

The Influence of Social Norms and Personal Values on Charitable Giving Behavior
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Kristen. Surely seeing her name here will make spending the last seven years supporting someone who would have been more financially stable working at McDonalds all worth while.

DEDICATION- Continued

To give away money is an easy matter and in any man's power. But to decide to whom to give it and how large and when, and for what purpose and how, is neither in every man's power nor an easy matter.
--Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

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ABSTRACT

Although the non-profit sector is now the third largest sector of the global economy, relatively little is known about the psychological processes that underlie decisions to donate to charity. Across five experiments, the present research explores two factors that are thought to underlie giving: social norms and personal values. *Study 1* elicits personal values and manipulates descriptive social norm information and finds that both of these factors influence giving behavior. *Study 2* replicates these findings with injunctive norms in place of descriptive norms. *Study 3* manipulates both descriptive and injunctive social norms within a single study and finds that while both have an influence on giving, they do not interact in any meaningful way with each other. *Study 4* manipulates descriptive and injunctive norm information in the context of a realistic online donation decision and finds that both injunctive norms influence rates of giving, but that descriptive norm information alone influences willingness to give. *Study 5* experimentally manipulates the costs and benefits associated with viewing social information and finds that while participants are willing to view social information when there are no associated costs, willingness to view information decreases dramatically under even very small costs. We conclude in Chapter 6 by discussing the implications of these findings and potential directions for future research.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Individuals in the United States donated approximately 227 billion dollars to charitable organizations in 2009, making up almost 75% of all charitable donations in the United States for that year. This staggering amount adds up to almost 2% of GDP and is the primary source of resources by which charitable organizations are able to provide crucial services both in the United States and throughout the world.

Although the statistics above suggest that humans are indeed highly generous in their charitable contributions, the question of why individuals choose to give remains largely unanswered. Why would millions of people across the United States and the world voluntarily choose to give their money to charitable organizations, often with little or no obvious direct benefit to themselves? My research aims to answer this question by investigating the social, cognitive, and neural mechanisms that lead to charitable donations using a fundamentally interdisciplinary approach, incorporating research from moral psychology and philosophy, behavioral economics, and neuroeconomics (Kvaran & Sanfey, 2010). Integrating across these various approaches has the potential to greatly improve our understanding of a question that is not only of academic interest, but can also have an important influence on public policy by providing insights into the kinds of interventions that will be most likely to inspire new donors to begin giving, as well as increase the contributions of individuals who already give.

Background and Specific Aims

The experience of being asked to give money to a charitable organization of one kind or another is a common human experience. Whether it be pledge drives on radio or television stations, canned food drives at schools, international aid organizations asking for money to rebuild after natural disasters, or simply a panhandler asking for enough money to buy a meal, we all face the decision of whether or not to open our wallets and give generously countless times over the course of a life. Given the prominent and important role that charity plays in modern life, it is perhaps surprising that careful research on philanthropy is still a relatively young discipline (Smith, 1975) with research into the psychological and neural underpinnings of charity being even more recent (Mayr et al., 2009).

One way to consider how to maximize the likelihood of donation is to look at large scale studies of who gives the most. Knowledge of this type is often thought to be particularly useful because it allows charitable organizations to target those individuals most likely to give. As a first pass, a review of the literature on philanthropy suggests that the ideal giver is: highly religious (Hodgkinson & Weitzman, 1996), of a protestant faith (Berger, 2006), with a college degree in the social sciences (Hillygus, 2005), a large income (i.e. in the top income tax bracket)(Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter, 2002), between age 40 and 65 (Andreoni, 2001), female (Andreoni et al., 2003), and caucasian (Feldman, 2007; Marx, 2000).

Although the above characteristics give a cartoon portrait of the most likely giver, the above information has turned out to be only superficially useful in determining how

to elicit charitable donation. Nearly all of the above characteristics come with multiple caveats as to when and to what they are willing to donate. For instance, although religiosity is among the largest predictors of charitable giving, the religious give almost exclusively to organizations that are based in their own faith, and are no more likely than the non-religious to give to secular charities (Marx, 2000). Because most data on who gives is gathered through large scale surveys and public records the data are also necessarily limited to correlations, making it difficult to discern whether the above variables are causally relevant to the likelihood of charitable giving.

What Makes People Give

There is a relatively large literature that has focused on the contextual and situational factors that can lead to giving. While still largely a descriptive project (the emphasis in almost all research on philanthropy is the end result, as opposed to the psychological process that brought about that result), this approach to philanthropy research has been substantially more productive in informing charities how to increase their giving than the previously cited assessments of who gives to charity.

A recent comprehensive review of philanthropy research across multiple disciplines cites six factors that influence giving: (1) awareness of need, (2) solicitation, (3) costs and benefits, (4) altruism, (5) reputation, and (6) values (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2007). Each of these factors suggests particular actions that can be taken on the part of the charitable organization to increase the likelihood of donations, and as such will be considered individually for how they influence giving.

Awareness of Need

Among the most important factors influencing a person's decision to give is their perception of the need of the organization they are being asked to donate to. Importantly, it is the subjective perception of need, and not the actual objective needs of the organization that influences giving to charity (Wagner and Wheeler, 1969; Lee & Farrell, 2003). This suggests that one important way for a charity to increase the likelihood of donation is to actively attempt to manipulate the perception of need among potential donors. The most common and powerful way to manipulate these perceptions is through use of media and advertising. It has been found that media coverage of a particular cause is highly correlated with perceived need of an organization (Simon, 1997).

One caveat to studies on the relationship between perceived need and giving is that it appears to be a non-linear "inverted-u" shaped relationship (Small et al., 2007). Perception of need appears to facilitate giving to a certain point, but when perception of need becomes too great, it decreases giving. Small and colleagues (2007) argue that this may be due to either a sense of helplessness when the need becomes too great, or a strong desire to invest in charities that will be able to accomplish a goal and make a genuine difference.

Solicitation

The method of solicitation has also been shown to have an important relationship with rates of giving. In particular, it has been repeatedly found that active solicitation generates more donations than passive solicitations (Lindskold et al., 1977). In short, charities that ask people to give receive more donations than charities that simply present people with the opportunity to give. However, it has also been shown that “donation fatigue” can often set in if the donors perceive that the active solicitation is too aggressive (Van Diepen et al., 2006).

Costs and benefits

Perceived costs and benefits of the giving process are a third factor that influences charitable decisions. In general, financial costs are less prohibitive (in instances of relatively smaller dollar amounts) than are perceived inconveniences such as loss of time, forms that must be completed and mailed in (Smith and McSweeney, 2007), and even donating during bad weather conditions. Anecdotally, during the recent crisis in Haiti, one of the primary methods of generating donations from the general public was to create remarkably simple methods of donating, including sending a single text message or clicking on single link in a social-networking site. Streamlining of the donation process should be of primary concern to the organization, and the solicitor should emphasize the simplicity with which they can carry out their donation.

Another well-known influence on the perception of the costs of giving is reference, or anchor, effects. These effects find that if a person has recently been asked

to give a very large amount, they will perceive a subsequent moderate amount as being smaller than it actually is (Cialdini et al., 1975), and as such will be more willing to give.

Altruism

Altruism is an important concept in the charitable giving literature. Economists distinguish between different types of altruism, in particular ‘warm-glow’ altruism in which giving is thought to generate utility in the form of positive emotion, and ‘pure’ altruism in which the individual is not concerned with his own self-interest, but rather purely with the well-being of the organization being donated to (Andreoni, 1990).

Reputation

Perceived implications of giving for an individual’s reputation are another important factor in influencing charitable donation. In most cultures, giving to charity is considered a positive social action, and as such, an individual who is perceived as charitable is more likely to be seen in a positive light by their peers (Clark, 2002) and being seen as uncharitable can be damaging to a person’s reputation (Bateson et al., 2006). Reputation enhancement can be harnessed by providing the potential donor with a token such as a sticker or certificate indicating that they have chosen to donate. Reputation deflation effects can be harnessed as well. One recent study found that creating the effect that the donor is being watched by simply putting plastic eyes on a donation tin lead to increased donations (Haley & Fessler, 2005).

Personal Values

Strong personal and moral values are also associated with increased giving. Personal and moral values have been particularly difficult to study experimentally because they are inherently not open to manipulation. Because of this, research into personal values has been restricted to considering differences in giving among groups with different personal values. Rene Bekkers has produced particularly substantial research in this area, showing that individuals who have altruistic or pro-social values (Bekkers 2007) and those who endorse moral principles of justice and care (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2006) are significantly more likely to give.

In addition to the above broad values being associated with increased giving, values tied to specific causes are also not surprisingly predictive of giving behavior to particular charities. Supporting causes that are perceived to be in line with ones own personal values is a strong motivator of giving (Bennett, 2003).

The Psychology and Neurobiology of Giving

Surprisingly, relatively little experimental research has actively explored the psychological mechanisms that lead to individuals' decisions to donate. As recent reviews of the literature on charitable giving reveal, most research investigating donations to charitable organizations has focused on large-scale correlational studies and field studies (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2007). While this body of research has provided substantial insights into charitable giving, it has tended to focus on questions related to policy implementation (i.e. does policy x increase or decrease total rates of giving, does

taxation crowd out private donation), leaving our understanding of the specific psychological and neural processes underlying generous donations remarkably limited. Moving beyond the macro-level questions that have typically dominated research on charitable giving and toward more rigorous experimental methods will provide us with an improved understanding of the individual decision-maker, and ultimately allow policy makers to design more effective interventions aimed at increasing both the likelihood that an individual will donate and the amount they will donate.

A small number of neuroimaging studies are beginning to reveal some information about why people give. Moll et al. (2006) had participants play a sophisticated task in which they decided whether to donate money to various charities. By manipulating the costs and benefits of donation, they were able to look at charitable giving under a number of different conditions. Perhaps most intriguingly, they found that activity in the striatum, an area associated with reward and economic utility, was activated both by receiving a cash reward and by giving to charity. This first study was seen as providing evidence for the warm-glow model of altruism (Andreoni, 1990). According to this warm-glow model, people give because it feels good to give, and this good feeling is associated with a certain amount of economic utility. If the amount of utility gained by donating is greater than the amount of utility gained by not donating, then the donation transaction will occur. Moll et al. (2006) suggest that because they see similar activation for giving as for receiving money, giving is rewarding, and thus this evidence is in favor with the warm-glow theory.

Harbaugh et al. (2007) found similar activations, but additionally found that these effects were substantially increased when donations were voluntary (as in the case of charity) as opposed to forced (as in the case of taxation). A third study has recently used a computational model of inequity aversion in conjunction with a charitable giving task to explore notions of distributive justice (Hsu et al., 2008). In this study, individuals are faced with the choice of whether to maximize the total amount of food that they can donate (but to donate it relatively inequitably) or to donate less food overall, but in a more equitable manner. For example, one could choose to donate 20 meals to one specific hungry child, or offer 6 meals each to 3 such children. They found that the degree of inequity was associated with bilateral activity in the putamen, that efficiency was associated with activity in the head of the caudate, and that individual differences in their modeling data predicted individual differences in insula activity.

These three studies suggest that there is much to be learned about the nature of charitable giving by adopting a cognitive neuroscience perspective. However, they also illustrate the dearth of knowledge currently available, and suggest that substantially more research is needed.

An analysis of the findings above suggests that factors influencing donation decisions fall roughly into two categories: those that are expectation dependent and those that are not. The vast majority of the research detailed above suggests that it is not objective standards that we are sensitive to in deciding what to donate to, but rather subjective, expectation-dependent beliefs. The notable exception to this is the research on personal and moral values. This suggests that one particularly promising approach to

studying the psychology of charitable giving would be to model it as an interaction between flexible, expectation-dependent beliefs on the one hand, and rigid moral values on the other.

Recent theoretical work in economics has produced powerful formal models of how expectations may influence decision-making (Batagalli & Dufwenberg, 2007) and recent neuroeconomic research has suggested an important role for expectations in other forms of social-decision making (Sanfey, 2009). Moral psychology has produced important new models of personal and protected values (Tetlock, 2000; Ritov & Baron; 1999) that provide an explanation of their rigid and inflexible role in decision-making. By integrating these two approaches and using them as a psychological framework for understanding charitable giving, we may begin to better understand not only who gives and what makes them give, but also why they give.

Social Norms and Charitable Giving

The research reported in Chapters Two, Three, Four, and Five of this dissertation aims to use experimental behavioral methods to explore one particularly important influence on human behavior: norms. Much has been written about the influence of norms on behavior (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), with most scholars agreeing that norms can meaningfully be broken down into three categories: descriptive norms, injunctive norms, and personal norms.

Descriptive norms are subjective perceptions of typical behavior in a given situation (i.e. what most people do). Descriptive norms are often contrasted with

injunctive norms, which are perceptions of what a social group deems to be appropriate behavior (i.e. what people ought and ought not to do). Descriptive and injunctive norms are both often subsumed under the category of social norms. Social norms have been repeatedly found to be important predictors of a range of behaviors from decisions to litter (Cialdini et al., 1990), to alcohol abuse (Walters & Neighbors, 2005), to safe sex practices (Van Empelen et al., 2001) and many others (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Both Sanfey (2009) and Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) found that by manipulating descriptive norm information, acceptance of unfair offers in a standard economic game (the ultimatum game) could be increased.

Within the field of charitable giving there is very little experimental work done on the influence of social norms. Rachel Croson and colleagues have provided compelling evidence that manipulation of social information relevant to descriptive norm perceptions has a significant positive effect on amount donated in a series of field studies done in collaboration with several public radio stations (Croson et al., 2009; Croson & Sheng, 2011). Frey & Meier (2004) found that social information manipulations had a positive effect on whether a person donated at all in a university fundraising campaign. Lastly, Martin and Randal (2011) conducted several field experiments using a museum donation box and found that by manipulating cues to giving norms, both willingness to donate and amount donated could be either increased or decreased.

In contradiction to the flexible social nature of descriptive and injunctive norms, personal norms are characterized as personal standards of behavior based on internalized values. Personal and moral values have been particularly difficult to study

experimentally because they are inherently not open to manipulation. Because of this, research into personal values has been restricted to considering differences in giving among groups with different personal values. For instance, research on protected and sacred values has found that challenges to a personal norm are accompanied by increased “moral outrage” and a desire for acts of “moral cleansing” (Tetlock, 2000).

Strong personal norms are also associated with increased giving. Rene Bekkers has produced particularly substantial research in this area, showing that individuals who have altruistic or pro-social values (Bekkers, 2007) and those who endorse moral principles of justice and care (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2006) are significantly more likely to give. In addition to the above broad values being associated with increased giving, values tied to specific causes are also not surprisingly predictive of giving behavior to particular charities. Supporting causes that are perceived to be in line with one's own personal values is a strong motivator of giving (Bennett, 2003).

Overview of Dissertation Research

The proceeding chapters of this dissertation will detail five studies conducted in order to illuminate the roles of personal values and social norms in charitable giving behavior. In *Chapter Two*, we show that charitable donations are influenced by descriptive social norms, but that the impact that this social information has on behavior is context-dependent. Participants are maximally influenced by descriptive norm information when their own values are not strongly consistent or inconsistent with those of the charity. In *Chapter Three* two studies are reported that show that injunctive norms

also exhibit an influence on giving behavior. In *Chapter Four* a realistic online donation task is used to determine whether the findings reported in Chapters Two and Three would persist in a more naturalistic environment. In *Chapter Five* we move beyond addressing whether social information has an effect on giving behavior to explore whether individuals will actively seek out social information when it comes with associated costs or benefits. *Chapter Six* summarizes the findings from Chapters Two, Three, Four, and Five and provides indications of where research aimed at understanding the psychology of charitable giving may be headed in the future.

CHAPTER 2: GIVING AS EXPECTED: THE ROLES OF PERSONAL VALUES AND SOCIAL NORMS IN CHARITABLE GIVING BEHAVIOR

Charitable giving is big business. Individuals in the United States donated approximately 230 billion dollars to charitable organizations in 2009, which comprises almost 75% of all donations in the United States (Giving USA, 2010). Given the size and importance of the charitable sector, surprisingly little experimental research has actively explored the psychological mechanisms that lead to individual decisions to donate (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2007, Andreoni, 2006). Though this research has provided significant insights into charitable giving, taken as a whole it has focused more on questions related to policy implementation, leaving relatively limited understanding of the specific underlying psychological processes. The present study attempts to shed light on these psychological processes by exploring the role that both personal values and descriptive social norms play in actual giving behavior.

Norms

Descriptive norms are subjective perceptions of typical behavior in a given situation, that is, our belief about what most people do (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Though often ill-formed, descriptive norms have been repeatedly found to be important predictors of a range of decision-making behaviors including littering (Cialdini, 1990), alcohol abuse (Walters & Neighbors, 2005), and safe sex practices (Van Empelen et al., 2001), as well as many others (Cialdini, 2004). For example, several studies have found

that by manipulating descriptive norm information, the decision to accept unfair offers in a standard Ultimatum Game could be increased (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Sanfey, 2009).

A series of field studies conducted in collaboration with public radio provided compelling evidence that manipulating descriptive norms had a significant positive effect on donation amounts (Croson et al., 2008; Croson & Sheng, 2011). Similarly, Frey & Meier (2004) found that social information manipulations had a positive effect on whether a person made a donation in a university fundraising campaign. Finally, Martin and Randal (2011) conducted field experiments using a museum donation box, finding that cueing 'giving' norms could influence both willingness to donate and amount donated.

Personal Values

Personal values are also associated with donation decisions. Personal and moral values are difficult to study experimentally as they are inherently not amenable to experimental manipulation, and therefore research into personal values has been restricted to examining differences in giving between groups with different sets of values. For example, individuals who have altruistic or pro-social values (Bekkers, 2007) and those who endorse moral principles of justice and care (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2006) are significantly more likely to give to charity. In addition to these broad sets of ideals, values tied to specific causes have been shown to be predictive of giving behavior. Unsurprisingly, causes that are perceived to be consistent with one's own personal values

provide strong motivations for giving (Bennett, 2003) - holding strong personal values associated with a particular cause (i.e. saving a nature conservatory) made participants unwilling to accept a tax refund at the expense of even minimal cost to that cause (Ritov and Kahneman, 1997; for similar results see Tetlock (2000) and McGraw and Tetlock (2005)). Conversely, participants rating a charity as highly inconsistent with their own personal beliefs were willing to forgo payment, or even accrue a cost, in order to ensure that the charity did not benefit (Moll et al., 2006). One question that has yet to be addressed is whether personal values interact with social norms. While no work we are aware of has addressed this question directly, Van der Linden (2011) found that personal values predicted intentions to give, and mediated the effect of descriptive social norms on intentions to give, suggesting an important relationship between these two factors.

Present Study

In the present study we both elicited individual personal values and experimentally manipulated beliefs related to the decision to donate to charity. Participants were first exposed to a number of different charitable organizations, and rated each on the degree to which this charity was consistent with their own personal values (c.f. Cialdini et al., 1990; Bicchieri, 2006). Participants were then provided with details about how much others had given to these charities, and following that participants made a real donation decision.

The hypotheses were twofold. First, we predicted that both social norm information and personal values would have a strong influence on giving. Second, and

most importantly, we predicted an interaction between personal values and descriptive norms, such that participants would be less likely to be influenced by the social norm when their personal values were either highly consistent or highly inconsistent with those of the charity, as compared to when their personal values were only moderately consistent with the charity. That is, social norm information should have the most influence when participants are relatively neutral about a particular charity. If these hypotheses were confirmed, it would have important implications for the understanding of the psychology of charitable giving.

Methods

Subjects

42 participants (48% female, mean age = 19.8, SD= 3.07) were recruited from the University of Arizona subject pool. All participants were undergraduates and received course credit as compensation, with participation taking approximately 90 minutes. The experiment was presented using the E-Prime software package.

Design

Participants completed the task in two phases within a single session. The charities used were all currently functioning organizations selected from the website www.charitynavigator.org. 54 charities were used in the experiment, consisting of nine charities from each of the following six categories: Animal Rights, Education, Environment, Health, Human Rights, and International Aid. All charities had been given

at least a three star rating (out of four) by charitynavigator.org, which avoids confounds associated with the organizational quality of the selected charities.

Phase 1: Charity Rating Task Participants were first informed about, and then rated, each of the charities on three variables: (1) prior familiarity, (2) how much the values of the organization overlapped with their own personal values, and (3) their judgment about how much people, on average, would donate to this charity (out of a notional \$5 amount). The presentation order of the charities was randomized across participants. The *familiarity* and *values overlap* questions were rated on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale. *Donation judgment* ratings were made on a \$0-\$5 scale in one dollar increments. After rating all charities on these variables, they were given a short break before beginning phase 2.

Phase 2: Charitable Donation Task

Next, participants were asked to make donations to each of the charities from phase 1. Participants were told that they would be endowed with \$5 on each trial, and that they could give as much or as little of this endowment as they wished in 50-cent increments. On each trial, participants were first given a brief reminder of the mission of the charity. Participants were then provided with an amount between \$0.50 and \$4.50. They were either told that this was the average amount that the previous 100 participants had given (*normed trials*), or that due, to an insufficient amount of data, a computer had randomly selected a number (*random trials*).

Norm information was presented such that for each of the six charity types, participants saw six normed trials and three random trials. Of the six *normed trials*, participants received two of the three possible ‘low’ norms (0.50,1.00,1.50), two ‘medium’ norms (2.00, 2.50, 3.00) and two ‘high’ norms (3.50, 4.00, 4.50). In the three *random trials*, participants saw one low, one medium, and one high norm offer. Importantly, across all 54 charities, participants saw equal numbers of each possible norm, ranging from 0.50 to 4.50.

After seeing the information, participants were asked to decide how much of their \$5 they would like to donate to the charity. Participants could select any amount between \$0 and \$5, in 50-cent increments. The participant kept any amount not donated. After making their decision, participants saw a screen reminding them how much they had donated and how much they would keep for themselves. In summary, we used a 2 (norm type: human or computer) x 3 (norm offer: low, medium, high) x 6 (charity type: animal rights, education, environment, health, human rights, international aid) repeated-measures design during this phase.

After making decisions for all 54 charities, participants were asked to complete several demographic and personality questionnaires. At the conclusion of the experiment one of the charities was randomly selected by the computer and participants (and the charity) were paid accordingly.

Results

Elicited Expectations Predict Giving Decisions

We first assessed whether participants' judgments of how much others would give to each charity would accurately predict overall donations. That is, are people well-calibrated as to how much each charity would receive on average? From a maximum possible of \$5 per charity, participants gave on average \$2.61 (SD=\$1.55), with the average judgment being that others would offer \$2.30 (SD=\$1.54). A mixed effects regression with the average donation amount for each charity predicted by the elicited expectation, using participant as a random factor and a varying slope, revealed that judgments of what others would give significantly predicted donations to each charity ($p=.10$, $se=.006$, $t=17.09$, $p<.001$, see figure 2.1).




Fig. 2.1. Relationship between expected and actual donations

Source of Norm Information Influences Giving Decisions

Next, we examined whether the source of norm information impacts giving decisions. We examined this within the context of a larger mixed effects model in which donations were predicted by trial type (norm or random information), the explicit amount shown, values overlap, and all two and three way interactions of these variables as fixed effects, with participant and charitable organization as random effects with varying intercepts.

There was no main effect of trial type comparing norm ($M=2.65$, $SD=1.54$) and random ($M=2.48$, $SD=1.57$) trials, but there was a significant interaction between trial type and the explicit amount displayed ($pe=.16$, $se=.081$, $t=1.997$, $p<.05$). Specifically, the effect of the explicit information amount is significantly larger on normed trials compared to random trials, that is, participants used the displayed amount more when they believed it was social norm information (see fig. 2.2).




Fig. 2.2. Interaction between Trial Type (human vs computer) and explicit norm manipulation.

Personal Values Interact With Social Norms in Giving Behavior

We first assessed whether either explicit descriptive norm information or subjective personal values influenced giving behavior. Norm information did indeed impact donations, with amounts increasing linearly as the norm amount increased ($\beta=.27$, $se=.21$, $t=4.08$, $p<.001$). Additionally, the degree of overlap between a charity's values and an individual's personal values also significantly predicted donation amounts, with donations increasing as participants reported higher levels of values overlap ($\beta=.46$, $se=.04$, $t=11.10$, $p<.001$).

Importantly, our analysis also revealed a significant interaction between values overlap and norm amount ($\beta=-.04$, $se=.016$, $t=-2.81$, $p<.05$). Specifically, the norm amount information had the largest effect when participants rated a charity as overlapping moderately with their own personal values (a score of 3-5 on a 1-7 scale) and a relatively smaller influence when the values of charities overlapped either substantially or very little (scores of 6-7, or 1-2 respectively, see figure 2.3). These results demonstrate that,




Fig. 2.3. Interaction between Personal Values and Descriptive Norms

as predicted, social norm information is relied on particularly when an individual's personal values are moderately connected to a particular charity.

Discussion

Though billions of dollars are given to charity every year, there is a relatively poor understanding of the psychological factors that underlie decisions to donate. Here, we investigated the impact of both social norms and personal values on real donations to a broad spectrum of charitable organizations. As predicted, participants gave more to a charity when supplied with information indicating that a greater amount had been given to that charity by others, and gave less when this norm was to give less. There was also an effect on donation amount when this number was randomly generated, suggesting an anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, the influence of the explicit information was significantly less when the associated amount paired with the charity was described as randomly generated compared to when the participant believed it reflected actual descriptive norm information. More importantly, we found that the influence of social norm information on charitable donations significantly interacts with people's own personal values. When individuals feel that the values of a charitable organization are either highly consistent or inconsistent with their own values, social norms have relatively little effect on donation decisions. However, when participants do not possess especially strong beliefs about the values of a particular charity, norm information has a strong and significant effect on how much is donated. Finally, it is

worth noting that participants in general were quite accurate at predicting average giving to each charity.

In contrast to previous work in this area, our findings argue that while altering beliefs about social norms can be an effective way to influence donation behavior, the relative impact of these beliefs will be context-dependent. That is, information related to social norms is likely to be a particularly salient factor in influencing giving decisions when potential donors are relatively neutral about the values of the charitable organization in question. In cases where people already view a charity as being highly consistent, or highly inconsistent, with their own values, providing norm information about how much people typically donate may not be a particularly effective strategy for increasing donation amounts. This effect is particularly important because people exhibit a wide range of beliefs about the consistency of the values of charities with their own values. In the present research participants on average gave relatively neutral values overlap ratings to 50.3 percent of charities, while giving ratings of highly consistent or inconsistent to 49.7 percent of charities.

The results from the present research are an important step in understanding how social norms and personal values influence giving. Future studies should aim to further clarify the specific underlying cognitive and emotional mechanisms, as increased insight into the mechanisms underlying donation decisions has the potential to allow for the development of interventions and policy designed to increase charitable giving. Much research in behavioral economics has explored the role of warm-glow altruism in pro-social decision-making (Andreoni, 1990; Harbaugh, 1998), whereby individuals are

motivated by the rewarding “warm-glow” inherent in the act of giving. While there have been some studies which argue the existence of neural correlates of warm-glow giving (Harbaugh et al., 2007; Moll et al., 2006), these studies do not take into account social norms. Future studies could usefully aim to either manipulate or elicit social norm beliefs from individuals in order to better understand the relationship between warm-glow giving and social norm effects.

A recent alternative to the warm-glow theory directly takes social expectations into account in models of altruism (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). This guilt-aversion model proposes that a negative feeling of guilt is experienced when we violate social expectations, with people therefore acting to minimize this feeling, that is, giving to avoid feeling bad about not giving. Recent neuroscience research (Chang et al., 2011) has provided compelling behavioral and neuroimaging evidence suggesting that this guilt aversion model has a plausible neural basis, and that it can also predict reciprocity decisions in a standard socioeconomic task, the Trust Game. Exploring the relationship between social norms and guilt aversion is likely to be a highly fruitful area for future research on charitable giving. Exploring other aversive social emotions such as shame, which has been associated with violations of personal values and standards (Keltner & Buswell, 1996), may shed even further light on the mechanisms by which personal values and social norms interact during decisions to donate.

In a time when demands for the services provided by charities are at historic highs, understanding the psychology of charitable donations is critically important. We have shown here that both social norms and personal values are key factors in donation

decisions. As charities look for strategies to increase donations, we believe that focusing on altering beliefs about how much others give to charity will be especially important, particularly for those charities for which individuals are unlikely to have yet formed beliefs about the values of the organization.

CHAPTER 3: DO AS I SAY OR AS I DO?
TESTING THE INFLUENCE OF INJUNCTIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE NORMS ON
DONATION BEHAVIOR

Abstract

Previous research has shown that manipulation of descriptive social norms can influence charitable giving behavior. However, little research has been conducted to determine whether other types of social norms may also influence giving behavior. Here, we report two studies that explore whether (1) injunctive social norms influence behavior and (2) whether injunctive and descriptive norms interact when both are made salient to decision-makers. We find that injunctive norms do influence giving behavior, but that they do not interact with descriptive social norms. These findings have important implications, as in many instances injunctive social norms may be substantially easier for fundraisers to manipulate than descriptive social norms.

Introduction

In Study 1 (see Chapter 2), it was shown that manipulating expectations about social norms of giving can significantly influence a donation decision, particularly when the values of the individual do not overlap strongly with those of the charitable organization. In that study, information related to descriptive social norms was manipulated. That is, we provided participants with information regarding the actual giving behavior of a sample of previous participants. Although descriptive social norms

are the most prominent focus of social norms research, there is also a substantial body of research devoted to other forms of social norms. In particular, research has focused on the influence that *injunctive* social norms may have on behavior in a number of different domains (Kredentser et al., 2012; Cialdini et al., 1990; Cialdini et al., 2003).

Injunctive social norms are norms about what others in one's social community find appropriate or permissible. In other words, they are norms about what one "ought" to do. Research in the area of social norms has identified these norms as a distinct psychological construct from descriptive social norms, which are norms about the actual behavior of other members of one's social community (see Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) for a review).

A clear example of these two types of norms in action come from a now-classic study on littering behavior conducted by Cialdini and colleagues (1990). In the study participants were observed coming out of a theatrical performance into a parking garage that had been manipulated to contain either a large number of playbills and other litter, or almost no litter. Additionally they manipulated whether this litter was swept into tidy piles, or scattered randomly. The researchers posited that the amount of litter on the ground sent a social signal about the descriptive norm of littering, whereas a competing message about the injunctive norm of littering was sent by whether the litter was swept (in which case the injunctive norm was "littering is not approved of") or unswept ("littering is accepted"). The researchers found that both of these manipulations had an influence on behavior, and in a follow-up study they found that the degree to which one was primed to focus on either a descriptive norm or an injunctive norm predicted the

degree to which norm one would conform to. This led to the development of the ‘norm focus’ theory (Kallgren et al., 2000), which has been applied to a number of societal problems including theft in national parks (Cialdini, 2003) and responsible household energy consumption (Schultz et al., 2007).

Although there is broad support for the role of injunctive norms in guiding behavior, recent research in behavioral economics has found that injunctive norms do *not* appear to influence behavior in laboratory experiments of pro-social behavior except in the case where they are consistent with descriptive norms (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). That is to say, when what others find appropriate diverges from what others actually do, individuals will be influenced primarily by the descriptive belief as opposed to the injunctive belief.

Present Studies

In the present studies we first elicited individual personal values and descriptive and injunctive social norms about small donations to a variety of different charitable organizations. We then experimentally manipulated beliefs related to the decision to donate to these charities. In Studies 2 and 3, we used an experimental procedure identical to that used in Study 1 (see Chapter 2), with the exception that we manipulated beliefs about injunctive norms in place of descriptive norms in Study 2 and manipulated both descriptive and injunctive norms in Study 3.

In Study 2, we predicted that injunctive social norm information and personal values would have a strong influence on giving. Second, and most importantly, we

predicted an interaction between personal values and injunctive norms, such that participants would be less likely to be influenced by the norm manipulation when their personal values were either highly consistent or highly inconsistent with those of the charity, as compared to when their personal values were only moderately consistent with the charity. In Study 3 we predicted that both injunctive and descriptive norm information would have a significant influence on giving behavior.

These hypotheses are of particular importance because recent research in behavioral economics has suggested that injunctive norms do not exert an influence on pro-social behavior (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). If the above hypotheses were confirmed, it would challenge this notion and establish a role for injunctive norms in giving behavior. Because injunctive norms may in many cases be relatively easier to manipulate than descriptive norm information, these findings may be of particular importance in developing strategies aimed at increasing fundraising totals.

Study 2

Methods

Subjects

Forty-eight participants (73% female, mean age = 18.77, SD= 1.01) were recruited from the University of Arizona subject pool. All participants were undergraduates and received course credit as compensation, with participation taking approximately 90 minutes. The experiment was presented using the E-Prime software package.

Design

Participants completed the task in two phases within a single session. The charities used were all currently functioning organizations selected from the website www.charitynavigator.org. Fifty-four charities were used in the experiment, consisting of nine charities from each of the following six categories: Animal Rights, Education, Environment, Health, Human Rights, and International Aid. All charities had been given at least a three star rating (out of four) by charitynavigator.org, which avoids confounds associated with the organizational quality of the selected charities.

Phase 1: Charity Rating Task Participants were first informed about, and then rated, each of the 54 charities on three variables: (1) how much the values of the organization overlapped with their own personal values, (2) how much out of five dollars other people would say should be donated to the charity, and (3) their judgment about how much people, on average, would donate to this charity (out of a notional \$5 amount). The presentation order of the charities was randomized across participants. The *values overlap* question was rated on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale. Judgments about descriptive and injunctive expectations were made on a \$0-\$5 scale in one dollar increments. After rating all charities on these variables, they were given a short break before beginning phase 2.

Phase 2: Charitable Donation Task

Next, participants were asked to make donations to each of the charities from phase 1. Participants were told that they would be endowed with \$5 on each trial, and that they could give as much or as little of this endowment as they wished in 50-cent increments. On each trial, participants were first given a brief reminder of the mission of the charity (see appendix for specific wordings of brief descriptions). Participants were then provided with an amount between \$0.50 and \$4.50. They were either told that this was the average amount that a sample of 100 individuals said should be donated to the charity (*injunctive trials*), or that due to an insufficient amount of data, a computer had randomly selected a number (*random trials*). This information was presented such that for each of the six charity types, participants saw six injunctive trials and three random trials. Of the six *injunctive trials*, participants received two of the three possible ‘low’ norms (0.50, 1.00, 1.50), two ‘medium’ norms (2.00, 2.50, 3.00) and two ‘high’ norms (3.50, 4.00, 4.50). In the three *random trials*, participants saw one low, one medium, and one high norm offer. Importantly, across all 54 charities, participants saw equal numbers of each possible norm, ranging from 0.50 to 4.50.

After seeing the information, participants were asked to decide how much of their \$5 they would like to donate to the charity. Participants could select any amount between \$0 and \$5, in 50-cent increments. The participant kept any amount not donated. After making their decision, participants saw a screen reminding them how much they had donated and how much they would keep for themselves. In summary, we used a 2 (norm type: injunctive or random) x 3 (norm offer: low, medium, high) x 6 (charity type: animal

rights, education, environment, health, human rights, international aid) repeated-measures design during this phase.

After making decisions for all 54 charities, participants were asked to complete several demographic and personality questionnaires. At the conclusion of the experiment one of the charities was randomly selected by the computer and participants (and the charity) were paid accordingly.

Results

Differences in Elicited Descriptive and Injunctive Norms

Our first question of interest was whether differences existed in the pre-manipulation descriptive and injunctive norms of participants. To assess this we first calculated the average descriptive norm (how much others would donate on average) and injunctive norm (how much others thought should be donated) for each participant across all 54 rated charities rated during phase 1 of the experiment. A within-subject t-test was then used to determine whether there was a significant difference between how much participants believed others *would* donate and how much they believed others thought *should* be donated. Results of this test revealed that participants believed that injunctive norms ($M=\$3.11$, $SD=\$0.85$) were significantly higher than descriptive norms ($M=\$2.34$, $SD=\$0.76$, $t(47)=-9.38$, $p<.001$, see fig. 3.1).




Figure 3.1. Difference in prior beliefs of descriptive and injunctive norms

As a secondary question, we were interested in the relationship between participants' prior beliefs about descriptive and injunctive norms. We assessed this question in two ways. First, we calculated the correlation between the average descriptive and injunctive norm ratings for each of the 54 charities. We found a highly significant correlation between the average descriptive and injunctive norm ratings of each charity (Pearson's $r = 0.96$, $t(52)=17.73$, $p < 0.0001$, figure 3.2).




Fig. 3.2. Correlation between average descriptive and injunctive norm by charity

Next, we assessed the relationship at the level of the average descriptive and injunctive ratings from each participant. A Pearson correlation test again revealed a highly significant correlation between descriptive and injunctive norm ratings (Pearson's $r = 0.87$, $t(46) = 7.70$, $p < .0001$, see fig. 3.3).




Fig. 3.3. Correlation between average injunctive and descriptive norms by participant

Source of Norm Information Influences Giving Decisions

Next, we examined whether the source of norm information impacts giving decisions. As in study 1 (see Chapter 2), we examined this within the context of a larger mixed effects model in which donations were predicted by (1) trial type (norm or random information), (2) grand mean centered explicit injunctive norm information, (3) grand mean centered values overlap scores, and all two and three way interactions of these variables as fixed effects, with participant and charitable organization as random effects with varying intercepts. Centered variables were used because the zero value fell outside the range of data for both the injunctive norm information and values overlap variables. Grand mean centering also made interpretation of the model intercept easier, as the

intercept reflects predicted donations for an “average” charity; both in terms of injunctive norm and values overlap (Singer & Willett, 2003).

Unlike in study 1, the results of this analysis revealed a small but significant main effect of trial type comparing norm ($M=2.89$, $SD=1.16$) and random ($M=2.76$, $SD=1.47$) trials ($p_e = 0.14$, $se = 0.04$, $t = 3.59$, $p < .001$). Participants gave significantly more on trials where they received norm information than on trials where they received random information.

As in study 1, there was a significant interaction between trial type and the explicit injunctive norm information displayed ($p_e=.07$, $se=.03$, $t=2.36$, $p < .05$). As in study one, this interaction was such that the effect of the norm manipulation was greater on norm trials than on random trials. In other words, participants used the displayed amount more when they believed it was social norm information than when they believed it was simply a randomly generated number (see fig. 3.4). Interestingly, we also




Fig. 3.4. Interaction between trial type and injunctive norm manipulation

observed a significant interaction between trial type and self reported personal values overlap ($\beta = -0.05$, $se = 0.02$, $t = -2.21$, $p < .05$). On norm trials, personal values overlap had a significantly smaller effect on giving than on random trials. In other words, when participants received injunctive norm information, participants relied less on the degree to which their own values overlapped with those of the charity compared to those trials where they only received a randomly generated number (see fig. 3.5).




Fig 3.5. Interaction between trial type and personal values

Personal Values Interact With Social Norms in Giving Behavior

We next assessed whether either explicit injunctive norm information or subjective personal values influenced giving behavior. Norm information did indeed impact donations, with amounts increasing linearly as the norm amount increased ($\beta = .28$, $se = .03$, $t = 10.92$, $p < .001$). Additionally, the degree of overlap between a charity's values and an individual's personal values significantly predicted donation amounts, with

donations increasing as participants reported higher levels of values overlap ($\beta=.34$, $se=.02$, $t=15.30$, $p<.001$). We did not see the interaction between values and norm information that was observed in Study 1 (see Chapter 2).

Instead, our analysis also revealed a significant three-way interaction between values overlap, norm amount, and trial type ($\beta = -.05$, $se=.02$, $t=-2.81$, $p<.05$). Specifically, for the norm trials we observed a relationship between norm information and values overlap very similar to that seen in Study 1, with norm information having the largest effect when participants rated a charity as overlapping moderately with their own personal values (a score of 3-5 on a 1-7 scale) and a relatively smaller influence when the values of charities overlapped either substantially or very little (scores of 6-7, or 1-2 respectively). No such interaction was observed for random trials. These results demonstrate that, as predicted, social norm information is relied on particularly when individual's personal values are moderately connected to a particular charity.

Study 3

Methods

Subjects

Thirty participants (66% female, mean age = 19.23, $SD= 2.98$) were recruited from the University of Arizona subject pool. All participants were undergraduates and received course credit as compensation, with participation taking approximately 90 minutes. The experiment was presented using the E-Prime software package.

Design

Participants completed the task in two phases within a single session. The charities used were all currently functioning organizations selected from the website www.charitynavigator.org. Fifty-four charities were used in the experiment, consisting of nine charities from each of the following six categories: Animal Rights, Education, Environment, Health, Human Rights, and International Aid. All charities had been given at least a three star rating (out of four) by charitynavigator.org, which avoids confounds associated with the organizational quality of the selected charities.

Phase 1: Charity Rating Task Participants were first informed about, and then rated, each of the 54 charities on three variables: (1) how much the values of the organization overlapped with their own personal values, (2) how much out of five dollars other people would say was appropriate to donate to the charity, and (3) how much people, on average, would donate to this charity (out of a notional \$5 amount). The presentation order of the charities was randomized across participants. The *values overlap* question was rated on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale. Judgments about descriptive and injunctive expectations were made on a \$0-\$5 scale in one dollar increments. After rating all charities on these variables, they were given a short break before beginning phase 2.

Phase 2: Charitable Donation Task

Next, participants were asked to make donations to each of the charities from phase 1. Participants were told that they would be endowed with \$5 on each trial, and that

they could give as much or as little of this endowment as they wished in 50-cent increments. On each trial, participants were first given a brief reminder of the mission of the charity. Participants were then provided with information about the average amount that the previous 100 participants had given (*descriptive norm information*) and what a sample of 100 individuals had said would be appropriate to donate to the charity (*injunctive information*). Both of these pieces of information were presented on the same screen.

In order to examine how corresponding and conflicting norm information would influence donation rates, a 3(injunctive norm: low, medium, high) x 3(descriptive norm: low, medium, high) within-subject design was employed. As in studies 1 and 2, low norms were defined as \$.50-\$1.50, medium norms were defined as \$2.00-\$3.00, and high norms were defined as \$3.50-\$4.50. Participants received six trials at each of the nine possible combinations of injunctive and descriptive norm levels, with the specific values within each level randomized across all trials. Across all 54 charities, participants saw six trials of each possible descriptive and injunctive norm, ranging from \$0.50 to \$4.50.

After seeing the information, participants were asked to decide how much of their \$5 they would like to donate to the charity. Participants could select any amount between \$0 and \$5, in 50-cent increments. The participant kept any amount not donated. After making their decision, participants saw a screen reminding them how much they had donated and how much they would keep for themselves. This design allowed us to explore the relationship between each type of norm and donation behavior, as well as the possible interaction between the two norm types of interest.

After making decisions for all 54 charities, participants were asked to complete several demographic and personality questionnaires. At the conclusion of the experiment one of the charities was randomly selected by the computer and participants (and the charity) were paid accordingly.

Results

In the present study we manipulated both descriptive and injunctive social norms related to charitable giving behavior. Our primary research questions for this study were (1) how individuals would use this information and (2) whether the social norm information they received would interact with their prior beliefs about descriptive and injunctive norm information.

We addressed these questions within the context of a multilevel model in which donation amount on each trial was predicted by (1) a grand mean centered “personal values overlap” variable, (2) a grand mean centered prior injunctive norm, (3) a grand mean centered prior descriptive norm, (4) a grand mean centered explicit injunctive norm, (5) a grand mean centered explicit descriptive norm, (6) the interaction between prior and explicit injunctive norm information, (7) the interaction between prior and explicit descriptive norm information, and (8) the interaction between descriptive and injunctive explicit norm information.

The effect of explicit descriptive and injunctive norm information on giving behavior

Our first question of interest was whether, when provided with both descriptive and injunctive social norm information, we would see an effect of either or both of these factors on giving behavior. The results of the above described model revealed a significant effect of both the explicit descriptive norm manipulation ($\beta=0.20$, $se=0.019$, $t=10.49$, $p<.001$) and the explicit injunctive norm manipulation ($\beta=0.13$, $se=0.019$, $t=6.97$, $p<.001$). No significant interaction was found between these two variables (see figure 3.6). Participants' donations increased approximately 20 cents for each dollar increase in the average donation of the previous participants and 13 cents for each dollar increase in the amount other individuals believe is appropriate to give. The absence of an interaction between these two variables suggests that their influence is relatively independent from each other.




Fig. 3.6. Marginal effect of descriptive and injunctive norm manipulations

Interaction between prior beliefs and explicit social norm information

We were next interested in whether prior beliefs about descriptive and injunctive norms of charitable donation would influence giving behavior and whether these prior beliefs would interact with the explicit social norm information provided to the participants on each trial. Our model revealed that prior beliefs about descriptive norms had a significant positive effect on giving ($pe = 0.14$, $se = 0.03$, $t = 4.88$, $p < .001$), and that prior beliefs did not interact with explicitly provided descriptive norm information (see fig. 3.7, right). Contrary to this, there was no main effect of prior beliefs about injunctive norms ($p < .05$), but there was a significant interaction between prior beliefs about injunctive norms and explicitly provided injunctive norm information ($pe = -0.07$, $se = 0.02$, $t = -4.38$, $p < .001$, see fig. 3, left). This interaction was such that when participants were provided with a relatively low explicit injunctive norm, prior beliefs had a relatively large influence on giving behavior, whereas when explicit injunctive




Fig. 3.7. Interaction between Prior and Explicit Norm Information

information was larger, prior beliefs about injunctive norms had little influence on giving behavior.

Discussion

There has been considerable debate in both the social norms literature (Cialdini, 2004) and the pro-social behavior literature (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009) about the role that injunctive norms play in guiding behavior. Across two studies we explored the role of injunctive social norms in charitable giving behavior. In Study 2, we explored the role of injunctive norms in isolation, in order to assess their role when descriptive norm information is not highlighted. This allowed us to assess whether there was in fact an effect of injunctive norms on giving behavior, and additionally, whether the interaction observed in Chapter 2 between descriptive norms and personal values would also hold for injunctive norms.

As predicted, both of these findings were confirmed. We found a significant main effect of injunctive social information on charitable giving and also found that the size of its effect was context-dependent. That is, when participants' personal values were reported to be either highly consistent or highly inconsistent with those of the charity, participants relied relatively little on injunctive norm information, whereas when participants were relatively neutral in relation to the values of the charity, participants relied more heavily on social norm information.

A related finding was the interaction between trial type (normative or random) and both personal values and injunctive norm information. Perhaps not surprisingly, we found that when participants received a true injunctive norm based on the beliefs of others, this information had a significantly larger effect than when this information was randomly generated by a computer. More interesting though, is that on trials where the information was randomly generated, the degree of overlap between their own values and those of the charity had a significantly greater impact on behavior than on trials where the information provided actual injunctive norm information. In other words, when participants have reliable social information, the degree to which they rely on their own personal values is diminished. When they have no social norm information to rely on, their behavior is increasingly guided by their own personal values.

In study three we provided participants with both descriptive and injunctive social information. As predicted, we found a significant main effect of both descriptive and injunctive norm information. Somewhat surprisingly, there was no interaction between the descriptive and injunctive information on giving behavior. That is to say, the effect of injunctive social information was consistent regardless of the level of the descriptive social information. This is a particularly important finding both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, it challenges the findings of Bicchiari & Xiao (2009), who have argued that injunctive norms only exhibit force on behavior when they are consistent with descriptive norms. Quite to the contrary, our results suggest that descriptive and injunctive norms operate relatively independently from one another.

From an applied perspective, these results are equally important. One potential concern with manipulations of social information in service of increasing giving behavior is that if various social norms interact with each other, it may be a relatively complex process to determine the optimal norm manipulation. Given that in the present research our norm manipulations appear to operate relatively independently, fundraisers may be able to proceed with developing funding campaigns aimed at highlighting whichever norm is most easily focused on with less worry about how it will influence other norms.

The results from the present research are an important step in understanding how social norms and personal values influence giving. Future studies should aim to further clarify the specific underlying cognitive and emotional mechanisms, as increased insight into the mechanisms underlying donation decisions has the potential to allow for the development of more precise interventions and policy designed to increase charitable giving. Future research aimed at further exploring how descriptive and injunctive norm information is integrated into donation decisions will be particularly important. In a time when demands for the services provided by charities are at historic highs, understanding the psychology of charitable donations is critically important. The present research suggests that altering beliefs related to injunctive social norms may be one approach that fundraisers can use to increase giving during their campaigns.

CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE AND INJUNCTIVE NORM INFLUENCE ON ONLINE CHARITABLE DONATION

Abstract

As the internet has become an increasingly prevalent part of everyday life, charitable organizations and other non-profits have become correspondingly interested in online fundraising campaigns. The present study examines the degree to which altering beliefs about descriptive and injunctive social norms can influence both willingness to give and giving rates in a realistic online setting. To explore this question, 180 individuals voluntarily signed on to an online crowd sourcing website (www.mturk.com) and took part in a memory experiment where they were paid for their performance. Participants were then given the opportunity to donate any amount of their payment to a charity. We find that by manipulating beliefs about social norms, it is possible to influence both willingness to donate and donation amounts. We discuss the importance of these findings for online fundraising campaigns and highlight important differences between giving behavior in the lab versus more naturalistic settings.

Introduction

Requests for small charitable donations are a ubiquitous part of everyday life. As an example, imagine that we are at a register at a convenience store and have just paid for a bottle of water. As the clerk hands us back your change, she nods to a UNICEF collection box and asks if we would like to donate any of our change to support UNICEF

causes. Surprisingly little is known about the psychological processes that underlie donation decisions. However, recent research has suggested that social information may be an important cue in our decisions to donate. To carry on our example, imagine that prior to being faced with this decision we had waited in a long line and noted that nearly every customer before us had chosen to donate their change to UNICEF. Would this have made us more or less likely to give our own change? The present research aims to provide a better understanding of how information about social norms influences donation behavior.

Social Norms

Social norms have long been studied for their role in explaining behavior across a number of different disciplines, in particular economics and psychology (for discipline specific reviews see Andreoni (2006) and Cialdini & Goldstein (2004)). Researchers studying social norms often distinguish between at least two forms: descriptive and injunctive. Descriptive norms are subjective perceptions of typical behavior in a given situation, that is, our belief about what most people do, while injunctive norms are beliefs about what is acceptable, or what one *ought* to do. While these norms are often in agreement, there are instances where they can come into conflict. Perhaps the most well known example is in the case of littering (Cialdini et al., 1990). In the case of public littering most have a well established belief that one ought not litter, and yet the presence of large amounts of litter in public places actively reinforce a descriptive norm that

littering is typical behavior. For a more extensive review of social norm research, see Chapters One, Two, and Three.

Present Study

In the present study we experimentally manipulated beliefs about descriptive and injunctive norms related to the decision to donate to a charity. Participants voluntarily participated in a memory experiment online and were entered into a lottery that provided the possibility of earning additional payment for participation. Participants were then asked to decide whether or not to donate any of this money to a charity with which the experiment had partnered. Prior to making their decision, participants were provided with details about either (1) how much other individuals had given to the charity, or (2) how much others thought was appropriate to give to the charity. This information was manipulated such that some participants believed that the social norms were relatively high while others believed it was relatively low.

The hypotheses were twofold. First, we predicted that social norm information, regardless of type or level, would influence willingness to donate, such that individuals who received any form of social norm information would be more likely to donate than control participants who received no such information. Second, we predicted that social norm information would influence the amount donated, such that individuals who were led to believe that others gave or believed it appropriate to give a relatively large proportion of the potential earnings would give significantly more than those who were led to believe that others gave or believed it appropriate to give a smaller amount. If

these hypotheses were confirmed, it would have important implications for the understanding of the psychology of charitable giving.

Methods

Participants

180 participants (70% female, mean age = 27.49, SD=8.78) were recruited for this study. Participants voluntarily logged on to an online crowd sourcing website (www.mturk.com) and agreed to participate in the study in exchange for a guaranteed payment of 0.50 cents. Participants were led to believe that they were completing a short memory experiment that would help the researchers understand the relationship between memory and language. Four participants were excluded from analysis due to failing an attention check, leaving a final sample of 176 participants (70% female, mean age = 27.55, SD=8.86).

Experimental Design

A 2 (norm type: descriptive vs injunctive) x 2 (norm level: high norm vs low norm) between-subjects design was used in this experiment. In addition to the four experimental conditions created by this design, a fifth baseline condition was run in which participants were provided no norm information. The primary dependent variables examined in the study were a binary willingness to donate variable, and a continuous donation rate variable. The experimental materials were delivered electronically through

the website www.mturk.com. The experiment was designed using the online survey creation software DatStat Illume.

Experimental Procedure

Participants began the task by voluntarily logging on to the website www.mturk.com, a crowd sourcing website that allows virtual “workers” to be paid in exchange for completing online tasks. Similar to subject pool management systems used in many psychology departments, mturk workers are provided with a list of projects that they can complete, along with a guaranteed fee for satisfactory participation and a short description of the project they will be completing. In the present research, participants were paid 50 cents for participating in a “memory and language experiment”. Although still a relatively new method for gathering experimental data, recent research has stressed that mturk is an efficient and inexpensive approach and that mturk samples produce (1) more reliable data than typical in-person college undergraduate studies from (2) samples that are far more representative of the American population than undergraduate samples (Buhrmester et al. (2011); Rand (2012)), see figure 1 for more detailed demographic information). The speed with which data can be collected through mturk is worth highlighting. The sample of 180 participants collected for the present research was completed in less than 48 hours, and resulted in only four individuals who failed an attention/manipulation check, resulting in less than 2.5% of data lost due to participant error.




Fig. 4.1: Sample distributions of participant demographics

After signing in to the present study, participants read and electronically signed a consent form and were then provided with instructions about a memory test that they would be completing that would help the researchers “better understand the link between memory and language”. In the memory task, participants were shown a list of 10 words, one at a time, which the participants could progress through at their own pace (although once participants had advanced past a word, they could not return to it again). After viewing the list, participants were shown a second list of words that contained five words from the original list and five new words. Participants were tasked with deciding whether or not the word had appeared on the first list. The choice of the memory task

was largely arbitrary, and was chosen because it (1) could be completed relatively quickly, (2) provided a compelling cover story for the true nature of the experiment, and (3) was relatively easy, allowing most participants to score highly on the test. This final point was important, as after completing the memory test and a short battery of demographic questions, participants were told that they had been entered into a lottery based on their performance on the memory task.

Participants were told that 25% of those entered in the lottery would receive a \$5.00 bonus payment at the end of the study (a standard method for providing additional performance-based pay in mturk). Participants were then told that they could donate any amount of their potential earnings to the charity *Save the Children* and read some brief instructions about the donation procedure. In each of the four experimental conditions, a single sentence was embedded into the instructions in order to influence beliefs about norms of giving (see table 1). In the baseline condition, no information was provided. The sentence that participants saw was:

Just to give you a little information, most people choose to give [*believe it is appropriate to give*] between 1 and 2 [*4 and 5*] dollars of their potential bonus money to the charity.

This approach to manipulating norm beliefs is modeled on the method used by Sanfey (2009), in which it was shown that a similar manipulation of beliefs about typical play in an Ultimatum Game significantly influenced second-player decisions to accept or

reject unfair offers. Following these instructions, participants were asked to decide how they would like to distribute their potential bonus pay, in 50 cent increments ranging from zero to five dollars donated.

Lastly, participants were asked to provide some information about their donation decision, including how much they believed others would donate on average, how much guilt they would have felt if they had donated each of the possible distributions of the bonus pay, and several questions related to prior giving behavior. The experiment was concluded by having participants read through a short debriefing that detailed the deception used in the study. After all data had been collected, participants and Save the Children were paid as stated in the task. \$134 dollars was donated to *Save the Children* from 45 randomly selected participants.

Results¹

Norm Induction

Our first question of interest was whether the norm induction used in the experiment did in fact alter beliefs about the donation behavior of others. After making their donation, participants were asked to report how much, on average, they would expect other individuals to donate to *Save the Children*. If the norm induction was

¹ All analyses were conducted using the R statistical computing package. Logistic regressions were conducted using the supplemental R package GLM and multi-level models were conducted using the lme4 package.

successful, then participants in the “high norm” conditions should expect that on average others give significantly more than individuals in the “low norm” condition.

We assessed the effect of the norm manipulation separately for the descriptive and injunctive norm conditions using two one-way, between-subject ANOVAs. The results of the analysis revealed a significant effect of Norm Level on norm beliefs ($f(2,108)=7.44$, $p<0.001$) for the descriptive norm condition. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference between the high norm condition ($M= 2.04$, $SD=1.22$) and the low norm condition ($M=1.11$, $SD=0.88$, $p<.001$) but no significant difference between the control condition and either the high or low conditions. For individuals in the injunctive norm condition, we found no significant effect of Norm Level on norm beliefs (see fig. 4.2).




Fig. 4.2. Influence of norm manipulation on beliefs

Norm Induction Influences Willingness to Donate

Having established that our norm manipulation had an effect on beliefs about the giving behavior of others, we next assessed whether our norm manipulation had any influence on willingness to donate (WTD, operationalized here as giving any amount greater than zero of the participants' total earnings to charity). We began our analysis of giving behavior with this question because compared to previous studies (see chapters 2 and 3), WTD was quite low. Forty percent of participants in the current study chose to donate none of their earnings to *Save the Children*. Because of this unusually low WTD, we wanted to determine whether our norm manipulation had any influence on this variable.

To assess the effect of norm manipulation on WTD, we first calculated a binary WTD variable, which indicated whether participants did or did not choose to donate to the charity. We then used two logistic regressions, one for individuals in the descriptive norm condition and one for individuals in the injunctive norm condition, in which the probability of donating was predicted by Norm Level.

For the participants in the descriptive norm condition a wald test run on the results of the logistic regression revealed that Norm Level did have a significant effect on WTD ($X^2(2) = 6.6, p < .05$, see fig. 4.3). Interestingly, the results of this logistic regression revealed that relative to the control condition, participants in both the high norm condition ($B = .96, SE = .49, p < .05$) and the low norm condition ($B = 1.23, SE = .50, p < .05$) were significantly more likely to give, while participants in the high and low Norm Level

conditions were not significantly different from each other. By converting the raw parameter estimates into odds-ratios, we found that individuals in the high condition were 2.6 times more likely to donate, while individuals in the low condition were 3.4 times more likely to donate than controls. In terms of predicted probabilities, the probability that individuals in the control condition would donate was 40.63%, while the probability was 64.10% in the high condition and 70.00% in the low condition. An identical analysis was applied to the participants in the injunctive condition and no significant effect of Norm Level was found.




Fig. 4.3. Effect of descriptive norm level on WTD

Norm Induction Influences Rate of Donation

Our next question of interest was whether the norm manipulation would influence the amount donated to *Save the Children*. In line with previous research on giving rates, we restricted our analysis to those individuals who gave at least 50 cents, removing all participants who gave zero dollars from the sample (Barraza et al., 2011). This left a sample of 104 participants who chose to donate. Because control participants were disproportionately unlikely to donate relative to participants in the experimental conditions, that left a unacceptably low sample size ($n=13$) for inclusion in analysis. Because of this, we excluded control participants from this analysis, leaving us with a sample of 91 participants that were in one of four experimental groups. We used a 2 (norm type: descriptive vs injunctive) x 2 (norm level: high vs low) ANOVA to determine the effect of norm manipulation on donation amounts. The results of this analysis revealed a significant main effect of Norm Level; participants in the high condition ($M = 2.06$, $SD = 1.36$) gave significantly more than participants in the low condition ($M=1.48$, $SD = 0.88$, $F(1,87) = 5.94$, $p <.05$). No effect of Norm Type or interaction effect was found (see fig. 4.4).




Fig. 4.4. Influence of norm manipulation on donation amounts

Guilt Sensitivity

As a final analysis, we assessed whether individual differences in guilt sensitivity were associated with donation behavior. Our measure of guilt sensitivity was calculated using a procedure outlined in Chang et al. (2011). After making their donation, participants were asked to consider the amount of guilt they would have experienced if they had chosen to donate each of the possible donation amounts (\$0 to \$5 in \$0.50 increments) using a 0 (not at all guilty) to 4 (extremely guilty) likert-style scale. A multi-level model with a random intercept for subject and a random slope for the counterfactual offer amount was used to predict guilt ratings. The random slope parameter estimate for each subject provided an estimate of the relation between counterfactual offer amount and reported anticipated guilt. These values were extracted and used as a “guilt sensitivity” parameter.

Conceptually, this parameter provides a measure of the degree to which an individual's anticipated guilt is related to possible donations they could have made. Individuals with negative estimates would experience increased guilt as they chose to offer less, while individuals with positive estimates would experience increased guilt as they chose to offer more. Although we had expected scores to be largely negative, participants were actually distributed relatively evenly between positive and negative parameter estimates, with 54.5% of participants having a guilt sensitivity score *greater* than 0.

Using this guilt sensitivity score as a predictor, we conducted two analyses, one aimed at assessing whether guilt sensitivity predicted willingness to donate and a second to determine whether guilt sensitivity predicted donation amounts. Using a logistic regression, we predicted willingness to donate with guilt sensitivity measure. The results of this analysis revealed a significant effect of guilt sensitivity on willingness to donate ($X^2(1) = 25.7, p < .0001$, see fig. 4.5 left)

To assess whether guilt sensitivity was associated with donation amounts, we restricted our analysis to those participants who donated any amount greater than \$0. A linear regression was run using guilt sensitivity to predict donation amount. The results of this analysis revealed a significant relationship between guilt sensitivity and donation amounts ($t(102) = -3.55, p < .001$, see fig. 4.5 right). Individuals who would experience increased guilt as they hypothetically gave less, did indeed give more to *Save the Children*.




Fig. 4.5. Guilt sensitivity effects on WTD and donation amounts

Discussion

Individuals worldwide voluntarily donate billions of dollars to charity every year. Given the enormous impact that charitable donation provides, surprisingly little is known about the psychology of charitable donation. In the present study, we investigated the impact of social norm information on a realistic donation decision in an online setting. Participants voluntarily participated in a memory experiment in exchange for payment, and were then given the opportunity to donate some proportion of these earnings to the charity *Save the Children*. By subtly manipulating beliefs about either descriptive or injunctive norms prior to this donation decision being made, we were able to assess the influence of these norms on giving behavior. Our primary questions of interest were whether manipulating beliefs about social norms related to giving would influence either (1) willingness to donate or (2) the amount donated to the charity.

As predicted, manipulation of norm information did have a significant impact on willingness to donate and donation amounts. When assessing willingness to donate, we found that for participants who received *any* information about the typical behavior of other participants, willingness to donate increased substantially. The probability of donating was between 25% and 30% higher in the experimental conditions than in the control conditions in which no information was provided. It is worth noting that this effect was only observed for individuals who received descriptive norm information. Participants in the injunctive condition, who received information about what others believed to be an appropriate donation, showed no such effect. Although willingness to donate was influenced only when descriptive norms were manipulated, we found that donation amounts were influenced similarly for individuals in both the descriptive and the injunctive condition. Namely, individuals who were led to believe that others either donate or think it is appropriate to donate a relatively large proportion of one's earnings to charity donated more themselves than individuals who were led to believe that others donated or thought it was appropriate to donate a relatively smaller proportion of their earnings to the charity. In addition to these primary results, we also found support for the relationship between guilt sensitivity and charitable donation. We found that individuals who were more guilt sensitive, such that they would experience increasing guilt as they chose to donate less, were both more likely to donate and donated more to charity.

In addition to our primary results, the present study is of interest because participants were both less willing to donate and chose to donate a substantially smaller proportion of their endowment to charity than in the other studies detailed in this

dissertation. The average donation in the present study was \$1.06, whereas average donations in the lab based studies described in chapters two, three, and five of this dissertation ranged between \$2.60-\$3.00. Moreover, this difference cannot be attributed solely to differences between lab and non-lab contexts, as other research using a very similar paradigm, with data collected through the same crowd sourcing site, found average donation rates in the range of \$2.50-\$3.00, consistent with the lab studies presented in this dissertation (Bartels et al., under review). One notable difference between the present study and these others was that the present study was the only to require that participants complete a substantial task in order to earn their endowment. These differences are of particular note because the generalizability of lab-based findings to the real world has come under considerable scrutiny by behavioral economists of late (Levitt & List, 2007). Not surprisingly, these criticisms have focused on the high degree of scrutiny and artificiality inherent in many lab based decision-making tasks, particularly noting that lab-based studies have consistently found people to be more altruistic than similar field studies.

Although more research into the differences between lab and field studies is needed, the method employed in the current study, in which participants realistically “earn” the money they are being asked to donate through a prominent distracter task, may ultimately provide a closer approximation to true giving behavior than more traditional approaches in which participants are simply endowed with a sum of money.

One surprising feature of the present sample of participants was the relatively large percentage of participants who reported that they would feel increased guilt as they

chose to donate more. Based on previous research (Chang et al., 2011) and our own intuitions about the relationship between guilt and giving, we had expected that nearly all participants would report that their anticipated guilt would increase as they considered giving less to charity. While this could be simply a quirk of the present, relatively small sample, one plausible explanation for why some participants showed a positive relationship between guilt and donation could be the demographics of the sample, the motivations for participating in the research, or beliefs about the quality of charitable organizations and their ability to manage money responsibly. It is of note that our sample was disproportionately weighted toward low-income and unemployed individuals. Additionally, mturk workers are primarily participating in studies in order to earn money. It is therefore possible that participants in the present study were in an economically-driven frame and that donating to charity was perceived as wasting money or violating the primary motivation for participating in the task. Similarly, we might expect that individuals who view charities as less able to manage their money well are more likely to view donating money to charity as a waste of money. Providing some support for this explanation, we found a significant correlation between self-reported beliefs about the quality of charities and guilt sensitivity measures ($r = .18, p < .05$).

The present research makes an important theoretical contribution, in addition to providing descriptive insights into donation behavior. Within the literature on pro-social behavior there are two broad predictions about the role of social information broadly, and social norms in particular in pro-social behavior. The Pure Altruism theory predicts a “negative” relationship between social information and giving (Becker, 1974; Warr,

1982). That is, as the donations of others increase, personal donations decrease. The related model of “impure altruism” predicts a similar negative relationship (Andreoni, 1989;1990). A separate set of theoretical models, derived from psychological research on social conformity and theories of reciprocity, predicts a positive relationship between giving and social norms (Sugden, 1984; Bernheim, 1994; Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). Our research provides clear support for this second class of models.

The results from the present research are an important step in understanding the role that social norms play in giving behavior. However, they also leave a number of open questions. In particular, our results were inconclusive about the influence of injunctive norms on giving behavior. While manipulation of injunctive norm beliefs did influence donation amounts, it did not have a significant effect on willingness to donate, which was observed in manipulation of descriptive norm beliefs. Minimally, this appears to suggest that when possible, targeting beliefs about descriptive norms may be a more successful intervention than targeting beliefs about injunctive norms, particularly in circumstances where the goal of fundraising is to increase the donor base or recruit new donors.

Future studies should aim to further clarify the specific underlying cognitive and emotional mechanisms, as increased insight into the mechanisms underlying donation decisions has the potential to allow for the development of interventions and policy designed to increase charitable giving. In particular, continuing to explore the role of guilt and its relationship to social expectations may prove a particularly promising direction for future research.

CHAPTER 5: WHAT'S IT GONNA COST ME? INFORMATION SEARCH AND THE VALUE OF NORMATIVE INFORMATION

Abstract

Recent research has revealed that social norm information can influence individual willingness to donate and rates of donation. This has led to the suggestion that social norms could be harnessed by non-profit fundraisers to increase donations. However, it is unclear how best to implement social norm manipulations into fundraising requests. An important question is the degree to which people seek out norm information, or must be financially motivated in order to search out this information. In the present research we use an information search paradigm to explore the degree to which people will voluntarily choose to look at information related to descriptive and injunctive norms. We find that small financial incentives can slightly increase the voluntary search for norm information, while small costs greatly decrease willingness to search for information. Theoretical and applied implications of these findings are discussed.

Introduction

In Chapters Two, Three, and Four of this dissertation, as well as in previous research (Croson & Shang, 2011; Martin & Randal, 2011), both injunctive and descriptive social norms have been shown to have a substantial influence on charitable giving behavior. Individual donations are influenced by both beliefs about what others have typically

given and what others think is appropriate to give². However, little is known about the degree to which individuals intrinsically desire social norm information or whether they will actively avoid information about the behavior and beliefs of others.

Would individuals presented with the opportunity to view social information value it enough to be willing to pay for it? Would they avoid social information if they were given a small payment for looking at it? The answers to these questions are currently unknown, but critical to policy-makers and fundraisers interested in increasing charitable donations specifically, and pro-social behavior more generally. In particular, in donation decisions where the behavior and beliefs of others are relatively private or otherwise unknown, norms may be highly ambiguous. Fundraisers will need to develop careful strategies for diffusing social norm information out to potential donors. Understanding the degree to which donors will actively seek out or avoid this information may be critical to optimally designing these strategies.

Although little work has been done in this area, one recent study by Bicchierri & Xiao (in press) assessed whether individuals would pay for information about the behavior of others in a single trial dictator game. They found that participants were relatively willing to view information about the behavior of other dictators when this information was free, but much less willing to view this information when it came at a small financial cost. This research suggests that individuals may be willing to view social information, but that it is not valued highly by most individuals. However, this

² For a more extensive overview of the role of social norms in giving behavior see Chapters One, Two, and Three of the present dissertation.

research says nothing about whether it is possible to increase willingness to view social information by providing a small payment in exchange for viewing this information.

Lastly, it is unclear whether individuals value injunctive and descriptive social information equally. In Chapter Three of this dissertation it was shown that participants seem to incorporate these two types of social information into their decisions relatively independently. However, previous research (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009) found that participants would disregard injunctive information when it was in conflict with descriptive information. Exploring whether individuals are more or less willing to actively seek out these two types of information may provide some insight into how individuals rely on injunctive and descriptive social information.

Present Study

The present research was designed to assess the conditions under which individuals would be willing to view explicit information about descriptive and injunctive social norms. To do this, we experimentally manipulated the costs and incentives associated with viewing social information. Participants in the experiment were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, one in which a small cost was associated with viewing social information, a second in which a small reward was associated with searching for information, and a baseline control condition in which no costs or benefits were associated with viewing social information. Participants were then asked to decide whether or not to donate any of a small endowment to a number of different charities.

The hypotheses were twofold. First, we predicted that when social norm information was associated with even a very small cost, willingness to view this information would decline dramatically. Second, we predicted that when viewing social information was associated with a small financial reward, participants would be more willing to view social information. If these hypotheses were confirmed, it would have important implications for the understanding of the psychology of charitable giving. In particular, it may lead to important insights into the types of strategies that will be most effective in disseminating social norm information to potential donors.

Methods

Participants

92 participants (75% female, mean age = 19.05, SD= 1.49) were recruited from the University of Arizona subject pool. All participants were undergraduates and received course credit as compensation in addition to possible monetary payment, with participation taking approximately 90 minutes. The experiment was presented using the E-Prime software package.

Design

Participants completed the task in two phases within a single session, as in the experiments presented in chapters two and three. Participants responded to the same set of 54 charities used in those studies, all selected because they were highly rated by the independent charity rating website charitynavigator.org.

Phase 1: Charity Rating Task Participants were first informed about, and then rated, each of the 54 charities on three variables: (1) how much the values of the organization overlapped with their own personal values, (2) how much out of five dollars other people would say was appropriate to donate to the charity, and (3) how much people, on average, would donate to this charity (out of a notional \$5 amount). The presentation order of the charities was randomized across participants. The *values overlap* question was rated on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale. Judgments about descriptive and injunctive expectations were made on a \$0-\$5 scale in one dollar increments. After rating all charities on these variables, they were given a short break before beginning phase 2. Phase 1 of this experiment was identical to phase 1 from study 3 (see chapter 3)

Phase 2: Charitable Donation Task

Next, participants were asked to make donations to each of the charities from phase 1. Participants were told that they would be endowed with \$5 on each trial, and that they could give as much or as little of this endowment as they wished in 50-cent increments. On each trial, participants were first given a brief reminder of the mission of the charity. Participants were then presented with a screen on which they could choose one of four options that corresponded to different types of information. Participants could choose to see (1) the average donation of the previous 100 participants, (2) the average amount that a sample of 100 individuals thought was appropriate to give, (3)

both of the previous pieces of information, or (4) no information at all. Participants had as much time as they wanted to make this decision, and decision times were recorded.

In order to examine how costs and incentives influenced these information search choices, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (free, costly, or rewarded search). Participants in the *free search* condition were asked to search for information without any associated financial cost or benefit. Participants in the *costly search* condition were endowed at the start of each trial with an additional \$0.50. This money could not be donated to charity, but could be used to pay for norm-related information. Participants could spend \$0.25 for either descriptive or injunctive information alone, or \$0.50 to see both of types of information. If they chose to look at no information, they kept this money as supplemental payment. Participants in the *rewarded search* condition could earn \$0.25 for looking at either descriptive or injunctive information, or \$0.50 for looking at both pieces of information. If they chose to look at no information, they received no supplemental payment.

After making their choice with regard to the sort of information they would look at, they were shown this information and were then asked to decide how much of their \$5 they would like to donate to the charity. Participants could select any amount between \$0 and \$5, in 50-cent increments. The participant kept any amount not donated. On trials where participants chose to look at no information they were advanced directly to this donation decision. After making their decision, participants saw a screen reminding them how much they had donated and how much they would keep for themselves.

After making decisions for all 54 charities, participants were asked to complete several demographic and personality questionnaires. At the conclusion of the experiment the computer randomly selected one of the charities and participants (and the charity) were paid accordingly.

Results

Information choice time increases with decision complexity

Our first question of interest was whether reaction times to decide which type of information to view would differ depending on which type of information they chose to view. In accord with Agresti (2002) and Gelman & Hill's (2007) approach to conceptualizing and analyzing unordered multinomial dependent variables, we sought to determine whether the time to make a choice increased as the participant made an increasingly complex decision. We conceptualized the choice between the four potential options (no information, descriptive only, injunctive only, or both injunctive and descriptive) as a set of three binary decisions.

Decision 1 was whether to view information or not. Decision 2 was if they chose to view information, did they choose to look at all available information or restrict it to either descriptive or injunctive. Choice 3 was if they chose to restrict to only one sort of information, did they choose descriptive or injunctive. To assess whether this underlying logic was consistent with the data from our participants, we conducted a multilevel model analysis with a random intercept for each participant. Within this model we predicted log transformed reaction times to choose which information to view by condition (free, costly, or rewarded) and a set of orthogonal contrasts related to search choice (see table

5.1). The planned contrasts first compared trials on which participants chose to view no information to those where participants chose to view any information. A second contrast compared trials in which individuals chose to view both types of norm information to those where they chose to only view either descriptive or injunctive information. The third contrast compared trials on which participants chose to view either descriptive or injunctive norm information.

Choice	Contrast 1	Contrast 2	Contrast 3
Both Desc and Inj.	-1	2	0
Injunctive	-1	-1	1
Descriptive	-1	-1	-1
No Information	3	0	0

Table 5.1. Planned contrasts for information search analysis

The results of this analysis revealed no effect of condition, participants reaction time was not influenced by our experimental manipulation. A significant effect of contrast 1 was found, with participants significantly faster when they chose to look at no information ($M = 1720.84$ ms, $SD = 2841.17$ ms) than when they chose to view information ($M = 2006.65$, $SD = 2518.54$ ms, $t = -8.61$, $p < .001$). Contrast 2 was also significant, with participants who chose to look at both types of information ($M = 1694.68$ ms, $SD = 1920.07$ ms) significantly faster to make their choice than individuals

who chose to look at only descriptive or injunctive information ($M = 2747.98$ ms, $SD = 3447.65$ ms). There was no significant difference based upon contrast 3.

Costs and incentives influence search behavior

Our primary question of interest was whether decisions to view information would be influenced by whether there were economic costs or benefits associated with looking at information. To assess this we compared individuals in the free search condition to individuals in the costly and rewarded conditions in three analyses.

In analysis one, we used a multilevel logistic regression model in which condition (free, costly, or rewarded search) was used to predict a binary dependent variable which coded trials on which individuals chose to look at norm information (descriptive, injunctive, or both) as a '1' and trials on which individuals chose not to look at norm information as a '0'.

To assess whether condition was a significant predictor of search behavior, we compared the above-described model to a baseline model, identical to the above model with the exception that it did not include the condition variable. These models were compared and the model including condition was a significantly better fit ($X^2(2) = 12.98$, $p < .01$). The results of this analysis revealed that the probability that individuals in the costly condition would look at norm information was significantly lower than for individuals in the free search condition ($pe = -2.02$, $se = 0.86$, $z = -2.37$, $p < .05$). Somewhat surprisingly, no significant difference was found between individuals in the free search condition and individuals in the rewarded condition (see figure 5.1).




Fig. 5.1. Effect of search condition on decision to view or not view information

We next assessed whether either of the experimental conditions influenced individuals who did choose to look at information to look at one type of social norm information, or both types of information. This analysis was restricted only to trials on which individuals had chosen to look at information. To assess this we used a logistic multilevel model analysis with condition (free, costly, or rewarded search) and a random intercept for each subject to predict a binary dependent variable that distinguished between trials where individuals chose to look at only one type of norm information (descriptive or injunctive) or both types of norm information.

To assess whether our experimental manipulation had an effect on whether individuals who chose to look at information chose to look at all available information or only one type of norm information, we compared the above described model to a baseline model, identical to the above model with the exception that it did not include the condition variable. These models were compared and the model including condition was

a significantly better fit ($X^2(2) = 11.384, p < .01$). The results of this analysis revealed that the probability that individuals in the costly condition would look at both types of information was significantly lower than for individuals in the free search condition ($pe = -2.59, se = 0.94, z = -2.74, p < .01$). As with our first analysis, no significant difference was found between individuals in the free search condition and individuals in the rewarded condition (see figure 5.2).




Fig. 5.2. Effect of search condition on decision to view all or partial information

Lastly, we assessed whether, for trials where participants chose to look at only one type of information, our experimental manipulation influenced whether participants were more likely to look at descriptive or injunctive information. We used a logistic multilevel model analysis with condition and a random intercept for each participant used to predict a binary dependent variable that distinguished between trials on which

participants chose to view descriptive information from trials on which participants chose to view injunctive information.

To assess whether our experimental manipulation had an effect on whether individuals who chose to look at only one type of information chose to look at descriptive or injunctive information, we compared the above described model to a baseline model, identical to the above model with the exception that it did not include the condition variable. These models were compared and the model including condition was not a significant improvement over the baseline model ($X^2(2) = 3.31, p > .05$). Although the model was not significantly improved by including condition, assessment of the model including condition did reveal a trend toward participants in the costly condition (prob. of looking at descriptive information = 0.85) being more likely to look at descriptive information than injunctive information compared to participants in the free search condition (prob. of looking at descriptive information = 0.61, $pe = 1.37, se = 0.74, z = 1.852, p = .064$). As with the previous analyses, no significant difference was found between individuals in the free search condition and individuals in the rewarded condition.

Discussion

In Chapters two, three and four of the present dissertation, it was shown that social norm information can influence charitable giving behavior. However, it has until now been an open question whether individuals would actively seek out or actively avoid information

related to social norms. In the present study, we aimed to assess the conditions under which individuals would voluntarily choose to look at information related to descriptive and injunctive social norms. More precisely, we studied whether individuals would seek out social norm information when seeking that information came with either a small cost or reward associated with it.

To address this question, we had participants complete a charitable giving task in which they made a decision about how to distribute money between themselves and each of 54 charitable organizations. Prior to making these decisions, participants were able to choose to view information about social norms relevant to the decision or to forgo viewing this information. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, one in which looking at information came with no financial costs or benefits, one in which participants paid a small fee for looking at information, and a third in which participants received a small supplemental payment for viewing information.

Our experimental manipulation was assessed in three stages, first asking whether it influenced decisions to look for information or not, then for those who did search for information, whether it influenced whether they would search for all available information, or only one type of information, and finally, for those who chose to look for one type of information, whether it would have an influence on the decision to look at descriptive or injunctive information.

We found that, as predicted, participants who had to pay in order to view norm information were much less likely to look for information at all compared to individuals who either suffered no financial cost or were rewarded for looking at information.

Surprisingly, individuals who were rewarded for looking were not significantly more likely to look for information than those in the control condition. Similarly, we found that of those individuals who did search for information, those in the costly condition were significantly less likely to search for all available information as opposed to only viewing one type of norm information. Again, no difference was observed between the control participants and the participants who were paid to view information.

These findings suggest two important features related to how individuals search for norm information. First, participants do not actively avoid seeking out norm information. Participants in the baseline condition were approximately 65% likely to seek out some form of social information, with the probability being even higher for individuals who received a small reward for viewing information. Second, viewing norm information is not so valuable to individuals that they will incur even a relatively small cost to obtain it. This suggests that fundraisers looking for optimal approaches to introducing potential donors to social norm information should think carefully about the perceived costs of viewing this information.

Another implication of the present research is that small rewards offered in exchange for observing norm information are not likely to have a particularly large effect on potential donors. Indeed, as long as there was no perceived cost of viewing information, participants were largely willing to spend additional time to view information about both how other participants behaved and what others thought was appropriate behavior in the task. Future studies aimed at better understanding the perceptions of costs and benefits associated with information search within the context of

fundraising campaigns may be a highly beneficial route for researchers interested in increasing social norm compliance.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The non-profit sector is now the third largest sector of the economy (Salamon et al., 2004). More than one million organizations are recognized with 501(c) charitable status, bringing in a total of 306 billion dollars in charitable contributions (Sargeant et al., 2010). Of this amount, more than two thirds comes from small private donations (Giving USA Foundation, 2009). Given these numbers, it is surprising that very little is understood about the psychological processes that underlie decisions to donate. The present dissertation was developed to further our understanding about the role of two critical factors involved in donation decisions: social norms and personal values.

Overview of Results

Across five studies the roles of social norms and personal values in charitable donation decisions were explored. In *Study 1* (see Chapter 2) a laboratory donation task in which participant personal values were elicited and descriptive social norm information was experimentally manipulated was conducted. We found that both of these factors had an influence on donation decisions, and that they interact with each other. When participants rated the values of a charity as either highly consistent or inconsistent with their own values, the influence of descriptive social norm information was significantly weaker than when participants values overlapped only moderately with those of the charity.

In *Study 2* we replicated the findings of study one with injunctive norm information in place of descriptive norm information. We found that, contrary to recent work on the role of injunctive norms in other types of pro-social behavior (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009), injunctive norms did have a significant influence on giving behavior and showed a similar interaction with personal values as seen in Study 1.

In *Study 3* we manipulated both injunctive and descriptive norm information at the same time. We found that while both descriptive and injunctive social information had significant influences on giving, they did not interact with each other in any meaningful way. Bicchieri & Xiao (2009) had previously reported that injunctive information only influenced pro-social behavior when it was consistent with descriptive norm information. Our results contradict this finding, suggesting that individuals are influenced by injunctive information independently of their beliefs about the actual behavior of others.

In *Study 4* we extended the laboratory findings from Studies 1, 2, and 3. We recruited participants through the online crowd-sourcing website mTURK.com and had them participate in a memory experiment in exchange for payment. After completing the memory task participants were notified that they had been entered into a bonus money lottery and were asked to donate any amount of their potential earnings to charity. In keeping with the findings from Studies 1 and 2, we found that descriptive and injunctive norms influence rates of giving for those participants who chose to donate. However, when we assessed whether our norm manipulations influenced willingness to donate, we found that while descriptive norm manipulation had a substantial influence on behavior,

injunctive norms did not. We also found that self-reported anticipated guilt was a significant predictor of giving across all participants in all conditions.

In *Study 5* we explored the degree to which individuals will actively seek out social norm information. We found that when viewing social information is associated with no costs or benefits, people are likely to search for information, and that they are likely to view as much information as is available to them. However, when viewing information comes with even a small cost, willingness to view information declines substantially. We also found that providing individuals with a small incentive did not increase willingness to look for information.

Implication and Future Directions

The five studies reported in this dissertation provide new insights into two critical psychological factors involved in decisions to donate to charity. The results from these studies make an important contribution both in our theoretical understanding of charitable giving, generous, and pro-social behavior, but also suggest important directions for applied researchers focused on increasing fundraising totals for charitable organizations. Theoretically, the present research makes an important contribution because it distinguishes between two leading theories of pro-social behavior. Within the literature on pro-social behavior there are two broad theories about the influence of social information. The first of these theories, Pure Altruism, predicts a “negative” relationship between social information and giving (Becker, 1974; Ware, 1982). That is, as the donations of others or the beliefs of others regarding giving increase, personal donations

should decrease. The related model of “impure altruism” predicts a similar negative relationship (Andreoni, 1989;1990). The underlying logic of these “negative” theories is that individuals gain utility at least in part from the overall amount of money that has been donated, as opposed to just their own contribution. Thus, as the typical rate of giving increases, people should gain increasingly little utility from their own donation. A separate set of theoretical models, derived from psychological research on social conformity and theories of reciprocity, predicts a positive relationship between giving and social norms (Sugden, 1984; Bernheim, 1994; Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). Our research provides clear support for this second class of models. Across all five experiments, we found a significant positive relationship between the behavior and beliefs of others and an individual’s own behavior.

From an applied perspective, these results suggest that fundraising campaigns must be sensitive to the social norm information presented to potential donors. Future research should focus on realistic strategies to increase the salience of social norms when social norms are consistent with large donations and to decrease their salience when norms of giving are relatively low. This is particularly critical for charities that will be soliciting donations from individuals who may not feel that their values are particularly well aligned with those of the charity.

While the present research does much to increase the understanding of the psychology of charitable giving, an important next step is to establish the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the factors studied here. In particular, recent research focused on the role that expectations-dependent emotions such as guilt (Chang et al.,

2011), shame (Keltner & Buswell, 1996), and regret (Reb & Connolly, 2010) play in underlying the force that social norms and personal values have on pro-social behavior. Although Study 4 provided some suggestion that guilt resulting from violating expectations plays an important role in donation decisions, the studies in this dissertation were not designed to carefully test this. More carefully controlled explorations of the relationship between these emotions, social information, and personal values are likely to be a fruitful avenue of research.

Field studies are an important next step in understanding both the psychology of charitable giving and also whether the effects observed in the lab are reliable in the real world. The substantially lower rates of giving seen in the more naturalistic Study 4 provide some indication that there are likely to be important differences between giving in a somewhat contrived laboratory setting and in the real world. Assessing the true impact of social norms on giving will require continuing to move outside the laboratory. Intriguingly, some new online crowd funding websites such as the popular kickstarter.com have already begun to allow individuals to decide whether information about the behavior of other donors is visible to all potential donors or not. This feature may allow for relatively easy experimental manipulations in the context of field studies of giving behavior.

APPENDIX A: CHARITY NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS

Below are the names of the 54 charities used in Studies One, Two, Three, and Five.

MAP International

American Endowment Foundation

League of Conservation Voters Education Fund

MediSend International

Computers for Youth

America's Promise Alliance

Operation Homefront

Keep America Beautiful

Adopt-A-Classroom

Delancey Street Foundation

Friends of the Earth

The Humane Society of the United States

American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

Last Chance for Animals

Scholarship America

Organization for Autism Research

Alzheimer's Foundation of America

Clean Ocean Action

National Down Syndrome Society

Locks of Love

College Summit

Direct Relief International

National Inclusion Project

Relief International

Susan G. Komen for the Cure

Mayo Clinic

ActionAid International USA

Global Links

American Red Cross

IMA World Health

The Sierra Club Foundation

Kids in Need Foundation

WaterAid America

KickStart International

National Parks Conservation Association

Wildlife Conservation Network

National Transplant Assistance Fund

Animal Legal Defense Fund

Jumpstart

The Conservation Fund

Boy Scouts of America National Council

Stand For Children Leadership Center

National Wildlife Federation

National Council on Aging

Globus Relief

Natural Resources Defense Council

Union of Concerned Scientists

National Coalition for the Homeless

Wildlife Conservation Society

Prevent Blindness America

Year Up

Best Friends Animal Society

Cell Phones For Soldiers

Farm Sanctuary

Center for Advancing Health

Children's Scholarship Fund

Below are the descriptions of the charities provided to participants in Studies One, Two, Three, and Five.

Founded in 1954, MAP International promotes the total health - physical, economic, social, emotional and spiritual health - of impoverished people in over 115 countries through: provision of essential medicines; promotion of community health development and prevention and mitigation of disease, disaster and other health threats.

Established in 1993, American Endowment Foundation (AEF) is a leading independent, national sponsor of donor advised funds. We provide donors and advisors uniquely flexible ways to manage their charitable giving. AEF offers flexible options in the types of assets donors can contribute, investments donors can recommend, and the range of charities that donors can support.

The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) Education Fund strengthens the capacity of the environmental movement to mobilize citizens as informed voters and advocates for sound environmental policies, thereby increasing the influence of the environmental majority on the national, state and local levels.

MediSend International is a humanitarian organization that supports under resourced hospitals in developing countries with a multi-dimensional approach to improving

community health. Medisend's mission includes education, training, technical support and the distribution of life-saving medical supplies and biomedical equipment.

Founded in 1999, Computers for Youth (CFY) is a national educational organization dedicated to improving the home learning environment of low-income school children. Our work is built on the belief that the home holds the greatest untapped potential for improving children's academic and life-long success.

Founded in 1997, America's Promise Alliance is a cross-sector partnership of more than 300 corporations, nonprofits, faith-based organizations and advocacy groups that are passionate about improving lives and changing outcomes for children. We have made a top priority of ensuring that all young people graduate from high school ready for college, work and life.

Operation Homefront provides emergency assistance and morale to our troops, to the families they leave behind, and to wounded warriors when they return home. Operation Homefront leads more than 4,500 volunteers in 30 chapters nationwide. Since its inception, Operation Homefront has provided critical assistance to more than 105,000 military families in need.

Formed in 1953, Keep America Beautiful (KAB) engages individuals to take greater responsibility for improving their community environments. KAB is guided by the

principles of education, individual responsibility, public-private partnerships, and volunteer action. It combines education with hands-on stewardship to make America's communities cleaner, greener, safer, and more livable.

Adopt-A-Classroom increases opportunity for student success by empowering teachers with community partners and funds to purchase resources for the classroom. Adopt-A-Classroom invites the community into the classroom in support of teachers and their students. By adopting a classroom, donors form partnerships with specific classrooms providing financial and moral support.

In 1971 Delancey Street began with four residents, a thousand dollar loan, and a dream to develop a new model to turn around the lives of people in poverty, substance abusers, former felons, and others who have hit bottom, by empowering the people with the problems to become the solution.

Friends of the Earth and our network of grassroots groups in 77 countries fight to create a more healthy, just world. Our current campaigns focus on clean energy and solutions to global warming, protecting people from toxic and new, potentially harmful technologies, and promoting smarter, low-pollution transportation alternatives.

The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) is the nation's largest and most effective animal protection organization. Established in 1954, The HSUS seeks a humane

and sustainable world for all animals - a world that will also benefit people. We work to reduce suffering and to create meaningful social change for animals.

The ASPCA's mission is to provide effective means for the prevention of cruelty to animals throughout the United States. The ASPCA provides local and national leadership in animal-assisted therapy, animal behavior, animal poison control, anti-cruelty, humane education, legislative services, and shelter outreach.

Founded in 1984, Last Chance for Animals (LCA) recognizes that animals have the ability to experience pain, and as such they deserve certain basic rights protecting them from pain caused by humans. LCA believes that non-human animals should not be subjected to suffering and exploitation by humans because alternatives exist for nearly every traditional usage of animals.

Founded in 1958, Scholarship America has distributed more than two billion dollars to nearly two million students. Scholarship America is the nation's largest private scholarship and educational support organization. Our mission is to mobilize America, through scholarships and educational support, to make postsecondary education possible for all students.

The Organization for Autism Research (OAR) was created in December 2001 to apply research to the challenges of autism. OAR's defines applied research as research that

directly impacts the day-to-day quality of life of learners with autism. OAR's programs revolve around funding new research and disseminating evidence-based information.

The Alzheimer's Foundation of America (AFA) was founded by a consortium of organizations to fill the gap that existed on a national level to assure quality of care and excellence in service to individuals with Alzheimer's disease and related illnesses, and to their caregivers and families. AFA's mission is to provide optimal care and services to individuals confronting Alzheimer's disease.

Founded in 1984, Clean Ocean Action (COA) is a broad-based coalition of over 125 active boating, business, community, conservation, diving, environmental, fishing, religious, service, student, surfing, and women's groups. Clean Ocean Action stops ocean pollution with a continuous, relentless effort using research, education, and citizen action

The mission of the National Down Syndrome Society (NDSS) is to be the national advocate for the value, acceptance and inclusion of people with Down syndrome. The NDSS envisions a world in which all people with Down syndrome have the opportunity to enhance their quality of life, realize their life aspirations, and become valued members of welcoming communities.

Founded in 1997, Locks of Love provides hairpieces to financially disadvantaged children under age 18 suffering from long-term medical hair loss from any diagnosis. Our mission is to return a sense of self, confidence and normalcy to children suffering from

hair loss by utilizing donated ponytails to provide the highest quality hair prosthetics to financially disadvantaged children.

Founded in 1993, College Summit helps bright, low-income students - with the right support during the post-secondary transition - propel their lives (and communities) in a positive direction. Over the past decade, College Summit has worked in partnership with schools, school districts and colleges to develop a sustainable model for raising college enrollment rates.

Founded in 1948, Direct Relief International is California's largest international humanitarian nonprofit organization. Direct Relief provides medical assistance to improve the health and lives of people affected by poverty and disaster - at home and throughout the world. Since 2000, Direct Relief has responded to a wide range of urgent and ongoing health emergencies.

Founded in 2003 as The Bubel/Aiken Foundation, National Inclusion Project (NIP) serves to bridge the gap that exists between young people with special needs and the world around them. We support communities and programs in creating awareness and opportunities for full inclusion where barriers break and doors open.

Founded in 1990, Relief International (RI) provides emergency, rehabilitation and development services that empower beneficiaries in the process. RI's programs include

health, shelter construction, education, community development, agriculture, food, income-generation, and conflict resolution.

Susan G. Komen for the Cure is the world's largest grassroots network of breast cancer survivors and activists fighting to save lives, empower people, ensure quality care for all and energize science to find the cures. Thanks to events like the Komen Race for the Cure, we have invested more than \$1.9 billion to fulfill our promise.

Mayo Clinic is the first and largest integrated, not-for-profit group practice in the world. Doctors from every medical specialty work together to care for patients, joined by common systems and a philosophy of the needs of the patient come first. More than 3,700 physicians, scientists and researchers work at Mayo Clinic.

ActionAid International USA's (AAI USA) works on the ground and in the halls of power to end poverty. We work in 49 countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America, with over 25 million poor people. ActionAid's mission is to work with poor and marginalized people to eradicate poverty by overcoming the injustice and inequality that cause it.

Founded in 1989, Global Links recovers unused medical supplies, surplus equipment and furnishings from the U.S. healthcare system for distribution to hospitals and clinics that serve the poorest segments of the population in developing countries. Even more

important than the volume of goods we ship is the care we take to send recipients only items they can readily use.

Since its founding in 1881 by visionary leader Clara Barton, the American Red Cross has been the nation's premier emergency response organization. As part of a worldwide movement that offers neutral humanitarian care to the victims of war, the American Red Cross distinguishes itself by also aiding victims of devastating natural disasters.

Founded in 1960, IMA World Health provides health care services and supplies to vulnerable and marginalized people. IMA procures and distributes medication and supplies to clinics and hospitals; helps to treat, prevent, and control diseases, some of which have been virtually eliminated in the developed world.

The Sierra Club Foundation was founded in 1960 to provide financial support to the Sierra Club and other environmental organizations for tax deductible work. We fund a range of environmental projects which fall into the three general categories of public education, litigation, and training.

Founded in 1995, Kids In Need Foundation works to ensure that every child is prepared to learn and succeed by providing free school supplies nationally to students most in need. The mission is achieved by providing free school supplies to students and teachers through the Kids In Need National Network of Resource Centers

WaterAid America transforms lives by improving access to safe water, hygiene and sanitation in the world's poorest communities. We work with partners and influence decision-makers to maximize our impact. WaterAid enables the world's poorest people to gain access to safe water and sanitation.

Founded in Kenya in 1991, KickStart International's mission is to help millions of people out of poverty. We promote sustainable economic growth and employment creation in Kenya and other countries. We develop and promote technologies that can be used by dynamic entrepreneurs to establish and run profitable small scale enterprises.

The mission of the National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) is to protect and enhance America's National Park System for present and future generations. Established in 1919, NPCA is an independent, nonpartisan voice working to address major threats facing the National Park System.

Founded in 2002, Wildlife Conservation Network (WCN) is dedicated to protecting endangered species and preserving their natural habitats. We support innovative strategies for people and wildlife to co-exist and thrive. We partner with independent, community-based conservationists around the world and provide them with the capital and tools they need to develop solutions for human-wildlife coexistence.

National Transplant Assistance Fund (NTAF), founded in 1983, works to help transplant and catastrophic injury patients afford critical but uninsured medically related expenses through fundraising guidance, patient support and resources, as well as financial assistance. NTAF is proud to have administered over 3,700 patient campaigns and provided direct financial assistance to 3,197 patients.

The Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) fights to protect the lives and advance the interests of animals through the legal system. Founded in 1979 by attorneys active in shaping the emerging field of animal law, ALDF has blazed the trail for stronger enforcement of anti-cruelty laws and more humane treatment of animals in every corner of American life.

Jumpstart is a national early education organization that works toward the day every child in America enters school prepared to succeed. Through extraordinary attention in yearlong one-to-one relationships, Jumpstart inspires children to learn, adults to teach, families to get involved, and communities to progress together.

Founded in 1985, The Conservation Fund is dedicated to advancing America's land and water legacy. We conserve land, train leaders and invest in conservation at home. From our headquarters in Arlington, Virginia and our field offices across the country, we've saved over six million acres of wild havens, working lands, vibrant communities and more.

The mission of the Boy Scouts of America (BSA), incorporated on February 8, 1910 and chartered by Congress in 1916, is to prepare young people to make ethical and moral choices over their lifetimes by instilling in them the values of the Scout Oath and Law. The BSA is the nation's foremost youth program of character development and values-based leadership training.

Stand for Children is an innovative, grassroots child advocacy organization. Our mission is to use the power of grassroots action to help all children get the excellent public education and strong support they need to thrive. Our members believe we need to stand up for our children now to create a better future for America.

National Wildlife Federation's (NWF) mission is to inspire Americans to protect wildlife for our children's future. NWF gives voice to the wildlife conservation values that are part of our country's heritage. Our work focuses on three main areas. We work to find solutions to the climate crisis, keep our nation connected to nature, and safeguard America's wildlife and wild places.

The National Council on Aging (NCOA) is a service and advocacy organization headquartered in Washington, DC. That works to improve the lives of older Americans. NCOA is a national voice for older adults - especially those who are vulnerable and disadvantaged -- and the community organizations that serve them.

Globus Relief was founded in 1996 by successful business entrepreneurs devoted to helping those in need, with a mission to redirect useable health resources locally and globally. Globus Relief is a major force for good, creating a reliable humanitarian supply chain that has provided over \$200 million worth of medical goods.

The Natural Resources Defense Council's (NRDC) purpose is to safeguard the Earth: its people, its plants and animals and the natural systems on which all life depends. We work to restore the integrity of the elements that sustain life - air, land and water - and to defend endangered natural places.

The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) is the leading science-based nonprofit working for a healthy environment and a safer world. UCS combines independent scientific research and citizen action to develop innovative, practical solutions and to secure responsible changes in government policy, corporate practices, and consumer choices.

The National Coalition for the Homeless is a national network of people who are currently experiencing or who have experienced homelessness, activists and advocates, community-based and faith-based service providers, and others committed to a single mission. That mission, our common bond, is to end homelessness.

The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), founded in 1895 saves wildlife and wild places worldwide. We do so through science, global conservation, education and the management of the world's largest system of urban wildlife parks, led by the flagship Bronx Zoo. Together these activities change attitudes towards nature and help people imagine wildlife and humans living in harmony.

Founded in 1908, Prevent Blindness America is the nation's leading volunteer eye health and safety organization dedicated to fighting blindness and saving sight. Focused on promoting a continuum of vision care, Prevent Blindness America touches the lives of millions of people each year.

Year Up is a one-year, intensive training program that provides urban young adults with a combination of skill development, college credits, and corporate apprenticeships. Year Up's mission is to close the opportunity divide by providing urban young adults with the support that will empower them to reach their potential through professional careers and higher education.

Best Friends operates the nation's largest sanctuary for homeless animals; provides adoption, spay/neuter, and educational programs around the country; manages the Best Friends Network, an interactive, online global community; and publishes Best Friends, the nation's largest general-interest animal magazine.

Cell Phones for Soldiers was founded by teenagers Robbie and Brittany Bergquist from Norwell, Mass., with \$21 of their own money. Since then, the organization has raised almost \$2 million in donations and distributed more than 500,000 prepaid calling cards to soldiers serving overseas.

Farm Sanctuary was founded in 1986 to combat the abuses of factory farming and to encourage a new awareness and understanding about farm animals. Through the years, we have rescued thousands of animals, and educated millions of people about their plight. Our rescue and education work continues, as we advocate for laws and policies to prevent suffering and promote compassion.

The Center for Advancing Health works to create an America where everyone is prepared to live a healthy life and make effective choices about health care. Working through the media, the Internet, professional organizations and health care institutions, the Center for Advancing Health works to raise the visibility and priority of health behavior research in solving health care challenges.

Founded in 1998, the Children's Scholarship Fund (CSF) provides partial tuition assistance for low-income families to send their children to private schools. Currently, almost 29,000 children nationwide are using CSF scholarships. These children are attending private school through the generosity of our donors

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