TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY OR MARKETPLACE? AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF INTER-NGO COLLABORATION IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS

by

Ruth Alminas

_____

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2012

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation

prepared by Ruth A. Alminas

entitled Transnational Civil Society or Marketplace? An Empirical Examination of Inter-NGO Collaboration in Post-Conflict Environments

and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

_____ Date: 11/6/12
Dr. Gary Goertz

_____ Date: 11/6/12
Dr. Joseph Galaskiewicz

_____ Date: 11/6/12
Dr. Faten Ghosn

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

_____ Date: 11/6/12
Dissertation Director: Dr. Gary Goertz

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

SIGNED: Ruth A. Alminas

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am truly thankful to my advisor, Gary Goertz, for his steadfast guidance and support throughout the dissertation development and writing process. Even across great distances, he was consistently willing to coach me through the challenges I faced and to keep my spirits lifted. I am also greatly indebted to the other members of my committee, Joe Galaskiewicz and Faten Ghosn, who generously provided invaluable feedback at critical points throughout this process.

I would like extend thanks to all those who helped me complete this dissertation. To Monica Williams, this dissertation would not have been possible without the countless hours spent on the telephone testing out arguments and venting frustrations. I am also grateful to Naomi Oliviae and Michael Ryckman, without whose assistance this dissertation would have been much more difficult to complete, as well to as my brother, Paul Alminas, who provided both technical and moral support at various points during this process. I am grateful to have gone through this process with the best cohort ever - Kara Ellerby, Diana Forster, Tiffany ("Texas") Harper, Zack Shipley, and Adam Sirimarco. I am extremely thankful to my parents, Margrith and Henry Alminas, whose unending moral support, advice and love are appreciated far more than they will ever know. Last, but most certainly not least, I would like to thank Andrew McGary, whose unwavering patience, support, and love – not to mention that brilliant and contagious smile – helped me to get through the most challenging moments of this process.

DEDICATION

For Mom, who believes in me even when I forget how to believe in myself.

I love you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

ABSTRACT

Do NGOs tend to operate more like activists in a transnational civil society or more like competitors in a transnational marketplace? This dissertation represents a preliminary attempt to understand the extent to which NGOs interact with one another through transnational networks in their efforts to assist and protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) in conflict and post-conflict settings. So far, the concept of the transnational advocacy network has served largely as a metaphor. This dissertation represents a significant contribution to our understanding of transnational relations by offering the first empirical examination of the structure of these networks. By applying the theoretical framework offered by resource dependence theory to the question of NGO interaction, this dissertation offers an alternative view of transnational relations. I first present original network data representing the transnational advocacy network of NGOs along with the state agencies, UN agencies and other organizations involved in providing assistance and protection to IDPs in Azerbaijan in 2010. These data will demonstrate that (1) transnational actors do network around specific campaigns, but (2) this does not necessarily mean that NGOs are collaborating with one another or acting as the central actors in these networks. I next analyze original network data modeling the extent to which inter-NGO collaboration exists among NGOs responding to 29 separate cases of protracted internal displacement. These data will provide support for my argument that NGOs tend to follow a strategy of resource dependence rather than resource mobilization in their strategic networking behaviors. Finally, I will examine the variation in the cohesion among these 29 potential inter-NGO networks and suggest conditions which underlie greater inter-NGO collaboration. I find that only in cases of a real or perceived

threat to the NGO-sector as a whole, specifically a legal environment that is not conducive to the functioning of the nonprofit sector, is extensive inter-NGO collaboration likely to occur. The data suggest that a hostile legal environment is necessary and sufficient for extensive inter-NGO collaboration.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem

This project began over coffee with a staffer at a well-known nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Geneva. Our conversation had meandered onto the issue of the relationships between NGOs, or rather the surprising lack thereof. My coffee companion told me that despite the fact that her organization is housed in the same building with several other similarly-oriented NGOs, the various staff members rarely speak with one another. Only when they attend the same meeting, generally organized by a non-NGO actor, do they sit down together to discuss the issues they each think about separately day in and day out. She expressed frustration that in preparation for important summits or hearings, these separate NGOs rarely if ever gather ahead of time to plan a united front or agree upon a common message. Instead, the primary focus of such preparations goes to crafting an argument that will satisfy the members and donors – that is, the material resources – behind the NGO.

This conversation stuck with me precisely because it surprised me so much. Although it is clear that sovereign states remain the dominant actors in international relations, a growing transnational relations literature has emerged around the impact that nonstate actors may have on global politics and state behavior (Burgerman 2001; A. M Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; Evangelista 1999; Florini 2000; Halliday 1994; Khagram, Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink 2002; Price 1998; Risse 2002). NGOs are frequently portrayed as uniquely able to play a crucial role in the protection of human

rights due to their narrow issue focus, intense and principled commitment to a cause, and relatively high levels of information and expertise (A. Clark 1995). Unlike states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs are not saddled with the competing concerns of national sovereignty and national security. Unlike for-profit firms and corporations, NGOs are thought to be motivated by mission rather than by profit-margin. Due to their perceived commitment to a cause and their relative independence from the state, NGOs are lauded by progressives and conservatives alike as vital to the effort to provide humanitarian assistance and protect human rights in post-conflict areas or underdeveloped regions.

Moreover, the networks through which these principled actors interact contribute to these high expectations. By participating in transnational advocacy networks – "increasingly dense networks of communications and informational exchange" – international and domestic nonstate actors are able to gather, frame, and strategically mobilize information in order to promote the adoption and implementation of norms and policies, monitor state compliance, and socialize state and IGO actors (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998). Some even hold that the density of such inter-NGO networking represents what may be an emerging transnational civil society (H. Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001; Burgerman 2001; A. M Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; Evangelista 1999; Florini 2000; Khagram, Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink 2002; Price 1998; Risse 2002). Being familiar with this literature about the rise of the NGOs and their crucial role in transnational advocacy networks for human rights, environmental protection and measures to end violence against women (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn

Sikkink 1998), I had envisioned a dense web of NGOs exchanging information, sharing resources, and organizing united efforts to raise awareness among donors, educate the public, and persuade powerful state actors to facilitate the construction of a more just and peaceful world.

Upon my return from Geneva, I read journalist Linda Polman's recent book *The Crisis Caravan*. Polman investigates the actors responding to major humanitarian crises and argues that "the most powerful link between humanitarian aid agencies is that of commercial competition *(Polman 2010)*." She describes the "big business" atmosphere of a humanitarian marketplace made up of actors seemingly more concerned with winning donor contracts and managing brand identity than collaborating to ease the suffering of the local populations.

My interest now piqued, I expanded my literature search and found others lamenting the tendency for NGOs to behave more like for-profit organizations than mission-oriented activists. In the gender-related development literature, the "NGOization" of social movements has been decried by some for, among other things, the influence of donors' agendas on issues addressed, the rise of the short-term project culture ("projectization"), and the emphasis on professionalization and technical skills at the expense of broader social goals *(Alvarez 2009; Lang 1997; Sloat 2005)*. Sloat (2005), for instance, reports that "Women's NGOs in most [Central and Eastern European] countries have struggled to develop a cooperative spirit, as they compete for scarce resources and focus on overlapping issues (444)." Cooley and Ron *(2002)* use case

studies to illustrate how the marketization of humanitarian aid and development projects has created the incentive for NGOs to compete, hide failures, and avoid sharing information with other NGOs. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) urged in 2008 that the humanitarian system would function better if organizations worked collectively instead of operating as competitors in a free market.

These two very different visions of how NGOs are (or are not) interacting with one another in response to some of the world's most pressing issues led me to the question guiding this dissertation: do NGOs tend to collaborate with one another in their efforts to assist and protect vulnerable populations in conflict and post-conflict settings? The central concern of this dissertation is whether or not NGOs are working together in order to realize their common goal of helping persons affected by armed conflict. Before we move any further we must ask: why is inter-NGO collaboration an important issue to study? What are the potential benefits of such collaboration?

The first and perhaps most obvious benefit of collaboration is the more efficient use of scarce resources (Linden 2002, 7). According to Walter Powell, the "basic assumption of network relationships is that … there are gains to be had by the pooling of resources (1990, 303)." Indeed, the two most well-known theories of interorganizational collaboration – resource dependence theory and transaction cost theory – both revolve around the issue of resource procurement (Guo and Acar 2005). Transaction cost theory suggests that organizations collaborate to reduce costs and maximize benefits

(Williamson 1985). According to the resource dependence perspective, collaboration is a strategy in which organizations engage when confronted with uncertainty in their resource environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Whether the aim is to economize or to manage external uncertainty, however, collaboration can be understood to be a pragmatic organizational strategy decision.

Second, by joining forces and pooling information, organizations are able to solve problems of wide-ranging scope and complexity (Gray 1989) and realize outcomes they could not have achieved independently (Linden 2002). Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that collaboration among actors in transnational advocacy networks, in which NGOs play a crucial role, have been instrumental in international efforts to promote human rights, environmental protections and measures to end violence against women. These networks enable traditionally less powerful non-state actors to gather, frame, and strategically mobilize information in order to promote the adoption and implementation of norms and policies, monitor state compliance, and socialize state and IGO actors to act in ways they otherwise might not have. In other words, by acting together these relatively powerless organizations have the capacity to accomplish far more than many observers would expect, and certainly much more than they could accomplish acting alone.

Third, collaboration tends to allow organizations to produce higher quality, more integrated products or services to the end users (Linden 2002). By integrating information resources, government and nonprofit organizations are often better able to accomplish their overlapping public service missions (Martinez-Moyano 2006). The

situation being examined in this dissertation – protracted internal displacement – is an extremely complex problem, demanding the attention of organizations competent in a wide range of issue areas including emergency aid, economic development, education and curriculum development, health care, psychological treatment, social services, advocacy, awareness raising and legal assistance. It is unlikely that any one NGO is equipped to handle all aspects of this crisis. However when multiple organizations work independently, there is an increased likelihood that efforts will be redoubled, that contradictory information will be provided to end users, or that some in need of assistance will slip through the cracks (Linden 2002). By working together and sharing information, NGOs should be better able to provide the assistance and protection needed by those internally displaced by conflict.

Fourth, collaboration increases the potential for individual and organizational learning (Linden 2002; Martinez-Moyano 2006; Pfeffer and Sutton 2000). Powell *et al.* find that "when the knowledge base of an industry is both complex and expanding, and the sources of expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of innovation will be found in networks of learning, rather than in individual firms (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996)." New ideas for solving difficult problems tend to be found in the interstices between organizations rather than within the walls of a single bureaucracy. New ideas are a necessary currency in the effort to assist and protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) in conflict and post-conflict environments. There are different causes and patterns of displacement, different magnitudes and duration of displacement, and very different experiences with both national government and international involvement (Mundt and

Ferris 2008). The endeavor to end protracted internal displacement requires a steady flow of efficient, reliable information, a function for which interorganizational networks are particularly apt (Powell 1990, 304).

Finally, collaboration is a recursive process (Martinez-Moyano 2006; Powell 1990). The greater the level of mutual knowledge among collaborating actors, the more they will come to trust one another and perceive that progress is being made. As trust and the sense of progress grow, so does the willingness to share key information (Martinez-Moyano 2006). Clark *et al.* (1998) illustrate this contention in their argument that one result of NGO networking is a deepening social relationship among NGOs, representing what may well be a nascent (although admittedly far from complete) global civil society.

The potential benefits of inter-NGO collaboration are many. By collaborating NGOs may make more efficient use of their resources, achieve things they could not possibly accomplish alone, provide more integrated services, increase individual and organizational learning and knowledge, and develop greater trust in their collaboration partners leading to ever deeper collaborative efforts. In other words: inter-NGO collaboration matters![1]

[1] It is of course the case that some would argue that competition among NGOs, not collaboration, is most beneficial for innovation and efficiency. I am persuaded, for the reasons already verbalized, that this is not the case. However it must be stated that this is not a question which will be addressed in the empirical content of this dissertation. Whether or not the reader agrees that collaboration is preferable in these cases, the substantive contribution of this project is relevant. My goal in this dissertation is simply to offer some initial data suggesting that overall, these NGOs are not collaborating, and says nothing of the substantive

Although the idea that NGOs are engaged in transnational networking has been much discussed *(Burgerman 2001; A. M Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; Evangelista 1999; Florini 2000; Halliday 1994; Khagram, Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink 2002; Price 1998; Risse 2002)*, no existing study examines the structure of these networks or empirically investigates the extent to which NGOs are collaborating with one another through these networks and under what conditions such collaboration occurs. This dissertation is an attempt to fill this specific research gap.

1.2 Overview of the Study and Research Questions

This dissertation addresses the question of inter-NGO collaboration in conflict and post-conflict settings. It seeks to investigate the relationships among NGOs responding to 29 separate cases of protracted internal displacement in 2010 using the tools of social network analysis. It further aims to examine the conditions under which extensive inter-NGO collaboration is more likely to occur. Two main questions guide this study.

First, do NGOs tend to collaborate with one another to assist and protect vulnerable populations in conflict and post-conflict settings? Are NGOs engaged in transnational networking surrounding the crisis of protracted internal displacement, and what is their relationship to one another in this network? The dominant strand within the transnational relations literature suggests that NGOs are central actors in these transnational networks, and that these networks are used by NGOs to collaborate in

---

outcome of this lack of collaboration. This is an issue which can be addressed in future research using data similar to those I am here presenting and suggesting.

pursuit of their common goals. So far, there has been no attempt in this literature to empirically examine the structure of these networks and the relationships among NGOs therein.

Second, under what conditions are NGOs more likely to collaborate with one another? Keck and Sikkink argue that activists form transnational networks "when they believe that transnational networking will further their organizational missions – by sharing information, attaining greater visibility, gaining access to wider publics, multiplying channels of institutional access, and so forth (1998, 14)." However, the conditions under which NGOs might hold this belief are not well theorized. Additionally, it remains unclear as to whether inter-NGO collaboration is truly a strategy engaged in order to further the organizational mission, or if instead it is a strategy intended to ensure organizational survival.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

So far, the transnational advocacy network has served largely as a metaphor. The literature on transnational networks and the pronouncements of an emergent transnational civil society rest largely on case studies. The handful of studies examining transnational networks with empirical data use mutual attendance at international conferences to represent the inter-NGO relationships *(A. M Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; True and Mintrom 2001).* Moreover even in these studies, there is no attempt to use the data to investigate the structure of the transnational networks themselves, but rather just to demonstrate that they exist. Despite the fact that the transnational network concept

made its debut in the literature over a decade ago, we still know very little about how these networks are actually structured. While Keck and Sikkink (1999) attribute the network concept underlying their theory to sociologist and organizational theorist Walter Powell (1990), there has been no effort to use the tools provided by social network analysis to examine the structures of transnational networks created and utilized by NGOs. This dissertation represents an attempt to begin rectifying this short-coming.

	Transnational Civil Society	Transnational Marketplace
Literature	Transnational Relations (within International Relations)	Organization Theory (within Sociology)
Basic Assumption	NGOs act as activists in a transnational civil society	NGOs act as competitors in a transnational marketplace
Primary Concern for NGOs	Success of Organizational Mission	Organizational Survival
Default Relationship with Other NGOs	Collaborative	Competitive
Theoretical Lens	Resource Mobilization	Resource Dependence
More Inter-NGO Networking When…	Organizational mission can be advanced through transnational networking. This is most frequently the case when the advocacy issue involves bodily harm to or inequality of opportunity for vulnerable persons.	Environment presents a threat to the sector. Specifically, a hostile legal environment.

Table 1.1: Theoretical Framework for this Dissertation

I will frame the discussion as something of a "three-cornered fight" (Lakatos 1970) between the expectations about inter-NGO collaboration drawn from the dominant strand of the transnational relations literature (Price 2003) and those derived from the resource dependence stream of organizational theory in sociology (Pfeffer and Salancik

2003). Table 1.1 summarizes the expectations which will be investigated using original network data representing inter-NGO networks surrounding the issue of protracted internal displacement in 29 post-conflict settings.

Transnational civil society "refers to self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest (Price 2003, 580)." This literature begins with the assumption that NGOs operate as activists (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998, 14), "who care enough about some issue that they are prepared to incur significant costs and act to achieve their goals (Oliver and Marwell 1992, 252)." The primary concern of the activist organization is the success of its organizational mission. "The collective nature of the good means that those who are involved look for support from a larger circle of people who share their interest. This expectation of support from others drives the mobilization process (Oliver and Marwell 1992)." In other words, for the activist, collaboration with other activists is the default expectation.

According to the transnational relations literature, one of the primary means through which traditionally powerless NGOs gain the leverage to effect state behavior is through the creation of dense transnational networks of NGOs. In *Activists Beyond Borders*, Keck and Sikkink develop the concept of the transnational advocacy network, a network made up of "those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998)." The network enables

traditionally less powerful non-state actors (*i.e.* NGOs) to gather, frame, and strategically mobilize information in order to promote the adoption and implementation of norms and policies, monitor state compliance, and socialize state and IGO actors. Keck and Sikkink argue that nongovernmental actors require speedy access to thick and accurate information to gain the type of leverage necessary to fulfill their roles, and that "contact with like-minded groups at home and abroad provides access to information necessary to their work, broadens their legitimacy, and helps to mobilize information around particular policy targets (Keck and Sikkink 1998)." In addition to facilitating the flow of information, these dense networks contribute to trust creation, consensus building and deepening of commitments to a set of common values. **From the point of view of the activist, the more numerous, informed and empowered actors "like me," the better.** From this perspective, one would expect to find cohesive networks among NGOs characterized by dense relations of reliable, reciprocal information exchange. Of course NGOs will also be network adjacent to non-NGO actors who can secure institutional leverage (i.e. states and IGOs) and/or material resources (i.e. states, IGOs, and donors). But the connections among the NGOs ought to exist unmediated by these more traditionally powerful actors.

The optimistic notion that an increasing level of transnational networking among NGOs and other nonstate actors amounts to "the rise of a transnational civil society" (Florini 2000) based on shared liberal norms and values has become the dominant position within the transnationalism literature (Price 2003). Based largely on case studies, this literature is devoted to establishing that some form of a transnational civil

society of nonstate actors matters, how and when it matters, and how desirable that influence might be (H. Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001; Burgerman 2001; Ann Marie Clark 2001; Evangelista 1999; Florini 2000; Glasius, Kaldor, and H. Anheier 2002; Halliday 1994; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink 2002; Price 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995).

Turning to organizational theory, which Keck and Sikkink cite in the construction of their transnational network concept, we derive a different set of expectations about inter-NGO collaboration. From what I am terming the "transnational marketplace" point of view, NGOs tend to operate much like any other organization, and consequently, once formed, they operate as though organizational survival were the primary goal (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Sell and Prakash 2004). Therefore the procurement of resources, not shared values, constitutes the central reason for establishing network relationships with other organizations (Joseph Galaskiewicz 1985). According to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), organizations do not form network ties simply to reduce transaction costs or increase efficiency. Organizations strive to retain their autonomy for unconstrained and independent action later on (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, 261), and the establishment of interorganizational relations necessarily comes with a loss of organizational autonomy (Zeitz 1980).

Organizational actors facing scarcity of or uncertainty about access to needed resources are more likely to form network ties with organizational actors who can provide these scare resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Of course, uncertainty about

access to needed resources comprises the norm for NGOs, who are highly dependent on donor budgets for their operations and survival. State and IGO (particularly UN) budgets constitute the bulk of NGO funding, "particularly in the issue-areas of international development and humanitarian aid (Risse 2002, 260)." Moreover, donors are increasingly distributing funds through short-term, renewable contracts for discrete projects (i.e. the marketization and "projectiziation" of aid), requiring competitive bidding and the reporting of concrete results (Alvarez 2009; Cooley and Ron 2002; Smillie and others 1995; Smillie and Watson Jr 1998).

Intense competition for scarce resources among the increasing number of NGOs in the relief and development sectors creates strong reason to doubt the optimistic pronouncements of an emergent transnational civil society of NGOs collaborating for the common good (Cooley and Ron 2002; Hulme and Edwards 1997). Similar organizations in this scenario are not empowering one another; **here the fewer actors "like me," the better for my own survival and success.** Under these conditions, NGOs face clear incentives to guard private information from their competing NGO counterparts. Moreover, there is an incentive to hide failures, as renewal of short-term contracts is often dependent on reports of successful programing. Clearly the expectations for our NGO network using the metaphor of competing organizations are quite a bit different. Resource dependency theory predicts that most interorganizational relationships forged by NGOs should be with those actors who control the resources necessary for NGO functioning (states, IGOs, private donors) rather than with other NGOs.

It bears noting that it is not a question of whether NGOs are engaging in transnational networking, but what types of networking strategies are being pursued. Are NGOs better understood as activists in a transnational civil society or as competitors in a transnational marketplace? Another way of framing this debate is to ask whether the NGO uses the network to benefit the cause as a whole or their organization specifically. While I do not doubt the sincere commitment of most NGO managers to their chosen cause, I argue that they largely perceive this cause to be best served by the survival and successful operation of their organization. I will therefore hypothesize that an empirical examination of the inter-NGO relations surrounding cases of protracted internal displacement will reveal largely disconnected and non-cohesive networks. In other words, the trend I expect to find among NGOs working to assist and protect IDPs is a failure to collaborate.

This dissertation also asks about the conditions under which greater inter-NGO collaboration can be expected. From the transnational civil society point of view, greater networking among NGOs is expected in situations when these activists "believe that networking will further their organizational missions (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998, 14)." These authors argue that network formation is most likely surrounding "issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals … and issues involving legal equality of opportunity (27)."

A few words are in order about the case selected for this study. There is perhaps no more pressing human rights crisis than that of protracted internal displacement.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs), like refugees, have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes but, unlike refugees, have not crossed an internationally recognized state border ("UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2" n.d.).[2] *Protracted internal displacement* refers to those situations where "the process for finding durable solutions is stalled and/or IDPs are marginalized as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights (Mundt and Ferris 2008)." People who find themselves in protracted IDP situations have lost everything – their homes, their property, their means of livelihood, and their social networks – and due to the highly politicized circumstances of conflict or generalized violence which resulted in their displacement, no feasible or palatable durable solutions are readily apparent.

So long as IDPs are not successfully reintegrated into society, a successful transition to durable peace is unlikely (Adelman 2002; Suhrke and Zolberg 1989). Internal displacement may increase the "ecological stress level" in a society, increasing inter-group tensions and the likelihood that armed conflict resumes. IDPs are especially vulnerable to human rights abuses, malnutrition and disease. Displaced women are often victims of sexual violence, and displaced children are disproportionately recruited as

[2] Definition of IDPs according to the *Guiding Principles*: "Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (Guiding Principles 1998)."

child soldiers. Moreover, because they have not crossed an internationally recognized state border, IDPs lack the legal status of refugee, a status which would qualify them for international guarantees of protection and assistance ("United Nations, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967, 606 UNTS 267" n.d.). Protracted internal displacement is certainly an issue which often involves the threat of bodily harm to vulnerable individuals and almost always involves legal equality of opportunity.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), an estimated 27.5 million people are currently internally displaced as a result of armed conflict or generalized violence. As of 2010, IDPs in 41 states[3] continued to linger in situations of protracted displacement with little hope for a durable solution. Protracted internal displacement is a complex problem, which would benefit from collaboration among organizations that specialize in a range of issue areas including emergency aid, development, education, health care and legal assistance.

1.4 Research Hypotheses

The research hypotheses investigated in this dissertation are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: NGOs do participate in transnational networking to help persons affected by armed conflict.

[3] Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe (IDMC Global Overview 2010).

Hypothesis 2: NGOs are not necessarily the central actors in these networks.

Hypothesis 3: NGOs relate to one another more as competitors in a transnational marketplace than as activists in a transnational civil society.

Hypothesis 4: NGOs tend to engage in little inter-NGO collaboration.

Hypothesis 5: More extensive inter-NGO collaboration occurs among NGOs operating within a hostile legal environment.

1.5 Significance

This dissertation represents a significant contribution to our understanding of transnational relations by offering the first empirical examination of the structure of the transnational networks through which nonstate actors operate. So far, the concept of the transnational advocacy network has served largely as a metaphor. Through the collection and analysis of original network data, this study offers a way to examine the actual structure of these networks and to begin to understand the way NGOs relate to one another as they strive to provide assistance and protection to those affected by armed conflict. By applying the theoretical framework offered by resource dependence theory to the question of NGO interaction, this dissertation offers an alternative view of transnational relations which may assist concerned practitioners in the creation of incentives to encourage greater collaboration in the field.

A corresponding contribution of this dissertation is its consideration of the effect of the legal environment on the extent of collaboration among NGOs operating therein. The existing organizational theory literature considering the effects of the legal environment on organizations is limited to western contexts. By extending this conversation to developing or post-conflict settings, this dissertation contributes to the literature the beginning of a discussion about how variations in regulatory quality influence the behavior of organizations.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This dissertation represents an initial attempt to examine the transnational networks of NGOs using social network analysis. As one might expect, the data available for such an analysis represents a significant limitation to this study. Given the salient implications of the limitations in the present analysis, this work must be considered preliminary and exploratory.

First, due to limited information about relevant non-NGO actors across my cases, I have only collected network data representing the "full" transnational advocacy network (*i.e.* NGOs plus relevant state and IGO agencies) for Azerbaijan (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation). The cross-national data collected and analyzed across all 29 cases is limited to the networks of NGOs only. With these data I am able to call into serious question one major assumption in the transnational relations literature by demonstrating that in the cases I am examining there is little inter-NGO collaboration and networking occurring. Further research is necessary to determine whether this in fact indicates competition

between the NGOs, or if instead the lack of collaborative network ties simply indicates that the NGOs are largely indifferent to one another.

Second, the ties (or relationships) between the actors for this analysis are based on hyperlinks between the actors' websites. This device allows me to collect data which are comparable across all of my cases. Certainly, providing links to another organization's website is a rather cheap form of collaboration, but I argue that given my hypotheses, a conservative measure of collaboration is appropriate (see chapter 3 for a more extensive explanation and justification of these data). Furthermore, recent research finds that organizations tend to hyperlink with other organizations with which they collaborate (Pilny and Shumate 2012).

Third, the set of NGOs to be examined for each case are limited to those identified by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) as relevant to the case in question. However, it should be noted that this does not necessarily comprise the full list of relevant NGOs. While I have carefully compiled a complete list of those NGOs reported by IDMC as active in the assistance and protection of IDPs in each case as of 2010, there is nonetheless the risk that I have left out some relevant NGOs not mentioned by IDMC.

1.7 Description of Chapters

Chapter 2 presents original data representing the transnational advocacy network of NGOs along with the state agencies, UN agencies and other organizations involved in

providing assistance and protection to IDPs in Azerbaijan in 2010. This chapter will be used to demonstrate that (1) transnational actors do network around specific campaigns, but (2) this does not necessarily mean that NGOs are collaborating with one another or acting as the central actors in these transnational networks. Chapter 3 provides original network data modeling the extent to which inter-NGO collaboration exists among NGOs responding to 29 separate cases of protracted internal displacement. These data will provide support for my assertion that NGOs tend to follow a strategy of resource dependence rather than resource mobilization in their strategic networking behaviors. Finally, Chapter 4 will examine variation in the cohesion among these 29 potential inter-NGO networks and suggest conditions which underlie greater inter-NGO collaboration. I argue that only in cases of a real or perceived threat to the NGO-sector as a whole, specifically a legal environment that is not conducive to the functioning of the nonprofit sector, is extensive inter-NGO collaboration likely to occur. Chapter 4 demonstrates that a hostile legal environment is necessary and sufficient for extensive inter-NGO collaboration. In the concluding Chapter 5, I summarize my main findings and suggest some directions for future empirical research on transnational advocacy networks.

CHAPTER 2. RESPONDING TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN AZERBAIJAN

2.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a story about a group of people who are internally displaced despite the fact that the conflict which displaced them officially ended eighteen years ago. The intractability of the cold conflict in Azerbaijan and the political decisions of the leaders there have created a situation where around 200,000 children have lived their entire lives as registered internally displaced persons (IDPs), and where approximately 600,000 people live in a state of what must feel like perpetual displacement. In 2010, fifteen nongovernmental organizations (NGO) were providing programs to assist and protect these IDPs in various ways. Their work was funded by a number of state, UN and other agencies concerned with the on-going crisis. This chapter will use the case of protracted internal displacement in Azerbaijan to demonstrate that (1) transnational actors do network around specific campaigns, but (2) this does not necessarily mean that NGOs are the central actors in the transnational networks or that they are using the networks to collaborate or share information with one another about their assistance and protection efforts.

2.2 Protracted Internal Displacement in Azerbaijan

In the early 1920s, as part of their "divide-and-rule" policy, the Soviet Union declared the territory known as Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous region, despite the fact that it fell completely within the boundaries of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The

majority ethnic group within Nagorno-Karabakh was Armenian[4], and in the late 1980s, during the waning of Soviet control, the region's parliament voted to join Armenia. Armed conflict began in 1988, intensifying following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, when Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself an independent republic.[5]

Hostilities between Azerbaijani forces and Armenian Karabakh separatists continued until the ceasefire agreement in 1994. By the time of the ceasefire, approximately 22,000 to 25,000 people were killed and an estimated 700,000 people had been forcibly displaced (IDMC 2010). The ethnic Azeri population of Nagorno-Karabakh, who made up about 25% of the region's population before the conflict, fled the territory, while ethnic Armenians fled the rest of Azerbaijan. Since 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh has operated as a de facto independent state, but it is still internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. Negotiations continue to be held, "but the key sticking points remain the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the return of IDPs to the territory (IDMC 2010)." It seems that there is little political will among the parties to come to a comprehensive resolution.

Due to this political impasse, nearly 600,000 ethnic Azeri, Kurd, Russian and Turkish IDPs from the Nagorno-Karabakh region remain in a state of protracted internal

[4] 74% ethnic Armenian population according to Minorities at Risk qualitative risk assessment

[5] Declaration on the Proclamation of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (September 2, 1991)

displacement in Azerbaijan.[6] This figure includes between 197,000 and 230,000 children born after 1994 who have acquired the IDP status of their fathers. The primary concern of IDPs in Azerbaijan, of which about 86% live in urban areas, remains their inadequate living conditions. Around 188,000 live in collective centers, such as former public buildings, hostels, schools and sanitariums. Many are run-down and overcrowded and have insufficient electricity supplies, sanitation facilities, water, waste disposal, and/or protection from the elements. Approximately 90,000 IDPs have been resettled into 65 settlements provided by the government, but they are often in remote locations and therefore limit IDP access to jobs, services and information. The rest live in makeshift accommodations, with relatives, or in housing they occupied or built themselves. Many have only limited security of tenure (IDMC 2010).

Other issues for IDPs in Azerbaijan include unemployment and underemployment, lack of documentation necessary to receive employment, assistance and services, and practical barriers to education, health care and mental health provision (IDMC 2010). According to the World Bank, about half of IDPs surveyed were not working or were seeking work compared with 36% of the general population (World Bank, March 2010). Surveys show that IDPs vary with respect to their preferred settlement solutions, with elderly IDPs generally expressing a desire to return home while many younger IDPs – particularly those born in displacement – prefer to remain in the region where they currently live. The Azeri government's strong position is that IDPs

[6] According to the Azerbaijani State Committee for Refugees and IDPs, the government reported 586,013 IDPs in January of 2010 (IDMC 2010)

should be allowed to return, and they have clearly articulated that any measures they have taken or will take to improve the living conditions of IDPs should be regarded as purely temporary measures. Given that return requires a resolution to the conflict – an outcome which remains unlikely in the current political climate – this lack of will to create more durable arrangements for IDPs amounts to a dangerous political game.

I have selected the case of Azerbaijan for this chapter for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons. First, as the above narrative demonstrates, internal displacement in Azerbaijan fits without question into the category of protracted internal displacement, defined as a situation where "the process for finding durable solutions is stalled and/or IDPs are marginalized as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights (Mundt and Ferris 2008)." Although the armed conflict resulting in the mass displacement has been over since 1994 and no new displacement has occurred since that time, the conditions faced by the IDPs there remains serious and no durable solution is in sight. Secondly, the conditions for NGOs in this case are relatively good, meaning that if the NGOs wanted to collaborate with one another in this case there should be no real impediment to doing so. The legal environment is relatively beneficial for nonprofits in Azerbaijan and the government is at least nominally supportive of efforts to help the displaced. Finally, the IDMC provides identification of those non-NGO actors who are actively involved in the assistance and protection of IDPs in Azerbaijan, making it possible to collect data on the full transnational advocacy network of both NGOs and non-NGO organizations involved in this matter.

2.3 Responding to Internal Displacement: Transnational Actors and Network

An important set of players in the assistance and protection of persons internally displaced by conflict are nongovernmental organizations. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)[7] database and documentation on Azerbaijan enabled me to identify fifteen NGOs[8] actively working to assist and/or protect internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan in 2010. Among these are thirteen international NGOs (INGOs), 2 regional NGOs, and 2 domestic NGOs. These NGOs are working on a range of issues including food security, water, sanitation, education, access to health care, infrastructure repair, community and civil society mobilization, government accountability programs, and agricultural assistance (IDMC 2010).

NGOs are arguably the best actors to implement programs of a humanitarian or human rights nature, but as "self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations (Vakil 1997, 2060)" they are clearly not positioned to do it alone. They must turn to other transnational actors (e.g. states, IGOs, private individual or corporate donors) for the resources necessary to do their work. The majority of NGO funding comes from states and IGOs (Helmut K. Anheier 2005). According to the IDMC, state support for IDPs in

[7] The IDMC is a Geneva-based center established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council to manage an public online database (http://www.internal-displacement.org) "providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries ("About Us" page of IDMC website)."

[8] Action Against Hunger (Action contre la faim), Amnesty International, Counterpart International, Danish Refugee Council, Eurasian Lawyers Association (ELA), ICRC, International Alert, International Crisis Group, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Oxfam, Praxis, UMID Humanitarian and Social Support Center, United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), Women's Association for Rational Development (WARD), and World Vision

Azerbaijan in 2010 came from the American, Japanese, German, Norwegian, and Swiss governments. Additional donor support came from the European Union, the World Bank, the Norwegian oil company Statoil. Finally five UN agencies were providing assistance and support to IDPs in Azerbaijan, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (Unicef), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), and the World Health Organization (WHO) (IDMC 2010).

In order to get a sense of the relationships among these various transnational actors concerned with internal displacement in Azerbaijan, I searched each organization's website to find hyperlinks to each of the other organizations. I counted any such hyperlinks as a relationship of collaboration and information exchange between the two organizations.[9] By entering this information into the Netdraw component of UCINET, a program for the visualization of social network analysis data, I was able to create a snapshot of the transnational network of actors concerned with waging the campaign to assist and protect IDPs in Azerbaijan (Figure 2.1). The circles represent NGOs, the triangles represent other (*i.e.* state, IGO and corporate) actors, and the lines represent the ties between these actors. There exists a dense pattern of linkages resulting in a highly cohesive transnational network surrounding the issue of protracted internal displacement in Azerbaijan.

[9] See section 2.5 below for a fuller explanation of this proxy for the existence of a collaborative relationship between two organizations.



Figure 2.1: Transnational Advocacy Network Responding to Internal Displacement in Azerbaijan, 2010

2.4 The Transnational Advocacy Network

The concept of the transnational advocacy network, developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), refers to a network characterized by "dense exchanges of information and services" enabling traditionally less powerful non-state actors to gather, frame, and strategically mobilize information in order to promote the adoption and implementation of norms and policies, monitor state compliance, and socialize state and IGO actors. Transnational advocacy networks are analyzed by campaigns (*i.e.* topical or country foci), "in which members of a diffuse principled network (what social movement theorists would call a 'mobilization potential') develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal (and generally against a common target) (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998, 6)." In this case, of course, the campaign

in question is the campaign to assist and protect internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan. Surprisingly, despite being a network concept, no one has taken advantage of the tools of social network analysis to visualize or analyze the transnational advocacy network. The relatively dense[10] and highly cohesive[11] transnational network of actors displayed in Figure 2.1 seems to be precisely what these scholars would expect us to find.

A number of other related implications have been drawn about these networks within the transnational relations literature which merit being examined using social network analysis. First, Keck and Sikkink suggest that "international and domestic NGOs play a central role in all advocacy networks (1998, 9)." NGOs operate as activists, creating and maintaining these networks when they believe that it will further their organizational missions. So certain are the authors of this fact that they represent the increase over time of international NGOs committed to social change as an indication of the growth in the "number, size and density of advocacy networks generally (1998, 10)."

Second, this literature draws an analogy between the transnational networks of actors surrounding specific campaigns and the civil society concept in domestic contexts, with NGOs playing the role of activists and community organizers. Indeed, the optimistic notion that an increasing level of transnational networking among NGOs and other nonstate actors amounts to "the rise of a transnational civil society" (Florini 2000) based on shared liberal norms and values has become the dominant position within the

[10] Density measure of 0.369 directed and 0.468 nondirected – see Table 2.1

[11] Krackhardt's Connectedness score of 0.86 directed or 0.929 nondirected – see Table 2.1

transnational relations literature (Price 2003). Based largely on case studies, a wealth of literature is devoted to establishing that some form of a transnational civil society of nonstate actors matters, how and when it matters, and how desirable that influence might be (H. Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001; Burgerman 2001; Ann Marie Clark 2001; Evangelista 1999; Florini 2000; Glasius, Kaldor, and H. Anheier 2002; Halliday 1994; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink 2002; Price 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995). However no study has used network data to consider whether this assumption about the place of NGOs in the transnational network in fact holds true.

Finally, this literature claims that these networks are unique because they are "motivated by values rather than by material concerns or professional norms (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998, 2)." The actors in these networks are said to be "bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998, 2)." NGOs use the networks to exchange information, frame issues, and mobilize this information in order to "persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998, 2)." In other words, the network is a tool for principled actors to collaborate in their efforts to fulfill a mission.

After defining some key concepts, I will proceed to use the transnational network of NGOs and donors working to assist and protect Azerbaijan's IDPs in order to examine some of these claims. Are NGOs the central actors in this network? Are they behaving

as activists in a transnational civil society, motivated by principled ideas rather than material concerns? Does the structure of the network suggest that NGOs are using it to frame and mobilize information in order to influence the more powerful actors (i.e. states and IGOs) in the network? In other words, is there evidence here that the network facilitates inter-NGO collaboration around the crisis of internal displacement? Alternatively, does the structure of the network actually suggest a relationship of competition among these NGOs, who are necessarily concerned with the material resources required for organizational survival and who are operating more as organizations in a transnational marketplace that as activists in a transnational civil society?

2.5 Inter-NGO Collaboration

In this section, I will define and discuss a central concept to this dissertation, specifically the concept of inter-NGO collaboration. Collaboration, from the Latin *collaborare* (to work with), is the act of working together with another or others on a joint project or common goal. The depth of this "co-laboring" can vary from polite cooperation to shared data to joint operations (Linden 2002).

Interorganizational collaboration is closely related to the concept of strategic alliance, or "an agreement between two or more partners to share knowledge or resources, which could be beneficial to all parties involved (Bannock, E. Davis, and Trott 2003, 351)." Indeed Bannock *et al.*, in their *Dictionary of Business*, list collaboration as a flexible form of strategic alliance wherein no separate legal entity is formed. The

organizations may work together on some common venture, but are not legally obligated to continue working together in the future.

It is further important to note that the concept of interorganizational collaboration is not generally conceived of as a one-shot scenario. Studies have found that successful collaboration between organizations requires open communication, trust and mutual understanding (Linden 2002; Martinez-Moyano 2006; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996). Hence another important related concept is that of the interorganizational network (Powell 1990; Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007) which, as Walter Powell explains, "looks more like a marriage than a one night stand, but there is no marriage license, no common household, no pooling of assets (1990, 301)."

The form of collaboration being examined in this dissertation is the interorganizational collaboration among nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). For the purposes of this research I will use Anna Vakil's definition of NGOs as "self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people (1997, 2060)." Vakil points out that the term NGO is distinct from the term nonprofit organization (NPO) on the basis of its historical association with development. "[T]he NGO sector normally excludes organizations such as unions as well as business, professional, recreational, cultural and strictly religious organizations that are usually considered a part of the nonprofit sector (*ibid*)." Built into the very definition of the concept, therefore, is the notion that these organizations, especially when

working on the same thematic or geographic campaign, share some sort of a common goal.

From the transnational relations literature on networking among development-oriented nonstate actors I derive the impression that the essential element of this type of interorganizational collaboration lies in the exchange of information, but may also include sharing of resources, services and/or skills. Drawing upon Powell's notion of the interorganizational network, Keck and Sikkink develop their concept of the transnational advocacy network, a network made up of "those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (1998, 2). They argue that the primary focus of these transnational networks is the production, exchange and strategic use of information (*ibid*, x). Clark *et al.* (1998) likewise refer to networking among NGOs as the informal exchange of information and services between NGOs.

My working definition of inter-NGO collaboration is as follows: Inter-NGO collaboration occurs when NGOs form relationships characterized by the exchange of information, resources, services, and/or skills in pursuit of some common goal related to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people.



Figure 2.2: Two-Level Concept Map for Inter-NGO Collaboration

Now that I have defined inter-NGO collaboration, how do we know it if we see it? In order to operationalize the concept we must ensure that all three elements of the working definition are present. As a reminder: an inter-NGO collaboration occurs when (1) NGOs form relationships (2) characterized by the exchange of information, resources, services, and/or skills (3) in pursuit of some common goal related to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people.



Figure 2.3: Three-Level Concept Map for Inter-NGO Collaboration

Because collaboration describes the relationship between actors rather than an attribute of the actors themselves, I will employ social network analysis for this dissertation. Despite being a commonly understood and studied aspect of organizational life, there is still no clear consensus on the definition of a network (Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007). I will adopt the general definition offered by Brass *et al.*, who "define a network as a set of nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship, or lack of relationship, between the nodes … The particular content of the relationships represented by the ties is limited only by a researcher's imagination (2004, 795)." Network analysis can be used to represent, measure, and analyze the ties (or relationships) among a set of nodes (or actors) in a network. For the purposes of studying inter-NGO collaboration, the nodes (or actors) are NGOs. The relationship of interest is collaboration as characterized by the exchange of information, resources and/or skills.

The third element of the definition – the pursuit of some common goal related to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people – can be interpreted very broadly.

NGOs by definition share a common goal of improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people (Vakil 1997), so it is theoretically possible to conceive of one global inter-NGO network. Alternatively one can understand the common goal as a more narrow topical or geographic campaign as suggested by Keck and Sikkink (1998, 6). For instance, this dissertation will take as its subject the inter-NGO collaboration among NGOs who share the goal of addressing protracted internal displacement in 29 separate conflict or post-conflict environments.

Presumably if one NGO links to another NGO's website they also consume the information provided on that website. These links indicate that not only are the organizations aware of one another, but also that they trust one another enough to publicly proclaim the other's information as valuable. Moreover recent research finds that NGOs tend to hyperlink with organizations with which they collaborate (Pilny and Shumate 2012).

In addition website links present a far more accurate picture of the tendency to collaborate than does mutual attendance at international conferences, which is a common proxy used in the extant literature on transnational advocacy networks. Attending the same conference does not necessarily even designate a mutual awareness; much less does it indicate any level of trust, respect, or inclination to work together.

To be sure, a hyperlink is a relatively cheap form of collaboration. If two organizations are not even willing to link to one another's websites, it is unlikely that deeper collaboration is occurring. If two organizations are competing with one another,

they are no less likely to attend the same conference. They might even be more likely to do so, as they both want to be seen and network with important resource providers such as donors. However two competing organizations would certainly not be inclined to provide hyperlinks to one another on their websites.

2.6 Competition among NGOs

Instead of collaborating with one another in their efforts to assist the vulnerable, it may be that NGOs are competing with one another for visibility, legitimacy, and ultimately funding. The primary focus of this dissertation is the extent to which NGOs are collaborating with one another as indicated by their website hyperlinks. A failure to collaborate may indicate that the NGOs are competing with one another instead.

Competition, however, is not adequately defined as an absence of collaboration. To compete is to strive against another or others to attain a goal, such as an advantage or a victory. In order to positively operationalize competition between two NGOs, one must know something not only about their relationship (or lack thereof) but also the relationships they each have with other types of actors (*e.g.* state agencies, IGOs, corporations, foundations) that possess the resources for which they may be competing (*e.g.* funding, access to political power).

In social network analysis, competition among actors is can be represented through their mutual connection with an actor who possesses a resource that they each desire combined with a lack of direct ties among the actors. Consider the hypothetical

networks displayed in Figure 2.4. If we know that actors B1-B4 are have roughly same interests and capabilities (making them interchangeable from A's point of view), this effectively allows A to induce competition between the Bs (Borgatti and Halgin 2011). If, on the other hand, the Bs are themselves connected, these "ties of solidarity" may mitigate A's ability to play them off of one another in a competitive manner. Imagine that A represents a state or IGO agency, and that B1-4 represent NGOs. In the network to the left, each NGO is connected to the network only through their respective relationships with A. No collaboration exists among the NGOs, as they are not connected without the involvement of B. Instead, the relationship among the NGOs in this example is one of competition for exchange with A. In the network on the right, however, the NGOs are themselves connected to one another, representing an increased collaboration and mitigating the competitive relationship. Another way to think about this is to imagine what would happen to the network if non-NGOs (*i.e.* A) were removed. In the network to the left, no connections would remain among the NGOs. Without the mediation of A, no interorganizational network would exist. In the network on the right, on the other hand, the NGOs would remain connected with or without the participation of A.



Figure 2.4: Competition among NGOs

2.7 The "Network" of NGOs in Azerbaijan

Recall the transnational network depicted in Figure 2.1. This image of the relationships among all the NGOs and other actors relevant to the issue of internal displacement in Azerbaijan displayed a dense and cohesive transnational network of actors. In section 2.4, I raised two main questions about the structure of such networks. First, are NGOs the central actors in the transnational network as predicted by the transnational relations literature? Second, is the relationship among the NGOs in the network one of collaboration as predicted by the transnational civil society strand of literature, or does it appear more as thought the NGOs may be competing with one another for the resources which the other actors in the network are able to provide?

In order examine the first question, centrality scores were calculated for all the network actors. There are a variety of methods to calculate which actor(s) are the most central, two of which are considered in this analysis. Because the data I have collected is

Organization	Actor Type	Directional Network		Nondirectional Network	
		In Degree	Betweeness	Degree	Betweeness
Eurasian Lawyers Association	NGO	0	0	0	0
Praxis	NGO	0.037	0	0.111	0
UMID Humanitarian and Social Support Center	NGO	0.037	0	0.037	0
Women's Association for Rational Development	NGO	0.037	0	0.037	0
Counterpart International	NGO	0.074	0	0.148	0
United Methodist Committee on Relief	NGO	0.074	0	0.296	0
Action Against Hunger	NGO	0.111	0	0.185	0
Danish Refugee Council	NGO	0.111	0.004	0.296	0.002
International Rescue Committee	NGO	0.111	0	0.296	0
Statoil	Corporate	0.111	0.002	0.222	0.001
International Alert	NGO	0.259	0.01	0.481	0.006
World Vision	NGO	0.296	0	0.333	0
SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation)	State	0.296	0.006	0.593	0.003
International Crisis Group	NGO	0.37	0.001	0.481	0
ECHO (European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office)	IGO	0.37	0.013	0.667	0.012
Amnesty International	NGO	0.407	0	0.444	0
ICRC	NGO	0.407	0.001	0.444	0
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)	State	0.407	0.004	0.556	0.001
JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency)	State	0.407	0.006	0.63	0.005
Oxfam	NGO	0.444	0.002	0.444	0
NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation)	State	0.444	0.023	0.63	0.01
UNFPA	IGO	0.704	0.018	0.741	0.019
UNHCR	IGO	0.778	0.213	0.963	0.215
USAID	State	0.778	0.046	0.778	0.031
World Bank	IGO	0.778	0.021	0.778	0.034
UNDP	IGO	0.815	0.05	0.852	0.058
WHO	IGO	0.815	0.042	0.815	0.039
UNICEF	IGO	0.852	0.096	0.852	0.061

Table 2.1: Degree and Betweenness Centrality Scores

directional (i.e. a link from A to B can exist independent of a corresponding link from B to A), I have calculated centrality (or "prestige") taking the direction of the ties into account. Standardized *in-degree centrality* measures the proportion of actors in the network that link their website to actor *i*'s website. The maximum score of 1 means that actor i is linked to by all other actors. I have also symmetrized the data (i.e. treated all links as reciprocal) to measure a nondirectional standardized *degree centrality* score. This measure captures the proportion of actors in the network linked to actor i, with 1 once again meaning that links exist between actor i and every other actor in the network. The idea with degree centrality measures is that the more ties in which an actor is involved, the more visible, prestigious or central is the actor in question (Wasserman and Faust 1994). As can be seen in Table 2.1, the highest in-degree and degree centrality scores are apparent among state and IGO actors, while the NGOs tend to have the lower scores.

Figure 2.5 offers another way of viewing the in-degree centrality of all the actors in the transnational network concerned with protracted internal displacement in Azerbaijan. In this figure, the nodes are assigned different sizes based on their standardized in-degree centrality measures, where the largest nodes represent those most central to the network. Here it is very clear to see that it is the non-NGOs (i.e. triangles) who are the most central actors, not the NGOs (i.e. circles).



Figure 2.5: Transnational Network with Nodes Sized by In-Degree Centrality

Betweenness centrality offers an alternative means of determining the most central actors in a network. Rather than conceptualizing the most popular actors as the most central (i.e. degree centrality), betweenness considers an actor central if it lies between other actors on their geodesics (i.e. shortest routes from one actor to another) (Wasserman and Faust 1994). I have calculated betweenness centrality scores for all actors in the network as reported in Table 2.1. Because the network is so highly connected, there are no actors who receive betweenness measures approaching 1. However, it is once again the case that the NGOs tend to receive the lower betweenness centrality scores. Whether we calculate centrality using degree or betweenness, and whether we account for the direction of the links or symmetrize the data, it can be said with certainty that the NGOs are not the central actors in this network.



Figure 2.6: Inter-NGO Network of NGOs working to Assist & Protect IDPs in Azerbaijan

In order to investigate the question of the relationship among the NGOs in the network – specifically, whether it looks more like collaboration or competition - I have removed the donors from the network, leaving us with Figure 2.6. Clearly, once the traditionally more powerful actors are removed from the network, the network itself disintegrates. The Krackhardt's connectedness score for this network is a mere 0.019, with a density measure of 0.010 (see Table 2.2 for comparisons of these measures). There are now 13 components, meaning that only two pairs of NGOs have a relationship between them unmediated by non-NGO actors. This image is certainly not what the transnational relations literature would lead us to expect. It seems that the primary relationship among NGOs in this network is one of competition rather than collaboration.

	Full Network	NGOs Only	Non-NGOs Only
Nodes	28	15	13
Components	2	13	1
Density Directetional	0.369	0.01	0.782
Density Nondirectional	0.468	0.019	0.897
Connectedness Directional	0.86	0.01	1
Connectedness Nondirectional	0.929	0.019	1

Table 2.2: Comparison of Density and Connectedness Measures with and without NGOs

The network of inter-NGO collaboration – or actually, the lack thereof – raises questions about the accuracy of the claims that NGOs are behaving like activists mobilizing information in an emergent transnational civil society. Their primary connections are not with one another, but rather with the organizations which can provide them with access to funding. Figure 2.6 casts real doubt on the notion that NGOs are using these networks to exchange information, frame issues, and collaborate in an effort to "persuade, pressure and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments." Rather than activists in a transnational civil society, these NGOs seem to be using the network more in the manner of competing organizations concerned primarily with accessing the material resources necessary to their organizational survival.

In the next chapter, I will explain why the organizational theory literature would lead us to expect exactly what I have demonstrated in this chapter with Azerbaijan. I will also expand the scope of the study to conduct a cross-national comparison of the inter-NGO networks surrounding 29 separate campaigns to protect and assist internally displaced persons.

CHAPTER 3. A FAILURE TO COLLABORATE

3.1 Introduction

A subset of international relations scholars have argued that nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) are the crucial actors in the creation and maintenance of transnational advocacy networks made up of "those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink 1998)." The NGOs are said to operate as activists, forming relationships of collaboration and information exchange with likeminded NGOs and other state and nonstate actors in an effort that amounts to the creation of a transnational civil society. Missing from this literature is any effort to use social network analysis to examine this hypothesis using cross-national network data. In this chapter, I first review the transnational relations literature. Next, I apply organizational theory from sociology to argue that the structure of funding faced by NGOs creates the incentive to compete with one another and keep information closely guarded. Finally I present and analyze original network data to demonstrate that NGOs responding to the crisis of protracted internal displacement in post-conflict settings are behaving more like organizations in a transnational marketplace than like activists in a transnational civil society. NGOs may well be networking in pursuit of their missions, but not with one another. Among NGOs on the ground, these data suggest an overall failure to collaborate.

3.2 The Rise of Transnational Relations

Set against the backdrop of an international relations discipline historically focused on the actions of states in an anarchic system, a theoretical framework has emerged over the past several decades known as transnationalism (Ahmed and Potter 2006) or transnational relations (Barnett and Kathryn Sikkink 2008; Risse 2002).[12] Although it is clear that sovereign states remain the dominant actors in the international system, there is a growing consensus among international relations scholars that non-state actors make a difference in world politics. Multinational corporations (MNCs), epistemic communities of scientific and technical experts, terrorist networks, transnational criminal organizations and networks of nongovernmental organizations are increasingly viewed as making a significant impact on state decision-making and international politics.

While there is a growing agreement among international relations scholars that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play an important role in world politics today, there is no such consensus on the definition of an NGO. The UN defines an NGO as "any international organization which is not established by inter-governmental agreement (Ahmed and Potter 2006)." However many scholars have taken exception to this definition, as it would include profit-seeking organizations, terrorist organizations, rebel groups, and other non-state actors who are clearly not the types of actors we understand to be NGOs. In this dissertation, I will adopt Anna Vakil's definition of NGOs as "self-

[12] Actually transnationalism can be understood as "an effort to revive the prominence of interdependence theory to broaden the study of international politics beyond the scope of the state (Ahmed and Potter 2006, 12)."

governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people(Vakil 1997)."

The increasing number of NGOs since World War II has been well documented *(Ahmed and Potter 2006; H. Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001; Boli and Thomas 1997; Simmons 1998)*. According to the Yearbook of International Organizations, the number of active international NGOs (INGOs, or organizations active in at least three countries) has increased from 985 in 1956 to more than 62,000 in 2009. Although it is nearly impossible to get an accurate count, an even greater increase in number has been seen among national and local NGOs (Ahmed and Potter 2006). There has also been a broadening in the focus of NGO activities, covering areas as diverse as research and education, human rights protection, humanitarian aid-related activities, environmental activism, labor, individual property rights, technical and communications infrastructure development, and health care to name just a few (Boli and Thomas 1997; Simmons 1998).

NGOs are frequently portrayed as uniquely able to play a crucial role in shaping domestic and international outcomes due to their narrow issue focus, intense and principled commitment to a cause, and relatively high levels of information and expertise (A. Clark 1995). Unlike states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs are not saddled with the competing concerns of national sovereignty and national security. Unlike for-profit firms and corporations, NGOs are thought to be motivated by mission rather than by profit-margin. Due to their perceived commitment to a cause and their

relative independence from the state, NGOs are expected to be able to achieve things that the primary actors in the international system – states – are unable or unwilling to achieve.

Ahmed and Porter (2006) discuss three crucial areas in which NGOs matter for international politics: relief, development, and political action. The traditional role of NGOs, short-term emergency disaster relief, remains a key role of NGOs today. Because they are perceived of as impartial, expert-led, mission-oriented organizations, NGOs, and particularly western-based INGOs, have become the delivery channel for a surprisingly large amount of Northern governments' emergency foreign aid budgets (Smith 1990). For instance, 75% of British food aid in the early 1990s, over 60% of USAID's non-food related emergency budget between 1992 and 1997, and approximately two-thirds of the EU's European Community Humanitarian Aid Office funding is spent through NGOs (Ahmed and Potter 2006).

A second key area where NGOs matter is in the area of social and economic development. It has become clear that short-term emergency relief by itself is insufficient to the creation of peaceful and prosperous societies following tragedies such as natural disasters or violent conflict. A wealth of NGOs have emerged to provide services – "intangible technical services as well as tangible resources for development and for other purposes (Ahmed and Potter 2006, 40)" – meant to create more just, stable and peaceful societies over the long-term. Agricultural development, healthcare services, education and curriculum development, legal assistance, and rehabilitation services are

but a few examples of work being done by development oriented NGOs. As with emergency relief aid, much of the money earmarked by governments for foreign development is channeled through NGOs due to their perceived ability to have access to the populations in developing countries most in need of assistance (*ibid*).

The third crucial area of NGO impact, and the one most discussed by scholars of transnational relations, is the ability of NGOs to directly impact international relations through advocacy, lobbying and agenda-setting activities meant to influence the behavior of more powerful system actors such as states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink 2002; Risse 2002; Simmons 1998). These and other scholars have argued that NGOs have been successful in adding previously-unacknowledged issues to the international agenda, educating the public and raising awareness, lobbying states to create and implement new international norms or laws, and monitoring and reporting state compliance with international law.

One of the primary means through which traditionally powerless NGOs gain the leverage to effect state behavior is through the creation of dense transnational networks of NGOs. In *Activists Beyond Borders,* Keck and Sikkink develop the concept of the transnational advocacy network, a network made up of "those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998)." The network enables traditionally less powerful non-state

actors (*i.e.* NGOs) to gather, frame, and strategically mobilize information in order to promote the adoption and implementation of norms and policies, monitor state compliance, and socialize state and IGO actors. Case studies demonstrate the impact of transnational networks of NGOs on the agenda-setting and norm negotiation phases of subjects ranging from human rights (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998), to environmental protection regimes (ibid), to the "hard case" of international security issues such as the nuclear test ban debate (Finnemore 1996) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Price 1998).

The optimistic notion that an increasing level of transnational networking among NGOs and other nonstate actors amounts to "the rise of a transnational civil society" (Florini 2000) based on shared liberal norms and values has become the dominant position within the transnationalism literature (Price 2003). Based largely on case studies, a wealth of literature is devoted to establishing that some form of a transnational civil society of nonstate actors matters, how and when it matters, and how desirable that influence might be (H. Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001; Burgerman 2001; Ann Marie Clark 2001; Evangelista 1999; Florini 2000; Glasius, Kaldor, and H. Anheier 2002; Halliday 1994; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink 2002; Price 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995).

Beyond case studies, little empirical evidence has been offered to substantiate this optimism. In a rare exception to the case study approach, Clark et al (1998) examine NGO participation in recent UN world conferences to assess the transnational civil

society thesis. They identify two "mutually interdependent" types of interaction in which NGOs engage. The first, "lobbying," refers to the strategic (i.e. interest-based) relationships forged by NGOs with more powerful actors (i.e. states and IGOs). The second, "networking," refers to policy discussion and informal exchange of information and services among NGOs, resulting in deepening social (i.e. based on common understanding) NGO-to-NGO relationships and lending to the rise of a transnational (or, in their parlance, "global") civil society. The authors argue that the density of such inter-NGO networking represents what may well be a "nascent global civil society," but they caution that "it is too soon … to declare that a global civil society has definitively emerged." Certainly the extant evidence seems strong that under certain circumstances, and particularly in the agenda-setting stage, NGOs band together to lobby, educate and socialize more powerful actors. However, the extent to which these strategic connections beget the deep social collaborative relationships lauded by the transnational civil society literature is less clear.

3.3 NGOs: Community Organizers or Competing Organizations?

So far, the transnational network of NGOs has served largely as a metaphor. The majority of the literature on transnational networks and transnational civil society rests on case studies. The handful of studies examining transnational networks and the "global civil society" with a cross-national lens use mutual attendance at international conferences to represent the inter-NGO relationships (i.e. A. M Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; True and Mintrom 2001). This proxy requires one to assume that (1)

all conference participants exchange information with all other conference participants[13], and (2) that lasting relationships and inter-organizational trust are developed at these intermittent events. I argue that both these assumptions are ultimately untenable. Moreover even in these studies, there is no attempt to use the data to investigate the transnational networks themselves, but rather just to demonstrate that they exist. Despite the fact that the transnational network concept made its debut in the literature over a decade ago, we still know very little about how these networks are actually structured. While Keck and Sikkink (1999) attribute the network concept underlying their theory to sociologist and organizational theorist Walter Powell (1990), to the best of my knowledge there has been no effort to use the tools provided by social network analysis to examine the structures of transnational networks among NGOs.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that issues amenable to transnational action do not produce transnational networks; activists[14] do, when they believe that networking will further their organizational missions. NGOs wage campaigns focused on particular issues or countries by using their networks to connect groups to one another, to seek out resources, propose and prepare activities, and to conduct public relations for the cause. We must now ask, what type of network strategy are these NGOs pursuing? Two metaphors present themselves as options; NGOs as community organizers and NGOs as competing organizations. Does the networking behavior of NGOs more closely mirror a

[13] A highly unlikely assumption considering that, according to Clark et al (1998), tens of thousands of NGOs participate during UN world conference processes (6).

[14] Activists are "people who care enough about some issue that they are prepared to incur significant costs and act to achieve their goals (Oliver and Marwell 1992)."

transnational civil society or a transnational marketplace? While most of the literature utilizing the transnational network concept seems at least implicitly to suggest the former, I will hypothesize the latter. I will argue that NGOs network strategically, as Keck and Sikkink attest, but the strategy is one of resource dependency rather than resource mobilization.

Much of the transnational relations literature adopts what I have called here the community organizing view. Community organizing, according to Stall and Stoecker (1998), is the process of building a mobilizable community. "It involves 'the craft' of building an enduring network of people, who identify with common ideals, and who can engage in social action on the basis of those ideals (Stall and Stoecker 1998)." Keck and Sikkink argue that nongovernmental actors require speedy access to thick and accurate information to gain the type of leverage necessary to fulfill their roles, and that "contact with like-minded groups at home and abroad provides access to information necessary to their work, broadens their legitimacy, and helps to mobilize information around particular policy targets (Keck and Sikkink 1998)." In addition to facilitating the flow of information, these dense networks contribute to trust creation, consensus building and deepening of commitments to a set of common values. **From the point of view of the activist, the more numerous, informed and empowered actors "like me," the better.** From this perspective, one would expect to find cohesive networks of NGOs characterized by dense relations of reliable, reciprocal information exchange. Of course NGOs will also be network adjacent to non-NGO actors who can secure institutional leverage (i.e. states and IGOs) and/or material resources (i.e. states, IGOs, and donors).

But the connections among the NGOs ought to exist unmediated by these more traditionally powerful actors.

Turning to organizational theory, which Keck and Sikkink cite in the construction of their network concept, we get a somewhat different understanding of the networking behavior of organizations. From what I am calling the competing organizations point of view, NGOs tend to operate much like any other organization, and consequently, once formed, they operate as though organizational survival were the primary goal (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Sell and Prakash 2004). Therefore the procurement of resources, not shared values, constitutes the central reason for establishing network relationships with other organizations (Joseph Galaskiewicz 1985). According to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), organizations do not form network ties simply to reduce transaction costs or increase efficiency. Organizations strive to retain their autonomy for unconstrained and independent action later on (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, 261), and the establishment of interorganizational relations necessarily comes with a loss of organizational autonomy (Zeitz 1980).

Organizational actors facing scarcity of or uncertainty about access to needed resources are more likely to form network ties with organizational actors who can provide these scare resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Of course, uncertainty about access to needed resources comprises the norm for NGOs, who are highly dependent on donor budgets for their operations and survival. State and IGO (particularly UN) budgets constitute the bulk of NGO funding, "particularly in the issue-areas of international

development and humanitarian aid (Risse 2002, 260)." Moreover, donors are increasingly distributing funds through short-term, renewable contracts for discrete projects (i.e. the marketization and "projectiziation" of aid), requiring competitive bidding and the reporting of concrete results (Alvarez 2009; Cooley and Ron 2002; Smillie and others 1995; Smillie and Watson Jr 1998).

Intense competition for scarce resources among the increasing number of NGOs in the relief and development sectors creates strong reason to doubt the optimistic pronouncements of an emergent transnational civil society of NGOs collaborating for the common good (Cooley and Ron 2002; Hulme and Edwards 1997). Similar organizations in this scenario are not empowering one another; **here the fewer actors "like me," the better for my own survival and success.** Under these environmental conditions, NGOs face clear incentives to guard private information from their competing NGO counterparts. Moreover, there is an incentive to hide failures, as renewal of short-term contracts is often dependent on reports of successful programing. Clearly the expectations for our NGO network using the metaphor of competing organizations are quite a bit different. Resource dependency theory predicts that most interorganizational relationships forged by NGOs should be with those actors who control the resources necessary for NGO functioning (states, IGOs, private donors) rather than with other NGOs.

Despite the largely optimistic tone of the transnational relations literature with respect to collaboration and network building among NGOs, I am not without support in

my argument here. Cooley and Ron (2002) extend the insights of the New Economics of Organization (NEO) school to theorize about relations among international donors, NGO contractors and aid recipients. They use case studies to illustrate how the marketization of humanitarian aid and development projects creates incentives to compete, to hide failures, and to avoid sharing information with other NGOs. A small but robust literature on the "NGOization" of social movements critiques the influence of donors' agendas on issues addressed, the rise of the short-term project culture, and the emphasis on professionalization and technical skills at the expense of broader social goals (Alvarez 2009; Lang 1997; Sloat 2005). Sloat (2005), for instance, reports that "Women's NGOs in most [Central and Eastern European] countries have struggled to develop a cooperative spirit, as they compete for scarce resources and focus on overlapping issues (444)." The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) urged in 2008 that the humanitarian system would function better if organizations worked collectively instead of operating as competitors in a free market. Likewise, the UN has urged greater collaboration among NGOs in the field. In his Foreign Policy article, Clifford Bob responds to the optimism of transnational relations literature by stating "global civil society is not an open forum marked by altruism, but a harsh, Darwinian marketplace where legions of desperate groups vie for scarce attention, sympathy, and money (Bob 2002, 37)."

It bears reiterating that it is not a question of whether NGOs are engaging in transnational networking, but what types of networking strategies are being pursued. Are NGOs better understood as activists in a transnational civil society or as competitors in a

transnational marketplace? Another way of framing this debate is to ask whether the NGO uses the network to benefit the cause as a whole or their organization specifically. While I do not doubt the sincere commitment of most NGO managers to their chosen cause, I argue that they largely perceive this cause to be best served by the survival and successful operation of their organization. I will therefore hypothesize that an empirical examination of the inter-NGO relations surrounding cases of protracted internal displacement will reveal largely disconnected and non-cohesive networks. In other words, the trend I expect to find among NGOs working to assist and protect IDPs is a failure to collaborate.

3.4 Agenda-Setting versus Implementation

As Thomas Rissse states in his review of transnational relations literature, it is useful to differentiate among the different stages of the international policy cycle, such as agenda setting, international norm creation, and norm implementation(2002, 265).[15] Much of the transnational relations literature lauding the success of transnational networks of NGOs focuses on their ability to put issues and ideas on the international agenda. In their effort to persuade powerful states and IGOs as to the salience of a thus-far neglected problem or issue, NGOs strategically form collaborative ties with one another in order to more

[15] According to Risse, transnational networks have the greatest influence during the agenda-setting stage of the process, but during the negotiations surrounding the creation of new norms they take a backseat to states and IGOs. He goes on to suggest that these transnational networks again take center-stage during the implementation phase, a contention I suggest is unsupported both theoretically and empirically.

effectively gather, frame, and mobilize information(Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998).

Organizational theory helps to explain why NGOs may make very different strategic networking decisions during the agenda-setting phase than during the implementation phase. As we have already discussed, when NGOs are engaged in activities pertaining to aid and development, service delivery and monitoring, they are in competition for donor funding, particularly with the advent of the short-term project culture. I do not argue that NGOs are not crucial actors during this stage, nor do I argue that they do not network strategically with actors who can provide the resources they need, such as states and IGOs. However, I do argue that because they view one another as competitors in a transnational marketplace full of NGOs hoping to be funded to do the work they hope to do, they are unlikely to form and maintain collaborative bonds with one another. While I agree with Risse (2002) that NGOs take center-stage during the implementation phase, I caution that transnational networks of NGOs may not be in operation during this phase as transnational relations scholars seem to assume. Because these NGOs are organizations strategically using networks to ensure their survival, not activists building and mobilizing a transnational civil society, I expect the implementation phase to be characterized by a failure of inter-NGO collaboration.

During the earlier phase of agenda-setting, however, even the competing organizations viewpoint may predict a greater level of inter-NGO networking. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), in their discussion of when and how organizations engage the

political system, suggest that organizations may collectively pool their resources with other organizations if they share common interests which require lobbying or petitioning the political system. They argue that this is most likely to be the case when the individual organizations represented are small or lack resources, "for there are undoubtedly economies of scale in lobbying which would make collective efforts more efficient for all (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, 218)." In such a case, the power dependence relations serve the collective interest (Joseph Galaskiewicz 1985, 295), prompting the motivation to create interorganizational relations with one's competitors.



Figure 3.1: Expectations for Inter-NGO Collaboration:
Agenda-Setting versus Implementation

According to this viewpoint, there is nothing inconsistent about the evidence presented by transnational relations about the transnational networks of NGOs during the agenda-setting (or "lobbying") phase of the international norm cycle and the contention here made that during the implementation phase there is a dearth of inter-NGO collaboration. Moreover, the presence of thick inter-NGO networks during the agenda-setting phase does not necessarily evince a transnational civil society of collective organizers or activists. The pooling of resources to change a system which effects the

organizational survival or opportunities of a set of competing NGOs is fully consistent with resource dependency theory. Rather than creating "deep social connections" which will carry forward into the implementation phase, strategic NGO actors are likely to return to their competitive behavior once the need for collective organization has passed. "When, or if, the [collective] organization removes a major environmental difficulty for the member organizations, they may no longer see any reason for participating and withdraw (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, 219)."

3.5 The Case of Protracted Internal Displacement

In the rest of this chapter, I will examine the inter-NGO collaboration (or lack thereof) among NGOs responding to crises of protracted internal displacement in 29 separate states. Beginning in the late-1980s/early-1990s, a small group of NGOs embarked upon a process of transnational collaboration on the behalf of millions of people around the world who are displaced by conflict but lack the legal status of refugee, a status which would qualify them for international guarantees of protection and assistance. The reason such guarantees do not extend to these long overlooked and vulnerable people is simple: they have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Prior to 1990s, very few references can be found to these "internal refugees" or "people in refugee-like situations," and in this handful of instances the reference comes in the form of an aside or a footnote (e.g. Claydon 1978; Emerson 1975; Fonteyne 1978).

Over last 20 years internal displacement has gone from being largely overlooked to being an issue of central concern for academics and practitioners in the areas of

international law and forced migration. While IDPs still do not enjoy a legal framework analogous to that of refugees, "it is now impossible to have a conversation about armed conflict and humanitarian action without thinking about the challenges posed by those victims who have not crossed an international border (Weiss and Korn 2006)." A set of principles known as The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement ("UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2" n.d.) has been developed and has become the accepted international standard for the treatment of IDPs (Holmes 2008). These accomplishments have been credited in large part to the movement started by three NGOs, namely the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Quakers, and the Refugee Policy Group (RPG) (Entwisle 2004; Weiss and Korn 2006). Over time, this movement grew into a large network of actors comprised of domestic and international NGOs, foundations, universities, UN agencies and states working together to further the cause of IDP assistance and protection, culminating in the creation and wide-spread acceptance of the Guiding Principles.

Protracted internal displacement refers to those situations where "the process for finding durable solutions is stalled and/or IDPs are marginalized as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights (Mundt and Ferris 2008)." People who find themselves in protracted IDP situations have lost everything – their homes, their property, their means of livelihood, and their social networks – and due to the highly politicized circumstances of conflict or

generalized violence which resulted in their displacement, no feasible or palatable durable solutions are readily apparent.

So long as IDPs are not successfully reintegrated into society, a successful transition to durable peace is unlikely (Adelman 2002; Suhrke and Zolberg 1989). Internal displacement may increase the "ecological stress level" in a society, increasing inter-group tensions and the likelihood that armed conflict resumes. IDPs are especially vulnerable to human rights abuses, malnutrition and disease. Displaced women are often victims of sexual violence, and displaced children are disproportionately recruited as child soldiers.

While placing internal displacement on the international agenda is certainly a major step in the right direction, the Guiding Principles do not alone solve the problems faced by IDPs around the world in attaining security, equality under the law, educational and employment opportunities, and the hope for a better future. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), an estimated 27.5 million people are currently internally displaced as a result of armed conflict or generalized violence. As of 2010, IDPs in 41 states[16] continued to linger in situations of protracted displacement with little hope for a durable solution.

[16] Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe (IDMC Global Overview 2010).

If the transnational network implies the creation of a transnational civil society based on shared liberal norms and values (rather than just a short-term strategic consideration), we should expect the network formed during the agenda-setting phase to continue and expand for the implementation process. NGOs concerned with the various elements of implementation – protection and assistance, aid and development, monitoring and reporting – should maintain and continue to create collaborative relationships. Protracted internal displacement is a complex problem, demanding collaboration among organizations which specialize in a range of issue areas including emergency aid, development, education, health care and legal assistance. Based on the optimistic literature about the collaborative proficiency of NGOs, one might expect NGOs engaged in the effort to find durable solutions for these vulnerable populations would continue to create and utilize strong inter-NGO networks in this phase of implementation. This chapter will examine whether NGOs are indeed collaborating with one another in their effort to assist and protect IDPs, and will represent an important contribution to the literature in allowing us to begin to gain a more accurate picture of the networking activities of NGOs.

3.6 Network Cohesion

Within social network analysis, an important property of a network is whether or not it is connected (Wasserman and Faust 1994). If there is only one component in the network, the network is connected. If there is more than one component, the graph is disconnected.

A component is a set of nodes (that is, actors) in which all pairs of nodes are reachable and there is no path between a node in the component and any other node not in the component (see Figure 3.2 for an illustration of this concept). Based on the theory I have



Connected Network Disconnected Network

Figure 3.2: Connected (one component) versus disconnected (two component) network

presented in this chapter, I expect that among NGOs working to assist and protect IDPs (i.e. implement the Guiding Principles in cases of protracted internal displacement), we will find largely disconnected networks.

However, the description "disconnected" alone does not tell us nearly enough. Consider the cases of Myanmar and Indonesia, illustrated in Figures 3.3. Each these cases have 13 NGOs working on the issue of protracted internal displacement. Both display disconnected graphs. However the case of Myanmar is disconnected simply due to one isolated NGO which is not connected to any of the other 12. The case of Indonesia, on the other hand, is as disconnected as can be, with no ties apparent at all among the 13 NGOs. Clearly we need to turn to some more sensitive measurement.



Myanmar
Inter-NGO Collaboration Network

Indonesia
Inter-NGO Collaboration Network

Figure 3.3: Comparison of two different disconnected networks

Transnational relations scholars who write about transnational networking imply that a crucial element of these networks is their cohesion. A cohesive network consists of actors connected through many direct, reciprocated relationships "that enable them to share information, create solidarity, and act collectively (Knoke and Yang 2008)." Traditionally, network cohesion is understood to have a positive effect on the creation of social norms and sanctions that facilitate trust and collaboration (Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985).[17] Cohesive networks aid in the rapid mobilization of crucial and trusted information to all network actors. Consider again the Keck and Sikkink description of the transnational networks as "forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange," among which the flow of information reveals a "dense web of connections (1998, 8–9)."

[17] There exits in the literature a debate over whether cohesion is actually the most beneficial social structure. Burt (1992, 1997) argues that a highly cohesive network is rigid and detrimental to innovation and creativity. There is a very interesting debate here with respect to NGOs, however for the purposes of this chapter, the point is simply that transnational network scholars clearly argue that NGOs are engaged in highly cohesive networks.

Clearly, proponents of the transnational civil society paradigm would expect to find highly cohesive inter-NGO networks.

The first frequently utilized measure of cohesion is density. Density is measured by first determining the maximum number of relationships possible within the network and then calculating the proportion of relationships actually present. This calculation results in measures varying between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates no relationships exist at all and 1 indicates that every actor is tied to every other actor in the network. Because providing a weblink is a relatively cheap form of collaboration, the hope would be for the density scores to approach 1. With respect to my theorized failure to collaborate, I expect very low density scores.

However a couple important caveats should be noted about density measures. First of all, the level of density beneficial to the overall effectiveness of a network is much debated. The highest density scores may not always be advantageous due to the increased burden that could be placed upon network actors to maintain a large amount of relationships. However, the tie being modeled here, as we will see, is not especially burdensome, so this should not be a major factor with respect to these data. Secondly, density scores are a notoriously problematic statistic for comparison across networks of varying size. The more actors there are in a network, the more difficult it becomes to expect each actor to have a relationship with each other actor. Because of this, network density ought to decrease with network size. For this reason, I will go on to discuss an alternative measure of network cohesion with less onerous demands.

Measuring the degree of connectedness of the network is perhaps the best way to understand a network's cohesion or lack thereof. Rather than being concerned with direct connections from all NGOs to all other NGOs, as is the case with density, consideration of the networks' degree of connectedness considers whether all or most NGOs are connected either directly or indirectly. Network scholar David Krackhardt provides a strong measure for a network's degree of connectedness as follows:

> The degree to which the graph is disconnected is a function of the number of violations of the connectedness condition. A violation is defined as a point being unable to reach another point in the underlying graph. If we divide the number of violations by the maximum number of possible violations (i.e., in the case where no point can reach any other point), we have a continuum representing the degree to which the graph is disconnected. Subtracting this ratio from 1 gives us the degree of connectedness in the structure (Krackhardt 1994, 95).

If all nodes are reachable (either directly or indirectly) from all other nodes, the connectedness level of the network is 1. If, on the other extreme, the graph is made up of all isolates, the connectedness score is 0.

The literature conceptualizing NGOs as activists in a transnational civil society following a strategy of resource mobilization would hypothesize highly connected inter-NGO networks with high Krackhardt connectedness scores. Based on my argument that NGOs actually operate as competing organizations following a strategy of resource dependency, however, I hypothesize the opposite. That is, I hypothesize that these inter-NGO networks will tend to be highly fragmented, demonstrated by very few Krackhardt connectedness scores approaching 1.

3.7 Research Design

I will demonstrate this tendency toward a failure to collaborate by collecting and analyzing data about the (potential) inter-NGO networks of NGOs working to assist or protect IDPs engage in 29 cases of protracted internal displacement. Using the social network analysis concepts discussed in the previous section, I will show that they lack the cohesion that we should expect of NGOs engaging in a strategy of resource mobilization. If the hopes and dreams of transnational civil society proponents are to be realized, the logic leading these NGOs must change.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)[18], in their 2010 Global Overview, coded the internal displacement in 41 states as protracted.[19] I begin by compiling a list of all NGOs identified by the IDMC as working for the assistance and/or protection of IDPs in each of these 41 cases. After this step, the number of cases for this project dropped from 41 (the number of states with protracted internal displacement) to 29. In four cases (Bangladesh, Mexico, Pakistan and Peru) there were no NGOs working to assist or protect IDPs. In an additional eight cases there were only one (Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya, Senegal and Somalia) or two (Croatia, Laos and Syria) NGOs

[18] The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), is the leading international body monitoring internal displacement worldwide. See http://www.internal-displacement.org/

[19] Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe

focused on the issue. In order to reasonably use the network concept, there must be at least three actors.

For each of my 29 cases[20] of protracted internal displacement, I now have a list of the NGOs I know to be working in some way for the protection and/or assistance of IDPs. These NGOs will serve as the actors, or nodes, for the 29 potential networks. The next step was to analyze the websites[21] of each of these NGOs to discover the links between them. These website links will be coded as the relationships, or ties, between the organizations.

I contend that website links present a far more accurate picture of the tendency to collaborate than does mutual attendance at international conferences. Attending the same conference does not necessarily designate a mutual awareness; much less does it indicate any level of trust, respect, or inclination to work together. On the other hand, recent research finds that organizations tend to hyperlink with other organizations with which they collaborate (Pilny and Shumate 2012). If one NGO links to another NGO's website we can also reasonably assume that they consume the information provided on that website. The essence of network activity is the exchange and use of information (Khagram, Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink 2002). These links indicate that not only are the

[20] Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe

[21] With the assistance of a backlink checker developed for search engine optimization

organizations aware of one another, but also that they trust one another enough to publicly proclaim the other's information as valuable.

In addition, to examine my contention that there is relatively little inter-NGO collaboration occurring, the website link offers a conservative measure. Providing a hyperlink is a relatively cheap form of collaboration. If they are not even willing to link to one another's websites, it is unlikely that deeper collaboration is occurring. If two organizations are competing with one another, they are no less likely to attend the same conference. They might even be more likely to do so, as they both want to be seen by and network with important resource providers. However two competing organizations would certainly not be inclined to provide hyperlinks to one another on their websites.

The result of this data collection process is 29 matrices representing the networks of information exchange and collaboration (or lack thereof) among NGOs concerned with these situations of protracted internal displacement. These data will allow me to use Ucinet 6 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002) to calculate measures describing the density and cohesion of our 29 potential networks of inter-NGO collaboration.

It should be noted that 29 NGOs identified in this data collection process had no websites. This is compared to 425 NGOs which did have websites. I calcualted the network measures both with and without these NGOs, and the results remain largely unchanged. That said, it seems clear that the inclusion of these NGOs as isolates may bias the results in favor of my expectations (*i.e.* by making the networks appear even less dense and cohesive). For this reason, I made the decision to drop these NGOs.

The unit of analysis for this study is the complete network. In other words, rather than calculating measures measuring the ego-networks of each of the actors within the networks, I will be calculating network cohesion measures for each of the 29 potential networks as whole entities. If NGOs are operating as activists in a transnational civil society engaging in a strategy of resource mobilization, we should expect to see relatively dense, connected and cohesive networks. However if, as I have argued, they are instead acting as competing organizations pursuing a resource dependency strategy in their networking behavior, we should see disconnected graphs exhibiting low levels of density and cohesion.

3.8 Discussion of the Data

Table 3.1 displays all the network cohesion measurements calculated for this chapter. The first column of data provides the number of NGOs concerned with internal displacement for each case, or in other words, the total number of actors for each potential inter-NGO network. The second column of data lists the number of components in each of the 29 separate cases. If a graph is fully connected, there will be only one component. In only one case, Zimbabwe, is there a fully connected network, suggesting some initial support for my contention that there is an overall failure to collaborate among NGOs responding to the needs of IDPs in protracted situations of displacement.

The third and fifth columns of data list the calculated density scores for all 29 cases. The data collection provided me with directional data, meaning that a link can exist

Case	Nodes	Components	Density Directional	Connectedness Directional	Density Nondirectional	Connectedness Nondirectional
Afghanistan	55	2	0.033	0.465	0.052	0.964
Azerbaijan	15	13	0.01	0.01	0.019	0.019
Burundi	3	2	0.167	0.167	0.333	0.333
car	4	2	0.167	0.167	0.333	0.5
Chad	8	6	0.036	0.036	0.071	0.107
Colombia	18	4	0.052	0.114	0.098	0.601
Cote d'Ivoire	7	6	0.024	0.024	0.048	0.048
Cyprus	5	4	0.05	0.05	0.1	0.1
Ethiopia	11	2	0.118	0.182	0.2	0.818
Georgia	19	4	0.044	0.047	0.088	0.55
Guatemala	3	3	0	0	0	0
India	5	3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3
Indonesia	13	13	0	0	0	0
Iraq	46	2	0.028	0.108	0.05	0.957
Kosovo	5	5	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	7	7	0	0	0	0
Myanmar	13	2	0.109	0.295	0.192	0.846
Nepal	47	7	0.026	0.073	0.048	0.759
Nigeria	5	4	0.05	0.05	0.1	0.1
Philippines	18	9	0.039	0.059	0.065	0.196
Russia	13	5	0.083	0.212	0.128	0.372
Serbia	3	3	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	3	3	0	0	0	0
Sudan	34	2	0.049	0.212	0.091	0.941
Timor-Leste	6	4	0.067	0.1	0.133	0.2
Turkey	10	6	0.056	0.067	0.111	0.222
Uganda	3	3	0	0	0	0
Yemen	5	4	0.05	0.05	0.1	0.1
Zimbabwe	4	1	0.333	0.5	0.5	1

Table 3.1: Network Cohesion Measures for all 29 Cases

from organization A to organization B without necessarily indicating a reciprocated tie. However, it is also possible to assume reciprocity and symmetrize the data to create a nondirectional network. Obviously this would provide the more conservative measure with respect to my hypotheses. Symmetrizing the data increases both the density and the

connectedness of the networks. Even with this more conservative approach, in no case does the density approach anywhere near 1. Figure 3.4 gives a visual representation of the range of nondirectional density measurements across all 29 cases. Note that the highest density score among the cases is 0.5. These data support my hypotheses that the density of the inter-NGO networks tends to be quite low.



Figure 3.4: Range of (Nondirectional) Density Scores Across all 29 Cases

The fourth and sixth data columns of Table 3.1 report the Krackhardt's connectedness measures for each of our cases. Once again, I have calculated these measures for both directional and nondirectional networks. Figure 3.5 graphically displays the range of connectedness measures across all 29 cases. In accordance with my expectations, six cases demonstrate extensive inter-NGO collaboration (here defined as having a connectedness measure of 0.8 or higher), and only one case (Zimbabwe)

reaches full connectedness. In only 9 of the 29 cases are at least 50% of nodes reachable and in only 6 do we see the level of connectedness surpass 80%. Additionally seven of our 29 cases return a connectedness measure score of zero, meaning there is no network among the NGOs at all. These data illustrate what I have argued amounts to a failure to collaborate. NGOs may be networking in pursuit of their goals, but the network strategy they are following is one of resource dependence, not resource mobilization. On the basis of this data, we have cause to seriously doubt the claim that these NGOs are operating as activists creating a transnational civil society rather than as competitors in a transnational marketplace.



Figure 3.5: Range of Krackhardt's Connectedness Scores Across all 29 Cases

The data support my assertion that there is an overall failure to collaborate among NGOs working on the issue of protracted displacement. However, it is also the case that they show a significant amount of variation in the level of cohesiveness or fragmentation. In the next chapter of this dissertation, I will examine the conditions that might underlie this variation.

CHAPTER 4. WHEN HOSTILITY BREEDS FRIENDSHIP

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I used original network data to demonstrate an overall failure to collaborate among NGOs working to protect and assist persons in situations of protracted internal displacement. However the data also showed some variation in the extent of collaboration among NGOs operating in these post-conflict environments. Indeed, six cases displayed rather extensive inter-NGO collaboration[22], with a Krackhardt's connectedness score of 0.8 or higher. In this chapter, I will begin by arguing that inter-NGO collaboration is a response to a real or perceived threat to the NGO sector as a whole. I will use the case of Zimbabwe to illustrate how the presence of a hostile domestic legal environment is understood as a threat to the sector, and why inter-NGO collaboration is engaged in to ameliorate that threat. Finally, I will provide descriptive statistics demonstrating that across the 29 cases under consideration, high levels of connectedness are always associated with a hostile legal environment. The primary contribution of this chapter is the suggestion that the presence of a hostile domestic legal environment is a necessary and sufficient condition for extensive inter-NGO collaboration in post-conflict settings.

[22] Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Myanmar, Sudan ,and Zimbabwe

4.2 Threat to the Sector as an Incentive to Collaborate

While I do not debate that the goal for (most) NGOs is to fulfill a mission rather than to maximize profits, a basic assumption underlying this dissertation is that NGOs, like other organizations, are primarily concerned with their own organizational survival and autonomy (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The networking behaviors and strategies employed by NGOs are "remarkably similar" to those employed by for-profit organizations (Sell and Prakash 2004). The creation of network ties is costly, particularly in that the establishment of interorganizational relations tends to impose constraints on an organization's future behaviors and thereby limit its autonomy. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), the forfeiture of future adaptability is understood to be a serious threat to organizational survival. According to these authors, there exists a constant trade-off between autonomy and uncertainty that must always be strategically balanced by organizational actors. Organizations are therefore unlikely to enter into collaborative relationships simply to reduce transaction costs in the pursuit of common values or similar missions, as the transnational relations literature might lead us to believe. In fact, such relationships are likely to be avoided unless they appear necessary for an organization's survival.

Resource dependence is determined by three factors (G. F. Davis and Powell 1992): (1) the importance of the resource (*i.e.* funding is crucial to the survival of NGOs); (b) the degree of discretion that the resource provider has over the allocation and use of the resource (*i.e.* donors have ultimate discretion over the allocation of funding and

grants and contracts are awarded by the donors on the basis of assurances made by recipients as to the use of such funding); and (3) the concentration of the resource (*i.e.* state and UN budgets constitute the bulk of NGO funding, "particularly in the issue-areas of international development and humanitarian aid (Risse 2002, 260)). Clearly, NGOs are perpetually dependent on a scarce and uncertain resource environment, leading to the expectation that they will seek out interorganizational relationships despite the resultant loss of autonomy. However, the organizations with whom the NGOs are likely to create network ties are actors who can provide these scarce resources, such as the UN or state aid agencies, rather than other NGOs similarly situated. Instead, the incentive among NGOs will be to compete against one another for access to these scarce resources rather than to collaborate with one another for the "good of the cause".

While the data presented in the previous chapter suggest support for an overall failure of inter-NGO collaboration, there is certainly variation among the 29 cases. Recall Figure 3.5, which illustrates the range of Krackhardt's Connectedness measures across all 29 cases. These measures range from 0 (meaning no relationships exist at all among the relevant NGOs in the case) to 1 (meaning that information can flow, either directly or indirectly, between each pair of relevant NGOs). What might explain this variation in the connectedness of these 29 potential networks?[23] Some other structural

[23] In the previous chapter, I argued that during the *international agenda-setting* phase, greater inter-NGO collaboration is to be expected (see Figure 2.1); however the cases here under examination all fall within the *domestic implementation* phase of the policy cycle.

condition(s) must explain why in some cases NGOs engage in greater collaboration despite the incentive to avoid such entanglements.

Russell Linden (2002) argues that interorganizational collaboration is more likely to occur in situations where the organizational actors are aware of or perceive that the stakes are particularly high. Linden argues that high-stakes situations create conditions conducive to collaboration for a number of reasons. First, when the stakes (real or perceived) are high, the goals, objectives and priorities at stake are clarified. Actors with "different agendas and conflicting egos" are able to set their differences aside for the time being to focus on the task at hand. Second, when the stakes are high, capabilities (rather than rank) count most. Third, high-stakes situations create a sense that actors face a common challenge or enemy creating a greater bond and encouraging collaboration.

Consider an analogy from the for-profit world. Imagine two tire manufacturers who are unlikely collaborate with one another because they are in competition for organizational survival and success. They have a strong incentive to keep information private as they compete for tire consumers. However, they may collaborate when organizational survival is in danger due to a threat to the tire manufacturing sector as a whole. For instance, assume that legislation is passed banning a chemical essential to the tire manufacturing process. In such a case, collaboration may take place among the (normally competing) tire manufacturers in an effort to lobby government actors to repeal the new law or to engage in prohibitively costly R&D on new chemical replacements.

I will argue that NGOs are most likely to collaborate with one another in situations where the stakes facing the NGO sector as a whole are perceived of as particularly high. The most fundamental goal of the organization is survival, a goal best served for NGOs by securing access to scarce resources (i.e. donor funds and contracts), creating an incentive to keep information private and abstain from establishing interdependent relationships with competitor NGOs, despite how similar or complementary their social goals may be. However, if the NGOs perceive that the environment poses a risk to the survival of the NGO sector as a whole, the incentive to compete for the attention of more powerful actors and to keep information private from one another may be over-ridden by a need to collaborate for organizational survival.

4.3 Domestic Legal Environment and Collaboration in Zimbabwe

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), as of the end of 2010 there were between 570,000 (UNDP) and 1,000,000 (ZimVac) IDPs in Zimbabwe, meaning that anywhere from 4.5-7.9% of Zimbabwe's population was living in a state of protracted internal displacement (Global Overview)[24] Actions by the government of Zimbabwe have been the primary causes of internal displacement, including illegal farm invasions under the guise of a "fast-track land reform and resettlement program," arbitrary evictions in urban areas such as Operation Murambatsvina ("clear the fifth"),

[24]It is notoriously difficult to estimate IDP figures. Moreover, until recently the government of Zimbabwe denied the existence of IDPs in Zimbabwe and has still not release official state numbers. Part of the reason that the number of IDPs is particularly difficult to estimate in this case is that a significant number of people have been displaced during more than one of these phases of displacement.

arbitrary evictions in mining areas such as Operation Chikorokoza Chapera ("no illegal panning"), and political violence surrounding the 2008 elections and the on-going constitution-making process (IDMC Zimbabwe Overview 2010).

The NGOs in Zimbabwe which are specifically targeting IDPs are primarily focused on provision of legal assistance and advocacy for durable solutions. The collapse of the Zimbabwean economy has essentially affected the entire population. Certainly the IDPs were among the worst affected and most vulnerable groups with respect to potential for sustainable livelihoods, coping capacity, access to health and education, and of course access to permanent shelter, but they are not alone in their need for humanitarian relief. It should also be noted that until 2008, the government of Zimbabwe was hostile to any suggestion that an IDP crisis exists in Zimbabwe. Unlike many of the cases of large-scale internal displacement, the crisis in Zimbabwe has remained largely hidden, with few outward signs such as IDP camps. Therefore most of the assistance functions carried out in Zimbabwe are aimed at the population as a whole rather than IDPs specifically. It is in the arena of protection – encompassing in this case both political and legal advocacy – that NGOs are operating programs specifically targeting the internally displaced population.

Figure 4.1 provides a visualization of inter-NGO collaboration among NGOs working for the assistance and protection of IDPs in Zimbabwe.[25] Note that four NGOs have been identified as relevant and all four form a single component, meaning that the

[25] Please refer to Chapter 3 of this dissertation for a complete explanation of how these data were collected.

network is fully connected and receives a Krackhardt's connectedness score of 1.0.[26] Recall that Krackhardt's connectedness measures the proportion of actors can be reached by other actors. Again, this does not mean that each pair of actors are directly connected, but rather simply that a path exists between each pair for information to flow. In this case, one organization – the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, is connected to each of the other organizations and therefore in a position to broker information among the entire set of NGOs working to protect IDPs in Zimbabwe.



Figure 4.1: Visualization of Zimbabwe's Inter-NGO Collaboration Network

[26] The reader may be concerned that with so few organizations, a fully connected network represents no real achievement. However, among our 29 cases, six other cases are comprised of four (Central African Republic) or three (Guatemala, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Burundi) NGOs and do not approach a connectedness score of 1. See Table 3.1 to review these data.

The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (Forum) fits the definition of what Provan and Kenis (2008) refer to as a network administrative organization (NAO). These authors present the NAO model as the third of their three ideal types of network governance. Within an NAO model of network governance, "a separate administrative entity is set up specifically to govern the network and its activities … The NAO is not another member organization providing its own services. Instead, the network is externally governed, with the NAO established, either through mandate or by the members themselves, for the exclusive purpose of network governance (Provan and Kenis 2008, 236)."

The strength of collaboration among the NGOs depicted in Figure 4.1 is evident to anyone who wishes to examine the Constitution and extensive reporting of the Forum. The Forum was founded in 1998 by eight human rights related NGOs. Today, the Forum describes itself as "a coalition of nineteen[27] human rights NGOs in Zimbabwe who while having their own objectives, are concerned with the level and nature of organized violence and torture in the country perpetuated mainly, though not exclusively, by state agents and their ancilliaries (Forum website)." Membership of the Forum is open to "any organization which is based in Zimbabwe and which is bona fide concerned with human rights (Forum website)." The Forum's Constitution provides for a Board of Directors, comprised of one representative from each of the 19 member organizations who are required to meet quarterly to engage in the overall planning and policy formulation of the

[27] My search found that only three of these 19 member organizations engaged in advocacy for IDPs specifically, accounting for the fact that there are four nodes in Figure 4.1 rather than 20.

Forum. Four individuals from the Board are nominated to the Management Committee, which is required to meet monthly and run the affairs and business of the Forum. The Board must also appoint an Executive Director to run the day-to-day operations of the Forum. The Forum has four functional units, concerned with transitional justice, public interest (i.e. the litigation of human rights cases), research and documentation (publishing a monthly political violence report), and international liaising (lobbying). The Forum enjoys observer status with the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and work closely with other coalitions in Zimbabwe such as the National Association of Nongovernmental Organizations, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, the National Constitutional Assembly, and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (Forum website).

One might anticipate that this extensive inter-NGO collaboration is the product of a supportive legal structure. Afterall, "transnational actors operate in institutional environments which are largely determined by the domestic structure of nation-states (Risse 2002, 261)." There is no global international instrument granting NGOs any particular legal status or capacity (Beigbeder 1991); rather, NGOs are subject to the laws of the state in which they reside and operate (Ahmed and Potter 2006),. Salamon and Anheier make the point that where an effective relationship exists between the state and the nonprofit sector, the scale and scope of nonprofit activities are larger than in countries where such a working relationship is absent (1996). USAID identifies a state's legal environment as one of the factors crucial to the strength and viability of the state's NGO sector:

> For an NGO sector to be sustainable, the legal and regulatory environment should support the needs of NGOs. It should facilitate new entrants, help prevent governmental interference, and give NGOs the necessary legal basis to engage in appropriate fundraising activities and legitimate income-producing ventures (USAID Sustainability Index 2009)".

If the literature suggesting the emergence of a transnational civil society (discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation) is correct, we should expect greater collaboration among NGOs operating in supportive legal environments. Factors such as the ease of the non-profit registration process, the range of activities in which such organizations are permitted to engage, tax codes benefiting non-profits, and the existence of tax incentives for philanthropy provide NGOs the leeway to operate the way they deem most effective (CIVICUS). If it is the case that NGOs actively seek out deep social collaborative relationships with one another in order to aid fulfillment of their common goals, than it should be the case that those NGOs operating in regulatory environments supportive to their needs would have the most connected inter-NGO networks.

The case of Zimbabwe – the most connected among the 29 cases being examined in this dissertation – certainly does not support such an expectation. In order to operate legally in Zimbabwe, an NGO must register as a Private Voluntary Organization (PVO), defined by Zimbabwean law as follows:

> '"private voluntary organization" means any body or association of persons, corporate or unincorporate, or any institution, the object of which include or are one or more of the following –
>
> (a) the provision of all or any of the material, mental, physical or social needs of persons or families;

(b) the rendering of charity to persons or families in distress;
(c) the prevention of social distress or destitution of persons or families;
(d) the provision of assistance in, or promotion of, activities aimed at uplifting the standard of living of persons or families;
(e) the provision of funds for legal aid;
(f) the prevention of cruelty to, or the promotion of the welfare of, animals;
(g) such other objects as may be prescribed;
(h) the collection of contributions for any of the foregoing;

but does not include –

(i) any institution or service maintained and controlled By the State or a local authority; or
(ii) any religious body in respect of activities confined to religious work; or
(iii) any trust established directly by any enactment or registered with the High Court; or
(iv) any educational trust approved by the Minister; or
(v) any body or association of persons, corporate, or incorporate, the benefits from which are exclusively for its own members; or
(vi) any health institution registered under the Health Professions Act [Chapter 27:19], in respect of activities for which it is required to be registered under that Act; or
(vii) any psychological health premises registered under the Psychological Practices Act [Chapter 27:11] in respect of activities for which it is required to be registered under that Act; or
(vii) [sic] any body or association in respect of activities carried on for the benefit of a hospital or nursing home which is approved by the Minister; or
(viii) any political organization in respect of work confined to political activities; or
(ix) the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society established by the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society Act [Chapter 17:08]; or
(x) such other bodies, associations or institutions as may be prescribed

(Private Voluntary Oroganization Act [Chapter 17:05] Section 2)."

Under the PVO Act [Chapter 17:05], PVOs are required to register with the Ministry of Social Welfare, with harsh penalties (fines and imprisonment) for any organizations which attempt to carry out activities or seek financial assistance as an unregistered group (NGO Law Monitor). Indeed, failure to register under the PVO Act is

treated as a criminal offense (Law Monitor). The registration process is a tedious and expensive process, requiring provision of police clearance and curriculum vitae for all board members as well as district clearances which must be obtained from largely partisan district administrators (NGOSI). Aspiring PVOs must also publish notice in local papers calling for objections to registration to be made to the Registrar (Law Monitor). There is no fixed time period for the government's review of the registration application (Law Monitor), and grounds for denial of registration include vague language that is subject to abuse (PVO Act section 9(5)(b)). The appeals processes are likewise complex and burdensome, and it is not uncommon for authorities to request bribes in order to register organizations (NGOSI).

Once a PVO is properly registered, its difficulties are not necessarily over. The government has the explicit authority to interfere in the internal affairs of PVs, including the suspension of any or all members of the PVO's executive committee when it deems that "it is necessary or desirable to do so in the public interest (PVO Act [Chapter 17:15] Section 21(1)(d))." Speech or advocacy that is critical of government policy, interpreted as an insult toward the office or person of the President, or seen to undermine police authority is strictly prohibited under Zimbabwean law (Public Order and Security Act, Criminal Code of Zimbabwe). The government may also appoint an inspecting officer "to inspect any aspect of the affairs or activities of any private voluntary organization and to examine all documents relating thereto (PVO Act, Section 20 (1)(a))." Any person who "willfully hinders or obstructs an inspecting officer" is subject to fines and/or imprisonment (PVO Act, Section 20(4)). The government has the power to make

regulations with regard to the books, accounts and records of and contributions made to PVOs (PVO Act, Section 28), and these organizations' registrations are vulnerable to suspension or dissolution by the state (NGOSI). For instance, during the buildup to the presidential runoff elections in June 2008, the Government became concerned that humanitarian and human rights PVOs were advocating for the opposition in the course of their activities. As a result, Social Welfare Minister Nicholas Goche accused several PVOs of "breaching the terms and conditions of their registration" and indefinitely suspended all field work by aid groups and NGOs, foreign and domestic (BBC 2008, ENS 2008).

Foreign NGOs carrying out work of a humanitarian nature in Zimbabwe are also required to operate as PVOs, and must enter into a direct memorandum of understanding with the Government (usually at both the national and local levels) for fees of up to $1,000 (Law Monitor). Foreign funding for domestic PVOs is closely regulated as external funding for any activity interpreted as "voter education" is strictly prohibited (Law Monitor). Moreover, the Government of Zimbabwe commonly creates a hostile environment for PVOs that receive foreign funding, making accusations publicly that they are merely instruments being used by the West (Law Monitor). There have also been reports of the Government "stealing" funds being held in the Reserve Bank for work relating to HIV/AIDs and tuberculosis in order to use these funds for "governmental purposes" (Law Monitor).

In addition to engaging in extensive inter-NGO collaboration (or perhaps *because* of this fact), NGOs in Zimbabwe perform relatively well according to USAID. "NGOs in Zimbabwe operate in a volatile political environment, vulnerable to dissolution by the state. Despite this government hostility, Zimbabwean NGOs are among the most advanced in the region in terms of providing services in response to acute social and humanitarian needs (NGOSI: 5)." While the NGO Sustainability Index score for local environment of 6.1 ("sustainability impeded") is among the worst across all cases coded, the other indicators (including organizational capacity, advocacy, service provision and public image) are much better resulting in a final NGO Sustainability score of 4.8 ("sustainability evolving").

My central argument in this chapter is that it is because of (not despite) the hostile legal environment that NGOs engage in extensive inter-NGO collaboration. The legal environment may be just one among several variables which constrain the behavior of NGOs, but it must be noted that "regulatory costs differ somewhat from market costs, particularly in the degree to which organizations can escape or influence them (Edelman and Suchman 1997, 487)." When the legal regime is hostile toward the needs of NGOs, the sustainability of the entire NGO sector is considered "impeded" and the survival of the entire sector, rather than any individual organization, is at risk. USAID states that "for an NGO sector to be sustainable, the legal and regulatory environment should support the needs of NGOs (NGOSI 2009)."

If, as I have argued, NGOs prefer to limit the extent of their inter-NGO relations due to the competitive nature of securing funding and donor contracts (Cooley and Ron 2002) and the desire to limit constraints of future choices (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), NGOs operating in supportive legal environments will be less likely to seek out collaborative ties with other NGOs in the organizational field, preferring instead to focus their networking efforts on those actors who can provide them access to funding and contracts. A hostile legal environment, on the other hand, presents a threat to the sustainability of the entire sector, and the stakes facing NGOs in such environments are high. The greatest dependency which NGOs must manage in this context shifts from the dependence on funding to the dependence on the state for the ability to continue operations without harassment. The uncertainty imposed upon an NGO by a hostile domestic legal structure becomes paramount, in turn diminishing the regular incentive to maintain autonomy from and competitive edge over other NGOs. In such contexts, NGOs face a "common threat or enemy" such that the incentive to compete for funding and to keep information private may be over-ridden by a need to collaborate for organizational survival.

Through inter-NGO collaboration, NGOs increase the flow and accuracy of the information they require to secure their survival. Additionally they increase their international visibility by merging their own network with other NGOs' networks. Randolph Martin, (former?) Senior Director for Operations at the International Rescue Committee, argues that the "cornerstone of security for NGOs" is acceptance by the state and community in which they are operating(Martin 1999). He goes on to state that when

the domestic political circumstances make acceptance strategies less effective, it is necessary for NGOs to enhance their protection strategies. In other words, if the state is not willing to protect the NGOs, they must develop strategies to protect themselves. Coordinating operations, according to Martin, brings "strength in numbers" and is one of the central components of a protection strategy for NGOs. The third side of the NGO "Security Triangle" (acceptance, protection, deterrence) is also enhanced through collaboration, namely that of "diplomatic deterrence." Much like the 'boomerang pattern' discussed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), the idea here is that international actors may be able to exert diplomatic pressure on behalf of the NGOs. "The quality of [an NGO's] participation in NGO coordinating bodies which are capable of presenting a united front" represents a very important element to an NGO's security strategy in a hostile environment.

In January of 1998, following the Zimbabwean Government's announcement about a general increase in the prices of basic commodities (mealie-meal, rice, cooking oil and bread), thousands of citizens began to riot in the streets of the capital city of Harare. "The police responded by firing tear gas, clubbing protesters, and in several instances shooting into a crowd. At one point, a helicopter swooped over the rioters and doused them with tear gas (Chicago Tribune)." President Robert Mugabe deployed hundreds of troops – some in battle tanks – to restore order. Zimbabwean Minister of Home Affairs Dumiso Dabengwa was quoted as stating about the deployed forces, "They will not hesitate to shoot (Chicago Tribune)."

When all was said and done, eight were dead, countless people were injured, and thousands of citizens were arrested and detained. Human rights NGOs began gathering information about police and military brutality during the riots as well as beatings and humiliating and degrading treatment of detainees. The Zimbabwean human rights community was disturbed by the violent response of the State and the reports of harassment and abuse by detained protesters. Amnesty International urged Dabengwa to repudiate his view that the situation required the use of arms of war and the shooting of unarmed civilians (Forum Report).

The food riots were certainly not the first instance of either social unrest or human rights abuses in Zmibabwe. According to NGO Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, in December of 1997 "the police attacked citizens peacefully trying to assemble to exercise their democratic right to protest against excessive taxation (Forum Report)." A number of human rights organizations called for inquiries following this event, but their calls went unheard. According to the Forum's report, "The Government response was not to look at the causes, but rather to threaten civil societ (14)." Against this backdrop, the Forum was created. Having In their own words:

> "The human rights NGOs in Harare swung into action following the many reports of human rights violations, and the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum was formed. This group, a loose alliance of NGOs … produced a report on the riots – *Human Rights in Troubled Times: An Initial Report on Human Rights Abuses During and After Food Riots in January 1998* – which was forwarded to the President and Parliament in support of the request for an independent commission of inquiry… There was no response from either the President or parliamentarians, and thus the human rights forum took the step of lobbying the UN Human Rights Committee at its meeting to consider the implementation by Zimbabwe of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (Forum Report: 4-5)."

Clearly the Forum meets the Provan and Kenis (2008) definition of an NAO, or a legally separate entity which plays a crucial role in the sustaining and coordinating the network of NGOs. As they describe, the Forum is expressly *not* "another member organization providing its own services," but rather exists *entirely for the benefit of its members*, aiding the collaboration among the nineteen legally separate human rights organizations. This point is key to understanding why such a formalized and robust form of inter-NGO collaboration was created by the NGOs facing Zimbabwe's hostile domestic legal environment.

Through collaboration, these nineteen human rights NGOs (including the three that explicitly work to help IDPs) have been able to share and access valuable information which enables them to do their work despite the obstacles set before them by the legal system in which they must operate. They also increase the likelihood that their work receives international attention, helping to protect both themselves and the people whom they are attempting to help. Through the creation of the Forum, the member NGOs have also been able to capitalize on an important loophole in Zimbabwe's Private Voluntary Organizations Act. Recall the list of exceptions to the organizations regarded by the Government as PVOs. The fifth exception is "any body or association of persons, corporate or unincorporate, the benefits from which are exlusively for its own members (PVO Act [Chapter 17:15) Section 2(1)(v))." By formulating a legally separate entity whose mission is expressly for the benefit of the 19 member organizations, the Forum can claim the classification of Universitas (or Unincorporated Association) rather than

that of PVO, freeing them from the complex registration procedures and government oversight and intrusion to which PVOs are susceptible.

A recent event illustrates this mechanism well. Recently, the Forum's Executive Director Abel Chikomo was served with a summons to stand trial on July 25, 2012 for running an unregistered PVO in contravention of Section 6(3) subsection 1 of the PVO Act. The summons was issued after Chikomo allegedly instructed his employees to carry out an illegal door to door survey on citizens' preferred transitional justice mechanisms in a suburb of Harare. Chikomo denied the charge on the basis that Zimbabwean common law recognizes the existence of the Universitas – the form under law which the Forum represents, existing as it does for the "benefit of its own members alone" – and therefore exempt from registration under the PVO Act. Meanwhile, many of the Forum's 19 member NGOs leapt to action, issuing press releases and reaching out to their international contacts to ensure that the trial would not go unnoticed outside Zimbabwe. On the day the trial was slated to begin, State prosecutor Innocent Chingarande withdrew the summons, advising the court that the State was not ready to proceed with the matter. Intern-NGO collaboration, it seems, has served as a useful strategy for protection of the NGO sector in the hostile legal environment of Zimbabwe. But does this relationship between legal environment and inter-NGO collaboration hold elsewhere?

4.4 USAID NGO Sustainability Index Legal Environment Scores

Since 1997 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been producing the NGO Sustainability Index[28] to report on the strength and overall viability of the NGO sectors in countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. In 2009 USAID released their first NGO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa, and soon a Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa will be added to the repertoire. NGO practitioners and experts in each country analyze and assign scores to seven dimensions of importance to the NGO sector.[29] These scores range from 1-7, where 1 is the best and 7 is the worst. These scores are also clustered into three categories: "Sustainability Enhanced" corresponding to a score between 1 and 3 points, "Sustainability Evolving" corresponding to a score between 3.1 and 5 points, and "Sustainability Impeded" corresponding to a score of 5.1 to 7 points on the scale.

The first of these seven dimensions is the legal environment, which considers factors related to the state's domestic legal and regulatory regime and the extent to which it meets the needs of the NGO sector. For instance how simple, quick, inexpensive and consistently applied is the process of registration for non-profit organizations? How favorable is the tax system for non-profits? What types of non-profits, if any, are eligible for tax exemptions and how significant are these exemptions? How broadly available are

[28] As of 2011, USAID is now calling the report the CSO Sustainability Index instead of the NGO Sustainability Index "in recognition of the broad range of nonprofit civil society organizations (CSOs) active in these countries."

[29] The Sustainability Index reports these scores along with an average of all seven indicators to produce an overall score as to the sustainability of the NGO sector

tax incentives to encourage individual and corporate philanthropy? To what extent are non-profits operating within the state free to engage in advocacy and criticize the government? Is there clear government hostility toward or harassment of NGOs? USAID provides the following descriptions for each category of legal environment scores:

> Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): The legislative and regulatory framework makes special provisions for the needs of CSOs or gives not-for-profit organizations special advantages such as: significant tax deductions for business or individual contributions, significant tax exemptions for CSOs, open competition among CSOs to provide government-funded services, etc. Legal reform efforts at this point are primarily a local CSO advocacy effort to reform or fine-tune taxation laws, procurement processes, etc. Local and comparative expertise on the CSO legal framework exists, and legal services and materials are available.
>
> Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): CSOs have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. They are permitted to engage in a broad range of activities, although taxation provisions, procurement procedures, etc. may inhibit CSO operations and development. Programs seek to reform or clarify existing CSO legislation, to allow CSOs to engage in revenue raising and commercial activities, to allow national or local governments to privatize the provision of selected government services, to address basic tax and fiscal issues for CSOs, etc. The local CSO community understands the need to coalesce and advocate for legal reforms benefiting the CSO sector as a whole. A core of local lawyers begins to specialize in CSO law by providing legal services to local CSOs, advising the CSO community on needed legal reforms, crafting draft legislation, etc.
>
> Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): The legal environment severely restricts the ability of CSOs to register and/or operate, either through the absence of legal provisions, the confusing or restrictive nature of legal provisions (and/or their implementation), or government hostility towards and harassment of CSOs.

Unfortunately, these scores have been calculated for only 10 of the 29 cases being considered in this dissertation. The range of legal environments across the 10 cases spans from 3.3 at the best and 6.1 at the worst. Perhaps not surprisingly, none of these cases have legal environments meriting a score within the highest quality range of "sustainability enhanced". Eight cases (Georgia, Kosovo, Serbia, Russia, Azerbaijan, Uganda, Nigeria and Burundi) fit into the intermediate "sustainability evolving" category,

and two (Ethiopia and Zimbabwe) are classified by USAID as having legal environments which are impeding the sustainability of the NGO sector.



Figure 4.2: Plot of Krackhardt's Connectedness against Legal Environment

The scatter plot in Figure 4.2 depicts the relationship between legal environment and extent of inter-NGO collaboration among these ten cases. The lower-triangular pattern which emerges in this graph supports the argument that a hostile legal environment is a necessary condition for extensive inter-NGO collaboration. With the exception of one data point (Georgia), the points on the graph seem to indicate that the quality of the legal environment sets a ceiling on the level of network connectedness among NGOs. Much of the connectedness in Georgia is due to an NAO called the Coalition for IDP's Rights. An interesting avenue of future research should examine why and how, in the absence of a hostile legal environment, this NAO was formed and maintained in Georgia. However it is also worth noting that Georgia only receives a

Krackhardt's connectedness score of .5497, hardly evidence of extensive collaboration among the entire field of NGOs working to assist and protect IDPs in Georgia.

	USAID NGO Sustainability Index Legal Environment	
	Sustainability Enhanced or Sustainability Evolving	Sustainability Impeded
More Connected Network (Krackhardt's Connectedness > .8)	no cases	Ethiopia Zimbabwe
Less Connected Network (Krackhardt's Connectedness < .8)	Georgia, Kosovo, Serbia, Russia. Azerbaijan, Uganda, Nigeria, Burundi	no cases

Table 4.1: 2x2 Table Relating Legal Environment to Network Connectedness

The descriptive statistics provided in Table 4.1 suggests support for argument that a hostile legal environment is a necessary condition for extensive inter-NGO collaboration. Using the Krackhardt's Connectedness measures calculated in the previous chapter, I have provided a 2x2 table categorizing cases receiving a connectedness score of .8 or higher as "more connected" and the rest as "less connected."[30] Both cases that are at least 80% connected have legal environments regarded by USAID as an impediment to the sustainability of the NGO sector. Note that two of the cells remain empty; no cases exist which are highly connected and enjoy a decent regulatory environment, and no cases exist which suffer a hostile legal environment and are nonetheless highly fractionalized. The empty top left cell suggests

[30]Recall that Krackhardt's Connectedness calculates the ratio of the number of pairs in the graph that are reachable relative to the number of ordered pairs.

that at least among these ten cases, a hostile legal environment represents a necessary condition for extensive inter-NGO collaboration. The empty bottom right cell likewise indicates that the condition is also sufficient for extensive inter-NGO collaboration.

4.5 World Bank WGI Regulatory Quality Indicator

The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Worldwide Governance Indicators report on six dimensions of governance for over 200 countries over the period 1996-2010. These data are compiled from 30 existing data sources comprised of household surveys, surveys of firms, commercial business information providers, NGOs and public sector organizations. One of these dimensions is the Regulatory Quality Indicator, which "captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development (WGI documentation)."



Figure 4.3: Plot of Krackhardt's Connectedness against Regulatory Quality

While this is not as directly germane as the Sustainability Index data, the Regulatory Quality data is available for all 29 cases and provides an adequate indication of the quality of the legal environment in the state as a whole. Figure 4.3 shows the plot of the connectedness scores of all 29 cases against the regulatory quality indicator. Once again, a ceiling seems to be set by regulatory quality on the extent of inter-NGO collaboration in any given case as demonstrated by the empty triangle on the top right side of the chart.

	World Bank WGI Regulatory Quality Indicator	
	Cases Ranked Above the 10th Percentile	Cases Ranked Below the 10th Percentile
More Connected Network (Krackhardt's Connectedness > .8)	Iraq (→) Ethiopia (→)	Sudan Afghanistan Zimbabwe Myanmar
Less Connected Network (Krackhardt's Connectedness < .8)	Cyprus, Georgia, Turkey, Colombia, Lebanon, Serbia, Kosovo, Uganda, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, , Yemen, Nepal, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Chad, Timor-Leste, Central African Republic, Burundi	no cases

Table 4.2: 2x2 Table Relating Regulatory Quality to Network Connectedness

Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics again suggesting support for the hypothesis that NGOs are more likely to engage in significant inter-NGO collaboration

when operating under the condition of a poor legal environment. The cases on the right-hand side of the table are those color coded red by the WGI, meaning their regulatory environments fall into the bottom 10th percentile worldwide. Note that on the basis of these data, Ethiopia ends up in the left-hand cell, although it is worth noting that it is still only ranked in the 21st percentile worldwide. Based on the "sustainability impeded" categorization offered by the NGO Sustainability Index, I have decided to move Ethiopia into the right-hand column. Likewise Iraq does not exhibit the hypothesized relationship, but it is also only ranked in the 14th percentile worldwide. This takes it out of the most severe category according to the World Bank, but it certainly does not indicate a stellar regulatory environment. Moreover, according the the NGO Law Monitor, the legal environment for NGOs was quite poor until a new system was implemented in late 2010. Because 2010 is the year for which all the data for this dissertation was collected, and because the quality of the regulatory environment for NGOs is specifically what my theory pertains to, I will again move this to the right-hand column. With these amendments, Table 4.2 demonstrates (as did Table 4.1) that a hostile legal environment is both necessary and sufficient to extensive inter-NGO collaboration.

4.6 Severity of Threat to IDPs

According to the transnational civil society literature, NGOs are expected to engage in more extensive networking and greater inter-NGO collaboration when they believe that such strategies will further their organizational missions. According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), transnational advocacy networks organize most effectively around issues that

involve bodily harm to vulnerable individuals or legal equality of opportunity. By selecting the issue of protracted internal displacement for this study, variation on issue characteristic is already somewhat "controlled for." IDPs are consistently at a greater risk of physical harm than the general population, and are also commonly not afforded equal opportunities as the general population of a state. As I have previously argued, based on these characteristics of the crisis of internal displacement, we should expect to see extensive inter-NGO collaboration across all 29 cases if the transnational civil society framework is correct; an expectation thwarted in Chapter 3.

Still, one might argue that the severity of the threat to an IDP's physical security or equality of opportunity might vary across these 29 cases. Perhaps this urgency represents the condition which leads to greater collaboration among some NGOs. In order to examine this possibility, I combine two data sources. First, I look at whether there was new displacement according to the 2010 Global Report published by the IDMC. Second, I consider whether the conflict which resulted in internal displacement was still ongoing in 2010. It is reasonable to assume that in either case – significant new displacement or ongoing conflict – the security of the IDPs is at greater risk and their equality of opportunity is restricted.

Table 4.3 provides the results of this analysis. Interestingly, the upper left-hand cell is once again empty, suggesting that the urgency of the situation faced by the IDPs may in fact be a necessary condition for extensive inter-NGO collaboration. In other

words, all cases of extensive inter-NGO networking occur in states where either the conflict rages on or new displacement has occurred.

	No Conflict or New Displacement in 2010	Conflict or New Displacement in 2010
More Connected Network (Krackhardt's Connectedness > .8) B	no cases	Afghanistan Ethiopia Iraq Myanmar Sudan Zimbabwe
Less Connected Network (Krackhardt's Connectedness < .8)	Azerbaijan Burundi Cyprus Georgia Guatemala Kosovo Lebanon Nepal Russia Serbia Timor-Leste	CAR Chad Colombia Cote d'Ivoire India Indonesia Nigeria Philippines Sri Lanka Turkey Uganda Yemen

Table 4.3: 2x2 Table Relating Internal Displacement to Network Connectedness

However, unlike the quality of the legal environment, the severity of the issue does not provide a sufficient condition to inter-NGO collaboration. Table 4.3 reports the fact that the cases of low collaboration are split evenly between those states where conflict is and is not ongoing and where new displacement has and has not occurred. The data presented in this chapter suggest that the transnational civil society literature is partially correct in implying that a greater the threat to vulnerable individuals is more likely to inspire extensive inter-NGO networking. However, the story only begins with the characteristics of the issue. An urgent crisis may well be a necessary condition, but the

quality of the regulatory environment provides sufficiency. The threat to the NGO sector represented by a hostile legal environment is both necessary and sufficient for inter-NGO collaboration.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary of Findings

This dissertation has introduced an alternative theoretical framework for the analysis of transnational relations. By considering resource dependence perspective from the sociological study of organizational behavior, I have called into question some of the assumptions made in the international relations literature about the behavior of NGOs. By taking advantage of the tools provided by social network analysis, I have suggested a direction for the future study of transnational advocacy networks. The following paragraph will briefly summarize the main findings of this dissertation.

Chapter 2 examines the structure of the transnational network of actors concerned with the crisis of protracted internal displacement in Azerbaijan. On the basis of this case, we can acknowledge that at least sometimes, NGOs do participate in transnational networking to help persons affected by armed conflict. However, the presence of such a network does not necessarily indicate that NGOs operate as the central actors in these networks. Nor does it imply that NGOs necessarily use these networks to collaborate with one another in pursuit of their complementary organizational missions. It may well be that rather than cooperating, NGOs in the same transnational network are competing with one another for access to more powerful network actors, such as states or IGOs. Chapter 2 develops a theory of inter-NGO collaboration as suggested by resource dependence theory. Using original network data collected by analyzing the websites of the relevant NGOs, I find that NGOs are mostly not collaborating with one another

around the issue of protracted internal displacement. Finally, Chapter 3 argues that while the characteristics of the issue are an important factor, the presence of a hostile legal environment is a necessary and sufficient condition for extensive inter-NGO collaboration. All these findings are consistent with the argument that NGOs do not seem to relate to one another as fellow activists in an emergent transnational civil society.

	Transnational Civil Society	Transnational Marketplace
Literature	Transnational Relations (within International Relations)	Organization Theory (within Sociology)
Basic Assumption	NGOs act as activists in a transnational civil society	NGOs act as competitors in a transnational marketplace
Primary Concern for NGOs	Success of Organizational Mission	Organizational Survival
Default Relationship with Other NGOs	Collaborative	Competitive
Theoretical Lens	Resource Mobilization	Resource Dependence
More Inter-NGO Networking When…	Organizational mission can be advanced through transnational networking. This is most frequently the case when the advocacy issue involves bodily harm to or inequality of opportunity for vulnerable persons.	Environment presents a threat to the sector. Specifically, a hostile legal environment.

Table 5.1: Theoretical Framework for this Dissertation (reprint of Table 1.1)

5.2 Limitations and Future Directions

This dissertation represents a preliminary attempt to understand how NGOs network transnationally in their efforts to help the victims of armed conflict. By applying organization theory and social network analysis to the study of NGO behavior, I hope to

have suggested a direction for future research in transnational relations. This dissertation represents what I hope to be the opening salvo to a much lengthier conversation.

Clearly, hyperlinks represent a relatively weak form of collaboration. While there is support for this proxy in the literature, future research could expand the discussion through the collection and analysis of alternative measures for collaboration. Such data are not easy to come by, however some potential avenues – given the proper access and resources – would include surveys of NGOs, textual analysis of NGO websites or analysis of co-contracting and/or joint-receipt of grant monies.

The cross-national network data in this dissertation are limited to NGOs and the relationships among them. In only one case – Azerbaijan – was the "entire" transnational advocacy network investigated. For this reason I can only state with any confidence that the lack of collaborate ties among NGOs indicate competitive relationships in this single case. A third option exits – that of a general indifference among NGOs to one another's missions and goals. Further research should be undertaken in order to better understand if this failure to collaborate indeed represents a drive to compete across cases. On the basis of the data collected and analyzed for the remaining 28 cases, we may only conclude that NGOs do not appear to operate like activists in a transnational civil society. The extent of inter-NGO networking is much lower than the transnational relations literature would lead one to expect. This represents a significant challenge to the extant literature. Clearly, however, more work remains to be done in order to determine the extent to which these findings are generalizable to NGOs focused on the plethora of other

issues to which NGOs respond. Future research should look more closely at the distinction drawn in Chapter 3 between agenda-setting and implementation. Future research could further increase our understanding of transnational relations by engaging in cross-national analysis of the transnational advocacy network as a whole. Finally, the actors to be included in the potential networks were limited in all cases to those identified as relevant by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Consequently it is certain that some actors concerned with these cases of protracted internal displacement are missing from this analysis. Using a focused webcrawler, future research could cast a wider net by automating both the harvesting of hyperlinks and the textual analysis of the websites of connected organizations to ensure relevance.

The largest source of NGO funding today is public, and competition for limited short-term government contracts comes with the territory. One practical implication following from this study is that funders themselves might incentivize collaboration by giving preferential treatment to collaborative projects and grant applications. Indeed this has been attempted in limited ways, despite the fact that for the donors competition is often seen as advantageous due to the increased "efficiency" this competition garners. Future research could investigate the effects of such funding incentives on legitimate collaboration (versus "short-term project culture") and on the success of stated organizational missions or grant purposes.

REFERENCES

Adelman, Howard. 2002. “Refugee Repatriation.” *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*.

Ahmed, Shamima, and David M. Potter. 2006. *NGOs in International Politics*. Bloomfied, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc.

Alvarez, S. 2009. “Beyond NGO-ization?: Reflections from Latin America.” *Development* 52(2): 175.

Anheier, H., M. Glasius, and M. Kaldor. 2001. *Global Civil Society 2001*. Oxford University Press. http://www.drmoores.info/download/i/mark_dl/u/4008327256/4538240806/Global%20Civic%20Space.pdf (Accessed July 5, 2012).

Anheier, Helmut K. 2005. *Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy*. London ;New York: Routledge.

Bannock, Graham, Evan Davis, and Paul Trott. 2003. *Dictionary of Business*. Bloomberg Press.

Barnett, Michael, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2008. “From International Relations to Global Civil Society.” In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 62–83.

Beigbeder, Yves. 1991. *The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations: The Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Bob, Clifford. 2002. “Merchants of Morality.” *Foreign Policy* (129): 36–45.

Boli, John, and George M. Thomas. 1997. “World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization.” *American Sociological Review* 62(2): 171–190.

Borgatti, S. P., M. G. Everett, and L. C. Freeman. 2002. “Ucinet for Windows: Software for social network analysis.” http://www.citeulike.org/group/11708/article/6031268 (Accessed October 18, 2012).

Borgatti, S. P., and D. S. Halgin. 2011. “On network theory.” *Organization Science* 22(5): 1168–1181.

Brass, D.J. et al. 2004. “Taking stock of networks and organizations: A multilevel perspective.” *The Academy of Management Journal*: 795–817.

Burgerman, Susan. 2001. *Moral victories : how activists provoke multilateral action*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Burt, R. S. 1992. *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Burt, R. S. 1997. "The contingent value of social capital." *Administrative science quarterly*: 339–365.

Clark, A. M, E. J Friedman, and K. Hochstetler. 1998. "The sovereign limits of global civil society: a comparison of NGO participation in UN world conferences on the environment, human rights, and women." *World Politics* 51(1): 1–35.

Clark, Ann. 1995. "Non-governmental organizations and their influence on international society." *Journal of international affairs (Columbia University (New York). School of International and Public Affairs)*.

Clark, Ann Marie. 2001. *Diplomacy of conscience : Amnesty International and changing human rights norms*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Claydon, John. 1978. "Internationally Uprooted People and the Transnational Protection of Minority Culture." *New York Law School Law Review* 24: 125.

Coleman, James S. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology* 94(Supplement): 95–120.

Cooley, A., and J. Ron. 2002. "The NGO scramble: Organizational insecurity and the political economy of transnational action." *International Security* 27(1): 5–39.

Davis, Gerald F., and Walter W. Powell. 1992. "Organization-Environment Relations." In *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, eds. Marvin D. Dunnette and Leaetta M. Hough. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Edelman, Lauren B., and Mark C. Suchman. 1997. "The Legal Environments of Organizations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 23: 479–515.

Emerson, Rupert. 1975. "The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World." *World Politics* 27(2): 201–226.

Entwisle, Hannah. 2004. "Tracing Cascades: The Normative Development of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement." *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 19: 369.

Evangelista, Matthew. 1999. *Unarmed forces : the transnational movement to end the Cold War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National interests in international society*. Cornell University Press.

Florini, Ann, ed. 2000. *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Fonteyne, J. -P.L. 1978. “Burden-Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Function of International Solidarity in Cases of Mass Influx of Refugees.” *Australian Year Book of International Law* 8: 162.

Galaskiewicz, Joseph. 1985. “Interorganizational Relations.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 11: 281–304.

Glasius, M., M. Kaldor, and H. Anheier. 2002. *Global civil society 2002*. Oxford University Press. http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/yearbook02chapters.htm.

Granovetter, Mark. 1985. “Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness.” *American journal of sociology* 91(3): 481.

Gray, Barbara. 1989. *Collaborating: Finding common ground for multiparty problems*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass: A Wiley Imprint.

Guo, Chao, and Muhittin Acar. 2005. “Understanding Collaboration Among Nonprofit Organizations: Combining Resource Dependency, Institutional, and Network Perspectives.” *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 34(3): 340 –361.

Halliday, Fred. 1994. *Rethinking international relations*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.

Holmes, John. 2008. “Ten Years of the Guiding Principles: Forward.” *Forced Migration Review* Special Issue: 3.

Hulme, David, and Michael Edwards. 1997. “NGOs, states and donors : too close for comfort?” In New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with Save the Children.

Keck, M. E, and K. Sikkink. 1999. “Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics.” *International Social Science Journal* 51(159): 89–101.

———. 1998. “Transnational advocacy networks in the movement society.” In *The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century*, eds. David S. Meyer and Sidney G. Tarrow. Rowman & Littlefield, p. 217–238.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cornell University Press.

Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 2002. *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*. University of Minnesota Press.

Knoke, D., and S. Yang. 2008. *Social network analysis*. Sage Publications, Inc. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=buiJi6HtGusC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=%22Social+Network+Analysis%22+knoke+yang&ots=l2QQ2mi-P8&sig=fy4eV4hBY0uWiXVNerIOr3LJSyg (Accessed July 9, 2012).

Krackhardt, D. 1994. “Graph theoretical dimensions of informal organizations.” *Computational organization theory* 89(112): 123–140.

Lakatos, I. 1970. *Falsification and Methodology of Research Programs. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lang, S. 1997. “The NGOization of Feminism.” In *Transitions, Environments, Translations: feminisms in international politics*, eds. C. Kaplan and J. Wallach. London: Routledge, p. 101–120.

Linden, Russell M. 2002. *Working Across Boundaries: Making Collaboration Work in Government and Nonprofit Organizations*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass: A Wiley Imprint.

Martin, R. 1999. “NGO field security.” *Forced Migration Review* 4: 4–7.

Martinez-Moyano, Ignacio J. 2006. “Exploring the dynamics of collaboration in interorganizational settings.” In *Creating a Culture of Collaboration: The International Association of Facilitators Handbook*, ed. Sandy Schuman. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass: A Wiley Imprint, p. 69–86.

McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” *The American Journal of Sociology* 82(6): 1212–1241.

Mundt, Alex, and Elizabeth Ferris. 2008. “Durable Solutions for IDPs in Protracted Situations: Three Case Studies.” In *Enhancing Protection of Civilians in Protracted Conflicts*, Canberra, Australia: Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement. http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/82C9997CA46D0CA7C12575B5004770F8/$file/protracted+displacement,+colombia.pdf.

Oliver, P. E, and G. Marwell. 1992. “Mobilizing technologies for collective action.” *Frontiers in social movement theory*: 251–72.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Gerald R. Salancik. 2003. *The external control of organizations: a resource dependence perspective*. Stanford University Press.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Robert I. Sutton. 2000. *The knowing-doing gap: how smart companies turn knowledge into action*. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press.

Pilny, Andrew, and Michelle Shumate. 2012. “Hyperlinks as Extensions of offline instrumental collective action.” *Information Communication and Society* 15(2): 260–286.

Polman, Linda. 2010. *The Crisis Caravan: What’s Wrong With Humanitarian Aid?* New York: Metropolitan Books.

Powell, Walter W. 1990. “Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization.” *Research in Organizational Behavior* 12: 295–36.

Powell, Walter W., Kenneth W. Koput, and Laurel Smith-Doerr. 1996. “Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology.” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 41(1): 116–145.

Price, Richard. 1998. “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.” *International Organization* 52(3): 613–644.

———. 2003. “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics.” *World Politics* 55(4): 579–606.

Provan, K. G, A. Fish, and J. Sydow. 2007. “Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks.” *Journal of management* 33(3): 479.

Provan, K. G, and P. Kenis. 2008. “Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness.” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18(2): 229.

Risse, Thomas. 2002. “Transnational Actors and World Politics.” In *Handbook of International Relations*, Los Angelas: Sage Publications, p. 255–274.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. *Bringing transnational relations back in : non-state actors, domestic structures, and international institutions*. Cambridge; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Salamon, L. M, and H. K Anheier. 1996. *The emerging nonprofit sector: An overview*. Manchester Univ Pr.

Sell, Susan K., and Aseem Prakash. 2004. “Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Between Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights.” *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 143–175.

Simmons, P. J. 1998. “Learning to Live with NGOs.” *Foreign Policy* (112): 82–96.

Sloat, Amanda. 2005. “The Rebirth of Civil Society.” *European Journal of Women’s Studies* 12(4): 437–452.

Smillie, I., and others. 1995. *The alms bazaar: Altruism under fire-non-profit organizations and international development.* International Development Research Centre (IDRC). http://www.cabdirect.org/abstracts/19951812014.html (Accessed July 6, 2012).

Smillie, I., and T. J. Watson Jr. 1998. “Relief and development: The struggle for synergy.” *OCCASIONAL PAPER-THOMAS J WATSON JR INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES*. http://watsoninstitute.octadyne.net/pub/OP33.pdf (Accessed July 6, 2012).

Smith, Brian H. 1990. *More than altruism : the politics of private foreign aid*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Stall, Susan, and Randy Stoecker. 1998. “Community Organizing or Organizing Community?” *Gender & Society* 12(6): 729 –756.

Suhrke, Astri, and Aristide R. Zolberg. 1989. “Beyond the Refugee Crisis: Disengagement and Durable Solutions for the Developing World’.” *Migration* 5: 69–119.

True, Jacqui, and Michael Mintrom. 2001. “Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming.” *International Studies Quarterly* 45: 27–57.

“UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.”

“United Nations, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967, 606 UNTS 267.”

Vakil, A.C. 1997. “Confronting the classification problem: Toward a taxonomy of NGOs.” *World Development* 25(12): 2057–2070.

Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. 1994. *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge University Press New York.

Weiss, Thomas G., and David A. Korn. 2006. *Internal displacement conceptualization and its consequences*. London ;New York: Routledge.

Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. *The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting*. New York: Free Press.

Zeitz, G. 1980. “Interorganizational dialectics.” *Administrative Science Quarterly*: 72–88.