A GEOPOLITICS OF INTIMACY AND ANXIETY: RELIGION, TERRITORY, AND FERTILITY IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
WITH A MAJOR IN GEOGRAPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2009

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Sara Hollingsworth Smith entitled A Geopolitics of Intimacy and Anxiety: Religion, Territory and Fertility in Leh District, Jammu and Kashmir, India and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I could never have completed the PhD without the generous help and support that I have been so fortunate to receive. As writing draws to a close I have often wondered how I got so lucky. Sallie Marston has been the best advisor anyone could ever ask for – inspiring and unceasingly supportive – it has been an honor to be her student. Paul Robbins, John Paul Jones III, Richard Eaton and Mark Nichter have been generous with their time, patience and critiques, which have shaped this work in significant ways.

The credit for the dissertation is entirely due to the women and men who generously shared their life stories with me in Ladakh. I asked embarrassing questions, drank their tea and ate their food, and was met with gracious patience and hospitality. Our Kagapa family in Ladakh, especially my mother-in-law, Dolma Tsering, made fieldwork a delight. Dolma was as concerned about my success as I was and she made this clear by answering every one of my questions, making contacts for me, and giving me advice about everything from how to ask questions to what to wear. I'll forever be grateful to everyone in Kagapa family, especially, of course, Dolma, Norbu, Angmo, Legdon, Dolkar, Phuntsog, Lotus, Adol, Nono Jimi, Eshay Angmo and Tsewang. Hasina Bano was the ideal research assistant – enthusiastic and energetic, Hasina always suggested we interview one more person. Others who were instrumental in helping with my research include Dr. Lhadol, Abdul Ghani Sheikh, Tsewang Lden, Fatima Bano, Becky Norman (and her dictionary!), as well as Moulvi Omar, Ashraf Ali Barcha, Nazir Ahmad Khan, Mohammad Ayup, Abi Padma, Spalzes Angmo, Thinle Angmo, Y Angmo and Ama Putit. Thanks also to the oral history group, who were a joy to work with: Fatima Batul, Sumera Bano, Wahida Khurshid, Nawaz Ahmed Khan, Bashir Ali, Tsering Dolma, Padma Tsering and Sonam Yangdol. Thanks to SECMOL for letting me try out the oral history group idea with two fantastic groups of students. Thanks to Jennifer Aengst for all the conversations we had back in Leh, and to Kim Gutschow for advice and encouragement!

It helped tremendously to be part of such a friendly and warm department. Erika Wise kept me sane with our weekly breakfasts. Other graduate students read first drafts and provided support in innumerable ways, especially, but not only: Katie Meehan, Heidi Hausermann, Brian Marks, all of Sallie's students, and the entire 2002 grad student cohort. In the office, Linda Koski was a saint, Liz Cordova always made me smile, and Gabriel Lopez and John Moeller always fixed my problems. Angellyn Salcedo, Keely Merrigan and Amber Field, were always ready when I needed an escape. My family, especially my sister, my mom, my dad, Dana, Robert, Ali and Gesine were always around to cheer me up and egg me on.

Finally, thanks to my husband, Stanzin Tonyot, for being with me in both joyful and painful moments and never giving up on me, for discussing every aspect of the dissertation with me a thousand times, and for cheering me up and making the future look bright.

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ABSTRACT

What happens when bodies are the territory through which geopolitical strategies play out? In the Leh district of India's contested Jammu and Kashmir State, religious identity has become politicized and Buddhist/Muslim conflict is being articulated at the site of the body. This dissertation contributes to political geography by exploring intimacy and fertility as geopolitical practice. In Leh, political conflict between Buddhists and Muslims is being enacted through women's bodies. Activist members of the Buddhist majority are encouraging Buddhist women to maximize fertility and avoid marrying Muslim men in order to maintain Buddhist electoral control. When women's bodies are instrumentalized and geopolitical strategy seeks to control desire, how do women cope with or resist these pressures? Can the body be an effective site of resistance against the politicization of religion and intimacy? My dissertation research consists of over 200 interviews and surveys of Buddhist and Muslim women in Leh district, as well as a participatory oral history project that engaged students in Leh with these difficult questions. The research explores how the politicization of marriage and fertility is affecting decision-making, how women negotiate religious and political pressures to participate in pro-natal territorial struggles, and how emergent geopolitical religious identities shape visions of the future.

INTRODUCTION

> The womb is such a powerful weapon; it's a weapon against the enemy...We look across the Islamic world and we see that they are outnumbering us in their family size, and they are in many places and many countries taking over those nations, without a jihad, just by multiplication (Nancy Campbell, quoted in Hagerty 2009).[1]

In a recent National Public Radio report, Nancy Campbell and other members of the Quiverfull movement describe their pro-natalism as a religious and territorial cause: proponents reject contraception to carry out the will of God, but also to employ the womb as a "weapon against the enemy." This dissertation is about how women and men make choices and tell their life stories when political actors seek to enlist their desires and reproductive capacity as territorial weapons or as territory itself.

Whom we love and whether we want to have children are among the most intimate choices we make. Simultaneously, these decisions determine demographic trends and shape territories. In this dissertation, I explore intimacy and reproduction as sites of geopolitical practice. In the Leh district of India's Jammu and Kashmir State (J&K), Buddhist/Muslim conflict is articulated through

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1 Nancy Campbell runs an "international women's ministry," and a website (www.aboverubies.org). On her website she "encourag[es] women in their high calling as wives, mothers, and homemakers." She also reiterates the territorial pro-natalism espoused in the NPR interview. For example: "It is an undisputed fact that the people who obey God's mandate to be fruitful and multiply are the people who will subdue and take dominion. Before dominion comes multiplication. It is an eternal law. If we as God's people want to multiply God's ways across the world, we must first be fruitful! Currently, the Islamic people are outnumbering western civilizations seven to one! They are on their way to taking dominion, unless we wake up! We are to be on the offensive, not the defensive!" (http://rubies.articledirectoree.com/articles/family-life/the-family-charge-2.html).

restrictions on interaction, and geopolitical strategies impinge on personal decisions. Incrementally, over the past century, religious identity has taken on political meaning in Leh. In 2004, when I asked questions about politics in Leh, I routinely got answers about marriage and babies. When I interviewed Paljor and Fatima, a Buddhist-Muslim couple who had given up family support in order to marry one another, they flirted and teased one another in between explaining to me why their parents, government officials and neighbors were doing all in their power to keep them apart.

Within a few months of that interview, they were divorced and Fatima had undergone an abortion. My dissertation is the story of why couples like Paljor and Fatima cannot marry in Leh, and how women in Leh deal with the politicization of their family planning choices. Over the course of my fieldwork, I came to understand this as a territorial struggle that is simultaneously about geopolitical territory and the territory of the body. My dissertation research, then, begins from this question: what happens when human bodies are the territory through which geopolitical strategies play out?

Pursuing this question over the course of 11 months of fieldwork brought me to an understanding of the body and bodies as fundamental to geopolitical practice. The body is crucial to state projects, never more than in the act of reproduction – states are built and territories are made through birth. This renders the reproductive body an irresistible target for political strategies of all kinds: states seek to produce the workforce, soldiers, citizens and voters through

interventions at the site of the mother's body. These political strategies, however, are endlessly complicated and sometimes thwarted by the very potentialities they seek to utilize: the intimate decisions and practices upon which they depend are susceptible to unruly desires and visceral fears.

Individuals may subscribe to geopolitical narratives about marriage, but that may not prevent them from falling in love with the wrong person. They may participate in pro-natal geopolitical talk, but fears about their own bodily integrity may discourage them from having babies for a political project. As these tensions play out, they dislodge distinctions between micro and macro scales: the most intimate link – between two lovers – becomes the center of the geopolitical map. For territories to be mapped, they must be populated. For boundaries to have meaning, bodies must be marked with difference. If individuals refuse that difference, the map becomes meaningless. This research is informed by state theory and feminist geopolitics – seeking to approach the power of the state and political actors through lived and embodied practices. In its approach to family decision-making, the dissertation comprises a response to calls to take the political/cultural meanings of fertility seriously. This work also adds to an apparent growing interest in intersections between religious identity and other practices such as politics and gender. Finally, the case study presented here contributes to the dismantling of vertical ontology by demonstrating that geopolitical territorialization – the very production and defense of territory – is enacted and refused in the most intimate of practices, and that to miss these

moments is not only to exclude geopolitical subjects, but to overlook the heart of geopolitical thinking and practice.

Research Problem and Context

In Leh district, Buddhist politicians have sought legislative autonomy for the district by portraying Leh as a disadvantaged Buddhist area discriminated against by the Muslim-run state government (van Beek 1996). Some of the autonomy movement's key strategies have been focused intensely on the regulation of bodily interaction between Buddhists and Muslims. This intensity is exaggerated by Leh's geopolitical vulnerability around disputed borders with Pakistan and China. Geopolitical anxiety also haunts political conversations. In an electoral democracy in which politicians often rely on religion to mobilize blocs of voters, numerical advantage is crucial, and therein we find a complicated connection between women's fertility and the state. In a 2007 interview with a senior member of the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA), I was told their top priority is keeping Leh district Buddhist - that is, promoting population growth by discouraging Buddhist women from using family planning.[2] A newspaper article from 2000 reveals a similar territorial defensiveness around marriage:

> "Conversion from Buddhism to Islam is a menace that has come to stay. As people who have cherished cordial relations for ages we definitely want this to die off," Tsering Samphel, President of influential Ladakh Buddhists Association (LBA) said. Samphel's feeling is echoed by many local Buddhists, who allege that the

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2 Leh district is 77% Buddhist and 15% Muslim, the remainder are Sikhs, Hindus and Christians (Government of India 2001).

> State Government was encouraging Muslim youth to lure Buddhists damsels to the Islamic fold. "Any Muslim Government servant marrying Buddhist girl is immediately rewarded with juicy postings," claimed Gey Lobzang Nyantak, youth wing president of LBA. (*Daily Excelsior* 2000).

Both Buddhists and Muslims have become increasingly invested in bodily boundary making with a 1995 ban on inter-religious marriage and increased attention to dress, food consumption and other bodily practices. Local Muslim associations (the Anjuman moin-ul Islam and the Anjumam-e-Imamia) support the informal agreement between Buddhists and Muslims to prevent intermarriage.

Despite its Muslim majority, Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh were incorporated into India instead of Pakistan in 1947. The Ladakh region was split into two districts in 1979: Kargil (with a Shia Muslim majority) and Leh (with a Buddhist majority). Today, Leh district is the single Buddhist-majority area in India and it resides within a Muslim-majority state. In a political framework in which claims for rights and sovereignty are often made on the basis of difference, religious identity has become increasingly politicized. The recent politicization of religion culminated in the late 1980s, when Buddhist activists drew attention to their cause (greater autonomy for the district) by “boycotting” local Muslims; that is, enforcing sanctions on Buddhist-Muslim interaction of any kind. Although the boycott ended in 1992, political discussion continues to be framed in terms of religious identity. There has been excellent work on the genealogy of these tensions (Aggarwal 2004; van Beek 1996, 2001; Bertelsen 1996; Gutschow 2006; Srinivas 1998); we have yet to develop, however, an account that traces out the ways these tensions are normalized in every day practice, particularly with respect

to bodily regulation. My interviews indicate that this is in fact one of the primary ways people experience and engage with the politics of religious identity. Recent developments suggest that this aspect is in fact the central stage on which the conflict is playing out.

In 2007, the LBA sent letters to Sonam Norbu Memorial Hospital in Leh (the only provider of tubal ligation services), demanding they cease providing family planning services. Simultaneously, Buddhist religious leaders began condemning family planning. Rumors spread that family planning was no longer available, and Buddhist women from Leh town traveled to rural areas to convince their rural counterparts – Buddhist women with the least education and least economic resources – to have more children in order to keep up with their Muslim counterparts. And although Leh district has the lowest fertility of any other district in India (Guilmoto and Rajan 2002), those Buddhists who once enthusiastically embraced family planning are now discouraging their daughters and daughters-in-law from using it. Despite the preponderance of Buddhists in the district, women of child-bearing age are being told that Buddhists will "die off," and Buddhist leaders threaten that family planning will have dire consequences for the cycle of reincarnation. While Buddhists have a solid majority in Leh district, they perceive Ladakh as a whole to be losing its Buddhist majority. While Muslim women do not reiterate demographic fears, their religious leaders have also told them that family planning is a sin. If it continues, this politicization of reproductive health could have profound repercussions for Ladakhis' lives as they

may be pressured into reproductive health decisions with serious economic, physical and family consequences. Buddhist and Muslim women's reasons for limiting or not limiting fertility are summarized in Table 2, and described in more detail in the appended papers (Appendix B and C).

In 11 months of dissertation fieldwork, I used a multi-method approach to examine how political narratives and changing conceptions of identity affect spouse selection and family planning decisions. This fieldwork entailed an extensive survey of women's marriage and fertility choices, in-depth life history interviews and a participatory oral history project with Ladakhi youth. These methods have elicited data on marriage and reproductive choices being made today (surveys); how individuals interpret those choices (interviews); and how discourses of Buddhist/Muslim interrelatedness and difference are produced and contested (participatory oral histories). The methods and major findings will be elaborated on in greater detail in "Present Study," and in the articles appended.

The overarching question that drives this research is simply: when female fertility is placed at the intersection of electoral democracy and identity politics, how do political concerns begin to affect family planning and marriage choices? I began with the following research questions:

1. **Geopolitical dynamics of the district:** What are the intersections between localized political identities (e.g. the movement for decentralized governance), international geopolitical narratives (e.g. the India/Pakistan conflict), and community geographies of interaction?

Method: semi-structured interviews and participant observation

2. **Geopolitical dynamics of town and neighborhood:** How are changing geographies of interaction – the meaning and use of public spaces and households – understood? What influences do these spatial dynamic have on family activity, identity, and self-definition?

Method: community-based ethnographies

3. **Geopolitical dynamics of the body:** How do emergent geopolitical narratives and concurrent identities relate to marriage patterns, family decision-making, reproductive strategies and fertility decisions? To what degree are families of Buddhists and Muslims related, and, if so, increasingly or decreasingly?

Method: oral histories, survey, and participant observations

Literature review

1. Geographies of Religion

Agnew (2006:183) begins a recent special issue of *Geopolitics* by announcing that, "Religion is the emerging political language of our time." Agnew is not alone in pointing to a seeming incongruity between geographers' attention to religion and the daily bombardment of news stories reflecting the collision of religion and political discourse and action (Dijkink 2006; Proctor 2006). While Kong (2001) argues that there is substantive work on religion in geography, she also observes a tendency to separate out the sacred and the secular, or the politics and the poetics, in ways that limit how religion is understood. According to Kong, while the 1990s saw a greater attention to the

how race, gender and other aspects of identity intersect, there has been less specificity in the way geographers approach religion. Kong's prescriptions for "'new' geographies of religion," include: exploring the majority/minority relationships that complicate populations; broadening the conception of sacred sites and problematizing the sacred/secular dialectic; analyzing religion in its contextual, historical, sited, specificity; and paying attention to a variety of scales of religious practice, from global and national discourses to embodied practices.

As Kong notes, some of the most promising work in the geography of religion troubles dialectics such as politics/poetics or invokes the contingency of religious identity. Nagar (1997) in particular, demonstrates the shifting spatiality of religious identification and the ways religion is complicated by other identity markers: in her case study, elite and lower-caste Hindus differ in their narrative performance of Hindu representation, and enact this performance spatially in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Philip and Mercer (1999) elicit the intersections between nationalism and religion through the marking of Buddhist space and disenfranchisement of minority religions. Exploring the "mosque in the suburbs," Naylor and Ryan (2001) observe that sacred spaces cannot be emptied of political meaning, as the construction of such spaces is inextricably part of the politics of the built environment.

Despite this promising work, Brace *et al.* (Brace, Bailey, and Harvey 2006:29) suggest that geographers can do more to reveal the ways "religious practices, in terms both of institutional organization and of personal experience,

are central not only to the spiritual life of society but also to the constitution and reconstitution of that society." By examining how religion intersects with political, ethnicity and gender through the spaces that emerge as part of historical process, geography can offer an approach to religion that opens up the spatiality of religion to a wider audience, and engage more deeply with the larger academic discussion (Brace *et al* 2006). Brace *et al* work toward this aim by exploring the ways Methodism was incorporated into the everyday lives of residents of Cornwall between 1830 and 1930, and, in particular, the ways it is co-produced with other aspects of identity, rather than being pinned only to official sacred spaces.

During my fieldwork in Leh, I was struck by the distinctions drawn between religious identity and morality. In interview after interview, I was told that society was more religious today, but that this did not mean that individuals followed religious guidelines for a moral life. Often, a contrast was drawn between being educated about religion and having a clean heart (*semba laksmo*). Both Buddhists and Muslims suggested to me that these days there is more knowledge about religion, and more religious teachers, but that wealth, literacy, busyness, or simply "being modern," led to conflict and that hearts were no longer clean. A few participants explained this as being Buddhist or Muslim, "in name only." A few of the students in the participatory oral history project described a process through which they came to learn about their religious identity and the conflict between Buddhists and Muslims through mundane discipline – for

instance, a Buddhist girl being scolded for imitating the prayers of her Shia Muslim friend. These findings will be described in more detail in Appendix C.

2. Demography and Differential Fertility

This research also builds on efforts to bring culture, gender, and micro-politics more firmly into the fields of demography and population geography, through an explicitly spatial orientation. Reviews of demographic studies have called for attention to the micro-politics of reproductive decision-making (Greenhalgh 1995, 1997; Riley and McCarthy 2003). Demographic trends are often discussed and measured at the macro-level, but the decisions that affect demographic trends are essentially intimate ones, made at the site of the body and the family. In response, population geographers have called for more theoretical engagement; a turn toward primary and qualitative data collection to take a more central place in population geography; and a broader approach to population going beyond migration (Boyle 2003, 2002; Findlay 2003; Graham 2000; Graham and Boyle 2001; Ogden 2000; Pandit 2004; Silvey 2004).

Demography is a discipline and practice of vital importance – as demographers are keen to observe, demographic studies are widely cited to reveal truths about our world, not only across the social sciences but in the popular press as well (Greenhalgh 1995a; Morgan and Lynch 2001; Riley and McCarthy 2003). Counting births and deaths is political work because all too often some lives count more than others (Scheper-Hughes 1992). Following Scheper-Hughes, engagement with demography is of critical importance, all the more so when we

consider the kinds of projects that demographic data has been used to support. As observed by Hartmann and others, programs aimed at reducing population growth have impinged on women's autonomy (Hartmann 1995; Robbins 1998; Hartmann 2006). Concerns from a wide range of political affinities about the relationship between population growth and the environment have been used to shore up projects with racist and sexist implications (Sillman and King 1999). At times, demographers have often started with research questions and approaches that treat population, especially population growth, as a problem: "the very term population implicitly is associated with images of danger and threat" (Furedi 1997:162). This normative starting point has led to particular questions being asked more than others, and by venturing into this realm of inquiry, we must be prepared to question our own positionality and the crucial relationship between methodology and epistemology (Haraway 1991; Harding 1986).

Demography is beginning to benefit from the critiques that have transformed social science in recent years (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991, 1995; Greenhalgh 1995b; Kertzer and Fricke 1997; McNicoll 1992; Presser 1997). There has been a widespread call for demographers to acknowledge the political nature of their field, and to pay more careful attention to culture and, in particular, gender (Bélanger 2006; Dixon-Mueller 1993; Kertzer and Fricke 1997; Presser 1997; Säävälä 1999; Watkins 1993). But the role of culture in demography is disputed. As Coast (2003) observes, nods to culture have at times been cursory and ahistorical: ethnographies are used to provide background material to preface

quantitative work, to confirm or validate quantitative results, or to pick research questions. Säävälä (1999), alternatively, takes a productive approach to the intersection of quantitative and ethnographic demography by seeing culture not as a constraint but as a fundamental constitutive element for fertility choices, as part of everyday practice (Bourdieu 1977).

Many of the questions that have arisen in demography surface again in population geography as population geographers are encouraged to engage with critical social theory (Graham 1999, 2000; Graham and Boyle 2001; Halfacree and Boyle 1993; Lawson 2000; McKendrick 1999; Ogden 2000; White and Jackson 1995). In 2004, a special edition of *Population, Space, and Place* echoes the recent discussions in demography journals by calling for a greater use of primary and qualitative data and for human geographers to engage more with questions of population (Graham 2004; Pandit 2004; Silvey 2004). As observed by Silvey (Silvey 2004), recent years have seen very exciting and productive work in population geography but the focus is almost exclusively on migration (Nagar 1998; Piper 2006; Silvey 2003). There is a need to incorporate these innovations into other aspects of population geography. For instance, population geography can contribute to the broader study of demography by providing more nuanced interrogations of the geographical aspects of population. Ogden (Ogden 2000) suggests that population geography's special strength is in migration studies, but my work on the geopolitics of demography will demonstrate that geographical analysis is crucial for fertility research as well.

At the center of current debates in demography and population geography are important questions and clear avenues for future research. Basu (2006) points to the significance of finding ways to explore emotion as it relates to reproductive health, observing that "much sexual and reproductive behavior is motivated by emotional states that can suppress prior knowledge, services, or agency" (107). This observation can be connected to claims that state discourses about reproduction focus on disembodied technologies and avoid any discussion of sex itself (Friedman 2000). Exploring marriage and sexuality in Southeastern China, Friedman argues that this kind of treatment of sexuality reinforces and inscribes reprosexuality (a term coined by Warner 1991:9 to describe sexuality conceived of only in relation to heterosexual reproduction). But this reprosexuality is productive in a Foucauldian sense as it works as an incitement to discourse; that is, it engenders new ways of thinking, talking, and acting. Working in Vietnam, Bélanger (2006) makes steps toward incorporating a more nuanced conception of women's agency into fertility research by examining women's strategies for negotiating reproductive desires at the conjunction of family and state patriarchy. As a whole, this work demonstrates that studies of demographic questions have benefited from engagement with qualitative methods and critical social theory. Thus far, however, geographers in particular have yet to work with questions of fertility to the same extent as they have contributed to understandings of migration.

3. Geopolitics and State Theory

The 1990s saw a resurgence of interest in geopolitics as theorists expanded its scope from a narrowly defined relationship between space and political strategy to incorporate political economy and critical approaches (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Ó Tuathail 1996; Dalby 1991). Typified by Halford Mackinder's global vision of land power versus sea power, the geopolitics of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was presented as an objective tool of strategy. In their important intervention, Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998) open up a new, *critical* geopolitics, moving it beyond military strategy to include three arenas, which Ó Tuathail and Dalby label popular, practical, and formal geopolitics. Shifting then, with the cultural turn in geography, the subject matter of critical geopolitics escapes the confines of think tanks and military advisory boards, to encompass, "the everyday life of states and nations," that is: geopolitical sites of production are "multiple and pervasive, both 'high' (like a national security memorandum) and 'low' (like the headline of a tabloid newspaper)" (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998:5). This explosion of geopolitical subject material enables the study of the discursive production of geopolitical narratives in political cartoons, movies and magazine articles (Dodds 1998; Sharp 1998; Sidaway 1998). By drawing our attention to "geo-power", Ó Tuathail gives a Foudauldian turn to geopolitics: the production of geo-political knowledge, reflecting a particular positionality, is both an incitement to certain kinds of discourse, and makes other ways of thinking more difficult because they lie outside "common sense."

Building on this reconfiguration of geopolitics, scholars have sought to balance representations of geopolitics with embodied practices in order to understand their constitutive power (Dodds 2001; Newman and Paasi 1998; Sharp 2000b; Sparke 1994, 2000). As Sharp (2000b: 363) observes, interventions such as Ó Tuathail's *Critical Geopolitics* set out to move away from the god-trick of an objective science toward a more nuanced, situated approach that reveals the messy, always contextual production of geopolitical knowledge, and yet, they often revolve around the histories of "Big Men." Dodd's (2001) sympathetic progress report on critical geopolitics pushes for further integration of postcolonial, feminist and political economy critiques, and points in particular to the preponderance of work on representation at the expense of the other workings of geopolitics. He suggests that a more ethnographic approach to the study of geopolitics can take the critique of the production of geopolitical knowledge even further.

A feminist approach to geopolitics emphasizes the material and embodied practices that shore up and pull apart political formations (Desbiens, Mountz, and Walton-Roberts 2004; Hyndman 2001; Hyndman 2004; Hyndman 2007; Dowler and Sharp 2001; Kofman and Peake 1990; Long 2006; Marston 2003; Secor 2001; Staeheli and Nagel 2006). "How, then, can dominant scripts of geopolitics be both displaced and re-situated in order to foreground the security of people on the ground, those subjects effaced by realist geopolitics and international relations" (Hyndman 2004, 311)?

Secor (2001:191) observes that thinkers such as Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1993) use geopolitical reasoning to "produce and to privilege the global scale as the locus of both the meaning of Islamist politics and the construction of knowledge about Muslim societies." This kind of abstraction performs specific political work, by flattening complexity, placing power at the site of the global, and obliterating the lives of the people whom it attempts to categorize and represent on a global scale. The result is, for Huntington, "a global civilizational contest in which an undifferentiated Islam produces 'bloody borders' where it abuts other, equally homogenized, ethno-religious blocs" (Secor 2001:191). As a correction, the women that Secor speaks with in Istanbul engage in political action in contingent ways with a variety of practices and from a variety of motivations. By thus vitalizing the embodied subject, Secor produces a "counter-geopolitics of the uncounted," which undermines the simplicity of Huntington's homogenizing maps.

One promising avenue for geopolitical research is an explicit and thorough engagement with state theory, particularly with theorizations that build on Abrams's (1988) important work on the reification of the state. According to Abrams, viewing the state as object, that is, a thing apart from the social processes of our lives, obfuscates rather than reveals the nature of the state; this obfuscation both imbues state practices with the power of the taken-for-granted and makes it difficult to understand the state from an analytical point of view. Elaborating up on Abrams's distinction between state idea and state system, Mitchell (1991:95)

suggests that the "mundane processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, supervision and surveillance, and representation" produce a "state effect," that is, the sense that the state is somehow fundamentally set apart from society, "as a distinct dimension of structure, framework, codification, expertise, information, planning and intentionality." One of the outcomes of these alternative formulations of the state is to recognize it as constantly in formation through the kinds of material practices and discourses that cannot be separated out from culture (Desbiens, Mountz, & Walton-Roberts, 2004). As Marston (2004) points out, however, political geography might go further still to incorporate culture as a central part of comprehending the state. Political geographers can draw on work such as Gupta and Ferguson (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Gupta 2001), Secor (2007) van Beek (2001), and Verkaaik (2001) as promising examples of ethnographies of the state that focus on the capillary nature of state power and the miniscule, monotonous and mundane ways that the state is produced and reproduced through unexceptional activities like waiting, paying bribes, and filling out forms.

Into this discussion, Painter (2006:760) introduces Bakhtin's valuation of prose as a vehicle for the "ebb and flow and complexities of everyday life." For Painter (2006:761), attention to prosaics draws out the heteroglossia or "many voicedness," of life in the state: we cannot meet the state except as performed by the police officer or teacher (or soldier) – this being the case, "the outcome of state actions is always uncertain and fallible." Following on these observations,

Painter (2006) suggests topics for political geographies of stateness, including: attention to the porosity of the boundary between state and civil society; the uneven spatiality of "statization" as inscribed in territory and evident in the maintenance and transgression of borders; how "statization" takes place in response to phenomenon such as terrorism; and "the prosaic construction of the *idea* of the state." For Painter (2006:755), statization is the "gradual process through which society becomes increasingly dependent on, or dominated by, relations with the state," but this process is never completed.

In response to Painter we might well ask: what do the prosaics of geopolitical practice look like? Much like the state effect, geopolitical discourse tends toward reification. State boundaries and strategic locations solidify through material and representational practice, and the people who daily produce them fade into the background, only to emerge when geopolitical strategy does not play out as intended – as, for example, when U.S. wars based on geopolitical reasoning in Vietnam and Iraq are complicated by the complexity of allegiances and practices on the ground. As the state effect seems to separate out the state from our daily lives, so does a geopolitical effect produce a boundary between our lived experience and the political jockeying of states for strategic control of territory or resources. If we approach geopolitical configurations, such as the complicated conflict of interest in J&K, as social facts that are daily constituted on the ground, can we unravel the taken-for-granted and unassailable logic of those configurations? Drawing on Painter, is there an uneven geopoliticization in which

some spaces are the focus of intensified geopolitical effects, and other spaces in which individuals resist the geopoliticization of everyday life?

Feminist approaches to the geopolitical and theoretical approaches to the state that begin with the everyday share an ontological underpinning that rejects the privileging of macro logics over micro processes. The implicit dislodging of vertical scale that these projects entail is made into an explicit and thorough unraveling of scalar thinking in the work of Marston, Jones and Woodward (2005). Marston *et al*. ask us to let go of hierarchical scale to embrace instead a flat ontology: by beginning from sites, rather than from predetermined scalar fields, we can understand the world as intermeshed unfoldings – in which there the existence of repetition and stratification does not exclude the possibility of newness.

The importance of this openness is borne out by the case of geopolitical practice in Leh district. Bodies as political and territorial sites participate in the endless repetition through the inscribing of religion onto territory and onto bodies, when residents invoke narratives of political-religious difference, and accede to cease eating with and marrying one another. On occasion, however, the bodily imperatives (desire, or defense of the body from harm) compel that potentiality to refuse – in that moment, the geopolitical work of making bodies into territories is undone.

In this dissertation, I work to mediate reified notions of geopolitics as a macro process (e.g. the India-Pakistan conflict) by exploring how individuals

reflect on, produce and resist micro-geopolitics (e.g. by affirming or negating political-religious boundaries through marriage or child-bearing). The territorialization of the body, the home, and of the district, is inherently related to what Nelson (2006:370) terms the "geopolitical positioning" of groups-in-formation, that is, "each community's position within broader configurations of nation, race and state territoriality." In my MA research, I observed that individual life histories intersected with, or were told through the lens of geopolitics, as when a Muslim woman drew a contrast between the time in her life when there was war between India and Pakistan and the time in her life when there was conflict between Buddhists and Muslims.

Building on this observation, my dissertation traces how the changing geopolitical context has been constituted on the ground. In her work on Palestinians in the Galilee, Kanaaneh (2002:1) argues that "Family planning is now part of the social processes…in which gender is configured, communities are imagined, and boundaries of the modern are drawn." When Muslim Ladakhis are imagined to maximize fertility, will Buddhists do the same? When registrars at the courthouse will not register the marriage licenses of Buddhist-Muslim couples, compelling them to leave Ladakh, what are the repercussions? When neighbors' religious identity suddenly has new meaning, how does the signification and surveillance of bodies change?

As will be described in the appended papers, one of the key changes is in the degree to which intimacy is allowed. While the percentage of Ladakhis who

have relatives across the religious divide is evidence of significant intermarriage in the past, today the overwhelming majority is against the practice (see Figures 1-3). While the move against intermarriage thus appears to have been fairly successful, on the other hand, the push for Buddhists to eschew family planning for political reasons appears not to have significantly limited the use of family planning in and around Leh town. These findings are discussed in Appendices B and C.

Contributions of the dissertation:

This work contributes to geography and social science in three primary ways:

a) It negotiates the analytical distance between nation-state tensions and every day practices by demonstrating that geopolitics is simultaneously micro and macro in its manifestations. This formulation builds on feminist political theory and nascent feminist geopolitics by introducing the body, fertility and intimacy as territorialized and territorializing sites.[3]

b) It humanizes and materializes the abstract study of geopolitics by foregrounding the ordinary actors who are consistently left out of political and geopolitical analysis.

c) It pushes demography onto new ground through attention to the politicization of fertility and the role that fertility choices play in national political tensions as well as its meaning for individuals and families.

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3 i.e., as sites that are struggled over and that can become tools to control territory.

Explanation of the dissertation format and future research directions:

This dissertation consists of three articles: one has already been submitted and accepted for publication in *Geopolitics* (see Appendix B), and the other two will be submitted this summer to *Geoforum* (see Appendix A), and *The Annals of the American Association of Geographers* (see Appendix C). Due to my condensed time frame for the completion of the dissertation, some of the articles resulting from this dissertation research cannot be included here. To provide a sense of the greater scope of the research results, however, I am ending with a summary of the articles that I have and intend to develop out of this project.

The article, "Geopolitical Bodies: Population and Political Geography" (Appendix A) emerges out of an independent study directed by Paul Robbins in spring of 2006 and is intended as an exploration of the value and potential of viewing the demographic as part of geopolitical projects. This paper does not revolve around my case study in Ladakh, but is rather conceived as a review of literature on politics and population and an outline of a theory on geopolitical bodies, with a loosely sketched analysis of the United States' global policies on the provision of abortion (the "Mexico City Policy," or "Global Gag Rule").

The second article, "The Domestication of Geopolitics: Buddhist-Muslim Conflict and the Policing of Marriage and the Body in Ladakh, India," (Appendix B) was submitted from the field and has been accepted for publication in *Geopolitics*. This paper argues for the need to destabilize the global scale of geopolitical analysis and explores this approach by tracing the ways that

geopolitical conflict in Ladakh has played out in intimate terms by shifting who does and does not marry or eat together.

The third article, "A Geopolitics of Intimacy and Anxiety: Religion, Territory and Fertility in Leh District, Jammu and Kashmir, India ," (Appendix C) builds on this project by exploring the intersecting meanings of marriage and babies. What do marriage and babies mean to politicians intent on managing religiously-marked blocks of voters, and how do those meanings impinge on or diverge from the meanings given to those who chose who to marry and how many children to have in this charged political context?

In addition to the three articles included here, I intend to develop the following as articles or book chapters over the next two years.

1. For *Population, Space and Place:* A paper about the quantitative and qualitative results that is partly about what stories can/cannot be told with numbers, i.e. about the political/ethical consideration and value of quantitative methods that also addresses the political nature of numbers. This paper will draw on qualitative and quantitative data from the dissertation work to illustrate what can be done with each – for example the quantitative data reveals the extent of family connections that blur the religious boundaries, and also enabled a more frank and productive discussion with local informants in Ladakh during the research – something invaluable since the conflict is about numbers. Quantitative data obscures, however, the diversity of marriage

practices, and the subjective reasons people attribute to their use of family planning techniques.

2. For *Gender, Place, and Culture*: A paper on bodily imperatives, bodily desires, and bodies that eat and dance together as an imperfect challenge to political narratives. Is the desiring body itself a source of resistance against fascist narratives? Fate and lanchaks (karmic burdens) surface as Buddhist-Muslim explanations of desires that are uncontrollable. These days, the legitimation of Buddhist-Muslim desire in marriage is effectively regulated within the policed space of Leh district, but the desire itself is not. Different kinds of bodily imperatives do different work: women insist on family planning (privately), but support the anti-intermarriage agreement. Why?
3. For *The Journal of Asian Studies*: an article on literacy, religion and division. In interview after interview, individuals made elaborate arguments explaining to me why more education and more money equal more conflict. Why can't Buddhists and Muslims marry today? Often I'm told that it is because now people have more understanding and are more literate and 'know' their religion in ways they did not in the past. This observation is inextricable from a greater surveillance and disciplining of the body; e.g. Muslims were told not to dance, sing, watch TV, Muslim girls learning how and why they should practice veiling, teachings for Buddhists, study groups, *bodyik* groups (in which Buddhists learn to read religious texts in Tibetan), teens becoming vegetarian.

4. For *Professional Geographer*: What did they know and when did they know it? A paper about participatory research, the limits of sharing data and the potential of sharing methods, and group oral history as a way of questioning common knowledge and building inter-group consensus and community.
5. For *Social and Cultural Geographies*: a paper on landscape and memory. How religion is built into the landscape and how the landscape is a deceptive memory archive. How do the changing meanings of religious structures tie to shifts in religious identity? For example, what happens when the temple moves from the mountainside into the bazaar?

PRESENT STUDY

The methods, results, and conclusions of this study are presented in the paper appended to this dissertation. The following is a summary of the most important findings in this document, and the methodology as conceived and deployed in the field.

Methodological Approach

A theoretical shift from critiquing representations of geopolitics to an engagement with embodied geopolitical practices requires a shift in methodology – but this is not an easy proposition. Critical geopolitics can begin from easily accessible, published texts or the ubiquitous rhetoric of powerful politicians; by arguing that geopolitics is likewise constituted in the intimacies of falling in love (or not), having children (or not), and dinner table discussions, I set for myself a rather difficult path and yet, I believe, ultimately a hopeful one that foregrounds the humanity and effectivities of the subjects/agents of geopolitical practice. Moving from the war room to the bedroom raises difficult questions of truth, power, and ethics. When it comes to our phenomenological lives, what kinds of truths can be produced, and to what purpose?

Truth and Numbers: who counts for what?

In recent years, following on the cultural turn, human geography, and perhaps feminist geography in particular, has had a love affair with qualitative methods (Crang 2002); meanwhile, government agencies, international development

agencies, politicians, transnational corporations and the popular press continue to trade in numbers, seemingly unconcerned with damning critiques of positivist science. Numbers may fail to capture the complexity of reality, they may provide a false sense of objectivity and underwrite disembodied forms of knowledge (Haraway 1991; Harding 1986; McLafferty 1995); at the same time as acknowledging these critiques, it is crucial to engage with quantitative methods at least to enter into or disrupt the conversations already in progress.

From a feminist perspective, Mattingly and Falconer-Al-Hindi's (1995) assessment still holds true – without "aim[ing] for a knowledge of the world that is total and exhaustive," counting can be a progressive project. Following Scheper Hughes (1997:204):

> Necessary empirical research of this kind need not be empiricist – that is, it need not entail a philosophical commitment to Enlightenment notions of reason, objects and truth. Empirical work can be guided by critical-interpretive concerns about the inevitable partiality of truths and about the various and contradictory meanings that facts and events have in the existential, cultural, and political sense.

The objective is to determine, "which questions can be answered by traditional quantitative methods, and how do these questions fit with broader feminist academic and political concerns" (McLafferty 1995). Stewart and Cole (2002) supplement this perspective with the argument that it is the junction of qualitative and quantitative data that is crucial to feminist research, and that such research requires a pragmatic and creative approach.

McLafferty argues that it is more productive to engage with science and positivism than to avoid those practices and discourses. As she observes, the

necessity of simplification and the use of categories in quantitative methods does misrepresent diversity; numbers, however, can also be very compelling. In 1995 McLafferty cited, as an example, the fact that only one of every ten full-time professors of geography in the United States was a woman. This quantitative representation of the field indicates an extent of structural inequality that would be lost in individual women's accounts of their experiences in academia.

Looking at the geopolitics of reproductive health, we could cite the 80,000 deaths a year caused by unsafe abortions in developing countries (Berer 2000), and note that these deaths are tied to quantitatively measurable cuts in funding related to US aid policies. Examining the spatiality of this, we could further quantify it at a variety of scales or sites: globally, unsafe abortions in Africa are 700 times more likely to lead to death than in a developing country, in hospitals in Bangladesh 50% of beds in the gynecology wings are occupied by women recovering from abortion complications, and so forth (Berer 2000). These statistics do not tell us about the individual experience of one young woman's life, her unwanted pregnancy, the individual circumstances that led to her reliance on unsafe abortion providers, nor does it tell us about how she made sense of her own life, or how her family and friends made sense of her death; however, the statistic does reveal some partial and strategically important truths about the human cost of current regimes of aid and about the power relations that run through population and reproductive health policies.

Quantitative methods may, to some extent, dehumanize the relationship between researcher and researched, but it is impossible to create relationships with the population of an entire region – quantitative methods can make it possible to provide at least a partial sense of lives that otherwise might be lost if only small scale studies were used. To make the most of quantitative research, ideally it needs to be done in tandem with more fine-grained work. Large datasets showing difference and discrimination can be meaningful even if we acknowledge they are partial truths, even more so when they are used in conjunction with other methods of documentation such as oral histories.

Miner-Rubino *et al* (Miner-Rubino, Jayaratne, and Konik 2007) suggest that surveys, in particular, can be useful for feminist research because they can influence policy, as well as help understand the spatial distribution of particular phenomenon and beliefs, even as we understand their limitation and tendency to oversimplify. From their perspective, good science is feminist science, that is, it limits claims, questions assumptions, and tries to understand the how objectivity is hampered.

In my research on the geopolitics of fertility, an engagement with quantitative methods for measuring fertility has been a necessity. Seeking to intervene in the ways that fertility statistics have been used to tell stories about groups of people, how could I not engage with the numbers that dominate such discussions? The use of numbers has been valuable in several ways that surprised me – for instance, when I interviewed politicians and the heads of organizations in

the summer of 2008, I could ask them follow up questions based on my data. When one Buddhist activist told me that Buddhist women should not use family planning, I told him that the women I spoke with felt it was a crucial necessity for modern life and that both Buddhist and Muslim women were using it enthusiastically – because they wanted to send their children to private schools. This elicited a more thorough argument from him about the spatiality of high Muslim fertility (claiming it is only in very specific sites), as well as a class argument stating that rural women send their children to private schools only because it is a "fashion." The quantitative data also allowed me to understand the extent to which there were inter-religious marriages in the past (see Figures 1-3), and the extent to which these are frowned on today.

How do individuals make sense of their lives and of their position within the collectivities that aggregate data seeks to measure and represent? Reading in the newspaper that the population of Ladakh (Leh and Kargil districts) is 237 thousand how might a resident of Leh conceive of themselves in a country of more than one billion? Hearing rumors that Ladakhi Muslims are having more children than Buddhists, how might an individual feel when they fall in love with someone of the "wrong" religion? Hearing these rumors, do individuals think: "this has nothing to do with me," or do they begin to see their own lives caught up in aggregates that produce the future of their district, their region, their state or our world? The answers to these questions cannot be separated from the

positionality of the subject, but the answers elicited are also caught up in the researcher's positionality.

A nod to the reflexivity and situatedness of the researcher has become *de rigueur* in most arenas of qualitative research. This can only be seen as a step in the right direction, however, as researchers acknowledge that they are not in possession of the neutral and objective "vision from everywhere and nowhere" that Haraway (1991) referred to as the god trick. Taken on seriously, the challenge to acknowledge the partial and situated nature of knowledge production is an important and invaluable political project. It is important, however, to explore in a critical way the motivations for and results of this situated production of knowledge. Not an easy and straightforward project, it is possible for the process of situating knowledge to become another means for legitimating that produced knowledge, for claiming innocence when enmeshed in colonial relationships, or for turning attention back to the researcher (e.g. researcher as noble, self-deprecating hero). This approach cannot be used as a simple method to close down the painful and political messiness of the researcher-researched relationship.

Ten years ago, Rose argued that

> No feminist should produce knowledge that claims to have universal applicability to all women (or men). This argument was preceded by a critique of the way the feminisms of white straight women ignored the specificities of black and lesbian women; more recently, with the academic institutionalization of at least some feminisms, it is also an argument directed at academic women (still mostly straight and white, especially in geography) whose knowledges may exclude others (Rose 1997:305).

This is an important observation, but also, as Rose observes, one that must be taken up with care; assumptions about where difference lies can reinforce problematic categories rather than destabilize them. If, instead of asking the questions above, about Ladakhi identity, I spend time in "red states," and "blue states," to explore whether abortion and fertility practices are shaped by adherence to particular political parties, can I hope to speak more authoritatively about the experiences of white women with these issues? As Rose suggests, such lines of argument and aspirations of reflexive transparency are ultimately doomed to fail, and a more hopeful project is to acknowledge the co-constitutive process of producing (rather than discovering) knowledge.

One of the ways this sort of knowledge production can be addressed is by troubling the spatial imaginary, and requisite difference, of here and there that underlies some of the assumptions on which much fieldwork is based. In anthropology, and, to some degree also in geography, the centrality of the field as a place distanced from home can be further problematized (Amit 2000). Pointing out the limited nature of reflexivity, Kobayashi (2003) suggests that reflexivity can be too personalized and over-indulgent: reading "yet another" self-reflexive account of a white graduate student learning about "the other," she feels that this kind of work might reinforce difference rather than deconstruct it. Moving forward from this critique, Kobayashi argues that reflexivity should be an ancillary part of our work and that we should acknowledge that it is not enough. Coming at the same problem from a different direction is Miraftab's (2004:602)

observation that some accounts of reflexivity assume a certain relationship between researcher and research participants; that is, we should rethink the idea of participants as passive and pay attention to the ways participants interpret and construct a relationship with the researcher: "a dichotomous interpretation of the relationship between the researched and the researcher that presumes the researcher to be the privileged member of a polar relationship risks victimizing the research participants as subjects of the researcher's privilege and power." The ideas of Miraftab and Kobayashi build on contributions made by Mohanty (Mohanty 1991a, 1991b) twenty years ago concerning the danger of homogenizing experiences into the category "third world woman." For Mohanty (1991:4), it is important not to generalize about either third world feminisms or Western feminisms: "it is not color or sex which constructs the ground for [feminist] struggles. Rather, it is the way we think about race, class and gender – the political links we choose to make among and between struggles." Twenty years of struggling with these questions have not led to a resolution, as we can see in a recent discussion with feminist scholar-activists in Pune India cited by Nagar (2002:179):

> When feminist scholars from Western countries come here to do their research, they often try hard to do everything in our local language and idiom. But why is it that when they return to their institutions, they frequently write in ways that are totally inaccessible and irrelevant to us?...[Suppose] you tell my story in a way that makes not sense at the conceptual level to me or my community, why would we care what you have to say about my life?

This quote hints at both the problems with narrow uses of reflexivity and points toward a way forward, one that we can argue is explicitly spatial. The discourse of fieldwork continues to be problematically based on spatial imaginaries of difference that naturalize the connections between cultural practices and specific places, producing a stubborn us versus them mentality, what Gupta and Ferguson (1997) describe as a focus on the "power of topography," rather than on the "topography of power": ethical discussions about what "we" owe "them" reinscribe the colonial assumptions about both the shared identity of researchers and the perceived difference of their objects of study. One way that we can move out of this dilemma is to spatialize the problem, and shift thinking from the individual to the institutional spaces (and our participation in them) that generate and reinforce certain kinds of reflexivity while closing off others. According to Nagar (2002:182), in the US, academic reflexivity has meant, "examining the identities of the individual researcher rather than the ways in which those identities intersect with institutional, geopolitical and material aspects of their positionality."

Ethics & Reflexively Participatory Methods: the geopolitics of everyday research

The work of Katz (2001), Nagar (2002), Larner (2000), Pratt (2000) others provides inspiration, if not conclusive answers, for a reflexive participatory research and constitutes, if not a response, at least an engagement, with Spivak's (1988) and hooks's (1984) trenchant critiques of those who seek to speak on behalf of others. Keys to such a project include: humility and the willingness to

make small rather than sweeping claims; acknowledging the co-constitutive and collaborative nature of research; avoiding the trap of legitimating authoritative claims through shallow reflexivity; producing research that can speak to a variety of audiences and engaging with research participants in ways that do not reinforce or assume specific types of power relations.

Nagar (Nagar and collective 2003) provides a particularly compelling challenge to easy escapes from the difficult problem of relevancy in research when she observes that she could filter her work in Northern India through several hot theoretical approaches that might garner accolades in the academy and indifference among the women activists that she works with in Northern India. The challenge for postcolonial and feminist geographers, then, is to conceptualize border-crossings that are committed to forming collaborative partnerships with academic and non-academic actors in 'other' worlds, in every sense of the term – partnerships in which the questions around how power and authority would be shared cannot be answered beforehand, but are imagined, struggled over and resolved through the collaborative process itself (Nagar 2003:369). This constitutes a major challenge, but a worthwhile one, and one thoroughly embedded in geopolitical relationships in such a way as to form a productive aspect of a feminist counter-geopolitics research agenda.

For me, the struggle has been to understand how to work with individuals who do not wish to publicly challenge the pressures facing them, preferring instead on an individual basis to make private choices that resist divisive projects.

I had naïvely hoped, for example, to work with a women's organization on issues of women's health as part of my participant observation. In Ladakh, I met with leaders and members of the Sunni Women's Center, the Shia Al-Zohra women's group, and the Buddhist Women's Alliance of Ladakh (WAL), only to find they are not interested in women's health. There are no women's organizations in Leh that work on reproductive health issues – in fact, some members of one organization, WAL, actively campaign against family planning. The only health-related activity I was able to engage in was assisting Jennifer Aengst and Rural Development and You in planning a "Women for Women's Health" event in collaboration with local doctors. That the event was well attended by an enthusiastic group of Buddhist and Muslim women indicates interest in information about reproductive health. My sense (confirmed by interviews with some health professionals in Leh) is that women's organizations will not actively participate in promoting women's health if that involves family planning because to do so would be to lose the political capital that they have worked hard to establish over many years.

Methods and Data Collected

The research for this dissertation was conducted over 11 months in the field in two periods – mid-June to mid-August 2007, and mid-December 2007 to mid-September 2008. During this time, I conducted a survey on reproductive decisions, choices around marriage, and opinions about religion and religious conflict. I surveyed a sample of 192 women, stratified by age and religion (see

Table 6). I engaged 50 of these women in longer semi-structured interviews about their lives and how their experiences relate to political events in Leh district and, when feasible, I discussed some of the same questions with men in the villages or neighborhoods – these comprise 10 additional interviews. In Leh, I interviewed thirteen political, religious and association leaders including the heads of religious organizations, women's organizations, and active politicians. I also did two participatory oral history projects.

The survey was intended to develop a broad sense of the logic of fertility choices in Leh. In the survey I asked what kinds of factors are taken into account when making marriage and fertility choices, what the desired family size is, as well as questions to determine the degree to which individuals' families cross religious lines. As per the discussions above, I did not expect these surveys to reveal "the truth," about fertility practices and marriage; however, I do believe they were an important component of a partial knowledge of the complexity of factors implicit in these choices, as well as a strategically useful tool for grounding ideas about what it means to be Ladakhi in a broader context. For example, I suspected, based on my previous interviews, that there was a significant degree of interrelationship between Buddhists and Muslims in Leh; the survey has been invaluable in eliciting this kind of contextual data to destabilize the idea that there are two Ladakhi communities. (See Appendix E for the survey questions.)

While surveys provided a broad overview of fertility practices, they could not answer the question of what fertility and marriage decisions mean to individuals in a politically charged context. To get at the intersections between individual lived experience and the political and cultural material of everyday life, I engaged in oral histories, with questions targeted at these specific issues. These questions included asking what kinds of discussions happen around family planning and marriage decisions and what cultural and political factors come into play in these discussions. How do individuals feel about having children? Do they see their own lives in a different light than that of their parents? What kinds of pressures do they face or imagine in relationship to their religious identities, if any?

These interviews, which were less structured than the surveys, also allowed me to pursue lines of questioning particular to that interviewee – for instance those who had witnessed events such as the burning of Muslim homes in 1989 or in Phyang in 2006. These potential lines of questioning were only evident once the interview was in process, e.g. when a woman in Leh volunteered the burning of her father-in-law's home as an example of Buddhist-Muslim conflict and its ties to the female body (saying that the reason for such acts was Muslim marriage to Buddhist women). Similarly, it was only once an interview was underway that Hasina and I might learn that a woman had been born into a Buddhist family and converted later to Islam. The open nature of semi-structured interviewing allowed me to request further details for those cases.

In the interview process, I have not found a way to get around the co-production of knowledge, nor would I want to: I think that ethically it is imperative to be open about the meaning of my questions, the intent of my work, and about my own position in Ladakh. Leh is a small town and it is common for people to recognize me and identify me as part of a Buddhist family – this made it all the more important for the interview to be a two-way process in which information is exchanged, and not just extracted. In particular, I faced the problem of being interpreted as "Buddhist," in ways that either dismantle or arm individuals' defense mechanisms: to make my research ethical (and productive), I had to explain the purpose of my research clearly, and find ways to destabilize expectations of me. I did this by visiting Muslim areas where I did not have prior contacts with my Muslim research assistant, Hasina, or by expressing sympathy and affirmation when respondents asked me what I thought about their situation.

Major Findings

Findings will be described in greater detail in the appended papers, but a brief summary of some of the major findings is included here.

Summary

Views on marriage, fertility and family choices are inflected with current political narratives. That is, individuals do make reference to political strategies when talking about the personal choices of themselves or others. Some aspects of family decision-making are being shaped or determined by emerging political-

religious identity practices. Interviewees report less engagement with friends and relatives of different religions, and they point to the 1989 social boycott as the breaking point. These changes are framed as being part of an inevitable shift towards "modernity," the result of increased wealth and competition, or the product of politics and politicians' need to rely on voting blocks. Tensions between Buddhists and Muslims are often attributed to politics, but are described in terms of interpersonal relationships (eating together, fistfights, marriages).

Young people – both the students who participated in the oral history project and others I interviewed – express both anxieties and hopes for the future as they relate to conflict between religious groups. Thus, one young Shia university student tells me that her Buddhist friend "has no future," because she is having an affair with a Muslim, and several oral history participants reported that their fears were for future communal conflict.

Marriage

It's common for Ladakhis to proclaim that today "everyone" has love marriage, however, as indicated in Table 7, this does not appear to be the case – if anything, young women today claim to prefer arranged marriage over love marriage. They cite risk as the chief reason for this preference – informing me repeatedly that if you choose your own spouse you will not be well-enough informed about their family and background, and that furthermore, if your family chooses your spouse and there are problems, your family will support you or invite you back home. The overwhelming majority of Ladakhi Buddhists and Muslims are against

intermarriage between Buddhists and Muslims, however, their family histories suggest that these kinds of marriages were not prevented in the very recent past. I spoke with four women who had married someone of the other religion and converted, but I did not meet anyone who had successfully married across the religious line since the end of the social boycott.

Fertility

Every woman I spoke with was aware of religious restrictions on family planning. Most had heard pro-natal arguments with arguments made based on both religious claims (i.e. that family planning is a sin) and, for Buddhists, territorial claims (i.e. that use of family planning cedes territory to an expanding Muslim population). That said, it was rare for women to state that they did not use family planning for religious reasons (three women in total – one Buddhist and two Shia Muslims). More often they listed reasons why family planning was problematic, but then went on to describe that they had not known about its sinful nature during their reproductive years, or to state that the prohibition on family planning should only be applied to those women who were healthier or wealthier. This was true across economic classes – unemployed women whose husbands did poorly paid manual labor told me about their struggles to pay for private school for their children, and said that those families in which the parents had steady jobs should have more children. Within those families in which both parents did have steady jobs, women told me that if they had fewer children they could send them to better private schools in large Indian cities. This research indicates that women will

pursue family planning to the extent that it is available. It is possible, however, that the methods used to limit family size may change. Several women suggested that they would not use sterilization, because it is permanent and thus more politically sanctioned, but that instead they would use an IUD to permanently limit their fertility.

TABLE **1**: METHODS

Question	Method, Analysis and Data	Sample and Strategy
Objective 1: To examine fertility decision-making with explicit attention to the following points:		
Whether fertility and desired family size correlate with religion, generation, education, income and/or other variables	**Survey**: fixed response & open-ended questions concerning factors related to fertility and desired family size. Testing for correlations between fertility and religion, economic factors, educational status and other salient factors. *Data:* Qualitative and quantitative data on the present and past composition of Ladakhi families, desired family size, and factors considered during spouse selection and family planning.	**Sample:** 192 **Sampling Strategy:** Divided Leh into neighborhoods, started with acquaintances and used snowball and convenience sampling.
Objective 2: To document the ways that individuals reflect on their own and others' family decisions		
A) Key factors behind family decisions; and how they view others' decisions (and if decisions are explained through identity or geopolitics)	**Oral histories** (Narrative analysis) In-depth oral histories of households on the meanings attributed to decision-making, and the relationship between decision-making and the geopolitical context. *Data:* Qualitative data on how women understand their life choices, especially the decision to marry and have children, and the negotiation of family and societal pressures.	**Sample:** 60 **Sampling Strategy:** Mixed purposeful sampling. Drawing on the pool of participants above, I used maximum variation sampling, stratified purposeful sampling, and extreme case sampling (here, inter-religious marriages).
B) Whether and how national and international narratives of identity or political position are invoked	Semi-structured interviews 25 semi-structured interviews with informants, comprising 10 interviews with local politicians and 15 interviews with participants from the general population. *Data:* Qualitative data on how individuals discuss the lives and decisions of those around them.	**Sample:** 25 **Sampling Strategy:** Politicians were recruited via the snowball technique (due to relative inaccessibility *and* the small sample frame), and the sample survey.

Objective 3: To document the ways that national and international geopolitical pressures are reflected or resisted through interaction between Buddhists and Muslims in Ladakh, through an examination of the following:		
A) On what occasions and to what purpose Buddhists and Muslims interact;	**Participant Observation:** Participant observation at political events, private events (e.g. when invited to social gatherings) and daily participation in spatial interaction. *Data*. The spatiality of political/religious identity: where do events take place; what signification is attributed to places?	Not applicable
B) How town, neighborhood, and household facilitate or restrict interactions	**Community-based Ethnographies**. I worked with a pilot group at SECMOL, and then with a group in Leh to compile oral histories and visual representations of their neighborhoods. *Data:* Documenting of generational or more recent change in the religious integration or segregation of households and neighborhoods.	**Sample:** 2 small groups of 15 and 10 students **Sampling Strategy:** Students in Leh were recruited through the principal's office at Islamia Model School, Lamdon Model School, Boys' and Girls' Higher Secondary.
C) How Leh and Ladakh is described in relationship to the national & international context	Oral histories (described above); Semi-structured interviews (described above); Community-based Ethnographies (described above) *Data*: References to demography and community geographies that coincide with *or disrupt* discussions of local political identity and/or geopolitics.	**Oral histories** (described above) Semi-structured interviews (described above) Community-based Ethnographies (described above)

TABLE **2**: REASONS FOR LIMITING FERTILITY

Reasons to limit fertility	**As stated by the participant** To look up details about the participant see Table 4 by ID number.
General costs of raising children	"Oh, you can't have a lot today, everything is expensive." (#1)
Cost of education	"Yes, [my husband and I] talked about it and made the decision. Because if we have many children, how will they get an education?" (#7)
Health concerns	"Some say it destroys their body." (#1) "I had a 3rd child, a girl, and she died, then I did the operation. IUD didn't work for me, with IUD I had two children.I couldn't have any more children, it was dangerous for me." (#33).
Inability to provide desired level of care	"Having fewer children is nice because in terms of food and so on, you can provide for them…[if you have more] they won't get a good education." (#4) "Everything is expensive and there is so much competition. That being the case, if you have a lot of children, it won't be possible to get them everything. If you only have a few, you can give them everything, every kind of facility." (#5) "If they have more, how would they get an education? How would they be able to provide clothes? Tasty, nutritious food, how would they get it?" (#10)
If you have many children they "won't turn out well."	"Nothing will happen to the parents [if you have many children] but for the children things won't turn out well The children won't have a happy life." (#10)
Need for inheritance in land	"They won't get land if there are more. It's happier to have fewer children." (#31).
Anxiety and stress from children	"I'm scared to death of another child…I have a headache just from my two." (#1) "Looking at today's conditions, how can you avoid [family planning]? If you have 12 children, you won't even be able to clothe them and keep them clean. Even taking care of 2 children, it reduces women to tears." (#32)
It's impossible not to use family planning	"They say not to use family planning. That's what they will keep saying but it is impossible. If we don't block it, we'll end up unconscious. Whatever they say about it in the religion, we still have to do it." (#40).

TABLE **3**: REASONS FOR NOT LIMITING FERTILITY

Reasons	**As stated by the participant (not in regard to their own choices)**
They come with their own luck	"Even if people are really poor, they say every child comes with their own luck. There are methods, but it's better not to have them. They will come with their own luck (*sode*). There are those people from outside [Ladakh], those ones who work on the road and so on, and they have lots of children…every year, one after another…They don't die. It should be harder for them. For us, living in our own country, it should be less of a problem." (#2) "In the past, however many children you had, it didn't matter. Now because of education, if you have fewer, it feels good…But *rinpoches* say not to do that. People say, 'only have a few, and give those few a good education. But there are two things about that. About education, however many children you have, they bring their own luck (*sode*), and they carry that. So as many children as someone has, if the mother and father really make an effort, there's no one who won't be able to care for them. That's what I think." (#9)
Population concerns	"Some talk about Buddhists and Muslims, and say that Buddhists have had fewer children and as a result our population is smaller. With that in mind, some are now having more children. Since Baltis don't use family planning, they just let them all be born, so they have had so many children and their population is really growing." (#1) "Last year, with the LBA, 25 of us went on a tour to explain to people not to do it. Because the Muslims (*Chipa*), they totally don't do it. Not at all. And for that reason, their population is growing, their population is really big now." (#9)
Sin	"Among Buddhists, if you kill a bug, it's a sin. So, if you kill a person that is worse. And now *rinpoches* like Drukchen rinpoche are saying, 'Aren't you ashamed?'" (#3) "Like *rinpoches*, our moulvis say we shouldn't do sterilization. They say, as many as you have, you should just let them be born. They will bring what they need from God (*Khuda*)." (#13)
Disruption of reincarnation	"[My neighbor] was reborn in the neighbor's family…as a very young child, he used to say, I would have been born again to that famiy, that was my intention. Bud the door was closed. Because in that family, the father's son's wife had used family planning." (#3)\
Availability of methods	"In the past there was no one to tell them, and there wasn't a method to have fewer children." (#4)

	"At that time, there was nothing to prevent getting pregnant…would we have had that kind of thing? At that time we didn't even have a single pill or medicine. We didn't even know when we were pregnant...In my time, we didn't know this thing of going to the doctor to have a baby." (#9) "In our time, there was nothing like that…my life is over and I've never even saw the door of the hospital. Nowadays they just have one child and then rush to the hospital for family planning." (#29).
Loneliness (of the child)	"I think it's really nice to have two or maybe three. I was sorry to have only one…I think it's nice for a child to have a companion. With just one they do get an education, but it's nice for them to have a companion so they don't get lonely or bored." (#5)
Loneliness (of the parent)	"If you look at my sister-in-law, she has six children. When they were young, it looked pathetic because they all needed clothes and everything and her husband didn't have a job and she didn't have a job. But now it looks so happy, it's a big family with lots of children. Sometimes all my 3 children are far away." (#71),
Risk	"If there's only one child, that's not enough. If they survive, that's fine, but what if something happens?" (#6) "If the children turn out nice, then they'll take care of the parents. Otherwise, it there's only one, what if s/he abandons the parents? But, then again, If children turn out bad then even two or three might abandon the parents. Some children just cause the parents trouble." (#13)
Wanted more children	"No, I didn't do any family planning because I wanted another child. After the boy, I never got pregnant again." (#17)
Accidental pregnancy	"My IUD failed, and then they say it is a sin to have an abortion, so I just let him be born. The boy." (#13)
Poverty	It's the poor who have more, they are having 3 or 4 children, and that is their life. They are not thinking about whether they can afford it." (#17)

Reasons for spacing fertility	As stated by the participant
Health	Abortion is a really big sin, but it's ok to put a gap if it is necessary for our health. (#32)
Lack of child care	"I thought there weren't people at home to take care of the child, so it would be hard to have a lot at once." (#2)
Not a sin	[S: is LBA saying not to put a gap?] "They won't say not to put a gap. It's ok to put a gap. There are those who do the operation not to have any children. But there are those who put the IUD, and then later you can take it out and allow the children to come." (#9) "Our own bodies, they don't have the ability to have a child one after another. If you have a child every year, you yourself won't survive…for that reason, in our religion, it's ok to space your children." (#32)

Reasons for not spacing	As stated by participants
Not available	"I didn't put gaps, at that time they didn't have that thing which puts gaps between your children." (#10)
Sin	"Yes, it we put a gap that is sin (*nyespa*), if we do the operation, that is forbidden (*gunna*)." [but note that this participant has done tubal ligation] (#34)

TABLE **4**: PARTICIPANTS BY ID

ID	Age	Religion	Gender	Children	Residence	Married
1	40	Buddhist	Female	2	Leh	Yes
2	57	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
3	57	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
4	51	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
5	56	Buddhist	Female	1	Leh	Yes
6	54	Buddhist	Female	2	Leh	Yes
7	35	Buddhist	Female	3	Stakna	Yes
8	29	Buddhist	Female	2	Leh	Yes
9	68	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
10	66	Buddhist	Female	6	Leh	Yes
11	44	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
12	65	Buddhist	Female	2	Leh	Yes
13	40	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
14	31	Sunni	Female	3	Leh	Yes
15	60	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
16	46	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
17	49	Shia	Female	1	Leh	Yes
18	39	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
19	21	Buddhist	Female		Leh	No
20	31	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
21	45	Buddhist	Female	5	Leh	Yes
22	64	Buddhist	Female	4	Leh	Yes
23	34	Buddhist	Female	2	Leh	Yes
24	32	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
25	70	Sunni	Female	5	Leh	Yes
26	32	Buddhist	Female	2	Leh	Yes
27	36	Sunni	Female	1	Leh	Yes
28	34	Buddhist	Female	2	Leh	Yes
29	43	Shia	Female	6	Chushot	Yes
30	50	Shia	Female	5	Chushot	Yes
31	105	Sunni	Female	6	Chushot	Yes
32	40	Shia	Female	1	Chushot	Yes
33	30	Shia	Female	2	Chushot	Yes
34	45	Shia	Female	4	Chushot	Yes
35	40	Shia	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
36	40	Shia	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
37	28	Sunni	Female	1	Leh	Yes
38	75	Sunni	Female	3	Chushot	Yes

ID	Age	Religion	Gender	Children	Residence	Married
39	70	Sunni	Male		Chushot	Yes
40	39	Buddhist	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
41	53	Sunni	Male	3	Chushot	Yes
42	35	Sunni	Male		Chushot	No
43	48	Sunni	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
44	40	Sunni	Male		Chushot	Yes
45	40	Sunni	Female	2	Chushot	Yes
46	37	Sunni	Female	2	Chushot	Yes
47	45	Sunni	Male		Chushot	Yes
48	47	Sunni	Male		Chushot	Yes
49	46	Sunni	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
50	65	Sunni	Female	2	Chushot	Yes
51	30	Sunni	Female	2	Chushot	Yes
52	25	Sunni	Female		Chushot	
53	26	Buddhist	Female	1	Chushot	Yes
54	40	Shia	Female	6	Chushot	Yes
55	29	Buddhist	Female	2	Chushot	Yes
56	33	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
57	20	Shia	Female		Chushot	No
58	58	Sunni	Female	4	Chushot	Yes
59	23	Sunni	Female	1	Chushot	Yes
60	18	Sunni	Female		Chushot	
61	30	Buddhist	Female		Chushot	No
62	75	Shia	Female	5	Chushot	Yes
63	65	Buddhist	Female	4	Chushot	Yes
64	20	Buddhist	Female		Chushot	No
65	28	Shia	Female	2	Chushot	Yes
66	63	Buddhist	Female	10	Chushot	Yes
67	45	Shia	Female	5	Chushot	Yes
68	45	Buddhist	Female		Leh	
69	50	Buddhist	Female		Leh	
70	29	Buddhist	Female	1	Leh	Yes
71	54	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
72	72	Shia	Female	7	Chushot	Yes
73	28	Sunni	Female	1	Chushot	Yes
74	45	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
75	49	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
76	70	Buddhist	Female	5	Leh	Yes
77	40	Sunni	Female	3	Leh	Yes
78	40	Buddhist	Female	3	Phyang	Yes

ID	Age	Religion	Gender	Children	Residence	Married
79	64	Buddhist	Female	4	Leh	Yes
80	50	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
81	56	Shia	Female	3	Leh	Yes
82	22	Buddhist	Female		Leh	No
83	84	Buddhist	Female	4	Leh	Yes
84	65	Buddhist	Female	5	Leh	Yes
85	42	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
86	56	Buddhist	Female	4	Leh	Yes
87	65	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
88	55	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
89	62	Shia	Female	7	Chushot	Yes
90	25	Shia	Female	1	Chushot	Yes
91	22	Shia	Female	0	Chushot	No
92	25	Shia	Female	1	Thikse	Yes
93	40	Shia	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
94	38	Buddhist	Female	2	Chushot	Yes
95	29	Shia	Female		Chushot	Divorce
96	34	Buddhist	Female	2	Spituk	Yes
97	35	Buddhist	Female	2	Chushot	Yes
98	40	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
99	72	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
100	50	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
101	65	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
102	42	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
103	73	Buddhist	Female	7	Leh	Yes
104	20	Shia	Female	0	Chushot	No
105	45	Shia	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
106	23	Shia	Female		Chushot	No
107	26	Shia	Female	1	Chushot	Yes
108	55	Shia	Female	4	Chushot	Yes
109	32	Buddhist	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
110	40	Shia	Female	4	Chushot	Yes
111	80	Shia	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
112	55	Shia	Female	1	Chushot	Yes
113	40	Shia	Female	3	Chushot	Yes
114	45	Shia	Female		Chushot	
115	28	Sunni	Female	3	Thikse	Yes
116	50	Sunni	Female	5	Thikse	Yes
117	40	Sunni	Female	1	Thikse	Yes
118	33	Sunni	Female	1	Thikse	Yes

ID	Age	Religion	Gender	Children	Residence	Married
119	65	Buddhist	Female	8	Thikse	Yes
120	28	Sunni	Female	2	Thikse	Yes
121	30	Sunni	Female	2	Thikse	Yes
122	22	Buddhist	Female	0	Thikse	No
123	36	Sunni	Female	3	Thikse	Yes
124	70	Buddhist	Female	3	Thikse	Yes
125	34	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
126	48	Sunni	Female	2	Thikse	Yes
127	52	Buddhist	Female	3	Thikse	Yes
128	38	Buddhist	Female	3	Thikse	Yes
129	66	Buddhist	Female	6	Thikse	Yes
130	33	Sunni	Female	2	Thikse	Yes
131	30	Sunni	Female	2	Thikse	Yes
132	29	Sunni	Female	1	Leh	Yes
133	30	Sunni	Female		Leh	
134	40	Sunni	Female		Leh	
135	23	Sunni	Female		Leh	
136	29	Shia	Female	2	Leh	Yes
137	35	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
138	60	Sunni	Female	5	Leh	Yes
139	48	Sunni	Female		Leh	
140	33	Sunni	Female	1	Leh	Yes
141	23	Buddhist	Female	1	Leh	Yes
142	25	Shia	Female	1	Leh	Yes
143	26	Buddhist	Female	1	Leh	Yes
144	40	Buddhist	Female		Leh	
145	23	Buddhist	Female		Leh	No
146	29	Buddhist	Female	1	Leh	Yes
147	48	Buddhist	Female	2	Leh	Yes
148	36	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
149	28	Buddhist	Female	1	Leh	Yes
150	33	Buddhist	Female	3	Leh	Yes
151	23	Buddhist	Female		Leh	No
152	38	Shia	Female	3	Leh	Yes
153	30	Shia	Female	2	Leh	Yes
154	60	Shia	Female	2	Leh	Yes
155	30	Shia	Female	3	Leh	Yes
156	24	Shia	Female	1	Leh	Yes
157	24	Shia	Female	2	Leh	Yes
158	56	Shia	Female	5	Leh	Yes

ID	Age	Religion	Gender	Children	Residence	Married
159	26	Shia	Female	1	Leh	Yes
160	60	Shia	Female	1	Leh	Yes
161	40	Sunni	Female	3	Leh	Yes
162	55	Sunni	Female	4	Leh	Yes
163	27	Buddhist	Female	1	Chushot	Yes
164	28	Sunni	Female	1	Leh	Yes
165	45	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
166	38	Sunni	Female	0	Leh	Yes
167	56	Shia	Female	3	Phyang	Yes
168	24	Shia	Female	1	Phyang	Yes
169	20	Shia	Female	0	Phyang	No
170	19	Shia	Female	0	Phyang	No
171	28	Shia	Female	2	Phyang	Yes
172	18	Shia	Female	0	Phyang	No
173	36	Shia	Female	0	Phyang	No
174	55	Sunni	Female	3	Leh	Yes
175	30	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
176	60	Shia	Female	4	Leh	Yes
177	24	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
178	55	Sunni	Female	4	Leh	Yes
179	28	Sunni	Female	1	Leh	Yes
180	38	Sunni	Female	2	Choglamsar	Yes
181	41	Sunni	Female	2	Choglamsar	Yes
182	24	Sunni	Female	1	Choglamsar	Yes
183	30	Sunni	Female	2	Choglamsar	Yes
184	50	Sunni	Female	3	Choglamsar	Yes
185	36	Sunni	Female	2	Choglamsar	Yes
186	34	Sunni	Female	2	Choglamsar	Yes
187	50	Sunni	Female	5	Choglamsar	Yes
188	31	Sunni	Female	2	Leh	Yes
189	56	Sunni	Female	3	Leh	Yes
190	72	Sunni	Female	1	Leh	Yes
191	28	Shia	Female	1	Leh	Yes
192	30	Shia	Female	1	Leh	Yes
193	24	Shia	Female	0	Leh	No
194	33	Shia	Female	1	Leh	Yes
195	30	Shia	Female	1	Leh	Yes
196	30	Shia	Female	4	Leh	Yes
197	23	Shia	Female	2	Leh	Yes
198	45	Shia	Female	6	Leh	Yes

TABLE **5**: RELATIVES ACROSS THE RELIGIOUS DIVIDE

	Relatives of another religion?	
N	*YES*	*NO*
105	85	20

This answer was in reply to the question put to Buddhists, “Do you have Muslim relatives?” and to Muslims, “Do you have Buddhist relatives?”

TABLE **6**: TYPE OF RELATIVE OF A DIFFERENT RELIGION

N	*Participant converted*	*Mother, Father, Aunt or Uncle*	*Grandfather, Grandmother, Great Aunt or Great Uncle*	*Distant Relative*	*Same generation or younger*
72	2	32	30	5	3

These reflect the answer to the question: "how are you related to them?" I asked this question after asking, "Do you have Muslim relatives? Or "Do you have Buddhist relatives?"

TABLE 7: OPINIONS ON INTERMARRIAGE

	Is marriage between Buddhists and Muslims acceptable?		
N	*Better to prevent*	*Let it happen*	*Neutral/unsure*
73	54	11	8

TABLE 8: MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY RELIGION AND AGE

Current Religion	Age Category	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Buddhist	18-29	1.27	11	.786
	30-39	2.50	12	.522
	40-49	3.00	9	.866
	50-59	2.80	10	.789
	60-69	4.83	12	2.329
	70 and above	4.40	5	1.673
	Total	3.03	59	1.752
Sunni	18-29	1.40	10	.699
	30-39	1.91	22	.684
	40-49	2.17	12	.577
	50-59	3.60	10	.966
	60-69	3.00	3	1.732
	70 and above	3.75	4	2.217
	Total	2.33	61	1.193
Shia	18-29	.94	18	.802
	30-39	1.80	10	1.229
	40-49	3.75	12	1.765
	50-59	3.43	7	1.397
	60-69	4.33	3	2.517
	70 and above	5.00	3	2.000
	Total	2.49	53	1.928
Total	18-29	1.15	39	.779
	30-39	2.05	44	.834
	40-49	2.97	33	1.357
	50-59	3.26	27	1.059
	60-69	4.44	18	2.255
	70 and above	4.33	12	1.826
	Total	2.62	173	1.658

Mean number of children for ever-married women. This does not include children who died in childhood.

TABLE 9: MEAN # OF CHILDREN BY AGE CATEGORY

Mean # of Children

Age Category	Current	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Ages 18-39	Buddhist	2.00	24	.885
	Sunni	1.72	32	.683
	Shia	1.25	28	1.041
	Total	1.64	84	.914
Ages 40 to 59	Buddhist	2.94	17	.827
	Sunni	2.83	23	1.029
	Shia	3.57	21	1.568
	Total	3.11	61	1.226
Ages 60 and above	Buddhist	4.50	18	2.229
	Sunni	3.67	6	1.966
	Shia	4.60	5	2.608
	Total	4.34	29	2.192
Total	Buddhist	3.03	59	1.752
	Sunni	2.33	61	1.193
	Shia	2.46	54	1.920
	Total	2.61	174	1.658

TABLE 10: SURVEY PARTICIPANT CROSS TABULATION

			Up to age 39	Age 40 and above	Total
Urban	Current Religion	Buddhist	18	30	48
		Sunni	17	18	35
		Shia	16	6	22
		Total	51	54	105
Rural	Current Religion	Buddhist	12	8	20
		Sunni	19	12	31
		Shia	16	20	36
		Total	47	40	87

TABLE 11: MARRIAGE CHOICES AND PERCEPTIONS

Age Category			Marriage type as defined by participant			
			Arranged	Love	Skuste‡	Total
Up to age 39	Current Religion	Buddhist	8	3	1	12
		Sunni	9	7	0	16
		Shia	8	6	3	17
		Total	25	16	4	45*
Age 40 and above	Current Religion	Buddhist	9	6		15
		Sunni	12	1		13
		Shia	15	2		17
		Total	36	9		45*

Answers to the question, "Did you have an arranged marriage or a love marriage?"

Age Category			Which Marriage is more common?			
			Arranged	Love	Both	Total
Up to age 39	Current Religion	Buddhist	0	5	2	7
		Sunni	2	7	4	13
		Shia	1	12	3	16
		Total	3	24	9	36*
Age 40 and above	Current Religion	Buddhist	0	3	2	5
		Sunni	1	4	3	8
		Shia	0	11	0	11
		Total	1	18	5	24*

‡ *Skuste* literally means stolen. In this context, its meaning is difficult to pin down. It can mean that a bride ran away with the groom as part of a pre-planned elopement against her family's wishes, that she was coerced into marriage, or that the two families involved spared wedding expense by staging a runaway marriage.

*Sample still incomplete: N will be larger in final publications.

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APPENDIX A. GEOPOLITICAL BODIES: FERTILITY AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

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While politicians may still be kissing babies, political commentators in the United States have taken to counting them. Among others, articles published in the *New York Times*, *USA Today*, and *The American Conservative* conjecture the political potential of babies by asking who is having more: red states or blue states, liberals or conservatives.[1] While these commentators' conclusions are quite speculative and their motivations may be profoundly suspect, their subject draws attention to emerging articulations of the political geography of fertility.

Nor is this unique to the North American context. Bialasiewicz (2006) observes a new 'moral' geopolitics in the rhetoric of Italy's Oriana Fallaci, which mirrors that of Samuel Huntington in its civilizational rhetoric, in a depiction of the west's demographic failure in the face of the multiplication of others. In Serbia and Croatia, the relative fertility rates of ethnic Serbs, Croatians and Albanians are a matter of mutual suspicion and political action (Djurdjev 2000; Shiffman, Skrabalo, and Subotic 2002). Similar discussions occur in Israel and Palestine (Kanaaneh 2002; Toft 2002; Yuval-Davis 1989). In Ladakh, India, Muslims and Buddhists, historically linked by intermarriage, find themselves accusing one another of strategic overpopulation, while some Buddhist leaders urge larger family sizes (Smith 2009).

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1 See, for example, David Brooks, "The New Red-Diaper Babies," *New York Times*. December 7th, 2004; Phillip Longman, "The liberal baby bust." *USA Today*. March 13, 2006; and Steve Sailer, "The Baby Gap: Explaining Red and Blue," *The American Conservative*. December 20, 2004; as well as commentary on Sailer's support of eugenics in "NY Times' Brooks cited defender of eugenicists in touting new political constituency," *Media Matters for America*, December 7th, 2004.

Beyond the way in which fertility and reproduction are perceived in these cases to impinge on questions of sovereignty – essentially extending the demographic into the political – the political pursuit of these logics also portends the reverse: the extension of political and ethnic struggle into the space of human reproduction. Around the world, therefore, political struggles are being advanced by using bodies to make territories while simultaneously territorializing human bodies. The concerns of demography and political geography appear to be in a state of urgent collision.

We argue here for the conceptual possibilities of *political* demography. Questions of culture and power are intrinsically tied to population questions. Thus far there has been little engagement between the emerging understandings of embodied experience in political geography and the nascent development of a critical cultural understanding of fertility. In population geography, we find increasingly nuanced views of power and politics used to study health disparity, migration and mortality, but rarely (thus far) fertility. While the approach we present here could be extended to include other demographic questions, in this paper we focus on fertility, which we find to be ripe with unexplored potential for political analysis.

After a brief review of relevant issues in demography and population geography, we suggest bringing together critical political understandings of demographic problems and a newly ethnographic approach to fertility to develop a *geopolitics of the body*. We then explore the utility of the approach by analyzing

population policy and rhetoric as a form of geopolitics, specifically through the "Mexico City policy," in which women's bodies become territory and struggles for electoral control in the United States play out through reproductive health access accorded or restricted to bodies abroad. We conclude by outlining elements of a theory of geopolitical bodies.

Fertility through Demography and Population Geography

The strength and universal applicability of demography (and population geography) is rooted in an historic stress on rigorous methodology and analysis. All social scientists are in debt to demographers: we draw on their analysis and data sets to place research within global and national contexts, and use their findings as jumping off points when counterintuitive data spark research questions. Demographic studies are widely cited across the social sciences and demographic statistics are a staple of policy makers at every level. The increasing availability of source materials and advances in computing in the last thirty years have further revolutionized demographic methods by making possible more complex calculations, sophisticated analytical approaches and the integration of individual survey data (Caldwell 1996; Gage and Massey 2004). The success and importance of demography in this arena has reinforced the centrality of methodology, and the status of the field as a science rests heavily on its protocols and quantitative techniques. As Morgan and Lynch (2001:35) observe: "Demography embodies the definition as a science…Its status does not appear to be faddish; its repute rests on *real* accomplishments." Along with this valuation of

science, some demographers see the ability to develop unitary and universal theories as the central value of demography. Demographers, Preston (1993:597) observes, "have the advantage of being oriented to the big picture."

For their part, some demographers have been suspicious of other social scientists' forays into population – viewing their use of demographic data as uncritical and suggesting that

> experience as a demographer often leads to impatience with disciplines that seem to build one unsubstantiated assumption upon another without foundations which can be tied to the observable world, indeed, without foundations which can in some way be measured or shown to be real and have ascertainable magnitude (Caldwell 1996:310).

Demographers' big picture orientation has led to success in evaluating global trends but has also led, perhaps inevitably, toward some gaps in the scope and focus of the field. In demography, a science studying the very heart of human practices – where, when and why people decide to have children - the majority of work continues to rely on large-scale sets of secondary data in ways that can lead to neglect of the political culture of site-specific practices. This is reflected in contributions to the field's flagship journal, *Demography*. A majority of the articles here rely on secondary data culled from the census or other historical records, or, occasionally, from surveys. From 2004-2007, for example, the journal contained only a few instances of in-depth qualitative work. Critics have argued that dependence on aggregated data sets and orientation towards universalizing statements in demography has failed to sufficiently engage with recent critiques concerning difference and contingency in social science, a crucial question given

the diverse and often-divergent demographic trends around the world (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991, 1995; Greenhalgh 1995; Greenhalgh and Li 1995; Kertzer and Fricke 1997; Presser 1997; Riley and McCarthy 2003). Where such issues are raised, it is typically in the context of multidisciplinary team building (McNicoll 1992; van Wissen and Dykstra 1999). The promise of demographic methods, their capacity to build macro trends from the micro decisions that determine them is a potentially fruitful counterpoint to recent trends in political geography to explore the everyday practices through which the state is manifest.

There has been movement towards interpretive and case study work, precisely in the interest of examining variables that have historically been neglected, and demography increasingly utilizes more than quantitative measures, including historical, ethnographic, and interpretive techniques. Much of this shift has been driven by anthropological demography (Greenhalgh 1995; Kertzer and Fricke 1997), and has involved careful, nuanced approaches to demography that take into account the intersectionality of cultural and political practices.

Such increasing sophistication is also evidenced in the field of population geography, which takes as its field of study the problem presented by the way varying kinds of demographic practices and trends are tied to specific places and regions, grounded in Trewartha's 1953 presidential address on centrality of population, "…the pivotal element in geography, and the one around which all the others are oriented…" (Trewartha 1953:97).

In 2004 a special edition of *Population, Space, and Place* echoed the recent discussions in demography by calling for a greater use of primary and qualitative data and for human geographers to engage more with questions of population (Graham 2004; Pandit 2004; Silvey 2004). Thus far, many of the most promising developments have been focused on migration (Nagar 1998; Piper 2006; Silvey 2003; Silvey 2006), inspiring calls for similar attention to the study of fertility (Boyle 2003; Graham 2000), but also for greater engagement with the critical theories that typically accompany these methodological choices (Graham 2000, 1999; Graham and Boyle 2001; Halfacree and Boyle 1993; Lawson 2000; McKendrick 1999; Ogden 2000; White and Jackson 1995). Research in population geography on fertility has included nuanced work on fertility differences (Lechner 2001; Coleman 2002). Other work has explored the meanings of maternal mortality (Underhill-Sem 2001).

Bailey's (2005) recent overview of the discipline makes clear the potential for population geography to be at the forefront of political analysis through its treatments of the relationship between states and populations, and he also outlines work on topics such as genocide as part of the "geopolitics of population." In the following sections we will discuss the problems of culture and power, which complicate the study of fertility but also comprise promising sites for the rematerialization of political geography.

The Problem of Culture

Riley and McCarthy (2003) argue that in demography, the recent incorporation of ethnographic and qualitative methods does not address epistemological questions invariably tied to such methodological decisions, leading to an avoidance of underlying assumptions concerning culture and power. Such work, they suggest, is often the product of those on the outside or the edges of the field (Greenhalgh 1990; Hodgson 1983; Kertzer and Fricke 1997; Szreter 1993). Even where ethnographic and historical information has been mobilized in demography, as Coast (2003) has suggested, it is often used to provide loose "cultural context," and often relies uncritically on information that is itself deeply contextually influenced (use of British colonial ethnographies from the 19th and early 20th centuries, for example, to provide interpretive information to understand contemporary demographic findings).

More generally, the incorporation of culture into demographic analysis has arguably been understood as a predictive constraint on female autonomy, usually taking the form of group beliefs. Research on religion and fertility, as a prominent example, has typically highlighted monolithic "cultural" conditions that can be used as variables for prediction. Examining fertility rates and religion in South Asia, Joshi *et al.* (Joshi, Srinivas, and Bajaj 2003) and Moulasha and Rao (1999) argue that Islamic doctrine deters the use of family planning, for example. Caldwell (1986) argues that Islam constrains women's autonomy in family planning decisions. Using a more complex explanatory model, Dharmalingam and

Morgan (2004) suggest the minority status of Muslims in India results in higher fertility.

Such an approach significantly reduces the complex realties of fertility behavior and control of bodies (Bélanger 2006; Coast 2003). In response, Jeffery and Jeffery (Jeffery 1997; Jeffery and Jeffery 2005, 2000) have criticized the use of culture as an isolated variable and argued that differential fertility ought to be explored "at a level of social organization that reflects coherent social groups, not through using variables that may change their meaning from place to place and have very little significance in people's day to day lives" (Jeffery and Jeffery 2000:3253). They suggest that to privilege religion over, above and independent from its social meaning, is to essentialize and homogenize the category and eclipse significant regional, class, caste, and urban/rural difference, leading to poor and unconvincing explanation. The heterogeneity within the categories "Hindu" and "Muslim," render straightforward comparisons of fertility between the two groups virtually meaningless, for example. In opposition to this kind of easy causality, they argue that a range of factors - economic status, educational attainment, job prospects, gender roles, available contraception and minority/majority relations, combine to produce differences in contraceptive use.

These variables are arguably further mediated by cultural interpretations. Keeping with the case of India, Kerala is typically cited as a family planning success story, and that success is often attributed to specific policies in place in that state. Why then, does Andhra Pradesh have correspondingly high rates of

birth control utilization, particularly sterilization, even though its policy context is quite different from that of Kerala? As Säävälä's (1999) research demonstrates, women there adopted and preferred sterilization because of its permanence, which allowed them to determine their own reproductive future (because neither husbands or mothers-in-law were able to undo the operation), and to accelerate their move into the culturally most stable and enjoyable stage of life – that of a woman who has children but is past the child-bearing stage. Säävälä's findings indicate that the particular meanings and practices associated with gender roles and motherhood – the privileged role of the mother within the household – is closely related to women's preference for sterilization. Rather than viewing culture as a constraint (e.g. Islam as a limit to women's autonomy), culture can be understood as the medium through which meaning is created and practiced in everyday life, a linkage between policy and experience.

The Problem of Power

Part of the difficulty in understanding the complex role of culture in demographic decisions may be mitigated by exploring the ways that culture and fertility practice (especially contraception) are inseparable from the *political* struggles over interpreting and imposing codes and strictures. Projects aimed at reducing population growth, in whatever cultural context, have themselves impinged on women's autonomy (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995; Hartmann 1995, 2006; Robbins 1998; Sillman and King 1999).

For many observers, therefore, a serious examination of gender and culture in demography and population geography necessarily requires acknowledging the political nature of studying population in the first place, and the politicized nature of demographic interpretation. As Sen and Grown (1988:49) suggest when observing the instrumentalist policy approach to women's bodies:

> Women know that child bearing is a social, not a purely personal, phenomenon; nor do we deny that world population trends are likely to exert considerable pressure on resources and institutions…But our bodies have become a pawn in the struggles among states, religions, male heads of households, and private corporations.

There has been a resulting acknowledgement in demography and population geography of the *politics* of culture and gender (Bélanger 2006; Dixon-Mueller 1993; Greenhalgh 1995; Greenhalgh and Li 1995; Kertzer and Fricke 1997; Presser 1997; Riley and McCarthy 2003; Sääväla 1999; Watkins 1993).

Part of the exploration of the intersections of culture and power must be an acknowledgement of the often-overlooked agency and resistance that women (and men) exercise when negotiating the minefield of power and social expectations (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995). State family planning projects emphasize fewer, high-quality children, while family expectations may require specific gender compositions. Bélanger's (Bélanger 2006) careful treatment of the negotiation of reproductive desires in rural Vietnam highlights how women attempt to achieve their desired status through manipulation of family size and composition. Iyer (Iyer 2002b, 2002a) notes in her study in the Southern Indian state of Karnataka

that more Muslim women than Hindu women perceive contraception to be forbidden or restricted in their religion, but that they simultaneously *resist* and interpret their religion flexibly, to accommodate contraception choices.

Where regional political concerns are united with demography in explanation, their convergence is typically either contingent, or one in which population drives politics. As Newbold (2007:3) explains at the opening of his useful and accessible text *Six Billion Plus*, "The uprising of Zapatista insurgents in Chiapas, Mexico, in the late 1990s was caused by rapid population growth, inequities in land distribution, and changes in laws governing access to the land." Here there is explicit acknowledgment of the confluence of regionally specific cultural, political and economic forces, all entangled with demographic issues. At the same time, however, the causal relationships between these forces remains opaque or unacknowledged, except through the implication that population is a *driver* of other outcomes, rather than a product itself of complex politics.

> There is a large potential for violence related to resource-scarcity and population issues, and local ethnic conflict of civil strife surrounding access and control of resources is a likely outcome of resource scarcity. The reality is that the new face of war will often be a struggle for power and resources within a country or group of countries, often between opposing groups and ideologies (Newbold 2007:3).

Such an analysis hints at many of the complexities between resources, conflict, geopolitics, but resists the possibility that fertility decisions are altered in conflict contexts, that resource scarcity might be driven by geopolitics, or that all these variables may be mutually determined by other forces. Instead, the Zapatista

example is used to suggest the way population leads to resource scarcity, and so to conflict, in a relatively linear fashion.

In summary, the twin sciences of demography and population geography are increasingly extending their areas of enquiry to incorporate issues of gender, power, and culture, but only haltingly explore the *geographical* convergence of *political forces* that act to control and transform the decisions reflected in fertility statistics. Demography is therefore a field admirably concerned with both the merging and the dissolution of boundaries between typically distinct territories: individuals and communities, localities and states, micro localized practices and macro policy (Ogden 2000), but one without a full range of tools to address such concerns. Political geography, however, is a field that attends precisely to the problems of territory and power.

Political Geographies and Population

Viewed in geographic terms, questions of fertility, reproduction, and the human body hinge on the relationship between culture, everyday life, state practice, and critical geopolitics. These are all areas where political geographic thought has advanced rapidly in recent years. The field has dedicated increasing attention to the culture/state conjunction, fueled by a wealth of case studies and theoretical approaches that dissolve the boundaries between everyday practices and the workings of the state.

Most prominently, political geographers have, in the wake of thoughtful admonitions (Marston 2003), dedicated increasing attention to culture, lending

theoretical and empirical insight into the co-produced nature of culture/politics: from city identities, the visuality of the Darfur conflict, to cognitive concepts of countries in South East Asia among many other recent contributions (Campbell 2007; Kong 2007; Thompson, Thianthai, and Hidayana 2007 2007). 2006 saw a special issue on sexual citizenship and calls for ethnography (Bell and Binnie 2006; Megoran 2006). While some have argued that this turn has been at the expense of political and economic aspects (Sayer 1994), in its most productive incarnation a cultural approach to political geography stresses culture and politics as inseparable everyday practices. Painter (2006) demonstrates this point through work on the prosaic nature of the state: we cannot meet the state except as performed by police officer, teacher, soldier or politician.

The application of this perspective to fertility and fertility policy, suggests a set of novel questions. Family planning is a fundamental experience of the state in everyday life for people around the world, through the provision of accessible birth control (or not), through state-sponsored maternity leave (or not), and through the political meanings applied to parenthood: does being a good citizen mean having children, or not? Does the citizenship of reproduction vary between sexual orientations, age groups, or economic classes? How is this reflected in the negotiations of neighbors, social workers, and public clinicians?

Simultaneously, political geography has renewed its attention to geopolitics, in a series of critical debates that expanded its scope from a narrowly defined relationship between space and political strategy to incorporate political

economy and critical approaches (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Dalby 1991; Ó Tuathail 1996; Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998). First among these, in their critical intervention, Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998) stress the situatedness of the geopolitical subject, arguing that geopolitics is as intimate as it is global. In this way of thinking, geopolitics encompasses, "the everyday life of states and nations," that is: "Its sites of production are multiple and pervasive, both 'high' (like a national security memorandum) and 'low' (like the headline of a tabloid newspaper)" (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998).

This shift stresses research into the discursive production of geopolitical narratives, as in Secor's (2001:191) examination of the way Western geopolitical reasoning acts to "produce and to privilege the global scale as the locus of both the meaning of Islamist politics." It simultaneously stresses the production of similar narratives in popular outlets, ranging from cartoons and movies, to magazine articles (Dodds 2001; Sharp 1998), as in Sharp's (Sharp 2000) analysis of the Cold War as told by *Reader's Digest* (Newman and Paasi 1998; Sparke 1994). This reflects extensions of geopolitical research to include ethnographic approaches (Dodds 2001) and integration of postcolonial, feminist and political economy (Desbiens, Mountz, and Walton-Roberts 2004 2004; Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2004; Kofman and Peake 1990; Long 2006; Secor 2001; Staeheli and Nagel 2006).

Operationalized in terms of population, the feminist geopolitical approach brings vital statistics, like mortality rates, into prominence. Hyndman (2007), for

instance, demonstrates the importance of counting (or not counting) the dead in Iraq as a means to discursively characterize or re-characterize the war. Extension of this way of thinking to other areas of vital practices, especially birth, seems an effective way of answering puzzling questions about reproductive politics. It does so, by explaining them in terms of both the daily constitution and experience of the state and the embodiment of territorial discourses, as Ó Tuathail and Dahlman suggest for populations in Bosnia- Herzegovina, whose direct manipulation is a matter of local military practice and statecraft. In Gregory and Pred's (2007) recent volume on *Violent Geographies*, contributors employ Agamben's concepts of bare life and the state of exception to explore bodies excluded from safe spaces (Hyndman and Mountz 2007) and bare life as a colonial project (Kearns 2007). Pain and Smith's (2008) work, *Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life,* catalogues the minutia of everyday and bodily geopolitical pressures.

Findlay and Hoy (2000:208) suggest that geographers attend to global population issues in terms of "the impacts on particular demographic regimes of the imposition, by world institutions and military orders, of certain demographic, economic and military policies." Mac Laughlin's (1999) recent discussion on sustainability and Malthusian thinking is even more explicit: "Third World wombs continue to be fought over, literally and fiercely, by world churches, by the defenders of traditional family values, by population experts, and by other advocates of radical population control."

In a compelling examination of civilizational rhetoric of Oriana Fallaci, Samuel Huntington and Pat Buchanon, Bialasiewicz (2006) observes that a new moral geography is emerging in which immigrants and others are portrayed as a "demographic-reproductive menace." According to Bialasiewicz (2006:702), "it is through ideas about reproductive practices and demographic threat that the 'clash of civilizations' is being brought home, with women's bodies becoming the new battleground for the preservation of the identity of the West." The danger inherent in such an instrumentalist view of women's bodies is nowhere more vivid than in the case of genocidal rape, such as perpetrated in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which Allen (1996) describes as a type of biological warfare, with impregnation as its genocidal goal and technique.

Applied to the body, therefore, critical geopolitical theory presents opportunities to unite concerns with geopolitical subjects and practices of the prosaic state, therefore, applied directly to the emerging concerns of demography and population geography, to explain new population conflicts by tracking the way geopolitics is lived through and produced in bodies.

A Geopolitics of the Body

Historical geopolitical strategies have never strayed far from concerns of population; fertility, reproductive health, and family planning are inseparable from economic and other strategic goals. Cold War mentalities framed problems in explicitly geographic ways that cried out for strategic family planning:

> We have about 50 per cent of the world's wealth, but only 6.3 per cent of its population. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the

> object of envy and resentment. Our real task is…to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security (George Kennan 1948, quoted in Bandarage 1997:8).

A geopolitics of the reproductive body can provide a framework to understand the contemporary politics of fertility and reproductive practices around the world. By addressing bodies geopolitically, as sites of prosaic state action and global political discourse, we can see the body a site of political inscription (Longhurst 2005) and as a site of lived experience (Basu 2006; Bélanger 2006; Friedman 2000; Krause 2005) but also as a site of *territorialization*, productive of territory itself. This provides insight to a diverse range of puzzling questions.

In Iran, as a useful example, a radical switch to pro-natalist policy in 1979 was followed by a surprising pro-family planning reversal in the late 1980s. What accounts for such changes? Hinting at the geopolitics of these transitions, Hoodfar demonstrates that the Iranian state deployed and redeployed such policies in order to produce a particular kind of nation through the production of specific types of families, linked to changing visions of Iran within the larger globe (Hoodfar 1996; Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000; Obermeyer 1994). The post-revolutionary pro-natalist policy restricted access to family planning, through a discourse that declared them an "imperialist tool for reducing the number of Muslims" (Hoodfar 1996:31). This religion-inflected politicization of family planning shifted in the late 1980s, only as leaders emphasized the need for Iran to be economically successful and thus globally geopolitically autonomous, leading to a reversal: the

promotion of family planning as part of the development of a healthy Islamic nation through healthy (Islamic) families. Since this shift, fertility rates have fallen drastically.

This example suggests first of all that the study of culture's relationship to fertility cannot ignore how culture, politics and the state are inseparable. Furthermore, it suggests the fundamentally spatial and relational politics of nationhood – anti-imperial or autonomous in turn - as they reside in policies relating to the individual body. This case study indicates that the production of the geographic imaginary of the nation, which is deployed for specific political purposes, cannot be separated from the everyday lives of its people. Iran's nationhood is territorialized not only through the marking of geographical borders, but also by the way its policies engender practices in the bodies of its citizens.

On the other side of the world, similar complexity haunts understandings of fertility in Latin America. Demographers have observed an (uneven) 'fertility transition,' a surprising counter-trend of increasing indigenous populations after periods of long decline; some communities are experiencing extremely high fertility, with as many as eight births per woman of more. How might these changes be explained? McSweeney (McSweeney and Arps 2005) and McSweeney and Arps (McSweeney 2005) suggest that the trends in indigenous population cannot be explained simply by virtue of traditional demographic variables (e.g. low rates of literacy). Instead, political responses to integration into

non-indigenous societies may contribute to higher birth rates, with the "communal memory of near-extinction," engendering a self-consciously "ethnopolitically motivated pro-natalism" (McSweeney and Arps 2005:24).

The Mexico City Policy

In terms of global scale policy and international relations, geopolitics of the body invites investigation of the way national decisions infringe on bodies internationally. Twenty-eight years after the Roe vs. Wade decision was announced President George W. Bush restored Reagan's "Mexico City Policy," (an echo of President Bill Clinton's first days in office, when he repealed the same policy – this policy was revoked by Barack Obama during his first week in office). On January 22nd, 2001, three days into his term, Bush declared that he was restoring this policy because "It is my conviction that taxpayer funds should not be used to pay for abortions or advocate or actively promote abortion, either here or abroad" (Reinstatement of the US "Mexico City Policy" 2001). The policy places the following limitations on any non-governmental organization via Title X of the Foreign Assistance Act that receives U.S. funding: a) the organization cannot perform any abortions (even with independent funding sources); b) the organization cannot provide abortion counseling and c) they cannot advocate abortion (e.g. if abortion is illegal, they cannot advocate its legalization). This represented a dramatic reversal of US policy, which had, since the 1960s and 1970s, championed the global movement to promote small family sizes and in 1967 played an important role in the formation of what is now the United Nations

Population Fund (Stein 1995). Population programs were funded enthusiastically by presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford, all of whom viewed this as a matter of national security (Gilbert 2005).

This former position was rooted in the geopolitical conditions of the Cold War, linked to narratives of scarcity and prosperity, and embodied in the semi-Malthusian logics of growth control (Erhlich 1968). Here, population policy is the extension of triangular geopolitical relations with the Soviet Union and the "Third World" of non-aligned nationals. The latter position, announced first at the 1984 U.N. population conferences in Mexico City, largely reflected the ideological territory of US domestic constituencies in a post Cold War environment, where "social issues" formed the core of the domestic agenda. Here, population policy represents an extension of the domestic electoral map onto global populations and women's bodies around the world.

The results of this policy are not easy to measure because it is difficult to establish a precise method of gauging how many lives would have been saved had NGOs been able to determine their programs of action based on their own evaluation of their clients' needs rather than their dependence on U.S. funding. According to one estimate, a related decision, not to fund UNFPA has led to "2 million additional unwanted pregnancies annually; 800,000 illegal, induced abortions; approximately 4,700 maternal deaths; and 77,000 infant and child deaths" (Crossette 2004 cited in; McFarlane 2006:420). Figures suggest that meeting unmet contraceptive needs would "prevent 23 million unplanned births,

22 million induced abortions and 14,000 pregnancy-related deaths every year" (Glasier et al. 2006 Garcia Moreno, and Van Look, 2006:1595).

Half of the 45 million abortions performed each year are unsafe. These 45 million abortions are the result of 80 million unwanted or unintended pregnancies. The distribution of these deaths is by no means random: 40% of the unsafe abortions are performed on women below the age of 25, and all but 3% of unsafe abortions occur in developing countries (Glasier *et al.* 2006). In sum, those most affected by the Mexico City policy are vulnerable young women in poor countries.

A recent article in *The Lancet* puts the situation concisely:

> The estimated 68,000 deaths from unsafe abortion equate to the death of every woman who will have an abortion in a year in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Scotland combined. Half the deaths arise in Africa, where one in four unsafe abortions are done on teenagers. Of all deaths related to sexual and reproductive health, those from abortion are most likely to be underestimated and arguably the most preventable…Growing evidence suggests that, especially in adolescent girls, unintended pregnancy and unsafe abortion are associated with violence and sexual coercion (Glasier *et al.* 2006 Garcia Moreno and Van Look 2006: 1598).

As such, it also represents a shift from the population control policies that treated reproductive bodies as instruments of territorialization and toward the ideological territorialization of those bodies for territorial political means. That is, during the heyday of U.S. involvement in the UNFPA, the rapid multiplication of bodies was viewed as a security threat; during the Reagan and (both) Bush administrations they began to be seen also as political terrain, over which domestic political battles could be fought. Both policies tend toward the denial of

autonomy to the lived, bodily experience of the women who comprise their object, but paradoxically both rely on a visceral, cultural-political understanding of the meaning of bodies, one in which particular types of bodies (fetus, woman), are marked with particular codings (race, nationality), and thus accorded very different meanings.

Conclusions: Elements of a theory of Geopolitical Bodies

> "the very term population implicitly is associated with images of danger and threat" (Furedi 1997:162).

These cases together demonstrate the explanatory possibilities of a geopolitics of the body. They also point to the key components that such an approach entails. First, from this perspective the body is both a territorialized and a territorializing site. That is, bodies are a link between abstract geopolitical strategies and territory itself. It is through the multiplication or elimination of bodies that territories are claimed or lost. It is here that the most intimate of human practices – reproduction – is linked to control of geography. This applies to 'first world' concerns about the multiplication of 'third world' bodies; it applies to Hindu nationalist concerns about the Muslim fertility rate in India; it applies to radio talk show assertions that United States are losing "blue state" territory by "aborting their own voters."[2] In

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2 "…Because the fact is we have had all the abortions, and I think that's one of the reasons the numbers of Democrats are down because it's primarily Democrats that have abortions. They're aborting their own voters, and they have been for 30 years." (Rush Limbaugh, *The Rush Limbaugh Show*, March 10th, 2005, cited by "Media Matters for America" on March 11th, 2005, http://mediamatters.org/items/200503110003?offset=20andshow=1, last accessed March 5th, 2008).

all these cases, bodies are instrumentalized as geopolitical territory and as the producers of territorializing bodies. Territory is dependent on who gives birth to what kind of baby.

Secondly, geopolitical bodies are phenomenological bodies (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987). They are sites at which the aftereffects of geopolitical strategy are lived, made palpable and material. Whether surviving rape as a weapon of war, the burden of bearing many children, or the medicalization of zealous population control programs, geopolitical strategy is experienced through the body as states and sub-state groups seek to produce certain forms of territory through the instrument of the body.

Third, bodies are ideological territory. What happens to women's bodies – whether they have access to reproductive health technologies or a wide range of fertility choices - is tied to struggles over political territory.

In sum, looking at fertility with a geopolitical perspective is useful in a number of ways. Most saliently, the geopolitics of the body can realize the promise inherent in demography by integrating the most intimate of human experiences with the most macro exercise of power: lived experience dovetails here with geopolitical strategy and practice.

More than 170 years after the death of Thomas Robert Malthus, women's fertility continues to be tied largely to discourses about resource scarcity and environmental crisis, bolstering projects with racist and sexist implications (Sillman and King 1999). What would a political demography look like that

simultaneously takes seriously population growth and decline (and its effects), while exploring both the intimate bodily conditions of fertility and the calculations of states and international actors in the constitutions of reproducing subjects? We argue that such an approach to geopolitical bodies, would open onto an enormous range of scientific and practical problems, including but not limited to:

1. The geopolitics of sex selective abortion: what kinds of territories are produced by consistent sex selective abortion?
2. Rape as weapon of war
3. Malthusian geopolitics: in what ways do global population discourses represent a form of geopolitical practice tied to strategies of power?
4. Geopolitics of modernity, e.g. China's one child policy or India's promotion of "hum do, hamare do," "we two, our two": how do individuals deal with the pressure to produce a modern nation of "low quantity," but "high quality"?
5. Civilizational geopolitics of fertility as evident in, for example, European discussions about immigrant birth rates
6. The incitement to competitive demography

At the heart of these concerns are the most intimate of human experiences: sex, death and birth. Fertility, as the production of political subjects, as the site of state and international family planning programs, and as a site of experience and meaning-making in everyday life, is both a topic from which we cannot extract politics, and a topic that ought to draw more attention from those who study politics. When bodies become geopolitical territories to be used for specific ends, it is incumbent on those of us who study the relationship between politics and geography to develop new ways of thinking about fertility and population that

engage and explain the political, material and embodied nature of fertility decisions.

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APPENDIX B: THE DOMESTICATION OF GEOPOLITICS: BUDDHIST-MUSLIM CONFLICT AND THE POLICING OF MARRIAGE AND THE BODY IN LADAKH, INDIA

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Abstract: This paper approaches intimacy as a site of geopolitical practice. What happens when the body is the territory through which geopolitical strategies are played out? In the Leh district of India's Jammu and Kashmir state Buddhist/Muslim conflict is articulated at the site of the body and geopolitical strategies impinge on personal decisions. Over the past century religious identity has increasingly taken on political meaning in Leh, particularly since the 1980s. Interestingly, for average Ladakhis political conflict is described in terms of bodies – that is, through discussions of who should or should not eat together, get married, or have children. By destabilizing the global geopolitical scale, we can arrive at a richer and more nuanced understanding of the everyday ways in which our bodies are incorporated into or reject incorporation into geopolitical strategies to control territory.

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Word Count: 7,638 exclusive of notes

> In the past, the Buddhists were more. Now, it's the Buddhists, mostly, I think, who have used family planning. Among the Shia Muslims, if you look in Kargil and Chushot, even now, they have nine each or eight each. *Rinpoches* say that our Buddhists are getting fewer, and then our Hill Council, in the future it's going to be run by Shia Muslims. What the Buddhist Association did, it said to all the Buddhists, "You should think. Up to four, or up to six, or up to five, let them be born. Don't sterilize after two." (Yangdol, 45 year old Buddhist mother of three).[1]

> In the beginning, in the very beginning, the relationship was very good. We were like one person. There were Buddhists who married with Muslims, and Muslims who married with Buddhists. Now, times have changed, and things are different. Now people don't understand, and they have bad hearts (Razia, 45 year old Sunni mother of two).

Introduction

This paper responds to calls for a feminist geopolitics by drawing attention to intimacy and reproduction as forms of geopolitical practice. For Razia and Yangdol, Ladakhis living in the Leh district of India's Jammu and Kashmir state (J&K) a little over 100 kilometers from the contested border with Pakistan, intimate decisions cannot be extracted from political practice. Geopolitical

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1. Names of research participants have been replaced with pseudonyms throughout. Yangdol uses here the term "Balti," to refer to Shia Muslims. In Ladakh the terms Balti and Kache are frequently used to distinguish between Shia and Sunni Muslims. These terms however, are somewhat misleading as they are geographic markers – Balti means a person from Baltistan and Kache means Kashmiri. These terms are regularly applied to Ladakhis to denote their religious identity, but in my interviews I have found it is more common for Buddhists to deploy these words and that Muslims more often differentiate using the terms Shia and Sunni. In later interviews throughout this paper I have translated Balti and Kache as Shia and Sunni, however, I have bracketed the term to indicate this substitution. A *rinpoche* is a high monk, generally the reincarnated spiritual leader of a particular monastery. Kargil is the district to Leh's west, dominated by Shia Muslims, and Chushot is a Shia-majority village that meanders along the Indus River, just southeast of Leh.

boundaries intersect with bodily boundaries when Muslim-Buddhist marriages are forbidden – but on occasion those same boundaries are undone by romantic love. Local politicians position the citizen-subject in relation to the Indian state in ways that draw attention to religious identity and capitalize on the central government's geopolitical fear of Pakistan. Future geopolitical territories are then imagined and claimed through the bodies of Muslim and Buddhist Ladakhis who participate in or refuse the instrumentalization of their sexuality and fertility: the blocks of future voters their children represent increase or decrease based on the decisions they make about contraception. In the examination of these practices and the narratives surrounding them lies a promising venue to push forward a feminist geopolitics of the everyday, that is, to ask how some of the most private decisions – whom we love and whether we want to give birth – produce or challenge geopolitical strategies.

Since the partition of South Asia in 1947, the geopolitical landscape of J&K has been mapped out according to religious identity by countless politicians: Hindu Jammu, Muslim Kashmir and Buddhist Ladakh. This shorthand cartographic representation does not express the complexity, fluidity and intensity of on-the-ground identifications. Drawing on interviews conducted in Leh, Ladakh in 2004, 2007, and 2008[2] I here examine how emergent political-religious identities

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2. This research is comprised of MA and dissertation research conducted in Leh and Chushot, Ladakh during three periods: May-August 2004, June-August 2007, and December 2007 to June 2008. The interviews that inform this article included 128 mainly female participants: 27 Sunni women, 14 Sunni men, 22 Shia women,

constrain individual choices and pull the most intimate decisions about desire and babies into the political realm. In Ladakh, a woman's choice of spouse is now subject to political debate: both Buddhists and Muslims wield state apparatuses (the police, the courthouse) to prevent the once commonplace Buddhist-Muslim marriages. The anxiety over intermarriage runs parallel to fears about family planning among those Buddhist leaders who suggest that adherence to small, 'modern' families has the potential to result in their future electoral downfall. My research finds that this politicization of religion has significantly reshaped the way that marriage and childbearing are discussed, but is also challenged on a daily basis by oppositional discourses, shared spaces, enthusiasm for reproductive health services, and the occasional elopement. I will proceed with a short review of feminist engagements with geopolitics before turning to the geopolitics of marriage and fertility in Leh district as a case study.

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3 Shia men, 51 Buddhist females, 9 Buddhist men, as well as one Christian woman and one Hindu woman. In addition to these participants I also conducted one focus group with eleven Buddhist women in 2004. Interviews with Tsewang, Yangdol, Yangzes, Razia and the 'seventy-year-old Sunni man,' were conducted in Ladakhi by me alone in 2007-2008. I conducted interviews with Jamyang, Bashir, Ali and Akbar in English in 2004, and interviews with Spalzes, Mary, Ahmed, Fatima and Paljor were conducted in Ladakhi with an interpreter in 2004. While all interviews were conducted during this limited time period, my research was also heavily informed by my own integration into a Ladakhi family through marriage as well as nearly two years spent living and working for the Ladakhi Women's Alliance in Leh between 1999 and 2002.

Geopolitical Bodies and Embodied Nations

By the close of the 20th century, the study of geopolitics ranged from global violence to the mundane, and the intersections between, as in Sharp's analysis of the Cold War as told by *Reader's Digest*.[3] Critical geopolitics asks us to examine not just the spatial positioning of international powers, but also how representations of geopolitical space produce political practice. Building on this reconfiguration of geopolitics, scholars have sought to balance representations of geopolitics with mundane and embodied practices in order to understand their constitutive power.[4] This has thus far been a difficult venture. As Sharp observes, even crucial interventions such as Ó Tuathail's *Critical Geopolitics*, which set out to move away from the god-trick of an objective science toward a situated approach that reveals the messy, always contextual production of geopolitical knowledge, still often revolve around the histories of "Big Men," that is, they

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3. J. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
4. K. Dodds, 'Political geography III: critical geopolitics after ten years', Progress in Human Geography, 25(2001) p. 469-484; D. Newman and A. Paasi, 'Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography', Progress in Human Geography 22 (1998) p. 186-207; J. Sharp, 'Remasculinising geo-politics? Comments on Gearoid O Tuathail's Critical Geopolitics', Political Geography 19 (2000) p. 361-364; M. Sparke, 'Writing on patriarchal missiles: the chauvinism of the Gulf War and the limits of critique', Environment and Planning A 26 (1994) p. 1061-1089; M. Sparke, 'Graphing the geo in geo-political: Critical geopolitics and the re-visioning of responsibility. Political Geography 19 (2000) p. 373-80.

focus on a canon of geopolitical thinkers and strategists at the expense of other actor.[5]

In 2001, Dowler and Sharp drew our attention to absences in political geography, observing that increasing attention to the everyday practice of power in the field "has tended to articulate this in terms of the 'cultural turn' rather than an acknowledgement of the feminist insistence that 'the personal is political'."[6] Six years later, Sharp can still assert "While it is true that gender has made its way into the lexicon of more political geography (as one of a number of markers of identity to be acknowledged as playing a role in individual and group political motivation and agency) a more thorough engagement with *feminist* geography is missing."[7] Critical geopolitics has not escaped this assessment. There are three key feminist critiques of critical geopolitics (and political geography more broadly):

1. A tendency towards masculinist analysis privileges the global or national scale and thus marginalizes and renders invisible those most affected by geopolitical practice.[8]

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5. G. O'Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: the politics of writing global space, (London: Routledge 1996); J. Sharp, 'Remasculinising geo-politics? Comments on Gearoid O Tuathail's Critical Geopolitics', Political Geography 19 (2000) p. 361-364.
6. L. Dowler and J. Sharp, 'A Feminist Geopolitics?', Space & Polity 5 (2001) p. 165.
7. J. Sharp, "Geography and gender: finding feminist political geographies," Progress in Human Geography 31 (2007) p. 385.
8. L. Dowler and J. Sharp, 'A Feminist Geopolitics?', Space & Polity 5 (2001) p. 165-176; M. Gilmartin and E. Kofman, 'Critically Feminist Geopolitics', in L. Staeheli, E. Kofman and L. Peake (eds.), Mapping women, making politics, (New York: Routledge 2004) pp. 113-126; J. Hyndman, 'Towards a Feminist Geopolitics', The Canadian Geographer 45 (2001) 210-222; J. Hyndman, 'Mind

2. Engagement with feminism is limited to the incorporation of or mention of gender rather than serious engagement with the ascendant feminist theory that has been described as "feminist geographies of difference."[9]

Attempts to develop an anti-geopolitical view with progressive political potential have been limited by methodological practices (reliance on textual sources) and epistemological positions – the disembodied view from nowhere and everywhere critiqued by Haraway.[10]

In response to these problems, a nascent feminist geopolitics emphasizes the material and embodied practices that both shore up and pull apart political formations.[11] Approaches to geopolitics that start from the subject, such as

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the gap: bridging feminist and political geography through geopolitics', Political Geography 23 (2004) p. 307-32.

9. L. Dowler and J. Sharp, 'A Feminist Geopolitics?', Space & Polity 5 (2001) p. 165-176; J. Sharp, "Geography and gender: finding feminist political geographies," Progress in Human Geography 31 (2007) p. 381-387; L. Staeheli, 'Of Possibilities, Probabilities and Political Geography', Space & Polity, 5 (2001) p. 177-189. In the Dictionary of Human Geography, Pratt describes feminist geographies of difference as having three main characteristics: 1) the assumption that gender is a contested category that intersects with other facets of identity, 2) engagement with cultural theory, especially poststructural and postcolonial theory, and 3) a commitment to situated knowledge. G. Pratt, 'Feminist geographies,' in R.J. Johnston, D. Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts (eds.), The Dictionary of Human Geography (London: Blackwell Publishing 2000) p. 259-262.

10. K. Dodds, 'Political geography III: critical geopolitics after ten years', Progress in Human Geography, 25(2001) p. 469-484; D. Haraway, Simians, cyborgs, and women: the reinvention of nature, (New York: Routledge 1991); J. Sharp, 'Remasculinising geo-politics? Comments on Gearoid O Tuathail's Critical Geopolitics', Political Geography 19 (2000) p. 361-364; in L. Staeheli, E. Kofman and L. Peake (eds.), Mapping women, making politics, (New York: Routledge 2004) pp. 113-126.

11. S. Desbiens, A. Mountz and M. Walton-Roberts, 'Reconceptualizing the state from the margins of political geography', Political Geography 23 (2004) pp. 241-

Secor's counter-geopolitics, upend conventionally macro-scale geopolitical discourses by providing new venues of study and a deeper understanding of the everyday *practices* of geopolitics, an alternative to the approach focused on the international map.[12] Secor observes that global scale geopolitical reasoning performs specific political work by flattening complexity, placing power at the site of the global, and dematerializing the lives of the people whom it attempts to categorize and represent.[13] Thus, in opposition to geopolitical discourses on Islamism, imagined at the global scale, Secor's work in Istanbul reveals the negotiated intersections of ethnicity, religious identity and gender, and thus vitalizes the embodied subject, producing "a counter-geopolitics of the140 uncounted."

Following on Smith's suggestion that feminists destabilize state-centered security discourses, Hyndman suggests that the work of *feminist* geopolitics is to address this question: "How, then, can dominant scripts of geopolitics be both displaced

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243; L. Dowler and J. Sharp, 'A feminist geopolitics?' Space and Polity 5 (2001) pp. 165-176; J. Hyndman, 'Mind the gap: Bridging feminist and political geography through geopolitics', Political Geography 23 (2004) pp. 307-322; J. Hyndman, 'Feminist geopolitics revisited: Body counts in Iraq', Professional Geographer 59 (2007) pp. 35-46; E. Kofman and L. Peake, 'Into the 1990s: A gendered agenda for political geography', Political Geography 9 (1990) pp. 313-336; J. C. Long, 'Border anxiety in Palestine-Israel', Antipode 38 (2006) pp. 107-127; S. A. Marston, 'Space, culture, state: Uneven developments in political geography', Political Geography 23 (2004) pp. 1-16; A. J. Secor, 'Toward a feminist counter-geopolitics: Gender, space and Islamist politics in Istanbul', Space and Polity 5 (2001) pp. 191-211; L. A. Staeheli and C. R. Nagel, 'Topographies of home and citizenship: Arab American activists in the United States', Environment and Planning A 38 (2006) pp. 1599-1614.

12. Secor (note 11).

13. Ibid, p. 191.

and re-situated in order to foreground the security of people on the ground, those subjects effaced by realist geopolitics and international relations"?[14] Hyndman's work on the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan troubles the global political scale by examining the meaning of body counts and individual lives in geopolitical calculations – "it recasts the subject of geopolitics as the fate of people, not simply as a struggle between states over oil and weapons of mass destruction."[15] In Smith's work, this leads to insight into the "small transformations" and gendered dimensions of the reunification in post-Cold War Germany.[16] Through these and other increasingly ethnographic accounts of geopolitical practices,[17] through examining the assumptions made in war calculations, and through bringing a feminist attention to intersectionality into geopolitical analysis, feminist geopolitics has effectively destabilized the geopolitical gaze. Instead of a global view from nowhere and everywhere, we find the situated knowledges of the subjects and targets of geopolitical strategy.

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14. J. Hyndman, 'Mind the gap: Bridging feminist and political geography through geopolitics', Political Geography 23 (2004) p. 311; F. Smith, 'Refiguring the geopolitical landscape: nation, ''transition'' and gendered subjects in post-Cold War Germany', Space and Polity 5 (2001) p. 213–235.
15. J. Hyndman, 'Feminist geopolitics revisited: Body counts in Iraq', Professional Geographer 59 (2007) p. 44.
16. F. Smith, 'Refiguring the geopolitical landscape: nation, ''transition'' and gendered subjects in post-Cold War Germany', Space and Polity 5(2001) p. 213–235.
17. See, for example, N. Megoran, 'The Borders of Eternal Friendship? The politics and pain of nationalism and identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley boundary, 1999-2000,' (PhD Dissertation, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, 2002).

Parallel work is underway in studies of the nation. Without using the label, geographers such as Mayer have begun deploying a feminist geopolitics of the body in their explorations of nation and intimacy. Mayer suggests that feminist geographers can offer the study of nationalism the use of scale, and the "inseparability of the subjects of the nation from the nation itself."[18] This embodied nationalism is nowhere more vivid than in the use of rape as a weapon of war. This practice in the Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated that "women's bodies (along with territory) are where the nation constructs its identity."[19] For Mayer, scale is an important framework to understand this phenomenon – the body "as a site of attack," is tied into a spatial strategy through which the rape is "scaled up," to make ethnic cleansing more effective, "although the location of the rapes can be identified in geographical terms, the site of the rapes was always the woman's body."[20]

As work by Korac and Morokvasic-Müller demonstrates, the embodied nationalisms that demarcate national boundaries on women's bodies do not arise only in the practice of rape as a war strategy, but are also evident in the degree to which marriages that cross ethnic or religious boundaries are permitted,

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18. T. Mayer, 'Embodied Nationalisms', in L. Staeheli, E. Kofman and L. Peake (eds.), Mapping women, making politics, (New York: Routledge 2004) p.153.
19. T. Mayer, 'Embodied Nationalisms', in L. Staeheli, E. Kofman and L. Peake (eds.), Mapping women, making politics, (New York: Routledge 2004) p.157.
20. T. Mayer, 'Embodied Nationalisms', in L. Staeheli, E. Kofman and L. Peake (eds.), Mapping women, making politics, (New York: Routledge 2004) p.160.

disparaged or eradicated.[21] Thus, in the former Yugoslavia, "Among the first targets and victims of cleansing were people whose existence was a living proof of the possibility of living with the 'other': the so-called 'mixed' or interethnic couples and families, people of mixed background."[22] Hence, after 1991, qualitative data suggest that, "mixed marriages became taboo, something to be eliminated, something disturbing."[23] Nationalism is gendered – as Yuval-Davis observes, "Control of marriage, procreation, and therefore sexuality…tend to be high on the nationalist agenda."[24] Thus women are coded as the mothers of the nation. The inseparability of gender and nationalism is made clear in that the children of interethnic marriages tended to adopt the ethnicity of their fathers, that women are more likely than men to identify with a hybrid Yugoslav identity but also more likely to adopt the majority identity of their husbands: "In a patriarchal

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21. M. Korac, 'Refugee women in Serbia: Their experiences with war. Nationalism and state building', in N. Yuval Davies & Pina Wierbner (eds.),Women, citizenship and difference (London: Zed Book 1999) pp. 192-200; M. Korac, 'War, flight and exile: Gendered violence among refugee women from post-Yugoslav states', in W. Giles and J. Hyndman, (eds.), Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (Berkeley: University of California 2004) pp. 249-272; M. Morokvasic-Müller, 'From Pillars of Yugoslavism to Targets of Violence: Interethnic Marriages in the Former Yugoslavia and Thereafter', in W. Giles and J. Hyndman, (eds.), Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (Berkeley: University of California 2004) p. 134-151.
22. M. Morokvasic-Müller, 'From Pillars of Yugoslavism to Targets of Violence: Interethnic Marriages in the Former Yugoslavia and Thereafter', in W. Giles and J. Hyndman, (eds.), Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (Berkeley: University of California 2004) p. 135.
23. M. Morokvasic-Müller, 'From Pillars of Yugoslavism to Targets of Violence: Interethnic Marriages in the Former Yugoslavia and Thereafter', in W. Giles and J. Hyndman, (eds.), Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (Berkeley: University of California 2004) p. 142.
24. N. Yuval-Davis Gender and Nation, (Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage 1997) p. 23.

society, the patrilineal transmission of national identity prevails and usually entails assimilation into the dominant majority."[25]

In the South Asian context, Das has shed light on the way that women's bodies take center stage in nationalist conflicts, as they become signs "through which men communicate with each other."[26] Some of her questions, such as "what happens when women are impregnated by 'other' men and give birth to the 'wrong' children?"[27] echo in the current anxiety over intermarriage in Leh district. Her research is born of the spectacular and violent tragedy of India's partition, but presages the symbolic and instrumentalist take on fertile female bodies that is in play in Leh, as well as the how concern over the fertility and symbolic value of the female body can overtake concern for the rights of women themselves. In Das's case, concern over the meaning of tens of thousands of abducted women after the partition takes on such political salience that the desires of the women themselves are deemed unimportant or secondary.

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25. M. Morokvasic-Müller, 'From Pillars of Yugoslavism to Targets of Violence: Interethnic Marriages in the Former Yugoslavia and Thereafter', in W. Giles and J. Hyndman, (eds.), Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (Berkeley: University of California 2004) p. 149.
26. V. Das, Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 1995) p. 56. I cannot adequately cover this work here, but other insightful and revealing work on partition includes U. Butalia The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2000) and R. Menon and K. Bhasin Borders & Boundaries: Women in India's Partition (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press 1998).
27. V. Das, Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 1995) p. 56.

Work on feminist geopolitics and embodied nationalisms in the former Yugoslavia, South Asia and elsewhere spotlights the importance of attending to the body not only as a site of inscription but also as a primary site through which identities are constituted.[28] Since the 1990s, geographers have evoked the body as the most intimate of geographies – as Longhurst observes, we hear about "*the* body, bod*ies*, bodily, gendered and sexed bodies, lived bodies, embodiment, body inscription, body schema, corpus, corporeal(ity), and Body without Organs…" and by the end of the twentieth century we had publications on a wide array of bodies – pregnant, tourist, disabled, virtual and so forth.[29] With a few exceptions (such as the work of Hyndman, mentioned earlier), this work has remained fairly isolated from research on geopolitical practice, and we have not had geopolitical work on the body. It is bodies that populate territories and bodies that bear the brunt of the most extreme geopolitical practice – war. Bodies are crucial to feminist geopolitical analysis: a) gender is performed in ways that intersect with nation, religion, identity, b) the body forms one site for counter-geopolitical work because people resist the recruitment of the body into political programs and finally, c) it is through the body that people experience territorialization and it is the body that also represents a territorializing force through reproduction.

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28. J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge 1990).
29. R. Longhurst, 'Situating Bodies', in L. Nelson and J. Seager (eds.), A Companion to Feminist Geography (Oxford: Blackwell 2005) p. 337.

In this case study, I argue that we cannot fully understand the geopolitical strategies in play in the region without attending to the ways that bodies participate in or refuse to participate in this territorialization. The insightful work on feminist geopolitics and embodied nationalisms points the way towards an examination of productive and performative bodies – of bodies as both territorialized site and a territorializing through reproduction. Political practices surrounding marriage and child-bearing are a fruitful site from which to begin. When certain bodies are encouraged to reproduce and others not, when certain bodies are encouraged to interact and others not, do our embodied experiences compel us to resist or do we conform?

"We cannot be divided on the basis of faith": Food, Milk, Blood and Fluidity

The particular location of Leh district makes it easy to render political discussions in geopolitical terms. J&K's strategic and symbolic value to India as its sole Muslim-majority state, and its contested nature – large portions of territory claimed by India are under Pakistan's and China's administration – mean that its lone Buddhist-majority district has the potential to have a more prominent role in Indian political discourse than one might expect of a sparsely populated, resource-poor mountain region. This vulnerable position lends itself to political use, making possible pleas such as the following from Tsering Samphel in 2002, "We cry. We have been crying right from 1947…We are at the mercy of the Kashmiri Muslims," he adds. "We want more integration with India. They want

separatism. We are for India. The majority of them are for Pakistan."[30] The territorialization of the body, the home, and the district, is inherently related to what Nelson terms the "geopolitical positioning" of groups-in-formation, that is, "each community's position within broader configurations of nation, race and state territoriality."[31]

Emphasis on Sunni Muslim insurgency in the valley of Kashmir has obscured the diverse composition of J&K's residents. The state can be divided into the former kingdoms of Gilgit, Baltistan, Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. Gilgit, Baltistan ("Northern Areas") and parts of Kashmir are now under Pakistan's jurisdiction. At the state level, 65% of Indian J&K's population is Muslim, but at the district level there is significant diversity.[32] Ladakh is evenly

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30. M. MacDonald, 'Ladakhis seek independence from Kashmir,' Yahoo News (August 28, 2002) available at http://in.news.yahoo.com/020828/137/1ufro.html.

31. L. Nelson, 'Geographies of state power, protest, and women's political identity formation in Michoacán, Mexico', Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96 (2006) p. 370.

32. Today, Indian Jammu and Kashmir State is conventionally referred to as three regions – Kashmir (the Kashmir valley, between the Himalayas and the Pir Panjal range); Jammu, in the southwestern corner of the state; and Ladakh. Kashmir valley's five million residents are mostly Sunni, Jammu's 4.5 million residents are predominantly Hindu with Muslim and Sikh minorities, and Each of these designations obscures the diversity of identification on the ground. In the 2001 Indian census, Ladakh's population was 236,539, approximately 47% Muslim (majority Shia), 46% Buddhist, with minority Hindu, Christian and Sikh populations (Government of India 2001). Kargil District has a (Shia) Muslim majority (approximately 80% to 15%), and Leh District has a Buddhist majority (77% to 15%), however, within Leh District, most Muslims reside in and around the political and economic center: Leh town (population approximately 20,000), where the ratio of Muslim to Buddhist is significantly higher than the rest of Leh District, and the ratio of Sunni to Shia Muslims is higher.

split between Buddhists and Shia Muslims, with a smaller population of Sunni Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in its capital, Leh town. Ladakh was split into two districts in 1979: Kargil, with a Muslim majority, and Leh with a Buddhist majority (refer to previous note for more detail). This diverse collection of regions was tied together by conquest and treaty during the early 19th century, and entered India in October of 1947 as one entity when the Maharaja of Kashmir signed his state into the Indian polity. Ladakh's incorporation into the state has left Ladakhis in a precarious position: Ladakhis speak a dialect of Tibetan, practice Buddhism, Shia and Sunni Islam, and inhabit a high altitude desert separated from the rest of the state by the Himalayas. Doubly marginalized, they are a minority population of less than 300,000 within a state that is itself the lone Muslim-majority state within India.

There is not room here to discuss in detail the long process through which demands for greater autonomy, or to 'free Ladakh from Kashmir' came to be articulated in terms of religious identity, but for a thorough and thoughtful discussion see the work of van Beek, Bertelsen and Aggarwal, among others.[33]

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33. R. Aggarwal, Beyond lines of control: Performance and politics on the disputed borders of Ladakh, India (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 2004); N. C. Behera, State, identity and violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers 2000); K. B. Bertelsen, 'Early modern Buddhism in Ladakh: On the construction of Buddhist Ladakhi identity, and its consequences', in T. Dodin and H. Rather (eds.), Recent research on Ladakh 7: Proceedings of the 7th colloquium of the International Association for Ladakh Studies (Bonn: Universitat Bonn 1997) pp. 67-88; K. Gutschow, 'The Politics of Being Buddhist in Zangskar:Partition and Today', India Review 5(2006) pp. 470-498; D. Pinault, The Horse of Karbala: Muslim devotional life in India (New York: St. Martin's

Van Beek suggests that it was partly the perception that communalism works in Indian politics led the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) to gradually and sporadically define political demands in those terms. This was most strikingly evident in the 1989 "social boycott" of Ladakhi Muslims, and ultimately, to gain greater autonomy within the state of J&K. The late 1980s were a time when India's authority in the Kashmir valley was increasingly challenged; this perceived threat provided a more vivid backdrop against which the LBA could position Ladakhi Buddhists as loyal Indian subjects. It also may have created economic concerns among Leh residents for the future of tourism in the region, additional economic competition from the influx of Kashmiri merchants fleeing the valley, or fears that the Srinagar chaos could spread to Leh. I have chosen, here however, to discuss the increasing religious tensions in the very different ways that Ladakhis *not* involved in politics explain them to me. That is, while I have heard Leh elites discuss these events, the efficacy of communal tactics and the subtleties of Indian politics, those not involved have different stories to tell. While any Leh politician, for example, can provide a political analysis of the

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Press 2000). S. Srinivas, The mouths of people, the voice of god: Buddhists and Muslims in a frontier community of Ladakh (New York City: Oxford University Press 1998); M. van Beek, 'Public secrets, conscious amnesia, and the celebration of autonomy for Ladakh', in T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat, (eds.), States of Imagination: Ethnographic explorations of the postcolonial state (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 2001) pp. 365-390; M. van Beek, 'The importance of being tribal. Or: The impossibility of being Ladakhis', in T. Dodin and H. Rather (eds.), Recent research on Ladakh 7: Proceedings of the 7th colloquium of the International Association for Ladakh Studies (Bonn: Universitat Bonn 1997) pp. 21-42; M. van Beek, 'Identity fetishism and the art of representation', Ph.D. Dissertation, (Cornell University Cornell, NY 1996).

Buddhist agitation that broke out in 1989, most of my informants tell me they have "no idea" why the conflict started, or else say, "it all started with a fistfight between young men."

In 1989, then, Ladakhi Buddhist politicians and their young supporters wielded the mobilization of Ladakhi bodies as a political tool by enacting a social boycott, which forbade any social or economic contact between Buddhist and Muslim Ladakhis. The boycott was enforced by fines and the threat of violence, administered in 'Gonpa Soma,' the Buddhist temple in the center of Leh Bazaar. This boycott, ostensibly organized to draw attention to the problems faced by a Ladakh dominated by "Muslim" (Kashmiri) politics, had the effect of disrupting everyday interaction between Buddhist and Muslim Ladakhis that had previously been common. The political strategy on the part of the LBA was to conflate first Ladakhi Sunni and then Ladakhi Shia Muslims with the Kashmiri administration in Srinagar, privileging the label "Muslim," over all possible facets of identity. This created a discourse that assumed that those labeled Muslim would have similar political interests, despite evidence to the contrary.[34] The Buddhist Association then took their grievances to the central government in New Delhi, and portrayed them as the result of religious discrimination.

This narrative suggesting that religious difference parallels political demands however, is belied by the ways that Ladakhi Muslims I spoke with

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34. See M. van Beek's dissertation, cited in note 32, for a thorough discussion of the ways in which Ladakhi politics divided along other than communal lines for most of the twentieth century.

discussed their own identities, which made clear distinctions based on geographic origin rather than on religious identity. In fact, several Ladakhi Muslims blamed Kashmiri separatists for causing the religious conflict in Ladakh, and took a very unsympathetic view of events in the valley. In 1995, Leh was granted a semi-autonomous government under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, now responsible for the distribution of all government funding except for police and defense. Buddhist leaders often point to this event as the successful outcome of a necessary evil (the boycott). Muslims contest this by suggesting that the boycott was used rather for personal political gain, or observe that it was only after the boycott was ended that the central government agreed to the Hill Council.

Although the social boycott ended formally in 1992, it has had lasting impacts: in 2004, 2007 and 2008 I was repeatedly told that relations had not reached pre-1989 levels, and periodic incidents emphasize the fragility of the peace. In 2000, tensions flared when the president of the LBA declared, "Conversion from Buddhism to Islam is a menace that has come to stay. As people who have cherished cordial relations for ages, we definitely want this to die off."[35] In the same newspaper article, a member of the more militant youth wing of the LBA accused J&K State of conspiracy: "Any Muslim government servant marrying a Buddhist girl is immediately rewarded with juicy postings." In

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35. Staff Reporter. 'Ladakhis are caught in conversion controversy,' (2000) Daily Excelsior. http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/00june23/state.htm#1.

February 2006, a torn Koran allegedly found in the small town of Bodh Kharbu in western Ladakh (Kargil district) set off the worst communal violence that Ladakh has seen since the social boycott. These incidents highlight the continuing political salience of religion and its ties to the regulation of bodies.[36]

The 1989 choice of policing interaction as a strategy and individuals' reactions to it, from compliance or secret disobedience to an outright refusal to comply, demonstrates vividly the manner in which the politics of nation and identity cannot be located at a particular, spatially distinct scale (e.g., the national) because everyday interactions are already situated within national and international imaginaries. These identity practices are literally embodied in the individuals who perform or disrupt them. This is equally true for Ladakhi politicians meeting national party leaders in Delhi and for Ladakhi women and men who find themselves unable to marry their lovers because the judge in the courthouse will not sign their marriage certificates. At the same time it is Leh's geopolitical position that enables Ladakhi politicians to attract the attention of the central government and rely on the politics of policing bodies.

> During New Year's celebrations, Buddhists would make offerings, and all the kids would go. The Muslims would go to the Buddhist families, and they would feed them food, and they would sing and dance together all through the night. During our celebrations like Eid, they would come and they would eat and drink, and not only would we feed them, but we would even send platefuls of food home with them (Ahmed).

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36. P. Swami. 'Power, profit and the politics of hate', (2006) The Hindu Online. http://www.hindu.com/2006/02/21/stories/2006022103791400.htm

I began my initial 2004 fieldwork in Leh seeking to understand how incorporation into the post-colonial state of India had affected everyday life and political practices between Buddhists and Muslims in Leh, focusing on the changes that took place during and after the 1989 social boycott. While my original research question was not focused on the body, I found that questions about politics were usually answered in terms of the corporeal experiences of marriage, shared meals and blood ties. While politicians were often blamed for instigating conflict, the conflict was articulated in bodily practices. Even more strikingly, a conflation of the personal practices of marriage and childbearing with politics not only emerged, but was seen as one of the most salient aspects of political conflict between Buddhists and Muslims, as Sunni Bashir told me: "Intercommunal marriage is the main problem…Now, because of education, people are angrier. They think that our community's people should not marry with others." The surveillance of bodies and the rejection of this practice coalesced around a few key practices brought up repeatedly in interviews: meals shared between Buddhists and Muslims, intermarriage, and babies – in particular, who was giving birth to more. When I asked, "what were relationships like between Buddhists and Muslims in the past?" the response was almost universally to answer with either food or intermarriage, along the lines of this, very typical, response from a Buddhist woman in her sixties:

Before the boycott, we used to have our house full of Muslims: they would come for Losar [New Year] and other festivals [lists 7 families that used to

visit]…Now they only come for the most crucial things, like marriage, birth and death ceremonies...Now even on Eid, we go to only one Muslim family, and on Losar, only one Muslim family comes to visit us (Spalzes).

Interview participants often explained how religious difference was accommodated in the preparation of food, often emphasizing the care taken by Buddhists not to offend Sunni Muslims by offering them non-halal meat by mistake, both today and in the past. "[Sunni Muslims] eat almost everything from us, excluding the [non-halal] meat and *chang* [local beer]. If we give that to them, it is a sin for *us*, because it is against *their* religion" (Nilza, emphasis is mine).

During the social boycott, those who disobeyed the prohibition on contact were threatened with fines or beatings, but some found that the ties of blood were too strong to resist:

> During that time, my [Buddhist] wife died, and none of the relatives came, with the exception of one. This one relative came, and he said, no matter what happens, I will come. He said, "I am a person who drank milk from the same mother as her, and I don't give a shit, whatever happens, I will come." There were some who would just come in the nighttime. They were scared so they would come at night (Ahmed, Sunni Muslim).

"We were like one person": Intermarriage and Politics

In her discussion of colonial sexualities in Indonesia, Stoler observes that sexuality in the colonies was a shifting venture.[37] Early in the colonial period,

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37. A. L. Stoler. 'Carnal knowledge and imperial power: Gender, race, and morality in colonial Asia', in R. N. Lancaster and M. de Leonardo (eds.) The gender/sexuality reader: Culture, history, political economy. (London: Routledge 1997) pp. 13-36.

Dutch settlers were encouraged to form relationships with local women. With the colonial form increasingly challenged, however, these relationships began to be seen as problematic because the resulting children posed a direct threat to the colonial distinction between colonizer/colonized. In Ladakh, a similar ambiguity exists in the frequent cases of intermarriage: of the individuals with whom I have spoken, the overwhelming majority has relatives across the supposed religious divide. We might be tempted to consider the talk about a time when intermarriage was accepted as nostalgia – and indeed perhaps elderly Ladakhis' stories about communal harmony are exaggerated. At the same time, in the more mixed settlements of Leh town and Chushot, evidence of a different past is written into family trees – of a sample of 50 living in those two towns, 42 had relatives of the other religion.[38] Furthermore, all but four of the 42 with relatives maintain the relationship by attending events such as weddings and funerals. As such, it becomes difficult to speak of Buddhists and Muslims as two distinct identities. A Muslim lawyer was one among many to remind me that, "Muslims and Buddhists have blood relations. We cannot be separated on the basis of faith." The recent political concerns represent a break from Ladakh's history of intermarriage: many interviewees repeated the story of Ladakh's most revered king, Sengge Namgyal.

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38. Out of the 50, 21 of the Buddhists had Muslim relatives and 21 of the Muslims – Shia and Sunni – had a Buddhist relative. Out of this sample, six Buddhists did not have a Muslim relative, and two Shia Muslims did not have a Buddhist relative. All of the 14 Sunnis in this sample had relatives who were Buddhist.

His mother, Gyal Khatun was a Muslim princess brought from Baltistan at the end of the 16th century to marry the Buddhist king Jamyang Namgyal.

The need for enforcement demonstrates both the difficulty of maintaining a boundary between Buddhists and Muslims – but that boundary is necessary for the categories to be politically salient. The gendered nature of this boundary-maintenance has profound implications for women's autonomy: while today's generation of young Ladakhi women might have increasing educational, and for some, employment opportunities, they face limitations on autonomy not faced by their mothers. Spalzes explained:

> In the past, if a Buddhist woman married a Muslim, the Buddhist family might go to the house, and they would ask her to come back home, and the woman would just say, "I like this person, I like this family, it is *my* decision." When the woman said that, the family could do nothing.

Concerns about the changing make-up of Leh's population are tied to discussions of birth control practices. In this 2004 interview with a Muslim-Buddhist couple that had recently married after much difficulty, elements of personal choice, emotion, and demographic change all surface, with the couple occasionally interrupting me to question each other.[39] In the following exchange, Paljor is the Buddhist husband and Fatima is his Shia wife.

> Sara: Before you got married, you knew there would be all these problems, so why did you get married?

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39. A few months after I left the field in 2004, this couple could no longer face the pressures exerted on them by people disapproving of their marriage: Fatima had an abortion, and her family relocated her to a village far from Paljor's. Her family arranged a new marriage for her and in 2005, Paljor was married to a Buddhist bride chosen by his family.

> Fatima: [laughter]
>
> Paljor: Yes, why did you get married to me? You had so many pressures, so why did you decide to get married to me?
>
> Fatima: It's because I liked you, isn't it? [laughter] Really. I swear.
>
> Sara: So, why do you think it made your community or your family so concerned, when you got married?
>
> Paljor: Because, I will say. Because her society is so tight.
>
> Sara: Yes, but *why* does it make them so upset?
>
> Paljor: I have a very good answer for this. Because I marry her, our son, our daughter, every one will be Buddhist. So they say, from her, there will be three or four more Buddhists.
>
> Sara: So, why is that a concern?
>
> Paljor: Because, they don't want the Buddhists to increase in population.

Later in the interview, Paljor continues with a narrative I heard frequently from Buddhists:

> Paljor: You know, I remember when I was in Phyang, there were only two or three families, Muslim families. Now there is a big community over there. There was only a Buddhist majority. That's why I was saying, they are not using family planning. But we Buddhists strictly go for family planning. So, that's why.
>
> Fatima: What are you saying? That we have 10 children in every family?

The LBA has an (unwritten) agreement with local Muslim groups to prevent intermarriages. In the event of a love affair between a Buddhist and Muslim, each side is responsible for taking the prospective bride or groom back to their family, who will presumably stop them from going through with the marriage. There is a lot of gossip about such couples in Leh, particularly about

well-known or wealthy families whose daughters fell in love with Muslim men, and about their families' attempts to prevent the unions. When I have asked if such marriages should be prevented or allowed, only three out of the 102 people I have asked said they should be allowed – in some cases even the children of such marriages insisted they should be prevented. Many emphasized, however, that in some cases this is not possible – a seventy-year-old Sunni man from Chushot indicated his grandchild, "If I'm thinking that I am going to prevent this child from being a Buddhist, and I think I can tie him up and keep him, with his fate, he will escape from the window. That's how it is. It's our fate, it is what is written on our foreheads." Others suggested that to try to change fate could result in suicide. Despite what would seem to be nearly universal approval of the ban on intermarriage, some still seem to have ambiguous feelings about the agreement, expressing doubts or regret even when stating its inevitability, or suggesting that its only value is in preventing pointless inter-religious conflict that might result from such marriages.

In my interview with Fatima and Paljor, I was told that it is impossible for such a couple to have any kind of marriage in Leh, even a secular court marriage. While Indian law (the Special Marriages Act) insists on the right of inter-faith couples to marry, they are prevented in Leh by the capillary arms of the state, that is, the government employees who are either Buddhist or Muslim Ladakhis.[40]

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40. M. Foucault. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, (Pantheon, New York 1980).

Paljor described this inevitability with frustration, pointing out that according to the law, "anybody can marry with any other religion. Whether his or her name is this or that, they can marry." On the other hand, he observed, "But the law is in the offices in Leh, and the offices are full of Muslims and Buddhists, only. So, we cannot marry…Before they sign it I think they will create some disturbance. Then it will create trouble in Leh. We have to expect that."

For this reason, the couple decided their only option was to fly to the relative anonymity of New Delhi – even in this they faced obstacles. Flying separately to avoid notice, Fatima was stopped at the airport by the police, who had heard rumors of the affair. These police, Shia Muslims, called Fatima's family and asked whether to allow her to get on the plane – it was only because Fatima had previously invented an excuse to leave Ladakh that she was able to board the plane. This couple accepted this situation as a matter of course. In fact, they described summer as a season for intermarriage because the passes are clear of snow and it is easier to travel.

As part of a larger strategy of conflict-avoidance, Muslims stressed that they discourage intermarriages. Indeed, the imam I spoke with told me that he would not perform *nika* (the Muslim marriage ceremony) for an interfaith couple, and that he had made speeches discouraging Muslim men from marrying Buddhist women. This was confirmed by Muslim respondents who pointed to this as an act of placation on the part of the Muslim community: "Our imam, from the

pulpit of the mosque, he tells the people, 'please, marry our sons to our own daughters, our own nieces'" (Bashir).

Some women see the marital and demographic suspicions as producing or reinforcing gender roles and limiting female autonomy. In their stories, women's bodies are the religious boundary. One Sunni Muslim respondent explained to me that the Buddhists should blame themselves if Buddhist girls caught the attention of Muslim boys because "you can see the dress code of the girls, they hardly wear anything on their body," while a few Buddhist interviewees suggested along similar lines that Buddhist girls are more disobedient than Muslim girls. When individuals spoke against the agreement, they posit desire as an uncontrollable bodily force, and as something that can resist division.

> If a Buddhist woman marries a Muslim out of love, and it can happen anywhere in the world, whether it is in the US, or whether it is in Europe, whether it is in Bosnia, whether it is in Middle East, or whether it is in India. It can happen, but they make it an issue (Akbar).

> Looking at the past, [the agreement to prevent intermarriage] really doesn't look like a good thing, does it? Because people used to get married in different communities, that creates harmony. Saying, 'these ones are bad or those ones are bad,' it's really wrong (Mary, Christian female, 70s).

In addition to being legalized outside of Ladakh, marriages today between the Buddhists and Muslims inevitably begin with the conversion of one of the spouses. This was not always the case; during interviews I was told several anecdotes about Buddhist/Muslim households in which children's names would reflect both faiths or even in which a Muslim husband would remind his Buddhist wife to perform the daily offering to Buddha. For such a marriage to take place

today seems almost unconceivable. The new production of political-religious identities and concurrent imaginary of the multiplying Muslim population threatening dwindling Buddhists has not only affected intermarriage. These themes, while not supported by evidence, recur in most interviews with Buddhists, and this narrative has resulted in anxiety, conflict and regret among Buddhists concerning the use of family planning.

Geopolitical Babies? Electoral Territoriality and Fertility

In 2006, according to several interviewees, including some who had access to the document, the LBA sent a letter to the doctors at Leh's Sonam Norbu Memorial hospital (the main district hospital) asking them to stop performing tubal ligations and abortions.[41] While some interviewees described this as a move to prevent sinful acts akin to murder, others, like Yangzes, a 40-year-old Buddhist mother of two, presented a more pragmatic view, "The LBA did that because they say the Buddhist population is declining, if you look at the census, the Muslims are many, we are becoming fewer. Worrying about that -- that's why." In 2007 stickers appeared around Leh denouncing abortion,[42] and in 2008 interviews I was

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41. The very preliminary results of a survey I am currently conducting suggest that differences in fertility are slight, with the mean number of children for Buddhists (n=44), Sunni (n=25) and Shia (n=20) at 3.18, 2.44 and 3.25 respectively. Clearly, however, these samples are still too small to be generalizable.

42. The yellow and red stickers are similar to bumper stickers, but were mainly plastered on buildings and walls. In Ladakhi and English, the stickers read, "The Four facts: Abortion is a cause to sever oneself from human rebirth in the next lives. Marriage between close kins [sic] is non-virtuous sexual misconduct. It is

informed that the LBA women's wing has gone on tour to rural areas urging Buddhists to shun family planning. This is not a new concern in the LBA – van Beek has documented concern within the organization on population issues going as far back as the 1930s.[43] A stereotype of the prolific Muslim family seems to be developing among Ladakhi Buddhists that closely mimics the Hindu nationalist discourse described by Jeffery and Jeffery as "Saffron Demography."[44] A Buddhist monk described the situation this way:

> In Ladakh, the Muslims are growing, Buddhists are feeling insecure, but in no way can we now balance it. We have to accept the reality. The Buddhists, no matter how much they feel insecurity, this cannot be prevented. We Buddhists can never stop the growth of the Muslim population. We can never. No one can.

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an act of partiality if the inheritance is not equally distributed among brothers & sisters. Disloyal it is, not to have affinity to ones own ethnic cultural values. L.B.A."

43. See van Beek, particularly "Dangerous Liaisons: Hindu Nationalism and Buddhist Radicalism in Ladakh," in S. Limaye, M. Malik, and R. Wirsing, eds., Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 2004) pp. 193–218.

44. See for example Nahendra Modi's comments on Muslim fertility, "Their kind of family planning slogan is 'We five and our twenty-five'" in the article "No relief camps for producing kids, remarks Modi." *Times of India*, September 9th, 2002. Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com:80/cms.dll/articleshow?artid=21695855. For an excellent discussion of this discourse see P. Jeffery and R. Jeffery, 'A population out of control? Myths about Muslim fertility in contemporary India', World Development 30 (2002) pp. 1805-1822; R. Jeffery and P. Jeffery, 'Saffron demography, common wisdom, aspirations and uneven governmentalities', Economic and Political Weekly (2005), January 29th. There is not room here to sufficiently discuss these issues, but also see A.M. Basu, 'The Squabble that Never Ends: Religion and Fertility', Economic and Political Weekly (2004), September 25; R.B. Bhagat and P. Praharaj, 'Hindu-Muslim Fertility Differentials', Economic and Political Weekly (2005) January 29, pp. 411-418 and P.K. Datta, 'Dying Hindus: Production of Hindu Communal Common Sense in Early 20th Century Bengal', Economic and Political Weekly (1993) June 19, pp. 1305-19.

> A miracle cannot stop. No one can stop it…So, in Ladakh, yes, Buddhist people have difficulties, and the future of the Buddhists, it is not good. Every year, the Muslim population will grow, the Buddhists will go down. What to do? …They may not have a very strong intention to increase their population in Ladakh in order to suppress the Buddhists, but it is growing unintentionally because of their traditional beliefs and all those things. So, it seems really difficult, if the Buddhists feel insecure, or they want to balance through some, how do you say, aggression or these things, we should not. It will never succeed (Jamyang).

This Muslim respondent provides the most succinct response to my question, "why have attitudes to intermarriage changed?"

> The Buddhists think that it will lead to demographic change in the long run. In the past for many Buddhist girls, there was some temptation in the Muslim community. Muslims were, I think, a bit prosperous, in the past. Now, fortunately I think that the Buddhists are quite well off, and so they have all this education. So, that was the temptation. Buddhists wanted to cut off the temptation and the girls were not aware about Buddhism. So, they are being educated now. They are being suggested now "we have to create awareness among the Buddhist girls about the significance of our religion." They were unaware. On the other hand, the Muslim girls are more aware about their religion (Bashir).

Discussions of demography quickly become discussions about women's bodies. The politically activist Buddhists discuss a perceived shift in population as an issue that is being addressed by Buddhist measures such as the ban on polyandry[45]

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45. Up until the middle of the last century, polyandry was common among Buddhists in Ladakh. There was also polygamy, but this seems to have been mainly in cases of infertility. In order to keep family lands from being split between brothers, it was common for one woman to marry two or more brothers. This meant that in theory the ratio of marriageable women to men was high. Some women became nuns, but others married traders in Leh town, and frequently converted to Islam. These marriages were generally between Sunni Muslim men and Buddhist women. The women generally adopted the religion of their husband, however, even in cases where the father was from Kashmir, my interviews with

and intermarriage, but also, perhaps, by changes in use of birth control. Every Buddhist woman I spoke with had heard or heard of speeches given by Buddhist *rinpoches*, discouraging Buddhist women from using birth control,[46] and they often brought this topic up in the context of population increases in the Muslim community:

> Yes, there has been a change. In the past, there used to be only a few Muslims, but now there are lots. These days there isn't any big difference [between the number of Buddhists and the number of Muslims]. In the past, there were just a few Muslims. The reason being, Muslims don't do family planning like the majority of the Buddhists do. Now even Buddhists are told that they shouldn't do family planning. That is being taught by *rinpoches*… so that is having an effect (Nilza, 57 year old Buddhist mother of three).

Spalzes disagrees with this instrumentalist treatment of women's bodies:

> The Muslims have really increased. Many people curse and say bad things about [a gynecologist] because she does abortion and encourages birth control. But usually women are happy that they have access to birth control and sterilization (Spalzes).

Spalzes exemplifies the ambiguity many women express regarding the encouragement to shun contraception. Buddhist women in particular often bring up a range of factors – religious, geopolitical, embodied, that cause them confusion and pain when reflecting on their own decisions. Nilza's story is worth

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Argons indicate that the children grew up speaking Ladakhi language and they and their descendents identify as 'Ladakhi.'

46. In my interviews women especially referred to a speech by Drukchen Rinpoche at the Leh polo ground in which he reportedly shamed Buddhist women by claiming that Baltis have many children and still manage to care for them. According to Buddhist women I interviewed, Rinpoches argue that each child comes with its own *sode*, or luck, (in this context, it could also be interpreted as karmic burdens) and thus attempts to produce certain outcomes through family planning are futile.

relating at length because it encapsulates the conflict and regret that several women expressed to me:

> When I was giving birth to the boy, I had a really difficult time and had to go to the hospital. I was unable to give birth to him, and they did the operation [cesarean]…one relative who was there at the hospital said, 'you already have three children, just do that operation [tubal ligation], block it.' At that time, I hadn't thought about it a lot though I had heard of it. And then I thought, since it was so difficult with the boy, 'yes, that's right, it's better to stop having children.' Later, I came to understand, that not to let children be born, that is such a sin. I had really done something wrong, which I have now confessed to *konjok* [the triple gem of Buddhism]. Otherwise, I would have just let them all be born, however many I would have had…
>
> If we think about it, [family planning][47] has no benefit for Leh. Because, it's not good. In Buddhism, it's a sin, it's the worst sin. I didn't know, I didn't know at the time. Now that people have told me and now that I have studied Buddhism, I now know that to prevent births is a big sin. It's also this, we have a neighbor and their grandpa, who was really great, and he passed away and then was born far away. Right after he was reborn he came and was saying, 'my *dzo*[48] is here, I died here, I wanted to come back to my house, but the door was closed.' The meaning of that was that the wife of the house had used family planning. In our Buddhist religion, people have to be reborn. That is really really important. He would have been reborn as the son of his son's wife, if she hadn't blocked him. (Nilza, 57 year old Buddhist mother of three).

The pain and regret expressed in these interviews are heightened by individuals' fundamental faith in education as the only way to deal with modernity.[49] They

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47. Here I am translating *thugu mi-skechesi thabs* as family planning. A more literal but cumbersome interpretation would be 'methods not to give birth to children.'

48. A *dzo* is a common farm animal in Ladakh, a cross between yak and cow.

49. For an insightful look into the contradictory meanings of education in India today see C. Jeffrey, P. Jeffery and R. Jeffery, Degrees Without Freedom? Education, Masculinities, and Unemployment in North India (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2008). Although the setting is very different, many observations

feel caught between morality and necessity. Seeing their neighbors' children attending private schools or even being sent 'outside' to Jammu, Srinagar, Chandigarh or Delhi, parents struggle with thousands of rupees of school fees just to feel that their children have a chance of competing for the scarce government jobs that are considered ideal by most.

CONCLUSION

Since partition and independence, the labels that were used to draw national borders have been reiterated through the degree of intimacy allowed between those of different religious identities. By employing the lens of feminist geopolitics, we can examine the inseparability of international relations from everyday life, as evident in the 'domestication,' or the bringing of geopolitics into the home and into the personal spaces of the body, marriage and intimacy. If we overlook these practices, we leave out not just the effects that geopolitical strategy has on individual lives, but also the ways that individuals can participate in or refuse the creation of geopolitical identity categories. While work on embodied nationalisms has demonstrated the ways that female bodies are conflated with the nation, it is important to attend to the ways that embodied practices are also geopolitical, that is, the potential they have to make certain kinds of territories. Seen through the lens of politicians' strategy, decisions about marriage and family

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hold true for Ladakh – in particular the way that education and identity are inseparable and education is given value even when it does not change economic status.

planning will shape the political future of Leh district, hence their efforts to regulate the mothers of the future electorate – but those mothers have their own vision of the future.

Individuals' hopes and fears about their children (Will they take care of me in my old age? Will they find well-paying jobs?) collide and conflict with politically-tinged narratives of the future. An anonymous letter distributed throughout Leh Bazaar on April 17th 2008 invokes millennial fears: "Countless birth doors have been closed. Buddhists are going to be finished. We're at the end of time. Glaciers have melted away. Untimely floods have come. Grasshoppers have eaten half the country." But can abstract territorial strategy and millennial visions compete with the flesh and blood concerns of those who open or close 'birth doors?' And is it possible to imagine a counter-geopolitics, in which individual and family choices negate or at least contest these divisive politics? The very palpability of embodied geopolitics makes it a site of potential resistance to strategies that instrumentalize the body. Thus, asked if women of her daughter Jigmet's generation will comply with the pressure to avoid family planning, Tsewang, a 54 year old Buddhist mother of three observes the simple impracticality of politically motivated suggestions to refrain from birth control:

> Her generation will say, and Jigmet is also saying, "If we have a child, that child will need a good education, if we have five or six children, there's not enough money for their education. If they don't get a good education, if they get a haphazard education, they won't get a good job, and then they are not going to have a happy life. If they say, for no reason, 'have children, have children,' are the *rinpoches* going to take care of those children? [laughing] Are

> the *rinpoches* going to give us money when our children can't get jobs?"

What does the contrast between the specter of Buddhists being 'finished,' and Jigmet's more mundane concern for her child's education teach us about geopolitics? Most viscerally, it reveals an important tension between the body as a site of territorialization and the body as a site of lived experience and emotion. In its reproductive capacity, the body is an almost inevitable target for geopolitical strategy – that is, it has the potential to create certain kinds of territories through giving birth to many children or few. This same reproductive capacity, however, cannot be extracted from the body as the site of pain, joy, desire or fear. In Leh, we cannot fully understand the implications of the geopolitical strategies in play if we do not understand the way that they intersect with the individual experiences that shape the body. The dictates of the body may challenge such strategies or they may conform to them. In Leh it appears that the utility of family planning and the burden of bearing many children work against the pressure to territorialize with babies. Desire also poses a challenge: individuals' unruly desires must be controlled through physical intervention.

This tension between the body as a resistant site of territorialization and the body as a potential territorializing machine opens several interesting questions for a feminist geopolitics. How and when does the idea of collective security gain ascendancy over bodily security? How can we better understand the interplay between intangible embodied individual experiences – religion, desire, fear – and

the political uses to which they are put? Is the body an effective site of resistance against narratives that seek to use bodies for territorial gain?

APPENDIX C. A GEOPOLITICS OF INTIMACY AND ANXIETY: RELIGION, TERRITORY AND FERTILITY IN LEH DISTRICT, JAMMU AND KASHMIR, INDIA

When I last saw Fatima and Paljor[1] together, they were sitting much closer than your average married Ladakhi couple. We were having lunch in their small rented rooms on the edge of Leh town. They had cooked a small feast – a love of cooking is one thing they shared – and settling down to eat it and pose for a photo, Fatima put her arm through Paljor's, and gazed at him for several seconds – the photo thus recording the kind of overt display of affection guidebooks caution tourists is not appropriate for members of the opposite sex. In our interview, as the two giggle and tease each other over questions of religion and politics, their affection for each other, so complicated outside the two rooms of their rented flat, seemed simple and incontrovertible. But Fatima is a Shia Muslim, and Paljor a Buddhist. They had fallen in love far from the political and economic center of Leh, both posted in the same remote village for their government jobs.

Perhaps out in the village, their desire for one another had teemed with possibility – they wanted to marry and share a life together. But only a few months after I had lunch at their house, I ran into Fatima in town: "Please tell Paljor, I'm pregnant, I want to be with him. Why is he ignoring me?" she pleaded. Paljor insisted to me later that she could not be trusted. Three years later, both Fatima and Paljor, having consented to marriages arranged by their families, are

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1 These are pseudonyms and identifying details have been omitted or changed to protect their identities.

now firmly ensconced within their own religious circles. Fatima's pregnancy with Paljor was aborted, but each now has a child with their new spouse. That seemingly irrepressible desire for each other, which caused them to defy the pressures of family, community, and the state institutions that proved to be inseparable from family and political pressure, had been defeated. Paljor had told me that their marriage was politically problematic for Fatima because it would result in children who would take the Buddhist religion of their father, and thus, "from her, there will be three or four Buddhists."

For a time, I had believed that the connection between them would overcome these political pressures – but this turned out to be naïve. As the 19-year-old daughter of a Buddhist mother and Muslim father recently told me, such marriages are impossible today. In Ladakh, Buddhist and Muslim identity has become inescapably political: with every body counted and confined to an assumed religious-political system of meaning, the mingling of these bodies is now forbidden, and there is constant discussion of which bodies are multiplying, and what that means for the territory caught in a web of geopolitical and electoral contest.

Introduction

In conception and birth, embodied subjectivity engages in complex ways with the expansive space of state territoriality. For instance, the birth of a child is the outcome not only of personal choices and commitments but it also contributes to ongoing state formation and territorial projects within which the parents –

especially the mother – reside: the number of future voters, soldiers, and citizens populating and constituting state territory are determined by this intimate decision. Moreover, ethnic and religious boundaries are enforced or blurred by decisions about whom one can love, marry, and bear children with.

In this article, I examine the inextricable relationship between bodies and territory. I ask: How is fertility and desire mobilized as a means for acquiring or defending territory, and how do female state subjects who are described as territory participate in or refuse this instrumentalization? In the Ladakh region of India's Jammu and Kashmir State (J&K), a politically divisive pro-natal campaign and ban on inter-religious marriage exposes both the territorializing potential of bodies and the corporeality of the body: as the material effect of circulating discourses (subjectivity) as well as the site of supple autonomy.

Caught between the disputed borders of Pakistan and China, J&K has been the subject of territorial dispute since its inclusion in independent India in 1947. J&K consists of three regions: the Kashmir valley with a Sunni Muslim majority, Jammu with a Hindu majority, and Ladakh – split between Tibetan Buddhists and (mainly Shia) Muslims. In Ladakh's Buddhist majority Leh district,[2] political struggles have increasingly been voiced in the language of religious identity, at first almost imperceptibly and then more aggressively over the course of the twentieth century. The slow politicization of religion as a salient marker of

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2 Ladakh, a former independent kingdom, was incorporated into India in 1947 as part of Jammu and Kashmir. It was split into two districts in 1979 – Kargil, with a Shia Muslim majority, and Leh, with a Buddhist majority.

identity culminated in the 1989 agitation, in which the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) imposed a social boycott on Ladakhi Muslims in order to get the attention of the central government in Delhi. In this boycott, described in more detail below, Buddhists were forbidden from interacting with Ladakhi Muslims under threat of physical coercion or monetary penalties – they were not to buy from, lend to, or associate with Muslims. This action – also known locally as the agitation or the demonstration (*pasad*) – was part of an ongoing political movement in Leh district, in which Buddhist political activists have demanded greater autonomy from J&K.[3]

In the wake of this politicization of religious identity, Ladakh Buddhists and Muslims have been abandoning once locally prevalent ideas and practices about religion to conform more closely to modernizing discourses premised on the neat taxonomies of "world religions". This shift from idiographic religiosity to more homogenized formulations is palpable in the architecture and location of new mosques and temples and in bodily practices such as increased vegetarianism among Buddhist youth or stricter veiling among some Muslim women. Complicating as well are the declarations made by the LBA against family planning including anti-family planning campaigns in rural areas, pressuring doctors at Leh's main hospital to discontinue sterilization surgeries, promulgating new interpretations of Buddhist doctrine that condemn family planning, printing

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3 It is important to note that this movement demands autonomy from *J&K State*, but not from India – its stated end goal is to obtain Union Territory status within India.

anti-abortion stickers and interfering with the provision of reproductive health services in rural areas. Widely adopted in the late 1980s, the use of birth control by Buddhist women of child bearing age is now regarded as a sin, a disruption of the cycle of reincarnation, and a capitulation to the perceived threatening growth of the Muslim population. Not surprisingly, the resulting struggle around babies runs parallel to a struggle to manage desire. Intermarriage between Buddhists and Muslims, once unremarkable, is now forcefully prevented within the district. Buddhist leaders claim that marriages of Buddhist women to Muslim men are in fact part of a strategy of deliberate demographic aggression. The reproductive potential of women's bodies renders those bodies as contested territory – but the corporeality of the body, its fleshy vulnerability and its unruly desire, compels and inspires individual women to refuse this rendering.[4]

Geopolitics: Territory, Bodies, Babies

Drawing on Agnew (2000), Paasi (2003:109) defines territory as "an ambiguous term that usually refers to sections of space occupied by individuals, social groups or institutions, most typically by the modern state." Territories are produced by and reflective of power relations through the process in which space is "made into territories in a multitude of social practices and discourses by using abstract, culturally laden symbolism" (Paasi 2003:109). The state's monopoly on

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4 This research draws on fourteen months of research conducted in 2004, 2007 and 2008, and includes life history interviews, a survey of 192 Ladakhi women and interviews with politicians and religious leaders. All participants have been given pseudonyms and details that might identify them have been removed.

territorial sovereignty derives from the development of the modern state system in the 17th century. At its heart, geopolitics involves techniques and motivations for controlling territory, and the positioning of politics within the international spatial context.

Population is an inescapable component of geopolitical strategies to control territory. Ratzel's *Lebensraum* (living-space), as appropriated, "supplied important conceptual resources to Nazi racial science, helping it to conceptualize the state as an organism and to specify the necessary connections between the nation and its dwelling area" (Gilroy 2000:39). German nationalism, its Pan-Regions, and "grotesque plans of 'racial/territorial' purity" (Sidaway 2008:448) is only one of the most vivid and disturbing examples of the strategic fusion of population and territory. "Geopolitics, in theory, language, and practice, classifies swathes of territory and masses of people" (Flint 2006: 13) and yet the relationship between people and territory remains only partially theorized.

Into this breach has come theorizations of the body and its utilization as a symbol of the nation, as the product of discipline and state power, and as the site through which our subjectivities are produced; but bodies are also entangled in territorial struggles. The presence or absence of bodies and the composition of aggregates of bodies produces particular territories – and the possibility of engineering territory through bodies is the premise upon which the chilling logic of ethnic cleansing and eugenics is built. Bodies, of course, are also necessary to defend territory. In Mussolini's Italy, there were rewards for prolific mothers,

especially those with more than twelve live births as inducements for women to give birth to soldiers (Krause 1994). Through these logics, bodies *become* territory. And thus there is a struggle to control what happens to each body – whether they reproduce or not, whether they are allowed to live or not, in the interest and logic of 'majoritarian' projects of national territorialization. This struggle is driven by the human body's capacity to populate territories through reproduction and the resultant consequences for that strategy.

As the critical geopolitics intervention of the 1990s has suggested, it is crucial for political geographers to "document and deconstruct the institutional, technical and material forms of these new congealments of geo-power, to problematize how global space is incessantly reimagined and rewritten by centers of power and authority in the late twentieth century" (Ó Tuathail 1996:249). Viewed through the lens of critical geopolitics, it is possible to trace the representations of territory and populations discussed above and situate these particular formulations of power/knowledge. Critiques by Sharp (2000), Dowler and Sharp (2001), Sparke (2000), Thrift (2000) and others allow us to further trouble geopolitical visions. In the last ten years, feminist geopolitics has emerged and become strengthened by building on the critical geopolitics deconstruction of discursive socio-spatial formations. But it has also gone further both epistemologically by asking: "how these discourses actually work in everyday life and how they make subjects of people: how they are articulated and performed in

different contexts to make subjects of their identities and geopolitical visions" (Dowler and Sharp 2001:174).

Before addressing this instrumentalization of bodies, I want to provide background on some of the more influential approaches to the body advanced within feminist theory.[5] Heuristically, I outline the discussion in terms of epistemological, corporeal, national, and disciplinary bodies; however, these approaches overlap and build on one another in crucial ways.

Feminist theorists have built a complex and cogent critique of masculinist knowledge rooted in the specificity of the body. Drawing on Haraway (1991) the epistemological claim has been advanced that knowledge is always already situated; that is, it is particular to the embodied perspective of the knower. This insight has had the effect of dismantling the mind/body dualism on which universal claims to knowledge have been founded and replacing it with the "idea of knowledge as embodied, engendered and embedded in the material context of place and space" (Duncan 1996:1; Longhurst 1997; Rose 1993). Importantly, this insight has an extensive genealogy. As Alcoff observes, an analytic that engages with the body was also evident in the work of Marx (on the laboring body), Nietzsche, and Freud; "Feminism simply pointed out that these bodies are both sexually specific and sociocultural, that they are inscribed by power, and that the Kantian 'man' who conditions all knowledge is, indeed, a man, and not a woman"

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5 A comprehensive review of the literature on body/bodies is beyond the scope of this paper, but for an overview in geography see Longhurst (1997), Moss and Dyck (2003), and Nast and Pile (1998).

(Alcoff 1996:17). And while bodily difference has consistently informed approaches to feminism, Haraway's reconfiguration of classical Marxist thought has enabled a radical shift within feminist theory from bodily difference perceived as an obstacle to equality (de Beauvoir 1953), to embodied knowledge as an epistemological position that destabilizes the Cartesian self in favor of the partial and positioned knower.

For feminist geographers, the body holds special appeal: foundational concepts – space and place – are necessarily encountered through the body (Nast and Pile 1998). Embodied knowledge as an epistemological position draws attention to the centrality of the corporeal body as a site through which we experience the world. Moss and Dyck (2003:59) distinguish between corporeal bodies as an analytic tool and embodied knowledge as an epistemological approach, that is, "between a social geography of the body and an embodied social geography." This critical distinction opens up a range of important and productive questions: how do racialized, sexed and differently-abled bodies experience space? How does that spatial experience shape subjectivities? How are bodies disciplined and shaped to fit spaces and places? The state impinges on the body and bodies are racialized and gendered. Flows of bodies are regulated and marked with national characteristics.

Studies of embodied nationalisms have begun to explore the links between making states, making nations and making people (Korac 1999, 2004; Mayer 2004; Morokvasic-Müller 2004; Yuval-Davis 1997; Yuval-Davis 1989). In

scholarship on the partition of India, for example, the process wherein women's bodies became the nation have been eloquently documented (Butalia 2000; Das 1995; Menon and Bhasin 1998). When women became signs for the nation "through which men communicate with each other" (Das 1995:56), their rights, needs, and lives became secondary to their symbolic value as ciphers for nationalism.

A religious demographic politics of biopower (Foucault 1990) is built into the Indian state. India's territory was delineated in 1947 according to the enumeration of lives marked as Hindu or Muslim, and counting has remained political. In classic governmental fashion (Foucault 1991), the management of population has been both extensive (inventoried in censuses, subject to national planning) and intimate (family planning as an intervention at the site of the body, the enlistment of the family in the project of modernity). In India, this governmentality has been tied to religious identity. Since partition and independence, the labels that were used to draw national borders have been reiterated through the degree of intimacy allowed between those of different religious identities. This policing was prefigured in the tragedy of partition, in which bodies, and women's bodies in particular, became symbols of the nations-in-formation (Das 1995; Butalia 2000; Menon and Bhasin 1998).

For Foucault, bodies and subjectivities are the product of knowledge/power processes rather than a pre-discursive core, "In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures,

certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals" (Foucault 1980:98, see also Butler 1993). For Foucault, the regulation of the body through accumulation of knowledge, medicalization, and the proliferation of social sciences is a key feature of state power and the process through which we are made subjects. The disciplinary regimes that participate in the production of docile bodies are indistinguishable – doctors, families, lovers, schools produce the body through a microphysics of power in which the body itself participates and through which our identity is in a constant state of formation.

National Context and Historical Background

The concern over women's bodies in Ladakh conforms to overarching narratives that politicize reproduction and tie it to religious identity. The Hindu nationalist trend that swept over India in the late 1980s frames India as a Hindu nation-state under Muslim threat from without and within. Fertility does not escape this treatment:

> The Census 2001 has given India a wake-up call. A Hindu majority in every region of the country is an implicit guarantee of its integrity, civilizational vitality and economic prosperity. It is a tragedy; India has no uniform civil code. In the absence of which some minority groups are given the privileges of democratic, modern, permissiveness, even as they enjoy the protections of outdated religious diktats. In such a situation all efforts of the state to have an enlightened population policy are defeated. The changing religious profile of Indian population has a strong impact on the future of India. And it continues to be amongst the major determinants of strife ("The population bomb" quoted in (quoted in Rajalakshmi 2004).

This Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS is a Hindu fundamentalist political group) article, written shortly after the release of census figures in 2004, gives an indication of the ways population-territory narratives are articulated. Reproduction and birth control have become so thoroughly politicized that the 2004 release of these census figures – widely known to be fundamentally flawed – caused widespread uproar. Politicians from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP is the principal Hindu Right political formation in India) discussed the need for population policy, and obfuscating newspaper articles warned of the "high growth" of Muslims and "decline" of Hindus (Basu 2004). The misleading figures overestimated a change in the proportion of Muslims, because they had not been adjusted to reflect the incorporation of J&K and Assam (left out of the previous 1991 census).[6] The figures were quickly retracted and adjusted by the Registrar General's office, but not before revealing pronouncements and discussion in the Indian media. Playing on the modernizing family planning slogan, "*Hum do, hamare do*," Nahendra Modi complained, "Their kind of family planning slogan is 'We five and our twenty-five'" (Bunsha 2002). The connection between the

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6 According to the National Family Health Surveys I and II (NFHS-I and –II), since 1984 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for all religions had declined from 4.5 to 2.9 in 1999 (Bhagat and Praharaj 2005). The 1999 TFR for Muslims was higher (3.6) than that of Hindus (2.8), although according to the NFHS, the Muslim rate decreased more during the 1990s than did the Hindu rate. The *incorrect* census figures indicated that the Muslim growth rate had increased since the 1981-1991 counts. Figures adjusted for the inclusion of Assam and J&K indicated that the rate of growth had declined from 32.9 percent to 29.3 percent, alongside a Hindu growth rate decline from 22.8 percent to 20 percent (Basu 2004). In the 2001 census, Muslims account for 12.9 percent of the population, and Hindus comprise an 80.9 percent majority.

census and rumors of Hindu decline are a recurrent theme in communal politics that can be traced back to colonial preoccupations with categorization of people and the subsequent politicization of those categories as part of colonial rule and post-independence elections (Bhagat and Praharaj 2005; Datta 1993). As Jeffery and Jeffery (2005) observe, "obsessive concern" about Muslim fertility is discursively tied to the creation of a "demonized 'other' (the over-sexed Muslim man and his over-fertile Muslim wife/wives)."

This national context and Leh's vulnerable position within conflicted J&K State have made it possible for Buddhist leaders of Ladakh's autonomy movement to frame their struggle in terms of religious identity. As van Beek (van Beek 2001) has argued, the division of Ladakhis into political blocs described in terms of religion was never inevitable – indeed, the past century has seen many instances of schisms *between* Buddhists – for instance during the 1960s and 1970s split of the Congress party.[7] Today we can see evidence of a similar phenomenon as Buddhists are split into two political parties dominating Leh: the Congress party and the Ladakh Union Territory Front (LUTF). According to van Beek (2001), as well as some of my own informants, the decision to portray the autonomy movement as the outcome of religious discrimination and identity difference was calculated to play into the communal themes dominating national politics, and was given a boost by the rise of insurgency in the Kashmir valley.

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7 For other insightful accounts of the politicization of religion, see Aggarwal (2004), Bertelsen (1996), Gutschow (2004) Pinault (2001), Srinivas (1998), and van Beek (1996).

Geopolitical babies: Birth and Marriage Politics

For Nargis, one of the women I interviewed in Leh, the connection between territorial expulsion and women's bodies needs no explanation; the burning of Muslim houses, including her husband's childhood home, is folded in with women's bodies. When Buddhists allege that Muslims "are taking all their girls," their narrative is built in part on the assumption that women's bodies are targets for geopolitical strategy.

> Sara: Why did they burn down the houses?
> Nargis: They were just thinking to put an end to the Muslims. They said to get out, for the Muslims to get out, that's what they were saying…Where would we go? And in Kashmir, there are Kashmiris[8], where would we Ladakhis go? The older people would say, "What are they saying? People who were born right here, telling them to get out, how can they get out?" Land and fields and houses, we all have them…
> Sara: Why would they do that?
> Nargis: There are some who say, the Muslims are taking all of our girls, there's this, there's that. That's one thing. Then, simply saying to get rid of the Muslims, some must have been thinking like that. (Nargis, 40 year old Shia mother of one).

An anonymous letter circulating widely in Leh during the summer of 2008 echoes Nargis's assessment of the connections between bodies and territory:

> Countless birth doors have been closed. Buddhists are going to be finished. We're at the end of time. Glaciers have melted away. Untimely floods have come. Grasshoppers have eaten half the country…The knife is at our throat and we are blaming each other for murder. Religion has been harmed. Hey Buddhists, think about it. Still you have time to think. One day you'll have to leave this place. One day you will have to convert to another religion

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8 I am translating from *Kachul* and *Kachulpa*, the Ladakh words for Kashmir and Kashmiri.

> (Excerpt from an anonymous letter distributed in Leh bazaar April 17th, 2008).

Unsurprisingly, the geopolitics of fertility and reproductive health manifests in a variety of popular movements across the globe, from the European nationalist anti-immigrant politics to discourses on right wing radio in the US comparing red state/blue state fertility and abortion rates. In Bialasieicz's (2006) compelling examination of the civilizational rhetoric of Oriana Fallaci, Samuel Huntington and Pat Buchanan, she observes that a new moral geography is emerging in which immigrants and others are portrayed as a "demographic-reproductive menace." According to her (2006:701), "it is through ideas about reproductive practices and demographic threat that the 'clash of civilizations' is being brought home, with women's bodies becoming the new battleground for the preservation of the identity of the West." Nowhere are Bialasiewicz's observations more supported than in the way that pro-natal and anti-natal policies, state agents and institutions produce and, literally, govern territory through the management of fertile bodies. In some cases, these policies regulate who is encouraged to reproduce through state-subsidized programs (e.g. single professionals in Italy and Singapore); in others reproduction is discouraged through the withdrawal of funding for family planning, especially legal abortions (welfare mothers, immigrant others, poor women in the global South). Sub-state movements or groups may also attempt to create territories through the animation or suppression of specific sexualities or reproductive practices (see, for example McSweeney on pro-natalism in indigenous populations (McSweeney 2005;

McSweeney and Arps 2005). Individuals' bodies effectively come to be colonized through medicalization and decisions that allow or limit a range of reproductive health services, and through these interventions or absences, the relationship between fertility, population, and territory can be clearly seen to be grounded in mundane practices. The day-to-day struggle to provide for a family, the toll of pregnancy on the body, or the intangible desire to give birth to a child unavoidably complicate the workings of geopolitical power through the territorialization of bodies.

Particularly in contested regions, such as Ladakh, the struggle for political power in local institutions is inseparable from international geopolitical narratives and the geopolitical struggle to control bodies and their reproductive capacity. But those struggles and narratives both hinge on the counting of people – the tallying of bodies – and the assigning of territory to states that claim the loyalties of the largest number of those people, that claim an affinity with other bodies of a certain religion, ethnicity, or other inscribed marker. This is especially true in South Asia, where the body-territory collision is particularly compelling, as the borders of the three largest states were drawn on and through bodies inscribed with religious identity, inheriting a. The independent states born through this bloody colonial legacy of biopolitics (Foucault 1990) are now challenged by these bodily calculations, as territories within territories reveal themselves as a set of never-ending Russian dolls: South Asia, divided into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India, reveals J&K as India's sole Muslim state, within which Hindus and

Buddhists find themselves minorities, and in Leh district, members of the Shia Muslim minority declare themselves the most minority of minorities.

Fertile Territory: bodies as territorial instruments

In Leh district, political activists are attempting to increase Buddhist women's fertility in order to maintain a Buddhist-majority territory. Pro-natal geopolitical strategy targets the fertile potential of bodies and the territorial potential of babies. As this strategy becomes part of discussions about babies, political and religious meanings complicate the decisions individuals make. Inseparable from pro-natalism is increased regulation of desire. Until the late 1980s, marriage between Buddhists and Muslims was not uncommon. In a 2008 survey, I found that 83 percent of women had relatives across this supposed divide (that is, Buddhists had Muslim relatives, and Muslims had Buddhist relatives), and in 75 percent of cases, these relatives were within one generation (a mother, father, aunt or uncle). That 80 percent of the women also professed themselves to be against intermarriage suggests a significant shift in thinking in a short period of time. In interview after interview, women indicated to me that young women today are more likely to have a 'love marriage,' that is, to choose their own spouse – but evidence suggests that this choice extends only to those with the same religious identity.

Pro-natal actions, such as pressuring doctors and pro-natal rhetoric espoused on tours to rural areas may shape access to reproductive health care: even if the provision of services is *not* restricted, both Buddhist and Muslim

women now frame their decisions in accordance with the new moral narratives in circulation. The decision to have a tubal ligation, once something "everyone was doing," is now an action that individuals feel the need to justify through explanations of their compromised or vulnerable bodies, limited incomes and the need to produce modern, well-educated children. There explanations suggest that this need to justify family planning is leading to shifts in the technology used – away from tubal ligation toward use of the IUD to limit births rather than to space them. In this milieu, women must negotiate both the political and personal meanings of their reproductive capacity: they consider what a baby means for them and its cost to their body, but also view the choice through the lens of religious and political judgment. In discussions about the future, geopolitical and individual narratives come to be stories about intersecting and conflicting fears and anxieties.

Political and religious incitements to reproduce

> The population problem is our top priority right now. We have been telling Buddhist women they must avoid family planning…They have become proud, and want to send their children to private schools. If they sent their children to our government schools, which are fine, then they could afford more children. (2008 interview with LBA member).

Since the 1930s, the LBA has been increasingly concerned about the future of Buddhists in the region,[9] and the pro-natal movement is the culmination of a slow-building demographic strategy. In 1941, the first step towards demographic action was a ban on polyandry – the common practice of one woman marrying two or more brothers (van Beek 2001). This decision was couched in the language of modernity and universalizing religion – aligning Ladakh's Buddhist practices with global practices, however, it also had a strong undercurrent of demographic strategy, as did the ban on primogeniture in 1943 (van Beek 2001).[10]

In the 1980s, Hindu nationalism was taking hold in India with the increasing success of parties espousing nationalist rhetoric, as well as staged spectacles such as the campaign to destroy the Baburi Masjid in Ayodhya. In Kashmir, years of neglect, conflict and human rights abuses led to an insurgency and demands for independence. In this charged atmosphere, the LBA decided to portray their quest for autonomy as a religious struggle. Pointing to oppression and neglect by the leaders of J&K, they declared that Ladakh was a fundamentally Buddhist region, oppressed by the Muslim majority in the state. To get the

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9 For excellent analyses of the deployment of communal politics and the rise of the influential LBA, see the dissertations of van Beek (1996) and Bertelsen (1996).

10 In the 2001 Indian census, Ladakh's population was 236,539, approximately 47 percent Muslim (majority Shia), 46 percent Buddhist, with minority Hindu, Christian and Sikh populations (India 2001). In 1979, Ladakh was split into two districts, Kargil and Leh. Kargil District has a Muslim majority (approximately 80 percent to 15 percent), and Leh District has a Buddhist majority (77 percent to 15 percent). Leh District's population according to the 2001 census is 117,637.

attention of the central government, the LBA called for a social boycott of Ladakhi Muslims. This was a defining moment in Ladakhi politics, in which political narratives and religious identity became fused and explicitly territorialized. Enforced restrictions on interaction marked all Ladakhis as members of one of two antagonistic political entities. With Leh regarded as Buddhist and Kargil as Muslim, the goal was to maintain Leh as a pro-India, non-Muslim majority enclave within the majority Muslim Kashmir, as part of the contest between Pakistan and India. The boycott ended in 1992, and in 1995, Leh district was accorded the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, giving it a semi-autonomous status within J&K. The fusion of politics and religion has remained.

After the 1989-1992 social boycott, the demographic strategy intensified. By the end of the social boycott, the LBA met with the temporary coalition of Muslim groups, the Ladakh Muslim Association, and negotiated a ban on marriages between Buddhists and Muslims. In my survey and interviews every participant was aware of this unwritten agreement (and most supported it). Accordingly, each side is responsible for the regulation of its own young people – if a Muslim girl runs away with a Buddhist boy, each "community"[11] is expected to forcibly return "their" daughter or son to their family, which is then under considerable pressure to continue to keep the couple apart. There are many stories

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11 Community is an extremely problematic term, but this is the language that Buddhist and Muslim leaders use to refer to the terms of this agreement.

in circulation about the enforcement of this agreement – some successful, some tragic. It has become impossible to *legitimate* desire for someone of the 'wrong' religion through marriage, but anecdotes about broken hearts and secret affairs point to the difficulty of regulating desire itself. The anti-intermarriage agreement publicly rejects individual desires that question religious identity and is both a means of separating those bodies of different religious origin and, according to my participants, also important for more than conflict prevention. The agreement is also meant to be a system of calculation, checks and balances: a means to avoid "spinsters" by keeping a balance of marriageable girls and boys in each community, and a means to prevent women from converting and producing babies of a different religion from the one in which the women themselves were born.[12]

Each of these objectives hint at the demographic-strategic potential of women's bodies, but this undercurrent has become explicit in the LBA actions of the last several years through measures such as the awareness campaigns about the religious and political repercussions of using birth control, attempts to ban family planning at Leh's Sonam Norbu Memorial Hospital, and harassment of gynecologists, leading in at least one case to the prevention of a family planning clinic in Nubra valley. Gutschow (2006) reports that health workers in Zangskar have had trouble stocking contraceptives such as IUDs and condoms due to interference. I have heard similar reports from a health worker in Sham. These

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12 These are the three reasons participants cited for the ban.

public actions reflect upon and draw on widely held Buddhist beliefs that Muslims do not use family planning.

> Sara: do you think that birth control is useful for Leh?
> Diskit: In the past, everyone did it because they thought it was useful. They didn't understand. Now the *rinpoches*[13] have given teachings, and they have said not to do it. Last year, with LBA, 25 of us went on a tour, to explain to people not to do it. Because, the *chipa*[14], they totally don't do it. Not at all. And for that reason, their population is growing. Their population is really big now. That's what people say. Now they say, in Turtuk, from one house, they had thirty grandchildren. Now, our Buddhist population is going to be cut off. In the past, the [Sunni Muslims][15] were few, but now there are many. In the past we didn't understand, and we did that family planning. Now that we did that, there are fewer children. Then, last year, listening to the *rinpoches'* advice, about twenty of us, and the LBA, went to Sham up to Dachok, in Nubra up to Yarma, to say, don't use birth control. …I really feel like it's not ok. I don't know what happened, in the past, people didn't understand and they just only gave birth to two or three children. Now, everyone is scared. Now when there are prayers in the temple[16] if there is a *rinpoche*…they say not to do it.

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13 A *rinpoche* is a high monk, most often the reincarnated spiritual leader of a particular monastery.
14 *Chipa*, in this context, means Muslim. The terms insider and outsider, *nangpa* and *chipa*, are often used to refer to Buddhists and Muslims. This is mainly a Buddhist usage – Muslims are more likely to identify as Mussalman. Gutschow (2006) makes the same observation, and Aggarwal (2004) suggests the *nangpa/chipa* language became more common after the social boycott.
15 Diskit uses the word "Kache" to refer to Sunni Muslims. In Ladakh the terms Balti and Kache are frequently used to distinguish between Shia and Sunni Muslims. These terms however, are misleading as they are geographic markers – Balti means a person from Baltistan and Kache means Kashmiri. These terms are regularly applied to Ladakhis to denote their religious identity, but in my interviews I have found it is more common for Buddhists to deploy these words and that Muslims more often differentiate using the terms Shia and Sunni. In interview excerpts throughout this paper I have translated Balti and Kache as Shia and Sunni, however, I have bracketed the term to indicate this substitution.
16 I'm translating from *gonpa soma* – she is referring to the temple in the middle of Leh Bazaar.

This very public anti-birth control campaign has not only attempted to limit access to family planning, it has also shifted the discourse about family planning. What once seems to have been a fairly straightforward personal decision has become one that requires public justification. Women enthusiastically embraced family planning in the 1980s and 1990s after the arrival of the first well-qualified obstetrician-gynecologist in Leh district.

Whether this new Buddhist interpretation of family planning as a disruption to the cycle of reincarnation will result in the rejection of family planning is difficult to predict. Some Buddhists believe that this pressure is actually working with Buddhist women. When I asked what might lead some women to have more rather than fewer children, this 40-year-old Buddhist mother of two girls told me the following:

> Dolkar: Some talk about Buddhists and Muslims, and say that Buddhists have had fewer children and as a result our population is smaller. With that in mind, some are now having more children.
> Sara: Really, they say that?
> Dolkar: Since Baltis don't use family planning, they just let them all be born, so they have had so many children and their population is really growing.
> Sara: Do you think that is really having an impact? Do you think that some women hear that and then have a lot of children?
> Dolkar: There are those who do. Older Buddhists are saying don't use family planning, just let your children be born. Later, something is going to happen with our Muslim population.
> Sara: What do you think about that?
> Dolkar: Thinking about religion that is right. Those who are thinking about our religion are having children, like four or five.

Dolkar confidently asserted that she had acquaintances who were maximizing fertility, but of the 67 Buddhist women I surveyed, only one had

refrained from using birth control for religious reasons. Unlike Dolkar, most women said they did not personally know anyone who was avoiding birth control for religious reasons, but they did use hypothetical examples of women who might avoid the practice. Both Buddhist and Muslim women suggest that extremely pious people would not use family planning, but then went on to say that they were not personally acquainted with such persons. Muslim women, on the other hand, suggest that the wife of a Mullah would be pressured not to use family planning because it would bring shame to her family if she herself could not follow the religious restrictions on contraception. Buddhist women insisted that all Buddhist women use family planning. In fact, they insisted that "most women" only have one child these days. This assertion, however, does not stand up to scrutiny – for reasons discussed in more detail below, it is very rare for a Ladakhi woman to only have one child.[17]

Pro-natal strategies, combined with the prohibitions on religious intermarriage, are built on imaginings of the territorial future of Leh district. Pro-natal Buddhists imagine a future in which Buddhist women have defended the territory's Buddhist majority by marrying Buddhist men and birthing Buddhist babies who grow up as part of the Buddhist voting bloc. Should Buddhists fail to heed the pro-natalist call, an alternative dystopian imagining is projected in

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17 In my survey, I did not encounter a single woman who had used a permanent method of contraception after one child – the only women with one child were those who had been unable to conceive after the first birth or who had divorced. Those women expressed anxiety or regret for having an only child.

which Buddhists lose their majority, or, in the words of several of my respondents, "are cut off," "die out," or "are finished." In this narrative, the birth of a baby is both more and less than a family event; it is part of a struggle to populate space with the right kinds of bodies. It is less than a family event because this reading of birth is focused so tightly on the macro scale that it elides the multiple meanings that fertility and children have for the women who decide whether or not to have them. Those meanings will be discussed in the next section.

Territories of the self and family

> She had been staying in a Muslim household, and then she got a message, "you better empty your room." …but she didn't do it. Then when she was in the main bazaar… They said, you have to come in *gonpa soma*[18] for a little bit, and then she went. She went in, and they asked her, "you are hanging around with [Sunni Muslims] and you are staying in a [Sunni Muslim] room, why are you doing that?" …So she told them, "where would I go, I'm poor, and where else would someone let me stay for free?" Then, they really slapped her, one of the boys, he slapped her, and she says that she still remembers the feeling of that slap, his name was -----, he just really slapped her, you know how someone might? And she just fainted. She had hair, what pretty hair she had, it was this long, fell to here… They just cut it all off, even worse than a boy's hair. Then she just went to her mother's house in Shey, they carried her there, and she stayed there for a while. Then her sister and so on, they came where she had been staying and took all her things, and they put her in a Christian's house, here in Leh. After a while, a

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18 *Gonpa soma*, literally "new monastery," is the Buddhist temple built in the center of Leh town after 1956. The LBA has its office in the temple courtyard, and the site has become as political as it is religious (some would argue the same for the main Shia and Sunni mosques). During the agitation, politically active Buddhists met in *gonpa soma*, and Buddhists who disobeyed the rules of the social boycott were punished there.

> Muslim came and then she just converted to Islam and married him. Because she said, "they did this to me, they cut off my hair, and how would I stay Buddhist?"

In this well-known event of the social boycott, a Buddhist woman who had not conformed to the established boundaries is punished through public, bodily humiliation by being slapped and having her hair chopped off.[19] As told to me by her Shia Muslim childhood friend, rather than bringing her back within the bounds of Buddhist identification, however, this punishment leads her to abandon her Buddhist identity. As a site of lived experience and through which we produce our sense of self, the body is both susceptible to disciplinary action *and*, I would argue, a site of resistance against attempts to instrumentalize its potential.

Thus far I have outlined political pressures bearing down on the bodies of women living in Leh. In this section, I will outline the complex ways that the meaning of babies for women's bodies, lives and sense of self intersects with the politics of fertility. Importantly, despite heightened anxiety around and policing of women's reproductive bodies, the commitment to pro-natalism by the LBA, and the firm conviction of most women that the use of family planning goes against their religion (whether that is Buddhism or Shia or Sunni Islam), women still see birth control as a necessity. Religious and political narratives compel women to

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19 As Gutschow (2004) observes, hair is one of the key signs of beauty and sexuality in Ladakh (as elsewhere). The meaning given to hair is evident in town, in that it is rare to see non-monastic women with short hair or to see women in public spaces with their hair loose. Hair is commonly well cared for, often colored or conditioned with henna and oil, and worn in a bun, braid or low ponytail in town. Most, but not all, Muslim women will cover their hair with varying degrees of vigilance.

put their bodies, and their economic resources, on the line: but they consistently refuse.

The decision of whether to have a child, and how many children to have, involves personal, economic, religious and political considerations. Most women describe a complicated combination of economic pressures and bodily fears that lead them to use family planning despite religious injunctions or political incitement. Many of my participants continue to see the increased options for women's reproductive health as a boon, as did this 60-year-old Buddhist mother of six surviving children when describing her decision to have a tubal ligation:

> Angmo: Dr. ----- scolded me, "You're a farmer, so you work so hard, and then every two years you're having another child?" and I said, "thank you, please do something about it." And then she did it. I was in the hospital for one day and then I left. I did the operation. Having given birth to seven boys, really!
> Her 40-year-old niece: having two, I just feel like they will kill me, it's so much trouble.
> Angmo: [to husband in the doorway] Don't come in! She's asking me questions!
> Sara: Then, between those children, did you put gaps?
> Angmo: I didn't put gaps, and at that time they didn't have the thing to put gaps [IUD]. But it just kind of happened that there were gaps. There are those who take care and intentionally put gaps, but we're farmers, we don't know anything about that. All we know how to do is how to work. About children – even when I was pregnant, I wouldn't realize I was pregnant, after three or four months, then I would realize…

Angmo's pragmatic and common sense description of her family planning decisions is mirrored in the preferences indicated by Buddhist and Muslim women for small families (see Figures 1 and 2).

While I will devote considerable space in this section to discussing the complex and varied reasons why women resist the push to have more children, I would be remiss for not elaborating the many ways that children are passionately desired. Wanting to have children is described as though it did not need explanation, although I pushed for one. When I asked recently married women if they wanted children, or asked a woman with children why she had them, the usual response was laughter at the absurd nature of the question.[20] Aside from Buddhist women who decide to join the monastic life,[21] motherhood is central to making a meaningful life and building individual and family status. Women expressed a desire for children in part because they simply liked children, or because a house without children would be empty – they described children as *skitpo*, "happy," in and of themselves. Many women emphasized to me the precious *and fragile* nature of children. In interview after interview I heard sentiments like those of Hazira, sentiments that emphasize the cherished and delicate nature of children and human life. When I asked Hazira how many children were ideal, she simply said more is better, and explained:

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20 It is important to note that for married women, not having children is an unlikely option. A childless marriage would likely end in divorce or cause embarrassment. Of 198 women, I encountered only one who had never conceived. She and her husband had adopted a child from relatives. Infertility arose as a topic of concern, either in stories about relatives who had been unable to conceive, or about divorces that had occurred due to failure to conceive. I interviewed two women in their late thirties who had decided never to marry or have children – one woman was Buddhist, one was Shia. Both the women said simply that they saw no appeal in marriage and enjoyed their independence.

21 For an excellent description of the varied motivations for joining monastic life see Gutschow (2004).

> Will they remain or not? We don't know, it's not in our hands, it's in God's hands. Once they are grown, and even have a job, they might end up underneath a car, they might get a disease – with God, we can't say anything. He will give and he will take them Himself. If after we have been sterilized he takes them? As many as you have, it is good… If you have one child, you can't be confident. Even if you have two, you still can't be confident. Later, if we say we need children, where will we bring them from? Is there a place from which you can bring children? Is there? There is no place. *(Hazira, 47 year old Shia mother of six)*

One of the reasons often given to explain the number of children a woman has is the role of children as future caregivers. Nearly all the women I spoke with mentioned this as a rationale to have two or more children. The most common answer among Ladakhi women to the general question, "what is an ideal number of children to have?" is two or three, and when asked, "Why?" the most common answer is that this number reduces the likelihood of abandonment in old age. Everyone has a story of a relative or neighbor whose child does not take care of them, or whose child died, or, in the terms I heard, "one could turn out bad," or "you never know if they will remain," "if the sons don't look after you, the daughter will." These responses clearly indicate the complex interplay between collective territorial fear and individual fears. At an abstract level, women worry about the future of Leh district, but more immediately and personally, they worry about their own bodily integrity as they age.

The positive meanings of children, as future sources of care, as a source of joy in the household, and a source of status for the family, are tempered by the perceived bodily and economic costs of childbearing and rearing. In giving their reasons for using family planning methods, women generally emphasized the

impossibility of bearing many children based on arguments about health. Invoking the vulnerability of the body, women brought up everything from specific medical conditions such as high or low blood pressure to the potential for death to (occasionally) concern for appearance:

> Dolkar: Some say, "it is bad for my body," some say, "I feel it makes me old." Then, breastfeeding, some say it makes their body ugly and their face long.
> Sara: So they use family planning to stay beautiful?
> Dolkar: Really, they do. They say it destroys their body so they only have a few. Some say that, and only have one child.

Moreover, this concern for appearance is subsumed under greater apprehension about the damage that frequent childbirth have on the body. Women like Tahira, now in her 60s, believed that many births had devastated her body; after eleven pregnancies, and with seven surviving children, Tahira indicated her body when I asked what the ideal number of children would be, saying, "It's better to have fewer! Just look at me, look at my health."

Unlike Buddhist women, Muslim women sometimes saw health as a valid justification for defying religious injunctions against family planning. Several Sunni and Shia women told me that it was a religious duty to preserve and care for their own God-given body, and that as the doctor had told them they were too weak for additional pregnancies, it was acceptable for them to use family planning. Other Muslim participants insisted that any such weakness could be cured by adequate nutrition or medical treatment, after which the body's reproductive capacity should no longer be controlled.

Most Buddhist women felt that spacing births for two to five years between pregnancies was acceptable as a means for protecting the body, and differentiated between spacing and permanent methods – identifying a moral scale on which avoidance of contraception was ideal, spacing was acceptable, and permanent methods were the 'most' sinful. Even women who see sterilization as a sin still have the operation performed, viewing it as unavoidable. A similar spectrum of morality was implicit in most of my discussions with Muslim women; some, however, insisted on a black and white distinction, lumping all forms of family planning together as prohibited. Identifying family planning as morally problematic, however, did not necessarily correlate with changes in practices. Bilquis, a forty-year-old Shia woman from Chushot with one child described the dilemma, after a question about whether it is acceptable to space children.

> Bilquis: We can't just let them be born – if we don't put a gap [between pregnancies][22] that is damaging ourselves so that is okay. Our own bodies, they don't have the ability to have a child one after another. If you have a child every year, we ourselves won't survive. For that reason, it is okay to put a gap. That's what they say now. Otherwise you will have high blood pressure or you will have low blood pressure, you will have all kinds of diseases. . . For that reason, now in our religion, spacing is okay. Abortion, that is totally forbidden. If you are really healthy, you shouldn't put a gap, they will say you should just have the children. Now since we don't have the ability, it's okay to put a gap.
> Sara: Do you think that thinking about today's conditions, are people listening to religious regulations?

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22 I am translating *bar borches* as spacing, or "putting a gap," in Leh, *bar borches* almost exclusively refers to the use of IUD to put two or more years between births.

> Bilquis: At this time, people don't have the ability [to follow religious regulations]. That being the case, and the doctors say we shouldn't have a lot, then people are thinking about their own health and they can't have a lot of children. For all those reasons, now people are putting gaps, everyone is putting gaps.
> Sara: Are they doing other things, like the operation[23]?
> Bilquis: They are also doing the operations, many have done that also.
> Sara: In Buddhism, now they are saying not to do the operation.
> Bilquis: In ours also they are saying the same.
> Sara: Is that difficult?
> Bilquis: Yes, exactly. Nowadays how could you not? Sterilization, they say it is like killing a person, but then looking at today's conditions, how can you avoid it? Now it's also difficult to get a job. If you have 12 children, you won't even be able to clothe them and keep them clean. Even taking care of two children, it reduces women to tears. Even two is difficult today. If you have all those children, what? And have to take care of them all?

Bilquis's argument for limiting and spacing the number of births was a recurring theme across my survey sample for all levels of education, religion, and age. Interestingly, the women I survey and interviewed perceive themselves as being part of a generational shift. Angmo, the mother of six children, believes that two or three is ideal today:

> Sara: In your opinion, what's a good number of children?
> Angmo: Well, for me it already happened. But I think it seems like two or three is a nice number. I don't know, chocho, I don't know what to say. It just seems like nobody wants a lot of children. I think at the most, three.
> Sara: Why don't people want more children?
> Angmo: Then, if they have more, how would they get an education? How would they be able to provide clothes? Tasty, good food, how would they get it? For those families in which both the mother and the father have a good job, then it's okay. Otherwise, how will it be okay? If it's not okay, for those who

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23 Tubal ligation, referred to as "operation," "*ban choches*" (to close or to stop), or "lapro," for laparoscopy.

> don't have it, then it will be difficult for the children. Nothing will happen to the parents, but for the children, it will be like that. The children won't have a happy life, that's why people are doing that.
> Niece: I feel a headache just from my two.
> Angmo: These days, it's chaotic, it's the time itself. It's happening like that. What it is, I just don't know. It's like that. If you have a lot of children, the children themselves won't turn out well.

By limiting reproduction, women participate in the project of modernity – using the English word, "modern," to describe their lives. In their natal families, most women were one of five to seven siblings, wore hand-me-downs and went barefoot throughout childhood. If they attended school at all, it was to a government-run one-room village school. These same women contrast their histories with their own children and point out that standards have changed completely – if they were to send their children barefoot to government schools, the family would lose status. Seeing their neighbors' children attending private schools or being sent 'outside' to Jammu, Srinagar, Chandigarh or Delhi, most parents struggle to pay the school fees so their children have a chance of competing for the scarce but highly prized government jobs. In describing their choices to me, women repeatedly see themselves as caught between desire to send their children to expensive private schools and provide them with the best food and clothing and the religious and political injunctions that call for them to avoid contraception. They describe their position as an impossible one.

On the roof of his house, while his wife and a daughter listened in, Muhammad spoke to me about family planning.

> Now, looking at the time… in religion we say that to do something, it is not good. Khuda konjok, however many he will give you, that is great…But now the government has explained to

> us, and everyone understands, that there are a lot of people now. That being the case, having two or three children, that is nice. Otherwise, how will you educate them? Abi-le (his wife) had one boy and five or six girls, with all those, how will they get educated?
> Sara: so if you have 9 or 10?
> Muhammad: They won't get an education.. We say you have to give them each the same. Now, for instance, it is me. I am a father with five or six girls. I have to give them each the same, carving up everything. For those who have a lot of land, they will get a lot. If you only have a little land, each one will only get one field. If they don't get much land, how will they take care of their children?

In interview after interview, women who indicated that they were against family planning suggested that the attempt to produce high quality, healthy, well-educated children was futile, because each child would arrive with their own *sode* (luck, fortune). For Buddhists, this implied that the good and bad deeds performed in previous lives (luck/karma) were accumulated in the child and would affect their lives more than any influence the family might have. For Muslims, bringing your own *sode* was a way to state that everything was in God's hands, or "written in the lines on your forehead." Women often told me that even if a woman had many children, their fates would be determined by this *sode*. Women who had completed their fertility used this theory to explain why contraception should be avoided, but women who had yet to complete their fertility used this expression with some measure of doubt, with some women saying plaintively, "they say every child comes with its own *sode*, but everything is so expensive these days." For Buddhists, as we learned from Nilza's story, the dystopian political future of Buddhist decline is mirrored in the disruption of the cycle of rebirth, as

individuals waiting to be born are "blocked" from the birth doors that they were meant to pass through.

Discussion

> In Stanley Kubrick's classic satirical movie on the Cold War, Dr Strangelove (1964), a rogue General Ripper authorizes nuclear annihilation on the basis of his paranoid conviction that the Russians were penetrating, polluting and exhausting the 'precious bodily fluids' of the American population. General Ripper's view on the pervasiveness of communist infiltration is interesting in that it understands geopolitics as at least partly unconscious, inescapably embodied in entire populations. For Ripper, geopolitics is more akin to sexual intercourse than a 'discourse.' (Saldanha 2008:323).

As Saldanha (2008:323) observes, General Ripper's obsession with bodily fluids "alerts him to the fact of embodiment often forgotten in geopolitical analysis." In Kubrick's film, political geography is not only "discursive, technological and economic, but also … a collectively embodied process of affects, prejudices, anticipations and negotiations" (Saldanha 2008:323). As explanations from women coping with the politicization of their reproductive decisions and desires indicate, territorial narratives don't play out in a vacuum; they meet with a complicated range of emotions and economic calculations, fears, hopes and apprehensions. These concerns are increasingly articulated as anxiety and fear. "Fear is on the up," and "exclusionary tensions and effects spill into everyday life, exacerbating social and spatial disparities, and contributing to the demonisation of those social groups who are at the sharp end of fear" (Pain and Smith 2008:1, citing Hopkins 2007; Shirlow and Pain 2003; Poynting et al. 2004).

Drawing on Spinoza by way of Deleuze, Saldanha (2008:329) lays out a physics of bodies, focusing on viscosity – that is, the stickiness of multiple bodies in relation to one another. "Crowds are easily appreciated as being sticky, because they are about concentrations in one place. But human bodies stick together in more durable ways: packs, cities, nation-states, social classes and racial formations are also examples of human viscosity." For Saldanha (2008:330), treating corporeal bodies not merely as "so many minds, subjectivities or discursive effects," allows us to better understand why and how systems such as race and patriarchy are maintained. It also provides a neutral ontological concept – "not all viscosity is bad. Crowd behavior can be destructive and ecstatic at the same time." In his materialist theory of race through Goa's trance scene, Saldanha (2007) demonstrates how difference allows some bodies to cohere, to stick together in an emergent whiteness. In Leh the problem is both the same and different. The difference in question is not race but religion,[24] and there is a concerted effort being made to break apart viscous bodies – bodies that sometimes desire, sometimes reproduce. A 19-year old daughter of a Buddhist mother and Sunni Muslim father tells me that such marriages are wrong and that families should prevent them – the desires that brought two bodies together and brought her and her younger brother into the world should be denied or extinguished. A geopolitical strategy, like acid in milk, seeks to separate it into curds and whey.

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24 Although perhaps religion in the process of being racialized – see Hopkins and Smith (2008).

The impetus for this breaking apart is the location of mechanisms of power in territory and the unforgettable knowledge that territory is made and claimed through bodies: the struggle for electoral territory through blocs of religion-differentiated district voters, the borders drawn by religious identity 60 years ago during the partition. These population-territories are spatial and embodied. But whereas white bodies in Goa cohere at sunrise "because they all saw each other regularly, smoked chillum together, danced to Goa trance, wore flashy clothing, and had money to spend on LSD and Ecstasy" (Saldanha 2007:5). How do you separate bodies that are less inscribed, less visibly marked? Once separated, how do you mechanize those bodies into a territorial war of replication?

In such a separation, fear, anxiety and pain must play a role: hence the sense of anxiety about the future that emerges in the ways that both old and young discuss it. Young people I talked to in Leh pointed to religious conflict as their first fear for the future:

> Student A[25]: In the past here was love for each other from [the bottom of] their hearts…there were some marriages among the Buddhists and Muslims. They didn't use to find it unfair as now the people find it wrong and against their religion.
> Student B: My fear is that we should not fight on the basis of religion as it happened in the past in 1989.

25 These are excerpts from anonymous questionnaires the students filled out after interviewing their elderly neighbors and relatives about Leh's past.

Razia, only 49, tells me that in her youth, "we were like one person. There were Buddhists who married with Muslims, and Muslims who married with Buddhists." When I ask Nilza, a 56-year-old Buddhist mother of three if she would have allowed her child to marry a Muslim, she answers that she "would beat them and bring them back." A young Shia Muslim college student was one of the few to tell me that such marriages should be allowed, "Because I have friends that I know of, who are having affairs…the girl is Buddhist. The boy is Muslim." When I asked her what the future held for her friends she answered, "she says herself: 'I have no future.'"

Conclusion

In their recent edited volume on the geopolitics of fear, Pain and Smith (2007:7) build on recent critiques of scalism (Marston, Jones III, and Woodward 2005) and emergent feminist approaches to geopolitics and global/everyday relations (Sharp 2007; Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2007; Hyndman 2004; Katz 2001; Pratt and Rosner 2006) to advance an understanding fear as "simultaneously everyday and geopolitical – remoralising and rematerializing fear." They offer a non-hierarchical[26] model of fear as a double helix, in which, "the parallel strands are geopolitics and everyday life, the connections the events, encounters, movements, dialogues, actions, affects and things that conjoin them."

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26 Although they describe it as "not so much a 'flat ontology' of fear as a model for the structuring of fear into – and potentially out of – life itself" (Pain and Smith 2007:7).

Pain and Smith (2007:14) argue for a need to privilege individual tellings of fear, the small materializations of fear that we encounter in day-to-day life because, "the materialities of local geographies can find their way into the circuits of high politics."

The "messy, fleshy" (Katz 2001) story of men and women working through their desires for each other, their desire to have children, or their reluctance to do so, points to the value of confronting geopolitics in the situated, complex and dynamic practices that constitute it. A standard geopolitical approach to the current tensions in Ladakh would not only omit the experiences of those who bear the brunt of geopolitical practice, it would actually misidentify the nature of the political practices altogether. In Leh, the situation is not one of macro-level organized pressures bearing down on the hapless individual, rather, it is a site of geopolitical animation, in which territoriality is enacted and refused *primarily* in corporeal enactments of separation. Slaps in the courtyard of a Buddhist temple, well cared for hair hacked off and falling to the ground, a young couple driving over icy mountain passes to get a marriage license in a distant city, a young woman choosing to limit her family size with an IUD rather than tubal ligation: these are not the side effects of geopolitical practice but its principal manifestation.

Like the politicians and popular narratives described by Megoran (2008) in Uzbekistan, Buddhist activists summon an "ever-present and all-pervading sense of territorialized danger," to encourage Buddhist women to produce

children who will territorialize Buddhist political identity onto the district. But the bodily nature of this act is where they run into problems. This territorialization occurs through the body; but the body is also the site through which we develop our sense of self, where our memories are stored, and wherein we experience pain and pleasure. Territorialization comes with a cost and is incited through bodily fears or through bodily pleasures. Territorial demands made on the body and the lived experience embedded in the body collide, and can be congruent or work against each other. Thus, when women are told that they should have more children to populate the district with Buddhists, this demand intersects with the experiences they have lived through their body and their own expectations for motherhood.

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APPENDIX D IRB APPROVAL

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

Human Subjects Protection Program

1235 N. Mountain Ave.
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Tucson, AZ 85724-5137
Tel: (520) 626-6721
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Continuing Review Determination

Investigator: Sara Smith
Project No. : 07-0360-02 (Previously: B07.151)
Project Title: Every Body Matters: The Geopolitics of Religion and Fertility in Northern India

Project Status	
☑ Enrollment in Progress or Still Planned	☐ Data Analysis Only
☐ Enrollment Closed: study procedure/intervention ongoing	☐ Concluded
☐ Enrollment Closed: follow-up only	☐ Study Not Begun

IRB Comments: Revised Consent Forms (updating to current UA template)

Documents Approved Concurrently:	Documents Reviewed Concurrently:
☐ N/A	☑ N/A
☑ Consenting Instruments: Informed Consent (version 5/9/08) Participant Disclosure Form (version 5/9/08) Re-consent: ☐ All ☐Current Only ☑Not Required	☐ Investigator's Brochure
☐ Protocol Amendments	☐ Progress Reports
☐ Protocol	☐ Study Related Problems
☑VOTF signed 4/8/09	☐ Protocol Deviation
☐ Other:	☐ Other

Period of Approval: 5/20/08 — 5/9/09

☑Expedited Review
☐ Full Committee Review
☐ Facilitated Review

Elaine G. Jones, Ph.D., Chair
Social and Behavioral Sciences Committee

Date Reviewed: 5/20/08

Arizona's First University – Since 1885

Reminder: Continuing Review materials should be submitted 30 – 45 days in advance of the current expiration date to obtain re-approval (projects may be concluded or withdrawn at any time using the forms available at www.irb.arizona.edu).

APPENDIX E. SURVEY QUESTIONS

SURVEY COMPONENT

1. How old are you? *Nyerang lo tsam in?*
2. How old were you when you got married? *Nyerang bakston dzadtsane lo tsam in-bin?*
3. Age at first birth? *Nyeran goma thugu skyetsane lo tsam inbin?*
4. When you married did you move into your in-laws' house? *Nyerang goma rang bakston dzadte ama-le yang aba-le nang nyampo zhuksata ya so so?*
5. Was your marriage *bakma kyongches* or *makpa kyongches*? *Nyerang bakma skyote in-a ya makpa kyongste in-a?*
6. What village are you originally from? *Nyerang kane in-le?*
7. What village is your husband from?
8. How many children did you give birth to? *Nyeranga thugu tsam skyes le?*
9. Details of children, including gender, age, currently studying/working, what school, married, arranged marriage/love marriage, # of grandchildren.
10. Did you have an arranged marriage or love marriage?

    Love marriage dzadspina, ya ama-le, aba-le tiste skyotspina?
11. Which is more common today: love marriage or arranged marriage? *Dang-dering mi mankya love marriage inanga drulina ya tiste?*
12. What do you think is a good age for a girl to marry? *Bomo lo tsam songte pakston cho nang rgyal?*

13. What do you think is a good number of children to have? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Nyerangi sambinanga, thugu tsam yot nang rgyalla inok le?* Why? *Chiphia?*
14. Did you limit or will you limit your family size? *Nyerang thugu ngyun skyeches chospina/choata?* What method(s)? *Chi dzadspin?*
15. Where have you accessed family planning services? (E.g. SNM Hospital, pharmacist, village clinic, camping, other) *Debo choches a la karu skyotsbin?*
16. What family planning methods are available in Leh? *Thabs chi-chi yot, Leh-i-nanga?*
17. Did you or will you space your children's births? *Thugu skyeste stingne bar borches chi thabs chospina/choata?*
18. How many more children do you want to have, if any? *Nyerang darung thugu gosna, tsam gosat-le?*
19. Why did you use family planning *or* why did you not use family planning? *Nyerang thugu ngyun skyeches-bo chiphia chospin/machospin?*
20. Did you talk about family planning with your husband? *makpa nang nyampo spera tangspina?*
21. Would you advise your daughter to use family planning? How many children would you like her to have? *Nyerangi pomo a kada salna, khong-a family planning chos molata ya ma cho?*
22. How many brothers ____ and sisters _____ do you have? *Nyeranga ming-shring tsam yot?*

23. How old are your mother _____ and father? _____ *Nyerangi ama-le nang aba-le lo tsam in?*

24. How many brothers _____ and sisters _____ does your father have? *Aba-le a ming-shring tsam yot?*

25. How many brothers _____ and sisters _____ does your mother have? *Ama-le a ming-shring tsam yot?*

26. Do you do farming work at home? *Zhingbat-at-a le? Tsodma tabata le? Tsongata?*

27. Do you rent in Leh or own land? *Leh-I nanga khira zhuksata? Zhing kane yot le?*

28. Do you plan to stay in Leh or return to your village?

29. Education? *Nyerang tsampa silpin-le?*

30. Husband's education? *Nyerangi magpa tsampa silpin-le?*

31. Do you work outside the home? Your job:

Nyerang chi chag las dzadat-le?

32. Does your husband work outside the home? Your husband's job:

Nyerangi magpa chi chag las dzadat-le?

33. What is your religion? *Nyerangi choslugs bo chi in-le?*

34. Does your religion or religious leaders say anything about family planning? *Family planning iskorla nyerangi chosinanga yongchena?*

35. Nyerangi nangtsangsi nanga sukhari macho molaraka (about family planning)

36. Which do you think is happier: love marriage or arranged marriage? Why? *Nyerangi samtsulinanga, kabo rgyalla rak: love marriage or aba-le ama-le tiches?*

37. Do you have close friends who are Buddhist/Muslim? *Nyezhe Boto/Kache/Balti snyemo yongchena?*

38. Is your neighborhood Buddhist, Muslim, mostly Buddhist, mostly Muslim or 50/50?*I-korla boto nang Muslim shreste yot-a, ya boto mankya yot ya muslim mankya yot?*

39. At Eid/Losar how many Buddhists/Muslims came to your house? __ If Muslims, Sunni or Shia? *Eid/Losar tsane, boto/muslim tsam nyerangi khanpa leb le? Kache, Balti?*

40. Anyone in your extended family who is Buddhist/Muslim? *Nyezhe gyud bo boto/kache/Balti gyud yot-a le? Boto chos chokan ya logches?*

41. How are they related to you? *Nyeranga snyen kazuk inok le?*

42. Are they invited to *skisdug* (happy and sad occasions)? *Khong skiduk a bodata le?*

43. Do you know anyone who has married someone of a different religion? *Nyerangi sheskan-i-nanga, boto kache nang nyampo bakston chokan ya Balti boto nang nyampo bakston chokan shesata?*

a. Approximately what age? ____ *Khong-a lo tsam in?*

44. Should marriage to a person of another religion be permitted or prevented? *Nyerangi sambinanga, kaltes boto chig kache/Balti nang nyampo bakston choches yot na, debo khong cho chuk nang rgyal, ya ban cho nang rgyal?*

Ask if time and circumstances permit:

45. If your son or daughter wanted to marry a person of another religion, what would you tell him? *Kaltes nyerangi putsa ya pomo mi chos-lugs so so nang nyampo bakston choat zerna, nyerang khong a khada chi salat?*

46. What do you think are the most important problems women in Ladakh face today? *Dangdering Ladagsinanga, pomo rguna chi skelas bardo tsangme sang kakspo inok?*

47. What is the relationship like between Nangpai, Balti, and Kache at this time? Very bad/Bad/Ok/Good/Very good *Dang dering, Boto, Balti, Kache staste, stundel kazuk yot? Margyalla, gyalla, digches, tsokpo, matsokpo?*

48. In your life, how has the relationship between Nangpai, Balti and Kache changed? *Nyezhe mitse inanga, nagpai, kache stundel inanga gyurcha chi yongtok?*

49. (When there is conflict) between Buddhists and Muslims, what is the cause? *Boto nang kache/Balti I nanga, zer zer chiphia songsenok?*

50. What caused the melen-chulen chadches in 1989-1992?

51. Two years ago there was some conflict between Buddhists and Muslims that started after an event in Bodh Karbu. Did anything happen here?

52. How are Muslim and Buddhist women's lives different? *Buddhist nang Muslimi pomoi mitse I nanga parak chi yot? Sunni nang Shia I nanga pomoi mitse parak chi yot?*

53. Is it more common for Buddhist girls or Muslim girls to marry someone of another religion? Why?

54. Among your friends, are there any who have fallen in love with someone of a different religion? What happened?

55. In your town when did the last intermarriage occur?

56. How many marriages between Buddhists and Muslims do you know of?

57. What forms of family planning are there at the hospital?

Ask if time and circumstances permit:

58. What do you feel about the growth of population in Leh district? Too fast/about right/too slow/do not know/not sure/other

Ladakhsinanga, nyerangi samtsul inanga, mitrangsi digches manga chaduk, ya gyokspa manga chaduk, ya ngyun chaduk, ya kazuk yot?

59. Does family planning benefit Leh? *Ladakhsiphia, family planning choches bo pantoks yot-a?*

60. Does family planning benefit India? *Gyagariphia, family planning choches bo pantoks yot-a?*

61. Can you tell me about the relationship between Sunni and Shia?

62. Are there Nurbakshi around here? Where? What are the differences/are there differences between Nurbakshi and other Shia?
63. Why do you think the Argons were not given ST?
64. What misunderstandings do you think that Buddhists have about Muslims/Muslims have about Buddhists?
65. For Shia Muslims, what are the restrictions on sharing food with Buddhists?
66. What changes have you seen in your religion over your lifetime?