

NATIONAL AND MINORITY CULTURES IN 21ST CENTURY FRANCE: NORTH
AFRICAN AND PIED-NOIR CULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

Social conflict is common in many nations around the world. Tensions often arise from cultural misunderstandings and disagreements over national and group membership in multicultural populations. France offers a particularly clear example of such unrest. As a contemporary multi-ethnic, multicultural nation, France advocates both the belief in universal human rights as well as assimilationist policies designed to create a singular majority culture. North African immigrants and Pied-Noir repatriates are two groups at the center of recent debate in France. Both have historical ties to colonial French North Africa, but now reside within the modern French state. Each offers a unique case study of alternative strategies related to cultural negotiation and social tension as both groups currently demand recognition as French citizens and minorities.

This dissertation analyses how North African and Pied-Noir minority communities in France engage discourses of history, culture, and identity to create a hospitable place for themselves in the French nation by redefining themselves both as minorities and as active citizens. One primary mechanism through which these groups achieve these goals is cultural associations, or social clubs. Cultural associations were legalized in 1901 and have not yet found a well-established role in France. Minorities use this institutional fluidity to develop concurrently their national and minority identities. Within such associations, they develop performances for both minority and outside audiences, engage contemporary French understandings of “culture,” and acquire attention and resources needed to enact social change. One of the recurring tropes in

such performances is the display of minority history and the role minorities play in French history. Through analysis of such activities this dissertation argues that these groups create new conceptions of national membership through their assertion of their right to be members in the French nation while retaining their cultural difference.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

4 March, 2010 - Aix-en-Provence

The presentation had ended to applause, the audience begun to disperse, those with questions milling around the platform that served as a stage, others remaining in their seats to catch up with friends or making their way to the tables set up in the back of the room with refreshments. I finished jotting down a few notes and asked the woman sitting next to me how she had enjoyed the presentation. A slight woman, with salt-and-pepper hair and glasses, we had met just before the lecture, when she introduced herself and asked why I was there: no one was used to seeing anyone so young at lectures at the *Maison des Rapatriés*. I explained that I was a graduate student at the University of Arizona, working on my dissertation on Pied-Noir and North African cultural associations in France. Delighted, she had introduced me to the Secretary General of the association, who was the evening's organizer, and the lecturer himself. After the lecture, she exclaimed over how much she had learned, questioned me on my impressions of the lecture, my prior knowledge of corsairs and the Barbary Wars - the subject of the talk- and introduced me to all and sundry in a torrent of energy and enthusiasm. Because I was clearly engaged in conversation at the center of an ever-evolving group of people, guests took it upon themselves to bring me plates of appetizers, both in recognition of the fact that I would not make it to the tables in a timely fashion, and to ensure that I sampled all the Pied-Noir cuisine. Our conversations ranged from my education and training to the decolonization of Tunisia, farming in Boise, Idaho, and the American participation in the Barbary Wars. People pointed at the

statues, flags, and display cases full of objects from French North Africa that lined the room, illustrating their points and teaching the foreigner about their culture and history. Some popped into the association offices surrounding the open space where the lecture was held, bringing out books or papers for me to see or taking care of association business with members.

As the evening's activities died down, those of us who remained stacked the chairs against the windows and put the little food that remained in the first-floor kitchen. Presidents and officials locked up their respective association offices, and we made our way downstairs, past the statue of Maréchal Juin, the building's namesake, and to the door. Outside, with many calls of goodbye and offers of rides or plans for the coming days echoing into the evening, we dispersed into cars or went our separate ways on foot along the boulevards. This was a typical evening at the *Maison Maréchal Juin*, the center in Aix-en-Provence for Pied-Noir and Harki associations, and illustrative of the character of such events. Although the audience and activities varied, as did my participation and familiarity with the assembled, they all involved a large dose of warm welcome, open-hearted curiosity, and, of course, good food.

When not in Aix-en-Provence, which occupied less than half of my time in France, I lived in Grenoble. Having spent my junior year abroad at the *Faculté Stendhal* learning French, on returning to France I knew the city well enough to find the university, downtown shopping district, and Arab quarter. Before finalizing my choice of field sites, I had returned in 2008 to revisit the city. I was concerned that no one would remember me after nearly five years. Nervous, I walked in to the first association building, through the entry and up the narrow stairs to the main office on the second floor. While waiting for the secretary to finish what she was

working on, I caught the eye of a man working at a computer in the back of the room. Barely looking up, he said: “Oh, c’est toi. T’es du retour?” before finishing what he was working on and his post to welcome me back. It was not quite as though I had never left – my French was rusty, the offices had been redecorated, and there was a sea of new faces – but by the ease and warmth of my welcome it was made clear that I was a part of the community, something a temporary absence, even one of five years, could not change. Reassured, I reconnected with other friends and acquaintances and boarded the plane back to Arizona to organize my research and plan my return. Not quite a year later, I arrived in Grenoble to conduct my fieldwork, and found a place to live in one of the Arab neighborhoods. In the center of one of the highest concentrations of couscous restaurants and near one of the only grocery stores open on Sundays, my apartment was also close to a number of North African associations. With a base of operations and the assurance of a steady supply of couscous, I began my research in earnest.

Theoretical Background

Globalization and the attendant movement of people and goods have increased stress on structures such as national borders (Heyman 2004) and identity boundaries within societies (Kiely et al. 2001; Taylor 1994), and have drawn attention to the fact that nation states and cultural groups are collections of diverse peoples (Appadurai 1986, 1988; Gupta and Ferguson 1992). Some theorists note that these areas of cultural mixing can create zones of hybridity and increased economic, social, and personal opportunities (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Rosaldo 1988). At the same time, other processes help maintain these boundaries and cultural differences

(Rosaldo 1988). Among these are cultural reasons for the maintenance of ethnic boundaries and separate identities (Barth 1969; Vila 2005); institutionalization of national borders, immigration, and citizenship policies (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 2003; Gardner 2005; Heyman and Smart 1999); and discrimination based on class, ethnicity, or religion which can lead to relegation of the minority to a fixed set of economic activities (Barou 1980; Wolf 2001). More covertly, this can involve the attribution of negative value to minority identities, thus creating not only classes of citizens, but inflicting psychological stress on certain groups (Appiah 1994; Taylor 1994). In situations of immigration, such processes can contribute to the creation of transnational enclave communities that perpetuate ethnic identities and practices across national borders (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Massey et al. 1993; Schiller et al. 1992). This can also challenge shared national identities and political ideologies (Eagleton 2007; Feldblum 1999).

Ethnic boundaries as well as the actions of associations are having a broader impact on anthropological theory, touching on questions of neoliberalism, democracy, and citizenship. As western governments are adopting more neoliberal policies, some state responsibilities are being assigned to civil society (Kipnis 2007). Questions of how associations function are therefore of increasing political and theoretical interest, especially under such politicized conditions as societies debating the legitimacy of their multi-ethnic composition. At the same time, the legal supports of the nation-state as a geographically located entity with an ethnically homogenous identity are crumbling, raising questions about the practice of democracy (Munck 2005). As such, citizenship and the role of the citizen are also problematized, particularly for minority communities.

In France, such dynamics are particularly visible. Ideologically, French republicanism is based on cultural assimilation of the individual, regardless of ethnic origin or religion, and any public recognition of ethnic difference is seen as endangering national unity and creating factions (Bowen 2007; Grillo 1998; Ireland 1994). Integration of immigrants and minorities supposedly takes place through the assimilative powers of French language and culture, and it is assumed that when the prerequisites for citizenship have been met the cultural integration has also been completed (Castel 1995; Feldblum 1999; Hargreaves 1995; Kastoryano 2002; Limage 2000). This connection is not so straightforward in practice. Although children of immigrants born in France are citizens, they are often neither recognized nor treated as such. French racists discourage attempts at integration and reinforce negative ethnic stereotypes, while minority citizens are increasingly demanding the right of recognition with their cultural distinctiveness and dignity intact (Fysh and Wolfreys 2003; Hargreaves and Leaman 1995; Silverman 1992, 1999). Overt and inherent racism in France has limited the educational, economic, social, and housing opportunities of minorities, creating the *banlieue*, or disadvantaged suburbs with high crime rates, wherein residents are sequestered without sufficient infrastructure, educational opportunities, or possibilities of economic or social advancement (Fassin 2006; Wacquant 2008). Even when minorities do not reside in these areas, they are often assigned negative characteristics (Derderian 2004; Feldblum 1999) or their points of view and history are sidelined, as with the Pied-Noir (Shepard 2006). This is one example of how negatively stereotyped identities can affect a minority group. While French society has traditionally understood cultural distinctions to be incompatible with inclusion in the national community, since the early-20th

century (with the negritude movement), minority groups have protested and demanded the rights promised to them as Republican citizens despite their cultural differences (Kastoryano 2002; Wacquant 2008). Strategies differ: some minorities try harder to assimilate, others revolt, and still others attempt to recast their group identities in a positive light and create space for themselves as contributing to society as French minorities, not simply minorities in France (Laronde 1993; Taylor 1994). This research focuses on a group that has adopted the third of these options.

Immigrant and minority associations have been offered as a solution to the problem of ethnic relations. The government funds these groups as a way to integrate immigrants and minorities into republican society, encouraging the development of civic habits in the democratic venue of the association and thus increasing civic participation (Hamidi 2003; Hargreaves 1995). As such, the literature primarily focuses on relations between the associations, the government, and their constituencies (Césari 1993; Chabanet 2005; Feldblum 1999; Geisser 1997; Grillo 1985; Hamidi 2003; Jazouli 1986). For local associations, the discussion is limited to three types of groups: reminiscence, neighborhood, and aid associations.

In part because of the societal ambivalence towards associations, research has focused on three vectors of influence. First, how associations serve to transmit their members' views to the government and how they influence the government in policy creation or implementation (Calmien 1994; Chabanet 2005; Comtat 2009; Feldblum 1999; Geisser 1997). Second, how the form of the association can inculcate democratic values and habits in their members (Hamidi 2003; Ireland 1994; Kwon 2004; Putnam 1995). Third, how associations serve to maintain

minority group networks (Calmien 1994, Hily and Poinard 1986, Kepel 1987, Smith 2006). Overall, the literature has consistently remained focused on the link between the government, the associations, and the minority groups. Additional attention has been paid to national, highly media-centered groups and associative elites (Césari 1993; Derderian 2005; Geisser 1997; Jazouli 1986; Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden 1985). In the existing literature on associations in France, the discussion is primarily limited to three types of groups that can be broadly categorized as: reminiscence, neighborhood, and aid associations. In earlier research, while working with the North African community in Grenoble, I identified a fourth type of group: reciprocal integration associations, which seek improved relations between groups through the education of the majority population about the minorities and vice versa, mandating a multi-ethnic constituency (Phaneuf 2004, 2006). What is lacking in this discussion is an investigation of how associations are used to create or promote different positions in the ongoing identity negotiations and comparative research on associations of multiple minority communities. Despite the fact that the primary interest of the French government in these groups is their ability to integrate minorities into French culture and society, thereby reducing communal strife and creating a stronger nation, inter-group dynamics have not been considered.

The Present Study

My project intends to expand on existing research by developing a comparison of North African and Pied-Noir associations as intermediaries in direct negotiations between their members and local French communities. This juxtaposition of these two populations is intended

as a step towards fuller comprehension and completion of each story, not to create a sense of opposition. These two populations use associations in similar ways, though to different ends, and with different emphases. The Pied-Noir and North African communities are both tied to the history of French colonialism in North Africa and the Algerian War and its traumas, have roots in the same geographic area, overlapping histories, and similar timelines for their arrival in the metropole, but very different compositions, orientations, and concerns. Both are also viewed with suspicion in society today as threatening the French national unity, more so than numbers would warrant (Favell 1998; Shepard 2006). By comparing these groups, I can make more general statements about processes surrounding membership in the French nation, identity construction, and the role of civil society. Both populations offer specific insights into the role associations play in inter-group relations in France.

The North African¹ community in France is a visible minority. The community is composed of colonial subjects residing in France at independence and North African citizens who immigrated to France for economic opportunities or to join family (Hargreaves 1995). In 1999 there were approximately 2,999,000 North African immigrants or individuals with at least one immigrant grandparent living in France (Tribalat 2004). Some are practicing Muslims (Kepel 1987). In the French context, North Africa is defined as Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Although people have circulated among these countries dating from before the colonial era (Clancy-Smith 2011) and North Africans have settled in France since WWII (Hargreaves 1995), with their children and grandchildren being legal French citizens, these communities are still

¹ Other terms in use to define this community are “French-North African” and “Maghrèbin”. I use North African for clarity to refer to the population in France from North Africa or of North African heritage that identifies as such.

labeled as “immigrants” (Begag and Chaouite 1990). Because some have been excluded from educational, social, and economic opportunities and live in *banlieue*, disadvantaged peri-urban neighborhoods, the population as a whole has been stereotyped as uneducated, violent, extremist Muslims and is the focus of much misunderstanding and fear (Bowen 2007; Fassin 2006; Marranci 2004; Wacquant 2008). This was particularly the case during the bloody Algerian Civil War and during the beginning of my research in 2002, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.

The Pied-Noir² population is composed of French citizens who had lived in Colonial North Africa. Primarily of European heritage, they are descendants of migrants from France, Spain, Malta, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and other countries as well as indigenous Jews (Smith 2006). Seven-hundred thousand Pied-Noir moved to France from Algeria in 1962, most within a few months (Jordi 1993), joining a smaller number who had moved to France at Tunisian and Moroccan independence. Members of the Pied-Noir population are not physically distinct from metropolitan French, but many had a distinctive accent in the 1960s, which has since faded for most. Some European families had lived in Algeria up to 132 years (indigenous Jews, of course, much longer). Their migration to France was politically instigated, sudden, and traumatic, following the independence of the colonies (Jordi 2003). Although they are of

² The term “Pied-Noir” is contested by some, while claimed by others in the community. Other terms this population uses or has used to define itself include “Rapatriés,” “Français d’Algérie,” and “Algériens”. None of these terms is universally accepted, so I have chosen to use Pied-Noir as the most widely recognized. Its origins are unclear, though it was first applied in the late nineteenth century in reference to Muslims, then was applied to Europeans living in Algeria as a pejorative (Shepard 2006:27). Over time this label was reclaimed by many Pied-Noir and is now used with pride (Dimech 2006). Many individuals repatriated from French Algeria do not identify as Pied-Noir and do not participate in associations. As such, they did not participate in the study, and are not included in the discussions that follow.

European descent, many of them believe themselves to be a separate group: many had never been to mainland France before their sudden departure from the colonies. They believed themselves to be fully French, but discrimination and exclusion upon their arrival demonstrated their perceived difference and encouraged the development of a separate identity (Smith 2003, 2006; Jordi 2003; Shepard 2006). To this day the population is stereotyped as violently politically conservative, with fascist and racist tendencies, and possessing wealth stolen from Algerians or acquired through slave labor (Mercier 2003; Shepard 2006). The Français d'Algérie repatriated in 1962 were not slave owners; indeed, the great majority were poorer than their French counterparts, many arrived in France with only what they could carry, and they espoused a range of political views (Comtat 2009; Mercier 2003:34; Manes 2005).

Both communities have strong associative tendencies, believe that the majority society holds false views about them and their cultures, and are attempting to correct those views (Calmien 1994; Dimech 2006; Geisser 1997; Phaneuf 2006). While there has been a sizable amount written on the North African population, and they have had a vibrant associative life since the 1980s, their associations remain understudied, particularly in the last 15 years. Current popular discussion on North African and Muslim minorities in France makes this a particularly timely topic, and worthy of more consideration. Additionally, research on North Africans in France has focused primarily on those living in the metropolitan areas surrounding Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles, areas with relatively large socially excluded minority groups. In comparison, North Africans living in Grenoble are more socially and economically integrated. Very little has been written about the Pied-Noir population as a whole, and even less about their associations

(Calmien 1994; Comtat 2009; Smith 2003). Work on this population is particularly critical at this time because the active Pieds-Noirs are aging and their associations may not survive the passing of the first generation. As the second generation of the Pied-Noir community is coming of age they appear less likely to participate in Pied-Noir associations and identify as such (Cohen 2003). This is very different from the North African community, where associative participation does not appear to be decreasing with time. By comparing how members of these two communities have used associations to mediate their relations with the majority society, I document a particularly interesting period in French history and expand knowledge on the role of associations in inter-group relations, which has larger implications for our understanding of the role of civil society and democracy.

Methodology

Research in general, and particularly in the social sciences, is a combination of planning and serendipity. This project is no different. Its genesis occurred during my sophomore year as an undergraduate. I approached Charles Lindholm, my undergraduate advisor at Boston University, with a dilemma: I wanted to spend my junior year studying abroad in France, but I did not want to put off learning Arabic (a longstanding goal of mine) for another year. He suggested that when in France I find a mosque or association that offered Arabic lessons, an idea I accepted with enthusiasm. He also strongly encouraged me to pick a topic for my honors thesis that I could work on while abroad so I would not be behind when returning to the states. Upon my arrival in Grenoble in September 2002 I found a North African cultural association that

offered Arabic courses, and enrolled. I was clearly an oddity – not only because I was the only student who could pronounce the “th” sounds in Arabic without trouble – but the members and organizers of the association approached my difference with the most profound respect. This was at a time when Americans had turned potatoes into political commentary with the change of ‘French fries’ to ‘freedom fries’ and preparations were in progress for military action in Iraq. I was very impressed, therefore, by this unexpected climate of tolerance and respect for national, cultural, and religious difference. My first idea was to write a piece on North African immigration for my university newspaper (the piece, incidentally, never materialized), then I wrote a short research paper on North African cultural associations for one of my French courses, and before the end of my year abroad I had decided to pursue the topic as my undergraduate thesis.

After returning to Boston I made a second 10-day trip in January 2004 to conduct the follow-up research necessary to compliment my initial data. Between the defense of my thesis in May 2004 and my next return trip to France I explored other research topics and regions. I continued studying Arabic and conducted research projects on borders, globalization, and industrial labor. In 2008 I spent two weeks in Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence exploring the feasibility of writing my dissertation on minority cultural associations in those two cities. Following a warm welcome by a Pied-Noir association in Aix-en-Provence, I decided to add Pied-Noir and Harki associations to my study (though here I do not discuss the Harkis at length). Although originally designating one specific unit in the French armed forces, ‘Harki’ has become a generic term for North Africans who served the French Army during the Algerian war

(Hamoumou 1993). Some relocated to France at or after the end of the war, to be placed in isolated camps with few services or opportunities (Jordi and Hamoumou 1999); these camps have since closed. Today, numerous Harki associations demand recognition and reparations (Calmien 2012). Their situation is outlined briefly in Chapters 2 and 3. A year after my first trip to Aix-en-Provence I returned to France with the support of a Fulbright Fellowship in August of 2009 to begin research, under the guidance of Dr. Abdulrahmanne Moussaoui, an anthropologist at the Université d'Aix-Marseille.

This project is primarily based on this twelve-month period of fieldwork between September 2009 and August 2010. My prior experiences with both cities remained formative, and the relationships formed at that time were central to the success of my fieldwork as a whole. I returned to France for follow-up visits for three months in summer 2011 and long weekends in November 2010 and January 2012. During the two extended research trips I conducted ethnographic fieldwork and a review of the textual and archival sources. Ethnographic fieldwork consisted of semi-structured and open-ended interviews and participant observation in the associations and with local residents and officials. I conducted interviews with 96 individuals and informal discussions with many more, including association members and representatives from all three study communities, elected officials, civil servants, community leaders, and local residents in both cities. This represented 73 associations and 9 associated institutions (such as public archives and institutions that assist associations as well as regional government and religious institutions). Interview topics varied, but included the history and composition of the minority populations, cities, and associations, minority relations, change in minority relations

over time, individual motivations for participation (or non-participation) in the associations, and individual goals and understandings of their involvement with an association or associations.

I was also active in the associations and in community life. In the associations I attended numerous activities as a spectator, volunteer, and participant. Living in the communities - and in once case the neighborhood - where the associations I was researching were located often blurred the boundaries between daily life and fieldwork, and interviews could turn into discussions of local restaurants just as easily as a walk around town could lead to a conversation about minority relations or the discovery of a new association. During the follow-up visits in 2010, 2011, and 2012, in addition to collecting ethnographic data, I also presented preliminary findings to the associations. This provided both the opportunity to gather feedback and ‘fact-check’ directly with the study participants, as well as valuable chances for further observations and interviews.

The review of the textual sources included contemporary coverage in local and national newspapers, official documents regarding the cities and associations, and published works, particularly dissertations and master’s theses. I conducted research at local and regional archives. In Grenoble I attended the library of the ODTI and CIIP (both immigration-based research libraries), and departmental archives of Isère. In Aix-en-Provence I conducted research at the Bibliothèque de la Méditerranée at the Maison Méditerranéenne des Science de l’Homme, the Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM), the departmental archives of Bouches-du-Rhône, and the archives at the Centre de Documentation Historique sur l’Algérie (CDHA). For a more detailed discussion of methodology and changes over the course of the project and copies of the consent documents, please see Appendix 1 and 2.

While many people I spoke with were surprised at my decision to speak with both North Africans and Pied-Noir, few were openly opposed to the project. What was more common was that people appreciated my thoroughness – the apparent desire to get ‘both sides of the story.’ Others simply found the choice appropriate: though these populations are seen as divided in contemporary society, to many residents of French North Africa there is nothing natural or obvious about the division, instead, it is understood as the direct result of geo-political forces outside their control. Some wished that I had expended my research to also include Jewish and Veterans associations as two other groups involved with French Algeria. Those who were opposed to my attention to both groups told me that they were concerned that I would not be able to represent their story correctly or in enough detail if my attention were divided. I hope that my efforts have exceeded their expectations and laid their concerns to rest.

Geography

This research was primarily situated in Grenoble, in the department of Isère, and Aix-en-Provence, in the department of Bouches-du-Rhône. These are similar in a number of ways. Both have relatively high percentages of immigrant residents and many active immigrant associations. Grenoble has more active North African associations, while Aix-en-Provence has a particularly vigorous Pied-Noir community, thus allowing comparison between the two. They are both home to around 150,000 inhabitants, and home to universities, but they are very different in character. Aix-en-Provence is in the more conservative south, its mayor, Maryse Joissains-Masini is a member of the UMP, the same party as former President Nicolas Sarkozy. Close to the economic

and social center of Marseille, Aix-en-Provence is a center for the visual and performing arts, with a well-known summer theater festival. In contrast Grenoble, in the Alps, is known as a center for scientific and technological innovation and social advancements. Grenoble's mayor at the time of my research was Michel Destot, a socialist, and the mayors of a number of surrounding cities and towns are socialists or communists. The similarities between these two cities facilitate comparison while the differences allow for statements about France more generally. In addition to the primary research in Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence, I conducted research visits to Paris, Lyon, Nice, Antibes, Béziers, Perpignan, Marseilles, Valence, Théoule-sur-Mer, and elsewhere to follow the movements of associations and attend cultural events.

Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation tells one chapter of a story about globalization that began somewhere on the Mediterranean long before the colonial era. While trans-Mediterranean relations and movements of population are not new, they are constantly re-created, re-envisioned, and re-discovered, often in ways surprising to the participants. Contemporary France is implicated in these relations. Although to outside observers it can appear that she is perpetually in a state of confusion after discovering the multi-cultural nature of her population, long-term processes of change and accommodation are ongoing in this diverse nation. One accommodation that *may* be involved in creating long-term change is the minority cultural association (MCA). In this dissertation I suggest that MCAs are currently searching for a role in a nation that lacks an official role for them, or for the minority populations they represent. To accomplish the social

change they desire – primarily, a secure place within the nation – MCAs must first overcome suspicion and develop a position that is intelligible to both metropolitan French and members of the minority communities. To accomplish this, they engage discourses of integration and democracy, culture, value, and history to both attract attention and pass messages about the minority group and its engagement with the nation. The dissertation is divided into five chapters, in addition to the introduction and conclusion.

In Chapter 2, titled “A History of French Colonial North Africa and Postcolonial France,” I trace the history of France in North Africa from the colonial era through the study period, with a focus on the 1980s through 2010. Throughout this overview I describe the development of the contemporary Pied-Noir and North African populations in France and emphasize the imbrication of these populations’ histories. In particular, I note that with the events of the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s, peri-urban unrest in France, and a re-re-discovery of France’s involvement in the Algerian War raised questions about colonial and post-colonial relations that implicate both the North African and Pied-Noir populations. These events contributed to a reinforcement of stereotypes of these populations; the North Africans as violent, radically Islamic, and uncultured/uneducated and the Pied-Noir as racist fascists. During the early 2000s, the beginning of my relations and research within the communities, such stereotypes were both reinforced and challenged, though continued unrest in the *banlieue* and international Islamic terrorism did little to alleviate the situation.

Chapter 3, titled “Associations in France: Between Integration and Suspicion,” describes the form and history of associations in general and MCA in particular in France. Associations,

especially MCA, are both favored and distrusted in France today. They incorporate citizens and foster democracy or increase communitarianism and anti-republican or anti-democratic sentiments. The MCA I studied took advantage of this liminal place between integration into the nation and reinforcement of community bonds to create space for a re-negotiation of concepts of nation and community. Because the associative form itself is relatively new and immigrant associations have only been allowed since the 1980s, they have the added challenge and opportunity of having to create a place for themselves in society. Since political activism on the basis of minority identity is not encouraged in France, MCA represent one potential vector of social change. In particular, I outline the *System D*, a creative approach to association management that takes advantage of varied opportunities, connections, and relationships to expand the possibilities for action. I compared this to the legal structure of foundations or associations *Reconnus d'Utilité Publique*, both particular categories of association that are expected to provide increased legitimacy and integration into the bureaucratic system.

In Chapter 4, “The ‘Value’ of ‘Culture’ and the ‘Culture’ of ‘Value’,” I discuss concepts of culture and value as used in contemporary French society. Because MCAs are cultural by definition, how the term is understood influences both their ability to act, governs how their successes and failures will be judged, and determines the kind of place they can create for themselves in society. Categories of culture in France are given value based on national assumptions that take the position of “sacred propositions” (Rappaport 1971) and social organization (Graeber 2001), both of which are tied to fundamental myths and propositions of the republican system, including *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, that are unquestioned and

unquestionable in society. MCS use the uncertainties and fluidities in these systems to argue for a re-evaluation of the self-definition of the French nation that, they hope, will lead to a re-valuation of the place of their cultures and identities in that system.

Chapter 5, “Performance as Communication: Ethnic Performance as Civic Critique,” recognizes that attempts to change social relations and systems of valuation must begin with communication of those hopes and desires. I use theories of performance and communication to describe how these groups attempt to pass messages about the minority community and its relation with society to both members of that community and the French nation more generally. The Pied-Noir and North African MCA have very different approaches to communication. North Africans enact their membership in the nation, at times in an explicitly pedagogic way, while emphasizing cultural differences as compatible with such membership. Pied-Noir, on the other hand, reference and re-create a symbolic landscape representing French Algeria that serves to reinforce group cohesion and underlines their historical differences from the Metropolitan French that they wish recognized. In this process, both groups minimize other differences that would detract from their primary message.

The role of history, particularly for the Pied-Noir community, has been emphasized in previous chapters. In Chapter 6, “History as the Handmaiden of Ideology,” I place these discussions of minority history in the context of contemporary debates on colonial and post-colonial history, the politicization of history by the last two presidents of France, and the French historiographical tradition. I argue that the MCAs negotiate the dissonances in these theories of historical production and its application to the French nation to create and maintain minority

cultural cohesion *within* the nation. At the same time they militate for the modification of national history to include their perspectives and contributions to the nation, both of which are promoted as having benefits to the minority population *and* France as a whole.

Chapter 7 “ Conclusion,” is the final chapter in the dissertation. In this chapter I pull together topics and discussions from the five thematic chapters into a consideration of the place of the contemporary Pied-Noir and North African minorities in France and what this means for the role of civil society in a multicultural, democratic nation. I end with directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2: A HISTORY OF FRENCH COLONIAL NORTH AFRICA AND POSTCOLONIAL FRANCE

Introduction

To understand present historical arguments and debate, and therefore contemporary social relations in France, it is necessary to have a basic knowledge of the French colonial period in North Africa and the demographic and social changes that occurred in the Metropole from 1830 until the present. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of colonization in North Africa, de-colonization, North African labor immigration to France, and the highlights of minority relations from the 1970s until 2011. Although my research includes communities from all three Maghrebi countries, the relationship between France and Algeria directly concerns the majority of the individuals studied and is particularly important for understanding contemporary relations with the region as a whole. As such, Algeria and its history will receive the most attention. The task of writing a history of the Algerian War is complicated by the fact that the majority of the official archives from this period remain closed while the secondary literature is overwhelmingly abundant. The history I present is drawn from the work of historians, contemporary accounts, oral histories, and newspapers. The result is an historical overview through an anthropological lens.

The history of the colonial period in Algeria and, to a lesser extent, post-colonial relations up to the present day is ardently contested. This is one source of tension between contemporary Metropolitan French, Pied-Noir, and North African communities and their descendants, as I

discuss in Chapter 6. Each group and sub-group has generated its own narrative of this past. At times these histories appear contradictory and confusing, or bear little resemblance to those told by other communities, leading one to believe these groups inhabited entirely different worlds or experienced different pasts, rather than a shared history of Algeria and colonial France.³ These disagreements lead Benjamin Stora to refer to the situation as “*la guerre des mémoires*,” or the war of memories (Stora 2007). In the remainder of this chapter, I present a historical overview of French North Africa, the North African independence movements, and post-colonial France and North Africa.

The French Colonial Period in North Africa 1830-1962

Pre-Colonial North Africa

North Africa has long been a crossroads for Mediterranean trade, at least since the Phoenicians built trading outposts there 1100 BCE. Islamic conquests in the sixth century brought Arabic and Islam to the “indigenous” Berber populations. Islamic expansion continued into Iberia, where a multi-religious, multi-racial, and multi-ethnic society existed until the end of the *Reconquista* in 1492. The North African region was home to widespread cultural mixing and hybridity, as is underscored in the work of Julia Clancy-Smith (e.g., 2011a; 2001). As only one example, both Jewish and Muslim practice was influenced by pre-existing local beliefs, creating regionally specific sets of practices (Chouraqui 1968; Park and Boum 2006), though the area

³ This is a common situation for groups created out of formative events. For more discussion see Irwin-Zarecka 2008.

maintained connection and exchange with the greater Islamic world through *hajj* pilgrimages (El-Mansour n.d.) and Mediterranean, European, and Mashriqi trade.

By the eve of the colonial period, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli were the seats of Ottoman Regencies, and Morocco was ruled by a hereditary dynasty. The Regencies were under the rule of Turkish or Arabized *deys* and *beys*, or regents. These rulers would subcontract control of territories surrounding their capital cities to local notables in return for a percentage of the taxes and conscription of men for troops (Bennoune 1988:2; Panzac 2005:295). The regents themselves returned a portion of the taxes collected in tribute to the Sublime Porte in Istanbul. Their degrees of connection to the Ottoman hierarchy varied by regency and over time. The *beylic* of Tunis, for example, evolved into an Arabized hereditary dynasty – the Husaynids (1705-1956) – that endured for two and a half centuries. The Husaynids maintained a certain independence by frequently offering gifts to Istanbul, while the Regency of Algiers remained much closer ties to the Ottoman Sultan (Clancy-Smith 2011a; Panzac 2005).

The capital cities of the regencies were cosmopolitan, with residents a mix of ethnicities, religions, nationalities, and languages. In Algiers until the 19th century, the population was composed of Muslim Arabs, Berbers, and Turcs, including Iberian Jews and Muslims who had fled the Spanish *Reconquista*; Jews, both indigenous and European; Christians who were primarily foreign diplomats, traders, or had been brought as captives of the corsairs; and slaves or former slaves from both Eastern Europe/Western Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Kaddache 1998:205-210; El-Mansour n.d.). Residents spoke Arabic, Turkish, Berber, French, and Spanish (Chaillou, quoted in Kaddache 1998:201), and the first American representative sent to negotiate

with the Algerian Dey was ridiculed for speaking only English (Dupuy 2002:43). In Tunis, Arab and Berber Muslims and Jews were ruled by the Ottoman elite with origins in the eastern Mediterranean and farther east, and were joined by descendants of black African slaves and European expatriates. A wide variety of languages was spoken, with Barbary Italian serving as a *lingua franca* until it was later replaced by French (Clancy-Smith 2011a). There was no indigenous Christian minority, and the European population was composed of slaves and captives and, over the course of the early 1800s, free merchants, traders, and diplomats, the latter under the jurisdiction of European councils (Clancy-Smith 2011a). Tunis' central location in the Mediterranean trading routes, as well as its proximity to Malta and Sicily, encouraged regular migration and a mixing of populations, making it the most cosmopolitan of the Maghrebi cities (El-Mansour n.d.). In all of these areas some captives, slaves, and travelers converted to Islam and inter-married with the local populations (El-Mansour n.d.). North African Jews lived as dhimmis, protected minorities, although subject to restrictions, regulations, and taxes (Chouraqui 1968).

The populations of the regencies and Morocco were predominantly rural. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, for example, 90 percent of the population of the Regency of Algiers was rural and composed of mountainous villagers or tribes who pledged varying degrees of allegiance to the dey, with taxes being correspondingly difficult to collect (Kaddache 1998:181). Urban economies were based to different extents on privateering⁴, long-distance maritime trade, and tax revenue from markets and city gates (el-Kodsy 1970:11; Panzac 2005).

⁴ Privateering was widely practiced by both Christian and Islamic powers in the Mediterranean at this time. (Panzac 2005)

In rural areas, the economy was primarily dependent on agriculture, horticulture, and animal husbandry, with regions specializing in certain products (Bennoune 1988:23). Residents of the pre-Sahara were pastoral nomads who were instrumental in local and long-distance trade routes (Clancy-Smith 1994:18-19). Other than the nomads, there were three classes of people in rural areas: large land or livestock owners (often absentee), small peasant landowners, and landless, impoverished peasants (sharecroppers) (Bennoune 1973:12; Kaddache 1998:186-187; Valensi 1969:34). The most important manufactured trade goods were carpets and other woven textiles (Clancy-Smith 1994:17). These societies were patriarchal, the elite practiced polygamy and seclusion of women, though these practices were too costly for rural or lower-class families (Clancy-Smith 2011a; Pennell 2003).

The nineteenth century saw a decline in political and economic stability in the region. For example, in Algiers, between 1808 and 1817 four *deys* were assassinated or put to death, among numerous failed assassination plots (Kaddache 1998:106; Panzac 2005:294) and, in 1805, Janissaries engaged in a pogrom against the Jews of Algiers (Kaddache 1998:106). By the 1830s the European capitalist nations and, to a much lesser extent, the United States, had increasing control over the Mediterranean and forcibly limited privateering in favor of their own merchant trading while excluding North African traders from participating in commerce (Bennoune 1988:27; Panzac 2005 261-2). Privateering and the capture of Christian slaves also served as a pretext for European military involvement in North Africa, such as Lord Exmouth's blockade and bombardment of Algiers in 1816 to free slaves (Clancy-Smith 2009). Frequent bad harvests between 1798 and 1820 led to food shortages and civil unrest (Panzac 2005:307-308). Plagues

hit North Africa in 1792-1801 and 1816-1821 and, though the death tolls are impossible to determine, percentages are thought to be considerable, particularly in Tunisia (Panzac 2005; Clancy-Smith 2011a). Political concessions made to European powers increasingly privileged foreign interests, and governments slowly fell into debt with European banks (Clancy-Smith 2011a). In part as a result of these economic and demographic troubles, in the early 1800s the *deys* increased the taxes on those indigenous residents within their spheres of influence, causing conflict and revolt (Clancy-Smith 1994:65, 67-9; El-Mansour n.d.).

Politically, pre-colonial Morocco looked rather different. Its position at the extreme edge of North Africa near Iberia created its position as a frontier zone. This position was used by elites in their unification and maintenance of power in the face of the Christian enemy (Bennison 2001), but also allowed for cultural and political exchanges and cooperation with the Christian powers and, in particular, Iberian Jews who relocated to Morocco during the *Reconquista* (El-Mansour n.d.). Morocco has been governed by a series of Islamic states since AD 787 (Park and Boum 2006). Although much of contemporary Morocco had been under centralized rule since that time, allegiance of the tribal populations outside central areas has always varied. Never conquered by the Ottomans, and successfully resisting Spanish and Portuguese imperialism, Moroccan kings maintained control and had begun a program of modernization and reform by the early 1900s (Park and Boum 2006; El-Mansour n.d.).⁵ These reforms were cut short, however, when the state was no longer able to resist European expansion and financial collapse as well as internal, religious opposition.

⁵ The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are notable remnants/markers of Spanish imperial aspirations.

Colonial Tunisia (1881-1956) and Colonial Morocco (1912-1956)

In 1881 France invaded Tunisia from Algeria. French interest in Tunisia was partially focused on preventing the *bey* from assisting Algerian revolts and therefore to protect the territory as well as for the financial and geo-political benefits, specifically to block Italian interests in the area (Clancy-Smith 1994:258). Using a tribal raid into Algerian territory as an excuse, the French occupied the capital in 1881 and imposed a treaty on the ruler allowing a military occupation. A full protectorate was instated in 1883, though the *bey* kept his status as ruler of the Muslim population and separate courts were organized (Clancy-Smith 2011b). French colonial offices were installed in the Medina, the traditional seat of Ottoman power (Clancy-Smith 2011b). French settlers had to buy land and their numbers remained relatively small, smaller than Italians until 1930 (Clancy-Smith 2011b). Cheap manufactured goods pushed out traditional Tunisian artisans, and the sale of common lands to French settlers disrupted traditional agricultural practices. This led to rural-to-urban migrations and social unrest, as well as to migration to work in European factories, particularly during WWI (Clancy-Smith 2012). While there were initial revolts and uprisings in the south, the political elites and notables of Tunis did not at first oppose the French presence, and others saw the protectorate as an opportunity for modernization; many at first did not openly oppose the French presence but practiced withdrawal and avoidance (Clancy-Smith 2012).

The early 1900s saw increased nationalist demands, and the independence movement began in earnest in the 1930s under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba (Clancy-Smith 2011b).

The independence movement developed into demonstrations, strikes, and armed attacks, and the French agreed to a transfer of power in 1955, recognizing Tunisia's independence in 1956 (Perkins 2004:118-129). By independence the Neo-Dustur, the leading political party, had sidelined or ousted competing political groups (Perkins 2004:128-9). Following independence, Habib Bourguiba, the party leader and president, organized elections to maximize party control, enlisted French assistance to eliminate armed supporters of his main political rival, and by the declaration of the Tunisian Republic in 1957 and the constitution in 1959 had concentrated the vast majority of state power in his office (Perkins 2004:130-3).

Colonial history of Morocco differs from that of Tunisia and Algeria due to its brevity and the nature of the European presence. In 1912 the sultan was forced to sign a treaty with France establishing a protectorate (Pennell 2003). Under French colonial jurisdiction, the Sultan kept his post and nominal sovereignty. The French had an explicitly hands-off approach to Moroccan life and culture, building separate cities for European settlers, trying not to disturb cultural, political, and religious customs and systems, even preventing incipient indigenous social changes and modernization (Pennell 2003:141, 149). The new rulers endeavored to socially and politically separate the Berber and Arab populations by dividing them into separate judicial systems, but without great success (Pennell 2003:141-142). The colonial economy centered on state-run extractive mining and economic modernization, industrial agriculture for export, and Moroccan agriculture for local consumption (Pennell 2003:148-9). The economic downturn of 1929 and droughts in the 1930s lead to economic hardship, primarily for the Moroccans who were not protected by French preferential treatment, as were the *colons* (Pennell

2003:148-9). Beginning in the 1920s *bidonvilles* or shantytowns grew around the cities and lasted until the end of the protectorate (Pennell 2003: 149-50).

Morocco is distinctive in North Africa in that the same ruling family maintained power before, during and after the colonial period (Bazzaz 2010). Though colonial rule began in 1912, and France had conquered the parts of Morocco they considered useful or strategically important by 1923, leaving less profitable or more remote locations under local control until 1934 (Pennell 2003:142-7). During French rule, there was continued official or unofficial resistance to the colonial presence. In 1930 a pro-independence movement, the Zawiya, was founded (Pennell 2003:151). The Istiqlal (independence) Party was founded in 1944, and proposed an independent, constitutional monarchy, to French refusal (Pennell 2003: 158). Nationalist sentiment grew after the war, fueled by French practices that were explicitly pro-colon, to the detriment of Moroccans (Pennell 2003:160). Protests escalated into violence on both sides. The king was exiled by the French between August 1953 and November 1955 (Pennell 2003: 160-1). His reinstatement was a prelude to Moroccan independence on March 2, 1956.

Following independence, Morocco established a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament holding limited powers (Park and Boum 2006). The new state underwent a decade of political uncertainty during which the Istiqlal party and the King struggled for executive power (Pennell 2003:164-8). The King maintained protectorate economic strategies, further destabilizing the traditional rural economy and encouraging emigration to the cities, where shanty towns spread, and then to Europe (Pennell 2003:168). Despite two attempted coups on Hassan II in 1971 and 1972, transfer of royal power has occurred smoothly since independence.

At Mohammed V's death in 1961 he was replaced by his son, King Hassan II, who was in turn succeeded by his son Mohammed VI in 1999. In general, though faced with great economic and social challenges, Morocco has had by far the most stable post-independence political regime of the three North African countries, and has entered into a period of increased openness and modernization with the ascension of Mohammed VI to power.

Early Colonial Algeria: Resistance and the Process of Colonization: 1830-1871

The French military occupied the city of Algiers on July 5, 1830, allegedly to punish the *dey* for insulting the French consul and striking him with a flyswatter in 1827 (Ruedy 2005), thus beginning French colonization of North Africa. This occurred during a period of European expansion and French political desire to create distractions from domestic troubles (Ageron 1991), and was one in a series of military offensives against North African rulers. There was a widespread expectation that the Ottomans would provide military assistance to the *dey* against the French, but the French navy prevented this (Clancy-Smith 1994:76). The French invasion was resisted by local tribes and the Turkish rulers, with varying attempts at agreement and collaboration (Bennoune 1988:21; Ruedy 2005).

When France took control of Algiers in 1830 it disrupted the existing networks of power across the *Dey's* sphere of influence but France was unable to assert its dominance over the area for some time. France attempted to replicate Turkish forms of colonial organization and subcontract the duties of rule to local notables (Clancy-Smith 1994; Establet 1991). France lacked a clear, coherent policy or understanding of local situations (Schreier, in press) and the

resolve to maintain and control its new possessions. This encouraged revolts and unrest in areas that were no longer (and not yet) under colonial control (Clancy-Smith 1994:71). For example, Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir (al-Kadir) declared jihad in Oran in 1832 from whence he continued to challenge and harass the French until his surrender in 1847 (Clancy-Smith 1994:71, 88; Danzinger 1977). While this revolt was ultimately against French rule, al-Qadir also took pains to eliminate any potential rivals (Clancy-Smith 1994:257). Revolts, however, were only part of the story, and other Algerian notables engaged in a wide array of activities from resistance to negotiation and tacit agreement (Clancy-Smith 1994). Algeria was declared part of France in 1848, though revolts continued and pacification was not complete until 1871 with the end of Shaykh al-Haddad’s revolt in Kabylia (Clancy-Smith 1994:89, 260).

During this time, France began settling Europeans in Algeria. This was one of the main objectives for the colony, which was intended as a penal colony for the metropole, a source of raw materials, and a market for industrial goods (Bennoune 1988:35; Clancy-Smith 2011a; Prochaska 1990:114-115). At conquest the French seized properties from the Ottoman Turks and purchased additional lands at low prices or occupied them outright (Bennoune 1988:43). This land could then be distributed to the military and then European settlers beginning in the 1840s, with increases after the 1848 revolution and after the loss of Alsace-Lorraine (Smith 2006:72). These individuals came from all around southern Europe. Unfortunately for them, life was very difficult and they suffered high mortality rates and, for those who were not French by birth, outright discrimination (Prochaska 1990:135; Smith 2006:73-4, 78). These economic and demographic changes disrupted or destroyed pre-1830 economic structures and caused flight of

local elites; by World War II the colony had been reorganized into a settler-run capitalist economy designed to extract and export raw materials to the metropole (Bennoune 1988:3-4; Smith 2006:72).

Mid-Colonial Algeria: Governing the Colony

Significantly, Algeria was ruled by the French military until 1870 when pacification was complete and the settler population was deemed large enough to support civilian rule (Prochaska 1990:137-138). As part of the pacification the French government selected local notables to act as intermediaries under the title of *caïds* and *cheïks* (Establet 1991). With the extension of military control and the installation of a modern government over indigenous social patterns this intermediary bureaucracy multiplied to oversee the artificial division of the local population into “tribus,” “ferqas,” and “douars” to enable their organization and control (Establet 1991). The real power lay in the creation of *Bureaux Arabes* and *Communes de Plein Exercice* which represented, respectively, areas ruled under colonial administration and areas ruled under French law (Ruedy 2005:72-3). The legal differences were significant. For example, beginning in 1865, indigenous Algerians desiring to become French citizens had to renounce their adherence to Islamic law (Roblès 2000:xiv). The *Code de l’Indigénat*, a series of laws enacted in the 1870s, imposed additional restrictions on Muslims in Algeria (Ruedy 2005:89-90). For example, Algerians without French citizenship could not move around Algeria without special papers until 1914 (Stora 1992:15). The French also treated Kabyle Berbers and Arabs differently, believing

that Kabyles could be ‘civilized’ and converted more easily, and privileging that population (Silverstein 2004).

In the face of the French reluctance to emigrate, the French government sought an uncontrolled immigration from non-French communities. In 1870 the *Décret Cremieux* was passed granting French citizenship to Jews in Algeria (Chouraqui 1968). This was followed by the law of 1870 granting French citizenship to all residents of European origin (Smith 2006). Despite this, settler society remained strongly stratified by occupation, region, and religion (Prochaska 1990:153-178). Over the generations, social mobility within the European population increased, and the settlers began early on to develop a common, distinct culture (Smith 2006:95; Prochaska 1990:206). By the early 1900s the settlers had developed a sense of being a people apart, from both the indigenous populations and the “effeminate” French (Clancy-Smith 2011c). However, there remained very little intermarriage among the three religious communities (Prochaska 1990:207).

Economically, Algeria was organized for extraction of mineral and agricultural resources. Mines, farms, harbors, and railroads were constructed to facilitate the movement of raw materials to metropolitan France for the economic benefit of European companies (Prochaska 1990:98). Export crops, such as wine, were favored. This disturbed local economic practices and led to local food insecurity as small cultivators lost their livelihood and migrated to cities (Clancy-Smith 2011c). Some then migrated to France as wage-labor, including as strike-breakers to Marseilles factories in 1905 (Clancy-Smith 2012c). As an explicit policy, there was only very limited development of industry, much taking place during the Second World War, but

agriculture was heavily subsidized, notably for viticulture (Clancy-Smith 2011c; Bennoune 1988:4). Urban areas relied on commerce rather than industry, organizing the export of raw materials to the Metropole and the importation of industrial goods (Prochaska 1990:115).

Late Colonial Algeria: World Wars and Nationalism

In the early 1900s, a number of French-educated Algerians formed the *Jeune Algérien* movement, and called for increased assimilation into France (Prochaska 1990:232). This movement was short lived. The First World War sent many Muslim men outside North Africa for the first time, an experience that changed the way they understood and saw their treatment under French colonial rule. Between 1914 and 1918 over 130,000 North Africans were brought to France to work, and between 1915 and 1918 and 170,000 Algerians, 50,000 Tunisians, and 34,000 Moroccans were mobilized (Clancy-Smith 2012; Stora1992:14). This relocation *en masse* to France, for those who served, encouraged these North Africans to form a “conscience nationale” as Algerians (Stora1992:23). This development of a national conscience among North Africans lead to the formation of *L’Etoile nord-africain*, the first pro-independence North African association, in Paris in 1926 (Stora1992:25-6). Although dissolved in 1929, it marked the beginnings of organized pro-independence activities (Stora 1992:28).

In the inter-war period, French and Algerian intellectuals continued to demand increased civic and political rights for the indigenous Algerians. This included the negritude movement of Léopold Senghor and Aimé Césaire, which called for an end to anti-African racism and a re-valuation of African roots (Müller 1996). In 1939 Albert Camus, himself born in Algeria,

insisted that “administrative emancipation” was necessary for the indigenous populations, accompanied with an improvement in living conditions (Schalk 1991:63). Though a number of legal reforms were debated and proposed, all were blocked by settler and metropolitan interests in keeping the indigenous Algerians disenfranchised (Prochaska 1990:236-237).

World War II saw an Anglo-American military occupation of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and it was from North Africa that de Gaulle launched his liberation of France. North Africans’ experience of serving in the war, watching the French fall to the Nazis, and participating in her liberation served to foster reconceptualizations of the colonial system. Between WWII and the Algerian War there were a number of nationalist organizations and movements, including political organizations and a paramilitary group (Roblès 2000:xiv-xv). The year 1944 saw the creation of two new Algerian nationalist groups (Roblès 2000:xiv).

On May 8, 1945, the same day that the end of WWII was celebrated, a march of indigenous Algerians displaying Algerian independence flags in Sétif, Algeria, turned violent. It is unclear who began the violence, but before the end of the day both marchers and European onlookers were dead. In the days that followed, settlers carried out reprisals in the countryside, adding significantly to the death toll (Pervillé 2007; Vétillard 2008). This harsh repression drove the nationalist movement underground, and life appeared to return, almost, to normal. Following the reciprocal massacres at Sétif, European Algerians began to move out of the countryside and into the cities (Mercier 2003:36).

The Algerian War

On November 1, 1954, known as the *Toussaint Rouge*, the Front de Libération Nationale made itself known to the world with coordinated bombings and attacks around Algeria. These attacks resulted in eight deaths (Miguel 1993:137, 139) and marked the beginning of the Algerian War, which lasted until 1962. In 1954, only 10% of the population of Algeria was made up of Europeans (Mercier 2003:43). Between 1955 and 1962 two million soldiers were sent to Algeria (Mercier 2003:43). They faced a force of active combatants that reached its maximum of sixty thousand in 1958 (Pervillé 2007:65). Both sides, and especially the civilian population, suffered heavy losses.

The FLN was supported by its armed branch, the *Armée de Libération Nationale* (ALN), and called for an independent, Islamic Algerian state that respected “basic liberties” of all races and religions (Roblès 2000:xvi). This was countered by the more moderate *Mouvement National Algérien* (MNA) formed by Messali Hadj in 1954 (Roblès 2000:xvi). These two groups fought each other as well as the French military.

The French government ruled out the possibility of negotiations, hoping to use a combination of force, development, and reform to eliminate the uprising and return to calm as quickly as possible (Mercier 2003:9; Miguel 1993:151). Reforms included an improvement of conditions of Algerian workers in France, infrastructural development in Algeria, and an extension of political rights and possibilities to Algerians with the hope of eventual full civic integration (Pervillé 2007:43-45). A number of laws were proposed or discussed during the war that could have led to true civic integration or a federal system with significant Algerian

autonomy, and thus could have potentially ended hostilities and kept Algeria French, but they were all defeated (Roblès 2000:xix). Harsh reprisals from the French military contributed to the strength of the rebellion as moderate Muslims lost faith in the possibility of continued cooperation (Roblès 2000:xvii). The rebellion spread across the colony, taking the form of a religious combat whose proponents recruited new members and exacted brutal punishment on any dissenters in Algeria or France (Pervillé 2007:45). Terrorist acts were also committed against the French administration and civilians. In response, the French military presence in Algeria was greatly expanded and continued its violent repression of rebels (Pervillé 2007:53).

In late 1956 the FLN increased its violent activity in Algiers, targeting French civilians and beginning the Battle of Algiers (Pervillé 2007:56). In early 1957, the FLN leaders called a general strike starting on January 28th to prove its power to the UN (Pervillé 2007:59). The French Army broke the strike in two days and by October 1957 destroyed the FLN network in the area through the use of force, torture, manipulation, and control of the population (Pervillé 2007:59-60; Roblès 2000:xx). Following the 1957 publication of Henri Alleg's *La Question*, in which he describes being tortured by the French military, serious critiques were raised and political support for Algerian independence increased in the Metropole (Roblès 2000:xxii; Pervillé 2007:62-3).

Since the beginning of the conflict, the French government was increasingly unstable until April 15, 1958, when France's 4th Republic fell, leaving the country without a government until May (Pervillé 2007:66). Faced with continued instability, political support shifted increasingly in favor of Charles de Gaulle, the head of the French Free Forces during WWII. The

general took over the government as prime minister and created the Fifth Republic (Dard 2005:35). Although the Metropole was content with their new head of state, Algeria was not. Many proponents of French Algeria were certain that the accession of Charles de Gaulle instigated the loss of Algeria (Dard 2005:35-6). The FLN also disapproved of his appointment, refused to negotiate with the new president, and increased its military actions (Pervillé 2007:74-5).

One of de Gaulle's first actions was to convene a national referendum on the constitution of the 5th Republic and the Algerian question. In September 28, 1958 the French voted in favor of de Gaulle and the constitution, and Muslim Algerians voted in favor of French Algeria (Pervillé 2007:76). De Gaulle became President of the 5th Republic in January of 1959 (Roblès 2000:xxiii). In order to begin incorporating Algeria into France and quell the rebellion, de Gaulle announced his "Plan Constantine." This included a 5-year development plan and expanded political rights and representation for Muslim Algerians (Ruedy 2005). At the same time, de Gaulle reduced the power of the military in Algeria and transferred many of the pro-French Algeria officers to other places (Pervillé 2007:78-9). The re-configured military began an offensive against the remaining rebels. This included reinforcing Algeria's borders, recruiting former rebels to track and eliminate rebels (Pervillé 2007:80). They were successful and reduced the rebel forces and violence; however, Europeans and Muslims alike migrated towards cities and away from the under-served and under-protected countryside (Miguel 1993:436, 439).

Despite the progress made by the Constantine Plan, on 16 September 1959 de Gaulle made an abrupt about-face and announced in no uncertain terms that he was in favor of Algerian independence (Mercier 2003:10). In previous announcements, de Gaulle had supported the

maintenance of Algeria as part of France, in one form or another (Connelly 2002:177-180). Considering the gains made by the French armed forces in reducing and demoralizing the rebels, this was not an easy decision, and was based more on France's foreign policy goals than goals internal to the Algerian situation (Connelly 2002:206-7). In June of 1960 de Gaulle took the next step and began negotiations with the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA), but the conference did not produce an agreement (Roblès 2000:xxiv). The news that de Gaulle was in favor of independence was primarily welcomed in metropolitan France (Pervillé 2007:86-7), but Europeans in Algeria felt abandoned and betrayed by the president, and the army was unhappy with de Gaulle's decision.

At this time, existing pro-Algérie Française groups grew and organized in response to de Gaulle's decision. The two most famous examples of this were the *Putsch des Généraux*, a military coup, and the *Organisation de l'Armée Secrète* (OAS). On April 21 and 22, 1961, four generals in Algiers attempted a military coup in the name of *l'Algérie française*. Although they had some initial support from the Army, the majority of the armed forces remained loyal to the state and the coup failed (Dard 2005:66; Mercier 2003:45).

The OAS was founded in January 1961, by a group of military and civilians committed to pursuing both violent and non-violent actions with the goal of keeping Algeria French (Dard 2005:74, 64). The failure of the generals' coup increased the draw of the nascent OAS, particularly since some of the coup's organizers and pre-existing pro-French Algeria groups joined the organization (Dard 2005:77; Deroulede 1997:130). Strategies of the OAS included torture, bombings, assassinations, and non-violent actions including distribution of tracts, pirate

radio stations, protests and propaganda (Mercier 2003:45). OAS actions were directed against French citizens as well as Muslims, with targets and directives changing over time. Among other actions, in January of 1962 the OAS announced that Europeans were not allowed to leave Algeria without OAS approval, and reinforced their threat with bombings and assassinations (*La Croix* January 20, 1962, cited in Mercier 2003:53).

To hide their imminent departure from the OAS, French citizens who wished to depart continued living as normal, leaving suddenly with no attempt to sell their belongings or make their goodbyes (Mercier 2003:54). The French Army, security forces, and FLN led a variety of campaigns to eliminate or neutralize the OAS. Members or supposed members could face imprisonment, death, or torture. One of the more well-known of the French security forces' anti-OAS actions was the blockade of Bab-el-Oued, a working-class neighborhood. In general, the OAS was not successful at maintaining Algeria as part of France, and had for its outcome a significant number of dead and wounded, and an increase in tensions and antipathy between the native and European populations that almost certainly increased the numbers of Pied-Noir who fled to France (Deroulede 1997:329-330; Mercier 2003:46-47). In addition, the OAS reduced the quality of life of those citizens who did leave by making it impossible for them to prepare for their departure.

From the beginning, the hostilities had traversed the Mediterranean and found their way to the metropole. Both the OAS and the FLN engaged in support and terrorist activities in France. The FLN gathered money, primarily from Algerian workers (Hamon and Rotman 1979:140), though at times under duress (Schalk 1991:34-35), and began its terrorist operations

on the night of August 25, 1958 (Hamon and Rotman 1979:111). Also, Algerians in France protested their treatment under new restrictions, including a curfew. On October 17, 1961 one such procession of between 20 and 30 thousand was disrupted by police, leading to the deaths of between 140-300 Algerians, 11,538 arrests, and an unknown number of injured and missing (Hamon and Rotman 1979:370-371; Stora 1992:306-310; Le Coeur Grandmaison 2001:8-9). The FLN in France was supported by academics, clergy, and the left, particularly communist youth, and had a policy of recruiting women, who were less likely to be suspected by security forces (Fouilloux 1991; Hamon and Rotman 1979:213,195-7; Pervillé 2007:93). These “porteurs des valises” carried suitcases full of money out of France to the FLN’s Swiss bank account and hid or transported letters, arms, or pro-FLN Algerians (Hamon and Rotman 1979:149, 11). The OAS also had a branch in metropolitan France, though it was not highly active and generally considered a “disaster,” in part because it became identified with fascists in a France still traumatized by WWII (Déroutède 1997:257-258). With the outbreak of hostilities in the metropole, a staunch opposition to the war developed. This culminated in the April 1962 vote in favor of Algerian independence (Shepard 2006:94-95). Additionally, in protest of the war, some conscripts deserted the army or delayed leaving taking up their posts as long as possible, and there were violent demonstrations such as in Grenoble in 1956 (Hamon and Rotman 1979:230-231, 15; Mattéi 2002; Sirkidji 2002). In addition to those who aided the FLN directly, other academics, prominent Catholics, and artists, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and the signers of the “Manifeste de 121,” defended the right of the Algerians to take up arms, and still others loudly protested the war (Fouilloux 1991; Granjon 1991; Schalk 1991). Camus, after taking a strong

position against Algerian independence, withdrew from political commentary (Le Sueur 2001:87-9). No social group was unified in its position on the conflict, and families themselves were divided in bitter debates.

A cease-fire was signed between the GPRA and the French government on 18 March 1962 and publically announced on the 19th. Called the Accords d'Evian, this document provided for the creation of two separate geo-political entities, a transition of power over Algeria to the GPRA, the right of all residents in Algeria to choose their nationality, and protections for indigenous Algerians serving in the French Army (Shepard 2006:107, 111). The accords included provisions for FdA to remain in Algeria. This was considered a key to the country's continued ability to function, as FdA occupied many important posts, including 82% of government positions, and a large majority of jobs in industrial and commercial enterprises (Harbi 1980:323).

Unfortunately for all the residents of Algeria, hostilities did not end with the peace treaty, nor were all provisions upheld. The Algerian independents continued their violence as did the OAS and the French security forces, making this cease fire anything but. One of the more dramatic events occurred on at the Rue d'Isly, Algiers, on 26 March 1962 when the French Army opened fire on a peaceful demonstration against the anti-OAS military blockade of the Bab-el-Oued neighborhood, killing French civilians. There is great variation in the numbers of reported dead, from 46 (Miguel 1993: 502), to 54 dead and 140 injured (Déroulède 1997:227), 80 dead and 200 wounded among the civilians (Dard 2005:219-20), and even, 100 dead and 200 injured (Descaves 2007:111). There were either no military casualties or injuries (Mercier 2003:47-48)

or 10 dead among the military (Dard 2005:220). Despite the fact that the event consisted of the Army firing on unarmed French civilians, only two French newspapers, *la Croix* and *Paris-Match*, mentioned the incident, and neither treated it as a particularly significant event (Mercier 2003:48). At this point the French residents in Algeria lost faith in the Army (Mercier 2003:48). This added to the climate of fear and unease, and many FdA reconsidered leaving indefinitely for France. Although a second peace treaty was announced between the OAS and the FLN on June 17th, it was not fully supported by the GPRA and did little to reassure either population (Harbi 1980:347; Shepard 2006).

One climax of inter-community violence occurred in Oran on July 5, 1962, the day of Algerian Independence. As the new government took control in Algiers, armed groups of Algerians shot and attacked Europeans in Oran with 95 French citizens killed and 163 wounded while the French army waited hours to intervene (Mercier 2003:48; Miguel 1993:507). This illustration of Algerian hostility and the lack of support by the French army convinced the Europeans remaining in Oran to flee.

The Algerian War was notable in its brutality because, as a civil war, it pitted neighbors, friends, and family members against one another. The violence occurred largely in Algeria and not metropolitan France, but people on both sides of the Mediterranean engaged in ideological battles surrounding colonization, decolonization, governance, the right to French citizenship, torture, and what it means to be French (Shepard 2006). Between 1954 and 1962 France lost Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, as well as the vast majority of its colonial empire, thus dramatically re-defining the country and its place in the world. What is also striking, as I discuss

in Chapter 6, is the widespread desire in Metropolitan France to simply forget the whole affair while the groups involved each maintain their own, separate memories (Derderian 2002; Favell 1998:59; Ferro 2005; Stora 1991, 1997). As we shall see below, these group-specific memories had varying impacts on the populations that served as living reminders of this period.

Harkis

The group that was arguably the most harmed by the French policies during decolonization and the desire to forget afterwards was the Harkis. As discussed above, the French armed forces had included colonial troops since the beginning of colonization (Ageron 2009:187). During the Algerian War, the French army recruited additional North Africans to assist in combat against the FLN (Ageron 2009). Their motivations for enlisting were diverse (Hamoumou 1993). The term *harki* is derived from an Arabic designation for a category of troops. By the end of the war, the term *harki* was used in popular speech to designate all Muslims who supported France during the Algerian war, including those engaged in the military and civilians working for French Algeria either directly through an elected position or otherwise (Jordi 1993:171). Following the Evian Accords, civilians were often repatriated to Metropolitan France, yet the military was ordered to discharge, disarm, and not repatriate its indigenous soldiers and their families, leaving them unprotected (Jordi 1993:171-2). As such, they fell prey to retaliations and massacres beginning the day after the Accords. Although the numbers are very uncertain, estimations of harkis killed in reprisals after Algerian independence vary between 10,000 and 150,000 (Miguel 1993:508; Shepard 2006:233). Official relocation to France for

harkis who requested it was only guaranteed by the French military for a short period starting in September 1962 (Jordi 1993:172; Shepard 2006:232), though some officers managed to bring harkis to France unofficially (Hamoumou 1993). The majority who were moved to France were treated not as French citizens or veterans, but as refugees (Shepard 2006:234-5). They were housed in tent camps and many were offered employment as foresters and moved to constructed encampments isolated in the middle of the forests they were protecting, some of which had been Vichy internment camps (Hamoumou 1993; Jordi and Hamoumou 1999:95). These situations were planned to last two years, but by 1975 there had been no change (Jordi and Hamoumou 1999). In that year youth in the camps revolted, demanding change, and solutions were found to relocate the families and integrate them into populated areas (Jordi and Hamoumou 1999), and measures were finally taken to close the camps, but this did not happen immediately.

The End of Colonization, Repatriations from the Colonies: 1956-1964

Between 1954 and 1964 more than 1.5 million people were repatriated from French colonies and protectorates (Jordi 1993:33), putting the state's ability to welcome and integrate these new residents to the test. By the time the North African holdings gained independence, France had already undergone similar upheavals in Indochina and Suez (Jordi 1993:19, 23). However, in both of these cases the small numbers of individuals returning to France, the relatively short time they had spent in the colonies, and the existence of state assistance allowed for their relatively easy assimilation into the metropole.

The repatriations from North Africa were rather different. At Moroccan independence around 265,000 French citizens were repatriated. Their integration was relatively straightforward and they remained for the most part independent of state assistance. In total, around 190,000 people were repatriated from Tunisia, and most made use of government aid (Jordi 1993:25). These populations differed for a number of reasons. French citizens in Morocco tended to be relatively better off than their counterparts in Tunisia and thus were more capable of financing their own relocation (Jordi 1993:24). French citizens in Morocco were 85% of French origin, compared to 10% and 5% of Spanish and Italian origin, respectively (Jordi 1993:24). In the Tunisian case, citizens of French origin were only 64% of the European population, with the balance primarily Italians (Jordi 1993:24). This provided some of these *rapatriés* with family contacts in France, further facilitating their adjustment and integration. Additionally, in the first years after independence in 1956, the numbers of French Moroccan migrants were small, growing each year until 1964. This provided subsequent waves of migration with additional points of contact, and greater ability to plan (Jordi 1993:24-5). For instance they created real-estate cooperatives to aid in their installation in France. Carnoux-en-Provence was founded by one such real-estate cooperative. The cooperative was founded in 1957 in Casablanca to offer its members a Plan B – a place to move if they eventually had to leave Morocco (Jordi 1993:119). Ground was broken in 1959 but Carnoux-en-Provence remained primarily a retirement and summer residence, only growing significantly after 1961 and the arrival of *rapatriés* from Algeria (Bouland 2000:1; Jordi 1993:119-120). Tunisian *rapatriés* returned with a very different rhythm: one third of all the repatriations occurred in 1957, with smaller numbers every year until

1964 (Jordi 1993:24). They had less time to plan their departure and fewer connections with *rapatriés* who had already moved to France.

Unlike the Moroccans repatriations, those from Tunisia underlined the inadequacy of the French system designed to welcome those from the colonies. They also forced the state to expand and alter its aid system, including more housing and transportation assistance, and providing information on where available jobs could be found (Jordi 1993:1931). This system was put under further strain beginning with the arrivals of Algerian *rapatriés* in 1961.⁶

When compared to the repatriations from Morocco and Tunisia, the *rapatriés* from Algeria were less prepared, less organized, and the conditions of their departure, voyage, and arrival in France were typically worse. This is due to the history of French Algeria as well as the conditions surrounding the departure. First, though this mass migration is often spoken of in terms of a “return” to France, many had never set foot in the metropole and had no connections there. While some had property in France or access to resources, many had all of their resources in Algeria (Mercier 2003:65-66). Many families did not arrive in France together, as some were split at the moment of departure. Others sent women and children to France first, with the men remaining in Algeria to try and sell possessions or assess the safety of a potential return, or men in the OAS left alone for Italy or Spain (Mercier 2003:95). This was a pattern I also noted in my interviews. It was difficult for separated families to find each other again (Mercier 2003:96).

Second, departures for France were increasingly unplanned and unorganized. Following the continuation of hostilities after the Evian Accords, the FdA fled both specific threats and

⁶ Until December of 1961 French citizens moving to the Metropole from Algeria were not legally considered rapatriés and did not have the right to government assistance (Jordi 1993 :32).

general insecurity, particularly by mid-April when OAS threats had lost credibility (Mercier 2003:85, 54). The ports and airports were overcrowded; hundreds of people waited in line for places on airplanes, often sleeping in their cars (Mercier 2003:58-9). The situation at the ports was even worse, with boats delayed for days and passengers held in areas without sufficient sanitary or sleeping arrangements (Mercier 2003:60). Also, fishermen brought back their families and friends, cargo boats were transformed into passenger boats, and the French Air Force for a short time offered military aircraft as passenger transportation (Mercier 2003:77-78). Conditions only improved in August 1962 (Mercier 2003:62).

Third, the Algerian *rapatriés* were economically disadvantaged compared to their Moroccan and Tunisian counterparts. In general, they were not wealthy and had fewer connections in France. In addition, they were not well off by any standards: 72% earned 15%-20% less than their compatriots in France (Mercier 2003:34). The deteriorating situation and OAS threats prevented long-term planning, and those who were able to sell their property did so for a pittance, abandoning or burning what they could not take with them (Mercier 2003:66; Miguel 1993:503). Those who were able to pay for a crate shipped by a moving company were often disappointed. Overwhelmed moving companies left crates in Algeria, which were pillaged by Algerians before departure or were dunked in the water by dock employees in Marseille on arrival as a political statement (Mercier 2003:63-4, 93-95). Without any connections in France, unable to sell their possessions, and with luggage limited to two suitcases per person, many of the arriving *rapatriés* had little money and possessed no more than what they could carry. Therefore, on their arrival in France they were in a much more precarious position than their

Moroccan or Tunisian counterparts and were much more reliant on the governmental structures (Jordi 1993: 32).

Fourth, in the Algerian case, the government significantly underestimated the number of people that would move to France. In early 1962 a maximum of 120,000 repatriations per year over four years with a maximum of 400,000 repatriations was expected. Government agencies were designed to function based on that number (Jordi 1993: 31; Mercier 2003:123). Yet the calculations were quite wrong. In total, 700,000 Pied-Noir moved to France in 1962, with 512,000 between May and August alone (Jordi 1993: 31). Between 1962 and 1964, more than 800,000 were repatriated from Algeria, in addition to those who had been arriving as part of a gradual migration since 1956 (Jordi 1993: 32). Even when it became obvious that the numbers exceeded estimates, official channels claimed that those returning were simply on vacation (Mercier 2003:89). Only in June, at the height of the repatriations, did the press admit that those arriving were in France to stay (Mercier 2003:90-91).

Fifth, under this kind of pressure, the state services proved to be insufficient. By April agencies were reporting that they were understaffed (Mercier 2003:125). By June arriving rapatriés had to wait at least a month for any aid other than that provided at the points of arrival (Mercier 2003:126, 130). Marseille, in particular, was a central transit point and local services were overwhelmed. The government asked private associations and groups for assistance, including the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Secours Catholique (Mercier 2003:109). In Marseille the *Comité de liaison des organismes participant à l'aide aux Français rapatriés*

d'outre-mer, a private association, doubled the capacity of the state services provided for *rapatriés* (Jordi 1993 :79-80).

Sixth, material shortages and bureaucratic inadequacy were compounded by tensions between populations. The Pied-Noir faced widespread discrimination and misunderstanding at the hands of the Metropolitans (Comtat 2009). There were widespread fears that the refugees would bring anti-French, “fascist” OAS violence and political instability to the metropole (Mercier 2003:87; Shepard 2006: 219, 225-6). By mid-June anti-*rapatrié* sentiments were visible in the press (Jordi 1993:92; Mercier 2003:177).

In light of the difficulty of the transition, the numbers of people involved, and the initial failure of government assistance, the government took aggressive measures to assimilate the *rapatriés*. These policies had two goals: to prevent formation of a Pied-Noir community and to aid in national development (Shepard 2006:221). One prescient Pied-Noir journalist noted in April 1962 that “tomorrow, the thousands of pieds noirs who are going to arrive will group together and organize themselves because no one will help them [...] I would rather that any future associations made up of French of Algeria have nothing better to do than to organize an annual cocktail party” (as quoted in Shepard 2006:222). The government sought to disperse Pied-Noir settlement across France as much as possible, particularly in areas in need of economic development (Shepard 2006:221). These policies met their long-term goals in that they prevented the development of a unified Pied-Noir community, as discussed in the introduction, and the influx of new residents and government aid did stimulate economic development in some areas (Jordi 1993:158). However, both the insufficiency of the aid upon arrival and these

aggressive assimilationist policies left many Pied-Noir feeling simultaneously abandoned and controlled by the government (Jordi 1993:89-92). From their arrival in France the Pied-Noir developed a stunning array of associations for self-help, socialization, and cultural promotion (Calmien 2012), as I discuss in the next chapter. Despite these rough beginnings the Pied-Noir were able to integrate economically into the metropole.

After Colonialism: The New Algeria

Following independence the democratic Algeria government consolidated its power, quickly coming under control of the FLN. The coup of 19 June 1965 that replaced the President Ben Bella with Houari Boumedienne also placed the army at the center of power (Harbi 1980:378). Over time, the development of the bureaucracy and power structure served to reinforce the absolute power of Boumedienne (Harbi 1980:379). At the same time, Algerian nationalism and socialism were linked to an invented tradition of Islamic, Arabic customs, a move which served to limit discussion of social issues or change that did not fall into the prevailing ideology, including women's and class issues (Charrad 2001).

North African Labor Immigration and its Aftermath: 1945 to 1980

Following World War II another, more gradual migration was taking place between North Africa and France as North African men were recruited to work in France on the reconstruction effort. They were only a portion of the workforce, representing only 2% of the foreign population in 1946 (Hargreaves 1995:12). Between the end of the Second World War

and the beginning of the Algerian war labor exchanges were temporary or seasonal, though some Algerians did settle in France (Stora 1992:94). During the Algerian War the number of Algerians in France increased from around 211,000 to 350,000, according to the census (Stora 1992:143), owing to the continued need for industrial and construction workers (Stora 1992:146). During this time Moroccans and Tunisians were actively sought as workers because they were deemed less political (Stora 1992:149). Otherwise, Algerian independence did not greatly alter the situation of immigrants, only changing the paperwork that needed to be filed.

Between the end of the Algerian War and 1974 the French economy and employment were in expansion. Reconstruction after the war and construction to house the 1.5 million individuals returned from the colonies necessitated a large manual labor force as the traditional French became progressively less interested in manual labor. This, in combination with high unemployment in the North African countries, led to a steady increase in laborers from all three North African countries living in France (Stora 1992:413-16). These shifting numbers represented a failure of French recruitment policy, which preferred European immigrants (Hargreaves 1995:11). North Africans came on the rotation system – working in France for a number of years before returning home to be replaced by another immigrant, often from the same village or region (Hargreaves 1995:15). This proved to be a cheap, renewable source of labor, as I discuss in more detail below (Meillassoux 1981).

This immigration pattern, for a time, accommodated the needs and desires of the French state, the sending countries, and the immigrants themselves. The French government preferred that immigrants return to their countries of origin and leave their families at home (Meillassoux

1981). The sending countries wanted to preserve the immigrants' loyalty and remittances (Hargreaves 1995:16; Stora 1992:420-423). For their part, the immigrants worked to return to their families and their country in a better economic position (Begag and Chaouite 1990:37). This pattern lasted until the 'end' of immigration in 1974.

While the rhythm of immigration might have suited most parties concerned, the available housing did not. In the 1950s *bidonvilles*, or shanty towns, sprung up around many of the major cities (Ireland 1994:41). In Grenoble, for example, immigrant workers lived in storm drains and ruined buildings. In 1956 SONACOTRAL, the National Corporation for the Construction of Housing for Algerian Workers, was instituted to provide *foyer*, or hostel, accommodations for immigrant workers (Hargreaves 1995:15; Silverstein 2004). Intended to solve the problem of the *bidonvilles*, this 'solution' also aimed to keep immigrants in housing insufficient for families (Hargreaves 1995:15-16). In 1975 the state began to focus its resources on family housing, including *cités de transit*, temporary housing, and *habitations à loyer modéré* (HLM), or subsidized housing (Hargreaves 1995:70; Ireland 1994:42). Also intended for French citizens of limited means, the HLM were only available to immigrants with families and were highly sought after by all (Benguigui 1997; Hargreaves 1995:70-71). For example, in St. Chamond (a small industrial city in western Rhone-Alpes), Maghrebin and Turkish immigrants sought HLM for both the increased levels of comfort and the increased possibility of integration (Barou 1980:85-7). This hope was short-lived, as the majority of French residents had moved out of the HLM by the late 1970s, opening places for more immigrant and minority families (Hargreaves 1995:71).

These two events were not entirely independent, as French residents cited the increasing presence of immigrants as one of the reasons they left the HLM (Hargreaves 1995:72).

1974: 'End' of Immigration

Due to the deteriorating economic situation following the oil crisis of 1973, major changes were made to French immigration policy. In 1974 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's government passed a bill severely limiting new immigration, particularly unskilled labor from outside the European Community (Hargreaves 1995:17-18). This policy was conceived to take advantage of the "rotation" system, and expected immigrants to leave at the same rate, thus gradually decreasing the immigrant population (Hargreaves 1995:20). The opposite occurred. Workers who had intended to return to their home countries after a limited stay remained in France and brought their families to join them, thus feminizing and solidifying the immigrant presence after family reunification became available in 1978. Since that date, family members of residents have become the largest single category of registered incoming immigrants (Hargreaves, 1995:18).

During the 1970s, other attempts were made to reduce the immigrant population. Beginning in 1977 the government offered repatriation assistance of 10,000 Francs and job training to unemployed foreigners who desired to return to their home countries (Husbands 1991:181; Lebon 1984:154). Beginning in 1978 the government also increased its expulsion of immigrants. Both measures ended when the socialists came to power in 1981 (Hargreaves 1995:19).

Those immigrants who stayed were expected to assimilate into the French population and be as invisible as possible (Benguigui 1997). French republicanism focuses on assimilation or incorporation of the individual; recognition of group difference is seen as both potentially racist and a threat to national unity (Grillo 1998:183, 186; Silverman 1999:58). During the post-war building spurt of the 1950s-70s, North African immigrants were primarily workers, and seen as part of the industrial project. In the 1970s and 1980s when immigrants settled in France with their families and were no longer as invisible, they were labeled a ‘problem’ in need of assimilation (Wieviorka et al. 1992:28). At this time France’s industrial economy weakened, shifting to a dualist economy: those who participate fully and those who are excluded from economic, social, and educational benefits (Wieviorka et al. 1992:29). The non-participants in this economy came increasingly to be associated with the *banlieue*, Islam, and minority populations. It is to this situation that the protest movements of the 1980s reacted.

The 1980s: The Beur and Headscarves

In the 1980s it was realized that the “end” of immigration in 1974 left a sizable minority population, and French citizens of North African heritage became an increasingly vocal part of society. At the same time, immigrants gained the right to found and run cultural associations and could expand their activities from the *Amicales* and French-run assistance associations of the 1960s and 1970s (the history of associations in France is analyzed in the next chapter). This instigated a florescence of these groups on the local and national scene. At the end of the 1980s, the headscarf affair refocused national attention on the minorities’ religious and ethnic

differences. These three major developments have continued to have ramifications through the 1990s and into the 2000s.

The Beur Generation

By the early 1980s France had awakened to discover that many of the ‘North African immigrants’ were in fact French citizens, born and raised on French soil. This was a particular surprise to the national imagination that, though there were more Portuguese in France than Algerians, imagined ‘immigrant’ as synonymous with ‘Algerian’ (Grillo 1985:13) and ‘Muslim’ (Kepel 1987). This new generation called themselves the *beur*⁷ and demanded the rights they deserved as citizens but were denied because of racist tendencies. The movement was based primarily on identity, culture, and politics; with a radio station, literary works, and protest marches claiming the right to difference (Aïchoune 1985; Hargreaves 1995:105; Hargreaves 1989; Laronde 1993). The movement was primarily successful at attracting national attention to the existence of second-generation immigrants since, previously, from an official perspective “[I]es enfants d’immigrés n’existaient pas” (Benguigui 1997:131). It also provided, for a time, a cultural space for the children of immigrants to create and enact an identity closer to their lived experience than any of the existing collective identities and to establish a literary movement of note (Hargreaves 1989).

⁷ The term arose in the 1970s as a *verlan* (a form of French slang, similar in construction to pig Latin) reconfiguration and re-appropriation of the word *Arabe*, the intent being to eliminate its negative connotations (Hargreaves 1995:105).

The *beur* were not successful in their attempts to create a new appellation for themselves or to promote a new pluralism and right to difference. By the late 1980s the term “Franco-Maghrebi” had replaced the term *beur*, which itself had come to connote young, male, second generation immigrants assumed to be from the *banlieue* and to carry all the negative traits associated with such residence (Derderian 2004:12; Feldblum 1999:135). By that time the racist Right had also taken control of the definition of pluralism, and so the right to difference came to mean the right of the French to be different from outside cultural influences (Feldblum 1999:36-7). The Right was able to do this because the *beur* did not diversify or explain their claim and spoke in reference to French norms in language that could be twisted to have multiple meanings (Laronde 1993:26-7, 23). Although the *beur* proposed equality of all in their differences, the Right countered with an ethnocentric vision wherein the diverse communities are equal only in their incompatibility (Laronde 1993:30).

Headscarves in Highschools

In 1989 three girls were expelled from a high school for wearing hijab. Later that year the Conseil d'Etat ruled that pupils can wear religious symbols as long as they are not ostentatious, do not interfere with the student's participation, and are not intended to make a demand, and that cases should be dealt with on an individual basis with the assistance of a judge (Kastoryano 2006:59). In 1994 this ruling was altered, giving teachers the power to deal with each case individually. In the national discussions on the subject, headscarves were first understood not as ethnic or religious markers, but as symbols of an incomplete integration of immigrants, even

though the girls were French by birth (Feldblum 1999:143; Hargreaves and Leaman 1995:13-14). It also served to revive uncomfortable memories of the colonial period. Following the failure of the *Beur* movement to integrate the second generation of North Africans into French society as equals, some sought meaning either in socialism and anti-racist campaigning or in Islam (Bowen 2007:68). Rise of political Islam by the late 1980s was tied to increasing Islamophobia, itself a sign that the minority population remained largely misunderstood (Bowen 2007:66; Kepel 1987). This topic was to reappear in the early 2000s.

The 1990s: Urban Unrest and the Algerian Civil War

Inter-ethnic relations in France during the 1990s were marked by periodic violence. Peri-urban riots were common at the beginning of the decade. The Algerian Civil war was brought home to France mid-decade in the form of media coverage and the 1995 bombings. This revived memories and questions surrounding the Algerian War and strained relationships between metropolitans, Pied-Noir, and North African minorities in France.

Burning Banlieues

The 1990s started off with a considerable amount of urban unrest. The year 1990 ended with a large riot; between 1991-1992 there were ten such riots across France, four in 1993, and thirteen in 1994 (Bachmann and Le Guennec 1997:10).⁸ Youth in the *banlieue* suffered from self-diagnosed *galère* (a combination of misery and boredom) and reacted to police

⁸ The precedent for riots with burned cars had been set at Vaulx-en-Velin in 1979 (Bachmann and Le Guennec 1997:9).

discrimination or violence by rioting (Bachmann and Le Guennec 1997; Dubet 1987). Over this time punishments were increased, a ministry was created to deal with the problem, and the media slowly lost interest (Bachmann and Le Guennec 1997:11). By 1995 and 1996 the violence was more limited only because it was better controlled (Bachmann and Le Guennec 1997:11). Over the decade unrest attached itself more and more to institutions: schools, post offices, and bus drivers found themselves targets of violence as much as the police (Bachmann and Le Guennec 1997:12). In general, through the early and mid-1990s, there was a decrease in riots, but incidents and violence grew (Bachmann and Le Guennec 1997:14-15). Riots again became the focus of media attention in 2005 and 2010, as I analyze below.

Civil War in Algeria

Following the reign of a single party state in place since 1962, Algeria opened itself to multi-party politics in 1988 and had its first free elections in 1990. In January 1992 the Front Islamic du Salut (FIS) was prevented from winning an election when the Algerian military staged a *coup d'état*. The army took over the government, economy, and security forces, despite a widespread sentiment that their power was illegitimate (Entelis 2000:xiii). This unleashed a civil war that lasted for a decade, taking over 100,000 lives in bombings, assassinations, shootings, and massacres (Entelis 2000:ix; Silverstein 2004:3). The *Mouvement Islamique Armé* (MIA) and a dizzying array of other belligerents, including the GIA, MEI, AIS, and armed bands of local teenagers, began armed opposition to the regime (Martinez 2000:68-9, 91, 80). All

opposed the government but these groups also fought bitterly amongst themselves (Martinez 2000:116).

By 1993 the war had moved into Algiers, which was gripped by insecurity and uncertainty. The army and Islamists harassed civilians, including women, and both sides attacked useful infrastructure. The perpetrators of the bombings or murders would often not be officially identified. The tactics employed by all combatants increasing the feeling of danger and make the civilian population choose sides (Martinez 2000:73, 74, 79, 116-17). In such a polarized climate many families were divided by chance or by choice, and brothers who fought for opposing sides could offer each other a certain amount of protection (Martinez 2000:80). Many intellectuals, political dissidents, and journalists, among others, were forced out of the country or assassinated before they could leave (Silverstein 2004:3). Some of those who fled took refuge in France.

In addition to bringing widespread bloodshed and extreme insecurity, the war had negative economic and social consequences. The Islamist groups' attacks on state-run enterprises pushed the productive sector of the economy into private hands, therefore increasing the power of the governing elite, but did not significantly weaken the regime (Martinez 2000:121, 147). The civil war served to foster economic growth, including new jobs and improvements in the oil and gas and commercial sectors, also strengthening the FLN elite (Martinez 2000:16). The war also offered the opportunity for social advancement for some, since in the *maquis* advancement was given not to those with education or good lineages, but to those who best exemplified the characteristics of a fighter (Martinez 2000:15). Similar social promotion through violence in

Algeria has been noted as far back as the Ottoman times by a number of scholars (Establet 1991; Harbi 1980; Kaddache 1992; Martinez 2000), but this practice is by no means limited to Algeria.

Of particular interest to the study at hand are the impacts of this war on France and its residents. In 1995 the conflict was physically brought to France with bombings in subways and markets (Silverstein 2004:1). This exportation of violence to France, the increase in refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented immigrants, along with the media coverage of the civil war, served to reinforce the stereotype of Algerians as inherently violent, an attitude prevalent since the colonial period (Shepard 2006). People again talked about the Algerian independence, placing the Pied-Noir and Algerian minorities increasingly in the spotlight.

The early 2000s: Headscarves, Riots, and Colonial History

The 2000s saw increased, negative attention focused on Islam after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. This led to a re-evaluation of the headscarf rulings of the early 1990s. At the same time, Chirac reached out to Algeria, North Africans, Harkis, and Pied-Noir, concluding with a 2005 ruling emphasizing the positive effects of colonization. These attempts at finding social peace were not successful and in 2005, peri-urban riots spread across France to protest discrimination and police brutality. After Sarkozy's election to power in 2007, the nation suffered deep unease about the international fiscal crisis and its influence on French employment and health care systems. Tensions and unease about what it is to be French today led in part to the 2009-2010 national consultation on national identity, a thinly veiled attempt at a 21st century 'solution' to the immigrant problem. The year 2010 saw a return of riots that, while

not as geographically widespread, were the focus of media and political attention and legal reform.

Headscarves, Take Two

By 2003 high schools continued to treat girls wearing headscarves individually, as per the 1994 ruling. Claims that more consistent guidelines were necessary and concern for the state of *laïcité* in the schools encouraged the president to appoint the Stasi Commission to study the problem. However, this move was couched as a commission to study *laïcité* in the republic at large (Stasi 2003). The commission delivered its report in December, recommending that all religious signs be banned from schools, that history of all major religions be mandated, and that some national holidays be moved to minority religious holidays (Stasi 2003:23-24). Only the first part was incorporated into law in 2004 and was generally perceived as specifically targeting the hijab.

In the years since the 1994 law two things had changed. First, the veil “had become a symbol of mounting Islamism and decaying social life” in France (Bowen 2007:242). Topics of concern associated with the veil included increasing violence in the *banlieue*, post-9/11 terrorism, fundamentalist Islam, women’s equality, and the state of the school system (Feldblum 1999:136). The position of women in the *banlieue* was all the more troubling following reports of *tournante*, or gang rape (Krémer and Laronche 2002). Second, the arrival of Le Pen in the second round of presidential elections in 2002 scared the more moderate political parties into believing that they had to prove to the public that they, too, could defend *laïcité* and the Republic

from the Islamic threat (Bowen 2007:243). Although protests were expected at the beginning of the 2004 school year, when two French reporters in Iraq were kidnapped and held hostage by a group demanding that the French government repeal the law, French Muslim groups unanimously and vocally opposed the terrorists, including a refusal to protest the law (Bowen 2007:145). Still subject to criticism, the headscarf issue as it pertains to schools has not been officially revisited. In 2011, however, a law was passed that makes it illegal to be in any public place wearing a veil that covers the face (BBC 2011). The impact of this law is still unclear.

Legislating History

In 2005 Chirac signed Law Number 2005-158, otherwise known as the Loi Mekachera, which was designed to provide national recognition for the contribution of French works in overseas departments and colonies of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Indochina. Specifically, the law “reconnait les souffrances éprouvées et les sacrifices endurés par les rapatriés, les anciens membres des formations supplétives et assimilés, les disparus et les victimes civiles et militaires” during the process of independence (Legifrance.gouv.fr 2005). This was not the first law in France that legislated history. Rather, it followed the Gayssot law (in 1990) that treated the representation of the Shoah, the Taubira law (in 2001) that regulated discussions of the slave trade, and another law (in 2001) that recognized the Armenian genocide. Although historians had questioned the utility and desirability of these laws since 1990, it was not until the Mekachera law that there was a mobilization (Lefebvre 2008). The association “Liberté pour l’Histoire” was founded to combat these four laws (Nora and Chandernagor 2008). At the same time, counter-

petitions circulated, and an association attempted to have Napoleon Bonaparte recognized as “un criminel contre l’humanité” for re-instituting slavery in the colonies while suing a historian of the slave trade “pour contestation de crime contre l’humanité,” an action that had been rendered illegal by the Gayssot law (Lefebvre 2008:43-4).

The article in the 2005 law that was considered the most offensive by historians stated that academics should study French colonization and recognize the positive effects of the French presence overseas, particularly in North Africa. “Les programmes scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord, et accordent à l’histoire et aux sacrifices des combattants de l’armée française issus de ces territoires la place éminente à laquelle ils ont droit” (Legifrance.gouv.fr 2005). In 2006 this article was removed from the law, and the lawsuit against the historian was dropped, but the anti-negationist provisions from the Gayssot law were extended to the victims of the Armenian genocide (Chandernagor 2008:32-35; Lefebvre 2008:44-5). Following this, numerous groups submitted propositions to have particular historical events labeled crimes against humanity. These were, at times, mirror images: “crime contre l’humanité commis *sur* des Algériens (répression des manifestations FLN à Paris en 1961) et crime contre l’humanité commis *par* des Algériens (assassinat de pieds-noirs et de harkis en 1962)” (Chandernagor 2008 :35). As illustrated by the second quote at the beginning of this chapter, where Chandernagor (2008:44-5) notes that historians have failed to teach historical relativism to the nation, other authors have also turned the question of the history’s place in national education (Lefebvre 2008; Rioux 2008). The furor

surrounding these laws and propositions has since died down, but they are still a reference point today, in academic as well as casual conversation.

Riots go National

During 2005, riots and peaceful demonstrations spread from the Parisian banlieue across disadvantaged areas of the country. Tensions in these areas were not new: earlier that year the Interior Minister (and future president), Nicholas Sarkozy, had publically called the inhabitants of the *banlieue* “racaille” (a more vulgar equivalent of “riff-raff”) and threatened to blast the areas clean (Fassin 2006:1). On 27 October 2005, two immigrant teenagers were killed and a third was badly injured when were electrocuted after hiding in a power installation to avoid police. Following the deaths, Sarkozy blamed the teenagers for a crime they did not commit and denied that there had been a pursuit at all (Fassin 2006:1). Riots and demonstrations protesting the deaths and the government’s response began and continued through 16 November, but they eventually petered out. After government officials agreed to meet with the boys’ families, there was an admission of police culpability, and the acknowledgment of a wider social problem. The extent of these riots shocked officials and called into question the social status quo (Ducoin 2005). Despite this, sweeping legal or social changes were not made.

This was not the end of urban unrest, nor its political manipulation. One of the most highly mediatized in recent years, it occurred in Grenoble during my residence there. On the night of 15 June 2010, two men robbed the casino of Uriage-les-Bains and fled police pursuit in the direction of Grenoble. Using illegal guns the two men exchanged fire with police officers,

wounding one, before one of the robbers was killed and the other fled on foot (Le Monde 2010a), into Villeneuve, one of Grenoble's *banlieue*. The following night in Villeneuve, groups of youth rioted, burned cars, destroyed public transportation infrastructure, and fired on police as they were searching for the second perpetrator (Le Monde 2010b). The violence continued through the weekend. In the days that followed a cache of guns was discovered in the basement of a local bar and death threats were addressed to local police (Le Monde 2010c, 2010d). Sarkozy responded with the now infamous *Discours de Grenoble*. Calling the riots: "les conséquences de 50 années d'immigration insuffisamment régulée qui ont abouti à un échec de l'intégration," Sarkozy promised to take a hard line against illegal immigration and to reinforce the capabilities of French security forces (Sarkozy 2010). Although the riots were relatively short-lived and confined to Grenoble, they, and Sarkozy's response, serve to illustrate the continued tensions surrounding questions of immigration, integration, and ethnic relations in France.

Conclusion

Long before 1830, France and North Africa had sustained intense contacts and exchanges. The balance of power in trade and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman *deys* and *beys* and the Moroccan rulers shifted over time in favor of the Europeans, leading to the colonial conquest. This lasted, at its longest, 132 years. Among its effects was the creation of a modernized local infrastructure and a settler population distinct from both the indigenous peoples and the metropole, but which legally considered itself unquestionably French. At the same time, North Africans contributed to the construction of contemporary France through production of

raw materials in the colonies, labor in the metropole, and military service. By the end of the bitter war of independence in Algeria, and less bloody independence struggles in Morocco and Tunisia, the Pied-Noir had relocated to the metropole. There, having to create a place for themselves in the face of discrimination, they founded many associations to defend their interests and create safe places to socialize. North Africans in France continued to struggle with social, economic, and legal discriminations, which were thrust into the public spotlight with the *beur* protests of the 1980s. The climate of violence of the 1990s stirred up uncomfortable memories and questions surrounding France's rule over Algeria and contemporary social problems; it also reinforced French stereotypes of Algerians as violent and the Pied-Noir as politically suspicious and prone to Fascist ideologies. In the 2000s, questions of Islam and security were of national interest, particularly under the influence of Sarkozy's politics.

By the beginning of this study in 2009, enduring connections between France and North African countries and populations were both visible and contested. Discussions on television, in print media, and on the street about the Algerian war of independence and the civil war, immigration, and the North African minority were commonplace. Less common, but still evident, were allusions to the histories of colonialism and the Europeans who had once peopled France's overseas territories. Political debates, protests, strikes and riots over these and other social, economic, and political issues punctuated my time in France, periodically disrupting public transportation and other services. Simultaneously, national and international partnerships, conferences, exhibits, and conversations were ongoing or created to reinforce positive international and inter-group ties and ameliorate relations. In the next chapter I analyze how

voluntary associations are organized and used to partake in such connections, conversations, and protests.

CHAPTER 3: ASSOCIATIONS IN FRANCE: BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND SUSPICION

L'association est la convention par laquelle deux ou plusieurs personnes mettent en commun, d'une façon permanente, leurs connaissances ou leur activité dans un but autre que de partager des bénéfices. Elle est régie, quant à sa validité, par les principes généraux du droit applicables aux contrats et obligations. (Law of 1901, Article 1)

Introduction

Minorities in France are looking for an acceptable place in society. One institutional form they use to organize their action is the association. Associations are an instance of civil society that is particularly prevalent in France. With nearly a million associations in 2006, this institutional form contributes significantly to the daily experience of life in France, as well as residents' understandings of what it is to be French (Debbasch and Bourdon 2006). Associations in contemporary France are promoted by the state in the interest of encouraging good republican behavior, strengthening the attachment of individuals to the nation, and combating isolation and other negative consequences of contemporary, post-industrial economic and social situations. Since the Revolution of 1789, associations have also been viewed with suspicion as potentially harboring anti-republican or anti-democratic ideas (Debbasch and Bourdon 2006).

If official views on associations are conflicted, those on minority associations are particularly so, revealing deep-seated uncertainty about cultural plurality and the place of minorities in the nation. On the one hand, these associations are promoted as functioning like any other association to integrate individuals into the nation, make them more active citizens of the republic, and live fuller personal and social lives, with the added benefit that the target

populations are known to suffer numerous forms of exclusion. On the other hand, the insistence of members that they can be both a minority *and* French falls outside the majority understanding of what it is to be a citizen of the French nation (Kastoryano 2002). As such, the pluralist message promoted by these groups can be interpreted as threatening to the republican national ideal. Individuals and groups face explicit and implicit attempts at cultural, social, or state control when involved with associations. They variously acquiesce, avoid these attempts with slantwise⁹ action, or resist (Campbell and Heyman 2006; Geisser 1997; Scott 1985).

In the first part of this chapter I provide the structural, social, and historical background that created the tensions and constraints inherent in the use of associations in France. To this end, I outline the debates and tensions surrounding minority associations, the history of these groups in France, and their legal structure. In the second part of this chapter I offer an ethnographic description of the minority cultural associations (MCAs) with which I worked. I emphasize the ways in which their actions, form, and character are creative responses to not only social factors, such as discrimination or racism, but also institutional tensions and the ambiguous nature of the associative form itself. In this second section I offer a typology that presents an introduction to the internal variation among these institutions and describe a number of key features of associations, namely: their structure, resources, activities, participation, membership, and audiences. In Chapter 5 I discuss at length another feature of associations: their physical characteristics.

⁹ Slantwise is a concept developed by Campbell and Heyman (2006) to elucidate actions that take place outside of relationships of domination and resistance and do not follow dominant or official systems of logic.

Part 1: Structural Factors

Debates on the Place of Civil Society in France

Associations were first legalized by the French Republic over 100 years ago. However, their place and power in French society remain contested. Proponents claim that associations foster democracy through the creation of active citizens, while detractors fear anti-democratic tendencies and the privileging of special interests. Concerns and hopes over the potential of associations to create social change are magnified in the case of MCAs. In this section I present the arguments surrounding the desirability of associations, focusing on claims made about minority communities.

Arguments in Favor of Associations

Beginning with Tocqueville (e.g. 1981 [1835-40]), champions of associations to this day claim that these institutions promote democracy and civic participation. Civil society is seen as promoting democratic practice through the production of democratic, civic-minded, and trusting citizens, the creation of social networks that tie these citizens into groups that can take action, and the re-invigoration of the state through critique and competition (Barber 1995; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1995). As such, they are a strongly federating force within the French republic. Debbasch and Bourdon (2006) recognize six primary justifications that support the right of association. The liberty of association is considered to be:

1. Part of the system of checks and balances.
2. An alternative form of political participation to voting.

3. It can “support de la plupart des autres libertés” such as right to assembly or right to a free press.
4. A “facteur d’innovation sociale”.
5. A “facteur de formation des citoyens,” particularly those individuals more active within the association.
6. A “moyen de defense et de promotion” of groups with shared interests (Debbasch and Bourdon 2006:11-13).

For Putnam (1995) and his followers, associations create social capital. In this use, Putnam follows Coleman (1988:S98) in finding that “social capital adheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” that facilitates the action of individuals within that structure. For Coleman, the benefits of participation in such social capital accrue to individuals, while Putnam views the benefits going to communities and even nations (Portes 2002). This is at odds with Bourdieu’s (1985) understanding of the term, wherein social capital lies in an individual’s person: knowledge, relations, and self-presentation, and how the individual translates that into power to act. In terms of minority or disadvantaged populations, members can gain social status within their communities that palliates, to a certain extent, the frustrations inherent in their socially or economically marginal position (Hamidi 2003), and receive education and training that compensate for failures in the educational system and serve as vocational training (Césari 1993; Geisser 1997). Participation in civil society is also seen as promoting solidarity and counteracting the trend towards excessive individualism in modern society (Kwon 2004). These authors also find that associations, at times, promote the rights of individuals and groups in a democracy, contribute to the proper functioning of that democracy, and act as a catalyst for social innovation and change.

For immigrants and minorities, Debbasch and Bourdon's (2006) justifications 5 and 6 are considered most important. As an institution that forms citizens, particularly democratic citizens (justification 5), associations are tasked with integrating immigrants and minorities into French society (Debbasch and Bourdon 2006:13; Hamidi 2003). Civic engagement or "the process by which individuals enter into and act within civic spaces to address issues of public concern," is seen as a marker of immigrants' attachment to and integration in their new society (Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012:2). Such engagement can take place through voting or other kinds of participation in civil society. Associative involvement, therefore, is tied to larger questions of social cohesion, individual agency, and the functioning of a democratic society, particularly when a minority population is involved.

Assessments of the ability of associations to actually foster civic engagement and democratic participation appear mixed. Camille Hamidi (2003), in her study of associations with minority members in two French cities, found that while minority associations were generally presumed to be either a staging ground for political action or a retreat from failed political aspirations, the situation she witnessed was quite different. For the majority of the members it was their only civic participation. The participants, however, did show a marked increase in self-confidence and sense of self-worth, which would presumably have had beneficial impacts on their lives. In her later work on these same associations, Hamidi (2006) finds that associative structure can work to depoliticize interactions between its members through efforts of organizers to maintain group cohesion, emphasize the apolitical stance of the association when in contact with public officials or media, and acquire and maintain funding. Kwon (2004) notes that while

these associations do create and foster social norms, these norms are not necessarily democratic, nor will they translate directly to the maintenance of democratic society outside the association. Instead, she argues that the association's "identities and interpretive framework" are larger determinants of their influences on members than their mere constitution as associations (Kwon 2004:161). These identities are shifting, as they are molded in hopes of changing or responding to social and political contexts. Even when associations promote democratic participation, it is not necessarily uniform. Césari (1993) notes that association participants are divided into elites and members, with, for the most part, only the elites receiving a democratic or civic education.

Associations have also been justified (6, above) as promoting communal defense and development of groups with shared interests (Debbasch and Bourdon 2006:13-14). This has been touted as positive, particularly for immigrant and minority groups, since these individuals are exposed to numerous forms of racism and exclusion as members in a minority community. However, this same process can be seen as negative, allowing a minority group unreasonable and even dangerous authority over the lives of others, as I discuss below. If a reductionist approach to French culture is taken, justification 6 appears in opposition to 5 (wherein associations form citizens in the French model) when applied to cultural groups. For those who believe that a unified French culture is part of an individual's ability to be a good citizen, any institution that helps preserve alternative cultures is threatening.

In general, participation in associations may not necessarily foster direct democratic participation, as was once thought. However, it does create opportunities both for individual agency and group participation through indirect forms of civic engagement. As such, it promotes

social capital in both Putnam's (1995) and Bourdieu's (1985) sense of the term. In other words, participation in associations strengthens an individual's social ties, competences, and self-confidence, or what Bourdieu would call social capital. As part of this process, it integrates these same individuals voluntarily into groups that are, themselves, integrated into the national whole. This strengthens what Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1995) would refer to as social capital, namely the individual's systems of social relations.

Arguments Against Associations

In contrast to those who support associations, others are wary of their power to disrupt social order and create undesirable change. Associations created by groups regarded as socially threatening appear all the more dangerous. Debbasch and Bourdon identify four of these main criticisms:

1. Associations create "concurrency a l'égard des gouvernants".
2. There is a "risque de mise en jeu des libertés démocratiques" through the propagation of anti-democratic ideologies.
3. Significant amounts of goods and services may be removed from the market, creating a risk of stagnation and associative monopolies.
4. They may foster "triomphe des intérêts particuliers sur l'intérêt general." (2006:14-17)

Associations may create challenges to the functioning of the state, its democratic principles, the economic welfare of its citizens, and as promoting particularist over general interests in society. Justifications 2 and 4 are seen to be of particular concern in reference to minority community associations.

First, associations in general and MCAs in particular are considered at risk of promoting non-democratic environments. In an analysis of associations in late 19th and early 20th century Italy, for example, Kwon (2004) points out that the civil society of this time actively challenged the democratic state and was instrumental in the rise of Fascism either through direct incubation of the movement or through the creation of conflict and social cleavages that could be exploited by fascist organizers. Instead of considering associations as directly and uniquely fostering democracy, Kwon suggests that we consider them in their specific historic and social context. Because of concerns such as these, periods of political agitation in France have historically fostered increases in regulation by the national government (Debbasch and Bourdon 2006). The effects fell heavily on minority groups, and included the ban on immigrant-run associations between 1939 and 1981 (see below).

Second, minority associations appear threatening to the nation because they promote the interests and cultures of the minority community, inherently contradicting the ideological basis of the French Republican state which is supposed to be guided by the general will (Kastoryano 2002). In terms specific to this study, it is feared that religious (in the case of the North Africans) or political (in the case of the Pied-Noir) extremism may be nurtured in these associations to the point where it will infringe on the democratic rights of others (Bowen 2007; Shepard 2006). Despite these fears, Césari (1993) has shown that while North African minority associations appear to serve the interests of the minority community, they can become domesticated over time, promoting the interests of an elite that moves increasingly into the mainstream and is no longer seen as representative by the minority community as a whole.

Concerns of minority extremism have created particularly strong resistance to the associations of North Africans and Pied-Noir, seen as exclusively promoting their own cultures. In an extreme example, the Front National in the 1980s combated the demands of minority associations for *le droit à la différence* (the right to be different) *within* French society, with claims that the French culture was its own source of difference that needed protection from outside influence (Feldblum 1999:36-7; Laronde 1993:26-7). I describe an example of similar resistance to Pied-Noir associations and culture at length in Chapter 4. Such episodes of resistance have responded to the historic and social situations in which they were set and, of course, vary over time. Although minority associations are intended to promote solidarity and culture, their position as minorities in a society with discriminatory, racist, and xenophobic currents has circumscribed the legal and institutional possibilities of the associative form with social and economic limitations.

While the form of the association has its proponents and detractors, neither point of view prevails in contemporary France: associations remain legal, but suspect, and have undergone numerous periods of greater or lesser regulation. As Barthelemy (2001:240) notes, an association is simultaneously an “instrument de transformation sociale par son inscription conflictuelle dans les rapports sociaux et instrument de régulation par son implication dans la sphère publique et par son institutionnalisation.” She laments, however, that at the time of her writing, French associations had progressively abandoned their oppositional stance in society and were increasingly satisfied to cohabit with the political powers. While this does appear to be the case, associations are still generally regarded as holding a position “entre conflit et intégration” (De

Maillard 2001:304). This uncertainty gives associations, and particularly minority associations, a liminal place in society, enabling their organizers and participants to constantly re-negotiate their situation vis-à-vis the government, funding agencies, and audiences to maintain legitimacy and achieve their goals. In the final sections of this chapter I return to these themes and discuss how these negotiations are played out in practice (a topic treated at length in Chapters 5 and 6).

Origins of Associations and Minority Participation in France

Contemporary French legal thought on associations and civil society is most often traced back to the Revolution of 1789. Revolutionary France harbored a distrust of organizations or corporations of any type, preferring instead to unite all citizens under the republican state (Ireland 1994:33). Because associations “constituent un espace de liberté,” the state has remained wary of their actions lest they use that liberty against the state (Debbasch and Bourdon 2006:4). Despite a number of voices raised in favor of associations as an officially recognized, public form of civil society, such as that of Tocqueville (e.g. 1981 [1835-40]), since the beginning of the 19th century, legal change was only instituted beginning in the late 19th century. The Law of 21 March 1884 legalized trade unions and gave immigrants the right to participate in union organizations but not to hold positions of power in those organizations. With the Law of 1 July 1901¹⁰ the national government gave individuals the right to join and form associations. This was justified in part because these groups were voluntary, and therefore membership was the product of choice (Bowen 2007:185-6). According to Gauchet, in his analysis of Rousseau, civil society

¹⁰ In discussions of associative law in France this law is commonly referred to as the Law of 1901. I will use this appellation here.

was considered positive for the development of the general will in society because it emphasizes individual choice as a norm in society: if peoples' social memberships are based on choice, then they understand its importance in the lives of others, a condition necessary for full participation in democratic society (Gauchet 1985).

Based on the Law of 1901, French citizens and foreigners alike could form an association by presenting the prefecture with a "declaration of formation" (Ireland 1994:33). There have been numerous changes to French associative law since 1901, but this law remains the seminal text. Shortly afterwards, when the Law of 9 December 1905 established the separation of church and state, the administration of religious cults passed from the state to religious associations (Article 13, 15, 18; Legifrance.gouv.fr 2012b).¹¹ These associations, which are constituted as 1901 associations, must abide by all the provisions of the 1905 law in addition to those of the law of 1901 (Legifrance.gouv.fr 2012b). This dissertation treats only 1901 associations.

While the original version of the 1901 law allowed immigrants to participate in associations, this was heavily restricted by the Decree-Law of April 12, 1939 which required associations founded, run by, or with a majority foreign membership to be authorized by the Interior Minister instead of the local Prefecture (Ireland 1994:35). The legal change was instigated by fears of the rise of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany between the two World Wars and made it very difficult to found immigrant associations (Hargreaves 1995:89). The intention was to prevent these political groups from gaining a foothold in France. This restriction included French colonial subjects and, following independence, those who were living in France

¹¹ In the interests of the reader, I cite article numbers for the law of 1901 in the text. All articles refer to the official version of law as of October 2012 (legifrance.gouv.fr 2012a).

that took the nationality of the new nation-states (Hargreaves 1995; Muzard 2006). As such, they fell under the provisions of the 1939 law. Despite this, some associations focused on immigrants continued to exist or be founded, either through involvement of their home country's government, or with groups of French citizens acting as the elected officials for legal purposes (Muzard 2006). The Amicale des Algériens, for example, existed without official recognition for many years (Ath-Messaoud and Gillette 1976:97). Other associations, such as the ADNA in Grenoble, opened as associations of foreigners, though they had North African immigrant and French membership and were run in partnership (Muzard 2006:156).

The restriction on immigrant associations lasted slightly over 40 years. The Law of 9 October 1981 removed the restrictions added by the 1939 law, allowing immigrants the right to form and run associations (Hargreaves 1995:89; *Journal Officiel* 1981:2795). This speaks to a number of changes in French society. Fascism was no longer a threat, and it was becoming more and more obvious that a large foreign population had permanently settled in France. As such, these associations were lauded as providing useful services to the immigrants for a number of reasons.

The association is the expression of national, cultural, and social solidarities and the instrument of their improvement. In that capacity, they constitute a means of breaking the isolation transplanted persons may suffer, of renewing the bonds with the homeland, and of reappropriating a cultural identity. (Parliamentary debate as quoted in Kastoryano 2002:87)

The presence of such associations was also recognized as keeping minorities' ties to the home country active (Hilly and Poinard 1986:158; Ireland 1994). It was hoped that this might favor return migration on the part of some (Hargreaves 1995; Ireland 1994:38). For those who stayed,

associative participation was considered useful as a training ground for good citizens and as offering the opportunity for group solidarity and mutual aid, as discussed above (Césari 1993; Debbasch and Bourdon 2006; Hamidi 2003). Some have also been welcomed as providing aid and social assistance to at-risk or disadvantaged populations, relieving the government of this task (Amselle 2003; Césari 1993). As neoliberal ideology has gained credence in France, in many cases the government relegated its duties to associations, such as language instruction or integration of immigrants (Broca 2009). The acquisition of the right to create associations was one of a number of measures taken in and after 1981 that were aimed to expand immigrants' political and social rights (Ireland 1994:62).

Legal Structure of the Associations

The Law of 1901 outlines how an association must be founded, run, and dissolved. An association must be declared at the prefecture in the town where its official headquarters are located (Article 5). To do this, a representative of the association must provide the prefecture with a declaration of formation including the name and legal address of the association, names and contact information of at least two officials, a statement of the association's goals, and a copy of the *statutes* (this is the equivalent of a student club or 501C3's constitution in the United States) (Article 5). An association can possess, buy, and sell material goods and services and charge membership dues (Article 6), but it may not be for profit (Article 1). Associations can be closed by mutual agreement of their members and a notification provided to the prefecture; they may also be dissolved upon order of a court or ministry (Article 7).

The law of 1901 is nearly silent on the form and activity of the association. It does mandate that the association have at least two members who must form a *Conseil d'Administration* (Administrative Council – AC) and hold a yearly *Assemblée Générale* (General Assembly - AG), or general meeting, at which the members discuss association business (Article 1). Of key importance to the functioning of the association is that the AG is sovereign. The AG is also charged with approving the statutes, the document which provides additional regulation and guidance for the association, its activities, dues for membership, functions, and, if necessary, dissolution. None of the members can receive payment for their activities or participation, but the association may hire employees. Finally, an association may not take part in illegal activities (Article 3, 7).

Associations Reconnu d'Utilité Publique

A subset of associations may receive the additional appellation of *Reconnu d'Utilité Publique* (Recognized as having Public Utility - RUP) (Article 10). This recognition serves two purposes: to confer additional legal rights and to legitimate the association's actions. Legally, RUP associations can accept certain kinds of donations, which are tax-deductible, and be willed property (Service-public.fr 2011). Additionally, “ la reconnaissance d'utilité publique est perçue par le monde associatif comme un label conférant à l'association qui en bénéficie une légitimité particulière dans son domaine d'action” (Service-Publique.fr 2011). Associations can leverage this mark of legitimacy provided by their RUP status in negotiations for funding, membership, and other resources. The *Conseil d'Etat* assigns the status of RUP to associations

that prove that they have met a number of requirements. They must have: “un but d'intérêt général” (a goal that has public value), a sphere of influence that is supra-local, at least 200 members, financial security (with proof of assets totaling a minimum of 46,000€), received approval of statutes, and have successfully passed a probationary period of at least three years, unless waived for special circumstances (Service-Publique.fr 2011). Requirements for the administrative structure and financial record-keeping of RUP associations are also stricter than for associations without this appellation.

Foundations

Foundations are another subset of associations. The *Fondation de France* (FdF) was created in 1969, as a 1901 RUP association benefitting from both private and public funding within the *Ministère des Affaires Culturelles* (Broca 2009). It was modeled after the system of philanthropic donations and foundations in the United States, and designed to promote the development of philanthropy in France (Broca 2009; Fondation de France 2012b). The FdF is in charge of organizing, running, and assisting the system of foundations. Foundations are associations that promote the public good whose fiscal stability and collective interest are overseen and guaranteed by the FdF. As of 2012, it had organized 800 foundations (Fondation de France 2012a). The foundations supported by FdF can have a variety of goals and actions. The organization, financial integrity, and utility of individual foundations and their projects are certified by the FdF, in return for which these entities receive financial, legal, organizational, and bureaucratic assistance as well as a tax status that makes a percentage of donations tax-

deductible (Broca 2009; Fondation de France 2009). As such, the requirements for the administrative and financial organization of these associations are stricter than for both RUPS and those without special appellation. Philanthropy is facilitated by stipulating that individuals or corporate entities can donate to specific foundations or to the FdF itself.

Part 2: Ethnographic Description

General Taxonomies of Associations

Authors who discuss minority cultural associations use a number of different taxonomies to describe their organization and activities. Not all organizational forms have the same functional and social possibilities and influences. With few exceptions, terminologies that define these groups are not standardized and lead to confusion, a lack of consensus, and a failure to generate general theory. This is due in part to the fact that researchers have not studied associations from the same demographic groups. While it has been noted that the diversity of associative form, composition, and action defies categorization (Calmien 2012) and that the rapidity of change within and among associations makes them difficult to classify (Jazouli 1986), there are some commonalities across associations worth comparing. In the following section I discuss the diversity of association typologies in use today. Following this, I offer an alternative typology that I use in the remainder of the dissertation.

Existing Taxonomies

In Césari's 1993 study of leaders of North African associations, she identified two types of associations within the North African population. First, "solidarity" associations were those founded after 1981 that arose out of protest movements, particularly those against discrimination and arbitrary deportations (1993:80-81). Solidarity associations followed the tradition of the late 1960s, when groups protested prejudice and other injustices. Unlike the social movements of the 1960s, however, organizations created in the 1980s were founded solely by immigrants within France (Dignan 1981:150; Muzard 2006). Second, Césari (1993) discussed a group of associations, to which she assigns no particular name, that were focused on the customs and cultures of the home country. Elsewhere I labeled these "reminiscence" associations, comprising both *amicales* founded beginning in 1962, as discussed below, and independent associations founded after 1981 (Phaneuf 2006:16).

Other authors describe associations primarily by the extent of their influence. Geisser, for example, identified four kinds of North African associations. In the 1990s the younger generations concentrated on:

les *associations de quartier*, dont l'action se limite à la cité ou à un ensemble d'immeubles; les *associations locales*, qui agissent à l'échelle de la commune ou de l'agglomération ; les *associations nationales*, dont la raison d'être est moins de socialiser les populations que de faire du *lobbying* auprès des pouvoirs politiques. (Geisser 1997:167)

These three categories of association were focused on life in France. The first generation, by contrast, had been involved with the *amicales* organized by the North African governments.

These associations, founded and controlled by the governments of the North African countries

after they gained independence from France, served to maintain contact and control over the immigrants, and to prevent their assimilation into French society (Ireland 1994:38). Generally distrusted as representatives of the state, the *Amicale des Algériens* in particular fell out of favor with the beginning of the Algerian civil war in the early 1990s (Geisser 1997).

Hamidi (2003:321) divided associations into (1) *amicales* or student-run associations founded before 1981, (2) national, media-centric associations, and (3) “local and small associations which deal with very practical issues and matters – educational and social support, sport and so on.” In this category of “practical” associations she combines associations whose goals are to provide legal or practical assistance with those who teach sewing or dancing. Also, she labels them North African after the majority of the population served, but all have multi-ethnic memberships and only one explicitly targets a North African population or culture. In her later work, she revises the discussion of these local, practical associations to differentiate them by their levels of politicization, and identifies the associations as “*issus de l’immigration*” instead of purely North African (Hamidi 2006:7).

Both ‘neighborhood’ and ‘national’ are categories that appear frequently in discussions of the North African associative universe. Neighborhood associations became prevalent in the 1980s. This was part of the *politique du ville*, wherein the state delegated authority to municipalities, which then provided improved facilities and funding for local associations (Chabanet 2005:185-6). They were established with municipal assistance as a way to ameliorate the quality of life in the *banlieue* by providing opportunities and infrastructure (Benguigui 1997; Chabanet 2005). *Associations de quartier* are typically implanted in the social fabric of their

neighborhood, offering a variety of services, primarily sports or amusement, to local youth of all ethnicities. These are the associations with the most geographically limited membership.

On the other end of the spectrum are the national, media-centric associations such as SOS Racism, France Plus, or Ni Putes Ni Soumises. These associations are notable for their size, geographic diversity of membership, and professional staffs, particularly those involved with media relations (Amara 2006; Geisser 1997). SOS Racism, founded in 1984 by minorities and members of the political left, was the first of these large groups to concentrate on the situation of minorities in France, and focused primarily on an anti-racist message (Geisser 1997; SOS Racism 2012). Known for its distinctive badges with a yellow hand proclaiming “Touch Pas à Mon Pote” (hands off my friend), the association focused on legal, political, and media activism and lobbying. France Plus was founded in 1985 by second-generation North Africans as a model for integration along republican lines. Though intended to rival SOS Racism, France Plus never attained the same kind of popular mobilization, due in part to its ties to the Socialist government, but was instrumental in promoting North Africans for local political office (Geisser 1997). Ni Putes Ni Soumises was founded in 2003 to protest and publicize the treatment of women in the *banlieue* and to act for change by engaging in large, media-centric events, political lobbying, and local commissions with immediate, practical solutions (Amara 2006). These associations set themselves apart from the majority of minority associations because of their national scale, focus on legal and political activity, and universalist membership and philosophy.

In an earlier work, I suggested an additional category of association. Labeled “inter-cultural exchange” associations, they promote social integration of members in society and act to

counter discrimination (Phaneuf 2006:16). Integration of the minority population belonging to these associations has been achieved through education of the majority population and the creation of ties among minority groups.

For Pied-Noir associations, the categorization has been more uniform. In part, this may have resulted from the limited number of works on the subject and the publication in 1994 of an overview of Pied-Noir Associations by Maurice Calmien that provided an exhaustive list and taxonomy. Calmien divides these groups into “grandes associations de défense”, “amicales”, “culturelles”, “spécialisées”, and “à caractère confessionnel” (Calmien 2012: 290, 330, 344). The associations *de défense* were founded shortly after the Pied-Noir arrived in France in 1962 and have been engaged in national, political lobbying and activism to further the material and moral interests of the Pied-Noir. *Amicales* are centered around a town, city, or institution in Algeria and serve to regroup individuals who had lived there prior to leaving Algeria. Some have a national membership, others are limited to one area in France (Calmien 2012). These groups were mainly founded during the 1970s and are primarily social. They do not typically engage in lobbying unless in cooperation with other associations. Certain *amicales*, such as the Sepia, were founded before 1962 and are purely social, without a specific geographic reference (Calmien 1994; Smith 2006).

Cultural associations are focused on maintaining and promoting Pied-Noir culture, identity, and history. The *Cercle Algérienniste* and the *Centre de Documentation Historique sur l'Algérie*, for example, were founded in the 1970s, a number were founded in the 1980s, and some as recently as 2002 (Calmien 2012). Memberships range in scope from local to

international. Specialized associations are defined as defending the interests of particular groups within the *rapatriés*. The majority are associations of Harkis and professional groups.

Confessionnel associations are focused on continuing particular forms of worship practiced in French North Africa. Associations have been founded to honor Notre Dame d’Afrique, the patroness of Algiers, Notre Dame de Santa Cruz, patroness of Oran, and Saint Augustine. Founded in the 1960s and 1980s, they typically organize a limited number of pilgrimages, masses, or trips in a year, though some participate in events organized by other associations, such as by bringing statues to special masses.

These typologies, when combined, lead to a certain amount of confusion. In particular, *amicales* of the Pied-Noir are social and place-based, but without any kind of governmental ties, but *amicales* of North Africans are operated in cooperation with the governments of the home countries and serve both practical and social purposes. Additionally, within the North African associations, differences between local and neighborhood associations are unclear. Potentially most problematic for matters of comparison, many of these authors – with the exception of Calmien – do not consistently make a distinction between associations that explicitly target minority individuals’ culture, and associations that have a strong minority membership because of their location in a minority-populated neighborhood.

An Alternative Taxonomy

In the interest of avoiding confusion, in this discussion I use the following terms to discuss these associations. Because many groups take part in activities related to more than one

category of association, these categories are not exclusive, but rather indications of associations' activities. "Reminiscence" activities include those whose main intention is to maintain the minority population's identification with the culture of their city, region, or country of origin. They focus on culture from a geographic place and may engage in multiple kinds of activities, such as cuisine, literature, and dance. For the North Africans this is illustrated by the actions of *amicales* and independent associations that aim to maintain one or more facets of minority culture, such as dance or language. For the Pied-Noir, this is primarily composed of the actions of *amicales*. "Cultural" activities focus on one or many facets of minority culture that are pan-ethnic and not tied to specific places. This includes genealogy, cuisine, historical preservation, poetry, and music. "Aid" activities include actions intended to directly benefit members of the minority community. This includes direct assistance, such as legal counsel, French lessons, and translation services as well as indirect assistance that aims at a direct benefit, such as lobbying for legal changes. "Reciprocal integration" or "outreach" (Phaneuf 2012) activities are aimed at informing a wider population of the minority group's situation and culture in the hopes of ameliorating relations and building inter-ethnic ties. This typology does not specifically include neighborhood associations because many categorized as such do not target minority cultures or members.

While this categorization of associations into these four types provides a useful heuristic tool, it is not sufficient for understanding the diversity of associations and, importantly, their potential impacts on members and French society as a whole. With budget cuts, consolidation,

and increase in the “*System D*”¹² style of associative management, associations are reorganizing and recombining their structures and offerings. While I continue to use these terms in the rest of the discussion out of convenience, in the remainder of this chapter I provide ethnographic details of this diversity.

Associative Structure in Practice

The associations in this study typically shared the same administrative format, even beyond that required by law. This speaks to their awareness of tensions over the place of MCAs in French society and represents a set of responses to these tensions.

Assemblée Generale

All of the associations held a yearly AG, as required by law. Members discussed and voted on association business, including reports on finances and activities for the previous year, changes in leadership, the constitution, and short or long term goals of the association. Reports varied in format, length, and detail, from brief oral presentations by one individual to extensive presentations by two or three individuals with Powerpoints and bound booklets containing additional information and financial tables. At times, hired accountants also presented financial information. For voting, many used a system of *pouvoirs* (powers, meaning votes) whereby members who cannot attend may designate someone to vote for them.

¹² This stands for *system débrouillard*, or ‘making-do’. I discuss this concept at greater length below.

At times, elected officials, representatives of funding institutions, or other notables were invited to part or all of the AG to witness the state of the association or its progress on particular projects. Some of these meetings were paired with catered or potluck meals, exhibitions, concerts, conferences, or other special events that gave the members an opportunity to socialize or showcase some of the association's recent activities. Particular importance was placed on these accompanying events by the members if elected officials or other guests were invited to the meeting. Including accompanying events, these meetings lasted from under an hour to a number of days.

The structure, organization, and content of the AG were determined by the association's character. Large professional associations (see below) tended to have more formal, longer and more detailed presentations and activities. Smaller, non-professional associations had less formal, more convivial meetings. This was particularly the case when the content of presentations was already known to all or most of the participants, as in some of the smaller associations. Larger, professional organizations tended towards more formal, organized meetings, some assigning an individual the task of orchestrating the proceedings. RUP associations and Foundations were required to prepare and present larger quantities of information.

Participation of members in AGs varied greatly. In some AG the descriptions of association activities and finances were accepted without comment, and changes to or reaffirmation of the AC were conducted smoothly. Alternatively, when associations were discussing significant changes to the statutes or – in one case – secession of half those present to

form a second, sister association – the meetings could be very tense and emotionally draining for participants. Disputes may be caused by personality conflicts, or may involve structural or philosophical questions. Voices were raised, either as part of long, impassioned speeches, or in incredulous outbursts. Prior to one AG, I was told to prepare myself because “des canes vont voler” (canes will fly), as they had in previous meetings. The meeting was unexpectedly calm, and I have yet to witness an example of this particular form of public expression, perhaps because of my presence. I did witness verbal disagreements, which occasionally disintegrated into yelling matches. This at times required the official presiding over the meeting (often the president) to diffuse the situation. The success of meetings and efficacy of the leadership were judged on the resolution of such disputes and not on whether or not they took place, though when outsiders attended the AG, members were expected to behave in a calmer and more orderly manner, and organizers were angry if similar outbursts occurred.

Association Leadership

The *Assemblée Generale* elected a *Conseil d'Administration* (administrative council - AC), from which was often formed the *Bureau* (board), though at times the membership of the AC and the board were identical. The board and AC provided the associations a specific direction and management within the general description of activities found in the statutes. ACs ranged in size from a handful of members to around 20. Legally, the manner in which these individuals were selected is left to the discretion of the association. While most associations, and all the MCAs I worked with in this study, maintained democratic elections, and many insisted

that democratic elections are legally required to elect the AC, not all associations I encountered in France had a democratic form. For the MCAs, the democratic form was of central importance, not only for the administrative functioning of their association, but also because it allowed them to illustrate to outsiders that they are good, republican citizens.

Often the AC met directly following the meeting or in the days or weeks afterwards for the AG to select the board. The board was typically composed of a President, Vice President, Treasurer, and Secretary. Some associations included an Adjunct Treasurer and Adjunct Secretary, or additional positions for special activities. The AC met regularly throughout the year to orient the association's activities and deal with concerns. The board met more often, at times as much as once a week, and was in charge of the day-to-day functioning of the association, applications for funding, and contact with members, officials, and the public. This took many forms, and in professional associations – associations with paid employees--much of this work can be delegated to these individuals, or the Bureau may manage them very closely by giving assignments on a task-by-task basis.

Membership and Allocation of Labor

The size of an association's membership is important to its structure, financing, and activities. Some association organizers spend considerable amounts of time discussing and thinking about how to increase the size or change the composition of their membership. Although an association is only legally required to have a membership of two individuals, the associations with which I worked ranged in size from under ten to thousands of members. The

largest has approximately 10,000 members, some of whom live outside France. Many association members make the distinction between members and “active” members (*membres actifs*). Active members are those who volunteer to run the association, have ideas for events and carry them through to fruition. Members are those who come to enjoy and participate in the events themselves. The majority of the people I interviewed considered themselves active members, in part because they were present at most association activities and were the most inclined to answer questions about their participation. I also spoke with and observed less-active members at association events.

Associations can be professional, hiring individuals with particular training to fill certain roles, or amateur, functioning only with the labor of volunteers. Larger associations are more likely to hire employees. The difference between professional and amateur associations is significant in many respects. Paid employees allow professional associations to engage in more or higher quality activities. The choice to use paid employees does, however, change the feeling of the association. As one man noted: “Les salariés vont faire les projets pour conserver son travail. Les bénévoles pour se faire plaisir.” Though it was agreed that volunteers created a livelier ambiance, the association members and elected officials I spoke with saw paid employees as producing more dependable work. Amateur associations are limited in the range and scope of their activities to what they can accomplish with the available pool of volunteers. This, however, is also seen as a positive situation because it involves the members at a deeper level. As one president of a North African association noted, the association:

est une association avec une vitrine qui est belle, sur la Maghreb [because of the paid employees]. Belle vitrine – on vient, c'est beau. Mais c'est au-delà qu'il fait qu'un adhérent vient, au-delà de la consommation. [...] Maintenant on est arrivé, [the association] fait des choses propres, lisses, comme une entreprise, sauf que dans une entreprise les dirigeants sont payés. Pour 2011 qu'est-ce que on fait ? Pour 2011 arrêtons de faire les projets sur 2-3 mois sans implication des bénévoles. Il faut que les projets viennent des adhérents. On doit être au-delà de ça : donner autre chose qu'une bonne image du Maghreb. On est la troisième génération, il faut avoir une réflexion sur le travail que l'on peut faire avec [the employees], bénévoles, c'est un travail global.

Here, the work could be accomplished with only paid employees, but having well-presented events was seen as insufficient to the association's goal of involving people in North African culture at a level deeper than consumption. Non-professional associations may occasionally hire individuals that perform special tasks, such as caterers for formal dinners or tour guides for trips to foreign cities. These specialists, however, provide services on contract and are not employed by the associations. For this kind of association, the size and activity of the membership is therefore crucial to their ability to offer events and services. The enthusiasm and engagement of volunteers, and the fact that they are unpaid, were seen as well worth the inconveniences.

Audiences

Activities can also have different intended audiences. An activity can be designed to serve the members of the association or a combination of association members and non-members.¹³ Among non-members, particular social engagements may target individuals from

¹³ The different ways in which associations and their members understand and discuss the boundaries between associative membership and the minority and national communities are discussed in the introduction.

within or outside the minority community. All of these will influence how an activity is organized and the extent of its influence.

Some activities were intended uniquely for the association's membership. Certain classes, services, or events, were often available only to members. Some of these events are communitarian activities (Phaneuf 2012), in that they are intended to strengthen intra-group ties. Parties, for example, were not publicized outside the association because the presence of non-members was not desired. Other members-only activities were advertised outside the group to attract new, long-term members. Year-long language classes tended to be widely publicized because they drew newcomers to the group and broadened membership, since interested individuals must join the association to take part.

Alternatively, associations could target an audience that was a mix of association members and non-members. This was seen as bringing a number of benefits. First, financially, an outside audience for particular events can offer a financial advantage because it brings in money through ticket sales. As I have discussed elsewhere (Phaneuf 2006), events that are designed to educate an outside audience and bring it in contact with the minority group can be intended to reduce racism and misunderstandings between communities and therefore have long-term benefits for the association's members. I have defined these educational events, those that aim to broaden the range of people who hear the association's message, as outreach activities (Phaneuf 2012).

Less frequently, associations focused exclusively on audiences outside their memberships. In such cases, the membership was organized to distribute aid or assistance to a

target audience that was not involved with the association. These activities could provide services to people unable to pay for a membership, or located elsewhere. At times associations would host open-air concerts in disadvantaged areas of their cities to expose local residents to new experiences, and music, which they could not afford to see in concert. Alternatively, association members of an Algerian student group in Grenoble gathered donations for victims of the 2003 earthquake, or a French-Moroccan association donated revenue from ticket sales for a scholarship fund in Morocco. Hamidi (2006:13) identifies this kind of charitable action as not only benefitting the audience, but fulfilling the participants' "besoin qu'éprouvent les individus de se sentir utiles et de croire en l'efficacité de leur action." Such charity activities can also be easily intelligible to non-minority audiences and reassure them of the civic qualities of the association members.

In cases where an association had a target audience outside its membership, this group tended not to be directly involved with the association's planning. As such, the association adopted more of a business model where, to be successful, it had to 'sell' its ideas and events not only to funding agencies, but also to its target audiences. If an association aimed to spread a message by attracting a diverse group of people to its events but failed to do so, it would be unable to achieve its goals.

Foundations and RUP

Among the study communities, RUP and foundations were seen as desirable structures for larger, professional, established associations. Both bring legitimacy and tax benefits. The

legal structure of foundations was seen as particularly attractive for two primary reasons: the assurances that the project will be perennial and the tax structure encouraging charitable donations. Both of these respond directly to concerns common among MCAs in this study: durability of the association and acquisition of funding. A small number of MCAs I worked with during the study period were RUP. Only one, the CDHA, was involved directly with a foundation, though others regularly received funding and a handful had considered developing foundations or partnering with existing foundations in support of their activities.

The CDHA, already RUP since 1985, holds and operates archives on the French presence in North Africa, specifically Algeria, and the post-independence lives of the Pied-Noir. The association is primarily concerned with the preservation and accessibility of these archives so as to facilitate future historical research. In 2011 the CDHA finalized two long-term projects: the creation of a foundation in support of its activities and the acquisition of land on which to build larger, more technologically sophisticated archives (CDHA 2011a, 2011b). The creation of a foundation was considered central to the CDHA's ability to pursue these plans to expand their activities so significantly. As one of the individuals involved noted, associations that receive local subventions are too dependent on the political opinions of elected officials: "Si demain on tombe sur un équipe qui dit que ca n'a aucun raison d'être. On n'a rien à faire sauf remballer tous les souvenirs à l'intérieur et les mettre où ?" This man worries that, otherwise, a political change could close the association. Another participant noted that a major motivation in creating the foundation was to prevent the documents ever being turned over by France to Algeria. The financial independence of a foundation is seen as preventing the eventual dismantling of the

collection and allowing the members to perennialize the association's activities. The benefits gained by the change in tax status are recognized, but as the association was already RUP, this was not a major motivation for the creation of the foundation.

Acquiring Resources

To remain viable, associations must acquire or have available some kind of financial or labor resources to hold activities and therefore maintain their membership. How they acquired or failed to acquire these resources is revealing of social and administrative tensions over the role of MCAs in society. Associations funded their activities in a number of ways. Primarily, they sought finances from their members, sales of services or objects, and grants or subventions from government agencies or the local, regional, or national government. All of these had repercussions for the kinds of activities the association could hold and its relations among members and with outside individuals and institutions. With the global economic downturn that worsened over the course of the study period, association organizers were investigating new ways of acquiring the resources necessary to continue their activities.

Sources of Funding

The most straightforward way to acquire necessary resources is directly from the association membership, and some associations are entirely self-financed. All money for their activities comes from members, either through membership fees, entry fees to particular events, donations from members to fund specific activities, or sales of products or services. During the

study, all associations required a financial contribution from members, but many had systems in place to waive part or all of dues for those unable to pay the full amount, and those serving underprivileged populations had smaller dues. Membership dues ranged from 5-40€, with the majority of the associations setting dues around 10-20€ a year. Dues also varied by services included with the membership. Associations with publications, for example, tended to be more expensive. Some associations also sold services, lessons, or products to bring in funding. Members of one association, for example, published a series of comic books on the history of Colonial Algeria, with the proceeds used to fund association activities.

Another source of funding during the study period was from outside public or private sources. While this offered the ability to hold larger, more complex, or more frequent events, arrangements or applications for funding could also be time-consuming, and accepting outside funding can create a number of difficulties, as I discuss in more detail below. Private sources, often companies, were called upon to donate funds, services, or materials for particular events. Sometimes these were cash donations. Services were also solicited: one association that hosted a concert with musicians from North Africa, for example, received sponsorship from an airline company in the form of free tickets for some of the musicians. Other associations borrowed materials for special events, such as chairs and tables from local restaurants. This kind of support tended to be sporadic and contingent upon the personalities and events involved.

A number of public agencies and levels of government have funds set aside for associations that were disbursed through grants and subsidies. These explicitly direct associations' actions by setting funding priorities. Both Pied-Noir and North African associations

seek funding from a number of sources. The national government (through the intermediary of particular ministries), local, department, and regional governments, and the European government also fund associations. Representatives of some North African associations noted that they had received increasing amounts of funding from the European government, as the French government has been steadily focusing funding for immigrants on new arrivals. The *Foundation de France* also offers subventions to associations primarily focused on social questions (Broca 2009: 211, 216), though few associations in the study benefitted from this source of funding. Student associations are also eligible to receive funding from their universities, but the range of what is considered for funding varies. For example, the Grenoble universities finance primarily cultural events, although universities at other cities will also fund purely social gatherings.

The most common sources of funding for North African associations in this study were from the FAS and its descendants, local municipal governments, departments, and regions. The *Fonds d'Action Social pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles* (FAS, also known under the names FASILD and FASTIF) was a primary source of funding for immigrant and minority (ethnic) associations until its replacement in 2006 by the *Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances* (Acsé) (L'Acsé 2012a; Hargreaves 1995). In the 1980s, for example, the FAS explicitly preferred to fund associations that focused on children and youth (Césari 1993). This had two effects: to direct associative actions to these areas and to legitimate group action based on ethnicity, though the latter was not explicitly stated (Césari 1993:88). At the time, the FAS was criticized for its *de facto* strengthening of social divisions (Kastoryano

2002). In recent years, the Acsé broadened its focus to include minorities and targets of discrimination, particularly those living in at-risk urban areas (L'Acsé 2012a). Funding priorities on the part of these agencies direct and legitimate the action of associations.

Particular foreign countries also offer support to their emigrants, and associations apply for these funds for activities such as language courses, cultural excursions, or vacations to the country of origin for school children. This was particularly common in the 1980s (Hargreaves 1995). A minority of the North African associations that participated in this study continued to seek and receive funding from their states of origin, either directly or through foundations. Since its creation in 2008, Pied-Noir associations can receive assistance from the *Mission Interministérielle aux Rapatriés*.

Types of Funding and Support

In general, regardless of their source, subventions fall into two categories. First, there are subventions designated for special projects. If an association wants to host a concert or lecture or take a trip, for example, it would apply for money for that specific project. Because funders have different priorities, the association tries to match projects with funders. It was through this kind of subvention that association activities were most clearly targeted to please the funding agencies. Second, there are subventions designated for general operations including staff, office rental and equipment, and utilities. Decisions on this kind of funding were based more on the general goals of, and services provided by, the association, and not on particular projects.

Public assistance also came in the form of services or access to property either for free or at a reduced rate. Both Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence have institutions that exist solely to aid associations. Some are generalized, while others focus on student or youth groups.¹⁴ For example, Cap Berriat, in Grenoble, is an association that aids youth (16-30) in creating and running associations. It offers space for meetings, post office boxes, technical assistance, and professional training to association members (Cap Berriat n.d.). Grenoble is also home to EVE, an association that provides very similar services to students, and the *Maison des Associations* (MDA-G), a municipal building dedicated to associations. Aix-en-Provence is home to the *Maison de la Vie Associative* (MVA). These institutions also offer space and assistance to associations. In both cities, buildings are set aside by the municipality as *Maison des Rapatriés* (MDR) and are reserved for Pied-Noir and Harki associations. I return to these facilities in Chapter 5.

Associations could also receive assistance from municipalities, regions, or other entities through loans of space or material, such as vehicles or equipment needed for special projects. For employment, “Contrats Unique d’Insertion” (CUI) or government subsidized positions available to not-for-profit employers were available to associations. This funding stream aimed to “faciliter l’insertion professionnelle des personnes sans emploi rencontrant des difficultés sociales et professionnelles particulières d’accès à l’emploi” (URSSAF 2011:2). At the end of the study period, these contracts were limited to 6 months, with possibility of renewal up to 24 months (URSSAF 2011:4), but the force of the changes had not yet been felt.

¹⁴ In France, youth is a very fluid concept, and can designate those under 18, 25, or 30.

Choices of Funding Types and Sources

Decisions of whether or not to accept outside funding, and for what projects, were based on a number of considerations, not all of them financial. Outside assistance was considered attractive because it gave associations additional abilities to run events, have offices, or hire employees. This is particularly important for associations that offer services to underprivileged populations, elderly, or youth, who would be unable to pay for these services on their own. When professional associations orient their activities towards those that are more likely to be funded it (Césari 1993), they become vulnerable to changes in funding priorities and may be unable to maintain continuity in activities from year to year. Some commented that this reduced trust of the populations they serve, who found sudden changes disorienting, and the disappearance of relied-upon services problematic. In these cases, associations that had been rewarded for serving as intermediaries between the government and the minority groups, by engaging with official priorities in the short or medium term, could be penalized in the long term with shifts in official funding priorities.

For other individuals and associations, creating and maintaining relationships of patronage with political entities was considered inherently problematic, complicating or negating their ability to ask for public funding. Césari (1993) notes that for North African associations in the *banlieue* in the 1980s, contact with funding agencies and the municipal government was seen by association members as a sign of collaboration on the part of the association organizers who were, instead, tasked with looking out for the minority's interest in the face of government

oppression and incomprehension. While none of the associations with which I worked had such fraught relations with public institutions, many of the organizers exhibited varying levels of reticence in accepting public funding to avoid political oversight and judgment. As one association organizer stated: “On a jamais demandé les subventions. [...] J’ai jamais demandé aux gens chargés du politique [...] Voilà l’esprit. Je ne voulais pas être tributaire des partis politiques.” For this man, the focus of the association on commemorations and memory makes it particularly important for group cohesion to not solicit external funding, because: “C’était à nous.”

Other associations that had been habitually refused funding eventually stopped asking. The chance that the outcome of the next application would be different, they felt, was not worth the time spent preparing the necessary documents or the implicit (or explicit) criticism of their activities that accompanied the rejection. By choosing to stop applying for funding they acknowledged that their activities fall outside the priorities for agency or branch of government to which they had been applying. Being unable to obtain official legitimation and in order to maintain legitimacy within the population they preferred to continue their activities and forgo official recognition and support.

Some associations choose to fund all or particular projects in-house instead of accepting exterior funding or assistance. In some cases, the requirements and procedures necessary to obtain the public aid were considered prohibitive. For example, due to the length of funding cycles, associations would not always know if they were going to receive any funding by the proposed date of the event. Alternatively, if they were awarded funding, it might not be

disbursed until after the event. For other associations, the small amounts of money available from some sources made the time spent writing the applications and justifications not worthwhile. Associations without salaried workers could more easily self-fund, because their overall budgets tended to be smaller and because their expenses were more contingent on the activities undertaken and less constant. They were therefore more resilient to fluctuations in funding, but could accomplish less.

This funding situation reinforces tensions over negotiations of integration and autonomy: while integration supposedly has political and social benefits, they do not translate directly into increased stability of funding (to say nothing of increased funding). In addition, vagaries in official financial decisions lead to distrust in government institutions. On the other hand, participation in government-funded projects, along with the integration that it implies, can be lucrative and beneficial to the associations' ability to serve their members.

The System "D" Style of Management

One way a number of association organizers spoke about their efforts to acquire needed funds, materials, and services was through the "*System D*."¹⁵ This stands for *system débrouillard*, or 'making-do.' Organizers tried to develop a more holistic approach to needs and resources. Instead of relying on habitual subventions or sources of public and private funding, they also employed the association's other assets, including the personalities and competences of

¹⁵ Not everyone referred to this style of management in the same way, but I have adopted the term here.

members and those assets that can be leveraged through personal and professional social networks.

Much of the System D relied on non-monetary exchange and unofficial relations. For many associations, their largest asset was the '*bénévols*', members volunteering their time. Some of these individuals were highly skilled, others merely enthusiastic. As I have discussed at length elsewhere (Phaneuf 2012), all volunteers in these associations participate at least in part for social considerations. While they may be impassioned by the goals or cause of the association, their engagement is also based on the pleasure of being with like-minded people whose company is mutually enjoyable. The personal characteristics of the association's organizers contribute significantly to setting the tone of the association and, therefore, influence decisions of volunteers to work there.

Personality of the individuals involved was particularly important, considering that associations exist within a web of relationships, social obligations, and reputations. The importance of personal relations in this kind of network has already been noted (Kastoryano 2012:81). A number of association members reported that developing relationships of trust with funding agencies is necessary: if an association is a known quantity, the agency knows that its money will be spent well. Association members cited particularly charismatic and energetic presidents as being able to mobilize people and resources especially well thanks to their tenacity and winning personalities. The same was true of highly active members, regardless of their official position in the group.

As part of the “*System D*,” efforts were also made to create lasting partnerships between associations to pool resources and reduce costs. A member of a North African cultural association who was also a member of a theater group, for example, borrowed sound equipment or chairs from the theater group. With reductions in public funding at the end of the fieldwork period, a number of associations discussed exploring this kind of option; however, it is unclear how successful or enduring these beginnings might be. Numerous associations have discussed consolidating their secretaries or social planners, for example, to create one position that will serve a number of groups. Although this would mean considerable savings and create the possibility of having one permanent position instead of a number of temporary or part time positions spread across associations, bureaucratic and organizational hurdles prevented any associations from entering into such an arrangement during the study period. This is particularly the case of associations that share cultural interests. Often, where multiple similar associations existed in a region, some were founded because of past or present disagreements or differences in personality or outlook. It may be the case that partnerships like the North African association and the theater group will be more fruitful in the long term because they do not have to overcome institutional memory of such disagreements. Here, too, personalities can be important. For example, if organizers of two associations do not like each other, or if one develops a reputation for not following through on commitments, these systems of exchange would not develop, or they would break down.

One example of System D management was finding alternative sources for employees’ salaries. Associations tended to pay for the employees out of their own budgets if the total

amount of their membership dues and products or services sold are sufficient. Alternatively, they could receive subventions for the employees, such as through CUI. While associations were concerned at the impending loss of funding as CUI were restricted, associations that used CUI were investigating other options, such as other funding sources, reducing employment, and forming cooperatives of associations to hire communal employees.

A final adaptation of some associations to a changing funding landscape has been to reduce and re-calibrate their activities to what they can comfortably self-fund or pay for with reliable subventions. One association, for example, reduced its staff and events, and planned to focus primarily on smaller events that can be run entirely with volunteers and staff, with one large event a year that will be funded through outside monies. This had the benefit, they believed, of making the association more financially stable, despite the reduction in activities. Also, as the president noted: “La question – l’association c’est quoi ? C’est une micro-entreprise qui fait de belles choses ? Où on a un sens fort où les gens veulent donner leur temps. C’est ça qui manque.” By asking himself if the association is “a micro-entreprise that does beautiful things?” or if it is a strong communal feeling, this man acknowledges that questions of what the association does reflect on the group’s understanding of civil society itself. With added emphasis on the role of volunteers in the association, the bureau hopes to reinforce internal ties and the connection of individuals to the association. In this way they are also enhancing a socially-acknowledged and acceptable function of associations, that of emphasizing members’ interpersonal ties and relationships.

In this section I have illustrated that the choices associations make of how to acquire the resources necessary to maintain their activities are determined by financial, social, and personal considerations as well as by how association leaders understand resources and the purpose of civil society. Aside from the financial necessities of running an association, the source of the money is important to many. An association's ability to self-fund can be a source of pride or receipt of public monies can be a sign of legitimacy and proof of its social utility and acceptance. These both impact the association's success at attracting members and audiences. The personalities, competences, and inclinations of presidents, the board, and others active in the association also determine how, where, and if the group will look for less-traditional resources and partnerships, and their success. Some individuals and groups were more willing than others to re-align the associations' activities with external demands or offers of funds or legitimation, particularly when they have understood that such offers may be temporary and change with the political party in office. These groups have developed alternative strategies. Others negotiate their activities with funding sources that they acknowledge to be more or less reliable. System D is one of a number of adaptations that allow associations to continue to participate in civil society and act for change while attempting to create a more permanent place for themselves in the nation.

Association Activities

Associations' primary official purpose is to put groups of people who share a common interest in contact. This common interest is enacted through the association's activities. As

discussed earlier in this chapter, there are minimal restrictions to associations' actions, provided they are legal and do not threaten national security. As a result, there are myriad activities offered by associations designed to amuse, educate, or serve the associations' members or a wider public. In this section I describe a typology of activities practiced by the MCA and discuss the ways associations combined a number of activities to create their yearly offering of social engagements.

Associations offered different combinations of activities, which can be roughly divided into courses, services, events, and activism (Phaneuf 2012). This is illustrated in Figure 1. Services typically represented aid or assistance that was specifically intended to benefit the minority population, though others could gain from them as well. These services were otherwise available on the free market, but were provided to members at reduced or no cost. Courses varied greatly in intent and content. Some were year-long segments in multi-year series, such as language courses. Others, such as writing, music, or drama classes, would occur weekly or monthly over the course of a year. Still others were sporadic, and took the format of workshops, where students registered for classes *à la carte*. Within courses, agents of the associations transfer knowledge to students. Events consisted of numerous social performances and engagements. However, at their core, events involved a group of people participating in or witnessing an action. Activism included activities explicitly social or humanitarian in nature intended to improve the status quo.

Figure 1: Taxonomic Organization of Association Activities

Activities	Services	Legal aid, Advocacy
		Translation
		Funeral and Repatriation Services
		Preservation of Objects and Archives, Property Management, Museum Operation and Curation, Research Assistance, Journal or Newsletter Publication
	Courses	Language (French, Dialect or Standard Arabic), Literacy
		Art, Theater, Music, Dance, Calligraphy, Writing, Cooking
	Events	Conferences, Lectures, Concerts, Theater Productions, Dance Shows, Art Shows, Historical Exhibits, Commemorations
		Vacations, Tours, Shopping Trips, Pilgrimages
		Dinners, <i>Aperitifs</i> , Coffees, Dances, Parties, Festivals
	Activism	Demonstrations
		Political Lobbying
		Fund Raising for Charities (Local, National, international)
		Commemorations

Associations combine activities from within one category or across categories of activities to create their offering of social engagements. Not all associations participate in all categories of activities; some focus, for example, on events, services, or activism. The number of activities an association organizes and runs in a year depends on various factors, including the demand for the activity(s), size of the volunteer base, funding, and availability of infrastructure. North African and Pied-Noir associations, on the whole, engage in categories of activities at different frequencies. Both offer services, events, and activism of varying types. North African associations tend to offer more courses, while Pied-Noir groups are more likely to run or manage archives, cultural and religious sites, or museums. During this study, these differences in

activities mirrored the differences in association goals. While North African associations were aimed at reducing discrimination, providing services to the minority group, and educating the outside public, Pied-Noir associations were additionally interested in preserving their way of life and their history, as much as possible, in the face of their impending mortality. In part, this is due to which kinds of events were considered acceptable, as I discuss more in Chapters 4 and 6.

Activity Organization

Activities can be organized and run entirely with volunteers from the association membership, or with a combination of volunteers and paid professionals. These require different financial and time commitments on the part of the association's membership. Concerts and conferences, for example, can be entirely organized and staffed by members. This requires a membership large enough, with sufficient time, and with the technical competences to put on this kind of event. Alternatively, if a concert is organized or run by paid professionals, such as light and sound technicians, the association must provide a considerably larger financial outlay to pay for these services, but it is not responsible for providing skilled manpower. Professionals tend to offer a technically superior product, and simplify the tasks of association members.

Associations source their labor based on their financial capacity and the ambiance they desire at the activity. A large, commemorative ceremony held in 2010 to remember the *Rue d'Isly* massacre of 26 March 1962, for example, relied heavily on the skills of professionals. Organizers had decided that the serious, solemn nature of the event, and the fact that they hoped to attract a large, diverse audience and media presence, required a polished, professional

presentation that they could not have achieved with the skills of the volunteers they had available. What is more, it was these same technical qualities on which the organizers relied to secure public funding to defray the costs of the event. In contrast, an association that desires a more intimate, homey atmosphere may rely entirely on the services of volunteers. One association, for example, held a potluck dinner/concert at the house of its president to celebrate the beginning of Ramadan. This event was entirely self-funded, organized, and run by volunteers, which fit the private, friendly character of the evening.

Association Demographics

Associations would not exist without their membership. While I have incorporated descriptions of the members and their motivations above, and will to a greater extent in the following chapters, in this section I offer a summary description of the members of these associations by age, gender, and socioeconomic status, along with providing basic information on their motivations for participation.

Age

Participants of all ages were not equally represented in the associations. In general, in France, individuals who are members of associations are more likely to be older than average (Hamidi 2006). This was most striking in the Pied-Noir associations, where the vast majority of the members were near or above retirement age. This trend was so marked that I would regularly be approached at events by individuals curious to see someone my age. This pattern follows the

average age of the Pied-Noir population in general – anyone born after 5 July 1962 does not share in the experience of living in Algeria and participating in the exodus. Those who were born in France to Pied-Noir parents are less likely to identify as Pied-Noir, to make claims based on that identity, and participate in this kind of association (Comtat 2009), though there are exceptions. Remembering Pied-Noir associations during the 1960s and 1970s, many individuals noted a more varied participation – from youth and families with young children to older individuals past retirement. This was tied to the assistance and social opportunities the associations provided to the newly-arrived Pied-Noir and their families. Over time, however, the children who took part in the dances, picnics, and Christmas dinners with their parents stopped participating. This was attributed to a lack of interest in their heritage. By 2009, though many individuals had been very active in associations during their professional life, many others began or increased their activity once they had retired or their children had left the house. This was attributed to an availability of free time and money that came with having fewer family and professional responsibilities. Individuals who participated in history or memory-based groups also noted that as they grew older they had become more interested in thinking about their youth and making provisions for how the Pied-Noir would be remembered after the last had passed away. Some have begun bringing their grandchildren to events and there is a general sense of hope that the new generation will develop an interest in their family history and culture.

Among the North African associations, the age range of participants was much greater, though some similar factors influenced participation. Some associations had programs or courses designed specifically for children or mothers and children. Others, even if they did not have

events designed for young families, would make efforts to include this demographic, such as by holding activities in the afternoon or early evening when it would be more feasible for parents to bring small children. Not all events were child-friendly. Many associations that had lectures, activities, and classes for adults had participants ranging from university students to post-retirement. The elderly did not tend to attend classes; that not all classrooms were accessible to individuals with reduced mobility may have had an influence on the participation of this demographic. Some associations had events for or serving the elderly. The presence in France of retired North African workers, either single or married with their family in North Africa, has begun to be a source of concern for local activists, social workers, and municipal governments (i.e., Chaouite 2009). These individuals are often not fully aware of their legal rights to retirement and health benefits, and lack kin and affective support networks. To ameliorate their condition, a number of mutual assistance associations have been created, and larger associations and public entities have added research and activist activities to better understand and meet their needs. For example, a group of activists created an association that serves as a *café sociale* to provide local retired workers with a place to socialize, access to technology (computers with Internet and Skype, Arabic-language television), and bureaucratic and legal assistance. Other associations provide similar assistance but do not have offices and meet their members where they can.

While there were clear trends in participation by age for youth and those at or above retirement, patterns for those in between these ages are less obvious. Instead, participation among individuals post-baccalaureate to retirement is best described in terms of their gender,

socio-economic situation, and personal inclination. In the following sections I outline patterns for these categories.

Gender

Participation in both North African and Pied-Noir associations was clearly gendered. In general, in France, individuals who are members of associations are more likely to be men (Hamidi 2006). The participation of individuals in interviews for this study was overwhelmingly male (75 men to 21 women). This discrepancy was due in part to the greater number of men as presidents and members of the CA or bureau. As I made an effort to speak to the presidents of every association, this significantly influenced the gender bias of my interviews. When I made efforts to include more women in the study, however, some sent me to speak to presidents, board members, or husbands, saying that their participation was not interesting and ignoring my protests to the contrary. On the part of some, who agreed to do interviews after getting to know me, I believe that the initial reticence was due to shyness. Others appeared to be extremely busy and likely did not wish to take the time. Also, in some of the more centralized associations, the tendency was to refer all questions to the president, and so an unwillingness to speak was normal of both genders. Such reticence may have also been due to my perceived role in the associations. I realized partway through the fieldwork that, because of my insistence on speaking to as many presidents and board members as possible, in many groups I was placed in the men's social circle. When I tried to help in the kitchen, for example, I was given an inconsequential task and sent away from the area as quickly as possible. While at first I assumed that this was because of my

foreign status and associated lack of culinary knowledge, I realized that this was the same treatment received by the men. These women may have assumed that I was only interested in men's roles and treated me accordingly. For these reasons, my comments on women's motivation for participating must remain incomplete.

On the whole, numbers of men and women involved with the associations were relatively equal across active members, inactive members, and non-members who attended events. The gender of audience members was, likewise, equal on the whole. However, the majority of association presidents and board members who participated in this study were men. At the time of the study, out of 25 North African and 33 Pied-Noir associations, 10 presidents were women: 5 of Pied-Noir associations and 5 of North African associations. This is not a reflection on the associative participation and involvement of these minority groups in general – while I asked questions about individuals' participation in other associations, there is no way to judge the associative participation of minority individuals who did not participate in MCA.

In addition to the gender bias in elected officials, active members who did not hold elected office tended to participate in gendered ways. Instructors at French and literacy classes, for example, were more likely to be women, as were people who volunteered to cook, organize, and clean for parties, dinners, and special events. Men were more likely to be in charge of the roast at *mechouis*, to give lectures and presentations, and to do any carrying or moving of heavy objects.

Gendered relations outside the associations had a significant influence on the ability and willingness of individuals to participate and the activities they choose. For many, active

participation is second to both professional and family obligations. A number of women with families noted that their participation in the associations was determined by the age of their children or the fact that the association with which they participated was very understanding of family obligations. Some men commented that over the past half-century women have become increasingly insistent that their husbands be present at home outside of working hours. A number noted that this has negatively affected participation and other forms of volunteerism among men. In a conversation, for example, two Algerian immigrant noted how changes in participation were not entirely due to a lack of interest on the part of men, but also to their wives' expectations:

Avant le bénévolat c'était important. Maintenant ce n'est pas évident.

Nous on n'est plus les mêmes: avant on prenait notre propre temps, [after work] la activité administrative pour se faire plaisir. Maintenant on n'est plus les mêmes. Les femmes ne sont plus les mêmes, ça n'excepte pas que l'on rentre tard.

Whether these expectations or their expression have changed over time, or the husbands in question have become more acquiescent, is unclear. One Moroccan immigrant who had a long history of active participation reflected that: "J'essaie de gérer mon temps entre ma famille et l'association, avec une bonne entente avec ma femme, par exemple. D'ailleurs elle est courageuse, elle essaie de m'éloigner [de l'association] mais c'est ma vie." Here, he responded to his wife's longstanding opposition to his participation in other ways, and maintained his involvement with the association.

While in some cases association membership can be a stress on personal relations, in others it plays a role in their success. Once partners have reached retirement, participation in

associations provides socially-sanctioned personal time – a role that had previously been filled by work. As one Pied-Noir man remembered:

Depuis que je suis à la retraite, je prends la vendredi pour moi, je pense à moi [...]. Ca fait 40 ans que l'on est mariée, avec ma femme, en réalité on n'a pas été tous les deux ensemble, j'ai plus vécu avec ma secrétaire que ma femme. Et tout d'un coup, Paf ! les deux sont là [...]. Il faut, pour pas s'étrangler, prendre un peu de recul. Donc [l'association] rentre dans mon emploi de temps de vendredi. [...] C'est plus intéressant, ça, que d'autres choses.

Although some use associations as a source of personal expression outside their marriages, others find in them an opportunity to spend additional time with their spouse or family. Numerous couples are active in associations, at times working very closely together, at other times having separate roles and duties. For example, one couple that belonged to a Pied-Noir *amicale* organized the school photo exhibit at the association's yearly meeting. They worked on it together for months each year as a shared project. Another man was the member of the bureau of a Pied-Noir association for which his wife volunteered. While they did very different things at the association, they organized their schedules so that they could be there at the same time.

Socioeconomics

Collection of systematic data on the socioeconomic status of association members was not part of this study. In the future I plan to conduct further research on this topic. However, here I address a few of the most prominent and cursory patterns. On the whole, in France, individuals who are members of associations tend to be more educated than average (Hamidi 2006). Within

the MCA in this study, there was a tendency for those with elevated socioeconomic status to occupy more prominent or prestigious positions in association hierarchies. There are several possible explanations for this pattern. Individuals who served on governing boards, particularly of national associations with many branches, traveled and participated in meetings and events, some of which lasted for days. This required financial resources and spare time available only to those with an elevated socioeconomic status. At the other extreme, individuals without reliable housing or income found it difficult to take on the most basic of roles in the association for lack of resources.

Position in the association could also be tied to profession. One example is treasurer. Often – though not always – the person who filled this position had some kind of financial or administrative background that qualified him or her for the task. This is not surprising: the role of treasurer requires a certain level of education and financial ability that not all possess. This matches patterns noted elsewhere among North African immigrants, where those with education or training beyond that of the typical *main d'oeuvre* but were underemployed played a large role in associations because they had the necessary qualifications (Geisser 1997). In these cases such individuals were not only qualified, they found in the associations an outlet for these professional abilities.

Socioeconomic opportunities also offer one possible explanation for the disparity in participation of youth in the Pied-Noir and North African associations over time. During the 1980s in France, social acceptance was one demand of minority populations (Geisser 1997). This period also saw an explosion of North African associations, in part to provide social

opportunities for individuals in *banlieue* (Chabanet 2005). While individuals became involved for a variety of reasons, a percentage saw associative participation as a possibility for social advancement and, in essence, job training (Geisser 1997; Césari 1993). This pattern also appeared in the early 1980s among Portuguese associations, where youth would use their participation in Portuguese cultural associations as an entry to professional careers in France or Portugal (Hily et Poinard 1985). For those North Africans who moved from participation to employment in associations, this could represent either a social advancement for those from modest backgrounds, or a sign of professional stagnation for those who had achieved advanced degrees but were unable to find employment in their area (Geisser 1997:69).

The socio-economic characteristics of the North African and Pied-Noir populations in France in general are quite different, as discussed in Chapter 2. North Africans are more likely to come from educationally and economically disadvantaged backgrounds or to be stereotyped as uneducated, uncultured hooligans or radical Muslims from economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, regardless of their educational, cultural, or religious background (Waquant 2008). Because of their physically identifiable characteristics, it was relatively difficult for some North African individuals and families to escape these stereotypes and accompanying discrimination. Children of Pied-Noir and the Pied-Noir themselves were not physically distinct, and, though some settled in disadvantaged neighborhoods, by the 1980s the majority of families were economically integrated into French society (Manes 2005). As such, on the whole, they did not have the social, economic, or structural constraints preventing their entry into mainstream educational, vocational, and social opportunities. This is, of course, only part of the explanation

of why North Africans and Pied-Noir show such different patterns of participation in associations, to which I return in Chapter 4 and 6.

Conclusion

Minority cultural associations in France today walk a fine line between integration and separation from the nation. Their form fosters bureaucratic integration, the development of social ties for their members, and may lead to political involvement for some. Certain associations can explicitly foster attachment to, and defend their position within, the nation. I will return to this point in the next chapter. However, their status as *minority* associations makes them the target of racist, xenophobic, or reductionist conceptions. What is more, minority associations cannot become too close to the mainstream or they lose legitimacy as representatives of the minority group. This liminal position – neither entirely integrated into nor in opposition to the social order – gives associations and their leadership opportunities for negotiating resources and the right to legitimate participation in civil society as well as constraints on that participation. The existence of such associations in French society is new: associations themselves are slightly over 100 years old, and minority associations that make claims of the state and society have only been present since the 1980s. As such, they do not fit comfortably into a pre-existing social category. Rather, they are trying to prove their cultural interest and social utility while negotiating for themselves a position in the nation from a tenuous, liminal standpoint.

As discussed in the last chapter, since the 1980s and particularly the 1990s current events and media discussions have reiterated the violent potential of the North African and Pied-Noir

minority groups. As such, the position of North African and Pied-Noir minority associations is particularly tenuous in terms of acceptance from outsiders. Tainted with suspicion of violence and Islamist or conservative views, minorities' opportunities for political action are circumscribed. Cultural associations offer a venue that is well known in France and explicitly apolitical and a-religious. Though there is no well-defined role for MCAs in society, they are less of a threat than if the minorities used political parties or religious groups to create solidarity and effect widespread change. Culture in and of itself is not threatening, and can be used both to define the minority population and argue for its position in France, as I discuss in Chapter 4.

The System D offers associations the ability to maintain their activity in the face of official and social uncertainty over their position. This is similar to other such attempts, as when associations reconstruct themselves as RUP or foundations. By becoming a foundation or acquiring the legitimating status of an RUP association, groups can integrate themselves more fully into the dominant system in a way that guarantees funding (foundations) or provides a universally accepted mark of their legitimacy (RUP and foundations). They both require that associations have a detailed plan of operations, more advanced knowledge of associative law, and the leadership can invest significant up-front planning and effort. What System D offers that these other options do not is the ability to walk the line between bureaucratic integration and distance from the political regime. If subventions are available and appropriate, then associations can take advantage of them – they have not cut all ties with the establishment, nor do they have any ideological reasons not to apply for public funds. This also allows them to engage in cooperative projects and take the role of spokespeople for the minority group to the municipal,

regional, or other levels of government or society at large. However, when such funding is not forthcoming, and there are no opportunities to collaborate, associations that have adopted the System D have the freedom to find other ways of maintaining their activity and possibly building a reputation for legitimacy over the long term that could allow them re-entry into the category of the politically legitimate. I provide an example of just such an association in Chapter 5.

What I have illustrated in this chapter is that association leaders and members deploy a number of different structural, organizational, and rhetorical strategies to demonstrate their legitimacy, seriousness, and utility to both the nation and the minority population. This is despite opposition based on concerns about the association form, the role of minorities in civil society, and, for some, the very existence of minorities in the French nation. While the attempts at solutions described in this chapter illustrate the associations' commitment to finding a role for themselves in society, how these negotiations take place is not clear. In the next chapter I outline categorizations of culture and value in France to explain how associations argue for a position within the nation and the ways in which they ideologically situate themselves to gain that place.

CHAPTER 4: THE 'VALUE' OF 'CULTURE' AND THE 'CULTURE' OF 'VALUE'

Introduction

Minority cultural associations (MCA) are founded to represent or enact culture(s). As discussed in Chapter 3, many give themselves the added task of promoting their culture or attempting to change the social relations of the minority group. Associations are more or less successful at these tasks: some are large, well-funded and attended, while others struggle to find audiences or cease to exist. In this chapter I argue that because MCAs exist to promote minority culture; their success is tied to how they negotiate larger understandings of culture and identity in French society. The success of an association is affected by *how* the culture it represents is understood in terms of larger conceptions of 'culture' held in society. 'Culture' is a particularly slippery term: not even Anthropologists can agree on a meaning, and the study of culture is our business. To understand the emic discussions of culture into which the MCA fall, one must first understand how they, their members, their funders, and their audiences understand the term. In the first part of the chapter I explain the main definitions of culture as used in France. Rather than having one definition, 'culture' refers to a number of different concepts that are assigned different levels of value in society. Their boundaries are shifting, negotiated, and contested. I then offer two theories for understanding how value is assigned in society through socially determined criteria. In the remainder of the chapter I provide two case studies of associations that explicitly deal with valuations of culture, explain how these differences in definition are of value to the associations' ability to attract and maintain members, funds, and an audience, three crucial

components of an association's existence. Throughout I draw attention to the dissonances and negotiations resulting from these tensions and slippages in the meaning of 'culture' and regimes of value.

Culture à la Française

Culture is a concept widely used in French society and assigned great explanatory power. This is despite the fact that it has no unified, agreed upon definition: neither academics nor the individuals involved with the MCA have a stable, shared understanding of the term. Rather, 'culture' is used in three distinct but overlapping ways, which I call: "high," "traditional," and "mode de vie."¹⁶ From an anthropological perspective these categories are unsatisfying and reductionist, but it is necessary to appreciate how the term "culture" is used by those involved with the MCA themselves to understand the contemporary social situation.

"High" Culture

First, culture is understood as 'high' culture, akin to fine art (Kuper 1999). This definition is similar to Redfield's "great tradition" (1956), though he uses the term civilization. Redfield, and after him, Milton Singer (1959), use "great tradition" to designate the cultivated, educated, and refined part of civilizations, that complement the "little traditions," or the culture of the

¹⁶ For ease of explanation I include references to anthropological works that name and discuss these different types of culture. Given the wide variation in definitions among participants, any attempt at providing a unified definition will be reductive. As such, the definitions offered here should be taken as general types and not understood as defining the complete understandings and beliefs of any particular individual or group. Further exploration of this emic variation in terminology is planned for a future project.

illiterate, unrefined members of the civilization that is derived from prior great traditions (Wilcox 2004:148-9). I discuss “little traditions” at greater length below. This category of ‘culture’ is seen as having universal interest because of its studied nature, depth, and quality, as opposed to other sorts of culture that are of ‘only’ local or of temporary interest. Ballet is a classic example, as are *haute cuisine* and opera. More applicable to this study, classical Arabic poetry is an uncontested example of high culture, as are the works of Albert Camus, recipient of a Nobel Prize. The supposedly universal character of “high” culture is, in practice, a value judgment that classes it as more legitimate and purer than other cultural expressions.

Minority or ‘Traditional’ Cultures

Second, culture refers to minority or ‘traditional’ cultures (Shryock 2004b), or “little traditions” (Redfield 1956). This category is often tied to an ethnicity, language group, or region of origin. This use of ‘culture’ presupposes both a mainstream or majority society and an individual or group that is exhibiting difference from that norm. Although there is a considerable body of literature in anthropology that illustrates and explores difference between traditional and popular culture within one society (i.e., García Canclini 1995, Guss 2000), this distinction is less significant in this case. Instead, traditional minority culture is understood in opposition to contemporary French culture (a designation which is itself also reductionist and problematic). Though it can be sensitive to cultural variation and changes, this understanding typically essentializes the culture it describes, placing the source of the culture’s value and legitimacy in a mythic or imagined past and discounting changes or innovations (Anderson 1983).

When appellations of minority culture are assigned by someone outside the group, the variety of internal cultural and ethnic designations considered significant by group members themselves are often effaced. The application of a unified ‘North-African’ label, for example, eliminates perceived differences between nationality, ethnic origins, religion, language, and region of origin that are considered to have explanatory power by members of these minorities. At other times, however, these same individuals may claim the North African label for particular ends (Geisser 1997). Similarly, the label ‘Pied-Noir’ also erases the variety of religious, national, and geographic backgrounds (Dimech 2006; Smith 2006). The reductionist force of this use of ‘culture’ is particularly true when applied to Middle Eastern cultures or peoples by occidentals (Said 1978), though in many cases they can also claim this kind of conglomerated label for themselves and treat other groups in a similarly reductionist manner. This definition of culture includes, for example, minority popular music, dress, and cuisine.

Mode de Vie

Third, culture is seen as a ‘mode de vie’ or a way of life. This is seen in theories of embodiment (Bourdieu 2008 [1972]), Judith Butler’s “styles of the flesh” where group differences (gender, in her case) are tied to ways of acting (2008:190), and Connerton’s bodily practices where history is “sedimented in the body” (1989:72). This is not tied to any particular cultural manifestation, like poetry or dance, but is intangible and refers to a series of attitudes and styles of practice. In my interviews I found that this kind of difference is said to exist in minority identity groups, by geography, and in groups with shared experience. All of these

categories can be interactive and self-reinforcing. These groups can have this kind of culture assigned to them from the outside, or they can promote the idea themselves. The Pied-Noir, for example, are described by Metropolitan French as ‘naturally’ imperious, commanding, and racist (Dimech 2006; Smith 2006:179-180), descriptions that are denied by the Pied-Noir. Instead, the Pied-Noir that I met during my fieldwork described themselves as more outgoing, welcoming, and cosmopolitan than the metropolitan French, similar to the attitude reported by Andrea Smith (2006:176). Algerians, on the other hand, are explained as ‘naturally’ violent (Shepard 2006). During my fieldwork they rejected this, and many questioned the idea that they should have a national character. The idea that both Algerian-born and French-born of Algerian parents would have the same character was also not accepted. Both Algerians and the Pied-Noir are identified as loud, blowing car horns at weddings and preferring noisy parties and barbeques to other kinds of gatherings. As we see here, while there is agreement that there are cultural differences, the content and distribution of these differences is disputed.

The same is true of geographic regions, both in France and elsewhere. In this folk cultural geography, places and regions are overlain with presumed cultural and character traits. Regions of France are assumed to have their own ways of living. In part this belief is attributed to the historically-based, regional linguistic and cultural diversity (Haine 2006). For example, residents of the south are categorized as louder and more outgoing, and residents of the north are seen as more reserved (Northcutt 1996). This presumed connection between region and culture is not unique to France. In the international ballet community, for example, it is generally accepted that

the “national character” of a ballerina’s home country is said to be visible in her/his dancing (Wulff 2002:68).

The participants in this study also took this connection between region and culture for granted, though with the acknowledgment that region is not all-determining. I witnessed a group of Moroccans living in France who were meeting each other for the first time. When each announced his or her hometown the others responded with a slew of good-natured ribbing and commentary about how well (or not) the individual matched the stereotypes associated with their town, and what could be expected from this or that individual. Because I had spent a summer in Tangier I was assigned membership to that geographic group in jest, the incongruity of an American “from” Tangier only adding to the joke. For these Moroccans, the system is open in the sense that affiliation with a place does not require long-term residence, and people can hold multiple affiliations. I can be American and Tangerois in the same way that the Moroccans I was speaking to could be simultaneously Tangerois, Grenoblois, and Lyonnais. I discuss the identities that accompany such place-based cultures in Chapter 7. The Pied-Noir similarly characterized individuals from different regions of Algeria with different forms of action and thought, and allowed for multiple affiliations, particularly noting town of birth, town of long-term residence (if that was different), and location of residence in France. Despite their almost 50-year absence from Algeria, they maintained that differences by town of origin were still perceptible, though attenuated. While these assumptions of ‘mode de vie’ based on geography are only half believed, they are still treated as half true.

Groups with communal experiences can also develop their own ‘mode de vie.’ These cultures tied to common experiences are explained by Iwona Irwin-Zarecka as stemming from “principles embedded in their shared stories” that influence their actions and decisions (2008:56). Renan (1882) attributes the strength of the nation to such a common past. As discussed in Chapter 6, Renan’s views on the importance of a common history for national solidarity are well known in France today, due to his re-discovery by politicians and intellectuals since the 1980s (Kastoryano 2002). However, at an infra-national level, these shared experiences may not be enough to create an identity group, they can still influence the witnesses.

Similarities and affinities between veterans and the Pied-Noir, for example, were often noted. This version of culture includes a respect for the French flag and other symbols of the nation. Explanations for why this is vary, including their mutual ‘traditional’ (in the sense of post-WWII) values, attachment to country as instilled by the French school system, and experience of war (Calmien 2012; Dimech 2006). As discussed in Chapter 2, the Pied-Noir have a close relationship with the Army in part because they felt protected by it when they believed that the national government – and particularly de Gaulle – had abandoned them. These inclinations have also translated into political allegiances. While living in Algeria, the Pied-Noir were typically members of leftist parties, including the French Communist Party (PCF). Since returning to France, it is typically assumed that they vote for the extreme right. In her research, Emanuelle Comtat (2009) has illustrated that the political allegiances of this group are more diverse and complex, but membership in the PCF is very low due to the party’s support of Algerian independence and terrorist activities.

In contrast, the North African population in France has typically been associated with the PCF because of the party's historic concern with worker issues and the overwhelming membership of Algerians in France in the working class (Hargreaves 1995; Stora 1992). Over time, however, the younger generations stopped identifying with the PCF, in part because of the party's ambivalent relationship with the immigrants, at times treating them as brothers in struggle, and at others as stealers of 'French' jobs (Ireland 1994; Hargreaves 1995:146, 182). Additionally, with the rise of the *beur* generation in the 1980s, the youth began to identify more as an ethnic than as a class group (Laronde 1993). This gave rise to associations such as SOS Racism, which focuses on the needs of minorities, including all North African immigrant groups, because of their shared experiences as victims of racism and discrimination (Geisser 1997; SOS Racism 2012). Regardless of ethnic differences, there is evidence that in contemporary France, youth organize their identities based on geographic and class positions (particularly, their shared experiences in the *banlieue*) that crosscut differences in ethnic heritage (Murphy 2011). In the examples of both the Pied-Noir and the North Africans, cultural and affective group ties are based on shared experience. Although this at times has played out in political alliance or censure, such affiliations and experiences do not map easily onto the political landscape by minority group.

The 'mode de vie' of an individual can also be attributed to various causes at the same time. A naturalized Algerian man used a story to explain to me the similarities between the Pied-Noir and the Algerians, and his regret that they could not work together more closely, which I now summarize. Shortly after Algerian independence, a Pied-Noir was working in a factory in

Paris. One day, while on break, he asked one of his co-workers for a cigarette. The coworker, “un français” (a Frenchman), pointed across the street and said that there was a Tabac (cigarette store) right there. The Pied-Noir turned in confusion to an Algerian man who had witnessed the exchange, who offered him a whole pack of cigarettes. The Pied-Noir accepted it with tears in his eyes. In this story, the teller represented the ‘French’ man as behaving in a way the Algerian and the Pied-Noir both considered to be unfriendly and unacceptable. The shared social mores of the Pied-Noir and Algerian workers are explained through their common geography (Algeria) and experiences of working and living there together. The story was also told to give a hopeful example of how the populations are not as different as they are often portrayed. The interlocutor identified it as a ‘Mediterranean culture’ that united the two men with roots in Algeria and set them apart from the northern ‘French’ man. In this example a culture based on shared geography and experience is explained as more determining than one based on shared nationality and ethnicity.

In this story, instances of shared culture can be used to create or eliminate boundaries between groups. Again, this approaches Butler’s ‘styles of the flesh,’ as when she notes: “Consider gender, for instance, as *a corporeal style*, an ‘act,’ as it were, which is both intentional and performative, where ‘performative’ suggests a dramatic and contingent construction of meaning” (Butler 2008:190). Though Butler is talking about gender difference, this understanding of a performative construction and maintenance of group boundaries is useful in this case for understanding why boundaries are drawn as they are. Differences in acceptable

behavior are used to distinguish between groups. This is particularly useful in situations, such as with the Pied-Noir, when the minority is not visibly distinct from majority.

'Culture' in Action

These three conceptions of culture as 'high,' 'traditional,' or 'mode de vie' are obviously simplistic and reductionist. During the fieldwork period, however, they were often treated as self-evident truths by study participants and the media. As such, they are central to understanding the lived experiences of these individuals. The apparent simplicity of these concepts is complicated by their semantic slipperiness and contestations over their meaning, which makes them subtler in practice. Classical Arabic poetry, for example, tends to be considered both 'high' and 'traditional' culture. Inherently connected with a minority group, its 'universal' relevance and 'value' are nonetheless asserted.

Another slippage in categorization may occur, depending on the categorizer. The position of belly dance, for example, is contested. French arts funders and venues and the public in general place it as part of a pan-oriental cultural tradition. Some practitioners prefer it to be considered as an element of 'high culture,' as a dance form. This is evidence of a western bias in 'fine art': ballet is also a regional cultural manifestation, and yet it is now claimed to be of 'universal' interest (Said 1978; Sezer 2009; Poirrier 2010). Other practitioners do not contest the category of belly dance as a minority cultural event. Instead, they capitalize on the association with the 'oriental,' performing in explicitly Mideast-themed venues, using 'traditional' costumes,

and emphasizing these characteristics in advertisements (See Figure 2). As such, they use their position of ‘other’ to encourage cultural tourism and create monetary value.

Figure 2: Photo of belly dance advertisement



The ‘Value’ of Culture

In the above sections I have shown the differences in cultural classification that exist and have meaning in contemporary French society. More than once I have alluded to the relationship between culture and value and the fact that cultures are evaluated, in the sense of having their values judged. It is useful to think about the connection between the different categories of ‘culture’ and the success of the associations in terms of how the value given these categories can

affect the perceived value of the association. Value, however, is more complicated. David Graeber finds that value is a proxy representing an individual's ability to act within a particular social context, through choices made over other, less desirable options (Graeber 2001). Specifically, Graeber notes that value "can best be seen in this light as the way in which actions become meaningful to the actor by being incorporated in some larger, social totality—even if in many cases the totality in question exists primarily in the actor's imagination" (2001:xxi). These totalities, themselves, are unknowingly created through decisions of value, making them open to both revolutionary and gradual change. Similarly, Rappaport's (1971) ultimate sacred propositions are adaptable because they are rooted in religious experience. As non-discursive and based on emotion, religious experiences can be neither proven nor disproven, and thus are never fully understood. The derivatives of such propositions permeate all levels of society as its organizing principles, including modern societies. For example, "The United States is "One nation under God," and its officers take oaths when they assume their duties" (Rappaport 1971:40). When the regime in power is challenged, it is not the sacred principles that are called into question, but rather the regime's ability to enact these principles (Rappaport 1971). In France, the sacred is not God, but rather the Republic and nation, with *liberté, fraternité, égalité* as its propositions. Immigrants' and minorities' devotion to the nation is constantly questioned and suspect, including those involved in associations (Chapter 3). As such, they need to constantly enact or perform their national attachment, in the hopes that through force of repetition it will be accepted once and for all. Through examination of the MCAs' choices, and where they attribute value, one can draw conclusions about their organizing principles—in this

case, devotion to the French nation. What is considered to be of value speaks not only to the needs and desires of the community, but their larger, shared understandings, such as beliefs about their place in the nation.

Different groups in a society have alternative criteria for determining these valuations. Funders, participants, the minority community, and outsiders all perceive the situation very differently. Considerations of the minority community and outside society are beyond the scope of the present discussion, as I did not systematically study these groups. For participants in the MCA, determinations of associations' value can be tied to fiscal value, social capital, considerations of legitimacy, or other considerations. Another potential basis for value judgment is the perceived cultural legitimacy of the association and its actions: its organizers, the activities it holds, and the character of the minority culture it presents. From the point of view of the membership, this can rest on remaining 'true' to their cultural heritage, history, or identity, and efforts to please the funding agencies can be seen as 'selling out' to the French powers that be (Geisser 1997; Césari 2006). For funders, determinations of associations' value have an inherently financial aspect: considerations of social, cultural, or personal worth are given monetary valuation when funding is awarded.

The three categories of culture, as discussed above, each come with *a priori* and judgments of value. I argue that it is precisely these judgments that the associations' members must negotiate to reach their goals and maintain the associations. As discussed in Chapter 3, neoliberal fiscal agendas in France are increasingly demanding that any kind of spending on cultural activities be justified in economic terms, thereby explicitly assigning it financial value.

In many cases, this serves to sideline communal, alternative systems of valuation through which an association's members determine its success. In this section I offer examples of how associations sell themselves as creating financial or social value and illustrate how they manipulate different ideas of culture to attract and maintain members, funds, and audience.

Cultural as Fiscally Valuable

Associations make an array of arguments for why and how they create financial value. They provide services to individuals and communities, bring money to municipalities, create jobs, and work against discrimination and for the economic and social mobility of minority individuals and the attendant economic benefits to the area as a whole. Larger professional associations can also create employment directly or through their demand for outside services. Associations argue that they create value for individuals, communities, municipalities, and society as a whole, as I outline in this section.

Associations also offer services of value to individual members. For some this represents things they could not find or afford elsewhere. For example, one North African association offered children vacations that their parents could not afford alone. Similarly, a number of Pied-Noir associations hired buses to transport their members to important religious or social events, a service that would have been more expensive had they paid for it individually. Another North African association offered group music lessons from an instructor who travelled from out of town for the classes, something that would have been financially unfeasible for most individuals to do on their own. Associations that offer legal aid also provide a valuable service at a

discounted rate, sometimes resulting in notable financial gains for clients. A number of Pied-Noir associations, for example, had been engaged in helping their members file applications for restitution of property left in Algeria. These applications could represent significant sums of money, and if successful, could bring substantial financial rewards for the individuals (see also, Shepard 2006). Some North African associations offer similar legal aid that helps, for example, North African workers obtain retirement benefits for which they are eligible.

At times, the services provided put associations in competition with each other. When two North African associations in a city offer Arabic classes, for example, some locals will comparison shop between them. In addition to cost, location, character of the association and instructor, schedule, and other factors may be taken into account.

At the community level, associations, primarily North African associations, were selling themselves as promoting anti-discrimination and minority education within and outside the minority community. These actions, they argued, help minorities to increase their economic and social mobility. This educated and integrated minority population that creates wealth instead of using services would also benefit the municipality. This is particularly important in France, where there is an ever-present threat of riots, such as took place in Grenoble in summer 2010, to cast a shadow over disadvantaged neighborhoods. Some associations explicitly market themselves as preventing riots, by offering alternative forms of engagement and fostering social cohesion (Bowen 2007; Chabanet 2005); however, none of the groups with which I worked ever made such explicit statements. For example, one Algerian man (Jewish and Berber) affiliated with a North African association noted that this group has more than one goal:

C'est un but qui n'est pas annoncé qui est, pour moi, la contribution à la paix sociale. On dit promouvoir la culture arabe, favoriser les relations franco maghrébines: on fait découvrir les cultures. Mais en fait le but caché, en tout cas pour laquelle on est financé par la ville de Grenoble [...], c'est en fait de préserver la paix sociale. A partir du moment que les populations se découvrent, se connaissent mieux, il y a moins d'animosité, et il y a la possibilité d'échanges, la possibilité de l'intégration.

Here, shared cultural knowledge, and thus the value added by the association, is recognized explicitly in terms of social tranquility. While not stated in terms of riot prevention, in such a climate as post-2010 Grenoble, this link would be understood. In general, the North African MCA sold themselves as offering future positive gains or loss prevention.

Job creation was likewise promoted as one of the association's benefits. As discussed in Chapter 3, these positions often receive, directly or indirectly, municipal funding for at least part of their salary. Larger professional associations may pay the salaries out of their own funds, a clear benefit for municipalities faced with high unemployment rates. Isère and Bouches-du-Rhone saw, respectively, 8.2% and 12.2% unemployment at the beginning of 2012, up from 7.9% and 11.9% in the first quarter of 2001 (Insee.fr 2012). Job creation, therefore, is beneficial at any scale.

The associations' activities also created a demand for supplemental services for art and performances, cleaning, catering, transportation, or audio-visual, among others, when these roles could not be fulfilled in-house. When an association brought a group of musicians into the city for a concert, this paid salaries not just of the musicians, technicians, and stage hands hired to put on the concert, but also contributed to the receipts of hotels and restaurants where the musicians were lodged and fed. Some associations hold conferences attended by hundreds or even

thousands of people. The largest Pied-Noir gathering to date was held in Nice in 1987 and was attended by over 100,000 people (Calmien 2012). Although similar events held today are not as large, a gathering of 500 or 2,000 people can be a significant addition to local tourist income, particularly in smaller towns or cities. Some associations have been successful at using such arguments to obtain funding or other assistance from municipal governments.

On the whole, there is a distinction between how the two minority groups present themselves as adding financial value. The Pied-Noir associations emphasize the creation of value in society. Stressing how many jobs were created or the large number of tourists brought into the area. Within the community, many focused on claiming financial support and restitution due to them as *rapatriés*. North African associations, in contrast, tend to sell themselves as improving the situation of the minority. This included some direct job creation, but also a general amelioration of the economic situation of minorities and, therefore, society as a whole. A part of this was an explicit or implicit promise of prevention of future loss through riots or other social disturbances. This speaks to how these groups perceive themselves as being seen by others in society, and to the priorities of the funding agencies that honor their requests.

Culture as Socially Valuable

The associations with which I worked justified the social value of their actions in a number of ways. In this section I use case studies of two associations to describe how culture is understood as having social value. These groups, one North African and one Pied-Noir, argue explicitly for the social value of culture in plural societies, though in different ways. Both

associations make explicit attempts to reclassify the minority group's culture in the eyes of both the minority group itself and the broader society. They do this either by trying to alter what components are seen as part of the minority culture or by contesting the value judgments assigned to these components. There are a number of associations dedicated to changing how their culture(s) are perceived; other associations engage in similar attempts as part of a suite of activities. Here I focus on examples of two associations¹⁷ that exist to promote specific cultures because this activity is seen as having intrinsic value.

First, AMAL, a North African cultural association in Grenoble, aims explicitly to alter the prevalent social understanding of North African culture (Phaneuf 2004, 2006). The association attempts to do this by gathering a diverse audience composed of French citizens and immigrants of all backgrounds. The association teaches them about North African culture by providing examples of the region's high culture. The officials hope to 'reclaim' the North African cultural heritage from a limiting stereotype that conceives of 'traditional' culture as consisting solely of couscous. They hope to accomplish this by using two strategies. First, by introducing aspects of culture that are widely understood to be 'high culture,' yet a high culture whose North African examples are not widely known. Classical and contemporary Arabic poetry, calligraphy, and fine art, for example, were displayed. Second, the association aims to foster communication. To this end it offers classes in French and Arabic to give individuals the skills to function in society and to hold these exchanges. It also offers events intended to draw a

¹⁷ In this section I use the real names of these two associations because they are large and well-known enough to defy any attempt to hide their identities. Additionally, my previous work (Phaneuf 2004, 2006) discusses AMAL by name.

wide range of people and foster intercultural discussion. For example, a presentation in 2009 about the Algerian author Kateb Yacine, on the twentieth anniversary of his death, drew a diverse crowd: men and women; North Africans, French-North Africans, and French *de souche*; youth and people over retirement age.

The project of simultaneously re-classifying North African culture and creating discussion was presented by the association as having two primary social benefits. First, it challenges the popular stereotypes of North African culture as being exclusively traditional, without the more refined, ‘high’ cultural aspects. One Algerian noted that he came to the association to find the “*raffinement perdu*,” the refinement of Moorish Spain that had been lost, through the association’s focus on history, calligraphy, and music. These individuals present this as an important component in their fight against racism and discrimination. At the most basic level, it counters discrimination by promoting the idea that contemporary France is made up of numerous ethnic and cultural groups. In addition to advertising the presence of this diversity, it couches this in positive terms and encourages the recognition of the unique, valuable contribution that all groups make to society.

Second, this re-imagining of the North African cultural contribution is seen as particularly important for individuals of that background who have been deprived of their “roots” through life in a country that does not recognize or value their ancestors’ contributions. The North African community includes children, children of immigrants who are now adults with families, as well as immigrants themselves. French youth of minority heritage are seen as particularly in need of this education. They are described elsewhere as people “nés sous X” and

searching for their roots in the same way that individuals who do not know their parents search for them. I discuss this in detail in Chapter 6. Through this re-imagining, their intent is to make their culture more accessible to the population at large, with the hope that this knowledge will make them more understanding towards the North African minorities. AMAL offers minority groups, themselves, the opportunity to re-connect with their roots and therefore develop their sense of place in the world and the sense of self-worth that will enable them to fully participate in society. This was illustrated in the quote above that tied social peace to cultural knowledge. Others tie this to personal experiences. As one naturalized Algerian woman noted: “en arrivant en France je me suis coupé du monde arabe – immersion en France. Tout sauf m’intéresser à mon culture. A un moment j’ai eu un déclic, j’avais envie, je trouve que c’est beaucoup mieux de faire les deux.” In order to make its message accessible, AMAL moved some of its activities from its offices and into the *quartiers*, as discussed in greater detail below.

AMAL explicitly presents itself as using culture to reduce discrimination and to promote a society in which all individuals are considered to be fully capable of participating. AMAL negotiates and manipulates the artificiality of the division between ‘traditional’ and ‘high’ culture in order to question and present a case for why such slippages are not only natural but also beneficial. This agenda does not attempt to change the structure of society, only to make it function in a way that is more equitable and just. The members of the association, on the whole, are hopeful that they will bring positive change to social relations in the city. They cited attendance records and personal interactions as positive indicators of change. They do not believe, however, that this change will be sudden or all-encompassing, and members repeatedly

shared stories of discrimination as cautionary tales and reminders of why more work is necessary. I return to this theme in Chapter 5.

The Cercle Algérieniste offers another example of a minority association whose explicit concern is with cultural categorizations. Its motto is: “Sauver une culture en péril” (To save a culture in peril). More specifically, it “a pour objectif de sauvegarder le patrimoine culturel né de la présence française en Algérie” (has the goal of protecting the cultural patrimony born of the French presence in Algeria) (Cercle Algérieniste 2011a). In pursuit of this task, the association publishes a review with works on the literature, art, and history of the French colonial period in Algeria, with current events included in a supplement. It also hosts an annual conference on these topics and current events at which prizes for literature and research are awarded. In addition to the national association the Cercle Algérieniste had, at the time of my fieldwork, 39 local chapters (Cercle Algérieniste 2011b:10). These chapters also hosted a variety of events, including lectures, video screenings, dinners, and trips. In January 2012 the chapter in Perpignan opened the *Centre de documentation des Français d’Algérie*: a museum, research center, and library (Rolando 2011). This was located at the site of the *Mur des disparus*, a memorial to French Algerians and Harkis who disappeared during the Algerian War, inaugurated in 2007. The Cercle Algérieniste’s membership and audience are primarily Pied-Noir and Harki, with limited exceptions such as friends or spouses of Pied-Noir or those having an interest in Pied-Noir literature. The Cercle Algérieniste presents itself as protecting Pied-Noir culture and emphasizing its high culture aspects. The inclusion of such subjects in the traditionally ‘high

culture' format of an academic lecture, for example, reinforces the members' understanding that they exemplify 'high culture,' as did the awarding of literary prizes.

While the Cercle Algérianiste explicitly categorizes Pied-Noir culture as 'high culture,' this designation is also extended to the membership of the association in two ways. First, the attribution of the adjective 'high' to the Pied-Noir culture valorizes their culture, contribution to society and therefore shared identity, like the North Africans discussed above. Second, the creation and enjoyment of such 'high' culture argues against the stereotypes of the Pied-Noir as having a 'mode de vie' unsuitable to such enjoyments. At the association's yearly conference in November 2010, for example, the national president commented that the Cercle Algérianiste was known as having a more well-mannered membership than other associations, particularly in regards to how they comport themselves at meetings: "Serenite c'est le marque de fabrique du Cercle Algérianiste" (Rolando 2010). This explicitly counters the popular stereotype that Pied-Noir are uncultured, noisy, and loud, as discussed above, by proving that they are not only interested in producing and understanding elements of high culture, but can present and discuss them in a genteel manner.

The Cercle Algérianiste exists to defend Pied-Noir culture, but its members are not hopeful that they will be able to make their culture widely known and respected. In part, this is recognition that their membership and audience are primarily drawn from their own minority group. Additionally, although they see their culture as "in peril" and threatened by revisionist outsiders who wish to efface the existence of the Pied-Noir and their Algerian roots (as discussed in Chapter 5), they discount the possibility of finding outside allies. They would like to increase

the value of their culture in society, yet doubt that this is possible, and so instead direct their efforts toward re-categorizing their culture for the Pied-Noir community itself, along with certain allies.

The opening of the Pied-Noir Museum and Research Center in Perpignan by the Cercle Algérieniste, which took place as I was finishing my study, has altered this outlook somewhat, though it is too early to determine precisely how widespread or lasting this may be. This large, public project could not have been accomplished without the successful creation of partnerships and relationships with municipal institutions and politicians (Mairie-perpignan.fr 2012). Also, the creation of this research center and museum, designed to perpetuate the memory of their culture and history on Pied-Noir terms, offers a new set of possibilities for the future and in itself is a hopeful example of what may be achievable. This development is not isolated. The CDHA, for example, is now partnered with a foundation that assures its continuation. In general, there appears to have been increasing concern over the durability of the Pied-Noir culture across generations.

In both case studies, these minority associations explicitly argue for the value of their culture and, in the case of AMAL, the value of minority cultures in general. AMAL aims to influence an audience composed of both members of the minority group and the society at large, while the Cercle Algérieniste focuses primarily on its own minority group. Both regularly challenge attributions of one or another cultural expression to low-value cultural categories, yet the existence of the categories themselves is not contested, nor is the overall social structure that

creates and maintains those categories. As such, the MCAs accept the dominant system of cultural categorization; they only desire a different placement in that system.

Value in the Eye of the Beholder

In the following sections, I explore how associations negotiate differing conceptions of culture and value among and between members, funders, and audiences to reach their goals. As discussed in Chapter 3, associations must function on a number of different levels and please a number of different groups to continue to exist. Without these negotiations, association elites might find themselves incapable of action or limited to the most restrained events. In the following sections I discuss how decisions about membership, funding, and audiences are made in light of discourses of culture and value.

Membership

Because associations are embodied in their members, they must have a membership to exist. It is not unusual for associations to close because of a lack of interest or split into two factions as the result of members' differences. To be of interest to members who are asked to give money or time, an association must offer something they consider valuable. In an earlier paper, I found that all members participated because the associations offered a community of individuals having similar interests with whom members could socialize, though some had additional, ideological motives (Phaneuf 2012). For this reason, associations that aimed to influence an outside public through outreach activities were best able to maintain membership

when they also offered community-focused, or what I called communitarian, activities in order to maintain strong social connections within the group (Phaneuf 2012). In the terms of the discussion at hand, individual members value the social and personal connections facilitated by the context of the association. They also see the opportunity to create social change as inherently valuable. In her article on minority voluntary associations in France, Hamidi notes that, for individuals, volunteering “helps them to define themselves as actors in their own lives” (2003:329). The ability to participate in associations that aim to improve ethnic relations in society, therefore, can be seen as valuable not only for its potential social benefits, but also for the opportunity it gives individuals to reclaim their autonomy in a social situation they see as stifling.

It can be challenging to please multiple social groups at the same time. For associations that explicitly aim to serve a diverse population, such as AMAL, this may be particularly problematic. The desires of different groups in an association may, at times, even be contradictory. For example, when the organizers attempted to highlight ‘high’ culture, and therefore increase their legitimacy and value in French society as a whole, they could face criticism from the minority population as being too elitist and esoteric or ‘selling out’ to the French majority (Geisser 1997). In the case of AMAL, the leaders realized that the focus on ‘high culture’ had unintended consequences. It successfully drew a non-North African audience, but within the North African community, it was not successful at drawing a diverse group. One man noted that the association had failed its duty to the community by serving only an elite that

did not require assistance instead of the general population that did.¹⁸ In their efforts to promote the ‘high’ culture elements of North African culture and history within and without the minority community, the members of the association had effectively excluded the part of the North African population itself that did not identify with this cultural heritage. In the case of the Cercle Algérieniste, the association has faced similar criticisms. The president of another large Pied-Noir association noted that convivial associations are those “Les amicales sont celles qui subsistent le mieux [...] c’est un défaut et une qualité. Les rapatriés ont le sens de la fête. Un air de guitare, deux merguez grille, c’est parti je fais le fête.” Other, similar associations, considered to be less ‘fun,’ even if they served other purposes, have closed. Although the benefits of claiming ‘high culture’ are known (as discussed above), this kind of self-presentation risks alienating segments of the minority population even when the association is attempting to act in their interest.

Place-based culture is also an important factor in drawing and maintaining a membership that is tied to a shared ‘*mode de vie*’ and folk geography. For example, many associations do not limit memberships to the group they represent, but open membership to people who have a strong personal association or interest in that group or its region of origin, including the ethnographer. A Moroccan cultural association, for example, counts as members Moroccans, French of Moroccan heritage, other North Africans by citizenship or heritage, and French *de souche*. Many of these non-North African French individuals’ connections to Morocco come through personal history or ties of affinity: they had studied or worked in the country, or were

¹⁸ I discuss this in greater detail in an earlier work (Phaneuf 2004).

married to or friends with Moroccans. When asked what the association was about, the president explained it was an “association franco-marocaine,” not to limit who can join, but because that is what they know best. Culture, here, is not an essential quality of the individual determined by his or her origins, but can be adopted and serve to unify groups of individuals with diverse backgrounds by emphasizing their shared affective ties to the culture itself.

Funding

The associations in this study all have operating budgets, though this is not intrinsic to the structure of an association. As discussed in Chapter 3, the majority use outside funding. Potential funders have particular zones of interest, and requests must also be posed carefully as events that are regarded as serving too limited a population or are perceived as being too radical will not be funded (Geisser 1997). To receive support is not enough: associations must simultaneously serve the needs of the group while proving to the funder that they are also fulfilling some broader interest or official priority. This wider interest is often couched in terms of facilitating the group’s social integration and political participation. I will illustrate this below.

The universal value of history as ‘high’ culture may be questioned when combined with other, more suspect categorizations of culture. For example, in summer 2010 the Cercle Algérieniste of Grenoble applied to the city for 500€ to support a visiting lecturer speaking on the Roman occupation of Algeria. Their request traveled a long road, first rejected without review, then reviewed at the insistence of one of the city council members and then granted. However, the request was rejected a second time during a city council meeting after protests

from representatives of the political left (Estrangin 2010; Alessandra, personal communication 2010). During this meeting, according to an article published in the local paper, the decision to reject the proposal was made after the association was accused of unacceptable practices: “promotion des biens faits de la colonization française de l’Algérie” by Maryvonne Boileau, of “agissent pour la culture des Pieds-noirs” according to Jean-Philippe Motte, and of being “une mouvance” according to Jérôme Safar, all city council members (Estrangin 2010). These were all presented as negative characteristics. The quality of the lecture, the qualifications of the lecturer, or the size and composition of the audience were not, apparently, even discussed.

This decision was contested by the Cercle Algérieniste in a letter from the president, Monique Alessandra, to the Mayor of Grenoble dated 16 June 2010. Alessandra responded directly to the statement that aid should be refused because the association promotes Pied-Noir culture, as cited in the newspaper article. She wrote:

Loin d’imaginer une quelconque hostilité de principe vis-à-vis des Français d’Algérie, nous pensons que notre projet a été mal compris ou mal interprété. Sinon, comment supposer que notre Maire pourrait refuser aux administrés et aux concitoyens que nous sommes depuis 1962 le minimum de l’aide octroyée, en principe, aux associations à caractère culturel, et au motif que le Cercle algérieniste s’occupe de culture ? (Alessandra, personal communication 2010-6-16)

As of the end of my fieldwork, there had been no official response. In this example, the funding agency presumes that history’s place as an objective academic pursuit and therefore an example of ‘high’ culture is obviated by the supposedly ‘extremist’ character of the associations (see Chapter 6). The association, in its defense, argues that as a cultural association its business is – by definition – culture, and that it is nonsensical to deny them aid on that basis. This exchange

illustrates the importance of culture in two ways. First, it shows that cultures are not viewed to be of equal worth. Second, this illustrates the material consequences – namely funding – of interpretations of culture. The audiences or historical qualifications were not at issue here, for the quality of the product or the size and distribution of the audience were not taken into consideration. Instead, the legitimacy and desirability of the event were decided on the basis of the culture of the group making the request. The rejection of funding, therefore, was also an implicit assessment of the value of Pied-Noir culture.

In contrast to the Pied-Noir example, where minority culture is considered a negative in the funding decision process, other minority groups are prioritized for funding precisely because of their minority cultural status. This is well documented. For example, in the past some attributed the large numbers of associations in France dealing with children, adolescents, or sporting a North African title more to the government's tendency to fund these types of associations rather than to local enthusiasm, and literacy courses are offered even when the instructors know that the pupils are seemingly too old to learn to read (Césari 1993:88; Benguigui 1997:90). Because, at the time, these associations involved particularly well-known minority groups, they also appear to have been successful because they played into French stereotypes of minorities as needing assistance (i.e., Wievorkia et al. 1992). These associations are mutual assistance associations involved in aid activities (Phaneuf 2012), a role that is well-known and understood in French society, offering an obvious social and humanitarian value, unlike the re-configured assessment of culture-as-valuable offered by AMAL and the Cercle Algérieniste. Under Sarkozy's tenure as president, political priorities focused on immigration

control and security (Hewlett 2007; Todd 2008), and funding was pulled from minority culture and given to fostering employment and preventing delinquency (L'Ac sé 2012b; Fieldnotes). Although it is too early to discern the ramifications of this funding change, or changes that the election of Hollande as president may bring, as I was wrapping up this study it appeared that MCAs would have to further adapt their strategies to maintain support.

Audience

Having an audience that is separate from the association's membership brings a number of challenges. To successfully attract and maintain such an audience, the association must provide a service that its participants recognize and value. The association must communicate with and understand the needs of groups that are not its members and so do not take part in determining events. As one association official noted, audiences must be enticed, for it is impossible to simply pull people off the street and make them listen.

Associations want to be recognizable to their target audiences. For this reason, one North African association had an argument over whether they should retain the word "Islam" in its statutes as a significant part of North African culture. Some felt that local North African residents would find AMAL and its actions more understandable and less threatening if this term was used in the official documentation. This was a break from how other AMAL officials viewed the situation. They considered religion to be a purely private affair that should not feature in the public self-presentation of a cultural association. Rather, the association can treat Islam from a cultural point of view, but should not single it out among other faiths and non-faiths

present in North Africa by including it alone in the statutes. While interest in Islam as a cultural manifestation could include an interest in religion as one of a number of cultural manifestations, they argued, official attention to the topic should be left to a 1905 association.

Other associations, particularly those creating foundations, museums, monuments, or other enduring structures, face an added challenge. They must try to anticipate the needs and interests of an audience that does not yet exist. In creating the *Fondation pour la Recherche Historique sur l'Algérie*,¹⁹ the board aimed to perpetuate and maintain the conservation of archives on French North Africa and their exploitation for research undertaken to date by the CDHA (CDHA 2011b). In this case, the needs of the future audience are unknown. The organizers of the association are working to ensure the preservation of their material culture in the name of academic and scientific inquiry. The perceived value of this kind of endeavor can be seen in the proliferation of museums and archives in France (Duclert 2010, Poulard 2010). The CDHA and its activities were officially recognized as worthwhile when they were awarded the status of *Reconnu d'Utilité Publique* in 1985 (CDHA 2011a). The creation of the foundation in 2011 is further justification of the association's legitimacy and social value as determined both by members of the minority community (who provided the ideas, funding, and time necessary to make the project come to fruition) and the *Fondation de France* that approved the project and allowed the foundation's creation.

By placing the focus on historical preservation, Pied-Noir associations can gain financial support and attention for their past from people outside the community that they might not

¹⁹ The name of this association and foundation are unchanged.

otherwise be able to mobilize for cultural or social events. History is not an unquestioned source of legitimacy for the associations, rather, it is the preservation of historical data that is seen as legitimate by outsiders, and not the focus on the past itself. Preservation of historical materials is seen as non-contestable, unlike historical interpretation which can be seen as prone to bias or misunderstanding. I illustrated this above, in the example wherein an association was denied funding for a lecture on the Roman history of Algeria. In contrast, preservation, memorialization, and dissemination of historical information all draw the support of the Pied-Noir population. Although it is seen as a legitimate activity, it is one of a number of possible actions that are considered culturally appropriate, along with literature, art, cuisine, and social gatherings. The preservation of historical data is justified, in particular, as preserving the culture after the Pied-Noir themselves have passed away. Some individuals also defined history and literature as more ‘worthy’ investments of their time because of their universal character, but this was not widespread. Here, one activity is defined as legitimate by different audiences (French society and the Pied-Noir population) in several different ways (universal, high culture, and minority cultural preservation).

Negotiating the Slipperiness of Value and Culture

In the above sections I detailed how value and culture are important for the associations’ ability to find and maintain membership and audiences. In this section I offer a number of examples illustrating what happens when associations confront specific problems. In so doing I demonstrate how associations’ officials and members can use these same discussions of value

and culture to negotiate a resolution and attempt to achieve the goals of the association vis-à-vis their membership while retaining legitimacy in the eyes of outsiders.

Association officials make use of slippages between meanings of “culture” when organizing and planning activities. For example, AMAL faced critiques that the local minority population was underrepresented, and re-evaluated its activities. Some of the solutions implemented were practical: certain activities were scheduled earlier in the day to permit families with children to attend. Others were geared towards making the culture of the association more legible and interesting to its target audience, such as the addition of popular music and dance to the agenda. These actions were seen as important because they broadened the association’s audience and therefore the number of people who could benefit from the activities and be influenced by the association’s message. By 2011, this was considered a success by association officials, as the range of people who attend events at the association was greater than it had been in 2004.

For other associations, it was not only the activities, but also the image of the association that is important. One Pied-Noir noted of an association: “Notre président actuel a changé l’image du cercle. Avant on était critiqué pour être trop intellectuel. Il est jeune, bon parler, il ne fait pas que de la peinture orientaliste et la littérature, mais il fait aussi du mémoriel.” In this case, the changes to the associations’ activities were more minor. The association primarily countered its critics by altering its institutional culture and adding value in that sense.

Another response to cleavages in membership has been for associations to subdivide their activities. One North African association engaged in mutual aid and has recently added a

significant number of cultural activities such as movie nights, dinners, and art shows housed at the association headquarters. The original North African members

don't dare to come, it's unknown, an intellectual climate. [...] They are told about the cultural stuff, they're content, they never complain. They just don't come. We can't make them. The exposition, that's different. It's a population that doesn't go to museums, this way they can see the art. (Fieldnotes, original written in English)

Neither the original members who were primarily interested in the mutual assistance activities of the association, nor the new members, who were primarily interested in the cultural activities, were concerned by the split within the group. In this case, it is not the culture that is negotiated, but the organization of the association itself.

Associations could also seek a unified audience. For example, one Moroccan association was unconcerned about its focus on 'high' culture. Its representatives stated that, with the variety of other Moroccan cultural associations in the area, they are not being elitist by offering a 'high' culture approach to their Moroccan heritage, but are filling a void in the cultural offerings of the area. They feel that they are legitimate because they are filling a niche left vacant by the activities of other associations and because they are considered useful by their target population, not the minority community as a whole. By contrast, AMAL, since it aims to influence the opinions of society as a whole, seeks a very different audience than the Moroccan association, which aims to make a segment of Moroccan culture available to whoever finds it interesting.

When MCAs and their officials were asked to perform the role of unofficial spokespeople for the minority population to an outside public, new questions arose. Public institutions such as museums, libraries, or schools contacted MCAs from time to time, seeking more information on

the minority group or assistance in setting up an exhibit or event. This could be problematic for the association leaders, as discussed in Chapter 3. If they did not participate, they lost the role of spokesperson for the community. If they chose to assist in such exterior performances of their own culture, they gained the opportunity to create or maintain good relations in the city and secure a measure of control over how they were represented. This was also important for legitimacy within the association whose stated goal is to publicize the minority culture. However, an offer of assistance came with the risk that the organizers would be held entirely responsible for the content of the presentation, even those parts which were out of their control. In the world of association politics, assistance could be seen or represented as approval of the project as a whole. In some cases the perceived risks or benefits are clearly predominant, and the decision is made to deny or offer assistance. When the situation is less well defined, one way in which officials can navigate this dilemma is to provide assistance off the record or outside their official role in the association. Although the association does not receive the publicity it could, were it to make its involvement with the event public, it nonetheless maintains its position as spokesperson, the officials do not risk a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents, and relations between the elites and the event organizers are strengthened – particularly due to the element of semi-secret collusion.

Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter I demonstrated that emic categorizations of cultural manifestations in France are not judgment free. External judgments of culture influence the

associations' abilities and actions and they are contested by minorities when seen as negatively reflecting on their identities. The attribution of a 'high culture' label includes a judgment of universal legitimacy most often claimed by cultural manifestations of the European upper class. 'Traditional' culture, on the other hand, is seen as interesting primarily for the minority population, or as a site of cultural tourism. Finally, culture as mode de vie references groups tied by region, ethnicity, affinity, or career. This version of culture can be used to emphasize both divisions and commonalities between and within groups. In use, this opens space for acknowledgment that cultures and the identity groups they reference are not bounded and discrete; instead, people can 'have' more than one culture. All three cultural categories have real consequences in the choices of funding agencies, association membership, and audiences. The ways in which certain activities or groups are perceived to fall into one category or another are at times highly contested and the focus of association action, as I illustrated with the examples of AMAL and the Cercle Algérieniste.

The value attached to these social conceptions of culture affects the ability of cultural associations to survive and flourish. It also significantly influences the actions organizers choose, and are able, to undertake. The value judgments aligned with attributions of 'high' or 'traditional' culture to different groups justify the existence of cultural associations because they are seen as one tool that can be used by minority individuals to protest and alter these hierarchical relations. When they are successful, at times, it is by focusing on one aspect of culture that is valued in the same way by members of both the minority community and society as a whole, such as the example of how AMAL used high culture to attract a diverse audience.

Both North African and Pied-Noir associations also use ‘traditional’ cultural activities to educate outsiders, assert minority difference, and reinforce the group cohesion of association members. North African associations were successful at using both “high” and “traditional” culture to attract an ethnically diverse audience. The Pied-Noir do not have as diverse an audience, and typically engage culture as *mode de vie* to collaborate with certain groups such as harkis and veterans associations.

Pied-Noir and North African associations also deploy “high” culture to attract an audience and assert their contributions to the French nation. High culture is particularly useful in attracting outside attention because of its high social value in French society. Some North African associations employed high culture to draw in outsiders and prove the community’s right to participate in the French nation. This comes with risks, as it attracted only part of the minority group, while alienating others who see it as uninteresting, self-aggrandizing, or simply not relevant to them and so do not attend. Some associations accept this downside, others worry that they need more diverse participation within the minority group to effect change. The example of the Pied-Noir tells a rather different story. While very effective for maintaining group cohesion, their performances of high culture do not attract a significant outside audience. Conversely, historical preservation served to attract both outside attention and Pied-Noir participation. The two audiences, however, were targeted on the basis of different justifications. For outsiders, historical preservation is valuable because it will further future scientific and academic inquiry; yet, as noted above, this is not the same as Pied-Noir historical production, which is often

ignored. While the Pied-Noir do not disagree with the assessment of preservation as useful for future historians, they are also concerned with preservation of their traditional culture.

Negotiation of culture and the value of culture provides insight into the functioning and success of MCAs, and also illuminates the relationship between the minority communities and the nation. As Graeber (2001) and Rappaport (1971) both demonstrate, value judgments made by groups and individuals refer back to larger systems of social organization. Because of their sacred (Rappaport 1971) or social (Graeber 2001) character, these systems are unknown and unquestionable by individuals within them. Therefore, change can occur at an organizational or functional level in the name of these systems. Graeber emphasizes that the social roots of this kind of organization open it to being changed through direct action. With this comes the possibility of conflict, and failed attempts at change. One of the ways groups in France organize themselves and create and maintain boundaries (Barth 1969) is through *how* they understand the nation's sacred propositions. Who is allowed to be part of the nation depends on how its sacred propositions are understood. Through examination of the choices made in the case studies in this chapter, we can, therefore, begin to map out negotiations over group boundaries by paying attention to performances of culture.

The minorities in these associations do not challenge fundamental French norms and systems of categorization, as I have illustrated above and in the previous chapter. They want to change *how* their culture is valued in these larger systems, to better fill the position they believe they should hold as contributors to, and not detractors from, the French national whole. They are defining themselves as falling solidly within French national boundaries. Through their

adherence to cultural norms they reaffirm their membership in the French nation and their acceptance of its sacred principles: *liberté, fraternité, égalité*, which can be read in a more or less inclusive sense. The associations offer a definition of French national unity that is both universal and cosmopolitan in its definition of who falls within the national boundaries. This conflicts with more nationalistic, ethnicized versions of Frenchness, that take an exclusive approach to boundary placement, as can be seen in the rhetoric of Nicolas Sarkozy (Marlière 2009; see also Chapter 6). For those who use this second definition, both of these minority groups are troubling to the French collective.

The North African and Pied-Noir associations are not equally successful at deploying these categorizations of culture and value to attract attention and audience. In part, this has to do with French stereotypes of these minorities. North Africans are seen as violent, uneducated, or in need of French assistance. When North Africans are viewed as prone to riot, for example, giving them alternative activities is beneficial. Traditional culture offers such a distraction, as well as a location for cultural tourism for non-North Africans. When this minority, or individuals within it, is in a dependent relationship, it requires assistance to become more educated (in French), or more self-sufficient (in the French system). This is not challenging to either the universal or the ethnicized version of the nation. It is when these individuals or groups make claims to recognition as equals with something to offer the collective, not as clients in need of patronage, that they threaten the borders of a narrowly conceived nation. As clients, they aspire to enter the nation on French terms. As minorities with a heritage they not only refuse to give up personally, but wish to publicize, they have the potential to shift the boundaries of what it means to be

French. Although perfectly in line with a universal understanding of French culture, this outcome is unacceptable to more nationalistic, ethnicized perspectives. I will return to this point in Chapter 6.

The Pied-Noir, in contrast, are seen as bearers of an uncomfortable memory and considered politically suspect. Because of their status as French citizens, relative economic stability, and lack of visible difference from metropolitan French, they are spared the effects of persistent discrimination that impact the North Africans. Their status as French and acceptance of the French nation *as individuals* is not questioned. Rather, it is their presence *as a group* that poses a problem. Public attention, then, is not seen as solving the ‘problem’ they pose French society, but could spread views and opinions widely considered to be extremist and dangerous or, at the least, call up painful memories. When they make claims to a ‘high’ or ‘traditional’ culture, they are referencing a part of France that no longer exists and is tainted with collective guilt over the excesses of colonialism and the violence of the Algerian war. This directly challenges the current borders of the French collectivity with troubling reminders of misdeeds. In contrast, North African claims of high culture are referencing cultures and peoples outside the borders of the French nation. This can be seen as threatening, as discussed above, or it could be seen as a dowry, of a sort, for the betterment of the collective. Many Pied-Noir also have ancestry outside the French nation and cultural heritage that could potentially be used in such a way, but when they make claims for recognition as Pied-Noir they are referencing their collective experience in Algeria, not their individual family origins. Their investment in emphasizing Frenchness during the war of Algeria and the years afterwards when they were

being resettled and receiving restitution (Shepard 2006) precludes highlighting the group's minority origins. Because they neither fit the role of dependent minority nor have any cultural capital to offer the French collectivity, the Pied Noir are in a much more difficult position to motivate attention or support. Their placement in a liminal space that is both French and straddles the French/foreign boundary complicates their claims to belonging in the nation. The devaluation of their culture serves to thwart their potential political and memorial influence.

While discussions of culture may, at first, seem esoteric, they are intimately connected with social constructions of value and society and with (re)defining national boundaries. Attempts of the individuals involved in these associations to reconceive discussions of culture are, as Rappaport (1971) would suggest, no less than attempts at reorienting the form of society to better align with its sacred propositions or organizing principles as they understand them. As Graeber (2001) reminds us, both the organizing principles and the organization in practice are the result of social negotiations leading to consensus, if a consensus that is only partially understood, contested, and perpetually in the process of being remade. In this chapter I have set out the theoretical background for why such negotiations take place as they do. In practice, performance is key to minority assertions of national devotion, cultural specificity, and their right to change the social organization. Attempts at negotiating an agreement will not progress if there is only one party at the table, and if two parties do not possess a mutually-intelligible language any attempt at communication will be for naught. In the next chapter I turn to theories of performance and communication to explain the methods used by associations in their attempts to transmit messages about themselves and enact change.

CHAPTER 5: PERFORMANCE AS COMMUNICATION: ETHNIC PERFORMANCE AS CIVIC CRITIQUE

In the previous chapter I discussed how varying understandings of culture and differing valuations of those categories of culture are of key importance to associations in their attempts to please their members, funders, and audiences. Consequently, cultural categories give people the means to influence their social world through instigation of change or maintenance of the status quo. In this chapter, I turn to theories on performance, communication, and “cultural work” (Singer 1959) to illustrate how associations use the means at their disposal to meet their stated goals. I argue that, in part, this happens through their performances of minority culture.

As discussed in Chapter 3, associations have a variety of goals for their actions. While some are explicitly constructed as “vitrines” in their minority culture, others provide the minority community a safe venue in which the group can enact and (re)define its culture and identity sheltered from racist and discriminatory influences. In both cases, they must communicate their beliefs about minority and shared culture, history, and identity to members of the minority community and society at large. Theories of performance can elucidate participants’ rationale for their decisions and assess the reception of their efforts. Key to this understanding is the relationship between the performer, audience, and medium of communication. In this chapter I describe how the associations use three kinds of performances to build group cohesion and communicate to outside audiences: commemorative ceremonies, material culture, and food.

Anthropology of Performance and Communication

The concept of performance has been employed in anthropological literature in a variety of ways. This chapter does not provide an overview or analysis of this active theoretical area. Rather, I outline those theories and areas of discussion used below. I follow Schechner (1990:25) in defining performance broadly to include theater, ritual, and daily interactions. All are informed by the subjects' cultural narratives, mores, and codes of behavior (Goffman 1997, Feldman 2002). All also involve action, with the intention to create a reaction in an audience. Edmund Burke (1969 [1945]:xi) approaches understanding "what people are doing and why" in performances by considering them as composed of five terms: "Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose." These represent the what, where, who, how, and why of any performative act. Thinking of performances as divided into these five fluid and overlapping terms makes it possible to analyze them systematically.

My perspective differs somewhat from these authors in that I also attribute performance characteristics to objects. In this I follow Kenneth Burke (1969 [1945]) and Schiffer (2010) who notes that objects can be actors, audience, or media of transmission. I consider non-verbal forms of communication as integrated with other forms of performance. As we are reminded by Bourdieu (2008 [1972]), not all enactments of culture are under the conscious control of individuals, and those that are embodied can be remarkably resistant to detection and even conscious change. Any performance runs the risk of failure or misinterpretation, including those embodied or conferred upon objects (Keane 1997; Schiffer 2010). These performances can both

support and alter pre-existing social or ideological structures (Keane 1997; Moore and Meyerhoff 1977:3-4).

As discussed in the previous chapter, associations attain value in society based on their ability to successfully negotiate different definitions of culture and accomplish their stated goals. When a minority attempts to re-create, alter, or define its culture(s) and identities, it can make use of cultural performances. Singer notes:

perhaps all peoples, think of their culture as encapsulated in such discrete performances, which they can exhibit to outsiders as well as to themselves. For the outsider these can conveniently be taken as the most concrete observable units of the cultural structure, for each performance has a definitely limited time span, a beginning and end, an organized program of activity, a set of performers, an audience, and a place and occasion of performance. (1959:xiii)

Actions of the MCAs contain many of these characteristics: they are located in the association or a venue designated for that event, they are scheduled, and they exist for some purpose. This purpose is not necessarily the ‘occasion’ that Singer mentions: a group that meets every Tuesday, for example, is less tied to occasions than those that commemorate particular events, such as Singer’s festivals and weddings, but the reasons for the meeting are defined and known. Another difference is that the division into performers and an audience is easily blurred. Dances or dinners may include no separate audience, since everyone is dancing or eating. Or they may represent a performance of culinary or musical culture by one segment of the assembly to another. Organized lessons have an audience, but it is an engaged and active one. In all of these cases, however, the group is presenting an organized version of itself – even if it is simply that they all like to dance or drink coffee. Representatives have a plethora of performance and

performative options from which to choose when staging representations of their culture for both internal and external consumption.

In this chapter, I focus on three aspects of performance: rituals or ritualized performances, material culture, and symbols. Rituals can be large, public commemorations, small private affairs, or symbols. “The symbol is the smallest unit of ritual which still retains the specific properties of ritual behavior” in that it references a thing outside itself (Turner 1967:19). Symbols can occur in gestures and words in interactions, as in Connerton’s incorporating practices (1989). In Connerton’s example, these practices reference and serve to perpetuate shared group memories, as discussed in Chapter 6.

Symbols do not exist in isolation. Instead, they are present within a network of signs through which individuals learn about themselves and others. As Goffman explains, in interaction, individuals learn about each other from signs or “predictive devices” (Goffman 1997a:21), that act as shortcuts in human relations. For Bourdieu, the reason that

all societies [...] set such store on the seemingly most insignificant details of *dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners*, the reason is that, treating the body as a memory, they entrust to it in abbreviated and practical, i.e. mnemonic, form the fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of the culture. The principles embodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, cannot even be made explicit (2008 [1972]).

Because daily interactions are permeated by these culturally coded forms of action or *habitus* that are embodied in individuals, they progress in ways that that are both structured and open to creativity (Bourdieu 2008). As such, embodied principles and forms of daily practice

serve to mark group membership. This also means that they will not necessarily be easily understood by persons outside the group, as I discuss below. Membership in a group that shares the same *habitus* or is part of one “interpretive community” (Feldman 2002) reduces this possibility. Interpretive communities share a canon of experiences, data, and understandings, and social actors refer to this canon to create products for an audience’s interpretation and audiences refer to it to interpret those products (Feldman 2002:52-4, 57). Intercultural misunderstandings are particularly possible because, in culturally diverse societies, some groups choose to select Western methods of self-expression and spokespeople who are sensitive to the audience and will portray the group in a good light (Shryock 2004a:15-17). They can also explicitly manage their cultural difference by creating performances of their culture for outsiders while aspects that are less accepted are hidden “off stage” (Shryock 2004a). Sensitivity to an audience’s desires is necessary, since a message embedded in a performance will not be heard if there is no one there to listen.

In multi-cultural societies, performances take on different roles and challenges. Barth (1969) suggests that in pluralist societies the boundaries between ethnic groups must be constantly maintained to have continuing relevance. Minority performance may be specifically constructed for consumption either internally or externally to the minority group that created them (Aleandri 2006; Bharucha 1984; Sellar 1983). Performances can represent an attempt to alter – or at least protest – the state of intra- or inter-group relations (Bagby 2003; Savory 1995). Group membership can be made visible through their association with material culture, specifically, “material signaling” that can indicate group membership (Wobst 1999, 1991, 1977),

or maintain, alter, and communicate group affiliation and information on the values and content associated with that affiliation. The creation of physical symbols adds a certain additional quality of permanence. Although this can perennialize the intervention (Wobst 1999), it also increases the risk that the object will be altered or interpreted differently over time with shifts in interpretive communities (Feldman 1992).

Symbols can also be embodied in physical objects. In France, material culture has received considerable attention from historians associated with the *lieux de mémoire* series and similar publications (i.e. Nora 1984; Agulhon 1979; Aldrich 2005), as discussed in Chapter 6. Like other symbols and forms of communication, material culture makes statements about the individuals who designed, created, and use it. Objects, then, become bearers of meaning and are thus a “non-discursive mode of communication” (Tilley 2006:7; also Burke 1969 [1945]). “Material interferences” as Wobst (1999:121) refers to them, are created by an agent to act on the world, and continue to influence their surroundings after creation, use, and even discard. Their creation is “driven by the assessment that without one’s material intervention the local context would be different in undesirable ways and that one’s artifacts would be of help in moving things in desirable directions” (Wobst 1999:124). Objects differ from other kinds of symbols because of their material properties (Keane 1997), their durability, the fact that they last beyond the length of the utterance or action, and even beyond the memories of those who were present at their creation.

In the remainder of this chapter I describe some of the performative choices made by associations, their rationale, and their impact in three case studies. First, I offer an example of

ritualized commemorative events that took place outside the association headquarters. These events were designed to communicate specific information to specific audiences. Second, I describe the buildings and spaces used by the associations and explain how the material context circumscribes their performative possibilities when activities take place at the associations themselves. Third, I analyze how food practices in the associations serve to create and pass messages about themselves to different audiences. With each example I focus on one of Burke's (1969 [1945]) five themes (act, scene, and agency) to analyze how and why agents use performances to try to communicate messages about the associations, their members, or their communities.

Performances of Commemorative Events: Act


Collective memory and history play a large role in minority identity construction and maintenance (Connerton 1989). One of the ways in which the MCA perform their history is through memorial celebrations. These acts (Burke 1969[1945]) include the dedication of plaques or renaming of features on the landscape (such as streets, roundabouts, or buildings) in memory of an event or person, religious ceremonies, marches, vigils, and spectacles. I compare two of the more explicitly staged events, one Pied-Noir and one North African. Each commemorated a massacre tied to the Algerian War and was intended to educate local residents and passers-by of all backgrounds who were not familiar with the historical event. As an interested outsider with little familiarity with these events, I was not only attending as an anthropologist, but also as a member of the target audience.

The Pied-Noir Remember : 26 March 1962

On 27 March 2010 a coalition of Pied-Noir associations, in cooperation with the Mayor of Aix-en-Provence, hosted an event in commemoration of the 26 March 1962 massacre at Babel-Oued, Algiers. On 26 March 1962 an unarmed march protesting the military blockade of Babel-Oued and bringing food and supplies to the local inhabitants came to an abrupt end when the French military opened fire, killing and wounding civilians (see Chapter 2). The commemoration at Aix-en-Provence was titled “La Mémoire qui saigne” and was billed as a memorial, conference, and spectacle, including elements of all three genres (see Figure 3). The event took place at the Pasino, a performance hall in downtown Aix-en-Provence; the room held over a thousand people and was full. The audience included local political figures and association officials, as well as spectators from across France. The event started with the audience lights dimming, and then the stage was swathed in blue light. From the sound system filtered noises of waves, slowly growing louder. No one else seemed perplexed about what this represented, but my confusion must have been evident because the woman sitting next to me leaned over and whispered that the boat was arriving: “Le bateau, le bateau qui arrive.” The lights switched to red, and Jean-Pax Mefret, a well-known Pied-Noir singer and journalist, began the proceedings with a song. Following Mefret, two other Pied-Noir took the stage in turns: Robert Castel, a well-known humorist, and Raphaël Delpard, a cinematographer and author. During the next two hours, songs were interspersed with historical discussions, humorous vignettes from colonial Algeria, and excerpts from voice-recorded interviews conducted by Mefret with officers in the

military who had commanded the soldiers involved in the massacre. The staging was very simple, a podium with a detachable microphone and a white backdrop that was constantly illuminated in blue, red, or purple. The event ended with a song, thanks to the elected officials and organizers present, and then a sing-along led by Mefret.

Figure 3: Flyer for La Mémoire qui saigne



The audience was strikingly quiet for most of the performance, though during the description of the massacre some individuals became visibly upset and one man approached the stage to argue with the presenter over his interpretation of the events. The presenters avoided, for the most part, speaking the name of de Gaulle. When they did, it was met with a handful of cries of “assassin!” from the audience. The performance concluded, lights were turned on, and

audience began to file out. A handful of audience members began singing “les Africains,” joined by the vast majority of those present. Following the event, the three presenters were seated at tables in the lobby to sell and sign CDs and books, and to answer questions. Pre-orders were also taken for the DVD of the event. Following the spectacle, the associations hosted a reception across the street in the *Maison des Rapatriés* where they provided food and drinks to the performers, organizers, and audience. In this discussion I focus on the performance and not the accompanying sale and reception.

La Mémoire qui Saigne was the first commemoration of the event as a large, choreographed and scripted performance. At the time of the study, the 26 March had been commemorated for many years with Catholic masses and flower ceremonies at cemeteries and monuments. It was scheduled on the 27th precisely so people could continue to hold their traditional ceremonies on the anniversary itself. According to the organizers, the goals of the event were to commemorate the event, provide a presentation of background information so individuals less familiar with what happened could come and learn about the massacre, and play Mefret’s interviews with the military officers in public for the first time. One of the organizers described the event as “une facette de notre combat pour la mémoire,” and therefore only part of a larger set of activities with the same goals. The explicitly performative and innovative nature of the event, as well as the celebrity status of two of its participants, was intended to draw a large crowd, which it did. The release on DVD would also enable its diffusion to an even larger audience and provide memorabilia for those who attended.

Reception of the event from the attendees was overwhelmingly positive. As an Act, it was put on in a Scene and with Agency that were appropriate to its Purpose. Audience members with whom I spoke were content that the massacre had been remembered in such a respectful way, noting that it was not at all like the small, amateur performances that they could put on in their individual associations. All found it emotionally intense: many of the audience members were visually upset or crying during and after the performance and some commented on the depth of their feelings during the spectacle. The elaborate nature of the event, however, appeared to give some comfort, for it was described as a “worthy” (*digne*) tribute to those who were killed in Bab-el-Oued. The Scene of the Pasino, a professional venue, contributed to this. A number of Pied-Noir regretted the fact that there were no visuals – they wanted to see photos of the event and thought that it would have added to the performance, particularly for those who were not familiar with the history. Others felt that the visuals were well known to the vast majority of the audience and were therefore unnecessary. All the non-Pied-Noir with whom I spoke, a minority of those present, preferred that the images were not included. Speaking as someone who had seen some of the visual documentation but was by no means familiar with all of it, I found the event as it was emotionally overwhelming and would have found the addition of further visual stimulus traumatic.

For the Pied-Noir, this spectacle appeared to reinforce a sense of community through shared suffering. As an outsider, I had the impression of being at the funeral of someone I did not know. That I did not know any of the victims did not differentiate me from a large number of the attendees. One woman from Bone (now Annaba, far from Algiers), informed me that she had not

heard about the massacre until after her repatriation to France. Remembered in their own right, these victims – French civilians shot by the French army – were also employed as symbols of France's betrayal of the Pied-Noir population as a whole and all innocent victims of the conflict. As such, this memorial re-enforced group identity through the presentation and elaboration of this symbol of their oppression. This message was easily understood, even to an outsider such as myself. Those killed and wounded were civilians engaged in a humanitarian – if political – action. Some were students, girls, or women. After the shooting began, the crowded, narrow streets prevented the protesters from running, so more were killed because they were unable to flee. For the audience, these deaths evoked the memory of the Algerian war: the Pied-Noir population caught in a situation where they did not see themselves as the aggressors, they could not leave, and were let down by the government they had believed to be protecting them and their interests. This symbolic connection was reinforced by its linkage in the March 27th performance to other symbols of French colonial Algeria and the lives of the Pied-Noir since their repatriation, such as the evocation of the boat, the vignettes of life in Bab-el-Oued before the war, and the presence of two of the most popular living Pied-Noir artists, Jean-Pax Mefret and Robert Castel. Through their use and elaboration, these symbols of French colonial Algeria became mutually reinforcing and re-invigorated a sense of shared identity. References that would dilute the emotional and symbolic message, such as those to the OAS, were avoided, and oblique references to de Gaulle evoked the external opposition against which the Pied-Noir organized. In this example, the Scene (both the physical location of the Pasino and the landscape of French Algeria symbolically invoked for the occasion) allowed for effective communication to the

minority audience. The depth and coherence of the symbolic landscape evoked, however, made this kind of presentation difficult for outsiders to access as the nuanced meanings were lost on outsiders. As such, by being so effective at building group solidarity through the creation of shared sentiments within the population, it is less effective at passing a detailed message to outsiders. This is not necessarily unintentional. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Pied-Noir culture is not highly valued in French society, and so there would be little benefit to tailoring a performance for an audience not likely to attend.

The North Africans Remember 17 October 1961

The succinctly titled “Rassemblement à Grenoble Place Edmond Arnaud Contre l’oubli et à la mémoire des victimes algériennes lors de la répression du 17 octobre 1961 à Paris” took place on 17 October 2009 in Grenoble. This memorial commemorated the Algerian workers massacred in Paris by French security forces during a peaceful demonstration against the imposition of a curfew. Following the massacre (discussed in Chapter 2), the bodies were dumped into the Seine and the event covered up in the newspapers of that date.²⁰ The memorial was organized by a group of associations – about 15 – with a mix of humanitarian associations, religious groups, unions, the Communist Party,²¹ and North African cultural associations. The procession began in front of the offices a participating association in a square in Grenoble’s historic immigrant neighborhood with a distribution of flowers to the participants. Flyers

²⁰ As discussed in Chapter 2, the numbers and nature of the deaths and injuries is highly contested.

²¹ At no point in the event was it mentioned that the Communist Party did not support Algerian independence at the time of the massacre.

describing the massacre and the commemoration were available. In addition, these leaflets called for a protest of the government's non-recognition of its responsibility in colonial massacres, the existence of OAS memorials, and the Ministry of Immigration and National Identity, among other migrant and immigrant-related issues. The president of *Algérie au Coeur*, the association primarily in charge of organizing the event, welcomed the participants and read a description of the political situation at the time, the massacre, and a testimony from an eyewitness, and also commented on the contemporary political situation. Then the choir *Les Barricades*, a local revolutionary choir, assembled and sang a song in French about the massacre and in Arabic a revolutionary song from the Algerian war. Their members all were wearing red, associating them at least implicitly with the Communist Party. Participants then formed a procession. At the head of the procession, association officials held a banner announcing the name of the event. They were followed by the choir, a number of people carrying PCF (Parti Communiste Française) flags, and the audience holding their flowers. The procession progressed slowly across the neighborhood, through one of the city's central plazas, and across another immigrant neighborhood to a footbridge over the Isère, where everyone gathered. During the march, the choir sang a revolutionary song, which described the combat of the revolutionaries in the Algerian jungle, fighting for their homeland. Over the course of the march, which lasted about 15 minutes, people came out of shops and buildings and joined the procession, which grew from about 100 people to over 150. At the footbridge the organizer called for a minute of silence. He then invited everyone to throw their flowers into the river, where the blossoms were caught in the eddies and floated away into the dusk. This marked the end of the demonstration, and

marchers mingled and chatted, watched the flowers float away, said hello to friends, and like the flowers dispersed into the dusk.

The event was considered to be a success. Although there were concerns over low attendance beforehand, numbers of attendees grew rapidly. Over the study period, this was a yearly event, with overall continuity in the associations and level of participation. According to the organizers and the published flyer, its goals were to inform the public of this massacre that occurred on French soil and to push for official government recognition of the deaths. A streamlined event – lasting no more than an hour – it was elegant in its simplicity. The main symbol – the carrying and throwing of the flowers into the river – mirrored the peaceful march and the tragic end of its participants. This was accompanied by pedagogic elements – the flyer and speech, as well as the availability of representatives available for questions – that served to explain the massacre through these symbols for the uninitiated and to remind the regulars. As such, the Scene (River) and Agency (flowers, flyers) matched the Purpose (to educate about the event) perfectly.

While the central symbolic and pedagogic message was clear and elegantly presented, it was diluted by the simultaneous inclusion of other, unrelated or subsidiary symbols. The participation of the choir singing revolutionary songs served to attract an audience and evoked the struggles and challenges of the period. However, by evoking armed conflict, it linked the victims of the massacre with the perpetrators of violence and therefore worked against any possibility of their transformation into martyrs. Instead, the victims were remembered both for themselves and as a symbol of a turbulent and violent time that eventually led to the victory of

the Algerian independence movement. Although very effective at gathering a diverse audience and passing historical information, this lack of unified, self-reinforcing symbols did not elicit the same emotional response as did the March 27th performance. Despite the presence of people who had been in Paris at the time and knew some of the victims, there was no visible emotional connection to the victims or among the participants, and everyone remained calm. The commemoration was referenced in interviews and casual discussions with association and community members, but mentions of the event were informational, and it soon faded as a topic of conversation.

I was unable to attend the 2010 or 2011 events. However, I received listserv emails about them, discussed the upcoming 2011 event at length with participants during the summer of 2011, and attended a planning meeting. As the 50th anniversary of the massacre and the beginning of what was expected to be a year of commemorations marking the 50th anniversary of Algerian Independence, this commemoration was considered to be of particular importance. In my conversations with members of the associations in summer 2011, I asked if there were plans for the 50th anniversary that would take place the coming fall. The response was yes, there was certainly going to be a commemoration, as there was every year, and it would take the same form as it took every year. However, hopes were that it would be better attended, as the 50th anniversary. Certain individuals expressed concern that the event would be used to further political agendas, especially since 2012 was to be an election year. Some preferred that it remain centered on the commemoration of this particular event and not be tied to larger geopolitical and humanitarian discourses, particularly on undocumented migrants. At the planning meeting

nothing specific was resolved other than the plan to hold the event and make it ‘bigger’ than usual.

In 2011 the ceremony was attended by 500 individuals (as estimated by the organizers) and organized, at least in name, by 41 associations. The list of associations included all of those which had participated in 2009 plus a number of political groups (including Communist, Socialist, and Green Party groups), humanitarian groups, and the Parti des Indigènes de la République, a group tied to the continent-wide protest movement of the same name begun earlier that year. The speech delivered during the event cited the undocumented workers, Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, and international worker solidarity. Like every year the flowers were donated and monetary contributions for the flowers went directly to help Algerian refugees. This commemoration was clearly the large, well-attended event for which the organizers had been hoping. It also held true to its yearly format in which the historical event was made a contact point for talking about contemporary political and social issues. The fact that this was an anniversary year did not entail significant departures from the format as developed over the years.

These two examples of commemorations illustrate some of the variety of communicative options through performance that are available to the associations, with their own benefits and consequences. The creation of an interlocking landscape of symbols presented in a performance-as-spectacle, as accomplished by the Pied-Noir, is very effective at creating a unified sense of self and an emotional response among the group. This exemplifies Connerton’s incorporating practices (1989) that serve to reinforce group memory. Additionally, the emotionally charged

proceedings, along with the knowledge that this is a special, one-of-a-kind event, created a liminal space (Turner 1969) for culture and identity work to take place. Behaviors, such as crying or being openly upset, that this population does not normally exhibit in public (Smith 2006:151) become acceptable. For people not members of the identity group, however, participation in the event to the depth shared by the rest of the audience was not possible because only members of the minority population who are in the same interpretive community (Feldman 2002) and select outsiders that have the tuning (Schiffer 2010) necessary to interpret the depth and coherence of the symbols used in the performance and therefore to fully appreciate its Scene. The more rational and explanatory, but not emotional, format of the demonstration in Grenoble proved an effective tool for the federation of diverse groups – religious, cultural, social, and political organizations including individuals from a wide variety of backgrounds – and the distribution of a particular message. The tuning necessary for the uninitiated to interpret the central symbols of the procession was provided within the event itself. However, the pedagogic nature and fact that the message was tied to multiple controversies and discussions meant that it could not incite the same emotional depth of involvement of those participants, nor did it serve to construct or maintain a group identity. Each event, or Act, therefore, was constructed using a specific combination of Scene and Agency to fulfill a Purpose. With subtle differences in the construction of these Acts, it becomes apparent how they serve different Purposes.

Communication through Material Culture: Buildings and Decorations

In this section I focus on how the spaces, offices, and buildings in which associations host their activities make nonverbal statements about the associations and their participants and set the Scene for their Acts. It is often said that associations are embodied in their members, but this is not equally true in all cases, and associations may also be embodied in buildings, places, and objects. At one extreme, an association may own or have the use of an entire building, suite, or office. In other cases, it may share office space part-time, and use private residences or rented rooms. At the other extreme, it may have no fixed point on the geography of the city and exist only in its members. After a general description, I provide examples of how associations' communicate through buildings and spaces.

Associations lacking permanent spaces, rented or borrowed rooms for their activities. One Moroccan mutual aid association, for example, did not have an office or other location in which to greet members. Meetings happened at members' houses or public places. Other associations did not have an office or permanent space, but habitually used the same places for their activities, such as restaurants or coffee shops and rented rooms, theaters, or conference halls. One association regularly held events at a local school of hospitality. This informal sense of connection could lead to conflict and tensions when an association had been accustomed to using a space beyond its legal rights. *Maisons des Rapatriés* (MdR), for example, are reserved for associations of *rapatriés*, but some welcome outside associations if time and space permitted. When non-minority associations were turned away at one MdR, their members sometimes leveled critiques of favoritism and discrimination at the MdR's organizing body, though they had

no legal right to the space. In both Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence, large halls or meeting spaces can be rented or borrowed from institutions, in particular the *Maison des Associations* in Grenoble (MDA-G) and the *Maison de la Vie Associative* in Aix-en-Provence (MDVA). Both the MDA-G and MDVA have a limited quantity of large-capacity rooms, which can cause conflict if many associations want to hold events on a particular date. The MDA-G has one large hall that seats 160 people, a number of meeting rooms, and a conference room to serve the 300 local associations that regularly use the facilities. As such, these rooms, and especially the large hall, are typically booked long in advance.

Other associations had permanent office or activity spaces, including leased rooms or buildings, shared offices in public buildings such as the MDA-G or MDVA, or dedicated buildings owned or reserved for the use of the associations. These shared offices were typically devoid of decoration or only minimally decorated. Associations that shared offices in the MDA-G, for example, each had a locking cabinet in which they kept their belongings, and organized their office hours around those of the other associations. These rooms were typically too small to hold events or meetings larger than a few individuals, so larger activities took place elsewhere, in public places or rented or borrowed rooms. Even among associations with permanent facilities, all had some outside activities, for space, variety, or to bring events closer to the target audience. Associations, therefore, all maintained a certain amount of flexibility of Scene.

Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence also had MdR, municipal buildings set aside for the use of the Pied-Noir and Harki associations. In Grenoble the MdR is located in the center of town, just outside the pedestrian zone in an alley between the Fnac and the Galleries Lafayette, both

large retail stores and popular meeting places. The building itself, however, is distinguished from those around it only by a small plaque and a list of office hours. Though I knew it was in the area and was looking for it, I regularly walked by the entrance for months before the sign caught my eye. A walk-up, the building is composed of offices and small meeting or activity rooms.

In contrast, the MdR-Aix is a large, imposing building. Built for the purpose, it appears larger from the street due to its location on a hill above a retaining wall. The MdR is not located in the center of town, but rather a little to the outside, between the Pasino (a casino, conference, and concert venue), an entrance to the highway, and one of the Aix-Marseille university campuses. The immediate neighborhood is a ZUP (*zone à urbaniser en priorité*: housing developments built primarily in the 1960s). The two-story building is served by an elevator and comprises offices, an exhibition space, a large meeting hall with attached kitchen, a small private parking lot, and considerable storage in the basement. The offices are reserved for Pied-Noir associations, but the meeting hall is also made available for use by other neighborhood associations. The building was named after the Maison Maréchal Alphonse Juin who was born in French Algeria and served in both WWI and WWII. This selection of a name served both to commemorate this hero of the Free French Forces and emphasize the inscription of the Pied-Noir into the history of metropolitan France.

During my research in both Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence, the MdR were decorated with paintings, photographs, artifacts, and educational posters from or of French North Africa. The stairways of the MdR-Grenoble, for example, were lined with posters of historic photographs of Algeria. In the MdR-Aix, visitors were greeted upon entering the building with a

larger-than-life statue of Juin. An open *salle* on the second floor, where many meetings and activities were held, was lined with display cases containing natural and cultural artifacts from French Algeria. When I attended meetings or events at the MdR, these decorations were used explicitly as teaching tools, referenced in explanations of historical or social situations to the visiting anthropologist. Members would also use them in discussions with each other. A map or photo of Oran, for example, would serve to determine how close two each other two members had lived in Algeria. Or photos of those killed during the Algerian war would be gestured at without comment during conversations about how that war was being portrayed in the media. In this way these objects reinforced the symbolic landscape created and re-created by the Pied-Noir. Here, the Scene served to set the tone for the Acts undertaken within. When objects were singled out for comment, they ceased to be part of the background Scene and became Agencies supporting the Act.

In the rest of this section I detail the physical history of a series of North African associations in Grenoble as an example of how associations move across urbanscapes and develop ties to particular places, when not associated with an institution such as an MdR or MdA. ADNA (Association Dauphinoise Nord Africain) was created in 1955 to assist North African (primarily Algerian) workers in Grenoble. ADNA (which soon changed its name to ADCFA) “avait une boîte aux lettres [...] qui était en somme son siège fictif” (Muzard 2006: 101) but beyond the mailbox that served as a fictive headquarters, the association had no permanent space. Instead, members went to public and private places such as Algerian neighborhoods, homes, municipal offices, and religious buildings (Muzard 2006:173). Aside

from the mailbox that fulfilled the legal requirements that the association have an address, the ADCFA was embodied entirely in its members, though some activities habitually occurred in the same place for long periods. Literacy classes, for example, were taught in a room at a Protestant church (Muzard 2006:104).

By the late 1960s the ADCFA had begun partnering with a *Maison des jeunes et de la culture* (MJC) near the Très-Cloîtres neighborhood, the primary North African neighborhood in Grenoble. In 1968 the city reorganized a number of services, moving the MJC to the edge of the Très-Cloîtres neighborhood. The city offered to provide the ADCFA free access to offices in the same building to facilitate its activities and its collaboration with the MJC (Muzard 2006:169). This municipal interest was interpreted as a “signe fort” in support of the North African population (Muzard 2006:173). The ADCFA’s organizers agreed, in part for the space, but also because cooperation with the MJC would further their goals of increased interaction and comprehension between the North African and French populations. Specifically, “la fréquentation de locaux imbriqués dans un ensemble s’opposait à la constitution d’un ghetto” because mixing of populations within the building prevented them from being isolated and the MJC’s objective of producing a global education encouraged interaction between associations within the building (Muzard 2006:169). In this way the ADCFA acquired its first *locaux*. The choice was made as a statement of the association’s desire not only to have a permanent office, but, more importantly, to reach a diverse audience. Ultimately, the selection of location both on the part of the city and the ADCFA was a success. Although the ADCFA no longer exists, North

African and Algerian associations continued to inhabit the building in 2012, as did the MJC, but they do not collaborate closely.

Figure 4: Commemorative Plaque



During the fieldwork period, the building was considered inseparable from the North African community. It had no name – other than its address – and was typically referred to by the

name of the largest active association or one of the now defunct associations that had previously occupied the space. The space was home to three associations, all of which served the North African community. The ADCFA and its founder were commemorated on a plaque hung outside the entrance (see Figure 4). The building is located on an open square facing one of the tram stops, across the street from the city's museum of modern art, a block from a square and central pedestrian shopping district, and on the outskirts of the Très-Cloîtres neighborhood. Its location at the intersection of a very Franco-French neighborhood and the North African *quartier* was often cited as leading to the success of the associations it held: convenient to transportation, visible to passers-by, and within the bounds of the minority neighborhood the building was located well within the comfort zones of both its North African and French constituents. In part this also had to do with the physical layout of the environs. A number of women of both French-North African and other backgrounds told me that the narrow, winding streets of the North African neighborhood next door made them feel uncomfortable. This was contrasted with the comforting openness of the building's environs. Here the Scene is considered crucial to the associations' ability to fulfill their Purpose by attracting an audience.

The building was well known in the area. The city maintained an official interest in keeping associations in the building. One official expressed the city's attachment to the building's associations in 2011: "la ville a une attachement à l'association. [...] Ca, c'est une question pour nous tous à la ville. A [name of association] je veux que vous teniez la route." During the study I routinely asked at municipal and cultural institutions in Grenoble if and where I could find North African associations that would be willing to speak with an American student.

If individuals knew of any, they most often sent me to this building, even when they did not know the names of the associations or individuals within. The building also had a status among the general public. In 2002, when I took Arabic lessons at one of the North African associations there, a French acquaintance told me that it was not 'safe' for a woman to be involved with a North African association. He revised his opinion when I told him where the association was located. The central, open site as well as the reputation of the associations there, he told me, made this a safe place to be.

As discussed above, the location of the ADCFA at that site was due to a confluence of social, relational, and political events and situations. By the beginning of fieldwork for this study, the building had become a *lieu de mémoire* in its own right, one of the few unanimously associated with the local North African community. The associations that inhabit the building benefit from the historical ties to their predecessors as passed through the physical building, particularly in that it confers legitimacy upon the resident associations. People who are 'tuned' to the history of the building, to use Schiffer's (2010) term, associate it with legitimacy and reliability, and the associations within benefit from such a symbol. The depth of history and of shared relations between the associations in the building and the city have imbued the building itself with characteristics, such as a reputation for openness and legitimacy, that are then reflected in the associations themselves. Members of the associations capitalized on these connections, benefitting from the notoriety and position as a go-to for information about the North African community. Some also felt the history as conferring additional responsibilities, requiring the associations to live up to the standards set by their location. Their special position

located them firmly ‘on-stage’ and in the public eye (Shryock 2004). In this example, I have illustrated how a long-term connection between a place and an association has created a symbol of what once was just a building.

To use Burke’s (1969[1945]) terms, this building began as a Scene and an Agency that set the stage for Acts of the associations and their members. Over time, however, the history imbued in the location allowed it to develop an additional role: that of Agent in its own right. As such, its very presence and history Act on others. For this shift from Scene to Agent to occur, however, the audience must be tuned to the history of the building.

Associations have numerous performative and communicative options for buildings, rooms, and spaces for their activities. In some cases, the constraints on their actions are structural – associations cannot hold events for large audiences, for example, without advance planning to reserve venues. In others, they depend on the communicative properties of the spaces themselves. Buildings, rooms, and decorations serve as interferences, in the Wobstian sense (1999), influencing the people who interact with and around them. The history of the building in Grenoble alters individuals’ perceptions of associations within it. The building has become a symbol of the ‘integrated’ North African population. OAS portraits, oil paintings of Algerian landscapes, and educational posters hanging on the walls of Pied-Noir associations each provide opportunities for performative and communicative use. These objects serve as references for the minority in their maintenance of group identity and reinforcement of the group’s symbolic landscape, and teaching resources in their interactions with outsiders.

Culinary Performance

One discrete set of symbols employed in activities by the MCA to create coherent cultural performances was food. Food is an example of an Agency that often serves in society to pass messages about group membership and culture (Lockwood and Lockwood 2000; Mintz 1996; Munn 1986; Sutton 2001). In an earlier work, I analyzed the ways in which the Pied-Noir and North African associations used food at MCA activities and noted significant differences between the two groups (Phaneuf 2012). I recap my earlier argument and then expand the discussion on how the symbolic and physical properties of the foods served are negotiated in interactions both internal and external to the minority group.

I have argued (Phaneuf 2012) that while both groups incorporated food into a large number of their events, the two groups did so in very different ways. Namely, the Pied-Noir were more likely, on the whole, to serve meals, snacks, or drinks at events than the North Africans. Kinds of foods served are outlined in Figure 5. When refreshments were served, North Africans offered ‘traditional’ dishes to outsiders and a mix of ethnic or neutral foods within the community. The resulting cultural performance shown to outsiders was very legible in that it was unified and ‘traditional,’ contrasting with emphasis on members’ individuality at members-only events. The Pied-Noir served ‘traditional’ dishes to community members and local or neutral foods to outsiders. When entertaining, the Pied-Noir associations minimized their cultural difference from the French. Instead, this was kept in a ‘shadow zone’ (Shryock 2004).

Figure 5: Foods Served at Association Events

AUDIENCE	PIED-NOIR HOSTS		NORTH AFRICAN HOSTS	
MEMBERS	Traditional	Anisette Rosé Wine, Mouna, Sobresade, Merguez, Mechoui (Meat Roasted on a Spit), Couscous, Paella	Pan-French	Quiches, Regional Specialties, Pizzas, Premade Dishes, Breads, Coffee, Soft Drinks, Finger Food
	Pan-French	Quiches, Regional Specialties, Pizzas, Premade Dishes, Breads, Coffee, Soft Drinks, Finger Food	Traditional	Couscous, Harissa, Dates, Pastries, Mint Tea, Coffee
	Unmarked	Rosé Wine (Both Pied- Noir and a Regional Favorite in the South of France)	Non-Halal	Present at Times, Absent at Others
OUTSIDERS	Pan-French	Quiches, Regional Specialties, Pizzas, Premade Dishes, Breads, Coffee, Soft Drinks, Finger Food	Traditional	Couscous, Harissa, Dates, Pastries, Mint Tea, Coffee
	Regional Specialties	Local or Regional Recipes or Ingredients, Well- Known Restaurants	Non-Halal	Absent

In comparing the entertaining patterns of these two groups, I noted several motivating factors for the differences in how and when food is deployed as Agency. First, there was a question of taste: Pied-Noir enjoy their ‘traditional’ dishes, and eat them when together, but know that they are not always well liked by the uninitiated and thus do not serve them to guests. Couscous, in contrast, was very popular and well liked in France, so it was both guaranteed to please the audience at North African associations and certain to cause disappointment if it were

not served at dinners. When no outsiders were present, however, individuals chose foods based on personal preference and not group membership (Phaneuf 2012).

In both cases, the primary consideration is with the physical characteristics of the objects (food items) themselves. Although the food symbolizes the culture and identity of the individuals present, choices are attributed to the inherent physical characteristics of the foods as appreciated in society. If a guest finds merguez too spicy, for example, that is a judgment of the physical properties of the symbol-bearing object and not on the culture it symbolizes. This can influence the objects' ability to fulfill its role of Agency.

Second, there were concerns with legibility and perceived legitimacy of the symbols used as Agencies. Food is a potent, federative symbol for the Pied-Noir (Hureau 2010, Manes 2005). The community comes from a variety of national and ethnic backgrounds and their 'traditional' foods, likewise, have a number of origins. This tended to cause uncertainty and doubt among the French, who are more accustomed to having single origins for food items (Phaneuf 2012). Exposing such a potent symbol to outsiders risks criticism and co-option, both of which would weaken its federative potential for members of the minority group. If couscous is rejected by an outsider as a Pied-Noir dish, and instead attributed to North Africans, this is also a rejection of the Pied-Noir's conception of culture and self as illegitimate. If mouna or sobresade were to be enjoyed too much by outsiders and incorporated into the national repertoire, it is likely that the symbolic nature of the dishes would be lost and they would no longer have the federative potential within the Pied-Noir population.

North Africans, in contrast, have a more easily legible food culture and many associations intend to promote and publicize North African cultural contributions to France. The threat of outsiders as seeing these symbols as illegitimate is smaller. Were the symbols to be co-opted, it would serve the associations' goals of promoting North African cultural contributions to France (Phaneuf 2012). North Africans could reference at any time the practices of the contemporary populations living in North Africa. Legitimacy, therefore, was not a major concern, though there were internal discussions and disagreements about who made the best or most 'authentic' version of a particular dish. Here, food-as-symbol for the Pied-Noir encourages its protection in a 'shadow zone' (Shryock 2004) as a defensive measure for the group identity. For the North Africans, food-as-symbol can be flaunted in hopes of acquiring recognition and acclaim for their group identity. Agencies, as we see here, must fit the Act, Agent, and intended audience if they are to be effective.

As discussed above in the example regarding memorial events, I propose that the Pied-Noir have been successful at creating a symbolic landscape composed of dates, images, and personas. This was explicitly referenced in the March 27th performance and the decorations at Pied-Noir associations and served to maintain group identity. Cuisine, as I have illustrated here, represented another facet of this symbolic landscape and was intimately tied to the group identity. Because of its special, central position to this landscape and the risks of contestation associated with it, however, the Pied-Noir preferred in many cases to protect key symbols from outsiders. This is in contrast with the culinary practices of the North African community. This community lacks such a coherent symbolic landscape, though certain groups have federating

dates, stories, and individuals. The fact that North Africans do not base their collective identity on such a coherent symbolic landscape, and instead reference the existing cultural landscape of North Africa, lessens the risk of sharing their traditional foods with a wider public.

Conclusion

The North African and Pied-Noir associations stage commemorative events as Acts, use buildings and spaces as Scenes, and serve food as Agencies to pass information about their members to outsiders and reinforce group cohesion. Organized performances and material culture transmit messages (intentional or not) in different ways. The means of communication can also be designed in certain ways for outsiders and others for group members. In their activities, Pied-Noir and North African associations employed performances in different ways, to different ends.

Commemorative performances of the kind described here are Acts that present a set amount of information, in a prearranged format, to an audience that has chosen to attend this event. The associations, for the most part, know who their audiences will be, as discussed in Chapter 4. They can therefore prepare their message and performance strategy to coordinate with the interests and needs of their audience. This is a good venue for transmitting a particular message to an audience, provided that the intended recipients attend the performance.

Use of material culture, either as Scene or Agency, has benefits and risks that planned performances do not. Objects have inherent qualities on which their selection as bearers of messages depends. The physical properties of food and its uncertain ability to please a non-

minority audience, for example, were part of why the Pied-Noir chose not to share their cuisine with outsiders. In this case, its potential as Agency is deemed insufficient. Material interferences continue to operate on their surroundings for the use-life of the object (Wobst 1999). When this object has a diverse audience, such as a memorial or building, viewers will have very different experiences and tunings (Schiffer 2010), varying their ability to interpret the object's message. Objects with a pedagogic intent, such as a memorial plaque, can provide some of the tuning necessary to understand their intended message. Others run the risk of being misinterpreted, particularly in a multicultural society, or altered, as through graffiti. Food is a particular example of material culture that differs in its ephemerality. The messages it transmits occur within the social interaction where it is served, and therefore achieve neither permanence nor risk alteration or misinterpretation as do other forms of material culture.

The Pied-Noir and North African populations make very different decisions about constructing their acts through kinds of performance. They also attempt to convey different messages. The Pied-Noir have a well-developed symbolic landscape that they reference in many of their performances. Filled with dates, names, colors, scents, and tastes, this landscape references and symbolically re-creates French Algeria. Andrea Smith (2006:216) finds that Maltese Pied-Noir “symbolically transform one place into another,” projecting their feelings and memories of their homeland, Algeria, onto Malta, the homeland of their ancestors. What performances at the associations illustrate is different. These individuals do not use a physical landscape, such as Malta, upon which to project their desires and emotional attachments. Instead, through reiteration of symbols referencing French Algeria in their performances, spaces, and

personal interactions, the Pied-Noir constantly (re)create the Algerian landscape. Though some of the individuals are also Maltese Pied-Noir and have developed a symbolic homeland in Malta, as a whole the Pied-Noir have no single ancestral homeland on which to focus their emotions, nor have they managed to translate their attachment to places in France. The symbolic homeland responds to this lack. It also creates a portable Scene for association actions.

When the landscape of memory is reproduced through interaction at the heart of associations and their activities it is highly portable and permits continuity despite physical separation. Although the Pied-Noir community has connections to certain places in France, these places are neither universal nor uncontested, and this outside opposition makes them problematic as physical foci of communal feeling. What is more, the Pied-Noir are widely dispersed and, as the population ages, their mobility is reduced, making travel to particular locations more difficult. The symbolic landscape is also resistant to outside approbation: verbal or performative symbols can be hidden in “shadow zones” or placed “on display” (Shryock 2004) at will, whereas monuments and other marks on the landscape cannot. This makes it possible to tailor the Scene and Agencies by selecting symbols that are more or less acceptable to outsiders. Some symbols, such as rosé wine, can be deployed publically without threat of censure because the outside population does not recognize their status as a symbol of French Algeria for the Pied-Noir. Others, such as references to the OAS, are kept private. While the Pied-Noir do create physical monuments, memorials, sacred spaces, and museums or archives in France, they do not fill the same role for group cohesion, nor are all equally successful. Monuments and memorials often instigate protest. Sacred spaces remain largely private to the community. It is museums

and archives that are the most effective at receiving outside assistance, legitimation and attention, both positive and negative (as discussed in Chapter 4).

The act of translating references to French Algeria into symbols not readily apparent to the general public makes it both easy to reference – a single word or phrase can evoke 132 years of colonial history – and resistant to outside influence. This is consistent with what I noted in Chapter 4: the Pied-Noir know that their culture is not valued in society and are decreasingly hopeful that this will change, with the notable exception of historic preservation. The creation of community identity around such a symbolic landscape allows for a culture, through its bearers, to be displaced and still retain its geographic character. For, after all, what distinguishes the Pied-Noir from the metropolitan French is their geographic origin in Algeria. From this first split stemmed a distinct history and *mode de vie*. Emphasis on the geography through use of such a landscape as the basis for identity construction allows for maintenance of just what is so distinctive about the group in society.

North Africans, in contrast, do not have a single group narrative at the base of their performances. Rather, they reference the French nation, minority culture (categorized as both ‘high’ and ‘traditional’ as discussed in Chapter 4), and universalist conceptions of human rights and the desirability of multiculturalism. Many performances are polysemic. For example, the 17 October commemoration referenced undocumented immigrants and human rights in addition to the massacre, potlucks provided a diverse array of foods, and associations brought a variety of ethnic musical groups. When they do have a unified cultural performance, such as serving traditional North African foods to outsiders, it serves three purposes. First, it can build group

cohesion, a place to dance to traditional music without the judgments or attention of unsympathetic outsiders. Second, in instances where outside presence is desired, it attracts and pleases an audience. For some, this is what I have referred to above as cultural tourism: outsiders attend for distraction or entertainment, not necessarily to achieve a deeper, holistic understanding of another culture. Third, once an audience is drawn to the activity, it can serve as the vehicle of a message about the group, or as the message itself. While a reading of classical Arabic poetry may not appear overtly political, it does serve to transmit the statement that North Africans have ‘high’ culture. This statement, as I discussed in Chapter 4, can be political and intended to create social change. Alternatively, a couscous dinner represents a legible, ‘traditional’ cultural performance, and provides the time and audience for organizers to speak on a variety of other topics and transmit additional messages.

In these performances the North Africans do not have a developed symbolic landscape, though certain neighborhoods or buildings have local resonance and serve as points of communal assembly and references of the community to the outside world. What is evident is an emphasis on republican values, minority culture, and a cosmopolitan interest in multiculturalism. They rely on legible performances of ‘their’ culture to draw cultural tourists and individuals with an interest in multiculturalism to their events. Ironically, the only way they can draw an audience to hear the argument that they are French and should be full members of society is by emphasizing their cultural difference. The Pied-Noir, on the other hand, minimize certain of their cultural differences in order to place the emphasis on their history while leaving their status as French

unchallenged. In the next chapter I focus on how the individuals involved with the MCAs used creation and performance of history to demonstrate their position in the nation.

CHAPTER 6: HISTORIOGRAPHY AS THE HANDMAIDEN OF IDEOLOGY

Perhaps ambivalence is the best simple way to describe [French] attitudes to the colonies – a mixture of nostalgia, residual pride, misgivings about the worth of the effort, sometimes shame about what was done, occasional outrage (Aldrich 2005:8).

Comment faire comprendre [...] que les « mentalités » changent avec le temps ? Que ni la sensibilité ni les valeurs morales ne sont les mêmes aujourd'hui qu'il y a dix siècles ? [...] Sans doute y aurait-t-il là un effort explicatif à fournir, une pédagogie, en direction de l'opinion, que les universitaires ont eu grand tort de négliger. Mais pour se faire comprendre, devront-ils, aujourd'hui que la « diversité » est à la mode, aller jusqu'à réclamer, pour le passé, un *droit à la différence* ? (Chandernagor 2008:44-5).

Introduction

In this chapter I place debates over colonial French North Africa in the context of a century of French historiographic traditions. I begin by presenting a chronology of French historiography, particularly that dealing with the North African colonies and post-colonial populations, then I explore how present-day political and politicized uses of history at the national and communal scales shed light on ideological and social cleavages in contemporary society. After providing examples of how Chirac and Sarkozy used history for political ends I engage in a closer examination of how associations and their members use history in negotiations of group and national membership and identity.

Collective memory, at both communal and national scales, is highly contested in contemporary France. The topic is so tumultuous that it has been the subject of laws, lengthy and bitter parliamentary debate, and extended nationwide discussion. Since the 1980s, colonial history has increasingly played a role in these debates, particularly conceptualizations and

contestations surrounding the history of colonial Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco (Shepard 2006; Stora 1998; Ferro 2005). To a lesser extent, the history of North African migrants and immigrants in France has also been used (Stora 1992). As described in previous chapters, contemporary France is trying to reconcile its multicultural, multi-ethnic population with its universalistic philosophical heritage. One way in which these tensions are negotiated, conceived, and made comprehensible is through the construction of history.

History and collective memory play central roles in all societies. Despite modernity's infatuation with its own newness, and with newness in general, the past is essential to how individuals understand themselves and their places in society. Here, I take history to include the study of past events through examination of written documents and other "texts" (Geertz 1973). Anthropologists have used the following as forms of texts: writings by past scholars and individuals, photographs, receipts and objects people intentionally or unintentionally left behind. I acknowledge that this definition results in an overlap of the traditional foci of history and archeology, but it reflects contemporary French academic and popular conceptions of the term. The systematic study of history as a discipline and how history is constructed is referred to as historiography, and has been practiced in France since WWII (Furay and Salevouris 1988:223; Miège 1979; Park and Boum 2006). Social or collective memory, for its part, is understood as the ways in which past events are understood and remembered within a society (Hawlbachs 1992). These terms will be discussed at length below.

Both history and social memory hold the power to create and maintain legitimizing discourses, and both are regularly deployed by those in positions of power and contested by

numerous groups in society (Cole 2005; Halbwachs 1992). Memory is “fundamentally social in nature. Since we rely on our memories of the past to know who we are and make decisions about our present and future, memory is closely connected to political power” (Cole 2005:103).

Memory is therefore “a key site at which one can witness the multiple ways in which individual subjectivity is tied to larger projects of political struggle and historical transformation” (Cole 2005:104). History, itself, can legitimize current social organization and power relations (Anderson 1983). This is how discourses tied to history and memory of colonial North African France will be treated in the rest of this chapter.

In France the connection between history and political power can be particularly explicit, as are its critiques. During the 19th and 20th centuries, French historians through their works were not distanced academics recording past events, but instead “were integral aspects of the protracted process of regime change” (Gemie 2005:489). In the late 1800s, after the Franco-Prussian War, history was considered particularly important by scholars such as Ernst Renan, Ernest Lavisse, and others, as “the repository of a humiliated nation’s pride, and its instruction was to contribute to the civic rearming of the nation” (Revel 1995:6). In the 20th century, history became “the repository of the social” (Revel 1995:12). By the mid-20th century Perry Anderson (2004b) identified France as the most striking example he knows of historians collaborating in the creation of a national political ideology: “Here, as nowhere else, history and politics interlocked in an integrated vision of the nation, projected across the expanse of public space. [...] There has rarely been such a vivid illustration of just what Gramsci meant by hegemony.”

Recognition and criticism of the connection between official history and political power are not new, nor are they limited to France (Anderson 1983; Bazzaz 2010; Duara 1995; Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds 1983; Miège 1979; Valensi 1990). For these authors, the creation of history become self-reinforcing, as each legitimates and creates the other. History not only provides legitimation for the political power, but “sketches a science of the practices of power” that serves to inform and perfect the exercise of power by those who hold its reigns (de Certeau [1975] 1988:6-7). In his *Mal d'Archive: une impression freudienne* (1995), Jacques Derrida elaborates on the specific role of archives in power relations and the creation of knowledge. Archives are created by those in power, who control the entry of items into the archives as well as their interpretation (Derrida [1995] 1996:2). In other words, not only is the production of history co-constitutive with political power, the very archives on which it rests are pre-constructed by that same power. For Derrida, this is not inconsequential ([1995] 1996:3): “Effective democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: the participation in and the access to the archive, its constitution, and its interpretation.” Ann Stoler calls colonial archives an “arsenal” for government power through which both what is written and what is not written can be controlled (2009:3). These institutions are both “a corpus of writing and [...] a force field that animates political energies and expertise, that pulls on some ‘social facts’ and converts them into qualified knowledge, that attends to some ways of knowing while repelling and refusing others” (Stoler 2009:22). The very institutions designed to preserve the source

materials necessary for the creation of future historiography, therefore, also skew the data that is preserved, and the ways in which it is preserved.²²

As we see, descriptions of French history are written and understood as tied into larger ideologies of power, nationality, and identity, among others. Participants at the MCA are aware of history's implication in political power and the criticisms of this. They then use this knowledge to inform both their own critiques and historiographic production, as I will discuss below.

History, memory, and culture have had a central role in France's conception of the Republic and the coherence of the French nation since the Revolution of 1789. During the late 1800s after the accession of Alsace-Lorraine by the German Empire in 1871, concerns about national coherence were high. In his 1882 lecture "What is a nation?" Ernst Renan discussed the creation of a shared cultural and historical base necessary to the maintenance of the nation. Renan stated that a nation is based on a shared spirit, shared memories (history), and a desire to be together in the present (1992 [1882]). For Renan, this sharing sustains a nation but may come at a cost: "l'essence d'une nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous aient oublié bien de choses" (Renan 1992[1882]:42). Forgetting past divisions, then, becomes necessary for the continuation of the national bond. This is a normal part of memory, as what is remembered and what is forgotten are equally selected.

What is more necessary in Renan's construction of the nation is that these individuals also share many things. Politically, this had translated into an emphasis on integrating all citizens

²² As Campbell and Heyman (2006) remind us, not all action takes place within relations of domination and resistance. This includes, of course, the preservation of 'texts' of historic interest and the writing of history.

into the Republic – first through the three institutions of school, family, and military service (Favell 1998). The shared experiences supposedly inculcate universal values and republicanism, seen as a typically French inheritance (Kastoryano 2002), as well as an understanding of the historical narrative of *how* France has arrived at its current situation. The infamous “*Nos ancetres les gaulois*” taught in French schools to children of colonial subjects is a well-known example of one attempt at an origin story that did not match its modern-day constituency. With the increase in proponents of multiculturalism and the multicultural nature of France itself in the 1970s and 1980s, the content of the national historical narrative has been increasingly contested. Since the 1980s, Renan’s work has been widely perceived as offering solutions to the “crisis atmosphere” of concerns over national identity in the face of this internal diversity (Kastoryano 2002:41-2).

A Brief Chronology of French Historiography

Before proceeding to a discussion on the place of post-colonial history in France, I provide a brief overview of French historiography as context. French historiography is of relatively recent vintage, beginning in the 1920s and consists, in part, of dividing historians and their works into ‘schools’ of thought. These schools are defined by shared methodologies, theoretical orientations, or other traits. However, they are not rigid, and historiographers acknowledge that each school holds significant internal variation, and some historians are difficult to categorize.

At present, there is little agreement on the number of schools or their defining characteristics in French historiography. However, there are claims that the number of schools ranges from three to five (Bourdé and Martin 1989; Burke 1990; Gildea 1994). Regardless of the exact number, there are several trends that are particularly significant for my research. These include: positivist history, Marxism, *Annales*, new political history, and social memory. Also important, though minor, is the influence of oral history.

Positivist and Marxist Historians

At the beginning of the 20th century, French historians typically fit into one of two historiographic traditions. The first were considered practitioners of *l'histoire événementielle*, also known as positivist historians. The second tradition consisted of Marxist historians (Bourdé and Martin 1989; Gildea 1994). In both Marxist and positivist history, borrowing from Hegel, the past was written beginning in deep time, progressing towards the present through the creation of a narrative. The narrative, was mostly political in nature, and constructed as a series of interconnected events that led inexorably to the now.

A central tenet of the practitioners of *l'histoire événementielle* was that they “argued that change was initiated by superior individuals who were then imitated by the generality” (Gildea 1994:2). With this assumption, adherents put great emphasis on the existence and actions of exemplary individuals in order to understand human history. Yet there was also a focus on a rigorous and objective, though limited, methodology. This methodology was based on Comtean, or French, positivism that linked all kinds of scientific enquiry into one totalizing system that

sought the rules for the physical and social determinants of human behavior (Lenzer 1975). In other words, as Isaiah Berlin (1969:43) commented, Comte sought “one complete and all-embracing pyramid of scientific knowledge; one method; one truth; one scale of rational, ‘scientific’ values. This naïve craving for unity and symmetry at the expense of experience is still with us.” The methodology developed out of Comtean positivism has been criticized as no more than an “investigative procedure” and as substantially limiting alternative possible explanations of the data in the interests of creating one, unified, system (Highmore 2006; see also de Certeau [1973] 1995).

Practitioners of *l’histoire événementielle* tended to lend uncritical support to regimes in power, acting as apologists, and, as Bourdé and Martin (1989:181) put it, would “sécrète un discours idéologique” that was at odds with an objective view of the past. This school encountered a great deal of resistance following the rise of the *Annales* historians in the 1920s. Yet it persisted and exercised significant influence until the 1940s in the university system and the 1960s in primary and secondary education (Bourdé and Martin 1989).

In contrast, Marxist historians did not conceive of individuals as central to the progress of history. Instead, they understood history as a series of advancements in technology and social relations that changed economic relations and engendered continued class struggle (Gildea 1994:3). This is known as historical materialism, where social relations of production are deterministic and individuals do not play significant leadership roles in history. History is understood through changes that bring about class struggle, though some strains of Marxism wedded to being scientific had positivistic traits.

The *Annales* School

Of all French contributions to the general field of historical method, the *Annales* School is arguably the most influential, particularly post WWII. Founded in 1929 by Maurice Bloch and Lucien Febvre, *Annales* was intended to re-conceptualize the way history was written and understood. Practitioners of the *Annales* school began histories with the present. They traced filiations in the *longue durée* and saw individual events not as the makings of history, but as markers of deeper, longer social processes with no independent explanatory power (Burguière 1979:1352; Burke 1990:2; Lepetit 1995:337). In contrast to earlier historians who tended towards schemas and abstractions, the *Annales* historians emphasized historical detail and avoided abstractions (Revel 1995). Adopting this approach allowed these historians and their followers to distance themselves from the idea that history is predetermined. It also recognized that the ability to conduct historical analysis is dependent on contemporary society and the questions that society deems important (Burguière 1979:1355). Adherents of *Annales* sought to be interdisciplinary, non-dogmatic, and eclectic.

The *Annales* also introduced new methodological dogmas they believed were less stifling to historical inquiry than previous approaches. One of the most important conceptual shifts was the introduction of “l’histoire problème” in which a contemporary problem is compared to similar historical contexts (Burguière 1979:1355). Another method, developed by Febvre, was *l’histoire totale*, which encouraged historians to investigate all aspects of human activity (Bourdé and Martin 1989). Fernand Braudel, acknowledged leader of the *Annales* school between WWII

and the 1980s, introduced the concept of multiple scales of historical time. According to Braudel, history occurs at three time scales: “historical geology” changes at a glacial pace, economic and social structures change slowly, and events change quickly but have temporary effects (Burke 1990:36; Forster 1978).

By the 1980s and 1990s, in what Bourd  and Martin (1989) call *l’histoire nouvelle*, *Annales* historians developed techniques for serial history, history of *mentaliti s* or psychological history, and quantitative history (Burke 1990). They also incorporated new sources of data through technological advances, such as aerial photography, and examination of extant yet unexamined sources, such as cookbooks and menus (Bourd  and Martin 1989). For these new historians, “L’envers du v cu (l’imaginaire, les r ves, les constructions id ologiques)” are as interesting and worthy of study as political or social realities (Bourd  and Martin 1989:270). This movement revolutionized the kinds of data and methodologies used by historians.

The myriad interests and insatiable curiosity of *Annales* historians opened all human activity to historical inquiry and renewed methodological rigor in the discipline. By 1990, however, a number of criticisms were levied against *Annales* practitioners. These focused primarily on the school’s refusal to discuss politics or to focus on the twentieth century and its inability to deal with the history of art, science, and other new areas (Burke 1990, Gildea 1994). Additionally, the very breadth of *Annales* interests resulted in critique. Wallerstein (1991:224) proclaimed that “if everything becomes *Annales*, nothing remains *Annales*.”

The New Political History

In response to criticisms, some historians within and outside the *Annales* school shifted away from these tendencies. For example, political history was never eliminated from French historical practice, and non-*Annales* historians consistently undertook such research (Bourdé and Martin 1989). Even the founding *Annales* historians argued for the separation of political history from the positivist historical tradition and the development of a new political history. It was only later, after WWII under the influence of Braudel, that political history was struck from the *Annales* repertoire (Bourdé and Martin 1989). In the 1990s it was re-incorporated into the work of some *Annales* historians, along with narrative. This was in part a response to critique and partly in protest of Marxist-influenced determinist tendencies of the first two generations (Bourdé and Martin 1989; Burke 1990).

Another critique of the *Annales* school involved conceptions of “the event.” Despite assertions that an event is only a fleeting symptom of deeper, more significant social processes (Burke 1990; i.e., Durkheim 1965 [1912]), its position in historiography has been complicated. Over much of the *Annales*’s history, events were largely ignored as insignificant symptoms. This was not unanimous, and Braudel found events to be the most interesting part of history because of their status as diagnostics of deeper social structures (Burke 1990:90). Later, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie questioned the status of the event in *Le Territoire de l’Historien* (1973). He noted that events are not necessarily simply diagnostic of social structure but could change those structures (Burke 1990). In his later work, however, and by the publication of his *Le Carnaval de Romans* (1979), Ladurie had concluded that events are purely symptoms.

Pierre Nora offered an alternative to the event as simply diagnostic of larger social progresses. In 1974 with his work “Le Retour de l’événement” Nora re-considers the modern event and notes the increasing role of the media in events in contemporary society (Nora [1974] 1995). In this framework, events again become worthy objects of historical attention because of their central position in modern social systems of structure and meaning. In traditional societies – and some contemporary ones – this relationship is inverted and changes in social structure were/are downplayed and ignored as much as possible. Instead, modern media societies over-publicize all change to the point that all news becomes meaningless in the torrent of information (Nora [1974] 1995). In such a situation, Nora asserts, the historian (or, more generally, the social scientist) must use these events as the point of entry with which to understand underlying social structures, meanings, and tensions. In Nora’s words “The event testifies not so much to what it represents as to what it reveals, not so much to what it is as to what it unleashes” (Nora [1974] 1995:432). Most importantly, Nora finds that the event is not solely diagnostic of larger social processes, but constitutive of society: it is created by the social structures of a given society (in particular its information systems) but then becomes a *fait social* that influences future events at both superficial and deeper levels.

Social and Collective Memory and French Historiography

Another significant and lasting development in French historiography was that of social and collective memory. Studies of social memory began with Maurice Halbwachs, a sociologist in the Durkhemian tradition who was a contemporary of the founders of *Annales* and participated

in the nascent school (Coser 1992). Halbwachs was re-discovered in the 1980s with the “memory boom” in the social sciences (Climo and Cattell 2002; see also Cole 2005). For Halbwachs, the past must be remembered collectively. In contrast to previous theories on memory that believed it to be either individual or universal, Halbwachs argues that to be comprehensible, an individual’s memories must be corroborated by those of others (Gildea 1994:10; Halbwachs 1992). As Halbwachs notes: “it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories” (Halbwachs 1992:38). Memory occurs at the level of the individual, but an individual’s personal memories will become confused if they are not reinforced by corroborating memories of others. Therefore, in a sense, they are stored in society. They are also stored in socially determined mnemonic systems linking every act of memory to the society in which it takes place (Halbwachs 1992:168). Different groups in society will have different frameworks for remembering, and they will be most effective at remembering aspects that the group finds of interest (Halbwachs 1992). The memory of an event will be clearer for an individual the more overlapping frameworks to which she has access that treat that event.

Of more interest to historians, group or community memory must be formed, according to Halbwachs, within a community through shared experiences and maintained in social situations, very much like Durkheim’s collective effervescence (Coser 1992: 24-5; Gildea 1994:10). Halbwachs expands on this notion, however, by explaining how communities remain unified during periods of physical separation. Collective history cannot be remembered directly – all individuals in the community would not have been present for all constitutive historical

events – so instead it must be “stored and interpreted by social institutions” within a society, specifically physical surroundings and commemorations of this past (Coser 1992:24). Such commemorations include both explicit acts of memory, such as the creation of statues and festivals, and coded references to these events within everyday discourse (Gildea 1994:10). For Halbwachs, these commemorations, and therefore the historical events they remember, take place in time and are determined by the constraints and imperatives of the time in which they are remembered, not the time that is being remembered (Coser 1992; Gildea 1994). This aspect of Halbwachs’ work has been criticized as too focused on the present. If there were no continuity in memories of the past it would be unrecognizable, atomized into individual recollections (Coser 1992; Schwartz 1982).

An aspect of social memory that has been significantly expanded by authors after Halbwachs is that of the commemorative processes in society that serve to store and revive memory. Paul Connerton (1989) divides these acts of social recall into commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices. Commemorative ceremonies, for Connerton, are ritual events that imply continuity with the past and serve to both create the community and remind it of itself. These practices are explicit acts of memory. Bodily practices, on the other hand, are implicit, where “the past is, as it were, sedimented in the body” (Connerton 1989:72). This takes place in two forms: incorporating practices, where the message is encoded in an action located in a social interaction, and inscribing practices, where a performance is recorded in a written, audio, or video format. The meaning of incorporating practices is context specific and typically stored in unconscious habit – there is no satisfactory explanation for how an individual can interpret

myriad meanings displayed in body language. Because of their unconscious nature these incorporating practices are both effective mnemonic devices and very slow to change. Inscribing practices, however, are open to more thorough interpretation because of their presence outside the social interactions in which they are created. It is for this reason that they have been privileged in the social sciences.

Social memories do not exist in vacuum, however, nor are they discrete, bounded entities. Rather, collective memories interact. Robert Gildea (1994) expands on the connections between collective memory and political culture. He finds that collective memories are neither universal, nor objective, but compete to be seen as such. This happens in three ways. First, all groups will have moments in their history that either reinforce or challenge their political legitimacy. Political groups try to use memory to gain legitimacy, occulting and de-legitimizing competing versions. Second, communities have different, at times opposed, opinions and memories of the same events or persons. Third, memories are continually edited and re-remembered based on subsequent events. Although commemorations are used to remember and reinforce memories of certain events – events that support legitimizing histories – other remembered and known events will not be commemorated. This is because these events would be delegitimizing or too painful to commemorate for the group. Competing memories can also be resolved through forgetting, or through processes of public discussion and reconciliation that are intended to promote healing, such as those in South Africa (Climo and Cattell 2002).

Beyond these basic directions in social memory studies, there has been a proliferation of theories since the 1980s on how social memory is structured and transmitted. As a general rule,

authors are primarily concerned with how groups in society *construct* stories of the past. As Gildea states: “There can be no objective, universally agreed history, and even if it were possible it would be of scant interest. What matters is myth, not in the sense of fiction, but in the sense of a construction of the past elaborated by a political community for its own ends” (1994:12). Given this orientation, concern with the truth of the assertions made in a society is abandoned, and interest shifts to what these constructions say about contemporary social relations and the ways in which the constructions themselves function. As Cole (2005:112) notes, psychologists have shown that individual memory is created through the interaction of a number of systems, and social memory functions the same way.

In the 1970s and 1980s *Annales* practitioners developed an interest in the production of social memory. This is illustrated most clearly by the publication of Pierre Nora’s six volume *Les Lieux de Memoire* (1984-1992). In this compilation Nora intended to create a national narrative that would serve Renan’s purpose of giving all citizens something in common, but without reproducing the errors of the positivist historians (Derderian 2002:28). In the introduction to the first volume, Nora notes a difference between history and two kinds of memory. For Nora, history is a critical analysis of what took place in the past. It is constituted, necessarily, with a certain distance from the events discussed, and, with this distance, displaces memory. Memory (meaning 1) is embodied knowledge, the traces of the way things were done in the way things are carried out now. Memory, therefore, is not in need of history because it is present. For Nora, this is “la mémoire vraie” (1984:XXV). Memory (meaning 2), however, is a “reconstitution” (Nora 1984:XXVI) of *mémoire*, a re-creation of what was, altered by its passage through history.

This is “la mémoire transformée” (Nora 1984:XXVI). With this transformation from meaning 1 to meaning 2, memory is no longer embodied and needs physical supports. Without such supports, the memories would be forgotten because “sans vigilance commémorative, l’histoire les balayerait vite” (Nora 1984:XXIV).

For Nora, with this transformation of memory over time, memory has come to reside in certain places, objects, or conceptions. These items are as diverse as the French national anthem, Versailles, generations, *monuments aux morts*, and the *Larousse* dictionary, to cite only a few (Nora 1984). These items form “un réseau articulé de ces identités différentes, une organisation inconsciente de la mémoire collective qu’il nous appartient de rendre consciente d’elle-même. Les lieux sont notre moment de l’histoire nationale” (Nora 1984:XLII). In this conception of national history, the immense plurality of these *lieux* lends itself to understanding history as plural because France has plural identities (Nora 1984:XI). Also, by tying national history and memory to particular places in the landscape in this way, Nora, like the scholars of social memory, recognizes the importance of the physical, tactile aspects of memory in addition to dates and narratives. This major compendium has received significant attention (Gemie 2005), as well as some criticism, particularly on the near invisibility of colonial France in the collection (Anderson 2004; Derderian 2002). I will discuss these criticisms at length in the next section. Maurice Agulhon is another historian who has written significantly on physical marks of history, such as his trilogy on the symbol of *Marianne* (1979, 1989, 2001) and *De Gaulle* (2000). Aldrich (2005) focuses this kind of analysis on symbols of the colonial period, and is discussed at greater length below.

Oral History and French Historiography

The final current in French historiography discussed here is oral history. Its development was spurred by colonialism and the interaction of French historians with non-literate societies that passed on histories through oral narratives (Henige 1982). Historians who focus on oral history distinguish between oral traditions, or “recollections of the past that are commonly or universally known in a given culture” as opposed to oral history which is “the study of the recent past by means of life histories or personal recollections, where informants speak about their own experiences” (Henige 1982:2). While also interested in collective and social memories, unlike social memory studies, oral history is not concerned with the social lives of these historical narratives, but rather in deconstructing their progression in an attempt to arrive at the truth. For the oral historian it is important to recognize the fact that traditions represent the parts of the past that are remembered today. As such, they change over time, because the parts that are remembered are those “that are best able to outlive changing circumstances” (Henige 1982:4) and that have been subjected to the processes of social reproduction and information flows in a given society (Vansina 1985). These authors believe that with appropriate methodology, including knowledge of how oral traditions are passed down and distortions are introduced into the corpus, it may be possible to arrive at improved approximations of the truth (Henige 1986).

North African Historiography in Postcolonial France

In the half-century following North African decolonization, French historical production on colonial North Africa and its post-colonial populations has gone through a number of stages. In this section I use the overview developed by Robert Aldrich in his *Vestiges of the Colonial Empire in France* (2005), of French historical thought on the colonies to describe this progression. Aldrich identifies three stages of colonial memory and one period of forgetting: “The triumphalist apogee of colonialism in the 1930s, the painful decolonization of the 1950s and early 1960s, [a period of forgetting, followed by] a rediscovery of the colonies in the 1990s” (Aldrich 2005:18). These three stages are marked by the production of different kinds of commemorations. They

also exemplify three stages of the workings of memory. In the colonial age, museums and monuments created memories. In the period of decolonization and its aftermath, memories were forgotten, repressed or denied. In the contemporary moment, memories are being recalled. In the phase of colonial rule, colonies were proudly presented [...]. In the years of decolonization and *tiers-mondisme*, they were embarrassedly hidden away. Now they are on show again, but increasingly colonialism is problematized, imperial rule is viewed critically, colonialism is being categorically interrogated. (Aldrich 2005:18)

This description of three stages of remembering and forgetting offers a useful overview of the primary trends in French historiography, and the one I will use here. While the colonial era falls outside the realm of the present work, in the remainder of this section I discuss in more detail the post-colonial periods of “forgetting” and “remembering.”

Forgetting the Colonies

Beginning at decolonization, there was a general desire in France, which lasted until the 1980s or early 1990s, to forget colonial North Africa. During this time, numerous topics surrounding the colonial period and, especially, the Algerian War were taboo for historians. Taboo subjects have included the use of torture by French armed forces and the use of terrorism by Algerian nationalists, among other topics (Ferro 2005). And when these topics were studied or written about, they were ignored by the French public (Ferro 2005). Therefore, though the use of torture by the French armed forces during the Algerian War was well known in the 1960s, it was rediscovered with great amazement in 2000 (Shatz 2002).

One of the consequences of this period of forgetting and the continuing desire to forget was to create the false impression that the Algerian War has been little studied or talked about. Books published on the Algerian war tend to have names involving forgetting, namelessness, and other titles that project an image of historically uncharted territory (Derderian 2002), even though approximately 2,000 books were published on the subject between 1962-1994, not to mention movies, entries in textbooks, and other discussions (Stora 1994). Elsewhere, Stora (1991:293-4) has labeled treatment of the Algerian War in France as “cloistered remembering.” In this case, each memory group fosters and maintains its own version of the history in question with little or no exchange of memory between the groups (Stora 1997; Derderian 2002). For Stora, this multiplicity of viewpoints makes them difficult to reconcile, and allows for the perpetual ‘re-discovery’ of the topic (Stora 1994). This is not unique to the memory of the Algerian war. Memories and histories of World War II, for example, are also plural and highly

contested, resulting in what Wieviorka (2012:7) calls “a fragmented memory,” and Nora (2008:16) refers to as “an essentially accusatory memory.” In the case of the Algerian war, I would add that this multiplicity also reinforces the memorial groups’ perceptions that it is necessary to continue to announce and defend their position and history because they realize that there is no outside audience listening to their proclamations, as I discuss below.

Despite assurances from academics such as Stora and Derderian that the colonial period and the Algerian War were not forgotten in French historical production, there is evidence that colonial memory has been “cloistered,” as Stora (1991) suggests. As one example, let us consider Nora’s exhaustive collection of *lieux de memoire*. This series of tomes, as discussed above, were criticized for assigning historical relevance to too exhaustive a list of sites (Derderian 2002). Nora calls the examples selected arbitrary, but Anderson (2004b) notes that the selection of examples is not disinterested, nor is the tone of the piece.

[T]he entire imperial history of the country, from the Napoleonic conquests, through the plunder of Algeria under the July Monarchy, to the seizure of Indochina in the Second Empire and the vast African booty of the Third Republic, becomes a *non-lieu* at the bar of these bland recollections. Both Nora and Furet had been courageous critics of the Algerian War in their youth. But by the time they came to embalm the nation thirty years later, each eliminated virtually any reference to its external record from their retrospections. [...] Nora’s volumes reduce all these fateful exertions to an exhibition of tropical knickknacks in Vincennes. What are the *lieux de memoire* that fail to include Dien Bien Phu? (Anderson 2004).

The far-ranging compendium touches on French imperial holdings in one chapter on the 1931 Colonial Exhibition in Paris (Derderian 2002). Decolonization and events that occurred during the colonial wars, such as the 1961 *putsch des généraux*, are noted only briefly (i.e., Nora

1984:656), or in occasional oblique references, such as when “ou les guerres coloniales” appears at the end of a list of French wars (i.e., Prost 1984:206). It does not discuss the heritage of imperialism at all (Anderson 2004). Anderson explains these *lacunae* as symptomatic of the ideological positioning of the text: “The underlying aim of the project, from which it never departed, was the creation of an *union sacrée* in which the divisions and discords of French society would melt away in the fond rituals of postmodern remembrance” (Anderson 2004). For Anderson, then, Nora is not sufficiently self-reflexive on his own ideological positioning. As can be seen in this example, colonial history was deemed troubling to contemporary French constructions of itself and its past, and was therefore sidelined to the profit of other facets of history considered less divisive. This sidelining and oblique referencing of the colonial period is not unique to Nora, and can be seen elsewhere, such as in Agulhon (2000). In these examples, we see, if not an occulting, then at least a side-stepping of the Algerian war as a subject of historiographical production.

Concurrently with the cloistering of French colonial history in French historical texts, there was a tendency to avoid discussions of the colonial and post-colonial populations present in the metropole (Ferro 2005; Shepard 2006). In part, this is common to all contested or unpleasant historical episodes because:

The reminder of compromises or even crimes committed by France might contradict the underlying purpose of the teaching of history, which, since the beginnings of the Third Republic, has always been designed to forge a civic community that shares common values illustrated by the national saga. (Wieviorka 2012:157).

In particular, it is feared by those such as Jean-Pierre Rioux (2006) that should such negative examples find their way into school curricula it would compromise the educational goals of the school and the very future of the nation. Namely, the students'

integration would be compromised, which is far from the goals of the school, whose underlying purpose, of course, is the individual emancipation of each student and his civic integration in a continuously vital relationship between different individuals and between the whole and each one of them. (Rioux 2006:167-8).

In opposition to such institutional forces and voices from the academy, there have also been various identity groups encouraging discussions of historical plurality and a problematizing of history, as I discuss below.

Rediscovery of the Colonies and Post-Colonial Populations

In the 1980s and 1990s, France rediscovered Algeria and its post-colonial populations due to the confluence of a number of historical, political, and social events. For the North African minorities, this re-discovery began with the *Marche des Beurs*, the florescence of associations demanding recognition for the second-generation North African immigration, and the frequent riots in the *banlieue*, where minority youth expressed their sense of hopelessness, *galère*, by burning cars and engaging in clashes with the police (Césari 1994; Geisser 1997; Bachmann and Le Guennec 1997). Part of the demands of these populations was increased attention to their history and contributions to the French state and society. Although some of the official and public responses were repressive, such as increases in security, efforts were also made to improve social and physical infrastructure in minority areas, and academic journals were

founded to study the situation, such as *Horizons Maghrébins*, which facilitates serious academic inquiry on the populations, the Maghreb as a whole, and their history (Chabanet 2005; *Horizons Maghrébins* 2012).

The Pied-Noir have never been in the national spotlight in the same way as the North African population, though they are the recipients of media attention on the event of anniversaries or surrounding discussions of the Algerian War. In 1987, a coalition of Pied-Noir associations assembled more than 100,000 people in Nice, their largest gathering to date, to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of their exodus (Calmien 2012:407-408). This gathering garnered significant national media attention and was the occasion for the release of an official commemorative stamp from the post office (Calmien 2012). Scholarly attention on the repatriation was facilitated when the archives concerning repatriation were opened in 1992, but many military archives remain closed at the time of this writing (Comtat 2009).

Outside France, the Algerian coup of 1992 and the resulting civil war that lasted until 2002 catapulted the country into the international spotlight (Ruedy 2005). In addition to the public attention on the Algerian War in the 1990s, a number of other events and situations combined to maintain national focus on Algeria and French-Algerian relations. In 1999 the *Assemblée Nationale* officially recognized the events in Algeria of 1954-1962 as a war. In 2000 the use of torture during the Algerian War regained media attention following Louisette Ighilahriz' testimony of being tortured and the reactions of Generals Massu, Bigeard, and Aussaresses (Shatz 2002). The 40th anniversary of Algerian Independence and the exodus of the Pied-Noir took place in 2002, the kickoff of the 'Year of Algeria' in France in 2003 followed by

the devastating earthquake in Algeria in May of the same year. Later, the historian Jean-Jacques Jordi gained special access to an additional set of closed archives, from which he produced *Un Silence d'État* (2011).

The coup and controversy surrounding torture during the War of Algeria focused discussion in France on the antecedents, namely, the Algerian War. As noted in Chapter 2, since the colonial era Algerians had been seen as “naturally” violent (Silverstein 2004). As the colonial period was rediscovered, much attention focused on the Algerian War. This reinforced ideas of ‘natural’ Algerian violence, but also led to a re-evaluation of past experiences. Some:

tentent de concilier les exigences de la citoyenneté et la fidélité ou la recherche de traces par rapport à la mémoire de leurs pères, essentiellement les immigrés ou les enfants de harkis, voire les enfants de pieds-noirs ou de juifs d'Algérie. Ils ont réussi ou cherché la conciliation entre cette citoyenneté, cette appartenance à la nation française, et ce qu'a pu être le mémoire des pères, la mémoire des familles. C'est par ces groupes particuliers que cette mémoire de guerre est revenue, qu'elle est commémorée, qu'elle circule et qu'elle commence à circuler de nouveau. (Stora 1994:133)

For these descendent groups a deeper understanding of the events was seen as necessary for full participation in the French nation. This deeper understanding was tied to a discussion that problematized the French participation (Aldrich 2005). This was particularly true by the late 1990s. For example, Maurice Papon's trial in 1997 on his actions during WWII also included a discussion of his tenure as Police *Préfet* in Paris in the 1950s and 1960s; in 1999 the French government officially declared the events in Algeria from 1955-1962 a war, and the controversy over the use of torture by the French army was revived (Aldrich 2005:135-136).

The fact that memory of the North African colonial era and post-colonial populations is seen through the lens of the Algerian War has a number of repercussions for the populations concerned. One repercussion is that this construction does not easily open space for discussions of contributions of North Africans and the Pied-Noir in metropolitan France. This is particularly the case since Colonial veterans of the Free French forces in WWII were not recognized until 2001 and 2006, one of the most historically well-defined and unambiguous contributions of the colonies (Wieviorka 2012). If, as we can see here, there was no room in the debates to acknowledge the participation of these veterans – whose existence and activity was reasonably well-documented – it is of no great surprise that the social and economic participation of minorities in the metropole who are not as well documented would be ignored.

A second repercussion of the dominance of the Algerian War in historical discussions of colonialism North Africa is that not all individuals with ties to this period appreciate attention, particularly if it is focused on the war. In the last decade there has been an outburst of memorial production by minority communities that has resulted in museums, texts, and artistic creations highlighting their heritage, history, and contributions to the French nation. These productions, particularly minority-run museums, have been criticized as creating divisions within the nation and fostering the formation of ethnic blocks. Criticism of Pied-Noir and Harki memory has been particularly harsh. Efforts at commemoration by the veterans, harkis, and *rapatriés* are generally not taken seriously, because “tainted in opponents’ eyes with nostalgia, unrepentant colonialism and racism – [they] hardly summoned widespread sympathy” (Aldrich 2005:135). Politicians and the media tend to refer to these minority groups as bounded entities that have infiltrated

French society and are challenging its coherence from the inside (Kastoryano 2002; Marlière 2009).

History in Contemporary French National Politics

Colonial and post-colonial historiography and its presentation were explicitly used in politics and nation-building exercises by the last two presidents: Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.²³ As discussed above this follows a long tradition in France of uses of history for political gain (Anderson 2004). Both presidents were personally engaged in publicizing and producing French history. They both discussed and commented on historical events on their discourses and altered the physical landscape of French history by creating or reconfiguring museums and archives during their tenure. Their changes to France's physical historical infrastructure were explicitly political statements on national history and a fruitful topic of consideration that I must leave for another venue. In this section I discuss non-material uses of history in their politics.

Jacques Chirac, president of France from 1995-2007 invested himself heavily in French-Algerian relations. After inviting the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to Paris in 2000, in 2003 he undertook the first French state visit to Algeria since 1962 (Aldrich 2005:145). The year 2003 was also the "Année de l'Algérie" in France, a year-long celebration that comprised more than 2000 events and visits focusing on artistic and cultural exchanges whereby "Français et Algériens sont appelés à se réconcilier" (E.N. 2003). Simultaneously, Chirac treated other, less

²³ François Hollande was elected after the end of the fieldwork period for this dissertation. As such, his tenure as President will not be discussed here.

complementary aspects of the bi-national relationship, but still with the goal of reconciliation and creating national unity. In 2001 Chirac presided over the first *journée d'hommage aux Harkis* on 25 September 2001, a day designed to be a unique event that has since been turned into an annual day of commemoration (Enjelvin 2004). He also inaugurated monuments to soldiers fallen in the Algerian War, worked against undocumented immigration, and generally increased security (Aldrich 2005:145-146). As part of this *rapprochement* between France and Algeria, Chirac used history to emphasize connections between the two populations and a desire to create partnerships going forward. For example, in his 25 September 2001 speech rendering homage to the Harkis, Chirac stated that these men were “les oubliés d'une histoire enfouie. Ils doivent désormais prendre toute leur place dans notre mémoire” (Chirac as quoted in Enjelvin 2004). Though they had been forgotten by history, they need to take their place in the collective memory. Chirac took great care to provide official acknowledgment and sanction of the harkis' correct place in national history, but never acknowledged state responsibility (Enjelvin 2004). In this case, incorporation into national history stood as a proxy for more official forms of incorporation, specifically, financial reparations as were demanded by associations of Harkis or Pied-Noir.

This inclusive orientation of Chirac's historical actions is generally representative of the tenor of his tenure as president. For example, Chirac relocated the grave of Alexandre Dumas to the Panthéon in 2002. This was a time of increasing ethnic tensions in France, following the 9-11 attacks and less than a year before the creation of the Stasi Commission to evaluate the state of *laïcité* in France. Between November 26 and 29 the state organized speeches, including one by

Chirac; rituals; visitations; and processions that accompanied the author to his resting place. Chirac's speech consisted of a biography of Dumas that simultaneously marked his minority origins and tied him to the historical, cultural, and ideological foundations of the nation (Chirac 2002). The speech also recognized past wrongs of the state: "Elle répare une injustice" in Dumas' recognition in the Panthéon (Chirac 2002). In this way, he explicitly tied ethnic minorities to France's national foundations. In this construction, Dumas symbolizes all minorities whose lives and aspirations were tied to this re-created Republic, which is a combination of the best parts of all of its citizens. It is also a Republic that recognizes its citizens equally, despite race, and based on merit alone. Chirac's message was underscored by the presence of a black Marianne, the symbol of France and typically white, representing a nation in touch with its past and present diversity.

Nicolas Sarkozy, president of France from 2007-2012, maintained a very different attitude towards history and the former colonies and promulgated an alternative history. Sarkozy was seen as a "tough and determined defender of law and order" following his harsh commentary on and repression of the 2005 *banlieue* riots (Hewlett 2007:407). Sarkozy organized his campaign for election in 2007 around an authoritarian populism and neo-liberal economic agenda (Hewlett 2007), with a discourse that "concernait la question des banlieues, l'immigration, et l'identité" and was anti-youth (Todd 2008:127). Over the course of the campaign, Sarkozy brought his ideological positioning closer to that of Le Pen, successfully recuperating some of the far-right constituency (Hewlett 2007). When elected, Sarkozy's discourse centered around order, tradition, and the idea of France as a nation "defined by its

history” and “a national identity which is set in stone and not supposed to evolve” (Marlière 2009:386). Sarkozy created a unified historical narrative that lacked nuance and avoided any complicated or unpleasant topics. Criticized as “historical zapping” (channel-surfing) by Marlière (2009:378), this was the opposite of Chirac’s approach. Where Chirac publicized and discussed troubling episodes in French history with the goal of attaining better national understanding and unity, instead, Sarkozy’s “narrative promotes a French society ‘reconciled with itself’ by setting aside the conflicting histories and cultures of the left and of the right” (Marlière 2009:378).

While forcing unity onto the past, some of Sarkozy’s comments on history created stiff opposition and division in the present. To cite only one example of how his interpretation of the past caused dissent and division, we can consider his 2007 speech at the Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, capital of the former French colony of Senegal. During this speech, he announced that:

Le drame de l’Afrique, c’est que l’Homme africain n’est pas assez entré dans l’Histoire. Le paysan africain, qui depuis des millénaires, vit avec les saisons, dont l’idéal de vie est d’être en harmonie avec la nature, ne connaît que l’éternel recommencement du temps rythmé par la répétition sans fin des mêmes gestes et des mêmes paroles. Dans cet imaginaire où tout recommence toujours, il n’y a de place ni pour l’aventure humaine ni pour l’idée de progress. (Sarkozy 2007)

In this conception, history is represented as a European phenomenon, excluding “Africa” not only from history, but also from progress and change. Elsewhere in this speech, following a list of reasons why colonialism was wrong and how it had negative impacts on the conquered

peoples, Sarkozy added that colonialism had also brought positive things to the colonized. Of the colonizer, he notes:

Il a pris mais je veux dire avec respect qu'il a aussi donné. Il a construit des ponts, des routes, des hôpitaux, des dispensaires, des écoles. Il a rendu féconde des terres vierges, il a donné sa peine, son travail, son savoir. Je veux le dire ici, tous les colons n'étaient pas des voleurs, tous les colons n'étaient pas des exploités. Il y avait parmi eux des hommes mauvais mais il y avait aussi des hommes de bonne volonté, des hommes qui croyaient remplir une mission civilisatrice, des hommes qui croyaient faire le bien. Ils se trompaient mais certains étaient sincères. Ils croyaient donner la liberté, ils créaient l'aliénation. Ils croyaient briser les chaînes de l'obscurantisme, de la superstition, de la servitude. Ils forgeaient des chaînes bien plus lourdes, ils imposaient une servitude plus pesante, car c'étaient les esprits, c'étaient les âmes qui étaient asservis. Ils croyaient donner l'amour sans voir qu'ils semaient la révolte et la haine. (Sarkozy 2007).

While this construction does, on one hand, attempt to nuance the history of colonization by insisting on the humanity and diversity of those who settled French colonies, it fails to engage with the colonized, or the “jeunes d’Afrique” as equals. This is especially true when taken with the quote above in the context of the speech as a whole. Instead, Africans were and remain a people outside history, acted on by Europe, but influencing only the progress of their own countries and continent. There is no room here for equality or incorporation of African innovations and talent into French experience in a positive way. Instead, according to Charbonneau (2008:289), Sarkozy proposes that France and Africa are destined, because of their common colonial history, to move towards a “Eurafrica.” Furthermore, Charbonneau argues that this new, European-ified version of Africa is simply a re-formulation of colonial expansionist desires. Unsurprisingly, this speech engendered significant conflict and opposition, with the *Nouvel Observateur* calling the entire visit “le flop” (Dryef 2007; see also Pironet 2007).

These two presidents used history in very different ways. Chirac tried to create historical consensus through the opening of national history to a plurality of backgrounds and manipulating symbols to support the sought-after accords. He explicitly aimed to calm tensions and integrate minority groups with historical claims into the nation through official recognition (Wieviorka 2012:164). Sarkozy, on the other hand, used history to develop an “image of the country he intended to forge—that of a nation sure of its past gallantly facing the future” (Wieviorka 2012:166). What such a unified history served to do, however, was to create divisions and exclude individuals and groups from the nation. Consensus, in practice if not in fact, was sought through focus on security, order, and strong armed tactics to troubled areas (Hewlett 2011; Marlière 2009).

Regardless of the political reasons behind the actions of Chirac and Sarkozy, the result is clear: history, particularly ethicized history, was of great interest in France during the study period. As I shall detail in the following section, history was used explicitly, not only in the president’s office, but at many levels of society. While some, such as Sarkozy, aimed to create divisions between groups within the nation, others followed a more Chiracian course and continued to emphasize connections.

History in the Associations

As discussed above, colonial and post-colonial history in France has seen areas of occlusion and forgetting. This is particularly true of the Algerian colony and war of independence. Seen as the ultimate symbol of France’s failure as a colonial power and as a

moral, civilized government, there was an explicit desire to forget these events as quickly as possible (Shepard 2006; Silverstein 2004; Stora and Leclère 2007). The Pied-Noir were first categorized as violent and dangerous in order to justify decolonialization and were then integrated and – as much as possible – forgotten. In addition, the period of national economic expansion following WWII, the “*trente glorieuses*” is touted as an example of French resilience and ingenuity, ignoring the Marshal Plan. However, the contribution of the North African workers has been disregarded in the broader narrative of French greatness. Each population demands that their respective contribution is remembered and incorporated into national history.

Like the larger French society, history and memory both feature in the activities of minority associations. In retelling their history, North African, Pied-Noir, and Harki communities re-define France by including and excluding certain groups from the collectivity. The MCA primarily collected and preserved historical artifacts and disseminated histories and historical data. When disseminating information they targeted two audiences: members of the minority community and outsiders. In this, they were not only trying to change their role in national history, but to insert themselves into the French nation in particular ways. In the interests of space I focus here on Algerian colonial history, by far the most contentious and discussed of the three North African countries.

History as Gatekeeper: Identifying Group Membership

In the MCA, knowledge of history was often used as a code for understanding and sympathizing with the group. In other words, it served as a form of gatekeeper. When first

introduced to me, individuals in the MCAs frequently asked if I knew what a historical name or date stood for. During interviews, they would respond to questions with seemingly unrelated questions or statements about historical events. This was particularly true of Pied-Noir. The North Africans commonly asked: when foreigners were allowed to found associations (1982), October 17th (the massacre of Algerian protesters by French security forces in Paris in 1961), and the difference between 1901 and 1905 associations (non-religious and religious). The Pied-Noir focused on dates, primarily 1962 (the exodus to France), March 19 (1962 the ‘cease-fire’ that preceded the Algerian independence but did not end civilian or military deaths), March 26 (1962 massacre in Algiers of unarmed, French protesters by the French military), November 1 (1954, beginning of hostilities in the Algerian war), and July 5 (1962 Algerian independence and the massacre of European nationals by Algerians in Oran).

These questioning sessions had similar forms. During the explanation of my study, I would be asked, for example, ‘What is 19 March?’ If I said that I did not know, or seemed uncertain, the individual would give me a lecture on the context and significance of the date. As I learned the history of French colonization and the Algerian war, and responded with descriptions of events, less time was spent on history lessons, and participants seemed more comfortable talking to me. My historical knowledge also facilitated introductions by serving as shorthand for my seriousness and qualifications. A number of times, when one study participant introduced me to a potential participant, one or the other quizzed me. My ability to pass the quiz reflected not only on my abilities and professionalism but also on the judgment of the person making the introduction. If I seemed uncertain, they prompted me with hints and answers to make sure that I,

and they, passed the test. Such coding of historical knowledge into easily referenced and remembered words or dates serves as Connerton's (1989) "incorporating practices" that preserve information and memory within a population. They also serve as supports for the symbolic landscape at the root of shared Pied-Noir identity.

During interviews, individuals periodically incorporated recitations of the history of pre- and colonial North Africa into responses to unrelated questions. Although I attributed this to flaws in my French, or a misunderstanding on the part of the participants, it became clear that the questions had been well understood. Instead, they had a more holistic understanding than I of what information I needed to interpret their responses. For example, at the beginning of an interview I told a former participant in a North African association that I wanted to ask him about the history of the association and his participation in it. His response:

Avant tout chose, [...] il faut que je vous dise que je ne suis pas arabe, je ne suis pas maghrebin. Je suis tunisien, quand même, d'origine, je suis né en Tunisie, il y avait des juifs la, [...] mes parents sont les tunisiens. La différence est énorme, j'ai obtenu la nationalité quand j'ai demandé toute suite, a 21. [...] Ce qui me donne les rapports très différent avec la France que les maghrébines. J'ai vécu avec eux, j'étais très bien avec eux. Je me suis mariée, divorcé, je me toute suite retrouvé dans cette communauté. Je suis français, mais je suis très proche des arabes. Je suis aussi juif, je pourrais me mettre dans les associations juives

Here, he went on to describe a Jewish association of which he was a part and only then returned to my question about the North African association. I was not considered capable of appreciating this man's participation in the association without background on the historical, geo-political, and social forces in colonial and post-colonial societies that organized his experience. To do otherwise was to open himself up to misunderstanding.

The two minority communities used references to and quizzes about history in different ways. North African participants were more likely to base their judgments on my qualifications, social relations, and social or cultural knowledge than on knowledge of history. They also rarely insisted that I knew their history before they would speak with me. When they quizzed me, the character of the dates and topics was quite different. Their questions centered on the history of associations in France, not the history of their particular minority group, with the exception of October 17th. Their focus was on the broader French context more than my knowledge of the minority group. In contrast, the Pied-Noir focused on *their* minority group's history *prior* to their arrival in the metropole. In determinations of my acceptability as a researcher, my historical knowledge of the group was a significant factor, in addition to my social relations and cultural knowledge (primarily my tastes in food). In both of these groups my historical knowledge was one of the criteria on which decisions about participation in the project were made, indicating that they considered history a significant part of their minority culture and my cultural competence. The fact that the Pied-Noir were more concerned about my knowledge of their history than the North Africans points to group concerns about national membership and how history can be used to create boundaries between groups, as I discuss in the next two sections.

History as Inscription in the Nation

Members of the MCA created histories to symbolically re-insert their minority group into the nation in a variety of ways. For example, a Pied-Noir association published a series of comic books written by one of its members. These books detail the history of French Algeria and

underline both the diversity of the FdA and, in particular, their deep attachment to France.

Another man involved in numerous associations noted that his family was from “Alsace Lorraine. Ils ne voulaient pas devenir Allemand. En France, on leur a dit, l’Algérie a besoin des gens. On va vous payer les trajets.” The very fact that this family was in Algeria, it was asserted, was because of their connection to France. A Pied-Noir man, in speaking of his children, offered an example of appropriate behavior in reference to their history. His children:

Ils lisent. Et ils savent tous dans l’histoire de ses parents, grands-parents, arrière grands parents. Je n’ai jamais insisté. [...] Le prof commençait à dire des choses, il s’est levé, il a dit au prof. « Je vous demande de vous taire. Mon grand-père a été assassiné par le FLN et vous êtes en train de lui faire du mal. » Le prof a changé du sujet. J’ai gagné.

In this example, the professor was placing the Pied-Noir outside the moral bounds of the French nation by identifying with the FLN. This version of history is rejected, returning the community to fully French.

North Africans also underlined their participation in key French historical events to assert their participation in the nation. “On a fait venir les gens pendant les deux guerres mondiales. [...] Marocains, algériens, sénégalais, à Marseille. Ils savent que c’est les soldats des colonies qui ont libéré Marseille” after WWII. To emphasize the participation of North Africans in such a key event as the liberation of France from Nazi control during WWII is to suggest that there is precedent for today’s French-North African population being a fundamental part of France. Re-insertion of the minority group into history, however, is not always the result of planning, and can take place in a more tactile way. The Grenoble art museum is internationally known for its collection of modern art. One local Algerian association that works with retired, North African

laborers decided to organize a trip to the museum as a diverting and educational experience for its members. When the men arrived at the museum, the tour organizers and association staff realized that these men were the same people who had built the structure. Instead of serving as knowledgeable experts on modern art to an uninformed immigrant population, the museum staff received a lesson in how the building was constructed and its physical properties. As one of the association reflected on similar activities: “c’est un but de l’association, leur donner le parole. Souvent ils n’ont pas eu la parole. Ils expliquent leur vie.” In this example, the foreign, relatively uneducated manual laborers were assumed by the museum staff and association organizers to be uninformed about something so quintessentially French as an art museum and its contents. However, by asserting their particular experience with the museum and its history, these men subtly challenged these preconceptions by illustrating a much deeper, one might say foundational, knowledge of the place. By extension, they asserted their active participation in the nation.

History was also used to re-inscribe others into the French nation. For example, one Pied-Noir and Harki association has been lobbying for construction of a *Memorial aux morts national d’outre mer*. This monument would list all the men *Morts Pour La France* whose memorials were located in former French possessions and were therefore no longer present on national territory. As an association leader explained at an association meeting:

On ne peut plus accepter que ceux qui ont versé leur sang aux batailles pour la France n’aient pas leurs noms sur les monuments. La France les a oubliés. Il faut que nous les retrouvions les noms de tous ceux qui sont inscrits sur les monuments des villages d’Indochine, d’Afrique, d’Afrique du Nord. Tous les monuments sont détruits. [...] C’est profondément injuste, mais on a commencé à

travailler avec le Ministre de la Défense. Il y a beaucoup de noms. Ça sera extrêmement intéressant de conduire les enfants devant ça. Ils pourraient lire les noms des combattants d'outre-mer. Actuellement la nation essaie d'intégrer, [Ça sera] un exemple merveilleux pour les jeunes, leurs ancêtres sont inscrites sur les monuments. Leurs ancêtres ont fait d'autres choses que faire des dégâts dans les banlieues.

This memorial would honor everyone who fell as a French soldier, regardless of origin. In this way the association wanted to – literally – re-inscribe these minorities into the nation by placing their names on a monument. This is seen as benefitting contemporary minority populations by providing both a positive example of their ancestors' commitment (willing or not) to the nation and proof of the government's acknowledgement of their contribution and sacrifice.

Boundaries Between Minorities

In addition to insisting on inclusion within the French nation, MCAs also used histories to challenge or re-think divisions between minority groups. Many Algerian immigrants (not second- or third-generation citizens of Algerian descent) and Pied-Noir told me that relations during the colonial period were not as bad as they are represented in society today. There was discrimination, and Algerians and Jews did not have the opportunities or rights of French citizens, but relations between the populations were relatively good and improving over time. Such reflections problematize the narrative of the colonizer and colonized as distinct, entirely separate groups with opposing desires.

Additionally, some Pied-Noir and North Africans identified a common history and heritage uniting the two groups through their residence in North Africa. One participant in a

North African association noted that in many ways the Pied-Noir “Have it worse than the North Africans. They were not prepared [to leave after independence], it’s their country too, they were born there” (Fieldnotes, original in English). In this case, the Pied-Noir were fully accepted within the group boundary of “Algerian” as having a legitimate connection to the territory. For a Pied-Noir man, the trend in French Algeria was towards greater integration of European and indigenous populations. It was

Ce rapprochement qui gagnait, les rapports, dans l’ensemble on se côtoyait. [...] Mais globalement le respect mutuel s’était instauré et progressait. Je crois, réellement, qu’il nous a manqué quelques années pour réussir ce que c’était en marche. Ça c’est moi telle que je le ressens. Quand j’ai fait mon service j’avais des appelés avec moi. [...] J’étais dans les zouaves. Il y avait 1/3 de soldats qui étaient musulmans. C’était avec eux que j’avais le plus de contact. Parce que, ils étaient du pays, moi aussi. On sentait les choses que les petits métropolitaines ne sentaient pas comme nous.

Here, this man remembers that his military service was characterized by closer connections by the “Muslims” in his unit than the metropolitan French. Later in the interview he notes that his “plus grand regret” was that a more durable integration did not take place. Here, those who were from French Algeria shared a deep understanding, something that the bonds of French citizenship did not provide. I discussed a similar representation of North African and Pied-Noir cultural similarities above in Chapter 4.

Another man expressed his explicit concern that history can be used to both divide and unite the populations from North African and the metropolitan French. This Berber Jew from Algeria noted that there were things that both united and divided populations in French Algeria, and that history can be used to emphasize either part of the story.

L'histoire de la France et de l'Algérie. C'est une grande histoire d'amour. Et tous les associations qui ont depuis les années travaillé sur l'Algérie ont toujours mis l'accent sur la 'vraie' histoire [...] la pire côte de la colonisation. Et personnellement j'en ai assez d'entendre ça. C'est à dire qu'on sait globalement qu'il y a eu des erreurs inacceptables. La colonisation c'était comme ça. On a commis des erreurs d'une part et d'autre, la France est responsable de beaucoup de choses. Mais je ne sais pas si en continuant d'écrire la grande histoire on apaise les choses. [...] C'est toujours mettre en avant les bons ou les mauvais côtés. J'aimerais qu'on aborde l'histoire. La vraie, la petite histoire des algériens. En Algérie, je faisais pas le Ramadan, mais je participais aux fêtes. J'étais invité manger le couscous le soir. [...] Cette histoire-là c'est ça qui m'intéresse. J'en ai assez de la haine. [...] J'ai dit que c'est une histoire d'amour parce qu'il y a rien de plus douloureuse qu'une histoire d'amour.

In this segment from an extended discussion, this man creates a distinction between the “grande histoire” and the “petit histoire” within the love story that is French-Algerian relations. The first is ideologically informed and aimed at changing opinions or altering relations of power between groups. The second, and the more useful, in this opinion, is the story of relationships and events in the lives of Algeria's inhabitants that drew them together.

In addition to such purely abstract discussions of Algerian-ness, there were also collaborations between North Africans, Pied-Noir, and their associations. Such collaborations occurred for particular events and, at times, included other kinds of institutions such as human rights groups, libraries or museums. One Pied-Noir association, for example, routinely collaborated with North African and human rights groups to host movie showings and other events.²⁴ A North African association partnered with a bookstore to sell Pied-Noir-authored histories of French North Africa inside the association. This was explained as natural because, after all it was their shared history. Individual Pied-Noir also took part in North African

²⁴ This association is unique its practice of such direct collaborations.

associations, and vice versa. Such collaborations revived the possibility of a community that had existed through its shared history and geography but had been severed due to geopolitical and military factors.

I do not wish to overstate the presence or success of these crossings and collaborations. There are significant impediments in each community to cooperation, and members who are uninterested in collaboration of any kind. Even for those who are, there are difficulties. Surrounding the 50th anniversary of Algerian independence there were a number of attempts by both Algerians and Pied-Noir to co-organize commemorative or memorial events. To my knowledge, none of these overtures resulted in a successful collaboration. However, the presence of these individuals in associations outside what might be considered ‘their’ community and active collaborations and attempts at collaboration across supposedly uncrossable boundaries challenged the dominant representation of these communities as isolated and isolating ethnic blocks.

The Associations and History

Both North African and Pied-Noir associations used history in similar ways to assert participation in the French nation and boundaries, or lack thereof, between minority populations. There was a significant difference, however, in how they selected activities. Many Pied-Noir associations were engaged in dissemination of historical information and inference. Certain associations’ main purpose was preservation. North African associations, in contrast, engaged in relatively little preservation and focused on dissemination, as I describe below.

Preservation

The only associations in the study whose primary purpose was the preservation of historical data were run by the Pied-Noir. Such associations created museums, archives, or databases. Such historical preservation was considered imperative.

Cependant on constat qu'il y a un regard des jeunes qui finalement ont compris ce qu'on a raconté de fausses histoires sur leurs parents et sur leurs arrières. La politique veut faire quelque chose et dénature tout. L'affaire d'Algérie n'est pas cicatrisée. [...] On s'emploi pour éviter justement que cette cicatrisation s'opère sur une histoire fausse. Voilà pourquoi il y a les collections de documents, des dons de documents. Ils sont incontournables, ils disent la vérité, ce ne sont pas des opinions. Nous sommes tout à fait d'accord que l'on a peut-être des torts. Mais pas au sens et au niveau où les politiques veulent le faire croire.

The “politique” was understood as self-servingly uninterested or hostile to the history of the Pied-Noir, and therefore could not be entrusted with historical artifacts. Many saw the only solution to be in organizing preservation themselves. The CDHA, for example, served to collect and preserve documents and artifacts from French Algeria. The GAMT collected genealogical records from French colonies in North Africa. At the end of the study period, the *Cercle Algérienniste* opened a museum and study center on French Algeria and the Pied-Noir. These associations preserve original documents and artifacts and facilitate their use by contemporary and future scholars. “En faisant ce que nous faisons de rassembler les éléments, quelque ce soit, nous mettons à disposition des historiens notre histoire de mener à bien leurs recherches.” All of the associations engaged in preservation were also involved in some sort of dissemination

activities. These included creation of books, memoirs, films, and websites to furnish information on their alternative to the reductionist national history. While historical preservation was seen as a good in itself, additional benefits associated with future dissemination were believed to profit both the Pied Noir community and society as a whole, as I discuss below.

During fieldwork I asked individuals involved with the MCAs about the activities their associations hosted or in which they took part. I did not systematically inquire about why North African associations did not engage in preservation activities, and so, I have only theories about why they do not. The Pied-Noir and North African populations are structurally distinct. North African immigration continues today, and many immigrants and descendants of immigrants can and do travel to their countries of origin or keep in touch with family and friends. For the North Africans, then, historical referents were primarily located outside the country. Additionally, buildings and infrastructure built during the “Thirty Glorious Years” mark their participation, as I discuss above in the example of the art museum. For the Pied-Noir, the population is fixed. With the 50th anniversary of Algerian independence and the exodus of the Pied-Noir occurring in summer 2012, the number of individuals who witnessed these events and are still alive decreases yearly. Also, many noted that they could not, for political or personal reasons, return to North Africa. Their social and cultural referents were now spread across France. Those who returned did so primarily to revisit places, not people. The guardians and keepers of Pied-Noir culture that survived transportation to France were no longer linked to their original geography and were therefore at risk of loss without special attention.

Additionally, the age distribution of participants in the associations varied between the two minority groups. Many of the Pied-Noir participants had lived in North Africa. They had firsthand knowledge of the colonies and wished to preserve their personal experiences, as well as those of their ancestors, for future historical inquiry. Many North African associations, in contrast, were composed of younger generations born in France, or more recent immigrants. Those who took part in the *trente glorieuses* were seldom the driving force in association organization and direction. Even if they were, many noted that Algerians “in general [...] won’t talk about immigration, they’re elitist, and for them it’s in the past. Besides, they were so scarred by living under the colonial power that even today they don’t say anything, they didn’t see anything, and everything is fine” (Fieldnotes quote recorded in English). This is part of a pattern generally recognized by study participants where the older members of the North African communities will only voice criticism within the community and not to outside individuals or institutions. As such, pressures and resources internal to the associations in favor of preservation were significantly lower than those of Pied-Noir associations.

Dissemination

In the aggregate, collection and preservation of historical artifacts and data were only a small part of the MCA’s activities; dissemination of historical information was far more widespread. Unlike preservation, dissemination of information was pursued for its social benefits and not as an end in itself. It was assigned specific objectives depending on the audience, either members of the minority community or outsiders. The aims of North Africans were quite similar:

to maintain a sense of community, prevent social and psychological problems, reduce discrimination, and re-insert their minority population into histories from which they believe they have been excluded. The specific ways in which they worked to achieve these goals, however, varied.

In-Group Dissemination

The Pied-Noir associations primarily targeted other Pied-Noir as recipients of their history. Younger Pied-Noir, those who were children or young adults in 1962, were eager consumers of history. Learning their past provided them a way to understand their roots and feel connected to their early lives from which they had suffered an abrupt break. As one man recounted:

Je suis partie à 13 ans de l'Algérie, c'est quelque chose qui me manque. D'être trempé dans l'histoire. On m'a raconté des histoires des Pied-Noirs quand j'étais petit. Ce n'est pas bouclé. J'aime me retrouver avec des amis, je ne parle pas l'arabe, c'est un regret, mais j'aime partager cette chaleur, j'aimerais que tout le monde le ressent ça. C'est une façon de boucler ma vie, compléter ça. C'est m'adapter au monde dans lequel on vit.

For him, learning and discussing the history of his ancestors and the country in which he was born was a response to his displacement and the need for continuity in his life. This sentiment was echoed by numerous other Pied-Noir. Some noted, additionally, that while living in Algeria they did not travel within the colony for lack of money and time. Their knowledge of French Algeria outside their city or region of origin, or the region of their military service, was therefore quite limited. As they grew older, some developed an interest in their past, including the region

they were from in Algeria, the colony as a whole, and their ancestors' country of origin in Europe. The latter was documented by Smith (2006).

For some, historical knowledge of colonial Algeria also allowed them to respond to negative, false, critiques of the Pied-Noir. As one [man?] noted: "Surtout ce qui est intéressant c'est de trouver ses racines, ça m'a permis aussi quand j'entends des bêtises d'avoir la force, la possibilité de répondre à les choses que j'entends." This is related to discussions between members of associations and outsiders, as discussed below.

The Pied-Noir's grandchildren and their descendants were also intended recipients of social history. Youth, it was believed, benefit from having an alternative, more nuanced and positive version of their family history. The idea that a group benefits from having a positive, unifying history is typical of contemporary French society (Wieviorka 2012). The children of the Pied-Noir, themselves, were not considered a target audience. Many were not involved in associations and their parents reported that they were uninterested in their origins, at times to the point of hostility. In general, when they had children, the Pied-Noir had been reluctant to talk to them about their experiences. This has been attributed to a number of causes, including inability to discuss painful memories and a fear of passing on trauma to the younger generations. As one man noted: "J'ai élevé mon fils à part de cette souffrance. Mais avec un sens de notre histoire et ses parents. Sans aller trop vers la sentimentalité." As the Pied-Noir aged, however, many have begun to wish that their children were more interested in their heritage. It was hoped that the grandchildren and future generations will have an interest in, and a need for, this history. To

have positive representations of your ancestors was considered desirable, and something that these individuals wanted to give their grandchildren and descendants.

North African associations tended to have different audiences and goals for their in-group dissemination. Some immigrants considered history to be an important part of their culture and something that needed to be transmitted to both French-North Africans, particularly younger generations, and to the French public more generally. They found an eager audience among second and third generation North Africans whose parents did not pass on this history, as discussed above. One man noted that in his association they worked for:

Le rapprochement d'histoire entre les jeunes d'origine immigré, magrébins, en particulier les jeunes algériens, qui ne connaissent pas la vie de leurs parents comment et pourquoi ils sont arrivés. [Pour eux] c'est très bien, ils ont fait des études, ils sont des médecins mais il y a une différence, ce n'est pas un approche avec les parents illettré. [...] Ils ont tout donné pour que les enfants peuvent être aujourd'hui dans l'administration, politique. [...] On a besoin, de connaître un petit peu nos racines. C'était mes propres enfants qui m'ont demandé. [...] Ça m'a poussé.

In this discussion of the association's activities, the association served to translate between the parents and their children in order to transmit the parents' own history. The younger generations were searching explicitly for information on their origins, and were happy to find a source.

This desire for information spurred participation in numerous North African associations. Second or third generation citizens explained that they sought out associations to re-find their "roots" or to learn more about their countries of origin and the lives of their parents and ancestors. Some explained such an interest as part of being a good, republican citizen. As one second-generation participant in an Algerian association noted:

Pourquoi je suis venu [à l'association]? Il y avait un besoin, un manque. On est une génération, les plus de 40 ans. Dans les années 80 on a tout fait pour ressembler aux français. On a rejeté les idées de nos parents, toute notre culture d'origine. On nous a dit en France, pour que vous soyez français, oubliez tout. Mais à la fin des années 80, on est arrivé dans le marché de travail, on nous a montré la différence. C'est la première choqué. Les loisirs : on nous disait on peut pas rentrer dans la boîte de nuit, les appartements. [...] Un film à l'époque, je suis sûr que tu la connais, *La Haine*. On avait de la haine. Tout état faux. Ce n' était pas possible. On s'est fait rejeté. On a tout accepté, puis à un moment on te renvoi à tes origines. Tu te rends compte que tu ne connais pas tes origines [...] C'est à partir du moment où j'ai eu mes enfants. J'ai fait un travail sur moi. Qu'est que je vais leur transmettre ? [...] Quand je suis arrivé ici c'est ce que j'ai cherché. [...] Maintenant j'accepte ma part algérienne. Mes parents, mes arrière grands-parents. Maintenant c'est facile, je suis beaucoup plus en paix avec moi-même. [...] Quand on dit je suis Algérien d'origine, peut-être pour la société française ça gêne, mais je peux rien faire. Je suis pas un mauvais français. Etre français c'est avoir des valeurs républicaines qu'on accepte.

This man specifies three benefits of minority individuals learning their history. First, they derive personal benefit, they fill the “lack” that he reports. Second, they can be better parents, avoid passing down such an unfulfilled need to their children. Third, they resolve their identity confusion and can participate in the republican nation by knowing and accepting their minority background. This man goes on to state that there are individual psychological benefits to those who know the minority history.

Souvent je compare ma génération avec les gens nés sous X, qui n'ont pas de parents. On arrive à un âge et on cherche ses géniteurs. Avec l'Algérie, c'est la même chose. J'aime la France mais j'ai besoin de savoir d'où je viens. Notre génération a vécu ici, on voulait être français à tout prix, même si on réussit, on a besoin de savoir d'où on vient.

Here, the psychological benefits for the individual are clear. In the comparison to children who seek their birth parents, there is reassurance that such an impulse on the part of minorities is neither unnatural nor a sign that they are less French. While this man spoke about these ideas in a

particularly straightforward way, they were echoed by many others. In general, therefore, for minorities to know their history was considered useful in and of itself for the minority population.

External Dissemination

Minority history was also understood as beneficial to society as a whole. The notion of a shared history as necessary for national cohesion per Renan (1889) is widely accepted in France today, as discussed above. Individuals involved with the MCA argued that to achieve such a common history, the contributions of their minority groups must be taken into account and recognized within the national history. At times, Renan himself was cited in such discussions. For example, a non-North African man noted that he participated in a North African association because the Algerian immigrant experience and background were implicated in a communal need in France that their inclusion in France's shared history would resolve.

Je reprends Renan, la nation c'est un projet partagé. Comme ça, on fait société et nation. Ce n'est pas d'expliquer que les gens, leur situation est due au passé - mais comment on peut travailler ensemble ? Ils se sont battus en Algérie. [...] Après, quand on avance ensemble vers un avenir et les travaux ensemble. [...] On peut se poser la question de son passé. Le passé est éclairée par ce que l'on veut faire.

In this understanding, the need for a national, shared past is emphasized. Class relations are no longer enough to integrate workers of diverse backgrounds into the nation on the basis of their status as workers. Instead, the nation can integrate its minorities through a consideration of their

pasts that create a shared history. Here, integration into the nation relies on the ability of the collective to create just such a shared past.

Participants in Pied-Noir associations have a similar conception of the ability of their minority history, if acknowledged and recognized outside the minority community, to contribute to the strength of the French nation. This Jewish, Kabyle man noted:

Il faut reconnaître les bienfaits que l'on a fait. Il faut reconnaître les histoires et les qualités et les défauts. Ça nous aide à grandir comme peuple.

Here, France's potential future development as a nation is tied to its recognition of its past. This man also carried his point further and attributed current social strife in France to historical incomprehension. In response to a question on the current divide between the Pied-Noir and North-African communities in France today, he responded:

C'est simple. Les jeunes arabo-musulmans, citoyens français, ces jeunes-là n'ont pas vécu en Algérie. Ils ne connaissent pas le rapport extraordinaires qui ont existé, ni la population Pied-Noir telle que la connaissent leurs parents. Il y avait des rapports extraordinaires à tous les niveaux. Des rapports d'amitié. Les raisons économiques et la politique ont divisé les gens. Les gens nés en France connaissent mal leur propre histoire. [...] Ils ont des clichés, du mépris pour les Pied-Noirs.

Here, it is argued that a more nuanced understanding of history would reduce inter-ethnic strife in contemporary society.

The creation or acknowledgment of the participation of minorities in France's history was also presented by both Pied-Noir and North Africans as beneficial because of the content of these histories. The Pied-Noir saw the colonial period as socially important, and lessons learned during

this time were considered to hold the key to future communal life in France. As one woman noted:

Si on existe, ce n'était pas pour dire en Algérie comme on bronzait bien! Cette expérience, il faut qu'elle serve mais personne n'en veut. Tous les problèmes de la laïcité ce sont posés il y a un siècle en Algérie. On dit maintenant les Anglo-Saxons et les Belges font ceci et cela. Mais il faudrait comprendre comment les choses ont fonctionné.

Here, minority history recovers the 'truth' from deforming special interests. The sacrifice and labor of their ancestors were considered to be useful, not only for territorial improvements in Algeria, but for France's ability to thrive as the multi-cultural nation it is today.

This same woman added that in order to contribute to national discussions on such topics, however, the Pied-Noir must first rehabilitate their history from distortion.

Je ne supporte plus cette référence constante. L'opposition entre mémoire et histoire. Quand il s'agit de nous, on utilise toujours le mot mémoire par rapport à l'histoire. [Ils ne] devrait pas s'opposer. Or, là on dit: ça c'est le mémoire et ça c'est l'histoire. Quand on dit mémoire on est dans l'irrationnelle et on est dans la déformation. Quand on dit l'histoire on est dans le rationnel donc dans la vérité. On dit, les Pied-Noirs sont dans le mémoire, oh les pauvres... mais nous, les intellectuels français, nous les historiens, nous on est dans l'histoire. C'est une façon de détourner, de discréditer ce que nous disons. [...] Pourquoi on me refuse à moi aussi le droit d'interpréter la vérité?

This sentiment was echoed by others in similar associations, such as these two men:

On n'est pas là pour faire les conférences sur la légende. [C'est l'] histoire. Son poids va faire réfléchir les jeunes. Comme on a des jeunes qui s'intéressent sur la révolution française. Malheureusement, on a beaucoup raconté des choses ignobles. On a accablé les Pied-Noir pour justifier la décolonisation.

Nous, il faut que l'on travaille pour l'histoire. Les parents, [ils n'étaient] pas des pourris, pas des saints. Des humains, avec les gens pas mal.

For these individuals, the ability of the Pied-Noir to contribute to the nation is contingent on their recognition (in the sense of Charles Taylor, 1994) and acceptance. Such recognition depends on the acknowledgment of both their, and their ancestors', positive and negative attributes. This can only be achieved through dissemination of the minority history in society.

Individuals involved in North African associations also argued that the acknowledgement of the content of their history would be socially beneficial. In this case, it would appropriately recognize the contributions made by North Africans to France's current situation. As one man noted:

The goal of the association is to promote discussions of Algeria and the history of colonialization because they don't give any attention to it in schools, and, without Algeria, France wouldn't be what it was today. (Fieldnotes, original in English)

For good, fraternal relations within the nation, it was considered necessary for the general public to understand the contributions of the North African minority community and to respect them on the basis of those contributions.

Participants in the MCA recognized that the acknowledgment and incorporation of minority points of view and experiences into the national history will not occur without negotiation and resistance. Certain associations of both communities made big claims of the power of history to integrate populations within the nation. However, not everyone within these minority communities attaches the same importance to their history. Some focused instead on social, political, or cultural questions, as I have discussed in earlier chapters. Among those who did promote dissemination of historic information for its benefits, their expectations for how this may happen and what histories are to be altered for it to take place vary by population. Pied-Noir

insisted on a more holistic understanding of their role in colonialism and a focus on aspects other than the Algerian War. North Africans want their contributions to the French state and nation recognized, including their economic contributions during the *trente glorieuses*.

Conclusion

In France the creation of history and the cohesion of the nation are considered to go hand in hand, following Renan's (1889) assertion that the nation that forgets together, stays together. History since the third republic has been used in this way to forge unity within the nation (Wieviorka 2012). Politically motivated historians, such as Nora, have developed their work in this vein, excluding eras or topics from their histories that are considered divisive (Anderson 2004). Despite the intentions to promote unity and calm that justify a focused, positive history, France is now a multicultural society with uncomfortable contemporary and historical relations with its minorities. These groups in France, particularly those with ties to the former North African colonies but also regional minorities, want their histories and contributions recognized in society to foster a unified, plural conception of the nation and symbolize their inclusion therein. This universalistic desire fits poorly with the model where minorities forget their differences and allow themselves to be subsumed in a unifying history that does not include them, their contributions, or national failures in their regard. Demands for attention to minority history and inclusion of minority perspectives rest on the premise that when their history (or their role in 'French' history) is recognized, they will receive a different level of respect in society. Acknowledgment that these populations have legitimate historical reasons for their presence in

France and have made positive contributions to the nation, it is believed, will render obsolete stereotypes of North Africans as drains on national resources and Pied-Noir as fascists. Such a change is touted as having benefits for the psychological wellbeing of individuals and the serenity of both the minority groups and society as a whole. Proponents of a more Renanian national history, however, find these premises suspect.

Recent politicians have taken advantage of this situation, though in different ways. Chirac's approach was to recognize the existence of conflicting memories and memorial groups to create solidarity through recognition, while not wholeheartedly adopting minority historical claims. Sarkozy developed a more restrictive discourse, focusing on an essentialized understanding of French history closed to addition or alteration. With the participation of these, and other, politicians in the history debates, what and how one understands history is imbued with meaning in negotiations of national boundaries and the role of immigrants and minorities in society.

In this climate of high-stakes historical interpretation – Stora (2007) called it a “*guerre de mémoires*” or a war of memories – minority associations try to develop historical discourses that simultaneously incorporate themselves into the nation and reinforce their alternative histories. As Gildea (1994) expects, each competing social memory – including the official, national narrative – wishes to be received as the universal, objective history. Within the situation of the associations, this desire is amplified for the Pied-Noir, since other aspects of their culture are devalued. As discussed in Chapter 4, Pied-Noir activities of historical preservation are seen as legitimate by outsiders, even when historical production and other activities are not. In this way,

preservation serves to symbolically incorporate this group into the history of the French nation, in ways their own history and culture cannot do. While North Africans do not spend as much time or energy emphasizing their history or making historical claims, this is in part because other aspects of their culture are valued in society and the communal histories they are referencing, for the most part, also concern the three North African countries and their populations, so the North Africans in France are not the only ‘keepers’, as it were, of the history (Chapters 4 and 5). This is also because of the problematic position of Islam and the colonial period in the French imagination, emphasis of these aspects of their history risks alienating the very audience they are hoping to reach.

Both Pied-Noir and North African associations explicitly develop historical discourse for internal and external consumption, though they are aware that the level of interest from outsiders is not what they would hope. While the presence of such competing versions of history is what Gildea (1994) would expect, attention to the ways in which those discourses are developed and deployed speaks to understandings of community and national boundaries. In this chapter I have argued that Pied-Noir and North Africans both use historical knowledge as a gatekeeper controlling entrance to their minority communities – a yardstick for an individuals’ knowledge of and sympathies to the minority group and therefore a shorthand for group membership. Group members who do not know their own history are at risk of having psychological problems.

While history is used in the associations to mark boundaries around the minority group, it also inscribes the group as a whole within the boundaries of the nation. Emphasis on the contributions of North African workers during the *trente glorieuses* and the presence of

educated, professional scientists, scholars, and businesspeople, for example, underscore the role these populations have played in making France what she is today. When the Pied-Noir detail the advances and contributions made in French North Africa, or the sacrifices made by themselves and their ancestors in the name of France, these declarations serve the same purpose. As I discussed in Chapter 3, MCAs in France do not have an established place in society. Viewed with suspicion in the political sphere and, in the case of some North Africans, excluded from the economic sphere, cultural associations represent a safe place to develop and maintain minority culture and identity while slowly trying to gain influence and instigate social change. Their approach to historical representation is very similar. Groups like the CDHA, GAMT, and *Cercle Algérienniste* have developed a reputation sufficient to garner RUP status and justify the creation of a foundation for the first and municipal support sufficient to build a museum and research center for the third. As *gestionnaires* of the archives and historical data that can be used in the elaboration of their histories, they maintain the resources needed to ensure that their histories can, someday, be given the place they feel they deserve in society.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters I have illustrated how individuals from the Pied-Noir and North African minorities in France are simultaneously strengthening their minority communities and those communities' place as active members in the nation. Though these two goals are considered incompatible by the predominant French ideology wherein citizens are incorporated into the nation as individuals, the minorities who participated in the MCAs on which I conducted research are proposing not only a new role for themselves in society, but a different conception of *how* participation in society can be organized. They achieve this by using a multi-faceted approach to national membership through: the bureaucratic integration of their associations, the symbolic separation from the metropolitan majority through the insistence on their minority background and communal membership, and the development of cultural, historical, and performative strategies to reinforce and publicize their social position both within the more general minority community and in society as a whole.

France is a republic with both strong centralizing tendencies and a universalist philosophy (Bowen 2007; Ireland 1994; Grillo 1998). Faced with its contemporary multi-cultural population and ideological inconsistencies in its past actions, this has created a situation of persistent tensions and unease that touch the foundations of the nation and what it is to be French. One of the key touchstones for these tensions in recent decades has been minority populations with roots in French North Africa. Though France and North Africa have a long history of interaction since before the colonial period, it has often been in situations of unequal

power, suspicion, and distrust. The unequal relations set up during the colonial regime created and maintained varied and shifting inequalities, both between French citizens and subjects, and between settlers and the metropole. The violence of the Algerian war, particularly that involving the civilian populations, created a climate of inter-communal fear and contributed to persistent stereotypes of both Algerians and the Pied-Noir as ‘naturally’ inclined to violence (Shepard 2006; Silverstein 2004). This was compounded by the destruction of the Algerian civil war, the global increase in Islamic extremist violence, and the rise of the Front National in France. The ideological division of the French state between universalism and assimilation paired with a multicultural society with persistent stereotypes and distrust has ramifications for international and internal policy and social relations. While the French system has no set formal roles for minority communities, this is both an opportunity to create a society that thinks beyond group membership, and a disadvantage for those excluded from the full ideological participation in the nation, if not socially and economically. Because of the division in France’s sacred propositions (Rappaport 1971) between universalist values and a homogenizing republican state with a strong attachment to a national culture, there is tension between a desire to propagate universal human rights and values and a restrictive idea of the French nation in which there is no place for minorities unless they are in the process of assimilation.

One way explored in this dissertation in which minority individuals and communities can offer an alternative proposal for how to live together in society with some cultural differences intact, is through the use of minority cultural associations. Other options include migration or emigration, attempts at assimilation, and revolt (Fassin 2006; Hargreaves 1995; Kastoryano

2002; Wacquant 2008). As discussed above, in Chapter 3, there exist many rules and barriers to associative action in France, reflecting ideological uncertainty surrounding their role in society (Debbasch and Bourdon 2006). However, because there is no specifically defined role for such groups, they have a certain amount of latitude for their activity as they attempt to directly and indirectly create a place for themselves in the nation. Not all associations have such explicitly political aims, though all intend to ameliorate or benefit their members' lives, either by providing aid, entertainment or by changing larger social and ideological systems that they feel are preventing their current and future well-being. However, because the place of minorities, and minority associations in particular, is distrusted in France, their potential for action is circumscribed.

Associations experiencing such ongoing tensions, changing funding statuses, political priorities and shifting relationships, are often engaged in trying to perennialize their position in order to have long-term influence on society. Long term relations and plans are considered especially important in building trust with populations that feel abandoned by institutions (such as some North Africans). Associations who are not satisfied with the current, diminishing, funding and attention available through traditional channels have chosen two paths to achieve this change. First, some have sought increased bureaucratic integration by becoming RUP or foundations. Membership in these two categories of association is the result of outside judgments that their mission and methods are legitimate and socially valuable, typically with something of explicitly universal interest. This comes with indirect and (in the case of foundations), direct

financial benefits and the ability to safeguard the associations' future. In addition to stability, associations that take these forms demonstrate their commitment to the French system.

The second method discussed in the dissertation that individuals use to increase the attention and funding their associations receive is to develop a System D style of management. Here, they combine unofficial and official sources of funding with barter, charisma, and the strength of individual and group networks to acquire what the associations need for their short and long term goals. This may also involve cutting back plans and projects to more closely match the abilities and interests of members. Previous literature on MCA in France (Césari 1993; Geisser 1997; Hamidi 2003, 2006) has focused on the relationship of civil society to political participation of participants, or as a source of vocational training or employment opportunities. In other words, they have treated participation in civil society as parallel to the mainstream economic and political system. Bartering of association services, sharing of staff, and a heavy reliance on personal relationships and abilities to “make do” are evidence of creative responses to an economic and political system that many agree is deeply flawed. What is evident through the System D style of management is an attempt to operate both within and outside the current politico-economic system, if not to create a new one.

Once having secured the means to do so, the North Africans, Pied-Noir, and metropolitans involved in the MCA attempt to use performances of culture to draw audiences and therefore pass a message about themselves and possibilities for developing their role in society. However, because of the differences between the two populations (North Africans are a disadvantaged minority with ties to contemporary, sovereign nation-states and therefore always

under suspicion of not being sufficiently attached to the nation; Pied-Noir are a minority who is unambiguously French in their citizenship but discriminated against and suspected as a carrier of political and social contagion), they are not equally able to attract audiences by using culture, nor do the audiences they attract approach the interaction in the same way. The position of each minority opens possibilities for action, while closing others.

North Africans often represent the essentialized, oriental other within the French social imagination. While this leads, in part, to fear and misunderstanding, it also engenders cultural tourism. Cultural tourists are attracted to the associations for a diversion, as one of a number of options for entertainment that can be consumed on an evening or weekend. While this effectively draws people to the association, they are not necessarily interested in exchange or understanding at a deeper level, as the membership desires. If associations cater to this, they run the risk of reifying and perpetuating orientalist stereotypes. As one association president noted: “Peut-on continuer si les personnes de bonnes moyennes vient ici pour qu’ils aient bonne conscience - ils ont mangé de la culture arabe ?” He wondered if the association can continue if well-off people come here so they have a clear conscience, having “eaten Arabic culture.”

The Pied-Noir, on the other hand, do not have such a legible cultural heritage to reference in interactions with outsiders. This has its drawbacks: as I illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, Pied-Noir culture is not valued in society and, in many cases, its nuances are beyond the understanding of passers-by and are hidden by the participants from outside view. What the Pied-Noir have created instead is a private symbolic landscape made up of references to French North Africa which serves both as a mnemonic device for their lost homeland and as a support

for group identity. Interactions, from daily conversation to explicit performances of culture, are permeated with references to this symbolic landscape. While, as I discuss in Chapter 5, this has created a very effective method of preserving group cohesion, it is not as efficient at passing messages to outsiders because of the relatively esoteric nature of the codes and symbols employed as well as the risk involved with sharing their meaning with outsiders.

North Africans in France represent a wide variety of nationalities, ethnicities, languages, cultures, and religions. Unlike the Pied-Noir, they have no communal narrative other than a shared history of colonialism and discrimination, though the first varied across North Africa and younger generations would have no personal experience or memory. And while anti-discrimination is a confederating cause, this is also shared with Sub-Saharan Africans, Middle Easterners, Asians, Southern Europeans, and others. *What* and *how* North African culture is presented in the associations is varied and contentious in consequence. While this is representative of the North African cultures and points of view in contemporary France, it makes it more difficult for any one association or group to pass messages within the community – since there is, essentially no singular North African community in France – or to serve as a legitimate spokesperson for that community to outsiders.

While the Pied-Noir are not successful at attaining an outside audience for their cultural performances, they are effective at gaining outside attention and inside approval for historical preservation. Outsiders see this as a type of historical preservation, something of universal interest in and of itself and because it will foster future historical inquiry. Despite assertions of academics that there is no one historical ‘truth’, this remains a self-evident truth in French

society, though the idea that there will be multiple points of view is also accepted. Preservation of something that will, someday, help uncover this ‘truth’, is therefore of social value. Evidence that the Pied-Noir are aging and the testimony of witnesses to French North Africa will die with them also contribute to an increase in interest in Pied-Noir memory. While the Pied-Noir welcome this interest for the universal value it ascribes to their experience and see it as a chance to preserve their past and be represented in official history. Outside interest in Pied-Noir history as legitimate is limited, however. Once the Pied-Noir attempt to analyze or create historical inference from the data, their findings and conclusions are treated in the same way as any other aspect of their culture.

In this dissertation, I have analyzed how these Pied-Noir and North African MCAs use slippages in ideas of culture, value and the role of associations and minorities within the nation to create spaces for creativity and civic participation. Within these spaces, they have opened opportunities to participate in and even create discussions on national belonging and nationalism. As such, they employ properties of the social and sacred structures that bind them into their non-role in France to act for change in those same structures and therefore the creation of a place for themselves in society. As such, MCA offer the possibility for non-violent civic change, and what may be the beginnings of a hopeful tale for nationalism and democracy in a multi-ethnic society.

APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY

The directions and methodology for this project have changed greatly over the years, though the main themes and topics remain the same. Before beginning my primary fieldwork I had developed an elegant research plan involving identification of and interviews with key informants in both cities, followed by interviews with key informants in the associative elite in both cities, leading into interviews with associative and community members accompanied by techniques to access emic systems of categorization and comprehension and a survey instrument to increase the numbers of respondents. I had planned on using pile sorts, for example, a technique used to elicit discussions of local categories where the respondent would be asked to sort cards bearing association names into piles while explaining why they were dividing the associations into these groups. An elegant plan, it fell very quickly by the wayside when those key individuals whose insights I had hoped to hear at the beginning of my research were unavailable for long periods of time. In one case I was given an interview date three and then six months in advance. Suddenly I was interviewing everyone at once: key informants at the same time as associative and community members and local residents. In the end I did have my interviews with the different categories of people I had planned to meet, but on their timeline, not mine. I also discovered that the associations were not as well known among the public as I had been led to believe. Casual conversations with local merchants, residents, and city employees in Grenoble, for example, turned up the names of one or two associations, when I knew there to be many more. As such I abandoned the idea of pile sorts (there being little interest in asking

informants to sort a pile of one) and in my conversations with locals I concentrated more on broader themes of minority relations, identity, and citizenship. I was also only able to conduct a survey with members of one association at the very end of my study. This data is not included here and will be the subject of a future publication.

In many ways the methodology for this project did not change while I was in the field, or did not change significantly. It rests, as it was planned, on the collection of ethnographic and textual data concerning minority and migrant cultural associations in Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence. In the following discussion I outline the methodology for collecting the data, the kinds of data that were collected, the precautions taken to protect the privacy of the participants, and the ways in which the data was processed, stored, and analyzed.

Ethnographic Data, interviews:

Ethnographic data consisted of interviews and participant observation. Interview data in each city was gathered from key informants within and outside the associations, members or participants of minority cultural associations, and community members at large. The interviews differed thematically between groups, but the interview process remained the same. Potential participants were identified through their involvement with local government, media, universities, local associations, public meetings and events, and their participation in MCAs. When I first made contact I introduced myself and the project, provided a copy of the Subject's Disclaimer Form (see Appendix 2), and asked if they would be willing to participate in the study. This and all other forms were provided to the interviewees in French. Interviews were conducted

at times and locations chosen by the interviewees, including association offices, the interviewees' places of work, the homes of the interviewees, outside during associations' festivals, cafes, and other public places. The interviews ranged from half an hour to multiple hours, with the majority lasting around an hour. Interviewees were given the option to be audio recorded, conditions permitting, with the understanding that the recordings would only be heard by myself and my dissertation advisors at the University of Arizona. The vast majority agreed to be audio recorded, with only one individual declining. Notes were made at the time either on paper or with a PDA and portable keyboard, depending on the physical conditions of where the interview was taking place. Though at the beginning I had feared that the use of recording and digital note-taking equipment would be disruptive or seen as an imposition, it was regarded by some of my informants as a sign of my seriousness and legitimacy as a researcher. For others it was more an object of curiosity, but aside from periodical battery or technical problems the use of technology did not appear to be a significant distraction.

Individuals who participated in the project were asked to refer me to others who might be willing to take part. I also provided the MCAs with my contact information to distribute to anyone who was curious or interested. In cases where I asked individuals to refer others, I had them give the potentially interested individuals my contact information so they could contact me on their own terms. In certain cases the referee asked that I initiate contact, so I contacted them myself through whatever media was suggested (i.e. phone, email, mail). In this process I identified the individual who had provided the contact information when I was explicitly given

permission, which occurred in all but one case. I did not disclose who participated in the project, though the informants often chose to disclose their participation in the project with others.

Key informants, MCA participants, and community members were all interviewed using semi-structured and open-ended interview techniques. For each interview I was prepared with a list of themes and topics I wanted to discuss, but the direction of the interview was determined to a varied extent by the interviewee. For key informants I used primarily semi-structured interviews. Key informants in each city provided information on the laws associated with associations, association structure, the history and character of the city, the minority and migrant communities, inter-ethnic relations, and the structure of local government. Interviews with MCA participants were open-ended. They focused on individuals' personal experiences with and perceptions of the associations and the North African and pied-noir minority communities and also elicited material on the history, character, and projected future directions of the associations. Finally, interviews with community members focused on the character and history of the city, its minority populations, and inter-group relations.

Ethnographic data, participant observation:

Participant observation was conducted in the MCA and in the cities. In total I participated in and observed association meetings, courses, protests, memorials, lectures, concerts, exhibitions, dances, movie nights, dinners, cocktail hours, and day-to-day functioning of association offices. I volunteered with two associations: in one case I co-taught a French class for recently arrived immigrants, in the second I assisted with preparation of a number of lectures,

conferences, exhibitions, and other special events. Though the vast majority of the observations were conducted in Grenoble and Aix-en-Provence, I also attended meetings and other events with the associations in Paris, Lyon, Nice, Antibes/Juan-les-Pins, Perpignan, Valence, and Béziers. The amount of time I spent with each association was necessarily determined by the format of the association itself. Some are open regular business hours, while others are open only on a weekly or monthly basis. This necessitated unevenness in the data, but as such it mirrors the experiences of the associations' members. After, and sometimes during, these events I took detailed fieldnotes. At times they were typed directly, at others they were written on paper and later transferred to the computer. Additionally, with permission, I took photos of the association buildings, offices, and public events. I received consent to use photos taken of recognizable individuals with the "Subject Photo Consent Form." (See Appendix 2). These photos were used in analysis to compare the associations' presentation of self in public settings.

Participant observation was also conducted outside the associations. I attended local non-minority associations, events, cafes, and businesses and interacted with local residents on the street. This was as unavoidable as it was integral to my research. Living in the cities I had the opportunity to witness inter-group relations, elicit informal discussions on the research topics, attain a grounded understanding of day-to-day life in the area, and build relationships with local residents and minority community members. Additionally, I took photos of the city centers and neighborhoods where the associations were found for comparison and illustration.

Ethnographic data, survey:

An anonymous survey was administered to attendees at the National Congress of the Cercle Algérieniste, in Perpignan, France, January 28-29. Paper copies of the survey were provided at the congress. The survey was also made available in digital form. The presidents of the Cercle sent emails to their members including the survey and Subject Disclosure Form as well as a link to the survey hosted by Google documents for those who did not have time to fill it out on the premises. In all of these cases the survey was accompanied by the Subject Disclosure Form. The survey provided basic demographic information on the participants, information on their participation in the association and the congress, and their motivations for participation. Identifying information was not collected, and surveys received by email were separated from the email address of the individual before processing. Because of the length of time needed to clean and analyze the data resulting from the survey, the results are not included in this dissertation. An article analyzing the results is planned for a future publication.

Textual Data:

Textual data was collected from the associations, newspapers and magazines, and local and national archives. First, printed material from the associations, such as newsletters, copies of websites, constitutions, and press releases was collected to track and corroborate how the associations present themselves to their members and non-members. Second, I read and collected commentary on the associations and the North African, Pied-Noir, and Harki communities in local and national papers during my time in France. I had previously developed a methodology to

analyze how minority associations and the minority community are represented to the public and whether these representations changed over time. Collection of articles was ongoing throughout the fieldwork period. In this way I was able to track how often the minority community and its associations are mentioned in the newspapers, and in what capacity. While intended to be a much larger part of the dissertation, I discovered that associations were mentioned only very infrequently in the local press, and none of the local associations were mentioned in the national press. As such, newspaper coverage is used to provide background and thematic details and not track the activities of associations, as had originally been intended. I had also intended to save copies of articles from six newspapers: *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, *Dauphiné Libéré*, *Le Progres*, *La Provence*, *Metro*. Once in the field I realized that the same articles were typically reprinted in multiple papers, reducing the interest and utility of copying articles from all six papers. National events were covered using *Le Monde* and *L'Humanité*, while local events were primarily covered using the *Dauphiné Libéré* and *La Provence*. These journals were selected because of their availability, their accessibility, and the size of their readerships. Third, I conducted archival research on the histories of the two cities, the three study communities, the associations, and minority relations in France in general. Specifically, I worked at the archives of the Departments of Isère and Bouches-du-Rhône, and the Centre de Documentation Historique d'Algérie.

Data Management and Analysis:

All informants were given unique identifiers. For purposes of organization, during the time in the field a document was maintained with a list of the participants' names and unique

identifiers. At all times my computer and this document were password protected and were, whenever possible, kept in a secure place. Following my return from the field and completion of data entry and cleaning I destroyed the document that identifies the names of the informants in connection with their unique identification number.

As noted above, many interviews were audio recorded, and I took notes during all of them, either digitally or on paper. In both cases the notes were re-read and corrected either immediately following the interview or as soon as possible thereafter and ethnographic prefaces were added with observations about the setting of the interview and any other events or impressions that did not find a place in the interview notes. Notes that were on paper were typed, again as soon as possible. I cleaned all fieldnotes and interview notes, which includes formatting and correction of misspellings, though in all cases the original copies were also kept. Finally, all fieldnotes, interview notes, and digital articles were entered into Atlas.ti, a qualitative software analysis program, and coded thematically. I coded progressively, beginning with a set of codes taken from my research themes and adding additional codes that developed out of the data itself.

Following completion of the dissertation I will provide digital copies to the MCA and archives with which I worked, as well as to all interested parties who gave me their contact information for this purpose during the course of my research. Other individuals asked for solely the French summary, which will also be provided. Hard copies of the complete dissertation will be provided to select archives, and hard copies of the French summary will be provided to all those who requested them.

APPENDIX 2: CONSENT DOCUMENTS

FICHE DU RENSEIGNEMENTS

“Perception et intention: une enquête sur les associations franco-maghrébines et pieds-noirs en France”

Vous êtes invité à participer volontairement dans le projet susnommé. Le but de ce projet de recherche est d'éclairer les processus sociaux concernant les associations culturelles des franco-maghrébines et pieds-noirs en France, surtout le rôle joué par ces associations, leur membres, et leur engagement avec la population française autochtone. Vous avez été choisi pour participer parce que vous êtes membre d'une association maghrébine ou pied-noir, vous habitez dans une communauté où se trouve ce type d'association, ou vous avez des connaissances spécifiques sur ce type d'association. Votre participation est volontaire.

Si vous décidez de participer, vous serez invité à participer à des interviews de groupe ou seul, à des enquêtes, ou à des observations sur votre engagement avec l'association et/ou sur vos opinions sur les associations minoritaires, la situation sociale courante dans votre communauté, et en France en général. Ces interviews peuvent être enregistrées (votre consentement sera demandé au commencement de chaque interview), et dureront environ une heure. Pendant l'interview ou l'observation la chercheuse prendra des notes pour mieux rappeler vos mots ou vos actions. Votre nom et le nom de votre association (au cas où) n'apparaîtront pas dans ces documents ou dans aucune publication sur cette enquête. Il est possible que des photos soient prises au cours du projet. Votre assentiment sur leur publication vous sera demandé par fiche séparé.

La chercheuse répondra à tous vos questions sur le projet, et vous aurez le choix de quitter le projet quand vous voudrez, même après avoir donné votre consentement de participation. Autant qu'on sache, il n'y a aucun risque en connexion avec votre participation. En plus, il n'y aura pas de gain direct pour vous, en tant que vous ne recevrez pas de compensation monétaire. Votre participation ne vous coûtera que votre temps.

Seulement la chercheuse et ses professeurs qui travaillent directement avec elle auront accès à votre nom et les renseignements fournis par vous. Afin de protéger votre identité, votre nom et le nom du club ne seront employés ni dans les notes ni dans aucune publication résultant de ce projet; toute information sera gardée dans un endroit sûr.

Vous pouvez obtenir plus d'information en contactant la chercheuse Victoria PHANEUF à 00-1-520-621-2585 (aux Etats-Unis) ou à phaneuf@email.arizona.edu. Si vous avez des questions concernant vos droits en tant que sujet de recherche, veuillez vous mettre en contact avec le Programme pour le Protection de Sujets Humains à l'Université d'Arizona, à 00-1-520-626-6721.

Par votre participation même dans ces interviews/enquêtes/observations, vous permettez la chercheuse d'utiliser l'information fournie pour buts de recherche.

Victoria Phaneuf

FICHE DE CONSENTEMENT POUR PHOTOS

“Perception et intention: associations franco-maghrébines et pieds-noirs en France ”

Cette fiche est à utiliser seulement comme auxiliaire à la fiche intitulée “Fiche de Renseignements” pour le projet susnommé.

On vous invite à lire l’information suivante sur la nature de ce projet de recherche et sur la nature de votre participation, si vous consentez d’y prendre part. En signant cette fiche, vous indiquez que vous avez été renseigné et que vous consentez de participer dans ce projet. Les réglementations du Gouvernement Fédéral des Etats-Unis exigent que la chercheuse obtienne votre assentiment écrit avant de votre participation, pour que vous soyez bien informé sur la nature et les risques, et pour que vous puissiez décider de participer ou non sans contrainte.

INFORMATIONS SUR LES PHOTOS

En signant cette fiche, vous agréez d’avoir vu un (ou plusieurs) photo(s) avec le(s) numéro(s) marqué(s) ci-dessous et que vous consentez à leur utilisation dans tout publication sur ce projet de recherche. Les photos ne seront pas utilisés ou reproduits pour aucun autre but. Au cas où cela sera nécessaire, on vous contactera pour demander votre permission. Au cas où vous voulez retirer votre consentement, veuillez vous mettre en contact avec la chercheuse (Victoria PHANEUF) à 00-1-520-621-2585 (aux Etats-Unis) ou à phaneuf@email.arizona.edu. Bien sûr, votre photo ne pourra pas être enlevé des pages déjà publiées, mais, à votre demande, la (ou les) photo(s) ne sera (ou ne seront) pas utilisé(s) dans des publications futures.

Numéros et description des Photos :

RENSEIGNEMENTS

Vous pouvez vous renseigner de plus en contactant la chercheuse Victoria PHANEUF à 00-1-520-621-2585 (aux Etats-Unis) ou à phaneuf@email.arizona.edu. Si vous avez des questions concernant vos droits comme sujet de recherche, veuillez vous mettre en contact avec le Programme pour le Protection de Sujets Humains à l'Université d'Arizona, à 00-1-520-626-6721.

AUTORISATION

Avant de donner mon assentiment en signant cette fiche, je vérifie que les méthodes, inconvenances, risques, et avantages m'ont été expliqués et que j'ai reçu des réponses satisfaisantes à mes questions. J'ai été informé que j'ai le droit de poser des questions à tout moment, et que je peux me retirer du projet à tout moment sans créer de mauvais sentiments. De même, ma participation dans ce projet peut être terminée par la chercheuse pour des raisons qui me seront expliquées. Au cas où des renseignements nouveaux obtenus au cours de ce projet pourraient changer ma volonté d'y participer, la chercheuse m'informerait aussitôt.

Cette fiche sera préservée dans un endroit désigné par le Comité sur les Sujets Humains de l'Université d'Arizona et peut être accédé seulement par la chercheuse, Victoria PHANEUF, ou un représentant autorisé du Département d'Anthropologie de l'Université d'Arizona. Je ne renie pas à mes droits légaux en signant cette fiche. Un exemplaire signé de cette fiche m'a été fourni.

En signant cette fiche je vérifie que j'ai reçu un exemplaire de la fiche "Fiche de Consentement pour Photos" pour le projet susnommé, signée et datée par la chercheuse et par moi-même.

Signature du Sujet

Date

DÉCLARATION DE L'INVESTIGATEUR

Je certifie que la nature du projet ci-dessus a été soigneusement expliquée au sujet par moi-même (ou mon intermédiaire). Je certifie qu'au mieux de ma connaissance, la personne ayant signé cette forme de consentement était au courant de la nature, des demandes, des avantages, et des risques concernant sa participation.

Signature de la Chercheuse

Date

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