SUNLIGHT UPON A DARK SKY

HAITI'S URBAN POOR RESPONDS TO SOCIO-POLITICAL

AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CONFLICTS:

A CASE STUDY OF THE GRANDE RAVINE

COMMUNITY HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

by

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The inspiration for this study is owed to human rights attorney Evel Fanfan and community human rights advocate Frantzco Joseph—both who I observed working tirelessly each day for a more just Haiti. In addition, I have been inspired by the staff at AUMOHD and members of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council who have played a crucial role in the fight for human rights. Their collaborative efforts have made it possible to defend and support the most vulnerable Haitians, particularly those residing in Grande Ravine. It is their unique collaboration that has been the force behind this study.

I am grateful to have met so many wonderful people from Grande Ravine, many who endure conditions of poverty that most would find unimaginable. I marvel at their strength and resilience in spite of the compounding difficulties they face each day. I thank them for sharing with me the accounts of their life and their invitations to be part of a community initiative to seek *justice and reparations*.

Masterking, an awesome nickname for a fabulous person. He is Frisman Floritant—my assistant, interpreter, bodyguard, cultural guide, and cherished friend who invited me into his family and circle of friends. Without his assistance, this study would not have been possible. *Masterking, mesi anpil!*

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No words can fully describe the depth of my gratitude for the kindness and hospitality extended to me during this academic and deeply personal journey. Although the completion of this dissertation seems to mark the end, the journey in fact has only begun.

DEDICATION

To my husband, William Edward Hill, who has graciously

supported all of my personal, professional, and academic endeavors

and has been the consummate model for me

in self-less giving to others in their greatest time of need.

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ABSTRACT

This case study investigates the organizational characteristics of a Haitian grassroots community human rights council (CHRC) that emerged as a response to three politically motivated massacres. The impromptu grassroots response of this poor urban community is at the core of the following research question investigated in this study: *What organizational characteristics influence the efforts made by the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council to resolve socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts?* One of the problems encountered was the suspicion by armed groups believing that the president of the organization was informing the police and the United Nations peacekeepers about their activities. The complex dynamics of the Grande Ravine neighborhood lead to additional questions about building community capacity. This raised the possibility of removing the CHRC as an organization that monitors human rights and expanding its role to include teaching about human rights and the responsibilities that go with protecting them. A question for further study would be whether or not a community-based human rights group can make a positive difference in resolving and diminishing socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts in similar neighborhoods.

CHAPTER 1 COMING TO KNOW HAITI: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

The focus and purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to contribute to the professional literature about grassroots organizations that address socio-cultural and socio-political violence. A case study approach was used to gather descriptive data about the emergence and organization of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council (CHRC), an organization in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, formed in 2005 in response to violence in the Grande Ravine region of Martissant, a neighborhood in Port-au-Prince. The CHRC became the first of a network of community councils initiated by a legal advocacy group, Association des Universitaires Motivés pour une Haïti de Droits (AUMOHD), which defends the human rights of the poorest and most vulnerable citizens of Port-au-Prince.

I began working with AUMOHD in 2005, just a couple months before the Haitian National Police and an attaché, Lame Ti Manchèt, attacked spectators at a Play for Peace soccer game. The immediate response by AUMOHD leading to the formation of the CHRC piqued my interest. I was particularly impressed with their ability to address the needs and concerns of victims and their families as well as the activities and initiatives they took to reinforce peace and improve security in the Grande Ravine area.

In the summer of 2006, I met some of the CHRC officers, including former president, Bruner Esterne, who was slain just two months later, and Franztco Joseph, who was the president from 2006-2009. I was also in Port-au-Prince when a third attack occurred. Deep sorrow and disappointment still resonate as I recall hearing about it from Evel Fanfan, the president of AUMOHD. For security reasons, I was not able to go to Grande Ravine to assist him and the CHRC. Kidnappings and armed violence were prevalent, particularly in certain areas of Port-au-Prince such as Martissant.

From my observations of the work of AUMOHD and the CHRC, I became increasingly interested in how they managed to resolve many of the conflicts that have jeopardized the security of Grande Ravine. This became the focus of my research question: *What organizational characteristics influence the efforts made by the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council (CHRC) to resolve socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts?* Furthermore, I wanted to explore how the CHRC might expand its role to include educational outreach for the purpose of increasing human rights awareness and action.

Since I was a participant-observer in this study, I have written about my initial experiences in Haiti and several later experiences that were transformational, leading up to the Grande Ravine massacres of August 2005. This section presents anecdotal information about the development of my interests in Haiti and how my experiences led me to this study. In addition, the

experiences I describe from previous trips will help the reader understand my own subject position in relation to the research.

Coming to know Haiti

My interest in Haiti began with a viewing of a Barbara Walters interview of Jean-Claude Duvalier and his wife, Michèle, four months after a popular uprising forced them to leave Haiti on February 7, 1986. Although I found the events leading up to the uprising to be noteworthy, Haiti did not enter my world of curiosity until 1993 when I enrolled in a class on Haitian Literature and Discourse. After taking the course, I knew that one day I would visit Haiti. I just thought it would be sooner rather than later—four years later.

During the summer of 1997, I made my first trip to Haiti. I went alone without facility to speak French or Creole. In fact, I was not quite sure where I would be staying once I arrived. A taxi driver who spoke almost no English gave me a brief tour of Port-au-Prince before taking me to the Hotel Oloffson, a historic landmark and the setting for Graham Greene's novel *The Comedians* (1966). There he introduced me to Alix, an unofficial guide who spoke English. Although Alix did not have a car, he accompanied me throughout the 10-day trip and introduced me to Haitian public transportation—taxis and taptaps, which are colorfully decorated trucks and buses. We did a lot of sightseeing in and around Port-au-Prince including visits to Champs-de-Mars (the main plaza of Port-au-Prince adjacent to the National Palace), the Iron Market where hundreds of *ti*

marchands (small vendors) sell their goods in a large warehouse, and to museums and upscale restaurants in Pétionville, a suburb of Port-au-Prince. Most exciting was our visit to a *houngan*, or vodou priest, in Léogane, a town located south of Port-au-Prince. The *houngan* and his small entourage invited us into his hounfort (vodou temple). He thought I might have come to him for protection or to do magic. Having just read two books by Harvard ethnobotanist, Wade Davis—*The Serpent and the Rainbow* (1987) and *Passage of Darkness: The Ethnobiology of the Haitian Zombie* (1988)—I was predisposed to ask a few questions about the Bizango cult. This is a cult that many people in Haiti fear. It is a form of vodou that barters with the dead and incorporates practices that can allegedly turn people into zombies. After asking the *houngan* about Bizango, he smiled and without saying anything, he pointed all around us to the décor and costumes filling the large *hounfort*.

Alix explained that I was a university student from the United States and had questions about vodou. The *houngan* was okay with that after customarily seeking spiritual permission. An hour later, we sat outside the *hounfort* where the *houngan* discussed with Alix his intentions of casting a magic spell against someone the *houngan* felt had betrayed him. While he shared his plans with Alix, I encountered a young man from Brooklyn spoke who told me that he came to the temple because he had AIDS, and he believed that the *houngan* could help him fight the disease. He wanted to tell me more but felt that what he had to say must be said in private. I never found out what he wanted to tell me since Alix and I

had to leave before the sun went down. After the sun goes down, there are fewer taxis and taptaps available. And, there is an increase in banditry.

Alix and I had a long discussion that evening about the houngan, zombies, and spirit zombies. He explained that many times the *ti bon anj* (the part of your soul that travels in your dreams) returns to an awakened state as a spirit zombie, a person whose psychological state has been altered. Our discussion didn't make it any easier for me to fall asleep. So I laid awake all night thinking about coming back to Haiti, but this time on a humanitarian mission. With its grinding poverty, Haiti is not a country where one can go for vacation in good conscience.

The next morning my ride to the airport was quiet and reflective. I thought about how much I wanted to return and under what circumstances. Six more years passed before I would again reach Haiti's shores. In the fall of 2003, I enrolled in a class on social justice. For various reasons, I took a mental detour from a class assignment and began researching volunteer opportunities in Haiti, particularly in the area of teacher training. I found the website of a Haitian-Canadian program, Konbit Pwof (also known as Project Teach), that was looking for volunteer teachers to facilitate a two-week seminar for elementary and secondary school teachers. In summer 2003, I joined a group of approximately 30 American and Canadian teachers in Jérémie, Haiti.

Konbit Pwof, a life-changing experience

My experience with Konbit Pwof was certainly life-changing and strengthened my interest in Haiti. With a group of more than 80, predominantly male teachers from all parts of Haiti, I soon learned that in spite of my best ideas, there were cultural road blocks. One of the most valuable lessons the participants taught me is that all of the so-called "best practices" in teaching mean nothing if they do not take into consideration the culture, the educational philosophy of that culture, and the circumstances under which teachers must work.

As a *blan* (a foreigner or white person), the participants wondered about my authority to speak when I did not know their situation, their students, or their curriculum. Although I received a quick debriefing on these topics the night before our first seminar session, I was not prepared for the challenges the participants would pose to me. It became apparent soon after our first session, that the seminar would be collaborative in its approach. Educational philosophy and strategies for teaching would be shared and adjusted to account for the realities of the participants' teaching situation: extremely large classes, no available books or materials, hungry children who cannot concentrate, and a very small paycheck if and when it arrives. This lesson was a pivotal one for me and has carried over into other Haitian settings where I have worked.

The Haitian Bicentennial

I returned to Port-au-Prince the following December for the Haitian Bicentennial (January 1, 2004). During this trip, I reconnected with one of the seminar participants who had been my interpreter, translator, and guide Frisman Floritant. He invited me to join him in the celebration of the Bicentennial, which was a traditional New Year's Eve party. The following day was not just any New Year's Day. It was the bicentennial anniversary commemorating the defeat of Napoleon's army by slaves who literally drove out the French and officially ended slavery. Unfortunately, the celebration was marred by opposition groups who were trying to overthrow President Aristide in what became an internationally sponsored rebellion.

During this brief visit, I witnessed some demonstrations that were pro-Aristide and others that demanded his resignation. Tension permeated throughout Port-au-Prince as Haiti became increasingly more politically unstable. Within two months, on February 29, 2004, the United States moved President Jean-Bertrand Aristide out of Haiti, insisting that there would be a bloodbath if he did not resign. Approximately 6,000 U.S. troops arrived shortly after Aristide left to maintain order until the United Nations took over the mandate in April 2004 and formed the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). As of this writing, the UN continues to work in Haiti to maintain security, oversee

elections, and to provide services that the Haitian government is not equipped to provide.

Branching out

Even with the presence of UN Peacekeepers, security continued to be problematic in Haiti, particularly in Port-au-Prince. In the summer of 2004, I was invited to give a week-long workshop on teaching strategies. In spite of the security problems, I agreed to be a facilitator in the workshop. The program was sponsored by the World Lutheran Foundation in Pétionville and followed a similar format to the one in Jérémie in 2003. Following the workshop that summer, I also gave a five-day seminar in Port-au-Prince for grassroots organizers of a "school to the streets" program. This was a program that provided free basic schooling to children living in the streets.

As a break from the security risks and the political fallout of the 2004 rebellion, Floritant took me to a place in the countryside where he grew up—Bainet. The region of Bainet is an isolated mountainous region called Toumarot where his aunts, uncles, and cousins lived. He confessed that he had not been to either place since he was 12 years old, explaining why their welcome during our visit was so extraordinary.

While in Bainet, I met a high school mathematics teacher who was a popular, highly respected person in the community. He and the deputy of Bainet convinced me to return the following winter to give a literacy workshop to

teachers from the surrounding areas. I did this and followed up with a second workshop in the winter of 2005-2006. By then the security problems in Haiti were so grim that I could not stay in Port-au-Prince. In addition to all of the gang violence, kidnappings were numerous and occurring on a daily basis. This limited my mobility in and around the city. This meant that I had to hire a private chauffeur and impose my own curfew of being indoors by 6:00 p.m. During this period, there was a kind of paralysis in the city as people worried about being the next victim. The most worrisome was a rash of kidnappings that lasted for over two years, beginning in 2004 and lasting until MINUSTAH was given the authority in February 2007 to do whatever was necessary to quash gang violence and organized kidnapping rings. Kidnappings were so frequent that it was common to meet people who shared their experiences. I, alone, met 10 people (Haitians and Americans) who had been kidnapped during 2005-2006.

New experiences as a human rights advocate

In 2005, my interests shifted to human rights problems that had escalated since Aristide's departure. I got involved with an online human rights group based in the United States that included Brian Concannon, Tom Luce, Athena Kolbe, and other human rights notables. Each week we held a phone conference to discuss the worsening security and human rights problems. Through this group, I became acquainted with two Haitian human rights organizations, the Institute for Justice and Democracy (IJDH) and AUMOHD.

When I returned to Port-au-Prince in 2005, I assisted IJDH with setting up a database for women who had been physically and sexually assaulted. The database included the medical statuses of each woman—that is, the extent of their injuries, whether or not they were diagnosed with HIV or any other sexually transmitted diseases, and if a pregnancy resulted from the assault. Each night, I worked on entering data about these victims, some who were as young as 10.

During the day, I worked with Evel Fanfan, the president of AUMOHD. Our work consisted of visiting commissariats (or jails) and prisons where we interviewed detainees who claimed to have been illegally arrested and held without charges. Many times this meant that we had to go to court to speak with judges who would either hear the detainees' cases or make provisions for their release. However, sometimes all that was required was a brief conference with a prison official who, when he saw me, a "*blan*," decided to release the detainees without further delay. This demonstrates the nervousness many of the commissariat and prison officials have when a foreigner inquires about the status of a detainee and the reasons for his/her arrest.

The living conditions I observed in the commissariats and prisons were deplorable in every respect. Cells were so full that inmates had to stand shoulder-to-shoulder. It was quite common for inmates to have to sleep standing up or take turns sleeping on the floor. In the commissariats, food depended on what an inmate's family could bring. If no one showed up one day, there was nothing to

eat. Prisons, on the other hand, offered food but hardly enough to meet minimal daily caloric standards. There was no potable water for inmates to drink and no toilet except a plastic bag that would be picked up from each cell once or twice a day.

I particularly remember three women inmates. The first one I met, Angela, was incarcerated in a male commissariat. The second woman was serving time in the Pétionville Women's Prison due to her association with a pro-Lavalas "*chimè*," her husband. *Chimè* is the Creole word for *chimère*, a French word refers to Chimaera, a mythological monster. In Haiti, a *chimè* is an unflattering reference to pro-Aristide gangs. The third woman was a well-known folk singer and friend of former President Aristide.

Angela was placed in a cell with a "major warden," who was physically and sexually abusive to her. The major warden is a violent detainee who is used to control other detainees. After meeting her, we spoke with the commissioner of the commissariat and insisted that her rights were being violated. She was released the following day with no charges.

The second woman, Helena, was the wife of Bily, a notorious "pro-Lavalas gangster" who lived in Cité Soleil but apparently died after escaping the National Penitentiary in 2004. A documentary film *Ghosts of Cité Soleil* (2005), produced and directed by Dutch filmmaker Asger Leth, featured Bily and his brother, Tupac, who wanted to be "the Haitian Tupac," a reference to American

rap artist, Tupac Shakur. Helena, guilty through her association with Bily and pro-Lavalas groups in Cité Soleil, was incarcerated in the Pétion-ville Women's Prison. She had contracted AIDS and was very weak when I met her. She told me about her situation and her health problems. We were unable to speak with any of the prison officials on her behalf and were told to leave.

Two weeks later, Fanfan called to tell me that Helena was dying and that we had to do what we could to get her to a hospital. After much negotiating, the prison guards allowed us to see her. One of the inmates carried her on her shoulders to sit her with us. Helena's painful moans could be heard before I even saw her. Within minutes of bringing her to us, she passed out. To the touch, her body was burning up. With much negotiation and hard talk, we were able to get her transferred to a hospital within four hours. The state would not pay for her medicine, so we did. Another contact paid off the judge so that she would not have to return to prison. I lost contact with Helena, but in 2007 she was still living and receiving treatment for her condition.

By far the most famous of all prisoners was Anne Auguste, also known as Sò Anne. She is one of Haiti's leading folk singers, a member of La Fanmi Lavalas, and a close friend of Aristide's. In March 2004 when the U.S. sent marines to Haiti to regain control of Port-au-Prince and to suppress the Lavalas Movement, they also came to Sò Anne's house to arrest her without charges. She was a political prisoner for more than three years in the Pétion-ville Women's

Prison. Through the work of attorneys Brian Concannon and Mario Joseph, as well as constant pressure from the international community, she was finally released in 2007 by President Prèval's administration.

Other examples of human rights complaints concerned police brutality. A young woman called from the General Hospital to complain that she had been badly beaten by a police officer. Fanfan interviewed her and spoke with the doctor on her ward to make sure she was getting the medical treatment that she needed. When we first walked into the hospital, there was a pool of blood on the floor outside the entrance of her examining room. Though it wasn't her blood, it brought to life the horror stories of those who are so poor that their only option if injured or ill is to go to the General Hospital, a hospital that is understaffed with few medical supplies. During the time I was there, I saw only two doctors and many sick and injured patients waiting to be attended to.

Figure 1. A typical street scene in Grande Ravine (Photo courtesy of Tom Luce, 3/9/2009).

The making of a community human rights council

Grande Ravine is a densely populated hillside neighborhood located in a geo-political subdivision of Martissant in Port-au-Prince. The infrastructure is supported by small businesses that share common walls and line the busy streets. Social and cultural structures including schools, churches for Protestant and Catholic worshippers, and vodou temples with murals of *lwa* (vodou deities) painted on their exterior walls can also be found nestled within residential areas.

Small private schools, both elementary and secondary, outnumber state schools even though their tuitions are difficult for most families to afford. Hundreds of small cinderblock homes and markets line the congested

Figure 2. The exterior of a vodou temple in a residential section of Grande Ravine.

narrow roads made all the more constricted by *ti marchands* (street vendors) selling food, clothing, toiletries, household goods, CDs, DVDs, and used books (especially textbooks). St. Bernadette's School, located in the heart of Grande Ravine, is a large two-story secondary school, a state school constructed during

Aristide's first presidential term—its soccer stadium, the site for a USAID-sponsored Play for Peace Soccer Tournament.

On August 20, 2005, less than a month after I left Haiti, members of the Haitian National Police along with Lame Ti Manchèt viciously attacked spectators at "the game for peace" and struck again early in the morning on August 21. AUMOHD documented 40 deaths as well as other casualties caused by gunshot and knife wounds. In addition, homes and businesses were burned down in the early morning hours the following day on August 21. My interviewees consider the early morning assault to be a second massacre perpetrated by the same people.

Fanfan recalls that the case load for AUMOHD was overwhelming during 2005, which is one of the reasons he organized a network of community human rights councils (Fanfan, interview, 6/14/2007) Although the first AUMOHD-sponsored community-based group was organized in Cité Soleil, the first CHRC was organized in Grande Ravine after the 2005 massacres (Fanfan, interview, 6/14/2007). The group in Cité Soleil soon adopted the CHRC format (Fanfan, interview, 6/14/2007).

One of the first goals of the Grande Ravine CHRC was to bring peace to Grande Ravine and to seek justice and reparations for those who were victims of the attacks. Each of these could be considered pretty tall orders for a community-based organization, especially since several members were themselves victims or

family members of victims, and had little (if any) prior experience in conflict management. However, Fanfan and the staff at AUMOHD were joined by an American volunteer, Paul Reineke, to help them develop a framework that would allow the organization to assist victims with the retrieval of bodies, burials for their loved ones, and filing complaints against the Haitian National Police (PNH) and MINUSTAH, who they claim did nothing to intervene and stop the attacks. Their complaints against the PNH focused on the involvement of the police in "hiring" an attaché (Lame Ti Manchèt) to destabilize an area that was still largely supportive of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

The Grande Ravine CHRC met weekly and informally throughout the week to gather information about the massacres (Fanfan, interview, 6/14/2007; Joseph, interview, 6/15/2007). AUMOHD provided the legal assistance and filed complaints against the Haitian National Police and Lame Ti Manchèt for victims of the massacres (Fanfan, interview, 6/14/2007; Joseph, interview, 6/15/2007). Furthermore, the CHRC worked in collaboration with AUMOHD to demand that the Haitian government pay for the funerals of the deceased and reconstruct the homes and businesses that had been burned down (Fanfan, interview, 6/14/2007; Joseph, interview, 6/15/2007). Their demands were partly founded on the fact that the attacks were politically motivated and supported by some government officials (Fanfan, interview, 6/14/2007; Joseph, interview, 6/15/2007). Furthermore, the police involved were on duty and actually encouraged the acts (Fanfan, interview, 6/14/2007; Joseph, interview, 6/15/2007).

In spite of the occasional problems with armed groups in Grande Ravine, most of the area was relatively secure from September 2005 to June 2007 with a UN and state presence to ward off potential violent attacks from Lame Ti Manchèt or any other armed groups (Joseph, interview, 6/15/2007). However, on July 7, 2006, during one of my trips, I received a call from Fanfan who told me that Lame Ti Manchèt had struck again the night before and burned down more than 200 homes, many with people asleep inside. The people I interviewed refer to this attack as "the third massacre."

As previously mentioned, I was unable to go there due to the risks I would be incurring for myself as well as others. However, I did get to meet with the CHRC officers for the first time at the AUMOHD office in Delmas, a suburb of Port-au-Prince, shortly after the attack. Although there were three women in the CHRC, only the men came to the meeting, including Bruner Esterne, the president who was later killed by snipers in Grande Ravine**.** A very courageous 24-year-old, Frantzco Joseph, stepped into Bruner's place as president immediately after his death and continued his work to bring about peace, justice, and reparation for the community. He remained involved as the CHRC's leader until September 2009 when security logistics made it too difficult for him to continue in that role. However, he continues to work with the CHRC informally and lends support and advice to the group.

My decision to conduct research on the efforts of the CHRC was based on my interest in the CHRC's ability to manage each violent conflict using a calm systematic approach, first considering the immediate security needs and then the humanitarian needs. I was also very interested in their consistent approach to reaching out to the Grande Ravine community through education about human rights and opportunities for victims to express their grief and their fear. It is for these reasons that I have focused my research on this question: *What organizational characteristics influence the efforts made by the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council to resolve socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts?*

A description of each chapter

Chapter 2 is an interdisciplinary review of the professional literature which includes concepts of community organizing, capacity building, and community-based learning. This is followed by a section on the relationship of human rights and responsibility based on an article published in *International Social Work* by Jim Ife and Lucy Fiske (2006) titled "Human rights and community work: Complementary theories and practices." The third section includes four case studies about community-based human rights initiatives in four different contexts including the Zapatista Movement in Chiapas, Mexico; micro-

level politics for controlling gang violence in three Brazilian *favelas*; the impact of gaps in understanding and communication on resolving human rights conflicts in Northern Uganda; and, the Metro Network for Social Justice in Toronto, Canada that formed in response to deep cuts in municipal programs. Although these case studies differ significantly, they each consider the roles of community organizing, capacity building, and community-based learning that are instrumental to the development and execution of effective grassroots human rights initiatives.

The final section considers six theories that inform the development of the theoretical framework used to analyze the data in this study. Three of the theories focus on the transmission and organization of knowledge. They include Jennie Smith's (2001) analysis of rural peasant organizations in Haiti and Ludwik Fleck's (1935) theory of *thought collectives,* which I use to begin a discussion about collective community knowledge. I also incorporate *funds of knowledge* (Moll, González & Amanti, 2005) as a conceptual framework for understanding intellectual and social knowledge formed within families. The remaining three theories focus on social learning and include *situated learning* (Lave & Wenger, 1991) and *legitimate peripheral participation* (Lave & Wenger, 1991). In addition, I include Etienne Wenger's (1998) theory about *communities of practice*. Wenger argues that learning occurs when a common interest is shared and extrapolated upon by a group of people who increase their knowledge and

skill level through regular interactions about the concern or topic. Finally, I incorporate James Paul Gee's (2005) theory of *semiotic social spaces* and *affinity spaces*, in particular. Although Gee (2005) is not in complete agreement with Wenger's *communities of practice*, he references Wenger's work sufficiently to provide a rebuttal and an extension to Wenger's theory. Gee (2005) argues that learning emerges out of a semiotic social space rather than a community of practice. Furthermore, he considers this space as a more fluid entity, and he provides a model for analyzing meanings and behaviors that are produced in this space.

Chapter 3 offers a description of my methodology. I have used a case study approach to collecting and analyzing data that addresses my research question. In this chapter, I describe my data collection methods, which include participant observations at Grande Ravine CHRC meetings and functions. I also describe the interviewing process used with Evel Fanfan, members of the Grande Ravine CHRC, and victims and witnesses of the Lame Ti Manchèt massacres. I discuss the importance of analyzing the data within a socio-historical context that includes three chronologies. These include events that led up to the massacres, accounts from interviewees who experienced the massacres and their impact on their families and community, and the creation of the CHRC and the steps it took to address the needs and concerns of the victims. Finally, I describe four levels of analysis used in the study. The first is a construction of three chronologies, the

second is an analysis of three recurring themes found in interview transcripts and field notes. The third level of analysis utilizes identifies critical events that were instrumental to the formation and development of the CHRC. The fourth and final level of analysis looks at the emergence of four categories that are used to evaluate the data. They include community organizing, community-based learning, insider-outsider dynamics, and capacity building.

Chapter 4 presents a brief history of Haiti from 1957 when François Duvalier was elected president in a rigged election according to many Haiti-watchers. This is significant to my study because it explains the national consciousness that eventually led to the overturning of the Duvalier regime and the rise in popularity of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The history presented in this chapter continues through the summer of 2007, during which I was collecting my data. The history particularly focuses on the rise and fall of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The history I present favors a Lavalasian point-of-view. La Fanmi Lavalas is the political party that Aristide founded in 1996 and ran on in 2000. This point of view is featured for two reasons. It is aligned with the interviewees' perspectives and interpretations of events, and a more extensive perspective of this historical period would make it difficult to analyze the data and address the research question.

Chapter 5 presents the other two chronologies compiled in the case study. This represents the first level of analysis. The chapter begins with a descriptionof

the events that led to the Lame Ti Manchèt massacres in 2005 and 2006 as well as descriptions of the incidents occurring on the three separate occasions. The chronology is created through anecdotal information provided in interviews I conducted with witnesses and victims. The third chronology is a description of the community's response to the three massacres and the formation of the Grande Ravine CHRC. Critical events having importance in to the emergence, formation, and development of the CHRC are presented in this chronology. A descriptive analysis of the data is then presented using the second, third, and fourth levels of analysis. Each of these levels will be addressed separately in this chapter.

The findings and implications of my research are presented in Chapter 6. The findings focus on the CHRC's efforts to resolve socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts. The chapter concludes with implications that suggest ways in which they might provide educational outreach and community-based programs to increase the community's knowledge of human rights and responsibilities.

A note about the spellings and word choice:

A French spelling is given for names of cities and communes since these are more familiar to most readers. However, several spellings for Grande Ravine are seen throughout this document. Gran Ravin (the Haitian Creole spelling) and Grand Ravine (the English spelling) are used when quoting sources that have these spellings. Finally, "bandit" and the Haitian Creole word *bandi* are used interchangeably. However, *bandi* is used when quoting interviewees and when describing an event that has a strong connection to the word.

The plural form for Haitian Creole nouns is marked by a dash and "yo" immediately after the noun (Ex. *bandi-yo*). Jennie Smith and other researchers have chosen to use the English plural by adding "s" to the end of the noun (Ex. *bandi-s*). I have chosen to use neither marker since context will inform the reader when the noun is singular or plural.

CHAPTER 2 CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND COMMUNITY-BASED INITIATIVES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Chapter overview

This chapter offers a review of the literature that informs my study in several ways. As the Community Human Rights Council (CHRC) is a community-based initiative, the first section, ***Defining and conceptualizing community***, explains "community," "capacity building," and "community organizing," which are terms used to label the categories in the fourth level of data analysis. The four categories provide a framework for discussing future implications for the Grande Ravine CHRC. This section also prepares the reader to understand the importance of community in any grassroots effort and the necessity for community-based groups to sustain and expand on their activities through a coordinated effort. The section concludes with a discussion of community organizing, a critical component in any grassroots initiative. Each of these terms will be utilized in the descriptive analysis of the Grande Ravine CHRC.

The second section, ***Community-based learning and knowledge formation***, provides an overview of how community-based groups might engage knowledge and praxis to analyze a situation and the steps necessary for resolving the situation. In addition, this section provides insights on how a community human rights council can engage in capacity building by putting theory and praxis into place so that the community it serves can learn about human rights and be prepared to defend those rights. This section will also be helpful for drawing implications from the study.

The third section, ***Developing a relationship between rights and responsibilities***, focuses on the points raised by Jim Ife and Lucy Fiske (2006) in their article "Human rights and community work: Complementary theories and practices." They argue that there is a clear and inextricable connection between human rights and responsibilities. One cannot exist without the other in a paradigm that incorporates conflict resolution. Ife and Fiske make clear connections to community involvement and improved human rights for those who live in that community. Their article addresses concerns raised in the case study.

The fourth section, ***Case studies in the professional literature***, contains four ethnographic studies about community-based programs that address socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts. These four were selected because they each focus on a different aspect of conflict resolution. Each of the studies is based in a different country with very different contexts. However, the commonality across the studies is an emphasis on community dialogue, or lack thereof, and the impact on conflict resolution. The first study focuses on advancing human rights policy through grassroots mobilization and community dispute resolution in Chiapas, Mexico. The study implies that sometimes a catalyst is required before human rights policies are addressed. The second study looks at grassroots efforts to address insecurity in impoverished regions. In particular, the study investigates networks and social order in three Brazilian *favelas*. The third study is exploratory and investigates the civil conflict in Northern Uganda where the author argues for the need for improved communications and acquisition of accurate information to resolve conflicts. However, he suggests that this can only come about through an

increase in literacy. The last study considers social movements and activist knowledge. The author of this study explores

"knowledge arising from activist practice and its significance for understanding social movements" (Conway, 2006, p. 1).

The fifth section, ***Relevant theories for analysis,*** is a description of the theories that are utilized in analyzing the data for my study. These theories include those discussed in Jennie Smith's (2001) study of rural Haitian peasant organizations. This study is important to my own case study in that it illustrates possible influences on the organizational traits of the Grande Ravine CHRC. I use Ludwik Fleck's (1935) theory of thought collectives to establish how community members may share common ideas and knowledge since they share common life experiences. My study is also informed by research on funds of knowledge (Moll, González & Amanti, 2005) to establish familial knowledge that later becomes part of a larger thought collective. Finally, my study incorporates theories of situated learning and legitimate peripheral participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991), communities of practice (Wenger, 1998), and affinity spaces (Gee, 2005). These theories are used to analyze how members of the Grande Ravine CHRC and participants (i.e., non-CHRC members who are residents of Grande Ravine) learned to take an activist position, without any prior experience, in defense of human rights in their community. Although the CHRC members are literate, most of the participants who attended the meetings were not literate. The study based in Northern Uganda addresses

some of the problems that the Grande Ravine CHRC had as a result of the low level of literacy common among the participants.

Defining and conceptualizing community

Defining the term "community" has been problematic because it does not go far enough to describe what and who are included and excluded in a localized social unit. David Studdert (2005) goes so far as to say that "community" might be a more useful term as a verb since it is "always the outcome of sociality as an action" (p. 2). As such, he states that it is impossible to perform without the presence of other people. According to Studdert, community is not something that can be decided on one's own since membership depends on others recognizing and allowing us membership. David Studdert's (2005) definition of "community" embodies five elements that are important to the communality and acts of sociality described in this study:

- Multiplicity
- Hybridity
- Action, though not creative of community
- Communality as something constructed by some form of conscious or unconscious agreement
- Community as something more than an individual (p. 3)

Developing capacity

Capacity building is concerned with sustaining and promoting the well-being of a community, as well as everyone and everything within that community including individuals, informal groups, organizations, social networks, and the physical environment (Chaskin et al, 2001, p. 7). Community capacity building can be described as that which makes communities function effectively. Chaskin, Brown, Venkatsh, and Vidal provide the following summary definition of *community capacity* that will be helpful in the analysis and final implications of this study:

> *Community capacity is the interaction of human capital, organizational resources, and social capital existing within a given community that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve or maintain the well-being of that community. It may operate through informal social processes and/or organized efforts by individuals, organizations, and social networks that exist among them and between them and the larger systems of which the community is a part* (p. 7).

The authors of *Building Community Capacity* have identified several dimensions and relations concerning community capacity. These include (1) its *fundamental characteristics*, (2) the *levels of social agency* embedded within the community and through which it may be engaged or enhanced, and (3) *its particular functions* (p. 11). A fourth dimension includes the *strategies* that are used to promote community capacity. The fifth describes the context, that is, *the continuing influences* that "support or inhibit

capacity or attempts to build it" (p. 11). The sixth concerns particular *community-level outcomes* that "may be the goals of community initiatives or of communities exercising their capacity toward particular ends" (p. 11). The framework proposed by the authors, then, suggests the following:

> . . . that community capacity is exemplified by a set of core characteristics and operates through the agency of individuals, organizations, and networks of relations to perform particular functions. It also asserts that strategic interventions can build community capacity—again by operating through individuals, organizations, and networks of relations to perform particular functions (p. 11).

Community organizing

Capacity-building efforts within a community focus on developing relationships among the components included in the framework developed by Chaskin, Brown, Venkatsh, and Vidal (2001). In addition, they also include a focus on collective action, the hallmark of community organizing, which is broadly defined as "the process of bringing people together to solve community problems and address collective goals" (p. 93). The objectives of community organizing vary greatly—some seek to overturn entire institutions or even governments (such as the recent rebellion that assisted in Aristide's removal) while others work to improve the quality of life in a neighborhood (such as the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council).

Community organizing not only involves individuals but organizations and networks that work together to achieve a common goal (for example, AUMOHD, the

Grande Ravine CHRC, MINUSTAH, and the Haitian National Police). Clearly, community organizing is not a new concept; however, when used as a tool for capacity building, it takes on a new role where the approach is based on consensus building that includes the involvement of community residents. This involvement might not represent a large segment of the community, though the door should be open to any community volunteers who have the commitment and willingness to work on behalf of the collective good.

Chaskin, Brown, Venkatsh, and Vidal (2001) briefly discuss the application of their framework to what they identify as "disadvantaged communities." They conclude that the situation(s) presented in these kinds of communities should not be much different for "disadvantaged communities that host formal capacity-building efforts" (p. 121). However, they do take note that problems that are exacerbated by crime, poverty, residential mobility, and other factors are certainly a challenge to maintaining a capacity-building initiative. They note, "These particular problems make it imperative for capacity-building efforts to develop a core group of active participants while simultaneously reaching into the wider population to connect with other potential volunteers" (p. 121). In such communities where there are attempts to organize initiatives, they suggest the following:

> . . . initiatives must identify stakeholders who are ready and willing to translate their commitment to the neighborhood into participation in a capacity-building effort. And they must develop means to locate other individuals with the potential

> to play equally important roles in the capacity-building process. They can also mobilize for large mass actions, engage in midrange involvement (ranging from fully involved to tangentially related), and offer targeted assistance, such as gathering petition signatures or door-to-door canvassing (pp. 121-122).

Of the case studies that Chaskin, Brown, Venkatsh, and Vidal (2001) present, one comes closest to the kinds of initiatives that are similar in scope to the Grande Ravine CHRC. The Neighborhood Partners Initiative was launched in 1996. The project, which was a seven-year initiative, focused on the production of "concrete, ongoing, sustainable improvements in living conditions within small targeted neighborhoods in New York City" (p. 241). It was launched by the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, an organization whose research showed that "a disproportionate percentage of homelessness in New York originates and is concentrated within certain low-income neighborhoods, including the South Bronx and Harlem" (p. 241). In fact, these neighborhoods harbored many of the same types of problems occurring in Grande Ravine such as a deteriorating infrastructure, faltering schools, a lack of affordable housing, unemployment, and the accompanying urban crime.

Realizing the complexities of these problems, the foundation worked with local agencies to strengthen their capacity to make specific, measurable improvements within geographically limited areas by improving their services and encouraging and supporting grassroots community organizing. Through a competitive process, the NPI selected five community-based organizations that would lead the initiative. There is no mention as to

the success of the three-phased initiative, only the statement that at the conclusion of the program, the agencies that had been selected to participate in this initiative "should have the organizational capacity to continue the work of community building in the future and to sustain that work with effective community support, and resident groups are expected to have become robust and effective in working to improve neighborhood conditions" (pp. 241-242). There was no description of the kinds of problems raised in communities like Grande Ravine where the commitment to fulfill community initiatives is a difficult task due to lack of resources and the danger of violence.

Community-based learning and knowledge formation

Community-based learning and knowledge formation provide a second area of professional literature relevant to this study. Grassroots initiatives that form in impoverished communities rely on tacit knowledge, praxis, and knowledge formation that might be specific to the context of the history and development of that community. Each of these impacts the organizational characteristics of the CHRC and, in fact, is instrumental to the approaches it takes to solving problems in the community.

How do local people engage in community development and capacity building? Furthermore, how are their initiatives supported? Geoff Fagan (1996) asks, "What education process places them at the core of their learning and engages them in the decision-making . . . ?" (p. 136). Fagan argues that education is not neutral but is immersed in the politics of justice and equality. Of course, the better one understands issues and the options for constructive action, the greater likelihood that the problem will

be resolved. Thus, for Fagan, the purpose of education is engagement, which is democratic, negotiated, and pragmatic (p. 137). This concept of education links knowledge to application. "It accepts that local people, parents, and young people are perfectly capable of enabling their own learning given help and support in doing so" (p. 137). Fagan's definition challenges the traditional hierarchy of education as being the only avenue for acquiring knowledge. According to Fagan (1996),

> . . . education has to address both behaviour and core values. It has to enhance future security. It has to be recognized as a process that helps alleviate community concerns. This means that education has to spring from local people: their values, aspirations, and beliefs. It has to be both real and active. And it has to promote 'ownership' and 'empowerment' (p. 138).

This is an essential point for capacity building in community-based organizations such as the Grande Ravine CHRC. As will be seen in the analysis of my data, one of the strengths of the Community Human Rights Council is that its approach to problem-solving and conflict management is grounded in the values and local culture of the Grande Ravine community. Although the CHRC still faces problems that seem almost unsolvable, it has been able to gain the respect and confidence of the populace because its actions reinforce the core values of justice, equity, and dignity. Furthermore, the members of the CHRC have lived in Grande Ravine long enough to contribute to the history of that community.

Praxis and reflection

Aristotle was the first to acknowledge and legitimize education as an intellectual function or production as well as a process or practice (Fagan, 1996, p. 138). From 2003 to 2005, I attended approximately 16 meetings of three different literary clubs, which typically comprised young adults, mostly men, who represented different levels of educational achievement ranging from those who had not finished their secondary education to those who were attending a vocational school or a state university. Discussions held at the meetings often included the difficulties participants faced in finishing their own education. Much of what they discussed at these meetings was also reiterated during impromptu conversations I have had with Haitian educators and other professionals including some Haitian ex-patriots who live in Canada and the United States.

In these grassroots and impromptu meetings, the following points have been reiterated: (1) Education is considered knowledge that can only be acquired in an institutional state apparatus; (2) Education is a hierarchy where those at the top are awarded greater social capital than those at the bottom; (3) This hierarchical, formal education has not been accessible to the vast majority of Haitians and has not provided them with the kinds of opportunities an educated person would have in a country with a stronger economy; (4) Haitians who are lucky enough to graduate from classical school, equivalent to high school, and attend a state university will not have the same opportunities as those who are educated in another country, leading to a deepening of

educational elitism; (5) Those who have the benefits of this education are normally not the ones that work with the Haitian poor; and, (6) Most of the highly educated Haitians leave Haiti to pursue careers elsewhere and few link these pursuits to initiatives that would help the very poor. For these reasons, it is important to look at the benefits of praxis as a legitimate and effective form of education. Examples will be presented in Chapter 3 in my discussion of grassroots community-based organizations in Haiti.

Fagan (1996) defines praxis as learning that is acquired through simultaneous action and reflection. He argues that it is a

> . . . rolling process in which action is informed by distillation and reflection followed by further action and reflection. It does not separate education into unnecessary hierarchical structures and sees education as being in one place. It is local, process embracing, pragmatic, intellectual and action led—no separation is necessary (p. 139).

This is what I saw occurring in the Grande Ravine CHRC as well as other community-based groups that established grassroots movements based on action and reflection, the key components to learning through praxis.

Freirean views of knowledge production through praxis

Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire (1985), has been most noted for the merging of his educational and political philosophies. Freire believed that no one is an empty receptacle for learning a body of knowledge that can only be presented by someone else.

Instead, he believed that all human beings, regardless of their education or economic status, have valuable experiences and knowledges that are the basis for personal growth and problem-solving. At the center of his learning theory and pedagogy is "a philosophy of praxis founded on hope of the possibility of human agency transforming the world" (Conway, 2006, p. 34). Freire (1985) takes extensive measures to link praxis, the dialectical relationship between action and reflection, as the means for knowing and transforming the world. He supports this in the following statement:

> . . . the accomplishment of this untested feasibility [the constructible future], which demands going beyond the point blocked by living without reference to our consciousness, is only verified in *praxis.* This means . . . that human beings do not get beyond the concrete situation, the condition in which they find themselves, only by their consciousness or their intentions, however good those intentions may be (Freire, 1985, p. 154).

That is, "Freire tells us that education as transformative praxis is constructed at grassroots level by ordinary men and women who, in their everyday practices, elaborate their own possibilities by engaging in a collective political-social project" (Gaudiano & de Alba, 1994, pp. 132-133). Essential to Freire's philosophy of praxis is that there must be "a dialectical relation between action and reflection that continuously transforms both" (Conway, 2006, p. 34). These form the grounds for knowing and transforming the world (p. 34).

Dialogue is certainly one of the most important tools the Grande Ravine CHRC members use and the corner point of Friere's philosophy of praxis. In fact, the Haitians have a name for dialogue aimed towards resolving problems or developing ideas. It is called a *chita tande* (a sit-and-listen) and is the first step towards conflict resolution and project planning. However, with so few resources, dialoguers at times will carry out these discussions in a climate of hopelessness. Freire (2004) states that the loss of hope is definitely to their detriment since their encounters will be empty and sterile (Freire, 2004, p. 92). Freire posits that real transformations cannot exist without dialogue between those who are desirous of improving their life circumstances. But, true dialogue, according to Freire, cannot exist unless those involved in the dialogue are engaged in critical thinking (p. 92). Critical thinking is defined by Freire (2004) in this excerpt:

> . . . thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and the people and admits of no dichotomy between them—thinking which perceives reality as process, as transformation, rather than as a static entity—thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved (p. 92).

Freire (2004) contrasts critical thinking with naïve thinking—a helpful distinction when working with grassroots groups like the CHRC. He writes:

> For the naïve thinker, the important thing is accommodation to this normalized "today." For the critic, the important thing is the continuing transformation of reality, in behalf of the continuing humanization of men (p. 93).

One of the problems that will be discussed in the analysis of the Grande Ravine CHRC meetings is how dialogue can more effectively activate critical thinking, allowing for action and transformational thinking.

Developing a relationship between rights and responsibilities

According to Ife and Fiske (2006), a defense of human rights requires establishing a clear relationship between rights and responsibilities and providing the structure for community members to fully participate (p. 297). Ife and Fiske note that considerable attention has been given to the articulation of human rights; however, far less consideration has been given to defining human responsibilities (p. 297). In fact, they claim that "responsibilities for human rights have tended to be left largely in a legal paradigm or to government" (p. 297). They claim,

> . . . the process of leaving responsibilities for human rights with nation-states and legal systems relieves us of our responsibilities and reinforces an elitist discourse of rights, suggesting that one needs specialist qualifications, and that one needs to be an expert with specialist qualifications to engage in human rights work (p. 300).

This could lead one to think that all human rights issues can only be dealt with in a legal or political venue.

Ife and Fiske (2006) state that "the linking of human rights and human responsibilities emphasizes an interactive component of human rights" (p. 301). They contend that the right and the imperative to act on the responsibility is what "gives human

rights their power as a framework" (p. 301). Furthermore, rights cannot exist in isolation. They can only be realized collectively. Ife and Fiske (2006) make the following case:

> Rights only exist when there are people in interaction, where rights and responsibilities are collectively realized and acted out. In this sense, it is meaningless to talk about 'my rights,' and far more useful to talk about 'our rights'. This suggests that rights only make sense within a community. They require a community of interlocking rights and responsibilities which people accept as members of a group, be it a family, a community or a nation. From such a position, one can argue that there is an element of collectivism associated with the idea of human rights (p. 301).

It is for these reasons that a discussion of human rights must take into consideration the importance of involving the whole community in the recognition of defense of human rights. The Grande Ravine CHRC took an important step by involving the entire Grande Ravine community in the defense of their collective rights.

Case studies in the professional literature

The following case studies are presented in this literature review since they each provide different components of a successful community-based approach to conflict resolution. These include raising local, national, and international awareness of a well-publicized catalyst or incident; networking with governmental and non-governmental agencies; developing a reliable communication and information model fostered by programs that increase literacy so that community members can access information and

correspond with institutions that might be able to help them; and, developing the knowledge base of community members through activities that promote and insist on the recognition of human rights.

Case study: Advancing human rights policy through grassroots mobilization and community dispute resolution in Chiapas

Linda Lopez (2005) examined the impact of grassroots organizing at the community level in Chiapas, Mexico, particularly to "address problems associated with human rights advocacy and implementation" (p. 77). She argues that "collective mobilization in local communities serves both symbolic and pragmatic efforts in helping disenfranchised groups empower themselves to address economic, social, and political inequality" (p. 77). Lopez (2005) claims that local-level activism can provide community members with "a sense of self-empowerment to change state institutional responses and to involve sectors of civil society domestically and internationally to initiate a proper resolution of issues that are fundamentally related to human rights" (p. 77).

Lopez (2005) recounts the first step the indigenous people of Chiapas took towards forcing a dialogue with the Mexican government:

> On January 1, 1994, the EZLN [Zapatista National Liberation Army] launched its first military offensive and declared war against the Mexican government. Their principal demands included work, land, housing, food, health, education, liberty, democracy, justice, and peace. . . Since the utilization of rights discourse and pacifist strategies such as protests and marches have proved ineffective in

> garnering action by the Mexican government, one consequence has been EZLN armed rebellion. In fact, the EZLN justified its declaration of war by relying on Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution. . . (p. 78).

This article gives Mexican citizens the right to alter or modify their form of government. As a result of the "low level" uprising, local, national, and international attention was elicited. Lopez (2005) explains:

> [T]here is some evidence to suggest that since the 1994 EZLN. . . uprising several micro-level political and social movements have contested the power of the state through symbolic and pragmatic organizing efforts. These groups include, but are not limited to, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women's groups, and indigenous groups. After the Zapatista uprising, these groups were instrumental in making claims against the state through numerous activities: protests to end the war, the development of NGOs to observe human rights violations, civilian-based Zapatista support groups (*base de apoyo*), peace camps, and open dialogue with the EZLN (p. 77).

Lopez's (2005) study demonstrates that a catalyst that is strong enough for a call-to-action can lead to grassroots mobilization and community dispute resolution at least on some fundamental level. However, both of these actions require participating community-based groups to continue levying pressure on the government to maintain positive changes and elicit greater outcomes.

Case study: An ethnographic study on grassroots efforts to address insecurity in impoverished regions--Networks and social order in three Brazilian favelas

A study conducted by Enrique Desmond Arias (2004) focuses on grassroots efforts to improve quality of life in three Brazilian *favelas* (or shantytowns). The study looked at the role of micro-level politics in controlling local conflict such as the kinds that involve armed conflict among gangs and police harassment and misuse of power. Both of these problems are similar to the kinds of problems Grande Ravine has experienced.

Arias (2004) argues that "networks can link *favela* residents to organizations in civil society, and state actors can play a critical role in reducing and establishing democratic order" (p.1) in areas that have been overtaken by gang violence and police misconduct. A network is described as a collaboration among local civic groups and social movements with state actors and agencies.

The evidence showed that in all three *favelas*—Vigário, Tubarão, and Santa Ana—the actions of both state actors and civil society groups depend on their coordination with groups inside these communities. "In closed, violent places, it is difficult for well-intentioned outsiders to gain access without the help of trusted locals" (Arias, 2004, p. 28). In Vigário, Arias claims that numerous outsiders gained access through politically active locals who introduced them to residents (p. 28). This has been tried in Grande Ravine with unfortunate consequences, including the murder of the first president of the CHRC after being seen with the HURAH president in Grande Ravine.

Arias (2004) notes the tenuousness of including outsiders, as is the case in Grande Ravine. He references the work of Mark Granovetter (1983) and Vincente Espinoza (1992) who found that "poor, isolated communities also tend to have strong protective ties among residents that make it difficult for outsiders to obtain information (p. 28). However, Arias explains that residents of these three *favelas* realize that without links to outsiders, information about the problems in their community could not safely pass to the institutions and state-level officials that could bring about change.

This study shows that there can be safety in numbers. Through the establishment of a network, the actors within this network are less likely to be victims of violent attacks. According to Arias (2004), "When groups operate together, the cost to violent actors of threatening or co-opting member groups increases" (p. 28). This dynamic has not operated in Grande Ravine, where little has been done to stop violent activity by armed groups and often times their members become involved in organizations that would make up these networks only to turn that information against the community. Arias (2004) states that organizations that are more densely organized and have more open connections among group members tend to avoid this problem of infiltration (p. 29). Arias concludes:

> . . . that while both institutional reform and popular mobilization play critical roles in addressing problems in those [three] communities, networks provide essential impetus to support reforms and stimulate long-term mobilization. . . Active organizational contacts help local groups transcend their own community to bring in resources, support important programs, and pressure government agents to

> undertake reforms. . . [N]etworks struggling to reduce violence may experience significant internal and external challenges from groups that would prefer things to continue as they are. Criminals can also use internal conflict and succeed; therefore, network members must be aware of the problems they can confront and must work to keep communication channels open. Only through mutual cross-institutional support can networks overcome challenges from criminals (p. 3).

Arias (2004) notes that further research in small case studies is necessary to understand the kind of local-level organizing that has been the focus of his study. In communities where there is ongoing violence, he claims that only close, detailed local studies have the potential to help us understand important localized political dynamics that he sees are critical to furthering the process of democratic consolidation in the region.

Case study: An exploratory study of civil conflict in Northern Uganda

The feasibility of local-level organizing is increased when a model of information and communication is followed, allowing community organizers to address problems expeditiously and with accurate information. Paul Sturges (2007) claims that a necessary component for such a model is a literate population (p. 211).

Sturges (2007) conducted a study of civil conflict in northern Uganda where banditry is commonplace. He found that the conflict in northern Uganda between government forces and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel movement that the government refers to as bandits or common criminals, has "created an information seeking environment with deep and unusual problems" (p. 211). Sturges (2007) states:

> . . . government neglect of the region and the LRA's communication through spirit messages and the symbolic use of violence have exacerbated the conflict by creating an intractable information and communication environment. It is concluded that long term resolution of the conflict can only be achieved through solutions that include the restoration of the institutions and practices of effective communication so as to facilitate information seeking (p. 211).

Sturges (2007) argues the government's neglect of northern Uganda worsened "broader government agendas and power strategies in which the welfare of the region has been openly neglected" (p. 210). This gave the LRA the opportunity to fill a void in the region and to exercise its own power over the populace. The LRA's expression of power through spirit messages, symbolic actions that include mutilation and rape, and the language of naked armed force may appear incomprehensible to outsiders. Sturges explains these actions as strategic and rational. He cites A. Vinci (2005), who argues:

> While the LRA's tactics may be barbaric in the extreme, they are rational and are directed at achieving ends. And, even though Joseph Kony [the leader] may be insane in reality, it is clear that the LRA as an organization is acting in a strategic, instrumental manner (p. 210).

Sturges (2007) suggests that the LRA "should not be considered a bandit movement, but as a rebellion that can be addressed by measures that include information and communication elements" (p. 210).

Sturges (2007) claims that solutions to human rights violations should begin with a process that fosters truth and reconciliation such as that which he cites from A. Westbrook (2000):

> Fact-based and fact-finding problems are central to the intractability of this conflict. Distortion on all sides has occurred and continues to occur. Issues ranging from human rights abuses and by whom they were committed to why the war has continued need to be resolved. There is a need for an independent, probably international in character, fact-finding commission to look into these issues (p. 11).

But, Sturges (2007) states that this alone is not enough. In addition to establishing a fact-finding commission, he argues that measures need to be taken that "neutralize the threat of the LRA and empower the tens of thousands in the camps to function economically, socially, and politically" (p. 210). These measures need to include resolutions that require the community to "be made to move itself out of the deprivation arising from the conflict" (p. 210). Sturges (2007) adds, "A key contribution to such a process could take the form of information-based work in the community—in the camps in particular" (p. 210). He takes the position of P. Buttedahl and D. Nkurunziza (2005) who claim:

> [Il]literacy and poverty are . . . huge barriers to communication. The inability to read and write causes severe handicap when trying to either pass messages up the chain or gain information from local government. Newsletters and posters are only good if you can read them (pp. 11-12).

Sturges (2007) reiterates and adds to this position the following statement:

> A population empowered by literacy and, through it, granted access to institutions, can begin, with appropriate help, to put right many of the horrific circumstances of the region. The message is that ultimately ideas, debate and consensus building are the only effective responses to violence as a form of communication and to the seizure of power as a political goal (p. 211).

Literacy may need to occur in more than one language. In Haiti, the languages would be Haitian Creole and, more importantly, French. French is the language used in governance and academic institutions. On more than one occasion, Haitians have told me that if their French is not flawless (spoken and written), their concerns will not be taken seriously by officials in the Haitian government.

Case study: Social movements and activist knowledge

Janet Conway (2006) conducted an ethnographic study of the Metro Network for Social Justice (MNSJ) in Toronto, Canada. Over a five-year period (1992-1997), she explored "the knowledge arising from activist practice and its significance for understanding social movements, for generating post-neoliberal alternatives and for re-imagining democratic politics" (p. 1). The MNSJ is a coalition that formed in the early 1990s as a response to deep cuts in municipal programs. Its member groups included labor unions, churches, anti-poverty and social service organizations, third world solidarity and international development groups, and equity-seeking groups representing women, people with disabilities, ethno-specific groups, and sexual minorities from within

the greater Toronto region. During the period of her study, the MNSJ maintained commitments to grassroots capacity-building, democratic organizational development, participatory knowledge creation, and broad-based campaigning. Conway (2002) states, "This multi-faceted praxis gave rise to new practices and emergent theories of knowledge production and its role in a reconstructed democratic politics" (p. 1).

Conway (2006) proposes that there are three distinct modes of knowing that are embedded in activist practice: tacit knowledge, praxis, and knowledge production. *Tacit knowledge* is produced through everyday experiences and practices. She differentiates *praxis* from tacit knowledge in that praxis incorporates practices that are "systematically reflected on, informed and transformed by other knowledges and theories about the world in an ongoing dialogue" (p. 21). She defines *knowledge production* as occurring when "the generation of movement-based interpretation of the world becomes central to the movement's self-understanding and development and to the capacity of social movement publics to enter into political struggles in which contestations over knowledge are central" (p. 21).

Conway's study revealed that activists drew on and generated tacit knowledge through everyday campaign-organizing activities. Conway (2006) states:

> . . . they also generated knowledge through praxis as each campaign was collectively planned and evaluated, the results debated and interpreted, and the insights disseminated. Each organizing process yielded particular insights and lessons, which were carried forward to inform the next campaign and which also

> diffused, through myriad discourses and practices, to shape the overall culture and politics of the coalition. These processes were uneven and imperfect, but as activist practices go, they were systematized to an extraordinary degree (p. 119).

According to Conway (2006), social movements produce knowledge primarily through praxis. In fact, she identifies knowledge production as embedded in "the everyday practices that constitute social movements as activists organize events, mount protests, orchestrate campaigns, frame issues, formulate demands, produce materials, facilitate educational processes, and deliberate together about their work and its relation to what is underway in the world" (p. 71). She argues that when activists reflect critically and self-consciously on their practice leading to new insights, they are engaging in praxis and so produce knowledge that is "articulated, systematized, repeated, shared, remembered and further actualized, developed, and revised through subsequent practice" (p. 71).

Conway (2006) concludes the following from her study:

> . . . this philosophy of knowledge and its production intersects directly with concerns about democratic functioning. The democratic culture of the MNSJ was fertile terrain for the development of these theories of knowledge and this praxis of knowledge production. Likewise, deep-seated commitments to broad-based capacity building, which are grounded, implicitly or explicitly, in appreciation of knowledge from below and commitments to democratizing 'expert' and hegemonic knowledges, are central to inculcating new, deeper, and more genuine

forms of democracy. This is relevant for all democratic political communities, however defined (p. 93).

Relevant theories for analysis

The theories presented in this section informed the fourth level of data analysis. In particular, they help to form a theoretical framework for analyzing insider-outsider dynamics within a community, in general, and a grassroots organization such as the CHRC, in particular.

Rural peasant organizations in Haiti

The first theory takes into account the history and structure of Haitian peasant communities and popular organizations, particularly the *konsèy kominotè* (community groups that grew out of the community council concept), which leans towards a socio-political agenda. Jennie Smith (2001) has identified a variety of structures and functions of the *gwoupman peyizan* (peasant groups) She has found that they tend to be less communal and more popular than other types of peasant organizations in their widespread attempt to effect social and/or political change. My study demonstrates how the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council, as with other CHRCs in the AUMOHD network, draws from this history of popular organizations in Haiti.

According to Smith, an anthropologist who has spent a substantial part of her career studying rural popular organizations in Bamòn, Haiti, the emergence of the *konsèy kominotè* occurred in the 1960s during Francois Duvalier's presidency. She draws on the work of Glenn Smucker (1983), another anthropologist and expert on Haiti, who states

that Duvalier enacted the formation of these councils in 1962 under the Code Rurale, which called for "the creation of local administrative councils to assume civilian governance over every rural section through principles of community action" (pp. 378-379). Although it would appear that the formation of these councils was an attempt to give greater autonomy to local communities, Smith argues that Duvalier's intentions were quite the opposite. According to Smith (2001):

> . . . this initiative might be more accurately characterized as one among the many directed at securing greater surveillance and control in rural communities, while further centralizing power in the capital. Not insignificantly, it appeared just as Duvalier's infamous Volontaires de la Sècuritè Nationale (National Security Volunteers) were beginning to proliferate throughout the countryside.
>
> According to members of some of Bamòn's original konsèy kominotè-s, the first task ever given these councils by Duvalier was to "clear brush from the footpaths." The reason, they said, was so his troops would be better able to drive out the *kamoken-s* (antigovernment rebels) he suspected to be lurking in the mountains, plotting revolution (p. 148).

Smith (2001) indicates that these konsèy kominotè only began proliferating on a large-scale once foreign-based organizations and churches got involved. Smucker (1983) explains their involvement in the following quote:

> In 1963 the national planning council (CONADEP) stated that community development was a national policy devoted to integrating rural communities into

> the "rhythm of national progress". . . In this plan the agency called ONEC was directed to conduct a mass literacy program, to construct rural social centers and potable water systems, to introduce modern agriculture, foster peasant crafts, and improve local roads and footpaths. Throughout the 1960s Protestant and Catholic missions and private voluntary agencies organized numerous community councils in rural Haiti. These efforts were primarily of American origin (Smucker, 1983, p. 379).

Early assumptions about these community councils were that they were not created to represent political interests of the peasantry but, rather, to serve as conduits for foreign and Haitian social service organizations working in rural areas. However, Smith's observations of these councils in Bamòn and my observations of the Grande Ravine CHRC reveal that they have significantly changed since the Duvalier era. In both cases, today's community councils or g*woupman kominotè* have agendas that represent a greater commitment to social and political change.

Smith (2001) notes that compared to the 1960s when foreign-sponsored community development programs concentrated on material and technical assistance to rural Haitians, in the 1970s the peasantry expressed increased concern with the underlying reasons for poverty. Citing Smucker and Noriac, Smith (2001) explains that "this shift had far reaching consequences . . . as it led to peasants questioning more boldly than ever before the social and economic injustices to which they had been subjected" (p.

151). Particularly important is the role of nonsecular organizations that focused on grassroots efforts for bringing about change:

> Among those leading the shift were various Catholic church-related institutions, such as the Justice and Peace Commission, an advocacy-group comprised of clergy and lay church members, and CARITAS, an organization that had previously worked mostly in the area of relief aid. Also central to the new movement were Catholic-sponsored Christian community development centers, the first of which had been founded in 1964 in Laborde. These centers focused on training grass-roots organizers called "animators." In general terms, training women and men to be, respectively, *animatris*-s and *problem*-s involves equipping them to motivate residents of a locale to organize into small community groups; guide these groups in a process of reflecting together on social problems; and teach group members how to work together effectively for positive social, economic, or political change (Smith, 2001, p. 151).

Animators also have been known to train and educate groups and individuals in technical skills such as sustainable agricultural techniques, preventive health strategies, income generation, literacy instruction, finance management, water purification, human rights, civic rights and responsibilities, and women's empowerment (p. 152). Animation within the CHRC structure is central to its effectiveness.

Organizations as thought collectives

Another way of thinking about these popular organizations is as "thought collectives," a term coined by Ludwik Fleck in 1935. A thought collective is defined by Fleck (1979) as "a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction" (p. 39). Given this, he maintains that ". . . by implication. . .it also provides the special 'carrier' for the historical development of any field of thought, as well as for the given stock of knowledge and level of culture" (p. 39). This notion of the thought collective is based on the idea that

> cognition is not an individual process of any theoretical "particular consciousness." Rather it is the result of a social activity, since the existing stock of knowledge exceeds the range available to any one individual (p. 38).

Popular organizations such as the *sosyete*, *konsèy kominote* and the *gwoupman kominotè*, themselves, can be considered thought collectives that have formed around knowledge of agronomy, sustainability, and cultural beliefs and practices. As groups became more focused on community building, collectives formed around initiatives such as literacy campaigns or campaigns designed to educate the public about HIV/AIDS. The Grande Ravine CHRC evolved into a thought collective of human rights advocates. Although none of its members received any formal training in human rights advocacy, they each held a common set of beliefs and expectations that defined their mission.

Funds of knowledge and Vygotsky's theory of cognition

Funds of knowledge—a conceptual framework described by Luis Moll, Norma González, and Cathy Amanti (2005) to reveal the intellectual and social knowledge found in families—was based on Lev Vygotsky's theory of cognition. They explain the key ideas they have borrowed from Vygotsky in their studies of funds of knowledge in the households of children:

> A major point in this theory is how culture provides human beings with tools and other resources to mediate their thinking. In a nutshell, from birth one is socialized by others into particular cultural practices, including ways of using language(s) and ways of using artifacts that become the "tools for thinking" through which we interact with our social worlds. Thus, from a Vygotskian perspective, human thinking has a sociocultural character from the very beginning because all human actions, from the mundane to the exotic, involve "mediation" through such objects, symbols, and practices. Put another way, these cultural tools and practices—some which are stable, and some which change across generation—are always implicated in how one thinks and develops (González, Moll & Amanti, 2005, p. 18).

The relevance of funds of knowledge and Vygotsky's theory of cognition to the Grande Ravine CHRC is that they indicate how grassroots efforts, without specific training in human rights advocacy, have the potential to fill many of their goals. A connection exists between funds of knowledge and popular organizations in that popular organizations ". .

.are generated through the social and labor history of families and communicated to others through the activities that constitute household life, including through the formation of social networks. . .” (González, Moll & Amanti, 2005, p. 18). Within this study, these funds of knowledge are seen as expanding beyond the family into Haitian popular organizations. That is, they provide the cultural tools and artifacts so that there is a knowledge base for such organizations to carry out their work. The exchange of knowledge in *gwoupman kominotè* occurs as members share their social and labor history

> to achieve an agreed upon goal. A shared history among members of the *gwoupman kominotè* results in a thought collective that helps the group develop an identity, philosophy, and a set of practices for a specific purpose. The members of the Grande Ravine CHRC all reside in Grande Ravine and not only share a common history but also a common set of values that brought them together in the first place—the belief that all conflicts can be resolved peacefully and that everyone should be able to enjoy a life free of fear and tyranny.

Situated learning and legitimate peripheral participation

Vygotsky’s notions of social learning were also the antecedents to Jean Lave’s and Etienne Wenger’s theory of situated learning. Lave and Wenger (1991) view learning as

> situated activity [which] has as its central defining characteristic a process that we call *legitimate peripheral participation*. By this we mean to draw attention to the point that learners inevitably participate in communities of practitioners and that

> the mastery of knowledge and skill requires newcomers to move toward full participation in the sociocultural practices of community. Legitimate peripheral participation provides a way to speak about the relations between newcomers and old-timers, and about activities, identities, artifacts, and communities of knowledge and practice. It concerns the process by which newcomers become part of a community of practice. A person's intentions to learn are engaged and the meaning of learning is configured through the process of becoming a full participant in a sociocultural practice. This social process includes, indeed it subsumes, the learning of knowledgeable skills (p. 29).

This theory of legitimate peripheral participation within communities of practice is useful in understanding the internal workings of popular organizations and how new members become full participants in the organization. With respect to the Grande Ravine CHRC, newcomers learn how to counsel victims and simmer, if not resolve, hostile situations brought about through the actions of disgruntled or suspicious neighbors, police, *bandi*, or political groups.

Communities of practice

Communities of practice are defined by Wenger (2008) as "groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly" (Communities of Practice, retrieved March 8, 2009). Furthermore, he states that these are

> formed by people who engage in a process of collective learning in a shared domain of human endeavor: a tribe learning to survive, a band of artists seeking new forms of expression, a group of engineers working on similar problems, a clique of pupils defining their identity in the school, a network of surgeons exploring novel techniques, a gathering of first-time managers helping each other cope" (Communities of Practice, retrieved March 8, 2009).

The Grande Ravine CHRC is a community of practice because it is comprised of a group of people who shared two common endeavors—promoting human rights and seeking justice and reparation for victims of human rights abuses. Its membership is comprised of people who represent different sectors of the Grande Ravine community—educators, clergy, small merchants, and others who convened after the first massacre in August 2005. None of them had previously worked as human rights advocates. Thus, their learning about human rights and how to advocate for victims of human rights abuses became an on-the-job endeavor informed by funds of knowledge and nurtured through legitimate peripheral participation.

Affinity spaces

James Paul Gee (2005) problematizes the notion of a community of practice in several ways. First, he states that the idea of community can carry connotations of "belongingness" and erroneously imply close ties among the people in this group. It suggests "membership," a term whose meaning changes across different communities of practice. Second, he believes that the notion of a community of practice lends one

towards the inclination of labeling a group of people. Gee (2005) argues, "Once this is done, we face vexatious issues over which people are in and which are out of the group, how far they are in or out and when they are in and out" (p. 215). These concerns do not appear to be as relevant to the Grande Ravine CHRC as they might be to a more loosely defined group since the community human rights council has a clearly defined membership. However, Gee does offer a useful way for analyzing meaning production within a semiotic social space, a notion he uses in lieu of communities of practice, because it is less concerned with membership and more concerned about "the way in which people get and give meanings to signs" within this space.

A semiotic social space is initially formed by content, otherwise known as a *generator*–"something for the space to be 'about'" (Gee, 2005, p. 218). A human rights violation or the potential for one is an example of a generator in the semiotic social space of the CHRC. When there are one or more generators, a set of signs that can be considered in two different ways—internally and externally (p. 218). The *internal grammar* of the generator(s) is the design or organization of the content. In the case of human rights, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Appendix A) is a document that describes explicitly what is within the purview of human rights and, thus, what might be considered an infraction. The *external grammar* of a semiotic social space is "the organization of people's thoughts, beliefs, values, actions, and social interactions in regard to the signs and their relationships" (Gee, 2005, p. 219). Within the CHRC, this might include discussions, problem posing and problem solving around actual or potential human rights abuses. *Portals* are any structures or entryways "that give access

to the signs of the [semiotic social space] and to ways of interacting with those signs, by oneself or with other people" (p. 220). The Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council is an example of a portal where victims of human rights abuses can air their concerns by reporting directly to a member of the council or by presenting their concern(s) at one of the CHRC's community meetings.

Gee (2005) describes the features of an *affinity space*—one type of semiotic social space:

1. Common endeavour, not race, class, gender or disability, is primary.
2. Newbies and masters and everyone else share common space.
3. Some portals are strong generators.
4. Internal grammar is transformed by external grammar.
5. Encourages intensive and extensive knowledge. [Intensive knowledge is specialized whereas extensive knowledge is broader and less specialized.]
6. Encourages individual and distributed knowledge. [Individual knowledge is the knowledge people carry with them. Distributed knowledge is knowledge that exists in other people or resources.]
7. Encourages dispersed knowledge. [That is, the portal encourages and enables people to acquire related skills and knowledge. For example, members of the CHRC might learn about the laws and policies governing the judicial system in Haiti.]

8. Uses and honors tacit knowledge. [This is knowledge that members of the CHRC have acquired over time but which they may not be able to fully explicate.]
9. Many different forms and routes to participation.
10. Many different routes to status.
11. Leadership is porous and leaders are resources (pp. 227-228).

According to Gee (2005), "Social activists, whether their cause is ecology, anti-globalization or school vouchers, also often organize themselves and others in terms of affinity spaces" (p. 228). "In such spaces, people who may share little, and even differ dramatically on other issues, affiliate around their common cause and the practices associated with espousing it via affinity spaces that have most or all of the previously described eleven features" (p. 229). Community human rights councils can easily be added to the list of examples of affinity spaces as the investigator will demonstrate.

Conclusion

The studies and theories presented in this chapter were useful in the analysis of my data and in determining the categories in the fourth level of data analysis in the Grande Ravine CHRC case study. In addition, the following theoretical frames provide a lens for analyzing the data and noting implications that emerge from the findings: (1) community organizing, (2) community-based learning and knowledge formation through praxis, (3) insider-outsider dynamics, and (4) capacity building. Finally, the findings from the case studies allow for a deeper analysis of my own data, which also

represents a group that is concerned with resolving socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts in their community. The analysis of the data will evaluate the extent to which residents of Grande Ravine take for rights identified by the CHRC and Grande Ravine community.

CHAPTER 3 A DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODOLOGY

A case study approach

A case study approach was used to investigate the organizational characteristics of the Grande Ravine CHRC. This approach appeared to be the most appropriate because this study's research question focuses on a single, intrinsically bounded context. Sharan Merriam (1998), who has written substantively about qualitative research methods in education, writes:

> Unlike experimental, survey, or historical research, case study does not claim any particular methods for data collection or data analysis. Any and all methods of gathering data, from testing to interviewing, can be used in a case study, although certain techniques are used more than others (p. 28).

Data gathered for this study included interviews, descriptions of site visits, life histories, chronologies, notes on participant-observations, legal documents, and my field diary.

Four levels of analysis are described in this chapter and include the following: (a) three chronological analyses of events, (b) a thematic analysis of recurring concerns raised in the interviews and field notes, (c) an analysis of behaviors and outcomes using the critical incident technique, and (d) an analysis of categories that emerged from a review of the data with a focus on the study's implications. Categories used for analyzing the data include (1) community organizing, (2) community-based learning, (3) insider-outsider dynamics, and (4) capacity building. These categories also appear

in the professional literature review, which was expanded after this final level of data analysis was completed. This chapter presents a detailed description of the methodology used in this study and the multi-level approach to data analysis.

Research design

Primary data was collected through interviews and field observations that at times included the investigator's participation. Haitian Creole was the primary language used for interviews, release forms, and communications during field observations. Texts describing the study were written by me in Haitian Creole and revised by Frisman Floritant, who served as the interpreter for the interviews. Oral responses were recorded on a handheld voice recorder, and written English translations of these responses were recorded by me in my field notebook. I asked clarifying questions throughout each interview to ascertain that interviewees understood the question and to gather additional information that initially might not have been provided in the interview. Recordings were reviewed with Floritant on the same day. Documents (including letters, reports, minutes, and photographs) were also collected as secondary data. These documents were written in French and orally translated into English by Evel Fanfan, the provider of all written documents, since I did not have proficiency in the French language.

Three chronologies are presented in this single case study. The first one is a historical chronology of events to establish the context of the emergence of AUMOHD and the Grande Ravine CHRC as well as the discourse most often reiterated by interviewees. The second chronology concerns accounts of the three massacres in

Grande Ravine according to interviewees, witnesses to these events, and police reports. The third describes the emergence and development of AUMOHD's first community human rights council as a response to the pressing needs of the massacre's victims and other residents of Grande Ravine. The tools used to organize these chronologies include a survey of the literature, interview transcripts and notes, field notes from observations, and documents including photographs. Only the second and third chronologies were coded for recurring themes because they form the basis of the case study.

The use of interrelated chronologies is consistent with the applications of a case study approach. Robert K. Yin (1984), an expert in case study approaches, states that there are at least four different applications of a case study:

> The most important [application] is to *explain* the casual links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies. A second application is to *describe* the real-life context in which an intervention has occurred. Third, an evaluation can benefit, again in a descriptive mode, from an illustrative case study—even a journalistic account—of the intervention itself. Finally, the case study strategy may be used to *explore* those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes (p. 25).

The interrelated chronologies incorporate each of these applications in data collection and data analysis in the following sections.

Data collection

Several types of data collection were utilized during the summer of 2007 included field observations of CHRCs other than the one in Grande Ravine. The importance of this data is to have a description of the organization and events of other CHRCs for a comparative analysis as needed. All interviews were conducted over a two-month period, beginning June 12, 2007 and concluding July 30, 2007. To collect data, I did the following:

Field work – Grande Ravine

1. Attended Grande Ravine CHRC meetings when it was appropriate to do so.
2. Attended (and participated if invited to do so) in CHRC activities.
3. Visited parts of Grande Ravine as the situation allowed.
4. Maintained field notes of observations.

Field work – Related

1. Attended CHRC meetings in Cité Soleil at the Don Bosco School in Douya.
2. Visited parts of Croix-des-Bouquets, Simon-Pélé, and Cité Soleil.
3. Shadowed Evel Fanfan, attorney and president of AUMOHD.
4. Maintained field notes of observations.

Interviews – Grande Ravine

1. Completed oral histories of five officers of the Grande Ravine CHRC. For the purpose of this study, oral histories included background information about the

interviewee, such as place of birth, and a detailed description of their recollection of events prior to, during, and after the occurrence of the three 2005-2006 massacres as well as the formation of the Grande Ravine CHRC. Interviews were recorded with written permission. If the interviewee was unable to read the release form, then it was read to him/her. In this case, the interview responses were written down rather than recorded. No one under the age of 18 years was interviewed. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. Pseudonyms were assigned to each person interviewed. If the interviewee wanted to have his/her identity disclosed, then written permission was sought from him/her. All interviews were conducted at a neutral site where privacy could be assured.

2. The investigator also recorded an oral history of five residents of Grande Ravine, some of whom were victims of LTM attacks. The same procedures and standards were utilized as in #1.

Interviews – Related

1. Completed oral histories of Cité Soleil CHRC officers, two Croix-des-Bouquets CHRC officers, and one from the Simon-Pélé CHRC. Oral histories were recorded with written permission. If the interviewee was unable to read the release form, then I read it to him/her. If the interviewee was unable to sign his/her name, then the interview responses were written down rather than recorded. No one under the age of 18 years was interviewed. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. Pseudonyms were assigned to each person interviewed. If an interviewee wanted to have his/her identity disclosed, then

written permission was sought from him/her. All interviews were conducted at a neutral site away from the interviewee's neighborhood.

2. Completed oral histories of three Cité Soleil residents, two from Croix-des-Bouquets and one from Simon-Pélé. The same procedures and standards were utilized as in #1.
3. Interviewed Evel Fanfan, president of AUMOHD, on three separate occasions: June 12, July 6, and July 28, 2007. The purpose for having the interviews spread out across the data collection period is to note operational and organizational changes in AUMOHD and their impact on the Grande Ravine CHRC. Two interviews were conducted at the AUMOHD office, and the final one was conducted at the investigator's residence.
4. Interviewed the Deputy of Grande Ravine/Martissant, Jean Cledor Myril, and the Deputy Chief of the UN Human Rights Division in Haiti, Etore Di Benedetto. The interviews were conducted at the AUMOHD office and the UN compound in Pétion-ville. My efforts to schedule interviews with the following officials were unsuccessful: Mario Andresol (Chief of Haitian National Police), Alix Fils Aimé (National Commission of Disarmament, Dismantling, and Reinsertion - NCDDR), and René Magloire (Haiti's Minister of Justice in 2007).

Focus group

One focus group was held with all of the CHRC presidents in attendance. The same precautions and respect for anonymity were taken as was the case with the

interviews. The purpose of the focus group was to synthesize and compare responses to questions in the study.

Document analysis

With the consent of Evel Fanfan, the president of AUMOHD, I was able to review and copy reports and other documents that pertain to the activities and interests of Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council.

Field observations

Field observations crossed many contexts. Their common thread was a connection to the work of AUMOHD. They included attendance at CHRC meetings (particularly those for Grande Ravine and Cité Soleil). However, there were times when it was not appropriate for me to be present, such as instances where my presence could become a security problem for myself and others. In lieu of my attendance, I met afterwards with the president, Frantzco Joseph, who summarized the discussions and described events of those meetings or occasions.

Field observations also included trips to several courts and one trip to a jail in Delmas; a meeting with the family and neighbors of a reputed gang leader in Cité Soleil who had been shot and killed by MINUSTAH troops; a tour of Grande Ravine, Cité Soleil, and Simon-Pélé; two press conferences held by AUMOHD; a graduation ceremony at a vocational school in Croix-des-Bouquet; and, a UN conference on the state of human rights in Haiti.

Field notes were recorded in a notebook during these observations. Each entry included a date, place and/or destination, and time as well as a record of others who were present.

During observations of CHRC meetings, I noted the following:

1. When and where the meeting took place
2. Who attended the meeting (including basic demographics such as age and gender)
3. How long the meeting lasted
4. Who led the meeting
5. The meeting's agenda
6. Who spoke at the meeting and what were his/her concerns
7. What issues or problems were raised at the meeting; who raised these issues or problems; how were these issues or problems addressed
8. What activities were planned or discussed at the meeting; how were they addressed
9. Other than officers, who else attended the meeting

Participant-Observations

There were two instances of participant-observation where I was involved in the activities beyond simply being an observer. The first was the Grande Ravine Day of Reflection where I participated in a type of demonstration involving hundreds of residents who walked to the mass burial of victims of the LTM massacres, singing songs that spoke of their sorrow and their resilience. Although I was asked to speak at the

grave site and at the press conference, I declined since this act was outside the role of participant-observer. Field notes were taken in a smaller notebook that could easily be held while observing the demonstration. I attempted to take photos of the demonstration, but my camera had a malfunction. Fortunately, one of the other participants took photos and saved them on a CD. Frisman Floritant, who accompanied me in my daily comings and goings, also participated in this event and elevated my understanding of the event and the songs that were sung throughout the demonstration.

The other instance in which I was a participant-observer occurred when I conducted a seminar on human rights for grassroots organizations in Grande Ravine. This was not originally part of the research plan. However, it was requested by three of the *bandi* with whom I met with and who were aware of my research interests in Grande Ravine. My participation included the development of the agenda and activities for the seminar, which involved collaborative planning with Joseph and Fanfan. Fanfan and I co-facilitated the seminar, leaving the last hour of the seminar for Fanfan to speak to the group. Although it was not possible to record observations during the seminar, I was able to reconstruct what happened afterwards in consultation with Floritant. I also was able to take photos of the seminar and collect written reflections from the participants. Otherwise, no video or audio recording devices were used, as these would create discomfort for people who are typically nervous about retribution for statements they might make against the police or armed groups residing in Grand Ravine.

The interview process

Interviews were conducted with Fanfan and CHRC officers; residents of Grande Ravine, Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, and Croix-des-Bouquet; victims of the LTM massacres; the Deputy of Grande Ravine/Martissant; and, the Deputy Chief of the UN Human Rights Division in Haiti. Interviews in Grande Ravine included:

- 5 Grande Ravine CHRC officers (total of 10 interviews)
- 5 Grande Ravine residents (4 who were victims of the LTM massacres)
- 3 Members of an armed group in Grande Ravine*
- 5 Cité Soleil CHRC officers
- 3 Cité Soleil residents
- 2 Croix-des-Bouquet CHRC officers
- 2 Croix-des-Bouquet residents
- 1 Simon-Pélé CHRC officer
- 1 Simon-Pélé residents
- Evel Fanfan (total of 3 interviews)
- The Deputy of Grande Ravine/Martissant*
- The Deputy Chief of the UN Human Rights Division in Haiti*

Total of Individual Interviews: 37**

*Informal impromptu interviews

**This total does not include the 4 participants (who had previously been interviewed) in the focus group

I asked the CHRC presidents whether they would feel comfortable recruiting interviewees for my research. Each of them responded positively and assisted with setting up the interviews. This procedure might have created a research bias. However, I do not believe much, if any, bias occurred because my questions did not ask interviewees to pass judgment on the CHRC beyond what they had observed.

Fanfan and the CHRC presidents also assisted in organizing interviews with other CHRC participants. Prior to the interview, I described the study to interviewees by reading the following text to them in Haitian Creole:

> Hello. My name is Deborah Dimmett. I am an American student at the University of Arizona and am studying how members of Community Human Right Councils learn to advocate for themselves and their community. I would like to ask a few questions of some individuals from this council about their participation in the council. When I finish collecting all of the information I need, I will return to my school and write my report. The report will be used to fulfill my graduation requirements for school. Once I have graduated, I will give five copies of the report to AUMOHD which will share the results with members of your council. Participants of the study may stop their participation at any time. As a participant in my study, I would ask you some questions about how you got involved in the community human rights council, what you believe are the council's accomplishments, and what you have learned by participating in the council. The interview would take approximately 40 minutes. We would meet at a location convenient to you where your privacy can

> be assured. At the end of the interview, I will pay you $10 US as a token of my appreciation. Do you have any questions about the study? Would you like to participate in my study?"

If the individual agrees to participate, then I would say, "I need to ask you just a few questions right now. Is that okay?" If the individual agrees I would ask these questions: (1) Where do you reside [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, etc.]? (2) With whom do you live? (3) How long have you lived in . . .? (4) Where did you live before? (5) What is your age [or are you at least 18 years old]? If the individual appears to be under 25 years old, I will ask them for a document (e.g. a national ID card or driver's license) to confirm their age. For individuals who live in the community but were not officers or participants in the CHRC, the text was slightly different:

> Hello. My name is Deborah Dimmett. I am an American student at the University of Arizona and am studying how members of the Cité Soleil [Simon-Pélé, Grand Ravine, Croix-des-Bouquets] Community Human Rights Council learn to advocate for themselves and their community. I would like to ask a few questions of some individuals who live in Cité Soleil [Simon-Pélé, Grande Ravine, Croix-des-Bouquets] but who are not members of the council. When I finish collecting all of the information I need, I will return to my school and write my report. The report will be used to fulfill my graduation requirements for school. Once I have graduated, I will give five copies of the report to AUMOHD, which will share the results with members of your council. Participants of the study may stop their participation at any

time. As a participant in my study, I would ask you some general questions about your community and the expression of human rights in your community. I would also ask you about your awareness of the Cité Soleil [Simon-Pélé, Grande Ravine, Croix-des-Bouquets] Community Human Rights Council and your perception of the work this council does. The interview would take approximately 40 minutes. We would meet at a location convenient to you and one that would assure your privacy. At the end of the interview, I will pay you $10 US as a token of my appreciation. Do you have any questions about the study? Would you like to participate in my study?"

If the individual agrees to participate, then I would say, "I need to ask you just a few questions right now. Is that okay?" If the individual agrees I would ask these questions: (1) Where do you reside [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Grande Ravine, Croix-des-Bouquets]? (2) With whom do you live? (3) How long have you lived in . . .? (4) Where did you live before? (5) What is your age (or are you at least 18 years old)? If they appear 25 years or younger, I will ask them for a document (e.g. a national ID card or driver's license) to confirm their age.

For members of AUMOHD, the Haitian government, and MINUSTAH, the text read as follows:

"Hello. My name is Deborah Dimmett. I am an American student at the University of Arizona and am studying how members of the Cité Soleil (Simon-Pélé, Grande Ravine, Croix-des-Bouquets) Community Human Right Council learn to advocate for themselves and their community. I would like to ask you a few questions about

issues concerning human rights in Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Grande Ravine, and Croix-des-Bouquets as well as initiatives to addressing some of the pressing issues. When I finish collecting all of the information I need, I will return to my school to write my dissertation. The dissertation will fulfill my graduation requirements for school. Once I have graduated, I will give five copies of the report to AUMOHD, which will share the results with members of the four councils, and I will send you a summary of the findings in English. Participants of the study may stop their participation at any time. The interview would take approximately 40 minutes and would be conducted at your home, office, or other location convenient to you and which assures your privacy. Would you like to participate in my study?"

An informed consent was used for those individuals in the study literate enough to sign the consent form, which was written in Haitian Creole and French. A subject's disclaimer was used for those individuals not literate enough to sign their names or who were uncomfortable signing their name because they wished to remain anonymous. The consent form was read in Haitian Creole to all interviewees who were officers or participants of a CHRC and all residents of the respective community. Participants representing AUMOHD, the Haitian government, and MINUSTAH were presented the disclaimer in Haitian Creole or French. Participants were asked if they had any questions or concerns before agreeing to sign the consent form. Those included in the subject's disclaimer were asked to give or not give oral consent. All participants were told that they could take the consent form with them to discuss with family members or friends before agreeing to sign it.

Interviews were conducted at the AUMOHD office in Delmas or at the investigator's residence in Pétion-ville during the daytime since this location was more comfortable and quiet for recording. Interviews were conducted in Haitian Creole with two exceptions when the interviewee wanted the interview to be conducted in English. Interview questions for residents of Grande Ravine, Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, and Croix-des-Bouquets included the following:

1. Basic questions on recruitment form:

    a. What is your name and occupation?

    b. What is your age or when were you born?

    c. What is your marital status?

    d. Do you have any children or children who are in your care? If so, what are their ages?

    e. Where do you live?

    f. Does anyone live with you? If so, who?

    g. How long have you lived at this residence?

    h. Where did you live prior to your current residence?

    i. What brought you to Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets]?

2. Tell me about Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets].

3. What is it like to live where you live?

4. What is a typical day for you and your family?

5. What kinds of issues must you contend with each day? (e.g. food, water, security, health, childcare, etc.)

6. What types of hardships or problems do people living in Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets]?

7. How would you describe the security situation in Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets]? Do you think Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets] is safe now? Why or why not?

8. Have you ever been a victim of armed groups? The police? MINUSTAH troops? Others residing in your neighborhood? If so, what happened? How did you respond? Did you contact anyone to help you? If so, who? What happened then?

9. What do you know about AUMOHD? The Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets] Community Human Rights Council? Have you ever contacted them or used their services? If so, what happened? Did you get your problem or concern addressed or resolved? Explain.

10. What else would you like for me to know about Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets]?

Interviewees were informed and even reminded that they were not obligated to answer questions that made them uncomfortable. They were also told at the beginning of the interview that they could stop the interview at any time without penalty. In spite of the sensitive nature of the questions, no one chose to skip a question or stop the interview. However, some interviewees did not want their identities revealed. I assured them that pseudonyms would be used instead of real names.

The same considerations were given to CHRC officers who were interviewed. The president of each CHRC was interviewed first, and he, in turn, selected other officers to be interviewed. In each case, interviews were conducted in Haitian Creole. Interview questions for officers of the CHRCs included the following:

1. Basic questions on recruitment form:

    a. What is your name, occupation, amount of schooling completed?

    b. What is your age or when were you born?

    c. What is your marital status?

    d. Do you have any children or children who are in your care? If so, what are their ages?

    e. Where do you live?

f. Does anyone live with you? If so, who?

g. How long have you lived at this residence?

h. Where did you live prior to your current residence?

i. What brought you to Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets]?

2. Tell me about Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets].

3. What is it like to live where you live?

4. Tell me about the CHRC in Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets].

5. What is the role/function of the community human rights council?

6. How and when did you first get involved with the Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pelé, Croix-des-Bouquets] CHRC?

7. Describe why you became involved with the CHRC.

8. What is your role in the CHRC? What are your duties?

9. How did you learn to perform the duties for your role?

10. What have you gained personally and/or professionally from your involvement in the CHRC?

11. What do you do between meetings?

12. What other ways are you involved in your community [Grande Ravine, Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets]?

13. Describe a typical CHRC meeting.

14. What have been the successes of the CHRC?

15. Have there been any disappointments or failures of the CHRC? Explain.

16. What are the goals of the Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets] CHRC? Do you agree with these goals? Why or why not?

17. What are the strengths of the CHRC?

18. What are the areas in which the CHRC needs to improve? Or areas which need to be improved to fully meet the goals of the CHRC?

19. What skills or knowledge have you needed to utilize or acquire as a result of your participation in the CHRC?

20. How have you changed as a result of your participation in the CHRC?

21. How do others respond to you as a result of your participation in the CHRC?

22. Is there anything else that you would like to share that you believe would help me to understand the CHRC and your role in the CHRC?

AUMOHD President, Evel Fanfan, was given the same considerations as the other interviewees and given the option to not respond to questions or to stop the interview at any time. The interview was conducted in English. The following questions were posed over the course of three sessions:

1. Tell me about AUMOHD.
2. What does AUMOHD stand for?
3. When and how did it first form?
4. How and why did you get involved?
5. Who else is involved in AUMOHD? What are their roles?
6. What is/are the objective(s) of AUMOHD?
7. Have these objectives changed since AUMOHD first organized? If so, how?
8. Describe a typical day/week for you as the attorney and president for AUMOHD.
9. What have been some of your most challenging cases? Explain.
10. What have been your biggest successes? What do you believe accounts for them?
11. What are goals you have for AUMOHD?
12. What do you and AUMOHD need to attain these goals?
13. What kind of support does AUMOHD receive? From whom?
14. What are the needs of AUMOHD?

15. Tell me about the development of the CHRC network. When and how did it first form?
16. How were officers selected or elected for the CHRC positions? Will they have the opportunity to take on new or different roles? Explain.
17. What skills or qualities do you look for in participants of a CHRC?
18. When and for what reasons did each of the CHRCs [Grande Ravine, Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets] form?
19. Are you planning to start any other CHRCs? If so, where? And, for what reasons?
20. What is the status of the Grande Ravine LTM case? Have the perpetrators been caught and prosecuted? Where are they now?
21. What is the status of Esterne Bruner's case? [He was the first president of the Grande Ravine CHRC and was murdered on his way home after a meeting at AUMOHD.]
22. What is the status of Cité Soleil's case against MINUSTAH? [MINUSTAH is the UN peacekeeping mission that has been present since 2004 after former President Aristide was deposed. UN troops have been charged by residents of deliberate and reckless endangerment, indiscriminate arrests, property damage, and various human rights abuses.]
23. Is there anything else I should know to better understand AUMOHD and the role and function of the CHRCs, particularly the Grande Ravine CHRC?

The first interview session ended abruptly since Fanfan needed to go downtown to the civil tribunal to meet with a judge. The second allowed for the completion of all of the questions on the interview schedule. The third interview session with Fanfan encompassed questions that focused on the status of AUMOHD and CHRC activities. Issues discussed included the development of a CHRC in the lower Plateau Central and Bainet, disarmament initiatives (particularly in Grande Ravine and Cité Soleil), and the status of cases like that of Charles Junior, a leader in the Cité Soleil Amaral gang, who was allegedly killed with deliberate intent by MINUSTAH troops.

Interviews conducted with the deputy of Grande Ravine and the Deputy Chief of the UN Human Rights Division in Haiti were informal as they were impromptu events.

The Focus Group

The focus group with the presidents of the four CHRCs was held in a private conference room at a small hotel in Pétion-ville. The purpose of the focus group was to gain a better understanding of the direction and role each president perceived for his CHRC. Several of the questions were posed in earlier interviews with CHRC officers. Nevertheless, I felt it might be helpful to ask them again since the focus group presented a different context for response. The focus group allowed recording of responses to questions that were posed to the CHRC presidents in the context of a discussion group.

The following questions were asked of focus group participants:

1. How did you get involved in the Grande Ravine [Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé,

Croix-des-Bouquets] Community Human Rights Council?

2. What is the basis (reasons for) most of the human rights violations in your community?

3. What, if anything, can be done to avert further human rights violations?

4. What can be done to inform the public in Grande Ravine (Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, Croix-des-Bouquets) about their human rights?

5. What do you believe is the role of your CHRC in reducing the number of human rights violations in your community?

6. Is it the role of your CHRC to educate the public about their human rights and how to advocate for themselves? If not, explain. If so, how will you educate the public?

7. What kind of plan could your CHRC implement for the development of self-advocacy?

8. What skills do you presently possess that allow you to develop your human rights program?

9. Learning can be defined as a social activity where individuals can learn by observation and indirect participation. What kinds of learning are fostered in your CHRC meetings? How?

Document analysis

The complete AUMOHD file for Grande Ravine was photocopied with Evel Fanfan's permission. The Grande Ravine file was extensive and included depositions from victims and witnesses; police reports; communiqués from Chief of Police Mario Andresol and his designees; letters to Haitian political officials including Prime Ministers Gérard Latortue and Jacques Edouard Alexis; financial statements; and, photographs of damaged buildings and the remains of people murdered by Lame Ti Manchèt. These documents, as secondary data, were used for checking and confirming details.

Timeline of data collection

Data collection began on June 12, 2007 and concluded on July 30, 2007. I arrived in Port-au-Prince on June 9, 2007 and conducted my first interview with Evel Fanfan on June 12 at the AUMOHD office. At this meeting, Fanfan and I created a plan for conducting the research. All data was collected in Port-au-Prince or in Pétionville, a well-to-do southeastern suburb.

Member checks

I returned to Port-au-Prince on two other occasions including the periods from December 25, 2007 to January 4, 2008 and June 7, 2008 to July 28, 2008. During these visits, I met with key personnel including Evel Fanfan and Frantzco Joseph. These meetings were scheduled as member checks for seeking clarification on reported events and data collected during the summer of 2007.

Data analysis

The first level of analysis involved the construction of three chronologies so that a narrative could be written from the data collected. The first is a history of socio-political events that led up to the Lame Ti Manchèt massacres in 2005 and 2006. Primary and secondary sources were used to construct this history. Primary sources included Evel Fanfan, Tom Luce, Frantzco Joseph and other CHRC members, residents from Grande Ravine, Paul Reineke, and the Deputy from Martissant. Secondary sources included Peter Hallward, Alex Dupuy, and Tom Ricker among others. The second chronology was constructed through retellings by Grand Ravine residents about events that occurred on August 20-21, 2005 and July 9, 2006. The third chronology details the steps taken by AUMOHD to address the massacres and, subsequently, to establish the CHRC network, beginning with the Grande Ravine CHRC. The data used to construct these chronologies include secondary sources from historians and journalists, interview transcripts, field notes, and legal documents provided by Fanfan.

The second level of analysis included a review of the field notes and interview transcripts to look for recurring themes that address the precursors and conditions for the formation of the Grande Ravine CHRC. The research data was reviewed to look for organizational characteristics that influenced the CHRC's efforts to resolve socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts. Three recurring themes emerged from this process:

- Types of responses to problems in the Grande Ravine community that were brought to the attention of the CHRC

- Modes of learning and collaboration that informed the Grande Ravine CHRC's problem-solving efforts
- Insider-outsider dynamics

The third level of analysis looks at critical events that were important to the formation and development of the Grande Ravine CHRC. These include the initial meeting that led to the organization of the CHRC and turning points such as the death of the CHRC's first president.

The fourth level of analysis involved coding field notes and interview transcripts in four categories: (1) community organizing, (2) community-based learning and knowledge formation, (3) insider-outsider dynamics, and (4) capacity building. These categories emerged in the analysis of critical events. They became relevant to the research because they addressed the research question in such a way that implications could be drawn from the study. Data used in this analysis include interview transcripts and field notes. A detailed discussion of these categories was presented in the review of the literature in Chapter 2. In the analysis of these categories, the theoretical frameworks were used in this final level of analysis: Jennie Smith's *When the Hands Are Many* (2001) on the structures and functions of rural Haitian peasant organizations; Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970); Ludwik Fleck's theory (1935) of *thought collectives*; Luis Moll, Norma Gonzalez, and Cathy Amanti's theory (2005) of *funds of knowledge* as well as Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger's theory (1991) of *situated learning* and *legitimate peripheral participation*.

Conclusion

The analysis for this case study incorporates data sources that are both primary and secondary sources. Both forms of data were used to construct three chronologies of events to frame events so that the investigator could focus on emerging themes and categories as well as organizational behaviors and outcomes. The first and second levels of analysis helped form a historical understanding of events and the initial themes that came from the discussion of these events. These two levels situated the research questions in a complex context. The third level of analysis looks at critical events that were instrumental to the formation and development of the Grande Ravine CHRC. The final level of analysis provided another type of information that was helpful in extrapolating implications.

CHAPTER 4 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PRECEDENTS LEADING TO THE CLIMATE OF INSECURITY AND THE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ATTACKS ON GRANDE RAVINE

This chapter is the first of three chronologies utilized in the first level of data analysis. The purpose of this chronology is to provide a historical and political context for understanding the events that led to the Lame Ti Manchèt massacres in Grande Ravine in 2005 and 2006. Although the history begins decades before many of the perpetrators were even born, the events that preceded Jean-Bertrand Aristide's presidency shaped the responses that led to his overthrow. If anything becomes clear, it is how much Haitian culture and political positions are shaped by this history. For this reason, an extensive overview of this historical context is important to this dissertation.

An overview of the socio-historical and socio-political Haiti begins in 1957 with the François Duvalier's election as president of Haiti. His death brought to power his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, who assumed the presidency in 1971. Characterized as a ruthless dictatorship, the Duvalier regime came to an end in 1986 when Jean-Claude Duvalier was overthrown by a popular revolt led by Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a strong supporter in launching *dechoukaj*, an objective strategy and tactic of what Haitians called the "popular movement." The aim of d*echoukaj* was to rid Haiti of dictatorship, especially the Tontons Macoute, a fearsome paramilitary force created by the Duvaliers. Aristide, formerly a Catholic priest in La Saline, a severely impoverished Port-au-Prince neighborhood, began to earn wide popularity with the poorest and most vulnerable

Haitians. Aristide gained his popularity as an advocate of liberation theology circa 1985-1990 (Woodson, personal communication, 2009). This inevitably led to Aristide's landslide victory.

During Aristide's first term, his administration was credited with improving "the quality of life, economic opportunity, and national infrastructure" (PR Newswire, 9/27/2001) including the building of "400 kilometers of major and minor roads that have opened previously inaccessible agricultural areas [and] construction of 50 artificial lakes stocked with millions of fish revitalizing the aquaculture industry" (PR Newswire, 9/27/2001). In addition, Aristide's administration allocated 20.8% of the national budget to education resulting in a 30% improvement in the literacy rate (PR Newswire, 9/27/2001). Yet, Aristide's entrance into Haitian politics resulted in him being twice elected and twice removed by a coup d'état or rebellion. The second one, which had international support from the United States, Canada, and France, led to the establishment of an interim government in 2004.

Many Haiti observers reported on heightened human rights abuses and complete breakdown of law enforcement after Aristide's departure (Paulvin, 2004; Martin, 2004; Griffin, 2004; Kolbe & Hutson, 2006). As a result, whole areas of Port-au-Prince, like Cité Soleil, remained in a constant state of siege. This was exacerbated by violence from armed groups that were not only trying to gain control of resources but willing to go head to head with MINUSTAH, the UN peacekeeping force whose mission was to keep Haiti from declining into anarchy. The 2004-2007 period was one of the most violent eras

Haiti has ever known. Armed violence, kidnappings, and physical and sexual assaults paralyzed Port-au-Prince (Kolbe & Hutson, 2006; Delva, 2007; Thompson, 2005) where people were often afraid to leave their homes even if they had to go without food to eat. I gathered anecdotal information from Haitians about this period of time. Prior to the study, I made numerous trips to Port-au-Prince, receiving warnings from acquaintances and people in the street about becoming the next kidnap victim. In 2005 and 2006, it was common for people to set their own curfews deciding not to leave their homes or vicinity of their home after dark. It is difficult to say that any one group was responsible for this state of siege. Much depended on the commune, a geo-political subdivision. In Cité Soleil, for example, gangs, or *chimères*, as well as MINUSTAH Peacekeepers were equally responsible for the regular day and night volley of shootings. Kidnappings were primarily associated with gangs and unsuspecting actors.

Among the events described in this chapter are those that have been influenced by the Democratic Convergence and Group 184, leading groups of the anti-Aristide opposition who worked to overthrow the president during his second term. Some high-profile members of Lafanmi Lavalas became easy targets for the U.S. Marines, who had a brief tour of duty in 2004 just after Aristide's departure. For example, folk singer and Lavalas supporter Anne Auguste was recovering from surgery when approximately twenty U.S. Marines broke into her home with full combat gear and arrested her and eight members of her family without a warrant (Hallward, p. 272; Auguste, 7/12/05). Police, former soldiers of the disbanded Haitian army, and *attachés* aligned themselves with anti-Aristide groups. [Note: *Attaché* in Haiti is a French word that means "closely

affiliated [to a police agency or political group] and usually applies to a person" (Woodson, personal communication, 2009).]

Lame Ti Manchèt (LTM) was an attaché group that became associated with the Democratic and Institutional Committee (KID), an anti-Lavalas organization launched by Evans Paul—a former mayor of Port-au-Prince in the 1990s, businessman, co-founder of the Lavalas Movement (circa 1986-1987), and opposition leader (Woodson, personal communication, 2010). On August 20, 2005 at a Play for Peace Tournament sponsored by USAID, members of the Haitian National Police accompanied by Lame Ti Manchèt moved unabated past the MINUSTAH troops who were assigned to provide security for Grande Ravine. Observers, who spoke with journalists and whom I later interviewed, noted that LTM members were identified by the red t-shirts they wore bearing the insignia KID (Hallward, 2008, p. 295). In 2006, LTM struck again just after René Préval was elected president. Many pro-Aristide, pro-Fanmi Lavalas Haitians felt that Préval, once Aristide's protégé and previously elected president in 1996 with his support, might ensure that Grande Ravine was one of the most active pro-Fanmi Lavalas neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince. Therefore, it made sense to quiet ambitions to re-organize the political party and bring Aristide back to Haiti. Resident observers and victims or family members of victims are consistent in their accounts of these events and their own personal experiences, but also verify that LTM members were supported by KID to commit grisly acts for the purpose of suppressing pro-Lavalas activities.

Facts about and interpretations of Haiti's history, particularly events that surrounded Aristide's two presidential terms, are highly contentious. However, I have checked my account of events that occurred during 2004-2007 with other published works about Haiti during this period. This account relies heavily on a study of the escalation of violence by Athena Kolbe and Royce A. Hutson that was published by *The Lancet* (9/2/2006), information from AUMOHD and other human rights organizations including the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, Partners in Health, and Amnesty International as well as my own observations and experiences in Haiti.

The following section looks at the political and historical antecedents to Jean-Bertrand Aristide's rise in popularity, beginning with the Duvalier regime that Aristide and his supporters fought so hard to overturn.

A retrospective of the Duvalier regime

President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier departed Haiti with his wife, Michèle Bennett Duvalier, and their children on February 7, 1986 on a U.S. cargo plane headed for Paris. Jean-Claude's departure officially ended the dynastic Duvalier dictatorship, which lasted for 28 years. On October 27, 1957, François Duvalier took office after what many Haitian and foreign observers considered a rigged election. In 1964 he forced the Haitian Parliament to change the Constitution, making him President-for-Life with the right to name his successor. Francois Duvalier, known as Papa Doc because he was a medical doctor and Minister of Public Health from 1946 to 1950, died on April 21, 1971.

Several months earlier he had named Jean-Claude, his youngest child and only son, his successor.

Papa Doc's stated intentions were to reverse the effects of the American Occupation (1915-1934), which two decades later left Haiti "rotting in poverty, hunger, nudity, sickness, and illiteracy" (Heinl & Heinl, 2005, p. 539). Heinl and Heinl (2005) state, "The Americans had modernized everything but Haiti and the Haitians. By 1957 Haiti had regressed to normal. These were the fruits of the second independence" (p. 539). The first independence proclaimed on January 1, 1804 was the result of the only successful slave revolt (1791-1804) in modern history to result in the creation of an independent state.

According to Heinl and Heinl (2005),

> the elder Duvalier was a bourgeois professional man of modest tastes, innocuous habits, and something of an intellectual, who had held and left office no richer than he started. He was a civilian, no soldier, a fact that immediately endeared him to Washington and to the enlightened men who would soon be shaping the Alliance for Progress. His very dress, always a black suit, white shirt, dark tie, black shoes, and black homburg, together with owlish thick-rimmed eyeglasses, gave him the look of a conservative family practitioner (p. 540).

Duvalier imbued himself with the likeness of Bawon Samdi, a vodou *lwa* (a deity) who lives in the cemeteries and associates most strongly with the souls of the dead, by

wearing dark glasses and adopting the nasal sounding voice often associated with the *lwa*. This was one way for him to create fear and exert control over the public.

Duvalier felt deeply connected to Haitian history and folk culture. As Heinl and Heinl (2005) explain, he "was committed to the proposition that Haiti should wipe away its French veneer and proudly acknowledge its African origins. . . . Rejecting any goal of assimilation into Euro-American cultures, Duvalier was determined that his government would become the political expression of that Africanist mystique, *négritude*" (p. 540), a literary and philosophical movement of French-speaking black writers and intellectuals who called for a return to traditional African values and culture. Heinl and Heinl (2005) describe Duvalier's own articulation of *négritude*:

> He was of course an adept Voodoo, almost certainly an *oungan* [a vodou priest] and, most believed a *bòkò* [a vodou priest that practice both dark and benevolent magic]. In addition, he was deeply versed in the labyrinthine esoterics of spiritualism, astrology, and *onomancie*, a Haitian kind of magical numerology from whose divinations Duvalier became convinced that the number 22 would confer upon him high and sinister powers. Amid these mysteries, he was a student of Machiavelli. . . He admired Nasser, Lenin, and Nkrumah and would subsequently compare himself with Dessalines, Mao Tse-tung, Ataturk, Charles de Gaulle and Christ (p. 540).

Alex Dupuy (2007) describes Duvalier's first six years of office (1957-1964) as a period that "unleashed a reign of terror hitherto unknown on all opponents, real, potential, or

imagined, and on the population in general" (p. 34). No institution or sector of society was untouched by Duvalier's ruthless and draconian measures to maintain absolute control. Dupuy (2007) remarks:

> By 1959, the legislature (the Senate and Chamber of Deputies) had been transformed into mere executors of Duvalier's will. He obtained from the Senate the special powers to rule be decree. Within the first six months of his presidency, he arrested, tortured, killed, exiled, or drove underground the candidates who opposed him during the electoral campaign and their prominent supporters. If a suspected "enemy" of the regime could not be found and arrested, the members of his family, his relatives, his domestic servants—sometimes even his pets or anyone with the same family name—might be arrested and killed instead. Entire families were killed by orders of Duvalier in the early months of the regime's consolidation (p. 34).

Not surprisingly, the media was heavily censored and journalists were subdued by the threat of arrests and torture. Dupuy also adds that publishers and broadcasters who criticized Duvalier's policies found their property destroyed and electricity cut off to prevent them from relaying any unfavorable information about the government. Trade unions were also outlawed as well as independent student organizations. Dupuy states that "faculty and students at the university were henceforth chosen on the basis of their loyalty to the president" (2007, p. 34).

Furthermore, Duvalier transformed and neutralized the Haitian military to prevent the possibility of a coup against him. He shifted power away from the military, according to Dupuy (2007), to replace it with a paramilitary force over which he had greater control. To deter the Haitian Army from challenging presidential authority, Duvalier frequently replaced officers who were loyal to him but were showing signs of independence. The military mirrored class divisions of the society, Dupuy emphasizes, and thus "Duvalier attacked the power base of the mulatto elite by dismissing the entire general staff and the older officers with twenty or more years of service and by arresting others who were known supporters of his presidential rivals" (p. 34). In their place, he would promote younger, mainly black officers who took oaths of personal allegiance to him. This move allowed him to get rid of nearly all of the mulatto "old guard" officers who backed the mulatto elite. He also appointed rural section chiefs who would be devoted to only him, taking over a role assigned to the army chief of staff since the American Occupation (p. 34-35).

Duvalier did not believe that it would be sufficient to replace the hierarchy of the military. Dupuy (2007) states that he created another armed force under his personal control that would guarantee his absolute power be a "counterforce to the military" (p. 35). Thus, in mid-1958, within a year of Duvalier's inauguration, he created a paramilitary organization that answered directly to the National Palace. Heinl and Heinl describe the organization as bearing similarities to the brown shirts in Germany because it was empowered to "offset the military and . . . provide an activist Duvalier political

cadre throughout the country" (2005, p. 549). Heinl and Heinl go on to explain how this paramilitary group evolved into the infamous and deadly Tonton Macoute:

> The organization was built on the Port-au-Prince *cagoulards* [hooded men who were Duvalier's private military group during his presidential campaign] and those rural headmen, the *chef seksyon*, whose appointment, until 1958 a long-standing army prerequisite, had been quietly taken in hand as a function of the palace. . . [T]wo chains of authority into the back country [were credited] – one, the army's, the other, the president's. As the *cagoulards* came out into the open, people soon began to call them *tonton macoutes* or just "TTM"'. . . . They were subsequently described in the *New Republic* as follows: "A *Tonton Macoute* is a Duvalier activist. In 99 cases out of 100 he is black. The civilian TTM can be recognized by his sharp clothes, dark glasses, pearl-gray homburg and bulge of a pistol on his hip. . . . This man is an informer, neighborhood boss, extortioner, bully, and political pillar of the regime" (2005, p. 549).

According to Smucker (1983), François Duvalier's Code Rural of 1964 required "the creation of local administrative councils to assume civilian governance over every rural section through principles of community action" (pp. 378-379). Smith (2001) notes that although this may have appeared to be a move towards greater autonomy for local communities, Duvalier most likely had the opposite intentions. Thus, the creation of *konsèy kominotè* (or community councils) in the early 1960s was one of many initiatives to widen surveillance and control in the rural communities while increasing the

centralization of power in the capital (p. 148). These councils came into existence just as Duvalier's infamous Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale (National Security Volunteers) began to flourish throughout the countryside (p. 148). The first task Duvalier gave these councils, Smith notes, was to "clear brush for footpaths" in Bamònn, Jérémie, and other towns in the south so that his troops would be better able to drive out the *kamoken* rebels he thought were living in the mountains and plotting revolution (2001, p. 148).

A legacy challenged

François Duvalier's impending death led to a constitutional amendment that would ensure that his 19-year-old son, Jean-Claude (Baby Doc), would succeed his father as president for life in April 1971 (Dupuy, 2007, p. 42). He followed in Papa Doc's footsteps by maintaining a fearsome dictatorship; however, he diverged from his father's style by focusing on an economic phase of governance that had not yet been fulfilled. Baby Doc's regime welcomed the black nationalist bourgeoisie and middle class as well as the mulatto bourgeoisie, and foreign capital (p. 42-43). But Jean-Claude Duvalier's accession to power resulted in conflicts between his administration and old guard "Duvalierists" loyal to his father and intent on maintaining "the nationalist thrust of the regime" (p. 44). According to Dupuy (2007), Baby Doc's acceptance of the mulatto bourgeoisie created a dynamic that would ultimately weaken his regime:

> The alliance between the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier and the bourgeoisie meant that the regime had to abandon the strident black nationalist discourse that solidified the dictatorship of François Duvalier among the black nationalist

> faction of the middle class. Thus, the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier undermined its own base of support among the black middle class and gave rise to divisions between the "old" and the "new" guards. This loss of support among the black middle class also meant that the old methods of repression used by the father and justified by the black nationalist cause against the "mulatto threat" could no longer be applied effectively by the son. Equally as important, Jean-Claude Duvalier began to lose support within the ranks of the Duvalierist military officer corps, and reported threats of a coup d'état further weakened the regime (p. 53)

Jean-Claude Duvalier's regime had largely served the interests of the bourgeoisie through its suppression of labor and peasant movements. Yet, the dictatorship continued to face criticism and loss of credibility from the same bourgeoisie, which chose to distance itself from him. Mounting criticism also came from the Catholic Church. Dupuy (2007) recounts that "Pope John Paul II himself encouraged the Church's opposition to the Duvalier regime during his visit to Haiti in 1983 by denouncing the regime's violence and declaring that 'things must change in Haiti'" (p. 53). Dupuy explains that the Church opened the way for its most progressive sectors to contest the Duvalier regime and hold it accountable for its corruption and repression of dissidents. Most notably, the Church paved the way for proponents of liberation theology and participants in an ecclesiastical community movement known in Haiti as the *Ti Legliz* (Little Church) "to assail the dictatorship (and the entire system of exploitation that it presupposed) and to express their 'preferential option for the poor'" (p. 53). This open

support for the oppressed and the impoverished by a segment of the Catholic church played a critical role in advancing the political consciousness and mobilization of the masses (p. 53).

Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure from Haiti on February 7, 1986 delighted most Haitians; however, the end of the regime did not bring with it the end of the Tonton Macoute and Duvalierists. Alex Dupuy (2007) argues, "From the fall of the hereditary Duvalier regime in February 1986 until March 1990, Haiti experienced an unparalleled political crisis marked by the rise and fall of four military-dominated governments and an unrelenting popular struggle for a democratic alternative" (p. 57). *Dechoukaj* was among the popular movements that took hold after the fall of the Duvalier regime. The Haitian Creole word means "to uproot" as you would a tree to clear a field to plant. *Dechoukaj* was the word used to describe the violent movement against the Tontons Macoute that followed Duvalier's downfall, and, more generally, to describe the necessity of ridding the country of Duvalierism (p.53).

Wilentz (1989) acknowledges that no one actually knows how many Macoutes were killed in the *Dechoukaj* in early 1986, although she believes it could have exceeded a hundred (pp. 49-53). However, she reports that Haiti's military National Government Councils protected "the bigger fish," including the mayors of towns, section chiefs, and well-known Macoutes from Port-au-Prince, by rescuing them from furious crowds and taking them to prison under police escort. Others were allowed to leave the country. In fact, Wilentz states that it was rumored that Madame Rosalie Adolphe, head of the

Tonton Macoute, left Haiti disguised as an ailing nun on a stretcher (p. 53). Many historians believe that it was the effectiveness of the *Dechoukaj* that ultimately led to the presidential victory of the young Catholic liberation theologist, Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990. It sufficiently suppressed Duvalierism, after Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure, so that a new leader could join the ranks of Leslie F. Manigat (1987) and Ertha Pascal Trouillot (1990) as the next populist president of Haiti.

To launch Aristide's candidacy for the presidency in 1990, he joined The National Front for Democracy and Change (FNCD), a political coalition comprised of "progressive, left-of-center, middle-class intelligentsia" (Dupuy, 2007, p. xv). Dupuy explains, "The FNCD had been the spearhead of opposition to the neo-Duvalierist forces who tried unsuccessfully to reimpose a military dictatorship during the five years that followed the overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986" (2007, p. xv). Lacking his own political party, Aristide ran for the presidency under the banner of FNCD (Dupuy, 2007, p. xv).

Jean-Bertrand Aristide launches a new era

On December 16, 1990 Jean-Bertrand Aristide won a landslide victory with 67% of the presidential vote. The election was particularly remarkable for its universal suffrage and high voter turnout (*U.S. News & World Report*, 1990, p. 14). Aristide's victory was described by Hallward (2007) as one of the measures used to judge the success of the Dechoukaj Movement. Hallward (2007) claims that the resistance to Duvalier's instruments of oppression grew steadily over the 1980s, "nurtured by small,

informal organizations—*organisations populaires*—which emerged to defend their communities and to help arrange some of the basic social services that the state was unwilling or unable to provide" (p. 15). He adds that hundreds of these organizations "developed in tandem with new community-based church groups" (2007, p. 15) affiliated with the *ti legliz*. These church groups were inspired by liberation theology, breaking from the traditional conservative Catholic Church in the late 1970s (p. 15).

Hallward describes this preferential option as an agenda informed by the revolutionary principles of liberation theology and noted for its "affirmation of the dignity and equality of the people, and a critique of the wealth, corruption, and brutality of the elite" (2007, pp. 16-17). This mobilization, he claims, would require the lasting demobilization of the army. Drexel Woodson differs with this statement and explains that the Haitian Army was not demobilized in December 1990 as indicated by Hallward (Woodson, personal communication, 2010). Woodson states that "in fact, the Army defended Jean-Bertrand Aristide's election by suppressing an attempted Duvalierist coup by Gérard Laffontant in January 1991" (Woodson, personal communication, 2010). This demobilization seemed to be successful enough for Aristide to capture the presidency in 1990. One of Aristide's supporters was cited in *The New York Guardian* a day after the election as stating, "We know Father Aristide has been elected because neither the Macoutes nor the Army were able to stop the elections. Those were the only threats to Aristide, not any of the other candidates" (pp. 16-17).

The election was one of the most momentous occasions in Haiti's history because it illustrated the power of the poor and the ability of the most impoverished Haitians to change the course of history to their benefit (Hallward, 2007, p. 32). This mobilization was initiated not only by Aristide himself, but numerous grassroots popular organizations throughout Haiti. Hallward (2007) quotes radio journalist Jean Dominique:

> To feel linked . . . with *millions* of people, millions of people who could feel for one second—one second in a century, one second in light-years, but still for one precious and wonderful second—this sense of being *together*, of doing things together, of moving forward together with them: I think it was a wonderful experience, the most wonderful of my life (p. 32).

Aristide's victory brought hope to the vast majority of Haitians that real change was within reach and that three decades of *makoutisme* would be overturned in every respect. Fatton (2007) states that "for Ti Legliz [a radical wing of the Catholic Church] and the vast majority of Haitians, real change demanded a massive social, political, and economic transformation" (p. 196). President Aristide's message embodied "the hopes and aspirations of the *moun andeyo* [people living in the countryside or poor peasants]" (p. 197). However, Fatton (2007) describes how quickly Aristide's first presidential term came under fire:

> Embracing liberation theology and its "preferential option of the poor," Aristide was bent on turning the world upside down. He exposed the gigantic class divide separating Haitians, preached that *tout moun se moun*—all human beings are

> human beings—and advocated extraparliamentary methods of popular rule. He soon discovered, however, that Haiti's dominant class found this brand of politics to be thoroughly unacceptable. In September 1991, barely seven months after his presidential inauguration, Aristide was overthrown in a bloody coup and forced into exile (p. 197).

A violent and repressive military dictatorship under the control of General Raoul Cédras, de facto president of Haiti, assumed power from 1991 to 1994 while Aristide remained in exile. During this time, Aristide still managed to hold onto "his domestic popularity and to mobilize international public opinion against the junta" (Fatton, 2007, p. 197). A series of negotiations failed between the Aristide government in exile and the Cédras de facto government. Therefore, the United States sent 20,000 troops in a joint effort with the United Nations to remove the de facto regime and to reinstate Aristide as the president on October 15, 1994, leaving him with only two years before the end of his term (Fatton, 2007, p. 197). In 1995, Aristide's government brought down the military responsible for the 1991 coup. Funding for the Haitian Army ended and it ceased to officially exist (Fatton, 2007, p. 197).

Aristide's Lafanmi Lavalas

After the Dechoukaj successfully uprooted the Tonton Macoute, Aristide spearheaded another movement called Lavalas. "Lafanmi Lavalas, a political party, was [later] formed during 1995 or even 1996 when Lavalas, a populist movement, began to splinter" (D. Woodson, personal communication, April 10, 2009). In spite of the

divisions that would follow, Lavalas' achievements were certainly notable under the Aristide and Préval administration. Aristide's mandate expired on schedule in 1996 (Hallward, 2007, p. 62). He then put his support behind his administration's former prime minister, René Préval, who would become his successor on February 7, 1996 (Hallward, 2007, pp. 62-63).

Préval served his first term as president from 1996 to 2001, working closely with Aristide to realize achievements in education, literacy, health care, child care, and other policy arenas. Peter Hallward notes some of these achievements in *Damming the Flood* (2007), arguing that education provides the greatest possibility for most Haitians to improve their economic positions. During the Préval and Aristide administrations, Hallward reports, more than 195 new primary schools were built along with 104 new secondary schools. Prior to this, there were only 34 secondary schools throughout Haiti. Illiteracy fell roughly 20% from 65% to around 45%. Aristide also opened a new university in Tabarre, which was shut down after the 2004 coup when the U.S. troops appropriated the school grounds as a military base.

Another achievement associated with Aristide's and Préval's administrations is the renovation of health clinics and hospitals (Hallward, 2007, pp. 134-135). A cooperative venture with Paul Farmer's Zanmi Lasante led to substantial improvements in government health facilities in several parts of the country. In addition, Aristide's government worked out an agreement with Cuba to have some 800 Cuban doctors and nurses come to Haiti and join its force of less than 1,000. Improvements in maternity

wards and prenatal programs added to this list of achievements. Finally, new programs designed to combat infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS were particularly successful, and Haiti became one of three countries to win grants from the UN Global Funds for AIDS, TB, and malaria (Hallward, 2007, pp. 134-135). With overwhelming popular support and successes in education and health, one has to ask how Aristide managed to lose his political base.

Aristide alienates his political base

Alex Dupuy's *The Prophet and Power* (2007) seeks to explain the paradoxes of conflicts among Lavalas and Aristide's supporters who gradually moved away from their leader--particularly during his second term, which began in 2001 but ended prematurely in 2004.

By the end of Aristide's first term on February 7, 1996, Dupuy (2007) notes a permanent rupture between the FNCD (the party whose slate Aristide ran on in 1990) and Aristide himself. This rupture signified the beginning of the end of Aristide's political career. Although the rift developed during Aristide's first term as president, the FNCD opposed the military junta and fought for his return in 1994 (Dupuy, 2007, p. xv). Dupuy explains:

> By 1996 . . . it was not only former allies within the FNCD who broke with Aristide and his Lavalas movement. The core cadres of the Lavalas movement who had formed the Lavalas Political Organization (OPL) within the Lavalas Political Platform coalition and who dominated parliament in 1995 also parted

> ways with Aristide and renamed their party the Organization of the People in Struggle (OPL). Aristide then formed his own Lavalas Family (FL) party and henceforth became OPL's bitter rival. But the FNCD and the OPL did not just become Aristide's and FL's opponents who sought to challenge him democratically. Rather, in 2000 they would join with neo-Duvalierists, who were their bitter enemies in 1986-94, and other centrist and right-of-center parties to form the Democratic Convergence coalition fostered by the International Republican Institute and supported by the most zealous and right-wing elements of the Republican Party and the George W. Bush administration to oppose and undermine Aristide's second presidency (2007, p. xv).

Dupuy (2007) adds that by 2000, Aristide had jettisoned his radical liberation theology and attempted to accommodate the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the pressures of globalization. USAID and the World Bank have also been instrumental in forcing Aristide to abandon his populist agenda. To explain their impact on Aristide's administration and Haiti, itself, Hallward (p. 8, 2008) cites an analyst for the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute:

> [T]he Haitian government is trapped. On the one hand, it must please foreign donors or risk losing the aid it needs to jump start the economy and avoid a further sharp decline in living conditions. On the other, it must satisfy the aspirations of the poor majority of Haitians for a better life. Unfortunately, whatever its purely economic merit, the USAID/World Bank/IMF prescription

> will almost certainly lead to more hardship in the short run, and probably a lot longer than that. . . As a result, one should expect growing frustration and probably rising violence. While most of the latter will take the form of common crime, some will be political (Shulz, 1996, pp. 12-13).

Hallward enumerates a number of IMF recommendations that were presumably going to cure Haiti's desperate poverty: "Further reductions in wages that had already sunk to starvation levels, privatization of the state sector, reorientation of domestic production in favour of cash crops popular in North American supermarkets and the elimination of import tariffs" (2007, p. 31). Hallward adds that among these imposed reforms was a 50% tariff cut that allowed American rice imports to flood the Haitian market, resulting in the disappearance of one of Haiti's most important domestic crops. As a result of this and other reforms imposed by IMF, agricultural production was decimated leaving only light manufacturing and assembly viable (2007, p. 31). Another outcome of the agrarian collapse was the move of rural migrants in 1995-1996 from the countryside to Port-au-Prince where they could at least try to earn a living through street vending and manual labor (Woodson, personal communication, April 10, 2009). Woodson explains, "Haitian rural-urban migration began in the 1950s, accelerated circa 1960-1986, and 'spurted' again in the mid-1990s. Although the fact of high populations in Port-au-Prince (and other cities) is widely reported, few researcher have carefully studied the immigrants' motivations or origins (Woodson, personal communication, 2010).

In spite of Aristide's initial reluctance to accept the IMF recommendations, Dupuy (2007) maintains his left-of-center approach contributed to the rift with OPL. Aristide's policy shift created almost a type of schizophrenic response by acquiescing to rather than resisting the IMF. Although Aristide's approach to governance became embroiled in the reality of globalization, he still adhered to a personal commitment that others were no longer buying. According to Dupuy (2007), Aristide maintained "a rhetorical commitment to the poor and a left-of-center perspective" (p. 143) that he saw as being no different than the other positions of social democratic parties whose leaders had once been allies. But clearly some break in philosophy or policy was apparent by 2000 when all of these parties and the intellectual cadres of Lavalas broke with Aristide, leaving the movement altogether or spearheading Aristide's opposition. The Haitian private-sector bourgeoisie, which had despised Aristide since the 1990 presidential campaign, gave its support to the Democratic Convergence (CD) in an effort to topple Aristide. George W. Bush's administration also distrusted and disliked Aristide but for slightly different reasons. Aristide would not fully implement the neoliberal policies he originally agreed to in 1994, which included the privatization of all public enterprises. As a result, the Bush administration blocked foreign aid to Haiti after Aristide's re-election in 2000 (Dupuy, 2007, p. 143).

Neo-Duvalierists and centrists challenge Aristide's presidency

The Democratic Convergence (CD), a coalition of neo-Duvalierists and centrists as well as those parties that were just to the right-of-center, was financed and supported by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Bush administration to undermine

and eventually overturn Aristide's second presidency. Hallward (2007), Robinson (2007), Fatton (2007), and Farmer (2007) concur with Dupuy (2007) about the course of Haitian politics during Aristide's second term and immediately after his forced resignation in February 2004. Dupuy argues that the Democratic Convergence in collaboration with the IRI and the Bush administration rallied "behind the former members of the Haitian Army and its paramilitary death squads to force Aristide out of power in 2004, and they would embrace the unconstitutional and illegitimate interim government of Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, whose primary objective was to crush what remained of the Lavalas party and Aristide's armed supporters" (2007, p. xvi).

In December 2002, another anti-Aristide coalition was formed called Group 184. It was comprised of 184 different organizations and institutions. It was led by André (Andy) Apaid and his brother-in-law, Charles Henri Baker, both wealthy businessmen. Blumenthal (2004) notes that the IRI was also instrumental in forming the Group of 184, which received financial backing from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the European Union, most likely assisted by France after Aristide demanded reparations of $21.7 billion dollars from the indemnity Haiti had been forced to pay its former colonizer after independence in 1804. Many Haitian organizations in the CD were also members of Group 184, and vice versa. However, Blumenthal (2004) identifies a subtle difference in the leadership of Group 184 in which he notes a "constitutional wing" that "emphasized protests and diplomacy as the path to forcing Aristide out, and a hard line faction quietly determined to oust Aristide by any

means necessary. The constitutionalists were represented by Group 184 spokesman . . . Andre Apaid Jr." (Blumenthal, 2004).

Another coup d'état in the making

On May 7, 2003, evidence began to surface regarding the planning of a coup d'état. Dominican authorities arrested five Haitians near the border at a planning meeting to overthrow Aristide (Dupuy, 2007, p.165). Among the five men was Guy Philippe, the Haitian rebel leader who was previously in the now-disbanded army and a former police chief in Cap-Haitien (BBC News, March 4, 2004). They were eventually released for lack of evidence, but this did not stop them from executing plans to destabilize Haiti—one section at a time. On the same day, more than twenty armed men attacked and disabled the main electrical plant in Péligre and killed two workers (Dupuy, 2007, p. 165). Guy Philippe would emerge as one of the central figures in the armed rebellion that many Haitians believe was an organized coup d'état with foreign support (at least from the United States) and well-funded nongovernmental coalitions such as the Haitian Democracy Project (Dupuy, 2007, p. 165). In response to these increased pressures, Dupuy notes, "Aristide sought to suppress his opponents, and they engaged in acts of violence against Aristide supporters. As a result, human rights abuses worsened, and the government became even more isolated" (p. 165).

By this time, Aristide had been negotiating a three-year congressional impasse centering around the legitimacy of the congressional elections, where Lavalas candidates won an overwhelming majority of the seats in Parliament (Dupuy, 2007, p. 165). Dupuy

states that Aristide promised to schedule new elections by the end of 2003 so that a government would be in place by January 1, 2004, Haiti's Bicentennial (p. 165). However, the U.S. insisted that it would not recognize any means of resolving this impasse without the CD's full participation (2007, p. 165). Dupuy describes a deadlock at a time when insecurity in the country was escalating and creating greater doubt about the Aristide government's survival (p. 166). As a resolution appeared to be nowhere in sight, violence and human rights abuses by government supporters and opponents alike escalated unabated (p. 166). A 2003 Amnesty International report cited by Dupuy showed that the police and the pro-Lavalas armed groups (often referred to as c*himères*) were responsible for most of the violence and human rights violations (p. 166). But, the opposition and the former soldiers of the disbanded army, too, had also committed their share of deadly violence (Amnesty International 2003 cited in Dupuy, 2007, p. 166).

September 2003 marked another turning point in questioning of Aristide's ability to govern, and Haiti seemed to be on the brink of a civil war with the Bicentennial celebration just around the corner. A quote from Dupuy's (2007) *The Prophet and Power*, though lengthy, presents a chronology and a description of particularly complex events:

> It is in the context that the significance of the uprising of a gang of *chimès* [the Haitian Creole spelling for *chimères*] formerly allied with Aristide in September 2003 is to be understood. That uprising not only revealed the . . . character of the *chimès* and their relationship with Aristide but was also the opening salvo that led

to the second overthrow of Aristide. On September 22, 2003, Amiot Métayer was found murdered an hour away from the seaside slum of Raboteau in the northwestern city of Gonaïves, where he was a strongman and pro-Aristide militant who gave out jobs at the port authority that he and his brother Buter controlled. As Jane Regan puts it, the "story behind Métayer's murder and Raboteau's revolt offers a glimpse at an ugly underbelly of Lavalas politics, a fragile formula where gangs rule the streets" (12/12/03).

Métayer was a Lavalas activist since the post-coup period of 1991. Forced into exile after the Raboteau massacre of 1994 by the Front Révolutionnaire Pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haïtien (FRAPH) [a so-called political organization that received logistical and reportedly financial support from the CIA], he returned to Haiti in late 1994 and became a staunch Aristide supporter until 2002. Arrested in 2002 after intense international pressure on the government, he was subsequently broken out of prison by members of his *Armée Canibale* (Cannibal Army). Despite renewed pressure from the United States, OAS, and human rights groups to rearrest Métayer, who had been accused of lynching an opposition party member on December 17, 2001, after the attack on the National Palace, the government refused. He left his stronghold of Raboteau on September 21 with a well-known former government employee, and when his bullet-ridden body and mutilated face were found the next day, violent protests and clashes with the police erupted in Raboteau. Buter Métayer charged Aristide with the murder, calling it treason. The reason for Amiot's assassination, Buter and Winter

> Etienne, a spokesman for the Cannibal Army, maintained, was that he knew too much about the inner workings of the National Palace and was about to reveal some facts about the assassination of Jean Dominique who was a very popular radio journalist. Buter Métayer and his followers vowed not to stop the uprising by their "army" until Aristide was overthrown (Regan, 12/12/03; Caroit 2003) (Dupuy, 2007, p. 166).

Although the preceding allegations detail events that led to Amiot (also known as Cubain) Métayer's murder and the beginnings of the anti-Aristide uprising in Gonaïves, many questions are left unanswered, including the identity of the murderer. Peter Hallward (2007) recalls that just two days after Aristide's meeting with U.S. Ambassador James Foley, Amiot Métayer was murdered in a brutal manner so heinous as to provoke the greatest outrage. No one has been charged with the murder, and to this day "his death remains one of the biggest mysteries of the entire coup sequence" (Hallward, 2007, p. 204). For the opposition, however, Aristide was responsible for Amiot's death. This suspicion also turned Amiot's gang against the government, which ultimately led to the gang's direct participation in the armed rebellion. According to Concannon, a U.S. human rights attorney, "the most likely motive for the killing was not political, but drugs" (Hallward, 2007, p. 205). Hallward, responding to lack of proof for any explanation, concludes with the question: "Who stood to gain by this murder, in the autumn of 2003, of a tried and tested Aristide loyalist?'' (p. 205).

Jean Tatoune, a notorious leader of FRAPH, the paramilitary organization responsible for the 1994 Raboteau massacres in Gonaïves, soon turned the Cannibal Army, Amiot's gang, into an extension of his new organization, FLRN (*Front pour la Líberation et la Reconstruction Nationale*). According to Hallward, the FLRN was funded by less visible elements in the U.S. government who were actively arranging the small Contra-style group of rebels in 2001 to destabilize Haiti enough to force Aristide out of office in 2003 and to disempower Lavalas (p. 119). Hallward (2007) provides details about the sequence of events in Gonaïves, a city in northern Haiti that was once a pro-Aristide stronghold. The actors mentioned in this quote became deeply involved in the rebellion that forced Aristide out of office in 2004:

> From September 2003 right through to early February 2004, the rate of minor but unnerving hit-and-run attacks on local government facilities and supporters dramatically increased. According to Reuters and AHP reports, two policemen and seven civilians were shot in demonstrations led by Tatoune on 24 and 25 September. Another policeman and a child were shot on 29 September, and a couple of houses were burned; on the same day Buteur Métayer called for "the establishment of a united front between the Democratic Convergence, the Group of 184, the Civil Society Initiative and his own organization to oust the elected authorities." Two days later Tatoune's men burned three government offices, . . . took control of most of Raboteau and through sustained intimidation managed to bludgeon at least part of the population into accepting his new affiliation. Despite repeated attempts to arrest him and a $17,000 reward for his capture, the police

> were never able to put Tatoune back in jail. Police searches for Tatoune sparked gun battles that may have killed five or six people in early October. Later in the month, Tatoune's fellow Cannibal Winter Etienne announced the gang's intention to mount attacks against all government officials in the Gonaïves police station: three policemen were injured and an adolescent was killed in the crossfire. The following day independent radio station Radio Vision 2000 broadcast the Cannibal's intention to push the country towards "civil war." More shootings followed on 28 November, 1 December, 2 December, and 4 December. On 2 December Tatoune's men torched the town hall; later they would burn dozens of homes and vehicles belonging to government officials or FL [Fanmi Lavalas] supporters. Another person was killed and several others wounded in a gun battle on 11 December. On 6 January 2004 Buteur announced the imminent massacre of all FL supporters in Gonaïves: "No supporter of Fanmi Lavalas will be spared by the opposition hordes" (Hallward, 2007, p. 206).

By Hallward's (2007) count, forty to fifty people, mostly supporters of Aristide, were killed between the end of September 2003 and the end of January 2004 by Cannibal attacks in Gonaïves and FLRN raids that had occurred across the Central Plateau region (p. 206).

Demonstrations: Evidence of a divided country

Increasingly more and more demonstrations were being held throughout Haiti, especially in Port-au-Prince during 2003-2004. They were organized by both Aristide

supporters and the opposition groups and often turned out hundreds if not thousands of protesters. The first demonstration that I observed was on December 26, 2003, along Rue Cadet in Carrefour Feuilles, a Port-au-Prince neighborhood, near the guest house where I was staying. The purpose of my visit was to observe events for the Haitian Bicentennial on January 1, 2004. Having arrived a week before the Bicentennial, I observed a very large parade of demonstrators, appearing to be in the thousands, pass by my guest house. The demonstration had begun in Champs-de-Mars, a large plaza located across from the National Plaza. The demonstrators represented the position of opposition groups, the side streets were filled with young men who reside in Lavalas strongholds such as Cité Soleil, Bel Air, and Martissant (where Grande Ravine is located). Although demonstrators exchanged taunts, the demonstration remained relatively peaceful.

New Year's Day and Haiti's bicentennial

On January 1, 2004, the day of the Haitian Bicentennial, Floritant and I went to Champs-de-Mars to see if we could observe any of the celebratory events. Although Aristide supporters were everywhere, there definitely seemed to be something missing—Aristide as well as the presence of journalists and the international community. Had they already left for Gonaïves for Aristide's Bicentennial speech? It seemed strange that Aristide would choose Gonaïves to make his speech since there was so much tension and risk involved with his presence and the potential for conflict between the opposition groups and those considered pro-Lavalas. However, it was clear that Aristide had stepped outside the National Palace to greet the public and to give a Bicentennial speech.

The fence that surrounded the stands in front of the Palace had been knocked down by the crowd's excitement. Within minutes, I encountered hundreds of people running frantically down the street to board one of five or more buses leaving for Gonaïves. All appearing to be supporters of Aristide, they were about to witness his momentous speech.

The Champs-de-Mars was full of vendors and revelers. One of them ran up to me and gave me an orange t-shirt with printing on the front: *1804 Un Bicentenaire de Liberté Pour un Millénaire de Paix 2004*. On the back was a classic portrait of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide smiling with his hand placed slightly under his chin and his index finger resting under his lower lip. I offered to pay for the t-shirt, but the man who gave it to me refused. He appeared to be looking for support for a president whose political position was evidently slipping. With the t-shirt draped around my shoulders, I continued to walk through the park until stopped by three young men sitting on a curb. They insisted that I put the t-shirt on and have my photo taken with them. Both instances seemed to indicate that it was important for some Haitians to have a foreigner, or *blan*, accept their embattled leader on this particularly important and symbolic occasion.

Soup joumou: A tradition representing freedom and independence

Given the tensions between the Lavalas and opposition groups, I was a little nervous wearing the t-shirt, so I accepted the invitation of a friend to visit his aunt who had prepared *soup joumou* (pumpkin soup), a traditional Haitian New Year's dish that has a special significance on Independence Day. During slavery, only the French colonists were allowed to eat this soup, which was prepared by slaves for special occasions. On

January 1, 1804, the Haitian people, the vast majority whom were former slaves or relatives of slaves, celebrated independence and the New Year with a huge pot of pumpkin soup (Charles, jcharles@herald.com, retrieved 2/17/2010). Today Haitians prepare the soup as a reminder of the injustices their ancestors overcame and the declaration that Haitians will never again suffer physical or ideological domination (Charles, jcharles@herald.com, retrieved 2/17/2010). Partaking of this delicious soup each year, also reminds Haitians that the fight against injustice and domination is far from over.

The February 2004 rebel uprising

While many Haitians were celebrating the month of their country's Bicentennial, the Cannibal Army and Guy Philippe's paramilitary group, FRAPH, had been plotting on the best way to spread their armed rebellion. They occupied and controlled major cities and towns in three departments—the North, the Artibonite, and the Center—as they moved closer to Port-au-Prince, intending to put pressure on Aristide. Hallward (2007) describes this alliance of criminals, death-squadders and former soldiers who, along with Winter Etienne and former Aristide supporters, such as Evans Paul, launched a pivotal operation called "liberate Haiti from the dictator Aristide" on February 5, 2004 just five months after the uprising in Raboteau. Hallward (2007) describes the unfolding events that many thought led to the demise of Aristide's second presidency:

> Armed with assault weapons and aided by at least twenty former soldiers, Tatoune's gang finally managed to overwhelm the long-suffering Gonaïves police

> force in a three-hour gun battle, and forced them out of the city. They burned the police station and, in keeping with a time-honoured tactic for gaining new recruits, released the 100 or so inmates from the city jail; they also torched houses belonging to the mayor and other FL [Fanmi Lavalas] officials. Flushed with its success, the Cannibal Army renamed itself the Revolutionary Artibonite Resistance Front. Two days later (7 February), in the single most important engagement of the entire insurgency, a combination of Etienne's Gonaïves rebels and Philippe's ex-soldiers ambushed a substantial though inept police counterattack, killing seven officers. They were now the undisputed masters of a terrified city. Winter Etienne proclaimed himself mayor of Gonaïves, and Buteur Métayer took the title of "provisional president of Haiti" (though by the end of February, as he slid further into the alcoholic stupor that would kill him in 2005, he settled for the title of "president of Gonaïves" instead). The rebels went on to take Hinche on 16 February and Cap-Haïtien on 22 February. By 27 February they appeared to control most of the northern half of the country, and parts of the south and south-west as well (Hallward, 2007, p. 210).

According to Dupuy (2007), the rebels played right into the hands of the Democratic Convergence (CD) and the Group 184 (p. 168). Blumenthal (2004) states that the CD's hard-liners "tapped Guy Philippe. . . to lead a band of insurgents consisting almost entirely of exiled members of FRAPH death squads and former soldiers of the Haitian army." Dupuy (2007) discusses events in early February, right around the same

time that the Cannibal Army began its insurgency, an event that appears to be one of the final acts that forced Aristide out of office:

> Philippe and his band of some 200 insurgents crossed the border into Haiti from their refuge in the Dominican Republic, and they would immediately supplant the anti-Lavalas gangs that had sparked the rebellion to become the principal force against Aristide. As the new rebel forces gained control of several major cities in the north and northwest of the capital and made their advance toward Port-au-Prince, they forced Aristide to leave Haiti on February 29, 2004. (p. 168)

But, the rebels, including Guy Philippe, didn't arrive in Port-au-Prince until several days after Aristide's departure. So questions remain: Did the rebels force Aristide to leave? Did he willfully resign to avoid a bloodbath in Port-au-Prince? Or did international intervention by the U.S., France, and Canada end Aristide's second term?

A forced resignation?

By February 26, as the rebels were making their way to the capital, the United States issued a call for Aristide's resignation. The American concern was that a bloodbath would surely ensue if the rebels were allowed to reach Port-au-Prince with Aristide still in power. What transpired late February 28 and the early hours of February 29 will always be a contentious moment in Haiti's history, leaving historians to wonder whether Aristide resigned the presidency or the United States forced him to resign. There appears to be more evidence and documentation indicating that Aristide was forced out by the United States. They evidence includes phone conversations that Randall

Robinson, founder and president of TransAfrica Forum; Congresswoman Maxine Waters; and other individuals had with Aristide on the evening of February 28 when he declared that he was Haiti's legitimate president and that he would continue to serve in that capacity. Robinson (2007), who had been in contact with Aristide throughout the day on February 28, described in his book *An Unbroken Agony* the eeriness of the last call to Aristide before he was taken out of Haiti. There was also a strange disruption of phone conversations when an American voice took the phone call and disallowed further conversations with Aristide.

Hallward (2007) also calls this supposed resignation into question and recalls Aristide stating in interviews with reporters and others who heard first-hand from him that he had no intention of stepping down. Hallward notes that there are a few awkward problems with the U.S. version of events that led to Aristide's resignation. The first discrepancy is the assumption that Aristide's decision to resign was a matter of free choice, which happened to occur with "remarkable solicitude and haste" when all through February 2004 he was quite outspoken about his decision not to resign but to serve out the remainder of his term (Hallward, 2007, pp. 235-236). An interview by Jim Lehrer, anchor of the Public Broadcasting System's "The News Hour," supported Hallward's suspicions just two nights before Aristide's resignation. According to Hallward,

> On Thursday 26 February, Jim Lehrer interviewed *The New York Times* reporter Lydia Polgreen. She confirmed that "Aristide has made every indication that he plans to stay in power. He has made absolutely no statement other than he plans

> to remain president of Haiti. . . There are no signs whatsoever [that this might be negotiable] from my conversations with people close to him. He is not making any plans to exit. Aristide corroborated this in an interview with CNN that same night, in which he again insisted that he would never resign nor bow to another coup d'état: "We need now to respect the constitutional order, and I will leave the palace on February 7, 2006" (2007, pp. 235-236).

Aristide's close allies and confidants continued to support his argument. One of Aristide's guards recalls that at 2 a.m. on February 29, he heard people inside Aristide's home making preparations with an urgency and haste that gave him the impression that U.S. Ambassador James Foley, his deputy Luis Moreno, and two U.S. special operations military men told Aristide and his wife that they would be taking them to the U.S. Embassy where he would be making a TV broadcast. With not much more than the clothes on their backs, the President and First Lady were taken to the airport instead and forced to leave Haiti for the Central African Republic (Robinson, 2007; Chomsky, Farmer & Goodman, 2004).

Hallward (2007) calls attention to the curious secrecy under which the U.S. conducted this operation, especially in light of the fact that the U.S. insisted that Aristide's resignation was voluntary and free of any coercion. Why, Hallward asks, did "the US . . . arrange it in utter secrecy, in the middle of the night, apparently in the absence of any cameras or reporters or any sort of independent witness who might later have been able to confirm its self-evidently voluntary qualities to a (predictably?)

suspicious Haitian electorate" (p. 237). Hallward also reports that lawyer Brian Concannon has analyzed the resignation letter and noted that its awkward wording gives the impression that this was a document written and signed under coercion (p. 238).

According to Lydia Polgreen and Tim Weiner of *The New York Times* (2/29/2004), the news of Aristide's departure created an emotional outpouring:

> Although officials and diplomats urged calm and promised the return of order, little authority was in evidence on the capital's streets early today [February 29, 2004]. Chaos and anarchy ruled as news of Mr. Aristide's departure trickled out. After several tense days of expecting a threatened rebel attack, residents lined the streets, anxious for news. . .
>
> Near the National Palace, opponents of the president began to celebrate, dancing in the streets and weeping. They flashed three fingers in the air, a response to the outstretched palm that the president's supporters use to signify their belief that he should be allowed to finish his five-year term, which was to end in February 2006.
>
> Mobs of armed young men soon converged on the palace, firing guns, seemingly at random, and thousands of looters poured onto the streets. Rioters set a Texaco gas station on fire, sending flames shooting skyward and leaving a black pall over the mountains surrounding the city. Mobs began a methodical looting of every shop they could pry open, piling water jugs, fans, and groceries onto

> wheelbarrows and carting them away. Several bullet-riddled bodies were spotted around the city.
>
> As the afternoon wore on, police officers reappeared, as if by silent command. Trucks of officers with machine guns patrolled the streets, arresting looters and breaking up packs of militant supporters of Mr. Aristide. . .

This quote describes the beginning of the escalation of street violence and deep insecurity within the country, particularly in Port-au-Prince and its surrounding communes. This is important because it describes the socio-political conditions in which the massacres in Grande Ravine occurred.

A U.S.-backed interim government leads Haiti down a path of anarchy and relentless street violence

After Aristide's forced departure, U.S. President George W. Bush deployed some 2,000 Marines to stabilize Haiti until a transitional government was in place to resume the duties of governance (Hallward, 2007, p. 258). To fill the void left by Aristide's removal and in keeping with the requirements of the Haitian Constitution, Boniface Alexandre, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was sworn in as interim president on the morning of February 29, although there was no Legislature in place to ratify his appointment, since the CD refused to hold new elections while Aristide was still president (pp. 258-259). Yvon Neptune, Aristide's Prime Minister, was ousted and in his place a *Conseil des Sages* was appointed (p. 259). This nine-person "Council of the Wise," was composed of church leaders (Catholic and Protestant) and leaders of civil

society organizations—at least some of whom had once been Aristide supporters and pro-Lavalas (p. 259). The *Conseil des Sages* selected Gérard Latortue who, according to Hallward, had spent most of the previous 20 years in Florida. Latortue, a neo-liberal economist and former UN functionary, was noted for his loyalty to the Bush administration along with some of Haiti's most powerful families, which had strong ties to the opposition's paramilitary wing (p. 260). Hallward (2007) notes that, initially, Latortue was considered to be impartial and fair in his new position as prime minister, but he was soon discovered to have some ulterior motives (p. 260). Hallward (2007) explains:

> Although in 2004 [Latortue] was invariably described as a detached and neutral figure who had played no role in the destabilization of the regime, members of the CD later admitted to well-placed members of Aristide's entourage that both Gérard and his nephew Youri had played significant roles in the coordination of the political and military components of the opposition. Unlike any other prime minister in recent Haitian history, with only a symbolic president above him and no political party beneath him, Latortue would wield effectively absolute power in Haiti for the next two years (p. 260).

Not long after Latortue became prime minister, he went to Gonaïves to make a public appearance where on stage he personally congratulated Guy Philippe and the effective paramilitary coordination he used to overturn the Aristide government. However, Latortue was not spared the problems of a country that had been so deeply

divided politically. These problems, Fatton (2007) maintains, led to a Hobbesian spiral of criminality, which Dupuy (2007) differentiates into two kinds of violent crimes—those committed by the state and its armed forces with the support of the economic elite and those committed by subordinate classes mostly comprising the marginalized poor who lived in the most wretched conditions (p. 193). For them, Dupuy emphasizes, violence and criminality would become a source of income, "whether as hired guns for those in power or seeking power, or those with powerful connections involved in drug trafficking or contraband" (2007, p. 193).

Fatton (2007) argues that Aristide's departure did little to quell a grim violent reality that had been percolating between the opposition groups (including rogue police officers and former militia) and Lafanmi Lavalas. The disintegration of central authority after Aristide's departure led to a breakdown of social order that many Haitians, Americans, and others in the international community described as anarchy. This situation prompted the deployment of a Brazilian-led multinational force of more than 3,000 United Nations peacekeepers.

The U.S. Marines remained in Haiti until a UN peacekeeping force was installed. Fatton notes that while the force helped to provide a relative measure of order to prop up the weak interim government of President Alexandre and Prime Minister Latortue, the newly installed government was unable to disarm the pro-Lavalas groups and insurgents. Ultimately, a United Nations military contingent, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), replaced the U.S.-led troops on June 1, 2004. However, it "remained an

understaffed and feeble peacekeeping force that had neither the will nor the capacity to unleash an effective policy of disarmament" (Fatton, 2007, p. 212). Though MINUSTAH challenged the activities of the disbanded Haitian Army in several localities, Fatton claims, it used "significantly more repressive means to curb the power of the *chimères* in Cité Soleil" (2007, p. 212). MINUSTAH forces were unable to disarm the armed groups on either side, fearing that a more aggressive disarmament effort without the mandate and necessary resources would ultimately lead to bloodshed (p. 212).

Hallward (2007) interviewed some members of a paramilitary group that continued to "work" in Cité Soleil, as they put it, to "finish the job" of initial police assaults that forced Fanmi Lavalas militants to retreat to their slums. One of these paramilitary group members, Peter Calixte, admitted to Steven Dudley of *The Boston Globe* (March 2, 2004) the intentions of paramilitaries to actively hunt pro-Aristide gangs. Dudley discussed with Hallward how he accompanied one of several such "upper-class military groups" to Cité Soleil soon after the coup. Hallward recounts this discussion:

> Armed with M-4 or M-14 assault weapons and led by young, affluent and US-educated businessmen like Sean Saint-Remy and Peter Calixte, they waited until the initial police assault had forced FL [Fanmi Lavalas] militants to retreat back to their slums. Then "as darkness settled, Calixte and dozens of other paramilitaries went out in groups of 10 to 15 men to finish the job. "We went down every alley,

> every street. We're cleaning up the neighborhoods," said one of Calixte's colleagues (2007, p. 255).

Survivors attested to this fact, including Lamarre Augustin, a Fanmi Lavalas leader in Cité Soleil who was working with disarmament efforts that would have gangs voluntarily turn in their guns and ammunition. In an interview on April 15, 2006, Hallward quotes Augustin:

> [M]ore people died after 29 February 2004 than 30 September 1991; although during this first coup many Aristide supporters were killed or disappeared, back then we didn't have to endure a systematic campaign of open shooting in the streets (p. 255).

Hallward (2007) also recalls the overwhelming number of violent deaths that taxed not only the hospitals but also the morgues (p. 255). Tom Griffin, a Miami-based human rights attorney, brought a team to Port-au-Prince to investigate the incidence of violent deaths, mostly among Lavalas supporters (Hallward, 2007, p. 255). He reports that by March 3, 2004, the eight largest hospitals in Port-au-Prince had to stop admitting patients due to the large volume of casualties. Where the state morgue normally dumps around 100 bodies a month in unmarked mass graves that have not been claimed by relatives (normally due an inability to pay or fear of public association), on March 7 the morgue's director admitted to dumping 800 bodies. He explained to Griffin (Hallward, 2007, p. 255) that normally the bodies are kept for 22 days before being removed, but the morgue's refrigerator coincidentally broke down on February 29, the day of Aristide's

forced departure (Hallward, 2007, p. 255). Griffin adds, "By further coincidence and in spite of the unprecedented resources that would soon be put at the disposal of the post-coup government, it apparently took a full year to fix this troublesome motor. In the meantime bodies would have to be dumped by the truckload on a regular basis, many with their hands still tied around their backs and bags over their heads" (Hallward, 2007, p. 255).

Broad systematic abuses continued throughout 2004-2006, particularly under the U.S.-backed interim government (Fanfan, personal communication, 7/10/2005). Arbitrary arrests of anyone thought to be pro-Lavalas resulted in severely overcrowded prisons and commissariats (jails). Nearly all who were arrested came from the poorer zones of Port-au-Prince, such as Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, La Saline, Bel Air, and Martissant/Grande Ravine. Not only were charges trumped up against those falsely accused, but the judicial system was itself overtaxed, understaffed, and corrupt. Since there were no courts in these areas, those arrested would be detained indefinitely in a commissariat near the arrest site, with little to no hope for having their case heard in a timely fashion, if at all (Fanfan, personal communication, July 10, 2005).

The incidence of human rights abuse and other criminal violations in Port-au-Prince after the departure of Jean-Bertrand Aristide

Athena Kolbe and Royce A. Hutson (2006) conducted a study on the frequency and severity of human rights abuses in Haiti after the departure of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

The reason for the inquiry was the number of disparate and inconclusive deaths after Aristide's departure.

To determine the frequency of abuses, Kolbe and Hutson (2006) used random Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinate sampling to select 1,260 households (5,720 individuals). The survey only pertained to incidents involving household members. For example, "respondents were asked how many members of their household had been killed since Feb. 29, 2004. Only household members who were murdered were included" (Kolbe & Hutson, www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article, 9/2/2006). This was also the case for other types of violations included in their survey. A household was defined for the respondents as follows: "Your household is you and all the people who live in the same home with you and with whom you share finances, food, and living space. This includes people such as a boyfriend or girlfriend who live with you all the time and a friend or relative's child that lives with you and that you care for" (Kolbe & Hutson, www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article, 9/2/2006).

Kolbe and Hutson (2006) collected data on seven types of human rights violations: property crimes, arrests and detentions, physical assaults, sexual assaults, murders, and death threats. The study did not investigate violations of Haitian social and economic rights during the post-Aristide period although news reports informed Kolbe and Hutson that "some Haitians had been expelled from their homes, fired from their jobs, prevented from going to school, and forced to become refugees. . ." More than

ninety percent of those sampled responded to the survey. The authors reported the following:

> Our findings suggested that 8,000 individuals were murdered in the greater Port-au-Prince area during the 22-month period assessed. Almost half of the identified perpetrators were government forces or outside political actors. Sexual assault of women and girls was common, with findings suggesting that 35,000 women were victimized in the area; more than half of all female victims were younger than 18 years. Criminals were the most identified perpetrators, but officers from the Haitian National Police accounted for 13.8% and armed anti-Lavalas groups accounted for 10.6% of identified perpetrators of sexual assault. Kidnappings and extrajudicial detentions, physical assaults, death threats, physical threats, and threats of sexual violence were also common (Kolbe & Hutson, www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article, 9/2/2006).

According to Kolbe and Hutson (2006), their study's results demonstrate that an inordinate number of crimes as well as systematic human rights abuses were common in Port-au-Prince during this period. They recommended that President René Préval, who was elected to a second term in 2006, and his administration needed to provide a systematic response with the United Nations and social service organizations "to address the legal, medical, psychological, and economic consequences of widespread human rights abuses and crime" (Kolbe & Hutson, www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article, 9/2/2006).

AUMOHD a first responder to reported human rights abuses

In 2002, Evel Fanfan, who was a law student at the time, and a group of 12 other university students began a student-run human rights group called AUMOHD. Their primary interest was to advocate for the most vulnerable people in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding communes who had been illegally arrested and detained in prisons and commissariats. Their clients mostly consisted of those far too poor to pursue judicial options. Many lived in locations where there was no local tribunal to hear their cases. AUMOHD was legalized as a Haitian nonprofit organization in 2004 just after Aristide was deposed. Since it first formed, AUMOHD has dealt with a myriad of human rights abuses of individuals as well as entire communities. To help address the escalation of human rights abuses, Fanfan, as the president and legal advisor of AUMOHD, organized four community human rights councils comprised of residents and victims who live in Grand Ravine, Cité Soleil, Simon-Pélé, and Croix-des-Bouquets.

An example of "deadly violence" to which Dupuy refers is the first massacre in Grande Ravine where Lame Ti Manchèt members were observed wearing the previously mentioned red t-shirts with the letters KID inscribed on them—the abbreviation for Evans Paul's organization Komite Inite Demokratik (Democratic United Committee). Paul and KID were affiliated with both CD and Group 184. Thus, it was a personal mission of Evans Paul to remove Aristide from office and to nullify, if not make illegal, the Lavalas Party after Aristide's forced departure. This point will be revisited in the interview data in Chapter 5 on Paul's apparent influence on a group of men living in Martissant who

would agree to viciously attack spectators at the USAID-sponsored Play for Peace Soccer Tournament in Grande Ravine.

Chapter 5 will focus on AUMOHD's response to the Lame Ti Manchèt massacres in Grande Ravine and the establishment of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council to address problems resulting from the 2005-2006 massacres as well as other community problems. The chapter will focus on the organization of the Grande Ravine CHRC and its actions to resolve socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a description of the socio-historical and socio-political landscape of ongoing conflicts in Haiti beginning with the Duvalier regime. The landscape can be described as a complex tapestry that cannot be appreciated nor understood if any of the threads are broken or missing. This, in fact, was one of the difficulties of understanding the events presented in the case study. Too many questions were raised regarding the "hows" and "whys" of relations between the people living in Grande Ravine and those alienated or at odds with them. Every story seemed to have historical or political antecedents that ran deep into the local culture. Providing a broad historical overview allows for a deeper understanding of the next two chronologies in the case study.

CHAPTER 5 THE CASE STUDY OF A GRASSROOTS RESPONSE TO ATTACKS ON GRANDE RAVINE RESIDENTS

Figure 3. A view of Grande Ravine where the massacres took place in 2005-2006.

Residents of Grande Ravine vividly recall the massacre of August 20-21, 2005, at St. Bernandette's School. A soccer match sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nation's Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reinsertion (UN-DDR) campaign intended to encourage good will and peaceful coexistence in Grande Ravine's neighboring communities and to gain the trust and confidence of residents to give up their weapons. Members of the Haitian National Police (PNH) in conjunction with the armed civilian group, Lame Ti Manchèt

(LTM), entered Bernadette's soccer stadium. A police officer took the microphone and ordered approximate 5,000 spectators to get down as officers and members of LTM descended upon the crowd, claiming to look for *bandi*.

On August 26, 2005, the Haiti Information Project—an alternative news source that focused on difficult stories skirted in the mainstream press—reported a description of these events as told by Tom Luce of HURAH (Human Rights Accompaniment in Haiti) an American non-profit that supports the activities of AUMOHD and AUMOHD investigators. The eyewitnesses who Tom Luce and Evel Fanfan interviewed recounted the details of a massacre-by-machete**.** Red-shirted men backed up by members of the Haitian National Police (PNH) attacked between 40 and 50 spectators at the Grande Ravine stadium on the evening of August 20, 2005. This extensive excerpt from Luce's account captures details that are important for understanding the attack's significance:

> This summary, extra-legal execution follows similar type massacres in Bel Air and Solino [two poor neighborhoods and Lavalas strongholds] earlier this month. This time the killings were done in plain daylight in front of and involving 5,000 soccer fans, an incredibly bold assault by Haitian police and their civilian accomplices. . . . As has been the case this entire past year, the "targets" in Saturday's massacre, were all identified as "bandits," "Lavalas" scum . . . .
>
> Eyewitnesses described to a group of human rights agents today this super T.V. drama styled event. As fans were being entertained during one of the breaks in the soccer game—highly attended because national league players had joined

the local teams—a group of police and men wearing red tee shirts and head bands entered the playing field and took over the microphone from the announcer. The people in the crowd at first thought that this was a friendly show of security by the police. But that idea was immediately dashed when the red shirt announcer stopped the music being played by the DJ and then demanded everyone to lie on the ground. A shot was fired into the air and people began a panicked response. Some tried to run away, some tried scaling the walls to escape and several of these were shot. Others tried running into the adjoining rooms of the stadium and later were found hacked to death. The red shirts, backed up by the police, began demanding specific individuals lying on the ground if they were affiliated with Aristide, asking for confirmation from others whether these people were "bandits." Then without mercy these red shirts either hacked their victims to death or hacked them and then had their victims shot by the police. According to eyewitnesses and the family members of the victims interviewed today, the victims of the executioners were innocent people and were attacked only because they were allegedly Lavalas supporters.

The red shirts were equipped with machetes and hatchets that were distributed, according to witnesses, by the police at the Martissant police station. These same civilians who appeared in red shirts and head bands at the soccer game, armed with machetes were recognized by people in the area as the same people who at least a month previously were thrown out of the area as troublemakers among whom were some prison escapees and thieves. Some of

these executioners were named by witnesses. . . .The chief of police of Martissant was also implicated in the operation by the witnesses and according to the witnesses threatened to come after them and “wipe them out the next day.”

On Sunday, Aug. 21, the same red shirts, accompanied by the police, invaded residential areas and burned more than four houses alleged to be inhabited by Lavalas supporters. They also severely damaged an electricity transformer in the area . . . as well as several other houses. (Luce, 2005, retrieved March 9, 2009)

Figure 4. A wall bordering St. Bernadette’s Park where the Play for Peace soccer match was held. Thousands of people jumped over the wall to escape the attacks by the PNH and Lame Ti Manchét (Photo courtesy of Tom Luce, 3/9/2009).

Although an exact number of casualties has not been determined, members of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council (GR-CHRC) claim that as many as 40 people were killed from the afternoon of August 20 through the early morning hours on August 21. The early morning assault is considered by GR-CHRC and the interviewees of this study to be a second massacre. Their interpretation of the events is that LTM remained in pursuit of Lavalas sympathizers, burning down houses in the Grand Ravine area, including the house of Lavalas journalist Arens Laguerre. Fortunately, Laguerre escaped the attackers before his house was set on fire.

As a result of these two massacres, a community-based grassroots group, comprised primarily of victims and families of victims, gathered in Grande Ravine to address their losses and their fears. Within a week of the first two massacres, the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council formed with the assistance of AUMOHD.

The Grande Ravine CHRC took immediate steps to counsel victims, find resources to cover funeral costs, improve security in the area, and assist with identifying the perpetrators. But, on July 6, 2006, Lame Ti Manchèt returned to Grande Ravine to burn down more homes in the middle of the night and early morning hours while most of the victims were asleep. Hallward's description of this third round of attacks in 2006, the third massacre, is consistent with the statements made by victims, witnesses, residents, and GR-CHRC members interviewed in this study:

> A year after the Martissant soccer field massacre in August 2005, Lame Ti Machete struck again on 6 July 2006, killing at least a dozen Grand Ravine

residents and burning scores of homes in a gruesome night of collective punishment. The leading representative of the victims of these attacks, Esterne Bruner, was himself assassinated on 21 September 2006. A few days later Lame killed another eight people in three nights of violence in Martissant. . . (Hallward, 2007, p. 307).

Figure 5. A home that was burned down during the July 2006 massacre (in order of appearance, young girl from the area; the study's investigator, Deborah Dimmett; and, CHRC member, Jean Ernest Point-du-Jour).

This chapter presents two chronologies that incorporate data from my field interviews. The first chronology begins with a summary of the epidemiological survey published in March 2008 by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)—also known as Doctors Without Borders—which documented the escalation of violence in Martissant, the geo-political subdivision that includes Grande Ravine. Following this survey are excerpts from interviews that I conducted with victims, witnesses, GR-CHRC members, and others who were at the soccer match as well as those who experienced the violent aftermath the following morning. The second chronology presented in this chapter focuses on the formation and organization of the GR-CHRC.

The purpose of the chapter is to provide a case study that explains the formation and organization of the GR-CHRC in 2005. The information for constructing the chronologies is provided by victims, witnesses, residents of Grande Ravine, members of the CHRC, and Evel Fanfan who I interviewed. The chronologies are used as a frame in the second section of this chapter to answer the study's research question: *What organizational characteristics influence the efforts made by the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council (GR-CHRC) to resolve socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts?* In addition, this chapter provides a frame for addressing this study's implications about ways in which the GR-CHRC could expand its role to include educational outreach for increasing human rights awareness and action.

Figure 6. An alternative view of Grande Ravine and the typical layout of businesses in the area.

Violence and mortality in Martissant

How do the Lame Ti Manchèt massacres compare to other instances of violence in Grande Ravine/Martissant? In March 2008, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) published the results of an epidemiological survey on the level of violence and mortality in Martissant. Martissant has 11 subdivisions, including Grande Ravine. Its population of more than 300,000 inhabitants resulted from a population explosion in the 1990s based on rural-urban migration. According to MSF, this migration resulted in "a completely anarchic settlement" (MSF, 2008, p. 3). MSF's description of the evolution of certain groups in Martissant provides a context for understanding some of the conflicts that continue to exist.

According to the MSF (2008) report, certain groups defending the civilian populations in Martissant gradually transformed themselves into armed groups that supported and/or were supported by Lafanmi Lavalas and anti-Lavalas groups (p. 3). In 2004, following the departure of former President Aristide, the violence between the groups intensified. A cycle of violence set in, generating acts of revenge and reprisals between the protagonists and holding the population in its relentless grip. In 2005 and 2006, the violence against people and property resulted in population displacements with many Grande Ravine residents leaving Martissant and moving to other areas in and around Port-au-Prince. This climate of insecurity in Grande Ravine/Martissant limited access to all basic social services (MSF, 2008, p. 3-4).

MSF (2008) highlights an increase in violence during 2007 (p. 4). The MSF study explains that this increase could be due to a "recall bias" where interviewees remember recent events better than those of previous years (p. 4). In spite of a possible recall bias, a further reason for the surge in violent activity could be the Haitian Government and MINUSTAH's crackdown on armed groups in Cité Soleil in February 2007. Cité Soleil was another Lavalas stronghold where many pro-Lavalas armed groups were pressured to leave or be arrested. According to the MSF report, "it is possible that a certain number of bandits found refuge in other poor districts of Port-au-Prince, such as Martissant, and brought with them certain forms of violence" (MSF, 2008, p. 8).

Although the MSF study primarily encompasses the period January 1, 2006 through August 31, 2007, the authors note some of the precursors that affected one of

Martissant's most violent periods. This claim is reiterated by interviewees for the case study. It is well-documented that violence escalated substantially throughout Haiti, but particularly in Port-au-Prince, after Aristide's departure on February 29, 2004 (MSF, 2008; Hallward, 2007; Dupuy, 2007; Fanfan, personal communication, 2007). Although this escalation of violence continued with the presence of U.S. forces and their replacement by UN peacekeepers (MINUSTAH) in June 2004, MSF notes particular clashes in October 2004 between the Haitian National Police (PNH) and partisans of former President Aristide in some of the poorer districts of the capital (p. 3). MSF provides a perspective on how the violence and instability continued in 2005, and in some cases was never under control.

In 2005, the report states that armed groups in the poorer districts of Port-au-Prince and nearby suburbs were blamed for the rising criminality and a notable number of kidnappings (p. 3). Violence and kidnappings increased until February 2006 when the presidential election brought René Préval back to power. Although the elections provided "increased optimism towards improvements in the security situation, . . . the violence continued, with incidents flaring up on several occasions. . ." (p. 3). The report states:

> Towards the end of the year 2006, the armed groups' activities increased, constituting a threat of destabilisation to the government. In 2006, violent fighting broke out between the UN forces and the armed groups, particularly in the Cité Soleil district, considered to be the stronghold of the chimères, an armed

> militia operating on behalf of the ex-President Aristide. Throughout this period, numerous civilians fell victim to the fighting. From the end of 2006 to February 2007, [MINUSTAH] intensified its operations in Cité Soleil: several group leaders were killed or arrested. The groups' activities diminished, resulting in a drop in criminal violence that still holds today and an end to the population's isolation, at least in Cité Soleil. In other districts in Port-au-Prince, the violence continues . . . (MSF, 2008, p. 3)

One of these districts is Martissant. Between July 31 and August 7, 2007, MSF conducted an epidemiological survey among 1,800 families living in different districts of Martissant (MSF, 2008, p. 5-6). They were asked questions on the incidence of mortality, violence, and illness within their households. Less than 4% of the families agreed to be questioned because of their fears of retribution in a prevailing climate of violence. One witness, interviewed in September 2007, described for MSF the level of risk faced by Martissant residents:

> *"The Martissant population lives in a state of psychosis. Bandits in the area have the population under their control. There are constraints on communication, people are prevented from saying what they think. There is also an economic side to it: taxes on traders, taxes on people in exchange for protection and gangs benediction"* (MSF, 2007, p. 7).

MSF notes that cases of violence were reported throughout the entire period covered in the study. However, there were certain peaks where intense fighting between armed groups resulted in a substantial number of civilian deaths and property damage. One MSF interviewee from Grande Ravine told of his experience in the third massacre described in this case study:

> *"It was 4:30 in the morning on the 7th July 2006: my brother and I woke up to go to work. Unknown voices started calling people to wake up, saying that people from Tibwa and Decayette had invaded. They started shooting randomly. My brother took a bullet, and so did my father-in-law. I fled for my life, and the same day my house was burned down. It was a total massacre"* (MSF, 2007, p. 7).

Long term consequences of violence were also noted in the MSF report: "68.3% of the victims . . . declared at the time of the survey, they were still affected by the consequences of the violent events" (MSF, March 2008, p. 16). The consequences included stress, trauma, sadness, insomnia, and physical illnesses such as high blood pressure. Violence has also taken its toll on family life as described by another interviewee from Grande Ravine who reported to MSF about the aftermath of the massacres:

> In the Grande Ravine area, the main problem for families is rebuilding their homes. It's true that we lost a lot of people during the events, and many have disappeared. But for those that remain, the problem is that we have nowhere to sleep. Families live with several people in one bedroom. Another problem is

> education. There are perhaps 300 children in this area, and only 50 or 60 of them go to school. If the head of the family is dead, it means that the family loses its source of revenue (MSF, 2007, p.16).

Some displaced families who returned to their temporarily abandoned homes found that their homes had been occupied by members of armed groups who forced the family to pay them rent if they wished to re-occupy the house.

The MSF in Martissant drew the following conclusions from the August 2007 epidemiological survey:

> . . . 1,800 families reveal the heavy consequences of violence on the health of families in the area.
>
> - Violence is the first cause of mortality in Martissant. It represents a fifth of all the cases of death and directly cost the lives of 600 persons during the period studied.
> - The homicide rates are particularly high, comparable to those revealed in highly violent areas in Latin America.
> - The violence affected the general population on a wide scale: more than a quarter of families were victims of aggression, either against their members, men and women, or involving their belongings.
> - Violence has had major consequences on the victims' health, including direct medical consequences, often requiring urgent treatment, or more

long-term consequences, affecting families' mental health as much as their physical well-being.

- Violence affects the families' economies and jeopardizes their equilibrium. Many families are obliged to leave their homes during the most violent periods.

The data collected during the survey and in the framework of Médecins Sans Frontières' medical activities in the area confirm that the violent situation has not stabilised in Martissant. On the contrary, the data indicates that the violence increased during the first half of the year 2007.

This crisis situation has struck a population already marginalised, extremely poor, and vulnerable in a context in which access to basic social services, such as access to health care, quite simply does not exist. Although Martissant is one of the poorer districts of Port-au-Prince, its inhabitants have not been accorded the presence of a single Ministry of Health facility. There are quite simply no health centres in the area.

The Martissant population has been rendered fragile by years of crisis in which the violence affects the morbidity and mortality within families. In this context, there are significant medical needs. The results of this survey and MSF's experience in the area, indicate the necessity of a two-pronged health response:

1. An emergency response in order to provide rapid case management to victims of violence.

2. A wider response to the essential health needs of the general population, left to fend for itself because it lives in a violent area (MSF, 2007, p. 20).

The MSF epidemiological survey describes in detail the level of insecurity and violence in Martissant, including Grande Ravine. The MSF report provides a partial explanation for the massacres described by the residents of Grande Ravine who I interviewed during June and July of 2007.

Interviews with victims of the Grande Ravine massacres and their family members

The following three interviews exemplify the climate of insecurity noted in the MSF report. What was particularly interesting is the extent to which interviewees, who lost their sons and other family members in the massacres, displayed a lack of emotion. Although the interviewees verbally expressed remorse and fear, they remained emotionally calm throughout the interview without showing any overt signs of sadness such as crying. Perhaps too much time had passed or their difficult lives have hardened them.

The interviews were conducted during June and July of 2007. Unless noted, all interviewees were given a pseudonym to protect their identity. They provide firsthand accounts of the Lame Ti Manchèt attacks. Marie, 54, was one of the first Grande Ravine residents interviewed. She recounted both massacres, her contact with AUMOHD, the Grande Ravine CHRC after the attacks, and how they helped her. The second interviewee, Lucille, a woman in her 60s, not only lost her large family in the massacres

but also her property and means of earning income. She remains homeless and lives day-to-day, relying on assistance from others. Lucille explains how she came to know AUMOHD and the CHRC and what, if anything, they have done for her and for Grande Ravine. The third interview was conducted with two interviewees, Jean-Pierre and Katleen, who are neighbors in Grande Ravine. Both of them, in their mid-20s, have two children. Their interview is significant because they detailed the everyday difficulties of living in Grande Ravine. In addition, they described their worries about future assaults from Lame Ti Manchèt. The interview ended with a discussion about the extent to which AUMOHD and the CHRC have been working with them.

Interview #1: Marie (June 22, 2007, 1:05-2:10PM; Delmas)

> My son attended a soccer tournament on August 20, 2005. The police and Lame Ti Manchèt took my son. They checked him [for weapons] and he had nothing. The police released him. When he tried to leave the arena, he met [members of] Lame Ti Manchèt, and they cut his arm. They cut him like a turkey. They cut out his eyes and cut him completely up. . . When they cut him, he had not died, yet. The police shot him twice. The police were criminal and part of Lame Ti Manchèt. After they cut him, the ambulance was there to carry away his body. (Marie, interview, 6/22/2007)

Marie, the 54-year-old mother of seven children showed the study's investigator a photo of her deceased son apparently lying in a funeral casket. She explained, "They buried all of the bodies after four months in one day because the police didn't want to turn over the

bodies. I don't know why they kept his body" (Marie, interview, 6/22/2007). I asked Marie why she believed the massacre on August 20 occurred. She replied:

> This OPL party might be working with Lame Ti Manchèt. I don't know, but it looks like it's political. My sons were favorable to Aristide. [PAUSE] I believe it was political. I don't know the position of Lame Ti Manchèt. I just know that they massacred people in Grande Ravine because they [those massacred] are Lavalas. . . One year later [July 6, 2006], there was a lot of shooting. People were dying and being shot down. The house where I was, we were living in front. We were not staying in the house, but we went to sleep somewhere else. They [members of Lame Ti Manchèt] walked up the mountain. When they walked up the mountain, they started burning houses. I would have burned with all of my sons. They burned my house down, but I wasn't there. It all happened around 3 a.m. until 5 or 6 a.m. The men yelled, "Fire, fire, fire!" Near Zion Temple is where they burned down all of the houses (Marie, interview, 6/22/2007).

Marie was asked about the present situation in Grande Ravine and how she felt about living there.

> There are no visible problems, but you know we still have fear. There are police around and they arrest gang leaders [in the area]. A lot of *bandi* still have guns . . . . Those who [are able to] run away, run away with their guns. They have not arrested all of the members of Lame Ti Manchèt either, because there are still many around Port-au-Prince (Marie, interview, 6/22/2007).

When Marie was asked how she first learned about AUMOHD and the CHRC, she explained that she met Fanfan and CHRC members after the first massacre in August 2005. She said she attended several of the CHRC meetings when they were held in Grande Ravine. Asked if either organization was able to help her, she said, "They helped me get the body of my son. AUMOHD gave me a little money for his funeral." She was asked what she would like to see the CHRC do for her and the other victims in Grande Ravine:

> . . . to bring justice and reparations. I lost my son and also my possessions. My son helped me with my children. He was not in a gang or a *bandi*. I would like for the government to find justice and reparations. He died and left four children behind as my responsibility. My poor house, they burned it down. If they help me to repair my house, it will be good (Marie, interview, 6/22/2007).

Figure 7: Remnants of a burned out home from the 2005 massacre (Photo courtesy of Tom Luce, 3/9/2009).

Marie explained that she has not been able to manage very well. "I don't do anything. A relative helps me. I had a little commerce, but they burned it down with the house. Sometimes I have friends who help, or I wash for them and manage with them" (Marie, interview, 6/22/2007). She added that friends sometimes provide her with a temporary place to stay in their homes and give her a little to eat.

Marie was asked what she believed to be the biggest problem(s) facing Grande Ravine right now:

> The biggest problem is the reparation for the houses that were burned down, which has created so many homeless people. There's no one to help them. This is the biggest problem. The government should take the responsibility to reconstruct the houses. There are a lot of victims like me. . . Around Mòn Jean-Pierre, 50 to 60 houses were burned down. Around Zion, I don't know. I cannot tell you, but there were a lot! (Marie, interview, 6/22/2007).

Figure 8. A deposit for debris collected from areas where homes and businesses were burned down (Photo courtesy of Tom Luce, 3/9/2009).

Mòn Jean-Pierre is a neighborhood in Grande Ravine. Temple Zion is a non-denominational Christian church located in a valley of Grande Ravine. This is the

location where the CHRC held most of its meetings. Marie described the third Lame Ti Manchèt massacre where many homes were set on fire in the middle of the night.

Interview #2: Lucille (June 27, 2007, 10:00-11:15AM; Pétionville)

Lucille has been actively involved in the Grand Ravine CHRC since it first organized in August 2005. I asked her why she became involved in the CHRC:

> The reason why is because I lost all of my family. I was living in Grande Ravine. I lost 13 children! I had a 26-year-old son who was a tap-tap driver. His name is Franz. They put him in the house, they locked it and burned him inside. I lost my dad. And after that I lost my daughter. She, Karla, was 37 years old. I owe more money to the owner of the morgue who kept them until I paid. They have been almost one year in the morgue since August 2006. I am going to make the celebration of the funeral [hold a funeral service]. I have my brother-in-law, and he gave me the money [for the funeral] and [he] went with the money [to pay for the funeral]--$1,600 Haitian [a fictive currency that in 2007 amounted to $8 US per $1 Haitian. The official currency is the goude.] I had a brother who was trying to hold a funeral, but they killed him, and now I only have my two arms. My brother had an encounter with Lame Ti Manchèt, and they asked for $1,500 Haitian. They took his money and killed him anyway. Lame Ti Manchèt killed all of them during their operations. This happened over three massacres [August 20-21, 2005 and July 7, 2006]. And my last daughter received a bullet in the

back, and it passed through the front. She is still in the hospital and sick with a disease called *zona* (Lucille, interview, 6/27/2007).

When asked about this disease, the interviewee was unable to explain what this disease is except to say that her daughter was very ill. She continued,

> I am not living anymore. Sometimes I sleep here, there, anywhere. I had 18 children and they killed 13. I have five children left, but they are useless. They can't help. They live somewhere else in Port-au-Prince. I sold my house to hold a funeral for two children. After that I began renting. The room I rented, they burned it down. I have two children in the morgue.
>
> The reason why I participate [in the CHRC] is because I don't have any family or parents. They [the CHRC] don't help me, yet. Nothing. I was sleeping on the floor in the General Hospital, but I see the floor is not good for my system. It has diseases. I've been going to the CHRC meetings so that I can find support. I am looking for a solution because I can't stay in the houses of other people for always. I hope that the CHRC can help. I was a food vendor. I lost all of the food [and materials]. To survive I have become more than poor. For example, I am living with a woman. Sometimes when she has money, we buy a pound of flour and we cook it. When she went out, I took care of her kids but now I have nothing to offer.

After losing the house, I don't have shelter. I met one of the gang members of Lame Ti Manchèt. While I was walking around to find something, he asked me what I was doing.

He said, "Wait, I'll give you 100 gourdes." When he turned around, I ran away. But I crossed him again and he said, "I told you to wait for me so I can give you the money." I ran away again. After a couple of times of running from him, I met him in Martissant #7. He said, "I told you to take the money. You don't have to be afraid of me."

I said to him, "But you said that you would kill my son in a certain way, and you killed him just as you said."

He told me, "It's the money that they give us that killed him. It's not money that killed him." It's something political from the [Democratic] Convergence because the people in Grande Ravine elected Préval [who they believed would bring Aristide back to Haiti].

Lame Ti Manchèt still exists. They have spread out, but they are there. They recently killed a woman and burned her house. They shot her four times. This was very recent—around three weeks ago. They killed her because she betrayed them. She is the one that brought information to the police (Lucille, interview, 6/27/2007).

Lucille believed they were Lame Ti Manchèt because they were deposed "sons of Grande Ravine" who were living on 5th Avenue. These are presumably the ones that were paid by KID to commit the attacks in 2005 and 2006. I asked Lucille to tell me about her experiences at the CHRC meeting:

> The meetings used to be in Grande Ravine at the Temple Zion. Now they can't meet there because of the *bandi*. [The CHRC officers] hold the meetings at the AUMOHD office. After the meeting, they say they will wait for AUMOHD response and get back to us. We have no result, yet. [Evel Fanfan and the CHRC officers] talk to us and give us a little hope. Sometimes the meetings are attended by a few people [about 20-30], but when it's at Zion, we have a lot of people [over a hundred] (Lucille, interview, 6/27/2007).

Those attending the meetings at Temple Zion do not have to find money to pay for transportation, whereas transportation becomes an issue for them if the meetings are held at the AUMOHD office in Delmas.

I asked Lucille if she could explain the function(s) of AUMOHD and the CHRC in Grande Ravine.

> Both AUMOHD and the CHRC helped to set us free. I could not step outside and now look at me. It was terrible in Grand Ravine. Everyone stayed in. They could not step out because of the *bandi* and Lame Ti Manchèt. If you sent your child out, your child might never come back. If it's a girl, they'd rape her (Lucille, interview, 6/27/2007).

What was it exactly that AUMOHD and the CHRC did? According to Lucille, they worked with the Haitian Chief of Police, Mario Andresol, to increase police presence in the Grande Ravine area. Also, they made key contacts with MINUSTAH to establish a post in the central part of Grande Ravine with Jordanian UN troops on active duty seven days a week, 24 hours a day until spring 2008.

Interview #3: Jean-Pierre and Katleen (July 11, 2007; 10-11:30AM; Pétionville)

Jean-Pierre (JP) and Katleen (K) are neighbors in Grande Ravine. They chose to participate in the interview together. Jean-Pierre is 26 years old and has two children, ages 2 and 3. Katleen is 25 years old and her children are 5 and 8. Their description of the Grande Ravine massacres is consistent with those given by Marie and Lucille.

K: Grande Ravine is a little better but before it was very bad. There was a fight with Lame Ti Manchèt which began killing people at a soccer tournament. [They destroyed her house.] Fanfan was trying to help us, but until now I am still a victim and still suffering. My husband is in jail.

JP: We are victims of Lame Ti Manchèt because [the group] was stronger than we are in Grande Ravine. But right now things are getting better because the police are gaining control of Grande Ravine and trying to help us. For almost three months we have no shootings because the police can get into Grande Ravine whenever they want. We cannot say that we are 100% safe, because now we have police who are making arbitrary arrests. They use bad strategies.

K: They arrested [my husband] on March 30 [2007]. He was trying to buy [items]. . . in the store. The CHRC and AUMOHD are trying to get him out of jail [because there are unsubstantiated charges against him].

JP: The police use a bad strategy in Grande Ravine. . .They represent us. They always stick around Grande Ravine. . . But if you step out, the police find you and arrest you arbitrarily. [Their behavior] doesn't have anything to do with Lame Ti Manchèt. If the police find them, they will arrest them. The police arrest [anyone] for no reason and put a charge on you. They can just say you are a kidnapper or a suspect or a *bandi*.

K: [The police] said [my husband] was in a malefactor association. Now he's in the National Penitentiary.

JP: . . . I am [still] living in Grande Ravine. I stayed there because there was nowhere [else] to stay [live or reside]. For example, some things in Grande Ravine are cheaper than in other areas. I can get free water in Grande Ravine and somewhere else it would cost me 5 gourdes. I am obliged to stay there because all of my experiences are in Grande Ravine and I feel comfortable there. Living in Grande Ravine though is difficult. There are many things we have no access to—like food. When you sleep, you cannot say that tomorrow you're going to eat unless you have 25 gourdes [equivalent to about 68 cents] in your pocket. Then you can have a little coffee. If not, you pray that God will bring you something.

I asked them to tell me what they know about the Grand Ravine CHRC.

> K: CHRC is an organization that helps people. They take the name of victims and try to find reparation and justice for them. They always [hold] meetings with us. When they make meetings, they call the press and journalists to attend so that the voice of victims can be heard. I have been to those meetings several times. . . The CHRC has tried to bring some process so that they can find reparations for us. We don't have an answer, yet, but they try.
>
> JP: The CHRC always accompanies us to help us find reparations and justice. For example, they analyzed the situation in Grande Ravine [to determine the depth of the damage and who should be held responsible for it].

Jean-Pierre immediately returned to the egregious acts perpetrated by Lame Ti Manchèt and the indifference he perceives by the police:

> JP: Grande Ravine is a good area, but if we had large guns, we would not have been victimized by Lame Ti Manchèt. . . [who] comes with big powerful guns like M16s, M1s, etc. and they destroy Grande Ravine. . . [Members of] Lame Ti Manchèt is still free in the streets and walking around. The police never do anything about this. The big worry that we have is that the head of Lame Ti Manchèt is always around, but not necessarily in Grande Ravine.
>
> July 27 [2007] we are going to organize a Day of Reflection. I wish you would be there. [For] people who did not have the chance to see the events

> [the massacres], we will have pictures. It will be a march. We are going to make the exhibit [presentation and procession] close to the Grand Ravine Park. People are going to walk up the hill [where last year' demonstration took place and which sadly precipitated a third violent strike by Lame Ti Manchèt on July 7, 2006] (Jean-Pierre and Katleen, interview, July 11, 2007).

I joined the thousands of people in Grande Ravine on July 29, 2007, for their Day of Reflection or what could be called their Day of Unification. The Haitian National Police and the Jordanian UN troops had a strong presence. As I stepped out of the taxi that brought me to the beginning of the procession, Lucille ran over to greet me. Others I met at the CHRC meetings motioned for me to go to the kiosk where they were preparing to hold a press conference. A panel of women, who lost their children and their homes, made an emotional and impassioned plea for Prime Minister Alexis and President Préval to help them obtain justice and reparation for the Grande Ravine victims of the August 20-21, 2005 and July 7, 2006 massacres. The mothers made it very clear that these attacks were not by the hands of ordinary *bandi*, but were orchestrated by a political machine that used violence as a way to punish a Lavalas stronghold that would and did cast its vote for René Préval, believing that he would assist in Aristide's return. Préval was elected to a second term as President of Haiti in February 2006, but he did not take the oath of office until April 2006. Thus, the people interviewed from Grande Ravine believed the attack by Lame Ti Manchèt on July 7, 2006 was a form of retribution for the votes they casted for Préval and for the on-going support and hope they held for Aristide's return.

Possible motives for the massacres in 2005

Although the massacre on July 7, 2006 can probably be explained as an act of retribution, the motives for the previous two massacres are more complex. The official statement provided by the Haitian National Police (PNH) says that the move was motivated by a directive to address a security problem created by four alleged bandits. It appears that members of Lame Ti Manchèt were used in this operation to identify the *bandi*. Others have said that the massacre was politically motivated and supported by OPL's Paul Denis, the organizer of an opposition party that sought to oust Aristide and the Lavalas party (Fanfan, 2005; Luce, 2005; Lindsey, 2005; Reineke, 2005; Hallward, 2007).

Hallward (2007) implicates Youri Latortue, a senator and nephew of former Prime Minister Gérard Latortue and his assistant Jean-Wener Jacquitte in these massacres.

> In the de facto prime minister's office . . . Youri Latortue had a free hand (along with a monthly $20,000 slush fund) to develop less formal means of providing security. Well-placed sources close to the prime minister's office suggest that Youri Latortue and his assistant Jean-Wener Jacquitte were intimately involved in the creation of the Lame Timanchete [sic] . . . which was responsible for a number of gruesome attacks in the summers of 2005 and 2006 (Hallward, 2007, p. 268).

According to Hallward, human rights attorney, Tom Griffin, found that organizational structure employed by the PNH was used to create a state of fear and

socio-political repression in the poorest areas of Port-au-Prince, the ones that were most loyal to Aristide (2007, p. 269). Noting the protocol as described by Griffin and other human rights lawyers, Hallward (2007) mentions that every credible human rights investigation conducted during 2004-2005 confirmed that: ". . . after quickly absorbing reliable members of the former military or paramilitary, the PNH redeployed them, in conjunction with US and then with UN troops, to wage an open 'campaign of terror in the Port-au-Prince slums'" (p. 269). In fact, when Griffin's legal team spoke with and observed police officers, they found that there was an absence of any "preliminary intelligence or detective work; there are usually no plans laid out for the arrest of a particular subject or for entry into a suspect's house" (Hallward, 2007, p. 269).

Hallward (2007) states that Griffin's report documents that there were no attempts to minimize casualties when apprehending suspects. "Instead, dozens of officers, often masked (for fear of popular reprisals) and out of uniform, would descend upon densely populated areas and launch what could only be described as 'indiscriminate guerrilla attacks'" (p. 269). I observed this protocol on several occasions during the summer of 2005 and would see masked police jump out of trucks and enter a building or residence. This guerrilla-style tactic is the one that witnesses said the PNH used on the evening of August 20, 2005, just before the game. Hallward (2007) identifies the factors that made collusion between PNH and Lame Ti Manchèt possible and their repercussions (p. 295).

A year after the 2005 attacks, Hallward's description of the third round of attacks in 2006 is again consistent with the retellings of the people whom I interviewed:

> A year after the Martissant soccer field massacre in August 2005, Lame Ti Machete struck again on 6 July 2006, killing at least a dozen Grand Ravine residents and burning scores of homes in a gruesome night of collective punishment. The leading representative of the victims of these attacks, Esterne Bruner, was himself assassinated on 21 September 2006. A few days later Lame killed another eight people in three nights of violence in Martissant (Hallward, 2007, p. 307).

In addition to Youri Latortue and Paul Denis, Hallward (2007) also implicates the Chief of Police Mario Andresol as someone who would be linked to Lame Ti Manchèt (p. 307), but sources including Evel Fanfan (Fanfan, interview, 7/12/2007) do not believe this accusation is consistent with his character. However, Andresol did assume his position as Chief of Police in July 2005 prior to the first massacre, and he eventually released many of the police who were named in the investigation. It is possible that Andresol's actions or inaction may have been guided by Youri Latortue, who alone had far more authority and power than the new Chief of Police.

The inspector general's report

The report (trans. Tom Luce, 11/6/2005) written by Inspector General Gessy Cameau Coicou, MD, records the involvement of the Haitian National Police at St. Bernadette Park (Appendix B). The following excerpts are included in the report titled "Official Complaint from the Inspector General's Office":

> On Saturday, August 20, in carrying out legitimate orders some personnel from different units of the Haitian National Police under the Central Administration of the Administrative Police and the Administration of the Department of the West conducted an operation at Martissant intended to question suspected bandits sought after by the police. Some individuals armed with machetes, sticks, and firearms took advantage of the presence of the police to undertake some revenge which ended in the death of a dozen people (Appendix B).

The report provides a detailed account of the actions taken by the Police Nationale d'Haiti (PNH) and its attaché group, Lame Ti Manchèt, and lists by name all those who were involved in the massacre. The report also describes the behaviors of the PNH officers, the Director of the West (Division Chief Carlo Lochard), the Central Director of the Administrative Police (Inspector General Renan Etienne), and members of Lame Ti Manchèt. Consequences for involvement included dismissal, cancellation of contracts with PNH officers, suspension of officers, and apprehension of members of Lame Ti Manchèt identified by victims.

One of the most pressing concerns raised by Fanfan and the Grande Ravine CHRC is why PNH would use a soccer tournament having a minimum of 5,000 spectators as an opportunity for apprehending and "questioning" certain gang members, and knowing all the while that there was the potential for violence. This was evident when one of the officers ordered spectators to lie down to avoid being shot. In spite of the details noted in the police report, there seems to be little accountability for the

creation of Lame Ti Manchèt and its inclusion in a police action as an attaché group. In fact, several eyewitnesses interviewed by the study's investigator said they saw the PNH inscription on the batons that some of the LTM members were carrying.

The investigative report downplays the seriousness of the August 20 and 21 events in several ways. It documents no more than four deceased persons, and it does not mention the extent of injuries. Although a precise count is not available, AUMOHD and the GR-CHRC maintain that there were 40 deaths and many others injured. I interviewed two spectators who each showed me bullet wounds from the massacre. With upwards of 5,000 people in attendance, it is easy to surmise that many more were also injured. Another inconsistency is the account of homes and businesses that were burned down in the early hours of August 21. The investigative report claims these buildings were considered the property of bandits, but this was never substantiated. One of the middle-aged women interviewed by me lost her business in the rampage. She was not a bandit.

The investigative report utilizes the same language throughout the text referring to "the little group named 'Army of the Little Machete.'" This is a curious reference that overtly downplays the group's size and, therefore, the amount of damage such a group could do to a substantial number of victims. Although the report identifies sixteen members, other attackers associated with Lame Ti Manchèt were mentioned in the CHRC meetings. Neither their names nor aliases appear on the list of PNH's Official Complaint. Rudy Kernizan, for example, who was the leader of the LTM, was never mentioned in the report. In fact, the report does not cite the charges against specific PNH officers or

members of Lame Ti Manchèt. Without official charges, Haitian law states that the arrestee will be released in three days with impunity. However, interviewees from AUMOHD and the GR-CHRC told me that some LTM members are now serving prison time while others have escaped to other parts of Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Although members of LTM have been seen in different parts of Port-au-Prince, some CHRC members claim that it no longer appears to be an organized group.

The formation and organization of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council

Figure 9. A group photo of Grande Ravine CHRC members (7/26/2007)

This section describes critical events that have been instrumental in the formation and organization of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council. The criteria used for this case study include: (1) impact of an event on the formation of the CHRC, (2) factors that affected the organizational characteristics of the CHRC, and (3) factors that resulted in a shift in practice for the CHRC. The critical events described in this

study include community gatherings where Grande Ravine victims and family members of victims regularly discuss their loss and ways of achieving "justice and reparation" in response to the PNH/Lame Ti Manchèt attacks.

Critical Event #1: A community response to the massacres

On August 21, 2005, following the two massacres, victims, witnesses, and concerned individuals informally gathered in Grande Ravine to share their experiences and their outrage. The initial purpose of the meeting was to gather information about the events that transpired on August 20 and 21. At this meeting, Esterne Bruner emerged as the leader and driving force. He was particularly active from day one in helping the families of victims locate and identify the deceased at the morgue. He was also instrumental in identifying victims of lost property from an early morning rampage on August 21, when Lame Ti Manchèt burned down houses and businesses. Bruner, a father of six children, was himself a victim and lost his house with all of its possessions as well as his shop.

Upon hearing about the massacres and this first meeting, Evel Fanfan and the Executive Council of AUMOHD decided that it was imperative to provide legal assistance to this loosely organized group that evolved into a community-based, grassroots group whose mission was to address the needs and concerns of victims of human rights abuses in the Grande Ravine. With Fanfan as their legal counsel, interested members, who attended these initial meetings, formed the GR-CHRC. Esterne Bruner became the CHRC's coordinator and first president.

The first task of the GR-CHRC was to gather information from victims and eyewitnesses of the events on August 20 and 21, 2005, so that a report could be compiled. The report, created collaboratively with AUMOHD, described in detail eyewitness accounts and victims' complaints from the August 20 and 21 massacres. The report was sent by the CHRC and AUMOHD to Chief of Police Mario Andresol; Interim Prime Minister Gérard Latortue; the UN Human Rights Chief Thierry Fagart; the Organization of American States Secretary General; Amnesty International; and the U.S. Ambassador James B. Foley. Meanwhile, AUMOHD sought support from international groups such as Amnesty International to put pressure on the Haitian government to investigate the massacres and to assist victims and the families of victims. Importance was given to the identification and burial of the deceased as well as reparations for lost homes and businesses.

The CHRC provided a venue for victims to voice their concerns and their needs. Weekly meetings were held for them on Sunday afternoons at Temple Zion, a nondenominational church in Grande Ravine, or the AUMOHD office in Delmas if security was a problem. Justice and reparations was the theme for each meeting as attendees and CHRC members dialogued about the plans for achieving both. The CHRC meetings also served as an intermediary between Grande Ravine residents and AUMOHD. At each meeting, Joseph would give an update on the legal and political steps that the CHRC and AUMOHD were taking to help victims find justice and reparation for the hurt and harm brought upon them.

This is a critical event because the massacres became the reason for the formation of the CHRC.

Critical Event #2: AUMOHD and CHRC members create an organizational framework

The Grande Ravine CHRC became the second CHRC in a network of four organized with the assistance of AUMOHD. The first CHRC was established in Cité Soleil during the summer of 2005 in response to a large number of arbitrary arrests. Seeing the need for a strong community presence, Fanfan and the two CHRCs worked together during the fall of 2005 to establish a framework. The framework included 11 members who would represent a cross-section of the CHRC's community including two representatives of churches, two representatives of schools, two representatives of small vendors, two victims of injustice, two notables in the community, and a legal assistant appointed by Fanfan.

Each CHRC member holds one of the following offices: president (presides over the meetings and represents the interests of the council), vice-president (assists the president with all of the functions of the council and helps prepare the agenda for each meeting), general secretary (assists the president and the vice-president, attends all types of meetings with them and takes notes or minutes), *secrétaire adjoint* (assists the secretary whenever s/he needs backup or needs someone else to serve in that role), two advisors (elders who advise the council and have an important community standing such as a religious leader or educator), treasurer (maintains funds for the group and concerns involving monetary matters pertaining to human rights issues and other interests of the

council), *délégué* (takes the president and vice-president to meetings with the media and other interested parties and institutions), and two *porte paroles* (spokespersons responsible for delivering oral and written communiqués to the media and the public).

The problems these massacres created for Grande Ravine, as well as the political motivations behind the attacks, made it imperative to work with an attorney or other legal entity that could help the people of Grande Ravine find justice and reparations. The group's decision to join with AUMOHD is considered a critical incident since it had a strong impact on the CHRC's organizational framework.

Critical Event #3: Armed groups meet with AUMOHD and the CHRC to launch a peace initiative

According to Reineke after the peace initiative on December 18, 2005, AUMOHD facilitated a potentially groundbreaking event on January 6, 2006. Reineke, who attended the meeting, summarized the discussion that transpired:

> Along with the problem of repressive State violence, the prevailing conditions of debilitating poverty, social injustice, and political injustice and upheaval have [resulted in] the growth of another disturbing phenomenon for the residents of Gran Ravin [Haitian Creole spelling of Grande Ravine]: the proliferation of arms and armed groups in the area. Residents, AUMOHD and other human rights monitors reveal that there are several armed groups in and around the vicinity of Gran Ravin. The groups include criminal gangs such as Lame Ti Manchèt, groups

that have become adversarial for political or other reasons, and groups who claim that they are armed out of self-defense (that they themselves are under attack for being Lavalas or some other ideology) or that they have taken up arms in defense of their ousted, democratically elected government. At the Jan. 6 [2006] meeting, those describing the armed elements in their neighborhoods lamented the fact that groups who were formerly Lavalas had bought into money and promises from the opposition in exchange for turning against other Lavalas groups. They pointed out that poverty, desperation, and manipulation caused them to turn against each other when really they share a common struggle. They also lamented the fact that when there are armed attacks between rival groups, it is often the innocent who are victims of the violence. (Reineke, 2006, retrieved March 3/8/2009 from www.new.peaceworkmagazine.org)

Representation from rival armed groups in three bordering Martissant neighborhoods—Grande Ravine, St. Bernadette, and Lafwa —met with the Grande Ravine CHRC and discussed the AUMOHD/ Grande Ravine CHRC proposal for creating peace. Fanfan told Reineke, "We discussed many points among which was the immediate necessity for everyone to lay down their weapons and to take the route of dialogue to resolve their differences." He added, "The leaders [of the armed groups] were all in agreement that some invisible hands have been manipulating the groups to stir up violence in the poor neighborhoods. They were all in agreement to hold an emergency meeting with the [greater population of] St. Bernadette and Lafwa to discuss the direction of

peace for the zone" (Reineke, 2006 retrieved March 3/8/2009 from www.new.peaceworkmagazine.org)

Reineke (2006) reports that on January 11, 2006, following the successful meeting, a "truce" was agreed upon by representative armed groups from the three neighborhoods. The agreement stated that they would report any potential violent conflict that might arise between the neighborhoods in time for AUMOHD and the Grande Ravine CHRC to mediate (Reineke, 2006, retrieved March 3/8/2009 from www.new.peaceworkmagazine.org).

This critical event demonstrates a shift in practice for the CHRC. Previous to the truce, there was no particular organization or structure available to mediate between armed groups. This GR-CHRC, then, assumed an additional role as a mediator for armed groups in Grande Ravine.

Critical Event #4: Lame Ti Manchèt strikes again

On July 7, 2006, Grande Ravine experienced another tragic massacre by members of Lame Ti Manchèt. Just shy of one year after the previous massacre, a preliminary report documented more than 25 people who were murdered inside their homes, five people who disappeared, and another 15 wounded by a group of heavily armed men from surrounding communities that include Ti Bwa, Descartes, Decarette, and Baz Kapab de Carrefour Feuille, all members of LTM (recounted by Evel Fanfan to Tom Luce on July 8, 2006; retrieved 3/8/2009 from www.hurah-inc.org). Fanfan also reported to Luce that more than 300 homes were burned down. Following this event, the Grande Ravine

CHRC and AUMOHD successfully increased security by working with MINUSTAH and PNH (Joseph, interview, 6/17/2007). More UN peacekeeping troops and police officers were stationed in Grande Ravine, but this had a significant impact on the prevalence of violent attacks in the community (Joseph, interview, 6/17/2007). In addition, PNH with the assistance of MINUSTAH were able to apprehend and arrest some of the Lame Ti Manchèt members while driving remaining members out of Grande Ravine/Martissant (Joseph, interview, 6/17/2007).

The third massacre did not have an impact on the GR-CHRC's formation. Nor did it affect its organizational characteristics. However, it did result in a greater CHRC presence in the Grande Ravine community as members interviewed victims and eyewitnesses as well as took photos of homes and buildings that were burned down for data to be used in a legal affidavit. In addition to collecting information for the affidavit, another shift in practice occurred as the CHRC worked more closely with the police and MINUSTAH to increase security in the area. The third massacre, then, represents a critical event.

Critical Event #5: Death befalls the president of the Grande Ravine CHRC

On September 21, 2006, Esterne Bruner paid the ultimate price for his community involvement and leadership in the CHRC. Fanfan described to Tom Ricker (2006) how this happened:

> Last Monday [Bruner] gave a press conference to denounce MINUSTAH, which took the rooms of the Grand Ravine high school as a base. Yesterday,

> Wednesday, he was in AUMOHD's office for a meeting in preparation for the people in the morgue. Today, again, he was in AUMOHD's office to get papers with AUMOHD and asked the Port-au-Prince city hall along with the General Hospital to give an authorization to take the bodies without the families having to pay a lot of money. He left the AUMOHD office and would not reach home (Ricker, 2006, retrieved 3/9/2009 from http://haiti.quixote.org).

Fanfan believes that Bruner's death resulted from the actions of three Lame Ti Manchèt (LTM) members who were waiting for him upon his return from the AUMOHD office. They shot and killed him as he entered Grand Ravine. Just weeks prior to the slaying, Bruner was giving Tom Luce, the president of Human Rights Accompaniment in Haiti (HURAH, Inc.) and an AUMOHD sponsor, a tour of the destroyed homes from LTM's latest attack.

Although no clear explanation of Bruner's death has been given, there are several theories shared during interviews or mentioned in written complaints from AUMOHD asking the Haitian National Police (PNH) to investigate the murder. Prior to his death, Bruner was working closely with AUMOHD and PNH to identify the perpetrators of the LTM massacres. Given that there was substantial unsanctioned involvement by certain police officers (see Appendix B), many of the officers involved in the first massacre would know about Bruner's work with AUMOHD. Fanfan and Joseph believe that his death was retaliation for these efforts (Fanfan & Joseph, personal communication, 6/28/2007). Another possibility raised by Luce himself is that the wrong people saw him

with the *blan* and felt that he had connections to resources and money that would increase his power in the community (Luce, personal communication, 7/22/2006). This is a common problem in Grande Ravine and one that required additional prudence in my own field work.

The death of Bruner is a critical event as it had an impact on the CHRC's internal organization. Frantzco Joseph needed to step in as the president of the CHRC and work with AUMOHD to initiate an investigation into the murder. The incident also created a shift in practice since the preliminary report suggested that the presence of *blan* with Bruner made him a target. This event appeared to be one of retribution and the final one that the CHRC tied to Lame Ti Manchèt. A full police investigation was never completed.

Figure 10. Bruner Esterne (left) poses with his family outside his home in Grande Ravine (Photo courtesy of Tom Luce, 3/9/2009).

Critical Event #6: The CHRC responds with a new president and an expanded role

Immediately after Bruner's death, Joseph, at the age of 24, took over the presidential duties of the Grande Ravine CHRC. With the breakup of Lame Ti Manchèt, the CHRC eventually began to shift its focus to reparations for the victims who lost family members and property in the 2005 and 006 massacres. The organization came close to achieving this goal in March 2008 when the CHRC and AUMOHD reached an agreement with then Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis. The agreement stated that the Haitian government would provide financial assistance to victims of the three massacres and reparations for damaged and destroyed property. However, on April 4, 2008, food riots broke out in the streets of Port-au-Prince and Les Cayes in response to sharp price increase for staples such as rice and beans. Shortly afterwards, the national legislature voted no confidence in Alexis' government (Woodson, personal communication, 4/10/2009). Michèle Pierre-Louis, Haiti's Prime Minister from September 2008 to November 2009, did not act on this agreement, most likely because concerns turned to relief and recovery efforts following four hurricanes that hit Haiti in September and October of 2008, creating food and housing shortages as well as infrastructure problems. Michèle Pierre-Louis was also voted out of office with a vote of no confidence.

The expanded role of the CHRC to find a political answer for reparations makes this a critical event. Although its 2008 agreement with Prime Minister Alexis was short-

lived, actions the CHRC and AUMOHD took to seek a political solution factored into the expansion of their practice.

Critical Event #7: Armed groups continue with threats

Although the members of LTM had dispersed and appeared to no longer be a threat to Grande Ravine, armed violence and threats coming from other *bandi* continued to be a problem in Grande Ravine and the surrounding communities in Martissant. The first Grande Ravine CHRC meeting that I attended was held at the AUMOHD office in Delmas, a commune bordering Port-au-Prince. The meeting had to be held there instead of at their regular site at the Temple Zion where, according to Joseph, it is not unusual for more than a hundred people to show up. Only 26 people, including the officers, attended this meeting because the AUMOHD office is much farther away and too expensive for many Grande Ravine residents to afford the taxi fare. Fanfan was not present. The meeting's agenda was brief with an update on the legal steps that were being taken to resolve issues regarding lost property and burial expenditures.

A second agenda item concerned donated sewing machines that the CHRC intended to use for a vocational training center to be established for Grande Ravine residents. However, Joseph, who presided over the meeting, did not get very far in the agenda before attendees adamantly complained that *bandi* would not allow such an initiative to happen. They claimed that the *bandi* would insist on receiving all the resources for the center as well as the money allocated for it. The *bandi* had previously

been accused of stealing emergency food supplies intended for dispersal to Grande Ravine residents. Most of the food did not reach the intended recipients.

The meeting took on an edginess after I and logistical assistant, Frisman Floritant, introduced ourselves. I told the attendees that I had been an AUMOHD volunteer and was now a student in the United States, and there to learn more about their situation and the Grande Ravine CHRC. I asked them to see me after the meeting if they were interested in being interviewed. The meeting soon ended but not before mothers eagerly ran up to show me photos of their deceased sons—photos of mangled and badly burned bodies, decapitated bodies, and bodies in funeral caskets. Each mother briefly summarized what happened to their sons, their homes, and their lives. I wrote down their names and contact information, offering them the opportunity to tell me more. (See Chapter 3 – Methodology for the handling of interviews).

Before I left with Floritant, we overheard several men tell Joseph that his life was on the line as, they noted, spies were at this meeting. The men told Joseph that the spies will report to the *bandi* the discussions that took place about them. The men also claimed that the spies would most likely tell the *bandi* that a *blan* was also present. Joseph appeared concerned about why anyone attending the meeting would consider themselves better off dealing with the *bandi* than with the CHRC, which intended to protect the fundamental rights of all Grande Ravine residents (even the *bandi*) and to provide a vocational program for Grande Ravine youth. As we exited, Joseph caught our attention and then looked at a photo of his family with a noticeably worried expression. We spoke

with Joseph about his concerns, worried about the impact our presence at the meeting might have on him. As we left, we were approached by a middle-aged man in the courtyard who assured us that these were not idle threats.

A meeting with the deputy: How can an outsider go in?

On the afternoon of June 17, 2007, I was waiting in the lobby of the AUMOHD office to speak with Fanfan about the CHRC meeting and to clarify the objectives of my research and data collection. The Deputy of Grande Ravine/Martissant, Jean Cledor Myril, who stopped by the office, spoke with me about the security situation in Grande Ravine. I asked him about the *bandi* who still roamed Grande Ravine's streets, instilling fear in the residents as well as local volunteers trying to improve life for the residents. Recounting the history of some of these armed men, Deputy Myril explained that the *bandi* are "sons of Grande Ravine," who fought back when Lame Ti Manchèt attacked their community.

Members of LTM were originally residents of Grande Ravine; however, they were run out of Grande Ravine due to their aggressive, violent activities and the insecurity they brought to Grande Ravine. Without these other *bandi*, Myril said the results of the attack would have been far worse. Deputy Myril knew the *bandi* that the investigator spoke of. He explained that they had a long history with the Aristide government. Most likely Lavalas officials gave them money and resources to create a pro-Lavalas presence in Grande Ravine.

I asked Deputy Myril if it would be possible to visit Grande Ravine given the security situation and the response of some *bandi* to the presence of a *blan* in Grande Ravine. Both the deputy and Fanfan assured me that I could safely go to Grande Ravine as long as I went with one of them or with Joseph. I was not as convinced after observing the interactions at the first CHRC meeting I attended. Less concerned for my own safety, I wanted assurance that I could enter Grande Ravine without putting someone's life at risk.

The insecurity caused by increased banditry required the CHRC to direct its attention to armed men who were trying to re-establish themselves in the Grande Ravine community after Aristide was deposed. This is a critical event because it required the CHRC to expand its role as human rights advocates. The threats of the armed men required them to be mediators for the Grande Ravine community and to further involve themselves with the police and the UN-DDR. Although this new role helped to alleviate some of the violent activities, the expanded role put Joseph's own life in jeopardy.

Critical Event #8: Fanfan suggests a face-to-face with the bandi

One of the most remarkable meetings that I attended took place on June 24, 2007. It was held at the AUMOHD office because it was still too dangerous in Grande Ravine for CHRC meetings. The same *bandi* had been threatening many people in the community to gain control of resources and to incite fear just as Lame Ti Manchèt did.

Along with Floritant and Fanfan, I had just been to another CHRC meeting in Citè Soleil. Fanfan wanted Floritant and me to attend the Grande Ravine meeting on his

behalf. Fanfan had not been feeling well and wanted to go home, but as soon as his car pulled away, Joseph called him on his mobile and insisted that he come to the meeting to address an escalating problem in Grande Ravine. While Fanfan was on his way, Floritant and I entered the room where 23 attendees (10 men and 13 women) were waiting.

Although the meeting's agenda focused on justice and reparations for the victims of the 2005-2006 massacres, it evolved into a high-energy discussion about Grande Ravine *bandi* who had generated a lot of anxiety. Recent threats to individuals and their families, robberies, sexual assaults, physical assaults (some bordering on torture), and even murders had again created a paralysis in the hillside neighborhoods. Fear followed the people who attended the meeting that afternoon, and several spoke up to report the presence of spies. Again their concern was that these spies would report to the *bandi* any plans for justice and reparations, thereby putting all attendees in jeopardy. A couple of attendees reiterated that Joseph and his family risked losing their home, if not their lives. They were afraid that Fanfan and Joseph would meet the same fate as the previous CHRC president, Esterne Bruner. Fanfan arrived toward the end of the meeting to address their concerns. He made an impassioned appeal to the group, confessing his own vulnerability:

> Some people in front of me have a situation that must be resolved. It has become harder to do this with the interference of the armed men and even harder, yet, when there are people sitting here right now planning to report back to

> the armed men the business of the CHRC. Their goal is to sabotage any efforts to bring assistance and resources to the Grande Ravine community and to further de-stabilize the area. They believe that any donations of food or other commodities belong to them and that they are the ones who will distribute them as they see fit. They think they will take the donations for themselves, but the donations are for the victims [of the massacres]. The *bandi* believe that I am trying to turn the population against them. I am not. I am not going to get rid of them [the *bandi*]. We need to develop the area and to make reparations and justice for the victims.

As Evel Fanfan, I want to help Grande Ravine, but I won't tolerate threats by *bandi*.

> Clearly, there are some people who want me to die. If there are people here who give information to the *bandi* about this meeting, all positive discussion will be taken in a negative way by the *bandi* who will in turn take it out on the Grande Ravine people (Fanfan, public presentation, 6/24/2007).

Fanfan began to turn the meeting over to Joseph, but those present wanted to discuss the threat by the *bandi* to kill Joseph and "hang him from a tree." Evel said that he would release Joseph from his duties as the president of the CHRC and relocate him outside of Grande Ravine. Everyone protested, asking Fanfan who would represent them in Joseph's absence. Fanfan's ability to release Joseph from his duties is a result of Fanfan's position as legal counsel to the CHRC. After some deliberation, Fanfan suggested that the CHRC meet one-on-one with the *bandi* in a closed session after the

next CHRC meeting. The goal of the extraordinary meeting would be to address misconceptions that the *bandi* had about the CHRC and AUMOHD.

Although there was some nervousness about acting on this suggestion, Joseph and three other presiding officers of the CHRC agreed to contact the *bandi* in an attempt to set up a *chita tande*, literally a "sit and listen." The purpose of the *chita tande* was to clarify the role of the CHRC in Grande Ravine. The *bandi* believed that CHRC members, particularly Joseph, were informants and had direct connections with Mario Andresol. Whether or not the *bandi* ceased activities, the goal of the *chita tande* was to clear rumors and misconceptions about the role and function of the CHRC and Joseph, in particular.

A chita tande with the bandi

The following Sunday, July 1, 2007, the *bandi* met with the CHRC at the AUMOHD office after the regular meeting. I did not attend this meeting. Two of the LTM victims the investigator interviewed earlier in the week suggested that there might be a violent altercation at the *chita tande*. They warned me that my presence could bring harm to me and possibly others. Floritant felt that my presence might increase tensions between the *bandi* and Joseph or, at best, it would be a distraction and preclude the kind of discussion that needed to take place.

I had an opportunity the next day to meet with Joseph who described the meeting in detail and told me that a truce had been reached with the *bandi.* The *bandi* learned that the CHRC was not trying to take control from them or of them, but simply to represent

victims of human rights abuses and find justice and reparations for them. Secondly, Joseph explained the intent behind working with a Taiwanese organization who wanted to help Grande Ravine establish a vocational center.

They also discussed my role as a researcher and why I was focusing on Grande Ravine. Joseph explained that I had chosen to work with the CHRC to fulfill requirements for my degree program. This piqued their interest and they asked Joseph if I would be interested in meeting with them, too. Joseph made the arrangements, and Floritant and I went to Grande Ravine, for the first time, to meet the *bandi*.

The meeting with the *bandi* allowed for a dialogue to occur only between them and the CHRC members. The *bandi* were particularly concerned about the power and influence that AUMOHD seemed to have on the Grande Ravine community. These men played a different role in the community prior to Aristide's departure. Rather, than having a quasi-political role in the community, they felt they were squeezed out of the politics that allowed them to control resources. The critical event, then, is working through power relations and dispelling myths that were soon to evolve into an act of violence. This event played a role in the CHRC's organizational characteristics in that it required a kind of dialogue and negotiation with the *bandi*.

Critical Event #9: Bandi as community advocates?

We met Joseph in front of the Hotel Oloffson and took a taxi as far as the road would go into Grande Ravine. Grand Ravine was a far more populated neighborhood of Martissant than I first thought. Not long after we began our trek up the hill, we were met

by another CHRC member who took us to the meeting site where we met three of the *bandi* in a burned-out building that resulted from the carnage of the 2006 massacre. In one part of the building, construction workers were repairing and renovating so that Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) could set up a practice there.

Figure 11: The damaged home where the study's investigator met with bandits.

The meeting included the *bandi*, Joseph, Floritant, and me. When the meeting began, I soon realized that the so-called *bandi* did not see themselves as bandits, but as "sons of Grande Ravine," who wish to be viewed as community advocates. Before we all sat down to talk, the *bandi* gave us a tour of the burned-out building and said that they had been working with MSF to establish the clinic. I did not have the opportunity to check the veracity of their story, but it became apparent that they wanted me to see them in a different role, one far from banditry. They brought me to a little room with a table and just enough chairs for those in attendance. A roll of toilet paper sat to one side of the table and one of them graciously handed it to me when he noticed the sweat rolling off

my forehead. This provided some needed comic relief in the middle of a graphic retelling of the 2005-2006 massacres when the toilet paper stuck to my forehead.

Ti Nolè, a reasonably articulate young man of 28 years, led most of the discussion. He shared his recollections of the massacres and the reasons why Grande Ravine was targeted by political groups opposed to Lavalas. Grande Ravine, he explained, is a Lavalas stronghold that was supported former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and called for his return to Haiti long after his forced departure on February 29, 2004. The other two *bandi*, Maton and Pato, chimed in and added details that Ti Nolè left out.

Several surprises came from this meeting. The first one was the deep respect that the three young men had for AUMOHD as the first official human rights organization to arrive on the scene after the first LTM massacre. Second was the extent to which they saw themselves as community advocates with an eye toward a political future. This became apparent when I first realized that they spoke of themselves as gatekeepers of Grande Ravine who regulate which organizations are allowed to work there, and decide how goods and services will be distributed.

The most surprising moment came at the end of the meeting when Ti Nolè asked me what I could do for Grande Ravine. I thought he was going to ask for money or other resources. When I began to explain my not-so-impressive status as a student, Ti Nolè interrupted and said he was not thinking so much of money. Rather, he wanted me to give a seminar on human rights that would be open to pre-selected representatives from

different civic organizations in Grande Ravine. I looked to Floritant and Joseph to read their response to this request. They both seemed positive about the idea, so the discussion continued about what this seminar would entail and who would be responsible for the planning. Among the first points of clarification: What did they want me to present in this seminar? Ti Nolè told me that they needed a seminar explaining what human rights are with specific descriptions of these rights. I responded positively but told him that I would first have to contact Evel Fanfan to see whether I had his support. Joseph told the three men that he would contact them after a meeting with Fanfan.

A dialogue with the *bandi* resulting in an invitation for me to meet with them is a critical event because both led to a shift in practice for the CHRC. The reconciliation was not between two groups of armed *bandi* as before, but with *bandi* and the CHRC. Since my presence at the CHRC meetings created a concern for the *bandi* and heightened their mistrust of the CHRC, my meeting with them shifted the *bandi* perspective towards Joseph and the CHRC, if only for a brief time. This critical event can be understood as a shift in CHRC practice where accord was facilitated by my presence and the amicable dialogue with the *bandi* about my role as a researcher.

Critical Event #10: AUMOHD and CHRC sponsor a community human rights seminar

With only a week and a half left before my departure date, I worked with Fanfan, Joseph, and Floritant to coordinate a five-hour seminar for a group of 28 representatives from different Grande Ravine community organizations. Although Fanfan was amenable to co-sponsoring the seminar with me, he refused to support or attend the seminar if the

bandi were involved in any way. As humane as they appeared to be at my initial meeting with them in Grande Ravine, it was still too dangerous socially and politically for Fanfan to have further contact with them. Fortunately, Ti Nolè, Maton, and Pato accepted their exclusion and left the planning of the seminar to Fanfan, Joseph, Floritant, and the study's investigator.

The seminar was titled *Advocating for Human Rights*, although a better title would have been *Understanding Human Rights*. The seminar began with an open discussion about what participants believed human rights to be. Responses varied but most were examples of treatment that people should not receive—such as arbitrary arrests and mistreatment by the police. Others suggested that human rights refer to the right to live with dignity where one is sheltered from extreme destitution. Still others believed it to be having one's vote count in a democratic election is a human right. This comment referring to the overthrow of democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, conflated human rights and civil rights.

One of the first activities scheduled for the seminar was a "zip-around" to familiarize the seminar participants with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN-UDHR) (See Appendix A). In this activity, each participant stood up and read one of the articles in the Declaration of Human Rights. When the participant finished reading the article, s/he asked the next participant to read the article that followed. A French translation was provided, although discussions were held in Haitian Creole. After the zip-around, the participants wrote about the article they read. They gave examples of

how that particular right is or is not recognized and respected in Haiti. Each participant shared with the group depending on his/her comfort level. This activity led to a discussion about the UN-UDHR and the extent to which its mission is realized in Haiti—a discussion we returned to at the end of the seminar.

Next, the participants worked in pairs to analyze different articles of the UN-UDHR and their applications to their own lives in Grande Ravine. The pairs shared their conclusions with seminar participants, some of whom did not always agree with the analysis. Usually, their disagreement was a matter of degree. Those who disagreed generally believed conditions to be worse in Grande Ravine than suggested by the participant-presenters.

The final activity invited participants to work in groups of four and write a vignette about a human rights problem that occurs or has occurred in Grande Ravine. However, when it came time for volunteers to share their completed vignettes, only one group volunteered. Its topic dealt with arbitrary arrests, a relatively safe topic compared to others such as security issues caused by *bandi*. They concluded the activity with a discussion about how some of the problems could be addressed when they arose and how they, and any resident of Grande Ravine, could use AUMOHD and the GR-CHRC as support groups for resolving a specific human rights issue.

Fanfan closed the seminar with an hour-long presentation that began as a response to one participant's statement. The participant said, "I think Haitians don't have human rights. These are for people who live in countries like the United States and Canada. We

don't have human rights here." His statement was a perfect introduction to Fanfan's presentation. Fanfan explained to the participants that when we are born, we have human rights—no matter who we are and what our circumstances are. He argued that by virtue of being human, all people have human rights, but as a community Grande Ravine residents have to pull together to defend these rights. This seemed to resonate with the participants and was very likely the most important point they took away from the seminar.

This critical event involved not only a shifting of practice, the inclusion of a community-based human rights seminar, but also a shifting of thought by the seminar's participants. In addition, the seminar opened the possibility for future seminars about human rights education that would be open to all residents of Grande Ravine. How that would be done was a question raised at the end of the seminar. This particular event demonstrated that human rights education can be comprised of the experiences and knowledge of those participating in it. It does not have to be a service provided only by AUMOHD and the GR-CHRC. However, a framework needs to be in place for human rights education to be viable. This particular critical event, then, has expanded the role of the CHRC and, as a result, a new characteristic that has the potential to reduce the bandits' distrust of the GR-CHRC while giving them a new, more valued role in the community as human rights advocates.

Figure 12. The beginning of the ravine that gave Grande Ravine its name.

Critical Event #11: AUMOHD and the Grande Ravine CHRC sponsor a Day of Reflection commemorating the victims in the Lame Ti Manchèt massacres

The day after the human rights seminar, AUMOHD and the Grande Ravine CHRC held a Day of Reflection as a memorial commemorating the loss of life and property in the 2005-2006 massacres. According to Fanfan, 278 homes and businesses were torched on the evening of July 27, 2006 (Fanfan, personal communication, 7/27/2007). This is a different number than previously reported by Tom Luce, who claims that more than 300 homes and businesses were lost in the 2006 massacre.

Events began with a 6:00 a.m. mass to recognize and remember victims of all three massacres. At 9:00 a.m., Floritant and I arrived in Grande Ravine where hundreds of people congregated at the kiosk to greet the Mayor of Port-au-Prince and the local media. Two UN tanks were parked across from the kiosk with soldiers visibly on alert. A small eclectic marching band comprised of nearly 40 youngsters from 10 to 18 years old were standing in formation, ready to begin the procession as soon as they were given the cue. The band itself was a symbol of a grassroots community effort, organized only for this special occasion.

When Fanfan realized the mayor was not going to attend the event, the band was cued to play the Haitian National Anthem. Soon after, it led the procession up the hill to a site where 50 of the deceased had been interred in a mass grave (Fanfan, personal communication, 7/27/2007). Fanfan and two pastors from the United States gave the eulogies. Ti Bwa, a bordering neighborhood and home to many of the *bandi* who accompanied Lame Ti Manchèt in the third massacre, was nearly a stone's throw from the grave site and certainly within plain view. For a moment, I wondered if this Day of Reflection might spark another violent rampage.

Figure 13. Evel Fanfan provides the eulogy for the Day of Reflection at a mass grave.

After the eulogies were finished, the procession began to head back to the kiosk, winding its way through narrow streets and corridors lined with small homes constructed of cement block and corrugated metal for the roof. Walking down the mountain, the Grande Ravine procession sang songs that spoke of people's despair:

"Peyizan, oh! Peyizan, oh!

Se pa kon-sa peyi nou te ye ee." (Repeated over and over)

Translation:

Peasant, oh! Peasant, oh!

It's not like how our country was before.

The song leader, a member of the GR-CHRC, then led the procession to another song just as melancholic as the first:

"Lè m'ap monte sou montay yo mwen wè

Falèz adwat agoch, oh Senyè kenbe m' pi fo

Si pye m' chape m' tonbe anba oh!

Senyè mwen pap gen lavi. (Repeated over and over)

Translation:

When I am walking up the mountain

I see cliffs left and right, Oh Lord!

Hold me tighter.

If my foot slips, I will fall down, Oh Lord!

I will not have life.

When the procession returned to the kiosk, Joseph joined mothers of some of the slain who were sitting behind a table facing reporters from Tele Guinen and Radyo Pa Nou. They were preparing to share their message with the Haitian public. The news conference began with Joseph who was clearly uncomfortable being interviewed on camera. His voice was quiet and his answers brief. However, the mothers were quite vocal in their call for justice and reparations for the victims of Grande Ravine. Each raised a personal challenge to then Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis to help her family repair or purchase a new home, to help pay for funeral costs, and to restore faith in

a government that had let them down when it covertly supported the opposition's retaliation against the people of Grande Ravine.

This is identified as a critical event because the Day of Reflection represented not only a successful community activity planned by the GR-CHRC, but also became an activity that gave Grande Ravine and the CHRC significant recognition by the media and political figures such as the former Prime Minister Alexis. Again, this event represents a shift in practice as the CHRC went public with its concerns and its deliberate attempts to include victims in press conferences who reiterated how the politically motivated massacres affected them.

Critical Event #12: Intervention in the streets

Four months later when I returned to Port-au-Prince, I asked Joseph about the three *bandi*, especially Ti Nolè. Joseph shared a story that sums up one of the CHRC's most important functions today—conflict intervention. During a subsequent trip to Haiti, Joseph told me that the previous evening he was called upon to intervene on behalf of a woman accused of being a *lougawou*, a mythical werewolf that some childless women allegedly morph into when it is time for them to eat. A man whose child recently died accused her of killing the child. Accompanied by a small group of neighborhood vigilantes, he was on the way to exact a deadly revenge upon her. Other people in the neighborhood wanted to protect the woman whom they believed had nothing to do with the child's death and who, herself, was mentally impaired. They called Ti Nolè to stop the vigilantes from carrying out their intentions, but Ti Nolè insisted they call Joseph in

his position as president of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council. Joseph came to the woman's aid and convinced the vigilantes that she could not be held responsible for the death of the child because there was no evidence to warrant an arrest. Fortunately, the woman's life was spared, and Joseph's reputation for resolving conflict became renowned.

Another case in which Joseph and the GR-CHRC were called to intervene involved a man who had been charged with a variety of criminal activities. People living in his neighborhood wanted to physically punish or kill him. However, Joseph and other CHRC members came to the terrified man's rescue by suggesting to the crowd that he be hog-tied until the police came to arrest him. It is unknown as of this writing whether formal charges were brought against him. If there is no evidence, the arrestee's family normally seeks his release.

Whenever Joseph and other GR-CHRC members are asked to state the location of their office, their response is "the streets of Grande Ravine," although they would like to have an office to conduct their activities. They feel that an office would give them greater legitimacy. However, they admit there is certainly something to be gained by being in the streets—readily available and visible to the Grande Ravine community.

These situations represent a type of critical event because they demonstrate confidence Grande Ravine residents have in the CHRC to intervene in social problems. The residents' belief that the CHRC can affect a peaceful and fair resolution

demonstrates an organizational characteristic that the CHRC acquired through the mantra to act, but to act peacefully, to solve problems.

Conclusion

This chapter provides the socio-historical and socio-political context for the emergence and formation of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council. In addition, it describes the partnership the GR-CHRC formed with AUMOHD, the Haitian legal advocacy organization that would provide legal counsel and other pro bono services to the CHRC. It also helped the CHRC with the development of an organizational framework that promotes diversity across age, education, and social position in Grande Ravine.

The case study considered 12 critical events that have been instrumental to defining the role and character of the CHRC. Collectively, these events have given GR-CHRC members opportunities to develop skills in community-based conflict resolution and human rights advocacy. Moreover, the critical events illustrate the skills CHRC members needed to develop to handle some of the crises residents of Grande Ravine brought to them. One of the first was the collection of information through interviews with victims, victim's families, and residents of Grande Ravine to create a report that AUMOHD would use in the creation of a written complaint to Chief of Police, Mario Andresol, and a legal affidavit to be filed in court.

Another skill they developed involved counseling and advising those who came to the GR-CHRC meetings to share their sorrows and their fears. I observed that Joseph and

other officers in the CHRC would give them gentle advice and would assure them that their concerns were being addressed by AUMOHD, which was attempting to put pressure on the Haitian government to provide justice and reparations.

CHRC members also developed skills in seeking political solutions to the problems created by the massacres. One of these involved an action in which they organized Grande Ravine residents for a sit-in at the home of then Prime Minister Alexis. The sit-in drew sufficient attention to the Grande Ravine community that Alexis was ready to meet with victims' families and compensate them for funeral costs. Compensation was ended when Alexis was voted out of office shortly after making the agreement.

The GR-CHRC had a number of opportunities to develop skills in conflict resolution. These included the peace initiative that the CHRC and AUMOHD co-sponsored in Grande Ravine. Armed groups and bandits from different areas in and around Grande Ravine met to discuss an appeal for peace. This was a grassroots effort timed to coincide with the United Nation's Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (UN-DDR) program to provide food and money for arms. Conflict resolution even extended to their own conflicts with *bandi* in the neighborhood who felt that the GR-CHRC might be a group of police informants and could be in a position to undermine the power of *bandi* in Grande Ravine. Another form of conflict resolution involved everyday people who believed that people other than bandits were threats to their families. In one instance, AUMOHD members intervened to save the life of an

innocent woman when vigilante groups formed. In another instance, AUMOHD members worked with residents in Grande Ravine on a citizen's arrest. They demonstrated that if someone is clearly breaking the law and people of the community want to have him/her arrested, there is a peaceful way to do this.

Another skill set that Joseph developed was that of mediation between two outsiders, Floritant and me, with three bandits who had previously sent death threats to him. Although there were some risks for all involved in the meeting, Joseph and Floritant effectively mediated my relations with the three bandits. The ease with which the meeting took place resulted in the unexpected request from one of the bandits. He wanted me to work with the three *bandi* and the CHRC to offer a seminar to Grande Ravine organizations about their universal human rights (Appendix A).

Planning and facilitating the human rights seminar involved a new skill set for Joseph and the other CHRC members. They needed to find a location, order food and drinks, and publicize the event to Grande Ravine organizations. However, probably the most difficult task was given to Joseph, who had to tell the three *bandi* that they could not attend the activity that was their idea. No one at the event, including GR-CHRC members, had ever read or discussed the human rights outlined in the UN-UDHR. The seminar provided the first opportunity for them to discuss and apply the document's articles to a Grande Ravine context as well as the larger Haitian context. After Fanfan's eloquent presentation during the second half of the seminar, the participants learned that

everyone is born with human rights but that it is their responsibility to make sure that these rights are respected and protected.

The GR-CHRC was gaining increasing experience in community organizing with events such as town hall meetings, sit-ins, and human rights seminars. However, the most impressive event that I observed and participated in was the Day of Reflection. Not only was the CHRC able to plan a large procession (in the hundreds) and arrange activities throughout the day for Grande Ravine residents, it was able to do this without involving other community groups, schools, and churches in the organizing.

These critical events create the categories for my research question in Chapter 6. I use them to identify organizational characteristics that have influenced Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council's efforts to resolve socio-political and socio-cultural conflicts. Moreover, I will consider the implications of these organizational characteristics and GR-CHRC achievements to date for future CHRC efforts. I will specifically explore how the GR-CHRC might maintain positive community relations by decentralizing itself as the first responder to the kinds of social or political problems that Grande Ravine residents often face.

CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS: POSSIBILITIES FOR THE GRANDE RAVINE CHRC

Chapter Overview

This case study has investigated the history behind the formation of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council and interviewed members of the council to address the following research question: *Which organizational characteristics influence the efforts made by the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council to resolve socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts?* Thus far, two levels of analysis have been reported. The first level included three chronologies. The first chronology, described in Chapter 4, provides a historical and political account of events from 1957, the beginning of the Duvalier regime, through the summer of 2007, the period during which data was collected for the study. The second chronology, presented in Chapter 5, provides a history of escalating violence in Grande Ravine after former Haitian President Aristide's departure in 2004 and includes interviews data about the three massacres during 2005-2006 from victims, families of victims, and other residents living there when the three massacres occurred. The third chronology, also presented in Chapter 5, gives a history of the formation, development, and activities of the Grande Ravine CHRC from August 2005 through February 2008. It focused on critical events that formed the purpose, roles, and functions of the CHRC. These events were pivotal moments instrumental in the collective learning and identity formation of the organization.

In this case study, the identified critical events not only include observations but also interviews of case study participants. The chronology of critical events placed an emphasis on actions taken by Joseph, Fanfan, interviewees, and others observed during CHRC meetings and visits to Grande Ravine. In addition, the chronology of critical events provided the basis for grouping of key events that reveal the skills or skill sets that had to be engaged or developed by CHRC members to address a goal or objective.

In this chapter, three recurring themes identified in the interview data will be discussed. As mentioned in Chapter 3, they include the Grande Ravine CHRC's flexible objectives, types of responses to problems presented to the CHRC, and modes of learning and collaboration noted in the CHRC's problem-solving efforts. The fourth level of analysis discussed in this chapter includes four categories (1) community organizing, (2) community-based learning and knowledge formation, (3) insider-outsider dynamics, and (4) capacity building as they pertain to the CHRC's formation and development.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of my case study's implications for the Grande Ravine CHRC. The discussion addresses the ways that the CHRC might expand its role to include educational outreach for the purpose of increasing human rights awareness and action based on the findings.

Findings of the case study

Finding #1: The politics of community

Sociologist Richard Sennett (1998) has problematized the implied "we" in community research as "that dangerous pronoun; dangerous because of the way it is often used to capitalize on negativity towards others" (p. 138). He argues that the rhetoric of community is likely to reinforce perceptions of social boundaries (p. 138). Community, then, creates the insider-outsider dynamics that may have made Lame Ti Manchèt a viable group for the Haitian National Police and Evans Paul's organization, the Democratic United Committee (Komite inite Demokratik, *KID***),** to tap for their deadly operations on August 20-21, 2005. Joseph and other interviewees from Grande Ravine explained that the members of LTM were formerly living in Grande Ravine but were forced by residents to leave because of the problems they created for the community through their illegal and violent activities. The reasons that PNH and KID used them as an attaché group during the first massacre may have been because they knew the *bandi* who the police claim they were trying to apprehend. However, the political connection to KID continued to raise suspicions from Fanfan, CHRC members, and other Grande Ravine residents who were interviewed. They maintain that in addition to it the alleged police operation being a poorly conceived, it was also a political attack against the Grande Ravine community.

Christine Everingham (2003) notes that the politics of community are reiterated in the politics of inclusion and exclusion. She argues:

> . . . the lived experience of community involves a process of identification with like-selves, at the same time excludes those who are unlike-selves. The boundary separating the two can be very highly charged indeed, with fear and insecurity generating more intensive identification" (p. 21).

The exclusion of members of Lame Ti Manchèt from a neighborhood that was once their home might explain the viciousness with which they exacted their assaults. Since their forced departure from Grande Ravine in 2003 (Joseph, interview, 7/3/2007), they had all been living in different areas of Port-au-Prince and bordering communes. Their common meeting place was a refrigeration shop where all or most worked. It is possible that their place of employment might have been LTM's connection with KID.

Studdert (2005) states that inclusion in a community cannot be decided on one's own since membership depends on others recognizing and allowing one to be a member of that community (p. 3). When the Deputy of Martissant was asked why other bandits in Grande Ravine such as Ti Nolè, Maton, and Pato did not receive the same treatment as the members of Lame Ti Manchèt, he said it was because they are the "sons of Grande Ravine," an expression used by Grande Ravine residents attending the CHRC meetings. According to the Deputy, there would have been far more casualties resulting from the three massacres if their "sons" had not intervened and fought back. Although a significant number of "sons of Grande Ravine" are, themselves, bandits, their social currency comes from their ability to fight back against the National Haitian Police and the far more notorious Lame Ti Manchèt. Furthermore, their fight might be construed as

a political/ideological fight for a Lavalas stronghold and against those, such as Evans Paul and his organization KID, who would seek to suppress any activities that were considered pro-Aristide or pro-Lavalas.

This finding suggests that the politics of a community can create a climate of retribution when a group is forced out of the community or feels that it is unwelcomed in the community. It is for this reason that members of Lame Ti Manchèt could be recruited to strike out at other members of Grande Ravine community, particularly against those considered "sons of Grande Ravine." The politics of community were clearly at work in actions taken to exclude and even run out certain members while embracing others. The politics of community, then, can make the use of the term "community" problematic since to be a part of a community one would have to follow rules of inclusion, even if one were a bandit or an "armed man."

Finding #2: Identity production through community involvement

Within 24 hours of the two consecutive 2005 massacres, Bruner Esterne and Frantzco Joseph were among the large congregation of Grande Ravine residents (reported by Joseph to include hundreds) looking for a plan to address their fears and insecurity. They would soon become founding members of the Grande Ravine CHRC, advocating for the local residents, with Esterne as the president and Joseph assuming these duties after Esterne's murder in 2006. What was it that encouraged these leaders to take such high-risk positions? This section looks at identity as one of several factors that influence those who seek to become advocates.

Dorothy Holland, William Lachicotte Jr., Debra Skinner, and Carole Cain (1998) provide a useful definition of identity that incorporates the social and the cultural:

> Identity is a concept that figuratively combines the intimate or personal world with the collective space of cultural forms and social relations. . . [I]dentities are lived in and through activity and so must be conceptualized as they develop in social practice. . . Identities are a key means through which people care about and care for what is going on around them. They are important bases from which people create new activities, new worlds, and new ways of being (p. 5).

Although Joseph was not the first leader to emerge in the GR-CHRC, his desire to continue in Esterne's steps, given the danger of this position, is indicative that being an advocate is productive of identity for him. This is also true of Fanfan who chose to be a human rights attorney rather than an attorney who could command a more lucrative salary. A part of their identity is formed not only by their connectedness to a community but to the need the members of that community have for them. Their identity provides a position from which they can act on behalf of the community. This is an evolving process that allows for identity production to be activated by involvement in and creation of "new activities, new worlds, and new ways of being" (Holland et al, 1998, p. 5).

To participate in a group and its endeavors, one needs to see that his/her participation is productive of identity and provides social currency. This is especially true if participation is voluntary and does not include any compensation. Where unemployment is staggeringly high, involvement in community organizations provides

people with opportunities to make a difference. This can also extend to reasons why some young men choose banditry or involvement in gangs.

Finding #3: Social currency and legitimacy: Necessary components for effective advocacy

Two actions added to the social currency of the grassroots advocacy group that formed in response to the 2005 massacres. The first was the decision to connect with AUMOHD and solicit the legal services of attorney Evel Fanfan. The second was to organize within the CHRC framework provided by AUMOHD. This framework includes ten people from the Grande Ravine community who represent businesses, schools, religious institutions, etc. The eleventh member would be a legal counselor, in this case, Fanfan. In addition, it helped that CHRC members all had families, attended church (Protestant or Catholic), and continued to live in Grande Ravine. These aspects created a positive connection to the community and gave residents confidence that the members could represent their needs and concerns.

An organizational characteristic that added to the legitimacy of the CHRC was the regularity and accessibility of their meetings. Normally, the meetings were held on Sunday afternoons in Grande Ravine at Temple Zion, as already reported, a non-denominational church housed in a pavilion-style structure. According to Joseph and other GR-CHRC members interviewed, the meetings were well-attended by 100 or more residents who were concerned about their security and the steps that were being taken by the CHRC with AUMOHD to seek justice and reparation. Far fewer people (about 20 to

25) attended the meetings at AUMOHD since the office is located in Delmas, a nearby commune that requires a commute.

David Cohen, Rosa de la Vega, and Gabrielle Watson (2001) discuss the importance of message delivery in a medium that is most accessible to the people who live in the respective community. Grande Ravine has a mixture of people who are literate and illiterate as well as television or radio and many people who have neither. An additional problem is the lack of resources, including print materials and electricity. The most viable medium in light of these limitations was people who could relay messages in formats that include one-on-one meetings; lobby visits; group or community meetings; seminars; public hearings; protests, public demonstrations, and mass action; and word of mouth (Cohen et al., 2001, p. 107). The public oral advertisements of meetings and activities also added to the CHRC's legitimacy. According to Point-du-Jour, the Vice-President of the CHRC, he and another member would drive around with a bullhorn and announce the time and location of the meeting. In addition, they would spread the word to people who they knew and met in the streets. Given the large number of people they would draw to the CHRC meetings, this medium appeared to be the most suitable and also promoted personal contact with CHRC members.

Finding #4: Social justice advocacy

Cohen et al. (2001) state that social justice advocacy embraces "power relationships, people's participation, and a vision of a just, decent society" (p. 8). They define this form of advocacy as follows:

> Advocacy is the pursuit of influencing outcomes—including public policy and resource allocation decisions within political, economic, and social systems and institutions—that directly affect people's lives.
>
> Advocacy consists of organized efforts and actions based on the reality of "what is." These organized actions seek to highlight critical issues that have been ignored and submerged, to influence public attitudes, and to enact and implement laws and public policies so that visions of "what should be" in a just, decent society become a reality. Human rights—political, economic, and social—is an overarching framework for these visions. Advocacy organizations draw their strength from and are accountable to people—their members, constituents, and/or members of affected groups.
>
> Advocacy has purposeful results: to enable social justice advocates to gain access and voice in the decision making of relevant institutions; to change the power relationships between these institutions and the people affected by their decisions, thereby changing the institutions themselves; and to result in a clear improvement in people's lives (p. 8).

They explain that "specific strategies, points of intervention, and actions taken will vary based on each social justice advocate's political, economic, and social context" (Cohen et al., 2001, p. 8). These may differ according to the following factors:

- What the political space allows.
- Whether the setting is local, national, regional, or international.

- Whether the issue is micro or macro.
- Whether the issue is one of the obvious human rights or rights not yet recognized by all (p. 8).

The Grande Ravine CHRC's actions and activities are aligned with the definition and description of social justice advocacy provided by Cohen et al. (2001). From the initial meetings in Grande Ravine, the group's decision to organize as a community human rights council, with AUMOHD as a sponsor and Fanfan as the legal counsel, was a momentous step towards becoming a social advocacy group.

Several instances demonstrate that the CHRC is a social advocacy group. The first is the CHRC's concerted effort to work with the courts, the Haitian National Police, and Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis to seek a legal and a political solution to assist those who were victims of the Lame Ti Manchèt massacres. As a result, the CHRC was able to get increased security from MINUSTAH peacekeeping forces, an investigation conducted by the National Haitian Police about police, and high-level officials working with the police who were involved in the first LTM massacre. Another instance is the CHRC's collaborative investigation with AUMOHD to identify the perpetrators of the massacres and to trace the root causes of the massacre stemming from socio-political precursors. As an advocacy group, the Grande Ravine CHRC has held publicly announced weekly meetings welcoming all Grande Ravine residents. Meetings gave residents an opportunity to voice concerns, to get updates on the legal and political solutions sought for victims of the massacres, and gave attendees a sense that there was an organization that they could go to when there were social justice/human rights issues

needing to be addressed. An example of the latter is Joseph's intervention to prevent a mentally impaired woman from being attacked by a vigilante group, which believed she was a *lougarou* and responsible for the death of a small child in their neighborhood.

Since the last massacre in July 2006, the CHRC has also been working with the UN-DDR to reduce the violence in the area brought about by gangs and small groups of *bandi* who have continued to make Grande Ravine a dangerous area, particularly in the evenings. In addition, the CHRC has been active in helping with relief missions in Grande Ravine—particularly those missions that were responsive to the severe mudslides in Grande Ravine resulting from heavy rains brought by four consecutive hurricanes in August/September of 2008.

As a social advocacy group, the GR-CHRC may find that the majority of residents in Grande Ravine have confidence in its ability to advocate for their security and rights. However, this can also work against the organization if other groups, such as those formed by bandits, feel they are in competition with the CHRC and feel they are being squeezed out of a social space and thus losing their own social currency.

Finding #5: The Grande Ravine CHRC as a popular organization

Popular organizations are community-based grassroots groups that gained momentum with the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986 (Smarth, 1997, retrieved March 5, 2010). After Duvalier fled the country, Smarth (1997) notes that "all social sectors came forward to exercise the right to participate in political and social life" (Retrieved March 5, 2010). He describes their emergence in the following statement:

> [Popular] Organizations were created to formulate and fight for long-postponed grievances. Students, teachers, peasants, city laborers, journalists, lawyers, doctors, artists, street vendors, priests, soldiers, young people, women shopkeepers, businessmen, all joined together in fighting for their rights and making their voices heard on the issues and decisions concerning the future of the nation. . .
>
> Neighborhood Committees were a creation peculiar to the period immediately following Duvalier's overthrow. Although in incipient and informal existence since the last years of the Duvalier regime . . . , they literally sprang up overnight and had a massive presence in all working-class and in some middle-class areas of the capital, in all provinces and in parts of the countryside. Base Committee activities included street upkeep and such urban improvement initiatives as planting trees and painting colourful graffiti and murals with political and social content. They also enlisted government help in attending to such community issues as water and power supply, construction of schools and medical care centers, and organization of adult literacy campaigns (Smarth, 1997, retrieved March 5, 2010).

The Grande Ravine CHRC embodies some of the more salient characteristics of Popular Organizations, for example, the inclusions of members who represent diverse groups such as street vendors, clergy, lawyers, educators, etc. The activities of the CHRC also enlist government help for addressing the needs of the Grande Ravine community. Most

importantly, the CHRC reinforces the right of Grande Ravine residents to participate in political and social life. This is demonstrated weekly when everyone in the community is invited to attend the CHRC meetings. Another example is the inclusion of all residents to participate in the sit-in at former Prime Minister Alexis' house and the Day of Reflection.

Jennie Smith (2001) describes the *konsèy kominotè* (community council) as a rural popular organization that emerged in the 1960s during François Duvalier's presidency (p. 148). The activities of the *konsèy kominotè* were influenced by foreign involvement (Smith, 2001, p. 149), "primarily of American origin" (Smucker, 1983, p. 379). According to Smith (2001) this foreign involvement was responsible for organizing the early *kominotè*, establishing a pattern of association between community-based groups and outside institutions (p. 149). According to Smith (2001),

> *kominotè* members often highlight as their groups' "good old days" the period in which they served as local conduits for *manje sinister*—the food aid sent by the U.S. government. This aid was often handed out to kominotè in exchange for their labor in road-, school-, clinic-, and church-construction projects. Since the aid was often through the Duvalier government, it is generally "Papa Doc" [François Duvalier], not the United States, who is gratefully remembered by [konsey] kominotè members as the donor (p. 149).

The community council framework of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council is very different from the rural *konsèy kominotè* described by Smith (2001). Instead of supporting dominant power structures in exchange for food and other

commodities, it adopted the attitude of the popular organizations that "ascribed much more value to 'the power of the street' and to popular participation in the country's social and political life" (Smarth, 1997, retrieved March 5, 2010).

The organizational structure of the Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council includes a few characteristics of the rural community council that formed during the Duvalier regime. One commonality is that it has an animator, or a member of the community who is trained by outsiders or an elder who possesses knowledge to be shared. An example of this is the collaboration with Fanfan to address socio-political and extrajudicial problems in Grande Ravine. Fanfan, whose home and office is located in Delmas, a commune in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, is an example of an outsider who was invited to work with the residents in Grande Ravine and help organize the CHRC. In fact, Fanfan suggested the CHRC organizational framework so that the CHRC could best meet the needs of the victims as well as other residents in Grande Ravine. This is consistent with community development programs, described by T.J. La Belle (1976), which have a change agent or community development worker who is an outsider or a member of the community trained by outsiders.

The framework Fanfan proposed to the Grande Ravine CHRC includes at least 11 members representing victims and their families as well as representatives of churches, schools, merchants, and other civic groups located in Grande Ravine. Nine of the 11 members hold offices. These include the following:

- president (presides over meetings and represents the interests of the council)

- vice-president (assists the president with all of the functions of the council and helps prepare the agenda for each meeting)
- general secretary (assists the president and the vice-president, attends all types of meetings with them and takes notes or minutes)
- *secrétaire adjoint* (assists the secretary whenever s/he needs backup or needs someone else to serve in that role)
- advisor (an elder who advises the council and has an important community standing such as a religious leader or educator)
- treasurer (maintains funds for the group and concerns involving monetary matters pertaining to human rights issues and other interests of the council)
- *délégué* (a delegate who takes the president and vice-president to meetings with the media and other interested parties and institutions)
- two *porte-paroles* (delivers oral and written communiqués to the media and the public)
- legal counsel (one of the attorneys in AUMOHD—in the case, Evel Fanfan)
- a member whose role is flexible depending on the needs of the CHRC.

Structuring the CHRC in accordance with the plan that AUMOHD provided gives it an organizational framework that includes free legal counsel and a diversity of membership drawn across differing age groups, occupations, and gender. This seems to be a very workable structure because it is the most representative of civil society in the Grande Ravine community.

Finding #6: Responses to problems and conflicts

The Grande Ravine CHRC worked collaboratively with AUMOHD. As a result, both were able to respond quickly to the 2005-2006 massacres by contacting the local and international press, the UN Chief of Human Rights and other branches of MINUSTAH, and the Haitian National Police, Amnesty International, and other human rights organizations. The CHRC was primarily responsible for collecting information from Grand Ravine residents. This information was shared with Fanfan (AUMOHD) who in turn would share the information with the previously mentioned organizations. At times he was accompanied by Joseph and other CHRC members. When this was not the case, the content of the discussions would be shared with CHRC members who in turn would provide updates to Grande Ravine residents at the weekly CHRC meetings. This process led to disciplinary actions, and even dismissal, of individuals working for the Haitian National Police. It also resulted in arrests of Lame Ti Manchèt members, although some successfully went into hiding and still remain at large. The collaboration also resulted in increased security with a larger number of UN peacekeepers assigned to Grande Ravine.

Unfortunately, the calls for justice and reparations were only partially responded to. One instance occurred shortly after the 2005 massacres. Paul Reineke, an independent journalist who investigated and documented the massacres in Grande Ravine, also donated money to pay for up to 10 burials. Another instance was the pressure the CHRC and AUMOHD collectively put on former Prime Minister Alexis, which resulted in an agreement by Alexis to provide financial compensation for families

who had to pay for burials for the death of a member in the 2005 massacres. No compensation was granted for loss of property.

The Grande Ravine CHRC has also worked collaboratively with AUMOHD in community organizing to increase the community's visibility and to draw attention to their needs and concerns both in the public and legal arenas. LaBelle (1976) refers to this type of community organizing as "integrated development" where a change agent or community development worker (usually an outsider or someone trained as an outsider), such as Fanfan, works with the group to help it mobilize resources for solving problems. For Grande Ravine, Fanfan was instrumental in notifying UN human rights officials, the chief of the Haitian National Police, judges and prosecuting attorneys who were handling the PNH/Lame Ti Manchèt case as well as the press, Amnesty International, and other international human rights organizations. Although LaBelle contends that outside community development workers create a dependence on their services and skills to mobilize communities, Fanfan's work in Grande Ravine was a little different. The Lame Ti Manchèt massacres required an attorney to take the case pro bono since victims, otherwise, would not be able to afford the legal costs. Furthermore, Fanfan's involvement in the CHRC encouraged collaboration between the two organizations on issues of concern so that together they might arrive at solutions or ways to address Grande Ravine's community problems.

The Grande Ravine residents I interviewed indicated that although there was an increased presence of UN forces and national police in the area, banditry was an on-going

problem. Joseph worked with UN Disarmament, Demobilization, and Re-integration (UN-DDR) to initiate programs in Grande Ravine that would encourage the *bandi* to turn in arms for food and other commodities. Many Grande Ravine residents argued that if they willfully turned in their weapons, they would not have a way to protect themselves or their families. Some even claimed that if they had not been armed, the casualties from the Lame Ti Manchèt (LTM) massacres of 2005-2006 would have been far greater. When I proposed using the disarmament program as an example of a topic for one of the human rights seminar activities, some nervously laughed and others were very quiet on the topic. Although the CHRC was not directly involved in the disarmament program, Joseph was. And this had some negative repercussions that will be discussed later in this chapter.

The CHRC has also been responsive to other community issues that not only include conflict resolution but disaster relief as well. In September/October of 2008, the CHRC in collaboration with AUMOHD provided relief assistance to hurricane victims in Grande Ravine. They were active in relocating victims in temporary shelters (i.e. schools, churches) and dispersing basic necessities—including food, clean water, and candles. Given the rising cost of food, particularly staples such as beans and rice, they wanted to keep the community kitchen open. Unfortunately, they were unable to open the kitchen for more than two weeks since there were no funds to continue supporting it.

The CHRC's responsiveness to a multitude of community problems and issues has given the organization credibility within the Grande Ravine community as well as

with national and international groups such as the Haitian National Police, MINUSTAH, and Amnesty International among other human rights groups. Furthermore, their responsiveness to urgent needs such as those in the aftermath of the 2008 hurricane season added to their credibility. As will be seen, increased credibility means to some groups that the CHRC has greater access to resources that were easier for those groups to have access to during Aristide's second term. This is partly why Joseph became a target of certain groups of bandits. This problem has the potential to be diffused if the CHRC takes a role that is not resource intensive but one that incorporates outreach. This will be discussed as an implication.

Finding #7: Dialogue and conflict resolution

One of the CHRC's strengths is its ability to address problems and resolve conflicts through dialogues, particularly between those who have a dispute or misunderstanding. Where Fanfan's legal training has favored a one-way direction for communication, the monologue, Joseph and other CHRC members demonstrated a strong capacity for opening up lines of communication so that Grande Ravine residents can speak their concerns and their fears. This dialogue was evident at CHRC meetings where Joseph was able to create a comfortable space for most residents to participate. This occurred in spite of some claims that the *bandi* had spies at the meeting. Their lack of worry about the potential repercussions of their outspokenness indicates that they believe the spies were there to collect information on the power and influence the CHRC had in Grande Ravine. The so-called spies were also interested in the ties that the CHRC had

with the PNH and MINUSTAH as well as any organizations bringing resources to Grande Ravine. In spite of the on-going problems the *bandi* created for the community in general and the CHRC in particular, Joseph was able to successfully organize what he refers to as a *chita tande* (a sit-and-listen) between the *bandi* and members of the CHRC and between opposing groups of *bandi*. In each case where parties agreed to meet, dialogue has been the most powerful in reaching some accord or agreement.

According to Stephen W. Littlejohn and Kathy Domenici (2001), dialogue is effective form of conflict resolution because it honors relationships (p. 26). They describe dialogue as "a yours-mine-and-ours activity, seeking to clarify what is important to each person and why. It aims to help each person understand the perspectives and experiences of others, but it does more. It calls attention to what communicators are making together" (p. 26). The following are features that Littlejohn and Domenici (2001) identify are necessary for dialogue:

- *Dialogue makes it possible to explore the rules we are using to communicate with one another.* We don't normally think of communication as a game, but it is. When we are interacting with others, what we say and do is very much governed by rules. A common rule is to defend yourself when under verbal attack, but you could make a conscious decision to use another rule and respond in a very different way. In dialogue, we suspend old rules of communication and try out new ones. This is why mediators and facilitators often begin with the ground rules,

and participants in dialogue can and do improve their patterns of communication.

- *Dialogue makes it possible to explore our contexts of meaning.* We always talk and listen from a particular frame of reference. These frames, or contexts, change from time to time, and different communicators often understand things differently because they have different frames of reference. We are not normally conscious of the frame of reference we are employing, and rarely do we examine it or share it with others. In dialogue, we have an opportunity to clarify our contexts and to see what would happen if we change them. We also have the opportunity to create new contexts of communication together.
- *Dialogue makes it possible to explore our differences.* In ordinary debates we are usually quite aware of certain differences, but we do not normally explore them in much detail. In dialogue, we can actually spend time coming to understand the basis for our differences.
- *Dialogue makes it possible to explore common ground.* Where differences exist on one level, we may find much in common on another. Generally, one of two things will happen when we talk about important issues. The first is that we notice a conflict, express it, maybe debate it, and try to win the other person's support. The second tendency is to find an area of agreement and keep reinforcing it, like "preaching to the choir." But in

> dialogue, we can acknowledge our differences and then look for areas of common ground (pp. 26-27)

At Grande Ravine CHRC meetings, Joseph was normally the one who facilitated dialogue among members and the meetings' attendees. In most cases this was fairly easy for him because he knew most of the people at the meeting; however, it was noticed that ground rules were never set for communication nor did he or other CHRC members explore the commonalities and differences existing among those who were engaged in a dialogue or debate. In closed meetings with *bandi*, Joseph and the other CHRC members took steps to close the gap between themselves and the *bandi* as well as between groups of *bandi* who met with the CHRC once to work on a nonviolent approach to co-existing in Grande Ravine without having to put themselves at risk.

Dialogue also has its risks, particularly in Grande Ravine where the CHRC held most of its meetings. Littlejohn and Domenici (2001) identified the following reasons why dialogue can feel risky to those who engage in it:

- They may feel uncomfortable using forms of communication they are not accustomed to. They know intuitively how to fight, be defensive, clam up, blame, and persuade. They may not be very practiced at really good listening, and they have rarely put themselves in a strictly listening role, especially when they disagree with what is being said.
- In dialogue, people risk change. If they experienced dialogue, they may change their opinion; they may question the way they used to do things; they may learn uncomfortable new things; they may find out that people

agree with them less than they thought; they may experience new feelings; and they may go away stewing about something that never bothered them before.

- In dialogue, people risk discovery. They may find out things about themselves they had not been conscious of before. They may have to face facts formerly glossed over. They may have to make uncomfortable acknowledgments.
- In dialogue, people risk disclosure. . . [M]ediations and facilitated meetings provide an opportunity for people to "say and hear what needs to be said and heard" (pp. 28-29).

In the Grande Ravine CHRC meetings, risking disclosure was the greatest concern of participants at regular weekly meetings that were open to the public. This was particularly the case at meetings where participants feared that spies were among them. The consequences of speaking against named *bandi* could be deadly. However, those who typically attended the meetings (in Grande Ravine and at the AUMOHD office in Delmas) were also the most vocal about the *bandi*. Two occasions were observed where someone boldly announced that there were spies among them. The first time this was observed, the meeting adjourned and upon leaving, two men cautioned Joseph about a death threat the *bandi* had on him. The second time this was observed, Fanfan was called to the meeting to address the Grande Ravine group including the spies. Fanfan spoke forcefully, chastising the *bandi*, their spies, and cautioning those in attendance not to give in to intimidation or involve themselves in rumor mills.

Separate meetings with the CHRC and the *bandi* involved mediation where Joseph was the primary mediator. Although I was not invited or encouraged to attend these meetings, my discussion with Joseph afterwards indicated that the meetings were productive to the extent that when the meetings adjourned, everyone had a more positive attitude towards the CHRC or the other *bandi* group involved in mediation. From Joseph's account of these meetings, all four risk areas appeared to have been overcome to avert hostility and to end the meeting positively and with a greater understanding of what created the conflict in the first place. A conflict resolution was reached at the end of each of these meetings; however, conflicts continued to re-emerge causing new death threats aimed primarily at Joseph (although other CHRC members as well as Fanfan and his family have also been threatened). Mediation between groups of *bandi* was also limited as *bandi* continued to fight for and over territory and resources. Some like Ti Nolè, Pato, and Maton fought over being the rightful group to act on behalf of the Grande Ravine community, particularly if *blan* were involved in any Grande Ravine initiatives. They, in fact, believed they were competing with the Grande Ravine CHRC for this imagined position.

The finding shows that dialogue is among the best ways to resolve conflicts in Grande Ravine. However, it does not provide a perfect fix. Although dialogue can be used to dispell misunderstandings and to clarify information, the benefits can often be short-lived. This was partly true with Joseph's attempts to work through misunderstandings with Ti Nolè, Pato, and Maton. The lack of a permanent resolution ultimately caused Joseph to have to leave Grande Ravine and to resign from the CHRC.

Dialogue appears to be most effective when an impartial mediator, an outsider, facilitates. This will be an important consideration in the CHRC's future attempts to mediate problems internally.

Finding #8: A shared history, a shared consciousness

The Grande Ravine CHRC is deliberately diverse with members varying in age, gender, levels of literacy and education, socio-economic categories, secular and non-secular practices, as well as experiences in community involvement. What unifies them is that they are residents of Grande Ravine and share a common history and social consciousness. Most of them have lived in Grande Ravine for at least five years. Of those interviewed, all believe their lived existence in Grande Ravine mirrors that of other residents who share common concerns about insecurity, homelessness, lack of affordable food, unemployment, lack of educational opportunities, and abuses perpetrated by the police and, sometimes, the UN peacekeepers.

A shared history and a shared consciousness have allowed CHRC members to engage in dialogue with other Grande Ravine residents about common assumptions regarding human rights and peaceful conflict resolution. Although many CHRC members generally understood what human rights are, most did not know that the United Nations had approved a "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (Appendix A) that applied to everyone in the world. They were not aware of the specificity of these rights and one participant at the human rights seminar told Fanfan that he did not believe that everyone has human rights. He told the group that they are only for those people who are in a class

position that honors these human rights. Other participants were quiet on the point suggesting agreement, except Fanfan, who has made a career of defending the rights of the poorest and most vulnerable.

Ludwik Fleck (1979) coined the term "thought collective" to refer to "a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction" (p. 39). He did not believe that cognition was an individual process but a social activity "since the existing stock of knowledge exceeds the range available to any one individual" (p. 38). Most of the participants attending the GR-CHRC seminar had a concept of human rights although the realization of these rights was associated with class position. Although they believed that law-abiding people were entitled to these rights, they did not envision a system that would assure them of such rights. Their conception of human rights is understandable in a society sharply divided by differences of class and allegiance to political leaders, where arbitrary arrests are common and the opportunity to have a speedy trial does not exist. Even those individuals, who have been charged without sufficient grounds or evidence, are often left in prison for an indefinite period of time. Such was the case with Anne Auguste, an Aristide supporter and Haitian folk singer. After five years of incarceration, she was finally released without a trial.

In spite of their tacit collective understanding of human rights, the Grande Ravine residents at the seminar did not initially understand what their human rights are, how they were determined, and who is entitled to them. This became particularly clear when the three *bandi*—Ti Nolè, Maton, and Pato—asked if I would be willing to give a seminar on

human rights to community organizations in Grande Ravine. I asked the three of them what they thought the agenda should be. They stated that many in Grande Ravine know about human rights in concept, but they do not understand what they are specifically and even who is entitled to them. Their perceptions were in line with comments by other seminar participants. Although the Grande Ravine CHRC is familiar with those rights that are most abused, such as freedom from arbitrary arrests, they have not received specific training, themselves, except the informal learning that occurs when they collaborate with Fanfan.

The Grande Ravine CHRC members have had the benefit of working closely with Fanfan. This has elevated their understanding of the political and legal discourses involving human rights. Operating within a *community of practice*, Etienne Wenger's (1998) term for the social dynamics that occur in learning, CHRC members never received formal training in human rights advocacy; yet, they all could state what human rights are. They, along with other residents of Grande Ravine, knew when they were being treated unfairly by the police or when their security was threatened by *bandi* and other armed groups. This became clear at the first community meeting after the 2005 massacres. It was not a trained volunteer who called the first meeting or an outsider with human rights experience such as Thierry Fagart who was the MINUSTAH chief of human rights. It was the late Bruner Esterne, former Grande Ravine CHRC president, and two other community organizers from Grande Ravine.

A shared history and a shared consciousness gives people a starting point for making sense out of events that have negative repercussions upon the community and residents living in the community. Dialogue can move forward when common ground is established. As previously mentioned, dialogue is necessary to move towards resolution of a problem or issue.

Finding #9: Learning and knowing about human rights advocacy

Wenger's (1998) theory of learning incorporates four components: (1) identity (learning as becoming), (2) meaning (learning as experience), (3) practice (learning by doing), and (4) community (learning as belonging) (p. 5). Each of these components is relevant to the formation, organization, and identity of the Grande Ravine CHRC. Identity is developed through participation in the CHRC. Although members initially may not see themselves as human rights advocates, they learn to assume this role and to apply the skills imparted by Fanfan and other council members. Meaning is developed through the experiences members have as part of the CHRC. Practice is developed by the application of knowledge members have about dialogue and intervention. New situations may also arise that also elevate this learning by doing. Finally, a sense of community is developed when residents in Grande Ravine identify CHRC members as human rights advocates working on their behalf.

A *community of practice* is the interdependence that individuals have on one another to learn or apply a new concept or skill (Wenger, 1998, p. 5). According to Lave and Wenger (1991), learning may be situated where participants are allowed to enter a

community of practice at levels commensurate with their degree of knowledge and skill. Grande Ravine CHRC members have been learning from Evel Fanfan, the Haitian legal expert in human rights, and following his lead when it comes to collecting information about writing complaints when Grande Ravine residents approach them with abuses of their rights and threats made by *bandi*. Lave and Wenger propose theories that function both within and outside of formal education. In fact, as social theories of learning, their theories support an informal education model, which is more realistic for community-based initiatives.

Geoff Fagan (1996) also utilizes a social theory of learning framework. He believes that education is not neutral but immersed in the politics of justice and equality. For Fagan, the purpose of education is engagement, which he argues is democratic, negotiated, and pragmatic (p. 137). His view of education links knowledge to application, suggesting that local people, parents, and young people are capable of enabling their own learning given help and support as needed (p. 137). His view of education is in line with the dynamics of the CHRC meetings I observed, where members of the CHRC as well as Grande Ravine residents worked through issues of justice and reparation. With each meeting, they would either receive an update on the legal steps that were being taken to address their concerns or they would engage in discussions having to do with conflict management as security issues worsened in Grande Ravine.

Janet Conway (2002) applies social theories of learning to social movements. She studied knowledge arising from activist practice in social movements and suggests that

there are three distinct modes of knowing that are embedded in activist practice. They include tacit knowledge, praxis, and knowledge production. Tacit knowledge is produced through everyday experiences and practices such as the day-to-day interactions and interventions that the CHRC members have with Grande Ravine residents. An example of this was when Joseph was asked to intervene on behalf of a resident unfairly targeted by neighbors who believed her to be a *lougarou* (or werewolf). Joseph's ability to intervene and convince the group of vigilantes that she, in fact, was not a *lougarou* exemplifies the use of tacit knowledge. He had to have sufficient understanding of why the group would identify her as a *lougarou* in order to convincingly dispute it and reverse the group's course of action.

Conway (2002) argues that knowledge in social movements is primarily produced through praxis (p. 21). She claims that when activists reflect critically and self-consciously about their practice and develop new insights as a result, they are engaging in praxis (p. 21). The activities and discussions that made up and superseded the weekly CHRC agenda exemplify learning through praxis. Activities that incorporated a simultaneous action and reflection included planning and conducting a sit-in at the residence of Prime Minister Alexis in 2007. The Day of Reflection is another example where CHRC members and Grande Ravine victims organized activities requiring them to not only do the planning and make the contacts but to hold a press conference where they each shared a personal story and demanded reparations from the Haitian government. The press conference at the Day of Reflection provided Joseph with a new experience. The social action, holding a press conference to demand justice and reparation from the

government is an example in which both praxis and reflection were occurring almost simultaneously.

Knowledge production, according to Conway (2002), occurs when "the generation of movement-based interpretation of the world becomes central to the movement's self-understanding and development and to the capacity of social movement publics to enter into political struggles in which contestations over knowledge are central" (p. 21). Freire (2004) says this begins with *conscientização* or consciousness raising. The statement made at the seminar claiming that human rights are only for some people was a rich moment in consciousness raising. It was an opportunity for participants to understand not only that they are born with these rights, but that the responsibility lies with them to protect these rights using legal and peaceful channels. Fanfan reiterated that at times people need advocates to help them defend their rights. However, it is still up to them to act responsibly when they observe that abuses of human rights have occurred or have the potential to occur. They do this by taking a personal stance and by making the appropriate legal and governmental contacts.

To facilitate knowledge about human rights and taking effective actions to defend these rights is a new role that the CHRC and AUMOHD were beginning to assume. The organization of a community-based human rights education program may be a direction that would be most beneficial to the CHRC, AUMOHD, and the Grande Ravine community since responsibility for articulating and defending human rights would be shared. This would also de-emphasize CHRC's role as a power broker of sorts and

reduce much of the suspicion bandits have about the CHRC influence with over the Haitian National Police or MINUSTAH, and in the Grande Ravine community.

A summary of the key findings

Certain organizational characteristics influenced the efforts made by the CHRC to resolve socio-political and socio-cultural conflicts. Among them was the fact that the members of the group originally came from a grassroots, loosely organized group of concerned Grande Ravine residents who met to discuss a response to the Lame Ti Manchèt massacres on August 20-21, 2005. The group was reported to have included at least a couple hundred people (Joseph, personal communication, 6/13/07). The group met weekly to discuss their grief, fear, and concerns about how victims were going to pay for funerals and the reconstruction of destroyed property.

With Evel Fanfan's assistance, the grassroots group became a CHRC framework that would include pro bono legal advice. The framework includes 11 members/officers, one of whom is legal counsel from AUMOHD, and the other 10 represent different interests in the community, including educators, vendors, clergy, victims, etc. The advantage to this framework is that it favors a diversity of representation so that the Grande Ravine community would feel there were people in the CHRC who could represent their concerns. Having both legal representation and a diversity of community members in the organization gave the CHRC sufficient cultural currency and legitimacy to act for the community in legal, political, and social arenas. Another factor that gave legitimacy to the CHRC was the shared history that members of the organization had

with other Grande Ravine residents. Each of the members had lived in Grande Ravine for a minimum of five years and were aware of the political leanings of the area, favorable to Aristide, as well as the social tensions in the community that resulted in members of Lame Ti Manchèt being driven out of Grande Ravine prior to their recruitment as members of the PNH attaché group.

Creating opportunities for dialogue has been one of the most effective methods used by the CHRC. Dialogue and opportunities to air concerns has given residents of Grande Ravine encouragement to work through problems created by the police, Lame Ti Manchèt, bandits living in or near the community, as well as misunderstandings among neighbors. Dialogue has been effective, if only for a few months at a time, in dispelling rumors that have themselves posed a threat to CHRC members, particularly Frantzco Joseph. However, dialogue alone could not resolve the complex problems presented to the CHRC.

Fanfan provided the means for the CHRC to formulate a legal, political, and social response to the massacres. The legal response required Fanfan and the CHRC to research the details of the massacres and provide a formal complaint to the Haitian National Police. A political engagement was also important to the efforts made by the CHRC. By seeking political solutions to the Grande Ravine community's call for justice and reparations, the CHRC established a presence at both the local level of government as well as the national level. The CHRC also developed a social response for addressing the massacres as well as other problems that occurred apart from the massacres, such as

problems of insecurity brought about by banditry and assistance to families who were displaced by hurricane damage in 2008. The work that the CHRC has done at a legal, political, and social level has provided opportunities for the CHRC to network and connect with other community organizations both inside and outside Grande Ravine.

Using networks to address community problems can have negative repercussions. The idea of living within a community can be both unifying and divisive. There are several examples of this in the case study. The first is the community's insistence on driving out members of Lame Ti Manchèt prior to the formation of the attaché group. Enough Grande Ravine residents believed that the bandits who made up LTM were sufficiently dangerous and destructive that they needed to be run out of the community. This, of course, set up the perfect opportunity for the PNH and KID to hire enemies of Grande Ravine to hunt down pro-Aristide gang members or bandits. Another example was a problem that continued to haunt Joseph as the president of the CHRC. The "sons of Grande Ravine" who had been identified by many, including the deputy of Martissant, as armed men who fought LTM, also in time believed that Joseph was working too closely with PNH and MINUSTAH. Their sporadic death threats against Joseph and his family eventually forced Joseph to permanently leave Grande Ravine and the CHRC. In spite of this, the CHRC has adjusted and continues to operate there, perhaps with the realization that one can never network too closely with certain entities.

A summary of the implications

The overriding implication of my study is that grassroots community human rights councils in urban Haiti are their most effective when they

- Are responsive to all members of a community through open dialogue and open invitations to meetings.
- Minimize the politics of exclusion and inclusion in their community.
- Maintain transparency as an organization.
- Create a council that represents the diversity in the community.
- Include legal counsel as one of the core council members.
- Consider models of capacity building that would expand the role of the community human rights council and provide the greatest outreach.
- Provide alternative social discourses that unify rather than cause mistrust.
- Offer community-based human rights education programs that encourage all community members to recognize and take responsibility for human rights. This latter implication will be the focus of this section.

Capacity building for the Grande Ravine CHRC

The politics of a community can impede any opportunities for its members to resolve security and human rights issues. However, models of capacity building for the Grande Ravine CHRC might allow the organization to restructure how others, particularly local *bandi*, might view its work. For Grande Ravine, an expansion of social

and political discourses appears to be necessary to reduce violence and resolve human rights issues. This opening up of new discourses is especially necessary for the CHRC to remain viable and, thus, expand its capacity to better serve the residents of Grande Ravine. To do this, the CHRC might consider a community-based human rights program that focuses on teaching about human rights so that a new discourse can emerge that is unifying and supportive. Such a program would also add another context for the CHRC to work within and possibly reduce the suspicion that others may have about its intentions. Finally, a human rights education program would enable residents of the Grande Ravine community to be more cognizant of their rights and to understand the peaceful and legal options they have for securing these rights.

Chaskin, Brown, Venkatesh, and Vidal (2001) have defined capacity building as that which is concerned with sustaining and promoting the well-being of the community and all the residents within the community including individuals, informal groups, organizations, social networks, and the physical environment (p. 7). Although the Grande Ravine CHRC does not have revenue streams to support many activities, it does have potential for capacity building by networking with other community and human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International. In addition, it has networked with the Haitian National Police, MINUSTAH, and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration to increase security in Grande Ravine and nearby neighborhoods. When appropriate, the CHRC, in conjunction with AUMOHD, has networked with national political officials, such as the deputy of

Martissant and Prime Minister Alexis of Haiti. This has helped the CHRC acquire assistance for victims of massacres and natural disasters.

The CHRC has maintained sufficient *agency* within the Grande Ravine community to have residents from the community come to them and report complaints of banditry or other forms of insecurity. Residents also use the CHRC to help them mediate problems between them and their neighbors, the police, or MINUSTAH peacekeeping troops. Joseph works with the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program to prevent conflicts between armed groups. Joseph's work with the DDR program has given the CHRC more visibility but has also resulted in an adversarial relationship with the Grande Ravine *bandi* who believe that he has or will turn them in to the authorities. This has created significant problems for Joseph, causing him to leave Grande Ravine due to continuing death threats on him and his family. Although being the president of the CHRC likely put him in this vulnerable position, his association with the national disarmament program led many to believe that he had a direct conduit to the Haitian National Police. This limited view of the CHRC's (and Joseph's) activities indicated that an expansion of the CHRC role was due. As three *bandi* saw the need for human rights education in Grande Ravine, this could have been a natural extension of the CHRC's role in the community and would have diverted attention away from the CHRC as a legal or political entity, making advocacy and human rights education the organization's primary function.

Human rights education – Expanding the role of the Grande Ravine CHRC

Edward O'Brien, the founder of the National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law (NICEL), an organization based in the United States, began development and implementation of law-related education programs in 1972. After visiting South Africa in the mid-1980s, he learned about "the necessary connections among . . . three separate but invariably linked substantive areas" (p. 416)—democracy, just laws, and human rights. He describes their interrelatedness in the following statement:

> Without law there can be no human rights; without human rights there can be no just laws; without human rights there can be no democracy; and without democracy there can be no human rights, nor just laws (O'Brien, 1997, p. 416).

The problem introduces is both definitional and practical. Although the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a description of these rights and even addresses, to some extent, just and unjust laws, "democracy" remains a more elusive term. According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Merriam-Webster, retrieved 3/16/2010), democracy is defined as:

> 1a: government by the people; *especially*: rule of the majority b: a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections
>
> 2: a political unit that has a democratic government

However, in Haiti, democracy is both misunderstood and mistrusted. In 1990 Jennie Smith met with a group of Haitians who live in a northern rural community. She excerpts a comment made by a man who is an educator, farmer, and preacher. In the little schoolhouse where the meeting was held, she began with the question: "What is democracy?" Smith (2001) recounts the group's response to this question (p. 4):

> . . . one man tentatively offered a definition. "Democracy . . . is when every person is able to have enough food to eat—and good food—not just corn meal mush with no bean sauce." A woman with a child nursing at her breast added, "It's when everybody has the chance to give their children an education, instead of having to keep them out of school because we can't afford shoes or books, or need them to work in the fields." "It's when the 'little people,'" her brother chimed in, "not just the 'big men' in town, or those folks in Port-au-Prince, have a right to say what they think without getting beaten up by the section chief [the local military commander]. Everybody ought to have that right." Several other people continued: "Democracy is having a bed to sleep on, instead of a pile of straw or rags heaped on the floor." "Some people shouldn't have to walk miles to get cruddy water while other people get *ice* in their glasses every day." "I hear that folks in La Gonâve are boiling green mangoes to stay alive these days. That's not democracy" (p. 5).

Six years later, Smith (2001) met with another group that she said closely resembled the 1990 group. In the mountains of a southwestern peninsula locality, the members of this group discussed democracy as they understood it:

> "The Americans, they come here to tell us what democracy is, but as for me, I don't see that they truly understand the thing."
>
> "American democracy, that's not real democracy! How can you have democracy if you don't have respect?" "Hummph." . . . *"Demokrasi? Se pa demokrasi sa, sa se demokrache!"* [Democracy? That's not democra-*cy*. That's democra-*spit*!] (p. 5).

These excerpts demonstrate that Haitians may not have a sufficiently clear understanding of democracy to hold in place just laws and human rights. Also, as the discussion at the 2007 Grande Ravine human rights seminar indicated, there does not seem to be a consensus on who is entitled to human rights. And, given Haiti's dysfunctional judicial system, there is not an adequate infrastructure to support a fair implementation of laws. Although these beliefs and realities seem to negate any progress for democracy, human rights, and the creation and implementation of just laws, an informed public has the potential to turn this around. This is where community-based human rights education can be beneficial to those who embrace it and a unifying force for all community members so that everyone feels they can be a valued member of the community.

Human rights education (HRE) is not a new concept. Paulo Freire was most notably associated with HRE through his work with illiterate Brazilian adults in the 1970s and his book, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (first published in 1968) is one of the most prolific arguments for HRE. Donaldo Macedo (2004), who wrote the introduction to the book's 30th anniversary edition, quotes Freire's view on history and possibility: ". . . History is time filled with possibility and not inexorably determined—that the future is problematic and not already decided, fatalistically" (pp. 13-14). This statement suggests that even though a country might not fully respect human rights, there still remains the potential to reverse this trend. In June 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights addressed the need to support human rights through education. The Conference concluded:

> . . . human rights education, training, and public information were essential to the promotion and achievement of stable and harmonious relations among communities and for fostering mutual understanding, tolerance, and peace. The Conference recommended that States strive to eradicate illiteracy and direct education towards the full development of the human personality and the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It called on all States and institutions to include human rights, humanitarian law, democracy, and the rule of law as subjects in the curricula of all learning institutions in formal and non-formal settings. (UN General Assembly Report, 12/12/96, retrieved 3/16/10).

As a result, the UN General Assembly declared in 1995 the Decade for Human Rights Education, which extended to 2004. The Plan of Action had five objectives:

> . . . the assessment of needs and formulation of strategies; building and strengthening human rights education programs; developing educational material; strengthening the mass media; and the global dissemination of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The plan focuses on stimulating and supporting national and local activities and initiatives and is built upon the idea of a partnership between governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, professional associations, individuals, and large segments of civil society. . . The active engagement of non-governmental organizations, grass-roots organizations and professional associations in the various activities of the Plan of Action is seen as a crucial element for success. . . . (UN General Assembly Report, 12/12/96, retrieved 3/16/10).

Although the UN Commission on Human Rights reported achievements from HRE initiatives worldwide, there were shortcomings in the implementation of the Plan of Action and the meeting of the five HRE objectives. Challenges were also noted in the report that included the need for further development of "appropriate methodologies for human rights education, and in particular how to develop human rights learning starting from the daily life of people" (UN Commission on Human Rights, 2/25/2004, retrieved 3/16/10).

Paula Gerber (2008) found in her study that human rights education (HRE) also lacked a clear definition (p. 111). However, in most international definitions, the following elements were included:

> First, HRE must promote respect for all human rights as universal and indivisible standards belonging to all people. This involves more than the mere dissemination of information about content of human rights treaties. It must be empowering . . . [and] enable people to respond to the challenges that they can expect to face in their lives. Second, HRE must promote respect for others, be they parents or persons from different cultures and civilizations. This requires that HRE displace ignorance, which can lead to fear of persons from diverse racial, ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. Thus HRE acts as an antidote to racism, intolerance, and discrimination. Third, HRE must actively encourage the development of values relating to peace, tolerance, and equality in an integrated and holistic manner. This aspect of HRE helps to prevent violence and conflict, and promotes a free and open society (Gerber, 2008, pp. 111-112).

Although the prevention of violence and conflict is one goal of HRE, Donna Hicks' (1998), who conducted her research in Cambodia, found that

> ". . . human rights laws are not enough to stop violence and threats to one's dignity. Human rights education, with its normative focus, is also not enough to guarantee the internalization of a "code of conduct" that guides human interaction. Nor have conflict resolution practices been able to affect the change

> necessary to prevent conflicts from emerging. The only strategy that stands a chance of achieving the changes that allow groups freedom from threats for expressing their respective identities is one that integrates all the resources available from different approaches while recognizing the uniqueness of each contribution. This "experiment in collaboration" could be a model of what the world could be like if the "impulse toward humanity" reined (Hicks, 1998, p. 95).

Hicks' conclusion is an important one to consider when evaluating effective models for human rights education. The most common approach is to develop a model and a curriculum that does not include the input of those who are the receivers of it. How can HRE be effectively implemented in a community like Grande Ravine? Given the findings of the study, Hicks' collaborative approach certainly needs to be centermost in planning and executing an HRE program. Because of its diversity, the GR-CHRC is in a unique position to provide educational outreach in a community-based program that accomplishes the descriptors in Gerber's definition of human rights education, but also incorporates the concerns and values of Grande Ravine. The CHRC is also in a position to offer an HRE program that utilizes methodologies that address the daily life of the people who live in Grande Ravine.

To begin, the CHRC would need to develop an approach to learning about human rights that would cause a shift in discourse and encourage behaviors that are aligned with all or most of those listed by Gerber. As Hicks suggests, this shift cannot occur by

providing a single program with a curriculum. Instead, an eclectic approach needs to be fostered using a theoretical frame that incorporates the ideas, knowledge, and experiences of many and not the few. James Paul Gee's research on semiotic social spaces is a starting point for designing a holistic, homegrown approach to HRE, one that Grande Ravine residents can relate to and grow from and one that would shift the discourse away from the CHRC as a mediator of problems in the community.

If the organization of the CHRC can be viewed as a "community of practice," as described earlier in this study, Gee's studies on semiotic social spaces provides an alternative. Gee (2005) states, "This alternative focuses on the idea of a *space* in which people interact, rather than on *membership* in a community" (p. 214). Gee critiques the notion of "community of practice" by noting some of the problems that have been touched upon throughout this study:

- The idea of "community" can carry connotations of "belongingness" and close-knit personal ties among people that do not necessarily always fit classrooms, workplaces, or other sites where the notion of a community of practice has been used.
- The idea of "community" seems to bring with it the notion of people being "members." However, "membership" means such different things across different sorts of communities of practice, and there are so many different ways and degrees of being a member in some communities of practice that it is not clear that membership is a truly helpful notion (Gee, 2005, p. 214).

Gee (2005) further problematizes the notion of "community of practice" because it appears to label a group of people. He argues:

> Once this is done, we face vexatious issues over which people are in and which are out of the group, how far they are in or out, and when they are in or out. The answers to these questions vary—even their very answerability varies—greatly across different social groupings. If we start with the notion of a "community" we cannot go any further until we have defined who is in and who is not, since otherwise we cannot identify the community. Yet it is often issues of participation, membership, and boundaries that are problematic in the first place (p. 215).

A semiotic social space suggests that sometimes we begin with "spaces" instead of "groups" (Gee, 2005, p. 216). Although Gee's examples of spaces refer to virtual spaces, I believe these spaces can also be purely conceptual. Such a space would allow mobility of social position that is rarely allowed when adopting theories that identify groups of people as oppressed by a dominant oppressor. A space allows for the oppressed to move into a semiotic space where they can conceive of not being oppressed. This is a critical first step to recognition of one's entitlement to human rights.

A semiotic social space provides a framework with the greatest flexibility for implementing an HRE program. Gee (2005) defines a semiotic social space in the following diagram (p. 221):

Generator

[gives us a set of signs and possible relations among them]

Internal Grammar External Grammar

[design of content] [patterns of thought, deeds, interactions]

Portal(s)

[offers access to signs and interactions with them]

A generator is the content of the space—that is, what is the space "about." For example, a generator could be recollections of the 2005 massacres, knowledge of Haitian laws and fundamental human rights. The internal grammar would be expectations for the Play for Peace soccer game, rule of law, and a cultural understanding of justice. The external grammar would be the interactive discussions and actions of the people in Grande Ravine. The portal could be community meetings (including the CHRC meetings). A HRE approach would incorporate an understanding of the semiotic social space taking into account the experiences and knowledge of those who enter the space. Using the framework of a semiotic social space would provide a structure for multiple and collaborative approaches to human rights education while encouraging participants in the space to engage in a common endeavor understood and accepted by all who have entered that space. (In Chapter 2, affinity space is described as one type of semiotic social space that can be incorporated into the framework of a human rights education model.)

Recommendations

It is not a mere coincidence that Ti Nolè, Pato, and Maton asked me to give a seminar on human rights. As noted in the seminar, there are community organizers who believe that human rights are only for people who live in the United States or for Haitians who have money. The participant who stated this was very close in articulating what Ton Gi and others said at their community meetings when attempting to describe what a democracy is. For this participant, he was alluding that there can be no human rights in a country where the most fundamental necessities are not met such as clean water, adequate and nourishing food, health care, and shelter. It would be easy to claim that oppressive state apparatuses and a corrupt government keep them in this position. However, this does nothing to advance a discourse that would open a space for challenging the status quo. Effective human rights education programs that favor a framework such as the semiotic social space described by Gee (2005) would value prior knowledge and shared experiences, and create opportunities for new discourses to be formed that embrace the ideals of the UN Declaration of Human Rights as well as the ideals of the community. Further research will be necessary to study the impact a community-based human rights education program would have on the community it serves. Would such a program reduce violence in the community? And, would the residents of the community feel more empowered if they had a better understanding of their rights and the responsibility they need to take to defend those rights?

Conclusion

The study leaves open the question as to the best way for a grassroots organization to provide an outreach program that would disseminate knowledge about human rights and encourage dialogue and effective, peaceful action. A common approach is to have a developed curriculum that is taught to those who are interested in learning more about human rights. Another approach is the incorporation of critical pedagogy where discussions are held about power inequities and the impact of these inequities on human rights. Although both of these approaches have their merits, they may not be the most appropriate. By utilizing the notion of a semiotic social space, the responsibility for increasing awareness of human rights can be shared among those who provide a generator. Where gaps exist in knowledge or skills, the facilitator can pose questions for those in the space to investigate and to share in subsequent meetings. This approach addresses the unique needs of participants who wish to avoid generic answers/solutions to complex human rights issues.

APPENDIX A

UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Preamble

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, therefore,

The General Assembly,

Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11

1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14

1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16

1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17

1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21

1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25

1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26

1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It

shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27

1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29

1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

APPENDIX B

OFFICIAL COMPLAINT FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE

The following Haitian National Police report translated by Tom Luce (November 6, 2005) details the planning of the operation that led to the massacre of August 20. However, it does not indicate clear culpability for the events and the actors in those events who left dead or maimed so many victims:

Objective: Involvement of the Haitian National Police at St. Bernadette (Martissant) Park, August 20, 2005

Source: Complaint from the Inspector General's Office

I – The Facts

On Saturday, August 20, in carrying out legitimate orders some personnel from different units of the Haitian National Police under the Central Administration of the Administrative Police and the Administration of the Department of the West conducted an operation at Martissant intended to question suspected bandits sought after by the police. Some individuals armed with machetes, sticks, and firearms took advantage of the presence of the police to undertake some revenge which ended in the death of a dozen people,

II – The Investigation

1. Following up on some information received from his informants operating in the Martissant zone, the Director of the Department of the West, Division Chief, Carlo LOCHARD, decided to go forward with an operation at St. Bernadette Park located in the said zone where there was taking place as in every year at the same time, a soccer championship.
2. The objective of this operation was to go into the center of said park, to identify, thanks to the presence of informants, the bandits being sought after and to proceed to question them. In fact the information which the Director of the Department of the West had was that a group of individuals were regularly present (whose names were WILGUENS, SASSON, WIDMAILLE, SARDOU) and very involved in different cases of theft, homicide and kidnapping committed in the metropolitan area.
3. The operation was set for Saturday, August 20, 2005 and the Director of the Department of the West organized a briefing with those taking part with their respective teams, the division inspector Jean Michel GASPARD, Agent IV Jean Floran MATHIEU and Agent III Médard BLANCHARD, respectively identified under their code names, DDO-14, DDO-12 and DDO-13. This briefing centered on the plan prepared for the event.
4. After the briefing the Director of the Department of the West contacted by telephone the Central Director of the Administrative Police, Inspector General Renan ETIENNE, to request the reinforcement of specialize units of the Haitian

National Police. The Central Director asked him to make contact with the commandants of the units in question while he, from his end, was going to pass on appropriate instructions.

5. On the day set for the operation the units involved (patrols DDO-12, DDO-13 and DDO-14) gathered in the courtyard of the director's office of the Department of the West for last adjustments. At this meeting there were police officers from SWAT Team 3 and the police inspector, Roody PETION, the man in charge of unit MO-13 from the Corps of Intervention and Maintenance of Order. After having received the last instructions from the man in charge of the operation (police officer Jean Floran MATHIEU), the police officers presents went on their way to St.Bernadette Park.
6. The teams deployed were formed as follows:

   Patrol DDO-12: officers Jean Floran MATHIEU, Niclès DESTIN, Termy HORAT (driver of a Nissan vehicle Patrol 1-0676;

   Patrol DDO-13: officers Michelet FILS-AIME, Nackel LOUIS, Médard BLANCHARD (driver of the Nissan vehicle Patrol 074);

   Patrol DDO-14: officers Grévy LINDOR, Jean Fednel LAFALAISE, Stevenson CLERSAINT, Jean Michel GASPARD (driver of the Toyota Tundra vehicle 1-0837);

   Patrol SWAT-3: officers Djuly JEAN-BAPTISTE, Robinson FORTUNATE, Lucksonne JANVIER;

Patrol MO-14: Officers Roody PETION (driver of the vehicle), Jean Avla LAFLEUR, Guilner LINDOR, Gaudy SALOMON, Edgard PASCAL

7. In the course of the trip the patrol of the sub-station of Portail Léogane (composed of officers Pierre Jocelyn LETELIER, Gaby DUCLAIR and Réginald CIVIL, who use a DAIHATSU TERIOS plate number 1-0614) joined the other units and upon arriving at the grounds the drivers received the order to stay at the steering wheels of their vehicles while the deployment was put in place in the following manner.

   Group for entering: patrol MO-14 (officers Gaudy SALOMON, Guilner LINDOR, Jean Avia LAFLEUR, Edgard PASCAL) and patrol SWAT-3 (officers Lucksonne JANVIER, Djuly JEAN-BAPTISTE, Robinson FORTUNAT), uder the command of the one in charge of the operation, officer A-IV Jean Floran MATHIEU.

   Control of the entrance to St. Bernadette Park: patrol DDO-14 (officers Grévy LINDOR, Stevenson CLERSAINT, Jean Fednel LAFALAISE) under the command of the Division Inspector Jean Michel GASPARD.

   Control of the intersection of Boulevard Jean Jacques DESSALINES-Martissant 1: Patrol DDO-13 (officers Médard BLANCHARD, Michelet FILS-AIME and Nackell LOUIS).

   Control of Prompt St. (behind St. Bernadette Park): patrol Portail Léogane (officers Gaby DUCLAIR, Reginald CIVIL, Pierre Jocelyn LETELIER)

8. Once the deployment was in place the group charged with entering went to the field where the first half-time of the match was finishing. The man named Reginald MICHEL, one of the informants of the Director of the Department of the West for the zone accompanied them to identify the bandits who had to be questioned. The officers opened the main gate and went in to the applause of the crowd, estimated at more than seven thousand people, who believed the officers were there to provide security for the sports event.
9. Officer Jean Floran MATHIEU went to the MC of St. Bernadette Park through whom he ordered the crowd to lie down while the other officers who accompanied him closed the gate at the entry. At that moment a shot rang out which, along with the clanging shut of the gate and the order given by the officer in charge for the crowd to lie down, provoked a panic among those attending the game who rushed toward the exit.
10. Noticing that it was impossible to leave St. Bernadette Park by the main gate, most of the spectators of the game tried to climb the walls surrounding the field while shots were produced in an exchange between the police and the bandits who were trying to cover their flight and to avoid an eventual arraignment.
11. The shots made inside St. Bernadette Park and the garage next to a school classroom "Republic of Peru" resulted in the death of two people: a presumed bandit who exchanged shots with the officers in the group entering the field and the man so-called Réginald MICHEL, beaten by the bandits who identified him as

an informant. No mention was made concerning the weapon which the presumed bandit used who was killed in the exchange with the police.

12. At that moment a group of individuals armed with machetes, sticks and firearms took control of the interior of St. Bernadette Park. This group of individuals, known by the name of "Army of Little Machetes" took advantage of the presence of the police to commit attacks of all sorts on the people who were trying to flee.
13. These individuals chased the frightened spectators, mainly those who in their opinion were bandits or who were connected with them and took advantage of the fact that the police did not intervene to stop their actions, killing a certain number of people among whom were: Nesdou FEVRY, Francky HERNE, Denis JEAN-MARIE, Erinel ALCIDAS, Grégory ODICE, Yvens MELISSE and another individual not identified; the names Enock LAPLANTE, Christome DORCE, Jean Milfort PETIT-HOMME and Patrick BAPTISTE were given as those wounded by machete by these individuals.
14. The one in charge of the operation, noting the inability of the police to take control of the situation, requested reinforcements directly by radio and from the Center of Information and Operations (CRO); three patrols were sent to the site of the operation:
    - Patrol Side Guards: officers Lycon FRANÇOIS, Anderson CHARLOT, Jean René ESPERANCE, Clébert DORLUS;
    - Patrol of the Brigade of the Port-au-Prince station: officers Mégène PIERRE, Ronel JEAN, Hielson ANTOINE, Jerôme DESCOMES

- Patrol of the sub-station of Marché Salomon: officers Camélo FRANÇOIS, Harold POPO, Osnel PREVILOR, Dieuriel SAINT-LOUIS

15. These patrols then came to the Martissant zone and took their respective positions:
    - in front of the sub station of the Martissant zone on request of the officers stationed at this post;
    - at the entry of the fifth avenue Bolosse near the St. Bernadette passageway;
    - at the National gas station situated in front of St. Bernadette church.
16. These patrols did not take part in the intervention, being satisfied to control their respective positions until rain put an end to the operation.
17. The officers who had gone into the park, toward the end of the operation, made a tour in the zone situated behind St. Bernadette Park; this permitted them to discover the bodies of two other persons likely killed by machete by members of the small group called "Army of the Little Machete". The one in charge of the operation called the ambulance service from the University Hospital of the State of Haiti to transport the bodies.
18. Next, on Sunday, August 21, 2005 some members of the different units of the Haitian National Police carried out, according to the instructions of the General Director of the Administrative Police, a search operation in the zone called Grand Ravine during which some automatic weapon loaders, ammunition of different caliber and some combat clothes were confiscated.

19. During this operation a Nissan vehicle, “Pathfinder”, colored red, found without a license plate was taken and driven to the Headquarters of the Traffic and Road Police.
20. At this time once more members of the little group named “Army of the Little Machete” took advantage of the presence of the police to get involved: no loss of human life was reported but several houses considered the property of bandits were burned.

III – Conclusions of the Investigation

A – The Planning and Execution of the Operation of August 20, 2005

1. The operation of Saturday, August 20, 2005 led by the Haitian National Police had been decided upon with the aim of proceeding to question certain presumed bandits whose presence had been pointed out inside St. Bernadette Park.
2. This operation decided upon as a result of information received by the Director of the Department of the West from his informants presents some weaknesses in both its preparation and its execution. In fact:
    - No familiarity with the grounds had been obtained; the possibility of an important increase in the number of spectators of the soccer game had not been taken into account which set in motion an inadequate action;

- The identification of the bandits to be questioned was not detailed for the officers participating in the operation but was left in charge of the informants;
- The briefing carried out be officer Jean Floran MATHIEU, responsible for the operation, was not clear; the mission of the different units involved in this mission which had different methods of operating with regard to their specific missions was not made precise;
- The entire group involved in the operation was placed under the command of an officer of Grade A-IV which constitutes a major handicap for the conduct of this operation, the one in charge had neither the capacity nor the necessary rank for an operation of this extent;
- No planning had been done by the Director of the Department of the West in view of answering in an immediate way to an eventual demand for reinforcement given by the people involved in the operation;
- The chief of Port-au-Prince in whose jurisdiction the operation took place had not been informed of its taking place, nor were the officers of the sub-station of Martissant;
- The hearings of the different people in charge did not allow obtaining the motivation for the operation on August 21, 2005 at Grand Ravine.

B – The behavior of the officers engaged in the operation

The police who participated in the operation carried out by the Haitian National Police at St. Bernadette Park, particularly those who occupied the soccer field and its principal entrance are responsible to different degrees for the process that led to the events that followed this intervention:

- After having carried out the entrance they ordered the crowd to lie down even though there was no sign, real or apparent, of hostility on their part;
- They locked the principal gate to the field cutting off therefore any orderly exit by the spectators;
- The police responded in an uncontrolled manner to the shots of the bandits and did so without ascertaining the source of these shots thereby increasing the panic reaction of the crowd and consequently increasing the risk of the number of victims;
- The members of the small group called “Army of the Little Machete” carried out their assault, armed with machetes, sticks and firearms, without the police reacting to stop thee attacks, but on the contrary with the police openly collaborating or at least passively complicit;
- No measures were taken by the police with a view to bringing assistance to the spectators at the sports event who clearly were in danger.

The combined actions committed by these police entail:

- an illegal act (point 2-03, Punishment Scale, RDG);
- an error against the good name of the police (point 2-21);
- a very serious professional error (point 5-01);
- a violation of articles 7 and 9 of the Code of Ethics of the Haitian National Police;
- a violation of the General Order 003, relative to the use of force.

In addition, the framework of the investigation pursued by the Inspector General of the Haitian National Police into the events of August 20 at Martissant, the police who participated in the intervention:

- have denied having used their weapons;
- were unaware of the presence and intervention of the individual members of the small group named "Army of the Little Machete";
- deliberately kept silent about the number of dead bodies resulting from the intervention, which constitutes a falsification (point 2-64, Ethics Code: to make a false deposition in an investigation).

C – Action of the Director of the Department of the West with regard to the events of August 20, 2005

The division chief, Carlo LOCHARD, Director of the Department of the West, has admitted being the organizer of the operation of August 20, 2005 at St.

Bernadette Park for the reasons cited above. However even though he had received the report of police officer Jean Floran MATHIEU, the one responsible for the operation, and having been fully informed of the events that took place subsequent to the so-called intervention, has failed to

- pursue an inquiry into the circumstances which were crucial in these serious events;
- submit a timely report on the specifics to his superiors (General Director of the Haitian National Police, Chief Inspector General) which constitutes: an infraction of orders (points 4-11 and 4-15, Code of Punishments)
- a professional error (point 5-02)

In addition, by making the decision to put back into active service Division Inspector Jean Michel GASPARD—the same one who, under an investigation undertaken by the Central Administration of the Judiciary Police, was the object of a report of abandoning his post made by the one in charge of the sub-station of Port-au-Prince (CAFETERIA)—without reporting this to the General Director of the Haitian National Police who had the prerogative, the Division Chief, Carlo LOCHARD betrayed the confidence of his superior (point 2-66, Code of Punishment).

D – The case of the Central Director of the Administrative Police

The Inspector General, Renan ETIENNE, Central Director of the Administrative police admitted in his hearing to having been informed of the intervention of the Director of the Department of the West who had asked him to put at his disposal two patrols of specialized units of the Haitian National Police, namely one from the Corps of Intervention and Maintenance of Order, and the other from the intervention group of the Haitian National Police to which he had responded positively. Nonetheless all the while knowing of the events that took place in the course of the so-called intervention, he failed to:

- undertake an inquiry into the circumstances which were crucial to these serious events
- submit a timely and detailed report to his superiors (Director General of the Haitian National Police, Chief Inspector General)

He also admitted that on Sunday, August 21, 2005 in spite of the grave incidents of the evening before he passed instructions to the commander of the Group of Intervention of the Haitian National Police to the effect that a team of this unit would intervene in the zone of Grand Ravine. This intervention also resulted in important material destruction and no inquiry was made by the Central Director with regard to these events.

Moreover although the Central Director had received a correspondence from the Commander of the GIPNH covering the report of the one in charge of the

team which had acted on August 21, 2005 at Grand Ravine, no transmission of said report was made to the Director General of the Haitian National Police, which constitutes:

- an infraction of orders (point 4-11 and 4-15, Code of Punishments)
- a professional error (point 5-02)

E – Members of the small group named "Army of the Little Machete"

1. The information collected in the framework of the inquiry pursued by the office of the Inspector General is that the members of this little group are bandits who had been on a rampage in the zone and who had been chased out after February 2004. They had fled to different places of the metropolitan zone (notably to Bertin, commune of Carrefour) all the while operating in the zone of Bicentenaire under cover as refrigeration technicians.
2. Among those who committed the attacks at St. Bernadette Park and at Grand Ravine there have been identified:
    - Frantz LARAME (alias "Gérald Gwo Lombril"), escapee from the National Penitentiary in January 2004
    - Jean Yves GEORGES (alias "Brown"), escapee from the National Penitentiary in January 2004
    - Valdimir PADEAU (alias "KIMO") (tried unsuccessfully to gain admission to the Haitian National Police in 2004)
    - Guito SAINT-FORT (tried unsuccessfully to gain admission to the Haitian National Police in 2004)

- Jean Denis FAUSTIN
- Carlo BERNADEL (alias “CHOUPITE”)
- Steve DIEUSIBON (alias “RODNEY”)
- Stevenson GEFFRARD (alias “TIAS AKEEM”)
- Luckson LOUIS (alias “GIRAFE”)
- Roland TOUSSAINT (the brother-in-law of officer Roody PETION)
- Evens so called (alias “TETE CHANKRE”)
- Eddy so called (base LA FOI)
- Sweet so called (committed a murder in the Dominican Republic and then escaped from prison to return to Haiti)
- Kikki so called
- Eliphète so called
- Abdias so called

IV – Recommendations on the measures to be taken

Consequently the office of the Inspector General of the Haitian National Police recommends:

1. The dismissal of Inspector General Renan ETIENNE, 11-PP-01557
2. The dismissal of Division Chief Carlo LOCHARD, 11-PP-02322
3. The cancellation of the contract between the Haitian National Police and the officers:
    - Jean Michel GASPARD, 11-PP-0734, Division Inspector

- Roody PETION, 95-08-07-04205, Police Inspector
- Jedan Floran MATHIEU, 99-12-03-05558, A-4
- Guilner LINDOR, 03-14-05-06264, A-1
- Jean Avla LAFLEUR , 03-14-02-05929, A-1
- Gaudy SALOMON, 03-14-03-06123, A-1
- Edgard PASCAL, 03-14-10-06707, A-1
- Lucksonne JANVIER, 11-PP-002483, A-2 (DAP)
- Djuly JEAN-BAPTISTE, 02-13-04-05778, A-1
- Robinson FORTUNATE, 95-06-009-02792, A-4
- Nackel LOUIS, 11-PP-0183, A-3
- Stevenson CLERSAINT, 11-PP0606, A-2

4. A suspension of 60 days with loss of salary for the officers:
    - Médard BLANCHARD, 95-04-17-01221, A-3
    - Termy HORAT, 99-12-06-05639, A-2
    - Michelet FILS-AIME, 03-14-08-06499, A-1
    - Jean Fednel LAFALAISE, 04-15-01-06920, A-1
    - Niclès DESTIN, 03-14-04-06158, A-1
    - Grévy LINDOR, 11-PP-0993, A-3
5. The transmission of the case to the Government Prosecutor
6. The transmission of the case to the Central Director of the Judiciary Police for the pursuit of the inquiry particularly into the matter of the members of the little group named “Army of the Little Machete”, identified by the victims.

7. The establishment of a uniform procedure for the conduct of operations in which units under different central administrations will be brought to work together.

Dr. Gessy Cameau Coicou, MD, Inspector General In Chief, MPH

APPENDIX C

UN MANDATE FOR MINUSTAH

The mandate given by the Security Council on June 1, 2004 included these areas:

I. Secure and Stable Environment

(a) in support of the Transitional Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place;

(b) to assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming Haitian National Police, consistent with democratic policing standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its reorganization and training, including gender training, as well as monitoring/mentoring members of the Haitian National Police;

(c) to assist the Transitional Government, particularly the Haitian National Police, with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for all armed groups, including women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and public security measures;

(d) to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Coast

Guard, as well as with their institutional strengthening, including the re-establishment of the corrections system;

(e) to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, taking into account the primary responsibility of the Transitional Government in that regard;

(f) to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and of police authorities;

II. Political Process

(a) to support the constitutional and political process under way in Haiti including through good offices, and foster principles and democratic governance and institutional development;

(b) to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to bring about a process of national dialogue and reconciliation;

(c) to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to organize, monitor, and carry out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections at the earliest possible date, in particular through the provision of technical, logistical, and administrative assistance and continued security, with appropriate support to an electoral process with voter participation that is representative of the national demographics, including women;

(d) to assist the Transitional Government in extending State authority throughout Haiti and support good governance at local levels;

III. Human Rights

(a) to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights, particularly of women and children, in order to ensure individual accountability for human rights abuses and redress for victims;

(b) to monitor and report on the human rights situation, in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, including on the situation of returned refugees and displaced persons;

The Council also requested that MINUSTAH cooperate and coordinate with the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in carrying out its mandate. (United Nations-MINUSTAH, www.un.org; updated 2005; retrieved 1/23/09)

APPENDIX D

ACRONYMS

AI	Amnesty International
AUMOHD	Association des Universitaires Motivés pour une Haïti de Droit
CD	Convergence Démocratique (Democratic Convergence)
CHRC	Community Human Rights Council
CSHR	Center for the Study of Human Rights, at the University of Miami
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration
EU	European Union
FL	Fanmi Lavalas (the Lavalas Family political organization)
FLRN	Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationale (Front for Liberation and National Reconstruction), an anti-Aristide insurgency group
FNCD	Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie (National Front for Change and Democracy)
FRAPH	Front Révolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haïtien (Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti, a paramilitary group established in 1993

G184	Group 184, established in December 2002 with support from the (US) International Republican Institute
GR-CHRC	Grande Ravine Community Human Rights Council
HRE	Human Rights Education
HURAH	Human Rights Accompaniment in Haiti, an organization based in Vermont
IJDH	Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, a human rights organization based in Oregon
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KID	Komite Inite Demokratik
LESPWA	A political alliance that formed in 2005 which supported Rene Préval's presidential campaign
LTM	Lame Ti Manchèt, the PNH attaché responsible for three massacres in Grande Ravine
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization en Haïti (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, initiated in the spring of 2004)
MSF	Médicins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)
NCHR	National Coalition for Haitian Rights
NGO	Non-governmental organization

OAS	Organization of American States
OPL	Organisation du Peuple en Lutte (Organization of People in Struggle), a political party; from 1995-1997 OPL was an acronym for Organization Politique Lavalas
PNH	Police Nationale d'Haïti (Haitian National Police, established 1995)
UN	United Nations
UN-UDHR	UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

APPENDIX E

MAP OF HAITI AND SURROUNDING CARIBBEAN COUNTIES

APPENDIX F

MAP OF PORT-AU-PRINCE

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