

ADVERSITY

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0. Introduction

Many languages of the world contain what we shall refer to as "adversity" constructions. Characteristically, in such a construction, there is a noun phrase present whose referent suffers in some sense from the consequences of an event represented in the sentence in question. Some examples of such sentences are:

(1) Japanese:

- a. Taroo-wa kodomo-ni sin-are-ta.
top child-dat die-passive-past
'Taro's child died on him/Taro had his child die.'
- b. Titioya-wa kodomo-o sin-ase-ta.
father-top child-acc die-cause-past
'The father had his child die on him.'

(2) Russian:

- a. u men,a ukral,i čemodan.
prep 1st pers. stole suitcase
sing. gen. 3rd pers. acc.
pronoun plur.
'My suitcase was stolen on me.'
- b. u n,ego um,er brat.
prep 3rd pers. died brother
sing. masc. 3rd pers. nom.
gen. pronoun sing. masc.
'He had his brother die on him.'

- (3) a. My suitcase was stolen on me.
b. What John did to me was leave town right before the meeting.
c. I had my suitcase stolen (on me).
d. He got his leg broken.

Such sentences give rise to interesting grammatical problems: what does it mean for a sentence to have an "adversity" interpretation? under what conditions can such an interpretation arise? how is the noun phrase whose referent is taken to be adversely affected integrated compositionally

with the structure of the rest of the sentence? what is the relation within a given language between "adversity constructions" and other syntactic constructions? what is the relation cross-linguistically between the "adversity constructions" of one language and the "adversity constructions" of another? is the notion of "adversity" which is linguistically relevant to the analysis of one "adversity construction" always the same as the notion of "adversity" which is linguistically relevant to the analysis of another "adversity construction," either within the same language or across languages.

In many cases, the problems posed by the existence of adversity constructions are unique in that it is very difficult to separate in even a rudimentary way the syntactic aspects of the problem and those which depend on interpretation. Moreover, characteristically one finds that the syntactic forms which are compatible with adversity interpretations are compatible as well with other interpretations, in which there is no residue of adversity at all. For these reasons, perhaps, although the existence of adversity constructions in many languages is widely recognized, there are few detailed studies of their properties (with the exception of Japanese, where the adversity interpretation connected with the suffix -(r)are has received considerable attention).¹

In this paper, we shall attempt first to provide a characterization of a family of related notions which may all be construed as adversative. We shall then apply these notions to the investigation in detail to a variety of adversity constructions in both Japanese and English. Finally, we shall compare the results of these two investigations, in order to see what provisional answers may be given to the questions of grammatical interest raised above.

1. Adversity

In considering the various adversative constructions of Japanese and English, it is evident that the vernacular term "adversity" is too broad and too nonspecific to be responsible for the subtle ways in which such constructions differ within and across these two languages. We would like to outline an abstract theory of "adversity," which not only allows comparison of adversative constructions across languages but also allows differentiation among the adversative constructions of a particular language.

Our abstract theory is based on two crucial assumptions. The first is that in "adversative" sentences an event is represented together with a person who suffers as a result of it. The second is that the person who suffers is independent of the event, in that the event neither represents an action of the person who suffers nor a change of state of the person who suffers. One must thus ask how it is possible for the event to have consequences for the person who suffers. One might expect that this could depend only on whether the person in question found the event pleasing, displeasing, or neutral. This is of course possible; for example, if one says (4):

(4) A rock fell on John's head.

one's interlocutors might presume that John found the event unpleasant. Yet such simple pragmatically-based inferences do not provide an adequate basis for analyzing "adversative" constructions, for if it were, then we would expect all adversity constructions to be inter-translatable, either within or across languages. But this is not the case. We shall suppose that a factor which makes this possible is the existence of some relation R which holds between the person who suffers (x) and an entity (y) involved in the event. It is this relation which mediates the (direct) effect of an event E on y and the (indirect) effect of E on x.

For example, consider a situation in which x stands in some relation R to y, which we shall denote by writing "xRy," and some event E occurs in which y undergoes a change of state of some kind, which we shall denote by (5a) below; a consequence of this change of state is that x no longer stands in relation to y, but rather to y', as in (5b).

- (5) a. $y \xrightarrow{E} y'$
 b. $xRy \xrightarrow{E} xRy'$

It is thus easy to see how an event with consequences for y can also have consequences for x, if the change from xRy to xRy' has consequences for x.

One might attempt to make this precise by introducing an ordering which evaluates the comparative worth, relative to x, of different entities to which x stands in a given relation, but we will rely here on intuitive judgment. As an example, consider a case in which there is a farmer whose crops go bad. Obviously a farmer with the possibility of a good crop is better off than a farmer with no such possibility. Insofar as the state of the crops deteriorates independently of the farmer, then the farmer qualifies as a person who suffers in the required sense: his crop undergoes a change of state, and the result of this change of state is that the farmer's crops (and this is the relevant relation here) are ruined, indirectly leaving the farmer in a worse situation than before. Such a case is typical of certain adversity constructions. We may represent the situation as follows:

- (6) x = Farmer Jones
y = Jone's crops

xRy is the relation which holds between farmer and crops; there is an event E (the drought) among whose consequences is that the crop is ruined ($y \xrightarrow{E} y'$). As a further consequence, $xRy \xrightarrow{E} xRy'$, and xRy' is worse for x (in some intuitive sense) than xRy.

An English sentence which represents such a state of affairs is:

- (7) Farmer Jones had his crops go bad (on him).

It is clearly possible in principle for a relation to mediate positive or beneficial effects as well as adversative ones. We comment on this below in our discussion of Japanese.

Depending on the content of the relation in question and the role of the entity designated by y in the event in question, different types of adversity may be distinguished. Suppose, for example, that the relation which exists between x and y is such that x is responsible for the behavior of y. To the extent that this is so, then the behavior of y reflects on x -- a phenomenon which parents are typically sensitive to with regard to their children. Suppose that a child behaves badly or in some way not in conformity with standard cultural mores in a given society. This behavior may reflect on the parents to the extent that they are charged (socially) with the responsibility of raising their children in such a way that they behave in conformity with those mores. In other ways, such behavior is an indication that the parents in question have failed in their social responsibility. As a concrete example, suppose one's child starts yelling at some inappropriate time and place, for example a religious service. Insofar as a parent ought to have trained the child not to behave in such a way, such an event betrays the failure of the parent with respect to his or her social responsibility. As a result, the event has adverse consequences for the parent.

These examples indicate how it is possible for a relation between two entities x and y to transmit the effects of an event involving y and independent of x to x. We shall leave open whether there are other ways as well, though it is important to recognize that insofar as the possibilities we have discussed are attested in one or another language, it is always necessary to specify the possible content of the relation R, for this range may be narrowly defined.

In what follows, we shall discuss a number of adversity constructions in English and in Japanese. We shall show that the "relational" account of "adversity" presented above offers insight into the nature of these constructions.

2. Japanese adversity constructions

As mentioned above, the adversity passive in Japanese has been discussed by many people. Sentence (1a) given earlier is an instance of this construction. Besides this "adversity passive," however, Japanese has another adversity construction. Consider sentence (1b), repeated here as (8):

- (8) Titioya-wa kodomo-o sin-ase-ta.
 father-top child-acc die-cause-past
 'The father had his child die on him.'

This is a "causative" construction, in which the suffix (s)ase is a "causative" morpheme. This causative sentence is ambiguous. There are at least four readings -- (i) Titioya 'father' intentionally brought about his child's death; (ii) he let his child die; (iii) the father caused his child's death, inadvertently; or (iv) the father did not cause his child's death, intentionally or otherwise, but he was nevertheless adversely affected by his child's death.

Among the four meanings above, the first three have causative meanings because of (s)ase. However, in the case of (iv), no causative meaning exists

It seems that if the verb does not have a transitive form, the productive causative is used. Sentences (9) through (11) have productive causatives because we do not have transitive counterparts of the intransitive forms involved.

Looking at these example sentences, it becomes clear that our abstract adversity mentioned above is as yet too broad for the adversity causative in Japanese. Specifically, concerning the point that x and y have a relationship, "abstract adversity" as it stands now countenances any kind of relationship between x and y. However, the crucial point in the adversity causative is that x should be "responsible" in some intuitive sense for the state of y. In the case of (11), for example, Taro must own the company. If Taro is merely an employee of the company, the sentence can only be understood as a regular causative. Furthermore, if x and y have the reverse relationship, that is, y is responsible for x, the sentence cannot have an adversity interpretation. Thus (13) is a regular causative:

- (13) x y
 Kodomo-wa titioya-o sin-ase-ta.
 child-top father-acc die-cause-past
 'The child caused the father's death.
 ≠The child had his father die on him.'

Furthermore, the relationship in the adversity causative cannot be an adversary one. Sentence (14) does not have an adversity causative reading in the sense employed in this paper.

- (14) x y
 Taroo-wa teki-no horyo-o sin-ase-ta.
 top enemy-gen captive-acc die-cause-past
 'Taro caused his enemy captive's death.
 ≠Taro had his enemy captive die on him.'

Concerning the point about the change of state of y, it must also be constrained. First, when y undergoes a change to become y', in our abstract adversity, y does not necessarily change for the worse. For example, it is compatible with a neutral change, which x does not like, and thus suffers from. However, in the adversity causative in Japanese, y' should be worse than y (from the view-point of common sense). Thus sentences (15) and (16) cannot be adversity causatives:

- (15) x y
 Taroo-wa musume-o kekkon s-ase-ta.
 top daughter-acc marry-cause-past
 'Taro made/let his daughter marry.
 ≠Taro had his daughter get married on him.'
- (16) x y
 Taroo-wa hana-o sak-ase-ta.
 top flower-acc bloom-cause-past
 'Taro caused the flower to bloom.
 ≠Taro had his flower bloom on him.'

In these sentences, the y's did not change for the worse. Second, when y becomes y', y cannot be construed as acting intentionally. A sentence like (17) cannot be an adversity causative.

- (17) x y
 Titioya-wa kodomo-o itazura s-ase-ta.
 father-top child-acc behave-badly-cause-past
 'The father made/let his child behave badly.
 #The father had his son behave badly on him.'

From the discussion just presented, we can see the domain of the Japanese adversity causative is much narrower than our abstract adversity; in other words, it constitutes a very special case within this broad scheme.

We now take up the problem of the Japanese "adversity passive." The first question that arises is how the "adversity passive" is to be distinguished within the general context of Japanese grammar, with particular reference to the grammar of the suffix (r)are. Our assumptions are the following.

First, when (r)are is attached to a verb, we follow Kuroda (1979) in distinguishing two cases, depending on the particle attached to the NP which corresponds to the subject of V in the absence of (r)are: namely, ni alone or ni yotte. Second, when a clause of the form ... V-(r)are can be converted into a corresponding clause of the form ... V by removing (r)are and reassigning case particles to the NP's to the left of the verb, we follow standard usage and refer to it as a "direct" passive. Otherwise, it is called an "indirect" passive. Sentence (18) is an example of the direct passive; sentences (19) and (20) exemplify the indirect passive.

- (18) a. Hanako-wa Taroo-ni nagur-are-ta.
 top dat hit-passive-past
 'Hanako was hit by Taro.'
- b. Taroo-wa Hanako-o nagut-ta.
 top acc hit-past
 'Taro hit Hanako.'
- (19) a. (=1) Taroo-wa kodomo-ni sin-are-ta.
 top child-dat die-passive-past
 'Taro's child died on him.'
- b. *Kodomo-wa Taroo-o sin-da.
 child-top acc die-past
- (20) a. Taroo-wa Hanako-ni tokei-o kowas-are-ta.
 top dat watch-acc break-passive-past
 'Taro had his watch broken by Hanako.'
- b. *Hanako-wa Taro-ni tokei-o kowasi-ta.
 top dat watch-acc break-past

These two criteria are syntactic in nature; yet they give rise to distinct semantic and pragmatic properties. Kuroda states: "The ni passive form, whether direct or indirect, carries a connotation of affectivity, which semantically distinguishes it from the ni yotte passive form. However, I do not maintain that this affective connotation can be described away by a unique semantic characteristic such as 'the passive subject being adversely affected' " (p. 310). He later suggests that the well-known fact that ni yotte cannot appear in 'indirect' passives is a consequence of this distinction: "If a syntactic structure is available by which a sentence may be combined with a term which does not bear any grammatical relation with it, the semantics of this structure would have to express the idea that the referent of the term in question is affected in some sense by the event or state of affairs expressed by the sentence with which that term is combined in this structure. Thus, the 'indirect' passive cannot but be 'affective' " (pp. 332-333). If we accept Kuroda's argument (which we have not done full justice to), then we can restrict our attention to cases involving ni and not ni yotte.

Now, the basic distinction between the "direct" passive and the "indirect" passive is that in the former the referent of the passive subject is directly involved in the represented state-of-affairs, whereas in the latter, since the subject NP plays no role in the argument structure of the verb from which the form v-(r)are is derived, this need not be the case. And, in fact, as Wierzbicka (1979) points out, the range of interpretations possible for indirect passives depends on the relation between the referent of the subject and the represented event. How, then, can we provide an analysis of "affectivity" which is adequate to the range of interpretations we find in the case of the ni passive, i.e. in sentences of the form "NP wa/ga NP ni ... V-(r)are-...?"

Let us assume first of all that if the referent of the passive subject is directly involved in the event represented by the verb v of a v-(r)are clause, it counts as being "affected" in the relevant sense. Any additional affect is then due to purely pragmatic considerations, including the connotations of words used to characterize the event in question. In most cases, the notion "directly involved" can be tested by considering whether or not the same event could have taken place in the absence of the referent of the subject NP. By this criterion, the subject of direct passives is always directly involved and, as result, by our first assumption, "affected." There are, however, cases of indirect passives, pointed out by Wierzbicka, in which the referent of the subject is directly involved in this sense: namely, those involving body parts of the referent of the passive subject. We cite the following from her paper (cf. pp. 130f.):

(21) Kanzya-wa kangohu-ni kanbu-o huk-are-ta.
 patient-top nurse-dat diseased-part-acc wipe-passive-past

'The patient had a nurse wipe the affected part.'

Since the referent of the subject NP kanzya-wa is directly involved, the affectivity requirement is satisfied. Thus, any further "affect" is due to other considerations, and, in this case, since the description is

neutral, there is none. We may induce further affect in such sentences by the introduction of lexical symbols which carry clear connotations, or by pragmatically-derivable reasoning, as in the following:

- (22) Sono kodomo-wa minna-ni kawaigar-are-ta.
 that child-top everybody-dat love-passive-past
 'That child was loved by everybody.'
- (23) (=18a) Hanako-wa Taroo-ni nagur-are-ta.
 top dat hit-passive-past
 'Hanako was hit by Taro.'
- (24) Kodomo-wa sensei-ni yasaki atama-o nade-rare-ta.
 child-top teacher-dat gently head-acc pat-passive-past
 'The child had the teacher pat his head gently (and he was positively affected by it).'
- (25) Watasi-wa John-ni kao-o kizutuke-rare-ta.
 I-top dat face-acc hurt-passive-past
 'I had John hurt my face (and I was adversely affected by it).'

Suppose now that the referent of the subject NP is not directly involved in the represented event. Here there is actually more than one case to consider, for on the one hand one may experience directly, through sensory perception, events whose occurrence need not depend on one, in which case one is involved in an event (though not directly involved); or, on the other hand, one need not experience such events at all, in which case one is independent of the event in the sense of the abstract adversity of §1. These two cases manifest distinct behavior both with respect to the cases in which the referent of the subject NP is taken to be directly involved and from each other. This is particularly apparent in the interpretation of sentences which allow a multiplicity of ways in which the relation of the referent of the subject NP to the represented event may be construed. Consider the following sentences:

- (26) Taroo-wa Hanako-ni piano-o hik-are-ta.
 top dat piano-acc play-passive-past
 'Hanako played the piano, and Taro was affected.'
- (27) Taroo-wa Hanako-ni utukusii ongaku-o kanade-rare-ta.
 top dat beautiful music-acc play-passive-past
 'Beautiful music was played by Hanako, and Taro was affected.'

Sentence (26) is applicable in a variety of situations: (i) in a competition, Hanako got to play instead of Taro and thus Taro was jealous of his competitor; (ii) Taro had his delicate piano ruined because Hanako played it; (iii) Taro experienced great pain in hearing the noises Hanako produced at the piano. In contrast we interpret (27) positively, under the assumption that Taro actually heard the music, because of the positive connotations of utukusii. The possibility in such cases of positive affect is easily

demonstrated in a variety of other examples (sentences (28a) and (29a) are from Alfonso 1966, quoted in Wierzbicka 1979:125):

- (28) a. Musume-wa sutekina wakamono-ni waraikake-rare-ta.
 girl-top handsome boy-dat smile-passive-past
 'The girl had a handsome boy smile at her.'
- b. Musume-wa henna otoko-ni waraikake-rare-ta.
 girl-top funny man-dat smile-passive-past
 'The girl had a strange man smile at her.'
- (29) a. Kodomo-wa kawaii inu-ni zyaretuk-are-ta.
 child-top lovely dog-dat frisk-around-passive-past
 'The child had a lovely dog frisk around him.'
- b. Kodomo-wa osorosii inu-ni hoe-rare-ta.
 child-top fierce dog-dat bark-passive-past
 'The child had a fierce dog bark at him.'

In these cases, the (a) examples are liable to be construed as carrying positive affect, whereas the (b) examples are prone to a negative interpretation. It is an interesting problem why, in such cases, there is no neutral interpretation. We can account for this fact by supposing that there is only one kind of "neutral affect," namely that which arises from direct involvement. In other cases, let us assume that the unmarked "affect" is negative, unless there are specific indications to the contrary.²

Even making these assumptions, we find that the possibility of "positive affect" is limited to those cases in which the subject is not independent of the event. When the subject is independent of the event, only "negative" or "adverse" affect is possible.³ This can be shown in two ways: first, by the fact that using words with favorable connotation in circumstances in which the subject is independent of the event; second, by considering cases in which the subject can be construed as either independent of the event or not. An example of the first case is:

- (30) ?John-wa tuma-ni naor-are-ta. (Wierzbicka p. 120)
 top wife-dat recover-passive-past
 'John had his wife recover.'

In spite of the fact that on pragmatic grounds we might assume that a wife's recovery would be positive, this sentence cannot be construed as carrying "positive affect." As a result of the conflict between the requirement of adverse affect and the presumed benefits of such an event, this sentence sounds rather strange.

To exemplify the second case, we again draw on a case of Wierzbicka's:

- (31) Kyoosoo-de kodomo-ni ittoo-ni nar-are-ta.
 competition-in child-dat first-prize-dat get-passive-past
 'I had my child win the first prize in the competition.'

If the (implicit) subject of this sentence (i.e. the speaker) is independent of the event, this sentence provides a conflict between the necessity of "adverse affect" and parental pride in having one's child perform well. Surprisingly enough, however, if the subject is construed as having participated in the contest, both positive and negative interpretations are possible: one may either be proud or ashamed of being bested by one's offspring.

Thus far, we have tried to combine two insights: Kuroda's observation that the ni-passive carries with a notion of "affectivity" and Wierzbicka's observation that "if the affected person is not involved in the event, the passive in the main clause⁴ always has adversity meaning. If the affected person is involved in the event, non-adversity meaning is possible depending on the words in the sentence." Although these results are certainly not consequences of the notion of abstract adversity introduced above, since this notion depends on the relation between an individual and a represented event, it provides a natural framework for the distinctions we have drawn.

We have suggested that when the conditions of abstract adversity are satisfied, then an adverse interpretation is obligatory in the ni-passive (with the exception of the verb tasuke 'rescue,' noted in footnote 3). Let us now raise the following question: if the subject of the ni-passive is independent of the represented event, is it always possible to specify some relation R which holds between the subject and some other entity directly involved in the event?

In many cases, the answer to this question is positive. In such cases as the following, such a relation is easily specifiable:

- (32) (=1) x y
 Taroo-wa kodomo-ni sin-are-ta.
 top child-dat die-passive-past
 'Taro had his child die on him.'
- (33) x y
 Taroo-wa musume-ni kekkon s-are-ta.
 top daughter-dat marry-passive-past
 'Taro's daughter got married on him.'
- (34) x y
 Taroo-wa Ziroo-ni syusse s-are-ta.
 top dat succeed-passive-past
 'Jiro succeeded, and Taro was adversely affected.'
- (35) x y
 Taroo-wa gootoo-ni kodomo-o okos-are-ta.
 top burglar-dat child-acc awake-passive-past
 'Taro had a burglar wake up his child.'

- (36) x y
 Taroo-wa otoko-ni musume-o metor-are-ta.
 top man-dat daughter-acc marry-passive-past
 'Taro had a man marry his daughter on him.'
- (37) (=20a) x y
 Taroo-wa Hanako-ni tokei-o kowas-are-ta.
 top dat watch-acc break-passive-past
 'Taro had his watch broken by Hanako.'
- (38) x y
 Taroo-wa musume-ni kekkon-o yame-rare-ta.
 top daughter-dat marriage-acc cancel-passive-past
 'Taro had his daughter cancel her marriage on him.'
- (39) x y
 Taroo-wa Hanako-ni piano-o hik-are-ta.
 top dat piano-acc play-passive-past
 'Hanako played the piano, and Taro suffered.'
 (e.g., Taro was jealous of Hanako, cf. (26))

In each of these cases, there is an event represented which occurs independently of x. Second, in each case there must be a relation which holds between x and y, though the content of this relation varies from one case to another: it may be an adversary relation (i.e., x and y are competitors) to kinship relation, or a possessive relation. Finally, in each case, y undergoes some change of state, and, whether this change of state is positive, neutral, or adverse for y, it is always construed as having adverse consequences for x. All of this is consistent with abstract adversity: in fact, it is a paradigm example of the general schema which abstract adversity provides.

Nevertheless, it is possible to find cases which are problematic within this framework. Consider the following:

- (40) x y
 Taroo-wa otoko-ni musume-o mi-rare-ta.
 top man-dat daughter-acc see-passive-past
 'Taro's daughter was seen by a man, and Taro suffered.'
- (41) x ?y
 Taroo-wa ame-ni hur-are-ta.
 top rain-dat fall-passive-past
 'Taro had it rain on him.'
- (42) x ?y ?y
 Taroo-wa Hanako-ni piano-o hik-are-ta.
 top dat piano-acc play-passive-past
 'Hanako played the piano and Taro suffered.'
 (e.g., the sound was annoying, c.f. (26), (39))

In the first case, the question which naturally arises is whether the daughter undergoes any change of state. Kuroda (1979) presents an interesting discussion about the verb mi 'see.' Suppose "I" am looking through a keyhole. Suddenly "I" notice John is looking at "me." "I" might say to "myself":

(43) A! John-ni mi-rare-ta.
 dat see-passive-past

'My God, I've been seen by John.'

"I" am affected by this event. The state of my consciousness changed. The "affected" meaning of the passive reflects this fundamental relation, "being-seen-by-the other." But in sentence (40), unlike (43), the person who has been seen is not in the subject position. In such a case the sentence is ambiguous: either (i) musume 'daughter' is aware of being seen; or (ii) she does not notice that she is seen, so she is not affected by the event. If the sentence has the first meaning, y has changed to y', from the non-conscious state to the consciousness state (affected). Therefore it seems that with this particular sense the sentence fits in our abstract adversity. However, even in this case, it seems different from other adversity passives because x's "suffering" is not caused by this kind of mental change that y undergoes. x's suffering seems to be more direct. Maybe there is some peculiarity in the verb mi 'see.' The interesting question in regard to (41) and (42) is what it is that the subject stands in relation to, for it is not clear that we can find an expression in the sentence whose referent stands in such a relation to the subject. If this were the case, it would be a serious problem, for a principal virtue of abstract adversity is that it provides, through relational connectedness of the victim and participants in the event, a means for the transmission of consequences. Although given our propensity to find relations, the requirement of relational connectedness is not terribly difficult to satisfy, if we find it impossible to satisfy, then we are forced to fall back on even vaguer notions. Thus, it is of interest to attempt to defend this view.

Looking at the second two examples more closely, we find that they can be used only when the subject is not independent of the represented event. In other words, the referent of the subject, even though not directly involved in the represented event, must be taken to have direct sensory experience of it. This can be shown by attempting to apply such sentences to circumstances in which this criterion is not met, as follows: Suppose that Taro has bet a huge amount of money on the outcome of the final game of the World Series, held in New York and is waiting eagerly in Tokyo for news of the results, for he is counting on his winnings to make his mortgage payment. If the game is postponed on account of rain, forcing Taro to miss his mortgage payment, it nevertheless is odd to use the sentence Taroo wa ame-ni hurareta, in spite of the fact that Taro undoubtedly suffers as a consequence of rain. Thus, we can conclude that where it seems impossible to find an NP to whose referent the victim is relationally connected, it must be the case that the victim is related to the event itself. Thus, while in such cases the victim cannot be construed as being independent of the event in the sense of abstract adversity, and, hence these cases do not yield counter-examples to it, they do suggest that the notion of relational connectedness be generalized in such a way that it can be extended to this class of cases which fall outside the domain of abstract adversity.

It is worth pondering why it is that in all ni-passives adverse interpretations predominate, even though non-adverse interpretations are possible. One answer to this question is to simply point to the fact that the possibility of non-adverse interpretations is subject to rather special conditions, as we have seen. But why should this be so? In fact, apart from the cases in which the victim is directly affected through some event involving body parts, the unmarked interpretation of indirect passives is always adverse: in order to achieve a non-adverse interpretation, it is necessary to load the sentence with words having a definite positive connotation. Sentence (42), for example, is couched in a vocabulary which is connotatively neutral. Why, then, should it be construed as conveying adverse affect, as it is, rather than simply being neutral with regard to affect? Although this cannot be answered easily, Kuroda's (1979) statement based on a philosophical observation may be helpful. He says that "the Self's encounter with the Other," which is the typical characteristic of the ni-passive, "is originally an adversative relation for him, forcing him to concede freedom to the Other. Adversity might thus be the initial manifestation of affectivity" (p. 335).

Finally, comparing adversity passives and adversity causatives, it is clear that adversity passives are used in a much broader area than the adversity causative construction. It is not surprising, then, that adversity passives have received so much more attention than adversity causatives in Japanese linguistics.

3. English

Although native speakers of English are often struck by the existence of such constructions as the Japanese "adversity passive" (sometimes referred to even more vividly as the "suffering passive"), the "adversity causative" seems to have a direct analogue in English: namely, constructions of the form NP have NP VP, which may be construed either as "causatives" (in a loose sense of this term, since properly speaking, they do not involve "causation" so much as "arrangement") or as adversity-like constructions. This particular ambiguity may be illustrated in the following example,

(44) Hoover had an FBI agent interrogate him.

which may be applied either to a situation in which Hoover arranged for an FBI agent to interrogate him or Hoover had the experience of being interrogated by an FBI agent. In addition to its apparent affinities with the Japanese (s)ase constructions, this sentence type has interesting properties of its own. Yet there are also other English constructions which might be termed "adversative," some of which we exemplify below:

- (45) a. What the doctor did to John was trample the flowers.
 b. The car broke down on him.
 c. He got his leg broken.
 d. He cut himself on a razor.

Our goal is not a complete analysis of all of these constructions; rather we shall attempt to examine some of them in the light of the general characterization of adversity given in §1 in an effort to test the value of this somewhat broad definition. While we shall see that the definition does not in fact cover each of the above cases adequately (in particular, the last two provide recalcitrant cases due to the necessary involvement of the referent of the subject expression in the presented event), the virtue of the definition and the distinctions that it allows lies in the fact that it makes it possible to isolate and in part characterize more precisely not only the language-internal relations between these various constructions, but also to place them in a broader context of cross-language comparison. The principal difficulty in analyzing them is the fact that it is quite difficult to pin down exactly the sense in which they may be taken to be "adversative" at all; on the other hand, this is the very strength of the abstract characterization of "adversity" which we have tried to provide. In the sections which follow, we shall examine these cases individually in an attempt to delineate their grammatical properties.

3.1 What y did to x was z

Pseudo-cleft sentences of the form what y did to x was VP may be broadly classed into two types. The first type is a neutral description of an action by y which directly effects x. Examples of this are:

(46) What I did to the floor was sand it, and then apply a sealer to it.

(47) What he did to the car was rewire it's ignition system.

(48) What the doctor did to him was remove his cataract.

The second type is always "adversative." This type may be illustrated with the following examples:

(49) What John did to me was leave town before the agreement was signed.

(50) What John did to Max was directly contact the administration.

(51) What John did to Max was trample the flowers.

Although these cases overlap to some extent, syntactically, we may consider two cases. The first is where an anaphor of x or an expression denoting some part of x appears as an argument to the first element of z. The second is where no expression designating x or a part of x appears anywhere in z. In the latter case, the consequences of z are always construed as adverse relative to the interests of x, regardless of whether or not such an action would be taken normally to be harmful or unbeneficial. In the former case, whether or not the consequences of z for x are construed as adverse or not depends precisely on such pragmatic factors. Thus, a sentence such as:

(52) What Jones did to him was pull out his tooth.

is interpreted as either a neutral description (with hoped-for benefits) or as "adverse" (if there was nothing wrong with his tooth, for example) depending on pragmatic circumstances. However, a sentence such as:

(53) What Jones did to him was trample the flowers.

where no anaphor of him appears in trample the flowers must always be construed as "adverse" regardless of pragmatic factors.

This bifurcation of the interpretive properties of this construction raises interesting questions about the relation between semantics and pragmatics: for while it is clear that there is a sharp division between the two types of construal, a division which seems to be semantic in nature rather than gradably pragmatic, each member of the division is subject to rather rigid conditions: in the first instance, we must specify with greater precision the notion "direct effect on x," where the x may appear syntactically in a variety of positions within VP. In this case, the question arises whether this can be done on the basis of purely semantic considerations: what would be required is that in addition to specifying a class of models which satisfy a given sentence, we be able to state which entities that appear in such models are "directly effected." In the second case, as we have already mentioned, there seem to be two syntactic cases: one of these overlaps with the "direct effect" case, as in such examples as,

(54) What the doctor did to me was knock my tooth out.

In such cases, any adversative tone to the sentence arises purely from pragmatic considerations, and on these grounds, the construction itself cannot be taken to be an "adversity" construction for two reasons: first, it depends purely on pragmatics, and thus cannot be distinguished from the sense of adversity which intrudes on such (otherwise neutral) descriptions of events as a rock fell on John's head; and second, it violates the precept of the definition that the victim be independent of the represented event.

On the other hand, however, in those cases in which there is no anaphor of the NP which occurs in the expression to NP in the focus VP of the construction as a whole, the construction may be said to qualify as an adversative construction, though of a rather special type.

What makes it an "adversity construction" is the fact that some relation must be found (pragmatically) which holds between the NP in the to-phrase and either the referent of the subject of do or the referent of some expression in the VP. While we may take the necessity of finding such a relation to be a semantic property of this particular construal of the construction as a whole, its instantiation in any given case is only accessible pragmatically. Compare:

(55) What John did to Max was leave town before noon.

(56) What John did to Max was trample the rose bushes.

In the first case, for example, it is plausible to consider the sentence applicable in a case where there is some special arrangement between John and Max, an arrangement whose benefits to Max are considerably worsened by the fact that John left town. In the second case, a natural model for the sentence would be one in which John trampled Max's rose bushes, although it is possibly to imagine more arcane instances which would satisfy the sentence.

What makes this construction a rather special type is two factors. First, when the subject of do represents a person, there seems to be the implication that the person acted with malice aforethought. While this is not an absolute property of the construction as a whole, a fact demonstrated by the existence of cases in which the subject of do is not animate:

(57) What inflation has done to him is ruin his business.

in general, when there is an animate subject, one feels that the part of the intention of this person is to inflict damage on the victim. In this respect, the construction as a whole might be termed "malefactive" rather than simply "adversative." Second, one cannot help noticing that much of the adversative effect of the construction is centered on the preposition to. If we replace to with for, we change the "malefactive" construction to a "benefactive" one: Compare:

(58) What John did to me was leave town.

(59) What John did for me was leave town.

Here what is most interesting is the fact that in constructions with for-phrases, we have exactly the same pragmatic problem in identifying a suitable relation between the NP in the for-phrase and some other expression in the sentence as we had in identifying a suitable relation between the NP in the to-phrase and some other expression in the sentence. And although there is a difficulty in restricting the class of relevant relations -- since the notion "relation" in and of itself is far too broad -- this corroborates in part the general theory of indirect effect adumbrated above in §1: apart from the "direct effect" cases discussed above in relation to to-phrases (for which no direct counterpart seems to exist for for-phrases), in cases of "indirect effect" the existence of relevant pragmatic relations seems to be a necessity in both cases.

3.2 Adversative on

There is a prepositional phrase construction in English which can form the locus of an "adversative interpretation": the preposition involved is on and this use of it is illustrated below:

(60) The horse died on me.

(61) The train left on time on me.

As noted by Lise Menn (1972), when on is construed in this way, it's object is never referentially identical with any of the individuals

involved in the event represented by the sentence to which the on-phrase is attached. This condition is a basic consequence of the theory of adversity outlined above, which includes the stipulation that the "victim" be independent of the event represented by the rest of the sentence which immediately contains the phrase whose referent is the victim. A second consequence of this general theory with respect to this construction is that the syntactic complement of the victim phrase in the sentence which immediately contains it must represent an event. Note that sentences which are stative resist inclusion of an adversative on-phrase:

- (62) a. *My horse is a nag on me.
 b. *Unicorns don't exist on me.
 c. *The train wasn't there on me.

In many cases, it is easy to see how such sentences meet the second criterion which we laid down above, namely that the victim stand in relation to a character involved in the represented event. For example, if one says, my horse died on me, it is easy to consider the change of the horse's state to have an effect on the victim as outlined above in §1. Moreover, even in cases where there is no overt indication of relation between victim and character in the represented event, it is evident that such a relation is implicit in the circumstances in which such a sentence is pragmatically appropriate. For example, if one says merely the horse died on me rather than my horse died on me, it seems intuitively clear that there must exist some relation between the victim ('me') and the horse in question, although it is possible to imagine many possible relations which would be pragmatically appropriate. For example, the victim may own the horse, may want to buy the horse, may have placed a bet on the horse, and so on. At the same time, it is possible to specify situations in which a given horse dies but for which sentences of this type are inappropriate: suppose for example one is watching a movie in which a certain horse dies. One may report this by saying, the horse died, but in the absence of any other information it would be rather difficult to imagine a suitable relation which would justify extending this report to the sentence the horse died on me. Thus, the general theory of adversity outlined above has useful application to this English construction in a variety of ways.

Apart from these general remarks, several grammatical idiosyncrasies of this construction may be noted. First, it is a bit strange to report the occurrence of an event to the victim using the on-adversity construction. Compare:

- (63) a. I was sorry to find out that your house burned down on you.
 b. *Hey Max! Have you heard? Your house burned down on you.

Second, the person represented in the on-phrase must be, in some vague sense, the principal victim of the event. Compare the two adversity constructions:

- (64) a. My brother was executed on me.
 b. What Stalin did to me was execute my brother.

Here the effect is quite different: in the first case, the case with adversative on, one has the impression that the me in question cares not so much for his/her brother's death as for its effect on him or her; in the second case, the victim (i.e. the NP in the to-phrase) stands in quite a different relation to events, for one has the impression that Stalin's execution of the brother was an attempt to inflict damage on the victim. It is easy to construct many similar examples, some of the rather morbid variety as illustrated above, and some rather comical in effect:

(65) Dr. Jones: Then the patient died on me.

(indicates that the major disaster was to the doctor and not to the patient)

(66) The car broke down on one of the passengers.

(indicates that the baleful effects of breakdown were concentrated on one of the passengers rather than shared equally).

While our general characterization of "adversity constructions" does not predict specifically that such differences would exist, it allows for their existence in the sense that considerable latitude is left for further specification, and in fact the differences that we find (insofar as we can put a finger on them at all) are really natural points of focus. While there are obvious affinities between the pseudo-cleft construction discussed in §3.1 above and the adversative on construction, as can be exemplified by comparing the following two cases,

(67) What John did to me was leave town.

(68) John left town on me.

in both of which it is necessary to construct some (pragmatically-given relationship between me and John, they differ in a number of ways. We will, however, postpone further discussions on them until a more complete review of the English "adversity" constructions is available.

3.3 Have

The problems we would like to address in this section are rather easy to state, but not so easy to resolve. It is well known that sentences such as

(69) I had the tree in the front lawn chopped down.

support a variety of interpretations. Among them, we distinguish:

(70) i) a case in which the persona arranges for someone else to chop down the tree (cf. I had John chop down the tree in the front lawn.), which we call the 'dynamic' or 'causative' interpretation.

ii) a case in which the persona him/herself has chopped down the tree, and this circumstance is relevant to the persona at the time of the tense referent (cf. When Max arrived, I had the tree in the front lawn (already) chopped down.), which we call the 'circumstantial' interpretation.

- iii) a case in which the persona is confronted with the circumstance that the tree has been chopped down, a circumstance which does not accord with his desires (cf. I had the tree in the front lawn chopped down on me.), which we call the 'adversity' interpretation.

The question we would like to raise are rather obvious ones:

- A) First, is it possible to specify the conditions under which a sentence governed by the occurrence of have supports each of these interpretations?
- B) Second, assuming the existence of adequate characterizations of these conditions, what is their relationship to the account of adversity presented in §1?
- C) Finally, again assuming the existing of adequate characterizations of the conditions mentioned in (a), and regardless of the answer to the problem posed in (b), what bearing do such questions have on general problems concerning the relation between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics? If it can be shown that analysis of such structures does have interesting consequences for more general problems, then the investigation of such seemingly arcane areas of language as "adversity" constructions will have justified itself.

In order to pursue these questions, it is useful to make a quick survey of the environments in which have appears. These include:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| (71) x have Past-participle phrase | He has/had proved the theorem. |
| x have NP | He has/had the book / a brother. |
| x have NP AP | He has/had the garage empty. |
| x have NP PP | He has/had the dog in the car. |
| x have/NP Present-part phrase | He has/had his mother visiting him. |
| x have NP Passive-part phrase | He?has/had his collaborator arrested. |
| x have NP VP | He?has/had the police arrest his collaborator. |

We may divide these types into two cases: those in which there is a single expression to the right of have (the first two cases) and those in which there are two expressions to the right of have (all the rest). The latter class cannot be reduced to the first, as is evident from the fact that the truth of the assertion the engine has some spark plugs missing does not entail the truth of the assertion the engine has some spark plugs. And it is this latter class that we shall be concerned with, for in every case there exists a predicative relation of some kind between the NP immediately to the right of have and the second expression to the right of have.

Assuming this much, what do we need in addition to provide an adequate classification of interpretations? There are three distinctions which we find necessary: the temporal relations which hold between the referent of the subject of have and the predicative relation which holds between two arguments to the right of have; the intentions, knowledge, and desires of the referent of the subject of have with respect to the predicative relation; and relational connectedness (in the sense of §1) between the referent of the subject of have and some member of the predicative relation. While the explanatory force of explicating the difference between three different interpretations on the basis of three different more primitive notions may be questioned, its value resides in two facts: first, the three more primitive notions are analytic in nature, in that they provide correlations between intuitive "readings"; second, there are non-trivial relations between the three parameters, relations which are not particularly surprising in view of the temporal relations which hold in analyses of causation and causal analyses in philosophy of the relation between intention and action.

In order to explicate these notions, let us use the term "model" in such a way that we may refer to a model M of an interpretation of a sentence S where M has a specifiable temporal structure. Moreover, let us coin the term "temporal involvement in M," which stands for a relation between the values of parts (x) of a sentence S and the temporal structure of M. Some such notion is necessary in the analysis of predication in any event, to deal with such cases as

(72) John built the house.

which demand, if true, that the temporal involvement of John in M precede the temporal involvement of the house in M.

Suppressing logical niceties, there are three principal possible relations between the temporal involvement of two arguments x and y of a sentence S in a model M of an interpretation of S, namely (using the symbolism TI(x) to denote the temporal involvement of x in M).

(73) $TI(x) \leq TI(y)$

$TI(x) = TI(y)$

$TI(x) \geq TI(y)$

Now, in the structure x have NP+XP, let t_x stand for the temporal involvement of x and t_e stand for the temporal involvement of NP + XP. Given the three possibilities:

(74) $t_x < t_e$

$t_x = t_e$

$t_x > t_e$

we identify the first with the "dynamic" or "causative" interpretation, the second with the "circumstantial" interpretation, and the third with the "adversity" interpretation.

This identification has natural relations with our other two parameters. First, the natural way to interpret the first case with respect to intentionality is to suppose that x acts intentionally to carry out some desire to be satisfied by the instantiation of the event. By the same token, the second case is compatible with intentionality when the event is a state of affairs which may be maintained, as in

(75) I have the back door open so that the cats can come and go freely.

Finally, the third case is incompatible with any action by x. Consider now the third parameter mentioned above, relational connectedness. In cases involving intentional acts, the act itself satisfies this criterion, but in the cases where intentional acts play no role, then we must find some pragmatic connection between x and E. We construe this as a semantic requirement whose satisfaction is pragmatically controlled.

When we consider these three parameters together, they appear to provide a complete classification of the interpretations of the sentences under consideration. Yet there does not seem to be any sense in which an "adversity" interpretation can be strictly identified with any member of this classification: rather, adversity interpretations arise as a pragmatically special case of the non-intentional interpretation, namely when the event or state of affairs E is pragmatically construed as being counter to the interests of x. In this sense, the construction x have NP + XP cannot be taken to be an "adversity construction," i.e., one which forces an adversity interpretation. In fact, even when such a construction supports an "adversity interpretation," it may do so in ways which violate the conditions of "abstract adversity" outlined in §1. In particular, x may be construed as a "victim" even when x is not independent of the event, as in one interpretation of:

(76) John had the police interrogate him.

As a result, we may consider the account given in §1 of "abstract adversity" to be a special case of the more general type we have called here "circumstantial constructions." These constructions share with "adversity" constructions the pairing of the referent of a designated NP with a state of affairs to which it is obligatorily related (typically on the basis of pragmatic considerations), but the state of affairs need not be an event and the referent of the designated NP need not be independent of the state of affairs. All the cases of have which we have special cases (as given in (70)) arise by specifying various parameters in distinguishable ways. In fact, we may say that semantically, when have occurs in the context NP₁ have NP₂XP, then it is a semantic requirement that some pragmatically based relation be identified which holds between NP₁ and the composition of NP₂ and XP.

4. Conclusion

In this brief survey of the properties of some "adversity" constructions, "abstract adversity" has played an important conceptual role. In some cases, it has allowed us to formulate conditions on the interpretation of a given construction by specifying more fully the parameters

available. In other cases, even where a given construction displays a range of uses which go beyond the available parameters, this concept has provided a setting in which it is possible to characterize more fully the range of the construction at issue. Thus, in the investigation of "adversity constructions" in Japanese and English, the concept of "abstract adversity" is of heuristic value.

Yet it is puzzling that the "adversity" constructions we have examined in these two languages are as different as they are. We suspect that an understanding of this phenomenon will arise only through more detailed comparison of the syntactic differences in the constructions in question.

FOOTNOTES

¹Wierzbicka's interesting paper attempts to go beyond the Japanese cases.

²Even in direct passives, many of the cases show negative "affect" without any specific indications.

³Wierzbicka provides the following example (p. 129):

John-wa raifu-seebaa-ni kodomo-o tasuke-rare-ta.
 top guard-dat child-acc rescue-passive-past

'A guard rescued John's child, John was affected by it.'

This sentence need not be interpreted as adverse. But as every example of a non-adverse interpretation in a pragmatic context which satisfies the conditions of abstract adversity known to us involves the verb tasuke 'rescue' or other verbs which mean 'rescue,' we consider these verbs to be idiosyncratic exceptions.

⁴Wierzbicka says there is an essential difference between passives in the main clause and in the subordinate clause. Since passives in subordinate clauses show complicated phenomena, our concern is only on those in main clauses.