INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600
Japanese written language reforms during the Allied Occupation (1945–1952): SCAP and romanization

Krumrey, Brett Alan, M.A.

The University of Arizona, 1993
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that the accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her judgement the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED: [Signature]

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

[Signature] 7/23/93
Elizaheth G. Harrison  Date
Assistant Professor, East Asian Studies Department
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE JAPANESE WRITTEN LANGUAGE AND ITS DIFFICULTIES</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE RÔMAJI MOVEMENT AND ROBERT KING HALL</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANGUAGE SIMPLIFICATION AND SCAP POLICY</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE UNITED STATES EDUCATION MISSION TO JAPAN</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REACTION TO THE EDUCATION MISSION'S REPORT</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPANESE ATTEMPTS AT LANGUAGE SIMPLIFICATION</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued

APPENDIX A: REPRINT OF THE REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES EDUCATION MISSION,
CHAPTER TWO: LANGUAGE REFORM ..................62

ENDNOTES ..........................................................................................68

WORKS CITED .................................................................77
ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the Rômaji Movement and its role in the reform of the Japanese written language during the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945-1952). Past analyses concerning the Rômaji Movement have suggested that romanization failed due to conspiracies against it and have neglected to consider other alternatives being pursued by the Japanese government. This paper will take a closer look at the Americans who supported romanization, their motivations for doing so, and the development of SCAP policy towards language reform. Since simplification, not romanization, was the preferred objective of both the American and the Japanese governments, this paper goes on to examine alternative methods to simplification which, in the end, proved to be highly successful.
INTRODUCTION:

The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the Allied Occupation of Japan. The United States, the primary occupying force, set out to eradicate the nationalistic and militaristic elements responsible for Japan's military expansion in the Pacific and the war with the Allied forces. To achieve these goals, the United States began to demilitarize and democratize every aspect of Japanese life. Since the educational system was thought to be one of the primary vehicles for the rise in ultra-nationalism and militarism, the American government believed it was necessary to ensure that the educational system encouraged individualism and free thought—two requirements thought to be necessary for a successful democracy. The past educational system had been too controlled and too suppressive. When the American government began to look at reforming the educational system, they examined the Japanese language, its difficulties, and the extent to which it had encouraged elitism and the rise of the militarist regime.

The American government was not the first to question the difficulties of the Japanese language. Japanese scholars had been discussing methods to simplify the written language since the Meiji Restoration (1868). While they recognized the need for simplification, these scholars were at odds over how to achieve this objective because there were different methods which could be taken to simplify the Japanese language. One of these methods was romanization—substituting the Chinese ideographs with the Western alphabet—and supporters of this method belonged to the Rômaji Movement.
Rōmaji Movement also had its beginnings in the Meiji era, but it never achieved much success because romanization involved abolishing the entire Japanese writing system and implementing a new one. Most Japanese preferred not to abolish a system that had been in place for over 1200 years. Instead, they searched for ways of simplifying the writing system without scrapping it.

When the debate over simplifying the written language ignited during the Occupation, some Americans, educators and government officials alike, heavily favored the romanization because it utilized an alphabet they were familiar with, thus eliminating the need for Americans and other Western foreigners to learn the difficult Japanese written language. Other Americans did not think the United States government should get involved in this area. As a result, Americans joined the Rōmaji Movement on both sides, those advocating romanization and those desiring simplification by other means. Debate continued throughout the Occupation, but in the end, romanization was not implemented. Language simplification was achieved, but the Japanese government had chosen a different method to accomplish their goals.

Recently, contemporary scholars have sought to determine the reason for what they call the "failure of the Rōmaji Movement". One of the more popular causes for the "failure" put forth by both John Juji Hada and Martha Ellen Hardesty is that the United States "reversed course" in the area of language reform. They claim romanization was supported and encouraged at first, but then became less important as the United States began to push economic development in Japan. The failure of SCAP to include the
recommendations of the United States Education Mission—a mission set up to figure out how best to reform the Japanese educational system—into SCAP policy was also a cause of the "failure of the Rômaji Movement". Other reasons given for the demise of the Rômaji Movement by both contemporary scholars and Occupation-era educators were the personnel conflicts within SCAP, the passive attitude of the American government, the conservative forces within the Japanese government, and even the ignorance of the Japanese people. As a result, contemporary scholars seem to accept the view of RÔMAJI advocates during the Allied Occupation: romanization was the one and only method of simplifying the Japanese written language and democracy would not succeed in Japan without it. Consequently, the "failure" of the Rômaji Movement constituted a failure of American policy in the area of language reform.

This thesis challenges the view that rejection of romanization constitutes a failure in the area of language simplification. Romanization was not the only solution to simplification, and to suggest that language policy was a failure because romanization was not adopted is inaccurate. Furthermore, the causes for the "failure" of the Rômaji Movement furnished by both RÔMAJI advocates and contemporary scholars are distorted. By focusing in on the Rômaji Movement, contemporary scholars have failed to incorporate the larger picture of language simplification—the goal of both the American and the Japanese governments. In addition to perpetuating the myths of romanization, past studies de-emphasized the work being done by the Japanese government in the area of language simplification, much of it occurring while the debate over romanization raged on. This paper will
attempt to disprove some of the theories offered for the "failure" of the Rômajî Movement, shed more light on the work being done by the Japanese government, and attempt to provide an objective analysis of the Rômajî Movement. The materials used to support this paper come mainly from documents and articles written during the Occupation by Americans. Memoirs written by members of the United States Education Mission were beneficial. Past studies on romanization, although scarce, were also utilized. While most of the information gathered for this paper was available in past studies, a recently published book by Gary Tsuchimochi, Education Reform in Postwar Japan: The 1946 U.S. Education Mission, provided insight into the Mission's work and the question of language reform. Included as appendices to his book are memorandums and diaries written by members of the Mission, materials which have only recently been released to the public.
THE JAPANESE WRITTEN LANGUAGE AND ITS DIFFICULTIES

To understand why both Japanese and Americans were calling for simplification, one must look at the makeup of the written language before the Occupation began and the difficulties involved with learning to read and write in Japanese.

At the time of the Occupation, the Japanese written language consisted of three different systems of writing. All three systems still remain today, but they have been simplified by the Japanese government over the years. The first system consists of the Chinese ideographs known in Japan as *kanji* characters. *Kanji* are very similar to the Chinese writing system—this being a result of their importation from China in approximately the fifth century A.D.\(^\text{14}\) Kanji characters typically symbolize entire objects or thoughts. There are characters for mountain, tree, and father, as well as for verbs like to go, to come, and to feel. Each character has two types of readings, an *on* reading and a *kun* reading. The *kun* reading typically represents the Japanese morpheme for that word: *yama*-mountain, *umi*-ocean, and *hito*-person. These *kun* readings also generally equate to the English equivalent of the Chinese character. The *on* readings were an attempt by the Japanese to follow the Chinese pronunciation of the character: *SAN*-mountain, *KAI*-ocean, *JIN*-person. Usually when the character stands alone it takes the *kun* reading, whereas the *on* reading is used when the character is in a compound of multiple characters, but this is not always the case. Additionally, a *kanji*
character can have multiple on and kun readings which can give multiple English equivalents.

Although the Chinese writing system employs only kanji characters, the Japanese writing system before simplification used several thousand kanji characters together with a mixture of two other syllabaries known as katakana and hiragana. Katakana and hiragana are phonetic alphabets in which each character stands for a syllable, not just a consonant or a vowel. Both alphabets also have their origins in the Chinese ideographs (manyōgana), but they were gradually simplified and changed into the forms used today. Katakana is drawn with straighter lines while hiragana is written in a more cursive form. Both were invented at about the same time--katakana in the eight century and hiragana in the ninth. Hiragana and katakana are both composed of 48 characters with the former being used more widely (since the Meiji Period) to supplement the kanji characters and for Japanese words not written with the kanji characters. The latter currently used typically for foreign loanwords, advertisements, and sometimes for emphasis. The mixed use of all these syllabaries is called kanamajiri. The Japanese student is taught the katakana and hiragana first, usually in the first grade, and then he begins to learn the kanji characters continually throughout his education.

At the time of the Allied Occupation, the Japanese written language was considered by many to be the most difficult language in the world, and even the cause of Japan's defeat in World War II. Though this view may have been extreme, the difficulty of the written language was recognized by many Americans and Japanese alike.
One difficulty is the necessity to learn three different writing systems instead of just one. Japanese was almost never written exclusively in kanji, katakana, or hiragana, one of the exceptions being that children's books were written entirely in kana because they had not yet learned enough kanji characters.

A second difficulty arose from the kanji characters themselves. As mentioned earlier, kanji characters often have various meanings and numerous different readings. Roy Andrew Miller, an experienced Japanese linguist, wrote the following about the Japanese language:

Japanese and Chinese are historically two quite different languages of totally different genetic origin and entirely different structures. Borrowing a script originally devised to write one and using it to write the other raised a raft of complex problems that could in turn only be solved by evolving a large repertory of equally complex graphic conventions.¹⁷

Even though the Chinese written language may utilize more than 10,000 characters, Japanese, which may only utilize several thousand, is considered more difficult because of the multiple readings and meanings for each character.

Learning the characters usually requires rote memorization and hours of study, and this was another difficulty associated with the Japanese written language. Each character consists of a set number of strokes which must be written correctly because some kanji have entirely different meanings even though they look identical except for one or two strokes. Critics claimed that too much time was spent learning an inefficient writing system that was
forgotten unless continually studied. Burnell C. Olds, a missionary who had worked in Japan for thirty-six years, commented in 1946, "The labor required to learn to read and write the thousands of characters involved, and to memorize them exactly so that they will not quickly slip away, is unimaginably enormous."\(^{18}\)

Another reason why Japanese was so difficult was that there were at least five different styles of writing the language, though only two were commonly used—colloquial style (kōgotai) and literary style (bungotai). In the Japanese language, differences in styles could be likened to the difference between English today and that of Shakespearean times, but even more difficult. Thus, even if one could speak Japanese fluently, it could not be assumed that he could read or write. Although the Japanese spoke in the colloquial style, they wrote most of their legal writings, government documents, and political writings in the literary style.\(^{19}\) Because of these difficulties, it was reported that few Japanese understood their own language. It was for this reason that the written language needed to be simplified, critics argued, and these arguments did not merely come about as a result of the Occupation. Some of the earliest proposals for reform of the Japanese script appeared around the time of the Meiji Restoration.

Ever since Japanese scholars had been introduced to Western forms of writing, they were astonished that every word could be written with knowledge of only twenty-six characters. As a result, these scholars began to question the difficulty and inefficiency of their own language. In 1866, Maejima Hisoka was one of the first to call for the eradication of the kanji characters and the use of only the kana scripts.\(^{20}\) Subsequently, numerous
debates broke out, and various clubs were formed, such as the Kana Club and the Rōmaji Club, which called for the abolishment of kanji and the exclusive use of either kana or rōmaji respectively.

Soon after the establishment of these organizations, newspapers and magazines began to be printed entirely in rōmaji and kana. The Rōmaji Zasshi and the Mainichi Hiragana Shinbun were two such papers printed in the 1880's. One of the prominent rōmaji supporters of the time, Nishi Amane, in an article which appeared in the Meiroku Zasshi, wrote,

If they know the twenty-six letters of the 'ABC's' and just learn pronunciation and spelling, even children will be able to read the writings of men, even the ignorant will be able to comprehend the works of gentlemen, and both children and the ignorant will be able to record their opinions of themselves.\(^{22}\)

Japanese rōmaji supporters claimed that the time spent mastering the kanji characters could be better spent learning Western technology and thought.

Neither of these groups were successful because they had difficult obstacles to overcome in order to achieve their goals. Both factions required that Japanese be written in a colloquial style (kōgotai) instead of the literary style (bungotai). Writing in the literary style was traditionally the correct method of writing, and a switch to the colloquial style was not a simple task. Kana supporters disagreed over "whether to employ historical or pronunciation-based kana usage", a debate which led to the decline of the group.\(^{23}\) The Rōmaji Club also had its disagreements; they centered around which form of romanization—Hepburn, Kunrei, and Nipponshiki—to adopt. The differences between the systems were marginal and practically a matter
of taste or preference. However, these differences prevented rômajî supporters from building a strong base to promote their message. Furthermore, the rise of nationalism in the 1890's also caused a decline in the Rômajî Movement as the Japanese began to reject Western things they had readily accepted the decade before.\textsuperscript{24}

The more popular reform movement among Japanese scholars seemed to hinge on reducing the number of kanji characters in use, simplifying their stroke order, and simplifying the rules of kana usage. Regarding the reduction in the number of characters, Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the preeminent Japanese scholars of the Meiji period, thought "two to three thousand characters should be adequate."\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, even the rômajî and kana supporters during the Meiji period supported a reduction in the number of characters because they considered that a direct transition from kanji to either script would be too abrupt and drastic to have much chance of success.\textsuperscript{26} Consequently, the Japanese government did attempt to limit the number of characters for daily use many times between the years of 1900 and 1942, but success was limited because enforcement was marginal and participation by newspapers and scholars was infrequent.\textsuperscript{27}

Although all of these language reform movements continued to be debated until the end of World War II, the Japanese government concentrated more on reducing the number of characters instead of replacing the kanamajiri system with an all kana or all rômajî script.\textsuperscript{28} However, with the end of World War II and the beginning of the Allied Occupation, the Rômajî Movement came to the forefront. Although there were some Japanese still in favor of romanization, the popularity of the Rômajî Movement at that time
was a result of the influence of American educators and government officials.\textsuperscript{29}
THE RÔMAJI MOVEMENT AND ROBERT KING HALL

The popularity of Rômaji Movement had waxed and waned throughout the 70 years prior to the Occupation; it was linked to the popularity of the West and the importation of Western things.\(^{30}\) When a few officials in SCAP became interested in the Rômaji Movement, the popularity of romanization began to increase among the Japanese. In the beginning of the Occupation when American policies in all areas were being formulated, there was a push to include romanization as part of SCAP's educational reforms. The impetus behind this push was the influence of Robert King Hall.

Naval Lieutenant Commander Robert King Hall had been an advocate of drastically reforming the Japanese written language since his early work as the chief of the Education Section of the Planning Staff for the Occupation of Japan at the Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) in Monterey, California during the Second World War.\(^{31}\) In June of 1945, Hall drafted a proposal for abolishing all the *kanji* characters and replacing the *kanamajiri* script with an all *katakana* script.\(^{32}\) Major General John Hilldring, the War Department's Civil Affairs Division director, consulted with Eugene Dooman, an official in the Department of State, about Hall's proposal. Dooman, who was born in Japan and spoke Japanese fluently, advised,

...the prohibition of Chinese characters could not be enforced. Even if it could be, the elimination of Chinese characters under conditions of military occupation would probably have consequences of a most serious and far-reaching character...\(^{33}\)
Thus, after some deliberations, the War Department refused Hall's proposal on July 11, 1945. Consequently, even before the Occupation of Japan had begun, the American government had shown an unwillingness to enforce a drastic reform of the written language.

Originally, Hall had favored the switch to katakana, but when he came to Japan at the start of the Occupation and discovered that the debate over the written language centered on the replacement of kanji with rōmaji and not katakana, he changed his mind. Hall probably saw that rōmaji was even easier for Americans to read than katakana because it was written with the same alphabet, and it would potentially provide the Japanese people easier access to European languages. Other rōmaji advocates also suggested that relations between America and Japan would be smoother if Americans did not have to learn the language. Few Americans were very knowledgeable about Japan or the Japanese language, and most rōmaji advocates also probably favored rōmaji because they personally could read it more easily than the kanamajiri system.

Hall's earlier proposal had stressed that a switch to katakana would not bring illiteracy to Japan since all Japanese were taught to read katakana. In fact, when he wrote his katakana proposal, Hall thought that rōmaji should be taught along with katakana, but if it was made the official form, it would bring widespread illiteracy to Japan. That the Japanese were not formally taught to read the rōmaji characters and had little exposure to them did not seem to concern Hall when he switched to favoring rōmaji. In his book, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952, Toshio Nishi confesses his confusion with rōmaji at the time:
I was a fourth grader in 1951, when I took my first course in Rômaji. It fascinated most of us for a month or so. Not only I but several of my classmates asked our teacher if we were learning 'English' (and wished we were). 'No,' he replied, 'you are studying the Japanese language written in the English alphabet.' When an examination came, we used to memorize an entire chapter from the Rômaji textbook without being able to read the Rômaji.39

Why did Hall and other rômaji advocates object so strongly to the Japanese kanamajiri system, and why did they favor romanization? What proof or studies were used to support their position? Did Americans desire reform simply so they did not have to learn the language, or did they truly believe that the majority of the Japanese people could not read their own language?

American rômaji advocates did believe the majority of the Japanese were illiterate and could not understand their own language. To support their claims, this group pointed to the example of the Emperor's speech to the people informing them of the plan to surrender to the Allies in August of 1945. The emperor's prepared speech was written in the literary style, which was not normally used in conversational speech and was unfamiliar to most of his Japanese listeners. As a result, some villagers thought he was urging them on to fight harder for victory.40 Rômaji advocates pointed to this occurrence as proof of the need to reform the language. Furthermore, it was widely reported that blind Japanese children learned their material faster than children who could see because the blind children did not have to learn the written language.41
The basic tenet of the arguments asserted by the *rōmaji* advocates during the Occupation was that the Japanese written language "constituted a formidable obstacle to learning". American *rōmaji* advocates highlighted the difficulties of the language mentioned above, and, with the help of Robert King Hall, formulated new arguments against maintaining the Japanese written language as it was.

Although Hall's first proposal was not approved, he continued to work for the implementation of romanization. As Gary Tsuchimochi wrote, Hall's motivation for revising the Japanese written language came from,

...the fact that as a graduate student he was strongly influenced by Charles C. Fries, one of his professors at the University of Michigan. Professor Fries was a prominent linguist who contributed to English education in postwar Japan, and his special subject was language simplification. In order to persuade his superiors to endorse romanization, Hall researched the Japanese written language and developed a staff study on its difficulties and the advantages of romanization which was completed in March of 1946. The staff study was extensive, "some 43 closely typed pages, with a more voluminous attachment of 35 appendices and a bibliography of some 260 titles", and was later the basis for his book, *Education for a New Japan*, published in 1949. Hall declared a large majority of the Japanese were illiterate, and since the "written language is the basic channel of communication, and literacy is the measure of the effectiveness of this channel," Hall claimed the success of democracy in Japan depended on developing a written language that could be read easily by all Japanese.
Hall's rationale was that democracy depended on an informed citizenry to make educated decisions, and because the primary means of communication at that time was through the written word, democracy, therefore, depended on a literate citizenry. Before the widespread use of books and newspapers, literacy was not necessarily a requirement for a successful democracy. Hall alleged that "in colonial New England, for example, people solved their problems in the open debate of the town meeting, in which all men whether literate or not might test their views with those of their neighbors." Hall pointed out that this was no longer the case because people relied on the printed word in order to educate themselves on the political and economic issues. Therefore, he stressed that the most important reform the Japanese needed was romanization.

Much of the information he presented in the staff study was later used by other educators and journalists writing in American journals urging the American government to adopt this policy. They disputed the high literacy rate declared by the Japanese government, and suggested that probably less than a quarter of the population could read and understand the Japanese written language. Most of these authors do not cite the sources of their information, but the numbers and arguments which they use are almost identical to Hall's. For example, John Ashmead argued, "We can hardly expect a Japanese school child to spend half of his time learning one fourth of the vocabulary needed for literacy, and still have time to acquire any but the sketchiest background in political and historical subjects." This argument was taken directly from the work that Hall completed.
The argument was that the typical elementary schoolchild was supposed to have learned 1300 characters by the end of his schooling, but really only retained around 600. Since it was generally accepted that the average Japanese newspaper utilized 2500 characters, these children supposedly only knew one-fourth of that vocabulary. Furthermore, they claimed that since only about fifteen percent of the people went on to higher education, the majority of Japanese were illiterate because they only knew a quarter of the average newspaper vocabulary at best. One Japanese educator, quoted by Hall in his book (and probably his study as well), commented on the \textit{kanji} characters by saying,

\begin{quote}
The use of the Chinese ideographs is the root of all evil in this respect [the difficulty of the written language]. A large part of the school-life is spent mastering some 4,000 ideographs, most of which are pronounced in three or four ways or written in at least three ways. The waste of energy thereby incurred is worthy of the most serious consideration, and can be prevented only by the adoption of transliteration, i.e., the use of the Roman alphabet instead of the Chinese ideographs.
\end{quote}

Furthermore, in order for the Japanese to rebuild their country, "the technical information necessary to enable the Japanese to help themselves can be made readily available only in a condition of literacy". These were the main arguments behind Robert King Hall's drive to replace the \textit{kanamajiri} system with the \textit{rōmaji} alphabet. Hall attempted to incorporate this proposal into SCAP policy by various means, but none of them worked because not all people agreed with the information he had collected about the written language and the conclusions he had made.
LANGUAGE SIMPLIFICATION AND SCAP POLICY

The question of who actually formulated policy within SCAP is currently being debated today. During and immediately after the Occupation, policy was believed to have originated from General MacArthur himself. Recently scholars have questioned this assumption, but there is little evidence to support either side. Some have even postulated that general overall policy was handed down from either MacArthur or top officials to the officers in the field, and then they, acting on their own judgment within the guidelines given to them, dealt with the daily problems which occurred in the area to which they were assigned. Whether this is true or not remains to be resolved, but it seems that Robert King Hall attempted to implement romanization in this manner.

Near the end of 1945, before Hall developed his staff study, both SCAP officials and Japanese officials from the Ministry of Education were discussing plans for interim textbooks to be used in the schools. At this time, Hall told the Japanese officials that the textbooks would be required to be written in romanized Japanese. When the Minister of Education found out, he proceeded to the CI&E Section to verify this mandate. The Minister was assured this was not the case, that the United States had no intention of forcing the Japanese to adopt romanization. Afterwards, a meeting was held among members of CI&E to clarify SCAP's position on this issue. Hall had attempted to take matters into his own hands without permission from his superiors and, as a result, MacArthur ordered that the Education Division be re-organized and Hall be transferred to the Planning Division and relieved of
his operational duties. This prevented him from working on the textbook issue, and his direct liaison with Japanese officials from the Ministry of Education was discontinued. Although Hall was relieved of his operational duties, he continued to work on the problems of language reform.

Hall and a few other officers in the CI&E section argued in favor of romanization, but the evidence to support their opinions did not exist. However, Hall and his associates were not prevented from pursuing the question of romanization. As Joseph Trainor, Deputy Chief of the Education Division, wrote in his memoirs,

It was not the intent of the administration of the Section [CI&E] to rule that all Occupation consideration of the problems of language was out of order. Indeed, throughout the occupation years it encouraged inquiry and welcomed plans regarding the different phases of the problem. It was, however, unwilling on the basis of insufficient evidence to consider it the function of the Occupation to order reform in this domain about which the Japanese knew far more than anybody connected with the occupation.

Since Hall was now in the Planning Division, he was allowed to develop a staff study concerning simplification of the Japanese written language. As mentioned earlier, information taken from this study was to form the foundation of numerous articles written by American educators during the Occupation calling for the switch to romanization.

Although accepted by many American educators and journalists, the staff study was a complete failure in the eyes of higher SCAP officials. Hall's superiors did not dismiss his staff study because it ran counter to official established policy, but because it was neither objective nor scientific.
A staff study was required to be based on scientific principles, but Hall's study did not follow scientific guidelines, starting with the statement of the problem. According to Trainor, the statement of the problem included purported facts, conclusions, and unsupported statements such as "Japanese is excessively difficult" and "the Japanese people are actually unable to read anything beyond the simplest level." From the start, Hall's staff study turned out to be a paper supporting his position, rather than an investigative inquiry.

Instead of trying to find out if the Japanese language needed revision at all or discussing other methods of simplifying the language, Hall only discussed romanization and the difficulty of the Japanese writing system. After the statement of the problem were the "facts" that supported the conclusions he had already made in the statement of the problem. Trainor further commented on the staff study by saying, "...as might be anticipated from the unorthodox formulation of the problem, the 'facts' turned out to be a hopeless mixture of data, conclusions, and recommendations. Data were presented with no indication of who had conducted the inquiry or how the data were obtained."58

The tests Hall used to support his view of the difficulty of the language almost always involved dictation or pronunciation drills.59 People involved in the tests were either asked to write a kanji by hearing its pronunciation only, or to give the pronunciation or reading of a written character, usually without a context. According to Hall, "it was assumed that if the subject were unable to render even an approximate phonetic equivalent for the word he could not be considered to know its meaning."60 This is a huge assumption to make because even as a foreigner learning the language, I often come across kanji
that I cannot pronounce correctly, but I do know the meaning of the word. In Japanese, knowledge of the reading of an ideograph is not a prerequisite for knowing its meaning and being able to understand written Japanese does not usually require knowing the exact reading of every kanji. Overall meaning of a sentence can often be deduced even though one may not know how to pronounce or write every character used in the sentence. These variables were not accounted for in the data Hall used.

Furthermore, it is never mentioned which kanji were tested or whether they were commonly found in everyday newspapers. In one instance, Hall does admit that the kanji were "selected at random from history", so that even a person with a fair amount of knowledge of the commonly used kanji characters might not fare so well during these tests. Hall also made it seem that knowledge of 600 or 1000 characters was grossly insufficient in a language that utilized approximately 2400 characters. However, as George Sansom, a well respected authority on Japan for years before World War II, pointed out, "knowledge of 1000 characters is the basis for a very large vocabulary." This is because many Japanese words are compounds of simple kanji characters. The mistake Hall and other American rōmaji advocates were making was in equating one kanji character to one vocabulary word. They claimed that if a Japanese student only knew 600 characters, they could only read a quarter of a Japanese newspaper.

Accordingly, Hall disputed the 99.6% literacy rate the Japanese government alleged, but his claims that no more than a quarter of the population could read were unsupported by the evidence he produced. Joseph Trainor discloses that one literacy test was actually carried out in Japan, but
he fails to say when it took place. He does say however, that "it [the research] indicated that indeed the Japanese were able to read and to handle their written language well within the requirements of an intelligent social pattern of living with each other." Although he does not say what those "requirements" were, Trainor's comments do point out that the question of Japanese literacy and language reform was not as concrete as Hall and other rōmaji advocates wanted people to believe. Joseph Trainor also had this to say regarding Hall's staff study:

It is, of course, possible to start with two things, an assumption that the Japanese language needs major revision and a plan for that revision. Then, working back from these conclusions, one can bring together a vast amount of factual data which would seem to lend support to the proposals made. This procedure falls somewhat short of proving the contentions, however, since such data are gathered selectively and data which do not support the conclusions are ignored.

Hall's foundation for proclaiming the language difficult was based upon two things: the opinions of American and Japanese educators who desired a switch to romanization and the skewed data from the faulty literacy tests. Moreover, Hall did not provide any proof that romanization would be successful; he only knew from personal experience that he could read romanization better than the kanji characters.

Finally, to claim that over eighty percent of the population was illiterate did not make sense in a country where some newspaper circulations exceeded those of the United States. Joseph Trainor also saw a problem with this rationale. He wrote, "It is a little strained to assume that all the purchasers of
those newspapers are people whose primary interest is to hold up in front of them a printed sheet which they cannot very well understand.\textsuperscript{64}

Consequently, Hall's superiors still did not believe enough evidence existed to support the adoption of the \textit{rōmaji} alphabet.\textsuperscript{65} They seemed to recognize their own inexperience in this field, and thought it wiser to leave the question up to the Japanese. The issues of experience and competence were also being discussed among the Japanese themselves. A majority of Japanese government officials were "dissatisfied with the lack of expertise in the CI&E."\textsuperscript{66} In order to appease these officials and perhaps persuade his superiors to accept the romanization plan, Hall early on pushed the idea of bringing a distinguished group of American educators to Japan. He hoped that with the support of these educators, the Japanese government would go along with the reforms he envisioned, including romanization.\textsuperscript{67}
General MacArthur wired the War Department in January of 1946 formally requesting a group of approximately twenty American educators to come to Japan and stay for about a month in order to advise SCAP on their policies regarding educational reform. Within a month, the members of the Mission were chosen, and it was agreed that the Mission would visit Japan in March of that same year. At the end of their three week stay, the Mission members submitted their report to General MacArthur before returning to the United States.

The Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan was divided into six chapters: The Aim and Content of Japanese Education, Language Reform, Administration of Education at the Primary and Secondary Levels, Teaching and the Education of Teachers, Adult Education, and Higher Education. The recommendations made by the Mission received much publicity both in Japan and America because the report offered recommendations on everything from textbook reform to re-education of the teachers to emphasis on individualism and free thinking. Among the suggestions made were the decentralization of the educational system, the establishment of the 6-3-3 school system—nine years of compulsory education (six years in elementary school and three years in lower secondary school) followed by three years in upper secondary school—and the romanization of the Japanese written language. The Mission proclaimed that the Japanese written language "constitutes a formidable obstacle to learning", the kanji
characters should be "wholly abandoned in the popular written language", and that rōmaji should be brought into common use.70

The United States Education Mission was very influential in guiding educational reform policy throughout the remainder of the Occupation. The members were distinguished, and the Mission was thought to be extremely successful and a model for future international relations between America and the world.71 In fact, every suggestion made by the Mission was eventually incorporated into SCAP policy (and later passed into law by the Japanese government) except the recommendation for romanization. As a result, contemporary scholars, such as John Juji Hada, have declared that the unwillingness by SCAP to incorporate the Mission's recommendations into official policy was a "major factor underlying the failure of the Rōmaji Movement."72 Studies like Hada's concerning the Rōmaji Movement have overlooked the people involved in the Mission and how the report was formulated, however. A thorough analysis of these points is needed to fully understand why both the United States and the Japanese governments rejected the romanization recommendation. Additionally, one must keep in mind the intended role of the Mission and existing SCAP policy on the issue of language reform.

Although Robert King Hall developed the first draft of a list of candidates for appointment to the Education Mission,73 the final decision as to the makeup of the group was left to the State Department.74 The selection of members to participate in the Mission ultimately became a political affair, with every organization from the American Federation of Teachers to the Catholic Educational Association wanting to ensure that they were
represented. Gordon Bowles, a State Department advisor later attached to the Mission, commented,

In completing the roster specific attention was paid to representation of minority populations, administration at the national, state and local levels (School Boards, PTA, etc.) public, private and religious sectors, education for the labor, adult, and handicapped groups, and the broader fields of libraries, museums, recreation and the Foundations.\(^{75}\)

Eventually, twenty-seven people were selected to participate. Diversity among the Mission members was stressed, but in the end the group was comprised of people with very similar backgrounds. More importantly, none of the educators chosen had any expertise on Japan or the Japanese educational system. In an article written in 1982, Edward Beauchamp recognized this:

With very few exceptions the Mission was composed of men and women who 1) knew next to nothing about Japan and Japanese education, 2) had little prior experience outside the United States, 3) had begun their careers between 1890 and 1920...\(^{76}\)

The lack of Japan specialists was not important to the State Department's vision of the Mission. In fact, such expertise was not even a criteria for selecting individuals to participate. Instead, individuals were selected according to whether or not they were highly qualified in their field, physically fit, and willing to participate in a group setting.\(^{77}\)

Attempting to diversify the Mission more, Gordon Bowles had proposed to include five or six non-Americans, but this plan was ultimately rejected.\(^{78}\) Among the reasons were the difficulty in selecting which
specialists from which countries and a desire to maintain American independence in formulating Occupational policies. Thus, most of the members, although representing different organizations, held the same fundamental beliefs and opinions on what educational system was the best because all were educated in the United States under basically the same system.

Before arriving in Japan, members of the Mission met in preliminary meetings throughout the month of February to discuss their goals and their plans. Members of the Mission also received briefings on the Japanese education system from officials who had recently been in Japan and by those with backgrounds in Japanese language and culture. They also divided up into special sections to concentrate on specific areas, including language reform. The chapter of the Mission's report recommending romanization was written by a subcommittee, the Special Committee on Language.

The members of this subcommittee were Charles McCloy, a professor of physical education at the University of Iowa, David Stevens, director of the Division of Humanities at the Rockefeller Foundation, William Trow, a professor of educational psychology at the University of Michigan, and George Counts, a professor of education at Columbia University, where Hall would later return to teach. The only qualification for being on this subcommittee was a desire to work on this area of Japanese education. "Interestingly enough", wrote Joseph Trainor, "[the question of romanization] was the one topic treated by the Mission which lay entirely outside the competence of any member of the visiting group." Consequently, although many people considered the members of the Mission to be "distinguished
American educators,\textsuperscript{84} none of the members selected by the State Department were qualified to make any decisions on reforming the Japanese language.

If the members were unqualified, where did they obtain the information they disclosed in their report? It seems a majority of their information came from SCAP. This may seem obvious and unimportant, but one must keep in mind that the Mission was asked to come to Japan because of the lack of experience and knowledge among SCAP officials. For the Mission to then get most of its information and solutions from these same SCAP officials invalidates the purpose of the Education Mission in the first place.

Before the Mission arrived in Japan, SCAP took two preliminary measures to ensure the members would be informed of the current state of education in Japan when they arrived.\textsuperscript{85} The first step was to assemble a brochure entitled "Education in Japan" which was distributed to each member of the Mission upon their arrival in Japan.\textsuperscript{86} CI&E staff members were asked to submit a report detailing facts of the Japanese educational system related to their respective section. These individual reports were then compiled into the brochure. The reports submitted were supposed to be entirely objective, but staff members did decide which information would be included in the brochure and did present their own evaluations of what had occurred in Japanese education to date.\textsuperscript{87} Furthermore, since "there was, in the visit of the United States Education Mission, a real temptation placed before the Education Division to seek the support of the Mission in whatever thinking and planning might be at the individual desk stage of development within the Division,"\textsuperscript{88} the information each Mission member received was biased
towards each SCAP officer's perspective on what the problem was and what
solutions were best.

Robert King Hall wrote the section on language reform. Although all
SCAP officials were discouraged from presenting solutions in this brochure
(it was supposed to be an objective compilation of facts), and Hall was
forbidden to mention romanization specifically,\(^{89}\) he was allowed to present
his personal views and some of the data from his staff study.\(^{90}\) Hall also
briefed the Mission on the problems of the written language during its first
week in Japan. These briefings were the second preparation SCAP had made,
and they were very similar to the sections of the brochure that was compiled.
Each area of Japanese education was briefed to the Mission members by the
SCAP officials who were involved with that area and, in some instances, by
Japanese educators.

When the idea for the Mission was approved, SCAP officials had also
recommended that the Japanese Ministry of Education assemble a group of
Japanese educators to work with the members of the Mission. However, this
group of educators was also subject to approval by the CI&E staff. In his
memorandum of the Education Mission, Gordon T. Bowles wrote,

The selection of the Japanese group of educators who served as
opposites for the Mission group was mainly limited to those whose
English was adequate at the conversation level. This tended to limit
representation in many fields of specialization and to bias the Japanese
group in the direction of those already familiar with and attuned to
western and especially American education and goals in the broadest
sense.\(^{91}\)
CI&E did make changes to the group so that "this committee [the Japanese Education Committee] was composed of liberal educators." As Bowles had noted, these liberal educators were more apt to go along with the reforms SCAP was envisioning.

In addition to the briefings, Gordon Bowles also admitted,

There was a considerable amount of lobbying by officers within that section [CI&E] on MacArthur's staff to make sure that their views and personal experiences were adequately, and, in some instances, persuasively presented to members of the Mission either individually or in small groups.

Robert King Hall was one of those officers. In addition to writing the section in the brochure and briefing the Mission on the problems of the written language, Hall also worked closely with Stevens and Counts while they drafted the chapter on language reform. Hall also was in close contact with William Trow who had been Robert King Hall's graduate academic advisor.

At least three drafts of the chapter concerning language simplification were written. The first draft was written in a more directive tone and was liberal in the reforms it suggested. One proposal in this draft called for all textbooks to be printed with kanji on one side of the page and rōmaji on the other side. This concept was almost identical to the policy Hall had tried to pass earlier on his own initiative. However, this proposal was deleted and the overall tone was made more advisory in the final draft. This was the result of the influence from Gordon Bowles and a group of conservative Japanese educators.
The Japanese Education Committee, even with its liberal makeup, did not agree with the idea of romanization. The committee was aware of Hall's attempt to persuade the Mission to urge the adoption of romanization, and they made an effort to counteract this by producing a report of their own declaring that it was too early to replace all the kanji characters with rōmaji. Additionally, Shigeru Nambara, president of Tokyo Imperial University, had formed a committee parallel to the Japanese Education Committee to discuss the problem of language simplification. Their paper on language simplification called for a reduction in the number of kanji, a revision of the rules for kana usage, and a simplification of writing the kanji characters. The Japanese had been informed of the nature and content of the first draft, and Gordon Bowles admitted that the members of the Special Committee on Language were influenced by the strong Japanese reaction to that draft. Bowles also took an active part in the rewriting of the chapter on language simplification. Unlike the members of the Special Committee on Language, he was opposed to romanization because he considered it too liberal and thought it "might well jeopardize the net benefits which were likely to be achieved by the report as a whole." Bowles was also, Joseph Trainor wrote, the only person attached to the Mission who "was in any detailed way acquainted with Japan and Japanese education". In the second and third revision Bowles kept fighting for the chapter to take on a more advisory tone, and to some degree he was successful. Robert King Hall was upset with the revisions which had been made, and he resented the efforts Bowles made to soften the tone of the chapter.
The original purpose of the Japanese Education Committee was to provide the Mission members with Japanese counterparts with whom to discuss the problems of the Japanese educational system. Two problems arose, however. The first problem, mentioned previously, was that the members were subject to approval by SCAP. The second was that Mission members rarely spent any time with these Japanese. One reason was that Mission members were given VIP status and thus couldn't visit with Japanese on an informal basis. The other reason was that not enough time had been allotted for the two groups to interact. Instead, many Mission members spent a majority of their time touring and sightseeing.

Contrary to popular belief at the time, leisure was the primary emphasis of the schedule of the United States Education Mission. The schedule was so relaxed that despite the short stay in Japan, members were instructed to use the weekends for travelling and told to anticipate being entertained by the Japanese at least 3 evenings per week. At the end of the first week—a week spent listening to lectures from SCAP officials, Mission members travelled to Kyoto and Nara on what was predominately a sightseeing tour. Between the date of their return to Tokyo and March 30, 1946—the date the report was submitted to General MacArthur—the Mission members primarily worked within their committees to draft their respective reports. Thus, Mission members were ready to formulate their committee reports simply on the basis of the lectures given by SCAP officials. The problem with this is that SCAP officials were not experts on how to reform the educational system—this was the reason for the Mission in the first place. The people with the better understanding of what would and would not work in Japan were the
Japanese, and the Mission seemed to spend little time asking them for their opinions. Furthermore, what Japanese they did spend time with had been subject to the approval of SCAP. The majority of the information Mission members were exposed to was only what SCAP wanted the Mission to hear.

This leads to one of the underlying purposes of the Education Mission: to publicly announce the policies of the United States government in the area of educational reform. Before the Mission arrived in Japan, SCAP policy had been fragmented, uncertain, and open to manipulation by individual staff members (like Robert King Hall) and officials in the Japanese government because there was no formal, public policy to follow. The Mission's report gave officials in SCAP a set of guidelines to follow so that every officer knew what official SCAP policy was in their respective area. Furthermore, since these policies now had the backing of the United States Education Mission, they were less likely to meet with opposition by Japanese government officials.

SCAP probably intended to accept the Mission's report as official policy, but a problem arose when the Mission surprisingly recommended romanization. SCAP did not foresee the Mission promoting Hall's recommendation, but SCAP officials had failed to see Hall's influence on the Mission. Since SCAP was unable to stop the Mission from recommending romanization, it now had to find a way to select only the recommendations it desired. SCAP wondered how it could justify ignoring the recommendations of a Mission it had asked to visit Japan because of the lack of expertise among SCAP officials. Although SCAP declared that the report was not
official policy, every recommendation was made into SCAP policy except romanization.
REACTION TO THE EDUCATION MISSION'S REPORT

The Mission's report helped to shape Japanese educational reform throughout the Occupation. While it was generally received favorably, there were dissenting views. In an article published in an education journal in August 1946, Caroll Atkinson thought the report was "just about what one would expect to come from a group of traditional educators making a brief tour of the country." Edward Beauchamp echoed this view later in a 1982 article,

[the Mission members] had spent in an alien cultural environment a hectic three and one half weeks, during which they were able to devote less than one-half of their time to a serious systematic study of Japanese education, and... were intensely lobbied not only by CI&E personnel but also by Japanese officials--each with their own interests in mind. Could anyone have reasonably expected a significantly different set of recommendations from the Mission?

No one seemed to question the competence or the modus operandi of the Mission immediately after the report was submitted to General MacArthur. When the Mission members submitted their report to General MacArthur, he thanked them for "the time they so generously gave and the contribution they have made toward a better educated world." The immediate reaction to the Mission and its report by most Americans was favorable. In the United States, the report was heralded to be "a piece of work of which all America may well be proud." It was also proclaimed as the crowning achievement in education and U.S. foreign diplomacy and was
designated as "one of the most brilliant reports of any group that visited Occupied Japan."^{113}

Nevertheless, there was debate. The biggest debate centered on the Mission's recommendation that romaji should be adopted by the Japanese. At the time of the announcement, romaji supporters celebrated this recommendation by the United States Education Mission because it seemed to legitimize the arguments they had made. More articles were published in American journals immediately after the report was announced urging the American government to follow the wisdom of their own Education Mission.^{114}

Many people were persuaded by the report, including John Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas. Hilldring was the one who had previously rejected Hall's proposal for writing Japanese only in katakana as impractical. However, after reading the Mission's report, Hilldring changed his mind and urged the State Department to submit a policy paper implementing romaji to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), the official policymaking body for Occupied Japan. Yet, after the War Department insisted "the State Department's idea would place MacArthur in an awkward and definitely unpopular position," the paper was tabled.^{115} The War Department's statement that MacArthur would be placed in an unpopular position was probably a result of strong opposition from Japanese government officials to being forced to implement romanization. What is interesting here is that Hilldring rejected the idea when it was Hall's alone, but later thought it was a great idea because the Mission recommended it—even though the Mission received most of its information from Hall.
After the State Department withdrew its policy paper, Hall still believed he had the green light to convert the Japanese written language to the \textit{rōmaji} script. "To the staff members of the Division assigned to the field of language problems it appeared as if the recommendations of the American Mission constituted a victory for their point of view."\textsuperscript{116} Hall's superiors in the CI&E section, aware of this situation, held a conference among the entire Education division and "it was pointed out that the recommendations of the American Mission did not carry with them a necessity that they be implemented as given and those with respect to language reform should have been considered in terms of the statement made by General MacArthur."\textsuperscript{117}

General MacArthur, at the formal announcement of the report, had in fact declared, "Some of the recommendations regarding education principles and language reform are so far reaching that they can only serve as a guide for long range study and future planning."\textsuperscript{118} MacArthur was reiterating the fact that the problem of language reform was still going to be left up to the Japanese to decide. SCAP reinforced this policy by not including the \textit{rōmaji} recommendation in its own policy paper, "Policy for the Revision of the Japanese Educational System," which was approved on March 27, 1947. This policy paper contained all the recommendations proposed by the United States Education Mission except the \textit{rōmaji} proposal. There was not one mention of language reform or romanization.\textsuperscript{119}

Soon after the report of the United States Education Mission was released, SCAP made it clear to everyone that the question of romanization was to be left entirely up to the Japanese. Besides the comments made by General MacArthur, another incident occurred which made this policy clear.
During a meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, the Chinese representative questioned the chief of CI&E, Brigadier General Ken R. Dyke, on the official policy concerning the kanji characters. The Chinese were interested in the language reforms occurring in Japan because their language was also based on ideographs. If the United States abolished the kanji characters in Japan because they were difficult and illogical, the Chinese would be offended, and Sino-American relations could suffer dire consequences. Dyke, who had been on leave during the United States Education Mission's stay, replied that it was a matter for the Japanese to decide for themselves. Thus, a month after the surprising recommendation for romanization by the Mission, it was clear that SCAP continued to have no intention of pressuring the Japanese to accept the proposals endorsed by the Mission, especially the adoption of rōmaji and the abolishment of kanji. Later, in a publication written in May of 1948, SCAP proclaimed, "The Mission Report gave due recognition to the necessity for language simplification to be carried on primarily through Japanese initiative. This attitude has been basic to Occupation policy toward this problem."

Many staff members within CI&E had been uncomfortable with the idea of forcing the Japanese to romanize. They thought an occupying force did not have the authority to force an occupied country to change its language. Their only interest was "in seeing that a competent group considers the problem, arrives at a fair decision, and puts into effect whatever change they deem wise." As was noted earlier, almost everybody—Americans and Japanese alike—agreed that some simplification was needed, and after the Mission made its recommendations, SCAP only wanted to
ensure that the Japanese did study the problem thoroughly and come up with a solution by themselves to simplify the written language. Finally, SCAP also wanted to ensure that all government documents were able to be read by the average Japanese. This was one of the reasons why the new Japanese Constitution was written in the colloquial form when Japanese tradition called for it to be written in the literary form.

Having been defeated by the rest of the Education Division, Robert King Hall requested to be transferred out of the Occupation soon after it was decided that the policy paper would not contain the romaji recommendation. Hall left the Occupation, started teaching at Columbia University, and began writing his book, Education for a New Japan. In it he warned that a conspiracy was preventing the single most important reform from taking place. He asserted,

The most basic reform of all, the achievement of accessibility to knowledge through a fundamentally revised writing system, promises eventual capacity for self-government, but has met with indifference or antagonism from the Occupational Authorities and obstruction from the vested Japanese interests.

Robert King Hall complained that "conservatism and personal bias of Occupation officials" in SCAP and the Japanese government were impeding democracy by not enacting romanization into law as the United States Education Mission had suggested. Hall further suggested "that a technical recommendation by a low-ranking officer gets very short shrift if it runs contrary to the traditional channels of the military mind."
What Hall failed to mention was that he was given the opportunity to develop a staff study on the problem but failed to argue his point clearly enough to persuade his superiors to change the current policy of non-interference. The staff study was not completely discarded because it did contain "a considerable amount of valuable evidence which indicated the need for some positive action to be taken with regard to problems of the written language." However, SCAP officials did not believe there was enough evidence to warrant forcing a complete switch to romanization. Hall failed to give the real reasons why his superiors rejected his proposal, and he also failed to divulge the influence he had exerted over the Education Mission.

American supporters of the Rômaji Movement at the time believed the success of romanization depended on sponsorship from SCAP. John Ashmead contended in a January 1947 article in the Atlantic Monthly that the Japanese typically rely heavily on direction from above and wrote, "Unless language reform is promoted by the Military Government, now the supreme authority in Japan, it will not be accepted by the Japanese people." Indeed, the Rômaji Movement faded from popularity as quickly as it had risen.

The primary reason contemporary scholars give for the "failure" of the Rômaji Movement is that romanization was not promoted by SCAP. In his 1981 doctoral thesis, John Juji Hada declared that SCAP's unwillingness to include the United States Education Mission's recommendation in SCAP policy directives is one of the primary reasons for the failure of the Rômaji Movement. In her 1986 doctoral thesis, Martha Ellen Hardesty also examined why rômaji was not implemented. Both scholars claim that SCAP either abandoned the reform to romanize the Japanese written language, or
that the United States government "reversed its course" in the area of language reform. The theory of the "reverse course" claims that the United States abandoned its democratic reform efforts midway through the Occupation in favor of economic development. The theory of the "reverse course" is still being debated today, but this theory simply does not hold true for the Rômaji Movement. These scholars claim that the United States government, along with abandoning other democratic reforms, also deserted romanization. On the contrary, official SCAP policy from the beginning was that the issue of language reform was a matter for the Japanese to decide alone. As this paper has shown, SCAP did not push for romanization in the early years and then decide to drop it in favor of economic development. Rather, from the first rejection of Robert King Hall's katakana policy to the end of the Occupation, SCAP "did not propose to reform the Japanese language or order its reform." Although the United States may have waffled on its policies regarding the breaking up of the zaibatsu and the purge of militarists in the political and business arenas, policy towards language revision remained constant throughout the Occupation.

By believing that the United States "reversed course" on the issue of romanization, Hada and Hardesty are maintaining that official SCAP policy was once in favor of romanization. To substantiate this, Hardesty wrote that "eradication of the traditional Japanese writing system" was "one of the specific goals identified by the Occupational authorities themselves at the onset." Her only proof of this is a statement made by Robert King Hall in 1945. Consequently, Hada and Hardesty mistakenly assume that the work of
Hall or the Mission's report was official Occupation policy—a mistake made by many scholars before them.

Furthermore, alternative simplification measures, including those passed by the Japanese government, have received little or no attention in previous studies concerning the Romaji Movement. Without taking these policies into account, together with the history of language reform in Japan since the Meiji Restoration, one only receives a partial assessment of what occurred during the Allied Occupation in the area of language reform.
JAPANESE ATTEMPTS AT LANGUAGE SIMPLIFICATION

While Americans continued to debate whether romanization should be included in SCAP's official policy directives, Japanese scholars and government officials were discussing other methods of simplifying their written language. These discussions were not merely a result of the United States Education Mission's report or pressure from American officials, however. Educated Japanese, as well as the Japanese government, had recognized the need for simplifying their language many years before. Many of the committees formed, arguments discussed, and simplification measures passed originated years before the Allied Occupation began.

None of the simplification measures being debated during the Allied Occupation were new ideas to the Japanese, including romanization. As previously discussed in this paper, organizations promoting the switch to an all-romaji or all-kana script had existed in Japan since the 1880's. However, the majority of Japanese were not in favor of abolishing a script that had been used in Japan for over 1200 years. "Chinese characters, despite their attendant difficulties, seemed preferable to other scripts by virtue of their semantic content and brevity, and also because of their long-standing tradition of use in Japan."\textsuperscript{140} Japanese valued the "cultural heritage of the language and the aesthetic value of the characters,"\textsuperscript{141} rather than the logic of the romaji characters. Furthermore, the Japanese language contains many homonyms which the Japanese insisted could only be distinguished by the use of kanji characters. The kanji characters were also concise and "they provided visual clues to their meaning."\textsuperscript{142} As the kana and romaji clubs
disbanded in the 1890's due to the rise in Japanese nationalism, the call to reduce the number of characters in common use as a means of simplifying the language gained "substantial support."\textsuperscript{143}

While efforts to implement \textit{rōmaji} or an all-\textit{kana} script were never seriously considered by the Japanese government, alternative simplification measures were attempted. The first major reform was an attempt to limit the number of characters in daily use. Starting in 1887, the Ministry of Education set a limit of two thousand characters to be used in school textbooks.\textsuperscript{144} This edict remained in effect until 1900 when the Ministry further lowered the number to 1200 as well as publishing new rules for \textit{kana} usage.\textsuperscript{145} While the limitation on the number of characters was received favorably, it was later rescinded in 1908 due to antagonism towards the regulation of \textit{kana}.\textsuperscript{146}

In 1921, the Japanese government established a temporary committee, The Interim Committee on The National Language, to investigate the problems of the written language and possible solutions. After deliberations, this committee published another list limiting the number of \textit{kanji} characters to be used in ordinary texts and newspapers. This list was also well received, and most of the major newspapers announced their decision to implement the list in their daily papers beginning September 1, 1923.\textsuperscript{147} Unfortunately, this was the day of the Kantō Earthquake. Due to the resulting chaos and destruction, proposed restrictions on the number of characters were postponed.\textsuperscript{148} In the next few years, attempts were made to re-establish the list, but nationalism and militarism began to rise, and in 1931 the Manchurian Incident turned Japan's attention outward.
Although the war impeded implementation of the previous proposals, Japanese government officials continued to discuss simplifying the language through a reduction in the number of *kanji* characters. To replace the temporary committee, the Japanese government set up the Deliberative Council on the National Language in 1934. During these years resistance against reform was increasing due to the rise of militarism and ultranationalism. Because written language reform would involve reforming the imperial rescripts—an act that could be construed as dishonorable to the Emperor—many were forced to change their minds about favoring written language reform. To abate the fears of disgracing the emperor, the list that this committee produced in 1942 expanded to 2528 characters, seventy-four of which were specialized *kanji* found only in imperial rescripts.

Fears of disgracing the emperor became less significant as the need for a simplified script became reality. Even the Japanese Army soon began to see the need for simplification. As the war took more lives and the Japanese government was forced to lower its standards for recruits, less-educated soldiers were unable to read the names of weapons and their instructions. As a result, the Army passed a regulation limiting the number of *kanji* characters used for these purposes to 1235.

The second major reform was revising the rules for *kana* usage. Although the attempts to reduce the number of characters were somewhat successful, the attempts at reforming the *kana* usage rules during this period met with the same resistance as in 1908. Japanese scholars favoring this type of reform wanted *kana* to become pronunciation-based rather than based on historical usage. Although this reform was equally as important as the
reduction in the number of *kanji* characters, according to some, reforms in the *kana* usage rules were never passed into law until after the end of the Second World War.

The third major reform advocated during the period from the Meiji Era to World War II was the simplification of style. Stylistic differences in the written language were one of the difficulties discussed in the first section of this paper. In the 1880's, many scholars and intellectuals became involved with the *genbun itchi* movement, which called for the written language to be the same as the spoken language. Many Japanese scholars argued that the written language would be simplified the most by removing the difficulties incurred by the stylistic differences. In fact, the difference in style was the reason Japanese scholars gave for the general misunderstanding of the Emperor's surrender speech--this argument was made to counter the American *romaji* advocates who blamed it on the *kanji* characters. These three attempts at reform—the reduction in the number of characters, the revision of *kana* usage rules, and the simplification of style—were the basis for the reforms passed by the Japanese government during the Allied Occupation.

When the war ended, Japanese government officials and scholars still desired to simplify their written language. While they were aware of Robert King Hall's attempt to completely romanize the Japanese language, Japanese government officials pushed on with attempts to simplify the written language through alternative measures. As Joseph Trainor wrote,

For reasons not too difficult to understand, the Japanese considered the advocacy of romanization by Occupation edict symbolized the worst
they had to fear from the Occupation: the imposition of alien notions and the attempt to remake Japan in the pattern of the victor.\textsuperscript{155}

The arrival of the United States Education Mission did not abate these fears. Even though Robert King Hall's direct attempt at forcing the Japanese to romanize their textbooks had failed, Japanese government officials were apprehensive about his influence on the Mission.\textsuperscript{156} As mentioned previously, the opposition to the first draft of the Mission's chapter on language did help to make the tone more advisory, but the Mission still recommended romanization. When the report was announced, reaction by Japanese government officials was cautionary. As an initial response, a Rõmaji Education Advisory Council was established in the summer of 1946, and a year later this council recommended that \textit{rõmaji} be introduced into the elementary school system on a voluntary basis.\textsuperscript{157} Unaware of SCAP's official policy regarding language reform, many Japanese citizens accepted the Mission's recommendations "as Occupational policy, despite repeated warnings to the contrary by the Headquarters."\textsuperscript{158} The Rõmaji Movement became more popular among the Japanese: "the real stimulus to a revival and expansion of activity in the field of rõmaji, however, was the \textit{Report of the United States Education Mission}..."\textsuperscript{159} The popularity of romanization produced by the Mission's report soon faded, however.\textsuperscript{160}

Despite the efforts of Robert King Hall and the United States Education Mission's report urging the Japanese to implement the \textit{rõmaji} alphabet,

As the year 1946 progressed it became clearer and clearer to the Japanese that the occupation meant what it said when it indicated that
the responsibility for running the Japanese Government, including the solving of the many problems which arose, rested squarely upon the Japanese themselves.\footnote{161}

While many Americans refused to believe that anything short of total romanization would successfully simplify the Japanese written language, the Japanese considered romanization only as an alternative, and a poor one at that. Many American \textit{rōmaji} advocates exaggerated the number of characters in use in the Japanese language, some as high as 50,000,\footnote{162} but the Japanese argued that the number of \textit{kanji} in daily use was closer to 2,500. While many more characters did exist, these were usually \textit{kanji} used in specialized fields or for naming places and people. Japanese government officials and scholars did agree that too many characters were used commonly, and that the language had its difficulties, but they remained unwilling to completely discard it in favor of a foreign-based writing system.

By enforcing the limitation of \textit{kanji} characters, revising the rules for \textit{kana} usage so that they were pronunciation-based, reducing the number of readings for each character as well as simplifying the way each was written, and writing the language in the colloquial style, many Japanese scholars believed the written language would be vastly simplified. And this is precisely what was accomplished. On November 16, 1946, the Cabinet issued both the \textit{Tōyō kanjihyō} ("List of Characters for Current Use") and the \textit{Gendai kanazukai} ("Modern Kana Usage"). The first restricted the number of characters in common use to 1850 and the second simplified the use of \textit{kana} in writing.\footnote{163} In January of 1948 another list was published simplifying the \textit{on} and \textit{kun} readings for each character.\footnote{164} Finally, in April of 1949 a list was
published simplifying the actual form of some of the more complex characters themselves.\textsuperscript{165} Additionally, the Japanese government decided that "public documents should be written in the colloquial style rather than in the old literary (bungotai) style."\textsuperscript{166} To set the example, the government published the new Constitution in the colloquial style under pressure from SCAP officials. Similar proposals had been passed before, but compliance among newspapers and writers was difficult to achieve. Due to the nature of the military occupation however, compliance with these reforms at this time was almost total.\textsuperscript{167}

With the passage of these alternative simplification measures, what became of the Rômaji Movement? The interest in romanization swelled as a result of the Mission's report, but was this a result of general interest among the Japanese people or superficial concern stemming from the American fascination with the subject? At this point, this question remains unclear. The Japanese government did comply with the report by establishing a committee to discuss romanization and passing a law to introduce romanization into the elementary schools. However, as it became clear that the official American stance on this issue was non-interference, Japanese citizens seemed to lose interest in romanization. Fewer and fewer rômaji magazines were being published, and fewer articles appeared in Japanese newspapers calling for romanization.\textsuperscript{168} Even though Japanese citizens were being exposed to more and more rômaji through the school system and various signs and magazines, the Rômaji Movement continued to lose the sudden popularity it had achieved. Was this a result of the success of the simplification measures
passed by the Japanese government? Or was the Rômaji Movement being wrongfully suppressed by conservative forces?

Robert King Hall believed that romanization was not succeeding because it was being suppressed by conservative forces. He firmly believed that the only reason why the Japanese public was not embracing Rômaji was that conservative forces within the Japanese government were preventing the public from knowing the advantages of romanization. John Juji Hada expounded on this notion by writing, "The 'rectification of excesses' campaign of early Occupation reforms by the Yoshida Shigeru third through fifth Cabinets was a major factor underlying the failure of the Rômaji Movement." Hada claims that these conservative cabinets overturned previous progress that had been made because earlier reforms were too liberal and went to far. Hada, however, neglects to disclose that no real progress had been made in the area of romanization except for the establishment of the Rômaji Education Advisory Council and the introduction of Rômaji into the schools, and neither of these were repealed by the government. Hence, the theory of suppression by conservative forces is unconvincing.

American Rômaji advocates also blamed the "failure" of the Rômaji Movement on the ignorance of the Japanese people. Robert King Hall wrote,

Ignorance has, of course, been a prominent barrier to reform. Among the common people of Japan, who have suffered most from the intellectual barrier erected by the traditional system, there are few who have the linguistic training to recognize the handicaps imposed by the system and to perceive the advantages of alternative writing systems.
In other words, since Hall could not accept the fact that the Japanese would discard romanization given its logical advantages, he proclaimed that they just didn't have the information necessary nor the intelligence to make the decision for themselves. Therefore, it was the responsibility of the United States government to act in the best interests of the Japanese people since they did not know what was best for themselves. Given the difficulty schoolchildren had with rôma, the theory that the Japanese simply lost interest in romanization after the pressure from American rôma advocates subsided seems more plausible than any conspiracy theory brought up by contemporary scholars.

Consequently, many questions about what the average Japanese citizen was thinking remain unanswered. Since public opinion polls on the matter are not available, obtaining an understanding of the general feeling towards romanization may prove to be impossible. Additionally, past studies give the impression that neither the American or the Japanese governments knew what the other was considering in the area of language reform. More information from Japanese sources needs to be obtained in order to fully understand the Rôma Movement and its role in the simplification of the Japanese written language.
Many of the arguments brought up by contemporary scholars to explain why the Rômaji Movement "failed" are questionable. The contention that the failure of the Rômaji Movement was the fault of a few SCAP officials who would not heed the wisdom of the United States Education Mission and base the Japanese written language on the rômaji alphabet is not supported by the evidence. By examining the information available to date, one can see that the members of the Education Mission were not qualified to make the suggestions of language simplification that they did.¹⁷⁴

Nor did rejection of romanization constitute failure of the United States to raise literacy rates in Japan, democratize Japan, and bring equality to the common Japanese citizen. Japan's literacy rate remains among the highest in the world, although some may still argue that it is inflated. But are those arguments valid? Is it wise to suggest that Japan--one of the leading economic nations in the world--is made up of a nation of illiterates? American rômaji advocates claimed that romanization was the only solution to simplifying the Japanese written language, but, contrary to those beliefs, it was simplified by other means. Looking back, the laws passed by the Japanese government to simplify the written language were successful. The Japanese written language today is far easier to read than the written language prior to World War II. This is not to say that the written language is no longer difficult, however. With the current limitation set at 1,945 characters, the written language still requires a great deal of time and energy to master. However, as the Japanese contended all along, being able to understand the written language does not
necessarily require knowledge of every character. The Japanese written language, difficult as it may be, has not prevented Japan from rising out of the ashes of wartime destruction to the heights of economic success.

This leads to another issue. American rōmaji advocates claimed that the failure to implement rōmaji would mark a return of militarism and inhibit Japan from becoming a successful democracy. Since this is not the situation in Japan, why have contemporary scholars insisted that the Rōmaji Movement "failed"? By making these assertions, contemporary scholars are agreeing with past rōmaji advocates who believed romanization should have succeeded. John Juji Hada even concurs with Robert King Hall's conspiracy theory. To them, the Rōmaji Movement could not have failed as a result of its own drawbacks; the "failure" had to be the result of foul play. The evidence in this paper, however, suggests another possible reading of the situation.

The Rōmaji Movement during the Occupation of Japan was little more than a concerted effort by a few individuals (mostly American) to try and abolish the traditional Japanese writing system and replace it with an alphabet that was easier to read and more logical—at least to Americans. Although Martha Ellen Hardesty did point to this theory as a possible explanation, she still considered American policy in this area a failure. But the "failure" of the Rōmaji Movement was not a result of foul play; the Japanese simply did not desire to replace their traditional writing system with a foreign-based one. Rōmaji had existed in Japan for over seventy years, but its popularity remained low until after the end of World War II. Even then, the evidence suggests that the common Japanese people were interested in romanization when it appeared the United States government was interested in
romanization; interest among the common Japanese swelled after the publication of the United States Education Mission's report. As a result, romaji was formally introduced into the education system by the Japanese government in 1948, but, before the end of the Allied Occupation, the "romance with romaji" had faded. Thus, the Rômaji Movement diminished because it lost its charm with the Japanese public.

Finally, rejection of the romaji proposal does not indicate failure of American policy in this area. Since American policy was to leave language reform to the Japanese government, SCAP succeeded by blocking the attempts of Robert King Hall to force the Japanese to romanize. Simplification, not romanization, was the objective of both governments, and thus the argument that the Rômaji Movement "failed" is inadequate. The recommendation to romanize the Japanese written language as a means to simplifying it was simply a poor alternative.

The main question left unanswered by all of the studies on romanization, including this one, is the role that Japanese government officials and scholars played in the process of language reform. Traditional conjecture surrounding the Allied Occupation of Japan is based upon the United States dictating policy to the Japanese government. Even Toshio Nishi wrote that "It was the American perceptions and assessments of Japanese affairs that provided the concrete basis for American policies." In the past decade, data from the American side has begun to suggest that the Japanese government took a more active role in the formulation of policies during the Allied Occupation than was previously suspected. This paper concurs with
this theory by suggesting that the Japanese took an active role in the simplification of their written language.

In previous studies, romanization is often considered separately from the simplification measures enacted by the Japanese government during the Allied Occupation. Is this a result of lingering perceptions on the American side that romanization was the only way to achieve simplification of the Japanese written language, or is the information regarding the interaction between the Japanese and American governments still to be uncovered? Perhaps it is time to move away from SCAP-centered histories of the Occupation of Japan because there is evidence that the Japanese government did indeed take an active role in determining what policies were going to be legislated during the Allied Occupation. Joseph Trainor does discuss the activities of a Japan Education Reform Council, set up to be independent of the Ministry of Education, but little mention is made of it elsewhere.

To what extent were the Americans aware of what the Japanese were doing and to what extent were post-war Japanese discussions and policies regarding reform of the written language keyed to SCAP policy and discussion? A great deal of information regarding policy-making has recently been released on the American side and was the basis of this paper. But the details of Japanese activity in relation to SCAP policy-making remain unexplored. There is need of an in-depth study which searches Japanese sources to determine the extent to which SCAP and the Japanese government interacted. This would require access to Japanese government documents revealing what was occurring in the Ministry of Education during the Allied Occupation. Minutes or other information from the various Japanese
committees who discussed the issue of language simplification also need to be examined closely. The insight provided by such a study would more clearly illuminate the interaction between Japanese and SCAP policy-makers in the area of language reform as well as other areas of Occupation activity. This would provide a new view of the active ways in which the Japanese government may have contributed to governing the country and to the formulation of policy during the Allied Occupation.
APPENDIX A:

REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES EDUCATION MISSION, CHAPTER TWO: LANGUAGE REFORM


We come now to a matter which both modesty and ease would counsel us to avoid, if our sense of responsibility to the children of Japan permitted. Language is so intimate an organism in a people's life that it is hazardous to approach it from without. This same intimacy operates, however, to retard betterment purely from within.

There is a middle course, and it may here prove to be a golden mean. Consummation of language reform can, we know, come only from within; its initiation, however, may receive a stimulus from any source. It is this friendly stimulus we feel called upon to give, and with it every encouragement to this generation to begin at once that for which all future generations will surely call it blessed.

From a deep sense of duty, and from it alone, we recommend a drastic reform of the Japanese written language.

Clearly the question of language reform is basic and urgent. It casts its shadow over practically every branch of the educational program, from the primary school to the university. If no satisfactory answer can be found to this problem, the achievement of many agreed upon educational goals will be rendered most difficult. For example, the promotion of an understanding of other nations and of democracy at home will be hampered.
The crucial role of language in the educative process and in all intellectual growth is generally recognized. It is a major factor in learning during the period of schooling and throughout the later years of life. The Japanese, no less than other peoples, think by means of the phonetic and written symbols of language. The quality and efficiency of the entire process of education is profoundly affected by the character of these symbols.

The Japanese language in its written form constitutes a formidable obstacle to learning. Practically all informed persons agree that the memorization of the Kanji, in which the Japanese language is largely written, places an excessive burden on the pupils. During the elementary years they are required to give a very great part of their study time to the sheer task of learning to recognize and write the language characters. During these initial years, time that be devoted to the acquisition of a vast range of useful linguistic and numerical skills, of essential knowledge about the physical nature and human society, is consumed in a struggle to master these characters.

The results achieved by the inordinate amount of time allotted to recognizing and writing Kanji are disappointing. On leaving the elementary school the pupils may lack the linguistic abilities essential to democratic citizenship. They have trouble in reading daily newspapers and popular magazines. As a general rule, they cannot grasp books dealing with contemporary problems and ideas. Above all, they usually fail to acquire a degree of mastery sufficient to make reading an easy tool of development after leaving school. Yet no one who has visited Japanese schools can deny that the pupils are mentally alert and remarkably diligent.
To discharge effectively the elementary duties of citizenship, the individual must understand the meaning of simple statements of fact touching social events. He should also possess those elements of general education that will enable him, after leaving school, to master progressively conditions directly affecting his own fortunes. If a child fails to make a beginning in such matters before leaving the elementary school, he rarely will find time or inclination to make the start himself. Approximately eighty-five percent of the Japanese children terminate their formal education at this time.

For the fifteen percent entering the middle school, the language problem remains. These older boys and girls continue to labor at the unending task of mastering the symbols of the written language. Can any modern nation afford the luxury of such a difficult and time-consuming medium of expression and communication?

The need for linguistic reform has long been recognized in Japan. Distinguished scholars have devoted much attention to the question, and many influential citizens, including publicists and editors, have explored various possibilities. It is reported that some thirty Japanese organizations today are concerned with the problem.

Broadly speaking, three proposals for the reform of the written language are under discussion: the first calls for the reduction in the number of Kanji; the second for the complete abandonment of Kanji and the adoption of some form of Kana; and the third for the complete abandonment of both Kanji and Kana and the adoption of some form of Romaji.

A choice among these proposals is not easy. But in view of the facts of history, education, and language analysis, the Mission believes that in time
Kanji should be wholly abandoned in the popular written language and that a phonetic system should be adopted.

Such a system would be relatively easy to acquire and would greatly facilitate the entire learning process. It would simplify the use of dictionaries, catalogues, typewriters, linotype machines, and other language aids. More important still, it would make more accessible to the great mass of the Japanese people the knowledge and wisdom to be found in their own writings in art, philosophy, science, and technology. It would also facilitate their study of literature of other peoples.

That certain esthetic and other values residing in the Kanji can never be fully conveyed by a phonetic system is readily granted. But the common people, if they are to be well informed and articulate in both domestic and foreign affairs, must be given a more simple medium of reading and writing.

The perfection of a unified and practicable plan may be slow, but the present is an auspicious time to begin.

In the judgment of the Mission, there are more advantages to Romaji than to Kana. Furthermore, it would lend itself well to the growth of democratic citizenship and international understanding.

Recognizing the many difficulties involved, sensitive to the natural feelings of hesitation on the part of many Japanese, and fully aware of the gravity of the changes proposed, we nevertheless propose;

1. That some form of Romaji be brought into common use by all means possible.

2. That the particular form of Romaji chosen be decided upon by a commission of Japanese, scholars, educational leaders and statesmen.
3. That the commission assume the responsibility for coordinating the program of language reform during the transitional stages.

4. That the commission formulate a plan and a program for introducing Romaji into the schools and into the life of the community and nation through newspapers, periodicals, books, and other writings.

5. That the commission study, also, the means of bringing about a more democratic form of the spoken language.

6. That in view of the steady drain on the learning time of the children, the commission be formed promptly. It is hoped that a thorough report and comprehensive program may be announced within a reasonable period.

The Japanese language commission appointed to launch this great undertaking might grow into a national language institute to assemble the wealth of data on the learning process that would come from the use of new forms. Such an institute would attract scholars from other countries, for many would discover in the Japanese experience ideas immediately useful everywhere.

The time is favorable for taking this momentous step in language reform—perhaps more favorable than it will be again for generations. The eyes of the Japanese people are on the future. The Japanese are moving in new directions in domestic life and international orientation that will require a simple and efficient medium of written communication. At the same time, the war has stimulated many foreigners to study the Japanese language and culture. If this interest is to be sustained and nurtured, a new system of writing will have to be found. A language should be a vast highway not a barrier.
Thoughtful men and women everywhere, desirous of bringing lasting peace to the world, realize that wherever possible linguistic supports of the spirit of national isolation and exclusiveness need breaking down. The adoption of Romaji would constitute a major contribution to the transmission of knowledge and ideas across national boundaries.
ENDNOTES

2Ibid., 258.
3*Rômaji* is the Japanese term for this system of writing. For a detailed explanation of the Japanese written language see the first section.
5Both Martha Ellen Hardesty (1986) and John Juji Hada (1981) wrote doctoral theses attempting to clarify why the Romaji Movement failed.
6Contemporary scholars argue that the United States "reversed course" midway through the Occupation by switching the emphasis of reforms from democratization to economic development. This theory will be explained in full in the third section of the paper.
7Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Although this acronym was the title given to General MacArthur, it also refers to the entire organization he commanded. In this paper, I will use MacArthur's name when referring to the man and SCAP when referring to the organization.
9Ibid., 2.
10De Francis, 217.
13Ibid., 70.
14Hall, Education, 295. The actual dates are still being debated today because not all scholars believe that the Japanese did not have a writing system prior to the borrowing of the Chinese script. In his book, A History of Writing in Japan, Christopher Seely discusses the question of the God-Age
script, a script that was invented by the Japanese before the introduction of Chinese script. The exact origin of the Japanese written language is not known, but the majority do believe it was copied from the Chinese. See Christopher Seely, A History of Writing in Japan, (Netherlands: EJ Brill, 1991), 4-15.

15 Hall, Education, 299.
16 Ashmead, 68.
19 Hall, Education, 303.
20 Seely, 138.
21 Ibid., 139-40.
23 Seely, 139.
24 Twine, 244.
25 Seely, 141.
26 Ibid., 142.
27 Ibid., 150.
28 A detailed account of the simplification measures taken by the Japanese government before and after the Allied Occupation can be found in the fourth section of this paper.
29 Trainor, 311.
30 Twine, 251.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 201. This quote is taken from a letter from Dooman to Hilldring, July 6, 1945, USNA 894.402/7-345.
35 Ibid.
37 Hardesty, 6.
39 Toshio Nishi, xxiii.
40 Hall, Education, 12.
43 Tsuchimochi, 112. The author bases this information on interviews he conducted with Mrs. William Trow and her son, Dr. Donald B. Trow. Dr. William Trow was a professor at the University of Michigan, Robert King Hall's academic advisor, and a member of the Special Committee on Language--the subcommittee of the United States Education Mission which wrote the chapter on language reform.
45 Hall, Education, 293.
46 Ibid.
47 De Francis, 220.
48 Ashmead, 70.
50 Hall, Education, 329.

52 Ashmead, 70.

53 Trainor, 302.

54 Tsuchimochi, 110.

55 Trainor, 302.

56 Ibid., 303.

57 Ibid., 304.

58 Ibid.

59 Hall, Education, 327. Hall did not conduct these tests himself, but gathered them from Japanese archives and then manipulated them to support his views.

60 Ibid., 314.


62 Trainor, 324.

63 Ibid., 299.

64 Ibid., 324.

65 Ibid., 300.

66 Tsuchimochi, 25.


68 Report, 1.

69 The complete recommendation regarding language reform can be found in Appendix A.

70 Report, 20-22.


72 Hada, 3.
73 Tsuchimochi, 26.
74 Ibid., 34.
77 Bowles, 40.
78 Ibid., 305.
79 Tsuchimochi, 46.
80 Ibid., 44-5. Over half of the members received their doctoral degrees from either an Ivy League school or the University of Chicago.
81 Ibid., 45.
82 Ibid., 112.
83 Trainor, 82.
84 Holtom, 221.
85 Trainor, 69.
86 Ibid., 185.
87 Ibid., 70.
88 Ibid.
89 Tsuchimochi, 112. This is taken from a memorandum from the chief of the CI&E section to Commander Hall.
90 Trainor, 305.
91 Bowles, 306.
92 Tsuchimochi, 97.
93 Bowles, 307.
94 Tsuchimochi, 118.
95 Ibid., 22.
96 Ibid., 114.
By examining the daily schedule of the Mission, I found little time was actually spent investigating the problems of the Japanese educational system.

106 Tsuchimochi, 228. This information is taken directly from the schedule of the Mission.

107 Beauchamp, 180.

108 Bowles, 310.


110 Beauchamp, 188.

111 Report, iii.

The Allied Council for Japan was an advisory body which was set up by the Allies to formulate policy for the Occupation. The council, however, was not given any power to enforce policy because MacArthur still retained supreme control. In effect, it became a sounding board for propaganda between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and a medium for discussion of the policies being carried out by SCAP.


Trainor, 300.

Ibid., 310.

Ibid., 300.

Ibid., 312.

Ibid., 308.


Trainor, 305.

Ashmead, 72.

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section, Education Division, *The Development and Present Status of Romaji in Japan* (Tokyo: SCAP, 1950), 15. Although the number of romaji magazines published had swelled to twenty-seven in September of 1946, by October of 1950, there remained only two.

Hada, 3.

Ibid., 208.

Hardesty, 202.

Nearly all contemporary books dealing with the Allied Occupation of Japan address the issue of the reverse course. Most believe the "reverse course" theory because the U.S. did not follow through on some reforms they had started earlier, such as the breaking up of the *zaibatsu*—large Japanese
conglomerates—and the promotion of labor unions. However, Theodore Cohen, in his book, *Remaking Japan*, does not believe in the "reverse course". Although he does admit the emphasis switched from democratic reforms to economic development, he believes this was a natural evolution of policy. Japan had to develop its economy for democracy to survive.

138 Trainor, 300.
139 Hardesty, 3-4.
141 Miller, *Nihongo*, 43.
142 Twine, 248.
143 Seely, 142.
144 Twine, 250.
145 Seely, 143.
146 Ibid., 144.
147 Ibid., 146.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., 148.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., 149.
152 Ibid., 150.
154 Twine, 237.
155 Trainor, 311.
157 *Education in the New Japan*, 373.
158 Hall, *Education*, 77.
159 *Present Status of Romaji*, 6.
160 Ibid., 15.
161 Trainor, 101.
162 Deverall, 196.
163 Seely, 153.
164 Ibid., 156.
165 Ibid., 157.
166 Education for a New Japan, 371.
168 Present Status of Romaji, 15.
169 Hall, Education, 349.
170 Hada, 209.
171 Ashmead, 72.
172 Hall, Education, 346.
173 See page 12.
174 Trainor, 82. This was thoroughly discussed in the paper.
175 Toshio Nishi, 206. Although the author does not have any official polls regarding this, he did grow up in Japan immediately after the Occupation, was introduced to romaji, and, along with his peers, did not favor the switch to romanization. Along with the decrease in romaji publications mentioned in the paper, this suggests that the popularity of romaji decreased toward the end of the Occupation.
176 Nishi, xxxviii.
WORKS CITED


Atkinson Caroll. "Japanese Education is Getting Revised--a la American!." *School and Society* 64 (17 August 1946): 115-16.


