights and privileges common to all constituents of that society.

This concept was primarily understood as the political body that unites constituents under the authority of a common government. For important political theorist of the time, such as Hobbes and Lock, civil society constituted an opposite sphere to the state of nature, a concept that shaped most of their thinking about human behavior (Bellah 2002). In fact, the political theorists' understanding of the state of nature provides a platform to discern divergence in their approaches to civil society. For some, the state of nature was conceived as a state of friendship and solidarity that pushes constituents into the establishment of society. For others, the state of nature indicated quite the opposite. It was understood as a state of perpetual warfare and fear of demise, which also pushed people to establish society in order to protect themselves from each other.

III.1.a. Hobbes and the Origins of Civil Society

Thomas Hobbes was one of the first political theorists to use the term “civil society” (Cohen and Arato, 1992:38). For Hobbes, the desire for human beings to preserve their existence and well being was at the heart of the formation of a civil society.

Humans, he asserted, form societies for fear of their demise at the hands of each other. Hobbes conceived of the state of nature as that where no regulations, laws, or customs existed to deter individuals from doing absolutely as they please and possessing absolutely whatever they want. The only law governing the state of nature is natural law, which translates into the right of each individual to use all means necessary to preserve their lives. For Hobbes, human existence is driven by biological egotism that emulates behavior in the realm of nature where organisms undertake all measures to ensure their survival. He understands this state of nature as one of constant warfare where everyone is fighting against everyone else. Even existing rules within the state of nature only succeed in tempering down this state of constant warfare if individuals and groups manage to respect those rules without exceptions.

Hobbes is famously quoted for stating that “laws are silent where weapons are speaking.” Institutionalizing a civil society in Hobbes’ point of view requires a supreme authority that embodies the commonwealth of all. This is the only formula likely to guarantee individual peace and security even if it requires the trumping of many individual liberties by the supreme authority. Failing that formula, people will be living a state of nature where constant warfare, unrest, and insecurity are predominant. Hobbes considers that civil society is a human construct that is artificially held together in order for individuals to live in peace and protect their property. Civil society is a human construct endowed with supreme authority in order to control the chaotic state of nature where people’s desires and greed would guarantee mutual destruction. Civil society for

Hobbes is a result of a social contract through which people submit to the rule of a supreme sovereign in order to enforce rule and order. Under this contract, individuals are not allowed to use force arbitrarily against each other since they are obliged to respect the power of the Leviathan, who offers the only chance for people to live in peace.

III.1.b. Locke and the Objectives of Civil Society

In his writings, Locke uses civil society and political society interchangeably, such as in the title of chapter VII of *The Second Treatise of Civil Government*: “Of Political and Civil Society.” Locke agrees with Hobbes in that civil society is a human construct that is necessary to ward off the chaos of the state of nature. Unlike Hobbes, however, Locke argues that civil society exists to achieve other objectives than just ensuring peace and order. The fundamental difference here is in their understandings of the state of nature. Hobbes believes that civil society is an opposing force to the state of nature whereas Locke argues that it is an extension of the state of nature, where people have natural rights such as the right to property. In fact, the right to property is central to Locke’s political philosophy as this concept goes beyond the confines of material possessions to include all that people possess, ranging from their bodies and actions to their freedoms and opinions. Therefore, Locke believes that the preservation of oneself and the preservation of property are the same. Property in this sense constitutes the subject since individuals carry within themselves the justification for property. He states that “man being the master and the owner of himself, of all his actions, and all his work,

always has within him the foundations of property” (quoted in Bellah, 2002:317). The institution of civil society is, therefore, an extension of the state of nature because it would not be able to exist otherwise. Civil society is a juridical and political set of arrangements that protect property, including individuals, which all inherently exist in the state of nature, but would not be protected in the absence of a robust civil society. The protection of property is the main objective of civil society and any government that fails to do so could be deposed by the people within whom rests ultimate authority.

The issue of political authority is another fundamental difference between Locke’s and Hobbes’ conceptions of civil society and the state of nature. The authority of the Leviathan for Hobbes is absolute and irreversible. Individuals are bound by the social contract through which they delegate their natural rights, except the one to self-defense, to the absolute ruler with almost unlimited power. For Locke, on the other hand, the idea of ultimate and unchecked absolute power that requires total obedience from its subjects not only seemed unnecessary, but logically contradictory in itself. If individuals accept a social contract that dictates absolute power, they will be at the mercy of this arbitrary authority and will, therefore, remain in the same chaotic state of nature that they tried to escape by giving up all their rights. Since the main goal of civil or political society is to regulate the problems that arise in the state of nature, the concentration of power in an absolute monarchy cannot be qualified as “civil” because it is a formula that perpetuates the state of nature where laws and rules do not apply equally to everyone.

Locke stands at an important semantic transformation of the concept of civil society. By extending the concept from the realm of the political where peace and security are its main objectives, into the realms of economic order, where property should be protected, and that of judicial equality, where individual rights are guaranteed, Locke managed to reject Hobbes' narrow understanding of civil society on the grounds of philosophical and political principles. Locke's inclusion of a global understanding of the concept of property in the political debates over society and government has had a profound impact on the development of a liberal conception of civil society. Despite these important differences in their understanding of civil society, Hobbes and Locke both emphasize the role of people in constituting civil society's institutions as opposed to the chaotic state of the nature. Hobbes and Locke attempt to steer away from a state of nature towards a civil society where laws are understood to be emanating from a combination of Divine Law and human rationality. Both political theorists are fully aware of the power of the church over society, hence, their emphasis on the human construction of civil society through the mechanisms of the social contract. The result is the auto-institution of society as opposed to a hypothetical, and heavily theological, state of nature.

Under this approach, Hobbes and Locke reject the role of divine power in shaping political institutions and have broken the path towards the secularization of political philosophy (Taylor 1991). Henceforth, the founding principles of political authority will not be traced back to the realm of Divine Authority, but will be discerned through

voluntary and free association of individuals and groups consenting to build a civil society that guarantees political order and legal protections. The association of individuals and groups should, therefore, be the only source of authority and the main organizing power of society. This source can be reproduced and this power can be transformed as long as individuals and groups can reach consensus on the type of civil society they would like to have.

III.2. The Economic Conception of Civil Society

During the 18th Century, the conception of civil society started to shift away from a primarily political understanding into one that emphasizes economic and commercial approaches to civil society. In the opinion of Adam Smith, for instance, civil society is not conceived of as political society nor is it understood to be resulting from the premeditated voluntary association of individuals and groups. Smith and other writers of his time did not seem too concerned with elucidating the origins of society as their 17th Century predecessors' work on natural law indicates. They did not see the need for any social contract to regulate society, either. They argued that civil society exists *a priori* to human beings intentionally planning to act on it since it is the result of the free pursuit of individual self-interest that leads to the formation of civil society. For Smith, the foundations of civil society lie in the economic realm of commercial transactions and all types of other naturally occurring transactions and not in the artificially constructed realm of political institutions and compromises. This was a novel conception of society at the

time where emphasis shifted into understanding human behavior in its relationships to society and the market place (Mitchell 2002).

III.2.a. Smith's Self-Regulating Markets

Adam Smith is one of the most well known authors recognized for representing civil society in economic terms rather than political ones. His book *The Wealth of Nations* established an economic approach to civil society's institutions and relationships. Although Smith does not use the term "civil society" in his writings, and instead uses the terms "nation" and "society," his theories have heavily influenced the transformation of discourses on civil society from exclusively political and legal to more economic. In Smith's view, civil society is an open field of free market exchange that is structured by the division of labor and held together by a complex system of socio-economic needs. Civil society here is conceived of as a commercial sphere that revolves around the fundamental principle of exchange. Smith has, therefore, re-conceptualized the definition of the market itself. The market is no longer a purely technical term reflecting mechanisms of economic regulations such as price control, but is also a sociological and political concept referencing mechanisms of social regulation and organization.

Smith argues that the economic sphere cannot be separated from other spheres since it plays a central role in shaping the social sphere. It is in the sphere of exchanges that one can glean the workings of society. The market, as analyzed by Smith, goes beyond local or regional commercial exchanges to serve as a matrix that globally defines

and shapes society. For Smith, the economy is the foundation of society and the market is its principal operator of social order (Mitchell 2002). He considers civil society to be a self-regulated sphere that operates according to its principles and laws such as those of the division of labor, which constitutes for Smith the strongest evidence of the autonomy of social relationships. The division of labor into multiple complementary professions and skills instills the principles of superiority and solidarity among people without any recourse to external mechanisms such as the State. While laboring to advance their self-interest, individuals are also satisfying the needs of others. The pursuit of self-interest plays a key role in the self-regulated civil society that Smith envisions.

A self-regulated market is the defining element of society and social institutions because every individual is looking after their own self-interests and those of the whole society without the need for any meta-authority like the State or the King. The market-based social relationships end up advancing social solidarity and reciprocity not out of the generous altruistic tendencies of individuals, but thanks to their pursuit of their self-interests. Social harmony and social integration are, therefore, the result of a self-regulated market system that functions independently of the intentions of individual actors. Ironically, public interest and common good, although are not declared as concerns of the market system, end up being great beneficiaries from the different pursuits of self-interests in which individuals and groups engage.

Smith still recognizes the need for a powerful State to provide necessary conditions for a free market system to emerge and blossom. He, however, does not allow

for the political sphere to intervene or alter the course and mechanisms of self-regulated market-systems. The State must limit itself to providing a sound and efficient administrative system to run the daily operations of the people and protect them through a stable legal system. The State must also be primarily responsible for protecting the nation against external threats as well as provide for large scale national projects such as roads and bridges. In sum, the State loses its role as the main provider of social integration mechanisms in the way proposed by Hobbes and Locke. Instead, Smith proposes a different understanding of the state of nature where competition between individuals leads to the development of interdependencies and collaborations that are self-regulating and autonomous.

Smith's use of the concepts of "nation" and "society" without much reference to the term "civil" might indicate his conscious efforts to emphasize the autonomy of self-regulated markets that function efficiently without the intervention of any "civil" institutions, especially the regulating powers of the State. To the contrary, the centralizing power of the State is almost useless, and can sometimes be harmful, to the functioning of the market and the progress of society. It is, therefore, not incumbent on individuals to intentionally seek to advance the common good in order to maintain social harmony and social integration. It is sufficient for them to pursue their own self-interest in a competitively free market to benefit themselves and society at large.

III.2.b. Ferguson and the Historicity of Society

Adam Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* [1767] is one of the earliest attempts to explicitly break with the speculative ruminations on the state of nature. Ferguson wanted to place the study of human behavior and social change within the context of historical analysis in order to replace the metaphysical theories of the origins of society with empirically-based theories bound by time, space, and scale. He argues that conceptions of civil society that are based on fictional conditions of the state of nature have led to mistakenly accept hypotheses for valid explanations. If in fact humans did exist in a state of nature as imagined by 17th century thinkers, it is of no use to Ferguson nor to our understanding of contemporary society since our knowledge of that imaginary period is at best speculative.

Ferguson believes that humans are social beings and agrees with Montesquieu when he says that 'man is born in society and there he remains' (cited by Ferguson p.121). The social character of humans is evident to Ferguson and loneliness is an irremediable evil. He states that: "sadness and melancholy are tied to loneliness, and tenderness and pleasure to relationships among men. A solitary navigator discovers with joy the traces of a Laplander on the snow covered shore" (p. 22). Humans are not solitary beings, according to Ferguson, but are social beings that combine all sorts of relationships based on different kinds of reciprocities, customs, and laws. Society is the central mediator of people's complex interests and needs, which also combine with people's emotional ties and blood relationships.

Ferguson wants to step beyond individual self-interest as the sole motivation for human action since he also observes different sets of behaviors that do not emanate from self-interest but serve to consolidate social relationships. Society is a “togetherness” that is not given once and for all, nor is it mechanically predictable in its development and evolution. It is a “togetherness” in the sense of a global historical structure that is open and relatively indeterminate where natural aptitudes and conscious decisions, material interests and affective ties, motivations and values, are all intermingling. Ferguson explains that

Neither an inclination of men to join together as a herd, nor the consideration of the advantages linked to this condition, include all the principles by which men have remained together. These links are only weak in structure if they are compared to the burning enthusiasm with which a man attaches himself to his friend, tribe, or those with whom he has at times traveled along the road of destiny. The reciprocal discoveries of generosity and the common tests of courage reinforce the enthusiasm for friendship. They arouse an enthusiasm in the human heart that cannot be suppressed by considerations of interest or by thought for personal security (p. 23).

III.3. Civil Society and Bourgeois Society

III.3.a. Hegel and the Benefits of Civil Society

Modern conceptions of civil society and understandings of its institutions are largely influenced by Hegel’s writings (Cohen and Arato 1992). Assuming that political economy is the modern science most suitable to reach the truth about human behavior, Hegel builds on the theories of the classical economists, like Smith and Ricardo, in order to formulate his understanding of civil society. Hegel mostly uses the term “bourgeois society” instead of “civil society” in order to emphasize the socio-economic system of needs that structures the spheres of production and division of labor. Bourgeois society

refers to all those individuals linked by their participation in the market as they look for ways to satisfy their self-interests and needs (Taylor 1991).

Hegel considers civil society as a distinct sphere apart from the family and the State. In modern societies, individuals [sic. Men] embody different roles and functions. A man is a bourgeois by virtue of his work. He is also a citizen of the State and the head of his private household. Hegel's understanding of the term "bourgeois" is quite different from that of Marx's. One major difference is that the bourgeois for Hegel does not refer to a dominant economic class that controls the means of production in society. Instead, a bourgeois for Hegel is that individual that is seeking his self-interests through his own labor, who is taking care of his household, and who is a citizen of the State. An acute awareness of one's individuality and a strong determination to pursue one's self-interest is what defines a bourgeois in Hegel's modern society.

Even with this narrow definition of the individual in pursuit of self-interest, civil society still occupies a central concept in Hegel's philosophy. Civil society acquires its key role as the sphere of interdependence that facilitates relationships between individuals. Hegel echoes Adam Smith when he argues that self-interested goals are the foundation of an intricate system of reciprocal interdependence that makes individual welfare intertwined with that of the whole society. This system of reciprocal interdependence is clearly manifested in the spheres of labor and economic exchange. Hegel considers that labor is more than just the sum of an individual's activities in pursuit of basic needs and their satisfaction. Labor is primarily a social activity that connects

individuals to society and confers a larger significance to their activities even if those activities are solely motivated by self-interest. The economic or productive subject is not only benefiting themselves, but are benefiting collective society as well. This relationship of mutual interdependence deeply characterizes modern societies in the sense of the more people become individualistic the more they become dependent on others' productive labor to achieve their ends.

This new type of solidarity permeating modern societies is particularly distinct from other forms of solidarity, mainly because it manages to reconcile two opposites, individualism and collectivism, into a dialectical relationship. This modern solidarity allows for individual pursuit of private self-interest to depend on, and hence be at the service of, society. Unlike the classical economists, however, Hegel does not limit civil society to its socio-economic system of needs and their satisfaction. He also includes the judicial and administrative systems. The former aims at protecting individuals and property, in addition to regulating economic exchanges and settling conflicts that might arise. The latter system comprises corporations or guilds and bureaucracies to keep law and order. Civil society is, therefore, incapable of realizing its potential for universal collectivity solely on the basis of economic exchanges. It also requires a facilitator of individual interdependences to promote associational, administrative, and judicial, institutions in order to regulate economic exchanges and adjudicate conflicts.

Hegel gives an important role to corporations or guilds, which promote professional self-interest and, more importantly, manage to curb rampant individual self-

interest by imposing some safeguards for collective welfare. Corporations give the ability for productive individuals to form a collectivity in order to promote their interests and also break their isolation as individuals by virtue of their membership in a recognized guild corporation. The corporations are capable of combining individual self-interest with collective welfare and have the ability to minimize conflicts between the private interests of individuals and corporations. Hegel, in fact, considers corporations as the most elevated form of sociability in which individuals can participate.

III.3.b. Hegel and the Contradictions of Civil Society

Although Hegel builds on the theories and principles of classical economists to elaborate his political philosophy, he is also vocal in pointing out the limitations of classical economists and very critical of their blind belief in the market-based model of society. Hegel is considered one of the first prominent philosophers to level serious criticisms of the rising science of political economy and at the same time emphasize the potential of this new approach to analyzing and understanding civil society (Mitchell 2002). While Hegel recognizes the benefits of civil society, he also focuses on its limitations and internal contradictions. He argues that the division of labor is creating abundant wealth, yet it also creates social alienation. He points out that civil society and free-market exchange open opportunities for prosperity and progress, yet they also cause a lot of poverty and misery. Hegel is also critical of the complete laissez-faire of a market-based society since it only favors individualistic pursuits of self-interests at all costs and with very little regard to rules and regulations.

Hegel thinks that the same civil society that builds economic relationships between individuals and groups is, simultaneously, working on destroying those relationships because of the constant push for narrow self-interests. Hegel breaks away from the classical economists when he rejects the idea that civil society is a self-regulated autonomous system. Instead, he does not see civil society in a state of harmony or equilibrium since it is rife with infinite conflicts of interests that, if left unchecked, can seriously threaten the existence of civic society itself. The only way out, Hegel argues, is to integrate the free-market model into a superior and supervising ethical structure that only the State is capable of embodying with the goals of mediating and settling conflicts and contradictions generated by laissez-faire civil society.

Still, Hegel does not limit the role of the State to regulating economic activities and mediating socio-economic conflicts. The State in Hegel's philosophy is not an entity that emerges from civil society nor is it an entity that is superimposed to it. Hegel argues for a reversal of roles: where classical economists and earlier political philosophers conceive of the State at the service of civil society and socio-economic interests, he conceives of civil society to be at the service of and subordinate to the State. The State has the capability to achieve what the market-based society fails to fully attain – a real universal order. Even if a universal order is sought by civil society, it is not fully developed in the absence of the State.

Hegel describes the unity between the particular and the universal in a market-based civil society as “external” because it is solely based on economic needs. In his

Principles of a Philosophy of Law, Hegel explains that universality is only indirectly achieved in civil society. Universality is not a conscious objective pursued by civil society. Instead, it is a means to achieving other ends. Even if individuals share the same objective of pursuing their self-interest, they do not construe that objective as a collective entity nor do they act in full awareness of the mass of individuals sharing that objective. Civil society is, therefore, a community without substance because it lacks a common positive objective. The freedoms that individuals enjoy in this type of civil society are formal freedoms capable of only satisfying basic material needs of individuals and groups. Real substantive freedoms are achieved through the State which is in a position to endow individuals with a fully developed consciousness of common positive objectives.

The State offers the framework for individual subjective will to interface with the universal that it embodies. Achieving universality through the State becomes the objective and normative goal of individuals fully aware that this goal not only extends but also goes beyond their particular self-interested needs. The State incorporates private interests into universal ones and transforms them from materially based interests into ones that seek the unique satisfaction of human liberty and dignity. All individuals, regardless of class and other differences, should have equal access to this universal pursuit of human liberty and dignity.

III.4. Debating Civil Society: Associations and Democracy in the Modern World

III.4.a. Rousseau's Social Contract: Let there be no Association!

The influence of Rousseau's political philosophy on various liberation movements around the world has been substantial over the last few centuries. His concepts of popular sovereignty, universal suffrage, and equality are all dominant in modern political discourses and practices. Rousseau left a complex and controversial legacy of writings that span literature, education, art, and politics. While I am mostly focusing on his political philosophy as expressed in *The Social Contract*, I want to emphasize that this is but a partial representation of his thought. It is partial because it considers one book without putting it in the context of the totality of Rousseau's writings, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation (see Cladis 2003). This disclaimer is important since Rousseau is one of the most commented on authors and one that stirs very contradictory feelings and interpretations among those numerous commentators (Dunn 2002). Consider what Bertrand Russell (1945: 645) said about Rousseau:

Ever since Rousseau's time, those who considered themselves reformers have divided into two groups, those who followed him and those who followed Locke. Sometimes they cooperated, and many individuals saw no incompatibility. But gradually the incompatibility has become increasingly evident. At the present time, Hitler is an outcome of Rousseau, Roosevelt and Churchill of Locke.

The establishment of a direct link between Rousseau's writings and Nazi Germany, Jacobinism, or other totalitarian regime has been a reoccurring error of blaming Rousseau for having his work interpreted and appropriated by totalitarian regimes. This erroneous

attribution of causality has been reoccurring ever since the French Revolution and was refuted as early as 1810[2003:20-21] when Benjamin Constant [1767-1830] wrote;

The mistake of Rousseau and of writers who are the greatest friends of freedom, when they grant society a boundless power, comes from the way their ideas on politics were formed. They have seen in history a small number of men, or even one alone, in possession of immense power, which did a lot of harm. But their wrath has been directed against the wielders of power and not the power itself. Instead of destroying it, they have dreamed only of relocating it. It was a plague; but they took it as something to be conquered; and they endowed the whole society with it. Inevitably, it moved from there to the majority and from the majority into a few hands. It has done just as much harm as before, and hostility to all political institutions has accumulated in the form of examples, objections, arguments, and evidence. . . . This doctrine creates and then carelessly casts into our human arrangements a degree of power which is too great to be manageable and which is an evil whatever hands you place it in. Entrust it to one person, to several, to all, you still find it evil. You lay blame on the power-holders and depending on the circumstances, you will have to indict in turn monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, mixed constitutions, and representative government. And you will be wrong. The condemnation must be of the extent of the power and not of those in whom it is vested. It is against the weapon and not the person wielding it we need to rail. There are things too heavy for human hands.

The tendency to associate Rousseau's work with totalitarianism, whether it is on the left or the right of the political spectrum, has been discussed by Talmon (1952) through his concept of totalitarian democracy. The argument is very important in resisting deceptive regimes that use democratic mechanisms of elections and rule of law to enforce their totalitarian grip on society and still enjoy the positive association of the label "democratic." Talmon also shows that other concepts of Rousseau's, such as popular sovereignty and popular government have been used to enforce totalitarian regimes that require complete conformity from their populace in the name of democratic principles.

In this brief discussion of Rousseau's *Social Contract*, I will highlight the main points of Rousseau's formula of social integration, particularly the concepts of general will and individual freedom. The main objective of this discussion is to explain why civil

society associations, such as neighborhood associations, have no place in Rousseau's political model. Rousseau's model is later contrasted to the American model of associative pluralism as analyzed by Alexis de Tocqueville.

To the question of how can Rousseau's political thought illicit such passionately contradictory reactions and paradoxical interpretations, Bellah (2002: 266-270) suggests an answer when he says that "no one has argued more strongly than Rousseau that human nature is fundamentally individualistic, yet no one has more clearly seen what humans owe to society." In an attempt to elucidate this paradox, I'll begin with a general overview of Rousseau's political model as elaborated in the *Social Contract*.

Rousseau is proposing the establishment of a civil community that has its own general will, that is centralized, able to carry out actions and enforce laws, and ready to defend itself and all its citizens to preserve their liberty. This form of association mandates that each individual that belongs to this community fully integrates its social body and respects its civil order while maintaining their individual autonomy. This is achieved through the social contract that guarantees individual autonomy and liberty since every individual respects the laws and the civil order that they themselves crafted. It is important to point out here that Rousseau does not imagine any separation between the individuals and the laws they need to obey. The autonomy and liberty of individuals is guaranteed by the community or the State only and only if the laws of the community and those of its constituents form one unified body. Rousseau elaborates this point as follows:

To find a form of association that may defend and protect with the whole force of the community the person and property of every associate, and by means of which each, joining together with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before. . . . The contract to form such an association implies the total alienation of each associate with all his rights; for, in the first place, since each gives of himself up entirely, the situation is equal for all; and the condition being equal for all, no one has any interest in making them burdensome on others. . . . In short, each giving himself to all, gives himself to no one; and since there is no associate over whom we do not acquire the same rights which we concede to him over ourselves, we gain the equivalent of all that we lose, and more power to preserve what we have.

If then we set aside whatever does not belong to the essence of the social contract, we shall find that we can reduce it to the following terms: "Each of us puts in common his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will; and in return each member become an indivisible part of the whole." (Book I, ch. 6)

The law that Rousseau calls the general will is supposed to be very clear, very limited in number, free of arbitrariness, and, above all, completely coherent with the nature of the community's constituents. So coherent with their nature that each individual feels it is emanating from him or her. Rousseau's concept of general will is not an aggregate of different particular positions, nor does it imply consensus or compromises. Rousseau states that "there is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter regards only the common interest, while the former has regard to private interests, and is merely a sum of particular wills (Book 2, ch.2). Rousseau believes that the particular will tends towards instituting preferential treatment, whereas the general will always guarantees the equality of all. He explains that

The first and most important consequence of the principles established above is that the general will alone can direct the forces of the State according to the object of its founding, which is the common good; for if the opposition of private interests has rendered necessary the establishment of societies, it is the concord of these same interests that has rendered it possible. That which is common to these different interests forms the social bond; and unless there were some points in which all interests agree, no society could exist. Now, it is solely with regard to this common interest that the society should be governed (Book 2, ch.1)

Rousseau's concept of the general will as the overriding common interest to which the government and its constituents are conforming rests on this ideal of complete unity that tolerates no deviation. Any citizen that would refuse to obey the general will is considered deviant and will in Rousseau's words "be forced to be free." He explains that "So that the social pact not be a pointless device, it tacitly includes this engagement, which alone can give force to the others – that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free" (Book 1.ch.7). This is one of the most complicated paradoxes of Rousseau's social contract where he also upholds individual rights and considers any violation of individual freedom as detrimental to the whole civil order. One explanation of this paradox might be identified in his understanding of freedom and the relationship between the State and the individual.

Rousseau argues that the existence of free individuals is contingent on the existence of a free society governed by the general will. The survival of this society depends on each individual's contribution to that freedom by upholding the sovereignty of the general will and conforming to its dictates. It follows that if an individual strays away from the general will, he not only is damaging his individual freedom but he is also threatening the freedom of all and the survival of the whole community. That individual is forced to be free in the sense of regaining his own individual freedom by coming back to the fold of the community. As Stockinger (quoted in Bellah 2002:279) puts it: "The

central theoretical point is that the general will is the result of an ongoing disposition on the part of each citizen or member of a community to ask himself or herself “What is best for all of us?” rather than the Lockean question, “What’s in it for me?”

The enemy number one of Rousseau’s political model is the particular will, either expressed by individuals or groups. Rousseau does not deny the existence of individual interest or the variety of interests that different individuals and groups might pursue. He recognizes that people live their lives in various ways as they fulfill different responsibilities towards family, friends, and work. But as citizens, every individual is in complete conformity with the general will. Furthermore, where an individual’s particular will comes in contradiction with the general will, the latter always supersedes. The same rule applies to the particular will expressed by associations of all kinds. These associations, in Rousseau’s view, are only capable of expressing narrow interests that might threaten the viability of the general will. It is therefore incumbent on the State to be the only possible expression of the general will and to not allow the proliferation of particular wills through the existence of associations. The State and its citizens form one unified body that needs no intermediaries, which are likely to foster preferential treatment and inequality in society.

Rousseau’s project of a civil society based on the social contract constitutes an eminent attempt by a committed humanist to help people achieve happiness, freedom, and peace. He entrusted the State with the responsibility of achieving that happiness for all on the basis of the general will of society as a whole. He clearly sought to tame, if not

eliminate, the particular will of individuals and associations. Particular will leads to strife in society and reinforces inequality and injustice. Every participant in the social contract is then converted into a citizen that serves and conforms to the general will in order to achieve individual and communal happiness. Duty becomes more important than self-interest and principled behavior guided by the general will supersedes individual instincts.

This is the paradox of Rousseau's humanist intentions. His social contract inevitably ends up relying on anti-humanist measures of discipline and techniques of control to coerce non-conforming individuals and groups to whatever the general will, often being the majority's, happens to be. As Benjamin Constant eloquently said "there are things too heavy for human hands," and the power derived from the sanctity of the general will as imagined by Rousseau is clearly one of them.

III.4.b. Tocqueville, Democracy, and Civil Society in America

Although Tocqueville seems to be mainly interested in conventional political issues, his reflection and analysis brings to the fore an acute cultural element in the debate over democracy and civil society. On the one hand, Tocqueville is interested in the tensions between the ideals of liberty and equality. He analyzes the concept of liberty in the shadows of a despotism that did not completely disappear despite the various revolutions against absolute monarchies. In fact, he warns against the development of a "soft" form of despotism that might prove more lethal to the ideals of liberty and equality. On the other hand, Tocqueville seems to go beyond the traditional political

analysis generally found in political treatises of his time and proposes to work with far more complex conceptualizations of the ideas of liberty and equality.

Tocqueville is far less interested in the formal characteristics and juridical definitions of liberty and equality than he is in their profound cultural significance. He believes that the modern idea of equality and its expansion in Europe and elsewhere constitute the fundamental cultural matrix of Western modernity and hence the cornerstone of a whole new civilizational era. This model goes beyond the new institutional order and mechanisms that developed to achieve the democratic ideals to a more profound cultural shift that informs all other ideas and shapes all other relationships in the modern world. For example, in his discussion of the idea of liberty, Tocqueville shows specific interest in the conditions that make liberty possible. He argues that these conditions are not exclusively guaranteed by the juridical institutionalization of certain norms and principles. These institutional norms and principles, in his opinion, manage to open and protect a field of “negative” liberty where individuals and institutions enjoy the liberty to do all that is *not* prohibited by the law.

However, Tocqueville puts a lot more emphasis on the cultural dimension of these norms and conditions. Liberty, he argues, would not survive for long if it is solely based on an Anglo-Saxon juridical model that provides the freedom to every individual to pursue their self-interested goals within the fixed limits of the juridical terms. This understanding and practice of liberty isolates members of society and makes them equally weak in the face of complex societal problems, and hence predisposes people to submit to

any power that portrays itself as capable of dealing with those complex issues.

Therefore, modern self-interest and individualism lead to substantial weaknesses in the societal fabric and leave openings for despotism and the annihilation of liberty.

Tocqueville notes:

Individualism is a calm and considered feeling which persuades each citizen to cut himself off from his fellows and to withdraw into the circles of his family and friends in such a way that he thus creates a small group of his own and willingly abandons society to its own devices. Egoism springs from a blind instinct; individualism from wrong-headed thinking rather than from depraved feelings. It originates as much from defects as from the mistakes of the heart. Egoism blights the seeds of every virtue, individualism at first dries up only the source of public virtue. In the longer term it attacks and destroys all the others and will finally merge with egoism. Egoism is a perversity as old as the world and is scarcely peculiar to one form of society more than another. Individualism is democratic in origin and threatens to grow as conditions become equal. . . . Aristocracy had created a long chain of citizens from the peasant to the king; democracy breaks down this chain and separates all the links. . . . Thus not only does democracy make men forget their ancestors but also hides their descendants and keeps them apart from their fellows. It constantly brings them back to themselves and threatens in the end to imprison them in the isolation of their own hearts (pp. 587-589).

Tocqueville shows similar concerns to those of Hegel in the sense that both consider the Anglo-Saxon juridical model insufficient for the thriving of liberty. They both emphasize the need to move from the domain of practice to that of personal and communal ethics in order for the ideal of liberty to take root and flourish in society (Taylor 1991:125). In fact, Tocqueville rejects the argument that this ethical dimension of liberty is merely normative or too abstract and believes that one can discern it in multiple forms throughout the American civil society of the first half of the 19th century.

In *Democracy in America*, two celebrated volumes published in 1835 and 1849, Tocqueville uses the phrase “civil society” multiple times without specifically defining it. The phrase is used in reference to extra-governmental society or associations commonly discussed in the liberal tradition at least since Locke’s writings, even if the words “civil

society” are not particularly used. Here is an instance where Tocqueville uses the terms: “Equality can take root in civil society without having any sway in the world of politics. A man may have the right to enjoy the same pleasures, enter the same professions, meet in the same places; in a word, to live in the same way and to seek wealth by the same means, without all men taking the same part in the government”(p.584).

The “Tocquevillian civil society” constitutes the space of all interactions that are extra-governmental and public or extra-private. Particularly, Tocqueville is interested in the associative aspect of civil society, which he considers the most vibrant in the American society he was observing. It is this associative dimension that is most familiar to contemporary understandings of “civil society,” which makes Tocqueville’s reflections one of the most contemporaneous of the classical treatises on civil society. I will quote him at length here because he was the first to make many of these observations:

Americans of all ages, conditions, and all dispositions constantly unite together. Not only do they have commercial and industrial associations to which all belong but also a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very specialized, large and small. Americans group together to hold fêtes, found seminaries, build inns, construct churches, distribute books, dispatch missionaries to the antipodes. They establish hospitals, prisons, schools by the same method. Finally, if they wish to highlight a truth or develop an opinion by the encouragement of a great example, they form an association. Where you see in France the government and in England a noble Lord at the head of a great new initiative, in the United States you can count on finding an association. . . . Thus the most democratic country in the world is that in which men have in our time perfected the art of pursuing in concert the aim of their common desires and have applied this new technique to the greatest number of objectives. Has this just resulted from an accident or is there in reality a necessary connection between association and equality? (p. 596)

Tocqueville gives a larger meaning to the concept of “association.” After excluding legally created permanent associations such as those of city and County councils, he divides associations into two main groups: political associations and civil

associations. He situates the former somewhere between the opposition parties and those currently designated as pressure groups. Political associations are often reacting to majority decisions that are perceived as despotic or unduly controlling of the minority's freedoms.

These associations are in some ways similar to Montesquieu's intermediary bodies or to Hegel's corporations with the main function of mediating or brokering relationships between the State and Society (Taylor 1991: 126-131). Civil associations, on the other hand, can occupy the most diverse functions and take on numerous tasks, including, according to Tocqueville, industrial and commercial enterprises, provided they result from voluntary association among consenting individuals. He observes that these numerous associations, politically or civilly oriented, exhibit such efficiency and enthusiasm in American society that they end up serving an important meta-function – that of reigning in and balancing rampant individualism of democratic societies:

In no country in the world has greater advantage been derived from association nor has this powerful instrument of action been applied to a wider variety of objectives than in America... Anyone living in the United States learns from birth that he must rely upon himself to combat the ills and obstacles of life; he looks across at the authority of society with mistrust and anxiety, calling upon such authority only when he cannot do without it. . . Should an obstacle appear on the public highway and the passage of traffic is halted, neighbors at once form a group to consider the matter; from this improvised assembly an executive authority appears to remedy the inconvenience before anyone has thought of the possibility of some other authority already in existence before the one they have just formed. . . In the United States, associations aim to promote public safety, business, industry, morality, and religion. There is nothing the human will despairs of attaining through the free action of the combined power of individuals (pp. 220).

Tocqueville concedes that an association might be initially, and all along, motivated by a utilitarian philosophy promoting its collective self-interested objectives.

He, however, observes that associative endeavors offer a lot more benefits. Associations are not only likely to neutralize despotism thanks to their increased autonomy and capacity for independent action, but also are unique in their ability to gradually transform an initially purely utilitarian philosophy into one that steps passed narrow self-interest to engage larger concerns and issues. This way, Tocqueville adds, peculiar and very localized issues, such as easements, push people to realize the importance of wider elements of relevance to their issue, such as public and private ownership of property. Here lies what Tocqueville considers key to the development of associative life when he states that “attention is paid, in the first instance, to the common interest out of necessity and later out of choice; what started out as calculation becomes instinct; and by working for the advantage of one’s fellow citizens, finally the habit and taste for serving them take root” (p.595).

Although this process is envisioned by Tocqueville as more reflective of political associations, he does not hesitate to extend it to social associations. The premise is that associative life generally nurtures relationships between equal individuals that are not exclusively utilitarian and helps develop a spirit of disinterested solidarity and authentic fraternity. With a full recognition of the centrality of self-interest in human individual and collective action, Tocqueville is convinced that the American society he is observing defies the stereotypical descriptions of its being the kingdom of individualism and self-interested action. He attributes American intolerance for despotism to the vitality of their associative way of life, concluding that modern democratic (or equality-driven) societies

can neither survive nor thrive if they stifle or even fail to show conspicuous commitment to associative projects of all stripes. He formulates this in a law like statement: “among the laws governing human societies, one in particular seems more precise and clearer than all the others. In order to ensure that we remain or become civilized, the skill of association must develop and improve among them at the same speed as the spread of the equality of social conditions” (p. 600). Development and progress of associative life is therefore essential to the well being of all other components of modern democratic societies.

Tocqueville is not only looking for an ideological or moral support for the sustenance of democracy in his time, but is equally concerned with providing a rigorous empirical analysis of the dynamics he is observing. He warns against the pitfalls of associative life and emphasizes that there are some necessary cultural conditions that would prevent the abuse of liberty and the slide into anarchy. He, therefore, considers the American model as very successful in balancing this tenuous system and calls on other governments to restrain from stifling associative liberty under the guise of threats of insecurity and political anarchy. He is convinced that the best force against anarchy in the era of increased equality is associative life for it fosters individual autonomy and creativity and helps develop social integration and solidarity. He notes:

There are no countries where associations are more necessary to prevent the tyranny of parties or the whims of princes than those whose social state is democratic. In aristocracies, secondary bodies form natural associations which check abuses of power. In countries where such associations do not exist and individuals are unable to create something like them artificially or temporarily, there is, as far as I can see, no longer a barrier holding back any sort of tyranny and a great nation may be oppressed with impunity by a fistful of rebels or even a single man (p. 224).

This discussion suggests the importance of the concept of associations to Tocqueville's vision of democratic society. The idea of civil society, with its variant meanings in contemporary discourse, draws very closely on Tocqueville's observations and exhibits similar descriptive and normative features. Tocqueville's idea of social associative life and contemporary uses of civil society both refer to a diversified field of action that spans most public non-governmental spheres. It is equally important to recognize that besides its descriptive features, the concept of civil society denotes a normative perspective that often prevents important questions from being raised. For instance, what are the reasons behind increased interest in the field of civil society? What aspects of civil society are normatively valued and why? In what ways are contemporary ideas about civil society drawing on earlier historical notions and what accounts for variations in those references?

III.4.c. Contemporary Understandings of Civil Society

While the concept of civil society has witnessed a vigorous resurgence since the 1980s (Cohen and Arato 1992), its manifestations have largely differed within the two most prominent camps in the world at the time: the Communist and the Capitalist worlds. The present discussion is limited to the development of the concept of civil society in relation to the expansion of capitalism and the welfare-state in the West.

The expansion of State control in industrialized countries during the 20th century has raised serious concerns over the overshadowing of different voices and social movements in the name of greater centralized efficiency of state interventions. In

response to such concerns, numerous procedures have been developed to increase institutional accessibility and provide for wide public consultation and participation in different governmental projects at different stages of their development (Hirst 1997, Greenhouse and Kheshti 1998). Putting aside some procedural and organizational aspects of public participation between Europe and the United States, we can say that the welfare-state ends up playing an important role in the decision making of individual and collective civil society actors.

While the welfare-state legally protects the autonomy of civil society groups and provides the space for their full participation in different governmental sectors, these groups voice various criticisms of the role it plays. Following Taylor (1991: 117-136) we can discern three main trends of criticism. A first leveled on the basis of economic concerns usually voiced by groups from the Right accusing the State of undue interference in the dynamics of civil society. A second emanates from a Centrist position with participatory concerns blaming the State for its inaccessibility to civil society groups. A third comes from the Left concerned about State's co-optation of civil society's activities and autonomy.

Thatcher's era in the United Kingdom during the 1980s, generally known as Thatcherism, often serves as a symbolic system of neoliberal governance that shaped the relationships between the State and civil society in crucially lasting ways (Taylor 1991: 119). This era reflected, in very pronounced ways, the dominance of a liberal thinking that extols the benefits of market economies. While the Tocquevillian idea of associative

life is integral to this neoliberal ideology, the former does not come close to sharing the contemporary belief in free market economies as the primary force in modern societies. This neoliberal camp targeted the welfare-state and worked incessantly on dismantling its apparatus since it was interfering with the workings of the free market. In the same vein, this neoliberal camp is critical of the State's interference in the workings of civil society. They advocate that the state retreat to its legitimate role to allow the development and flourishing of both markets and civil society groups in the absence of State's interference and control.

Although many neoliberals say the State has crossed the line and stepped way beyond its legitimate spheres when it turned into a welfare provider, they believe this anomaly can be addressed and the correct order reestablished (Brenner et.al. 2003). This remedial program would include the lowering of taxes, the privatization of state owned businesses, and the deregulation of economic and labor laws. Society, then, will find its "natural equilibrium" under expanding free markets and so will civil society be liberated from any impediments that the State might have previously imposed.

Charles Taylor (1991:126-131) has demonstrated that the neoliberals have been unable to completely carry out their ideological program of free market economies. They have found themselves, contrary to their ideological stipulations, forced to intervene in the running of markets and social programs. They have also greatly contributed to the revival of the debate on the nature and role of civil society in modern democracies. The neoliberal position on free market economies continues to shape contemporary

understandings of civil society and continues to fiercely compete with the other two major positions, the participatory one and that formulated by the Left.

The participatory camp is probably the most comfortable of the three groups in dealing with the State and engaging its welfare structures. This camp is likely to count among its members many diverse groups, ranging from non-governmental, socially oriented groups to professionally organized unions and corporate associations. One general claim, however, tends to be shared by these diverse groups. It is the observation that there is a deficit in civic participation in decision making at all State levels and that the State needs to open more channels and greater avenues for that participation to take place. Unlike the neoliberal and the Leftist camps, the participatory one positions itself as a partner with the State in almost all fields, be they social, economic, or educational.

Two main groups can be distinguished among the participatory camp. The first has a largely established relationship with the State and is treated by the latter as a recognized partner whose opinions and active participation are not only sought but sometimes also made legally mandatory. This group may include labor unions, corporate associations and other professionally organized groups with established mechanisms of participation in government and civic life. Members of this group, however, often complain about insufficient participation and are often suspicious of being exploited for rubber stamping already agreed upon government, labor, or corporate decisions. In their opinion, the seemingly open participatory process tend to be weakened by its lack of enforcement mechanisms likely to empower all participants and by perceptions that

government officials are often guided by their political agendas which make them favor some civic partners over others (Taylor 1991:132).

The second main group within the participatory camp includes individuals or groups that claim the right to participation but are either denied or severely limited in their access to decision-making circles. Members of these groups perceive the State and other power houses (such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund) as very selective in granting participatory privileges to groups that suit their interests with very little challenges or criticisms. From this group's point of view, only very few privileged voices of civil society get to be heard through exclusionary participatory mechanisms controlled by established power-houses (Taylor 1991: 134). As long as these groups are not part of the decision making process, clouds of suspicion and perceptions of incompleteness remain associated with the system of participatory and representative democracy. These are crucial components of the representative system since it relies on wide and varied modes of participation to bolster its legitimacy, especially in light of the idea that wide-ranging participation is likely to benefit public administrative decision making.

The third camp, the new Left, positions itself further away from the neoliberal agenda and shares various tendencies with the participatory camp. The new Left does not reject the role of the State in social redistribution, environmental and economic regulations, or privileging ecological and welfare issues over free market priorities. Such orientations are considered by the new Left as progressive and necessary functions for the

State given the failures of the capitalist model in protecting society and the environment since WWII. The main distinctive feature of this camp, however, is their critical stance towards the technical and bureaucratic mechanisms through which the State and its partners collaborate to achieve different projects. The new Left has emerged as a counter culture movement since the 1960s and has a tendency for systematic suspicion of government structures, authority figures, as well as traditional social and economic units, such as the family, work, and hierarchy. This movement has gone a long way since then and has managed to overcome its rejection of normative hierarchical structures to the point of embracing full political participation, such as the case of the Leftist Green party in Germany.

At the same time, this movement still prides itself on preserving its autonomy with regards to the State or the corporate world and continually works on solidifying its ranks locally, regionally, and globally. Groups in the new Left still prefer exercising external pressures over power houses, through large demonstrations and organized civil disobedience without seeking to be invited to the negotiation table. In fact, the threat of co-optation through active participation in normative technocratic structures is seriously considered by groups belonging to the new Left. They, therefore, have a different conception of civil society, one that is close in its feverish autonomy to the ones described by Tocqueville in 19th century America (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 249).

Habermas (1996: 366-67) offers a general definition of civil society that includes the different groups discussed above with the significantly distinctive feature that most of these groups are voluntary:

What is meant by “civil society” today, in contrast to its usage in the Marxist tradition, no longer includes the economy as constituted by private law and steered through markets in labor, capital, and commodities. Rather, its institutional core comprises those nongovernmental and non-economic connections and voluntary associations that anchor the communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of the lifeworld. Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres.

Modern understandings of civil society have progressively developed over the last few centuries. In Western political thought, the term civil society first appeared in the 17th century to designate a society that is politically organized as opposed to one that is in a state of nature. Hobbes saw civil society as a political body that is formed to protect individuals and their wellbeing, which is always in competition with and under threat of destruction in the state of nature. For Hobbes, the State only exists after the formation of civil society and constitutes a pragmatic solution to the quandary posed by constant warfare. Locke expands Hobbes’ theory of civil society by reconciling it with the state of nature. He agrees that civil society is a political body and adds that it is an economic body as well, charged with the protection of an expansive notion of individual property. The economic underpinnings of civil society are further emphasized by the classical economists such as Smith and Ricardo. They rejected the opposition between civil society and the state of nature by arguing that civil society and its political institutions

emerge from the market-place and from exchanges that build and expand social relationships. Civil society in their opinion is not a construct of human beings but a part and parcel component of the self-regulated socio-economic system that structures societies. Although Hegel builds on the legacy of the classical economists' view of civil society, he also critiques its limitations and points out its contradictions. Hegel proposed to see civil society as bourgeois society composed of socio-economic, judicial, and law enforcement spheres. Civil society and the state are not opposing camps. They are both components of the same process towards the development and achievement of human liberty. Civil society in this formula acquires meaning only through its belonging to the State which is the sole body capable of transcending individual self-interest and mediating the conflicts and contradictions threatening the existence of civil society.

Both Tocqueville's commentary on associative life in America and Rousseau's vision of a unitary political entity provide thoughtful insights into crucial debates that shaped their era and have continued to impact societies since then. Debates about democratic institutions and the meanings of liberty and equality continue to rage as central legitimating symbols in many contemporary societies. The persistent and overarching issue of these debates continue to be the disputed question "What is democracy?" (Held 1987). The theme that frames this dissertation's focus on neighborhood associations in relation to participative democracy is informed by the perennial dispute about whether democracy is possible primarily through local institutions (as maintained in the American political tradition by the anti-Federalists and observed by Tocqueville);

or whether democracy is possible primarily through national institutions (as maintained by the Progressives, the New Deal, and the Great Society). This continuing dispute turns around whether democracy is understood to involve primarily “self-government” in that oneself and ones neighbors are primarily responsible for solving the day to day problems of living together (as the Jeffersonian tradition maintains); or whether democracy is understood to involve a greater degree of national-level government to regulate the nation’s economy in order to promote “economic democracy” and secure rights (as the Hamiltonian tradition advocates).

Although the neighborhood movement has witnessed many changes since the 1960s and so have other components of civil society, the basic relationship between the State and its people in democratic systems seems to retain the same central understanding. That is the idea that the democratic system rests over the sovereignty of the people and, therefore, the State must respond to the will of the people or the sovereign. In cases where the State fails to adequately do that, it needs to adjust and adapt in order to carry out its most essential mandate – that of reflecting the will of the people. The neighborhood movement has adopted a participatory approach of civil society to constantly remind the State of the simple, but often overlooked, formula – that government structures are at the service of their constituents. This central mission of neighborhood associations is discussed in more detail in Part II of the dissertation.

PART TWO

GOVERNING PLURALISM: NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS AND

PARTICIPATORY URBAN POLITICS

CHAPTER IV
PLURALISTIC READINGS OF URBAN DEMOCRACY:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE PUBLIC ACTION

IV.1. The Plurality of Needs and the Public Sphere

Nancy Fraser has researched and published on a variety of issues and has contributed to many crucial debates, including the public sphere (Fraser 1997), the politics of recognition and redistribution (Fraser 1989), and feminist theory (with Bartky 1992). Her work is relevant to this dissertation in that she offers pertinent insights into understanding collective action from a pluralistic point of view. Instead of the Habermasian focus on the emergence of meaning from the plurality of interpretations, Fraser proposes to discern the meanings of social practices by examining their plurality. Fraser's insights are particularly useful to my work with neighborhood associations and my attempt to contextualize their local practices in a wider social and historical framework. The objective is to understand the ways in which the apparently diverse discourses and practices of neighborhood associations might converge into uniform units that allow for a reading of the local in its plurality.

IV.1.a. Nancy Fraser and the Plurality of Public Needs

In her book *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* (1989), Fraser examines the ideology of the welfare-state and raises questions about its needs-based approaches. She points out that the identification of

"needs" themselves has been subject to discursive processes (including practices as well) through which a "need" is defined as a "public interest" and hence becomes part of the welfare state's responsibility (1989:114-125). Fraser divides this discursive process into three stages. The first stage consists of the struggles to determine whether an issue or a need belongs to the sphere of public action or to that of private interest. She (1989:294) explains that the first stage is the struggle to establish or deny the political status of a given need, that is the struggle to validate the need as a matter of legitimate political concern or to enclave it as a nonpolitical matter. The second stage consists of the struggles to design appropriate programs in order to address the identified needs. The third and last stage is where the battles shift into whether the State should or should not take responsibility of responding to the identified needs through the designated programs.

Through this process of recognition and redistribution, Fraser puts unmistakable emphasis on the contested nature of "needs" and on their plurality as well. As she indicates (1989:292): "I suggest a break with standard theoretical approaches by shifting the focus of inquiry from needs to discourses about needs, from the distribution of need satisfactions to the 'politics of need interpretation.'" Fraser is distinguishing her model from established models of socio-political analysis by emphasizing the importance of understanding discursive practices involved in identifying "needs" themselves rather than confining analysis to responses to those needs. Fraser's model is important in that it leads to insights into the processes through which social groups and society in general identify and define the issues that merit collective concern and public action.

Fraser is acutely aware of the controversial debates surrounding the welfare-state and its needs-based ideology when she proposes "a model of social discourse designed to bring into relief the contested character of needs-talk in welfare-state societies" (1989:292). Fraser recognizes that her project to focus on needs identification and interpretations would eventually bring the State's organizational structure under similar contested scrutiny. An analysis of the diverse and contested interpretations of needs ultimately leads to an examination of different understandings of social organization and social relationships. This is understandable given that Fraser is especially interested in the processes that lead the State to take charge of identified needs. Her main objective is to discern the ways in which needs-interpretations contribute to the formulation of public decisions and programs. She states that "from this perspective, needs-talk appears as a site of struggle where groups with unequal discursive (and nondiscursive) resources compete to establish as hegemonic their respective interpretations of legitimate social needs" (1989:297). Therefore, discursive processes become crucial tools for delimiting the political sphere of needs-recognition and entrusting those needs to the sphere of collective responsibility regardless of the inequities that plague processes of identification themselves.

Fraser's model clearly suggests that the stakes are very high since the definition of public action itself becomes subject to the contests among different competing discursive processes. She points out that "one of the primary stakes of social conflict in late-capitalist societies is precisely where the limits of the political will be drawn" (1989:

298). These contests that are shaping public action in numerous ways are central to Fraser's model in understanding political action in its plurality of competing meanings rather than in the emergence of a discernable and dominant meaning as advocated by other researchers. Particularly, Fraser disagrees with Habermas' approach to elucidating political contestation and devotes her book *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition* (1997) to explain her critique of public sphere theory.

Fraser's critique of public sphere theory rests on the argument that Habermas' model effectively silences the plurality of voices and contests that characterize the public sphere. For Habermas, the public sphere designates "a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction" (Fraser 1997:70). Given the exclusively discursive character of Habermas' public sphere, it follows that contested issues have to be sidelined in order to reach a point of common interest that transcends all individual and private interests (Fraser 1997:72).

Habermas conceives of his public sphere model through the example of "the bourgeois public sphere" where the emerging European bourgeoisie started publicly formulating its opposition to their absolutist monarchies (Habermas 1989). Fraser, on the other hand, questions this historical interpretation on the grounds that there is not or was not a single public sphere with the unique ability to formulate and reach common interests. Instead, Fraser maintains, there have been multiple public spheres harboring

conflicting interests and competing for recognition. Therefore, Fraser argues that by choosing to identify a single public sphere as representative of the whole society, Habermas becomes oblivious to the numerous discourses that characterize public debates or what Fraser (1997:86-87) calls "the notion of publicity" itself. In Fraser's view, Habermas' position is akin to the civic-republicanism position that recognizes only one public sphere, that where private interests animate public life and action. In denying the existence and influence of the multiplicity of public spheres, Habermas proposes an ideological model of the public sphere. As Fraser (1997:75) indicates; "there is a variety of ways of assessing public life and a multiplicity of public arenas. The Habermasian concept of the public sphere turns out to be ideological; it rests on class – and gender-biased notion of publicity, one that accepts at face value the bourgeois public's claim to be *the public*" (emphasis in original).

Fraser is arguing that multiple public spheres ensue from the multiplicity of discursive practices about public life and action, hence her notion of publicity. She recognizes that there are hegemonic discourses dominating others, but emphasizes the need to recognize the existence of competing public spheres that are attempting to push their vision of social organization and common interests. In Fraser's view, analyzing the different public spheres and the different publics in their attempts to define public interests and actions would bring deeper understandings of and more accurate insights into the modern welfare-state. Fraser (1997:33) defines her use of the term "public" as follows: "the concept of a public differs from that of a community. "Community"

suggests a bounded and fairly homogenous group, and it often connotes consensus.

"Public," in contrast, emphasizes discursive interaction that is in principle unbounded and open-ended, and this in turn implies a plurality of perspectives. Thus, the idea of a public better than that of a community, can accommodate internal differences, antagonisms, and debates."

IV.1.b. Conceptualizing Dialogic Social Practices

The broader theme or thread that links this research to the various works of Fraser is her focus on politics and political practices in their plurality. Fraser (1989: 292-93) chooses to examine discursive processes of needs-interpretations rather than the needs themselves in order to not lose sight of the numerous competing interpretations that do not emerge to the level of public interest. The question of politics in its plurality animates Fraser's (1997) critique of the public sphere as she emphasizes the existence of multiple publics with their competing discourses on public action and differing interpretations of social relationships.

Fraser (1989) sets out the dimension of pluralism in socio-political practices as the single most important component of her approach. Her notion of pluralism, however, does not necessarily support contemporary models of social fragmentation and dissipation of solidarity. While Fraser's research can be taken to show that the existence of multiple enclosed discourses reflects a fragmented society, especially that many of those discursive practices seem irreconcilable, she actually rejects that interpretation. Her insistence to show the existence of multiple publics with multiple interpretations of

social needs and relationships partly serves her critique of the single public sphere approach and most importantly undermines the fragmented society model that mistakenly assumes that an increasing individualization of society reduces communication into isolated groups and obliterates solidarity for common interests. To the contrary, Fraser argues that despite the seemingly increasing fragmentation of discourses, there are always explicit or implicit interactions between these discursive practices. These interactions are key to understanding social practices as dialogic practices.

Fraser points out how different groups that are engaged in civic activism are usually examining and reformulating their interpretations of the social in part due to direct and indirect interactions with other groups and discourses. She (1989: 295) states that: “In fact, in welfare-state societies, discourses about needs typically make at least implicit reference to alternative interpretations. Particular claims about needs are “internally dialogized;” implicitly or explicitly, they evoke resonances of competing need interpretations.” For Fraser, then, the multiplicity of discursive practices should not distract from the dialogic interpretations of social needs and relationships, within and among the numerous groups engaging these processes.

The dialogic characteristic of the numerous discursive practices and their interpretations extends into the more general deliberations on the meaning and scope of public life and action. These deliberations take place in public arenas and require the input of the different publics because these same publics are the agents and subjects of these discursive practices. Reflecting and debating on issues that are pertinent to the

public not only lead to general public deliberations but also result in group-specific dialogues and debates. The flow of interactions is dispersed and extensive to the point that Fraser uses it to challenge the “incommensurability thesis” (Shapcott 1994: 69) that posits the absence of meaningful interactions between different groups since the latter carry cultural and political blinders that limit the sphere of their interactions, most of the time, to their own inner groups. Fraser is challenging this notion of incommensurability by showing the different contributions of discursive practices to public action. She joins here the notion of “doors to otherness” proposed by Charles Taylor (1995) in the sense that the dialogic characteristic of discursive interpretations opens up access to differing perspectives and even irreconcilable positions.

Contrary to the assumptions of fragmentation and dispersion maintained by the thesis of incommensurability, the multiplicity of discursive practices, even those championed by minor or dominated groups, add up to a lot more than just the sum of the isolated groups. Fraser (1997:82) explains that: “In stratified societies, subaltern counterpublics have a dual character. On the one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics. It is precisely in the dialectic between these two functions that their emancipatory potential resides.”

Here again Fraser is emphasizing the dialogic and interactive characteristics of discursive practices by underlining the multiplicity of interpretations and numerous publics formulating them. At play are competing interpretations of public needs and

action and, therefore, despite their fragmentation, these groups are obliged to directly or indirectly engage each other. As Fraser (1997: 82) states: “In my view, the concept of counterpublic militates in the long run against separatism because it assumes an orientation that is *publicist*. In so far as these arenas are *publics* they are by definition not enclaves – which is not to deny that some are involuntarily excluded. After all, to interact discursively as a member of a public – subaltern or otherwise – is to aspire to disseminate one’s discourse into ever-widening arenas” (emphasis in original).

I emphasize Fraser’s rejection of the thesis of incommensurability for it is crucially relevant to understanding the dialogic conceptualization of social practices in the work of neighborhood associations. Fraser postulates interactions where the proponents of incommensurability postulate isolation. This understanding becomes further important to Fraser’s formulation of a critique of the politics of recognition where primacy is given to unique differences and identities at the expense of their distribution in social and historical contexts. This a blind spot that Fraser qualifies as an obsession with difference as an asset in itself, detached from any reference to other social spheres. In this context, she (1997: 184) asks: “Which differences, finally, should a democratic society seek to foster, and which, on the contrary, should it aim to abolish?” The politics of difference and that of recognition solely based on those differences disables the possibilities for formulating common public interests since they tend to distance their claims from wider social references. Ultimately, the gap between the politics of difference and the politics of redistribution keeps on widening as the two are perceived to belong to separate

incommensurate spheres. Instead, Fraser proposes a dialogic conceptualization of disparate discursive processes in order to muster the abilities to formulate common projects to advance public interests.

IV.1.c. Interpretations of Urban Collective Action

My research focuses on Neighborhood Associations (NA hereafter) to discuss local collective action in Tucson. There are numerous urban groups collectively working on myriad of issues pertaining to local as well as global urbanization and my research does not pretend to represent all the threads of urban civic engagement. Instead, my analysis of the work of NA steers towards a common theme among contemporary urban movements regardless of their specific agendas and techniques. That underlying theme has been the goal (expressed and sometimes unexpressed) of participants in local urban activism to change current urban government practices, which they generally characterize as elitist and bureaucratic (Booth and Jouve 2005, Wacquant 2008). The general goal of these movements, despite their overwhelming diversity, is to open up the field of local participatory governance to differing extents of direct democracy, depending on the particularities of each context and issue. Although my data is specific to Tucson's Neighborhood Associations, I argue that this research contributes to larger questions pertaining to collective action and the reformulation of the role of the State as the main regulatory and governing agent.

The work of NA and other urban movements has long been diminished at best and dismissed at worst for being localized and for having very little impact on bringing

structural changes. The standard against which these movements have been evaluated amounted to “revolutionary change” that many researchers embedded as biases (Castells 1983, Harvey 1973). Urban collective action was interpreted in light of the revolutionary changes expected by the researchers who were examining whether these movements were capable of transforming the rules of the game and of imposing new conceptions of power. Such research biases eventually led to emphasizing the weaknesses of urban collective action based on its fragmentation, localization, and ease of cooptation. However, more recent research on urban collective action has recognized and rejected these “revolutionary biases.” Instead, urban collective action has been evaluated on its own terms by contextualizing its contributions to change and by outlining its limitations in the face of numerous structural determinants (Amin and Thrift 2002, Gough 2002, Reichel 1999).

I conducted fieldwork with neighborhood associations in Tucson to contribute to the more recent understandings of urban collective action. I use the expressions “urban movements” and “urban collective action” interchangeably in this dissertation without the intention to ignore the heterogeneity and diversity of those movements. NA are considered part of the broad category of urban movements on the basis that these different groups are independently or collectively active in civil society in order to further various conceptions of public good and common interest through the questioning of urban administrative practices and their refashioning along the lines of more participative democracy. The urban scene has been bustling with a myriad of movements ranging

from those working on economic and legal issues to those concerned with environmental and preservation issues. NA are voluntary groups that have engaged with numerous urban issues instead of being a single-issue driven organization. In particular, however, three major issues help characterize the specificity of NA: (1) they are highly active in the production and monitoring of urban space, (2) they primarily work to bring resources (e.g., play grounds and parks) to their space and keep out undesirable development, and (3) they share the ideals of participative democracy and push for their realization.

Without denying the diversity of urban movements and their agendas, I refer to NA as urban movements in the sense that Pickvance (1985: 32) uses it when he explains that:

The ambiguities derive from the diversity of literature and analytical framework involved. The political-science literature distinguishes between parties, pressure groups, and protest groups as forms of “interest aggregation.” As used here, urban movements may either be protest groups, which reject the rules of the game, or pressure groups, which work to change particular policies but accept the political system. (In many cases, urban movements will do both over a period of time.) Again there is the connotation of a non-institutionalized social force, but in this case it lies outside pressure groups and parties. I shall use “urban movement” to refer to the individual organizations rather than the movement as a whole.

The notion of NA as a contemporary example of urban movements is different from the concept of “urban social movement” developed by Castells (1983) and other urban researchers of 1970s and 1980s. Not only do NA tend to shy from revolutionary agendas and prefer to work with the existing political structures in order to change specific policies and practices, they also exhibit so much diversity in their agendas and styles that they might not qualify for the concept of “movement” as defined by Castells (1983) in his early writings. In addition, NA are generally believed to be led by middle-class residents that tend to perpetuate institutional inequities, especially as far as labor issues are concerned. However, such criticisms of NA seem to attack them for what they

are supposed to be doing instead of what they actually are doing. NA, like other urban movements, are embedded within structural limitations that have been developing for decades and that have great influence on their field of action. For example, Katznelson (1982) has proposed the notion of “city trenches” to conceptualize the separation of the spheres of labor from that of housing and urban dwelling. He (1982: 55) states that: “This new urban system of “city trenches” had three main elements: trade unions at the workplace; a quite separate decentralized party system; and an array of new government services that were delivered to citizens in their residential communities.” Recognizing such structural limitations is important so as to avoid dismissing the work of NA and their contributions to the framing of current urban issues and to the expansion of forms and processes of participative democracy.

NA, in their diversity and apparent fragmentation, constitute an important challenge to theories of individualistic triumph and decline of urban collective action (Putnam 2000, Skocpol 2003). NA suggest that vibrant urban movements have not disappeared but have changed their modes of action and adopted different organizational forms in response to immense socio-economic transformations as well as transformations in individual preferences and group priorities. Since the 1980s, the urban scene has witnessed the multiplication of urban movements pursuing numerous issues under very different organizational forms (Booth and Jouve 2005). It is understandable to mistake their inefficacy because of their apparent fragmentation. It is also understandable to blame the rise of individualism for the decline or absence of mass mobilization. These, however, are inaccurate assessments of current urban collective action as illustrated by the work NA in Tucson.

One of the most significant characteristics of the work of NA is their capacity to question the legitimacy and efficacy of established systems of professional actors, be them political parties, city officials and administrators or other official business groups. Because NA are officially and legally positioned outside the established professional systems of urban management, their work embodies the possibilities of alternative urban

processes that certainly challenge an elite-driven model of urbanism. NA are not only a reactive force that provides critical assessments of professional urban processes, they also constitute a positively pro-active force that capitalizes on its position at the periphery of official administration and political parties to redefine the field of urban political practices. NA emphasize collective action at the local level and tend to focus on everyday issues that pertain to individuals and groups. They put a lot of effort into cultivating interpersonal relationships of trust and are often trying to push neglected issues to the forefront of urban activism, including issues of environmental sustainability, cultural and historical preservation, and equal local representation.

For NA, being strategically positioned at the periphery of traditional urban management channels does not necessarily translate into being marginalized or having to operate in a political vacuum. NA are carving niches of autonomous urban action in a traditionally crowded and contentious field where numerous other groups are competing for resources and political control. By virtue of their peripheral position and sense of autonomy, NA have successfully expanded the field of urban participatory politics and management. They have demonstrated the limitations of traditional urban management systems and become a crucial component of the wave of urban political remodeling and decentralization of power. NA, despite the heterogeneity of their goals and ideologies, have been pursuing the overall objective of enlarging the spaces of autonomous action in urban civil society (Cohen 1985). They have anchored their position in civil society where a multitude of other groups are working to reshape traditional bureaucracies of the State and are contributing towards the establishment of ever more democratic processes. As Cohen (1983:113) observes: “Movements reacting against the excesses of welfare state industrial societies raise the hope once again of a post-bourgeois, democratic civil society organized not around market and property or around the state, but in free associations and public spheres penetrating and institutionalizing both economy and polity.”

In this context, Offe (1985) has emphasized important ideological differences between neo-conservative and liberal civil society movements despite their overall objective of attempting to minimize the role of the State with its bureaucratized policies and regulatory apparatus. Offe (1985:820) points out that while neo-conservative movements seek to depoliticize civil society in order to facilitate the operation of market processes as the main organizing system within a robust State structure; liberal movements' main objective is to politicize civil society in order to fill up the different vacuums left by channels of representative bureaucratic political institutions. Offe (1985:831) adds:

... concerning the actors of the new social movements, the most striking aspects is that they do not rely for their self-identification on either the established political codes (left/right, liberal/conservative, etc.) nor on the partly corresponding socio-economic codes (such as working class/middle class, poor/wealthy, rural/urban population, etc.). The universe of political conflict is rather coded in categories taken from the movements' issues, such as gender, age, locality, etc. or, in the case of environmental and pacifist movements, the human race as a whole.

Although locality and local issues are the predominantly organizing axes in the context of the work of NA, these groups' strengths lie in their capacities for multilateral engagements with various players in the urban field as well as within their own constituency (Castells 1983). NA sometimes challenge and other times cooperate with dominant urban administrative structures. They also have the more complicated task of channeling the individual opinions and positions of their constituents into acceptable collective platforms likely to influence urban plans and policies. Another major challenge that faces NA is that of institutionalization. As pointed out by Cohen and Arato (1984), civil society groups tend to resist institutionalization because of its apparent association with the traditional ways of urban politics and structures. However, these groups have also found out that institutionalization offers one of the best means to preserving their gains and building up a legacy that can contribute to the overall objective of expanding direct democratic processes. Debates about the efficacy of NA and other civil society groups in transforming political processes continue between differing camps of supporters, skeptics, and critics. I hope readers from these different

camps can find in this dissertation examples of NA work that confirms as well as challenges their positions.

IV.1.d. Community Organizing Antecedents

The growth of neighborhood associations throughout the US has long been preceded by federally created and funded programs, notably the Community Development Corporations (CDC), the Neighborhood Development Organizations (NDO), and the Model Cities Programs. These different programs were created in the 1960s and 1970s in response to several urban riots and widespread urban protests. The programs emphasized local participation of residents, fostered a comprehensive approach to economic development, and targeted most impoverished urban areas and neighborhoods (Mayer 1984:18). Mayer (1984: 24) defines these organizations as follows:

Neighborhood Development Organizations (NDOs) initiated and controlled by local residents that seek to revitalize urban neighborhoods by building and renovating housing, creating new jobs and enterprises, reviving commercial activity, establishing community centers, and promoting energy conservation, often as a broad strategy for community development. These NDOs have chosen explicitly to target the benefits of their efforts to lower income people living and working in their communities. They have also combined public and private resources of many kinds to finance their projects.

Research on NDOs and CDCs has indicated that these programs have been more successful at creating affordable housing than at creating jobs and reducing economic inequities (Duncan 1986). Members of these organizations had a lot more experience in renovating housing units and residential real estate in general, but a lot less experience in the complex field of sustainable employment and business investments. Nevertheless, these organizations had a great impact on local participation in urban planning and revitalization. Mayer's (1984) assessment of these organizations concludes that the efficacy of their work depended on the expertise of their leadership and the quality of

relationships they developed with other working partners. Another important observation that Mayer (1984:85) makes is that the participation of these organizations, regardless of the quality of their performance, paved the way for the institutionalization of voluntary community organization. Members of community organizations and City administrators realized over years of engagement that it was necessary to preserve accumulated expertise in order to foster the collective learning abilities of all different participants and minimize disruptions and discontinuities. One final point that Mayer (1984: 192) makes is that these organizations had realized that they could not replace investment banks nor could they supplant City structures and services, but that their efforts would bring important changes into urban processes by increasing local participation and emphasizing direct urban democracy.

The Model Cities program was another attempt by the federal government to institute resident involvement in urban decision making while targeting the reduction of urban poverty and the deteriorating conditions of inner cities. Model Cities program was conceived as part of the Great Society projects and was designed to supplant Neighborhood Development Organizations and other Community Action Agencies, which had been plagued by power struggles within the organizations and between the latter and City officials and administrators (Frieden and Kaplan 1975). President Johnson proposed the Model Cities program in 1966 and positioned it at the heart of the Great Society programs for its potential to tap citizen-involvement and creativity in order to tackle some pernicious urban problems of the time. Abu-Lughod (1991: 369) observes that “the intent of Model Cities was to decentralize power over planning to neighborhoods where local needs and priorities were to be set by residents.” However, and in order to avoid the pitfalls of previous community organizations, Model Cities came with a top-down structure administrated by the designated city and often run out of the Mayor’s office. The Model Cities program required the creation of local community agencies composed of residents and located in the targeted urban area. Unlike NDOs or CDCs, these local agencies also had very little control over the distribution of funds, but

had a lot more oversight over planning and decision-making processes. The Model Cities program was run by the Housing and Urban Development office through its selected cities in order to primarily invest in the reconstruction and revitalization of cities' infrastructure. This program ended up closely linking local neighborhood groups to the city structures and oversight in order to avoid what has been perceived as the fragmentation, waste, and lack of accountability of NDOs and CDCs (Frieden and Kaplan 1975).

Over the last few decades, various Neighborhood Associative Systems have been established in different US cities (Berry et.al. 1993) both by municipalities and counties, which suggests that such form of urban organizing and management has been an important component of discussions on municipal reform and urban governance (Harvey 1989). The City of Madison, Wisconsin, for example, has been experimenting with the Planning Council as a new organizational structure likely to strengthen NA in more areas of town. The planning council in Madison is a coalition of NA in an area that form an independent non-profit organization and receive city and private funds for a small staff and operating expenses. Planning councils and similar organizations exist or have been tried in a small number of other cities around the U.S. (Berry et.al. 1993, Katznelson 1981).

As will be discussed in more details in the next chapter, there are integral values – civic engagement, local control, and efficient problem-solving – to the work of NA that are all central values in American political culture, including urban governance (Sirianni 2005). Although the centrality of these values is hardly contested, questions remain on whether NA can fulfill those expectations and, especially, whether the City Council or its administrative structures can be amenable to share their power with resident voluntary organizations.

IV.2. Doing Fieldwork in Tucson: Methods and Data of An Urban Ethnography

IV.2.a. Observing Voluntary Action in Urban Space

I conducted my research with NA in Tucson in order to examine voluntary collective action in the context of global transformations in modes of urban governance. The work of NA offers a window into the dialectic between the structural repositioning of government authority and the deep and dynamic social groups questioning that authority and pushing for remodeling it towards a more responsive, participative, and integrative power. Not only do NA work directly with the city and its structures to advance their agendas, the plurality of those agendas and the multiplicity of the associations advocating them offer exemplary case studies of urban redeployment and recomposition that powerfully characterize the new modes of urban governance (Le Gales 1995). Through the work of NA in Tucson, I have sought to learn about the interactions between voluntary organizations and administrative structures, how these interactions are animating and renewing public action, and how they contribute to the shaping of local participative democracy.

The account I provide here focuses on the dynamic interplay between NA and City structures, especially in terms of their political and social frameworks. These frameworks provide important illustrations of the fragmented character of current urban governance. While the political framework offers the regulatory space and economic incentives for partnerships and voluntary public action, the social framework often loses grip of its global vision and objectives as it settles into a problem solving apparatus that attempts to rearrange, sometimes dissolve, social relationships. I should note here that my research and analysis have not sought to measure the effectiveness of the work of NA nor to provide a quantitative contribution to the debate on the decline and reanimation of civic engagement. The main objective here is to discuss processes of urban governance and participative democracy from the point of view of NA as advocates for their space as well as consumers and shapers of city services and urban politics.

NA are part of the processes that contribute to the transformation of urban governance, but voluntary organizing and collective action are not the only agents of change. The wider political and economic context in which NA are operating has been characterized by budgetary pressures limiting the field of investment possibilities and by civic pressures demanding more transparency and more efficiency of urban administrative structures. Within these broadly characterized pressures, collective action is not always voluntary and alliances are not always permanent. The current urban context has a multitude of actors that are sometimes brought together because of structural obligations (such as elections) or reciprocal obligations (such as voluntary partnerships). Singling out NA for the purposes of this research should not be interpreted as lack of recognition of the numerous other actors impacting the urban field. Privileging the point of views and voices of NA is not meant to obscure the work of non-profit organizations or foundations as agents of urban change. In fact, members of NA do inhabit different spheres as citizens, residents, activists, and consumers, among others. The boundaries of their actions are fluid even if they are mostly presented in this work through the actions and interpretations of NA.

In Tucson, Neighborhood Associations are voluntary organizations formed by local residents and officially recognized by the City's Department of Neighborhood Services (DNR). The City of Tucson and Pima County, through their various administrative services, support the formation and sustainability of NA as representatives of and advocates for their specific urban territory as well as of larger territories under the umbrella of coalitions and alliances. Besides these elected government bodies, there are other organizations such as PRO Neighborhoods and foundations such as the Southern Arizona Community Foundation and United Way that are heavily involved in the work of NA. The City's Department of Neighborhood Resources (DNR) is the primary official interlocutor with NA. It keeps records of registered NA and their bylaws, prints and mails their monthly newsletters and other mailings (e.g., monthly meetings, occasional announcements), and monitors the status of NA through communications with their

boards. For instance, if a NA fails to hold its annual board elections as required by the bylaws, DNR puts that NA in a probationary status and suspends its official recognition.

NA are a formal voluntary institution operating on a territorial basis covering part of the municipality. NA are organized and run by voluntary members residing in delineated spaces. Some of these residents sit on the NA's board and others participate in various committees. The board members are elected every year by residents who attend the election meeting. NA have to maintain a functioning board that has recognized bylaws, of which a copy is deposited with the DNR. Members of the NA comprise all the residents and businesses that fall within the recognized boundaries of the associations. There are no membership fees collected by the association or the City on behalf of the association. Active members of NA are people involved in actions that generally constitute an interest of the local community as a whole. By virtue of their voluntary organization, they enjoy representative privileges at their Ward's office, the City Council, and with other governmental and non-governmental funding agencies.

Cohen (1985) points out that it is only where people have a sense of belonging that deliberative communities can be established. This sense of belonging, however, need not rest on a "feeling of community." The importance of civil organizations to democracy has been derived from two steps: (a) engaging in a voluntary organization makes people co-operate, and (b) the possibility of an individual to become a member of several organizations enhances capacities for problem solving, both at the individual and societal levels. The pre-condition for the success of this process is that people in a community would not group themselves into mutually exclusive segments by the selection of voluntary organization memberships, and, therefore, most likely a situation of organizational overlap would emerge. NA institutionalize the mechanisms of 'overlapping memberships' that is so important to the formation of processes of cooperation across interests and social backgrounds within the context of a diverse urban community (Portney and Berry 2007).

IV.2.b. Fieldwork in Tucson

The City of Tucson and its metropolitan area had a population approaching the one million mark in 2008, according to the Pima Association of Governments. Tucson's population growth has been steady and significant over the last half century and it is projected to grow into more than a half million residents by 2010 (American Community Survey 2006). Tucson is the second most populated city in Arizona and is one of the earliest urban settlements in the State. From around 300 B.C., the Hohokam people thrived in the Southwestern region including present day Tucson. Remains of one of the pithouses of the Hohokam village were found within the walls of the later Spanish presidio. The inhabitants of this village suddenly declined during the fourteenth century and were replaced by probable Hohokam descendents – the Pima and the Tohono O'odham. These Native American peoples later saw new foreign arrivals, including Spanish, Mexican, and American colonists who have occupied the region during the past three centuries. There is strong evidence that the site of Tucson's downtown has been almost continuously occupied by Native peoples, Spaniards, Mexicans, and eventually Americans for about four thousand years (Sheridan 1995, Logan 2006).

The City of Tucson was incorporated in 1877 with a population of about 7,000 and an area of about two square miles. By 1882, the East-West rail connection through Tucson was completed, making Tucson a major link in the transcontinental transportation system and a hub for mining, agriculture and commercial activities in Southern Arizona. The City developed primarily north and east of the railroad to take advantage of the gentle slope and the attractive landscape views. Development west of downtown lagged due to the Santa Cruz River and the inaccessible terrain of the Tucson Mountains. Since the 1880s, the orientation of the rail lines through Tucson has set the general pattern of much of the City's industrial development. This pattern was partially modified by the location of the new municipal airport (1941-1951) and the Interstate Highway System

(mid-40s to mid-60s). During the 1950s, the size of Tucson increased sevenfold due to postwar growth and large territorial annexations (Sheridan 1995, see Appendix V).

The City of Tucson has a tradition of progressive politics and a relatively active citizenry (Logan 1995, Sheridan 1986). The city's midtown area, where my research is focused, was traditionally a working-class and industrial area particularly involved with the development of the railway business. It has had small pockets of both affluence and poverty, with wealthier homes concentrated east of the university and the low income ones along the southern part of the railway tracks. Some of the traditionally working-class areas have become homes to middle class single families as well as an increasing number of university students and professionals. While white, non-Hispanic residents are still the largest group in Tucson, other minority populations also count the city as their home. Hispanics are Tucson's largest minority group with 35.7% of the City's population in 2000. According to the 2000 census, other minority groups are also present in Tucson, namely African-Americans (3%), American-Indians (2.6%), and Asian (2.1%). The City's south side areas are predominantly low to moderate income areas with higher concentrations of minorities and immigrants than the City as a whole (Census 2000). The City of South Tucson is a one square mile incorporated area originally founded in 1936, unincorporated in 1938 and reincorporated in 1940. The City of South Tucson lies within Tucson's city limits and has a population of 5500 according to the 2000 Census.

Like many cities in the United States (Ostrander and Portney 2007), Tucson has a growing number of neighborhood associations. These are formally recognized by the City, which provides them with some informational and technical support through its staff. NA board members are routinely notified of a variety of City hearings and programs. Several City ordinances also require developers or other parties to notify NA thirty days in advance of applying for City permits for developments that require substantial changes in the zoning code or substantially depart from specific neighborhood restrictions mandated by a neighborhood master plan, for instance. The City of Tucson,

in collaboration with Pima County and United Way Charitable foundation, have created PRO Neighborhoods in order to provide educational and networking opportunities for NA as well as offer competitive small grants with the objective of community development. As a result of this system of City recognition and support, NA's input is often influential in planning and development decisions.

Pima County is also actively supporting neighborhoods in Tucson and its other territories even if it does not have a system that formally recognizes them. The County runs a "Neighborhood Reinvestment Program" through which it identifies "Community Development Target Areas" eligible for the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG). In Pima County, the CDBG program is administered by the Community Services Department and it has been serving the County since 1978 (Pima County Community Services Department 2007). Congress developed the CDBG program to benefit low-and moderate-income communities. CDBG funds are used to revitalize lower-income neighborhoods through housing rehabilitation, public facilities, infrastructure improvements, and the provision of public services. The CDBG program has assisted many communities, especially in low-income areas, by providing facilities and services where other financial services were not available to meet neighborhood needs. Pima County Community Development Target Areas are areas selected for assistance based on household income. According to the County and based on the 2000 census, there are 60,000 residents or 7% of Pima County's population living in the target areas. To be eligible, the target area must have more than 51% of the households below 80% of the median income as determined by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) based on the U.S. Decennial Census. Pima County delineates target areas each ten years based on HUD's Low-and Moderate-Income estimates, which are adjusted for a 4-person household and then adjusted to the block group area's average family size (Pima County Community Services Department 2007).

Residents of these target areas are involved in the planning and disbursement of the CDBG funds, albeit usually in a reactive way and often only in the areas of the

County with well organized communities and NA. These expert-led planning processes are organized by a team of County staff that regularly meets with interested parties in order to develop an officially recognized three- to five-year plan for the target areas and to allocate seed money for priority projects in the plan. Direct citizens' input is often sought through official public hearings about the proposed plans. A CDBG selected community's abilities to influence these decision-making processes largely depend on its underlying capacities and resources. These capacities vary considerably according to numerous variables that have been addressed in other studies (Mayer 1984). This dissertation is limited to NA within the City of Tucson, therefore, comparisons of community involvement in other areas of Pima County will not be made here.

I conducted fieldwork for a total of 24 months between 2004 and 2007 with the objective of surveying and understanding the work of various NA in its different facets. The City of Tucson had a total of 140 registered NA in 2008, with few forming in the late 1970s (3 NA) and many more joining in the decades after: 38 in the 1980s, 61 in the 1990s, and 38 from 2000 to 2008. I mostly focused my fieldwork on NA in the Midtown area, which comprises approximately 54 NA. I attended NA meetings in 15 neighborhoods. Since NA hold their public board meetings once a month, I planned to attend the meetings of two neighborhood associations year around and simultaneously attended meetings in the rest of the 13 neighborhoods as the fieldwork progressed. The choice of these NA was determined by access to the field. In the two NA meetings that I attended year around, I had prior contacts with one or more members of the board who introduced me to the other residents at the monthly meetings as well as to other people who are active in other NA. The following table presents some of the socio-economic characteristics of the residents that granted me interviews. The last column in the table presents data for Tucson as a point of reference.

Categories	Socio-Economic Characteristics of Interviewees		Tucson Data (2000 Census)
Age	10 between age 35 & 50	42 are above 50	34.5 (median age)
Gender	36 Female	16 Male	51% Female
Household Income	22 (\$30,000 - \$45,000)	30 (>\$45,000)	\$31,000 (median)
Education	15 with High School Diploma	37 with BA or higher degree	24% (High School), 23% (BA or graduate degree)
Homeownership	100%		53%
Residency History	7 resided between 5 to 10 years	45 resided more than 10 years	42.8% have 5 years or more of residency

Table 1: Socio-Economic Characteristics of Interviewees

Besides attending NA meetings, I also conducted participant-observation at various public hearings (e.g., City Council, urban planning and zoning commission, regional transportation hearings, and neighborhood reinvestment meetings) related to neighborhood issues and different neighborhood-based events, such as neighborhood tours and neighborhood ice-cream socials. I also conducted 64 open-ended interviews, including 52 Neighborhood Association participants and residents (36 women and 16 men) and 12 other interviewees comprising six city employees and six professionals in the non-profit sector dealing with NA and community organizing. The majority of the interviewees from the NA were either members of their NA boards or previous members of the boards who continue to be active with their NA by volunteering on committees or participating in other neighborhood activities. I met most of the interviewees during regular NA meetings where I requested to set up interviews with interested residents. In addition, in a snowball fashion, I followed up on recommendations of people I should

contact to interview and some leads were successful while others were not. The interviewees from the City staff and the non-profit sector were approached on the basis of their involvement with neighborhood issues and their willingness to grant me an interview. Several vignettes from these interviews are written in italics to differentiate them from the rest of the text.

In general, the people I interviewed for this study and also the ones I observed expressing their opinions about NA issues formulated positive and negative responses to the work of NA. To sum up these opinions, on the positive side, residents said that NA (1) increase political engagements, (2) lead to increased well-being in the local community, and (3) are efficient means for municipal problem-solving. On the negative side, residents indicated that (1) NA can create unrealistic expectations, (2) can increase geographical conflicts in the City and County, and (3) can lead to problems of governance.

One important requirement for NA in Tucson is their a-political civic characteristic in the midst of a highly politicized urban scene (See Appendices I-IV). Unlike many other cities in the US, Tucson's City Council members are voted in on the basis of party affiliation. The City of Tucson has six wards, each represented by a city-wide elected councilor. The six wards are blanketed by NA (see Figure 1), which they do not control or regularly finance. NA in Tucson are independent of the City's bureaucracy and their main official connection to the City is the Department of Neighborhood Resources. These associations are run by board members that are voted in by neighborhood residents that attend the board election meeting. The system of party politics does not have any direct or apparent control over or influence on the work of NA and does not play a formal role in the selection of the board members.




Figure 1: Tucson’s Registered Neighborhood Associations

Source: Department of Urban Planning and Design, City of Tucson

These locally created voluntary organizations do not function as sub-municipal units that represent the City Council’s laws and policies. They are grass-root organizations that tend to steer away from formally espousing partisan cleavages and put all their weight on what unites the residents in terms of neighborhood investments and improvement projects. The emphasis on non-partisan composition and work of NA is a strong indicator of their differences from the ordinary politics of the City Council. The people serving on the board of NA or working on their various committees are primarily local level activists that belong to different parties or are independents, have various occupations and come from different backgrounds (racial, ethnic, and religious).

NA are involved in a wide range of municipal activities, but, as some critics told me, not to the extent or depth that they would like. They work with the City and other

funding sources to attract culture and leisure infrastructure into their neighborhoods. Some are also involved in business and community development activities, health and services to the elderly or group homes, technical infrastructure, and environmental protection. Above all, NA keep a high involvement in the planning and zoning processes that impact their space.

NA in Tucson do not receive funding for their operational activities from the City. They run on very low budgets that they finance through different income-generating activities, such as selling beer at the Fourth Avenue Street Fair and organizing tours of historic homes and sites in their neighborhoods. In general, NA have very limited financial responsibilities and rarely have any paid staff to fulfill clerical and coordination tasks. NA boards must include four positions: the president, the vice-president, the treasurer, and the secretary. The treasurer is responsible for balancing the NA's account and for reporting to the board about NA financial activities. Most of NA budgets are spent on food and refreshments for the mandated monthly meetings as well as any other special events, which might also serve as fundraising occasions themselves.

The City Council maintains complete control over service responsibilities and budgetary considerations for the City. NA can influence some of the budgetary decisions by raising money from the grants and donations to push the City to provide matching funds for specific, City-Council approved projects. Most of the grants that NA are eligible for come from Federal sources (e.g., Housing and Urban Development and Environmental Protection Agency). Other sources of money and expertise come from national and local philanthropic foundations and non-governmental organizations (e.g., Annie E. Casey Foundation, Arizona Community Foundation, and PRO Neighborhoods). Most of the NA members I worked with in Tucson hesitate to pursue large grants from national foundations for lack of personnel and expertise to apply for such grants and successfully run them if received. Instead, they prefer applying for local small grants and federal grants because both involve local collaborations with the City as well as other volunteer expertise ranging from local architects to artists and designers. The emphasis

on the local scale and the collaborative paradigm reflects NA's conscious choice to preserve their voluntary character as opposed to other efforts that have been previously undertaken by official groups such as the Community Development Corporations or the Neighborhood Development Organizations.

NA participants seem to represent a group endowed with strong educational resources. More than half of the residents I interviewed have completed a bachelor's degree. NA also seem to attract different age categories, although the below thirty has a very low percentage of participation. NA members are civically engaged people who participate in a broad range of organizations, clubs for songs, music and theatre, social and humanitarian organizations, and clubs for culture, hobbies, and leisure. In general, NA participants are in their 40s or older, have or had a professional occupation, and are homeowners. Some of the tasks that NA engage in are:

- Organizing local activities (e.g., social gatherings, clean ups)
 - *"We want activities for kids in our community, especially for kids that are 6-12 years old. We plant and harvest, bake bread, make tea, collect compost from neighbors and make compost. Sell crops we grow, create a cool play area in garden. The other day, the kids made the game table with donated tiles and supplies, met a neighbor who knows how to do mosaics, had a fun time at the work party, had a small table at an open house; sold beets, chard, carrots. Now we have a solid plan for the shade structure for the garden. Hopefully the kids will want to continue gardening and building in the garden. They would like to be self-sustaining by selling crops. They also want to make luffa soap again." (Miles NA resident)*
- Implement actions to improve local community (e.g., Neighborhood Watch, Graffiti Abatement)
 - *"We needed a new utility trailer. This trailer will be used to carry and store our own graffiti abatement equipment and paint. We could make it available for personal use to our citizens if necessary and permissible. We needed a trailer to be able to take care of our graffiti problems without bothering the City every time. The replacement of our worn-out trailer has allowed us to continue graffiti abatement without overburdening Tucson's Graffiti Abatement Program." (Amphi NA Resident)*
 - *"We cleaned up the Mountain Avenue drainage, painted a mural on the spillway, placed river rock-based skyline on the concrete wall bounding the Park and Ride and built a permanent bulletin board for notices and activities."*

The continuity and stability of our neighborhood is challenged by ever-increasing short-term residences. Our permanent residents struggle to keep a sense of community and maintain the upkeep of the neighborhood.... A neighborhood clean-up, painting a mural over graffiti, a flower planting at and near the new Keeling Elementary School and a recognition luncheon organized by our High School Volunteer Club – All these actions beautify our neighborhood, bring the community together and create positive relations among various groups of people." (Hedrick Acres NA resident)

- Act as a representative body entitled to comment on municipal business
 - *“Our NA completed a survey in our neighborhood to assess needs of seniors and connect them to available resources. We wanted to identify seniors who need assistance and volunteers that want to lend a hand. We also wanted to communicate the information to our Council member.” (Blenman-Elm NA resident)*
- Promote local issues at the City, County, and state levels
 - *"There is approximately 15 vacant lots in the middle of both of our neighborhoods. These lots are on the south (10 acres) and (4 acres) on the north of 22nd street. We are very concerned of what will be developed on these properties. We cannot afford having any development! We want to preserve the uniqueness of our barrio. We need economic development that will be of benefit to our families and not any commercial zone that will be of negative impact. Our project is not complete. We have just started and need PRO Neighborhoods assistance to continue on. We still need to meet with developers, mayor and Council. Research more funding." (Barrio Kroeger Lane NA resident)*
- Inform the local community about neighborhood issues
 - *“The goal of this project is to establish a neighborhood network to provide mosquito control information and materials to residents. In order to disseminate information to neighbors. The group plans to establish a mosquito hotline, a remote voice messaging. The urban mosquito has significantly impacted neighborhood activities and interactions between neighbors. Establishing a mosquito hotline and the larger control network will enable neighbors to control mosquitoes at the grassroots level. This is an on-going project. It is unrealistic to expect urban mosquitoes to be eradicated. However, it is reasonable to expect neighbors to take an active role in mosquito control. We will continue with the hotline mosquito workshops for the public and school presentations to increase awareness.” (Sam Hughes NA resident)*
- Partner with local businesses to promote and attract desirable development
 - *"We have been working with Tucson Electric Power and the Tucson Botanical Gardens. This Atturbury Bird & Animal Sanctuary has made a major*

environmental impact on the local neighborhood and the community at large. It has introduced adults and children to the diversity of riparian animal and vegetative life within easy reach, at no cost. The appearance of the neighborhood association area; our ability to assist residents with yard clean-ups; regular trash collection in these same park project areas; enhancement of the trail for handicap accessibility; our ability to maintain and improve the space." (Groves Lincoln Park NA resident)

- Co-operate with the City on issues of community development
 - *"This workshop is the brainchild of neighborhood girls who desired more experience in the use of basic hand and power tools by building small woodworking projects. ZAA [Zuni Avenue Artisans] recognized a lack of safe, neighborhood-based activities in the Corbett area. There is a need for the space and opportunity for neighbors to interact in creative and positive ways and meet on a regular basis. Saturday Art Days provides the space for these activities. The project was a success because the girls involved learned to trust themselves around the tools. They became capable and knowledgeable young carpenters: Sawing, hammering, drilling, sanding, measuring, thinking things through, step-by-step, planning, assembling, sharing, teamwork, self-respect, etc. The girls were also able to apply their skills at home. One of the girls helped install a door at her house. Our participation is strong and the people we have spoken with outside our neighborhood are affirming this success. The staff was very communicative and provided additional information through workshops that expanded our thinking about community and resources. Staff included our group in the Fiesta de los Barrios by asking us to make the awards. It was a proud moment. Girls with Tools plans to continue meeting and having wood working workshops every week. We will continue offering space for eight girls, with one space available for a girl who may need to perform community service hours. We also hope to continue being fun! A stable project takes time and patience. Learning together is more important than knowing it all. Girls need their own space to grow and learn. And women need to be there to show them how." (Corbett NA resident)*

However, substantial differences in perceptions about what the proper tasks for NA are or should be continue to characterize this field. There are clear red lines that several interviewees have drawn with regards to NA activities. For example, there is wide agreement that NA should not become mini-substitutes to the City-Council and should not expand their activities to the areas of ordinary municipal services nor should they become boosters for their neighborhoods trying to develop business initiatives at the

expense of community cohesion. On the other hand, NA members do encourage individual participants to be involved with all aspects of ordinary municipal services as they wish. Hence, some of the residents have been involved with programs for the elderly in their neighborhoods in collaboration with the City and County. In general, however, the focus of NA remains within the frame of technical infrastructure and urban planning. Their main objective is to promote desirable developments and oppose other types of development deemed undesirable for their space. This is accomplished through various strategies that are discussed in the following sections.

IV.2.c. Participation and Urban Governance

Citizen participation in all different fields of State governance has seen unprecedented increase in the last few decades. Not only has citizen participation and commitment to public service become a crucial measure for the health of democracies around the world, it has also been central to the reshaping and restructuring of the State-Citizen relationships. While the State has played a major role in these restructuring efforts which allowed the phenomenal increase in citizen participation, it is important to note that not all forms of citizen participation are mediated by State structures and facilitated by its resources. In addition to the new forms of cooperation and means of rapprochement increasingly developed by the State, citizens in many different countries, and trans-nationally at times, are still pushing for more equitable resource distribution, better protection for the environment, and more direct and democratic channels for the management of public assets. Over the last few decades, the struggles and conflicts in which numerous groups of civil society have engaged, have greatly characterized the evolution of State and citizen relationships in many contemporary societies. The case of Neighborhood Associations in Tucson should be viewed within this wider national and international context where local action serves to illustrate some opportunities and perils of this evolving relationship between citizens, their communities, States, and the global context.

The participation of NA in the coproduction of urban policies and services in Tucson serves as an example of a larger growing trend that several researchers have characterized as a response to the current disenchantment with rigid and irresponsible democratic processes (Beck 1998, Putnam 2002, Sockpol 2003). Citizens are increasingly engaging in direct decision-making processes as they feel alienated and distant from traditionally established decision-making structures, such as political parties and State administration. The on-going transition in urban public administration has been part of larger transitions in governing processes generally described as a movement from “government towards governance” (Le Gales 1995). Another scholar, Ulrich Beck (1998: 23), had dubbed this transition as a “second modernity” where people look outside the political system in their engagement to define and protect common good, search for social and international peace, and preserve their general well-being. Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam (2000) have made similar observations in their book *Disaffected Democracies*. They argue that liberal democracies have been witnessing a steadily increasing tendency of citizens’ questioning the efficacy and legitimacy of representative political and administrative bodies. These representative structures rest at the foundation of the political fabric of liberal democracies as the guarantors of common welfare and existence of society. The disenchantment with these foundational representative institutions has led Putnam (2000) to ring alarming bells about the threat of the dissolution of liberal democracies as a result of decreasing civic engagement and citizen participation in public governance.

A closer examination of the varied citizen responses to this democratic disenchantment suggests that the questioning of traditional institutions and the turning away from some forms of civic engagement and social networking has resulted in the creation of new institutional forms for the expression of new understandings of citizenship and public participation (Rosanvallon 2006, Ozawa 2004). A closer look also suggests the resilience of traditional political institutions thanks to their adaptation skills and reformulation of their mission (Johnson 2004). In fact, the institutionalization of

collective action has become a central mechanism in understanding the interactive relationship between NA and the City. The increasing interpenetration of the spheres of government action and civil society is having a particularly significant effect on the logic and modes of action of groups organizing in urban spaces. For many NA, it becomes necessary to be included within the partnerships that the City and the State build up within segments of civil society in order to secure their ability to incorporate any collective action in urban decision-making processes. Even more NA networks and coalitions sometimes act as the orchestrators of this institutionalization process in relation to more marginal or less organized neighborhood groups (Johnson 2004).

As of May 2008 and according to the Department of Neighborhood Resources, Tucson had 187 registered neighborhood associations (Website accessed May 21st). The earliest registration dates back to the late 1970s and the most recent to 2008. NA cover almost every area of the City (see Figure 1) and pursue several official strategies to promote and protect their space. Here is a list of some of these regulatory and non-regulatory strategies (source: Tucson's Department of Urban Planning and Design – see Appendices V-VII)

- ***Area Plans*** are regulatory documents prepared by the City Department of Planning and Urban Design, intended to guide development for a specific geographic area. Area plans tend to be large in scale, encompassing several neighborhoods. Specifically, an area plan guides land use, transportation and other development issues. Most often, it is used as a guide to evaluate proposed rezoning and changes in land use. NA that are part of an area plan usually support and pursue the following policies: (a) encourage new compatible residential development, (b) preserve unique historic character, (c) insure compatibility of residential-commercial development, and (d) preserve archaeological sites.
- ***Neighborhood Plans*** are regulatory documents prepared by the City Department of Urban Planning and Design, intended to guide development for a specific area. They guide land use, transportation and other development issues. Due to their smaller scale (compared to Area Plans), neighborhood plans tend to include more detailed neighborhood design issues, which also serve as a guide when issues of rezoning and land use are encountered. NA that have a neighborhood plan usually support and pursue the following

policies: (a) encourage infill of vacant lots to promote environmental conservation, (b) envision mixed use development to encourage walkable communities, (c) buffer inharmonious land uses by modifying and enforcing zoning laws, (d) create high density perimeters on major thoroughfares and low density centers in residential areas, and (e) utilize historic district designation to enforce preservation ordinances.

- **Community Plans** are non-regulatory documents typically prepared by non-governmental planning agencies and/or neighborhood associations. Community plans are more comprehensive in scope, addressing a wide range of neighborhood concerns. They are often used as strategic planning tools by neighborhoods for future development. NA that have developed a community plan usually support or pursue the following policies: (a) encourage homeownership, (b) use vacant land for first time homebuyers, (c) encourage student housing in designated areas, (d) use trade schools for home improvements, and (e) diversify housing stock through mixed use development and affordable housing.
- **National Register Historic Districts** is a registry compiled and administered by the National Park Service in collaboration with local offices of historic preservation at the State and City levels. The Register is part of a national program to coordinate and support public and private efforts to identify, evaluate, and protect historic and archeological resources. Listing in the Register contributes to preserving historic properties and districts in a number of ways: (a) Recognition that a district is of significance to the Nation, the State, or the community, (b) consideration in the planning for Federal or federally assisted projects, (c) qualification for Federal assistance for historic preservation, and (d) eligibility for State and Federal tax benefits.
- **Neighborhood Preservation Zone (NPZ)**, still at the experimental stage in 2008, is an additional zoning overlay that permits neighborhoods to develop neighborhood specific design manuals that would apply to any new development or remodeling projects. For the first time, the NPZ will allow residents to initiate zoning modification requests and play a more pro-active role in controlling their space as opposed to their primarily reactionary role to developer or city initiated land use changes.

Over the years, many neighborhood associations have expanded the membership list to one or a combination of these strategies of urban management. As the membership list has grown, the role of City institutions has expanded and several NA have started to object to the strength of their presence and to fear that the weight of the tasks of partnership, consultation, and institutionalization was progressively pulling these citizen-

based organizations away from their roots and visions (Logan 1995, Kent et.al. 2007). The formal institutionalization of a NA and its pursuing of specific strategies are built on the idea that the neighborhood should speak in a single voice, which often ends up silencing specific opposing positions that might hinder agreements and consensus. The construction of a common neighborhood vision as signaled by the adoption of one or more of the above strategies is a further consolidation of the formal procedures and organizational structures continuously promoted by the City. This leads to the creation of an ideology of universalism that no longer welcomes groups or individuals expressing particular identities and visions that are likely to challenge the dominant model of urban integration in Tucson. The territorialization of policies has allowed urban management officials to bypass historically complex and potentially sensitive urban organizing lines along race, ethnicity, and language. These officials have increasingly discovered the benefits of initiatives that target specific districts rather than given communities, thus avoiding potential conflicts and unwelcome failures. In this context, certain neighborhood groups refuse to be enclosed within the territorial policies of the City and view these efforts to territorialize social and economic intervention as means of denying diversity and cultural pluralism at the local level (Otero 2003).

On the other hand, the identification of a neighborhood group or a coalition of neighborhood groups with a defined territory and a set of strategies and plans has allowed these groups to acquire a great deal of legitimacy and move beyond specific and confining enclaves limiting their actions. The desire of participation often translates a need for integration into wider management processes in order to mitigate inevitable changes and alleviate the sense of spatial fragmentation that accompanies all urban processes. The next chapter discusses the underlying values that consolidate NA's efforts to mitigate the tensions between the particular and the universal and alleviate the drawbacks of territorialized policies.

CHAPTER V

AN EVERLASTING PROJECT: NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS AND PARTICIPATORY URBAN DEMOCRACY

The Dunbar Spring Neighborhood Association (DSNA) formed in the early 1990s to fight encroachment into the neighborhood by road widening projects. It also brought together two neighborhood associations that before had been in conflict. They were the “Dunbar” association and the “John Spring” association – both serving the same neighborhood, but different interests within the neighborhood. The geographic boundaries of our neighborhood are: Stone Avenue (East) and Speedway Boulevard (North) to railroad tracks (West) and 6th Street (South). The first grant our neighborhood received was in 1996 for \$1,000 to organize the first of what is now our annual neighborhood tree planting program. That first year the grant subsidized the cost of the trees so they were free for anyone who wanted them – 280 trees were planted that first year. Right now, the DSNA wants to calm vehicular traffic heading into the neighborhood along University Boulevard and 2nd Street, traffic emanating from new student housing projects built within our eastern border, and speeding traffic from a hot rod shop on South 9th Avenue. Along with mitigating traffic impacts, we would like to build community involvement through planting trees and landscaping within the two intersections and other improvements along the public right-of-way. We believe the traffic circles will slow traffic along 9th Avenue and cross-street traffic heading West and East along University and 2nd Street. The design and building of traffic circles will create community by bringing neighbors together to help implement the project and beautify their neighborhood. The DSNA wants to lessen the negative traffic impacts of the Entrada Real Apartment Complex and the soon to be completed Sahara Apartment Complex through the construction of two traffic circles, planting of trees, and neighborhood involvement incorporating the principles of community decision making. We will build two traffic circles at the intersections of University and 9th Avenue and 2nd Street and 9th Avenue. This physical infrastructure will be the core of the project. It will be the foundation of the reclaiming of our neighborhood streets, making safer for bicycle travel and crossing the street by pedestrians by slowing the excessive speeding that currently occurs. With the traffic circles built, we will then landscape the traffic circles. Landscape designs will be created by the neighborhood through various meetings

and City Repair community decision making process. Neighborhood volunteers will then implement the landscaping in both circles. Other improvements such as benches are also envisioned for installation along the public right of way along the existing sidewalks and footpaths. Artworks could also be installed along the right of way or within traffic circle itself, more likely in the form of a sculpture. Once again, City Repair community decision making processes through neighborhood meetings will determine what additional improvements and art will be made and where with the full approval of the City of Tucson. Improvements such as benches will welcome neighbors to gather and talk. The art work will beautify the neighborhood, encourage folks to walk through the neighborhood enjoying it all, and slow traffic due to the “visual difference” of the intersection and right of way improvements. Through the creation of a plan and organizing structure, we can then solicit additional funds from a variety of sources like Weed and Seed, the City, and possibly the County as the project continues to grow. By the way, a Weed and Seed, a Federal funding agency, mural project will simultaneously be underway on the South East corner of University Boulevard and 9th Avenue and will likely feature the tree planting and traffic calming efforts of the neighborhood within the mural. The Inter-Neighborhood Building Bridges Project (also funded by Weed and Seed) is consecutively happening to plan for improvement of inter-neighborhood bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure connecting the DSN to surrounding neighborhoods. Part of the plan is to turn University Boulevard and 9th Avenue into bicycle boulevards by planting more street trees and implementing more traffic calming measures, which will make the streets safer and more enjoyable for bicyclists and pedestrians traveling from neighborhood to neighborhood and within Dunbar Spring specifically. University Boulevard is currently a major pedestrian-bicycle East-West route connecting to West University and West side neighborhoods. 9th Avenue is a major North-South route connecting to downtown. The Building Bridges Project has only received money for planning how to improve linkages between neighborhoods; the money cannot be spent on physical infrastructure improvements like traffic circles and benches. We also intend for our traffic circles project to serve as a catalyst for other proposed projects in the area, such as the proposed neighborhood Railroad Park at 9th Avenue and 6th Street and the implementation of the Historic Warehouse Arts District Master Plan along Toole Avenue. Our current traffic circles project will involve the neighbors who live along 9th Avenue and the Dunbar Spring neighborhood. Over 85% of the residents within one block radius of each traffic circle location signed petitions in support of the project. Numerous pets and parked vehicles of residents along both streets have been victims of hit and run accidents by speeding motorists, and those ignoring stop signs. There have been numerous near accidents with pedestrians and bicyclists. The implementation of the traffic circles will greatly reduce the occurrences of such

conflicts and threats in the future. The core volunteers of this project live along these streets or walk or bike them on a regular basis. They helped pass petitions to get the traffic circles approved and have agreed to help implement the landscaping within the circles and potential artworks. Henry Jacobson is the community volunteer and civil engineer who created a more efficient traffic circle design that is half the cost of what the City originally proposed. His design has been approved by the City for use in our neighborhood. Other neighbors who reside in the corners of the two intersections will oversee watering and maintenance of the circles' plants. Neighborhood volunteers will design and install the landscaping within the circles on scheduled "landscape fiesta days." Annual Dunbar Spring neighborhood tree planting crew members have already voiced their committed support to help with the landscape implementation. In addition, volunteer crews can help with traffic control during the construction of the traffic circles and this has been done successfully by a number of other neighborhoods working with Henry Jacobson. We will announce a construction schedule, volunteer activities, and the landscape fiesta days (in which neighbors will install the landscaping within the circles and celebrate its completion) through the neighborhood newsletter, on the neighborhood email listserv, and through the bulletin board at the community garden. Neighbors can be involved in the short term through helping with the building and planting of the circles. They can continue their involvement through the other ongoing projects, such as the associated annual neighborhood tree plantings and through maintenance of the traffic circles. We will also hold workshops and gatherings that empower neighbors to create the place where they want to be living while creating a healthy relationship between automobiles, bicycles, and pedestrians in our shared right of way. This project will also foster communication, sharing, and collaboration among neighbors and design professionals. We will learn how to communicate with neighbors and government officials, including the City of Tucson, Trees for Tucson, Henry Jacobson's construction company, and the surrounding neighborhoods. For the organizers of these projects, they will learn how to bring people together and foster positive communication. We will also be soliciting additional organizers from the volunteer crews as the projects grow. The actual day of construction will allow neighbors to work hand in hand with construction workers in creating safer and more livable neighborhood. We will make connections between neighbors and government officials including the Ward One Council office. Our traffic circles project will be successful when there will no longer be cars racing down the streets and the intersections will be beautified by the traffic circles, landscaping and possibly art work. More neighbors will get to know each other and feel safe to walk across the street and visit with each other. We will throw a 9th Avenue block party after the work is complete to celebrate and showcase the improved intersections. Now, we have to

secure funding for both traffic circles because both intersections are critical in mitigating traffic impacts on the neighborhood. Everything is in place to begin the construction of the two traffic circles and we are soliciting funds to meet the bid as soon as possible to avoid any prices increase. One of the most important skills we have learned from our past projects is to work with numerous agencies. We have done so in trying to get the final piece of funding for the traffic circle infrastructure. We solicited traffic circle bids from all concrete and asphalt contractors in Tucson. The lowest bid for the City specified traffic circle design was over \$12,000. We approached Henry Jacobson and Traffic Circle Partners for a less expensive alternative design. He generated a design and options of working with neighborhood volunteers that would save us over \$6000. We are now just \$3700 short for traffic circle construction and landscaping. We approached Ward 1 for Back to Basics funding of \$2500. We were awarded the money, but due to City Back to Basics fund regulations, we would only have been able to use a contractor on the City of Tucson's approved contractor list. This would have doubled the cost of traffic circles, since they would be required to construct the City's traffic circle design rather than Henry Jacobson's alternative and City approved design.

The City's design costs double the price of Henry Jacobson's to construct. Thus this would have more than negated the donated amount. Instead, Ward 1 is giving us the \$2500 towards landscaping materials for use within the traffic circles. Neighborhood volunteers will implement the landscaping so there is no need to use City approved contractors. We approached the City of Tucson Transportation Department, but we were turned down for money towards infrastructure. Instead, they agreed to cover the cost of all permits and signage. We tried Weed and Seed, but they will not fund physical infrastructure projects. Thus we cannot get any additional funds through the City of Tucson for the creation of the traffic circle infrastructure if we choose to work with Henry Jacobson. He is licensed, bonded, and insured, but is not on the City of Tucson approved contractor list. The City has agreed to let Henry Jacobson's firm do the traffic circle implementation, as long as it is not paid for with City Back to Basics funds. We feel that the physical infrastructure of the traffic circles is the core of the project that starts the process to reclaim the streets and lays the foundation for future artworks and enhancements. In addition, through this project, we can create a model or base plan and organizational structure through which we can solicit for additional funding to continue to build on this project in within our neighborhood. As far as leveraging money, we have \$5500 towards the physical infrastructure of the traffic circles from the Dunbar Spring Neighborhood Association. We also have donations from Trees for Tucson, Ward 1 Back to Basics funds, and neighborhood participation which will give us credits back towards the funds needed. Lastly, we see this project as a catalyst for future City

*Repair projects within the neighborhood as well as throughout the city. The City Repair Project (see www.cityrepair.org) was started in Portland, Oregon and has brought a fun atmosphere to its neighborhoods. We hope to bring that same energy to Tucson. This would be the first project of this kind in the city. The next project will likely be a Railroad Park at 9th Avenue and 6th Street, for which we began the design two years ago when Mark Lakeman from the City Repair Project came to speak in Tucson. We have worked with neighborhood volunteers, local artists, and Planners Ink to create a conceptual design for the park. We are waiting for the vacant parcel to transfer from the Arizona Department of Transportation to the City of Tucson control, then we can move forward with the project. From there, we envision City Repair improvements going down Toole Avenue as part of the Historic Warehouse Master Planning process which has been moving forward with the help of several agencies.
[Interview with Dunbar Spring Neighborhood Association Member]*

Researchers from different disciplines working on issues of urban politics and public action are often accused of being under the spell of key actors shaping public policies and bewildered by glittering new policies and innovative projects. These researchers' attraction to what's "new," the criticism continues, leads them to theorize changes and transformations in public policies every time new tools of urban administration are introduced (Jessop 1997). Behind this criticism lies the premise that tools of public administration introduced to carry out urban policies and projects have, in and of themselves, very little to teach us about urban politics. To the contrary, the constant innovations and the numerous projects are there only to mask hidden objectives of such policies as well as to embellish chronic urban problems (Edwards 1997).

Analyses of urban projects and policies have long been subject to such criticisms even though such analyses have flourished in different disciplines ranging from public administration and urban planning to anthropology, sociology, and political science. One

of the reasons behind the longevity of these criticisms is the failure of most urban researchers to provide systematic analyses of the notion of “urban project” and all the practices that this notion embodies. This failure has been reproduced in most urban analyses that focus on urban projects as a *unit* of analysis instead of turning those same urban projects into *objects* of analysis (Brenner 2002, Chaskin and Abunimah 1999, Heathcott 2005). The notion of urban projects as a unit of analysis provides entry to examining situations where collective action is organized around a finite number of actors who mobilize to carry out specific objectives over a specified amount of time and a clearly bounded territory. This formula has provided a rich background for a lot of urban analyses by allowing them to focus on a temporally and spatially limited urban project where scrutinizing relations of power and measuring the capacity for collective action become feasible endeavors (Diamond and Liddle 2005, Kenny and Zimmerman 2004). On the Other hand, the use of Neighborhood Associations as units of analysis can extend analyses of urban organizing and activism almost indefinitely. I propose in this chapter to approach NA as an urban project and policy that emerged in response to profound changes in urban management and governance over the last few decades (Harvey 2005, Vidal and Keating 2004, Appadurai 2002, Kohler and Wissen 2003)

Although necessary, and most often highly informative, studies of urban projects as units of analysis to examine power structure and collective action in the city do not fully probe underlying values and dimensions of the urban project as an object of analysis in itself. In fact, urban projects not only reflect sequences of action in a recognized space

but also embody a mode of action (MacAllister 2004, Fisher 1994). Through analyses of that mode of action we can glean some of the concepts structuring the possibilities of collective action in contemporary urban settings. Focus on this mode of action could also allow an examination of relations of hierarchy, the role of interactions and consultations, and the relationships between the State and society as reflected in practices of urban civic organizations such as NA.

This chapter explores processes through which NA have been constructed as crucial urban actors vital to the functioning of representative democracy and urban governance. The role that NA play in three distinct domains of urban politics will be examined. These domains comprise the regulatory and operational aspects of urban politics, urban and regional planning, and reinvestment and revitalization projects. This discussion will bring to the fore three important roles of NA as urban actors. First is their role in social mobilization, which requires their second role of legitimizing rational and procedural modes of interaction, and third is the affirmation of group solidarity through collective action beyond whatever urban projects or objectives they might be involved in. Exploring NA as an object of analysis can also provide entry points to documenting transformations in urban policies and ideological changes in State actions, specifically the perennial underlying tensions between private ownership and public regulations.

V.1. Neighborhood Associations and Fields of Public Action

V.1.a. NA and Entrepreneurial Urban Management

Towards the end of the 1960s, NA started gaining recognition as formal actors with important roles to play in the formulation and implementation of urban policies and plans (Fisher 1994). The role of these associations as sources and spaces for social mobilization started to crystallize after the widespread urban uprisings of the 1960s (Sugrue 1996, Jahn-Khan 2003). The discourse of urban projects was being supplanted by the more entrepreneurial discourse of urban planning and management (Harvey 1989). This urban entrepreneurial discourse reflected government officials' convictions that a new era of urban politics and management was dawning. An era that witnessed a paradigm shift requiring the government to retreat from its dominant position as sole expert on urban affairs and to start engaging urban issues in their fully political dimensions by opening the space for the participation of various interested actors and by recognizing and valuing local expertise and knowledge on matters pertinent to local territories.

The success of entrepreneurial urban management requires a dialogue that systematically relates existing urban territories including their present resources, past conditions, and territorial memory to contemporary aims of urban public action. This requirement is clearly reflected in the important role NA play in urban operational and regulatory processes. In these processes, urban master plans are replaced by small scale urban projects since the former denotes huge urban changes solely guided by their

functional utility and based on dominant expertise while the latter reflects acute sensitivity to existing urban conditions and attributes tremendous importance to the participation of local groups.

Even with the adoption of the new urban entrepreneurial discourse, the underlying practices of urban management rely on the continuity of methods and customs largely established over many decades. Urban politics and management are still set in motion through structured timetables, planned projects, and chiefs of projects who mobilize and coordinate governmental and non-governmental actors involved in those projects. The novelty of the entrepreneurial approach has been the weight attributed to the inclusion of the public into the on-going motion of urban processes (Amin and Thrift 2002). The main objective behind this inclusion is to remedy the failures of technocratic expertise and policies of urban planning widely blamed for excluding legitimate sources of urban knowledge and particularly that of local neighborhoods. Therefore, the appropriate response to urban issues ranging from uprisings to routine road extensions has been framed in terms of a social development that values local expertise, both technical and, more importantly, communal, embodying local social networks and relationships (Castells 1983). Valuing local resources not only allows the parties involved to prioritize their issues but it also fosters a sense of appropriation and ownership of those issues by local participants. Perceptions of the city itself are transformed through this process (Davis 1991). The city is no longer just a set of physical structures that will be modified

through a master plan, but is now a whole range of organizational networks, relationships and identities.

The earlier urban management style was developed by governments at different levels in response to the rapid economic expansion post WWII. There was an urgent need for developing land use laws in order to bring urban growth under some control, mostly juridical control in this case (Robertson and Judd 1989:279-315). The entrepreneurial style of urban management emerged under different economic circumstances that proved very challenging to the running of cities. These economic challenges pushed the cities to shift away from using regulations as the primary tool for controlling urban space into embracing a philosophy of urban growth that heavily relies on promoting one city's competitive advantages over the others (Tulchin 2002). Without completely abandoning regulations, cities have put their regulatory role at the service of enhancing their chances of attracting capital to settle within their boundaries. NA have become an asset that the city celebrates with the hope of attracting new residents and businesses. They can also become an obstacle in cases where they disagree with plans proposed by city officials or other developers. However, even when they disagree, NA's participation perfectly fits within the entrepreneurial style of management and serves its objectives of social mobilization of local resources and talents.

V.1.b. NA, Accumulating Experience, Challenging Experts

The inclusion of NA and other non-governmental groups into the fabric of urban decision making processes has resulted in the decentralization of sources of expertise

acting in the field of urban public policy. While large scale urban housing projects have served as the perfect example of the inherent limitations of exclusive governmental expertise, they instilled the largely shared belief that expertise in urban technical and technocratic fields is not sufficient to bring about successful urban projects or comprehensively address complex urban problems (Robertson and Judd 1989). Instead, consultations and deliberations involving various actors in the urban scene have become the cornerstones for building urban expertise. The promotion of NA and public participation helps to unlock local resources and provides avenues for intimate knowledge and user-based expertise of the urban to inform and even challenge the “rule of experts” (Mitchell 2002).

In this mode of urban management, processes and methods for elaborating urban projects are as important as the execution plans and outputs. NA are to be involved at all levels: plan conceptions and modifications, decision-making sessions, and deliberations (MacAllister 2004). The main objective is to foster project appropriation through cooperation and consensus building. After all, it is the participation of the residents of those neighborhoods that endows the process with its most vital element for it to be labeled democratic, open and transparent. The imperatives of deliberation and inclusion have become so entrenched that urban projects and plans are no longer perceived as an end in themselves. Rather, they are a starting point, an open process, and another occasion for formulating an urban future for the city and its residents.

V.1.c. NA, Planning, and Uncertainty

The decentralization of sources of urban expertise and the inclusion of user-based urban knowledge reflect an important recognition of the limitations of expert rationalities and an acceptance of the uncertainties that characterize urban policy (Keil 2003).

Mounting economic pressures and increasing demands for improving local services have led urban officials to be more forthright about the uncertainties of revenue generation and adopt more flexible positions when it comes to implementing policy. In this context, the mobilization and articulation of resources, including those of NA, are central to framing discussions over the objectives of public action in the urban sphere. The uncertainties of planning outcomes are embraced by different participating actors and become rallying points for continuous deliberations and consultations. This process is vital in transforming neighborhood participation in urban affairs from a single project-focused activity whose interest might dissipate by the end of the project into a permanent social activity routinely engaging NA (Vidal and Keating 2005). This permanent participation in turn is transforming conventional urban planning into a more pragmatic field where feasibility of objectives pushes aside considerations of desirability.

As long as urban objectives are deemed precariously dependent on various conditions that determine the availability or lack of resources, the active participation of concerned urban actors has to be sustained. Collective choices and decisions constantly come under revisions and urban planning and development become a permanent social activity. One notable result of these transformations has been the introduction of

considerable flexibility to land-use laws and codes (Ben-Joseph 2005). The latter have come under increasing criticisms for their rigidity, their lack of specificity, and incapacity for adaptation to new conditions within reasonable time. The new urban system favors the elaboration of land-use laws that serve specific residents and their needs without the side effects of harming other residents in different areas with different land-use needs.

Being open to negotiation is a celebrated characteristic of urban entrepreneurial systems. Whether it is a land-use law, a revitalization project, or a transportation proposal, residents are engaged in the process of negotiation thus rendering all urban public actions as beginnings for permanent conversations and modifications instead of unmovable blueprints framed in drawings and plans. The objectives of urban planning have transcended the responsibilities of resource allocation and land-use control into the larger realm of activating processes of reflection and deliberation that are likely to engage local participation and contribution in highly sustainable ways.

V.2. Developing a Deliberative and Processual Urban Rationality

The Broadmoor-Broadway Village Neighborhood Association (BBVNA) has been active for many years. The neighborhood's geographic boundaries are Broadway Boulevard (North), Country Club (East), Stratford (South), and Tucson Boulevard (West). The results of a neighborhood study, conducted by the Drachman Institute, were presented at a neighborhood meeting in December 2005. One project suggested by the Institute and supported by the BBVNA Board and neighborhood was the development of a neighborhood gathering place with trees and benches at the Malvern and Arroyo Chico intersection. In 2006, we received a design grant from PRO Neighborhoods and now have the plaza design with construction drawings. Early in 2007, we made a pre-application to several agencies for a fund raising project to be directed by teens in our neighborhood. This group that is coming together now is a new one and while a few have worked on previous projects, the majority has not. A group of neighborhood teens has

been formed to work on the Malvern Neighborhood Plaza project. Some teens who are working on the project have been identified and are now recruiting additional neighborhood teen members. We have learned that while there are many teens in the neighborhood, they are isolated from one another by attending different schools and lacking opportunities to meet and form friendships. Because they spend time in their houses or activities outside the neighborhood, there is a perception that we don't have teens in our neighborhood. Working on this project has provided opportunities for teens to make new connections close to home and strengthen the bonds between individuals and families within our neighborhood. So, our neighborhood wants to create a plaza where people can gather both formally for planned events and informally as neighbors meet to chat or walk their dogs. In order to raise money to fund this plaza, we have planned to sell ceramic tiles, both photographic and decorative, which will be placed in the plaza to commemorate people, pets, or their activities in our neighborhood which people want to share. The tile project has been youth directed by neighborhood teens who coordinate all aspects of the project including researching the cost of producing the tiles, locating a production source, creating a marketing plan, and selling them. We already had a Summer Water Party featuring a cookout and water games to recruit more teens to the team. Adult advisors from the neighborhood have been available in addition to the assistance of two facilitators trained in working with youth and developing leadership skills. Our own neighborhood resident, Stan Gordon, has led the teen team in two, one-half day sessions of team building and leadership development based on his own program "A Lighter Path," which he has conducted for several local schools and social services agencies. The teen team has been researching the cost of producing the tiles and will be setting the sales price in order to generate funds for the plaza. Opportunities will be provided for other teens to participate in the actual creation of the tiles and learn how they are made. They may also participate in the final production and installation of the tiles. The teen team is developing a marketing strategy with a planned sales event to kick off the project. The team is also working with the Broadmoor-Broadway Village merchants to promote the project. An additional workshop is in the plans to present the project to other neighborhood associations that are seeking to facilitate teen involvement in their projects. Through these activities, neighborhood teens become a vital group, contributing to the fabric of our community. This project has the added benefit of involving neighborhood youth by providing a concrete, tangible product they can create and display while they meet other neighbors and learn about project management and the details of ceramic tile production. The tiles will personalize the plaza space and help establish a sense of place for our neighborhood. The neighborhood residents also have an opportunity to meet and work with the teens, both in implementing this project and in sales activities of the tiles. This project

also fosters the on-going realization of the Malvern Plaza and underline the importance that for this project to become a reality it will require the commitment and participation of everyone in the neighborhood, not just a few people. Leadership development skills building activities are an explicit aspect of our projects. To be successful, the teen team needs to acquire these skills. Through partnerships with different groups, teens will enhance their leadership skills. They are learning to separate a larger project into its components, develop a plan, make decisions and accept responsibility. Problem solving and teamwork have been essential to carry out the project. Moreover, the teens working collaboratively on this project have got to know one another in a supportive, friendly, and safe environment. Parents of teens have also had the opportunity to work together as they formed a support team for the teens. Adults are learning about working with teens and gaining appreciation for the many positive contributions they are making to their community. Nearby businesses from the Broadway Business District have been active supporters of BBVNA. Our project structures the interactions with the teens and merchants and promotes positive relationships. Working with these businesses will enlarge the impact of the project beyond our neighborhood boundaries and provide positive interaction with the groups around us. The businesses in the Broadmoor-Broadway Village shopping center recently donated items and services for a raffle to raise money for the plaza. This project has given them an additional way to create bonds with the neighborhood which provides mutual benefits. I always ask myself “What happens to a neighborhood that has no interaction?” The answer is that each house becomes there own little neighborhood, having no concerns of the goings on around them. But this new neighborhood plaza will connect the neighborhood by breaching the wall of twenty feet oleander trees that cuts our neighborhood in half blocking others from view. This plaza is a place for the young to play, the middle aged to visit, and the old to relax on a nice bench under the trees. But most importantly, it will bond the teens in this neighborhood together. Building it will build our character. It will also provide a place for us to hold our annual events, such as the 4th of July parade and Octoberfest celebration. Previously, these events have taken place on the front yards of gracious neighbors. The plaza will bring this neighborhood together like never before. [Interview with Broadmoor-Broadway Village Neighborhood Association member]

V.2.a. Incremental Emergence of Urban Objectives

The expansion of NA derives its strengths from widely shared theories and practices that conceive of collective action as a deliberative and processual activity

(Habermas 1992). In a context where active agents recognize the limitations on their operational rationality as well as the weaknesses of urban utopian planning and the contested nature of urban expertise, urban decisions are less the result of experts planning in the confines of their offices than of processes of interactions, deliberations, and continuous adjustments. The expert standards of urban rationality no longer reign supreme but are used now to further the gradual process of consensus building in order to reach sustainable urban objectives that participating actors can identify with and help achieve (Appadurai 2002, Chaskin and Abunimah 1999). NA, among other actors in urban politics, do not shy from actively participating in decision making processes in order to contribute to the shaping of their neighborhoods' future. This participation, however, is as much an attempt to exercise some control over an unpredictable future as it is a steady push for the creation of institutional and organizational structures that will endow urban actors like themselves with greater adaptability and maneuvering in rapidly changing cities (Heathcott 2005).

The transformation of urban policy from grand master planning to small scale deliberative interactions is clearly visible in the changes that occurred in the fields of urban design. Master urban plans appeared in an era of unquestionable authority of science and technical knowledge shaping public urban policy. Cities could be designed with extreme precision and, in theory, their future growth could be controlled with maximum efficiency as long as the whole process is conducted in light of scientific evidence (Robertson and Judd 1989). The authority of urban planners stemmed from

their technical expertise and their predictive models so vital to the anticipation of urban future needs. Deliberative urban processes, on the other hand, reject this authoritative approach in favor of a mostly political process where legitimacy of urban policy is derived not solely from technical expertise but mostly from negotiations and agreements among disparate actors involved in the elaboration of incremental urban policy objectives (MacAllister 2004).

NA have fully appropriated processes of urban deliberations and negotiations not only to be part of the decision making apparatus but also to influence procedural conventions and deliberative customs that are likely to result from an on-going interactionist urban model (Euchner and McGovern 2003). The elaboration of urban visions and the development of norms of urban collective action have led to the institutionalization of urban interaction processes that aim at involving a plurality of urban actors including governmental institutions and non-governmental groups from the public and private sectors. In this context, the development of urban strategies is tightly linked to the networks of proliferating urban groups (Jones and Ward 1998). As financial resources grow scarce, the success of urban decision-making processes increasingly hinges on its inclusion of large swaths of actors and resources. Urban policies become just as important as the processes through which they are elaborated and the mechanisms through which they are implemented. NA are an integral part of the urban consensus apparatus and play a central role in the success or failure of strategies for urban development (Davis 1991).

The incremental emergence of urban policy objectives through processual deliberations and negotiations has transformed several aspects of the field of urban planning (Healy 2002). The perception of urban policy objectives has been transformed from a “scientifically based” and authoritatively fixed status to one that is open ended, flexible, and sensitive to multiple needs as well as to the accumulation of new information and the emergence of new resources. The development of urban policy objectives has been transformed into processes of mutual adjustments among a plurality of participating actors instead of technically developed visions of desirable urban futures. The development of urban policy objectives is no longer uniquely determined by technical expertise but is characterized by open, interactive, and repetitive processes that aim at generating the widest mobilization of urban actors and the largest adherence into elaborated urban blueprints. The incremental character of these urban processes seems to transcend the domain of urban growth and serves the larger goal of mobilizing urban actors and stabilizing complex networks of competing interests (Appadurai 2002).

V.2.b. Urban Deliberative Processes and their Important By-Products

The uncertainties characterizing deliberative urban processes would not have been tolerated if it were not for the positive by-products that these processes are believed to be promoting and nurturing (Davis 1991, Healy 2002). The involvement of NA and other civic actors in urban planning is believed to have wide and lasting impacts on relationships among individuals and groups in the urban setting. One crucial impact that is often identified as off-setting the uncertainties generated by citizens involvement in

urban planning is the transformation of urban residents and groups into resourceful community actors (Heathcott 2005). Urban residents mobilize and are mobilized through NA to draw financial resources into their neighborhoods in order to carry out projects of all sorts. Residents are transformed into a more active political resource that can support specific political actors and lend precious legitimacy to urban projects in their neighborhoods. Residents also develop cognitive resources by way of their involvement in urban projects that push them to learn about different areas of expertise and accumulate knowledge that will help them in future plans and strategies. Participants also acquire important organizational skills that contribute to a deeper appreciation for the difficulties surrounding urban management and to a higher confidence in the NA's resourcefulness and capabilities (Diamond and Liddle 2005). Other important by-products of deliberative urban processes are the highly coveted objectives of developing robust consensus agreements among disparate urban actors and the fostering of flexible yet permanent collaborative mechanisms among these actors.

As a result of the adoption of urban deliberative processes, traditional tools of urban planning such as maps and master plans are transformed from their authoritative and fixed roles into communicational platforms that facilitate interactions among involved urban actors as they modify or completely change the plans represented on those planning tools. The static representation of plans gives way to opportunities for interactions and consensus building that echo Habermas' communicational theory, especially as urban planning processes move outside the closed doors of planning offices

into the open and public space of NA, informational Town Hall meetings, and the media. Not only are the plans discussed in the public sphere, they are also subject to a continuous stream of input from participating actors, which requires the creation of permanent institutions to channel that input and provide a framework for continuous interactions and feedback. NA are one important institution that promotes continuous and regular interactions between urban actors and fosters cooperation among them (Davis 1991, Fisher 1994).

V.3. Actor-Oriented Urbanism: Establishing a Participative Attitude and

Developing a Global Vision

When our neighborhood, Tucson Park West, was built in the mid 1960's, it was not set up as a Homeowners Association. Our neighborhood's boundaries are: Calle Puebla and Calle Carapan (North), Calle Morado (South), Greasewood (East), and Shannon (West). Legally, we cannot collect mandatory maintenance fees. A small core of volunteers does all present work. In the Fall of 2006 at a neighborhood Association board meeting, we discussed the need to have more residents involved with the neighborhood to serve on the association board, to assist with the maintenance of the neighborhood pool and common areas, to initiate or sponsor activities for various age groups, etc. We discussed the possibility of doing a neighborhood project of landscaping the unattractive, bladed, weed and grass grown city property that the "front door" to our neighborhood. This site gives a negative image or message regarding our neighborhood. When a neighborhood seems rundown and unattended, it encourages graffiti and other crimes. Although there is still a strong core (now mostly elderly) of original or long time homeowners, many new people have moved in that we would like to engage in cooperative neighborhood activities as well as get to know each other in order to build pride, concern, and a spirit of community. The City property is approximately 395 feet long and 36-45 feet wide between Calle Padilla and Calle Genova and run parallel to Greasewood Road that the City has given permission to landscape adhering to certain restrictions. We landscaped it with native vegetation much like Tumamoc Hill, which is directly across the street, so that it would have a natural look. To prepare the site, we eliminated weeds and grass and used weed block to prevent weed growth,

purchased plants and trees that were not donated, disbursed water reimbursements to residents bordering the site for watering the plants till they are established, purchased hoses and sprinkling attachments for watering and wire cutters and other tools, we even rented other heavy equipment for digging holes, and attached name signs of our neighborhood to the stop signs at Calle Puebla, Calle Morado, and Calle Carapan. We have planned this project to foster neighborhood cohesion and cooperation by getting to know each other; to build pride and caring for the neighborhood which has led to forming interest in other group activities including a neighborhood watch program to provide for a safer community. We see more residents involved in our annual neighborhood clean up and periodic Greasewood Road clean up days and local buffel grass eradication efforts. Other activities such as block parties, senior and youth activities have also been held. Membership in the Neighborhood Association Board has also increased and been more stable. The plot project has visually enhanced the view and tremendously helped our community spirit. Now we are working on having the walking path along Greasewood Road that ends at Broadway and picks up again at Calle Morado connect, which would be incorporated into our landscape project located between those two streets, Broadway and Calle Morado. Through this landscaping project, and other projects and activities, neighborhood residents have opportunities to participate in whatever part of the project they want and are capable of assisting with. Residents are asked to take responsibility for various phases of projects and report on a regular basis as to their progress. Neighbors that have not been involved in the neighborhood are especially encouraged to assist. Teenagers and younger kids are invited to be "Project Committee Assistants" providing opportunity to learn how to organize, help with and complete assigned tasks from older residents. A number of the neighborhood children attend Tolson Elementary School and Maxwell Middle School, which are within walking distance of the landscaped site. Parents of these kids were asked to contact the schools to ask if any classroom or group such as student council, boy and girl scouts could assist as a community service project. We also solicited donations of plants from the schools and the Lennar Company, which is planning and building a residential development next to Tolson School. We also contacted local nurseries for plant and monetary donations and received 15 trees and plants from Trees for Tucson. At the end, the City property was converted into a neighborhood space landscaped with native vegetation. Neighborhood name signs were installed and all the work has been done by neighborhood residents and participating organizations. Residents have become more engaged in neighborhood activities and have formed new friendships. There is a sense of pride among all participants which has inspired them to become involved in other projects. [Interview with Tucson Park West Neighborhood Association Board member].

V.3.a. Primacy of Vision over Procedure

Urban deliberative processes have displaced the primacy of procedural formalities and emphases on outputs to be supplanted by the valuing of urban political processes that are clearly participative, transparent, and inclusive (Healy 1997). This is an urban vision that embraces the political nature of urban planning despite the risks and uncertainties it entails. It is also a vision that puts substantial operational responsibilities in the laps of urban actors such as Neighborhood Associations. This vision forces NA into action, with its anticipation, frustrations, and sense of achievement. By virtue of their participation in urban planning projects, NA are, therefore, adopting a visible position in their environment and accepting the opportunities and risks associated with such political positioning. At the same time, and in order to avoid irrevocable disintegration as a result of competing interests, urban actors are encouraged to develop a global, multi-sectorial, and interdisciplinary approach in the development and execution of their urban objectives and projects.

The adoption of a global urban vision is crucial to the maintenance of functioning urban participatory processes under tremendous pressures from numerous competing interests and needs (Jones and Ward 1998). A global urban vision is equally important to avoid an infinite division of labor among all actors involved in the formulation, implementation and execution of urban projects. By embracing a global urban vision while primarily acting within recognized territorial boundaries, NA have subscribed to an urban operational mode that prioritizes the management of urban functions without

completely erasing the important role of territorial management (Jessop 1997). Putting urban functions at the forefront allows urban actors to respond to specific local neighborhood needs as part of a global urban vision that avoids singling out some neighborhoods as “disadvantaged,” “low-income,” or “stressed.” Neighborhood territories, despite their differences, become the spatial theater for anchoring various actions and projects emanating from numerous departments and service providers into a concrete and limited urban space. Two very important objectives are achieved: on the one hand, functional management allows for more politically correct and less controversial urban projects, generally branded as “revitalization,” “renewal,” and “preservation.” On the other hand, urban territories become the uniting thread around which competing interests and multiple administrative sectors revolve and focus their energies (McCann 2003).

The involvement of NA in the elaboration and implementation of urban projects allows the city to clearly communicate its political intentions to different urban actors and to avoid alienating several of those actors if it were to uniquely stick to the project’s technicalities ranging from soil erosion studies to set backs from neighboring structures. The City can also benefit from the involvement of NA and various other urban actors in cases where it competes with other cities for State and Federal governments money. Mobilizing urban actors is likely to endow a city with the distinction of not only being a reliable space for project operations but most importantly of being an actor-city whose residents are as valuable an asset as its space (Mayer 2003).

The primacy of vision and intention over procedure in carrying out urban projects has resulted in the reexamination of urban political processes and power. The political and technical power of the City Council and all its administrative branches is reevaluated in light of the active participation of NA and other urban actors. This reevaluation has pushed for a repositioning of the power of urban government without losing the reigns of leadership. Instead, the City has created a little more room to accommodate the voices and channel the energies of the various urban actors it deals with. NA are not seeking to displace the central role of government which they recognize as necessary to provide strong leadership crucial to the achievement of projects in urban settings. They have succeeded, however, in partnering with the various government agencies and in convincing them to work together to achieve goals that have been collectively elaborated without being in total control of every single aspect of those goals. The City and its administrative branches assume the role of a leader and a facilitator capable of mobilizing different resources, providing technical assistance, and guaranteeing the integrity of the projects in their compliance with the broad lines of their stated urban vision.

V.3.b. Affirming a Collective Actor

Besides reflecting a sincere shift in urban political workings where urban vision and political intention have gained primacy over technical procedures, NA have also been able to affirm the role of the collectivity in the management of urban space (Davis 1991, Fisher 1994). The institutionalization of NA has been instrumental in providing the space for individuals, groups and coalitions to achieve or work on achieving levels of autonomy

and independence in elaborating their priorities and developing their projects. NA's sense of autonomy is of paramount importance to their sustainable insertion into their economic, cultural, and ecological environments (Chaskin and Abunimah 1999). This sense of autonomy and confidence usually comes from years of experience in the urban setting as well as from the capacities to reflect on those experiences and analyze them. NA become active and experienced actors that represent their territories as individual units or in small and large coalitions that reflect strong interactional relations and a perennial source for community organizing and mobilization.

NA are also instrumental in the construction of fragmented urban territories into collective actors. In the process of elaborating urban projects, urban territories are no longer mere recipients of programs and grants but are actors whose residents use those programs and grants to develop a collective territorial identity. The elaboration of these collective territorial identities has gained acute currency in the aftermath of the housing riots in the early 1970s. "Urban Strategic Planning" (Robertson and Judd 1989) emerged as the guiding force to repackaging cities into actors with distinct identities that are operating in highly unstable and very competitive environments. This new strategic approach that centered on the city as a collective actor was displacing the classic model that construed the city as a territory that presents challenges and opportunities to planners and investors. Strategic planning stipulates that the city becomes a social actor and a territorial collectivity with a distinct identity that sets it apart from competing cities (Mayer 2003). Through the strategic model of planning, NA play an important role in

forging strong urban ties in order to develop the capacity to act as a united front and affirm the image of the city as a collective actor. Cities are constantly immersed in attempts to elaborate those distinct identities by tackling questions like “Who are we?” “How do we want to grow?” and “How do we plan on sustaining our identity?” Hence cities engage in long and sometimes open-ended processes of collective diagnosis in order to determine their strengths and identify their challenges. Often, the history of a city is reinterpreted in light of its new image in order to identify its unique characteristics and defining traits (Kenny and Zimmerman 2004).

The Corbett Neighborhood Association is working with the Zuni Avenue Peace Center (ZAPC) on a series of water harvesting workshops. Several members of our neighborhood are participants in and plot holders at the Zuni Avenue Peace Center’s community garden. The garden has been very successful, with most of the plots occupied, but we have been considering ways we can use the garden and ZAPC property to further educate the community on sustainability. The garden uses drip irrigation, but those of us who have experience in water harvesting decided that we should use our resources as responsibly as possible by installing a water catchment system, utilizing earthworks for passive water catchment, and landscaping with native plants. Most importantly, since the ZAPC is already a place that draws neighbors together, we wanted the establishment of these practices to be used as an educational experience for broader Corbett community and other neighborhoods, so neighbors can copy what they have learned about desert water harvesting at their own homes. So we hosted a series of workshops at the ZAPC to educate neighbors on how they can save water and make good use of native plants by focusing on water harvesting and landscaping with edible desert plants. The workshops were hands-on, where participants learned how to apply these techniques at their own homes as they were demonstrated and established at the ZAPC. We divided the series into two parts: (a) Cistern installation to catch water run-off from the roof, and (b) passive water catchment through earthworks and incorporating edible plants into the landscape. During these workshops, we had a local photographer document each step of the project that we later

compiled into a how-to manual and slideshow for future reference. Also, after participating in the workshops, we compiled a list of people who are willing to assist other neighbors as they try some of these techniques at home. This has been an important project for the neighborhood and the wider community because it educated community residents on ways that they can save water and energy, which is a crucial part of living in the desert. It also brought neighbors together to work on the initial project at the Zuni Center and further fostered community through the establishment of “work crews” that can help each other emulate these practices at home. Finally, it got more people involved with the Zuni Peace Center which promotes the acquisition and sharing of practical skills for families and children, through other programs like clay classes, the bike club, girls with tools, and yoga classes. Most importantly, water harvesting is already a high-interest topic right now and so far at least twelve neighbors have already joined the project and installed cisterns and planted water saving plants. This project has turned some community members into desert harvesting experts as they learned practical techniques at the workshops and then assisted each other in applying them in their own homes. It has had wider impacts since those volunteer crews have been invited to give presentations and assist with installations in different parts of the city. [Interview with Corbett Neighborhood Association member]

This survey of the different roles that NA play in the field of urban politics share different points in common. NA play important roles in contextualizing urban plans, territorializing urban projects, representing territories as collective actors, redefining the temporality of urban public action, and anchoring an incremental approach to urban processes and projects. NA contribute to the formation of perennial urban interlocutors actively involved in urban decision making processes and, through their work, affirm the values of social integration as well as the principles of incremental, interactive, and iterative urban action. At the same time, we need to recognize that this participative model is not free of contradictions – an important aspect that NA members and city officials are well aware. The main contradiction arises from the need to control urban

processes and affirm actor autonomy, on the one hand, and the need to respect the deliberative model and uncertainties that might result from actions based on interactive, iterative, and incremental processes. NA represent important players on the unstable field of urban plans and politics. They have come to understand the uncertainty of urban processes without relinquishing the possibilities of exercising some control over those processes. They have come to demand the institutionalization of an open process that values interactions, redundancy, and incremental action. They have greatly contributed to the transformation of urban politics and processes through their participation.

PART THREE
GLOBALIZING GOVERNANCE:
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT NOW AND THEN

In the first part of the dissertation, I broadly discussed, from the point of view of the history of ideas, the evolution of the idea of modern democracy and its institutionalization into representative systems. I also presented a general discussion of some contradictory aspects of contemporary systems of democratic representation, particularly with regards to the widening gap between elected officials and their electorate. The latter are not only critical of the system of representation but are also very mindful of the expanding administrative bureaucracy that controls many aspects of the socio-economic fabric and yet is even less accountable to public scrutiny and assessment. Furthermore, the representative system and its administrative apparatus is perceived as shrinking from their traditional roles in favor of furthering the interests of neo-liberal policies and their ideology of market globalization. These broadly discussed issues provide the framework for contextualizing the work of NA as voluntary associations that are part of a vibrant civil society decrying a democratic deficit and the commercialization of urban life, both threatening collective public action and aspirations for common good.

In the second part of the dissertation, I have moved to presenting the work of NA to discuss issues of urban governance and analyze values underlying NA involvement in urban participative democracy. The analysis in Part II points to a hybridization of urban

politics where NA combine traditional channels of representation and new paths of participative urban politics to further their agendas and offer alternatives to prevalent neoliberal policies. Above all, a tolerance of uncertainty, an embrace of iterative processes, and an ethic of consensus-building are all central values characterizing NA participation in urban politics. The prevalence of these values suggests that most urban actors have accepted more inclusive decision-making processes and have come to demand significant involvement of the public in formulating public projects and policies.

Part II shows, through the example of NA, how participative urban democracy is taking root as part of new conceptions of urban governance that emphasize civic engagement, accountability, and inclusiveness. Part II also shows the limitations of civic engagement as practiced by NA, especially when it comes to bringing significant structural changes to urban hierarchies of power. Despite their ability to challenge, sometimes successfully, the official structures of power, NA are firmly working within the current system of city administration with the objectives of modifying specific policies or projects and at the same time enhancing a more direct, participative, and inclusive democracy. NA are not trying to subvert the urban political system nor do they challenge any and every form of authority. Instead, they are part of the current fabric of urban power and a legitimizing agent of processes of urban governance.

Part III of the dissertation takes the pervious discussions and findings into a historical foray and a comparative framework. First, the historical foray consists of examining some of the roots of the current civic activism exercised by NA in the 1960s,

particularly in the 1968 upheavals. Many of the NA residents I interviewed (42 residents) are 55 years old or older. Some talked about their experiences in the 1960s and 1970s rebellions against the status quo and how they have carried a lot of that activism with them into their current civic engagements, including NA. Others mentioned it in passing as a reference point or a historical framework for me to better contextualize current work of NA. Second, the comparative frame is a discussion of the globalization of civil society discourses with a particular focus on the Middle East. I take Morocco as a case study to examine the wide institutionalization of municipal elections in many Middle Eastern countries as a measure to foster participative democratic processes at the local level. I argue that a selective Americanization of local urban politics is taking shape in the Middle East, but that the space for voluntary associations like NA is still legally constricted and economically constrained. The objective here is not to set comparative stages for the development of civil society and urban collective action according to the American model. To the contrary, the comparative approach is a critique of the attempts to universalize discourses of civil society, democracy, and urban change in the last few decades. The comparative approach serves to point out the limitations of any single model of democratization by emphasizing historical specificity, political contingency, and cultural values (Held 1987).

CHAPTER VI
INDIVIDUALISM, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE 1968 CULTURAL
REVOLUTION

VI.1. The Inspiration of the 68 Counter-Culture Movements

Although NA pursue different strategies, advocate for different agendas and reflect the interests of diverse, sometimes contradictory, constituents, they all adhere to a general frame of action structured by common values of practice. NA act in the domain of public action often with the claim of preserving and furthering common interests. They cooperate from within existing power structures in order to forcefully present alternatives to policies or projects deemed unsuitable and in the process, they challenge local administration to review its procedures, reflect on its underlying ideology, and move closer to direct and participative democratic processes.

The work of NA reflects tremendous diversity of positions, strategies, and ideologies that defy monolithic categorization. While NA have generally been defined as pragmatist-realist organizations (Lake 1987: 275-287) that find very little practical use for principled ideological beliefs, I have in the course of my research seen that being pragmatic may in fact not tell the full story of the individuals and groups involved in NA. These residents have often expressed their mistrust of government policies and resisted the wholesale neoliberal market ideology. They have often expressed their long term objectives in ideal terms of “community building,” “caring society,” and “direct

democracy.” At the same time, they engage the same institutions they are critical of in order to serve their ideals as well as remodel those same institutions according to those ideals.

NA share a common interpretive mode or matrix towards local government action. Despite their significant differences, NA relationship with government authority is perceived through the lenses of a political culture that values participation, accountability, and ever-expanding democratization. NA are central to the grand project of “democratizing democracy” (Ermarth 2007). Although NA only achieved that status of centrality in the late 1980s and mostly during the 1990s (Berry et.al. 1993), they draw their inspiration, most often in implicit ways, from the cultural revolution of the 1960s. Not only have many of the NA activists lived through the 1960s and witnessed its upheavals first hand, a number of the residents I talked to have described their current activism as a continuation of the struggles of the 1960s, albeit within differing contexts and following different strategies. Still, very present with some NA participants is the perception of “democratic deficits” that are lingering despite the various breakthroughs and successes achieved since the 1960s (Sckocpol 2003). In fact, some residents think those democratic deficits have even increased under the guise of market ideological dominance, which they deem even more threatening to the work of NA than earlier state control.

In the next section, I propose to broadly review the cultural revolution of the 1960s, particularly that of 1968s, in order to trace earlier threads of the current NA

activism. The objective is to place current civic engagement in a larger continuum of cultural values that underline different forms of participation that carry on quite similar ideals and visions. I will first start with a brief overview of the Frankfurt School, which I propose as a theoretical lens that provides an understanding continuum between the 1968 cultural revolution and contemporary NA. Second, I will argue that the civic engagement and involvement of NA draw some of its ideals from the 1960s movement without neglecting to adapt its strategies to contemporary structures and constraints.

VI.1.a. The Frankfurt School and the Culture Industry

The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School aimed at understanding the ways in which rationalization could turn against reason and at exploring the limits of capitalist development and bureaucratic organization. The school researchers examined the rationalization of modern life that produced the relentless pursuit of efficiency and reduced human choices to consumer options and a loss of capacity to advance liberty by transforming individuals, institutions, and society (Benhabib 1986:147-150). One of the major contributions of the Frankfurt School's analysis of culture was the concept of the "public sphere." This concept was used extensively by Adorno and Horkheimer to refer to those cultural institutions in which the bourgeois class succeeded in organizing the structure of public information and debate with the aim of institutionalizing the democratic control over state activities. However, the broad tendency of capitalism to develop highly centralized economies and polity has had the effect of producing collectivist ideologies in conflict with the liberal ideologies of the public sphere

(Benhabib 1981:123-128). Here the emphasis shifts from the concept of the autonomous individual to a general conformity to the prevailing norms of existing society.

Horkheimer (1972:98) observed that the idea of the autonomous individual “did not survive the process of industrialization, and that human relationships tend to a point wherein the rule of economy over all personal relationships turns into a new form of command and obedience.” For Horkheimer, the family, once the center in the process of socialization of individuals, loses its educational and cultural functions as individuals are increasingly socialized by external institutions. The result is the diminution of humanity, with individuals becoming mere cogs in a machine and reflective thought and free time being assimilated to the dehumanized norms of bureaucratic organization and administration (Jay 1973:176-190).

The Frankfurt School researchers argued that the economic and political logic of capitalism ultimately leads to the eclipse of the public sphere and the social structure of modern capitalism would no longer be characterized by the strong and independent institutions which guarantee individual values and freedoms. Instead, a new mode of social integration arises, based on the concept of “culture industry,” that is, a structure organized collectively around capitalist economic principles, a highly rationalized system of cultural production which effectively socializes individuals into a state of passivity and conformism (Jay 1973:216). Culture industry develops out of the ruins of the public sphere. With the growth of cartels, monopolies and the elimination of genuinely free competition, the core institutions of modern capitalism provide no space for autonomy

and freedom. Bureaucracy, rationality and administration end up dominating society (Benhabib 1986:114-120).

The transition from public sphere to culture industry involves an important instrumental role for science which leads to a new mode of domination centered in technology and bureaucracy. For the Frankfurt School, an instrumentalist form of rationality saturates all forms of culture and social life since it is largely concerned with the efficient functioning of existing society. Culture industry works through instrumental reason and represents the negation of substantive rationality (Benhabib 1986:169). This process alienates reflective and critical thought from the realms of culture and economy. In his essay "Culture and Administration," Adorno (1991:35) argues that once culture has come under the sway of formal, instrumental rationality, it becomes planned and administered in ways which damage it irreparably as the norms that govern culture are no longer intrinsic to it but imposed externally.

The theory of culture industry, first elaborated in Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944), has often been interpreted as a deeply pessimistic intellectual response to a context of war and genocide in Europe. However, to situate the theory of culture industry within a specific social context is to ignore its wider ramifications as a structure integral to capitalist societies within varying traditions and histories (Calhoun 1995:18-26). In fact, Adorno and Horkheimer linked the failure of socialism to the growth of a conformist mass culture and saw in culture industry the means whereby modern industrial society (whether capitalist or state socialist) controls its

population, not through force, but through mass culture. Adorno (1991: 27) identifies characteristic features of mass-produced economy as “repetition, endless recurrence, and pseudo-individuality.”

The totalitarian implications of Enlightenment find their most complete expression in the concept of culture industry, which transforms the liberating and civilizing potential of communication to a conformist and passive mode of total administration and control (Adorno and Horkheimer 1973:61-62). However, in his critique of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Habermas (1985:10) argues that Adorno and Horkheimer oversimplified the image of modernity and failed to do justice to the “rational content of the cultural modernity” exemplified in bourgeois ideals. They ignored the fundamental elements of cultural modernity that suggest alternatives to the pervasive domination of culture industry. For Habermas, their vision remains rooted in a deterministic and pessimistic perspective that focuses on mere technical and formal knowledge instead of probing issues laying at the foundations of modern culture, such as law and morality, political constitutions, and economic organizations. Adorno and Horkheimer (1973:3-7), however, argued that the potential emancipatory project of the Enlightenment itself represents a totalizing system through its organizing elements of calculation, quantification, formalism, utility, and efficiency. Marcuse (1964:97), for instance, observed similar characteristics in contemporary advanced industrial societies:

Concentration of the national economy on the needs of the big corporations, with the government as a stimulating, supporting, and sometimes even controlling force; hitching of this economy to a worldwide system of military alliances, monetary arrangements, technical assistance and development schemes; gradual assimilation of blue-color and white-color population, of

leadership types in business and labor, of leisure activities and aspirations in different social classes; fostering of a pre-established harmony by the togetherness of public opinion; opening of the bedroom to the media of mass communication.

The Frankfurt School's critique of capitalism and the culture industry is one of the school's most influential legacies (Jay 1973:217). Critical theory remains an important tradition in linking the contemporary critique of neoliberal economy to diverse strands of community organizing and civic engagement. Its basic critique of social inequality and the corrosion of culture as well as its vigilant criticism of the forces undermining democratic citizenship continue to inspire criticism and research. Concepts drawn from this scholarly tradition (such as atomization, commodity fetishism, pseudo-individualization, and diachronic standardization) are essential to understanding mechanisms of mass culture and maintaining the capacity of social actors to communicate and act collectively on the basis of common understandings and interests. Its legacy is probably most important in defending the liberating potential of knowledge in the face of new and continuing threats from an expanding ideology of neoliberal globalization.

While it comes as no surprise that all previous economic systems transformed the ecology of their surrounding environment and that some even damaged the possibility of maintaining a viable balance in given areas to guarantee their survival, only in the last few centuries, characterized by unprecedented expansions in production at the global scale, have we come closest to the possibility of damaging a viable future existence for humankind (Wilk 1996). The practices of market individualism dominate our modern

world. Most of the nations of the world today trade in a global market based on the assumptions that individuals and corporations are rational, autonomous, and self-interested. Moreover, the promotion of these assumptions rests on universal appeals that participants in the free market should have equality before the law and the freedom to maximize their profits; that innovation in the pursuit of profit should be encouraged even if it disrupts established social relations and the environment; and that a commitment to individualism should replace commitment to tradition since the more a nation accepts the free market formula, the better it will be at industry and the closer it will get to democracy and prosperity.

Neoliberal principles are still guiding a lot of policies and projects despite mounting criticism and increasing resistance over the past decade (Bourdieu 2003:28-30). Those principles seem to persist because they are appealing to established standards of professional excellence, technology transfer, and universalized as well as administratively simple solutions. Their appeal also resides in their opportunistic aura that allows policy-makers, donors, and all those involved to claim credit for “encouraging development” and “bringing solutions” to different communities (Scott 1998). These appealing facades fail to totally mask their blind faith in technological solutions and hide their built in inequities and lack of consideration for people’s aspirations and values.

VI.1.b. The 1968 Counter-Cultural Revolution: Values, Aspirations, and Hopes of an Era

There are numerous studies of the events of the 1960s and many interpretations of their impact on contemporary civic engagement or, what is deemed its opposite, the rise of acute individualism. I do not propose to review or debate these different interpretations in this section. My purpose is to tease out underlying themes and values that powerfully emerged in the aftermath of the 1968 cultural movement and are still invoked by people I interviewed or observed in the course of this research project.

Broadly speaking, the 1960s has been associated with the era when students in particular, along with many other groups, came to reject centralized authority and bureaucratic hierarchies. They insisted on a comprehensive understanding of individual freedoms and pushed for self-governance and grass-root organizing (Fink et.al. 1998, Ali 1978, Kurlansky 2004, and Allen 2004). These themes and values still characterize the work of NA, even if they appear under more pragmatic and politically realist forms of action. The purpose here is not to construct an inventory of the cultural heritage of the 1960s as much as it is to recontextualize some traits of that heritage in order to gain a better understanding of the work of NA and the values and aspirations of some of the residents involved in that work. It is particularly important to understand the cultural heritage of the 1960s since it had a wide impact that transcends the events themselves into an existential movement (Habermas 1970) that emerges under so many different

forms without losing most of its original objectives, primarily those of changing political structures and processes.

The cultural revolution of the 1960s has abruptly exploded in 1968 in different parts of the world and under different forms of protest and contestation. In the name of universal values of democracy, equality, and liberty, the protestors sought to radically change their societies. The contestation was the expression of a utopian movement envisioning a completely alternative way of life (Marcuse 1972). Although most Western countries that experienced these protests were in the midst of full economic growth following the post-World War II expansion, the protesters, mostly students at first, were reeling against a consumer society that symbolizes all the other ills they were rejecting (Marcuse 1972). At issue were existential questions about the meaning of life and its objectives as symbolized by an expanding middle-class for which economic growth trumped all other values or indices of success. With steady economic growth came steady consumption and hence the mantra of the productive individual and consumer society (Strasser 1998:59-83). Against these dominant values and their supporting structures, the protestors were proposing an anti-production society where individuals can have the opportunity to freely pursue their interests instead of being forced into the mold of standardized production and consumption processes.

That was the general background of the 1968 cultural revolution in industrial countries. A more specific theme that ties these disparate protests and movements together was their uniform rejection of existing forms and figures of authority and power

(Habermas 1970). The global reach of the 1968 revolts and protests in the industrial world was led by students in full rejection of a system of reproduction, particularly in the field of education (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990), which also extends to an elite driven moralizing ethos that emphasizes authority and fosters inequities. The general proclamation of these youths and the other groups that joined them was one of individual autonomy and rejection of stifling societal norms and values shaping all aspects of the youth's lives and directing them towards common goals of industrially productive careers.

This initial revolt against authority figures on the grounds of abuse of power and moralizing control had later shifted into a larger rejection of the underpinnings of the consumer society and its capitalist framework (Allen 2004). This shift in focus is crucial in understanding the relationships between the events of 1968 and current movements like NA. In order to shed some light on the dimensions of this shift, I will briefly discuss the impact of Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) on the student movement of the 1960s. Marcuse was one of the central figures of the Frankfurt school and a leading theorist of critical theory and consumer society. Marcuse went beyond the Marxist critique of capitalism which denounced its systematic exploitation of people and nature for the sake of increasing production and growth. Marcuse provides an incisive critique of capitalism that is based on consumption processes (Trentmann 2001: 135-66). His critique recognizes the successes of capitalism, but turns those successes against the capitalist system by differentiating between real needs and artificial needs. Capitalism, Marcuse

argues, has successfully created and responded to artificial needs that people consume perpetually in order to keep the capitalist system growing. In addition to creating artificial needs for the sole purpose of growth, the capitalist system also reinvents and mutilates basic human needs for the sole purpose of maximizing productivity and consumption. In fact, Marcuse insists that at the heart of capitalism's success is the establishment of a principle of productivity that spans every aspect of human activities. The principal of productivity is so dominant in modern industrial societies that, according to Marcuse, it has stifled and marginalized other aspects of human life, such as creativity and aesthetics. It is, therefore, the responsibility of individuals and groups to reclaim their independence from the overriding principle of productivity and insatiate materiality in order to reconnect with their true individual and collective needs (Marcuse 1972, Honneth 2007, Holloway 2002).

In most of Europe of the 20th Century, the idea of a revolution was very prevalent as well as the conviction that a socialist-communist system was inevitable. For many, the economic crash of 1929 was the eminent sign of the collapse of capitalism and the rise of socialism. The idea of a socialist revolution was more than an alternative plan to capitalism, it was central to the identity of many Europeans at the time (Habermas 1970). Capitalism, however, has shown great resilience. By adopting a Keynesian approach to economic policy, Western European countries managed to recreate a more stable capitalist system capable of withstanding the cyclical crises it is bound to experience. The key to the Keynesian approach was to maintain a minimum level of demand and

consumption by assigning regulatory and redistributive functions to the State in order to maintain economic growth by strengthening individual purchasing power, which would eventually increase individual access to higher consumptive levels (Harvey 2006).

The rebounding of capitalism on the basis of individual consumption had the effect of stripping the socialist revolutionary discourse of some of its central arguments, especially those pertaining to inequity and exploitation. The new consumer society was progressively excelling at burying sources of inequity and modes of exploitative production (Mintz 1986). It became increasingly difficult to convince consuming individuals of the need for a socialist revolution since that would first and for most require an individual decision to forsake the new comforts of the consumer society and embrace a politically rigid model teetering on totalitarianism.

Nonetheless, the writings of Marcuse and others, have succeeded in articulating the sources of discomfort that many students were feeling in relation to their society of material abundance. By emphasizing the cultural and existential dimensions of the student protests of 1968, Marcuse and others were able to formulate a comprehensive critique of a totalitarian capitalist system. The 1968 cultural and existential revolution sought to create spaces of autonomy capable of challenging the expanding authority of the capitalist mode of production. The students sought to challenge the technological rationality of the capitalist system, which was based on a market rationality that was in the process of standardizing everything in terms of monetary value. The articulation of this dehumanizing, mercantilist, and alienating system of thriving consumer society has

been the impetus of the 1968 student cultural revolution. Since then, one of the means to challenge the dominant system has been the reformulation of the political system into a more open, accessible, and direct system that prioritizes citizens over corporations and care over consumption.

The cultural turn aimed at the emancipation of the individual through experiential living and experimentation (Habermas 1970, Allen 2004). It rejected radical revolutionary ideologies and embraced the combination of individual aspirations with collective needs. Spontaneity was to replace rigid planning and instincts were to be as valid sources of knowledge as the praised and dominant system of rationality. It, hence, discredits the foundations of consumer society and mass culture. It suspects the mythical powers of technology and science, and it rejects the destructive effects of progress on all spheres of human and natural lives. Instead, the cultural turn celebrates individual liberties, social equality and solidarity, and a caring relationship with all forms of life.

VI.2. Neighborhood Associations and New Forms of Civic Engagement

In the aftermath of the 1968 protests and the counter culture movements it generated, many debates emerged about the detrimental impact that the 1968 radical individualism would have on collective action and social solidarity. According to Benford and Snow (2000:612), analyses of collective action and social movements, in the pre and post 1968 era, have generally developed around three main axes: the Chicago School perspective on collective behavior, the resource mobilization theory, and the

European perspective on the “new social movements.” The proponents of these different schools of thought have offered explanations in terms of goals, ideologies, or psychosocial dynamics in order to understand the organization of social movements. Key to most of these approaches is the concept of “frames” (Goffman, 1974) that actors bring into play to interpret their reality. The research has aimed thus to identify the frames of collective action defined as “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford and Snow, 2000:628). Following this broad approach, many empirical studies have been produced and a vast spectrum of social movements (political, environmental, anti-nuclear, civil rights, homeless issues, and others) has been examined.

The flourishing of these numerous social movements has posed a serious challenge to the assumptions of a threat of radical individualism. In fact, it has demonstrated that new forms of individualism as well as new forms of civic engagement can coexist and nurture each other. Beck (1998:207-230) argues that the 1968 movements resulted in new forms of civic engagement that several researchers were ill equipped to identify as they continued to observe a decline in traditional group memberships (e.g., church, social clubs, sports associations). Instead, the legacy of 1968, according to Beck (1998) has been a renewed emphasis on the ideals of democratic processes and practices. The central idea of people’s sovereignty, with its subversive potential for change to which everybody can contribute, embodies the 1968 movements’ rejection of vertical authority and bureaucratic opacity. One of the important goals of the

post-1968 generation has been to reconnect with the ideals of democratic promises in their most universal reaches encompassing the promotion of human rights, a comprehensive vision of pluralism, and the protection of the environment.

It appears that both individual and collective emancipation have found mutually beneficial grounds of public action in the post-1968 era. In the work of NA, individuals bring their visions and contributions into the public frame in order to construct a grass-root, self-organizing alternative to the bureaucratic top-down structures of city management. These individuals are acutely aware of the needs to compromise and build consensus but are also cognizant that they do not have to erase their individuality in order to be part of their neighborhood collective decision-making processes. The ideals of community building, self-governance, and a caring society continue to inspire the work of NA. These are ideals that have strongly resurged in the aftermath of the 1968 protests and are encompassed within the broader drive for more direct democratic processes and participative governance.

In this context of new forms of civic engagement, the crisis of participation in democratic processes appears under very different lights from those that have traditionally focused on political parties, electoral cycles, and membership based associations. NA as a new form of civic engagement are highlighting the inadequacy of bureaucratic hierarchies to effectively respond to citizens' needs and incorporate them in decision-making processes. The individuals that constitute these NA are quite different from those that belong to a labor union or a political party in that they are able to

celebrate their autonomy as individuals and at the same time contribute to the collective work of NA. These individuals correspond to what Beck (1998:227) has described as a two stage process of autonomy through which individuals are disenchanting with the modes of materialist expressions characterizing modern life and then they become re-enchanting with their experienced modernities on the basis of their individuality, autonomy, and responsibility.

Individuals engaged in the work of NA are deconstructing imposed forms of affiliation and reconstructing new modes of belonging and novel means of civic engagement. These citizens exercise a powerful art of presence that challenges the model of the abstract citizens represented by elected delegates. These are citizens that prefer to express themselves without mediators and that require their opinions and concerns to be heard even if they do not enjoy wider appeal or support. They are citizens who are often critical of the established mode of political representation. They militate for direct forms of representativity and demand more horizontal forms of governance. These citizens would like to wield as much control as possible over their identities and their life trajectories. In the words of Beck (1998:58-63), these citizens are “the authors of their own biography.”

CHAPTER VII
THE GLOBALIZATION OF GOVERNANCE:
TOWARDS THE AMERICANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE

VII.1. Remodeling Urban Governance in the Middle East: The Case of Morocco

VII.1.a. Civil Society in the Middle East

Over the last three decades, Middle Eastern countries have been struggling to come to grips with the recognition and governance of their complicated mosaic - culturally, ethnically, demographically, and politically. In seeking solutions to numerous domestic challenges, many activists throughout the area seem to have chosen the United States as a role model of grass-movements, civil rights organizations, and media liberalization (Posusney and Angrist 2005). As the region continues to deepen its economic and military dependence on the United States, and educated Middle Easterners as well as scores of immigrants from the region continue to be exposed to American cultural trends and modes of civic engagement, a process of Americanization is transforming the region in many different ways, but with outcomes that are very difficult to foresee. The region is witnessing the mushrooming of multiple social change and advocacy organizations that emulate the style and methods of action of the twentieth century American social movements (Langohr 2005). These nonprofit, politically partisan and non-partisan organizations embrace concepts of civil society, communal service, outreach, grassroots activity, citizen and group mobilization, due process of law,

interfaith dialogue, and public education. Their activists formed common cause coalitions to confront gender issues, ethnic, religious and minority rights, regional peace initiatives, and environmental protection (Hamzawy 2003).

Yet, according to a recent UNDP report, the region is still far from democracy. In 2005, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published a devastating report on the state of freedoms in the Arab countries, which focuses on civil rights in the broad sense, embracing civil and political liberty, and social, economic, educational and environmental rights. The 2004 Report has been the third in a series of four. The first report published in 2002 gave a comprehensive appraisal of human development in the Arab world, and pinpointed three main problems: knowledge, freedom and women's status. The 2003 report was devoted to "building a knowledge society" and the 2004 report focused on women and gender equity.

In addition to emphasizing the role of regional and international geopolitics, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the occupation of Iraq as "hindrances" to human development in the Arab world, the report does place much of the blame on Arab rulers and governments. Most of them with authoritarian regimes that deny basic rights: freedom of speech, expression and association. The report describes the lack of democratic legitimacy of most Arab regimes, which pervert elections and representative bodies by cheating on the rules of the game. Only rarely does the judiciary enjoy any real independence from government, and in many cases it operates exclusively through

exceptional courts. Many obstacles keep opposition parties, when tolerated, on the sidelines of politics.

There is no process of *habeas corpus* for the citizens of Arab countries, nor yet a guarantee of their right to life, caught in the crossfire between violent extremist groups and government forces unconcerned about innocent lives. Women and cultural, religious or ethnic minorities suffer double subjugation, persecution specific to their group besides general oppression. “The modern Arab State, in the political sense,” the report says, “runs close to this astronomical model, whereby the executive apparatus resembles a black hole which converts its surrounding social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and from which nothing escapes” (2005: 5). With the gradual loss of forms of traditional or charismatic, religious or nationalist legitimacy, political life has been stripped of any substance, leaving a vacuum that organizations of civil society are struggling to fill.

The 2004 Report does not restrict itself to describing symptoms. It also offers diagnoses of the causes of the Arab democratic deficit. It rejects culturalist explanations, rooted in a biased perception of the Orient, Islam and the Arab mindset. The question of whether Islamic doctrine is compatible with democracy is a matter of interpretation, and many exegeses are actually designed to suit practices not originally inspired by religion. The behavior of global powers in the Arab world is severely criticized: they care little for promoting democracy - their prime concerns are oil, the state of their allies and the war on terror. At the same time, the main groups opposing Western domination, regardless of whether they are Islamist or nationalist in inspiration, have in the past adopted a strictly

opportunist line on democratic liberties. The real or imaginary anti-democratic character of some Islamist opposition movements is still used to justify the refusal to organize elections, referred to by the report as the “the trap of the one-off election” (2005: 32).

The status of civil liberties in the Arab world is linked to the dominant social organizations. The report highlights the survival of traditions rooted in tribalism and an education system that inculcates voluntary submission. Together with poverty and increasing social inequality, they prevent the underprivileged from playing a part in politics. The rentier mode of production, particularly in oil-producing countries, means government is not accountable to its citizens.

As solutions, the UNDP report mostly offers conventional remedies to the shortcomings it identifies, advocating political, judicial and constitutional reform to set up democratic institutions. It acknowledges that pressure from outside may be a positive factor, but only if civil rights and popular wishes are upheld in a way clear of any domineering relationship. The overall picture is most instructive. The fact that it was published by a UN agency and written by Arab authors, including several well-known intellectuals, makes it a valuable tool that Arab activists can use without running the usual risk of facing accusations of treason. Above all, the report appeals to governments and their subjects to implement the necessary changes. To avoid the “impending disaster” (2005: 42) that would follow widespread revolt - which, it fears, would only lead to civil war - reformers in government and civil society must negotiate a redistribution of the political stakes in order to achieve good governance.

VII.1.b. Transforming Techniques and Values: Towards Urban Governance in Morocco

The history of urbanization in Morocco, which entails the practice of urban management and policy, dates many centuries back. Successive dynasties contributed to the expansion of existing cities and the establishment of new ones. The cities of Fez (8th Century), Marrakech (12th Century), and Meknes (16th Century) have been praised by researchers as prime examples of intricate urban knowledge, architectural techniques, and space management (Le Tourneau 1949, Rachik 1995). More recently, the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1912 brought one of the most significant changes into the Moroccan urban landscape (Naciri 1983). With its mission of modernization, the French Protectorate (1912-1956) implemented new concepts of territorial management to ensure adequate military control and guarantee the flow of primary resources. These policies have had a great impact in the post-independence decades of 1960-1980 as State centralization and control over urban management was further enforced (Sedjari 1999). These three broad historic phases of Morocco's urban landscape provide a very brief background likely to help in contextualizing a discussion of recent efforts to implement urban governance techniques and procedures in Morocco.

Morocco has recently engaged in a series of administrative and territorial reorganization in order to align its structures with the guidelines of good governance, particularly in relation to citizen participation in local urban management. While the

number of urban population and urban centers has significantly increased since 1956 (see Table 2), Naciri (1986:25) points out that there are “decreasing numbers of urban citizens in Moroccan cities.” He emphasizes this paradoxical situation to highlight rural-urban migration as the primary source of urban expansion in Morocco and to underline the intensity and rapidity of this urban growth. The authorities in expanding cities and in sprouting urban centers were ill-equipped to handle an urban acceleration of this scale. Although many plans were implemented to respond to Morocco’s urban crisis, they all remained highly centralized, bureaucratically opaque, and contingent on unstable budgets.

The promotion of local urban management has taken center stage in the comprehensive approach of political, economic, and social reforms that Morocco launched in the late 1990s. Participative democracy at the local level is considered key to the establishment of the rule of law and accountability. It is also deemed necessary to foster trust between local officials and their constituents. Sedjari (1999) suggests that participative democracy at the local level is likely to transform the “citizen-elect” into the “citizen-actor” thanks to the proximity of action and the potential for effecting changes. This transformation is contingent, Sedjari (1999) says, on the implementation of transparent and fair elections, the creation of routine processes of communication between citizens and their representatives, and the enforcement of mechanisms of accountability.

With the establishment of the French Protectorate in Morocco came the creation of new institutions of urban management that effectively displaced and undermined pre-colonial urban administrative structures (Ben Ali 1983: 41). The first officially decreed City Council (al-Majles al-Baladi) established by Royal Decree of April 1st, 1913 (amended by Royal Decree of August 8th, 1917) saw the light in Fez in response to urban protests and revolts that took place in 1912 (Yakhlef 1990). The members of this Majles or Council were appointed by the colonial power and run in parallel to the City Municipality, which effectively controlled all urban management decisions in the city. The Majles was a strategy to co-opt the Muslim elite and appease the subjected population by offering them an outlet for consultation, but not for deliberation and direct participation (Yakhlef 1990). In the same vain, the French Protectorate instituted a separate Urban Commission for Moroccan Jews in 1919.

In the case of Fez, the Majles al-Baladi comprised 15 members with the Pacha as the executive member. They were all notables who enjoyed the recognition of the city residents and hence were confined by the French authorities into dealing with the indigenous population as long as those issues did not spill over into the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council. The Municipal Council was officially instituted in 1919 and comprised five members that later grew into nine in 1920 and 12 in 1944 (Yakhlef 1990). The council's members were all appointed by the Protectorate and enjoyed great technical support and funding from the colonial authorities. In the three decades following its independence in 1956, Morocco inherited and reinforced the highly

centralized urban management and territorial control apparatus that developed over the colonial era (Naciri 1983, Kenbib 2005). The post-independence accelerated urban growth further marginalized the growing population from the municipal authorities as mutual blame and feelings of mistrust on both parts continued to fester with occasional urban riots and unrest, such as the ones in Casablanca in 1984 and Fez in 1991 (Bennani-Chraïbi 1994).

In the year 2000, the Moroccan government launched a national campaign for a “New Charter of Territorial Management” (Snoussi 2003). This national campaign aimed at involving all interested parties in long term discussions about issues of sustainable development, regional decentralization of territorial management and the development of local and regional partnerships to oversee plans and projects (Snoussi 2003: 5-10). These discussions were organized around a series of workshops that focused on a central issue relevant to each region, as the table below shows:

Regions	Central Issues
1. Souss – Massa – Draa	Water and Territorial Management
2. Gharb – Chrarda - Beni Hssen	Irrigated Lands
3. Chaouia – Ouardigha	Small and Medium Size Cities
4. Marrakech – Tensift – al-Haouz	Mountains and environmental protection
5. Oriental	Border Lands
6. Grand Casablanca	Metropolitan Management
7. Rabat – Sale – Zemmour – Zaer	Informal/Clandestine Habitat
8. Doukkala – Abda	Environmental Pollution
9. Tadla – Azilal	Urban Development and Agricultural Land
10. Meknes – Tafilalet	Desertification
11. Fes – Boulemane	Patrimonial Preservation
12. Taza – El Hoceima – Taounate	Regional Integration
13. Tanger – Tetouan	Coastal Development
14. Oued Eddahab – Lagouira	Territorial Management and Urban
15. Laayoune – Boujdour – Sakia al-Hamra	Development in Cities of the South
16. Guelmim – Essmara	

Table 2: Regional Decentralization Plan in Morocco (from Snoussi 2006)

This national scale discussion came to reinforce the role of several dynamic civil society associations that have been pushing for more direct communication with State authorities and more accessible channels for feedback (Zyani 1991). Almost all of the

regions listed above has seen the development of prominent associations that focus on urban issues, such Association Grand Atlas in Marrakech, Association Fes Sais in Fes, Association Ribat al-Fath in Rabat, Association Bouregreg in Sale, Association Illigh in Agadir, and Association Ingda in Oujda (Zyani 1991). In fact, the regionalization framework has been part of a long term process that was inaugurated by a referendum on a new constitution in 1996.

The 1996 constitution officially introduced the institutional paradigm of regional planning and territorial management to herald the efforts of the Monarchy and the first opposition-led government and emphasize their commitment to implement a policy of decentralization. The regionalization policy has also been an effective strategy to recognize the cultural diversity of Morocco and celebrate the plurality of its people within their specific regions. Decentralization by means of regionalization constitutes a central practice of democratization processes and movement towards standards of good governance (Held 1995). It is a way for the state to reinvent itself, delegate some of its powers, and yet reinforce its position as the holder and protector of the people's sovereignty. More importantly, it allows the State to not appear in opposition to civil society whose numerous groups are more likely to view the State as an arbitrator that is capable of supporting regional specificities without undermining unitary traits and symbols.

The framework proposed by regime theory can help elucidate the process of democratization taking place in Morocco since late 1990. Regime theory suggests that

regimes are in the most part social institutions, governing the actions of the participants, and whose core element rests on a set of rights and obligations which can be explicitly or implicitly formulated. A regime is usually established to promote principles, norms, and decision-making processes (Krasner 1985:5-10). A regime, therefore, generally consists of intervening variables standing between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the other. The principles, norms, and rules at the heart of a regime can either exist already at the regime's creation, or emerge over time. In the first instance, where there are commonly held values at the outset of the regime, a situation of "harmony" exists (Keohane 1984: 32-35). In the second instance, common principles and norms are not present at the regime's inception, although they may take hold over time. The most extreme form of such initial absence of jointly held values is a regime based on "common aversion" (Keohane 1984: 32-35). This is a concept that can be used to describe situations in which the contracting parties have very divergent interests for accepting to participate in a regime and only deriving their rationale for participation from a strong desire to avoid a determined (and often detrimental) outcome.

VII.2. Decentralization and the Territorialization of Governance

VII.2.a. Regime Theory and Regime Change

Regime theory also emphasizes the cognitive dimensions of learning processes inherent in long term regime changes. Regimes can be instruments to promote cognitive change and behavioral adaptation (Keohane 1984). An evolutionary regime may lead actors to alter the means hitherto used to achieve a determined end, modify states'

perceptions of each other as well as even contribute to change the objectives pursued by a state. One can imagine different paths through which an evolutionary regime is likely to affect change. For instance, when all participants have more or less equal standing in a regime in the sense that there is no single participant or a group of participants which has larger sway than its homologues in the regime. In such a case, norms-emission is shared and diffused in that the impulse behind the socialization process leading to the adoption of a certain norms or decision-making procedure can form any component part of the regime. Furthermore, the gradual convergence towards a common set of values and principles is, more often than not, a result of compromise among participants. In another possible instance, however, the existence of a power asymmetry among the regime partners and the most dominant actor impedes the convergence process. The norm-setter, in this case, might use its economic and political leverage within the regime to communicate and defend the norms, rules and rights underpinning the regime, which ends up reinforcing its own values and procedures.

The dominant actor in a regime can still foment processes of cognitive change through some combination of cohesion, cooperation, and manipulation of incentives in a direct or an indirect manner. A direct process of regime socialization would be operationalized through the mechanisms established for political dialogue or by the use of incentives. The norm-setter could also use instruments to sanction, such as the threat of reduction of financial assistance or the suspension of full or partial relations. The norm-setter mobilizes its instruments in order to directly generate changes within its spheres of

influence in order to effect changes or to promote the opening of channels of communication between divergent actors. On the other hand, an indirect process of regime socialization would encourage the spread of values, ideas and behavioral patterns by means of facilitating resources and technical know-how to decentralized actors, but without necessarily establishing direct contact between the norm-setter and its recipients. The indirect socialization relies to a great extent on either intermediary actors or on the attractiveness of the proposed models or norms. These processes of indirect and direct regime socialization are not necessarily incompatible and are often used in a simultaneous fashion (Held 1995). As I will discuss below with regards to the work of Neighborhood Associations in Morocco, both direct and indirect processes of regime socialization are being used, although a common aversion model between the dominant actor and other participants is more fitting to grasp the situation.

VII.2.b. Urban Reforms and Activism in Morocco

At the level of local municipal management, Morocco has replaced its 1976 Municipal Charter by a new one in 2002. For the first time since independence, the 2002 Municipal Charter endows cities that count more than 750 000 residents to directly elect a City Council to be in charge of urban management policies and projects. This is an important departure from the earlier system where municipal councils were representing and implementing the central government's policies and directives. The elected City Council enjoys an autonomy that allows it to have a working relationship with the central government and at the same time the possibility of incorporating more specifically local

issues into its planning. One of the crucial objectives of this city election-based system is to foster the participation of the electorate in urban management issues and transform the residents, as Sedjari (1998) suggested, from “citizen-electors” to “citizen-actors.” An elected City Council is supposed to be more accountable to a vigilant population. It is supposed to open up direct channels of communication with its voters, institute rules of transactional transparency to fight rampant corruption, and encourage entrepreneurial competition and partnership to undermine cost ballooning and the diversion of public funds and property (Benhima 2005).

The 2002 Municipal Charter falls within the Moroccan process of regime socialization. The discussions over this new charter were launched in early 1992 and were part of a comprehensive project of modernization of political practices and institutions in Morocco. More importantly, the Municipal Charter is central to cascading steps to decentralize political and administrative powers without taking risks that are likely to destabilize the continuity of traditional structures of power. The cascading framework of decentralization justifies the running of two parallel reform packages, one that is reinforcing central power through the direct representatives of the government, and the other trying to reinforce popular sovereignty by representing the interests and needs of its constituents. The first system is the guarantor of stability and continuity while the second system is nurtured, often times disrupted, while it slowly acquires political maturity.

In addition to these overarching systems, residents of urban centers have also been organizing and pushing for more direct participative processes regarding urban management and policies. In the city of Fez, Barrou (2006: 354-362) reports the establishment of the first neighborhood association in 1991, a number that grew to 161 by 2002. These associations have found a new interlocutor through the elected City Council representatives and are vying to exercise more scrutiny and impose more accountability measures introduced by the new Municipal Charter. Unlike NA in Tucson, the associations in Fez are based on membership dues, which confers voting rights to residents who can afford to pay those dues. The membership dues are important to the mission of these associations as they are responsible for hiring labor to ensure the security, the cleanliness, and maintenance of small projects within their neighborhoods. Since the power and efficiency of these associations mostly depend on their membership dues, it is no surprise that neighborhoods with higher income residents will have more resources to invest in the infrastructure of their neighborhoods. Low-income and poor neighborhoods, however, have managed to organize in order to directly demand that the City Council invests in basic municipal infrastructure, such as sewage and roads (Benhima 2005).

The City Council in Fez, however, has failed to institute regular public meeting processes to encourage public input and incorporate it in the framing of local decision-making (Barrou 2006: 354-362). According to Barrou, most NA reported a precarious relationship with the City Council and its administrative apparatus. El Kharoufi (2000)

argues that such precarious relationship is mainly attributed to the control of major political parties over municipal elections in Morocco. These parties often end up selecting candidates for electability purposes regardless of their urban management experience or qualifications. The voters, El Kharoufi (2000) adds, and especially those that are active in NA, are often a lot more educated than the representatives sitting at the City Council table and often find it frustrating to communicate with representatives that still adhere to party politics and calculations at the expense of local interests and needs.

CHAPTER VIII

Urban Governance to Modernize Government

There is a widespread agreement that the style and tools of urban public management and administration has been transformed in contemporary times (Hirst 1994, Beck 1997, Held 2000). One conspicuous transformation has been the convergence of public administrative processes towards more public participation, cooperation among multiple public and private partnerships, and the inclusion of a plurality, often competing, groups and interests. The deliberative and communicative characteristics of such processes has been common place in many countries and is rapidly taking hold in many others. Multiple networks of coordination and collaboration have been created in order to facilitate the participation of all possible groups in the most inclusive and transparent manner possible. The requirement of operational cooperation has obliged a multitude of urban actors, that are independent from each other, to cross paths and work together under what Jessop (1997) calls “a system of interdependency management.” In addition to the necessity to cooperate, urban actors are also expected to focus on problem solving through deliberative processes, flexible attitudes, and a concern for the common interest. A fundamental assumption of such processes is a strong belief in the power of deliberation. As March and Olsen (1995:84) put it: “The dream of democratic argumentation is integrative. Clashes among private interests may be transformed by deliberation into a question of what is good for the community and acceptable in it.” Under the general guise of urban governance as a new mode of urban management, the

arts of persuasion and compromise have become underlying values necessary for effective urban actors to successfully carry out their projects, advance their interests, or protect their spaces.

Many questions, however, have been raised about the timing of the emergence of urban governance as mode of urban management as well as the fairness and legitimacy of the process itself. Several researchers have suggested that the move from “government” to “governance” has been dictated by conditions of economic globalization, financial crises of several States, and the steady march towards privatization of public services (Hirst 1994, Pierre and Peters 2000). The rise of self-organized urban groups like neighborhood associations points out to an ironic impact that the increasing complexity of societies is dictating. On the one hand, our complex urban societies are resulting in more social fragmentation and individualization of urban actors. On the other hand, it is forcing individuals in a complex and fragmented society to join in organized groups in order to effectively respond to their interdependencies. The increasing interest and adoption of urban governance processes highlights the success that organized groups have been able to achieve in comparison to other urban actors who are not as skilled in organizing or partaking in the underlying values and principles of urban governance (Pierre and Peters 2000:57-69). Pierre and Peters (2000:13) point out that while the debate about governance has opened up important questions about the nature of the State and its relationship to civil society groups, they note that: ” One problem in the contemporary debate over governance is that it assumes a golden age of the State in the

not too distant past. In that period the State was presumed to be preeminent and virtually unchallenged in its exercise and control over the economy and society. This assumption appears to be at best an exaggeration of the power of the State in the past, and at worst a failure to understand adequately some important aspects of governing in the past. For example, while there may have been a growth in the visibility of networks and other manifestations of the influence of interest groups in the public sector, these groups certainly have had a significant role in policy making in most democracies for decades.”

Similarly, Tarrow’s (2000) work on social movements has pointed out similar problems with current debates about governance. He shows (2000) that although organized groups have successfully transformed their advocacy work into more collaborative and partnership work with different actors, the particularism of each groups’ position are not always successfully overcome despite the strong belief in processes of deliberative democracy and direct participation. Indeed, March and Olsen (1995:179) observe that: “Democratic politics is filled with attempts to clarify and redefine the division of labor, responsibility, and competence among different spheres. It is also filled with imperialistic attempts to subordinate the discourse of one sphere to the logic, norms, and discourse of another institutional sphere.” In addition, the State with its administrative apparatus is often deeply involved in molding and coding dominant discourses in society (Offe 1984). The State often ends up initiating urban governance programs and playing the role of facilitator and trust builder in increasingly mobile, complex, and differentiated societies.

Another criticism leveled at the model of urban governance relates to the issues of accountability and transparency. The powerful dominance of urban governance as a model of public management rests on its ability to coordinate among a great number of urban actors and successfully achieve important outcomes. It also provides direct participatory mechanisms and monitoring processes to ensure public involvement and robust legitimacy. Successful outcomes, however, may satisfy some groups at the expense of others since some elements of the public might be better at exploiting the established system of public management than others. Pierre and Peters (2000:15) point out: “When governance theory came to focus on horizontal cooperation and policy formation within networks, it was recognized that this raises the problem of democratic accountability. Horizontal cooperation and negotiation in networks can be no substitute for democracy, even though, in view of the difficulty of representing very specific interests within a system of general elections, the development of policy networks that include representatives of opposing socio-political interests is sometimes seen as a more practicable form of interest representation.”

My research with neighborhood associations in Tucson and the studies of urban associative movements in Morocco suggest that urban actors have been organizing on the basis of territorial interests in order to benefit from the opportunities and preserve against the threats presented by the urban governance model. These associations obviously represent their special interests and work on advancing their agendas, but they are also acutely aware of the larger system of interdependencies that ties numerous other urban

actors together. These associations also serve the role of monitoring bodies, admittedly self-appointed, but possibly fulfilling a crucial part of democratic functioning. The political, social, and economic roles these urban associations are playing and the visibility they are acquiring are very important to understand since the world is on a rapid path of urbanization and cities are becoming crucially central to how societies will deal with major environmental challenges in addition to the socio-economic and political ones. Whether it is Morocco, the United States, or other countries, the management of urban growth is a global challenge requiring vigilant and engaged citizens working towards what Held (2000:15) has called “the direction of establishing new modes of holding transnational power systems to account – that is, helping to open up the possibility of a ‘cosmopolitan democracy.’ If this possibility is to be consolidated, each citizen of a state must learn to become a cosmopolitan citizen – a person capable of mediating between national traditions, communities and alternative forms of life.”

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has presented and discussed some of the experiences of Tucson's Neighborhood Associations in order to highlight new modes of urban governance that are steadily taking root in localities around the globe (Abott 1996, Appadurai 2002, MacAllister 2004). Far from being exceptionally unique or particularly innovative, Tucson's NA underline the communal thread that each urban locality needs to reaffirm as it continues to invent itself and realign its political structures of power along more participative, deliberative, and consensus-based urban management processes.

NA, along with numerous other community-based organizations, have been moving away from oppositional positions whose mission is to fight and resist negative plans and policies emanating from the City Council or other government entities. The positions of NA as well as that of government agencies have moved from less opposition to more collaboration as a result of the gradual reformulation of local urban governance frameworks. Tucson has seen its NA grow over the last three decades from a handful to over 140, spanning most of its residential neighborhoods and emerging as a crucial component of local urban politics. These associations are first and foremost a tool of participatory democracy that allows residents, city officials, developers, and many other urban actors to interact and formulate their positions about particular projects that impact a particular neighborhood as well as larger projects and policies that might have City or County-wide effects.

In order to situate these NA and their local experiences and practices within a larger context of participatory democracy and civil society, I broadly discussed in the first part of the dissertation the development of democracy as a system of social integration based on the central concept of representation. I conceive of NA as a rich space to not only explore the constant formulation and reformulation of institutions of representation but more importantly as an illustrative expression of the growing tensions between traditional systems of representation and emerging claims for direct democratic participation and representativity. I also discussed in the first part of the dissertation some of the major debates about civil society in relation to conceptualizations of democratic systems of government. I have aimed at situating NA within a continuum of groups and associations that form civil society and partake in the reshaping of systems of democratic representation.

In the second part of the dissertation, I presented the work of NA in Tucson based on my fieldwork observations and the interviews conducted. I described NA practices and participation in urban management and emphasized the values that underline the workings of participatory democracy in an urban setting. I argued that these new modes of urban governance have come to value processes of participation and direct representation just as much as, sometimes even more than they value the outcomes of these processes. Participants in these new modes of urban governance have constructed an interactionist and deliberative urban management framework that aims at integrating conflicting interests, building consensus, and incorporating uncertainty.

As much as practices and values of NA reflect new and alternative modes of governance, they also lend more legitimacy and undeniable centrality to traditional government institutions. Where the work of NA might appear in the first place as a radical critique of democratic institutions and their lack of more direct forms of participation and representation, this dissertation shows that NA are far from the radical or anarchist image some might have. Rather, NA see themselves as part of a larger body of citizenry that constitutes a civil society whose responsibilities include monitoring government agencies and reforming their practices by requiring direct participation and representation beyond official elections and referenda. This is the main point that the third part of the dissertation discusses in the context of Morocco's urban reforms and the growth of NA in the city of Fez.

Prior to presenting the case of Morocco to illustrate the expansion of the American model of local democracy, I argued in part three of the dissertation that the current growth of urban activism as reflected by NA in Tucson finds its most recent roots in the 1968 cultural revolution. I explored the links between contemporary NA in Tucson and cultural movements of the 1960s in order to highlight cultural and historical specificities that pertain to urban activism and governance in the American context. This discussion serves as a reminder of the need to avoid confounding universal forms of activism, such as Neighborhood Associations, with the particularities of the contexts in which they have been evolving. The value of identifying an almost universal trend towards participatory urban governance and direct representation would gain

tremendously from equally highlighting similarities and differences in trajectories of supposedly non-comparable models of government such as Morocco's Constitutional Monarchy and the United States' Republican Federalism.

I suggest in this dissertation that the field of civil society offers a conceptual framework for analyzing the trend towards direct participatory democracy without overlooking each movement and each society's particular histories. In chapter three, I traced the broad historical lines of the development of the concept of civil society in order to show how understandings of civil society have moved from a primarily social prism where relationships are developed into a predominantly political prism where the voice of sovereign people, apart from their State, is formulated and expressed. These two prisms, the social and the political, have long co-existed within the field of civil society and are inseparable. The difference in contemporary times is that civil society seems to embody the push towards more direct participatory democracy and, hence, is overtly embodying more political functions than before.

Tocqueville championed civil society in America as this independent and autonomous body capable of preventing, and if necessary, opposing despotic regimes. Besides that overtly political function, Tocqueville primarily emphasized the role of civil society groups and associations in developing relationships of trust and solidarity among people growing increasingly individualistic and isolated as a result of democratic institutions and ideals. The social attributes of civil society are equally emphasized by contemporary researchers such as Cohen and Arato (1992) and Habermas (1996) who

recognize civil society for its role in maintaining the “communicative infrastructure” of society. These authors, along with many others, have also come to recognize the limitations of a fragmented and nebulous entity called “civil society” to act as a unified body capable of pushing a specific agenda in the political arena. These limitations become particularly apparent as one moves from local political arenas into broader regional and national forums. This dissertation does not attempt to illustrate those limitations since its focus has been locally bounded NA. Instead, I have described NA’s active participation in urban management and administration, which, I suggest, constitutes a parallel field to traditional political participation in political parties, elections, and legislation. I suggest that administrative participation as illustrated by NA in the United States, Morocco, and many other countries, constitute different shades of direct democratic participation – a form of political participation that is competing for room in the framework and structures of modern democracies.

Democratic representation continues to constitute the main organizing principal of modern democracies. While people’s sovereignty is recognized and emphasized, it is their elected representatives who embody that sovereignty and act on it. These representatives, in turn, must, to the extent possible, distance themselves from personal and electoral interests in order to preserve national and society-wide interests from being compromised. The foundational principal of democratic representation provides a unifying framework for addressing increasingly fragmented and numerous demands of modern societies at the same time that it struggles to adequately and rationally

incorporate direct citizen participation in decision-making processes. The work of NA as discussed in this dissertation presents one form, albeit local, of direct participation that more and more modern democracies are encouraging in their attempts to go beyond the institutions of representation and into a more inclusive representativity.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Neighborhood and Homeowners Associations (Source: Tucson Department of Neighborhood Resources)

What is a Neighborhood Association?

A neighborhood association is a voluntary organization of residents who work together to improve and maintain the quality of life in their neighborhood. Associations can form out of concern over a particular issue, or as a means of enhancing the "sense of community" in the neighborhood.

Features of a Neighborhood Association:

- Membership is open to all residents in the neighborhood but participation is optional; boundaries are established by the association (usually 40 - 400 households)
- Dues are voluntary
- There is no legal authority to enact or enforce maintenance or design requirements beyond those established by City ordinances
- To ensure a visibly democratic process, the organization establishes formal or informal bylaws to provide for at least one general membership meeting per year and require an annual election of officers
- Associations create their own newsletters (NO advertising or political campaigning), which the Neighborhood Services Division duplicates and mails to all households in the area.
- Association position statements are reached through consensus; any dissenting statements are also attached and sent to the City.

If you would like to know whether you live within a neighborhood association area, or would like information on how to form an association, please contact the Department of Neighborhood Resources at (520) 791-4171 or CSDAdmin@tucsonaz.gov.

What is a Homeowners Association?

Homeowners associations, unlike neighborhood associations, are formal legal entities created to maintain common areas and enforce private deed restrictions (CC&R's). Most condominium and townhome developments and some newer single-family subdivisions have homeowners associations, which are usually created when the development is built.

Features of a Homeowners Association:

- Membership is mandatory for all property owners within the boundaries of the development
- Members are usually charged mandatory fees
- Homeowners associations have the legal authority to enact and enforce maintenance and design standards in addition to those established by City ordinances
- Homeowners associations are corporations with formal bylaws - there is usually a governing board which hires a property management company to handle maintenance and enforcement issues
- Many homeowners associations publish a newsletter, which is sent to members at the association's expense

Appendix B



**CITY OF
TUCSON**
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
310 N. COMMERCE PARK LOOP
BOX 27210
TUCSON AZ 85726
Phone: 520-791-4605 Fax: 520-791-2566

RESPONSIBILITIES OF REGISTERED NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

One of the purposes of being a registered neighborhood association is to assist the City of Tucson and its departments in notifying citizens of impending events, projects, developments, etc. In order to do that effectively, the registered neighborhood association needs to provide updated information to HCDD. This includes:

- Current copy of the neighborhood bylaws (must be updated every time there is a change in bylaws including boundary changes)
- Current Officer Release Form (must be updated every time there is a change in officers or contact information)
- Annual/Election Meeting minutes

Registered neighborhood associations that propose changes to bylaws, merging of associations, splitting of associations, dissolution of associations, or revision of boundaries should use the HCDD created mailing list to ensure that all within the neighborhood are notified.

Neighborhood Associations that wish to receive mailing assistance from HCDD need to follow the mailing guidelines in order that citizens receive notices in a timely manner. A neighborhood association has the option to print, mail or hand deliver notices on its own.

Neighborhoods may seek HCDD's assistance in obtaining meeting space at area schools. In order to ensure timely scheduling with school districts, neighborhoods should contact HCDD no later than 5 weeks in advance of a meeting. Also, please notify HCDD in the event of cancellation. School districts may charge fees for weekend or summer use and these fees are the responsibility of the neighborhood association.

Appendix C

Neighborhood Association Sample Bylaws (Source: Tucson Department of Neighborhood Resources)

SAMPLE BYLAWS

The following is an example of bylaws for a typical neighborhood association. Certain clauses and phrases may or may not be applicable to all associations, e. g., names and numbers of officers should be determined by the needs of the individual organizations.

BYLAWS

BYLAWS OF _____ ASSOCIATION

ARTICLE I. NAME AND BOUNDARIES

- A. The name of the association shall be _____.
- B. The association shall encompass the areas bounded on the
North by _____
East by _____
West by _____
South by _____

ARTICLE II. MEMBERSHIP

- A. The membership of this association shall be residents, property owners or businesses within the neighborhood.
- B. A Voting Member shall be a household or business within the boundaries of the neighborhood. Each household or business within the neighborhood shall be entitled to one vote.
- C. Dues will be determined by the voting members. Yearly dues are to be \$_____ per voting member.
- D. Membership shall not be denied on the basis of views or opinions contrary to the goals and purposes of the association.

ARTICLE III. OFFICERS

- Two suggested options for the election of officers are: 1. The voting members of the neighborhood association shall nominate and elect the officers of the association, or 2. The voting members of the neighborhood association shall elect a Board of Directors who will then appoint officers of the neighborhood association. The officers of this association shall hold office for a term of one (1) year or until successors are elected. The term of office shall begin at the close of the Annual Meeting. The officers of the association shall be President (or Chairperson), a Vice President (or Vice Chairperson), a Secretary (or Secretary/Treasurer), a Treasurer and an Historian, if deemed appropriate. The officers of the association will comprise the Board of Directors.
- A. The President (or Chairperson) shall call and preside at all meetings, shall act for and in behalf of the membership of the association, shall appoint any special committees necessary for the operation of the association business and shall act as official spokesperson for the association.
- B. The Vice President (or Vice Chairperson) shall, in the absence of the President,

assume all of the duties of that office and shall be responsible for publicity and notifications of meetings of the association.

C. The Secretary shall keep a permanent record of all formal meetings and all legal documents and legal transactions of the association. The secretary shall transcribe the minutes of each meeting and shall maintain a file copy of same and submit a copy of these minutes to HCDD.

D. The Treasurer shall keep all financial receipts and a permanent record of all financial business of the association. An up-to-date financial report shall be submitted at each meeting. The Treasurer shall be responsible for membership.

E. The Neighborhood Advocates (or Area Representatives) shall be composed of an appropriate number of Voting Members, shall be elected by the voting membership and shall serve in the capacity of gathering and disseminating information critical to the implementation of the purpose stated in these bylaws. Every effort will be made to insure that neighborhood advocates serve specific blocks or streets within the association boundaries.

F. Any officer can be removed from office by a 2/3rds majority vote of the dues paying membership (if applicable) after a special meeting has been requested at least ten (10) working days in advance. HCDD requires that meetings involving the recall of officers be mailed through this office.

ARTICLE IV. COMMITTEES

A. The President (or Chairperson) shall have the power to appoint committees as necessary to implement the purposes of the charter

B. The President (or Chairperson) shall be an ex-officio member of all committees.

ARTICLE V. MEETINGS

An annual meeting shall be held during the month of _____ at a time and place designated by the President/Chairperson.

A. Not less than ____ percent of the Voting Members shall have the privilege of petitioning a special meeting at any time.

B. The Voting Members present shall constitute a quorum.

C. At least a - day notice shall be provided in advance of any association meeting. Every effort will be made to notify all interested parties and members of the Association of upcoming meetings either by direct mailing, pamphlets, newsletters, or announcements at regularly scheduled meetings.

D. All meetings shall be public and open to any interested persons.

ARTICLE VI. NOMINATION, ELECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORTS AND INSTALLATION OF OFFICERS

A. Nominations of officers shall be made from the floor at the annual meeting or a slate presented from a nominating committee would also be acceptable.

B. Election of officers shall be held on the same day as the nominations.

C. Upon installation of the officers whose terms begin at the close of the Annual Meeting, all documents, records, and any materials pertaining to the duties of the office as designated in the bylaws which are in the possession of the outgoing officers shall be submitted to the newly elected counterpart within days of the installation.

D. Any vacancies occurring during the year of any Officer or member of the advocates shall be filled by appointment by the association advocates.

E. Any officer may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the

voting members.

ARTICLE VII. FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

A. Expenditure of funds of the association may not be made without the signatures of at least two (2) of the six (6) Officers and the Treasurer.

B. Financial records and funds of the association shall be audited at least once a year by a committee of at least two (2) Voting Members of the Neighborhood Advocates appointed by the President/Chairperson prior to a new Treasurer’s taking office.

ARTICLE VIII. AMENDMENT OF BYLAWS

A. These bylaws may be amended by a majority vote.

B. Proposed amendments shall be sent to all members at least working days in advance of the meeting where action is to be taken or shall be read at the presiding meeting.

ARTICLE IX. GENERAL

A. The rules in the current edition of Robert’s Rules of Order shall govern the association, the Board of Directors, and all subcommittees in all cases to which they apply and do not conflict with the specific provisions of these Bylaws or any special rules that the association may adopt.

B. If any part of these Bylaws or the application thereof is hereafter held invalid or unenforceable, the remainder shall not be affected thereby, and only the affected portions are declared eliminated.

C. No officer, representative, spokesperson or member shall have any financial liability of the association.

DATE ADOPTED: _____

SIGNATURE/TITLE

SIGNATURE/TITLE

Appendix D

**Citizen and Neighborhood Services (CNS)
Registration Guidelines
(Mayor and Council Adopted July 6, 1992)
(Source: Tucson Department of Neighborhood Resources)**

I. The following are guidelines for neighborhood associations desiring registration with the Citizen and Neighborhood Services Office of the City of Tucson.

A. Contact persons' names and addresses are to be filed with Citizen and Neighborhood Services (CNS) PLEASE NOTE: CNS also requires an Officers' Release Form with attached agenda and minutes of the Neighborhood Association's meeting when officers were elected.

B. Membership list will be filed with CNS. (This can be identified by the boundaries of the neighborhood association.)

C. Charter, if the association has one, and Bylaws are to be submitted to CNS for review and approval. The documents are to include reference to the following:

1. The organization must clearly involve a neighborhood with boundaries clearly defined that do not overlap the boundaries of other neighborhood associations.
2. The purpose should be general in nature, e.g., crime prevent, neighborhood improvement, communication among neighbors, etc.
3. The organizational structure: including officers, board members' election and replacement procedures, terms of office and duties shall be specified.
4. Membership and meetings:
 - a) Are to be open to all residents of a neighborhood and not restricted to property owners.
 - b) Quorum requirements must be specified.
 - c) Amount of dues, if required, should be stipulated. A minimum of one annual meeting is required. The advanced notices and minutes of this meeting must be submitted to CNS.
 - d) Adequate and equal notice of all meetings must be given to all interested persons or households. Provisions should be made for emergency meetings.
 - e) Agenda may be flexible e.g., calls to the audience, amendments to the agenda, etc.
 - f) Parliamentary authority should be specified, e.g., Robert's Rules of Order, appointments of Sergeant at Arms, etc. This will provide for efficiency and productive meetings.
 - g) Voting and membership rights must not be restricted to property owners.

D. Incorporation, although not required, is advisable only if the association plans to apply for non-profit status or plans to accept donations as tax deductions.

E. Charter and bylaws of the association must be signed by at least two (2) officers,

dated and forwarded to CNS with ten (10) days following the meeting at which they were approved and adopted by the association. The minutes for the meeting at which the general membership approved bylaws or amendments need to be on file at CNS.

F. CNS services are available to all parties within an association, i.e. services cannot be limited to officers or to certain groups or certain groups within the association.

G. The following are exigencies that will be cause for restricting or denying services from CNS.

1. Bylaws, charters, or articles or incorporation containing the following:

- a. Property owner's rights
- b. Deed restrictions
- c. Covenants
- d. Assessments from property owners


2. Homeowners' Associations.

3. Associations registered and filed by an individual other than a resident of the area concerned i.e., registration by a realtor or builder who is not resident of the area.


H. Services may be provided for Addressing City related issues at the discretion of CNS staff.

I. Conditions, actions, provisions not specifically contained herein are permissible with the approval of CNS staff.


Appendix E



Appendix F



Appendix G



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