MORAL DOMAIN EXPERTISE AND THE COMPLEMENT MODEL:
THE MARRIAGE OF VIRTUE ETHICS AND SITUATIONISM FOR BUSINESS
ETHICS PROGRAMS

by

Laura Marks Howard

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SIGNED  Laura M. Howard
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DEDICATION

This is for my father, Marvin Daymond Marks, who so passionately wanted to finish a Ph.D., and easily would have, had he not been halted by life tragedy. I miss you, Dad.

I also dedicate this to my incredibly talented son, Robert Daymond Howard, for whom I hope this serves as a lesson that many ‘states of being’ worth striving for take considerable time to realize, and so perseverance is perhaps the greatest virtue.

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ABSTRACT

When a business organization designs an ethics program, should it adopt a situationist conception of moral psychology or a virtue approach to character building? In this dissertation I argue that the answer is, both. The complement model is a recommendation for business ethics programs that blends the best aspects of these two theories in social psychology and philosophy. I start by giving a critique of the experimental literature surrounding situationism and argue that older adults have different prosocial competencies than the younger college-age subjects used in the situationist experiments. I give an explanation of virtue development, which concludes with the claim that older adults are an overlooked resource to be used in formal ethics mentoring programs. I also present the findings from a study I conducted with business ethics professionals, which provided information that I used to formulate the recommendations for the complement model.
INTRODUCTION

Virtue ethics has enjoyed a contemporary spotlight of academic and popular attention that began in the later decades of the 20th century and continues today. At the same time, however, it has become the well-lit target of situationists in philosophy and psychology, eager to adduce experimental evidence to show that the notion of global character traits is deeply flawed and the traditional theory of virtue ethics empirically inadequate. Among academics, such scathing criticisms are par for the course; but in the business community, this charge, if true, is serious trouble for business ethics programs. For in the past two decades, virtue ethics has become the guiding force behind an emerging ethics culture in for-profit, non-profit, and government enterprises. Although the business version of virtue ethics lacks the theoretical precision inherent in scholarly studies of the topic, the prevalence and appeal of business virtue ethics is widespread. At the center of business virtue ethics, just as in the traditional theory, is the notion of character.

Currently, in the wake of exploding corporate scandal, business ethics has become serious business, and the characters of business leaders have come under intense scrutiny. There are entire corporate departments populated by professional ethicists and lawyers, whose sole responsibility is to design and maintain a comprehensive ethics

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1 The primary target of situationists such as John Doris is any virtue ethics account that conceives of the virtues as robust, global character traits that are determinative of behavior across a broad range of diverse circumstances, even when some circumstances may not be conducive to such trait-relevant behavior. This is to be contrasted with other versions of virtue ethics that do not require such agent ‘robustness’ in terms of resistance to situational influences. I will have much more to say about this in coming chapters.

2 Although not addressed within the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that virtue ethics in the form of “character education” currently lies at the very heart of many elementary and secondary school programs aimed at moral development.
program—which includes developing a code of conduct, conducting ethics orientation plus ongoing management and employee training, cultivating an environment conducive to ethical conduct, and structuring sanctions for ethical violations, among other things. Designers of comprehensive business ethics programs seek guidance from ethical theory; they will look to the theory to answer questions about what makes people behave morally, why some behave morally while others do not, how people make moral judgments, what motivates them to be moral, and what is the best way for people to decide what to do in morally difficult circumstances. Many businesses rely on a virtue ethics approach to inform and guide their programs. So, if the situationists are correct, and virtue ethics is a theory that cannot adequately explain or predict behavior, then business ethics is in trouble. But are the situationists correct? Are people simply unable to behave as a virtuous person ought when insignificant situational factors influence them to do otherwise? Should those who design business ethics programs rely on virtue ethics or take heed from the situationists? In this paper I undertake to answer these questions and conclude with a recommendation for the design of business ethics programs based on a complement model that marries the important warnings from situationism with the character-central theory of virtue. Along the way, I will argue that the conclusions drawn by situationists from the experimental evidence is based on a non-representative sample of college-age subjects, and I will argue that older adults would have fared better than the younger subjects in these experiments because older adults have had time to develop a greater degree of moral expertise of which prosocial competence is a part. I argue that older mentors are an excellent and overlooked resource to employ in a business ethics
program, and that mentoring partnerships should consist of an older mentor and younger mentee. These arguments are supported by data from a field research project I conducted, which yielded several interesting insights into the nature of practical business ethics programs. Taken together, I hope for my arguments to show that we have empirically grounded reasons not to abandon the quest to develop virtues, conceived as stable and enduring cross-situational dispositions.

The structure of the paper proceeds as follows: In Chapter One, I address the situationist’s conclusion (drawn from a collection of social psychology experiments) that the experimental subjects’ behaviors were strongly influenced by insignificant situational factors. I present a critique and rejection of the situationist’s extrapolation from conclusions about subjects in social psychology experiments to conclusions about people generally. First I survey the landscape of the experiments used to draw those conclusions, and I argue that because the experiments were conducted using college students, a critical subject demographic—age—was ignored. Because the subject population was non-representative of the natural context, we should not make generalizations about people’s moral psychology in situations that demand a prosocial response.

In Chapter Two, I give an argument to explain why older adults are likely to have made further progress toward moral expertise than college-age adults. I analyze an analogy between the development of virtue and the development of expertise in a practical skill to show why it takes so much time to become a moral expert. I identify two constraints to the development of expertise that cause more difficulty for the development of moral expertise than for practical skill expertise. I hope to have shown by this point
that the generalization made by situationists from the social psychology experimental evidence is unjustified because older adults would not have been as vulnerable to situational influences, since prosocial competence is a function of having attained some degree of moral expertise, which comes with age (among other things).

In Chapter Three, I argue that older adults should be used as mentors in business ethics programs, because ethics mentoring by older adults may help to develop more people of good character. I give evidence from research in organizational psychology to suggest that mentoring is successful when measured against certain mentee outcomes. I appeal to models of life stage development, based on Erik Erikson’s theory, to argue that the older mentor/younger mentee relationship is uniquely suited for success because of different motivations due to difference in age. I consider a claim that one’s moral character is sustained by interpersonal relationships but can also become disrupted because of the same mechanisms that underlie such relationships. I agree that this kind of vulnerability is real—especially in the business domain. I suggest that the mentoring program I advocate in the business domain may function to protect against the negative effects of these mechanisms. I introduce evidence in accountability research to support this claim.

In Chapter Four I present the complement model for the design of business ethics programs. I identify the findings from situationism that I think ought to be preserved and used as a guide for program designers. The warnings that issue from this body of situationist work ought to be seriously heeded. Business ethics programs will benefit from incorporating these recommendations into their designs, in order to minimize
situations that produce pressure and create temptation to behave immorally. As the complement to a successful business ethics program, I also recommend the virtue ethics approach, which prescribes development of stable and reliable character traits that effectively resist these temptations. An adjunct to this approach recommends the use of older mentors in ethics training as well as individual and collective ethical reflection used in regular and ongoing ethics training. I present the evidence from my field research, which grounds the claims of the complement model and also suggests that the complement model would succeed if implemented. The field research I conducted consisted in collecting survey responses from 44 subjects from the business community involved in their organizations’ ethics programs and shows that a blended character ethics/situationism approach is already a natural element in the business ethics domain.

It is my hope that this work contributes to furthering the philosophical debate between situationists and virtue ethicists, and that it offers a workable model for business people concerned to develop a business ethics program that results in a richer and more successful ethical culture.
CHAPTER ONE: A CRITIQUE OF THE SITUATIONIST’S EXTRAPOLATION

1.1 Introduction

Drawing from the experimental research in social psychology conducted primarily during the last half of the twentieth century, situationist philosophers argue that the notion of enduring character traits is empirically inadequate. According to the situationist view, experimental evidence shows that people are significantly influenced by insignificant situational factors, resulting in inconsistent behavior across objectively different situations in which we would expect the same stable and enduring character trait to manifest. For example, if the conditions of two different situations call for honesty, we would expect an honest person not to be dishonest in either case. But the situationist concludes that this is not what happens when experiments are conducted to test for trait-relevant behaviors, and so we should accept a descriptive psychology according to which people have very fragmented personality structures that do not support stable character traits. One contemporary advocate of the situationist view is John Doris, whose prime target is virtue ethics in the Aristotelian tradition.

In this chapter I argue that John Doris uses the experimental data to make an unjustified extrapolation, which appears most explicitly in his book, *Lack of Character*.

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3 Character traits are to be distinguished from personality traits. My concerns are the claims about character traits.

4 Doris’s view should be distinguished from other situationists, most notably Gilbert Harman, in the following way: While Harman is skeptical about the existence of character traits altogether, Doris claims that “local” traits may exist in narrowly defined domains. So, for example, one may be consistently honest whenever one pays one’s taxes and still be an adulterer. This is to be contrasted with the concept of “global” traits, attributed to the virtuous agent who behaves with honesty in any ‘honesty-eliciting’ situation.
He claims that the data collected from a set of psychology experiments about the behavior of experimental subjects are grounds for drawing conclusions about the general population. (Hereafter, I shall refer to this collection of experiments as the “LOC” experiments.) Doris’s central claim is that people do not, and cannot, behave as virtue ethics predicts people with robust character traits would behave. He bases this claim on a hypothesis that he believes experimental evidence refutes. The hypothesis is that if someone possesses a trait, that person will exhibit trait-relevant behavior in experimental trait-relevant eliciting conditions. (In the LOC experiments, the moral trait-relevant behavior being tested is prosocial or ‘other-regarding’ behavior, specifically compassion.) I will accept Doris’s hypothesis, but reject his claim that the LOC experiments falsify it. In section 1.2, I present a short discussion of representative design and ecological validity (in experiment structure) to show which experimental criteria the LOC experiments satisfy and which they do not. But for the sake of argument, I agree with Doris’s claim that many of the LOC experiment subjects did, indeed, succumb to moral failures as a result of insignificant situational influences.

Since a great number of subjects in the LOC experimental studies were strongly influenced by sometimes trivial situational variables that resulted in diminished prosocial behavior, situationists conclude that people, in general, cannot possess stable character

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5 A number of commentators have noted that a study of ‘traits’ based merely on behavior is inadequate to address any claims about virtue on most virtue ethical accounts, especially any in the Aristotelian tradition. See Rachana Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character,” Ethics, April (2004): 458-491; Gopal Sreenivasan, “Errors About Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” Mind, 111 (2002): 47-68; Nancy Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory (New York: Routledge, 2010). Virtue is a much more complex concept, involving motivations, feelings, sensitivity to particulars, deliberation, and the ability to give reasons for one’s actions. But for the purposes of this chapter, my aim is not to argue conceptual differences about what constitutes a trait, but to rather to dispute Doris’s generalized extrapolation about the experimental data.
traits. It is this generalization that I refute by arguing that the LOC experiments fail to satisfy the population representativeness criterion. I argue that the problem concerns the subjects, which makes Doris’s extrapolation to the general populace unjustified. The subject demographic that Doris fails to consider, which would substantially alter the data from these experiments, is the age of the subjects. In the experiments I am grouping as the LOC experiments, all of the subjects were college students. An intermediate conclusion of my argument is that older adult experimental subjects in LOC-type experiments would have, to a much greater degree, resisted the pressures of situational factors had they been chosen to participate as a comparison cohort. This counterfactual claim is supported by evidence and arguments aimed to show that older adults are positioned at a point in lifespan development where they may have gained a degree of competence about prosocial matters—a level of competence that most young people are not in a position to have acquired. Compared to young (college-age) adults, midlife and older adults have made further progress toward the development of moral expertise, of which prosocial competence is a part.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In section 1.2, I present the LOC experimental data and interpretations and my argument against the LOC experiments extrapolation. In section 1.3, I present findings from ten experiments involving older adults, which give evidence suggesting that older adults would perform better at resisting the situational influences of LOC-type experiments. I conclude that, had the LOC experiments been conducted on an older population, the resulting data would have been significantly different, and therefore Doris’s extrapolation from
conclusions about LOC experimental subjects to conclusions about the natural context is unjustified.

1.2 The Situationist Experiments

The empirical evidence offered by John Doris comes from a collection of well-known experiments. To show that moral behavior is substantially affected by insubstantial situational factors, we are presented a host of studies done from the 1920s through the 1980s to show how certain factors—such as receiving a gift, being in a hurry, or being part of a group—will affect helping behavior. (See Appendix A-Table 1.1 for a summary of the LOC experiments.) Doris aims to show that people do not possess robust character traits that are stable dispositions resistant to situational pressures.

Because a great many of these experimental subjects behaved immorally—or at least with moral ignorance or insensitivity—Doris concludes that humans have fragmented characters.

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6 I have omitted the famous ‘dime-finding/paper dropping’ experiment (A.M. Isen, and P.F. Levin. “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 21: 384-8) because it does not include only college students, and because the prompted behavior (picking up papers) does not seem to be a prosocial behavior that fits into the category of “compassion.” I am also omitting the Milgram obedience study because it does not include only college students, and because of its complexities, both in administration and interpretation. The obedience studies were repeated extensively, using numerous different variables. The interpretations are still a matter of controversy; psychologists have done studies to look for a correlation between personality traits and obedience (e.g., authoritarianism, social responsibility, hostility; cf: T. Blass “Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60 (1991): 398-413), while situationists (e.g., John M. Doris, *Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) continue to point to the Milgram experiments as strong evidence of lack of character traits. As Nancy Snow points out (Snow, *Virtue as Social Intelligence*, 114), even Milgram himself thought personality is implicated in the experimental results when he writes, “I am certain that there is a complex personality basis to obedience and disobedience. But I know we have not found it.” Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974, 205).
Doris maintains that he is justified in extrapolating from experimental contexts to what is true of humans generally, because the “social processes” at work in the experiments are analogous to those in the natural context. Although he does not say explicitly what he means by social processes, I take him to mean the force of the situational variables and the resulting variable effects that produce the behavior. He states, “[T]here is good reason to think closely related social processes are at work in both instances. More generally, it strains credulity not a bit to claim that people are influenced by mood, time pressures, and the presence of others in both natural and experimental contexts.” Here, Doris is arguing for what he terms the ‘ecological validity’ of the LOC experiments. We should pause for a moment to take a look at this claim about ecological validity. There is a long history in experimental psychology and social psychology, and more recently in experimental economics, to fix a set of criteria that will serve to judge an experiment ‘valid.’ One worry has always been, and continues to be, that an experiment is vulnerable to artificiality in the sense that the experimental setting does not accurately reflect natural contexts. In an important early work aimed at specifying success conditions for experiments, Urie Bronfenbrenner defines ecological validity as “the extent to which the environment experienced by the subjects in a scientific investigation has the properties it is supposed or assumed to have by the investigator.”

Doris similarly defines ecological validity as the extent to which an experimental finding accurately reflects phenomena found in natural contexts, and the

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extent to which the experimental situation resembles its natural counterpart.\(^8\) At first glance, these definitions sound roughly equivalent, and on Doris’s rendering the LOC experiments look to pass muster. Even in those experiments conducted in laboratory settings, it seems as if the situational variables are closely matched to those one might find in the real world. But Bronfenbrenner pointed out long ago that “the relevant features of the environment include not only its objective properties but also the way in which it is perceived by the research subjects.”\(^9\) And it is precisely on this point that Doris is challenged by some critics.\(^10\) I am quite persuaded by the critics’ arguments; but again, I am granting the interpretation of the LOC experimental data, viz., that the behavior of the subjects in the LOC experiments was significantly influenced by insignificant situational factors. It is the generalized extrapolation from the interpretation of the experimental data to the natural context that I reject.

Doris claims that in order to refute the extrapolation that he makes from the experimental context to people generally, it would require one to show “not that the experimental contexts are different, or even vastly different, from the natural contexts, but that there are differences suggesting that situational factors are less powerful in natural contexts than they are in experimental contexts.”\(^11\) This is exactly what I aim to show. I will argue that certain situational factors are less powerful in natural contexts,

\(^8\) Doris, Lack of Character, 35.
\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^10\) I agree that the answer to the question “How ordinary is the experimental setting to the natural habitat of the subject?” is different for each LOC experiment. So, the ecological validity of an experiment, unlike logical validity, is a matter of degree. In addition, quantitative measures do not always capture meanings in the natural habitat. For more about the mismatch between the meaning of correlation coefficients in experiments and the meaning of differences between situations in the real world, see Sabini, John, and Maury Silver. “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued.” Ethics 115 (2005): 535-562.
\(^11\) Doris, Lack of Character, 36.
because the subject population in a natural context is not represented by the experimental population. Doris’s extrapolation from the subject groups in the LOC experiments to the general population results in claims about character, or rather, the lack of it. Doris claims to have given strong evidence to suggest that character cannot produce behavior with any cross-situational consistency because of the power of situational factors. But, the situational factors in the LOC experiments are less powerful in natural contexts, because subjects in natural contexts are not all under twenty-five years of age, as they are in the LOC experiments. The age demographic, as I will show, has profound effect on prosocial behavior. So, although I am not disputing the ecological validity of the experiments, I am disputing the related notion of the total representative design of the experiments.

According to the concept of ‘representative design’ in psychology and economic experiments, 12 if an investigator wishes to generalize the results of an experiment to the natural context, he must satisfy two criteria. First, situations faced by subjects are representative of natural environments (this is the validity requirement); and second, subjects must be representative of the population to which one wishes to generalize. I am arguing that the second criterion was not met in the LOC experiments, and thus Doris’s generalized extrapolation is unjustified.

Doris considers other demographic variables such as gender, socio-economic status, and personality. And he admits that if these demographic variables turned out to have an impact on studies in pro-social behavior, then that at least would give the character theorist a foot in the door. But he dismisses these demographic differences

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12 For the original formulation of the notion of representative design in psychology, see E. Brunswik, Perception and the Representative Design of Experiments. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956.
because they have not been confirmed experimentally to be predictive of helping behavior. Yet Doris fails to consider the age variable, and in social-psychology experiments of the past several decades, including the LOC experiments, the population of experimental subjects has been composed almost entirely of college-aged students. The reason is obvious: These subjects are convenient. They are in close proximity to university researchers, neatly collected all together in one place, and numerous. This is no secret among behavioral scientists. As long ago as 1986, David Sears noted that prior to 1960, experimental subjects came from a diverse group of individuals.  

But beginning in the 1980s, research shifted to utilizing predominantly college students. In 1980, eighty-five percent of all articles published in the three main psychology research journals relied solely on undergraduates for experimental subjects. At the time, notes Sears, subject population was widely regarded as an insignificant experimental factor. The phenomena under investigation were thought to be so universal that subject selection did not matter, and it was hardly mentioned in the experimental methodology. But typical college undergraduates possess a number of characteristics that should be cause for concern for anyone interested in making an extrapolation from college-student moral behavior to that of the general population.  

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15 It is also a concern that most of these subjects are from middle-class American families, another bias that should be controlled for. In their 2010 article, “The Weirdest People in the World?”, Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan shed light on this representativeness problem. According to the authors, behavioral scientists often making sweeping claims about humans, generally, based on experimental data from subjects that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic. These populations, along with
demographic are from 17 to 19 years of age, and according to the standard texts on adolescence in the 1980s,

[T]hey tend to have (a) a less than fully formulated sense of self, manifested variously in mercurial self-esteem, identity confusion and diffusion, inadequate integration of past, present, and future selves, feelings of insecurity, and depression. One important consequence is that (b) their social and political attitudes tend to be considerably less crystallized at this stage than later in life. They also tend to be (c) substantially more egocentric than older adults. They differ from adults in their interpersonal relationships, as well, having (d) a stronger need for peer approval, manifested in dependency, conformity, and over-identification with peers. However, this need tends to be mixed with (e) highly unstable peer relationships and especially highly unstable peer group relationships.\(^\text{16}\)

These teen-year characteristics do not appear to have changed much, either, as present day researchers in adolescent psychology report substantially the same findings.\(^\text{17}\) Doris’s claim that people have disintegrated personalities, are easily influenced and prone to conformity pressures, preoccupied with their own needs and desires, and overwhelmed by their own emotions, is actually a claim about late adolescents, and exactly what we would expect to find in experimental subjects of this age.\(^\text{18}\) And so the age-bias objection is well-known in psychology research circles. But so far, to my knowledge my age-bias objection has not been addressed in the virtue ethics literature that criticizes the

\(^{16}\) Sears, College Sophomores, 521.
\(^{18}\) In fact, the comparison is almost verbatim. See “Egocentric Biases” in Sears, College Sophomores, 526.
situationist conclusions. If I can show that the age demographic has an impact on studies in prosocial behavior, then I will have given the character theorist a foot in the door.

I am granting that a large number of college age subjects in the LOC experiments did not resist the pressures of situational factors and failed to behave in a prosocial manner befitting the situation. This shows a lack of competence as a moral agent in responding to prosocial behavior-eliciting conditions. But these results do not justify a generalization according to which all people lack prosocial competence. I will present sufficient experimental evidence to strongly suggest that prosocial competence is greater in older adults as compared to college-aged adults. My argument aims to refute the extrapolation. Before I present the experiments showing prosocial behavior in older adults, however, I need to examine more closely Doris’s conception of compassion, specifically, and how this relates to prosocial behavior, more generally.

In the evaluation of the LOC experiments, Doris claims to be treating compassion as “a sort of test case.” He concludes that the failures of compassionate conduct are disproportionate to the situational pressures and this “problematizes thinking about

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19 With the exception of Rachana Kamtekar, who raises a methodological concern about the Hartshorne and May (1928) studies of cheating, stealing, and lying performed on children and used to draw conclusions about adults. See Kamtekar, *Situationism and Virtue Ethics*, 466, fn30.

20 Interestingly, as will become evident in upcoming sections, “older” is older than what we might imagine when we think of people ‘older than college students.’ In psychology experiments in lifespan development, age cohorts are typically divided into young, 25-40 years of age; middle-aged, 41-58; and older, 59-90. In fact, in studies measuring performance along wisdom dimensions (discussed in section 1.3.3), the age at which people begin to show marked gains in wisdom is between middle and old age—around 60 years of age. Cf. Igor Grossman, Jinkyung Na, Michael E. W. Varnum, Denise C. Park, Shinobu Kitayama, and Richard Nisbett, “Reasoning About Social Conflict Improves Into Old Age,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 107, No. 16 (2010): 7249. [www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1001715107](http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1001715107)

compassion in terms of a robust character trait.” Doris chooses to focus his discussion of moral behavior around compassion, a ‘core ethical concern’ that figures prominently in any characterization of ethics.\textsuperscript{22} He claims that Aristotle would likely sanction ‘compassion’ as a virtue, although not among Aristotle’s stated list of virtues. It would be odd, says Doris, for Aristotle to expect brutal behavior from a virtuous man, and so compassion-relevant behavior can plausibly be construed as virtuous behavior. Let us grant that Doris is right about this: compassion is a reasonable candidate to include among a list of virtues, and “behaviors associated with compassion are of substantial interest for any ethical perspective that emphasizes other-regarding concern.”\textsuperscript{23} But Doris then stipulates that his argument is not contingent upon any particular understanding of compassion. He states, “I could as easily couch discussion in terms of what psychologists rather colorlessly call “prosocial behavior.”\textsuperscript{24} His view is that conclusions drawn from experimental data about helping behavior (or lack of same) can be extrapolated to conclusions about compassion-relevant behavior, which yet again can be extrapolated to conclusions about pro-social behavior. This series of inferences lacks precision. If we start by defining compassion as \textit{sympathy combined with a desire to alleviate pain and suffering},\textsuperscript{25} then it seems a stretch to say that each of the LOC experiments yields data from which we can draw conclusions about compassion-relevant behavior. Performing a

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Most any dictionary gives something very similar to this definition. I am inclined to think that the definition captures the sense of the term used in everyday language and serves to represent the distinction I am drawing between compassion-relevant behavior and other-regarding behavior.
numbering task as a favor to the experimenter\textsuperscript{26} may be demonstrative of some kind of ‘helping behavior’ but doesn’t seem to fit into the same category as helping a crying woman who has fallen from a ladder,\textsuperscript{27} which more closely exemplifies compassion-relevant behavior as I’ve defined it. And compassion-relevant behavior is not synonymous with prosocial behavior, either. Prosocial behavior is a more general category of behavior, of which compassion-relevant behavior is merely one type. A more precise taxonomy of behavior type is required in order to differentiate between dispositions to act, which are motivated by different situational features. But again, I will grant Doris’s loose interpretation of compassion-relevant behavior to include many ordinary ‘other-regarding,’ or prosocial, acts that people sometimes perform. Indeed, if prosocial behavior is other-regarding in this very broad sense, we might include other prosocial behaviors such as mentoring, counseling, consoling, advising, teaching, encouraging, helping to resolve conflict, helping to accept compromise, being generous, giving to charity, providing leadership, and more. Surely these prosocial helping behaviors figure as prominently in the picture of a virtuous agent as does adding up numbers as a favor. Therefore, the experimental research involving the study of the type of prosocial acts I have just listed is relevant to include in a study of character; and prosocial, construed in this broad sense, allows me to introduce empirical evidence from a different body of theoretical and empirical research in life span development.


psychology, which strongly suggests that people, as they age, perform better than young people at prosocial cognitive tasks such as reasoning about social conflicts, drawing moral inferences, making judgments necessary for cooperation, recognizing and remembering emotionally charged information, and engaging in impartial problem-solving; and they demonstrate prosocial behavior to a greater degree than younger people in areas such as charitable giving and sacrificing for compromise.28 I submit this evidence as reason to think that if there had been older adult subjects in the LOC experiments, the resulting behavioral data would have been quite different.

1.3 Prosocial Competence in Older Adults

I am now ready to present the older adult experiments (hereafter, “OA”) to show that prosocial competence is demonstrated to a higher degree in midlife adults and older adults than in college age adults. This collection of OA experiments tests the following prosocial features of the subjects: 1) attunement to morally charged information and emotional regulation, 2) resistance to conformity pressure, 3) perspective-taking, and sensitivity to a context broader than the issues at hand, 4) problem-solving and conflict resolution, and 5) charitable giving and sacrificing for compromise. For each of these features I give an argument for why it contributes to prosocial competence. The evidence

28 Parenthetically, I would add that compassion is actually one of the more base and morally underdeveloped prosocial behaviors. Even small children show compassion. (See Shaun Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.) A moral agent who possesses a more sophisticated suite of moral virtues exemplifies the kind of agent more likely to behave consistently in the manner Doris seeks to discredit. The LOC experiments test for compassion, but compassionate behavior by itself doesn’t show us much about personal morality. We can easily imagine compassionate behavior in otherwise immoral people. Mob leaders can be compassionate toward members of the same mob; assassins will rescue a fellow mercenary; some kinds of criminals will protect children. But these are hardly moral exemplars.
from these experiments, collectively, supports my argument against the LOC extrapolation.

1.3.1 Moral Attunement and Emotional Regulation

Experience with older adults often gives us reason to think that cognitive processing, especially with respect to information processing and memory, declines with age. So far, this has been demonstrated to be true in most experimental research. But until very recently, the body of experiments used to test cognitive processing and memory was entirely focused on testing for processing and recall of non-moral information. But new work conducted by Narvaez, Radvansky and colleagues tested the hypothesis that older adults are more attuned to morally charged information because they are more socially experienced, resulting in better facilitation of processing for moral information as compared to younger subjects.29 The study combined two areas of previous research: Age-related changes in comprehension and memory, and information processing in moral discourse. The idea for the Narvaez project took off from previous work done by other researchers, suggesting that older adults tend to focus more on the deeper meaning of stories and the symbolism of narratives;30 they tend to place greater emphasis on positive emotion and emotional regulation;31 they favor negotiation and compromise to a greater

degree than younger subjects;\textsuperscript{32} and they exhibit improved memory when recalling positive emotional experiences.\textsuperscript{33} All of this led Narvaez and team to postulate that older adults would perform better than younger adults in recalling and using morally charged information in integration and inference tasks.\textsuperscript{34} The data from their experiment strongly suggests that they are right.

The methodology of the experiment employed the following components: Subjects populated two age groups, 18 to 30 years old and 60 to 82 years old. In an initial test to discover baseline cognitive processing, the younger subjects scored higher on tests for general processing speed and working memory span for non-moral tasks. These test results were consistent with most research in cognitive aging. In three iterations of an experiment testing for moral information processing, the materials they used consisted of eight stories—four control and four experimental, randomly ordered. The experimental stories contained elements of moral sensitivity, moral reasoning, moral focus, and moral action. Only the experimental stories were analyzed, as the others were used merely for obscuring the test objective to subjects. After reading the stories, subjects were given a recognition test consisting of eight probes: 1) Memory for non-moral information; 2) Memory for moral information; 3 and 4) Two true/false comprehension questions; 5)

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} The Narvaez researchers define ‘morally charged’: “When elements of a situation point to the need for cooperative response, or to social responsibility, we call that morally charged information” (Narvaez, \textit{Are Older Adults More Attuned to Morally Charged Information?}, 400.)
\end{itemize}
Vocabulary test; 6) Processing speed test; 7) Pattern comparison test; and 8) Working memory test.\textsuperscript{35}

Data from the three experiment iterations are as follows: Older adults exhibited greater memory for morally charged story events than younger adults and were more likely to generate moral inferences during reading comprehension and when responding to moral probes.\textsuperscript{36} When processing non-moral information, older adults tend to glean the gist of the stories rather than attend to details; that is, they prefer to focus on the “big picture” and ignore details. But when moral information is presented, this trade-off was less evident.\textsuperscript{37} Moral information motivates memory for details in older adults. Taken together, these findings support the hypothesis that older adults are more attuned to morally charged information. Narvaez and colleagues believe that this is because older adults are social experts, who have “greater domain knowledge, are more attuned to information in that domain, and are more likely to draw inferences from domain events.”\textsuperscript{38}

How does attunement to, and memory for, moral information contribute to prosocial competence? Part of prosocial competence must include the ability to recognize situations calling for other-regarding concern when they occur. This may appear to be

\textsuperscript{35} Here is an abbreviated example of one of the moral-information stories: A family pulls into a gas station; the daughter buys something in the convenience mart and is given too much change. She thinks about a time when her father was given too much money in his paycheck and gave it back. She wonders about what she should do. Within the (much larger) story, there is one sentence identified by the researchers as containing non-moral characteristics, and another containing moral information (actions and characteristics about relating to others). The memory tests were given for each of the sentences. The comprehension test was designed to probe understanding of the whole story. The remainder of the tests were performed to test general cognitive processing.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 422.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 423.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
stating the obvious, but not trivially so. Indeed, the failure to recognize the moral features of a situation may explain the actions of several subjects in the famous seminarians ‘good Samaritan’ study, who in their haste stepped over an ailing person in their path.\(^{39}\)

The subjects in the seminarians experiment were young students on their way to give a presentation when they came upon a confederate feigning distress. Subjects were divided into three groups—high hurry, medium hurry, and low hurry—according to how much time they were told they had to make it to the presentation. The subjects in the high hurry group performed much worse in terms of helping behavior than the medium hurry group, and the medium hurry group worse than the low hurry group. In analyzing this outcome, Doris supposes the reason to be that the subjects either didn’t notice the person’s suffering, or didn’t care.\(^{40}\) The Narvaez experiments seem to suggest it was the former, i.e., a lack of awareness about the morally important aspects of the situation. Unless we want to attribute callousness to all seminarians in a hurry (which seems unlikely), it looks rather like the young seminarians were focused on the wrong bits of situational information.\(^{41}\) But older adults in the Narvaez experiments consistently exhibited greater facility in interacting with a situation by recognizing the moral meaning of the circumstances, and drawing moral inferences. Perhaps this is because older adults impart greater value to the moral aspects of a situation and therefore moral matters are

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\(^{40}\) Doris, *Lack of Character*, 34.

\(^{41}\) Indeed, Darley’s and Batson’s anecdotal note about some seminarians who stepped over the confederate lying in the doorway as they hurried past may just as easily be interpreted as complete lack of attention rather than callousness.
more salient to them.\textsuperscript{42} I suggest that older subjects in an experiment similar to the seminarians experiment might be more likely to stop and help even if in a hurry, because they would be more attuned to the morally charged information. They would recognize the moral information in a situation and prioritize it over other concerns, rather than failing to notice it altogether. To be attuned is to be aware and responsive. It is hard to see how one could react appropriately in a situation calling for one to help another person unless first there is awareness of a need.

1.3.2 Resistance to Conformity Pressure

Famous in psychology research, the Asch experiments on conformity have led to a general acceptance of the claim that, in large number, people are woefully vulnerable to group pressure when reporting their judgments. Subjects in the Asch experiment, when asked to perform a simple task of matching line lengths, conformed to confederates’ erroneous answers in astounding numbers—seventy-five percent conforming at least once, and more than a third of all test subjects conforming when trial iterations were combined. Asch proposed that the subjects lacked self-confidence to disagree with the majority. In the more than fifty years since Asch’s first experiment there have been many variations on the experimental methods used to test for conformity, but all yield similar results—people who are concerned with what others think of them lack confidence and more readily conform. Of course, the data comes almost entirely from experiments conducted with college-age subjects. Not until the 1990s did adult development research

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 424.
emerge to suggest that the tendency to conform may lessen with age and maturity.

Consider a study by Monisha Pasupathi to explore differences in responses from different age cohorts for both nonemotional and emotional stimuli in group-pressure situations. Participants were women, grouped as young (18-35 years) and elderly (63-85 years).

Subjects were evaluated for conformity on categorization tests for geometric shapes (nonemotional) and facial expressions (emotional). The experimental procedure was based on a modification of the original Asch paradigm, using pre-recorded confederate voices to respond with plausible but atypical answers to standardized questions about the shape of an object, or the emotional expression of a face in a photograph. The subject was asked to respond immediately after hearing the responses of three confederates. After giving her own response, the subject gave a rating on a scale of 1 to 10 to indicate how confident she was in the correctness of her own response. The study results are highly suggestive that older adults conform less. Pasupathi reports that “age differences in conformity were particularly marked for judgments of faces,” and “all participants were less confident in responses given on critical trials, as compared with responses given on noncritical trials…This difference, however, was reliably larger for younger adults.”

Pasupathi notes the possible limitations to the findings as a result of small sample size, no gender variation, and potential confounds due to ordering and subject suspiciousness. But the implications of the study are important for motivating further research in life span

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44 Ibid., 172. Critical trials were those in which the subject heard three atypical responses preceding her own. Split trials presented two atypical responses (used to diminish suspicion); non-critical trials presented no pressure to conform.
development. There are implications for theories of social influence and the role played by older adults; for recognizing that generalizations from college samples can misrepresent typical human behavior; and for identifying the mechanism that produces age differences in conformity.\(^45\) The study suggests that older adults resist conformity pressure better than younger adults and have greater confidence in their judgment when confronted with group pressure. They also appear to resist with greater strength when judging emotional stimuli as contrasted with non-emotional stimuli.\(^46\)

1.3.3 Perspective-taking

There is a common lay belief that young people are self-centered and older people are better at being able to imagine what it is like to walk in another’s shoes. This perspective-taking ability is thought to result in a sensitivity to the bigger picture, which in turn allows for compromise and conflict resolution. Is there truth to this belief? According to research conducted by Igor Grossman, Richard Nisbett and colleagues in 2010, the evidence is highly suggestive. In two studies, evidence shows that older people make more use of higher-order reasoning schemes when assessing stories involving conflict between individuals, and stories involving inter-group conflict. The experiments were set up to evaluate reasoning about social conflict based on six dimensions of wisdom. These dimensions were derived by using a compilation of the most often-used

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 173.

\(^{46}\) In the Klein experiment (R. L. Klein, “Age, Sex, and Task Difficulty as Predictors of Social Conformity.” Journal of Gerontology 27 (1972): 229-236) older adults conformed more than younger adults in making difficult visual judgments. The older and younger adults performed these tasks at the same time and in the same group. Pasupathi suggests that an older person’s deference to the visual acuity of a younger person is more adaptive than conforming. She claims that the discrepancy between her findings and Klein’s may be explained by the differences in non-emotional versus emotional stimuli.
characterizations of wisdom in the most recent psychological literature in studies of wisdom. The six dimensions are: (1) perspective shifting from one’s own point of view to the point of view of people involved in the conflict; (2) recognition of the likelihood of change; (3) prediction flexibility, as indicated by multiple possible predictions of how the conflict might unfold; (4) recognition of uncertainty and the limits of knowledge; (5) search for conflict resolution, and (6) search for a compromise. The studies involved 439 subjects, grouped into age cohorts as follows: young=25-40 years; middle-aged=41-58 years; older=60-90 years.

In the first experiment, subjects were presented with three newspaper articles describing intergroup conflict. The first story depicted a tension between immigrants who wanted to preserve their customs and the people of the destination country who wanted the immigrants to assimilate; the second story dealt with a struggle between two groups over regulations involving natural resources; the third featured problems between two ethnic groups battling over which traditions to preserve and which to eliminate. The subjects were asked to reflect about the cause of each conflict and what would be likely to happen afterward. Their responses were blindly coded for each story on all six wisdom dimensions. In the second study, subjects were presented with stories about

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47 Here is an example of responses and score-coding along the “uncertainty” dimension in the immigration story: High score—“I don’t know, that’s a tough one. I guess that’s like what’s going on here with the Mexicans that are immigrating here. (...) I don’t know too much about the Tajiks and their national pride. I don’t know how much of that they actually want to keep. And I’m sure when the Kyrgyz come over they’re acting and speaking differently and they don’t want to assimilate.” Low score—“I say it’s up to them and if you can’t speak the language stay at home or get the hell out of there. Same as all of the people coming over here. (...) You get all of the outsiders coming in and they want to change everything. They’re welcome to come, but you got to adapt to the ways of their country that’s already there. Any immigrants should have to adapt to where they’re going, not that country adapting to the immigrants, in my opinion.”
interpersonal conflict, and the experimental and coding procedures were the same as in the first study. (Subjects responded to “Dear Abby” letters.) The wisdom-rating results overwhelmingly supported the expectations of the researchers. They report, “Older participants scored significantly higher for each wisdom dimension, as well as for the composite score of wisdom….Length of response was positively correlated with wisdom…but the effect of age was very substantial even when response length was controlled…”\textsuperscript{48} In only two cases did the older cohort score slightly lower than the middle-aged and young cohorts, viz., along the dimensions of uncertainty and resolution in Study 2 involving interpersonal conflict. When the wisdom score was aggregated across both studies, the researchers report that “the overall effect of age was substantial…with older people being significantly over-represented among the top 20% on wisdom performance. The average age of the participants in the top 20% was 64.9 years; the average age of the participants in the bottom 80% was 45.5 years.”\textsuperscript{49} In looking for possible confounding causal variables, the researchers found some quite interesting relations. Men and women do not differ in aggregate wisdom, and the age effects on wisdom hold at every level of social class, education, and IQ level. Age and IQ are significant predictors of wisdom, while neither socioeconomic status nor education


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 7248. There was no cohort of college age young adults in these studies. But I think it is plausible to infer that if gains in perspective-taking ability are realized in the years between mid-adulthood and older adulthood, then there are gains made between young adulthood and mid-adulthood. Yet, even if this is not true, i.e., the ability is static from young adulthood until midlife, the evidence would still indicate that (by transitivity) older adults are better than young adults along this dimension. (I am assuming a continuum along which degrees of improvement are realized as people progress in age. The inference would not hold if, for some reason, young adults are extremely good at perspective-taking, then lose the ability in midlife and gain it back again in old age. But that seems unlikely, especially given psychologists’ descriptions of late teen self-centeredness that I mentioned earlier.)
contributed to wisdom. Of the sixteen participants who were university faculty, none were wiser than non-academics having postgraduate degrees.\textsuperscript{50} The researchers also note that the most gain in wisdom appears to happen between middle and old age.

What are we to make of this strong body of evidence suggesting that despite cognitive declines in fluid intelligence,\textsuperscript{51} older people perform better than younger people in reasoning about social conflicts? One thing to say is that the folk wisdom is right—people get wiser as they get older—especially if we can agree on a definition of wisdom according to the dimensions of wisdom formulated by the professional community of researchers in lifespan development psychology. I contend that the dimensions of wisdom tested in the Grossman/Nisbett studies—perspective-taking in particular—contribute a good deal to diminish egocentrism and enhance one’s ability to judge situations with a sensitivity to other-regarding demands. Having this ability to position oneself at another’s point of view, all by itself, places the developing moral agent many levels above one who is unable to step away from her own self-interested perspective.

1.3.4 Interpersonal Problem-solving and Cooperation

In the Grossman studies, discussed in the previous section, subjects were tested for how well they employed wisdom characteristics in judging and assessing outcomes for conflicts of two types: intergroup conflict and interpersonal conflict. However, in the interpersonal conflict scenarios presented in the Grossman studies, the subject was not

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 7249.
\textsuperscript{51} A substantial body of experimental literature confirms the widely held belief that older people lose fluid intelligence, i.e., speed in information-processing, perceptual speed, ability to remember details and other tasks associated with high level cognitive performance.
featured as one of the parties to the conflict. For example, subjects were asked what they thought should be done about a conflict between siblings, depicted in an authentic letter to “Dear Abby.” Now I present evidence from another set of studies conducted by Blanchard-Fields and colleagues, in which the interpersonal conflict scenario presented to the subject featured the subject, herself, as a party to the conflict. In these studies, a total of 106 subjects, equally divided into two age cohorts, were rated for their problem-solving strategy selection and problem-solving effectiveness.

Three problem domains—instrumental, interpersonal, and mixed—included a total of twenty-four hypothetical problems from the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory used in the psychological sciences. For each problem presented to the subject, there were four problem-solving strategies presented, and the subject was asked to rate each strategy for how likely she would be to use it in solving that particular problem. The strategies were either (i) emotion-controlled/cognitive avoidance or (ii) withdrawal strategies; (iii) planful problem solving or (iv) cognitive analysis problem-focused strategies. For example, type (i) strategies include suppressing emotions evoked by the

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53 Young=18-27 years; old=60-80 years. Each cohort included roughly the same number of men and women.
54 Here are two examples from each of the three problem domains: Instrumental problems: 1. You have let your home become too cluttered with items you use infrequently but that have much sentimental value for you. 2. You are experiencing difficulty and feel frustrated trying to learn new procedures on how to operate a new machine in your job. Mixed problems: 1. You lost or broke an expensive item that you borrowed from someone. 2. You find out that your child is having a problem with a teacher at school. Interpersonal problems: 1. A friend criticizes you for an important decision that you make about one of your children or parents. 2. You are competing for a better job with a fellow employee you like, and it is upsetting your relationship with him or her. (Subjects were presented with 24 problems total.) Cf: ESPI in S.W. Cornelius and A. Caspi, “Everyday Problem Solving in Adulthood and Old Age,” *Psychology and Aging* 2 (1987): 144-153.
situation and making efforts to control the meaning of the situation; type (ii) strategies involve relying on others to solve the problem; type (iii) strategies include responding with overt behaviors that deal directly with a problem and its effects; and type (iv) strategies include attempting to employ logical analysis, manage one’s subjective appraisal of a situation, understand it better, and interpret it from a different perspective.

A panel of external judges had nominated the ideal solution to each problem, and each subject’s strategy endorsement rating for each problem in all three domains was compared to the judges’ selections. For each domain, large positive correlations to the judges’ ratings would indicate effective problem solving. The domain of central interest is the interpersonal problem solving domain. Here, the results confirmed the hypothesis of the researchers. Older adults employed emotion-controlled and cognitive analysis strategies more than young adults, and were more effective than young adults in their overall choices of strategies.

Researchers also assessed effectiveness at the level of the problem domain and at the level of specific strategies. They discuss their conclusions: “Thus, it is not simply that older people use more or less of a strategy in various domains; they use these strategies appropriately (as determined by panel effectiveness scores) to match the context of the problem. This adaptivity may be crucial to interpersonal problems. Although proactive strategies are typically key to resolving causes of problems (e.g. Thornton & Dumke, 2005), older adults’ use of passive (emotion regulation)

55 The 1987 panel comprised 9 young adults (24-40 years), 8 middle-aged adults (44-54 years), and 6 older adults (62-72 years) for a total of 23. Of the total, 18 were laypersons without training in psychology, and 5 were graduate students in developmental psychology; 10 men and 13 women. The researchers raise representativeness concerns about the judges’ coding and recommend future research to examine the metric properties of the 1987 EPSI to check for consistency with a more current sample of judges.

56 Old adults Mean=0.46; young adults Mean=0.39.
strategies may buffer them from intense emotional reactions in order to maintain tolerable levels of arousal…”

The investigators also postulate that experience and maturity increase sensitivity to context, which helps in selecting the best problem-solving strategy from a repertoire that has accumulated over a lifetime. Although choosing proactive strategies to directly confront instrumental problems may prove successful in most cases of that kind, selecting more passive strategies in interpersonal conflict shows a sensitivity to domain-fitness that younger cohorts do not typically possess. A bank of information about which strategies succeed and which do not figures prominently in strategy preferences; such an accumulation of information takes time to amass. The researchers give their concluding remarks: “[T]hese findings are significant because they provide further evidence for the capacity of older adults to draw on accumulated experience in socioemotional realms to solve problems successfully. Older adults’ strategy use suggests that they are capable of complex and flexible problem solving.”

In fairness, I should discuss a point of possible contention in the authors’ interpretation of their studies. The effectiveness ratings of the strategy selection for each problem type were determined by a panel of judges that was assembled in 1987--25 years ago. The panel gave the highest strategy selection rating for interpersonal problems to the ‘emotion-suppression/cognitive analysis’ combination of strategies (employed more by

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57 Blanchard-Fields, Age Differences, 63.
58 Ibid., 61.
59 Young adults tend to choose direct action strategies for interpersonal problems about as much as they do for instrumental problems. They do not demonstrate differential strategy preferences to the degree that older adults do. Ibid., 63, Table 2.
60 Ibid., 63.
older adults). But what grounds this judgment? Why not think that a more emotionally reactive strategy would be better to employ for interpersonal problem solving?  

The first surge of psychological research in emotion-regulation happened in the early-to-mid-2000s, and studies have raised new questions about various self-regulatory processes. For one thing, emotional regulation and emotion-suppression are not synonymous, although in the Blanchard-Fields study the terms are conflated. Emotion-suppression is just one of many regulatory mechanisms of emotion-regulation, which is a sub-category of affect-regulation.

Emotional responses occur in a sequence that comprises initial exposure to a situation, attention to the features of the situation, and appraisal of the meaning of the situation. Meaning is what gives rise to emotion, and the meaning is contingent upon what the subject sees as her goals relative to the situation. Goals can be enduring or transient, central to one’s identity or peripheral, conscious or non-conscious. We may try to regulate our emotions by modifying the situation (or avoiding it altogether); by directing our attention elsewhere, or maybe by changing how we think about the situation’s meaning and its significance to us. We can regulate either positive or negative emotions by concentrating (or ruminating) on them to initiate a ‘controlled start.’ So, ‘emotion regulation’ is a complex array of phenomena, and researchers have not yet even settled on a conceptual understanding. Moreover, an experimental subject’s self-report of

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61 My thanks to Rachana Kamtekar for raising this question.
how he would deploy his emotions in a given situation may not be predictive of the way in which complex emotion-regulation strategies are actually deployed.

Although a great deal of research has been focused on how the emotions may come into play when making moral decisions, less attention has been paid to studying how well the emotions may serve us in making good moral decisions. Dan Batson has long been involved in conducting research to test the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and evidence continues to mount to show the correlation. The causal connection remains contentious. And in the case of empathy, especially, regulatory mechanisms may be automated. Yet, there is some evidence to suggest that effortful regulation may contribute to positive prosocial behavior. Albert Bandura reports that “the ability to visualize oneself undergoing the experiences to which others are being subjected seems to be a critical factor in the empathetic process.” So, there may be evidence to suggest that consciously concentrating on one’s empathetic feelings motivates prosocial response.

Generally, suppression of negative emotions and expression of positive emotions are more central to effective social functioning. For example, anger is typically regarded as

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65 The experiment was a 2-year longitudinal study involving 464 older adolescents; they were tested for how much their own affect regulation affected their self-reports of performance in academic development, their ability to resist peer pressure for antisocial activities; and their ability to engage themselves with empathy in others’ emotional experiences. “In accord with prediction, a strong sense of efficacy to manage one’s positive and negative emotional life contributes to perceived self efficacy to take charge of one’s academic activities, to ward off peer pressures for transgressive behavior, and to feel empathy for the experiences of others.” Bandura, Albert, Gian Vittorio Caprara, Claudio Barbaranelli, Maira Gerbino, and Concetta Pastorelli. “Role of Affective Self-Regulatory Efficacy in Diverse Spheres of Psychosocial Functioning.” Child Development 74, No. 3 (2003): 777.
an emotion the expression of which tends to lead to anti-socialization. But generalizations are misdirected. For example, there may be situations when anger over injustice has a positive effect; or other situations in which overly expressive positive emotion is socially dysfunctional, if not morally misguided.

Further research promises to tell us more about the emotions and how they affect moral decision-making. But early evidence suggests that deliberate attention to controlling as well as engaging certain emotions in appropriate situations is an effective strategy for social interaction. If this is true, and if older adults select emotional-regulatory strategies for interpersonal problem-solving (as suggested by the Blanchards-Fields study), then it is plausible to add this to our reasons for thinking that older adults are more apt to behave appropriately in prosocial behavior-eliciting situations.

Further evidence for older adult performance in everyday problem solving comes from a very recent study conducted by Artístico and colleagues in 2010. In this investigation, young, middle-aged, and old cohorts are presented ill-defined problems that occur in day-to-day living. The experiment was conducted to challenge earlier studies that demonstrate older adults experience cognitive declines and perform worse than younger adults at everyday problem solving. Subjects in the Artístico experiment were measured for solution fluency (the number of solutions posed to hypothetical problems) and solution quality. Again, the two types of problems presented were instrumental and interpersonal, and each hypothetical problem was cast within a social
context designed to be relevant to each age cohort. All subjects were presented problems from all three age contexts (young, middle-aged, and old). And once again, an external panel of judges fixed the success terms. The researchers found that levels of performance are context dependent and all subjects perform best when presented with problems situated in the context of their own age category. And within each age-context domain, subjects of that age performed better than their counterparts. That is, young adults showed more solution fluency in young-adult problems than middle-aged or older adults, middle-aged adult better in middle-age problems, etc. So, the Artistico evidence is not as strong as the Blanchard-Fields evidence, and the Artistico team concludes that older adults are not universally better at everyday problem solving. But interestingly, for interpersonal problems presented in the Artistico study, older adults showed greater solution fluency than middle-aged adults did for young-adult problems; and they showed greater solution fluency than young adults did for middle-age problems.

1.3.5 Charitable Giving, Altruism and Cooperation

The topics of inquiry in these studies include charitable giving, and altruism in ultimatum and dictator games conducted outside university walls.

Charitable Giving

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66 An example of an everyday instrumental problem is meeting a financial obligation. The young-adult context is framed as not having enough money for college; the middle-aged context, having a medical bill from a child’s illness; the old-adult context, being on social security and not having adequate resources to pay bills. An example of an interpersonal problem is increasing social contact. The young-adult context is framed as recently broken up with a boyfriend/girlfriend; the middle-aged context, having been recently divorced; the old-adult context, having been recently widowed.

67 See: Artistico, Daniele, Heather Orom, Daniel Cervone, Stephen Krauss, and Eric Houston. "Everyday Challenges in Context: The Influence of Contextual Factors on Everyday Problem Solving Among Young, Middle-Aged, and Older Adults." Experimental Aging Research 36 (2010): 241, Figure 1.
There have been thousands of scholarly articles written about charitable giving from academics in several different disciplines, including economics, sociology, and psychology. Reasons for the interest are varied. Information about charitable giving yields demographic data useful to fundraisers in the nonprofit sector; economists and tax accountants are interested in the effects of price- and income-elasticity on giving patterns, psychologists and philosophers study charitable giving for what it might reveal about human behavior. Charitable giving raises questions about altruism and generosity, or whether people might give for selfish reasons instead. A vast amount of literature focuses on the question of who gives, but less so on the question of why people give.

Before I take up an attempt to answer the latter question, let us take a brief survey of the answers to the first. Naturally, I am most interested in the evidence on age as a correlate of charitable giving.

A very recent work by René Bekkers and Pamela Wiepking presents the findings of a comprehensive review of 550 scholarly publications in order to identify predictors of charitable giving. More than a compilation of household statistics, this study analyzes the individual profiles of charitable donors, and offers some discussion of the mechanisms that may explain why some people give more than others. The authors report that 59 publications in the literature surveyed indicate a positive relation between

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68 The ‘price’ of giving is a function of the marginal tax rate. It can be thought of as opportunity cost, and its elasticity is tied to changes in tax rates. People tend to give more when tax rates are lower. However, this effect is confounded by income elasticity, the degree to which the ‘demand’ for giving changes in response to changes in income. Economists are able to use an algorithm to separate price elasticity, income elasticity, and also the effects of marital status and age according to income class.


70 The authors investigate four factors: religion, education, age, and socialization. I will focus only on age.
age and philanthropy. The ‘older’ age bracket varied among studies, although typically, ‘older’ means 49 years of age or above. A few studies found a decrease in giving after a certain age; for example, in one study declines began at around 65, and in another around 75. The effect of age does co-vary with other characteristics such as religion, marital status and income. But in the first study of its kind, completed in 1976 by prominent economist Martin Feldstein and co-author Amy Taylor, 15,291 tax returns were analyzed, and the results revealed that in households where one or both of the taxpayers was over 65 years old, charitable contributions were 56 percent more than for younger taxpayers with the same income and wealth. Presumptive explanations for this finding point to age-related increases in disposable income. But this explanation is not supported by the 1976 evidence, nor is it validated by current studies controlling for income conducted by Bekkers and Wiepking. However, two co-variables that do seem to inflate the age-giving relationship are religious involvement and higher education (giving increases with both). Yet, two phenomena emerge to strengthen the age relation nonetheless. First, even when religious involvement is controlled—just as with income—the age relationship to giving does not disappear; older non-religious people give more, too. Second, even though younger generations on average have higher levels of education, the positive relationship to charitable giving remains much higher for the older age groups. Why do

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71 This statistic is my own, gleaned from the literature surveyed for this paper.
73 Bekkers and Wiepking, Who Gives?, 351.
74 Ibid.
older people give more to charity? Bekkers and Wiepking appeal to both life-cycle effects and cohort differences to offer possible explanations.

When older people have financially independent adult children, they are less concerned about them, and perhaps charitable donations represent a shift from benefiting children to benefiting worthwhile causes. Bekkers and Wiepking see this as a mechanism of altruism that may explain the age-relation in giving. The altruism connection is between a “generic desire to contribute to the wellbeing of others” and the fact that older people’s grown children’s needs are met.75 This interpretation may suggest that it is the circumstance of being without children that motivates the giving, rather than a developed disposition to help others. But other findings may weaken that suggestion: First, let us assume that, as a group, married people are more likely to have children than single people. The Feldstein study found that married couples give thirty-seven percent more than single individuals with the same income. So, whether people have children or not seems to be a causal confound that precludes drawing conclusions one way or the other. There are no studies, to my knowledge, which look for correlations between age and giving but control for having children. But since people over 65 give more than all other groups, and those groups include both people with children and people without children, the motivating mechanism is likely to be something else. Perhaps, as Bekkers and Wiepking speculate, it is greater altruism associated with age.

Beyond statistical support for this explanation we might also look to psychological factors not tied to financial wellbeing. Age is not merely a number, it is a

75 Ibid.
point on a timeline. As mortality approaches, it is likely that priorities will shift. The reasons may not always be altruistic; perhaps some people want to be remembered for their generosity, or they wish to make up for a life of stinginess. But it may also be the case that as one’s own life nears the end, concern for others grows as concern for oneself diminishes. Altruism may increase as concerns for one’s own future decrease.\footnote{Again, this may seem to point to situational determinates of behavior; in fact, an experiment in which college students were reminded about death led them to give more to a charity. (See: E. Jonas, J. Schimel, J. Greenberg, and T. Pyszczynski, “The Scrooge Effect: Evidence That Mortality Salience Increases Prosocial Attitudes and Behavior,” \textit{Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin} 28, No. 10 (2002): 1342-53.) However, no research has explored this mechanism (Bekkers and Wiepking, \textit{Who Gives?}, 351). But if it turns out that mortality salience increases prosocial behavior, then given that older people are likely to have those thoughts (of mortality) more than college age people, this would add to reasons for thinking that older subjects in the LOC experiments would have displayed more prosocial behaviors. But I don’t think this situational factor can be taken out of context from an overall picture of the older adult age group (based on a collection of evidence); and it does not undermine attribution of prosocial dispositions in older people. Evidence that mortality salience increases prosocial behavior does not entail that people do not have dispositions for prosocial behavior \textit{concurrent with} this additional influence.}

\textbf{Altruism in Ultimatum and Dictator Games}

Experiments to measure altruism in the form of ultimatum and dictator games are numerous. But many researchers are concerned that the college student subject population is non-representative. So, in recent years, several studies have been designed to discover whether there are systematic differences between students and community members when it comes to giving shares of an owned asset to others. I present a summary of four different experiments to survey the findings relative to age differentials.

In a representative dictator game conducted by Jeffrey Carpenter and colleagues, subjects included college students plus randomly selected residents of Vermont, \(n=114\).
and 410, respectively. Each participant was asked to divide $100 between herself and a charity of her choice (among a menu of thirteen). The main result of central interest to the researchers suggests that student behavior is not representative of behavior of members of the broader community. Community members were three times more likely to give away all $100. Researchers remark that “among the determinants of allocation choices, the robust factors appear to be age and sex.” The results from another dictator game experiment are not as sanguine. In a field study of altruistic behavior in an all-or-nothing dictator game conducted in the Netherlands, participants came from a pool of respondents from an internet invitation. In this variation, the subjects were given non-monetary assets to allocate, but they did not have the option of keeping a portion of the money for themselves and giving a portion away. Instead they had the choice of keeping it all or giving it all to their choice of one of three charities. Two other variations were used: First, participants had to ‘earn’ their assets, rather than being given them by the experimenter. (Participants had to spend considerable time filling out a questionnaire to earn rewards.) Second, the participant’s choice (to keep all or give all away) was done anonymously. The effect of these two variations yields results that are bad news for

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78 In standard ultimatum games there are two players, and the recipient accepts or rejects the proposed distribution from player one. In dictator games, the recipient plays no role; she simply receives whatever amount player one proposes.
79 The mean age of the Vermont community resident cohort was 50.
81 E.g., merchandise vouchers, or airline miles.
altruism. Of the 1,852 subjects, 94.3% kept their earned reward. Even so, of those who donated, the positive correlates once again were age, education and income.\textsuperscript{82}

More optimistic results come from a third experiment that employed a three-person version of the ultimatum game. Participants were drawn from readers of the German weekly, \textit{Die Zeit}; and one of the foci of the study was the influence of age on bargaining behavior.\textsuperscript{83} The three-person twist of this version is designed to observe behavior when there is a powerless third party, as player two must accept or reject player one’s proposal not only for himself but for player three also. 3,844 players were given $1200 in play money to split three ways by selecting one of 18 share allocations.\textsuperscript{84} More than half—56.8 percent—chose the equal split (400, 400, 400). Additionally, the frequency of proposing the equal split becomes more frequent with age.\textsuperscript{85} And remarkably, older subjects are more likely to accept the equal split than they are a more

\textsuperscript{82} See Bekkers, \textit{Measuring Altruistic Behavior}, 142, Table 1.
\textsuperscript{83} Werner Güth, Carsten Schmidt and Matthias Sutter, “Bargaining Outside the Lab: A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game,” \textit{The Economic Journal} 117 (2007): 449-469. As a side bar, the study also revealed interesting data involving gender influences and the differences that result from the medium used by subjects to reply to the prompts. Female participants always choose the equal split significantly more often than male participants. And quite interestingly, internet users in the 46-65 years and over-65 years cohorts are more opportunistic than their counterparts who used mail or fax. (‘Opportunistic’ refers to those participants who proposed a two-player ‘power coalition,’ i.e., a 600, 500, 100 split of a $1200 endowment between themselves, player two and player three, respectively.) For the younger cohorts, the type of medium was inconsequential. Finally, it should also be noted that the conclusions drawn by Güth and colleagues are counter to the Bekkers study in terms of the student-to-community generalization worry. On Güth’s analysis of the German participant data, there looks to be a high degree of external validity of student data.
\textsuperscript{84} As an incentive to treat the task seriously, even though the money was not real, experimenters offered prizes to the seven participants who correctly predicted the most frequent strategy vector. In addition, participants knew that 18 of them would be randomly selected for actual payments.
\textsuperscript{85} Relative frequency of equal split proposal among females over 65 =85%; males over 65=62%; females under 26=50%; males under 26=40%. (These are the internet users statistics; mail/fax user statistics vary slightly.)
advantageous proposal of 200/600/400. (600 for their share, 200 for the proposer, and 400 for the passive third party.)

The fourth and final study I present is actually a series of studies designed by John List, which examines the data from 1) a public goods games conducted at a sportscard show, 2) charitable giving in a university fundraiser, and 3) participant behavior in a television game show. The purpose of the studies was to explore the correlation between age and other-regarding behavior with respect to voluntary contributions to public goods and cooperation. For the sake of brevity, and because charitable giving has already been discussed, I will focus on cooperation and simply note that the conclusions from the first two List studies in voluntary giving are consistent with the others presented earlier regarding charitable giving: The probability of giving and the gift size are related to age; more mature subjects (age>49) invest a higher portion of their endowment in public goods games, and whereas nearly one-third of the middle age cohort (19-49) gives less than 20% of their endowment to the public good, the older cohort has no representation in this percentile.

List’s third study involving assessments of cooperation comes from a natural, uncontrolled environment—a television game show modeled after the prisoner’s dilemma game. By examining 240 individual decisions from the game show over a five month

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86 See Güth, Bargaining Outside the Lab, 461, Fig.5.
88 In the List game, participants were given an endowment in the form of 10 Michael Jordan sports cards with a value of approximately $1 each, and then told to divide it between a private account and a group account.
89 Total number of participants=80; mature cohort=28; middle cohort=27; young cohort=25.
90 The show was “Friend or Foe?” and aired between May and September of 2002.
period, List provides further evidence that older adults are more cooperative than younger players. In this rendition of the classic set-up, the division of winnings between two team players in isolation from each other comes down to the three standard options to test cooperation: Both cooperate (each by not pushing a ‘foe’ button), and winnings are divided equally; one pushes the button and the other does not, leaving the button-pusher to walk away with all the winnings; or both push the button and no one gets anything.

The reason this study is so compelling is twofold. First, the stakes are high and decisions are real. In some cases, game show participants are playing for as much as $22,000. Second, the subject population is diverse and the demographic data rich, including information about participants’ age, race, gender, and area of residence. List divides participants into young (less than 31 years old) and mature (31 years old or older) cohorts, and summarizes the data: “In terms of cooperation rates, one glaring result...is the cooperation rates across age cohorts. Simply splitting the sample along the first moment of the age variable shows that more mature agents (31 years and older) chose to cooperate much more than younger agents: 64% versus 40%. ...[And] older agents were more likely to cooperate than younger agents, regardless of partner’s age.”

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91 Average stakes were $3,690.
92 List, Young, Selfish and Male, 145. These results would have been even more interesting (for my purposes) if age cohorts had been more finely divided than simply over or under 30 years of age. Of particular interest is whether or not increases in cooperative behavior come incrementally with age. Nevertheless, given that the game show data show that subjects over 30 are more cooperative (an aspect of prosociability), and given that the LOC subjects were well below 30, this supports my argument that the LOC experimental data cannot be justifiably extrapolated to the general population. The extent to which prosocial behavior does or does not increase incrementally with advancing age is underdetermined by this particular study.
1.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I presented a body of experimental evidence, which suggests that older adults are more attuned to morally charged information than younger adults, choose better strategies for solving interpersonal problems and group conflict, resist conformity pressures with greater success, demonstrate improved ability to shift their perspective and seek compromise, make altruistic and fair choices in the distribution of goods to a higher degree, and give more to charity. This evidence that prosocial behavior is manifest to a greater degree in older adults than younger adults strongly suggests that had an older subject population been used in the LOC experiments (composed entirely of college-age subjects), the results would have been significantly different. Therefore, the extrapolation from the conclusions drawn about young adults generalized to conclusions about all adults is unjustified. I claim here to have met the situationist challenge: I believe I have given strong evidence to show that situational factors are less powerful in natural contexts, where the population comprises all people—not just college students.

It looks as though, as a group, older adults have developed a greater degree of progress toward prosocial competence, so we are likely to find among the older adult population a greater percentage of people who demonstrate prosocial behavior when the situation demands it. In the next chapter, I’ll examine why this is so.
CHAPTER TWO: MORAL DOMAIN EXPERTISE:  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIRTUE  

2.1 Introduction  

In the previous chapter I claim to have shown that older adult subjects would have fared better at resisting situational factors in the LOC experiments, because they are more likely than young people to possess a higher degree of prosocial competence. What explains this? One answer is that, compared to young (college-age) adults, midlife and older adults have made further progress toward the development of moral expertise, of which prosocial competence is a part.  

What is moral expertise? I will start with a definition of expertise: “Expertise refers to the mechanisms underlying the superior achievement of an expert, i.e., one who has acquired special skill in or knowledge of a particular subjects [sic] through professional training and practical experience.”  

Moral expertise, then, refers to the mechanisms underlying superior moral achievement. In this discussion, I am identifying the mechanism for superior moral achievement with the virtues that constitute a traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics. So, on my account, progress toward moral expertise is progress toward developing the virtues. In recent work, Julia Annas presents a theory of virtue-development according to which developing virtue can...  

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93 There are other reasons. For example, it could be that more older people have somehow gained an extra amount of empathy.  
95 I cannot here argue against adopting some other ethical theory to identify with moral expertise. The overarching theme of this dissertation is to defend virtue ethics and recommend it as a constituent of a business ethics training model. I also think the very nature of exercising the virtues incorporates the most important elements of the major competing moral theories.
be seen as analogous to acquiring and improving a skill.\(^{96}\) In this chapter, I will discuss the ways in which Annas’ account of virtue development—drawing on the ancient virtue ethics tradition—corresponds nicely with the contemporary empirical research involving the development of expertise in practical skills, led predominantly by Anders Ericsson. I will also point out areas of dissimilarity between the development of expertise in skill and the development of virtue. These dissimilarities help explain why excellence in virtue (as compared to excellence in skills) is uncommon, and why older adults are more likely to have made further progress toward moral expertise than very young adults.

In the next section, I begin by discussing the notion of ‘deliberate practice with knowledge’ in connection with the development of expertise in practical skills explored in recent psychology research. I compare and contrast this with Annas’ emphasis on ‘practice with learning and understanding’ in the development of virtue. In section 2.3, I discuss the concept of automaticity and the phenomenon of “flow.” These are cognitive and psychological states that do not involve deliberate practice, but also appear to aid and enhance the further development of expertise. Each is discussed by both Ericsson and Annas in connection with expert performance. In section 2.4, I present two constraints on the development of expertise that present much greater difficulty for the development of virtue than they do for development of expertise in a skill. These constraints are the resource constraint and the epistemic constraint. I argue that these help explain why the development of expertise in virtue is uncommon, as contrasted with the more common

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observation of expertise in practical skills. In section 2.5, I argue that time helps to overcome these constraints; this offers a plausible reason for why (some) older adults have made further progress toward moral expertise than very young adults. In section 2.6, I conclude by constructing an ideal for development of moral expertise within a specific domain that involves using the success strategies utilized in the development of expertise in the practical skills discussed in this chapter.

2.2 Deliberative Practice in the Development of Expertise

In a new theory of the structure of virtue, Julia Annas elaborates on Aristotle’s lesson that there is an analogy between the development of expertise in a skill and the development of virtue. Here we find a strong emphasis on practice and learning. As Aristotle tells us, we learn to be builders by building, and we learn to be just by doing just actions. Annas emphasizes the intellectual component of developing expertise when she writes, “The learner in virtue, like the learner in a practical skill, needs to understand what she is doing, to achieve the ability to do if for herself, and to do it in a way that improves [...].” Of course, the learner’s understanding is not immediate. It develops over time with practice that is not merely repetitious but improves as a person gains knowledge and understanding. In this section I focus on the element of learning in its

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97 I am contrasting on the one hand the possibility of becoming, say, a concert pianist and on the other hand the possibility of becoming a person of extreme virtuous character. I mean to be suggesting that the former, while uncommon, is not rare; but the latter is quite uncommon.


100 Annas describes the psychological states of virtue development as the ‘need to learn’ and the ‘drive to aspire.’ These are linked together in a way that shapes unformed motivations (Ibid., 16, 11). In this section
connection with gaining knowledge through deliberative practice in practical skills. I examine the concept of deliberative practice with knowledge that has been researched in psychology studies of the development of expertise in practical skills and discuss the extent to which this is analogous to the development of virtue.

To become an expert at most anything takes time, as everyone knows. The common view is that if one just practices and practices, then expertise will follow. But evidence from extensive research in expertise shows that there is much more to it. Anders Ericsson and colleagues have discovered, over the course of more than twenty years of research, that deliberate practice is the key to the acquisition of expert performance. What is deliberate practice? It is a change of structure from the routine of repetitive practice—repetition that typically leads to a plateau of mediocre performance. Deliberative practice represents a difference in method, duration, and intensity of training. It involves extended effort and reorganization of the skill learning methods.

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102 Annas remarks that skills involving a large contribution from natural talent are not the kind of skills that bear the similarity to virtue that we are discussing (Intelligent Virtue, 16, 19). But this may overstate the contribution of natural talent to expertise in skills. Interestingly, Ericsson and colleagues conclude from their research that innate talent plays only an indirect role in the developmental history of an individual. Practice plays a more direct role. There are several examples. Perfect pitch is considered to be a sign of innate musical talent. But several empirical findings refute this. People with “perfect pitch” begin to lose the ability when the tone is generated artificially rather than on the instrument that they play. Also ‘normal’ adults can acquire perfect pitch after extended training. Superior memory in savants turns out to be adaptive, a result of compulsive repetitive practice. Savants with superior memory for music are often blind; the only way for them to learn music is to memorize, therefore the skill develops because of the blindness. Finally, even with respect to physical attributes that appear to endow natural talent, it has been found in many cases that the attribute has evolved from extended and intense practice. Things like lung and heart size, bone structure, proportion of slow and fast twitch muscles, aerobic power, shoulder
This is readily seen in the way that sports performance has improved over a relatively short time. For example, over 25,000 people entered the Boston Marathon in 2011 with a qualifying time just a few minutes from what would have earned a medal in the 1896 Olympics.\textsuperscript{103} Much of the improvement comes from the performer’s acquisition of knowledge about the new methods of deliberative practice. To stay with the running example, in recent years long distance runners have learned that including periods of training that focuses on bursts of intensity rather than simply repeating endurance workouts leads to greater marathon performances. Another example in the physical skills comes from baseball. Championship baseball pitchers can explain the technical physiological reasons for practicing overarm throwing in the way that they do, which includes knowledge of core strength theory, force production, balance, scapular and rotator cuff stability, and more.\textsuperscript{104} They work with trainers to actively seek methods for improved performance and rely on their ability to adjust in response to feedback and error. In contrast, the novice aspiring pitcher, who simply imitates the throwing motion and practices it relentlessly, is likely to meet with injury.

The intellectual component of deliberative practice is seen in both physical skills (such as those associated with sports, music, and surgery) and also in cognitive skills. The ability to understand and explain the reasons for doing what you are doing, in the

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flexibility in swimmers and foot turn-out in dancers—all thought to be genetic factors—are the result of physiological adaptations to extremely intense practice extended over many years. (Ericsson, \textit{Role of Deliberate Practice}, 393-396.) So, evidence seems to suggest that deliberate practice is a necessary condition for all skills performed expertly.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 366. (NB: The 1896 Olympic Marathon was a 25 mile event, and the winner posted a time of 2:58:50. In 2011, the Boston Marathon, at 26.2 miles, was won with a time of 2:03:02.)

\textsuperscript{104} http://www.championsportstraining.com/article_toc.html
\end{flushleft}
way that you are doing it, is a part of learning expert performance in both domains. In cognitive skills, practice that moves from rote learning and repetitious practice to deliberative engagement with the cognitive process also results in large performance improvements. These examples are many, as well. “Active Learning” is a trend in education that has received much attention in recent years. Advocates of the active learning process stress the need for student engagement in order to meet superior learning outcomes. Michael Prince reports: “[G]ood activities develop deep understanding of the important areas to be learned…[T]hey must…promote thoughtful engagement on the part of the student.”

Active learning encourages students to employ active strategies to think about what they are learning. The empirical evidence for this method is strong. Another example comes from work done with chess masters. Their ability to conceptually organize information into larger units is one of the best-established phenomenon in expertise research. Chess masters have learned to organize patterns of

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105 One might wonder if this is typically true about sports, though. Some athletes might merely follow their coach’s instructions for a training workout and never bother asking why. Even in sports, however, the evidence suggests that truly expert performance will involve learner engagement with the knowledge, a good example being the extraordinary understanding that professional athletes (these days) have of nutrition and sports physiology.


108 Researchers collected data from over 6,000 students in introductory physics courses to test for level of performance between two cohorts: traditional lecture-based teaching condition versus active learning condition. Results are remarkable. Test scores measuring conceptual understanding were approximately twice as high in the active learning condition. See Appendix B.

play into “chunks.” After only a brief five-second glance at a chess board, the expert can reproduce four to five times the number of chess pieces recalled by a novice. Recall by world-class players is nearly perfect for a 25 piece representation. This ability comes only after many years of deliberate practice. Masters do not merely practice, they practice with goals for discovering “new variants of chess openings and [they] advance the knowledge of chess” to make innovative contributions to the domain.

These examples that come from the practical skills highlight just the sort of deliberative practice involving knowledge and understanding that Annas urges for virtue development when she explains *articulacy versus ‘knack’*. To be articulate is to be able to express the reasons for action, claims Annas, making the process of ethical education an integral part of virtue ethics. As Aristotle says, the master craftsman who can give an account of the causes of what is produced is superior to the manual craftsman who produces things without knowing what he is doing. A knack involves picking up the ability to do something in an unintellectual way. Annas does not give us an example of having an *ethical* knack. But perhaps the following example fits: We might say that a person with a ready capacity for recognizing when someone else is feeling socially awkward has a knack for seeing occasions to help. But if she repeatedly exercises her compassion in the same way (say, by enthusiastically pulling a shy person into a large

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110 The ‘chunking’ explanation for superior performance is not uncontroversial. Some researchers are testing theories involving the way experts encode and retrieve information from short-term and long-term memory as an alternate explanation.  
111 Feltovich et al, *Studies of Expertise*, 49.  
crowd) without knowing the reasons for that particular action, she may actually act against the aims of compassion (e.g., if what the shy person really wanted was help in exiting the crowd). Presumably, the exuberant helper has picked up the knack of being prosocial in an unintellectual way. And if she can’t explain after the fact why she did what she did, we would certainly be inclined to say she hasn’t much prosocial skill.

It may be useful here to pause and consider how we might differentiate between levels of articulacy. What if one can give reasons for why one does something in a certain way, but not in very sophisticated language? What if one can explain how something is done but not really be able to teach someone else how to do it? Is a person articulate if she understands (in her own mind) how and why something is done, but is unable to express it in words? Which level of articulacy is sufficient to call someone an expert? My sense is that it depends on the domain, and the role someone plays in that domain. Certainly, to be a teacher requires articulacy that includes command of language. But in other domains, it may be enough that the expert knows why she is doing what she is doing without being able to express it with sophistication. Yet, again, it will depend on the role that person plays. One might think that in sports, for example, verbal articulacy is not required. But consider the role played by a sports team leader. He must be able to understand the game at an expert level and be able to communicate that information to other players and coaches. A great example is found in Robert Griffin III, the 2011 Heisman winner, drafted to play quarterback with the Washington Redskins for the 2012 season. Griffin played for Baylor University, graduating on the Dean’s list with a degree
in Political Science. Here is an excerpt from an interview with John Gruden, in which Griffin explains a three-second football passing play as they watch it on video:

“This is a power foot pass. So, you come around, the guards are pulling; this time he’s going to protect you and block that end. And all you are going to have is your inside receiver. He’s going to run a slant and go. He runs that slant and he gets the safety to think, ‘Okay he’s running a slant’. And then when he gets that “go” the safety cannot recover. Because a safety plays safety for a reason; they’re not fast. Not as fast as corners, I should say. They do not have good cover skills. They are more run stoppers; they are smart and they can tell defensive guys what to do. But as soon as he jumps that slant, me and Kimball are thinking the same thing—it’s over. I had to slide in the pocket here, just because of a little pressure from the backside. The lineman got in on me, just pushing in on me, so I slide a little bit, get reset, throw it to Kimball, and that’s just a great catch by him. The corner comes off, so I led him more across the field. This backside safety is out of the play. You’ve just got to know where your guys are and where the defense is, and…touchdown.”

This example highlights the fact that articulacy, just like knowledge, is domain-specific. The jargon of football may be foreign to a pianist, in the same way an augmented fifth chord may be to a linebacker. But each knows why he plays the way he does; and as an expert, he can express it.

Articulacy in deliberative practice, i.e., being able to give reasons for why one is practicing in the way that he is, marks the difference between the learner progressing toward excellence and the novice who is still copying the teacher and executing the skill by rote. This is the way that children initially learn habits of virtue; they do not know at first why they must wait their turn or why they cannot simply take away another child’s toy. But they come to learn the reasons, and that is the point at which they can begin to make progress toward virtue. (Unfortunately, many people become ethically lazy, as

116 For the entire interview, visit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6wY-rlGznk&feature=related
Annas observes, taking on patterns of behavior without thinking for themselves about the reasons for what they do.\textsuperscript{117} Progress toward virtue, as in a skill, requires the learner to have enough understanding to correct and self-direct.\textsuperscript{118} Once some understanding is acquired, deliberative practice cuts the trail toward expertise.\textsuperscript{119}

I have endeavored to show that the notion of deliberative practice studied in expertise research can be applied to virtue development, because both incorporate the critical element of intellectual understanding in practice. Of course, the way in which deliberative practice might be used in ethical practice is not as easy to imagine as it is in sports, music, and medicine. In these domains, the activity of practice is more structured; the ends seem clearer and more specifiable; plus, there is a metric for measuring improvement. But in ethical deliberation, do people really deliberately practice? Certainly, there are some examples of formal deliberative ethical practice, such as role-playing in ethics vignettes, which is made a part of some business ethics training.

\textsuperscript{117} Annas, \textit{Intelligent Virtue}, 24. NB: A remarkable example comes from the subprime mortgage crisis, when hundreds of loan officers over a ten-year period followed corporate orders to push minority applicants into loans they could not afford. Of course, for some people it was surely a case of weakness of will rather than laziness, or possibly ignorance, and for still others a case of external pressures too difficult to overcome (namely the need to stay employed). http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/us/07baltimore.html?pagewanted=all

\textsuperscript{118} A new direction in physical therapy (especially sports physical therapy) conceives of the patient’s involvement as that of developing an intellectual skill, in order to correct and self-direct. On this model, the patient is \textit{required} to understand the physiology of the movements that the therapist prescribes. In sessions conducted by John M. Woolf, PT (ProActive Physical Therapy, Tucson, AZ) before each new set of movements, the patient is taken to a classroom with a dry erase board. Diagrams are drawn, a lesson is given, and the patient must demonstrate understanding of the anatomical condition before being allowed to begin movement therapy. This stands in stark contrast to conventional physical therapy, which typically consists in putting a patient on a machine, for example, and telling him to do a certain number of reps, or simply having him imitate a movement the therapist demonstrates.

\textsuperscript{119} Perhaps some examples of skills in the arts run counter to the articulacy requirement. A painter, for example, might produce an extraordinary piece of work but be utterly unable to explain why she did what she did. This kind of example merely falls outside of the kind of skills we are interested in, but does not weaken the analogy. We want to examine the kind of skills that \textit{do} match the structure of virtue. Or, alternatively, we can just say that the painter’s ability is not a skill.
The use of ethics case-studies in American business schools is a widespread practice, also. But these examples may seem contrived, and it is likely that many of the participants involved in the activity are not genuinely invested in deliberately acquiring understanding. But I suggest that deliberative ethical practice is actually fairly common if we consider the role of *reflection* in ‘practicing’ ethics. Reflection is a kind of deliberative practice in that it draws on knowledge previously gained and uses it to reconfigure thoughts about how to go about living a better life. Ethical reflection as deliberative practice consists in doing things like imagining what one would do in a new situation; reflecting about what one could have done better in some past situation; observing others and thinking “What would I do if I were in that spot?” So, it does seem as though we engage in deliberative ethical practice, where conscious effort to improve is central to performing well, just as it is in the pursuit of excellence in many other practical skills.

I have been talking about how deliberative practice in skills such as sports and music are similar to the ways in which people intentionally practice their skills of ethical

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120 For example, E-factor! is a company that markets workshops and seminars to companies so that they may “evaluate and enhance business ethics standards.” It features role-playing, simulation and game methods that put people into character roles to act out real life ethical dilemmas. http://e-factorgame.com/

121 There are other opportunities for ethical practice, as well. Following along with a story in a novel or movie allows us to vicariously live through the moral problems facing the characters. Our practice is deliberate if we realize what we are doing as we engage with the story, rather than just casually enjoying the plot. Another way in which we ‘practice’ is when we hear about others’ moral difficulties and talk it over with the people closest to us.

122 Another good example of deliberate ethical reflection comes from medical ethics in practice. Medical ethics committees must make decisions based on considerations of particular cases and how they compare to past similar situations. Some of the process involves reflection and discussion about hypothetical case studies, which facilitates ethical policy making. My thanks to Michael Gill for pointing this out.
deliberation and that both kinds of practitioners (at the top of their games, so to speak),
can give reasons to explain why they are doing what they are doing in the way that they
are doing it. But in all of these domains, one might object, it is clear that some people
perform their skill with expertise because they are not consciously thinking about it.

2.3 Automaticity and “Flow”

Automaticity is easily observed in many skills, especially those involving speed.
Automaticity refers to cognitive processes that occur below conscious awareness and
have adapted to reorganize and refine knowledge; it enables the utilization of large
amounts of information in a way that lessens cognitive demand, both in memory retrieval
and processing. The idea of performing an action without consciously thinking about it
is quite intuitive and the phenomenon quite common. It happens not only in elite athletes,
musicians, and many other skillful experts, but in many of our everyday activities. What
is unique in the case of experts, however, is the level of performance that is possible even
while conscious attention is suspended. Annas contends that automaticity is a feature of
the virtuous person’s response to situations calling for virtue; in her words, “conscious
thoughts seem to have disappeared; they are not taking up psychological room…[.]” In
the case of the virtuous person, the reasons for action are still there, but she does not have
to construct them in an effortful way. Her responses are unmediated by conscious
reflection because she has reached the point where her disposition is finely tuned to
respond automatically (and intelligently). Automaticity in other skills, especially those

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123 Feltovich, Studies of Expertise, 58.
124 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 29.
requiring digit dexterity (such as musicianship and typing) is pronounced. Expert typists and guitar players rarely, if ever, think about the position of their fingers on the keyboard or the fret board. Automaticity, in this sense, is a cognitive mechanism for producing behavior that effectively meets desired ends. It occurs from having performed the means to those ends many times, resulting in competent or expert execution. It can be behavior as simple as walking or as complex as playing a piano concerto. There are two distinct features of this kind of automaticity. First, we seem to be in control of the activity (we can stop walking or piano playing in order to re-direct the activity in some way); and second, we are in some sense aware that we have been “under the influence” of an automatic behavior. This kind of automaticity is to be contrasted with the kind of automatic behavior that results in a flawed performance about which we never have knowledge. Evidence is very strong that humans uniformly make social mistakes because of these processes operating below our conscious awareness. For example, there are many experiments showing that behaviors are easily influenced by priming subjects with words that trigger stereotypical behaviors, yet subjects are completely unaware they have responded automatically to the priming. But the kind of automaticity that Annas refers

\[125\] Compare we everyday typists to experts: We may not have to think about our fingers all of the time, but we do consciously check their position from time to time, and especially on the periphery of the keys. (At least I do.) By contrast, expert typists can type and recite nursery rhymes simultaneously. (I can, too, but the typing errors are dreadful.) Shaffer, L. H. “Multiple Attention in Continuous Verbal Tasks.” In Attention and Performance, edited by P. M. A. Rabbitt and S. Dornic. New York: Academic Press, 1975.

\[126\] Famously, for example, priming subjects with words associated with old people correlates with the subjects walking slower to the elevator. However, not all automatic processes produce negative outcomes. Some help us socially, too, as when we unknowingly mirror others’ body language to ease tension and increase likeability. Automaticity also benefits us because much of it is adaptive and self-regulatory—dealing with the concerns of our immediate environment on our behalf, freeing up valuable conscious energy for other things. John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand, “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being,” American Psychologist 54, No. 7 (1999): 467-468.
to results from purposefully and habitually directing one’s activity toward excellence, with superb performance as the end goal. After enough practice, the habit becomes automatic.

Sometimes one of the effects of automaticity during activity can be the phenomenological experience of “flow.” This is discussed at some length by Annas, and it is mentioned in Ericsson’s work as well. The idea of flow is that when someone is intently engaged in the experience of a goal-directed activity that is not routine but complex, she may have a feeling of intense enjoyment. Moreover, the enjoyment is of the activity itself and not tied to the product, or outcome of the activity. There is a sense of oneself being ‘lost’ in the activity, such that the passage of time can go by unnoticed. For the application of the flow concept to virtuous activity, Annas homes in on the autotelic nature of the flow experience, i.e., the virtuous activity has a purpose in itself, or has its own end. This is a complex Aristotelian notion, tied to concepts involving integration (unity) of the virtues, and harmony between one’s activities, goals, and dispositions. “Pleasure,” on this account, is not synonymous with fun or feeling good, but is rather the experience of acting virtuously—for the right reasons, and without conflict or reluctance.

2.4 Constraints on the Development of Virtue

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127 This claim is supported by research in non-conscious goal pursuit automaticity: “If an individual repeatedly chooses to pursue a certain goal in a situation, then eventually merely encountering that situation is enough to automatically activate the goal and put it into operation.” John A. Bargh and Erin L. Williams, “The Automaticity of Social Life,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 15 No. 1 (2006): 2.
129 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 70-82; Ericsson, The Role of Deliberate Practice, 368.
To now I have been attempting to extend the skill/virtue analogy by showing the similarities in deliberative practice to gain knowledge and understanding; I also touched on the similarities between expertise in skills and virtue with respect to automaticity and flow. Now I will address two dissimilarities in the virtue/skill analogy that I perceive as implications of the expertise research; I submit these as two reasons to explain why expertise in virtue is more uncommon as compared to excellence in practical skills (there are others, of course). The first involves the resource constraint on virtue development: The amount of deliberative practice and coaching necessary for expertise, which is available to athletes and musicians for example, is not available for people who aspire to virtue. The second dissimilarity is the epistemic constraint on virtue development: The knowledge and understanding required for deliberative practice (and thus expertise) is highly domain specific and not transferable; this may not significantly hinder the development of expertise in athletics and music, but threatens the plausibility of the global nature of virtue. I will explore these in turn.

The resource constraint involves two parts: the aspiring virtuous agent’s limited access to deliberative practice and the agent’s limited access to teachers. To put into perspective the importance of deliberative practice, let’s briefly revisit flow. The flow phenomenon that is experienced by experts in skills such as sports and music comes typically at the peak of performance. \(^{130}\) Annas says the same of virtuous activity. Only the virtuous (or at least those with a significant degree of development toward virtue) can experience virtuous activity flowing effortlessly from their character, formed over time by

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\(^{130}\) Ericsson, *The Role of Deliberate Practice*, 368.
the dynamic shaping of their dispositions.¹³¹ But there is a significant difference between the athlete (or musician) at her peak and the aspiring virtuous person. The athlete has invested an enormous amount of time in deliberative practice. For many hours a day, for many years, the athlete has engaged in highly structured rehearsal. Ericsson explains:

“Specific tasks are invented to overcome weaknesses, and performance is carefully monitored to provide cues for ways to improve it further.”¹³² But for the aspiring virtuous agent, the occasions for practice usually come from circumstances arising in real life that demand her moral response. Yet this is not really practice; rather it is trying to learn through performance. To push the analogy, it would be similar to a gymnast having only the time during her competitions to practice her skills on the balance beam.¹³³ Not only that, but the real life occasions for the aspiring virtuous agent to perform virtuously in the face of demanding countervailing pressures (and thus get what expert practice she can) are sometimes few and far between. (Are there that many occasions calling for bravery?)

Granted, in most people’s lives there are probably many small, everyday demands to make ethical choices about one’s alternatives for action. And these do accumulate bit-by-bit over time, counting as practice toward expertise. But these everyday situations do not test virtuous character in the way that ‘defining moments’ do; and until a person’s performance in some domain is tested under pressure, it is doubtful that we would want to call that person a high level expert. Also, when any occasion for ethical choice presents itself in real life, it is typically accompanied by cognitive anxiety (at least in the

¹³¹ Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 76.
¹³² Ericsson, The Role of Deliberate Practice, 368.
¹³³ Ericsson notes that during a three-hour baseball game, a batter may get only 5-15 pitches, whereas during practice of the same duration he will have several hundred batting opportunities (Ibid., 368).
not-yet virtuous), analogous to the nervousness experienced by athletes and musicians during competition or performance. During deliberative practice, with skills as well as ethics, the environment is more relaxed, and mistakes are not just tolerable but welcomed for the learning opportunity they present. In real life, ethical mistakes are not welcome.

Recall, the key to deliberative practice is that it is done with adequate frequency, intensity, and duration. I am arguing that the lack of structured, deliberative practice is an impediment to the development of expertise in virtue, just as it has been proven to be in other practical skills. Lack of sufficient deliberate practice is the first part of the resource constraint for the development of virtue; the second part is lack of sufficient coaching (or teaching).

In the case of truly masterful expertise (staying with the sport and music examples), there is always a teacher or coach involved. This is necessary in order for the athlete or musician to receive the feedback necessary to make the proper adjustments in her performance. By contrast, on Annas’ account of virtue, the picture is one of much self-directedness. A very important part in the early stages of learning virtue is for the child to take over from what he has been taught about virtue by his parents and learn to practice it himself, in his own way, with understanding about what he is doing. This process continues into adulthood, as every time he faces an ethical challenge he enlarges his understanding of the field of the virtue and directs himself toward improvement. Of course, Annas is not suggesting that we must develop virtue alone by ourselves in a vacuum. She repeatedly stresses that our characters are shaped by our communities (e.g.,

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family, school, society), and that the virtues are always embedded in a particular context. This is surely right. We do interact with others daily, and they become the content of our deliberations. Many times they help us with our ethical deliberations. Yet the development of virtue relies heavily on thinking things through on our own. The heavy burden of self-directedness in virtue development for adults may also be one of the biggest reasons so few people attain an extremely high degree of progress toward virtue.

Experts in sports and music, however, not only receive coaching during the formative stages of their development, but the coaching continues after a level of expertise has been reached. Symphony musicians continue to take instruction from the conductor; professional athletes not only have a head coach, but coaches for each area of specialty as well. For these elite performers, the teaching is never done, but is ongoing. In the moral domain, coaching ends very early in life for many people, and often before any level of expertise is reached. Why do we not have more ethics teachers later in life? The possible answers to this question are surely many. But my claim is that the aspiring virtuous agent is, for the most part, left on her own to develop her expertise, without a resource that other experts depend on—the teacher. Long periods of deliberative practice with a teacher are resources not typically available to adult moral agents as they are to

\[135\] Here are three possible answers: First, there is the problem of moral autonomy. We are reluctant to suggest that rational adults cannot figure out for themselves how to be good people. Second, there is the problem of tolerance. The idea here is that it is no one’s place to get involved in the ethical character-building of another; rather, we should ‘live and let live’ as long as no harm is done. Third, there is the problem of relativism, and the belief that no moral view has privilege over any other.
practitioners in other skills. So, the resource constraint is a dissimilarity in the virtue/skill analogy.\footnote{In Ericsson’s work, the resource constraint as it would apply to athletes, for example, has to do with limited funds for hiring coaches, lack of practice facilities in the town, cost of travel to competitions, etc. So, it is not as if there are no resource constraints for developing expertise in these skills. But they are not nearly as large or difficult to overcome in comparison to the resource constraints on developing virtue.}

The next dissimilarity in the analogy that I wish to draw out involves the epistemic constraint to virtue development. By this I am not referring to constraints on what one can know about virtue because of one’s impoverished circumstances, but rather the constraint on what one can know about virtue because of one’s limited circumstances. Again, from expertise research we learn that expertise in a skill requires knowledge and understanding; moreover, it requires \textit{domain specific} knowledge. In the research involving expertise in different spheres of activity, including sport, music, surgery, chess-playing and more, the evidence overwhelming supports a link between domain-specific knowledge and extraordinary performance. But this discovery is relatively new.

An old paradigm of research (in the 1960s) in the community of researchers testing cognitive abilities assumed that general cognitive skills (like basic problem-solving or memory tasks) could be measured without taking into account the person’s knowledge of the particular content being used in the assessment tasks. So, for example, questions testing for problem-solving strategies might use cooking examples or mechanical examples, and it was thought that the knowledge variable was a “nuisance variable.”\footnote{Feltovich, \textit{Studies in Expertise}, 47.} But this assumption began to evaporate as researchers discovered the correlation between better basic cognitive performance and larger amounts of domain
specific knowledge. For example, in a study using high- and low-knowledge individuals with regard to baseball, it was found that when presented new material from that particular domain, high-knowledge people had better recall, could make useful inferences from smaller amounts of partial information, and were better able to integrate old information with new.138 This effect is especially evident in logical reasoning tasks. For example, Erikson and colleagues claim that people are not very good at understanding inference structures involving conditionals, unless the variables of the hypothetical statements are translated into concrete expressions with content the person understands, such as “If the purchase is over thirty dollars, then the manager approves it.”139 Other research conducted by Leda Cosmides, John Tooby and colleagues over many years—and specifically directed toward investigating human intelligence in making conditional inferences—yields different and more fine-grained conclusions.140 According to Cosmides, human intelligence for drawing inferences can be powerful—but not because of the content. Rather, our abilities are tied to adaptive specializations of problem-solving strategies that have evolved in response to the need for social cooperation. Even our distant ancestors relied on implicit conditional rules of fair trade—if some requirement is met, some benefit will be conveyed. When someone gets a benefit without meeting the requirement, she is a cheater. When we humans are searching for cheaters among us, we are quite good at detecting violations of conditional rules. But when we are confronted

138 Ibid., 48.
139 Ericsson, The Role of Deliberate Practice, 47.
with solving standard conditional logic problems that do not involve social exchange, we can be quite bad.\textsuperscript{141} The experiments Cosmides has conducted give evidence that this remains true, even when the problem deals with very familiar content; i.e., if the content does not involve satisfying a requirement-benefit social contract, we tend to be less-than-competent at using inference strategies.\textsuperscript{142} Continued research will, hopefully, provide a clearer view into the psychological mechanisms that govern cognitive skills such as problem-solving, inferential reasoning, and concept formation. But it is looking more and more as if much of our underlying cognitive expertise is highly domain specific.\textsuperscript{143} This research lends support to the claim that expert performance is tightly tied to domain specific knowledge.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{141} As Cosmides notes, social exchange is, by definition, social behavior that is conditional (Ibid., 9009). Someone receives a benefit (Q) if he first meets some requirement (P). (If P, then Q) According to Cosmides’ \textit{social contract theory} of mind, humans have evolved specialized, domain-specific, mechanisms for making inferences about important violations of social exchange that do not necessarily follow rules of logic. We humans have a cognitive defense against cheaters because these are people who intentionally take a benefit without meeting the requirement. Most people can readily make the inference that a conditional rule has been violated by picking out the co-occurrence of a false antecedent and a true consequent. (Someone gets a benefit without having met an antecedent condition.) Although this inference does not adhere to logical rules, it is an extremely reliable computational mechanism for ‘cheater detection’. A situation that triggers a search for cheaters activates nonstandard inference rules, adapted specifically for this task. The social contract theory of mind diverges from ‘blank slate’ theories, which posit that humans employ reasoning procedures that are general-purpose, domain-general, and content-independent. On the blank slate view, people should be able to reason successfully about any topic by using standard logical inference rules, or be able to detect violations of deontic rules involving permission and obligation irrespective of content. But Cosmides’ body of experimental evidence strongly suggests otherwise. Generally, humans are good at detecting violations of deontic rules irrespective of content, but \emph{only} if the violator is getting away with a benefit without having met the permission or obligation requirement. (E.g., “If a student is to be assigned to Dover High School, then the student must live in Dover City” involves a benefit to be gained.) If the content is neutral with respect to social exchange for benefit, subjects do not do well at detecting violations. (E.g., “If doing Ladies Shoes inventory, then use a blue form” involves no benefit for violating the rule.) Ibid., 9011.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 9009.

\textsuperscript{143} In fact, Cosmides refers to the diverse array of adaptive specializations of human intelligence as “expert systems.” Ibid., 9008.
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Experts have a way of seeing problems within their domain that is much deeper than the way a novice sees those same problems, because experts have a vast amount of very specific knowledge relative to their domain of activity. They have a superior ability for situational awareness that the novice lacks. To better understand how specific the knowledge is in a skill domain and how it leads to expertise, I will use an example from sport—cycling. Within any skill domain (a sphere of goal-directed activity) there are specific items with which the activity is concerned, and the expert must have knowledge and understanding about those items. In professional cycling, the expert knows a great deal about his equipment, the road and weather conditions, his own physiology with respect to aerodynamics, the strengths and weaknesses—both physical and psychological—of his competitors and himself, safety, nutrition, race strategy and tactics. Each of these categories includes even more fine-grained knowledge. Each time the cyclist takes to the road, the knowledge of these items aids his performance, and the adjustments that he makes to new conditions contribute to the fine-tuning of his expertise.

How does this compare to the knowledge required for development of virtue? The goal-directed activity of the domain of virtue consists in reasoning, feeling, and acting in certain ways that develop our understanding of the virtue, which informs our view of what the virtuous thing to do is in a new situation. Now, what are the items

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144 A great example of this comes from studies of firefighters. Expert firefighters interpret the scene of a fire according to how it changes. They make inferences about what preceded the current state of the fire, and how it is likely to continue. This gives them understanding about how best to intervene. Novices, by contrast, look for superficial perceptual clues such as color and intensity. G.A. Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).

145 The ‘goal-directed’ aspect of activity associated with skills demarcates this kind of sphere of activity from mere play.

with which the activity is concerned and the knowledge requirement relative to those items? In Christine Swanton’s characterization,\textsuperscript{147} items in the field of a virtue are ‘demands of the world’ that may include things like other human beings, property, money, situations, knowledge, beauty, children, friends, sentient beings in general, inanimate objects like artwork or natural objects of the environment, and even our own bodily pleasures.\textsuperscript{148} The comparison of domain specific knowledge in virtue with domain specific knowledge in cycling brings out three differences, all of which contribute to the difficulty in making progress toward virtue. First, the amount of knowledge required for virtue is much larger than for practical skills; second, the type of knowledge required for virtue is quite different; and third, the community within which one performs the activity is quite different.

Consider the issue of quantity as compared to the domain of cycling: Granted, there are many things to know in order to become an expert cyclist, as sketched above. But acquiring that much knowledge is \textit{manageable}. Perhaps the cyclist confronts variables each time out on the road that add to his bank of knowledge, but these things still fall within the general categories of knowledge that form a solid basis for his expertise. By contrast, the amount of knowledge required for expertise in virtue (if

\textsuperscript{147} Christine Swanton gives a revisionary definition of virtue as a “disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its ‘field’.” I do not mean to be taking on Swanton’s pluralism, but I find her conceptualization of “items” as the objects with which virtue is concerned to be useful for making my point about epistemic constraint. Christine Swanton, \textit{Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 19.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 20-21.
Swanton’s list is any indication) is infinitely vast. The virtue ethicist will likely object that I am confusing the need for knowledge of nonmoral information and situation-specific normative concepts with the need for and understanding of the virtues and how they apply in different situations—an understanding that improves through active engagement with experience. But doesn’t our accumulated experience include gaining knowledge of nonmoral information as well as the normative concepts that are specific to a particular domain? And isn’t this often just what we need to know in order to act virtuously when the virtues are in tension with each other? To illustrate, consider a seasoned college professor who has become very good at balancing the virtues of honesty and kindness with respect to the way she handles students in her evaluations of them. She has gained considerable knowledge over the years about how much criticism to give, and how to give it, based on students’ varying levels of competence such that she does not unnecessarily hurt them, while still being forthcoming with the truth about their performance. There are variables that may change from student to student, but the content (that is, the items with which the virtues are concerned in this domain) remain roughly the same. But now suppose that she has just discovered that her friend’s wife is cheating on him. It seems that honesty and kindness are (at least some of) the relevant virtues in this case as well; but she is at a loss with respect to having knowledge of the items in this sphere. Unlike cases involving her students, this is literally new territory. She hasn’t the experience to know how things might turn out if she does nothing, or if she does this

149 Swanton does not claim that we must have understanding of these things; rather, she identifies them as the demands we must respond to (Ibid., 19). I am making the point, in keeping with the skill analogy, that they are also items we need to have knowledge about if we are to be experts.

150 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 41.
rather than that (as she does with her students); she isn’t an expert about marital relationships (as she is about student-teacher relationships); she is reluctant to invoke her own standards of ‘rightness’ to address the infidelity situation (whereas she is confident about invoking her standards of pedagogy); and there is undoubtedly even more knowledge that she would need in order to exercise virtue excellently in the infidelity case.\footnote{Anas would say that virtues cannot be in tension this way. On her Aristotelian account, all of the virtues are reciprocal, or united, such that the truly virtuous person will act in a way that expresses all of them properly in the particular situation. It is not part of my project here to argue for or against the unity thesis; I think my point about the epistemic constraints associated with virtuous activity applies whether or not all the virtues are united.}

This example gestures at the second difference between domain specific knowledge in virtue and domain specific knowledge in practical skills, and that is the qualitative difference. In practicing virtue, we are challenged with needing to know a great deal about human psychology. The moral domain is filled mostly with concerns about what people need, desire, think, feel, and what they do in response to these states. Furthermore, addressing moral issues in a particular subdomain of morality (e.g., medical ethics) will require quite a bit of knowledge about nonmoral facts, as well.

Finally, the community within which the expert of a practical skill operates and the community within which an aspiring virtuous agent operates are quite different. In the case of exercising a practical skill, the aspiring expert functions within a homogeneous group. The activity is controlled, so to speak, by a community of people aspiring toward the same goal, operating in accordance with mutually accepted practices and norms. Admittedly, these norms morph as the sophistication of the activity increases, but the
community tends to move together adjusting to the new practices. In the moral domain, homogeneity in communities with respect to moral goals is likely to be unstable. This is not the place for a discussion of relativism; the point I am urging is simply that it is much harder to utilize knowledge (or even to be confident in one’s knowledge) when the other people with whom one interacts are not pursuing the same goals in the same way.

In summary, the problems associated with the epistemic constraint that I have discussed are greatly minimized (or often non-existent) in the practical skills we have been examining. The knowledge required for musicianship (and even more narrowly, for example, clarinet musicianship) is neatly circumscribed by the domain of (clarinet-playing) activity. Once the knowledge is acquired, the expert can execute the activity without conflict. Moreover, this happens quite frequently. There are many experts in sports, music, surgery, chess and other practical skills. Each expert in each domain has a large inventory of knowledge associated with that particular activity. Expertise in

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152 Radical departures from the way a skill is practiced can result in the formation of a new domain of skill, but the old domain is typically left intact. An example of that can be found in the different way that football is played in different professional leagues throughout the world. The same is true in the moral domain, of course, but it is not as easy for each group to ignore each other. Even small groups operating within their own set of norms (e.g., the Westboro Baptist Church) can have enormous impact on many other individuals and groups.

153 However, this may be a consequent of larger, more diverse and complex societies. In smaller cultural groups, it may be morally homogenous.

154 NB: Although there are now computers that can beat humans at chess and Jeopardy, so far none has been invented to solve ethical dilemmas. The knowledge required for chess and Jeopardy, while enormous, can be quantified for implementation in machines with artificial intelligence. The knowledge requirements for artificial ethical intelligence have not yet become programmable. (Even lethal military robots do not have autonomous decision-making algorithms.) As Cosmides, and colleagues remark, in reference to the remarkable human ability to detect cheaters in social exchange, “[I]f adherence to content-independent inferential methods constituted intelligence, then equipping computers with programs implementing these methods, operating at vastly higher rates, should have made them intelligent. It did not.” (Cosmides et al, Adaptive Specializations,9007.)

155 Another constraint that I will not pursue here, is that domain specific expertise is almost never transferable. Feltovich reports: “[P]eople hardly ever reach an elite level in more than a single domain of
virtue, however, is not as familiar as the expertise we observe in the practical skills. I contend that the epistemic constraint is a large contributing factor.

There are at least three ways for the virtue ethicist to respond to the problem of epistemic constraint. The first, as I have already noted, is simply to object that I have not grasped the concept of the interconnectedness of the virtues, the ends of the virtuous agent’s life as a whole, and the role of practical intelligence. Practical intelligence, on the Aristotelian account, is not ‘compartmentalized’ knowledge, but rather wisdom that allows us to integrate all the relevant aspects of a situation from the start. But what is the feature of practical intelligence such that it gives us the ability to simply know what we need to know in novel situations across many different domains? Perhaps practical intelligence gives us the ability to pick out what we need to learn, which then becomes new knowledge. But even then, there is an enormous amount of domain-specific knowledge that would need to be learned. It seems implausible to me that intelligence is a sweeping general knowledge (of what I cannot apprehend) that crosses over to all domains of life.

Another response to the implication of the epistemic constraint on virtue development would be to simply drop the analogy at this point. Perhaps the requirement of domain specific knowledge for expertise in sports and music is very narrow and specific, but with virtue, the demands for knowledge are, by necessity, holistic. The activity. This has proven to be one of the most enduring findings in the study of expertise...There is little transfer from high-level proficiency in one domain to proficiency in other domains—even when the domains seem, intuitively, very similar.” (Feltovich, *Studies in Expertise*, 47.) A good example of this comes from basketball. Of the five player positions, there are two guard positions: point guard and shooting guard. Each requires different skill sets. In the NBA, there are only a few players who are “combo” guards, able to play both positions with the same level of expertise.

extent to which the virtues are united (and thus the knowledge required for virtue holistic) is a general area of disagreement among virtue ethicists. I will not tackle that here. (But I will suggest, in the next section, that the epistemic constraint can be somewhat overcome if we accept the idea that it is possible to set goals for developing virtue in just one specific domain.) The third response is to simply grant that this account of virtue is ideal, but striving toward an ideal is, after all, the point.

Both the resource constraint and the epistemic constraint on the development of virtue, as I have argued, give plausible explanation for why extreme virtue is rare, especially early in life. The virtue ethicist does not have to accept this as a threat to a theory of virtue development, however. As Annas urges, progress toward virtue progresses by degree, as long as we each continue to strive toward it. Some people have just made further progress in the development of virtue than others have. It is to this topic that I turn next.

2.5 Moral Expertise and Age

So far, I have been concerned to show how the virtue/skill analogy holds up to evidence from empirical research in expertise. The development of virtue does, indeed, bear much similarity to the development of expertise in a practical skill. But I also illuminated two dissimilarities in the analogy that I labeled the resource constraint (limited access to teachers and deliberative practice) and the epistemic constraint (limited access to knowledge in the domain of virtue activity) on the development of virtue. I argued that these constraints are much more limiting to the development of virtue than
they are to the development of expertise in a practical skill. But in this section, I argue that these constraints can be lifted, little by little, as a person ages, moving through life to gain opportunities for deliberative practice and accumulation of knowledge relevant to the virtues. An older person is more likely to have developed a higher degree of progress toward moral expertise, having had more time for more access to the resources. It is still likely the case that few older people have reached an extremely high level of moral expertise; but among the older, I claim that there we will find a higher percentage of people farther down the path to virtue.\footnote{I have no rigid parameters in mind with respect to absolute age. The degree of moral expertise that anyone has is a function of not only time but circumstances, motivation, education, and a host of other variables. Additionally, as I will soon argue, the level of moral expertise is tied to specific domains within which a person functions most in life. The contrast I wish to draw is between the percentage of the population of very young (college-aged) adults that we would expect to have a high degree of moral expertise and the percentage of the population of midlife or older adults that we would expect to have a high degree of moral expertise.}

Before defending this claim, however, a qualification is in order. I have yet to say anything about motivation, either in relation to the development of virtue or the development of expertise in skills. For Annas, motivation to develop the virtues starts very early. A child acquires the drive to aspire as he moves from copying what he has learned from parents and teachers about virtue to thinking about it on his own. The drive to improve his understanding leads to self-directed improvement. On this view, the virtues are “educated developments of our unformed motivations.”\footnote{Annas, \textit{Intelligent Virtue}, 11.} So, we start with motivations, and through the natural way that we reason for ourselves about the virtues, our need to learn \textit{more} is linked with our aspiration to improve with practice. Annas admits that this is a very demanding feature of a skill, and that many people lapse into
repetition and routine.\textsuperscript{159} These are the ethically lazy. I am not sure about the claim that the drive to aspire is acquired and maintained in this way; but I am sure that many people are ethically lazy. So the qualification I want to make is that I am sure many older people are ethically lazy, too. Time (and thus age) is not a sufficient condition for moral expertise. The motivation to improve must be present,\textsuperscript{160} along with a long period of deliberative practice informed by knowledge. How long?

In the pursuit of expertise in the skills, the period of time from the beginning of serious deliberative practice until the attainment of exceptional performance uniformly follows the “10-year rule.”\textsuperscript{161} The rule is supported by data from a wide range of domains including swimming, long-distance running, music, chess, mathematics, writing and poetry, academic publishing, scientific work, evaluation of livestock, and making diagnoses from X-rays.\textsuperscript{162} In each of these activities, expertise is attributed to intense, frequent, deliberative practice. (This rule holds regardless of any innate talent the performer is alleged to possess.) How does this correspond to the development of moral expertise? If we start practicing our moral skills in kindergarten, then according to the 10-year rule, shouldn’t we be moral experts by the age of fifteen or so? Obviously, it does not work this way. For the aspiring virtuous agent to put in as much practice as the aspiring pianist, she will need much more time. The pianist will spend three to five hours per day in focused practice; how many people spend that much time each day deliberately

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 18.

\textsuperscript{160} I will discuss the older adult’s motivation for virtue development in self and others in the next chapter. For this argument, I am assuming that motivation is present, but I will not defend any view about where it comes from.

\textsuperscript{161} Ericsson, The Role of Deliberate Practice, 366.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
practicing virtue? And now, the reader may be happy to hear, I will drop the skill analogy.

Building one’s character is a lifelong process, there is no doubt. It is not necessarily linear, either. It does require focused periods of reflection and adjustment to new knowledge about people and circumstances. Some of what we develop in our characters is built up a little bit each day, for example, a disposition to be friendly and kind. But the big problems that we confront—the ones that really test our character—don’t come along daily. So, building the deeper parts of our character will take time. The defining moments, as it were, for gaining new knowledge and reflecting about our developing characters, are not typically frequent. So, being able to ‘practice’ virtue takes a lifetime. Moral experience isn’t the sort of thing that can be compressed into a short amount of time. Although, experience, simpliciter, can be compressed into a short amount of time. Young people often set out to discover the world, learn a great deal of knowledge and make progress in the development toward virtue along the way. But it will still take time to gain enough temporal distance to reflect on that knowledge and how

163 Of course, the degree to which this claim is empirically true will depend upon an individual’s role within a particular domain. Some people might very well be confronted quite often with big moral decisions (e.g., members of medical ethics committees, Supreme Court Justices, corporate administrators of ethics hotlines for whistleblowers, environmental protection liaisons to private business, etc.) But a great majority of people, I suspect, confront the same, regularly occurring ethical issues within stable, patterned contexts. I think that John Doris is correct to remark that many people operate within narrow (or ‘local’) environments most of the time, and because of this the globalism of their character is rarely tested (Doris, Lack of Character, 89-91). We can think of this group as rarely coming up against exceptions to moral generalizations. This point is made by Rosalind Hursthouse when she argues that the inexperienced lack practical wisdom because they tend to think about what the virtues require in terms of conventional generalizations rather than taking note of exceptions to virtue. The latter, she claims, develops a more sophisticated understanding of virtue, which requires a great deal of time to acquire. (Rosalind Hursthouse, “Practical Wisdom: A Mundane Account,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 106 (2006): 292.) This is why Aristotle insists that the young cannot be wise. Most people just don’t have adequate opportunity to practice making ‘big’ ethical decisions.
it fits into a broader view of life. So even if morally precocious, a young adult will make even more progress toward virtue with time.

As I said before, time is not a sufficient condition for moral expertise. There are plenty of older people who are apathetic, mean, and rigid. I am not suggesting that older people can overcome all the constraints on the development of virtue. Conversely, there are young people who are morally wise because they have managed to overcome the constraints. So perhaps (in uncommon cases) time is not a necessary condition for moral expertise. But the percentage of people having a higher degree of moral expertise is likely to be greater in the group of older adults, as compared with the group of very young adults. This also means that the percentage of people who have a high degree of prosocial competence is higher for the group of older adults, since prosocial competence is one result of virtue development. (The character traits of people with a high degree of progress toward virtue include among them the disposition to act compassionately.) So, it should not be a surprise that in the older adult experiments discussed in the previous chapter, the older cohorts exhibited better prosocial behavior.

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that there are important similarities in the analogy between development of skill and development of virtue. I have also pointed out dissimilarities that explain why high-level expertise in practical skills is not uncommon, as it is in virtue. In the previous section I attempted to convince the reader that time ameliorates the difficulties connected with the development of virtue, therefore we should
expect to find more people among the older who have progressed further toward virtue. But is *waiting* to get old the only choice we have?

I believe that this analysis of the skill/virtue analogy points toward a direction for ethical education that I take up in greater detail in the coming chapters. I contend that, within a specific domain, using older ethics mentors and employing deliberative ethical practice, more people of good character can be developed. I base this claim on the arguments of this chapter. First, expertise is likely to be found in narrow domains of activity because knowledge is domain specific. For this reason, I suggest that within the practical domain of business, each unique business organization can be thought of as a narrow subdomain within which the virtues of its members can be cultivated. Acquiring moral knowledge in this narrower domain is more manageable than acquiring moral knowledge in the domain of *life*. The epistemic constraint, while still forceful, is somewhat lifted in a more narrowly circumscribed arena. Second, in this more specific domain, it may be possible to implement methods of deliberative practice for the development of virtue. I am thinking of training tools that can be used as part of a business ethics training program, which engage workers to deliberately and thoughtfully address potential ethical problems in a practice setting. I will discuss this more fully in the last chapter. And finally, because self-direction is so difficult in the progress toward virtue; and because we have seen the value of the teacher and coach in the development of expertise in the skills, a business ethics program should include ethics mentors to help

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164 I don’t mean to be saying that business ethics is a small domain. It is not. But one organization, operating within one industry, has the possibility of somewhat overcoming the constraints on virtue development that impede progress toward virtue in the bigger, unwieldy domain of life.
direct mentees toward the ethics goals of the organization and the virtue goals of the mentee. And following from the argument I have made about the importance of time in developing progress toward virtue, the best mentors will probably be found among the older members of the organization. This is the claim I defend in the next chapter.
3.1 Introduction

The world needs more ethical people. How do we get them? In this chapter I offer a modest suggestion: Ethics mentoring by older adults may help to develop more people of good character. This claim requires four clarifications before I begin to defend it. First, I am referring to older adults that have obtained some degree of moral expertise. (In the previous chapter I argued that the older population might be a good place to look for people with moral expertise, so I begin with the assumption that there are at least a few of them to be found.) Second, moral domain expertise comes in degrees as one makes progress toward the development of virtue (I do not assume that the older mentor is fully virtuous). Third, I will be talking about character development within a specific domain, viz., the work domain of an individual business organization. Finally, I will be discussing specifically a business ethics mentoring relationship involving an older mentor and a younger mentee. This subject immediately generates several questions: What is mentoring? What is ethics mentoring? How does it work? What is it supposed to achieve? Is it effective? Even if some older adults are qualified, why would they want to mentor? Why would a mentee want to be mentored? What does it offer that other relationships do not?

In section 3.2, I give a brief explanation of the practice of mentoring, generally, and ethics mentoring, specifically; and I give evidence from research in organizational psychology to suggest that mentoring is successful when measured against certain mentee
outcomes. In section 3.3, I appeal to models of life stage development, based on Erik Erikson’s theory, to argue that the older mentor/younger mentee relationship is uniquely suited for success because of different motivations due to difference in age. In section 3.4, I consider Maria Merritt’s claim that one’s moral character is sustained by interpersonal relationships but can also become disrupted because of the same mechanisms that underlie such relationships. I agree that this kind of vulnerability is real—especially in the business domain. I suggest that the mentoring program I advocate in the business domain may function to protect against the negative effects of these mechanisms. I introduce evidence in accountability research to support this claim.

3.2 What is Ethics Mentoring, and Does It Work?

In an ethics mentoring relationship, we must first assume that the mentor, himself, has made some very good progress toward development of good moral character. I hope to have shown in the previous chapter that the process of becoming more expert in the moral domain is not an easy one, but that some degree of virtue is not impossible, either. We can expect within a large enough organization of people that there will be at least a few people suited for the ethics mentoring role. Not everyone who has a skill can develop it in someone else, however; that is an obvious truth. But some can; and they will have what it takes to teach and guide someone else in the development of the same skills.\(^{165}\)

\(^{165}\) This is admittedly obscure. But I am picturing a situation in which a person has been around in an organization for a long enough time for others to notice that he has a skill for tutoring and ‘bringing up’ those around him.
A mentor functions in the role of guide, counselor and teacher for the mentee. The mentor is not a supervisor to whom the mentee reports. The mentee is not evaluated, either formally or otherwise by the mentor, although the mentee will at times be required to give justifications for decisions and actions. The mentor is there to be consulted, and also to be alert to areas of concern where the mentee might need help. The foundation of a successful mentoring relationship is trust. This is especially true when talking about an ethics mentoring relationship. The role of the mentor will vary according to the position of the mentee in the organization. The moral problems that one faces and the decisions to be made about those problems are tied to job role, and the mentor is one with prior experience to whom the mentee can come for confidential counsel.

In business, especially, there is a distinction to be made between leaders and mentors, coaches and counselors, role models, tutors, and others in supervisory roles. Perhaps the most salient perceived difference between a leader and a mentor is that the leader occupies a directorial position of authority that the mentor does (or should) not. Leading does not necessarily imply that the leader has the follower’s best interests in mind, while mentoring connotes a more nurturing stance toward the mentee (although not a friendship\textsuperscript{166}). In mentoring, the goals of the mentee in context of a larger collective goal are paramount, whereas one who follows a leader may not receive such individual attention and consideration. But there are also similarities between leadership and mentorship. Leading organizational psychologist Stephen Zaccaro defines successful and

\textsuperscript{166} It is important that the mentor and mentee not develop a close friendship. The reason for this will be evident shortly, when I discuss the benefits of psychological distance for the purpose of mentee accountability to the mentor.
effective leadership as “influencing others by establishing a direction for collective effort and managing, shaping, and developing the collective activities in accordance with this direction.”\textsuperscript{167} To that I will add that good leaders also take an interest in the goals of individual people within the organization. It seems to me that effective mentoring within a business ethics program should include these same leadership skills. Perhaps the act of “influencing” and “shaping” strikes a dissonant chord against our moral sensibilities when it comes to ethics mentoring for adults. Should any adult (however wise) be influencing and shaping the ethical behavior of another? Well, yes. This is just the ethics goal of most business ethics programs, and the topic with which this dissertation is concerned. But we needn’t think of ‘influencing’ and ‘shaping’ in negative terms. I am assuming the mentor and mentee are part of an organization committed to values with which they both agree. So, the mentoring relationship should be seen as one in which a wiser and more experienced mentor uses her knowledge and skills to guide the mentee through solving his own ethical problems in his own way, within a community of people with shared values. The direction toward which the mentor influences the mentee is the ethics goals of the organization, the mentor and the mentee. Mentorship should not be authoritarian in the ways that leadership often is, but like good leadership in business, it should be effective in helping to guide less experienced workers.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{168} Just as importantly, the mentor benefits from the relationship as well. Anyone who has ever guided and taught will attest to how much one learns while doing it. Plus, the fresh insights, experiences, and moral perspective of the young person are valuable contributions to the relationship, not to be discounted.
Initially, mentoring activities will focus on learning the code of ethics, code of behavior, decision procedures for recurring ethical problems, rules of conduct and sanctions for violations, how to use the ethics hotline, how to file an ethics grievance, etc. But codes and decision procedures do not begin to cover all the moral situations one might encounter, and so ethics mentoring should include character building. This will involve directing attention to the ways in which virtues of character serve to meet the business ethics goals.\textsuperscript{169}

Ethics mentoring differs from general occupational mentoring in important ways. A mentor who guides someone in learning the technical aspects of her job can usually give advice in fairly concrete terms regarding what the mentee should do. Such is not the case in ethics mentoring. Moral waters are can be murky, and often there are no concrete answers. But there is another sense in which the typical operational decisions tied to one’s job are importantly different from the ethical job decisions one must make. To make a moral decision is to say something about \textit{who you are}. It is much more intimately tied to one’s identity than deciding, for example, how many cold calls to make to reach a sales quota. So, a very special sensitivity is required for a mentor to guide someone else in making those kinds of decisions. Even more importantly, the mentor should make sure that the decision belongs genuinely to the mentee. Although mentor can act as role model and guide, the mentee’s autonomy should be respected. A related concern is the way in which ethics mentoring, even though restricted to the business domain, might naturally spill out into other areas of a mentee’s life. While I do think that it is common to

\textsuperscript{169} I will have more to say about this in the next chapter.
psychologically compartmentalize the different domains of one’s life, there are nevertheless people in a business ethics mentorship who will earnestly apply the ethics training to the other areas of their lives. In this sense, building character is holistic in ways that building occupational skills is not, requiring great care on the part of the mentor not to overstep boundaries.

Is there any empirical evidence that mentoring works? In a 2008 study by Lillian Eby and associates, funded by a grant from the National Institutes of Health, researchers conducted a meta-analysis of 116 studies involving youth, academic (higher education), and workplace mentoring. This was the first interdisciplinary review of the generally positive mentoring literature to date, and the researchers were interested in documenting whether or not there are differences in how much mentoring matters across mentee outcomes. Taking over from the conventional wisdom view that close relationships are important across the lifespan, they hypothesized that effects of mentoring on six types of mentee outcomes would be positive. The six outcomes included behavioral, attitudinal, health-related, relational, motivational, and career outcomes. The researchers reported that their six hypotheses were supported; mentoring was significantly related to favorable outcomes. Interestingly, the attitudinal outcome showed the highest favorable correlation among the six, especially for workplace mentees. (Between youth, academic, and career mentoring, the strongest association with positive outcomes was for academic

172 Ibid., 260.
mentoring.) The researchers interpret the results as reason to ‘cautiously’ develop mentoring programs, since although the studies reveal significant correlations between mentoring and positive outcomes, it is unknown whether that reflects a causal effect. Much of their caution, however, is directed toward practitioners involved with troubled youth and dealing with such things as gang violence. Workplace mentoring correlations were higher than those for youth mentoring. The take home lesson from this extensive meta-study is that mentoring has value. Furthermore, since ethics-based outcomes are closely associated with attitudinal, interpersonal, and motivational aspects (the outcomes most favorably impacted by mentoring), this may explain the success of workplace ethics mentoring, especially.

3.3 Older Mentor and Younger Mentee

Mentoring programs are in widespread use throughout thousands of corporations, small businesses, academia, government agencies and other organizations. Informal mentoring has been around a long time, and in recent years outside consulting agencies have proliferated to meet the demand of companies looking to create formal programs. But mentoring is usually about job advancement for the mentee, with a pinch of ethics thrown in—usually a cursory pass over the rules about diversity, sexual harassment, the code of conduct, etc. And pairing a young person just starting out with an old-timer is

Anecdotal evidence for the positive value of mentoring is enormous. I am especially impressed with stories relayed to me about physician interns whose medical ethics are much more influenced by the mentors with whom they spend their first year than by the classroom training they received.
nothing new. What is new about what I am proposing is a unique mentoring relationship focused primarily on ethics, and in particular character building.¹⁷⁴

Why think that the model of mentoring I propose will work? I argue that its success is based on the age-specific differences in the motivations of both parties. I start by identifying the unique motivations for self-development of both the mentor and mentee, driven by their respective age-relative life stages. I will argue that these different motivations to improve oneself, when brought together in this unique mentoring relationship, combine to bring about the improvement of the other.

Before I begin, two introductory remarks are in order. First, the outcome of a mentoring relationship will be driven partly by the organizational leadership, the organizational culture, and the ethics goals of the organization, and partly by individual goals of the mentor and mentee, among other things. I take this for granted, and I am not concerned to argue for any specific content relative to those goals. Second, I start from the assumption that, initially, older mentors with a fair degree of progress toward virtue are few within an organization, and they must be identified and selected by organizational leaders who also possess a good deal of development toward virtue. One might wonder how such a program gets off the ground, if leadership must first be wise in order to select wise mentors. To answer this puzzle, I will defer to traditional virtue ethics accounts to explain how people of good character get that way in the first place. My concern here is

¹⁷⁴ Ethics mentoring is gaining steam in business circles. But typically, the ethics portion of the mentoring is a small part of the training, which focuses mostly on operational business goals. Notable among the many organizations now including ethics in their mentoring are: Enterprise Leasing, FedEx, University Health Systems, the New York Times, CitiBank, TJ Maxx, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Management Mentors, “The Proof of an Effective Mentoring Process—Just Ask Our Clients,” Last modified 2012, http://www.management-mentors.com/effective-mentoring-process/
to give an account of how the number of virtuous agents might multiply within a given organization by utilizing a mentoring program that pairs (at the start) a few suitably motivated older mentors along with willing and receptive younger mentees. Admittedly, the widespread success of a program of this sort will take time, as mentees eventually become mentors. But a mentoring program could only be successful to the extent that both the mentor and mentee are motivated to participate. What gives rise to their respective motivations?

Research in psychology surrounding the concepts of ego identity and self-development through the lifespan from birth till death has been greatly influence by the mid-to-late twentieth century work of Erik Erikson. Erikson thought that each stage of life was a time of self-discovery and that all stages were systematically related such that entry into each stage depended upon successful passage through the previous one.\(^{175}\) I will explain only the two stages that relate to this discussion—young adulthood, and middle adulthood.\(^{176}\) First, I will briefly sketch the motivational structure of the young adult starting out in the business world. My main focus, however, will be directed toward the motivational psychology of the older adult.

A young adult just entering the workforce is likely concerned with forming an identity that is tied to the occupation. Part of this search for self-identity will include


forming a dream about her future career, building relationships, questioning her competence and effectiveness, learning the insider information about navigating through a complex organization of people, and a host of other concerns. It can be a time of anxiety and role confusion. In Erikson’s terms, this is the period when the positive outcome of ego development will be intimacy and solidarity with others; the negative outcome is isolation. It is important during this time to create meaningful relationships. Otherwise, the young adult becomes secluded in her own world, and in isolation can begin to feel superior over others. So, the young adult new to the work world is likely to seek relationships that will help with forming a positive sense of identity. An ethics mentoring relationship with an older adult can be extremely beneficial in helping the young person to establish her sense of confidence not only about her identity as a working adult but as a moral adult.

The next stage of development I will discuss is middle adulthood and the positive outcome that Erikson dubbed *generativity*, the time of life when one’s interests shift to concerns about the next generation. On most Eriksonian models, in a psychologically healthy individual, generativity begins in middle-adulthood and increases with age. (One who has not successfully grown in terms of self-identity may experience instead a phase of stagnation, especially if one cannot come to terms with life being half over, and if one perceives of the time remaining as having no further opportunity for growth or

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178 I hope I have made clear that a *good* mentor does not indoctrinate. This is the best part about a virtue approach to moral education. The emphasis is on developing virtue *for oneself*. The older mentor concerned with helping to build character in young mentees will be sensitive to this.
advancement. Generativity is the interest in guiding the next generation, which starts in parenthood and is directed toward one’s one children, but in later adulthood is directed toward young adults outside the family. Kathy Kram undertook a study to examine phases of the mentor relationship and characterizes the motivation of the older mentor in terms of generativity as follows:

The more experienced adult at midlife is likely to be in a period of reassessment and reappraisal during which time past accomplishments are reviewed, and one is confronted with the challenge of readjusting future dreams and coming to terms with past accomplishments. Entering a developmental relationship with a young adult provides an opportunity at midlife to redirect one’s energies into creative and productive action. Through enabling others, the midlife [mentor] satisfies important generative needs.

One of the psychological motivations that an midlife adult might have to help a younger adult may stem from the experience she has gained from being a party to a number of moral problems encountered throughout a long life. Having suffered and lost, and had to

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179 Ibid., 103.
180 An interesting longitudinal study involving 94 women and 44 men that began in 1958 at the time of their college graduations and continued at intervals over a 25-year period until around age 52, strongly suggests there are high correlations between practical wisdom, age, and generativity. Researchers Paul Wink and Ravenna Helson began with a concept of wisdom as an aspect of personality development in adulthood. Participants were tested at college graduation age, age 27, age 43 and age 52. The tests consisted of self-reports using the Adjective Check List and open-ended questions (“Would you give an example of wisdom you have acquired and how you came by it?”), sentence completion tests, the California Psychological Inventory test for personality; the Myers-Briggs trait type indicator test, and open-ended life satisfaction questions. The group of 77 women and 21 of their partners showed significant increases in wisdom from early to mature middle adulthood (with the eight psychotherapists showing the greatest gains). Interestingly, divorce was a factor in increased wisdom. Wisdom at midlife correlated with measures of empathy, leadership, and social initiative; those with high scores on the Practical Wisdom Scale demonstrated a generative attitude and reported an enjoyment of mentoring. (Paul Wink and Ravenna Helson, ”Practical and Transcendent Wisdom: Their Nature and Some Longitudinal Findings,” Journal of Adult Development 4, No. 1 (1997): 1-15.)
time to reflect, an older person has gained perspective from which she can counsel a younger person who has not yet had the time to learn those lessons firsthand.

Crisis, hardship, trauma and suffering—although experienced to different degrees in individual lives—are nevertheless inescapable consequences of living a life. As hardship and losses accumulate over time, people learn to successfully navigate through them.\(^{182}\) This results in reduced self-centeredness, and “increased wisdom expressed through insight, understanding, and sympathy and compassion for others.”\(^{183}\) Closely related to the notion of suffering is that of social loss. Social losses and gains contribute to moral maturity. It takes time to amass an inventory of social gains and losses. So, an older person with generative concerns may very well feel a prosocial motivation to help a young person to avoid some of the losses and suffering, if possible. (At least within the domain where the mentoring relationship exists.) Lawrence Kohlberg thought that we are attracted to tragedy in fictional stories because they track real life issues surrounding moral development. He quotes from Aeschylus’ play Agamemnon: “Zeus, who guided men to think, has laid it down that wisdom comes along through suffering.”\(^{184}\)

Motivation to mentor may also arise from conscious reflection, which often starts with trying to make sense of one’s life or with figuring out what kind of person one has become. To reflect means literally to throw back, and with respect to reflective thought, it

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\(^{182}\) Of course, suffering doesn’t always bring expertise in navigating life. Some personal tragedies are of such a magnitude that a person may become despondent and entirely unmotivated to pursue virtue, or anything else.


often means to look back. Since a life is a temporal thing, the farther along life’s path we
find ourselves, the more we have to look back at. And when we are deliberating about
something, the more first-hand information we have at our disposal, the better. It seems
to me that time is a necessary condition for the kind of reflection to which I’m referring.
It’s a matter of degree, of course. A four-year-old can look back on her last trip to the
park. But when reflection upon moral matters is required, a larger inventory of past
experience offers more resources for decision-making. Time is not a sufficient condition,
of course. How one handles what happens over time ultimately determines how virtuous
one becomes. There is something valuable about carefully looking back at experiences of
the distant past after one’s emotions have cooled, after the sting has healed or the elation
has waned. Temporal distance has value that can’t be replaced by loads of experience
piled up quickly in the present and very recent past. With time one is able to see the
consequences of past actions play out in a far-reaching ripple effect. Many actions cause
intermediate effects which, in turn, cause further effects. The long-term consequences
take time to reveal themselves. This kind of reflection increases with age, and in later
years is likely to produce generative motivations.

I submit that there is yet another, even deeper, sort of psychological motivation
that offers yet another explanation for why an older person would want to become an
ethics mentor. I think that the psychological state of an older person, which motivates the
mentoring activity, is partly explained by the need to write the meaning of her career life
into the narrative of her life as a whole. Particularly, I am interested to discuss the aspect of narrative closure.

It seems to be a common psychological phenomenon that people approaching later midlife (and especially beyond) begin to contemplate the meaning of their own lives in a more serious way than they previously might have. One natural way to do this is to look back upon one’s life to see if it makes sense as part of a story that includes all of the people with whom one has interacted and all of the contexts in which one has played a part. Some would even say that a life is fundamentally narrative, and that the meaning of a life can be found in the unity of the story it tells from beginning to end.

In *After Virtue*, Alasdair MacIntyre provides an interesting view of conceptions of narrative. The book is first a narrative about the history of the Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy, and secondly it includes a descriptive account of what narrative is, and how it functions. Various commentators have criticized the work for its lack of analytic precision; nevertheless, I think MacIntyre’s claims are useful for considering to what extent the psychological need for narrative gives rise to motives for action (especially the motive to be an ethics mentor). MacIntyre makes the following claims regarding life narratives: Humans are story-telling animals with a quest to tell their own stories, shaped simultaneously by unpredictability as well as purpose. Human action can only be made

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185 I should qualify that I am talking about a person who values her career as something more than a means to make money. Someone who clocks in and out each day merely to get one day closer to the benefits of retirement is not who I have in mind. I assume from the start that someone interested in becoming an ethics mentor (or any kind of mentor, for that matter) attaches a meaning to work that is more than instrumental.

intelligible by situating it within a story, which has the further requirement of being part of other narratives, namely the cultures and traditions in which one lives. He writes, “the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity.” MacIntyre argues that the narrative is what provides a fundamental unity for the self that temporally links action from birth to death. An interesting objection arises to this last claim, however. Not all traditions believe that physical death is the end of a life, nor birth the beginning; still others may not place the self at the locus of the story of life. I assume that MacIntyre would reply that a narrative can still be told with respect to the culture in which it is embedded, and thus maintain temporal cohesion. Of central interest to me, however, is MacIntyre’s insight about human actions and how they are placed within the context of a set of narrative histories that evolve throughout one’s life. I take it that what MacIntyre has in mind is that one’s life is a meta-narrative, as it were, populated by a set of smaller, but interrelated stories. And I suppose these stories will be unified and coherent, somehow, if we are to accept MacIntyre’s explanation of intelligible action.

But I would like to suggest that although making sense of an entire life might be too tall an order, there is one narrative history (at least in some lives) that conforms to a

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187 There are other narrative elements MacIntyre discusses with respect to narratives about traditions, cultures, and communities, but I am interested to talk about the aspects of personal narrative.
188 Ibid., 221.
189 Ibid., 205.
191 That is, on MacIntyre’s account, an action is made intelligible by the reasons for the action, which are logically prior to the action. I’m not sure how this entails temporal unity, however. I can imagine a day full of discrete actions, each one made intelligible by the reason I had for acting as such, but each one having no rational connection to the one before it.
unified narrative structure quite well, and that is the history of a career. A career might very well be told in a narrative that makes sense from start to finish. And unlike a life—the end of which is debatable depending on one’s metaphysical views, and almost always unpredictable—a career most definitely comes to an end, and typically it is planned.192 Moreover, the narrative of a career is crucially important to the person who occupies the starring role. A career, oftentimes, expresses a large part of who we are. And while the narrative of one’s life always seems to hold promise for new and improved chapters, the story of one’s career has finality—one we must live with for a good while, too (if we should live so long). Thus, to many people, it is important how a career ends.193

Narrative closure is a concept normally applied to art forms, but I suggest it has relevance for the point I am trying to make. The concept of narrative closure is intuitive. We feel it whenever a piece of music resolves on just the right note (and feel its absence even more when it doesn’t). We feel it when the last page of a book has been turned and all the questions have been answered. It is a feeling of completeness. Philosophers in aesthetics examine narrative very closely to develop theories of narrative closure; my description is less than a sketch. But it is enough to make the point. The narrative of a career feels best, I submit, when it comes to a close at just the right point, with a sense of balance and completeness. Becoming a mentor can help satisfy this desire (or, in Eriksonian terms, this need). In a somewhat paradoxical way, the contentment of closure comes from the prospect that one’s work will go on. In the case of an ethics mentor, the

192 Of course, there are many threats to the plan.
193 This is made salient by stories involving business people and leaders with fantastic careers, who take a horrible crash at the end and are only remembered for that.
‘work’ that passes from mentor to mentee is the activity of building character in order to live well in the business domain and serve the ethics goals of the community.\textsuperscript{194}

The idea of meaning through narrative closure as a motivation to serve as a mentor may be coupled with generative needs. There is nothing mutually exclusive about wanting to bring a satisfying closure to one’s career story (which might seem egoistic) \textit{and} wanting to do it by helping the next generation to learn the knowledge and skills associated with living a better moral life. There are any number of ways to bring narrative closure to a career (even quite self-aggrandizing ways), so choosing to close out one’s career by bringing along a younger protégé ought not to be considered completely egoistic.

There are certainly other motivations besides generativity and meaningfulness through narrative closure that would drive someone to mentoring. Some people might mentor from a purely altruistic motive, having no connection whatsoever to personal goals. Another explanation might be that the older person needs to atone for wrongs she has done in the past. Perhaps in her mind, mentoring represents a path to some sort of karmic balance. I am sure there are more. And I am certainly not suggesting that every person at some point manifests the positive generative effects of aging as I’ve described them here. Plenty of people approach late midlife with sadness, bitterness, and even extreme jealousy toward younger people coming up in their place. These are not the

\textsuperscript{194} The point along the timeline of any particular person’s career at which they might feel the tug of generativity will be unique to that person. Some people start to work earlier in life than others and reach retirement age sooner. So, despite the ‘older person’ line of argument I have been running, I think in actual practice mentors can be younger than the ‘older cohort’ age bracket used in the OA experiments surveyed in chapter one.
people who would be mentors. But I have been suggesting reasons that may explain, in part, the motivations that a more positive and open-minded older person might have to become an ethics mentor. Coupled with the arguments I have been making in previous chapters about the likelihood of finding a greater percentage of people with some degree of moral expertise in the older population, there seems to be reason enough to implement mentoring programs of this type. Moreover, there is the very real possibility that instituting a mentoring program within an organization would have the effect of eliciting latent motivation (to mentor) among the older members of the organization. An older person may not even realize she has a generative desire to help others until presented an opportunity to act on it. Or, if the desire is apparent, it cannot be expressed if there is no mentoring role to fill as a means to satisfying that desire. But the existence of a formal mentoring program creates opportunities that may ignite generativity, and that’s good for mentors, mentees, and the organization.  

If older mentors can play an important role in developing more people of good character, can they also play a role in sustaining the characters of good people?

3.4 Mentoring as an Augmentation to Situational Character Building

People of strong character are disposed to respond in the right way, with the right feelings, to the right objects of choice, for the right reasons. This is the Aristotelian ideal of a virtuous agent, whose psychology includes beliefs and feelings about good ends such as honesty, justice, friendship, generosity and other virtues, and whose cognitive abilities

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195 My thanks to Rachana Kamtekar for suggesting this as an additional reason to justify implementing a formal mentoring program.
include reasoning well about how to achieve those ends in any situation. In making the right choices, a virtuous agent will not choose objects that ought to be avoided, even when choosing the right things would be painful. Just as importantly, for the virtuous agent, making this kind of choice is not difficult, but pleasant, because her actions are in harmony with the good ends that she endorses, her feelings about them, and her reasons for living her whole life according to those ends.

Many philosophers have expressed the worry that a moral agent, on this account, has a heavy burden to bear. The normative ideal of virtue requires an agent to draw upon her own reason and understanding, her own feelings and motivations about what to do in a given situation, and act with confidence independently of any factors outside herself. But as Maria Merritt points out, even Aristotle allows that “mature virtuous character needs at least some support from social relationships.”\textsuperscript{196} In fact, for Aristotle, the activity of exercising the virtues requires a community inhabited by friends, loving one another for their good characters. People live together according to shared values and worthy goals. A life of honor is measured by the standards of men of practical wisdom, and a man cannot be confident that his conduct is honorable without such judgment. Merritt stresses that although the development of virtue in maturity is expected to come with increasing independence from teachers, the mature moral agent will nonetheless be influenced by the continuing expectations of people with whom he has interpersonal relationships.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 33.
Merritt turns to contemporary psychology for supporting evidence of the idea that our self-evaluative standards for our own characters are shaped by the relationships we have with others and their expectations of us. She looks at two behavioral phenomena in identity psychology that, she claims, (partially) explain why we are able to sustain our virtuous evaluative commitments over time. One is ‘self-regulation’ behavior, which happens each time a person adjusts behavior in an effort to become more like her ‘desired self.’ Another type of behavioral manifestation related to self-regulation is ‘self-presentation,’ whereby a person shapes the impression she makes on others. Self-regulation and self-presentation often take place below conscious awareness and so are not necessarily manipulative. Psychologists maintain that these are mechanisms for successful communication and social interaction for both first-time encounters and long-term relationships. They serve to edit the information we convey about ourselves, determined by who we are interacting with and what the interpersonal goals of the particular circumstances happen to be. Presenting the self in a certain way sets expectations for the next encounter, so that over time, and with repeated interaction with the same people, this mutual dance of self-presentation has the effect of fortifying each person’s perception of the other’s character. Since it is easier to operate within contexts where we can satisfy expectations, we behave according to those expectations. That is how dispositions are trained. Merritt applies this theory to ethical practice: “I suggest that whatever success we may enjoy in meeting our own self-evaluative standards for personal character, even in maturity and even assuming we have somehow really got the

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198 Ibid., 34.
right values, is typically subject to our ongoing engagement with the expectations of particular other individuals with whom we hold values in common.”¹⁹⁹ She does not suggest, of course, that we cannot act rightly unless we have the support of others who are present and looking on; once we have the dispositions that have been reinforced through these relationships, we can be self-motivated in certain circumstances to act in accordance with those dispositions, regardless of who may or may not be watching. But she stresses that these response tendencies will need ongoing reinforcement from interpersonal processes.

Unfortunately, the same interpersonal processes that help to reinforce character are the very same ones that may disorder it. To show how, Merritt starts by calling attention to a cognitive failure she calls ‘misapprehension of the objects of choice and avoidance.’ This occurs when people overlook the ethically bad aspects of a situation (don’t even seen them, actually) and choose the wrong action, although outside observers can easily recognize the moral failure. These are missing mental contents that just don’t come to mind, causing the action of choice to look either morally neutral or even laudable to the agent. To make matters worse, after the poor ethical choice has been made, the self-regulation and self-presentation mechanisms are activated in service of rationalizing the behavior (i.e., the agent selectively picks out all the reasons to justify her action, which then confirms her self-attributions of good character and coheres with the picture of her that others expect to see). So the same mechanisms that enable social cooperation become the mechanisms that cause ethical lapse.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 36.
Merritt has suggestions for remedial measures to help guard against these negative influences on character, at least in organizational and institutional life (remedial measures for bringing ethical discipline to one’s private life are not forthcoming). For one thing, she advocates a stance of modesty about the state of one’s own character and warns against over-idealizing the character of close associates, as this results in misplaced confidence that leads to ethical complacency. Additionally, governance in organizations should include objective standards of accountability and structured incentives for accountability; there should be regulatory mechanisms under corporate law, ongoing independent review of policies, decision procedures for ethical problems, and elimination of practices that so strongly trigger self-interested biases as to not be controllable.

These remedial measures are aimed at reducing occasions of ethical lapse, which are sometimes caused by the underlying mechanisms at work in our interpersonal relationships. But I think there is an interpersonal relationship and an underlying mechanism that have been overlooked, one that promotes slow and deliberate reflection rather than effacing it. The interpersonal relationship I’m referring to is, of course, the mentoring relationship between an older mentor and a younger mentee. I will use psychological research on accountability to make my point that a young mentee, faced with choosing an action she must justify to an older mentor, is likely to be more self-critical and reflective in virtue of the uniqueness of their relationship.

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200 Ibid., 24.
202 Merritt, Aristotelean Virtue, 45.
Accountability refers to the “implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others.” People often seek approval from whomever their audience is. And when a person thinks she knows the view of her audience, she’ll shift her attitudes in that direction. This has been shown repeatedly in experimental settings. It is another example of simple conformity. But when the audience view is not known, people tend to engage in preemptive self-criticism—considering multiple perspectives on the issue, anticipating reactions from the person to whom they must make the justification, and rehearsing possible objections ahead of time. The implication for making an ethical choice is that a person—who is required to justify the choice—is likely to recognize both good and bad features of a situation during the preemptive stage, before she makes the decision.

What makes this relevant to the mentoring relationship I propose is that the views of the older mentor are probably not going to be apparent to the younger mentee—at least for a while. Even though they are both part of the same organization operating under the same code of ethics, that does not mean that in a particular situation the mentee can predict the views of the mentor with respect to the moral justifications that the mentor


204 Ibid., 256. When financial aid agents had to justify their allocation of money for college tuition to recipients, they wasted money by trying to give some money to all of them (resulting in no one getting the full amount necessary). In another cohort without the accountability condition, the money was distributed efficiently. In natural settings, the phenomenon is ubiquitous: Insurance agents, telecommunications workers, and professional auditors tailor their messages to an audience when the audience views are known.

205 Ibid., 257.

206 This points to another dimension of mentoring discussed in the literature: Mentoring relationships have a developmental history that, if successful, must include an ending that comes at just the right time. (Kram, Phases of the Mentor Relationship, 609.)
endorses. And considering the age gap, she won’t likely think that she can guess. For example, perhaps a young manager thinks the distribution of employee bonuses ought to be made according to merit; and she does not know if the mentor shares this view. (He may endorse an egalitarian standard for distributions.) She is more likely to carefully consider her reasons for her choice if she must explain them to the mentor. Without this mentoring relationship—or within a relationship where both parties know each other’s minds—it may never even occur to the young manager to consider her reasons at all. She may lack pre-emptive self-criticism, acting without thinking about the justifications for the action. But since the mentee will be in a conversation with the mentor about her choice (either before or after her action), she will need to reflect beforehand about her actions. Furthermore, since she does not know the mind of the older mentor, she cannot simply defer to him either, and it is good that she cannot. She ought to think for herself about important ethical choices, which is just what the older mentor will encourage (if he is a good mentor). And since the relationship is based on respect and nurturing, rather than a close friendship, the notion of accountability plays a big part in developing ethical independence on the part of the mentee. Conformity is more likely to happen when both parties are closer in age, like-minded, and share similar motivations; so in the case of younger mentee/older mentor, the psychological distance due to the age differential turns out to be a benefit.

There are other ways in which mentors may provide the social glue for maintaining character within the organization. Their own resistance to conformity pressure gives them a measure of stability that can guard against forming attitudes that
conform to a prospective audience. The mentor is also likely to see herself as occupying a role of large responsibility, thereby reinforcing her motivation to approach ethical situations with critical, discerning care. In demonstrating the qualities of a careful, rational character, she becomes a role model for the mentee, not a close associate whom the mentee should avoid ‘idealizing,’ contra Merritt’s worry. Ironically, structuring the organizational situation to include mentoring promotes moral character—the presumed lack of which motivates the situational structuring.

There are two objections I should address about the potential success of ethics mentoring programs. First, it seems that nearly every time we hear of ethical disasters in business, they are perpetrated by older people. But these are the news stories that make headlines because they are big stories. They are big stories because they begin with people at top level positions of power in large corporations, people whose unethical actions result in substantial damage. In top level positions in large corporations we will typically find older people, because it takes time to elevate to such positions. So, the probability that we will hear about older people committing unethical actions is higher. There are, no doubt, plenty of young people making ethically bad choices, who just don’t make the news. Good and bad people permeate every organization. But among the good, those who are older and more experienced offer an excellent resource for helping the younger good people get better.

207 Jeffrey Skilling, former president of Enron, was 53 at the time of his conviction in 2006. The late Patricia Dunn was also 53 in 2006, at the time she was fired from her position as chairman of Hewlett Packard for the ‘snooping scandal.’ Bernie Madoff was 70 at the time of his arrest in 2008.
The second objection to the potential for success of a mentoring program has to do with the amount of time that it takes to develop a degree of moral expertise, coupled with the amount of knowledge about the particulars of an individual organization—both of which a good mentor needs to possess. This in itself would not be a problem were it not for the fact that the current trend in business is one of high and rapid turnover in the work force. Very few people are around long enough in one organization to accumulate experience and knowledge of particulars about that organization. Worse, many people don’t even stay in the same industry for the entirety of their careers, and so the prospect shrinks of developing moral expertise about a particular domain. Finally, in a struggling economy, often the first to be laid off are the older, more highly paid, workers. All of this results in fewer wise and experienced people being available to mentor. Admittedly, this means that my proposal for a training program featuring older mentors is contrary to the trend. But I do not think this is a reason to abandon the idea. If anything, it is a reason for business leaders to stand up and take notice of the costs that are not being considered when decisions are made to remove older workers from the payroll. I make no claims about the ease of implementing or maintaining a mentoring program. It will take time to make a difference. But it seems to me that the benefits will be exponential over time, as each mentee becomes a mentor to others.

3.5 Conclusion

I thank Rachana Kamtekar for prompting this discussion.
In this chapter I have presented an original model of a business ethics mentoring relationship that features character building as the primary focus of attention and comprises an older mentor and younger mentee. I presented empirical research strongly suggesting that mentoring programs achieve positive outcomes for mentees and mentors alike. I appealed to work in lifespan development psychology to show that age-relative motivational differences between an older mentor and younger mentee would function reciprocally to serve the life-stage goals of each one. Included in the older mentor’s motivations are needs arising from past experiences with suffering and loss, generativity motives to help the next generation, and the need to write a meaningful narrative closure to her career. I then considered the empirical claim that the same interpersonal relationships that sustain character may also disrupt it. I countered with different empirical evidence, suggesting that mechanisms underlying accountability may function uniquely in the older mentor/young mentee relationship to promote slow, critical reflection of ethical issues.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE COMPLEMENT MODEL

4.1 Introduction

The complement model suggests an approach to designing a business ethics program that combines the best aspects of both situationism and virtue ethics. The complement model blends a situationist ‘conduct control’ approach with a virtue-based approach. The conduct control approach is situationist in nature because it seeks to control behavior by structuring situations in order to keep workers from temptations to make unethical choices. It does so first by establishing a hierarchy of authority and accountability in the management structure, which requires strict obedience.\(^\text{209}\) This approach also controls conduct by attempting to eliminate situational variables that can negatively influence moral behavior—variables such as receiving gifts, working with others who do not behave ethically,\(^\text{210}\) and working for too long in very familiar environments,\(^\text{211}\) for example. The virtue-based approach is less restrictive in terms of mandating the avoidance of specific situations and dictating specific behavior. It places more emphasis on personal responsibility for making ethical choices according to general

\(^{209}\) A conduct-control code of ethics will typically list specific individuals to whom a worker is instructed to report any ethical concerns; usually there is an ethics hotline for reporting violations that goes to a select committee of people with exclusive authority to deal with ethics problems.

\(^{210}\) For example, outside consultants sometimes (often) suggest material substitutions on bid specifications for a project in order to reduce production costs; a strict conduct control organization opposed to such practices will eliminate potential for situations in which consultants and production supervisors interact directly.

\(^{211}\) Some companies require ‘job rotation’ for several different reasons, one of which is to keep employees from learning too much about how to circumvent the rules that pertain to a specific job.

http://www.lebhr.com/2012/05/17/job-rotation-study-good-practice/
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v10n2/peopleatwork.html
principles of honesty, fairness, caring, trustworthiness, etc. As an empirical fact, most organizations have codes of conduct that incorporate rules of varying situational specificity, which determines to what degree the approach is ‘conduct control’ in nature. For example, a rule that merely requires a worker to safeguard company information is not strongly related to conduct control, whereas a rule forbidding a worker to communicate with particular vendors (in order to safeguard company information) is more strongly related to conduct control. The complement model assumes that most large corporations have rules. What the complement model adds is an awareness of how those rules might be more effective in controlling conduct (by being directed more toward specific conduct), and an awareness of how the virtues can enhance the ethical culture of the whole organization by promoting the virtues at each level—individual, team, and corporate. A strictly conduct-control model for business ethics programs misses an important human element of business. The marketplace was historically a social place, not a place constructed of rules. Of course, because of this it could also be chaotic and ruthless. The right kind of rules help control bad behavior, while the virtues help restore a sense of social happiness in the workplace. The complement model will feature specific prescriptions for elements to include in the ongoing training program, which I will enumerate later in this chapter.

\[ 212 \text{ Some organizations are now making heavy use of vignettes (presented by DVD or through role-playing in live training sessions) that feature decision-making according to virtue. For example, a recent business management training book, “Discussing the Undiscussable,” includes a DVD with vignettes in which the actors model “defensive routines and virtuous cycles of behavior,” and the trainees participate in reflective and interactive exercises. William R. Noonan, Discussing the Undiscussable (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishing, 2007).} \]
The complement model is founded on three claims. Two are descriptive claims about the moral psychology of people at work, and one is a prescriptive claim about the means to achieve the goals of organizational leadership: First, workers at all levels desire structured guidance for meeting the ethical expectations of the organization. Second, workers desire that they and others in the organization are people of good character. This is not a trivially true claim, as I came to find out in a study I conducted. There are some people who do not care about character in business, or do not think that it is relevant to business. Third, a business ethics program concerned to promote ethical conduct should include not only conduct-control policies, but also active and ongoing practices aimed at developing virtue in individual workers, teams, and the organization itself.

These claims are based on data that comes from a research study I conducted in which I surveyed 44 business people from various types of organizations. This project, like any other, began with a cluster of questions: What results are desired from a business ethics program? (Hereafter, “BEP.”) What would the structure of an ideal BEP look like? Should a BEP be designed around a situationist construal of moral psychology or a character-based concept? The situationist-virtue ethics debate has not been confined to academic circles. It influences the business people who design business ethics programs; and they tend to lean either toward a situationist conduct-control model or a virtue-based model. A situationist conduct-control model focuses primarily on instituting a great number of rules and policies aimed at controlling the specific conduct of employees by structuring situations in the work environment and explicitly identifying situations to be avoided. A virtue model focuses primarily on emphasizing personal virtues and personal
responsibility for making ethical choices. The complement model will join the best of both approaches.

The study I conducted involved presenting a questionnaire to the subjects, which asked them questions about their own organization’s BEP as well as their thoughts about an ideal BEP. The first thing each respondent did was to rate a menu of 19 possible BEP features according to how much their own organization’s BEP employed them. I had antecedently designated each feature as virtue-type, situationist type, or neutral. I simply added up each respondent’s ratings on those 19 items in order to ‘type’ their BEP as S-type or V-type. Then, they were asked to state their desires for an ideal BEP and their expectations for the results of an ideal BEP. (I will refer to the respondents desires and expectations for an ideal BEP as ‘desiderata.’) Next, each respondent then rated their own organization’s success in satisfying those desiderata and gave reasons for why it did or did not succeed. In this chapter, I present three major findings from the BEP study: First, when asked to state their desires and expectations for an ideal BEP, respondents

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213 For an example of the contrast, compare the following two approaches to governing conflicts of interest: The first comes from the Sears Holding Company (SHC) code of conduct and serves as an example of situation/conduct control because of its specificity and emphasis on situations to avoid, presumably for the temptation to further bad conduct: “Except as expressly permitted below, associates may not accept gifts or the conveyance of anything of value...from a vendor. SHC associates should return non-perishable gifts valued over $50.00 and donate gifts to a charitable organization...[.] Accepting tickets from a vendor to a sporting event...is generally permissible as long as you reimburse the vendor for the full face value of the tickets....However, accepting tickets to events that are impossible or very difficult to obtain tickets for, such as to the Super Bowl, the World Series, the Western Open or the Stanley Cup Finals, is generally not acceptable and is not permissible absent the approval of your manager and the Chief Compliance and Ethics Officer.” The next example is of a virtue approach to the same issue and comes from the Cummins Engine Company code, which places responsibility for good judgment on personal character: “Our aim is that Cummins will be known as trustworthy in all respects...[.] Be honest....be fair...be responsible...[.] Use good judgment—avoid actions and circumstances that may appear to compromise good business judgment or create a conflict between personal and company interests.” There are no additional specific rules addressing specific situations of potential conflict. [http://www.searsholdings.com/govern/code.htm#CONFLICTSOFINTEREST](http://www.searsholdings.com/govern/code.htm#CONFLICTSOFINTEREST) Also: Patrick E. Murphy, *Eighty Exemplary Ethics Statements* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 62.
expressed the desiderata almost equally between S-terms (situationist/conduct-control terms) and V-terms (virtue terms)—as coded by two psychologists. Second, the average success rating for V-type BEPs as compared to S-type BEPs was higher (although not quite statistically significant). Third, the predominant reason given to explain a BEP’s success or failure in satisfying the desiderata was expressed in terms of the respondent’s report of perceived management success or failure in supporting the stated commitment to values through ongoing training and attention to virtue, with the failure rating being nearly twice as high as the success rating.

As part of the complement model, I offer a remedy for the lack-of-training problem: Deliberate ethical reflection. I suggest it as a structured practice, which leadership should endorse and support in order to develop virtue in members at all levels of the organization and to facilitate the improvement of the conduct-control policies.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: In section 4.2, I give a brief summary of the situationist-virtue ethics debate and how it has come to bear on business ethics programs. In section 4.3, I present the BEP study I conducted. In section 4.4, I explain deliberative ethical reflection as I conceive of it. I suggest it as a practical exercise (that can be used in two different ways) for business ethics programs, a practical suggestion which has not been explicitly discussed in the literature, to my knowledge. The exercise is meant to be practiced as both deliberative individual ethical reflection, and deliberative collective ethical reflection. I argue that this practice is an overlooked

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214 Although a similar mechanism (for individuals in groups) has been developed and used in educational settings, which I will discuss shortly. Perrin Cohen, Melissa McDaniels and Donna M. Qualters, “AIR Model: A Teaching Tool for Cultivating Reflective Ethical Inquiry,” College Teaching 53, No. 3 (2005): 120-127.
opportunity for helping to improve the ethical cultures of business organizations. In section 4.5, I present the details of the complement model, and section 4.6 concludes.

4.2 The Situationist-Virtue Ethics Debate and Its Impact on Business Ethics Programs

The debate between situationists and virtue ethicists now constitutes a healthy body of philosophical and social psychology literature. Whether we have reliable, personal traits of character that dispose us to act distinctively in different situations, or whether our behavior is determined by trivial situational influences, is still a matter of large disagreement. Situationists claim that if people come to a situation with a set of pre-existing evaluative commitments reached through ethical reflection, but behave antithetical to those moral commitments because of minor situational variables, then something is wrong with the power of ethical reflection to shape our characters. For this reason, our reliance on our virtuous character traits to predict our behavior should be replaced with our alert attention to the determinative features of situations that can lead us off the moral path.

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215 The situationist thesis is that what is determinative about behavior owes more to situational factors than to one’s character (e.g., Harman, 2003; Doris, 2002, 2009). The claim rests on a large body of experimental work (e.g., Darley and Batson, 1973, Latané and Rodin, 1969, Aderman, 1972, Hartshorne and May, 1928) which shows that behaviors that fail to be responsive to the prosocial demands of a situation correlate with insignificant situational variables. Replies from virtue ethicists take various tacks, including: Disputing the interpretation of the experimental data (e.g., Sabini and Silver, 2005); arguing that the character traits examined in the experiments do not bear resemblance to the traditional concept of virtue (e.g., Kamtekar, 2004, Kupperman, 2001); arguing that conclusions about the lack of reliable dispositional character cannot be drawn without knowing each subject’s particular construal of the situation (e.g., Screenivasan, 2002, Snow, 2010); and there are many more replies, as well.

216 John Doris makes this point most forcefully in “Skepticism About Persons,” 2009.

217 A closely related area of investigation deals with theories about whether our moral judgments are slow and rational, intuitive and automatic, or both (E.g., Haidt, 2002) Still more experimentation proceeds on theories about automaticity and heuristics—processes that enable cognitive efficiency, which operate outside of our conscious control. (E.g., Bargh, 1999, 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Ross and Nisbett,
But ethical reflection is essential to an account of virtue, for it is the space in which we practice and *improve* our reasoning (among other things). Aristotle counsels us to deliberate with practical reason when making ethical choices. With experience and sensitivity to the particulars of a situation, we may reach a determination for virtuous action aimed at the good.\(^{218}\) Virtue ethicists argue that what is missing from an account of character on the situationist’s interpretation is an appreciation of the role of practical reason in making ethical choices. A full picture of moral behavior on the part of a moral agent will include a description of her desires, emotions, and reasons for action; and the determinative factors of a situation (if that is what they are) cannot be objectively stipulated without reference to the way that the moral agent sees the situation. This ‘way of seeing’ is expressive of her aspiring virtue, and formed partially by reflecting on her choices and values that are integral to her ends.

The situationist-virtue ethics debate continues on, and I certainly won’t try to settle it here. But it has infiltrated the business ethics community, and various philosophers, organizational psychologists, and management professionals have entered the fray to weigh in on how it affects the workplace. If people are so woefully vulnerable to situational influences beyond their control, should work situations be structured to

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\(^{1980.}\) For each of these areas of research, one of the central areas of concern is whether or to what extent rationality controls our judgments and behaviors. My concern is to discuss the nature and value of ethical reflection, and I will assume that we do, at least at times, deliberately control our reasoning processes and the actions that follow from them.

minimize opportunities for failures in behavior? Or should the remedy be to encourage business people to develop the virtues as a defense against moral mishaps?

The response from business leaders to the situationist-virtue ethics debate has been varied. Some do nothing. Some seek to build an ethical culture by implementing an ethics program that is predominantly based on a highly structured conduct-control model. Others implement a program that is predominantly based on a corporate virtues model. When either type of program is operationalized without providing a mechanism for workers to take part in shaping and improving the ethical culture, the same negative outcome is realized: Workers feel a lack of moral support from leadership.

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219 I will hereafter refer to people at work as ‘workers’ for the sake of brevity, but also because I think ‘business people’ conveys the idea of management professionals or entrepreneurs, and when I talk about the people who I think should participate in deliberate ethical reflection (introduced shortly), I mean to be referring to workers at all levels of the organization.

220 Here is a recent story about a corporation whose top management elected to enforce rules of conduct rather than support the helping action of one of its employees. Apparently, that decision backfired: The story involves a May, 2012 incident at a California Safeway store. [News story here: http://bit.ly/JJNLZc]. One commentary comes from attorney Jack Marshall, who hosts a website called Ethics Alarms. [http://ethicsalarms.com]. Marshall lambasts the corporation for its insensitive and ‘ethically blind’ response to the courage of its employee, Ryan Young. A man in the store was beating his pregnant girlfriend, and Young intervened to stop the beating by pushing the man away from the woman. Young was suspended without pay for violating a company rule requiring employees to summon security for help in the event of a crime or fight in progress and never to intervene. When the story broke, an online petition to reinstate Young’s employment garnered 171,000 signatures; local patrons boycotted the store, and Safeway’s Facebook and Twitter pages were flooded with protests. Young is quoted in the news story as saying he has no regrets: “I don’t think anyone should have to second guess themselves or feel bad doing something that was right.” Ironically, here is a sentence I found in the preamble of Safeway’s code of conduct: “Most of the rules on the following pages are based on common sense and decency. If we abide by these rules and the Policies, and above all else, if we always do what we know to be right, we will avoid both legal problems and the appearance of impropriety” (their italics).

http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/IROL/64/64607/governance/CodeofConduct_3142005.pdf

221 ‘Ethical culture’ is a buzzword in business ethics circles that refers to “the values, principles, and support for doing the right thing inside an organization.” Cf.: Ethics Resource Center 2009 National Business Ethics Report. http://www.ethics.org/

222 Most companies use a combination of both, but my field study of corporate business ethics programs (which I present in section 4.3) suggests that organizations lean more strongly in one direction or the other.
The conduct-control model is undoubtedly motivated by the devastating business-ethical transgressions that have occurred in recent years. The fallout has prompted many corporations to develop detailed policies and rules to govern ethical conduct. Corporate codes of ethics have ballooned in size from simple credos to near book-sized manuscripts. For example, in 1980, Sanford McDonnell, CEO of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft, wrote the company’s first code of ethics since it was founded by his uncle, James S. McDonnell, in 1939. The 1980 credo was a one page document, declaring the commitment of the company and its employees to trustworthiness, reliability, truthfulness, cooperation, fairness, and “an improvement of the quality of life in the world in which we live.” In 1997, the company merged with Boeing Aircraft and today, the Boeing code of ethics is 45 pages long and includes specific rules of conduct, e.g., rules for using the copy machine to make personal copies, using the computer to surf the internet or taking time to write a personal letter, all of which require an employee to consult with his manager before doing. Boeing is a government defense contractor, so perhaps the attention to detail is warranted. But the example is not unique. Verizon Wireless has a code of ethical conduct that is 36 pages. In highly structured conduct-control organizations, the rules do not make much room for autonomous reflection on the part of the worker. The trust runs one way; workers are expected to trust leadership to make all the ethical decisions. And leadership expects workers to comply. The ethical culture is strongly hierarchical, and does not include workers in the decision-making process regarding the rules of ethical conduct. Workers are likely to feel that they have

little, if any, personal connection to, or endorsement of, the reasons for the rules in the ethical code. This is not to say that the worker in all cases disagrees with a rule, but she may not understand why it applies to her. Consider rules against taking gifts. Many organizations have rules prohibiting workers from taking gifts from vendors, customers, recruiters, contributors, etc. But the number of violations surrounding this rule is enormous. As a result, the laws surrounding the giving and receiving of gifts are numerous and complex. Yet, one wonders if the violations would be as excessive if people were encouraged (and taught) to reflect on the reasons for the rules. A quick internet search yields dozens of reports about how to comply with the rules, and the prudential reasons for following them. Discussions about the ethical principles underlying the rules are much harder to find.\(^{224}\) Without knowing the morality of a rule, a worker may feel that it is merely being forced upon her. In the vernacular of business, there is no ‘buy-in.’

With character models of business ethics, the emphasis is on the virtues; but they are usually expressed as corporate virtues, and typically ‘character training’ amounts to not much more than urging people to ‘be virtuous’. The assumption is that the individual represents and upholds the integrity of the company through her virtuous behavior. But the worker is not likely to embrace virtues that she has not reflected on and adopted for herself, for her own reasons. Personal morality is personal. Virtue is not likely to be genuine if handed down as an exhortation. A genuine virtue ethics model of character building will include the practice of actively choosing for oneself what action to take,

based on one’s own reasoning and feelings about the relevant aspects of a situation. But within the pseudo-virtue model for business ethics, a worker is exhorted to behave virtuously without any help in reflecting about what that means for her. The problem ends up being the same as it is in the organizational culture that employs a highly structured conduct-control model: The worker feels disconnected and unsupported.\textsuperscript{225}

I believe this feeling of dissociation is common throughout American corporate organizations. (This claim is supported by data from my field research, and also from simply listening and reading news reports on the state of business today.) Part of the explanation, I submit, is the relative lack of attention paid to corporate codes once they are created, and the ineffective ethics training that follows (if any follows at all).

Typically, the leadership of a corporation starts an ethics program by assembling a team of ethics experts (and also attorneys) to structure a compliance and governance program, which adopts policies and procedures to ensure that company activities stay within the law.\textsuperscript{226} (Much of this is industry-specific, but will also include comprehensive laws pertaining to discrimination, harassment, and diversity, for example.) Next, they will turn their attention to human resources issues that involve specific employee conduct. In constructing their code, they may create an original composition, or follow a template, or

\textsuperscript{225} Here is one of dozens of similar comments I found on a work and employment blog titled \textit{Cognitive Dissonance in the Workplace}: “I’ve often felt ‘out of place’ with my job though. The environment at most companies thought [sic] seems very artificial with ab [sic] artificial set of rules and values. That, in itself, can be highly disassociating.”

\textsuperscript{226} For many organizations, ‘ethical’ is synonymous with ‘legal.’ This attitude is criticized by Mark Schwartz who argues that codes of ethics must be written with attention to the normative justifications for the code. He claims that merely because codes “work” to ensure ethical (understood as legal) behavior does not entail that the codes are ethical, themselves. Mark Schwartz, “A Code of Ethics for Corporate Code of Ethics,” \textit{Journal of Business Ethics} 41, No. 1/2 (2002): 27-43.
in some cases, simply copy another firm’s code off the internet. Sometimes, the code may include a list of corporate virtues. The code becomes a part of the company’s policies and procedures manual and is distributed to employees. Each organization bears a unique relationship to its code after it has been created. Rarely, in a few organizations, the code becomes an important part of daily operations; but much more often it lies dormant—unused and unchanged.

I wanted to know to what extent these observations about BEPs could be quantified. So I designed a field study to probe the intuitions and judgments of business people involved in some aspect of their organization’s business ethics programs.

4.3 A Business Ethics Program Study

I designed the BEP study around hunches I had formed over years of working in the for-profit, private sector of business. I learned a number of things about practical business ethics as a corporate real estate broker, then an independent building contractor, and finally as president of the chamber of commerce in a midsize Midwestern town. Through my conversations with many other business people, I found that ethics programs are generally an afterthought, which seems to frustrate employees more than anything, because they are given little to no support for meeting the expectations of the code of

[^227]: An example of a template for a code of ethics can be found at “Bcorporation” [http://bit.ly/KqXme6]. A Code of Conduct template sold as a software program can be found here: http://www.biztree.com/policies?ppc=1&gclid=CL2Y8uWsnrACFWrptgodLhxCYA

[^228]: But there are some organizations that maintain a commitment to their values, according to Ethisphere, a think tank of business leaders and ethicists devoted to research in corporate ethics. Each year they publish a list of ‘the world’s most ethical companies.’ “Since the list’s inception, 23 companies have made the list all six years including: Aflac, American Express, Fluor, General Electric, Milliken & Company, Patagonia, Rabobank and Starbucks, among others.” http://ethisphere.com/wme/
ethics and code of conduct. Conversely, it also seemed to me that businesses with satisfied employees (with respect to the ethics program) were likely to have people at all levels of the organization who possessed strong commitments to doing business ‘with character.’ Given these perceptions, I launched the study with three expectations about what I would find: First, I expected that respondents would express desiderata for an ideal BEP in terms highly favoring a virtue-based approach. Second, I predicted that business ethics programs that were predominantly virtue-based would garner higher success ratings than BEPs that were predominantly conduct-control based. Third, I expected that the predominant reason given to explain a BEP’s perceived success or failure in satisfying the desiderata would be expressed in terms of the management’s success or failure in supporting the stated commitment to values through ongoing training and attention to virtue. The last two expectations were supported; I was wrong about the first.

4.3.1 Methods

The project was submitted to the University of Arizona Institutional Review Board, it was approved, and the interview process began in April, 2008.

Participants and Procedure

Sixty members of the business community were invited to participate in a study by filling out a questionnaire. (I began with a list of approximately 30 people personally known to me and then asked for referrals to extend the number of invitees to sixty.) I solicited them in person and by email. Fifty-nine agreed to participate. Subjects were told that the data from the study would serve to identify business ethics program desires and expectations
as perceived by business professionals, and that the data would be included in my Ph.D. dissertation.

Materials

The questionnaire consisted of five questions. (See Appendix C.) The first question asked the respondent to rate 19 BEP features according to how much they were included in their organization’s business ethics program. (The rating scale was based on a 0-4 Likert scale.) The second question called for a write-in answer in which the respondent was asked what they would desire and expect in an ideal business ethics program (i.e., the ‘desiderata’ of an ideal BEP). The third question again used a Likert rating scale and asked the respondent to indicate to what extent their organization’s ethics program satisfied the desiderata listed in the preceding question. Question four asked for an explanation of why the organization does or does not succeed in satisfying BEP desiderata. The last question asked the respondent to rate the importance of 14 different desiderata of a BEP.

Procedure

Informed consent forms and questionnaires were distributed to fifty-nine people. Fifty-six were sent the forms by personal delivery or postal delivery, with a self-addressed stamped envelope included to preserve anonymity. Three participants waived anonymity and asked to receive and return the forms by email instead. Consent forms and questionnaires were received from forty-four of the fifty-nine people to whom the materials were sent. Forty-two of the subjects came from the private business sector (in various industries), one from the government sector, and one from education.
Measures

Question one contained 19 items called ‘features’ and the respondent was asked to rate to what extent their organization included them in the ethics program. The purpose of this question was to ‘type’ the BEP as either a predominantly situationist (conduct-control) approach or a predominantly virtue-based approach. There were thirteen non-critical items, with a neutral weight on this dimension. That is, the feature neither favored a situationist leaning nor a virtue-based leaning: For example, “The BEP includes employee performance reviews that include evaluation of ethical conduct.” Three questions made strong reference to virtues, for example, “The BEP includes online training that emphasizes personal virtues.” Three questions made strong reference to a conduct-control approach, for example, “The BEP provides a formal, written decision-procedure to follow for ethical dilemmas.” The respondents used a Likert scale with 0=not at all; 1=very little; 2=somewhat; 3=quite a bit; and 4=a great deal. The rating values were tallied and the BEP was typed according to the ratings given on the six critical items. (See Appendix D.)

Question 2A asked respondents to imagine that there exists an ideal BEP, then to state their desires and expectations (desiderata) for the results of such a program. The responses were coded by two psychologists who were given instructions to interpret the respondents’ comments on two scales. (See coding instructions in Appendix E.) Each coder rated how strongly each comment made reference to virtues of character (V-code), and how strongly each comment made reference to situational behaviors (S-code). (See coding results in Appendix G.) Inter-rater reliability was very good.
Question 2B asked respondents to rate the success of their organization’s BEP with respect to the desiderata expressed in 2A. The same Likert scale was used. (See Appendix D.)

Question 2C asked respondents to give reasons for why they gave those ratings (i.e., why the organization does or does not succeed in satisfying the desiderata).

The responses were coded by two college graduates who were given instructions to interpret the respondents’ comments on two scales. (See coding instructions in Appendix F.) Each coder rated each comment for its reference to the reported level of perceived management success in supporting the stated commitment to values through active and ongoing involvement in training (SU-code); each coder also rated each comment for its reference to the reported level of perceived management failure in supporting the stated commitment to values through ongoing involvement in training. (F-code). (See coding results in Appendix G.) Inter-rater reliability was very good.

Question 3 listed 14 features and expectations of a BEP. Respondents were asked to rate, on a scale of 0-4, the importance of each of the fourteen items. (See Appendix J-Table 4.3.)

4.3.2 Results

The first prediction that respondents would express their desires for an ideal business ethics program in predominantly virtue terms was not supported.\(^{229}\) The second

\(^{229}\) This was determined by the coding for question 2A, which coded reported desires for an ideal BEP as either predominantly S-type or predominantly V-type. The difference was not statistically significant. [See Appendix G—Total S-codes=75; (mean: 1.88); Total V-codes=61; (mean: 1.53); P value= 0.2599.]
prediction that V-type business ethics programs would earn higher success ratings (when rated against the respondent’s own desiderata), was not quite statistically significant (P value=0.0772), so I cannot reject the null hypothesis. But the actual averages for success ratings on S-type and V-type BEPs were 1.615 and 2.275, respectively, suggesting a possible trend. More evidence would be needed to confirm. The third prediction that the successes and failures of a BEP to satisfy the desiderata would be expressed in terms of perceived management successes and failures to support ongoing ethics training and attention to virtue was confirmed. Initially, I presumed that the third prediction would be confirmed merely by reading through the comments respondents gave to the question asking them why their BEP did or did not succeed in satisfying the desiderata of an ideal BEP. However, once I saw that the comments were almost entirely expressed in terms of management success or failure (there were almost no neutral responses), I was interested to know if the comments could be quantified according to how much they perceived the success or failure of management to be the reason their BEP succeeded or failed in meeting desiderata. So I devised a coding scale for these comments, also. The numbers were striking. If a respondent thought that their BEP did not come close to meeting the desires and expectations of an ideal BEP, the reason given was that management failed in a large way to provide ongoing training and attention to virtue. If a respondent thought their BEP did do well in meeting the desiderata of an ideal BEP, the reason given was that management largely succeeded in providing ongoing training and attention to virtue.\(^{230}\)

\(^{230}\) The summed scores of the two coders along each dimension (success or failure) are as follows: Success
4.3.3 Discussion

My first expectation (that respondents would express their desires for an ideal business ethics program in predominantly virtue terms) was not confirmed. In fact, overall the desiderata were expressed almost equally in V-terms and S-terms, with a slight favor toward S-terms. This was a bit surprising, given that a greater number of V-type BEPs were given higher success ratings than S-type BEPs (See Appendix I Table 4.1). The other reason it is somewhat surprising to see the desiderata expressed with a slight favor toward S-terms is because I thought there might be some (inadvertent) priming effects from preceding question number one. (Question number one asked respondents to rate to what extent each of 19 BEP features were included in their own programs. Three of the 19 features included the words integrity, honesty, responsibility, trustworthiness, fairness, respect, and virtues.) Although, if there was a priming effect, perhaps the S-weighting might have been even higher without it. In any case, I think it is plausible to suggest that these results indicate people favor a balanced approach to ethics training that includes both S-type and V-type approaches. Some of the comments are telling with respect to the respondent’s desires for S-type structure: “A practical, systematic and easy to understand training that would incorporate written info as well as role playing at [sic] situational questions specific to the job with clear concrete expectations of what is expected by the company/organization” (Questionnaire [Q] #2). “Consistency; detailed, clear and concise
blueprint to establish guidelines” (Q23). Other comments were more strongly expressive of the desire for virtue: “[E]veryone would be kind instead of expecting kindness, would be judgeless instead of judging, would always be empathic and loving toward each other…” (Q18). There were those that were a blend: “Employees making decisions based on honesty and fairness and reasonableness—they have a happier clientele and a happier work environment. Rules of conduct are clear from the outset” (Q8). And there were a few skeptics: “Ethics programs are not feasible to use…” (Q21). Some respondents misinterpreted the question, so rather than giving a positive description of an ideal BEP, they stated the things that were wrong in their own organization (comments that should have been directed toward answering question 2C, which asks why the BEP does not satisfy the desiderata). Question 2A should have been worded in a way that would have prevented this misunderstanding.

The foregoing results from the first prediction support the first two claims for the complement model: Workers at all levels desire structured guidance for meeting the ethical expectations of the organization; and second, workers desire that they and others in the organization are people of good character (a balanced approach).

The second prediction that virtue-based business ethics programs would earn higher success ratings was not statistically confirmed, but it was close (P-value .0772) and suggestive. It is unlikely that the difference between the two groups is one of mere chance, suggesting that there is a trend that favors a virtue approach. These results combined with the earlier evidence from the desiderata coding seem to suggest that both S-type and V-type BEPs have something favorable to be said for them.
The prediction that the successes and failures of a BEP to satisfy the desiderata would be expressed in terms of management successes and failures was an easy prediction to make, given the fact that business ethics programs are created and run by management. However, I did not have a prediction as to how the BEP success/failure comments might be quantified. The statistical analysis turned out to be very significant—showing a very low probability that the mean difference between high- and low-rated groups was the result of chance. (See Appendix H) The numbers probably comport with most people’s intuitions about the state of business ethics programs today. The aggregated ratings show that the respondents’ reports of perceived management failure outweighed their reports of perceived management success in supporting the stated commitment to values through active and ongoing involvement and training. These results give support to the third claim of the complement model: Business ethics programs concerned to promote ethical conduct should include not only conduct-control policies, but also active and ongoing practices aimed at developing virtue in individual workers, teams, and the organization itself.

Three incidental findings emerged from the data that bear mention. An examination of the ratings that respondents gave to the 19 features of question (1) reveals that the more features (of any type—S or V or Neutral) that a BEP employs, the higher its rating. Of the 17 BEPs that were given a low rating (0 or 1), the sum of the ratings given to all 19 items equals 394. But of the 16 BEPs that were given a high rating (3 or 4), the sum of the ratings given to all 19 items equals 647. This suggests that a business ethics
program will be more successful to the extent that it uses numerous and diverse methods of ethics training and other types of support. (See Appendix J-Table 4.2)

The second incidental finding comes from question (3), in which respondents were asked to rate how important each of 14 features are to a BEP. Interestingly, the feature receiving the second to lowest score is: “The BEP results in higher profits.” The item receiving the third highest score (behind “it reduces ethical violations,” and “it reduces legal violations”) is “it gives employees a decision-procedure for taking action in an ethical dilemma.” (See Appendix J-Table 4.3)

The third incidental finding is that respondents who came from a S-type BEP expressed desiderata for an ideal BEP in S-terms 80% of the time (as determined by coding of 2A comments); and respondents who came from a V-type BEP expressed desiderata in V-terms 60% of the time. This may suggest that people express idealizations in terms of an improvement upon what they are already familiar with; perhaps there are epistemic limitations to expressing alternate approaches. But it also suggests a consistency between the respondents’ ability to recognize the types of features employed by their own BEP and their ability to articulate desiderata. This kind of consistency casts doubt on the concern that the expressions of desiderata (as V-type or S-type) occurred by chance.

Directions for future BEP research are many. It would be instructive to know the frequency with which ethics training is done. Do employees get one orientation and none thereafter; or do some organizations have ongoing curricula? What does the training entail? I would be interested to do a study similar to this one except directed toward
specific private sector industries, e.g., hospitality, retail, service. I would like to compare those BEPs to others from highly regulated professions. I am interested to know in what ways employees in highly regulated professions (e.g., insurance, real estate, law, health) experience ethical issues that fall outside of what is covered by the regulations. It would also be interesting to control for age and gender. For any future study, I would endeavor to gather a larger number of participants. I think the sample size of this study was adequate, but it would have been better with a larger group.

Collectively, the findings from the BEP study seem to supply good evidence for the claims I put forth for the complement model: First, workers at all levels desire structured guidance for meeting the ethical expectations of the organization; second, workers desire that they and others in the organization are people of good character; and third, a business ethics program concerned to promote ethical conduct should include not only conduct-control policies, but also active and ongoing practices aimed at developing virtue in individual workers, teams, and the organization itself. In the next section, I present an idea for an ongoing practice aimed at developing virtue in individual workers, teams, and the organization itself.

4.4 Deliberate Ethical Reflection

As the study data suggest, management needs to do a better job at providing employees with active and ongoing training. The data also suggest that virtue-based organizations rate fairly high in terms of successfully meeting ethics expectations; so, it makes sense that ongoing training in developing virtue would be welcome. I suggest that
a good, comprehensive ethics program in any organization will include all of its workers in developing virtue.\textsuperscript{231} This cannot be accomplished in a one-shot orientation, or by passing out a booklet. What I suggest is a practical exercise (that can be used in two different ways) for business ethics programs, which has not been explicitly discussed in the literature, to my knowledge. The exercise is deliberate ethical reflection, practiced individually and collectively; aimed at helping workers to shape and improve their own characters, and to understand and improve the ethical culture of the organization. I maintain that this is an overlooked practice that can help diminish feelings of moral disconnectedness and improve the ethical culture of the organization.

Workers need time to spend in structured ethical reflection. Yet, rarely do workers possess the developed concepts and vocabulary needed for ethical reflection, nor have they learned \textit{how} to engage in deliberate, purposeful ethical reflection. Amidst other workplace pressures, the default position is for workers to simply label situations as right or wrong, which does not foster taking a more reflectively critical stance toward problems.\textsuperscript{232} Deliberative ethical reflection offers a framework for ethical inquiry that goes beyond merely expressing one’s opinion. Ethical reflection in the business ethics context should be a structured activity, based on evaluative ends for both the employee and the organization in which she works. It differs from problem-solving or decision-making, as the process and ends are unique. Ethical reflection can be learned, and it can be made part of an existing ethics program.

\textsuperscript{231} B-Lab, a non-profit organization dedicated to supporting businesses that aspire to solve social and environmental problems, also expresses this view. http://www.bcorporation.net/why
\textsuperscript{232} Cohen, McDaniels, and Qualters, \textit{AIR Model}, 121.
In the next section, I begin with a description of the nature of individual reflection, which draws on academic work from philosophers, psychologists, and organizational development experts. Later, I will discuss work being done in organizational group dynamics to give a revisionary account of reflection as it would occur in the group activity I call collective ethical reflection.

4.4.1 Individual Ethical Reflection

Reflection has been defined in many ways. It is a process of internal examination that explores an issue of concern, triggered by an experience, which clarifies meaning and results in changed conceptual perspective; it is a cycle of paying deliberate attention to one’s own past or current actions for the purpose of improving one’s future actions. Reflection has self-evaluative, and sometimes self-corrective outcomes that result from looking in both directions—past and future. (But the subject of one’s reflection may also be an event occurring in the present, or what has been called “reflection-in-action,” as when one modulates to adjust to unexpected events.)

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233 Some philosophers (see Doris, 2009) use the term ‘reflectivism’ to denote accurate reflection as distinguished from possibly flawed reflection in terms of epistemic truth. I will stay with the commonsense usage of ‘reflection,’ which assumes that generally people are accurate about the truth conditions of their own thoughts. I do not deny that there can be cognitive dissonance between what one believes (or feels, or remembers, etc.) and what one actually does believe (or feel, or remember). But I needn’t settle the matter here to carry on. I start with the assumption that we have some veridical second order thoughts.


237 It has been known for a long time that people can be quite bad at introspection. Ross and Nisbett (1980) present an abundance of literature suggesting that we are often poor at explaining our own
Reflection can help to explain or make sense of one’s experiences, adding to and reorganizing knowledge. From ancient philosophers we learn that reflection is the starting point for thinking about what kind of person one wants to be and understanding one’s life as a whole.\textsuperscript{238} What can we take from this general description of the activity of individual reflection to apply to the work place?

The first thing to notice is that much reflection is \textit{deliberate}. I have discussed the importance of deliberative practice in acquiring expertise in a skill (in chapter two), and the same applies here. Deliberate ethical reflection is intentional in the sense that the activity of introspection is not accidental, but purposeful. Taking time to reflect for the purpose of planning has been a beneficial practice for many business leaders for many years. But the view that taking time to reflect is a luxury reserved only for the elite of an organization fails to recognize or appreciate the benefit of reflection for \textit{everyone}, from the CEO to the delivery driver.\textsuperscript{239} A company truly committed to improving its ethical culture will want to invest time and other resources to give the opportunity for each and
every worker to learn how to reflect; moreover, the company should support workers in using reflection as an ongoing, cyclical practice for improving character and team cohesiveness with other workers. To see how this might be done, I suggest a structured exercise for ethical reflection.

*The content and process of individual ethical reflection*

I would first like to stress that I am arguing for a claim about virtue ethics in practice. A great deal of important theoretical work has been done to defend virtue ethics theory as a resource for business. However, I hope to add to the project by offering a description of a practice than can be applied in actual work settings in order to reify the theoretical aims.

First, a starting point for thinking about any practice is to ask what its purpose is. In the case of ethical reflection as it pertains to building character, we can say that its purpose is to strengthen morally praiseworthy character traits, which serve the ends of the agent and are manifest in behavior befitting the virtue. Second, usually deliberative practice is best done according to a stepwise method. In the case of ethical reflection, the steps are mental steps, but no less efficacious than the physical steps used for others types of practice. Deliberate reflection, I suggest, should be mindful and disciplined. I conceive of the practice as comprising three steps—analysis, appraisal, and adjustment. Any attempt to promote the development of character will need to engage the cognitive and motivational states of the moral agent, which are stimulated in all three steps.

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240 The alliteration (analysis, appraisal, adjustment) was quite accidental. But it occurs to me that it opens a wide range of opportunity for catchy labels (as are so popular in business training).
In the first step—analysis—the worker needs to consider the ‘menu’ of virtues that inform the organizational culture. The analysis is primarily one of identification and classification. She first must locate the broader virtues that will typically be found in the corporate code of ethics. She should also consider the ‘narrower’ character traits that are beneficial and relevant to her specific role in the organization. Robert Audi distinguishes ‘comprehensive’ virtues from role-specific virtues: “A comprehensive virtue, such as honesty, impacts virtually everything we do, certainly all our social interactions. But a role-specific virtue … may affect only our activities in a special role … The comprehensive virtues are needed by all of us and constrain the way the role specific virtues operate …(his italics)"242 (In the appraisal step, forthcoming, I’ll discuss the problem of constraint and conflict.) Now, let us have a look at how the analysis of the virtues might proceed.

As I indicated, the first place for the worker to start is with the corporate code of ethics. But this is not the last place to look, especially for the role-specific virtues that she may want to develop for her particular activities within the organization. Lists of ‘business virtues’ abound. As virtue ethics has gained prominence in business ethics, the number of character traits associated with doing business ‘virtuously’ has expanded greatly. Some of these traits are not moral virtues, per se, e.g., attentiveness.243 Many characteristics named as business virtues are not really virtues but rather skills, talents, or

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242 Ibid., 274.
243 As a virtue in the traditional sense, attentiveness seems not to qualify. Attentiveness is something that does not seem to require deliberation and rational choice; it is more like a capacity than a state or disposition; it isn’t concerned primarily with feelings and action; and it isn’t clear how one hits the mean between excess and deficiency. But on an “occurrent-state” view of virtue, virtuous action comes from motives that may include a desire to do one’s duty, or bring about something good. (Hurka, Virtuous Act, 69.) Seen in this way, attentiveness is a virtue, as are many others.
attitudes (more examples include articulateness, creativity, determination). And so the lists of business virtues is sometimes very long.\textsuperscript{244} On the other hand, Aristotle’s list of virtues does not seem to meet the complex needs of a modern-day business ethics program. Certainly we would want to include the Aristotelian virtues of honesty, fairness, justice, moral courage, (and possibly forms of generosity and temperance) in a corporate code of ethics. But the contemporary business community has adopted others. A survey of ‘eighty exemplary ethics statements’ culled from hundreds of global corporations\textsuperscript{245} demonstrates the numerous ways in which organizations prioritize the virtues they believe ought to be included in a business code of ethics. Some examples include: leadership, openness, respectfulness, responsibility, trust, and commitment. (Of course, ‘integrity’ is the most ubiquitous ‘virtue’ of all, but this is often expressed in thin terms such as ‘integrity is doing the right thing’; alternatively, it is simply equated with honesty.)\textsuperscript{246} Examples of role-specific virtues that a worker may desire to cultivate as part of her character include diligence, stewardship, and perseverance, for example. A worker will have to determine for herself which role-specific virtues are most significant to her, which ones are already firmly established in her character, and which she needs to work on.

To help in the identification of the narrower virtues relevant to the work setting, it will next be essential to consider those virtues in the context of one’s overall goals and

\textsuperscript{245} Murphy, Eighty Exemplary Ethics Statements, 1998.
\textsuperscript{246} Rosa Chun constructs an interesting categorization of the many different virtues issuing from Aristotle, Hume, Solomon, Murphy, Moberg, Shanahan and Hyman to illustrate the diverse use of virtue notions in ‘organizational virtue.’ Rosa Chun, “Ethical Character and Virtue of Organizations: An Empirical Assessment and Strategic Implications,” Journal of Business Ethics 57 (2005): 273.
the extent to which they figure in one’s happiness. This is the central feature of traditional virtue ethics. The *telos* of virtue is a happy, or flourishing, life. Because much of one’s life in a contemporary western society involves work, the importance of establishing a set of business character traits that are in accordance with happiness cannot be overstated. When the opposite occurs, there is likely to be a feeling of disintegration among one’s beliefs, desires and actions. A lack of unity between a person’s work traits and her character in other domains of her life make character seem like “a mask or suit of clothing; an agent may have to possess more than one.”

The second step involved in ethical reflection is appraisal, and this is where the reflective exercise of ‘looking back’ is engaged. The worker, having analyzed the virtues and reflected about those she most aspires to develop, is now in a position to appraise her past actions in light of those virtues. She may ask, Which of my past actions have aligned with the virtues and the overall goals of my life? Which have not? She will need to ask herself what her reasons, feelings, and desires were at the time of choosing those actions. In doing so, she may locate where her actions fell short of true virtue, for a right action is not always a virtuous action. An example will be useful. Imagine a real estate agent showing a listing, who chooses to disclose to her client that there are barking dogs next door (because she knows this is an area of deep concern for her client). The disclosure results in losing the sale. The real estate agent did the right thing, of course. But if she reflects on this action and discovers that the honor in the action was not pleasurable for

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its own sake, but rather that she acted with feelings of disappointment and frustration, she has learned that there is work to do in building a stronger character. (Likewise if her reasons were purely egoistic; for example, if she knew that her action would court favor from her client, resulting in referral business.) This is an example of a conflict in motivations between performing a virtuous act and acting from virtue.\footnote{This distinction between acting from virtue versus performing a virtuous act—with the former being characterized as true virtue and the latter not—comes from traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics. On this account, the consequent feeling of a virtuous act is supposed to be one of pleasure and not conflict. But not all accounts of virtue have this requirement (e.g., Humean accounts). Perhaps what really matters in the business case is that the real estate agent does the right thing, even if it is difficult and unpleasant for her to do. But I think she still must be able to give reasons for her actions so that her future behavior is consistent with those ethical commitments. I thank Michael Gill for conversation about this.}

Another source of discord requiring appraisal may result when a narrow virtue is constrained by a broader virtue. (Referenced in the earlier quote by Audi.) Again, an example illustrates this point: A debt collections specialist may include among her role-specific virtues diligence or perhaps perseverance. However, if the corporate virtues include caring and respectfulness, an appraisal of the ‘fit’ between the narrower and broader virtues will help her to see that her persevering zeal in collecting debts must be tempered with care and respect for the people affected by her actions. This naturally leads to the third step in deliberate ethical reflection—adjustment.

The process of adjustment now shifts reflecting from backward to forward. In this step, the worker identifies opportunities for improvement. She may start by imagining future situations that will call on her to exercise a particular virtue and think about the reasons she would have for acting in one way or another. She will want to envision how her virtuous actions would affect those who will benefit from them (including herself). In imagining future scenarios, combined with the reflection she has done about mistakes of
the past, she can self-correct. Part of the process will require that she evaluate the reasons for acting from virtue; the test of her character will be to see how her motivations align with those reasons.

As stated earlier, the point of ethical reflection is to improve character, which manifests in action. Ultimately, we want our actions to flow from our characters with the right kind of feelings and reasons. According to Aristotle, virtue comes from habitually performing good acts. We learn by doing, by repeated practice. How does deliberate ethical reflection lead to action? A thorough treatment of the answer to this question would require a treatise examining the many theories that seek to explain how motivation converts to action. But let us assume that a person’s desire to improve with respect to certain virtuous ends, along with a belief about how to achieve those, will compel her to action. Ethical reflection is the means to informing the belief. It is a learning mechanism that can lead to virtuous action. When we were children, we had parents and teachers to tell us how to behave; and from there we learned virtue through practice. The means to develop virtue consisted in the actions we were directed to perform. As adults, we must for the most part, be our own guides. Ethical reflection makes us better guides.

*The value of reflection*

Reflection has been called “the essential part of the process that makes it possible to learn from experience.” (Not all learning requires reflection, of course; a child learns

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249 Robert Audi argues a similar point: “A selfish person who, as a foreseeable and avoidable result of the selfishness, is unfair but wants to reform, can, through repeated self-discipline, become unselfish and fair....With sufficient commitment to moral standards, it is sometimes possible to become to a significant extent morally self-made.” Audi, *Virtue Ethics as a Resource in Business*, 277.

that fire is hot without having to reflect about it.) Learning from experience is often a
*comparative* exercise. We reflect on our past experiences and hold them up to visions of
what we want to become to see if our past actions fit with the vision. Many times
reflection begins because we are unhappy with ourselves. Reflection shows us that we
need to review and reorder our priorities.251 Or perhaps the value of reflection will be in
the discovery that our dissatisfaction lies in the fact that our goals are being imposed on
us by others.252 This may lead us to question the ethical rules, and ask about the
principles that are supposed to ground those rules. At first blush, this may seem like
something management would rather avoid. But, the most successful organizations have
learned that involving employees at every level in the process of improving and revising
the organization’s ethical principles and rules results in a number of benefits.253

Deliberate individual ethical reflection is something that can be taught to, but not
forced on, workers. I am not suggesting that this exercise be implemented as some kind
of mandatory training. Rather, workers should be shown how to use the tool; whether
they choose to use it is up to them. However, should it come to be used by groups within
the organizational structure, it is likely to catch on. I now turn to discuss the concept of
collective deliberate ethical reflection for groups.

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252 Ibid.
253 Here are some statistics from the 2006 Ethics Study performed by LRN, a leading provider of
governance, ethics, and compliance management applications: Out of 998 respondents, 36% said they
have left a job because they disagreed with the company’s ethical standard. Sixty-three percent said they
spent time away from work duties talking with colleagues about unethical behavior within the
organization. Eighty-six percent said they would prefer to work for an ethical company than be paid more.
Those 35 and older are more likely than younger workers to choose an ethical company over pay (85% versus
76%). Report pdf can be accessed at:
4.4.2 Collective Ethical Reflection

In the previous section, I discussed the concept of individual ethical reflection, and it is readily apparent that reflection of this type is a very personal activity. When I reflect, I focus on my life—where it has come and why, how I might make it better, how my future actions can serve the overarching goal of my life. The content of my reflection is often likely to be deeply intimate, involving memories of past events that perhaps are not all that flattering to my ego or positive for my self-esteem. The corrective aspect of reflection can be painful. But thankfully, at least it is private.\textsuperscript{254} Considering the strongly first-person perspective of ethical reflection, how plausible is the idea that reflection can take place collectively? The collective ethical reflection I have in mind has different ends and is done from a different perspective.

One might think that collective reflection takes place in workshops and seminars, which feature in-depth study of the corporate ethics handbook, analyses of case studies, ‘ethics awareness’ training to avoid unintentional incidents of discrimination, harassment, etc. But for many workers, these ethical concerns are abstract, irrelevant to their particular work lives, or thought to be covered by laws about which they can have no input, anyway.\textsuperscript{255} Ethics training of this sort probably does more to alienate workers from

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{254}Private, that is, unless one has a trusted relationship with a mentor.
\item \textsuperscript{255}Recognizing this problem, the U.S. Sentencing Commission (in 2004) revised its guidelines to foster ethical cultures, instead of merely using check-the-box, compliance-only approaches. “The organization shall take reasonable steps to communicate periodically and in a practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects of the compliance and ethics program, to all personnel, including high-level personnel, members of the governing authority, and others by conducting effective training programs and otherwise disseminating information appropriate to such individuals’ respective roles and responsibilities.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, §8B2.1(b)(4)(A).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the ethics culture than it does to draw them in. The problem is similar to one discussed by Perrin Cohen, a psychologist whose research focuses on the processes of ethical education.256 Cohen has developed a model for cultivating reflective ethical inquiry for college students. In the sciences, in particular, students and teachers are traditionally uncomfortable with discussing ethical issues, because until very recently ethics has not been a standard part of the curriculum. The same can be said of business. The idea persists that the sensitive subject of ethics conflicts with very nature of business (and science) as a practice concerned with quantifiable outcomes. But Cohen has been successful in implementing his model for reflective inquiry, by helping students to “relate to ethical concerns in a positive, constructive way rather than in the usual reactive way (such as opinions, avoidance, blaming, problem-solving).257 The goal is to move students from a ‘reactive mode’ (jumping to conclusions) to a reflective mode, allowing them to research their thoughts to clarify and refine them.258 But this model is still based on individual reflection, performed in a group setting. It, too, is a valuable tool; but not what I mean by collective reflection. Collective reflection takes place among a group of people who are concerned to reflect about the ends of the group.

The idea of group virtue is relatively new, and work is just beginning to flourish in this area. How can groups be virtuous? The concept proceeds on the assumption that groups, like individuals, have goals and even (sometimes) final ends. Let’s call these

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256 Cohen, AIR Model.
257 Ibid., 122.
258 Cohen calls his teaching tool the AIR Model; the acronym stands for: Awareness of ethical issues, Investigation of those issues, and Responding to those issues. It is presented as a recursive diagrammatic flow chart.
objectives. Group objectives are different than individual ends; a group cannot be happy (although its members can). But for the same reasons I argued that individuals can adopt role-specific virtues tied to work and life goals, so can groups adopt virtues tied to work objectives. In corporate business there are three levels in the organizational structure: individuals, teams, and the corporation, itself. The corporation is a group that can adopt virtues, as is each team within the organization. The process of ethical reflection follows the same steps as for individual reflection: analysis, appraisal, and adjustment. But the perspectives of the individuals in a group now change from a first-person perspective of oneself to a first-person perspective of the group. Collectively, the members of the group ask, What kind of group should we be as we pursue our work objectives? (It is also useful to think in terms of what kind of group not to be.) Here again, a menu of virtues may be consulted. Business management researcher Rosa Chun conducted a study to identify corporate virtues and construct a validation scale for testing each virtue’s correlation to the dependent variable of satisfaction. In other words, she started with the assumption that each organizational virtue should show significant correlation to both internal (employee) and external (customer) satisfaction, if the virtue is to be effective in expressing the character of the corporation. According to Chun, “an empirical investigation of virtues at the organizational level will enable managers to identify distinctive virtues that lead to successful social and financial performance.”

259 Chun, Ethical Character, 269.
260 Chun conducted an extensive search to identify a list of corporate virtues. She first reviewed the philosophical literature, then she sampled documents from 158 companies from 6 industries. The results were coded to select items that appeared as the firm’s ‘aspirational ethical values.’ Then, a survey of 2548 customers and employees was conducted; the respondents were asked to “imagine that the organization ‘has come to life as a human being,’ and then asked to assess the organization’s character item by item,
are not merely instrumentally strategic, even for corporations. A corporation, just like an individual, seeks both internal and external goods. In his argument for the concept of corporate character, Geoff Moore makes use of Alasdair MacIntyre’s claims about the interdependence of both kinds of goods in the pursuit of excellence. The external goods of a corporation are, obviously, money, market share, positive public image, etc. The internal goods, by contrast, are things like the enjoyment that each individual worker experiences in the exercise of his skills, the feeling of mutual respect among members of the organization, the positive energy derived from an honest and fair competitive effort, etc. According to Moore, a virtuous corporation not only balances its practices in order to provide these goods, but also wards off threats from the corrupting power of other (non-virtuous) corporations with which it engages. The specific virtues that a corporation adopts will depend, among other things, on the industry within which it operates. For example, a pharmaceutical company may want to develop a corporate character that includes virtues such as conscientiousness and empathy. An organization in the hospitality industry may choose to develop a character that expresses friendliness and zeal. Teams within the organization can approach the first phase of collective ethical

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262 Ibid., 661. Moore distinguishes between corporate culture and corporate character, claiming that the former is primarily the means to external goods, while the latter is a means to internal goods. He thinks that paying greater attention to corporate character protects internal goods (of excellence) from being “killed” by the singular pursuit of external goods (661, 668). Paying attention to the distinction between the internal and external goods of a corporation and how they may come into conflict is good. I’m not sure it’s necessary to locate them within two distinct constructs. Although corporate culture and corporate character are conceptually distinct, in practice they both contribute to providing (or failing to provide) both internal and external goods.
reflection in the same way. The members analyze and adopt particular virtues in light of what kind of team they want to be. Again, this will depend on their performance objectives, and the team-specific virtues will be constrained by the broader corporate virtues. The second and third steps of the reflective process, appraisal and adjustment, might proceed best for groups by employing an exercise used in organizational psychology—cognitive behavioral modification adapted for groups.

Cognitive behavior modification (CBM) has been used for a long time as an intervention technique in clinical psychology for individuals who need to change maladaptive behaviors. But the method has been remodeled for use in changing organizational cultures, as well.\textsuperscript{263} Starting from the assumption that a group has stability in virtue of its developed norms and habits over time, and that those habits can sometimes have negative effects on organizational behavior, consulting psychologists draw on the tools of CBM to intervene and reshape the thoughts and actions of the group. One of those tools is ‘reconstructed narrative.’ The task is for the group to create a representation of itself in a narrative story. David Boan writes: “In CBM, change starts with observing behavior through heightened awareness and deliberative attention.”\textsuperscript{264} Through this awareness, the group is able to tell the story of its past experiences. At the organizational level, the narrative is “a shared mental model that develops from the experience of the organizational members and communicates the values and intentions of the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., 53.
\end{flushright}
organization." Boan goes on to describe the process for teams very similar to what I am calling the appraisal and adjustment steps:

In our pilot team development program...we distinguished between the larger corporate vision and the team vision, promoting the idea that the team develops clarity about its role in achieving the larger corporate vision. We then discussed the gap between the desired state and the current state, including discussion of the source of the current state such as the systems that create barriers or the norms for behavior that can limit improvement. Finally, we developed measures of the actions needed for the desired state to be attained.

The exercise of deliberate ethical reflection, I submit, is well-suited to business groups—both team and corporate—for its emphasis on concrete particulars. The exercise challenges group members to think in terms of specific past experiences that represent both virtue and vice, and to construct narratives of future performance that exemplify virtue. It calls on the group to give reasons for adopting particular virtues, and it takes into account how each member feels about the ‘validity’ of the virtue in satisfying goals for attaining both internal and external goods.

Can it work? Do groups benefit from ‘operationalizing’ virtue? In two studies conducted by Michael Palanski and colleagues, the team-level virtues of transparency, behavioral integrity, and trust were evaluated for their relation to team performance.

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265 Ibid., 55.
266 Ibid., 56.
267 Feltovich, et al, report that novices in skill domains are inefficient and largely ineffective at employing abstract concepts to solve problems (Feltovich, Studies in Expertise, 50-53). If this is so, then new skills (such as deliberate reflection) should be taught by making use of concrete particulars.
268 M. Palanski, S. Kahai, and F. Yammarino, “Team Virtues and Performance: An Examination of Transparency, Behavioral Integrity, and Trust,” Journal of Business Ethics 99 (2011): 201-216. One study was a longitudinal study involving temporary work teams (149 college students in a semester-long organizational behavior class) and the other was a field study of 83 nurses in a healthcare network. Data came from self-reports designed to measure each virtue according to specific items relative to that
(Researchers conducted a review of literature in theoretical development of team virtues to derive these three virtues.) In the final analysis of both studies, they found that team transparency was positively related to team behavioral integrity, which in turn was positively related to team trust. They also found evidence of a positive relationship between team trust and team performance. This is all good news, but we should pause to consider the warning from situationist psychology in order to form a realistic picture of the potential success for cultivating virtue in groups.

If groups take seriously the idea of cultivating team (or corporate) virtues, then they should also deliberately learn about the possible pitfalls of group interaction that have been widely studied by social psychologists. I have discussed many in this dissertation. Here I will mention just a few that look to be most applicable to groups in the business context. First, a group of individuals that regularly works together will want to be alert to problems associated with group conformity, or as it has come to be known in the popular literature, groupthink. Groupthink supposedly results in a number of undesirable consequences: the group limits its discussion to only a few alternatives when trying to make a decision; the group tends to ignore new information that may involve risks or setbacks; they ignore information about the benefits of rejected alternatives; they fail to consider what may go wrong.\textsuperscript{269} The alleged cause of this phenomenon is the group members’ desires for harmony and avoidance of conflict. This leads to uncritical virtue. For example, here are two questions meant to measure behavioral integrity: “How often does this team keep promises?” “How often does this team act in a way that shows that these values are actually important?” (Subjects used some version of a Likert scale, e.g., 0=not at all; 4=frequently if not always, etc.). Team performance was measured by an independent third party.

evaluation of their own performance. Obviously, this would not be conducive to productive reflection; so it is something the group would need to override by conscious awareness of their vulnerability to this phenomenon. There are numerous other non-conscious biases that may be at work in the group setting also, such as the representative heuristic, which may cause inadvertent stereotyping; or the interpersonal processes of self-presentation and self-regulation that were discussed in chapter three. A simple awareness of the possibility that there are mental processes operating outside of conscious awareness will help people to monitor their behavior.270

More research into the nature of group dynamics will yield important data to help inform a model for deliberate collective ethical reflection. In the meantime, at the very least deliberate ethical reflection will spawn discussion about important ethical issues in business—and that alone is something business could use more of.

4.5 The Complement Model

The complement model suggests an approach to designing a business ethics program that takes on the best aspects of situationism and virtue ethics. It may be quite some time before the debate about the true nature of the psychological structure of moral agents is settled. Until then, however, business activities must continue. The need for practical guidance in how to develop ethics training that will promote and develop an ethical culture has never been greater. In this chapter I used data from my own study to

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270 Perhaps everyone should take the tests at the Harvard website for Project Implicit. The online tests evaluate implicit attitudes regarding group preferences for categories such as age and race: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
make three claims about worker psychology. First, workers at all levels desire structured guidance for meeting the ethical expectations of the organization; second, workers desire that they and others in the organization are people of good character; and third, a business ethics program concerned to promote ethical conduct should include not only conduct-control policies, but also active and ongoing practices aimed at developing virtue in individual workers, teams, and the organization itself. These three claims are the grounds for the complement model. The art of implementation is in the balance. The complement model recommends six procedural components to implement in a business ethics program: 1) Establish a hierarchy of authority for ethics training and violation reporting in order to build trust. 2) Create rules that are clear and specific, and tailored to specific divisions of the organization. 3) Provide a decision-procedure for making ethical decisions that are not covered in the rules. 4) Include ongoing, cyclical training that includes interactive participation (such as role-playing) in ethics vignettes. 5) Provide professional training in collective ethical reflection for teams (and individuals, if desired). 6) Implement a formal ethics mentoring program that pairs older mentors with younger mentees.

As shown by the first three recommendations, I think there are good reasons for retaining some of the prescriptions of situationism that red flag our moral frailties and help us recognize areas of danger. Situationism brings to light empirical evidence that should not be ignored. There are features of situations that leave us vulnerable to forces we may be unaware of, so we should try to consider in advance what those things might be. As John Doris counsels: “Reflection on situationism has an obvious benefit: it
reminds us that the world is a morally dangerous place….We should try, so far as we are able, to avoid ‘near occasions for sin’…” However, ‘so far as we are able’ may not be very far at all. The business world is changing at a rapid pace, especially because of technological advances. Occasions for sin are multiplying at an alarming rate. It would be impossible to avoid even a small portion of the situations that might be morally dangerous. The response to this fact from many business organizations has been to develop specific rules to deal with specific situations. This is good as long as workers understand the reasons for the rules and are invited to some extent to help shape the rules. It is also useful to create a decision-procedure for dealing with ethical dilemmas. For example, the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics presents an ethical decision-making framework for business that includes using a utilitarian approach, a rights approach, a fairness approach, the common good approach, and the virtue approach when making a choice for action. The complement model recommends that each organization adopt an ethical decision-making procedure that meets the specific demands of its business industry as best it can. The data from the field study seem to indicate that workers want an aid of this kind. And decision procedures can be valuable in circumstances where action must be taken quickly and there is no time to get counsel from authorities. When there is time, however, it is important to have a hierarchical structure that makes workers feel secure about what to do when faced with ethical dilemmas they cannot solve on their own. Going to one’s supervisor might not be the best action to take if the supervisor is

271 Doris, Lack of Character, 146-147.
untrained in such matters. Organizations are well served to recognize that business ethics is a profession, and some people are better trained to deal with ethical issues than others.

Yet there is a danger in thinking that rules, a decision procedure, or deferring to someone else will always be enough when dealing with the complexities of every ethical situation. That is where virtue ethics brings balance. As we have seen, virtues and character are important to individuals, teams, and organizations. For the development and maintenance of character, role-playing or interactive exercises in vignettes are currently very popular. Of course, popularity is not an argument for their efficacy; but I think any method that engages people to critically think about how to respond in ethical situations is to be recommended. In addition, I have argued for implementing two other practices in a business ethics program: deliberative ethical reflection and mentoring.

Ethical reflection is an activity that breathes life into the virtues that lie dormant on the pages of dusty codes of ethics. It is a practice that can help workers define the good of their work activities with the good of their lives overall. Ethical reflection holds promise at all levels of the organization for creating a cohesive and happy work environment. It is a process of correction and improvement that runs in both directions between management and workers, helping to build trust.

In the preceding chapter, I argued for the efficacy of a mentoring program for developing and maintaining good character traits in individuals. The key feature of the model I urge is the older mentor/younger mentee combination. I think that this is a viable model for many organizations to adopt, and the idea of utilizing the resources in our

273 Julia Annas makes this point with regard to moral theory being able to provide a decision procedure. Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 34.
aging population is catching on. In discussing the results of their study involving the reasoning abilities of older people, Grossman and colleagues write: “Social reasoning improves with age despite a decline in fluid intelligence. The results suggest that it might be advisable to assign older individuals to key social roles involving legal decisions, counseling, and intergroup negotiations.”

Discussing the relation between age and wisdom, Monika Ardelt writes: “[W]ise elders might become our most valuable asset to guide us on the path to a more ecologically balanced and socially just future.”

To summarize, the complement model is a commonsense approach to designing a business ethics program. As Robert Adams asks: “Why shouldn’t we try both to make morally propitious situational changes and to improve our characters?” The current paradigm is heavily weighted toward a conduct-control model that does not develop or support a rich ethical culture. A convincing body of evidence has been presented to show that workers desire to be connected with an organization concerned to promote virtues. To meet that demand from workers, organizations have begun to incorporate a virtue framework into their codes of ethics; but little has been done to “operationalize” the virtues. I have suggested ways to make virtue development a practical skill, both individually, in groups, and with a mentor. I have nowhere suggested that it would be easy to implement or widely and quickly successful. But it seems like the time is right to give it a try.

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275 Ardelt, Age, Experience, and the Beginning of Wisdom, 317.
4.6 Conclusion

This dissertation began by calling attention to a body of experimental work involving college age subjects, which purports to show that prosocial behavior is significantly (negatively) influenced by insignificant situational variables. I objected to the extrapolation that was made from this conclusion about college age adults to conclusions about the general population. I presented evidence from lifespan development research, which suggests that older adults are more likely to manifest prosocial behavior because they possess features of prosocial competence that insulate them from situational pressures to behave otherwise. I argued that prosocial competence is a feature of moral domain expertise, which I identified with virtue. I showed that progress in development of virtue is analogous to progress toward expertise in practical skills, by comparing and contrasting a traditional virtue ethics account of virtue development with a contemporary account of skills acquisition that comes from expertise research in psychology. I argued that two important differences emerge from the analogy: The development of virtue is constrained by epistemic and resource limitations that skills development is not, and for this reason progress toward virtue (moral expertise) takes considerable time. Because moral expertise comes in degrees, and higher levels of expertise take extended experience and time, we are more likely to find a higher percentage of older people who have made further progress toward moral expertise than young people.

I suggested that mentoring would be a valuable practice to include in business ethics programs, especially if it involves pairing an older mentor with a younger mentee.
I derived this claim from the previous evidence and arguments showing that a greater percentage of older people have made further progress toward virtue, and also because they are likely to be motivated by feelings of generativity and the need to bring narrative closure to their careers. Mentoring is just one of six recommendations I proposed for a complement model for business ethics programs. The other recommendations include establishing a hierarchy of authority for ethics training and violation reporting in order to build trust; creating rules that are clear and specific, and tailored to specific divisions of the organization; providing a decision-procedure for making ethical decisions that are not covered in the rules; including ongoing, cyclical training that includes interactive participation (such as role-playing) in ethics vignettes; and providing professional training in collective ethical reflection for teams (and individuals, if desired).

The complement model for business ethics programs was inspired by the research study I conducted in recent years and presented here. The results of the study support a model that blends both situationism and virtue ethics for creating the most effective and flourishing ethical culture for all members in an organization.

I envision future directions for research that would include studies aimed at testing prosocial behavior in different age cohorts; I also think that more longitudinal studies for assessing character development would yield important insights into personality psychology. As I indicated earlier, there are a number of different ways in which business ethics programs could be tested for effectiveness in order to design even better training. “Business” is an enormous part of every adult’s life, every single day. Each of us works in some business or another—indeed, we spend a majority of our lives
doing that. Every day we use products produced by hundreds of businesses. We depend on services from businesses in many different industries from all over the globe. And every “business” is populated by individuals who make ethical decisions, both small and large, every day. Helping people do better at *that* is no small matter. I hope that this project, and my future research, contributes in some small way to shedding light on the importance of ethics in business.
APPENDIX A

TABLE 1.1 EXPERIMENTS CITED IN LACK OF CHARACTER

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviated experiment name</td>
<td>Seminarians</td>
<td>Bystanders helping fallen woman</td>
<td>Smoke-filled room</td>
<td>Seizure simulation</td>
<td>Favor to experimenter</td>
<td>Negotiation task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-social-behavior (PSB) eliciting condition</td>
<td>Confederate in some sort of distress en route</td>
<td>Loud crash and cries come from confederate behind curtain</td>
<td>Smoke coming through wall vent in room</td>
<td>Sound of someone having seizure</td>
<td>Subject asked to do a favor for experimenter</td>
<td>Subject must compromise for joint outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situational Variable</td>
<td>Running late/running on time to give presentation</td>
<td>Bystander waiting in a group/bystander waiting alone</td>
<td>In room alone/in room with group</td>
<td>In room alone/in 'intercom' convo with others</td>
<td>Reading elation-mood statements/reading depression-mood statements</td>
<td>Seeing cartoons and receiving gift/not seeing cartoons and not receiving gift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presumed Intervening factor</td>
<td>'Degree of hurry' anxiety alteration</td>
<td>Perceived obligation to take responsibility alteration</td>
<td>Perceived obligation to take responsibility alteration</td>
<td>Perceived obligation to take responsibility alteration</td>
<td>Mood alteration</td>
<td>Mood alteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of subjects</td>
<td>40 Princeton students, 25 years or under</td>
<td>Columbia University undergraduates</td>
<td>undergradS</td>
<td>College students</td>
<td>Male college students</td>
<td>Males from State University of New York (80 subjects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of data</td>
<td>Greater PSB caused by less hurry anxiety</td>
<td>Greater PSB caused by being alone and not in group</td>
<td>Greater PSB caused by being alone and not in group</td>
<td>Greater PSB caused by improved mood</td>
<td>Greater PSB caused by improved mood</td>
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Active-engagement vs. traditional instruction for improving students’ conceptual understanding of basic physics concepts

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE

Business Ethics Program Questionnaire

1. Assign a number from 0-4 to indicate the extent to which your organization’s ethics program includes the following features:

   0 = not at all    1 = very little    2 = somewhat    3 = quite a bit    4 = a great deal

The Ethics Program:

___ Refers to specific rules, a code of conduct, or an employee ethics policy manual.
___ Includes training to recognize situations that raise ethical concerns and provides procedures for handling them.
___ Provides a formal, written decision procedure for dealing with ethical dilemmas.
___ Organizes discussion roundtables about the difficulties of doing the right thing.
___ Provides an ethics hotline, or some procedure for reporting ethics violations.
___ Uses a formal procedure for punishing ethical violations.
___ Institutes a system of promotion and compensation for implementing ethical values.
___ Includes employee performance reviews that include evaluation of ethical conduct.
___ Includes a committee available to advise employees facing an ethical dilemma.
___ Includes a Code of Ethics, or Mission/Values Statement that uses words such as honesty, responsibility, trustworthiness, fairness, respectfulness, etc.
___ Emphasizes personal virtues such as integrity, honesty, responsibility, trustworthiness, respectfulness, etc., which appear in materials such as newsletters, memos, posters, etc.
___ Includes staff training sessions that emphasize the personal virtues.
___ Includes speeches from management that emphasize the personal virtues.
___ Includes online training that emphasizes the personal virtues.
___ Emphasizes individual responsibility for making ethical choices.
___ Encourages employees to develop ethics-mentor-relationships.
___ Urges outside community service and volunteerism.
___ Supports family values within the organizational ethics culture.
___ Sponsors a company website where stories of virtuous acts by employees are featured.

Other___________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________

2A. Imagine there exists the ideal Business Ethics Program. What would you expect and desire the results of such a program to be?

2B. Using the same 0-4 scale above, circle the number that indicates to what extent your organization’s ethics program succeeds in satisfying the expectations and desires you listed in Question 2A:

0 1 2 3 4
2C. What are the reasons that your organization does or does not succeed in satisfying the expectations and desires you listed in Question #2A?

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

3. Assign a number from 0-4 to indicate the importance of the following features and expectations of a business ethics program:

0 = not at all important  1 = a little bit important  2 = important  3 = very important  4 = maximally important

___ It is cost-effective to administer
___ It is time-efficient to administer
___ It reduces ethical violations
___ It reduces legal violations
___ It motivates employees by appeal to reason
___ It motivates employees by appeal to emotion
___ It promotes a happier, friendlier workplace
___ It gives employees a decision-procedure for taking action in an ethical dilemma
___ It inspires ethical reflection, discussion, and informal dialogue among employees
___ It does not harm employees psychologically
___ It results in consistent and long-term ethical behavior according the code of ethics
___ It helps employees live a better life overall, including outside the workplace, within the family, etc.
___ It results in higher profits
___ It contributes to improved public perception of the company
### APPENDIX D

**BEP TYPED AS S OR V WITH 2B RATINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire #</th>
<th>Question #1 Total S Value</th>
<th>Question #1 Total V Value</th>
<th>Question #1 Total N Value</th>
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APPENDIX E

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CODING 2A COMMENTS

Explanation of material to be coded:

Each 2A comment box is a respondent’s answer to the following question: “Imagine there exists the ideal Business Ethics Program. What would you expect and desire the results of such a program to be?”

Instructions for Coding:

For each 2A comment box, assign one (1) V-code and one (1) S-code.

Code Key

V-Codes:

V-2 Comment very strongly makes reference to virtues of character in people. Virtues of character are consistent dispositions to think, feel, and act in the right way at the right time. Virtues of character include things like honesty, fairness, compassion, trustworthiness, generosity, kindness, etc. Virtuousness includes striving to have an integrated character in all areas of one’s life.

V-1 Comment somewhat makes reference to virtues of character in people.

V-0 Comment makes no reference to virtues of character in people.

S-Codes:

S-2 Comment very strongly makes reference to situational behaviors. Situational behavior is action specific to circumstances. Ethical situational behavior is expressed as right action according to some procedure or standard. Ethical situational behaviors include things like complying with ethics policies and programs, adhering to formal ethics procedures, following ethical decision-making rubrics, etc.

S-1 Comment somewhat makes reference to situational behaviors.

S-0 Comment makes no reference to situational behaviors.
APPENDIX F

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CODING 2C COMMENTS

Explanation of material to be coded:

Each 2C comment box is a respondent’s answer to the following question: “What are the reasons that your organization does or does not succeed in satisfying the expectations and desires you listed in question 2A?”

Instructions for Coding:

For each 2C comment box, assign one (1) SU-code and one (1) F-code.

**Code Key**

**SU Code:**

SU-2 Comment makes reference to management’s large success in supporting the stated commitment to ethics values through active and ongoing ethics training.

SU-1 Comment makes reference to management’s moderate success in supporting the stated commitment to ethics values through active and ongoing ethics training.

SU-0 Comment makes no reference to management’s success in supporting the stated commitment to ethics values through active and ongoing ethics training.

**F Code**

F-2 Comment makes reference to management’s large failure in supporting the stated commitment to ethics values through active and ongoing ethics training.

F-1 Comment makes reference to management’s moderate failure in supporting the stated commitment to ethics values through active and ongoing ethics training.

F-0 Comment makes no reference to management’s failure in supporting the stated commitment to ethics values through active and ongoing ethics training.
## APPENDIX G

### CODED COMMENTS SHEETS

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<tr>
<th>Q#</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>2B</th>
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<th>2C Comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>I would expect and desire the results of the ideal Business Ethics Program to create a more compassionate organization that affects all entities it interacts with, i.e., employees, customers, vendors, etc. Also to create an atmosphere that encourages and provides the tools and means for personal development and growth among its employees. In addition, the organization should encourage and reward its employees for work done outside the organization for the betterment of society, i.e., volunteering at food shelters, humane society, etc. The ideal BEP should help to influence the decision making process to become a more open thought process than simply being based on quantitative or monetary values. Employees would be evaluated not only on the task oriented aspect of their jobs but also on the positive influence they have on their co-workers and positive contributions made to society. V-Code: 1,2 S-Code: 1,0</td>
<td>My organization does a fairly good job at satisfying the expectations listed above except that there are no formal guidelines to follow. The company does have an open thought process when making decisions and is open to providing tools for personal development and growth if asked. However, they don’t go out of their way to provide many of the intangibles listed above. SU-Code: 1,1 F-Code: 1,1</td>
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<td>A practical, systematic and easy to understand training that would incorporate written info as well as role playing at situational questions specific to the job with clear concrete expectations of what is expected by the company/organization.</td>
<td>At times it seems that my organization is more concerned with production than mentorship at times but with a staff of 70 full-time and 15 part-time people of a multi-million dollar non-profit, it’s tough.</td>
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<td>I would expect that people in the organization would move towards a more ethical work mentality, such as honesty (no stealing from organization—materials, time, money), people working hard together as a team to do the best work possible—not just as little as can get away with to stay employed; and people being respectful to each other and less gossip, disrespectful towards each other, etc.</td>
<td>They do succeed in the matter of emphasizing working as a team to provide the best service possible and being honest with time, materials, etc. They do not succeed in the area of respect towards each other; we were rarely given meetings or tutorials on respect for fellow co-workers, managers, etc.</td>
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<td>An environment where employees feel comfortable to bring forward unethical behavior without fear of repercussions.</td>
<td>No matter how strong a program is, there will always be those unwilling to do their part.</td>
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<td>That all ethical violations are fully documented for reference and the committees approved solution to correct and improve a possible reoccurrence is fully explained and recorded.</td>
<td>Upper level management was excluded from the expected level of observation.</td>
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<td>A culture where employees desire to behave ethically in all situations. A culture where it is safe to discuss difficulties employees are having making ethical decisions</td>
<td>Part 2B would have been scored at 4 but I sense that employees within my organization still don’t feel completely safe talking about their struggle with ethical behavior.</td>
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<td>That everyone in the organization would feel obligated to conduct themselves in an ethical manner naturally and at all times. There would be few and minor violations of the ethics policy because people would be clear about expectations and want to conduct themselves according to the highest principles.</td>
<td>Our organization recruits good people and offers initial training in the core values and mission of our company. Every so often, an action is taken out of expediency, that violates the ethical policy, and is dealt with via organizational process.</td>
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<td>Employees make decisions based on honesty and fairness and reasonableness—they have a happier clientele and a happier work environment. Rules of conduct are clear from the outset.</td>
<td>People get caught up in power trips and dishonesty, stresses of work, time pressures, short cuts, pleasing their bosses for promotional and financial gain, selfishness, control factors.</td>
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<td>'There is lots of ‘talk’ in the organization I work for re: ‘ethics.’ However, my observation is that our senior leadership does not specifically practice what it preaches. Thus, and ideal program would focus the expectation on all employees with a method to measure attitudes (intrinsic) and behaviors (extrinsic).</td>
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<td>I honestly do not know wht and where the gap is. Front line staff and managers are heavily engaged in ‘doing the right thing.’ Mid and senior leadership, I’m sure, believes it is displahing virtues such as integrity, honesty, responsibility, etc. But it is not particularly evident to me.</td>
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<td>Empower employees to make ethical decisions each and every time.</td>
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<td>We don’t give ethics enough time or energy. When we go through our daily activities it is left uncovered. It is not spoken about, it is expected</td>
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<td>To equip staff to better challenge themselves regarding ethical decisions rather than be dependent on managers to decide for them. More individual initiative and assertiveness on this topic would be helpful. For staff to better serve a company’s customer</td>
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<td>They provide a general manual but it is not tailored enough or specifically for the company’s business. Treated as a afterthought with not much time available to allocate to it.</td>
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<td>Every employee acts always to: 1. Further the mission of the company, 2. Adhere to the spirit of the code of ethics, 3. Achieve personal excellence at work and in general.</td>
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<td>Complacency; leadership with no interest unless a problem occurs; no link between practice and values.</td>
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<td>Consistency of philosophy and behavior in the organization.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Proper leadership will usually bring people to the right place.</td>
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For a small company, any program needs to be flexible yet documented to allow ease of use. The usage needs to offer employees sessions during normal working hours yet does not negatively affect the production efficiency. It must also allow use by a broad range of personnel; sales, engineering, production welders, field service technicians, customer service personnel and management. Results should be tangible; that is, an acceptance of a set of moral/ethical values that are easily understood and remembered, much like “do unto other as you would have them do unto you.”

Our company priorities are based around the established priorities of the founders. Our interface with the outside is based upon sales, marketing, and employee relations that are fostered around building long term relationships. This strategic objective does rely upon an ethics base of conduct or the strategy would fail.

All decision-making requires a checkdown of ethical concerns for person, company, customers, moral

Lack of regard. Profit motive comes first in typical situations.
An ethics program would instill in everyone throughout the corporation “do unto others as you would have others do unto you.” Then everyone would be kind instead of expecting kindness, would be judgeless instead of judging, would always be empathetic and loving toward each other and everything they do. They would all see clearly that they have a choice, and the choice of kindness, love, and respect will replenish and lift them towards the goals (company or their own personal) better than anything else. They would rub love on everything they do.

Our company does not always reach this euphemistic level all the time because of the stress, speed, and pressure that is applied from the top. Yep, that is me. It is a lot easier to talk the talk than to walk the walk. We get caught up in our daily routines, not being kind after you find out the supplies went through the roof this quarter that had nothing to do within anyone’s control. Assuming you know the details and moving on, cutting someone off in the middle of their sentence. Not taking the time to listen. Not giving the time to truly listen and operating out of the emotion of the moment. Those are the things that keep us from hitting our mark more consistently. What does work is daily emphasis on pride of product and respect for each individual employee. Exemplifying quality work through personnel. If we treat

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</table>

- **V-Code: 2,2**  
  **S-Code: 0,0**

**It would inform subjects to all ethical considerations without biasing.**

- **V-Code: 0,0**  
  **S-Code: 1,1**

**It fails to completely inform. When it does inform it biases.**

- **V-Code: 2,2**  
  **S-Code: 0,0**

**People would always do the moral or ‘right’ thing. They would consider the effect of their actions on others directly involved and also on society as a whole.**

- **V-Code: 0,0**  
  **S-Code: 1,1**

**Our organization has rules of conduct in place to ensure ethical behavior and primarily to protect the public. These rules are followed in the majority of cases. Each office is individually owned and operated and financial considerations or personal values can alter the decisions that are made.**

- **V-Code: 0,0**  
  **S-Code: 1,1**

**Ethics programs are not feasible to use. They are subject to the ethics of the person or persons which wrote them. In a large corporation they tend to cause dissent.**

- **V-Code: n/a**  
  **S-Code: n/a**

**N/A**
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<th>Many, if not all, of the items listed above, in Question #1.</th>
<th>We do succeed by encouraging and expecting an exceptionally high level of quality in our work—taking pride in the accuracy of our work. We stress honesty, integrity, and accuracy in our everyday work.</th>
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<td>Consistency; detailed, clear and concise blueprint to establish guidelines.</td>
<td>Consistency in approach to ethics.</td>
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<td>SU-Code: 2,1 F-Code: 0,0</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I expect and desire the results to include an iron-clad front of ethical conduct. Not just a front, like a façade, but an outside that represents the inside.</td>
<td>My organization isn’t really a business but rather a government operation.</td>
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<td>V-Code: 0,0 S-Code: 1,1</td>
<td>SU-Code: 0,0 F-Code: 0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>That people show up on time, do the “work” they agreed to do and that they treat the customer in the same manner that they would want to be treated.</td>
<td>We have 3 restaurants and we are “actively” involved in all of them. Learn the names of your employees and learn about what their future plans are…take an interest in them—they will NOT disappoint you. Our employees return year after year. We don’t have a high turnover. I never ask an employee to do something I won’t do. I asks them to help me. “If you have the time” to ask someone to do something—they will NOT do it yourself.</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>An ideal business ethics program would have a more formal way of stating specifically what behavior is expected of employees and a way of evaluating that behavior that could be somewhat quantified (although admittedly, this might be hard to do!) V-Code: 0,0 S-Code: 2,2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>In my field (education) we did a better job of encouraging ethical behavior in students (character education programs, etc.) than in promoting that behavior among (between) staff, administration and community. SU-Code: 1,1 F-Code: 2,1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>In order to protect the ‘image’ of the organization, many times poor behavior is ignored or covered up. SU-Code: 0,0 F-Code: 2,1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
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<td>0,0</td>
<td>Consistent, fair. Our business ethics are clearly stated and everyone is held responsible. SU-Code: 2,0 F-Code: 0,0</td>
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<td>A good result would be that employees have a handbook to read or a program to follow so they have a procedure to follow when questions of ethics come up. There is nothing down on paper. There is no exact plan we always follow. SU-Code: 0,0</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
To allow someone to be able to act ethically, without seeking advice from others or questioning one’s actions.

V-Code: 1,0
S-Code: 1,0

Time constraints in the schedule.

SU-Code: 0,0
F-Code: 0,0

That people who have ethics are recognized for such and people with no business ethics who promise everything and force people to compromise their own are disciplined and dealt with immediately up to and including termination.

V-Code: 1,1
S-Code: 2,1

Too many friends and family, too many people unqualified to perform their responsibilities. Too many people paid on selling, not profit. Too many people who get away with lies to cover their ass.

SU-Code: 0,0
F-Code: 2,1

Dealing outside of what we think of as “the normal human being.”

V-Code: 0,0
S-Code: 0,0

We are who we are, let’s do business “our way.”

SU-Code: 0,0
F-Code: 1,0

An ideal program would defined virtues and how to employ them in the business setting. To some it would be a new way of looking at how to approach the job. The results of an organization that hold its actions to a much higher standard.

V-Code: 0,2
S-Code: 2,1

No formal program (EEO comes closest). Program seen as detraction to work. Not tied to success of work accomplishment. No real upper management support.

SU-Code: 0,0
F-Code: 2,1

Right conduct of all

Lack of buy-in by some
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<th>employees. Recognition of COI, ethical dilemmas. V-Code: 1,1 S-Code: 0,0 employees. SU-Code: 0,0 F-Code: 1,1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Quickly identify when an ethical dilemma exists. Provide safe environment for discussing ethical dilemmas. V-Code: 0,1 S-Code: 1,0 There isn’t enough discussion. There is pressure to ‘keep the client happy.’ SU-Code: 0,0 F-Code: 1,1</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>In-house training with follow-up and ability to ask in-house questions. V-Code: 0,0 S-Code: 0,1 The only focus in our mandated ethics training for attorneys. Others are just expected to be ethical without training. SU-Code: 1,0 F-Code: 1,1</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>That people who are in charge of providing and in charge of the company’s programs actually have an idea of what ethics are and are qualified to advise employees regarding ethical dilemmas. The result I would like to see is that everybody would be treated fairly and not by who you are and who you know and how much of a suck-up you are. V-Code: 1,1 S-Code: 1,1 All the people are unqualified to even hand out the company’s code of conduct. SU-Code: 0,0 F-Code: 2,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I would expect everyone to [Our organization] does try to</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
honor and obey the rules set forth. For people to counsel
and mentor the newbies or any violators.
V-Code: 1,0
S-Code: 1,1
enforce an ethics program, but there is no or little training offered.
SU-Code: 1,1
F-Code: 1,1

Short, concise, emphasis on personal responsibility and respect. Swift and fair
punishment. Formal training/roundtable discussions. Leadership by example. Program should seek buy-in due to reason and not just fear of punishment.
V-Code: 1,0
S-Code: 1,1
Good written plan; good definitions but no follow-through. Limited management accountability/visible activity to support/enforce plan. Very little reinforcement of program to employees. Just not part of individual business unit culture.
SU-Code: 1,1
F-Code: 1,2

The results would be an increase of the behaviors and mental states that would reflect enlightened self-interest, with a slight bias toward the interests of the firm of course. What would those behaviors be? Improved employee job performance. Increased employee well-being. Increased successful community engagement, where “successful” would mean increased community citizen well-being. Increase
Its primary goal has never been and will likely never be to succeed in satisfying those desires. The desired results would be welcomed, and working towards them is even encouraged somewhat; however, the primary goal is maximizing profits in the short-run (0-5 years). To the extent that behaviors consistent with the stated desires would aid that profit maximization, those behaviors would be highly encouraged, if not required. But many of the ideal ethical behaviors that would not
community political participation. Increased community economic prosperity. The “well-being” results could be measured by surveys requesting people to anonymously share their true opinions year after year.

V-Code: 1,0
S-Code: 0,1

contribute great to short-run profit maximization would be either unobservable or simply unperformed. Profit maximization is the end, and ideal ethical behavior would only be promoted or required where it would serve as an effective means to that end. I suspect this would be the same for most small and fast-growing firms fighting for market-share in competitive markets. * Continued below…

SU-Code: 0,1
F-Code: 1,2

43 7 12 15 3 Blank
44 11 17 19 3 Blank

TOTALS

V-Code=61
S-Code=75

SU-Code=49
F-Code=81

* Question 42, 2C Comments continued…

The small, fast-growing firms that would uncompromisingly rank the goal of ideal ethical behavior above short-run profit maximization would fail at a higher rate than the firms that would rank the goal of ethical behavior as a somewhat lower goal than the goal of short-run profit maximization, because they would leave too much money on the table too often. Also, small, fast-growing firms that would rank the goal of ideal ethical behavior much lower would fail at a higher rate than the firms that would rank the goal of ideal ethical behavior as a somewhat lower goal than the goal of short-run profit maximization, because they would be punished—they would lose symbolic capital or reputational capital in iterative games. Large, well-capitalized, market-leading businesses can afford, due to their large market share and political economic influence in their
industries, to rank the goal of ideal ethical behavior slightly higher than competitive small, fast-growing firms can. In fact, the economic incentives for ranking the goal of ideal ethical behavior slightly higher are probably stronger. Observing and participating in plenty of ethical-economical deliberations in the contexts of the small, fast-growing businesses I’ve led or consulted for, my military career, and my dealing with large corporatons, has caused me to adopt the professional mantra, “fight fairly in fair fights.” (My personal mantra is “happiness trumps.”) The phrase “fight fairly in fair fights,” has multiple meanings and would guide the sobered and battle-tested business leader’s behavior differently in different contexts. I suspect the best business leaders hone in on a similar, real-world based, pragmatic ethical disposition in their business lives., which most of us believe are ethically separate from and measured differently than our personal lives. Those who don’t adopt a similar business ethics disposition are more likely to prove too idealistic to compete in real-world, high stakes business contests. I surmise the most successful business leaders must spend some time emulating Plato as well as some time in bed with Mephistopheles.
## APPENDIX H

SU AND F RATINGS COMPARED TO 2B RATINGS

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Average SU and F rating for Low-rated BEPs (0s and 1s)  

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Average SU and F rating for High-rated BEPs (3s and 4s) 1.8 1.4

P-Values 0.0011 0.0236
APPENDIX I

TABLE 4.1 HIGH AND LOW 2B RATINGS BY BEP TYPE

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # high ratings</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX J

### TABLE 4.2 TOTAL FEATURES

17 Business Ethics Programs rated success of program (2B Rating) at 0 or 1: Total Features Rating \((S + V + N) = 394\)

16 Business Ethics Programs rated success of program (2B Rating) at 3 or 4: Total Features Rating \((S + V + N) = 647\)

### TABLE 4.3 TOTAL VALUE RATINGS QUESTION 3

3. Assign a number from 0-4 to indicate the importance of the following features and expectations of a business ethics program:

- **0** = not at all important
- **1** = a little bit important
- **2** = important
- **3** = very important
- **4** = maximally important

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>It is cost-effective to administer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>It is time-efficient to administer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>It reduces ethical violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>It reduces legal violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>It motivates employees by appeal to reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>It motivates employees by appeal to emotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>It promotes a happier, friendlier workplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>It gives employees a decision-procedure for taking action in an ethical dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>It inspires ethical reflection, discussion, and informal dialogue among employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>It does not harm employees psychologically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>It results in consistent and long-term ethical behavior according to the code of ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>It helps employees live a better life overall, including outside the workplace, within the family, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>It results in higher profits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>It contributes to improved public perception of the company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


