

THE ROLE OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS IN LATINO POLITICAL  
BEHAVIOR

By

Gabriel R. Sanchez

---

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2005

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA  
GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Gabriel R Sanchez entitled The Role of Group Consciousness in Latino Political Behavior and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

\_\_\_\_\_  
John Garcia Date: July 14, 2005

\_\_\_\_\_  
Barbara Norrande Date: July 14 2005

\_\_\_\_\_  
Brad Jones Date: July 14, 2005

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Dissertation Director: (John Garcia) Date: July 14, 2005

## STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other must be obtained from the author.

TYPE NAME HERE: Gabriel R Sanchez

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This dissertation was completed with the assistance and support of many. John Garcia, Barbara Norrander, and Brad Jones all gave me valuable comments and feedback throughout the dissertation writing process. Laura Langer and William Mishler were also instrumental in helping me develop ideas that informed my research and provided helpful comments on earlier version of the dissertation. John Garcia in particular has provided a great deal of direction and support on not only this project but throughout my graduate school experience. I would not have been able to complete my graduate studies as quickly and successfully without his outstanding mentorship. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my family. The support and sacrifice of my parents, Wilfred and Geraldine Sanchez made it possible for me to make it this far in my educational career. And finally, the emotional support and general assistance of my wife Anna throughout this process were invaluable, and helped make completion of this dissertation possible.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>LIST OF TABLES.....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>ABSTRACT.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>11</b>
1.1 The Link Between Group Consciousness and Latino Politics.....	13
1.2 Limitations of Previous Research.....	36
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>	
<b>CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT STRATEGY FOR</b>	
<b>VARIABLE CLUSTERS.....</b>	<b>42</b>
2.1 Group Consciousness Cluster.....	43
2.2 Socio-Economic and Demographics Cluster.....	45
2.3 Political Orientations Cluster.....	46
2.4 Contextual Factors Cluster.....	48
2.5 Political Activities and Experiences Cluster.....	50
2.6 Cultural Factor Cluster.....	52
2.7 National Origin Cluster.....	53
<b>CHAPTER 3</b>	
<b>GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS AND LATINO POLITICAL</b>	
<b>PARTICIPATION.....</b>	<b>56</b>
3.1 Theoretical Framework/Literature Review.....	57
3.2 Hypotheses/Anticipated Findings.....	69
3.3 Impact of Contributing Factors on Voting .....	75
3.4 Impact of Contributing Factors on Latino Specific Participation .....	78
3.5 Conclusions and Discussion.....	83

TABLE OF CONTENTS-*Continued*

<b>CHAPTER 4</b>	
<b>THE ROLE OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS IN PARTY BEHAVIOR</b>	
<b>AMONG LATINOS.....</b>	<b>94</b>
4.1 Trends in Latino Partisanship .....	99
4.2 Group Consciousness and Partisanship.....	103
4.3 Hypotheses .....	105
4.4 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Party Choice.....	112
4.5 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Party Strength .....	114
4.6 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Political Independence .....	116
4.7 Conclusions and Discussion .....	117
<b>CHAPTER 5</b>	
<b>THE ROLE OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS IN LATINO PUBLIC</b>	
<b>OPINION.....</b>	<b>127</b>
5.1 American Public Opinion .....	128
5.2 Hypotheses .....	140
5.3 The Impact of Contributing Factors on General Policy Areas .....	147
5.4 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Latino Salient Policy Areas .....	150
5.5 Conclusions and Discussion .....	156
<b>CHAPTER 6</b>	
<b>GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS AND MINORITY COALITION</b>	
<b>FORMATION.....</b>	<b>166</b>
6.1 Coalition Formation Literature (Competition vs. Cooperation).....	168
6.2 The Role of Group Consciousness in Coalition Formation.....	174
6.3 Hypotheses.....	175

TABLE OF CONTENTS-*Continued*

6.4	The Impact of Group Consciousness on Commonality With African Americans (Isolated Model)	181
6.5	Conclusions and Discussion	186
<b>CHAPTER 7</b>		
<b>FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS</b>		<b>195</b>
7.1	Does Group Consciousness Exist for Latinos?	196
7.2	Theoretical Framework/Literature Review	198
7.3	Hypotheses	203
7.4	The Impact of Contributing Factors on Latino Commonality	211
7.5	The Impact of Contributing Factors on Perceived Discrimination	214
7.6	The Impact of Contributing Factors on Desire for Collective Action	218
7.7	Conclusions and Discussion	221
<b>CHAPTER 8</b>		
<b>CONCLUDING CHAPTER: IMPLICATIONS OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS ON LATINO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR</b>		<b>230</b>
8.1	Group Consciousness Among Latinos	230
9.2	Contributions and Research Extensions	235
9.3	The Future of Group Consciousness Within the Latino Community	237
 <b>WORKS CITED</b>		<b>242</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

1.1	Latino Commonality Frequencies Over Time.....	39
1.2	Perceived Discrimination Over Time.....	40
1.3	Collective Action Frequency in 1999.....	41
2.1	Contributing Factors Organized by Variable Cluster.....	55
3.1	Contributing Factors to Participation Organized by Variable Cluster.....	87
3.2	The Effect of Group Consciousness on Voting.....	88
3.3	The Effect of the Full Model on Voting.....	89
3.4	The Impact of Perceived Discrimination on Voting.....	90
3.5	The Impact of Perceived Discrimination on Participating in all Three Latino... Specific Activities	90
3.6	The Effect of Group Consciousness on Latino Specific Participation.....	91
3.7	The Effect of the Full Model on Latino Specific Activities.....	92
3.8	The Impact of Latino Commonality on Participating in all Three Latino... Specific Activities	93
4.1	The Effect of the Full Model on Party Identification-7 Point Scale.....	121
4.2	Contributing Factors to Partisanship Organized by Variable Cluster.....	122
4.3	The Effect of the Full Model on Party Choice.....	123
4.4	The Effect of the Full Model on Party Strength.....	124
4.5	The Impact of Party Perception on Partisan Identification.....	125
4.6	The Effect of the Full Model on Political Independence.....	126
5.1	Contributing Factors to Public Opinion Organized by Variable Cluster.....	159
5.2	The Effect of the Full Model on Abortion.....	160
5.3	The Effect of the Full Model on the Death Penalty.....	161
5.4	The Effect of the Full Model on Immigration.....	162
5.5	The Effect of the Full Model on Bilingual Education.....	163
5.6	The Effect of Perceived Discrimination on Support for Immigration.....	164
5.7	The Effect of Perceived Discrimination on Support for Bilingual Education....	165
6.1	Contributing Factors to Perceptions of Commonality With Blacks..... Organized by Variable Cluster	190
6.2	Perceptions of Commonality Among Latinos Toward Whites and..... African Americans	191
6.3	The Effect of Group Consciousness on Commonality With African..... Americans	192
6.4	The Effect of the Full Model on Motivating Commonality With African..... Americans	193
6.5	The Impact of Latino Commonality on Perceived Commonality With Blacks...194	194
7.1	Contributing Factors to Group Consciousness Organized by Variable Cluster..	224
7.2	The Effect of Contributing Factors on Latino Commonality.....	225
7.3	The Effect of Contributing Factors on Perceived Discrimination.....	226
7.4	The Effect of Contributing Factors on Collective Action.....	227
7.5	The Impact of Latino Specific Participation on Perceived Discrimination.....	228
7.6	The Impact of Discrimination Experience on Perceived Discrimination.....	229

## ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the role of group consciousness in the political life of Latinos in the United States. This dissertation provides a full analysis of group consciousness presence and performance among Latinos. In separate analyses, I test the impact of group consciousness across several areas of Latino political activity, including; political participation, partisanship, policy preferences, and the propensity to engage in coalitions with African Americans relative to other more dominant explanations of Latino political behavior. In addition to the role of group consciousness in Latino political behavior, I am also interested in determining the factors that contribute to group consciousness for Latinos. Therefore, chapter six is dedicated to discussing how group consciousness is formulated among Latinos. Ultimately I examine not only how group consciousness motivates Latino political behavior, but also how group consciousness is created for Latinos.

Group consciousness has been suggested to be a multidimensional concept, consisting of the following dimensions; group identity, perceived discrimination, and support for collective activity. This dissertation improves on existing research focused on group consciousness by including measures for all three of these dimensions. This analysis provides evidence that these dimensions are not cumulative and are independent from one another. This finding has implications for how group consciousness should be measured in the future. Further, experiencing discrimination and participating in political activities directly tied to the Latino community contribute to group consciousness for Latinos.

I also find that there is a meaningful relationship, although a somewhat limited one between group consciousness and the aspects of Latino political behavior discussed in the dissertation. Further, of the three dominant dimensions of group consciousness, perceived discrimination proved to have the greatest influence across the various aspects of Latino political behavior explored in the dissertation. The dissertation suggests that group consciousness does indeed help explain some of the uniqueness found in Latino political behavior.

## **CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION**

The huge migration of individuals from Latin American countries to the United States during the 1980's and 1990's is well documented. For example, during the 1980's, the Latino population grew nearly five times faster than the rest of the population, and their rate of growth continued at nearly the same pace through the mid nineties (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996). More recently, the U.S. Census Bureau indicates that the Latino population increased by 57.9 percent, from 22.4 million in 1990 to 35.3 million in 2000, compared to an increase of only 13.2 percent for the non-Latino population (Guzman, 2001:2). Currently there are approximately 40 million Latinos living in the United States, which represents 13.7 percent of the U.S. population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2004). The continued flow of migration, coupled with the younger median age, and higher birth rates of Latinos has contributed to this group being recognized as the largest minority group in the United States.

It is not just the sheer magnitude of this emergence of Latinos as an influential constituency, but that Latinos are concentrated in several states (i.e. CA, TX, NY, FL) with a tremendous impact on national elections (Suro & Singer, 2002). In fact, the Mexican origin population has played a pivotal role in the politics of the Southwestern United States for some time now. This suggests that while the population influx is a more recent phenomenon, Latinos have been politically relevant well before the release of the 2000 Census. The salience of Latinos in American politics is reflected in the attention they have received from the two major political parties who have both taken major steps

to increase mobilization of the Latino community (Segal, 2004), as well scholars who have recently increased their focus on the Latino-origin population. Despite the growing attention the newly titled “largest minority group” has yielded, there is still a large question of whether the visibility and size of the Latino population will result in a degree of political influence that their numbers command.

It has long been suggested that the actualization of the political potential based on the size and concentration of the Latino population is difficult given the diversity that exists within their population (de la Garza et al., 1992; Pachon & DeSipio, 1994; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; 2003). Differences based on nativity, citizenship status, country of origin, length of time spent in the United States, educational attainment, and income have contributed to diversity regarding the political behavior of Latinos (Uhlener, Cain, and Kiewiet, 1991). This heterogeneity has led many to argue that panethnicity, or a sense of group affinity and identification that transcends one’s own national origin group (J.Garcia, 2003) is needed for increased political mobilization and the realization of political power that is based on large demographic numbers for some time (Aguirre & Saenz, 1991). Therefore, the growing numbers of Latinos in the United States will not be translated into political power without the formation of solidarity or group consciousness within the Latino population.

This dissertation examines the propensity for group consciousness to influence the political behavior of Latinos in the United States. In separate analyses, I will test the impact of group consciousness across several areas of Latino political activity, including; electoral political participation, partisanship, policy preferences, and the propensity to

engage in coalitions with African Americans. This effort will provide some insight into whether or not the continued numerical strength of the Latino community will result in greater political influence. If this section of the dissertation provides results that suggest there is a meaningful relationship between group consciousness and these aspects of Latino political behavior, there is motivation to analyze the factors that contribute to group consciousness for Latinos. Therefore, chapter six, dedicated to discussing how group consciousness is formulated among Latinos is the final component of this dissertation focused on the role of group consciousness in Latino political behavior. In the following sections, I outline the plan of the dissertation and specify the concepts and theories that are the focus of this analysis.

### **1.1 Defining Group Consciousness and it's Role in Political Science**

Critical to the discussion of Latino political behavior is the examination of the basis and formation of identity and the salience of group identification. The Latino community is comprised of individuals from over twenty national origin groups (J. Garcia, 2003). This dynamic poses an interesting dilemma for identity and group identification. Most Latinos identify and think of themselves in reference to their national origin group (Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican etc.). However, a sense of panethnicity or recognition of ones attachment to a broader community is also a major aspect of Latino individual and group identity. Is there a meaningful Latino community with common interests, concerns, and beliefs? Essentially this dissertation attempts to address this

question by investigating the extent of group consciousness among Latinos and the role of group consciousness in Latino political behavior.

Group consciousness involves identification with a group and a political awareness or ideology regarding the group's relative position in society along with a commitment to political action aimed at realizing the group's interests (Gurin et al., 1980). This definition of group consciousness strongly suggests that this concept is multidimensional, comprised of three distinct components. Group identification is one of these three dimensions, and implies a psychological feeling of belonging to a particular group, in this case, the Latino community. The second step in group consciousness raising is an evaluative assessment about the group's relative position in society. In other words, a recognition that ones group has and continues to face discrimination or adversity as a result of their race/ethnicity. Finally, group consciousness requires that individuals support collective action aimed at improving the status of ones group. It is this final component of group consciousness that links this concept to political behavior. In fact, Padilla (1985) suggests that ethnic-consciousness is intrinsically linked to political behavior, as ethnic-consciousness is directed at gaining access to American urban systems. For Latinos, individuals with a sense of group consciousness have a positive affinity for being Latino; they assess their group's sociopolitical status as experiencing lower levels of socioeconomic and political status and are inclined to participate in some collective activity to change the situation (J.Garcia, 2003).

The concept of group consciousness is closely tied to the concept of pan ethnicity, or the grouping of persons and/or communities with similar cultural and historical

experiences in the U.S. (J. Garcia, 2004). The advent of umbrella or pan-ethnic labels became a way in which political institutions could manage the policy and political concerns of different Latino sub-groups. Therefore, individuals who are of the many Spanish origin communities in the U.S. have been categorized under the umbrella terms of Latino or Hispanic. The construct of pan-ethnicity relates to a sense of community and is organizationally based on activities to advance Latino group interests and concerns, not the interests and concerns exclusively of specific Latino sub-groups. Therefore, the concept of pan-ethnicity is closely tied to group consciousness in that; “a political linkage is associated with the presence of a politicized individual” (J. Garcia, 2004).

It is important to clarify here in the introduction that in this dissertation Latino group consciousness transcends the boundaries of individual national and cultural identities of the Latino sub-group communities (Padilla, 1985). In other words, Latino group consciousness is present when an individual expresses connectivity to Latinos outside of their group and are motivated to engage in collective action to improve the status of Latinos generally, not only those within their national origin sub-group.

Therefore, this dissertation is interested in panethnic group consciousness and not the presence of consciousness within each individual national origin population.

Interestingly, there has been evidence that individuals who unify with other Latinos from different national origin groups to address common issues or problems adopt a new “Latino” identity while maintaining their national identities (Barvosa-Carter, 2001). This suggests that Latinos may maintain multiple identities, including both national origin based and pan-ethnic identities. Again, I am interested in group consciousness within the

pan-ethnic context, regardless of whether or not that identity is situational as (Barvosa-Carter, 2001) suggests.

I make this distinction here to differentiate this analysis from the extant literature that has focused on the presence of group consciousness among Latino sub-groups, largely the Chicano population in the Southwest (Aguirre & Saenz, 1991; Bernal, 1993; Keefe, 1987; Lien, 1994; Pailla, 1985). Interestingly, there has not been much evolution in the way scholars have defined or measured group consciousness, however there has been a shift in how scholars conceptualize the Latino origin population. As Latino sub-groups other than Mexican-origin have grown over time and begun to establish political influence, scholars have generally utilized wider samples of the Latino origin population. This trend has motivated an interest in investigating the presence of group consciousness at a more broad scale, specifically at the panethnic level (Stokes, 2003).

There has been interest in the role of group consciousness in minority political behavior dating back to the 1960's (Wolfinger, 1965; Parenti, 1967; Glazer & Moynihan, 1963; Olson, 1970; Verba and Nie, 1972). Much of the early literature attempted to explain the phenomenon of ethnic voting despite apparent assimilation of white ethnic groups (Parenti, 1967; Wolfinger, 1965). I say apparent due to the contention of Parenti (1967) that assimilation was not occurring among ethnic groups, as ethnic voting is a result of heightened ethnic consciousness. Work in this area developed during the 1970's primarily focused on the African American population and generally attempted to explain the relatively high political participation rates of African Americans given their low education and income levels (Olson, 1970; Verba and Nie, 1972). While these studies

have provided a solid framework for more contemporary studies of the role of group consciousness in today's era, this work has generally ignored the pan-ethnic communities of Latinos and Asians. The primary objective of the dissertation is to define the role that group consciousness has on the political behavior of Latinos in the United States.

Specifically, my dissertation will explore the relationship between group consciousness and the following political phenomenon for Latinos: political participation (electoral and Latino specific), partisanship, policy preferences and the propensity to form political coalitions with other racial/ethnic groups. The final empirical chapter will explore group consciousness formation, discussing the factors that contribute to increased levels of each component of group consciousness. In depth exploration into group consciousness among the Latino population is a timely topic that ties together several important literatures: political participation, group consciousness, partisanship, and coalition formation.

### **Does Group Consciousness Exist Among Latinos?**

One of the most critical questions facing this dissertation is whether or not group consciousness is present at all within the Latino community, and if so to what extent. If not, there is little to no significance in a larger analysis that investigates the relationship between group consciousness and political behavior among Latinos. I want to devote some time here to an investigation of the current intensity of group consciousness among Latinos relative to past levels of Latino group consciousness. In order to assess any potential changes in group consciousness over time, comparisons will be made between

the Post/Kaiser data used in the dissertation and the Latino National Political Survey (1989).<sup>1</sup> The purpose of this discussion is to provide evidence that group consciousness is in fact relevant for Latinos and to explore variation among the Latino sub-groups across the three dimensions of group consciousness. This aspect of the larger analysis will provide the backdrop for the thrust of the dissertation that investigates the utility of group consciousness to matters political.

Group consciousness again has three dimensions; group identity, evaluation of group's status in society, and desire for collective action. I want to briefly present the frequencies of the measures for these dimensions in order to assess the level of group consciousness among members of the Latino community, as well as the frequencies of Latino commonality and perceived discrimination from the 1989 LNPS survey to assess any changes in group consciousness over time. The first group consciousness dimension is group identity and is measured in this dissertation with a Latino commonality index derived from the following survey item taken from the Kaiser/Post 1999 data; *How much do you have in common with the following groups (Insert Latino sub-groups)?*

Approximately 10 percent of all Latinos are within the two highest categories of the Latino commonality measure, reporting that they have a lot in common with all or all but one Latino sub-group population. Puerto Ricans are the group who have the highest percentage within those two high values (14 percent), and Central/South Americans are the least likely to indicate they have a lot in common with all or all but on Latino sub-

---

<sup>1</sup> The LNPS only has measures for the group consciousness dimensions of Latino commonality and perceived discrimination, therefore my comparison of group consciousness over time will be restricted to these two dimensions.

group (7.7 percent). Results from the LNPS indicate that overall, just under 18 percent of Latino respondents believe that Latinos are very similar culturally in the United States, 54 percent believe they are somewhat similar, and 28 percent not very similar.<sup>2</sup> Due to differences in sample populations utilized in the two data sets and survey question wording, these two measures are not directly comparable.<sup>3</sup> However, these trends that are presented in table one suggest that there has not been much change in perceptions of Latino commonality over the last decade.

(Insert Table 1.1 About Here)

The second dimension is perception of your group's relative position in society. Consistent with other work in this area, this concept is operationalized through a perceived discrimination measure based on the following survey item; *Is discrimination directed toward Latinos a problem, if so it is a big problem?*<sup>4</sup> Relative to commonality, the presence of perceived discrimination is much greater among Latinos. Overall, 56.4 percent of Latinos believe that discrimination directed toward Latinos is a big problem in the United States. The Dominican population professes the highest level of perceived discrimination, as 73 percent believe that discrimination is a big problem for Latinos. Among the major sub-groups, although still above 50 percent, Mexicans have the lowest level of perceived discrimination with 54.6 percent in the high category of the variable. Findings from the LNPS suggest that perceived discrimination has increased over the last

---

<sup>2</sup> These results are based on the following survey item from the LNPS; Do you think that (respondents group) and other Hispanics are culturally: very similar, somewhat similar, or not very similar?

<sup>3</sup> The Latino National Political Survey only sampled Latinos of Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican origin.

<sup>4</sup> In addition, to perceived discrimination others have employed a measure of perception of power differential to capture the second dimension of group consciousness.

fifteen years.<sup>5</sup> As table two indicates, on average, 38.4 percent of LNPS respondents indicated that Latinos face some discrimination, and 24.3 percent indicating Latinos face a lot of discrimination. Overall, respondents felt that Cubans faced the least amount of discrimination, with only 6.6 percent of respondents indicating that Cubans face a lot of discrimination compared to 31.6 percent for Mexicans 34.7 percent for Puerto Ricans.

(Insert Table 1.2 About Here)

The strongest support for the presence of group consciousness among Latinos comes from the final dimension, collective action. The collective measure is based on the following survey item; *Do you think that if various Latinos groups worked together politically Latinos would be better off, worse off, or wouldn't make much difference?*

Table three indicates that overall, 85 percent of Latinos believe that collective political activity leads to positive benefits for Latinos, with Dominicans leading the way with 90 percent. These data clearly indicate that there is group consciousness among Latinos, and thus investigations of consciousness among this community are relevant. With this settled, this introductory chapter now directs its focus on defining how group consciousness is created for Latinos and the relationship group consciousness has with Latino political behavior.

(Insert Table 1.3 About Here)

---

<sup>5</sup> The LNPS perceived discrimination survey item is; *Do you think the following groups face a lot of discrimination, some, a little, or no discrimination at all (insert Latino sub-groups)?*

### **The Relationship Between Group Consciousness and Political Participation**

Latinos currently comprise approximately 13 percent of the national population and are the largest minority group in the United States. As previously suggested, this is even more salient when one considers that the overall percentage of Latinos is even higher in several states that due to their electoral votes are critical to electoral politics: 32 percent in both California and Texas, and 17 percent in Florida (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). Despite this growing potential for political influence, Latinos have consistently been found to have lower rates of voter registration and voting than Whites and African Americans (Verba et al., 1995, de la Garza & DeSipio, 1992; Hero, 1992; Uhlaner et al., 1989). For example, in 1968 the gap between Black and White voter registration rates was 9.2 percentage points (Williams, 1987). Over the past three decades this gap has consistently declined. In fact, in 2000 the difference between voter registration rates among Whites and African Americans was only 2 percent, as 65.6 percent of White voting-age residents were registered to vote compared with 63.6 percent of Blacks (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002).

However, the gap between White and Latino voter registration rates has remained considerably wider, with a difference of 30.7 percent in 2000. This gap in 2000 reflects the historical trend, as the mean gap in voter registration rates between Whites and Latinos is 31.4 percent. Although voting has consistently been viewed as the dominant and most pervasive form of political participation (Verba et. al 1995), it is necessary to include activities that extend beyond voting such as participating in demonstrations, or donating time and/or money to a campaign in a conceptualization of Latino political

behavior. Previous research indicates that while Latinos participate within these modes of participation at much more comparable rates to the general population (Wrinkle et. al. 1996; Hero and Campbell, 1996) a participation gap between Latinos and Whites still remains (McClain and Stewart, 2002; Verba et al, 1995).

Given the general characterization of lower rates of political participation for Latinos, many scholars have attempted to explain this trend utilizing the dominant theories of American political participation. For example, the structural model of political participation suggests that aspects of the “rules of the game” contribute to lower rates of political participation among Latinos. Specifically, a sizable proportion of the Latino population are ineligible to vote due to the citizenship requirement of voting (J. Garcia, 1981; Hero, 1992; DeSipio, 1996; Sierra et. al.2000). In addition, the socioeconomic status model of participation has been found to only partially explain Latino political behavior (Hirtzuk and Park, 2000; Cho, 1999). Further, the political resource model of participation suggests that lower participation rates among Latinos is a result of lower levels of skills and resources needed to participate, most notably language skills (Verba et. al., 1995). And finally, the mobilization model of participation suggests that lower levels of participation for Latinos is a result of less mobilization of the Latino community (Leighly, 2001).

It is in this discussion of how to explain the lower rates of participation of Latinos relevant to other racial/ethnic groups where group consciousness emerges as a viable alternative to the more dominant models of political participation. The group consciousness model was originally developed to explain the relatively high participation

rates of African Americans given their lower SES levels (Olsen, 1970; Verba & Nie, 1972). The final component of group consciousness requires that individuals support collective action to improve the status of ones group. This notion of collective action includes the potential for individuals to participate in the political arena in order to address the needs of their group. This aspect of the dissertation attempts to investigate the propensity of group consciousness to motivate political participation among the Latino community. Chapter two presents a more comprehensive review of the pertinent literatures that connect group consciousness and political participation. I then investigate the impact of group consciousness on both voting and Latino specific participation by including measures for each dimension of group consciousness in multivariate models including measures for the dominant participation models in political science.

### **Group Consciousness and Partisanship**

Group consciousness has been found to not only influence the participation rates of minority groups, but also the partisan behavior of racial/ethnic groups in the United States. In the social psychological model of partisan identification, people relate to the political world as members of social groups. In this context, Republicans and Democrats in much the same way that others incorporate religious, regional, or ethnic groups into their self-conceptions (Green, 2002). This process is strikingly similar to the formation of group consciousness among minority groups, where group consciousness is developed when members of a group recognize their status as being part of a deprived group (Miller et al., 1981). Both partisan identification and group consciousness require notions of what

Greene (2002) calls “group belonging” to motivate political behavior. This similarity seems to suggest a natural relationship between the two concepts.

In chapter three this dissertation examines the role of group consciousness in partisanship for Latinos. Specifically, chapter three tests the impact of group consciousness in party identification, strength of that identification, and propensity to remain politically independent for Latinos. The relationship between group consciousness and party identification has been investigated among the African American community, with group consciousness being credited with the near monolithic support for the Democratic Party, despite the growing socioeconomic diversity among the population (Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1995). Dawson argues that this is due to African Americans basing their political decisions on group preferences and not their individual interests. Unfortunately, this theory has yet to be tested for other racial/ethnic groups in the United States. This analysis will greatly expand our understanding of Latino political behavior and possibly provide evidence for the significance of group consciousness for Latinos.

The literature in the area of minority partisan identification suggests that not only is party attachment different among Latinos and African Americans, but also that this trend may be at least partially explained by the differential impact of group consciousness. For example, Tate finds that “race identification appears to be the major component of Black partisanship” (Tate, 65). This falls in line with the general notion of group consciousness motivating political behavior for African Americans. The magnitude of this impact is reflected in the trend of African Americans reporting attachment to the Democratic Party in numbers consistently over 80 percent. In contrast to African

Americans, education and perceptions of the economy are statistically significant in relation to partisanship for Latinos (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2002). This suggests that Latinos may base their political decisions on individual and not group-based preferences. This potential lack of consciousness is reflected in more segmented partisanship identification; as in the 2000 NES, only 50 percent of Latino respondents identified as Democrats (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2002) compared to the near monolithic attachment of African Americans to the Democratic Party.

Chapter three provides a thorough review of the literature regarding Latino partisanship and the role of group consciousness in minority partisanship. I then test the impact of group consciousness on Latino partisanship across three dependent variables; 1) party choice, 2) party strength, and independents. While presenting results from the more typical seven-point scale partisanship measure, I utilize this separated measurement approach based on the argument that the seven-point scale does not account for the diversity of the Latino population (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998; Hajnal, 2004). The impact of group consciousness is assessed in relation to several control variables that have been found to partially explain partisanship for the general American population, and Latinos specifically.

### **Group Consciousness and Latino Public Opinion**

Unfortunately, we know less about the public opinion of Latinos in regard to policy issues than other aspects of Latino political behavior. However, as a result of the continued growth of the Latino population and their growing influence in American politics, we have increased our knowledge of Latinos opinions across several issue areas.

This section of the dissertation is an effort to learn more about the factors that affect Latino public opinion, an area that has remained relatively understudied. Specifically, this chapter is dedicated to investigating the relationship between group consciousness and the policy preferences of Latinos across both general and Latino salient issue areas. By including both general issues (death penalty, affirmative action) and issues more salient to Latinos (immigration, bilingual education), I can test my primary hypothesis that group consciousness has a greater impact on Latino political attitudes when the issues are directly tied to ethnicity.

The two policy issues used as indicators of the role of group consciousness in the opinion of Latinos across general issue areas are abortion and the death penalty. These issues were chosen due to their lack of direct ethnic connotation, as well as the propensity of Latinos to take stances on these issues similar to Whites. An issue often used as evidence of Latinos social conservative stance is abortion, as Latinos are about 10 percentage points more likely than Anglos to oppose abortion (Leal, 2004). Further, not only do Latino attitudes toward abortion resemble those of the general population. Latinos are also influenced by the same variables as the general population. Specifically, greater support for a feminist position increases the probability for pro-choice attitudes, while religiosity increases pro-life attitudes. Demographically, higher socioeconomic levels and being female increase the probability of pro-life attitudes (Bolks et al., 2000). Further, opposition to abortion is stronger among Spanish dominant Latinos, and Puerto Ricans (Leal, 2004).

The second general policy area used in this analysis is the death penalty. The only extant work focused on Latino attitudes toward the death penalty has found that both Latinos and African Americans express greater opposition to the death penalty than Whites, with opposition being greater for women and the Spanish dominant (Leal, 2004). However support for the death penalty is stronger for citizens among Latino respondents (Leal, 2004). There is little research exploring the attitudes of Latinos toward the death penalty, which motivates the inclusion of this issue in the analysis, as well as the decision to make the death penalty a non-Latino salient policy issue. This analysis will provide some insight into what factors differentiate Latinos who are for or against the death penalty.

In order to assess the potential differential impact of group consciousness across Latino-salient versus general policy issue areas, I utilize the issues of bilingual education and immigration for my models of Latino-salient policies. Surveys of the Latino population consistently indicate that most Latinos support bilingual education, in sharp contrast to Whites and African Americans who tend to oppose bilingual education (Uhlaner, 1991; Hajnal & Baldassre, 2001). For example, the Latino National Political Survey (de la Garza et al. 1992) indicated that 80 percent of Mexican Americans, 87 percent of Puerto Ricans, and 89 percent of Cuban Americans support bilingual education, with majorities in each sub-group reporting that they would be willing to pay more taxes for it. Although variation does exist based on national origin and citizenship status, over two thirds of the least favorable group (U.S. born Mexican American citizens) supported bilingual education in the LNPS (Uhlaner & Garcia, 2002).

Interestingly, despite similarities in language usage patterns among Latinos and Asians, Latinos display more enthusiasm for bilingual education than Asians (Cain & Kiewiet, 1987).

In addition to bilingual education, immigration is included as a Latino salient policy. Despite the common perception that Latinos support a very liberal immigration policy, analyses of Latino public opinion suggest that support for a relaxed immigration policy is not widespread among the Latino population. In fact, a sizable percentage of the Latino community believes that there are already too many immigrants coming to the United States annually. The LNPS (de la Garza et al. 1992) indicated that 75 percent of Mexican Americans, 79 percent of Puerto Ricans, and 70 percent of Cuban Americans agreed with the statement that there are too many immigrants coming to the United States.<sup>6</sup> These general trends have been reinforced by other surveys of Latinos (Uhlener & Garcia, 2002; Binder et al., 1997). For example, only 23 percent of Mexicans believe that more illegal immigrants should be allowed to enter the U.S. and 73 percent of Mexicans believe that immigration laws should be more strictly enforced (Binder et al., 1997). Further, Latinos are evenly divided on their opinions of the use of sanctions for employers who hire illegal immigrants (Cain & Kiewiet, 1987). Due to a general lack of extant work in this area, the results of this chapter contribute greatly to our understanding of how group consciousness and other contributing factors influence Latino public opinion formation across both Latino salient and non-salient policy areas.

---

<sup>6</sup> The 73.8 percent of Anglos is lower than that of both Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.

### **Group Consciousness and Coalition Formation**

There is power in numbers when the population is equipped with accompanying resources, and we are now beginning to see that the increasing proportion of ethnic and racial minorities in the United States is having a significant impact on electoral politics. Currently Latinos and African Americans constitute roughly one-quarter of the United States population. The sheer size of these groups suggests an opportunity for increased political influence, with this opportunity providing the incentive for coalition formation between them. In spite of these growing numbers, the formation of political alliances are still essential for the full force of the minority vote to be felt at the ballot box. Despite the apparently rational incentives for minority coalition building, there is little evidence of political coalitions between Latinos and African Americans, with coalitions being limited to particular locales or contexts (McClain & Stewart, 2002; Rich, 1996).

While the focus of all other chapters of this dissertation is based on group consciousness within the Latino population, here I investigate group consciousness at the more broad level of minority group status. I contend that beyond the presence of common circumstances and the rational benefits associated with shared political interests, a sense of commonality or intra-group consciousness between members of different minority groups is essential to building meaningful Black-Brown coalitions. That is, Latinos must perceive a notion of commonality with African Americans before exhibiting any support for coalition formation with the African American community.

The research conducted on common or linked fate in the black politics literature is particularly meaningful to this argument and provides the bridge between the group

consciousness and coalition formation literatures. For example, Michael Dawson's *black utility heuristic* argues that African Americans infer self-interests from group interests of African Americans generally. Further, Dawson contends that political coalition formation and collective action requires individuals to perceive that their fate is linked, first, to others in their own social group and, second, between their group and another (Dawson, 1994). Therefore, to set the basis for coalition formation with African Americans, Latinos must have perceptions of commonality with other Latinos first, and then maintain similar perceptions of commonality with African Americans. In other words, Latinos must develop group consciousness internally before engaging in a political relationship with another group. Therefore I hypothesize that group consciousness within the Latino community will be positively associated with perceptions of commonality with African Americans, a precursor for coalition formation between these two groups.

In chapter five I develop the link between the concept of group consciousness and coalition formation through a thorough review of the coalition formation literature. This discussion provides the context for an investigation of the relationship between group consciousness within the Latino community and the propensity to see commonalities with African Americans. Again, this chapter is based on the argument that common circumstances alone are not sufficient for the creation of coalitions between Latinos and African Americans, as perceptions of shared interests are equally important in the coalition formation process.

### **Investigation of the Factors that Motivate Group Consciousness**

The sixth and final empirical chapter will define the factors that motivate group consciousness formation among the Latino population. Each chapter to this point in the dissertation has discussed the impact of group consciousness on Latino political behavior. With the relevance of the concept of group consciousness well developed, this chapter provides a discussion of how group consciousness is formulated for Latinos. This aspect of the analysis concludes the analysis due to the ability of this chapter to predict or project the propensity of group consciousness to either increase or decrease in the future. As indicated, group consciousness involves identification with a group and a political awareness or ideology regarding the group's relative position in society along with a commitment to political action aimed at realizing the group's interests (Gurin et al., 1980). The focus of this chapter will be to outline the potential for increasing group consciousness or solidarity among the Latino population.

The group consciousness cluster of variables are the dependent variables in this aspect of the dissertation. The Pew survey provides several interesting measures to test in this model of group consciousness, including; length of time in the United States, nativity, socio-economic status, language use and preference, experience with discrimination, assimilation, and acculturation. In addition the contextual variables of Latino population, presence of Latino elected officials and civic organizations, and initiatives and referendum salient to Latinos will be included in the analysis. Chapter five will provide a comprehensive literature review of the work on group consciousness formation among minority groups and expand on the literature by providing a detailed

discussion of what factors contribute to the three dimensions of group consciousness among Latinos.

### **Testing Strategy/Data Source**

The primary data source utilized in this dissertation originates from the 1999 survey of 2,417 Latinos conducted by the Washington Post, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University. Although Latino voting behavior is highly significant to the empirical political world, the lack of current well-designed survey data has been a strong hurdle for scholars of Latino politics. The Latino National Political Survey, conducted in 1989, was undoubtedly the most complete survey available for the study of Latino political attitudes and behavior (de la Garza, et. al. 1992). However, both the political reality and perception of political viability among the general public have changed drastically over the last fifteen years. Comparisons made between previous studies of group consciousness based on LNPS data and this study utilizing more current data will possibly reveal if these changes in the Latino political landscape have had an impact on the relationship between group consciousness and political participation.

The Washington Post/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University National Survey on Latinos in America consists of 4,614 adults, with 2,417 Latinos in the sample. The study includes interviews with 818 Mexicans, 318 Puerto Ricans, 312 Cubans, and 593 Central or South Americans. Latino adults were interviewed in their choice of English or Spanish, with 53 percent of the Latino interviews conducted predominately in Spanish. The final results were weighted to the national Latino population as estimated by the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. This survey

was conducted by telephone between June 30 and August 30, 1999 by the International Communications Research. My analysis is only concerned with the Latino respondents to this survey, therefore the non-Latino respondents were excluded from the model.

The survey is accompanied by a set of contextual variables created from original data that allows for greater depth to this analysis. Specifically, I include the number of Latino elected officials by state, the number of civic and political organizations by state, the black population within each state, and the number of initiatives and referendum salient to Latinos by state throughout the dissertation. By identifying the state of residence for each survey respondent I am able to include several state level measures that are expected to have an impact on the relationship between group consciousness and the political behavior of Latinos for the same time period as the Pew Center survey. I collected data for states for the year 2000, as this was the year the Pew Hispanic Center survey was conducted. The contextual data was collected from the following states which were locations used to conduct interviews in the Pew Survey; California, Illinois, Texas, Florida, New York and Washington D.C. However, 106 respondents are coded as National in the survey and are not able to be tied to a specific state. For these respondents averages were conducted for each mobilization measure from the five states with the next largest Latino populations. Those states are: Arizona, New Jersey, New Mexico, Colorado, and Massachusetts.

These additional measures are used throughout the various dissertation chapters described above. Specifically, I include the number of Latino advocacy and political organizations in each state corresponding to the Pew survey using data collected from the

Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute (CHCI). To do so I coded the number of Latino advocacy organizations in each state using data collected from the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute (CHCI) for 2000. The CHCI issues the National Directory of Hispanic organizations, a listing of Latino organizations by state. The directory lists each organizations headquarters and contact information, its founding date, and its stated goal or mission statement. I first coded the number of Latino organizations that were political in nature. I coded organizations as political if they included in their mission statement descriptors such as “mobilize voters”, “political involvement”, or “register voters”. I define civic organizations as those that work to promote cultural pride or sensitivity and address problems of discrimination and inequalities. Therefore the descriptors used to code civic organizations were “advance anti-discrimination legislation”, “civil rights”, or “cultural awareness”. Then I would research through organization websites, or if necessary, contact each Latino political organization to determine how many chapters the organization has within each state included in the analysis. The second step provides very valuable variation in the Latino organization variables, and provides a much clearer picture of the relationship between Latino organizations and the various components of this dissertation.

Similarly, following the work of Leighly (2001) and Barretto et al., (2003), I use a measure of Latino elected officials at both the state and federal level for 2000 using data collected from the National Association of Elected Officials. The NALEO organization publishes an annual directory which includes the names, addresses, and party affiliations for each Latino elected official organized by jurisdiction. I coded the

number of Latino congress- people, U.S. senators, state senators, state representatives, and governors for each state included in the analysis. Once coded I simply took the total number of Latino elected officials within each state for the Latino representation variable. This variable ranged from 42 Latino representatives in Texas to 0 in the District of Columbia.

I also include a measure of ballot initiatives salient to Latinos by state, as anti-immigrant or Latino initiatives have been shown to be more salient in minority communities and also have an impact on political participation (Hero and Tolbert, 1996). Data on the number and types of initiatives from 1990-2000 were taken from the Initiative and Referendum Institute (2003). I simply counted the number of initiatives that had a potential direct or indirect impact on the Latino community in each state (for example English-only ballots or reduced services for immigrants). Respondents from those states that do not allow citizens to propose ballot initiatives were coded as 0 for the ballot initiative variable. Among the states included in the Pew Survey, only California had any ballot initiatives salient to Latinos, as California had six initiatives. However, the average for the national respondents was 1.6 initiatives, as Colorado had three and Arizona had two initiatives salient to Latinos over that ten year time span.

Finally, population data was collected from the United States Bureau of the Census for 2000. The population and population percentage within each state of Latinos generally and each major Latino sub-group is used in several areas within the dissertation to investigate the role of Latino population concentration in Latino group consciousness. Further, the population and percentage within each state of African Americans is used in

the coalition formation chapter to analyze the relationship between African American population and the propensity of Latinos to perceive commonality with the African American community. These contextual variables will greatly add to this investigation of group consciousness and Latino political participation.

## **1.2 Limitations of Previous Research/My Contribution to the Literature**

While the analysis of group consciousness among groups is far from a novel idea (Olsen, 1970; Verba & Nie, 1972; Gurin et al., 1980), this dissertation contributes to the general social science literature in several important ways. First, while there have been several empirical investigations of the relationship between group consciousness and political behavior, this literature has primarily focused on the African American population, placing less emphasis on the Latino community (see Stokes, 2003 and Lien, 1994 for exceptions). Gaining an understanding of how group consciousness influences political participation rates, partisanship and ideology, policy preferences and propensity to perceive commonality with African Americans will greatly add to the literatures of political science and racial/ethnic studies.

In addition, while there have been major strides taken in this area with the application of group consciousness to Latinos in recent years, these studies have either lacked a sample of multiple Latino sub-groups (Lien, 1995; Padilla, 1985) or have not utilized current data (Stokes, 2003). . For example, the Lien piece only includes Mexicans in the analysis. While Mexicans are the largest Latino group, a study based on

group consciousness is not very meaningful if it does not tap into the panethnic nature of the Latino population.

The Stokes (2003) piece is particularly promising due to the inclusion of multiple Latino nationality groups. However, the data used in the study (LNPS 1989), while containing very comprehensive group consciousness measures, is somewhat dated. Given the huge immigration shifts in the 1990's, and migration of Latinos into new regions of the country it is likely that factors within the Latino community, particularly in regard to group consciousness have changed somewhat. With the advent of new data and continued analysis the relationship between group consciousness and political behavior will become clearer. This analysis intends to shed light on this subject by testing the impact of all dimensions of group consciousness on multiple forms of Latino political behavior with contemporary data.

The greatest limitation in the literature of group consciousness has been ambiguity in measurement strategies for the concept of group consciousness. Many studies constrain their measurement of group consciousness to group identity, only one aspect of the complex concept.<sup>7</sup> For example, Uhlaner et. al. (1989) measured group consciousness using membership in American ethnic or non-ethnic organizations and social groups. Similarly, Olsen (1970) focused on blacks who had identified themselves as members of an ethnic minority versus those who did not. Verba and Nie (1972) used an index that summed the number of times black respondents referred to race in responses to several open ended questions.


---

<sup>7</sup> See Stokes 2003 for a discussion of these studies.


Group identification is only a measure of one dimension of consciousness. Individuals may develop an overall sense of belonging to a group due to economic or social circumstances, however they may lack conscious loyalty to the group because they do not perceive that the group lacks access to resources when compared to other groups. This leads McClain and Stewart (2002) to argue that there are two measures needed to analyze group cohesion among racial and ethnic groups; the degree of closeness an individual feels to other people in the group with respect to ideas and feelings about issues, and the degree of perceived discrimination against both the individual and one's group. It is clear that studies must use a multidimensional conception of group consciousness in order to gain an accurate assessment of how this concept impacts political behavior. By providing multiple measures of group consciousness that cover all of the theoretical dimensions of the concept, this dissertation provides the most comprehensive analysis of group consciousness.

## Appendix Tables

**Table 1.1 Latino Commonality Frequencies Over Time**






Latino Commonality Values: 1) Not Very Similar 2) Somewhat Similar 3) Very Similar



Latino Commonality Values: 1 indicates that a respondent has no sense of commonality with any of the Latino sub-groups, 7 indicates a strong sense of commonality with all Latino sub-groups

**Table 1.2 Perceived Discrimination Over Time**



**Table 1.3 Collective Action Frequency in 1999<sup>8</sup>**

<sup>8</sup> Collective action measure not available in LNPS (1989)

## **CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT STRATEGY FOR VARIABLE CLUSTERS**

### **Conceptualization and Measurement Strategy**

My general discussion of the literatures associated with political behavior has identified several factors that must be controlled for when testing the role of group consciousness in Latino political behavior. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed discussion of how the factors used most pervasively in this dissertation are measured. While all of the factors discussed in this chapter are used repetitively throughout the dissertation, there are other variables that are unique to one particular empirical chapter. The presentation of measurement strategies for these more chapter specific measures are included within the chapter that they appear for organizational purposes. In addition, each empirical chapter provides a graphed outline of all explanatory variables included in the analysis.

The array of more pervasive contributing factors is grouped into five clusters representing the different perspectives attempting to explain Latino political behavior. These clusters are group consciousness (Latino commonality, shared political interests, perceived discrimination), SES/Demographic factors (income, education, work status, gender, age, Catholicism), political orientations (assimilation, efficacy, political interest, ideology, party perception), political mobilization (Latino elected officials, Latino political organizations), political activities and experiences (Latino specific participation, discrimination experience), cultural factors (nativity, English proficiency, length of time

in U.S., citizenship status, and generational distance), and national origin (Cuban, Central/South American, Caribbean Latinos). Table one clearly identifies all contributing factors included in each cluster graphically. A discussion of the variable construction within each variable cluster will provide a background for the statistical analyses that drive the various empirical chapters of this dissertation.

(Insert Table 2.1 About Here)

## **2.1 Group Consciousness Cluster**

The concept of group consciousness suggests that the effects of group affinity and collective orientations are felt within Latino sub-groups (Puerto Rican, Columbian, Mexican etc.), as well as the broader pan ethnic grouping of Latino. I agree with Miller et al. (1981) that proper conceptualization of group consciousness requires the employment of multiple measures to tap into the main dimensions of group consciousness. Past literature suggests that there are three general dimensions of group consciousness; 1) general identification with a group, 2) an awareness of that group's relative position in society, and 3) the desire to engage in collective activity that focuses on improving the situation of that group (Gurin et al., 1980; Padilla, 1985; J. J. Garcia, 2003). Fortunately, the Washington Post survey provides the opportunity to capture all three aspects of group consciousness for Latinos.

To capture the first dimension of group consciousness, a group commonality index was created using a battery of questions asking respondents how much he or she

felt in common with other Latino sub-groups.<sup>9</sup> Respondents were given a score based on their response to the set of questions. For example, a response of a lot in common received +2 points, a fair amount in common +1, only a little in common -1, and nothing in common -2. These scores were used to construct an index that consists of seven values running from no sense of Latino commonality to a strong sense of commonality with all Latino sub-groups (Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Central/South Americans). There is significant variation in this measure, as just under 10 percent of respondents are in the two highest commonality categories, while approximately 30 percent are within the two lowest categories.

In addition to general commonality, a measure of Latino political commonality is also included in the group consciousness cluster. The political commonality measure was based on responses from the following survey question; *Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Latinos in the United States share FEW political interests and goals?* The two values for this variable are 0) no commonality (agree) and 1) commonality (disagree). The addition of the measure tapping into the extent of common political interest among the Latino population allows for the distinction to be made between social and political commonality, an advantage over other studies of group consciousness.

Beyond notions of commonality, group consciousness requires that individuals recognize that their group shares a disadvantaged position in society. I employ a measure

---

<sup>9</sup> The Cronbach's Alpha statistic of .876 indicates with great confidence that these survey questions can be scaled to create the Latino Commonality variable.

of perceived discrimination to capture this component of group consciousness based on responses from the following survey questions; *Is discrimination against Latinos in our society today a problem or not? And, is it a big problem or not such a big problem?* A three point scale is used as a measure of discrimination with the following values 0) those individuals who believe discrimination is not a problem 1) those who indicate that discrimination is a problem for Latinos but not a big problem 2) and those who believe that it is a big problem for Latinos.

The final component of group consciousness is the desire to improve the disadvantaged societal position of ones group through collective action. I use the following survey question as an indicator of ones belief that collective action can improve the groups position in society; *Do you think that if various Latinos groups worked together politically Latinos would be better off, worse off, or wouldn't make much difference?* The values of this final component of group consciousness are 0) worse off 1) no difference 2) better off. The inclusion of these four measures effectively captures all dimensions of group consciousness, an advantage over most other studies interested in the relationship between group consciousness and political participation.

## **2.2 Socio-Economic Status and Demographic Cluster**

In order to assess the individual and cumulative impact of SES on Latino partisanship, measures for income, education, and work status are included in this analysis. The 1999 Post/Kaiser survey contains an annual household income variable, consisting of a nine-point income scale. The scale ranges from less than \$20,000 per year

to \$100,000 or more per year. Included in the middle of the scale are those respondents who reported an unspecified annual household income of more than \$50,000. This variable will provide the relationship between participation and income, indicating possible differences between high and low income respondents.

In addition to income, education is included as another socio-economic status variable along with work-status. The education measure is derived from answers to the survey question; *what is the last grade that you completed in school?* The values of the education variable are; 0) <9<sup>th</sup> grade 1) some high school 2) high school graduate 3) vocational training 4) some college 5) college graduate 6) post graduate training. The final SES measure, work-status has three values; 0) students/ homemakers/ retired 1) unemployed 2) employed. In addition to socio-economic status, demographic indicators consisting of gender and age will also be included in this cluster of influencing factors. Gender is a dichotomous variable 0) women, 1) men and age is continuous with the youngest respondent being 18 and the oldest being 90. Finally, Catholicism is also dichotomous measure 0) non-Catholic 1) Catholic and is based on the following survey question; *What is your religious preference?*

### **2.3 Political Orientations Cluster**

The survey instrument also includes several indicators of the political attitudes of the respondents, including the following political orientations used pervasively throughout the dissertation; assimilation, efficacy toward politics and government, party perception, ideology and political interest, and partisanship. These concepts all tap into

the respondent's attitudes toward the political process, and therefore will be used as measures of political orientations. The concept of assimilation is a process in which the immigrant group leaves his or her customs, cultural practices, social networks and blends into the American society (J. Garcia, 2003). The following survey question was used to measure assimilation; *How important is it for Latinos to change so that they blend into the larger society as in the idea of a melting pot?*

Efficacy is the notion of increased trust and/or feelings of affinity toward government institutions, and politics more generally. Again, there are two forms of efficacy that have been identified to have an impact on political participation, internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy is based on the notion of whether or not an individual can make an impact on politics. This concept is measured with the following survey item. Please tell me how you feel about the following statement; *political leaders do not care much what people like me think..* The values of the variable are 0) strongly agree 1) agree 2) disagree 3) strongly disagree. External efficacy on the other hand is based on a level of trust an individual has in government institutions. The following survey item is used to measure this concept; *How much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right?* The values of this variable are 0) never 1) some of the time 2) most of the time 3) just about always. Higher values on both efficacy measures indicate greater levels of efficacy.

The survey includes an indicator of respondent's perception of how concerned each party is with the Latino community. The party perception variable consists of the following values; 0) Republican 1) no difference 2) Democrat, based on responses to the

following survey item; *Which party do you think has more concern for Latinos?* In addition, a simple three-point ideology scale (0= Liberal, 1=Moderate, 2= Conservative) will be employed to consider the impact of ideology on party acquisition, choice and strength. The political orientation cluster also includes a measure of interest in politics. The following question was used to construct the political interest variable; *How much attention would you say you pay to politics and government?* The political interest variable has four values; 0) none 1) not much 2) a fair amount 3) a lot. Finally, partisanship is included in multiple chapters and has the following categories; 0) Republican 1) Independent 2) Democrat. The partisanship measure is based on the following survey item; *In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?*

## **2.4 Contextual Factor Cluster**

Contextual data has been used throughout this dissertation to tap into the impact of mobilization on the relationship between group consciousness and political behavior. The three contextual variables used most pervasively are political organizations, and Latino representatives. To collect contextual data, I collected and coded documents and reports from the National Association of Latino Elected Officials, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute. I collected data for states for the year 2000, as this was the year the Pew Hispanic Center survey was conducted. The contextual variables included in this analysis that are theorized to have an impact on Latino public opinion are; the number of Latino elected officials, the number of Latino political organizations, the

number of civic organizations, and black population. Both political organizations and elected officials are based on state level data.

To test the relationship between descriptive representation and public opinion, I use a measure of Latino elected officials at both the national and state level for 2000 using data collected from the National Association of Elected Officials. The organization publishes an annual directory that includes the names, addresses, and party affiliations for each Latino elected official organized by jurisdiction. I coded the number of Latino Congress- people, U.S. senators, state senators and representatives, and governors for each state included in the analysis.

Further, given the potential of minority organizations to provide information to members and therefore shape public opinion preferences, I coded the number of Latino political organizations in each state using data collected from the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute (CHCI) for 2000. The directory lists each organizations headquarters and contact information, its founding date, and its stated goal or mission statement. I coded organizations as political if they included in their mission statement descriptors such as “mobilize voters”, “political involvement”, or “register voters”. Then I would research through websites or if necessary contact each Latino political organization to determine how many chapters the organization has within each state included in the analysis. The second step provides very valuable variation in the Latino organization variable, and provides a much clearer picture of the relationship between political organizations and participation.

I coded the number of Latino advocacy organizations in each state using data collected from the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute (CHCI) for 2000. The directory lists each organizations headquarters and contact information, its founding date, and its stated goal or mission statement. I define civic organizations as those that work to promote cultural pride or sensitivity and address problems of discrimination and inequalities. Therefore the descriptors used to code civic organizations were “advance discrimination”, “civil rights”, or “cultural awareness”. I would then research organization websites, or if necessary, contact each Latino political organization to determine how many chapters the organization has within each state included in the analysis. Finally, I include the number of African Americans living within the state of the respondent in this analysis. By identifying the state of residence for each survey respondent I simply identified the African American population in each state in which respondents were interviewed in the Pew Center survey according to the 2000 Census Brief on Black population.<sup>10</sup>

## **2.5 Political Activities and Experiences Cluster**

The survey instrument also includes several indicators of both political activities and experiences of the respondents. The most pervasive political activity and experience measures used in the dissertation are; Latino specific participation and discrimination experience. In order to assess the impact of participating in political activities on

---

<sup>10</sup> The Pew Hispanic Center 2000 survey interviewed and identified respondents from the following locations; California, Illinois, Texas, Florida, New York and Washington D.C. However, 106 respondents are coded as National in the survey and are not able to be tied to a specific state. For these respondents averages were conducted for each mobilization measure from the five states with the next largest populations. Those states are: Arizona, New Jersey, New Mexico, Colorado, and Massachusetts.

partisanship, I have included a measure for participation in Latino specific political activities.<sup>11</sup> The Latino specific index is based on a cumulative score among the Latino respondents regarding their participation or not for three Latino-specific political activities within the last ten years; working for a Latino candidate, attending a demonstration or meeting based on Latino issues, or contributing money to a Latino candidate.<sup>12</sup> The values of this variable and distributions consist of; 0) participation in none of these activities (1583), 1) participation in one activity (536), 2) participation in two activities (212), and 3) participation in all three activities (86).

The final component of the political activity and experience cluster included in the analysis is experience with discrimination. This measure is distinct from the group consciousness measure of perceived discrimination, as experience with discrimination taps directly into respondents personal occurrences with discrimination. The variable has the following values; 0) no experience 1) indirect experience-family member or close friend had been discriminated against 2) direct experience respondent personally faced discrimination. This variable was coded utilizing responses from the following two survey questions; *During the last 5 years, have you, a family member, or a close friend experienced discrimination because of your racial or ethnic background, or not? And, was that you personally or was that someone else?* Individuals who report that neither themselves or loved on have experienced discrimination are coded as having no

---

<sup>11</sup> A measure for voting was originally included in this analysis, however it was dropped due to extreme collinearity with citizenship status. However, in models including voting, voters were more likely to be strong partisans, and less likely to be political independents.

<sup>12</sup> The Cronbach's Alpha statistic of .562 indicates that these survey questions can be scaled to create the Latino specific participation variable.

experience, those indicating that they have not experienced discrimination but loved on has are coded as having indirect experience, and those who have experienced discrimination are coded as having direct experience.

## 2.6 Cultural Factor Cluster

In addition to the various contributing factors described to this point, studies of Latino political behavior suggest that there are several cultural factors that must be accounted for when analyzing the political activity of Latinos. In order to measure the impact of this phenomenon, measures of nativity, citizenship status, English proficiency, and length of time us U.S. are used pervasively throughout the dissertation as part of the cultural factor cluster. Both nativity and citizenship are operationalized as dichotomous variables.<sup>13</sup> The values of nativity are 0) foreign-born 1) native born, and those for citizenship status are 0) non-citizen 1) citizen.

English proficiency is determined by a series of questions that tap into the familiarity with English that respondents exhibit consisting of how well respondents can speak and read English, as well as which language they prefer instructions to be in. The English proficiency scale tunes from 0) non-proficient through 3) highly proficient. Finally, the analysis includes a measure for time spent in the United States. In regard to time in the U.S., respondents who were born outside of the U.S. were asked; *How many years they have lived in the United States?* In order to maintain those respondents who were born in the U.S. in the analysis, the ages of the U.S. born were used for years lived

---

<sup>13</sup> The correlation statistic (Chi Square .6) suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue here; in addition these measures were tested individually and collectively through the use of a scaled variable with no change in direction or statistical significance in any of the models

in the United States. The variable is coded into the following categories; 0) 01-12 1) 13-24 2) 25-36 3) 37-49 4) 50-97.

## 2.7 National Origin Cluster

There is a general question about whether or not group consciousness is relevant only within the context of individual Latino sub-groups, or if group consciousness extends beyond national origin boundaries. In order to offer some insight into this question I include a series of national origin dummy variables in the dissertation. This strategy will allow for a discussion of whether there remains a need to analyze Latinos as a set of separate individual ethnic enclaves, or one more cohesive community. If this analysis reveals meaningful differences in the relationship between contributing factors and the three partisanship measures across national origin population, there will be initial support for the need to continue to account for national origin in studies of Latino political behavior or identity.

To account for national origin, dummy variables are constructed for Cubans, Central/South Americans, and Caribbean Latinos, with Mexicans serving as the comparison population. Interestingly, being of Mexican origin was not significantly correlated with any dimension of partisanship, providing support for the decision to use this group as the comparison population in the analysis.<sup>14</sup> All variables were coded based on the following set of survey questions; *Earlier you said you were Hispanic or Latino, what country did your family of ancestors come from? Which country do you identify with*

---

<sup>14</sup> The decision to use the Mexican population as the base category for national origin variable construction was based on the size of the Mexican population. Further, all models used here were also run with Mexicans included in the analysis, and regardless of sub-group combination Mexicans were not significantly related to any dimension of partisanship.

*more?* Each dummy variable utilizes the same coding strategy, 0) non-Cuban 1) Cuban, 0) Central/South American 1) non-Central/South American, non-Caribbean 1) Caribbean. The Caribbean variable includes Latinos of both Puerto Rican and Dominican descent. The decision to combine these two populations is based on the proximity of those two countries, as well as the regional concentration of those two communities in the United States.

## Appendix Tables

**Table 2.1     Contributing Factors Organized by Variable Cluster**

<b>Group Consciousness</b>	<b>Political Orientations</b>	<b>Activities/Experiences</b>
Commonality	Assimilation	Latino Specific Participation
Political Commonality	Internal Efficacy	Discrimination Experience
Perceived Discrimination	External Efficacy	<b>Cultural Factors</b>
Collective Action	Party Perception	Nativity
<b>SES-Demographics</b>	Ideology	Citizenship Status
Income	Political Interest	English Proficiency
Education	Partisanship	Length of Time in U.S.
Work Status	<b>Contextual Factors</b>	<b>National Origin</b>
Gender	Political Organizations	Cuban
Age	Civic Organizations	Central/South American
Catholicism	Latino Representatives	Caribbean Latinos
	Black Population	

### CHAPTER 3

## GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS AND LATINO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

### Statement of Research Question

Historically, Latinos have had much lower rates of voter registration and turnout than both Whites and African Americans. The gap in voter registration between Whites and African Americans has closed significantly since the 1960's, however the gap between White and Latino voter registration rates has remained considerably wider, with a difference of 30.7 percent among the voting age population in 2000 (U.S Census Bureau, 2002). While scholars have provided several explanations for this trend, this study attempts to add to this literature by testing dominant theories of political participation in conjunction with the concept of group consciousness. Through an examination of the relationship between group consciousness and political participation (voting and Latino specific) among Latinos, this study suggests that the gap in voting participation among Latinos may be partially explained by the inability of group consciousness to motivate participation among Latinos and compensate for other political resource differences.

The primary goal of this study is to investigate the relationship between political participation and group consciousness, with group consciousness being defined as when a group maintains a sense of affinity and group identification with other members of the group that leads to a collective orientation to become more politically involved (J. Garcia, 2003). This study attempts to clarify the influence that group consciousness or solidarity has on both voting and Latino specific participation for Latinos, and the possible

implications that this relationship may have on the American political system. Testing competing theories of participation may provide a new modified model of political participation for Latinos.

### **3.1 Theoretical Framework/ Literature Review**

Political participation is generally defined as a set of activities citizens utilize in order to influence the structure of government, the selection of government officials, or the policies of government (Conway, 2000). Political participation provides citizens of the American democracy the opportunity to communicate information to government officials about their interests and concerns, and is also the mechanism that individuals may use to put pressure on officials to respond to those interests and concerns. Although there are many different methods of participating in politics, voting is the most common and most analyzed political act (Verba et. al, 1995).

Despite the tremendous value of engaging in political activity, interest and participation in the political process has been declining in the United States (Putnam, 2000; Neimi & Weisberg, 2001; Crenson & Ginsberg, 2002). For example, the right to vote is arguable one of the most important rights of citizenship in a democratic society, however a substantial number of U.S. citizens choose not to exercise this right. Census data indicates that 55 percent of the voting-age population (those 18 and over) reported voting in the 2000 presidential election, nearly identical to the record low 54 percent recorded for the 1996 election (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002).

If participating in politics is at the core of democracy, why does nearly half of the voting-age population refrain from the most common form of participation, voting? The study of political involvement has a long-standing and rich history in the social sciences. Scholars have developed several theories intended to explain why some individuals participate in American politics while others do not. Within this vast literature pertaining to political participation is a growing interest in racial/ethnic differences in political activity, particularly those between Anglo whites and African Americans (see for example Verba et. al, 1995; Leighley and Velditz, 1999; Conway, 2000). It is my intent here to briefly summarize a few of the dominant theories of political participation that will be tested against the group consciousness model of participation in this analysis, along with several other key factors that scholars of minority political participation have found to be pertinent to investigations of Latino political activity.

#### Socio-Economic Status Model of Participation

The first theory that I will discuss is the socio-economic status model, or SES model of participation (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978). This model posits that differences in educational attainment, occupational status, and income among political participants are motivating factors for participation. The classic application of this approach was by Verba and Nie (1972) who developed the “baseline model” of political participation. This model consisted of an expected level of participation based on educational, income, and occupational variables that are generally not affected by other individual characteristics. In short, persons with higher levels of schooling,

particularly post-secondary, and positioned in professional/managerial positions earning above median income levels are more likely to be politically involved. Increased education is associated with greater familiarity with the political system, knowledge and information, greater political trust and efficacy, and skills that are valuable in political arenas. Similarly, having higher status occupations places an individual to be concerned about public policies and political representatives.

For example, the high rate of political involvement among lawyers is partially explained by the nature of their work and their interaction with political institutions. Finally, individuals at higher income levels have the opportunities, motivation, and resources to become involved politically. For example, individuals that are more affluent may feel that they have a direct economic incentive to becoming involved in political affairs given their propensity to invest in companies etc., whose value may be challenged by detrimental policies. In addition, they are more likely to be contacted by organizations, and/or political officials for support and input (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1994). As a result, the socio-economic status model focuses upon the resources that an individual has acquired that have value and enhances one's ability to be involved politically in effective ways.

Scholars applying the SES model, or variations of the model have found that participation input is heavily skewed in the direction of the upper class (Verba and Nie, 1972). For example, among the most active citizens, 57 percent come from the top thirds

of the status hierarchy and only 14 percent come from the lower third.<sup>15</sup> While the SES model applied by Verba and Nie held across most modes of participation, it had relatively no impact on particularized contacting. Further, in the United States social class was suggested to be the major dividing line between participants and non-participants (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978). When taking into account potential social cleavages (race, region etc.), there is less deviation from the SES model of participation in the U.S. than the authors expected. The largest upper-status group within their study had close institutional ties and was highly active, while the most inhibited groups come from the lower level of their socio-economic scale (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978). These general findings from early proponents of the SES model have been supported by a plethora of other studies who have found that SES, measured individually or as a whole is a strong predictor of political participation (Verba et al., 1993; Leighly, 1990; Kenny, 1992). Therefore, measures for education, income, and work status are included in this analysis on Latino political participation.

#### The Political Mobilization Model of Participation

While most literature on political participation rests on the factors that lead an individual to choose to participate in political ventures, there is also a focus on external factors. A key perspective in this realm can be described as the mobilization model of participation (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) define mobilization as the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce

---

<sup>15</sup> Verba and Nie use a combined SES measure consisting of educational level, household income, and occupational status. They do not investigate the individual impact of each SES component.

other people to participate. That is, rather than the person initiating his/her political involvement, others ask the person to participate. Mobilization provides individuals with political information that they might not otherwise acquire, adds psychological benefit to participation, and possibly skills needed to participate (Leighley, 2001). In most cases, it is directed toward support for certain candidates, issues, or specific referendum. In a basic sense a person gets involved because he/she is asked.

Not all persons are contacted to become politically involved. Political leaders are strategic actors, wanting to maximize the number of people involved with the least amount of costs. The mobilizing groups are therefore more inclined to contact persons who are more likely to respond and have the political resources to be politically active. In many respects this translates to persons in higher occupational positions, higher educational levels, organizationally involved, older, and in higher income categories. In short, those who are most likely to respond by participating (Huckdeltdt & Sprague, 1987).

The link between mobilization and participation is a strong one, as those who are contacted by mobilizing agents are more likely to participate across a wide range of political activities. In particular, studies of Latino political participation reaffirm the role of mobilization in increasing political participation. Whether based on single cases (de la Garza, Menchaca, De Sipio, 1994; Hero, 1992; Pachon, 1985) or representative samples (de la Garza and Abrajano, 2002; Leighley, 2001; Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee, 2000), this research reaches the same general conclusions. First, Latinos who have been directly contacted by Latino organizations are significantly more likely to participate than those

who have not been contacted (de la Garza and Abrajano, 2002; Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee, 2000; J. Garcia & Sanchez, 2004). Political organizations are a critical mobilizing agent. For example, Vigil (1987) contends that Latino organizations serve as the vanguard for social, political, and economic opportunity for Latinos in the U.S. because they mobilize constituencies to obtain collective goods. Further, being contacted by a Latino organization was second only to income in motivating voting for Latinos in the 1996 election (Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee, 2000).

The second general conclusion is that Latinos are less likely to be personally contacted (Leghley, 2001; Verba et al, 1995). In fact, Latinos report being asked to participate at a lower rate (25 percent) than both Whites (56 percent) and African Americans (40 percent) (Verba et al, 1995). Theories based upon the mobilization principle posit that Latinos appear to participate at lower levels than other groups because most issue agendas, candidates, party and group activities are not geared toward mobilizing Latino voters. Therefore, the recent increase in Latino turnout is in spite of a lack of significant mobilization efforts (DeSipio, de la Garza and Seltzer, 1999). This may partially explain lower levels of Latino political participation, particularly in regard to non-electoral participation (J. Garcia & Sanchez, 2004).

Recent studies of minority political participation investigate the impact of descriptive representation on mobilization (Leighley, 2001; Barreto et. al, 2003). Analyzing Texas, Leighley (2001) finds that neither group size, nor the presence of a Black or Latino mayor has an impact on mobilization of Blacks and Latinos. Social class (measured with education, family income etc.) was the most consistent predictor of

mobilization across all racial/ethnic groups. However, Barreto et al. (2003) suggest that descriptive representation is better-measured using state and federal legislatures than mayorship, as Latino mayors have varying duties and power. Latinos with at least one Latino representative reported being contacted at higher rates than those without a Latino representative (Barreto et al, 2003). Despite debate regarding measurement, the presence of Latino elected officials is critical in the mobilization process. As a result, Latino representation at the federal and state level will be used as a measure for mobilization in this analysis.

Finally, certain issues are more likely to mobilize particular groups than others. For example, Pantoja et al. (2001) suggest that contextual factors such as the timing and context (political climate, incentives etc.) of naturalization must be accounted for when discussing mobilization of immigrants. In fact, it appears as though Latinos naturalized in California during the politically charged anti-Latino policy era were more likely to participate than those naturalized in other setting, and more likely to participate than U.S. born Latinos. Pantoja et al. contend that issues in California (Prop. 187) served as a mobilizing agent for Latino immigrants. Therefore, a measure for initiatives and referenda that are salient to Latinos is included in this analysis.

### The Role of Political Attitudes/Orientations in Political Participation

The study of political involvement has also indicated that political attitudes or orientations are also correlated with political participation. The political culture model of participation holds that political efficacy, trust, and engagement impact political

involvement (Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba et al., 1995). Engagement, which is typically measured by the general interest an individual has in political affairs has been shown to be positively correlated with political participation and is the foundation for other political attitudes, including political efficacy, political interest and trust (Verba et al., 1995; Liu, 2001).

Political efficacy can be either internal or external, with internal efficacy being defined as whether or not an individual believes that he or she can make a difference in politics. Studies such as Campbell et al. (1964) suggest that individuals who believe that political leaders do not care what people like themselves think are more likely to refrain from participating in politics. External efficacy, much like trust requires that individuals believe that government institutions are legitimate (see Almond and Verba, 1963 or Campbell et al. 1964 for a more detailed discussion of the discussion). Social trust, or trust in others in society also has been suggested to have an impact on political participation (Putnam, 2000), with those individuals who express lower levels of trust in others being less likely to participate. Given the attention paid to political orientations in the extant research, I include measures for political interest, internal and external efficacy, as well as acculturation and assimilation in this study.

### The Role of Group Consciousness in Political Participation

The final model of participation that is the focus of this analysis is the group consciousness model of participation. Theories based on Verba and Nie's group consciousness model of participation have been the most helpful framework to explain

political behavior among minority groups. Group consciousness is developed when members of a group recognize their status as being part of a deprived group (Miller et al., 1981). It is this sense of commonality and shared circumstances that encourages groups to become involved politically, partially explaining relatively high rates of political participation among disadvantaged groups (Verba and Nie, 1972; Olsen, 1970). There has been literature analyzing the relationship between group consciousness and political participation for some time (Olsen, 1970; Verba & Nie, 1972; Miller & Gurin, 1980; Miller et al., 1981), but not until recently has this work moved beyond a focus on African Americans. The early literature in this area found that when socio-economic status is controlled, African Americans tend to participate at higher rates than Whites across several modes of participation (Olsen, 1970; Verba & Nie, 1972). The concept of group consciousness has been suggested as the explanation for this empirical trend.

There has been some debate within the minority political behavior literature as to the impact of group consciousness on minority political participation. Research in the discipline of political science has provided evidence that the related concepts of group cohesion or solidarity is associated with increased levels of political participation (Stokes, 2003; McClain and Stewart, 2002; Miller et. al, 1981).<sup>16</sup> Those in this camp argue that group consciousness involves recognizing a shared marginalized status with others in your group, and motivates individuals to act collectively to gain access to political resources. Miller et. al. (1981) find that while group consciousness has the strongest

---

<sup>16</sup> Research in this area utilizes various terms that are very similar both conceptually and in measurement to refer to group consciousness, including; solidarity, group cohesion, collective identity. I will use these terms interchangeably in this essay.

impact on political participation for African Americans, it is also evident for women and the poor. Perceptions of group cohesion are credited for the relative unity in the policy preferences of African Americans (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989) as well as relative homogeneity in partisanship and voting behavior (Tate 1993; Dawson 1994). The relationship between group consciousness and political participation is not exclusive to African Americans. Stokes (2003) finds that group consciousness increases Latino political participation, but in varying manners across the various Latino subgroups.

Despite convincing evidence that group consciousness does motivate political participation, others disagree. Verba et. al. (1995) found that group consciousness does not have an impact on political participation when other factors are included within a multivariate context. In addition, Wilcox and Gomez (1990) found that group consciousness is not a strong predictor of participation for African Americans, while Leihley and Vedlitz (1999) find that group consciousness fails to account for political engagement among several racial and ethnic groups.

I believe that at least some of this debate is a result of ambiguity in measurement. Many studies constrain their measurement of group consciousness to group identity, only one aspect of the complex concept.<sup>17</sup> For example, Uhlaner et. al. (1989) measured group consciousness using membership in American ethnic or non-ethnic organizations and social groups. Similarly, Olsen (1970) focused on blacks who had identified themselves as members of an ethnic minority versus those who did not. Verba and Nie (1972) used

---

<sup>17</sup> See Stokes 2003 for a discussion of these studies.

an index that summed the number of times black respondents referred to race in responses to several open ended questions.

Group identification is only a measure of one dimension of consciousness. Individuals may develop an overall sense of belonging to a group due to economic or social circumstances, however they may lack conscious loyalty to the group because they do not perceive that the group lacks access to resources when compared to other groups. This leads McClain and Stewart (2002) to argue that there are two measures needed to analyze group cohesion among racial and ethnic groups; the degree of closeness an individual feels to other people in the group with respect to ideas and feelings about issues, and the degree of perceived discrimination against both the individual and one's group. It is clear that studies must use a multidimensional conception of group consciousness in order to gain an accurate assessment of its impact on political participation.

Fortunately recent studies tapping into group consciousness have begun to incorporate the multidimensional nature of the concept (Stokes, 2003; Lien, 1994). While these studies have made steps in the right direction, there remains room for improvement. For example, the Lien piece only includes Mexicans in the analysis. While Mexicans are the largest Latino group, as indicated in the introductory chapter, this study based on pan-ethnic group consciousness attempts to tap into the pan ethnic nature of the Latino population and whether or not group identification is present beyond the national origin level among the Latino community.

The Stokes (2003) piece is particularly promising due to the inclusion of multiple Latino nationality groups. However, the data used in the study (LNPS 1989), while containing very comprehensive group consciousness measures, is somewhat dated. Given the huge immigration shifts in the 1990's, and migration of Latinos into new regions of the country it is likely that factors within the Latino community, particularly in regard to group consciousness have changed somewhat. With the advent of new data and continued analysis the relationship between group consciousness and political participation will become clearer. This analysis intends to shed light on this subject by testing the impact of all dimensions of group consciousness on multiple forms of Latino political participation with contemporary data.

#### Latino Cultural Factors That Impact Political Participation

In addition to the models of political participation described to this point, studies of Latino political participation suggest that there are several cultural factors that must be accounted for when analyzing the political activity of Latinos. The proportion of Latinos that is foreign-born represents an electoral liability. Almost two out of every five Latinos are foreign-born, with the percentage varying by subgroups. For example for Cubans it is over 70 percent and similarly for El Salvadorans (J. Garcia and Sanchez, 2004). This trend become salient when coupled with overall lower naturalization rates among Latinos. While the overall naturalization rates for all foreign-born is approximately 50 percent (INS, 2000), Latino naturalization rates range from 20 percent to 45 percent. As a result, the large and growing population base for Latinos is reduced significantly in terms

of possible voters due to citizenship status. In fact, many studies have indicated that when citizenship status is controlled for, the voter registration and voting rates of Latinos is much closer to Whites (de la Garza & DeSipio, 1992; Hero, 1992; Uhlaner et al., 1989). Related to citizenship status and naturalization is the notion of length of time living in the United States. Scholars have indicated that Latinos with longer residence in the United States are more likely to participate in U.S. politics (Uhlaner et al., 1989).

Finally, language has been consistently identified as a dominant influencing factor of Latino political participation, as English-speaking Latinos have greater access to the resources necessary to participate (de la Garza & DeSipio, 1992; Uhlaner et al., 1989). Recent national surveys of Latinos suggest that Puerto Ricans are the most proficient with the English language, with only 13.6 percent of Puerto Ricans being non-proficient and nearly 70 percent indicating English as their primary language usage. In comparison, 54 percent of Salvadorans are non-proficient in English, and only 72 percent of Salvadorans use English as the primary language (J. Garcia and Sanchez, 2004). Although virtually all application forms, including voter registration, are available in Spanish, inability to function with English may suppress political participation by increasing the cost of political information.

### **3.2 Hypotheses/Anticipated Findings**

Investigation of the relevance of group consciousness among the Latino community relative to more comprehensive approaches to political participation creates a theoretical framework that is based upon differential impact of group consciousness on

voting and Latino specific political activity. Several hypotheses naturally develop from this investigation. **Hypothesis 1:** There is a positive and significant relationship between group consciousness and both voter registration and voting for Latinos at the individual level, particularly before introducing the other variable clusters into the model. I anticipate finding data that reveals group consciousness does play a role in motivating voting for Latinos. **Hypothesis 2:** The impact of group consciousness on political participation is weakened but still significant after the remaining variable clusters (SES, Political Orientations, Mobilization and Cultural Factors) are introduced into the model.

**Hypothesis 3:** There is a positive and significant relationship between group consciousness and Latino specific political participation, with the impact of group consciousness being stronger than affecting voting levels. Given the nature of engaging in political activities that directly improve the status of Latinos, I anticipate that group consciousness will prove to be more meaningful in the context of Latino specific participation than voting. **Hypothesis 4:** The positive relationship between group consciousness and Latino specific participation will remain significant after the full Latino specific model (including S.E.S./mobilization/political attitudes/culture) is specified (see figure one for visual of full model). This is again based on the notion that group consciousness will have a greater impact on Latino specific participation than it will on voting.

### **Dependent Variable Measurement Strategy**

Political participation is defined in this study as voting in national elections and Latino specific participation. The dependent variable for the voting model is operationalized through a scaled measure of voter registration and voting. This study utilizes a voter index indicating whether an individual is a likely voter. The values and distribution for this variable are; 0) not registered (342) 1) registered and non-voter (165) 2) registered and have voted in the past (363) and 3) frequent voter (664). Frequent voters are those respondents who are currently registered, who voted in the 1996 Presidential election, as well as the 1998 Congressional election, and thus likely to vote in future elections. It is important to note that citizenship status is not included in the voting model, as non-citizens are not able to fill the lowest value of the scale, registered non-voter.

The dependent variable for the Latino specific model is a Latino specific index based on a cumulative score among the Latino respondents regarding their participation or not for three Latino-specific political activities within the last ten years; working for a Latino candidate, attending a demonstration or meeting based on Latino issues, or contributing money to a Latino candidate.<sup>18</sup> The values of this variable and distributions consist of; 0) participation in none of these activities (1583), 1) participation in one activity (536), 2) participation in two activities (212), and 3) participation in all three activities (86).

---

<sup>18</sup> The Cronbach's Alpha statistic of .562 indicates that these survey questions can be scaled to create the Latino specific participation variable.

### **Independent Variable Measurement**

My general discussion of the participation literature has identified several factors that may impact political participation. This array of factors is grouped into five clusters representing the different perspectives attempting to explain electoral participation. These clusters are group consciousness (Latino commonality, shared political interests, perceived discrimination), SES/Demographic factors (income, education, work status, gender, age ), political orientations (assimilation, acculturation, efficacy, political interest), political mobilization (Latino elected officials, Latino political organizations, Initiatives/Referendum) cultural factors (nativity, language, length of time in U.S., Citizenship Status, and generational distance) and national origin (Cuban, Central/South American, Caribbean Latinos). Table one clearly identifies all contributing factors included in each cluster graphically. Chapter two provides a full discussion of the operationalization and measurement strategy for all variables used in this analysis. Therefore, please refer to chapter two for any questions regarding variable measurement.

(Insert Table 3.1 About Here)

### **Testing Strategy/Model Specification**

The source of all the data introduced in this research paper originates from the 1999 survey of 2,417 Latinos conducted by the Washington Post, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University. Although Latino voting behavior is highly significant to the empirical political world, the lack of current well-designed survey data has been a strong hurdle for scholars of Latino politics. The Latino National Political

Survey, conducted in 1989, was undoubtedly the most complete survey available for the study of Latino political attitudes and behavior (de la Garza, et. al. 1992). However, both the political reality and perception of political viability among the general public have changed drastically over the last ten years. Comparisons made between previous studies of group consciousness based on LNPS data and this study utilizing more current data will possibly reveal if these changes in the Latino political landscape have had an impact on the relationship between group consciousness and political participation.

The Washington Post/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University National Survey on Latinos in America consists of 4,614 adults, with 2,417 Latinos in the sample. The study includes interviews with 818 Mexicans, 318 Puerto Ricans, 312 Cubans, and 593 Central or South Americans. Latino adults were interviewed in their choice of English or Spanish, with 53 percent of the Latino interviews conducted predominately in Spanish. The final results were weighted to the national Latino population as estimated by the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. This survey was conducted by telephone between June 30 and August 30, 1999 by the International Communications Research. My analysis is only concerned with the Latino respondents to this survey; therefore the non-Latino respondents were excluded from the model.

The survey is accompanied by a host of contextual variables created from original data that allows for greater depth to this analysis. By identifying the state of residence for each survey respondent I am able to include several state level measures that are expected to have an impact on political participation through mobilization for Latinos for the same

time period as the Pew Center survey.<sup>19</sup> These contextual variables will greatly add to this investigation of group consciousness and Latino political participation.

### **Multicollinearity Issues**

A correlation matrix was created for this model in order to test for the presence of multicollinearity, or high correlation between the explanatory variables. The presence of multicollinearity is problematic because the likelihood of finding statistical significance is decreased due to increased standard errors and smaller t-ratios (Schroeder et. al, 1986). The two explanatory variables with the greatest inter-correlation in the analysis are citizenship status and nativity, with a Pearson coefficient of .61.<sup>20</sup> In general, correlations below .7 or .8 are not of major concern for statistical analysis. In addition, these measures were tested individually and collectively through the use of a scaled variable with no change in direction or statistical significance in any of the models. There are only three other sets of explanatory variables with correlations greater than .5; age and length of time in the United States, citizenship status/length of time in the U.S., and English proficiency/nativity.

---

<sup>19</sup> The Pew Hispanic Center 2000 survey interviewed and identified respondents from the following locations; California, Illinois, Texas, Florida, New York and Washington D.C. However, 106 respondents are coded as National in the survey and are not able to be tied to a specific state. For these respondents averages were conducted for each mobilization measure from the five states with the next largest populations. Those states are: Arizona, New Jersey, New Mexico, Colorado, and Massachusetts.

<sup>20</sup> Due to high collinearity with citizenship status and length of time in the U.S., generational distance from ones home country was dropped from the analysis.

### **3.3 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Voting**

The first step of the data analysis is to investigate the impact that the group consciousness cluster has on political participation in terms of voting. Within the Multinomial Logit approach I have set those who are non-registered as the baseline category, allowing for comparisons to be made regarding the impact of group consciousness on voter registrants, voters, and frequent voters. Therefore all results are interpreted in comparison to non-participants. Throughout the analysis more attention will be focused on the frequent voter category, as those individuals who have voted in the previous two elections are most likely to participate in future elections. Table 3.2 indicates that political commonality is the only dimension of group consciousness that increases the odds of Latinos becoming registered or voting. However, group consciousness has a much greater impact on frequent voting. Specifically, three of the four group consciousness dimensions including Latino commonality and perceived discrimination are positively correlated with the high value for voting. In fact, collective action, the final dimension of group consciousness is the only component of the group consciousness cluster that does not motivate frequent voting in the isolated model.

(Insert Table 3.2 About Here)

As both general and political commonality increase among Latinos, the odds of an individual becoming a frequent voter are significantly greater than being non-registered. In addition, as Latinos perceive greater levels of discrimination directed toward their community, the odds of becoming frequent voters also increase. Therefore, consistent

with hypothesis one, before controlling for outside factors with the inclusion of the other variable clusters in the model, group consciousness does motivate voting for Latinos. The next step in the analysis is to specify the full model and assess the impact of group consciousness relative to other theories of political participation.

Multinomial Logit (MNL) is again used to test the impact of group consciousness relative to other theories of political participation on voter registration, voting, and frequent voting. Table 3.3 indicates that only three variables are significantly related to voter registration; commonality, length of time spent in the United States., and the national origin variable of Central/South American. I begin this discussion with general Latino commonality or perception of having commonalities with others outside of your national origin group, which is positively related to voter registration. As Latino commonality increases among Latinos, the odds of individuals becoming registered to vote also increase. Within the cultural factors variable cluster, as time lived in the United States increases the odds of individuals becoming registered to vote does as well. This makes intuitive sense, as people who have spent more time in the United States are more likely to be citizens and familiar with the U.S. political system. Finally, among the national origin variables, Central and South Americans are more likely to be registered to vote relative to the other Latino sub-groups.

(Insert Table 3.3 About Here)

Turning now to the impact of the full model on the propensity to vote, there are five factors that are significantly correlated with voting. Most importantly to this study, none of the group consciousness measures are significantly related to voting when

compared to the base category of non-registered. Being employed significantly increases that an individual will vote compared to being non-registered, as does being interested and paying attention to politics. In addition, as one's internal efficacy increases so do the odds that they will have voted in their lifetime. The role of these political attitudes confirm results of most studies of political participation. Finally, Central and South Americans as well as Caribbean Latinos are more likely to have voted than Mexicans or Cubans.

The final column of Table 3.3 is of primary interest to the analysis of voting, as the figures depict the impact of all contributing factors on frequent voting relative to non-participation. While three of the four consciousness measures had no impact on voting, perceived discrimination is significantly and positively related to frequent voting. Therefore as Latinos perceive greater levels of discrimination directed toward their community, their odds of becoming frequent voters is significantly greater than the odds of them falling in the baseline category of non-registered. In order to assess the marginal impact of perceived discrimination on frequent voting, predicted probabilities were computed and graphed (see tables 3.4 and 3.5). By allowing the perceived discrimination variable to run its full range of values while holding the other variables at their means, it is clear that the probability of frequent voting increases with increasing levels of perceived discrimination. Consistent with the first two hypotheses, while group consciousness does have an impact after the full model is specified, it is clear from comparing tables two and three that the inclusion of other relevant factors has considerably diluted the impact of group consciousness on frequent voting.

(Insert Tables 3.4 and 3.5 About Here)

In addition to perceived discrimination, variables from four of the five remaining variable clusters are significantly correlated with frequent voting. Consistent with previous research, the socio-economic status and demographics cluster impacts voting, as income, education, work status, and age are all positively correlated with frequent voting. In addition, political interest has a tremendous impact on whether an individual will become a frequent voter, as this variable has the largest odds ratio of any variable in all three voting models. Within the cultural factor cluster, the odds of being a frequent voter are greater as the length of time an individual lives in the United States increase. Finally, both Cubans and Latinos from the Caribbean are more likely to be frequent voters than Mexicans or Central/South Americans. The odds ratios for these two variables indicates that Cubans however are the sub-group with the greatest likelihood of having voted in multiple national elections.

### **3.4 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Latino Specific Participation**

With the interpretation of the voting models completed, I turn now to the role of group consciousness in Latino specific participation. The dependent variable for Latino specific participation has four categories based; 1) participation in no activities, 2) one activity, 3) two activities, and 4) participation in all three activities. Again, the political activities included in this measure are; donating money to a Latino candidate or organization, volunteering for a Latino candidate or organization, and attending a meeting or demonstration focused on Latino issues. Due to the ordered nature of this

measure, Generalized Ordinal Logit is used to specify the Latino specific participation models<sup>21</sup>. Generalized Ordinal Logit is preferred here due to its ability handle the proportional odds assumption associated with the ordered Logit model. Much like Multinomial Logit, the GOL model provides results for each category in the dependent variable other than the base category, in this case participation in no activities. However, with GOL results are relative to all lower categories, not just the baseline.

Table 3.6 indicates that when isolated, the group consciousness cluster has a strong impact on all three categories of Latino specific participation. In fact, collective action is the only variable that is not significant in all three models, only having a significant impact on participation in two activities. This table suggests that as group consciousness increases, so does the likelihood that Latinos will participate in Latino specific activities. Consistent with hypothesis three, when compared to the impact of group consciousness on voting reflected in table two, it is clear when isolated, group consciousness has a much greater effect on Latino specific participation.

(Insert Table 3.6 About Here)

General and political commonality along with perceived discrimination are positively correlated with participation in one Latino specific activity. In all three cases as the measure of group consciousness increases so do the odds that an individual will have participated in at least one Latino specific activity. Both commonality measures as well as perceived discrimination motivate participation in two Latino specific activities; however in this model collective action is also significant and positive. Therefore,

---

<sup>21</sup> Generalized Ordinal Logit was employed after Ordinal Logit models failed tests for the proportional odds assumption.

believing that Latinos working together politically has a positive impact on Latinos generally also increases the odds that Latinos will participate in two Latino specific activities. More support for the impact of group consciousness on Latino specific activities comes from the relationship between group consciousness and propensity to participate in all three Latino specific activities. Collective action is the only dimension of group consciousness that does not increase the odds that Latinos will participate in all three political activities directly tied to Latinos versus participating in anything less than three activities. Clearly, when isolated the group consciousness cluster has a tremendous impact on Latino specific political participation.

Table 3.7 reflects the impact of all explanatory variables on the propensity of Latinos to participate in Latino specific activities. In all, nine variables have a statistically significant impact on Latino participation in one Latino specific activity. Within the group consciousness cluster, as perceived discrimination increases so do the odds that a respondent will participate in one activity compared to not participating at all in Latino specific activities. In addition, men, the more educated, and the young are more likely to participate in one activity compared to participating in none. Within the political orientations cluster, respondents more interested in politics are more likely to participate in one activity. However, the acculturation coefficient is negative, implying that those who believe Latinos should maintain aspects of their culture are less likely to participate in one activity.

(Insert Table 3.7 About Here)

Both the level of Latino representatives and the number of initiatives salient to Latinos are significantly correlated with participation in one Latino specific political activity. However, while increases in initiatives motivates participation in this form, increases in the number of Latino representatives decreases the odds that Latinos will participate in one activity. This is interesting, as two of the three Latino specific political activities require the presence of Latino elected officials. There are two possible explanations for this trend. There is some debate regarding the impact of descriptive representation on political participation, as some contend that the presence of “safe” districts increase minority elected officials but decrease mobilization and participation among the electorate (de la Garza & Desipio, 1997). Further, it is possible that the presence of Latino elected officials may create a sense of political satisfaction, which removes the need to participate.

Turning to participation in two Latino specific activities, we see that eight explanatory variables are related to Latino participation in two political activities relative to participating in one or no activities. Most importantly, all group consciousness measures lead to an increase in odds of Latino specific participation. This is further evidence that group consciousness has a greater impact on Latino specific participation than it does on voting. Within the SES cluster, the primary socioeconomic indicators of education and income are significant and positive, suggesting that increases in education and income lead to an increase in Latino specific political activity. Not surprisingly, the politically interested remain more likely to participate in Latino specific political activities. As was the case in the last model, acculturation is significant and negatively

correlated with participation in two activities. None of the mobilization, cultural factors or national origin variables are significant in this model.

Finally, the last column provides the propensity of the explanatory variables to motivate Latino participation in all three political activities relative to participating in two or fewer activities. Perceived discrimination and commonality continue to increase the odds that Latinos will participate in Latino specific activities. The predicted probabilities themselves, along with predicted probabilities graphed in table 3.8 suggest that increased general Latino commonality and perceptions of discrimination directed towards Latinos increase the likelihood that Latinos will become active in Latino specific political participation. These results suggest that group consciousness maintains a positive effect on Latino specific participation even after the full model is specified. This is consistent with hypothesis four.

(Insert Table 3.8 About Here)

In addition to group consciousness, the socioeconomic status model of participation is marginally supported here, as income increases the odds that Latinos will participate in all three Latino specific activities. In addition, the political orientation measures of acculturation and political interest are significant in the full model of Latino specific participation in all three activities. As was the case in the previous model, political interest motivates participation in this context, while acculturation decreases Latino specific participation. None of the mobilization or cultural measures were statistically significant in this model either, suggesting that factors included in these two

clusters are more meaningful in the context of voting than they are in Latino specific participation.

### **3.5 Conclusions and Discussion**

This paper began by highlighting the changing American political landscape and the increasingly consequential impact that Latinos will continue to play in electoral politics. In the aftermath of the 2002 mid-term election and 2004 presidential election, Latinos as candidates and voters played a critical role. This is reflected in two U.S. Senators being elected in 2004, New Mexico electing a Latino governor in 2002, and the achievement of the most Latino Congress people in history. Further, both the Democratic and Republican parties spent record amounts of money on courting the Latino vote during the campaign for the 2004 presidential election (Segal, 2004). Finally, the recent election of Antonio Villaraigosa as mayor of Los Angeles marks the first time the Latino stronghold of Los Angeles has had a Latino mayor in more than a century. Given these political victories and the steady growth of the Latino population, a systematic examination of the factors that contribute to political participation among Latinos is extremely valuable.

The core question of this analysis is whether or not group consciousness motivates political participation for Latinos. Results from both the isolated and full models indicate that yes, there is a positive relationship between group consciousness and political participation, however the impact varies depending on the dimension of group consciousness and mode of political participation. Among the three general dimensions

of group consciousness defined by the literature, commonality and perceived discrimination consistently had the greatest impact on political participation across the various models. This is supported by the inability of political commonality or collective action to provide a statistically significant effect on the high level of participation for either voting or Latino specific political activity within the fully specified model. It is important to note that the investigation of the differential impact of general and political commonality revealed that general commonality is more meaningful to group consciousness than a sense of political commonality.

Among the four measures within the group consciousness cluster, collective action had the most minimal impact on political participation. In fact, collective action was only significant in the isolated model for participation in two Latino specific activities.<sup>22</sup> Clearly, believing that Latinos working together politically has benefits does not increase participation to the same degree as other aspects of group consciousness. This may be the result of few Latinos having participated in collective action at the pan ethnic level, which ensures that there are not many individuals who have personally experienced the benefits of this type of activity. In short, this analysis strongly supports the notion that group consciousness is a multidimensional concept, with some dimensions having more influence on political participation than others.

The investigation of the potential differential impact of group consciousness on type and context of political participation revealed some interesting results. As expected, the group consciousness cluster had greater influence on Latino specific participation

---

<sup>22</sup> Collective action was only significant at the .10 level

than voting. Group consciousness is based on a notion of collective action directed toward improving the status of the group. This analysis suggests that group consciousness motivates Latinos to direct their collective efforts toward political activities that directly impact the status of the group, rather than the indirect activity of voting. This may at least partially explain the lower rates of voting among Latinos in comparison to African Americans and Whites. Nonetheless, it is clear from this analysis that individuals who have a strong sense of group consciousness are more likely to attend meetings or demonstrations based on Latino issues, and donate money to and work on campaigns of Latinos running for office.

This investigation adds to the discussion of the role of group consciousness in Latino political participation in three important ways. First, this study incorporates measures of all dimensions of group consciousness, including analysis of whether or not there is a meaningful difference between general and political commonality. Second, this analysis is not constricted to a single Latino sub-group, but provides a more complete picture of the impact of group consciousness by including several Latino sub-groups, including Central/South Americans. Finally, by looking at more than just voting this analysis has revealed that group consciousness has a greater impact on political participation that is directly focused toward Latino representation or issues.

While this analysis significantly adds to our general understanding of group consciousness and its impact on Latino political participation, there remains room for further study. In particular, it would be beneficial to determine whether group consciousness motivates other aspects of Latino political behavior, mainly vote choice,

partisanship, and policy preferences. Further, given the general premise that group consciousness is greater among African Americans than other minority groups, it would be interesting to construct and analyze data reflecting the role of group consciousness in political behavior among both Latinos and African Americans. This would allow for a direct comparison of what motivates group consciousness formation among both groups, and what impact consciousness has on particular aspects of political behavior.

## Appendix Figures and Tables

**Table 3.1     Contributing Factors Organized by Variable Cluster**

<b>Group Consciousness</b>	<b>Political Orientations</b>	<b>Cultural Factors</b>
Commonality	Assimilation	Nativity
Political Commonality	Internal Efficacy	Citizenship Status
Perceived Discrimination	External Efficacy	English Proficiency
Collective Action	Political Interest	Length of Time in U.S.
<b>SES- Demographics</b>	<b>Mobilization</b>	<b>National Origin</b>
Income	Political Organizations	Cuban
Education	Latino Representatives	Central/South American
Work Status	Latino Salient Initiatives	Caribbean Latinos
Gender		
Age		

**Table 3.2                      The Effect of Group Consciousness on Voting (Isolated Model)**

	Voter Registration			Infrequent Voting			Frequent Voting		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Commonality	.143**	.072	1.15	.141**	.056	1.15	.210***	.050	1.23
Pol. Commonality	.094	.220	1.09	.010	.170	1.01	.398**	.153	1.48
Perc. Discrim.	.204	.138	1.22	.162	.106	1.17	.236**	.095	1.26
Collective Action	-.367	.241	.692	-.039	.206	.961	-.019	.186	.981

N 1216

Log Likelihood -1522

\* P< .10 level    \*\* P< .05 level    \*\*\* P< .01 level

**Table 3.3** **The Effect of the Full Model on Voting**


	Voter Registration			Infrequent Voting			Frequent Voting		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
<b>Group Consciousness</b>									
Commonality	.213**	.080	1.23	.081	.064	1.08	.096	.027	1.1
Political Commonality	.128	.247	1.13	-.187	.192	.828	.187	.188	1.2
Perc. Discrim.	.104	.161	1.11	.141	.125	1.15	.214*	.121	1.23
Collective Action	-.413	.276	.661	-.297	.230	.742	-.178	.230	.836
<b>SES/Demographics</b>									
Income	-.036	.073	.964	.053	.058	1.05	.100*	.057	1.10
Education	-.122	.085	.884	.055	.064	1.04	.353***	.063	1.42
Work Status	.041	.150	1.04	.350**	.128	1.42	.341**	.125	1.40
Gender	.247	.247	1.28	-.218	.191	.803	-.293	.187	.745
Age	-.007	.019	.992	.014	.013	1.01	.037**	.013	1.03
<b>Political Orientations</b>									
Assimilation	-.170	.122	.843	-.003	.083	.996	-.104	.083	.901
Acculturation	.030	.122	1.03	-.010	.096	.989	-.093	.098	.911
Internal Efficacy	-.174	.118	.839	.184**	.089	1.20	.085	.087	1.08
External Efficacy	-.037	.167	.963	-.185	.131	.830	-.098	.128	.906
Political Interest	-.015	.157	.984	.472***	.123	1.60	.720***	.123	2.05
<b>Mobilization</b>									
Political Organizations	.010	.021	1.01	-.000	.016	.995	.007	.016	1.00
Latino Representatives	-.008	.028	.991	.011	.021	1.01	.005	.021	1.00
Salient Initiatives	.082	.084	1.08	.080	.057	1.08	.159	.065	1.17
<b>Cultural Factors</b>									
Nativity	.701	.447	2.01	.140	.317	1.15	-.326	.306	.721
English Proficiency	.191	.206	1.21	.034	.153	1.03	.072	.155	1.07
Length of Time in U.S.	-.047**	.022	.953	-.000	.015	.099	.041**	.014	1.04
<b>National Origin</b>									
Cuban	.368	.542	1.44	.647	.409	1.91	1.23***	.391	3.45
Cen/So American	.662*	.385	1.93	.566*	.305	.176	.275	.307	1.31
Caribbean Latinos	.355	.360	1.42	.696**	.277	2.00	.695**	.273	2.00

N 1122

Log Likelihood -1170.3984


\* P< .10 level \*\* P< .05 level \*\*\* P< .01 level

**Table 3.4 The Impact of Perceived Discrimination on Frequent Voting**



Perceived Discrimination Values 1) Discrimination is not a problem for Latinos 2) Discrimination is a problem, but not a big problem for Latinos 3) Discrimination is a big problem for Latinos

**Table 3.5 The Impact of Perceived Discrimination on Participation in all Three Latino Specific Activities**



Perceived Discrimination Values 1) Discrimination is not a problem for Latinos 2) Discrimination is a problem, but not a big problem for Latinos 3) Discrimination is a big problem for Latinos

**Table 3.6 The Effect of Group Consciousness on Latino Specific Participation**

	One Activity			Two Activities			Three Activities		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Commonality	.142***	.030	1.15	.252***	.042	1.28	.355**	.072	1.42
Political Commonality	.301**	.097	1.35	.501***	.137	1.65	.800**	.243	2.21
Perceived Discrimination	.283***	.065	1.32	.254**	.094	1.29	.360**	.169	1.43
Collective Action	.120	.115	1.12	.292*	.177	1.33	.525	.409	1.69

N 1850

Log Likelihood -1794

\* P< .10 level \*\* P< .05 level \*\*\* P< .01 level

**Table 3.7 The Effect of the Full Model on Participation in Latino Specific Activities**


	One Activity			Two Activities			Three Activities		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>									
Commonality	.046	.036	1.05	.105**	.051	1.11	.196**	.096	1.21
Political Commonality	.075	.114	1.09	.273*	.160	1.31	.488	.310	1.63
Perceived Discrimination	.319***	.077	1.37	.250**	.108	1.28	.361*	.199	1.38
Collective Action	.171	.134	1.15	.398**	.207	1.49	.690	.080	1.99
<i>SES/Demographics</i>									
Income	.025	.035	1.04	.092**	.047	1.09	.231**	.080	1.26
Education	.083**	.037	1.07	.094*	.053	1.08	.075	.106	1.07
Work Status	.116	.078	1.40	.133	.113	1.14	.018	.221	1.01
Gender	.283**	.114	1.32	.020	.157	1.02	.035	.280	1.03
Age	-.010*	.007	.989	-.001	.011	.999	-.028	.025	.972
<i>Political Orientations</i>									
Assimilation	-.019	.057	.980	-.036	.084	.964	.031	.151	1.03
Acculturation	-.115*	.065	.890	-.387***	.117	.678	-.456**	.201	.663
Internal Efficacy	-.025	.052	.974	.015	.073	1.01	.164	.132	1.17
External Efficacy	.070	.075	1.07	.014	.107	1.01	-.129	.203	.878
Political Interest	.370***	.071	1.44	.435***	.110	1.54	.778***	.241	2.17
<i>Mobilization</i>									
Political Organizations	.015	.009	1.01	.006	.013	1.00	.016	.026	1.01
Latino Representatives	-.033*	.012	.967	-.010	.017	.989	-.011	.033	.988
Salient Latino Initiatives	.098*	.037	1.10	-.031	.052	.968	-.037	.096	.962
<i>Cultural Factors</i>									
Nativity	.169	.196	1.18	.354	.276	1.42	.345	.485	1.41
English Proficiency	.009	.086	1.00	.084	.127	1.08	-.155	.286	.855
Length of Time in U.S.	.012	.008	1.01	.012	.012	1.01	.041	.026	1.04
Citizenship Status	-.030	.174	.970	-.059	.269	.942	-.800	.687	.448
<i>National Origin</i>									
Cuban	.386*	.223	1.47	-.169	.301	.869	.457	.538	1.58
Central/South American	-.176	.162	.838	-.278	.238	.756	-.257	.457	.773
Caribbean Latinos	.075	.186	1.07	.018	.233	1.01	.739*	.414	2.09

N 1576

Log Likelihood -1424.5548532

\* P&lt; .10 level \*\* P&lt; .05 level \*\*\* P&lt; .01 level

**Table 3.8 The Impact of Commonality on Participation in all Three Latino Specific Activities**



Latino Commonality Values: 0 indicates that a respondent has no sense of commonality with any of the Latino sub-groups, 6 indicates a strong sense of commonality with all Latino sub-groups.

## **CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS IN PARTY BEHAVIOR AMONG LATINOS**

The population increases associated with Latinos and the corresponding increased voter turnout of the Latino population (Kamkaski et al., 2004) has generated an intensified focus on Latino political behavior, particularly partisanship. Although there has been a growing interest in Latino partisanship in recent years, (Hero et al, 2000; Uhlaner & Garcia, 1998; De Sipio, 1996; Hajnal, 2004; Alvarez & Brehum, 2002) one concept that has thus far escaped the attention of scholars is the role of group consciousness. In this component of the dissertation I intend to contribute to this growing literature by examining the influence of the various dimensions of group consciousness on Latino partisanship.

Specifically, this analysis tests the impact of group consciousness relative to other contributing factors on the following three aspects of partisanship; party choice (Democrat/Republican), strength of attachment to either dominant political party, and decision to remain politically independent. This modeling strategy will allow for analysis of how group consciousness influences party choice for Latinos, as well as the intensity of attachment to ones party of choice. Finally, given the overall move of many Americans to political independence (Hajnal, 2004), and the trend of a large segment of the Latino community lacking a relationship with either party (Hero et al, 2000; Alvarez & Brehum, 2002) I choose to investigate the potential ability of group consciousness to motivate party attachment versus independence.

Political parties are critical components of American politics, mobilizing various interests into large organizations. In addition to the role of parties as organizations, partisanship has tremendous influence in the political behavior of individuals regardless of ethnic group. It is well established that partisanship is a valuable psychological tool that helps people understand a complex political system and make political decisions (Campbell et. al., 1960). Where parties help reduce information costs by providing cues to potential voters regarding candidates and policy issues. For these reasons alone it is important to increase our understanding of Latino partisanship, a community whose political behavior is still relatively understudied. The salience of Latino partisanship has intensified with the recent voter turnout and partisan trends of the Latino community.

It is clear that Latino turnout in 2004 exceeded expectations, as approximately 7.5 million Latinos voted in 2004 (Kamkaski et al., 2004). This represents an alarming 27 percent increase from 2000, and twice that of Latino turnout in 1998. The growing interest in Latino political behavior driven by the potential of this ethnic group to influence election outcomes is not restricted to the academic community. In fact, the 2004 presidential election has prompted serious consideration of whether Latinos have shifted their partisan attachments toward the Republican Party. The conservative ideologies of Latinos, coupled with the Republican focus on family and moral values and opposition to homosexuality are the basis for perceptions of Republican in-roads with the Latino community (Johnson, 2004; Hero et al, 2000). The notion of Latinos being “up for grabs” politically is supported by both the Democratic and Republican parties spent

record amounts of money courting the Latino vote during the campaign for the 2004 presidential election (Segal, 2004).

Several media outlets reported that George W. Bush significantly increased his share of the Latino vote in 2004 from 2000 based on the Edison/Mitofsky National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll. This poll, which was the most widely cited source by the press, reported that Bush received 44 percent of the Latino vote, approximately a 9 percent increase from 2000. Those results have been challenged by a number of different sources, specifically the William C. Velasquez Institute, the research affiliate for the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SWVREP) and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR). According to Southwest Voter, Kerry got nearly 68 percent of the Latino vote nationwide, leaving Bush with approximately 32 percent. An NCLR report attempting to provide some clarification on this issue suggests that although the 44 percent reported by the NEP may be exaggerated (they contend Bush more realistically received 39 percent or less of the Latino vote), in both 2000 and 2004, President Bush did garner a substantial and increasing share of the Latino vote.<sup>23</sup> Given this recent partisanship trend among Latinos, and the increased interest of Latino voting behavior, investigations of Latino partisanship are highly relevant and necessary. This analysis will shed some light on this and other partisan behavior issues surrounding the Latino community by determining the factors that contribute to party choice and party strength among Latinos. Learning whether or not group consciousness in particular influences

---

<sup>23</sup> See David Leal et al (2005) for a more detailed discussion of the exit poll controversy

Democratic or Republican attachment is a valuable contribution to our general understanding of Latino political behavior.

### **General Theories of Partisanship**

Over forty years ago, The American Voter (Campbell et al,1960) argued that there was no factor of greater importance to U.S. national elections than the lasting attachment of a majority of Americans to one of the political parties. Partisanship has remained the dominant influencing factor of political opinions and voting behavior (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998). Campbell et al (1960) contend that most Americans have this sense of attachment with one party or the other. And for these partisans, the intensity and direction of partisanship is the primary determinant of political attitudes and behavior. There are two general theories offered by the political science literature to explain why some individuals are Republicans while others are Democrats, these theories are Michigan model of Campbell et al, (1960) and the Rational Choice Model of Fiorina (1981).

The classic *American Voter* (Campbell et al, 1960) model of partisanship emphasizes the strength of psychological attachment of people to political parties. In fact, for Campbell et al, the source of partisanship is purely psychological. Initial selection of a party may be due to non-political pressures, as partisanship is formulated through socialization during childhood, often inherited from ones parents. However, once established, the attachment to a party tends to last well into that individuals life. Altering ones self-concepts are difficult, therefore once partisan identification takes place in young adulthood, they tend to persist even among changing political circumstances. This led to

the depiction of partisanship being highly stable and unsusceptible to short-term forces including policies or political events (Green et al, 1998; Miller, 1992). Further, for most Americans attachment to a party grows more intense with age. This theory is supported by the fact that young people are much more likely to be politically independent than other age cohorts.

Based on traditional theories of retrospective voting and the rational choice model from economics, Fiorina (1981) developed a scorecard view of partisanship to provide an alternative to the Michigan model of Campbell and colleagues, where citizens “keep score” while observing the world of politics. Fiorina’s model is often referred to as the rational choice perspective. This view assumes that the vote is based solely on an evaluation of the attractiveness of the two parties platforms. Therefore, rational choice models characterize partisanship as the current evaluation of parties based on the sum of received information. As a result of citizens using past performance of the party to estimate likely future achievement, party identification at any given time is a function of party performance prior to that time. Fiorina contends that the source of partisanship is not psychological attachment, but is the result of an individuals past experiences with the two parties.

This model contends that as new evaluations form, an individual’s identification may wax and wane. Therefore, if parties are inconsistent over time, partisanship will not be as stable as *The American Voter* suggests. Regarding stability, scholars have found that short-term forces, including elections cause changes in partisanship (V.O. Key, 1955; Stanly & Neimi, 1996). In addition, Fiorina (1981) suggests that party identification can

also change due to evaluations of particular candidates, such as Ford and Nixon. In regard to partisanship strength, Fiorina (1981) also concludes that if an individual's experiences with their party of choice are consistent, then over time an individual's attachment to their party of choice intensifies.

#### **4.1 Trends in Latino Partisanship**

These dominant models of party identification and strength were developed for the general population. One must cautiously apply these models to Latinos, as these populations have many unique characteristics (Language, nativity, citizenship status). Although these characteristics make the application of either dominant model difficult, they provide an opportunity to examine subtle aspects of these models that are often challenging to distinguish.

Until recently, Latinos have not been major players in national party politics, being largely ignored by the dominant political parties. This has been largely due to Latinos historically being viewed as a small and geographically concentrated (Hero et. al, 2000). While there have been several studies of Latino's relationship with the political parties (Cain, Kiewiet, Uhlaner, 1991;Brischetto, 1983; Hero et. al, 2000), they have either not been nationally representative or have not been generalizable to multiple Latino sub-groups. Nonetheless, there are several things that we do know about Latino partisanship.

Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans have consistently identified with the Democratic Party (de la Garza & Brischetto, 1983; Uhlaner & Garcia, 1998; Hero et. al, 2000). This attachment among Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans to the Democratic

Party stems largely from the perception that the Democratic Party is more receptive to the interests of racial and ethnic groups, as well as those of lower socioeconomic status. The Democrats have also have been more inclined to take a pro-Latino stance on policy issues such as immigration, affirmation action, and bilingual education. In contrast, based on a different political history, Cubans tend to identify as Republicans (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998; Hero et. al, 2000; Brischetto, 1987). Cuban attachment to the Republican Party is based on the Republican anti-communism intensity, and the availability of Cubans to gain prominence within the party in Miami due to the absence of a strong Republican infrastructure (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998). There is partisanship diversity however among the Cuban population, as Cuban Americans who live outside of South Florida are more likely to be Democrats than those in South Florida (De Sipio, 1996).

Beyond this historical relationship of each Latino subgroups to the two dominant parties, scholars have found that several factors influence party choice. For all three major Latino sub-groups, increased exposure (information/knowledge) to American politics is associated with a greater propensity to be Democrat (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998; Cain et al., 1991). For example, Latino immigrants are more likely to be Democrats the longer that they have lived in the United States (Cain et al., 1991). Uhlener and Garica (1998) argue that this is a result of Latino cumulative experiences such as discrimination or perceived challenges to their cultural characteristics, along with experiences related to their lower socio-economic status. That is, if the Democratic Party is “better” for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans because it is supportive of their economic and civil rights

interests, then stronger support for the Democrats should exist among those who had more opportunity to learn this (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998: 13).

While there is a general consensus that socio-economic status is a salient factor for Anglos, the role of education and income in Latino partisanship is debated. While there is evidence that socioeconomic status (SES) does not have much impact on Latino partisanship (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998), others have found that attachment to the Democratic Party is stronger among lower income Latinos, and intensity of partisan attachment is greater among the higher educated (Cain et al., 1991; Brischetto, 1987). Spanish language skills are associated with sharing the groups dominant party choice; Democrat for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, Republicans for Cubans (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998).

Religion is also becoming a critical factor in Latino partisanship and vote choice. In 2004, the Bush campaign used moral values, specifically opposition to gay marriage and abortion in an attempt to appeal to the conservative religious segment of the Latino community (Johnson, 2004). This strategy appears to have paid dividends, as there appeared to be a religion gap in 2004 among Latino voters. According to the NEP exit poll, Bush garnered higher support from Latino Protestants (59/40), born again Christians (78/21), and Church-goers (61/39) (Leal et al, 2005). In short, although constituting only approximately 18 percent of the Latino electorate, Latino non-Catholic Christians were part of Bush's election coalition.

## **The Role of Political Independence**

There has been a growing interest in political independents, as overall, nearly 40 percent of Americans labeled themselves as independents in the 2000 American National Election Study (Hajnal, 2004). This makes independents the largest political category in America, larger than self-identified Republicans or Democrats. This concern with populations lacking a strong tie to either political party is particularly salient among ethnic groups, with many scholars noting that a large segment of the Latino community do not identify with either the Republican or Democratic parties (Hero et. al, 2000; Alvarez & Brehum, 2002; Hajnal, 2004; Pachon & DeSipio, 1994). The Post/Kaiser data used here reinforces this trend, as overall 39 percent of respondents indicate that they are either independent or something else, compared to 40 percent Democrat, and 18 percent Republican.

This trend is the result of several factors, including the lack of knowledge and experience with the Democratic or Republican parties among foreign-born Americans (Hajnal, 2004). With nearly 40 percent of Latinos being born outside of the United States political socialization is critical to Latino party acquisition. This is evident by the fact that in addition to being more likely to choose Independence, the foreign-born and those politically unassimilated are more likely to refrain from choosing any partisanship option including Independent on surveys (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002; Hajnal, 2004). For example, 70 percent of nonnaturalized Mexican and Dominican immigrants, 40 percent of Cuban immigrants, and 55 percent of other Latino immigrants reported that they were not

attached to either of the parties (Pachon & Desipio, 1994). However, Latinos who have made the decision to remain in the United States and become citizens exhibit stronger party attachments (Cain et al., 1991).

Further, the common view of greater trends of ideological moderation and political ambivalence among Independents does not hold for Latinos (Uhlener et al, 2000; Hajnal, 2004). There is only a minimal relationship between liberal-conservative ideology and partisanship for Latinos, with only inconsistent results suggesting any link between ideological moderates and partisan independence (Hajnal, 2004). Given this trend among the Latino population, it is necessary to analyze the role of group consciousness and other factors on party acquisition, in addition to party choice and strength. This comprehensive approach will provide a more relevant depiction of the relationship between group consciousness and Latino partisanship.

#### **4.2 Group Consciousness and Partisanship**

In the social psychological model of partisan identification, people relate to the political world as members of social groups, in this case Republicans and Democrats in much the same way that others incorporate religious, regional, or ethnic groups into their self-conceptions (Greene, 2002). This process is strikingly similar to the formation of group consciousness among minority groups, where group consciousness is developed when members of a group recognize their status as being part of a deprived group (Miller et al., 1981). Both partisan identification and group consciousness require notions of what Greene (2002) calls group belonging to motivate political behavior. This similarity seems to suggest a natural relationship between the two concepts.

The relationship between group consciousness and party choice has been investigated among the African American community, with group consciousness being credited with the near monolithic support for the Democratic Party despite growing socioeconomic diversity among the population (Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1995). Dawson argues that this is due to African Americans basing their political decisions on group preferences and not their individual interests. Unfortunately, this theory has yet to be tested for other racial/ethnic groups in the United States. Therefore, this analysis will greatly expand our understanding of Latino political behavior and possibly provide evidence for the significance of group consciousness for Latinos.

The literature in the area of minority partisanship suggests that not only is party attachment different among Latinos and African Americans, but also that this trend may be at least partially explained by the differential impact of group consciousness. For example, Tate finds that “race identification appears to be the major component of Black partisanship” (Tate, 65). This falls in line with the general notion of group consciousness motivating political behavior for African Americans. The magnitude of this impact is reflected in the trend of African Americans reporting attachment to the Democratic Party in numbers consistently over 80 percent.

In contrast to African Americans, education and perceptions of the economy are statistically significant in relation to partisanship for Latinos (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2002). This suggests that Latinos may base their political decisions on individual and not group-based preferences. This potential lack of group consciousness is reflected in more segmented partisanship identification of Latinos. For example in the 2000 NES

approximately 50 percent of the respondents identified as Democrats and 42 percent identified as Republicans (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003).

There is evidence however that at least one dimension of group consciousness, perceived discrimination does influence the direction of Latino partisanship (Cain et al., 1991 ;Uhlener and Garica, 1998). With increased exposure to discrimination the likelihood of Latinos becoming Democrats increases, as the Democratic Party is perceived to be the party more sympathetic to civil rights issues. Therefore, it is likely that perceived discrimination will have the greatest impact on partisanship for Latinos among the dimensions of group consciousness. This analysis will investigate the impact of all of the remaining dimensions of group consciousness on partisanship for Latinos, as well the role of perceived and actual experience with discrimination. Given the diversity in ideology and experience in the United States among Latinos, it is unlikely that group consciousness will have as great an impact on partisan behavior for Latinos as the concept does for African Americans.

### **4.3 Hypotheses**

The general theory to be tested in this analysis is that the impact of group consciousness on Latino partisanship across the three indicators of party choice, strength, and independence is not very significant, particularly in comparison to results for African Americans found by others. The diversity of the Latino population, particularly in regard to political behavior leads me to believe that group consciousness has not yet reached a level strong enough to motivate partisanship. The one dimension of group consciousness that has been correlated with partisanship is perceived discrimination, as Latinos who

have higher rates of perceived discrimination and direct experience with discrimination being more likely to identify as Democrats. This broad theory leads to the following hypothesis.

**H1: Perceived discrimination will be the only dimension of group consciousness that has a statistically significant impact on party behavior across all three indicators for Latinos.**

Further, although not a dimension of group consciousness, the perception of which party is better for Latinos is a measure of how group interests influence political behavior. If Latinos utilize perceptions of which party they believe to have more concern for issues pertinent of Latinos to choose a political party they are essentially using groups interests and not individual interests to determine party choice. This process is similar to linked fate, in which African Americans use group interests to determine party choice and policy preferences (Dawson, 1994). This theory leads to the following hypothesis regarding party preferences;

**H2: Party perception will be positively correlated with identification with the Democratic Party, as individuals who believe the Democratic Party has more concern for Latinos will be more likely to identify as Democrats.**

In regard to party acquisition and strength, it is has been suggested by previous research that greater exposure to American politics and the parties increases the likelihood that individuals will become partisans and that the strength of attachment to the party of choice will increase. Although the data here does not provide any direct measures for experience with political parties, indirect measure tapping into the general

exposure that Latinos will have to American society and politics can provide some insights in this area. This leads to the following hypothesis.

**H3: The cultural factor variables (length of time in the United States, nativity, citizenship status, English proficiency) will be positively correlated with party strength, and negatively correlated with political independence.**

Again, this hypothesis is based on the notion that Latinos who are recently arriving immigrants and therefore less integrated into the American political system are not going to be as likely to have established a relationship with either political party.

#### **Dependent Variable Measurement (Issues and Strategies)**

Studies of U.S. partisanship generally employ seven point ordered scales, ranging from “Strong Democrats” at one extreme to “Strong Republican” on the other as the dependent variable. This scale generally combines the following three survey items that incorporate direction of party attachments as well as intensity;

- Q1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, or what?
- Q2. (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call yourself a strong (Republican/Democrat) or not a very strong (Republican/Democrat)?
- Q3. (IF INDEPENDENT) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?

Although there has been some debate regarding this measurements strategies ability to account for differences between Independents and weak partisans (Keith et al, 1992; Miller & Wattenberg, 1983), the conventional linear scale has generally endured.

Given the nature of the Latino population, including the large foreign-born population, as well as the historical tie of the three dominant Latino sub-group to the two

dominant parties; the combined scale is problematic (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998). The standard scale also confuses the distinction between partisan acquisition and strength of that attachment to either party (Hajnal, 2004). In fact, Campbell et al (1960) argued that there is a theoretically meaningful distinction between identifying with a party and partisan activity (vote choice and evaluation of parties). Therefore, the process involved in acquiring some attachment to either party is plausibly much different than the process of intensifying that existing attachment. The differences between party attachment and intensity are magnified among communities with large immigrant populations who have not yet become familiar with the U.S. political system or the political parties (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998). Therefore an analysis of Latino partisanship must be conscious of these potential measurement issues.

In order to examine these processes recognizing the targeted population, I will use three different dependent variables.<sup>24</sup> The first stage in the analysis will be to examine the factors that contribute to party identification (Democrat vs. Republican) among respondents who are partisan. This section will rely on a dichotomous dependent variable: 0) Republican 1) Democrat, based on only those respondents who indicate an attachment to either of these two parties.<sup>25</sup> The second stage builds on the first, examining the factors that distinguish weak and strong partisans. This stage also utilizes a

---

<sup>24</sup> Results from this analysis utilizing the traditional 7 point scale are included in table 4.1 of the appendix. For this model, the scale runs from 0) strong Republican – 6) Strong Democrat. Results indicate that perceived discrimination is the only group consciousness dimension significantly related to partisanship in this context, perceived discrimination is positively correlated with identification with the Democratic party. Further, based on size of odds ratios, party perception which is positively correlated with Democratic identification as well is the explanatory variable with the greatest impact on partisanship in this model.

<sup>25</sup> Respondents are asked the following survey question; In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, or something else?

dichotomous dependent variable; 0) weak partisan 1) strong partisan, with respondents who indicate that they are either strong Republicans or strong Democrats being defined as strong partisans.<sup>26</sup> The final stage investigates the factors that contribute to individuals maintaining partisan independence, a highly relevant group, as nearly 40 percent of respondents in the survey indicate that they are Independent or something else. This dependent variable isolates those individuals who are Independents: 0) Partisan 1) Independent. This measurement strategy will allow for a discussion of the role of group consciousness or not and other factors in party choice and strength among Latinos, as well as whether group consciousness motivates individuals to remain independent.

(Insert Table 4.1 About Here)

### **Independent Variable Measurement**

My general discussion of the partisanship literature has identified several factors that may impact partisan behavior among Latinos. This array of factors is grouped into five clusters representing the different perspectives attempting to explain partisan affiliation and intensity. These clusters are group consciousness (Latino commonality, shared political interests, perceived discrimination), SES/Demographic factors (income, education, work status, gender, age), political orientations (assimilation, efficacy, political interest, ideology, party perception), political mobilization (Latino elected officials, Latino political organizations, Catholicism), political activities and experiences (Latino specific participation, discrimination experience), cultural factors (nativity, English proficiency, length of time in U.S., citizenship status, and generational distance),

---

<sup>26</sup> Respondents who indicate that they are either Democrats or Republicans are then asked; Would you call yourself a strong (Democrat/Republican), or not?

and national origin (Cuban, Central/South American, Caribbean Latinos). Table 4.2 clearly identifies all contributing factors included in each cluster graphically. Chapter two provides a full discussion of variable construction for all explanatory variables used in this chapter. Therefore, please refer to chapter two for any questions regarding operationalization and measurement of independent variables used in this analysis.

(Insert Table Two About Here)

### **Testing Strategy/Model Specification**

The source of all the data introduced in this research paper originates from the 1999 survey of 2,417 Latinos conducted by the Washington Post, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University. Although Latino voting behavior is highly significant to the empirical political world, the lack of current well-designed survey data has been a strong hurdle for scholars of Latino politics. The Latino National Political Survey, conducted in 1989, was undoubtedly the most complete survey available for the study of Latino political attitudes and behavior (de la Garza, et. al. 1992). However, both the political reality and perception of political viability among the general public have changed drastically over the last ten years. Comparisons made between previous studies of group consciousness based on LNPS data and this study utilizing more current data will possibly reveal if these changes in the Latino political landscape have had an impact on the relationship between group consciousness and political participation.

The Washington Post/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University National Survey on Latinos in America consists of 4,614 adults, with 2,417 Latinos in the sample. The study includes interviews with 818 Mexicans, 318 Puerto Ricans, 312

Cubans, and 593 Central or South Americans. Latino adults were interviewed in their choice of English or Spanish, with 53 percent of the Latino interviews conducted predominately in Spanish. The final results were weighted to the national Latino population as estimated by the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. This survey was conducted by telephone between June 30 and August 30, 1999 by the International Communications Research. My analysis is only concerned with the Latino respondents to this survey; therefore the non-Latino respondents were excluded from the model.

The survey is accompanied by a host of contextual variables created from original data that allows for greater depth to this analysis. By identifying the state of residence for each survey respondent I am able to include both Latino elected officials and Latino political organizations, that are expected to have an impact on Latino partisanship through mobilization for the same time period as the Pew Center survey.<sup>27</sup> These contextual variables will greatly add to this investigation of group consciousness and Latino political participation.

### **Multicollinearity Issues**

A correlation matrix was created for this model in order to test for the presence of multicollinearity, or high correlation between the explanatory variables. The presence of multicollinearity is problematic because the likelihood of finding statistical significance is decreased due to increased standard errors and smaller t-ratios (Schroeder et. al, 1986).

---

<sup>27</sup> The Pew Hispanic Center 2000 survey interviewed and identified respondents from the following locations; California, Illinois, Texas, Florida, New York and Washington D.C. However, 106 respondents are coded as National in the survey and are not able to be tied to a specific state. For these respondents averages were conducted for each mobilization measure from the five states with the next largest populations. Those states are: Arizona, New Jersey, New Mexico, Colorado, and Massachusetts.

The two explanatory variables with the greatest correlation in the analysis are citizenship status and nativity, with a Pearson coefficient of .61.<sup>28</sup> In general, correlations below .8 are not of major concern for statistical analysis. In addition, these measures were tested individually and collectively through the use of a scaled variable with no change in direction or statistical significance in any of the models. There are only three other sets of explanatory variables with correlations greater than .5; age and length of time in the United States, citizenship status/length of time in the U.S., and English proficiency/nativity.

#### **4.4 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Party Choice**

The dependent variable for the party choice analysis is a dichotomous variable consisting of Republican and Democratic Party attachment. This variable construction requires the use of Logistic regression, a statistical method used for dichotomous dependent variables. In all, there are eight explanatory variables that are significantly correlated with party choice for Latinos. Among the group consciousness variables, collective action is negatively correlated with party choice. This indicates that Latinos who believe that Latino collective action leads to political benefits are more likely to be Republican than Democrat. This may be the result of Latino Republicans being more likely to engage in collective action as a result of having greater SES levels. None of the remaining group consciousness dimensions are statistically significant, including perceived discrimination, which was anticipated to contribute to Democratic

---

<sup>28</sup> Due to high collinearity with citizenship status and length of time in the U.S., generational distance from ones home country was dropped from the analysis.

identification. This provides initial evidence that supports the primary hypothesis that group consciousness does not have a meaningful impact on Latino party choice.

(Insert Table 4.3 About Here)

Consistent with previous research (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998) socio-economic status does not have any meaningful impact on Latino party choice, as none of the SES/Demographic variables were statistically significant. Among political orientation variables, political interest, ideology and party perception are significantly related to party choice. Latinos who report that they less interested in politics are more likely to identify as Republicans than those who are more interested in politics. Those who are less interested in politics may identify with the party in control of the presidency due to not having a strong attachment to politics more generally. Not surprisingly, Latinos who self-identify as Liberal ideologically are more likely to be Democrats. Consistent with hypothesis two, party perception is significantly related to Democratic identification. Latinos who believe that the Democratic Party is the party that has more concern for Latinos are more likely to identify as Democrats. The size of both the coefficient and odds ratio reflects the intensity of this relationship. Table 4.4 that graphs the predicted probabilities for the relationship between party perception and party choice illustrates the impact of party perception, as it is clear that when other factors are held to their means perceiving that the Democratic party has more concern for Latinos greatly increases the likelihood that Latinos will identify as Democrats.

(Insert Table 4.4 About Here)

Interestingly the national origin variables are correlated with party choice. Both Caribbean Latinos and Central and South Americans are significantly more likely to identify as Democrats than Republicans, and Cubans are significantly more likely to identify as Republicans. The coefficient and odds ratios indicate that Cubans have a stronger relationship to the Republican Party than other Latinos tie to the Democratic Party. This trend confirms our general understanding of Latino party identification. Finally, citizenship status is negatively correlated with party choice. This suggests that citizens are more likely to be Republican than non-citizens. This is most likely the product of the Republican Party being associated with policies aimed at minimizing immigration from Latin America, as well as the general perception of the Democratic Party being more receptive to issues of discrimination and social services.

#### **4.5 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Party Strength**

The next stage of this analysis focuses on party strength among self-identified partisans. It is important to note that the sample population for this analysis is restricted to those individuals who reported that they were either Republican or Democrat. Among group consciousness dimensions, Latino commonality decreases party strength. Latinos who feel they have a lot in common with other Latinos are less likely to be strong Democrats or Republicans. This is additional evidence that group consciousness does not motivate cohesive party identification for Latinos as others have found for African Americans. However, consistent with the first hypothesis perceived discrimination is positively correlated with party strength. As perceived discrimination increases so does

the likelihood that individuals will be strong partisans. This supports previous research that suggests discrimination is a contributor to Latino partisanship (Cain et al., 1991; Uhlaner and Garica, 1998).

(Insert Table 4.5 About Here)

Socio-economic status again has no impact in this analysis. However, the political orientations of political interest and party perception increase party strength, as those who pay close attention to political matters and believe the Democratic Party is more concerned with Latinos are more likely to be strong partisans. Further, political participation has a positive impact on party strength. Specifically, those who participate in Latino specific activities are more likely to be strong partisans.<sup>29</sup> As hypothesized, English proficiency has a positive relationship with party strength, however citizenship status has a negative coefficient. Therefore, while Latinos who are more proficient in English are more likely to be strong partisans, citizens are less likely to be strong partisans than Latinos who have yet to become citizens. This can be the result of increased mobilization by both parties directed toward newly arrived immigrants who may be perceived as being up for grabs by both parties. This could also be the impact of immigration related initiatives such as propositions 187 from California and 200 from Arizona that could potentially strengthen non-citizens party attachments to the Democratic Party due to Republicans being associated with these propositions. This can also be the result of citizens moving toward independence due to a lack of perceived attention from either party.

---

<sup>29</sup> Voters were also more likely to be strong partisans in other models where voting was included. Voting was dropped from this analysis due to its high correlation with citizenship status

#### **4.6 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Political Independence**

The intent of this stage of analysis is to determine what factors contribute to individuals deciding to remain political independents. The dependent variable for this model has two categories; 0) partisan and 1) independent. Therefore all positive coefficients suggest an increased likelihood of being independent, and negative coefficient indicate an increased likelihood of identifying as a partisan. In all, eight explanatory variables are significantly related to political independence for Latinos. Further supporting the notion that group consciousness has a limited role in Latino partisan behavior, none of the dimensions of group consciousness have an impact on party independence. Among the demographic variables, younger Latinos are more likely to be independent. Consistent with Campbell et al (1960), this suggests that attachments to parties intensify as individual's age and acquire greater familiarity with the American parties.

Political orientations play a major role in determining whether or not one will become partisan or not, as internal and external efficacy, political interest, and party perception are all negatively correlated with political independence. Therefore, Latinos who believe they can have an impact on political affairs, who trust the American political system, and who have greater interest in political affairs are less likely to be independents. In addition, Latinos who believe that the Democratic Party has more concern for Latinos are less likely to be politically independent. Interestingly non-Catholics are more likely to be independent than their Catholic counterparts. This is

potentially due to the stance of the Catholic Church on policy issues, specifically abortion. For Catholics the decision to vote based on party attachment may be strongly influenced by the platforms of each party on that issue.

(Insert Table 4.6 About Here)

Inconsistent with the party strength results, but more in line with previous work in this area (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002; Cain et al., 1991), citizens are less likely to be Independent than non-citizens. This is due to non-citizens having less time to become familiar and form a bond with either dominant party. Finally, of all Latino sub-groups included in the analysis, Cubans are the group least likely to be politically independent. This can be the result of several factors, including the strong attachment of many Cubans to the Republican Party as well as Cubans having fewer recent immigrants among their population than other Latino sub-groups included in the sample.

#### **4.7 Conclusions and Discussion**

I began this chapter by discussing the salience of partisanship in American politics and the debate regarding Latinos perceived growing affiliation with the Republican Party. This analysis intended to shed some light on Latino partisanship by exploring the impact of contributing factors on party choice, party strength, and partisan independence among Latinos. While the primary focus of the investigation is to analyze the relationship between group consciousness and Latino partisan behavior, many interesting results were revealed among other variable clusters.

Results from all three models strongly suggest that group consciousness is not a strong contributor to Latino partisanship. Group consciousness has often been credited for the overwhelming attachment of African Americans to the Democratic Party (Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1993). However, collective action, the only group consciousness dimension significantly correlated with Latino party choice is negatively associated with the Democratic Party, the dominant party of Latinos. This trend is reinforced by the negative relationship between Latino commonality and party strength. In fact, the only dimension of group consciousness with a positive impact on Latino partisan behavior is perceived discrimination, which contributes to greater party strength. While it has been well substantiated that Latinos are a tremendously diverse population, particularly in regard to partisanship there has yet to be empirical work that explores the relationship between group consciousness and partisanship among Latinos. Results of this analysis strongly suggest that group consciousness works differently for Latinos compared to African Americans, and has not yet become pervasive enough among Latinos to motivate collective partisan attachment.

Party perception, while not directly tied to group consciousness does however have a major role in Latino partisan behavior. Latinos who believe that the Democratic Party has more concern for the Latino population are more likely to identify as Democrats, more likely to be strong partisans, and less likely to be political independents. The magnitude of the relationship between party perception and partisanship suggests that despite the performance of group consciousness, many Latinos do utilize group interests when evaluating the two dominant parties. In other words, Latinos appear to

consider which party is more concerned with the Latino community when formulating their party choice. This suggests that there is an element of group consciousness or group based party evaluation at work in the political decision making of Latinos. This analysis also reinforces the need to control for national origin when investigating Latino political behavior. Confirming previous work, Cubans are more likely to be Republicans while Central/South Americans and Caribbean Latinos are more likely to be Democrats. National origin is also relevant across the other two partisanship models. Puerto Ricans and Dominicans are less likely to be strong partisans, and Cubans are less likely to be politically independent relative to other Latinos.

Another major finding from this analysis is the inability of conventional socioeconomic measures to explain Latino partisanship. Neither income nor education has any impact on any of the three partisanship dependent variables. Further, there is little support for hypothesis three that less assimilated Latinos are less likely to be attached to a political party. Neither nativity, length of time in the U.S., or the assimilation variable itself has any impact on partisan behavior for Latinos. The only expected result from the cultural factor variable cluster was the trend of increased party strength among those with greater proficiency in the English language, and citizens being less likely to be politically independent. Finally, political orientations, including political interest and party perception a consistent impact on partisanship.

It is clear that Latinos will continue to be major players in both local and national elections, and therefore will be the target of greater attention from both political parties. It is also apparent from this analysis that Latinos evaluate the concern each party has for

Latinos when developing a party choice. Therefore it is likely that rhetoric and symbolic actions made by both parties will not have as much impact on Latino partisanship as partisan positions associated with policy issues pertinent to Latinos. However, as the individual circumstances of Latinos continue to vary more widely it is likely that their political attitudes will also continue to vary. Therefore, national origin will remain a highly influential contributing factor to Latino political attitudes, and thus a necessary variable in investigations of Latino political behavior.

## Appendix Tables

**Table 4.1 The Effect of the Full Model on Party Identification-7 Point Scale (Ordered Logit)**

	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>			
Commonality	.012	.067	1.01
Political Commonality	-.010	.109	.989
Perceived Discrimination	.160**	.076	1.17
Collective Action	-.025	.133	.975
<i>SES/Demographics</i>			
Income	.001	.003	1.00
Education	-.045	.035	.955
Work Status	.054	.073	1.05
Gender	-.309	.110	.733
Age	-.001	.006	.998
<i>Political Orientations</i>			
Assimilation	.052	.056	1.05
Internal Efficacy	.104**	.049	1.10
External Efficacy	.253***	.073	1.28
Political Interest	.169**	.069	1.18
Ideology	.112	.070	1.11
Party Perception	2.07***	.089	7.95
<i>Mobilization</i>			
Political Organizations	.008	.007	1.00
Latino Representatives	-.002	.009	.997
Catholicism	.138	.128	1.14
<i>Political Activities/Experiences</i>			
Latino Specific Participation	.053	.067	1.05
Discrimination Experience	.107	.069	1.11
<i>Cultural Factors</i>			
Nativity	-.093	.188	.910
Citizenship Status	-.177	.162	.837
English Proficiency	.103	.082	1.10
Length of Time in U.S.	.011	.007	1.01
<i>National Origin</i>			
Cuban	-.447**	.196	.639
Central/South American	.133	.154	1.14
Caribbean Latinos	.292*	.173	1.33

**Table 4.2 Contributing Factors Organized by Variable Cluster**

<b>Group Consciousness</b>	<b>Political Orientations</b>	<b>Cultural Factors</b>
Commonality	Assimilation	Nativity
Political Commonality	Internal Efficacy	Citizenship Status
Perceived Discrimination	External Efficacy	English Proficiency
Collective Action	Party Perception	Length of Time in U.S.
<b>SES-Demographics</b>	Ideology	<b>National Origin</b>
Income	Political Interest	Cuban
Education	<b>Mobilization</b>	Central/South American
Work Status	Political Organizations	Caribbean Latinos
Gender	Latino Representatives	
Age	Catholicism	
	<b>Activities/Experiences</b>	
	Latino Specific Participation	
	Discrimination Experience	

**Table 4.3 The Effect of the Full Model on Party Choice (Logistic Regression)**

	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>			
Commonality	.012	.067	1.01
Political Commonality	-.003	.209	.996
Perceived Discrimination	.242	.145	1.27
Collective Action	-.412*	.241	.661
<i>SES/Demographics</i>			
Income	.003	.007	1.00
Education	-.054	.066	.947
Work Status	.010	.139	1.01
Gender	.042	.211	1.04
Age	.009	.012	1.00
<i>Political Orientations</i>			
Assimilation	.086	.112	1.09
Internal Efficacy	.042	.094	1.04
External Efficacy	-.036	.143	.964
Political Interest	-.222*	.129	.800
Ideology	.241*	.132	1.27
Party Perception	2.43***	.127	11.38
<i>Mobilization</i>			
Political Organizations	.019	.014	1.01
Latino Representatives	-.016	.018	.983
Catholicism	.235	.244	1.26
<i>Political Activities/Experiences</i>			
Latino Specific Participation	.090	.132	1.09
Discrimination Experience	.018	.128	1.01
<i>Cultural Factors</i>			
Nativity	.188	.354	1.20
Citizenship Status	-.761**	.313	.466
English Proficiency	.183	.159	1.20
Length of Time in U.S.	-.002	.014	.997
<i>National Origin</i>			
Cuban	-.857**	.352	.424
Central/South American	.534*	.304	1.70
Caribbean Latinos	.638*	.358	1.89

N= 1220

Log Likelihood -344.50345


**Table 4.4 The Effect of the Full Model on Party Strength (Logistic Regression)**

	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>			
Commonality	-.087*	.050	.916
Political Commonality	.123	.159	1.13
Perceived Discrimination	.275**	.109	1.31
Collective Action	-.069	.197	.933
<i>SES/Demographics</i>			
Income	-.004	.005	.995
Education	.023	.051	1.02
Work Status	-.141	.109	.867
Gender	-.119	.158	.887
Age	.012	.009	1.01
<i>Political Orientations</i>			
Assimilation	-.112	.083	.893
Internal Efficacy	.043	.071	1.04
External Efficacy	.095	.106	1.09
Political Interest	.574***	.104	1.77
Ideology	-.030	.102	.970
Party Perception	.181**	.091	1.19
<i>Mobilization</i>			
Political Organizations	-.012	.011	.987
Latino Representatives	.018	.013	1.01
Catholicism	.061	.187	1.06
<i>Political Activities/Experiences</i>			
Latino Specific Participation	.285**	.090	1.33
Discrimination Experience	-.100	.100	.904
<i>Cultural Factors</i>			
Nativity	-.049	.264	.951
Citizenship Status	-.413*	.235	.661
English Proficiency	.262**	.121	1.30
Length of Time in U.S.	.017	.010	1.01
<i>National Origin</i>			
Cuban	-.074	.272	.928
Central/South American	.023	.234	1.02
Caribbean Latinos	-.023	.242	.976

N= 847      Log Likelihood -508.99391

\* P&lt; .10 level    \*\* P&lt; .05 level    \*\*\* P&lt; .01 level

**Table 4.5 The Impact of Party Perception on Partisan Identification**



Party Perception Values 1) Republican Party 2) No Difference 3) Democratic Party

**Table 4.6 The Effect of the Full Model on Political Independence (Logistic Regression)**

	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>			
Commonality	-.022	.039	.977
Political Commonality	.152	.124	1.16
Perceived Discrimination	-.078	.085	.924
Collective Action	-.138	.140	.870
<i>SES/Demographics</i>			
Income	-.000	.004	.999
Education	-.030	.039	.969
Work Status	-.031	.083	.969
Gender	.191	.124	1.21
Age	-.013*	.007	.986
<i>Political Orientations</i>			
Assimilation	.092	.061	1.09
Internal Efficacy	-.109**	.056	.895
External Efficacy	-.254**	.083	.775
Political Interest	-.422***	.079	.655
Ideology	-.061	.079	.940
Party Perception	-.237***	.068	.788
<i>Mobilization</i>			
Political Organizations	-.002	.008	.997
Latino Representatives	-.001	.010	.998
Catholicism	-.241*	.140	.785
<i>Political Activities/Experiences</i>			
Latino Specific Participation	.004	.076	1.00
Discrimination Experience	.116	.077	1.12
<i>Cultural Factors</i>			
Nativity	.180	.219	1.19
Citizenship Status	-.549**	.187	.577
English Proficiency	-.059	.093	.941
Length of Time in U.S.	-.000	.008	.999
<i>National Origin</i>			
Cuban	-.726***	.232	.483
Central/South American	.025	.171	1.02
Caribbean Latinos	-.300	.297	.740

N= 1365

Log Likelihood -826.17016

\* P&lt; .10 level \*\* P&lt; .05 level \*\*\* P&lt; .01 level

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **THE ROLE OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS IN LATINO PUBLIC OPINION**

Relative to Americans generally, we have historically known less about the political opinions of the Latino community in the United States, particularly in regard to what factors influence those opinions. This is a result of a general disinterest in the attitudes and opinions of Latinos prior to the late 1980's (de la Garza, 1987). The more recent interest in the political attitudes and beliefs of Latinos has been driven by the rapid growth of this population, which has generated interest within both the political world and marketing industries. This section of the dissertation is an effort to contribute to the growing knowledge of Latino public opinion regarding public policy issues. Specifically, this focuses on the relationship between group consciousness and the public opinion of Latinos on both general and Latino salient policy issue areas. By including both general issues (death penalty, affirmative action) and issues more salient to Latinos (immigration, bilingual education), I can test my primary hypothesis whether group consciousness has a greater impact on Latino political attitudes when the issues are directly tied to ethnicity.

To investigate this primary hypothesis this chapter utilizes four separate empirical models, one for each issue area. The core group consciousness cluster utilized throughout the dissertation will again be used here, along with a set of control variables used to test the influence of group consciousness on Latino public opinion in a multivariate context. Presentation of results from these multivariate models will follow a discussion of related literature focused on Latino political opinion across the issues used in this analysis.

The chapter begins with a general discussion of what we know about American public opinion, with a particular emphasis on factors that influence policy opinion. This discussion will provide motivation for the inclusion of explanatory variables within the various variable cluster described later in the chapter. In addition, I review the literature focused on the relationship between group consciousness and minority political opinion. While this work almost exclusively examines this relationship within the African American population, this discussion will provide a nice backdrop for the analysis conducted here focused on the Latino origin population.

### **5.1 American Public Opinion**

Erickson and Tedin (2005) define public opinion as the preferences of the adult population on matters of relevance to government. The key to this definition is the direct tie to opinions related to government, as attitudes directed toward issues that have nothing to do with politics are obviously not relevant to this dissertation. Further, this broad application to the entire adult population does not exclude the possibility of referencing subgroups (Mac-Dougall, 1966), specifically the U.S. Latino population. Prior to 1940, politicians judged public sentiment mainly from newspapers (Kernell, 1993). However, in the modern era of public opinion both academics and politicians have access to the opinions of millions of respondents through the thousands of surveys that are accessible through various data archives such as the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan. The availability of

this information has greatly improved how people think about political issues, and more importantly to this analysis, why they do.

One of the most widely studied contributing factors to public opinion is ideology (Campbell, 1960; Jacoby, 1988). Ideally, ideological classification is a convenient way to measure individuals core political values and to summarize their political views on the issues (Erickson & Tedin, 2005). However, in practice results are mixed. Much of the early research within the area of ideology and political attitudes or opinions conclude that the majority of United States citizens do not think about politics in a conceptual way, and are unable to use ideology as a proxy for their political attitudes (Campbell, 1960). Therefore the most politically sophisticated segment of the American public, particularly those with strong ideologies use their personal ideology as a guide for understanding the political world. Scholars have found that the many less politically sophisticated in the electorate use several alternatives to ideology to make political decisions. These alternatives include; candidate's party affiliation, endorsements of political organizations, polls, and the physical appearance of candidates are used to by people to make political judgments (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). Based on results from this literature, this analysis contains measures for ideology, party affiliation, and Latino political organizations in order to determine which heuristic, or information "short-cut" the Latino population is more likely to utilize when forming policy opinions.

Of these alternatives to ideology, party affiliation is the most pervasively utilized heuristic for the American public. Whereas only a select minority of the electorate may utilize ideological identification, people at all levels of sophistication appear to hold

meaningful party identifications (Erickson & Tedin, 2005). Compared to other political opinions people's party identification are quite stable over time, both before and after adjustment for measurement error (Green, Palmquist, and Shickler, 2002). The dominant parties are a critical source of cues for voters trying to form concrete impressions of national office seekers (Conover & Fieldman, 1989). For example, Conover and Fieldman (1989) suggest that people determine the ideology of the political candidate through the party he or she belongs to.

Utilizing the same process needed to form opinions of political candidates, individuals can use party identification to aid in forming the remainder of one's political beliefs. For example, a Republican learns that a good Republican is supposed to subscribe to conservative positions on certain issues and responds accordingly. By including party affiliation as an explanatory variable, this analysis can provide some insight into whether or not Latinos use partisanship to form political beliefs across a range of policy issues.

Scholars have found that group characteristics can also clearly make a difference in how people view the political world. Belonging to a group is a part of one's self-identification. Some of the factors that put people into these groups that have been found to influence public opinion include; social class, racial and ethnic, gender, and age. Because many policy issues concern the distribution of economic benefits in society, it is not surprising that socio-economic status has an impact on public opinion. Overall, the poor in the United States are more favorable to social welfare programs designed to raise living standards than are the more affluent. As a result, the working class is the group

most likely to favor increased government spending (Erickson & Tedin, 2005). Class differences in public opinion have also been suggested to be increasing in the United States (Stonecash, 2000; Erickson & Tedin, 2005). For example, despite non-economic issues becoming more salient to voters, the partisan polarization of the rich and poor has actually increased (Stonecash, 2000). Therefore, measures tapping into social class (income, education, and work status) are included in this analysis.

Although there are no age-group differences on the majority of issues, on a sizable minority of issues the older are more conservative than the young. Across many economic issues, self interest seems to drive differences between age-groups. For example, younger adults are more likely to feel the government should provide increased services to its citizens and is considerably more liberal on the issue of increased spending for student loans (Erickson & Tedin, 2005). Across most social issues it is safe to say that people get more conservative as they get older. For example, younger adults are more likely to support the legality of abortion and to allow homosexuals to teach in college (Erickson & Tedin, 2005). Religion and church membership also have an important influence on public opinion. Catholics tend to be slightly more liberal than Protestants, and Catholics are also more likely to be Democrats (Erickson & Tedin, 2005).

Gender is another factor that divides public opinion based on group membership. Studies of the gender gap have found that women are more likely to be attached to the Democratic Party, and more likely to be independents than Republicans (Norrander, 2003. Norrander & Kanthak, 2003). The gender gap has been caused by shifts in men's political attitudes (Kaufmann& Pretrocik, 1999) and is based on core values like

ideology, partisanship, and beliefs regarding the role of government. In addition, men and women often differ in their opinions of issues. For example, surveys have consistently found that women are less prone to endorse violence and aggression, as is reflected in women being less likely to support the death penalty or U.S. involvement in military conflict (Erickson & Tedin, 2005). There are also meaningful differences between men and women across issues dealing with societal hazards. For example, women are more likely to support the fifty five mile and hour speed limit, state laws requiring seat belts, and stiffer jail terms for drunk drivers (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986). For these reasons it is clear that gender must be included in any multivariate studies of public opinion.

Finally, there is no greater dividing factor in American public opinion than race. Particularly across issue areas that involve race, there are large gaps between Whites and African Americans. Not surprisingly, Blacks are more supportive of affirmative action than Whites (Dawson, 1995). In addition, African Americans are considerably more likely to perceive that racial discrimination is a major problem in the United States (Dawson, 1995; McClain & Stewart, 2002). While differences exist between Whites and other racial/ethnic groups across these issue areas, these differences are not as severe as those between Whites and African Americans (Erickson & Tedin, 2005). The role of race and ethnicity in public opinion motivates this analysis focused on the relationship between group consciousness and public opinion for Latinos. This chapter intends to investigate whether greater divisions between African Americans and Whites compared to those for Latinos and Whites is a result of group consciousness being less meaningful for Latinos in the context of forming opinions related to several policy areas. With

literature focused on American public opinion generally now concluded, the next section of the chapter discusses our extant knowledge of Latino public opinion, and some factors that are specific to Latino public opinion formation.

### **Latino Public Opinion in General Policy Issues**

Latinos generally support an activist government that protects minority civil rights and provides opportunities for individual citizens and minority groups (Martinez, 2000). In addition, Latinos also tend to support the death penalty at higher rates than Whites or African Americans, and are also slightly more opposed to abortion than Whites (Uhlener & Garcia, 2002). This leads to Latinos being often referred to as having competing ideologies, generally liberal politically but more conservative on social issues.

I intend to shed some light on the complex nature of Latino public opinion by testing the relationship between group consciousness and public opinion across several issue areas. The primary inquiry here is whether group consciousness has a greater impact on the attitudes of Latinos within Latino salient or specific policies relative to more general policy areas. The two policy issues used as indicators of the role of group consciousness in opinion of Latinos generally are abortion and the death penalty. These issues were chosen due to their lack of direct ethnic connotation, as well as the propensity of Latinos to take stances on these issues similar to Whites.

An issue often used as evidence of Latinos social conservative stance is abortion. Latinos are about 10 percentage points more likely than Anglos to oppose abortion (Leal, 2004). However multivariate analysis in this area has indicated that there is no statistical

difference between Whites and Latinos in regarding attitudes directed toward abortion (Leal, 2004; Bolks et al., 2000). Further, not only do Latino attitudes toward abortion resemble those of the general population, they are influenced by the same variables as the general population. Specifically, greater support for a feminist position increases the probability for pro-choice attitudes, while religiosity increases pro-life attitudes. Demographically, higher socioeconomic levels and being female increase the probability of pro-life attitudes (Bolks et al., 2000). Further, opposition to abortion is stronger among Spanish dominant Latinos, and Puerto Ricans (Leal, 2004). Interestingly, Leal utilizing the Kaiser (2000) data used here found that Cubans are less favorable of abortion rights than other Latinos, while Bolks et al. 2000 utilizing the LNPS found the conflicting trend that Cubans are significantly more likely than Mexican Americans to be pro-choice.

The second general policy area used in this analysis is the death penalty. The only extant work focused on Latino attitudes toward the death penalty has found that both Latinos and African Americans express greater opposition to the death penalty than Whites, with opposition being greater for women and the Spanish dominant (Leal, 2004). However support for the death penalty is stronger for citizens among Latino respondents (Leal, 2004). There is little research exploring the attitudes of Latinos toward the death penalty, which motivates the inclusion of this issue in the analysis, as well as the decision to make the death penalty a non-Latino salient policy issue. This analysis will provide some insight into what factors differentiate Latinos who are for or against the death penalty.

### **Latino Salient Issues (Bilingual Education and Immigration)**

The issue areas that generate the most divergence from the general population are those with a cultural or ethnic basis. Generally speaking, Latinos express a strong desire to protect their cultural traits and traditions, specifically the Spanish language. Among U.S. residents whose primary language is not English, Spanish speakers are an overwhelming majority (Schmidt, 1997). Although variation exists regarding form of bilingual education program, overall bilingual education helps Spanish-speaking individuals retain their native language, thus contributing greatly to the maintenance of Latino culture (Houvouras, 2001). This is reflected by language policy being the issue area that has the highest level of consensus among Latinos and separates Latinos from other racial/ethnic groups (Uhlaner & Garcia, 2002).

Surveys of the Latino population consistently indicate that most Latinos support bilingual education, in sharp contrast to Whites and African Americans who tend to oppose bilingual education (Uhlaner, 1991; Hajnal & Baldassre, 2001). For example, the Latino National Political Survey (de la Garza et al. 1992) indicated that 80 percent of Mexican Americans, 87 percent of Puerto Ricans, and 89 percent of Cuban Americans support bilingual education, with majorities in each sub-group reporting that they would be willing to pay more taxes for it. Although variation does exist based on national origin and citizenship status, over two thirds of the least favorable group (U.S. born Mexican American citizens) supported bilingual education in the LNPS (Uhlaner & Garcia, 2002). Interestingly, despite similarities in language usage patterns among Latinos and Asians,

Latinos display more enthusiasm for bilingual education than Asians (Cain & Kiewiet, 1987).

Despite clear support for bilingual education Latinos do not have a nationalist view of language, as over 90 percent of Latinos in the LNPS agreed that all citizens and residents of the United States should learn English. Further, less than 10 percent of Latinos indicated a belief that the primary purpose of bilingual education should be to maintain Spanish language or culture (Schmidt, 1997). On other hand, Latinos clearly reject an assimilationist, or English only policy stance. This is supported by Latinos in the LNPS overwhelmingly rejecting the proposition that English should be the official language of the United States, and fewer than 30 percent of each sub-group supporting a policy allowing employers to impose English-only rules in the workplace. Therefore, Latinos appear to support bilingualism in language policy, rejecting both English and Spanish only policies. This is most clearly reflected in responses to bilingual education, where over 70 percent of each group indicated that learning two languages is the primary objective of bilingual education (Schmidt, 1997).

In addition to bilingual education, immigration is included as a Latino salient policy. Despite the common perception that Latinos support a liberal immigration policy of decreased border enforcement, analyses of Latino public opinion suggest that support for a relaxed immigration policy is not widespread among the Latino population. In fact, a sizable percentage of the Latino community believes that there are already too many immigrants coming to the United States annually. The LNPS (de la Garza et al. 1992) indicated that 75 percent of Mexican Americans, 79 percent of Puerto Ricans, and 70

percent of Cuban Americans agreed with the statement that there are too many immigrants coming to the United States.<sup>30</sup> These general trends have been reinforced by other surveys of Latinos (Uhlener & Garcia, 2002; Binder et al., 1997). For example, only 23 percent of Mexicans believe that more illegal immigrants should be allowed to enter the U.S. and 73 percent of Mexicans believe that immigration laws should be more strictly enforced (Binder et al., 1997). Further, Latinos are evenly divided on their opinions of the use of sanctions for employers who hire illegal immigrants (Cain & Kiewiet, 1987).

There are variations among the Latino community in regard to immigration attitudes. The native born are more likely to favor a more restrictive policy than more recent arriving Latinos (Binder et al., 1997; Knight Ridder/Mercury News Survey), as are wealthier, more educated, and older Latinos (Hood et al., 1997; Binder et al., 1997). In regard to specific immigration policies; citizens and those who speak primarily English were more likely to support Proposition 187 in California (Newton, 2000). Further, non-citizens are more concerned with immigration issues generally than citizens (Michelson, 2001). In regard to national origin, Cuban Americans are the most concerned with illegal immigration, and Mexican Americans are more likely than others to believe that the government is already doing too much to stop illegal immigration. English speaking Latinos, and those at the lower end of the income scale are also more likely to support open immigration policies (Martinez, 2000).

---

<sup>30</sup> The 73.8 percent of Anglos is lower than that of both Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.

The most prominent explanation for these trends is that Latinos are more concerned with the economic impact of high immigration to the United States due to their overall lower socioeconomic status, which places them in direct competition for jobs with immigrants (Roriguez & Nunez, 1986; Gutierrez, 1995; Polinard et al., 1984; de la Garza, 1993). In line with this notion, Chicanos from Texas who were higher educated were often more sympathetic to the plight of illegal immigrants due to a lack of job threat (Rodriguez & Nunez, 1986). Contrary to the economic based explanation for immigration attitudes among Latinos, Newton (2000) found that ethnic identity measured by language use and citizenship status accounted for differences in support for Proposition 187 in California. Specifically, English speakers and citizens were more likely to support the anti-immigration proposition.

It is important to note however that despite concern over increased immigration and border enforcement, Latinos are generally supportive of recent immigrants once they have arrived in the United States (de la Garza et al., 1991). For example, Latinos are more likely than Whites, Africans Americans, or Asians to support amnesty for illegal immigrants (Cain & Kiewiet, 1987). Further, Mexicans in general are more likely to support policies that facilitate the political and social integration of Mexican immigrants, such as bilingual education and immigrant access to services and citizenship (de la Garza, 1998). Further, investigations of Latino attitudes toward immigrants and immigration generally must take into account the demographic, contextual, and attitudinal factors that influence this relationship (Binder et al., 1997). For example, most Cuban Americans who immigrated to the United States were defined as refugees and therefore had an

immigration experience much different than Mexicans who must naturalize to become citizens. These historical differences help to explain the national origin variation that exists among Latino attitudes toward immigration policies.

### **The Role of Group Consciousness in Minority Public Opinion**

There has not been extensive work investigating the relationship between group consciousness and public opinion among minority groups. Further, research in this area has focused almost exclusively on the African American population, therefore the theory driving this analysis is based largely on the limited work exploring the role of group consciousness in African American public opinion. The most direct test of the relationship between group consciousness and public opinion is Michael Dawson's (1994) work exploring the role of group interests in African American policy preferences. Dawson argues that both economic and racial policies have been historically tied to African American group interests. Group interests have a significant impact on African American views toward economic redistribution policies, as support for redistributive policies are greatest among those whose perceived link to other African Americans is high. Further, perceptions of linked fate, an indicator of group consciousness played the greatest role in predicting support for government racial policies in Dawson's analysis. Overall, group interests help counterbalance class divisions among African Americans in regard to policy preferences, particularly when the policy area is racially driven.

Katherine Tate (1993) suggests that the prevailing perception among African Americans that there remain inequalities based on race in the United States motivates racial identity among African Americans which leads to group interests dominating Black

policy preferences. Further, African Americans who identify with the upper economic classes are less likely to have strong racial identities, as are Black women in comparison to men (Tate, 1993). Finally, while there is little to draw from in this area specific to Latinos, cultural affinity has a significant influence on immigration policy, as the more “Mexican” a respondent is, the less likely they are to support restrictive immigration policies (Binder et al., 1997).<sup>31</sup>

## 5.2 Hypotheses

The primary theory that drives this analysis is that group consciousness influences the political attitudes of Latinos, particularly when the policy area is directly tied to the Latino community. Although the relationship between group consciousness and public opinion has been investigated for African Americans, there has yet to be a similar study for Latinos. Group consciousness is a resource that generates political activity through an individual’s attachment to a group. Therefore, I theorize that if group consciousness is relevant for Latinos, its effects will be more pronounced in the context of policy areas salient to the Latino origin population. In regard to direction, I hypothesize that the various dimensions of group consciousness when statistically related to the two Latino salient issue areas will be positively correlated with support for bilingual education and increased immigration to the United States. This leads to the following formally hypothesis;

---

<sup>31</sup> The authors here do not provide a conceptualization or measurement strategy for their measure of Mexican identity.

**H1: Group consciousness will have a greater impact on the attitudes of Latinos directed toward the Latino salient policy areas of bilingual education and immigration, than the general issue areas of abortion and the death penalty.**

Although this chapter is focused primarily on the relationship between group consciousness and Latino public opinion, there are many other factors that are potentially related to the political attitudes of Latinos. I hypothesize that cultural factors are going to be important contributing factors to Latino salient policy areas. It is likely that Latinos who are not citizens, were born outside of the United States, and who are less likely to be proficient in English will have significantly different attitudes regarding both immigration and bilingual education. Specially;

**H2: Latinos who are non-Citizens, born outside of the United States, and have lived in the United States for a shorter period of time will be more likely to support increased immigration to the United States.**

This trend is expected due to the notion that more recent arriving immigrants potentially have greater personal experiences with the current immigration policies in the United States, and also may be more likely to have friends and family who would benefit from a more relaxed U.S. immigration policy. Similarly, I believe that Latinos who are more recent arriving immigrants and are less proficient in English would express greater support for bilingual education due to the actual and/or perceived benefits this policy provides to Latinos with this background. This general theory leads to the following specific hypothesis;

**H3: Citizenship status, nativity, length of time in the United States, and English proficiency will have a negative relationship with**

**bilingual education.**<sup>32</sup>

Among the two non-salient issue areas of the death penalty and abortion, the contributing factor I expect to be most critical is religion. Given the moral nature of both abortion and the death penalty, I believe that Catholicism will be significant in both models. I hypothesize that Catholics will be more likely than non-Catholics to have a pro-life stance in the context of both abortion and the death penalty. This motivates the following formal hypothesis;

**H4: Catholics will be more likely to oppose increased availability of abortions and more likely to oppose the death penalty.**

These hypotheses will be tested through the estimation of four multivariate models, two for Latino salient policy areas and two for more general issues.

**Dependent Variable Measurement**

This investigation of Latino public opinion utilizes four policy areas as dependent variables, two general issue areas (abortion & the death penalty), and two Latino salient issues (bilingual education & immigration). This strategy will allow me to determine whether or not group consciousness has a greater impact on policy areas that are directed primarily at Latinos. The first issue of abortion is based on the following survey item; *Do you think abortion should be legal in all cases, legal in most cases, illegal in most cases, or illegal in all cases?* The categories of the abortion variable were recoded to represent simply whether or not individuals believe abortion should be legal or illegal; 0) legal in

---

<sup>32</sup> The negative relationship implies that non-Citizens, the foreign-born, those who have lived in the U.S. for shorter periods of time, and are less proficient in English will be more likely to support increased immigration due to the category sequencing of these explanatory variables.

all or most cases, 1) illegal in most or all cases. The other general policy issue is the death penalty and is derived from the following survey question; *Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?* This variable is dichotomous with 0) favor and 1) oppose as the two categories of the variable.

The two Latino salient issues of bilingual education and immigration are included due to their close connection to the Latino community and the fact that both issues are hot topics of debate generally in the United States. The bilingual education variable utilizes the following survey item; *Do you think all public school classes should be taught in English or do you think children of immigrants should be able to take some courses in their native language?* There are two responses to this question, 0) taught in English, 1) take courses in their native language. The survey item used here does not directly reference the policy of bilingual education; therefore this measure does not directly assess attitudes toward bilingual education. However, due to the positive value of this measure indicating support for some inclusion of native language in the classroom, I believe that this is a suitable surrogate measure for bilingual education. Throughout this dissertation I will refer to this dependent as bilingual education, despite its lack of that terminology in the survey item.

To measure the attitudes of Latinos toward immigration, the following survey question was used as an indicator; *Do you think the number of new immigrants allowed into the United States each year should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?* There are three categories for this variable; 0) decreased, 1) same, 2) increased. Both

Latino salient measures were re-coded to make pro-Latino responses the high variable value.

### **Independent Variable Measurement**

My general discussion of the public opinion literature has identified several factors that may impact the political attitudes of Latinos. In addition to those factors identified by previous literature cites, there are several concepts that I believe may have an impact on the public opinion of Latinos. This array of factors is grouped into six clusters representing the different perspectives attempting to explain partisan behavior. These clusters are 1) group consciousness (Latino commonality, shared political interests, perceived discrimination), 2) SES/Demographic factors (income, education, work status, gender, age), 3) political orientations (assimilation, political interest, ideology, partisanship), 4) political mobilization (Latino elected officials, Latino political organizations, Catholicism), 5) political activities and experiences (Latino specific participation, discrimination experience), 6) cultural factors (nativity, citizenship status, English proficiency, length of time in U.S.), and 7) national origin (Cuban, Central/South American, Caribbean Latinos). Table 5.1 clearly identifies all contributing factors included in each cluster graphically. Chapter two provides a full discussion of the variable construction for all explanatory variables used in this chapter. Therefore, please refer to that section of the dissertation for operationalization and measurement of concepts outlined above.

(Insert Table 5.1 About Here)

### **Testing Strategy/Model Specification**

The source of all the data introduced in this research paper originates from the 1999 survey of 2,417 Latinos conducted by the Washington Post, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University. Although Latino voting behavior is highly significant to the empirical political world, the lack of current well-designed survey data has been a strong hurdle for scholars of Latino politics. The Latino National Political Survey, conducted in 1989, was undoubtedly the most complete survey available for the study of Latino political attitudes and behavior (de la Garza, et. al. 1992). However, both the political reality and perception of political viability among the general public have changed drastically over the last ten years. Comparisons made between previous studies of group consciousness based on LNPS data and this study utilizing more current data will possibly reveal if these changes in the Latino political landscape have had an impact on the relationship between group consciousness and political participation.

The Washington Post/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University National Survey on Latinos in America consists of 4,614 adults, with 2,417 Latinos in the sample. The study includes interviews with 818 Mexicans, 318 Puerto Ricans, 312 Cubans, and 593 Central or South Americans. Latino adults were interviewed in their choice of English or Spanish, with 53 percent of the Latino interviews conducted predominately in Spanish. The final results were weighted to the national Latino population as estimated by the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. This survey was conducted by telephone between June 30 and August 30, 1999 by the International

Communications Research. My analysis is only concerned with the Latino respondents to this survey; therefore the non-Latino respondents were excluded from the model.

The survey is accompanied by a host of contextual variables created from original data that allows for greater depth to this analysis. By identifying the state of residence for each survey respondent I am able to include political organizations and Latino representatives, both expected to have an impact on public opinion through mobilization for Latinos for the same time period as the Pew Center survey.<sup>33</sup> These contextual variables will greatly add to this investigation of group consciousness and Latino political participation.

### **Multicollinearity Issues**

A correlation matrix was created for this model in order to test for the presence of multicollinearity, or high correlation between the explanatory variables. The presence of multicollinearity is problematic because the likelihood of finding statistical significance is decreased due to increased standard errors and smaller t-ratios (Schroeder et. al, 1986). The two explanatory variables with the greatest correlation in the analysis are citizenship status and nativity, with a Pearson coefficient of .61.<sup>34</sup> In general, correlations below .8 are not of major concern for statistical analysis. In addition, these measures were tested individually and collectively through the use of a scaled variable with no change in

---

<sup>33</sup> The Pew Hispanic Center 2000 survey interviewed and identified respondents from the following locations; California, Illinois, Texas, Florida, New York and Washington D.C. However, 106 respondents are coded as National in the survey and are not able to be tied to a specific state. For these respondents averages were conducted for each mobilization measure from the five states with the next largest populations. Those states are: Arizona, New Jersey, New Mexico, Colorado, and Massachusetts.

<sup>34</sup> Due to high collinearity with citizenship status and length of time in the U.S., generational distance from ones home country was dropped from the analysis.

direction or statistical significance in any of the models. There are only three other sets of explanatory variables with correlations greater than .5; age and length of time in the United States, citizenship status/length of time in the U.S., and English proficiency/nativity.

### **5.3 The Impact of Contributing Factors on General Policy Areas**

The first stage of this analysis is to assess the influence of group consciousness on general policy areas in order to investigate any potential variation across issue areas. The dependent variable for the abortion model is dichotomous, therefore logistic regression is utilized to estimate the model. Of primary importance to this study, consistent with hypothesis one, none of the group consciousness dimensions have any impact on Latinos attitudes toward abortion. Further, both education and age are negatively correlated with abortion. Therefore, the odds of opposing the legality of abortion decrease as Latinos become older and more educated. The negative coefficient on the ideology variable indicates that Latinos who identify themselves as ideologically conservative are more likely to believe that abortion should be illegal in all or most cases. Consistent with hypothesis four, Catholics are significantly less likely to support the legality of abortion relative to non-Catholics. The traditional pro-life stance of the Catholic Church has an impact on the attitudes of Latinos concerning abortion who identify themselves as Catholic.

(Insert Table 5.2 About Here)

Finally, the cultural factors of nativity and length of time spent in the United States are significant in this model. Latinos born outside of the United States are more

likely to believe that abortion should be legal than Latinos born in the United States. This is potentially the result of the near universal illegality of abortion throughout Latin America, a region where many women are prosecuted for having abortions annually. Foreign-born Latinos are potentially more likely to express support for the legality of abortion due to this hard-line approach of most Latin American countries. In addition, the odds of opposing the legality of abortion increase with time lived in the United States, which implies that greater exposure to American society increases perceptions that abortion should be illegal. Interestingly, there does not seem to be any significant variation in Latinos stance on abortion across national origin groups, as none of the subgroup dummy variables are statistically significant in this model.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, the largest division on this issue occurs among Catholics and non-Catholics, and those born outside of the United States compared to the U.S. born Latino population.

### The Death Penalty

The final model in this analysis utilizes a dichotomous variable to examine Latinos attitudes toward the death penalty, the second general policy area used in the chapter. The categories for this variable are 0) favor the death penalty for convicted murderers, and 1) oppose the death penalty for convicted murderers. Given the dichotomous nature of this variable, logistical regression is used to estimate the model.

Among the dimensions of group consciousness, perceived discrimination has a negative relationship with opposition to the death penalty. This indicates that as

---

<sup>35</sup> Although not statistically significant, Cubans are more likely to oppose abortion than Mexicans, consistent with Leal (1994).

individual's perception of discrimination directed toward Latinos increases, the odds that they will favor the death penalty for convicted murderers also increases. This finding is counter-intuitive, as perceived discrimination theoretically would lead individuals to question the equality of the criminal justice system. It is important to note that perceived discrimination is the only dimension of group consciousness that has had a statistically significant impact on Latino attitudes across all four issue areas.

(Insert Table 5.3 About Here)

Although neither income nor education had a significant impact on death penalty attitudes, both men and Democrats are more likely to oppose the death penalty. All three of the mobilization variables have an impact on opposition to the death penalty.

Opposition to the death penalty is greater in states with greater levels of political organizations. However, increased Latino representation contributes to greater support for the death penalty for convicted murderers. Catholicism is again statistically significant, and as expected contributes to greater opposition to the death penalty. Similarly to abortion, the pro-life stance of the Catholic Church seems to contribute to this trend among Catholics. In addition, opposition to the death penalty is greater among individuals who have participated in multiple Latino specific activities.

Cultural factors play a meaningful role in Latino policy views, as nativity and length of time in the United States are both have significant relationships with opposition to the death penalty. Latinos born in the United States oppose the death penalty with greater likelihood than the foreign born segment of the Latino population, as do those who have lived in the United States for a greater period of time. Length of time in the

United States has been a contributor to Latino public opinion across all issue areas, and the only issue where nativity was not significant was immigration. Therefore, cultural factors are clearly necessary components of statistical models intended to analyze Latino political attitudes or policy preferences. Finally, attitudes toward the death penalty vary across national origin groups; as opposition to the death penalty is greater among Cubans and support for the death penalty is greater among Puerto Rican and Dominicans.

#### **5.4 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Latino Salient Policy Areas**

With the two Latino general models now specified, the next step in this analysis is to determine the role of group consciousness and other factors on the Latino salient policy areas of immigration and bilingual education. The primary purpose of this analysis is to determine the ability of group consciousness to influence the attitudes of Latinos within policy areas salient to the Latino community, and to assess this relationship relative to the impact of group consciousness in more general policy areas. The first stage in this analysis is to identify the role of group consciousness relative to a set of control variables in the attitudes of Latinos regarding the Latino salient issue areas of immigration and bilingual education. The immigration variable has three categories, immigration should be 0) decreased, 1) kept the same, and 3) increased. Given the ordered and categorical nature of this variable, Generalized Ordered Logit is used to estimate this model. The baseline category for this model is decreased, therefore the two sets of results reported are immigration being unchanged and immigration being increased. Results for these two reported categories are interpreted relative to the baseline

category of immigration being decreased. I will begin this section of the analysis with the variable category of immigration being unchanged, with results being interpreted relative to immigration being decreased.

In all, there are seven contributing factors that have a statistically significant relationship with the belief that immigration should remain unchanged. There are no group consciousness dimensions that are significantly related to this category of the immigration variable. Among the SES cluster, Latinos with higher incomes are more likely to support immigration remaining the same, although the odds ratio suggests that this relationship is weak at best. Interestingly, as Latino representatives increases, the odds of an individual believing that immigration should remain unchanged is less than the odds of that individual believing immigration should be decreased.

Participating in Latino specific activities increases the odds that Latinos will support increased immigration to the United States. Working for a Latino organization or candidate potentially strengthens one's bond to other Latinos, many of whom may be potential recent immigrants. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that if you are working for a Latino organization you will be involved in activities with Latino immigrants given that 40 percent of the Latino population is foreign born. In addition, given the tendency of Latino organizations and candidates to focus on making immigration more open, Latinos working in these areas may be more likely to support policies aimed at making immigrating to the United States easier. As expected, cultural factors are important contributing factors in the context of Latino salient policies. As hypothesized, Latinos who are less proficient in English and who have spent less time in

the U.S. are more likely to believe that immigration policies should remain the same relative to immigration being decreased. However, non-citizens are less likely to indicate that immigration should remain unchanged. This is potentially a result of non-citizens perceiving continued immigration a potential threat to their prospects of finding employment in the United States. Finally, Latinos of Caribbean origin are less likely to indicate that immigration should remain unchanged relative to being decreased. Similarly to non-citizens, this is potentially a result of Puerto Rican and Dominicans viewing recent arriving immigrants as economic competition.

The second set of results report the impact of contributing factors on Latinos indicating that immigration should be increased. This statistics are taken relative to the two lower categories of the immigration variable, unchanged immigration to the U.S. or decreased immigration. Eight contributing variables are significant in this context. While group consciousness did not have any impact on the neutral immigration category, perceived discrimination is positively correlated with increased immigration. Therefore individuals who believe discrimination is a big problem for Latinos in the United States are more likely to support the notion that more immigrants should be allowed to come to the United States. This is the first evidence in support of the primary hypothesis that at least one dimension of group consciousness has a greater impact on Latino salient policies than general issue areas.

(Insert Table 5.4 About Here)

Increased age also increases the odds that Latinos will support a more open immigration policy. Latino representation decreases support for increased immigration,

however Latino political organizations increase the odds that individuals will support the notion that more immigrants should be allowed to enter the United States. This is most likely due to the advocacy efforts of these organizations related to immigration issues. Further, participation in Latino specific political activities is again positively correlated with support for increased immigration. Citizenship also remained significant, however in the context of increased immigration citizenship status has a negative coefficient. Therefore, as hypothesized non-citizens are more likely to support increased immigration relative to keeping immigration the same or decreasing immigration to the United States. Also supporting hypothesis two, Latinos who have lived in the United States for a shorter period of time are more likely to support increased immigration. These last two findings are a result of the greater likelihood of non-citizens and Latinos with limited residency in the U.S. being immigrants themselves and are consistent with previous research (Binder et al, 1997).

Finally, consistent with Martinez (2000), Cuban Americans are more likely to support increased immigration to the United States. Cubans, who have experienced a much different historical immigration experience as a result of being granted refugee status by the U.S. government support a more relaxed immigration policy to a greater extent than other Latinos. This is potentially due to Cubans having less perceived or actual fear of economic competition with immigrants as a result of their general higher socioeconomic levels relative to other Latinos. Or, it is possible that Cubans have a sense of nationalism or anti-communism that overrides any economic concerns associated with increased immigration.

### Bilingual Education

The next model utilized in this analysis focuses on the policy area of bilingual education. There are two categories in the bilingual education measure, students should be taught in English or taught in ones native language. Given the dichotomous nature of this measure, logistic regression is used to estimate this model. Among group consciousness variables, perceived discrimination is again the only dimension to have an impact on bilingual education. As perceived discrimination increases, so do the odds that Latinos will believe children of immigrants should be taught in their native languages. Results from the two Latino salient models suggest that perceived discrimination is the only dimension of group consciousness that motivates Latino attitudes toward policy areas directly tied to the Latino community.

(Insert Table 5.5 About Here)

In addition to perceived discrimination, both age and partisanship are significantly and positively correlated with support for bilingual education. Older Latinos and those who identify as Democrats are more likely to support the notion that children of immigrants should be allowed to be taught in their native language. As was the case for immigration, while political organizations increase the odds that Latinos will support bilingual education, in contrast Latino organizations decrease support for education in ones native language. Latino specific participation is again a contributor to Latino salient policy support, as defense of bilingual education rises with more political activity directly tied to the Latino community.

Based on coefficients and odds ratios, cultural factors appear to be the most critical in determining support for bilingual education, as all four variables in the cultural factor cluster are statistically significant. Interestingly, both citizens and Latinos born in the United States are more likely to support bilingual education. This contradicts the theory promoted in hypothesis three that Latinos who stand to benefit from bilingual education would exhibit the greatest support for the policy. This is potentially the result of non-citizens and the foreign born having a strong desire to have their children learn English quickly due to the economic benefits of English proficiency in the United States. This would motivate greater support for policies that attempt to quickly assimilate children with language issues into English dominant classrooms. Conversely, citizens may support the use of Spanish for those with language barriers due to its perceived benefit to Latinos generally. More in line with hypothesis two, both English proficiency and length of time in the United States are negatively correlated with support for bilingual education. This indicates that Latinos who have lived in the United States for shorter periods of time and who are less proficient in English are more likely to believe it is better for children of immigrants to be taught in their native language than to be taught exclusively in English.

Among national origin variables, consistent with the Latino National Political Survey Cubans are more likely to support bilingual education. However, being Central or South American increases the odds of believing children of immigrants should be taught exclusively in English. This trend for Central and South Americans again supports the theory used to explain nativity and citizenship status that recent arriving immigrants may

desire that their children learn English as quickly as possible in school due to the economic benefits associated with English language proficiency. This suggests that economic concerns may be more critical to this segment of the Latino population than cultural maintenance. In addition, the desire to maintain English skills may be based on a desire to prevent their children from facing discrimination due to their inability to speak English well. This is an important finding, as the prior mentioned LNPS did not survey this segment of the Latino population.

## **5.5 Conclusions and Discussion**

This analysis has not only shed light on the relationship between group consciousness and Latino public opinion, but has also defined the role of other contributing factors in Latino political attitude formation toward both Latino salient and more general policy areas. While the four policy areas used in this analysis (immigration, bilingual education, abortion, and the death penalty) are not exhaustive, I feel that they provide a strong backdrop for this analysis. The primary question addressed in this investigation of Latinos attitudes is the role of group consciousness across various types of issue areas. Results suggest that perceived discrimination is the only dimension of group consciousness that plays a role in determining Latino public opinion. Perceived discrimination motivates support for increased immigration and bilingual education among Latino salient policies, and opposition to the death penalty among general issues. The impact of perceived discrimination on both Latino salient policy areas is displayed in tables 5.6 and 5.7 which both provide the predicted probability increases associated with

perceived discrimination. In both cases it is clear that the predicted probability of supporting the pro-Latino stance on the issue increases with greater perceived discrimination.

(Insert Tables 5.6 and 5.7 About Here)

Further, there is only mixed support for the principal hypothesis that group consciousness is more meaningful in Latino salient issue areas. Specifically, while perceived discrimination has an expected impact in both Latino salient policy areas of immigration and bilingual education, it is also a contributing factor to Latino opposition to the death penalty. Therefore, the only policy area where perceived discrimination is not statistically significant is the general issue of abortion. While this supports hypothesis one, the results are not overwhelming. In short, perceived discrimination is the driving force behind any impact group consciousness has on Latino public opinion, and this impact is not limited to Latino salient policy areas.

Relative to the other variable clusters, cultural factors have proved to have the greatest influence on Latino public opinion. The level of integration into American culture and society clearly influences Latino political attitudes, as demonstrated by the statistical significance of length of time spent in the United States across all four policy areas. In addition, Latinos born outside of the United States appear to think differently about policy issues than Latinos who were born in the U.S. In fact, immigration was the only issue area where nativity did not have a statistically significant impact on Latino public opinion. Finally, as expected Catholicism played a meaningful role in shaping Latino political attitudes across the general issue areas of abortion and the death penalty.

Catholics clearly support a pro-life stance in both policy areas, being more likely to oppose abortion and the death penalty for convicted murderers.

In conclusion, this analysis in no way closes the door on the relationship between group consciousness formation and Latino public opinion. It does however provide a very important look into the role of the various dimensions of group consciousness in formulating Latino political attitudes. The inability of any dimension of group consciousness beyond perceived discrimination to impact Latino public opinion, along with the impact of perceived discrimination across the previous realms of Latino political behavior explored in this dissertation (participation, partisanship) strongly suggest that perceived discrimination is the driving force behind group consciousness. Given the role of perceived discrimination in Latino political behavior to this point, it will be interesting to see the impact of perceived discrimination on coalition formations and results from the final chapter analyzing factors that contribute to perceived discrimination and the other dimensions of group consciousness.

There is definitely need for further study in this area to test the impact of group consciousness across other issue areas. It is possible that Latino commonality or collective action motivate public opinion in other contexts. However, results of this study have provided valuable information and will hopefully generate more research that explores why Latinos behave politically they way that they do.

## Appendix Figures and Tables

**Table 5.1      Contributing Factors Organized by Variable Cluster**

<b>Group Consciousness</b>	<b>Political Orientations</b>	<b>Cultural Factors</b>
Commonality	Assimilation	Nativity
Political Commonality	Political Interest	Citizenship Status
Perceived Discrimination	Ideology	English Proficiency
Collective Action	Partisanship	Length of Time in U.S.
<b>SES-Demographics</b>	<b>Mobilization</b>	<b>National Origin</b>
Income	Political Organizations	Cuban
Education	Latino Representatives	Central/South American
Work Status	<b>Activities/Experiences</b>	Caribbean Latinos
Gender	Latino Specific Participation	
Age	Discrimination Experience	
Catholicism		

**Table 5.2 The Effect of the Full Model on Abortion (Logistic Regression)**

	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>			
Commonality	-.041	.040	.959
Political Commonality	-.010	.127	.989
Perceived Discrimination	.105	.087	1.11
Collective Action	-.208	.156	.811
<i>SES/Demographics</i>			
Income	-.005	.004	.994
Education	-.133***	.040	.874
Work Status	-.134	.085	.873
Gender	.049	.126	1.05
Age	-.016**	.007	.983
<i>Political Orientations</i>			
Assimilation	.050	.065	1.05
Political Interest	-.027	.079	.972
Ideology	-.367***	.081	.692
Partisanship	-.111	.140	.894
<i>Mobilization</i>			
Political Organizations	.013	.009	1.01
Latino Representatives	-.002	.011	.997
Catholicism	-.728***	.152	.482
<i>Political Activities/Experiences</i>			
Latino Specific Participation	.047	.077	1.04
Discrimination Experience	-.055	.079	.945
<i>Cultural Factors</i>			
Nativity	-.910***	.218	.402
Citizenship Status	-.277	.188	.757
English Proficiency	-.131	.095	.876
Length of Time in U.S.	.018**	.008	1.01
<i>National Origin</i>			
Cuban	-.294	.192	.744
Central/South American	.190	.182	1.20
Caribbean Latinos	-.252	.204	.777

N 1243      Log Likelihood -767.77764

\* P&lt; .10 level    \*\* P&lt; .05 level    \*\*\* P&lt; .01 level

**Table 5.3 The Effect of the Full Model on the Death Penalty (Logistic Regression)**

	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>			
Commonality	-.023	.040	.977
Political Commonality	.011	.129	1.01
Perceived Discrimination	-.034**	.090	.965
Collective Action	-.139	.158	.870
<i>SES/Demographics</i>			
Income	-.002	.004	.977
Education	.026	.041	1.02
Work Status	.046	.086	1.04
Gender	.267**	.129	1.30
Age	.003	.007	1.00
<i>Political Orientations</i>			
Assimilation	-.018	.066	.981
Political Interest	-.037	.080	.963
Ideology	.104	.083	1.11
Partisanship	-.464***	.144	.628
<i>Mobilization</i>			
Political Organizations	-.019**	.009	.980
Latino Representatives	.028**	.011	1.02
Catholicism	.568***	.152	1.76
<i>Political Activities/Experiences</i>			
Latino Specific Participation	-.092***	.077	.911
Discrimination Experience	-.031	.081	.969
<i>Cultural Factors</i>			
Nativity	.626**	.221	1.87
Citizenship Status	-.055	.188	.718
English Proficiency	.182	.096	1.19
Length of Time in U.S.	.010***	.008	1.01
<i>National Origin</i>			
Cuban	.542**	.233	1.71
Central/South American	.234	.181	1.26
Caribbean Latinos	-.404**	.211	1.49

N 1224      Log Likelihood -747.07867

\* P&lt; .10 level    \*\* P&lt; .05 level    \*\*\* P&lt; .01 level

**Table 5. 4 The Effect of the Full Model on Immigration (Generalized Ordered Logit)**

	Immigration Unchanged			Increased Immigration		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>						
Commonality	.074	.055	1.05	.038	.046	1.07
Political Commonality	-.067	.169	.993	.035	.148	.934
Perceived Discrimination	.161	.112	1.28	.380***	.109	1.17
Collective Action	.361	.186	1.17	-.029	.181	1.43
<i>SES/Demographics</i>						
Income	.016*	.009	1.00	.003	.004	1.01
Education	.002	.056	.991	-.029	.046	1.00
Work Status	-.003	.110	1.04	.078	.101	.996
Gender	.047	.167	1.00	-.034	.148	1.04
Age	-.003	.011	1.01	.022**	.007	.996
<i>Political Orientations</i>						
Assimilation	-.122	.080	.920	-.045	.077	.884
Political Interest	-.072	.113	.958	-.010	.090	.930
Ideology	-.031	.109	.980	-.025	.094	.968
Partisanship	.167	.181	1.21	.244	.166	1.18
<i>Mobilization</i>						
Political Organizations	.017	.011	1.01	.018*	.010	1.01
Latino Representatives	-.036**	.014	.973	-.024*	.013	.964
Catholicism	.071	.193	.958	-.144	.173	1.07
<i>Political Activities/Experiences</i>						
Latino Specific Participation	.400***	.110	1.40	.299***	.086	1.49
Discrimination Experience	-.141	.106	1.01	.142	.091	.867
<i>Cultural Factors</i>						
Nativity	-.485	.308	1.11	-.168	.258	.615
Citizenship Status	.017*	.302	.718	-.584**	.208	1.01
English Proficiency	-.256*	.144	.896	-.048	.105	.773
Length of Time in U.S.	-.024*	.013	.969	-.026**	.009	.976
<i>National Origin</i>						
Cuban	.321	.312	1.71	.673**	.253	1.37
Central/South American	.143	.279	.848	.293	.204	1.15
Caribbean Latinos	-.643**	.237	.654	-.175	.251	.525

N 1224      Log Likelihood -1039.5321

\* P&lt; .10 level    \*\* P&lt; .05 level    \*\*\* P&lt; .01 level


**Table 5.5 The Effect of the Full Model on Bilingual Education (Logistic Regression)**

	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>			
Commonality	.010	.040	1.00
Political Commonality	-.006	.128	.989
Perceived Discrimination	.414**	.087	1.53
Collective Action	.187	.150	1.18
<i>SES/Demographics</i>			
Income	-.000	.004	.995
Education	-.009	.040	.985
Work Status	.130	.086	1.13
Gender	-.082	.128	.904
Age	.016**	.007	1.01
<i>Political Orientations</i>			
Assimilation	.012	.066	.996
Political Interest	-.040	.080	.960
Ideology	.102	.082	1.09
Partisanship	.285**	.140	1.33
<i>Mobilization</i>			
Political Organizations	.037***	.009	1.03
Latino Representatives	-.033**	.011	.967
Catholicism	.165	.148	1.20
<i>Political Activities/Experiences</i>			
Latino Specific Participation	.242**	.078	1.26
Discrimination Experience	.040	.080	1.02
<i>Cultural Factors</i>			
Nativity	.497**	.221	1.64
Citizenship Status	.182*	.193	1.20
English Proficiency	-.347**	.097	.713
Length of Time in U.S.	-.039***	.009	.962
<i>National Origin</i>			
Cuban	.410**	.227	1.50
Central/South American	-.432**	.183	.644
Caribbean Latinos	.120	.205	1.12

N 1235      Log Likelihood -760.96553


\* P&lt; .10 level    \*\* P&lt; .05 level    \*\*\* P&lt; .01 level

**Table 5.6 The Impact of Perceived Discrimination on Support for Increased Immigration**



Perceived Discrimination Values 1) Not a Problem 2) A problem 3) Big Problem

**Table 5.7 The Impact of Percieved Discrimination on Support for Bilingual Education**



Perceived Discrimination Values 1) Not a Problem 2) A problem 3) Big Problem

## **CHAPTER 6 GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS AND MINORITY COALITION FORMATION**

### **Introduction**

The previous chapters in this dissertation explore the role of group consciousness on the internal dynamics of the Latino population, including; political participation, partisanship, and policy preferences. In particular the next chapter explores the factors that help create or motivate Latino group consciousness formation. With the relationship of group consciousness and several internal dynamics of Latino political behavior now investigated, there is a need to investigate the role of group consciousness to external political phenomenon. The purpose in this chapter is to define the role of Latino group consciousness in the propensity of Latinos to perceive commonality with African Americans, a precursor for coalition formation between these two groups. I contend here that while perceptions of commonality are not the only requirement for collective political action between groups, it is a critical component of any coalition between racial/ethnic groups. This is a result of commonality between groups being an indicator of proclivity to engage in cooperative collective action. Therefore, determining the impact of group consciousness among Latinos on attitudes toward African Americans is vital to the discussion of coalition formation between the nations two largest minority groups.

There is power in numbers, and we are now beginning to see that the increasing proportion of ethnic and racial minorities in the United States is having a significant impact on politics. Currently Latinos and African Americans constitute a little more than

one-quarter of the United States population. This potential for political influence is most promising in urban areas, as not only have many U.S. cities attained majority-minority populations, but these minority populations have become more diverse. The 2000 Census reflects a changing minority mosaic in which multiple communities of color coexist in many of our central cities (J. Garcia, 2003). The African-American population has been more urbanized than other minority groups; however, in some cities (Dallas, Houston, Miami, New York, and L.A. for example) Latinos exceed African American population (J. Garcia, 2003). The sheer size of these groups suggests an opportunity for increased political influence, with this opportunity providing the incentive for coalition formation between them.

In spite of these growing numbers, the formation of political alliances are still essential for the full force of the minority vote to be felt within the American political context. Despite the apparently rational incentives for minority coalition building, there is little evidence of political coalitions between the nation's two largest minority groups, Latinos and African Americans (McClain & Stewart, 2002; Betancur and Gills, 2000; Jennings, 2003).

Latinos and African-Americans share a number of common conditions or circumstances that often have political connotations. These characteristics include levels of education and incomes that are significantly below the national average (McClain and Stewart, 2002).<sup>36</sup> This trend is apparent across several indicators such as lower home-ownership rates, and higher than average unemployment rates relative to Whites. In

---

<sup>36</sup> African Americans have higher educational attainment and income levels than Latinos, yet they both trail Whites in these indicators.

addition, both groups have faced both a legacy and ongoing discrimination based on their racial or ethnic backgrounds. However, I will make the argument here that common circumstances alone are not sufficient for the creation of coalitions between Latinos and African Americans, as perceptions of shared interests are vital to the coalition formation process as well.

The focus of this paper examines individual attitudes and their propensity to motivate African Americans and Latinos to engage in political coalitions. Specifically, I examine perceptions of commonality among Latinos toward African Americans utilizing data from the 1999 Washington Post/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University National Survey on Latinos in America. The driving theory of this work is that perceived commonality between Blacks and Latinos is integral to constructing political associations at the mass level. Public opinion data has consistently found that there is asymmetry in the affinity that Latinos and African Americans have for one another, as African Americans tend to perceive much greater levels of intergroup commonality than do Latinos (Kaufmann, 1999). This study essentially attempts to identify the factors that account for this unbalanced perception of commonality through an analysis of factors that contribute to higher levels of Latino affinity for African Americans.

### **6.1 Coalition Formation Literature (Competition vs. Cooperation)**

Due to their common circumstances and conditions Latinos and African Americans appear to be perfect coalition partners, particularly in many metropolitan areas

in the United States. However, scholars of minority group politics have indicated that the coalition formation process between these two groups is very complex. The on going presence of segregated housing and the recent phenomenon of globalization has concentrated Latinos and African Americans in U.S. cities and metropolitan areas (Betancur and Gills, 2000). This concentration and common conditions have increased personal interaction among individuals within these groups and provided a foundation for coalition formation. This is the result of increased familiarity potentially leading to greater alliances. However, on the other hand the conditions associated with this residential concentration (deteriorated living conditions, lack of services, lack of viable employment etc.) have also placed members of these groups in direct competition with one another for access to limited resources, potentially leading to increased contempt (Betancur and Gills, 2000). Therefore it seems as though the changing demographics of the last century have provided the background for either intensified competition or coalition formation between Latinos and African Americans.

The question of whether or not Latinos and African Americans will become engaged in political coalitions has often been approached from the standpoint of shared interests versus intergroup competition (McClain & Karnig, 1990; Meier & Stewart 1991; McClain, 1993). Shared interests as discussed in the introduction are based on similar objective circumstances in the United States. Both groups are disadvantaged across several socio-economic indicators; both groups experience substantial discrimination, and both share similar social policy views and priorities. Despite these shared interests, competition over occupational, educational, and political resources often place these two

groups in direct competition. This potential conflict can often serve as an obstacle for coalition formation due to the nature of our winner take all electoral system (Borjas, 1999). For example, despite maintaining greater shared circumstances such as lower S.E.S. and lack of political power, competition over scarce jobs and resources may dominate the individual minority communities. In that case, poorer and less educated respondents are less likely to favor coalitional strategies (Jackson, Gerber, and Cain, 1994). Therefore, social class is a critical factor to coalition formation between minority groups.

According to Blalock (1967), competition between minority groups occurs when two or more groups strive for the same finite objectives so that success for one reduces the probability that the other will gain its goals. Scholars have found that Latinos and African Americans often find themselves in this competitive situation. For example, Latinos have been found to make less progress in terms of socio-economic well being and political power in cities with black majorities or pluralities (McClain and Karnig 1990). Further, biracial coalitions are less likely to occur when one group maintains a class or power advantage over the other (Giles and Evans, 1985; Mc Clain and Karnig, 1990; Tabb, Marshall, and Browning, 1990).

Scholars have also noted that competition can extend to other segments of the political environment, including political representation and the drawing of electoral districts (Meier and Stewart 1991; Gay, 2001). For example, while election results from 118 large multiracial school districts indicate that as the black population increases, political representation of Latinos increases, the reverse is not true. When the population

of Latinos grows, blacks do not gain, but in fact lose political representation (Meier and Stewart 1991). Further, Claudine Gay finds that African-American voter turnout is lowest in districts that have a majority Latino population (Gay, 2001).

It has also been suggested that this intergroup conflict may be a product of the nativity of a large segment of the Latino population. Roughly 40 percent of Latinos in the United States are foreign born (U.S Census, 2000). One consequence of this demographic trend is that immigrants from Latin America may be competing, directly or indirectly with native-born African-Americans for both public and private resources (Jones-Correa, 2001). During the 1980's many of the nation's major cities went through rapid demographic transformations while government cutbacks left new immigrants and older residents in poor sections of these cities directly engaged in competition for scarce resources. The upward concentration of wealth in the U.S. in the last two decades has been coupled with declines in real wages and lack of investments in urban neighborhoods, putting the Black and Latino working class in a disadvantaged position (Jennings, 2003). As a result four of the top five immigrant-receiving metropolitan areas underwent significant civil disturbances by the early 1990's (Johnson & Oliver, 1989).

Finally, policy preferences play a significant role in determining the relationship between Latinos and African Americans. Education has been a priority for both Latinos and African Americans, yet the specific policy preferences related to education are different for these groups. For example, African Americans are less likely to support bilingual education programs, a policy area vital to Latinos and Asians. Further, in cities such as Dallas and New York, conflict has resulted based on disagreements regarding

competition for school superintendents, bilingual education programs, and funding formulas for specific school sites (J.Garcia, 2003). Therefore, while similarity in policy preferences on such issues as racial profiling, affirmative action, or segregated housing can help forge partnerships among minority communities, conflict can arise due to disagreement on other policy issues, including education or immigration.

#### Attitudinal Dimension Research

In addition to opinions regarding policy preferences, there has been a lot of work investigating the role of political attitudes in coalition formation. While the literature is riddled with examples of competition between Latinos and African Americans, recent research has argued that individual orientations of Latinos and African-Americans can motivate coalition formation between these groups. Tedin and Murray (1994) have found that individual level concern over economic conditions, such as poverty and unemployment, is associated with support for biracial coalition activities among both African-Americans and Latinos. This is largely a result of Blacks and Latinos having historically experienced lower median family incomes and higher rates of poverty and unemployment when compared to Whites and Asians.

Similarly, recent research has indicated that a shared experience with discrimination based on race/ethnicity among Latinos and African Americans can form a basis for a common link or bond between the two groups (J.Garcia, 2000; Uhlaner, 1991). The discriminatory-plus model (J.Garcia, 2000) suggests that common experiences and values among minority group members can lead them to be more receptive to collective

political efforts. The key to coalitions within this framework is that one's own individual disadvantaged status is tied to that of other groups so that each faces similar problems, and perhaps a common enemy. This shared experience or perception of discrimination also motivates a stronger sense of racial or ethnic group identity and greater support for specific issues or problems affecting the individuals group (Uhlener, 1991).

Beyond shared objective conditions, Latinos and African-Americans are more Democratic in partisanship than non-minority Americans. Latinos, with the exception of Cubans are stable Democrats at rates exceeding 60 percent (DeSipio and de la Garza 2002). Segura and Rodrigues (2003) suggest that Latino Democratic partisanship favors the formation of biracial coalitions with African-Americans because, of all the partisan social groups in the United States, African-Americans are the most loyal to the Democratic Party (Segura & Rodrigues, 2003). This shared partisanship provides the context for the possibility of common networks (i.e. party organizations, clubs) that can facilitate affinity among members of these two groups.

Along those same lines, scholars have argued that a shared ideology may also serve as the basis for the formation of coalitions. Raphael Sonenshein contends that coalitions form not on the basis of pure self-interest but on the grounds of shared ideology (Sonenshein, 1993). Thus, the most likely coalition to form is the one between groups close in ideology, even when another alliance might be more advantageous. Recognizing the role of interests, Sonenshein adds that while ideology alone may not hold coalitions together, without a shared ideology interracial coalitions are unlikely to

form in the first place. Frank Gilliam (1996) findings suggest that ideology is an important feature of governing coalitions as well in the city of Los Angeles.

## **6.2 The Role of Group Consciousness in Coalition Formation**

Based upon this attitudinal dimension research, I propose that beyond the presence of common circumstances and the rational benefits associated with shared political interests, a sense of commonality or inter-group consciousness between members of different minority groups is essential to building meaningful Black-Brown coalitions. The research conducted on common or linked fate in the black politics literature is particularly meaningful for this argument. For example, Michael Dawson's notion of the *black utility heuristic* argues that African Americans infer self-interests from group interests of African Americans generally. Further, Dawson contends that political coalition formation and collective action requires individuals to perceive that their fate is linked, first, to others within their own social group and, secondly, between their group and another (Dawson, 1994). Therefore, to set the basis for coalition formation with African Americans, Latinos must have perceptions of commonality with other Latinos first, and then maintain similar perceptions of commonality with African Americans.

In other words, Latinos must develop group consciousness internally before engaging in a political relationship with another group. Thus, the more Latinos see their economic, social, and political realities linked with the status of minorities generally, the more likely that they will become engaged in coalitions across racial/ethnic lines.

Therefore, just as perceptions of common fate among African Americans has led to unity in policy preferences for Blacks (McClain & Stewart, 2002) and homogeneity in voting behavior (Tate, 1993; Dawson, 1994), perceived commonality between Latinos and African Americans should motivate the proclivity to form more general minority coalitions.

### **6.3 Hypotheses**

This theoretical framework motivates a set of hypotheses that will be tested in this study. Without a general perception among individual Latinos that they share interests, preferences, and needs with other Latinos, collective action for Latino interests, much less minority interests, is very improbable. Latinos with a strong sense of group identity, or who view politics and political action based upon Latino collective identity, should be more likely to perceive common interests with African-Americans.

**H1: Perceptions of intergroup commonality among Latinos should lead to an increased likelihood of exhibiting perceptions of commonality with African Americans.**

Therefore, Latinos who see their life circumstances intertwined with other Latinos should be more likely to perceive similar ties with African Americans.

A history of discrimination toward the African American community, and a continued perception of discrimination within the African American community lead to strong solidarity and a belief in common or linked fate among individuals within the racial group (Dawson, 1994). In addition, a shared experience with racial/ethnic discrimination has been suggested to motivate reception for collective political efforts

among Latinos and African Americans (Uhlener, 1991; J. Garcia, 2000). Therefore, perceived discrimination is essential to the formation of group cohesion among African Americans and to support for collective political action between Latinos and Blacks. This leads to the inference that Latinos who have experienced discrimination or maintain perceptions that racial discrimination is a problem for Latinos will be more likely to exhibit feelings of commonality with African Americans. This assumption motivates the next hypothesis.

**H2: Perceptions and actual experience with discrimination among Latinos contributes to greater feelings of commonality with African Americans.**

As a result, the separate variables of perceived discrimination within the group consciousness cluster, as well as actual experience with discrimination should be positively correlated with perceptions of commonality with African Americans.

In addition to notions of perceived discrimination, I believe that increased exposure to African Americans will also yield increased perceptions of commonality with Blacks for Latinos. In order to acquire positive attitudes regarding African Americans, Latinos must have some interaction with individuals from that group. One of the main arguments for the potential of Black-Brown coalitions is that the two groups share similar disadvantaged positions in society. However, not all Latinos or African Americans share economic circumstances similar to the majority of their respective groups (Segura & Rodrigues, 2003). Therefore, it is quite plausible that Latinos with higher educations and incomes than the median for Latinos may not perceive that they share political

circumstances with members of their own group, much less African Americans. This leads to the following two hypotheses.

**H3: As African American population within a state increases perceptions of commonality between Latinos and African Americans will decrease.**

**H4: The socio-economic status indicators of education and income are negatively correlated with perceptions of commonality with African Americans.**

Finally, the level of incorporation or assimilation into the American political and social fabric should have a positive impact on inter-group commonality. As stated earlier, the large segment of foreign-born Latinos has implications regarding biracial coalition or competition. Immigrants new to the United States may not have a clear understanding of common economic and social circumstances, or the history of political exclusion and wide spread discrimination towards both Latinos and African Americans. It is logical therefore that Latinos more assimilated into American society are more likely to identify with the notion of a collective minority identity.

**H5: Political and social integration measured by length of time in the United States and nativity are positively correlated with perceptions of commonality with African Americans.**

Although the five hypotheses outlined above are the driving force behind this dissertation, the literature in this area suggests that several other factors will influence Latino perceptions of commonality with African Americans. These secondary hypotheses are listed below.

**H6: Latinos who believe assimilation is important for racial/ethnic groups will be more likely to perceive commonality with African Americans due to being less likely to feel it is important to maintain cultural differences.**

**H6: Latinos who identify with the Democratic Party and who define themselves as liberal are more likely to perceive commonality with African Americans.**

**H7: Latinos who support the use of affirmative action in higher education are more likely to perceive commonality with African Americans.**

### **Dependent Variable Measurement Strategy**

The dependent variable in this analysis is commonality with African Americans. This variable is based on the following survey question; “*How much do (respondent’s group) have in common with African Americans?*” Respondents could offer responses ranging from a lot in common to nothing at all in common. The values of this variable are therefore; 0) nothing in common 1) only a little in common 2) a fair amount in common 3) a lot in common. The same question is also asked regarding commonality with Whites. For comparison purposes, descriptive statistics will be used to investigate perceptions of commonality among Latinos toward Whites.

Table 6.1 indicates that overall Latinos do not perceive high levels of commonality with either Whites or African Americans. However, there is some meaningful variation, as 23 percent of Dominicans and 19 percent of Puerto Ricans report that they have a lot in common with African Americans compared to only 10 percent among Central and South Americans. Further, despite common political and social circumstances with Blacks, it does not appear as though Latinos make meaningful distinctions in perceptions of commonality with Whites or African Americans. For example, the percentage of Cubans and Mexicans who indicate that they have a lot in

common with Whites is essentially identical to the percentage of those populations who indicate that they have a lot in common with Blacks.

(Insert Table 6.1 About Here)

### **Independent Variable Measurement Strategies**

My general discussion of the coalition formation literature has identified several factors that may impact the way Latinos perceive African Americans. This array of factors is grouped into six clusters representing the different perspectives attempting to explain partisan behavior. These clusters are 1) Group Consciousness (Latino commonality, shared political interests, perceived discrimination), 2) SES/Demographic factors (income, education, work status, gender, age), 3) Attitudes and Experiences (assimilation, acculturation, support for affirmative action, discrimination experience, ideology, partisanship), 4) contextual factors (Latino civic organizations, Black population), 5) Socio-political Integration (nativity, length of time in U.S.), and 6) national origin (Cuban, Central/South American, Caribbean Latinos). Table 6.2 clearly identifies all contributing factors included in each cluster graphically. Chapter two provides a full discussion of the variable construction for all explanatory variables used multiple times in this dissertation. Therefore, please refer to that section of the dissertation for operationalization and measurement of the concepts outlined above. However, the concept of support for affirmative action is unique to this chapter, therefore I include a discussion of measurement strategy for that variable here.

(Insert Table 6.2 About Here)

I hypothesize that Latinos who exhibit support for the use of affirmative action in higher education will be more likely to express commonality with African Americans. The support for affirmative action measure is a dummy variable with the following categories; (0=no support, 1=support). The value no support indicates that respondents selected the response; *colleges and universities should select students without considering their racial or ethnic backgrounds*, and support indicates respondents selected this response; *colleges and universities should sometimes take a student's background into consideration when they decide which students to admit*. Respondents are able to choose one of these two statements.

### **Testing Strategy/Model Specification**

The source of all survey data introduced in this research paper originates from the 1999 survey of 2,417 Latinos conducted by the Washington Post, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University. Although Black-Brown coalition formation is highly significant to the empirical political world, the lack of current well-designed survey data has been a strong hurdle for scholars of minority politics. The Latino National Political Survey, conducted in 1989, was undoubtedly the most complete survey available for the study of Latino political attitudes and behavior (de la Garza, et. al. 1992). However, both the political reality and perception of political viability among the general public have changed drastically over the last ten years. The use of this data source will provide a more contemporary investigation of factors leading to perceptions of

commonality toward African Americans among Latinos. In addition to the survey instrument, contextual data was collected to construct the black population and civic organization variables discussed above.

The Washington Post/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University National Survey on Latinos in America consists of 4,614 adults, with 2,417 Latinos in the sample. The study includes interviews with 818 Mexicans, 318 Puerto Ricans, 312 Cubans, and 593 Central or South Americans. Latino adults were interviewed in their choice of English or Spanish, with 53 percent of the Latino interviews conducted predominately in Spanish. The final results were weighted to the national Latino population as estimated by the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. This survey was conducted by telephone between June 30 and August 30, 1999 by the International Communications Research.

Due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable, Generalized Ordered Logit models will be specified for an isolated group consciousness model of commonality with African Americans, as well as the full model including group consciousness, S.E.S., contextual factors, attitudinal dimensions, and integration measures. Generalized Ordered Logit was utilized after ordered Logit models failed to pass Hausman tests for the proportional odds assumption.

#### **6.4 The Impact of Group Consciousness on Commonality With African Americans (Isolated Model)**

Investigation of the isolated impact of group consciousness on perceptions of commonality with African Americans initiates this analysis. As table 6.3 indicates,

commonality is the only variable that motivates a minimal level of commonality with African Americans. Therefore, consistent with the first hypothesis, as the level of commonality among Latinos increases, so does the odds that Latinos will perceive that they have at least a little in common with African Americans. General commonality remains positively related to Latinos perceiving commonality with African Americans at both the medium and high levels of the dependent variable.

(Insert Table 6.3 About Here)

In addition, consistent with hypothesis two, perceived discrimination is significant in both the fair amount and high commonality categories. This suggests that Latinos who believe that discrimination directed toward their group is a serious issue are more likely to perceive commonality with African Americans than those who do not see discrimination being a salient issue for Latinos. Results from the initial models provide support for the main hypotheses that Latino internal commonality and perceptions of discrimination directed toward Latinos motivate stronger feelings of commonality toward African Americans. Despite the observed significance of these two group consciousness dimensions, collective action fails to motivate perceptions of commonality with African Americans in the isolated context. This is potentially due to competition between the two groups politically. It is plausible that individuals who engage in collective political activities with other Latinos perceive African Americans as competitors for limited political and economic resources.

### **The Impact of Contributing Factors on Commonality With African Americans**

Although the isolated models provide evidence that group consciousness does play a role in motivating perceptions of commonality with Blacks, there remains a need to test group consciousness against alternative factors suggested to have an impact on perceptions of commonality with outside groups. Table 6.4 indicates that there are only five variables that are significantly related to perceptions of minimal commonality with African Americans. Among the group consciousness cluster, both commonality and the thus far irrelevant political commonality variable are significant. Commonality continues to perform as expected, motivating commonality with Blacks. However, political commonality is negative, suggesting that Latinos who believe that Latinos have a lot in common politically are less likely to perceive a minimal level of commonality with African Americans relative to no commonality. Similar to collective action, this may also be the result of perceived competition between the two groups, as individuals may believe that in order to attain political benefits they must compete with African Americans.

(Insert Table 6.4 About Here)

Consistent with hypothesis two, Latinos who have personal experience with discrimination are more likely to express a minimal level of commonality with African Americans than no commonality. Although none of the socio-economic status variables are significant, they are all negative which implies that as education and income levels increase among Latinos their perceptions of commonality with Blacks decreases. In regard to national origin, both Cubans and Latinos from the Caribbean are more likely to

perceive that they have a minimal level of commonality with African Americans. The finding for Caribbean Latinos is most likely explained by the physical similarities between Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and African Americans that can cause Latinos of Caribbean origin to recognize their similar status in society.

There are considerably more variables that are significantly correlated with Latino perception of a fair amount in common with African Americans. The group consciousness variables of general commonality and perceived discrimination both have positive relationships with commonality with African Americans. As Latino perception of discrimination and feelings of internal commonality increase, so does the propensity to see commonality with African Americans. The SES and demographic cluster indicate that younger and less educated Latinos are also more likely to express that they have a fair amount in common with African Americans. While income and work status remain statistically insignificant, they are again negatively correlated with commonality with Blacks.

Among the attitudes and experience clusters, experience with discrimination again motivates commonality with African Americans, with acculturation and partisanship also having an impact. The partisanship coefficient and odds ratio suggests that Democrats are more likely to perceive commonality with African Americans than independents or Republicans. Interestingly, acculturation is negative, as Latinos who believe that it is important to maintain aspects of their culture are less likely to express that they have a fair amount in common with African Americans. Both mobilization measures are significant, with increased black population increasing the odds of commonality with

African Americans and increased civic organizations decreasing commonality. As the African American population within a state increases so does the propensity of Latinos to express that they have a fair amount in common with them.<sup>37</sup>

Contrary to my belief that civic organizations would help motivate bi-racial coalitions between Latinos and African Americans, this data suggests otherwise. With increased civic organizations the propensity of Latinos to perceive either medium or high level commonality with African Americans decreases. This suggests that either civic organizations extenuate differences between Latinos and African Americans, or Latinos who become involved with Latino civic organizations have lower perceptions of commonality with African Americans. Another possible explanation would be that civic organizations are more likely to be located in areas highly concentrated with Latinos, and therefore there may be less interaction with African Americans. Consistent with hypotheses three, Latinos born in the United States are more likely to perceive commonality with African Americans than those who are foreign born. The variables for the Caribbean and Cuban populations remain significant and positive, again suggesting that individuals from these two communities are more likely to perceive commonality with African Americans than Mexicans or Central and South Americans.

There are a total of four variables that influence the propensity of Latinos to express that they have a lot in common with African Americans. Among the group consciousness cluster, only general commonality among Latinos is significantly related to commonality with Blacks. As suggested by hypothesis one, as Latino internal

---

<sup>37</sup> The odds ratio for the Black population variable indicates that the impact of increased African American population has a very slight positive impact on perceptions of commonality among Latinos towards Blacks.

commonality increases so does the odds that respondents will express that they have a lot in common with African Americans. The strength of this relationship is presented in table five, in which the predicted probabilities associated with Latino commonality are presented when all other factors are held to their means. The SES factors perform as expected, as education and age are negatively related to the high level of Black commonality. This again suggests that Latino elites are less likely to express feelings of commonality with African Americans, as these individuals do not share similar experiences with either the Latino or African American community.

(Insert Table 6.5 About Here)

## **6.5 Conclusions and Discussion**

The statistical analysis provides strong support for the contention that Latino internal cohesion leads to greater commonality with African Americans. This relationship is significant across all categories of the dependent variable for both the isolated and full models. Therefore it is clear that this dimension of group consciousness is critical to the coalition formation process. It appears as though there must be solidarity among Latinos before there can be any discussion of meaningful partnership with other groups. This makes a lot of intuitive sense, as it is logical to assume that an individual of Latino origin who does not feel as though they have much in common with other Latinos will also not feel any notions of commonality toward African Americans. Therefore panethnicity, or a common identity among Latinos of different origin groups is a necessary component of common identity with external groups. Despite this trend associated with the first dimension of group consciousness, both Latino political commonality and collective

action decrease perceptions of commonality with African Americans. It appears as though collective action and political commonality heighten perceptions of African Americans being political competitors in a struggle for limited resources and access to political institutions.

In regard to national origin, it is clear that Caribbean Latinos (Puerto Rican/Dominicans) and Cubans are more likely to believe that they share similarities with African Americans across minimal and medium levels of perceived commonality. These perceptions are strongest among Caribbean Latinos who live in close proximity to African Americans and face similar circumstances to African Americans due to their skin color.

Perceived discrimination also suggests that group consciousness has a meaningful impact on commonality with Blacks. As expected, Latinos who believe that discrimination is a major problem for Latinos are more likely to express commonality with African Americans. Recognizing that your group faces external discrimination provides the basis for commonality, as this connects individuals to the larger experience of being a racial/ethnic minority in the United States. This relationship confirms that being a member of a minority group is the common link between Latinos and African Americans. The role of discrimination in coalition formation is not limited to perceptions, as actual experience with racial/ethnic discrimination also motivates commonality with African Americans among Latinos. Facing the reality of racial/ethnic discrimination reinforces identification with other individuals who share this experience, in this case African Americans.

While I cannot make the claim here that this common experience motivates collective action among Latinos and African Americans, this initial analysis provides motivation for further study in this area. For example, although the data here is not able to identify the source of external discrimination, future studies should investigate how the source of discrimination impacts support for coalition formation. We often assume that Whites are the source of discrimination directed toward minority groups, however this is not always the case. Experiencing discrimination will most likely not lead to feelings of commonality if the discrimination directed toward Latinos is from African Americans. While discrimination, both perceived and actual are clearly meaningful within the process of commonality recognition between Latinos and African Americans, it would be valuable to learn if the relationship between discrimination and commonality is dependent on the source of racial/ethnic discrimination.

Finally, I find little support for the social and political integration thesis. While Latinos born in the United States are more likely to indicate that they have a fair amount in common with African Americans than the foreign born segment of the population, length of time in the U.S. has no effect in the analysis. One of the more interesting findings from this analysis is the role of age in perceptions of commonality with African Americans. Age is negatively correlated with perceptions of medium and high levels of commonality with Blacks, suggesting that younger Latinos are more likely to recognize common experiences across groups. This is promising for the future of coalition formation between these groups. If this younger generation of Latinos maintain these attitudes as they age and become more involved politically, the ability of political leaders

to utilize this resource for collective efforts will increase tremendously. However, it is also possible that Latino youth engage in more interaction with African Americans due to their enrollment in the public school system. If so, it is possible that the level of interaction will decrease as they age, with this decreased interaction also having an impact on perceptions of commonality with African Americans.

While this is not a direct test of the relationship between the components of group consciousness and coalition formation, investigating the role of the multiple dimensions of group consciousness in the formation of commonality with African Americans is a valuable piece of the puzzle. Previous research has suggested that Latinos and African Americans share common experiences in the United States. This analysis adds to this discussion by testing whether or not individuals within these communities recognize that these commonalities exist, and which factors contribute to Latino perceptions of commonality with African Americans. As demographics continue to change in the United States, positioning Latinos and African Americans in common situations the propensity for coalition formation will continue to intensify. However, this analysis suggests that these opportunities for collective action will not manifest themselves unless group consciousness develops within the Latino community, providing the foundation for intra-group commonality with African Americans.

## Appendix Figures and Tables

**Table 6.1 Contributing Factors Organized by Variable Cluster**

<b>Group Consciousness</b>	<b>SES-Demographics</b>	<b>Attitudes and Experiences</b>	<b>Contextual Factors</b>	<b>Social/Political Integration</b>
Latino Commonality	Income	Assimilation	Latino Civic Organizations	Nativity
Political Commonality	Education	Acculturation	Black Population	Length of Time Spent Living in the United States
Perceived Discrimination	Work Status	Support for Affirmative Action		<b>National Origin</b>
Collective Action	Gender	Discrimination Experience		Caribbean
	Age	Ideology		Central/South America
		Partisanship		Cuban

**Table 6.2 Perceptions of Commonality Among Latinos Toward Whites and African Americans**

<b>African Americans</b>	Mexican	Puerto Rican	Cuban	Central-South American	Dominican	Salvadoran
A lot in Common	11 %	19 %	12 %	10 %	23 %	13 %
A fair amount in Common	18 %	30 %	20 %	13 %	20 %	8 %
Only a little in Common	40 %	33 %	42 %	36 %	36 %	39 %
Nothing in Common	29 %	16 %	24 %	40 %	24 %	38 %
<b>Whites/Anglos</b>						
A lot in Common	12 %	11 %	12 %	9 %	4 %	11 %
A fair amount in Common	20 %	23 %	20 %	23 %	16 %	10 %
Only a little in Common	43 %	39 %	43 %	42 %	37 %	49 %
Nothing in Common	25 %	27 %	25 %	25 %	41 %	25 %

**Table 6.3 The Effect of Group Consciousness on Commonality  
With African Americans**

	Degree of Commonality								
	Minimal Level			Medium Level			High Level		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Commonality	2.14***	.105	8.58	1.86***	.085	6.45	1.79***	.110	6.01
Political Commonality	-.232	.159	.792	.183	.152	1.20	-.118	.193	.887
Perceived Discrimination	.101	.104	1.10	.374***	.102	1.45	.370***	.127	1.44
Collective Action	.228	.173	1.25	.258	.196	1.29	-.077	.253	.925

N 1850

Log Likelihood 758.76888

\* P< .10 level \*\* P< .05 level \*\*\* P< .01 level


**Table 6.4 The Effect of the Full Model on Motivating Commonality  
With African Americans**

	Minimal Level			Medium Level			High Level		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
<i>Group Consciousness</i>									
Commonality	2.22***	.130	9.23	2.25***	.125	9.52	1.91***	.139	6.78
Political Commonality	-.347*	.188	.706	.088	.198	1.09	.295	.248	1.34
Perceived Discrimination	-.122	.136	.884	.293**	.132	1.34	.168	.163	1.30
Collective Action	.072	.208	1.07	-.006	.242	.993	-.148	.314	.862
<i>SES/Demographics</i>									
Income	-.017	.060	.982	-.045	.059	.955	-.097	.074	.907
Education	-.042	.060	.958	-.167**	.067	.845	-.246**	.082	.781
Work Status	-.002	.128	.997	-.053	.127	.947	.050	.167	1.05
Gender	.047	.193	1.04	-.265	.189	.766	.177	.242	1.19
Age	-.008	.010	.991	-.032**	.012	.968	-.031**	.015	.969
<i>Attitudes/Experiences</i>									
Assimilation	-.047	.101	.953	-.057	.085	.944	.022	.103	.997
Acculturation	-.110	.109	.895	-.189*	.108	.827	-.023	.117	.976
Support for Aff. Action	.221	.229	1.26	.045	.224	1.04	.015	.274	1.08
Experienced Discrimination	.403***	.119	1.49	.432***	.121	1.54	.081	.150	1.15
Partisanship	.213	.208	1.23	.596**	.221	1.81	.177	.276	1.19
Ideology	-.003	.119	.996	-.199	.126	.818	-.058	.159	.943
<i>Mobilization</i>									
Civic Organizations	-.001	.006	1.00	-.030**	.007	.969	-.029**	.009	.971
Black Population	.000	.000	.999	.000**	.000	1.00	.000	.000	1.00
<i>Social/Political Integration</i>									
Nativity	.224	.319	1.25	.826**	.296	2.28	-.132	.366	.875
Length of Time in U.S.	-.003	.011	.996	.018	.013	1.01	-.104	.016	1.01
<i>National Origin</i>									
Caribbean	.931**	.313	2.53	.860**	.296	2.36	.189	.345	1.20
Central/South America	-.409	.260	.663	.055	.293	1.05	-.249	.375	.779
Cuban	.744**	.322	2.10	.726**	.320	2.06	-.104	.407	.900

N 1672 Log Likelihood -958.76888

\* P< .10 level \*\* P< .05 level \*\*\* P< .01 level

**Table 6.5 The Impact of Latino Commonality on Percieved Commonality With Blacks**



Latino Commonality Values: 0 indicates that a respondent has no sense of commonality with any of the Latino sub-groups, 6 indicates a strong sense of commonality with all Latino sub-groups.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS**

#### **Statement of Research Question**

Each chapter to this point in the dissertation has discussed the impact of group consciousness on Latino political behavior (political participation, partisanship, policy preferences, and coalition formation with African Americans). With the relevance of the concept of group consciousness now well developed, there is a need to explore how group consciousness is created for the Latino population. This is the motivation for the final empirical chapter that provides a discussion of how group consciousness is formulated for Latinos. This analysis attempts to define the factors that motivate group consciousness formation among the Latino population. In other words, this chapter attempts to explain why some individuals develop higher levels of group consciousness than others, if any. Further, this analysis attempts to clarify the connection between the three dimensions of group consciousness utilized throughout this dissertation. This is vital to this dissertation, as it will allow for a discussion of how scholars should operationalize and measure the complex concept group consciousness.

As indicated in the introductory chapter, group consciousness involves identification with a group and a political awareness or ideology regarding the group's relative position in society along with a commitment to political action aimed at realizing the group's interests (Gurin et al., 1980). The focus of this chapter will be to outline the specific factors that lead to each of the components of group consciousness within the Latino community. Therefore, the group consciousness cluster (general commonality,

perceived discrimination, collective action) used to this point as the primary explanatory variables now become the dependent variables in this chapter.<sup>38</sup> This approach will provide an opportunity to differentiate the role of explanatory variables for each dimension of group consciousness. This is critical, as it is likely that a contributing factor such as Language preference or use will have a different role in increasing perceived discrimination than it will for increased perceptions of commonality with other Latinos. Before moving into a discussion of how group consciousness is formulated among Latinos, descriptive statistics are used to illustrate the extent to which group consciousness exists among Latinos.

### **7.1 Does Group Consciousness Exist Among Latinos?**

One of the most critical questions facing this dissertation is whether or not group consciousness is present at all within the Latino community. If not, there is little to no significance in a larger analysis that investigates the relationship between group consciousness and political behavior among Latinos. Given the nature of this chapter focusing on group consciousness formation, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of this aspect of the dissertation that is presented in the introductory chapter.<sup>39</sup> The purpose of this discussion is to provide evidence that group consciousness is in fact relevant to Latinos, and to explore variation among the Latino sub-groups across the three dimensions of group consciousness.

---

<sup>38</sup> Latino political commonality is not included as a dependent variable in this analysis due to its lack of relevance in the preceding chapters, and the desire to maintain measurement consistency with other work in this area.

<sup>39</sup> See the introductory chapter for a detailed discussion of the presence of group consciousness among the Latino population, as well as changes in consciousness over time.

Group consciousness again has three dimensions; group identity, evaluation of group's status in society, and desire for collective action. I want to briefly present the frequencies of the measures for these dimensions in order to assess the level of group consciousness among the Latino community. The first group consciousness dimension is group identity and is measured in this dissertation with a Latino commonality index. Approximately 10 percent of all Latinos are within the two high categories of the Latino commonality measure, reporting that they have a lot in common with all or all but one Latino sub-group population. Puerto Ricans are the group who have the highest percentage within those two high values (14 percent), and Central/South Americans are the least likely to indicate they have a lot in common with all or all but one Latino sub-group (7.7 percent).

The second dimension is perception of your group's relative position in society. Consistent with other work in this area this concept is operationalized through a perceived discrimination measure. Relative to commonality, the presence of perceived discrimination is much greater among Latinos. Overall, 56.4 percent of Latinos believe that discrimination directed toward Latinos is a big problem in the United States. The Dominican population professes the highest level of perceived discrimination, as 73 percent believe that discrimination is a big problem for Latinos. Among the major sub-groups, Mexicans have the lowest level of perceived discrimination with 54.6 percent in the high category of the variable.

The strongest support for the presence of group consciousness among Latinos comes from the final dimension, collective action. Overall, 85 percent of Latinos believe

that collective political activity leads to positive benefits for Latinos, with Dominicans leading the way with 90 percent. These data clearly indicate that there is group consciousness among Latinos, and thus investigations of consciousness among this community are relevant. With this settled, this chapter now directs its focus on defining how group consciousness is created for Latinos.

## **7.2 Theoretical Framework/ Literature Review**

Although the vast majority of work in the area of group consciousness is focused on the relationship between this concept and other political phenomenon, there have been several studies focused on group consciousness formation that have provided insight into what factors contribute to Latino consciousness formation. For example, nativity has been suggested to influence Latino individual level identity and group consciousness formation. Specifically, while the native born are likely to lose certain Mexican traits and adopt many American characteristics, they also take on new traits unique to Chicanos while retaining their ethnic loyalty (Keefe & Padilla, 1987). The authors here find that foreign born Mexicans are more likely to identify with their ethnic group than their native born counterparts. Being new to the United States potentially causes the foreign born population to seek out other Latinos for social connections. In addition, Keefe and Padilla (1987) find that socially assimilated Mexican Americans are more likely to be Protestants and non-barrio residents, and tend to be higher in socioeconomic status and education as well as more socio-economically mobile. Therefore more assimilated Mexican

Americans are less likely to develop group consciousness as a result of being less likely to live near other co-ethnics, and less likely to maintain low S.E.S. levels.

Scholars have also suggested that group consciousness is a product of the disadvantaged political and economic status imposed on the Latino community by the larger American society's system of inequality (Padilla, 1985; Bernal & Martinelli, 1993). For example, Rosales (1993) contends that structural factors including discrimination have influenced the ethnic identity of Mexican Americans. Specifically, most Mexican immigrants do not arrive in the United States with a strong sense of Mexican identity. However the negative treatment that immigrants receive in America motivates the formation of Mexican American identity. This identity construction can therefore be vital to survival under these harsh conditions. Further, discriminatory experiences based on class background serve as a major segment of political socialization for Chicano elites (de la Garza and Vaughan, 1984).

Along the same lines, scholars have found that the emergence and growth of Latino ethnic identity and group consciousness has been influenced by the level of integration or assimilation of Latinos into American society (Padilla, 1985). According to Padilla, integration into American society is the process of being subjugated economically, socially, and politically by the dominant society. Padilla argues that institutional inequality causes some Latinos to redress their disadvantaged situation through collective action. This process described by Padilla strongly suggests that maintaining lower socio-political status contributes to group consciousness among Latinos. Specifically in regard to socio-economic status, education and income have been

found to be negatively correlated with cultural awareness and ethnic loyalty for Mexicans, factors closely tied to the dimensions of group consciousness (Keefe & Padilla, 1987). Further, being working-class inhabitants of a working-class neighborhoods reinforces Latino panethnic identification and interaction (Ricourt & Danta, 2003).

Similarly, Richard Griswold del Castillo (1979) contends that anti-Mexican violence and discrimination was responsible for increased ethnic consciousness among Mexican Americans in California. This is consistent with Blauner's (1969) internal colonial model. Blauner's theory essentially states that ethnic consciousness stems from nonwhites colonized position in society. The colonized status of nonwhites makes minorities aware of their common position in society, which in turn motivates group consciousness. Further, Keefe and Padilla (1987) find that their survey respondents consistently indicate that their consciousness of their own ethnicity came in response to their exposure to others who were different than themselves. This exposure to others can mean Anglos, African Americans, or even Latinos of different sub-groups. Dawson also contends that group identity is reinforced by comparisons to out-groups, with the greater the perceived differences between the in-group and out group the stronger the identity of in-group members (Dawson, 1994).

Spanish language serves as a symbolic cultural similarity between various Latino groups, and therefore is a motivator of Latino group consciousness (Ricourt & Danta, 2003; Padilla, 1985; Bernal et. al, 1990). For example, Mexican children who are Spanish speaking tend to exhibit stronger notions of ethnic identity than those children who have

little Spanish speaking ability (Bernal et al., 1990). In addition, Heler (1987) argues that the knowledge and use of ethnic language permits the development of shared ethnic background and culture. Language has consistently been the dominant common denominator among Latinos that has often been the basis for discussions of pan-ethnicity or group consciousness formation. Initial federal legislation in the mid-1970's required that all federal agencies maintain records and designations of persons of Spanish origin, with persons of Spanish origins being generally defined as individuals from Spanish speaking countries (J.Garcia, 2003).

However, language alone cannot sustain consciousness, as external stimuli (discrimination, anti-Latino policies) motivate collective action based on perceptions of linguistic and cultural commonalities. The other mechanism contributing to the formation of Latino solidarity is the extent to which members interact across the boundaries of their own group. This implies that Latino population density, or being around other Latinos is important (Keefe & Padilla, 1987). Similarly, the tendency to choose ethnic friends and associates is related to both cultural knowledge and ethnic identification for Mexican Americans (Keefe & Padilla, 1987). Further, Keefe and Padilla (1987) find that living in a barrio, or highly concentrated Mexican American neighborhood is the primary factor related to ethnic identification among Mexicans.

This leads to Keefe and Padilla to suggest that Mexican cultural maintenance requires considerable contact with others of Mexican descent, not only in childhood but also in adult life. Similarly, Dawson (1994) argues that if information about Black America decreased due to Blacks moving out of Black neighborhoods group

consciousness would decrease. Further, Dawson contends that it is easier for Latinos and Asians to move out of their ethnic enclaves; again suggesting that living within ethnic enclaves contributes to group consciousness formation.

Religion can also potentially motivate group consciousness, and along with language has been suggested to be a cultural similarity among Latinos. The common view of Latinos and religious affiliation is that Catholicism dominates across all of the subgroups. A review of the Kaiser data used here indicates that 72 percent of all Latinos are Catholic. Mexicans are the Latino sub-group most likely to be Catholic with 77 percent, Puerto Ricans are second at 70 percent, Cubans are next with 66 percent, and Central/South Americans are the least likely to indicate that they are Catholic in the survey at 60 percent. These results are similar to the Latino National Political Survey (1989), where 77.4 percent of Latinos reported being Catholic (J.Garcia, 2003). Despite the tendency of Latinos to be aligned with Catholicism, being Catholic is only weakly correlated with cultural awareness and not significantly related to ethnic loyalty for Mexicans (Keefe & Padilla, 1987). To explore this relationship further here, I include measures of both religious affiliation and religiosity in order to assess whether the level of importance an individual gives to religion in their lives will have an impact on group consciousness formation along with Catholicism.

Finally, Latino community organizations play a vital role in group consciousness formation. The community organization represents the social process that teaches what it means to be Latino or Hispanic (Padilla, 1987). Participation in community organizations that involve more than one Spanish-speaking group brings forth solidarity among

Latinos. These community organizations also can provide individuals with a set of common material interests that can serve to reinforce informal, inter-group social ties. The supporters and promoters of the Latino or Hispanic ethnic identity are in fact the leaders of community organizations and similar groups who attempt to organize and coalesce the different segments of the larger Spanish speaking population (Ricourt & Danta, 2003). Group mobilization and political organizations have also been found to provide a mechanism for reinforcing group identity and behavior among African Americans (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984).

### **7.3 Hypotheses**

Building on the work of Padilla (1985) and others (Bernal & Martinelli, 1993; Keefe and Padilla, 1987), it is clear that socioeconomic status is a vital component of group consciousness formation. Latinos who have lower incomes, are less educated, and who have recently experienced hard economic times are potentially more inclined to see that they have commonalities with other Latinos, and more likely to recognize that Latinos have a disadvantaged position in American society. This general theory leads to the following hypothesis;

**H1: The three primary measures of socio-economic status; income, education, and financial situation will be negatively correlated with all the three dimensions of group consciousness.**

Among the political attitudes and experiences cluster of variables, I believe that engaging in Latino specific activities, and having personal experience with racial/ethnic discrimination will be important contributors to group consciousness for Latinos.

Working with other Latinos in the political process should lead individuals to develop greater feelings of affinity for other Latinos, and therefore increase group consciousness. Further, being personally discriminated against provides individuals with first hand experience of their group's position in society, a critical component of group consciousness. This leads to the following hypothesis;

**H2: Both Latino specific participation and discrimination experience will be positively correlated with all three dimensions of group consciousness.**

The notion of nativity and continued immigration among the Latino population provides the opportunity to explore the role of social integration in group consciousness formation. Keefe & Padilla (1987) find that immigrants are more likely to identify with their native born counterparts due to the need to interact primarily with other Latinos once arriving in the United States. Further, Rosales (1993) argues that immigrants are particularly susceptible to discrimination, and this experience shapes their ethnic identity.

Finally, there is no question that language is a critical component of group consciousness formation among the Latino community (Padilla, 1985; Bernal et. al, 1990; Heler, 1987). Therefore, Latinos who are Spanish dominant will be less likely to integrate into mainstream America, utilizing social networks in the Latino community more than those who are more proficient in English. This general theory that Latinos who are less socially integrated leads to the following hypothesis;

**H3: Nativity, length of time in U.S., and English proficiency will be negatively correlated with the three dimensions of group consciousness.**

### **Dependent Variable Measurement Strategy**

The group consciousness cluster of variables used to this point in the dissertation as the core independent variables now become the dependent variables for this chapter. The concept of group consciousness suggests that the effects of group affinity and collective orientations are felt within Latino sub-groups (Puerto Rican, Columbian, Mexican etc.), as well as the broader pan ethnic grouping of Latino. I agree with Miller et al. (1981) that proper conceptualization of group consciousness requires the employment of multiple measures to tap into the main dimensions of group consciousness. Past literature suggests that there are three general dimensions of group consciousness; 1) general identification with a group, 2) an awareness of that groups relative position in society, 3) and the desire to engage in collective activity that focuses on improving the situation of that group (Gurin et al., 1980; Padilla, 1985; J. Garcia, 2003).

These three dimensions are theoretically cumulative in nature, yet this theory has yet to be empirically tested. In other words, the first dimension of group consciousness implies that individuals have a positive affinity for being Latino. This then leads them to assess their group's sociopolitical status as disadvantaged, which results in them to be inclined to participate in some collective activity to change the situation (J. Garcia, 2003). Fortunately, the Washington Post survey provides the opportunity to capture all three aspects of group consciousness for Latinos, providing an opportunity to not only define the factors that influence group consciousness formation; but also to investigate the cumulative nature of these three dimensions of group consciousness.

A group commonality index was created using a battery of questions asking respondents how much he or she felt in common with other Latino sub-groups<sup>40</sup>. Respondents were given a score based on their response to the set of questions. For example, a response of a lot in common received +2 points, a fair amount in common +1, only a little in common -1, and nothing in common -2. These scores were used to construct an index that consists of seven values running from no sense of Latino commonality to a strong sense of commonality with all Latino sub-groups (Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Central/South Americans). There is significant variation in this measure, as just under 10 percent of respondents are in the two highest commonality categories, while approximately 30 percent are within the two lowest categories.

Beyond notions of commonality, group consciousness requires that individuals recognize that their group shares a disadvantaged position in society. I employ a measure of perceived discrimination to capture this component of group consciousness based on responses from the following survey questions; *Is discrimination against Latinos in our society today a problem or not? And, is it a big problem or not such a big problem?* A six point scale is used as a measure of discrimination with the following values; 0) those individuals who believe discrimination is not a problem 1) those who indicate that discrimination is a problem for Latinos but not a big problem 2) and those who believe that it is a big problem for Latinos.

---

<sup>40</sup> The Cronbach's Alpha statistic of .876 indicates with great confidence that these survey questions can be scaled to create the Latino Commonality variable.

The final component of group consciousness is the desire to improve the disadvantaged societal position of one's group through collective action. I use the following survey question as an indicator of one's belief that collective action can improve the group's position in society; *Do you think that if various Latinos groups worked together politically Latinos would be better off, worse off, or wouldn't make much difference?* The values of this final component of group consciousness are; 0) worse off 1) no difference 2) better off. Due to the theoretical interest in comparing those who believe that collective action is positive versus those who do not, as well as the small rate of individuals who indicate collective action leads to negative outcomes, these three categories are condensed into two values; 0) not better off 1) better off. The inclusion of these three measures effectively captures all dimensions of group consciousness, an advantage over most other studies interested in group consciousness formation.

### **Independent Variable Measurement Strategy**

My general discussion of the extant literature on group consciousness formation literature has identified several factors that may influence group consciousness levels among Latinos. This array of factors is grouped into six clusters representing the different perspectives attempting to explain partisan behavior. These clusters are 1) SES/Demographic factors (income, work status, education, work status, gender, age), 2) Religion (religiosity, Catholicism) 3) Out-group Interactions, (commonality with whites, Black population), 4) attitudes and experiences (assimilation, acculturation, Latino specific participation, experiences with discrimination), 5) Contextual Factors (civic

organizations, Latino salient initiatives, Latino representatives, Latino density), 6) cultural factors (nativity, citizenship status, English proficiency, length of time in U.S.), and 7) national origin (Cuban, Central/South American, Caribbean Latinos). Table 7.1 clearly identifies all contributing factors included in each cluster graphically. Chapter two provides a full discussion of the variable construction for all explanatory variables used in multiple chapters in this dissertation. Therefore, please refer to that section of the dissertation for operationalization and measurement for many concepts outlined above. However, there are several variables that are unique to this chapter, and I therefore provide some discussion of their measurement and operationalization here. These variables are; financial situation, religiosity, commonality with Whites, Latino salient policy initiatives, and Latino density.

(Insert Table 7.1 About Here)

Among the socio-economic status variables financial situation is derived from the following survey question; *In recent years, has your personal financial situation gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?* Financial situation has three values based on responses to that question: 1) worse 2) about the same 3) better. Along with Catholicism, the religion in order to assess the salience of religion in the lives of respondents a religiosity measure was created from the following survey question and has the following values; *How important is religion in your everyday life?* ; 0) not important at all, 1) somewhat important, 2) the most important thing in your life.

The following survey item is used to construct the perception of commonality with Whites measure; *Just thinking about groups living in the United States, how much*

*do (Insert Respondents Group) in the U.S. have in common with Anglos?* The values for the variable are; 0) nothing in common 1) a little in common 2) a fair amount in common 3) a lot in common. This measure will allow for testing of the notion that group consciousness is reinforced by comparisons to out-groups, with the greater the perceived differences between the in-group and out-group the stronger the identity of in-group members (Dawson, 1994; Keefe & Padilla, 1987). I also include a measure of ballot initiatives salient to Latinos by state in the contextual factor cluster, as anti-immigrant or Latino initiatives have been shown to be more salient in minority communities and also have an impact on political behavior for Latinos (Hero and Tolbert, 1996). Data on the number and types of initiatives from 1990-2000 were taken from the Initiative and Referendum Institute (2003). I simply counted the number of initiatives that had a potential direct or indirect impact on the Latino community in each state (for example English-only ballots or reduced services for Immigrants). Respondents from those states that do not allow citizens to propose ballot initiatives were coded as 0 for the ballot initiative variable.

The final contextual variable unique to this chapter is Latino density which is based on Latino population within each state. Latino density is included in the 1999 Kaiser data set, but is also based on Census data. The Latino density variable has four values ranging from 0) low density to 3) high. The principal investigators of this survey used the Latino population of each respondent's state of residence to determine Latino density. Therefore, individuals coded as having high Latino density are in the states most highly populated with Latinos.

### **Testing Strategy/Model Specification**

The source of all the data introduced in this research paper originates from the 1999 survey of 2,417 Latinos conducted by the Washington Post, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University. Although Latino voting behavior is highly significant to the empirical political world, the lack of current well-designed survey data has been a strong hurdle for scholars of Latino politics. The Latino National Political Survey, conducted in 1989, was undoubtedly the most complete survey available for the study of Latino political attitudes and behavior (de la Garza, et. al. 1992). However, both the political reality and perception of political viability among the general public have changed drastically over the last ten years. Comparisons made between previous studies of group consciousness based on LNPS data and this study utilizing more current data will possibly reveal if these changes in the Latino political landscape have had an impact on the relationship between group consciousness and political participation.

The Washington Post/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University National Survey on Latinos in America consists of 4,614 adults, with 2,417 Latinos in the sample. The study includes interviews with 818 Mexicans, 318 Puerto Ricans, 312 Cubans, and 593 Central or South Americans. Latino adults were interviewed in their choice of English or Spanish, with 53 percent of the Latino interviews conducted predominately in Spanish. The final results were weighted to the national Latino population as estimated by the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. This survey was conducted by telephone between June 30 and August 30, 1999 by the International

Communications Research. My analysis is only concerned with the Latino respondents to this survey; therefore the non-Latino respondents were excluded from the model.

### **Multicollinearity Issues**

A correlation matrix was created for this model in order to test for the presence of multicollinearity, or high correlation between the explanatory variables. The presence of multicollinearity is problematic because the likelihood of finding statistical significance is decreased due to increased standard errors and smaller t-ratios (Schroeder et. al, 1986). The two explanatory variables with the greatest correlation in the analysis are citizenship status and nativity, with a Pearson coefficient of .6.<sup>41</sup> In general, correlations below .7 or .8 are not of major concern for statistical analysis. In addition, these measures were tested individually and collectively through the use of a scaled variable with no change in direction or statistical significance in any of the models. There are only two other sets of explanatory variables with correlations greater than .5; citizenship status/length of time in the U.S., and English proficiency/nativity.

### **7.4 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Latino Commonality**

The first stage in this analysis is to model the factors contributing to Latino commonality, the first dimension of group consciousness. OLS regression is used for this model, as the dependent variable Latino Commonality has seven categories and is ordered. The model's r-squared of .717 suggests that the explanatory variables do a good

---

<sup>41</sup> Due to high collinearity with citizenship status and length of time in the U.S., generational distance from ones home country was dropped from the analysis.

job explaining how Latino commonality is produced among Latinos. In all, eight variables are significantly correlated with Latino commonality. Among the SES and demographic variables, both education and age are negatively associated with Latino commonality. Consistent with hypothesis one, Latinos with less formal education express higher levels of commonality with other Latinos. This confirms the general theory that racial/ethnic group identity is reinforced through being disadvantaged relative to the dominant society (Padilla, 1985; Keefe & Padilla, 1987). Age is also negatively correlated with Latino commonality. Given the recent demographic shifts in the United States that has placed Latinos of different nationality backgrounds into the same environments, it is plausible that younger Latinos are more likely to interact with other Latinos. In addition, younger Latinos may be more exposed to the media who have reinforced the notion of panethnicity among the Latino community.

(Insert Table 7.2 About Here)

Interestingly, non-Catholics are more likely to express greater feelings of commonality with other Latinos. This could be the result of the increased rate of Latinos moving away from the Catholic Church, and/or the potential of non-Catholics to attend more diverse churches. Unfortunately, the data used here does not allow for greater analysis into this trend. Consistent with hypothesis two, Latinos who have faced discrimination have higher levels of Latino commonality. This is consistent with previous literature that suggests discrimination is a key component of group identity or consciousness (Griswold del Castillo, 1979; de la Garza & Vaughan, 1984; Dawson, 1994). Further, participating in Latino specific activities increases perceptions of

commonality among Latinos. This suggests that the process of working with other Latinos in political activities leads individuals to believe that Latinos share common circumstances in the United States.

Within the out-group interaction cluster, respondents who report greater levels of commonality with whites also reported greater levels of commonality with other Latinos. This implies that if you feel you have a lot in common with other Latinos, you are also more likely to feel notions of commonality with other groups. Therefore, this has implications for work interested in collective action among multiple minority groups. This relationship is explored in more detail in the coalition formation chapter of this dissertation, however this result is inconsistent with previous literature that suggests group consciousness is higher among individuals who perceive people who are not within their ethnic group as outsiders.

Among national origin groups, only the Caribbean variable was significantly related to Latino commonality. Puerto Rican and Dominicans are more likely to express commonality with other Latinos than those from other national origin populations. This is potentially the result of interaction between these two communities due to regional concentration. Further, the cultural factor English proficiency is significantly related to Latino commonality. Inconsistent with hypothesis one, Latinos who are more English proficient are more likely to express greater levels of commonality. This is potentially due to the English proficient having greater contact with Latinos outside of their national origin group, as those without English skills are more likely to be recent immigrants who must rely on national origin contacts in the United States. Other explanations for this

finding are that those with greater proficiency in English have greater exposure to the media which often promotes pan ethnicity, or that those without Spanish speaking ability have a desire to recapture a sense of group identification. In addition, those skilled in English are better able to recognize that they face differential treatment in American society.

To summarize these findings and tie the significant contributing factors together, here is a brief profile of who is more likely to have high levels of commonality. Puerto Rican and Dominicans are more likely than other Latinos to perceive commonality with other Latinos. Demographically, Latinos who are younger, proficient in English and who have lower education levels are also more likely to perceive commonality with other Latinos. The experiences one has throughout their lives contribute to Latino commonality, as those who have participated in Latino specific activities and have been discriminated against have greater levels of commonality. Finally, Latinos who are not Catholic are more likely to believe that they have a lot in common with other Latinos.

### **7.5 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Perceived Discrimination**

The measure of perceived discrimination is categorical and ordered. Due to the ordered nature of this measure, Generalized Ordinal Logit is used to specify the Latino specific participation models.<sup>42</sup> Much like Multinomial Logit, the GOL model provides results for each category in the dependent variable other than the base category, in this case believing that discrimination is not a problem. Therefore I will discuss two sets of

---

<sup>42</sup> Generalized Ordinal Logit was employed after Ordinal Logit models failed tests for the proportional odds assumption.

results, those for factors impacting individuals to report that discrimination is a problem, and those influencing individuals to indicate discrimination is a big problem. However, with GOL results are relative to all lower categories, not just the baseline. In addition to the host of explanatory variables included in table one, Latino commonality is also included in this analysis. Interestingly, Latino commonality is not only statistically insignificant, but also negative in the context of discrimination being a problem. Therefore, Latino commonality does not contribute to greater levels of perceived discrimination as would be expected. This provides strong initial evidence that the dimensions of group consciousness are not cumulative.

(Insert Table 7.3 About Here)

Table 7.3 indicates that in all, five variables were significantly related to the perception that 1) discrimination is a problem for Latino in the United States, and twelve related to 2) discrimination being a big problem. Among the SES and demographic factors, financial situation and age are significantly related to perceptions of discrimination being a big problem. Latinos whose financial situation has gotten worse in recent years are more likely to indicate discrimination directed towards Latinos is a big problem. This is consistent with hypothesis one, and the notion that the disadvantaged are more likely to develop group consciousness. Perceptions of discrimination being a big problem also increase with age. This is potentially a result of older Latinos having longer exposure and a greater range of experiences with discrimination. However, given the small odds ratio here, age is not a very meaningful factor for this dimension of group consciousness.

The negative and statistically significant coefficients for acculturation suggest that individuals who believe that it is important for Latinos to maintain aspects of their culture are less likely to believe that discrimination is a problem or a big problem. It is possible that those who do not feel it is important to maintain cultural characteristics have this attitude as a result of facing discrimination. In addition, both Latino specific participation and discrimination experience are positively correlated with both categories of the dependent variable perceived discrimination. As hypothesized, participating in political activities directly tied to the ethnic group increases the likelihood that Latinos will develop group consciousness. Not surprisingly, being discriminated against is highly correlated with perceptions of discrimination being a problem. However, being personally discriminated against is not a necessary condition for perceived discrimination, as over 600 respondents who believe discrimination is a big problem for Latinos have no personal experience with discrimination. These two factors were also relevant in the context of Latino commonality.

As hypothesized, commonality with Whites is negatively correlated with believing that discrimination directed toward Latinos is a big problem in the United States. This indicates that Latinos who believe that they do not have much in common with Whites are more likely to see discrimination as being a major issue. This contradicts the positive trend between commonality with Whites and Latino commonality, suggesting that explanatory variables may influence dimensions of group consciousness differently. This is initial evidence that the dimensions of group consciousness may be distinct from one another. This supports the notion that exposure to out-groups increases

internal group identity or consciousness. Also in line with this theory, increased black population is also positively correlated with the high value of perceived discrimination. However, the odds ratio (1.00) for both categories of the dependent variable categories indicates that this relationship between black population and perceived discrimination is weak at best.

Among contextual factors, both salient Latino initiatives and Latino representatives are significantly related to the high value of the perceived discrimination variable, and Latino density is correlated with the perception that discrimination is a problem for Latinos. Given the propensity of ballot initiatives relevant to Latinos being perceived as discriminatory toward Latinos, it is not surprising that perceived discrimination is higher in states with higher numbers of initiatives salient to Latinos. The negative coefficient for Latino representatives indicates that Latinos living in states with fewer Latino elected officials have higher levels of perceived discrimination. This suggests that descriptive representation helps to curtail perceptions of racial/ethnic discrimination or provides more opportunities to address this situation. Consistent with previous literature, living near other Latinos increases group consciousness, as Latino density increases the likelihood that respondents believe discrimination is a problem for Latinos.

Central and South Americans are more likely to believe that discrimination is a big problem for Latinos. This is potentially a result of this population having higher rates of recent immigration to the U.S. Recent immigrants are less likely to be citizens, less likely to be proficient in English, and therefore more likely to face discrimination in

society. Non-citizens also being more likely to believe that discrimination is a big problem for Latinos reinforces this theory. Finally, consistent with hypothesis three, Latinos less proficient in English are more likely to perceive that discrimination is a problem, as well as indicate that it is a big problem. This makes intuitive sense, as it is likely that these individuals will face greater discrimination as a result of the language barrier.

To summarize these findings and tie the significant contributing factors together, here is a brief profile of who is more likely to have high levels of perceived discrimination. Central and South Americans are the sub-group most likely to believe discrimination is a major problem for Latinos, as are those born outside the U.S. who are less likely to be proficient in English. Demographically, older Latinos and those who have faced financial difficulty in recent years also profess greater levels of perceived discrimination. Similar to Latino commonality, those who have been discriminated against in their lives and who have participated in Latino specific political activities are also more likely to believe discrimination is a big problem for Latinos.

## **7.6 The Impact of Contributing Factors on Desire for Collective Action**

The measure of collective action is dichotomous, consisting of either believing collective action leads to benefits for Latinos, or not. Given the nature of this dependent variable, logistic regression is used in this model. Further, in addition to the host of explanatory variables included in table one, both Latino commonality and perceived discrimination are also included in this analysis. There is a significant and positive relationship between perceived discrimination and collective action. Therefore,

individuals who believe that discrimination directed toward Latinos is a big problem are significantly more likely to indicate that Latino collective action leads to an improved situation for Latinos. However, Latino commonality is not significantly related to collective action, therefore it does not influence individuals to believe Latino collective action leads to an improved situation. This, coupled with results from the perceived discrimination model suggest that group consciousness is not cumulative, as only perceived discrimination is statistically correlated with the other two dimensions of group consciousness.

(Insert Table 7.4 About Here)

Among the socioeconomic status and demographic variables, only financial situation is positively correlated with believing collective action leads to an improved situation. Latinos whose financial situation has improved are more likely to believe that Latino collective action leads to benefits for the Latino community. Although inconsistent with hypothesis one, it is likely that individuals whose financial situation has recently improved are more likely to have a positive outlook on the potential for success. Further, it is possible that those who have had recent economic success have benefited from collective efforts related to their careers with other Latinos. The positive coefficient here in contrast to the negative relationship between financial situation and the other two measures of group consciousness is an example of how the contributing factors have differential impacts on the three dimensions of group consciousness.

Latino specific participation increases the likelihood of believing collective action leads to an improved situation for Latinos. This is not surprising, as those engaged in

collective activities directly tied to Latinos are more likely to recognize the ability of collective action to improve the situation of the Latino community. None of the out-group interaction or contextual variables have any impact on collective action. However, consistent with hypothesis three, English proficiency is negatively correlated with collective action, indicating those less proficient in English are more likely to believe that collective action results in positive outcomes for Latinos. Finally, Puerto Rican and Dominican (i.e. Caribbean) respondents are more likely to believe that collective action leads to positive political outcomes for Latinos. The recent work by Ricourt & Danta (2003) suggests that panethnicity is created by Latinos in New York, a city concentrated with Puerto Rican and Dominican Latinos. Therefore, it is likely that respondents of this ancestry have personal experience with collective action that has led to some political success.

To summarize these findings and tie the significant contributing factors together, here is a brief profile of who is more likely to have high levels of collective action. Puerto Rican and Dominicans are more likely than other Latinos to believe collective political efforts contribute to positive outcomes for the Latino community. Latinos who have seen their financial situation improve recently, and those who have participated in Latino specific activities score higher on the collective action measure. Finally, those who believe discrimination is a major issue for Latinos and those who are more Spanish dominant are more likely to believe collective action yields benefits for Latinos.

## 7.7 Conclusions and Discussions

The two main inquiries in this chapter of the dissertation are to define the factors that contribute to group consciousness formation among Latinos, and to investigate whether the three components of group consciousness are cumulative. To this point in the dissertation group consciousness has been found to influence political participation among Latinos, particularly when political activities are directly linked to the Latino community; feelings of commonality with African Americans; partisanship and party identification; as well as policy preferences. Given the role of group consciousness in Latino political behavior, a comprehensive look at group consciousness formation within the Latino population is a very valuable contribution to the Latino political behavior and identity literatures.

Overall, it is apparent that Latino specific participation and experiencing discrimination are key contributors to group consciousness. Participating in political activities directly tied to Latino candidates, organizations, or issues increases group consciousness across all three dimensions. This trend is presented nicely by the graphed predicted probabilities (table 7.5) that clearly indicate Latino specific participation increases group consciousness across all three dimensions. This suggests that as Latino candidates and organizations continue to grow in number and influence, mobilization of Latino into these types of political activities should result in increased group consciousness for Latinos. Direct experience with discrimination is also a strong contributor to both Latino commonality and perceived discrimination, but is not significantly related to collective action. The impact of being discriminated against is

most apparent in the context of perceived discrimination, as is apparent through the large odds ratio (2.96) and the graphed predicted probabilities in table 7.6.

(Insert Table 7.5 and 7.6 About Here)

Results from this analysis also strongly suggest that the three dimensions of group consciousness are not cumulative or unidimensional, as Latino commonality is not significantly related to either collective action or perceived discrimination despite having an impact across several aspects of Latino political behavior. This implies that the initial condition of group consciousness formation, Latino commonality is not necessarily required to generate the other two dimensions. This is key, as it implies each dimension of group consciousness is possibly independent from one another. This is supported by the differential impact of contributing factors on each dimension of consciousness. For example, while English proficiency is negatively correlated with both perceived discrimination and collective action, it is positively related to Latino commonality. Similarly, increased age leads to greater levels of collective action, while leading to decreased Latino commonality.

Overall, Latino specific participation is the only explanatory variable that is significantly and positively related to all three dimensions of group consciousness. These results suggest that there are three distinct dimensions or components of group consciousness that may have only a limited connection to one another. Group consciousness should therefore not be thought of as a process, but instead a concept with multiple indicators. This finding also suggests that a stand-alone measure of group

consciousness constructed by combining all three dimensions is not warranted. This is supported by the small Alpha (.09) produced through a scale reliability test.

This general trend provides initial evidence that we may have to rethink the way we conceptualize and measure the concept of group consciousness in the future. Is there a stand-alone measure of group consciousness? Should we believe that group consciousness is a process in which each dimension builds upon one another leading to collective action? These are questions that while explored further in the concluding chapter are unfortunately not yet definitively answered by either this analysis or the extant literature. However, given the continued growth of both Latinos and Asians in the United States, research attempting to investigate group consciousness formation among panethnic groups is critical to our understanding of the concept and its relationship with political behavior. In closing, while not explored here due to data limitations. Future research should investigate the impact of group consciousness within national origin groups on pan-ethnic consciousness. In other words, are Latinos who have strong feelings of commonality with members of their national origin group more likely to profess greater affinity for Latinos outside of their national origin group? I feel that this is the next step in our continued exploration of group consciousness among Latinos.

## Appendix Figures and Tables

**Table 7.1     Contributing Factors Organized by Variable Cluster**

<b>SES-Demographics</b>	<b>Attitudes/Experiences</b>	<b>National Origin</b>
Income	Assimilation	Cuban
Financial Situation	Acculturation	Central/South American
Education	Latino Specific Participation	Caribbean Latinos
Work Status	Discrimination Experience	<b>Cultural Factors</b>
Gender	<b>Contextual Factors</b>	Nativity
Age	Civic Organizations	Citizenship Status
<b>Religion</b>	Latino Salient Initiatives	English Proficiency
Religiosity	Latino Representatives	Length of Time in U.S.
Catholicism	Latino Density	
<b>Out-Group Interaction</b>		
Commonality With Whites		
Black Population		

**Table 7.2 The Effect of Contributing Factors on Latino Commonality (OLS Results)**

<u>Contributing Factors</u>	<u>(B) Coefficient</u>	<u>(SE) Standard Error</u>
<i>SES/Demographics</i>		
Income	.002	.001
Financial Situation	-.005	.034
Education	-.029**	.015
Work Status	.011	.031
Gender	-.000	.047
Age	-.005**	.002
<i>Religion</i>		
Religiosity	.005	.027
Catholicism	-.151**	.055
<i>Political Attitudes/Experiences</i>		
Assimilation	-.014	.021
Acculturation	-.026	.024
Latino Specific Participation	.051*	.028
Discrimination Experience	.083**	.028
<i>Out-Group Interaction</i>		
Commonality With Whites	1.36***	.024
Black Population	.000	.000
<i>Contextual Factors</i>		
Civic Organizations	.000	.005
Latino Representatives	-.007	.008
Latino Salient Initiatives	.014	.016
Latino Density	.030	.024
<i>National Origin</i>		
Cuban	.137	.089
Central/ South American	-.103	.067
Caribbean Latinos	.246**	.083
<i>Cultural Factors</i>		
Nativity	.137	.117
Citizenship Status	.097	.069
English Proficiency	.073**	.034
Length of Time in U.S.	.002	.003

N 1699 R-Squared .717

\* P&lt; .10 level \*\* P&lt; .05 level \*\*\* P&lt; .01 level

**Table 7.3 The Effect of Contributing Factors on Perceived Discrimination (G.O.L.)**

Contributing Factors	Discrimination a Problem			Discrimination a Big Problem		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
<i>SES/Demographics</i>						
Income	-.001	.004	.998	-.002	.003	.997
Financial Situation	-.071	.107	.931	-.204**	.087	.815
Education	.002	.049	1.00	-.018	.038	.981
Work Status	-.060	.100	.940	-.081	.080	.921
Gender	-.144	.150	.865	-.048	.119	.952
Age	.008	.008	1.01	.012*	.007	1.01
<i>Religion</i>						
Religiosity	.082	.088	1.08	.085	.070	1.08
Catholicism	-.006	.171	.993	.085	.141	1.01
<i>Political Attitudes/Experiences</i>						
Assimilation	-.048	.072	.952	-.069	.056	.932
Acculturation	-.143**	.067	.866	-.186**	.062	.829
Latino Specific Participation	.284**	.099	1.32	.196**	.074	1.21
Discrimination Experience	1.08***	.114	2.96	.773***	.076	2.16
<i>Out-Group Interaction</i>						
Commonality With Whites	-.060	.139	.941	-.270**	.108	.762
Black Population	.000	.000	1.00	.000**	.000	1.00
<i>Contextual Factors</i>						
Civic Organizations	.008	.016	1.01	.012	.014	1.01
Latino Representatives	-.028	.025	.972	-.036*	.021	.963
Salient Latino Initiatives	.082	.052	1.09	.098**	.041	1.10
Latino Density	.127*	.074	1.13	.050	.060	1.05
<i>National Origin</i>						
Cuban	-.054	.273	.946	.169	.222	1.18
Central/South American.213	.213	.228	1.23	.383**	.171	1.46
Caribbean Latinos	.187	.267	1.20	.211	.209	1.23
<i>Cultural Factors</i>						
Nativity	-.200	.247	.818	-.277	.207	.745
Citizenship Status	-.082	.233	.961	-.348**	.175	.920
English Proficiency	-.668***	.127	.502	-.365***	.089	.511
Length of Time in U.S.	.002	.009	1.00	.008	.007	1.00
<i>Group Consciousness</i>						
Latino Commonality	-.095	.083	.908	.051	.065	1.03

N 1664

Log Likelihood -1299.739

\* P&lt; .10 level

\*\* P&lt; .05 level

\*\*\* P&lt; .01 level

**Table 7.4 The Effect of Contributing Factors on Collective Action (Logistic Regression)**


	B	SE	OR
<i>SES/Demographics</i>			
Income	-.006	.004	.993
Financial Situation	.256**	.113	1.29
Education	.020	.051	1.02
Work Status	.093	.103	1.09
Gender	.031	.161	1.03
Age	.076	.092	1.07
<i>Religion</i>			
Religiosity	.076	.092	1.07
Catholicism	.174	.184	1.19
<i>Political Attitudes/Experiences</i>			
Assimilation	.012	.076	1.01
Acculturation	-.081	.076	.921
Latino Specific Participation	.228**	.109	1.25
Discrimination Experience	.038	.104	1.03
<i>Out-Group Interaction</i>			
Commonality With Whites	-.058	.148	.943
Black Population	.000	.000	1.00
<i>Contextual Factors</i>			
Civic Organizations	.003	.018	1.00
Latino Representatives	-.014	.028	.985
Salient Latino Initiatives	.049	.056	1.05
Latino Density	-.102	.082	.902
<i>Cultural Factors</i>			
Nativity	.047	1.19	1.04
Citizenship Status	.245	.250	1.27
English Proficiency	-.238**	.125	.787
Length of Time in U.S.	-.008	.010	.991
<i>National Origin</i>			
Cuban	.179	.315	1.19
Central/South American	.055	.228	1.05
Caribbean Latinos	.518*	.312	1.67
<i>Group Consciousness</i>			
Latino Commonality	.085	.259	1.08
Perceived Discrimination	.475***	.105	1.60

N 1664

Log Likelihood -564.30026


\* P&lt; .10 level \*\* P&lt; .05 level \*\*\* P&lt; .01 level

**Table 7.5 The Impact of Latino Specific Participation on Perceived Discrimination**



Latino specific participation values equal number of activities individual have participated in. Latino specific activities are volunteering for a Latino candidate or organization, donating money to a Latino candidate or organization, and attending meetings or demonstrations focused on Latino issues.

**Table 7.6 The Impact of Discrimination Experience on Percieved Discrimination**



Perceived discrimination values equal: 1) Indirect experience with discrimination, 3)  
Direct experience with discrimination

## **CHAPTER 8**

### **CONCLUDING CHAPTER: IMPLICATIONS OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS ON LATINO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR**

#### **8.1 Group Consciousness Among Latinos**

I started this dissertation by highlighting the growing strength of the Latino population in the United States and return to that trend here to motivate a discussion of the major findings from this dissertation and an investigation of the potential ramifications of this work. Most discussions of Latinos and political influence begin with a mention of the population numbers associated with the Latino population. For example, it is well known that currently there are approximately 40 million Latinos living in the United States, which represents 13.7 percent of the U.S. population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2004). The continued flow of migration, coupled with the younger median age, and higher birth rates of Latinos has contributed to this group being recognized as the largest minority group in the United States. However, scholars and pundits alike have questioned whether or not Latinos will convert the population surges into political power for some time now (Aguirre & Saenz, 1991; de la Garza et al., 1992; Pachon & DeSipio, 1994; Portes and Rumbaut, 1997; Pachon, 2003). This dissertation has argued that the growing numbers of Latinos in the United States will not be translated into political power without the formation of solidarity or group consciousness within the Latino population.

Group consciousness among Latinos has been explored here from several different perspectives. The introductory chapter provided the frequencies for each dimension of group consciousness in an effort to establish the presence of group

consciousness among the Latino community. Clearly, group consciousness is present among Latinos as measured by the three dominant dimensions of Latino commonality, perceived discrimination, and collective action. In an effort to expand the measurement strategy of this concept I have also included a measure for political commonality throughout the dissertation in order to assess any meaningful differences between general Latino commonality and political commonality. The dissertation then explored the impact of group consciousness on Latino political behavior by testing the relationship between each consciousness dimension on the electoral participation, partisanship, public opinion, and propensity to perceive commonality with African Americans. Generally, speaking my research finds that group consciousness does have a role, although a somewhat limited one in Latino political behavior. Further, of the three dominant dimensions of group consciousness, perceived discrimination proved to have the greatest influence across the various aspects of Latino political behavior explored in the dissertation.

Specifically, in regard to political participation, Latino commonality increases the likelihood that Latinos will become registered, and perceived discrimination leads to frequent voting. As expected, group consciousness has a much greater impact on Latino specific participation, with all four measures being positively correlated with participation in two activities. Further, as perceived discrimination and Latino commonality increases so do the odds that Latinos will have participated in all three Latino specific activities of donating money to a Latino candidate or organization, working for a Latino candidate or organization, or attending a meeting or demonstration focused on Latino issues. Therefore, group consciousness has a contributing effect on

Latino political participation even when working in conjunction with a host of other relevant variables, particularly when the electoral activities are directly tied to the Latino community.

In the context of party behavior, results from all three partisanship models strongly suggest that group consciousness is not a strong contributor to Latino partisanship within a multivariate context. Group consciousness has often been credited for the overwhelming attachment of African Americans to the Democratic Party (Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1993). However, collective action, the only group consciousness dimension significantly correlated with Latino party choice is negatively associated with the Democratic Party, the dominant party of Latinos. In fact, the only dimension of group consciousness with a positive impact on Latino partisan behavior is perceived discrimination, which contributes to greater party strength. In short, results of the partisanship analysis strongly suggest that group consciousness works differently for Latinos compared to African Americans, and has not yet become pervasive enough among Latinos to motivate collective partisan attachment.

Chapter five of the dissertation focuses on the relationship between group consciousness and Latino public opinion. Results from this segment of the dissertation suggest that perceived discrimination is the only dimension of group consciousness that plays a role in determining Latino public opinion when group consciousness is tested against other relevant contributing factors to Latino public opinion. Further, there is only mixed support for the principal hypothesis that group consciousness is more meaningful in Latino salient issue areas. Specifically, while perceived discrimination has an expected

impact in both Latino salient policy areas of immigration and bilingual education, it is also a contributing factor to Latino opposition to the death penalty.

Chapter six discusses the role of group consciousness in perceptions of commonality with African Americans among Latinos. Based on coefficients and odds ratios, it is clear that Latino commonality has the greatest positive impact on perceived commonality with African Americans among all contributing factors. Latinos who believe that they have a lot in common with other Latinos are significantly more likely to believe that they share common circumstances or characteristics with African Americans. This is the only context in which perceived discrimination was not the group consciousness dimension with the greatest individual impact on Latino political behavior.

The final component of the dissertation attempted to define the factors that contribute to the formation of each dimension of group consciousness. Overall, it is apparent that Latino specific participation and experiencing discrimination are key contributors to group consciousness. Participating in political activities directly tied to Latino candidates, organizations, or issues increases group consciousness across all three dimensions. Direct experience with discrimination is also a strong contributor to both Latino commonality and perceived discrimination, but is not significantly related to collective action.

The key finding from this stage in the larger analysis is that the three dimensions of group consciousness are not cumulative, as Latino commonality is not significantly related to either collective action or perceived discrimination. If group consciousness were a cumulative process, Latino commonality would contribute to perceived

discrimination, which would then lead to collective action. However, results here suggest that Latino commonality does not contribute to either of the remaining dimensions of group consciousness. This implies that the initial condition of group consciousness formation, Latino commonality is not necessarily required to generate the other two dimensions. This is key, as it implies each dimension of group consciousness is possibly independent from one another. This has tremendous implications on how we conceptualize and measure the concept of group consciousness. For example, the search for a stand alone measure of group consciousness may be futile based on the relationship of perceived discrimination with the other two dimensions of group consciousness, and the low Alpha statistic that suggests the three dimensions are not suitable for scaling. This tend suggests that group consciousness should therefore not be thought of as a process, but instead a concept with multiple indicators that all have independent contributing effects to various aspects of Latino political behavior. This dissertation represents the first empirical analysis to include measures for all three group consciousness dimensions, and it is clear from this finding alone that this approach contributed greatly to our understanding of group consciousness and its relationship with political behavior.

## **8.2 Contributions and Research Extensions**

Group consciousness was introduced to studies of political participation as a concept that should be included with socioeconomic status (SES) in multivariate models due to the ability of group consciousness to compensate for lower SES levels of minority

groups (Verba & Nie, 1972). Specifically, group consciousness was suggested to explain why African Americans were observed to have relatively high participation levels despite low income and education levels compared to Whites. Latinos have even lower incomes and education levels than African Americans (McClain & Stewart, 2002), therefore group consciousness may be even a more critical resource for Latinos to actualize the political influence their numbers have provided. Results from this dissertation suggests that due to the ability of group consciousness to not only contribute to Latino electoral participation but other aspects of Latino political behavior, group consciousness should be included in models of political behavior alongside others including SES.

This dissertation has added to our understanding of how group consciousness is formed for Latinos and how the various dimensions of group consciousness influences Latino political behavior. This is particularly valuable due to the relative lack of knowledge we have about Latino group consciousness relative to other aspects of Latino political behavior. However, while a number of questions have been addressed in this dissertation, many steps can be taken to improve upon this study and related lines of inquiry. First and foremost, this analysis could benefit greatly from the construction of a data set specifically tailored for the study of group consciousness among multiple minority groups. If this data set included sizable sample populations of both Latinos and African Americans, there could be a direct test of the differential role of group consciousness for Latinos and African Americans. In addition, a direct measure of linked fate would be a nice addition to studies of Latino group consciousness. If the three dominant dimensions of group consciousness are not cumulative in nature, linked fate

may be the greatest single indicator of group consciousness available to scholars interested in the concept. The new national survey that is currently in the developmental stages will deal specifically with the Latino population. I am hopeful that this instrument will be useful in developing our knowledge of minority groups and their political behavior as it relates to group consciousness.

One issue that was not resolved by this dissertation that should be addressed in the future is how the presence of group consciousness at the national origin level influences panethnicity. Are Cubans who maintain high levels of group consciousness with other Cubans more likely to develop panethnic group consciousness? And further, does believing that your national origin group faces severe discrimination increase the likelihood that you will believe Latinos from other national origin groups do as well? This is a line of inquiry that is unfortunately not able to be resolved with existing survey data on Latinos but should be explored in the future when better data is available.

And finally, given the significance of perceived discrimination throughout this analysis, more in depth investigation of perceived and actual experience with discrimination should be conducted. Specifically, while it is generally assumed that Latinos who face discrimination are discriminated against by non-Latinos, results from the more recent 2002 Pew National Survey of Latinos suggests that many Latinos face discrimination from other Latinos. This would contradict our general understanding of perceived discrimination motivating collective minority group action. Further, internal discrimination among Latinos would serve as a significant obstacle to panethnicity for Latinos. There may be no basis for a sense of groupness that can motivate activities

focused on advancing Latino (as opposed to national origin) interests and concerns if high levels of internal discrimination exist within the Latino community. This is a line of inquiry that I intend to continue utilizing the 2002 Pew Survey. I believe that nativity is the factor most responsible for this trend, with U.S. born Latinos discriminating against Latino immigrants due to competition for jobs and scarce resources.

### **8.3 The Future of Group Consciousness Within The Latino Community**

Group consciousness offers scholars the opportunity to explore the relationship between group identity and political behavior. This analysis has suggested that group consciousness resources are present in significant quantities within the Latino community, however the impact of group consciousness on Latino political behavior is not as consistent and apparent. As Latinos continue to grow in population and political prowess they will continue to garner greater attention from both scholars and political experts. It will be interesting to see if the dispersion of Latinos of different national origin groups into the same geographic area will contribute to greater group consciousness among the Latino population or increased conflict due to economic competition. I want to conclude this dissertation by exploring each of these two scenarios in an attempt to investigate the future of group consciousness for the Latino community.

It is clear that the demographics of the United States have changed significantly in recent years. While much attention has been focused on the rapid growth of the Latino population that has made Latinos the largest minority group in the United States, it is important to note that all indicators suggest that this trend will continue in the future. The

future projections of the Census Bureau (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002) estimate that by 2050, Latinos will make up one fourth of the U.S. population. This obviously will provide Latinos opportunities for political influence, however the distribution of Latinos throughout all regions of the U.S. may be even of greater importance to the future of group consciousness formation. The influx of Latinos into areas they have not traditionally been associated with (Dalton Georgia, Portland Oregon) may provide an opportunity for Latinos to develop social networks critical to group consciousness formation in new areas throughout the nation. We know that inter-group coalition is greater in contexts where the groups in question share similar power levels (McClain & Stewart, 2002). Because these new geographic areas have not had sizable Latino populations in the past, there is no dominant Latino sub-group in place, providing opportunities for Latinos to develop consciousness that extends beyond national origin boundaries.

The final demographic trend that can contribute to increased group consciousness is the greater mix of Latino sub-groups in many localities across the United States. The historical regional concentration of the three dominant sub-groups; Mexicans in the Southwest, Puerto Ricans in the Northeast, and Cubans in Florida has reduced the opportunity for inter-group interactions. However, the 2000 Census reflects a changing minority mosaic in which multiple communities of color coexist in many of our central cities (J. Garcia, 2003). The 2000 Census strongly supports the greater mix of Latino groups in areas where Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, or Cubans were the predominant group (Miami, Houston, New York City for example). The increased

diversity of Latinos across many urban areas provides the opportunity for greater contact, a necessity for group consciousness formation. This increased contact is being driven primarily from the emergence of Central and South Americans within the Latino community. While the Mexican origin population remains the overwhelming majority of Latinos, it is Latinos from the Dominican Republic, Columbia, El Salvador, Guatemala, etc. who are growing faster and becoming more geographically important (J. Garcia, 2003). These Central and South Americans have settled for the most part in areas where Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban communities are located, therefore expanding opportunities for resource building. These demographic trends could very plausibly broaden a sense of Latino community in the future.

While the changing demographics of the United States provide increased opportunities for group consciousness formation, the role of leadership and framing of common issues and visions become critical to its development. Latino activists and elites have recognized the potential of panethnicity for Latinos and have responded by consciously promoting a broader group identity to maximize group size, presence, and resources (J.Garcia, 2004). This action is reflected in the stance of most Latino organizations to broaden their focus beyond one national origin group and to establish national offices in addition to those within their regional home base. These organizations continue to represent and advocate on behalf of Latinos, and new organizations have and will continue to emerge to reflect the needs and concerns of the growing Latino population. These developments may be heightened as the media continues to follow the

activities of Latinos, and promotes the use of panethnic terminology to refer to the Latino origin population.

An other potential catalyst for group consciousness formation among Latinos is the promotion of state initiatives that target Latinos such as the recent Proposition 200 of Arizona. We have learned from Proposition 187 that Latinos may galvanize around common concerns when threatened with an initiative perceived as being harmful to segments of the Latino community. Based on success of Proposition 200 in Arizona it is plausible that many other states will attempt to pass similar legislation based on the issue of immigration in the near future. This could lead to heightened group awareness and consciousness among Latinos to combat these initiatives as well as any other political issues that arise focused on the Latino community (Michelson, 2001). While it is not clear whether these factors will work to increase group consciousness, they all provide opportunities for an expansion of the Latino community.

While I have presented what I believe to be the future of group consciousness for Latinos, the demographic trends discussed above could also result in increased competition among Latinos. Greater dispersion of the Latino population and the continued influx of Latinos of Central and South American backgrounds may place members of these groups in direct competition with one another for access to limited resources (Betancur and Gills, 2000). For example Cubans no longer represent the majority Latino population in the greater Miami metropolis as Central and South Americans have settled in this area in large numbers. What will happen if Cubans refuse to allow these newcomers to establish themselves politically or economically in order to

protect their self-interests? This same dilemma could present itself throughout the regions experiencing greater Latino diversity.

Finally, the phenomenon of Latino internal discrimination described in the previous sub-section of this concluding chapter may work against the formation of greater community building among Latinos. While increased interaction may foster a larger Latino community where common concerns and interests motivate collective action. It is also plausible that greater interaction will lead to Latinos discriminating against one another as they attempt to establish themselves in a new environment. The two scenarios presented here essentially pose the question of whether individual or group interests will dominate Latino political behavior in the future? While this dissertation does not provide the answer to this question, it has provided insights which will help generate greater discussion on this topic. In either event group consciousness will continue to be a concept with great potential for analysis concerned with the political behavior of American minority groups.

## WORKS CITED

- Aguirre, B. E. and R. Saenz. 1991. "A Futuristic Assessment of Latino Ethnic Identity." *Latino Studies Journal* September: 1-14.
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 2002. *Hard Choices, Easy Answers*. Princeton; Princeton University Press
- Alvarez, R. Michael and Lisa Garcia Bedolla. 2003. "The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 Election." *Journal of Politics* 65: 31-49.
- Arvizu, John R. and Garcia, F. Chris. 1996. "Latino Voting Participation: Explaining and Differentiating Latino Voting Turnout." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 18: 104-128
- Barrera, Mario. 1979. *Race and class in the Southwest: A theory of racial inequality*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Barreto, Matt. Espino, Rodolfo. Pantajo, Adrian, and Ricardo Ramirez. 2003. "Selective Recruitment or Empowered Communities? The Effects of Descriptive Representation on Latino Voter Mobilization." Paper Presented at the 2003 Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Philadelphia, PA.
- Barvosa-Carter, Edwina. 2001. "Multiple Identity and Coalition Building: How Identity Differences within Us Enable Radical Alliances among Us." In *Forging Radical Alliances Across Difference: Coalition Politics for the New Millennium*. Ed. Jill M. Bystdzienski and Steven P. Schacht. New York: New York University Press.
- Bean, Frank and Martha Tienda. 1987. *The Hispanic Population of the United States*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation
- Bernal, Marha. George P. Knight, Camille Garza, Katheryn A. Ocampo, Marya K. Costa. 1990. "The Development of Ethnic Identity in Mexican-American Children." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 12, No.1.
- Bernal, Martha and Phylis Martinelli. 1993. *Mexican American Identity*. Encino, California.: Floricanto.
- Betanacur, John and Douglas Gills. 2000. *The Collaborative City: Opportunities and Struggles for Blacks and Latinos in U.S. Cities*. New York: Garland Publishing..

- Binder, Norman E., J.L. Polinard, and Robert D. Wrinkle. 1997. "Mexican American and Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform: A View From the Border." *Social Science Quarterly* 78: 324-337.
- Blauner, R. (1969) "Internal Colonization and Ghetto Revolt." *Social Problems* 16: 393-408.
- Bolks, Sean M. Diana Evens. J.L Polinard, and Robert D. Wrinkle.2000. "Core Beliefs and Abortion Attitudes; A Look at Latinos." *Social Science Quarterly*, Vo.81, No.1.
- Brischetto, Robert.1987. Latinos and the 1984 Election Exit Polls: Some Findings and Some Methodological Lessons. In *Ignored Voices: Public Opinion Polls and the Latino Community*, ed. Rodolfo O. de la Garza. Austin: CMAS Publications.
- Cain, Bruce E., D. Roerick Kiewiet, and Carole J. Uhlaner. 1991. "The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans." *American Journal of Political Science* 35: 390-422.
- Campbell, Angus. Phillip E. Converse , Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cho, Wendy K. Tam. 1999. "Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and Non- Voting". *Journal of Politics* 61, 4: 1140-1155.
- Conover, Pamela and Stanley Fieldman.1989. "Candidate Perceptions in an Ambiguous World: Campaigns, Cues, and Inference Processes." *American Journal of Political Science* 33: 912-941.
- Conway, Margaret. 2001. *Political Participation in the United States*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Crenson, Matthew A. and Benjamin Ginsberg. 2002. *Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press
- Dawson, Michael C. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- De la Garza, Rodolfo and David Vaughan. 1984. "The Political Socialization of Chicano Elites: A Generational Approach." *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol.65, No.2.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo. 1987. *Ignored Voices: Public Opinion Polls and the Latino*

- Community*. Austin: Center for Mexican American Studies Publications.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O. and Brischetto, Robert R. 1983. *The Mexican American Electorate: Political Participation and Ideology*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo, Angelo Falcon, F. Chris Garcia, and John A. Garcia. Latino National Political Survey. 1989-1990. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University,
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O., Louis DeSipio, F. Chris Garcia, John A. Garcia, and Angelo Falcon. 1992. *Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- de la Garza RO, DeSipio L, eds. 1992. *From Rhetoric to Reality: Latino Politics in the 1988 Elections*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- de la Garza, Rudolfo, Martha Menchaca, and Louis DeSipio. 1994. "Barrio Ballots Latino Politics In The 1990 Elections." Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo and Louis DeSipio. 1997. Save the baby, Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral Participation after Twenty Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage. In *Pursuing Power: Latinos and the Political System*, ed. F. Chris Garcia. University of Notre Dame Press.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo. 1998. "Interests Not Passions: Mexican American Attitudes toward Mexico, Immigration From Mexico, and Other Issues Shaping U.S.-Mexico Relations." *International Migration Review*, Vol. 32, No.2
- de la Garza, Rodolfo and Marisa Abrajano. 2002. "Get me to the polls on time: Latino Mobilization in the 2000 Election." Paper Presented at the 2002 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston.
- Dennis, Jack. "Theories of Turnout: An Empirical Comparison of Alienationist & Rationalist Perspectives." 1991. In. *Political Participation and American Democracy*, ed. William Crotty. Greenwood Press.
- DeSipio, Louis. *Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
- Erickson, Robert, and Kent Tedin. 2005. *American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact*. Pearson Education, Inc.
- Espiritu, Yen Lee. Lopez, David. 1990. "Panethnicity in the United States: A Theoretical Framework." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13 (2): 198-224.

- Garcia, F.C., & de la Garza R. 1977. *The Chicano Political Experience: Three Perspectives*. North Scituate, MA:Duxberry Press.
- Garcia, F. Chris. 1997. "Latinos and the Affirmative Action Debate: Wedge of Coalition Issue?" *In Pursuing Power: Latinos and the Political System*, ed. F. Chris Garcia. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
- Garcia, John. 1981. Political Integration of Mexican Immigrants: Explorations into the Naturalization Process." *International Migration Review*.
- Garcia, John, A. 1995. *Political Participation: Resources and Involvement among Latinos in the American Political System*. In, *Pursuing Power; Latinos and the Political System*, ed. F. Chris Garcia. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
- Garcia, John. 2003. *Latino Politics in America: Community, Culture, and Interests*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Garcia, John. 2004. "Pan Ethnicity: Is it Politically Relevant For Latino Political Engagement?"  
Paper Presented at the 2004 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Portland.
- Garcia, John and Gabriel Sanchez. 2004. "With the Spotlight on Latinos, Examining their Political Participation in the United States." *In Latino Political Participation in the Next Millennium*, ed. S. Navarro and A. Mejia.
- Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel Moynihan. 1963. *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*. Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T. Press.
- Green, Donald P., Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 1998. "Macropartisanship: A Replication and Critique." *American Political Science Review*, 92: 883-99
- Green, Donald. Palmquist, Bradley and Eric Shickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of the Voters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Greene, Steven. 2002. "The Social-Psychological Measurement of Partisanship." *Political Behavior* 24:171-197.
- Griswold del Castillo, R. 1979. *The Los Angeles Barrio, 1850-1890: A Social History*. Berkely: University of California Press.

- Guzmán, B. 2001. "The Hispanic Population: Census 2000 Brief". Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
- Gurin, P., Miller, A. H., & Gurin, G. 1980. "Stratum identification and Consciousness." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 43: 30-47.
- Hardy-Fanta, Carol. *Latina*. 1993. *Politics, Latino Politics: Gender, Culture and Political Participation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Hajnal, Zoltan. 2004. *Latino Independents and Identity Formation Under Uncertainty*. The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper.
- Heller, M. 1987. "The Role of Language in the Formation of Ethnic Identity." In *Children's Ethnic Socialization*, ed. J.S. Phinney & M.J. Rotherman. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Hero, Rodney E. 1992. *Latinos and Political Understanding: an Exploration*. Paper Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.
- Hero Rodney E., Tolbert Carol J. 1995. "Latinos and substantive representation in the U.S. House of Representatives: direct, indirect, or nonexistent?" *American Journal of Political Science* 39:640-52.
- Hero, Rodney E. and Campbell, Anne G. 1996. *Understanding Latino Political Participation: Exploring the Evidence From the Latino National Political Survey*. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 18:129-141.
- Hero, Rodney. F. Chris Garcia. John Garcia, and Harry Pachon. 2000. "Latino Participation, Partisanship, and Office Holding." *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 33. No.3: 529-534.
- Hood, M. V. Irwin L. Morris, and Kurt A. Shirkey. 1997. "¡Quedate o Vente!": Uncovering the Determinants of Hispanic Public Opinion toward Immigration. *Political Research Quarterly*, 50:627-647.
- Hritzuk N, Park DK. 2000. "The Question of Latino Participation: From an SES to a Social Structural Explanation." *Social Science Quarterly* 81:151-66.
- Jacoby, William. 1988. "The Impact of Party Identification on Issue Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* 32: 643-661.
- Johnson, Kirk. 2004. "Hispanic Voters Declared Their Independence," *New York Times*, November.

- Kamasaki, Charles. Clarissa Martinez, and Jessica Munoz. 2004. "How Did Latinos Really Vote in 2004." National Council of La Raza Report.
- Kaufmann, Karen & John R. Pretrocik. 1999. "The Changing Politics of Men: Understanding the Source of the Gender Gap." *American Journal of Political Science* 43: 864-887.
- Kernell, Samuel. 1993. *Going Public: New Strategies for Presidential Leadership*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Keefe, S.E. and A.M. Padilla. 1987. *Chicano Ethnicity*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Lau, Richard, and David Redlawsk. 2001. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Hueristics in Political Decision Making." *American Journal of Political Science*, 45: 451-471.
- Leal, David. "Latino Public Opinion?" 2004. Paper Presented at the Conference of Latino Politics: The State of the Discipline. Sponsored by Texas A&M University and the University of Texas at Austin. College Station, TX, April 30-May 1, 2004
- Leal, David L. Matt Barreto. Jangho Lee. Rodolfo O. de la Garza. 2005. "The Latino Vote in the 2004 Election." *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 38: 41-50.
- Lee, Yueh-Ting. Victor Ottati. Imtiaz Hussain. 2001. "Attitudes Toward "Illegal" Immigration Into the United States: California Proposition 187". *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 23: 430-443.
- Leighley, Jan. 2001. Strength in Numbers? *The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minorities*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Leighley, J & Vedlitz, A. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *Journal of Politics*, 61: 1092-1114.
- Lien, Pei-te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison between Asian and Mexican Americans." *Political Behavior* 16:237-64.
- Liu, Alex. 2001. "Political Participation and Dissatisfaction with Democracy: A Comparative Study of New and Stable Democracies." Research Methods Working Paper Series.
- MacDougall, Curtis. 1966. *Understanding Public Opinion*. Boston: Little, Brown.

- Martinez, Anne. 2000. "Established Latinos More Likely to Support Curbing Immigration." *San Jose Mercury News*, October 15.
- Martinez, Andres. 2000. "Two Candidates Seeking Votes with Salsa." *New York Times*, August 16.
- McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McClain, Paula D., and Joseph Stewart, Jr. 2002. "Can We All Get Along?": *Racial and Ethnic Minorities in American Politics, 3ed*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Michelson, Melissa R. 2001. "The Effect of National Mood on Mexican American Political Opinion." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 23: 57-70.
- Miller, A.R., & Gurin, G. 1980. "Stratum Identification and Consciousness." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 43: 30-47.
- Miller, A.R., Gurin, P., & Gurin, G. 1981. "Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 25: 494-511.
- Montoya, Lisa. 1996. "Latino Gender Differences in Public Opinion: Results From the Latino National Political Survey." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* Vol. 18, No.2 .
- Morris, Aldon. 1984. *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*. New York: Free Press.
- Newton, Lina. 2000. "Why Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187: Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypotheses." *Social Science Quarterly* , Vo.81, No.1.
- Norrander, Barbera. 2003. "The Intraparty Gender Gap: Differences between Male and Female Voters in the 1980-2000 Presidential Primaries." *PS: Political Science and Politics* (April 2003): 181-186.
- Norrander, Barbera and Kristin Kanthak. 2003. "The Enduring Gender Gap." *In Models of Voting in Presidential Elections: The 2000 Election*, ed., Herbert Weisberg and Clyde Wilcox. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Olson, Marvin. 1970. "Social and Political Participation of Blacks." *American Sociological Review* 35: 682-697.
- Pachon, Harry P. 1985. "Political Mobilization in the Mexican-American Community."

- In *Mexican Americans in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Walker Connor. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute.
- Pachon, Harry, and Louis DeSipio. 1994. *New Americans By Choice: Political Perspectives of Latino Immigrants*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Padilla, Felix. 1985. *Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Pantoja, Adrian, Ramirez, Ricardo, and Gary Segura. 2001. "Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos." *Political Research Quarterly* 54:729-750
- Parenti, Michael. "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification". *American Political Science Review* 61: 717-726.
- Polinard, Jerry, Robert D. Wrinkle, and Rodolfo de la Garza. 1984. "Attitudes of Mexican Americans Toward Irregular Mexican Immigration." *International Migration Review* 18:782-799.
- Porter, J.R. "Minority Identity and Self-Esteem." *Annual Review of Sociology* 19:139-161.
- Portes, Alejandro and Ruben Rumbaut. 1996. *Immigrant America, A Portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ricourt, Milagros. and Ruby Danta. 2003. *Hispanas de Queens: Latino Panethnicity in a New York City Neighborhood*. Ithica: Cornell University Press.
- Rosales, Arturo. 1993. "Mexican Immigrant Nationalism As An Origin of Identity for Mexican Americans: Exploring The Sources." In *Mexican American Identity*, ed. Bernal and Martinelli. Floricanto Press.
- Schroeder, L.D., Sjoquist, D.L., & Stephen, P.E. 1986. *Understanding Regression Analysis: An Introductory Guide*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Segal, Adam. "Bikini Politics: The 2004 Presidential Campaigns' Hispanic Media Efforts Cover Only the Essential Parts of the Body Politic: A Select Group of Voters in a Few Battleground States." A Report of the Hispanic Voter Project of John Hopkins University.
- Segura, Gary. Information Obtained From Dinner Lecture: "Coming to Grips: Latinos in the American Electorate." June 15, 2000.

- Shapiro, Robert and Harpreet Mahajan. 1986. "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960's to the 1980's." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50: 47-55.
- Shaw, Daron. de la Garza, Rodolfo O. Jongho Lee. 2000. "Examining Latino Turnout in 1996: A Three-State, Validated Survey Approach." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 44, No.2.
- Sierra, Christine Marie and Teresa Carrillo, Louis DeSipio, and Michael Jones-Correa. 2000. "Latino Immigration and Citizenship." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 33: 535-540.
- Stanley, Harold, and Richard G. Niemi. 1996. "Party Coalitions in Transition: Partisanship and Group Support, 1952-1996." In *Controversies in Voting Behavior*. Ed. Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg. CQ Press.
- Stokes, Atiya Kai. 2003. "Latino Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Politics Research*, Vol.31, No.4.
- Stonecash, Jeffrey. 2000. *Class and Party in American Politics*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Suro, Roberto and Audrey Singer. 2002. "Latino Growth in Metropolitan America: Changing Patterns, New Locations." Center on Urban & Metropolitan Policy and The Pew Hispanic Center.
- Tate, Katherin. 1993. *From Protest to Politics, The New Black Voters in American Elections*. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.
- Tolbert, Caroline J. and Rodney E. Hero. "Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California's Illegal Immigration Initiative." *Journal of Politics* 58: 806-818.
- Uhlener, Carole. 1989. "Rational Goods and Participation: Incorporating Sociability into a Theory of Rational Action." *Public Choice*.
- Uhlener, Carole. 1991. "Perceived Prejudice and Coalitional Prospects among Black, Latinos, and Asian Americans." In *Ethnic and Racial Politics in California*, ed. Byron Jackson and Michael Preston. Berkeley, CA: Institute for Governmental Studies.
- Uhlener, Carole. Bruce Caine, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1991. "The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans." *American Journal of Political*

*Science*, Vol.35, No.2.

- Uhlaner, Carole Jean., and F. Chris Garcia. 1998. "Foundations of Latino Party Identification: Learning, Ethnicity, and Demographic Factors Among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Anglos in the United States." Irvine: Center for the Study of Democracy Research Monograph Series.
- Uhlaner, Carole Jean, and F. Chris Garcia. 2002. "Latino Public Opinion". In, *Understanding Public Opinion*, ed. Barbera Norrander and Clyde Wilcox. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- United States Bureau of the Census. 2002. "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2000". Current Population Reports. Washington, D.C.; Department of Commerce.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2004. "Facts for Features: Hispanic Heritage Month 2004 Special Report." Washington, D.C.; Department of Commerce.
- United States Bureau of the Census. 2001. *The Black Population: 2000*. Washington, D.C.; Department of Commerce.
- The Hispanic Population in the United States. March 1997. Current Population Reports, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
- V. O. Key, Jr. 1955. "A Theory of Critical Elections." *Journal of Politics*. 17: 3-18.
- Verba, Sidney, and Norman Nie. 1972. *Participation in America* New York: Harper and Row Press.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Scholzman and Henry Brady 1995 *Voice and equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press.
- Vigil, Maurilo E. 1987. *Hispanics in American Politics: The Search for Political Power*. New York: University Press of America.
- Wilcox, C., and Gomez, L. 1990. "Religion, group identification, and politics among American Blacks." *Sociological Analysis*, 51: 271-285.
- Williams, Linda F. 1987. "Black Political Progress in the 1980s: The Electoral Arena". In *The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power*, 2d ed., ed. Michael Preston, Lenneal Henderson, and Paul Puryear. New York: Longman Press.
- Wilson, William J. 1980. *The Declining Significance of Race*. 2ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wolfinger, Raymond. 1965. "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting".  
*American Political Science Review* 59: 896-908.