SPIRITUAL BUT NOT RELIGIOUS BEING: EXPLORING STRUCTURAL ANTECEDENTS FOR THE PAIRING OF SPIRITUAL AND NON-RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

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SIGNED: Brian N. Hewlett
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ABSTRACT

Recent research and popular discourse offers evidence of a significant number of people in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world that self-identify as both “spiritual” and “not religious.” Based on the conventional religious paradigm that has previously been supported by western scholarship, spirituality is a factor of religious involvement and such an identity combination should be rare in societies where people overwhelmingly participate in church activities. However, these new empirical data challenge this supposition. This quandary has renewed an interest among academics in understanding the relationship between spirituality and religion and in identifying mechanisms that have an impact on variance on particular combinations of the two. This dissertation explores the antecedent nature of certain combinations of structural conditions across nation states in association with substantial aggregations of “spiritual but not religious” populations in an effort to offer empirical evidence that can be used to support theoretical arguments about the cross-national variation of this population. Using fuzzy set qualitative comparative methods and data from 32 nation states, this analysis explores the necessity and sufficiency of individual demographic and economic conditions, church and state relations, and popular attitudes about church involvement in politics while examining the consistency of their presence in paths that lead to “spiritual non-religious” identification. The results suggest that in the midst of an atmosphere of attitudes that oppose the involvement of religious organizations in politics that is related to the size of the institutional religious canopy, a nation’s structural economic forces may be driving the variance in religious identification that is associated with spiritual identification. However, a full understanding of this relationship can only be gained through combining tests offered in this work with future qualitative cross-national studies that also consider subjective meaning.
CHAPTER 1 – UNCOUPLING SPIRITUALITY AND RELIGION

1.1 The Problem: Confounded Spirituality and Religion

Social institutions are extremely important to the human developmental process. As essential agents in the process that creates social beings, they aid humanity in developing behaviors that are essential for effective participation in society. A central part of the socialization process is the formation of concepts individuals use in defining the self. Self identity emerges in the course of interaction with others and represents the ideas individuals have regarding personal attributes, capacities, and behavior and is reflected in the personality that individuals and individual social units, such as organizations, project. All individuals and other social units as a whole are mutually dependent on the socialization and emergent self-identity process in which institutions play a major role.

One institution that clearly plays a major role in socializing individuals is religion. An important question is just how major is the role of this institution in the process of developing and maintaining the self and another is how much is this institution reflected in personal identity. The answers to these questions are important for understanding human personality that is manifested by means of religious socialization versus that manifested within a lesser religious social context and for understanding the differences in the every day lives of individuals with personalities that have been fashioned in these two different ways. These answers are also important to the fundamental understanding of the attitudes individuals hold and the behaviors they direct toward conventional religious organizations and doctrines.
In the wake of growing evidence that spirituality and/or religion influences not just the physical well-being of individuals but also their mental health (Paloutzian & Ellison 1982; Reed 1991; Büssing, Ostermann & Matthiessen 2005), social, behavioral and health scientists alike have rekindled interest in understanding the spirituality of individuals, the religiosity of individuals, how religion relates to spirituality, and whether they are distinct phenomena or merely “two sides of the same coin.” This knowledge is important in determining where the source of the mental and physical well-being truly lies.

This renewed interest leads to the rethinking of old explanations or at least to the process of clarifying previous ways of obtaining these explanations. The traditional paradigm or conventional wisdom associated with western scholarship and the religious institution offers an explanation of the relationship between spirituality and religion that translates into spirituality being a product of involvement with the religious institution (Herminiak 1996; Wulff 1997; Grant, O’Neil & Stephens 2004). Under this conventional paradigm spirituality is defined as the subjective religious experience of individuals or the manifestation of individual interactions with structure that is produced by or representative of the religious institution (i.e., churches, doctrine, organizations, etc.). With this explanation the source of the well-being lies in the conventional religion.

A slight problem with this traditional paradigm is that spirituality and religion are analytically the same but philosophically and theoretically distinct. The “fuzziness” or “obscurity” of this distinction becomes even more apparent when spirituality is represented more along a personal subjective dimension and is often discussed as
“subjective religious experience,” or the identity that results from one’s involvement with the religious institution (Herminiak 1996; Wulff 1997; Grant, O’Neil & Stephens 2004). From this standpoint spirituality is often conceived as a byproduct or consequence of religious involvement (Helminiak 1996; Hood et. al. 1996; Spilka & McIntosh 1996; Zinnbauer et. al. 1997; Rose 2001). This conception leads to a few critical suppositions. First, individual spirituality or personal spiritual identity should not be possible without individuals experiencing conventional religious life. Second, spirituality should be associated with the behavioral experiences people have with religious institutions (i.e., attendance, affiliation, etc.) and in the subjective characteristics associated with the religious institution that people profess (i.e., beliefs, attitudes, etc.).

Classic and recent measures often indicate spirituality, as these suppositions would suggest, in ways that pertain to religious practices, beliefs and values and do not take into account all relevant dimensions of religiosity and spirituality (Fetzer Institute/NIAWG 1999; Pargament 1999; Seidlitz, Abernathy & Duberstein 2002). In other words, these measures indicate individual spiritual identity as religious identity or subjective religiosity. This leads to little if any conceptual difference between spirituality and religion which in turn leads to little possibility to express an analytical distinction between the two. Consequently, it is difficult to determine the actual source of physical and psychological well-being linked to the personal identities of individuals.

A basic inherent assumption that underlies the presuppositions of this traditional paradigm of western thought is that behavior and attitudes are unwavering indicators of true identity. This assumption logically leads to the understanding that socialization by
religious institutions produces religious behavior that subsequently produces a subjective religious identity or religiosity, which as previous measures have indicated is conceived synonymously as spirituality.

However, literature surfacing in recent examinations of “spiritual but not religious” self-identification, challenges this conventional approach by demonstrating that a fair number of people exhibit spiritual and/or religious behaviors but do not subjectively indicate religious identity (Roof 1993; Hout & Fischer 2002; Marler & Hadaway 2002). These empirical findings are consistent with what social psychologists have long argued that although behaviors and attitudes are sometimes consonant or consistent with identity in many cases they are dissonant or in opposition (Festinger 1957).

Classic and recent social psychological literature has also noted that social structure or context based on ordered and persisting relations among social positions in society is a key factor in determining different varieties of behavior and affect associated with personality or individual identity (House 1981; Molm, Takahashi & Petereson 2003; van Prooijen, ven den Bos & Wilke 2004). To illustrate this point, one can take for example those who self-identified as Jewish in Nazi controlled Germany. Although the personal subjective identity of these individuals was clear, they did not execute behaviors and attitudes that reflected their true identity due to the consequence that doing so evoked based on their position in the social structure. This is also currently the case with racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual minorities along with other oppressed populations in many parts of the world who consistently project dissonant attitudes and behaviors in order to
avoid maltreatment. A recent study of nurse practitioners further illustrates this point by noting that these professionals often take on spiritual/religious behaviors in order to better facilitate the terminal illness of their patients regardless of the nature of their true spiritual/religious identity (Grant, O’Neil & Stephens 2004).

Consequently, it may be accurate that behavior and attitudes often do in fact indicate true identity but given the situational or structural nature of this relationship this is not always the case. Therefore, any explanation of the relationship between spiritual and/or religious characteristics of personality and behaviors associated with conventional religion must consider the structural conditions which influence the level of consonance versus dissonance. By remaining ignorant of the effects of contextual differences, particularly at the societal level, making predictions or social generalizations about this relationship within or without particular societal units is precarious because the social mechanisms that are powerful in determining these identifications and the meanings that individuals associate with them are camouflaged, undoubtedly leading to a number of spurious assumptions.

Unfortunately, to date, when research has examined spirituality, contextual differences in societal units have been taken into account very little. The overwhelming majority of work on spirituality has been studied within a number of single cultural contexts and little work has been done to examine the impact of differences of social structure on either spiritual or religious identity. This work attempts to bridge that gap by examining how differences in societal structural conditions, including church-state
relations, economic composition, political ideology and demographic factors, affect the pairing of spiritual identification and non-religious identification.

1.2 Shifting Paradigms: Uncoupling Spirituality and Religion

Recent scholarly work in both the social and health sciences has offered evidence that is counter to the presuppositions of the traditional western paradigm of spirituality as religious experience. The evidence instead supports an approach that assumes that religiosity is a subset of spirituality that is formed in relation to conventional religion (Roof 1999; Rose 2001; Hout & Fischer 2002; Marler & Hadaway 2002; Hay & Socha 2005). The evidence also supports the notion that the two are often subjectively perceived as mutually exclusive by individuals and that conventional religious activity is not necessarily associated with either subjective religious identification or subjective spiritual identification.

The interdisciplinary approach to spirituality of which this research is a part conceives it as a much broader concept than subjective religious experience and in some interpretations as a natural human phenomenon (Reed 1987, 1991, 1992; Helminiak 1996; Pargament 1999; Rose 2001; Seidlitz, Abernathy & Dubenstein 2002; Roof 2003; Hay & Socha 2005). This conceptualization is much more in line with eastern philosophical thought, which unlike western thought that typically views the individual as maintained by an objective universe holds that people are intrinsic and inseparable parts of a subjective universe. Conceptualized in this manner, spirituality is not always bounded by experiences with conventional religion. Furthermore, any research that attempts to indicate spirituality in this manner addresses the problem of measuring
spirituality solely in religious terms as noted by some scholars (Helminiak 1996; Pargament 1999; Seidlitz, Abernathy & Dubenstein 2002).

In the diagram below, the conventional conception of spirituality as a product of religion is illustrated on the right by spirituality being the smaller of two concentric circles that is positioned within the larger circle of religion. This demonstrates the notion that spirituality is both a product and a subset of religion. In the second diagram to the right, spirituality is the larger of the two concentric circles, demonstrating the conceptualization that spirituality can exist outside of conventional religion.

Diagram 1: Venn Diagrams of Conventional vs. Interdisciplinary Approaches to Spirituality

Conventional (Western Thought)      Interdisciplinary (Eastern Thought)

This conceptualization allows movement away from indicating spirituality as objective characteristics of the religious institution that are reflected in individual behaviors, attitudes and beliefs while allowing movement toward an indication of subjective identification of the individual and the subjective meaning that spirituality holds for them, whatever that meaning may be. In other words, this approach places the focus on variation in how individuals experience themselves as spiritual and/or religious
versus on how they are categorized by others based on observed characteristics or objective criteria. In fact, some argue that a focus on spiritual and religious identity serves the human developmental need for self definition and to connect to others much more than conventional paradigm of the western world (Poll & Smith 2003). This conceptualization is also reflective of the concept of “habitus,” which Pierre Bordieu (1977) extended in his studies of the subjective-objective nature of cultural social practices and understanding.

This more recent approach is led by the conceptual difference that exists between spirituality and religiosity within the individual psyche. This subjective conceptual difference provides the basis for analytical distinctions that are sometimes independently influenced by social factors and at other times are jointly influenced by social factors. This subjective conceptualization of both religion and spirituality leads some individuals to identify themselves as just religious, some to identify themselves as just spiritual and others to identify as both, as illustrated in the additional Venn diagram below.

Diagram 2: Venn Diagram of Author’s Approach to Religious and Spiritual identification
The work I present in this study is consistent with this more recent approach and presumes the following distinctions in meaning based on these subjective conceptual differences.

**Spirituality** - the broader subjective identity of personal existence in relation to other objects that is held by the individual and may or may not be formed by a religious context. (*i.e.*, a personal identification with the purpose of maintaining the delicate balance of the earth’s ecological system that can be formulated through an indoctrination that it is God’s plan for human survival or not)

**Spiritual** – possessing character that is determined subjectively by individuals to be associated with the broader identity of their personal existence (*i.e.*, Earth Day is a spiritual event for an individual whose spirituality is tied to the above example)

**Religion** - the conventional social institution and its objects of organization. (*i.e.*, church services or the doctrine of God as a trinity that is promoted in them)

**Religious** – possessing character that was formed by the conventional social institution of religion. (*i.e.*, the crucifix is a religious symbol)

**Religiousness** – set of characteristics deemed manifestations of the conventional institution of religion. (*i.e.*, the personal belief that ritualistic reciting of prayers from the Torah will help purify the self)

**Religiosity** - the identity that individuals hold that is associated with the religious institution and/or their religiousness. (*i.e.*, a personal identification as an inherently sinful being who must constantly ask for forgiveness as taught in church)

A further understanding of these concepts is gained when the perspectives of subjective self-identification versus objective structural categorization are considered. This means that each of these concepts are conceived by individual actors as part of their identity or not and each are labels that are also used by others to categorize individuals based on common cultural understandings regardless of how they perceive themselves. In other words, actors see themselves as having spirituality, being a spiritual person,
being associated with religion, as being a religious person, as having religiousness, and as having religiosity. Likewise other actors categorize or label the same actors as having spirituality, as being a spiritual person, as being associated with religion, as being a religious person, as having religiousness, and as having religiosity. Sometimes these subjective identifications and labels are consistent and at other times they are not.

1.3 Shifting Assumptions: A Different Scope

By using the analytical distinctions based on the interdisciplinary approach to spirituality which is in line with eastern philosophy, the scope of my research in terms of assumptions or presuppositions is different than if I were to remain in line with the more traditional paradigm.

Several assumptions underlie this work but the first supposes that spirituality can be mutually exclusive from religion in terms of conventional behavioral practice, attitudes and beliefs. In other words, in this work, I contend that individuals can and do attend church, hold some attitudes that are consistent with religious doctrine and even hold beliefs as valid that are associated with what they have been taught by the church but do not identify these characteristics as a whole or as part of their spiritual identity (and visa versa).

In line with the traditional paradigm, I also assume that one’s religiousness and religiosity are a factor of their religion and religious experience. This means that if one professes a religious identity that possesses characteristics that they deem as religious, their identity is indicative of their interactions with the religious institution.
Furthermore, I assume that an individual’s subjective identification with objects that they deem religious or spiritual is indicative of their religious or spiritual identity. In other words, if the individual expresses that they identify with God and conceptualize God as a religious object, I interpret this as the individual identifying with something religious which suggests the presence of a religious identity. On the other hand, if the individual does not identify with any objects they conceptualize as religious, I presume this indicates an absence of religious identity. Similarly, if an individual identifies objects as spiritual and does not identify with them, for the purposes of this research, I classify them as not possessing a spiritual identity and I classify those who do identify with spiritual objects as possessing a spiritual identity.

Second, in relation to these conceptual denotations of spirituality and religion, I also assume that there is some basic common meaning that is shared by people across societies. In other words, when people in different nations are asked to elaborate on their own spiritual and religious identity distinctions, I presuppose that they refer to concepts that are commonly understood by people in all societies and then subjectively elaborate based on their personal experience. This assumption of conceptual equivalence is important because the surety that what people are conceptually describing as spirituality and religion in one nation state is the same as what is being described in another is not possible with the available data. Unfortunately, the only way to be sure of this is to empirically test whether this is the case. However, this assessment can not be performed prior to this study but due to its importance is reserved for future research as a part of my overall research agenda.
Third, in order to understand the impact of structural context of state governance on religious and spiritual distinctions, I make another assumption that is critical to this research. I assume that individuals see their governments as legitimate authority in their overall socialization. This contention is necessary since the impact of the political governance on the identification of its people is tied to whether individuals perceive their government in the proper authoritative context. It follows from the social psychological work that individuals offer propriety or personal legitimacy to objects they perceive to be legitimized by other objects to which they already give authority or by the endorsement of the collectively around them (Walker, Thomas & Zelditch 1986). Without the people giving legitimate authority to the government, the influence that the relationship between the church and state political system will have on the personalities of the people is implicit. However, with this postulation I am arguing as others have (Chaves & Cann 1992; McCleary & Barro 2003) that the impact on the personalities of the people is explicit.

Because this research is constructed with the concepts and assumptions outlined above and are limited by the data used in the analysis, I am constrained to a certain scope of claims that can be made in reference to my findings. In terms of the dependent identity variables that are affected by structural contexts in different societies, I can only make claims regarding whether identification does or does not exist, how these identifications exists separately or together, and whether independent factors do or do not influence the existence of these identities and their pairing. Although I offer interpretations and implications, I cannot and will not make express claims regarding the
meaning of spirituality, religiosity or any of the other subjective conceptions for individuals. However, I fully understand the importance of the development of meaning in different contexts and how differences in meaning lead to different personalities and how this process would to a great extent aid in establishing the validity of my argument. Even so, as I confer later in the discussion of methodology, due to data limitations, I am unable to determine expressed meaning in this project. This very important piece of my overall research agenda is also reserved for subsequent qualitative study.

1.4 Research Questions

Using the concepts outlined above and considering these basic assumptions, I explore the following questions in the remaining chapters:

1. **How is the spiritual but not religious identity distinction represented among this particular sample of European nation states?**

2. **What structural conditions individually impact the presence of the spiritual but not religious identity distinction within these states?**

3. **What combinations of structural conditions are most predictive in explaining the presence of the spiritual but not religious identity distinction?**

These questions are motivated by the fact that little research has been done to thoroughly analyze the spiritual but not religious phenomenon at the cross-national level and the fact that when this phenomenon is conceptualized in terms of the more recent approach to spirituality, there exists a substantial amount of variation in the identity distinctions across nation state boundaries that conventional wisdom cannot explain.
1.5 Theoretical Implications

Although some work has been done comparing nations in terms of the presence and/or lack of presence of religious organization, individual behaviors and attitudes that reflect religious organization and the impact of these behaviors and attitudes on particular political states and public policies and vice versa (Minkenberg 2002; Greeley 2003; McCleary & Barro 2003; Fox & Sandler 2005), little work has been done cross-nationally to address questions of spiritual but not religious identity or spiritual identity in general. Consequently, there is little theoretical basis for predictions or hypothetical assertions about when and where substantial populations that identify as spiritual but not religious should or should not be present. Therefore this project is forced into an exploratory mode. As a result, no particular hypotheses are addressed but consideration is given to logical progressions fostered by larger traditional ideologies and the implications of findings from previous work performed within particular societies.

Based on the traditional western paradigm of spirituality discussed earlier that conceptualizes spirituality as a byproduct of interacting with the religious institution, a general postulation can be formulated about the presence of spiritual identifiers, religious identifiers, and those that identify as spiritual but not religious. This tradition implies that the presence of religious identification and spiritual identification should be explained by the necessary and sufficient presence of substantial levels of conventional religious activity. In other words, large numbers of churches and high levels of participation in church activities should not only be adequate but required for the production of
substantial levels of spiritual identity alone, religious identity alone, and the pairing of the two.

This basic postulation is formulated logically from the conception of spirituality as “subjective religious experience,” or the byproduct of religious involvement. This postulation stems from the critical suppositions that: 1) individual spirituality should not be possible without individuals experiencing the religious institution; 2) spirituality should be reflected in the behavioral experiences people have with the religious institutions (i.e., attendance, affiliation, etc.); and 3) spirituality should also be reflected in the subjective characteristics associated with the religious institution that people profess (i.e., beliefs, attitudes, etc.). If religion (the conventional institution) is extremely prevalent in the sociopolitical landscape of a given nation and large amounts of people are participating in that institution, logically based on these suppositions, both religious and spiritual identity should be more prevalent as byproducts of that involvement.

By applying these basic postulations to previous theoretical and empirical work that has been concerned with the religious and spiritual experiences of individuals within specific national contexts, a limited framework was formulated to guide this project. This framework is defined more so by logical progression than by hypothetical expectations or theoretical probabilities. Although, some of the discussions within this project speak of expectations, I reiterate that in the subsequent analyses, these expectations do not take the form of directly tested hypotheses with predictions. These expectations are instead propositions derived from logical succession used to guide the
research in terms of what variables and indicators should be used and how and why it is important to test them in particular ways.

Although few have examined the effects of particular structural variables on combinations of spiritual and religious identification across national populations, many scholars have produced work that comment on this relationship within particular national contexts. For better or for worse, much of this work has used the United States as a laboratory.

In particular, Hout and Fischer (2002) in their analysis of changes in non-religious affiliation over a ten year period, argue the effects of a number of factors. They argue that a rise in the U.S. population of those claiming “no religion” or identifying as “non-religious,” some of which are “spiritual but not religious,” can be attributed to: 1) the possession of firm religious beliefs; 2) differences in age cohorts; 3) particular political views; 4) connections to a larger variety of social institutions; 5) the level of social activity; 6) the level of self confidence; 7) the level of education; and 8) parental influence. Although they argue for the effects of all of these variables, they give more serious attention to the existence of what they term a backlash against the conventional religious institution for its “politicalization” and alignment with conservative social agendas in the 1990s. They describe this backlash as a “dissent from the affinity that had emerged between conservative politics and organized religion” (pg. 179).

Their work gives credence to the possibility that demographic characteristics of a country, such as the age of its population, the parenting situation, the education situation, and the attitudes that people hold toward the religious institution’s involvement in politics
have a significant effect on religious identification of the populous. These scholars note a positive association between years of education and non-religious identification (i.e., the more education attained, the higher the level of non-religious identification) and a positive association between the cohort of children whose parents were most effected by the 1960s. They also note a negative effect of the number of parents on non-religious identification (i.e., the higher the level of the population with children, the lower the level of non-religious identification).

The work Hout and Fischer (2002) has done with these demographic variables demonstrates that individuals with higher levels of education are less likely to self-identify as religious. Their work also suggests that younger individuals also identify as religious less, those individuals with younger parents should also identify less with religion, and that where there are more parents there will be more individuals that identify less with religion.

It is possible that these individual level effects might prove to have some impact at the national level. For example, it is a logical progression to assume that if higher educated individuals are associated with non-religious identification, countries with higher levels of education in general will likely have higher levels of spiritual but not religious people. It is also a logical progression to assume that if individuals with younger parents are associated with non-religious identifiers, countries with younger populations combined with more parents are likely be associated with spiritual but not religious populations. However, these likelihood assumptions are based more upon whether individuals are likely to interpret their personal situations similarly versus based
on the likelihood of a structural condition uniformly constraining the situation that is interpreted; such as poverty or institutional discrimination.

Because this research is much more about the latter, I have chosen to focus on the individual level demographic variables discussed by Hout and Fischer (2002) in subsequent research and in this research concentrate more on the variable they point out that might have more of a uniform constraint on identification with religion due to social conformity. With attitudes against the politicization of religion, they note a positive relationship not identifying as religious. In other words, they argue that more of these attitudes are associated with more of these attitudes. This can be logically progressed to the assumption that national contexts that are more saturated with these anti-politicalization attitudes should also possess higher numbers of spiritual but not religious identifiers.

Although the work of these scholars offers a basis for assumptions about the presence of non-religious identification, their work unfortunately does not specifically provide a basis for when more spiritual identification should be expected in conjunction with this identification as is the case with the spiritual but not religious population of interest in this project. As I suggest earlier in this discussion, this lack of basis for cross-national expectations regarding the presence of spiritual but not religious is not unique to the work of these authors alone.

Regardless of this fact, other national and cross-national studies have aided in the understanding of non-religious identification by offering evidence of a correlation between religiousness and socioeconomic differences. Previous literature has pointed to
the fact that richer or more economically developed populations are less likely to be religious. Continuing contentions originally argued by Weber (1930), Wilson (1966) and Berger (1967) numerous works assert that economic development leads to the secularity among individuals and within social institutions.

A recent cross-national study by McCleary and Barro (2003) supports this assertion by offering evidence of a negative relationship between positive economic development in a country and the level of religiousness found in the population. They point out however that this depends a great deal on other dimensions. Combining this information with the postulations that spiritual and religious identifications are together byproducts of religious involvement leads to the possibility that a cross national analysis such as this project might reveal lower levels of religious identity and lower levels of spiritual identity in places where there are higher levels of economic success. Although it may give some indication, this is still not a basis for expecting to find lower levels of spiritual but not religious in similar conditions of high economic success.

Two dimensions that might play a part in determining these relationships are the level of inequality and wealth. If economic gain or the presence of economic success and wealth is equal across the population, it may not have an effect on the religiousness of the people since each facet of the population has the same resources to participate in religious institutions. However, if the wealth is concentrated in the hands of a lesser portion of people, that facet will possess much more resources to allow them to participate but they may not want to invest resources in religion for reasons that they associate with diminishing wealth. For whatever reasons, their decisions would certainly have an
impact on effects of wealth or economic success on religiousness as noted by McCleary and Barro (2003), which would include effects on the spiritual but not religious population.

The idea that the development of economic resources and the distribution of the resources may have an effect on the personality of the populous of national populations is also found in the recent work of Inglehart and Baker (2000) who argue that different value systems emerge from different economic situations and that economic development is associated with pervasive and predictable changes in the culture. They broadly contend that economic growth under industrialization promotes more secular-rational values and modernization and the rise of the postindustrial moves societies toward what they term “a syndrome of increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, postindustrial values.” Applying such contentions to this research certainly suggests that the richness of nations and rational competition for resources within nations should prove to have some sort of cross-national effect on spiritual but not religious populations.

The competition for resources that is highlighted by the question of inequality is reflective of a larger “Smithian” perspective on religious markets that might also have an impact on the cross-national variance in levels of spiritual, religious and consequently spiritual but not religious identification. Based on the work of Smith (1791) and most recently argued by Finke and Stark (1992) and Iannaccone and Stark (1994), this perspective argues that in an open market, organizational divisions of the religious institution must change and cater services in the competition to capture the association of particular facets of the population. Finke and Stark (1994) argue more specifically that
where there is religious pluralism, a situation where multiple religious possibilities realistically exist for the population, people are more likely to associate since they have an organizational division of the religious institution that will fit their needs (i.e., meet their market niche). Based on this perspective, the subsequent cross-national analyses might find that in countries where the level of religious pluralism is high, religious and spiritual identification should also be high, since conventional wisdom argues they are byproducts of the association with the religious institution. Alternatively, in countries where conventional religion is homogenous, this theoretical relationship suggests that religious and spiritual identification should be lower. Driven by the aspect of religious identification, it is then possible that the analysis might also find more spiritual but not religious populations in these countries as well.

Some have posited arguments challenging Finke and Stark (1994), claiming that religious pluralism does not lead to greater religiousness (Blau, Land and Redding 1992). This is based on the notion that the more choices people have in a religious market, the less people will be religious, in terms of organizational association, because the power of the institution is watered down and therefore becomes less appealing to the masses. Accordingly, this argument suggests that a cross-national analysis of religious and spiritual identity may find that in more religiously plural nations less people will identify as religious and hence the less spiritual the people will identify as well. Again based on the religious identification only, this suggests that more spiritual but not religious populations will possibly be found in these countries as well.
The issue of religious pluralism is closely related to church state relations due to the fact that restrictions on religion from the national government will have a profound effect on whether true pluralism exists. Some researchers have noted that cross-national rates of religious attendance are lower where state involvement and interference with religion is much more apparent (Chaves & Cann 1992). Chaves (1994) also argues that the secularity of a nation is a factor of authority given to the religious institution by individuals and by the state. This declining authority argument goes hand and hand with those arguing against Finke and Stark (1994), since a more pluralistic state would place religious choice in the hands of the people; giving them the ability to bestow authority to the church. These arguments lead to the possibility that the ensuing cross-national analyses will find that in places where the church is legitimized or given official authority by the state that there will be higher levels of religious identification and spiritual identification associated with the people, which based on the religious identity suggests that spiritual but not religious populations may be found in situations where the state does not legitimize the church or give it authority.

As noted, the postulations stemming from the traditional idea that spirituality is a product of the conventional religious institution do not offer an explanation as to when and where spiritual and religious identification should be expected to be at different or opposing levels in the same society. Likewise, the previous studies highlighted here also do not. The lack of cross-national analysis regarding this subject matter leaves a void in terms of empirical basis for expected correlation between the pairing of spiritual and non-religious identification of individuals and any structural variables; thereby making these
type of predictions in this project precarious at best if not impossible. Therefore, empirical examinations to determine these corollary relationships are clearly necessary in order to make future inference. Consequently, by addressing the cross-national research questions with many of the variables used in previous within nation studies in mind, I believe a better understanding of the relationship between spiritual and non-religious identification and the effects of societal structural factors will surface.

1.6 Methodological Overview

In order to help readers better understand the process by which the research questions were examined in this project, I offer here a short overview of the data sources, dependent and independent variables and methods of analysis. However, each of these will be elaborated upon in subsequent chapters.

I selected indicators for eight different data categories from multiple data sources. The sources include one international social survey (1999-2001 World Values Survey); one international archival project (2004 Religion and State Separation Project); two statistical indexes (2003 Gross Domestic Product Index and the Gini Index of Inequality); two annual fact books (1991 & 2001 Statesman’s Yearbook and the 2000 C.I.A. Factbook); and one previous study on religion and political economies (McCleary & Barro 2003). The seven different data categories involved include spiritual/religious identification, economic factors, church and state separation, conventional religious participation, political ideology, anti-politicizing attitudes toward religion and religious pluralism. Although, some sub-analyses using individual level data are discussed, the social units of analysis in this study were 32 nation states. As a result, all indicators in
each of these categories were transformed from individual level data into national state level proportions.

In order to reflect the subjective identification conceptualization illustrated in Diagram 2 earlier, I manipulated the spiritual and religious identification indicators to produce state level proportions of four types of subjective identification: 1) “spiritual and religious” identification, 2) “not spiritual but religious” identification, 3) “spiritual but not religious” identification, and 4) “not spiritual and not religious” identification. The indicators from the other categories were used to signify structural conditions that were tested in terms of their individual necessity, joint sufficiency and combined consistency against the spiritual but not religious outcome using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative methods of analysis. Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis was used because it is a proven method for analyzing the necessity of single conditions, the joint sufficiency of multiple conditions and the consistency of combined sets of conditions in the pathways leading to the presence of particular outcomes in a limited amount of cases (Ragin 2000).

I addressed the first research question by simply performing an in-depth analysis of the frequency distribution of the proportions of spiritual but not religious identifiers for each national case. Using the fs/QCA 2.0 analysis software package, I addressed the second question by testing for the necessity and sufficiency of each of the individual independent conditions for the production of substantial spiritual but not religious proportions in the set of national cases. I again used fs/QCA 2.0 to determine the consistency of combined conditions in the production of substantial proportions of the spiritual and not religious outcome among the set of nation states, minus any conditions
found to be necessary in the test addressing question two. The final question is addressed by simply comparing cases in terms of the appropriate values for each independent causal condition to determine groups of structurally equivalent or similar nations. The aggregate levels of spiritual but not religious populations for each of the nations in these subsets were then compared.

As is necessary with fs/QCA analyses, I calibrated the proportion values for each condition and the outcome into fuzzy set scores, which constitute the level of membership of each nation in the given set of nations that possess substantial levels of the outcome. A high fuzzy set score constitutes a high level of membership in this set while a low score constitutes a low level of membership. The findings of these analyses are presented and elaborated upon in the subsequent chapters.

1.7 Limitations and Challenges

Due to the limited amount of work that has examined combinations of spiritual and religious identities at the cross national level, at the onset of this project I confronted a number of overall challenges. With little work to draw on, the usual process of formulating expectations from previous theoretical arguments and empirical analysis was not possible. This lack of research severely limits my ability to directly support the framework of my argument and the conceptualizations used in presenting it. Additionally, it is difficult to present citations that offer similar arguments or to re-examine previous hypotheses. Instead, I am forced to construct an argument using previous work that indirectly supports what I present.
Another major overall challenge to this project is getting the academic research community that has become fairly rooted in the traditional paradigm for a number of decades to offer legitimacy and to accept a new approach. With little or no previous empirical evidence to compare with the results of this study, the challenge is to present evidence from this research in a manner that scholars will be definitively convinced of its validity.

Aside from these overall challenges exists a number of other limitations, most of which are related to the conceptualization and data measurement. First, as previously mentioned, there is a limited amount of data collected on this topic, particularly for spirituality overall but even more so for how it is conceived in this research. The measurement issue that was also mentioned earlier is a large problem since what has been traditionally collected as spirituality in general is more often than not data reflecting religious spirituality or religiosity.

An additional limitation of the data used in this study, due to selection biases beyond my control, is that the cases include only a particular subset of nations that are not necessarily representative of the total world typology of spiritual and/or religious identification. Unfortunately, the international survey used was overwhelmingly distributed in European countries and in nation states that prescribe to Western values. Consequently, my research presents a lesser view of the variation related to the intersection of these two identities in the World and much more of view of this variation in the European Western World.
Lastly, the fact that I must heavily rely on assumptions as I argue some of the points in this work I contend is a limitation as well. The most frustrating of these examples is illustrated by the fact that my general argument that social structural factors help sufficiently explain variation in the identities at the cross national level relies heavily on the assumption that there is some common meaning or conceptualization of religion and spirituality that exists across nations. I can only proceed with this research based on this assumption because, to date, no qualitative study has measured whether this is or is not the case. Although this is another of many limitations that can be attributed to the lack of previous comparative or cross-cultural analyses regarding spiritual and/or religious identification, it is my hope that this research will serve as a catalyst for change in this area by providing a foundation upon which subsequent studies may build.

1.8 Expected Contributions

Despite the limitations and challenges that this work has faced, I believe the analysis and the results present a perspective that warrants the claims being made and consequently contribute to a number of literatures in the social, behavioral, and health sciences.

For one, the findings clearly help to support the previous literature in social psychology that has argued the importance of structure in the formation of personality and individual or group identities. Along side this support for social psychological premises; the work also has implications for the study of spirituality in relation to religion that traditionally takes place in the social science disciplines. It provides a fundamental approach to the conceptualization and study of spirituality that addresses the issue of
analytical differences, the concept has in relation to conventional religion, and measurement problems that have plagued the study of the relationship between the two.

This study also sheds much light on the recent “spiritual but not religious” and the “non-affiliated religious” phenomenon that have become a part of the secularization discourse by presenting secularity more as a form of identity and less a form of behavior, by pinpointing particular areas in the world where these phenomenon are occurring and by looking at structural associations that in combination may be serving as causal mechanisms for the presence or absence of this form of secularity. The production of this knowledge presents an empirical example upon which future researchers can build theoretical claims and offer assumptions.

Similarly, the health sciences, which as I discussed earlier is interested in the role of spirituality in health outcomes, can also utilize this work to assist in pinpointing particular spiritual identifications in given parts of the world and examine health issues in relation to them.

In addition to the health science contribution, this work speaks to political scientists’ interests in the impact of relationships between political regimes and social institutions like religion. It provides insight into how particular political relations between institutions have an impact on aspects of the personalities of people who are subjected to the impact of these institutional relationships.

The last important contribution I note is a methodological one. The use of fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis in this work provides a testimonial to the power of this method in analytical examinations of indicators of conceptual variables where the
correlation of the two is normally a problem when using other methods. By using this method, I was able to effectively untangle spirituality, religiosity and conventional religion and pinpoint the consistent presence of one as a particular structural causal factor in the pathways that lead to a particular combination of the other two as an outcome.

1.9 Summary and Chapter Overview

In sum, much of the previous literature focusing on the relationship between spirituality and religion reflects a traditional paradigm of conventional religion where spirituality is conceived and measured as subjective religious experience and is regarded as a subset of conventional religion. This traditional paradigm and its assumptions become problematic when the focus is turned to the subjective spiritual and religious identifications of people cross nationally. In fact, as this work suggests, this paradigm is unsatisfactory in explaining significant cross national variation in both the pairing and the disconnection of these identifications.

There is an alternative to this paradigm; a more recent approach to spirituality that conceptualizes spiritual identity as a broader concentric circle that encompasses religious identity and/or conventional religion. This approach coupled with recent methodological advances allows for the testing of the effects of other independent variables on spiritual and religious identity as exclusive but related variables and also for testing effects each may have on the other. Using this approach, I examined the effects of structural context on the variance in the disconnection of these identities (i.e., the spiritual but not religious identity distinction).
The research is directed by four major questions. The first question asks how the proportions of spiritual but not religious identifications vary across nation states. The second question asks what structural conditions influence or impact the pervasiveness of this identification across nations. The third question asks about combinations of structural conditions that are most consistent in explaining the presence of this particular identity distinction. The final question asks how structurally equivalent nation compare in terms of this identity distinction.

These questions are addressed by in-depth examinations of frequencies and Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. In Chapters 4 and 5 these methods are discussed in detail. Prior to this discussion, in chapters 2 and 3, the characteristics of the data including the sources, sampling methods and descriptive statistics, explanations of indicator generation, proxies selected for use in this study and the manner in which they were manipulated to produce sets of causal conditions and the outcome of interest are expanded upon.

Using frequencies, Chapter 2 offers in-depth discussions of the many independent structural variables that are transformed into causal conditions in this project. The national cases are categorized into sets of countries with substantial proportions of these variables of interest as well as sets with moderate and trivial proportions. These national groupings become important for inferences that are made in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3 also offers in-depth discussion about the spiritual but not religious dependent variable that is transformed into the project’s outcome that is examined in relation to the causal conditions developed in Chapter 2. This chapter also categorizes
the national cases in order to illustrate national groupings or sets of spiritual but not religious nations that are important to the analysis and discussions in the remaining chapters.

Chapter 4 moves from describing the data to analyzing it. In this chapter the concept of fuzzy sets and the importance of determining substantial membership in these sets are introduced and the transformation or calibration of both the independent and dependent variables from aggregate proportions into fuzzy set scores is illustrated. The transformed fuzzy set scores are used in this chapter to provide evidence for more explicit connections between the independent causal conditions and the spiritual but not religious outcome. Initial connections are revealed in this chapter by first determining the level of necessity and sufficiency for each independent variable that has been transformed into a causal condition for substantial membership in the set of spiritual but not religious nations. Consequently, this chapter offers the most insight into the methods solicited for the overall project analysis. Along with the necessity and sufficiency tests and a thorough description of the encompassing Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) methods, this chapter also provides insight into the rationale for their use as opposed to traditional regression methods.

Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) methods are used again in Chapter 5 to delineate more explicit connections by determining the consistent role of causal conditions in the pathways that lead to substantial membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations. The focus of the consistency tests
in this chapter is on determining the degree to which combinations of causal conditions are explicitly connected to the production of the outcome.

Finally, Chapter 6 offers some interpretations of these findings by drawing circumstantial narratives from the conjunctural findings about mechanism that may be driving the production of spiritual but not religious identity across the globe. In this chapter comparisons are drawn between structurally equivalent nations by discussing the spiritual but not religious phenomenon within subsets of countries that offer similar structural conditions and subsets of countries at the extremes of membership in the set of spiritual but not religious nations. The discussion points out and interprets mismatches that appear.

A final summary of findings and some implications and inferences about the spiritual but not religious world are also presented in this chapter. The chapter also discusses the overall significance of the work and contributions to current research in a few different sub-disciplines of sociology, work in the health sciences, and general discourse on spirituality, religion and their relationship. It ends with comments on the need for future research that will supplement and move the work performed here further.
CHAPTER 2 – STRUCTURAL CAUSAL CONDITIONS

2.1 Structure as Context

Sociologists define social structure as relatively enduring patterns of behavior and social relations embedded within social systems such as social institutions and norms. These patterns are a result of the interaction of personalities. Yet, no interaction of personalities occurs outside of the influence of these patterns or without social structure. In this way, structure shapes behavior as behavior shapes structure. This interplay between macrosocial phenomenon and individual psychology was pointed out by James House (1977) in his paper *The Three Faces of Social Psychology*. This thesis was later restated by Melvin Kohn (1989), who stressed the importance of sociologists and social psychologists considering characteristics of environment, not in terms of the immediate interpersonal environment but in terms of the broader societal environment in which interaction occurs.

Understanding this interplay requires the conclusion that personal interactions and the relationships associated with them do not occur in a vacuum but in contextual environments that are defined by particular sets of structural characteristics or conditions. An additional conclusion that must be made is that these sets of particular structural conditions have a causal impact on the personal interactions that are performed within them that is different from the impact of a different set of structural conditions.

When these contexts are taken into account, social researchers become acutely aware that when studying personal interactions we can either extract or isolate the relation from the contextual environment by replacing it with an artificial manipulated
one in the case of controlled experiments and holding other variants constant with statistical techniques or we can assess the characteristics of the context in which the relations are embedded and then compare the interactions and their outcomes when the contextual characteristics are more or less evident.

With this project, I opt to examine the effects of structural context on the presence of spiritual but not religious identification in the second manner rather than the first. Because I have chosen to explore the possible structural causation for this identification pattern conjunctively rather than partially, the additive nature of broader societal environments must be considered as much as possible. Understanding that it is not possible to consider all structural aspects or conditions at once, I start by concentrating on characteristics that when examined by others within national contexts have empirically proven to have some relative causal impact on other forms of similar or related identity patterns.

The work of the authors presented in the previous chapter offer a number of structural conditions that plausibly matter to the cross-national variance in spiritual but not religious identification because these conditions have empirically been tested and demonstrated some level of impact on general associations with religion. To briefly reiterate, Hout and Fischer (2002) argue for the effect of *attitudes that are in opposition to the politicization of religion*. McCleary and Barro (2003) assert a negative effect on religiousness resulting from *positive economic development* while presenting data that suggests an additional effect associated with the *distribution of wealth*. Inglehart and Baker (2000) provide evidence at the cross-national level for this as well. Finke and
Stark (1992) and Iannaccone and Stark (1994) argue that the \textit{plurality of conventional religious possibilities} has an effect while \textit{state involvement and interference with religion} is also offered as a factor by Chaves and Cann (1992).

2.2 Sources

Given the plausibility of the above effects, this chapter is dedicated to constructing independent causal conditions reflecting the conceptual significance of the variables noted by these authors. The bulk of the data used in the construction of these conditions were taken from three primary sources. The sources include the 1999-2001 World Values Survey, the 2004 Religion and State Separation Project, and the 2003 Human Development Report that includes a Gross Domestic Product Index and a GINI Index of Inequality.

The World Values Survey (WVS) is a one of two social surveys distributed worldwide to investigate socio-cultural and political change. It is conducted by a network of social scientist at leading universities around the world. The survey is performed on nationally representative samples in almost 80 societies on all six inhabited continents. A total of four waves have been carried out since 1981 allowing for a fairly accurate comparative analysis. Data from the latest wave of the survey, which was performed between 1999 and 2001, were used in this project.

In 2004 Jonathan Fox, Professor in the Department of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University in Ramat Gan, Israel, and his colleagues have developed the comprehensive Religion and State Separation (RAS) database that focuses on official government structure, policies, institutions, practices, and laws associated with religion. It solicits a
number of indicators from the RAS that are used as proxies for particular contexts of church and state separation. It is the most detailed dataset to date focusing on religion and state separation (Fox and Sandler 2005).

The Human Development Report (HDR) was first launched in 1990 with the single goal of putting people back at the center of the development process in terms of economic debate, policy and advocacy. Since the first report, a number of new composite indices for human development have been produced — the Human Development Index, the Gender-related Development Index, the Gender Empowerment Measure, and the Human Poverty Index. The reports have been published at the country level for more than 120 nations. This independent report is commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and is the product of a selected team of leading scholars, development practitioners and members of the Human Development Report Office of UNDP. The Report is translated into more than a dozen languages and published in more than 100 countries annually.

Each of these sources contributes indicators for particular types of data. The WVS is an appropriate source because it offers spiritual/religious identification information, demographic information, religious attitudes and participation information about the populations of each country serving as cases in this project. Another reason for its appropriateness is the fact that it provides large samples of respondents from a variety of countries in multiple continents. It is one of only two major international projects that survey a fairly random sample of the population of each country. The random quality of these samples is extremely important as it allows me to make compelling claims of
There are some pitfalls associated with the use of the 1999-2001 WVS as a major source for this project. First, the sample that I end up with is entirely European due to the fact that the items, from which I build my dependent variable/outcome, were not asked in other countries. This unfortunately limits my ability to make global claims. Second, although I would like to be able to make solid claims regarding the character or quality of the spiritual identity of the people of given nations in relation to the dependent demographic, attitude, behavioral and structural variables, I am severely limited in what I can claim as a result of the nature of the proxies used for spiritual identity and religious identity. The proxies only allow claims to be made about the presence or absence of identification in the population as related to the dependent variables/causal conditions versus claims that could be made about the presence or absence of particular meanings of spirituality or religion reflected in the identification of the people. In the long run, these meanings are obviously important for predictions and interpretations of the effects of these independent variables but unfortunately due to the limitations of the data, any discussions of meaning are relegated to speculation that can only be addressed in future research.

2.3 Independent Measures: *Attitudes opposing the involvement of Religion in Politics*

*Attitudes opposing the involvement of conventional religious organizations in politics*, which were the foremost focus of Hout and Fischer (2002) in their examination of
non-religious in the U.S., were also indicated using three items from the 1999-2001 WVS. The items asked respondents: 1) whether they believed that clergy should not influence voters; 2) whether it would be better if people with strong religious beliefs held public office; and 3) whether clergy should not influence government. Affirmative answers to the first and third items were coded as opposing attitudes, while the non-affirmative answers to second items were coded as opposing attitudes. As with all of the independent measures, these items were aggregated to the national level as well using the following formulas:

\[
\text{opposed to voting influence} = \frac{n \text{ of respondents who disagreed that church clergy should be allowed to influence voting}}{\text{total n of respondents}}
\]

\[
\text{opposed to people with strong religious beliefs holding public office} = \frac{n \text{ of respondents who did not agree that people with strong religious beliefs should hold public office}}{\text{total n of respondents}}
\]

\[
\text{opposed to government influence} = \frac{n \text{ of respondents who disagreed that church clergy should be allowed to influence government}}{\text{total n of respondents}}
\]

2.4 Independent Measures: Conventional Religious Participation

Conventional religious participation, the dependent variable of focus for Stark and Finke (1992), was indicated using a traditional item taken from the 1999-2001 WVS as well. The item used to indicate participation or religious attendance asked respondents how many times per year they attend church. The answers ranged from not at all to multiple times. Those respondents who indicated any attendance at all were coded as attending, while those who indicated not at all were coded as not attending.

Nation state proportions were determined using the following formula:
*religion attendance* = n of respondents in each case who indicated attending church 1 or more times per year/total n of respondents polled from that case

2.5 Independent Measures: Religion and State Separation

In an effort to address the concept of legitimacy or authority given to religious institutions by the state and the general nature of state neutrality toward conventional religion discussed by Chaves and Cann (1992) and Fox and Sandler (2005), a cumulative index measure was used from the RAS. The RAS database is divided into sections that code countries based on religious demographics, how separate religion is from the political state, discrimination aimed at minority religions, regulations and restrictions imposed on majority or all religions, types of religious legislation and general legislation that is effected by or has an effect on religion. Many of these subsidiary indicators are aggregated into cumulative indicators. One such indicator is the level of *religious discrimination*, which was formulated using the number of possible restrictions religious organizations or denominations were subjected to at the hands of their national government. The score between “0” and “20” that was assigned to each case by the RAS was transferred directly to the dataset. Therefore no formula for aggregation was necessary.

*religious discrimination* = n of 20 possible religious restrictions

2.6 Independent Measures: Economy

Traditionally, historical comparative analysis has also examined the impact of economic stratification on different cross national variables. McCleary and Barro (2003) and Inglehart and Baker (2000) all point to economic factors as having effects on trends
of less religiosity. Following this trend, this project uses values that were directly transferred for each case from the Gross Domestic Product Index (GDP) and coefficients from the GINI Index, both of which were published in the 2003 HDR, as indicators of economic development, which implies more wealth and relative inequality of distribution of wealth respectively. Higher values on the Gross Domestic Product Index represent higher economic development. A score of 0 on the GINI Index represents perfect income/wealth equality and a value of 100 equates to perfect inequality.

\[
\text{economic development} = GDP \text{ index score} \\
\text{economic inequality} = GINI \text{ index score}
\]

### 2.7 Independent Measures: Political Ideology

Comparative analysis of national populations has traditionally also considered differences in political environments and ideologies when examining social relations across national borders. In fact the work of Chaves and Cann (1992) and Inglehart and Baker (2000) both point to the effects of differences resulting from political structure. Keeping this in mind, I also developed an indicator for whether the national cases in this dataset have some current or prior socialist influence. The socialist influence indicator was developed by cross-referencing data offered by both The Statesman’s Yearbook and the RAS. Both sources indicated whether the countries in this dataset were formerly or currently controlled by socialist governments. Using this information any case indicated as such in either source was coded in this dataset as having a socialist influence.

\[
\text{socialist influence} = [0 = \text{absent}, 1 = \text{present}]
\]
2.8 Independent Measures: *Religious Pluralism*

As discussed in the initial chapter, a recent topic of debate is whether a religious free market offering a plethora of conventional religious options is or is not instrumental in larger numbers of people associating with the conventional religious institution (Stark and Finke 2004). Since the emergence of this debate, scholars have focused on the impact of *religious pluralism* on different cross-national phenomenon. I also developed an indicator that reveals how pluralistic a country is religiously using the comprehensive denominations data offered by the RAS. Finke and Stark (2004) argue that pluralism is not just about the presence of a variety of denominations but also about the actual distribution of the population among them. Following their conceptualization, I determined the indicator of pluralism for this study using the following formula, where $d$ is equivalent to the proportion of particular denominational and non-denominational affiliations to the total amount of religious in a given case.

\[
religious \ pluralism = 1 - \sum (d_i)^2
\]

2.9 Descriptive Statistics

Cases were selected from the 1999-2001 WVS based on the availability of data indicating the dependent spirituality and religious identification proxies, which I elaborate upon in the next chapter. Because all countries participating in international WVS are not polled at the same time or using the entire survey, only 32 countries (N=32) reflected data from both indicators.

Therefore the sample of nation states used in this analysis include: Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, The Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The United Kingdom, and Ukraine.

As previously mentioned, the sample is geographically biased considering all of the countries represented are European. As a result, many of the cases are also *western democracies*. Seventeen of the thirty three (51%) cases used in this analysis are coded as western democracies in the RAS. In addition to this substantial representation of western democratic rule, there exists a fair representation of countries with a *socialist-communist* influence. The subset of 16 countries with socialist and/or communist influence includes Austria (based on historical boundaries and occupation), Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany (based on occupation), Latvia, Lithuania, Poland Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Ukraine.

Despite this fact, the sample offers visibly significant variation in all of the structural conditions. The following set of graphs visually represents this variation across the national cases by plotting the proportions for each of the structural conditions that are examined in the subsequent analysis.

Using the GDP index to indicate national *economic development*, Graph A below offers the distribution of GDP index scores across the cases in the dataset. Graph B offers the distribution of GINI index scores indicating the level of *economic inequality*. For both indexes, higher values indicate greater economic development or greater inequality attributed to the country in relation to the others.
Graph A: Distribution of Gross Domestic Product Index Values

Mean: 0.86
Standard Deviation: 0.09
The GDP index scores reveal three economic subsets of nations. One set that falls above 0.8 while the other set is between 0.6 and 0.8 and the lowest falling below 0.6.
Based on these index scores, the richest subset of nations in this dataset include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. On the other hand, the two poorest nations are Belarus and the Ukraine.

Like the GDP index scores, the GINI index scores have less variance falling between just below 25 just below 40. Based on these scores, the nations can be divided into four subsets of inequality. In this sample, the countries with the “least inequality” include Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden with coefficients of 25 or below. Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine are all countries with “some inequality,” which is represented by coefficients between 30 and 25. Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, France, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Spain all have a “fair amount of inequality,” as is evident by scores between 30 and 35. Portugal and the UK all reflect the “highest inequality,” possessing scores above 35.

In terms of indicators of conventional religious participation, the case populations also vary visibly. Graph C reveals the differences in levels of religious attendance across cases.
Graph C: Distribution of Conventional Religious Participation

- Mean: 32%
- Standard Deviation: 22

Percent of Population Attending Religious Services
For a subset of 13 cases, religious attendance was indicated by less than 30% of the respondents. Another subset of 16 cases possessed between 30% and 60% of respondents who attended in some manner and a smaller subset of 3 cases possessed percentages above 60%.

Although religious attendance is used to indicate conventional religious participation in this project, another indicator that is often used is the proportion of the population that designates some affiliation with a particular denomination. In terms of this indicator, almost all of the cases affiliated populations were less than 20%. Austria, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Northern Ireland were the only countries with populations higher and unfortunately affiliation data were not available for Sweden.

What is interesting when affiliation is compared to attendance is that where attendance is high affiliation is not and where affiliation is high attendance is less. This pattern illustrates what Robert Wuthnow discusses in *After Heaven* (1998) and Wade C. Roof discusses about baby boomers in *A Generation of Seekers* (1993). Wuthnow argues that individuals have moved from a personal religion that is characterized by dwelling in sacred spaces or places to a self-oriented approach of spirituality characterized by seeking to find ways to compromise complex social reality and replace it with personal understanding. Roof also presented this notion by arguing that baby boomers are freer than former generations to break with their inherited faith and to shop for new ones conducive to their own liking, which leads to a self-styled or cafeteria-style approach to their denominational statement of belief. This pattern illustrates just that. In this sample, people are involved in religious activity but are not binding themselves to specific
denominations, which suggests less dwelling and more seeking through participation in various cross-denominational or non-denominational religious activity.

Not only do behaviors such as these suggest an “organizational aversion” or a lack of organized and lots of individual religion but the distributions of the attitudinal measures suggest the same. As I noted earlier, Hout and Fischer (2002) point out the connection between non-religious identification and attitudes held by U.S. respondents of the 1998 General Social Survey that oppose the church becoming involved or intervening in politics; what they term the “politicalization” of religion. Graph D delineates the case distribution of the three indicators from the WVS that I used to operationalize this concept.
Graph D: Distribution of Attitudes Opposing the Politicalization of Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent of Population who believe Clergy should not influence voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sweden</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nether</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finland</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spain</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>slovakia</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uk</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ireland</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>slovenia</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iceland</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>germany</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>romania</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hungary</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>denmark</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>czech republic</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belgium</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poland</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>luxembourg</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>italy</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belarus</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ukraine</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>russia</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>portugal</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>latvia</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>france</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>estonia</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lithuania</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greece</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>croatia</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bulgaria</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>austria</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>malta</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean: 89%
Standard Deviation: 5
Graph E: Distribution of Attitudes Opposing the Politicalization of Religion

Mean: 63%
Standard Deviation: 20
Graph F: Distribution of Attitudes Opposing the Politicalization of Religion

Mean: 55%
Standard Deviation: 33
The first indicator reflected in Graph D, which delineates attitudes opposed to conventional religion influencing voting, offers little agreement among the nations in the dataset. As the graph illustrates, the proportions of the people who reflect this attitude range from below 10% to between 80% and 90%. Malta, Romania and Ukraine, all having more than 70%, are the three countries with the highest level of these attitudes present while Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden are all below 15%.

The national sets of respondents were also not very consistent in terms of the proportions of attitudes that opposed the need for religiousness to hold public office, which is reflected in Graph E. For this indicator, the proportions ranged from below 20% to above 80%. Here the highest proportions also involve Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, all above 85% and the lowest percentages (below 30%) involve Malta, Romania and Ukraine as well.

The attitude that the religious institutions should not influence governmental decisions, seen in Graph F, seems to be the most consist among the three in terms of responses across countries and it is the most consistent in terms of maintaining the highest proportions. In all of the countries the proportions of respondents who agreed was above 65%. Sweden had the lowest agreement at 65% and Ireland was just above the lowest at 70%. The highest group included Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Lithuania and Portugal with 90% of the population in agreement.

These patterns may reflect a historical relationship between the church and the political state. For example the Scandinavian countries have had a history of democratic rule that has included very liberal state churches whereas countries like Romania and Ukraine have been involved with socialist/communist regimes that have had adversarial
relationships with the church. This historical note is just another reason why it was important to also develop a causal condition based on the relationship that churches have with the state. The RAS draws conclusions about this relationship in different countries based on a variety of measures. Based on laws designed for regulation or restriction of religious denominations, it offers a measure of the level of discrimination by the state. Graph G offers the levels of this discrimination across the cases used in this research.
Graph G: Distribution of Level of Religious Discrimination

Mean: 3.84
Standard Deviation: 4.4
The graph indicates that a subset of nineteen countries have little religious discrimination (scoring less than 5). Of those remaining, a subset of nine scored between 5 and 10, while only three, Belarus, Bulgaria and Russia scored 10 or above.

Finally, Graph H offers a look at the level of religious pluralism associated with each of the countries in this sample of nations.
Graph H offers a fairly wide distribution of religious pluralism across nations. Understanding that a score closer to 1 translates into higher levels of pluralism and a
score approaching 0 translates into lower levels because higher values represent more population distributed across more religious denominations, the total set of nations shows a clear division of four score classes; those countries that are below 0.2, those countries that are between 0.2 and 0.4, those between 0.4 and 0.6, and those countries above 0.6. Based on this distribution, the least religiously plural countries include Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Spain, which are all traditionally Catholic countries or Orthodox, which is fairly close to Catholicism. The most plural countries in terms of religious options are the Czech Republic, Estonia, and the Netherlands.

In sum, the overall independent character of the dataset reflects a fairly developed (mean GDP = .86) set of nations where wealth is not so evenly distributed (mean GINI = 31). In other words most of the wealth is in the hands of fewer numbers of people. Because of the usual secular character of Europe, there is a surprising number of respondents (mean proportion = 32%) that attend religious services of some kind overall they do not associate themselves with religious organizations (mean proportion = 13%). These respondents resoundingly do not want religion to be involved in the politics but they seem to think religion involved with voting is more of a problem (mean proportion = 89%) than being required to hold office (mean proportion = 63%) or involved with government (mean proportion = 55%). Most of the countries do not discriminate against religions (mean proportion = 3.8) but the set of nations are not extremely pluralistic when it comes to religious opportunities either (mean proportion = .34).

In terms of the chapter objective, which is to effectively group the cases according to structural conditions, proportion levels in each of the categories indicate that along the
lines of most of these dependent variables, the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Iceland and Finland) group together as expected. This is the most evident in the attitudes opposing religious intervention in the political realm. Additionally in some cases the grouping rises along the Catholic versus Protestant dimension as with the religious pluralism values. At other times it is clear that the countries group along the dimension of socialist/communist influence as with the state discrimination variable. These groupings confirm the normality of this sample in relation to what others have found about these countries.

When the visible distributions are scrutinized regardless of these national groupings, it appears that the variation found in some variables may be correlated with the variation in others. The matrix below indicates the actuality of these correlations.
Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Independent Causal Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>gdp</th>
<th>gini</th>
<th>noinfvot</th>
<th>relnr4ofc</th>
<th>noinfgov</th>
<th>relattend</th>
<th>relaffiliat</th>
<th>reldiscri</th>
<th>relplural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI</td>
<td>0.0241</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy should not influence vote</td>
<td>-0.451</td>
<td>0.2309</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need not be religious to hold office</td>
<td>0.7724</td>
<td>-0.1492</td>
<td>-0.4521</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy should not influence government</td>
<td>-0.3162</td>
<td>0.0981</td>
<td>0.7391</td>
<td>-0.1813</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend church</td>
<td>0.1259</td>
<td>0.3281</td>
<td>0.0084</td>
<td>-0.1476</td>
<td>0.1233</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denominational affiliate</td>
<td>0.5266</td>
<td>-0.2921</td>
<td>-0.6748</td>
<td>0.3548</td>
<td>-0.6197</td>
<td>0.0371</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious discrimination</td>
<td>-0.5221</td>
<td>-0.0704</td>
<td>0.2792</td>
<td>-0.3437</td>
<td>0.1721</td>
<td>-0.1584</td>
<td>-0.3207</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious pluralism</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td>-0.2278</td>
<td>-0.1108</td>
<td>-0.0793</td>
<td>-0.2144</td>
<td>-0.6028</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results of this matrix reveal negative relationships between GDP and a number of the structural conditions of interest. In terms of the opposition to religion being involved in politics, in less developed countries there exists more opposition to clergy influencing voting and government in general. Religious discrimination is also higher in less developed nations. The strongest negative correlation (> -0.50) associated with GDP involves the negative association with religious discrimination (-0.5221).

Reasonable negative correlations (> 0.45) also exist between the attitudes that clergy should not influence voting and the attitude that people need not be religious for office (-0.4521), meaning there are lesser numbers who hold the latter attitude where there are more who hold the former. Likewise, there are lesser numbers of those who don’t think religious is necessary to hold office where there are higher numbers of people who hold some denominational affiliation (-0.6748). In the same context of higher numbers of those who affiliate, less people believe that clergy should influence government (-0.6197). In the context of higher levels of religious pluralism, less people attend church.

Together these negative correlations suggest that in more developed wealthier countries there exists less discrimination against religious organizations and less opposition to religious involvement in politics. They also reflect a possible understanding that being religious in a political system is not the same as using religion to influence it since these attitude types are negatively correlated. The correlations also suggest that this understanding may be less relevant where there are a lot of denominational affiliates. Lastly, these correlations suggest that people don’t attend
when they have a variety to choose from, which already yields some relevance to the pluralism argument in the sociology of religion.

The matrix also offers strong (> 0.50) positive relationships between the attitude that religious beliefs are not required for public office and GDP index score (0.7724), religious affiliation and GDP index score (0.5266). It also offers a strong positive relationship between the attitude that religious organizations should not influence the government and the attitude that they should not influence voting (0.7391).

These correlations point to ties between economic wealth and anti-organizational and anti-politicizing attitudes. While taking into account these correlations, subsequent chapters are dedicated to determining how these conditions alone impact the presence of spiritual but not religious populations across the national cases and how they also impact this phenomenon as combined sets.
CHAPTER 3 – SPIRITUAL BUT NOT RELIGIOUS

3.1 Spiritual but not Religious as a measure of Secularity

Recently, a number of scholars in different disciplines have provided empirical evidence of the existence of substantial numbers of individuals who identify as spiritual but do not identify as religious in the U.S. and in other parts of the world (Roof 1989; Hout & Fischer 2002; Marler & Hadaway 2002; Greelely 2004).

Although evidence for this identity combination is growing, modest work has been produced that focuses on determining what social factors are correlated with the existence of this population within certain societies and even less work has focused on causes of cross-national variation in this social phenomenon. Consequently, we still know little about what may explain this self-identification pattern or in what context we can potentially expect it to emerge. Additionally, little qualitative research has been done that captures what meanings individuals attach to their non-identification or disassociation with religion or to understand what meanings may or may not be associated with their identification as spiritual. This being said, any assertions about the cause or meaning of spiritual but not religious identification have limited empirical grounding until more qualitative work is added to the quantitative studies done in this area.

Despite these facts, some have speculated that spiritual but not religious identification may be an indicator of rising secularization positing the variance in the religious part of the identity to be a result of less direct and indirect influence from proximate religious institutions or a statement of disapproval with conventional organized religion (Stark & Bainbridge 1987; Hout & Fischer 2002; Marler & Hadaway 2002).
Others have speculated that the spiritual but not religious label that individuals give themselves is merely a re-labeling of religion by those who are disappointed or have some dissafinity with the church (Hout & Fischer 2002) and others argue it is a re-conceptualization of personal religious experience (Roof 1992; Wuthnow 1998). Still others, particularly those outside of sociology of religion, see it not as a birth of some form of secularity but as a return to, resurgence, or rebirth of an understanding that would have existed before what Marx (1970 [1843]) and Durkheim (1976 [1915]) point to as the functional use of organizational religion for social control (Poll & Smith 2003).

In the world of conventional religion, those who practice it and those who study it conceive secularization as the process through which religious thinking, practice, and institutions lose their religious and/or social significance. The conception is related to the notion that as societies become more industrialized their religious morals, values, and institutions give way to worldly or material ones making traits that are often associated with conventional religion become common secular practices. The secularization thesis that society would “outgrow” belief in the supernatural was first set forth by Thomas Woolston (1733) and was followed up by Frederick the Great, Voltaire and Comte and most recently by Berger, Finke and Stark an others (Stark 1999). However, Stark and his colleagues now argue that this thesis is invalid, that secularization is not inevitable, and that societal levels of religious association depend upon the pluralistic character of religious markets. A major premise of secularization thesis is change over time. In other words, secularization is seen as a movement away from religiousness, which is predicated upon the assumption that religion is an ordinary social characteristic of humanity that has somehow always existed in its conventional organizational form. This assumption is
often attributed to the work of Durkheim who claimed that religion is an inherently social thing (1976 [1915]).

Although Durkheim does make this claim, many assumptions have falsely developed in relation to this statement. In particular, the notion that because religion is an inherently social thing, all social things are inherently religious. This notion lends to the further assumption that religion as we know it today has always been in the forefront of human existence. However, this assumption has effectively been debunked (Thomas 1971; Douglas 1983) allowing for the alternative notion that all forms of spirituality in the social world may not be religious and that the spiritual but not religious identification that I study here may in fact have some other motivational meaning that is more related to the spiritual part of the identity and less related to the religious part of the identity that is presumably associated with their interactions with conventional religion. Despite the actual motivation or meaning that individuals may or may not hold in association with this identity combination that this research is not able to make definitive conclusions about, it remains clear that since this identification is an active statement of non-identification with religion it represents a personality that is characterized by lesser association with conventional religion and can therefore be considered an indicator of individual secularity.

Secularity has been overwhelmingly measured in terms of conventional religious participation or activity associated with the religious institution or its organizations. This is based on another assumption that participation reflects the significance of religion to society and its members. However, as pointed out in the introduction, the discrepancy in
religious participation and religious identification warrants a closer examination of this assumption as well.

Due to the traditional conception of secularization little attention has been given to the notion of secularity as identity. In an attempt to address this void, I contend that individual subjective repudiation of conventional religion in the form of non-identification is an indication of secularity just as individual decisions not to participate. This being said, I further contend that examinations of secularization are incomplete without the consideration of this fact since social psychologists have long established the dissonance between behavior and cognition (Festinger 1957), which suggests that religious behavior does not necessarily indicate true subjective personal religiousness.

This point is illustrated with a simple examination of the percentages of spiritual identifying individuals, religious identifying individuals and religious participating individuals with the help of a few Venn diagrams. The module of the 1999-2001 World Value Survey, from which the data analyzed in this project were extracted, involves 118,519 total individual cases. However, only 36,161 of those cases were eligible for inclusion in this project since the analysis is limited to cases that responded to at least one of the three items used to indicate spiritual identity, religious identity, and religious participation which are discussed in more detail either in this or the previous chapter.

Assume the box with the diagrams below represents the total set of 118,519 individual cases. Within that set of total cases is the subset 36,161 of individuals that responded to at least one of the three indicators (note: missing values in each category included). Out of those 36,161 valid cases, the bottom left circle represents 11,886 cases (35%) that positively identified as participating in conventional religious services at least
once a week. The bottom right circle represents the 71% or 24,150 cases that positively identify as religious. The top circle represents the 77% or 26,439 cases that positively identify as spiritual. At the center of the diagram are the 10,659 cases or 31% of the sample that positively affirms religious participation, religious identification, and spiritual identification. These are effectively the most religious non-secular respondents.

Although the circles are not proportionate, further examination of the proportional overlap reveals that a very small portion (123 cases or less than 1%) of those who attend do not identify as religious as identified by the intersection of the bottom two circles. This suggests that there is a subset of individuals whose affirmative conventional religious behavior is not reflective of their secularity in terms of non-religious identity. Likewise, there is also a subset of individuals (642 cases or approximately 2%) whose affirmative conventional religious behavior is not reflective of their secularity in terms of non-spiritual identity.
This overlap offers evidence that among those who attend, there is less secularity in terms of either religious identification or spiritual identification than there is among non-participants. In other words, there is a higher ratio of people who do not identify as one or the other outside of the church than there is inside the church. This is illustrated by the fact that 6% of 34,161 respondents did not attend and did not identify as spiritual as opposed to the 2% that did not identify as spiritual and did attend. Similarly, 13% did not attend and did not identify as religious as opposed to 2% of the respondents that did not identify as religious and did attend.

The diagram also provides evidence for the claim that there is more non-participation among those who spiritually identify than there is among those who identify as religious. In fact, approximately 58% of the subset of 26,439 respondents who identified as spiritual did not attend church while approximately 54% of the subset of 24,150 religious identifiers did not attend.

In terms of other indications among the 26,439 spiritual identifying participants, it appears that approximately 16.5% are secular in terms of both religious attendance and identification. Approximately 19% did not identify with conventional religion regardless of attendance. Among the 24,150 religious identifiers, approximately 11% did not identify as spiritual while 9% did not identify as spiritual or attend. These numbers indicate less secularity among the religious identifiers (approximately 9%) than among the spiritual identifiers (approximately 17%).

As the distribution overlap shows, these three religious/spiritual indicators intersect to offer six different forms or types of secularity. The first form secularity (Type A) can be classified as totally secular because they are neither spiritual, religious,
nor are they practicing or attending as noted by non-affirming answers to the three indicators. It can be argued that the second from of secularity (Type B) is based on “institutional or conventional aversion” or a disconnect with the conventional religious institution since it involves understanding oneself as spiritual but not identifying or being involved with the conventional religious institution. Type C secularity can be argued is “spiritual church aversion” because it involves identification with conventional religious beliefs or doctrine but individuals do not see themselves as spiritual and do not venerate their religious identification in any church. It can be argued that Type D is “unchurched” secularity since it is characterized by not going to church although one sees themselves as spiritual and identifies with the religion. Type E then demonstrates “churched” secularity because it is characterized by going to church but no identification with the religion and by not seeing oneself as spiritual. Type F is “spiritual non-identifying” secularity, which is characterized by non-identification with religion only. Type G shows “non-spiritual” secularity, which is characterized by individuals not understanding themselves as spiritual only. Lastly, Type H is really not secularity at all but should be considered the opposite, non-secularity or total religiousness since individuals of this type are spiritual, religious and practicing as noted by affirmative answers to all of the indicators. This typology is reiterated in the following table:

Table 2: Secularity Distribution among World Values Survey Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secularity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Total</td>
<td>4,936</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Institutional/Conventional</td>
<td>4,367</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Spiritual church aversion</td>
<td>2,144</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Unchurched</td>
<td>10,828</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Churched</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Spiritual non-identifying</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G Non-spiritual</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Not Secular</td>
<td>10,659</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34,161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If spirituality is assumed to be part of the realm of religion as in the scope of most sociology of religion research, this typology of secularity is valid and these results effectively illustrate that secularity is a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans behavioral and cognitive dimensions. This evidence warrants the importance of determining factors that effect not just whether secularity exists or does not exist or whether it is more or less prevalent in some places over others but also determining what factors have an effect on variance across these dimensions and within one or two and sometimes all three of these dimensions.

3.2 Dependent Measures: Spirituality and Religiosity

In order to discover what structural conditions are factors in determining the variance in spiritual but not religious secularity across particular national contexts, it was important to indicate this outcome in the manner it is reflected by the above Venn diagrams. As I outlined in the first chapter, in this project, I conceptualize spirituality as a broader subjective identity of personal existence held by the individual in relation to other objects that may or may not be formed by a religious context. Therefore this identity is associated with whatever an individual conceives to be spiritual, which could be the conventional religious institution although not necessarily. I also conceptualize religiosity as the individual subjective identity that is associated with the conventional religious institution. Consequently, the scope of my conceptualization required my indication of the outcome to be in such a way that one can claim spirituality and religiosity, spirituality without religiosity, religiosity without spirituality or neither spirituality or religiosity.
The ideal items for this indication were offered in the 1998 General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS, which is conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), takes as its purpose the gathering of data on contemporary American society in order to monitor and explain trends and constants in attitudes. It has been administered 25 times since its initial fielding in 1972.

In 1998, respondents were asked “To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?” and “To what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person?” These items are ideal for indicating the dependent variables, spirituality and religiosity, as conceptualized in this project. Unfortunately, the 1999-2001 World Values Survey, from which I garner the data for this project does not replicate these items exactly but it does poll respondents with similar items that serve as adequate proxies. I believe the proxies are valid and still capture the constructs of spirituality and religiosity as I conceive them here because the proxy for spirituality captures spiritual identification by measuring an individual’s identification with something they subjectively conceive as spiritual and the religiosity proxy captures whether the individual personally identifies as religious.

The spirituality or spiritual identity proxy asked respondents to choose “what comes closest to your beliefs.” Respondents were offered the following four choices: 1) Spirit or life force; 2) Personal God; 3) Don’t know what to think; or 4) No spirit, God or life force. In this analysis, the first two choices were combined and coded as “1” to indicate definitive spiritual identification and the remaining two categories were coded as “0” to indicate non-definitive spiritual identification. This coding scheme is reflective of the author’s conceptualization of religious and non-religious spirituality.

\[
\text{spirituality} = n \text{ of spirit or life force respondents} + n \text{ of personal god respondents}
\]
The religiosity or religious identity proxy asked respondents: “Independently of whether you go to church/temple or not, would you say you are a religious person?” This item gave respondents three choices: 1) A religious person; 2) A convinced atheist; and 3) Not a religious person. Those who indicated they were a religious person were coded as “1” to signify definitive religious identification. Those who indicated they were a convinced atheist or were not a religious person were coded as “0” to indicate definitive non-religious identification.

religious = n of religious person respondents
Out of the total 34,374 people that responded to both proxies, 26,595 or 77.4% classified as spiritual and 24,299 or 70.7% indicated they were religious.\(^1\) Out of the over 77% who classified as spiritual, 4,983 or 18.7% indicated they were not religious.

As noted in the previous chapters, the goal of this research is to determine what impacts the variance in spiritual but not religious identification at the cross-national level. This dictates the nation state as the unit of analysis for this project. Therefore, ultimately the outcome to be examined in the subsequent analysis does not concern whether or not individuals self-identify as spiritual but not religious but instead concerns the aggregate numbers of individuals in each national case who identify in this manner.

Consequently, I distributed the 4,983 respondents who identified as spiritual but not religious into national sets of individuals and normalized the sets by determining what proportion were represented by this set. As a result, each set represents the proportion of the national respondents that subjectively identified with a force they conceive as spiritual in relation to the extent to which they believe themselves not to be religious. The percentage distribution across the 32 national cases involved in this study is outlined in Graph H below.

---

\(^1\) 36,161 cases responded to three indicators while 34,374 responded to the religious identity and spiritual identity indicators alone. Therefore, a total of 1,787 cases that responded to the religious participation items were missing for the religious identity item, the spiritual identity item or both.
Mean: 16%
Standard deviation: 11
3.3 Spiritual but not Religious compared to Non-religious and Non-practicing

One question that is relevant at this juncture is whether spiritual but not religious identification is in fact the same as just non-religious or at least driven by the non-religious part of the identity. In other words, how can we be sure that it is not the non-religious identification making up half of this secular identity that is actually driving the spiritual but not religious distribution witnessed here? This question is relevant since numerous scholars including many of those cited in this research speculate that this identity may just be a re-labeling of religiousness resulting from a backlash against religion. If this is so, it might also be the case that spiritual but not religious is a way for people to express that they are religious but not practicing.

If the non-religious identification is in fact driven by non-attendance and the spiritual but not religious identification is driven by the non-religious identification, the distribution of proportions should be highly correlated. Graph 3 offers some answers about whether or not this is the case by determining the correlation values of a matrix containing the distributions for the national sets of population identifying as not religious, the national sets of population identifying as religious but not attending church and the national sets of population identifying as spiritual but not religious.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Correlation matrix of other secularity types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>spnotrel</td>
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<tr>
<td>spiritual but not religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious non-practicing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This matrix reveals that there is no correlation between the national sets of not religious and the national sets of spiritual but not religious as represented by the -0.00 value. This finding clearly delineates no correlation between the national proportions of
spiritual but not religious identifiers and the proportions of those exclusively identify as not religious. Those who question this exclusivity are actually arguing that the spiritual identification is not a factor in its own right. However, this finding refutes that notion by indicating that the pattern of spiritual but not religious does not mirror the non-religious pattern, which means there is something substantively different about the subset of those who identify as non-religious with spirituality in relation to the superset of non-religious identifiers. However, this preliminary finding does not definitively mean that non-religious identification is not important to the professing a spiritual but not religious identity.

The coefficient of -0.49 suggests that any relation between the spiritual but not religious proportions and the religious non-practicing proportions is in the negative direction. This means that the higher the proportion of people in a country who are religious but not practicing the lesser the proportion of those who are spiritual but not religious. This finding offers evidence that is counter to the speculation that this identification is merely a re-labeling for those who are still religious but just don’t practice their religiousness with others. In fact this finding places these two identifying populations at opposing ends of the scale which means that identifying as spiritual but not religious and being religious but not practicing is highly unlikely.

Finally, the .65 coefficient represents a strong correlation between those who identify not religious and those who are religious but do not practice. This similarity in pattern suggests that there exists a relationship between those who do identify as religious but don’t go to church and those who do not identify as religious. This correlation indicates that the class of people who are unhappy with organized religion and
consequently interested in re-labeling their religiousness may be contained more so in these two sets of identifiers instead of in the spiritual but not religious set. Although these data suggest this, no definitive arguments can be made until analyses similar to this can be followed up with qualitative assessments of meaning.

3.4 Spiritual but not Religious as a fuzzy set

Having established some difference between the spiritual but not religious population and other secularization populations that have been argued by others may be the same group, I return to the chapter objective of outlining the development of the spiritual but not religious outcome. In order to do so, I remind you of the overall objective of the research, which is to determine the role of particular independent structural causal conditions in producing significant amounts of this form of secular identity. Previous literature suggests that independent conditions outlined in Chapter 2 are related to spiritual but not religious identity within nations. Additionally, the demographic make up of a country, the economic situation of a country and its political climate have all been proven to have an impact on individual and national identity at the cross-national level.

As also outlined earlier, Hout and Fischer (2002) argue that in the U.S. the age of a particular cohort, the level of education achieved by individuals, whether or not individuals are parents, and whether people approve of religious intervention in political policy are all factors in whether they claim religiousness. Stark and Finke (2002) argue that the plurality of opportunities presented to individuals in cultural contexts will aid in their association with the religious institution. Other scholars argue that the degree of legitimacy or authority given to religious institutions by individuals and state which is
related to the nature of a state’s neutrality toward religion or the legal recognition of
churches and denominations also has an effect on popular association with the church and
its ideology (Chaves and Cann 1992; Mark Chaves 1994; Minkenberg 2002). In an
attempt to determine the effect of these independent conditions on the presence of
spiritual but not religious identification, I solicit a method that takes into account the
quantitative nature of the proportions of both the independent conditions and the outcome
as we have discussed it thus far. But the use of this specific method also addresses an
additional qualitative dimension of these factors as well.

Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis allows this research to not just focus on
the quantity of spiritual but not religious identification associated with each national case
but it also turns the focus to a qualitative standard cases must possess in order to be
considered a true member of the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious
populations. In other words, as the quantitative distribution reveals, each national case
possesses some quantitative proportion [P] of population that identifies as spiritual but
not religious. However, should a nation that boasts just 2% of its population be
considered a true spiritual but not religious nation? What about a country where 25% of
its population identifies in this manner? Although the quantity reflects a quarter of the
population, does this qualify them as a member of the set of nations that are substantially
spiritual but not religious? This qualitative issue is addressed with the use of fuzzy sets.

By definition, a fuzzy set is a fine-grained, continuous measure that has been
carefully calibrated according to the substantive and theoretical knowledge of the
researcher that is relevant to the quality upon which membership in the set is based
(Ragin 2000). They are continuous measures whose intervals reflect the membership of
each case or nation state in a given set between the qualitative states of “fully in,” which is represented by a score of “1” and “fully out,” represented by a score of “0”. An entire set constitutes these two qualitative states and all the quantitative variation that exists in between. The fuzzy set score is always in relation to the standard that is necessary to make cases qualified members of the set in question.

Consequently, the fuzzy set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations in this analysis are the set of nations that have calibrated scores that reflect each cases membership in terms of them being between “fully in” or “fully out” of the set, or in terms of them possessing populations that are somewhere between “negligible” or “substantial.” In this study the crossover point that distinguishes being “in” versus “out” of this set is the central tendency of the mean (16% of the population identifying as spiritual but not religious). Based on this tendency the membership stratifies based on the positive and negative deviation tendencies. In other words, I used the first standard deviation above the mean as further crossover points to help qualitatively determine what was “more in than out” (between 16% and 27%), “almost fully in” (between 26.99% and 38%), and “fully in” (more than 38%) the set. Likewise, the determination of “more out than in” (between 5% and 15.99%), almost fully out (between -6% and 4.99%), and fully out (less than -6%) were determined using the first standard deviation below the mean. Of course, based on my substantive knowledge and the understanding that negative percentages are not possible, an adjustment of this qualitative coding scheme was necessary to reflect these qualitative distinctions within the range of the real distribution.

The case knowledge of the researcher combining with the central tendencies is a much better way to calibrate membership versus relying specifically on one or the other
(Ragin forthcoming). The combining of the two in a systematic manner also allows for replication. With this in mind, I utilized a technique that systematically combines the two in the production of probability values for each case, which are further transformed into fuzzy set membership scores.

The process involves first coding each case according to the qualitative labels [Q] discussed above. In this project, those cases determined to be “fully in” were assigned a code of 4. Those cases determined to be “almost fully in” were assigned a qualitative code of 2. Those cases determined to be “more in than out” were assigned a qualitative code of 0.5. The cases falling below the 16% crossover point were coded negatively, resulting in those determined to be “more out than in” coded as -0.5, those determined to be “almost fully out” coded as -2 and those determined to be “fully out” coded as -4.

These codes were regressed upon the original aggregate proportions in order to obtain a regression coefficient ($Y = a[Q] + x[P] + e$). This coefficient was added to the constant and multiplied by the case proportions to yield a distribution of probabilities (probability = $Y + cons * [P]$). The probabilities were then exponentiated to yield the fuzzy set distribution ($fz = \exp(\text{probability})/1+\exp(\text{probability})$). The table below offers the resulting values for each stage of the calibration process for the fuzzy set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations. The same process was used to calibrate the fuzzy sets for each independent causal condition as well.
Table 5: Mathematical Transformations (Calibration) of Qualitative Interpretations of the Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>spnotrel(%)</th>
<th>Qual. Interpretations</th>
<th>Qual. Code</th>
<th>Coeff(15.24)</th>
<th>Const(-2.397)*%</th>
<th>exp(predicted)</th>
<th>1+exp(predicted)</th>
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</table>

I close this chapter by addressing a simple question that leads to the reiteration of an important basis for my methodology. Why is the subsequent analysis performed using fuzzy sets and not performed using the aggregate proportions of spiritual but not religious in each country? The answer to this question lies in my brief explanation about focusing on both quantitative and qualitative aspects of a distribution in order to obtain a more richer understanding of the social phenomenon being studied. The use of the aggregate percentages would have stopped short at discerning the correlation between proportions of the spiritual but not religious identifiers and proportions of particular structural conditions. Whether or not a country possessed the standard to be considered a nation with a substantial spiritual but not religious population would not have been addressed.
Because this qualitative statement about how to classify each of the cases is important to case studies research, the use of fuzzy sets has greater relevance.
CHAPTER 4 – TESTING CAUSAL CONDITIONS

4.1 Necessity and Sufficiency

With traditional quantitative methods of analysis in order to make claims about the relationship between variables, the amount of the variance within a dependent variable, corresponding to the outcome in QCA, explained by an independent variable, corresponding to the causal condition in QCA, must be determined. This is done by usually holding all other variable constant or not allowing them to vary at the same time as those being tested. A variable is deemed significant if it significantly reduces the proportion of error or unexplained variance. This type of analysis is said to be “partial” because it is limited to the explanation of variance that is particular to that variable while controlling all other independent variables with potential impact. This partial method is less effective when research is concerned with conjunctural causation.

Since this study wishes to explore the impact of the causal conditions on the membership of cases in the spiritual but not religious set of nations both independently and conjuncturally, a method that effectively considers the combined impact of variables is essential. Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is appropriate because it considers the impact of conditions individually and combined by determining whether the relationships between the conditions and the outcome meet the criteria for a set theoretical relation. Using QCA to examine fuzzy sets makes it possible to first consider the impact of single causal conditions in terms of their necessity and sufficiency for the production of the outcome.

The determination of necessary conditions is important because it indicates that this condition must be present for an outcome to occur that is defined by a set theoretical
relation to be present. The determination of the sufficient conditions in combination is important because this indicates that a particular combination is at least one cause of the occurrence of an outcome that is defined by a set theoretical relation. In other words determining necessity establishes that a condition is a required part of a theoretical formula and sufficiency establishes that the condition has a causal ability within that theoretical formula to produce the outcome. Once these characteristics are established, the method can also be used to determine the consistency of combinations of causal conditions in pathways that lead to the outcome in question, thereby establishing the strength of the ability of this combination within the theoretical formula to produce the outcome.

In his methodological work on comparative methods, Charles Ragin (1987) argues that a causal condition is found to be necessary if its presence is required for the outcome of concern while a condition is found to be sufficient if it can produce the outcome in question by itself. Considered jointly, “a cause is both necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause that produces an outcome and it is singular (i.e., not a combination of causes). A causal condition is sufficient but not necessary if it is capable of producing the outcome but is not the only condition with this capability. A causal condition is necessary but not sufficient if it is capable of producing an outcome in combination with other conditions and appears in all such combinations. Finally, a causal condition is neither necessary nor sufficient if it appears only in a subset of the combinations of conditions that produce the outcome.” By using QCA, I can first determine whether each condition is individually necessary for the production of the spiritual but not religious outcome and second indicate the necessity and sufficiency of
particular conditions associated with particular combinations of conditions while
determining how consistent these combination are in leading to the substantial presence
or absence of the spiritual but not religious outcome. The focus of this chapter is on the
first of these two determinations.

The key to confirming necessity and sufficiency of a single causal condition is the
establishment of the subset relationship between the independent condition and the
outcome. A condition is necessary if the outcome is a subset of that condition and it is
sufficient if the condition is a subset of the outcome. This subset relationship can be
tested by plotting the fuzzy set scores of each condition along with the fuzzy set scores of
the outcome on a simple XY Graph. The following sets of graphs do just that. Each of
the graphs is a result of the plotting of each causal condition with the spiritual but not
religious outcome.

Necessity scores (ranging between 0 and 1) below each diagram represent the
proportion of fuzzy membership scores that is consistent with the set theoretical relation
(condition is subset of the outcome). Therefore the score is generated by the proportion
of condition and outcome scores that intersect such that the score for the condition is less
than that of the outcome. Necessity is graphically represented by a proportion of 90% or
more of the intersection points plotting below the diagonal. 90% or more of the
intersection points plotting above the diagonal would conversely represent sufficiency,
while all the score plotting along the diagonal would indicate necessity and sufficiency.
Graph J: Necessity of Economic Development for Spiritual but Not Religious

Graph K: Necessity of Economic Inequality for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .61    Necessity = .79
Sufficiency = .63    Necessity = .70
Graph L: Necessity of Opposition Attitude #1 for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .58
Necessity = .67

Graph M: Necessity of Opposition Attitude #2 for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .65
Necessity = .78
Graph N: Necessity of Opposition Attitude #3 for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .53    Necessity = .76

Graph O: Necessity of Religious Attendance for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .82    Necessity = .36
Graph P: Necessity of Discrimination for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .69   Necessity = .50

Graph Q: Necessity of Religious Pluralism for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .61   Necessity = .63
The first eight XY graphs test the necessity of each of the structural causal conditions. Based on the first glance at the distribution of plots and the associated necessity scores, it would appear that none of the variables are partially important in determining the membership of these cases in the set of nations that have substantial spiritual but not religious populations because no condition produces a situation where 90% or more of the intersections consistently meet the requirement of the theoretical subset relation.

However, when more comprehensively examined, it becomes evident that for each of the three attitude indicators most of the intersections fall below the diagonal as evidenced by the necessity scores hovering around the 70%. Additionally, for the religious participation indicator the intersections are above the diagonal, as evidenced the sufficiency score above 0.8. These clues serve as a prompt for further a more in depth analysis of these attitude indicators and religious attendance. Although they are related to economic situation of a country and their necessity scores also hover between 70% and 80%, the GDP and GINI are indicators of fundamentally different things no further analysis is really possible.

Because the three attitude items were used to indicate the dimension of opposition to religious involvement in politics, their fuzzy set scores of the three indicators that asked respondents about clergy involvement in voting, clergy involvement in government and whether religious beliefs were necessary for people to hold office were combined to indicate the concept of anti-politicization of religion. Using the Boolean algebraic principle of logical “or,” which argues that the maximum encompassing the minimum, the merging produced a distribution where the best score of either of the attitude
indicators is used to represent a case. This process can logically be explained by noting that if a country’s score in the set of nations where a substantial amount of the population has the attitude that *clergy should not influence voters* is higher than its score in the set of nations with the attitude that *people who hold office do not need strong religious beliefs* or higher than the membership score in the set of nations with the attitude that *clergy should not influence government*, then it follows that all scores are covered by the larger of the three scores since each of these indicators equally represent opposing attitudes making it possible for the highest score for the three attitudes to serve as the indicator for each case.

A result of combining scores using logical “or” is that it may appear that the researcher is “stacking the deck” because the highest score of each of the three indicators is reflected for each case. To compensate for this process being used with the anti-politicalization attitude scores, I offer an adjusted plot that squares the original logical “or” score combinations, which essentially increases the criteria for necessity to a level that exceeds the threshold of 0.9 or 90%, making the quality of the cases that meet the set theoretical relation those countries with substantially higher levels of combined attitudes. When the combined and the adjusted combined distributions are used in the following XY graphs, much higher necessity scores are indicated (0.97 and 0.92 respectively).
Graph R: Necessity of Anti-politicalization for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .53    Necessity = .97

Graph S: Necessity of Anti-politicalization for Spiritual but Not Religious (adjusted)

Sufficiency = .61    Necessity = .92
Both the easier and more demanding graphical analyses indicate the necessity of this opposition to religious political involvement for membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations. In the easier test, the scores garner a consistency score of 0.97. This consistency (0.92) holds even after the adjustment for the skew resulting from the logical “or” combination of scores. This can be interpreted to mean a structural atmosphere where the population is against religious institutions intervening in politics is theoretically an important antecedent for a country’s membership in the set of spiritual but not religious nations.

The next XY graph is a reprint of the earlier necessity test using the fuzzy set distribution for religious attendance. Although it fails to provide evidence of this condition’s necessity, it yields a high sufficiency score (0.82), which implies that the absence of this condition is possibly important for the presence of the outcome. This implication is confirmed by the second graph.
Graph T: Necessity of Religious Attendance for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .82    Necessity = .36

Graph U: Necessity of Absence of Attendance for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .54    Necessity = .93
The necessity of this condition suggests that smaller levels of religious presents a better atmosphere for the production of substantial spiritual but not religious populations. This is signified by the necessity score of 0.93 in the second graph. The necessity of this condition indicates that those who are identifying as spiritual but not religious may be doing so relative to the diminished presence of institutional religion around them.

The results of these tests offer some commentary on the relationships that others have found previously associated with these variables. Clearly, the association that Hout and Fischer (2002) uncovered is not just a phenomenon that can be claimed by the U. S. Attitudes that oppose the involvement of conventional religion in politics are a force cross-nationally as well. However, with their proving only necessary and not sufficient the explicit causal quality of their presence in relation to the presence of spiritual but not religious identification is still in question.

These results also speak to the work of Stark and Bainbridge (1987) who argue that the mere existence of religiousness or the proximity of the sacred canopy to others has an effect on the religious associations of individuals. This finding offers evidence that is somewhat counter to this claim. This evidence supports the notion that the lesser the canopy size, the greater the association with spiritual but not religious identification. Coupled with the results in the previous chapter that note that spiritual but not religious is not driven by those religious believers who don’t practice, these results imply that the production of this type of secularity may be less related to the presence of the religious institution and more related to its weakness.

In sum, these results indicate that theoretically wherever substantial levels of attitudes in opposition to religious intervention exists, high levels of spiritual but not
religious populations will exist as well. In other words this is an ingredient of the theoretical formula that is required for the outcome to exist. The importance of these attitudes may be associated with the absence of a strong religious institution since the absence of religious participation is a condition that proves to be important at some level as well. However, it is not yet possible to argue that absence of a strong religious canopy is the result of anti-politicalization attitudes or for that manner arguing any causal direction without further analysis is unfounded. On the other hand, the results indicate that smaller presences of conventional religious participation are an adequate situation to produce spiritual but not religious identification, which is obviously associated with other structural characteristics. This indicates that whatever the cause of people identifying as spiritual but not religious, this identification becomes more realized with lesser amounts of religious participation. The next chapter delineates combined paths that will provide a greater understanding of the potential relations between these two necessary conditions.

4.2 Necessity and Sufficiency of other forms of Secularity

Before closing this chapter, I wish to add to examination of the relationship between the spiritual but not religious secular identity and other forms of secularity. Although, the non-religious identifiers are not substantively equal to the spiritual but not religious identifiers as illustrated by the simple Pearson’s R correlation tests performed in the previous chapter, the type of testing I do in this chapter can offer a look at necessity and sufficiency of substantial membership in this set and the set of religious non-practicing nations for membership in the set of spiritual but not religious nations.

Although the coefficients offered in the previous chapter do not indicate a correlation between the proportions of spiritual but not religious identifiers in these
nations and proportion of non-religious identifiers, it seems intuitively likely that membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations should be related to membership in the set of nations with substantial non-religious populations. Therefore any test of necessity should show that membership in the set of latter should be necessary for membership in the former. Additionally, based on the opposition offered by the negative correlation, it is also intuitive to assume that non-membership in the set of nations with substantial religious non-practicing populations should be necessary for membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations. The following necessity and sufficiency results should shed some light on these intuitions.

\[\text{Graph V: Necessity of Absence of Religious ID for Spiritual but Not Religious}\]

Sufficiency = .63   Necessity = .76
Graph W: Necessity of Non-Attending Religious for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .56  Necessity = .62

Graph X: Absence of Non-Attending Religious for Spiritual but Not Religious

Sufficiency = .75  Necessity = .83
The first graph above offers some surprisingly counter intuitive results. It actually confirms what the correlation coefficient suggests that being a member of non-religious nation is not driving whether a country has membership in the spiritual but not religious set of nations. In other words, it appears that other factors are more important in determining whether substantial numbers of people identify in this way than large numbers of people identifying as non-religious.

Additionally, membership in the set of religious but non-practicing nations does not prove to be necessary for membership in the set of spiritual but not religious nations. This also confirms that large numbers of those who maintain their religiousness but just don’t practice conventionally with others is also not driving spiritual but not religious identification, which weakens any claim that being non-religious is equivalent to being spiritual but not religious. But this does not actually address whether not having large numbers of those non-practicing religious people actually drives this identification.

When the fuzzy set scores for the religious non-practicing condition are negated, and the following XY plot is formulated, the absence of large numbers of these identifiers also does prove to be necessary for spiritual but not religious identity. This indicates that in contexts where larger numbers of people are not religious non-practicing, there is no reason to believe that people will be more likely to identify as spiritual but not religious.
CHAPTER 5 – CONJUNCTURAL CAUSATION: A DEVELOPING STORY

5.1 Review

The previous chapters offer in-depth discussions of the independent causal conditions and the dependent outcome associated with this project. Having discussed the necessity and sufficiency of the independent conditions for the presence of the dependent outcome, they lay the foundation for a developing narrative about what structural conditions exist when a country is a member of the spiritual but not religious set of nations. This chapter advances this understanding with a qualitative comparative analysis the object of which is to determine the level of consistency associated with certain combinations of the dependent conditions serving in the antecedent pathways to the outcome. Understanding what conditions have proven to be necessary and sufficient, it is now important to determine how frequently they appear in pathways to the outcome, either alone or in combination. By determining these significant variable combinations, it is theoretically possible to determine or predict when membership in the set of spiritual but not religious nations would occur based on the structural characteristics of the nation in question.

The preceding chapter establishes that attitudes that oppose the involvement of conventional religion in politics, which Hout and Fischer (2002) argued were important in the U.S., are necessary for producing membership in the set of nations that have substantial spiritual but not religious populations. The preceding chapter also establishes the necessity of the absence of religious participation or involvement in the production of this outcome as well. The necessity of these conditions argues that they are given conditions in the conjunctural analysis that follows. In other words, the combined paths
found to be important in this analysis are conceptual and analytical subsets of a larger path that includes the two previously discovered necessary conditions.

Therefore, it is assumed that any combined condition or pathway that leads to this outcome includes these conditions whether we include them in the model or not. Based on this assumption, the conditions can be extracted from the conjunctive analysis in order to minimize the complexity of the overall results. Although it may be the case that due to their necessity the opposition to the politicalization of religion and the absence of substantial attending populations are superset of all other combined conditions, this is not the case for the conditions that only proved sufficient.

Qualitative comparative analyses focus on determining what conditions combine to produce the specific outcome in question. In this case, the outcome of course is membership in the set of spiritual but not religious nations. The focus is not only on what conditions combine but in what ways they combine. In other words, combined analyses address a number of questions about the qualities of the pathways that lead to or do not lead to the outcome. For example one question that can be answered by this type of analysis is, if attitudes of anti-politicalization are necessary and always present, are they always present when some other condition is present as well or when another condition is absent? Another question answered is whether particular sets of present conditions lead to or do not lead to the outcome. Another is does the absence of a condition change the outcome or not?

Hout and Fischer (2002) also argued that as well as attitudes opposing the involvement of religion in politics as a condition for non-religious identification in the U.S., age cohorts have different associations with the level of this population as does
education levels and parenting levels. However, they did not present a picture of how these conditions work together in context or how they work with other variables in context to produce substantial spiritual but not religious populations but instead like others discuss the partial impact of the variables.

5.2 Consistency and Coverage

Qualitative Comparative Analysis examines the impact of every possible combination of independent conditions considered by a given model whether the combination produces a positive outcome within the set of cases or not. The significance of this impact is delineated in two different ways, coverage and consistency. Raw coverage represents the proportion of membership scores in a given combination distribution that meet the requirement for the set theoretical relation that the combination is a subset of the outcome regardless of whether the scores also meet requirements for another combination (i.e., portion of outcome instances explained by combined condition regardless of what percentage of overlapping explanation). Unique coverage represents the proportion of membership scores that meet the requirement for the set theoretical relation in a specific combination only. In other words the unique coverage is for a given combination net the coverage of any other combinations or controlling for the outcome produced by all other combinations (i.e., portion of outcome instances only explained by combined condition). The consistency of a combination is the degree to which a particular combination of causal conditions leads to or serves as a subset in the production of the outcome (i.e., ratio of portion of instances of the outcome explained by condition to the total instances of everything explained by the condition). There is often
a trade off between the coverage and consistency values since the more consistent a combination, the narrower the scope of coverage.

With QCA, the determination of importance of these coverage and consistency values is an interpretive process determined by the researcher. For the models offered in this chapter, the combined condition is considered important if the consistency score is 0.9 or higher. A score of 0.9 is interpreted as 90% of the instances of the combined condition being subsets of the outcome. In other words, this researcher feels it is important for at least 90% of the outcome to be explained by this condition in order for it to qualify as important for determining membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations.

5.3 Conjunctural Analysis

As I noted prior to this chapter, in traditional regression analysis emphasis is placed on the importance of the effect of a single variable that is partially determined by controlling for or holding other variables constant. With QCA, the emphasis is placed on the combined conjunctural nature of effects because conditions have different impact based on what other conditions impacting the outcome in conjunction with it. Therefore, the fs/QCA model below analyzes all of the conditions outlined above in relation to the spiritual but not religious outcome. This model omits the combined distributions for the attitudes in opposition to politicalization and religious attendance because the presence of the former and the absence of the latter proved to be necessary.
Model 1: Combined Conditions given Necessary Conditions

Model: \( Y (\text{SPIRNOREL}) = A (\text{GDP}) + B (\text{GINI}) + C (\text{DISCRIM}) + D (\text{RELPLURL}) + E (\text{SOCIALIST}) \)

Solutions: Intermediate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Unique Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP<em>GINI</em>RELPLURL</td>
<td>0.417874</td>
<td>0.417874</td>
<td>0.933453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.417874

solution consistency: 0.933453

The intermediate results of the model reflect that there is one path that is consistently involved with the production of membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations. The path involves three important antecedents that must be considered given a structural atmosphere that is shaped with attitudes of anti-politicalization and with smaller amounts of population involved with conventional religion. The path is characterized by membership in the set of countries with substantial economic development, substantial inequality, as well as membership in the set of nations with substantial religious pluralism. The consistency score indicates that a little over 93% of the instances covered by this path are subsets of the outcome. This combination is also associated with approximately 42% of all of the theoretical instances of membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations.

The resulting pathway presented above combines to offer some interesting findings in general when considering the fact that this path is in the given context of substantial anti-politicalization attitudes and the absence of a strong conventional religious participation. The path generally offers evidence that forecasts larger spiritual but not religious populations being found in countries that are wealthy as a result of their highly developed economic status, where the wealth from the status is in the hands of a minority of folk rather than evenly distributed, and where there is a greater amount and
variety of religious opportunities for the population to choose from. This evidence is consistent with previous literature that finds less religiousness associated with attitudes of anti-policialization (Hout and Fischer 2002) and with wealth. Conversely, the results contradict previous literature that finds higher levels of religiosity in association with inequality. The results also contradict Stark and Bainbridge’s (1987) argument that more religious people in a given society will lead to more religious association and the Stark and Finke (2004) argument that more religious association should be a result of pluralistic church opportunities.

One might logically assume that if the path in this direction offer these implications, that in the opposing structure of poor societies where there are more people who are involved with the conventional religious institution and more people who do not wish for that institution to be involved in there politics, where there is less inequality and less religious choices there should be a substantial absence of spiritual but not religious populations. However, the paths that result below from a second fs/QCA model that examines all of the conditions against the absence of membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations. However, the paths that result below from a second fs/QCA model that examines all of the conditions against the absence of membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations does not indicate a path of this nature. In fact, the absence of wealth, inequality and religious pluralism do not appear together in any of the pathways that the model below produces.
What is apparent from this model is the presence of a socialist influence in the three paths that equate to almost 30% of the subset of the outcome. This suggests that having a socialist influence is very important in determining the set of nations that have substantial absence of spiritual but not religious identifiers. Since the rest of the cases in the dataset are in fact western democracies, it can be said that this finding indicates an association of western democracies with substantial spiritual but not religious populations. The problem with this finding is that until further data discerning meaning are collected, it is not possible to determine whether these associations are substantively more about spirituality or more about non-religiousness or about both equally.

Like model one, these pathways to the absence of the outcome occur in a given context dictated by necessary conditions. The graphs below offer the necessary conditions for the substantial absence of spiritual but not religious populations. Note that according to the first graph attitudes for anti-politicalization are also necessary for the absence of substantial spiritual but not religious populations when the normal combined distribution is used.
The necessity of these attitudes for the absence of substantial spiritual but not religious populations is an interesting finding that implies that these attitudes are not germane to the presence of spiritual or to the absence of religious identification. In other words, although neither presence nor absence of substantial spiritual but not religious populations exists without these conditions because this is the case, these conditions may be reflecting a more encompassing macro phenomenon. This implication is strengthened by the results of tests to determine the necessity of these attitudes for the absence and presence of spiritual identification alone and the absence and presence of religious identification alone. Although the graphs are not shown here, the scores indicate their necessity across the board (.97, .96, .94, and .97 respectively). This means that regardless of how these two identities are combined the necessity will hold.
In addition to the necessity of these attitudes, the indicator for religious attendance is also necessary for the absence of substantial spiritual but not religious populations as well. This finding seems intuitive because if the absence of these conditions were necessary for the presence of spiritual but not religious, then logically the presence of these conditions should be necessary for the absence of spiritual but not religious. However, it is important to note that, unlike this case, this inverse necessity does not always hold.

\[
\text{Graph Z: Absence of Attendance for the Absence of Spiritual but Not Religious}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Sufficiency = .62} \\
\text{Necessity = .93}
\end{array}
\]

Given the necessity of substantial attitudes of anti-politicalization and the absence of substantial religious attendance pointed out by this last set of necessity tests, it is apparent that economic development, wealth inequality, and pluralistic religious choice work together in different ways to produce the absence of spiritual but not religious populations for the most part in a context of socialist influence. These findings will be
expounded upon in further work focused on the absence of this type and other types of secular populations. However, because this project has a greater focus on the presence of this spiritual but not religious secular population, no further discussion will be dedicated to these findings.

In sum, the findings suggest that there is clearly a different set of social forces working to foster the substantial presence of spiritual but not religious populations than there are working to foster the substantial absence of this same population. In situations where many people hold attitudes in opposition to the politicalization of the conventional religious institution and where less people are involved with this institution, people tend to identify more as spiritual without religious identification when they are in a highly developed nation with a lot of inequality even when they are offered a number of religious opportunities to choose from.

On the other hand, in the same given context of people holding attitudes in opposition to the politicalization of the conventional religious institution and where fewer people are involved with it, people tend not to identify as spiritual without religious identification when the country they live in has been influenced by socialism and there exists a lack of development, discrimination and religious choice. This phenomenon of not identifying as spiritual but not religious relationally brakes down even further into countries with a socialist influence that splits into countries that are either well developed, offer a plethora of religious choice, and wealth is spread more evenly across the population or into the counties that lack inequality and discrimination against religion but offer a number of religious opportunities.
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND INFERENCES

The results of the conjunctural analysis in the previous chapter offer a number of structural contexts that are associated with the presence of substantial spiritual but not religious identifiers as signified by a national membership in the set of countries that have significant spiritual but not religious populations. Each of these contexts serves as the framework for a theoretical explanation that identifies a specific social issue or problem that may be the catalyst or cause for the larger presence of this population. Many of these issues have recently surfaced in sociological and political debates about secularization, the impact of religious pluralism, church and state relations, rational economic choices as well as macro economic growth and industrialization. As I attempt to fulfill my obligation to interpret and apply the results of this analysis by comparing them across the 32 national cases and making inferences about similar countries, I discuss the implications that these results hold for these issues and other sociological phenomenon.

6.1 The presence of Spiritual but not Religious Secularity

A fair amount of this study is dedicated to the effect of conventional religion and conventional religious related structure on the presence of spiritual but not religious identifiers. Obviously, the subjective identification with religion and the subjective identification as spiritual can both be effected by the perceptions people have about the conventional religious institution to which they are subjected by means of their direct or indirect interactions with it. As I have already stated, secularization and secularity are both related to the general idea that for the society and/or the individual religious thinking, practices and institutions have less social significance. This social significance or the perception of importance of religion in the lives of individuals is a factor of how
others behave toward the religious institution and how the institution treats the people. The non-identification as religious is conceived as an indicator of secularity and therefore nation states with substantial numbers of spiritual but not religious identifiers should be conceived as secular nations. Consequently, the findings of this study have some direct implications for the social phenomenon of secularization or when and where the spiritual but not religious form of secularity can be expected.

Many scholars of religion, sociology of religion and of other academic disciplines have charged new scholars with managing research on individual religious experience and secularization differently (Ammerman, 2003; Roof, 2003; Demarath III, 1999). In general, this new call challenges researchers to focus on the variety of religious experience, examine the sacred in a much broader manner, and compare conventional and non-conventional religious experiences. This analysis has answered that call by examining spiritual but not religious identification as a form of secularity that can either be a part of, apart from or influenced by involvement with or participation in the conventional religious institution.

Answering this call was an important motivation for this research since I believe it is not possible to discuss whether a society is truly secular without determining the place religion has in the identity of the populous because it is from these individual identities that the collective social significance of the religion arises. Participation in an institution or organization does not automatically legitimize it as in a case of coercion or a case of no alternatives. Granted that the collective participation of more people than less people presents some sense of authority (Chaves 1994) but as this research comments it is theoretically possible to have a nation with high participation thereby
appearing religious because of a lack of secularity in terms of non-attendance but still highly secular in terms of non-religious and/or non-spiritual identification. Beside what is theorized as secularity of non-attendance being a factor of the absence of authority given to the church by the people or by the state (Chaves 1994), the findings of this research suggests that when other forms of this social phenomenon are prevalent, they may be the result of factors that have less to do with conventional religion than previously thought.

One major finding that points to this possibility that spiritual but not religious secularity may be related to the level of authority given to religion is a finding that may also support the contrary possibility that it is not related to religion. The fact that attitudes that oppose religion’s involvement in politics are necessary for the presence of spiritual but not religious populations offers evidence that could be interpreted in the manner of Hout and Fischer (2004). In other words, the finding could be interpreted as an indicator of the contempt people hold regarding the thought of the church being aligned with politics that leads to less authority given to the church.

However, since the same attitudes are necessary for the absence of substantial spiritual but not religious populations it could also be interpreted that these attitudes are not a direct result of or related to the churches actions but they are possibly the result another social phenomenon that exists regardless of the churches actions. In other words, if the spiritual but not religious identity is a direct byproduct of negative attitudes that are formed as a reaction to the church making the choice to align with certain political ideologies as noted by Hout and Fischer (2004) in their work in the U.S., then these attitudes should logically be associated with only the presence of this outcome across
nations and not be associated with structural situations where no reaction should have taken place. In other words, if the identity is a direct result of the alignment stimulus and the identity is less substantial, then it can be assumed that the stimulus is also less substantial.

The necessity of these attitudes across the board leads to the possibility that spiritual but not religious identity may not actually be a direct result of the church choice to align with politics but may be associated with larger social or philosophical issues. One interpretation might be that regardless of one's subjective identification with religious doctrine, beliefs in religious ideology or one's spiritual identification, people do not want the institution of conventional religion that is involved with helping individuals understand their existence involved an institution that they associate with social control. Perhaps this is a factor of the notion of “free will” promoted by the conventional religious institution itself. This would suggest somewhat of a conflict of interest that may be perceived by the populous with respect to some loss that would be reflected in the presence of these attitudes withstandng either combination of spiritual but religious identification.

Another interpretation is that these attitudes may not be directly related to the religious institution but may instead be related to institutions in general. It could be the case that attitudes opposing the involvement or alignment of the educational institution, the media, or any other structural institutions would also be necessary for both the presence and the absence of spiritual but not religious identification because the population does not want any formal institution influencing each other in general.
Still yet another interpretation might argue that the object of contempt here is not the religious institution but is instead the political one. Connotations of politics are not “pretty” in many European societies or in general. The history of a political institution that is connected to earthly corruption and power may be the backdrop for attitudes that oppose its alignment with an institution that is seen as “Godly.”

A second major finding that is related to secularity is the necessity of the absence of substantial religious participation or religious canopy for membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations. This finding can be interpreted in terms of the non-religious portion of the identity as just due to the fact that if the nation is less conventionally religious in general, the population will identify with conventional religion less. However, logically based on the propositions put forth by the traditional relationship paradigm of religion and spirituality, sizeable spirituality should not be associated with little conventional religion. This association then indicates that to some extent that whatever the substantive nature of this spirituality, with which individuals identify in Europe, it has some substantive difference in character than the way it is conceived with the traditional paradigm.

This point of substantive difference is consistent with a previous finding associated with European attitudes about life after death. The belief in life after death is much more of an indicator of the broader existential spirituality paradigm upon which this research is based because it reflects a dimension of transcendence regardless of belief in conventional religious doctrine. In his sociological profile of Europe at the turn of the Century, Andrew Greeley (2003) noted that there was statistically significant increase in belief in life after death in more than half of the countries in his sample since 1955 that
crosses all cohorts, while there was a decrease in belief in heaven. This suggests that life after death is an indicator of a spiritual identity of a fair proportion of Europeans that does not have the same substantive meaning as those who hold a conventionally religious identity. Unfortunately, this point cannot fully be determined without meaning data.

Regardless of the validity of the interpretations associated with these two necessary conditions, the resulting pathway from the conjunctural analysis provided in the previous chapter offers some commentary on the traditional paradigm of non-attendance secularization. Unfortunately the scope of the traditional paradigm places the focus on religious association within these cases, forcing the interpretation of the pathway to substantial spiritual but not religious identification to be driven by the non-religious aspect of this secular identity.

The single path to substantial spiritual but not religious populations characterized by substantial economic development, substantial inequality, and religious pluralism can be interpreted to mean that this form of secular identity is a product of a contextual situation where a lesser number of individuals who hold more wealth related to the higher international economic status held by the country do not have to commit to a particular religious organization or institution. This context implies that people may identify as spiritual but not religious because they are trying to maintain wealth that is gained in this unequal context and therefore may not wish to associate with the religious institution or any of its organizations that might have an effect on the maintenance of that wealth or the overall distribution of it. This implication is bolstered when the fact that attitudes opposing involvement of conventional religion in politics and fewer numbers of people associated with the church are both given in this contextual situation as well.
The results of this path provide empirical evidence that comments on a number of theoretical debates in the sociological literature. For one, the path implies that people are less likely to choose to associate with conventional religion in a situation where they are not pushed to do so. This speaks to the debate on the effect of religious pluralism that is being waged by Finke and Stark (1992) and colleagues who argue that this plethora of choice should lead to higher association with the conventional religious institution. Although it could be argued that this path suggests it leads to more spiritual identification, the other half of the spiritual but not religious secular identity dictates that the religious pluralism leads to non-religious association. These results lend support to the Berger (1967) argument that religious variety or freer religious markets dilute the influence of the religious organization and lead to less adherence to conventional religion.

Second, the results comment on the economic impact on religious association discussed by McCleary and Barro (2003) who argue that higher economic development leads to less religiousness. The pathway results clearly lend support to the direction of this relationship. The pathway argues that in highly developed nations there is more religious non-identification associated with spiritual identification. This finding lends itself to a rational economic interpretation, which suggests that the population may perceive greater rewards for not associating with religious organizations despite the number of different identities projected by the religious institution as a result of trying to market them as argued by Finke and Stark (1992; 1998). It also lends credence to the Inglehart and Baker (2000) argument that different value systems emerge from different economic situations and that economic growth under industrialization promotes more secular-rational values.
What is interesting is the path does not directly address the effect of church state relations. Despite Chaves and Cann (1992) and McCleary and Barro (2003) arguments that relationships between the church and state have an effect on religious involvement, the only commentary about this impact is found in the necessity of the attitudes of anti-politicalization. With non-inclusion of state discrimination in this path, this finding of necessity suggests that a political relationship may de-legitimize the church, which would in turn have an impact associated with identifying as spiritual but not religious.

In sum, the character of the pathway leading to spiritual but not religious secularity in Europe appears to tell a story that, for whatever the reason, clearly involves the population not wanting the conventional religious institution and the political institution to align. This desire to keep them apart is associated with smaller levels of conventional religion. This context of smaller levels of conventional religion is also associated with more choices individuals have to choose a religious opportunity, although the outcome tells us that this opportunity does not manifest in religious identification. This non-manifestation of religious identification is associated with lesser wealth for some and more for others in a context where wealth is greater due to the national economic status of the country.

In addition it this actual story, the outcome of substantial spiritual but not religious populations may also speculatively involve economic competition or maintenance at the least of greater wealth that is associated with the higher development of a country. This desire to maintain may take the form of non-association with the church and the desire to not want it involved in the political realm where it could have an impact on this maintenance, accumulation or distribution of wealth. The availability of
different religious organizations may not have an effect of more non-association since the population sees no reward in doing so; especially if the people see the religious institution as illegitimate because it is in alignment with the politics.

6.2 Inferences and Case Comparisons

Based on the implications of these data, some theoretical inferences can be made about structural contexts that provide some level of generalizability, predictability or external validity to the findings offered by the analysis of these European cases. The likelihood of this predictability is boosted when the focus is returned to subsets of cases characteristic of these contexts, as I do in this next few paragraphs, and examine their association with the outcome. However, the true predictive value of these data cannot be determined unless data are collected from other national cases not included in this work.

Given the scope conditions and assumptions of this research laid out in the initial chapter (all cases are European nations; spirituality, religiosity and conventional religion can be mutually exclusive; religiosity is a factor of religion and religious experience while spirituality may or may not be; subjective identification with objects that are deemed religious or spiritual is indicative of religious or spiritual identity; religion and spirituality are conceptually equivalent across societies; individuals see their governments as legitimate authority in their overall socialization more so than not; behaviors do not always indicate cognition) and based on the findings and implications of these findings, it can be argued that any cases falling within this scope will likely be members of the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations if the nation is possesses a substantial amount of attitudes opposing the involvement of conventional religion, if there is substantially less religious participation, if the country is
economically developed, if there is a substantial amount of inequality in the country and if there exists a number of conventional religious choices.

By returning to the cases and calculating intersecting fuzzy set scores of the set of relevant structural conditions, I offer several grouping of countries that fit these profiles. The table below notes the groupings of the nations by fuzzy set scores for each of the nations in the dataset for the combined distributions of anti-politicization, absence of religious participation, economic development, economic inequality and religious pluralism. The conditions were combined using the process of logical “and,” which, as I stated earlier, uses the lowest score among the indicators to represent the case in the combined set.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
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Table 6: Fuzzy Set Comparison of Path, Outcome, and Causal Conditions
As the table reflects, Great Britain, France and The Netherlands are all at the top of the pathway distribution in the first column. These nations are fairly equivalent in terms of the structure associated with this pathway. All are western democratic nations with no socialist/communist influence. They are also all highly developed nations. Great Britain and France have a fair amount of inequality, while The Netherlands has much less which is reiterated by their GDP and GINI scores that are also reiterated in the table. All have pretty substantial scores for the absence of religious attendance, religious pluralism, and attitudes of anti-politicalization as well.

At the other end of the scale are Belarus, Portugal, Ukraine and Poland, all of which have had some socialist/communist influence but Portugal. These nations are equivalent in terms of most of these conditions but not all. Each possesses fairly high scores associated with the anti-politicalization attitude set and the religious participation set. The divergence comes with the economic factors of wealth and inequality as well as with religious pluralism. These four countries also diverge in terms of being Catholic or Protestant.

As a result of this analysis, it is possible to infer that countries that are not a part of the dataset but have similar qualities or are structurally equivalent will have similar levels of membership in the set of spiritual but not religious nations. For instance there are a number of countries now labeled eastern European that are not a part of this dataset that were formerly a part of the Soviet Union. Based on the negated analysis, if the country possesses attitudes opposing conventional religious involvement in politics, and low levels of involvement with conventional religion, it would most likely not garner membership in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations if
it also has a plurality of religions from which its citizens can choose from and it is either highly developed with low inequality or less developed with no state discrimination. Likewise, there are a number of highly developed countries in South America and Asia that if these countries also have high levels of economic wealth, inequality and religious pluralism and they also share an absence of substantial religious canopies, they should be expected to garner membership in the set of nations that possess this substantial secular population. Unfortunately at this juncture, it is not possible to test this hypothesis of external validity without spiritual but not religious identification data from countries such as these that are beyond this dataset.

6.3 What about the United States?

Unfortunately the dataset used in this work did not include the United States and therefore no direct comparisons can be made to the U.S. and the cases examined here. However, the U.S. is structurally equivalent to many of the nations that are a part of this dataset and inferences can be made based upon this fact.

As I noted much earlier in Chapter 3, the ideal measures for spirituality and religiosity as conceived by this work were used in the 1998 General Social Survey (GSS). Unlike the 1999-2001 World Values Survey where U.S. respondents were not asked to react to both measures, this survey collected data from U.S. for both of these measures. As a result, it was possible to determine the proportion of the U.S. population that was spiritual but not religious one year prior to the initiation of the WVS.

Additionally, proportions for a number of the independent structural conditions could also be determined. When these proportions are accounted for, it is clear that the U.S. is a western democracy with a fairly religious population that attends church
regularly. Those who identify with religion are overwhelmingly affiliated with some form of organizational religion. The populous also has a high amount of opposition toward religious involvement in politics.

Based on this structural description it is difficult to infer the membership status that the U.S. should garner in the set of nations with substantial spiritual but not religious populations. This difficulty is associated with the fact that although it possesses high levels of attitudes opposing the politicalization of religion, a fair amount of wealth and inequality, and offers an assortment of religious choices, it does not possess an absence of substantial religious participation. In fact, the country is characterized by large numbers of church goers.

Nevertheless, when the proportion of the outcome are revealed in Venn Diagram below only 4% of the respondents to both the religious and spiritual identification items in the GSS classify as spiritual but not religious.

```
Diagram 4: Individual Distribution of Religious and Spiritual Indicators in the U.S.

spiritual = spiritual
religious = religious identification

Venn Diagram
N = 2832

2551 (90 %)
110 (4 %)
108 (4 %)

63 (2 %)

religious (92 %)

spiritual (94 %)

% of total
6 Mar 2007
File: E:\Dissertation\General Social Survey\a00031.dta (30 May 2006)
```
Perhaps this is the case because the U.S. is not a European country. Another factor might be the age of the population as well as the fact that in the U.S., spiritual identification, religious identification, and religious attendance are less mutually exclusive than in Europe. Whatever the reason, at least for this case, the external generalization does not hold.

However, it is important to note that over time spiritual but not religious identification has grown in the U.S. The newest GSS data offers of evidence of this growth from 1998 to 2004 being 12%, while the growth in religion has remained stagnant.

6.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, spiritual but not religious identification is clearly an international social psychological phenomenon that warrants more future examination. Based on the findings of this research, a clearer understanding of this phenomenon is necessary to not only further understand the opposition different populations hold toward the religious institution and to further test the implications of these findings but to clarify the speculations associated with the religious part and to grasp some initial awareness about the meanings people place on the spiritual part of this secular identity. Additionally, the examination of these European cases only scratches the surface of the worldwide variation in this form of secularity and the possible structural conditions that are associated with it.

As a result of this research, it is now possible to discuss this phenomenon at a cross-national level and to have discourse about its multi-dimensional character. It is also possible to discuss the impact of particular structural contexts that can be associated with
either states or other global units and to use those structural contexts in making predictions about when and where this population might be likely or less likely to surface in other parts of the world in the future.

Also because of this project, we now have empirical evidence that the people in multiple nations who are most religious are so not just because they participate in some form of structural, conventional formal religion but because they believe in and identify with the doctrine and meanings associated with it and it is key to their spiritual understanding and self-identification. Likewise, the most secular people are so not just because they don’t participate in church services but because they don’t identify with the doctrine and their spirituality is most likely anchored in non-conventional religious alternatives.

However, what we do not have empirical evidence to support as a result of this project is the substantive character of these alternatives. In other words, what these alternatives to the religious institution actually are. Additionally, there is still a void in what the meaning of these alternatives hold and what the meaning of spirituality is for those who do not hold the religious form of it.

Fortunately, this work lays the groundwork for future research associated with this phenomenon and it serves as an initial step of a larger research agenda that involves the development of fine tuned measures that can be used in qualitative assessments of subjective meaning associated with both the religious and spiritual parts of this identity combination. This future research should also include a comprehensive assessment of a number of different parts of the world in order to present a truly more global picture.
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