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BOTTLES, BUILDINGS, AND WAR:
METAPHOR AND RACISM IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN POLITICAL
DISCOURSE

by

Meredith Anne Green

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
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
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I dedicate this thesis to my father, mother, brother, and grandmother for their patience and moral support throughout this project.

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I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my grandfather, Lewis Dipple

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ABSTRACT

Political discourse in contemporary Germany provides a window into issues of racism, nationality, and the overall question of German identity. The use of metaphor and racist semantic techniques in political speeches and articles addressing issues of increased neo-Nazi activity and changes in immigration policy point to an increasing struggle over the establishment of a common discursive framework within which such questions are discussed. Such a struggle itself points to a deeper crisis of the state and German identity.

This paper offers an approach to understanding these struggles by first examining metaphorical conceptions of the nation and state that not only reflect and describe, but actually shape German experience of these phenomena, further impacting conceptions of race and national identity. The active role of racism in creating a common discursive framework and as it informs the process/state project of hegemony is examined. Questions concerning whether the racism detected is "new" and the consequences of establishing a racialized discourse will contribute, finally, to an exploration of possibilities for creating an anti-racist discourse in Germany.

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INTRODUCTION

Let me say in all clarity: The fact that many people in our country worry about the growing flood of asylum-seekers, the vast majority of whom are not persecuted in their home countries on political, racial, or religious grounds, has nothing to do with racism

- Chancellor Helmut Kohl

In a policy statement to the German Bundestag on 12 December 1992, Chancellor Helmut Kohl addressed the parallel developments of increasing immigration and right-wing violence. At issue was the fate of Article 16 of Germany's Basic Law, which at the time stood as one of the world's most liberal asylum policies. According to Chancellor Kohl, changes to the law were necessary if "mass abuse" of the policy was to be stopped and the corresponding right-wing violence halted. But given Germany's history, in light of which Article 16 was established in the first place, tinkering with the law was not simply a national question. In June 1993, when stricter asylum laws finally culminated in a constitutional amendment it became an international issue, gaining world-wide attention as restrictions went into effect and Germany's borders began to close.

Was this simply a national question of "law and order" as the German government claimed? Was it a larger issue of European security? Or was it an act of discrimination and intolerance? In the above quote Kohl quite adamantly denies the anticipated charges of racism. Yet given the fact that Kohl was lobbying *for* a change in policy, *for* a restriction of asylum requirements, denials in this context seem suspect. The evidence is

damning: those affected most by restrictions of asylum policy are third world immigrants and refugees from Eastern Europe. The logic is blatantly faulty: presuming that if neo-Nazis attack minorities, it necessarily follows that if there are fewer minorities there will be less violence. Add to this the weight of German history and Kohl's denials, no matter how vehement, don't stand a chance. Yet in the face of all evidence he insists that, on the contrary, Germany is doing the world a favor by "saving" the asylum policy from further "abuse."

Is it wishful thinking? A rhetorical smoke-screen? Are German politicians deluding themselves? A denial similar to Kohl's was voiced by Friedrich Bohl, Minister of the Federal Chancellery, in early 1993:

As the official charged with formulating our policy response, I am firmly convinced that the suggestion made by some observers that Germany's history between 1933 and 1945 is coming alive again is completely false (Bohl 2/9/93)

With this we come to the heart of the matter - Germany's past. In a year when newspapers are overflowing with reports of solemn German ceremonies honoring and commemorating events of fifty years ago, including the Allied attack on Dresden, the liberation of many labor and concentration camps, and the ultimate collapse of Hitler's National Socialist program, Germans are once again in the position of being looked upon by the world through the lens of history. Even Kohl's statement, itself an attempt to free contemporary Germany from the chains of the past, is seen through this lens. In newspapers around the world, history collides with contemporary neo-Nazism,

underscoring that inescapable link between past and present. It is impossible to understand political rhetoric outside of this context.

Contemporary German Society

Right-wing extremism is not a phenomenon new to contemporary Germany. Activity on the Right has been visible for over a decade, beginning with the inception of the Republican Party in 1983. This party has since ridden the issue of immigration control to national prominence. Meanwhile, the yearly number of criminal acts with right-wing political motives more than quintupled between the years 1983 and 1988. In 1992 there were 2,285 such violent acts, an increase of 54% over 1991 (This Week In Germany 2/12/93). Neo-Nazi thugs have waged a campaign of fear, indiscriminately attacking all minorities, be they asylum seekers, foreigners, or long-time resident "guest-workers." Aided in part by a slow-responding government, these groups have succeeded in normalizing, at least to a certain degree, violence against minorities. The situation reached panic proportions in November 1992 with the Mölln arson attack that resulted in the murders of three Turkish citizens, an event duly noted by other countries of the world. History weighs heavily on the German people, as do the 4,200 Skinheads residing within the nation's boundaries. Alan Watson writes:

By shouting the slogans and flaunting the symbols of the Third Reich, these [neo-Nazi] groups have a mesmeric hold on both former victims and former perpetrators...Their is the pulling power of the nightmare (1993:15)

While this is the picture painted for us by newspapers and the evening news, a more thorough look at contemporary German life and politics finds recent assumptions about German events and "character" to be oversimplified and uninformed. Focus on the "crisis of immigration" has eclipsed focus on the crisis of unemployment, the crisis of an aging population, and the continuing crisis of reunification. Although the two separate German States were brought together again nearly six years ago and the event has long-since faded from the world stage, the jarring effects of such economic, political, and social upheaval will continue to reverberate well into the twenty first century. For example, in the former East Germany one finds the paradox of newly renovated streets and buildings surrounding deserted factories, "rusted industrial dinosaurs" (Fulbrook: 213). With the collapse of communism came the collapse of traditional markets which guaranteed demand for industrial products. Privatization and the transition to a capitalist economy found East German products unable to compete with established West German industry. Further, as Soviet central planning had established total regional dependence on a single industry, loss of that industry proved devastating. For example, the town of Rostock built ships, and only ships, for the Soviets. Subsequently, when the shipping industry went under, so did the town of Rostock. Unemployment soared to over 60% in 1991(Watson:7). The result was a strengthened political Right and the increasing lure of neo-Nazi organizations.

Wider-ranging effects of the collapse of communism must also be considered. Overall estimations vary according to which source is cited, but according to Watson 1991 and 1992 witnessed between 1.1 and 1.5 million immigrants entering the Federal Republic

each year (1993:9). They joined the 4.5 million guest workers already there. In a May 6, 1993 press release it was noted that "since the start of the armed conflict in former Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Germany has absorbed almost 300,000 persons from conflict zones" (press release 5/6/93). One must also consider illegal immigrants crossing into the country every day as well as the categorically problematic ethnic Germans who have, in a sense, returned home. It would be difficult for any economy to adjust to this kind of influx. As it was in the "new" Germany, competition for already scarce jobs added to an economic recession and growing pessimism. According to Watson, "unemployment and immigration had converged to create laboratory conditions for the growth of xenophobia" (1993:10).

History, Language, and Metaphor

Given these considerations, explanations of racism become more complex. Simple, essential linkages between past and present are more difficult to locate and accusations of racism are made with less certainty. But if we dismiss this simplistic past/present framework for understanding recent events in Germany, how then can we understand them? If we dismiss, as Foucault advises, the common notion of tradition that "makes it possible to rethink the dispersion of history in the form of the same...[and] enables us to isolate the new against a background of permanence," how are we to make sense of even the very term "new-Nazi?" (1972:21) How can we establish as "new" something that is so familiar? While we may find it impossible to eliminate completely the question of tradition, especially given Germany's history, we might still refuse to see recent events as the

"unfinished business" of the past and attempt instead an understanding of them as independent of their so-called "origins" (Hobsbawm:165). We might question the very notion of history itself by emphasizing not continuity, but discontinuity and rupture.

An analysis of political discourse, specifically the discourse of high ranking officials, provides an alternate approach to understanding contemporary German politics and social issues. As opposed to (or perhaps in conjunction with) historical frameworks, discourse analysis focuses instead on the speech, i.e. the "text and talk" of individuals (Van Dijk: 1993) German political elites, in their speeches to mass demonstrators, the German Bundestag, and the rest of the world, touch on all dimensions and complexities of German life today including, as we have seen, issues of increased neo-Nazi activity and changes in immigration policy. Their words provide an ideal site for research. The undeniable use of racist semantic techniques point to an increasing struggle over the establishment of what Roseberry terms a "common discursive framework." In his terms, briefly, a discursive framework refers to:

a common language or way of talking about social relationships that sets out the central terms around which and in terms of which contestation and struggle can occur (1994:361)

The establishment of hegemony, then, is in part a linguistic project. Hegemony, a concept developed more fully below, is a larger process in which a broader material and conceptual framework is contested and perhaps established in a given society. There are material, symbolic, and institutional aspects of hegemony to consider, as well as linguistic.

The terrain of contemporary German society now begins to unfold as a site of

intense struggle and vigilance. The question has moved beyond a simplistic flirting with history into the realm of power, problematizing such statements as those above by Kohl and Bohl. In terms of a level of analysis, we are interested in the level where social and linguistic boundaries of "text and talk" are manifest and can thus be studied. Without dancing much closer to theories of social psychology and personal cognition, we are interested here in the level of *comprehension*. The terms in which questions of hierarchy, nationhood, and race are understood are not given in any society. In each society they are established along lines of privilege and power. Hence, they are constantly under duress, constantly shifting under pressures of warring factions with clashing interests. Where these lines (in our invisible matrix of social relations) are drawn constitutes the "frameworks" to which Roseberry, and I in this paper, refer. This level of comprehension can be accessed through the language in which actual discussion and debate occur.

Examining the metaphors employed by German politicians contributes much to a project of outlining the discursive framework within which issues of race and immigration are debated. "Metaphor" here, though, takes on an expanded, more comprehensive meaning than a simple rhetorical flourish or literary device. Lakoff and Johnson suggest that the metaphor be understood instead as a phenomenon that is "built into" the conceptual scheme of a culture. In the opening of their book, *Metaphors We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson write:

We have found...that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (1980:3)

In essence metaphor is a tool of comprehension, referencing something in terms of something else. For our purposes, the metaphor is a way of understanding the non-physical in terms of the physical and the invisible in terms of the visible. For example, to envision society as a "fabric" allows us to understand how it can "come unraveled" or be "torn apart" by racism. That which is ambiguous and indeterminate is thus rendered real, actual, and substantial. Metaphors, then, contribute to the creation of "common sense categories of experience," lending "concreteness" to ambiguous categories (Alonso:380). It follows that metaphors contribute as well to the analytic concepts developed to understand experience, for theory, like metaphor, is a tool of comprehension, employed to understand such experiences as race and nation. In his article "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," Roseberry exposes the metaphorical nature of such theories as Corrigan and Sayer's "great arch" of English nationalism and James Scott's "field of force." To this we can easily add Gramsci's metaphor of war employed to understand class relations. Thus metaphor often encompasses metaphor, further problematizing and confusing attempts to grasp the nature of a situation, or in our case the meaning of a speech.

The categories most referenced by metaphor in German political speeches are those with which I will be primarily concerned with in this paper, namely the nation, the state, and immigration. According to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors not only describe our experience, but actually shape it. Given this, my main premise is that the ways in which German politicians talk about nation, state, and immigration, i.e. the metaphors and other semantic techniques they use, not only reflect and describe, but actually shape German

experience of these phenomena, impacting conceptions of race and national identity. Lakoff and Johnson would add that metaphors highlight certain aspects of a phenomenon while simultaneously concealing others. Hence, metaphors (in speech and theory) structure our experience only partially, leaving room for contestation and struggle. At stake in the struggle is the role these metaphors and semantic techniques play in the creation of a common discursive framework, and the consequences of that for racism and overall questions of German identity.

The remainder of this paper will be devoted to exposing and discussing the metaphors and semantic techniques employed by German politicians in their speeches. The first section will outline two generally accepted premises of "the nation" and "the state" - namely Anderson's suggestion that the nation is "imagined," and Abrams' similar suggestion that the state is "illusory." How these concepts are substantialized through the use of metaphor and how they lend themselves to racism will be discussed. The techniques of metaphorical analysis are those delineated primarily by Lakoff and Johnson. In the second section, after a brief introduction to the work of Van Dijk that summarizes his position regarding elite discourse, I will move beyond the broad, conceptual metaphors to more specifically racist semantic techniques. For these analyses, I focus on four political speeches, all of which address issues of violence, racism, and immigration. "The Dignity of Man is Inviolable" is the title of a speech given by Herr Richard von Weizaecker, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The speech was delivered at a mass demonstration in Berlin on 8 November 1992, prior to the Mölln murders that lit the fire,

metaphorically speaking, under the issue of immigration in Germany. "Extremism and the Rising Propensity for Violence in Germany" is the title of a policy statement delivered to the German Bundestag by Helmut Kohl on 10 December 1992, an excerpt from which opened this paper. An untitled address, also by Chancellor Kohl, made to the Diplomatic Corps in Bonn on 3 December 1992, speaks to broader issues of German reunification, development, European security, and human rights. Lastly, "Violence Has No Chance in Germany" is the title of an article by Friedrich Bohl, Minister of the Federal Chancellery. The article was published in *The Christian Science Monitor* on 9 February 1993. Finally, an exploration of German elite racism must at least tentatively offer possibilities for creating an effective anti-racism. The possibilities for such a project will be entertained in the conclusion of the paper.

CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE NATION

Even if, in some cases, we had never met before, I felt that the pattern of our lives was almost identical.

- Slavenka Drakulic, *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed*

A key feature of the body of literature on nationalism is a decided lack of decisiveness. Repeated attempts to define nationalism is a phenomenon that itself points to a lack of agreement as to what the word even means. Terms are constantly reintroduced and redefined. Criteria are first suggested then rejected as too vague, narrow, or subjective (Hobsbawm:1990). Further, such exercises are invariably prefaced with remarks about the paradoxes, ambiguities, and difficulties inherent in the idea itself. As a category and concept, nationalism is philosophically empty, yet politically powerful (Anderson:5); universal, yet particular (Anderson:5; Balibar:54); "intrinsically ambiguous" (Balibar:45); and as an analytical concept developed to understand the formation of "common sense categories," nationalism suffers from an acute case of "misplaced concreteness" (Alonso:382). That is, nationalism as a concept has been endowed with an objectified, substantial reality that, in essence, doesn't exist. Accordingly, objective criteria have failed to define nationalism and are "as useless for purposes of the traveller's orientation as cloud-shapes are compared to landmarks" (Hobsbawm:6).

Anderson has provided a definition of the nation, however, that has since been widely employed, i.e. the nation as an "imagined political community" (1983:6). I, with Alonso, believe that this conception of the term has done much to expose and remove the supposed "concreteness" that has eluded definition for many years, and contributed to a

much needed foundation in the literature. The concept is best explained in Anderson's own words:

[The community] is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion (1983:6 emphasis in original)

It is this "communion" that provokes declarations of unity and comradeship such as that found in Slavenka Drakulic's above quote. Yet the instinctive closeness, the feelings of national unity are not inherent or biological. Anderson shows us that nationalism is a social construct, an invention, a cultural artifact (1983:4). It is subject to creation, manipulation, and extinction. This is a radical departure from nationalism as it is popularly considered. It is hard to fathom, yet for an example we need not go back further than fifty years:

...it was the communist regime which deliberately set out to *create*...'nations' in the modern sense, where none had previously existed, or been thought of... (Hobsbawm 1990:166 emphasis in original)

It is a fair question to ask how this "communion" is established. To the extent that it is a process and that this process is in part linguistic, the literature is in agreement. Alonso, for example, suggests that with "tropes of substance" the nation can be bound as a collective subject (1994:384). This can be done using metaphors suggesting that individuals are bound by kinship, sharing some bodily substance such as blood or genes. The German term *volk* is familiar even to English speakers, recognized as a term that represents Germans as "related" to each other over centuries by blood (Le Gloannec:129). *Volk* is a term that binds all citizens as a unified German subject. While *volk* is absent from

the speeches I have analyzed, lost most likely in the translation, the phrase "we Germans" is used copiously in every speech. "We Germans" serves to level differences and unify the body politic. In this way, "we" can have a common purpose, a collective duty, and "we" can take action against right-wing violence.

Yet beyond the commonality of "we Germans," beyond understanding the nation as a group of "relatives," politicians make an even more direct reference. Their language reflects a conceptual jump, from understanding the nation as a collective group of bodies to understanding the nation *as a body*. In a broad sense, metaphorically, the nation is an **entity**. More specifically, the nation is a **body**. The nation is personified and takes on human characteristics and abilities. In a single speech, Helmut Kohl mentions the "psychological effects" of reunification and the "rehabilitation" that is still left for the former East Germany. Society is "faced" with problems but the country remains as "well-disposed" to foreigners as any human. Germany has an "identity" and even engages in a "dialogue" between North and South (Kohl 12/3/92). In a separate article distributed by the German Information Center, the author makes remarkable use of personification: the country "faces" challenges, undergoes a "transformation," engages in a "painful" process of reunification, and must be "re-oriented" ("Rightwing Radicalism in Germany" 1). von Weizsaecker notes that the country receives "respect," and that the demonstrators whom he addresses are gathered in the "heart" of the capital (11/8/92) The nation is a **body** metaphor is grounded experientially in the concept of creation, more specifically, birth (Lakoff & Johnson:74). Herr von Weizsaecker, in his speech at the mass

demonstration in Berlin, glorifies "the unshakable courage 'born' of non-violence"(11/8/92). In this way, the nation (and non-violence) are conceptualized as entities, specifically as human bodies that engage in human activities. This metaphor of substance endows the nation with an identity, feelings, and a voice.

That the nation is actually *experienced* as a body is reflected in the population's ready acceptance of the idea that immigration and foreigners "infect" the body, or "attack" it ("attack" is part and parcel of another metaphor, a war metaphor, that will be discussed more fully below). The concept of purity, then, or national "health," is understood as an extension of the nation as a body metaphor. From here, it is not a far slide into racism. Obviously, high-profile politicians would not be so crass as to blatantly suggest that immigrants represent an "infection" of the nation. But the conception of the nation as a body certainly makes this jump possible. Alonso suggests that kinship tropes, and I would add metaphors of personification, "substantialize hierarchical social relations and imbue them with sentiment and morality"(1994:385). Having established the nation as a person, and thus imbued it with morality, politicians draw on this morality. "We Germans" are morally placed at the top of a social ladder, placed in a position from where paternalism and condescension can be exercised. The speeches demonstrate that paternalism and condescension are not only sanctioned, but encouraged. Herr von Weizsaecker declared:

We know very well who, above all others, depends on this protection: the weak who cannot help themselves and strangers who find themselves in unfamiliar surroundings...A sympathetic understanding for everything new or foreign and for people in need has a strong tradition in Germany...(11/8/92)

In this passage, Germany and the "tradition of sympathetic understanding" is glorified. Linguist Teun van Dijk, in *Elite Discourse and Racism*, suggests that this kind of self-glorification is part of the "positive-self presentation" semantic technique. The expression of paternalism constitutes the flip-side of this positive representation as part of the "negative other" presentation. That is, "we Germans" are positively presented as protectors, and immigrants and minorities are negatively depicted not only as "strangers," but as weak and "dependent" on that protection. The nation, then, not only takes on the form and characteristics of a human, it specifically assumes the function of a father. Immigrants can be easily imagined, in this schema, as children. We can see, then, how a seemingly simple, harmless metaphor can structure experience in a way that is not harmless at all.

Perhaps the most important thing to remember is that if nationalism can be imagined and invented, it can be *re*-imagined and *re*-invented. This contributes to the confusion one finds in attempts to define it. More accurately it contributes to the uselessness of such attempts as well as any objective, fixed definition that might be agreed upon. Nationalism changes and shifts, both radically and imperceptibly. It can be molded to serve a cause, scrapped and re-molded for another. As we have just seen, it can be used to invoke conscious, deep feelings of pride, obligation, love, or hatred. Its articulation in metaphors of kinship and personification serve to ground it experientially and emotionally. The paradox remains in tact: nationalism is ambiguous, yet grounded in experience. Thus nationalism, in all its fuzzy and ambiguous manifestations is a fundamental component of

identity. And as Stuart Hall reminds us: "Identities are never completed, never finished...Identity is always in the process of formation" (n/d:47).

Another criterion that has traditionally been used to specify the concept of nationalism is territory. The "national frontier as prior criterion" for the nation has been used, and is still being used by states and separatist movements all over the world in their own self-definitions. Also, it often provides justification for racism and racist programs. In essence, then, it is possible to simply envision a nationally imagined community within politically concrete borders.

While Hobsbawm problematizes territory considerably by noting instances where it fails as a criterion and does his best to background the issue, territory cannot be excused from discussions of nationalism because the emotional link between a people and the land they live on remains to be explained. Once again we must turn to the realm of the invented, the imagined, to understand this link not as an inherent biological attachment to the land one works or the place of one's birth, but an invented connection that is, over generations, given substance and concreteness. Territory is not, therefore, to be treated as a simple question of geography, as we find with Hobsbawm. Instead we are speaking of the *production of a notion of national territory* (Alonso:382 emphasis mine). National territory is produced, and for purposes of this paper the production of territory, the process of territorialization, is what is of interest.

The process of territorialization facilitates the naturalization of a bond between people and land. It includes the "enclosure, measurement, and commodification of space

for national purposes" (Alonso:382). "Enclosure" in this sense is not simply a matter of fencing off the property in question. It constitutes an isolation of the population as well, a distancing from other populations. Enclosure in this sense produces an inside/outside dichotomy, a sharp distinction between those who belong and those who do not. This distinction then becomes *necessary* for the maintenance of national identity (Hall:n/d). As Hobsbawm reminds us, "if the foreigners with their knavish tricks did not exist, it would be necessary to invent them" (Hobsbawm:174). National identity then, is impossible without "foreigners," without a population against whom one can define one's own group.

The inside/outside dichotomy of nationalism is established in part discursively, with metaphors. Keeping with a broad conception of the nation as an entity, politicians employ a more specific metaphor, namely the nation is a container. Lakoff and Johnson suggest that many metaphors which constitute the conceptual system in terms of which we think and act are not obvious (1980:3). The nation is a container is one such metaphor, employed unconsciously every time one talks about coming *into* or going *out of* a country. This is spatial conceptualization of the nation (Lakoff & Johnson:56). Kohl uses this metaphor when he insists that foreigners "are and remain welcome *in* Germany" (12/2/92 emphasis mine). The nation is conceived of and experienced as a receptacle in which the population is contained and into which and out of which people move. It is possible to reduce the metaphor even further to the social group is a container, marked by the same characteristics as the nation is a container metaphor.

The most overt use of the nation is a container metaphor can be found in Herr von Weizsaecker's speech. In reference to the surge in immigration following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, he said:

As the borders are open, people attempt to emigrate...they all squeeze themselves through this bottleneck which was not designed for this purpose...(11/8/92)

A look at what language is *not* used in reference to immigrants provides further insight. The language is not active. Immigrants are not represented as agents in their own movement. They are not "arriving" or "coming," but are passively and shapelessly "flowing into" the country where they are passively "let in" by the German government (Van Dijk:102).

Getting back to our metaphor, everyone knows that containers, when full of some substance, overflow. Follow these thoughts to their logical end and we can see that the nation conceived of as a container or bottle lends itself to several conclusions that play neatly into the hands of racism. A metaphor overwhelmingly used in these speeches, linked conceptually to the nation is a container, is immigration is a substance. Over and over again immigration is seen as a liquid of some sort. A few examples:

The radical changes of the past few years, increasing migratory flows, and, not least, diminishing moral authority, have engendered a profound sense of insecurity...(Kohl 12/10/92)

Let me say in all clarity: The fact that many people in our country worry about the growing flood of asylum-seekers...(Kohl 12/10/92)

No one can be indifferent to the hardship suffered by the civilian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the increasing flow of refugees, the horrible crimes...(Kohl12/3/92)

It is not a far leap conceptually to envision a nation "overflowing" with refugees and immigrants, "drowning" the resident population in successive "waves" of influx. This metaphor helps to "shore up" racism in several ways. First, it is dehumanizing. A primary tenet of racism is that the victim is something less, something that is not as human as, usually, a white person. Racism is its most effective when the exploited party possesses no human qualities that could suggest that discrimination is not, in fact, deserved. By representing immigrants into Germany as a shapeless, faceless, nameless mass, as a substance instead of even a group of people, racist ends are served. Further, while immigrants are dehumanized, the nation is simultaneously humanized through, as I have discussed, metaphors of personification. Secondly, representing immigrants as a substance, as a "wave" or a "flood," contributes to a feeling of panic, a feeling that the situation is in fact out of control and needs the intervention of, say, stricter asylum laws (Van Dijk:108). It is rhetorically easier and far more effective to "drown in the flood" than to produce an actual number of asylum-seekers that would quite obviously not have the same impact.

Returning to Alonso's discussion of the process of territorialization, the "measurement" of space includes marking off the national space with visual devices. While discursive techniques contribute to a visualization of the national space through the employment of metaphor, visual devices that serve this purpose include, for example, maps. Maps help to create and naturalize the identification between people and territory by creating a visual field that *is* the country. In a purely geographic sense, maps place something physically encompassing and possibly even incomprehensible in the palm of the

hand. But in terms of the process of territorialization maps "have always been both symbols and instruments of power" (Poole:1) and it is this dimension of space and land that we utilize in our discussion of Germany and German reunification. In Germany the Berlin Wall served much the same purpose as a map, i.e. it was a visual indicator of a boundary. Yet as a symbol and instrument of power it speaks volumes more than as a mere geographical marker.

The significance of the Berlin Wall and its collapse on 9 November 1989 evidences the extent to which the process of territorialization was completed in the former East Germany:

I lived for eighteen years with the Wall in my backyard...and we talked about the Wall every single day of the year, how inane it was. You could hear people on the other side talking but you would have been shot if you had tried to talk to them. When the Wall was finally down, we rode our bikes over every evening with hammers and chopped away at it, trying to get it out of our sight...

- Helga Schutz, writer and filmmaker (Dodds & Allen-Thompson:104-5)

Communism was clearly unable to re-invent the link between territory and people. Beyond "measuring" the national space, East German politicians after W.W.II could not naturalize new boundaries. Combined with significant political, economic, and social changes, the realignment of national space could not override an older bond between people and territory that had been in production for hundreds of years, each succeeding generation endowing it with more concreteness and substance. The upheaval of geographic realignment in 1945 was diminished for West Germans because they were spared the shock of communism. The link between territory and people was only re-invented in the West to

the extent that East Germans had now become the "outside" of the inside/outside dichotomy, and therefore provided the "otherness" required for West German national identity.

While new territorialization processes put into motion after W.W.II were never fully naturalized, never reached the stage of the "commonsensical," they were nevertheless acknowledged, and to a certain extent accepted. Reunification in 1989 disrupted this accepted national space in both the East and the West. Consequently, the old partitioning of space doesn't hold anymore, nor in a sense does the old partitioning of people. Boundaries have shifted and the inside and outside have become confused. There is a massive scramble to determine who belongs and who does not.

Myths professing the homogeneity of the German people and the difficulty of integration contribute to the confusion (Smith:1992, Rätzzel:44). Although it has been shown time and again that Germany is a country of immigration, or at least diversity, "a majority of Germans continue to think primarily in terms of a culturally homogenous, monoethnic community..." (Fulbrook:212, Rätzzel:44). Loss of established boundaries has evoked serious re-evaluation of such beliefs. In the words of Hobsbawm:

In the unhappier countries they are, and have always been, our neighbours, but our very co-existence with "them" now undermines the exclusive certainties of belonging to *our* people and *our* country (1990:174 emphasis in original).

We have seen how the enclosure and measurement of the national space is accomplished, at least in part, discursively. It follows that the uncertainty surrounding who belongs within that space and who doesn't will be reflected in metaphors used to discuss

immigration and nationality. As I have demonstrated, metaphors chosen to refer to the country are not the same from speech to speech, or even within the same speech. The nation is a body and the nation is a container are two distinct metaphors that seem to be at odds, fighting for conceptual space within the mind of an audience. Specifically, there appears to be a contradiction in the metaphorical organization of the nation. The confusion is understandable, but we must ask if these metaphors are in fact conceptually opposed to one another.

We can answer this question at least in part by asking what these two metaphors have in common. Primarily, they share an objectification of space. In both cases the nation is an object. In both cases boundaries have been projected onto something that socially (not geographically) has no boundaries, i.e. the nation. The non-physical is conceptualized in terms of the physical. Utilizing a distinction posed by Lakoff and Johnson, the metaphors may not be *consistent*. But because they are *coherent* within the metaphorical system that structures our experience, the nation is experienced in the same way through both metaphors. Within the broader metaphorical system, then, there is room for inconsistency. Additionally, because "metaphorical structuring of concepts is necessarily partial" neither metaphor can account for the entire conceptual experience of the nation (Lakoff & Johnson:52). Each metaphor highlights certain aspects of the nation while simultaneously concealing others. Together they work to illuminate the broader conception of the nation as an object.

The partial structuring of concepts also helps us understand metaphorical slips into racism. By highlighting the physical unity of bodies and containers, these metaphors contribute to the myths of German homogeneity mentioned briefly above. The nation is a body and the nation is a container both conceal the differences within a population while simultaneously highlighting the differences arising from contact between one body of people and another. Further, the metaphor immigration is a substance highlights certain characteristics of substances, namely that they can be quantified and assigned a value. Immigrants and their "value" can thus be placed on a moral scale where they will, of course, not "measure up."

CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE STATE

And let it be remembered that the people's democracies indoctrination is enforced by the whole power of the State.

Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*

Given what we know about the nation, the fact that the state is as prevalent in the literature and as difficult to define would lead us to conclude that perhaps it, too, is an unfortunate victim of misplaced concreteness. Yet just as it is impossible to dismiss the nation, to automatically dismiss the state as a figment of our collective imagination would undeniably leave us searching about for ways to account for such phenomena as, for example, "official" knowledge or institutionalized power. Indeed, to dismiss the state is to dismiss one of its most enduring definitions. In 1918 Weber wrote:

...a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory (1918:78 emphasis in original)

This definition resonates in contemporary German political speeches:

The state alone holds the monopoly on the use of force...(Kohl 12/10/92)

The state's monopoly on the use of force is necessary...(von Weizsaecker 11/8/92)

Therefore, to dismiss the state is to dismiss the very real threat of "state violence." It is to revoke, in a sense, its own potential. In Germany, variations on this theme include:

...the state has once again demonstrated that it is capable and ready to use all its powers to fight violence and extremist terror (Kohl 12/2/92)

The state has a duty to ensure that German society functions normally...that perpetrators of violence are made to feel the full force of the law...(von Weizsaecker 11/8/92)

We consider this violence as an act of aggression against...our liberal and democratic state. We will combat it with all constitutional means and methods at our disposal (Bohl 2/9/93)

Beyond an understanding of the state as merely an organ of coercion, Corrigan and Sayer suggest that state institutions and activities are "profoundly" cultural and, this said, aim to eliminate the established distinction between a state and the culture over which it presides. The state, in their estimation, has substantial implications "for the constitution and regulation of social identities, ultimately of our subjectivities," an area of inquiry that has previously been quite divorced from studies of government and politics (1985:2). In their own words:

Out of the vast range of human social capacities -- possible ways in which social life could be lived -- state activities more or less forcibly 'encourage' some whilst suppressing, marginalizing, eroding, undermining others (1985:4)

Slavenka Drakulic, in *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed*, illuminates this totalizing, yet individualizing dimension of the state. Vividly describing life under the rule of communism, Drakulic illustrates a culture of shortages and exposure, apathy and paranoia:

Asking for the right to privacy meant you had something to hide. And hiding something meant it was forbidden. If it was forbidden, it must have been against the state (1991:97)

And then I understood perfectly the significance not only of censorship but of its subtler, deeper variations -- autocensorship, internalized in each of us (1991:80-1)

Women of former East Germany add their voices to Drakulic's, accentuating and detailing the pervasive dimensions of communism, the long reach of the state into the personal lives of average citizens. Their words also underline Corrigan and Sayer's emphasis on the state regulation of cultural forms such as education and the church:

I always tried to get the kids to think for themselves. But I also told them that even if they were right, they had to develop the art of getting along because we would always be weaker in a confrontation with the state (Eva Stahl in Dodds & Allen-Thompson:59)

I was a Christian, very opposed to the state, even to the point where I wanted to commit suicide because I couldn't bear it any longer (Gerda Maron in Dodds & Allen-Thompson:73)

I think the schools were an instrument of oppression...the kids developed certain character traits: fear of peer opinion, desire to be part of the group, fear of being an individual (Eva Stahl in Dodds & Allen-Thompson:61)

Shall we suggest to these women, in the face of such fearful and vehement testimony that the state does not exist? Shall we tell them that the shortages in tampons, toilet paper, apartments, food, and clothing are as illusory as their so-called "state?" Perhaps an answer will strike us as this discussion unfolds.

A primary component of Gramsci's conception of hegemony is that "the relations between ruling and subaltern groups are characterized by contention, struggle, and argument" (Roseberry: 360). The above quotes suggest that this was in fact the case in communist Eastern Europe. While the doctrine of communism had, to some extent, become internalized, many citizens were capable of articulating their problems with the state. In many ways, the subaltern groups in the former East Germany were far from the

compliant and docile subjects the system had ordered. They had not all become the captive minds Milosz wrote about in the first years of post-war communism (1951). The relationship between the people and the state was marked instead by antagonism and contention at every turn.

However, subaltern groups do not autonomously express an entirely separate politics and culture. Hegemony is a perpetually shifting process that constructs a framework within which subaltern groups carry on their struggles and arguments (Roseberry:360). That is:

...the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and movements used by subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate themselves to, or resist their domination are shaped by the processes of domination itself (Roseberry:360-1).

Therefore hegemony, like identity, is never finished. It is best understood not as an end product, not as a weapon that the dominant wield over the subordinate, not as a state of affairs, but as a process that articulates the relations found within it. And because the relations within a society are constantly shifting and changing, so too is the process of hegemony, lending it a fragility that must constantly be reinforced. Alonso suggests that:

Cultural inscription is the key for transforming the fragile into the monumental, limiting polysemy by removing hegemonic meanings from the immediate circumstances of their creation and endowing them with a misplaced concreteness (1994:381)

Hence we can speak of the *idea* of a state that is produced (as is the idea of the nation) within the processes of hegemony. Abrams follows this thought to its logical end

and proposes that we are only making things difficult for ourselves by supposing that we must study the state, an entity. For "the state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is" (1988:82). Mystification and aridity abound. The state is an illusion.

In agreement, then, Alonso and Abrams suggest that the state has in fact been endowed with misplaced concreteness and this contributes to such conceptions of the state as those above. This is a conception of the state as an actual entity, one that can possess a monopoly on the use of force, be a victim of aggression, utilize the educational system for "national" purposes, and ban religion. As the quotes demonstrate, "this misplaced concreteness resonates with and is reinforced by everyday experience and becomes 'commonsensical'" (Alonso:380). Such common sense, in turn "impels us to the inference that there is a hidden reality in political life and that this reality is the state" (Abrams:61). Misplaced concreteness draws us into a kind of circular reasoning that results in a lack of critical evaluation. The state, like the nation, is a category of experience that is not often questioned but repeatedly cited and invoked.

Towards what *exactly*, then, should the populations of Eastern Europe and the women quoted above direct their anger? On what basis are their feelings of fear, loathing, and pain experienced? Keeping with Lakoff and Johnson's assertion that life is not just understood in terms of, but in many ways experienced through metaphor, we may begin our discussion here. Abrams writes:

We have come to take the state for granted as an object of political practice and political analysis while remaining quite spectacularly unclear as to what the state is (1988:59)

Instead of going on to determine what the state is or is not, I suggest we stop with "we have come to take the state for granted as an object - " It is the state constructed metaphorically as an object or entity that can provide interesting and important ground for research. The state is an object metaphor allows the state to acquire the general characteristics of an object or entity, even if that entity is suspiciously human. For example, the state can *possess* the monopoly on force, *ban* the church, *control* education, and *drive* innocent people to suicide.

In German political speeches, more specifically, **the state is a building** and thus has all the essential components of buildings. The state, referred to in these speeches by its institutions or as "the state", "liberal democracy," "united and sovereign Germany," and so forth, has primarily a foundation or a base:

- (a) We consider violence as an act of aggression against the very foundations of our liberal and democratic state (Bohl 2/9/93)
- (b) Whoever breaks this rule is attacking the foundations of our liberal and democratic state (Kohl 12/10/92)

Our liberal state based on the rule of law (Kohl 12/10/92)

Through hard "work" the structure is built:

Our friends and partners who helped us build our democracy after years of dictatorship (Bohl 2/9/93)

Jewish compatriots were prepared to assist us in building the Federal Republic of Germany (Kohl 12/10/92)

The resultant building is strong or weak:

Even more vital than applying the law is...to strengthen the institutions which give young people support...(Kohl 12/10/92)

The confidence which other nations have in the stability of Germany's democracy (von Weizsaecker 11/8/92)

Once completed, this building functions as such:

No other country in Europe has given shelter to so many people from other nations (von Weizsaecker 11/8/92)

Therefore, Germany will continue to offer sanctuary to persecuted foreigners (Kohl 12/10/92)

The state as a building metaphor is conceptually and structurally similar to the nation as a container metaphor, i.e. the two metaphors "stand" for the same concept, highlighting the inside/outside dynamic of the country. Although in the context of neo-Nazi violence and immigration these politicians do not utilize this metaphor to serve racist ends, let it be said that in other contexts this is a possibility.

Perhaps most importantly, as demonstrated by (a) and (b) above, this building can be assailed and assaulted by "sworn enemies." Neo-Nazi violence and other belligerent activities of the far Right constitute just such an attack according to German politicians. And under such circumstances, the building must be defended. Counter-attacks are in order:

Last week a decision was made to launch a "safety campaign" against the violence (Kohl 12/10/92)

...we have launched special educational efforts targeting these young people (Bohl 2/9/93)

Our liberal state based on the rule of law is ready and able to use all means available to it to combat violence and extremist terror (Kohl 12/10/92)

Progressively, we can see, one metaphor has slipped into another. The issue of immigration and the violence it precipitates has brought about a war. And the war, according to Lakoff and Johnson, is a primary metaphor through which we conceptualize and experience argument (1980:4). It is not merely a poetic issue, a fancy kind of political rhetoric designed to "strike fear" into the enemy and calm the populace. The war metaphor "is in our very concept of an argument" (1980:5). Arguments are, in fact, "won" or "lost." "Opponents" "attack" each other, "defend" their positions, and "surrender" to the enemy. Such is the conception of neo-Nazi violence and state retaliation in Germany.

The war metaphor, like other metaphors, highlights and conceals certain aspects of the actual situation for which it is a representation. In this case, as in most, it highlights contention, struggle, and difference while simultaneously concealing cooperation and commonality. Although highlighting differences between an average citizen and an average neo-Nazi, in the broad context of neo-Nazi violence, does not immediately offend one's moral sensibilities, if we take a closer look at the adversaries we may change our minds.

Van Dijk notes that "blaming the victim" is a common racist semantic technique employed by political elites whereby immigrants or minorities are blamed for their own oppression (1993:92). In Germany, paradoxically, immigration itself is often professed to be a cause of violence against immigrants and minorities:

The root cause [of "this wave of violence and aggression"] can be found in the fundamental social changes we are witnessing. Increasing migration, the weakening of family structures...(Bohl 2/9/93)

The radical changes of the past few years, increasing migratory flows, and, not least, diminishing moral authority, have engendered a profound sense of insecurity...(Kohl 12/10/92)

These quotes evidence a thinly veiled backlash. Immigrants are welcomed in one breath and blamed for all the trouble in another. Germany is defending itself, it seems, from two enemies -- neo-Nazis and immigrants. While overtly implicating neo-Nazis, German politicians covertly implicate immigrants in issues of "national security." The potential for extension of the war metaphor to immigrants thus increases. In conjunction with "blaming the victim," the war metaphor diminishes the possibilities of cooperation and commonality.

The misplaced concreteness attributed to both the nation and the state contributes in part to the frequent confusion of the two terms, which are often employed interchangeably. Also contributing to the confusion is a conceptual interconnection that links the two terms in thought and practice. Even Anderson flirts with blurring the two terms in his very definition of a nation as an "imagined political community" that is sovereign (1983:6). Although the literature unanimously posits a separation, there is a general concession that the concepts remain closely related. Hobsbawm (1990:10), Wallerstein (1991:81), and Gellner (1983:4) all refer to the necessary prior existence of the state for the emergence of the nation. In the following quote, Gellner demonstrates that the two concepts are separate, yet do not function alone:

Moreover, nations and states are not the *same* contingency. Nationalism holds that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete...(1983:6 emphasis in original)

Within the ideology of America's melting pot, such conceptual proximity allows us (or should allow us) to say "I am an American" and "I am a citizen of the United States" without a great disparity of meaning. It blurs and it conceals. Citizens (subjects of the state) and ethnic groups (members of the nation) move closer together conceptually as differences are elided and the potential for hostility diffused. This contributes to the nationalism that binds Americans to one another.

In contemporary Germany, state and nation are not so easily confused. According to Michael Mertes, "to German ears, *Staat* and *Nation* remain two distinct concepts" (1994:25). The end of W.W.II brought the establishment of two distinct states, whose officials had to grapple with questions of history, democracy, and nationalism. Having broken with the fascist state of the past, the East found the idea of the nation to be a positive concept. Communists who had fought against the Nazis did so under the banner of the German nation. Later, "the nation was looked upon as a panacea, a cure for all miseries" for those who looked to the west for hope (Le Gloannec:136). The West, however, denied the past and banished the notion of the nation:

The West forged a counterpoint to Auschwitz, offering a modern and flawless present, a democratic and cosmopolitan social and political body, removed from the national past. The new Germany -- the Federal Republic -- was devoid of asperity and national celebrations; it was smooth, odorless, colorless (Le Gloannec:137-8)

The adaptability of notions of the nation to purposes of the "state" accents, once again, the element of social engineering involved in the formation of nations and the experience of nationalism. Bringing the state and nation closer together is, for purposes of

peace, in the interest of the German government. Legally this is done by according foreigners the rights of citizenship. This is not enough, however, to merge the two conceptually. The citizen must be bound to the nation as well as to the state, and the minority must become bound to the state as well as to the nation. These must each be a "commonsensical" merger, accomplished within the established discursive framework. Within this framework, tools are available. Once again the metaphor is the tool of choice.

Of the almost two million foreign workers in the western states, some one million work in industry, and about half a million on building sites and in shops...The foreigners who live and work here thus make a vital contribution to our prosperity (Kohl 12/10/92)

Lakoff and Johnson remind us that in the world of metaphor activities are substances that can be measured, quantified, and assigned value. In this scheme, labor is a kind of activity. The structural metaphor labor is a resource is basic to Western industrial societies (1980:66) and is the metaphor on which Kohl builds his depiction of foreigners in the above quote. As the economy is a basic function of the state, binding foreigners to the economy is one way of reducing disparities between state and nation:

We extend our solidarity also to our fellow citizens of foreign nationality. We called them to share in the creation of our prosperity (Kohl 12/2/92)

And not least the millions of foreign workers and their families with whom we live together harmoniously have made a substantial contribution to the prosperity of our country (von Weizsaecker 11/8/92)

These fellow citizens make contributions which are indispensable to our country... (Kohl 12/3/92)

"Indispensable contributions to national prosperity" is the language of economy and resource. On 14 December 1992 the Federal Press Office released a press release entitled "Foreigners are Indispensable to the German Economy." Detailing a speech by Hans Peter Stihl, President of the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce, the press release counted the number of resident foreigners and broke down, by industrial sector, their places of employment:

...for the most part they are employed in semi-skilled or unskilled capacities and are willing to perform hard physical labour, something which Germans frequently refuse to do (press release 12/14/92)

Furthermore, as taxpayers:

...the economic importance of foreigners extends well beyond the labour market (press release 12/14/92)

Foreigners then, by filling jobs, creating jobs, and providing services, contribute to the gross national product and have thus become "fully integrated" in and "increasingly indispensable" to the German economy (press release 12/14/92). This is the arsenal from which government officials draw in attempting to combat racist slogans like "Germany to the Germans."

In Germany, as in all Western industrial societies, the labor is a resource metaphor is part of the common discursive framework within which debates about immigration and foreigners are contained. At issue, however, is not the metaphor itself but what it emphasizes and conceals. Obviously, what the metaphor highlights is the end product. What it conceals, however, is the connection of the labor (and product) to who performs it

and what it may mean to him or her (Lakoff & Johnson:67). The struggle to shift the focus onto who performs the labor provides an opening for racist assaults. By replacing (or at least de-emphasizing) the quantitative aspects of the metaphor with qualitative aspects, foreigners can be morally evaluated according to criteria distantly related to the economy.

Thus, while bringing the state and the nation closer together can potentially serve to conceal differences and diffuse tension, the metaphor that is used, indeed the metaphor *built into* the conceptual system of all Western industrial societies, can be manipulated to serve racist ends and highlight difference anyway. Unfortunately, politicians fight the battle against racism at this lower level of metaphorical emphasis. What is even more unfortunate, perhaps, is that concealing who performs the labor in no way guarantees protection from racism either, and can also be used as a racist strategy. What this suggests, then, is that the potential for racism is in the metaphor itself, not its emphasis. But the metaphor itself and the discursive framework of which it is a part both remain safely intact. While the shift of emphasis is contested, what allows the shift, namely gaps and crevices in the metaphor itself, is not. Thus, labor remains a resource and racist intentions can still be served by the same metaphor, albeit from a different angle or with a different emphasis, in the future.

ELITE RACISM VIA VAN DIJK

In *Elite Discourse and Racism* Van Dijk charges elites in all spheres of society with the production and reproduction of racism:

Many of both the subtly and the blatantly racist events that define the system of everyday racism are enacted, controlled, or condoned by white elites...(1993:6)

Van Dijk's work rests primarily on a distinction between popular and elite racism. Popular and elite racism maintain distinct properties, spheres, and modes of articulation, although each is necessary to the functioning of the other. Political elites, as I have demonstrated, recreate and perpetuate this system of racism subtly, from "the top," in ways that often construct the xenophobia and racism which they then proceed to condemn (Van Dijk:8). Usually thickly veiled and of a "softer style" than popular racism, elite racism has the paradoxical ability "to express tolerance, understanding, acceptance, or humanitarian worldviews" concerning minorities and immigrants while simultaneously creating a cognitive framework that will secure just the opposite (Van Dijk:6).

In Germany this separation of elite and popular racism is strictly observed. Although there are suggestions that mainstream politics is in fact drifting to the right and that principles expounded by leaders of the far-right have infiltrated the German Bundestag, there is no (observable) connection between legitimate parties of the far-right, and extremist violence. Under German law a party can be banned for openly advocating violence (Watson:21).

As I have shown, German speeches are permeated by semantic moves that, intentional or not, serve racist ends. Denial, positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, paternalism, dehumanization, and blaming the victim have all been discussed above, however briefly. While each is, to some extent, singularly effective, what lends them force is their ability to intersect and perform with one another. Hence, we will see them again and again, in different combinations, as I continue to dissect these speeches. I will return first to the examples of denial that opened this paper:

Let me say in all clarity: The fact that many people in our country worry about the growing flood of asylum-seekers, the vast majority of whom are not persecuted in their home countries on political, racial or religious grounds, has nothing to do with racism (Kohl 12/10/92)

...I am firmly convinced that the suggestion made by some observers that Germany's history between 1933 and 1945 is coming alive again is completely false (Bohl 2/9/93)

Van Dijk reminds us that "denials of racism are the stock in trade of racist discourse" (1993:81). However, to understand German denials as more than bad-tempered, stubborn protests on the part of government officials we must turn to history. Racism is understood, in Germany and throughout Europe, as something specific to the Third Reich. According to Kalpaka & Rathzel, history:

...turns the racism of the Nazi-period into something so extraordinary, so aberrant, that it could never be repeated, ideologically or otherwise...(1990:150)

Therefore, to speak of racism today is to insult the suffering experienced by Jews under Hitler's National Socialist regime. What abounds in contemporary Germany,

instead, is *auslanderfeindlichkeit*, or "hostility against foreigners" (Kalpaka & Rathzel:149). Racism, then, is taboo. It is of another order altogether. This said, we must now ask if the words of Kohl and Bohl actually qualify as denials.

They do. The verbal processes of "distancing" and "transferral" are evident not just in the above quotes, but in German political rhetoric generally (Van Dijk:111). With these techniques one can deny racism by distancing oneself from those engaged in racist practices, or by transferring the blame to another group (often the very group that is experiencing the discrimination). For Kohl and Bohl, the distancing is both temporal and political. Racism took place in another time, under another system of rule. If there is any occurrence of racism today (which there is not) it is safely transferred into the hands of neo-Nazis:

...there are also neo-Nazi and extreme right-wing groups and organizations seriously advocating and publicly promoting racism...(Bohl 2/9/93)

Denial also emerges from the confusion of how racially-motivated offenses will be categorized. As it did when neo-Nazism was emerging in the not-so-distant past, the government today wages its war against "criminal offenders" (Bohl 2/9/93). Right-wing violence against minorities and immigrants is not seen as a civil offense. This allows the state to explain and treat right-wing violence as an apolitical, criminal crime (Hockenos:81). Racist and xenophobic transgressions are thus emptied of ideological and political content and the state can then target "violence," not "racism."

All attempts to "conjure up the specter of racist reactions among the white population at large" Van Dijk collects and places under the heading "white racism as threat," another popular rhetorical technique that veils racist intentions (1993:99).

Backlash within the white community is often provided as an excuse for restricting immigration policies. In Germany, though, no one must use their imagination, for the "specter" of white racism is experienced on a daily basis. Therefore, instead of alluding to some hidden threat that has as of yet not revealed itself, German politicians utilize the "specter" of neo-Nazi and far-right violence as "a case in point." Although there is no overt evidence of intent to create a feeling of panic, images of violence serve as reminders of what has already come to pass. It is left to members of the audience to make the simple conceptual leap from what *has* happened to what *can* happen. Kohl in particular relies on this technique:

We are all witnessing an alarming increase in violence in our country. The terrible arson attack in Molln, which claimed the lives of three innocent people, is a particularly depressing example (Kohl 12/10/92)

The conflict between right- and left-wing radicals is becoming ever more violent, not to say brutal...(Kohl 12/10/92)

All of us hear and read shocking reports about violence in schools...(Kohl 12/10/92)

We are quite easily led to believe, by the use to which Kohl puts these images, that he will next appeal to the Bundestag, his audience, to stop the violence and apprehend the criminals. Surprisingly, however, the action he proposes is just the opposite:

We need this amendment to the Basic Law in order to stop the mass abuse of the right to political asylum...(Kohl 12/10/92)

Whether intentional or not the "specter" of violence and brutality benefits the cause of racism by serving as a reminder of what will happen if immigrants are hereafter allowed to enter the country.

Altering the asylum policy so as to "stop the mass abuse of the right to political asylum" is a prime example of "firm, but fair" legislation, is it not? According to Van Dijk, the positive "fair" in the equation is designed to counter-balance, even erase the negative implication of "firm." As long as "fairness" is achieved it matters not how "firm" the German government has to get with immigrants who are "abusing" the country's hospitality. This technique, in itself paternalistic, can function with several other semantic moves. For example, it functions with a "positive-self presentation" that highlights the goodness of the host country. Acknowledging the need for fairness is an expression of humanitarian values and effectively excuses politicians for the measures they must take to guard humanity against those who would "abuse" it. Such an embracing of humanity can undoubtedly have particularly devastating effects for immigrants. Further, Kohl's quote suggests that these restrictions would not be necessary, but the immigrants themselves make it so. Once again, the victim takes the blame.

Finally, Kohl uses the Fake Refugee technique:

The fact that many people in our country worry about the growing flood of asylum-seekers, *the vast majority of whom are not persecuted in their home countries on political, racial, or religious grounds...*(Kohl 12/10/92 emphasis mine)

According to Van Dijk this technique is designed to expose "economic" refugees by highlighting:

...illegal entry, fake passports, lying, making several refugee/welfare applications in different countries or cities, and the activities of traffickers, seen as the merchants of human misery (1990:79)

In the four paragraphs preceding Kohl's plea for a constitutional amendment, then, he utilizes techniques of denial, blaming the victim, positive self-presentation, negative-other presentation, firm but fair legislation, the Fake Refugee Schema, and various metaphors of labor, immigration, and nation. Immigrants do not stand a chance in the face of this kind of assault. The German Basic Law was subsequently amended, and in June 1993 Germany's borders began to close.

CONCLUSIONS

An analysis of how metaphors of the nation and state function with other discursive techniques allows, at least to some small degree, an understanding of what a "common discursive framework" is and how it functions. More than just a common lexicon with which to communicate, a common discursive framework delineates the conceptual boundaries within which communication, argument, and discrimination can take place. Yet setting boundaries and mapping concepts is far from a unified process. Struggle and contestation emerge over how material, social, economic, and political relationships will be expressed, namely how the process of domination will be structured. A homogenizing state project attempting to erase differences will not go uncontested.

However:

To the extent that a dominant order establishes such legitimate forms of procedure, to the extent that it establishes not consent but prescribed forms for expressing both acceptance and discontent, it has established a common discursive framework (Roseberry:364)

To the extent that metaphors and other semantic techniques contribute to the foundation of a common discursive framework, they are links in the chain of power and cogs in the wheel of hegemony. Attention to the processes of which they are a part, such as the production and reproduction of racism and hierarchy, can "illuminate many aspects of a complexly structured field of force" (Roseberry:363).

The force of metaphor is not just expressing, but structuring experience plays a central role in the creation and perpetuation of a discursive framework. As I have

demonstrated, the nation and the state are both understood and experienced through metaphor, as are the related concepts of immigration and race. Further, the experience of racism as a social relation is structured and experienced through language and metaphor. If the possibility of creating an effective anti-racism is to be seriously entertained, then, it is not enough to simply change the surface phrases, the "buzzwords" with which one discusses issues of immigration. It is necessary to understand the structuring nature of metaphor and make changes at the deeper level of conceptualization.

For example, looking to what metaphors highlight and conceal provides an opening for the creation of an anti-racist discourse. Metaphors of the nation and state highlight primarily an inside/outside dynamic which informs issues of "national security" and asylum policy. Metaphors of labor highlight the end product, not who is actually performing the labor. Struggles over the emphasis of a metaphor often represent struggles over the establishment of a racial concept. However, it is often the case that a racial concept is embedded in the metaphor itself and the question is not one of emphasis, but of using the metaphor. These metaphors that ground our experience are the most crucial to change if an anti-racist discourse is to be served. Yet they are also the most resistant to change.

Finally, to speak of metaphors instead of theories in our analyses of experience allows more space, I think, for experimentation and possibility. To the extent that my goal in this paper has been to provide a possible understanding, not a decisive explanation, of racism and politics in contemporary Germany, the visual metaphor of a "framework," with its boundaries and borders, has aided me considerably. Beyond a conventional

understanding of "theory," metaphor as theory allows for freedom and play. Contested dynamics can be more thoroughly examined, and possibilities for understanding can be expanded.

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