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**Kenneth Burke's approach to language and theory construction**

**Archias, Susan Dana, M.A.**

**The University of Arizona, 1988**

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**KENNETH BURKE'S APPROACH TO LANGUAGE  
AND THEORY CONSTRUCTION**

by

**Susan Dana Archias**

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**A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the**

**DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION**

**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
For the Degree of**

**MASTER OF ARTS**

**In the Graduate College**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA**

**1988**


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### **Acknowledgments**

**My thanks go to Dr. Henry L. Ewbank, Dr. William E. Bailey, and Dr. David A. Williams for supporting the independent nature of this project, and for providing the practical guidance I needed to facilitate both the process and the clarity of my analysis.**

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### Abstract

This thesis explains the "systematic" refinement of Kenneth Burke's theoretical process through his development of a theological paradigm for the dramatic vocabulary. It describes the merging metaphysical and dialectical issues in Burke's critical thought and locates a theoretical shift in A Grammar of Motives, where Burke posits the prototype for his key term, "act." The study then interprets the formal treatment of the prototype in The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, and demonstrates how the derived paradigm maintains and advances the convergence of metaphysics and dialectics, and how it reestablishes the interaction between language structure and usage in two types of definition or explanation (temporal-logical, narrative-tautological). This thesis also describes the purpose and functional range of Logology.

### Introduction

Kenneth Burke's theoretical predilection led him into an expansive project of theory building such that the labyrinth of his textual meanderings has left for many an impression of impenetrable complexity and contradiction. This may be due in part to the range of literary, historical, theological, and philosophical allusions that mound up, juxtaposed, during the process of Burke's critical thought. It is probably more the result of his proclivity toward a metamorphic vocabulary. Internal consistency in theory construction is understandably suspect when the reader must deal with a nonstable terminology. Revolving around Burke's fundamental pentadic vocabulary is a daunting constellation of continually evolving terms that may, even in the span of one essay, show up in ostensibly contradictory usage.

In the context of this thesis, Burke's Dramatism and Logology are treated as metatheory, as opposed to substantive theory. Hawes (1975, p. 46, 47), notes that "such theory contains the greatest number of statements; consequently it is said to be the least parsimonious. ... His thinking represents a basic theory or viewpoint; it takes the form of a system of interrelated principles ... ." The nature of the terminological developments in Kenneth Burke's work represent appropriately the nature of his beliefs about the way we define, develop, and use vocabularies — both theoretically and normatively — to explain our behaviors and our environment, and on a more abstract level, about the way we perceive and articulate our state of being and our methods of knowing.

In other words, Burke's beliefs about language behavior and metaphysics are very consciously and systematically infused in his own theoretical language. Burke practices what he preaches and confronts directly the issue of a nonstandardized terminology. He notes of the body of theory he referred to as

"Dramatism," that "It is not the purpose of our Dramatism to abide strictly by any one system of philosophic terms that happens to exemplify the dramatist pattern" (Burke, 1969, p. 67-8). This attitude derives from the notion that words do not precisely represent thoughts and things. Because no two things, acts, or situations are exactly alike, the same term applied to each introduces "a certain ambiguity" (p. xix), and all of the resulting "transcendences," or "titles," "ultimate terms," or "god-terms," as representational substitutions, are in some sense therefore, false (p. 319-320).

The affirmation of a given term "enables men to go far afield without sensing a loss of orientation. And by the time the extent of their departure is enough to become generally obvious, the stability of the new order they have built in the name of the old order gives them the strength to abandon their old god-term and adopt another" (Burke, 1969, p. 54). This is one manner in which Burke describes the process of substitution and analogy and the possible misapplication of language to situation. Our use of language is substitutional or analogic in nature; linguistic structure is itself substitutive or analogic in character. Substitution and analogy introduce the continual potential for ambiguity.

According to Burke, the grammatical ambiguity of language allows us to supply context variably to confusing phenomena and communicative transactions, to attribute motives in a posteriori fashion, to name or label our actions in retrospect. It also allows us to communicate persuasively through an obfuscation of the "ground" where Burke suggests all descriptive possibilities are merged. In his effort to explain how language works in our lives, his project becomes one of "cracking" symbolic representation by investigating the "logical" derivation of a given term or explanation and thereby locating a juncture of linguistic ambiguity, a point where other descriptive or explanatory terms might have been selected.

"Hence, instead of considering it our task to 'dispose of' any ambiguity by merely disclosing the fact that it is an ambiguity, we rather consider it our task to study and clarify the resources of ambiguity" (Burke, 1969, p. xix).

A perfectionist might seek to evolve terms free of ambiguity and inconsistency (as with the terministic ideals of symbolic logic and logical positivism). But we have a different purpose in view ... We take it for granted that, insofar as men cannot themselves create the universe, there must remain something essentially enigmatic about the problem of motives, and that this underlying enigma will manifest itself in inevitable ambiguities and inconsistencies among the terms for motives. Accordingly, what we want is not terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise. (Burke, 1969, p. xviii)

For Burke, this amounts to an examination of what I will call the dialectics of analogy, the building and substitution, interpretation and translation of analogies designed ultimately to persuade. I use the term generically, to describe the acts involved in the context of either definition or explanation. Ironically, the term is more useful to me because it is less a verbal noun than "substitution" — an important term in Burke's project — and more of a concrete noun. "Analogy" is a term that helps to freeze the action of Burke's critical thought more rigidly than his own trenchant selection of more dynamic descriptive terms, such as "act."

The summational word for the Burke's method is "Dramatism," since it invites one to consider language structure and use as modes of action. Drama as literary genre offers a metaphor carrying with it all the conflict, contrast, and verbal action Burke needs to describe his beliefs. The metaphor, Dramatism, is directed toward the elucidation of human motives that necessarily figure in man's selection of words to describe or explain his environment and his interaction with his fellow man. Or rather, it helps to explain the generative development of forms as frozen actions, and the convolutions of linguistic structure generated by a ongoing jumble of human motives. In this, the dramatic metaphor — steeped in the notion of action versus motion in matters of human perception, judgment,

and linguistic selection — helps Burke to describe how man uses language as a changeable "system of placement."

In an intriguing sense, "Dramatism" means "differences," or the ground of all linguistic possibilities. Dramatistic language, like the terms of Burke's pentad (act, agent, scene, agency, purpose), is that which provides the widest possible scope of explanation because it allows for the greatest amount of translation and substitution. But paradoxically, it is heuristic not because it is analogic or metaphoric, but because it is representative of an "ultimate" reduction (as Burke sees it), which opens and does not restrict the possibilities of explanation. Dramatistic language avoids closure of explanation because it concentrates itself in the functional aspect of language forms.

As a contrast, Burke points to "scientific" or "operational" language, wherein, he says, so many definitional possibilities have been eliminated from the potential field that a rigorous nomenclature remains, and obfuscation of the ground (the dramatistic) is inevitable. Here is the impetus for ever widening misrepresentation, or as Burke might say, "nonrepresentative" language (Burke, 1969, p. 59-61). So, if the "dramatistic" is language rife with possibility, "dramatism" is the realm of all differences. This is one example of terminological usage that carries the ideas driving Burke's theoretical apparatus — where the word action is a subliminal cornerstone between ontological realm and epistemological way. The shift is a grammatical one, hinging partly on the movements between verb and noun. In this and several other ways, "Dramatism" bears the marks of Burke's metaphysics.

More generally — or at least, using a less specialized vocabulary --Kenneth Burke is interested in dialectics, which he defines formally in this way (Burke, 1969, p. 402):

By dialectics in the most general sense we mean the employment of the possibilities of linguistic transformation. Or we may mean the study of such possibilities. Though we have often used "dialectic" and "dramatistic" as synonymous, dialectic in the general sense is a word of broader scope, since it includes idioms that are non-dramatistic. One may study the possibilities of linguistic transformation in general (as with our analysis of the possibilities inherent in the pentad). Or one may study particular instances of linguistic transformation (as with the critic describing the developments in some one work of art).

"All told," says Burke (1969, p. 440), "dialectic is concerned with different levels of grounding ... ." His use of this term basically applies to the pragmatic selection of a definitional or explanatory perspective during everyday or theoretical language use. Specifically, "dialectics" refers to the act of continual redefinition or re-description (p. 403). Or again, "An ever closer approximation to truth by successive redefinition is sometimes offered as the opposite of the dialectical method, or such 'spiraling' may very well be taken as the example par excellence of dialectic" (p. 403).

Ultimately, Burke (1969, p. 243) chooses not to use the term "dialectics" formally because it has been so beleaguered in usage that it "has repeatedly lost track of its dramatistic origins" (sic), resulting in dogma. When formally referring to his theory, therefore, Burke generally relies upon his own specialized terms. When I use the word "dialectics," it will be in either of these two senses: linguistic transformation in normative usage or in the study of linguistic transformations in general (language about language).

His goal is clear (Burke, 1969, p. 317): "Our concern is primarily with the analysis of language rather than with the analysis of 'reality' ... consciousness of linguistic action generally, is needed if men are to temper the absurd ambitions that have their source in faulty terminologies." Burke does not purport to explain motivational causes or human relationships in any reductive sense other than that which preserves human action, the metamorphosed strata of symbolic form --

language. And in this, Burke's project does not claim to do more than to locate ambiguities and posit the "differences" implicit within definition and explanation.

Burke eventually embraces the specialized term, "Logology," to refer to the same body of dialectical concerns. The range and function of Logology will be explored in the course of this paper. For now, it's important to note that whether Burke stands under the somewhat different umbrellas of "Dramatism" or "dialectics" or "Logology," his strong orientation toward choice and change — contained at rest in the guise of his primitive term, act — is evident in the continual re-description of his theory and the vocabulary he employs. How can a passion for choice and change be arrested in language structure? The paradox is undone once we realize that Burke's theoretical linchpin is, grammatically speaking, a verbal noun, and that Burke's vision of structure is one of words vibrating with human thought, judgment, will, purpose, motive, choice, action. For Burke, language is more than "value laden."

Accordingly, the reader of Burke will discover a number of formally unrelated words and an apparently nonsystematic terminology used to describe normative language behavior, the process of theory building, and the dimensions of language structure. Words like "substance," "transcendence," "form," "order," "ratio," "transformation," "representative anecdote," "scope," "reduction," "circumference," "hierarchy," "entitlement," "essence," "ultimate," "god-term," "negative," "principle," "logical priority," and "temporal priority" frequently accompany in varied combinations, less specialized words like "ground," "narrative," and "tautology." The relationship between these terms is intentionally tautological, for a special reason.

In representing his thoughts about linguistic abstraction on whatever level, Burke will direct an idea onto a "reduced plane," delineate the "circumference" of

word choice (the "scope" or definitional boundaries), and then rotate his ideas to fit into different descriptive terms, on a different reduced plane. Here is a two-way usage of language. In his rhetorical method, Burke fits the set number of terms in his pentad to a multitude of phenomena. But in his metatheoretical instruction, in his grammar, he will explore a variety of terms well-grounded in a consistent epistemology to describe for the reader the dimensions of language structure and use. Even so, the basic pentadic terms pervade the body of his theory.

Being so driven by this particular epistemology is perhaps the reason Burke will not or cannot present the reader with "formal" theory. Any attempt to extract from his works the most salient analytical statements -- usually involving either definition or description of process -- reveals an interesting, cumulative effect in his writing style. He may begin with an analogue, or scenic metaphor, and work through all its trappings, exploring what explanatory leverage it will provide him, and supporting it with a wealth of multidisciplinary evidence. He will then begin his instruction again, this time with a different scenic metaphor. Moving along with Burke's instruction however, we will follow one analogue lapping over into the next.

Why is the result not just a confusing jumble of argumentation? Because the ensuing, cumulative essays or arguments represent a "transcendence" of previous definitions and descriptions. They are each ends of a lengthy, systematic, dialectical process of discovery that reveals along the way a marvel of idiosyncratic moments in critical thought. Volumes such as A Grammar of Motives (1945; 1969) and The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (1961; 1970) read like series of interrelated essays, each as its own argument, each laying the foundation for another metaphor in the next essay, for some aspect of the

same overall goal. Or, the next essay may delve more deeply into the analogical implications of the same metaphor, until it appears that Burke must have felt a sense of completion in that particular scene, that he had come full circle in all its possible ramifications — for the time being.

As already suggested, although Burke relies on metaphoric terms drawn from a range of disciplines, he is not interested in analyzing the accuracy of the ideas and issues those terms represent. Rather, he is interested in tracing the "grammatical" lineage of vocabularies or expressions to uncover the "motives" implicit in their construction and use. The "logical" or tautological implications of structure are of central importance in the theoretical stance of Burke, because in his view, structure obscures selected analogies, and therefore, different ways of defining and explaining. He will utilize an expression, an explanation, a vocabulary, or an entire discipline as a case history, exploring its development as linguistic structure. A number of troublesome issues surface here: scholarly concerns about the clarity of Burke's logical underpinnings, questions about etymological allusions in the context of broader semantic arguments, and closely related confusion about possible structuralist-poststructuralist tendencies, or other scholarly orientations.

Kenneth Burke is not a structuralist. In sum, had he chosen some imagistic or contextual term other than the verbal noun "act" to serve as the nexus of his theory, things might have been different. Nor is Burke a poststructuralist, in the "Derridean" sense of the word. He does not cut free entirely from Western metaphysics insofar as he has posited a central, albeit evasive, ground. His is less a revolt against Western metaphysics than a common sense approach to its tremendous power over perception and expression. Placing him in some academic camp or other becomes a specious exercise when the reader gradually realizes

that Burke's inclination for self-refinement would avoid such closure (unless he has himself named the field). All the scholarly concerns mentioned above can be said to filter down to one question: what is it that Burke really wants his theory of language to say and do? What is the real scope of Dramatism and Logology?

Burke's aim is to locate and explain the inherent ambiguities of language. One possible source of confusion about this goal is the recurrent Burkeian phrase "language as motive," (Burke, 1970, p. vi, 10, 38), which gives the persistent impression that structure itself is endowed with purpose. I will pursue this issue in the course of the thesis. For now, it is enough to note Burke's habit of placing his own theoretical terms in various "scenes," to explore their explanatory scope. It is this process that forms the dynamic core of Burke's ideas about metaphysics and language use.

As far as the formal study of linguistics is concerned, Burke's purview is none exactly of syntax, semantics, or pragmatics. His use of the word "grammar" is specialized and most closely approximates the term "metatheory," although he will also use it in its traditional sense. His etymological allusions are sporadic. His application of the term "metaphor" (at least in the context of my two primary sources) is vague. His rhetorical theory, intended to explain persuasion, and sometimes touching the issue of communicative transactions, hinges on the potentially dynamic, functional term, "act," and yet technically, enigmatically, locates the actual study of language use in syntax, to the exclusion of a host of situational variables. And therein is an answer to one paradox. We return again to Burke's view that language is structure charged with action: it is both "at rest" and infused with persuasive purpose.

The pentadic device of his rhetorical method, which works to cover that host of situational variables, represents theory that is itself "literary" or "academic" in

nature, and so the value of the method as a nonfalsifiable research tool is primarily in the area of criticism. It cannot predict, and its ability to explain is limited to instances of language use; it cannot therefore, identify probable patterns in language behavior. In this regard, a rhetorical critic may use the pentadic terminology to perform any number of creative, nonverifiable analyses.

However, this argument takes a funny twist when we look at Burke's metatheoretical instruction, his grammar. In his abstract view of language structure and usage, Burke ranges freely, describing precisely what his pentad cannot perform on a substantive theoretical level: here, he releases a cadre of noneconomical arguments that delineate patterns of language behavior. The process, as I will explain, culminates in choices for types of definition or explanation in normative and theoretical language use. Specifically, it culminates in two kinds of definition or explanation.

When Burke moves his exegesis of dialectics into The Rhetoric of Religion (1970), the pentad as a whole plays a less visible role than it did in A Grammar of Motives (1969). Above all other pentadic terms, "scene" controls the activity that seeks to break down the process of explanation and definition. Burke has indicated that Dramatism's "way in" is via consideration of the ontic ground (Burke, 1970, p. 38). If we equate "scene" with ontological issues (state of being), it follows that "act" suggests epistemological issues (way of knowing). Although they are key terms in the tautological cluster for Burke's full project, "agent," "agency," and "purpose" do not claim the same titular presence here: they are implicit partners in the highly visible interplay of "scene" and "act." Perhaps this is appropriate given that Burke's ideas about language derive systematically from his ideas about metaphysics. In the context of Dramatism and Logology, Burke provides a stellar analysis of developmental human expression, touching each of

syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Unconcerned with measurable scientific goals, he develops a grammar of amazing internal consistency.

I will not attempt any reconciliation of Burke's various vocabularies. Instead, I will focus upon Burke's adaptation of a theological metaphor for the exposition of key terms and the identification of prototypes, as a systematic refinement of his theoretical process. I will essentially describe my interpretation of this process, and will not evaluate this body of theory beyond indicating its internal, conceptual consistency.

Accordingly, in this thesis I will first explain the concentration of Burke's metaphysical ideas in his theoretical language and process. Second, I will explain the refinement of Burke's critical process as he moves from the various dramatistic metaphors in A Grammar of Motives to a single dramatistic metaphor in The Rhetoric of Religion. My explanation of this development will not cover the variety of scenic metaphors utilized in the first volume, but will begin with the shift posited therein. It's an important move because it allowed Burke to construct a paradigm around his key term, "act." By translating his theoretical framework into a religious or "supernatural" scene, he also gained some respite from the numerous "scenes" in which he had previously placed his instruction. The supernatural "realm" or "order" is here differentiated from realms of nature and socio-political mankind. The theoretical change explored in this paper does not involve changes in articulated terms. Rather, it is my contention that The Rhetoric of Religion presents a cogent model for the dramatistic vocabulary already developed.

Finally, in the context of The Rhetoric of Religion, I will explain how the thrust of Kenneth Burke's concern about language structure and use corresponds primarily to shifts between kinds of definition or kinds of explanation. This is the

major advance in explanatory power allowed by the exposition of the theological paradigm. It describes the manner in which we build analogies founded on two different kinds of "priorities" or "firsts," or beginning assumptions. In A Grammar of Motives, Burke begins by calling these firsts "temporal" or "logical." He ends in The Rhetoric of Religion by calling them in addition, "narrative" or "tautological." Both kinds of firsts are intrinsic to Burke's ideas about metaphysics.

This is a large agenda for a beginning reader of Burke. In order to articulate my ideas about Burke as they now stand, it was necessary for me to define project boundaries strictly, on a textual basis. Since my interest centers on a particular shift in Burke's theoretical process, I have taken as my text The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (1970 edition). A Grammar of Motives (1969 edition) provides a springboard for the theoretical advances to come: it foreshadows the issues Burke dealt with more formally and thoroughly in the later volume. Since both volumes were intended as "formal considerations" of "the linguistic instrument" itself as opposed to its use in communication or rhetoric (Burke, 1969, p. xvi; 1970, p. vi), the selection of materials for this project is well justified. Both are important to Burke's aim to create a "consciousness of linguistic action generally" (1969, p. 317).

That the Grammar is integral to understanding the fit of theoretical language to metaphysical issues is clearly supported by Burke's declaration (1969, p. xxiii) that:

It is not our purpose to import dialectical and metaphysical concerns into a subject that might otherwise be free of them. On the contrary, we hope to make clear the ways in which dialectical and metaphysical issues necessarily figure in the subject of motivation.

In other words, to understand the motivational forces behind language behavior, we must understand the power given us by the characteristics of the tool itself and at the same time, understanding the nature of the tool presupposes an awareness of fundamental things that metamorphose the tool. When we translate ideas into language, and transform that language into substitutive language, we practice, according to Burke, a form of dialectics proper.

Although the background for my interpretation of the section about metaphysics derives from the Grammar, it is impossible to advance very far into a discussion of Burke's views on these matters without employing the theological metaphor he explored more formally in the Rhetoric of Religion. This is because Burke continually resorts to the use of religious analogy, even while testing a series of analogies in the Grammar. It's almost as if a retrospective glance at his writings highlighted the tendency for him, and recognizing the merits of the religious scene, he decided to develop it formally. In a sense, the move was self-corrective. The theoretical paradigm was both diagnosed and prescribed in the Grammar; the second volume then, serves as a full-length, formal exegesis of the idea.

As this thesis represents my initial interpretation of these two works by Burke, it will not be within my purview to explore the historico-philosophical derivation of Burke's beliefs about metaphysics or language theory. The influence of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Locke, Spinoza, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger, James, and others is highly visible. But such exposition would require research and analysis of a kind other than the parameters of this thesis will allow. Burke's analysis of St. Augustine will be the one exception, but my presentation in this case will be limited to the application of Burke's literary criticism of Augustine's Confessions to his theoretical ideas. My purpose here is to sketch the metaphysical framework

that I believe supports Burke's process of explanation, and to show a conscious, and therefore systematic, refinement in that process. Finally, this paper assumes a basic understanding of Burke's pentadic terminology.

### **Basic Theoretical Orientation and Problematic Terminology**

Fundamentally, Burke's theory derives from an action-motion dichotomy central to the human condition. Beyond our natural capacity for motion, man is endowed with a "second nature," language:

Dialectically considered (that is, "dramatistically" considered) men are not only in nature. The cultural accretions made possible by the language motive become a "second nature" with them. Here again we confront the ambiguities of substance, since symbolic communication is not a merely external instrument, but also intrinsic to men as agents. Its motivational properties characterize both 'the human situation' and what men are 'in themselves' " (Burke, 1969, p. 33).

Action is a process that is inherently human because it involves desire or will, a synthesis of phenonema or perception of relationships, abstract judgment, and verbal activity of some sort — either the cognitive activity of attitude (which subsumes to some extent the preceding terms) or the act of expression. Verbal activity involves linguistic selection. While "choice" may not fully represent the meaning of action, it is certainly a major element indicating the difference between action and motion. Further, choice is formalized in language.

Burke's terminology "clusters" about his primitive term "act." Defined as "the human body in conscious or purposive motion," (Burke, 1969, p. 14), the word poses some conceptual problems: (1) it may be too reductive to include "attitude"; (2) the relationships between "act," "attitude," and "motive" are not entirely clear; (3) the derived term "symbolic act" seems variably to represent "act" as linguistic selection in some sort of communicative transaction, and "attitude" or "motive" as cognitions. The perspective also suggests that cognition is dependent upon language for its operation (Burke, 1970, p. 297).

The basic problem has to do with a kind of substitution that calls into question the locus of meaning. Such fundamental problems are important to the internal validity of the dramatistic framework, but they are not critical to the overall framework of my project, since the theoretical process I am analyzing essentially focuses on two specific forms of an act (narrative and tautological definition) as opposed to the content of an act. I need only mention these terminological problems briefly.

Burke says that the ways we think and use language are driven by human motivation. It is important to note that he takes a retrospective look at human motivation. He seeks to explain not causation, but attribution: "This book is concerned with the basic forms of thought which, in accordance with the nature of the world as all men necessarily experience it, are exemplified in the attributing of motives" (Burke, 1969, p. xv). "Motivational clusters" (p. 108) are implicit equations in the structure of every act. Motives involve "assumptions as to what kind of act equals heroism, what kind equals villainy, what kind contains the likelihood of reward, of punishment, etc." In other words, motives involve judgments. And our formulation of motives is intrinsically related to our concept of substance (p. 377) or perception, so problems of motivation involve problems perception, judgment, and linguistic choice.

There begins to be a difficulty when "motive" appears to represent simultaneously "principle" or meaning, as well as "attitude," described as an implicit program of action. For example, "To call a man a bastard," a substantiating act, "is to attack ... his whole line ... his 'principle' or 'motive' ... . An epithet assigns substance doubly, for in stating the character of the object it at the same time contains an implicit program of action with regard to the object, thus serving as motive" (1969, p. 57).

Attitude is a "preparation for an act, which would make it a kind of symbolic act, or incipient act" (Burke, 1969, p. 20). In an argument based on the views of I.A. Richards, George Herbert Mead, Alfred Korzybkski, and Aristotle, Burke (p. 236) says that the "concept of incipient acts is ambiguous. As an attitude can be the substitute for an act, it can likewise be the first step towards an act." Later (p. 242), Burke decides that "attitude" (and "incipient act") is essentially ambiguous because it bears the potential for an act or for no act.

If attitude is a kind of symbolic act, then the latter must also carry the same potential ambiguity: "The realm of the incipient, or attitudinal, is the realm of 'symbolic action' par excellence; for symbolic action has the same ambiguous potentialities of action ... " (Burke, 1969, p. 243). So "motive," "attitude," and "symbolic act" appear to be synonymous, or more specifically, the theoretically derived term "symbolic action" sums up both "attitude" and "motive" as cognitive activity. It represents more, then, than actual language choice and use. Since the terms "act" and "symbolic act" are used interchangeably, it would appear that the central term "act" must account for both behaviors and cognitions.

Human motives are not confined to verbal action (Burke, 1969, p. 33). But, "the dramatistic analysis of motives has its point of departure in the subject of verbal action." This reminder serves to relocate the path of Burke's critical thought. Above and beyond a nonstable terminology, Burke's epistemological stance begins with an investigation of the forms implicit within verbal action.

Even with the knowledge that Burke is primarily interested in forms of attribution, the phrase "language as motive" (Burke, 1969, p. 318-320, ) or "the language motive" (p. 33,) is troublesome because its syntax, and sometimes its usage, frequently gives the impression that structure itself is endowed with purpose, or more simply, that language is a purpose for human persuasion. The

issue again involves the interrelationship between cognition and language. For Burke, language provides "the 'critical moment' at which human motives take form, since a linguistic factor at every point in human experience complicates and to some extent transcends the purely biological aspects of motivation" (p. 318-20). The perspective devolves to the idea that only language gives thought "the body necessary for its existence." No modern technology, for example, would be possible without "the use of a vast linguistic complexity ... ." Although this example works well with the statement that human motives are not confined to verbal action, the question about cognition and language still remains.

However, with regard to Burke's theory about the tool itself, Burke's position is two-part: language is structure infused with persuasive purpose in its construction; and language persuades. It is interesting to note that one statement is tautological, the other directional or narrative. In a sense, Burke's beliefs about the dimensions of language structure pervade the form of his own critical presentation: the full realization of his "grammar" in The Rhetoric of Religion is based on his fascination with these two particular forms of symbolic action. Each depends upon a different "first departure" in perspective.

Considering the persuasive nature of language, it is indeed possible, in Burkeian terms, to say that language is motive, or that language is a purpose for persuasion. Language is developed through principles of order and transformation that culminate in a "logic of perfection," the search for some ultimate locus of meaning (Burke, 1970, p. 297). From this stance (characteristic of Western metaphysics), it follows that we "derive purpose from language" (p. 274-5), since the desire for perfection drives language use (1969, p. 79-82, 91-100, 318-320).

Within the context of this paper, however, it is my general contention that Burke's metatheoretical grammar concentrates upon the "implicit" and therefore,

tautological features of language structure. If "motive" is defined in the artistic, literary sense as "motif," rather than as "volition," it is possible to avoid the confusing suggestion that structure itself is endowed with purpose: in this sense, the "language motif" or "language as motif" would refer to the implicit meaning of structural relationships.

### **The Metaphysics of Kenneth Burke**

#### **Ontology Into Epistemology, One "Way In"**

In expressing his beliefs about the ways we envision our state of being and our ways of knowing, Burke never ranges from his view of the world (or his reduction of it) "in terms of" the linguistic instrument. His work deals with many kinds of linguistic "transformation." Whether it's called the "ground" or the "center" the ontological source of existence or locus of meaning is endowed with all possibilities for transformation (1969, p. xix):

It is in the areas of ambiguity that transformations take place; in fact, without such areas, transformation would be impossible. Distinctions ... arise out of a great central moltenness, where all is merged. They have been thrown from a liquid center to the surface, where they have congealed. Let one of these crusted distinctions return to its source, and in this alchemic center it may be remade, again becoming molten liquid, and may enter into new combinations, whereat it may be again thrown forth as a new crust, a different distinction. So that A may become non-A.

Prima facie, it would appear that Burke here presents his version of the proverbial center of Western metaphysics. But the center perceived by Burke is not fixed entity; it is not placed at a static location. It moves, it is liquid, uncongealed. It is in a continual state of flux while at the same time "containing" all possible permutations, all differences, all types of definition and explanation. It is a center of sorts, yes; but it is a metamorphic core, a complex that may be viewed "in terms of" an unlimited number of selected terminologies. From this

center, emanates "such distinctions as those between freedom and necessity, activity and passiveness ... " (1969, p. xix). It therefore retains indefinitely, an element of ambiguity, of supernatural character, mystery, and magic. The supernatural character of the ground is one "way in," one premise in Burke's theory about the tautological relationship of ontology and epistemology.

This is metaphysics, says Burke (1969, p. xxii), "which brings its doctrines to a head in some over-all title, a word for being in general, or action ... or motion ... or experience in general, ... with all its other terms distributed about this titular term in positions leading up to it and away from it." The tendency to search for an overall title is epistemological in nature. The ontological ground that Burke envisions must retain an enigmatic quality because we cannot explore or know or talk about it apart from our reliance upon language. Our dependency upon language in exploring that enigmatic center is suggested even by the character of dictionary definition, which reduces the subject to terms of "being" (Burke, 1969, p. 73).

There is a "pantheistic temptation," says Burke (1969, p. 73) "in the very nature of ontology as a subject. For if one would treat of 'everything' in terms of 'being,' 'being' would then be the over-all concept, the summarizing 'god-term,' " to which all other terms would relate, "as parts to the whole." Burke's idea of this temptation, and the tendency to search for transcending terms drives his actional perspective, and involves an aspect of human nature necessarily included in any equation about our existence and our way of knowing. This view differentiates humanity from nature and "super-nature" by the all-consuming presence of language in the "socio-political" order.

The vocabularies of two opposing and controversial arguments about our "beginnings" help to illustrate the respective "departures" of action-motion

terminologies. Theories about Creation and Evolution are alike in their "reference to matters of sequence, to 'befores' and 'afters' " (Burke, 1969, p. 63); they are ontological theories because they consider the nature of existence. The theological explanation "sums up in terms of action," (motion generated by God's act of command) while the scientific explanation sums up in terms of motion (natural operations). The Evolutionary argument about motion in nature must be verified empirically. "But 'the Creation' is 'true,' as a prototype of action, if it has the form of the most complete act ..." (Burke, 1969, p. 63). Even a fundamentalist, Burke says, would have to agree that the act of Creation involves principles. The Creation myth, therefore, has logical, nonempirical truth.

The principles involved in the Biblical description of the act of Creation concern a simultaneity: the act is not historical because it occurred "not just in time and motion, but ... outside to the extent that it is the establishment of inauguration of time and motion" (Burke, 1969, p. 73). The process of Evolution also involves principles. But in that explanation of beginnings, principles are ontological only insofar as considered "in terms of permanent principles that underlie the process of becoming." This is one introduction to Burke's idea of "logical and temporal priority," where the Creation is viewed simultaneously as the first moment of time, and as the first principle of being.

Burke's ideas about "priorities" or "firsts" are integral to the theoretical development this paper seeks to describe. The juxtaposition of Evolution and Creation suggests an analogy that focuses on form versus content. Again, the distinction between the two is that the "first" of one must be empirically verified, while the "first" of the other can be affirmed only logically. This necessity in each is controlled by the respective characters of the scientific and theological vocabularies. Thus, Burke says "it is impossible to "explain the meaning of 'the

act of Creation' in terms of concrete operations" (Burke, 1969, p. 63), or in the form of narrative exposition, because the meaning of the Creation is basically free of time constraints. The book of Genesis, of course, tells the story of the Creation in narrative style. But such a temporal sequence of explanation, says Burke, will not explain the meaning or principle of Creation. Being beyond time, the Creation can only be explained logically, or as Burke will later claim, tautologically.

Humanity can be described in terms of both temporal and logical priority as well. We exist not only within our own peculiar situations (temporal), but also in a universally human situation or condition (logical) (Burke, 1969, p. 84). The unique feature of our human condition is our symbol system, our "second nature" (1969, p. 33). But in conjunction with our second nature, we must operate in a temporal mode. Trapped on a pragmatic level within the constraints of time, with the ability to explain or describe only selectively (and therefore, partially), we are entrenched in our language system.

The locus of meaning here clearly lies in the word "action." From it emanates the development of the dramatistic framework and the inception of the theological prototype. The derivation of "act" as the nexus of Burke's body of theory is once more clearly inferred. It is based in the notion that understanding is predicated in linguistic choice. Language is vulnerable to any number of pragmatic deformations when we choose ways to define, describe, or explain. The necessary act of selection therefore, precludes any possibility of naming something precisely. And the back channel for this process is that of variable human motivation. The theoretical formula is: "The basic unit of action is the human body in purposive motion. We have here a kind of 'lowest common denominator' of action, a minimal requirement that should appear in every act ..." (Burke, 1969, p. 61). So much for the human condition.

A term like "substance" is helpful in understanding the movement of Burke's critical thought from ontology to epistemology, or rather, how he approaches an explanation of ontology through epistemology. As a synonym for the word "being," "substance" hints at the covert influence of the absent, since to define a thing is to place it in terms of something else, to mark boundary conditions and contextual reference. The word's etymological reference, says Burke, describes a thing not according to something that is inside or intrinsic to it, but to something that is outside or extrinsic to it (Burke, 1969, p. 23). For example, "a person's or a thing's sub-stance would be something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing" (p. 22). Burke's use of the term, which drives his epistemological concept of linguistic definition, was influenced primarily by Locke and Spinoza (p. 21-35).

Substance is a term that helps to reveal the paradox of definition, since the concept contains an "unresolvable ambiguity." This ambiguity creates the "strategic moment" where "miracles of transformation can take place" (1969, p. 23), where substitutions and analogies allow us to range widely in expression. Punning with the term, Burke explains that "only by systematically dwelling upon the paradoxes of substance could we possibly equip ourselves to guard against the concealment of 'substantialist' thought" (p. 57), of overly contextualized thought.

Burke has referred to this contextual definition of substance as "geometric" (Burke 1969, p. 29). For example, an object is placed or located such that it is logically derivable from other elements in the same scene: "These relations exist all at once, implicitly," although they can be expressed in various sequences."

For the purposes of explaining Burke's ontology, the contextual or geometric definition of substance is most pertinent here. This is one of those metamorphic terms however, for which Burke has offered varied definition (Burke 1969, p. 29-35): "familial substance" relates to temporal, ancestral sequence; "directional

substance" is the closest he comes to defining causal necessity, patterns or trends; "dialectic substance" is supposed to be the overall term, which studies the "antinomies of substance" (of definition) generally. As far as I can tell, the first usage I have given carries the overriding impact of the term.

It is our "contextual approach to substance" (Burke, 1969, p. 34), that induces us to locate everything in a central ground. From a grammatical point of view, he explains (p. 249):

One should also note that whereas the scientist beginning with 'the object' explains abstraction, generalization, classification as a process having to do with nouns, a dramatist stress upon act suggests an origin in verbs. Words like 'run,' 'go,' 'do,' are likewise abstract and general. No action word refers to just this action and no other. One regularly uses nouns, pronouns, and demonstratives that do thus particularize. Every proper name is of this nature. But verbs are always abstract and generic. And we do well to remember, when trying to generate philosophic methods dramatically, that a key word of traditional realism was being or essence, which was no demonstrative noun, but a verbal noun, the most abstract and general form of the most abstract and general act.

Burke's grammatical focus on the verbal noun "being" guides his theoretical reduction of the universe to matters of form instead of context. Form is considered as an arrested process, or as function. On a very fundamental level, a grammatical shift between noun and verb facilitates Burke's critical explanation of the interrelationships in a vocabulary about ontology and epistemology (1969, p. 63-4):

... We here stand at a moment of great indeterminacy, the watershed moment that slopes down to "being" on one side and "becoming" on the other. It is the ambiguity etymologically present in the Latin, natura, (and its Greek counterpart, physis). For though we came to speak of a thing's "nature" as its essence, the word originally had a genetic or developmental meaning, a reference to growth or birth ... The shift is between temporal priority and logical priority.

The imagery of this passage is suggestive of Burke's metaphysics and his dialectics, which finds its zenith in the unlimited possibilities for transformation provided by the pentadic ratios. In fact, Burke's ratios are a formulaic expression

of the same basic concept. The movement of being to becoming can be expressed as the grammatical transformation of scene (ontology) to or through act (epistemology), or scene:act. Burke defines "ratio" as a "formula indicating a transition from one term to another" (Burke, 1969, p. 262). A ratio is a bridging element that suggests the mediated relationship between the two terms.

Such a relation necessarily possesses the ambiguities of the potential, in that the second term is a medium different from the first. For the nature of the (mediated) necessarily differs from the nature of the immediate, as a translation must differ from its original, the embodiment of an ideal must differ from the ideal, and a god incarnate would differ from that god as pure spirit.

The watershed or critical moment of this process is a grammatical one, because it is the grammatical ambiguity of language that allows increasing distance from a "central moltenness" of descriptive possibilities, through the selection of synonyms, the transition from one word form to another. The process hinges about the mediating element, "act," the subliminal cornerstone between ontological realm and epistemological way. "Act," in Burkeian language, is the watershed moment.

Burke's ratios may be interpreted as "principles of selectivity rather than as thoroughly causal relationships" (Burke, 1969, p. 18). Actually, Burke's analyses rarely extend to causation: he will continue, in The Rhetoric of Religion, to discuss two forms of explanation only: logical and temporal. Our ability to describe the ontological, as illustrated by the vocabularies of Creation and Evolution, is restricted in Burke's view either to narrative or tautology.

Essentially, the ratios are analogies. That is, "by a 'scene-act ratio' we mean that the nature of the act is implicit, or analogously present, in the nature of the scene" (Burke, 1969, p. 444). Metaphysically, this refers again to the necessary relationship between language about ontology and language about

epistemology: the latter is necessarily implicit in the former, and both are no more than analogies.

The idea of "mediated" language structure helps Burke to describe the way people selectively build analogies. Later, Burke will fit the same process into a theological paradigm wherein Christ becomes the prototype of the mediating ratio.

### Epistemology into Ontology

An ontological discussion of the "ground" and "firsts" has already introduced Burke's epistemology as well. An extension of the geometric, contextual metaphor will help to round out the activity involved in any metaphysical expression.

#### The dialectics of analogy.

To illustrate an epistemology described in terms of linguistic selection and substitution, Burke presents a dynamic system of placement wherein boundaries of meaning are scribed.

Borrowing a term from William James, Burke (1969, p. 77-78) uses the word "circumference" to explain definition "by location," a contextual approach. Implicit within the language of definition are circumferences of "varying scope" or explanatory power, which allow for the "contracting and expanding of scene" (p. 84) that will mark "the outer boundaries of the ground that is to be covered" (p. 86). Linguistic placement is an act, a kind of "partial Creation," involving the freedom of choice. Any selection of terms is a selection of circumference, and further, says Burke (p. 90), "So far as we can see, this matter of circumference is imbedded in the very nature of terms." The selection of a circumference then, is implicit in language structure.

Every circumference is also a reduction (Burke, 1969, p. 96). But unlike the word "circumference," "reduction" is a verbal noun: there can be no reduction without the act of reducing. The word serves to enforce the memory of active choice (of the agent) in language behavior. Any terminology reduces the world to some abstraction or generalization, however broad. Abstractions or generalizations group and order things, to the exclusion of other particulars. So, "any characterization of any sort is a reduction," and further, "to note any order whatever is to 'reduce'." The world may be treated in terms of any reduction or summarizing "god-term" (p. 105). Burke's aim is to remind us of the complexities subsumed beneath actively selected reductions, because perfection can exist in everyday life only "in principle." The "paradox of substance" means that we can only partially represent the phenomena of our world in language.

In one sense, the use of substitutes or analogies develops out of the "law of parsimony." When "two circumferences are matched" (Burke, 1969, p. 98), most likely it will be the wider set of terms that has "multiplied entities beyond necessity." For example, if nature is defined as the "manifestation of God's will," its design represents God's design. As the ground, "God" (agent) then becomes an invariant term involving unnecessary duplication, since language about nature would be symbolic of God's design. So, "if the two terms, or the two aspects of the one term, are taken as synonymous, then one side of the equation can be dropped as 'unnecessary' " (p. 80-81). Because the source of being (God) can be eliminated as a necessary term in some motivational statement, this process of reduction or analogy allows us to obfuscate the ground and range far from its locus of meaning, its principle. Further, the analogy can be reversed: God can then be defined in terms of sheer natural motion.

This kind of economy bridges one terminology to another. Most important to Burke's view, the dialectics of analogy allow for the "dissolution of drama" (Burke, 1969, p. 440) — when terminologies about humanity narrow so that the "motivational circumference" is reduced to terms of motion. When verbal action is reduced to nonverbal motion, or when vocabularies treat ethical issues in nonethical terms, "we violate the principle of specification" (p. 404), because our terms for examining one field "are got by the simple importation from some other field." Burke frequently indicts behaviorist vocabularies in this regard.

The dialectics of analogy are based in part on a grammatical shift. When we try to define an act in terms of the agent who commits it (Nature = God's Will), we discover that the term for the agent behind the act duplicates the act itself. We can then discount the agent and focus on process itself, using terms about motion and not about action. Evolution is a vocabulary about process or motion; but it is important to remember that Burke's comparison of the two vocabularies is quite detached from any comparison of the philosophical issues and realities involved.

Using Burke's own terminology, we can ignore the act of reducing and simply focus on the reduction. Once the (human) agent has been eliminated from consideration, "the orbit of action is thereby reduced to terms of sheer motion" (Burke, 1969, p. 119-120). The grammatical shift involves the move away from the activity of the verb toward an expressed noun-ness that determines some state of being. In this way, language reduces the ontological ground. This is the tautological nature of metaphysics Burke seeks to describe.

Apart from this dramatistic explanation of substitution, which was refined in the formulaic expression of the pentadic ratios, Burke is keen to explain the priorities involved in the transformable analogies we necessarily use in definition and explanation.

**Freedom, necessity, and priorities.**

I have already presented the issue of logical and temporal priority, by way of example; I have also indicated the central importance of logical priority in Burke's Dramatism and Logology. It remains for me to express this reduction of form in terms of necessity.

When we confront our range of choices for a linguistic circumference to locate the meaning of an act, we confront both freedom and necessity (Burke, 1969, p. 84). We are free to select language within the necessary conditions of our situation. In this way, "men are 'substantially' free." "Necessity" is a term however, that also suggests an important structural feature of language.

Whether referred to as "principles," "essence," or "meaning," the symbolic (like the term "God") are priorities or firsts that do not require a temporal sequence of definition or explanation. They are absolute, "They just are," (Burke, 1969, p. 73) "They have logical, rather than temporal, priority." They are "beginnings" without regard to time. Logical priority is defined as the kind of explanation "whereby things can 'precede' and 'follow' one another in a kind of succession that requires no time coordinate." When we talk about the underlying principles of the Creation therefore, we translate the "historical sequence" of the story to the priority of "logical sequence." The relationship between terms in a logical sequence involves "placement." Temporal priority on the other hand, is defined as the kind of explanation that relies on the historical sequence of one event to another. The relationship between terms in a temporal sequence is ancestral or derivative (p. 26, p. 402).

But, "if a first and a second are related 'logically,' " (Burke, 1969, p. 73) "they are by the same token related 'necessarily' ." Necessity is intrinsic to symbolic forms. If we say that "Nature is the manifestation of God's Will," then

necessarily implicit in the structure of the definition is "God's Will."

Logologically, Burke would revise the definition to say, "Implicit in Nature is God." Such is the retrospective, actional view of language Burke holds. Structure vibrates with human choice, and language users cannot escape the tautological necessity in language structure.

Burke's fascination with the tautology of language structure pervades his Logology. In The Rhetoric of Religion, he will explain that the book of Genesis translates logical principles about beginnings to terms of narrative, temporal sequence. The Christian notion of humanity as derived from God, like offspring from parent, is an example of ancestral definition that relies on temporal priority. When Christianity posits that derivation as the most important principle of mankind, however, it translates temporal priority to logical priority.

In summary, Burke's views anchor man's way of knowing in two kinds of priority: temporal and logical. As forms of explanation, the terms translate to "narrative" and "tautological." The vocabulary of the Creation myth actually contains both styles of explanation. As Burke notes (1969, p. 28), "In any sustained discussion of motives, the two become interwoven, as with theologies which treat God both as 'causal ancestor' of mankind and as the ultimate ground or context of mankind."

### **Theoretical Refinement: Pro forma**

#### **Recognition of the Prototype "Act"**

Why did Burke shift the study of his dialectics regarding the attribution of motives from a focus on dramatism to logology and religion? Early on, Burke noted the potential support theological vocabularies would provide his project (Burke, 1969, p. xviii) and that religious philosophy would "bring us nearest to the concept of total acts" (p. 19).

Basically, if there is a "pantheistic temptation in the very nature of ontology as a subject" (Burke, 1969, p. 73), and if metaphysics and dialectics are interrelated as Burke has suggested, then it would be systematically correct to place a body of theory about structural relationships and the consummatory, analogical character of symbolic action in a metaphor about the ultimate ground. Burke's reflexive process is amazingly detailed, and our ability to experience the moment of his theoretical refinement is exciting.

The vocabularies we build are "reflections" of a reality we perceive; as reflections they are also "selections" of reality; and as selections of reality, they can also be "deflections" (Burke, 1969, p. 59). If a vocabulary is not suited to its subject, its scope and reduction (its circumference) deflect from a true representation of that subject. What is the ideal calculus to describe the use and structure of language? Notes Burke (1969, p. 60):

A given calculus must be supple and complex enough to be representative of the subject-matter it is designed to calculate. It must have scope. Yet it must also possess simplicity, in that it is broadly a reduction of the subject-matter. And by selecting drama as our representative, or informative anecdote, we meet these requirements. For the vocabulary developed in conformity with this form can possess a systematically interrelated structure, while at the same time allowing for the discussion of human affairs ... in such typically human terms as personality and action ... .

So far, Dramatism has provided Burke with the proper vehicle for his project. The implicit structural relationships of the pentad and other derived terminology are a conclusion or summary of the dramatistic metaphor. But something basic is missing in the orientation. Critically examining his own theoretical process, Burke (1969, p. 61) contemplates:

Once we have set seriously to work developing a systematic terminology out of our anecdote, another kind of summation looms up. We might call it the "paradigm" or "prototype."

In selecting drama as our anecdote ... we discover that we have made a selection in the realm of action, as against scientific reduction to sheer

motion. And we thereupon begin to ask ourselves: What would be "the ultimate act," or "the most complete act"? That is, what would be the "pure" act, an act so thoroughly an act that it could be considered the form or prototype of all acts? For if we could have a conception of a consummate act, any less thorough acts could be seen as departures from it, as but partial exemplifications of it. But whatever qualities it possessed clearly, by reason of its nature as an absolute summation, we could then discern dimly in all lesser acts.

What then would be the "pure act" or "pure drama" that one might use as the paradigm of action in general? Such a paradigm or prototype of action, the concept of an ultimate or consummate act, is found in the theologians' concern with the Act of Creation. It "sums up" action quite as the theory of evolution sums up motion, but with one notable difference: whereas one must believe in evolution literally, one can discuss the Act of Creation "substantially," or "in principle" ... "

This sequence illustrates the merging dialectical and metaphysical issues in Burke's critical thought. Once having cited his model, Burke brings his terminology of motives in yet closer approximation with his theoretical perspective. This is the conscious, self-corrective move of the theorist. It will bring to the fore important ideas about ways we define and explain various phenomena, the ways we proliferate faulty vocabularies, and the ways such symbolic action interacts with linguistic structure. The activity extends formally into Burke's 1961 volume The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (1970).

Throughout, Burke's goal of enhancing our linguistic consciousness is unchanged: "Our purpose is simply to ask how theological principles can be shown to have usable secular analogues that throw light upon the nature of language" (Burke, 1970, p. 2). That is, how does the form of theological explanation compare with the nature of explanation in general? Are the principles of sacred vocabulary representative of linguistic principles in the secular realm? More specifically, Burke chooses a Christian vocabulary for the pursuit of his logological project.

The term "Logology" means "words about words" (Burke, 1970, p. 1), the study of "the foibles and quandaries that all men (in their role as 'symbol-using

animals') have in common" (p. 5). It differs subtly from Dramatism; in a sense, it is an abstraction of Dramatism. With its goal of reminding us always of repressed differences in definition and explanation, Dramatism is grounded in a terminology of action. Logology studies the process of definition in vocabularies of action and motion. It does not replace Dramatism; it complements it. Dramatism allows for the development of actional terminologies and actional interpretation. Logology is the "technical methodology" for examining dramatic and nondramatic vocabularies; yet of course, it is more appropriately described as "metatheory." Further, Logology maintains the same fundamental orientation about temporal and logical priority in the act of definition and explanation.

### Paradigm for Action

A prototype is requisite to the study of any concept, and Burke needed a paradigm to identify relationships in his terminology of action. Christian doctrine provided a useful summation: "This prototype we find in the conception of a perfect or total act, such as the act of 'the Creation' " (Burke, 1969, p. 66). Why choose the act of an ultimate entity (an ultimate agent)? The concept of God's fiat contains an element of magic or novelty because "it produces something out of nothing." As a prototype, the Creation would delineate the need for some degree of novelty in every act. As prototype, it would be the only act completely free of any necessity; it is an act of total freedom or perfection.

Upon God's "originating act depend all the laws of motion which men necessarily accept as the conditions of action" (Burke, 1969, p. 65). In other words, action in the supernatural realm (action constituted as paradigm) precedes or generates motion in the natural realm, where men accept temporally constrained motion as the prerequisite to their own potential for action. All acts

of humanity derive their potential from God's first act. His act is therefore outside the realm of motion, "in the area of more-than-motion that we call action ... ."

The prototype maintains the action-motion dichotomy, since "Dramatism", says Burke (1970, p. 40), "assumes a qualitative empirical difference between mental action and mechanical motion," and because the logological project is geared to extend the dramatic perspective. Here, as he had argued in A Grammar of Motives, Burke maintains (p. 39): "Dramatism holds that 'action' is a more inclusive realm, not capable of adequate description in terms of 'motion' only. 'Action' is to 'motion' as 'mind' is to 'brain'."

Clearly, the logical prototype "act" overrides the concept of "motion" as a first. If this were not so, Burke would have been unable to identify "act" on a theoretical level as his primitive term. Nor would he have been able to develop the religious paradigm. And yet, he adds that "though there can be 'motion' without 'action' ... there cannot be 'action' without 'motion'" (Burke, 1970, p. 39), that implicit in the idea of action is the idea of motion. Is this a contradiction? Is motion after all a condition for action in Burke's theoretical orientation?

Actually, this apparent contradiction arises in part as a result of different contextual usage, in part as a distinction emerging from a shift between logical and temporal priority. In any articulation of God's supernatural action, the logical prototype overrides the temporal quality of sheer motion in the natural realm, since we can talk about the ineffable only logically and not empirically.

However, in any discussion about the realm of socio-political action, the distinction between action and motion is controlled by linguistic shifts between logical and temporal priority. In essence, this statement amounts to a logological interpretation of the action-motion criteria of human nature. We operate within

the realm of temporal motion. We can communicate in narrative sequence. But the accretionary nature of language also allows us to transcend the realm of sheer natural motion when we talk about meaning. For meaning is not reducible to terms of motion (Burke, 1970, p. 40). So we can approach the logical realm of the ineffable when we talk about principles. And since principles involve a semantic dimension that is outside the realm of natural motion, Burke rejects the notion of first effect from material cause in any consideration of mankind. Terminology of action must always retain a wider circumference than terminology of motion.

Language allows for the simultaneous presence of motion and action in any terminology of human motivation. Nevertheless, the process of action contains motion because all the terms subsumed in action (will, desire, judgment, attitude, choice, etc.) can never be defined in terms of motion. Action is theoretically prior to motion in any terminology of motives insofar as the logical priority it supports allows us to approximate the ontological ground, the ineffable.

Terminologies reduced to motion, on the other hand, will be constrained by a temporal quality that will severely limit their access to the ontic ground. Because of the substitutional character of language, the logical form of actional terms most closely approximates the absolute firsts of the ground.

What are the implications of the theoretical prototype for Burke's range of explanatory power? What does the analogy add to his explanation of language behavior? What if man were capable of a perfected, totally free act?

Such would be the Edenic paradigm, applicable if we were capable of total acts that produce total transformations. In reality, we are capable of but partial acts, acts that but partially represent us and that produce but partial transformations. Indeed, if all the ratios were adjusted to one another with perfect Edenic symmetry, they would be immutable in one unending "moment." (Burke, 1969, p. 19)

If all possible pentadic interpretations of some verbal action were tallied, says Burke, revealing all their implicit relationships, then we might perceive man achieving a "perfect Edenic symmetry" — a perfect expression comparable to a pure act. But the necessity confronting man situationally and linguistically constrains his capability for "perfect" definition or explanation. (Burke's emphasis on such necessity, by the way, deflects his position from something resembling social constructivism, besides the fact that his real focus is upon attribution, not the creation of meaning. Of course, in the context of Logology, Burke analyzes linguistic necessity, and not the situational necessity he acknowledges.)

The theological prototype allows Burke, in a highly summational, systematic way, to explain his views about our state of being in relation to an ultimate ground. It crystallizes the procedures he believes we follow in our continual attempts to perfect any explanation about our relationship with the ground, with our environment, and with each other. The prototype converges Burke's ideas about metaphysics and dialectics. For Burke, the interrelationships between epistemology and ontology are so actively manifestations of the dimensions of language that he is able to reduce their description to the difference between two styles of explanation (Burke, 1969, p. 64):

And if even a concept so super-genetic as the evolution of evolution forces us back to an ontological level as soon as we make generalizations about this process of process, all the more clearly are we found shuttling between being and becoming in the concept of Creation. The shift is between temporal priority and logical priority.

If we are discussing the beginning of beginnings, or the "law" of beginnings, our ontological statements force us to shuttle between being and becoming, to discuss the absolute in terms of the relative, and timelessness in terms of time. This is the meaning of Burke's "watershed," the synergy of epistemology and ontology, which is most cleanly summarized in the word, "act" (Burke, 1969, p. 63): "We

here stand at a moment of great indeterminacy, the watershed moment that slopes down to 'being' on one side and 'becoming' on the other."

The religious paradigm reinforces the actional power of logical priority. For although language forces us to discuss absolute "Being" only partially, in terms of "Becoming," we are not left in our human condition with the power of temporal explanation only. The structural dimensions of language allow us to approximate logical perfection through the definition of principles (e.g., Burke, 1970, p. 297). We can, for example, talk about the "formal" meaning of the Creation as "beginning without end," rather than as historical sequence. We would then be considering the Creation as a logical prototype of action. For the principle of the Creation is without temporal quality, "since it was itself the positing of time; it was the act that set up the conditions of temporal development ... " (Burke, 1969, p. 64).

Therefore, any vocabulary that reduces the Creation to terms of temporal priority alone "would lack sufficient scope" (Burke, 1969, p. 64). Christian theological explanation is "correct" or sufficient (Burke, 1970, p. 300, 304) because the tautological nature of its vocabulary reopens the closure of its narrative to explanation in terms of principles, thereby placing the Creation "at an intersection of time and the timeless -- a point at which we place ourselves when we discuss it in terms of those non-temporal firsts called 'principles' " (1969, p. 64).

But if the dimensions of language are inherently tautological, and if every reduction (every transcendence!) is a perfection (Burke, 1970, p. 298), how can we differentiate between vocabularies of sufficient and insufficient scope? The moment we can discern the elimination of the "agent acting," after the principle of Occam's Razor (Burke, 1969, p. 80-81, 98), we should recognize the "dissolution

of drama" (1969, p. 440-441). With the absence of the agent, we are left with a vocabulary of motion, devoid of actional character. Such a vocabulary lacks sufficient scope to explain any situation or process in which choices are made, commands given -- in short, to explain human cognition or behavior.

By defining God as the first principle of being and the Creation as the perfect form of an act, God has pure freedom. Free of situational and linguistic necessity, He is also free from human motivation. For any motive would constrain God's will and restrict the utter freedom of His action (Burke, 1969, p. 69; 1970, p. 98). The freedom of God's Act determines the conditions "utilized by human agents in the motion by which they act. In this sense, it represents an ultimate source of motives ... ," although mankind will also evolve their own motives out of language.

But if God as prototype is the ultimate agent who establishes time and motion, then in what scene does He act? What is the scene for God's "constitutive act" (Burke, 1969, p. 69)? "What are we to do with a god who is himself the ground of everything?" asks Burke (p. 71). For the symmetry of dramatic logic requires a scene for the Creative act, and especially since Dramatism has claimed the ontological ground as the "way in" for its perspective (Burke, 1970, p. 38; 1969, p. 69-76). What is the ground of "timelessness and rest" (p. 70)?

To say that God is "super-scene, super-act, and super-agent all in one" (Burke, 1969, p. 71) would be too simplistic for the logic of Dramatism. After Spinoza and James, Burke cites the "'pantheistic temptation' in the very nature of ontology as a subject" (p. 73) as the driving force behind our tendency to "treat of 'everything' in terms of 'being,'" or to finish the transcendence of terms in the notion of Being. And if, using the agency of our language, we treat everything according to the god-term "Being," then "Being" subsumes both agent and act. In

absolute Being, the relationship between the agent and the act would be logical, simultaneous, or coeval.

So as prototypes or principles of action, God and the Creation would be logically related. The first term (agent) would be related to the second (act) in a sequence "whereby things can 'precede' and 'follow' one another in a kind of succession that requires no time coordinate" (Burke, 1969, p. 73). If they are related logically, they are related necessarily. If related necessarily, they are related ontologically, or "logically related in terms of being" (p. 74), meaning that each is implicit in the other.

If Nature (the Creation) is determined by God (the Creator), then its motions represent the conditions of necessity, while God's action represents freedom. Necessity and freedom are ultimate terms of motivation (Burke, 1969, p. 74). If, as a response to the pantheistic transcendence Burke describes in language behavior, the prototypes Creation and Creator are ontologically merged in the dramatic vocabulary, then this "double genesis for motives" (p. 74) "allows for free will and determinism simultaneously" (p. 75), and as a result, "'freedom' and 'necessity' become identical." The definition of each is implicit in the other.

Again, this geometric relationship merges the metaphysical and dialectical in Burke. It also mirrors the synergistic relationship of epistemology and ontology. Yet, Burke has emphasized the ontological orientation of Dramatism (1970, p. 38-39):

I would set "Dramatism" against "Scientism." In so doing, I do not necessarily imply a distrust of science as such. I mean simply that language in particular and human relations in general can be most directly approached in terms of action rather than in terms of knowledge (or in terms of "form" rather than in terms of "perception"). The "Scientistic" approach is via some such essentially epistemological question as "What do I see when I look at this object?" or "How do I see it?" But typical "Dramatistic" questions would be: "From what, through what, to what, does this particular form proceed?" or "What goes with what in this structure of terms? ... Either approach ends by

encroaching upon the territories claimed by the other. But the way in is different, Dramatism beginning with problems of act, or form, and Scientism beginning with problems of knowledge, or perception. (One stresses the "ontological," the other the "epistemological" — though to say as much is to be reminded that each ends by implicating the other.)

It may seem difficult to understand Burke's forged alliance between Dramatism and the ontological, because of his identification of the term "act" as his theoretical nexus. In the correspondence of "action" and "form," he appears to identify form as "process" of structured language use. If we translate "process" to "way", it's a short, easy step to epistemological issues. If Dramatism has to do with symbolic action, with selective use of language, with reducing spheres of explanatory possibilities to "circumferences," it would seem more the case that Dramatism, along with its key term, act, takes an epistemological "way in," contradictory to Burke's statement above.

Once we remember the dramatic adage that language can only recreate "sub-stantial" realities, the paradox begins to fade. Expression necessitates an emptying of potential context for the sake of some ultimate term. In such a way is language behavior infused with the negative: in one stroke, it both condones and condemns. Since matters of substance correspond with matters of "Being," we can discern a dramatic alliance with ontology. To the extent that Burke's term "Dramatism" refers to the realm of all possible differences — the ground for all definition or explanation that logically precedes the act of linguistic transformation — the emphasis on ontology is understandable.

But the more cogent explanation of Burke's "temporary" pronouncement is this: if our concern is with kinds of firsts or beginnings — in this case, "logical" or "temporal" beginnings — then we are concerned with "groundings." If we accentuate the ground, we stress the ontological, and once again, we can sense Burke's idea of the ontological "way in."

The most salient proposition, of course, has to do with Burke's parenthetical conclusion that "each ends by implicating the other" (1970, p. 39). After all, this interaction strikes at the heart of his goal of heightening "consciousness of linguistic action generally" (1969, p. 317).

Using pentadic terminology, we could say that the above questions posed "by Dramatism" are scenic ones. They are questions about location: "In what scene does the act occur?" or "What scene does the act create?" The answer would be a starting point for delineating the ground of some vocabulary that was used to describe or contain some act in some scene.

But the perspective can then fold back on itself. Instead of asking "What scene does the act create?" we might ask, by a dramatic substitution, "What reduction does the act create?" Now we're working with a verbal noun, a noun infused with action. Through a grammatical shift from common noun to verbal noun, we can move from our formulation of "Being" to "Becoming." Instead of analyzing the reduction, we can analyze the implicit analogical process in the act of reducing.

This dialectic, generated by Burke's metaphysics, can help to explain the convolutions of vocabulary, and understanding that (the disposition of some vocabulary chosen) is the key to understanding the fit and misfit of descriptive language to situation.

Dramatistically, the linguistic interaction of epistemology and ontology is summarized in the pentadic ratios, which facilitate grammatical shifts in focus by hinging on the key term, "act." Logologically, the ultimate Burkeian prototype for the ratio is Christ as mediator, between god and spirit incarnate, between dominion and sacrifice, between wisdom and word, between the logical and the temporal.

### **Within the Religious Paradigm: The Logological Project**

"I define language as a species of action: 'symbolic action,'" states Burke (1970, p. 38, 34) as he embarks on his logological enterprise, and "Insofar as language is formed through its use for communicative purposes a communicative motive is implicit in its sheer form." Clearly, Burke ventures into the business of the religious paradigm with the same fundamental orientation: language is structure "activated" by human motivation. Overly contextualized or radically reduced vocabularies "conceal from us the full scope of language as motive" (p. 10). In any study of human motivation, "it is necessary to consider all the symbolic dimensions involved in the motives" of man (p. 14). What we need are vocabularies whose linguistic principles acknowledge the thoroughness of "transcendence," the inherent dialectical tendency in language use that emphasizes symbolic meaning over materialism. Words transcend nonverbal nature (eg. the difference between the word "tree" and a tree) because taxonomical potential endows man with a second-natured freedom.

Such linguistic principles are exemplified in the dialectics of theology. First, religion is a focal point of endless varieties of human action: it may be considered as one center for all forms of human motivation, or as unifying principle that submerges innumerable understandings of even one "article of faith." Second, religion is a form of rhetoric. If rhetoric is defined as the art of persuasion, then we might say that (Burke, 1970, p. v-vi) "religious cosmogonies are designed, in the last analysis, as exceptionally thoroughgoing modes of persuasion."

In order to influence attitudes, theologians ground their statements in vocabularies of the "widest and deepest possible scope, concerning the authorship

of men's motives." Their subject is so "ultimate" or "radical" (Burke, 1970, p. vi) that its vocabulary must be as "far-reaching" as possible. If "God" is considered as a formal principle, statements about him should reveal the linguistic forms "underlying their genius as statements" (p. 1). The verbal action of religious doctrine therefore, should elucidate the "terministic enterprise in general" (p. vi), and illustrate why any secular theory of language that ignores the formal linguistic strategy of theology will be inadequate — whether or not theology is "true." Thus Burke begins his "logological thesis" that the forms of theological definition and explanation will provide insight into the nature of language "itself as motive."

Burke's interest still centers around the analogical nature of language, and shifts between logical and temporal priority; his purpose still involves the development of a vocabulary (Dramatism) designed to explain language variations in theory construction (Burke, 1970, p. 33):

It is my notion that ... we can finally develop a considerable body of conceptual instruments for shifting back and forth between "philosophic" and "narrative" terminologies of motives, between temporal and logical kinds of sequence, thereby finding it easy to translate discussions of "principles" or "beginnings" back and forth into either of these styles ...

It is my thesis that Burke utilizes the religious paradigm to describe the "kinds of firsts" (priorities, formal principles, or logical meaning) implicit in the analogical character of definition and explanation. The idea is directly supported by Burke (1970, p. 3):

Formally, the investigation heads in an attempt to study the point at which narrative forms and logical forms merge (or being to diverge), the exquisite point of differentiation between purely temporal and purely logical principles of "priority," an overlap that comes to a theological focus in the shifts between God as logical ground of all moral sanctions and God as originator of the natural, temporal order.

### Guidelines for Theoretical Refinement

All vocabularies have in common "principles of order and transformation" aiming at "the same ultimate perfection" (Burke, 1970, p. 297). The verbal quality of religion suggests an analogy to Burke, about the relationship between sacred and secular language. Theological statements about the nature of the supernatural might serve as exemplary forms of language in general because they are "explicitly concerned with transcendence," and "provide us with 'perfectly thorough' instances of such processes" (p. 38). The explicit character of transcendence in religious terminology suggests its usefulness as a paradigm.

"If we defined 'theology' as 'words about God,'" begins Burke's description of his special approach, "then by 'logology' we should mean 'words about words'" (Burke, 1970, p. 1). He is not directly concerned with the validity of theological doctrine, but with the implicit relationships of its terminology — "not directly with man's relationship to God, but rather with his relationship to the word 'God'" (p. vi).

In his earlier work, Burke had assumed an historical, analogical development of secular vocabularies from language used to describe the sacred or supernatural realm (e.g., the god-like language of money). But gradually, reacting against "so simple a dialectic" (Burke, 1970, p. 35), he developed his idea of Logology, which is designed to illustrate our tendency to shift back and forth between the two orders, to explain the supernatural in terms of the secular and then to re-borrow the words (now bearing a creative distinction by virtue of their temporary location in the supernatural realm) to describe himself. Here, Burke hits upon a kind of analogical symmetry in language behavior, which suggests that the relationship between sacred (theology) and secular (logology) vocabularies is not linear, but cyclical.

From this basic position, Burke presents six analogical guidelines for his investigation in an essay entitled "On Words and The Word." The first deals with the relationship between "words about words and words about The Word" (Burke, 1970, p. 11-16, 33). He grounds the analogy in four basic referential areas for words (p. 14): words about "natural" things and operations; words about socio-political relations (such as laws, rules, etc.); words about words (dictionaries, grammar, etymology, philology, literary criticism, rhetoric, and so forth, all united in the discipline of Logology); and words about the supernatural, which are necessarily borrowed from the other three realms.

The first three orders account for the expression of empirical experience. Even if the fourth order does not exist, there are words to describe it. But, "the supernatural," says Burke (Burke, 1970, p. 15), "is by definition the realm of the 'ineffable.' And language by definition is not suited to the expression of the 'ineffable.'" So terms for this order are "necessarily borrowed by analogy" from the other three orders. Therefore, we can only speak of God through analogy. The nature of language is such that beyond empirical reference, words can be used analogically to determine the ineffable.

Words for the supernatural must be borrowed from the realm of natural human experience and yet, man can re-secularize the secular terms that he once endowed with supernatural character. Here, for example, is how Logology explains the process of definition: borrowed from the lexicon of the social order to describe the relationship between God and man, "grace" was then reborrowed with all its theological prestige to describe some aesthetic effect (Burke, 1970, p. 7-8). As a result, a godly character is implicit in the performance of a "graceful" dancer. The ambiguity of language sets up this constant analogical potential, which distances structure itself further and further from a metaphysical grounding

for human motivation. This secular-sacred verbal relationship completes the master analogy, the "architectonic" for the remaining five (p. 13).

The second analogy (Burke, 1970, p. 16-17, 33) says that "words are to non-verbal nature as spirit is to matter." The sense in which the symbol transcends the thing involves the "qualitative difference between the symbol and the symbolized" (p. 16). The analogy touches on Burke's troublesome term "symbolic action":

A duality of realm is implicit in our definition of man as the symbol-using animal. Man's animality is in the realm of sheer matter, sheer motion. But his "symbolicity" adds a dimension of action not reducible to the non-symbolic — for by its very nature as symbolic it cannot be identical with the nonsymbolic.

Here Burke restates his distinctive view of the "second nature" that separates us from the supernatural and natural orders, which grounds his theoretical distinction between action and motion.

The third analogy (Burke, 1970, p. 17-23, 33) delves into the negative, Burke's specialized term accounting for both the indicative (is-is not) and imperative (shall-shall not) moods. The negative figures critically in Burke's theory of language behavior. Here, theoretical trends in "negative theology" summarize its behavior.

First of all, we must remember that language is infused with the negative in order to avoid naive verbal realism (Burke, 1970, p. 18): the word is not the thing. The concept of "substance" is carried forward here: paradoxically, words describe the nonverbal in terms of what it is not. Since there are no negatives in nature, "every natural condition being positively what it is" (p. 19), the concept of the negative is purely linguistic. We approach nature clothed in our symbol system, inevitably "transcending" nature because language is necessarily apart from what it symbolizes. Because language is so isolated, words borrowed from

the socio-political realm to describe God as "Father" must be understood not as positives, but as quasi-positives. Grounded in the negative, such terms are nothing more than analogies suggesting the image of something positive (p. 22).

Discussed in a metaphysical vocabulary, in the context of the term "Being," theology comes to an ultimate head in a kind of "negative theology." Since language behavior is driven by an upward spiraling principle of perfection, its summational path causes philosophers to arrive at the term "Non-Being," as the only remaining dialectical transformation, which is achieved by adding the negative to "Being." "Non-Being" is then treated as the contextual ground for the previous term. Logologically, the advance ends by containing God in such terms as "immortal," "immutable," "infinite," "unbounded," and so forth (Burke, 1970, p. 22). This kind of analogical activity suggests the possibility that the negative is a controlling feature of language use in general.

Using the paradigm to discuss the state of mankind, Burke focuses on the imperative mood of the negative, the "'Thou shalt not's' of the Decalogue" (Burke, 1970, p. 20), shifting the idea of "nothing" to the idea of "no," which does not depend upon a positive image. Its reality is only symbolic or substitutive; it posits no place or thing. The idea is based on the notion that man must choose an epistemological perspective to explore the ontological ground: implicit in the idea of "no" and its reciprocal "yes" is the idea of choice. Because the imperative form of the negative emphasizes the necessary choice and reduction involved in verbal action, Burke's usage throws into high relief the necessary linguistic interrelationship between epistemology and ontology. It also posits the first importance of the negative's imperative function as an essential controlling feature of language use.

The fourth analogy simply utilizes the theological context to formalize the principle of transcendence in language. Burke (1970, p. 24-27, 33) suggests that "linguistic entitlement leads to a search for the title of titles, which is technically a "god-term." It involves the "linguistic drive towards a Title of Titles, a logic of entitlement that is completed by thus rising to ever and ever higher orders of generalization" (p. 25). Like the title of a book, such a term would summarize all its particulars by emptying the description of the book of all its material reality. Further, all the particulars of its material reality would emanate from this title. The negative is here considered as a variable in the dialectics of analogy.

The theological analogue is God posited as the "title of titles," summing up all humanity, and from which all humanity derives. As a logological translation of theology, "God-term" simply refers to any functional, summarizing word that transcends all the details subsumed within it (Burke, 1970, p. 2-3).

The fifth analogy (Burke, 1970, p. 27-29, 33) is another ratio suggesting that "Time" is related to "eternity" as the particulars in the unfolding of a sentence are to its unitary meaning. If the sequence of a sentence is "temporal," the meaning of the sentence is an "essence" (p. 27), a "fixed significance" not confined to any portion of the sentence, but pervading or inspiriting the phrase as a whole. Obviously, this analogy poses a dramatistic problem with its suggestion of fixed meaning: from a fundamental orientation emphasizing variable attribution of motives, what sentence could ever have fixed meaning?

Nevertheless: meaning, says Burke (1970, p. 27), is analogous with the word "eternity," which represents a nontemporal condition. Within the flux of the sentence, each term or syllable rises, exists, and dies. In this way, meaning is "embodied (made incarnate) in a temporal series."

Logologically, "eternity" can be defined two ways: as "time extended forever" in the temporal sense, or "beyond time" in the nontemporal sense, quite like a fixed principle or the meaning of a sentence, according to Burke (1970, p. 28). The duality invokes the "ambiguous relation between terms for 'logical priority' and terms for 'temporal priority'" (p. 29), which is pursued in the final analogy.

In the context of the religious paradigm, the sixth analogy (Burke, 1970, p. 29-33, 34) involves the "correspondence" or "communion" between symbol and symbolized: "The relation between the name and the thing named is like the relations of the persons in the Trinity." That is, thing as the first moment, grounds name as the second moment, but the two together form a "communion." With the Trinity as analogy, Burke considers the idea that the First Person generates the Second Person and the two together generate the Third, Love (p. 30).

Although in this narrative "style of placement," Father precedes Son in time, "orthodox theologians admonish that the process whereby the Father is said to 'generate' the Son must not be conceived temporally, that Father and Son are one eternally" (Burke, 1970, p. 32) Father is prior to Son in a "logical sense (as the first premiss could be called prior to the second premiss of a syllogism)" (sic). The idea of generation contains both a sequence and a simultaneity. Implicit in the logical sense is the idea that "parents can be parents only insofar as they have offspring." In this way, the offspring generates the parent, or in other words: Father and Son are reciprocal terms, each implying the other.

These are the master analogies upon which The Rhetoric of Religion opens. Reading as a tautological series, they mark the most technical, analytic language Burke will offer in the volume. Driving the whole business is the notion of temporal-logical priority, which Burke (1970, p. 31-2) redefines in this way:

(By temporal or "narrative" priority is meant such a sequence as yesterday, today and tomorrow; logical priority involves a kind of "simultaneity," as in a sequence such as prevails among the parts of a syllogism, where the argument proceeds from the first premiss, through the second premiss, to the conclusion, but not in a temporal sense).

Besides the necessary choice of temporal or logical priority in explanation, the negative has again emerged in Burke's theory as a major feature of our language system. A dramatistic translation of the third analogy would center on the idea that action involves choice, and the form of choice is perfected in the "distinction between Yes and No (between thou shalt and thou shalt not)" (Burke, 1970, p. 41). While the idea of motion is nonethical, action (and specifically, symbolic action) implies the ethical, for which the negatives of the Decalogue are posited as prototypical.

### Partial Survey of Prototypes and Ratios

The pentadic terminology is well represented in the development of the theological paradigm. It is not my purpose to correlate prototypes with each pentadic term, nor to illustrate the extended use of dramatistic ratios. A few examples however, will enhance the context of my project and reveal the complementary effect of the paradigm with regard to Dramatism.

Of course, the Creation has already been presented as the ultimate "act," but in The Rhetoric of Religion, Burke (1970, p. 149-150) solidifies the definition:

The "creating of something out of nothing" might be called the very essence of an act. For an act can be an act only if it is free (if it is not free, it is but compulsive motion); and it can be free only insofar as it has novelty, in adding something to the previous total of necessary conditions (a contribution that can properly be described as the "creating of something out of nothing"). ... God's creative fiat, then, is the paradigm of all action: It is creation "in principle."

Burke had already noted (1969, p. 63-64) that as a prototype of action, the Creation involved principles that are not temporal firsts, but rather, logical

firsts. Logology therefore, interprets the Creation "not as a temporal event, but as the logical prototype of an act."

God is an ultimate agent because He has no motive, which would limit His omnipotence (Burke, 1970, p. 98). Unlike humanity, He acts with total freedom. Free of situational necessity, He is also free of linguistic necessity. His Word is "silent." Through his interpretation of St. Augustine (p. 120), Burke explains that God's Word is produced "not by the language of the flesh," but through "eternal Wisdom." If the Word is Wisdom, and Wisdom is God, then "God" may be viewed in terms of verbal action, or as an agent capable of a "wholly free act" (p. 150). Briefly, these terminological relationships are grounded in Burke's dramatic bent to infer one term from another.

The fall from the state of Eden however, is one analogue for man's separation from nature "through his many kinds of mechanical invention" (Burke, 1970, p. 40), most specifically, that of his symbol system.

Christ as prototype receives much attention from Burke. Christ has two basic mediatory roles: that of "curative victim" and of translator (Burke, 1970, p. 136-7, 166). As "divine scapegoat" (p. 90), He is the "perfect victim," interceding for man and serving as "ransom" for man's guilt. Thus, He mediates between guilt and redemption.

In Christ's "dual nature as both God and man" (Burke, 1970, p. 137), He is an ambiguous "middle term" joining disparate orders: two realms of nature (nature proper and human nature) and the supernatural. So Christ mediates the natural and the supernatural.

For example, Christ is related to God as thought is related to word. As Word made flesh, Christ is the "watershed" term bridging "knowledge" between heaven and earth. Burke notes (1969, p. 15) that "When Christ said, 'I am the way'

... we could translate, 'I am the act,' or more fully, 'I represent a system, or synthesis of the right acts.' " As translator, Christ represents the principle of action. And so, Burke would say, implicit in "Christ as representative" of the principle of action, is God and God's Creative fiat.

Christ also mediates the temporal and the eternal, which leads Burke once again to questions about "beginnings" (Burke, 1970, p. 123, 140-1). For the evocation temporal-nontemporal "sets the conditions for an inquiry into the relation between 'time' and 'eternity' — and that in turn is reducible to an ambiguity in the meaning of the word 'first' " (p. 140-141).

If temporal words emerge from nontemporal Word, what term marks the beginning of the "emergent order" (Burke, 1970, p. 145)? How would it bridge the two realms? (Linguistically, this translates: in what way does some ambiguous term metamorphose one analogy into another, or one vocabulary into another?). Christianity solves the dialectical problem, says Burke, through the idea of a "God-man" as mediator of the two orders. Because He mediates, Christ reinforces the theological tautology Burke elucidates. But if Christ's role as Word is considered as the beginning of time, Christ becomes a "first term" that must be situated outside the order of time.

Considered as part of the Trinity, Christ as Son is derived from Father, and Holy Spirit is derived from both (Burke, 1970, p. 152-3). But the relationship between the terms in the Trinity is like the triadic relationship of the symbol. Because of the grammatical ambiguity of language, which allows us to shift between temporal and logical explanation, we can say that each element of the Trinity is implicit in the other. Although Father precedes Son, there is a sense in which Son precedes Father if we say that "implicit in" the idea of Son is Father, or that the Son creates the role of Father. "Inasmuch as they are reciprocals, and

'simultaneously' imply each other," (p. 153), the two terms are "logically 'co-eternal'."

Finally, to complete this very brief survey of theological prototypes and ratios, I must mention two roles for Burke's negative. First, the Decalogue is presented as a prototype for the imperative mood of the negative, its "shall-shall not" potential as form (Burke, 1970, p. 20, 41). Second, Evil is presented as the tautological character of the negative in its indicative mood (Being-Nothing), quite as "near" and "far" are reciprocally related in the principle of distance (p. 273-316). Logologically, since Evil would reside in the realm of the absolute, it too would be free of linguistic and situational necessity connected with motives.

#### **Super-Nature and Human Nature: Limitations of the Symbol-User**

Kenneth Burke's most directed teaching, in near vernacular tone (without much aid from personalized language other than "the negative"), does not appear in The Rhetoric of Religion (1970) until the dialogue of the final section, the "Prologue." Ironically, Burke withholds such "straightforward talk" until positioning himself within the role of prototype for the tandem production of "words" from two major players, God and Satan. From this ultimate spot, the theoretical tension of Burke's style is significantly relaxed.

In the dialogue, God and Satan are presented in purely logological terms. That means that conceptually, they are reduced in composition to linguistic structure alone. They are considered not theologically, not as potential realities, but as pure manifestations of language.

The scene is one of a perfect geometry between the pair, with history appearing "in one momentary panorama," as God and Satan conduct their discourse "not of words, but of sheer awareness" — as entities representing contradictory

ideas that are both far apart and close together, like the polar ideas implicit in the word "distance." Such is the backdrop for a dialogue set apart from all spatial and temporal dimensions (Burke, 1970, p. 273-4).

The dialogue is intended to demonstrate the principles of Logology, "a purely secular subject." "Basically, it is designed to uphold the position that, in the study of human motives, we should begin with complex theories of transcendence (as in theology and metaphysics)" (Burke, 1970, p. 5), rather than with rigorous or technical, nondramatistic or overly contextualized terminologies. For "any terminology is suspect to the extent that it does not allow for the progressive criticism of itself" (p. 303). Overly contextualized terminologies, as strict reductions, would produce only caricatures of motivation (p. 300). But why does Logology look to theological explanation to describe the dimensions of linguistic structure and use? In what way is its vocabulary reflexive?

Even if theology is fiction, and if there were no motive of "divine perfection" in our use of language, "the paradigms of theology and of its coy counterpart, metaphysics, would be no less cogent" because (Burke, 1970, p. 300):

The close connection between the form of words and the form of The Word (between theology and logology) would still be enough to justify the word-using animal in approaching its motivational problems through an architectonic that made full allowance for the nature of both human animality and human symbolicity. And such an architectonic is to be found, not in the solemn caricatures that reduce the problem of motives to a few absurdly simple themes, but in the full ... terminologies that can be developed in connection with the "logic of perfection."

The theological form of explanation carries the full potential for both temporal and logical priority, which allows for the simultaneous representation of human motion (animality) and human action (symbolicity) in its vocabulary. It therefore offers the appropriate scope for a vocabulary of human motivation. Because theology can be translated logologically to terms of either temporal or logical

priority, it proves to be a terminology that exhibits the "logic of perfection." The possibility for both temporal and logical explanation in theological doctrine accounts for its reflexive condition: interpreted shifts between the two "departures" will help to heighten our consciousness of linguistic action in the formation of that doctrine.

Much of the dialogue centers on Burke's idea of the principle of perfection. At first, "perfection" appears to be a term of contradictory usage (1970, p. 295-304) because it seems to represent both the absolute and the relative. As a function of language, God is the "only conceivable ultimate perfection" (p. 295). Yet, every reduction (analogy, substitution) -- every name, every exaggeration or lie -- represents the "essence of perfectionism" (p. 298).

The usage is best understood through such qualifying phrases as "the principle of perfection" or the "logic of perfection," which can exist on earth only relatively (Burke, 1970, p. 303). Such phrases denote the aim toward ultimate perfection (p. 297). The term is analogically related to "transcendence." Perhaps Burke might say that it is more closely related to the term "reduction" in its form as verbal noun: instead of interpreting the word to mean "some perfected thing," our attention now shifts to the "act of perfecting," much like the "the act of reducing." Functionally, both words (or both actions) provide closure. Only God (as ontological ground) is perfection, but the logic of our symbol system will "be headed in the same direction" (p. 297).

As symbols for ineffable super-nature, God and Satan suggest to Burke a useful "way in" to explore the dimensions and use of language. Their analogic interrelationships as examples of form are of interest because of their implicit pragmatic derivation: as symbols, they are the relics of human choice. As such, the terms "God," and "Satan" are cogent examples of our limited ability to define

and describe the supernatural, and by extension, anything else. We tend, for instance, to view God and Satan as mere opposites, obscuring their common ground.

But logologically, as forms, God and Satan are polar entities in the same ground. Satan from this vantage point is viewed not as a differential, not in the theological character of a fallen angel representing evil, but as the eclipsed view of the same ineffable body. Both God and Satan are "implicit in" the idea of eternity, just as "near" and "far," beyond their status as opposites, are both implicit in the idea of distance (Burke, 1970, p. 307). God's positive nature and Satan's negative nature "mutually imply each other in perfect dialectic oneness" (p. 291).

The idea generates from Burke's tautological development for the cluster of terms derived from Order-Disorder, a key functional "pair" generated from the central ground, "act," or in this context, "Act." (I will deal with the Order-Disorder pair only indirectly.) Logologically, God and Satan are reciprocal terms in a single tautology. This theoretical move sets up such comparative ratios (analogies) as Order:Disorder, God:Satan, God:Order, Satan:Disorder.

The discourse of the "Prologue" centers in Satan's attempts to understand the influence of language on humanity. "Language as motive" once again figures in Burke's exegesis: mankind derives purpose from language, "which tells them what they 'ought' to want to do, tells them how to do it, and in the telling goads them with great threats and promises" (Burke, 1970, p. 274). Language creates purpose and need beyond the physical need for food, shelter, sex. For example, the language of economy (money) generates perpetual problems and solutions in convoluted networks of production and distribution.

But of course, the primary function of language structure is the influence of its "principle of perfection," which drives the use of all languages, no matter how different they are (Burke, 1970, p. 296-7). For all languages possess "principles of order and transformation as will go by the name of grammar and syntax" that "will make for a common underlying logic" headed for the same ultimate transcendence, the same ultimate locus of meaning. Burke claims therefore, that "kindred logological principles are implicit in all thoroughgoing human terminologies of motives " (p. 311); this dialectic is characteristic of Western metaphysics. But the dynamic form of perfection is intrinsically related with the negative.

In sharp contrast to the motivational, linguistic, and situational constraints upon humanity, the freedom of the prototypical agents in this dialogue reinforces the relative quality of human action. "The Lord" is the ideal agent. "True," He explains, "some of their metaphysicians, will offer talk about 'nothing' that has 'being.' But I must begin and end with the proposition that something is what it is" (Burke, 1970, p. 277-8). What is quasi-positive for us, is positive (supernatural) for God: we can only describe the supernatural in terms of something it is not.

How can the negative exist if it is not "positively what it is?" Satan ponders (Burke, 1970, p. 283). Burke's (or rather, The Lord's) answer is that the negative is but a device of language, which instigates continual confusion in the socio-political realm by encouraging naive verbal realism (based on the "is-is not" determination of the propositional negative). The paradox of the negative is that we can only discuss the nonverbal quality of nature and super-nature verbally (p. 18, 283-4). Since there are "no negatives in nature, every natural condition begin positively what it is" (p. 19), the negative is strictly a function of form in the socio-political order (passim).

The source of this confusion is our disregard for the principal influence of the linguistic negative: Burke supports the integrity of the hortatory (imperative) negative as the first moment of human motivation. He explains to Satan (1970, p. 277):

With us, there is only the distinction between is and is not. But with them, the first negative will be of a different sort: It will involve the distinction between shall and shall not. ... Owing to the nature of our eternal simultaneity ... the command and the obedience are one ... . But once the idea of logical contradiction is modified by the possibility of temporal contraction, the command can be at one time, the obeying at another. And once there is the possibility of a breach between them, here are the makings of a contraction, different from that of sheer logic ... . A whole cluster of their words could be used: above all, it might be called "moral" or "dramatic," because it has to do with action. And their words for morality, drama and action will all imply one another.

The hortatory "no" is implicit in morality, drama, and action. These are motivational principles of the Order-Disorder pair, where the negative shades into terms like guilt, victimage, sacrifice, and redemption.

The hortatory negative is experienced and understood before the propositional (indicative) negative. According to Burke (1970, p. 279), an infant will arrive at an understanding of the negative first "as an aspect of action (of command, with a temporal breach that allows for both obedience and disobedience)." The temporal quality of human action removes it from the sphere of simultaneous, absolute action ("eternity" as prototype). Thus, the child will experience the "shall not" before the "is not."

The integrity of the hortatory negative as the first moment of human motivation conveys a vision of the perpetual complications arising in theoretical and normative postures about human relationships — complications that end up concealing the "shalls" and "shall-nots" implicit in statements that purport to explain what "is" and "is not" (Burke, 1970, p. 279). In other words, our vulnerability to the command aspect of the negative will cause us to obscure the

ground of our analyses. The idea derives from the moral implications of Burke's Order-Disorder pair. It means that implicit in man's choice of definition and explanation are the "incipient acts" of attitude, and of moral judgment.

The distinction between "shall" and "shall not" also raises a distinction between "mine" and "thine," which fortifies the legal, political, and commercial doctrines of socio-political hierarchies. These hierarchies, born of negative command, build a sense of guilt "equally as vast and complicated as this bundle of negatively protected properties" (Burke, 1970, p. 285).

And from this sense of guilt there will arise the yearning for a new and all-inclusive positive, the demand for a supernal sacrifice literally existing and somehow serving by his suffering both to cancel off this guilt and to sanction the perpetuating of the conditions out of which the guilt arises.

Ultimately, all of this activity, encapsulated in the Order-Disorder tautology, derives from the temporal, negative properties of language. The negative gets its quasi-positive character "in the idea of the 'will,' the hypothetical watershed that slopes off into either obedience or disobedience" (Burke, 1970, p. 284). The idea of the will as the "hypothetical watershed" emphasizes the Yes-No quality of human choice and the ability to act. "There is no purer act than pure form. And a pure act is by definition pure freedom," says The Lord (Burke, 1970, p. 281). Because perfection is pure freedom expressed as pure form, the perfect answer to any question would be Yes or No. But because of the accretionary, temporal presence of morality in human action, our freedom is only relative, precluding perfect definition or explanation.

Symbolic action, therefore, lacks perfection! Even so, the perfect answer is tautologically present in our every definition and explanation, because implicit in every answer is the ability to act, the potential for perfect action. So, symbolic action operates according to the principle of perfection. Insofar as we can act

within given circumstances, we are free; insofar as we must act within given circumstances not of our choosing, we confront "sheer necessity" (Burke, 1970, p. 282). We are free to act within the necessity of our circumstances, and one of those circumstances is the presence of language, with its temporal, negative trappings.

Logologically, God is also free of time. By creating the beginning of a moment, He also created its death. Dwelling within God's Creation, we are contained in the circumference He constructed for us, therein lacking the capacity for simultaneous expression. Forced to deal with ideas discursively, we do however, have the ability to deviate (Burke, 1970, p. 282): we can give the wrong answer; we can misrepresent. That in itself is a kind of freedom.

The Lord (Burke, 1970, p. 282) explains that, "Discursive terminologies will allow for a constant succession of permutations and combinations." So, responds Satan (with his usual habit of clarifying The Lord's remarks), the "ideas of both freedom and necessity are intrinsic to the idea of an act" because the dramatic character of man's vocabulary is infused with action and motive and the state of being "forced to be free" (p. 283). In sum, implicit in the idea of action is the idea of the negative, or as Satan recounts: "So the idea of action, which is to say the idea of morality, which is to say the idea of freedom, implies the principle of negativity ... " Thus, the negative is a controlling principle of symbolism, and the moralistic overlay of human motivation restrains perfected language use.

The vexing problem of the propositional negative, confounded in use by the temporal quality of language, is more abstractly related to the argument of my thesis. For this indicative mood of the negative, by expressing the "is-is not" state of being, refers directly to "firsts," and therefore, to logical-temporal priority in definition and explanation. Temporal explanation culminates in the

determination of principles: ultimately, we find that the ground for "time" can only be "timelessness." And to explain the concept of "timelessness," we can only present a quasi-positive, descriptive analogue: "eternity." The logic of perfection, explains The Lord (Burke, 1970, 285-286), elicits this conclusion:

Inasmuch as words have contexts, if one of the Earthy thinkers sums up "everything" as the "determinate," then using the only resource he has left, he finds that the only possible context for the "determinate" is the "indeterminate," which thereby becomes the "ground" of the determinate and amounts to making "nothing" the ground of "everything." Or, if he starts with "time," he arrives at the "timeless," to which negative he can then give a positive look by calling it the "eternal."

Here we come full circle to issues of metaphysics, freedom and necessity, definition and explanation. Surely, suggests Satan (p. 286), as "natural" creatures, mankind can know nothing of the supernatural, because once the ineffable becomes known in terms of the natural, it would lose its supernatural character. The argument is irrefutable, responds The Lord, but once again, it disregards the "proper first" of language use, the hortatory negative, the watershed moment of choice. It is possible for mankind to achieve of semblance of perfection in the idea of God.

God is the "only conceivable ultimate perfection" (Burke, 1970, p. 297), yet our concept of Him is nothing "but a function of language." Further, states The Lord, "All orderly thought will be a function" of language. Although these ideas again evoke questions about the interdependency of cognition and language — the ability to know equated with the ability to articulate — they do have an impact on Burke's theoretical refinement. For we do have the ability to "conceive of God in terms of a perfection which is identical with an underlying principle of language" (p. 298). In spite of the jumble of motives driving the logic of perfection in our every expression, we are justified in constructing vocabularies that make full allowance for the animality (motion) and symbolicity (action) in our natures. By

developing such vocabularies, we emphasize a logical priority that most closely approximates the ground of pure action, through the approximation of pure form.

Theoretically however, this condition still leaves us forever separated from an ultimate scene, and from the ability to say fully what we mean. Being separated from the "all known," we are imprisoned in the "partly known." Our statements of logical explanation, even as approximate perfections (forms), will always lie within a smaller circumference of the absolute.

However, tenacious creatures that we are, even while realizing that we cannot know and express all, we can not be deterred from describing what the ultimate scene is like in terms of what we do know and can express, claiming: "Here's what you could say about the ineffable if it could be talked about. Here's what eternity would look like if it did have visibility." Here, says Burke (1970, p. 287-8), is "how the indeterminate should be discussed in terms of terms." This expresses Burke's idea about our relationship with the ontological ground.

Since temporal explanation culminates in the determination of principles, the logic of perfection will transcend the sheer animality (motion) of mankind (Burke, 1970, p. 305-6):

By the tests of sheer animality, the "deathless essences" of sheer symbolism will be a mockery. Yet, by their own tests, they really will transcend the sheerly material realm of corruption and death. The fall of all the trees in the world will not bring down the meaning of the word "tree." ... It will have this perfection, this finishedness. ... In this technical sense, meanings really do transcend time. Yet, once you have said as much, the fact remains that, once the beings who understand a given language cease to be, the sweetest poem written in those words is dead.

The meaning of our symbols is the "perfection" left to us, as opposed to any perfected empirical explanation of the phenomena of our world. Therefore, a system (language) that is founded on a lack knowledge is by "sheer definition" tautological, incapable of explaining the mysterious (Burke, 1970, p. 307-308).

Note that Burke completes his own dramatic tautology above, by anchoring symbolic action in the idea of the agent. This definition of linguistic structure figures prominently in the character of Burke's theoretical advance.

Burke describes the dimensions of our symbolic nature as a tautology. Implicit in language's ability to be, "is its ability to vary; and implicit in its ability to range, there is its ability to range far, even too far" (1970, p. 290). For "Discourse can be truly discourse only by having the power to be fully itself." Discourse must retain the potential to both represent and misrepresent. Words are "de-terministic" (p. 294) when used to define, and the principle of substitution in language dictates that every synonym, every paraphrase, every symbol is a substitute. In the vocabulary of economy, for example, money is a symbol of "redemption by payment," another way of saying "by substitution."

The principle of substitution culminates with the idea that "one person can suffer for another, as 'payment' for the other's guilt" (Burke, 1970, p. 295). Within the religious paradigm, Christ becomes the ultimate substitute, the perfect scapegoat. As prototype, Christ is the mediating principle between sacrifice and redemption, between the nontemporal and temporal. Theologically speaking, we are so guilt-laden "that only a perfect sacrifice would be great enough to pay off the debt." But, explains The Lord to Satan, it is important to realize that this move involves "not only a principle of theological perfection, but also a principle of logological perfection."

Once again, Burke reiterates the language motive: apart from philosophic ideas about the heavens, theological explanation is influenced by the logic of perfection in language. The principle of logological perfection corresponds to our idea of God reduced "purely and simply to terms of the form underlying all language" (1970, p. 297). Satan tries to understand the logic of perfection in

language, and the difference between the function of theology and the function of Logology. "Is not the principle of perfection itself," he asks (p. 298), "perfectly reducible to logological terms?" "Symbolism is unthinkable without it," responds The Lord. "To call something by its right name, as judged by the given symbol-system in terms of which it is being named, is the very essence of perfectionism." But if theology is reducible to logological terms, Satan continues (p. 300), "would it not amount to saying that there is an adequate logological explanation for every theological tenet," and would that not make theology "otiose?"

At this moment, and through the voice of God, Burke confirms the function of Logology. The answer to Satan's query is that theology and Logology have different purposes (Burke, 1970, p. 300):

Above all, logology fails to offer grounds for the perfection of promises and threats that theology allows for. And there are incentives in both animality and symbolicity that will keep men always asking about ultimate principles of reward and punishment, in their attempts to scare the devil out of one another. Being creatures that necessarily think in terms of time, they will incline to conceive of such a culminative logical design in terms of sheerly temporal firsts and lasts. Hence, there is the goad towards theological translation into terms of a final destiny in an afterlife. A sheerly logological explanation must leave such doctrinally stimulated hunger unappeased.

Essentially, Logology is a tautological form of analysis that offers no final explanation of ontological problems or motivational issues in human relationships. It does not offer the closure of the vocabularies utilized by theology and science. It is a reduction that offers no closure of explanation. It reinforces the idea that we have no choice but the choice to utilize the dialectics of analogy, which variably results in representative or misrepresentative definition. We must "temporize" our symbol system in order to use it, even in framing a logical explanation, which will only partially represent the full logic of the ground.

Logology, like Dramatism, opens the field of explanation until language rests in a perfect tautology. Within the religious paradigm, the Order-Disorder pair rounded out the logic of theological explanation. After God's Word, Logology seeks to explain the eternal perfection of symbols unfettered by temporal finality.

Logology, as a tool for interpreting the presence and relationships of logical or temporal priority in vocabularies of human motivation, has the ability to indict statements that are developed "with the logic of 'firsts' but without the proper criticism of such procedures" (Burke, 1970, p. 299). Through the logic of perfection, that is, through the use of symbols, "things thereby transcend their nature as sheer things" (p. 301). They inspire us not just by their physical nature, but by whay they "stand for" as symbols: "Whatever their non-symbolic nature as sheer motion and position, they are seen to participate in the symbolic realm of action and rest."

"Perfectionist" doctrines, like those of theology, will never ignore this duality. But "quasi-scientific reductionist theories," as mere caricatures, "will be so constructed that they never even miss the loss" (Burke, 1970, p. 301) In this way, "reductionist" vocabularies lose their reflexive character, and their capacity for self-criticism (p. 303). Despite the slippery usage of the terms "perfection" and "reduction" here, and besides the recurrent indictment of socio-scientific vocabularies, Burke's remarks carry forward his balanced and probing insights to the reductive process of definition and explanation.

God has so far been considered as the ultimate principle of verbal order. There is one more twist in this logological dialogue. Burke next analyzes the theological definition of God as the perfect version of the human personality. The process again involves the temporizing of nontemporal essence. The term "personality" is already mediatory or intermediate, since we are composites of the

verbal and nonverbal in relation to the circumstances of our socio-political environment. "Personality" sums up or represents all these compositional elements (Burke, 1970, p. 310). But if we describe God as an analogue of the human personality, as "superperson" (e.g., "Father"), how do we distinguish between ourselves and God? The Lord (p. 304) answers Satan thus:

In one respect, they can draw the line by obscuring it, as when they conceive of a god incarnate, a supernatural entity translated into terms of nature, the timeless made temporal. Such an intermediate term, by formally uniting in one locus the opposite, mutually exclusive terms, 'perfectly' represents the difference in the very act of bridging it.

The analogy, like a mediated ratio in the pentad, symbolizes the difference in its usage. "Father," a secular term borrowed to describe the sacred realm, contains a new dimension of creativity, and represents both "slopes," the natural and the supernatural, in the act of mediation. But now, Logology would admonish of a possible analogic reversal.

By imputing the role of personality of God, theology set up the conditions for reversing the process and defining humanity in terms of God. Both analogies are strictly a function of the tautological nature of language. Logologically, the dialectics of theology first "conceived of godhead as a superperson by analogy with human personality" and then conceived of the "human personality as 'derived' from this divine principle or First" (Burke, 1970, p. 310). This argument is an example, par excellence, of the function of Logology: working from within the religious paradigm, it has shown an analogical reversal of explanation that is nothing more than a tautological function of language. This is the "logological symmetry that infuses theological symmetry" (p. 313).

The dialogue concludes with a crisp synopsis of the theological symmetry, guided by the logic of the Order-Disorder pair (Burke, 1970, p. 314-315). The statement includes the theological potential for both temporal and logical

priority. Logologically, our inheritance of Adam's Original Sin torques into a cycle of guilt, victimage, sacrifice, and redemption in which death is not "natural," but the punishment for that sin. The principle of perfection in the tautology elicits the hopeful idea of redemption. Further, the symmetry displays the Creative Word as the moment that established time, "that bound time with eternity," and that foretold the promise of eternal life, "the end toward which all words of the true doctrine are directed." This moment arrives with the words, "The way to heaven must be heaven, for He said: I am the way." Here is the logological (dramatistic) translation of that symmetry: "The way to heaven (the means to the end, the agency for the attainment of purpose) must be heaven (scene), for He (agent) said (act as words): I am the way (act as The Word)" (p. 315).

Clearly, the logological symmetry revolves around "form" as the central ground, and therein we can discern the presence of Western metaphysics. Yet, "form" is designed to generate endless tautological substitution. As central ground, is it possible that "form" can be unfettered by time or space?

In substantive theory, a structuralist might correlate things or relationships by virtue of their structural form, like the structural form of "kinship," for example. Burke, on the other hand, might say that the form of kinship only selectively represents some ground, and is therefore misrepresentative when applied to various kinds of human relationships. Here is the difference in perspective: where one theorist might reduce some phenomenon to the form of some other phenomenon, Burke would not treat the phenomenon in this logological perspective. Rather, he would merely correlate the words used to describe the phenomenon. The aims are different. One seeks a resolution of phenomena; the other seeks a resolution of definitions or explanations, based on their

interrelationships as form. One seeks to order things, the other seeks to order forms.

So Burke, with Logology, ultimately seeks not to describe empirical reality — things, people, and relationships — but rather, to explain our process of perceiving and describing empirical reality. The logological method amounts to the systematic elucidation of some form's analogic derivation.

Through its study of interrelated analogies, Logology claims to discover the dramatistic — and therefore pragmatic — differences of potential definition. But instead of deconstructing words or analogies for the purpose of exposing some ground of deferred explanation(s), of indefinite substitutions, Logology is more directed toward finding the same ground only to describe how — in terms of a process yielding form — Christian theology, for example, arrived at its explanation of the Act of Creation.

Revealing the concentration of the dramatistic through form depends upon locating the juncture of grammatical ambiguity Burke earlier described in A Grammar of Motives (1969, p. xviii, xix). The discovery of this turning point identifies one moment when motives influenced the determination of some locus of meaning. Through the delineation of this timing, the method locates the intersection of other forms or analogies positioned in the central ground such that their potential as alternative choices have become obvious.

But locating the moment is tantamount to locating a first, a point of form-al departure in the process of definition. It must stop short of explaining motives themselves, except as terms in a style of thinking, or kinds of firsts inherent in definitional process. For the evocation of motives and active selection culminates here in fixed structural form. In backward-spiraling procession, this activity will only reveal form implicit in form implicit in form, and so on. Logology then, will

only describe or explain human motives in terms of their representative forms in language.

As representative forms, these terms will never be more than the relics of human choice, and although a cluster of human motivations is implicit within, they can never do more than represent the arrested action of the cluster. Thus Burke's idea that the temporal character of language — through its delayed response to thought or thoughts — has forever separated man from the nonspatial, nontemporal character of the absolute.

By reducing the field of explanation to terms of the representational form of symbolic action, of motive-attitude-purpose, Burke returns to the paradox of substance: form (language) is not the motive. This is why the phrase "implicit in" is so prevalent in Burke's logological arguments.

In The Rhetoric of Religion, it appears that the Order-Disorder pair dominates the Burkeian idea of ultimate form. Through its tautological exposition, Burke illustrates the possibility for two forms of explanation in theology: temporal and logical. Any interpretation selected from the (dramatic) ground would have to emanate from these two principles. The reduction of formal explanation itself is therefore contained in a dichotomy.

So Logology, as a kind of metatheory, may prepare the way for substantive theory about human motivation. By "beginning with a complex theory of transcendence" Burke's master thesis takes a step toward explaining the process of language behavior, and the tautological, analogical nature of linguistic structure. As theory about structure and use it is systematically derived: clearly, we are dealing with two levels of form here. One is dialectical (method of explanation), the other metaphysical (Order-Disorder). They converge in Burke's theoretical "grammar."

## Narrative and Tautological Explanation

### Logical conversion.

The full expression of the religious paradigm occurs in Burke's analysis of narrative and tautological explanation in the book of Genesis. Prefacing that study however, he approaches the same issues through a critical analysis of verbal action in St. Augustine's Confessions.

Thus much hast Thou given them, because they are parts of things, which exist not all at the same time, but by departing and succeeding they together make up the universe of which they are parts. And even thus is our speech accomplished by signs emitting a sound; but this, again, is not perfected unless one word pass away when it has sounded its parts, in order that another may succeed it.

Burke (1970, p. 27; source not provided) cites this passage during the presentation of his fifth analogy in the essay "On Words and The Word," to illustrate the distinction between logical and temporal priority. While Augustine has set up an analogy between humanity-eternity and utterance-meaning, Burke extends the context to form. Temporal priority is analogous to the succession of words in a sentence, while logical priority is analogous to its essence, or its meaning, which is not reducible to any of the sentence's parts, but "pervades or inspirits" its whole.

The conversion of St. Augustine, from a teacher of pagan rhetoric to a teacher of Christian theology, is of interest to Burke because of Augustine's attention to the relationship between secular words and sacred words. More specifically, Burke interprets the chronicle of Augustine's progressive thought as a series of logological advances, and concludes that the conversion was the result of an exploration of and adherence to a tautological terminology of order. Burke's conclusion was a response to his translation of theological explanation (Augustine's "verbal action") to logological explanation (1970, p. 142):

Given the resources of language, what might one say about Eternity, even if eternity is not? And given the limitations of language, how inadequate must such statements be, even if eternity is? And finally, whether eternity is or isn't, what might be the empirical logological applications of the theological doctrines?

What is the nature of Augustine's verbal action in consideration with the resources and limitations of language? How does he describe the ineffable?

Burke (1970, p. 164) noticed that a "strong Trinitarian emphasis in Augustine's thinking had radical bearing upon his conversion, in shaping its nature as a form ... ." Burke (p. 85-6) points to the Augustinian idea that while the Trinity could not properly be called "Father" or "Son," it would be appropriately termed "Holy Spirit," because that expression represents the communion of the first two terms. The idea of Trinitarian principles suggested the triadic relationship of the symbol (p. 166), which underscored the recognition of implicit linguistic forms.

The linguistic relationships implicit in Augustine's idea of the Trinity supported Burke's sense of a terminologically determined conversion. By extrapolation, it seemed possible that the verbal influence in Augustine's conversion corresponded with Burke's idea of transcendence, or the "principle of perfection" in language. Further, adherence to a symbolic order suggested the possibility that Augustine had adapted his thought to an explanatory tautology.

Considering the "Son" in his mediating role of redeemer or curative victim, Burke turns once again to issues of logical and temporal priority. Christ is analogous with the mediating Word (Burke, 1970, p. 166), which interposes itself between individual nature (the temporal) and the ultimate ground (the eternal). Since time and eternity suggest the idea of "beginnings," Burke focuses his attention on Augustine's idea of eternity.

How might the terms "time" and "eternity" be related? Augustine, according to Burke (1970, p. 142), thought of eternity as "time endlessly extended," but not as a movement from past to future. Theologically, "Creation" is by definition the beginning of time (p. 146), so eternity cannot itself be defined as "before" or "after" time. Thus, eternity is "like the momentary present made permanent, without past or future." Such a definition would be synonymous with the word "immutable." Logologically, "immutable," like "eternity" is a quasi-positive synonym for 'timelessness'" (1970, p. 150). Therefore, Augustine's definition is of logical temperament. "Timelessness" then becomes the ground for time; it is the more generalized term whose circumference lies outside that of time.

According to Burke (1970, p. 146), Augustine grounded his idea of God in the phrase "before all time God is." Burke presents the logological implications of this idea (p. 148):

"God" would "come first" in a purely logical sense of antecedence, as a more inclusive term. ... Logologically, we need but distinguish between logical priority and temporal priority. But insofar as logical entities are endowed with the principles of personal life, they must be translated into terms of time (which must in turn be translated into terms of timelessness) -- and from there on we necessarily encounter the paradox of an eternity in which something is said to have been before something else. The assumption of these essays is that the problem is not by any means confined to theology, but lies at the roots of all terminology.

Augustine's definition of eternity stimulates Burke's notion of the shifts between logical and temporal priority in the development of theological explanation. "Eternity" suggests an instance of language use that exemplifies the borrowing of words from the secular order to describe the sacred order: the meaning of "eternity" becomes infused in the borrowing, with the ideas of time and timelessness. These shifts between logical and temporal priority, exemplified in the verbal action of Augustine's theological treatise should bear implications for general language behavior.

An important step in Augustine's conversion hinged on the negative, as the linguistic manifestation of action and the will. According to Burke (1970, p. 89), Augustine believed that moral evil is not a positive natural reality, but a linguistic resource of the negative. "Since it is 'what man adds to nature,' and since it defines the discriminatory nature of an act (the yes or no that make the difference between will and will-not), ... the ideas of act, will and the negative mutually imply one another." Thus, viewed symbolically, evil is a reciprocal form of God's Covenant of Order: as a semblance of Disorder, evil is representative of the "No" of choice.

So, Burke's logological analysis of the chronicle emphasizes not only a linguistic influence in the idea of evil, but specifies the imperative form of the negative, which conveys the idea that Augustine himself must have recognized the impact of the socio-political "No" in Manichaeian doctrine. From this perspective, Augustine could have accepted the notion of a monotheistic power once he was able to reject the Manichaeian doctrine of "competing dieties" of light and darkness (Burke, 1970, p. 155). Thus, he was able to ground his idea of God in a different circumference.

Once his idea of God was reformulated, Augustine's idea of "eternity" and "the Word" affected his ideas about words in the secular realm. Burke was fascinated that such a "word merchant" as Augustine would accede to a linguistic influence (1970, p. 121): "Logologically, we are endlessly enticed to speculate on the paradoxical knot of motives that must be involved when an inveterate wordman thus conceives of eternity under the sign of an ultimate, unchanging Word, itself conceived in terms of wordlessness ... ." For the Word of God, to Augustine, was silent, existing as pure Wisdom (p. 120). Once the Word became the ground for words, says Burke (p. 114), "the intellectual aspect ... of his

conversion had already been accomplished." The key aspect of this conversion is a symmetry of formal, terminological progressions.

The moment of Augustine's Christian discovery, finds Burke (1970, p. 124, 168), was implicit in his beginning premise: all the terms representing the conversion of thought were analogic. Yet, despite the tautological aspect of the conversion, the sequential exposition of thought allowed for a "pattern of development," that amounted to a shift from a narrative of memories to the principles of Memory (p. 124). This shift, says Burke, corresponds to the logological difference between "time" and "eternity."

Dialectically, Augustine's conversion reached its zenith within the grammatical ambiguity of temporal terms used to describe the nontemporal realm. From there, it was necessary to translate issues of "time" and "eternity" to ideas of "firsts," which amounted to reducing everything to a central ground from which all else radiates, including words in the secular realm. Theologically, the conversion moved through the following stages: first, time emerges from eternity through God's Creative fiat. Second, Christ as God's Word mediates the communication between time and eternity. Finally, the return to eternity from time occurs through mediating redemption of Christ (Burke, 1970, p. 167-168). What then, is the nature of Augustine's verbal action given the resources and limitations of language? Burke explains (p. 128):

One can get out of a vocabulary only what one has put into it -- and the Bible "solved" this problem by putting "God" into the first sentence. Hence, so far as the sheer dialectics of the case is concerned, his attempt at an ascent through Memory to God is solved in advance by the very nature of the terminology which, since his conversion, he had been committing to memory. And reinforcing such trends there would be a technical equivalent of "memory," the forms of language (the logic of internal consistency that comes to a head in a title of titles, or "god-term").

As the eventual shift from temporal to logical priority in the Confessions was the result of a series of tautological progressions, God was already present (implicit) as the center of Augustine's narrative of memory and discovery. But what are the implications of this logological analysis for Burke's own theoretical statement? The translation helps Burke to formalize his notion of tautological (cyclical or logical) explanation (1970, p. 128-129):

Logologically, there are only two ways in which a terminology can "transcend" itself either by tautology or by non sequitur. If the operation is contrived by non sequitur, this means that the work is inconsistent with itself. But if it is consistent with itself, then the term for the transcendent function must be there at the start, either explicitly or implicitly. Usually it is implicit, and is gradually purged of its obscurities. But in theological terminology it is explicit from the start, though there may be a certain craftiness in unveiling it. ... Insofar as several terms are consistently related, they mutually imply one another — hence, in the last analysis, the genius of the "highest" term will in some way pervade the lot.

This is the moment, par excellence, from which Burke spins out his dialectics, his idea of logical or tautological explanation. Since the logic of perfection pervades language via "principles of order and transformation as will go by the name of grammar and syntax" (Burke, 1970, p. 297), there is only one correct way a temporally-formed vocabulary can transcend or perfect itself. Only logical priority will surpass the narrative style, by summing up the symbolic content of its temporal sequence.

We can get a great deal out of the Biblical vocabulary, because "God" is "explicit" from the start, as the ground of all terminological action. God created the Beginning, and He was there "In the Beginning." Dramatistically, "His Act" carries the full potential for both logical and temporal explanation. But his logical Presence exceeds his temporal Creation, and therefore, as the highest term, equivalent with Eternity, God pervades the narrative sequence, tautologically.

**Form and explanation in Genesis.**

A change in the dialectical structure of Augustine's Confessions had alerted Burke to a shift between two "modes of placement," the temporal and the logical. This development in Augustine's theological analysis inspired him (1970, p. 164) to pursue a logological analysis of the same text, the first three chapters of Genesis. As a text of "beginnings," Burke studied the Creation as a form of myth.

Ultimately, the analysis seeks to explain how vocabularies are built, analogically, through the accretionary effects brought about by shifts between logical and temporal priority. In the context of the religious paradigm, those shifts are manifested in the "borrowings" between sacred and secular vocabularies.

Burke's interpretation of Genesis is designed to show that the "logological counterpart of eternity" is the manner in which terms imply each other, "so that an expository procession from one to another is in effect 'predestinated,'" because each term is implicit in any other chosen "as the point of departure" (Burke, 1970, p. 143-144). This is the "cyclical" or "tautological" property of terminology. "Tautology" refers to a truth constituted by the inclusion of all logical possibilities. According to Burke (p. 208), a tautological relationship is one that is "logically synonymous." Conversely, the "logological counterpart" of time is the "rectilinear" nature of narrative.

Genesis provides an example of both styles because "its terms straddle these two aspects of placement" (Burke, 1970, p. 143-4). The Creation myth suggests a paradigm about the "ways whereby such interlocking motivation principles are translated into terms of an irreversible narrative sequence" (p. 3). That is, it illustrates the translation of tautological relationships (principles) into narrative explanation.

Burke treats the Creation myth as a tautology driven by socio-political principles of order, where such terms as sin, guilt, mortification, victimage, sacrifice, and redemption are considered interrelated forms. Burke's concept of definition for the supernatural realm is one way to begin this discussion about form.

Logologically, "personality" is defined as linguistic competence: it is the "ability to master symbol-systems" (1970, p. 208-209), which carries an intrinsic "moral sense" of the negative. That is, the Yes-No of choice is linguistically grounded such that "conscience gets its high development from the commands and ordinances of governance." Linguistic competence is refined by the concept of negativity.

Dialectically, God's verbal edict in Genesis is "essentially the personal principle (Burke, 1970, p. 192-3). The logological translation of the phrase "man is made in God's image" is "God and man are characterized by a common motivational principle,' which we would take to be the principle of personality that goes with skill at symbol-using."

Morality and the logic of perfection combine to motivate our perpetual attempts in the explanation of the unknown, which we can only describe in terms of the known. We can conceive of a pantheistic presence with the power of absolute action only in terms of the human personality. The only alternative would be a vocabulary of motion borrowed from the natural order.

The definition of God in terms of His verbal fiat places Him in the role of prototypical Actor, whose Act sets up the conditions for both the natural and human orders. "Covenant" is a theological word borrowed from the socio-political realm, in keeping with the personal principle, to describe God's laws: the mandates in the first chapter, which set up the principles of order and disorder;

the injunction of the first Covenant, and by tautological implication, Adam's disobedience; and the decree of the second Covenant, "imposing penalties upon all mankind" (Burke, 1970, p. 180). Each of these acts was implicit in the first Act, the prototypical form for all acts. For example, Adam's temptation and disobedience are implicit in God's first Act, the Creation of the temporal order: this would be a logological evaluation of theological explanation.

Theological doctrine defines two types of sin: "original" and "actual" (Burke, 1970, p. 222). Actual sin is enacted by an individual; original sin is "that of the 'old Adam' in us. It is sin 'in principle.'" Stated tautologically, the sin of old Adam is implicit in us. Translating the principle to temporal sequence results in the statement that we inherit this sin from our first ancestor. Both cases deal with "firsts," for which Adam's act of disobedience serves as prototype. But the movement from ancestor to descendent (which begins in reverse here) is "the way to say 'in principle' in narrative terms."

"And why," asks Burke (1970, p. 222), "do we all always commit this sin 'in principle'?" Theological terminology provides for the implicit presence of "temptation" in its idea of order (Covenant). Further, the necessary influence of the negative in that terminology provides the freedom to disobey, "to negate a negation."

The principle of personality helps theology to interpret natural death as capital punishment ("mortification") resulting from Adam's sin. Narratively, it is as if theology were saying that physical death is capital punishment dealt upon the human conscience. Once described in terms of the socio-political realm, death becomes infused with its principles of order. The tautology of Order is completed in this kind of symmetry between the natural, the socio-political, and the supernatural realms (Burke, 1970, p. 207).

Theology's "personal" definition of God accounts for the mythical idea of a contract, a Covenant, made "in principle" (Burke, 1970, p. 242). As ideal agent, God was the ultimate authority to impose such law. Based on the idea of governance in the socio-political order, the narrative style of Genesis "temporizes the essence" of original sin. Tautologically, the terminology implies the idea of redemption, which lies at the far end of the narrative sequence.

Why, in the context of Genesis, does Burke refer to Christ in his role as Redeemer? Through a process of terminological substitution, Christ enters the formula when we consider that: implicit in the redemption is the idea of punishment, and implicit in the idea of punishment is the idea of guilt, and implicit in the idea of guilt is the idea of disobedience, and implicit in the idea of disobedience is the idea of Order manifested by God. Because the terms are tautologically related, they may be considered in any order, and therefore, Christ's redemptive act for the sake of humanity is implicit in the guilt of Adam's original sin. In this way, Burke argues that redemption through Christ is a principle already present in the book of Genesis (Burke, 1970, p. 177).

The grammatical ambiguity of language allows for this process of substitution. Dramatistically, there can be no act without an agent. Therefore, implicit in the act of redemption is a redeemer. Theologically, the term refers to the opportunity a sinner has to be "cured" through the act of another (Burke, 1970, p. 176). If as a substitute, one individual may suffer for another, then it follows that guilt can also be transferred through the sin of another.

So, the principles of temptation and redemption are mutually inclusive in the logical translation of the Covenant: the configuration of terminology in Genesis provides the ground for those and other interrelated principles. As principles, the meaning of such terms as sin, guilt, sacrifice, victimage,

redemption, etc. all have to do with "firsts" (Burke, 1970, p. 178-180). Generally speaking, the logological interpretation of Genesis involves identifying such principles, which are "logical 'firsts,' rather than sheerly temporal ones." Such logical firsts are "grounded in the idea of a verbal command" (p. 194), which creates the actional-temporal potential for obedience and disobedience.

However, in order to work through all the possibilities of the religious paradigm, Burke eventually finds the term "Covenant" too restrictive. To apply the paradigm to normative dimensions of language, "Covenant" is inconvenient; it has no polar opposite in standard usage. Instead, it has a positive quality much like that in such words as "stone," "tree," and "table," "which are not matched by companion words like 'counter-stone,' 'anti-tree,' or 'un-table'" (Burke, 1970, p. 181). There's no latitude in a term like "Covenant," no logological give. We can't add the negative to the word to obtain any sort of dialectical advance.

The word "Order," however, possesses the dialectical polarity Burke seeks. It implies both "Disorder" (after the propositional negative) and "Counter-Order" (after the imperative negative). "Order" allows for the dialectical intervention of the negative. As a functional term to represent "beginnings," it combines the potential for temporal and logical priority -- and that potential combination locates a point of ambiguity that Dramatism seeks to utilize. Because "Order" allows for these different points of departure, it can provide for a vocabulary about natural motion or socio-political action.

The ambiguity of the term "Order," still allows for the description of the heavenly, supernatural realm in terms of socio-political verbal order. Logologically, each daily decree by God is marked by a verbal trait that is strictly characteristic of the socio-political order: "Empirically, the natural order of sheerly astrophysical motion depends upon no verbal principle for its existence.

But theologically, it does depend upon a verbal principle" (Burke, 1970, p. 185).

God's words to Adam and Eve are only analogous to human verbal communication.

Yet empirically, any analogy between the supernatural order and our verbal order would be nonexistent, since analogy is a purely verbal device. But, "by a Dramatistic ambiguity, standard usage bridges this distinction between the realms of verbal action and non-verbal motion when it speaks of sheerly natural objects or processes as 'actualities'" (Burke, 1970, p. 186), as the "sign of God's action."

The term "Order" bridges the distinction and shows itself to be a term of desirable dramatistic breadth. God's authority combines both meanings: He created natural order and as a "divine ruler," laid down "the law by words" (Burke, 1970, p. 181-2). Does the shift from a theological term to a standardized term threaten the validity of Burke's paradigm? No. The aim is not to set up a religious vocabulary to explain normative language use. The aim is to reveal the principles driving theological explanation, to show that the same principles are inherent in normative usage.

The study continues to expose the tautological cluster of terms implicit in theological "Order." It is important to remember that "such a cycle of terms follows no one sequence" (Burke, 1970, p. 182). It's possible to break in at any point of the cycle: the idea of order is implicit in the idea of disorder, the idea of disobedience is implicit in the idea of disorder, and so on. Any tautology may be restated in an irreversible narrative format that makes possible some outcome, and outcome that would be different if the story had started in reverse order. Through a logological reversal (since Burke begins with a narrative text), the Biblical terminology illustrates that potential.

The style of explanation in Genesis is rectilinear; the character of its terminology is cyclical. The cycle of terms is in a sense "timeless," while the

sequence of the narrative is "temporal." In this way, both logical and temporal priority are implicit in Genesis.

The term "Order" also allows Burke to spin out the full implications of the negative. Verbal action includes the hortatory aspect of the negative and our ability to obey or disobey God's edict. Thus Burke reiterates that we are differentiated from nature and the supernatural not just by our language system per se, but by the dual features of the negative. "In this sense, moral disobedience is 'doctrinal.' Like faith, it is grounded in language" (Burke, 1970, p. 186). Still, as terms in the Order tautology, "obedience" and "disobedience" and their various substitutes revolve around Burke's key theoretical term, the verbal noun "act," which is the "watershed," the "dividing line ... itself midway between the two slopes," the two choices (p. 187).

The idea of choice, and therefore of freedom to use the negative, is stated differently in theology, ontology, and logology (Burke, 1970, p. 187):

Ontologically, and theologically, we say that this locus of freedom makes possible the kind of personal choice we have in mind when we speak of "Action." But note that, logologically, the statement should be made the other way round. That is, whereas ontologically or theologically we say that by being endowed with free will man is able to act morally, the corresponding logological statement would be: Implicit in the idea of an act is the idea of free will. (Another version of the formula would be: Implicit in the idea of an act is the idea of freedom).

Logology hails from an over-the-shoulder perspective. It will always seek to locate past forms of action in linguistic structure, quite as the problematic phrase "language as motive" seeks not to provide causal explanation for language use, but to describe the probable actional "motifs" implicit within the structure. It is a way of heightening "linguistic consciousness generally," not of grounding human motives themselves, unless they are characterized as forms, and specifically, forms with the attribute of either temporal or logical priority.

Although for Burke language is structure infused with human persuasive purpose, it is never more than the relic of human choice. Logology and Dramatism do not offer a structural explanation of human behavior, or explicate human motives using only verbal utterance. Although they consider language as structure vibrating with human action, they ultimately reduce all worldly phenomena to the forms of linguistic structure alone merely to reveal the concomitant influence of structure and explanation in human motivation.

Burke's logological analysis of Genesis concludes that even if its story isn't true, its "narrative way of associating 'sin' with 'death' would be ... correct" (Burke, 1970, p. 210), because narrative statements, tautologically translated, would be logically true (p. 187-88). For example, while there may be no such thing as free will, "it would still remain true that implicit in the idea of action there is the idea of freedom," for without the freedom of choice, there is no action, only motion.

To complete the pattern of Order, Christ resolves competing principles through his mediating role (Burke, 1970, p. 191):

Then comes the Grand Rounding Out, where the principle of reward as payment ... merges with the principle of punishment as payment ..., to promise redemption by vicarious atonement. Sovereignty and subjection (the two poles of governance) are brought together in the same figure (Christ as King and Christ as Servant respectively) -- and the contradiction between these principles is logically resolved by a narrative device, the notion of two advents whereby Christ could appear once as servant and the second time as king. Here is the idea of a "perfect" victim to cancel ... what was in effect the "perfect" sin.

The symmetry of this tautological design does not "resolve the problem of the 'watershed moment,' the puzzle of the relation between 'determinism' and 'free will.' The search for a cause is itself the search for a scapegoat, as Adam blames Eve, Eve blames the serpent ... and Lucifer could have blamed the temptations implicit in the idea of Order" (Burke, 1970, p. 192). The question is

ontological; it asks how the symmetry of the theological design is related to the ground.

To crack the code, Burke restates the issue dramatically, with a grammatical equation: order implies disorder, which implies an act of disobedience performed by an agent, whose motives derive from his scene, "which thus somehow contains the principles that in their way make a 'bad' act possible." Dramatically, the "watershed moment" devolves to a moment of choice, or "motivational slope" (Burke, 1970, p. 192). If "scene" becomes the ground from which all possible acts can be determined, "the question of de-terminism narrows down to a kind of term that within itself contains two slopes (two different judgments or 'crises)': "act" is the pure form from which the perfect answer (the choice of either "yes" or "no") derives. But then the question becomes one of "deciding how far back the grounds of choice must be traced" (p. 193).

Now, the beginning reader of Burke asks again: does Burke's project maintain a pantheistic stance? Is the ground ultimately a composite of "act" and "scene"? If so, does that mean that within the ontological ground, freedom equals necessity, action equals motion? In other words, how is the tautology of Order grounded? For the time being, Burke will not answer the question, but continues to spin out the tautology.

Reaching the issue of moral choice, Burke finds that the Order-Disorder pair is not "representative" enough of human motivation and language use. Disorder is more representative of the propositional negative, and suggests a state of mere disintegration more than disobedience (Burke, 1970, p. 193). Deliberate rebellion against Order is best characterized as an allegiance to some Counter-Order (p. 195). Therefore, "Order" alone implies too much of motion and not enough of human action stained by moral choice.

"Counter-Order" provides a good basis for discussing theological evil.

Logologically, evil is defined as "a species of the negative" ... "a sheerly linguistic invention" (Burke, 1970, p. 199-200). Evil, so defined, is simply a species of Order because it is a dialectical analogy for Disorder. Theologically, of course, such a tautological view of Disorder would not be sufficient to explain the problem of evil. Theology must set up the concept of "evil" as the end of a downward moral trend more aptly described as an allegiance to a "Counter-Order" (p. 217).

Whereas, the terms of Order, considered tautologically, go round and round ... endlessly implicating one another, when their functions are embodied in narrative style the cycle can be translated into terms of an irreversible linear progression. But with the principle of authority personalized as God, the principle of disobedience as Adam ..., the principle of temptation as an Aesopian serpent, Eve as mediator in the bad sense of the word, and the idea of temptation reduced imagistically to terms of eating ..., such reduction of the tautological cycle to a narrative linear progression makes possible the notion of an outcome.

A logological interpretation of the Bible elicits a continual reenactment of sin, sacrifice, redemption. For example, all the forms of victimage in the Bible, including that of Christ, are seen as "variants of the sacrificial motive" (Burke, 1970, 217-8). While each of such terms is identified as a "principle" in logological parlance, theology demonstrates a more selective usage of substitutive forms. Theology requires a more "promissory" kind of explanation, and so determines all sacrifices as "types of Christ." Yet, this is an example of the way theology incorporates both logical and temporal priority: it comes close to the determination of logological form.

Adam's fall must be viewed in principle as a condition of sacrifice and redemption. For theology would not have been able to consider man as "essentially a sinner" without all elements of the tautology of Order (Burke, 1970, p. 252).

In the realm of temporal governance, "the cycle of terms implicit in the idea of worldly order continues, forever circling back upon itself, thus forever 'guilty,' thus forever demanding 'redemption,' thus forever inciting anew to the search for a curative victim" (Burke, 1970, p. 223). The rectilinear style in the Book of Genesis promises a finality to the hierarchy of Order, yet at the same time reaffirms the "Hierarchal Cycle" (p. 232) inherent in the temporal domain of Order, in which human language operates.

Narratively, the sequence of Biblical events can "be interpreted as movement towards a fulfillment," towards a promise of "an ultimate linear progression" (Burke, 1970, p. 217, 223). But since that promise is eternal life, theology reaches a point where narrative sequence and the temporal realm should end, while the "realm of eternity" and principles takes over. However, even as principles, the hierarchal idea of sin, guilt, mortification, punishment, sacrifice, and redemption are never eliminated in the rectilinear style of the Biblical narrative. The triumph of heavenly goodness does not obliterate the verbal quality of social governance, which is implicit even in the theological notion of an everlasting Hell.

Terminologically, Genesis retains this cyclical character "intrinsic to the idea of Order" (Burke, 1970, p. 224), regardless of its narrative style. As a result, the mythical presentation of Genesis is only "quasi-narrative." It expresses relationships "that are not intrinsically narrative, but 'circular' or 'tautological'" (p. 258).

Further, the flow from one term to another in the vocabulary is reversible, a movement allowed by the substitutional property of structure. If we say that guilt is implicit in redemption, the grammatical shift places redemption prior to guilt. But in narrative format, "they stand at opposite ends of a long development, that

makes one 'Book' of the two Testaments taken together" (Burke, 1970, p. 218). The locus of meaning is not in any particular sequence, but "in the ground of the process as a whole" (p. 247).

So, even though God's "thou-shalt-not" decree narratively preceded the temptation in the garden, logologically, "thou-shalt-not" is a condition of temptation, "since the negative contains the principle of its own annihilation" (Burke, 1970, p. 218). God's negative command introduced the the principle of the negative, says Burke, and the only way to carry out the symmetry of the verbal Order would be to negate the negation. Burke argues that guilt "comes not from the breaking of the law but from the mere formulating of the law (that is, from the Idea of Order)" (p. 228). This assertion is based on a study of "the linguistic conditions involved" in theological principles.

What are the implications for normative language use? The narrative style makes it possible to "spin out a simultaneity into a succession" (Burke, 1970, p. 225). The grammatical ambiguity of language tends to obscure the endless substitution of one synonym for another, one analogy for another. For example, Burke recalls the Calvin Coolidge phrase, "When jobs become scarce, unemployment results." The second condition is nothing more than a redundancy of the first: it is a just synonym for "scarcity of jobs." "We don't usually realize how often we use the quasi-successiveness of narrative when actually we are but giving a synonym."

Since explanation frequently commits this redundancy, it does not always explain at all, or provide a true outcome. The difference between a sounded chord and a sounded arpeggio suggests one metaphor for this process. The arpeggio "solves the logical problem," and thereby any possible discord, by stretching the notes of the chord into a sequence. The chordal "logic" is simultaneous,

containing "thesis, antithesis and synthesis ... in equal force" (Burke, 1970, p. 229-230). But the arpeggio (the narrative sequence) only strains out the discord; it does not eliminate its potential.

From Burke's point of view, the rectilinear promise of the Bible does not outweigh the influence of the cyclical nature of its terminology and the resultant presence of formal principles (Burke, 1970, p. 233). For if the socio-political order finds its end in the supernatural realm, its inherent cycle of motives, constituted in its hierarchal terminology, should also find its end. It doesn't, it can't, because our consideration of "eternity" is made possible by quasi-positive terms, which correspond to our socio-political order.

Principles of worldly governance — dominion, victimage, sacrifice, etc. — will continue as supernatural counterparts in Heaven and Hell. The total dialectic of Genesis infuses the rectilinear with the cyclical, narrative with tautological, temporal with logical. For example, Christ's role as Mediator not only cleanses guilt, but "intensifies the very sense of guiltiness" (Burke, 1970, p. 234), much in the way a "principle" of desire is never "satisfied with getting." Guilt and desire are only "processed," not resolved — a closure that would occur only if the Order-Disorder principle of governance were to cease.

Returning to the logological definition of God as pure act, Burke describes an ultimate agent endowed with pure freedom, at rest. Logologically, God can be described in any number of actional terms. He is, in fact, analogous to a terminological tautology (Burke, 1970, p. 241):

In principle, the consistency that prevails "eternally" among the terms of a nomenclature is "at rest." The relations are all symmetrically there "in advance," before being "made manifest" in the "history" of analytic procession from one to another. They are related to "narrative" developments quite as the properties of a geometric form are to the Euclidean demonstration of those properties.

God is pure act, tautology is pure form. God has pure freedom. A tautology is built on necessary relationships. If God is synonymous with the form of a tautology, both at rest or grounded, then it is possible to discern the ontological character of Burke's vision. Adding the earlier idea that God is Eternity, it is possible to delineate the following relationships: agent, scene, and act are identical; freedom equals necessity; action (freedom) equals motion (necessity). Thus, Burke's view of the ontological ground is constrained by the religious paradigm to reveal its pantheistic disposition.

The expression of anything means the "temporizing" of it, narratively or tautologically. And selective description is synonymous with symbolic action. By reducing a tautological circumference, vocabularies are determined actively or passively. Logology can do nothing more than trace the analogical route (Burke, 1970, p. 250):

If we but realize that the interrelationships among a cycle of terms can be traced in any sequence, with any one term capable of being selected as the point of departure, and if we add the realization that any selection of any one can be "wrong" from the standpoint of any other selected as "the right" one, we readily see how fertile the terms for the idea of Order necessarily are in fomenting charges of "heresy." Logology can make no choice among these many possible sequences; it can but note the embarrassment of riches intrinsic to the terministic situation.

Through Logology, Burke seeks to explain the logic of structure. In so doing, he must — by virtue of his orientation in action and purpose — explain the generative nature of language. But the approach will always begin with the reductive finality of form: while theology might have the freedom to consider the idea that Adam did not have to sin, Logology does not. Had Adam — as the prototype of a logological principle — chosen to obey God, the structural design of the Bible have been destroyed (Burke, 1970, p. 252-3):

Logologically, to say that Adam didn't have to sin would be like saying the Oedipus didn't have to kill his father and sleep with his mother, except that in the case of Adam it looks like more of a choice. Or it's like saying that Othello "didn't have to" kill Desdemona. As regards the logic of the fable, the formal requirements of tragedy, he most certainly did "have to." The act is "de-termined" by the symmetry of the terms as a whole. He necessarily had to kill her, in order that the play be a tragedy.

Logology then, looks at the structure of completed acts, or more specifically, of completed symbolic acts, where the act is de-termined retroactively, as a "fait accompli." Even so, the principle of structure is viewed as a dynamic, nonrigid form that changes its shape through continual analogic shifts and reversals, which manifest the "creative dimensions" added to a word like "grace" as its passes from secular-sacred-secular descriptive usage. Pragmatics hold the ultimate significance in any theory of human motivation: "Discursively, and morally," says Burke (1970, p. 269), "words attain their formal perfection in discrimination (choice), the Yes-No design (including, if you will, the paradoxical fact that any such antithesis also implies a ground in common ...)."

Contrast Logology to the mythological approach to theory construction, which tends to "explain myths by myths" (Burke, 1970, p. 264-265), and it's possible to see how Burke avoids such closure. Such analogies are misrepresentative because an "overreliance upon imagery has the further drawback that the apparent concreteness of such terms conceals their actual abstractness." While such vocabularies utilize terminological order in search of knowledge, Logology studies order only to determine the forms or "anecdotes that help reveal for us the quandaries of human governance" (p. 268). And so in answer to Augustine's comment about the discursive and essential nature of words, Burke emphasizes the importance of tautological truth (p. 272):

This is inescapably true, since it is tautologically true, no matter how earnestly people try to make it seem otherwise. The future will inevitably be what the particular combination of all men's efforts and counter-efforts and

virtues and vices, along with the nature of things in general, inevitably adds up to.

We can pack all of history together, call it "predestination," and provide an empirical analogue, "for however the world is made, that's how language is made." However, we cannot look into the future and define it in terms of its particulars. Even so, the gift of language allows us to name it -- as providence or divine foreknowledge -- in principle. The tautological character of language allows us to transcend the empirical particulars we can never know.

"Language as motive" is one hallmark of a philosophy that sees language at once as a rule-governed and pragmatically deformed system. By homing in on terminological ambiguities, Dramatism and Logology work to expose the symmetry of terms and the analogical bridges from one term to another.

In this sense, "language as motive" has a dual reference, quite as Genesis employs two referential paths. Form constrains action. Yet, tautologically, language structure is infused in its generative construction with persuasive purpose. This touches on semantic, substitutive, analogical matters, or as Burke would say, logical correlation. Expressed narratively, language usage persuades. This touches on pragmatic, temporal matters. Yet of course, statements built upon logical priority also persuade. Here intrudes a perplexing discrepancy in the definition of "logical and temporal priority." For the term "temporal" has been used in the dramatistic-logological project to describe narrative sequence, on the one hand, and the verbal, symbolic order on the other. A difference in contextual placement accounts for the incongruity, which my conclusion will resolve.

### Conclusion: Metaphysical and Dialectical Motivation

Logology reduces its consideration of form to logical-temporal "firsts" or "principles," in an effort to uncover the deformational path of explanatory vocabularies. "A logological calculus," says Burke (1970, p. 170), "keeps us ever on the alert to spot the role of symbolism as the motivating genius" in vocabularies. Yet, there appears to be a disparity in Burke's logological specification of form.

At the close of my analysis of the "Prologue," I mentioned that Burke refers to two different levels of form: metaphysical and dialectical. In the logological calculus, the split levels of form complicate his use of the terms "temporal" and "logical," which have different reference depending upon their contextual placement.

Of dialectics, I might say first that language structure is tautological and allows for both temporal and logical priority. Second, language use can have temporal priority (narrative explanation) or logical priority (tautological explanation).

Now to muddy the waters. Metaphysically, the word "temporal" refers to time, to the empirical or "nonverbal," and to motion. For example, a tree exists in the temporal realm; its growth patterns are a matter of motion. But the temporal order includes more than Nature; it also contains the socio-political order. In this sense, the metaphysical reference of the word "temporal" also refers to the verbal, and therefore, to action. The word "tree" also exists in the temporal realm, but its symbolic use is a matter of action. As the sum total of both the natural and socio-political realms, the word "temporal" refers to verbal action as the symbolic and nonverbal motion as the empirical.

Finally, the metaphysical reference to the word "logical" denotes timelessness or the nontemporal, the nonverbal, and the nonempirical. Only

through verbal action in the temporal realm can we locate the absolute ground, which can only have logical, not empirical truth. Therefore, only a vocabulary of logical priority (e.g., the word "God") will be symbolically representative of the "supernatural" order. The immediate interference of the symbolic in any discussion of the ground evokes the synergistic relationship between epistemology and ontology, and between metaphysics and dialectics. This relationship elicits Burke's frequent use of the term "quasi-positive."

Dialectics comprises all that is verbal or symbolic action. If language structure is itself at rest in its analogic, substitutional character, then dialectics involves selective reduction of the tautology, or the "temporizing of essence." It can specify temporal priority, resulting in a vocabulary of motion, and a narrative style of explanation. It can also specify logical priority, resulting in a vocabulary of action, and a tautological style of explanation. Further, a tautological vocabulary carries the full capacity for narrative form and temporal motion: such is the case in Genesis. But whatever "departure" we choose, we are still engaging in verbal action in the temporal realm.

There is one more set of correlations. Using "form" as a god-term, it is possible to build an analogy between the nontemporal, ontological realm, and the temporal, dialectical realm.

As the theoretical articulation of both metaphysics and dialectics, the relationship between the prototypical terms of the religious paradigm is tautological. They are logically interrelated: "Father" and "Son" are coeval; guilt and redemption are simultaneous. As each term implies the other, they are tautologically identical. Representing the ontological ground, God is pure freedom or the form of a pure act. He represents perfect action.

If the ground, as pure act or pure freedom is pure form, it is at rest, it just is. If language structure as form, is tautological, then it displays logical necessity, and it too, is at rest. Dramatistically, this does not contradict the "language as motive" idea: theoretically anchored in a verbal noun ("act"), action is implicit in language structure.

Considering the idea that we can talk about the ground only symbolically, the derived correlation states: language structure is equivalent to the ground, whereupon, we have returned to a definition of Dramatism as the realm of all differences, via the textual "meanderings" of Burke's logological project. And Dramatism itself is reducible to the primitive form of the pentadic tautology.

Finally, if structure and the ground are tautologically identical, then necessity equals freedom, and motion equals action. It is important to remember that these correlations are only metaphysical and logological "contractions." They do not represent the kind of dialectical operation that reduces a vocabulary of action to a vocabulary of motion. Metaphysically, logologically, equating necessity with freedom and action with motion does not compel a "dissolution of drama." It is merely to describe the conditions from which such acts derive. That kind of dialectical behavior is left to the complications of human motivation.

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