INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI®
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder.

SIGNED: ____________________________

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

Anna M. Shields
Assistant Professor of East Asian Studies
DEDICATION

To my parents, in appreciation for giving me a childhood that included an introduction to Chinese culture.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis represents the culmination of nearly three decades of interest in ancient Chinese history, philosophy and language. Many people have been responsible for planting and nurturing the seeds that have helped me to accomplish this lifelong goal. In profound appreciation, I offer my sincere thanks to:

Daniel Lee, my undergraduate advisor, Chinese language instructor, and mentor, for teaching me the practical benefits of "sensible guessing."

Dr. Robert Rau for writing a letter of recommendation for the MA program — 23 years after my last class with him.

Dr. You-Wen Yau, my classmate at the Stanford Negotiation Program, for sending me the copy of Guiguzi that introduced me to the Guiguzi.

Dr. Donald Harper for his incomparable introduction to the richness of the classical Chinese language, for enduring my atonal pronunciations, and for not leaving Tucson until I had completed CHN 523.

Dr. Tom Miller for teaching me that there is also a Western rhetorical tradition.

Dr. Roel Sterckx for providing me with valuable insights into pre-Qin thought and for helping me to develop better translations of the Zhanguo ce episodes.

Dr. Anna Shields for guiding me toward this investigation of Chinese persuasion, for keeping me on track toward an MA, for being a merciless reviewer, and for being unwilling to accept anything less than "best effort."

Ben and Amy for tolerantly accepting the excuse "Sorry, but I've got to study" from their father more times than any of us can remember.

Terry for constantly encouraging and supporting my studies and for being there to remind me that it's important to persevere in order to achieve your goals — regardless of the short term inconveniences. (I couldn't have done it without you)
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Rhetoric of the <em>Zhanguo ce</em></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Analyzing the Rhetoric of the Warring States</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Thesis</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Thesis Organization</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II. SPRING AND AUTUMN AND WARRING STATES RHETORIC</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Persuasion and Disputation</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Political Persuasion During the Spring and Autumn Period</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Philosophical Persuasion During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Eras</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ming Jia 名家 (The School of Names)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ru Jia 儒家 (The Confucian School)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mo Jia 墨家 (The Mohist School)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dao Jia 道家 (The Daoist School or School of the Way)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Fa Jia 法家 (The Legalist School)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Political Persuasion During the Warring States Period</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Rhetoric of the <em>Zongheng Jia</em></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Persuasion and the <em>Zhanguo ce</em></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Persuasion and the <em>Guiguzi</em></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III. THE ZHANGUO CE</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. An Overview</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Two Persuasions of Fan Ju to the King of Qin</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Fan Ju Persuades the King of Qin (Qin 3.9)</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fan Ju Persuades the King of Qin (Qin 3.11)</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV. THE DIPLOMATIC PERSUASIONS OF SU QIN AND ZHANG YI</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Han, Qi, and Zhao Persuasions</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Su Qin Persuades the King of Han</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Zhang Yi Persuades the King of Han</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Su Qin Persuades the King of Qi</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Zhang Yi Persuades Qi</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Su Qin Persuades Zhao</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Zhang Yi Persuades Zhao</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Rhetorical Styles of the <em>Zhanguo ce</em> Persuaders</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Similarities Between <em>Zhanguo ce</em> and <em>Guiguzi</em> Persuasion</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Warring States China................................................................. 58
ABSTRACT

The persuasive speeches of the Zhanguo ce, "The Intrigues of the Warring States," are considered by many to have been written for the purpose of training Warring States political advisers in the rhetorical style of the Zongheng rhetorical school. In contrast to earlier Chinese persuasive styles, the persuasions of the Zhanguo ce were apparently crafted to incorporate manipulative techniques in order to improve the effectiveness of the presentations. This thesis analyzes persuasive speeches from Zhanguo ce in order to identify the types of rhetorical devices used by Warring States rhetors. It also evaluates another reputed Warring States text, the Guiguzi, that openly advocates the use of psychological manipulation in persuasions. Lacking evidence that the received Guiguzi is a valid Warring States text, this thesis compares the Guiguzi teachings and Zhanguo ce persuasions to identify similarities that may indicate general Warring States attitudes toward using psychological manipulation in political persuasions.
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

There are fundamental differences between the persuasive practices of China and the West. While a Westerner may describe the Chinese approach to persuasion as "inscrutable" or "evasive", a Chinese person may likewise characterize Westerners as being "too direct" or even "pushy." Each perception of the other is both correct, from one's cultural perspective, and incorrect, from the perspective of the other.

The history of Western attempts to understand ancient Chinese rhetoric have exhibited mixed results. Much early scholarship established Greco-Roman rhetoric as the benchmark for rhetorical validity. When Chinese rhetorical practices were found to be consistent with Western rhetorical concepts, then Chinese rhetoric was deemed acceptable and even civilized. However, when Chinese persuasive techniques could not be correlated to Western practices, the Chinese approaches were, by definition, illogical. A remarkably egregious example of such a pronouncement was made in "The Chinese Sophists" by Forke:

Their dialectic is of the most rudimentary kind. From their unsystematical reasoning to the subtle logic of an Aristotle there is still a long way, yet in both cases the principle is the same. The Chinese mind has never risen above these rudiments and developed a complete system of logic, perhaps because it is altogether too illogical in itself.²

¹ Young's "Inscrutability Revisited" describes the both Chinese perceptions of American persuasion and American perceptions of Chinese persuasive practices. (Note: I have provided full citations for all works referenced in this thesis at the end of the document) ² Forke, 5.
There was a renewed interest in Chinese rhetoric by Western scholars during the middle of the 20th century. Articles discussing the persuasive styles of various Chinese philosophical schools began to appear in American rhetorical journals. Although many of these articles were written by rhetoricians who, lacking Chinese language skills, based their observations on English translations of the Chinese texts, they introduced Western scholars to a legitimate rhetorical tradition that was not rooted in the Greco-Roman rhetorical canon.

More recently research into ancient Chinese rhetoric has been increasingly conducted by sinologists who have a solid foundation in classical Chinese, Chinese philosophy, and Greco-Roman rhetoric. These scholars have provided new insights into the rich Chinese rhetorical tradition by initially evaluating philosophical texts from a Chinese cultural context and then interpreting their observations in the context of classical Western rhetoric. This approach has not only produced new perspectives on Chinese philosophy, but it has also provided new insights into the similarities and differences between Western and Chinese rhetorical traditions.

---

There has also been a growth in Chinese research in this subject in recent years. Early scholars argued that the pre-Han era was an embryonic period\(^5\) for Chinese rhetoric and that the true development of rhetoric did not begin until the Han Dynasty.\(^6\) Such erroneous contentions have since been rejected with works of scholarship such as the five volume "History of Chinese Rhetoric."\(^7\)

Although there has been an increase in scholarship concerning the various schools of pre-Han Chinese philosophy, there has not been a similar growth in interest toward non-philosophical persuasive practices of the period. Possible reasons vary from the limited number of available political records, to the dubious reputation of the accuracy of ancient Chinese histories, or even a traditional Chinese condemnation of certain political texts for promoting ideas that are downright devious. A notable exception to this trend has been David Schaberg's research on remonstration practices in the *Zuo zhuan*.\(^8\)

A. The Rhetoric of the *Zhanguo ce*

Another sinologist who has devoted his life's work to the research of early Chinese texts is the renowned James Crump. One of his most significant contributions to the field has been his extensive research related to the *Zhanguo ce* or *Intrigues of the Zhanguo*.

---

\(^5\) Zheng uses the expression "萌芽期", which I have translated as "embryonic period", to describe the contributions of the pre-Han era to Chinese rhetoric. (Zheng, 12).
\(^6\) Ibid., 12-25.
\(^7\) The first volume of this series, edited by Chen and Wang, discusses Chinese rhetoric during the Qin, Han, Jin, and Nanbei Dynasties.
\(^8\) Schaberg's PhD dissertation, *Foundations of Chinese Historiography*, and his shorter journal article "Remonstrance in Eastern Zhou Historiography" provide detailed insights into persuasive practices during the Spring and Autumn period.
*Warring States.* The text is a primarily a collection of what are purported to be records of diplomatic negotiations conducted by or advice given by political advisers during the late Warring States period. The role of such an adviser, or persuader, was to travel among the Warring States on behalf of the ruler who had hired him and plead or argue the ruler's case. These men were highly valued for their persuasive skills, military expertise, and political cunning.

Unfortunately, although viewed by many as a masterpiece of classical Chinese literature, the *Zhanguo ce* has two fundamental flaws that have limited its general acceptance as history. First, the *Zhanguo ce* contains many blatant historical inaccuracies which have resulted in its rejection on historical grounds. Second, the recurring lesson of most of the episodes in the *Zhanguo ce* is that cunning and deviousness, not honorable actions, will eventually win the day. These characteristics have earned the *Zhanguo ce* a reputation for being an amoral and unreliable text that was not to be discussed in polite company.

Crump's contribution to *Zhanguo ce* scholarship was to propose a new interpretation of the text. Acknowledging the obvious historical shortcomings of the *Zhanguo ce*, he argued that the work was never intended to be chronicle of the Warring States period. Instead, the text was written as a series of rhetorical exercises that were used to train

---


10. Mid-4th to late 3rd century BC, prior to the founding of the Qin Dynasty in 221 BC.
persuaders in their rhetorical skills. Similar in purpose to the Roman *suasoriae*, the students used the stories as models for developing practice persuasions that were based on historical events.\(^{12}\) This has since become the generally accepted view of the *Zhanguo ce*’s purpose and the *Zhanguo ce* is more widely accepted as a source of Warring States diplomatic and rhetorical practices.\(^{13}\)

**B. Analyzing the Rhetoric of the Warring States**

So now that the *Zhanguo ce* has been legitimized by both Chinese and Western scholars as a source of Warring States rhetoric, how should we analyze the text? Several different approaches can be used to characterize the political rhetoric of the period. In the approach used to research his *Intrigues*, Crump methodically analyzes the *Zhanguo ce* episodes, identifies the rhetorical devices favored by the persuaders, and presents them in context using a wide variety of examples from the text.\(^{14}\) Another approach would be to trace the influence of earlier Chinese persuasive approaches on the rhetorical practices presented in the *Zhanguo ce*. This type of analysis could be used to identify the types of rhetorical devices that survived into the Warring States and lead to a discussion of the possible reasons for their survival. A third approach to analyzing its rhetoric is to evaluate the *Zhanguo ce* in the context of the *Guiguzi* [The Master of Ghost

---

\(^{11}\) Although Crump points out that people who condemned the *Zhanguo ce* somehow knew enough about its moral shortcomings supposedly without ever having read it. Crump *Chan-kuo Ts'e*, 29.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 40.

\(^{13}\) A notable exception has been Průšek who argues that the episodes should simply be considered as fiction. (589-590)

\(^{14}\) See chapter’s 4, 5, 6, and 9 of Crump’s *Intrigues* and pages 41-46 of his *Chan-kuo Ts'e* for examples of the types of rhetorical devices that are used in the *Zhanguo ce*. 
Valley], the text traditionally associated with teacher of two of the most famous persuaders in the Zhanguo ce, Su Qin 蘇秦 and Zhang Yi 張儀. The Guiguzi is a text that describes the techniques of psychological manipulation in support of persuasion, detailing how and when specific tactics should be used. Like the Hanfeizi it acknowledges that there are correct and incorrect ways to persuade different types of people. Unlike the Hanfeizi, however, it presents a methodology for eliciting the true feelings of a ruler in order to better tailor one's rhetorical appeal. Unfortunately, the major problem using with using the Guiguzi as a source of Zhanguo ce rhetoric is that, although Master Guigu is traditionally accepted as a source of such rhetoric, the received Guiguzi text has not proven to be a Warring States text. So, although, like the Zhanguo ce it is a rhetorical text that venerates the benefits of pragmatism and opportunism over morality, it is not possible to claim with any certainty that the Guiguzi used as a source of Zhanguo ce rhetoric or even that it predated the Zhanguo ce persuasions. However, the continuities between the Guiguzi and the Zhanguo ce are such that comparison is a fruitful way to uncover the psychological strategies behind certain Warring States rhetorical practices.

C. Thesis

My thesis is that it is apparent from the Zhanguo ce and Guiguzi texts that the political persuaders of the Warring States, more than their predecessors, were aware of the importance of employing a specific set of psychological techniques to creating successful

---

15 As discussed below, many Western scholars have largely ignored the Guiguzi because of its dubious claims to Warring States origins, while Chinese scholars freely quote from
persuasions. If this is the case, it will be possible to identify similar manipulative rhetorical approaches that are either used in persuasions, in the case of the *Zhanguo ce*, or explicitly advocated as legitimate rhetorical devices, in the *Guiguzi*. I do not intend to claim that one text necessarily influenced the development of the other. Instead, I am arguing that early Chinese political persuaders, be they Warring States or later, had adopted the use of similar psychologically manipulative techniques as part of their persuasive arsenal.

D. Thesis Organization.

In the next chapter I will present an overview of early Chinese rhetoric. In the initial sections I will summarize the rhetorical techniques used by the Spring and Autumn political advisers and Warring States philosophers and will then discuss the rhetorics of the Warring States political advisers. This final section addresses such issues as the authenticity and dating of the *Guiguzi* text, the rhetorics of the *Zhanguo ce*, and finally the rhetorics of the *Guiguzi*.

In the third chapter I will begin with a discussion of the history and organization of the *Zhanguo ce*. I will then analyze two of Fan Ju's persuasions to the king of Qin, commenting on Fan Ju's rhetorical approach and comparing his approach with the rhetorical advice presented in the *Guiguzi*.

In the final chapter I will analyze the rhetorical features of diplomatic persuasions made by the conflicting rhetors Su Qin and Zhang Yi to the six states of the anti-Qin the text in a wide range of contexts.
Alliance. I will conclude the chapter by commenting on the persuasive practices of these rhetors and comparing these to the persuasive practices that are advocated in the *Guizhi*. 
CHAPTER II. SPRING AND AUTUMN AND WARRING STATES RHETORIC

Tremendous changes occurred in Chinese rhetorical practices over the five and a half centuries of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Initially used for the purpose of persuading a ruler to follow the proper course of action, by the middle of the period new philosophies and their associated rhetorical styles were emerging. Toward the end of the Warring States era, the time of the Zhanguo ce persuasions, the focus of both political rhetoric and counsel had shifted toward pragmatism. This chapter presents an overview of the ways that Chinese rhetorical practices developed during the Spring and Autumn (770-481 BC) and Warring States (480-221 BC) periods.

A. Persuasion and Disputation

Before identifying the development of rhetorical styles in ancient China, it will be useful to discuss the major differences between Chinese political and philosophical rhetoric. It is important to be aware of certain distinctions when considering Chinese rhetoric since they are not mirrored in the better-known Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition. In contrast to the rhetoric of ancient Greece, Chinese political rhetorics did not develop out of a representative political process. Chinese political persuasion was conducted in a hierarchical relationship and typically involved two people: an adviser and a ruler. It was the job of the adviser to persuade the ruler to take a particular course of action and the adviser was considered successful if his recommendation was adopted. The adviser did most of the talking as he presented his case, usually with little interruption from others.
Philosophical disputation more closely represented Greco-Roman philosophical or political discourse. Persuasions were conducted among peers and victory was determined on the basis of logic. Participants in disputations typically had well defined, opposing points of view and neither side was supposed to monopolize the dialogue.\textsuperscript{16}

B. Political Persuasion During the Spring and Autumn Period

The primary form of political persuasion during the Spring and Autumn period was remonstration; advising or indirectly criticizing the actions of a ruler in order to encourage the ruler to take an appropriate action. Lacking any power to compel a ruler who possessed absolute authority to act in a particular manner, the ability of an advisor to persuade a Spring and Autumn ruler was almost exclusively based on the sources of moral authority presented in the remonstration. Sources of such moral authority included lessons learned from the actions of past rulers, wisdom encapsulated in canonical writings (in particular the \textit{shih [Odes]}), aphorisms, folk wisdom, and even events in nature. Because these sources were accepted by those in authority, the skill required of the persuader was to mold individual elements from these diverse sources into a presentation that left the ruler with only one reasonable course of action.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} These observations are based on Kroll "Disputation in Ancient Chinese Culture," 128-129.

\textsuperscript{17} Schaberg has extensively researched the subject of Spring and Autumn remonstration practices. "Remonstrance in Eastern Zhou Historiography" presents a good overview of the practices and is an abridgment of the exhaustive research presented in his PhD dissertation, \textit{Foundations of Chinese Historiography}. Lewis' \textit{Writing and Authority in Early China} discusses the ways that canonical texts were used to establish authority Spring and Autumn discourse. Jullien's \textit{Detour and Access} describes how the \textit{Odes} were used to provide advisors with a way of incorporating indirection and insinuation in their
It is important to understand that the purpose of such remonstrations was not to manipulate the ruler for the persuader's own purposes. Instead, it was the persuader's responsibility to keep the ruler on the proper path. When used in the proper manner, the sources themselves would do the manipulation. The *Lü shi chun qiu* (呂氏春秋), or *Annals of Lü Buwei*, a late Warring States text, explains that success in persuasion is the result of relying on the proper foundation: 

A skillful persuader is like a clever knight; He relies on the strength of others for his own strength... He does not set forth his own forms or figures, but creates and develops in accord with those of others, Relies on them as he speaks... When you shout with the wind, your voice is no more intense; when you climb up high and gaze out, your vision is no clearer. The advantage comes from what you have relied on.

This introduction is followed by an illustrative anecdote in which Hui Ang persuades the King Kang of Song. By relying on the teachings of Confucius and Mo Di in the encounter, Hui Ang argues so effectively that he leaves the King speechless. The text concludes by explaining the lessons of this persuasion:

The king of Song was a vulgar ruler and so the way his heart could be tamed by Hui Ang is an instance of the technique of "relying." By employing the technique of "relying," the poor and lowly can vanquish the rich and noble and the small and weak can control the strong and big.

---

18 Carson and Loewe explain that the *Lü Shi Chun Qiu* was "(i)n the traditional Chinese view... regarded as a repository of thought and knowledge" and was primarily derived from the Confucian, Mohist, and Daoist schools of philosophy. (324).

19 Knoblock and Riegel, 356.

20 Knoblock and Riegel, 358.
As will be observed in later sections, this type of advice on effective persuasion is rarely, if ever, adopted by the persuaders of the *Zhanguo ce*.

One of the more interesting sources of authority used in Spring and Autumn remonstration was the *Odes*. The *Odes* were praised by Confucius as the foundation of personal cultivation and knowing the accepted interpretations of the *Odes*, having skill in their recitation, and being able to understand how they were used by others was an important part of civilized Spring and Autumn discourse. As Mark Edward Lewis, a preeminent Warring States scholar, explains

> The essential feature of the poems . . . is that they are citations, drawn from a stock of verse shared by the educated men of the period. The citation of known verse performed several functions. First, it certified the speaker as an educated man and a member of a cultured nobility . . . Second, it claimed kinship of spirit in the assumption that the listener would recognize the ode and understand its import. Third, since the ode was applied to a situation other than that which had inspired it, the meaning imparted to it in the scene of presentation often differed from a presumptive original meaning.22

The following *Zuozhuan* story is an example of how the *Odes* were used in Spring and Autumn remonstration:

A stone spoke in Wei-yu in Chin. Duke P'ing of Chin questioned Shih K'uang, saying, "How can a stone speak"?

Shi K'uang replied, "A stone cannot speak. But perhaps something took possession of it. If not, then the people who reported it must have made a mistake. Nevertheless, I have heard it said that if enterprises are not undertaken at the proper time, resentment and grumbling will arise among the people. And then even things that do not speak will do so.

"Now our halls and palaces are lofty and lavish, and the people's strength is impaired and exhausted. Resentment and grumbling continually arise, for the

22 Lewis *Writing and Authority*, 161.
people cannot go on living as human beings. It is hardly surprising that a stone should speak!"

At this time the ruler of Chin was engaged in building the palace at Ssu-ch'i.

Yang-she Shu-hsiang of Chin remarked, "Shih K'uang's words are those of a gentleman. The words of a gentleman are trustworthy and capable of proof. Therefore resentment never comes near him. The words of a petty man are irresponsible and lacking proof. Therefore resentment and blame fall on him. This is what the Odes means when it says:

Pitiful is he who cannot speak!
His words have barely left his tongue
when his body encounters distress.
Lucky is he who can speak!
His skillful words are like a current
bearing his body to a place of rest.

When the Ssu-ch'i palace is completed, the other feudal lords will surely turn against Chin, and our ruler will suffer blame. This gentleman, Shih K'uang, understands this."*^23

In this example, Yang-she Shu-xiang validates the critical analysis of the situation in Jin that had just been presented by Shi Kuang and uses an ode24 to add to the remonstration. It can be assumed that both the persuader and the ruler who was being persuaded, Duke Ping of Jin, were familiar with the Odes and it is unlikely that the Duke required any further explanation.

In stark contrast to the frequency with which the Odes are used as rhetorical devices in Zuozhuan remonstrations, we will soon see that the Odes are rarely used in the persuasions of the Zhanguo ce.25

---

23 Watson Tso Chuan, 211-12 (From Zuozhuan, Duke Chao 8th year)
24 焉無正 Yu wu zhen [The endless rain]. Mao 194.
25 There are undoubtedly a variety of factors that contributed to the shift from remonstration to the less canonical persuasive styles that are reflected in the persuasions of the Zhanguo ce. For example, with the disintegration of the Zhou empire coupled with a worsening political situation, it is possible that Warring States rulers became less
C. Philosophical Persuasion During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Eras

The volatile political and social environment of the Warring States period spawned many diverse philosophies that vied for ideological supremacy. A tradition of philosophical argumentation grew out of this whose fundamental purpose was to promote the persuader's own perspective while invalidating the contentions of philosophical competitors. This meant that the fundamental purpose of philosophical persuasions was to disprove the contentions of competing philosophers.\textsuperscript{26} Since a philosopher was usually more interested in explaining the specific details of a world view than in spending time devising clever persuasive methods to present his case, he did not pursue or develop rhetorical strategies that went beyond the presentation of his parent philosophy. The attitude of the philosophers seemed to be that, were a listener but to understand what the speaker was saying, the inherent truth of the argument would win him over; provided that the auditor was not too ignorant.\textsuperscript{27}

Despite the fact that the rhetorical strategies of Chinese philosophers did not assume the prominence of many Greek and Roman philosophers, certain rhetorical devices eventually become associated with various schools of Chinese philosophy.\textsuperscript{28} In fact, as interested in cultured discourse that was rooted in the writings of the past. Instead, they became more interested in receiving practical advice that would simply help them to survive.\textsuperscript{26} The added benefit of winning over a competitor to one's own perspective was not considered to be an essential element of a successful persuasion.\textsuperscript{27} The most notable exception to disinterest in developing persuasive techniques were, as discussed below, the Mohists.\textsuperscript{28} I will use the term "school" with the understanding that this is a convenient, yet imperfect, way of categorizing the different philosophies that developed during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Obviously, the same limitations are
proponents of the various schools developed different methods of argumentation, differences in persuasive styles frequently provided yet another reason to criticize an opponent. This means that much about the rhetorical approaches used by the various philosophical schools can be learned by evaluating its texts and, in many cases, the texts of its adversaries.

Unlike the successive development of Greek philosophical schools, these Chinese schools co-existed throughout most of the Warring States period. During this time the philosophies of each of the schools evolved from within, but were also influenced by keen competition among the schools. Whether a pragmatic response to the rhetorical tactics of a competitor or the (suitably modified) adoption of a particularly successful logical appeal, none of the schools developed in isolation. Given the degree of rivalry among the schools, rhetorical skills were crucial to the success of the schools.

The social and political turmoil of the Warring States period led to the development of a large number, some say hundreds, of philosophical schools. Of these, the rhetorical styles of five schools that are considered representative of the most influential philosophies of the period are discussed in the following sections.\(^{29}\)

\[^{29}\text{Several scholars have written widely on rhetorics of the various philosophical schools. The next sections are intended to highlight some of their observations and provide references for further information.}\]
1. Ming Jia (The School of Names)

*Ming Jia* is the one school that is consistently assigned the name of a Greek rhetorical school — "The Chinese Sophists" — by Western scholars. The designation "School of Names" is based on the claim by *Ming Jia* philosophers that names must correspond to reality. Like the Greek Sophists, *Ming Jia* proponents were renowned both for being persuasive speakers and for being despised by competing rhetors, such as Zhuangzi, for clouding peoples' minds, turning the false into the true, and casting a spell over the audience. Although the particular rhetorical style and philosophical focus of the *Ming Jia* school gradually evolved over the 200 years of the Warring States period toward a greater interest in logical appeals, the school's adherents were united by a common recognition of the power of language in representing and shaping reality. Their preferred rhetorical devices were metaphor, analogy, and Socratic-like dialogues that were used to define, classify, and exemplify their arguments. Among the famous *Ming Jia* philosophers were Deng Xi, Hui Shi, and Gong-sun Long.

---

30 Lu's *Rhetoric in Ancient China* provides a comprehensive analysis of *Ming Jia* rhetoric. (127-153) Chen and Wang also discusses the topic in their *History of Chinese Rhetoric*. (121-129)

31 See Graham *Disputers of the Tao*, 75; Forke, 1; and Kennedy *Comparative Rhetoric*, 158.

32 Lu *Rhetoric in Ancient China*, 129.

33 Lu (*Rhetoric in Ancient China*, 130) and Kennedy (*Comparative Rhetoric*, 158-159) likened Deng Xi's role to that of Protagoras. Lu also compared Hui Shi with Gorgias. (*Rhetoric in Ancient China*, 136)
2. Ru Jia 儒家 (The Confucian School)

The word *ru* 儒 [soft] is the name traditionally given to this of traditionalists or "ritual specialists." With Confucius as its traditionally accepted founder, other prominent members of the *Ru Jia* were Mencius and Xunzi. Confucius stressed the need for a strong, moral, paternalistic ruler and a populace that understood its subservient role and acted appropriately. Confucius considered the ancient Zhou Dynasty to be a model worthy of emulation and frequently used examples from that era to support his arguments. Like the *Ming Jia* he held that it was important to define what was signified by names as they were used. Unlike the *Ming Jia*, however, he did not believe that names could be defined by debate. Instead, he considered it the responsibility of the ruler to "rectify" names in order to create societal harmony. Confucius also attributed special powers to canonical texts, particularly the *Shi Jing, The Odes*, claiming that when correctly used they could mysteriously move people's hearts. Confucius condemned glibness that lacked moral substance, arguing that the power of persuasion lies in the moral quality and cultural refinement of the people.

---

34 Lu presents a detailed evaluation of *Ru Jia* rhetoric in *Rhetoric in Ancient China*. (154-194) Chen and Wang also presents an extensive analysis of the topic. (27-74)

35 VanZoeren refers to the school as "ritual specialists." (28) Graham impishly claims that "it is likely that the term Ju, a word meaning 'soft' first applied perhaps by men who rule and fight to the softies who merely teach, was already used by professional teachers before Confucius . . ." (Disputers of the Tao, 31)

36 Von Falkenhausen comments "After the fourth century B.C., ru scholars found it undignified to engage in debates with other schools, and it was generally assumed that the hoped-for political unification under an enlightened ruler would silence all such debates." (129)
Followers of the *Ru Jia* revered appropriate discourse with the understanding that the speaker would be held to a high standard of benevolence and act in accordance with ritual propriety. It was expected that the knowledgeable person would speak clearly and concisely, having an ability to see two sides of an argument in order to present a more convincing persuasion. To a *Ru Jia* adherent, purpose of a disputation was more important than rhetorical skill. Although *Ru*-ists acknowledged a need for balance between simplicity and eloquence in discourse, they condemned glibness that was devoid of moral content.

It is possible to identify certain aspects of the Confucian rhetorical practice that are similar to those of the West. For example, Lu notes parallels between Confucius and Plato for their seemingly paradoxical tendency to criticize rhetorical glibness while praising the importance of balancing style and simplicity in presentation. She also argues that Confucius exhibits Aristotelian qualities by attributing the power of persuasion to the audience and not the speaker.\(^{37}\) It has also been common to compare Confucius with Socrates on the basis of similarities in the way that each used questioning as a rhetorical device.\(^{38}\) While such similarities do occasionally exist, it is risky to go beyond such feature-based associations in an attempt to establish wholesale correlations between Chinese and Western personalities or practices (e.g. Confucius was the Chinese Socrates).

---

\(^{37}\) Lu *Rhetoric in Ancient China*, 165.
\(^{38}\) Kennedy *Comparative Rhetoric*, 152-153.
3. *Mo Jia* (The Mohist School)

In contrast to the Confucian School which was absorbed in a reality based on hierarchy and order, the Mohist School was interested in discovering truth through debate and argumentation; especially through interactions with the lower classes. Named for the philosopher Modi (also Mozi), the early Mohists expressed an interest in logical, religious, and ethical systems, while the so-called Later Mohists “were more concerned with issues of argumentation, logic, epistemology, and science” and produced the Mohist rhetorical text the *Mo Bian* [The Argumentation of Mo]. Mohists stressed the practical application of rhetoric, claiming that argumentation that didn’t have a practical purpose simply wore out one’s mouth. Garrett gives the following summary of Mohist rhetoric:

The Mohists, as a lower-class philosophical school, and as the first challengers of Confucianism, were in a defensive position as no other school was: they had no choice but to argue for their ideas if they wished to have them accepted. They were thus especially pressed both to provide rational backing for their tenets and to subject other doctrines to critical scrutiny. We see primitive, fumbling attempts in these directions even in the earliest writings of the school, in the ‘three standards’ which supposedly establish the correctness of Mo-tzu’s doctrines, and in the many ‘against’ chapters which attack upper-class and Confucian beliefs and behaviors. The logical writings take this project of justification several steps further, by relying on no authority except reason, a position which led them to evaluate competing philosophical ideas solely on their logical merits; for example, they subjected the Sophists’ paradoxes to serious analysis, rather than mere ridicule, and even accepted some of them. And while some schools held aloof from the vigorous debates of the day, the Mohists plunged in energetically.

---

39 Lu presents a detailed evaluation of *Mo Jia* rhetoric in Rhetoric in Ancient China. (195-224) Chen and Wang also discuss the topic. (75-88) Graham’s acclaimed *Later Mohist Logic* provides a translation and analysis of the *Mo Jing*. (Graham 1998)

40 Lu *Rhetoric in Ancient China*, 197.
Mohists dropped in on Meng-tzu to chat, Mohist debaters traveled from court to court, and 'fighting like Yangists and Mohists' was a cliché of the day.\footnote{Garrett "Theoretical Buffalo", 232.}

Lu argues that while Later Mohist theories of naming, classification, and argumentation may share certain Aristotelian characteristics, the overall Mohist approach to classification differed significantly from the logical progression of Aristotle's syllogism.\footnote{Lu Rhetoric in Ancient China, 233.}

Such differences have been cited by some as "evidence" of the illogical nature of the Chinese mind. Based on subsequent Mohist contributions to scientific development in China, such non-Aristotelian Mohist logic has not been illogical, it has simply been non-Western.

4. \textit{Dao Jia} (The Daoist School or School of the Way)\footnote{Lu (Rhetoric in Ancient China, 225-257), Chen and Wang (89-103), and Jensen's "Rhetorical Emphases of Taoism" each present overviews of Daoist rhetoric. Kirkwood's "Revealing the Mind of the Sage" and Raphals' "Skeptical Strategies" each focus on the rhetorical aspects of the Zhuangzi.}

The tenets of the Daoist School stand in near antithesis to those of the Confucian School. Arguing that Confucian attempts to restore social order were actually the cause of social problems, purported Daoist founder Laozi and his followers claimed that the Confucian insistence on ritual propriety resulted in hypocrisy and actually stifled the natural order of things. Instead of advocating behavior that they believed would interfere with the natural order, Daoists proposed to follow the relativistic concept of \textit{wu wei} \(無為\); variously translated as non-action, non-striving, or "going with the flow." In contrast to a Confucian rhetorical style that looked to the past, the Daoist rhetorical style was...
blatantly iconoclastic. Harbsmeier argues that such a rejection of convention is also at the heart of the Daoist attitude toward language.

The Taoist rejection of language goes well with the strategists' indifference to language and with the purely opportunistic and strategic role of language envisaged by legalist thinkers such as Gongsun Yang or Han Fei. Taoists, Legalists, and Military Strategists are all cultivators of metic knowledge. They are wily philosophers of the practical life who do not walk the straight path of any linguistically enshrined values or truths.\textsuperscript{44}

Two principal texts are associated with the Daoist school. The \textit{Dao De Jing} or \textit{Laozi} is a short 5000-character text that discusses the nature of the \textit{dao}, "the Way", and \textit{de}, "virtue". In contrast to Confucian texts which stress the importance of doing what is proper, the \textit{Laozi} emphasizes becoming aware of the Way and responding to it appropriately. The text uses many ambiguous and paradoxical phrases to stress the importance of observing and becoming attuned to the Way. Although one's ability to speak well is not necessarily criticized in the text, the \textit{Laozi} argues that there are times when fewer words are an appropriate response to a situation.\textsuperscript{45}

The \textit{Zhuangzi} or \textit{Laozi} is a "in your face" philosopher, routinely taking on his opponents with enthusiasm, sarcasm, and conundrums. Far from being the caricature of the unspeaking Daoist, Zhuangzi understands and uses rhetoric with a remarkable degree of skill

\textsuperscript{44} Harbsmeier "Review of Knowing Words", 990.
\textsuperscript{45} A Daoist concept frequently misinterpreted by non-sinologists relying on decontextualized translations. For example, "... eloquence, and even speaking in general, is deprecated and is associated with high negative connotation." (Jensen "Rhetorical Emphases of Taoism", 221)
One might conclude that the author of the *Chuang Tzu* has little to do with rhetoric beyond condemning it. However, while he stresses the limitations of language and reason, he is also well acquainted with their use... Hence *Chuang Tzu* is well acquainted with the exercise of persuasion, although he insists he is not interested in political affairs.\(^4\)

It is interesting that while the *Laozi* and the *Zhuangzi* texts each condemned the misuse of language as standing in the way of truth, Daoists such as Laozi and Zhuangzi showed great familiarity and skill with Warring States persuasive techniques.

5. *Fa Jia* 法家 (The Legalist School)\(^5\)

In many respects, the Legalist or Totalitarian School (*Fa Jia*) is a synthesis of many aspects of the other philosophical schools combined with a liberal portion of Chinese Machiavellianism. With its most famous Warring States proponent being the philosopher Han Feizi 韓非子, the School exhibits a strong Confucian influence by insisting that ruler is the government, while rejecting Confucius' habitual reliance on the past for solutions. Advocating a philosophy of naked pragmatism, the Legalist School defines effectiveness as the key criterion for decision-making. Attempting to find a Greek rhetorical counterpart, Kennedy compares Han Feizi with Plato's portrayal of Callicles in *Gorgias*.\(^6\)

\(^4\) Kirkwood, 6-7.

\(^5\) Lu (Rhetoric in Ancient China, 258-287 and "The theory of persuasion in Han Fei Tzu") and Chen and Wang (104-120) discuss the rhetorics of the Legalist School. Although less substantial that the other texts, Deher and Crump provide their unambiguous opinion of the amoral bent of *Fa Jia* philosophy by equating it with Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. (10)

\(^6\) Kennedy Comparative Rhetoric, 162.
Han Feizi was a descendent of the royal family of Han. Although was a poor speaker, he wrote extensively on argumentation and persuasion in the *Han Feizi*. According to his book, Han viewed persuasion as an activity that took place between a ruler and his advisors and involved an awareness of audience psychology, trust, and listening. In the *Nan shui* [On the Difficulties of Persuasion] chapter of the *Hanfeizi*, the author focuses on the psychological aspects of persuasion. After asserting that "the difficult thing about persuasion is to know the mind of the person one is trying to persuade and to be able to fit one's words to it" he provides a detailed description of the difficulties encountered in persuasion. Han Feizi mistrusted persuasive techniques of others and contended that argumentation based on probabilities necessarily resulted in confusion and contradiction. Referring to persuaders as one of the "Five Vermin" cited in that chapter, he complains:

> These days, when the ruler listens to men's words, he delights in their eloquence and does not bother to inquire if they are apt... For this reason the people of the world, when they come to make a speech, strive for eloquence and disregard the question of whether their words are practical."

Han Feizi is particularly associated with the rhetorical technique of "chain reasoning" and his effective use of the "law of contradiction." In addition to being an author, Han Feizi was also a persuader; writing letters instead of giving oral persuasions to influence Warring States politics. Initially failing to

---

49 Lu *Rhetoric in Ancient China*, 275-283.
50 Watson *Han Fei Tzu*, 73.
51 Ibid., 109.
52 i.e. If A, then B. If B, then C. If C, then D. And so on.
53 The concept that diametrically opposed statements cannot logically coexist.
In the Warring States period, he turned to the king of Qin, who was impressed with his political advice and hired him as an adviser. However, because of his opposition to Qin plans to attack Han, he lost favor with the king of Qin and eventually took his own life.

D. Political Persuasion During the Warring States Period

In "Disputation in Ancient Chinese Culture" Kroll opens his discussion of the Warring States political persuasion by stating:

One of the major points of controversy in studies of the art of persuasion is whether the school responsible for training persuaders, the Tsung Heng school, is to be regarded as a formal school of oratory and rhetoric, and whether a rhetorical tradition ever truly developed in China. The evidence suggests, however, that the Tsung Heng school must have had a tradition of diplomatic rhetoric studied by its adherents, the object of study being not only writings of the authors of the schools, but also rhetorical devices.

The Zongheng Jia or "Vertical-Horizontal School" was reputed to have been a Warring States school that was dedicated to teaching the rhetorical arts in order to support the pursuit of political alliances. Traditionally identified as the founder of the school, Guiguzi, "The Master of Ghost Valley," has not only been identified as a

---

54 Kroll, 123.
55 The name of the school is rooted in Warring States politics. "Zong" is a shortened form of he zong, a term that Crump claims meant "to assemble, in some fashion, like-minded people or powers." This term was historically associated with "The Alliance" of pro-Chu states that was organized by Su Qin to oppose Qin. "Heng", on the other hand, is an abbreviation of lian heng, "to bring together persons or states who were not like-minded." This term was associated with "The Syndicate or Coalition" of pro-Qin states that was championed by Zhang Yi. The contrasting words zong and heng are also translated as "vertical" and "horizontal" and are associated with the north-south and east-west characteristics, respectively, of the anti-Qin alliance and the pro-Qin
master of persuasion, but also as a military strategist, a Daoist mystic, and a master of
divination. He is also identified as being the teacher of the Zhanguo ce persuaders Su Qin and Zhang Yi.

Like those who established other Warring States schools, Master Guigu is credited
with a text that is alleged to contain his teachings; the Guiguzi. Unfortunately, because
little evidence has been found to support its claimed status as a Warring States text, the
origins and authenticity of the received Guiguzi are suspect. Chinese and Western
scholars, however, have dealt with these issues in different ways.

Chinese scholars appear quite willing to accept the existence of a Zongheng Jia and
the authenticity of the Guiguzi. For example, a recent illustrated history of the Zongheng
Jia gives the stories of 27 of its members, credits Guigu establishing the school, and
presents a summary of the persuasive principles espoused in the Guiguzi. In the
Zongheng Jia chapter of the five-volume History of Chinese Rhetoric, Chen Guanglei
dedicates nearly twenty pages to the rhetoric of the Guiguzi. Several chapters of
Taiwanese scholar Chen Yinglue's book on the Guiguzi are devoted to evaluating not
only the Zhanguo ce version of Warring States history in the context of Master Guigu's
principles of persuasion, but also using the Guiguzi to provide a context for evaluating
episodes of the 20th century diplomatic histories of China, France, and Russia. He even
devotes a chapter of his book, entitled "The European Guiguzi," to an evaluation of

---

coalition. Crump presents a comprehensive study of this derivation in his "Intrigues." (89-96)

36 Tsao, 10.

37 Chen Zhiliang's Hua Shuo Zongheng Jia.
Machiavelli's *The Prince*. Sections of the *Guiguzi* are given equal credibility with excerpts from the *Hanfeizi*, *Zuo Chuan*, and *Zhanguo Ce* to present historical examples of effective persuasion in a book *Crisis Negotiations*. The general attitude of Chinese scholars seems to be that since much in the received *Guiguzi* text is consistent with ideas presented in other Warring States texts, the received *Guiguzi* should be accepted as a Warring States text.

In contrast to these Chinese contributions, Western scholars are much more skeptical about associating the *Zongheng Jia* and the *Guiguzi* text with Warring States history. Renowned sinologist Angus Graham questions the claimed authenticity of the *Guiguzi* in arguing that it was likely a text written by an unknown author who followed the established practice of "hiding your pseudonymous work openly under a pseudonym presumed to conceal the identity of someone who while remaining humbly in the shadows taught some famous man the secret of his success." Ding-Ren Tsao, beginning his dissertation on *Guiguzi* rhetorical teachings with an investigation of the history of the text, states

Kuei Ku Tzu, like most characters of the pre-Ch’in period, did not have a valid biography. Stories of this life and work are abundant, but almost all lack reliable support. Throughout the long span of history, many new stories were added and the identity of Kuei Ku Tzu becomes increasingly vague.

---

58 Chen and Wang, 130-148.
59 The Chinese title of the chapter is *Ouzhou Guiguzi* (歐洲鬼谷子). (Chen Yinglue, 244-260)
60 Chen Shuangjing’s *Wei Ji Tanpan*.
61 Graham *Disputers of the Tao*, 216.
62 Tsao, 10.
Tsao traces the history of text, providing a reference to Master Guigu in the *Shi ji* "Records of the Historian", but offering no reliable references to a *Guiguzi* text until it is first mentioned in the *Suishu* "The History of Sui". Such evidence from a document published more than eight centuries after the Warring States period does little to support the claim that the received *Guiguzi* is a Warring States text.

Without attempting to establish the *Guiguzi* as a Warring States text, some Western scholars have chosen to highlight certain stylistic consistencies between the *Guiguzi* and other Warring States texts. In his discussion of the development of the military treatise during the Warring States era, Mark Edward Lewis uses the example of rhetor Su Qin to identify similarities between the *Zhanguo ce* and the *Guiguzi*.

Several pre-Qin or early imperial texts explicitly assimilated the arts of the rhetorician and the military commander. These texts, most notably the *Zhanguo ce* and the *Guiguzi*, identified the procedures of the commander with those devices by which a debater masked his true plans, lured his adversary into revealing his intentions, and struck unexpectedly where no defense had been prepared. This is particularly important because the author of the *Guiguzi* was Su Qin's putative teacher. More importantly, Su Qin himself explicitly identified persuasion and diplomacy as superior forms of warfare in his lengthy critique of reliance on military force.

Lewis also argues that, because the authors of pre-Qin and early imperial military treatises had a "common grounding" in Daoist thought, Daoist terminology and concepts were incorporated into their works. Such a Daoist influence is readily apparent throughout the *Guiguzi*.

---

63 Ibid., 26.
64 Lewis *Sanctioned Violence*, 101.
65 Ibid., 101.
In his review of Crump's complete *Zhanguo ce* translation, Chinese literary scholar David Knechtges discusses the use of rhetorical terminology

... Professor Crump fails to note the technical term *ch'uai mo* which he translates in one place "to fit and fathom" and in another "study." *Ch'uai* and *mo* actually are chapter titles in the *Kuei-ku tzu*, which is reputed to be the rhetorical manual of Su Ch'in and other Warring States persuaders. In the *Kuei-ku tzu* they refer to the ability of the persuader to "measure and calculate" the feelings and inclinations of the person the speaker is attempting to persuade. It is similar to the mode of persuasion Aristotle termed *pathos*.66

Arguing that both texts use the same uncommon terms that were used to describe persuasion, Knechtges implies that there may be an association between the *Zhanguo ce* and the *Guiguzi*. Beyond these examples, however, few Western sinologists have provided more that a passing acknowledgement of even the possible existence of an historic Guiguzi.67

The issue of the relationship between the *Zhanguo ce* and *Guiguzi* texts remains unresolved and resolving the issue is a challenge far beyond my current sinological skills. Although it would be fascinating to be able to prove that Su Qin and Zhang Yi were following the *Guiguzi* program, in the absence of evidence that positively establishes the *Guiguzi* as a Warring States text that is contemporaneous with the *Zhanguo ce*, any relationships that were established from such a project would be based on wishful

---

66 Knechtges, 335. Knechtges also notes that the *Guiguzi* "easily qualifies as one of the secret books that Professor Crump discusses. It is full of arcane terminology and elaborates a rhetorical theory in *yin-yang* and *wu-hsing* terms."

67 Lu states "Historians have not confirmed that Gui Guzi was a real historical figure... It is theorized that Gui Guzi was produced during the Warring States period, possibly by some hermit, and refined by Su Qin and Zhang Yi." (Rhetoric in Ancient China, 323). Crump translates the opening sentences of *Shi ji* 70 as "Chang Yi... and Su Ch'in served Kuei-ku as master of their art" but does not pursue the matter. (Crump Legends, 37)
speculation. But this still leaves us with the problem of dealing with the numerous examples in which the *Zhanguo ce* rhetors appear to be using persuasive approaches that are consistent with the teachings of the *Guiguzi*.

We know that *Zhanguo ce* persuasions provide some of the first examples in which rhetors rely on psychological techniques to manipulate their audiences. The *Guiguzi* not only advocates the use of psychological manipulation, but also explains how it is to be achieved. We have also seen that the *Hanfeizi* decries both the difficulty of incorporating psychological factors into an appeal and the skill with which his opponents manipulate their audiences. These observations lead me to conclude that during the Warring States period, more so than in earlier times, there was a general awareness among political persuaders that one could (and should) manipulate an audience as a way to strengthen an appeal. By analyzing several the *Zhanguo ce* persuasions, we can identify the ways that psychological manipulation was incorporated in Warring States persuasion. By comparing such observations with the guidance presented in the *Guiguzi*, whether a text of Warring States or early Imperial origin, we can gain even more insight into ways that psychology was incorporated into early Chinese persuasive practices.

1. The Rhetoric of the Zongheng Jia

As previously discussed, the Zongheng Jia was a rhetorical school whose fundamental purpose was to teach the principles of effective persuasion to political advisers who were in the service of the rulers of the various Warring States. According to Chinese tradition, the school was founded by Guiguzi, the Master of Ghost Valley. Among Guiguzi’s most
famous students, according to Su Qin's biography in the Shi ji, were the Zhanguo ce persuaders Su Qin and Zhang Yi.  

Although the Zongheng Jia made significant contributions to Warring States rhetorical practices that will be discussed below, according to the following observation, the school also used persuasive techniques of other schools and traditions:

It follows that the Tsung Heng school . . . and persuaders in general . . . were closely connected with each other and with the arts of disputation between philosophers. The philosophers seem to have provided them with logical devices for argument, which did not exclude, but rather presupposed, the invention of specific devices of persuasion, such as the "method of [discussing] advantages and disadvantages" that evidently originated from disputation, the use of inference by analogy not only as logical argument but also for indirect conveyance of ideas, resorting to citations, enigmas, allegories, fables, as well as elegant language, rhyme, and rhythm for the sake of the psychological effect these had on the listener. Rhetoricians modified traditions of disputation in accord with the aim of persuasion and evidently, in turn, influenced disputation through their reliance on such devices as ornate language, rhyme, and rhythm . . .

The most important contribution of the Zongheng Jia to Chinese rhetorical practice was its unmasked application of psychological principles to persuasion. This is not to say that the psychological elements of persuasion were not used by earlier persuaders. With few exceptions, such considerations are always a part of how one chooses to persuade. As previously discussed, Han Fei stridently complained about the difficulty of tailoring a persuasion to match the interests of a specific audience. Even when techniques that manipulated the psychology (e.g. inducing fear, shame, joy) of an audience were used as part of an appeal, however, their use was usually overshadowed by the philosophical precepts of the school.

---

68 Shi ji, Chapter 70.
The Zongheng Jia persuaders, as depicted in the Zhanguo ce, and the Guiguzi changed this approach, giving psychology a prominent role in persuasion. While the Zhanguo ce persuasions unambiguously demonstrate the efficacy of manipulating one's audience, the Guiguzi explains the principles of manipulation.

2. Persuasion and the Zhanguo ce

Although not written as a rhetorical textbook, as previously discussed, the Zhanguo ce is generally accepted as a collection of "case studies" for Zongheng Jia persuaders. This section summarizes the types of persuasive approaches and rhetorical devices that are used in the Zhanguo ce episodes. The history and structure of the text will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Zhanguo ce persuasions are, for all practical purposes, monologues. As such, the orator who is making a persuasive presentation to a ruler is usually in control of his situation. The amount of dialogue in each episode is minimal, with a typical ruler speaking only enough words to indicate his concurrence with the persuader's proposal and to describe the actions that he will take to indicate the degree of his concurrence (e.g. presenting gifts to the rhetor, ceding land to the Qin King). Although such scenarios may seem unrealistic, given that the episodes in the text are model persuasions there is little reason to expect the ruler to get a word in edgewise.

69 Kroll, 127.
70 Tsao makes the point that, while the Ming Jia manipulated logic, the Zongheng Jia manipulated psychology. (176)
The persuaders of the *Zhanguo ce* are also portrayed as master manipulators. First and foremost, they are depicted as people who are skilled at manipulating their audiences. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the persuaders use every imaginable technique to please, enrage, or mollify the ruler in order to lead the ruler to the appropriate emotional state to accept a particular stage of the persuasion. The persuaders can be obsequious, demanding, or sarcastic in order to obtain in order to receive the desired response from the ruler. Using these techniques, the persuaders artfully moved the ruler through emotional highs and low several times through the course of a single persuasion. In reading a *Zhanguo ce* persuasion, we are left without any doubt that it is the persuader who is in control of the entire episode.

*Zhanguo ce* persuaders are also adept at manipulating the facts to their advantage. When the rhetor requires a political commitment from a ruler, the facts are presented to emphasize the geographic, agricultural, or military strengths of the state. Conversely, when submission is desired from a ruler, the persuader will focus on the advantages of the ruler's adversary and the weaknesses of the ruler's state. While such types of persuasive practices are commonly used in 21st century political rhetoric, their use in during the Warring States were subject to widespread criticism by many of the philosophical schools.

In addition to the persuasive approaches described in the previous sections, there is a set of rhetorical devices that are typically associated with Warring States rhetoric, particularly the *Zongheng Jia* persuaders and the persuasions of the *Zhanguo ce*. Two
such examples of commonly used devices are "doubled persuasions" and "joining objects of the same kind."

In considering the persuasions of the Zhanguo ce, Crump argues that there is a strong and clear tendency on the part of the persuader... to frame his persuasions in "doubles"; thesis and antithesis, arguments for a certain action and against its opposite and other classes of doubles such as paradoxes and dilemmas. However we may analyze them for their logic, one fact is apparent: The writers were very intent on achieving rhetorical symmetry which exploited both the genius of the language and human delight in balance and complementation.71

The rhetorical device that emerged from this attitude is referred to as a "doubled persuasion" and was frequently used by the Zhanguo ce persuaders to present their arguments in the form of a pair of alternatives.

Crump identifies two types of doubled persuasions. The first type, a win-win, casts an argument in the form: "You should take this action; If you succeed, then you will have gained A. If you fail, then you will have gained B." A second form of "doubled persuasion" is: You should take this action. If you do A, then it will be good. If you don't do A, then it will be bad.72

The Warring States persuaders also used a rhetorical device referred to as "joining objects of the same kind" which was used to string together examples to indirectly convey ideas by inference. Kroll argues that Chinese persuaders, in particular, "tended to string together series of historical examples" to state their case by analogy.73

71 Crump Chan-kuo Ts'e, 44.
72 Crump Intrigues, 110-122 and Chan-kuo Ts'e, 41-44 and Kroll, 124.
73 Kroll, 125.
Another aspect of this practice was the use of deductive reasoning, "using proverbs, wise sayings, abstract notions, or citations from the classics" as deductive elements. Persuaders also used inductive reasoning, relying on more concrete information (e.g. a particular situation, advantages/disadvantages) to reinforce deductive reasoning.  

3. Persuasion and the Guiguzi

In summarizing the Hanfeizi’s plaintive description of the difficulties of persuasion, G. E. R. Lloyd summarizes the Warring States persuaders dilemma as being in a "delicate position" where they found themselves as

... often placed vis-à-vis those whom they were trying to advise. The principal situation envisaged is one where the adviser has to deal with a ruler or otherwise with a person with power and authority. Their needs to maintain their reputation and not lose face have to be taken into account: their whims have to be humoured, and there is no question of the adviser attempting to be too idealistic in winning the ruler round to a course of action that was 'virtuous' but went against his intentions. The main thrust of the discussion is to advise the adviser to study the ruler's character, to play to his emotions and his vanity, to exploit his weaknesses, to beware of the differences between his real and expressed intentions - and to do all this, so far as possible, without himself being revealed as manipulator.  

While the Hanfeizi describes the challenges of persuasion, the Guiguzi presents a program that responds to the challenges. According to the Guiguzi, a person's feelings and attitudes have a tremendous effect on how a persuasion will be received and, therefore, cannot be left to chance. Instead the persuader must identify, manipulate and control the feelings and attitudes of his audience in order to improve the probability of a successful persuasion.

---

74 Lu Rhetoric in Ancient China, 120-121.
Although the *Guiguzi* is not considered to be a philosophical text, the philosophy that it implicitly espouses — that the end justifies the means — made it the logical target of schools that praised proper behavior and relationships, such as the Confucianists. Just as the *Laozi*, the Daoist Warring States text which it most clearly echoes, seems to have been written for would-be hegemons, the *Guiguzi* seems to have been written for the advisers of rulers. Applying the text's precepts in such a context would imply not only that it is possible for a subordinate to control the feelings and attitudes of his superior, but also that it is the persuader's prerogative to decide when and how to manipulate the ruler. With the exception of the *Guiguzi*'s last chapter which presents a relatively superficial philosophy, the entire text is devoted to practical aspects of persuasion. The texts consists of twelve chapters which are arranged in an order that sequentially describes how to establish, cultivate, and control a relationship.

The *Guiguzi* uses Daoist rhetorical devices such as paradoxical sayings, *yin-yang* duality, and expressions that would not seem out of place in the *Laozi* or the *Zhuangzi*. As discussed earlier, such Daoist influences are not unexpected in Warring States treatises such as the *Guiguzi* as many of the authors were grounded in Daoist philosophy.

We will now discuss the *Guiguzi* from two related perspectives. The first approach will be to identify the key rhetorical points of the *Guiguzi* using the translation of Tsao Ding-ren. The second approach will be to analyze the Chinese text to identify rhetorical

---

75 Lloyd, 79.
I contend that, as a rhetorical text, the Guuguiz used both explicit explanations and integrated examples of rhetorical devices to explain persuasive concepts. Since such subtleties can get masked in translation, I have used my own more literal translations of the passages in which rhetorical device can be identified.\textsuperscript{77}

\textit{a. Bai He} [Opening up, closing down; Prodding, ceasing]\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{bai he} describes two techniques for determining both the strengths and weaknesses and intentions and will of a subject: prodding and ceasing.\textsuperscript{79} The purpose of prodding is to determine the truth and anticipate the subject's feelings, while ceasing is to be used for observing the subject. Any actions that the persuader takes should be in response to the subject. The persuader is encouraged to be open with the subject only when they are both in agreement. For that reason, until the persuader is confident in his assessment of his subject's outlook, he should remain silent. While using this approach, the persuader is encouraged to maintain agreement with the subject. The text also gives several descriptions of \textit{bai} and \textit{he} as counterparts of the duality of \textit{yin} and \textit{yang}.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{76} This is in no way intended as a criticism of Tsao's excellent translation, but instead demonstrates the importance of relying on texts written in the original language when evaluating rhetorical and grammatical usage.

\textsuperscript{77} I have made a point of using masculine pronouns in my translations as the recorded persuaders of the era were usually men.

\textsuperscript{78} Tsao, 48-55. Unless otherwise indicated, I have used Tsao's translations throughout this and subsequent chapters of the Guiguiz. The pages in the translation are cited at the beginning of each Guiguiz chapter.

\textsuperscript{79} Although not used in the text, I will use "subject" to mean the person who is the object of the persuasion.

\textsuperscript{80} e.g. Prodding is \textit{yang} and ceasing is \textit{yin}. 
persuader's responsibility to determine the proper balance between bai and he that will achieve the desired results.

b. Fan Ying 反應 [Reflection and Response]^{81}

This chapter provides advice on the art of active listening. It is the persuader's responsibility to use the proper words to establish the tone of the conversation and elicit the desired information from the subject. The text compares this to fishing.

If the bait-language is appropriate to the situation, the human fish can be caught. Speaking is like spreading and setting up snares to trap animals. I set up many snares in the intersection of animal paths and wait for my prey. [By the same token,] if the Way [of my speech] fits the situation then my prey will automatically fall into it. Thus is the snare to catch people. The snares are used often.^{82}

The persuader is advised to listen, reflect, and then rebut the contentions of the subject.

c. Nei Jian 内捷 [Internal Bonds]^{83}

This chapter discusses the importance of forming internal bonds with the subject. Such bonds can be formed "by morality, by friendship, by wealth, or by lust", but once formed the bonds can be used to manipulate the subject.^{84}

The persuader is next given advice on maintaining the bond. For example, if the subject asks the persuader about a particular plan

I silently judge the prudence [of the proposal] then openly state its strengths and weaknesses, so as to manipulate the will [of the prince]. I submit the

---

^{81} Tsao, 56-63.
^{82} Ibid., 58.
^{83} Ibid., 64-69.
^{84} Ibid., 64.
(proposal) in proper time so that it may match his plan. After careful thinking, I come to strengthen the bond.\(^85\)

The persuader acts so that he does not openly oppose the subject's desires. In turn, the bond between the persuader and subject is further strengthened. He is also encouraged to use accepted interpretations of history when talking about the past and to be vague when discussing the future. The persuader is strongly discouraged from conducting a persuasion until he is fully aware of the situation. Once he understands the situation, however, he can begin to control the situation and can "freely resign or advance . . . liberally form the bond or dissolve it." He is also encouraged to make use of the *Odes* and the *Book of Documents* and "mix them with my own words, then discuss generally the gains and losses, the comings and goings of events."

\(d. \textit{Di Xi} \text{ 抵峨}\) [Dealing with fissures]\(^86\)

This chapter discusses the inevitability of rifts between the persuader and his subject, how to detect such rifts before they disrupt the bond, and how to deal with rifts. The text identifies people as the source of fissures, using this to highlight the importance of understanding their intentions.

This chapter also uses the rhetorical device of citing the example past rulers in order to add authority to the argument. Specifically, the Five Emperors and Three Kings are cited

\(^85\) Ibid., 65-66.
\(^86\) Ibid., 70-74.
as examples of those who effectively used, respectively, "mending by filling" and "mending by taking possessions.\(^{87}\)

*e. Fei Qian 飛箋 [Making fly and manacling]\(^{88}\)*

The chapter describes techniques for manipulating a subject through his weaknesses so that the subject "can be sought, summoned, and put to use" by the persuader. The manipulative method suggested for accomplishing this is quite straightforward:

Employ the expressions to which he is most vulnerable of being hooked and manacled, then make him fly and manacle him. The speech which hooks and manacles is the speech which persuades. In using it, I should suddenly use *pai* to show my agreement, and suddenly use *he* to show my disagreement.\(^{89}\)

Tsao incorporates a insightful interpretation into the translation of the final sentence. However, 乍同乍異, literally translates to a much more succinct "suddenly agree, then suddenly disagree."\(^{90}\) Used in the context of the "persuasion as fishing" analogy of this chapter, these sudden changes appear to correspond to the action of tugging on the line to set the hook.

The text also describes how to deal with one who cannot be manipulated:

\(^{87}\)In a footnote, Tsao cites a commentator's explanation that these groups of rulers appropriately used different types of mending to respond to their differing political situations. (73)

\(^{88}\)Ibid., 75-78.

\(^{89}\)Ibid., 75-76.

\(^{90}\)Guiguzi 6a.6-7. My translation.
Either you can first summon him and then give him a heavy burden, or first encumber him with a burden, and then destroy him, or use a heavy burden to destroy him, or make (his) destruction to be a heavy burden for him.

Although the options which are presented are rather mundane, the variety of ways that so few words are manipulated does an effective job of demonstrating that even limited resources can be employed to produce a variety of options.

The chapter concludes with the claim that the persuader who employs the fei qian technique will "leave empty and return prosperous" and be capable of completely controlling his subject.

f. 卍合Wu He [Disagreeing and agreeing]^{92}

This chapter explains that, as it is impossible to please everyone, it is the responsibility of the persuader to decide whom to support and whom to oppose. The persuader is cautioned to be discreet when working against adversaries and to thoroughly understand the situation before taking an action. He is also advised to develop plans that are in harmony with the realities of the situation that he faces:

\^{91} Guiguizi 6a.7-8. My translation.
\^{92} Tsao, 78-81.
If used in the world, then I must measure the world (situation) and work with it.
If is used in the state, then I must measure the state (situation) and work with it. If
used in the family, then I must measure the family (situation) and work with it. If
used for myself, then I must measure my own talents and strengths and then work
with them.

This use of repetitive pattern and working down through the hierarchy of world, state,
family, and self\(^{94}\) is crafted to emphasize the importance of preparation in applying the
principles of *wu he*. Another powerful aspect of the rhetoric of this example is the
sudden change to the previously established pattern in the last phrase. The first three
phrases use a 用之A必量A而與之 structure, where the same noun is used as the object
of each phrase. In the last phrase, however, the structure is changed to 用之A必量B而
與之 and the "myself" that must be measured is more explicitly stated as "my own talents
and strengths". Not only is the change in rhythm likely attract the attention of the
persuader, but the final phrase will leave him with little doubt as to what is expected of
him.

\(g.~Chuai\) [Figuring out]\(^{95}\)

Opening with an appeal to the successful advisers of the past, this chapter discusses
the importance of understanding both the power situation and the feelings of the person

---

93 *Guizzi* 7a.6-8. My translation.
94 天下，國，家，身
95 Tsao, 82-85.
being advised.\textsuperscript{96} It is obvious that an adviser will be unable to formulate appropriate plans unless he understands the realities of the situation that he is facing. The \textit{Guizui} presents an extensive list of the various elements that should be considered as components of the power situation. Some of the aspects to be considered include

It is estimating the size and the population of the states, weighing their degrees of prosperity and the wealth of the people, finding out which resources are abundant and which are insufficient. Judging the strength and weakness of topography of natural defense, which locations are advantageous and which disadvantageous? What are the strengths and the weaknesses of the advisors?\textsuperscript{97}

The text then turns to the importance of understanding the feelings of the person who is being persuaded and provides a technique for eliciting this information. The text claims that most effective way to accomplish this is by using language to manipulate the subject through emotional highs and lows:

Figuring out someone's feelings should be done at a time when he is overwhelmingly pleased. Move him to the extreme of his desires. For when someone has desires, he will be unable to mask his feelings. Or it should be done at a time when he is in deep despair. Move him toward his worst fear. For when someone is extremely troubled, he will be unable to mask his feelings. (Hidden) feelings and desires are revealed by their changes.

\textsuperscript{96} "Those in the past who proficiently guided the world needed to weigh the existing power situation and figure out the feelings of the princes." My translation of \textit{古之善用天下者必量天下之權而揣諸侯之情。} (\textit{Guizui 7b.8})

\textsuperscript{97} Tsao, 82.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Guizui} 8.a5-8. My translation.
The text continues by explaining that once an adviser understands both the power situation and the desires of the ruler, he can confidently determine a recommended course of action. To further emphasize the importance of understanding feelings, the text claims "Even if he possesses the Way of ancient kings and the ability of the sages and the wise, he gets nowhere without figuring out the hidden ch'ing. This is the grand root of planning and the method of persuasion."^99

h. Mo 摩 [Stroking or Ingratiating]100

Stroking can be described as manipulating people by secretly playing to their desires. The text compares those in the past who were skilful in this art to a fisherman who knew how to correctly select bait and always caught fish.

The text explains that there are ten ways of stroking: by using pacifying, straightness, pleasing, infuriating, appealing to reputation, appealing to deeds, modesty, trustworthiness, profits, and debasement.101 Analogies are also used to explain the importance of determining and exploiting a ruler's preferences and desires. The benefit of nurturing common interests with one's ruler is compared to using the driest wood when making fires or moistening the earth to make it more absorbent when pouring water on the ground. "Thus is the response of the internal feelings to the external strokings.

---

99 Tsao, 84. The grammar used in the final sentence is quite emphatic. 此謀之大本也而說之法也。 (Guiguzi 8b.4)
100 Tsao, 86-90.
101 Ibid., 88.
Stroking by the right kind, there will always be correspondence. I stroke by what is desired, there will always be successful persuasion.\textsuperscript{102}

\textit{i. Quan 椎 [Weighing]}\textsuperscript{103}

This chapter discusses the different categories of speech, their characteristics, and the ways that different types of speech can be used to the adviser's maximum benefit. The practical type of advice presented in this chapter includes "(f)lattering speech gives the impression of being knowledgeable and can be used to solicit a reputation of wisdom" and "In order to give the impression of pleasing, anticipate his intention and cater to his desires."\textsuperscript{104} The text also warns about the futility of attempting to persuade someone who is not open to persuasion. The chapter expounds on the importance of using one's strengths, citing examples from nature to support the argument:

言其有利者，從其所長也；言其所害者，避其所短也。故
介蟲之捍也必以堅厚。螫蟲之動也必以毒螫。
故禽獸知用其長而禽知用其用也。\textsuperscript{105}

When there is advantage in words, then play to your strengths. When there is harm in words, avoid your shortcomings.
This is why hard-shelled insects need to depend on durability and thickness or why venomous insects should act based on poison and venom.
So, if the birds and the beasts know enough to use their strengths, then a speaker should know enough to use that which he possesses.

The chapter concludes with poetry that advises the persuader how to select the proper words when persuading eight different types of people:

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 91-96.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 91.
\textsuperscript{105} Guiguzi 10b.7-10. My translation.
When speaking with the wise your words should rely on the extensive,
When speaking with the dimwitted your words should rely on distinctions,
When speaking with the discerning your words should rely on what is needed,
When speaking with the nobility your words should rely on authority,
When speaking with the prosperous your words should rely on the lofty,
When speaking with the impoverished your words should rely on benefits,
When speaking with the lowly your words should rely on ridicule,
When speaking with the brave your words should rely on daring,
When speaking with the impatient, your words should rely on sharpness.

This chapter begins by reiterating the importance of both careful planning and
determining the desires of the person who is being persuaded, comparing "measuring
strength, weighing ability and figuring out the feeling for the situation" to the legendary
south-pointing vehicle used by people in Zheng to find jade. The goal of the advisor is to
develop solutions that provide mutual benefits that, in turn, will result in closeness with
the ruler.

A logical circle is next used to describe the role of persuasion in the endless
progression of events from changes to action. This is a variation "chain logic" that is
frequently used in the Zhanguo ce persuasions and its use is worth highlighting.

106 Guiguzi 11a.4-7. My translation.
107 Chen Shuangjing explains that guo zhe 过者 means "rash and impatient." (94)
108 Tsao, 96-102.
109 "So, if there is mutual benefit, then closeness will result." My translation of: 故相益
則親 (Guiguzi 11b9)
Therefore, changes produce situations. Situations produce plans. Plans produces strategies. Strategies produce discussions. Discussions produce persuasions. Persuasions produce advances. Advances produce retreats. Retreats produce controls, which are used to control events.

The persuader is next given a general strategic principle for persuasion: directly attack the source of disagreement.\textsuperscript{10} This advice is accompanied by a recommended tactical approach to persuasion:

Change in the direction of his suspicions; agree with what he perceives as right. Examine him according to what he says; fulfill him according to his aspirations. Judge according to what he dislikes; reject what bothers him. Figure out his feelings to scare him. State the lofty to entice him. Use the minute to prove to him. Set up external signs to match his internal feelings. [If all these methods fail, then,] overwhelm him to stop him and disturb to confuse him. These are called strategies and plans.\textsuperscript{11}

The persuader is advised that when using such tactics "the open approach is inferior to the concealed."\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{10} "Where there is external affinity but internal disagreement, persuade from the internal. Where there is internal affinity but external disagreement, persuade from the external." (Tsao, 99)
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 99. Roel Sterckx suggested that this paragraph might be more appropriately translated as: "Therefore rely on (your adversary's) doubts in order to change his (point of view); rely on what he (visually) perceives and agree with his (observations); rely on what he says in order to get a hold on him, etc ..." The idea is not to simply follow your adversary's arguments but to turn them to your own advantage." (Roel Sterckx, letter to thesis committee, 23 July 2001)
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 100.


k. Jue 决 [Deciding]^{113}

This chapter presents advice on how to decide for or against a particular course of action. Not surprisingly, the guidance tends toward opportunistic pragmatism. The general advice is to "(r)eview past experiences, infer to things to come, confer with common sense. If all three concur, then decide for it." More specifically, the persuader is told to decide for something if it "concerns high officials ... and may bring good reputation ... does not require much effort and can easily succeed ... requires dangerous work but cannot be spared ... aims at ridding of troubles ... aims at bringing fortune."^{114}

1. Fu-Yan 福言 [Matching Speech]^{115}

The final chapter of Guiguzi moves from the practical toward the philosophical, discussing a variety of topics which include principles for holding positions of authority, becoming enlightened, being virtuous, rewarding, inquiry, following the course of righteousness, being thorough, being sincere, and correctly using names to represent reality.

m. Key Elements of the Guiguzi Rhetorical Program

The Guiguzi presents a wide range of practical advice concerning the persuasive arts. Much of the information is explicitly provided as specific procedures that should be followed when persuading a ruler. In the next two chapters we will evaluate the

---

^{113} Ibid., 102-104.
^{114} Ibid., 104.
^{115} Ibid., 105-109.
techniques and devices that were used by the Zhanguo ce persuaders to manipulate their subjects. In preparation for that analysis, it will be useful to summarize three rhetorical techniques that are part of the Guiguzi program and we can also observe, to a certain extent, in the Zhanguo ce persuasions: power balance, stroking, and styles of speech.

The Guiguzi argues that it is the responsibility of the persuader to determine and evaluate the power balance before formulating a strategy. Although the Guiguzi stresses the importance of the power balance in preparing for a persuasion, the Zhanguo ce persuaders will also demonstrate that the power balance can be wielded as a weapon that is useful for controlling the psychological tone of a persuasion.

The Guiguzi describes ten different methods for "stroking" or ingratiating the persuader to his subject. The Zhanguo ce persuaders also use a wide variety of approaches to curry favor with the rulers that they are persuading, typically using several methods during the course of a single persuasion.

The Guiguzi identifies nine styles of speech that are to be used in persuasions. The rhetor is directed to use the style of speech that the Guiguzi identifies as being most effective when addressing the type of person who is being persuaded. The Zhanguo ce persuaders also use different styles of speech when addressing different types of leaders, frequently changing styles throughout the course of a persuasion in order to maintain control.

As previously discussed, there is not enough evidence to make the claim that either the Guiguzi or Zhanguo ce directly influenced the development of other text. However, in
the next chapters it will be interesting to observe the similarities between the rhetorical approaches that are implicitly or explicitly promoted in these texts in order to gain a better understanding of general Warring States rhetorical practices.
CHAPTER III. THE ZHANGUO CE

A. An Overview

The Zhanguo ce or "The Intrigues of the Warring States" is purported to be a diplomatic history of Warring States China. Written as a collection of 497 episodes, the book describes how advisers to the rulers of the seven major states of the period (Chu, Han, Qi, Qin, Wei, Yan, and Zhao) affected and manipulated the political landscape (Figure 1). In particular, the text details Qin's expertise in keeping the other six states from uniting to form an effective opposition to her. By playing off her competitors against each other, Qin eventually neutralized any collective threats to her supremacy and by 221 BC emerged as the ruler of a unified Chinese nation.

Scholars do not agree on the meaning of the word ce in the context of the title. Crump contends that the word refers to the strategies or the intrigues described in the episodes. Others have argued that the word can also mean a type of "bamboo strip" that was used for recording information and thus propose a meaning like "Records of the Warring States" or the "Warring States Papers." (Crump Chan-kuo Ts'e, 27-28)

The name of this state is spelled "Hann" in the map (Figure 1).

Mark Edward Lewis' "Warring States Political History" presents a concise overview of the history of the period. (587-650)
While the text describes historical events and traditionally considered to be a history, it is important to note that the *Zhanguo ce* was not an actual history of the period. The episodes of in the *Zhanguo ce* were originally compiled by the palace librarian at the Han court, Liu Xiang (劉向), during the early first century BC. Liu's memorial to the Han

---

119 This map is reproduced from Lewis "Warring States Political History", 594.
120 Durrant claims that Sima Qian made extensive use of the *Zhanguo ce* as a *Shi Ji* source, with as much as forty percent of the Warring States history in the *Shi Ji* directly attributable to accounts from the *Zhanguo ce* (102-103).
emperor describes how he consolidated fragments from a variety of Warring States
source to create what we now know as the *Zhanguo ce*: ¹²¹

The fragments . . . came from books originally called *Guo Ce, Guo Shi, Duan
Chang, Shi Yu, Chang Shu, and Xiu Shu*. It appeared to me that the peripatetic
persuaders of the Warring States era used to repay those countries which
employed them by contriving schemes for their use. It therefore seemed proper to
me to call this new book the *Zhanguo ce* . . . ¹²²

Crump argues that many of the descriptions in the text are also derived from a body of
romance literature that described the exploits such heroes as Su Qin 蘇秦 and Zhang Yi
張儀. Highlighting the historical inaccuracies of the text, he cites Maspero's analysis
demonstrating that there were significant inconsistencies between *Zhanguo ce* accounts
of when events were to have occurred. Crump concludes that Liu did not intend for the
text to be treated as a Warring States history, but instead compiled the fragments to be

¹²¹ The *Zhanguo ce* episodes are arranged quasi-chronologically, in one or more volumes,
by state (e.g. Qin 3). Traditionally, individual episodes are identified by the first several
words of the episode, for example "Zhang Yi persuaded the king of Zhao on behalf of the
Qin Alliance," *Zhang Yi Wei Qin Lian Heng Shui Zhao Wang*張儀為秦連横, 說趙
王. Crump uses a similar procedure for identifying episodes in his *Chan-kuo Ts'e*,
however the two methods are not identical. Assigning a number and descriptive title
to each episode, he also cross references each episode by Chinese text number and title. In
this thesis I will use 'CKT' (i.e. *Ch' an-kuo Ts'e*) followed by a number (e.g. C KT136)
when citing Crump's translation of a particular episode. References to the Chinese text
will be made using both and state's volume number & episode number within the volume
and also the page number from the *Zhanguo ce* (e.g. Qin 2.4 *Zhanguo ce*, 250-253).

¹²² Crump *Chan-kuo Ts'e*, 27. I have taken the liberty of changing Crump's Wade-Giles
transliterations of the titles to *pinyin* transliterations in this citation. The names of the
texts (my translations) are *Guo Ce* 國策 "Strategies of the States", *Guo Shu 國事
"Activities of the States", *Chang Duan 長短 "Long and Short", *Chang Shu 長書 "Long
Book", and *Xiu Shu 欽書" Book of Cultivation." Crump argues that *Chang Duan* refers
to the Warring States rhetorical practice of accentuating the positive aspects of a strategy
while minimizing the negative aspects. (1996, 41-42) *Xiu*, which I have translated as
"cultivation," may also be a shortened version of *xiuci 欽辞 "cultivated words" or
"rhetoric." This would change the translation of *Xiu Shu* to "Book of Rhetoric"
used as a series of rhetorical examples that were based on the history of the Warring States period.\textsuperscript{123}

In spite of such historical inaccuracies, the \textit{Zhanguo ce} occupies a unique position in Chinese culture. On one hand, the work has been consistently reviled for the ways that it showcases how it is possible to employ deception and cunning to achieve one's objectives.\textsuperscript{124} On the other hand, it is consistently cited as a superior example of early Chinese literature.\textsuperscript{125} In spite of this reputation, throughout history its detractors have been sufficiently well acquainted with the details of the text to provide detailed criticism of its tenets.\textsuperscript{126} In fact, Chinese fascination with the \textit{Zhanguo ce} continues to be reflected in contemporary publications. Recent business books have cited the lessons of specific \textit{Zhanguo ce} episodes to explain certain principles of negotiation or strategy.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{123} Crump \textit{Chan-kuo Ts'e}, 36-41. Crump cites CKT 145 楚王死 \textit{Chu Wang si} [The King of Chu died] as the only example in the \textit{Zhanguo ce} that is explicitly written in a form that supports this contention. In CKT 145, the death of the king of Chu provides an opportunity for Su Qin to consider ten different options in response to the situation. The episode contains short persuasions that could have been used to support each of the first nine options. (Ibid., 186-190)

\textsuperscript{124} Chapter 5 of Lisa Raphals' \textit{Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China & Greece} presents a fascinating analysis of sections of the \textit{Zhanguo ce} that reveals the historical tension caused by, on one hand, acknowledging the effectiveness of using cunning while, on the other hand, wondering if such deceptive actions should be emulated.

\textsuperscript{125} Citing a Qing dynasty source that states that compares the text to "poison in delicious food", Tsien argues that the traditional Chinese attitude the \textit{Zhanguo ce} was "appreciating it as literature while condemning it as history." (1)

\textsuperscript{126} One of the justifications has been that it is important to study evil practices so that you can recognize them when they're being used against you.

\textsuperscript{127} Chen Shuangjing's uses numerous examples from the \textit{Guiguzi}, \textit{Zhanguo ce}, \textit{Han Feizi}, and \textit{Zuozhuan} to provide historical justification for contemporary negotiation principles in his \textit{Weiji Tanpan} "Crisis Negotiations." Lu Zhongjie also uses episodes from the
The principal actors in the Zhanguo ce are the military and political advisers known as you shui [travelling persuaders]. According to tradition these persuaders were followers of the Zongheng Jia, a rhetorical school that was formed to train advisers in persuasive skills. Garrett describes their style of discourse favored by these persuaders claiming that

...the emphasis in shui is on the audience, not in the thesis being proposed. Usually the audience is being asked to change its behavior or to adopt a belief that may well require that it do so. Shui was receiver-centered discourse in other ways as well. Examples of shui as well as discussion of the genre make it clear that the speaker was expected to tailor the message, appeals, supporting examples, and even delivery to the audience. The speaker was required to be sensitive not only to the particular audience by also to other situational variables such as timing, context, and competing influences.

As implied by their title, these experts in military strategy, political advice and effective persuasion traveled from court to court, working in the service of whichever ruler would hire him. Unlike the political advisers of the Spring and Autumn period, the Warring States persuaders had little interest in appealing to the examples of past kings or quoting from the Odes. Tsao compares the persuaders to the Greek Sophists

They both traveled from place to place, although the Sophists did it for the convenience of teaching, while to Tsung-heng persuaders did by the necessity for diplomacy. They both won admiration for their skills in moving people toward a desired end, although the Sophists primarily used pedagogy as the medium for fame, while the Tsung-heng persuaders used politics. In both cases, their success brought them considerable wealth and the envy of their contemporaries. They

128 A variety of Chinese terms are used to describe this type of person, including 辯士 bian shi [disputer], 浩説 you shui [travelling, wandering, or peripatetic persuader], and 浩士 you shi [wandering knight]. In this text I will use the term 'persuader' or 'adviser' to describe such people.

also shared some interesting viewpoints concerning communication. They both viewed persuasion to be competitive.\footnote{Tsao, 177-8.}

The persuaders also shared the Sophists' reputation for being men who were skilled at constructing effective arguments, regardless of whether or not the arguments were based on factual information.

A large number of persuaders are identified throughout the episodes of the \textit{Zhanguo ce}. Although the consensus is that while many of the persuaders, such as Su Qin and Zhang Yi, did actually exist, it is highly doubtful that the details of their experiences that are chronicled in the \textit{Zhanguo ce} are much more than fictitious examples that were used in the training of persuaders.

\textbf{B. Two Persuasions of Fan Ju to the King of Qin}

To introduce the rhetorical styles used by Warring States persuaders, I have selected two short persuasions by Fan Ju \textit{范雎} to the king of Qin. The persuasions use several of the rhetorical devices that were discussed in the previous chapter and are examples of both types of 'doubled persuasion.' (Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.)

\textit{1. Fan Ju Persuades the King of Qin (Qin 3.9)}\footnote{CKT 95: Crump \textit{Chan-kuo Ts'e}, 195-196. Qin 3.9, \textit{Zhanguo ce}, 193-197. CKT95 is taken from the last section of the last section of Qin 3.9 范雎至秦.}

In the first persuasion that I will consider, Fan Ju is attempting to persuade the king of Qin to regain control from those in his court who are acting without his authority.
how throughout the entire encounter, Fan Ju skillfully interlaces statements of fact with aphorisms, odes, and historical examples to lead the King to the desired action.

范雎曰：臣居山东聞齊之內有田單，不聞其王。聞秦之有太后、穰侯、穰陽、華陽，不聞其有王。

Fan Ju said: "When I lived to the east of the mountains, I heard in Qi there was a certain Tian Dan, but I didn't hear of Qi's king. I heard that in Qin there was Queen Mother, a Marquis Rang, a Lord Jing, and a Lord Hua. However, I didn't hear that Qin had a king.

This opening statement is designed to alarm the king. Qi is a prosperous state that situated far from Qin. It might not bother the king that he is unknown in a foreign state. However, the mere fact that his mother and three subordinates are better known than he is, especially in a foreign state, should be cause for concern and he should be ashamed to have allowed it to occur.

夫據國之謂王，能專利害之謂王，制殺生之威之謂王。今太后擅行不顧，穰侯出使不報，穰陽、華陽擅斷無誶，四貴備而國不危者，未之有也。為此四者，下乃所謂無王已。然則權焉得不傾，而令焉得從王出乎？

"Now the one who has authority over the state is called 'the king.' The one who is uniquely able to benefit or harm is called 'the king.' The one with the awesome power to control life and death is called 'the king.' And yet, now the Queen Mother, acting without authority, disregards the prerogative of the king. Marquis Rang goes out and gives orders, but does not report to the king. Lord Jing and Lord Hua execute and pardon in broad daylight. Can these four continue to flaunt their actions and not put the state in grave danger? Impossible! Because of these four, to their subordinates it is as if there were no king at all. Being like this, is it not possible that their power will not be overturned and their authority will be taken from the king?

Fan Ju addresses the effects of the current situation on Qin's kingship. Citing three fundamental prerogatives of a king, he shows how each of the people who are known in
Qi have abrogated various aspects of his kingship. Note that Fan Ju also uses the fixed pattern, X之謂王 [One who does X is called "the king"] to emphasize that it is the concept of Kingship that is being attacked and not merely a king. Fan Ju also specifically associates each of the evildoers with having appropriated one aspect of a king's authority. This parallel association of evildoer and crime is a strong rhetorical device. He concludes by implying that things have gotten so bad that even the usurpers' subordinates don't acknowledge the king. The conclusion that the king should draw from this persuasion: "Unless somebody takes some action, I may be deposed.

臣聞善爲國者，內固其威，而外重其權。穎侯後者操王之重，決裂諸侯，剖符於天下；征敵伐國，莫敢不聽。戰勝攻取，則利歸於陶；國弊，御於諸侯；戰敗，則怨結於百姓，而禍歸社稷。

I have heard it said that "The king who wants what is best for his state will firmly establish his authority at home and impose his power abroad." That which Marquis Rang orders constrains the power of the king, breaks off relations with the feudal lords, establishes imperial relations across the land, attacks enemies and assails states, and none dares to disobey. When he is victorious in battle and occupies new lands, then the spoils come to Tao. But when the state is ruined and this is reported to the feudal lords or when there is a defeat in battle, then the resentment intensifies among the common people and calamity comes to the state.

Fan Ju next identifies the power balance by addressing the effects of the current situation on the Qin state. He recites an aphorism that reminds the king that he has a responsibility to his state, both at home and abroad. Purposely attempting to infuriate the king, Fan Ju then describes how Marquis Rang has not merely appropriated another royal prerogative, but he is doing it in such a way that provides the usurper with personal benefits while endangering his kingship.

132 Crump explains that Tao is a Marquis Rang's fiefdom (Chan-kuo Ts'e, 126)
It says in the Odes: "When the fruit is bountiful, it covers the branches. When it covers the branches it injures the heart. When the capital is great, it endangers the state. When the servant is venerated, the king is made inferior." When Nao Chi had power in Qi, he bound King Wen's sinews, hung him from the temple beam where he remained overnight and was dead. When Li Dui ruled Zhao, he starved King Fu and within a hundred days the king died of starvation.

Finally, Fan Ju addresses the effects of the current situation on the King's personal safety. Having completed the presentation of his evidence, he now provides the King with two different contexts for evaluating the information. The theme of the ode is that there is a danger when the subordinate is raised above his superior. He also uses examples from history to demonstrate that, if unchecked, subordinates can and will overthrow a king.

```
今秦，太后、穰侯用事，高陵、偃陽佐之，卒無秦王，此亦淬齒、李黽之類已。臣今見王獨立於廟朝矣，且臣將恐後世之有秦國者，非王之子孫也。
```

Nowadays in Qin, the Queen Mother and Marquis Rang are taking actions with the assistance of Gao Ling and Lord Jing that will ultimately result in there being no Qin King. These people are also of the same ilk as Nao Chi and Li Dui. Today your servant observes that the King is going to the temple court alone. Moreover, your servant fears that those who, in future generations, will rule the state of Qin, will no longer belong to your majesty's offspring."

Fan Ju now uses what Crump calls a "doubled persuasion" to present his advice to the king. In this example the king has one of two choices: either the king must decide to

---

133 i.e. the heart or essence of the tree.
134 These two seven-line couplets are not found in the Shi Jing.
135 In this case, the "doubled persuasion" is in the form of: If you do what I recommend you will prosper, but if you don't do what I recommend you will suffer.
deal with the situation and take appropriate action or he must decide to not deal with the situation and suffer the inevitable consequences of his inaction. Fan Ju summarizes his argument by explicitly stating that the Queen Mother and her associates are a danger to the monarchy. He not only associates them with people who committed regicide in the past, but further suggests that the king's situation is more similar to those kings who were killed than the king might imagine. If the situation is allowed to continue, the usurpers will succeed and the king's royal line will end with him.

The Qin king was terrified and thereupon degraded the Queen Mother, expelled Marquis Rang, dismissed Gao Ling, and sent Lord Jing out of the country. King Zhao (of Qin) then said to Fan Ju: "In the past, the Prince of Qi gained Guan Zhong and at that time he was treated as his uncle." Today I have gained you who will be treated as a father."

As with most Zhanguo ce persuasions, Fan Ju's persuasion is successful, the evildoers are punished, and the persuader is rewarded. What is particularly interesting about the king's response is that he uses an historical example to describe Fan Ju's new status. Guan Zhong served as a senior minister to Duke Huan of Qi during the 7th century BC and is credited with helping the Duke to be an effective ruler. The king claims that, because Guan Zhong was such an outstanding adviser, the duke gave him the respect due to his father's younger brother. In his praise, the king not only compares Fan Ju to Guan Zhong, but he also says that he deserves the respect of the king's father.

136 Literally, "father's younger brother."
137 Watson discusses Guan Zhong's role his Tso Chuan. (19n4)
In summary, Fan Ju is attempting to persuade the king of Qin to take action against those who are usurping his authority. It is also worth noting that the usurpers are also a danger to Fan Ju's position, prestige, and power. Opening his presentation with an argument designed to shake the king out of his complacency, the persuader methodically describes the likely results of the king's inaction on Qin's kingship, the state of Qin, and finally the king of Qin, himself. He frequently implies the association of the usurpers to his aphorisms, poems, and historical examples, but it is not until he has presented all of his evidence that he directly equates them with the evildoers of the past. Finally, although he expresses concern about what will happen if the Qin King takes no action, he never explicitly recommends that the King take a particular action. On the other hand, the forcefulness of Fan Ju's persuasion leaves the king with little doubt as to the correct course of action.

2. Fan Ju Persuades the King of Qin (Qin 3.11)\textsuperscript{138}

In the second persuasion, the king of Qin is well on his way to making a significant military blunder. His advisor, Fan Ju, not only develops a way for the king to avoid disaster, but is also able to disadvantage a rival persuader in the process.

秦攻韓，圍隴。范雎謂秦昭王曰：「有攻人者，有攻地者。殽侯十攻魏而不得傷者。非殽弱而魏強也，其所攻者地也。地者，人主所甚愛也。人主者，人臣之所樂為死也。攻人主之所愛，與樂死者鬬，故十攻而弗能勝也。」

Qin attacked Han and surrounded the city of Xing. Fan Ju said to King Zhao of Qin: "There are those who attack men and those who attack land. Ten times Marquis Rang attacked Wei and were unable to inflict any damage. This was not

because Qin was weak or because Wei was strong. It was because that which he attacked was land. It is land that is so deeply loved by rulers. It is the ruler for which men and officers are happy to die. To attack that which the ruler loves is to contend with people willing to sacrifice their lives. Therefore, they attacked ten times and were still unable gain a victory.

In this encounter, Fan Ju opens his persuasion with the expression "There are those who attack men and there are those who attack land." Using this pair of contrasting four-word phrases, Fan Ju explains that Qin history has demonstrated that an essential element of military victory is the selection of the proper targets. In the Qin defeat cited by the persuader, not only did the Qin army fail once, they failed ten times and the weaker country that was attacked wasn't even harmed. The reason for the Qin defeat; they attacked land and not the people. Fan Ju's explains that the reason for this military failure was that the people love their ruler and will defend what the ruler loves. Since rulers love land, it is only logical that the people will fight to the death to protect their ruler's land. His explanation implies that the king of Qin's plans that are designed to capture land are preordained to failure.

今王將攻韓圍陳，臣願王之毋獨攻其地，而攻其人也。王攻韓圍陳，以張儀為言。張儀之力多，且削地以自贈於王，幾割地而韓不盡；張儀之力少，則王逐張儀，而更與不如張儀者市。則王之所求於韓者，言可得也。

At present, your majesty is preparing to attack Han and surround Xing. Your servant desires that your majesty not merely attack her land, but also to attack her people. When your majesty attacks Han and surrounds Xing, say that it is being done on behalf of Zhang Yi. If Zhang Yi's power is great, he will give you territory in order to redeem himself to you. Yet, how many times can he cut away pieces of land before Han is exhausted. However, if Zhang Yi's power is small, then the Han King will expel him and replace him with someone who is not as good as Zhang Yi. Either way, that which your majesty desires from Han can be achieved with these words.
It is at this point Fan Ju reminds the king of the power situation: he is in an untenable situation that can only be resolved through one of two unpalatable alternatives. But as an experienced rhetor, Fan Ju would never have identified a problem to the king unless he had already formulated a solution to the problem. In this case he proposes a solution that benefits the king regardless of which decision he makes. Using the strategy of attacking men, Fan Ju advises the king to blame the persuader Zhang Yi for his actions, implicitly accusing the Zhang Yi of betraying his current benefactor, the king of Han. Fan Ju’s logic is that, once accused, a powerful Zhang Yi would be willing to give Han land in order to maintain his position, while a weak Zhang Yi would be replaced by a less capable advisor. There are two reasons why Fan Ju considers Zhang Yi to be a formidable threat that must be neutralized. At a political level, as an important military adviser to the enemy state of Han, Zhang Yi represents a direct military threat to Qin. At a personal level, Fan Ju and Zhang Yi are advising opposite sides in a conflict, so a victory for one persuader will translate to a defeat for the other. The king’s decision is not recorded; however, his probable decision is quite transparent.

This is the type of episode that gave the Zhanguo ce its amoral reputation. First, the king of Qin shown to be ignorant of military strategy and the history of his own state. Wise kings are not supposed to make military blunders, or worse, repeat the errors of their predecessors. Putting his forces in a position that requires the king choose between shameful retreat or certain defeat reflects poorly on his abilities as king. Second, the king

---

139 The King must either withdraw his forces without attacking, an action that will bring shame to the king and his state, or carry out his planned attack with the expectation of
is apparently willing to agree to a solution that is based on slander and deception. The king is supposed to set the moral example, and this simply is not an honorable way for a king to behave. According to the Confucian tradition which eventually prevailed, kings are defined as being either good or bad; there is no in-between.

In the context of Warring States politics, Fan Ju benefits from this encounter in two ways. First, by rescuing the king from a apparently hopeless situation, he has further strengthened his relationship with the king. Second, assuming that the king follows his advice, Fan Ju has will have seriously damaged the reputation of a competing persuader, Zhang Yi. Fan Ju implies that Zhang Yi, by allowing himself to get into a situation in which he could be so easily manipulated, may not deserve the impressive reputation he has as an advisor. Perhaps this was the underlying reason for the way that Fan Ju handled this entire situation. As an advisor, it is unlikely that Fan Ju would have been unaware of the movements of the Qin army until after the forces were in position it attack. In fact, the more Machiavellian among us might even suggest that Fan Ju purposely waited for the king to put himself into such a position before offering advice in order to benefit himself at the expense of both the king and Zhang Yi.

These features of these two persuasions by Fan Ju are typical of many of the Zhanguo ce episodes. The king of Qin is unaware that has allowed himself to be placed in a perilous situation. Fan Ju makes the king aware of the predicament, using historical examples to establish the gravity of the present situation. All of the historical examples describe terrible incidents in which a leader either suffered defeat or death because he did

failure, another equally shameful act.
not take the appropriate action. Fan Ju also uses examples from nature, the *Odes*, and even folk wisdom to add support his appraisal of the situation. In the end, Fan Ju recommends one or more courses of action to the king. In the first persuasion, the king willingly accepts Fan Ju's advice and honors him and there is no reason to doubt that Fan Ju was equally successful in the second persuasion. The persuasions do not, however, only benefit the ruler. Although he presents the king with a political victory in each persuasion, Fan Ju also manages to craft his solution in such a way that also gives the persuader a personal victory against his rivals.
CHAPTER IV. THE DIPLOMATIC PERSUASIONS OF SU QIN AND ZHANG YI

In addition to being political advisers, the persuaders held an important diplomatic role during the Warring States era, that of negotiator. The *Zhanguo ce* contains numerous episodes in which persuaders were sent by the anti-Qin forces to persuade a ruler to unite in opposition to Qin or, conversely, were sent by the king of Qin to deliver an ultimatum of submission.

Two persuaders are frequently associated with diplomatic negotiations during the Warring States period: Su Qin and Zhang Yi. According to the biography of Zhang Yi from the *Shi ji* both were students of Guiguzi and knew each other. Su Qin was jealous of Zhang Yi's persuasive skills, however, and had one of his subordinates falsely accuse Zhang Yi of theft. Zhang Yi was punished and left his advisory position. Several years later Su Qin summoned Zhang Yi to Zhao where he berated Zhang Yi and dismissed him.\(^{140}\) The result of this incident was that Zhang Yi "regretted that none of the lords he might serve would be able to give Su Ch'in and his state of Chao any trouble save only Ch'ìn. Therefore, to Ch'ìn he traveled."\(^{141}\) So Zhang Yi, in opposition to Su Qin, persuades on behalf of the Qin Alliance.

Conveniently, the *Zhanguo ce* contains episodes from both sides of the negotiations with each of states. This means that we can not only evaluate the episodes to determine what, if any, traces of the *Guiguzi* program exist in the persuasions, but we can also

\(^{140}\) Crump provides a translation of the *Shi ji*, chapter 70, biography of Zhang Yi in *Legends*. (37-38)
compare the way that two persuaders from the same school approach similar, but not identical, situations. This might allow us to identify a Zhang Yi or Su Qin style of persuasion by comparing the way that their arguments are constructed or the types of rhetorical devices that they favor. Such stylistic models could have provided persuaders-in-training with more easily remembered sets of rhetorical devices that were associated with a particular persuader (e.g. argue this in the Zhang Yi style).\textsuperscript{142}

For the purposes of this analysis, I have selected twelve episodes in which the persuaders Su Qin and Zhang Yi present opposite views to rulers of the same states.\textsuperscript{143} From these I have included three pairs of persuasions in their entirety in order to highlight the way that the persuaders used their skills. While persuasions to the other states were also interesting and are incorporated into the analysis later in this chapter, I decided to focus on the Han, Qi, and Zhao persuasions because, in my opinion, they did the best job of displaying the skills of the persuaders. This was probably due to the great importance that both sides placed on these states. Han was valued by the pro-Qin Coalition and anti-Qin Alliance because whoever controlled Han controlled the gateway

\footnote{Crump Legends, 38.}

\footnote{It is important to note, however, that although the rhetors are presenting their cases to the king of a particular state, the individual persuasions were undoubtedly separated by several years. As a result, it is unlikely that the rhetors were arguing under identical circumstances. The rulers being persuaded could have changed, alliances could have changed, or other things could have happened that would make direct comparisons invalid.}

\footnote{Persuasions to the rulers of Han, Qi, and Zhao are individually cited below. The other persuasions that I evaluated were to: Chu (CKT 184 and 195, Chu 1.17 [蘇秦為趙合從說楚威王] and 1.18 [張儀為秦破從連横]), Wei (CKT 310 and 328, Wei 1.5 [蘇子為趙合從說魏王] and 1.11 [張儀為秦連橫]), and Yan (CKT 443 and 454, Yan 1.1}
to Han. Distant Qi was important to the Qin Coalition because Qin desired Qi's abundant natural resources and wealth and also wanted to place the Alliance in the difficult strategic position of facing the Coalition to both the east and the west. Naturally, the Alliance wanted Qi as an ally to avoid being placed in this situation. Zhao's northern location, having direct access to the central plains, gave her a pivotal position in both sides of the Warring States power balance.

Before we look at the individual persuasions, it is worth noting that I am relying on a non-standard reading of the Zhanguo ce to analyze the episodes presented in this chapter. I have established associations between the certain episodes because I consider this to be an effective way of comparing the rhetorical styles of Su Qin and Zhang Yi. Although to my knowledge, Warring States scholars have not relied on this type of reading to support previous research, I still consider it to be valid. When considering the way that Liu Xiang selected and arranged the textual fragments that became the Zhanguo ce, it is not unlikely that the original Warring States texts were transmitted and studied in different ways.

\[\text{[蘇秦將為從北說燕文侯] and 1.6 [張儀為秦破從連横謂燕王]}. \text{ For each state's listing, the Su Qin persuasion is the first number cited.}\]

\[\text{144 It may be useful to refer to the Warring States map (Figure 1 in Chapter 3) when considering the political context of these persuasions. I will use "Coalition" when referring to the pro-Qin lian heng camp and "Alliance" when referring to the anti-Qin he zong camp.}\]
A. The Han, Qi, and Zhao Persuasions

1. Su Qin Persuades the King of Han

In this persuasion, the king of Han is considering submission to Qin. Sharing a common border with Qin, the King probably considers Qin conquest as inevitable and favors considers willing surrender preferable to slaughter at the hand of the Qin forces. The anti-Qin "vertical" Alliance, considering Han to be a gateway to Qin, has sent Su Qin to convince the king of Han to join with the Alliance.

Su Qin persuaded the king of Han on behalf of the Chu Alliance, saying: "To the north of Han are the fortifications of Gong, Luo, and Cheng-Gao. To the west are the forts of Yi-Yang and Cheng-Ban. Yuan, Rang, and the Wei River are to the east and Xing Mountain(s) are to the south. Her territory is a thousand miles.

Su Qin does not begin his persuasion by stating his purpose. Instead, he begins by addressing the power situation; painting a picture of Han's geographic situation in a positive light, stressing the natural and man-made barriers that protect the territory. In the description he identifies several specific geographic locations, indicating to the king that he is has a detailed understanding of Han's situation, has evaluated the situation and is competent to provide appropriate advice. As we will observe in subsequent

---

145 CKT 387: Crump Chan-kuo Ts'e, 427-428. Han 1.5, Zhanguo ce, 930-934.
146 Commentators agree that both references to 'Chu' in this text should have been written 'Zhao' (Zhanguo ce 1978, 931 and 933). Crump's translates it as 'Zhao' without comment.
persuasions, this is the type of introduction that both Su Qin and Zhang Yi use to reassure
the ruler that they are competent to argue their individual cases.

"You have several hundred thousand armored troops. The world's most
powerful bows and strongest crossbows, these are produced by Han itself. The
gizi, xiaofu, shili, and julai bows, they can all shoot more than 600 paces. And
when the Han troops take their positions to shoot, they can release a hundred
arrows without a rest. From far away they can hit an enemy shoulder and from
close by they can cover his heart. The double-edged swords and halberds of the
Han forces are from Ming Shan, Tang Gu, Mo Yang, and He Bo. Made by Deng
Shi or Feng Yuan in Long Yuan or Tai Ah, on land they can split a horse or ox, in
water can cut wild geese, and when facing the enemy can cut in two the strongest.
Armor, shields, boots, helmets, iron masks, thumbrings and even plaited shield
thongs. There is nothing that the Han troops lack. Considering the bravery of
the Han troops, that they wear firm armor, use strong crossbows, and wield sharp
swords, to say that one Han soldier is the equal of a hundred others doesn't begin
to give him enough credit.

Su Qin next presents an inventory of Han's military strength. Not only is Han a state
with brave, well-equipped soldiers, it is also a state that produces extraordinary weapons.
Once again Su Qin uses detailed information (e.g. names of bows and armorers) to
demonstrate his familiarity with Han's situation. With a simple statement praising the
value of the Han soldier, he closes his description of Han's situation, leaving no room for
disagreement: "One Han soldier is equal of a hundred others doesn't begin to give him
enough credit" (一人當百，不足言也.). It is also worth noting that throughout this
section Su Qin does not once refer to the Qin enemy on the Han border.
...considering Han's strength and your majesty's worth, to desire to turn westward to serve Qin, to proclaim to be her eastern boundary, to build an imperial palace, to receive a cap and sash, to supply her needs for spring and autumn sacrifices, to fold your arms and then submit to him... To do this will shame your altars and make the empire laugh as nothing else could! That is why I desire your majesty to thoroughly consider this matter. Were your majesty to serve Qin, then Qin would demand Yi Yang and Cheng Gao. This year if you comply, then next year the demand for land will be even greater. If you comply, you will soon have no more land to give. If you don't comply, then they will reject your previous work and you will suffer even more. Moreover, your majesty's territory is finite, while Qin's demands are infinite. So to use limited lands to oppose limitless demands is what is called going to the market in anger and buying a calamity, and nothing more! Without a battle all of your land will already be gone. Your servant has heard a vulgar expression: 'Better to be the mouth of a chicken, than to be the ass of an ox.' Now if your majesty faces westward to submit and serves Qin, how is this in any way different than being the ass of an ox? With your majesty's value, controlling the strong Han forces, and then accepting the title of 'ass of an ox'? Your humble servant is ashamed on your behalf!"

Su Qin now addresses the problem of Qin. Instead of simply saying "So, I've heard you want to serve Qin," he begins this section of his persuasion by providing an excruciatingly detailed list of what serving Qin would entail. The elements of the list are presented in a sequence that identifies a deeper commitment to Qin with each action taken by the king of Han.\(^{148}\) Su Qin wants to make sure that the King understands that

\(^{147}\) Crump's translation of this phrase. \(\text{(Chan-kuo Ts'e, 428)}\)

\(^{148}\) The use of four three-word phrases culminating in "fold your arms and then submit to him" give this description a particularly biting tone: "to proclaim to be her eastern
allegiance to Qin will require him to utterly reject any allegiance to Han, an action that will bring great shame to his state. Han will also become a laughingstock among the other states because, with all of her military might and geographic advantages, she will have made no effort to resist Qin.

Su Qin next presents a series of hypothetical, yet probable, situations that the king of Han will face if he submits to Qin. He makes extensive use of "if-then" sentences (A→B) to demonstrate that each of the King's options will only lead him to a worse situation. He is also building on a logical chain that culminates with the analogy: "So to use limited lands to oppose limitless demands is what is called going to the market in anger and buying a calamity, and nothing more!" (夫以有限之地，而逆無已之求，此所謂市怨而買禍者也，不戰而地已削矣.) Su Qin utterly rejects the King's flawed logic. And then, just as the King's despair is apparently at its deepest, Su Qin changes the direction of his persuasion to infuriate him.

Warning the King that he is about to use is a vulgar expression, Su Qin recites the rhyming couplet that equates the King with the "ass of an ox." Then, to ensure that there is no misunderstanding, he uses the expression two more times: first, when he asks a rhetorical question concerning the appropriateness of the comparison and second, when he describes the shame of "accepting" such a name.

boundary, to build an imperial palace, to receive a cap and sash, to supply her needs for spring and autumn sacrifices, to fold your arms and then submit to him..." My translation of 稱藩服, 築帝宮, 受冠帶, 祀春秋, 折臂而服焉。 149 Literally "back of an ox", but "ass of an ox" more closely approximates the impact of this expression.
The king of Han, enraged, changed color. He pushed back his sleeve, reached for his sword, threw back his head toward the heavens and made a deep sigh, saying: "Although I may die, I will never serve Qin. Now that you have come to explain to me what the king of Chu desires, I respectfully offer my state to the Alliance."

The king of Han responds to Su Qin's persuasion first with appropriate anger. Su Qin has seriously offended him, so he reaches for his sword. But then the king understands what Su Qin is saying; he has seen past the insult and grasped the advice. As with most Zhanguo ce persuasions, the king ultimately realizes the error of his ways and adopts the course of action recommended by the persuader.

2. Zhang Yi Persuades the King of Han

In this persuasion, Han has sided with the Zhao Alliance. Working on behalf of the Qin Coalition, Zhang Yi attempts to convince the king of Han to switch his allegiance to Qin.

Zhang Yi persuaded the king of Han on behalf of the Qin Coalition: "The lands of Han are inhospitable and mountainous. Of the five grains that are needed for life, Han only has wheat and beans. What the people eat, for the most part are beans or broth from the greens. If one harvest fails, then the people will not be satiated with only the dregs and the chaff. You don't even have 900 li of land, so

150 Probably to kill Su Qin for insulting the King.
151 CKT 393: Crump Chan-kuo Ts'e, 432-433. Han 1.6, Zhanguo ce, 934-937.
you can't grow two years worth of food. I would also guess that the number of your majesty's troops can't be more than 300,000, and that estimate includes servants and other support personnel. Excluding those already protecting the frontiers and the city walls, the number can't be any more than 200,000.

Zhang Yi is trying to convince the king of Han that resistance to Qin is futile, so he immediately presents a picture of the power balance that highlights Han's geographic and population disadvantages. He explicitly describes the difficulties of growing food on mountainous terrain, stressing the vulnerability of the population to even one bad harvest; especially since they don't have enough farmland to provide a surplus. He next addresses the Han forces. No longer is this the well-equipped Han army, as described by Su Qin, that is supplied with superior weapons from Han's own craftsmen. It is now simply a ragtag group of soldiers, servants, and support personnel.

Qin, on the other hand, has more than a million armored troops, a thousand chariots, ten thousand cavalry soldiers, warriors with the grasp of a tiger, who leap about bare-headed, and charge straight at the enemy. With an unstoppable strategy for victory. And the excellence of Qin's horses is like the abundance of her warriors, they leap through the air, covering over 20 feet in a bound, in countless numbers. The troops from the east of the mountains put on their helmets and strap on their armor as they prepare for battle. Helmetless, the Qin troops throw off their armor to more easily chase their foes. With their right hand they raise an enemy's head while in their left they hold a prisoner. Comparing the Qin forces to soldiers from east of the mountains is like comparing the fierce Meng Ben to cowards. Their awesome power is crushing. It is like comparing

\[152\] The Zhao Alliance
In his effort to convince Han that military resistance is futile, he moves from his description of the woefully inadequate Han militia to the superhuman Qin army. Everything in Zhang Yi's description is larger than life. The size of the Qin force is huge and it is manned by unbelievably bloodthirsty warriors. While their enemies are encumbered by armor, the Qin soldiers fight nearly naked as they rout the foe. Zhang Yi intensifies his imagery by using several analogies to compare the Qin soldiers with their enemies. Qin soldiers are like the strong men Meng Ben or the Black Catcher, while their foes are like cowards and little babies. A country that resisted the Qin army would be crushed like a pile of eggs under a huge weight. Zhang Yi doesn't directly threaten the king of Han, but he is obviously presenting an implied threat.

153 Meng Ben 孟貢 and Wu Huo 烏獲 (The Black Catcher) were used to represent a person who was the epitome of strength. (Lau, 172)
154 A particularly clever analogy is the pair of four-word phrases that Zhang Yi uses to equate the quality of Qin's horses to the quantity of her uncountable warriors: "The excellence of Qin's horses are as the abundance of her warriors." My translation of: 秦馬之良，戎兵之眾.
Having contrasted the weakness of Han with the power of Qin, Zhang Yi explains why people have ignored this reality. In this part of his appeal he is "stroking by means of trustworthiness" as he confides in the king and explains the 'real' reason for the obstinate attitude of the Zhao Alliance. He lays much of the blame on the "sweet words and convincing arguments" of the supporters of the Zhao Alliance; it was the wandering persuaders! By blaming the persuaders for leading the rulers astray, Zhang Yi begins to provide the king of Han a way out of his current situation. He doesn't accuse the king of making the poor decision to side with the Zhao Alliance; it was that the mercenary persuaders deceived him. Now aware of the true situation, the King has the opportunity to make the proper decision. Zhang Yi has presented him with a way to save both his state and his "face."

大王不事秦，秦下甲據宜陽，斷絃緜之上地；束取成皋、宜陽，則鴻臺之宮，桑林之苑，非王之有已。夫塞成皋，絕上地，則王之國分矣。先事秦則安矣，不事秦則危矣。夫造福而求福，計淺而怨深，逆秦而順楚，雖欲無亡，不可得也。故爲大王計，莫如事秦。

If your majesty refuses to serve Qin, then Qin will send down her armored troops to occupy Yi Yang and will cut off the upper lands of Han. In the east Qin will seize Cheng Gao and Yi Yang. Then the Palace at Hong Tai and the luxurious Sanglin Park will no longer possessed by your majesty. And when Cheng Gao is secure, Qin will sever the upper lands of Han. Your majesty's state will be divided. If you make it your priority to serve Qin, then there will be peace. If you don't serve Qin, then there will be danger. For to bring forth calamity when in search of prosperity indicates that a strategy is shallow while resentment runs deep. To oppose Qin and favor Chu, even if no calamity is desired, is simply out of the question. Therefore, were I to plan on your majesty's behalf, I would say that there is no better alternative than to serve Qin.

Then Zhang Yi suddenly changes his approach to presents a detailed description of the consequences of remaining with the Zhao Alliance. The detailed manner that the
evisceration of his state is described is designed to leave the king of Han with no doubt as to the consequences of refusing to serve Qin. However, in case there is any doubt as what Han should do, Zhang Yi uses two unambiguous parallel phrases: "If you make it your priority to serve Qin, there will be peace. Period. But if you do not serve Qin, then there will be danger. Period." (先事秦則安矣，不事秦則危矣)\textsuperscript{155}

Zhang Yi explains to the King what he has described will be the consequences of not submitting Qin even if that is not the King's intention. Then, just like a court adviser to Han, Zhang Yi graciously tells the King that, were he in the King's shoes, he would choose to serve Qin.

秦之所欲，莫如弱楚，而能弱楚者莫如韓。非以韓能弭於楚也，其地勢然也。今王西面而事秦以攻楚，為敵邑，秦王必喜。夫攻楚而私其地，轉禍而誅秦，計無便於此者也。是故秦王使使臣獻書大王御史，須以決事。"

Of that which Qin desires, there is nothing as great as to weaken Chu. And for weakening Chu, none can do it better than Han. It is not that Han is considered to be stronger than Chu. It is just that Han's geographic situation is favorable. Now, if your majesty heads west and serves Qin in order to defeat Chu, on behalf of your ragged region, the king of Qin will, of course, be delighted. And on top of that, when Han attacks Chu and takes her lands, then you will have turned a disaster into good fortune and pleased Qin. There is no plan more advantageous that this. This, then, is why the king of Qin sent his servant to present this document to your majesty's chief censor\textsuperscript{156}. You must now decide the matter."

Then Zhang Yi again "strokes using trustworthiness" and 'confides' to the king of Han that Qin really considers Chu to be her biggest threat. Next, he uses "stroking using reputation" as he explains that Qin needs Han to weaken Chu. Zhang Yi qualifies his compliment by stating the need is not because Qin considers Han's troops to be any

\textsuperscript{155} The final particle \texttt{ye} 矣 gives the sentence a strong sense of finality.
match for Chu, it's simply a matter of geography. Zhang Yi concludes his argument by "stroking using profit" as he describes the benefit to Han of attacking Chu on behalf of Qin.

The king of Han said: "You have given me good fortune and instructed me. I desire to join my lands with those of Qin, to build a palace for the Qin emperor, to supply her needs for the spring and autumn sacrifices, to be Qin's eastern protector, and to present to Qin the city of Yi Yang."

Since this encounter took place approximately fifteen years after the previous Su Qin persuasion, the political and military situations have changed since Han was first persuaded to join the Alliance. The king of Han now willingly accepts the demands presented by Zhang Yi and offers his services to Qin.\textsuperscript{157}

Zhang Yi, negotiating from a position of strength, makes a very direct presentation of his view of the power situation. There is a tension in the way that he alternates between confiding in the king and delivering implied threats, the type of unexpected shifting of positions that keeps Zhang Yi in control of the situation. Unlike Su Qin's earlier persuasion, Zhang Yi has no reason to give the king of Han any reason for hope. From Qin's perspective, one way or another Han will be engulfed by the Qin empire. From

\textsuperscript{156} "Chief censor" is Crump's translation of \textit{yu shi} 御史. (Crump \textit{Legends}, 54)

\textsuperscript{157} Although we do not know if Su Qin and Zhang Yi persuaded the same king of Han, the words used by the king of Han to declare his allegiance to Qin are exactly the same words that were distastefully spoken by Su Qin when he chided to king of Han for considering a surrender to Qin: "Build a palace, supply her needs for the spring and autumn sacrifices, be called 'Eastern Protector.'" 蔡帝宮，祠春秋，稱東藩 Only the reference to "cap and sash" is missing, presumably because this must be received from the Qin king. These are apparently set expressions that are used to indicate subservience.
Zhang Yi’s perspective, he is merely providing the king of Han an opportunity to minimize the degree of misery that will be suffered by his state.

3. Su Qin Persuades the King of Qi.\(^{158}\)

Su Qin has been sent by the Zhao Alliance to convince the king of Qi to join the Alliance. Qi, a coastal state in northeast China, is buffered from Qin by Wei and Han, so it is not immediately threatened by Qin. Qi has also apparently been able to keep herself relatively removed from other inter-state conflicts, preferring not to side with either confederation. However, the Alliance does not want Qi to abandon her neutrality in favor of Qin. Such an occurrence would not only give Qin access to Qi’s riches, but it would also present the Alliance with Qin to their west and a member of the Coalition, Qi, to their east. This is why the Alliance has sent Su Qin to convince the king of Qi to commit his state to the Zhao Alliance.

Su Qin persuaded King Xuan of Qi on behalf of the Zhao Alliance: "To Qi’s south are the Tai Shan, to her east Lanye, on her west are the Qing and Yellow rivers, and to the north is the Bo Hai. This is then the so-called ‘State of four borders.’ The land of Qi covers two thousand li, her armored troops number in the hundreds of thousands, her grains are like hills and mountains. The excellence of

her chariots, her 'Five Family' troops, as fast as a needle-dart, battling like thunder and lightning, loosed like wind and rain. And in all of her exploits, none was able to put the Tai Shan at their backs, cross the Qing or Yellow rivers, or ford the Bo Hai. In Linzi there are 70,000 families, and by your servant's estimate, each of these families has three sons, thus thrice seven for 210,000. So without having to go any further, Linzi's soldiers will certainly number 210,000.

Linzi is a wealthy and upscale city. Among her people there are none who do not play the yu-reed pipes, strum the se-zither, play the zhu-lute or qin-lute, enjoy cockfights, race dogs, gamble, or play ball games. Concerning the roads in Linzi, the carts run hub-to-hub and the people rub shoulders. If they joined sleeves it would be like a screen, if they raised their sleeves it would be like a curtain, and if they shook off their sweat it would be like rain. The families are generous and wealthy. Their intentions are lofty and well-known. Considering the king's virtue and Qi's strength, nowhere under heaven can be more suitable. If you were to now face westward and serve Qin, I would humbly feel shame for your majesty.

Su Qin begins his persuasion with a description of the power situation that gives a flattering overview of Qi's geography, resources, and military. He provides detailed information with a degree of obsequiousness that lets the King know that not only is he familiar with that of which they are most proud, but also that he is simply in awe of the grandeur of Qi. He next gives an exhaustive description of the prosperous city of Linzi. Selecting words to create a mesmerizing and chant-like presentation, he uses two-word expressions to catalog Linzi's eight types of leisure activities and employs three four-word exaggerations (e.g. shake off their sweat... like rain) to illustrate the immense size of the city's population. He concludes his description of Linzi by praising the moral character of her citizens, again with a pair of rhythmic four-word phrases. Then,

---

159 The defense of the Qi capital was organized using a hierarchy that was based on five family units known as gui; hence, 'Five Family' troops. (Lewis Sanctioned Violence, 55)
160 Crump's translation of 猃 (Crump Chan-kuo Ts'e, 169)
161 The contrived way that Su Qin multiplies the number of families by the number of sons to determine the strength of Qi's army adds to the obsequious style of the first part of this persuasion.
162 The city is so prosperous that each family has three sons.
unexpectedly changing the tone of his persuasion, Su Qin contrasts the splendor of Qi and her king with the shameful act of serving Qin. This abrupt change in mood undoubtedly left the King hanging on Su Qin's every word.

Moreover, the reason that Han and Wei fear Qin is because they both share borders with her. Were Qin troops dispatched and Han and Wei were forced to defend, it wouldn't be more than ten days before the matter of victory and defeat was settled. If Han and Wei fought and defeated Qin, half of their forces would be cut down and could not protect their borders. Were they to fight and lose, annihilation would follow. This then is why Han and Wei consider war with Qin as weighty, but consider servitude to Qin as being of little consequence.

Su Qin next explains why Han and Wei, states that border Qin, have a reason to consider joining the Qin Coalition. It is possible that this passage is here because the king of Qi is considering using the examples of Han and Wei to justify a decision to submit to Qin. Su Qin explains to the king of Qi that while Han and Wei must choose between annihilation and submission, Qi is not faced with such a situation.

However, were Qin to attack Qi, it wouldn't be like this. With her back to the lands of Han and Wei, she will have crossed Lesser Wei through the Yang Jin road, threaded through the Kang Fu Pass, where chariots cannot ride two abreast and horses cannot ride side by side. If one hundred men defended this pass, a force of one thousand couldn't make it through. Although Qin may want to penetrate deeply, she must do so like a wolf, always looking around her. Fearing the agreements of Han and Wei behind her, this then will be Qin — the
dissatisfied, suspicious wild dog that will be unable to bite. Although she may
leap high, she will not dare to advance and, therefore, will be unable to harm Qi.
Furthermore, that you have not seriously considered this situation regarding Qin
as I have presented it, but instead desire to face westward to serve Qin — this
implies that recommendations of your advisers have been in error. Today you do
not have the name "servant of Qin." Instead you have the reality of a powerful
state. I strongly desire that your majesty will decide with little delay."

Having previously described the serious threat posed to Han and Wei by Qin, Su Qin
now describes the actual threat posed to Qi by Qin. He explains that, for Qin to present a
danger to Qi, Qin must overcome insurmountable geographic and political obstacles.
Describing Qin as a lurking wolf or a nervous dog and implying that Qin may engage in
saber-rattling in an attempt to frighten Qin into submission, Su Qin argues that Qi has no
reason to consider submitting to Qin. Su Qin then attacks the source of the advice that
has led the king to even consider serving Qin; the king's advisers. He does this both to
provide the king with a face-saving way of changing his mind about serving Qin and also
to enhance his reputation at the expense of king's advisors. Su Qin concludes his
persuasion by saying that the "reality" (shi 真) of the situation was that Qi was a
powerful state that did not have the "name" (ming 名) of "servant of Qin." By saying this
he implied that a decision by Qi to serve Qin would be incongruous as the name would
not match the reality. It was the king's responsibility, therefore, to ensure that both name
and reality were in agreement by deciding to join the Zhao Alliance.163

163 The association between ming 名 "name" and shi 真 "reality" is a theme in several
Warring States philosophical schools. The Confucian school argued that unless the two
were properly associated disorder would ensue and considered it the responsibility of the
ruler to ensure that the both were in harmony. Thanks to Anna Shields for pointing out
the ming/shi association in this persuasion text.
齊王曰：「寡人不敏，今主君以趙王之敬詔之，敬奉社稷以從。」

The king of Qi said: "I have not been too perceptive. Having heard the instruction from the adviser to the king of Zhao, I also proclaim it and respectfully offer my state in service to the Alliance."

As with his persuasion to the king of Han, Su Qin begins his persuasion to the king of Qi by highlighting the strengths of Qi and asking, in essence, "why would anyone ever want to unilaterally turn over a state such as Qi to Qin?" He then explains, from a strategic perspective, why it is appropriate for Han and Wei to consider serving Qin, but also why it is entirely inappropriate for Qi even consider Qin to be a threat. When Su Qin began his persuasion he faced a king who considered Qi to be a weak and vulnerable state that was foreordained to be conquered by powerful Qin. By presenting facts in a way that highlighted Qi's strengths and Qin's vulnerabilities, Su Qin changed the king's perspective and convinced the king that the his only reasonable choice was to commit Qi to the cause of the Alliance.

4. Zhang Yi Persuades Qi

As this persuasion opens, Qi has sided with the Zhao Alliance. Qin wants Qi as a member of the Coalition in order to have access to her abundant resources and to present the Alliance with enemies Qi, to the east, and Qin, to the west. Working on behalf of the Qin Coalition, Zhang Yi attempts to convince the king of Qi to switch his allegiance to Qin.

\[164\] CKT 142: Crump Chan-kuo Ts'e, 183-184. Qi 1.17, Zhanguo ce, 343-346.
张仪为秦连横齐王曰：「天下强国无过齐者，大臣父兄殷众富乐，无过齐者。然而大王计者，皆为一时说而不顾万物之利。从人说大王者，必谓齐西有强赵，南有韩、魏，负海之国也，地广人众，兵强士勇，虽有百秦，将奈我何！大王览其说，而不察其至实。夫从人朋党比周，莫不以从为可。」

Zhang Yi persuaded the king of Qi on behalf of the Qin Alliance saying: "Of all of the powerful states under Heaven there is none greater than Qi. Having senior ministers and advisers with abundant wealth and happiness, there is none that surpasses Qi. Yet, there are those who plan on behalf of your majesty, but speak only for the moment, not caring for the benefits of ten thousand generations. These proponents of the Alliance who persuade your majesty are always arguing: With a strong Zhao to Qi's west, Han and Wei to her south, and her back to the sea, with broad lands and an abundant populace, with her strong soldiers and brave knights, were there a hundred Qin states, could they do anything to Qi? Your majesty has inspected their arguments, but has not examined their realities. These proponents for the Alliance are a partisan lot who never even consider whether what they propose will work or not.

Zhang Yi does not take the time to offer more than the most basic pleasantries to the king of Qi. Instead, he quickly begins criticizing the anti-Qin persuaders for their shortsightedness and their failure to fully examine their plans. As part of his argument, he sarcastically recites a simplistic strategy that might easily have been presented by a persuader. Hearing what was possibly an Alliance strategy presented by a representative of the Qin Coalition would probably be unnerving for the King. Zhang Yi concludes this section by accusing the king, not his advisers, of doing a poor job of evaluating his options. In contrast, Zhang Yi implies, that Qin has evaluated Qi's strategy and, moreover, understands why it will not work.

165 Probably Su Qin
166 The character Ian 覲 can be translated as "to read" or "to inspect." Since persuasions were typically made orally (even Zhang Yi read the king of Qin's letter to the king of Zhao), I use "inspect" to contrast with "examine" in order to portray the sarcastic tone of Zhang Yi's presentation.
I have heard that Qi battled Lu three times and each time Lu was victorious in battle. However, Lu was also endangered and ultimately perished. Although Lu was victorious in name, the reality was that Lu was defeated. How could this happen? Qi was large and Lu was small. Nowadays Zhao's position relative to Qin is just like Lu's was to Qi. When Qin and Zhao fought above the Yellow river and the Zhang river, they battled twice and Zhao defeated Qin twice. When they fought above Bo Wu, they battled twice and Zhao defeated Qin twice. However, after four battles Zhao had lost hundreds of thousands of men and Handan barely survived. Although Zhao was victorious in name, her state was in ruins! How could this happen? Qin was powerful and Zhao was weak.

Like Su Qin in his persuasion to the King of Qi, Zhang Yi discusses matters in the context of "in name" and "in reality." He evaluates two historical examples to demonstrate that it is possible to win battles in name (ming) but still be defeated in reality (shi). In the first instance, the smaller state of Lu defeated the larger state of Qi three times. But it is Lu who is ultimately defeated because she completely exhausted her limited resources and could no longer defend herself. Zhang Yi explains more recently Zhao made Lu's mistake when confronting Qin. Zhao was the short-term victor in four battles, but suffered extensive damages to the point that she actually lost. Even when Zhao achieves temporary victories against Qin, Zhao loses because the more powerful state of Qin will win.

---

167 The capital of Zhao
168 Of the Su Qin and Zhang Yi persuasions that are evaluated in this thesis, only the persuasions to the king of Qi present ming/shi arguments. It is not known why this is the case, but it is possible to speculate. Perhaps the king of Qi, ruling a wealthy state that is relatively isolated from an immediate military threat, has the freedom to be interested in philosophical issues and would be receptive to such an argument. On the other hand,
A striking aspect of the grammar in this section is the way that a simple sentence pattern is used almost mockingly to highlight the unexpectedness of Lu’s ultimate defeat: "Lu thrice fought and Lu thrice won" 魯 三戰而魯三勝. This pattern is also used to describe the Zhao victories. Another basic sentence structure is used to explain the reason for the losses by Lu and Zhao. In the case of Zhao the reason is given as: "Qin was strong and Zhao was weak." 秦強而趙弱也. In the midst of elegant persuasions, such simply stated conclusions can make a strong impact on an audience.

At present, Qin and Chu have exchanged sons and daughters in marriage and have become fraternal states. Han has given Yi Yang to Qin, Wei has done the same with the lands across the Yellow river, and Zhao has paid homage at the Qin court in Mian Chi, giving her lands near the Yellow river in Qin’s service. If your majesty does not decide to serve Qin, then Qin will encourage Han and Wei to attack Qi’s southern territories. Qin also knows that Zhao can cross the river pass, head toward Bo Guan and the cities of Linzi and Ji Mo would no longer be your majesty’s. On the day that your state suffers attack you may then wish to serve Qin. But by then it will be too late. It is for this reason that I request your majesty to fully consider this matter.

Zhang Yi concludes his persuasion by describing the consequences if Qi decides not to serve Qin. It is late in the Warring States era and, according to Zhang Yi, the states of Chu, Han, Wei, and Zhao have all submitted to Qin. As he did in his persuasion of the king of Han, Zhang Yi implies that Qi’s submission to Qin is inevitable; it is up to the perhaps, having just recited (and belittled) Su Qin’s version of the threat posed to Qi by Qin, Zhang Yi is attempting to further unnerve the king of Qi by using the same type of argument employed by Su Qin. While Su Qin used this type of argument once, Zhang Yi uses it twice.
King's whether he will surrender his state peacefully or have it taken from him in battle. Zhang Yi explains that Qin will "encourage" the Coalition states that border Qi to attack Qi. He adds credibility to the threat by providing details of how such an attack would be carried out. He also adds a sense of urgency to the King's decision by explaining that once Qin forces attack Qi, it will be too late to make a decision to serve Qin.

齊王曰：「齊僻陋隐居，託於東海之上，未嘗聞社稷之長利。今大客幸而教之，請奉社稷以事秦。」獻魚鹽之地三百於秦也。

The king of Qi replied: "Qi is a rustic and secluded place that has trusted in her position on the Eastern Sea, never having heard of such long-lasting benefits to her ancestral altars. Now this great guest has given me good fortune and instructed me. Please accept my state in the service of Qin." The king presented three hundred miles of fishing and salt-producing lands to Qin.

As with his persuasion to the king of Han, Zhang Yi is addressing the king of Qi more than a decade after Su Qin convinced Qi to join the Alliance. At this point in history Chu, Han, Wei, and Zhao have joined the Qin Coalition and the ultimate victory of the Coalition seems inevitable. Qi, still described by Zhang Yi as a wealthy state, has apparently remained minimally affected by the turmoil to her west. With only distant Yan as a possible ally, the king yields to the inevitable and joins the Coalition.

In this episode Zhang Yi makes an extremely direct presentation to the king of Qi. Perhaps it is because he is in a very strong position and is, in essence, delivering an ultimatum to the king of Qi. His use of unambiguous language to deliver a persuasion that ends in with a threat is in marked contrast to the loquacious words used by Su Qin in his earlier persuasion to the king of Qi. While Su Qin indirectly implied that it was in

---

169 The state of Qi
Qi's best interests to join the Alliance, Zhang Yi now emphatically states that, to avoid military invasion, Qi must join the Coalition.

5. Su Qin Persuades Zhao

In this persuasion, Su Qin persuades the young king of Zhao to form and lead an Alliance against Qin. This is a key persuasion in the Zhanguo Ce as it is the persuasion in which Su Qin first lays out his plans for an anti-Qin Alliance led by Zhao. At over 1400 words, it is also one of the longest persuasions of the Zhanguo Ce.

Su Qin went from Yan to Zhao where he first formed the Alliance. He persuaded the king of Zhao: "Of all of the nobles, ministers, people, and servants, under heaven, there is none who does not revere your majesty's righteous conduct. They have all long wanted to receive your instruction and declare to you their loyalty. However, Lord Feng Yang is jealous, and your majesty has not allowed other officials to serve you. Because of this, guests from abroad and wandering persuaders have not dared to be entirely loyal before you. Now that Lord Feng Yang has passed away, your majesty may finally be able to draw closer to your subjects. Your servant also dares to offer his foolish advice, foolish but loyal. In making plans on behalf of the great king¹⁷⁰, there is nothing as good as peace and leisure for the people. I request to show you how to achieve what you want without warfare. The source of having the people at peace lies in selecting one's allies. If you are able to do this, then people will be at peace. If you aren't able to do this, then the people will never know peace.

Unlike in his previous persuasions, Su Qin begins his presentation by actively subordinating himself to the young king. As indicated in the closing lines of this

¹⁷⁰ CKT 234: Crump Chan-kuo Ts'e, 281-285. Zhao 2.1, Zhanguo ce, 635-642.
persuasion, the king has not been in power for long, so Su Qin uses every opportunity to reaffirm the king's exalted position. As will become obvious through the course of the persuasion, Su Qin does not want to give the king any excuses for rejecting his persuasion.

Su Qin has apparently been kept from persuading the king by his late adviser, Feng Yang, so Su Qin explains that Feng Yang was a bad adviser and describes the negative effect that he had on the king's ability to receive proper advice. Su Qin presents Feng Yang's recent death as an opportunity for the king to receive better advice from more honest advisers and promptly offers his services to the king as an adviser. At this point there is an abrupt change in the direction of the presentation as Su Qin begins to give what appears to be his actual persuasion. Using a type of "doubled persuasion", he begins by emphasizing that is important for the king to select his state's allies because his selection of allies will determine whether his state will be at peace or at war. Su Qin's ability to convince the king of the value of alliances is crucial to the success of the Alliance.

"Allow me to first speak of external evils. If Qi and Qin are both your enemies, then the people will never achieve peace. If you rely on Qin to attack Qi, then the people will never achieve peace. Conversely, if you rely on Qi to attack Qin, then the people will never achieve peace. So in plotting against the people's ruler or attacking a state's people, it is often that words that slip out can

\[171\] The king of Zhao.
\[172\] The king has not rejected his offer to be an adviser, so Su Qin apparently interprets this as concurrence.
sever relations between people. So I desire that your majesty be careful not to let words slip out. I request that you send your servants away and I will speak of the differences between the *yin* and the *yang*.

Su Qin next address the dangerous aspects of the power situation. He discusses the futility of relying on Qi and Qin to bring him peace, using three sentences that each ends with an identical phrase: "The people will not achieve peace." Su Qin’s plan is for Zhao to lead a six-state Alliance against Qin, so he must convince the king that bilateral arrangements will not bring his state peace.

He next encourages the king to be careful of what he says, requests that the king send his servants away, and offers to present to him the esoteric knowledge of the *yin* and *yang*. These actions not only appear intended to keep Su Qin’s plans from disloyal members of the Zhao court, but also reinforce the sense that Su Qin is giving the king privileged information that must only be revealed to a king. Su Qin is confiding in the king and strengthening their relationship.

If your majesty can sincerely listen to your servant, then Yan will send you lands that produce carpets, furs, and hunting dogs. Qi will send you coastal lands that produce fish and salt. Chu will send you oranges and pumelos and the land of Yun Meng. Han and Wei will give you lands for fiefdoms and bathing areas, and honored relatives and senior officials can become fiefholders. To cut off land of similar value, the five hegemons defeated armies and captured generals. To enfeoff their honored relatives, Tang and Wu deposed and killed their kings.

173 Apparently the King had been previously been advised to ally with one or both of these states.

Yet today your majesty need only clasp his hands to have them. This is what I desire for your majesty.

Now Su Qin shifts his appeal to the king's sense of greed and pride. He explains to the king that if he "sincerely" listens to Su Qin, he will be rewarded by the states of Yan, Chu, Han, and Wei with their riches and lands. While ancient rulers paid tremendously for bounty such as this, Su Qin explains that the king need just say the word and the riches and lands will be his. As he entices the king, however, Su Qin does not explain what will be required from the him in return.

If your majesty joins with Qin, then Qin will weaken Han and Wei. If you join with Qi, then Qi will weaken Chu and Wei. If Wei is weak, then she will deliver the land beyond the river to Qin. If Han is weak, then she will hand over Yi Yang to Qin. If Yi Yang is handed over then your Shang Jun will be severed. If the land beyond the river is delivered, then your roads will go nowhere. If Chu is weak, then you will have none to assist you. These three strategies must be evaluated thoroughly. When Qin heads down the Zhi road, then Nanyang is next. After she has plundered Han and protects Zhou, the Zhao herself will melt. If Qin takes Lesser Wei and captures the Qi river, then Qi will be forced to pay homage at the Qin court. Once Qin has achieved her desires to the east of the mountains, then she will gather her armor and head toward Zhao. When Qin fords the Yellow River, crosses the Zhang River and captures Bowu, then your forces will have to fight below Handan. This, on behalf of your majesty, is what I fear for.

Having just described the rewards that await the king by following his advice, Su Qin abruptly shifts the topic of the persuasion back to politico-military issues. This forced transition from the pleasant to the unpleasant is likely designed to psychologically disorient the young ruler. In an earlier section Su Qin mentioned that Zhao would never
achieve peace by relying on Qin or Qi and now he describes how this would occur. Su Qin’s message is clear: whether Zhao relies on Qin or Qi, the result will be the same: Zhao will ultimately serve Qin.

At this very moment, of the states to the east of the mountains, there is none as powerful as Zhao. Zhao occupies an area of two thousand li, with several hundred thousand armored troops, a thousand chariots, ten thousand cavalry, with rations for ten years. To her west is Chang Shan, the Yellow and Zhang Rivers are to the south, the Qing and Yellow Rivers are to her east, and Lesser Wei is to her north. Lesser Wei is certainly weak, a country not worth fearing. Moreover, of the countries that Qin fears, none can be compared to Zhao. So, if Qin doesn’t dare to send troops and armor and attack Zhao, what can be done? There is reason to fear Han and Wei to her rear. It is as if Han and Wei are Zhao's southern screen. But were Qin to attack Han and Wei, then this would not be the case. They don’t have famous mountains or large streams as borders, so gradually the Qin silkworm would nibble away toward their capitals until they arrived. Neither Han nor Wei would be able to withstand Qin, so they would both become vassals. Once Han and Wei become Qin’s vassals, then would no longer be a Han-Wei buffer between Zhao and Qin. This would be disastrous for Zhao. This, on behalf of your majesty, is what I fear for.

Su Qin returns the persuasion to a more pleasant subject for the king: the greatness of the state of Zhao. Su Qin presents a power situation in terms of Zhao’s strengths. He describes the size of Zhao’s army and state’s geographic advantages and contrasts these with the poor geographic situation faced by Wei and Han. Shifting to a more unpleasant aspect of the power situation, Su Qin further explains that to rely on Wei and Han for protection from Qin is foolish because, lacking any geographic barriers, Qin would nibble
Su Qin has moved the tenor of the persuasion from positive to negative, however he has yet to explain what he desires of the king.

Su Qin uses history to provide the king with some reason for hope. He explains that, even with limited resources, Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, and Wu all achieved greatness. He then argues that the "enlightened ruler" will be considering the elements of the power situation and developing his own strategies for victory. One so enlightened wouldn't consider taking advice from the unenlightened or decide the matter without good reason. Su Qin does not refer to the "enlightened ruler" as a way of indirectly criticizing the king, instead he uses the model as a way of appealing to the king's pride. Su Qin is implying that if the king but follows his advice, the king, too, will be considered an enlightened ruler.
Allow me, your humble servant, to present my point of view by means of a map of the empire. The territory of the feudal lords is five times that of Qin. And I estimate that the forces of the feudal lords are ten times those of Qin. If the six states unite their strength as one and head westward to attack Qin, then Qin's destruction is assured. But now it is they who are being destroyed by Qin, heading to the west to serve her, as servants to Qin. Of course it is better to destroy others than to be destroyed by others. It is better to subjugate others than be subjugated by others, but how can this even be said on the same day! These proponents of Qin, they want to lop off the lands of the feudal lords to unite them with Qin. Once they are on good terms with Qin then they will receive high towers, beautiful palaces and living places, they will listen to the music of the yu reeds and the se zither, and they will discover the harmonies of the five flavors. Before them there will be balconies and behind, their long halls. Their beautiful companions will be clever and smiling. In the end they will finally experience the treachery of Qin, but they will not share in their grief. This, then, is why the agents on Qin work day and night to strike fear in to the hearts of the feudal princes using the power of Qin — because they want to cut away at their lands. I desire that your majesty would seriously think through this matter plan.

Having placed thoughts of the "enlightened ruler" in the king's mind, Su Qin next delivers a different perspective on the power situation that is designed to make the king angry. The resources of Qin are no match for the combined strength of the other states. If the states work together they can defeat Qin; however, they are independently deciding to submit to Qin. In contrast to this logic, there are many who advocate the idea of submission to Qin. ¹⁷⁵ Presenting a detailed description of the luxurious life that awaits the Qin advocates, Su Qin argues that they will enjoy their pleasures, unaware of the

¹⁷⁵ Most likely including some of the king of Zhao's advisers.
damage that they have caused to their states. These are the people, Su Qin implies, that will keep the king of Zhao from becoming the "enlightened ruler" that he is destined to become.

臣聞，明王絕疑去謗，屏流言之跡，塞朋黨之門，故尊主廣地強兵之計，臣得陳忠於前矣。故竊為大王計，莫如一韓、魏、齊、楚、燕、趙，六國從親，以備畔秦。

I have heard that the enlightened ruler cuts off the suspicious and sends away the slanderous, he screens himself from the traces of unreliable words, and he blocks the doors of the partisan. So, in planning to venerate the ruler, broaden his lands, and strengthen his forces, the servant achieves complete loyalty before the king. Therefore, your servant's plan on your majesty's behalf is that there is nothing better than uniting Han, Wei, Qi, Chu, Yan, and Zhao: six states united for the purpose of rejecting Qin.

Su Qin again turns to the "enlightened ruler" appeal as he indirectly advises the king to reject all advice of the Qin advocates. Appealing to the king's sense of greed and desire for reputation, Su Qin describes the beneficial result of Zhao's supporting an alliance of the six states in opposition to Qin. However, Su Qin still has not explained to the king of Zhao what is required of him.

令天下之將相，相與會於涇水之上，通質刑白馬以盟之。約曰：秦攻楚，齊、魏各出銳師以佐之，韓絕食道，趙涉河、漳，燕守常山之北。秦攻韓、魏則楚絕其後，齊出銳師以佐之，趙涉河、漳，燕守雲中。秦攻齊，則楚絕其後，韓守成陽，魏塞牛道，趙涉河、漳、博關，燕出銳師以佐之。秦攻燕，則趙守常山，楚軍武關，齊涉渤海，韓、魏出銳師以佐之。秦攻趙，則韓軍宣陽，楚軍武關，魏軍河外，齊涉渤海，燕出銳師以佐之。諸侯有先背約者，五國共伐之。大國從親以撓秦，秦必不敢出兵於澗谷關以害山東矣！如是則伯業成矣！

Order the generals and ministers of all the states to meet above the Huan River. We will exchange hostages and sacrifice a white horse as a covenant. The treaty will say:
If Qin attacks Chu, then Qi and Wei will each send their valiant forces to her aid, Han will sever the Qin supply lines, Zhao will ford the Yellow and Zhang Rivers, and Wei will protect the north of Chang Shan.

If Qin attacks Han and Wei, the Chu cut Qin off from her rear, Qi will send her valiant forces to her aid, Zhao will ford the Yellow and Zhang Rivers, and Yan will protect Yun Zhong.

If Qin attacks Qi, then Chu will cut Qin off from her rear, Han will protect Cheng Gao, Wei will close off the Wu Road, Zhao will ford the Yellow and Zhang Rivers and through the Bo Guan, and Yan will send her valiant forces to her aid.

If Qin attacks Yan, then Zhao will protect Chang Shan, Chu will fortify Wu Guan, Qi will cross Bo Hai, and Han and Wei will send their valiant forces to her aid.

If Qin attacks Zhao, then Han will fortify Yi Yang, Chu will fortify Wu Guan, Wei will fortify beyond the Yellow River, Qi will cross the Bo Hai, and Yan will send her valiant forces to come to her aid.

The Lord that is first to reject this treaty will be attacked by the other five states. If the states unite to reject Qin, then Qin would never dare to send forces into the Han Gu Pass to harm those east of the mountains. When this is accomplished, then your majesty's great work will be complete.

Su Qin finally explains the role that he is proposing for the king of Zhao: he wants the king to establish the Zhao Alliance. Su Qin advises the king to call a meeting of state representatives to swear a blood oath of allegiance to the anti-Qin Alliance. He then details the responsibilities of each of the states in the event of an attack by Qin. He concludes by claiming that once the Alliance is established, Qin will be forever contained. Then, once again appealing the king's greed and pride, Su Qin informs the king of Zhao that once Qin is contained then the king's hegemony will be complete.
The king of Zhao said: "I am quite young and have led his state for a short time. I have never before heard the long-range plans for my state. Now that my honored guest has a desire to preserve the states and bring peace to the feudal lords, I respectfully offer my state to the Alliance." He then gave Su Qin the title Lord Wu An, presented him with one hundred decorated carriages, twenty thousand taels of pure gold, one hundred pairs of white jade bi, and a thousand pieces of elegantly embroidered silk for the purpose of bringing into treaty the feudal lords.

Not unexpectedly, the King graciously offers his state to the alliance. Not surprisingly the king claims that he is supporting the Alliance because Su Qin has convinced him that it is the proper thing to do. He makes no mention of the benefits that he, personally, anticipates from this decision. The king then lavishly rewards Su Qin for his beneficial advice, presenting him with a title and a great assortment of valuable items. A few Zhanguo ce persuasions do include the fact that a king has rewarded a persuader for the quality of his advice, however, the quantity of Su Qin's reward is exceptional. Perhaps it was included to establish the importance of Su Qin's role in establishing the Alliance. On the other hand, as we consider the next persuasion in which Zhang Yi persuades the same king, perhaps the inventory of riches that were presented to Su Qin by the king of Zhao is included to demonstrate that the king's protestations to Zhang Yi that he followed the advice of Su Qin out of ignorance were not very credible.

Among the techniques employed by Su Qin during this persuasion, two to be the most interesting as they have not been encountered in the earlier persuasions. First, from the perspective of the king, Su Qin presents an absolutely tantalizing persuasion. Instead of
taking a direct approach that describes what he desires of the King and how the king will be rewarded, Su Qin gradually reveals information about the king's reward and gradually reveals what will be required of him. The longer the king is made to wait before he can agree to Su Qin's plan, the more uncertain he becomes about receiving his reward. By the time he is given the opportunity to agree, the king does so without hesitation.

Another novel thing that Su Qin does during this persuasion is to openly and consistently impugn the integrity, motives, and intentions of all of the advisers who oppose what he is proposing. The process begins as he asks the King to remove other advisers from his presence during Su Qin's persuasion and ends as Su Qin describes the advocates of Qin as self-serving persuaders who will never have to deal with the consequences of their advice. Throughout the persuasion Su Qin chips away at the various political proposals that have been considered by the King until there is only one reasonable solution remaining: Su Qin's.

A final observation concerning this persuasion is that, in addition to being very long, it is also very detailed. In particular, Su Qin's descriptions of the military consequence of not following his plan and the individual sections of the proposed treaty all lack the spontaneity of the earlier persuasions. I consider the most likely reason for such refinement in the persuasion is that, given the legendary importance of this persuasion to Warring States history, it was probably reworked numerous times to ensure that Su Qin words reflected what was accepted as history. With each successive revision, the words of the persuasion gradually began to take on a more text-like appearance.
The Zhao Alliance has dissolved with Han, Wei, Qi, and Chu having submitted to Qin.

Su Qin has been executed by Qin. Zhang Yi is sent to Zhao to read a letter from the king of Qin to the king of Zhao that delineates Qin’s ultimatum.

Zhang Yi was organizing the Coalition for Qin and spoke to the king of Zhao:

"My rustic prince, the king of Qin, has sent me here to deliver a letter to your majesty's chief censor to this effect; your majesty leads the Lords of the empire to resist Qin and it has been fifteen years since Qin troops dared go beyond the Hangu Pass. Your majesty's awesome power has its effect throughout the empire. The king of Qin, frightened and faint of heart, repaired his armor, sharpened his weapons, renewed his chariots and trained his horsemen and archers, while laboring long in the fields to store up sufficient grain. He defended the land within Qin's four passes and lived cautiously and in terror not daring to make a move for fear your majesty might come to chastise him for his faults. Because of your majesty's great power Qin has taken Ba and Shu in the west and annexed Han-Chung, has taken the two Zhou in the east, transferred the Nine Cauldrons and garrisoned the ford at White Horse. Although Qin has been isolated, our suppressed anger and wrath have been building up for a long time now, and at this very moment we have mustered our troops into camp at Mianqi. Qin hopes to ford the Yellow River, leap the Zhang, take Bowu, and meet your troops below the walls of Handan. I hope to meet you on the day jia zi as King Wu met Zhou of Yin. I have respectfully sent my envoy to inform your attendants of this.

176 CKT 237: Crump Chan-kuo Ts’e, 286-287. Zhao 2.3, Zhanguo ce, 649-652. I have taken the liberty of changing Crump's Wade-Giles transliterations of the titles to pinyin transliterations in this quotation.
Although he is presenting a letter from the king of Qin, Zhang Yi does not waste an opportunity to demonstrate his rhetorical skills. Unlike Su Qin, Zhang Yi immediately puts the king of Zhao in his place by referring to him as a "rustic prince." Zhang Yi then reads the letter that begins with a description of the power situation. Qin, it explains, has been frightened by Zhao's aggressive behavior and has had no recourse but to mobilize her troops and respond. The letter then describes the extensive preparations that Qin has been forced to make and the lands that she has been forced to annex because of Zhao's actions. The king of Qin is presently advancing on Zhou, the letter states, and looks forward to facing the king of Zhao in battle.\footnote{Crump notes that jia zi is the day that King Wu delivered the "Harangue at Mu" against the wicked Zhou. The king of Qin is obviously comparing his role to that of the righteous King Wu. (Chan-kuo Ts'e, 287)}

All things your majesty has hoped for in the organization of the Alliance have been based on the schemes of Su Qin. Su Qin dazzled and deceived the Lords, made what is true seem false, and twisted wrong into right. He hoped to subvert Qin but could not and finally was ordered torn asunder there by chariots. From that time on it has been increasingly clear that the empire cannot be united.

The letter continues by reporting the demise of Zhang Yi's rival, Su Qin, flippantly describing Su Qin as one who "Took the true as false. Took the false as true. 以是為是非, 以非為是. Without Su Qin, it claims, there is no way that the Alliance could be united.\footnote{i.e. United against Qin.}
Qin and Chu are at present fraternal states, while Han and Wei proclaim themselves protecting vassals on Qin's eastern border. Qi has given us fishing ports and salt flats, and all this has cut off Zhao's right arm. Now does someone wanting a right arm seek a fight with another? Indeed even though he quit his fellows and lived all alone merely hoping to avoid danger would he be likely to succeed?

The letter continues with a description of the power situation. As Su Qin predicted, Han, Wei, and Qi have all submitted to Qin. The letter states that even Zhao has effectively been neutralized and taunts the king of Zhao by comparing his current predicament to being without a right arm.

At the moment Qin has sent forth three armies. One to arm and blockade the Wu Road and to tell Qi to raise her troops, cross the Yellow river and the Qing and camp to the east of Handan; the second to garrison Cheng-gao to urge Han and Wei to occupy the Hewai area; the third to garrison Mianqi. We have a covenant which says, 'Four states have combined to attack Zhao and four states will share in her land when she is broken.' For these reasons I have not dared hide my conclusions and intentions but have made them known to your attendants. If I were to make your plans, your majesty, nothing would be better than meeting Qin at Mian-chi where, face to face, you could bind yourselves to each other personally. Let me give the order to our troops not to attack but to wait for your majesty to fix his plans."

The letter concludes by stating that Qin is preparing an all-out assault on Zhao. Han, Wei, and Qi are all supporting the attack and, to add insult to injury, the letter explains these three states have been promised a share of the spoils from Zhao. Zhang Yi explains
that he has already discussed this letter with the king's attendants and, assuming the role of a loyal adviser, suggests that the king of Zhao to submit to Qin without a fight.

"In the days of the previous king," replied the king of Zhao, "Lord Fengyang arrogated all the power of the state, hoodwinked my forebear, and controlled the government by himself. I lived in the palace in those days under the control of my tutors and had no part in the affairs of state. When my father dismissed all his ministers I was still young and had spent very few days in charge of our sacrifices. To be sure I had my private reservations about it. It seemed to me that being head of the Alliance rather than serving Qin was not of long range benefit to our state. And now I am entirely willing to change our minds and our thinking, cede lands to atone for past transgressions and serve Qin. Indeed I was in the process of bringing together a retinue to set out for Qin when I happened to hear her envoy's enlightened orders." Then he went to Qin's court at Mian-chi with three hundred carriages and ceded Hejian as a token of his service to Qin.

It has now been over a decade since Su Qin convinced this king to establish the Alliance and was rewarded for his excellent advice. Not surprisingly, the king of Zhao now agrees to submit to Qin, but not before a litany of excuses as to why he was not solely to blame for Zhao's situation. Echoing Su Qin's complaints against Lord Feng Yang, he argues that this supposed adviser actually ran the government at the time of his decision. In fact, the king explains, not only did he have no part in the decision to join the Alliance, but he also had serious concerns about the decision to oppose Qin.

Interestingly, the person who was most responsible for the king of Zhao's decision to join the alliance, Su Qin, is never even mentioned in the king's remarks. Zhang Yi and the king of Qin undoubtedly knew of Su Qin's role in the formation of the Alliance, reporting
Su Qin's demise in the letter read by Zhang Yi. Perhaps the king of Zhao was astute enough to not highlight Su Qin's role in his decision to support the Alliance; the king might have a difficult time explaining the title and wealth that he bestowed on Su Qin for his role in forming the Alliance.

Although delivered as a letter, this ultimatum to the king of Zhao still bore the characteristics of the \textit{Zhanguo ce} persuasions. These included presenting the power situation in such a way that Qin could justify her "defensive actions," reviling the advice of other persuaders, providing a detailed description of the consequences of failing to follow the advice presented in the persuasion, and manipulating the emotions of the subject. ¹⁷⁹

7. Rhetorical Styles of the \textit{Zhanguo ce} Persuaders

To summarize my observations, a final issue that I will consider is the way that the individual persuaders were portrayed in the \textit{Zhanguo ce}. In the examples previously discussed there are obvious differences between the ways that Su Qin, Zhang Yi, and Fan Ju conducted their persuasions. This section identifies the differences between the persuasive styles of the rhetors and comments on possible reasons for such differences.

Su Qin comes across as a persuader who is very confident in his analysis of the power situation. In his persuasions he presents the power situation with detailed facts that both establish his credibility and ease the apparent desperation of those whom he is attempting to persuade. He frequently uses what seem to be set expressions when describing
geographic features of a state, characteristics of weapons, or the character of a people. He uses few other rhetorical devices in his persuasions, favoring aphorisms and historical examples, although both rarely appear in the same persuasion. This is not to imply that he is incapable of using all of the devices in a single persuasion, as he did in his prolonged and exceptionally manipulative persuasion to the king of Zhao. When manipulating his subject, he prefers to rely on both appealing to the subject's reputation and pleasing his subject. In his persuasions Su Qin is attempting to create the Alliance, so saying things to please his subject as well as describing the benefits of the Alliance in terms of the benefits to his subject's reputation do not seem out of place.

Zhang Yi's persuasive style can best be described as bullying. In the six persuasions in which he delivers the Qin ultimatum to the various states his presentation of the power situation highlights the awesome power of Qin and the utter insignificance of the other states. In his persuasions he presents terrifying descriptions of the Qin forces, using analogies and obvious set phrases that are mesmerizing. He is adept at using aphorisms and historical examples to support his contentions. As ultimatums, his persuasions contain a detailed description of the consequences for opposing Qin; each tailored to the state being persuaded and matter-of-factly describing the utter destruction of the country at the hands of Qin and her allies. Five of the six persuasions also explicitly blame Su Qin and other persuaders for encouraging the king to oppose Qin; an explanation usually accepted by the king since it changes his position from being an "opponent of Qin" to

---

179 Although, in this letter, the emotions were manipulated to move the king of Zhao from fear to dread to despair.
being "one who was fooled by the persuaders." When manipulating a subject, Zhang Yi alternates between relying on infuriating, in an obvious attempt to unsettle his subject, relying on profit, giving his subject an excuse to side with Qin, and relying on self-debasement, apparently to give his subject a small amount of dignity. As Zhang Yi delivers his ultimatums, his reliance on infuriation, greed, and self-debasement help to convince each of his subjects that someone else is to blame for their predicament, that they will be able to personally profit from a difficult situation, and that they can make the decision to serve Qin while still retaining a shred or two of their dignity.

In his role as political adviser, Fan Ju's persuasive style is significantly different than that of Su Qin and Zhang Yi. As discussed above, he presents a very specific description of the power balance which is used to focus the king of Qin on the problem at hand. He uses aphorisms, historical precedent, and examples from nature in both of his persuasions. Unlike Su Qin and Zhang Yi, he also presents a quotation from an unidentified ode. When stroking, Fan Ju relies on deeds, reputation, and infuriating.

Although there are obvious differences between the rhetorical styles of these three rhetors, it is not possible to identify the reasons for such differences. It is possible that the Zhanguo ce authors may have attempted to give certain features to the individual persuaders; possibly to create a Su Qin or Zhang Yi style of persuasion. It is equally likely that the differences in their persuasive styles were due to the different conditions of the persuasions. It is, however, interesting to observe that even within a relatively

---

\[130\] For example, had Zhang Yi persuaded against Qin would he have adopted a significantly different style?
small number of persuasions each of these Zhanguo ce persuaders are presented as individuals with rhetorical styles that are easily differentiated.

B. Similarities Between Zhanguo ce and Guiguzi Persuasion

It appears that Warring States persuaders had an awareness of that psychological techniques could be used to manipulate one's audience in order to improve the acceptance of an appeal. Although the Hanfeizi, Zhanguo ce, and Guiguzi each address different aspect of this issue, there was a general awareness of the importance of the following principle of successful persuasion:

Change in the direction of his suspicions; agree with what he perceives as right. Examine him according to what he says; fulfill him according to his aspirations. Judge according to what he dislikes; reject what bothers him. Figure out his feelings to scare him. State the lofty to entice him. Use the minute to prove to him. Set up external signs to match his internal feelings. [If all these methods fail, then,] overwhelm him to stop him and disturb to confuse him.\(^\text{181}\)

In this section we will discuss the similarities and differences between the persuasive techniques used by the Zhanguo ce persuaders and the persuasive program promoted in the Guiguzi. I will consider fourteen persuasions from the Zhanguo ce in this analysis.\(^\text{182}\)

One of the underlying principles of the Guiguzi is that there are actions that a persuader should perform in public and other actions that should remain hidden. So before we compare the persuasive techniques recommended in the Guiguzi with those

\(^{181}\) Tsao, 99.

\(^{182}\) In addition to two persuasions of Fan Ju to the king of Qin and the persuasions of Su Qin and Zhang Yi to the kings of Han, Qi, and Zhao that have been previously discussed, I have also included the persuasions of Su Qin and Zhang Yi to the kings of Chu, Wei, and Yan in this analysis (See note 143 for a listing the specific episodes).
observed in the *Zhanguo ce* it will be useful to identify which elements of the *Guiguzi* program we would not expect to observe.

According to the *Guiguzi*, when a persuader appears before a ruler he is fully prepared to argue his case. He has weighed the situation, understands the intent and perspective of the ruler, and knows what is going to recommend to the ruler.\(^{183}\) As a result, it is unlikely that we will observe the persuader using techniques for gathering such information (e.g. prodding/ceasing, reflecting/responding). As the episodes in the *Zhanguo ce* are, for the most part, rhetorical monologues, it is also unlikely that we would observe the persuader using techniques that rely on dialogue between the ruler and the persuader (e.g. making fly and manacleing).\(^{184}\) In spite of these limitations, however, there are still several aspect of the *Guiguzi* program that might also be evident in the *Zhanguo ce* persuasions.

We are able to observe the persuader using the technique of "stroking" or manipulation in his presentation.\(^{185}\) Although the *Guiguzi* warns the persuader to limit his use of this technique, lest the ruler become aware of it, the rulers in the *Zhanguo ce* episodes appear surprisingly ignorant of how they are being manipulated.\(^{186}\) Using the

\(^{183}\) Although the *Guiguzi* does say that the ruler might take actions that the persuader doesn't anticipate because there are things that the persuader does not understand, the exemplary persuaders of the *Zhanguo ce* rarely find themselves in such situations.

\(^{184}\) Although in one *Zhanguo ce* episode, Su Qin purposely (and expertly) enrages the king of Han as part of the persuasion.

\(^{185}\) The different types of stroking being pacifying, straightness, pleasing, infuriating, appealing to reputation, appealing to deeds, modesty, trustworthiness, profits, and debasement.

\(^{186}\) This may indicate that the authors of the fragments used in the *Zhanguo ce* felt that the advisers, having been educated in strategy, diplomacy, and persuasion, were qualified to
Guiguizi terminology, the primary approaches that Su Qin, Zhang Yi, and Fan Ju use are stroking "by means of reputation" in appealing to the King's virtue, shame, or both; "by means of infuriating" in bluntly detailing consequences; "by means of pleasing" in concentrating on a state's advantages; and "by means of profit" in presenting the promise of lands or power. In addition, the obsequious tone that Zhang Yi typically takes at some point in his persuasion qualifies as "stroking by means of debasement," while his willingness to divulge Qin's "true" motives to Han and Chu falls into the category of "stroking by being trustworthy."

It is interesting to observe that none of the persuaders simply used a single method to manipulate the ruler during the course of a persuasion. For example, when Zhang Yi explains the benefits of serving Qin to the king of Wei he is relying on "pleasing," but when he follows this by threatening consequences if Wei rejects Qin the persuader relies on "infuriating." This is probably done for two reasons. First, were a persuader to use only one type of stroking throughout an entire persuasion, not only would the presentation become less dynamic, but it might also give the subject an opportunity to recognize that he was being manipulated by the persuader and respond appropriately. Second, the persuaders frequently changed the type of manipulation that they used in order to maintain control of the persuasion. By moving his subject through different emotional states with stroking, it would be very difficult for the subject of the persuasion to anticipate what was coming next, keeping him perpetually off-balance.

establish the course of a state. The rulers, on the other hand, were useful tools that could be manipulated to do what the advisers considered best for the states.
The persuasions also provide us with some insights in the persuader's perspective on the power balance. Although both texts acknowledge the importance of power balance to persuasion, the way that the Guiguzi and Zhanguo ce use the concept differs. The Guiguzi recommends that the persuader secretly determine the power balance and use it to support the development of a strategy. Although there is no evidence that the Zhanguo ce persuaders don't follow this advice in developing their strategies, in the majority of Zhanguo ce episodes the persuader routinely presents his perspective of the power situation. This is probably done to, first, establish that the rhetor is a credible advisor and has sufficient understanding of the situation to offer appropriate advice to the ruler. It is also done to provide evidence in support of the proposal that he is presenting to the king. With two exceptions, all of the diplomatic persuasions begin by presenting details of the power situation. In persuading the states to unite against Qin, Su Qin delineates the capabilities of the state's armed forces, weapons, agricultural capabilities, and geographic features using a presentation style that would make the ruler wonder why he would ever feel threatened by Qin. In his persuasions Zhang Yi also catalogs the factors that affect the power balance; in addition, he typically tallies Qin's awesome capabilities. In one of the exceptions to this practice, when Su Qin persuades the king of Wei he delineates everything except the military capabilities, recounts an historical example that explains that military influence is more important than mere numbers, and then describes Wei's

---

187 These exceptions are discussed below.
not insubstantial forces. In the other exception Zhang Yi, in delivering his ultimatum to the king of Yan, doesn't even bother to describe the power balance.

Fan Ju also describes the power balance in his first persuasion to the king of Qin as he details the degree to which the Queen Mother and her co-conspirators have usurped the king's authority. In the second persuasion, Fan Ju casts the power situation in an historical context by describing the futility of attacking land. Even though Fan Ju is not involved in diplomatic negotiations, it is important for him to identify the factors that affect the course of action that he is recommending to the king. This is done both to establish his credibility as a persuader and to present the king with the data that have been used to develop his recommendation.

In identifying the type of speech that the persuader is using to argue his case it may be possible to gain some insights into the type of person that the persuader thinks that he is persuading. Although such an evaluation is quite subjective, in most of the Zhanguo ce episodes, the persuaders use focused and powerful speech in their persuasions implying that they consider the rulers that they are persuading to be discerning and noble. However, in Zhang Yi's persuasions to Han and Yan and in Su Qin's persuasion to Han both use sharp and ridiculing language that indicates they feel that they are persuading lowly and foolish people. It is also possible for a persuader to use several types of speech

---

188 Su Qin probably does this to force the king of Wei to acknowledge the other factors, besides numbers of troops, that make Wei a great state.
189 The "Weighing", Quan 權, chapter of the Guiguzi identifies the different types of speech that the persuader should use with eight different types of subjects. For example, daring speech should be used with the brave, while powerful speech should be used with the noble.
within a single persuasion, using ridicule to respond to a ruler's foolishness in at one point in the persuasion, while later using powerful speech in recognition of his nobility.

In addition to using manipulative techniques to control their audiences, the Zhanguo ce persuaders relied on the tried-and-true rhetorical devices of the philosophical schools and the even the Spring and Autumn remonstrators. Grammatical structures, poetry, folk sayings, analogies, examples from history, examples from nature, and logical chains were each used to varying degrees throughout the episodes. Several times, the Guiguzi advises the persuader to use these types of rhetorical devices in order to strengthen their persuasions. At least one aphorism or historical example was used in each of the Zhanguo ce persuasions that were considered. In two episodes, Zhang Yi at Chu and Su Qin at Zhao, the persuaders used every one of the devices at least once. The persuaders weren't interested in the source of a rhetorical devices. What did matter was how effectively a specific rhetorical device could be used to make their persuasions more successful.
REFERENCES


———. "A Summary of Recent Articles on the *Chan-kuo tsʻe*." *Early China* 1 (Fall 1975): 15-16.


