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STATE PARTISAN INTERVENTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

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
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
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ABSTRACT

The dissertation explores the phenomenon of joining behavior —non-neutral interventions by third party states in interstate conflicts. The opportunity and willingness theoretical framework (Most and Starr 1989) is used to develop a model of third party intervention that integrates simultaneously intervention decision, alignment choices, and selection of specific intervention techniques. Within the general model of third party intervention, two models of third party's preference formation —a rational choice and a homophily-based model— are compared. The models are empirically tested with newly collected data on interventions in interstate disputes for the 1946-2001 period. The data expand current knowledge on third states' activities by including information on non-military —diplomatic and economic— intervention techniques. Opportunity factors are found to predict effectively third parties' intervention, while willingness shapes alignment decisions and selection of intervention techniques. Strategic and homophily-based similarities with the state supported in a conflict and dissimilarities with the state being antagonized are found to matter equally in shaping third parties' decisions. Methodologically, this study addresses a variety of selection issues present in current research on joining behavior. Theoretically, it speaks to a variety of international relations issues, such as balance-of-power and bandwagoning, spatial diffusion of conflict, foreign policy substitutability and decision-making, and alliance formation and reliability.

CHAPTER 1

The Decision to Enter a Conflict

1.1 Introduction

When in April 1982 Argentine troops occupied the Falkland Islands —a desolate group of islands off Argentina’s coast, which had been under British control since the 1830s— US President Ronald Reagan found himself in an uneasy position (Weisburd 1997). At the height of the Cold War, the President could not afford to let a severe conflict develop in the US’ own backyard. Even more problematic and potentially harmful was the fact that the dispute involved two countries within the United States’ sphere of influence. The conflict saw, on one side, a Latin American country traditionally close to the US and, on the other side, America’s most loyal ally in Europe. Under such constraints, President Reagan was interested not only in diffusing the tension and preventing a war, but also in preserving a delicate strategic balance and alliance ties in both regions of the world.

Despite the scarce strategic and economic importance of the Falkland islands, the conflict between Great Britain and Argentina proved impossible to prevent. Both countries sternly rejected the US’ initial attempts to find a diplomatic solution to the dispute. Argentina in particular showed unwillingness to renounce the islands it had just conquered. With British warships en route towards the Falklands, by the end of April, 1982, it became evident that a military confrontation was almost inevitable. Ronald Reagan faced a tough decision. Could the US afford to remain neutral in such a conflict? And if it chose to intervene, with which side in

the conflict was the US to align? Ultimately, historical alliance ties prevailed over neighborly relations. On April 30, 1982 —almost four weeks after the Argentine seizure of the Falkland islands— the United States ceased any attempt to mediate the conflict, imposed economic sanctions on Argentina, and began providing material support for the British. With the support of her allies, Britain's action in the Falkland was swift and decisive. British troops landed on May 21, 1982, and recaptured the islands in slightly more than three weeks and with limited casualties.¹ The American support for Great Britain continued until Argentine troops officially surrendered on June 14, 1982 (Weisburd 1997, 53-54). The US kept sanctions against Argentina in place until July of the same year.

President Reagan was not alone in facing such a foreign policy dilemma. Latin American and European policy-makers found themselves in a very similar position. The European Community states reacted quickly and threw their support behind Great Britain. Latin American countries showed greater sympathy for the Argentine invasion, although they appeared reluctant to become directly involved in the confrontation. The question of how President Reagan, the European Community states, and other Latin American countries chose to act in the regard to the dispute between Great Britain and Argentina is equally challenging and complex. But the problem of what to do when other states engage in military hostilities transcends the Falkland islands conflict. It is a pervasive dilemma in international politics. At some point in their history, all states in the international system have been forced to consider what to do about a conflict between other nations. Could they afford to remain neutral? If neutrality is not an option, which side in the conflict should they

¹Approximately 250 British troops died in combat, while 1,100 were wounded. This was in sharp contrast with the 746 casualties and 13,000 captured troops suffered by Argentina (Weisburd 1997).

support? And if they choose to intervene in a conflict, which approach would be the most effective? Direct military involvement? Economic sanctions? Diplomatic pressure? How much are they willing to commit in the process of intervening?

These questions constantly trouble nations' leaders and policy makers as well as analysts and scholars of international politics. This study proposes a new set of answers to such lingering foreign policy questions by exploring the process through which external states —also labeled *third parties*— decide to become involved in ongoing conflicts between other countries. As stated before, interventions by third states in disputes between other countries is a recurrent phenomenon in international politics. Countries take sides and intervene in other states' wars using a wide range of violent (military) and non-violent (non-military) techniques. Despite its relevance to our understanding of conflict dynamics and foreign policy, previous research has not managed to develop a theory of third party interventions that fully explains this phenomenon. Most theories of international conflict look at this phenomenon as a byproduct of alignment choices made before a conflict or as a question tangential to the bigger problem of the onset and spread of war. Rival hypotheses about alignment choices and third parties' intervention decisions abound. But most studies analyze these phenomena in isolation, without exploring the relation between them. Even less is known about how states select their intervention technique. Dearth of adequate data complicates efforts to analyze this issue thoroughly. This work contributes theoretically and empirically to our knowledge of third party interventions by filling many of the voids of current research and by addressing previously unexplored questions about third parties' behavior. It offers a model of third party interventions that simultaneously accounts for third

parties' decision to join, their alignment choices, and their selection of intervention techniques. It achieves these goals in part by collecting and exploring new information about third parties' non-military interventions in ongoing militarized interstate disputes for the post-World War II period.

1.2 The Relevance of Third Parties' Interventions

During the last couple of centuries the majority of international disputes between states has involved only two participants (Cusack and Eberwin 1982; Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996). Nonetheless, each time a conflict between two states arises in the international system, other nations face the complex decision of whether to intervene, on which side to intervene, and how to intervene. Progress in military, transportation, and information technology in modern times has dramatically increased the likelihood that third states will affect and be affected by hostilities ongoing in other parts of the globe. Such developments have also increased the ease with which third parties can intervene in geographically remote conflicts. Technological and economic progress has also amplified the scope and range of states' interests, making them truly global in character. Breadth of interests and projection capabilities make the opportunity to become involved in external conflicts especially relevant for major power states. Yet, all countries—not just the powerful ones—confront the choice of whether to intervene in other states' confrontations as an omnipresent, and increasingly more acute, foreign policy dilemma.

The issue of partisan *joining behavior*—i.e., the act of taking side with a contender in a conflict—has immediate relevance for each nation's foreign policy-making. This phenomenon also lies at the intersection between different theoretical perspectives in the field of International Relations (IR). Yet, the decision to enter

an ongoing conflict on the side of either disputant has received somewhat marginal attention in the discipline. Many scholars have used the logic that shapes alignment decisions before conflict in order to explain interventions during a conflict. In addition, some of the existing studies that deal directly with the subject, or touch upon it indirectly, tend to focus either on the decision to intervene in a conflict or on third parties' alignment choices as two isolated phenomena. With due exceptions, no theory provides a comprehensive view of joining behavior as a process. Rather, current knowledge of third party interventions is based on theoretical "snapshots" of the different stages of this phenomenon.

Moreover, most of the existing works concentrate on third parties' participation in wars and on military forms of interventions in such conflicts. The participation by external states in conflicts of lower intensity than war is rarely addressed both in theoretical and in empirical terms. Systematic studies of non-military forms of interventions in interstate conflicts also are rarely found in the literature. As a result, analyses of states' joining behavior are guided by the assumptions that: (a) interventions by state actors in wars and conflicts of lower intensity are essentially the same phenomena; (b) the only relevant interventions by states in external conflicts are military in nature. Yet, as seen in the example of the confrontation between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland islands, third states' involvement is often non-military, and such interventions can be decisive in the resolution of a conflict.

It is plausible that past and present studies of third parties' interventions in conflicts between other states have observed only a limited part of a phenomenon of much larger proportions. It is possible that most joining behavior by external states is non-military in character and occurs in conflicts of less virulent nature than

wars. If this is the case, what is known about the propensity to intervene in ongoing interstate conflicts are based on the analysis of a very particular set of occurrences—that is, military interventions in wars. Moreover, current knowledge of the factors affecting states' decision to intervene rest on the observation of a limited sample of third parties—those willing to use military force in a full-scale war. There are limited theoretical and empirical foundations for assuming that the choice of a selected number of states to join a war militarily can be indiscriminately applied to all states and to all forms of international conflict. The dynamics and logic governing the phenomenon of states' joining behavior may be more complex than commonly assumed by foreign policy-makers and international politics scholars alike.

The objective of this study is then threefold. The first goal is to develop a theoretical framework that can account for the phenomenon of joining behavior in its complexity. Most of the existing theories limit themselves to the identification of individual factors affecting a particular stage of joining behavior. An improved theoretical framework should, instead, account for all of the steps that comprise a state's decision to intervene in a conflict. In other words, the decision to intervene *per se*, the alignment decision, and the choice of a specific intervention technique should not be considered as independent decisions. Rather, they should be conceptualized as sequential and interdependent steps in the same decision-making process.

The second goal is to investigate empirically why states sometimes resort to non-military forms of interventions—while in other occasions they find it necessary to employ military force—and how this decision is made. Specifically, what factors shape the decision of third parties to resort to militarized or non-militarized forms

of intervention in interstate disputes? Addressing this question involves evaluating the extent to which existing theories about militarized joining behavior in war can be extended to other forms of intervention in conflicts of lower intensity. Are the factors that guide the decision to enter a war or a dispute using military means the same that shape the decision to resort to other, non-military forms of intervention? Is the dilemma of intervening militarily or non-militarily an “either/or” question? Or do states look at the choice to join an external conflict in terms of a continuum ranging from a non militarized extreme to a militarized one? The answer to these questions necessitates the collection of new information of third parties’ non-military intervention in ongoing conflict.

In addition, the answer to these questions must be accompanied by an empirical analysis of the extent to which states intervene in international disputes in non-military ways vis-a-vis their propensity to resort to the use of military force. This leads to the third and final objective. This final objective is to arrive at an empirical model which may allow us to explore the degree of dependence between different stages of the intervention decision-making process. Contrary to the approach followed by most of the existing studies on joining behavior, it is difficult to imagine that the decision to join, alignment choices, and selection of an intervention technique are independent from one another. It is then necessary to adopt empirical models that allow a researcher to take into account how decision made at a particular stage of the joining decision-making process are influenced by decision made at the previous stages. Because the empirical models necessary to this type of analysis are rather complex and of recent development, the final objective of this research may bring some insight on the effectiveness and usefulness of some new methodological approaches to the study of conflict processes.

1.3 Theories on States' Intervention in Conflicts

For the purpose of this study, *partisan* or *participatory interventions* in conflict are defined as instances of intervention in a militarized dispute in which a third party state take sides with either disputant with the intent to help that state to prevail in the conflict. Partisan or participatory interventions in interstate disputes contrast with *neutral*, or *intermediary*, forms of interventions, in which a third party engages in behavior aimed at the resolution of the conflict, without siding with either disputant. Neutral forms of intervention in conflict have received substantive attention in international relations research. The relevance of intermediary efforts by third party for the onset, evolution, and resolution of interstate conflicts has been amply assessed both in empirical and theoretical terms (see, for instance Bercovitch 1986, 1991, 1996; Bercovitch and Diehl 1997; Butterworth and Scranton 1976; Diehl 1988, 1993; Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel 1996; Dixon 1993, 1994, 1996; Raymond 1994; Sherman 1994; Young 1972). Existing studies have explored the neutral interventions by state and non-state actors in different types of conflicts, ranging from wars to crises. Specific conflict management techniques employed by third parties have also been explored, with particular attention given to the distinction between military —e.g., peacekeeping— and nonmilitary —e.g., mediation— forms of participation. Scholars dealing with the issue of mediatory participation in conflict have developed exhaustive theories, which are supported by strong empirical evidence concerning the third parties' motives for intervening (Young 1967, 1972), the traits of the third parties themselves (Dixon 1993, 1994), the techniques they employ (Raymond 1994), and the effectiveness of such techniques (Dixon 1996; Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel 1996).

The same cannot be said of third party partisan interventions. The major theoretical approaches in the field of international relations have addressed the problem of which factors guide a state's decision to take sides in an ongoing conflict. Yet, with a few exceptions, most scholars have treated the issue of partisan intervention as a theoretical subcategory of a larger class of international phenomena. More specifically, the decision to intervene in an ongoing conflict has often been looked at as the byproduct of alignment choices made *before* the onset of a crisis or the start of military hostilities between two or more states. Many studies on joining behavior have also failed to distinguish theoretically among the various types of third parties' partisan interventions that occur during the different stages of a conflict. Rather, the general tendency has been to extend hypotheses about pre-war alignment choices and about the decision to take side in full-fledged wars to all stages of a conflict and to conflicts of lower magnitude than wars. In addition, few or no studies on alignment choices in ongoing conflicts have developed a theoretical distinction between different techniques of partisan interventions and, in particular, between *military* and *non-military* forms of interventions.

Theories of international politics that emphasize the tendency of states to engage in balance-of-power politics have shaped the way most analysts look at joining behavior (see Morgenthau 1985; Waltz 1979). Balance-of-power theories are concerned both with states' alignment choices in alliances before a conflict and joining behavior during a conflict. However, in regard to the tendency of states to take side during a conflict, these approaches generate contradictory expectations. Because it sees states as being concerned with the maximization of power, what has been labeled as classic realism predicts that states will enter an ongoing conflict whenever they can achieve some gains, and they will do so frequently (Morgenthau

1985, 1967). The tendency to intervene in external interstate quarrels is expected to be greater for revisionist states —that is, states that are dissatisfied with the the status quo. Newer variants of the balance-of-power approach, such as neorealism, theorize that security concerns motivate states' actions. Therefore, they predict that states will avoid taking part in hostilities between other countries, because they are most interested with their own survival (Waltz 1979). It is only when their survival is directly challenged that third parties are expected to take side in an external conflict. Nonetheless, balance-of-power approaches converge on the prediction that third parties will side with the weaker disputant in an attempt to balance against the stronger contender.

From within this tradition, some scholars have begun to modify the central tenets of the balance-of-power view on joining behavior. Walt (1987) has suggested that states side against the most threatening opponent rather than against the stronger country. Christensen and Snyder (1990) have proposed that a country's alignment choices may depend on the behavior of other states and on military technology and strategy. According to these authors, states may be "chain-ganged" into a conflict by reckless allies when military technology and strategy favors the offense, or they may "pass the buck" to other states and avoid intervention altogether when military technology and strategy favors the defense. Finally, some have observed that often third parties will intervene militarily in ongoing conflict on the side of the stronger combatant in order to capitalize on the benefits that come with victory. This behavior is labeled "bandwagoning", and it may be more diffused among dissatisfied, revisionist states (Schweller 1994).

Many scholars have challenged some of the balance-of-power hypotheses by suggesting that factors other than power-based and strategic considerations matter in

determining the joining behavior of third party states. These analysts have emphasized the normative, institutional, and economic forces that may affect a state's decision to intervene and its alignment choices. In particular, studies on the phenomenon of the democratic peace have indirectly led to the expectation that regime type may influence the frequency and timing of third party interventions (Enterline 1999). Although it is debatable whether states with similar forms of government tend to ally with each other before a conflict (Siverson and Emmons 1991; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Lai and Reiter 2000), it appears that intervening third parties tend to take side with the disputant more similar to them in regard to regime type (Werner and Lemke 1997). This tendency is common not only among democratic states but also among non-democratic regimes.

Other recent works within this perspective explore the relevance of economic ties and international organization (IO) membership in the conflict behavior of nations (Russett, Oneal and Davis 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Gartzke, Li and Boehmer 2001), indicating that the decision to enter a conflict may be more complex than usually theorized. In particular, these studies have indirectly suggested that strong economic ties and IO memberships reduce the likelihood of initiating a conflict, but they may increase the probability of getting involved in one as a third party. Similarity of institutions, economic interdependence, and shared IO membership reflects a general affinity of interests that translates into similar foreign policy behavior (Gartzke 2000). Overall, empirical analyses of the hypotheses derived from non-balance-of-power approaches have tested the relevance of domestic-level factors on the decision of states to become involved not only in full scale wars, but also in conflicts of lower intensity, such as militarized disputes.

Some scholars have looked at interventions in conflict not just as the result of strategic or domestic-level factors, but also as the result of larger dynamics of spatial diffusion of conflict. In particular, they have emphasized the so-called process of contagion of conflict (Beer 1979; Most and Starr 1980; Most, Starr and Siverson 1989; Siverson and Starr 1991). According to this view, geographical proximity increases the opportunity for a third party to become involved in an ongoing conflict. The likelihood of an intervention is maximum when a third party state is geographically contiguous to either or both originators of a conflict. This theory suggests that third party involvement will occur when the opportunity to intervene is coupled with the willingness to do so. Overall, the opportunity and willingness framework offers an interesting framework for examining not just conflict contagion-diffusion, but also joining behavior. The usefulness of the opportunity and willingness framework is further explored in the following chapters.

While spatial proximity influences a third party's opportunity to intervene, the presence of an alliance with either disputant can affect the willingness to enter an external interstate dispute. Scholars have long debated about the reliability of alliances (Sabrosky 1980; Siverson and Tennefoss 1984; Oren 1990; Smith 1996; Leeds, Mitchell McLaughlin and Long 2000). Nonetheless, studies on alliances and their reliability have produced consistent evidence that: (1) allies are more likely to join into a conflict than non-allies (Singer and Small 1966; Siverson and King 1979, 1980; Kim 1991); and (2) third parties base their joining decision on the expectation that other allies may enter a conflict. The general expectation is that the larger the number of their alliance ties, the greater the likelihood that third parties will intervene in a conflict.

Several scholars have focused on the joining behavior of major power states. Major power states are expected to have a greater range of foreign policy interests. They tend to have more alliance ties than less powerful states. They are members of more intergovernmental organizations. They have a larger number of economic ties with other states. They have greater ability for power projection. As a result, major power states are more likely to exhibit a peculiar joining behavior. Some of the existing studies have indicated that major powers are more likely than other states to join into a conflict (Yamamoto and Bremer 1980; Huth 1996); that they tend to enter a conflict in collaboration with other states (Corbetta and Dixon 2004); but that such apparent multilateralism is the result of the bandwagoning tendencies of smaller states (Dixon 1984).

1.4 Two Models of Third Party Interventions

A brief overview of the existing theories and studies on joining behavior suggests that most analysts concentrate on specific factors affecting third parties' decision to intervene in a conflict. Balance-of-power approaches stress the importance of security and power imbalances. Alternative views underscore the importance of regime type, economic ties, and membership in international organizations. Other studies point at the effects of geographic proximity, alliance ties and major power status. Yet, it appears that only few of these approaches actually move beyond the identification of the determinants of partisan interventions. Most of them fail to provide a comprehensive theory explaining why and when third parties intervene, how they choose on which side to intervene, and how they decide the technique with which to intervene. Moreover, as previously suggested, most of these studies draw their conclusions from the application of hypotheses about intervention in

war to interventions in other types of conflict. The risk is that such conclusions may be based on unrepresentative samples of observations and of actors.

Few analysts seem to have concerned themselves with developing a comprehensive model of third party partisan interventions that incorporates some or all of the explanatory factors outlined above. Some formal theorists have designed models that take into account: (1) the rational decision-making process that shapes states' alignment choices; and (2) their decision to become involved in an ongoing conflict. These models hypothesize that outside states will intervene in a conflict when they have a positive expected utility toward the victory of either combatant. Interveners are predicted to side with the contender for which they have the larger positive utility (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Bueno de Mesquita 1980, 1981, 1989). Expected utility models employ several of the factors identified by both balance-of-power theories and alternative views in order to establish a potential third party's utility toward either disputant. Some of these works have employed alliance portfolios in order to measure states' utility toward the conflict initiators and states' capabilities for measuring the probabilities associated with possible outcomes.

Formal models have supported the claim that third parties follow balance-of-power considerations. Yet, because of their frequent reliance on traditional power-based indicators, such as capabilities and alliances, some expected utility models may have been somewhat "biased" in favor of balance-of-power expectations. When they are extended to the choices of specific states and to a different class of conflicts, some of the same formal models have indicated that, for instance, ideological considerations may enter into a state's decision to intervene (Kaw 1990). Other applications of the expected utility framework have suggested that a third party's decision to intervene depends on its expectations about the behavior of other states.

In particular, third parties are prone to intervene when they expect that no other third parties will intervene or after other third parties have already joined (Kim 1991). It also appears equally rational for the originators of a conflict to adjust their objectives and demands in order to deter the intervention of external states (see, for instance Werner 2000*a*).

Formal theories based on assumptions about the rational/strategic behavior of third party states represent a step forward in the study of joining behavior for several reasons. They do not just isolate individual determinants of third party intervention. Rather, they employ the factors identified by balance-of-power and alternative theories in order to specify the preferences of third parties. They then use such preferences to model a state's decision to intervene and its choice on which side to intervene as a dynamic, strategic process. Unlike other approaches, rational/strategic models also allow researchers to narrow the population of potential interveners by focusing attention on states with a positive expected utility toward either participant. In addition, they indirectly generate hypotheses about third parties' choices of intervention techniques. They do so by suggesting that third parties with high expected utility will be more likely to adopt more decisive methods of intervention.

An alternative to rational choice, formal models is indirectly suggested by studies that have challenged the traditional balance of power framework. Many of these works reach the conclusion that states which share similarities on some critical traits are more likely to bind together in various associative arrangements. Similarity of government type seems to be the critical trait that most often recurs in this body of literature. However, status in the international hierarchy, type of economic system, cultural and linguistic similarities, and "attitude" towards international

organizations may also affect the propensity of some states to join in common associations. The probability that such similar traits will result in shared ties may be affected by contextual factors, such as geographical proximity. The propensity of similar actors to develop associative bonds is known in the sociological literature as “homophily” (see, for instance Feld 1982; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson, Popielarz and Drobnic 1992; Popielarz and McPherson 1995). An homophily based model of partisan intervention leads to the expectation that states will be more likely to intervene in an ongoing dispute the more similar they are to either of the disputants on some critical dimension.

Much like the expected utility model, the homophily approach provides a useful framework for understanding a variety of decisions about joining made by third parties. This model, in fact, allows one to understand the origin of states’ preferences the result of a wide range of traits that determine similarities among countries. It also allows one to develop hypotheses about what states will be more likely to enter a conflict, when they will be more likely to intervene, and which side they will take. In addition, this approach suggests that the modes of intervention —i.e., the intervention techniques— adopted by potential third parties will depend on their degree of similarity with either disputant. However, unlike the formal expected utility model sketched above, a homophily-based theory of third party interventions does not necessarily presupposes that the decision to intervene will be exclusively based on rational, strategic calculations. The two models differ in their identification of a pool of potential third parties and in their predictions about alignment choices. These two alternative approaches and the hypotheses they generate will be more thoroughly described in the following chapter.

To summarize, the alternative models of third party interventions just outlined go beyond existing theories of joining behavior for a variety of reasons. First, they focus specifically and directly on the decision to intervene in an ongoing conflict, as they separate pre-war alignment choices from decisions made after fighting broke out. Second, they do not concentrate on specific determinants of joining behavior. Rather, they use a variety of state-level and dyadic characteristics to specify third parties' foreign policy preferences. Third, they attempt to model the intervention and alignment choices as dynamic, strategic processes rather than single-shot decisions. Fourth, they develop expectations not just about a third party's alignment choices, but also about the mode of an intervention. Fifth, they help us build hypotheses about the behavior of third parties after they join a conflict and the effects of such interventions on the evolution of conflict. Finally, they focus our attention on the variety of activities that constitute third party interventions —not just military interventions.

Nonetheless, the strategic/rational and the homophily-based models of third party interventions do not tell the entire story about joining behavior. While they present alternative alternative conceptions about the sources of third parties' preferences, they say little about the actual ability of third party states to become involved in conflicts. Regardless of their attitudes toward either side in a conflict, and regardless of their willingness to spend precious resources to support friends and defeat enemies, not all potential third parties have the same amount of resources. In addition, different potential joiners operate in different environment and face different disputes. As a result, a comprehensive view of joining behavior must take into account the means available to a third party and its interaction with the surrounding environment. The combination of unit-level attributes and environmental

attributed largely determines the possibilities available to potential third parties and the probability that they will take advantage of them. Thus, the homophily and the strategic/rational “stories” must be compensated by the analysis of the opportunities available to third parties. The broader theoretical design that brings together three components of joining behavior —homophily, rational/strategic interests, and opportunity— is provided by Most and Starr (1989)’s opportunity and willingness approach to international politics and foreign policy-making. In very plain terms, this view suggests that joining behavior is largely shaped by third states’ opportunity to intervene and by their willingness to do so. State-specific, conflict-specific, and contextual factors affect third parties’ opportunities. Their willingness depends, instead, either on their strategic/rational goals or on their homophily-based preferences (or both). The opportunity-willingness approach to the study of joining behavior is presented in detail in the following chapters.

1.5 The Inclusion of Non-Military Interventions

In addition to complementing some of the theoretical work done so far on joining behavior, this study also has a strong empirical motivation. Existing research on third party interventions has employed a narrow definition of joining behavior. With a few exceptions, most works concentrate on military interventions in wars. This narrow focus has resulted in potentially biased results and limited theoretical development.

Empirically, expanding the definition of joining behavior to include non-military forms of third party interventions in conflicts of lower intensity than wars would allow researchers to explore and develop models of joining behavior that go beyond the binary-choice models currently employed in the study of this phenomenon. Such

models may resemble the expected-utility and homophily models discussed above. Most foreign policy actions —and in particular those concerning conflict behavior— do not result from relatively simply “either/or” choices taken in a decision-making vacuum. Rather, they result from strategic interactions among multiple actors occurring in the context of complex environmental dynamics. Yet, a large number of studies on conflict apply models that fail to capture the strategic context in which foreign policy decisions are made (Signorino 1999). This may occur either for lack of better suited statistical models or for the absence of adequate data on conflict dynamics. Regardless of its cause, this practice can produce biased results and may lead researchers to accept overly stylized theories. Bringing non-military third party actions in disputes into the picture —in addition to the existing data on militarized interventions in full-scale wars— can help researchers reconstruct the complexity of the decision to start or to enter a war. If, in turn, this facilitates the task of selecting the appropriate empirical models for the research question at hand, more efficient and less biased information about joining behavior and conflict behavior can be obtained.

Military interventions in wars may be the tip of a much larger phenomenon that begins with a state’s decision to enter a conflict of lower intensity. The escalation of a low-intensity dispute into a war, or the failure of such a dispute to escalate, can be the result of the decision by some third parties to intervene in the initial stages of a conflict with non-military actions. These decisions are likely to be strategic. Third party’s actions affect and are affected in turn by the dynamics of the ongoing conflict and by the choices of other potential interveners. The dynamic dimension of the processes of conflict onset and conflict expansion can be investigated by including non-militarized forms of third party interventions in the analysis of joining behavior.

This approach offers the potential for interesting theoretical advancement. It would be possible, for example, to apply to the study of joining behavior theories and models of deterrence, crisis bargaining, and conflict expansion that have previously been used in other settings, such as those developed by Kilgour and Zagare (1991), Morrow (1989), Nalebuff (1991), and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992).

Finally, taking into consideration non-militarized forms of intervention can help researchers discriminate among the different stages that compose a third party's broader decision to enter a conflict. Most of the existing approaches to this topic consider either the decision to intervene or the alignment choice. However, it appears that considerations about the techniques available to a potential intervener should weigh just as heavily in the overall decision to join a conflict. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979), Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Kim (1991), and others note that the decision to intervene is affected by a third party's estimation of what other third parties will do. Non-military forms of interventions such as expressions of support, promises of economic aid, or use of sanctions signal to either third parties what a state may be willing to do with regard to an ongoing conflict. Moreover, Werner (2000*a*) points out that combatants in a war adjust their behavior strategically depending on their expectations about potential third parties' intentions. Third parties' non-military actions may serve as a signal of their intentions to the belligerents, who can update their expectations and adjust their actions accordingly. Thus, exploring how states resort to non-militarized forms of conflict intervention and the timing of their choices in this regard, should help researchers understand the way in which the decision to intervene takes shape. It is possible, for instance, that potential third parties "test the waters" before deciding whether to intervene and which side to take by evaluating the reaction of either disputant to

the use of non-military techniques. Or the factors motivating a non-military intervention may diverge from those leading to a militarized action. Nonetheless, IR theories on joining behavior fail to consider higher levels of complexity, and the data available cannot support a more discriminant analysis.

In the Falkland islands war, for example, a large amount of joining behavior occurred on both sides of the dispute. The United States and the European Community chose to offer moral and material support to Great Britain. Some—although not all—Latin American states expressed support for Argentina. However, their commitment to Argentina appeared to be moderate at best. Latin American countries' support remained verbal and diplomatic. It never grew into provision of economic or military aid. It can be hypothesized that Latin American countries were influenced in their choice by the possibility of alienating the US and other Western countries. In this regard, the intervention decision for the leaders of Latin American countries was more problematic than President Reagan's decision. Yet, this dimension of the Falkland islands conflict is lost in too many accounts because none of the states who actually intervened in the war did so militarily. In most cases, the Falkland islands war is simply recorded as a confrontation between Great Britain and Argentina.² It is questionable whether interventions by the US and other countries would have altered the outcome of the conflict. Nonetheless, all the unrecorded interventions by many third parties raise essential questions about the escalation of the Falkland islands dispute into a war, about why the war remained circumscribed to two states, and about the complex decisions made by the United States, the European Community states, and several other Latin American states.

²See, for instance, how the conflict is recorded in the Correlates of War's Militarized Interstate Disputes data set (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996).

1.6 Outline of the Project

The overarching objective of this project is to provide a more detailed picture of the phenomenon of joining behavior by investigating: (1) states' tendency to enter ongoing conflicts of lower intensity than wars; (2) the factors promoting their alignment choices, and (3) the determinants of the decision to adopt specific joining techniques. The present study explores and tests the expected utility-based and the homophily-based approaches to third party interventions within the broader opportunity and willingness theoretical framework. This approach is applied to an expanded definition of joining behavior—a definition which includes non-military interventions in conflicts of lower intensity than wars. This study re-examines some of the hypotheses on third parties raised by the balance-of-power approach and its alternatives by recasting them in a more comprehensive approach to joining behavior and in a broader empirical context. In addition, this project explores the extent to which the study of non-military interventions in disputes improves our understanding of conflict dynamics in general.

For these purposes, original data on military and non-militarized partisan interventions have been collected. The empirical domain of this study is defined by the militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) occurring after 1945.³ All pairs of states—also called *dyads*—that experienced at least one militarized dispute in the post-World War II period have been identified and ranked according to the number of confrontations they experienced. Each post-1945 dyad has been systematically investigated for presence of third party interventions, with particular attentions

³Militarized interstate disputes are commonly defined as “cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed toward the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state” (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 163).

given to previously unrecorded non-military interventions. The following chapters present the detailed categorization of techniques of non-military interventions, which range from simple expressions of opposition or support to the provision of economic or military assistance. The data do not quite provide all of the information necessary to develop a perfectly strategic model of joining behavior like the one advocated above. In particular, they do not include actions and reactions by conflict originators. Yet, they offer a useful springboard for future research in that direction.

The study consists of two major sections. The first three chapters of the dissertation lay the foundations for the following analysis. They are meant to be theoretical and descriptive in character. The present chapter has introduced the issue of joining behavior, described the literature on this topic, outlined the shortcomings of the existing research, and suggested some avenues for improving our knowledge on third party interventions and conflict dynamics. The second chapter outlines in detail the opportunity-willingness framework for understanding joining behavior and the two alternative models of third parties' willingness—an expected utility model and a homophily-based model. Because the data used for the following empirical analysis are relatively new, Chapter Three describes the data set, its main variables, and the collection procedures. It presents aggregate-level trends and patterns about states' tendency to adopt non-militarized intervention techniques.

The second section of this study is more empirical and tests the alternative models of third party interventions as outlined in Chapter Two. Chapter Four explores hypotheses about the likelihood of intervention and third parties' alignment choices as a function of opportunity, strategic/rational, and homophily-based factors. Contrary to previous studies, these hypotheses are explored simultaneously

through a two-stage selection model. Chapter Five further extends opportunity-willingness approach to joining behavior by testing a set of hypotheses concerning the adoption of specific intervention techniques. The emphasis is on differences between non-military —i.e., economic and diplomatic— and military interventions. Several econometric techniques are employed to explore the extent to which different degrees of willingness and opportunity lead to the adoption of costlier forms of intervention. Finally, Chapter Six summarizes the empirical findings; it assesses the theoretical and practical contribution of this work; and it attempts to derive a few substantive implications from the very broad model of third party interventions presented here.

CHAPTER 2

Opportunity and Willingness: Theories of Partisan Intervention

2.1 Introduction

Periods marked by complete absence of conflict have been extremely rare in history. Even in the relatively peaceful years after World War II, the presence of several disputes between states evolving simultaneously in the international system has been the rule rather than the exception. The majority of these disputes remain isolated incidents involving no more than two states (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996). Some conflicts, however, attract the attention of leaders in other states, who are then faced with the decision of whether or not to get involved. The question of what characteristics differentiate conflicts which draw in additional states from conflicts that remain limited affairs arises spontaneously.

This question has drawn the curiosity of historians and scholars of international relations alike. Scholars have focused on two different sets of factors affecting the propensity of a conflict to involve multiple actors beside its originators. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some analysts have investigated the contextual characteristics of a conflict that make it likely to expand in space and time. The brutality of some disputes, the thorny issues about which they are fought, their geographical location, and the characteristics of the states that started them make some disputes more likely to escalate and spread. Other scholars, instead, have focused on the decision process that leads potential third parties to become actual

interveners. Formal and informal ties binding external states with the disputants, and the possibility to score significant gains by becoming involved, tend to precipitate the actual involvement of third parties.

Yet, the actual intervention in a conflict —whether analyzed in terms of a state’s decision-making process or in terms of a conflict’s spontaneous tendency to expand— is only a part of a larger puzzle. Understanding what makes states become third parties raises the questions of how they decide which side in the conflict to support and how they should intervene. Interventions and alignment decisions have been traditionally understood in terms of the realist notions of balancing and bandwagoning or in terms of alliance ties. However, such choices can be more complex than a simple dichotomous decision of siding with the weaker or stronger side. How to explain, for instance, Jordan’s puzzling decision to throw its weight behind Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, even though the probability of success was nearly nonexistent and King Hussein had equally strong reasons for supporting the coalition forces? As Werner and Lemke (1997) and others suggest, power and alliance considerations are not the only determinants of alignment choices. Other factors must help shape the relationship between potential third parties and disputants and, in turn, alignment choices. Many of the same formal and informal ties used by scholars to explain alignment choices in conflict are the same ties that explain the decision to intervene in the first place.

The choice of intervention technique is the third dimension of the intervention puzzle and the one least explored in the literature on joining behavior. Returning to the example used in the preceding chapter, what led Ronald Reagan to assess that verbal support of Great Britain was the “right” way to intervene in the Falkland Island war, while European states adopted more decisive economic sanctions

against Argentina? Existing research does not have a direct answer to this question. However, it suggests -again- that factors related to the contextual character of the conflict at hand and to the relations between third parties and disputants may be part of the explanation. If this is truly the case, it appears that the choice of an intervention technique is deeply intertwined with the intervention and alignment decisions.

As suggested earlier, the “joining behavior puzzle” derives from the multi-dimensionality of this phenomenon. Actual intervention, alignment preferences, and choice of intervention techniques are interconnected steps in a complex process that may result either in conflict expansion or conflict circumscription. Analyzing the three dimensions in isolation may lead us to erroneous conclusions about the dynamics of interstate conflict. However, existing research on the causes of the individual dimensions of joining behavior indicates that partisan interventions in conflicts depend either on a potential third party’s motivations to become involved or on the opportunity to join in a conflict, or both. Virulent, proximate conflicts and a state’s own material means present potential third parties with the opportunity to get involved. Strong preferences for either disputant or interest in a certain outcome shape a state’s motivation for committing to the conflict either in military or non-military terms.

Existing research does not suggest a unifying theoretical framework which embraces all dimensions of joining behavior and accounts for why the same sets of factors seems to explain intervention, alignment, and technique choice. The conflict literature, however, does suggest that joining behavior —like other forms of international behavior— can be said to depend on third parties’ opportunity and willingness. The notion that states act internationally because they can and want

to act has been extensively described and used (see Most and Starr 1980, 1984, 1989; Most, Starr and Siverson 1989; Siverson and Starr 1990, 1991). The opportunity and willingness approach surmises the aforementioned multiple dimensions of partisan interventions under a broad theoretical umbrella. It provides a useful general categorization for identifying the many factors that may affect third parties' behavior and for deriving hypotheses about joining behavior. The opportunity and willingness framework is introduced in this chapter first in general terms. The chapter then tackles the opportunity aspects of partisan interventions, developing hypotheses about the contextual factors which influence third parties' options for conflict involvement. Finally, it deals with the willingness dimensions of joining behavior. It does so by developing hypothesis concerning the homophily and expected utility ties that shape third parties' desire to enter an ongoing militarized dispute.

2.2 Opportunity and Willingness in International Politics

States act in the international arena when they can and when they want to. Although this statement may sound like a platitude, it should not be treated as such. Much research in international relations is based on the notion that states react automatically and in identical ways to the forces and constraints operating within the international system. The traditional "pool table" view of the international system, for instance, or the neorealist notion that all states are motivated by security objectives, implicitly rests on these premises. Yet, behavioral variation among states is better accounted for by recognizing that not all states share similar preferences, and that the international system's constraints do not affect all countries in the same manner. The idea that states' actions can be understood in

terms of the opportunities they face and their willingness to act is more useful than suggested by its apparent simplicity.

The characteristics and forces of the international system surely “shape and shove” the behavior of states, either facilitating or preventing their actions (Waltz 1986, 343). However, states do not respond uniformly to such systemic forces. Faced with similar constraints, not all states become active third parties in ongoing conflicts. And when they do so, not all states intervene in the same manner. Opening the “black box” of the state is important if one is to explain not just the variety of behaviors we observe in international politics, but also the variety of actions that fall under the label of joining behavior. The concepts of opportunity and willingness are useful for the present analysis—and for the study of international relations in general—because they allow one to combine macro and micro levels of analysis. The micro-level of analysis refers to such domestic factors as decision-makers’ preferences, organizational dynamics, rational or expected utility calculations, etc. The macro-level of analysis pertains to systemic factors such as the distribution of material power among states or the polarity of the system (Siverson and Starr 1991, 21).

Within the opportunity and willingness framework, the notion of opportunity refers to the “possibilities that are available to any entity within any environment, representing the total set of environmental constraints and possibilities” (Siverson and Starr 1990, 48). In the study of joining behavior, opportunity logically refers to those environmental variables that shape the possibility of a state to become an active third party in a conflict. Some factors affecting opportunities are similar for all states. Contiguity to an ongoing conflict, for instance, makes it easier for all states to intervene in said conflict regardless of their characteristics. Other factors

influencing a state's opportunity structure display greater variation from state to state. Distance from an ongoing conflict, for example, may have a different impact on the joining opportunity of a powerful state like the United States and on the opportunity of, say, Luxembourg. The notion of opportunity brings the macro-level of analysis in the study of joining behavior.

In the specific case of joining behavior, opportunity often refers to the degree of interaction that is possible between states (Siverson and Starr 1990, 48). However, the possibility of interacting with the actors involved in an ongoing conflict is a necessary but not always sufficient condition of third party intervention (Most and Starr 1989; Most, Starr and Siverson 1989). On occasion, conflict can expand in space and drag in states that are proximate to its epicenter. Lebanon, for instance, has been overrun by Syrian and Israeli forces for nearly three decades. Yet, the Lebanese never did deliberately choose to take part in the Israeli-Syrian dispute (Weisburd 1997, 155-165). Most of the times, participation in conflicts is the result of a deliberate decision-making process that takes place within a country's governmental institutions. Decision-makers must perceive that some interest is at stake in an ongoing dispute for them to translate the opportunity to join the conflict into an actual intervention. It is necessary to add a "willingness component" to the equation in order to understand why not all countries with equal interaction opportunities become active third parties, or why some states try to overcome systemic and material constraints in order to participate in a conflict.

The idea of willingness allows one to incorporate the micro-level of analysis into the study of joining behavior. Willingness is a fundamental component in the analysis of any decision-making process. In the words of Siverson and Starr (1990, 49),

“willingness is related to a decision maker’s calculations of advantage and disadvantage, costs and benefits, considered on both conscious and unconscious levels. It is through willingness that decision makers recognize opportunities and then translate those opportunities into alternatives that are weighed in some manner.” Willingness, then, implies both the identification of a preference for a specific outcome of a dispute and the process of evaluating whether a direct intervention of some type may bring about the desired outcome. As such, the notion of willingness covers different ways of identifying state preferences and interests and different models for weighing alternative courses of action. As mentioned before, the conflict literature focuses on two apparently alternative models of willingness, one emphasizing key similarities between third parties and disputants and one emphasizing strategic links between potential joiners and combatants.

The opportunity and willingness framework has a long-standing tradition in the study of interstate conflict. This approach comes from Sprout and Sprout (1969)’s ideas concerning environmental possibilism, environmental probabilism, and cognitive behaviorism which depend on the interaction between entity, environment, and entity-environment (Siverson and Starr 1990, 48). In addition to combining micro and macro-levels of analysis, the opportunity and willingness model forces the researcher to explore joining behavior as the product of the interaction of: (1) external environment; (2) characteristics of a dispute; and, (3) characteristics of the disputants (Enterline 1999). The interrelatedness of these different components can be lost in studies that conceive joining behavior exclusively as the result of systemic dynamics of conflict diffusion or immediate security considerations. The simultaneous analysis of the various dimensions of entity, environment, and entity-environment interactions is essential for a complex understanding of joining

behavior—that is, for an understanding that goes beyond the intervention decision to include alignment and intervention technique choices.

2.3 Opportunity Structure and the Diffusion of Conflict

The appeal and usefulness of the opportunity and willingness approach has emerged with particular strength in the study of the spatial diffusion of conflict. The metaphor of war as an infectious virus that spreads either by contagion or diffusion has been widely used in conflict literature (see, among others, Beer 1979; Most and Starr 1980; Houweling and Siccama 1985; Most, Starr and Siverson 1989; Siverson and Starr 1990, 1991). Existing studies on the diffusion of conflict have immensely expanded our understanding of the conflict disease both with regard to the intervention of third parties in ongoing interstate disputes—the focus of the present analysis—and with regard to the tendency of states proximate to ongoing wars to initiate new conflicts. Regardless of the meaning given to the term “diffusion,” analyses of this phenomenon have centered on discovering the environmental and systemic factors that promote or impede the transmission of the conflict disease.¹

¹According to the literature on the epidemiology of war, expansion can occur in either of two ways, through direct contagion (a third party becomes involved in the ongoing war) or through infection (states proximate to or involved in an ongoing war start a new conflict) (see, for instance Houweling and Siccama 1985). Within this subfield, scholars’ interest lies more with the dynamic of the spatial expansion of the war phenomenon than in the actual actors involved in it. Thus, many of these studies fail to distinguish between the two types of diffusion. In their empirical analyses, any conflict participation by a state that is proximate to an ongoing war counts as an instance of positive diffusion. The obliteration of the distinction between the two mechanisms is often attributed to the fact that a nearby war modifies the opportunity structure for all neighboring states. Neighbors become then equally more likely to join the ongoing conflict or to take advantage of the changed circumstances by starting a new war (Kadera 1998; Siverson and Starr 1990). The present analysis is, instead, concerned with the contagion mechanism of conflict diffusion. Initiations of new conflicts are of theoretical interest because they may be promoted by opportunity structures similar to those that promote joining behavior. Yet, the focus here is not on the diffusion of war as a systemic aggregate phenomenon. Rather, it is on factors

Thus, in the contagion literature, the opportunity dimension of the broader theoretical framework tends to encompass those attributes that make a third party's intervention or conflict initiation possible (environmental possibilism) and those mechanisms affecting the probability that such action will take place (environmental probabilism). For an action to take place, it must be possible in the first place, and systemic and contextual factors define decision-makers' "menu for choice." Although they often are very similar, not all states' menus are alike. After choice menus are defined, opportunity factors —interacting with willingness attributes— determine different degrees of probability for decision-makers to undertake a particular course of action (Siverson and Starr 1990). Even slight variations among states in terms of environmental probabilism and possibilism help explain why not all states become involved in ongoing conflicts and why war spreads through paths of least resistance.

Kadera (1998) provides a useful label for the components that enter into the definition of opportunity structure regulating the diffusion of conflict. She talks about transmission mechanisms, transmission barriers and constraints (Kadera 1998, 368). Because the conflict disease propagates through direct contact and interaction (Siverson and Starr 1990), transmission mechanisms are all those factors facilitating interaction among states. Transmission mechanisms raise the probability of contagion. Transmission barriers operate in the opposite direction from transmission mechanisms. They are those environmental factors that reduce the likelihood of conflict diffusion by limiting state interaction. Finally, *constraints* are

affecting the state-level decision to enter an ongoing conflict. The argument can be made —and it has been made (see, for instance Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Houweling and Siccamo 1985)— that joining behavior and conflict initiation are two qualitatively different phenomena involving different decision-making dynamics and different willingness structures. Thus, initiations of new conflicts, regardless of the location of the initiating state, is not strictly of the present empirical interest here.

limitations to specific courses of action resulting from the interaction of state-level attributes with environmental factors. To some extent, they correspond to the factors that affect the viability of some of the items present on the decision-makers' menu for choice.²

Among the transmission mechanisms of conflict, borders and distance are the ones most commonly discussed. Siverson and Starr (1990, 48) consider the degree of interaction as central to the concept of opportunity. States that share borders have greater frequency of interactions with one another. The sheer number of interactions in which proximate countries engage multiplies the opportunities for conflict. Disputed territories near national boundaries and the precise location of maritime boundaries are the most common causes of interstate conflict (Goertz and Diehl 1992; Hensel 1996; Holsti 1991; Huth 1996; Mitchell and Prins 1999). Shared natural resources are often at the root of military disputes. In addition, common borders amplify problems related to cross-national ethnicities, customs coordination, migration flows, and occasional boundary violations. In general, contiguous borders offer the highest degree of interaction opportunity, followed by cross-water borders and colonial borders (Siverson and Starr 1990).

Since interaction opportunity declines with distance, Kadera (1998, 372) suggests that in addition to borders it is useful to think “of proximity as a transmission

²Kadera (1998) stresses that the transmission mechanisms, transmission barriers, and constraints approach is an alternative to and improvement on the opportunity and willingness framework. The claim is motivated and substantiated by her interest in systemic dynamics of war diffusion. The distinction between opportunity and willingness remains important if one's interest lies in the state-level decision-making processes that facilitate conflict participation. To carry on with the disease analysis, not all infectious diseases spread by simple exposure to a viral agent. At the individual level, infection is often facilitated by lifestyle choices that make a subject more receptive to the viral agent. In epidemiology, studying the geographical patterns of diffusion of a disease at the aggregate level can be important for prevention and disease containment purposes. However, this approach may force a researcher to lose sight of the individual-level choices that contribute to the formation of such aggregate patterns of diffusion —often leading to ecological fallacies.

mechanism and distance as a barrier to transmission.” Bueno de Mesquita (1981), and Most, Starr and Siverson (1989), and many others have discussed extensively how distance affects the ability of states to project power and engage in wars. Projecting power over long distances in fact imposes increasing costs—a phenomenon known as the “loss of strength gradient” (Houweling and Siccama 1985, 648)—significantly limiting the opportunity for potential third parties to become involved in conflicts. Thus, shared borders and geographical proximity offer the first dimension that defines the opportunity structure of potential third parties. This suggests the first general hypothesis concerning partisan intervention: Joining in an ongoing conflict should be influenced by the permissiveness of the geographical conditions, as expressed by shared borders and spatial distance.

The fact that not all states can shoulder the costs involved in taking part in a far-away conflict suggests a second factor that is usually said to define a state’s opportunity structure. A state’s material capabilities significantly shape the aforementioned notion of environmental possibilism. Capabilities belong to those attributes that Kadera (1998) calls constraints to the opportunity for conflict expansion. Capabilities can affect the opportunity structure surrounding potential joiners in two ways. First, for intervention to be on a state’s menu for choice, capabilities of some type (military, economic, technological, etc.) must be present (Siverson and Starr 1990). Second, the distribution of capabilities among the actors involved in a conflict determines whether external states can be labeled potential third parties. In this sense, capabilities represent a system-level, rather than a state-level, attribute (Kadera 1998; Hammarstrom and Heldt 2002). They equally contribute to define environmental possibilism and probabilism. Combining both views on the role of capabilities allows one to derive a second general hypothesis about joining

behavior: The likelihood of intervention in an ongoing conflict should increase with a third party's share of material means (capabilities).

Among the states with the most capabilities are great powers. By definition, major power states are more powerful than other nations, and their interests are global in scope (Waltz 1979; Siverson and Starr 1990). Great powers have the material means to overcome many of the constraints and barriers discussed earlier. Distance is less of an obstacle to them because of their greater capacity to project power over long distances. For instance, until World War I, great powers were defined by the possession of a large naval force. However, scope of interest is as important as material capabilities in defining great power states. Major powers tend to be more active internationally. Their activities often put them in attrition with other nations. This tendency multiplies the chances they will become involved in conflicts as initiators, targets, or joiners. In the past, great power states were often had colonies. Possession of colonies implies more borders, which leads to more interactions with other states and more opportunities for conflict participation (Siverson and Starr 1990). Status in itself can be a motivator for more frequent conflict interventions, as great powers are more likely to receive challenges by aspiring major powers and more likely to try to preserve their privileged position in the international hierarchy. Major power states have consistently displayed a higher rate of conflict participation over time (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996). Thus, their status affects both the environmental possibilism and probabilism surrounding them. It is then reasonable to hypothesize that the probability of third party intervention will be affected both by a third party's status in the international system and by the status of the combatants.

The notion that conflict involving major powers may be more likely to elicit interventions suggests that the characteristics of the conflict at hand may shape the opportunity structure of joining behavior. Enterline (1999), for instance, finds evidence of this in his study of the timing of third party intervention. This tendency has also been noted in studies of the geographical expansion of conflict. Most and Starr (1980, 944) note that “different types of war appear to have different propensity to diffuse.” Virulent conflicts tend to leak across national borders, increasing uncertainty for neighboring states. Conflicts with multiple initiators—which are often extremely virulent—also create systemic uncertainty. Some conflicts can, in fact, alter the environment around their epicenter by altering or piercing existing borders, by changing the systemic distribution of power, by altering informational flows, and by increasing uncertainty and threat perception. Thus, some conflicts can modify the opportunity structure for external states. In general terms, third party intervention should be more likely in conflict whose characteristics affect, directly or indirectly, the environmental status quo.

In its simplicity, the opportunity component of the opportunity and willingness approach forces one to identify systematically environmental dynamics and state-level traits that promote or constrain a third party’s possibility to enter an ongoing conflict, regardless of its foreign policy preferences. Opportunity represents in fact a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for joining behavior. States can have strong foreign policy preferences for a disputant in a conflict. Yet, they may not have the chance to take part in such conflict because of a constraining opportunity structure. Many small Central American nations did declare war against Germany and Japan during World War II, but they never participated in any action against their declared enemies. Limited capabilities and their distance from WWII’s major

theaters reduced their menu for choice. Whether one studies the expansion of conflict *per se* or the decision of individual states to become active third parties, the analysis cannot avoid considerations about opportunity. It is possible to think of opportunity either as a broad, directly unmeasurable variable or as the combination of a set of co-acting environmental factors (Clark and Regan 2003). Nonetheless, opportunity works as the primary selection mechanism separating a sample of active or latent third parties from the larger population of states. In addition, opportunity allows one to take into consideration the intervention options (techniques) available to states. Some intervention techniques are potentially costlier than others. It is plausible to expect that they will not be equally available to all states under all circumstances.

Casting the issue of partisan interventions in terms of intervention opportunities represents an improvement over the tendency to select inductively both system-level and state-level factors that may promote joining behavior. However, the concept of opportunity does not tell us the whole story. As noted before, not all latent third parties become active joiners. Foreign policy preferences can separate a second subset of states—those that realize their opportunity to become third parties—within the sample of potential third parties. Actual foreign policy preferences are necessary to explain a second level of variation in the phenomenon of joining behavior. Those preferences represent the willingness component of the present theoretical approach. The following section discusses alternative models of willingness.

2.4 Willingness and the Formation of Foreign Policy Preferences

The willingness and opportunity approach to international relations recognizes that opportunity does not automatically translates into action. The framework

goes beyond the view of states as automata contributing to the preservation of a system that operates according to some law-like principle such as balance of power. Opportunities appear on a state's menu for choice, but they do not all carry the same weight. As Clark and Regan (2003) suggest, it may be useful to think about states having different levels opportunity for a specific foreign policy option —with some states having no opportunity at all. Similarly, it can be useful to think of an individual country as having different levels of opportunity for all of the options on their foreign policy menu. Which option is actually chosen is the result of a domestic-level decision-making process in which preferences are rank-ordered and associated with the available opportunities. Some degree of willingness towards a specific course of action must be present. Again, Siverson and Starr (1990, 49) state that, “willingness is related to a decision-maker's calculations of advantage and disadvantage, cost and benefit, considered on both conscious and unconscious levels. It is through willingness that decision-makers recognize opportunities and then translate those opportunities into alternatives that are weighed in some manner.”

To a large extent, willingness corresponds to Sprout and Sprout (1969)'s idea of cognitive behaviorism. Understanding how willingness intervenes in turning opportunity into realized action involves understanding the cognition process through which preferences are formed. With regard to joining behavior and partisan interventions, willingness is equated to a third party's preference for either state involved in a conflict and/or for a particular outcome of the dispute. In many studies on the spatial diffusion of war, willingness is expressed in terms of existing alliances between a third party and the war originators. Different degrees of willingness are then measured in terms of the different degree of commitment required by alliances of different type (see, for instance Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Most, Starr

and Siverson 1989; Siverson and Starr 1990, 1991). Defensive alliances are assumed to require a higher degree of commitment than neutrality agreements. Ententes are said to require the least amount of willingness (Siverson and Starr 1990, 52). Lack of willingness does not imply non-intervention. Conflict, for instance, may move across a third state's border. However, some degree of willingness is said to significantly raise the probability that some type of intervention may take place.

The willingness component becomes even more important when the question under examination concerns the intervention techniques of third parties. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is reasonable to assume that military interventions are more costly and require a higher degree of willingness than other forms of intervention. Stronger preferences for one combatant over the other must be present for a third party to take the high risk of military involvement. Lack of preference or preferences of equal weight for both combatants may produce no intervention or low-intensity interventions, as it was the case for the United States in the Falkland War example described in Chapter 1.

Identifying individual determinants of third parties' preferences has been the key question underlying numerous studies of war alignment choices. For instance, the issue of whether states balance or bandwagon rests on the assumption that power is the only determinant of third parties' preferences (see, among others Waltz 1979; Schweller 1994). But alliance and power capabilities are not the only components of willingness found in the literature. Werner and Lemke (1997), for example, investigate whether third parties are more likely to take sides with "side A" or "side B" in a militarized interstate dispute.³ In addition to the distribution of capabilities and alliances, they investigate the impact of similarity in regime type

³Side A and side B are generic labels indicating the two or more states that started a militarized interstate dispute.

and economic system as determinants of alignment choices. They find that both factors significantly contribute to the explanation of joiners' alignment choices. Enterline (1999) looks at similar covariates while attempting to explain timing of third party interventions in ongoing disputes. Again, his results underscore the relevance of non-military sources of foreign policy preferences. What these and other works suggest is that, given the variety of factors explaining alignment choices, it is not sufficient to just "shop around" for individual factors that may define willingness. A more theoretically-grounded approach to the definition of willingness is desirable.

Studies on third parties' alignment choices also suggest that it is possible to group the determinants of such choices into two broad categories. On the one hand, there are those factors expressing a third-party's rationally-calculated, strategic interest for one side in a conflict. On the other hand, there are factors that express some form of similarity between a third party and one side in a conflict. Siverson and Starr (1990)'s emphasis on the role of alliances, for example, belongs to the first general category. Werner and Lemke (1997)'s focus on the similarity of regime type between intervenors and combatants belongs to the latter grouping. This simple categorization helps one to formulate two different, yet not incompatible, models of third party's preference formation. If previous studies of joining behavior are correct, the willingness to intervene in an ongoing conflict may come (1) from a third party rational and strategic interest in the victory of either combatant, or (2) from a perceived sense of commitment due to some key similarity with either state in the dispute. The two willingness models dominant in conflict literature, one based on rational interest and one based on similarity, are summarized below.

2.4.1 Expected Utility and Third Parties' Willingness

In the study of conflict, states are often assumed to behave like unitary rational actors. The assumption is not just made out of convenience. Its viability has been amply tested both formally and empirically. Rational decision-making models have made a major contribution to our understanding of conflict (Bueno de Mesquita 1989). In these models, rational actors are expected to be able to order alternatives in transitive fashion according to the intensity of their preferences. Alternatives are evaluated in terms of the product of the probability of achieving a certain outcome and the intensity of the preference for that outcome. The key assumption of rationality-based models is that decision-makers invariably choose the alternative that offers the best combination of probability and final payoff. The intensity of a certain preference is labeled "utility," while the product of the probability of a given outcome and the associated utility is known as "expected utility" (Bueno de Mesquita 1989, 144).

The construction of a decision-maker's utility for the victory of either disputant is crucial in rational choice models. On a theoretical level, the sources of actors' utilities remain unspecified in such models. When a single decision-maker is involved, her utility may be derived from a material, tangible payoff or from an affective value placed in a specific outcome. In practice, in the study of conflict initiation or conflict expansion, "a nation's utility for another nation is a direct, positive function of the degree to which they share a common policy perspective" (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 29). States sharing similar foreign policy perspectives are assumed to have similar foreign policy goals. Cooperation or simple policy coordination is expected to be more easily achieved between them. Two states with similar foreign policy outlooks are less likely to represent a security threat for one another. In a

conflict, it is rational for a third party to support, between two belligerents, the one with the more similar foreign policy perspective. The more similar the third party is to either combatant in terms of foreign policy interests, the greater the value the third party places on that state's victory, and the greater the likelihood that it will take part in a conflict with decisive (military) means. A third party is expected to be indifferent to both originators of the conflict if it shares no foreign policy goals with either, or if it is equidistant to both (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Bueno de Mesquita 1981).

In rational choice models, a nation's utility is usually estimated in terms of alliance networks or various measures of similarity of foreign policy positions. Such concepts offer the advantage of representing expressed —rather than implicit— foreign policy preferences. The concept of utility toward another actor in the international system is by definition a relational concept. Alliances and declared foreign policy positions offer an immediate and unambiguous way to assess the impact of an enemy's defeat or the impact of joining with one combatant on a state's position in the international system.

Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) and Bueno de Mesquita (1989) offer a well-known model of alignment choices in war based on the relative magnitude of a third party's utilities for either state involved in the war. In the model, the assumption is made that war is relevant to all states, but only some decision-makers find a conflict sufficiently relevant to justify taking military action (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979, 88). Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979, 97) identify two types of utility that determine whether a conflict is sufficiently relevant to a potential third party. One is the utility from a specific outcome of a conflict, which depends on a third party's ability to influence that conflict. The other form of

utility is the utility from strategy that a third party derives from “participating in the war effort on the preferred side” (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979, 97). This type of utility expresses “the strategic importance that the third nation C attaches to each of the original belligerents” (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979, 97). Defensive alliances and ententes with either of the warring parties are taken as a measure of strategic preference by a third party. Neutrality pacts, alliances with both combatants, and no alliance are considered to indicate no preference. The existence of some type of alliance network appears to be the trigger of a rational third party’s willingness to enter a conflict. Moreover, “how much effort k [the third party] makes depends both on the intensity of k ’s preference for one or the other side and on k ’s power” (Bueno de Mesquita 1989, 159). Thus, in rational choice models of joining behavior alliances are also expected to trigger a third party’s willingness to participate more intensely —i.e., militarily— in a conflict.

The notion of a state’s utility toward another nation has been refined beyond the simple existence of alliances. Bueno de Mesquita (1980, 1981) introduces the idea of “alliance portfolio” to indicate the extent to which two states share the same network of alliances, either regionally or globally. The greater the similarity in alliance portfolio between state A and state B, the stronger the preference of A for B, and vice versa. Signorino and Ritter (1999) extend the concept and measure of alliance portfolio to incorporate similarity of votes in the United Nations between states. By incorporating foreign policy dimensions other than security concern, they provide a notion of strategic preference based on affinity between states’ foreign policy designs. Rather than simple alliance portfolio, Signorino and Ritter (1999) claim to be capturing the broader idea of “foreign policy portfolio.”⁴

⁴Details of the various measures of strategic preferences are discussed in Chapter 4.

In Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) and Bueno de Mesquita (1981), utility of strategies and intensity of preferences do not tell the whole story. Alliances and other measures of foreign policy preferences are rational indicators of preferences because they reflect the strategic location of two states vis-a-vis other states in the international system. However, the true rationality of rational choice models emerges from the way in which such indicators are used to estimate one's utility for entering an ongoing conflict. A probabilistic element also enters in the estimation of a state's willingness to intervene. This probabilistic component —by which actual utilities are weighed— is given by a third party's chance to make a significant contribution to the conflict. The probability of positively affecting a war is estimated in terms of material capabilities in a way similar to that used for operationalizing opportunity in models of conflict spatial expansion. The greater a third party's proportion of the total amount of capabilities involved in the conflict, the greater is its probability to steer the conflict in the desired direction (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Kim 1991). As defined above, the product of utility and the probability to make a contribution is known as expected utility.

To some extent, the probabilistic component of rational choice approaches seems to overlap with notion of environmental probabilism previously discussed. It can be argued that rational choice approaches, because of their probabilistic element, reflect opportunity rather than willingness. But probability in these models refers to the likelihood of occurrence of a certain course of action, not to the actual availability of that alternative on a state's menu for choice. The question tackled by rational choice models of joining behavior is not whether intervention is a possibility, but whether a third party will intervene given its preferences for either belligerent.

Moreover, although it may represent an environmental constraint, probability does not take anything away from a decision-maker's ability to make a deliberate choice concerning war and peace. According to Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 5), "... decision makers are ultimately responsible for their actions. They are not victims of outside forces inescapably driving them to war ... The choice of war and peace depends on the choices of individuals and not on compulsion by circumstance." Thus, interveners use their material capabilities relative to those of the combatants to estimate whether it is cost-effective to try to alter in their favor the outcome of a conflict in which they already know they can take part.

Furthermore, Siverson and Starr (1990) state that opportunity and willingness are not mutually exclusively categories. Some contextual or state-level attributes can influence both a potential joiner's ability to become involved and its willingness to do so. Clark and Regan (2003) propose that capabilities should enter in the estimation of both willingness and opportunity. Their claim is that a state's absolute capabilities determine its opportunity to become a third party. Its capabilities relative to those of the conflict originators are supposed to determine a third party's willingness to join in the conflict. Their logic is that a third party will be more likely to become involved in a conflict the greater its chances to produce the desired outcome. Their model aptly brings together the opportunity and willingness components reflected by rational choice approaches.

The central notion running through rational-choice models of joining behavior is that intervention occurs not only when a third party's interests are directly affected by an ongoing conflict, but also when the third party is not indifferent to either combatant. Some utility for either belligerent must be present for a third party to be rationally willing to get military involved. A potential joiner's preferences

are the result of affinity in foreign policy vision, whether expressed in terms of alliance, alliance portfolios, or entire foreign policy portfolios. Thus, the general hypothesis emerging from the rational-choice approach is that, opportunity factors being equal, the likelihood of intervention and the intensity of said intervention increase as a third party's rational interest-based preferences for either combatant increase. However, despite the widespread acceptance of rational choice-based approaches, these claims do not go unchallenged. Willingness is also said to depend on unstated similarities in traits among states, which then lead to similar foreign policy preferences. This alternative approach is discussed next.

2.4.2 Homophily and Willingness in Joining Behavior

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, third party states' preferences need not be shaped exclusively by strategic concerns. Many existing studies on conflict initiation have provided extensive evidence that a state's political affinity for another state can emerge from similarities in deeper ideological, institutional, or economic characteristics (Nincic and Russett 1979). A large part of the voluminous body of research on the democratic peace rests on the idea that democracies share similar beliefs and norms about the appropriate conduct of a government and resolution of conflict (see, for instance Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Senese 1997; Mousseau 1998). Even similarity in governmental institutions between states affect their approach to conflict initiation and management (Morgan and Campbell 1991; Morgan and Schwebach 1992; Werner 2000*b*). The impact of these crucial political similarities persist even after controlling for the impact of contextual (opportunity) factors and for the determinants identified in rational choice models (see, among others Maoz and Russett 1992; Bremer 1993). On the other hand, states who are

markedly different from one another with regard to cultural, religious or, in more general terms, civilization traits, are said to be more likely to fight with one another (Huntington 1993, 1996).

Extended to the the study of joining behavior, the idea of similarity in key ideological or institutional traits is an equally useful concept for explaining joining decisions and alliance choices. Werner and Lemke (1997) indicate that states sharing the same type of regime —whether democracies or autocracies— are likely to end up on the same side in a conflict. The same outcome is likely to occur when two nations share the same ideas about the appropriate structure of domestic economy. The timing of third parties' interventions in conflict also appears to be affected, although weakly, by similarities in political institutions (Enterline 1999). The aforementioned study by Kaw (1990) goes as far as to incorporate ideology in a formal expected-utility model of joining behavior, and it finds that ideological similarity does indeed explain a third party's propensity to support a certain faction in a conflict.

What is sometime absent from studies that stress similarity in crucial traits between third parties and combatants is a theoretical rationale that can explain why such similarities may produce the observed behavior. It was noted in Chapter 1 that such a theoretical foundation is, instead, present in sociological theories of group formation, group mobility, and social group networks. The notion of "homophily" underscores this approach to the study of group dynamics. This concept, in its surprising simplicity, can be summarized in the old adage stating that "birds of a feather flock together." In a more sophisticated fashion, homophily is defined as "the tendency of people in friendship pairs to be similar" (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987, 370).

Within this framework, a social structure is conceived as a multidimensional space -also known as “social space” or “Blau space” (Popielarz and McPherson 1995, 699)- of different social positions among which a population is distributed (Blau 1977, 4). Individuals’ salient sociodemographic characteristics constitute the axes of the social space. These key characteristics are known as *parameters*, which can be nominal or graduated. Nominal parameters are basic categorical distinctions between individuals, such as sex, religion, and race. Graduated parameters are continuous dimensions implying different rank-ordering among individuals. Education and wealth, for example, are graduated parameters (Blau 1977, 7). The crucial hypothesis of homophily theory is that “social associations are more prevalent among persons in proximate than between those in distant social positions” (Blau 1977, 36).

Social proximity and distance are dichotomous concepts for nominal parameters. With regard to these parameters, individuals are either within a group or outside of it. For graduated parameters, instead, proximity and distance are a matter of degree. The nature of parameters grouping or dividing people leads to two additional key hypotheses. First, for any individual, associations within a group are more frequent than associations outside it. Second, the frequency of associations declines as distance along graduated parameters increases (Blau 1977, 36). In other words, “the probability of a tie between two individuals decreases with social dissimilarity” (Popielarz and McPherson 1995, 701). In addition to the frequency of dyadic associations, the intensity of such associations decreases with social dissimilarity. Similar individuals within the same social group experience centripetal forces, while people at the margins of a group are subject to centrifugal forces (McPherson, Popielarz and Drobnic 1992; Popielarz and McPherson 1995).

Within the context of homophily theory, it has been argued that dyadic associations are the outcome of interaction opportunities that emerge from social “foci” around which social activities are organized (Feld 1982). Yet, the bulk of empirical evidence offers support for a voluntaristic view of homophilous ties within a group. Within fairly heterogeneous groups, the formation of dyadic associations between members is more accurately predicted by shared characteristics, or parameters, than by simple interaction opportunities (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987). While some basic opportunity for interaction must be present, similarity in key social characteristics appears to affect the willingness of individuals to create and preserve dyadic ties.

It would be inappropriate to claim that sociological homophily theory can be transplanted in its entirety to the world of interstate conflict. Yet, the study of international politics has seen several fruitful applications of the “society of individuals-society of states” analogy (see, for instance Bull 1977). Within this society, states with similar traits are more likely to form associations. Regime type, for instance, may work as nominal parameter delineating in-group and out-group. The same can be said of states’ economic systems or cultural traits. The European Union, the Group of Seven, the League of Arab States, the Conference of the Islamic Council are just some examples of associations among states that rest on similarity of regime type, economic interests, or cultural traits. Across and within these groups, dyadic ties between states should be more likely to emerge the more similar states are along Blau’s graduated parameters. According to Blau (1977), dyadic conflictual relationships are more likely to emerge across groups separated according to key nominal parameters and, within groups, between individuals who are distant according to graduated parameters. Many analyses of international politics rest on

the distinction of states in groups based on some key characteristics. Even in the study of conflict, there is evidence —though controversial— that similarity in key traits does influence the tendency of states to join together in associations. Democratic states, for instance, appear more likely to ally with one another than states with dissimilar regime type (Siverson and Emmons 1991; Lai and Reiter 2000).⁵ Werner (2000*b*) even notes that similarity between states in institutions —rather than government’s philosophy— produces similar foreign policy preferences, affecting states’ propensity to go to war against one another. Thus, to the extent that we can equate regime type and other salient characteristics of states to Blau’s parameters, homophily theory raises an interesting general hypothesis about joining behavior. Opportunity factors being equal, the likelihood of intervention and the intensity of said intervention should increase with the homophily between a third party and either originator of the conflict.

2.4.3 Alternative or Complementary Models?

If the claim that alliance agreements result from similarity in key traits between states is correct, the question emerges of whether rational choice and homophily-based models are alternative or complementary to one another. When applied to international conflict, homophily theory suggests that the relationship between expressed foreign policy preferences and third party behavior may be spurious. Affinity in foreign policy preferences —measured either in terms of alliance networks or foreign policy portfolios— ought to be the result of similarity in key traits between states. Alliances, after all, are only a proxy measure of similarity of foreign policy positions. If such foreign policy positions are similar between two states, it

⁵For evidence against the tendency of democratic states to join the same alliances, see Simon and Gartzke (1996)

is because these two states are proximate to each other along one or more critical dimensions in the international social space. If the theory is correct, homophily constitutes an antecedent variable to the relation between utility and tendency to join an ongoing conflict. Moreover, even if there is a relationship between alliances and joining behavior, the formation of dyadic ties based on key characteristic should take place even within alliance groups. The expectation is that within a multi-member alliance agreement, the ties between two states with similar characteristics should be more intense.

Rational decision-making modelers make no claim about the origins of common foreign policy perspective. As shown by Kaw (1990), similar foreign policy positions may come from shared ideology. However, proponents of rational choice approaches point out that similar key traits do not directly suggest foreign policy positions. Not all democratic states have similar foreign policy preferences. The foreign policies of Norway and the United States, for instance, have been guided by quite different philosophies even though the two states have been mature democracies for a long time. Variations in alliance or foreign policy portfolios allow for more variation in actual preferences than what is predicted by homophily. Alliances also exist between states with opposite traits. Indeed, states may come to more similar foreign policy preferences because they are in the same alliance, rather than the other way around. In addition, the essence of making a rational choice lies in making a strategic choice that takes the potential behavior of other states into account (see Signorino 1999). The very way in which utility is measured brings into the picture the position of a potential joiner and the position of the two combatants in relation to all other states in the system. Homphily describes, instead, a dyadic relationship—a rather poor description of foreign policy affinity.

The possibility also exists for these two models of willingness to be complementary rather than absolutely incompatible. It is likely that the homophily and expected utility models capture two different, yet co-existing dimensions of foreign policy preferences. Based for the most part on alliance networks, the idea of utility in rational choice models of joining behavior captures a dimension of the phenomenon that is rooted in security considerations. Homophily, on the other hand, taps into dimensions of international politics that are not exclusively security related. If the “international politics space” is indeed multidimensional like the Blau space, utility derived from alliance networks can be another dimension in this space which does not exclude similarity or dissimilarity along other parameters. If this is the case, both interest-based and homophily-based factors may be needed to estimate with greater accuracy the probability and intensity of joining decisions

2.5 Opportunity, Willingness, and the Steps to Partisan Intervention

Compared to other international relations approaches, the opportunity and willingness framework is almost disarming in its simplicity and in the common sense character of the hypotheses it generates. However, this approach forces researchers to go beyond the traditional balance of power-bandwagoning structure that for so long has dominated the study of joining behavior. While it incorporates power capabilities, the opportunity and willingness approach raises the possibility that intervention and alliance choices may depend on factors other than security. This framework also allows a researcher to consider the idea that not all states act similarly when they face a conflict in the international system. Some states can intervene militarily; others can intervene only non-militarily; others yet, cannot participate at all. Like previous theoretical approaches to joining behavior, the

idea of opportunity structure does recognize a role for the systemic and environmental components that shape partisan interventions. But it also stresses the fact that opportunity factors are necessary, but not sufficient. Since potential third parties do not act like automata before an ongoing conflict, willingness is a second necessary, non sufficient component of third party interventions. The idea of willingness forces a researcher to open the black box of the state and take into consideration how foreign policy preferences emerge and decisions are taken.

The opportunity and willingness approach leads one to consider the various dimensions of joining behavior as integrated elements of a larger international phenomenon. In this context, it is no longer efficient to think of the joining decision, alignment choice, and intervention technique selection as unrelated events to be analyzed separately. The choice to intervene is triggered by an environmental window of opportunity and requires some degree of willingness in order to be fully realized. Such willingness reflects a third party's alignment preferences in that it depends on the affinity in foreign policy positions or on the similarity between intervenors and originators of the conflict. This framework forces a researcher to model third party interventions not as "one-shot decisions" but, at the least, as two-stage processes. The goal of this analysis is a clearer and theoretically unifying view of joining behavior. The final goal is established by the adoption of this specific framework of analysis. However, the multi-stage nature of the phenomenon, and the fact that many elements which affect step 1 (opportunity) also enter in step 2 (willingness), complicate the analysis. This also requires the development of a more sophisticated research design containing some elements that have, thus far, eluded investigators of this phenomenon. The following chapter sets the groundwork for the development of such a research design.

CHAPTER 3

Collecting New Evidence on Interventions in Militarized Disputes: Rationale, Procedures, and Preliminary Findings

[T]he empirical study of world politics runs the risk of stagnation unless we devote attention to generate the data set required to adequately make use of our theoretical and methodological refinements. (Bremer, Regan and Clark 2003, 11)

3.1 Introduction

Few would disagree with the statement that third states' interventions—or lack thereof—can have far-reaching consequences for the evolution and termination of conflicts among states. The story of US involvement in World War I, for example, is the story of a third party entering an ongoing war. In some respect the same can be said of the US intervention in the European theater during World War II and in the Korean peninsula in the 1950s. It is difficult to imagine what the outcome of those wars would have been without US intervention. Similarly, the Iran-Iraq war—apparently a war between only two states—may have lasted much less if many states had not meddled in the conflict by supporting the belligerents with weapons and money. Contrary to these examples, the Falkland Islands war was very short-lived and saw very limited diplomatic interventions by third states. Had other countries chosen to side with Argentina or the United Kingdom, the war could actually been longer and more brutal. Third parties affect conflicts in a variety of ways. Some scholars claim that the shadow of possible interventions looms large even on the initiation on conflict, as potential aggressors and targets include

expectations about the probability of foreign intervention in their calculations about initiations.

Because this phenomenon is so important for conflict dynamics, one would expect that more attention had been paid to it. Yet, compared to other international politics phenomena, we know relatively little about the dynamics of third party interventions. Theories that tangentially deal with joining behavior exist—as indicated in the preceding chapter. But the absence of specific and information-rich data on this phenomenon and the limitations of the existing data on interstate conflicts have placed many restrictions on the development and exploration of those theories' implications. Specifically, research on third parties' partisan interventions in conflict has focused exclusively on military participation in wars and militarized interstate disputes. As a result, empirical tests of hypotheses on joining behavior have been limited to only one phase of the intervention process: the militarized phase. Current research observes third parties only after they have decided to participate in a conflict at the highest possible level of foreign policy engagement. Existing accounts do not include analysis of instances in which third parties attempt to influence a conflict through non-violent means such as, say, economic sanctions. Left out of joining behavior are the decision-making steps that precede the militarization of an intervention and all of those interventions that never escalate to the militarized level.

Moreover, existing records on partisan interventions often provide a limited description of a third party's actions. Third parties are known to enter a war or a militarized dispute on the side of one of the belligerent with a violent action of some sort. But in most cases the specific nature of that action remains unclear. It remains difficult—and often impossible—to ascertain whether the intervention

was aimed at supporting one's friend or opposing one's enemy. Focus on military actions also constrains our knowledge of other dimensions of joining behavior. For example, the actual duration and evolution of an intervention can be obfuscated by narrow focus on military confrontation, since third parties' involvement may begin (or end) well before (or after) the "militarization phase." Interventions may also be a punctuated —rather than continuous— phenomena, since third parties may alternate military and non-military activities. Yet, existing data on joining behavior fail to provide information of this kind.

The limited nature of existing records on joining behavior is likely due to an implicit bias for high-politics acts involving the use of military force. This focus is understandable in light of the enormous political, economic, and societal consequences of military actions. However, it can also be argued that a narrow interest in military acts limits the scope of the theoretical inferences that are actually evaluated and tested and the range of applicability of existing theories about conflict. That is, some of the existing theories about conflict can be more correctly described as theories of militarized conflict rather than theories about conflict in general. Part of the endeavor involved in defining the range of theories on conflict consists of the collection of richer and better data on wars and disputes.

One of the goals of this study then is to contribute to our knowledge of interstate conflict by gathering and analyzing more detailed records on joining behavior. In particular, the collection of data on partisan non-military interventions in interstate disputes is one the major contributions that the present project aims to bring to the field. This chapter begins with a description of existing data on third party interventions in conflict and their limitations. It proceeds by discussing the theoretical and empirical implications of continuing to explore joining behavior with the

data on conflict currently available. The fourth section explains the rationale and procedures driving the collection of the data upon which this study is built. It then describes the major patterns and trends emerging from the newly collected data set. In so doing, it raises preliminary hypotheses about third party interventions that will be explored in following chapters.

3.2 Existing Records of Partisan Interventions in Disputes

There are many difficulties inherent in the task of developing a systematic and comprehensive record of third parties' activities in interstate conflicts. The first two problems that emerge are (1) defining what constitutes an observable conflict and (2) defining what third party activities qualify as partisan interventions. The analysis of historical and diplomatic records may suggest to the researcher that all conflicts are different from one another, and that each intervention decision is unique. Unique historical circumstances, context-specific attributes, and unique coincidences make up the chain of events along which each conflict unfolds. Thus, in pursuit of absolute thoroughness and richness of information, one may engage in the effort of collecting an endless amount of meticulous descriptions of conflicts over time. Accounts of this type do exist. Yet, an approach of this type is likely to reinforce the impression of the uniqueness of each conflict and of the impossibility to draw any general conclusion about joining behavior in international politics.

Efforts conducted by the *Correlates of War* (COW) project and by other scholars over the last forty or so years have led researchers of conflicts past the aforementioned obstacles. In particular, scholars involved in COW have set the groundwork for most —or all— of current research on conflict by providing precise definitions of wars and interstate disputes for the last 200 years (see Singer and Small 1972; Small

and Singer 1982; Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996; Sarkees 2000; Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004). COW researchers have developed classifications of interstate conflicts occurring in the modern system of states that work as unitizing tools and that define a specific empirical domain within which theories of conflict can be tested. In addition, by defining the characteristics and temporal boundaries of modern interstate conflicts, COW researchers have identified specific types of conflict participation by state actors. In fact, the two most widely used data sets developed within COW—the COW Data on War and the Militarized Interstate Disputes data sets—are composed of two parts: a record of actual conflict occurrences (wars or disputes) and a record of states' participation in such conflicts.

The so-called “war file” of the COW War data set and the “dispute file” of the MID data set define, among other things, the beginning and end date of a conflict, its duration, the number of fatalities, the level of hostility reached, the outcome, and the type of settlement reached. The “participant files” of the COW War data and the MID data set record, instead, information about each state's involvement in the war. Among the information collected in the participant file are: whether a state initiated the conflict; the duration of each state's involvement; which side of the conflict a state chose; and the hostility level of the participation. It is the participant portion of the MID data that is most relevant to the present study. This part of the Militarized Interstate Dispute project offers what currently is the most up-to-date record of third party interventions in conflict. Because it uses threat to use force as the lower threshold for defining militarized disputes, and because it keeps track of all involvements in a dispute, the MID participant file allows a researcher to identify all states that intervened militarily in all conflicts (ranging from unfulfilled threats to full scale wars) since 1816. The MID participant file has been the source

Table 3.1: Sample Observation from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data Set, Version 3.0

MID	State	Code	Begin	End	SideA	Fat	HiAct	Host	Orig
27	FRN	220	13/8/1961	28/10/1961	1	0	7	3	0

of data for most of the recent works on joining behavior (see, for instance Werner and Lemke 1997; Enterline 1999; Hammarstrom and Heldt 2002).

However, in spite of its thoroughness, the MID record of third parties' intervention in conflicts is not without limitations. After the omission of some variables, in the MID participant file an observation concerning intervention by a third party state looks approximately as shown in Table 3.1. The information conveyed in this particular case is that France intervened from August 13 to October 10, 1961 in militarized dispute number 27. We know that France was a third party—not an originator—in the dispute because the “Orig” variable assumes a value of 0 (zero). France intervened on the side of the state(s) classified by the MID's project's coders as “Side A”. France suffered no fatalities during the confrontation, as the variable “Fat” is also coded as zero. The “Host” (Hostility Level) and “Hi Act” (Highest Act) variables tell us that France engaged in a display of military force during the dispute, but did not directly use force.¹ In fact, the observation refers to France's participation in the 1961 dispute concerning the construction of the Berlin wall. The dispute saw the Soviet Union and East Germany on one side, West Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and France on the other side. Each of these participation is recorded separately in the MID data. The dispute number allows one

¹See Faten Ghosn and Glenn Palmer's *Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0* (available at <http://cow2.la.psu.edu>) for a description of the variables contained in the MID's data sets. See Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004) and Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) for a detailed description of the coding rules, rationale, and procedures.

to identify the other states that took part in the dispute —either as originators or third parties— and which side they took.

The amount of information contained in a data line such as this is remarkable. Yet, it is amenable to further expansion. In the example used above, the French intervention is recorded as occurring almost three weeks after the beginning of the Berlin Wall dispute —started by the United States and the Soviet Union on July 25, 1961. Given the severity of the Berlin Wall crisis, and given the extent of France’s interests in maintaining a foothold in the city of Berlin, it is difficult to imagine France being completely inactive between July 25 and August 13, 1961. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine that, in the course of the crisis, France’s first step was a show of force against Soviet forces in Germany. Without calling into question General De Gaulle’s propensity for taking risks, it is hard to conceive that any decision-makers were willing to start World War III without previously taking less provocative and escalatory steps.

France’s actions during the first three weeks of the crisis are missing from the picture. Also missing is the sequence of France’s actions following the decision to intervene militarily. The MID data recorded France’s most severe act during the Berlin Wall confrontation. Given the severity of the situation, it is plausible that France’s show of force lasted for the two and a half months of the crisis. Yet, one does not know whether the “highest act” was preceded or followed by other less intense military acts such as, for instance, a simple threat to use force. Indeed, because of the difficulties implicit in defining and “unitizing” interstate disputes, it is difficult for the MID data to provide a detailed sequence of the chain of events that constitute a dispute. Admittedly, actions of lesser severity that follow a state’s highest act in the dispute are omitted in the reconstructed

dispute sequence of events (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 173-174). However, it is not unlikely for the course of a militarized dispute to be changed by lower-intensity actions occurring during crucial moments of a crisis. The “twists and turns” that mark most real life historical occurrences are sacrificed to the need of capturing a snapshot of France’s overall participation in the dispute.

Also missing from the picture is the involvement of other states who chose to take part in the Berlin Wall crisis in ways that never reached the intensity of a threat to use force against the Soviet Union or in favor of it. It may be argued that the non-military involvement of minor powers in a crisis that saw the participation of four major powers —US, Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain— was likely inconsequential. Yet, it is also plausible that non-military interventions by, say, other NATO or Warsaw Pact allies could have changed the opportunity structure for the great powers involved in the crisis. Non-military participation —unrecorded in existing data sets— by third parties may have affected the duration and intensity of the originators’ intentions and actions in ways that cannot possibly be estimated if such non-military interventions are not catalogued.

The absence of more accurate information concerning the number of states intervening (militarily and non-militarily), the timing of their intervention, and the sequence of their actions has implications for the theoretical conclusions one draws about joining behavior in MIDs. Working with only a subset of the population of states intervening in disputes (those states who resorted to military means) can have serious consequences on the conclusions we draw about complex dynamics of joining behavior. If we are interested in explaining which factors affect a state’s decision to intervene in conflicts, we face a situation in which problems of selection on the dependent variable are compounded with problems of measurement on the

independent variable (see King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Geddes 1990). Truncation of the measurement of the variable we want to explain leads to problems with the sample selected for the analysis. Non-military interventions are in fact treated as non-events, and it is easy to lose sight of the fact that there is a selection process determining how states select themselves into the “military participation sample.” A researcher can draw biased conclusions about the factors affecting a state’s propensity to intervene in a dispute and to do so militarily. One could easily underestimate states’ tendency to become involved in MIDs, while overestimating their propensity to intervene militarily. The inclusion of non-military interventions in the sample may greatly increase or dilute the effects of some the covariates scholars usually find to be associated with joining behavior. In addition, the potential problems related to an exclusive focus on third parties’ military actions can be compared to the concerns raised by King and Zeng (2002) with regard to rare events in international politics. Because military intervention in a MID is a rare occurrence, the effects of the independent variables determining joining behavior can be of different magnitude than they are in reality. The inclusion of non-military intervention in the data corresponds to one of King and Zeng (2002)’s suggested “fixes” —a more precise measurement of the dependent variable. Problems of selection on the independent variable are less severe (King, Keohane and Verba 1994) but can manifest themselves nonetheless, resulting in biased conclusions if they are associated with measurement error and incorrect model specification (Signorino 2002).

Estimating the probability of third state intervention may not be a researcher’s exclusive concern. If a researcher is interested in exploring other dimensions of joining behavior, she may want to estimate the effect of third party interventions

on other conflict characteristics. Under these circumstances third party interventions is an independent variable of which we only know the extreme values. For example, if only military actions by third parties are recorded, a researcher can easily overestimate the amount of time between the beginning of a dispute and a third party's decision to intervene because: (1) the aforementioned "steps to interventions" drop out of the picture; and (2) decisions to intervene militarily are less likely to be taken hastily than, say, the decision to issue a declaration of opposition. For the same reason, scholars interested in estimating the length of a third party's intervention itself may end up underestimating such duration. Because of the exclusion of non-militarized partisan intervention, decision-makers may appear more reluctant to stick their noses in a dispute while, in reality, their concern is only with the escalation of their action to a militarized level. As a result, if a researcher decides to estimate the "survival time" to intervention on the basis of military interventions alone by using event history analysis or similar models, she also runs the risk of misspecifying the probability density function and adopting a model that is inadequate for the distribution of events over time (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Again, it is not only the time preceding or following the intervention and the duration of the intervention itself that can be incorrectly measured. The magnitude of the effect of the explanatory variables can also be misrepresented. In addition, because in existing data on third party intervention only the highest act of a participant is recorded—not the entire sequence of events— inaccurate conclusions can be derived about the escalatory or de-escalatory dynamics of a dispute. A show of force during a dispute may represent the culmination of a process of self-reinforcing military confrontation. But it could also be the start of a process of disengagement

as the parties attempt to walk away from the confrontation with their reputation intact.

Thus, the image indirectly conveyed by existing data on joining behavior is that third parties choose among a limited range of military options and stick to the chosen intervention technique throughout the dispute. The MID data suggest a linear, regular pattern of behavior that may not be supported by the actual sequence of events of a dispute. Scholars have already tried to document the irregular nature of state behavior in crises.² Even more ambitiously, several projects exist that attempt to record in detailed fashion all types of foreign policy actions by states.³ Such efforts tend to confirm that states alternate aggressive actions to peaceful behavior regardless of the temporal frame one chooses to analyze. Indeed, like other foreign policy behavior, interventions in conflicts may be punctuated -rather than continuous- phenomena, since third parties may resort to a wide range of military and non-military activities. Thus, efforts to document the behavior of third parties in Militarized Interstate Disputes in a more nuanced fashion may require the collection of both military and non-militarized actions by joiners.

To date, the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set constitutes the richest source of information about joining behavior in international conflict. Nonetheless, the MID's data set focuses on the disputes themselves and their participants —rather than on third parties' actions. The recently released version of Militarized Interstate Incident data set comes close to filling this void by offering a compilation of

²See, for instance, efforts by Russell Leng's in his Behavioral Correlates of War Project (Leng and Singer 1988)

³See, for instance, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) data and the World Interaction Survey (WEIS) data (Azar 1980; Howell 1983; Vincent 1983; Goldstein 1992). Similar projects currently exist that employ computers to code automatically states' cooperative and conflictual actions in international relations. See the Schrodtt and Gerner's Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) and Gary King's IDEA project (Gerner and Weddle 1994; King and Lowe 2003).

observations based on individual events, rather than just participants.⁴ Yet, this data set only covers the 1993-2001 period and is limited to events that pass the militarized threshold, thereby excluding the chain of events that may precede such militarization. This leaves scholars of third party intervention wanting for more detailed data and wrestling with significant research design issues. Such shortcomings can be corrected by using the MIDs data as a stepping-stone for developing a data set that revolves around individual intervention.

3.3 Expanding the Existing Records

It could be argued—and correctly so—that it is inappropriate to compare state military involvement in interstate disputes to non-militarized interventions. For one, it can be argued that militarized and non-militarized actions are categorically different types of occurrences. If this is true, they cannot be easily integrated in a comprehensive data set of intervention acts—and in the same analyses of joining behavior—without altering the focus and nature of our attempt to understand violent (military) intervention. At worst, non-military actions in the context of militarized interstate disputes could be simply uninteresting from a theoretical and empirical perspective. However, attempts to document sequences of acts of varying intensity in the same data collection is not without precedents.⁵ Such efforts have brought insight in escalatory and de-escalatory patterns in various dimensions of interstate conflict behavior, ranging from arms races to international crises. A similar approach could bring the same kind of contribution to studies focusing on

⁴See Faten Goshn and Scott Bennett, *Codebook for the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Incident Data, Version 3.0* (available at <http://cow2.la.psu.edu>).

⁵See, for instance, the COPDAB and WEIS data collections and various attempts to develop scales that would capture the intensity of state actions, ranging from cooperation to conflict (Vincent 1983; Goldstein 1992).

escalatory dynamics in the context of interstate disputes (see, for instance Senese 1997).

Regardless of one's position on the issue of comparability between violent and non-violent foreign policy actions, parallel analysis of militarized and non-militarized intervention in disputes may help shed light on the issue of differences in degree and differences in kind between alternative policy options (see Sartori 1970). This issue can be of crucial importance for studies on foreign policy substitutability (see, for instance Most and Starr 1984, 1989). Cataloguing different forms of conflict intervention may allow scholars to test hypotheses concerning substitution of military and non-military means. It may be possible to explore whether states consider the two forms of intervention as being different in kind and apply them simultaneously, or whether they perceive them as mutually exclusive alternatives.

Nonetheless, the idea that the militarization of interstate tension is a gradual occurrence, rather than a sudden one, is present both in the conflict literature and in more technical military literature. In their *Military Encyclopedia*, Dupuy and Dupuy (1993, 1035) present a series of stages of conflict that range from the simple emergence of inter-state non-military tension to the nuclear war. Vasquez (2000) talks about various "steps to war" that states go through as conflict becomes more intense. Again, these steps start with the occurrence of non-military tension and go all the way to full-scale war. It is not necessary for states to go through each of these steps in their path to war. Some steps can be skipped, and war may still occur. Similarly, it is not necessary for states who have taken some of these steps to go all the way to war. At each step of the ladder states face the option to de-escalate. Yet, Vasquez (2000) makes it clear that taking each of those sequential steps reduces the probability of de-escalation while raising the likelihood of war.

It is possible to hypothesize that non-military third party interventions can similarly represent the first step in the direction of a growing probability of conflict initiation and expansion. Militarized disputes cover a range that extends from simple armed incident to full-scale war. The frequency and type of third party intervention may determine whether a dispute will reach the level of war. Rather than exploring the impact of third parties on war—as it has been done in the past—it may be more useful to develop evidence of the impact of third parties on conflict evolution. Despite the limitations discussed above, the MID data set provides a natural and useful starting point for the effort of collecting a record of non-military interventions in interstate conflicts. MIDs data were used to produce a list of all pairs of states—dyads—that experienced at least one militarized dispute after the end of World War II. As many as 357 dyads had at least one MID (as originators) after 1945. Dyads were then ranked based on the actual number of disputes they experienced. The list is topped by the United States-Russia (Soviet Union) dyad with 54 militarized disputes. Dyads experiencing only one militarized dispute clustered at the end of the list. Dyads experiencing only a one day-long dispute were excluded from the list. This choice was made in the course of the data collection process after noticing that a large sample of dyads with a single “one-day dispute” failed to produce any third party intervention. In such circumstances, the short duration of the dispute seems to prevent third party intervention. Many of these one-day disputes amount to little more than transitory threats to use force, minor border and air space violations, seizure and search of non-military boats in the high seas or territorial waters, etc. There are few reasons to expect a large number of interventions in such disputes. Their inclusion brings the risk of biasing the results of the investigation, rather than providing a richer

picture of the empirical domain under study. These procedural choices left us with as many as 314 post-WWII dyads to investigate and a total of 1515 MIDs (out of the 2323 interstate disputes recorded in version 3.0 of the Militarized Interstate Disputes data set).

3.3.1 Intervention Techniques

Searching for third party interventions in disputes within a dyadic framework offers some advantages for the purpose of carrying out this voluminous analysis. In the first place, it allows one to proceed systematically rather than moving almost randomly from dispute to dispute. But, most importantly, this approach gives the researcher a more integral sense of the history of hostility between a set of states, providing clues about where to look for instances of third party involvement. These clues can be useful for searching for those interventions that occur before and after a dispute rather than during it.

Having identified a research strategy, the second challenge was to identify the range of partisan actions that third parties may take in militarized disputes and ascertain that such categories were exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Some of the possible non-militarized actions had already been identified by event data collections projects, such as WEIS and COPDAB. Some, instead, were created *de novo*. The effectiveness of the categories was verified through a trial-and-error approach. The preliminary analysis of a handful of MID dyads in a pilot study (Dixon 1998) provided evidence that the following categories capture almost all actions in which third parties can engage.

According to this scheme, partisan interventions range from simple verbal expression of support to militarized actions, as identified by the MIDs project. The

Table 3.2: Third Party States' Intervention Techniques: Classification Scheme

Non-Military		Military
<i>Diplomatic</i>	<i>Economic</i>	
Expression of Support	Offer of Economic Assistance	Offer of Military Assistance
Expression of Opposition	Economic Assistance	Military Assistance
Cease-fire Appeal	Economic Sanctions	Military Sanctions
Troop Withdrawal Appeal		Threat to Use Ground Troops
Diplomatic Assistance		Threat to Use Aircraft
Diplomatic Sanctions		Threat to Use Naval Ships
		Mobilization of Ground Troops
		Mobilization of Aircraft
		Mobilization of Naval Ships
		Use of Ground Troops
		Use of Aircraft
		Use of Naval Ships

threshold established for identifying the lowest level of diplomatic interventions may appear so low to be practically unfeasible. Each day newspapers are replete with statements supporting or condemning some state involved in a conflict. Yet, some successful attempts to record systematically such forms of foreign policy behavior already exist.⁶ To clarify, verbal expressions of opposition or support must be uttered by an official representative of a government or organization on behalf of the entire government or organization in order to be classified as interventions. It is assumed that such verbal expressions reflect the lowest level of commitment or willingness on the part of a third party. Such verbal expressions may signal the third party's sympathy for one of the combatant or the fact that the third party has some material or ideological stake in the dispute. Verbal expressions of support and opposition may come in different degree of intensity and may affect the likelihood of intervention in different ways. However, the task of classifying different verbal statements with regard to their intensity is daunting (see, for instance, Goldstein

(1992) and King and Lowe (2003)). A less ambitious, less controversial, and feasible objective is simply to record the presence (or absence) of such statements and focus on the fact that, in most cases, they are reversible. Promises that are not kept and threats that are not carried out may damage a state's reputation in costly ways. Yet, the damage may not be as great as when a third party reneges publicly on promises to participate economically or and militarily.

Economic forms of interventions, instead, are more difficult to reverse and rescind. Common wisdom about economic interventions in conflict suggests that, when they are successful, they tend to produce long-term gains rather than immediate results. Economic sanctions may weaken an opponent in the long run. Economic assistance may guarantee greater influence for the third party in the post conflict settlement if the side favored by the intervener has won. However, economic intervention may produce both short-term and long term costs for the third parties, especially if the third party chooses not to follow through with them. On the one hand, a state that has given millions of dollar to a disputant may lose precious resources and credibility if it abandons its favored party in the midst of a conflict, or if the supported side loses the conflict. On the other hand, the higher probability of exerting influence on the evolution of the dispute is offset by the higher danger of being dragged into a war that is not fully wanted. Overall, a progressively more intense economic involvement can affect a third party's willingness to become involved militarily in order to contain losses (both economic and political) and to ensure that the resources invested will bear fruits.

Much of the same logic applies to milder forms of military interventions. Offers and actual provision of military aid raise the stakes for a third party. These types

⁶See, for instance, the International Crisis Behavior data (Michael and Wilkenfeld 1997) or the WEIS data (Goldstein 1992).

of intervention may not be fully comparable to actual military action. They may represent, in fact, only a strategic attempt to signal greater commitment to the outcome of a conflict. However, promises and provision of military aid involve possible strategic and reputational losses for a third party. If such interventions affect the evolution of the dispute in the desired direction, the third party stands to reap benefits in terms of greater influence on the conflict settlement and on the winner's future policies. However, if the conflict evolves in the wrong direction, the third party may feel pressured to intervene directly in order to contain or recoup the losses. The decision to establish a lower threshold for military action than the MID data allows one to explore the hypothesis that milder forms of military interventions lead states toward more violent involvement justifies.

At the level of threats to use force by a third party in support of one party in a dispute, the present data overlap conceptually and practically with the MID participant data set. The overlap may seem redundant. Yet, it can be useful for the purpose of re-constructing the chain of actions of increasing intensity leading to the militarization of a partisan intervention whenever such escalation occurs. It may also be useful to explore unknown patterns of de-escalation of military engagement.

The overlap between the MID data and the data collected for this project is not complete. There are discrepancies between the two data sets. Such discrepancies are largely attributable to two factors. First, there are minor differences in the historical records consulted and in coding decisions concerning the thin threshold that separates pre-militarized activities and threats to use military force. Second, the decision was made to treat multilateral interventions as single interventions by a coalition of states, rather than coding an individual intervention for each of the

participants. The latter source of discrepancy is addressed more extensively in the following sections.

A final characteristic of the classification scheme for third party actions adopted here is that each category includes some actions that are conflictual and some actions that are cooperative. This represents an improvement over the MID participant file in that MID data only capture the conflictual dimension of third party actions. In the present data set, instead, actions such as expressions of support, provision of economic assistance, and provision of military aid are recorded alongside actions that express opposition against a dispute originators. Some scholars may object to the inclusion of cooperative actions into a data set that ultimately is about conflict by appealing to the aforementioned problem of differences in degree vs. differences in kind. Indeed, the inclusion of third party actions generates methodological and theoretical complications for scholars interested in aggregating these events over time (see Lebo and Moore 2003). However, the inclusion of a “cooperation dimension” in the actions being recorded allows one to capture more complex interactions among actors. In particular, it allows a researcher to derive more refined conclusions about degrees of homophily, strategic affinity, and enmity between third parties and originators.

3.3.2 Investigation Procedures

After identifying a universe of cases for investigation and an instrument for measurement of the events of interest, the process of data collection began with the construction of narratives for each dyad from 1946 to 2001. Each narrative described the events leading to the occurrence of one or more militarized disputes within a dyad and contained information about potential interventions by third

parties. The information contained in each narrative was derived from a standard set of primary and secondary sources. Newspapers—in particular, the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London—and various chronologies, such as Facts on File and Keesing's *Record of World Events* provided the basis for each narrative. The description of the events surrounding each dispute was enriched by pre-existing compilations of inter-state conflicts and crisis—such as Weisburd (1997)—historical almanacs and, where available, regional sources. All of the regional sources were in the English language. All of the primary and secondary sources employed were widely used for the collection of event data in international relations (see, for instance Azar 1980), because they have proven they manage to identify crucial events shaping the relations between states.

Several graduate and undergraduate students were responsible for collecting the event information and compiling the narratives. All researchers received the same training. They were asked to initially build narratives for the same standard sample of dyad histories. They were given a template to follow with regard to narratives' format. The more senior investigators cross-checked the consistency of the sample narratives. If the training was successful, each graduate student was assigned to investigate a set of dyads from a specific region of the world. This allowed individual researchers to develop area-specific expertise and in-depth knowledge of the primary and secondary sources that could produce the best information.

It is important to note that several scholars involved in the collection of event data have questioned both the use of human researchers and the use of narratives in the coding of events (see Gerner and Weddle 1994; King and Lowe 2003). As an alternative, these scholars have developed computerized systems of data collection that automatically code the “lead”—the first sentence—of wire reports from news

agencies, such as Reuters. These systems have proved reliable, consistent, and cost-effective (King and Lowe 2003). Unfortunately, automated systems are not quite as effective when it comes to coding instances of joining behavior. News-reading software can be programmed and “trained” to identify effectively agent and target of a foreign policy action. In fact, either agent or target, or both, are extremely likely to appear in a news report’s lead. However, the news reading software cannot do two things. First, it cannot know exactly the context in which the agent’s behavior takes place. That is, it can identify a foreign policy action but cannot distinguish if such action is an intervention in an ongoing conflict or an action in a dyadic conflict between agent and target. Second, news reading software cannot go beyond the lead of a news report. Very frequently, third party interventions are discussed in the larger body of an article or news report about a conflict between two states. Uncovering evidence of intervention often can be a time-consuming task requiring much digging through a large number of different sources. Although reliable, unbiased, and cost-effective, event coding software falls short of fulfilling the needs of the present project.

Although it was necessary to rely on fallible human coders, this procedure provided a wealth of information for each dyad under analysis. In the case of the least active dyads —those experiencing one or few disputes— a narrative could be as short as a few lines of text summarizing the key events of the conflict(s). Instead, in the case of the most active dyads, such as India and Pakistan, or the United and Russia, the narrative could stretch for pages detailing even minor changes in the evolution of each dispute. Regrettably, the density of information is not equally distributed among all dyads. Unfortunately, this procedure for collecting information, while being systematic in uncovering data, tends to privilege conflicts occurring in

the Northern hemisphere and between major power states. It is often more difficult to unearth information for conflicts occurring in Africa or Asia that is of quality comparable to the information available for disputes involving Western Hemisphere or European states.

Lemke (2003) has discussed the bias in the nature of all data—and conflict data in particular—available in the field of International Relations. Data from certain regions of the world, and especially from Africa, are few in quantity and poor in quality. This can generate oddities in the results one gets, such as the presence of a strong democratic peace in Africa while it is widely known that a larger-than-average amount of conflicts takes place in that continent (Lemke 2003, 118-119). The inclusion of regional sources can help reduce the problem to some extent (see Gerner and Weddle 1994). The use of techniques for multiple imputation of data can be useful after the process of data collection has been completed (see King, Joseph and Scheve 2001) but is no substitute for actual good data. Part of the problem is state fragility and poor record-keeping on the part of many developing states (Lemke 2003). With regard to the present project, a larger component of the problem was the tendency by primary and secondary sources to pay a disproportionately smaller amount of attention to developing countries. Several researchers noted a greater availability of information for conflicts involving Western countries and for interventions in which the third party is a Western state.

The risk of a pro-Western bias in the sources and in the data diminishes the closer we come to the present, and as the availability of news sources for different parts of the world improves. The now-extensive availability of primary sources from all regions of the world through a variety of news search engines has improved the quantity and quality of information on conflicts. In recent years many sources

such as the *New York Times*, *Keesing's*, and *Facts on File* have put parts of their records on line. Search tools such as Lexis-Nexis offer searchable data bases of newspapers from all over the world. The existence of these sources has made the research process more systematic and uniform. However, for the time being, the pro-Western bias is largely unavoidable and should be taken into account in the analysis of the empirical findings of every research work.

In the following stage of the project, several researchers were involved in coding the narratives for each post-WWII dyad using previously devised coding sheets. In addition to identifying the identity of the disputants, the intervening third party, and the intervention technique, the coding sheets required coders to record the beginning and ending date for each intervention, whether the third party resorted to more than one technique, how many personnel were involved in the intervention, and the number of casualties. To guarantee consistency and unbiasedness in the events being coded, several intercoder reliability checks were conducted. Different coders were given the same set of dyads to code. Coders and the senior researchers then gathered and went over each dyad together to ensure that all events—i.e., interventions—were identified and that coders had recognized all intervention techniques correctly. Where differences existed, they were resolved through discussion. The last part of the process consisted of inputting the data from the codesheets into a spreadsheet-like computer file. It was decided that coders should not input the data directly in a computer because the separation between physical codesheets and the electronic data set allowed for another occasion to detect anomalies and inconsistencies. The following section discusses descriptive, preliminary results emerging from this lengthy process.

3.4 Descriptive Analysis and Some Preliminary Findings

Of the 314 post-WWII dyads experiencing at least a dispute longer than one day, 151 witnessed some sort of intervention by a third party state. The total number of state interventions catalogued in the data set is 1264. This is quite a larger number of interventions than the 355 post-WWII militarized interventions contained in version 3.0 of the MID Participant file. There is a mean of 8.377 interventions per dyad, if only the dyads experiencing interventions are taken into account. The mean is 4.02 per dyad, if all post-WWII dyads experiencing at least a dispute longer than one day are included.


An innovation compared to the MID data sets is that a longer period of time than the actual dispute duration is investigated for presence of third state intervention. During the process of compilation of the dyads narratives, it soon became evident that third parties do not only intervene after a dispute has become militarized. A cursory overview of the first narratives compiled suggested that, unless a MID starts suddenly and unexpectedly without a preceding crisis, sometimes third parties intervene before and/or after the militarization of a dispute. Intervention in a crisis preceding a MID can have an effect on the likelihood that the crisis will become a militarized incident. Intervention in the phases following the termination of an MID may have an impact on the recurrence of MIDs within the same dyad of originators. Thus, it was decided to investigate events occurring two weeks before and after a dispute's official beginning and ending date. That two-week window could be expanded if we encountered evidence of a brewing crisis or extended dispute de-escalation. Following Dixon (1998), it was decided to preserve a distinction between interventions that are "precipitated" by a specific MID —those intervention occurring between the start and end date of a dispute— and interventions

surrounding a MID. Overall, 196 third party state interventions (15.46 percent of the total) occurred before or after the official beginning and ending date of a militarized dispute.

Figure 3.4 shows the number of state interventions in militarized disputes per year since the end of WWII. 1970 is the year with the most interventions (89), immediately followed by 1968 with 85 interventions. A handful of post-WWII years do not register any state interventions in disputes. The late 1960s and early 1970s stand out for having a high level of third party activity. Arguably, the Vietnam war was a catalyst for interventions, probably because of its duration and because of the nature of actors and political interests involved in the conflict. Figure 3.4 also reveals peaks in the number of third party interventions in connection to major conflicts. There were 63 interventions in 1951, at the apex of the Korean war. There were 48 and 49 interventions in 1983 and 1986, respectively. Many interventions in 1983 were associated with the US invasion of Grenada and Soviet action in Afghanistan. US action against Libya in 1986 also drew a lot of opposition from the international community. The 1990s were relatively quiet if compared to other decades. The large number of interventions in 1992 is due to the skirmishes between the US, Britain and Iraq following the end of the first Gulf War, to the numerous conflicts that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the Bosnian crisis.

It may be surprising not to find more third party interventions in 1990 and 1991, given the vast international turmoil surrounding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm. The reason is to be found in the coding rules for this phase of project. Interventions conducted by two or more third party states in coordination were classified as interventions by coalitions of states rather than being de-composed into individual state interventions. In order for a collective

Figure 3.1: Third Party States' Interventions per Year, 1946-2001



intervention to be classified as executed by a coalition of states it had to meet certain criteria. First, several third parties had to conduct the same type of action on the same day. Second, there had to be sufficient evidence in the sources of coordination between different actors. For example, a joint statement of support for a combatant by two states would qualify as a collective intervention and would be set aside for the time being. If, on the other hand, two or more third states separately engaged in military action against a combatant without manifest evidence of coordination, those acts were classified as separate interventions.

It can be argued that the exclusion of joint, coordinated interventions introduces bias in the conclusions about third parties' decisions that may be derived from these data. However, the decision to separate out joint interventions and individual

interventions is not without precedents in the study of joining behavior and state alignment choices (see, for instance Leeds, Mitchell McLaughlin and Long 2000). The motivation for this coding choice is that the decision-making process behind multilateral collective action is different in nature from the decision to join made by a single state (see, for instance Corbetta and Dixon 2004). It is very likely that many third parties—and especially weaker third party states—decide to intervene only because they can do so in coordination with other states. They would not make the same choice if the opportunity for multilateral action were not present. In light of this logic, it is the separation of multilateral interventions in individual acts of joining that introduces bias by bringing into the data set states that would not have joined on their own, and especially if such joint interventions are treated as being independent from one another. It is well-known—and the very centerpiece of formal approaches to international relations—that third party states develop expectations about the behavior of other states and make decisions accordingly (Yamamoto and Bremer 1980). These expectations concern not just enemies but also potential allies. Capturing the strategic interactions among states in general, and third party states in particular, is a theoretically and methodologically complex problem for which solutions are just now being introduced (see Signorino 1999, 2002). Overall, the costs involved in the inclusion of multilateral interventions in this project turned out to be considerable. Such interventions were recorded, but it was ultimately decided to tackle the issues raised by such interventions in a separate project.

Analysis (not shown here) of the relative frequency of non-precipitated interventions per year and the total number of interventions per year indicates that there is not a remarkable relationship pattern between the two. That is, the frequency of


non-precipitated interventions is not simply a function of the total number of interventions. It would be erroneous to conclude that, because some years are eventful with regard to interstate disputes and experience many third party interventions, they will also experience a larger share of non-precipitated interventions. Rather, the proportion of non-precipitated interventions is likely to vary as a function of dispute characteristics and of the actors involved in such disputes. This hypothesis will be explored in successive chapters.

Similarly, there is no indication that the number of interventions in any year and over time is simply a function of the number of militarized disputes in that year. The correlation between the number of MIDs per year and the number of third party interventions per year is actually negative (Pearson's $r = -.43$). Figure 3.4 below compares the frequency of militarized disputes per year after WWII with the frequency of third party interventions per year. A visual inspection of the graph seems to confirm the results of correlation analysis. No consistent pattern of covariation between MIDs occurrence and third states' interventions seems to emerge. In a way, Figure 3.4 suggests a slowly declining trend in the frequency of interventions over time after the peak of the late 1960s-early 1970s, while the frequency of disputes per year appears relatively constant. Also of interest in Figure 3.4 is the fact that, with the exception of the 1980s, MIDs occurrence and frequency of intervention often move in opposite directions, thus explaining the negative sign of the correlation coefficient between the two.

A variety of hypotheses emerge from this observation. First, when few disputes are occurring, potential third states may find it easier to focus their attention and resources on those disputes. Second, when many disputes are occurring in the international systems, more states are likely to be involved in them and have fewer

resources to become third parties to other conflicts. Finally, it is possible that the relationship between dispute occurrence and partisan interventions depends on the states involved in the dispute and the characteristics of the disputes themselves. In particular, when major powers are involved in a few high intensity disputes, they polarize international attention around such conflicts with the result that fewer disputes occur in the system but more third party interventions take place in the ongoing major power MIDs. This final hypothesis is somewhat reinforced by findings concerning the frequency with which major powers seem to attract equal amounts of support and opposition from third party states when they are involved in disputes as originators. These findings are presented in the following section.

Figure 3.2: Frequency of Militarized Disputes and Third Party Interventions per Year, 1946-2001



This also indirectly suggests the hypothesis that it is not the number of militarized disputes occurring in a given year to determine the number of third party interventions. Rather, the specific traits of certain disputes and the characteristics of the actors involved seem to be more likely to draw third party state interventions. Hypotheses about the states most likely to enter an ongoing MID and about the dispute characteristics that may precipitate militarized interventions have been raised in works by Kaw (1990), Kim (1991), Smith (1996), and by Yamamoto and Bremer (1980). Overall, these authors suggest that states with large capabilities and/or status or states that are geographically proximate to a conflict are more likely to intervene militarily. High-intensity disputes involving major powers are said to attract the attention of third parties. These hypotheses will be spelled out in greater detail and tested in light of the new data in subsequent chapters.

The relative frequency of militarized and non-militarized third party state intervention over time is also of interest. 338 of the 1264 interventions (26.80) were military in character. Approximately three-fourths (73.2 percent) of post-WWII interventions were non-military in character. To the extent that these data overlap with pre-existing records on third party interventions for the post-WWII era, this may indicate that previous analyses of joining behavior have looked at a sample of approximately one-fourth of all available interventions. Interestingly, version 3.0 of the MID data records 355 militarized interventions in the post-1945 period. This number is very close to the number recorded in the present project, suggesting some degree of overlap exists where interventions become militarized. However, it is curious that the MID data records more military interventions than the present third party data even though the latter's definition of a militarized action is more restrictive.

Three factors may explain these differences. First, several coders involved in the present project reported discrepancies with MID coding as MID coders appeared willing to code promises of intervention and military assistance as threats, displays, or actual uses of military force. Second, there may be discrepancies in the primary and secondary sources consulted in the two projects. Third, as mentioned above, the number of third states involvement in the MID data set is largely magnified by de-composing multilateral interventions into individuals acts of joining. This dimension is lost in the current project, and instances of multilateral interventions are excluded from the data set used in this analysis. Table 3.3 below summarizes the frequency of state interventions by the three main techniques. Table 3.4 instead shows the comparison between the partisan intervention data and Militarized Interstate Disputes data for militarized interventions by specific category.

Table 3.3 suggests that third parties prefer either diplomatic or military interventions to economic ones. While this phenomenon awaits systematic explanation, it is plausible that diplomatic and military interventions are more frequent because states can exercise influence on the combatants individually and in direct fashion through these techniques. The effectiveness of economic interventions may be too dependent on the willingness of other international actors to cooperate for states to consider it an attractive choice. Economic aid and, especially, economic sanctions can be more effective if implemented collectively —often in the context of international organizations. Economic interventions can be rather expensive forms of interventions that may have a long-term impact, while states look for forms of intervention with immediate impact that do not require coordination among a large number of actors.⁷

⁷Admittedly, the classification scheme has weaker discriminatory power for economic intervention. Economic assistance and sanctions categories are broad categories that comprise a variety

Table 3.3: Frequency of Third Party State Intervention Techniques, 1946-2001

Technique	Frequency	Percent
Diplomatic	843	66.71
Economic	82	6.49
Military	339	26.8
Total	1264	100.00

It is possible to be more specific about the exact technique used by third parties by using the extensive classification table shown above. 727 instances of intervention are either declarations of support or declarations of opposition, constituting 58 percent of the 1251 total interventions. Expression of opposition are the most “popular” technique of all -455, or 36.37 percent of the total. Obviously, such diplomatic expressions also are the most popular type of non-military intervention. Third parties who intervene in diplomatic fashion are less likely to make specific requests, such as troops withdrawal or cease fire demands. Arguably, neutral third parties are more likely to employ these techniques. With regard to economic intervention, third parties are almost equally split in their preference for economic support (35 instances) and economic sanctions (41 instances). The provision of military assistance in the form of weapons, personnel (military advisers), and expertise is the most used form of military involvement. In 160 instances —12.76 percent of the total and 47.19 percent of military interventions alone— third parties resorted to this form of involvement. Cumulatively, there are 28 instances of threats to use force, 47 instances of mobilization, and 51 instances of actual use of force.⁸

of policies. Both primary and secondary sources upon which the record is based rarely elaborate on the details of such measures.

⁸22 instances of multilateral military intervention are excluded from the analysis. These 22 collective interventions would add 92 individual military interventions to the data set. 83 of these


Table 3.4: Frequency of Third Party Military Interventions: Third Party Intervention Data and Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Data, 1946-2001

Technique	TPI data		MID data	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Missing or No Action	3	0.8	45	12.67
Offer of Military Assistance	20	6.0	NA	-
Military Assistance	160	47.4	NA	-
Military Sanctions	31	9.1	NA	-
Threat	26	7.6	30	8.45
Display or Mobilization	47	14.0	140	39.44
Use of Force	51	15.1	140	39.44
Total	338	100.00	355	100.00

Fluctuations in the overall frequency of intervention may be driven by variations in a specific type of intervention compared to other intervention techniques. Figure 3.4 tracks the variation in the frequency of interventions over time by technique. Visual analysis of the plot suggests there is consistently remarkable pattern of covariation between different types of third party interventions. The frequencies of diplomatic, military and, to a lesser extent, economic interventions mirror each other until the mid-1960s. Arguably because of the Vietnam War, we see a sharp divergence in the frequency of military and diplomatic interventions lasting for approximately a decade. The same pattern is observable during the 1980s. As noted previously, both time periods were marked by intense super-power activity. Dispute involvement by major powers is likely to draw the attention and participation (both in support and against) of other states. These patterns seem to confirm the notion that conflicts involving major power states are more likely to expand. The year with the highest number of military interventions is 1951 with 24 militarized third party involvements. Most of these military intervention occurred in

the context of the Korean war. 1961 and 1977 also experienced a relatively high number of military interventions (18 and 16, respectively), but such interventions are not related to one conflict in particular. Rather, they took place in a variety of conflicts.

Figure 3.3: Frequency of Third Party Interventions per Year, by Technique



Further inspection of the data about types of intervention suggests that the number of military intervention is not a function of the total number of third party participation in a given year (Pearson's $r = .4821$). Because the number of diplomatic interventions overall is such a great fraction of the total number of interventions, it is no surprise that strong correlation between the two exists

military interventions are at the level of threat to use military force or above. For three of the 22 collective military interventions, the actual number of states involved is missing, leaving open the possibility that even more interventions could be added to the data.

(Pearson $s\ r=.9633$). The number of economic intervention is a much smaller fraction of the total number of interventions. It peaks in 1951 and 1953, due to widespread compliance with United Nations-mandated sanctions against China for its intervention in the Korean War. But it remains steady over time, experiencing only minor oscillations in the late 1970s-early 1980s -due to the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the US invasion of Grenada. It is worth noticing that, if one only looks at precipitated interventions, there is no discernible change in frequency of interventions over time regardless of their type.

A descriptive analysis of the third party data suggests a variety of hypotheses that are worth exploring further. First, they capture a wider range of militarized joining activities than the MID data set, although both projects record a similar frequencies of intervention. Military interventions remain the tip of the iceberg of a much larger phenomenon. The findings support existing concerns about measurement error of the dependent variable and potential bias in the results of existing studies on joining behavior. Second, the analysis indicates that (a) the frequency of third party interventions over time is not a function of the number of disputes, and (b) the frequency of military and non-precipitated disputes is not a function of the volume of joining activity in a given year. Third party actions and joining behaviors can be analyzed as macro-level phenomena, but their variation over time is likely to be best explained by characteristics of the disputes taking place and by the traits of the third parties —potential and actual.

3.4.1 Who Intervenes?

Since the characteristics of the third party themselves may play a large role in explaining joining behavior, the question of which states intervene more frequently

emerges naturally. Moreover, the data thus far suggest that states prefer to intervene diplomatically, while they are more cautious with using economic and military pressures. But are there differences among states concerning the tendency to join in an ongoing militarized dispute and preference for a particular technique? Simple descriptive analysis of the data can provide preliminary answers to these questions. Table 3.5 below shows the number and type of interventions by the most active states. 15 interventions over the 1946-2001 period was arbitrarily chosen as cut-off points because there seems to be a considerable gap between states with these many interventions and the vast majority of less active states. These states account for about 70 percent (879 interventions out of 1264) of all post WWII joining behavior.

The table suggests that the Security Council Permanent members have earned that position for a reason: They carry out a preponderant amount of all third party activity (679 interventions, or approximately 53 percent of the total). It is an open question whether their foreign policy activities are truly consonant with the spirit of collective security embodied in the United Nations or just adds fuel to the fire of interstate conflict. The permanent members of the Security Council also seem to hold a monopoly on the use of military force: They account for 66 percent of all state military interventions (226 out of 339). Great Britain, the least military active among the Big Five, has almost twice as many military interventions as Egypt, the closest “runner up.” After the five permanent members, we find —not surprisingly— regional great powers, close allies of the United States, and aspiring great powers. The most active joiners are Western states, but the Middle East is -again unsurprisingly- over-represented. With the exception of Egypt, the African continent is under-represented despite the large amount of conflicts fought in the regional after World War II.

Table 3.5: Most Active Third Party States (15 or More Interventions in MIDs), 1946-2001

	Diplomatic	Economic	Military	Total
US	141	21	134	296
Russia/USSR	123	4	31	158
China	60	1	17	78
France	43	3	29	75
UK	51	6	15	72
Egypt	31	0	9	40
Australia	14	4	6	24
India	20	1	0	21
Iran	17	0	4	21
Germany	14	2	3	19
Syria	11	0	4	15
Jordan	10	0	4	15
Japan	10	5	5	15
Canada	9	5	1	15
Cuba	9	2	4	15
Total	564	54	261	879

When we look at individual third party states, the table above suggests that approximately one-fourth of all post-WWII joining behavior and is attributable to the United States, which registered 294 out 1264 total. The gap between the US level of foreign policy involvement and that of its competitors is striking. The US has almost twice as many interventions than Russia/USSR —the second most-active intervener. Also striking is the propensity of the US to use military means, as approximately 45 percent of its interventions are military. Arguably, these figures cast the idea of a post-WWII “Pax Americana” in a different light from its common usage. The figures may provide supporting evidence to the argument that, beyond the idea of bipolarity, the Cold War international system was truly a hegemonic system. Concerning the use of military intervention techniques, the US has four times as many military interventions as Russia and France —the second and third-most militarily active states. The US has a disproportionate number of economic

interventions compared to other countries —arguably a reflection of the disparity between American economic power and the economic power of other countries. Despite the availability of greater economic means, the US still has preferred military techniques over other techniques. Forty-five percent of US joining actions are military. Only thirty-eight percent (approximately) of France's -in proportion, the second most active military joiner- interventions are military.

Table 3.5 also reflects a relatively even split between democracies and non-democracies with regard to their level of joining activity. We know that regime type affects the alignment choices of states (Werner and Lemke 1997). We do not know whether regime type affects a state's level of joining activity. The relationship between a state's regime type, its alignment choices, and its joining activity will be explored systematically in the following chapter. Yet, this preliminary exploration of the data indicates that it is essential to keep in mind that the United States' "hyperactivity" may influence the results one gets and may have affected the results in existing studies on joining behavior.

The data provide a good portrait of the post-1945 international system. Intensity of joining behavior can be a good indicator not just of major power status, but also of hegemonic status. Major power states intervene more often than other states in militarized disputes and are more likely to do so with military means. The present data could be useful to scholars of major power politics as well as to students of American and comparative foreign policy. Figure 6 below re-proposes much of the usual temporal patterns outlined earlier. Even for major power states, the temporal patterns in the frequency of militarized and non-militarized (diplomatic and economic) interventions track each other closely over time with the exception of the mid-1960s to mid-1970s period. However, the proportion between militarized

and non-militarized interventions appears much higher in the early stages of the Cold War. There seems to be a slightly temporal trend of diminishing militarized interventions vis-a-vis militarized that deserves scrutiny in the future.

Beyond the descriptive statistics just presented, Table 3.6 evaluates the strength of the relationship between major power status and the propensity to intervene militarily, showing that the association is strongly significant. The association is also strong between major power status and diplomatic intervention, but weaker with regard to major power status and the tendency to intervene with economic means. The inclusion of data concerning forms of intervention other than military ones does not alter the relationship between major power status and joining behavior. Rather, the data bring to light more strongly those behavioral differences between great powers and “ordinary states” that are frequently highlighted in the conflict literature.

Some theories and models predicting third party intervention exist in the conflict literature. Yet, with the possible exception of Kim (1991). None of them says much about the targets of joiners. Scholars tend to fall back on realist assumptions about balancing or bandwagoning but do not move past that. One of the advantages of the present data is that they allow one to establish a specific connection between the decision to intervene and the joiner’s action. This is a step forward compared to the MID data, where one can loosely establish a joiner’s intentions by looking at whether it joined with Side A or Side B. This is adequate when only two states are involved in the conflict. But what if there is a third originator in the dispute –say state C– who joined with B? Then one has a lot of guess-work to do to establish whether a joiner entered targeting state B, state C, or both. In the present data, disputes with multiple originators are unpacked in their component dyads, which

Table 3.6: Association Between Major Power Status and Intervention Techniques, 1946-2001

Diplomatic			
	Non-Major Power	Major Power	Total
No	159	262	421
	27.32	38.42	33.31
Yes	423	420	843
	72.68	61.58	66.69
Total	582	682	1264
Chi-square = 17.5782			
Pr = 0.000			
Economic			
	Non-major Power	Major Power	Total
No	535	647	1182
	91.92	94.87	93.51
Yes	47	35	82
	8.08	5.13	6.49
Total	582	682	1264
Chi-square = 4.4506			
Pr = 0.035			
Military			
	Non-Major Power	Major Power	Total
No	470	455	595
	80.76	66.72	73.18
Yes	455	227	682
	19.24	33.28	26.82
Total	925	339	1264
Chi-square = 31.7348			
Pr = 0.000			

allows a researcher to build directly into the data the objective of the joiner's action. So, against whom do joiners tend to intervene? Table 3.7 below present the states most targeted by third party states. The expectation is that -obviously- such states will be those most likely to become involved in conflicts as originators. The table below should contain many of the major power states found in the table of the most active joiners and a variety of revisionist states.

Table 3.7: Most Frequent Targets of Third Parties' Intervention, 1946-2001

Target	Diplomatic	Economic	Military	Total
US	251	8	17	276
Russia	68	10	33	111
China	24	12	28	64
North Vietnam	33	7	21	61
Israel	35	0	23	58
UK	30	1	2	33
Iran	21	6	5	32
Iraq	28	0	4	32
South Africa	27	1	1	29
Libya	10	3	12	25
South Vietnam	14	4	7	25
Portugal	19	0	5	24
Hungary	14	3	6	23
East Germany	19	0	3	22
West Germany	19	0	3	22
Egypt	11	0	11	22
Syria	17	0	5	22

Unsurprisingly, the three most active joiners —US, Russia, and China— top the list of target states. They attract a great deal of international opposition. Yet, as a reflection of their preponderant power, they draw mostly diplomatic opposition. China is the only exception, and the anomaly is largely explained by the large number of states intervening in the Korean war. Again unsurprisingly, Israel and North Vietnam are right behind the major power. These findings raise the hypothesis that the intervention technique chosen by third party states depends of the characteristics of a dispute: The presence of a major power states in the dispute is one such factor. These figures, however, are also interesting because they suggest that opposition to or close association with the hegemon expose a state to attacks of various sort by the international community. Surprisingly missing

from the table are such obvious candidates for the role of “bad guy” such as North Korea and Serbia/Yugoslavia. The reasons for their absence is the fact that most actions taken against them were multilateral and, therefore, escaped the analysis. This reinforces the concern that multilateral interventions need to be unpacked into individual interventions that will later be included in the present data set. More puzzling are (1) the presence of Portugal—a state that experienced a lot of international pressure throughout the decolonizations period- and (2) the absence of France, whose active interventionism is not matched by an equally strong international opposition. Thus far, if we look at the data from the perspective of the target state, rather than the joiner, it seems intuitively evident that the data set picks up a majority of interventions from Cold War rivalries, the Vietnam war, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Since four of the five post-WII great powers rank very high in the list of third party targets, the data also suggest that third parties are not shy about siding against major power states—especially after accounting for diplomatic forms of intervention. It is possible to hypothesize that interventions against major powers may not be military or economic in character. Rather, they may be diplomatic. A hypothesis of this sort allows us to speculate and further explore competing realist claims about states’ tendency to either balance against power or bandwagon. Because major power states carry out most interventions, the data tend to confirm the earlier findings that major powers are prone to dragging each other into conflict. Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) indicated that major powers are more likely to intervene into conflicts originated by other major powers. This may also be due to the fact that non-military interventions are now taken into account and, when they are included, we capture interventions on the part of weaker states may not

be otherwise detected. That is, weaker states may be more willing to use diplomatic and economic intervention techniques than military action against stronger originators. The following chapters explore the possibility that the inclusion of non-military interventions may allow us to derive a different image of the impact of power relations between third parties and originators on intervention decisions.

3.5 Conclusion

The descriptive evidence presented here seems to support the claim that further study of joining behavior can be useful in expanding our knowledge of interstate conflict dynamics. Several authors have suggested that third party actions and expectations about their actions influence calculation about conflict initiation and conflict evolution (see, for instance Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Werner 2000a). A vast number of studies have suggested, directly or indirectly, that study of joining behavior is essential to a better understanding of state alignment choices, alliance dynamics, and tendency to keep or break commitments. Further analysis of third party actions is also crucial to our understanding of the phenomenon of the spatial evolution of conflict. In summary, the investigation of third parties' decisions and actions goes directly to the heart of the bigger theoretical issue of conflict and cooperation in international politics, thus affecting past and current debates between different theoretical paradigms in International Relations.

Yet, despite the stated need for broader knowledge of joining behavior and the development of new theories on this topic, the vast majority of studies on the subject relies on information that is limited to *military* action by third parties. It has been argued that, while the study of militarized joining behavior is of fundamental importance, we need to pay attention to more nuanced forms of joining behavior.

Military interventions are only the tip of the iceberg of a much larger international phenomenon. Ignoring what lies under the surface of the most visible forms of joining behavior generates a variety of theoretical and methodological problems that can undermine the soundness of the conclusions one draws about joining behavior per se and about a variety of other international dynamics.

This chapter has presented new data on joining behavior that have been collected for the purpose of filling this void in the study of international conflict. The data pay special attention to the diplomatic and economic techniques to which third party states may resort in the attempt to influence the outcome of conflicts. The resulting data set is structured around the framework provided by the Militarized Interstate Disputes data sets (MID), and the two sources can be easily integrated, as demonstrated in the multivariate analysis portion of the paper. By integrating existing MID data with new information on economic and diplomatic state intervention, it becomes possible to assess the extent to which sampling biases influence our results in the study of a variety of international relations topics. Many of these topics extend beyond the issue of joining behavior and include the duration of conflict, reliability of alliances, escalatory dynamics, and mechanisms of spatial diffusion of conflict, and foreign policy substitutability. At the very least, the present data may help us (1) provide a richer account of foreign policy action and decision-making —both at the systemic level and at the level of individual nation-states, and (2) refine existing theoretical models of joining behavior.

The following chapters attempt to achieve these goals by moving beyond the descriptive exploration of the data and by investigating in a more systematic fashion the multiple dimensions in which joining decisions take place. More specifically, within the theoretical framework of opportunity and willingness, I will examine

how a third party's characteristics, its relations to the originators of a conflict, and the characteristics of the conflict at hand interact in determining whether a state will enter an ongoing conflict and how.

CHAPTER 4

Third Party States and the Decision To Intervene

4.1 Introduction

The literature on conflict initiation suggests that the decision to start a war is a rational one. States contemplating to start a war act rationally, choose their opponents carefully, and rarely start hostilities against another state if their chances to win a one-on-one conflict are low (Bueno de Mesquita 1980, 1981). However, states operate in an uncertain international environment and must incorporate such uncertainty in their decision-making processes. One such source of uncertainty comes from the behavior of third party states. Potential conflict initiators must — and actually do— take into account the possibility that the conflict will expand and that third states will join in either on their side or on the side of their opponent. Bueno de Mesquita (1981); Reed (2000); Werner (2000*a*), and others show that conflict initiators effectively select themselves into conflicts that tend to remain one-on-one affairs. Werner (2000*a*) even shows that conflict originators behave in such a way as to prevent interventions by other states. Nonetheless, 15.58 percent of all militarized disputes (MIDs) between 1816 and 2001 (362 out of 2323), and 12.28 of all disputes between 1946 and 2001 (186 out of 1515) have failed to remain circumscribed conflicts. Rather, they have experienced militarized interventions by third states. The number of conflicts in which third parties have intervened grows higher if we also consider non-military interventions.

The number of third party interventions in interstate disputes is not overwhelmingly large. But it is sufficiently large to induce caution before adopting rational explanations of conflict initiation at face value. Conflict originators may be procedurally rational actors, but the outcomes of their decisions often is substantively suboptimal. The number of third party interventions suggests that there are two additional outcomes to the originators' decision-making processes. First, states pondering about starting a conflict may simply miscalculate and underestimate the probability of intervention by other states, arguably because of undisclosed private information or joiners' failure to maintain commitments (see Fearon 1995). Second, they may rationally decide to start a conflict under the expectation that third parties will intervene on their side and not on the opponent's side. If rational explanations of conflicts are correct, it is in these two sets of circumstances that we should witness conflict expansion.

Yet, the rational decisions of conflict initiators do not determine the entire range of circumstances in which third parties can intervene. On some occasions, interventions occur when no miscalculation has taken place. On other occasions, third parties do not intervene even if a conflict originator has accurately estimated a potential joiner's chances of getting involved. It is possible to explain the occasional unpredictability of third parties—so vividly reflected in the debate about alliance reliability, for example—by considering that third parties go through a decision-making process that is not dissimilar to that of conflict originators. That is, the selection mechanism of conflict onset and evolution identified by Bueno de Mesquita (1981); Fearon (1995); Reed (2000) is not the only selection mechanism at work. Just like conflict originators select themselves into disputes and wars, so third parties select themselves into a specific set of conflicts. The selection process

by which third parties select themselves into conflicts has been investigated occasionally (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Smith 1996) but never thoroughly analyzed. More specifically, the data and models employed in existing studies of joining behavior do not accurately capture the selection dynamics of the joining decision. In this chapter, I propose a model of third party intervention that takes into account the selective nature of decision-making processes that lead to the decisions to enter in ongoing conflicts. I do so by returning to the opportunity and willingness theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 2. Finally, I use data described in Chapter 3 to test empirically the implications of such a model.

4.2 Joining Behavior and Selections Bias

When do third parties intervene in ongoing disputes and why? As previously pointed out, early international relations scholarship has answered this question often hastily and rather carelessly by appealing to pre-existing theories about alliance formation before the onset of conflict and joining behavior in wars. These theories have been in essence very slight modifications of the realist notion of balance of power behavior. It has been generally assumed, often without much accompanying empirical tests, that third states join a conflict with the goals of achieving greater power or greater security. Such assumptions about third parties' goals have led scholars to expect that third parties will join in ongoing conflicts when those conflicts raise the opportunity for material gains or increase the risk posed by an emerging threat. Many students of international politics have raised incompatible hypotheses about balance-of-power or bandwagoning behavior by third parties.

More recently, scholars of international conflict have begun clearing up the confusion between pre-conflict alignment tendencies and actual joining behavior during conflict. Debates about the reliability of alliance agreements (see, for example Siverson and King 1979, 1980; Sabrosky 1980; Sullivan and Siverson 1984; Oren 1990; Leeds, Mitchell McLaughlin and Long 2000; Leeds 2003) and the mechanisms of conflict diffusion in space (see, for instance Beer 1979; Most and Starr 1980; Houweling and Siccama 1985; Most and Starr 1989; Kadera 1998; Gleditsch 2002; Hammarstrom and Heldt 2002) introduced the notion that factors other than simple balance of power or bandwagoning factors can motivate the decision of third parties to join. It is neither sufficient nor necessary to assume that states are motivated by desire to accumulate power (see Morgenthau 1985) or survival (see Waltz 1979) in order to explain joining behavior. The decision to join must also be explained by looking the opportunities for interventions that states face—as explained in the conflict diffusion literature—and by existing ties between third parties and disputants, as suggested by the literature on alliance reliability.

Moving beyond “grand” theory and anecdotal evidence, conflict scholars have proceeded to test empirically models of third party interventions (Yamamoto and Bremer 1980; Kaw 1990; Huth 1998) and alignment choices (Werner and Lemke 1997) or both (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Kim 1991; Smith 1996) in a variety of conflicts, ranging from crises to full scale wars. These works share two major findings. First, the fact that material capabilities and major power status almost invariably predict intervention indicates that possibilistic factors shape the decision to join just as much as unobserved desires to increase power and security. Second, ties of some sort between joiners and disputants and between joiners and other potential joiners play a crucial role in shaping the decision to join. Such

ties can be politico-ideological —as expressed by (dis)similarity in regime type— formal —as expressed by alliance agreements— or simply strategic —as expressed by similarities in foreign policies.

Scholars espousing a formal approach to conflict have highlighted the importance of the latter finding. Again, the role played by ties between joiners and conflict originators shows that the decision to intervene is not shaped by monodimensional concerns with power and security. Rather, formal modelers have suggested joining is the result of elaborate —though often imperfect— decision-making processes. These decisions take place in sequential steps through which third parties take into consideration expectations about the behavior of other states and the probability of being successful. Such approaches to the study of joining behavior rest on the assumptions that third parties: (1) want to shape the outcome of a conflict in a way that is consonant to their foreign policy interests; and (2) want to minimize the costs of intervention while maximizing the chances of success.

Nonetheless, even studies that have adopted a formal or empirical (or both) approach to the study of joining behavior have been characterized by important limitations. These limitations take the form of two interrelated types of selection bias. First, for reasons discussed at length in the preceding chapters, recent formal/empirical studies of joining behavior have focused almost exclusively on militarized interventions in conflict of the largest magnitude —i.e., wars. Plausibly, only a limited number of states have the means and the desire to become involved in the most violent conflicts with the most violent technique. This approach only looks at the tip of the iceberg of the phenomenon of joining behavior. Conflicts of lower intensity are not considered. Third party interventions that are non-military are treated as non-events. Conclusions about joining behavior derived from such

a set of observations are not likely to be generalizable and compound problems of case selection on the dependent and the independent variable.

The second type of limitations is more subtle and has to do with the analytical technique used in most studies of joining behavior to investigate third parties' decisions to join. Several works on the subject do take into consideration the complex nature of the joining decision by acknowledging that such a decision does take place in a vacuum. Rather, it is recognized that third states enter a conflict when they have the capacity to shape the outcome of the conflict by affecting the behavior of the disputants. Implicitly or explicitly, scholars assume that major power states are more likely to become third parties than smaller powers (see, for instance Yamamoto and Bremer 1980; Huth 1998). In addition, they recognize that having stakes of some sort in the conflict is a crucial determinant of joining behavior. In most instances, scholars define such stakes in terms of the relationship between a potential third party and the combatants. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979), for instance, look at the distribution of power between third parties and war originators. Werner and Lemke (1997), instead, investigate the relationship between third parties and disputants by looking at similarity in regime type and economic systems. Smith (1996), instead, explores the effects of alliance agreements between interveners and war originators.

Yet, with the possible exception of Smith (1996), these studies lose track of the dynamic environment in which the joining decision is taken. They model third party intervention as a either/or event. More specifically, existing models of third party interventions are estimated through logistic or probit regressions in which the dependent variable is code as 1 if a third party intervenes militarily on one side in a dispute and 0 if no intervention or a non-military intervention takes place (see,

for instance Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Werner and Lemke 1997). Models of this type fail to take into account the mechanism through which joiners select themselves into the sample. They assume that all states have equal opportunity and interest to enter an ongoing dispute *militarily*. Often, they systematically restrict the sample of potential interveners by selecting on some particular explanatory variable, such as major power status. Problems related to selection on the explanatory and the dependent variable are extensively treated in King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and more recently in Signorino (2002). The following discussion is largely borrowed from these two sources.

4.2.1 Selecting Joiners on Some Explanatory Variable

Yamamoto and Bremer (1980); Huth (1998) and, more implicitly, a variety of classic and neorealist scholars have studied joining behavior in violent conflicts by looking at major power states' interventions exclusively. According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and Signorino (2002) systematic selection of a sample on some explanatory variable is not a considerable problem overall. If Y is intervention in a conflict and $X\beta$ is the effect of major power status, studies such as these model the phenomenon linearly as

$$Y = X\beta + \varepsilon$$

and assume that errors are normally distributed with mean 0:

$$E[\varepsilon|X] = 0$$

In these particular cases, the expected value of the dependent variable conditional on X is the same as in the true population

$$\begin{aligned} E[Y|X] &= E[X\beta|X] + E[\varepsilon|X] \\ &= X\beta \end{aligned}$$

While formally this is not an issue, systematic selection of samples on some explanatory variable —such as major power status— has hidden problems. Selection on X does not constitute a problem only if the functional form of the relationship between X and Y is specified correctly (Signorino 2002, 96). If the relationship between X and Y is assumed to be linear but we have two samples —one selected on the basis that $X > 0$ and the other where $X < 0$ — then regressing Y on X in the two different samples may well produce coefficients of opposite sign. As a result, the conclusions one draws are not necessarily biased but are clearly limited to the sample chosen. Choosing samples of joiners based on major power status or some other attribute that is assumed to increase a third party's opportunity to join creates threats to the external validity of the conclusions and reduces their generalizability beyond the sample (Signorino 1999, 96). Extending the conclusions about major power states' tendency to intervene in conflicts to all states in the international system may then be quite misleading.

Major power status is not the only explanatory variable scholars have used to circumscribe the sample of potential interveners. A state's material capabilities or its proximity to a conflict are often mentioned as affecting the likelihood that a state will enter the sample of potential joiners. Scholars have identified a set of

politically relevant dyads that are more prone to experiencing conflicts (see, for instance Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993). Similarly, they have suggested -- although indirectly-- that there exist a subset of “politically relevant states” that may be more likely to enter ongoing conflicts. Reed (2000) has shown that explicitly modeling the mechanisms through which conflict-prone dyads select themselves into successive phases of conflict makes a substantive difference in the results one gets. The same has not been done with regard to third parties and joining behavior.

4.2.2 Selecting Observations on the Dependent Variable

The tendency to focus on joining behavior by major powers or contiguous states --or a subset of states chosen on some other independent variable-- can be more problematic if the sample is also constrained around certain values on the dependent variable. Selection of samples on some value of the dependent variable Y can generate biased conclusions (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Consider a situation analogous to what was described above -- Y and X are linearly related. According to Signorino (2002, 97), if observations are selected so that $Y > 0$, what results is that

$$\begin{aligned} E[Y|X, Y > 0] &= E[X\beta|X, Y > 0] + E[\varepsilon|X, Y > 0] \\ &= X\beta + E[\varepsilon|Y > 0] \\ &= X\beta + E[\varepsilon|\varepsilon > -X\beta] \end{aligned}$$

Under such circumstances, the estimates of β we derive from a linear regression of Y on X are consistently biased because the expectation that the mean of the

error term is equal to 0 is systematically violated. This occurs regardless of whether Y is continuous or dichotomous.

In the case of third party interventions, the data used in most studies artificially dichotomize Y by considering only militarized interventions. Such studies do not commit the same oversights as those studies identified by Geddes (1990), in which only cases where $Y = 1$ are analyzed. Conflict scholars have included in their analysis cases where $Y = 0$ (see, for instance Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Huth 1998). Yet, evidence presented here indicates that the threshold between militarized intervention and non-intervention is not as sharp as it is operationalized in those works. Rather, we can think of intervention almost as a continuous variable ranging from indifference to the conflict and abstention to full-scale military involvement. Intervention as a perfectly continuous variable is clearly unobservable. Yet, we can identify some major realizations of the variable on the no intervention-military intervention continuum. Those are the realizations identified in Chapter 3.

When only extreme values of all of the possible realizations of Y are used in the analysis, researchers are in effect dealing with a truncated sample. Biased conclusions are derived if one does not explicitly account for the mechanism that systematically produces such observations (Signorino 2002, 97). Scholars of joining behavior have repeatedly found that major power status, material capabilities, and contiguity (or geographical proximity) influence the likelihood of military intervention by using standard linear approaches. Since it is easier for powerful, proximate states to employ violent pressure, such results are unsurprising. “Politically relevant states” have the means and the opportunity to use violent pressure in ongoing

conflicts. They select themselves into the sample of those states that actually intervene violently. If only violent, military realizations of the dependent variable are considered, we are in the presence of a selection mechanism that is systematically related to observed Y . But if such selection process is not taken into consideration, researchers end up drawing biased conclusions about the impact of the aforementioned covariates on the likelihood of intervention.

4.2.3 Compounded Selection Problems in Joining Behavior Research

In synthesis, existing studies of third parties interventions suffer from problems of selection bias on both the dependent and independent variable. In some instances, such problems coexist in individual studies, and they are related to one another. Selection of observations on the dependent variable is due to lack of better measurement of Y . Adoption of linear models that do take into account the fact that military interventions represent a truncated sample may generate bias in the results. Scholars often theorize—more or less explicitly—about the existence of some selection mechanism that would account for a truncated sample in which only military interventions are included. The solution to this problem has been to narrow the sample of potential interveners on the basis of some independent variable. Major power status has been a favorite discriminating factor to sort states with higher military intervention rates from state that are unlikely to join. Researchers of joining behavior attempt to account for a mechanism of selection on X without investigating how critical values of X are related to the observed values of Y . Whether the dependent variable is intervention *per se* or a third party's alignment choice, results can be: (1) non-generalizable beyond the sample selected on X ; and

(2) biased because standard linear models used in such analyses cannot deal with the correlated disturbances between the two selection process at play.

In truth, conflict scholars have long been aware of issues of selection on the dependent variable. Situations such as those described by Geddes (1990) have not been frequent in recent years. The description of problems of bias from selection on Y presented above is more stark than what we observe in reality. Scholars of conflict no longer study wars or interventions by looking only at cases in which wars or interventions actually occurred. Rather, they have tried to avoid such shortcomings by including in their samples all instances of realization of the dependent variable. For instance, the introduction of the dyad-year research design in the study of dispute or war onset has been motivated by the need to avoid estimation bias caused by selection problems.

Yet, this solution is only partially effective in cases in which Y is a dichotomous variable since it leads to an over-proliferation of zeros in a data set. Enormous data sets with hundreds of thousand observations have become extremely common in international relations. But they have presented scholars with problems similar to those outlined above, just cast in a different light. IR analysts have resorted to limiting their samples on the basis of some independent variable in order to make their data more manageable. Suppose one has to take into account all instances of third party interventions —failed and realized— in all conflicts since 1945. If only major power states are included, one has to deal with only 5-7 potential interventions per conflict rather than the 150-plus potential interventions resulting from the inclusion of all states in the system. Thus, in order to avoid selection bias on the dependent variable, researchers have been redirected their attention toward selection on X .

IR data sets that include all possible realizations of Y also face problems of rare event estimation. According to King and Zeng (2002), coefficient estimates in samples in which the 1s represent a minimal fraction of the total cases can be almost as biased as estimates in which only 1s are considered. Three solutions to this problem are available. The first solution is to better the measurement of Y so as to obtain a larger proportion of events. With regard to third party interventions, this approach has been discussed at length in the previous chapters.

The second solution, proposed by Signorino (1999, 2002), is that we explicitly and correctly model the selection mechanisms that lead states to select themselves into the restricted “war sample” or “intervention sample.” This requires that we abandon the straightforward linear models that have been employed in most studies of joining behavior in favor of more complex multi-stage models. Finally, when problems of dependence across observation in different stages of the selection mechanism are not existent—that is, it is safe to return to more familiar linear logit or probit models—it is possible to implement computational adjustments that explicitly account for the fact that that ratio of ones to zeros in y is so small. In the following section, I attempt to implement the second proposed solution to selection bias problems by developing a multi-stage model of third party intervention. I proceed to estimate it with non-linear selection approaches and with sample-corrected linear models in order to quantify the influence of the dynamic process in which intervention decisions take shape.

4.3 A Unified Model of Partisan Intervention

The selection problems that mar many works on third party interventions would be less of a concern if models that account for the selection mechanisms were

employed. Instead, many studies on joining behavior attempt to predict either the decision to join or a third party's alignment choices by resorting to linear models, such as logit or probit regression. The adoption of these techniques imposes on the analysis the implicit assumption that all states have an equal opportunity to enter the conflict. Sometimes these techniques are adopted for lack of more refined estimation procedures (for instance Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Yamamoto and Bremer 1980). On other occasions, the adoption of linear models is motivated by restrictive theories of joining behavior.


Most theories of joining behavior correctly postulate that the decision to join is largely shaped by the relationship between a third party and the disputants. Most scholars have looked at the existence of alliance ties between third parties and conflict originators, at power relations, or at a combination of the two (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Kim 1991; Smith 1996; Huth 1998). Some have extended the set of third party-originator relationships to include political and regime similarities (Werner and Lemke 1997). Yet, regardless of ties and similarities between third states and originators, not all potential joiners have the same ability to enter a conflict militarily. Some studies have acknowledge that, beyond the willingness to join, a variety of factors may affect a third party's ability to intervene. They have resolved this issue in a variety of ways. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) try to incorporate this consideration into their formal model. Huth (1998) restricts his sample to major power states. Werner and Lemke (1997) choose to look exclusively at alignment choices after joining has already taken place. As illustrated in the preceding sections, these solutions are only palliative remedies that do not eliminate potential sources of bias if linear estimation models are employed.

It is possible to provide a more exhaustive picture of the dynamics of third party intervention by matching a theory that accounts for the fact that not all states have equal opportunity to join with an analytical technique that explicitly models the selection mechanism at work. The opportunity and willingness approach to foreign policy behavior offers such a framework. This theory of joining behavior suggests that intervention in an ongoing conflict takes place if a third party has the opportunity to join and sufficient willingness to do so. Opportunity refers to all circumstantial factors that make it easier (or more difficult) for an external actor to enter an ongoing conflict. The opportunity dimension of the joining decision can encompass such variables as major power status, material capabilities, contiguity, geographical proximity —that is, variables that determine whether a third party realistically has the means to enter a dispute and to have an impact on its unfolding. Willingness refers to the motivational factors that may stimulate a state's interest toward a particular dispute. This dimension encompasses all strategic and affective ties between a third party and the originators. An expected utility view of third party willingness emphasizes strategic connections, while an homophily-based view stresses ideological, institutional, and cultural proximity.

This theoretical framework suggests that the intervention decision takes places in sequential, interconnected steps. All states are potential third parties but, for any given conflict, only a limited group has the opportunity to intervene. Given that a third party has the potential to intervene, the likelihood of the intervention will depend on its willingness to do so -that is, on the strategic or homophily-based ties to the disputants. This dynamic is analogous to a general selection model.

Figure 4.1 presents a generic selection model as developed by Signorino (2002, 100). In the model a decision-maker arrives at a decision in two stages. The first

Figure 4.1: General Selection Model



decision is made at node 1 decision. Here a decision-maker opts for one of the two alternatives based on the value of some latent variable y_1^* , the value of which is determined by a set of observable variables. No action takes place if $y_1^* < 0$, and no event is observed ($y_1 = 0$). Where instead $y_1^* > 0$, a decision-maker opts for the branch that leads her to the second stage of the process at node 2. This is the instance in which a researcher ends up with a truncated sample, as a subset of the observed decision-makers select themselves into a sample on the basis of y_1^* .

The second stage of the decision takes place only if the decision-maker has selected $y_1 = 1$. In this case, the decision-maker faces two options — $y_2 = 1$ and $y_2 = 0$. The decision depends on the value of a second unobserved variable y_2^* . If $y_2^* > 0$, the decision-maker moves down the right path, toward a $y_1 = 1, y_2 = 1$

outcome. Alternatively, a researcher observes a $y_1 = 1, y_2 = 0$ manifestation of the behavior of interest. Yet, regardless of whether the first or second outcome takes place, the observed behavior depends both on the value of y_1^* and y_2^* . While such variables remain latent, they are correlated to one another, and such correlation should be modeled both theoretically and empirically.

The general selection model represented in Figure 4.1 closely reflects the “opportunity and willingness” theoretical approach to third party intervention discussed in previous chapters. The opportunity and willingness model of joining behavior postulates that joining dynamics have two dimensions. State-level and environmental factors shape the actual decision to intervene by determining whether an external state has the actual opportunity to join an ongoing conflict. Regardless of a country’s interest in a certain conflict, no interventions can take place in the presence of unsurmountable opportunity constraints. The willingness dimension of joining behavior, instead, shape a third party’s considerations about alignment choices and intervention techniques. The major advantage to this model is that it restores theoretical clarity to a body of research that has largely failed to distinguish between actual intervention, alignment decision, and interventions techniques.

Failing to distinguish among the different dimension of joining behavior has led to bias in the selection of cases and econometric estimates used in existing research. The most commonly used models bundle together opportunity and willingness variables without accounting for their correlated nature. The selection model displayed in Figure 4.1 reconciles theory —the opportunity and willingness approach— with case selection and estimation by allowing one to represent the decision to join as occurring in two phases. In the first stage, a third party evaluates its chances to

intervene based on some unobserved variable y_1^* . We can call this variable “opportunity” and speculate that it is the function of a series of circumstantial factors such as material capabilities, major power status, etc. If $y_1^* > 0$, then a third party is selected into the smaller sample of interveners. Otherwise, no intervention occurs regardless of the level of the state’s willingness. The observed realization of the first stage of the selection mechanism (the left branch in the tree) is $y_1 = 0$. If instead $y_1^* > 0$, then the next phase of the decision is determined by the value of the other latent variable y_2^* which we may call “willingness.” Again, willingness is a function of a series of observable variables, such as the presence of an alliance agreement or similarity in regime type between a third party and a disputant. The outcome y_2 represents a third party’s desire to align itself with either side in a conflict. As stated earlier, the expectation common to both the expected utility and the homophily theory of joining behavior is that a joiner will intervene on the side of the more similar or more “strategically proximate” combatant and against the more dissimilar or more “strategically distant” combatant. Thus, where $y_2^* > 0$, a third party will join on the side that we may generically call Side A. It can be hypothesized that this is the party in the dispute to which a third state is closer with regard to foreign policy interest and political or cultural similarity. Where $y_2^* < 0$, instead, a third party will join on the opposite side, which may be called generically Side B.

The major advantage of the present unified model of intervention is that it helps us solve the mismatch between theoretical considerations and empirical tests of such considerations that often plagues research on joining behavior. A common trait of existing studies of joining behavior is the notion that the decision to join is equally affected by the practical ability to join and a third party’s relationship with the

disputants. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979), for instance, model this dynamic by incorporating both a third party's material capabilities and alliance portfolios in the same (linear) decision model. Huth (1998), instead, controls for the ability to intervene by restricting his analysis to major powers states. This allows him to focus on the relationship between major power joiners and the combatants. A third approach is offered by Werner and Lemke (1997), who implicitly decompose the joining decision into an intervention stage and an alignment stage. Werner and Lemke (1997) look at states after they make the intervention choice and focus on a variety of factors affecting the relationship between a joiner the disputants to explain a third party's alignment choices. The general model just offered eliminates the need to resort to ad hoc sampling solutions or theoretical justifications, while handling the issues of selection bias raised by Signorino (2002).

The present unified model of third party intervention is also sufficiently general to include a variety of third party actions that scholars have addresses under the general name of "joining behavior." More specifically, outcome y_2 in Figure 4.1 can be modeled in a variety of ways depending on one's interests. Y_2 can stand to represent alignment choice between Side A and Side B as in Werner and Lemke (1997). It can also represent a third party's tendency to join with the stronger side in a conflict, as in Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979). It can constitute the likelihood that a joiner will intervene on the side of the state threatened with aggression in a crisis, as in Huth (1998), or in support of an ally, as in Kim (1991) and Smith (1996). In short, it allows researchers to pay attention to variety of manifestations of the willingness to intervene while simultaneously accounting for the fact that joining is, in Smith (1996)'s words, a "biased decision."

Most importantly, the unified model of third party intervention helps researchers handle the problem that joining behavior involves situations in which the dependent variable is (at best) trichotomous and the assumption of independence across observations —upon which linear econometric models rest— does not hold. The trichotomous nature of the dependent variable stems from the fact that we are attempting to model a tri-pronged decision between no intervention, intervention on one side of the conflict, or intervention on the other side of the fight. Regular logit or probit models can accommodate only a dichotomous dependent variable and are, therefore, inadequate. Ordered and multinomial probit and logit models are based on the assumption of independence across the possible realizations of the dependent variable. In the case of third party interventions, the decision to not intervene is clearly not independent of the decisions to intervene on either side of the conflict. Using ordered or multinomial logit models in these circumstances may produce biased estimates. The third party intervention model here proposed can be estimated through selection or strategic models (see Signorino 2002). Such models allow one to tackle the intervention-non intervention variable as a function of “opportunity” factors in the first stage of the estimation and the alignment decision as a function of “willingness” in the second estimation stage.

Returning to the examples mentioned in the previous paragraph, scholars of joining behavior have approached the problem of the trichotomous nature of the dependent variable in different ways. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) resorted to probit analysis by recasting their dependent variable as a choice between no intervention and intervention on the side of the stronger combatant. Huth (1998) and Kim (1991) used an analogous strategy and employed logit analysis to estimate whether a third party joins with the target of a potential aggression and with the

side with which it has an alliance. Werner and Lemke (1997) escape the “trichotomy problem” reformulating their research question exclusively as an alignment issue. In addition to the aforementioned issues of selection bias, common to these studies is the problem that, when a trichotomous variable is dichotomized for estimation purposes, the 0 (zero) category ends up containing both cases of non-intervention and cases of intervention in the “wrong” direction. Two-stage selection models or strategic models fit tightly the opportunity-willingness approach to joining behavior here proposed, and they also circumvent the problem of a trichotomous dependent variable.

4.3.1 Defining Opportunity

The two stage selection model here proposed aims at providing a tighter correspondence between a theory of joining behavior and the empirical formulation of that theory. It does so by (1) capturing the theme of willingness and opportunity that underlies the entire research on joining behavior, and (2) correcting for selection and measurement biases derived from the inadequate econometric representation of the decision to join. However, the exact specification of the selection model —i.e., the variables that actually define the unobserved y_1 and y_2 discussed above— is left to the investigator’s theoretical understanding of what constitutes willingness and opportunity.

As outlined in previous chapters, opportunity is defined by the environmental factors that shape the possibilistic and probabilistic nature of an intervention decision. Third party states will intervene in ongoing militarized disputes only when they can. That possibility is, first and foremost, affected by those factors that

bring ongoing conflicts to the attention of third states. Most and Starr (1989) argue that states can undertake foreign policy decisions only when they are aware of the “menu” of opportunities facing them. It seems reasonable to assume that states begin to care about external ongoing conflicts when those conflicts affect their own foreign policy interests. To the extent that this assumption is correct, it also seems plausible to expect that states with the broader range of foreign policy interests will pay attention to a larger set of foreign conflicts. As a result, states with a broad foreign policy agenda will face more opportunities for foreign intervention than more isolationist states. Those interventionist states are, of course, major power states. Evidence presented in the previous earlier about the frequency of major power interventions supports Singer and Small (1972)’s definition of major power states has having a broader range of foreign policy interests than medium and small powers. It also supports Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979)’s assertion that great powers have a lower utility threshold toward external conflicts. That is, they are more likely than other states to perceive that their utility is affected even by minor, faraway conflicts. Thus, major power status expands a state’s opportunity horizon, making intervention in an ongoing dispute more likely, regardless of a state’s actual desire to take part in it. It is possible to define the first “opportunity hypothesis” as:

Opportunity Hypothesis 1 Major power status positively affects the likelihood of intervention in an ongoing militarized dispute.

Closely related to major power status in shaping a state’s range of foreign policy options are a country’s material capabilities. Regardless of the number of ongoing disputes that may affect them and their willingness to stick their nose into them, states cannot intervene without the means to do so. Again, Sprout and Sprout

(1969, 53) and Most and Starr (1989, 31) cite capabilities as one of the crucial connections between opportunity and possibilism. And as all International Relations introductory textbooks teach, economic and military power influence a state's ability to conduct an activist foreign policy. While they may not shape a state's desire to intervene in all disputes ongoing in the international system at one time, economic and military might make it easier to become an effective third party to a large number of conflicts. It is possible to formulate the second opportunity hypothesis as:

Opportunity Hypothesis 2 Material capabilities positively influence the likelihood of intervention in an ongoing militarized dispute.¹

Ongoing disputes may appear on a state's foreign policy agenda also because of some of disputes' characteristics. A third party's opportunity structure is shaped not only by its own attributes, but also by the attributes of the environment in which international political phenomena take place. It is important to remember that the opportunity-willingness framework for explaining international relations was created in part as an attempt to incorporate contextual factors into a comprehensive model of foreign policy decision-making (Most and Starr 1980, 1984,

¹It can be argued that material power simply is a dimension of major power status, and that including both elements in the same model generates redundancy and multicollinearity. Yet, although the two variables largely overlap, they do not represent the same concept. The notion of major power status extends well beyond the idea of material capabilities to include in a single idea a country's own vision of its foreign policy and other states' interpretation of that country's actions. Great powers see themselves as major actors on the international stage and are perceived as such by other states, regardless of material capabilities. The overlap between capabilities and status need not be perfect. Italy in the 1930s arguably is the best example of a state that acted and was perceived as a great power despite its obvious lack of adequate economic and military power. Germany and Japan for a large part of the Cold War era are examples of states with ample means which deliberately eschew a major power role. For the original definition of major power status, please consult Singer and Small (1972).

1989; Most, Starr and Siverson 1989; Siverson and Starr 1991). Geographical location of events and the spatial dimension of international politics are explanatory variables to which conflict scholars have paid enormous attention. Geographical distance and contiguity, in particular, have been the contextual factors to receive the most extensive analysis. A variety of international phenomena—including interstate conflict—have been found spread in space (see, for instance Gleditsch 2002). Contiguous states are more likely to have unresolved issues, to go to war with one another, and to become involved in each other's affairs. Overall, spatial proximity—whether expressed as contiguity or as geographical distance—affects the opportunity structure within which a state operates (Most and Starr 1980). The spatial dimension of international conflict suggests two more opportunity hypotheses concerning joining behavior:

Opportunity Hypothesis 3 States contiguous to an ongoing conflict are more likely to intervene as third parties.

Opportunity Hypothesis 4 Geographical distance from a conflict is inversely related to the likelihood of intervention in an ongoing militarized dispute.²

The interplay of the international environment and an actor's ability to move in it shapes the possibilistic factors of all foreign policy action in the most general terms. Such factors change over time and across actors. But they do so at a relatively slow pace and often only across units. Contiguity and major power

²Some have argued against including contiguity and geographical distance in the same model (see Ray 2003). The criticism has sound foundation since distance and contiguity clearly overlap for low values of distance. Yet, growing borders permeability in many areas of the world have changed the effect of contiguity in unpredictable ways. Fast-changing transportation and communication technology has done the same for geographical distance, increasing the chances that far-away states may be able to interfere in each other's businesses more easily than in the past and in ways that may run counter the changes that affected the impact of contiguity.

status, for example, tend to be relative stable factors across dyads or triads of states. Some contextual elements that define opportunity, on the other hand, change more rapidly both over time and across units. With regard to joining behavior, third parties' decisions take place in the context of conflicts that have been initiated and conducted by others. Each of these conflicts has different characteristics and different dynamics that third parties are likely to take into account in planning their moves. Militarized disputes that are reciprocated by the state being attacked, for instance, tend to last longer, thus opening up opportunities for third parties to join in.

All of these conflict-specific factors alter the strategic environment of external states, who will then be less likely to remain indifferent to an ongoing dispute and more likely to be drawn in regardless of their original intention to participate. A similar logic applies to those disputes originated by at least one major power state. Such disputes can have politico-strategic repercussions that ripple across the international system, affecting many more potential third parties. The recent US invasion of Iraq and the numerous Cold War disputes between the US and the Soviet Union should give a sense of the "noise" that major powers' conflict participation generates. In addition, there is evidence that the presence of major power states in a dispute attracts the participation of other states both as originators and as third parties (Corbetta and Dixon 2004). When major power states start a conflict, they can coerce other states into participating. Or the dispute may be of such a magnitude that it changes the strategic environment for other states who are then "sucked into the conflict." Studies of conflict diffusion often suggest that major power conflicts are more likely to spread in size and space than other types

of conflicts (see, for instance Yamamoto and Bremer 1980). Several additional hypotheses follow from these considerations:

Opportunity Hypothesis 5 The likelihood of third party intervention increases with a militarized dispute's level of violence between originators.

Opportunity Hypothesis 6 Interstate disputes in which the initial act of aggression is reciprocated by one or more target states are more likely to experience third party intervention.

Opportunity Hypothesis 7 The presence of one or more major power states in the dispute as originators increases the likelihood of third party intervention.

Petersen, Vasquez and Wang (2004) have recently shown that the issue of contention around which a dispute revolves can affect the probability that: (1) a conflict will become a multiparty conflict, and (2) a dispute will escalate to war. Disputes fought over territory, in particular, tend to be multiparty conflicts with great escalatory potential. The relationship between territorial claims and severity of conflicts is well known (see, for instance Diehl 1992; Vasquez 1993; Diehl 1996; Hensel 1996; Vasquez 2000). In addition to being longer, more severe, and more likely to expand, territorial disputes can be destabilizing for other states. Just like major power disputes, territorial disputes have the capacity to alter radically the strategic environment for states not directly involved in those disputes. As a result, conflicts fought over territorial claims present third states with additional opportunity for intervention. Thus, it is possible to hypothesize that:

Opportunity Hypothesis 8 Territorial disputes increase the likelihood of third party intervention.

Very likely, the set of explanatory variables here proposed is not exhaustive of all the components that may enter in the definition of such a composite measure as opportunity. Like most models of international conflict, this model is then open to omitted variable bias. Different scholars have defined opportunity in many different ways. The present conceptualization offers a richer notion of opportunity and follows Clark and Regan (2003) in combining the structural (environmental) view espoused by Sprout and Sprout (1969) and Most and Starr (1989) with the strategic component of opportunity. Structural components affect opportunity by changing the frequency and nature of contacts among states. The strategic components, instead, affect opportunity by modifying the strategic environment within which a state operates. However, it is crucial to remember that the two dimensions are manifestations of what remains a latent and continuous variable which operates as a necessary, although not sufficient, determinant of joining behavior.

4.3.2 Defining Willingness

A great deal of individual discretion also enters into the definition of willingness. Different authors have alternatively expanded or restricted the definition of willingness, depending on the foreign policy issue under investigation. In fact, while the dimensions of opportunity tend to remain relatively similar across different foreign policy realms, it would be quite implausible to conceive decision-makers to be motivated by the same set of preferences across international politics issues of different nature. Yet, since willingness refers to the processes—rather than the context of foreign policy decision-making—Most and Starr (1989, 34) suggest that: “Willingness is intimately related to the decision maker’s calculations of advantage and disadvantage, of cost and benefit, that decision makers consider

on both conscious and unconscious levels.” In dealing with willingness in foreign policy decision-making, Most and Starr (1989) make explicit reference to expected utility analysis of foreign policy behavior. The theoretical framework proposed in this paper begins with their suggestion and adds an additional model of preference formation based on the notion of homophily. The two models arrive at similar predictions, but they significantly differ from one another in relation to the source of actors’ preference. Defining willingness requires then the identification of those variables that shape rationalistic, expected utility calculations and choices based, instead, on similarity on key traits.³

The expected utility approach to willingness postulates that intervention is the function of a cost-benefit decision-making process in which strategic considerations dictate preferences. Third parties intervene in conflicts when they have stakes in a specific outcome of a conflict. That is, third states will likely intervene in ongoing disputes if they are not indifferent toward both parties in the conflict. The likelihood of intervention will increase the more they move away from an “indifference threshold” and their expected utility toward the victory of one side and/or the defeat of the other increases. Common foreign policy agendas are the key determinant of strategic proximity between a third party and a disputant. The larger the number of foreign policy goals a third party shares with a dispute originator, the greater the chance of intervention on the side of the conflict. Conversely, the smaller the number of foreign policy goals with one side in a conflict, the greater

³It is important to keep in mind that this approach is not meant to suggest that decision based on homophily are irrational. Rational calculations of advantage and disadvantage—to quote Most and Starr (1989, 34)— can be based on similarities between a decision maker and the target of her action. The two models do not differ with regard to the process in which decisions are made. Rather, they differ with regard to the source of the preferences that drive the decision-making process.

the chances that a potential joiner will actually intervene against that side. In summary:

Willingness Hypothesis 1 A third party's willingness to intervene in an ongoing dispute is directly proportional to its foreign policy similarities with one dispute originator and its foreign policy dissimilarities with the other originator.

The existence of an explicit commitment between two states to support one another may also influence a state's willingness to intervene in a dispute. Alliance agreements may require for one state to come to the defense of a partner that is attacked by another country. Alliances may also stipulate for two states to coordinate action in an offensive manner. The debate about the reliability of alliances suggests that the presence of an agreement does not produce automatic compliance. Indeed, Leeds, Mitchell McLaughlin and Long (2000) indirectly suggest that allied intervention may occur if and only an alliance specifically demands it. Nonetheless, regardless of the nature of an alliance, it is plausible that the existence of an explicit and often public commitment may exercise pressure on a country's desire to become involved in an ongoing conflict.

It may be argued that the existence of an alliance is only an indication of similarities in foreign policy preferences and, therefore, it is redundant with the willingness dimension addressed in the previous hypothesis. The argument has its strengths; yet, an alliance is just one of the many articulations of a state's foreign policy. Alliances express very specific objectives (Leeds, Mitchell McLaughlin and Long 2000). Foreign policy agendas imply a larger vision. The foreign policy agendas of two allied countries may converge exclusively in regard to the specific objective of their alliance while diverging in all other respects. The pre-WWII alliance between

Hitler and Lenin, or the various foreign policy squabbles between NATO members US and France while come to mind. Overall,

Willingness Hypothesis 2 The presence of an alliance between a third party and a disputant positively affects the likelihood that a third party will take the side of the state with which it shares an alliance.

Most and Starr (1989, 31) and Clark and Regan (2003) argue that capabilities affect not only a state's opportunity but also its willingness to transform those opportunity into realized foreign policy actions. In relation to the intervention decision, realist theory has considered capabilities the most important determinant of a third party's alignment choices. The traditional realist expectation is that a third party will align itself with the weakest state in conflict. Thus, at the level of willingness, the disputants' capabilities matter just as much as a potential third party's capabilities. Following realism's classic idea of balancing, it is possible to hypothesize that:

Willingness Hypothesis 3 A third party will be more likely to align with one side in a dispute as that side's capabilities decrease and the opposing side's capabilities increase.

Not all factors affecting a third party's willingness to intervene may originate in strategic considerations. An alternative perspective on the willingness dimension of foreign policy decision making suggests that a state's homophily toward another state results from cultural, normative, or ideological proximity. The solid partnership between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, for instance—a partnership which lasted throughout the Cold War and actually strengthened after the end of the Cold War—has led these states to be on the same side in

many conflicts, from the Korean War to the Vietnam War to the recent war with Iraq. Although the US, Britain, and Australia share alliances and common foreign policy interest, the bond between them seem to extend well beyond their strategic goals. Their special relationship has often set them apart from other members of their same alliances who may have quite similar foreign policy objectives. Their special relationship may be rooted in their common language and cultural make-up and in the similarities between their regime types and institutional arrangements. The same factors may explain the foreign policy convergence of states that we may otherwise expect to be in opposition to one another, such as the former USSR and Yugoslavia, or many Middle East states.

Because of the theoretical and practical pervasiveness of the democratic peace proposition, arguably the first dimension of homophily one has to take into account is similarity in regime type. Both normative and institutional explanations of the democratic peace phenomenon suggest that democracies not only avoid conflicts with other democracies, but they may also have an implicit interest in the preservation and diffusion of democracy internationally. Studies on the systemic evolution of democracy support the proposition that the growth in number and “maturity” of democratic states is, in many ways, a self-supporting mechanism that simplifies the foreign policy outlook of democratic states themselves (see, for instance Cederman 2001*a,b*). In addition, evidence that states sharing the same regime type tend to align with one another in interstate disputes already exists (Werner and Lemke 1997). Werner and Lemke (1997) suggest that a similar dynamic may be at play among authoritarian states, although the theoretical rationale for such a phenomenon remains weaker—or less explored—than the rationale for democratic

states. Thus, the first hypothesis concerning homophily-based causes of third party intervention may be states as:

Willingness Hypothesis 4 The greater the similarity in regime type between a potential third party and a disputant in a conflict, the greater the third party's willingness to join the side of that disputant.

It has been suggested that it is not only similarity in the political ideology that brings countries together, but it also the similarity in the institutions upon which such governments are based (Werner 2000*b*). A pair of states may be equally democratic or autocratic, but the institutional structures in which their ideologies are embodied may differ. While the notions of democracy and autocracy refer to a general set of values, institutional structures shape how such values are integrated into a state's foreign policy. It is a well-known fact, for instance, that democracies are less likely to fight one another. Yet, there is evidence that presidential democracies and parliamentary democracies approach the democratic peace in different ways LeBlang and Chan (2003). In addition to ideology, similarity in institutions may then bring countries to gravitate in the same "homophily space".⁴ Similarity in institutional arrangements, rather than simple strategic considerations, may promote similarity in foreign policy preferences. In relation to third party intervention, this notion translates into the hypothesis that:

Willingness Hypothesis 5 The greater the similarity in institutional arrangements between a potential third party and a disputant in a conflict, the greater the third party's willingness to intervene in the conflict on the side of the institutionally similar disputant.

⁴This is what what sociologists sometime refer to as "Blau space" (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987).

Homophily among states may not depend entirely on political factors. Pairs of states with similar historical experiences, similar religion, and similar ethnic background can perceive greater affinity for one another than pairs of states where ordinary people and decision-makers speak highly dissimilar languages, disagree about zero-sum issues such as religious matters and ethnicity, or lived through dissimilar experiences. What can be summarized as commonality of cultural traits has often brought together states with radically different political goals. After the end of WWII, for instance, on many occasions Arab states have set aside their ideological and short-term strategic interests to support one another in their opposition against Israel and against Western powers. Similarly, former colonial states have often coalesced in defense of their common interests despite differences in their ideological or institutional outlook. The presence is a conflict of a state that is perceive to be similar with regard to such broad cultural traits is likely to influence a country's willingness to intervene independently of formal commitments or short-term political goals. This additional dimension to homophily suggests that:

Willingness Hypothesis 6 The greater the similarity in cultural traits between a potential third party and a disputant in a conflict, the greater the likelihood that third party's will intervene in support of the most culturally similar state.

While the sociological notion of homophily states that individual-specific traits bring people in the same social space, it can be argued that homophily is also an evolutionary and self-reinforcing concept. As applied to international politics, the idea of self-reinforcing similarity between states is contained, for instance, in various functionalist theories or in Deutsch (1954)'s idea of security communities. Considerations other than individual-level attributes may bring states into the context of the same international considerations. However, self-interested motivations

are replaced over time by a common identity that further fosters homophily. For instance, the common identity resulting from shared institutional membership is at the heart of theoretical arguments concerning the “third leg” of the democratic peace argument (Russett, Oneal and Davis 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999). Plausibly, feelings of commonality that emerge from shared membership in the same international institutions can influence third party’s willingness to come to the aid of friendly states involved in a conflict. More formally, we can hypothesize that:

Willingness Hypothesis 7 The greater the number of shared organizational ties a third party and a side in a conflict, the greater the a third party’s willingness to intervene in support of that state.

The dimensions of willingness here outlined may not exhaust the enormous range of factors that prompt a state to become an active third party. Strategic interest and homophily capture the most recurrent and pervasive stimuli of foreign policy action specifically directed toward or against another state. What is missing from the willingness-component of the model are arguably those domestic politics factors that are country-specific and conflict-specific. One cannot rule out, for instance, that interventions can be motivated on occasion by a leader’s diversionary objectives or by the influence of interest groups with a disproportionate influence in government. While the present model does capture domestic sources of joining behavior, it is also open to the omitted variable bias generated by country-specific and conflict-specific idiosyncrasies. This is the standard trade-off faced by all researchers of international politics. No model of joining may ever perfectly capture all forces shaping a state’s decision to intervene in a militarized dispute. And all models of joining behavior will unavoidably be biased toward what Waltz (1959) called second and third-image attributes at the expenses of first-image factors. Yet,

the objective is to develop a model of joining behavior that is sufficiently comprehensive to be applicable across a large number of cases. To the extent that the objective is achieved, the impact of omitted country-specific and conflict-specific idiosyncrasies will be minimized, and the model we produce estimates that are, on average, close to their true values. The attempt to translate the willingness and opportunity model of joining behavior into an empirically estimable model is carried out in the following section.

4.4 Estimating the Willingness and Opportunity Model

The willingness and opportunity approach offers a model of joining behavior that circumvents the pitfalls of selection and measurement bias that have troubled existing works on this issue. However, translating this multi-stage model into an actual econometric model that can be estimated by most statistical packages can be challenging. Overlooking issues of sample selection, many studies have relied on binomial logit and probit models by coding the occurrence of third party intervention as a dichotomous dependent variable. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979), for instance, use probit analysis to estimate whether a third party joins with the stronger side of a war. Huth (1998) uses logistic analysis to estimate whether major powers join on the side of the target state in a dispute. Kim (1991) also uses logistic regression analysis to predict whether third parties intervene in wars regardless of side. As previously discussed, such models do not fully reflect the theory behind them and are at risk of producing biased and inefficient estimates of causal effects.

Some authors have added a degree of complexity and have used multinomial or ordered probit and logit models in the attempt to better capture the complexity of

the decision to join (Smith 1996; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2003, see). Mindful of problems of selection bias inherent in the use of simple probit or logistic models, these studies have introduced non-intervention as a possible outcome of the dependent variable. However, while such models provide a fuller reflection of theories about joining behavior, they also rest on the difficult assumptions. Models with ordered dependent variables usually purport to estimate an increasing level of willingness to join either side in conflict. The two disputants are generally distinguished on the basis of some characteristic such as capabilities, and the dependent variable to be estimated is the increasing likelihood of joining the stronger side in a dispute. Conditional and multinomial logit models, instead, have been used to estimate the likelihood that a third party will abstain, join with Side A, or join with Side B, as if the three outcomes were independent of one another. In synthesis, both models for ordered dependent variables and for multichotomous dependent variable are problematic because the strong theoretical assumptions they require, and because they are likely to violate the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) upon which their estimation rests (Greene 2003).

To my knowledge, Smith (1996) was the first to implement more complex Heckman two-stage probit model in his attempt to explain the joining decision of allies in an ongoing wars. The advantage of this approach is that it allows to estimate two successive probit equations while testing for dependence between them. The first equation reflects the underlying selection mechanism. The second equation estimates the causal effects of a set of covariates in the the actually observed outcome of the dependent variable. This procedure allows Smith (1996) to estimate the effect of alliance ties on a third party's decision to abstain, to side with its ally, or to

side against its ally without having to assume that such choices are independent of one another.

Without making specific reference to the issue of joining behavior, other authors have employed similar econometric models aimed at estimating multi-stage selection processes. Reed (2000), for example, uses a censored (bivariate) probit model to estimate the probability that dyads involved in a dispute will choose to escalate to the level of war. Reed (2000) shows that censor probit models outperform Heckman two-stage probit model because the latter is heteroskedastic and, therefore, less efficient. The general specification for this model is:⁵

$$\begin{aligned}y_1^* &= X_1\beta_1 + \varepsilon_1 \\y_2^* &= X_2\beta_2 + \varepsilon_2\end{aligned}$$

The latent dependent variables, y_1^* and y_2^* are clearly not observed. What is observed are dichotomous realizations of y_1 and y_2 . Disturbances are assumed to be normally distributed with:

$$\begin{aligned}E[\varepsilon_1|X_1, X_2] &= E[\varepsilon_2|X_1, X_2] = 0 \\Var[\varepsilon_1|X_1, X_2] &= Var[\varepsilon_2|X_1, X_2] = 1 \\Cov[\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2|X_1, X_2] &= \rho\end{aligned}$$

⁵See Greene (2003).

The model implies that there are three types of observations in a sample, with unconditional probabilities:

$$y_1 = 0 : \quad \text{Prob}(y_1 = 0|X_1, X_2) = 1 - \Phi(X_1\beta_1),$$

$$y_1 = 1, y_2 = 0 : \quad \text{Prob}(y_1 = 1, y_2 = 0|X_1, X_2) = \Phi_2[X_1\beta_1, -X_2\beta_2, -\rho],$$

$$y_1 = 1, y_2 = 1 : \quad \text{Prob}(y_1 = 1, y_2 = 1|X_1, X_2) = \Phi_2[X_1\beta_1, X_2\beta_2, \rho].$$

The log-likelihood function for this model is:

$$\ln L = \sum_{y_1=0} \ln(1 - \Phi(\beta_1 X_1)) + \sum_{y_1=1, y_2=0} \ln \Phi_2(\beta_1, -X_2\beta_2, -\rho) + \sum_{y_1=1, y_2=1} (\beta_1, X_2\beta_2, \rho)$$

Applied to the question of joining behavior, this selection model allows one to account simultaneously for both the opportunity and willingness components of interventions that previous studies have estimated separately. For instance, y_1 can represent the act of intervention based on opportunity alone, while y_2 is the alignment decision at which a third party arrives if intervention can occur based on opportunity factors. The effects of the willingness components of the intervention decision $\beta_2 X_2$ can be estimated only if $y_1^* > 0$. Thus, if y_2 is defined as a third party choice to align itself with either side in a dispute —say, Side B:

$$\text{Intervention} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } y_1^* > 0 \\ 0, & \text{if } y_1^* \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Alignment with Side B} = \begin{cases} \text{observed}, & \text{if } y_1 = 1 \\ \text{unobserved}, & \text{if } y_1 = 0 \end{cases}$$

Because bivariate probit generates more efficient estimates than two-stage Heckman probit, this model is adopted for this paper. It is worth repeating that the advantage of this estimation approach is that it allows one to bring together intervention models based exclusively on opportunity factors —such as those used by Kim (1991)— with intervention models based on willingness factors —such as those seen in Werner and Lemke (1997). By simply dichotomizing the dependent variable into intervention or no intervention outcomes, studies of the former kind fail to include the critical dimension of the relationship between third parties and disputants. By focusing mostly on the relationship between joiners and combatants, studies of the latter type, instead, face the shortcoming of equating non-interventions with interventions on the “wrong” side of the dispute. The present model circumvents these shortcomings by making the sequential estimation of two dependent variables possible.

The only assumption that is required for the adoption of such models is that the decision to intervene is not affected by the willingness covariates outlined earlier. That is, it is assumed that intervention *per se* —i.e., as an act separate from alignment choices— is exclusively a function of the opportunity variables. The assumption does not require excessive bending of the theoretical framework. Most and Starr (1989, 42-44), for instance, argue that the flow of foreign policy action generally goes from opportunity to willingness. They do recognize that, on occasion, willingness creates opportunity for international actors. Yet, they insist that this is a rather unusual relationship between the two dimensions of foreign policy decision-making. If opportunity were to flow from willingness in the case of joining behavior, this would require that a third party’s relationship with either disputant would in some way affect its external environment so as to make intervention possible. This

is not unlikely: A weak third party, for instance, may engage in a capability build-up in order to take with an ally in a conflict. Most commonly, however, there will be a very low likelihood of intervention if the opportunity components do not fall in the right place. That is, alignment preferences may well form before and independently of the intervention decision. But intervention will not take place if a third party lacks the individual or environmental means to intervene.

It could be argued that a better way to model joining decisions is by allowing for the possibility that a third party will align itself with neither side, even if the opportunity is present. Indeed, a third party may have the means to intervene and find itself in an environment that is favorable to intervention but still decide to avoid intervention because it is indifferent toward either combatants. In practical terms, this involves adding a third outcome to the second stage of the selection model. Unfortunately, the obstacles involved in modeling a decision making process that involves even this scenario are difficult to overcome. Multi-stage models that allow for multichotomous dependent variables in the second phase of the estimation are often impossible to estimate and even more difficult to interpret (Greene 2003, 714-715). Alternatively, models that incorporate multiple decision “branches” are likely to produce nonsensical options in the specific case of joining behavior.⁶ As it will be observed in the following chapters, such models can be, instead, more useful for predicting a third party selection of intervention techniques.

Despite some unavoidable limitations, the bivariate probit approach represents an improvement over existing models of third party intervention. It does not require for the model to be excessively twisted in order to accommodate estimation. It does

⁶Nested logit models, for instance, are of difficult implementation because a third party faces a “dead” decision branch if it chooses no intervention at the initial decision node.

nor require heroic econometric or theoretical assumptions. Thus, *Intervention* — coded as 0 or 1— is the dependent variable of the selection equation. Following Werner and Lemke (1997), I code y_2 —the dependent variable of the alignment equation— as 1 if a third party decides to take side with Side B in a dispute, or 0 if it sides with Side A.⁷

4.4.1 Research Design

One of the major problems in the study of joining behavior is that of structuring a research design that will avoid problems of selection bias. Some scholars have complained about the fact that most existing studies of third party interventions only look at states who have actually intervened, excluding potential joiners who chose not to intervene. The alternative to this approach is to include in a data set all potential joiners at every stage during a conflict (Gartzke and Gledistch 2003). Because this alternative generates an unwieldy number of observations, some scholars have restricted the number of potential joiners based on some key attribute, such as major power status or geographical contiguity. Yet, as discussed earlier, even the latter approach does not eliminate selection problems and potential bias and inefficiency in the analysis causal estimates.

Gartzke and Gledistch (2003) note that these obstacles are made steeper by the fact that, as third parties enter or leave a conflict, coalitions expand and shrink. As a result, in their decision about joining other third parties must take into consideration not only the characteristics of the original disputants, but also the attributes of the third parties who have already joined. If, for instance, state C joins a dispute between A and B on the second day of combat, potential third party D will now

⁷In the Third Party Intervention data set, the denomination Side A or Side B has no intrinsic meaning. Side A simply identifies the disputant with the smaller Correlates of War country code.

have to take into account the presence of this new actor in its calculations. Moreover, not all states remain in the same dispute for the same amount of time. Some states abandon the fight before the dispute has been resolved, again changing the scenario for other potential joiners. Thus, the ideal research design for the study of joining behavior is one that breaks down each dispute in infinitesimally small discrete phases and that follows the movement of each combatant at every phase.

However, a design of this type has two potential major shortcomings. First, it may lead to a hardly manageable amount of information—that is, data sets of millions of observations. Modern computers have little or no problems handling data sets of this size, and increasing the number of one's observations is almost always desirable (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Nonetheless, having millions of observations and only several thousands events—i.e., third party interventions—generates a variety of issues for causal inference (see King and Zeng 2002). Second, a research design that decomposes each conflict into many discrete phases imposes on researchers the impossible burden of having to collect information on the covariates at each stage of the conflict. This may be possible for some of the variables commonly used in the study of international conflict. But in most cases, such information is simply not available. States' regimes often experience transitions during conflicts. Records about, say, military and industrial capabilities can simply be unavailable if the conflict phases are measured in days or months. The majority of indicators in international conflict are recorded on a yearly basis, and too often information is not present even for such large time intervals. Transforming a conflict into minuscule phases—or even recasting the issue of joining behavior into a continuous time framework, as someone advocates—may force researchers to assume that many

important variables do not change over time, thereby nullifying many of the benefits implicit in this research design.

Given said obstacles, most studies of joining behavior are based on triads. That is, each observational unit is constituted by a dyad of interstate dispute originators and a potential third party. Again, this research design has been criticized because it oversimplifies the complex dynamic of each dispute and of each joining decision. It is important to note, however, that this criticism is overstated for at least two reasons. First, most militarized interstate disputes begin as two-state affairs (Corbetta and Dixon 2004). Second, the criticism is motivated by the fact that existing studies on joining behavior employ data that provide incomplete information about the actions of the third parties that actually join—as pointed in the preceding chapter. MID data, in particular, tell us which side of a dispute a third joins. But in cases of sequential third party joining—i.e., cases in which more than two states are on one side in a dispute—MID data do not tell us against which state(s) a third party is acting. It is assumed that a joiner is fighting simultaneously against all states on the side opposite to the one it has joined. The data collected for this research indicate that this seldom occurs. Most often, joiners in multilateral disputes often act against one or few specific states of the opposed coalition. Similarly, joiners do not systematically support all states on the side they have joined. Because the present data offers *specific* information on third parties action, separating multilateral conflicts into a series of triads becomes a feasible—although not ideal—solution. Although some of the complexity of real multiparty disputes dynamics is lost, such a loss is not overwhelmingly damaging. A research design based on triads is still sufficiently adequate to draw valid conclusions about joining behavior.

The design for this analysis was then structured in the following way. First, a dispute-dyad year data based on Zeev Maoz's dyadic MID data, was generated through the widely used EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000).⁸ The dispute-dyad data were augmented with data on the individual states that were members of the international system in a given dispute-year to create a more complex matrix based on triads —more specifically, on triad-dispute year.⁹ Finally, the triadic dispute year data were merged with the third party data collected for this project. This final merging action allowed for the integration of multiple interventions by the same third party in any dispute-year.

This research design is considerably different from the research designs employed in existing studies of third party intervention in conflicts. The designs in these studies almost invariably center around a dispute or a war and consider the relationship between a third and the two principal conflict originators. When multiple originators are considered simultaneously, researchers have been forced to make strong assumptions concerning dyadic variables that measure similarity or differences between third parties and combatants (see, for instance Kim 1991; Werner and Lemke 1997). Although it does not fully capture the ever-evolving dynamics of the most complex disputes, the data structure proposed here includes disputes with multiple actors —though they are disaggregated in dyads— and multiple interventions by the same third party in the same dispute-year against (or in support of) one

⁸Maoz's dyadic MID data disaggregate complex military disputes into dyads that actually experienced some level of militarized hostility. States who found themselves on opposite sides of a dispute but never fought with one another are excluded. Where a pair of states experiences more than one dispute in a year, EUGene reports the dispute with the highest level of hostility. Maoz data set and codebook are available at <http://spirit.tau.ac.il/poli/faculty/maoz/dyadmid.html>.

⁹Stata's command **JOINBY** allows to create all possible pairwise combinations of observations from two different data sets.

or more dispute participants.¹⁰ In addition, a data structure revolving around a what is basically a dispute-triad year allows for the inclusion of those interventions occurring slightly before or after a dispute —interventions that would be lost if the data were to center around a dispute alone. The final data matrix contains 312,883 observations, each representing a decision by a potential joiner to enter the conflict and align itself with either disputant. The size of the data set may seem disproportionate to the the limited number of observed intervention, as described in Chapter 3. Yet, this is a much smaller number of observation that those that would result if we truly were to decompose each conflict into a infinitesimally small number of stages. Moreover, it is a research design that does not require the researcher to adopt any additional theoretical restriction in order to arrive to a manageable number of observations. Rather, it is the theoretical framework adopted here that requires a data structure of this size and that provides the tool to handle it.

4.4.2 Operationalizing the Opportunity Covariates

The operationalization and measurement of the variables that define opportunity are rather straightforward processes. Most, if not all, of those covariates have been previously defined, measured and employed in uncountable conflict studies. Here the most elusive concept arguably is that of major power state. As stated above, major power states are those countries with broad foreign policy interests and with an active foreign policy agenda. Although the definition may appear rather loose, they are those states who behave as great powers and are perceived by other states as being such. The commonly used Correlates of War definition of major

¹⁰It can be argued that a drawback of this strategy is the assumption that, when two states experience more than one dispute in a given year, third parties intervene in the most visible of those disputes. Yet, the present third party data contains information about the specific dispute in which a third party intervenes, so that eventual discrepancies can be corrected.

powers originates in Singer and Small (1972)'s work and is employed here. States recognized as major powers are coded as 1. Lesser powers are coded as 0.

The operationalization of material capabilities is computationally more involved, but conceptually more straightforward. In this analysis, the Correlates of War's CINC (Composite Index of National Capabilities) score is adopted. This index represents a combination of a state's military, industrial, and demographic assets. Total population and the number of people living in urban centers constitute the demographic dimension of a state's capabilities. Energy consumption and iron and steel production represent the industrial component of the CINC score. Finally, military expenditures and armed force size are the indicators for the military portion of the index (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, 25-26). As previously argued, a third party's capabilities can be indicative of its ability to project power and of the magnitude of its opportunity to influence a dispute's outcome in the preferred direction.

Two concepts of geographical distance enter the opportunity selection equation, contiguity and actual distance. Contiguity is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if a potential joiner and either combatant share borders or are separated by less than 150 miles of water. Although apparently simplistic, this measurement has proved to capture the environmental conditions of interaction between states that are very proximate to one another. Many studies show that contiguous states trade more, fight more, and are more likely to stick their nose into each other's affairs. However, contiguity may not be able to express the entire set of interaction opportunities between states in an age where communication, travel, and projection of military power have become less distant. Thus, the opportunity equation also includes a continuous variable for geographical distance expressed in miles. The

distance variable refers to the distance in miles between a third party's capital and the capital of the closer between the two disputants.

The two remaining opportunity factors are specific to the dispute, rather than to the third parties or the environment. The level of hostility of a dispute is measured through the Militarized Interstate Dispute hostility-level measure (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996; Ghosn and Palmer 2003). This measure ranges from 1 (no military action) to 5 (war), with the remaining indicators representing threat to use force, display of force, and use of force.¹¹ A dummy variable —again taken from the MID coding— indicates whether a dispute was reciprocated or not. If the target state responds to the aggressor's challenge, the reciprocation variable is code 1 (Ghosn and Palmer 2003) . If the target state capitulates, then the variable is coded as 0. The descriptive statistics for all of the opportunity variables appear in Table 4.1.

4.4.3 Operationalizing the Willingness Covariates

Measuring the variables that are meant to capture the willingness component of the joining decision is a more difficult task. These variables express a relationship between a potential third party and both dispute originators. In this sense, these variables have multiple dimensions, since a potential third party is supposed to compare its foreign policy portfolio, regime type, etc. with the foreign policy portfolio, regime type, and other characteristics of both sides in a conflict. In addition, the potential third party will compare the two originators' foreign policy portfolios, regime type, etc. with one another. Ideally, one would want to create a series of independent variables that integrate into a single measure the relationship between a potential third party, Side A, and Side B. For example, one would

¹¹Thus, an advantage of this measure is that it allows one to separate conflicts that escalate into wars from conflicts that remain at the dispute level.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Opportunity Covariates

Variable Name	Obs.	Mean	St. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Capabilities	312871	.007	.022	0	.364
Major Power	312871	.037	.189	0	1
Major Power Dispute	312883	.052	.223	0	1
Contiguity	312883	.058	.234	0	1
Distance	312721	4195.21	2569.02	5	12311
Hostility Level	312883	3.694	.618	0	5
Reciprocation	312883	.557	.496	0	1
Territory	312883	.118	.323	0	1

want to create a single measure of regime similarity that simultaneously accounts for similarity in regime type between a third party and Side A, the similarity in regime type between a third party and Side B, and the similarity in regime type between Side A and Side B. In some instances, the difficulty has been solved by distinguishing between the two originators on the basis of some characteristic and then by calculating similarities and differences just between a third party and only one originator. Huth (1998), for instance, distinguishes between an aggressor and a target in a dispute, then estimates differences and similarities between potential third parties and the target state. Werner and Lemke (1997), on the contrary, avoid making any a priori distinction between originators and include in the model measures of similarity between a third party and both Side A and Side B. Although it is computationally less convenient, Werner and Lemke (1997)'s approach does not imply any additional assumption about the relationship between a third party and the disputants and, therefore, it will be adopted here. It will be necessary, then, to calculate two versions of most of the following variables: one expressing similarities between a potential third party and Side A; one expressing similarities between a third party and Side B.

Starting with the variables of the rational choice approach to intervention, the most involved measurement is the measurement of foreign policy similarity. Each country's foreign policy agenda is filled with many different items and has many different dimensions. Luckily, studies exist that have effectively solved the problem of producing a single indicator for such a multidimensional concept. Bueno de Mesquita (1975, 1978, 1980, 1981) developed a measure of similarity between two states' foreign policies based on the extent to which their set of alliances with other members of the international system—their alliance portfolios—overlap. Measured with the measure of association Kendall's τ_b , and often referred to as “tau-b”, this indicator has a range of [1, -1]. τ_b between two countries that share exactly the same set of alliances will be equal to 1. Complete dissimilarity is expressed by a τ_b equal to -1. A τ_b of 0 indicates that two countries foreign policy portfolios are independent of one another. More recently, Signorino and Ritter (1999) have offered a similar measure of foreign policy similarity named S which includes not only alliances, but also other expression of foreign policy preferences in particular, voting records in the United Nations. While its computation is not nearly as intuitive as that of τ_b , S seems to resolve some anomalies inherent to τ_b and is more easily interpretable. S, in fact, still ranges from -1 (perfectly opposed foreign policy portfolios) to 1 (perfectly similar foreign policy portfolios). Yet, an S value of 0 simply represents a mid-point between -1, whereas the meaning of τ_b when it is equal to 0 remains unclear (Signorino and Ritter 1999). While the superiority of one measure over the other remains the subject of a debate that is beyond the scope of this research, I adopt S to express similarity between two states' foreign policy preferences simply because S includes more dimensions than just alliances (see Bennett and Rupert 2003).

As Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979, 91) suggest, it is possible to think of measures such as τ_b as indicators of a state's utility for a certain outcome — that is, how much a state values having a certain combatant to win. This can be distinguished from what they refer to as “utility from strategy,” or how much a state values helping an ally. Thus, they suggest that the presence of an alliance can be a powerful factor affecting a potential third party's willingness. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979, 98) see the presence of defense pacts or ententes between a potential third party and either disputant as reflecting “declarations of expected utility strategy.” I follow a similar procedure and employ two alliance variables — one for a third party and Side A, one for the third party and Side B — coded as 1 if a potential joiner and a dispute originator share a defense agreement or an entente, 0 otherwise.¹²

At the willingness level, the distribution of capabilities among actors is likely to shape a third party's decision. It is then essential to bring the disputants' capabilities into the picture. The classic realist expectation about balance of power is that a third party will take the side of the weakest combatant. Following Werner and Lemke (1997, 534), the capabilities component of willingness is measured simply as the CINC scores on each side of the dispute.

Trade relations between a potential third party and either dispute originator provide the final measure in the rational approach to willingness. Again, the expectation is that third parties will be more willing to intervene on the side of a combatant in a MID if the two states share strong economic interests. Adopting a

¹²A third type of alliances, neutrality pacts, are excluded because they either reflect lack of strategic utility for one side in a conflict or actually express potential hostility. States who perceive one another as threats are, in fact, more likely to sign neutrality pact. The presence of a neutrality pact under those circumstances may actually be an indication that a third party is more likely to join with the side with which it does not have a neutrality pact. If that is the case, the inclusion of neutrality pacts in the alliance measure may introduce error.

measure of dyadic trade relations for the purpose of studying joining behavior offers a particular challenge for two reasons. First, existing records of interstate trade over time are rather sparse. Second, third party interventions take place during conflicts and, when hostility is high, regular trade relations between a combatant and a third party are often disrupted. Among various data sets with indicators of interstate trade over time, the one compiled by Oneal and Russett (1999) arguably is the most complete. From Oneal and Russett (1999), I adopt two measures of economic dependence, one for a third party and the combatant on Side A, one for a third party and a combatant on Side B. The index of economic dependence ranges from 0 to 1.5039. However, as expected, the number of missing cases on these variables is very high. As shown in Table 4.2, figures of trade dependence are available for approximately two-thirds of all available observations. This may pose considerable obstacles to the use of these variables for the empirical test of the hypotheses.

Willingness to intervene in an ongoing dispute based on political proximity may not be dictated by strategic interests alone. Actually, according to the homophily approach, common strategic interests and the presence of alliances simply are reflection of deeper political bonds that originate in political-ideological similarities. Similarity in regime type, the first of the homophily variables is measured as the difference between two countries' Polity IV's democracy-autocracy score, often referred to as DEM-AUT score. This score ranges from 10 to -10 and expresses a country's democratic traits minus its autocratic traits. Countries scoring -10 are perfectly autocratic. Countries scoring 10 are perfectly democratic. This measure has been widely used in the conflict literature. For example, many findings supporting the democratic peace theory are based on the notion that states scoring 7

or above on this index are mature democracies. For the purpose of this research, difference in regime type can range from 20 —the largest possible difference— to 0. The smaller the difference in regime type, the greater the expectation that a third party will intervene on the side of the more similar combatant.

The measurement of the notion of institutional similarity is more involved but still based on the variables from the Polity project. The DEM-AUT index mentioned in the preceding paragraph is a composite measure of several Polity indicators which capture various regime dimensions, ranging from institutional constraints on the executive branch to individual freedom to participate in the political process. Some such measures deal specifically with a country's institutional features. Werner (2000*b*) has used those indicators to produce a measure of institutional similarity. The Polity IV variables she employs are: constraints on the executive branch of government (XCONST); competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP); competitiveness of executive recruitment (XRCOMP); and openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN) (Werner 2000*b*, 355). The four variables are combined in the following way to obtain the Euclidian distance between two states on these measure (Werner 2000*b*, 356):

$$\textit{Political Similarity}_{ij} = [(((xrcomp_i - xrcomp_j)/3)^2 + ((xropen_i - xropen_j)/4)^2 + ((xconst_i - xconst_j)/6)^2 + ((parcomp_i - parcomp_j)/5)^2)^{.5}] [-1] + [2]$$

What results is an index ranging from 0 to 2, where 2 indicates perfect similarity.¹³

¹³According to Werner (2000*b*, 355, fn.17), this measure overlaps somewhat with Polity VI's democracy-autocracy scores. Yet, the correlation is not so severe as to generate concerns about multicollinearity. Werner (2000*b*, 356, fn. 22) also notes, interestingly, that democratic states tend to be more similar to one another than than autocratic states.

One of the most difficult measures of homophily to estimate undoubtedly is similarity in cultural traits. The difficulty stems from the multi-dimensionality inherent in the concept of culture. An ideal measure of cultural similarity would incorporate a linguistic dimension, a religious dimension, and an historical dimensions. Unfortunately, such a measure does not exist. Henderson and Tucker (2001), however, have developed an indicator of states' civilization that approximates the notion of a country's cultural identity. Originally designed to test empirically Huntington (1993, 1996)'s thesis of a clash of civilizations, this indicator identifies ten different civilization categories: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American, African, Buddhist, and "other".¹⁴ This measure clearly is a distant proxy from the notion that it is intended to measure. Each of the civilization labels contains an enormous amount of cultural variation. For lack of a better measure, this approximation was used to create a dummy variable coded 1 if a potential third party and a dispute originator shared the same civilization, 0 otherwise.

Whether common intergovernmental organization memberships affects a state's propensity to intervene on the side of either dispute initiator is measured with the COW International Governmental Organizations Data, version 2.0 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke 2004). This data set contains an indicator of a common membership in 500 intergovernmental organizations for all pairs of states since 1816. From this data set, I created two dyadic yearly counts of the number of shared IGO memberships since 1946 —one between a third party and Side A, one for a third party and Side B. Unfortunately, the COW IGO membership data for the period 1816-1964 were recorded only at five-year intervals. I had to impute the missing

¹⁴The data are available on Clash of Civilization Data Project at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/rtucker>.

data for the 1946-1964 period by assuming that no change in IGO membership took place in the four years between successive measurements. Considering that the years between 1946 and 1964 are a period of exponential growth both in the number of IGOs and in memberships (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke 2004), the measure is weakened by this compromise. The range of the variable is from zero —no shared membership— to an hypothetical maximum of 500. The actual observed maximum for this variable is 105. Table 4.2 summarizes the independent variables expressing a third party's willingness to intervene.

4.5 Findings

Given that they have the opportunity to intervene in a militarized dispute, what factors affect the alignment choices of third party states? Most and Starr (1984, 1989) argue that too often conflict scholars advance claims about the necessary conditions of international phenomena and then proceed to employ empirical tools that explore the sufficient conditions of such events, or vice versa. This research attempts to eschew these shortcomings by avoiding selection on the dependent or independent variable and —unlike previous studies of joining behavior— by developing a model that focuses on the process of intervention, rather than on the outcome alone. The aim is to generate a theoretical model and a matching empirical model that evaluate the sufficient conditions of third party's intervention in interstate conflicts. Trying to meet these theoretical and empirical requirements simultaneously can be quite challenging. One dimension of the challenge is to identify the various components of opportunity and willingness in a theoretically meaningful and not ad hoc way. A second dimension of the challenge consists of measuring the various components of opportunity and willingness in a way that is

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Willingness Covariates

Name	Obs.	Mean	St. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Capabilities Side A	312879	.038	.062	1.00e-06	.364
Capabilities Side B	312881	.014	.033	2.00e-06	.180
Alliance Side A	300805	.089	.284	0	1
Alliance Side B	300662	.048	.215	0	1
Affinity Side A	300805	.359	.579	-.983	1
Affinity Side B	300662	.388	.573	-.983	1
Trade Side A	188103	.007	.032	0	1.504
Trade Side B	190305	.001	.010	0	.633
Regime Similarity Side A	254981	8.07	6.79	0	20
Regime Similarity Side B	254538	8.08	6.65	0	20
Institutions Simil. Side A	254981	1.15	.523	.092	2
Institutions Simil. Side B	254538	1.14	.507	.092	2
Civilization Simil. Side A	310480	.142	.349	0	1
Civilization Simil. Side B	311222	.131	.338	0	1
IGO Ties Side A	312783	23.09	12.58	0	105
IGO Ties Side B	312781	21.16	11.32	0	103

consistent with their conceptual definition –i.e., to produce valid measurements. A third and final dimension of the challenge is to estimate an empirical model which can be quite cumbersome both conceptually and computationally.

Table 4.3 reports the results of a series of probit models aimed at estimating the simultaneous impact of opportunity and willingness factors on the decision to join. The models do not distinguish between military and non-military interventions. Model 1 in the table is a straightforward probit model that estimates the effect of opportunity variables on the decision to intervene, without taking into account alignment choices. Model 2 and 3, instead, are bivariate probit models for seemingly unrelated equations that incorporate, respectively, rational/strategic variables and homophily variables. Finally, Model 4 brings together combines the strategic/rational dimension of willingness and the homophily dimension while accounting for the influence of opportunity factors. Because the data are essentially

panel data, in all models observations were clustered on dyads in order to account for within-group dependence. Robust (Huber/White/sandwich) standard errors are reported in parentheses.

The most noticeable outcome in Table 4.3 is the effectiveness of the opportunity model to predict intervention in an ongoing interstate dispute. Both third party's attributes and dispute characteristics seem to influence the decision to intervene, regardless of the specification of the willingness component of the model. Opportunity Hypotheses 1 through 4 find strong confirmation. Material capabilities and major power status significantly increase the likelihood of intervention. As expected, contiguity makes it easier for third parties to intervene, while distance reduces a third party's foreign policy options. Probably because they tend to last longer, disputes in which the target state reciprocates the attacker's military challenge are more likely to attract third party interventions. This confirms Opportunity Hypothesis 6. However, the results do not offer support for Opportunity Hypothesis 5. The level of hostility in a dispute, however, steers away third parties, who may fear entanglement and the high costs associated with affecting the outcome of disputes that already are very violent. The two most surprising results, though, are the negative effect of the presence of major power states in a conflict and the insignificant coefficient for territorial disputes. The presence of major power states is generally associated with multiparty disputes. However, it is unclear whether MIDs with major power states as originators expand because of third party interventions or begin as multilateral disputes. These results suggest that multiparty disputes begin as such, rather than expanding in successive phases. The results are also consistent with Corbetta and Dixon (2004)'s findings that major powers are likely to begin conflicts multilaterally than unilaterally. Again, the

Table 4.3: Probit Estimates of Effects of Opportunity and Willingness on Third Parties' Decision to Intervene and Take Sides in Ongoing Conflicts, 1946–2001

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff.	St.Err.	Coeff.	St.Err.	Coeff.	St.Err.	Coeff.	St.Err.
Capabilities _A			1.163**	.378			.790	.408
Capabilities _B			-3.309*	1.496			-3.356*	1.626
Alliance _A			.097	.061			.047	.086
Alliance _B			.368*	.109			.376*	.168
Affinity _A			-.278***	.074			-.291***	.077
Affinity _B			.198**	.074			.238**	.090
Trade _A			–				–	
Trade _B			–				–	
Constant			-2.937***	.059				
Regime Sim _A					.020***	.005	.009	.005
Regime Sim _B					.012*	.006	.015**	.006
Institutions _A					.044	.058	-.089	.061
Institutions _B					.261***	.080	.317***	.077
Civilization _A					-.105	.066	-.157*	.073
Civilization _B					.194***	.049	.008	.075
IGO ties _A					.004	.002	.005	.003
IGO ties _B					-.003	.002	-.005	.003
Constant					-3.499***	.158	-3.439***	.178
TP Capabilities	5.499***	.667	3.925***	.546	3.062***	.591	3.286***	.447
Major Power	.73***	.072	.472***	.062	.438***	.056	.506***	.068
MajPow Dispute	-1.192***	.246	-.897***	.221	-.554***	.145	-.826***	.218
Contiguity	.358***	.068	.153***	.041	.160***	.033	.140**	.043
Distance	-6e-05***	.00001	-5e-05***	.00001	-2e-05	.00001	-4e-05***	.00001
Hostility Level	-.409***	.115	-.186**	.068	-.128*	.065	-.171*	.076
Reciprocation	.435***	.076	.239***	.055	.158**	.053	.191***	.061
Territory	-.173	.202	-.109	.117	-.094	.107	-.062	.129
Constant	-1.509***	.356	-2.113***	.204	-2.306***	.206	-2.159***	.226
ρ			.986	.006	.988	.004	.990	.005
Wald test for $\rho = 0$.000		.000		.000	
Log Likelihood	-6043.7944		-6820.1605		-6664.5938		-5315.2301	
Wald χ^2	1176.48		324.10		320.58		480.68	
Prob > χ^2	.000		.000		.000		.000	
Pseudo R^2	0.2946							
Number of obs.	312721		297249		238516		227560	

fact that territory is not significant is somewhat surprising, given the well-know

relationship between territorial claims, hostility, and dispute expansion and escalation. However, this result is not discordant with recent findings indicating that the number of parties in a conflict has an effect on escalation independent of the presence of a territorial claim. The impact of territory and “multipartism” on the likelihood of escalation is additive, rather than cumulative (Petersen, Vasquez and Wang 2004, see). Clearly, although the present research is not the place to pursue this goal, the relationship between the presence of major states and the claim around which a dispute revolves is a topic that deserves further exploration.

The second, but arguably most important, result from the bivariate probit estimate of the model is the dependence between the opportunity and willingness components. In model 2 through 4, the Wald χ^2 test for the hypothesis that ρ is equal to zero is consistently significant. This indicates that the estimation of Y_2 is not independent of the estimation of Y_1 . In substantive terms, this indicates that the decision to join and alignment choices are truly related to one another. Models of joining behavior that claim to evaluate joining behavior by looking exclusively at the decision to intervene or at alignment choices are bound to be incomplete. The willingness-opportunity approach paints a more complete, although more complex, picture of the phenomenon of joining behavior.

The results emerging from the willingness equation are not as consistent across model specifications and with previous research as those emerging from the opportunity side. Yet, with the exception of some anomalies, they conform to the general expectations raised earlier. Beginning with the expected utility/rational choice approach to intervention, the first thing to be noticed is that variables indicating trade dependence were excluded from the Model 2 and the Full model because too many observations were lost due to missing data. The introduction of

the trade dependence data in Model 2 causes more than 100,000 observations to drop out. The number of total observations for the full model when trade variables are included reduces to about 30 percent of the total. The sign of the coefficients for these variables were in the expected direction and, for the relationship between a third party and Side B, the coefficients were statistically significant. There is some evidence that trade dependence with one side in a dispute affects the likelihood that a joiner will support that side. Yet, the price to pay for the inclusion of these variables computationally and in terms of lost information was deemed too high. Establishing the impact of trade and economic dependence on states' behavior during conflict—rather than before conflict—is contingent on acquiring better data.

Estimating the effects of other expected utility/rational choice variables was less problematic. The coefficients concerning the capability relations between a third party and the disputants confirm previous findings by, for instance, Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) and Werner and Lemke (1997) that third parties prefer to balance power rather than bandwagon. The negative and significant sign in front of the coefficient for the capabilities on Side B variable confirms the realist expectation that the more powerful B is, the less likely a third party will be to take sides with it. The results also support previous findings by a variety of authors that the presence of formal agreement is a powerful incentive for states to intervene on the side of an alliance partner (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Kim 1991; Smith 1996; Werner and Lemke 1997). These findings lend support to current research indicating that alliances indeed are more reliable than previously thought (Leeds, Mitchell McLaughlin and Long 2000). Similar results hold for measures of foreign policy similarity. Affinity in foreign policy preferences between a third party

and Side B in a dispute increase the likelihood that a joiner will take sides with B, while reducing the chances that it will side with A.¹⁵ The effects of the combatants' capabilities, alliances, and foreign policy affinity on a third party's alignment decisions remain stable even after controlling for various homophily variables in the full model (model 4).

The most striking finding concerning the homophily variables is the fact that regime similarity seems to have the opposite effect than previously predicted. It makes intuitive sense that difference in regime between a third party and Side A will increase the likelihood of an intervention on the side of B. However, it is unexpected that is the greater the difference in regime type between a third party and Side B, the more likely the joiner is to align with B. Democratic third party states are apparently more willing to support autocracies in a dispute, and viceversa. This outcome goes against all expectations and previous findings (see, for example Werner and Lemke 1997). This anomalous result also clashes with the findings concerning institutional similarity and civilization similarity. These two variables conform to the hypotheses raised in previous sections. Joiners prefer to align themselves with states with which they share institutional and cultural similarities. Yet, the impact of cultural similarity does not appear to be particularly consistent. When we control for the effects of rational choice variables in the full model, it is differences in cultural traits —rather than similarities— that seem to

¹⁵It is to be noted, though, that the results for measure of foreign policy affinity vary depending on which S measure one employs. Using a global, rather than regional, S measure of similarity produces a negative and significant coefficient for the likelihood that a joiner will take sides with Side B. Such an anomalous result is largely due to the fact that the global version of the S measure tends to inflate the similarity score because of its tendency to equate lack of alliances between two states who interact rarely with foreign policy similarity. When “irrelevant” states are included in the picture, a third party will tend to have equally high foreign policy similarity with both state A and state B, explaining the negative or insignificant effects of this index on a joiner tendency to align with either side in a dispute. For a comparative overview of various version of S, see Bennett and Rupert (2003).

matter the most. Shared IGO ties, on the other hand, do not have any statistically significant effect on a joiner alignment choice. Overall, it appears that homophily factors have a great effect on the probability of conflict initiation—as the vast literature on the democratic peace consistently shows—but not on the behavior of third party states. Overall, democratic states seem unwilling to start conflict with their “kin” but less willing to help them out when they get involve in conflict. Institutions seem to matter more than the political philosophy behind a regime when it comes to joining behavior.

In theoretical and substantive terms, it makes little sense for actual dispute joiners to be willing to support institutionally similar states while being indifferent to “ideologically” similar countries. It is plausible that institutions and the political philosophy behind a government may have independent, additive effect on joining behavior. It is however difficult to rationalize how their relationships with the dependent variable may be moving in opposite directions. Because both measures are derived from similar Polity measures, it is not to be ruled out that multicollinearity may be the root cause of the anomalous findings. While Werner (2000*b*) claims that correlation between the two measures does not generate statistical concerns, she does admit that it is quite high. With the present data set, the high correlation between regime similarity and institutional similarity—Pearson’s r between regime and institutional similarity for Side A is 0.77; for Side B, it is 0.78—may actually be driving the results. Table 4.4 below shows the homophily and the full models estimated with the exclusion of institutional similarity. Only the equation for Y_2 —the alignment choice—is presented since results for the selection equation are identical to those shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.4: Probit Estimates of Effects of Opportunity and Willingness on Third Parties' Decision to Intervene and Take Sides in Ongoing Conflicts After Correction for Multicollinearity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficients	St. Errors	Coefficients	St. Errors
Capabilities Side A			.787*	.394
Capabilities Side B			-3.052	1.604
Alliance Side A			.044	.083
Alliance Side B			.370*	.171
Affinity Side A			-.272***	.077
Affinity Side B			.229**	.089
Regime Sim. Side A	.016***	.004	.015***	.003
Regime Sim. Side B	-.0027	.003	-.003	.003
Civilization Sim. Side A	-.106	.066	-.167*	.071
Civilization Sim. Side B.	.168**	.056	-.011	.078
IGO ties Side A	.003	.002	.005	.003
IGO ties Side B	-.002	0.002	-.000	.003
Constant	-2.977***	.133	-3.060***	.111
ρ	.988	.005	.992	.005
Wald test for $\rho = 0$.000		.000	
Log Likelihood	-6694.5915		-5337.0326	
Wald χ^2	295.26		464.77	
Prob > χ^2	.000		.000	
Number of obs.	238516		227560	

The exclusion of the institutional similarity measure produces results that are more in tune with earlier expectations, confirming that the degree of collinearity between regime and institutional similarity is indeed high. As suspected, if regime similarity —instead of institutional similarity— is excluded from the model, results nearly identical to those in Table 4.4 obtain. The difficulty to separate regime similarity from institutional similarity mirrors the difficulty encountered by many democratic peace scholars in distinguishing between the institutional effects and

normative effects of regime type. What is most interesting theoretically and substantively about the results in both Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 is that they suggest that opposition against a disputant matters just as much as amity toward another disputant in shaping a third party's alignment choices. As expected, the presence of an alliance and foreign policy similarity with Side B significantly increase the likelihood that a joiner will actually take sides with B. But it also is the difference in regime with the opposite disputant —Side A— that increases the likelihood of intervention on behalf of B. This is consistent with Blau (1977)'s expectation that the likelihood of social conflict increases with the distance in homophily space. Strong evidence of balance of power behavior persists across different models and specifications of the regime similarity variable. The indicator of Side A's capabilities remains positive and significant, indicating that that the greater A's power, the more likely a third party to side with disputant B.

Strategic/rationalist interests seem to provide a more robust prediction of third party states' behavior than the homophily model of willingness. Yet, in addition to multicollinearity, the less-robust-than-expected results emerging from the homophily model —especially those concerning regime similarity— may be due to poor variable operationalization. Specifically, the literature on the democratic peace indicates that regime similarity has a stronger effect on conflict initiation when states in a dyad have been around for a long time. Mature democracies and autocracies —those states scoring more than 6 or 7 and less than -6 or -7 on the Polity scale, respectively— behave differently than less established regimes with regard to conflict. And even among mature regimes, pairs of mature democracies seem to be more proximate to one another than pairs of mature autocracies. The same can be true about third party states' behavior. Werner and Lemke (1997),

for instance, uncover stronger effects of regime type on joining behavior after separating democratic third parties from autocratic third parties. In their analysis, democratic third parties are more likely to join with other democracies than autocracies are to side with other autocracies. Regime similarities affects autocracies' joining decision more strongly only in the 19th century.¹⁶

It is quite possible that compounding democracies and autocracies, mature and young regimes in the same measure of regime similarity washes out most of the effects of regime similarity. Because of the learning processes associated with the consolidation of regimes (Cederman 2001*a,b*), mature democracies and autocracies are more likely to take side with similar states than less established third parties. In order to explore this possibility, regime similarity has been re-operationalized as a dummy variable coded 1 if a third party and a combatant are mature democracies or autocracies, 0 otherwise. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 report the results of bivariate probit models with dichotomous measurements of regime similarity. In both tables, Model 1 reports the coefficients of the effects of regime similarity between mature democracies or mature autocracies on the likelihood that a third party will join with Side B. Model 2, instead, reports the coefficients of the full model including rational/strategic variables. Again, coefficients for the selection equation are not reported in the table, since they are nearly identical to the coefficients observed in Table 4.3.

The results from Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 suggest that, within the homophily model, it is deceiving to think of the effects of regime similarity on alignment choices as being of the same magnitude across different values of the variable. Apparently, regime similarity matters for third parties' alignment choices only after a certain

¹⁶This result is probably largely driven by the fact that most states were autocratic for most of the 19th century (see, for instance Spiro 1994; Thompson and Tucker 1997; Cederman 2001*a,b*).

Table 4.5: Probit Estimates of Effects of Opportunity and Willingness on Third Parties' Decision to Intervene and Take Sides in Ongoing Conflicts with Dummy Coding of Similarity Between Mature Democracies

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficients	St. Errors	Coefficients	St. Errors
Capabilities Side A			1.277***	.372
Capabilities Side B			-3.326*	1.508
Alliance Side A			-.033	.082
Alliance Side B			.385**	.143
Affinity Side A			-.302***	.074
Affinity Side B			.224**	.079
Mature Democracy Side A	1.119	.075	-.263***	.056
Mature Democracy Side B	.120*	.059	.226***	.054
Civilization Sim. Side A	-.129*	.059	-.090	.074
Civilization Sim. Side B.	.161**	.065	.049	.062
IGO ties Side A	.002	.002	.005	.003
IGO ties Side B	-.0009	.002	-.005	.003
Constant	-2.828***	.098	-2.955***	.072
ρ	.993	.005	.989	.006
Wald test for $\rho = 0$.000		.000
Log Likelihood		-8549.2707		-6763.7119
Wald χ^2		310.40		457.33
Prob > χ^2		.000		.000
Number of obs.		309688		295233

homophily threshold has been passed. Only mature democracies and autocracies appear to recognize one another as being similar and side with one another in ongoing disputes. States who have not clearly embraced a democratic or autocratic identity may seem politically distant, or simply different, to mature joiners. The literature on democratization and conflict suggests that less established regimes are more susceptible to sudden domestic changes and produce less consistent policies (see, for instance Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Leaders in mature democracies or mature autocracies display greater unwillingness to defend nations with whom they agree only partially, or who are more at risk of sudden political and ideological

changes. Theoretically, this turn in the findings is consistent with Blau (1977)'s idea that stronger homophily ties develop between individuals who are most similar and with much of the literature on the democratic peace.

Equally interesting, and equally consistent with democratic peace theory, is the fact that the effects of regime similarity are more consistent for mature democracies than for mature autocracies. As Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 show, the effects of joint mature regime between a third party and either disputant are significant and in the expected direction until strategic/rational choice factors are not controlled for. The impact of joint mature autocracy disappears in the full model in Table 4.6. The presence of mature democratic ties between a potential joiner and a disputant significantly affects the likelihood that the joiner will side with state B, and the coefficients even become more markedly significant in Table 4.5, after controlling for strategic/rational choice factors. Going against Werner and Lemke (1997)'s findings, it does appear that the strategic/rational aspect of the joining decision take precedence for mature nondemocratic states. Confirming the idea that mature democracies do in fact occupy a peculiar space in international politics, these results indicate that democracies do perceive that a special bond exists among them. Regardless of alliances, balance of power considerations, and foreign policy preferences, regime ties still play an independent and significant effect on a third party's joining decisions.

One wishes that the results emerging from this first round of empirical investigation were more robust. In general, expectations about third party's strategic/rational considerations find fairly strong confirmation. Third parties' alignment decisions are guided by balance of power considerations and by the willingness to support allies and states with similar foreign policy preferences. It takes a bigger

Table 4.6: Probit Estimates of Effects of Opportunity and Willingness on Third Parties' Decision to Intervene and Take Sides in Ongoing Conflicts with Dummy Coding of Similarity between Mature Autocracies

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficients	St. Errors	Coefficients	St. Errors
Capabilities Side A			1.029**	.372
Capabilities Side B			-3.208*	1.425
Alliance Side A			-.042	.093
Alliance Side B			.344*	.155
Affinity Side A			-.283***	.076
Affinity Side B			.206**	.079
Mature Autocracy Side A	-1.485**	.057	-.032	.059
Mature Autocracy Side B	.161*	.070	.067	.071
Civilization Sim. Side A	-.122*	.057	-.116	.078
Civilization Sim. Side B	.152**	.051	.053	.063
IGO ties Side A	.0004	.002	.002	.003
IGO ties Side B	.0003	.002	-.002	.003
Constant	-2.833***	.085	-2.937***	.067
ρ	.991	.005	.986	.006
Wald test for $\rho = 0$.000		.000
Log Likelihood		-8537.6031		-6805.5179
Wald χ^2		313.83		476.99
Prob > χ^2		.000		.000
Number of obs.		309688		295233

effort to sort out the effects of homophily variables. Civilization similarity behaves inconsistently, at times suggesting that cultural similarities are the key determinant of alignment choices, at times suggesting that cultural differences with a potential target weight more heavily. It is evident that regime and institutional factors do play a role in the decision to join, although the process of specifying that role is more involved than expected. Regime/political similarities with Side B and dissimilarities with Side A equally increase the likelihood that a third party will join with the former side in the conflict. However, one must keep in mind that: (1) it is unclear whether those similarities concern only institutional structures or the

“philosophical” underpinning of a political system; (2) regime/political similarities affect mature regimes only, and democratic regimes in particular. The gamut of model specifications required to tease out these relationships may suggest *ad hoc* theorizing. More likely, it is a reflection of the wide variety of theoretical explanations used in the area of conflict studies to account for international political outcomes that depend on the domestic structures of pairs — triads, in this case — of states.

4.6 Moving Beyond Theoretical and Empirical Selection Concerns

The argument herein begins with the consideration that many theoretical and empirical models in international politics are marred by problems of selection bias (Most and Starr 1989; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Signorino 2002). These problems can be particularly severe in the study of joining behavior due to the multiple sources of potential selection bias. Some of these sources are theoretical; some are empirical. Theoretically, the bias stems primarily from the tendency to study intervention *per se* and alignment choices as two separate, independent aspects of joining behavior. This has led scholars to develop explanatory models that include only variables that predict intervention or only variables that predict align decisions without considering the potential dependence between the two steps in the decision-making process about joining. Authors who have shown awareness for this problem have often dealt with it on a *ad hoc* basis —for instance, by eliminating the intervention issue through sample selection based on some crucial independent variable, such as major power status (e.g. Huth 1998) or severity of the conflict (e.g. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979). Authors who have not dealt

with this issue and have looked only at realized interventions have simply incurred in major problems of selection on a possible outcome of the dependent variable.

Empirically, the sources of potential bias are equally severe. Foremost among these sources is the fact that, because of data availability, existing studies only investigate militarized interventions while overlooking the largest share of states' joining activities—that is, nonmilitary activities. Because they do not account for the selection mechanism driving sampling of militarized interventions alone, many studies on joining behavior have incurred into two problems. First, they settle on an operationalization of the dependent variable that inflates non-events compared to actual interventions and/or alignments. Second, they run the risk of model misspecification, as variables leading to the militarization of interventions are systematically excluded from the analysis.

I have attempted to address these shortcomings in current research by proposing a selection model of joining behavior steeped into the opportunity and willingness theoretical framework. This model simply requires one to accept the assumption that the joining decision takes place in two interconnected steps. In the first stage—the opportunity stage—the selection between the states that have the opportunity to intervene takes place. This selection rests on the effects of state-level and environmental factors, including a dispute's characteristics. Alignment decisions are made at the second stage—the willingness stage. Here the general model of joining behavior allows one to compare the effects of two alternative models of state's preference formation—the strategic/rational choice model and an homophily based model. This model is not “strategic” in Signorino (2002)'s definition of the term because, due to data constraints, it is difficult to map the sequential interaction

between all potential joiners and combatants. However, the model focuses on process in Most and Starr (1989)'s definition of the term —that is, it does not focus on specific events but on the mechanism that produces such events. In this regard, the model has the potential to contribute to the cumulation of knowledge about joining behavior.

The most obvious contribution of the model is that it bridges previous models of third party interventions with existing models of alignment choices. Because it overcomes the tendency to study the two dimensions of third party interventions as separate problems, the model avoids the various selection issues outlined earlier. In so doing, it identifies the necessary conditions for the occurrence of actual interventions while simultaneously evaluating their dependence on alignment preferences. The model suggests that the occurrence of an intervention largely depends on a potential third party's capabilities and status, on geographical proximity to the participant in the conflict, and on the intensity of the conflict itself. In more specific terms, the probability of intervention in a dispute increases with a third party's ability to intervene, with the scope of its foreign policy interests, with its proximity to combatants, and with the extent to which the initial act of aggression in a dispute is reciprocated. Contrary to the original expectations, the intensity of conflict tends to deter third party interventions. This finding matches Werner (2000*a*)'s idea that attackers in disputes and wars can manipulate the conflict stakes so as to avoid third party interventions and Smith (1996)'s idea that the aggressor's strategic actions lead to the selection of a subset of third party defenders that are generally less credible than third party defenders in the entire population. This result suggests that an aggressor can achieve this objective by raising the stakes of war with a highly hostile action. A novel hypothesis deserving further investigation

is the fact that territorial disputes are not significantly more likely to draw in third parties, even though they are inherently more likely to be multiparty conflicts. Arguably, territorial disputes are more likely to begin —rather than becoming— as multiparty disputes.

A further contribution of the unified model is that it leads to the conclusion that strategic/rational and homophily-based sources of foreign policy preference formation are not incompatible with one another. Rather, they both work in shaping a third party alignment choices. Even after including instances of non-militarized intervention, there is evidence of balance behavior among third parties. Alliances consistently influence a joiner's tendency to take side with preexisting partners, lending further credibility to recent research on the reliability of such agreements (Leeds, Mitchell McLaughlin and Long 2000). Similarity in foreign policy preferences with one side in a conflict and dissimilarity with the other side strongly nudge a joiner toward taking sides with the politically more proximate side. Yet, contrary to what suggested by previous research, foreign policy affinity does not eliminate the impact of homophily-based factors on foreign policy decision-making. Although its performance is not as consistent as originally hoped, the homophily model of preference formation suggests two interesting developments. First, dissimilarity in regime types and/or institutional structures between third parties and disputants counts as much as —if not more than— similarity in those traits. Second, the effects of regime similarity are more evident for mature regimes, and especially for mature democracies. Interestingly, common IGO ties seem to have no effect on the alignment choices of potential joiners, suggesting that shared IGO membership may be more effective in the prevention rather than the management of ongoing

conflicts.¹⁷ Overall, the cumulative model of joining behavior combines and expands on pre-existing knowledge on joining behavior by leading to the prediction that intervention will occur with the highest probability in conflicts of relatively lower intensity between a weaker friend and a foe of a geographically proximate powerful, major power state.

All of this is not to say that this approach to joining behavior is void of limitations. There are at least five areas in which considerable work still needs to be done. First, there is a clear mismatch in the model between the theoretical content of some variables and the indicators available to measure them. This is particularly true of some of the indexes used in the homophily portion of the model, where concepts such as cultural similarity, political/institutional similarity, and regime similarity are measured with crude and often overlapping —i.e., collinear— variables.

Second, the model in truth is a selection model but not quite a strategic model such as those advocated by Signorino (1999, 2002) or Werner (2000*a*). The model fails to capture the interaction between third parties and dispute originators because it deals with events occurring *after* the inception of a conflict. While one may speculate formally about how those interactions may take place, there rarely is sufficient evidence to test those speculations empirically. It is not exactly known, for instance, how power relations between disputants and third parties change after the beginning of a war since we do not have sufficiently fine-grained indicators of

¹⁷Arguably, shared IGO membership may be more likely to elicit collective, IGO-sponsored interventions rather than individual states' interventions. Before it is concluded that IGO fail to create common identities and are ineffective conflict managers, it is important to point out that the present data are not adequate to address such issues, since they exclusively focus on individual states' joining actions.

capability shifts during the course of a conflict. The present attempt to incorporate indicators of economic ties into the model largely failed because those measures often become unavailable after a conflict starts.

Third, the research design has some shortcomings because of its inability to capture perfectly the multilateral nature of those conflicts that involve more than three states. That is, the triadic research design does not fully match the complex evolution of multilateral MIDs. As previously discussed, this shortcoming is partially compensated by the fact that the data allow one to know the exact targets of a third party's actions and to account for multiple interventions by the same third party against multiple targets in the context of the same dispute. Nonetheless, this solution is far from optimal.

Fourth, in truth, the model addresses and ameliorates most of the selections biases of previous models of joining behavior, but it does not completely eliminate them. After all, the interventions recorded in the data set occur only in the context of conflicts that have already become militarized. Interventions occurring in situations that never escalate to the level of a militarized interstate dispute fail to appear in the analysis. The inclusion of such data is highly desirable. Yet, it would involve the investigation of the entire history of all possible state dyads for the past sixty-or-so years. This is not impossible. But it would require enormous amounts of time and resources beyond the ability of a single or a few researchers.

Finally, much ado has been made in this chapter and in previous chapters about the difference between militarized and non-militarized interventions, and about the problems arising by considering one but not the other. Yet, the present analysis has combined militarized and non-militarized third parties' actions without discerning

between them. Would the findings proposed here still hold if non-militarized interventions are analyzed separately? Are the effects of opportunity and willingness variables exactly the same for the two forms of third party interventions? Or are there variations between the two types of joining behavior? And what factors shape a third party's choice of an intervention technique over another? These are questions that have bearing for the opportunity and willingness approach to joining behavior. These questions are addressed next.

CHAPTER 5

Beyond the Military/Non-military Divide: Selecting Intervention Technique

5.1 Introduction

When we look at non-military interventions in addition to militarized third parties' participation, a different view of joining behavior different from what is commonly found in the conflict literature emerges. The opportunity and willingness framework and the inclusion of non-military intervention have shown that, contrary to most existing explanations of joining behavior, third parties also look at similarities and dissimilarities with the disputants in choosing when and how to intervene. Theories of joining behavior that center almost exclusively around balance of power hypotheses and third parties' strategic calculations neither tell the whole story nor provide the only model of intervention. Homophily, or lack thereof, shapes third parties' decisions. Homophily and balance-of-power/strategic considerations are not mutually exclusive sources of alignment choices.

However, the results emerging from this approach may be driven by the fact that the preceding analysis compounded militarized and non-militarized third party actions without distinguishing among them. The model presented earlier predicts whether an intervention occurs or does not occur, and which side of a conflict a third party chooses. The model does not take into account whether the intervention was militarized or non-militarized. Consequently, the model addresses the question of the relative impact of the two sub-models of state preference formation — homophily

and strategic/rational choice— on third party's decisions only in a rudimentary way. Disaggregating interventions by their actual type can lead to a richer insight about the conditions under which homophily considerations weigh more heavily and the conditions in which strategic/rational considerations play a larger role.

At an even more basic level, the disaggregation of militarized and non militarized interventions can shed more light on the usefulness of the opportunity and willingness approach for the study of joining behavior. This theoretical framework can be extended beyond the prediction of the occurrence of interventions. The model suggests when third parties can intervene and which side they will take. This application raises hypotheses about which opportunity and willingness factors are more likely to promote military interventions vis-a-vis non-military ones. The rather simple intuition is that military interventions are more difficult than non-military ones and require a higher degree of both opportunity and commitment. If we conceive opportunity and willingness as latent variables underlying intervention, a higher threshold for both will have to be passed before a military intervention takes place. Thus, certain characteristics of a third party and the environment surrounding it should increase its opportunities for military intervention. Similarly, traits of a relationship between a third party and a combatant that increase a joiner's strategic or "affective" proximity toward that state should increase its willingness to commit itself militarily.

This chapter of the project proceeds in the following order. The first section discusses the issue of different intervention techniques as foreign policy alternatives on a joiner's "menu for choice." It extends the willingness and opportunity model to the study of intervention type and develops hypotheses about the relative tendency of third parties to resort to military or non-military techniques. The second

section discusses methodological issues related to the estimation of a model that may effectively predict the selection of specific intervention techniques. Section three includes the estimation of a series of alternative empirical models predicting the form –or type– of partisan interventions. Although these models fail to meet the ideal estimation approach, they provide consistency in the empirical results. Thus, they allow to draw conclusions about the selection of different forms of intervention. The final section further discusses the relevance of these finding for research on joining behavior and concludes.

5.2 Techniques of Militarized and Non-militarized Intervention

The unitary model of third party intervention previously outlined rests on the –rather simplistic– notion that joiners can use either military or non-military intervention techniques in order to affect the outcome of an ongoing dispute. Bringing non-military interventions into the picture represents a step forward compared to pre-existing analyses, which have focused generally either on militarized techniques or economic sanctions separately but never simultaneously. Separate, independent analyses of military interventions and economic sanctions are important, and their significance for the study of international conflict should not be downplayed. Yet, the validity of this type of analyses depends on the unstated assumptions that joiners evaluate the possibility to apply either military or economic pressures as if they were unrelated foreign policy options. More specifically, it is indirectly assumed that potential third parties face simple dichotomous choices: “economic sanctions–no intervention” or “military intervention–no intervention.”

In reality, the menu for choice for a potential joiner is more complex than that. It is plausible to imagine potential joiners asking themselves questions such as “Shall

I signal my hostile (or friendly) intention first? Or shall I intervene decisively with force from the start?" Or "Are economic sanctions (or support) more cost-effective than military intervention?" Or again "Is my ally (or friend) worth the price of military engagement? Or am I going to be perceived as soft and undecided if I only employ diplomatic and economic pressures?" Some of the questions have been addressed formally in various deterrence and informational models of international conflict (see, for instance Kilgour and Zagare 1991; Morrow 1994; Fearon 1994; Werner 2000*a*). Lack of data on non-military interventions has often been the main obstacle preventing the empirical tests of some of these puzzles. Even more important is that existing theories of foreign policy substitutability have warned us against assuming that (1) decision-makers options always come as a series of dichotomous choices between a certain foreign policy option or no action, and (2) these sets of dichotomous choices are independent of one another (Most and Starr 1984, 1989). Rather, most decision-making models suggest that states are likely to weigh the potential costs and benefits of a variety of alternatives before settling for the option that is most appropriate to achieve the objective at hand. The evaluation of alternative foreign policy options may be done more or less rationally, but few or no approaches question whether such decisions actually take place at all.

What factors shape a third party's choice of a particular intervention technique, then? Again, the opportunity and willingness approach provides a useful framework for trying to answer this question in a novel fashion. Indeed, the opportunity and willingness framework was originally conceived to investigate the issue of substitutability between different foreign policy options (Most and Starr 1984, 1989). The obvious contribution is that states will implement those foreign policies for

which they have sufficient means and which pass an unspecified willingness threshold. Opportunity factors restrict the menu for choice for some states. Willingness components help states discriminate between those policies that are costly and require a high degree of commitment and policies that are less costly and potentially reversible.

With regard to joining behavior, a state's foreign policy options can be approximately modeled first as a decision between non-intervention and intervention on either side of the conflict, then as a decision between several intervention techniques. The actual decision in the mind of foreign policy leaders surely does not take place in such a sequentially mechanistic way. Nonetheless, the unified model of third party intervention proposed earlier attempts to preserve the logic inherent in the process by sorting out the necessary and sufficient conditions of intervention. Thus, the successive step in the decisional logic concerning joining behavior implies the integration of intervention techniques into the existing model. Following the willingness and opportunity framework, it is possible to hypothesize that the more costly the intervention, the greater the degree of willingness required of a third party ---assuming that the opportunity for a certain type of intervention exists. Intervention techniques were distinguished as diplomatic, economic, and military in Chapter 3. It was also earlier assumed that military techniques were the most expensive among the three, followed by economic techniques. Working from within the opportunity and willingness framework, we can hypothesize more specifically that the greater the strategic or homophily-based proximity between a third and its preferred side in a conflict, the greater the chance that the third party will resort to expensive intervention techniques in support of that side. If, instead, Kim (1991) is correct in stating that joiners are more likely to intervene in order to punish

enemies, it is possible that the lower the strategic or homophily-based proximity between a third and the least preferred side in a conflict, the greater the chance that the third party will resort to expensive intervention techniques against that side. The two hypotheses are not mutually incompatible. Rather, they may just represent opposite sides of the same coin.

However, not all options will be equally available to all states. Although some states meet the basic opportunity conditions necessary for intervention, they may not have all possible intervention techniques at their disposal. Upon deciding to intervene and the side with which to align themselves, some third parties may find their menu for choice constrained to a limited set of alternatives. For instance, limited military capabilities may restrict their options to resort to diplomatic or economic intervention. Or limited economic leverage vis-a-vis the combatants may reduce their set of choices to diplomatic or military means. Or again, conflicts that are particularly violent may induce the necessity to have an immediate impact and may make it necessary for third parties to rule out diplomatic or economic means. Reprising the opportunity hypotheses developed earlier, it is possible to expect that the probability of progressively costlier forms of intervention will be directly proportional to a third's capabilities, status, and proximity to a conflict, and to a conflict's various measures of virulence (hostility, presence of major power combatants, reciprocation, and territorial claim).

Thus, introducing third parties' intervention techniques allows us to extend further the hypotheses about joining behavior advanced in the preceding chapters. Looking at militarized and non-militarized interventions together produces unbiased estimates of the effects of opportunity and willingness on both the likelihood of intervention and the alignment choices of a state. Further distinguishing between

diplomatic, economic, and military interventions allows us to test hypotheses concerning: first, the existence of differences among foreign policy alternatives for third parties; second, the strength of a third party's preferences; and, third, the impact of possibilistic factors on the foreign policy alternatives available.

The general selection model based on the willingness and opportunity framework proposed earlier saw the intervention decision as the result of the latent variable "opportunity" and a third party's choice to align itself with either side—Side B was arbitrarily chosen for the estimation of the empirical model—as the result of the effects of the latent variable "willingness." The model can be extended to incorporate decisions concerning intervention techniques is extend by an additional selection branch . At this stage a third party selects a specific intervention techniques depending on the means available and the relative strength of its strategic or politico-ideological similarity/dissimilarity with either side in a militarized interstate dispute. Graphically, the dynamic of the interventions technique selection can be modeled as shown in Figure 5.1.

The first branch in Figure 5.1 is analogous to the first decision-stage proposed in Chapter 4 and presented in Figure 4.1. Here, based on opportunity constraints, potential third parties select themselves out or into a militarized dispute. Those states opting for intervention, must decide whether they will side with generic state A or state B. This choice leads third parties either to node A or B in the figure. In previous analysis, this decision was modeled as the result of willingness factors based on a combination of homophily-based and strategic/rational preferences. Having reached node A or B, a joiner must now select between three basic available techniques: *diplo* (diplomatic); *eco* (economic); *mil* (military). Again, not of all this options will be available to all third parties, and the selection of any one of them




Figure 5.1: Model of Third Party's Technique Selection

will largely depend on a joiner's willingness to commit itself to the conflict. Thus, while the joining and alignment decisions were shaped, respectively, by opportunity and willingness considerations, *both* opportunity and willingness should affect the selection of a specific intervention technique.

It cannot be repeated often enough that the above representation is nothing more than a very crude model of the actual decision process in which third parties engage. The model should be interpreted as an approximation of the set of decisions that shape joining behavior rather than a literal depiction of such a behavior. In reality, third party states do not approach the decision to join an ongoing conflict in a such a clean, sequential manner. Very likely, the decision to join, the alignment decision, and the technique selection decision overlap to a great extent —often to the point

of being undistinguishable from one another, at least in the mind of a foreign policy decision-maker. However, if one could artificially disentangle the various elements that ultimately enter in what we label as “joining behavior,” one would probably find the various dimensions —intervention, alignment, and technique— are weighed roughly in the same sequence proposed above and, roughly, according to the opportunity and willingness factors proposed in various chapters.

5.3 Testing a Model of Intervention Technique Selection

Although it is a crude simplification, Figure 5.1 presents a rather involved model of third party intervention which can strain a researcher’s ability to estimate it empirically. A variety of difficulties emerge when one tries to test the implications of the model presented above. Some of these difficulties are practical. Others, instead, emerge from a mismatch between the theoretical model and the available empirical models. First and foremost is the fact that the theoretical model requires that one incorporates several sequential, yet overlapping selection steps. While sample selection models for discrete outcomes are becoming more widespread in the study of international politics, they still contain inherent limitations (Reed 2000; Signorino 2002). More specifically, it is difficult to extend them beyond a two-step choice set (Greene 2003).

Second, in addition to having multiple decision stages, this more complex version of the intervention model postulates that there are more than two plausible alternatives at the final node of the decision tree. One could simplify things by focusing only on those third parties who actually intervened and by adopting simultaneous equation models like those employed in Chapter Four. Yet, the presence of multiple

alternatives at the final stage complicates both the estimation and interpretation of those models that may fit this type of situation¹

Third, the model illustrated above presents at its third stage a choice between multiple related alternatives. The alternatives available to a third party—diplomatic, economic, and military intervention—are hypothesized to be connected to one another in two ways. (A) The choices made by a hypothetical third party who chooses to take sides with, for instance, Side B are not independent of the choices available if it were instead to choose Side A. We have seen that the willingness components that express both proximity to one side and enmity with the other side equally matter in shaping a third party's alignment choice. (B) Although theories of foreign policy substitutability may lead one to expect that the military, economic, and diplomatic options are independent of one another, that expectation is likely to be unrealistic. The probability that a third party will choose, for instance, the military option may not be independent of the presence or absence of a diplomatic or economic technique.

Regardless of whether we assume that military, economic, and diplomatic techniques are equivalent alternatives or options expressing increasing level of commitment toward a certain disputant or outcome, many of the most commonly used statistical models are inadequate. The popular multinomial logit models, for instance, are appropriate for situations in which the dependent variable is categorical and multichotomous. Yet, they all rest on the assumption that disturbances are independent and homoscedastic (Greene 2003, 724). In substantive terms, this assumption translates into the expectation that the probability of a certain outcome, given a set of alternatives, is independent on the remaining probabilities. This is the

¹See Greene (2003, 714-15)'s aforementioned discussion on multivariate probit models.

aforementioned “independence from irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) property which is at the foundation of many maximum likelihood models. Ordered logit/probit models are also appropriate if one accepts the assumption of an underlying degree of commitment that increases if one moves from diplomatic to military intervention techniques. Yet again, these models can predict the effects of opportunity and willingness of the probability that a third party will choose a certain technique in support (or against) of a disputant the theoretical model without considering the degree of enmity (or proximity) to the other disputant. That is, it is difficult to account for the fact that the probabilities of selection of military economic, and diplomatic techniques are not independent of one another. It is even more difficult to account for the fact that the probability that one will choose any one of the three techniques in support (or against) Side A is not independent of the probability that one will simultaneously choose one of these techniques in in order to antagonize (or support) Side B.

Selection ordered probit models are the empirical models that comes closest to mirroring the dynamic presented in Figure 5.1. These models incorporate at least one initial selection stage while predicting the the occurrence of ordered outcomes at the following stage. Although statistical software designed to implement such models exists, their convergence is often difficult to obtain and their results are sometimes unstable.² Further difficulties arise from the fact that the model suggested above has not one, but two selection stages. Because of these practical limitations, it was possible to estimate only the last two branches of the theoretical model. I originally attempted to estimate a multivariate probit model predicting a

²To my knowledge, LIMDEP is the only statistical package explicitly designed for the estimation of discrete choice models of this type. However, even with LIMDEP these models often produce stable (unbiased) results only under optimal circumstances. See, for instance, various exchanges at <http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2003-03>.

the probability that a third party would select a diplomatic, economic, or military technique given its decision to take sides with either state originator in a dispute. Such models can be estimated through GHK (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) simulated maximum likelihood with a relatively straightforward statistical routine³. Nonetheless, such a routine is so computationally intensive that the original data matrix with more than 300,000 observations allowed me to accommodate only a very limited version of the willingness–opportunity model, it did not always converge, and it produced unstable estimates.

An alternative solution is to resort to a specific family of models that allows one to tackle at least –although imperfectly– some of these issues. Unlike other logit models for multiple outcomes, conditional logit models allow one to relax the assumption of homoscedasticity of disturbances across different choice sets. Models of this type do take into consideration the fact that probabilities *across* two choice sets are not independent of one another. Assuming that the IIA assumption holds among different alternatives *within* a specific choice set, conditional logit models estimate that probability that a specific technique will be chosen conditional on the probability that a third party has joined Side A or Side B in a dispute. The research design, operationalization of the variables, and results from the estimation of this model are discussed in the following section.

5.4 Research Design and Results

As discussed earlier, there is no known model that may estimate the full model of joining behavior as presented in Figure 5.1 because of a variety of interrelated econometric shortcomings. The econometric model that best approximates the

³A **mvprobit** routine in Stata was employed. On this, see Cappellari and Jenkins (2003)

proposed theory of third party intervention is conditional logit. However, conditional logit —unlike bivariate probit used in Chapter 4— requires a data structure based on the choices available to the decision-makers rather than on the individuals (states) making the decision. This, and the fact that the first branch in the decision-making tree is not being estimated, require a change in the data structure. First of all, because states who choose not to intervene are no longer included in the analysis, those observations are dropped from the data set. Second, actual joiners now must be presented with three options —diplomatic, economic, and military technique— each constituting a new observation —i.e., a new data line. Thus, with this data structure, a new dependent variable is coded —labeled CHOSEN— which assumes a value of 1 if a third party selects a specific technique, 0 otherwise. The “old” dependent variable from the bivariate probit model in Chapter 4 —the dichotomous Side A/Side B— becomes now the dependent variable for the initial branch of the decision-making process. The manipulation of the data set necessary for setting up a structure suitable for conditional logit estimation produces 7584 observations.

Conditional logit requires the presence of choice-specific independent variables in order to be able to discriminate among discrete alternatives. While most of the independent variables used in Chapter 4 remain unchanged, some of the third party-specific and dispute-specific variables had to be recoded in order to introduce within-group variation. In particular, opportunity covariates had to be redefined as follows:

1. **Third Party Capabilities:** now expressed as the logged ratio of a third party’s material capabilities and either side A’s or Side B’s capabilities;

2. **Distance:** no longer the shortest distance between a third party and either disputant; it is now the logged distance between a third party and Side A and a third party and Side B, depending on the branch of the model;
3. **Territory:** still a dummy variable but it is now coded as 1 if either Side A or Side B have advanced a territorial claim;
4. **Contiguity:** now coded as an ordinal variable ranging from 1 (shared border) to 5 (no contiguity) between third party and Side A and between a third party and Side B;
5. **Hostility:** no longer the general hostility level of a dispute, but the hostility level of each dispute originator; its scale is the same as in Chapter 4;
6. **Reciprocation:** operationalized as a dummy variable coded 1 if the state targeted in the dispute reciprocates the aggression.

Because the willingness covariates change with the different branches of the model, their operationalization does not require specific changes.

Table 5.1 reports the results of a series of conditional logit models with opportunity and willingness variables estimated first separately, then together. Although the coefficients are not immediately interpretable, it is evident just by looking at their standard errors and statistical significance that this formulation produces estimates that are also consistent with both the original expectations of the model and findings reported in Chapter 4. A battery of Hausman tests between different specifications of the conditional logit model—the results of which are not reported here—confirms that possible violations of the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives assumption is not an issue here (see Hausman and McFadden 1984).

Among the opportunity variables, it is apparent that a third party's capabilities, the disputants' level of hostility, contiguity, and distance retain their predictive power. Most of the willingness covariates do perform as expected. With some unsurprising differences between variables expressing willingness toward Side A and variables expressing willingness towards Side B, it seems that the disputants' capabilities, similarity in foreign policy interests, the presence of alliances, similarity in regime types between mature democracies, and cultural similarities weigh in a third party's choice of intervention techniques. Contrary to previous results, it seems that international organization ties also affect such a decision.

Conditional logit estimation makes it possible to assess which opportunity and willingness factors significantly affect the choice of specific intervention techniques. However, it remains difficult to establish in which direction specific willingness and opportunity covariates operate. Parameter estimates of multinomial choice models—the model that the conditional logit model most closely resembles—are often difficult to interpret. The interpretation of conditional logit parameter estimates is even less straightforward. The difficulty is amplified by the fact that conditional logit does not fully capture the underlying—and unobserved—growing commitment suggested in the theoretical model. The theoretical model postulated that the tendency of third parties to resort to progressively more expensive forms of interventions should be proportional to their willingness to aid or punish a disputant, given the available opportunities. Conditional logit suggests whether third parties see real differences between different policy alternatives, but it does not allow us to evaluate the correctness of the assumption about the varying costs between these alternatives.

Table 5.1: Conditional Logit Estimates of Effects of Opportunity and Willingness on Third Parties' Decisions to Adopt Specific Intervention Techniques, 1946-2001

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.
Third Party Capabilities	.376***	.028			.222***	.067
Contiguity	-.137***	.035			-.094*	.044
Distance	.176***	.025			.174***	.035
Hostility Level	-.133	.070			-.218**	.083
Reciprocation	-.286	.585			-.161	.466
Territorial Claim	-1.052	.886			-1.100	.916
Capabilities _A			-13.381***	1.323	-8.147***	1.949
Capabilities _B			-11.872***	2.908	-5.270	3.328
Alliance _A			.545	.292	.419	.309
Alliance _B			1.380***	.305	1.031***	.320
Affinity _A			1.298***	.220	1.103***	.228
Affinity _B			.445*	.195	.312	.203
Regime Similarity _A			1.369***	.219	1.105***	.226
Regime Similarity _B			.733***	.217	.486*	.228
Civilization _A			.024	.208	-.001	.216
Civilization _B			.836***	.222	.864***	.240
IGO ties _A			.007	.007	.023**	.008
IGO ties _B			.015	.008	.035***	.009
Log Likelihood	-2072.9503		-1941.3109		-1906.8439	
Prob.> χ^2	.0000		.000		.0000	
Number of obs.	7584		7584		7584	

As discussed in the previous section, an alternative —although less efficient— way to translate this assumption into a model that can be estimated empirically is through some other model for ordered discrete choice not based on sample selection. This approach is less efficient because the estimates produced will not be conditional on a third party's previous decision concerning intervention and alignment. Rather than a simultaneous decision-making model, a standard model for ordered choices —ordered logit or ordered probit— allows one to only estimate a one-shot decision about intervention techniques in which non-interventions will be either excluded or considered as failures to decide about a specific technique.

To compensate for these shortcomings, models for discrete ordered choices do offer some advantages. Ordered logit and probit models are built around a latent regression that estimates the underlying probability of observing a certain outcome within a set of discrete but ordinal outcomes (Long 1997; Greene 2003). A significant difference between ordered probit and other models for discrete choices is the greater ability of the former to handle issues of heteroskedasticity (?). Because the main hypotheses raised here do imply some degree of heteroskedasticity in the data—the very notion of opportunity and willingness implies that a subset of the observations has a greater variance in their choices than other observations—these types of models can be used to estimate at least one of the last two branches of the technique selection tree. In addition, unlike multinomial or conditional logit models, they face fewer constraints with regard to the IIA assumption.

An advantage of applying order probit analysis to the data at hand is that they do not necessitate a choice-based data structure like previously employed models. That is, these models can still predict the observation of specific intervention techniques without necessitating the presence of choice-specific variables. They can take advantage of the third party-based structure of the original data. Thus, the data structure is reverted to its original format, from choice-based to individual-based, and so is the operationalization of those opportunity covariates that was changed to accommodate choice-specific variation.⁴ This data structure simplifies things considerably. The dependent variable is now coded as follows: observations where a third party chose to side with Side A are coded as 0; diplomatic interventions on the side of Side B are coded as 1; economic and military interventions in support of

⁴See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the operationalization of the independent variables.

Side B are coded as 2 and 3 respectively.⁵ As indicated earlier, a selection ordered probit model capable of estimating a first-stage process of self-selection into a dispute would be ideal. Yet, it is too costly both computationally and practically. The ordered probit models estimated below, therefore, should not be taken as reflecting the theoretical model at its fullest. Rather, they represent empirical compromises the goal of which is to provide further evidence that hopefully will corroborate what found through the conditional logit estimation. Table 5.2 shows the coefficients for three ordered probit models. Models 1 and 2 estimate the effects of opportunity and willingness covariates separately on a third party's choice of intervention technique in support of Side B. Model 3 estimates the effects of opportunity and willingness covariates together on a third party's choice of intervention technique in support of B. Only instances in which intervention has taken place are considered in these models.

The battery of ordered probit models presented above falls short of the ideal multi-stage ordered approach required by the theoretical model. This is particularly evident in the fact that opportunity and willingness covariates do not behave as they did earlier when included in the same model. Nonetheless, this series of models still offers some useful insight into the factors leading third party states to adopt certain intervention techniques and into the ability of the opportunity-willingness model to predict the impact of such factors. Looking at the opportunity factors first, one immediately notices that these variables behave as expected only if they are analyzed separately from the willingness factors (Model 2). Only reciprocation

⁵It is important to reiterate that Side B is chosen for coding the dependent variable because of coding rules. The coding rules guiding the process of data collection established that the disputant with the lower country code should be coded as being on Side A. As a result, the United States, whose country code is 2, is always on Side A. The constant presence of the US on side A may systematically skew the results one would get if Side A were chosen as the "target side."

Table 5.2: Ordered Probit Estimates of Effects of Opportunity and Willingness on Third Parties' Decisions to Adopt Specific Intervention Techniques in Support of Side B, 1946-2001

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coeff.	St.Err.	Coeff.	St.Err.	Coeff.	St.Err.
Third Party Capabilities			1.203*	.604	-.067	.695
Major Power			-.112	.097	-.062	.124
Major Power Dispute			-.296	1.046	8.970***	.328
Hostility Level			-.052	.027	-.049	.032
Reciprocation			.306**	.113	.389**	.130
Distance			2.97e-06	.00001	-.00001	.00002
Contiguity			.235***	.072	.063	.088
Territory			.206	.124	-.117	.166
Capabilities _A	2.88***	.543			2.664***	.595
Capabilities _B	-3.259*	1.430			-4.017**	1.427
Alliance _A	-.436**	.152			-.436**	.154
Alliance _B	.518***	.122			.537***	.128
Affinity _A	-.211 *	.092			-.226**	.096
Affinity _B	-.001	.095			-.081	.112
Regime Similarity _A	-.416***	.107			-.440***	.115
Regime Similarity _B	.636***	.107			.668***	.110
Civilization _A	.066	.101			.034	.102
Civilization _B	.253**	.104			.203	.108
IGO ties _A	-.010**	.004			-.009*	.004
IGO ties _B	.008*	.004			.009*	.004
cut 1	-.221	.104	-.1956	.073	-.257	.165
cut 2	1.137	.115	1.008	.076	1.112	.172
cut 3	1.283	.117	1.140	.076	1.260	.173
Log Likelihood	-1079.697		-1495.9655		-1071.3881	
Prob.> χ^2	.0000		.0001		.0000	
Number of obs.	1070		1326		1070	

behaves consistently across models. The expectation that a third party capabilities will increase the probability of costlier interventions is supported only in Model 2. Similarly, expectations about the role of contiguity are supported only as long as willingness factors are excluded. Distance from the conflict, instead, is non-significant. In Model 2 its sign is even in the “wrong” direction. Equally surprising

is that major power status has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of that more expensive intervention techniques will be used. Model 3 suggests that, if a dispute involves at least a major power, the odds that some costly intervention technique will be used increase.

The inconsistency of results concerning the opportunity variables is of some concerns, especially in light of the fact that the conditional logit model in Table 5.1 indicates that opportunity factors help third parties distinguish between different intervention techniques. It is possible that the assumption of ordinality of outcomes is simply incorrect. The same intervention technique may involve different costs for different joiners. To some third parties, economic interventions may involve greater costs than military interventions. This points to a potential violation of the parallel regression assumption that underlies models for ordered outcomes (Long 1997; Greene 2003). Alternatively, the lack of consistency in the estimate for the opportunity covariates suggests that possibilistic and probabilistic factors play a greater role in selecting those states who can intervene in a conflict from those who cannot. But they may play a smaller role in determining the selection of progressively costlier techniques. States who select themselves into a dispute may have sufficient means to choose any of the techniques available to them. The surrounding contextual conditions are less constraining in the selection of a technique than in the decision to enter a conflict. For those states who can actually get involved in an ongoing conflict, willingness plays a stronger role in the selection of a specific technique.

A superficial look at the willingness covariates highlights the same mixture of homophily and rational/strategic factors in shaping joiners' that shapes a third party's choice of a side in a conflict. Even with regard to technique choice, there

is evidence that states tend to balance power, as the likelihood of higher level techniques goes up economic intervention goes up with the degree of capabilities of the opposing side. The comparative analysis of the effects of political similarity and affinity on foreign policy preferences further suggests that the selection of an intervention technique depends in equal parts on the presence of a friend on one side and the existence of an enemy on the opposite side. Third parties are more likely to spend more resources in order to balance against stronger enemies who are fighting against their allies, against states with whom they share foreign policy preferences and IGO ties, and against states who just “look” like them with regard to regime type. Again, cultural/civilization similarity behaves inconsistently, achieving significance only when the willingness factors are analyzed in isolation. Very likely, the operationalization for this variable is inadequate and does not fully reflect the complexity of the idea it is supposed to capture.

With these weaknesses in mind, Table 5.3 provides a summary description the predicted probabilities associated with each outcome of the dependent variable estimated from the ordered probit Model 3 —i.e., the full model. Table 5.4, instead, shows discrete changes in probabilities for each independent variable in Model 3. Because most of the opportunity and willingness variables are either dichotomous or perfectly continuous, a graphical illustration of changes in the predicted probabilities may be deceiving (Long 1997, 135–36). Displaying discrete changes in probabilities is more illustrative in these circumstances. The reported changes are changes in probabilities estimated with covariates held constant at the means for continuous variables and at their mode for discrete variables. The probabilities give a more intuitive sense of the magnitude of the change for each independent variable. Generally, they confirm the interpretation of the coefficients presented

Table 5.3: Predicted Probabilities of Selection of Intervention Techniques in Support of Side B

	Probability of Outcome			
	No Intervention	Diplomatic	Economic	Military
Minimum	.0127077	.0393788	.0003647	.0005463
Mean	.3931347	.4158776	.0318807	.159107
Maximum	.9597102	.5068055	.058869	.7632623
Range	.9470025	.4674267	.0585043	.762716
Standard Deviation	.2149325	.0983949	.0171023	.1409228

earlier. Changes in probabilities for the statistically significant variables are of particular interest. The probability of military intervention increases by about 25 percent from the baseline through the range of capabilities for Side A, confirming the tendency of third parties to balance power against the stronger disputants. The presence of a common alliance with Side B increases the probability of military intervention by 15 percent. Regime similarity between democracies increases the likelihood of military support by about 20 percent. Similarly, the probability of military intervention increases by about 20 percent across the range of values for common IGO ties between a third party and Side B. Among the opportunity variables, the presence of a major power in a dispute turns the probability of military intervention into certainty.

The relevance of these findings can be easily overstated given the mismatch between theoretical claims and the empirical models offered here. Yet, they provide at least some marginal support for the usefulness of the opportunity and willingness approach as a framework for understanding joining behavior. Previous research has proposed different frameworks for analyzing different dimensions of joining behavior—i.e., intervention and alignment. The opportunity and willingness approach offers a comprehensive model that incorporates such dimensions while adding a new one; that is, intervention technique. With due exceptions (Werner and Lemke 1997),

Table 5.4: Discrete Change in Probability of Selection of Intervention Technique in Support of Side B

	No Interv.	Diplom.	Econ.	Milit.	Significant?
Baseline	.315960	.497698	.036978	.149363	
Third Party Capabilities	.008698	-.002201	-.000869	-.00563	No
Major Power	.022045	-.004693	-.002235	-.015111	No
Major Power Dispute	.000	.000	.000	1.00	Yes
Hostility Level	.087521	-.020084	-.008790	-.058654	No
Reciprocation	-.14831	.062102	.013419	.072791	Yes
Distance	.048961	-.013238	-.004850	-.030874	No
Contiguity	-.02275	.006325	.002851	.014178	No
Territory	.042703	-.01298	-.004166	-.02555	No
Capabilities _A	-.25787	-.012559	.025841	.244167	Yes
Capabilities _B	.279693	-.139123	-.023336	-.117233	Yes
Alliance _A	.166902	-.072729	-.014885	-.079287	Yes
Alliance _B	-.161241	-.014086	.016759	.158624	Yes
Affinity _A	.156306	-.031375	-.01571	-.109223	Yes
Affinity _B	-.054377	-.011878	-.005495	-.037	No
Regime Similarity _A	.168789	-.073119	-.01503	-.079921	Yes
Regime Similarity _B	-.190312	-.035005	.019359	.205961	Yes
Civilization _A	-.012268	.002771	.001238	.008234	No
Civilization _B	-.068546	.00911	.007095	.052343	No
IGO ties _A	.351259	-.147768	-.030627	-.172853	Yes
IGO ties _B	-.231345	.014412	.0234373	.193497	Yes

previous research largely emphasized power relations and the role of alliances as determinants of military joining behavior. The opportunity and willingness approach expands on that view by suggesting that (1) homophily factors also matter in joining behavior; and (2) all sorts of joining decision are shaped by consideration not just on the desire to support a friend, but also on the desire to punish or balance against enemies on the other side of the conflict.

5.5 Conclusion

Previous research on joining behavior has failed to address the issue of intervention technique selection by third parties. Joiners have been assumed to resort exclusively to military interventions. More careful analysis of joining behavior activities—as presented in chapters 3 and 4—reveals that third parties employ a variety of techniques when they become involved in ongoing interstate conflicts. A variety of diplomatic and economic options can be used as alternatives to military intervention. The opportunity and willingness framework is useful for shedding light on questions concerning third parties' choice of alternative intervention tactics. Faced with the presence of several substitutable means, third parties seem to base their decisions on a variety of opportunity and willingness factors.

It was originally hypothesized that both opportunity and willingness could affect the probability that third parties would choose increasingly costlier intervention techniques. This expectation proved to be only partially correct. Opportunity factors seem to determine what intervention options are available to states, but they seem to be largely irrelevant in determining the probability that expensive forms of intervention will be chosen. Willingness appears to be a stronger determinant of the propensity to adopt increasingly costlier and more dangerous intervention techniques. To the extent that the assumption that military forms of intervention are more expensive and riskier than other forms is accepted, the result of the ordered probit model suggest that joiners are more likely to invest resources to balance against stronger states and to support allies with similar regime types.

The estimates of the effects of the willingness variables are robust across different model specifications. However, the overall robustness of the results is affected by the

limitations imposed by the empirical techniques available. The various stages of the general model of third party intervention as described earlier cannot be estimated simultaneously. It becomes increasingly difficult to evaluate the extent to which the choice to intervene on one side of the conflict influences a third party's decision to commit a certain amount of resources in support of its partner. Conditional logit models suggest that both opportunity and willingness play a role in third parties' perception of the existence of different intervention options. However, these models fail to point out specifically toward which intervention technique third parties may lean. By incorporating the assumption that some forms of intervention are costlier than others, ordered probit models provide relatively greater clarity. They indicate strategic and homophily-based (dis)similarities between a joiner and a disputant play a larger role in shaping the choice of riskier intervention techniques.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusions

6.1 Opportunity, Willingness, and Joining Behavior

Beginning with the realist concern with balancing and bandwagoning, studies about joining behavior have largely focused on the impact that third parties have on conflict as a whole. More recent bargaining approaches to the study of joining behavior have centered on the influence of third party intervention on the expectations and behavior of conflict initiators (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Werner 2000*a*; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2003). It has been generally assumed that realist views about power and security as the source of state preferences were on average correct. As a result, many investigations on joining behavior have revolved around tests of the balancing vs. bandwagoning controversy. Moreover, partly because of data availability, partly because of this inherent theoretical bias for power and security dimension of international politics, most existing studies of joining behavior have centered on military interventions in interstate conflicts, with a particular emphasis on wars. Within this context, scholars have tended to assume that hypotheses about third parties' military behavior in wars may be effectively extended to other forms of third party interference in conflicts of lower magnitude. Attention to power distribution and security concerns has shifted the focus away from the third parties themselves, their motivations, and their decisions. Few studies have centered on alternative processes of third party preference formation. Even fewer have centered on alternative techniques for joining ongoing conflicts. This study

has argued that these dimensions of the phenomenon of joining behavior are just as important as the impact that third parties have on conflict originators. They must be systematized and included in studies of conflict processes if we truly are to produce a unified theory of conflict initiation, evolution, and termination.

This research has offered several suggestions aimed at expanding our understanding of third party intervention and the chances to produce a more comprehensive theory of conflict. The first suggestion is to expand theories of joining behavior beyond the existing realist/systemic framework and beyond approaches that emphasize bargaining relations between conflict initiators. This involves re-directing our attention on the actual decision to join, even though that requires that we temporarily assume that such a decision is relatively independent on the actions of the actual combatants. Only if we begin to understand the motivations of third parties, we can start patching together a comprehensive view —bargaining or systemic— of the conflict phenomenon.

Focusing attention on the decision to intervene requires that we recast third party intervention not just as another conflict-related explanatory variable but as a more complex foreign policy issue to be explained. To this end, this project has suggested that the well-known opportunity and willingness framework of foreign policy decision-making can work effectively in identifying the sources of third parties' preference formation and in predicting their joining choices. Quoting Most and Starr (1989), opportunity and willingness work as a proto-theoretical framework of international politics that can encompass a large number of mid-range theories. The opportunity and willingness theme has underlined several works on joining behavior (see, for instance Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Werner and Lemke 1997; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2003). Such a framework is sufficiently

flexible to accommodate numerous and often conflicting hypotheses about the various components of opportunity and willingness. In particular, two theoretically opposed models of third parties' preference formation can be couched under the willingness label, one emphasizing instrumental, strategic sources of preferences; the other stressing various similarities between states—or homophily. Yet, regardless of how third parties' preferences take shape, no intervention can take place without the existence of an opportunity to intervene. A comprehensive model of joining behavior as a foreign policy decision must incorporate both aspects and take them into account simultaneously.

As an approach to foreign policy decision making in general and third party intervention in particular, the willingness and opportunity approach can be criticized as being too parsimonious and, consequently, too vague. Which foreign policy behavior cannot be explained in terms of willingness and opportunity? The statement that decision-makers act when they can and when they want may be seen by somebody as amounting to an untestable truism. The broad concepts of willingness and opportunity may work as catch-all categories that international relations scholars fill unsystematically and atheoretically with any explanatory variable that they intuitively believe to be related to their own idea of willingness and opportunity. The opportunity and willingness approach can be criticized as being so general that it falls in the category of those theories that are considered non-falsifiable in the popperian meaning of the term.

Although it is extremely general, the international politics the opportunity and willingness approach does not cross the line into the realm of useless non-falsifiability. Researchers have considerable freedom in assigning meaning and content to the concepts of willingness and opportunity. Most and Starr (1989)

themselves recognize that the empirical content of opportunity and willingness can change across different issue areas of international relations. Yet, this is to be interpreted as a strength of the approach rather than a weakness. In fact it is difficult to imagine for states' motivations and incentives for action to be shaped by the same facilitating or constraining factors across all of the actions that states must engage in by necessity in international politics. Rather than defining opportunity and willingness in an *ad hoc* manner, the task of international relations scholars is exactly that of understanding what factors enter in the decision-makers' own idea of opportunity and willingness. Because of the complexity and unpredictability of international politics, opportunity and willingness remain very useful and expedient tools for separating the possibilistic and probabilistic environmental factors affecting foreign policy decisions from the normative and/or strategic motivations of such choices.

Moreover, the opportunity and willingness approach is an effective framework for uncovering differences between the actions that originate from deliberate decision-making and internal process from those actions that originate from external stimuli. More specifically, with regard to joining behavior, the opportunity and willingness approach help us explain and predict interventions originated by a third party states and separate them from interventions that are, instead, initiated by the disputants. Just like the United States was dragged into World War II by Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, so third party states may be drawn into disputes against their own volition by the actions of both enemies or allies.

As suggested above, an important and challenging goal of this project has been to avoid an *ad hoc* articulation of the various components of opportunity and willingness. Sprout and Sprout (1969)' theory of environmental probabilism and possibilism and various takes on Most and Starr's view of their own theoretical framework already suggest a large portion of the individual components of opportunity and willingness (see Most and Starr 1980, 1984, 1989; Most, Starr and Siverson 1989; Siverson and Starr 1991). Greater freedom was taken in determining which components of willingness should belong to the homophily sub-model and to the strategic/rational choice sub-model. Such choices were, nonetheless, steeped in theory as much as possible. Expected utility theory and democratic peace theory served as theoretical referents for distinguishing rationalistic/strategic determinants of state actions from factors that originate from real or perceived proximity between a third party and the disputants.

It can be argued that this distinction between rational/strategic preferences and homophily preferences is artificial, and that the two approaches are not mutually incompatible. Rational choice, expected utility models do not specify the sources of decision-makers' utilities (Morrow 1994). Homophily toward some state may be in itself the source of the utilities that enter into a rational decision-making process. Yet, in international relations in general, and in the study of joining behavior in particular, the tendency has been to present these two approaches to the formation of state preferences as being either mutually exclusive or endogenous to one another. The debate about whether similar foreign policy preferences result from two states being similar, or two states become similar because they have similar foreign policy preferences is an ongoing one (see, for instance Siverson and Emmons 1991; Garztko 2000; Werner 2000*b*). This study is by no means meant to settle this debate.

But the empirical evidence presented suggests that strategic/rational preferences and homophily-based factors have effects independent of one another, and such effects often operate at cross-purpose. A democratic third party may indeed be more likely to share alliances and foreign policy preferences with a democratic disputant. Across different model specifications and variable operationalizations, robust evidence has emerged that the effect of proximity caused by shared regime and cultural traits is independent of that of alliances and foreign policy outlook. Nonetheless, questions concerning the extent of the overlap between homophily and rational approaches do not weaken the usefulness of opportunity and willingness framework for the understanding of the phenomenon of joining behavior.

Arguably, a richer and even more systematic definition of what constitutes opportunity and willingness represents an area for future research and improvement of the present model. It is particularly disappointing that not all measures of opportunity and willingness could be effectively included in the actual test of the hypotheses. The exclusion of trade variables and variables indicating institutional similarity between states are of particular concern. Trade and direct investment are a crucial component of states' strategic interests toward other states. Unfortunately, the state of existing data on trade and direct investment is not adequate for the present study. While data on dyadic trade exist for years in which pairs of states were at peace, the quality of those data sharply decline for conflict years. Lagging observations in order to recover information about trade before the onset of a conflict does not improve things. There seems to be a clear mismatch between the population of dyads for which trade data are available and the population of triads needed for the present analysis. As a result, missing data cause too many

observations to drop out of the analysis. The information lost by including trade data is not offset by the little knowledge gained in the process.

Similarly, the indicators employed to measure cultural similarity and intergovernmental organizations are not fully satisfactory. Here the issue is not so much the presence of missing data but the validity and reliability of the measures themselves. Cultural similarities were measured with a dichotomous variable indicating similarity between civilizations as collected by Henderson and Tucker (2001). This measure falls well short of capturing even a small portion of the larger idea it is meant to represent. It is not surprising that it often behaves inconsistently across different models. Common IGO ties are better measured than cultural traits. Yet this indicator is not satisfactory in that it assumes that all IGO ties matter equally across all dyads. In reality, there is a set of IGO memberships that is shared by all states in the international system. Most states, for example, are members of the United Nations and their associate agencies. As a result, the actual effect of common IGO ties on the likelihood of intervention and alignment choices is diluted by the presence of these universally shared connections. In reality some IGO ties may matter more than others. As Russett, Oneal and Davis (1998) suggest, it is the density of IGO connections that matters more than the actual number of those connections. Unfortunately, indicators of IGO connection density suffer the same problems of trade indicators: there is a mismatch between the population of dyads for which those data are available and the population of triads included in the present analysis. Attempts to employ measures of IGO membership density have led to a substantive loss of observations from the analysis. Although imperfect, a simple measure of common IGO ties allows, instead, to retain precious information that can be used to better assess the effect of other covariates.

Improving the quality of some of the opportunity and willingness measures is certainly an objective for future research. It is important for the different components of opportunity and willingness to be conceptualized and operationalized adequately in order to draw meaningful conclusions about the relative weight of opportunity and willingness. In addition, it is important that they are measured adequately in order to establish the relative contribution of strategic/rational and homophily factors to third parties' alignment decisions and selection of intervention techniques. Most efforts at the current stage were devoted to the collection of new information of the dependent variable(s). Having largely completed the process of data collection on military and non-military intervention, more attention is to be given to the specification of the independent variables in the future.

6.2 Non-military Interventions and Selection Issues

Issues of bias caused by inadequate sample selection or selection on the dependent variable, or both, have attracted much attention in recent years (Geddes 1990; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; King and Zeng 2002). Past studies of joining behavior have suffered from selection problems either because they excluded non-interventions, or because they focused exclusively on military interventions. A contribution of this study is the inclusion of non-military intervention in the analysis of joining behavior. The data presented and used throughout the previous chapters indicate that military interventions are a minor proportion of all interventions. Diplomatic and, to a minor extent, economic interventions are widely used by joiners.

The inclusion of diplomatic and economic interventions forces a researcher to reconsider basic issues concerning the opportunity of potential third parties to

intervene. Because geography and capabilities do not necessarily place limitations on diplomatic intervention techniques, it is necessary to incorporate in all models of joining behavior the possibility that all states may become active third parties. This expands the data matrix considerably, but prevents questionable restrictions of the population of potential interveners on the basis of some states' attributes—such as major power status or regional proximity. In this way it is possible to evaluate the actual effects of all opportunity variables rather than assume *a priori* that they have an impact on joining behavior.

After taking non-military interventions into account, it is possible to achieve greater confidence in the estimates of the effects of the opportunity and willingness covariates. One of the most stable results, for instance, was the finding that joiners tend to balance power against the stronger of two states involved in a dispute. We now know the finding to hold regardless of the intervention technique employed and the intensity of the conflict. At least some of the realist hypotheses about third states' military behavior in wars gain greater applicability—and therefore, strength—as they can be extended to a larger class of events and to a larger number of observations. A similar argument can be made about the effects of regime type and other homophily factor on third parties' preferences. While Werner and Lemke (1997) found support for the claim that states with similar regime traits take sides with one another, we now know that that argument can be expanded to all forms of interventions. We also know that regime similarities exercise a stronger pull on mature democratic states, and that dissimilarities with the side being targeted for intervention matter just as much. We further know that opportunity variables such as capability, contiguity, and distance still affect a third party's propensity to intervene at all levels of involvement. Results of this type matter because they

suggest that even non-military interventions can have an influence on the escalation and expansion of conflict, although these consequences still need to be explored.

Equally important is the fact that the inclusion of non-military interventions allows scholars of conflict to expand on bargaining theories of conflict in general and joining behavior in particular. With regard to theories of conflict, many scholars have modeled the impact of threats, promises, and commitments on states' decision to initiate or continue conflicts in the context of games of imperfect information (Fearon 1994; Morrow 1989; Werner 2000*a*). Few have pursued any empirical test of such models because of actual lack of the necessary data. With information on non-military interventions, formal scholars could proceed to verify the correctness of their predictions and eventually expand on their models.

However, the contribution of the inclusion of non-interventions and non-military interventions in the analysis of joining behavior should not be overstated. Although they improve the number and quality of the available information, the new data do not represent a perfect solution. Two limitations are especially evident. First, although they reduce selection bias, data on non-military intervention do not completely eliminate it. The data presented in Chapter 3 are in fact collected from a subset of dyads in the international system: those experiencing at least one militarized interstate dispute longer than one day. It is quite possible for these dyads to be characterized by a different baseline probability of experiencing third party interventions than other dyads. It is also possible that some of the dyads experiencing only one day-long MID or no MIDs did so because of non-militarized interventions by third parties deterred the potential combatants from escalating tension to the level of threat to use force, or above. Indeed, the research framework adopted for the collection of new data may have simply exposed a greater proportion of the

joining behavior “iceberg,” while the largest share of its body remains submerged. Nonetheless, the problem is in many respect analogous to that of collecting evidence about effective deterrence between two states alone. We can observe only instances of failed deterrence and a selectively biased proportion of cases in which we know deterrence worked. We fail to see cases in which deterrence worked perfectly, and no crisis ever arose. For this very reason, even if a researcher had the material and human resources necessary to investigate all dyads in the international system for all post-WWII years, that solution would still be imperfect. Given these practical constraints, even a small reduction reduction in sample and measurement bias may be more desirable than no reduction whatsoever.

A second limitation is that the new data on non-military interventions provide information about the behavior of third party states, but they do not provide information about the reaction of the disputants. Regardless of how meticulous and detailed the narratives of the dyads’ histories are, there often is not sufficient evidence to reconstruct the disputants’ specific reactions to each third party’s action. This prevents an analyst from evaluating the actual effectiveness of third parties’ interventions. Moreover, this prevents scholars of joining behavior from developing and testing models of strategic interactions between third parties and conflict originators, such as those advocated by Signorino (1999). Evidence supporting the greater empirical efficiency of strategic interaction models compared to simple selection models is still limited to simulated data (see Signorino 2002). Yet, all models of joining behavior would be considerably less biased if the disputants’ actions were included in the actual third party’s decision-making process.

Thus, Bueno de Mesquita (1981)’s and Werner (2000*a*)’s contentions about the effectiveness of joiners’ non-military actions must remain untested, at least for

the time being. It may not be *a priori* impossible to collect sufficiently detailed information about the reactions of conflict originators to individual actions by third parties. Yet, collecting such information would require an unwieldy amount of time and resources. And it still may not represent an ideal solution, because actions and reactions caused by simple expectations about third parties' or originators' actions may go unobserved.

6.3 Connecting Theory with Methods

As just stated above, at this stage the unified model of third party intervention proposed here cannot take into account the interactions between third parties and conflict originators. Therefore, the —supposedly— superior empirical models of strategic interaction cannot be employed to test the various hypotheses emerging from the theoretical framework. However, the difference between econometric models of sample selection and strategic interaction models is marked only under certain specific conditions (see Signorino 2002). The two-stage or multi-stage techniques employed in this research are far from perfect, but nonetheless adequate to test at least some of the main substantive predictions.

One of the main shortcomings of current research on joining behavior is the fact that questions of intervention, alignment, and technique selection have been explored separately from one another and under the assumption that there is no connection between them. Although his focus is largely on the effects of alliance commitments, Smith (1996) presents the only attempt to tackle the sample selection issues inherent in the study of joining behavior through a two-stage selection approach. The present study sets forth the ambitious project of testing hypotheses about the interrelatedness of the three stages of the joining decision. Econometric

techniques aimed at the estimation of complex, multi-stage selection processes exist and have been employed with various degrees of success.

The ideal multivariate probit model allows researchers to investigate the dependence between different choice steps, while taking into account the possibility of multiple outcomes—i.e., more than dichotomous—at the final stage (see Cappellari and Jenkins 2003). Unfortunately, such models are computationally intensive and cumbersome. In most cases, their simulated likelihood function failed to converge. In rare occasions, and only after the general model had been stripped down well beyond the level of recognition, the models managed to produce very unstable estimates. As a result, I attempted to explore the various hypotheses by looking at two different selection branches at a time with relatively easier models. Bivariate probit models handle issues of heteroskedastic disturbances better than Heckman selection models (Reed 2000), and they were used to test the independence between the intervention and the alignment decisions. Regardless of their specification, the various bivariate models revealed consistent dependence between the two decision stages. Conditional logit models, instead, estimated odds ratios concerning the selection of specific intervention techniques conditional on a third party's alignment decision. These models failed to provide sufficient information about the likelihood that a specific technique would be chosen. However, they allayed concerns about the degree of dependence between various intervention techniques and violations of the independence from irrelevant alternatives assumptions (IIA). They gave way to the adoption of more straightforward estimation techniques, such as ordered probit models.

Despite their imperfections, these models produced remarkably consistent results, suggesting that opportunity variable strongly affect intervention, while homophily and rational choice/strategic factors equally contribute to shape alignment and technique choices. Where the models did not produce consistent results, the variations can be explained more by poor measurements of key covariates than by the inadequacy of the models themselves. Within this process, some assumptions underlying the theoretical model are violated at different stages. However, although cumbersome and imperfect, the default strategy of trying to explore the connections between two successive stages at the time still sheds some light on the dynamics of the overall decision-making process and suggests avenues for further improvement. It appears that the implementation of more adequate empirical models is largely due to computational limitations and occasionally poor data. As more data on trade, institutional similarities, and IGO ties are collected, parameter estimates may become more stable across different models. As the implementation of multistage selection models for multiple discrete outcomes becomes more routine and is consistently included in different statistical software, the objective of testing simultaneously the various steps of the unified third party decision model will become progressively easier.

6.4 The Substantive Meaning of Joining Behavior

At this stage, directions for improvement and future research with regard to theory, data, and methods are fairly clear. Samples can be increased, measures can be improved, econometric models can be made more sophisticated. However, the question remains of what does this all mean in substantive terms? What gains were produced by the development of a single, unified model of third party intervention?

What is it now known about the dynamics of third party interventions that was not known before? Arguably, the incorporation into a single approach of hypotheses that were previously developed and tested in isolation allows us to see joining behavior in its complexity. It allows us to find which factors shape each step of the intervention decision-making process *in relation* to their effect on other steps of the same process. We knew about the effects of power calculations and the tendency of states to balance or bandwagon (Waltz 1979; Schweller 1994). We knew about the role of major power status and major power interests on the act of joining itself (Yamamoto and Bremer 1980; Kim 1991; Huth 1998). We knew about the reliability of alliances and their influence in shaping interventions and alignment choices (Leeds, Mitchell McLaughlin and Long 2000; Smith 1996). We knew about the impact of regime similarities and ideology on the decision to take sides in ongoing conflict (Kaw 1990; Werner and Lemke 1997). We knew much less about how and whether such different forces may coexist with one another. And we knew much less about how such factors often can operate at cross-purpose depending on whether a third party looks at the side to support or at the state to be antagonized.

Arguably, in substantive terms, one of the major insights is that strategic and “ideational” factors are equally important in shaping joining behavior. Strategic calculations about power capabilities, alliances, and foreign policy interests affect all stages of the joining decision process. But they are not incompatible with preferences dictated by ideological proximity between two actors. Overall, sharing a democratic form of government with one of the disputants can be just as important being bound by a formal alliance agreement. The combination of the two factors works as a powerful predictor of the decision of third party states. Returning to an

actual example often used throughout this work, we now know that European states—bound by regime and IGO homophily with Great Britain—had little doubt about taking sides with the UK during the Falkland Islands war. Cultural similarities arguably played a crucial role in shaping the Latin American countries' decision to side with Argentina in the same conflict. It is now understood that the two factors can work simultaneously and independently of one another in determining alignment choices.

Homophily and strategic calculations do not take place only with regard to the state being supported, but also with regard to the enemy in a conflict. The relationship between a third party and the conflict originators is a triangular one. The further away a third party moves from an enemy, and the closer it moves toward a friend, the greater the chances of partisan intervention with the adoption of expensive strategies. Conflicts in which a state defined as a friend along several dimensions of willingness fights against a state that is more remote along the same dimensions offer a lethal combination for potential third parties and are more likely to expand. Again, during the Falkland islands war, the United States struggled with the decision to intervene, since it was close to both Argentina and Great Britain. Yet, the US closeness to both Britain and Argentina was not as symmetrical as to generate perfect indifference. When the US finally and mildly intervened on the UK side, the slightly stronger ties between the US and Great Britain arguable shaped the difference in outcomes for the US. The EU countries, on the other hand, were less constrained by similarities or opposition to the Argentine regime and more concerned with the similarities and ties with the UK. Thus, despite the dangers of another war of major proportions, the EU decisively chose to side with Britain out of concerns with the ideological or practical support of one of its members, and out

of relative indifference toward the other combatant. Even more evidently, in the very recent dispute between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the United States, some states opportunistically chose to forgo balance of power considerations and joined the US' "coalition of the willing." Many US allies, on the other hand, remained neutral not because they suddenly lost any tie with the United States, but arguably because they could not perceive Iraq as a sufficient threat.

Although it is not included in the data used for this research, the apropos-named "coalition of the willing" offers a useful example of the insight brought by the joining behavior model proposed here. While many big and small states were rattling their sabers in the weeks preceding the March 2003 conflict with Iraq, the vast majority of them showed various degrees of opportunity and, especially, willingness with regard to war effort. Only Britain, Australia, and a couple more states ultimately chose to place troops on the ground. States such as Spain, Italy, and Poland did not back up their harsh rhetoric with comparatively visible deeds. They only offered to field limited troops for the post-war efforts. Even more states provided the US with all of the diplomatic support they could muster, but nothing more than that.

The unified model of third party intervention allows us to better understand all ranges of behavior exhibited by these states, from those who chose to abstain to those who actually fought against Iraq. More specifically, this approach allows us to grasp different behaviors within the "coalition of the willing" itself. The model, in fact, suggests that different intervention techniques involving different costs largely depend on the same dimensions of the triangular relationship between a third party and the two disputants. The more proximate a joiner becomes to one of the disputants, and the further away one is from the other conflict originator,

the greater the chances that a third party will intervene with a more expensive form of intervention. Relative US indifference toward both the UK and Argentina during the Falkland Islands war arguably shaped the decisions to provide only mild support for the UK. Strong closeness between the UK and the US, associated with a strong perception of hostility toward Iraq, largely shaped the UK decision to put troops on the ground in the 2003 dispute and subsequent war.

With regard to the above examples, exclusion of nonmilitary forms of intervention from the analysis of joining behavior would have allowed a researcher to explore only the UK decision to take part in the 2003 Iraq war. With information about non-military interventions one can instead draw comparisons between different instances of interventions involving the same states engaging in different behaviors at different points in time. As Most and Starr (1989) suggest, the goal of good theories of international politics is that of helping us understand the circumstances under which similar factors produce different forms of behavior, and the circumstances under which different factors produce the same type of behavior. Explanations that accomplish this task tend to be explanations about *processes* of international politics, rather than explanations about static observations. The inclusion of non-militarized forms of intervention in a model that links together decisions about joining, alignment, intervention technique selection allows us to move away from a static view of different aspects of third party intervention and to make some significant steps in the direction of a theory of the process of joining behavior.

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