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Gender and Interpretation: An Empirical Study  
of Reader Response to Golden Age Literature

by

Michael Phillip Kristiansen

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the  
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
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In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

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
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
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
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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to Jack and Sharon Watson, and to Suzanne Michelle Watson. They have my eternal gratitude and will forever remain in my memory.

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## ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to test empirically for affective differences postulated to vary by reader gender in response to literary texts. Eighty participants, composed of equal numbers of male and female English- and Spanish-speakers, were randomly distributed into three experimental groups. Participants in two groups read emotionally-provocative text stimuli, and participants in a control group read an affectively-neutral text stimulus. The provocative text stimuli are excerpts from Cervantes's Persiles y Sigismunda, and the affectively-neutral text stimulus is from Quevedo's Buscón. Participants completed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) and Positive and Negative Affect Schedules (PANAS). A first PANAS measured current moods, and a second one measured moods in general. On completing the second PANAS, participants read the text stimuli. After reading the text stimuli, participants completed a third PANAS to measure their current moods relative to the texts they had just read. The results of this experiment reveal no significant differences between male and female readers, and thus do not support the hypothesis that affective reader-response to literature varies by gender. Implications for reader response-based literary theories are discussed, along with suggestions on how such theories may be refined or modified.

## INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study is to scientifically research connections between gender and Golden Age literature. Creativity, criticism, and interpretation represent three such connections, and according to J. Donovan (1987), all three activities are interconnected and expressed differently by gender. Additionally, creativity encompasses not only the creation of literature, but also the creative aspects of literature's criticism and interpretation (Donovan, 1987). Hence, if gender is a variable in literary interpretation, then creativity and criticism may also be gender-inflected. Among those sharing Donovan's position are Golden Age literature scholars Smith (1987b), El Saffar (1990), and Wilson (1990). It is in part from Donovan's theory of a "women's poetics" that the empirical component of this investigation derives.

As part of this study, a controlled experiment will be conducted to test for gender differences in reader response to Golden Age texts. Although there is some empirical work that has been done on reader response to literature, either it has not tested for gender as a variable (e.g., László, 1988; Martindale, Brewer, Helson, Rosenberg, Simonton, Keeley, Leigh, & Ohtsuka, 1988; Bourg, 1996), it has not used Golden Age literature (Howard & Allen, 1990), or it has been methodologically incomplete (e.g., Flynn, 1986). The present study departs from previous empirical work in that it will use Golden Age literature to test specifically for gender as a variable

in reader response without compromising methodological integrity. Given that there is Golden Age scholarship that concentrates on questions of women, gender, and other socio-demographic positions (e.g., Mariscal, 1992; Smith, 1986, 1987b, 1988, 1992, 1993; El Saffar, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995; Williamsen, 1992; Wilson, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992; note also Fuchs, 2001), the experimental results of this study will be valuable in providing concrete, non-assumptive evidence with which to develop further the scholarship and pedagogy on Golden Age works.

#### Truth-value and Acceptance and Confirmation of Critical Literary Theory

Before addressing particularly the question of testing premises of gender's connection with Golden Age literature and scholarship, the question of determining truth-value<sup>1</sup> in literary theory must be explored. The rationale for the present study is partially based on the notion that critical literary theory can be empirically tested and that it is subject to the same scholarly interplay that characterizes theory confirmation and acceptance in the non-literary disciplines (e.g., physical and social science). Such an approach might strike some empiricists as questionable since literary theory is not ordinarily subjected to scientific testing, leaving the truth-value of literary theory unobserved and, consequently, unavailable for use in determining the applicability of the theory to literary phenomena. This line of reasoning is biased, however, since

observable, empirically measurable, evidence is not the sole determinant of a theory's confirmation or acceptance (see Kuhn, 1970, 1977).

The difficulty of employing empiricism in literature lies partly in the fact that critical theory refers more to "critical perspective" than to empirically-based theory, and so those outside literary circles might construe the critical-theoretical enterprise as highly subjective. It is not uncommon to come upon such utterances as "art is what you make of it" or "a text can mean almost anything" from individuals outside the fine arts or literary disciplines. Moreover, given that critical literary research does not produce or yield any usable technology, as does, for example, research within the sciences (e.g., electrical engineering research on pulsed power<sup>2</sup>), public support for literary undertakings, and for the arts in general, is weak in comparison to the monies provided for the sciences and business-related disciplines. In an appraisal of literary studies, Andrew Milner (1987) writes,

. . . the core of the discipline, the reading and appreciation of . . . literature, entails no obviously new skills or knowledges. . . . students are asked to read and appreciate novels, plays and poems, something that many of them would be doing whether they were students or not. . . . students are examined on their ability to read novels, that is, to do what a large slice of the population does anyway for pleasure. It is

rather as if one were asked to pass examinations in television-watching, or rock concert attendance (p. 294).

In reference to literary theory itself, Milner characterizes it as “cultivated theoretical inarticulacy” and views the literary discipline as one that “. . . is positively saturated in values, to such an extent that any attempt to eliminate those values would be to eliminate the discipline itself” (emphasis in original, p. 293). W. John Harker (1996) adds to Milner’s perspective on literary theory by writing that although critical theoretical

. . . pronouncements continue to capture the attention and imagination of many, they are, for the most part, just that—descriptions about how reading proceeds based on various theoreticians’ intuitions about this process. For this reason, they are as fictive as the readers they describe. Missing is a science of literature, an empirical approach to literary interpretation that permits a clearer understanding of the psychological processes through which interpretation is achieved (p. 646).

If one dismisses the observations of Milner and Harker, noting that they are scholars from outside the critical literary community, one should consider the comments of Monroe Beardsley, who is a member of the critical literary community. In reference

to historically-based criticism, Beardsley issues an invective at least as intense as those of Milner and Harker: "It is a great field for half-baked speculation, which can often not be disproved and is thus allowed to stand" (1981, p. 18). It might therefore be no exaggeration to say that critical literary theory may well be more of a self-serving system (e.g., for the academic press, university literature professors and their students) than it is anything else. On a utilitarian level, then, literary theory might not have much value outside literature or the humanities. Attitudes such as "What does literary theory have to do with real life?" might also function to preserve the relative lack of attention those outside the field give to literature (again in comparison to other such areas as the applied sciences, a salient example being medicine).

It is precisely because literary theory holds a minor status relative to physical and social scientific theory that the present investigation proves useful. Since literature departments typically receive less funding than those in science, empirically-based research in Golden Age literature could bring greater attention, and potentially increase funding, to Golden Age studies, and to literary studies in general. Mignolo (2000) recognizes the practical issues raised here in an article where he discusses the ". . . role of foreign languages in higher education and the role of the humanities in an increasingly corporate university" (p. 1238):

The humanities, having lost the place they occupied in higher education and consequently in society before World War II, became a supplement to an education geared increasingly toward training experts in practical knowledge and toward supplying the needs of what is today called the neoliberal project (p. 1240).

Later in his article, he adds:

Unlike medicine, where health has become one of the most attractive industries for financial investments, or unlike engineering and computer sciences, which can raise substantial funding for the university, the humanities are, from the perspective of the ideology of efficiency and the market, quite superfluous (p. 1243).

In agreement with Mignolo's perspective (note pp. 1243, 1244), the present study's approach, though perhaps uncommon and pedagogically controversial, does not advocate abandoning either historically-based or theoretically-based approaches to literature. Rather, the present investigation seeks to supplement those approaches with an integrative one. Although conclusions from this research might be at odds with one or another approach to literature of the Golden Age, empirical studies will ultimately enhance literary studies, for denial of critical literary theory's value will no

longer be justifiable on utilitarian grounds, as "real world" connections or implications will have been established for literature, even if only tentatively so.

Still and all, there may exist those within the literary enterprise who do not care whether their work is deemed of dubious utility by extra-literary populations, and who further believe that an attempt to examine literature from a scientific approach is little more than a confused venture pursued, perhaps, only by those lacking the academic discipline to "stay within literature," to master a critical theory, or both. Nonetheless, it is precisely along a more scientific vein that this work proceeds. Anti-scientific sentiments regarding the arts, this study maintains, are without solid foundation. After all, there can be no quarrel with the notion that art is a social product (note Blau, 1988, p. 270; Milner, 1987, p. 298). As such, it is impossible to claim justifiably that art is exempt from empirical scrutiny, namely, from that grounded in experimental design. Let it be understood that it is not the intention of this study to equate art with biomass, electrons, unruly mobs, or other such phenomena typically researched in physical and social science, but rather to illustrate that experimental aesthetics in literature is sensible. In so doing, critical literary theory can be strengthened, for, to borrow from Gerhard Lenski's (1988) piece directed toward sociological theory,

... we are faced today with a vast and constantly growing array of theories. While it is true that many older theories are now largely

ignored, this is not because they have been tested rigorously and found logically wanting. Usually it is only because newer theories have come along and crowded them out of our limited span of attention—either because of vigorous promotion by energetic proponents or simply because of their novelty appeal (p. 165).

Indeed, Lenski's ruminations may be as true of literature as they are of sociology.<sup>3</sup>

Theory acceptance and confirmation is routinely influenced by such extra-theoretical factors as biography,<sup>4</sup> "traditional bias, reverence for authorities, vested interests, professional ambition and egotism . . . ." (Warren, 1860, p. 1), and "happiness" of theoretical adherents (see Frank, 1954, pp. 139-141).<sup>5</sup> For example, if a theorist encounters regular success with the application of a particular theory, then, even in light of disconfirming or non-working instances, the theorist will not abandon using the theory, for it has worked well in the past and contributed to scholarly satisfaction.

James Parr (1990) makes similar observations in reference to literary scholars:

The most depressing perspective in academe is that of the peripatetic professor, commuting from conference to conference, always flying the flag of the same ossified theoretical program.

The second saddest sight is that of the “postmodern mariner,” bereft of moral philosophy and history but armed to the teeth with technique (p. 28).

As should be apparent, theory choice and practice in the literary field is arbitrary, not based on any particular systematic process. What has been expressed should be sufficient, therefore, to relate to the reader the possible benefit of integrating empiricism into literary scholarship (see Harker, 1996, p. 646), potentially lending truth-value to literary theory.

What now follows is a brief and rather skeletal discussion of empiricism’s promising foray into literary scholarship. Special attention is directed toward works making reference to questions of identity, which are also grouped under headings such as subjectivity or alterity. Important to remember throughout the following section is that gender is a component of identity/subjectivity/alterity.

#### Connecting Literary Theory and Empiricism

If the question of whether gender influences literary perception or creation is to be resolved, or even addressed, it is necessary to know whether it is possible to test for, or identify, textual communication of alterity to real readers. Since alterity is an expression of one’s socio-demographic subjectivity (see Smith, 1988, 1992; Alphen, 1991; Corbey & Leersen, 1991; Mariscal, 1992; Nederveen Pieterse, 1991; Gilman,

1998), and since subjectivity or identity comprises emotional dimensions (Ho & Driscoll, 1998; Stets, 1997; Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994; Dion, 1975, 1986; Dion & Earn, 1975; Dion, Earn, & Yee, 1978; Sinclair & Mark, 1992; Millar & Tesser, 1992; Bourhis, 1994), textual communication of alterity can be gauged in terms of real readers' real emotional responses to texts. Let it be understood that the question is not whether readers respond emotionally to texts, but whether real readers will report experiencing real emotions upon reading a text. Implied readers or authors, intellectual comprehension of emotionally-provocative text, or any other intellectually-based response to a narrative is irrelevant to this study. The present focus is specifically on real emotional responses in real readers. Given that Walton (1978a, 1978b, 1985) argues that real-fictional interactions are not actually possible, the empirical question in this investigation centers on what readers will report when reading literary texts.

Empirical analysis of art is not without precedent, for experimental investigations of art phenomena abound. Dean Simonton (1980) examined the degree to which life events spawned innovation in the musical compositions of several composers (see also Simonton, 1989 for the effects of age on creativity in music). Norman Cazden (1979) investigated the proposition that extra-musical aspects inhere in music. In reference to listener-response to music, Kate Hevner (1935) and R.

Crowder (1984, 1985a, 1985b) confirmed the often dismissed traditional association of the major and minor modes in music with happiness and sadness. Experiments with literature are also abundant in social science scholarship. Goetz and Sadoski (1996) report that “...(a) imagery and emotional response are central to reading and the literary experience, and (b) imagery and emotional response can be measured and interpreted reliably and validly” (emphasis in original, p. 236). Brewer and Ohtsuka’s (1988) work examined the relationship between story structure and reader affect, and János László (1988) studied reader expectation as influenced by literary text and context. In all of these studies of art, statistical analyses were performed to reveal whether the various hypotheses in each study were either confirmed or unsupported.

This study, too, employs statistical analysis to test its hypothesis. Again, the literature to be used in this study is from the Spanish Golden Age, and Donovan’s (1987) proposal for a women’s poetics helps form the theoretical base from which the gender-interpretation hypothesis is derived and tested. What follows below is a review of critical literary, scientific, and other scholarly articles that bear upon and support the empirical-aesthetic approach used in this work. The following scholarship also addresses questions on art and literature, as well as ones pertinent to alterity, otherness, and identity, concepts which necessarily include gender.

## CHAPTER ONE: ALTERITY, OTHERNESS, IDENTITY, AND GENDER

### Overview

In the present study, alterity and otherness form the conceptual backdrop for the more specific term “gender.” Although gender may be considered a manifestation of alterity or otherness, one might still pose the question, “What are alterity and otherness?” The answer is complex. In this work, alterity and otherness are defined as reference to subjects (e.g., themes, characters, identities) that do not necessarily reflect or exemplify dominant or canonical forms or positions. Some distinction can be made between the terms, with alterity referring to the simultaneous existence or presentation of two or more positions in an artwork (e.g., the product of the combination of ethnicity, gender, socio-economic level, and other demographic elements of a character in his or her world or environment). Simply put, alterity refers to the multiple positionality of a subject, but it does not refer to mere oscillation between positions, nor does it refer necessarily to any hierarchical ordering among positions. Conversely, otherness does imply such ordering, and is defined here as reference to positionality of a subject relative to a subordinate object (e.g., a “good man” relative to a “bad woman”). The definition is admittedly broad, but, as will be seen, nonetheless characteristic of the multiple ways in which the terms alterity and otherness are used in academic scholarship (e.g.; see Alphen, 1991; Greiner, 1992).

Empirically-measured analogues for alterity and otherness are readily available. For alterity, the social-psychological scholarship has used the term “status position”(i.e., identity), which, comprises, for example, age, education, occupation, gender, and control aspects (see Stets, 1997, p. 186). Like alterity, status position is multiple, non-ordered, and “. . . people possess multiple status characteristics resulting from their multiple positions in the social structure” (Stets, 1997, p. 189; note also Schwalbe & Staples, 1991). Hopkins & Moore (2001) write that “. . . any categorization is haunted by alternatives,” and “categories cannot be assumed” (p. 250), thus capturing the very sense of what is meant by alterity. Otherness has empirical correspondents in prejudice and discrimination, which involve and highlight differences between groups or individuals in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, power, identity, socio-economic level, and social context, to name only some of many possible means of establishing differences between groups or individuals (see Dion, 1975; Dion & Earn, 1975; Dion, Earn, & Yee, 1975; Walker, Ilardi, McMahon, & Fennel, 1996; Cast, Stets, & Burke, 1999; Clay-Warner, 2001; Bourhis, 1994; Lalonde & Cameron, 1994; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Taylor, et al., 1994).

If one finds this study’s rendering of the alterity and otherness concepts arbitrary or unsatisfactory, appealing to alternatives in the alterity-otherness scholarship will prove equally so, for there is no unified theory or approach that exists for the

usage or application of alterity or otherness to literature or literary criticism (note Alphen, 1991; Corbey & Leersen, 1991; Nederveen Pieterse, 1991; Gilman, 1998; Grabes, 1996; Mariscal, 1992; Smith, 1992). One might argue that alterity and otherness are not useful concepts to literary analysis since their definitions are perpetually in flux. In addition, it is not uncommon for a proponent of one perspective on alterity or otherness to resist and reject the use of the words when they are defined in terms of a different or uncomplementary perspective (note Wordsworth, 1982, p. 88). Further complicating the definitions of alterity and otherness is that, when examined critically, approaches to alterity or otherness from hermeneutic, epistemological, psychological (see Alphen, 1991; Ponzio, 1997; Valdés, 1995), deconstructive, and psychoanalytic (Wordsworth, 1982) perspectives suffer from lack of connection with reality, logical insupportability, or both. Research that sustains this claim includes work by Milner (1987), Amabile (1982), Kreuz and MacNealy (1996), and Walton (1978a, 1978b, 1985). Given that this study holds that in some of the alterity and otherness scholarship there is a lack of connection between what scholars assert in their work and what may actually exist in reality, attention will be directed toward alterity and otherness studies that rely, either implicitly or explicitly, on the existence of real connections or interactions between literary texts or other creations of fictional worlds and their real readers or authors. Some of the studies to

be discussed include those of Alphen (1991), Ponzio (1997), and Wordsworth (1982). Using Walton's (1978a, 1978b, 1985) work, the notion of real-fictional interactions will be shown to be untenable, consequently highlighting the confusion about how to conceive of the alterity or otherness concepts in their application to literary criticism. Finally, another consideration in this study's critique of the alterity-otherness concepts lies in the fact that some studies have employed the terms without inviting the logical or theoretical difficulties that characterize the studies mentioned above. The major part of Díaz Balsera's (1993) work, as well as the scholarship by Wilson (1996) and Grabes (1996), successfully apply the alterity-otherness concepts to literature and art without reliance on real-fictional interactions or dependence upon problematic, ideologically-based definitions (e.g., psychoanalytic, deconstructive, epistemological). Since it is possible to use alterity and otherness in logically defensible ways, it is justifiable to question those approaches that avoid or shirk logic or clarity in favor of grounding their definitions in tautology or lexical turbidity. If a term or concept is rendered such that it is comprehensible only to a group of scholars who use it in a particular way, then what meaning or utility can it have for an intellectual or academic discipline as a whole? If it is claimed that words and concepts are forever unfixed in their meanings, as is the case in deconstruction (note Norris, 1982, p. 32), then what general good can come to literary criticism? Would there be any difference at all in the

state of literary criticism if it were stripped of what Andrew Milner (1987) calls “cultivated theoretical inarticulacy?” Perhaps this review of literature can help answer that question.

Ernst van Alphen on Approaches to Alterity, Identity, and Otherness

‘Identity’ and ‘alterity’ are concepts with a past. They have had different meanings throughout history, and they have created history by their application to different objects. When applied to imperialistic expansion, identity and alterity are primarily defined in terms of race or ethnicity. When applied to threatened boundaries and changing governmental systems, they are defined in terms of nationality. When applied to changing gender roles they are defined in terms of sexuality. In other words, ‘identity’ and ‘alterity’ pertain to concrete historical situations and to the preoccupations relevant to each of those historical situations (Alphen, 1991, p. 1).

Alphen’s characterization of alterity and identity effectively highlights the difficulty of defining the terms in any singular way. Immediately, one can conceive of the problems entailed in employing those terms as theoretical constructs or in attempting to measure alterity or identity empirically. If alterity and identity are indeed concepts with a past, then their definitions will necessarily change according to socio-historical

context. To state that alterity or identity exist in an artwork, then, is to make an argument whose truth-value is fixed to the time in which the argument is made.

Cognizant of that qualification, Alphen examines alterity and identity from hermeneutical, epistemological, and psychoanalytic approaches.

From a hermeneutical perspective, the following questions are raised: “. . . how can ‘identity’ or ‘alterity’ be understood? Does an identity have intrinsic characteristics which can be described and re-produced, or can we understand an identity only by opposing it to what it is not (by differentiating it from its ‘other’)?” (p. 2).

Alphen proposes relativism as an answer. Consequently, there are no intrinsic characteristics to identity, and an individual (or other entity or phenomenon) is understood in terms of what he or she (or it) is not (i.e., relative to the characteristics of others). Any attempt at self-definition therefore results in cyclical references between self and other. Given this condition, Alphen finds that the “the very attempt to approach self and other hermeneutically is bound to fail . . . [and] leads finally to the conclusion that the other cannot be understood—that the concepts fail to be hermeneutically disentangled and substantiated” (p. 3), as alterity becomes rendered, at least for Alphen, “. . . nothing, has no meaning; [and] it is a mere device of meaning-production . . . .” (p. 3).

In discussing the epistemological approach to understanding alterity or identity, Alphen refers to questions regarding the recognition of the two terms as objects of knowledge (see p. 3). Making reference to Michel Foucault, Alphen writes that

. . . identity is seen as an origin which generates behaviour, the acts and artifacts produced by the owner of that identity. Acts, behaviour and artifacts can be read, then, in terms of their originator's identity. The producer's identity is mirrored in her/his products (p. 4).

The appeal to Foucault is interesting; however, it is also problematic in its position that human identity is mirrored in a producer's products. The issue is that, though artists are real, their artworks are not. When anything is incorporated into an artwork, be it physical or psychic, it becomes part of the artworld and is no longer a "real" object (see Dickie, 1974; Danto, 1964, p. 581; 1973; 1983, pp. 37, 44, 45; 1985, pp. 19, 20; see also Walton, 1973, 1978a, 1978b, 1985, 1990, 1992 for further support for Danto's position). Aesthetic questions aside for the moment, Alphen further states that ". . . identity or alterity should not be defined in terms of how they underpin the meaning of a given cultural act or artefact; rather, it is more fruitful and more realistic to see identity/alterity as the effect produced by a given cultural (artef)act" (p. 5). If identity and alterity are to be construed as objects of knowledge, then focus should be placed on the ". . . situation in which an object receives its meaning" (p. 5). By

Alphen's reasoning, it follows that one can claim that socio-demographic subjectivity (identity) can be evoked or otherwise communicated in art, but that the response to an artwork will vary by one's position. Alphen illustrates this idea in his article, where it is observed that German and American critics have different responses to the photograph Besetzungen by Anselm Kiefer (see pp. 5-11). The photograph remains the same object on its own, but when interpreted, it becomes two different objects, each one reflecting an individual subjectivity or identity in concert with the percipient.<sup>6</sup>

That an artwork may be perceived distinctly by different individuals goes to an underlying question in this study about whether it is logical to believe that any particular aspect of identity can be communicated in an artwork (i.e., gender). If it is true that an art object conforms to the perceptions of the individual perceiving it, then the existence of a "women's poetics" (as proposed by Donovan, 1987) could be threatened. It would be controversial, for example, to say that artwork  $x$  portrays a female creativity, since the ultimate meaning of  $x$  would lie in the interaction with its percipients. To continue with this example, what if there were no percipients who interpreted  $x$ 's creative origin along a gender dimension? This scenario has actually occurred in a study involving eight experiments conducted by Amabile (1982) where sex (gender) incongruities in creative assessment and manifestation were absent. Like the hermeneutical approach, then, the epistemological approach is fraught with

relativism when considering art as a manifestation of identity or alterity, and the concepts remain unfixed in their definitions.

Alphen ponders a third perspective on identity and alterity that “. . . examines the relation between meaning, effect and affect . . . . Self and other are no longer counterparts; from now on, the other is part of the self. We are our own others. The other is always the other within” (p. 11). This third position is a psychoanalytic one, and it addresses the “disintegration of the self” (p. 11). Alphen uses Freudian theory to explain what happens when a self encounters an other in an artwork:

. . . sometimes things which are known are repressed, hence, are both known, familiar, and disavowed, becoming strange and spooky. . . .  
Something uncanny is, in short, something which is known and familiar, but repressed, made strange and thereby displaced onto an alien other  
. . . . From this perspective, the uncanny other is a creation, the result of repression. This repression is motivated by the ‘need’ to defend the coherence of the self and to conserve its fragile unity and integrity. The other who arouses uncanny feelings is then in fact a return of that which has been repressed and was once part of the self; this other is not so other after all (pp. 11, 12).

On reading the previous citation, one might have a sense of why Milner (1987), Harker (1996), and Beardsley (1981) inveigh against literary theory and criticism. As for applying the cited psychoanalytic position on identity and alterity to art, that which is present in an artwork is the expression of a previously repressed other which was always and already present in the artist. On perceiving an artwork, a percipient may also encounter his or her always and already repressed other. The wonder, interest, or other aesthetic experience we have when confronting art is the effect of our other selves producing affect in our consciousness, which then results in our giving a meaning to an artwork. This position is tenuous.

First, psychoanalysis presupposes the existence of repressed selves. How, exactly, is it known that such selves even exist in human perception? Can they actually be observed, and, if so, how would one determine whether a self were one's unrepressed self or one's previously repressed self? Second, in accepting the existence of real selves or others (repressed or not) in artworks, the psychoanalytic perspective asserts the paradoxical existence of real phenomena in art, which is by nature fictional (see Walton, 1978a, 1978b, 1985). Furthermore, arguing that a real percipient can interact with "things" in artworks is thoroughly inaccurate (see Walton, 1978a, 1978b, pp. 16-18). Magnifying psychoanalysis' precarious position is its tautological quality, divertingly satirized by Turner (1996),<sup>7</sup> but despite its conceptual

and logical shortcomings, one may acknowledge that Freudian analysis has nonetheless contributed to art and literary criticism by recognizing the human psyche and the role it might play in expression.

On completing his discussion of the hermeneutic, epistemological, and psychoanalytic perspectives on identity and alterity and their applications to art, Alphen concludes that "Identity and alterity are not 'givens', they are not presences behind the self or the other, but changeable products of the ongoing process of constituting a self-image" (p. 15).

#### Augusto Ponzio on Alterity

Ponzio (1997) grounds much of his discussion of alterity on Bakhtin's work, and in relation to alterity's connection with literature, Ponzio writes:

The form of the literary work coincides with the author's discourse. . . .  
Artistic form, that is to say the author's discourse, organizes the contents of another's discourse and life, and a real alterity must be expressed in the author's discourse, if the character is to be convincing and the contents real, and if there is to be a convincing representation of values.

The relation author/hero, or form/content, is the relation between literary discourse and the discourse of actual life, between artistic form and the contents of social life, between aesthetic values and extra-

aesthetic values. In the tension of these relations the artistic representation of the world takes shape, which, while penetrating to the interior of social life with all its values, reaches a point of view external to it. This point of view constitutes its alterity; the alterity and specificity of artistic form, the surplus of the author's point of view . . . its 'being outside' the life represented (pp. 317, 318).

On interpreting Ponzio's view of literature, one is tempted to ask what he means by stating that "a real alterity must be expressed in the author's discourse," and to what he refers in writing, ". . . if the character is to be convincing and the contents real." If Ponzio is using the word "real" in its usual sense, then he is claiming that real components are present in literature (in this case, real alterity and real contents), which is a questionable position (see Walton 1978a, 1978b). Also, to express a real alterity is to commit an act, and, it can be supposed, an author may engage in such an act with another person or group of persons. To suggest, however, that an author's discourse—when it is a literary form—can engage in expression of real alterity is erroneous.

To explain this idea, if anything real expresses something in an artwork, that which it expresses is not identical to what it expresses in an extra-artistic context, even when what it expresses in reality is what it expresses in an artwork. Once anything is

taken into an artwork, it becomes part of that artwork and leaves its status as a real object or entity (note Dickie, 1974; Danto, 1964, 1973, 1983, 1985). If, for instance, Jones takes himself, a real person, and places himself in the role of a character in a novel, then anything he does or expresses in that novel is fictional and is not to be construed as identical to what Jones does as a real person. In other words, Jones does not reach over from the real world to express a real alterity (for example) in a fictional world. He does not need to since he belongs to the fictional world, too (see Walton, 1978b, p. 18). The basis of this line of reasoning is that fictional statements occur

. . . implicitly if not explicitly, within the scope of an intensional operator, “It is fictional that,” and hence as analogous to statements of the forms, “It is believed that . . .,” “It is wished that . . .,” etc. The impossibility of a real person’s interacting with (mere) fictions is thus rendered no more remarkable than the impossibility of a real person’s interacting with “things” which are believed or wished or said or denied to exist but which do not exist (p. 18).

It cannot, therefore, be true that an author’s discourse can engage in a real act of expression when it is part of a literary text. Walton’s scholarship (1973, 1978a, 1978b, 1985, 1990, 1992) effectively, albeit complexly, establishes the impossibility of

interactions between real persons and fictional entities. Those things considered “true” in artistic contexts, are only fictionally true. For example, when we say that it is true that Hipólita sought the aid of a sorceress to make Auristela fall ill, we are expressing that truth in a fictional context (Persiles y Sigismunda), so it is only fictionally true that Auristela falls ill. Since elements in artworks are fictional, we cannot really interact with them. To clarify further this thought,

From our position in the real world we cannot . . . rescue Robinson Crusoe from his island, or send flowers to Tom Sawyer’s relatives grieving at his funeral. Willy Loman (in Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman) cannot tell us his troubles, nor can we give him advice (Walton, 1978b, p. 12).

Neither can we offer medical assistance to Auristela. As it should be evident that real-fictional interactions are factually impossible, it should consequently be evident why the present argument maintains that the notion of a real author’s discourse committing the act of expression in a fictional context toward anyone in a real context (i.e., a real reader) is factually impossible (again, it does not need to since it is also part of the fictional context).

Once more leaving aside aesthetically-based objections, Ponzio's conclusion about alterity complements that of Alphen's in the previous section to the extent that alterity is characterized as a dynamic concept (see Ponzio, 1997, p. 327).

#### Ann Wordsworth Unconscious, Deconstruction, and Psychoanalysis

Earlier in this work it was mentioned that ideologically-based approaches to alterity are problematic. Wordsworth's work on alterity (1982) is an example of such an approach. Wordsworth relies on the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious, fusing it with deconstruction to form "radical alterity" (see p. 85), to fashion her arguments on art, writing, and literature. Since psychoanalysis is notoriously untestable, unfalsifiable, and tautologous (see Popper, 1988), Wordsworth may exercise tremendous latitude in what she claims, for, realistically, one cannot base agreement with her arguments on logic, but, rather, primarily on faith or on ideology. On logical grounds, Wordsworth's piece could be ignored, used as extra fuel for the criticisms of Milner (1987), Harker (1996), and Beardsley (1981) against literary theory and criticism. However, one aspect of Wordsworth's article is a striking demonstration of what a literary critic can do with sufficient imagination and a tautologous theory. Near the beginning of her work, she declares that

Writing is no more than an involuntary act of conveyance: not of course the means of matching emotion to the external as in Eliot's recipe for

artistic inevitability or of intuitively sharing oedipal desire, but no less the passive vehicle via which unconscious desire is satisfied in a text (p. 83).

In one sentence (and in her article as a whole), Wordsworth renders writing as an unconscious act. If that is so, then literature is unintentional, and indeed for Wordsworth, the notion of unconsciously-created literature is perfectly sound. It is here where Wordsworth steps into critical-theoretical quicksand. Even though art has no necessary or sufficient properties (see Weitz, 1956, pp. 170, 171; note also Langer 1953, pp. 292-294), it "is a concept which necessarily involves human intentionality" (Dickie, 1974, p. 46; see also Beardsley, 1981, p. 17). Wordsworth's conception of literature is that it is not qualitatively distinct from writing in general, and human intention to produce literature is immaterial. From Wordsworth's view, then, texts produced by babbling psychotics, babies placed in front of computer keyboards, and those under the influence of primitive pharmaceuticals would qualify as literature. Wordsworth's article might represent an extreme in subjectively-grounded scholarship, but it is certainly representative of why an empirical foray into literary criticism holds great academic and intellectual promise.

To be fair, while Wordsworth (1982) and Ponzio (1997) are not alone in discussing alterity with turgidity and circular reasoning (e.g., Fludernik, 1995; Dragon, 1996), not all literary criticism on alterity is so written. Concerning the discussion of

real-fictional interactions in the Alphen, Ponzio and Wordsworth articles, one might wonder whether it was irrelevant or out of place, but, in fact, the real-fictional interaction question is the foundation of this study's null hypothesis: there are no significant differences between the responses of males and females when they read literary texts. If the null hypothesis should be confirmed in the experimental test of gender's influence on reading, then that result will empirically complement Walton's (1973, 1978a, 1978b, 1985, 1990, 1992) position that art percipients are fully aware of the fact that literature (and all art) is fictional (i.e., unreal), and do not therefore exhibit real reactions to art. Since in this study the real context in which the participants exist will be made salient (see both Procedure in CHAPTER FOUR and Appendix E), the null hypothesis predicts that participants will not report experiencing real emotions after reading. Implications of the experimental results will be explored at greater length in the Discussion section of CHAPTER FOUR, but for now, attention will return to how other critics have characterized alterity and its related concepts.

#### Gisela Brinker-Gabler and Feminine Alterity

Starting from a brief overview of several theoretical perspectives, Brinker-Gabler (1992) writes of "feminine alterity." As she develops her material, she notes that the category of "woman" has been viewed in terms of class, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, and, in an effort to "stimulate further debate" on feminine alterity,

she narrows her focus to approaches that emphasize gender, body, and text (p. 240).

For example, in discussing the “new historical/materialist” approach, she describes how

. . . such an approach deals with the intersections of social structures, systems of representation, and subjectivities, . . . [which allow] one to recognize social constructions of gender, to take into account all the determinants shaping female existence and to acknowledge historical and cultural specificity (p. 240).

Citing Lennox and Butler,<sup>8</sup> Brinker-Gabler strengthens the claim that gender is a socio-cultural construct. Since identities of individuals are socially-inflected, it is reasonable to posit that their discourse may reflect that inflection, particularly along a gender dimension (see p. 241). That position is complementary to Donovan’s (1987) theory of a women’s poetics.

In commenting on feminist approaches to the female body as a creative-interpretive fulcrum in literature, Brinker-Gabler does not accept *prima facie* the psychoanalytic arguments on desire for the forbidden as an origin of female bodily identity. She suggests that the female body, like gender, may be the “. . . effect of the apparatus of cultural construction” (p. 241). Brinker-Gabler also adds that the relationship between “woman” and “female body” has yet to be sufficiently researched to sustain adequately the hypotheses of psychoanalytic treatments of women’s art.

Finally, in her discussion of text-based scholarship, Brinker-Gabler calls attention to Cherríe Moraga's Loving in the War Years:<sup>9</sup>

As a Chicana without a language she can call her own—neither English nor Spanish—as a lesbian living in the United States, she is conscious of her own fragmentation . . . Subjective historical narratives like Moraga's offer an opportunity “to pursue a complex construction of subjectivity, since there, change is not presented in the form of ready-made identities, in coherent narratives of a single thread” (p. 242).<sup>10</sup>

Textually-based analyses “. . . also help bring out new conceptions of what feminist practice can be” (p. 242). In short, Brinker-Gabler's discussion of a feminine alterity is lucid, well-balanced, and perceptive. She warns against siding with either “universalizing tendencies” or “radical particularizations” in feminist scholarship on feminine alterity, and suggests re-examining current critical perspectives to find a “space in between” them (p. 243). Like Donovan, Brinker-Gabler is optimistic that a women's poetics can be articulated. In the next section, the alterity concept is applied to language in terms of narrative representation through translation.

#### Norbert Greiner on “Alteristic” Translation

Greiner's 1992 article provides an illustration of how alterity can be expressed in terms of language translation. In reference to 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century French texts,

Greiner maintains that “The stylistic physiognomy of . . . texts was unconditionally sacrificed to the stylistic ideals of contemporary readers and critics” (p. 49). On Greiner’s view, throughout history, all texts everywhere have been “. . . translated in order to overcome . . . alterity of times past” (p. 47). Translations have been tailored to the taste preferences of readers and critics, such preferences varying by historical context. In support of his argument on alterity-grounded translation, Greiner writes of the “. . . Goldoni and Shakespeare adaptations for the German stage until far into the 19<sup>th</sup> century, all of them forced into the mould of the prevailing taste for decency, good manners, and moral edification” (p. 49). In contrast, 18<sup>th</sup> century translations of Shakespeare into German “. . . consisted in adaptation to the familiar . . . to strip it [the original text] of its nature of alterity” (p. 50). Greiner concludes his article with a statement that translation functions to mediate between cultures (p. 55), thus making for the matter of cultural alterity, or the recognition of differences across cultures and their readers.

The value that Greiner’s work holds for this study is that it supports the premise that readers are inextricably linked to the interpretation of texts and that a reader’s identity or position within the social structure can have everything to do with how he or she reads something. It is partly because of Greiner’s observations on translation that the experimental design for this study was modified to use text stimuli

in both English and Spanish, as well as participants who were native speakers of both languages (the Procedure section in CHAPTER FOUR addresses this question).

Herbert Grabes, Aesthetics, and Alterity

Noteworthy in Grabes's (1996) approach to alterity is his straightforward use of alterity to refer, simply, to difference. He mirrors Brinker-Gabler's clarity of explanation in exploring how art might affect its percipients and further recognizes, as do Alphen (1991) and Greiner (1992), that individuals do in fact participate in the interpretation of artworks (see pp. 24, 25). What Grabes also manages is to describe how alterity is involved with art production to the extent that "since the beginning of modernism the aesthetics of art has been determined by the task of enabling the experience of alterity; indeed, so much so, that the ability of 'making strange' became the measure of aesthetic quality" (p. 23). Grabes's argument that alterity is assimilated into art production supports Donovan's contention that a feminine subjectivity may be expressed under a women's poetics. Correspondent with the positions of Danto (1964), Dickie (1974), Langer (1953), and Wollheim (1980) on the nature of art's movement or development, Grabes holds that

. . . the experience of radical alterity can be preserved only by constantly repeated major changes in artistic form—a development that is manifest in the swift succession of avant-gardisms in this century. And as

this repetition of radical change leads to a heightened ability to accommodate strangeness, the process of renewal had to be speeded up until it ended in the postmodern simultaneousness of a multitude of individualistic innovations . . . . the provocative erasure of the boundary between art and non-art—as it has been practised from Duchamp’s ready-mades to the installations of postmodernisms—can be seen as a desperate measure to create alterity by violating established aesthetic expectations (p. 24).

Though Grabes concentrates more on alterity in art itself rather than in those perceiving it, he observes the following in literature “The estrangement of traditional narrating by foregrounding the narrational process, by self-referentiality, and by the preference for the fantastic and the grotesque in the postmodern novel—these are, above all, so many strategies to ensure a ubiquitous encounter with strangeness” (p. 24). Reader encounters with the new and unfamiliar in literature is something Grabes cheers, and he extends the idea to all art. He suggests that the more alterity there is in art, the more human creativity can expand (p. 28). Under the condition of a continually expanding range of creativity, to deny the possibility of the existence of a feminine modality becomes increasingly difficult, and that can only bode well for scholars interested in matters of gender in artistic endeavors.

"Other" Thoughts by R. Corbey & J. Leersen and J. Nederveen Pieterse

The distinction between alterity and otherness is variable, and for Corbey and Leersen (1991), ethical considerations are also entailed. However alterity and otherness are ultimately defined, Corbey and Leersen find it significant that "Within the Western world, the exclusion of women from the formulation of cultural values has . . . been a central topic in women's studies. Indeed the very personality of the female subject as an Other has become a central concern . . ." (p. xv). The authors further observe that "The construction of Otherness can be detected at the root of much injustice and suffering . . ." (p. xviii), accentuating the importance of maintaining critical focus on women's cultural undertakings, particularly those in literature. Within a literary context, any particulars of women's experience as others might be more likely revealed, and that is precisely what Donovan (1987) believes is the case in a women's poetics. Other researchers, such as Morris (1993), caution against making a "special-case" status for women's literature, since marginalization of women's writing could be perpetuated if it were taught only within women's writing or women's studies courses (pp. 54, 55). Morris also advises us that ". . . we cannot assume that all writing by women will be necessarily or essentially 'feminine' in its perspectives and values. Even less can we assume that anything and everything written by women will be—somehow—feminist . . ." (p. 2; see also Culler, 1991 for a concurring opinion).

Nonetheless, given that otherness is a “categorical fact of life” (Corbey & Leersen, 1991, p. xviii), it would be scholarly remiss to leave aside analysis of women’s writing or to relegate it to treatment under “special topics.”

Nederveen Pieterse’s (1991) work recognizes empirical investigations on otherness (see p. 192), and his text reflects some of the ideas expressed in the Overview section of the present chapter of this work: “In sociology studies of deviance produced relevant perspectives. Social psychology contributed key concepts such as prejudice, ethnocentrism, attitude, stereotype or schema, prototype and script” (p. 192). His text also reflects this work’s critical posture toward current definitions of alterity or otherness. Nederveen Pieterse reasons that by concentrating excessively on finding a model of otherness, there is “. . . potential for overrating the homogeneity of western culture” (p. 195) and that research might inadvertently introduce “an essentialism of otherness” (p. 200). Any model of otherness must consequently acknowledge the socio-historical component of otherness, and, by Nederveen Pieterse’s view, that involves studying power relationships in and between groups:

Changes in representations of otherness according to time and place tend to reflect, not changes in the characteristics of the labeled group, but rather changes in the circumstances of the labeling group, or

changes in the relationship between the labeling and the labeled group (p. 200).

Lending credence to Nederveen Pieterse's position is sociology's definitional or relativistic perspective on deviance, which takes context and control aspects into account in definitions of deviance (see Orcutt, 1983; Liska, 1992). Additional empirical support for Nederveen Pieterse's focus on power in intergroup dynamics may be found in Stets & Burke (1996) and in Walker, et al. (1996). What stands out in Nederveen Pieterse's analysis on the construction of otherness is that it lends itself easily to empirical testing by virtue of clearly defined concepts, not the least important of which is that "Representations of otherness participate in the production and reproduction of social inequality. The culture of difference is a hierarchical culture" (pp. 201, 202). In view of the fact that Nederveen Pieterse's article, a non-empirical work, is empirically adaptable, it serves well to authenticate the present study's empirical approach to alterity and otherness.

#### Sander Gilman on Ethnicity and Bruce Smith on Sexuality

In a penetrating article on ethnicity in literature, Sander Gilman (1998) poses cogent questions about ethnicity's definition. He agrees with integrative approaches to questions of identity whereby ". . . race, class, and gender must become part of any discussion of the ethnic" (p. 21), but the main force of his article lies in his commentary

on the preoccupation in literary criticism with the ethnicity construct in particular (see pp. 19, 20). In response to the question "What is ethnic writing?" Gilman argues that ". . . writing becomes ethnic only after it is permitted to become ethnic" (p. 21).

Aware of the socio-cultural and socio-political factors in literary criticism, Gilman asks:

Are writers ethnic only if they are not included in the canon of universal writing? . . . Ethnic writers seem only to represent groups that have rarely been presented in the world of literature or high culture . . . Is the label "ethnic" a valuable commodity? Who is ethnic—the writer or the actual or implied reader or both or neither? (pp. 22, 23).

These questions are not asked for mere intellectual exercise, as Gilman alerts the reader that

In Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and Australia, scandals have recently revealed "ethnic" writers to be whites writing under ethnic pseudonyms. Toby Forward, an Anglican vicar, managed to persuade the feminist Virago Press that he was a South Asian woman named Rahila Khan. The white Anglo-Saxon Protestant writer Daniel Lewis James wrote Famous all over Town (1983),<sup>11</sup> which won the 1984 Rosenthal Award for literary achievement, under the Hispanic pseudonym Danny Santiago . . . . Australia has recently discovered that

a number of “aboriginal” writers and artists are anything but aboriginal . . . . Leon Carmen, a Sydney taxi driver, won a prize for a first publication by a female author with My Own Sweet Time,<sup>12</sup> written under the name Wanda Koolmatrie. According to a fictitious biography, Koolmatrie was kidnapped by whites as a child (p. 23).

There are other examples of fraudulently-claimed ethnicity in Gilman’s text, but the ones above are sufficient to illustrate how discussions on identity, alterity, or otherness in literature can easily become more complex than they already are. Gilman’s citations of authorial dupery also recall the institutional setting in which art exists (note Danto, 1964; Dickie, 1974), and thus the paramount relevance of context in the interconnected activities of art’s creation and interpretation.

In his work on premodern sexuality, Bruce Smith (2000) writes what could almost be lines from the philosopher of art Kendall Walton, who has been cited with frequency in this study:

In texts written before the 1880s, perhaps before the 1920s, perhaps even before the 1980s, sexuality, in our psychopolitical understanding of it, is something that is not there.

Of course, sexuality is no more not there in a fictional text than anything else is not there. A fictional text represents things; it is not the things themselves (emphasis in original, p. 319).

As to where sexuality does exist, Smith writes that it resides “. . . in the minds of critical readers since the 1960s” (p. 319). Once more, another critic validates the idea that interpretation of a work is connected with its percipient. Another idea to which Smith lends validity is the interdependence between historical context and identity-construction. Smith's attention is on sexual identity, and he holds that since it “. . . seems to be one of the most natural, most universal, of human traits, [it] provides an exemplary case of how identity is in fact a function of cultural history” (p. 319). Smith's view of sexual identity construction as a context-mediated process is shared in Ponticelli's (1999) study, which finds that sexual identity construction is not unlike any other aspect of identity formation. With the relationship between context and identity in mind, attention will now turn to alterity scholarship more directly associated with Golden Age literature.

## CHAPTER TWO: ALTERITY, OTHERNESS, IDENTITY, AND GENDER IN GOLDEN AGE CRITICISM

As is evident in the preceding text, alterity, otherness, and identity are, and have been, fertile concepts for the production of literary criticism. A concept's fertility in application, however, is not a guarantee that what is derived from it will be something useful or that the derivative will express anything true. For example, psychoanalytically-based approaches to alterity or otherness in Golden Age criticism (e.g., Smith, 1993; El Saffar, 1994) enjoy the luxury that psychoanalysis has ". . . to explain practically everything . . ." (Popper, 1981, p. 21) to which it is applied. Note Popper's observation:

The Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their "clinical observations." As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once . . . I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty in analysing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. "Because of my thousandfold experience," he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: "And with

this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one-fold.”

What I had in mind was that his previous observations may not have been much sounder than this new one; that each in its turn had been interpreted in light of “previous experience,” and at the same time counted as additional confirmation. What, I asked myself, did it confirm? No more than that a case could be interpreted in light of the theory (p. 21).

Popper continues his criticism of Freudian-based theory with an example of how two different approaches within psychoanalysis—one Freudian and one Adlerian—can easily explain two different human behaviors. No matter the human behavior under question, Freudian interpretations always fit and confirmed behaviors “—which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories” (p. 21). Popper’s complaint about Freudian theory is that its truth-value cannot be tested or verified, thus rendering the theory a non-science. Whether or not one wishes to debate the status of psychoanalysis as science, the fact that it is tautologous remains. Even so, certain literary critics have had no apparent reservations in using Freudian or Freudian-derived perspectives to substantiate their interpretations of literature in terms of alterity or otherness. Such activity might be regarded as

intellectual malpractice, for why would anyone knowingly use an improper tool in literary analysis? Perhaps it is the tremendous explanatory power of psychoanalysis that accounts for its popularity. The criticism here is based on the assumption that what one writes for publication is meant to be scholarly sound and truthful. As the perspective in this work is practical and scientific, psychoanalytically-based analyses of Golden Age literature are viewed with skepticism.

Since the experiment conducted for this study uses excerpts from Golden Age texts, the literature review of alterity scholarship in this chapter differs slightly from that of the previous one. Specifically, as part of persistent questioning of critical-theoretical propositions whose truth-value is resistant to verification, the logical integrity of the claims Golden Age scholars have made in reference to alterity, otherness, identity, subjectivity, and so forth, is more aggressively scrutinized. The present literature review also differs in that there is more often special focus on the gender dimension of identity. What continues in this review, however, and in concurrence with Walton's (1973, 1978a, 1978b, 1985, 1990, 1992) research on the matter, is that any assertions of real-fictional interactions between real readers and fictional texts are strenuously rejected.

Golden Age Scholars on Subjectivity, Identity, Alterity, and Gender

In a study on 17<sup>th</sup> century Spanish culture, Mariscal (1992) maintains that the idea of transhistorically-fixed definitions of the individual, self, or subject are indefensible. He presents the concept of one's identity and agency as fluctuating dependent upon social context. Human essence, Mariscal holds, is determined by a constellation of demographic variables (note also Stets, 1997, p. 189). That fact makes it impossible to formulate a uniform definition of human identity that is accurate across time, whether the period is limited to the Golden Age, or extended to include other periods. The implication of Mariscal's position is that traditional views of various authors—he cites Quevedo and Cervantes as examples—must be reconsidered if human nature is in fact fluid. Countering unifying tendencies in literary criticism whereby perceptions of authors and their texts are homogenized, Mariscal sees multiple views of Quevedo's "self" in the author's works. Quevedo's picaresque portrayals may serve, Mariscal suggests, to accentuate the "alternative subject positions" of non-picaresque portrayals, such as aristocratic ones. Cervantes also portrays alternative subject positions in his texts. For example, writing of Cervantes's Las dos doncellas, Fuchs (2001) contends:

By analyzing the historical context of Spain's fraught European empire, the larger repercussions of the damsels' transvestism, and the literary

allusions in the narrative, I will show how Cervantes challenges generic conventions in a tale of gender transgressions and how these breaches of decorum complicate the Spanish imperial project that frames the main events of the narrative (pp. 285, 286).

Fuchs views Cervantes's character representations as fictional analogues to Spanish socio-historical conditions, and concludes that the text shows that ". . . romance has been exposed as an unstable category, vulnerable to the intrusions of historical realism and to gender disorders" (p. 296). The relevance of Fuchs's article for the present study lies in its conformity with Mariscal's implicit belief that by concentrating on the different ways in which authors represent subject identities, it can become possible to receive their work in an alternate, non-canonical, but no less valuable, light.

Díaz Balsera (1993) echoes Mariscal's notion of identity's multipartite construction in her article on alterity in Ercilla and Lope de Vega. In writing of the literary representation of Araucanian alterity, she calls attention to the fact that contradictory or uncomplimentary characteristics can reside in a single identity. Her rendering of alterity also corresponds to how the term has been defined in this work, namely, that all identities or subjectivities are equally valid, with no hierarchical ordering. Díaz Balsera's recognition of equal treatment of identity in Ercilla's La Araucana is evident in her statement that, "For Ercilla, the Araucanian Other is fully

equal to the European in his iron-willed determination to defend territorial sovereignty” (p. 26). “The Araucanians, though ‘gente . . . sin Dios ni ley,’ are morally correct in resisting a degraded Spanish domination” (p. 26). Ercilla’s portrayal of the Araucanians “. . . contradicts the arguments put forth by Ginés de Sepúlveda in the famous 1551 Valladolid debate about the New World native’s cowardice, immorality, childishness, and concomitant inferiority” (p. 26). Díaz Balsera effectively argues that Araucanian representation in Ercilla’s text contradicts the European perception of American natives as lesser, “other” beings. In that sense, Ercilla’s work exemplifies alterity, since “others” are not presented as such, but rather as equals.

The same neutrality of otherness is present, by Díaz Balsera’s reading, in Lope de Vega’s Arauco domado:

The colonizer’s barbarism erases the difference between himself and the savage, inferior Other . . . . it must be conceded to the Spanish colonizer’s discourse, or maybe even to the discourse of colonialism at large, that there is usually a recognition of inevitably admirable things in the Other, as well as an acknowledgement of things about the colonizer’s predicament which might be loathsome and terrible (p. 31).

As is the case with Ercilla’s text, Lope portrays the Araucanians as individuals who are at once European and barbaric, possessing “otherly” characteristics (p. 32). Attending

to representations of identity in the texts by Ercilla and Lope is significant for Díaz Balsera, since doing so allows us “ . . . to understand the stakes of Spanish textual production of the 16<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup>, and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries that deal with New World issues . . . A story about this production must be written that specifically addresses the struggles, interests, fragmentation, and desires of the colonial subject” (p. 36). She believes that exclusive focus on aesthetic aspects of Spanish texts would preclude such understanding. Díaz Balsera’s commentary on alterity in the Ercilla and Lope texts is insightful, and although this work is not dedicated to textual analysis, pursuing Díaz Balsera’s line of research could prove intellectually compelling. For purposes of this work, what is significant is Díaz Balsera’s use of the alterity concept in an illuminating, productive way, without reliance on muddled theoretical constructs or illogical reasoning. Her article further illustrates that a critic may employ contemporary theoretical concepts and nonetheless draw conclusions similar to those characteristic of more traditional critical approaches (e.g., historical).

Williamsen’s (1992) study on Caro’s Valor, agravio y mujer affords another opportunity to witness a contemporary theoretical perspective applied to Golden Age literature. Like Fuchs (2001), Williamsen views literature as something that may be interconnected with social and artistic contexts: “The constant play with gender roles and the honor code in Caro’s texts represents a rewriting of societal standards;

moreover, her consistent manipulation of generic conventions critically engages 'canonical' comedias" (p. 21). In agreement with Nederveen Pieterse's (1991) counsel against too eagerly establishing a model of otherness, Williamsen writes:

I will argue that in order to explore "writing in the margin" we must carefully consider works that have been marginalized; otherwise, we as critics may falsely claim to appropriate the place of "the Other", thereby propagating exclusionary practices that merely re-center rather than de-center discourse (p. 21).

Williamsen reinforces her position against re-centering discourse with her citation of Spivak:<sup>13</sup> "The putative center welcomes selective inhabitants of the margin in order to better exclude the margin. And it is the center that offers the official explanation . . ."

The argument in Williamsen's article is in part an amplification of Smith's (1988) work on otherness, which uses, ironically, canonical texts to address the question of marginality in Spanish literature. Expectedly, Williamsen finds Smith's work contradictory in some respects, and she addresses that question in her analysis, citing Smith's mis-reading of Zayas's Al fin se paga todo (note Williamsen, 1992, p. 23). In further concurrence with other scholarship on alterity and otherness, Williamsen acknowledges experimental work on the relationship between gender and interpretation (p. 24) and how a plurality of readings may be assigned to a single text.

It is shortly after introducing the gender variable into her study that Williamsen declares Caro's Valor, agravio y mujer a text that questions gender and its social construction, adding that the ". . . play presents gender not as a physical or psychological essence, but as a matter of performance" (p. 24). Williamsen's citation of Butler (see Note 8) strengthens the gender-as-performance position. She then proceeds to demonstrate how Caro's work is incongruous with social norms regarding gender roles, and with generic norms in relation to the roles of graciosos in theater, as well as to the idea of women as poets or other literary creators (see pp. 27, 28). An important conclusion Williamsen draws is that ". . . Ana Caro's play suggests several ways that marginal texts can lend insights crucial for the understanding of literature of a given period. Only by considering that which has been excluded from the canon can we begin to understand how the canon defines itself" (p. 28). Williamsen convincingly argues her case for how the analysis of marginalized or excluded texts can contribute to literary studies, and her reference to gender in literary contexts as performative is particularly sagacious.

Williamsen frames gender as performative in a fictional context (in Caro's text) while remaining cognizant that gender is also performance in a real context (citing Butler). In so doing, she avoids the complications Walton describes in his work that occur when one muddles fiction with reality. Avoiding logical errors, of course, is not why Williamsen's characterization of gender as performance is noteworthy. Rather, in

describing gender as something done, even if only fictionally, Williamsen's article serves as confirmatory support for Donovan's proposition of a women's poetics or "gynocriticism." Equally significant is that if gender is indeed an act, then it may be observed and tested. Williamsen's article therefore encourages investigation of gender and subjectivity in Golden Age literature on both critical-theoretical and empirical fronts, and therein lies part of the article's value for this study.

Paul Julian Smith

One hallmark of Smith's criticism may be its relatively antithetical posture toward traditionally-based approaches to literary analysis. In his (1987a) study on picaresque narrative and its critics, he writes,

My position will be broadly anti-humanist: that is, I am in opposition to the myth of 'Man' as founding father of the text and as integrated, active subject within that society which the text is thought to reflect. In this I take my general approach from strains of modern critical theory . . . . Such a position may be accused of anachronism. But if this is so, 'humanist' critics are equally anachronistic. For the ideals they cherish belong neither to the Renaissance nor to our own time. They derive rather from a particular historical moment (the mid-nineteenth century) and the literary form most characteristic of it (the 'classic' or 'Balzacian')

novel). Though many critics proclaim their adherence to the literary conventions of the Golden Age, the critical concepts they employ and the aesthetic values they propose . . . are consistent with received nineteenth-century 'humanism'. The tools of previous scholars are thus, necessarily, an object of my own critical investigation and cannot serve as the instrument of my own reading . . . ." (pp. 88, 89).

As he develops his approach to the picaresque, Smith affirms that ". . . the act of writing is not invested solely in the author but can be completed only by the reader to whom it is implicitly directed" (p. 90). The reader's inextricability from textual interpretation is not a proposition unique to certain literary critics, for empirical scholars recognize reader-text interdependence as axiomatic: "A complete model of text comprehension would include the role of both text and reader variables" (Bourg, 1996, p. 242). In his argument for a scientific model to understand the reading process, Harker (1996) notes that empirical studies ". . . depict the reader as engaged in an interactive process with the text, a process in which both reader-based and text-based information contribute to a construction of meaning" (p. 646) and that "Reading varies according to the reader, the text, and the context" (p. 655). Martindale (1988) joins Bourg and Harker: ". . . the reader is not a passive recipient but, in a real sense, an active creator of the text-as-understood . . . . The reader as well as the author is,

then, present at the act of creation" (p. v). It may be that the reader-text interdependence in literature's interpretation is more readily acknowledged in science than it is in literature since it is more difficult to dispute empirically-grounded argument than it is to contest literary point of view. There certainly can be no doubt that to make a successful case for removing the reader as an agent in textual meaning is ambitious and, under current conceptions of art and literature, an apparent impossibility. Rejecting the absolute supremacy of text over reader, then, is a sound position for literary critics such as Smith and others who draw on contemporary theory to hold.

In further criticism against traditionally-based perspectives, Smith states that "Social circumstance does not 'produce' writing in any direct sense . . . writing is manifestly multiple, not coterminous with, but relatively autonomous from, the social practices within which it finds its meaning" (p. 106). Susanne Langer (1953) holds a correlative posture, and extends her view to dismiss context per se as a sufficient condition for artistic status:

A work of art . . . . may be said to "express" . . . the life of the society from which it arises, namely to indicate customs, dress, behavior, and to reflect confusion or decorum, violence or peace . . . . All these things may be found in museums and galleries if we choose to note them.

But they may also be found in wastebaskets and in the margins of schoolbooks. This does not mean that someone has discarded a work of art, or produced one when he was bored with long division. It merely means that all drawings, utterances, gestures, or personal records of any sort express feelings, beliefs, social conditions, and interesting neuroses; "expression" in any of these senses is not peculiar to art, and consequently is not what makes for artistic values (emphasis in original, pp. 25, 26).

Subsequent to rejecting textual meaning as ultimately authoritative and the primacy of socio-historical context as a direct literary catalyst, Smith introduces the idea of subjectivity. He defines subjectivity as a "sense of self" (see p. 107; Smith, 1988, p. 121) and asserts that it operates reflexively in Lazarillo de Tormes, and that in Guzmán de Alfarache, subjectivity " . . . traces the reflexive relation between writer and reader, and its role in the constitution of a genre (the novel) . . . ." (p. 107; see also Smith, 1988, p. 121). Smith's concern in his article is with the rhetoric of representation in picaresque narrative and how " . . . it may yield up the secret of how we came to see ourselves as we do" (p. 108). Smith believes that studying identity's representation is important to understanding narrative, and in his analysis of representation, he examines

relations “. . . between the individual and the world as represented in the text [and] between the writer and the reader as implied within the text . . . . “ (p. 90).

Smith develops theses on subjectivity further in his text, Writing in the Margin (1988), granting special attention to marginality, which, he asserts, to be the essence of Spanish “difference” in relation to the rest of Europe. In characterizing Golden Age discourse, Smith emphasizes the presence of continuous “slippage,” decentering, and non-fixed meanings. Conceptismo and culteranismo may be interdependent as well as constitutive of the Spanish identity: “. . . the problems of clarity and of excess seem to be linked to the peculiar sensitivity of Spanish rhetoricians to the marginal status of their culture” (p. 23). On the other hand, the terms were unknown to Spanish writers (i.e., Góngora, Quevedo, Gracián) and would have been unintelligible to them. Thus, Smith suggests that using a conceptismo-culteranismo framework for analyzing Golden Age narrative may be anachronistic (p. 21).

As to what accounts for the slippage or unfixed meanings in Golden Age literature, Smith believes it is the problem of representation. Using Quevedo’s poetry as an example, he explains that it “. . . points up the margins of representation itself. But it is undecidable because it deprives the reader of any stable referent ‘outside’ itself” (p. 15). A central position for Smith is that representation, especially of a visual or pictorial kind, may not be possible in literature since language involves social

aspects, thus qualifying literary construction or representation of self as a social phenomenon. As such, Smith denies the notion of fixed meaning in literature since he questions all “social and subjective forces which produce Man as cultural construct” (p. 83). He writes at length on how social relations between world and self can play out in a literary text, as in Quevedo’s Buscón. Operating from a political reading of the work, and in commenting the picaresque in general, Smith writes, “We are at once involved by the picaresque’s first-person narrative and distanced by the wilful inconsistency and unreliability of its perspective” (p. 120). In more specific reference to the Buscón, Smith holds that the text

. . . asserts the subordinate place of the individual in society, yet discloses, by the very attention it pays to that individual and by the inconsistency with which he is represented, his necessary role in defining the society which excludes him. Only from his marginal position can Pablos reveal the centrality within the text of class conflicts repressed by the author himself” (p. 121).

By the time he writes Representing the Other (1992), Smith has adjusted his critical focus to center on the racial aspect of subjectivity and how it intersects with text and gender. He describes race as “. . . not a discrete topic to be extracted from the body of the literary text in which it appears . . . rather it is always already embedded in

the textual ground of the narrative, and is frequently inextricable from such 'extraneous' determinants as class, gender and sexuality" (p. 2). He adds that the meaning of race is historically, linguistically, and socially variable, and always interdependent upon the entire set of demographic components that define an individual at any given moment. On reading Smith's text, one gets the impression that any definition of race too narrow in what it encompasses is unacceptable to Smith, for race is as subject to variability for him as the sense of self is for Mariscal. To define race, then, may be like defining alterity and otherness in that all three concepts are contextually influenced and thus resistant to singular definitions.

Additional considerations of race should avoid tendencies toward assimilation (e.g., "black equals white") and homogenization ("black equals black) since both ". . . are guilty of a false universalism in which dominant binaries remain, albeit reinscribed" (see pp. 7, 8). Once sufficient understanding of race is achieved, critics may see that "Race' is not intrinsically different from any other topic and need no longer be confined to a theoretical ghetto" (pp. 16, 17). Smith's applies his work on race to ". . . treat the possibility of a Jewish identity in the Celestina and of a feminine discourse in St. Teresa. Gracián's El criticón serves as a test case for the inextricability of the narratives of nationality and of allegory" (p. 2).

To this point, the review of Smith's scholarship has shown the cardinal importance he places on the reader and reader context for the construction of literary meaning. His work also reveals doubts as to socio-historic context's direct responsibility for literary production and content, and whether it can be claimed that literature mirrors that context to any meaningful or significant degree, if it does so at all. The preceding discussion further shows that Smith finds the subject of self (subjectivity) germane to literary criticism and analysis, particularly the way in which self is represented. Connected with subjectivity, Smith attests, is marginality and the manner in which literary narrative portrays subaltern identities. Since language is socially-produced, inherent in it are the traits characteristic of such products, namely human bias and other forms of selectivity. For that reason, Smith argues that literary representation of self, marginal or not, is a difficult if not illusory endeavor. In keeping with his treatment of other concepts, Smith finds "race" to be not only a denotatively elusive term, but a part of identity that intersects and coexists with several other of identity's components, including sexuality and gender. Below is Smith's argumentation on the gendered aspect of language.

Writing of Góngora's Soledades, Smith (1986) states that there is a ". . . conventional gendering of language and discourse . . ." (p. 83), that Góngora

“scrambles” the “. . . reproduction of gender roles. . .” and rules of genre (p. 83). As for associating “sex and text”, Smith is forthright in his argument:

. . . language is always already gendered, . . . sex is never absent from discourse or value . . . . The slippage between sex and text is almost imperceptible, because of its very omnipresence. If language is a system of differences [i.e., genres], then the sexual distinction is uniquely efficacious, because uniquely “natural” (p. 84).

Drawing on Quintilian,<sup>14</sup> Smith continues: “The male text is authentic and true, the female counterfeit and mendacious” (p. 84). Smith then extends the gendered-language concept to incorporate sixteenth-century narrative forms, and to support that extension, he cites Scaliger’s<sup>15</sup> text which “. . . states succinctly that the subjects of the epic, the highest genre, are ‘dux, miles, classis, equus, victoria’ ‘the commander, the soldier, the fleet, the cavalry, victory’ (45). By contrast, the inferior lyric treats the matter of love: ‘curas amatorias’ (47)” (p. 84). In further advancement of his gendered language position, Smith explains that plot is modally masculine, exemplified in the epic, and that “Lyric is a lady is a flower: gender, genre, and nature link hands once more” (p. 85). An excerpt from Tasso’s Discorsi dell’arte poetica e del poema heroico<sup>16</sup> illustrates his claim. More justification of Smith’s view of language as gendered is his observation, following Maclean,<sup>17</sup> that

When male, utility, virtue, and epic are contrasted with female, decoration, sensuality, and lyric, then each contrast is one not of true opposition but rather of deprivation. In scholastic terms, the female elements are not species relative (different but equal and even mutually constituting) but species privata (different because of a lack in the second term of the defining characteristic of the first) (emphasis in original, p. 85).

Languages themselves, and not just narrative forms, may also be gendered, for Smith characterizes Italian as having “feminine vices,” while Spanish has “. . . manly virtues, canonic already in Quintilian’s prescription for robust and solid eloquence: virility, nobility, religiosity” (p. 85). Smith concludes that “The Spanish poet of the late sixteenth century is thus uniquely bound in the discursive prison of binary, reactive oppositions” (p. 86). Applying his gendered language approach to the Soledades, Smith writes that Góngora

. . . seems consistently to valorize the traditionally negative, privative side of the gender paradigm: woman, ornament, lyric, Italy—these are the emphases of a work that aspires . . . to the highest regions of cultural prestige and to the utmost limits of linguistic complexity (p. 87).

Noting Martínez Arancón's<sup>18</sup> less than positive reception of the Soledades, Smith relates that "Like the flighty female of Italian lyric or the mendacious cosmetic abused by Quintilian's unmanly oration, Góngora's text is promiscuous, inconsistent, and insubstantial" (p. 87). Smith construes Martínez Arancón's perspective on poetry as one prescribing that "The prudent poet (that is, man) will scorn reckless ornament and sing (in Propertius's much quoted phrase) 'things that any girl can understand'" (p. 87).

From the previous citations of gender in language, it is apparent that literary criticism has been, or may certainly be, gender-inflected. Moreover, reader-response may have a gendered component as well, for Smith suggests ". . . that Góngora's simultaneous and contradictory engagement with and subversion of myth, nature, and gender reproduce an analogous bifurcation in the reader" (p. 90). Smith's text seems to imply clearly that such bifurcation is reproduced in the real reader. The question of real-fictional interactions has been discussed to some degree in this work; so, for now, addressing gender-mediated responses in real readers will be laid aside. One must realize that Smith's article is concerned primarily with demonstrating how Góngora transgresses gender codes in the Soledades, and not necessarily to convince the reader that language is gendered. Smith assumes that the critical reader will acknowledge the logic of the article's arguments to then observe how a gendered language design can be applied to Golden Age writing. One of the present study's

principal goals is to review systematically literary criticism that asserts, whether implicitly or explicitly, the existence of gender-inflected differences among writers and readers. Using responses from real readers under empirical conditions, this study will test critical literary assertions of gender-inflection. Achieving that goal is especially compelling when reading critical conclusions such as the one Smith makes regarding Góngora's Soledades: "Their provisional and intermittent unfixing of nature, culture, and gender tends to displace both writer as active, virile origin of coherent meaning and reader as passive, nonvirile recipient of it" (p. 92).

If Smith's 1986 work may be viewed as support for Donovan's belief in the existence of gender-mediated reading, then that support is reinforced in his (1987b) study on Saint Teresa and María de Zayas. Smith states outright that "Until recently criticism of St. Teresa has been marked by overt sexism" (p. 227). Using a citation of Américo Castro<sup>19</sup> for illustration, Smith finds that Castro ". . . has no difficulty in defining the essence of womanhood: as in the Renaissance, it is volatility, inconstancy and emotionalism" (p. 228). Male critics can ". . . both denigrate and idealize female writing . . ." (p. 228), and although criticism may admit Teresa's writing ". . . into the ranks of male authors," it does so, "as long as the supposed deficiencies or excesses of her style remain ignored or repressed. The canon itself is undisturbed" (p. 229). With respect to Zayas,

. . . if we abandon traditional modes of criticism, it may be possible to offer a progressive or feminist reading of a superficially conservative text . . . My own thesis is that the relationships between men and women depicted by Zayas and the language in which those relationships are couched may be read in terms of Irigaray's 'parler femme' or women's discourse (p. 235).

Smith believes that the Zayas story Mal presagio casarse lejos (from Desengaños amorosos) lends itself to the kind of reading he suggests. Another aspect of Donovan's theory of a women's poetics lies in the postulate that there exists a female creative modality. Smith offers some evidence for that possibility with his comments on Teresa and Zayas, noting that their shared characteristics, if they exist, ". . . are to be found not in the images of women that their texts offer us, but rather in the texture of their very language" (p. 221). Smith also expresses, somewhat indeterminately, that writing may be a portal to a "pre-verbal" consciousness that is associated with the female body (p. 232), thus complementary to Donovan's claim of the existence of a women's epistemology (1987, p. 98). Cautious to avoid essentialism or relativism, however, Smith does not see an ". . . innate connection between women's experience or their expression at different moments in history" (p. 222), and reasons that ". . . one way of keeping both nature and nurture in play at the same time is

through a conception of the woman's body as historical construct, not biological essence" (p. 222). If writing and women's bodies are historically-constructed, history can serve as a basis for the treatment of women's writing and, at the same time, permit characterization of such writing as a gateway to a consciousness oriented toward the female body.<sup>20</sup> If one accepts Smith's approach to women's narrative set forth in his article, then it can be possible to avoid becoming entangled with problematic questions in criticizing Teresa's *Vida*, such as "First, to what extent is the text personal . . . or social . . . ? Second, to what extent is Teresa's writing spontaneous . . . or artificial . . . ?" (p. 232). In an appeal to recognize narrative positions of women in literature generally, Smith feels that literature and language must themselves be called into question (see p. 222).

Returning to Smith's overriding interest, he contends that the male-authored criticism of Teresa and Zayas has falsely attributed common traits to both writers (e.g., spontaneity, naturalness; see p. 240) and should therefore be reconsidered. The male critical system must be interrogated in order to, ultimately, ". . . preserve woman's alienation while transcending her marginality . . . [to create] . . . space for new readings of women writers such as Teresa and Zayas" (p. 240). By Smith's reckoning, male writers and readers are now marginal themselves (note p. 240). In short, and in addition to its contribution to Golden Age literary studies, Smith's work on Teresa and

Zayas is most relevant to the present study in that it sustains the idea of gender-inflected criticism.

Though many of Smith's premises support the idea of gender-engaged criticism, they are not self-evidently true. With this qualification having been restated, attention is directed at one more work of Smith's studies on a Golden Age text.

The main question I ask is whether it is possible to draw out of Cervantes's text a male alternative to the patriarchal, hierarchical order, an alternative that may perhaps be identified with a desublimated homosexuality. The problem of sexual preference, however, is inseparable from that of sexual difference. I therefore attempt a new reading of the women in the text . . . (Smith, 1993, p. 227).

The excerpt above—taken from the opening paragraph of Smith's study—recalls his persistent faith in the existence of gender-engaged criticism and writing. Consonant with his 1992 work, Smith underscores the value in considering race, text, and gender to formulate new and interesting readings of literary works. He feels his perspective holds promise for Cervantes's "The Captive's Tale," (from Don Quixote, I, 39-42) since it can be read ". . . from a vertical paradigm of filiation or patrimony to a horizontal model of contingency or contiguity. . . the former is a phallic mode and the latter an anal one" (p. 228). Dependency on psychoanalytically-derived reasoning,

informed by Kristeva, Irigaray, Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, and Spivak, is obvious in Smith's reading proposal. The suggestion that readings can be "phallic" or "anal," however, could benefit from some correspondence in an extra-literary context. If "phallic" and "anal" readings were rendered by individuals outside critical literary circles, or by those not conversant with psychoanalytic theory, then Smith's intuitions would carry more weight. In order to assent to psychoanalytically-driven interpretations of literature, one must be accepting of psychoanalytically-grounded concepts and propositions, in which case agreeing with Smith on a "phallic" reading of Cervantes would be nothing more than an instance of shared reading ideology. The existence of literary studies as merely a community of shared values, the absence of which would eliminate the discipline itself, is the core of Milner's (1987) objection against literary scholarship. If one uses Smith's 1993 study as an example of literary criticism, defending against Milner's position is knotty indeed. It is unclear, really, why Smith presents "phallic" and "anal" constructs for his reading of "The Captive's Tale," since it is conceivable that arguing for patrimonial or contingent interpretations can be accomplished without reference to extra-textual psychoanalytic concepts.

The criticism of Smith's position is of course not based on the value-laden nature of literary studies, for, like literary theory, scientific theory is not value-free. Unlike literary theory, however, scientific theory is falsifiable (testable), and thus

tautologous propositions are unconditionally rejected. It is the tautologous nature of Smith's approach that makes dubious his suggestion for "anal" and "phallic" readings. How can one ever dispute a literary interpretation that is impervious to falsehood? More importantly, how is one to defend against charges of sexism or other interpretative malpractice if the charges are based on tautologous arguments? No critic will disagree with the value of deriving new, controversial, even radical readings of literature. It would be helpful to literary studies, though, if new or innovative paradigms on literature's interpretation were more correspondent with what actually may occur in real readers and critics during the interpretive process. This idea is presented under the assumption that a theoretical perspective, literary or otherwise, cannot be divorced from substance and methods. Characteristically, literary criticism is generous in theory, variable in substance, and methodologically impoverished. In fairness, literary theory is not customarily designed to be scientifically tested, but, at the least, if it is really theory, it should be substantively robust, and it should not be unreasonable to expect some degree of logical integrity in the arguments and hypotheses of professional literary scholars.

Not all of Smith's article is psychoanalytically-derived. In some instances, Smith's text demonstrates how alterity or otherness may guide interpretation of Golden Age literature. Still in reference to "The Captive's Tale":

Initially the division between the 'races' is as hermetic as that between genders. The difference between Christian and Muslim is a binary divide at once ethical and epistemological: that between truth and falsehood. North Africa is thus the mirror of European production, its duplicity and treachery the inverse of the Christian captive's loyalty and true faith. . . . As a Christian convert, Zoraida is at once true and false, faithful to her new religion and its cult of the Virgin, and the faithless to the father whom she so cleverly deceives . . . . she embodies a number of disparate and indeed irreconcilable moments: of Christian truth as opposed to Muslim error; of feminine falsehood as opposed to male truth; and perhaps . . . of womanly self-assertion, independent of male values (pp. 229, 230).

Smith feels that language itself can evoke alterity or otherness: ". . . language is based on a network of differences both internal and external; and that meaning is produced both within and between cultures" (p. 232). In his conclusion, Smith rightly notices that gender and ethnicity are both at play in "The Captive's Tale," and he suggests revisiting race and gender in narrative-historical contexts.

In summarizing Smith's contribution to Golden Age literary studies, one may commend his reference to the crucial significance of several factors in the reception of

literary narrative: the reader's role in textual interpretation, the context under which reading occurs, the subjectivity of both the reader and textually-represented characters, marginality and its representation, race and ethnicity and their representation, text and language themselves as representational media, and the intersection and presence of gender in all of these factors. In the case of each of these factors, alterity and otherness are manifest, and despite this work's criticism of some of Smith's theoretical bases, it is incontrovertible that his scholarship has helped shape the conceptual landscape of Golden Age literary studies.

Whether gender is expressed or represented literarily in the ways Smith suggests is unknown, and no speculation on that matter will be offered. Paramount in this investigation is whether gender's expression in literature is "real" or perceptible to real readers. To help assure the realization of that objective, additional Golden Age scholarship bearing on gender is reviewed below.

#### Ruth El Saffar

Sometimes difficulties in theoretical inquiry endure because of insufficient communication between scholars. If researchers in one specialized area of study do not exchange academic dialogue with those in another area, certain problems may remain needlessly unresolved. One instance of this condition may be observed in the criminology scholarship in sociology. For decades, and at great financial expense and

exorbitant use of resources, longitudinal designs were advanced as superior to cross-sectional ones for investigating career criminality. In the end, proponents of longitudinal research designs merely confirmed data derived from cross-sectional studies conducted since the 1940s, or revealed methodological shortcomings of the longitudinal model itself (see Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1986, 1987). Ideological posturing among criminologists gave rise to unnecessary, prolonged research, squandering academic resources that could have been better used to advance the field in more productive ways. Extending one's scholarly interests to areas outside one's immediate specialization can therefore be fruitful for research purposes. El Saffar (1984), for example, does not hesitate in her text to borrow from psychoanalytically-derived theory to highlight

. . . the position of the undesirable woman because she represents the neglected element that guarantees the continuation of fiction in all its instability and violence. She stands quite literally for the unconscious—that element systematically excluded from awareness—in the Spanish Golden Age" (p. 14).

One of El Saffar's theses is that there is a feminine presence in Cervantine texts, and that it is that very presence that occasions resolution in those texts. El Saffar also believes that Jungian theory is most applicable to Cervantes's prose since Jung's

. . . stages of self-discovery . . . from the development of the ego to assimilation of the shadow, to development of a relationship to the anima, seem to be clearly revealed in a sequential reading of Cervantes' works. Most persuasive, however, are the recurrences in Cervantes' work of symbols to be found also in Jung . . .

On a theoretical level, little else will explain the growing importance, in Cervantes' later works, of the independent female character. Her emergence at the same time as the male characters are undergoing conversion suggests that the two phenomena are linked. In recognition of this coincidence of events I have used Jung's theories and applied to Cervantes' long works my intuition . . . that Cervantes underwent a change in orientation over the course of his writing life now clearly detectable in his works (p. 15).

El Saffar's reliance on Jung may remind the reader of the complaints this study makes with regard to psychoanalytic theory as a basis for literary interpretation, but her appeal to psychoanalysis is only one peculiarity of her 1984 work.

It was stated above that research may be unnecessarily static when scholars do not reach beyond their immediate specializations to discover alternative and potentially useful avenues to address their subjects of inquiry. El Saffar employs Jungian theory to

plainly declare in the citation above that “On a theoretical level, little else will explain the growing importance, in Cervantes’ later works, of the independent female character.” Yet, her claim is remarkable, for certain questions arise immediately: (1) How has she determined little else will explain that? (2) What and how many alternative theories has she used to establish her position? (3) On what basis has she chosen Jung’s theory over others that can also address female character representation in literature? (4) Is the growing importance of independent female characters independently observable by others, or is it contingent upon sharing a Jungian point of view?

If one finds psychoanalytic bases ineffectual for literary criticism, then the truth-value of El Saffar’s position is dependent upon one’s sharing it. In other words, to agree with El Saffar means to share her interpretation and not that what she proposes is in any way self-evidently true. If this criticism seems empirically-centered, it should not be disconcerting, for in her book, El Saffar makes reference to, and uses, a postulate from a field replete with empiricism: quantum physics. In commenting the interlinking of woman and text, and in pondering the question “Is something in the very nature of woman disturbed when she enters the realm of the text?” (p. xi), she relates to the reader that she reminded herself of that question as she wrote her 1984 study on recovering the feminine in Cervantes’s novels. She then continues: “I did so

because I came to feel, somewhere along the line, that there is really no such thing as 'object' and 'observer'—something Heisenberg already told us early in this century" (p. xi). This phrase demonstrates why scholars should exercise caution when making statements according to theories or principles outside their area of specialization.

Simply put, El Saffar errs in basing her "no object, no observer" statement on Heisenberg. It is all too common to find individuals ill-versed in physical science who misapply scientific principles in extra-scientific contexts (see Sokal & Bricmont, 1998). El Saffar's belief that the non-existence of observers and objects is verified by Heisenberg's principle is mistaken in at least three ways. First, the uncertainty principle refers to the imperfection of any measurement of an event or phenomenon. Knowledge of measurement error (i.e., uncertainty) has long been recognized, even since before Heisenberg. The existence of measurement errors does not somehow negate the existence of observers and objects. Second, the uncertainty principle applies to measurement on a micro-precision level, the accuracy of which worsens with further measurement. Third, and in connection with the second statement here, uncertainties in measurement are present in relation to atomic-level phenomena (wave-particles, to be precise), and are therefore not applicable to macro-level phenomena in daily life.<sup>21</sup>

What should be remembered about El Saffar's 1984 work is that she recognizes a feminine subjectivity in Cervantine prose. It is on that point that her book is cited, since it goes to establishing that Golden Age scholars have indeed attended to gender and gender-related issues. El Saffar's appeal to scientific literature, as well as her reliance on allegedly scientific literature (i.e., psychoanalysis), should also be remembered since it attests to the value that the present study has for Golden Age studies: (1) properly-designed empirical work can address the same gender questions that El Saffar and other Golden Age scholars do and (2) literary theory concerned with gender can gain truth-value outside a critical literary context, thus potentially and ultimately leading literature out of its "marginal" status relative to science.

In a different study, El Saffar's (1988) interest in gender and its representation in literature focuses on matters of marginal parental positions and their power. Her notation of a mother role is important since Donovan incorporates the fact that women can be mothers (thus forming a communal identity) into her proposition of a women's poetics (1987, p. 102, 103). Of mothers and their roles, El Saffar writes:

If the role of the father in . . . Cervantes is one characterized by instability and unreliability, that of the mother is one of extraordinary power. The mothers' power, however, is so unsettling that it is most often dealt with through repression and denial. Especially in Spanish

literature of the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, mothers rarely have voice or role in the imaginative portrayal of everyday life the authors offer (p. 4).

To point out the rarity of mothers, El Saffar looks to Don Quixote's world of motherless men and women (p. 6). More to the question of parental roles in connection with identity, El Saffar suggests that Cervantes documents the process of male identity formation under ". . . father figures incapable of fathering . . ." (p. 11) in texts that ". . . consistently question authorship and authority, and that present, in place of loving mothers—who are largely absent—figures of female power terrifying in their capacity to engulf" (p. 12). Turning to Rojas, El Saffar characterizes La Celestina as a work that portrays ". . . female autonomy, sexuality, and power . . ." (p. 13), and adds that Celestina herself depicts a "Bad Mother" figure (p. 14). In that regard, mother as identity is "otherly" portrayed in Rojas's text and, as woman, the female figure in Celestina is one who is dominated by the male (p. 14). The mother figure is also powerless in Lazarillo de Tormes, as Lázaro's mother is ". . . reduced to servitude, concubinage, and prostitution before deciding finally to give the boy up to a blind beggar" (p. 15). In adulthood, Lázaro's masculinity is ambiguous (p. 15), and his identity formation became that way, perhaps, because it was constructed while confronting a ". . . castrating and essentially rivalrous father" (p. 16). By the writing of Don Quixote, ". . . the mother figure has lost all apparent power" (p. 17). A main

theme in El Saffar's article, then, is that the role of mother has been portrayed in Spanish literature as a negative, marginal, impotent "other."

The negative valence of the female position is studied further in El Saffar's 1995 paper where she states:

Until feminism, Americanism, and global ecology began to force reflection on the legacy of oppression and despoliation that are the shadow side of Europe's rebirth, few questioned the dazzling achievements of the military and the heroes of arms and letters who have crowded out our textbooks and school curriculums, to say nothing of the cultural values of individualism and autonomy on which their achievements were based . . . . scholars tended to miss the fact that masculine growth and autonomy depended on a corresponding restriction of female activity. . . . (pp. 178, 179).

El Saffar cites Irigaray's view that the scientific revolution was based on the "male imaginary" principles of logic, ones that are antagonistic to the "female imaginary" (see p. 179). Empiricism is suggested as a cultural component contributing to male and female socialization patterns during Europe's rebirth, with the "female" trait of irrationality to be avoided at all costs.

Male subjectivity perceived that of the female as inferior, powerless, illogical, and overly concerned with home and mother, as well as with passion and internal feelings (see pp. 179, 180). Male socialization, then, followed a custom whereby feminine behavioral algorithms were eschewed in order that a male subject would have the capacity to exercise power or control over his environment. Of this pattern, El Saffar observes:

. . . when the disciplines applied to schooling reach a significant portion of the population, and when the criteria for success and power are linked to education, then the conditions are in place that spread repressed hostility and the rejection of feeling, the body, the land, and the woman into all aspects of social organization . . . . women lost power in the Renaissance, as the bases of power came to be associated with money, schooling, and military, ecclesiastic, and government jobs” (emphasis in original, p. 181).

With the suppression female agency in place, it was merely necessary for Renaissance male socialization to insure against male recidivism into femininity, the devil’s apparatus (see p. 182; see also Wilson, 1988, p. 18). Was this anti-feminine perspective present in literature? El Saffar affirms that it was.

In Calderón's texts, including La vida es sueño and La devoción de la cruz, El Saffar finds that male heroes seek ". . . safe haven out of the reach of the woman" (p. 187). In the case of the powerful mothers of Eco y Narciso and La hija del aire, males under their influence are weak. El Saffar elaborates on that condition, explaining that "Fear of mother power underlies the efforts at dominance and control so central to Golden Age drama in general, which is why the action so often focuses on the feminine figure least capable of defending herself, the young maiden" (p. 187).

The dreadful position of Lázaro's mother in the Lazarillo de Tormes has been documented above, and of Lázaro himself and Teresa's Vida, El Saffar notes: "Both Lázaro and Teresa trace psychic journeys that force the child out of the mother and into the father's world, only to have that father's world in its turn eject them" (p. 189).<sup>22</sup> One may offer that Lázaro becomes an "other" to overcome the other-created institutions of social inequality or injustice (note p. 196). If that proposition is true, and becoming an "other" is an instrumental adaptive strategy for a subject to employ, then Anselmo of "El curioso impertinente" (in Don Quixote, I) could have avoided his self-induced torment over the scope of his wife's commitment to him by attempting to understand her position. Instead, as El Saffar notes, Camila remains a repressed other, belonging ". . . to the unconscious. As unconscious, she represents a

force over which . . . the husband has no control” (p. 186). El Saffar lists fear of the other as the catalyst of Anselmo’s undoing.

Fear of the other lies in the ego—following El Saffar’s reference to psychoanalytic theory—for it represses the other, and any resurgence of the other from the unconscious is undesirable. “Others” must be repelled to insure the stability of the male subject. It is only in the absence of disruptive female chaotic presence that the “male imaginary” may continue to enjoy its “status of the symbolic” (p. 196) and avoid even the consideration of difference. Self-identification under such condition is difficult. The concept of “I” is ambiguous, and it is that very ambiguity in identity that El Saffar analyzes in her text, and which she argues is manifest in some Golden Age texts.

The notion of the mother-daughter bond holds a central focus in El Saffar’s 1990 article. After making note of the fact that “La Celestina . . . gives us an unforgettable portrait of older women talking with younger women, of female friendship, and autonomy, of talk that offers a glimpse of female subjectivity . . .” (p. 5), she recalls that “. . . most male-authored literature of the period insists on the continued suppression of women and the darkness and depravity associated with her” (p. 5). Because of that suppression, textual representation of female subjectivity is noteworthy, particularly that of the mother-daughter bond, since that context excludes the male completely (see p. 4). Delving into mother-daughter literary representations

can therefore reveal unique insight into feminine subjectivity. For example, El Saffar shares with the reader: "What I have found fascinating in the work of Zayas . . . is the return, through the hell of the male world of torture, mutilation and murder, of the daughter to her mother" (p. 6). As is the case with her 1988 study, El Saffar stands with Donovan on the importance of the "mother" component of women's identity. In this 1990 work there is added the concept of a ". . . a true culture, a true epistemology . . ." in women's writings (p. 7), and that also has Donovan's endorsement.

The final El Saffar work reviewed in this study is her 1993 analysis of Zayas's The Enchantments of Love (Novelas amorosas y ejemplares). Recurrent are the themes of a "mother identity aspect,"<sup>23</sup> female subjectivity, and textual portrayal of alterity and gender. The idea of a female creative modality is also hinted in El Saffar's statement that the stories of the Novelas amorosas y ejemplares are sex-coded: "Typically, the stories narrated by the women present female characters as devoted, and as victims of male treachery . . . . In the stories told by men, on the other hand, women generally show at least some inclination toward depravity as defined by the honor code" (p. 20).

Evidence for textual evocation of gender may lie in El Saffar's observation of "The redoubling of the separation of the sexes . . ." (p. 15) in Zayas's text, especially

given that the separation is not apparently linked to narrative construction. It may be, then, that Zayas's prose possesses ". . . a quality of overdetermination, of obsessive reiteration, to the question of gender distinction" (p. 15). A women's subjectivity may be inferred in Zayas's prologues, for she writes of how ". . . men overpower women in the world only because women have been denied training" (p. 27). Zayas also addresses the question of profit, advising that her book should be purchased rather than read at a bookstall, and in that way raises the controversial issue of textual production and publication by women of the period. Generally, El Saffar's article is a discussion of how Zayas's work counters male-generated ideologies on women's place in society, and how it can reveal the position of a writing woman in a male-privileged environment (see p. 8). Taken together, then, the cited El Saffar scholarship in this literature review joins Smith's to help establish the fact that alterity, in its various forms, is a frequent object of critical-theoretical work in Golden Age studies. To perhaps establish definitively that alterity is a topic that has been routinely researched in Golden Age criticism, and to solidify the rationale for this investigation's focus on gender, there follows now a review of Wilson's work on Cervantes.

#### Diana de Armas Wilson

Wilson's critical literary research has drawn extensively on exploring questions of identity. She has discussed, for example, a "triple interalterity" between Don

Quixote, the conquistadores, and the heroes in the libros de caballerías, “. . . all of whom are ‘other identified’” (see Wilson, 1996, p. 221). Outstanding in her critical production, however, is the comprehensive treatment she has devoted to Cervantes’s Persiles y Sigismunda. What is possibly Wilson’s most significant claim about the Persiles, is that it “. . . is itself metaphorically ‘an’ androgyne—a fiction structured in the shape and by the conjunction of two different halves” (1986, p. 152; 1990, p. 45; 1991, p. 79; 1992, p. 61). Wilson’s continuous and unwavering adherence to her classification of the Persiles as an androgyne attests to the cardinal role gender-constructs can play in Golden Age prose, while at the same time giving reason to believe that texts truly can be gender-inflected. Like other scholars (e.g., Brinker-Gabler, 1992; Williamsen, 1992; Ponticelli, 1999; Smith, 2000), Wilson accepts the postulate that gender or sexuality may be socially-constructed. Evidence to this fact lies in her conviction that the Persiles “. . . posits gender as socially constructed through cultural fiats . . . ” (1986, p. 152; 1991, p. 43). Wilson does not mention textual presentation of gender as a socially-constructed phenomenon lightly. She firmly maintains, for instance, that the Persiles “. . . radically questions gender codes” (1986, p. 158). It is through its questioning of binary oppositions such as male-female that the Persiles may be read as “. . . a place where all oppositions can fit” (p. 170). Wilson argues that Cervantes’s text mediates polarities and therefore all but requires a

non-canonical reading (see p. 170). Moreover, that the Persiles challenges the ancient dualism between male and female is extraordinary, for “Gender is a principal component of social organization whose structuring effects can be seen at every analytical level from personal identity to organizations to cultural institutions and belief systems” (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1996, p. 173). It is thus not to be looked upon casually that Cervantes’s text grapples vigorously with the gender concept.

Unsurprisingly, the Persiles does not limit itself with undoing the split between male and female,

. . . but also works overtime to undo every other ‘split’ in its text: Greek romance/medieval pilgrimage narrative; first half/second half; main plot/inset stories; North/South; civilization/barbary; Catholic/Protestant; Madonna/whore; and on and on, transforming the one into the other ‘and into the in-between” (Wilson, 1986, p. 170).

The Persiles can exist, then, as a kaleidoscope of alterities existing along multiple identity dimensions, especially that of gender. Wilson recognizes as much when she infers that Cervantes’s narrative exploration of gender in the Persiles is more penetrating than that in Don Quixote (see 1988, p. 2; 1991, p. 111). It is in the Persiles, Wilson maintains, where it may be seen that “. . . the Barbaric Isle narrative functions as the germinal staging for a revolutionary poetics of gender—a poetics

unwritten in Cervantes's day, just beginning to be codified in ours" (p. 2). If Wilson is correct in her scrutiny of Cervantine prose, then there would seem to be no doubt that Donovan (1987) is on the right track in her belief in gendered-creative modality. Wilson may also support Donovan's view that women read differently, since Wilson offers a "female reading" of Bradamiro's death by arrowed-tongue in the Persiles, reasoning that the barbarians ". . . must stop the tongues of all dissidents" (p. 11). Her reading is in contrast to others' interpretation of the episode as an evocation of sodomy in one way or another (see pp. 10, 11), which compels her to quote Freud: ". . . sometimes a cigar is just a cigar" (p. 11).

In a 1990 article dedicated to exploring dualisms in Persiles, Wilson's attention to the question of sexual difference persists and is intensified, as she claims that such attention is ". . . central to any deep analysis . . ." of the work (p. 40; 1991, p. 43). After stating that "The master trope of Persiles . . . is syneciosis [sic]" (pp. 43, 44), Wilson recalls the text as an androgyne and presents textual examples to lend credence to her idea that cross-dressing represents surfacing of sexual difference in the novel (see p. 47; 1991, p. 83). More than simply a manifestation of sexual difference, cross-dressing in Cervantes's novel ". . . gestures toward a different ordering of sexual relations, toward an economy founded on an ethical exchange of gendered subjectivities" (p. 48). Wilson is thus aware that subjectivity can be gendered. She

also shows her knowledge that sexual identity can exist paradoxically since she calls for charting the space of sexual difference when viewed as “two concurrent lines” ending up in one place (see pp. 49, 50). Wilson’s rally for charting sexual difference in Spanish literature is attractive and, conveniently, amenable to empiricism.

Wilson may actually signal ways in which sexual difference may be studied, at least empirically, through her continued textual analysis of Cervantine texts: “. . . Cervantes represents gender identity as inhabiting language, as culturally instituted and maintained” (1991, p. xv). If Cervantes represents gender as a culturally-mediated construct, then his gender representation matches what gender is in real contexts, for current empirically-based research recognizes that institutional and organizational structures in human interaction are gendered (see Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1996, p. 173). If, additionally, Wilson is right in her view that Cervantes depicts language as inclusive of a gendering identity, then it should be possible to observe instances of gender in language experimentally since gender identity inhabits readers. To pursue identification of gender in literature via reader response seems almost directly implied in Wilson’s citation.

In concurrence with El Saffar’s (1988, 1990) view that a mothering identity or subjectivity can be evoked or expressed in literature, Wilson identifies in the Persiles a “most remarkable feature” of the “. . . dominance in it of the language of female

parturition" (1991, p. 222). Permeating the novel, then, is a gender and sexual difference-engaged subjectivity. The Persiles is ". . . the myth of the two different sexual halves, the myth of the Platonic Androgyne, that Cervantes writes for his age" (emphasis in original, 1992, p. 62). What must never be forgotten, however, in considering Cervantine texts is that

Cervantes is hostile to overly schematic oppositions, to Janus-faced dualisms that signal either irreducible opposition or mutual exclusivity. But he is also resistant to facile resolutions of difference. His texts are singularly aware, in other words, of the frontiers of difference" (emphasis in original, p. 50).

Furthermore, although "Duality . . . is perhaps the most ubiquitous structural principle of Cervantes's prose narratives, constructed as they are around striking symmetries and encounters between opposites" (p. 50), one is advised to remain mindful that Cervantes's art invites reintegration into the familiar of that which is "other" or of ". . . whatever it has excluded from itself as 'disgusting'" (p. 52). Following Wilson's notation on incorporating that which is "other" into a familiar context, this study presents empiricism as a promising avenue for wrestling with questions of alterity, identity, and gender as they are expressed in Golden Age literature and discussed in its criticism.

## CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICISM IN ART

This work strongly advances the position that incorporating empiricism into literary scholarship to investigate questions involving identity constructs (e.g., alterity, otherness, subjectivity) and gender as they relate to human interaction with literature is sensible, illuminating, and beneficial to literary studies. It is patent that identity constructs are elusive, fragmented, and conflictive as they are defined and managed in the critical literary discipline. Even within individual perspectives (e.g., psychoanalytical), one finds that identity constructs are as multiply interpreted as they are across perspectives. Operating partly under the assumption that a goal in any academic or intellectual endeavor is to discover or reveal new knowledge or insight about a phenomenon, this work maintains a critical posture against the way in which identity constructs have been treated in literary research. There is no question that the number of articles and books published on identity constructs in literary scholarship is substantial, far exceeding the number of those reviewed in the previous chapters, but there is also no question that it is erroneous to equate academic prolificacy with scholarly achievement. As should be evident from this literature review, copious literary research has not resulted in any readily applicable ways in which identity constructs may be used without simultaneously generating frenzied controversy among literary critics who are partisans of one or another theoretical approach.

Adherents of psychoanalytic or deconstructive perspectives on identity might assert that defining identity in any context approaches impossibility, and that conclusion would be acceptable if it were based upon logically-grounded reasoning. However, the allogical bases of psychoanalysis and deconstruction serve more to perpetuate the belief that identity constructs are indefinable than they do to prove that they are. Appealing to the value of the pursuit of pure knowledge, psychoanalytic or deconstructive adherents, and maybe others, may express serious reservations against an empirical invasion into critical literary space, charging—perhaps—that science is sexist, noncontextual, and, most importantly, absolute. As a consequence, it might be asserted that to allow scientific studies into literary research, especially that dealing with identity constructs, would be to incorporate into the literary field a scholarship that would unduly produce answers to things which are “inherently” or “properly” unanswerable. This view is unjustified and goes more to revealing ignorance of scientific inquiry than to defending literary studies.

Recalling the criticism in this work against El Saffar’s use of the uncertainty principle, it will be remembered that physics is “replete with empiricism.” Relative to some other sciences, its purview includes greater numbers of observable phenomena. Notwithstanding that fact, physics endures, for it is as active in posing new questions about matter, energy, motion, and force as literature is in posing questions about

representation, authorship, meaning, and identity. One of the prime goals of science in general is to discover or reveal new knowledge. That is not accomplished by having answers to everything, but rather by posing questions about everything. Hypotheses can be derived in no other way. So, in the spirit of “. . . creating a milieu that privileges the question” (Williamsen, 1992, p. 28), this study submits an empirical test for the hypothesis that interpretation of literature is gender-inflected.

Given the empirical nature of this study, the present research question has been formulated with attention given to two particular criteria that are often used in scientific research. Economy is the first criterion, and it refers to using the minimum number of independent variables possible to adequately address a problem under study. This study has one independent variable: gender. Excessive numbers of independent variables can needlessly complicate a research design and, more significantly, result in errors concerning the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses.

Compatibility is the second criterion that guides this study, and central to satisfying it is to verify that one's research asks the same kinds questions and can provide the same or similar kinds of answers about the object under study as previously existing research does. The question in this study is whether gender affects, or is expressed in, literary interpretation. The answer to that question will be not

unlike those that already exist. For example, the content of a text itself may play a role in whether reading is affected by gender.

Another factor that has been incorporated into the formulation of this study is efficiency. In other words, can the empirical approach in this study address gender's role in literary interpretation more effectively than current literary research does? The answer is "yes" for at least three reasons. First, the experimental design used here allows observation of gender's influence on literary interpretation in isolation from other variables that may also affect reading (e.g., language and content of a text, language of the reader, attitudes a reader may have in relation to content he or she reads, and so forth). Second, this study allows the truth-value of its conclusions to be tested by other researchers, independent of critical-theoretical positions they hold. Third, the results of this study may help move scholarship on gender and identity constructs in a productive direction without engendering the ideological muddles that currently exist in literary criticism.

In contemplating this research, it should be remembered that this study does not intend to displace or dismiss out of hand the approaches literary scholars use to write about identity constructs. Rather, this study should be considered complementary to the questions literary critics ask about identity and gender, and as a method that can reveal previously unknown avenues for exploring the conceptual

landscape on how humans perceive and interact with literature. Presented now are examples of empirical studies involving art, followed by Donovan's (1987) theoretical proposal for a women's poetics, from which the experiment for this research derives.

### Experimental Studies in Music and Literature

It was noted in the first chapter of this work that empirical investigation of art is not unprecedented. To illustrate ways in which science has approached art as an object of study, some experiments on music and literature are reviewed below. These studies demonstrate that so-called subjective qualities in art are not necessarily invisible to empirical observation.

In a study on music, Simonton (1980) makes the bold and controversial claim that expression of emotionality in music lies within music itself, independent of listener interpretation: ". . .we . . . have strong evidence that music expresses emotional states experienced by the composer" (p. 216). Prior to Simonton's work, claims of emotional expression in music was considered a listener-created concept and not inherent in music per se. Simonton's experiment thus shows that what at one moment is speculative may at another become real and observable. His conclusions are not haphazard. His experiment is based on the analysis of 5046 themes from 10 composers (Bach, Handel, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Chopin, Wagner, Brahms, and Debussy). Although the ". . . composers comprise only slightly more

than 1% of the available pool, they are responsible for 39% of all music performed in the classical repertoire, and therefore they can be deemed to be highly representative of classical listening" (p. 210). One of the hypotheses tested in Simonton's study is whether biographical stress tends to " . . . increase the amount of melodic originality in the themes that a composer creates" (p. 215). Support for the hypothesis is positive.

Simonton explains:

Thus, when a composer suffers deaths in the family, adverse economic conditions, or other personally stressful events, the melodies composed over the same time period tend to employ more chromatic notes and more dissonant or extreme intervals between consecutive notes.

Whether or not the composer does this consciously is open to discussion at this point (pp. 215, 216).

The most significant finding in Simonton's experiment, according to Simonton himself, is that

. . . the themes most frequently performed and recorded tend to have more notes outside the key signature and more uncommon transitions between consecutive notes. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the actual popularity of real musical works has been shown to depend on objectively determined characteristics of the melody (p. 216).

In a later experiment, Simonton (1989) reveals the presence of a swan-song effect, whereby swan songs “. . . tend to score lower in melodic originality and performance duration but higher in repertoire popularity and aesthetic significance” (p. 42). The last-works effect (the endurance of works composed at the end of life) remains even after controlling for “. . . total compositional output, eminence, and most significantly, the composer’s age when the last works were created” (p. 42). As in his 1980 study, music’s formal characteristics are empirically measured, allowing the conclusion in this 1989 study that last-works effects are “substantively significant” (p. 46). Simonton suggests that last-works effects may not be unique to music, but also present in “. . . other aesthetic activities, such as the visual arts and literature . . . .” (p. 46). Simonton’s work bears on the present one to the extent that artworks by themselves may have more to do with their interpretation than is routinely acknowledged. It may be, for instance, that just as a composer’s emotional “mark” has been observed to reside in a musical work, independent of the listener, an author’s mark may potentially exist in literary texts independent of the reader. That possibility could be contingent upon subjectivity and identity comprising an emotional dimension, and there is reason to believe that they do (Ho & Driscoll, 1998; Stets, 1997; Taylor, et al., 1994; Dion, 1975, 1986; Dion & Earn, 1975; Dion, et al., 1978; Sinclair & Mark, 1992; Millar & Tesser, 1992; Bourhis, 1994).

In another experiment, Nilsson & Sundberg (1985) test for the ability of listeners, including both musicians and non-musicians, to detect emotional state from the fundamental frequency of voice samples. The results show that musicians have greater ability to “. . . decode affective information from the fundamental frequency contour of fluent speech” (p. 515). Nilsson & Sundberg’s study is of interest because of its similarity to this one in that it measures responses in the percipient, as well tests for gender. In their test for differences between males and females, Nilsson & Sundberg report no significant findings. Addressing the question of whether an artist’s intentions can be communicated to a listener, Senju & Ohgushi (1987) conclude that there is a statistically significant degree of correspondence between a player’s intention in performing a musical work and a listener’s impression of that intention. Their finding may bode well for Donovan since she holds that an artwork can relay an artist’s intention to its percipients.

Experiments with literature have been as revealing as those with music. One of the conclusions in Simonton’s 1988 study on short story perception is that “Literary tastes are not utterly arbitrary . . .” (p. 69). His experiment tests for effects in reader response in relation to the “prestige suggestion,” which refers to the idea that when an author’s fame is greater than that of another, the more famous author’s story will be rated as necessarily superior to that of a lesser-known writer. Experimental results fail

to support the prestige suggestion (p. 71). The effects of publication date and story length also have no “. . . relation with the various gauges of literary impact” (p. 71). Simonton’s results thus point to the possibility that knowing that a work is canonical may have no effect on how it is rated by independent judges, and subsequent testing in his study supports that position. In his conclusion on reader response, Simonton writes: “. . . differences in impact, rather than being arbitrary, reflect an aesthetic reality” (p. 72). The experimental findings of Simonton’s 1988 study appear contradictory to the reasonable beliefs that reader and textual subjectivity, as well as context, influence response to literature.

László’s 1988 experiment finds that context can be a variable in reader response. Wishing to explore the relationship between text and context, László tests for the influence of instructions given to participants in reading experiments. His contention is that instructions on what to read for, or on how to read a text, can affect an experimental outcome (see pp. 206, 207). Specifically, László hypothesizes that a literary context will evoke a literary reading (p. 207). Experimental results confirm László’s hypothesis: “. . . literary context acts to evoke a particular reading style which differs from ordinary comprehension” (p. 213). In fact, non-literary texts, when inserted into literary passages, take longer to read than when the same texts do not appear in literary contexts (see p. 213). These results would not be surprising to

Walton, who firmly maintains that individuals' responses to art stimuli are distinct from those they exhibit toward non-artistic stimuli, particularly along psychological dimensions (see Walton, 1978a, 1978b).

It is worth noting that László's study involved text-centered instructions, which have to do with text-based measurements and responses to literary text itself (e.g., on whether to read a text as a short story, as a newspaper article, or for use of metaphor; see p. 207). This study's instructions are reader-centered, asking readers to report only on their feelings with respect to their current emotional states and attitudes. The present study will therefore not yield artifactual results stemming from the kinds of methodological problems discussed in László's article.

The experiments annotated above should provide a sense of what science can contribute to the study of art. Simonton's 1980 study supports the previously impressionistic concept that music includes an emotional essence. The same study also reveals correspondence between music's objective or formal characteristics and its popularity among listeners. The Senju & Ohgushi study investigates listener perception, supporting the "commonsensical," but previously only speculative, view that listeners can sense performer's intention in music. In the case of the Simonton and László studies on literature, the role context in reading is examined to observe effects it may or may not have on reader response. Absent in these studies, excepting

the Nilsson & Sundberg experiment, is testing for gender. The two studies that are discussed next explicitly target the gender variable and the effect it may have on reading.

### Elizabeth Flynn: Gender and Reading

In 1980, Elizabeth Flynn conducted a study to investigate whether gender plays a role in literary interpretation (see Flynn, 1986). After surveying the results of her work, she concluded that

. . . male students sometimes react to disturbing stories by rejecting them or by dominating them, a strategy that women do not often employ. The study also suggests that women more often arrive at meaningful interpretations of stories because they more frequently break free of the submissive entanglement in a text and evaluate characters and events with critical detachment. . . . [Flynn also observed] that women are often receptive to texts in that they attempt to understand them before making a judgment on them (Flynn, 1986, p. 285).

On reading Flynn's remarks, one may assume that she has examined gender's connection with literary interpretation formally (i.e., empirically); however, this is not the case. This review examines the flaws present in Flynn's study to illustrate how they

render her conclusions untenable within the context of her study. In other words, it may be true that males and females respond differently to what they read, but it is not possible to base that conclusion on Flynn's experiment.

Reviewing Flynn's work is somewhat problematic since her text does not clearly describe the procedure she used in conducting her experiment, so one is left to guess as to what, exactly, she did. Flynn begins her article by recognizing that "We know very little . . . about the reading patterns of relatively mature male and female readers" (p. 267). She then adds that she ". . . conducted an exploratory study designed to examine the interpretive strategies of college freshmen in their responses to three frequently anthologized short stories . . ." (p. 267). With that notation, Flynn provides what most closely resembles a hypothesis for her research. The fact is, however, that a hypothesis is not to be found anywhere in her work, which is disconcerting since she states that her study is an attempt ". . . to bring an empirical orientation to the reader-oriented work of feminist critics" (p. 267).

The obvious hypothesis for Flynn's experiment is that males and females respond differently to literary texts, but it is necessary to know in what way or on what terms such responses will differ. For example, since she claims empathy may be what accounts for gender differences in reading, she could have incorporated empathy as a variable in her study to test for gender differences. As will be explained, however,

variable definition is an additional problem in Flynn's study since she fails to define variables clearly in her work.

It might be that the dependent variables in her study were "reading in a dominant way," "reading in a submissive way," and "reading in a productive way" (see pp. 268-270). When describing dominating readings, she regards the reader as someone who has not understood the text (p. 277). When describing submissive readings, she regards the reader as someone who has become too involved with the text (p. 280). If a reader keeps a proper ". . . balance between empathy and judgment . . ." (p. 270) while reading, then the reader is interpreting the text in a productive mode. Though these descriptions may refer to what could have been the dependent variables in her study, Flynn does not explain how the different "modes" of reading were measured. Since there is no apparent standard or indication of measurement in Flynn's work, accepting her study as an empirical one, even under a less strict sense of the term "empirical," becomes increasingly difficult.

The closest semblance of a measurement instrument in Flynn's study is her use of students' written interpretations of three texts. She considers her analysis of the data (the written responses) ". . . informed by a conception of the reading process which assumes that reading involves a confrontation between self and 'other'. . ." (p. 267). Complicative in Flynn's design, though, is that her conception of reading is not

operationally defined. She makes attempts toward such definition in proposing notions of detached and involved reading, but does not specifically relate what "detached" means or how different degrees of detachment and involvement are to be measured. It remains uncertain, then, how Flynn actually classified or categorized her students' literary interpretations.

Flynn mentions the possibility that one of the texts she used, Hemingway's "Hills Like White Elephants," was a "difficult" one. How she arrived at that conclusion is unknown. An additional concern with her design, then, is that she failed to account for effects of the levels of difficulty of the three texts she used, as well as to specify how such difficulty was gauged.<sup>24</sup> Other deficiencies in Flynn's design lie in her sampling technique. "Students who comprised the sample were fairly representative of the 1979-80 freshman class as a whole" (p. 286) at Michigan Technological University. To support her claim of her sample's representativeness, she cites similarities in ACT scores, age, and areas of study (majors). Specifically, the sample includes 26 females and 26 males who ". . . were enrolled in one of seven sections of freshman composition taught by two male colleagues and [her]self in the spring quarter, 1980" (p. 286). Other than size, Flynn offers no other design-pertinent information about her sample (see p. 287).

Perhaps the most noticeable shortcoming in Flynn's work is the absence of any information revealing the method of statistical analysis she used to make her conclusions. In short, Flynn's study possesses no methodological or design structures that comply with empirical protocol. Her investigation lacks hypotheses, sound means of measurement, identifiable variables, identifiable predictions, and all else that makes for the matter of a scientific undertaking. As a result, one cannot view her work as confirmatory of gender differences in literary interpretation. Still and all, one may embrace Flynn's belief that "We may come to discover that women have interpretive powers that have not been sufficiently appreciated" (p. 286). The next section is a review of a second, more carefully designed empirical study on gender and reading. The study has two authors: one is a sociologist and the other a literature professor. As will be noted, even studies that include a sociologist (or any other empirically-trained person) are not necessarily free of empirical imperfection.

Judith Howard and Carolyn Allen: The Gendered Context of Reading

Judith Howard and Carolyn Allen offer the following observation near the beginning of their article:

Although feminists have posed ideology as central to the oppression of women (and other social groups), Barrett (1985) [see note 25] suggests that this centrality is treated generally as self-evident, citing the

inadequacy of feminist attempts to explore the ways in which material conditions have structured mental aspects of oppression. One of the most significant of those social practices through which ideology works is the activity of reading” (pp. 534, 535).

Howard and Allen believe that reader response theory in literature can be instrumental in exploring gender ideology since it considers relevant the context in which a reader interprets a text (p. 535). Despite the promise they find in reader response theory, the authors are quick to point out that “systematic attention” has not characterized the theory’s application. With the purpose of addressing that oversight, they “. . . attempt to gage the dynamics of making meaning through reading and how the gender and other social characteristics of the reader might influence interpretation” (p. 535).

After a brief review of literature on gender and literary theory, Howard and Allen explain the procedure of their investigation, which uses two short stories as text stimuli. One text is Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily,” and the other is Jayne Anne Phillips’s “Home.”<sup>26</sup> Operating under the same logic that guided text selection in the present study, Howard and Allen chose texts that “. . . would allow for the possibility of gendered reading . . . without focusing so strongly on this dimension as to force readers to interpret the text in terms of gender” (p. 537). Also like the present study,

Howard and Allen “. . . do not attempt to identify the precise parameters of the text-reader interaction” (p. 538). They rightly view identifying such parameters as complex since individual text excerpts can have wide variation in meaning for different readers. (In the current study, the focus is on whether an emotional change occurs in readers as a result of textual exposure, rather than on isolating any meanings a text stimulus has for readers, thus avoiding the complications to which Howard and Allen allude.)

In that respect, the design in this study is more rigorous than Howard and Allen’s, since here the dependent variables are precisely defined and measured. In Howard and Allen’s experiment, dependent variables are less precise in their definition and measurement. For example, dependent measures for Faulkner’s text are in the form of questions such as “Why did Emily kill Homer?” “Why did Emily sleep with Homer after killing him?” and “What is Emily like?” In coding the responses to Faulkner’s text regarding the first question, Howard and Allen reduced them to descriptors such as “Emily is crazy, she wants to keep Homer, for revenge, because of factors related to her father” (see p. 539). The categorical reduction of Howard and Allen’s dependent variables is in conflict with their knowledge that accurate empirical measurement of response to literature is difficult because of “. . . far too much variation in what specific parts of texts individuals respond to . . .” (p. 538). Through

apparent disregard for that knowledge and their imprecise dependent measures, Howard and Allen weaken the methodological integrity of their study.

As mentioned, the two authors do recognize that certain social characteristics, such as holding a feminist ideology, may function with gender in shaping reader response. Their study incorporates that variable into their design, as measured by participants' identifying themselves as feminists or non-feminists. In addition, and in following Schweickart<sup>27</sup> and other reader response theorists (see p. 540), Howard and Allen's study measures personality and identity variables as determined by the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (ATW), ". . . which assesses beliefs about gender-related roles" (p. 540). The rationale for using the ATW accommodates the possibility that attitudinal postures of readers toward gender can affect literary interpretation. The same rationale led to the presents study's use a similar instrument for measuring gender attitudes (note the Procedure subsection in CHAPTER FOUR).

Howard and Allen's procedure involved asking all participants

. . . to read one of these two randomly assigned short stories and to provide their reactions to this story through a tape-recorded interview and completion of a written questionnaire. The readers were asked to comment on a story while reading it, with the instructions "tell as much as you can about what you're thinking and feeling" while reading the

story. Only when participants completed the reading sessions were they asked a series of structured interview questions. The participants were asked to then complete a written questionnaire that included questions about the story and about themselves (p. 539).

The description above is the account Howard and Allen offer with respect to their experimental treatment. In a disturbing similarity to Flynn's (1986) study, their procedure is atypically cryptic for an empirical study. First, they do not detail the procedure for the tape-recorded interview (e.g., in terms of duration, list and type of questions, empirical validity and reliability). Neither do they describe the "structured interview" treatment. Second, measurement of written and verbal comments is described with less than expected specificity. Third, there is no control text in the study. Finally, in relation to statistical matters, the authors set their level of statistical significance at .10, which is not the most prudent level on which to base one's findings. Customarily, levels of .05 or lower (frequently .01 and lower) allow for more certainty about the robustness of one's results.

Although Howard and Allen's study is unexpectedly dissimilar to other empirical work (this judgement based primarily on Howard and Allen's imprecise variable measurement and absence of a control text), their investigation may be regarded as tentatively valid, contingent upon replication by more rigorously designed

and controlled studies. Having made this qualification, reporting Howard and Allen's results is in order: "In summary, then, we found that the gender of readers, in and of itself, did not exert a strong influence on interpretations of the texts we used to generate reader response . . . ." (p. 549). In particular reference to the notion that gendered reader-identification with components or characters in a narrative affects reading (suggested, for example, by Donovan), Howard and Allen state: ". . . gender alone was not a strong basis for identification" (p. 547). The authors mention that feminists are observed to be ". . . more sensitive to the influence of social context. . ." (p. 548), but it is not stated whether the differences between feminists and non-feminists are significant. The authors suggest that ideological positions may have had some effect on reader interpretation, but, again, do not report on the significance of the effect. Though they mention empathy as a factor that could explain ideological variances in reading, that is all they can do, for empathy was not a variable in their study. They can only offer conjecture. In sum, Howard and Allen's results should be considered inconclusive on all counts, or at best tentative, due to uncertainty about their experimental design and methodology. The question of gender's effect on literary interpretation thus remains open, though perhaps slightly less so. Attention now turns to the work of Donovan and her proposal for a women's poetics.

Josephine Donovan: Toward a Women's Poetics

In a 1987 article, Josephine Donovan argues that "women's aesthetic and ethical judgments, when authentic, are rooted in a woman-identified, or woman-centered epistemology" (p. 98). She then continues with the premise that "A women's poetics will be constructed from comprehensive studies of women's stylistics and thematics, but those studies must be informed by an understanding of women's ways of seeing, a women's epistemology (p. 98). She also calls for ". . . the identification of women as a separate community, a separate culture, with its own customs, its own epistemology, and, once articulated, its own aesthetics and ethics" (p. 100). Motivating Donovan's perspective on art perception is the notion that a gynocriticism is necessary to override the androcentrism in a good deal of literature and criticism. All of these sentiments are among the aspects of Donovan's article that help frame the theoretical base upon which this empirical study is formulated. However, not all of what Donovan writes in her article is compatible with this study's orientation toward literary study. For example, it may be striking to the reader that Donovan's article is valued in this work, despite her candid hostility toward the use of . . . the quantitative, positivist, "value-neutral" methodology of traditional scholarship . . . a gynocritical methodology [may] not be built upon

masculine modes, for, as Audre Lorde once put it rather succinctly:

"the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house"<sup>28</sup> (p. 105).

Another aspect in Donovan's paper at odds with the current study's posture is her tendency toward essentialism. Furthermore, the tone of Donovan's piece is somewhat "anti-male." Distinctive in Donovan's article, however, is that certain elements exist in it that are supported by empirical scholarship in sociology and psychology, and echoed in Golden Age scholarship. That some of Donovan's propositions are positively addressed in social science literature may be regarded as fortuitous, since she published her work in 1987, and most or all of the empirical works that support her positions were published after that date.

To begin now with the discussion of Donovan's article in terms of its applicability to this study, her proposal of several factors that support the idea of the existence of gender-linked aesthetic response will be reviewed. Empathy is the first factor Donovan presents as an element of women's art response, and she opens her article with an illustration of how that is so:

A recent New Yorker cartoon shows a husband returning to the TV set to find the closing credits rolling over the screen. Since he has missed the ending, his wife fills him in: "It came out happily. She shot him."

The cartoon suggests that women may evaluate art differently than men.

In this rather basic case, the woman viewer's judgment stems from her empathetic identification with the triumphant female character. That woman's victory over the male character is pleasing to the woman viewer. . . . The film pleases this woman because she identifies with women as a class. She might be surprised to learn that her judgment is rooted in a woman-identified epistemology (p. 98).

Donovan's appeal to empathy in explaining the cartoon woman's identification with the female television character seems intuitive, but it is also somewhat difficult to employ an empathy variable in an empirical proposal for a women's poetics.

To clarify, empathy is resistant to easy definition, and observations of it remain mostly indirect, such as through its role in altruistic behavior. The psychological scholarship on altruism, for instance, has been divided over the issue of an empathic presence in altruism for years because of competing, but equally plausible, interpretations of altruistic acts. Some scholars believe that prosocial behavior is egoistically-motivated, while others believe it is empathically-motivated.<sup>29</sup> Encouraging for Donovan's position is that some experimental researchers on literature, in spite of measurement difficulties, feel free in incorporating an empathy variable in reader response. In the discussion of their results, Bernsten and Larsen (1996) report:

Females are, to a larger degree than males, socialized into the role of the caregiver, which requires a basic attitude of empathy and identification; that is, a socialization that promotes the kind of reflexivity that characterizes the personal orientation. This assumption is supported by the fact that the primary difference in the reading of males and females had to do with whether the attitude was personal or nonpersonal: 18% of the males were personally oriented, whereas 45% of the females had a personal orientation" (pp. 628, 629).

After empathy, Donovan offers a second factor as contributing to women's art response. She claims the existence of a "structural condition" whereby "Women . . . share a condition of oppression, or otherness, that is imposed by governing patriarchal or androcentric ideologies. Women as a group, therefore, share certain awarenesses that are common to oppressed groups" (p. 100). In connection with women's shared identity as an oppressed group, Donovan's claim may be supported by Brewer (1994) and Clay-Warner (2001), with the latter study also lending support to why women would respond to a stimulus as a consequence of their group identity (see pp. 228, 235, 236).

A third factor Donovan cites as central to gender-variable response to art is a structural condition of experience under which

. . . women have been confined/consigned to the domestic or private sphere. An important determinant of traditional women's consciousness has been the practice of domestic labor or housework. An essential component of this labor is that it is non-progressive, repetitive, and static.

A women's poetics, therefore, may have to reconceive the notion of plot as a fundamental aesthetic category so that it may be grounded in an idea of temporal order more appropriate to the cyclic experience of women's lives.

Another aspect of the domestic woman's work experience is its fundamental "interruptibility".

. . . . This phenomenon contributes to the structure of women's artistic labor just as it does to their household labor . . . . (pp. 101, 102).

Substantiating Donovan's idea of domestic labor as a component of women's shared identity is Kroska's (1997) study, where it is observed that "people may select family work activities that allow them to affirm the affective meanings of their identity" (p. 304) and that gender is the only variable that has "consistently explained the division of domestic work" (emphasis in original, p. 306). Additionally, after comprehensively citing a wide range of scientific research on identity and gender, Kroska restates her

position more definitively regarding the gendered division of labor in the home: “. . . People choose to do family work only if the work behaviors allow them to confirm the evaluation, potency, and activity of their gender-ideological identity” (p. 318).

Donovan could not ask for more convincing empirical support than Kroska’s for the notion of domestic labor as a component of gender-identity.

Childbirth is a fourth factor Donovan lists as contributing to women’s experience and identities as women, which in turn affects their response to art. Burke and Cast (1997) experimentally corroborate the link between women’s gender identities and childbirth:

The birth of a child . . . made gender identities more disparate: Men became more masculine, and women more feminine. Because the transition to parenthood tends to accentuate an individual’s sense of womanhood/manhood, identity standards changed so as to become consistent with these “gendered” meanings attached to the role of parent (p. 288).

Nuttbrock and Freudiger (1991) provide evidence of a mothering identity among women who have borne children.

A fifth factor Donovan cites as influential in women’s art response is the fact that women often occupy care-giving roles and have internalized “holding or preserving

attitudes" (pp. 103, 104). Such attitudes, also considered "waiting attitudes," and are in contrast to the more male attitude of "questing." Since ". . . both history and story, [are] traditionally so full of quests as to be virtually synonymous with them, . . . [history and story] may not be formally appropriate to express the traditional feminine experience" (p. 104). Evidence that can support of Donovan's view that care-giving or preserving attitudes form part of women's identities is present in Lee's (1998) experiment, which explores gender in relation to self-concept and self-perception (see pp. 199, 201, 202, 214). Considering the discussion above of the social science literature and its support of Donovan's ideas on women's identity, one may realize how gender-linked aesthetic responses could in fact be real phenomena, especially since such responses have been observed in relation to popular narrative representations (Ford, 1997). In the remainder of this review, discussed are connections between Donovan's perspective on women's poetics and scholarship on Golden Age literature.

Sharing Donovan's conception of a "women's epistemology" is Golden Age scholar El Saffar (1990). In her article on Golden Age women writers and their works, El Saffar concludes: ". . . [in] that nearly lost tradition, there is a true culture, a true epistemology. . ." and "It is time now . . . to bear witness, in our readings, and in our critical excavations, to the always re-enacted recovery of Persephone to Demeter that

the women's writings . . . celebrate" (p. 7). The idea of writing from a woman's identity or position is also present in El Saffar's (1993) article on *Zayas*. As for Donovan's view that men and women perceive art differently, that sentiment is present in Smith's article on women writers of the Golden Age, where he documents that the commonalities ascribed to Saint Teresa and *Zayas* have been written by men (see Smith, 1987b, p. 240).

The proposal of motherhood as a component or theme in women's art, which is part of Donovan's theory on gender-differentiated aesthetics, is thoroughly explored in El Saffar (1990, p. 4): "Recently, feminists have begun to probe the question of the mother-daughter bond, wondering at its absence in literary representation, and insisting on the importance of its place in the lives of women and in women's texts." El Saffar also recounts Donovan's contention that critical scholarship is androcentric: ". . . we all were taught to [read] . . . within the androcentric norms that governed the production as much of Spanish Golden Age texts as of the criticism interpreting it (El Saffar, 1990, p. 4).

On the issue of art perception or interpretation, Donovan presses for the consideration of non-androcentric (i.e., non-dominant) perspectives, and one finds such a perspective suggested in Wilson's (1986) view on Cervantes's *Persiles*: "By positing gender as socially constructed through cultural fiats . . . the text calls into

question a sexual economy that relies on the loudest voices of its 'barbarians' and the muteness of its women" (p. 152). Another instance that exemplifies Donovan's petition appears in Williamsen's (1992) study on Ana Caro's Valor, agravio y mujer:

I would hope that our future discussions of marginality in Spanish literature would take into account the voices of women and other groups whose speech has often been appropriated by dominant discourse. Only then can we grow to understand the artificiality of many assumptions we consider natural (p. 29).

More general, yet concentrated, analyses of gender in Golden Age writing appear in Wilson's (1990) work on the Persiles and in Smith's (1992, 1993) works on race, text, and gender.

It is now clear that Donovan's propositions for a women's poetics have analogues in both the social science and Golden Age literature scholarship. Also clear is that scientific research involving art, including literature, is valid and has precedent. What remains to be seen is whether the view that reader response to Golden Age literature is gender-inflected will be borne out by empirical testing.

In comparison with the others before it discussed in this chapter, the present experiment is rigorously designed and controlled. For example, the experimental design and method incorporates and precisely measures the variable of real

(emotional) response, it precisely introduces and measures control variables for attitudes toward gender, it uses a control text, and it states and reports clearly its method of statistical analysis. In view of these facts, this study's findings cannot be dismissed or disputed casually by those who might find them discomforting. Most importantly, this experiment marks the beginning of a new and beneficial research direction for Spanish Golden Age criticism, and for literary studies in general.

## CHAPTER FOUR: AN EXPERIMENT

The objective of this study is to determine whether reader gender influences response to Golden Age Literature. Specifically tested is the following hypothesis: when exposed to socially- or ethnically-provocative texts, females will respond affectively to the texts differently than will males. The hypothesis is derived from Donovan's (1987) gender-linked approach to aesthetics and literature.

### Method

#### Participants

Eighty participants, 40 males and 40 females, were randomly distributed into three groups. Forty participants were Spanish-speakers, and the other 40 were English-speakers. Among the Spanish- and English-speakers, equal numbers were male and female.

#### Materials

Text samples were taken from Cervantes's Persiles y Sigismunda and Quevedo's Buscón (see Appendices A, B, and C). The texts were chosen not only for their content, but also for their readability, which has been shown to be conducive to proper measurement of reader responses (Martindale, et al., 1988).<sup>30</sup> English-speaking participants read English translations of the original Spanish works, and Spanish-speaking participants read the texts in Spanish.

## Procedure

Sampling was purposive, the desire being to have equal numbers of males and females in the sample, as well as equal numbers of English- and Spanish-speakers.

Given that this study used Golden Age Spanish texts as stimulus materials (note Appendices A, B, and C), it was imperative to control for socio-historical context, both of the text and of the reader. Ignoring that variable could have lead to inaccurate results. Controlling for socio-historical context was managed in two ways.

First, to accommodate the possibility that reader response or interpretation could be due more to language or culture than reader gender, the design for this experiment required half the participants to be Spanish-speakers reading Spanish texts. Second, the participants were informed of the author, date, and place of composition for each text. That information was sufficient to make the participants cognizant of the fact that what they read in the experiment is not of this time and place, but of Early Modern Spain. At the same time, the information was scant enough to avoid inducing the participants to disregard completely their positions as late 20<sup>th</sup> century readers. If more information had been provided for the experimental texts, such as details regarding race and ethnic relations of 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century Spain, then this investigation could be challenged on methodological grounds, for the participants' responses in the study could have been more the product of experimental design than of real

responses to literary texts. It must be understood that providing more information about the experimental texts would not have been not improper, per se, but that prematurely providing that information as a control variable would have been methodologically unwise. Only if there were no support for the textual communication of alterity to real readers in the current study would it be methodologically prudent to proceed to a subsequent test of readers. In such a test, a more sensitive control variable would be employed whereby the participants would have more information about the experimental texts, but such matters need not be considered presently. Because this experiment was exploratory in nature, purposive sampling was appropriate since it was the goal of this investigation to observe whether empirically demonstrable gender differences in real reader response actually exist.

Before reading the text stimuli, participants read and signed consent forms (see Appendix D), read an introductory statement (see Appendix E), and answered the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI)<sup>31</sup> questionnaire about how they perceived men and women (see Appendix F).<sup>32</sup> The instructions were written to stress the utmost importance of reporting only the feelings that the participants had in regard to the questions they answered (note Clore, 1992). Participants were asked not to answer based on their beliefs or ideologies. Since there was potential for the participants to give socially-desirable responses anyway, the ASI instrument in this study served as a

control for social-desirability effects (see Gackebach & Auerbach, 1975).<sup>33</sup>

Additionally, through heavily emphasizing the reporting of feelings in the instructions, affect salience was induced in the participants, lending methodological validity to the experimental design since personal responses were the phenomena measured in this experiment (see Millar & Tesser, 1992). The introductory statement that the participants read was deliberately phrased to avoid errors in validity that can result in studies measuring social judgements or attitudes (see Strack, 1992; Strack, Schwarz, & Wänke, 1991).

After completing the ASI questionnaire, participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; see Appendices G and H)<sup>34</sup> to measure their moods at the moment before they read the text stimuli. Participants then completed an additional PANAS in order to measure their moods in general.

On completing the second PANAS, participants read the experimental texts (bibliographic citations did not appear in the texts the participants read). One narrative portrays a treatment of Jewish and female identities (Narrative 1, Appendix A), a second narrative, depicting a conversation between two travelers, is neutral relative to the others (Narrative 2, Appendix B), and the third narrative portrays a behavioral-attitudinal interaction between male and female characters (Narrative 3, Appendix C). The neutral passage served as an experimental control. After reading the text stimuli,

participants completed a third PANAS to measure their moods at the moment after reading.

Reader response was thus measured as a function of mood change, such measure justified on the grounds that, per the literature review in this study, both literary and scientific researchers believe mood (i.e., emotion) is intrinsic to one's identity, and it is an identity component that is being examined in this work (gender). In addition, since empathy has been invoked by literary critics (including and especially Donovan) as a variable in reader response, and since empathy has been studied along affectively positive and negative dimensions in the social science literature, using the PANAS scales is especially appropriate for measuring reader response in this study. Regarding empirical measurement of mood in general, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen (1988) and Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain (1990) demonstrate that such measurement has been successfully accomplished in wide range of scientific investigations. There is also evidence of successful measurement of emotional response to art stimuli in particular (see Fried & Berkowitz, 1979; Peretti & Zweifel, 1983; Crowder, 1984, 1985a, 1985b).

## Results

The PANAS instruments were used to derive mood variables to allow comparisons between experimental groups and conditions. The statistical tests employed in this analysis include t-tests and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). There is no predetermined level of significance for this study, though results significant at the .05 level or lower will be regarded as robust.

Frequencies for gender, language, and condition are provided in TABLE 1. In a test for differences in participants' mood after reading the experimental texts, gender was observed to have no effect (see TABLE 2). In fact, not only was gender unrelated to participants' mood after reading, but it had no relationship to mood change (the measured difference between mood after and mood before reading). Results also show that there was no relationship between gender and participants' mood before reading the texts.

The ANOVA in TABLE 3 reveals that the different texts the participants read had no effects upon the dependent variables. None of the relationships are statistically significant. The participants who read Cervantes's texts ("Negative Portrayal of Women"—Narrative 1; "Negative Treatment of Women"—Narrative 3) were slightly lower than those who read Quevedo's text ("Control Text"—Narrative 2) for mood before reading. For mood after reading, the participants who read Cervantes's texts

were slightly higher than those who read Quevedo's text. The Cervantes readers were slightly higher than the Quevedo readers in mood change.

In testing for effects language had on the dependent variables, t-tests reveal no statistically significant relationships (see TABLE 4). English readers were somewhat higher than Spanish readers in mood before reading, and there was absolutely no difference between English and Spanish readers for mood after reading. English readers were somewhat lower in mood change.

In essence, neither gender nor experimental condition was significantly related to the dependent variables, and neither was language. In further analysis, gender, language, and condition were combined (as "main effects") to test whether, together or in some combination, they influenced reader response. Once again, none of the main effects were statistically significant in their influence on reader responses (see TABLE 5). Also, none of the statistical interactions were statistically significant. The variables "Hostile Sexism" (derived from participants' responses to the ASI, and referring to negative, prejudicial attitudes toward women) and "Mood in General" were statistically significant at the  $F = .078$  and  $F < .001$  levels, respectively in their effects on mood after reading. The sexism variables were derived to serve as controls in the event that mood change by gender was significant in this study, so any significance they have here may be coincidental. The "mood in general" variable's

significance is strong, and may have some role in reader affect, as will be suggested shortly in the Discussion section.

In an ANOVA with "Mood Before Reading" as the dependent variable, there are once more no statistically significant relationships for the main effects (see TABLE 6). None of the statistical interactions were statistically significant. Again, the "mood in general" variable was statistically significant at the  $F < .001$  level.

With "Mood Change" as the dependent variable (see TABLE 7), it remains the case that none of the main effects reached statistical significance. None of the statistical interactions were statistically significant. "Hostile Sexism" was the only statistically significant variable ( $F = .028$ ).

In summary, the results of this experiment clearly show that gender had no effect whatsoever on reader response as measured by mood. Other factors that could have influenced reader response such as text-content and language did not exhibit any significant effects. Combining the main effects of gender, text, and language also failed to demonstrate any significant influence on reader response. The null hypothesis for this study is thus confirmed: there are no significant differences between the emotive responses of males and females when they read literary texts.

## Discussion

The experimental confirmation of the null hypothesis in this study is in some respects unsurprising, for other studies involving art perception have also revealed no effects for gender (e.g., Amabile, 1982; Howard & Allen, 1990). Martindale (1988) would also anticipate a “no gender effect” in literary perception, since, despite the variation that exists between individuals, there are studies that “. . . demonstrate that readers do in fact show a good deal of agreement in their comprehension and affective response to the same text” (p. vi). Brewer & Ohtsuka (1988) support Martindale with the observation in their study of “. . . considerable agreement across subjects in their response to . . . [a] diverse sample of short stories” (p. 143), which was made up of six American stories and six Hungarian ones. In accounting for the absence of a gender effect in their study, Howard & Allen (1990) propose that measuring gender as a unique variable may not always be appropriate since gender might be expressed across “. . . multiple status variables and social positions” of readers (p. 549), such variables overriding any individual effect gender alone might exert.

There might be a straightforward reason for which gender exhibited no effect on reading in this experiment, and it could be related to the “mood in general variable” and its strong significance in both the “mood before reading” ANOVA, and the “mood after reading” ANOVA. Based upon the statistical results, it is logical to state that one’s

real emotional response to a literary text is a function of one's general disposition more than of one's gender, language, or perception of textual content. The specification of "real" in the previous sentence is important.

The instructions to the participants (APPENDIX E) explicitly informed them that the "most important thing" in how they responded was that they do so according to their actual feelings. Intellectually-based responses were categorically discouraged. The instructions thus induced mood salience in the participants throughout the duration of the experiment. When they recorded their mood on the third PANAS, they indicated their real responses relative to the texts they had just read (per verbal instructions).

This design is curious, for one might assert that it stacked the deck against finding a significant effect for the gender variable in reader response, as readers were asked to report real reactions to a fictional stimulus. However, with so strong an emphasis on the reporting of real responses, it is logical that mood changes relative to fictional stimuli would not be expected if participants were truthful in their responses. Charges of design error in this experiment would therefore be unjustified.

Major emphasis in this study was to establish empirically whether the intuitions, feelings, empathic identifications, or other psychological states literary critics attribute to readers (and other art percipients) actually exist, or are merely illusory theoretical

constructs that literary critics use when they write journal articles. If non-emotively-based responses had been permitted in this study, then there could have been the inaccurate interpretation of the experimental results for the existence of interactions between real persons and fictions. Clearly, then, the results obtained in this experiment are perfectly in line, coincidentally, with the perspective of Kendall Walton on the nature of fiction and how we understand it. As he observes,

We do indeed get “caught up” in stories; we often become “emotionally involved” when we read novels or watch plays or films. But to construe this involvement as consisting of our having psychological attitudes toward fictional entities is . . . to tolerate mystery and court confusion (1978a, p. 6).

If reader responses to narratives are in fact unreal, then they may be fictional and become part of the fictional world which elicits them (see Walton, 1978a, p. 22).

Walton effectively demonstrates in his work that it is possible “. . . to comprehend our sense of closeness to fictions, without attributing to ourselves patently false beliefs” (1978a, p. 22), such as believing we experience real emotions in response to fictional stimuli.

In the next chapter, implications for literary criticism and reader response theory will be examined in light of this study’s findings. Suggestions on how identity

concepts may be treated when they exist in fictional contexts will also be presented. Finally, even with what this experiment has revealed, it will be explained that the question of whether gender-inflected response to literature exists is far from any sort of resolution.

The present experiment served as a pilot study for empirically studying gender's role in literary writing and criticism. In development now is a substantially-enhanced design for a second experiment on reader response with Golden Age literature that will use full-length texts by Cervantes and Zayas. That literary theory can be tested remains the position of the author, and it is only a matter of time before Golden Age criticism proceeds in new directions that may significantly and productively contribute to Golden Age studies in ways not previously considered.

## CONCLUSION

This study represents a significant contribution to Golden Age studies, for it marks what may be the first instance in a Spanish graduate program that customary literary practice has been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny. Stemming from a view that current scholarship on identity constructs, particularly gender, in Golden Age texts is unduly based primarily on conjecture and speculation, and that it need not be so-based to address those constructs, this study employed an experiment to assess whether any of the critical-theoretical assertions on identity in Golden Age literature might be true. Predominant in critical literary scholarship on identity are references to emotively-valent constructs (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality) to account for perceived or interpreted notions of identity in narrative representation. Certain critical-theoretical scholarship holds that gender codes in the *Persiles*, for example, are constructed indeterminately, grounding the position on human culture and literary history (e.g., Wilson, 1991). However, some theorists (e.g., Paul Julian Smith, Ruth El Saffar) have formulated their approaches such that there is reference to allegedly “real” senses of alterity or otherness in Golden Age textual representation, which suggests one application of the results of this study to Golden Age criticism.

In particular, critical literary approaches appealing to the notion that a reader can “sense” or “identify with” narrative representations of gender or other status

positions in Golden Age prose must be conditionally rejected. First, implicit in those approaches (by virtue of reference to identity constructs) is the idea that a reader interacts in a real way with a fictional entity. Walton (1978a, 1978b) argues the impossibility of real-fictional interaction. Second, this study's findings on the experimental variable "mood in general" decidedly corroborate Walton's position (the mood in general variable's effect would occur as it did in this experiment in less than one case per 1000 cases due to random factors alone). It is concluded, then, that—barring mental incapacitation or pharmaceutical influence—one does not, and cannot, really emotively respond to a text in terms of gender, or of any other emotively-valent status position. Perhaps literary criticism should be reformulated to explain human understanding of fiction without reference to manifestly illusory phenomena. Walton (1978a) offers an ideal proposal on how that can be accomplished, and frames his model as engagement in the game of "make-believe."

Briefly, and greatly oversimplified (his scholarship on the matter spans over 20 years), Walton's model of human interaction with fiction is that when reading a novel, for example, a reader accepts, "make-believedly," the reality of world portrayed in that novel. In so doing, the reader also "make-believedly" accepts all the norms, rules, and conditions of the novel's world. So, when we speak of Cipión and Berganza in Cervantes's El coloquio de los perros criticizing unnecessary uses of Latin and Greek,

as well discussing the evils of gossip, digressions, and philosophizing, we do not say that they are doing so in the fictional world (e.g., we do not say, “Look, Cipión and Berganza are speaking in the fictional world” or “in the world of the novel”). Rather, we describe the event in the same way we describe real (non-fictional) events: “Cipión and Berganza criticize unnecessary uses of Latin, etc.” We pretend to take (seriously) the fiction for reality. That is not surprising since, if we are involved within a fictional world, and we accept its reality and norms, then we will naturally express ourselves as a member of that world (see Walton, 1978a). We do not, therefore, promote “. . . fictions to our level . . . More accurately, we extend ourselves to their level, since we do not stop actually existing when it becomes fictional that we exist” (emphasis in original, p. 23). “Make-believedly,” then, we do believe (know) that Berganza worked guarding sheep, was born of a human mother, and traveled with gypsies. We also make-believedly have feelings or attitudes about Berganza’s experiences. Walton explains, “Rather than somehow fooling ourselves into thinking fictions are real, we become fictional. So we end up ‘on the same level’ with fictions” (p. 23). This conception allows us to account for our psychological closeness with fictions, without claiming, erroneously, that we are really interacting with them. It also explains why, even after attending several performances, we may have the same sense of suspense in Tirso’s El burlador de Sevilla during the moments before Don Gonzalo

takes Don Juan's hand and drags him into hell, because, in each performance (in each reading), we are make-believedly witnessing Don Juan's demise for the first time.<sup>35</sup>

A second way in which this study's results may apply to literary criticism on Golden Age literature is that they obviate essentialist models of interpretation, which assert that female writers or critics are emotively distinct from their male colleagues. It would thus behoove literary scholars to consider a cognitively-based approach to literary research on identity constructs in early modern Spanish literature. A cognitive approach to gender's role in criticism, for instance, would be compatible with already existing research interests, as well as with empirical testing. If substantial, innovative progress in Golden Age criticism is to be made, combining literary theory with science to investigate gender and other status positions in Golden Age narrative presents intriguing research possibilities.

A cognitive study on reading would automatically take into account the social aspects of literary interpretation, including the influence of gender. With respect to measuring cognition, the task is not necessarily any more or less difficult than measuring affect is, for just as affective salience was induced for the experiment conducted in this study, cognitive salience may also be induced (note Millar & Tesser, 1992). Furthermore, given that a cognitive approach to literary interpretation is non-essentialist, it is complementary to critical literary opinion on gender and reading. As

Culler (1991) notes: “. . . reading as a woman is not necessarily what occurs when a woman reads: women can read, and have read, as men . . . . to ask a woman to read as a woman is in fact a double or divided request” (p. 513). Culler’s view on reading women recognizes that individuals occupy more than just one status position, a fact recognized also in empirical studies (e.g., Stets, 1997). In an equally important observation, Culler writes:

For a woman to read as a woman is not to repeat an identity or an experience that is given, but to play a role she constructs with reference to her identity as a woman, which is also a construct, so that the series can continue: a woman reading as a woman reading as a woman. The non-coincidence reveals an interval, a division within woman or within any reading subject and the ‘experience’ of that subject (p. 522).

Culler refers to the act of reading in relation to identity, and to the idea that acts (behavior) and identity are interdependent and can vary in relationship to each other. There is good reason to believe Culler is right in his thinking, for the act of “subjects constructing roles” with reference to, and in interaction with, their identity has already been empirically observed and measured in social-psychological scholarship (e.g., Burke & Cast, 1997; Cast, et al., 1999; Stets & Burke, 1996).

Along with Culler, Annette Kolodny (1980a) is cognizant of gender and its significance in reading and literature: “. . . whether we speak of poets and critics ‘reading’ texts or writers ‘reading’ (and thereby recording for us) the world, we are calling attention to the interpretive strategies that are learned, historically determined, and thereby necessarily gender-inflected” (p. 452; see also 1980b, p. 588). There is no logical reason for disagreeing with Kolodny. Reading is a human behavior, often done in solitude, but human behavior is inherently social, even when one is alone (note Mead, 1934),<sup>36</sup> and thus inherently gendered (see Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1996).

Hence, it should be clear that a theoretical foundation upon which to build a new, cognitively-based scholarship incorporating empiricism into Golden Age studies already exists. All that remains is to examine current literary hypotheses and to formulate them operationally. When emotively-based theory was tested in this study, gender differences failed to be detected. If literary criticism is modified, and in some cases “corrected” to correspond with what actually exists—or does not exist—then the concept of gender-inflected reading could potentially be confirmed on a cognitive level.

If differences in literary interpretation do lie in cognition, the existence of so-called aesthetic pleasure or emotion may be called into question. In fact, it might be

that the emotional province in literary perception as a whole will require re-evaluation. This possibility should not be troubling, for if Walton's proposal for framing our understanding of fiction in terms of make-believe is right, then it is naturally the case that previous literary theory which refers to emotive perception will require revision. Since Walton's perspective denies any real emotional response to fiction, using a cognitive approach to literary (and art) interpretation is logical.

Some cautions relating to the suggestions just offered on cognitive studies are in order. First, despite the failure of the results in the present study to support the hypothesis that (emotive) reader response varies by gender, one cannot dismiss the possibility, however remote it might seem, that this experiment could well be a fluke. One of the reasons given in favor of using an experimental design to test for gender differences in reading is that experiments allow for replication, which serves to either confirm findings of previous studies, thereby strengthening the theories they test, or to reveal "accidental" (i.e., false) findings. Another consideration regarding the arguments presented in this conclusion pertains to the idea that human responses to literature are either emotional or cognitive. Let it be clear that this work does not mean to advance an exclusively dualist position. Even Walton does not deny that we respond emotionally to fictions. He merely denies that our emotional reactions are real. In addition, while it has been stated that in experiments either affective or cognitive

salience may be induced and then measured in participants, the purpose of so doing was not to imply that affect and cognition become mutually exclusive under empirical conditions. On the contrary, Sinclair and Mark (1992) report that cognitions can be determined by mood differences: "Such differences are observed in processing information and in making judgments ranging from estimates to correlations to responses to persuasive appeals, from justice judgments to stereotyping" (p. 187).

How, then, should scholarship on Golden Age studies proceed? The answer lies in an integrative approach. Even in a corporate university, Mignolo (2000) makes it clear that he does not ". . . intend to declare obsolete the need of experts in the humanities. People who can read an ancient papyrus, organize archaeological remains, or edit old manuscripts will continue to be necessary" (1243). Proposed here is that empirical studies in Golden Age criticism can benefit the field in at least two ways: one is scholarly and academic, and the other is financially by way of grants and, eventually, corporate funding.

In order to begin progress toward that goal, results of the present study will be presented in an appropriate professional forum, thereby introducing the Spanish Golden Age to a wider audience of scholars. Another step toward beginning a new research direction in Golden Age studies will be to conduct a second, more comprehensive experiment which will take into account both affective and cognitive

measures of reader response in order that gender's role in literary interpretation may be better understood. The second study will use a larger number of participants, non-purposive sampling, cognitive measurement instruments, and four full-length texts, one of which will be a control text. Cervantes's "La fuerza de la sangre" and Zayas's "El prevenido engañado" and "Al fin se paga todo" are tentatively selected for the three "provocative" text stimuli.

Although this study found no support for the hypothesis that emotive reader response varies by gender, further research is advised to allow more certainty in concluding that emotion is not a factor in reading. Additionally, further study will also be beneficial to answering the question of whether gendered response to reading occurs on a cognitive level. Finally, it is recommended that future studies on reader response to Golden Age literature incorporate a wider range of theoretical work in Golden Age criticism than was consulted for this study. It is possible, for example, that gender differences might have been revealed in light of a different theoretical perspective on how Golden Age literature is read and interpreted.

One readily notices that these recommendations prescribe continued study in an unexplored direction. Though it is believed that empiricism is a promising approach for Golden Age literary criticism, it is not known where an empirical orientation will ultimately lead. Nonetheless, it is in the spirit of intellectual and

academic pursuit, and with the sincere desire to make a meaningful contribution to Spanish Golden Age studies, that this study has been conducted.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Truth-value is used here as it is used in logic: to refer to the truth or falsehood of a proposition. For example, the truth-value of " $1 + 1 = 3$ " is falsehood. Truth-value is not to be interpreted here as reference to truth in any absolute sense.
- <sup>2</sup> The U.S. Department of Defense with the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) awarded three Multi-disciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) grants in the area of high power microwave sources in April 1995, one of which went to principal investigator Magne Kristiansen at Texas Tech University. In 1998, the U.S. Department of Defense with the AFOSR awarded another grant to Kristiansen and to colleagues at University of Missouri at Rolla to further explore the possibilities of producing efficient "Explosive-Driven Power Generation for Directed-Energy Munitions."
- <sup>3</sup> This view applying, of course, only to theory-users, as there are non-theoretically-bound researchers in literature.
- <sup>4</sup> Biography refers to the amount of time one has dedicated to supporting a particular theory (see Kuhn, 1970, 1977).
- <sup>5</sup> To express the idea more clearly, the "compatibility of... [a] theory with daily life experience" (Frank, 1954, p. 141, 142).

<sup>6</sup> “Percipient” is used to refer to “a person or thing that perceives” (Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary. 1999)

<sup>7</sup> On psycho-babble:

“What did you do today?”

“I cleaned my desk.”

“Ah yes, being anal compulsive again.”

“No, it was just a mess.”

“No need to be defensive.”

“I’m not being defensive, I’m just disagreeing with you.”

“Yes, but you disagree with me because you have an unresolved conflict with your father.”

“No, I always got along well with Dad.”

“Of course you believe that, but the conflict was unconscious.”

“There was no conflict!”

“I am not your father! Please don’t cathect your speech with projected aggression.”

Ad infinitum. Ad nauseam (emphasis in original, p. 61).

<sup>8</sup> The first citation is of Lennox, S. (1991). Some proposals for feminist literary criticism. In J. Clausen and S Friedrichsmeyer (Eds.), Women in German

yearbook 7 (pp. 91-97). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. The second citation is of Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. New York: Routledge.

- <sup>9</sup> Moraga, C. (1983). Loving in the war years. Boston: South End.
- <sup>10</sup> The text within quotation marks is (Elizabeth Naylor Endres's) translated citation of Martin, B. (1989). Zwischenbilanz der feministischen Debatten. In F. Trommler (Ed.) Germanistik in den USA (pp. 165-195). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- <sup>11</sup> Santiago, D. [Daniel Lewis James]. (1984). Famous All over Town. New York: Plume.
- <sup>12</sup> Koolmatrie, W. [Leon Carmen]. (1995). My Own Sweet Time. Sydney: Magabala.
- <sup>13</sup> Spivak, G. (1988). In other worlds: Essays in cultural politics (p. 107). New York: Routledge.
- <sup>14</sup> Quintilian [Marcus Fabius Quintilianus]. (1922). Institutio oratoria (H. Butler, Trans.). London: Loeb.
- <sup>15</sup> Scaliger, J. (1561). Poetices libri septem. Lyons: Vincentius.
- <sup>16</sup> Tasso, T. (1964). Discorsi dell'arte poetica e del poema heroico (L. Poma, Ed.). Bari: Laterza. (Original work published 1594).

La verginella è simile a la rosa  
 ch'n bel giardin su la nativa spina  
 mentre sola e sicura si riposa  
 né gregge né pastor se le avvicina.

- <sup>17</sup> Smith cites the distinction as treated by Maclean (44-45): Maclean, I. (1980). The Renaissance notion of woman. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- <sup>18</sup> Martínez Arancón, A. (1978). La batalla en torno a Góngora (selección de textes). [sic] Madrid: Bosch.
- <sup>19</sup> Smith takes his Castro citation from García de la Concha, V. (1978). El arte literario de Santa Teresa (p. 126). Barcelona: Ariel. Castro's comment on Saint Teresa reads, "Teresa, alma muy feminina, trasupuso su querer en su pensar, y éste arrastrará siempre, como preciosa ganga, el tesoro de su emoción y fantasía."
- <sup>20</sup> The material from which Smith derives the premises in his article is based on the work of Kristeva and Irigaray. See pages 224-227 of his article.
- <sup>21</sup> If this criticism seems inadequate to question El Saffar's claim of "no objects, no observers," then Cramer's (1986) investigation should prove more than substantive to explain why El Saffar is mistaken in her appeal to Heisenberg.

"It is our conclusion . . . that the approach of CI4 [Copenhagen interpretation component in regard to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle] to the problem of identity is a relatively superficial one. It has raised as many problems as it has solved and has led its practitioners into very deep philosophical waters. We suspect that the broad acceptance of the CI's identification of the state vector with knowledge is attributable more to the lack of a satisfactory alternative than to its compelling logic" (Cramer, 1986, 2.1.2). After lengthy and highly complex discussion of state vectors and quantum mechanics in general, Cramer presents the transactional interpretation (TI) for quantum phenomena as an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation (CI) (which incorporates Heisenberg's uncertainty principle). Cramer demonstrates in his study that TI accounts for quantum phenomena similarly to the way CI does, but without the CI's observational difficulties: "The visualization of quantum phenomena has been denied us for half a century, not by the abstract QM [quantum mechanics] formalism but by the Copenhagen interpretation. The transactional interpretation of the same formalism now makes this long-sought visualization possible." In section 3.0, Cramer states that his study: ". . . has illuminated several interpretational problems intrinsic in the CI . . . we now present the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics (TI). We will find that the TI

is objective and . . . It provides a description of the state vector as an actual wave physically present in real space . . . . The transaction model provides a way of clearly visualizing and developing intuition about the quantum phenomena which have remained mysterious and counter-intuitive for half a century." Cramer's work signals a paradigm shift in quantum mechanics, and he claims as much in his work.

<sup>22</sup> El Saffar refers to Lázaro as if he is a real individual in this context, compounding her earlier error on the uncertainty principle.

<sup>23</sup> For example, in reference to "El prevenido engañado", El Saffar believes that the text ". . . foreshadows, in the scarcely-written story of Serafina and Gracia, the retreat to a world made up exclusively of women—of mothers and daughters . . . ." (1993, p. 24).

<sup>24</sup> In Heyduk's 1975 work, for example, measures were taken to insure that the four stimulus materials were different in their levels of complexity, and that the stimuli actually ". . . cover[ed] a discriminable range of psychological complexity" (p. 87). See Heyduk, R. (1975). Rated preference for musical compositions as it relates to complexity and exposure frequency. Perception & Psychophysics, 17 (1), pp. 84-91.

- <sup>25</sup> Barrett, M. (1985). Ideology and the cultural production of gender. In J. Newton & D. Rosenfelt (Eds.), Feminist criticism and social change. New York: Methuen.
- <sup>26</sup> Phillips, J. (1979). Home. In Black tickets. New York: Dell.
- <sup>27</sup> See Schweickart, P. (1985). Add gender and stir. Reader, 13, 1-9. See also Schweickart, P. (1986). Reading ourselves: Toward a feminist theory of reading. In E. Flynn & P. Schweickart (Eds.), Gender and reading: Essays on readers, texts, and contexts. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- <sup>28</sup> Lorde, A. (1981). The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. In C. Moraga & G. Anzaldúa (Eds.), This bridge called my back, writings by radical women of color. Watertown, MA: Persephone.
- <sup>29</sup> See, for example: Batson, C. (1991). The altruism question: Toward a social psychological answer. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- <sup>30</sup> Martindale et al. (1988) write that if a text is abstract, intellectual, or otherwise complex, dislike might be the only measured reader response. It is therefore desirable to keep reader response measurement uncomplicated (methodologically) by using readable texts (see pp. 287-289).
- <sup>31</sup> The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI). Copyright 1995 by Peter Glick and Susan T. Fisk (see Glick & Fiske, 1996). Used with permission.

- <sup>32</sup> Measuring attitudinal behavior will serve as an additional control variable, for it is possible that attitudes and not gender per se might influence response to texts dealing with men and women.
- <sup>33</sup> The authors write that their “. . . findings are viewed as support for the notion of the well-meaning liberal male, i.e., that a certain duplicity exists among a substantial number of males who verbalize or intellectualize liberal sex-role attitudes, but who do not differ from their sexist counterparts in emotional response to stimuli seemingly incongruent with their verbalized attitudes. Researchers who employ sex-role attitude as a variable thus need to address the problem of the confounding effects of social desirability among males . . . ” (p. 634).
- <sup>34</sup> The PANAS is a standard, recognized, “reliable, valid, and efficient means for measuring . . .” positive and negative mood dimensions. See Watson, et al. (1988). Using the PANAS also frees this study from Tiller & Campbell’s (1986) criticism of studies that employ mood adjective lists that have not been verified as valid scales of mood measurement.
- <sup>35</sup> Compare the examples of our feeling of suspense in Tirso’s play with “. . . a child playing an ordinary game of make-believe with his father. The father, pretending to be a ferocious monster, cunningly stalks the child and, at a crucial

moment, lunges viciously at him. The child flees, screaming, to the next room. The scream is more or less involuntary, and so is the flight. But the child has a delighted grin on his face even while he runs and he unhesitatingly comes back for more. He is perfectly aware that his father is only 'playing,' that the whole thing is 'just a game,' and that only make-believedly is there is vicious monster after him. He is not really afraid" (Walton, 1978a, p. 13). In the same way, were are only make-believedly in suspense, for we know perfectly well that there is no man named Don Juan being pulled into hell by a stony figure Don Gonzalo. To quote Borges, as cited in Walton's article, "[The actor] on a stage plays at being another before a gathering of people who play at taking him for that other person" (p. 12). Walton cites the Borges source: "Everything and Nothing," Borges, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby eds. (New York: New Directions, 1962), p. 248.

36 Even when one is apparently alone, an imagined or implied presence of others influences and affects one's thoughts, feelings, and behavior to some degree.

## APPENDIX A, NARRATIVE I

English

From The Trials of Persiles and Sigismunda, by Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra.

Written during the late 1500s to the early 1600s in Spain. Published c. 1617.

Hipólita was on her way home more confused than contrite. She was pensive, too, and what's more, in love, for although it's true that in the beginning of love rejection usually puts an end to it, the rejection she'd suffered at the hands of Periandro had only fanned her kindled desires. It seemed to her a pilgrim couldn't be so made of bronze that he wouldn't soften up after the gifts she was planning to give him.

But in talking over the matter with herself, she said, "If this pilgrim were poor he wouldn't have such a valuable cross with him, for its many costly diamonds are a clear indication of his wealth. So the strength of this rock won't be broken by seige [sic] and hunger; other skills and maneuvers will be needed to bring about its surrender. Isn't it possible this young man has his heart set on someone else? Isn't it possible that this Auristela isn't his sister? And isn't it possible, too, that the other side of the coin of all this scorn for me is kind favors he'd like to do for Auristela? Hold it!

## APPENDIX A, NARRATIVE I (continued)

As God is my witness, I think I've just found the solution to my problem! Kill Auristela! Let's get the mystery out into the open, or at least let's see what kind of feelings the boy's untamed heart is capable of. Let's at least try this plan. . . . We'll have Auristela get sick, and that'll take the sun out of Periandro's eyes. . . . We'll see whether or not when we take away beauty—the principal cause of love—love itself will also disappear. It's possible that if I then supply what I'm depriving him of by removing Auristela, he might be persuaded to have more tender thoughts towards me . . . at least I have to give it a try, because as they say, 'there's no harm in trying . . . you might just get lucky!'"

Somewhat consoled by these thoughts, she reached home and found Zabulón, to whom she outlined her whole plan, counting on the fact that his wife was the most famous sorceress in Rome. After having first given him some gifts and promises of more to come, she asked him to persuade his wife not to change Periandro's mind—for she knew that was impossible—but to make Auristela fall ill, and within a certain length of time, if it should be necessary, to take her life. Zabulón assured her that was something easily within the scope of his wife's power and knowledge. He received I don't know how much as a down payment and promised that on the following day Auristela's health would begin to fail. And not only did Hipólita pay

## APPENDIX A, NARRATIVE I (continued)

Zabulón well, she also threatened him; fits and threats will make a Jew promise and even perform the impossible (Cervantes, 1989, pp. 329, 330).

.....

By morning of the next day the spells, poisons, enchantments, and malice of the Jewess, Zabulón's wife, had begun to take effect on Auristela (Cervantes, 1989, p. 333).

Spanish

De Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra.

Escrito en España durante los últimos años del siglo XVI a los primeros del siglo XVII.

Publicado cerca del año 1617.

Más confusa que arrepentida volvió Hipólita a su casa, pensativa además y además enamorada, que, aunque es verdad que, en los principios de los amores, los desdenes suelen ser parte para acabarlos, los que usó con ella Periandro le avivaron más los deseos. Parecíale a ella que no había de ser tan de bronce un peregrino que no se ablandase con los regalos que pensaba hacerle; pero, hablando consigo, se dijo a sí misma:

## APPENDIX A, NARRATIVE I (continued)

—Si este peregrino fuera pobre, no trujera consigo cruz tan rica, cuyos muchos y ricos diamantes sirven de claro sobrecrito de su riqueza. De modo que la fuerza desta roca no se ha de tomar por hambre; otros ardidés y mañas son menester para rendirla. ¿No sería posible que este mozo tuviese en otra parte ocupada el alma? ¿No sería posible que esta Auristela no fuese su hermana? ¿No sería posible que las finezas de los desdenes que usa conmigo los quisiese asentar y poner en cargo a Auristela? ¡Válame Dios, que me parece que en este punto he hallado el de mi remedio! ¡Alto! ¡Muera Auristela! Descúbrase este encantamento; a lo menos, veamos el sentimiento que este montaraz corazón hace; pongamos siquiera en plática este disignio; enferme Auristela; quitemos su sol delante de los ojos de Periandro; veamos si, faltando la hermosura, causa primera de adonde el amor nace, falta también el mismo amor, que podría ser que, dando yo lo que a éste le quitare quitándole a Auristela, viniese a reducirse a tener más blandos pensamientos. Por lo menos, probarlo tengo, ateniéndome a lo que se dice que no daña el tentar las cosas que descubren algún rastro de provecho.

Con estos pensamientos algo consolada, llegó a su casa, donde halló a Zabulón, con quien comunicó todo su disignio, confiada en que tenía una mujer de la mayor fama de hechicera que había en Roma, pidiéndole (habiendo antes precedido

## APPENDIX A, NARRATIVE I (continued)

dádivas y promesas) hiciese con ella, no que mudase la voluntad de Periandro, pues sabía que esto era imposible, sino que enfermase la salud de Auristela y, con limitado término, si fuese menester, le quitase la vida. Esto dijo Zabolón ser cosa fácil al poder y sabiduría de su mujer. Recibió no sé cuánto por primera paga y prometió que desde otro día comenzaría la quiebra de la salud de Auristela. No solamente Hipólita satisfizo a Zabolón, sino amenazóle asimismo y, a un judío, dádivas o amenazas le hacen prometer y aun hacer imposibles (Cervantes, 1997, pp. 690, 691).

.....

. . . otro día por la mañana, comenzaron a obrar en Auristela los hechizos, los venenos, los encantos y las malicias de la judía mujer de Zabolón (Cervantes, 1997, pp. 696, 697).

## APPENDIX B, NARRATIVE 2

English

From The Swindler, by Francisco de Quevedo. Written sometime during 1603 to 1608 in Spain. Published in 1626.

The day came for me to leave the best life I had ever had. God alone knows how I felt at having to leave so many friends and all my acquaintances. I sold the little I had, secretly, to get some money for the journey, and with a bit of trickery I collected about six hundred *reals*. I hired a mule and left my lodgings. I had no right to take anything more out of the house than my shadow. You can't imagine how angry the shoemaker was about the shoes I had on tick, how worried the housekeeper was about her salary, and how furious the owner was about the rent of his house. Some said:

'I always knew it,' and others:

'They were right when they told me he was no good.'

In other words, so well-loved was I that when I left half the town were in tears because I had gone and the other half were laughing at their bad luck.

I was whiling time away along the road thinking of all this when, just after crossing the river Verote, I came up with a man on a pack-mule who was talking away to himself

## APPENDIX B, NARRATIVE 2 (continued)

nineteen to the dozen and so absorbed that he didn't see me even though I was riding alongside him. I said 'hullo' to him and he said 'hullo' to me; I asked him where he was going and, after a few pleasantries, we began to talk about whether the Turks would attack and about the King's army. He began to tell me how the Holy Land could be taken and how Algiers would be won. From the way he talked I could see he was one of those cranks who could run the country all on their own if anyone let them. We carried on talking in this way, which was just about right for layabouts, and the conversation led us to Flanders (Quevedo, 1971, p. 123).

Spanish

De La vida del Buscón llamado Don Pablos, de Francisco de Quevedo. Escrito en España, entre los años 1603 y 1608. Publicado en 1623.

Llegó el día de apartarme de la mejor vida que hallo haber pasado. Dios sabe lo que sentí el dejar tantos amigos a apasionados, que eran sin número. Vendí lo poco que tenía, de secreto, para el camino, y, con ayuda de unos embustes, hice hasta seiscientos reales. Alquilé una mula y salíme de la posada, adonde ya no tenía que sacar más de mi sombra. ¿Quién contara las angustias del zapatero por lo fiado, las solicitudes del ama por el salario, las voces del huésped de la casa por el arrendamiento? Uno decía: --«¡Siempre me lo dijo el corazón!»; otro. --«¡Bien me

## APPENDIX B, NARRATIVE 2 (continued)

decían a mí que éste era un trampista!». Al fin, yo salí tan bienquisto del pueblo, que dejé con mi ausencia a la mitad dél llorando, ya la otra mitad riéndose de los que lloraban.

Yo me iba entreteniendo por el camino, considerando en estas cosas, cuando, pasado Torote, encontré con un hombre en un macho de albarda, el cual iba hablando entre sí con muy gran prisa, y tan embebecido, que, aun estando a su lado, no me veía. Saludéle y saludóme; preguntéle dónde iba, y después que nos pagamos las respuestas, comenzamos luego a tratar de si bajaba el turco y de las fuerzas del Rey. Comenzó a decir de qué manera se podía conquistar la Tierra Santa, y cómo se ganaría Argel; en los cuales discursos eché de ver que era loco repúblico y de gobierno.

Proseguimos en la conversación propia de pícaros, y venimos a dar, de una cosa en otra, en Flandes (Quevedo, 1984, pp. 147, 148).

## APPENDIX C, NARRATIVE 3

English

From The Trials of Persiles and Sigismunda, by Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra.

Written during the late 1500s to the early 1600s in Spain. Published c. 1617.

. . . It happened by chance, then, that while I was at this inn, in came a girl about sixteen years old, or at least she didn't seem any older than that to me, although I later found out she was twenty-two. When she came in she was wearing short sleeves and had her hair in braids; her dress was of plain cloth but she had a fresh, clean look, and when she passed by me I thought she smelled like a meadow full of flowers in the month of May, making all my senses forget the perfumes of Arabia. She went up to one of the boys who worked at the inn and, saying something in his ear, broke out laughing; then turning around, she left the inn and went into a house across the street. Another young man from the inn ran after her and barely caught her, except with a kick on her backside that made her fall flat on her face into her house. Another girl from the same inn saw this and said furiously to the boy, 'Good Grief, Alonso, you're doing it all wrong! Luisa doesn't deserve for you to make the sign of the cross on her with a kick!' 'On my life, I'll give her more of the same,' replied Alonso.

## APPENDIX C, NARRATIVE 3 (continued)

'Be quiet, Martina my friend; these sassy little girls need to have not only hands laid on them but feet, too, and everything else.'

"And with that he left Martina and me alone; I asked her who Luisa was, and whether or not she was married. 'She's not married,' replied Martina, 'but she soon will be to that guy Alonso you've just seen. And because of the deal being made between her parents and his, Alonso considers her practically his wife and so dares kick her around any time he feels like it, though it's rare when she doesn't deserve it, for, to tell you the truth, my fine guest, that Luisa is pretty saucy and a little free and easy. I've warned her often enough, but she won't listen; she'll do what she wants even if they put out her eyes for it. But what's truer than true is that one of the best dowries a girl can have is her purity, and may the mother who bore me have the reward she deserves for being the kind of person who wouldn't even let me look at the street through a peephole, much less get as far out of the house as the doorway. She knew very well, as she used to say, that when it comes to women, "if you leave the barn door open . . ." (Cervantes, 1989, pp. 229, 230).

## APPENDIX C, NARRATIVE 3 (continued)

Spanish

De Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra.

Escrito en España durante los últimos años del siglo XVI a los primeros del siglo XVII.

Publicado cerca del año 1617.

Digo, pues, que, estando en este mesón, entró en él acaso una doncella de hasta diez y seis años (a lo menos a mí no me pareció de más, puesto que después supe que tenía veinte y dos). Venía en cuerpo y en tranzado, vestida de paño, pero limpiísima, y, al pasar junto a mí, me pareció que olía a un prado lleno de flores por el mes de mayo, cuyo olor en mis sentidos dejó atrás las aromas de Arabia. Llegóse la cual a un mozo del mesón y, hablándole al oído, alzó una gran risa y, volviendo las espaldas, salió del mesón y se entró en una casa frontera. El mozo mesonero corrió tras ella y no la pudo alcanzar, si no fue con una cox que le dio en las espaldas, que la hizo entrar cayendo de ojos en su casa. Esto vio otra moza del mismo mesón y, llena de cólera, dijo al mozo: «¡Por Dios, Alonso, que lo haces mal; que no merece Luisa que la santigües a coces!». «Como ésas le daré yo, si vivo—respondió el Alonso—. Calla, Martina, a la cual le pregunté que qué Luisa era aquélla, y si era casada o no. «No es casada—respondió Martina—; pero serálo presto con este mozo Alonso que

## APPENDIX C, NARRATIVE 3 (continued)

habéis visto y, en fe de los tratos que andan, entre los padres della y los dél, de esposa, se atreve Alonso a molella a coces todas las veces que se le antoja, aunque muy pocas son sin que ella las merezca, porque, si va a decir la verdad, señor huésped, la tal Luisa es algo atrevidilla y algún tanto libre y descompuesta. Harto se lo he dicho yo, mas no aprovecha: no dejará de seguir su gusto si la sacan los ojos. Pues, en verdad, en verdad, que una de las mejores dotes que puede llevar una doncella es la honestidad, que buen siglo haya la madre que me parió, que fue persona que no me dejó ver la calle ni aun por un agujero, cuanto más, salir al umbral de la puerta. Sabía bien, como ella decía, que la mujer y la gallina, etc.» (Cervantes, 1997, pp. 498, 499).

## APPENDIX D, CONSENT FORM

### Subject's Consent Form

Project Title: An Empirical Study  
of Reader Response to Golden Age Literature

I AM BEING ASKED TO READ THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL TO ENSURE THAT I AM INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF THIS RESEARCH STUDY AND OF HOW I WILL PARTICIPATE IN IT, IF I CONSENT TO DO SO. SIGNING THIS FORM WILL INDICATE THAT I HAVE BEEN SO INFORMED AND THAT I GIVE MY CONSENT. FEDERAL REGULATIONS REQUIRE WRITTEN INFORMED CONSENT PRIOR TO PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY SO THAT I CAN KNOW THE NATURE AND RISKS OF MY PARTICIPATION AND CAN DECIDE TO PARTICIPATE OR NOT PARTICIPATE IN A FREE AND INFORMED MANNER.

#### Purpose

I am being invited to participate voluntarily in the above-titled research project. The purpose of this project is to find out about feelings people have when they read literature.

#### Selection Criteria

I am being invited to participate because I can read in English and or Spanish. Approximately 80 subjects will be enrolled in this study.

#### Procedures

If I agree to participate, I will be asked to consent to the following: I will answer two questionnaires about attitudes I have about people and about how I feel emotionally at the moment and in general. I will then read a literary passage and then answer a questionnaire about how I feel after reading the passage. I understand that all subjects have been randomly assigned into groups for this study, "like the flip of a coin". My participation will require about 45 minutes or so of my time.

#### Risks

There are no risks of any sort associated with this study.

#### Benefits

I understand that there are no personal benefits to myself by participating in this study, but I also understand that my participation will help researchers learn more about how people perceive and understand literature.

Confidentiality

Any and all information I provide for this study will be kept confidential. Only Michael Phillip Kristiansen, Dr. Amy Williamsen, Dr. Malcolm Compitello, Dr. Richard Kinkade, Dr. Alden Roberts, and Dr. Mary Fuller will have access to the data from this study.

Participation Costs and Subject Compensation

I understand that I will not be compensated monetarily for this study. Any compensation I receive will be in some form of class credit, at the discretion of my instructor.

Contacts

I can obtain further information from the principal investigator Michael Phillip Kristiansen, Ph.D. Candidate at 520-621-3396. If I have questions concerning my rights as a research subject, I may call the Human Subjects Committee office at 520-626-6721.

Authorization

BEFORE GIVING MY CONSENT BY SIGNING THIS FORM, THE METHODS, INCONVENIENCES, RISKS, AND BENEFITS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME AND MY QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED. I MAY ASK QUESTIONS AT ANY TIME AND I AM FREE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE PROJECT AT ANY TIME WITHOUT CAUSING BAD FEELINGS. MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROJECT MAY BE ENDED BY THE INVESTIGATOR FOR REASONS THAT WOULD BE EXPLAINED. NEW INFORMATION DEVELOPED DURING THE COURSE OF THIS STUDY WHICH MAY AFFECT MY WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT WILL BE GIVEN TO ME AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. THIS CONSENT FORM WILL BE FILED IN AN AREA DESIGNATED BY THE HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE WITH ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR, MICHAEL PHILLIP KRISTIANSEN, OR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE DEPARTMENT. I DO NOT GIVE UP ANY OF MY LEGAL RIGHTS BY SIGNING THIS FORM. A COPY OF THIS SIGNED CONSENT FORM WILL BE GIVEN TO ME.

---

 Subject's signature

Date

Investigator's Affidavit

I have carefully explained to the subject the nature of the above project. I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the person who is signing this consent form understands clearly the nature, demands, benefits, and risks involved in his/her participation and his/her signature is legally valid. A medical problem or language or educational barrier has not precluded this understanding.

---

 Signature of Investigator

Date

## APPENDIX E, INSTRUCTIONS, INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

M or F \_\_\_  
E or S \_\_\_Instructions

In the upper right corner Please indicate whether you are male or female, and whether you are reading the English or Spanish text.

Introductory Statement [This heading did not appear on the participants' forms.]

This is a study that asks questions designed to find out about feelings people have when they read literature. Since the texts you'll read involve people, you'll also be asked questions about how you perceive different groups of people, particularly men and women. There is no right or wrong answer to any of the questions. As you answer, don't tell what you think "the best", "socially acceptable", or politically correct answer should be. The most important thing to remember as you respond to the questions is that you answer according to how you actually feel personally. ALL INFORMATION YOU PROVIDE IS ANONYMOUS AND CONFIDENTIAL.

## APPENDIX F, AMBIVALENT SEXISM INVENTORY

## Relationships Between Men and Women

Below is a series of statements concerning men and women and their relationships in contemporary society. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement using the following scale: 0 = disagree strongly; 1 = disagree somewhat; 2 = disagree slightly; 3 = agree slightly; 4 = agree somewhat; 5 = agree strongly.

- 1. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he has the love of a woman.
- 2. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality."
- 3. In a disaster, women ought not necessarily to be rescued before men.
- 4. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.
- 5. Women are too easily offended.
- 6. People are often truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a member of the other sex.
- 7. Feminists are not seeking for women to have more power than men.
- 8. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.
- 9. Women should be cherished and protected by men.
- 10. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.
- 11. Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.
- 12. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.
- 13. Men are complete without women.
- 14. Women exaggerate problems they have at work.
- 15. Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash.
- 16. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against.
- 17. A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man.
- 18. There are actually very few women who get a kick out of teasing men by seeming sexually available and then refusing male advances.
- 19. Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility.
- 20. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.
- 21. Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men.
- 22. Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good taste.



## APPENDIX H, PANAS (GENERAL)

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on average. Use the following scale to record your answers.

1	2	3	4	5
very slightly or not at all	a little	moderately	quite a bit	extremely
	<input type="checkbox"/> interested		<input type="checkbox"/> irritable	
	<input type="checkbox"/> distressed		<input type="checkbox"/> alert	
	<input type="checkbox"/> excited		<input type="checkbox"/> ashamed	
	<input type="checkbox"/> upset		<input type="checkbox"/> inspired	
	<input type="checkbox"/> strong		<input type="checkbox"/> nervous	
	<input type="checkbox"/> guilty		<input type="checkbox"/> determined	
	<input type="checkbox"/> scared		<input type="checkbox"/> attentive	
	<input type="checkbox"/> hostile		<input type="checkbox"/> jittery	
	<input type="checkbox"/> enthusiastic		<input type="checkbox"/> active	
	<input type="checkbox"/> proud		<input type="checkbox"/> afraid	

TABLE 1: FREQUENCIES

**Gender**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid male	40	50.0	50.0	50.0
female	40	50.0	50.0	100.0
Total	80	100.0	100.0	

**Language**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid English	40	50.0	50.0	50.0
Spanish	40	50.0	50.0	100.0
Total	80	100.0	100.0	

**Condition**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Negative portrayal of women	26	32.5	32.5	32.5
Negative treatment of women	27	33.8	33.8	66.3
Control text	27	33.8	33.8	100.0
Total	80	100.0	100.0	

TABLE 2: t-TEST, MOOD AND GENDER

## Group Statistics

	GENDER Gender	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MB Mood Before Reading	0 Male	40	2.3971	.6111	9.662E-02
	1 Female	40	2.2075	.5278	8.345E-02
MA Mood After Reading	0 Male	40	2.1425	.6356	.1005
	1 Female	40	1.9450	.5326	8.422E-02
MOODC Mood Change	0 Male	40	-.2546	.5377	8.501E-02
	1 Female	40	-.2625	.6033	9.539E-02

## Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
MB Mood Before Reading	Equal variances assumed	.466	.497	1.485	78	.141	.1896	.1277	-6.45E-02	.4438
	Equal variances not assumed			1.485	76.382	.142	.1896	.1277	-6.46E-02	.4438
MA Mood After Reading	Equal variances assumed	2.202	.142	1.506	78	.136	.1975	.1311	-6.35E-02	.4585
	Equal variances not assumed			1.506	75.682	.136	.1975	.1311	-6.37E-02	.4587
MOODC Mood Change	Equal variances assumed	.689	.409	.062	78	.951	7.868E-03	.1278	-.2465	.2622
	Equal variances not assumed			.062	76.988	.951	7.868E-03	.1278	-.2466	.2623

TABLE 3: ANOVA-MOOD BY CONDITION

Descriptives									
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
MB Mood Before Reading	0 Negative Portrayal of Women	26	2.2462	.6142	.1204	1.8981	2.4942	1.10	3.50
	1 Negative Treatment of Women	27	2.2881	.5805	.1137	2.0845	2.5318	1.40	3.45
	2 Control Text	27	2.3608	.5362	.1032	2.1485	2.5727	1.24	3.60
	Total	80	2.3023	.5753	6.432E-02	2.1743	2.4303	1.10	3.60
MA Mood After Reading	0 Negative Portrayal of Women	26	2.0038	.6140	.1204	1.7558	2.2518	1.10	3.35
	1 Negative Treatment of Women	27	2.1556	.6578	.1288	1.8953	2.4158	1.10	3.50
	2 Control Text	27	1.9704	.4962	9.549E-02	1.7741	2.1687	1.00	3.15
	Total	80	2.0438	.5911	6.609E-02	1.9122	2.1753	1.00	3.50
MOODC Mood Change	0 Negative Portrayal of Women	26	-.2423	.6381	.1251	-.5000	1.542E-02	-1.50	1.55
	1 Negative Treatment of Women	27	-.1428	.5260	.1012	-.3507	6.549E-02	-1.50	1.05
	2 Control Text	27	-.3902	.5284	.1017	-.5992	-.1812	-2.15	.40
	Total	80	-.2586	.5678	6.348E-02	-.3849	-.1322	-2.15	1.55

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
MB Mood Before Reading	Between Groups	.174	2	8.705E-02	.258	.773
	Within Groups	25.972	77	.337		
	Total	26.146	79			
MA Mood After Reading	Between Groups	.524	2	.262	.745	.478
	Within Groups	27.078	77	.352		
	Total	27.602	79			
MOODC Mood Change	Between Groups	.838	2	.419	1.310	.276
	Within Groups	24.632	77	.320		
	Total	25.469	79			

TABLE 4: T-TEST, MOOD AND LANGUAGE

## Group Statistics

	LANG Language	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MB Mood Before Reading	0 English	40	2.4013	.5603	8.859E-02
	1 Spanish	40	2.2034	.5800	9.171E-02
MA Mood After Reading	0 English	40	2.0550	.5793	9.160E-02
	1 Spanish	40	2.0325	.6098	9.642E-02
MOODC Mood Change	0 English	40	-.3463	.5836	9.227E-02
	1 Spanish	40	-.1709	.5447	8.613E-02

## Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
MB Mood Before Reading	Equal variances assumed	.465	.487	1.552	78	.125	.1979	.1275	-5.60E-02	.4517
	Equal variances not assumed			1.552	77.907	.125	.1979	.1275	-5.60E-02	.4517
MA Mood After Reading	Equal variances assumed	.000	.988	.169	78	.866	2.250E-02	.1330	-.2423	.2873
	Equal variances not assumed			.169	77.796	.866	2.250E-02	.1330	-.2423	.2873
MOODC Mood Change	Equal variances assumed	.114	.736	-1.389	78	.169	-.1754	.1262	-.4267	7.592E-02
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.389	77.633	.169	-.1754	.1262	-.4267	7.594E-02

TABLE 5: ANOVA-MOOD AFTER READING BY MAIN EFFECTS

ANOVA<sup>a,b</sup>

			Experimental Method					
			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Slg.	B
MA Mood After Reading	Covariates	(Combined)	6.299	3	2.100	7.071	.000	
		SEXISM Sexism	.157	1	.157	.529	.470	.105
		HS Hostile Sexism	.950	1	.950	3.199	.078	-.220
		MG Mood in General	5.800	1	5.800	19.533	.000	.531
	Main Effects	(Combined)	.930	4	.232	.783	.540	
		GENDER Gender	.651	1	.651	2.194	.143	
		COND Condition	.163	2	8.129E-02	.274	.761	
	2-Way Interactions	LANG Language	2.440E-02	1	2.440E-02	.082	.775	
		(Combined)	.578	5	.116	.389	.854	
		GENDER Gender*	7.385E-02	2	3.692E-02	.124	.883	
		COND Condition						
		GENDER Gender*	.478	1	.478	1.610	.209	
		LANG Language						
	3-Way Interactions	COND Condition*	4.985E-02	2	2.493E-02	.084	.920	
		LANG Language						
		GENDER Gender*						
	COND Condition*	.496	2	.248	.836	.438		
	LANG Language							
	Model		8.303	14	.593	1.997	.032	
	Residual		19.299	85	.297			
Total		27.602	79	.349				

a. MA Mood After Reading by GENDER Gender, COND Condition, LANG Language with SEXISM Sexism, HS Hostile Sexism, MG Mood in General

b. Covariates entered first

TABLE 6: ANOVA-MOOD BEFORE READING BY MAIN EFFECTS

ANOVA<sup>a,b</sup>

			Experimental Method					
			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	B
MB Mood Before Reading	Covariates	(Combined)	11.521	3	3.840	19.245	.000	
		SEXISM Sexism	3.305E-02	1	3.305E-02	.166	.685	-4.80E-02
		HS Hostile Sexism	6.540E-02	1	6.540E-02	.328	.569	5.762E-02
		MG Mood in General	10.369	1	10.369	51.960	.000	.710
	Main Effects	(Combined)	.964	4	.241	1.208	.316	
		GENDER Gender	.277	1	.277	1.390	.243	
		COND Condition	.646	2	.323	1.619	.206	
		LANG Language	6.092E-03	1	6.092E-03	.031	.862	
	2-Way Interactions	(Combined)	.166	5	3.326E-02	.167	.974	
		GENDER Gender*	6.698E-02	2	3.349E-02	.168	.846	
		COND Condition*	3.487E-02	1	3.487E-02	.175	.677	
		LANG Language*	5.722E-02	2	2.861E-02	.143	.867	
		GENDER Gender*						
	3-Way Interactions	COND Condition*	.523	2	.261	1.310	.277	
		LANG Language*						
	Model		13.174	14	.941	4.716	.000	
	Residual		12.971	65	.200			
	Total		26.146	79	.331			

a. MB Mood Before Reading by GENDER Gender, COND Condition, LANG Language with SEXISM Sexism, HS Hostile Sexism, MG Mood in General

b. Covariates entered first

TABLE 7: ANOVA-MOOD CHANGE BY MAIN EFFECTS

ANOVA<sup>a,b</sup>

				Experimental Method					
				Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	B
MOODC Mood Change	Covariates	(Combined)	3.814	3	1.271	4.248	.008		
		SEXISM Sexism	.334	1	.334	1.116	.295	.153	
		HS Hostile Sexism	1.514	1	1.514	5.058	.028	-.277	
		MG Mood In General	.659	1	.659	2.203	.143	-.179	
	Main Effects	(Combined)	1.513	4	.378	1.264	.293		
		GENDER Gender	7.857E-02	1	7.857E-02	.263	.610		
		COND Condition	1.299	2	.650	2.170	.122		
		LANG Language	5.488E-02	1	5.488E-02	.183	.670		
	2-Way Interactions	(Combined)	.396	5	7.915E-02	.264	.931		
		GENDER Gender * COND Condition	6.207E-02	2	3.103E-02	.104	.902		
		GENDER Gender * LANG Language	.255	1	.255	.851	.360		
		COND Condition * LANG Language	.135	2	6.742E-02	.225	.799		
		GENDER Gender * COND Condition * LANG Language	.293	2	.147	.490	.615		
	Model	6.016	14	.430	1.436	.162			
	Residual	19.453	65	.299					
	Total	25.469	79	.322					

a. MOODC Mood Change by GENDER Gender, COND Condition, LANG Language with SEXISM Sexism, HS Hostile Sexism, MG Mood In General

b. Covariates entered first

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