

LABELS AND TAGS: A NEW LOOK AT NAMING

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

What meaning does a name have in a sentence? How do we escape the inevitable difficulties that arise in delineating an individual's meaning through one's speech? The need arises for a distinction between proper names on the basis of the kinds of objects to which they refer. This distinction can provide the theoretical tools needed to solve the problems of empty names, negative existential statements, cognitive significance and substitution failure. Through a study of these issues, the fallacies inherent in current theories of meaning for proper names becomes apparent, as they fail to provide adequate or complete solutions. By elucidating a distinction between two kinds of proper names, labels and tags, we are able to provide solutions to the problems of naming where other theories fail.

## CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEMS OF NAMING

What is the meaning of a proper name? When you ask a non-philosopher this question, you generate confusion, especially if the non-philosopher knows something of the naming practices of different cultures. For instance, if she is familiar with the naming practices of various Native American tribes, she might wonder if you are asking about the significance of the name. Or if she is familiar with the Russian patronymic, she might think you are asking about the derivation of the name. And if she has a historical focus, she might believe that you are asking about the origins of the name. However, if she is a competent user of American English, she knows that it has no such practices; just about anything can become a name, including an unpronounceable symbol for the artist formerly known as Prince. Although some people choose names on the basis of significance or family history, it isn't a regular, and hence, predictable feature of American English. But if you rephrase the question, asking instead what the name contributes to the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs, the competent language speaker will say that it tells you which person or thing the sentence is about. In the terminology of philosophy of language, the competent language user thinks that the meaning of a proper name is the object it names.

Upon reflection, however, problems arise from this view of the meaning of proper names, and these problems are not so easily solved. Some arise from our use of names such as 'Santa Claus', which don't seem to refer to anything. Others arise from the fact that we often have more than one name for the same object, as our propensity for creating nicknames demonstrates. It is possible to have knowledge about the object under both



names, and never realize that it is the same object to which the names apply. Another source of these problems is our use of homophonic names for different objects – count the number of times ‘John Smith’ appears in the phone directory – so that we don’t know whether *this* John Smith is the same person as *that* John Smith. And human fallibility compounds the problems; we may misidentify the referent of a name, mistakenly applying it to a different person than the person so-named by others in our linguistic community. Philosophers of language have made various theoretical moves in order to either avoid or solve these problems. A number of them have adopted complex theories of proper names in which the meaning of a name is something other than the object to which it refers. Others have accepted ontologies containing metaphysically questionable objects. Still others have maintained theoretical simplicity by asserting the truth of certain counterintuitive claims.

I believe that we can distinguish between different proper names on the basis of the kinds of objects to which they refer. This distinction provides the theoretical tools needed to solve the problems of empty names, negative existential statements, cognitive significance and substitution failure. In this chapter, I describe these problems and discuss the current theories of meaning for proper names. I argue that they fail to provide adequate solutions to the problems. In the following chapters, I elucidate a distinction between two kinds of proper names, labels and tags, and discuss how this distinction applies to proper names in various contexts, providing solutions to the problems of naming.

### **Problems for the Pre-Theoretical View of Proper Names<sup>1</sup>**

Several problems arise for the theorist who takes seriously the intuition that the simple answer – that the meaning of a proper name is the object it names – is the correct answer to my opening question. For instance, suppose there is no object so-named; is the name, and hence, the sentence in which it occurs, meaningless? Santa Claus doesn't exist, yet surely the following sentence has meaning:

(1.1) Santa Claus lives at the North Pole.

Consider, for instance, a contrast between (1.1) and (1.2):

(1.2) Santa Claus lives in Cincinnati.

Language users who are familiar with the classic story about Santa Claus recognize that the former sentence corresponds to the story, whereas the latter sentence does not. In order for language users to understand the contrast between (1.1) and (1.2), the sentences must be meaningful, but if the pre-theoretical view of proper names is correct, there is no object referred to by the name 'Santa Claus' for these sentences to be about. Thus, on the pre-theoretical view, these sentences should be meaningless. In fact, if this view is correct, it should be meaningless even to say

(1.3) Santa Claus doesn't exist.

Negative existential statements, such as sentence (1.3), pose special problems for the pre-theoretical view. In order for these statements to be meaningful, there must be some

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<sup>1</sup> At this point, the view about proper names that I am defending, which I am calling 'the pre-theoretical view' is similar to what others, notably Nathan Salmon, have called 'the naïve view' (see, for example, his introduction to Part II, *Sense and Reference*, in [Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language](#), edited by Robert M. Harnish). However, since I intend to develop this view in ways that differ significantly from 'the modified naïve view' that Salmon defends, it seems preferable to give it a different name from that view.

object that the name refers to, but if there is an object that the name refers to then the statement is false. Thus, it seems that, on the pre-theoretical view, every negative existential claim is either false or meaningless. And yet, competent language users who are familiar with the classic story of Santa Claus seem to think that sentence (1.3) is both meaningful and true. Our language is rife with names like ‘Santa Claus’, which apparently have no references. The problem is to explain what these names contribute to the meaning of the sentences in which they occur. These are the problems of empty names and negative existential statements.<sup>2</sup>

Another question that arises for the pre-theoretical view is this: if there is more than one name for an object, then both names should have the same meaning; why is it that it frequently seems to make a difference which name we use? In some cases, true sentences in which one name for an object occurs seem false when the name is replaced by another name for the same object.

(1.4) Cary Grant was famous.

is true, but

(1.5) Archie Leach was famous.

seems false. In other cases, replacing one name with the other makes informative sentences seem trivially true, and vice versa.

(1.6) Cary Grant is Archie Leach.

is informative;

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<sup>2</sup> The sentences about Santa Claus, above, are patterned after the puzzles involving empty names (“The present king of France is bald”) and negative existential statements (“the difference between A and B” where A and B are names for the same object), proposed by Bertrand Russell in “On Denoting.”

(1.7) Cary Grant is Cary Grant.

is not. These are the problems of substitution failure and cognitive significance.<sup>3</sup>

Problems of substitution failure also arise in other contexts, such as belief reports and direct quotation. Suppose that Mary asserts the following sentence:

(1.8) Mark Twain wrote “Life on the Mississippi.”

On the basis of her assertion, we report her belief as follows:

(1.9) Mary believes that Mark Twain wrote “Life on the Mississippi.”

Suppose that John, who knows that ‘Mark Twain’ was the *nom de plume* for Samuel Clemens, hears Mary’s statement and reports:

(1.10) Mary believes that Samuel Clemens wrote “Life on the Mississippi.”

Is John’s statement true? If Mary is unaware of the identity of Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens, she would deny the following:

(1.11) Samuel Clemens wrote “Life on the Mississippi.”

And yet, if the meaning of a proper name is the object it names, sentences (1.8) and (1.11) have the same meaning. Thus, if Mary believes one to be true, she should also believe the other. How can we accommodate Mary’s assertions as evidence of her beliefs when they seem to lead to a contradiction?

A similar problem arises from cases of misidentification. Suppose, for instance, that Mary is looking at a photograph of Samuel Clemens standing next to another man, Joe Smith. Furthermore, suppose that she does not know the names of either man in the photograph. Dave, glancing at the photograph, says, “That’s Mark Twain.” Suppose that

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<sup>3</sup> The problems of substitution failure and cognitive significance are generally attributed to Frege, in “On Sense and Reference.”

Mary mistakenly thinks that Dave was indicating Joe Smith rather than Samuel Clemens. Thus, she attaches the name ‘Mark Twain’ in her idiolect to the wrong person. Mary asserts the following sentence:

(1.8) Mark Twain wrote “Life on the Mississippi.”

How are we to account for her belief? On the pre-theoretical view, ‘Mark Twain’ refers to the same person as ‘Samuel Clemens’ does. But on the basis of the scenario above, we know that she believes of Joe Smith, not of Samuel Clemens, that he is Mark Twain.

The problem of substitution failure of co-referential terms in belief reports also results from translating proper names from one language to another. Consider the following puzzle, made famous by Saul Kripke.<sup>4</sup> In the first case, the puzzle arises as a result of translation from French into English. Pierre, a Frenchman living in Paris, sees brochures containing pictures of London, and asserts:

(1.12) Londres est jolie.

Translated to English, (1.12) becomes:

(1.13) London is pretty.

Later, Pierre is living in a poor section of London and learning English by immersion. Not realizing that the city he now inhabits is the one he referred to as ‘Londres’ in French, he utters the statement:

(1.14) London is not pretty.

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<sup>4</sup> These problems appear in “A Puzzle About Belief.”

If we accept Pierre's statements as evidence of his beliefs, it seems we must attribute to him contradictory beliefs. It turns out that when we report Pierre's beliefs, the contradiction appears in our own systems of belief as well.

Kripke's puzzle also arises within a single language that permits homophonic names, as most natural languages do. Consider the case of Peter, who hears Paderewski perform and asserts:

(1.15) Paderewski is a great musician.

He then hears of the Polish statesman, Paderewski. Unaware that he is the same person whose performance he attended, and believing that no statesman can be a great musician, he asserts:

(1.16) Paderewski is not a great musician.

What are we to say about Peter's beliefs? Does he, or does he not, believe that Paderewski is a great musician? Furthermore, given our knowledge that the statesman is also the musician, we have one entry in our idiolects for 'Paderewski', whereas Peter has two. How are we to translate the name from his idiolect to ours?

The cases given above illustrate two disagreements among semantic theorists: the first, seen in the puzzles about beliefs, concerns accommodating a person's assertions in analyzing reports of her beliefs; the second, seen in the 'Cary Grant' examples as well as the belief reports, concerns whether the difference in meaning in the above cases is real or only apparent. With regard to direct quotation contexts, however, these disagreements do not arise; all semantic theorists agree that substitution of one name for another in a direct quote produces a sentence with a different meaning, and hence, a different truth

value, from the original sentence. Furthermore, all agree that the person's assertions provide evidence for the truth or falsity of the speech report. Suppose that in the case above, John reports Mary's assertion of (1.8) by saying:

(1.17) Mary said, "Samuel Clemens wrote 'Life on the Mississippi.'"

Semantic theorists agree that it is not only improper, but incorrect, to report Mary's utterance using (1.17), rather than:

(1.18) Mary said, "Mark Twain wrote 'Life on the Mississippi.'"

Where they differ is in explaining why substitution fails in this case. Clearly, the names 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' do not make the same contribution to direct quotations as they do to simple sentences. The difficulty lies in saying what the names contribute in these contexts.

We may be tempted to explain away the puzzles about belief by pointing out the obvious, namely, that in each case the believer lacks information about the references of the names. Thus, Mary doesn't believe that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens; Pierre doesn't believe that Londres is London; Peter doesn't believe that Paderewski (the musician) is Paderewski (the statesman). But these claims only complicate matters. Since Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens, on the pre-theoretical view, the names 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' contribute the same object to the meaning of the sentence. Thus, the sentence, 'Mary doesn't believe that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' appears to attribute to Mary a lack of belief that an object is identical to itself. The same could be said, *mutatis mutandis*, about Pierre and Peter. But it seems absurd to claim that, in each

case, the believer doubts that objects are self-identical.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, even if in some cases there is merit to that claim, generally that isn't what we intended to say. Rather, we want some way of pointing out the believer's lack of information about the link between certain names and certain objects. Thus, we need a theory of meaning for proper names that provides us with a way to do so.

### **Alternative Theories**

Theories that adopt the pre-theoretical view about the meaning of a proper name are called Millian theories, after John Stuart Mill. I will return to these theories after considering alternative theories. The alternative to the pre-theoretical view is to deny that the meaning of a proper name is the object it names, or at least to deny that the meaning of a proper name is solely the object it names. Theories of the former type are called Russellian theories; theories of the latter type are Fregean theories.

Russellian theories adopt the approach taken by Bertrand Russell in "On Denoting," in which he propounds four of the puzzles concerning singular terms that were discussed above: the problems of empty names, negative existentials, cognitive significance, and substitution failure. Russell proposes an account of singular terms that solves the puzzles. On his view, terms that are usually considered to be proper names are not actually used as singular terms, but as disguised definite descriptions. Thus, they do not contribute the individual that is the referent of the name to the proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence containing the name. Rather, the name is analyzed away

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<sup>5</sup> In "On Denoting," Russell points out that the fact that George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of *Waverley* did not indicate his interest in the law of identity. Russell uses this example to motivate the view that 'Scott' and 'the author of *Waverley*' do not make the same contribution to the sentences in which they occur.



according to Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions, in which simple subject-predicate sentences are replaced by conjunctions of existential and universal generalizations. Thus, sentences containing names that have no referents are meaningful, though false. For instance, sentence (1.1) 'Santa Claus lives at the North Pole' is analyzed as (roughly) 'There is exactly one thing that has the property of being Santa Claus, and it lives at the North Pole'. The sentence so-analyzed is meaningful because every constituent of it has meaning, but it is false because the first conjunct is false – there is nothing that has the property of being Santa Claus.<sup>6</sup> Alternatively, problems of cognitive significance and substitution failure, arising from multiple names for the same object, can be addressed by the fact that the different names are analyzed into different descriptions.

Fregean theories, derived from the work of Gottlob Frege, hold that the meaning of a proper name is not its referent; rather, it is a purely conceptual mode of presentation, which Frege called the 'sense' of the name.<sup>7</sup> The sense of a name is a concept, which is given by a description, and the name's referent is whatever uniquely fits the concept. The distinction between sense and reference solves both the problems of empty names and cognitive significance. In the first case, even though empty names such as 'Santa Claus' have no referent, they have a sense, which contributes to the meaning of the sentence. In the second case, the cognitive significance of sentences containing distinct

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<sup>6</sup> Actually, Russell's theory is somewhat more complex. Because the description replacing the proper name, which I have paraphrased as 'There is exactly one object that has the property of being Santa Claus', contains both universal and existential quantifiers, the sentence can be read in two different ways – with the existential quantifier having wide scope or having narrow scope – which may yield a reading in which the sentence is true. For details of Russell's Theory of Descriptions, see "On Denoting."

<sup>7</sup> Frege, G. "On Sense and Reference".

but co-referential names is explained by positing that the names have different senses. For example, the sense of ‘Samuel Clemens’ might be ‘resident of Hannibal, Missouri’, while the sense of ‘Mark Twain’ is ‘author of “Life on the Mississippi”.’ On the other hand, the problem of the apparent failure of intersubstitutability of ostensibly co-referential names in propositional attitude ascriptions and in direct quotations is solved by denying that names have their customary referents in these contexts. On Frege’s view, the referent of a proper name in a propositional attitude ascription is its customary sense, rather than its customary reference. Different names may have different senses even though they have the same customary reference. Thus, in oblique contexts, in which the customary sense, rather than the customary reference, is the reference of the name, names having different senses are not co-referential, and therefore are not intersubstitutable. Similarly, on Frege’s view of direct quotation, the names in the quoted expression refer to themselves rather than to their customary referents. Thus, different names have different referents, and so fail to be co-referential.

Although Russellian and Fregean theories can solve the problems of empty names, negative existential statements, cognitive significance, and substitution failure, they are not without problems of their own. Both types of theories are descriptivist with regard to the meaning of a proper name: the Russellian theories, because they treat names as disguised definite descriptions; the Fregean theories, because the sense of the name is a concept which is given by a description. They are also both descriptivist with regard to fixing the reference of a proper name: the Russellian theories hold that the reference of the proper name is whatever object uniquely satisfies the description; the Fregean

theories hold that the sense of the name, which is a concept given by a description, determines the reference of the name. Thus, both Russellian and Fregean theories are vulnerable to the objections to descriptivism raised by Kripke in Naming and Necessity.

### **Objections to Descriptivism**

In Naming and Necessity, Kripke raises three kinds of objections to descriptivist theories. The first objection is that proper names cannot be disguised definite descriptions because proper names and definite descriptions behave differently in modal contexts. Consider, for example, the sentence:

(1.19) Benjamin Franklin invented bifocals.

This sentence is true in the actual world because the referent of the name ‘Benjamin Franklin’ is the person who invented bifocals. According to the Russellian view, the name ‘Benjamin Franklin’ is a disguised definite description, such as ‘the first Postmaster General of the United States of America’. Thus, on the Russellian view, sentence (1.19) is equivalent to:

(1.20) The first Postmaster General of the United States of America invented bifocals.

However, imagine a counterfactual situation in which Benjamin Franklin was not the first postmaster general of the United States of America. Sentence (1.19) would be true in that counterfactual situation just in case the person who invented bifocals in the actual world – Benjamin Franklin – was the inventor of bifocals in the counterfactual situation. On the other hand, sentence (1.20) would be true in the counterfactual situation just in case the person who is the first Postmaster General of the United States of America in the

counterfactual situation was also the inventor of bifocals in that situation. Since, by stipulation, that person is not Benjamin Franklin, the truth conditions for sentence (1.20) in the counterfactual situation depend on the actions of someone other than Benjamin Franklin. Thus, sentences (1.19) and (1.20) have different truth conditions in the counterfactual situation, so they are not logically equivalent. Since the difference between the sentences is that one contains a proper name and the other contains a definite description, proper names and definite descriptions are not equivalent. Thus, proper names cannot be disguised definite descriptions.<sup>8</sup>

Kripke's second objection to descriptivism is that it cannot be the correct theory of meaning for proper names. Briefly, a descriptivist theory of meaning for proper names holds that the meaning of a name is a description or cluster of descriptions associated with the name. Kripke argues that descriptions cannot provide the meaning of proper names; if there were more than one uniquely denoting description associated with a proper name, we would not be able to determine which description provided the meaning of the name. Furthermore, if different speakers associated different descriptions with the name, their uses of the name would have different meanings, so they would not be able to

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<sup>8</sup> It might be argued that this objection does not affect the Fregean view, because Frege does not hold that senses are definite descriptions, merely that they are given by descriptions. However, according to Leonard Linsky in "Reference, Essentialism and Modality," the Fregean view still has problems with modal contexts. According to Frege, modal contexts are oblique contexts, so the reference of a name in a modal context is its customary sense, not its customary reference. Linsky gives an example – '9 is greater than 7, and necessarily, it is greater than 7' – that raises a problem for Frege's view. The reference of '9' in the first clause is the mathematical object. 'It' is an anaphor that whose reference is derived from '9' in the first clause. However, on Frege's view, 'it' occurs within the scope of the modal operator, so its reference should be its customary sense. Thus, the anaphor 'it' in the scope of the modal operator cannot get the correct reference on Frege's view.

communicate information by using the name. However, speakers do seem to communicate in spite of associating different descriptions with a name, so the meaning of a name cannot be the definite description associated with it.

Kripke also objects to descriptivism as a theory of reference for proper names. A descriptivist theory of reference holds that the reference of a proper name is mediated by associated conceptual content. Thus, a particular object is the referent of a particular name because it satisfies a description, or cluster of descriptions, or a weighted sum of those descriptions, which describe the associated conceptual content of the name. For example, the name 'Benjamin Franklin' may be associated with the properties described by 'author of "Poor Richard's Almanac",' 'first Postmaster General of the United States of America', and 'inventor of bifocals'. If the descriptivist theory of reference is correct, any person who satisfies these descriptions, or a weighted sum of them, is the referent of the name 'Benjamin Franklin'. According to Kripke, descriptions cannot determine the reference of proper names; an object could fail to satisfy the description and yet still be the reference of the proper name associated with that description. Likewise, an object could satisfy the description associated with a proper name and not be the reference of the name. Thus, satisfying the definite description associated with a proper name is neither necessary nor sufficient for being the reference of that name.

### **The Causal Theory of Reference**

If Kripke's arguments against descriptivism as a theory of reference are successful, we cannot rely on descriptions to fix the reference of proper names. Although we can use ostension to fix the reference of names for objects that are within our

perceptual range, we often want to use proper names to refer to objects that are spatiotemporally distant from us. Thus, we need another way to determine the reference of proper names. The alternative to the descriptivist theory of reference is to deny that the referent of a name is secured by associated conceptual content. This is not to claim that there is never any conceptual content associated with the name; rather, it is merely to say that the conceptual content does not determine which object the name refers to. This type of view is generally known as a direct reference view. Many direct reference theorists also hold the view that the reference of a name is determined by an initial baptism in which the baptizer picks out an object, either by ostension or description, and gives it a name. Future uses of the name to refer to the object depend on a causal-historical chain between the object and the speaker. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke suggests a causal-historical chain theory as an alternative to descriptivism. He says, "An initial baptism takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is 'passed from link to link,' the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it."<sup>9</sup>

Although Kripke offers a mere sketch of a theory, other theorists have supplied more details. In Language and Reality, Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny suggest that the name is introduced ostensively at a formal or informal dubbing. Those present at the dubbing acquire a semantic ability to use the name to refer to the object dubbed. This semantic ability is causally grounded in the object in virtue of their witnessing the

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<sup>9</sup> Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity. p. 289.

dubbing, which caused them to be causally affected by it. People who were not present at the dubbing acquire the semantic ability to use the name to refer to the object dubbed through reference borrowing from those who were present at the dubbing. Reference borrowing is also a causal perceptual process; the name is used in conversation, and hearers of the conversation, if of suitable linguistic sophistication, can gain the ability to use the name to name the object. The exercise of this ability designates the object in virtue of a causal chain linking the object, those present at the dubbing, and the user, through the conversation.

Another theorist who addresses the task of clarifying what is required of a causal theory of reference is Gareth Evans.<sup>10</sup> He argues that the conditions under which a name gets a denotation are more stringent than Kripke suggests. For instance, he claims that dubbing an object with an expression and thereby causing it to be in common usage is not enough to cause the expression to be a name for the object. Rather, there must be a community of language users which have a procedure of using the name intentionally to refer to the object, and that it is common knowledge among the members of the community that this procedure exists. Furthermore, in any particular case of successful reference to the object by the name, it is because of the common knowledge among the members of the community that the name has been used to refer to that object in the community, rather than common knowledge that the object satisfies some description associated with the name.

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<sup>10</sup> Evans, Gareth. "A Causal Theory of Names."

According to Evans, one of the advantages to this account over Kripke's account is that it allows for the denotation of a name to change over time. Among the cases he discusses is the change in denotation of 'Madagascar' from a portion of the African mainland to the large island off its eastern coast. On Evans' view, a speaker intends to use the name to refer to the object that is the dominant source of the information that the speaker has associated with the name. Thus, if the dominant source of that information changes over time, the denotation of the name changes also. In the Madagascar case, for example, when Marco Polo originally used the name 'Madagascar' to refer to the island, he spoke falsely, because the portion of the mainland was the dominant source of the information he had associated with the name. However, over time, the island became more dominant as the source of information he associated with the name; once it became the dominant source of information, on Evans' view, it became the denotation of the name 'Madagascar'.

My view about causal-historical chain theories of reference for proper names has features in common with Evans' view, but there are differences also. For instance, like Evans, I hold that baptism alone is not enough to fix the reference of the name; rather, it is acceptance of the name by a community of language users as a name for the object that fixes its reference. However, Evans may not agree with me regarding the nature of the community, for on my view, the community of language users can consist of a single member, as the following case demonstrates. Suppose that a child is born, and the child's great-aunt wishes that the child be named 'Lily' after an old friend. The parents reject the name, choosing some other name instead. The great-aunt says, "Well, I shall call her



'Lily'." Suppose that the parents strenuously object to this, even enlisting the aid of other family members to prevent her from using the name 'Lily'. The great-aunt is sufficiently cowed, so that no one, and particularly not the child, ever hears her use the name 'Lily' to refer to the child. Nevertheless, she thinks to herself, "To me, that child's name will always be 'Lily'." It seems that in such a case, 'Lily' is a name for the child even though no one ever hears it used to refer to the child. The great-aunt forms a linguistic community comprised of a single individual who has accepted the name and its reference.

A second difference between my view and Evans' view concerns the 'Madagascar' case. Evans holds that the shift in the dominant source of information that speakers associate with the name 'Madagascar' is what causes the denotation of the name to shift from the portion of the mainland to the island. I suggest that the shift is actually the result of a second causal chain being formed by the community of language users who followed Marco Polo in referring to the island with the name. Otherwise, how could the island become a source of information associated with the name? For a period of time, there were two causal chains, and thus, two linguistic communities who used the name to refer to two different objects. Speakers in both linguistic communities who used the name 'Madagascar' were probably unaware that there were two different linguistic communities with regard to that name. The discrepancy would only be detected when a speaker from one linguistic community said something to someone from the other linguistic community that was obviously false, given the referent of the name in that community. Once the speakers became aware of the discrepancy in the use of the name, a decision was made to use it to refer to the island in both linguistic communities, and not

to the portion of the African mainland. I suggest that the choice was made for sociological reasons, not linguistic ones.

In “Proper Names and Intentionality,” Searle argues that the ‘Madagascar’ example demonstrates that the causal chain theory fails to provide a sufficient condition for the name to refer to the island.<sup>11</sup> His claim is that the causal chain from the name ‘Madagascar’ extends from the speakers who use the name, to the African mainland, not to the island. On my account, however, a second causal chain began when the linguistic community accepted the baptizing-intentions of Marco Polo, their source of the name, and this chain extends from the speakers to the island, not to the African mainland. Because my view holds that there were two causal chains, and that the acceptance of the linguistic community is necessary for an initial baptism to occur, I do not see the ‘Madagascar’ case as a counterexample to my version of the causal-historical chain theory of reference.

In addition to the ‘Madagascar’ case, however, Searle suggests other counterexamples to the causal chain view. Some of these are intended to show that a causal chain is not necessary for reference to an object to occur. One such case concerns sequentially named streets, such as M Street in Washington, D.C. Searle claims that one can refer to M Street simply because one knows that there is an alphabetical sequence of street names in that city; thus, a causal chain is not necessary for reference to M Street. The problem with this example is that a causal chain between M Street and the speaker does exist. One could not know that the alphabetical sequence of streets exists without

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<sup>11</sup> From Intentionality, p. 231-262.

some causal link between the street names, the people naming the streets, and the alphabet. Without that knowledge, one would need more than knowledge of the alphabet in order to refer. Thus, because the causal chain does exist, this case does not show that it is not a necessary condition for reference.

Searle's final counterexample to the causal chain theory is intended to show that the essential character of the institution of proper names is not adequately captured by the causal chain theory. In this case, Searle considers a tribal community having the following properties: every member of the community knows everybody else, and everyone attends the baptisms of all newborns. As the children in this tribe grow, they learn the names of people and the objects in their environment by ostension. Furthermore, tribal members are forbidden from speaking the names of the dead. Thus, in this community, all uses of proper names are for objects within the perceptual fields of the tribe members. Searle contends that, as a result of these naming practices, no use of a name by a tribe member satisfies the causal chain of communication theory. He suggests that even though the causal theorist might contend that there is a causal connection between the acquisition of a name and the object named, this connection is an internal intentional connection and not an external connection at all.

Although I agree with Searle that there is an internal intentional connection within an individual who acquires a name, between a name and the object named, I reject his claim that there is no need for an external connection. On my account, an internal intentional connection is not enough for communication with a proper name to take place. For instance, in order to communicate using the name 'Cary Grant', it is not enough that I

mean the man I recognize as Cary Grant. For my communication to be successful, my use of the name has to conform to some external features of my linguistic community. Otherwise, the community will not accept my use of the name.

### **Millian Theories of Meaning**

If Kripke's objections to descriptivism as a theory of meaning for proper names are successful, then Fregean and Russellian theories of meaning ought to be rejected. The alternative to Fregean and Russellian theories of meaning is to adopt a view that matches the intuitions of the competent language user about the meaning of a name, i.e., that it is the object so-named. These are Millian theories, derived from the work of John Stuart Mill.<sup>12</sup> The problems raised earlier – empty names, cognitive significance, and substitution failure of co-referring names – were the result of adopting a Millian perspective, so it may seem that they provide reasons for rejecting such a view. However, Millian theorists have some responses to these problems. For example, one solution to the problem of empty names is to claim that these names refer to possible, but non-actual, objects. On the other hand, to solve the problem of cognitive significance, some Millians distinguish between the semantic content of a sentence, which is taken to be the meaning (in terms of truth conditions), and the information content of the sentence, which is not semantic. Thus, sentences (1.6) and (1.7) have the same truth conditions, i.e., meaning, but they differ in information content, which is pragmatic, not semantic.

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<sup>12</sup> Mill, J.S. "Of Names."

The difference in information content between the two sentences explains why one sentence of the pair seems more informative than the other.<sup>13</sup>

The Millian solution to the problems of apparent substitution failure also turns out to be pragmatic, rather than semantic. On the Millian view, substitution of co-referential names produces no difference in meaning; the belief that Mark Twain wrote “Life on the Mississippi” is the same as the belief that Samuel Clemens wrote “Life on the Mississippi.” Rather, the difference between the two claims lies in the fact that using a particular name may be misleading. For example, to attribute to Mary the belief that Samuel Clemens wrote “Life on the Mississippi,” by using the name ‘Samuel Clemens’ leads the hearer to believe that Mary would express her belief using the name ‘Samuel Clemens’ rather than the name ‘Mark Twain’.

There are objections that can be made to these Millian solutions. In the case of empty names, for instance, adopting the proposed solution may require accepting into our ontology all kinds of questionable objects. Consider the following sentence:

(1.21) Mermite is a colorless green frog.

It seems clear that there is no possible world in which something is both colorless and green. Therefore, either there is a possible world in which impossible objects such as colorless green frogs exist, or there is no such object. Such a world would be very strange indeed, since the law of non-contradiction would not be true there. On the other hand, if there is no such object, the name ‘Mermite’ fails to have a referent, and the problem of empty names remains.

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<sup>13</sup> Nathan Salmon argues for such a view in “Frege’s Puzzle”.

With regard to the problem of substitution failure in belief reports, Millian theorists face the quandary that arises with regard to the principle of disquotation. This principle holds that there is a link between a speaker's assertions and her beliefs.<sup>14</sup> Consider Mary's assertion of sentence (1.8), above. It is because of the disquotation principle that we take her assertion as evidence for her belief that Mark Twain wrote "Life on the Mississippi." Suppose, however, that Mary not only denies (1.11), but asserts its negation, (1.22):

(1.22) It is not the case that Samuel Clemens wrote "Life on the Mississippi." The disquotation principle supports taking her assertion of (1.22) as evidence that she believes that Samuel Clemens did not write "Life on the Mississippi." The principle of substitution allows us to substitute 'Mark Twain' for 'Samuel Clemens', yielding:

(1.23) Mary does not believe that Mark Twain wrote "Life on the Mississippi." Faced with attributing to Mary these contradictory beliefs, some Millian theorists insist that she does believe that Samuel Clemens wrote "Life on the Mississippi," despite her denial of (1.11) and her assertion of (1.22). That is, they insist on the priority of her assertion of (1.8) over her assertion of (1.22). And yet, without a principled reason to choose one assertion over the other, we ought to either accept the evidence of both assertions or accept the evidence of neither. To do the former seems to force us to attribute contradictory beliefs to the speaker; to do the latter is to reject the disquotation principle completely, which leaves us wondering what can serve as evidence of a person's beliefs, if her assertions cannot.

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<sup>14</sup> Several versions of the disquotation principle have been proposed, particularly in Saul Kripke's "A Puzzle About Belief."

### **Alternative Accounts**

From what has been shown so far, it appears that the standard theories of meaning for proper names all have unpalatable results. Indeed, these results have led some to abandon the project of providing a theory of meaning for proper names. Others have taken unusual approaches in an attempt to solve these problems. For instance, in “Ordinary Proper Names,” Marga Reimer proposes a hybrid theory incorporating features of both Millian and Russellian accounts of proper names. She argues that sometimes proper names act as tags, contributing the object so-named to the proposition expressed by an utterance of the sentence in which the name occurs. However, sometimes proper names act as disguised definite descriptions, and an utterance of the sentence in which the name occurs expresses a general proposition, with the name – or rather, the description that it disguises – analyzed as an existential generalization along the lines of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions. The communicative intentions of the speaker determine, in each case, whether the proposition expressed by an utterance of the sentence is singular or general. Presumably, in contexts in which expressing a singular proposition yields counter-intuitive results, the speaker would intend to communicate a general proposition, and vice versa. Thus, Reimer’s hybrid account may be able to solve the problems that face a straight Millian account. However, it is not clear to me that she is able to avoid the objections to descriptivist accounts that Kripke raised; since she has only given the broad outlines of the view, it is difficult to know how she will address the details.

My own account of proper names also takes an unusual approach to the problems. I also adopt a portion of the Millian view, as Reimer does, but I do not try to merge it

with another view. Rather, I suggest a distinction between two kinds of proper names; tags, which refer to concrete objects, and labels, which refer to abstract objects. It is to a discussion of this view that I now turn.



## CHAPTER 2: LABELS AND TAGS

Suppose that we are attending a costume party, to which many prominent politicians have been invited. You have arrived early and discovered the identities behind the costumes of many of the attendees. I, having arrived later, am interested in being enlightened by your discoveries. You make the following statements:

- (2.1) Bill Clinton is dressed like a gorilla.
- (2.2) Al Gore is dressed like a policeman.
- (2.3) Hillary Clinton is dressed like Bill Clinton.

What am I to make of your claims? The first statement appears to be unambiguous – Bill Clinton is wearing a gorilla costume. That is, there are certain properties of appearance associated with gorillas, and the costume that Bill Clinton is wearing reproduces those properties. The second statement seems to be interpreted in the same manner as the first; there are certain properties of appearance that are associated with policemen, and the costume that Al Gore is wearing reproduces those properties. There is a certain amount of vagueness in determining exactly what those properties are, given that the uniforms that policemen wear vary from one location to another. I might be expecting him to be wearing a dark blue jacket with brass buttons and matching trousers, a peaked hat with gold trim, a badge on the jacket, and carrying a nightstick, but he could just as easily be wearing a khaki shirt and trousers, and a belt holding various articles, including handcuffs, a two-way radio, and a holster with a gun. It may turn out that certain items, such as a badge, are necessarily a part of a policeman's uniform, so that a policeman costume would have to include reproductions of those items. Perhaps it is the case that

more than one collection of appearance properties satisfies the description ‘policeman’s uniform’. Thus, if Al Gore is attired in a costume that reproduces the properties of one of those collections, he is correctly described as being dressed like a policeman.

Notice that it is not necessary that anyone else be attired in a policeman’s uniform in order for it to be true that Al Gore is. It could be the case that no policemen are in uniform at the time of the costume party. That would not affect the truth of the statement about Al Gore. The word ‘policeman’ in the statement about Al Gore’s attire does not refer to a member of the law enforcement community; it does not claim that there is a policeman that Al Gore is dressed like. Rather, it claims that there are certain properties of appearance associated with policemen, and that Al Gore is wearing a costume that reproduces those properties. Although this may seem obvious, there are circumstances in which the statement ‘Al Gore is dressed like a policeman’ could be used to communicate that there is a policeman whom he is dressed like. However, as statements (2.1) and (2.2) are normally used, the common nouns ‘gorilla’ and ‘policeman’ do not refer to gorillas and policemen, but to properties of appearance associated with gorillas and policemen.

The third statement, ‘Hillary Clinton is dressed like Bill Clinton’ appears to be ambiguous in a way that the first and second statements do not. It seems to be open to two different interpretations:

(2.4) Hillary Clinton is dressed as Bill Clinton is dressed.

(2.5) Hillary Clinton is dressed as Bill Clinton.

On the first interpretation, ‘Bill Clinton’ refers to the man so-named, and since he is dressed as a gorilla, Hillary would also be dressed as a gorilla. On the second

interpretation, ‘Bill Clinton’ does not refer to the man so-named, but to a collection of properties that are properties of his appearance. Thus, on the second interpretation, I would expect to see Hillary wearing a mask and wig that reproduced Bill’s appearance – his bulbous nose, prominent chin, and thick gray hair, side-parted, of course.

The first interpretation is plausible on the view that proper names refer to the objects so-named, as well as on the view that proper names are disguised definite descriptions. The second interpretation is plausible on the basis of the interpretation of statements containing common nouns, such as (2.1) and (2.2). Furthermore, in some cases the second interpretation is more plausible than the first, as when the proper name that is a constituent of the predicate of statement (2.3) is replaced by a proper name that has no referent in the actual world. For instance, replacing ‘Bill Clinton’ with ‘Santa Claus’ in statement (2.3) yields

(2.6) Hillary Clinton is dressed like Santa Claus

which has the following interpretations:

(2.7) Hillary Clinton is dressed as Santa Claus is dressed.

(2.8) Hillary Clinton is dressed as Santa Claus.

In this case, (2.8) seems like a reasonable interpretation of (2.6), whereas (2.7) does not.<sup>15</sup>

I want to distinguish between two kinds of proper names: tags, which refer to the object so-named, such as ‘Bill Clinton’ in (2.4); and labels, which refer to a collection of

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<sup>15</sup> My thanks to Shaughan Lavine for pointing this out.

properties, such as the appearance properties referred to by ‘Bill Clinton’ in (2.5).<sup>16</sup>

Proper names as labels frequently occur in comparative statements, such as the following:

(2.9) John walks like Cary Grant.

(2.10) Amber is singing like Etta James.

(2.11) Simon looks like Ben.

Other examples include:

(2.12) He’s a Casanova.

(2.13) Elizabeth is a future Rita Hayworth.

(2.14) Mike is another Tiger Woods.

Labels can be used ironically to refer to a collection of properties that are lacking in an individual; a woman may say of her enthusiastic but inept dancing partner:

(2.15) He thinks he’s Fred Astaire.

Another example, also ironic, although the label is used literally to refer to a collection of properties lacking in the named individual, is:

(2.16) As a student, Einstein was no Einstein.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> The term ‘tag’ has been used for proper names on the Millian view, to indicate that the name does not contribute any descriptive content to the semantic content of a sentence in which it is a constituent, even though there may be descriptive content associated with the name. The term ‘label’ is my own. I do not know of anyone else who makes the distinction between proper names that I am making in this chapter. I chose to use ‘label’ because labels have a similar function to tags; indeed, many people use the terms interchangeably. I think of labels as indicating properties of the objects to which they are attached, as the nutrition labels on packaged food, or the care and fabric content labels on clothing. Thus, I should say “price label” rather than “price tag”, but perversely, I do not. So although the origin of the term ‘label’ for certain kinds of proper names has its roots in a distinction in usage that I recognize, but do not always respect, it is a technical term in this dissertation, one that does not depend on the reader recognizing the distinction from which it originated.

In this case, the first occurrence of the name ‘Einstein’ is as a tag, the second, as a label.

Descriptively introduced names are labels, although not all labels are descriptively introduced. For instance, when film director Brad Bird gave the name ‘The Incredibles’ to the animated film that he intended to create, he introduced a label into the linguistic community by means of a description. Likewise, when the police (or the press) create a name and associate it with a description of characteristics of the as yet unidentified perpetrator of a crime or series of crimes, as was the case with ‘Unabomber’, they introduce a label into the linguistic community. Descriptively introduced names are not as common as tags, which are names that are introduced by being directly associated with an object, but they are not so rare as to be idiomatic. Furthermore, they are not the only source of labels, as labels can be created from tags.

Since labels refer to collections of properties, they are often used to attribute those properties to other objects. Thus, they can also appear as modifiers to common nouns:

(2.17) Andrew is wearing his Superman costume.

(2.18) That was a Clapton guitar riff.

(2.19) Boy, that was a Mary comment if I ever heard one!

Sometimes labels endure and become widely used throughout the linguistic community; ‘Superman’ is such a label.<sup>17</sup> Other labels may become known only in smaller

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<sup>17</sup> This example was inspired by a billboard, which displayed a picture of Albert Einstein sticking out his tongue, with the caption, “As a student, he was no Einstein.”

<sup>18</sup> Although my examples are taken from the sentences in which the labels occurs as modifiers to common nouns, my point about longevity and widespread use applies to all labels. Furthermore, names as tags, particularly nicknames, also may be used only by localized groups of language users, and they may cease to be used after a period of time.

communities of language users: ‘Clapton’ may be used as a label only by those familiar with his music; ‘Mary’ may be used only by her friends and family. Furthermore, a label may cease to be used; suppose that Mary, stung by the criticism implicit in (2.19), decides to cease making the kinds of comments she has become known for. After a period of time, the collection of properties referred to by the label ‘Mary’ will no longer include properties of the kinds of comments that were once typical of her. If those were the only properties in the collection referred to by that label, the label will cease to refer, and cease to be used.

Although labels and tags differ in the kinds of objects they refer to, they are similar in many ways. Both acquire their references by being accepted by a linguistic community whose members believe that, in uttering the name on a particular occasion of utterance, a speaker intended to introduce a new name into use in the community. Both are directly referential, referring to their references without a mediating sense, mode of presentation, or description. Both contribute their references to the propositions expressed by utterances of the sentences in which they occur. I will argue that the distinction between labels and tags is not simply a distinction between two different uses for a single proper name, but that the name as a label is a different name from the name as a tag, and behaves differently in the sentences in which it appears. Furthermore, I will show how this distinction between labels and tags can solve the problems of empty names, negative existential statements, cognitive significance, and substitution failure in unembedded contexts.

### **Descriptively Introduced Names**

Some names are introduced into the linguistic community in virtue of being associated with an object, as when Margo acquired a puppy and said, “His name is ‘Saul’.” Introducing names in this manner creates a tag, as ‘Saul’ became a tag for that particular dog. Other names are introduced into the linguistic community in virtue of being associated with a uniquely denoting description, as when Margo said, “My second puppy will be called ‘Rufus’.” In this case, the name ‘Rufus’ was not introduced into the linguistic community by being associated with a particular object, because at the time of utterance, Margo had not yet chosen her second puppy. Indeed, at the time of utterance, the puppy that she would eventually choose may not have existed. Rather, the name ‘Rufus’ became a name in the linguistic community of which Margo is a part, in virtue of being associated with the uniquely denoting description, ‘Margo’s second puppy’; it is a descriptively introduced name.

Although descriptively introduced names are created by associating the name with a uniquely denoting description, simply associating a name with a uniquely denoting description does not suffice to create a descriptively introduced name. My own name is associated with the uniquely denoting description ‘third child of Theodore and June Slabey’, but it was introduced into the linguistic community by being associated with an object, namely, me. On the other hand, my brother’s name was descriptively introduced by being associated with the uniquely denoting description ‘first son of Theodore and June Slabey’, because my parents promised to name their first son after his paternal grandfather before any of their children were born. Thus, my brother’s name was

introduced into the linguistic community of which my parents are a part before mine was, although I was named before he was.

Robin Jeshion, in “Descriptive Descriptive Names”, gives several examples of names that were descriptively introduced, including ‘Jack the Ripper’, ‘Neptune’, ‘Deep Throat’, ‘Vulcan’, ‘Son of Sam’, and ‘Unabomber’.<sup>19</sup> More importantly, she characterizes three classes of descriptive names, to which additional examples can be added, indicating that descriptive names are not as rare as some theorists have claimed.<sup>20</sup> The first of these is the class of names that name “individuals we think exist but we are presently unable to identify, in the sense that we lack a certain variety of ‘knowledge-who’ or ‘knowledge-which’, yet ... we introduce the name because we aim to catch, or avoid, or discover the named individual.”<sup>21</sup> The second class includes the names we introduce for “objects that we believe will exist in the future” because they are objects “we are currently constructing or intend to construct.”<sup>22</sup> This class includes names for yet-to-be-created works of art, including paintings, sculptures, films, and writings (although she hedges about the metaphysical status of fictional objects), as well as future events, such as conferences or concerts, and anticipated business ventures. The third

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<sup>19</sup> ‘Son of Sam’ is not actually a descriptively introduced name, since the sniper left notes signed with that name. Thus, he actually baptized himself with the tag, and the police and newspapers took up the name for him. However, there are other examples from the annals of crime, such as The Hillside Strangler and The Boston Strangler (which are proper names rather than descriptions, since their victims were neither hillsides nor Boston (the city itself)).

<sup>20</sup> Jeshion cites Gareth Evans as explicitly stating the view that descriptively introduced names are rare in “Reference and Contingency.” The view is implicitly held by most of the theorists whose views she opposes in “Descriptive Descriptive Names.”

<sup>21</sup> Jeshion, Robin. “Descriptive Descriptive Names” p. 608.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 609.



class, according to Jeshion, includes the “names of numbers or other mathematical objects with which we lack acquaintance.”<sup>23</sup> I will not have anything to say about the third class of descriptively introduced names.

There is some confusion in Jeshion’s account of descriptively introduced names regarding what, if anything, they refer to at the time they are introduced. In discussing the first class of descriptively introduced names, she asserts that these names name the individuals that we think exist but cannot identify, which seems to indicate that she thinks those individuals are the referents of those names. However, in discussing the second class of descriptively introduced names, she asserts that these are names for objects that we believe will exist in the future. It is not clear whether she intends to say that these kinds of names refer now to future existent objects, or whether they will refer to those objects in the future, when they actually exist. With regard to the first class of names, for individuals that we believe exist but that we cannot identify, it could turn out that the name fails to refer because the description either denotes more than one individual or does not denote anyone at all. Furthermore, even if there is an individual who uniquely satisfies the description, we may never know his or her identity. And if we do come to identify the individual who uniquely satisfies the description, it seems that it is the act of associating the individual with the name – which is a baptism by ostension – that causes the name to be a name for that individual. Thus, with regard to the first class of names, the description does not fix the reference of the name as the individual who satisfies the description. With regard to the second class of names, there is no object that satisfies the

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 609.

description at the time of naming because, by stipulation, names in this class are for objects that we expect to exist in the future. Thus, the second class of descriptively introduced names creates empty names at the time of naming. The problem, then, is to give an explanation of what these names refer to. I will begin by considering Nathan Salmon's account of a particular kind of descriptively introduced name, those that name mythical objects.

In "Mythical Objects," Salmon argues that our erroneous theories about the world create abstract objects that are the referents of the names in those theories. For example, when Babinet postulated the existence of a planet between Mercury and the Sun, and gave it the name 'Vulcan', he created a mythical object. Presumably, these names fall within the first class of descriptively introduced names, since the person who introduces the name hopes to discover which object satisfies the description. The most natural reading of Salmon's account of mythical objects is that the abstract object that is the referent of the name is created when the name is descriptively introduced. This abstract object serves as the referent of the name throughout the name's usage. Thus, sentences containing the name as a constituent are meaningful, though false. Of course the theorist who introduced the name, thus creating the abstract object, does not believe that the sentences are false, because he or she believes that there is a concrete object that is the referent of the name. So, for instance, Babinet created the abstract object that is the referent of 'Vulcan'; thus, there was an object for his sentences to be about, even though it was not the kind of object he thought he was referring to.

We might ask about the nature of the abstract object so-created. I suggest that it is a collection of properties denoted by the descriptions used to introduce the name, and predicated of the object that the name purports to refer to. This corresponds to an intuitive view about what happens when we descriptively introduce a name for an object that we intend to create. For example, suppose that an artist decides to create a sculpture. He decides what the subject will be, the kind of materials to use, and the size of the sculpture. He makes some sketches and comes up with a name for the sculpture, which he descriptively introduces by saying, “My sculpture, ‘Heart of Stone’, will portray the cruelty of a beautiful woman.” All of these steps indicate certain properties that the sculpture is to have, but as yet, there is nothing concrete; all he has is a collection of properties. I suggest that the name that he descriptively introduced is a label whose referent is the collection of properties. At some point, as the artist begins to sculpt, the properties begin to be instantiated; the artist shifts from thinking of the sculpture as something that will exist in the future to thinking of it as something that exists in the present. Whereas he once said, “That piece of marble is the material I will sculpt into ‘Heart of Stone’,” he now says, “That is my sculpture, ‘Heart of Stone’.” At this point, he is using the name as a tag to refer, not to the abstract collection of properties, but to the concrete object that instantiates those properties.

This scenario seems to capture the intuition behind descriptively introducing a name for something that we intend to create. Furthermore, it is in keeping with the intuitions regarding the creation of an abstract mythical object as the referent of a name that arises within a false theory. And the case of the false theory seems to me to be no

different than the case of descriptively introducing a name to refer to an object that is predicted by a successful theory, save that in the latter case, the object is eventually located and dubbed with the name, creating a tag. Thus, I suggest that for the first and second classes of descriptively introduced names, the act of naming creates an abstract object which is the collection of properties denoted by the description or descriptions, and which is the referent of the label so-created.

### **Labels From Tags**

If we can create an abstract object by stipulating properties by description, it seems that we should also be able to create a collection of properties, which is an abstract object, from the observed properties of a concrete object. Likewise, it seems that we would want to use the same name as a label for that collection of properties as is the tag for the concrete object that instantiates those properties. For example, suppose that Joe is a golf coach, who is watching one of his students, Mike, practice on the driving range. Joe, who has studied Tiger Woods' golfing style extensively, notices that the way that Mike swings his club is similar to the way that Tiger Woods swing his club. Furthermore, suppose that Joe attributes much of Tiger Woods' success to his swing, and that he notices that Mike also seems to have the ambition and focus on the game that is characteristic of Tiger Woods. So Joe says to his colleagues, "Mike is another Tiger Woods." What Joe has done is to create a label, using the name 'Tiger Woods' to refer to a particular collection of properties, which is a subcollection of the properties instantiated by Tiger Woods. Thus, Tiger Woods is a paradigmatic exemplar of the properties in that collection.

Joe's use of the name 'Tiger Woods' to refer to that particular collection of properties makes sense from a standpoint of communicative efficiency. Firstly, using a label for a collection of properties is short and to the point, compared to denoting the properties by description. Secondly, for all Joe's knowledge of golf, he may not have adequate words to describe the properties in the collection; he may be able to recognize a swing in the manner of Tiger Woods when he sees it, but an accurate description of it may involve rather technical knowledge of physics. Thirdly, even if Joe has sufficient technical knowledge of physics to accurately describe Tiger Woods' swing, he may doubt that his audience would be able to understand or appreciate the description; it is far easier to point them to Tiger Woods as an example of the properties in the collection. And the easiest way to point them to Tiger Woods is to use 'Tiger Woods' as a name for that collection of properties.

When a label is created from a tag, as in the above case, all the properties of the object so-tagged are available to become part of the collection of properties so-labeled; however, most of those properties are not included, usually because the creator of the label does not consider them to be salient. For instance, when Joe created the label 'Tiger Woods', the collection of properties included a particular style of swinging a golf club, and personality attributes of ambition and the ability to focus; other properties instantiated by Tiger Woods, such as his ethnicity, age, or gender, may not have been included in the collection so-labeled.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> From the way the example was described, it is not apparent whether those properties were included in the collection of properties that Joe labeled 'Tiger Woods'. It could turn out that 'Tiger Woods' as a label in another person's idiolect refers to a collection of

Sometimes when a label is created from a tag, the collection of properties so-labeled includes properties that the object so-tagged instantiated at one time but not at another. For example, the collection of properties labeled ‘Einstein’ includes the properties described by ‘brilliant’ and ‘genius’; however, as a student, Einstein did not exhibit those properties. Thus, the sentence, ‘As a student, Einstein was no Einstein’ is true when the first occurrence of ‘Einstein’ is a tag, and the second is a label. In addition, sometimes the collection of properties so-labeled includes properties that the creator of the label mistakenly believes are instantiated by the object so-tagged. Suppose that, after watching the movie ‘Cover Girl’ repeatedly, Elizabeth learns the words to the songs, and the dance routines performed by Rita Hayworth. After watching her perform, Elizabeth’s grandmother says, “Elizabeth is a future Rita Hayworth,” intending the label ‘Rita Hayworth’ to refer to a collection of properties that includes the property described by ‘beautiful singing voice’. However, unbeknownst to her, Rita Hayworth did not have a beautiful singing voice; all the songs attributed to her were performed by a vocalist, with Rita lip-synching before the camera.

Sometimes an object has been tagged with more than one name, and a label is created from each tag. When this happens, properties that are instantiated by the object may be included in the collection of properties referred to by one label, and excluded from the collection of properties referred to by another. One example of this comes from

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properties that does include ethnicity, age, and gender, even if it doesn’t in Joe’s idiolect. I will discuss labels and idiolects in chapter 4.

fiction: the original version of the Superman story.<sup>25</sup> Assuming the existence of the fictional cosmos in which the story takes place, ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’, as tags, are both names for the same object, Superman/Clark Kent. The label ‘Superman’, created from the tag, refers to a collection of properties that includes those described by ‘faster than a speeding bullet’, ‘more powerful than a locomotive’, ‘able to leap tall buildings in a single bound’, and ‘dresses in a blue and red costume with a cape and a large ‘S’ on the chest’. Although these are properties that Clark Kent has, since he is Superman, they are not properties that are part of the collection of properties referred to by the label ‘Clark Kent’. Rather, ‘Clark Kent’, as a label, refers to a collection of properties that includes those described by ‘meek, mild-mannered reporter for the Daily Planet’ and ‘dresses conservatively in a suit and tie, hat, and horn-rimmed glasses’. Thus, even though Superman wears the suit, tie, hat, and glasses (since he is Clark Kent), when Penny says, “Andrew is wearing his Superman costume,” we take ‘Superman’ as a label, and look for him in the blue and red union suit with an ‘S’ on his chest.

Of course, if fictional examples were the only ones available to illustrate multiple labels being instantiated by a single object, we would have reason to doubt their legitimacy. As it turns out, there are several examples from the entertainment industry. For instance, Queen Latifah has released an album and is performing in concert under the name ‘Dana Owens’. She has not kept her alternate identity a secret; rather, since the

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<sup>25</sup> I use ‘original version’ to indicate the story as it was originally conceived and presented, in which the identity of Superman as Clark Kent was known to the audience, but unknown to the other characters in the story. Other versions of the story have since been created in which some of the other characters, including Lois Lane, know of his dual identity.

genre of music that she performs as Dana Owens is very different from the genre that she performs as Queen Latifah, using two names prevents her from disappointing the expectations of fans who come for rap and R & B, and instead hear jazz and blues. Thus, ‘Queen Latifah’, as a label, refers to a collection of properties that includes those described by ‘R & B singer’, ‘rapper’, and ‘actress’, whereas ‘Dana Owens’, as a label, refers to a collection of properties that includes those described by ‘jazz vocalist’ and ‘blues singer’. Other examples include Will Smith, who is also the rapper known as ‘Fresh Prince’, and Garth Brooks, the country singer who recorded a rock album under the name ‘Chris Gaines’.

The preceding examples are cases in which more than one label is in fairly widespread use within the linguistic community. However, cases abound in which a label is created that refers to a collection of properties that are part of an individual’s public persona, and a second name is used to protect the individual’s private life. A second label can be created from the second name, referring to a different collection of properties than the collection to which the public label refers. This happens frequently with authors who write under pseudonyms and performers who use a stage name. Many times the second name, and the label created from it, is only known to a small circle of friends and family. When we consider the social group that a person interacts with as a sub-community, many people have a name that is used at for some acquaintances, but not for others. This multiplicity of names can lead to multiple labels being created to refer to different collections of properties that are all instantiated by the same individual.



### **Different Names or Different Uses**

The distinction between labels and tags has largely gone unnoticed in semantic theories. I suspect that this is because, for the most part, semanticists have not focused much attention on the role of proper names in sentences in which the name appears as a constituent of the predicate, which is where the distinction shows up most clearly. Those examples that have been widely discussed are identity sentences, such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, in which the name in the predicate is taken to be co-referential with the name in the subject of the sentence. A notable exception is Jennifer Saul, in “Substitution failure and simple sentences,” who offers examples similar to sentence 3, above. She does not make the label/tag distinction, however. Rather, she argues that a semantic theory cannot adequately explain the intuitions of substitution failure in the cases she cites. Thus, she contends that a pragmatic explanation is necessary to account for these cases, which supports a pragmatic account of substitution failure in other contexts, such as belief reports. Those who have challenged her conclusion have tried to accommodate her examples within existing semantic theories, rather than postulating that, in some cases, proper names occurring as constituents of predicates behave differently than they do in other cases or other locations. I will not rehearse these arguments, as they are tangential to the question I am concerned with, which is whether the label/tag distinction is a distinction between two kinds of names, or a distinction between two uses of one kind of name.

Before considering the arguments for each side of this question, however, I want to clarify what I mean when I speak of kinds of names. In order to do that, I need to say

something about how we differentiate names. One way to do it, of course, is to differentiate them according to their orthographical or phonological form. When names are differentiated in this manner, ‘John Smith’ is a single name that refers to thousands of different individuals. There is a sense in which our everyday usage supports this view; Betty meets her new neighbor, John Smith, and says, “Oh! You have the same name as one of my co-workers.” Of course, those of us who are somewhat more linguistically sophisticated point out that her words, ‘the same name’, should be taken to mean qualitative similarity rather than numerical identity. From a theoretical standpoint, it is much simpler and much more useful to differentiate names according to both their orthographical and phonological form and by their references. On this view, there are multiple names with the form ‘John Smith’, each having a single individual as its referent. If we were concerned about keeping track of the referent of each of these names, we could incorporate some way of distinguishing them. In fact, this is what Betty does when she uses ‘John Smith, my neighbor’ to talk about the one, and ‘John Smith, my co-worker’ to talk about the other.

If we differentiate names according to their references as well as by their orthographical and phonological form, then names having the same orthographical and phonological form but referring to different objects are different names. Likewise, names that have different orthographical and phonological forms are also different names, even though they may refer to the same object. On this view, ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ are different names, even though, as tags, they both refer to Mark Twain/Samuel Clemens. Taking this criteria for differentiating names, and applying it to

labels and tags, it turns out that the label ‘Mark Twain’ is a different name from the tag ‘Mark Twain’. This is because the label ‘Mark Twain’ refers to a collection of properties, which is an abstract object that may be instantiated by more than one physical object, whereas the tag ‘Mark Twain’ refers to a physical object that is the object associated with that name by a baptism by ostension and the acceptance of the name for that object by a linguistic community. We could generalize from these cases, differentiating kinds of names according to the kinds of objects to which they refer. Thus, labels would be one kind of name, referring to abstract collections of properties, and tags would be another kind of name, referring to concrete physical objects.<sup>26</sup> The alternative is to deny that labels exist as a distinct kind of names. This alternative takes two different forms, depending on whether the theorist is a Russellian or a Millian about proper names. In either case, the data regarding names as labels is explained away in terms of how a proper name is used.

The idea that the label/tag distinction is simply a distinction between two uses of one kind of name gains support from the work of Keith Donnellan on definite descriptions. In “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Donnellan argues that definite descriptions can have two uses: an attributive use and a referential use. According to Donnellan, “A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states

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<sup>26</sup> Actually, I am not sure that all the objects referred to by tags are concrete physical objects. The example that comes to mind is a concert series, which is a sequence of events, and thus, may not be considered, by itself, a concrete physical object. Nevertheless, the events are brought into existence by the actions of various physical objects, such as the musicians and their instruments. This may be enough to make the concert series qualify as a concrete physical object. Alternatively, the description of the kinds of objects that tags refer to could be modified to accommodate such objects.

something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing.<sup>27</sup> Thus, an assertive utterance of the sentence, “The man in the yellow raincoat is waiting for the bus,” in which the definite description is used attributively, states of whoever is the man in the yellow raincoat that he is waiting for the bus. However, if the definite description is used referentially in an assertive utterance of the same sentence, the utterer is asserting of some particular person that he is waiting for the bus, and the description, ‘the man in the yellow raincoat’ directs the audience’s attention to that person.

### **The Russellian Argument**

Suppose that we try to extend this distinction to proper names. It seems incontrovertibly clear that using a name as a tag corresponds to the referential use of a definite description, since a speaker who uses a name as a tag states something about the person or thing so named, and the name enables the audience to pick out that person or thing. Indeed, this has been seen as the main semantic function of a name, to refer to the object so named. But is it possible to get a similar correspondence between using a name as a label and the attributive use of a definite description? In the case of labels that appear in the subject position of sentence, as descriptively introduced names frequently do, the answer seems to be affirmative. In fact, this is one of the motivations for a Russellian theory of proper names, which treats proper names as disguised definite

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<sup>27</sup> Donellan, Keith. ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions,’ p. 243.

descriptions. In the sentence, “Jack the Ripper was never apprehended by the police,” the name ‘Jack the Ripper’ is a disguise for a definite description, such as ‘the murderer of several women in the Whitechapel district of London in 1888’. Thus, an assertive utterance of the sentence above, in which the name ‘Jack the Ripper’ is used attributively, states that whoever was the murderer of several women in the Whitechapel district of London in 1888 was never apprehended by the police. As this shows, in the case of labels that appear in the subject position of a sentence, a correspondence with the attributive use of definite descriptions can be achieved by treating the proper name as a disguised definite description.

Can a similar correspondence with the attributive use of definite descriptions be achieved by treating a proper name as a disguised definite description when it appears as a constituent of the predicate of a sentence? I do not think that it can. Consider sentence (2.5) again:

(2.5) Hillary Clinton is dressed as Bill Clinton.

The intended interpretation, with ‘Bill Clinton’ as a label, in the scenario described earlier, is that Hillary is wearing a mask and wig that replicate Bill’s facial features and hairstyle, and clothes such as Bill would usually wear. On the Russellian view, treating ‘Bill Clinton’ as a disguised definite description, sentence (2.5) looks something like:

(2.20) There is exactly one person that has the property of being Bill Clinton, and Hillary is dressed like that person.

It seems to me that this expresses the same proposition as (2.4) – that Hillary is dressed as Bill Clinton is dressed. However, it is possible that there are some unarticulated

constituents expressing temporal locations that signify the difference in interpretation between (2.4) and (2.5), as follows:

(2.21) There is exactly one person that has the property of being Bill Clinton, and Hillary at time  $t$ , is dressed like that person at time  $t$ .

(2.22) There is exactly one person that has the property of being Bill Clinton, and Hillary at time  $t$ , is dressed like that person.

In (2.21), the temporal location of both Hillary and the person she is dressed like is the same, such that she is wearing whatever that person is wearing, i.e., a gorilla suit in the opening scenario. In (2.22), there is a temporal operator that has scope over Hillary, but not over the person she is dressed like. Thus, sentence (2.22) could be taken to give the interpretation ‘Hillary is dressed to appear as Bill usually does’.

Even if I grant this interpretation of (2.22), it doesn’t generalize to other cases. Consider, for instance, the case of Joe, who works in Las Vegas as an Elvis Presley impersonator. Joe’s costume consists of a white rhinestone-studded jumpsuit with a large pointed collar and zipper down the front, which he wears unzipped to his waist. Accompanying this he wears a red silk scarf tied around his neck, large sunglasses, a black wig styled in a pompadour, and sideburns that reach his jaw line. When Joe’s wife is asked to describe her husband in his “work” clothes, she says:

(2.23) Joe is dressed like Elvis Presley.

Giving this a parallel Russellian interpretation to (2.22), we get:

(2.24) There is exactly one person who has the property of being Elvis Presley, and Joe at time  $t$ , is dressed like that person.

For the sake of argument, let's ignore the fact of Elvis's demise, which makes the first conjunct of (2.24) false, and accept that (2.24) gives the interpretation 'Joe is dressed to appear as Elvis Presley usually does'. Is this true? No, although Joe's "uniform" is standard among Elvis impersonators. Elvis did not usually wear the white rhinestone-studded jumpsuit; he did not even usually wear it when performing in concert. The white jumpsuit has become iconic because Elvis wore it at the last concert he performed for which a live recording was made and marketed, and a photograph from the concert, of him in that jumpsuit, appeared on the cover of the album. Furthermore, in that concert, he did not wear sunglasses, nor was his hair styled in a pompadour. The standard uniform of the Elvis impersonators is a collage based on several properties of his appearance that did not all occur simultaneously, much less usually. So the interpretation of (2.24) is false, showing that (2.22) doesn't generalize to cover this case.

Another problem with trying to generalize (2.22) is that it cannot handle cases such as sentence (2.8), 'Hillary Clinton is dressed as Santa Claus'. This is because the first conjunct, 'there is exactly one person who has the property of being Santa Claus', is false. Of course, the same thing can be said regarding (2.24) above, if we accept the claims of Elvis's demise. The previous argument shows that the Russellian view of proper names as disguised definite descriptions does not yield a corresponding attributive use for proper names as labels that occur as constituents of predicates. Thus, a strictly Russellian account of proper names cannot regard the label/tag distinction as merely a distinction between two uses of the same kind of name. Since I reject a Russellian account of proper names as tags, I will not attempt to formulate a Russellian analysis of

names as labels in which labels are treated as a different in kind from tags. Instead, I will consider whether a strictly Millian account of proper names can regard the label/tag distinction as merely a distinction in use, rather than in kind.

### **The Millian Argument**

On a Millian account of proper names, the idea that the use of a proper name as a tag corresponds to the referential use of a definite description is unproblematic; a speaker who uses the name as a tag states something about the object so named, and the audience is enabled to know who or what the statement is about in virtue of knowing the referent of the name. Unlike the Russellian account, however, the Millian account has difficulties with a use of a proper name that corresponds to the attributive use of a definite description. This is because, on the Millian account, a name refers to an object without a mediating sense or description, even though there may be cognitive content associated with the name. Thus, for the Millian, an attributive use of a proper name would not be based on a semantic distinction, but on a distinction between the semantics of proper names and pragmatics. With regard to cases of labels appearing in the subject of a sentence, e.g., ‘Jack the Ripper was never apprehended by the police’, the Millian could deny that the name is, in fact, a label. If the name ‘Jack the Ripper’ fails to refer, perhaps because the police attributed to him murders that he did not commit, then the sentence above is false, even though it appears to communicate something true. So for the Millian, descriptively introduced names appearing in the subject of a sentence do not support the label/tag distinction at all, whether as a distinction in use or as a distinction in kind.



Can the Millian also dismiss the label/tag distinction with regard to proper names as constituents of the predicate of a sentence? Consider sentence (2.5): Hillary Clinton is dressed as Bill Clinton. Again, the interpretation we are after is that Hillary is wearing a mask and wig that replicate Bill's features, and clothes of a type that he would normally wear. According to the Millian account, the proposition expressed by an utterance of (2.5) is something like:

(2,25) [Dressed as (Bill Clinton)], (Hillary Clinton)

In this proposition, the name 'Bill Clinton' refers to the man himself. But this doesn't get us the interpretation that we want, because at the time of utterance (per the opening scenario), Bill is wearing a gorilla suit. So the Millian approach will get the interpretation associated with (2.4), but not (2.5). Suppose we assume that there is a temporal operator that has not been represented in my formulation of the proposition, and that the temporal operator, being fixed as the time of utterance, has scope over Hillary but not over Bill, giving the interpretation that Hillary is dressed (at the time of utterance) as Bill is (usually) dressed. This is still not what we are looking for, since Bill is not usually wearing a mask and wig (at least, I assume that he is not).

One possibility open to the Millian is to treat sentences such as (2.3), (2.5), and (2.9) – (2.11) as similes, and sentences such as (2.12) – (2.16) as metaphors. Of course, in order to do so, one needs a suitable theory of meaning for similes and metaphors; it is not clear to me which of the available theories would be most attractive to the Millian. One of the difficulties for sentences (2.3), (2.5), and (2.9) – (2.11) is that they do not simply claim that one object is like another object, as most similes do, but they claim that

the first is like the second in a particular way – manner of dress, manner of walking, manner of singing, manner of appearance. Nevertheless, perhaps some sense can be made by treating the sentences as if they had an adverbial modifier. For example, sentence (2.3) could be interpreted as:

(2.26) In manner of dress, Hillary Clinton is like Bill Clinton.

This sentence admits of two further interpretations:

(2.27) In manner of dress, Hillary Clinton at time  $t$  is like Bill Clinton at time  $t$ .

(2.28) In manner of dress, Hillary Clinton at time  $t$  is like Bill Clinton.

The reference to temporal location in (2.27) for both Hillary and Bill yields the interpretation that whatever Bill is wearing at time  $t$ , Hillary is also wearing it at time  $t$ . On the other hand, the lack of reference to temporal location in (2.28) for Bill is intended to give the interpretation that Hillary at time  $t$  is dressed like Bill at an unspecified time, or perhaps, like he usually dresses.

One problem with this account of (2.28) has to do with the nature of similes; as Donald Davidson points out, “all similes are true...because everything is like everything.”<sup>28</sup> Thus, there are many circumstances in which (2.28) will be true; the reading isn’t narrow enough to get only the interpretation that we are aiming for, namely, that Hillary is similar to Bill not only in clothing, but also by replicating his hair and facial features. This is not insurmountable; the Millian might suggest that there is a contextually determined threshold, that there must be a sufficient number of properties in common for an assertion of the sentence to be judged true. Thus, in the case of the

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<sup>28</sup> Davidson, Donald. “What Metaphors Mean,” p.441.

costume party, it is not enough for Hillary to wear a suit and tie; she must also replicate his hair and facial features.<sup>29</sup> In a different context, a suit and tie alone might be enough. For example, a staff worker who believes that mimicry is the highest form of flattery and will lead to promotion, who also wants to be subtle in case he is mistaken, might wear suits and ties like those Bill Clinton wears, but not on the same days as he does.

The Millian has two responses to cases like sentences (2.12) – (2.16): on the one hand, she can treat them as metaphors; on the other hand, she can treat them as disguised similes.<sup>30</sup> Consider sentence (2.14):

(2.14) Mike is another Tiger Woods.

Taken as a metaphor, the sentence is false, since the name Tiger Woods refers to only one individual, and that individual, presumably, is not Mike.<sup>31</sup> For the Millian, this result does not present a problem, since the sentence, though false, can be used to communicate something true, namely that Mike is similar to Tiger Woods in certain respects.

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<sup>29</sup> It is possible that the need for the mask and wig is motivated partly by the fact that it is a costume party, and that the purpose of a costume is to disguise one's own appearance. Thus, without the wig and mask, Hillary would not be sufficiently disguised to count as being costumed. Also, it might be that a costume must be recognizable as a costume of some thing or kind of thing. Thus, a suit and tie, without the mask and wig, would not be recognizable as a costume of Bill Clinton.

<sup>30</sup> Treating sentences (2.12) – (2.16) as disguised similes does not require that all metaphors be treated as disguised similes. The Millian can hold that there are sentences which appear to be metaphors, but should be analyzed as similes, while maintaining that other sentences which appear to be metaphors should be analyzed differently. Thus, this response to cases such as sentences (2.12) – (2.16) is neutral with regard to a general theory about metaphors.

<sup>31</sup> There are cases in which sentence (2.14) would turn out to be true, but they are not the ones normally intended by a speaker who utters sentence (2.14). For instance, 'Tiger Woods' could be a nickname given to Mike by some of his acquaintances, either in admiration of his golf skill, or ironically, because of his lack of skill.

However, this sentence, and sentences like it, differs from other metaphors in an interesting way. Suppose a poet says, “My love is a red rose,” or “War is hell.” On analogous lines to sentence (2.14), we are to take these utterances as strictly speaking false, although conveying truths by causing the audience to look for similarities between a lover and a red rose, on the one hand, and between war and Hell, on the other. The audience is not in a position to reject these metaphors by denying that they convey truths: to state that war is not hell is not to deny the metaphor; it is to fail to understand it. But sentence (2.14) is not like that; to say “Mike is not another Tiger Woods” does not indicate a failure to understand what the sentence is communicating. I could understand which properties of Tiger Woods the speaker is attributing to Mike, and yet reject sentence (2.14), either by denying that Mike has those properties, or by denying that having those properties is sufficient to make the phrase ‘another Tiger Woods’ applicable.

Alternatively, the Millian could treat cases like sentences (2.12) – (2.16) as disguised similes, along the lines of sentences (2.3), (2.5) and (2.9) – (2.11). In these cases, the treatment is even simpler, because there is no verb such as ‘dressed’ to indicate a manner in which the first object is similar to the second. Notice, however, that whether the sentence is treated as a metaphor or as a disguised simile, properties of the object referred to by the proper name that is a constituent of the predicate are brought into play in understanding the sentence and judging the truth of an assertive utterance of it. On a strictly Millian account, these properties are not available as part of the semantics, because the name only contributes the object so named to the proposition expressed by an

utterance of the sentence. Thus, the distinction between tags and labels, on a strictly Millian account, is a distinction between semantics and pragmatics.

### The Syntactic Argument

Perhaps the strongest case for treating labels and tags as different kinds of names, rather than merely as different uses of the same kind of name is based on syntax. When a label appears as a constituent in the predicate of a sentence, a different kind of constituent is created from when a tag so-appears. Consider sentences (2.4) and (2.5) again:

(2.4) Hillary Clinton is dressed as Bill Clinton is dressed.

(2.5) Hillary Clinton is dressed as Bill Clinton.

The syntactic structures of the sentences are as follows:

(2.29) [[[Hillary Clinton]<sub>NP</sub>[is dressed]<sub>VP</sub>]<sub>S</sub>[<sub>a</sub>COMP[[Bill Clinton]<sub>NP</sub>[is dressed]<sub>VP</sub>]<sub>S</sub>]<sub>S</sub>

(2.30) [[Hillary Clinton]<sub>NP</sub> [[is dressed]<sub>V</sub> [<sub>a</sub>PREP [Bill Clinton]<sub>NP</sub>]<sub>ADV P</sub>]<sub>VP</sub>]<sub>S</sub>

To put it more plainly, in sentence (2.4), ‘Bill Clinton’ is the subject noun phrase of an embedded sentence, whereas in sentence (2.5), ‘Bill Clinton’ is the object noun phrase of a prepositional phrase that acts as an adverb modifying the verb ‘is dressed’. If our grammatical practices were somewhat different with regard to proper names, (2.5) could be paraphrased as “Hillary Clinton is dressed Bill-Clintonishly.” Likewise, sentence (2.14) could be paraphrased as “Mike is Tiger-Woodsish.” That is, the addition of the suffix ‘-ish’ would create an adjective from the noun, and the further addition of the

suffix ‘-ly’ would create an adverb from the adjective.<sup>32</sup> This is not to suggest that we ought to change our grammatical practices with regard to proper names; rather, it is because our grammatical practices with regard to proper names do not permit the addition of suffixes to create adjectives and adverbs that we must use other features of the grammar – prepositions and the predicative ‘is’ – to get our meaning across. In these cases, as in the cases of common nouns that form the root for adjectives, the adjective attributes the properties of the root noun to the object to which it is applied.

Sentences (2.17) – (2.19) add strength to the argument for labels on the basis of syntax. In (2.17) and (2.19), the proper names appear as modifiers within a noun phrase whose head is a common noun. Sentence (2.18) is interesting because it is ambiguous: a ‘Clapton guitar riff’ could be either a guitar riff performed by Clapton, or a guitar riff in the manner of Clapton. In the former case, ‘Clapton’ is a tag, referring to the guitarist, Eric Clapton; in the latter case, ‘Clapton’ is a label, referring to a collection of properties that includes a particular manner of playing the guitar. In English, we actually have a grammatical practice that allows us to change these nouns into adjectives: the addition of the suffix ‘-esque’. Thus, we could say, “That was a Claptonesque guitar riff” when discussing a guitar riff in the manner of Clapton. However, this suffix has fallen out of

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<sup>32</sup> The ‘-ish’ suffix is sometimes used in English to create adjectives from common nouns, particularly those that attribute animal traits to humans: tigerish, kittenish, boorish, foolish (although boors and fools are not non-human animals). It is also frequently used for changing nouns regarding nationalities to adjectives: British, English, Danish, Swedish. Although we don’t tend to create adverbs out of the adjectives of nationality, we do create them out of the adjectives that attribute animal traits, e.g., “He behaved boorishly at the party last night.”

use; most people don't bother with it for various reasons, some sociological, some linguistic.

### **Empty Names and Negative Existential Statements**

The distinction between labels and tags provides the theoretical apparatus to begin to address the problems of empty names, negative existentials, substitution failure and cognitive significance. I will begin with the problems of empty names and negative existential statements. Prior to providing analyses of these kinds of sentences, however, it is necessary to say more about what empty names are. It is difficult to give a good characterization of empty names that does not presuppose a particular metaphysical position. Perhaps this is a satisfactory beginning attempt: an empty name is a name that purports to refer to an object that has no instantiation in the actual world.<sup>33</sup> Philosophers disagree about the nature of the objects that empty names purport to refer to. Some hold that the references of empty names are objects that exist in possible, but non-actual worlds. Others deny the existence of such objects. On my view, empty names are labels that refer to collections of properties that have no instantiation in the actual world.

Metaphysics aside, my view can explain the semantics of empty names in a way that allows the sentences in which they occur to be meaningful. Consider sentence (1.1) again:

(1.1) Santa Claus lives at the North Pole.

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<sup>33</sup> Although it is possible to make a distinction between fictional names and other empty names on the basis of their genesis, this distinction is not necessary in order to give an account of the semantics of empty names.

Let's assume that this sentence is found in the usual story about Santa Claus. Sentence (1.1) is meaningful, because on my view, 'Santa Claus' is a label whose referent is a collection of properties specified by the descriptions included in the story.<sup>34</sup> Thus, there is an object that is the referent of the name. However, this object, which is an abstract collection of properties, is not the kind of thing that can satisfy the predicate 'lives at the North Pole'. So sentence (1.1) is false, though meaningful. Nevertheless, there is a reading of (1.1) on which it is true, namely, if 'lives at the North Pole' is taken as asserting that the collection of properties referred to by the label 'Santa Claus' includes the property described by the predicate. Thus, there is one reading of (1.1) that supports the intuition that it is false, and a second reading that supports the intuition that it is true.

Contrast sentence (1.1) with (1.2):

(1.2) Santa Claus lives in Cincinnati.

The property described by the predicate of (1.2) is not part of the collection of properties specified by the story. Thus, there is no reading of sentence (1.2) on which it is true.

The case of negative existential statements is similar to sentence (1.1) in that there is a reading on which it is true. Consider this sentence:

(1.3) Santa Claus doesn't exist.

'Santa Claus' is an empty name, and on my view, empty names are labels referring to a collection of properties. If sentence (1.3) taken to assert that the property described by the predicate 'doesn't exist' is satisfied by the referent of the label, then it is false.

However, (1.3) can be read as asserting that the property described by the predicate

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<sup>34</sup> Since there are different stories about Santa Claus, there are different labels referring to different collections of properties attributed in the stories.



‘doesn’t exist’ is part of the collection of properties referred to by the label ‘Santa Claus’.

Thus there is a reading of sentence (1.3) on which it is true.

### **Substitution Failure and Cognitive Significance**

Consider the problem of substitution failure in un-embedded sentences as illustrated in the following sentences:

(1.4) Cary Grant was famous.

(1.5) Archie Leach was famous.

Substitution failure in these sentences is only apparent; since ‘Cary Grant’ and ‘Archie Leach’ are tags for the same individual, both sentences are true if either is. The problem is that one sentence, (1.4), is generally judged to be true, and the other, false. This intuition can be explained by treating ‘Cary Grant’ and ‘Archie Leach’ as labels, and the predicate ‘was famous’ as asserting that the property so-described is part of the collections of properties referred to by the labels. Since on the ‘label’ reading, sentence (1.4) is true and (1.5) is false, the apparent discrepancy in the truth-values of the sentences is explained.

The difference in the cognitive significance of the following identity statements can be explained by the label/tag distinction:

(1.6) Cary Grant is Archie Leach.

(1.7) Cary Grant is Cary Grant.

When the names ‘Cary Grant’ and ‘Archie Leach’ are taken as tags, sentences (1.6) and (1.7) express the same proposition, namely, that a particular person, Cary Grant, is self-identical. Thus the puzzle why the former seems informative and the latter does not.

When some of the names in (1.6) are taken as labels, the source of its informativeness becomes apparent; the label ‘Cary Grant’ refers to a different collection of properties from the label ‘Archie Leach’. Thus, sentence (1.6) can be taken to predicate of the individual tagged ‘Cary Grant’ the collection of properties referred to by the label ‘Archie Leach’. There is even a reading of (1.6) where it is false, namely, when it is taken as an assertion of identity between the collection of properties referred to by the label ‘Cary Grant’ and the collection of properties referred to by the label ‘Archie Leach’. On the other hand, there is no reading of (1.7) where it is false. Furthermore, all the properties in the collection referred to by the label ‘Cary Grant’ are observed properties of the man referred to by the tag ‘Cary Grant’. Thus, unlike (1.6), there is nothing to be learned from (1.7).

### CHAPTER 3: WHAT DO WE SAY

People talk. Sometimes we want to know what they are saying. So we ask, “What did he say?” or “What did she say?” The person we queried is now faced with the task of deciding how to answer, and part of that decision is based on his or her judgment of what we want to know. For example, suppose that Lora’s friend, Jean, who is visiting from France, says, “Nicolas vas au magasin.” Julie wants to know what Jean said, so she asks. Among the various possible responses that Lora could make are the following<sup>35</sup>:

- (3.1) Jean said, “Nicolas vas au magasin.”
- (3.2) Jean said, “Nicolas is going to the store.”
- (3.3) Jean said (that) Nicolas is going to the store.
- (3.4) Jean said (that) Nicolas went to Target.

Lora’s actual response will depend on her judgment about what Julie wants to know, and that judgment will be based partly on information that she has about Julie, Nicolas, and Jean. If Lora thinks that Julie understands French and merely did not hear what Jean said, she may take Julie’s question as equivalent to, “What was the utterance that he made?” Thus, she would be inclined to response (3.1), what grammarians call ‘direct quotation’. Alternatively, Lora may not think that Julie understands French, in which case, she might take Julie’s question to be something like, “What would he have uttered if he had spoken English?” and responded with (3.2), a translation. Responses (3.3) and (3.4) can be seen as answers to the questions, “What did you interpret his utterance to mean?” and “What information did his utterance convey to you?” respectively. This

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<sup>35</sup> The that-complementizer in responses (3.3) and (3.4) is in parentheses because it is optional in English.

question calls for Lora to interpret Jean's utterance, and Lora must decide how much interpretation is needed.

Let us switch to the monolingual example; this is to be an account of what a competent language user knows about proper names, and surely it is absurd to think that competency in a language requires one to be multilingual. Suppose that Jean's utterance was 'Nicolas is going to the store'; (3.1) now seems to be an unlikely candidate as a response to Julie's question. Response (3.2) is now a direct quotation, and (3.3) is an indirect quotation, or indirect speech report. Response (3.4) is hard to categorize; it is not clear whether or not it is close enough to Jean's utterance to count as an indirect speech report. I'll call response (3.4) an interpretation. All of these responses are examples of speech reports, however, not all kinds of speech reports pose the same difficulties for a theory of proper names. In particular, only direct quotation speech reports are subject to the problem of substitution failure of apparently co-referential proper names. In this chapter, I will discuss various theories of direct quotation speech reports. I will propose a theory that solves the problems of substitution failure, anaphoric reference, and emphatic stress. I will begin by looking at the interpretation process leading up to the speech report.

### **The Interpretation Process**

The interpretation process leading up to the speech report is the process that the person who will be making the speech report goes through in order to determine how to respond. The process has two parts: understanding the speech to be reported, and understanding the request for information. Take the monolingual example involving

Lora, above. Let's assume that Lora is a competent English user. What happens when Jean says, "Nicolas is going to the store"? Lora hears Jean's words, processes them through the perceptual and conceptual systems in her brain, and arrives at an interpretation of Jean's statement.<sup>36</sup> It is an interpretation of Jean's statement because the conceptual system in Lora's brain processes the words according to their meanings in her idiolect. Of course, Lora doesn't think of it that way; she thinks that she uses words to mean the same things that they mean for the other members of her linguistic community. Her default assumption is that Jean does, too. Lora doesn't consciously think of her interpretation of Jean's words to be particular to her. Nevertheless, if we ask a question that makes her think she might not have understood what Jean said, her response would be something like, "Well, I thought he said, "Nicolas is going to the store". Thus, if pressed on the issue, she can distinguish her interpretation of his words from the interpretation that others might give. We can symbolize this interpretation by subscripting Lora's name to Jean's statement, yielding [Nicolas is going to the store.]<sub>Lora</sub>. On the basis of Lora's interpretation,<sup>36</sup> her beliefs about the world, and in particular, her beliefs about Jean and Nicolas, she may make some inferences about what Jean believes and what Nicolas believes. For instance, she might believe that Nicolas only likes to shop at Target, or at least, she might believe that Jean thinks that. So she might infer that when Jean said, "the store" he meant Target. Another thing that Lora might think is that sufficient time had passed since Jean's utterance to make it likely that Nicolas had

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<sup>36</sup> My account of the interpretation process relies on Grice's accounts of 'meaning<sub>NN</sub>', the cooperative principle, and conversational implicature, which I take to be basically correct. The first is found in his paper, "Meaning." The second and third are found in "Logic and Conversation."

already gone to the store. Thus, she might infer that Jean's report was now about a past event, rather than a present one. So she might revise her interpretation of Jean's statement to accommodate these inferences, coming to believe that what Jean said then would now be more accurately expressed by 'Nicolas went to Target'. Once again, this is her interpretation, processed through her idiolect, so it can be symbolized as [Nicolas went to Target.]<sub>Lora</sub>.

Of course, there is nothing about this part of the interpretation process that is solely for speech reports; it is merely an explanation of speech processing from the hearer's perspective. We can give a general description of this process as follows:

1. U makes an utterance – call it X.
2. A perceives U's utterance of X, and processes X through her perceptual system and her conceptual system, arriving at an interpretation of X – call it X<sub>A</sub>.<sup>37</sup>
3. On the basis of X<sub>A</sub>, and A's beliefs about the world, and in particular, about U, A may make some inferences about U's beliefs.
4. On the basis of these inferences, A may further interpret X<sub>A</sub> as X\*<sub>A</sub>.

For philosophers of language, there is a temptation to correlate these three levels of representation – X, X<sub>A</sub>, and X\*<sub>A</sub> – with three theoretical distinctions – what is uttered,

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<sup>37</sup> Anecdotal evidence, supported by linguistic research, seems to indicate that if you know a language, then you perceive any spoken utterance in that language as a string of words and pauses, rather than a continuous stream of sound, given adequate hearing conditions (volume, background noise, clarity of the speaker's enunciation). This suggests that step two may be involuntary. Jerry Fodor contends that this is the case in *The Modularity of Mind*. Whether or not A completes steps three and four depends on how much A knows and cares about U, and about the topic of conversation.

what is said, and what is communicated by the U's utterance. To make such a correlation is a mistake. The correlation between X and what is uttered holds, of course, because we have so stipulated, but we cannot do likewise for the others. What is said by U's utterance depends on the conventions of the linguistic community, and A's interpretation of U's utterance,  $X_A$ , may not follow those conventions. For example, Lora may be mistaken about the reference of 'Nicolas', so her interpretation of X, based on her conceptual system, will not follow the conventions of the linguistic community with regard to the name 'Nicolas'. So  $X_A$  does not correlate with what is said by an utterance of X. A similar argument can be made against correlating  $X^*_A$  with what is communicated by an utterance of X. What is communicated by U's utterance depends on what U means in uttering X. But A can be mistaken about that as well. In the example, Jean intended to communicate that Nicolas went to the store. But if Lora is mistaken about the reference of 'Nicolas', her interpretation  $X^*_A$  will not express what Jean intended. Thus,  $X^*_A$  does not correlate with what is communicated by U's utterance of X.

So far we have an account of what happens in basic communication. This gets extended when we turn to speech reports. In the example above, Julie asks Lora what Jean said. As before, Lora hears the words that were uttered, and processes them through the perceptual and conceptual systems in her brain, arriving at an interpretation of Julie's question. And as before, this is Lora's interpretation, which may not be the same as Julie's interpretation. For instance, if Julie said, "What did he say?" Lora could be mistaken about the reference of the pronoun, thinking that Julie intended to refer to Jean,

when Julie was actually asking about someone else. But let us assume that no mistake occurs, and that Lora's interpretation, [What did Jean say?]<sub>Lora</sub>, accurately reflects Julie's question. Lora is still not in a position to answer this question, because it is ambiguous. As I pointed out earlier, there are several different paraphrases of the question; before Lora can respond, she has to decide which paraphrase to respond to. Thus, she has to make a judgment about Julie's intentions in asking the question. Then she can decide whether to quote Jean directly or not. In this case, her decision is somewhat simplified, because the direct and indirect quotations can be homophonic, so she can simply decide whether or not to give her interpretation of Jean's remark.

As before, we can give a general description of this part of the interpretation process:

5. B asks A, "What did U say?" – call this W.
6. A perceives B's utterance of W, and processes W through her perceptual system and her conceptual system, arriving at an interpretation of W – call it W<sub>A</sub>.
7. W<sub>A</sub> is ambiguous (as is W), so A evaluates B's intentions in order to decide which paraphrase of W B intends for A to answer:
  - a. WDQ – "What was the utterance that U made?"
  - b. WIQ – "What did you interpret U's utterance to mean?"
  - c. WI\*<sub>A</sub> – "What did information did U's utterance convey to you?"



8. On the basis of A's judgments about B's intentions, A may respond in one of the following ways:<sup>38, 39</sup>
- a. If A decides that B intends for A to answer WDQ, A takes B to be asking for a direct quotation of U's utterance, and cooperates with B by uttering the following: U said "X."
  - b. If A decides that B intends for A to answer WIQ, A takes B to be asking for an indirect quotation of B's utterance, and cooperates with B by uttering the following: U said (that) X<sub>A</sub>.
  - c. If A decides that B intends for A to answer WI\*<sub>A</sub>, A takes B to be asking for A's interpretation of U's utterance, and cooperates with B by uttering the following: U said (that) X\*<sub>A</sub>.

Although the first part of the interpretation process is not dependent on the second part of the process, the reverse is not true. This is because the question, "What did U say?" is only relevant if B has reasons to think that A can answer it, i.e., that U uttered something and that A perceived U's utterance.

We now have an explanation of how a competent language user determines what is an appropriate response to a request for a speech report. What is needed, for each type of speech report, is an account of what constitutes that type of speech report and what its

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<sup>38</sup> Several other responses are open to A: she could ignore B's request, or respond in ways that indicate her lack of cooperation with B. The three responses given – direct quotation, indirect quotation, and interpretation – assume that A is following a cooperative principle and Gricean conversational maxims.

<sup>39</sup> There are many ways to phrase a speech report, especially when it is not a direct quotation. So in 8a-c, I am actually suggesting a schema for A's response.

truth conditions are. In this chapter, I provide an account of direct quotation; I will address indirect quotation and interpretation in the following chapter.

### **Problems For Direct Quotation**

Philosophers of language characterize certain contexts as referentially transparent, and others as referentially opaque. In transparent contexts, substitution of co-referring terms is permitted, because the substitution does not affect the truth conditions of the sentence. For example, it is permissible to substitute ‘Samuel Clemens’ for ‘Mark Twain’ in ‘Mark Twain wrote “Life on the Mississippi”,’ because whatever is true of Samuel Clemens is true of Mark Twain, since they are the same individual. However, in opaque contexts, substitution of co-referring terms is prohibited, because it fails to preserve truth in those contexts. Direct quotation is one of the contexts so characterized. If Mary says, “Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’,” it is not merely misleading, but false, to report her utterance by saying, “Mary said, ‘Samuel Clemens wrote “Life on the Mississippi”’.” This is the case, regardless of what Mary believes about Mark Twain/Samuel Clemens.

Philosophers of language agree that substitution fails to preserve truth in this context, but they disagree about how to explain why this happens. Most theorists claim that the names fail to have the same reference in opaque contexts that they have in transparent contexts; the difficulty is explaining what, if anything, the names do refer to in those contexts. Thus, the first problem for theories about quotation is to explain the apparent failure of substitutivity of co-referential terms in direct quotation.

A second problem for theories about quotation concerns emphatic stress in direct quotation speech reports. Emphatic stress, which is a phonological feature of utterances, affects our judgments about the truth or falsity of a direct quotation speech report, even though it has no impact on the semantic value (the meaning) of the sentence. Thus, we can judge a direct quotation speech report to be false, even when there is no substitution of co-referring terms for any of the words in the original utterance. Kent Bach illustrates this by distinguishing two reports of an utterance of Donellan: DONellan and DonELLan.<sup>40</sup> The problem of emphatic stress and direct quotation speech report judgments occurs not only within words and particularly names, as in his instance; it also arises with emphatic stress that changes the focus of the sentence, as the following example illustrates.

Suppose that Ben and Margo are talking about one of her co-workers, Kristen, who has gone to Dallas on company business. They have the following exchange:

Ben asks, “Why did the company send Kristen to Dallas?”

Margo takes Ben to be asking why Dallas is the place that Kristen is going, rather than elsewhere, so she starts to explain the importance of sending someone to Dallas on company business.

Ben: “That’s not what I asked.”

Margo: “You said, ‘Why did the company send Kristen to DALLAS’.”

Ben: “I didn’t ask why they sent Kristen to DALLAS; I asked why they sent KRISTEN to Dallas.”

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<sup>40</sup> Bach, Kent. “Conversational Implicature.”

The emphatic stress, made visible in the written speech report through the use of orthographic irregularities, such as capitalization or italicization, makes a difference in the perceived truth or falsity of the sentence, or in this case, the appropriateness of the answer to the question, even though there is no difference in the words used in the different tokens of the utterance. It is highly unlikely that emphatic stress can cause the reference of a name to shift, so this problem cannot be explained by positing different references for the words in the embedded sentence. Furthermore, any adequate theory of direct quotation will have to solve this problem as well as the problem of substitution failure.

The third problem with direct quotation is one that Donald Davidson pointed out in his article, "Quotation".<sup>41</sup> This is the problem of anaphoric reference. An anaphor is a linguistic unit, such as a pronoun, that derives its interpretation from a previously expressed linguistic unit, such as a proper name. For example, in the sentence, 'John showed me a picture of his mother', the pronoun 'his' derives its meaning from 'John'. Thus, in interpreting the sentence in this context, we take it that the picture is of John's mother, not of the mother of some other man. Anaphoric reference is a way to keep track of the identity of objects throughout a discourse. Davidson's examples of anaphoric reference do not involve reference to an embedded sentence in a direct quotation speech report, so I offer one that does:

(3.5) Mary said, "I bought this model train for Jacques," and she gave it to him.

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<sup>41</sup> Davidson, Donald. "Quotation."

In this example, ‘it’ is anaphoric on ‘this model train’ and ‘him’ is anaphoric on ‘Jacques’. The problem that anaphoric reference poses for quotation is that if the meaning of the embedded sentence in the direct quote is different from the meaning of the original utterance – or if it has no meaning, because it is just a picture or some other representation, then there is no meaning for the anaphor to derive its meaning from. That means that we shouldn’t be able to give an interpretation of (3.5), because we can’t know what ‘it’ refers to.

The theories about quotation that have been put forth, though varying in details, fall into one of four basic categories: Name theories, Description theories, Demonstrative theories, or Identity theories. These theories have attempted to accommodate all kinds of quotation, not simply direct speech reports, as in the example above. Thus, some of the arguments for and against these theories are not based on their account of direct quotation.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, an adequate theory of quotation must solve the problems of direct quotation: substitution failure, emphatic stress, and anaphoric reference.

### **Name and Description Theories**

The underlying intuition motivating the name and description theories seems to be the idea that ‘said’ is a binary relation, taking as its arguments an utterer and a thing uttered. For instance, in the sentence, ‘Mary said, “Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the

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<sup>42</sup> A concise account of these theories and the arguments against them is found in Paul Saka’s “Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction”. I rely heavily on his account in the following sections. However, similar explications of the theories and the objections to them are widespread in the literature on quotation. Thus, although I have cited the arguments when the sources are known to me, with regard to some of them it is reasonable to suppose that any language theorist who thinks reflectively about the issues might arrive at the same objections to the views.

Mississippi”’,’ the material following ‘said’ denotes the second argument, the thing uttered. Thus, ‘Mark Twain wrote “Life on the Mississippi”’ is a denoting expression, syntactically a noun phrase, and hence either a name or a description (or a demonstrative, as we shall see). Proponents of the Name theory, notably Tarski and Quine, recognize that a name can be attached by ostension to any object, including a linguistic expression, and that once named, the name can be used to refer to that object. Furthermore, although any word can serve as a name for an object, it is useful to use the expression itself as a name, for communicative efficiency. Nevertheless, both Tarski and Quine point out that, in the context of the quotation, the constituents of the expression have no independent meaning. Tarski says, “Quotation mark names may be treated like single words of a language ... the single constituents of these names ... fulfill the same function as the letters and complexes of successive letters in single words. Hence they can possess no independent meaning.”<sup>43</sup> Likewise, Quine states, “From the standpoint of logical analysis each whole quotation must be regarded as a single word or sign, whose parts count for no more than serifs or syllables ... The meaning of the whole does not depend upon the meanings of the constituent words.”<sup>44</sup>

The Name theorist is able to give an acceptable response to the problem of substitution failure of co-referential names in direct quotation speech reports. She does so by pointing out expressions that contain different terms as constituents are different expressions, even if the constituent terms are co-referential. Since the expressions are different, when they are quoted the names that refer to them are not co-referential. Since

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<sup>43</sup> Tarski, Alfred. “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” p. 159.

<sup>44</sup> Quine, W.V.O. *Mathematical Logic*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. P. 26.

the names are not co-referential, there is no reason to expect that they should be intersubstitutable. Thus, for the Name theorist, what appears to be a problem of substitution failure in direct quotation speech reports is explained away by denying co-reference.

The problem of emphatic stress is not one that was addressed by Name theorists when the theory was first proposed, so it is not clear exactly what Tarski or Quine would have said in response to this problem. However, it seems to me that the Name theorist might claim that expressions containing the same constituents in the same syntactic relations to one another but having different emphatic stress are different expressions. There is evidence from the behavior of people with easily mispronounced names in support of such a move. For example, a person who emphasizes the middle syllable of his name, as in ‘DonELLan’, might deny that ‘DONellan’ is his name. As in the case of substitution failure, if the expressions are different then the names are not co-referential. Thus, it is possible to explain how direct quotation speech reports in which the only difference in the quoted expression is the emphatic stress could be judged to have different truth-values.

The third problem for direct quotation speech reports involved anaphoric reference into the quoted expression. It is here that the Name theorist has difficulty. The difficulty arises from the fact that the constituent words “have no independent meaning”, as Tarski claims, counting as “no more than serifs or syllables”, as Quine suggests. For the Name theorist, the quoted expression in sentence (3.5), ‘I bought this model train for Jacques’, is a single word; the constituents ‘this model train’ and ‘Jacques’ are not

meaningful on their own. As a result, there are no meaningful constituents for the anaphors ‘it’ and ‘him’ to derive their meaning from, and the speech report is meaningless.

In addition to the problem of anaphoric reference, other objections can be raised to the Name theory. One is that quotation, unlike naming, is systematically productive. The standard method for forming a quoted expression is by enclosing an expression in quotation marks.<sup>45</sup> Thus, if one knows the expression, one can know its quotation, and vice versa. Naming, however, is not systematic in this way; although as a matter of convenience, we conventionally use the expression, enclosed in quotation marks, as a name for itself, it is not necessary that we do so. For example, I could use ‘S’ as a name for Mary’s statement:

S. Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’.

I could then report her speech by saying, “Mary said S.” In this case, one could not know what it is that Mary said, without knowing what ‘S’ names. It could be argued, of course, that some names are more informative than others. However, since there is no restriction against uninformative names, the fact that some are informative does not solve the

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<sup>45</sup> There is some controversy over whether quotation marks are necessary in written quotations. Some theorists, notably Marga Reimer, have argued that quotation marks are frequently omitted without loss of comprehensibility (see her “Quotation Marks: Demonstratives or Demonstrations?” and her “Too Counter-Intuitive to Believe? Pragmatic Accounts of Mixed Quotation.”). However, Paul Saka, in “Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction,” argues that the cases in which quotation marks are absent, though cases of mentioning, are not cases of quotation. I will remain neutral on the issue with regard to quotation in general, except to characterize those cases in which the quotation marks are absent as non-standard cases. With regard to speech reports, however, I hold the view that a written speech report in which quotation marks are absent is an indirect quotation, not a direct quotation.



problem for the Name theory. Although the more informative names may allow a certain amount of productivity, such that if one knows the name of the quoted expression then one can know the expression, this productivity is not systematic.

A final objection to the Name theory concerns quoted expressions that are simultaneously used and mentioned. Consider a sentence I used previously:

- (3.6) The difficulty arises from the fact that the constituent words “have no independent meaning”, as Tarski claims, counting as “no more than serifs or syllables”, as Quine suggests.

According to the Name theory, the expressions enclosed in quotation marks –“have no independent meaning” and “no more than serifs or syllables”– are names, which are syntactically noun phrases. However, in order for (3.6) to be syntactically well-formed and semantically interpretable, “have no independent meaning” must be a predicate, containing at minimum a verb. Thus, the Name theory must either hold that one expression can simultaneously fall into two incompatible syntactic categories, or it must fail to account for cases in which the quoted expression is simultaneously used and mentioned.

The problems with the Name theory led some theorists, including Quine, and Geach, to advocate the Description theory of quotation. Different theorists proposed different ways of describing the quoted expression. So, for example, the expression ‘hit the ball’, might be described orthographically as in (3.7), phonologically as in (3.8), or lexically as in (3.9):

- (3.7) the expression formed by *h*, then *i*, then *t*, then space, ...

(3.8) the expression formed by *aitch*, then *eye*, then *tee*, ...<sup>46</sup>

(3.9) the expression formed by *hit*, then *the*, then *ball*

The advantage of the lexical version of the Description theory is that, unlike the orthographic and phonological versions, it treats the quoted expression as a string of meaningful language rather than simply a sequence of meaningless marks. On the other hand, the orthographic and phonological versions postulate far fewer primitives – one for each letter – than the lexical version, which postulates one for each word of the language.

Like the Name theory, the Description theory is able to explain away the apparent problem of substitution failure of co-referential terms in direct quotation speech reports. For the Description theorist, as for the Name theorist, expressions having different terms as constituents are different expressions, even if those terms are co-referential. For instance, ‘Mark Twain wrote “Life on the Mississippi”’ is a different expression from ‘Samuel Clemens wrote “Life on the Mississippi”’, even though ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ are co-referential. The descriptions that are formed by the concatenation of the letters, the sounds, or the words in those expressions are different; the former begins with an *M*, or an *em*, or *Mark*, the latter with *S*, or *ess*, or *Samuel*. Furthermore, the descriptions denote different objects – different expressions – and hence, are not co-referential. Thus, there is no reason to expect that they should be intersubstitutable.

The Description theory is somewhat less successful at solving the problem of emphatic stress. This is particularly the case for the orthographic and phonological

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<sup>46</sup> Contemporary Description theorists would probably use phonetic symbols, but historically the sounds of the letters were spelled out as in (3.7).

versions of the theory; emphatic stress is not encoded at the level of letters or sounds of letters. The lexical version of the theory could accommodate emphatic stress, but at the cost of greatly expanding the already enormous stock of lexical primitives. For instance, to accommodate Bach's Donellan example, the stock of lexical primitives would need to include both 'DONellan' and 'DonELLan'. It would be possible to formulate a version of the Description theory that forms the descriptions by concatenating syllables, and has as primitives stressed and unstressed syllables, although to my knowledge, no theorist has done so. The main difficulty with these approaches is that it places too much emphasis on emphatic stress, since the stress would need to be encoded in the description of an expression whether it was important for interpreting the expression or not.

Anaphoric reference is also a problem for the Description theory, particularly for the orthographic and phonological versions. This is because the description functions as a single constituent in the direct quotation speech report, having a single denotation, the quoted expression. So in sentence (3.6), for example, the description of the quoted expression, 'I bought this model train for Jacques', has no constituents to serve as the anaphoric references for the words 'it' and 'him' that occur outside the quoted expression. Even the lexical version of the Description theory has difficulties on this score. Although it could be argued that the word 'Jacques' occurring in the description could serve as the anaphoric reference for 'him', there is no constituent 'this model train' to serve as the anaphoric reference for 'it'.

With regard to productivity, the Description theory, especially the orthographic version, fares somewhat better than the Name theory, because it is systematically

productive. However, it is not adequate for all cases of quotation; we can quote sounds that do not occur in any human language, and thus, cannot be represented by the orthography of a human language, such as the sound of a screech owl.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, it falls to the same objection as the Name theory with regard to simultaneous use and mention of quoted expressions; the first quoted expression in (3.6), being a description, is a noun phrase, yet it must function as a predicate in order for the sentence to be syntactically well-formed and semantically interpretable.

### **The Demonstrative Theory**

The Demonstrative theory of quotation originated with Donald Davidson, who proposed that a direct quotation speech report is a sentence containing a demonstrative, which is either the word ‘that’, or the quotation marks, and a demonstration, which is the embedded sentence.<sup>48</sup> The meaning of a demonstrative is the thing that is demonstrated; the demonstration has no semantic meaning, but serves to direct one to the thing that is demonstrated. He says:

Those words within quotation marks are not, from a semantical point of view, part of the sentence at all. . . .What appears in quotation marks is an *inscription*, not a shape, and what we need it for is to help refer to its shape. On my theory, which we may call the *demonstrative theory* of quotation, the inscription inside does not refer to anything at all, nor is it part of any expression that does. Rather it is the quotation marks that do all the referring, and they help refer to a shape by pointing out something that has it. . . .The singular term is the quotation marks, which may be read

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<sup>47</sup> This point was made by John Searle in *Speech Acts*, p. 76.

<sup>48</sup> Other proponents of the Demonstrative theory of quotation include Barbara Partee, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, and Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore. Jonathan Bennett holds a hybrid view in which features of the Description theory are combined with the Demonstrative theory. The particular version of the Demonstrative theory that I address here is due to Davidson.

'the expression a token of which is here'.<sup>49</sup>

According to the Demonstrative theorist, the interpretation of Lora's report of Jean's remark is the following:

(3.10) Jean said that: Nicolas is going to the store.

On his view, the embedded sentence is not actually part of the report – it is merely displayed as a way of demonstrating the sentence uttered. The word 'that' in (3.10) is a demonstrative, which is a singular term put in place of the quotation marks, also a singular term.

The Demonstrative theorist has a solution to the problem of substitution failure of co-referring terms. The explanation of why there is substitution failure is not blamed on a shift in reference of the terms in the quoted expression, because those words are simply part of the demonstration, so they have no reference in this context. The reason that substitution fails is because it changes the demonstration: 'Mark Twain wrote "Life on the Mississippi"' does not demonstrate the same thing as 'Samuel Clemens wrote "Life on the Mississippi"'. It is like pointing to one dog and saying, "That's Saul" and then pointing to a different dog and saying, "That's Saul." They can't both be the same dog, Saul, so at least one of the sentences must be false. The difference in demonstration makes a difference in the thing demonstrated, which is the denotation of the demonstrative 'that'. Likewise, in the Mark Twain/ Samuel Clemens case, the difference in the names changes the demonstration, which may then demonstrate the wrong utterance or no utterance at all.

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<sup>49</sup> Davidson, Donald. "Quotation." p.90

In his account of the Demonstrative theory, Davidson doesn't discuss the problem of emphatic stress, but the response could be much the same as for the previous problem. The presence or absence of emphatic stress, and its location in the embedded sentence is part of the demonstration. If there is a change in the emphatic stress, it will change the demonstration. To do that might change the thing demonstrated, which would change the meaning of the demonstrative, resulting in changing the truth conditions for the speech report. Thus, the Demonstrative theorist can account for differences in judgments about the truth-value of sentences because of differences in emphatic stress.

Although Davidson discusses anaphoric reference, his examples do not include anaphoric reference to an embedded sentence. Furthermore, they do not even include quotation marks. So it isn't clear what the Demonstrative theorist would say about the problem of anaphoric reference in direct quotation speech reports. On the one hand, Davidson states that the quoted expression has no meaning itself and is not part of a meaningful expression. The Demonstrative theorist who accepts this claim cannot handle sentences such as (3.6), because there is no meaningful expression to be the anaphoric reference for the anaphors 'it' and 'him' that occur outside of the quoted expression. On the other hand, in attempting to deal with what he calls cases of mixed use and mentioning of a term, Davidson seems to take back his claim that the demonstration has no meaning:

Any token may serve as target for the arrows of quotation, so in particular a quoting sentence may after all by chance contain a token with the shape needed for the purposes of quotation. Such tokens then do double duty,

once as meaningful cogs in the machine of the sentence, once as semantically neutral objects with a useful form.<sup>50</sup>

Thus, the Demonstrative theorist is faced with the problem of reconciling the inconsistencies in Davidson's view.

The main problem for the Demonstrative theory is that it inherits the problem of demonstratives in general, which is how the demonstration correctly picks out the thing demonstrated. Even though the quoted expression has the right 'shape', as Davidson says, there are potentially many utterances that have that shape, but are not Jean's utterance. Thus, there is still a problem to be solved in the general mechanism that he uses.

### **The Identity Theory**

The Identity theory of quotation traces its roots back to Frege's "On Sense and Reference":

If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is what they mean. It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, when the words of another are quoted. One's own words then first designate the words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual meaning. We then have signs of signs. In writing, the words are in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary meaning.<sup>51</sup>

Proponents of this view frequently characterize quotation as a context in which words refer to themselves, hence, the idea of identity.<sup>52</sup> What is meant by this is not, of course,

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<sup>50</sup> Davidson, Donald. "Quotation." p. 92.

<sup>51</sup> Frege, Gottlob. "On Sense and Reference" p. 201.

<sup>52</sup> Other theorists who at one time or another have advocated the Identity theory include W.V.O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Searle, Corey Washington, and Marga Reimer. My account of this theory depends largely on Washington's presentation of it.

that the utterance embedded in the direct quotation is numerically identical to the utterance it is a report about; that cannot be true. Rather, the claim is that both tokens – the original utterance and the one embedded in the direct quotation speech report – are tokens of the same type. According to Paul Saka, the Identity theory and the Demonstrative theory “can both be called picture theories, for both claim that quotation resembles its referent, the quoted material.”<sup>53</sup> However, the Identity theorist avoids the main problem of the Demonstrative theory, namely, explaining how the embedded sentence in the utterance directs the hearer to the original utterance. The Demonstrative theorist must explain how the right utterance is demonstrated, but the Identity theorist need only direct the hearer to another token of the same type as the one displayed within the quotation marks.

The Identity theorist faces the problem of substitution failure of co-referential terms in direct quotation speech reports. According to the Identity theorist, the terms, though co-referential, are tokens of different types. Thus, when they appear in expressions that are otherwise identical, the expressions are also tokens of different types. For example, ‘Samuel Clemens’ and ‘Mark Twain’, though co-referential, are tokens of different types. Likewise, ‘Samuel Clemens wrote “Life on the Mississippi”’ is a token of a different type than ‘Mark Twain wrote “Life on the Mississippi”’. Thus, substituting the former for the latter in a direct quotation speech report fails to direct the hearer to Mary’s utterance, because it will direct the hearer to utterance tokens of a different type from Mary’s. So the Identity theorist’s response to the problem of substitution failure of

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<sup>53</sup> Saka, Paul. “Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction,” p. 121.



co-referential terms in direct quotation speech reports is to deny that co-reference is a sufficient condition for substitution in this context. Rather, the terms must be tokens of the same type in order for substitution to occur. However, the Identity theorist is still faced with a problem; he must specify what type the quoted expression is to be a token of. For there is a sense in which ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ are tokens of the same type; they are both tokens of the type that can be specified as “singular terms referring to Samuel Clemens”. I suspect that the type will need to be specified in terms of linguistic features. Care must be taken, however, to allow for the possibility of direct quotation speech reports in different media – reporting speech in writing, or writing in speech.

A similar problem arises for the Identity theorist with regard to the problem of emphatic stress, because he has to claim that, for a particular expression, a token utterance of it without emphatic stress is a token of a different type than a token utterance of the expression with emphatic stress. As in the case of substitution failure, the Identity theorist is faced with the problem of specifying how to differentiate utterance types. For instance, emphatic stress in a sentence is usually produced in one of three ways: raised pitch, increased volume, and length of syllables, words, and pauses. The problem is that these features often arise innocently out of natural differences in speech habits, in length of vocal cords, and in other features of the auditory-articulatory systems of human beings. Surely it would be absurd to determine that a difference in pitch makes a difference in utterance type, since that would mean that people with low-pitched voices couldn’t report the utterances of people with high-pitched voices, and vice versa. Again,

this problem is not insurmountable for the Identity theorist; but it requires more attention than it has previously received.

The third problem of direct quotation speech reports – anaphoric reference – also poses difficulties for the Identity theorist. This is because, on the Identity view, the token of the expression that is enclosed in the quotation marks refers to the expression type, but the expression type does not refer to anything at all. In his discussion of the Identity theory, Saka says, “tokens have the capacity to refer, hence the capacity to refer to themselves, hence the capacity to be used in quotations. Types do not refer, hence do not refer to themselves, hence cannot be used in quotations.”<sup>54</sup> Although Saka isn’t concerned with the problem of anaphoric reference, his point about tokens and types shows the problem the Identity theorist faces. In sentence (3.6), the words ‘it’ and ‘him’ are anaphors, deriving their reference from constituents of the quoted expression, “this model train” and “Jacques”, respectively. However, in the quoted expression, “this model train” refers to the expression type ‘this model train’, not to the physical object that Mary bought. Likewise, “Jacques” in the quoted expression refers to the expression type ‘Jacques’, not the person who is the recipient of the train. And the expression types do not refer, so the Identity theorist cannot get the intended references for the anaphors. It is not clear to me that the Identity theorist can modify his theory to remedy this problem.

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<sup>54</sup> Saka, Paul. “Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction,” p. 123.

### **Saka's Disambiguation Theory**

Saka's theory of quotation, which he calls "formal disambiguation of multiple ostension," is based on two ideas regarding the act of ostension. The first is the idea of deferred ostension, in which an absent object may be ostended by demonstrating or describing something present that is relevant to the absent object. For instance, one could point to a painting, in order to direct one's audience's attention to the painter, about whom one wishes to speak. The second idea regarding acts of ostension is that "every use of language is an act of multiple ostension, partly direct and partly deferred."<sup>55</sup> Among the items ostended by the use of a term are its lexical entry, which includes its orthographic form, phonological form, syntactic category, intension, and information about its sociolinguistic register. According to Saka, the term's lexical entry is evoked automatically and spontaneously upon exposure to a written or spoken tokening of the term in anyone who is trained in the language. The lexical entry of the term specifies the term's intension, which determines the term's extension. So, for example, an utterance of 'cat' directly ostends the phonological token of *cat* and deferringly ostends the phonological form type, the lexical entry for *cat*, the concept CAT, and the extension of *cat*, which is its customary reference.

Given this account of multiple ostension, Saka explains the distinction between use and mention on the basis of speaker intentions; in using a term, the speaker intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to the extension of the term, whereas in mentioning the term, he or she intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to some other item

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<sup>55</sup> Saka, Paul. "Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction," p. 125.

associated with the term.<sup>56</sup> This leads directly to his definition of quotation, which is, for him, one of several ways of mentioning a term. He says:

Syntactically, a pair of quote marks is a discontinuous determiner (a complex symbol which, applied to an argument expression, produces a noun phrase). Semantically, a pair of quote marks is a concept or intension, QUOT, which ambiguously or indeterminately maps its argument expression *X* into some linguistic item saliently associated with *X* other than the extension of *X*.<sup>57</sup>

Thus, the presence of quotation marks helps to disambiguate which among many objects the speaker intended to refer to by his ostension, by eliminating the extension of the term as a possibility. Pragmatic mechanisms are called into play to further disambiguate the referent, which could be the orthographic form, the phonological form, the type, the lexical item, or the intension of the term.

Saka has been concerned mostly with the distinction between use and mention, and as a result, he provides no examples of how his theory addresses direct quotation speech reports. Furthermore, none of his examples are of quotations involving expressions whose constituents are other than noun phrases. Thus, it is not clear exactly how he intends that these expressions should be handled. It seems, however, that his theory should be able to accommodate the problem of substitution failure, since the lexical entry for ‘Samuel Clemens’ is different from the lexical entry for ‘Mark Twain’. Thus, the names, though they have the same extension, are not intersubstitutable within quotation marks because they will not be co-referential within that context. Saka’s theory

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<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* p. 126.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* p. 127.

should also be able to handle the problem of emphatic stress, since phonological form is one of the things ostended by an utterance of the term.

The problem of anaphoric reference, however, is one that Saka cannot accommodate. This is because, on his view, the expression within the quotation marks does not ostend its extension, and yet, that is exactly what is needed for anaphoric reference to succeed. For instance, in sentence (3.6), none of the other items associated with the constituent ‘this model train’ – its orthographic form, phonological form, lexical entry, or intension – can serve as the reference for the anaphor ‘it’ if the sentence is to mean what it is intended to mean, or indeed, to be meaningful at all. And the failure of Saka’s account with regard to anaphoric reference is particularly telling, because anaphoric reference is a specific kind of simultaneous use and mention. Saka claims that his account accommodates cases of simultaneous use and mention, and that may be true for cases of mentioning without quotation marks. But it cannot be true of cases of quotation, because on his account, quotation marks create a noun phrase out of the quoted expression. A noun phrase cannot simultaneously be a different kind of grammatical constituent, such as a verb phrase or a complete sentence. And yet, that is exactly what is needed for his account to succeed.

### **An Alternative Account**

The theories discussed above, though flawed, all contribute to an understanding of the general problem of direct quotation speech reports, which is explaining how one utterance can be used to evoke another utterance. The Name and Description theories demonstrated that the linguistic mechanisms of referring and describing are inadequate

for the task. The Demonstrative, Identity, and Disambiguation theories, each of which may be seen as a ‘picture’ theory, were useful in refining what features of the quoted utterance were needed – the Demonstrative theory focused on the ‘shape’ of the utterance, the Identity theory refined it by requiring a token of the same type, and the Disambiguation theory spelled out in more detail what linguistic features are available to be tokened. And yet, all three failed to solve one or more of the problems of substitution failure, emphatic stress, and anaphoric reference.

I think that the reason the theories discussed above failed to provide an adequate account of direct quotation speech reports is because the theorists were so focused on the truth conditions of the speech report that they neglected to consider the communicative intentions of the speech reporter. The truth conditions of a direct quotation speech report are based on a relationship between an utterer and an utterance, so the problem for most theorists has been to get the right utterance into the relation. They knew, of course, that it could not be the numerically identical utterance that was enclosed in quotation marks as part of the speech report, because the speech reporter made that utterance, not the person to whom the utterance was attributed. So the goal was to explain how one utterance could evoke another. But if we consider the communicative intentions of the speech reporter, we find that truth conditions are not the only, or even the most important consideration; often we are not so concerned with who said what, as we are with what was said. Of course, there are reasons why we might use a direct quotation speech report, rather than an indirect one. For example, in a scholarly work, it might be important to directly quote an author, in order to show that he did in fact hold the view attributed to

him. But even in those cases, the purpose of quoting at all is to make available to the audience the information conveyed by the expressions attributed to the speaker.<sup>58</sup> Thus, the expression enclosed in the quotation marks must have the linguistic features necessary for it to be interpreted by our cognitive faculties. As a result, enclosing an expression in quotation marks cannot change it from one kind of grammatical constituent into another, nor can it make the expression simply a picture, no matter how complex.

The ‘uttering’ relation holds between an utterer and the token of the utterance that he or she produced. The ‘said’ relation holds between an utterer and a different utterance, the one that the speech reporter produced. What is this relation? It is a derivative relation based on the relation between the original utterance and the one that is produced in the direct quotation speech report. The relation between the original utterance and the one that is produced in the speech report is a special kind of resemblance relation that I will call the ‘reproduction’ relation.

### **Copies and Reproductions**

The idea of a reproduction is a familiar one in the world of art and antiques. A reproduction is a copy, but it is a copy that is faithful in the important details.<sup>59</sup> To carry this analogy further, let’s consider the difference between a copy and a reproduction of Monet’s “Impression: Sunrise”. There are certain features of the original that must be replicated if it is to be considered a reproduction, and not simply a copy. A copy of the painting could be made by simply photographing the painting and printing it on a color

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<sup>58</sup> The phrase ‘information conveyed’ is intended to be inclusive of semantic content, not contrastive as it is sometimes used.

<sup>59</sup> I will return to the question of how to determine which details are important.

printer. It would not be a very good copy – the design would show, but the colors might not be true to the original colors. Also, the copy would be ink printed on paper, rather than oil paint brushed onto canvas, and the size of the copy could differ significantly from the original. On the other hand, a reproduction of “Impression: Sunrise” would need to be created with paint on canvas, with the design features of the painting, and the colors and brushstrokes carefully replicated. For the best reproductions, the only difference between the copy and the original (aside from the fact that they are two separate objects made from separate materials) is their origins; the original was created by the artist, and the reproduction was produced at a different time, possibly by a different person.

It is unclear exactly where to draw the line between copies and reproductions. Reproductions are at least very good copies of the original. In fact, there seems to be a minimum level of detail and likeness necessary for a copy to be considered a reproduction. Appearance seems to be a chief consideration; a reproduction may not be able to fulfill all the functions of the original, and yet still be considered a reproduction. An example of this would be a reproduction of a Civil War cannon that may not need to be able to fire in order to be a reproduction. Also, it may be that the reproduction can be made of different materials, provided that the materials have the same appearance as the original. To return to Monet’s painting, there is a question whether a copy that used acrylic paint rather than oil, or one that was larger or smaller in size would count as a reproduction or only as a copy. We can talk about the relative merits of various reproductions of the same original. The criterion that is most important here is faithfulness to detail. The more faithful the reproduction is, the better the reproduction



will be. Thus, the best reproductions will be so faithful to the details that they are impossible to differentiate from the originals.

Let's bring this knowledge of reproductions into the realm of the linguistic. When Lora produces the direct quotation speech report, her utterance of 'Nicolas is going to the store' is a reproduction of the original that was uttered by Jean. Thus, the criterion of faithfulness to detail applies to her utterance. What are the details of Jean's utterance that must be reproduced? The morpho-phonological, morpho-syntactic, and semantic features of his utterance. These are the very features that make the utterance perform its linguistic function. With these features, the hearer of Lora's utterance can determine the meaning of Lora's utterance, and since it is a reproduction of Jean's utterance, they can determine the meaning of Jean's utterance.

### **Solving The Problems**

The advantage to the reproduction account of direct quotation is that it seems to solve three problems that have nagged at philosophers of language who were trying to come up with an adequate account of direct quotation. The first problem is substitution failure of co-referring terms. As has already been noted, you cannot substitute 'Samuel Clemens' for 'Mark Twain' in the direct quotation speech report of Mary's utterance, "Mark Twain wrote 'Life on the Mississippi'." Philosophers of language have assumed that this is because, in this context, 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' do not have the same reference that they have in referentially transparent contexts. This is because they were following Frege, who introduced the idea of an opaque context.<sup>60</sup>

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Unlike Frege and the rest, I do not assume that the words in the embedded sentence – the reproduction – undergo a shift in reference, nor do I assume that they are meaningless. Instead, I assume that the reference of the words is the same as they are when the utterer whose speech is being reported spoke them. The reason that substitution fails in this context is because the truth or falsity of the direct quotation speech report isn't based on the reference of the words in the embedded sentence. It is based on the faithfulness of the reproduction of the original utterance, and that faithfulness is based on the linguistic features of the original utterance. Reproductions can be compared to one another, and a reproduction can be unfaithful relative to another reproduction of the original utterance. The problem with substituting 'Samuel Clemens' for 'Mark Twain' is that they do not have the same linguistic features. Their semantic features and syntactic features are the same but they don't have the same morphophonological features; 'Samuel Clemens' begins with a sibilant consonant, 'Mark Twain' does not. So the substitution produces a less faithful reproduction of the original utterance. It might seem that this is a minor detail, and no reason to reject the substitution, yet there are often cases where the original utterer will deny the truth of the direct quotation speech report on the basis of an unfaithful reproduction of emphatic phonetic stress.

On the reproduction view, emphatic stress is a phonological feature of an utterance in which it occurs.<sup>61</sup> Assume that the original utterance has emphatic stress

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<sup>60</sup> Frege, Gottlob. "On Sense and Reference."

<sup>61</sup> A similar problem to the problem of emphatic stress can arise with regard to foreign inflections. In some contexts, the truth or falsity of a direct quotation speech report may hinge on whether or not the reproduction accurately reproduces the pronunciation of

encoded in a phonological feature. If the reproduction either fails to reproduce the emphatic stress, or does not reproduce the emphatic stress correctly (puts it on the wrong word, as in the dialogue between Ben and Margo), then it is not a faithful reproduction of all the linguistic features and the direct quotation is false. Thus, this view can account for our intuitions about the falsity of these reports.

The reproduction view does not suffer from the problem of anaphoric reference. The faithful reproduction includes all the linguistic features, including the semantic features. Since those are the features that are used to interpret the meaning of an utterance, we can use those features to derive a meaning for the embedded sentence and its constituents. Thus there is a meaningful expression available for the anaphor to get its interpretation from.

To summarize, the reproduction view explains the problem of substitution failure of co-referring terms by appealing to the notion of a faithful reproduction of the original utterance. Since the reproduction of the utterance in which the co-referring terms have been substituted does not reproduce all the linguistic features of the original utterance, it is not a faithful reproduction of that utterance. As a result, the direct quotation speech report in which it occurs is false. Although the faithfulness of a reproduction is a matter of degree, in the case of direct quotation, the criterion for truth is that the reproduction reproduces all the linguistic features of the original utterance. So the explanation of this case is not due to shifting reference; the reference of the terms in the embedded sentence in a direct quotation does not shift. That is why we are able to determine the meaning of

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certain words. I owe this point to Marga Reimer, who discusses it in “Too Counter-Intuitive to Believe? Pragmatic Accounts of Mixed Quotation.”

the embedded sentence. The fact that all of the linguistic features are reproduced in the direct quotation explains why emphatic stress and anaphoric reference are not problems for the reproduction view.

### **Labels, Tags, and Direct Quotation**

The distinction between labels and tags does not figure into my explanation of substitution failure in direct quotation speech reports. Thus, other than for purposes of completeness, by accounting for the apparent failure of substitutive abilities of co-referential proper names in an additional context, it may seem that this chapter is tangential to the overall project of this dissertation. However, that is to see the chapter the wrong way around. What was needed was an explanation of how direct quotation speech reports work that could account for the apparent failure of substitution without blocking the availability of the linguistic features of the reported speech, because these linguistic features are necessary for interpreting the embedded sentence. In many cases, the decision whether to interpret a proper name as a label or a tag is based on the syntactic features of the sentence in which the name appears. For instance, the presence of the quantifier, ‘another’, in front of the proper name, ‘Tiger Woods’, in the sentence, ‘Mike is another Tiger Woods’, makes it clear that ‘Tiger Woods’ is a label, rather than a tag, in this context. Thus, when I report Joe’s speech, my audience is able to interpret what he said because the syntactic features of the original speech are reproduced in the quoted material.

## CHAPTER 4: SAYING WHAT WE THINK

People talk about beliefs, both their own beliefs and the beliefs of others. But an interesting asymmetry between our beliefs and the beliefs of others is that, although we can avoid talking about the beliefs of others, we cannot, unless we stop talking altogether, help but talk about our own beliefs. But this claim is somewhat misleading; it would be better to say that we cannot help revealing our beliefs through what we say. Consider the following sentences, which illustrate two different ways that a speaker might express her opinion about the authorship of a certain book:

(4.1) Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’.

(4.2) I believe that Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’.

What is the difference between these two sentences? One difference is in the truth conditions for each of the sentences – for (4.1), the truth conditions concern the author relationship between a certain person and a certain piece of literature; for (4.2), they concern the relationship between a believer and a certain proposition. Yet an utterance of the first sentence also conveys information about the beliefs of the speaker, while an utterance of the second sentence may or may not convey information about the world outside the believer’s mind. What information do they convey? When uttered by a particular speaker in a given context, both (4.1) and (4.2) convey information about the ideas that the speaker associates with three terms in her idiolect; ‘Mark Twain’, ‘Life on the Mississippi’, and the verb ‘to write’.<sup>62</sup> These ideas form a belief that may or may not

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<sup>62</sup> I am assuming that the lexical entry for a verb is in the infinitive form, with information about tense, person, and aspect encoded in the entry. Also, this is a

conform to the way the world is. Sentences (4.1) and (4.2) also convey the information that the belief formed by those ideas has a relation to a proposition about the world. The proposition about the world expresses the fact that the objects so-named are in an authorship relation. Sentence (4.1) is a simple statement; sentence (4.2) is a belief report. What is a belief report? It is a sentence of the form ‘A believes (that) X’. The problem is to explain what X is. I will begin by discussing two different approaches to the problem: the naïve view and the hidden-indexical theory.

### **The Naïve View**

Some philosophers of language, including Scott Soames, Nathan Salmon, Jon Barwise, and John Perry, have suggested an analysis of belief reporting which has become known as the "naive" theory, because it satisfies a condition of "semantic innocence."<sup>63</sup> Naïve theorists hold that belief reports express a binary relation between agents and propositions. Because most naïve theorists also support a principle of direct reference, the problem of substitution failure of apparently co-referential proper names in belief reports poses a serious challenge to their analysis. Consider the following example: suppose that Caius is an ancient astronomer who discovers (for himself, at least) that a certain celestial body is the first star-like object to be seen in the evening sky. Having heard the name ‘Hesperus’ associated with the description ‘the evening star’, Caius believes that the celestial body that he has located is Hesperus. Now consider the following statements:

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representation of the kind of information that might be stored, not a claim about particular mental structures.

<sup>63</sup> This presentation of the naïve theory draws largely on the presentation of it in Mark Crimmins, Talk About Beliefs (Cambridge, Mass; The MIT Press, 1992.)

(4.3) Hesperus is the evening star.

(4.4) Hesperus is Phosphorus.

(4.5) Phosphorus is the evening star.

According to the principle of direct reference, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' have the same content, since they both refer to the planet Venus. By the principle of compositionality, they can be substituted for one another within a sentence without changing its content or truth value. So, for the naive theorist, sentences (4.3) and (4.5) have the same content, namely, the proposition that Venus is an evening star, and therefore, the same truth value. However, Caius lived prior to the discovery that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same celestial body, so he would dissent from sentence (4.5), even while assenting to sentence (4.3).

The naive theorist resolves this discrepancy by saying that, strictly speaking, both belief reports are true; nevertheless, it would be misleading to represent Caius' beliefs by sentence (4.5), because of unspoken pragmatic rules. According to these pragmatic rules, the speaker who uses (4.5) to express this belief is insinuating that Caius believed that the thing he called 'Phosphorus' was an evening star. Naive theorists rely on Grice's theory of conversational implicature, which provides pragmatic rules for determining the appropriateness of different manners of expressing the same proposition.<sup>64</sup> Grice claims that in conversation, we operate according to a "Cooperative Principle," which involves following maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner. Furthermore, Grice contends that when we violate one or more of these maxims, we license the hearer to infer that our

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<sup>64</sup> Grice, H.P. "Logic and Conversation."

violation was deliberate, and hence, that we intended to communicate something other than simply the semantic meaning of our words. In the case of Caius' beliefs, using (4.5) to report those beliefs might be considered a violation of the maxim, "Be relevant," because the name 'Phosphorus' is irrelevant to his beliefs about Hesperus. In this case, using the name 'Phosphorus' to report a belief about Hesperus would allow the hearer to infer the name 'Phosphorus' was relevant to the belief report. As a result, the naive theorist would agree to the inappropriateness of (4.5), while maintaining that it is true.

### **Objections to the Naïve Theory**

Those who object to the naive theory of belief report analysis claim that there are strong intuitions that the use of (4.5) to report Caius' beliefs is not merely inappropriate but false. These intuitions are based on the fact that those who are familiar with Caius' beliefs, including Caius himself, would deny the truth of sentence (4.5). These intuitions are further supported by the possibility that there are different ways of believing propositions, a possibility that even naive theorists would acknowledge. Accounting for the different ways an agent might believe a proposition would require a non-naive analysis of believing. Although such an analysis of believing would not require the semantic theorist to reject a naive analysis of belief reporting, it seems intuitive that a non-naive analysis of belief reporting would more adequately reflect the complexities of the beliefs themselves.

Mark Crimmins, a philosopher who rejects the naive theory, thinks that arguments based on intuitions about truth and propriety are bound to be inconclusive, since we cannot always discriminate between these intuitions and we must admit the possibility



that our intuitions could be mistaken.<sup>65</sup> Instead, he levels his criticism at the arguments used to support the naive analysis. Crimmins contends that there are four main arguments used to support the naive theory, three of which involve general semantic principles, and one which presents an explicit example designed to show that even in context-sensitive cases, the naive view is correct.

According to Crimmins, proponents of the naive theory claim that there are general semantic principles of articulated compositionality and direct contribution which support a naive analysis of belief reports. Articulated compositionality is the principle that the content of a complex expression depends only on the contents of its component expressions. For instance, in the sentence, "Spot ate the potato chip," the content of the sentence can only depend on the content of the component expressions, namely, 'Spot', 'the potato chip', and 'ate'. Crimmins claims that a theory of compositionality must be fully articulated in order to be acceptable as support for the naive theory, so this principle has the effect of limiting the sources of information about the content of a statement to the statement's components themselves. In other words, no information about content is available except that which has been articulated. The principle of direct contribution states that "the contribution *traceable to* the use of a name to the content of the containing statement is simply the object it denotes".<sup>66</sup> Crimmins is careful to distinguish this principle from direct reference, which states that "the content of a use of a name in any statement is the object it denotes".<sup>67</sup> This distinction serves a two-fold purpose: it

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<sup>65</sup> Crimmins, Mark. Talk About Beliefs. p.4.

<sup>66</sup> Crimmins, Mark. Talk About Beliefs. p.11.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, p.11.

prevents a name from contributing more than its content in case full articulation is false, and it prevents names from influencing the content of other constituents. Using the principles of articulated compositionality and direct contribution, the naive analysis claims that statements such as (4.3) and (4.5), concerning Caius' beliefs, have the same content -- express the same proposition -- and therefore, are either both true or both false.

Crimmins attacks this argument for the naive analysis by rejecting the principles of articulated compositionality and direct contribution. It turns out that many sentences are underarticulated. A classic example is the sentence, "It's raining," which fails to articulate the location at which it is raining. Various contexts can be provided which yield different locations; the appearance of a dripping wet friend indicates the immediate vicinity, while a television weatherman pointing to a map might indicate a more distant location. Furthermore, because there are many parameters such as time, location, relation, and relevant circumstances, all of which could be underarticulated, it seems that the principle of articulated compositionality could not be refined by rules of tacit reference in a way that would make it sufficiently powerful to support the naive analysis.

Crimmins rejects the principle of direct contribution as well. Using Quine's example of "Giorgione was so-called because of his size," Crimmins shows that direct contribution fails. In contrast to simple predication sentences, such as "Giorgione plays chess," in which the name simply supplies the individual, Crimmins states that in the previous sentence, "the name is used to supply not only the man being discussed, but also *itself* as the name that Barbarelli is said to have been called because of his size".<sup>68</sup> So it

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<sup>68</sup> Crimmins, Mark. Talk About Beliefs. p. 20.

turns out that both articulated compositionality and direct contribution are not general semantic principles, and therefore cannot be used as independent support for the naive view.

The second argument used to support the naive analysis is that the statements which are counter-intuitively true, such as "Caius believes that Phosphorus is an evening star," are cases of pragmatic implicature, in which cancelable information is conveyed which is not conveyed in equivalent statements, such as "Caius believes that Hesperus is an evening star." As previously mentioned, the first sentence implicates that Caius believed that the thing he called 'Phosphorus' was an evening star. So while both sentences are literally true, there is a pragmatic implicature resulting from the first sentence that could be avoided by using the second sentence. Alternatively, further information could be added as a disclaimer, thus canceling the implicature.

The problem with this argument, however, is that the cancelable information in statements is not limited to pragmatic implicatures. Crimmins points out that many times a statement is ambiguous or misleading because it is under-articulated, and further statements can disambiguate them by shifting the meaning or the referent of the ambiguous term. So in order for pragmatic implicature to support the naive view, there must be some way of discriminating among sentences that are misleading because they are under-articulated, and those which convey cancelable information via pragmatic implicature. Because there does not seem to be a good set of criteria for doing so, this argument for the naive view also fails.

Another argument used to support the naive analysis is based on translation from one language to another. Proponents of the naive view claim that the truth values of translated statements remain the same through translation. Because this is so, we can infer that two sentences that have the same translation must have the same truth value. But Crimmins claims that this inference is not valid. He says, "Translation preserves the meanings and referents of the words used in belief reports, we can suppose. But, as cases of underarticulation clearly demonstrate, the meanings and referents of words do not always determine the proposition expressed in a statement".<sup>69</sup> It is necessary to specify the context of the statements in order to determine the propositions they express, so if the statements are under-articulated prior to translation, preserving the meanings and referents of the words will not be sufficient for determining that they express the same proposition. It is interesting to note that Crimmins's rejection of this argument hinges on his rejection of the principle of articulated compositionality. If a statement is fully articulated prior to translation, the translated sentence would express the same proposition if the meanings and referents of the words were preserved.

Crimmins's main criticism of the naive theory is that it requires all information about the content of a sentence to be derived from the content of its constituents. Because of this requirement, it is not context-sensitive, and so cannot adequately account for under-articulation. Mark Richard presents the "Steamroller Argument," as an example of an argument that is context-sensitive in virtue of its use of indexicals, in order

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<sup>69</sup> Crimmins, Mark. Talk About Beliefs. p.27.

to show that the naive intuitions hold, regardless of context.<sup>70</sup> Crimmins describes the situation this way: "*A* is talking on the telephone to *B*. *A* sees, out his window, a steamroller about to crush a phone booth, at obvious peril to its occupant. Unbeknown to *A*, *B* is in that phone booth"<sup>71</sup>. According to the argument, *A* would affirm the claim "I believe that she is in danger" (referring to the phone booth occupant) but would deny the claim "I believe that you are in danger" (referring to *B*). However, the indexical pronouns, 'she' and 'you' refer to the same individual, namely *B*, the person in the phone booth. According to the principle of compositionality, both statements express the same proposition, and hence, the same belief. Richard claims that this argument shows that our intuitions about the truth values of belief claims are wrong. Crimmins, however, thinks that he is mistaken because "he assumes that the features of context that determine the contents of the *parts* of a sentence are sufficient to determine content, and hence the truth value, of the statement as a whole."<sup>72</sup> In order to see how context does determine content in belief reporting, we need to turn to the hidden-indexical theory.

### **The Hidden-Indexical Theory**

Proponents of hidden-indexical theories hold a broadly Russellian view by maintaining certain features of Russell's semantics, including the concept of propositions having as constituents objects and relations, and Russell's treatment of descriptions. Yet they also adopt Frege's concept of sense, or mode of presentation, in order to explain the substitutive problems involved in belief reporting. According to the hidden-indexical

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<sup>70</sup> Richard, Mark. "Direct Reference and Ascription of Belief"

<sup>71</sup> Crimmins, Mark. Talk About Beliefs. p.29.

<sup>72</sup> Crimmins, Mark. Talk About Beliefs. p.30.

theory, believing is a three-place relation between an agent, a Russellian proposition, and a mode of presentation, which accounts for how the proposition is believed. Proponents of this type of theory, including Crimmins, must reject principles of articulated compositionality and direct reference, because the reference to the mode of presentation is not part of the content of the components of the belief report, but is hidden in the context. Furthermore, the mode of presentation may vary depending on context of utterance of the belief report. It is from these two characteristics that the hidden-indexical theory (HIT theory) derives its name. Many theorists have either proposed HIT theories, or proposed modifications to existing HIT theories, including Stephen Schiffer, who eventually became a leading opponent of these views. Although the resulting variations are interesting from the perspective of finding different means to solve the problems, it seems more useful to focus on one version in detail, rather than considering a multitude of versions superficially. Thus, for the purposes of illustrating this approach to the problems of substitution failure in belief reports, I will focus on the variation of the HIT theory proposed by Mark Crimmins.

One of Crimmins's goals in Talk About Beliefs is to provide an account of believing as a foundation for his semantic theory concerning belief reports. He considers two possible concepts of beliefs, abstract states and concrete particulars, and argues for rejecting the former in favor of the latter. According to Crimmins, analyzing beliefs as shareable abstract states is motivated by the need to explain the similarities among the beliefs of different agents. However, one of the purposes of an adequate account of believing is to provide a way of individuating instances of believing. According to

Crimmins, characterizing beliefs as shareable abstract states fails to do this. He says, "a theory of beliefs in terms of such states will not be able to individuate instances of believing in the right way, because of a certain tension between the complexity and interconnectedness of actual mental representation on the one hand, and the supposed simplicity and independence of the posited belief states on the other".<sup>73</sup> Crimmins thinks that a better account of believing is one that characterizes beliefs as un-shareable concrete particulars. Instances of believing could then be individuated by these parameters: agent, time, the agent's contribution to the belief, and the content of that belief. This account would allow the similarities among the beliefs of different agents to be explained in terms of similarities among the agents' contributions to the belief.

The key to Crimmins's account of beliefs as concrete particulars is the distinction between the content of the belief, which is the proposition on which the truth or falsity of the belief hangs, and the agent's contribution to the belief instance. Crimmins accepts a Russellian account of propositions, which have as their constituents individuals and relations between individuals, with properties being unary relations. Ideational beliefs, which are the agents' contributions to belief instances, have as constituents notions, which are mental representations of individuals, and ideas, which are mental representations of relations and properties.

Crimmins treats all instances of believing as being dependent on explicit beliefs in the following way: instances of tacit believing that *A* are *as if* the agent had an explicit

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<sup>73</sup> Crimmins, Mark. Talk About Beliefs. p.36

belief that *A*.<sup>74</sup> It is necessary for him to account for tacit beliefs as well as explicit beliefs, because tacit beliefs can influence an agent's actions or other beliefs that the agent holds. For example, in the supermarket produce section, a shopper might never buy Jerusalem artichokes because of a tacit belief that they have an unpleasant taste. The shopper may never form an explicit belief about their taste unless asked why he never purchases them; nevertheless, his tacit belief affects his actions in choosing produce to buy. Because tacit beliefs can be part of an agent's contribution to a belief instance, treating tacit beliefs in this manner allows Crimmins to posit a method of representing the agent's contribution to a belief instance that will handle both tacit and explicit believing.

Crimmins's method of representing the agent's contribution to a belief instance is intended to provide information about how a proposition is believed, without relying on the words that express the proposition. To do so, he posits thought maps, beliefs that are such that they involve notions unique to the agent, and which are uniquely determined by the main idea of the belief and a function from its argument places to further ideas and notions. The purpose of these thought maps is to specify, through a relation of responsibility, which notions and ideas correspond to which roles in the proposition. Because it is possible for an agent to have more than one notion of an individual, a thought map can contain more than one notion of that individual, each of which is responsible for a different role that that individual fills in the proposition which is the content of the belief instance. For instance, in the statement, "Bill believes that Cicero is taller than Tully," the notion Bill has of the individual referred to as Cicero is distinct

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<sup>74</sup> Crimmins's arguments for the conclusion that tacit believing is as if there were an explicit belief appear in *Talk About Beliefs*, 58-73.



from the notion he has of the individual referred to as Tully, even though both names refer to the same individual. In this account of belief instances involving thought maps, the 'believes' relation takes four arguments (agent, time, thought map, proposition), and belief reports are analyzed as existential claims about thought maps.

Analyzing belief reports as existential claims about thought maps allows Crimmins to account for the difference in truth value among belief reports in the problematic cases we have been considering. In the example above, it turns out that although "Cicero is taller than Cicero" expresses the same proposition as "Cicero is taller than Tully," the belief reports in which these sentences are embedded do not. The sentence "Bill believes that Cicero is taller than Tully" expresses the proposition that there is a thought map in which Bill's notion of Cicero is responsible for one role that the individual so-named fills in the proposition, while his notion of Tully, which is distinct from his notion of Cicero, is responsible for the other role that that individual fills. This proposition turns out to be true just in case there really does exist such a thought map. The sentence "Bill believes that Cicero is taller than Cicero" also expresses an existential proposition about thought maps, but one in which Bill's notion of Cicero is responsible for both propositional roles filled by that individual. Because Bill does not have such a thought map, the proposition expressed by the belief report is false. So this analysis of belief reports as existential claims seems to provide an account of belief reporting which is compatible with our intuitions about substitution.

### **Objections to the HIT Theory**

There are three objections that are raised to the HIT theory. The first is that there doesn't seem to be linguistic evidence that there is a hidden constituent that refers to the mode of presentation. Theorists who raise this objection frequently point to the fact that substitution of co-referring names in un-embedded sentences can cause the truth value of the sentence to change, but there doesn't seem to be a hidden constituent in those sentences to explain the substitution failure. For example, a context in which the sentence 'Dan is dressed like Superman' is true seems to be a context in which 'Dan is dressed like Clark Kent' is false, even though 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' co-refer.<sup>75</sup> HIT theorists do have a response, based on other simple sentences, such as 'It's raining', which also seem to have unarticulated constituents.

The second and third objections, both due to Schiffer in "A Paradox of Meaning," are more telling against the view. Of these two objections, the first is that there doesn't seem to be a way of individuating modes of presentation such that we can refer to the mode of presentation under which a person believes a proposition. For example, the HIT theory claims that Mary has two different modes of presentation of the person who is referred to by 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens'. Under one of these modes of presentation, she believes that he is the author of 'Life on the Mississippi', but under the other, she does not. The problem for the HIT theorist is to identify the correct mode of presentation for Mary's belief and for her lack of belief. But we don't have access to her mental structure, and so we cannot tell which modes of presentation she has. So the HIT

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<sup>75</sup> This example is due to Jennifer Saul, in "Substitution Failure and Simple Sentence."

theorist's claim that we can refer to a mode of presentation is specious. The third objection to the HIT theorist pushes this point a step further. Schiffer argues that there is nothing in our mental architecture that can satisfy the role of a mode of presentation in a belief report. If we have nothing that can satisfy that role, then it doesn't matter whether there is an unarticulated constituent that can refer to it. That constituent will have nothing as a reference, so the argument place in the 'believes' relation will not be filled. Thus the belief report will be meaningless.

### **My View of Belief Reports**

I find many of the arguments against the naïve theory and the hidden-indexical theory compelling, so I reject them both as accounts of believing and belief reports. However, an account of belief reports must be given; after all, several of the problems of naming arise because of the failure of intersubstitutability of apparently co-referential proper names in belief reports. Although we make belief reports, it isn't clear what it is that we are reporting. From a pre-theoretical standpoint, beliefs are mental objects of one kind or another. However, the only beliefs that we can talk about are those that can be expressed in language. Thus, one way to talk about beliefs, at least with regard to proper names, is to talk about them in terms of labels and tags in our idiolects. Whether belief reports are ultimately cashed out in terms of claims about our mental states, or whether we simply take them to report sentences that we would assent to or dissent from, we can expect to make some headway in understanding how our knowledge of language can license making such statements. In what follows, I will talk as if we have beliefs, and as if they are what our belief reports are about; I do not intend that any theoretical

commitments about the nature of beliefs or their existence follow from such talk. I will begin by discussing the similarities among, and differences between belief reports and quotation.

### **Belief Reports and Quotations**

There are some superficial similarities among quotations and belief reports: both have been called opaque contexts, that is, contexts in which substitution of supposedly co-referential terms fails. Both are embedded contexts, in which the main verb – ‘said’ in quotations, and ‘believes’ in belief reports – take a sentence as a complement. However, one difference between quotation and belief reporting concerns the use of the complementizer ‘that’. In quotation, the presence of ‘that’ is generally taken to indicate that the embedded sentence represents the speaker’s thoughts but not necessarily her words, or what is commonly called an indirect quotation. Thus the difference in truth conditions between the following sentences:

(4.6) Mary said, “Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’.”

(4.7) Mary said that Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’.

Sentence (4.6) is only true if Mary uttered the words that the words in the embedded sentence reproduce. Sentence (4.7) is true if the words Mary uttered conveyed that information, whether they were strung together in that order or in some other grammatical configuration (which could omit words that occur in the quoted sentence in (4.6), and add other words that do not occur in it). This distinction between sentences (4.6) and (4.7), which is not solely between the presence and absence of the ‘that’ complementizer, does not hold for belief reports, as the following sentences show:

(4.8) Mary believes Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’.

(4.9) Mary believes that Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’.

It has been suggested that there is a distinction between sentences (4.8) and (4.9): (4.8) is taken to report a *de re* belief about Mark Twain; (4.9) is taken to report a *de dicto* belief in the proposition following the ‘that’ complementizer. However, generally people do not distinguish one from the other and either use them interchangeably, or consistently use one in preference over the other without regard to the nature of the belief.

There is a different kind of distinction regarding belief reports, one that parallels the distinction between speech reports. Some belief reports are direct belief reports, while others are indirect. Direct belief reports are reports of beliefs that we have direct evidence for, whereas indirect belief reports are reports on beliefs we attribute to the believer on the basis of indirect evidence. What counts as direct evidence for a direct belief report? The words spoken by the person to whom the belief is attributed. Thus the parallel between belief reports and speech reports: whenever one is in a position to make a direct quotation speech report about what a person said, she is also in a position to make a direct belief report about that person’s beliefs. I grant that we do not have the signs to indicate that a person is making a direct belief report, in the way that we have signs – quotation marks and the like – to indicate that a person is making a direct quotation speech report. Nevertheless, this distinction brings out something regarding the nature of these reports. Indirect quotation requires a little bit of interpretation – for example, when the speaker uses a pronoun, the indirect speech reporter needs to determine the referent of the pronoun in order to report what the speaker means by his utterance. The truth

conditions for indirect speech reports require that the speaker said something that means what the reporter attributed to him. In order to determine the meaning of the speaker's remark, the indirect speech reporter must know what his words mean, not only in the language of the larger linguistic community, but in speaker's idiolect as well. Likewise, in making an indirect belief report, the reporter must sometimes draw inferences about the meanings of words in the believer's idiolect.

Another distinction that is made regarding beliefs is the distinction between enduring and passing beliefs. Consider this example: although Lois probably doesn't believe that Perry White likes ham sandwiches on rye bread, she probably doesn't have a belief that he does not. However, suppose she walks past his desk and notices a ham sandwich on rye bread. She thinks, "I never knew that Perry likes ham on rye." Hours later, Lois is caught up in chasing a late-breaking news story. Because of the stress of the moment, she is not thinking about food at all, and especially not Perry White's food. She will probably forget that she ever thought that Perry White likes ham on rye. It certainly doesn't come to mind each time she sees him. Lois's belief is a passing belief.

The relationship between the enduring/ passing belief distinction and direct belief reports seems to be that we are more likely to have evidence of enduring beliefs than of passing beliefs, so it is more likely that enduring beliefs will be the ones that are reported by direct belief reports. But the distinction does not preclude our obtaining evidence for passing beliefs – a bystander who overhears Lois comment about Perry White's liking for ham on rye has such evidence. But it may turn out that, once the bystander has obtained

that evidence, Lois will forget that she had the belief and deny the truth of the direct belief report.

### **Evidence for Belief Reports**

In the previous section, I have relied on the fact that we are able to obtain evidence for the beliefs that we intend to report. This raises the question of what kinds of evidence we might hope to obtain, and from which sources. When we read about the problems of belief – Kripke’s puzzle, for example – the problems are set up from an omniscient standpoint. For instance, in Kripke’s puzzle, we are told how Pierre came to have his beliefs about Londres, how he came to learn English, how he came to have his beliefs about London, and whatever background beliefs are necessary for appreciating the puzzle. I’m not criticizing Kripke here; this information is necessary to understanding his arguments. But this is not the kind of information about the beliefs of other people that we get in the normal course of events. Consider Pierre’s neighbors in London, for instance. They may lack most of this information about Pierre’s beliefs, particularly given the way he acquired his English language skills, and the fact that most of our evidence about people’s beliefs comes through their use of language. So they may never discover that he, at least apparently, has a contradiction in his set of beliefs. We are more likely to be in the position of Pierre’s neighbors than the reader of “A Puzzle About Beliefs”, when trying to determine what other people believe.

I have already indicated a major source of our evidence for the beliefs of others: their use of language. However, other kinds of behavior can provide clues as well. We may look for signs that the person recognizes other people, or evidence of familiarity

with people or surrounding or other objects. Consider, for instance, how Sherlock Holmes could adduce a stranger's occupation from baggy trouser knees or characteristic calluses on certain fingertips. I am not suggesting that we ought to try and outdo Sherlock Holmes; however, non-verbal sources of evidence can support our inferences about what others believe. For instance, suppose that Mary always waves a greeting to Joe Smith, but never to Samuel Clemens. This behavior is evidence that can support various suppositions: that she knows Joe, but not Samuel; that she approves of Joe, but not of Samuel; that she is attracted to Joe, but not to Samuel, and so on. Further evidence from various sources can confirm or deny those suppositions. Still, the greatest source of evidence about a person's beliefs is his use of language.

What can we learn about a person's beliefs from his use of language? To take the simple case first, we can learn what words he uses. For instance, when Mary says, "Mark Twain wrote 'Life on the Mississippi'," we know, among other things, that one of the names in Mary's idiolect is 'Mark Twain'. We don't know much about what she believes about Mark Twain as yet, although we know that she associates the property 'writer' with that name. We may make some other assumptions, based on our beliefs about Mark Twain, but those assumptions may be wrong. We also know some things about another name in Mary's idiolect – Mary believes that 'Life on the Mississippi' is the name of something that was written. As we continue to listen to Mary use language, our knowledge of her idiolect grows, and with it, our evidence for attributing to her certain beliefs. For instance, if she makes further statements using 'Mark Twain' we can know more about the properties she associates with that name. And if she says something like,



“I saw Mark Twain at the store yesterday afternoon,” we have evidence that she associates the name ‘Mark Twain’ with a person. Barring evidence to the contrary, we will assume that the person she associates with the name ‘Mark Twain’ is the same person that the linguistic community associates with that name, Samuel Clemens. However, we may get evidence to the contrary; suppose Mary says, “I think clean-shaven men, like Mark Twain, are so much more handsome than men with facial hair, like Samuel Clemens.” Suddenly, our assumption that she associates the name ‘Mark Twain’ with Samuel Clemens is destroyed. As further evidence, we see her wave to Joe Smith and call out, “Hello, Mark.” We now have strong evidence that she associates the name ‘Mark Twain’ with Joe Smith. How can we report her beliefs?

### **Labels and Tags in Belief Reports**

Given the evidence that we have just accumulated about Mary on the basis of her words and actions, we can make certain statements about the names in her idiolects and the objects that she associates with them:

- (4.10) Mary associates the name ‘Mark Twain’ with Joe Smith.
- (4.11) Mary does not associate the name ‘Mark Twain’ with Mark Twain/Samuel Clemens.
- (4.12) Mary associates the predicate ‘writer of “Life on the Mississippi”,’ with the name ‘Mark Twain’.
- (4.13) Mary associates the predicate ‘writer of “Life on the Mississippi”,’ with Joe Smith.

Suppose Mary says,

(4.14) “I believe that Mark Twain wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’.”

How can we analyze this statement in view of our knowledge about which objects she associates with which names? The naïve view cannot provide a correct analysis, because on that view, ‘Mark Twain’ refers to Mark Twain/ Samuel Clemens; thus the naïve theorist would say

(4.15) Mary believes of Mark Twain that he wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’.

But that is not correct, because she believes it of Joe Smith, not of Mark Twain/Samuel Clemens. The HIT theory is no better off; it can explain that her ‘Mark Twain’ mode-of-presentation is different from her ‘Samuel Clemens’ mode-of-presentation, but it cannot explain how a ‘Mark Twain’ mode-of-presentation gets Joe Smith into the proposition believed.

I suggest that an appeal to the distinction between labels and tags can provide an explanation. Mary’s assertion of (4.14) is ambiguous, because the name ‘Mark Twain’ can be taken as a tag, or as a label. When ‘Mark Twain’ is taken as a tag, (4.14) asserts that Mary believes that the object so-tagged, namely Mark Twain/Samuel Clemens wrote ‘Life on the Mississippi’. Thus, when ‘Mark Twain’ is taken as a tag, (4.14) is false. However, it can also be analyzed with ‘Mark Twain’ as a label; in this case it asserts that Mary believes that ‘Mark Twain’ refers to a collection of properties that includes the property described as ‘writer of ‘Life on the Mississippi’’. We have evidence for this belief from (4.12), which is based on various things that Mary said. Thus, there is a reading of (4.14), in which her assertion is true. The fact that there is also a reading on which it is false is not surprising; after all, she is mistaken about which person is

associated with the name ‘Mark Twain’. Suppose that we want to go further; we want to point out her mistaken beliefs. Can we do so without ending up with a contradiction in our own belief system? This is a question raised by Kripke’s puzzle.

### **Kripke’s Puzzle**

The obvious point about Kripke’s puzzle is that it is puzzling; indeed, philosophers of language have been puzzling over it since it was first published. So much has been written about it that it would be difficult to catalog the responses. In addition, it has appeared to be as intractable as at first, in spite of the insights of decades of wrestling with it. What I have to say about it, however, I hope will render it less puzzling.

I believe that the distinction between labels and tags that I have argued for in this dissertation provides the theoretical mechanism to solve the puzzle. I am going to focus on the second formulation of the puzzle – Peter’s beliefs about Paderewski – for two reasons: firstly, I think that the solution to that formulation will also, *mutatis mutandis*, solve the first formulation, and secondly, I think that the first formulation of the puzzle is ill-formed. Much of the difficulty in saying what Pierre believes rests in the fact that cities such as London, because of their size and their diversity, inevitably have sections that are not pretty, and usually have sections that are pretty. It is not clear to me whether I would say that London is pretty, and I am not in Pierre’s position of having two names for the same city without knowing it.

In the second formulation of Kripke’s puzzle, Peter hears Paderewski perform and asserts:

(4.16) Paderewski is a great musician.

He then hears of the Polish statesman, Paderewski. Unaware that he is the same person whose performance he attended, and believing that no statesman can be a great musician, he asserts:

(4.17) Paderewski is not a great musician.

The puzzle is to explain what Peter believes in a way that leaves no contradiction, either in Peter's system of beliefs, or in ours. Let's begin by considering the following sentence, which is a conjunction of Peter's two assertions (4.16) and (4.17):

(4.18) Paderewski is a great musician and Paderewski is not a great musician.

According to the principle of disquotation, Peter's sincere, reflective assertion of (4.16) and (4.17) allows us to attribute to Peter belief in the propositions they express. Since (4.18) follows from (4.16) and (4.17) by the laws of logic, we can also attribute to Peter a belief in (4.18). But (4.18) apparently expresses a contradiction.

A competent language user, with no theoretical presuppositions, might attempt to deny that Peter believes a contradiction by asserting one of the following:

(4.19) Peter believes that Paderewski is not Paderewski.

(4.20) Peter doesn't believe that Paderewski is Paderewski.

Given that the naming conventions of our language permit more a single orthographical and phonological form to refer to more than one object, it is not necessarily a contradiction to believe that Paderewski is not Paderewski – provided, of course that the first token of 'Paderewski' refers to a different object from the one referred to by second

token of ‘Paderewski’. But there’s the rub; in this case, both tokens of ‘Paderewski’ refer to the same object. Or so Kripke would have us believe.

Let’s consider sentences (4.18) – (4.20) in the light of the label/tag distinction.

Sentence (4.18) is open to four possible combinations of labels and tags:<sup>76</sup>

(4.21) Paderewski<sub>T</sub> is a great musician and Paderewski<sub>T</sub> is a not great musician.

(4.22) Paderewski<sub>T</sub> is a great musician and Paderewski<sub>L</sub> is a not great musician.

(4.23) Paderewski<sub>L</sub> is a great musician and Paderewski<sub>T</sub> is a not great musician.

(4.24) Paderewski<sub>L</sub> is a great musician and Paderewski<sub>L</sub> is a not great musician.

Sentence (4.21) is the standard interpretation of (4.18) – both tokens of ‘Paderewski’ are tags referring to the same person, so it expresses a contradiction. In the first conjunct of sentence (4.22), ‘Paderewski’ is a tag, so that conjunct expresses the proposition that the person so-named is a great musician. However, in the second conjunct of (4.22)

‘Paderewski’ is a label; that conjunct expresses the proposition that the collection of properties referred to by the label so-named includes the property described by ‘is not a great musician’. Now, as we have seen, the object tagged ‘Paderewski’ need not instantiate properties in the collection of properties referred to by the label ‘Paderewski’, even if the label was created from the tag.<sup>77</sup> Thus, (4.22) does not express a

contradiction. Sentence (4.23) is explained in the same fashion, *mutatis mutandis*, so it likewise does not express a contradiction. Finally, both conjuncts of (4.24) contain

‘Paderewski’ as a label; thus, it expresses the proposition that the collection of properties

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<sup>76</sup> The subscripted ‘L’ and ‘T’ attached to the names indicate that the name is a label or a tag, respectively.

<sup>77</sup> This point was illustrated in chapter two with the example, “As a student, Einstein was no Einstein.”

referred to by the label ‘Paderewski’ includes the property described by ‘is a great musician’, and that the collection of properties referred to by the label ‘Paderewski’ includes the property described by ‘is not a great musician’. Whether (4.24) expresses a contradiction depends on whether the label in the first conjunct is the same label as the label in the second conjunct. It is not clear to me that this has to be the case.

Consider a different example, involving the actor/businessman Paul Newman. Suppose that Susie, who was a fan of Paul Newman’s movies when she was a girl, creates a label, ‘Paul Newman’, that includes the properties described by ‘handsome leading man’. Many years later, Susie is a grandmother, and she no longer watches movies. As a result, she hasn’t seen Paul Newman act in decades. However, at the grocery store, she picks up a bottle of Newman’s Own salad dressing. She doesn’t recognize him from the picture on the label, and reading about his charitable giving and the success of his business, she creates a label, ‘Paul Newman’, that includes the properties described by ‘successful businessman’ and ‘generous philanthropist’. Both labels were created from the same tag, but Susie doesn’t realize it. This example is not exactly like the ‘Paderewski’ case in (4.24), because the labels do not refer to collections of properties in which one of the properties in one collection is a contradictory property to a property in the other collection. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that it is possible to have two distinct labels with qualitatively similar names created from the same tag. As a result, it is only by attributing to Peter a belief in the proposition express by (4.21) that we attribute to him a contradictory belief.

What of sentence (4.19): Peter believes that Paderewski is not Paderewski?

Doesn't this sentence attribute to Peter a contradictory belief? Here again, there are four possible combinations of labels and tags: in one case, both names are tags: in another, both names are labels; in the remaining two cases, one name is a label and the other a tag.<sup>78</sup> The first case, in which both names are tags, attributes to Peter a contradictory belief. The second case, in which both names are labels, parallels the Paul Newman example; it is not contradictory for Peter to believe that there are two non-identical collections of properties that are both labeled 'Paderewski'.

The other cases, in which one name is a label and the other is a tag, are a little different. In the first two cases, the 'is' was interpreted as identity, so they were treated as assertions of belief in a statement that denied the identity of two objects. However, it is possible to read 'is' predicatively instead. In fact, since labels are generally used to attribute the collection of properties so-labeled to objects that can instantiate those properties, the predicative reading of 'is' is more natural than reading it as an assertion of identity. Furthermore, the predicative function of the label is the result of its being a label, not the result of its position in the string of morphemes in the sentence. So in both of the remaining cases, the embedded sentence in the belief report denies that the collection of properties referred to by the label 'Paderewski' are instantiated by the object tagged 'Paderewski'. In other words, one of these cases attributes to Peter the belief that

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<sup>78</sup> Actually, there are eight possibilities: four ways to combine the two names as labels and tags, multiplied by two readings of 'is' (predicative or identity). The four readings I considered are the most natural; some of the others are absurd to the point of incomprehensibility (for example, the reading in which both names are tags and 'is' is predicative).

Paderewski, the musician, does not have the property described by ‘being a statesman’; the other one attributes to Peter the belief the Paderewski, the statesman, does not have the property described by ‘being a musician’. Though the embedded sentences in the third and fourth cases are false, both interpretations of the belief report are true, because they accurately describe Peter’s beliefs. In fact, only the first interpretation of sentence (4.19) attributes to Peter a contradictory belief.

The final question raised by Kripke’s puzzle is whether it forces the belief reporter to have contradictory beliefs in his or her idiolect. This problem is demonstrated by sentence (4.20): Peter doesn’t believe that Paderewski is Paderewski. This sentence avoids the problem of contradiction in Peter’s system of beliefs because it attributes to Peter a lack of belief in an identity, rather than a belief that identical objects are not identical. However, the problem is raised to the level of the belief reporter’s beliefs, because according to the disquotation principle, the belief reporter who sincerely asserts (4.20) believes the proposition that it expresses. Presumably, the belief reporter asserts (4.20) because she believes that in Peter’s idiolect, the first token of ‘Paderewski’ refers to a different person than the one referred to by the second token of ‘Paderewski’. But the problem is that the belief reporter cannot use Peter’s idiolect to express this belief; she can only use her own. And in her idiolect, both tokens of ‘Paderewski’ have the same referent. Thus, (4.20) commits the belief reporter to the belief that Peter does not believe that Paderewski is self-identical. But the belief reporter does not believe that. So she cannot assert (4.20) on pain of having contradictory beliefs.



The solution to this part of Kripke's puzzle can again be found in the label/tag distinction. Here again, sentence (4.20) is open to four interpretations, only one of which leaves the belief reporter with contradictory beliefs.<sup>79</sup> Not surprisingly, the interpretation yielding contradictory beliefs is the strictly Millian interpretation, in which names only function as tags, contributing the object so-named to the proposition expressed. The 'expanded Millian view' in which some names are labels and some are tags, avoids the problems of the strictly Millian view without suffering from the problems that afflict descriptivist accounts. An interesting side note to this solution to Kripke's puzzle is that it demonstrates that not all identity statements are, if true, necessarily true. As it turns out, only those in which both names are tags have this feature. That is not surprising to me; there is a sense in which the sentence, 'Archie Leach might not have been Cary Grant' seems true to me.

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<sup>79</sup> Because the interpretations of sentence (4.20) parallel the interpretations of sentence (4.19), I will spare the reader the tedium of reading through it again.

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