GENDER AND THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT:

A META-ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

by

Maureen Ann O'Connor

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

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As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Maureen O'Connor

entitled Gender and the Definition of Sexual Harassment: A Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Literature

and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Bruce D. Sales	4-9-98 Date
Barbara A. Gutek	4-9-98 Date
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	Date
	Date

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

Dissertation Director Bruce D. Sales — 4-9-98 Date

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ABSTRACT

To prove a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must show that the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to have created a hostile, intimidating, or abusive work environment. In determining whether that standard has been met, courts ask whether a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would have found the conduct harassing. Since 1991, some courts have determined that this objective standard can best be operationalized by asking the triers of fact to view the behavior from a "reasonable woman's" perspective. In the landmark case, Ellison v. Brady, the court justified the need for a sex-specific standard by implicitly relying on findings from social science research suggesting that men and women differ in how they define sexual harassment. A meta-analysis of 79 studies that examined male/female differences on definition of sexual harassment was conducted. A small but persistent sex effect was found ($\underline{r} = .1635$) such that women tend to have broader definitions of sexual harassment than men. A closer look at male/female differences on individual stimuli showed that they varied considerably, however, suggesting that the important differences may relate more to the type of behavior being evaluated than to the sex of the evaluator. Additional research exploring these stimulus effects should be conducted.

INTRODUCTION

Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII which prohibits "discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ...sex" (Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 1986; see MacKinnon, 1979, for the sociological and legal argument supporting this view; but see, Franke, 1997, for a critique of the evolution of sexual harassment law as sex discrimination, and Oncale v. Sundowner, 1998, for the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of sexual harassment as sex discrimination in cases of opposite-sex and same-sex harassment). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) 1980 guidelines and two earlier United States Supreme Court cases (Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 1986, Harris v. Forklift, 1993) have given shape to the broad parameters of sexual harassment law. Two types of sexual harassment are recognized: quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment harassment. The first is relatively straight forward, benefit or detriment at work based on an exchange of sexual favors. The second, however, has proved more elusive. A hostile work environment plaintiff must show that the complained of conduct was unwelcome and that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive environment (Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 1993; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,1986):

would a reasonable person have been offended by the conduct and was this plaintiff so offended? These rules, though easy to state, have proven difficult to apply, leading to a "psychologically-focused, case-by-case, tort-like treatment" of these claims (Hadfield, 1995).

One criticism of this reasonableness-based approach is that it simply misconceives the nature of sexual harassment. Bernstein (1997) argues, for example, that "reason and reasonableness have little to do with offensiveness," echoing Justice Scalia's own discomfort with the focus on reasonableness in Harris. Justice Scalia conceded that the words "abusive" or "hostile" did not present a very clear standard, and [he did' not think clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb 'objectively' or by appealing to a 'reasonable person['s]' notion of what the vague word means" (Harris, 1993, Scalia, J., concurring, p. 24). Bernstein proposes a standard based on "respect" rather than reason, suggesting that civility is much more relevant to offensive conduct than is reason (Bernstein, 1997).

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has shown no signs of retreating from a requirement that the conduct in question must "unreasonably" interfere with an employee's work environment to be actionable. The question, then, is how should the courts decide what is a "reasonable" versus "unreasonable" altering of work conditions? How do jurors know where to draw the line? Many courts rely upon the traditional "reasonable person" standard to make that determination (Rabidue

v. Osceola Refining Co., 1986; Radtke v. Everett, 1993; see also Childers, 1993). In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court said that the conduct at issue must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create "an objectively hostile or abusive work environment--an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive."[1] Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (1993) has recently reiterated that the standard for determining whether the alleged harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive is whether a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would find the challenged conduct intimidating, hostile, or abusive. The EEOC added, however, that:

> In determining whether that standard has been met, consideration is to be given to the perspective of individuals of the claimant's . . . gender . . .. Recent case law on this issue emphasizes the importance of considering the perspective of the victim of the harassment rather than adopting notions of acceptable behavior that may prevail in a particular workplace (citations omitted).

Since 1991, some courts have determined that this "objective" standard can best be operationalized by asking the triers of fact to view the behavior from a "reasonable woman's" perspective. In the landmark case, Ellison v. Brady (1991), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the traditional reasonable person

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[1] Note that the Supreme Court in Harris was not dealing specifically with the question of the appropriate objective standard, although its reliance on the reasonable person standard is instructive of how it may ultimately view the legal viability of the reasonable woman standard. Note also that the Court required that

standard in favor of that of a reasonable woman. The Ninth Circuit derided the purportedly gender-neutral reasonable person standard in practice as merely reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination in society (Ellison v. Brady, 1991, p. 878-79).

Courts and commentators before and after Ellison have made numerous claims about what a reasonable woman (or a "reasonable victim")[2] standard might accomplish (see e.g., Abrams, 1989; Note, 1984; Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company, 1986, J.Keith, dissenting). It has been hailed as a "harbinger of change" in the way the law treats women (Tavris, 1992). It will purportedly insulate

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the conduct be subjectively perceived by the victim as abusive (Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 1993)(1993 WL 453611).

[2]Some courts and commentators have used a "reasonable victim" standard as a more gender-neutral form of the "reasonable woman" standard in recognition that not all victims of sexual harassment are women (Attanasio, 1982; Rhode, 1992). In October 1993, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability. These proposed Guidelines would supplement the Commission's existing Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex (1992) and its Sexual Harassment Policy Guidance (1990) by explicitly addressing harassment that is gender-based but non-sexual in nature. Interestingly, in its Notice, the EEOC specifically adopts a "reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances" standard, and cites Ellison to demonstrate the importance of considering the perspective of the victim of the harassment (EEOC, 1993, n.4).

We have found no empirical evidence on how these differing standards will affect the behavior of judges or juries, yet we are hesitant to equate the two standards. We do not believe that a reasonable victim and a reasonable woman are necessarily the same person. As one commentator recently noted, "All women are not victims, and all victims are not women. Using the terms "woman " and "victim" interchangeably induces [] misconceptions detrimental both to society's

employers from the "hypersensitive" employee and her unfounded claims (e.g., Attanasio, 1982; Bratton, 1987; Ellison, 1991), and will also make decisionmakers more sensitive to legitimate sexual harassment complaints rather than perpetuating existing stereotypes (Bratton, 1987; Ellison, 1991; Note, 1984).

The predominant claim, however, is that the new standard would force judges and juries to look at the case from the victim's perspective. Traditionally, of course, the "reasonable person" standard in any lawsuit (tort, criminal, discrimination) has always meant that judges and juries are supposed to consider a "reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances" (Second Restatement of Torts, § 283). In a negligence suit involving a person who is blind, for example, the jury is told to expect that person to "take the precautions, be they more or less, which the ordinary reasonable person would take if he were blind" (Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, & Owen, 1984, p. 174). Judges and juries have always been required to do just that in any number of legal cases, from simple or complex torts to other forms of discrimination (race, ethnicity) to criminal law.

But, judges (who are still mostly male) and male jurors may need special help in understanding that a woman may honestly feel threatened by a workplace environment permeated with seemingly harmless pornography, flirtation,

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view of women and to women's view of themselves (Childers, 1993). Therefore, we limit our analysis to the "reasonable woman" standard.

obscenity, and sexual innuendo.[3] Presumably, if left to their own devices, most judges or jurors would simply be unable to appreciate the point-of-view of the victim of sexual harassment. Using an explicit "reasonable woman" standard could facilitate proper application of the legal standard.

At bottom, this belief in the inadequacy of traditional legal language in these cases is based on the assumption that men and women do not (or cannot) view workplace behavior in the same way. Recognizing the empirical nature of that assumption, the courts and legal scholars have looked to social science evidence that addresses that question (e.g., Bratton, 1987; Ellison, 1991). What was the Ellison court's evidence for concluding that a new reasonable woman standard was necessary, particularly for its assumption that men and women perceive workplace interactions differently? Does the empirical research support that assumption? To answer these questions, it is instructive to examine the Ellison opinion in some detail.

Ellison v. Brady and the Reasonable Woman Standard

Facts and Opinion. Kerry Ellison worked for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in California. On January 30, 1987, she filed a complaint alleging sexual harassment with the IRS, based on a hostile working environment created

[3] A comparable analysis was used to explain to judges and juries how a battered woman could feel sufficiently threatened by a sleeping spouse to justify using force to kill that spouse despite no immediate threat of physical force from him as he slept (see, e.g., Follingstand, 1996; Schuller, 1992).

by the repeated, unwanted sexual advances of a co-worker. Her claim was denied by her own agency, and that denial was upheld by both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the federal district court. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, Ellison's claim was examined in a new light. The Ninth Circuit held that Ellison had put forth enough evidence to state a claim of a hostile working environment. In so holding, the court said:

> a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment (Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879)(emphasis added).

Ellison is cited as the precedent-setting case for judicial use of the reasonable woman standard (see, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., 1993; Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 1991). Yet, courts relying on Ellison do not generally cite to the information supporting the Ellison rationale but rather accept the male/female perceptual gap as a given (cf. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 1986, rejecting the need for a reasonable woman standard). As a starting point for analyzing the reasonable woman standard, then, it is instructive to examine closely the reasoning underlying the Ninth Circuit's decision.

The Ninth Circuit's Reasoning. In deciding to focus on the perspective of the complainant, the Ellison court was following the guidance provided in the EEOC's Compliance Manual for sexual harassment. In that manual, the EEOC

suggests that courts "should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior" by the alleged harasser (although the EEOC has stopped short of recommending an explicit reasonable woman standard, EEOC, 1993). According to the court, this approach can avoid protecting those harassers whose behavior is common and acceptable in certain quarters (Ellison, at 878).

After pointing to the EEOC's guiding legal principle, the Ellison court then attempted to give meaning to the victim's perspective. Since most victims are women, the court began its analysis by making a fundamentally empirical observation:

> A complete understanding of the victim's view requires, among other things, an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women. Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women. (at 878).

To justify this observation, the Court relied on two sources. First, it cited prior case law. It quoted from two cases that had acknowledged that men and women may differ in their reactions to behavior in the workplace, Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 1988, p. 898)("A male supervisor might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has a 'great figure' or 'nice legs.' The female subordinate, however, may find such comments offensive"), and Yates v. Avco Corp., (1987, p. 637 n.2, "men and woman are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior;" see also Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company, 1986, Keith, J. dissenting). None of

these cases cited empirical support for those statements, although in his dissent in Rabidue, Judge Keith cited a 1984 Harvard law student note that pointed to some early empirical work (which will be discussed in more detail below).

Second, the Ellison court relied on arguments made by two legal scholars in law review articles, Nancy Ehrenreich (1990, p. 1207-1208)(men tend to view some forms of sexual harassment as 'harmless social interactions to which only overly-sensitive women would object'") and Karen Abrams (1989, p. 1203)("the characteristically male view depicts sexual harassment as comparatively harmless amusement"). The court continued:

> We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but we believe that many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share. . . .For example, because women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. (at 879)

Note here that the court has shifted its emphasis from a fundamental difference in viewpoint between men and women, to an emphasis on behavior; the court distinguished between men's and women's life experiences, using FBI crime statistics on rape to justify its statement. In expanding on this point, the court noted, without further citation, that:

> Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive. (at 879).

Finally, the court reasoned that these differences demand a new standard by which sexual harassment is judged:

> we hold that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. (at 879)

To justify this precise holding, the court relied on two prior cases that had leaned toward a reasonable woman standard (Yates, 1987 and Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 1990), and on the same 1984 Harvard Law Review Note cited previously in which the author urged courts to adopt the woman's point of view as the norm (Note, 1984, p. 1459).

The Ninth Circuit did not itself cite any social science studies to support its assumptions. But, in examining those cases and law review articles the Ninth Circuit did cite in Ellison, it becomes apparent that findings from social scientific research augmented the perspective provided by feminist legal theory and contributed to the Ellison decision.

The Social Science Evidence Underlying Ellison. The Harvard Law Review Note is the source most often cited by courts for the need for a reasonable woman standard, and is cited explicitly by the Ellison court to support its adoption of this new standard (see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 1990). More importantly, that Note is a critical source for the empirical proposition that a perceptual gap between men and women exists (Ellison, 1991, p. 878; Andrews v.

City of Philadelphia, 1990, p. 1485-1486). The Note claims that "many of the actions women find offensive are perceived by men to be harmless and innocent" (Note, 1984, p. 1451, citing Collins and Blodgett, 1981 and "Faculty council," 1983). Given these circumstances, the Note concludes that a reasonable woman standard would "protect women from the offensive behavior that results from the divergence of male and female perceptions of appropriate conduct" (Note, 1984, p. 1459).

A second article, cited by Ellison as well as other courts and scholars, documenting the existence of the perceptual gap, is by Karen Abrams (1989). At least four cases have explicitly relied on or responded to her reasoning on the perceptual gap point (Ellison v. Brady, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Radtke v. Everett, T.L. v. Toys R Us). In trying to reframe the issue of sexual harassment for the courts, Abrams explains that a "principal reason for the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the workplace is that men regard conduct, ranging from sexual demands to sexual innuendo, differently than women do" (p. 1202). In coming to that conclusion, Abrams relies heavily on work by Barbara Gutek (1985). Relying on Gutek (1985), Abrams states that: (1) women as a group tend to hold more restrictive views of both the situation and the type of relationship in which sexual conduct is appropriate; (2) women are more likely to regard a sexual encounter, verbal or physical, as coercive and less likely to view them as flattering when directed to them as individuals, whereas men are less

likely to regard such conduct as harassing, more likely to view it as a flattering reflection on their physical or personal attributes, and (3) men are more likely to perceive such encounters as mutually desired, whereas women are more likely to feel that encounters were desired only by the more powerful, initiating party.

One court has recently incorporated this discussion by Abrams wholesale into its opinion (with the citation to Gutek (1985) as well), concluding that "the research and literature on sexual harassment suggest[s] that there are differences in the way sexual conduct on the job is perceived by men and women" (T.L. v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 1993, p. 459). As such, the court concludes, since the traditional reasonable person standard does not sufficiently reflect this diversity, a reasonable woman standard is necessary.

Similarly, Ehrenreich (1990), cited by Ellison, found fault with the court's traditional approach to reasonableness analysis in part because it ignores or minimizes the conflict between men's and women's viewpoints that arise in sexual harassment cases. She cited the Collins and Blodgett (1981) survey, as well as several other popular press polls to support her claim (Ehrenreich, 1990, nn. 81 & 110).

The preceding dissection of Ellison demonstrates that differences in the way men and women evaluate incidents of potential sexual harassment as reported by social scientists undergirds its adoption of a reasonable woman standard. This focus makes some sense. In order to justify abandoning the existing legal

standard, reasonable person, the courts must believe it is inadequate to the task of representing a typical sexual harassment victim's viewpoint. It can only be inadequate if men (supervisors, coworkers, judges, and jurors) are routinely failing to give adequate credence to a sexual harassment complainant's claims simply because they are unable to see the world from her vantage point.

Can these assumptions about the perceptual gap withstand empirical verification? Behavioral assumptions of this type permeate the law and legal decisionmaking and it is an essential part of psychology and law scholarship to examine such assumptions (Sales & O'Connor, in press). It may be even more critical in this situation for two reasons. First, the behavioral assumptions made by the Ellison court are not merely based on conjecture or armchair psychology, but instead are linked directly to science--the empirical findings from psychological research on definitions of sexual harassment--filtered through legal scholarship. Second, none of these findings were subjected to any kind of judicial scrutiny for their scientific quality. No inquiry into the reliability or validity of these findings was made by the court as these findings were not presented by either party at the trial level by expert witnesses or other means (see Daubert, 1993). Therefore, while it may ultimately be appropriate to conclude that a sound empirical basis exists for the assumptions made by the Ellison court, it behooves scientists to play a more affirmative role in a case of this type to scrutinize the scientific foundation for this important legal rule. As

some critics have argued, the courts may choose to rely on social scientific findings when they serve their ultimate end, but ignore equally-valid or relevant findings when they do not (see, e.g., Bersoff, 1987). It is even more important, then, that scientists take on the responsibility of determining whether the courts have appropriately relied on a particular finding or set of findings by reviewing the literature upon which they relied.

As a beginning step in examining the empirical support for the Ellison decision, the three empirical studies that were cited by the legal scholars cited in the opinion itself--Collins and Blodgett (1981), Faculty Council (1983), and Gutek (1985)—will be examined in some detail. These three studies were large-scale surveys designed to estimate the prevalence of sexual harassment in the populations of interest. Additionally, each of the surveys sought data on respondents' definitions of sexual harassment by presenting to them a list of behaviors and asking whether they would consider these behaviors to be sexual harassment. The researchers provided no context information, individuating information, nor detail of any sort in the lists or behaviors.

The Collins and Blodgett (1981) study was a joint survey by Redbook magazine and Harvard Business Review of 7000 Harvard Business Review subscribers, 25% of whom responded. As for the prevalence findings, women and men strongly disagreed on how frequently sexual harassment occurs, women believing it occurs more often. But, as to male/female definitions of harassment,

the major conclusion drawn by the authors regarding readers' perceptions of these behaviors is that "men and women generally agree in theory on what sexual harassment is" (p. 78). In the "definitions" section of the survey, the authors listed 14 comments about the behavior of men toward women at work and asked whether the behavior described constituted sexual harassment.[4] All respondents rated six of the behaviors, but the sample was split in half for the remaining eight behaviors, half responding to the behavior coming from a supervisor, and the other half coming from a coworker. Inspecting the data more closely (bearing in mind that, as the authors admit," it was not possible to include all the survey data in the exhibits, [so] . . . the data have been extrapolated" (p. 81) reveals that men and women agreed that the four most extreme situations (e.g., "Mr. X has told me that it would be good for my career if we went out together") constituted sexual harassment. In two other instances –where the man offers to drive the woman home and where the married man and the woman have dinner together and go to a nightclub while on a business trip—"slightly more men than women" (emphasis added) thought those were harassment. For five of the six behaviors that the entire sample responded to, more women than men considered the behavior harassment, e.g., 24% of women, compared with 8% of men, believed "[w]henever I go into

[4] Two versions of the survey were sent out: one in which 8 of the 14 behaviors were done by a supervisor and the other in which the same 8 behaviors were done by a coworker. The authors report a split-sample effect, such that respondents who

the office, my supervisor (coworker) eyes me up and down, making me feel uncomfortable," to be sexual harassment. In one of those six instances, more men than women rated the labeled the behavior as harassment (where the man kisses the woman every time they meet). No breakdown by sex is provided for the two remaining behaviors. In summary, women were more likely than men to label 5 of the 12 behaviors for which data are reported as sexual harassment. Men were more likely than women to label three of the behaviors as sexual harassment. Men and women agreed on four behaviors, and data are not reported for the reaming two. The authors' own conclusion regarding a gap between the sexes is that it exists regarding what actually happens in the workplace, but does not exist in the perception of what constitutes sexual harassment.

The second source of empirical support for the perceptual gap in male/female definitions of sexual harassment is a report of a survey conducted at Harvard University (Faculty Council, 1983). Survey respondents indicated whether any of eight different acts would be considered sexual harassment if done by someone with or without authority. Overall, the results showed a substantial consensus that unwanted physical contacts or pressure for sexual relationships is sexual harassment whether carried out by someone in authority or a peer, although slightly higher percentages of females took that position. "Ninety percent or more

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received the Supervisor version tended to rate the remaining, common 6 questions as being more sexually harassing than the Coworker split-sample respondents.

of the respondents in all groups (with a few exceptions that are close to 90 percent) believe that unwanted sexual letters or phone calls, physical contact, or pressure for dates or sexual activity represent sexual harassment" (Faculty Council, 1983, p. 9). Quite clear gender differences did appear for verbal behavior and looks or gestures (such as, sexual stereotypes and jokes). One-half of female faculty and graduate students rated "[t]easing, jokes, remarks, or questions of a sexual nature" as sexual harassment, versus 24-40 percent of males (40 percent of male faculty, 30 percent of male graduate students, and 24 percent of male undergraduates) although, interestingly, the authors note substantial disagreement within sexes as well on these items. The same pattern held for "perceptions of sexual remarks" and for "unwanted sexual looks and gestures," though a majority of all groups found these to be sexual harassment. The authors did not report the data on the responses to the same behaviors when performed by someone without authority, although they state that the same patterns hold: general consensus across all groups that "unwanted physical contact" or "unwanted pressure for sexual activity" is sexual harassment, but less agreement for "unwanted pressure for dates."

The third source of empirical support for the legal scholars' conclusion about a perceptual gap comes from Gutek (1985; see also Gutek, Nakamura, Gahart, Handschumacher, & Russell, 1980). Gutek (1985) surveyed working men and women in Los Angeles County in 1980. She presented respondents with eight

categories of behaviors and asked whether they thought a particular kind of behavior was sexual harassment. Over 90 percent of both sexes said that socializing or sexual activity as a job requirement were sexual harassment, over half of both sexes thought that sexual touching, insulting sexual comments, and sexual gestures meant to be insulting are sexual harassment, while less than 10 percent of both sexes thought nonsexual touching is sexual harassment. Within this broad agreement, though, the results showed a "tendency for women to be more likely than men to label each of the categories sexual harassment" (p. 44). "Sexual touching" showed the largest gap--84 percent of women and 59 percent of men considered it sexual harassment—and "Expected sexual activity" the smallest gap, 98 percent of women and 94.5 of men. Overall, Gutek (1985) concluded that, at least as of 1980 when sexual harassment had received scant attention and had only been named four years before (MacKinnon, 1979), little consensus existed about what constitutes sexual harassment. In general, though, men were more reluctant than women to label a particular behavior as sexual harassment.

It appears, then, that two of the three studies relied upon by the sources cited by Ellison do not fully support the perceptual gap assumption, revealing a more complex pattern of gender differences, while the Gutek (1985) data more convincingly show consistent differences between men and women. This one study, in fact, has been credited with spawning much of the subsequent research on gender differences in the perception of sexual harassment (Pollack, 1988, p.

16-17). Not satisfied with Ellison's reliance on these three sources as solidifying these differences, however, Gutek and O'Connor (1995) conducted a more thorough qualitative literature review. That review examined the primarily published studies that had examined gender differences in perception of sexual harassment since the early work by Collins and Blodgitt, Faculty Council, and Gutek to see whether the court's conclusion could withstand closer inspection given more recent data (see also Frazier, Cochran, & Olson, 1995).

Qualitative Review of Research on the Definition of Sexual Harassment

Researchers have used two primary techniques for investigating people's definitions of sexual harassment. Some of the relevant studies are surveys of working people or students (e.g., Collins & Blodgett, 1981; Gutek, et al., 1980; Gutek, 1985). Typically in these studies, respondents drawn via some random procedure or from some identifiable population are asked if particular categories of behavior (e.g., sexual touching, sexual comments) constitute sexual harassment. Respondents are usually expected to answer "yes" or "no" and may have the option of checking "don't know." Respondents typically make just one rating of each of several kinds of behavior, and definition of sexual harassment is typically only one of many areas addressed in the questionnaire or interview. Almost all survey studies have found significant differences between the sexes on at least one category of behavior, but also substantial agreement among the sexes on other categories, e.g., sexual propositions.

The other type of study to address sex differences in definition of sexual harassment is a scenario study, i.e., studies in which respondents are asked to evaluate scenarios of possible sexual harassment (e.g., Powell, 1986; Weber-Burdin & Rossi, 1982; Pryor, 1985). These scenarios may be very short, e.g., one or two sentences in length, although most are longer than that and some are several paragraphs (e.g., Pryor & Day, 1988). A subset of scenario studies use a factorial design in which one or two characteristics of the actors, behavior, or situation may be manipulated or the study may be a factorial survey in which components of the scenario are randomly selected (e.g., Hunter & McClelland, 1991; Reilly, et al, 1982; Weber-Burdin & Rossi, 1982). Respondents may read written scenarios, listen to audio tapes (e.g., Valentine-French & Radtke, 1989), or listen to and watch videotapes (e.g., Jaschik & Fretz, 1991; Johnson, Stockdale, & Saal, 1991; Marks & Nelson, 1993) which usually consist of short interactions between two people, an initiator and recipient. In these studies, respondents are typically asked to evaluate the scenario (or scenarios) about which they read, using five or seven-point rating scales, e.g., "To what extent does the scenario constitute sexual harassment?" where, for example, 1 = not at all harassing and 5 = very harassing. Typically, and in contrast to the survey studies, respondents provide a number of ratings of only one incident, or sometimes a number of ratings of several incidents. Rating of definition of sexual harassment is often the key outcome studied because one of the goals of many scenario studies is to determine which factors --

characteristics of the situation, the actors, and the rater -- affect people's definition of sexual harassment.

In general, across all studies, this qualitative review of the surveys and scenarios revealed that, when there was a difference, the direction of the difference was consistent; women were somewhat more likely than men to identify behavior as sexual harassment or view behavior as less appropriate. Nevertheless, the size of the effect was small, within-sex variation may have been greater than between-sex variation, other factors have been shown to have as large or larger an effect, and factors correlated with gender generally have not been taken into account in the studies. Moreover, in the studies relying on fact patterns that most closely paralleled court cases, the gender gap tended to disappear (see, e.g., Terpstra & Baker,1987). Frazier et al (1995) came to much the same conclusion in their review.

This second step towards understanding the empirical evidence on the gap between men and women in sexual harassment studies led Gutek and O'Connor (1995) to question whether the empirical evidence used to demonstrate that gap is sufficiently strong, consistent, and meaningful to justify a sex-based legal standard. The differences between men and women in definition of sexual harassment appeared small, they were most often found in incidents that were atypical of court cases, and the authors' own portrayal of the results seemed to mask or minimize sex differences that did exist.

These lingering concerns prompted a third step towards a comprehensive understanding of the male/female difference—a meta-analysis of as complete a database as could be reasonably obtained. The remainder of this article will describe that meta-analysis, its method, analysis, and findings, after which it will revisit the question whether a reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases can be justified on the basis of empirical findings from social science.

Meta-analysis of sexual harassment studies

Meta-analyses of sex differences.

Beginning in the 1970s, psychologists who were dissatisfied with traditional methods of reviewing research on sex differences began using meta-analytic techniques (Eagly, 1987; Cooper, 1979; Hyde, 1981; 1984). In meta-analysis, a quantitative summary is made of the results of a set of studies all testing the same hypothesis, namely that there is a sex difference in some particular class of behavior. Among the advantages of using meta-analysis for review of sex differences are the following: 1) the definition of the independent variable, gender, is stable and accurate; 2) it provides a relatively objective research summary that is less vulnerable than traditional reviews to charges of biases stemming from reviewers' own preferences about the presence of absence of sex differences.

Not all scholars agree on the continuing value of focusing on and highlighting yet another category of behavior in which males and females may differ, and these concerns must be addressed. In the 1970's, research on sex

differences was a burgeoning area within feminist psychology because research that could show that women were "as good as men" was viewed as having the potential to significantly erode patriarchy (Walsh, 1997). A leading practitioner of meta-analyses of sex differences, Alice Eagly (1995), explained that if women were not different than men, then opportunities would open up that had been heretofore closed. Other scholars, notably Carol Gilligan (1982), argued that women's special qualities, such as empathy, caring, and consensus building, should be celebrated not denied, and that a better world could be created by emphasizing these differences. A third perspective urges scholars to peer behind any sex differences that might be observed to expose cultural and political arrangements that allow them to persist (Lott, 1997; see also Unger, 1992). Despite these criticisms, ignoring the alleged sex differences in definitions of sexual harassment was not feasible since the courts were relying on these alleged differences to inform legal policy. Moreover, since sex is so easy to measure, it continues to be one of the main categories used by people, not only social scientists, to make sense of the social world (Walsh, 1997). The media can barely contain itself when new findings of sex difference appear. In reporting on the Ellison v. Brady case, for example, the Wall Street Journal headline read: "Court concedes the sexes think in unlike ways." Moreover, as detailed above, the court in Ellison did rely on the perceived difference between male and female definitions of sexual harassment, making it practically important to focus on that

difference. Given these concerns, meta-analysis offers several advantages. While measuring the sex effect, meta-analysis allows the analyst to simultaneously examine other measured variables as well as characteristics of the studies themselves to more clearly discern the nature and shape of the sex difference, not simply its existence (Eagly, 1997). Additionally, a meta-analysis should include unpublished studies, studies which may have remained unpublished precisely because they produced no significant sex effect (Hyde, 1994). Finally, a meta-analysis should be able to provide a detailed and complete picture about the research approaches that have been used to examine sex differences and provide the basis for recommendations for improving future work, a not unworthy end result in itself.

Framework for Current Meta-Analysis. In contrast to many of the meta-analyses involving sex differences, the variable of interest in the current study is sex of the rater (respondent) rather than the sex of the person being evaluated, rated, scored, or whose behavior is observed. The class of behavior in focus is the evaluation of behavior that might be considered sexual harassment and the primary research question is whether males and females differ in how they define sexual harassment.

A number of theories might explain male/female differences in definition of sexual harassment: natural/biological models (see, e.g., Tangri, Burt, and Johnson,1982); social/organizational theories (see, e.g., Gutek and Morasch, 1982,

discussing sex role spillover theory); and, interpersonal dynamic-oriented theories (see, e.g., Pryor, 1985, discussing attribution theory). Research has tended to provide some support for the latter two categories, although no one theory has emerged as fully explanatory of sexual harassment behavior in general or gender differences in particular (Gutek, 1985). Recent work by Burgess and Borgida (in press) has provided new support for sex-role spillover theory, suggesting that the carrying over of sex roles into work settings does explain some sexually harassing behavior. Pryor's (1985) work suggests that it may be perspective-taking that can explain male/female differences because males tend to take the perspective of the male harasser and females tend to take the perspective of the female target, in the prototypical research (and real world) situation. Other researchers have hypothesized that women's experience with prior sexual experiences will give them a broader definition of sexual harassment because they will be more aware and sensitized to the issue (see, e.g., Birkelli, 1994; Konrad & Gutek, 1986), although the evidence to date suggests that prior victimization is not a significant predictor of sexual harassment definitions (see, e.g., Barnett, 1991; Dougherty, Turban, Olson, Dwyer, & Lapreze, 1996; Geer & Melançon, 1997; Powell, 1983; cf. Gehlauf, 1989).

Thus, while there are various explanations as to why women may have broader definitions than men, no one explanation is paramount at this point in time. Nevertheless, the convergence of the empirical findings reviewed in the

qualitative literature review (Gutek & O'Connor, 1995), the plausibility of a number of theses theoretical orientations, and the explicit assumption about the direction of the gender difference made by the court in Ellison v. Brady (1991) lead to the primary prediction for this meta-analysis: that females will be slightly more likely than males to label a behavior as sexual harassment than males.

At the same time, the explanations for a gender difference are still inconclusive. Moreover, Gutek and O'Connor (1995) noted a number of important qualifications to the empirical findings from the research on this question. Therefore, a number of study and rater characteristics could affect the size and strength of the gender gap. Predictions in specific categories are as follows:

(1) Study Characteristics: The largest sex effect, with females rating more behaviors as sexual harassment than males, will be observed in studies with the following characteristics:

(a) **studies conducted before 1992** (Rationale: Because of the publicity about sexual harassment emanating from the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and the surrounding controversy caused by allegations of sexual improprieties by Professor Anita Hill in 1991, it is expected that both men and women would be more sensitized

to the issue of sexual harassment in studies conducted after 1991);

(b) **published studies** (Rationale: Because non-significant sex difference findings are less likely to be published in mainstream, peer-reviewed journals);

(c) **studies conducted with community-based or employee samples** (Rationale: As opposed to student respondents, working adults with significant experience in the workplace will have broader definitions of sexual harassment because of greater awareness of the reality of unwanted sexual attention in the workplace);

(d) **studies conducted outside of classrooms or laboratories** (Rationale: Because males and females in real-world settings will have experiences that lead to different definitions of sexual harassment;

(e) **studies that did not mention or discuss any particular theory of sexual harassment** (Rationale: Researchers who have not examined theories underlying purported sex differences may be less attuned to variables other than sex that might explain apparent sex effects and so fail to include such variables in their research);

(f) **studies that did not mention sexual harassment laws or cases** (Rationale: Because authors who are not cognizant of the legal parameters of sexual harassment law nor the types of cases that are litigated may be less attuned to the reality of sexual harassment cases in designing stimuli material, thus minimizing contextual and disputed information, both of which could reduce male/female differences); and

(g) **studies in which respondents rated only lists of behaviors** (Rationale: Because with little contextual information on which to base a judgment, respondent's sex may play more of a role.

(2) Rater Characteristics: A smaller sex effect will be found in studies in which other Rater variables were measured, because in these studies, "sex" will be less likely to serve as a proxy for other unmeasured variables and less likely to appear as a significant sex effect.

(a) **studies which measured attitudes** (Rationale: If measured, attitudinal variables (such as Attitudes Toward Women or Sex Roles) that correlate with gender may account for some of the otherwise observed sex effect, thus reducing the size of the sex effect); and,

(b) **studies which measured prior sexual experiences** (Rationale: While the empirical evidence to date is mixed on the effect of prior sexual experiences on definition of harassment, such experiences do correlate with gender and will account for some of the otherwise observed sex effect).

METHOD

Sample of Studies

Seven over-lapping strategies were used to identify a comprehensive sample of studies, based in part on knowledge that much of the research literature in this area remained unpublished. First, in preparation for the qualitative literature review described above (Gutek and O'Connor, 1995), every item in the reference sections of every article in the two Special Issues of Journal of Social Issues on sexual harassment (Vols. 38(4) & 51(1)) as well as other prominent research articles on the topic were reviewed. Copies of all articles cited that at least appeared to be empirical investigations of sexual harassment were obtained. The reference sections of each article was then reviewed in the same manner, and so on throughout the article-gathering process. Second, we had access to numerous conference presentations and unpublished manuscripts. These are sent, unsolicited, to Dissertation Committee member Barbara Gutek for her review, particularly if they have cited her work (which is the case for most articles on sexual harassment). In addition, conference programs for several years for the Society for Industrial/Organizational Psychology, American Psychological Association, and the Academy of Management meetings were reviewed.

Third, letters or personal Emails were sent to prominent researchers in the field of sexual harassment, asking them for data that would fit within the parameters of the meta-analysis, but that we might not find through traditional literature searches. Fourth, Email solicitations for assistance in locating relevant studies was sent to the following Discussion Lists: FEMJUR (Feminist Law Professors), LAWSOC (Law and Society), PSYLAW (Law and Psychology), SASH (Sociologists Against Sexual Harassment), SPSSI (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues), and WMST (Women's Studies). Both of these techniques produced manuscripts that had not been identified via any other avenue.

Fifth, computerized database searches were conducted for the following databases: ABA/INFORM, 1980-1996; DAI (Dissertation Abstracts International), 1982-1996 (45 of the 57 identified dissertations or masters theses were obtained, either through interlibrary loan, purchase, or in a later published apparently identical journal article. Nine were, however, simply unable to obtain, even after calls to the Psychology Departments at the relevant university; 18 were deemed to meet criteria for inclusion in the analysis); ERIC, 1980-1995; Government Printing Office on SilverPlatter, 1979-996; Medline, 1976-1996; PsycLIT (Psychological Abstracts)(both Journal Articles and Book Chapters databases),1974-1996; Sociofile, 1980-1995. Key terms "sexual harassment" were the main search vehicle, since this term would <u>always</u> appear in a study of

definitions of sexual harassment. Just to be thorough, however, key words "gender harassment," "gender discrimination," "gender differences w/ harassment," and "sexual intent w/ friendly," were also used.

Sixth, a search of the Social SciSearch Data Base (1983-1995) was conducted to locate articles citing Gutek, Morasch, and Cohen (1983), one of the first scenario studies to be published on male/female definitions of sexual harassment.

And, finally, each study that was deemed to be includable in the meta-analysis was coded for "articles cited to support statements about male/female differences in perceptions of sexual harassment." This served as an excellent check on the database, particularly given the number of dissertations in the database. Every article that had been relied upon by other researchers as indicative of the perceptual gap between men and women was identified through this strategy.

These methods produced many hundreds of manuscripts, nearly 250 of which appeared, upon initial review, to be at least potentially relevant to the meta-analysis. The final sample of 79 was derived through a rigorous review procedure, with any doubt regarding satisfaction of the inclusion criteria resulting in exclusion of the study.

Criteria for Inclusion

First, studies that dealt only with sexual harassment experiences or prevalence were excluded. Then, two primary criteria for inclusion of studies were applied: (1) both men and women had to have evaluated the same set of stimulus materials depicting possible sexual harassing behavior; and (2) the raters had to have answered the question, "[i]s the behavior in question sexual harassment?" or its equivalent. This latter requirement resulted in the exclusion of a number of studies that are often cited as the basis for the perceptual gap between males and females, such as Gutek, Morasch, and Cohen (1983) and Jensen and Gutek (1982), and deserves some explanation.

One common criticism of meta-analyses is the "apples and oranges" problem, the attempt to aggregate findings from studies that have measured different variables (see, e.g., Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Rosenthal, 1991). To avoid this problem as much as possible, studies in which the dependent measure was not "perceptions of sexual harassment" were ruthlessly excluded. Therefore, if the dependent variable was perceptions related to sexual assault, friendliness, flirtiness, or sexiness of behavior, or discriminatory or sexist behavior, or attitudes toward sexual harassment or related constructs, even where these showed differences in males and female perceptions, the study was excluded. Additionally, any study in which respondents did not actually provide a "sexual harassment" rating were excluded, even where other perceptions about the behavior were assessed, such as: inappropriateness of the

behavior (e.g., Garlick, 1994); seriousness of the behavior (e.g., Hunter & McClelland, 1991); who to blame for the behavior (e.g., Jensen & Gutek, 1982); harmfulness of the behavior (e.g., Maddox, 1993); and, comfort level with the behavior (Rubin, Hampton, & McManus, 1995).

This strategy for exclusion is supported by the "apples and oranges" concern, but also by empirical and substantive concerns. A number of studies report different results regarding male/female perceptions of the behavior regarding one of the excluded categories and "sexual harassment" ratings. Hippensteele (1991), for example, found that significant gender differences in reactions to scenarios were more prevalent on questions regarding the behavior's appropriateness or sexism than on the sexual harassment rating of the behavior. Additionally, since the meta-analysis is directed at assessing male/female perceptions as they would be relevant to legal decisionmaking in sexual harassment cases, it makes psycholegal sense to exclude studies in which respondents never provided a "sexual harassment" judgment.[5] Note that studies were excluded under this approach, even where the study findings or

[5] In three of the 79 studies, respondents were not asked specifically whether the behavior was sexual harassment, but rather were asked whether it constituted a hostile or offensive work environment. Since our primary interest is in understanding the studies in this area that are relevant to legal decisionmaking, we chose to leave these three studies in the database. In another meta-analysis of this topic, a number of articles were included in the database that have been excluded in this one under the criteria just specified (Blumenthal, 1998).

conclusions stated that men and women differed in how they defined or perceived sexual harassment (see, e.g., Jensen and Gutek, 1982).

A final category of studies were excluded because no data were provided to support the article's statement about male/female differences in reactions to sexually harassing behavior. For example, in a 1991 survey, Majka explored perceptions of sexual harassment in a nationwide church survey, and reported differences, but provided no data. For this and approximately 12 other studies, attempts to locate authors or retrieve data were not successful.

Ninety-four studies satisfied all of these criteria for inclusion in the meta-analysis. Fifteen of these studies satisfy the criteria but have been excluded at this phase because they either use the same data set as another included study or they have a missing data problem (such as, no male/female breakdown of perception data) despite attempts to obtain the data from the authors.

Variables Coded from Each Study

The items included in Table 1 were coded from each of the 94 studies, although only data from 79 were used in the analyses. The primary categories of data were: Study Characteristics (e.g., Author data, publication data, funding data, type of study, setting of study, and stimulus data); Rater Variables (e.g., other independent variables, demographics, and source of study populations); and, Article Content (e.g., the manner in which the male/female difference

hypotheses and findings were discussed, theories discussed, legal issues discussed). Not all of the data are appropriate for statistical analysis, particularly the Article Content data. Those data will augment the comprehensive, descriptive picture of the database.

[Insert Table 1 About Here]

Computation and Analysis of Effect Sizes

An overall effect size r was calculated for each of the 79 individual effect sizes (which came from 75 individual studies). The major difficulty in obtaining effect sizes resulted from the nature of the study population. Most studies asked raters to evaluate more than one behavior, often eight or more. Because theoretically and empirically, it makes sense to expect sex differences for some categories of behavior (more serious, where sexual coercion is involved) than for other categories (minor, casual glances or remarks), most studies did not combine across items to provide an overall male/female difference. Yet, as a necessary first step in understanding this database and for providing preliminary guidance to legal decisionmakers on male/female differences overall, it was decided to calculate an overall effect size for each study.[6] Forty-two of the effect sizes were calculated using Rosenthal (1991)

[6] Phase Two of this meta-analysis is underway in which the subset of studies from Phase One for which we have individual male/female scores on individual items will be included. Each individual stimulus behavior (whether from a list or a scenario) is being coded for a number of relevant variables, including category or

from original results reported by the study authors, either in the form of X^2, t-test, F, or r. For the remaining 37 studies, some transformation of the reported data was required. Since respondents in most of these studies evaluated a series of behaviors or multiple scenarios, data were reported for each individual item rather than in any type of overall statistic for the male/female differences on sexual harassment rating. Where percentages of males and females labeling a particular item sexual harassment were provided, contingency tables with observed and expected frequencies were reconstructed based on the average number of males and females who labeled the behaviors as sexual harassment and a "Derived X^2" was used in computing an overall effect size. In addition, a "Derived X^2" was also computed on both the largest and smallest percentage differences between males and females.

Where mean male/female ratings on a response scale for each item were provided, average means were computed and compared to existing mean differences to obtain an appropriate t-value. Additionally, the largest mean difference and accompanying t-value as reported were included in the analysis as

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harassment (based on Till's, Fitzgerald's, and Gruber's, and taxonomies), harasser and target characteristics, level of detail and context provided, presence or absence of contested facts, relevant legal facts (severity and pervasiveness of behavior, whether it would be considered Quid Pro Quo or Hostile Work Environment harassment). A number of these ratings will be done by a panel of experts in the field. Phase Two will satisfy the concerns about non-independence raised by Rosenthal (1991) and Mullen (1989) where effect sizes are computed by averaging across individual effect sizes within studies.

a "biggest" difference category. Based on these analyses, a reported or a derived effect size were calculated, providing an overall effect size for each study.

Finally, where nonsignificant results were reported accompanied by no statistical information, a value of 1.0 was used in the effect size calculations (indicating nonsignificant but not necessarily no sex difference, since that seemed to more closely approximate the results in those studies, which typically showed some but not significant differences)(cf. Eagly & Steffen, 1986, in which they assigned a value of 0.00 to indicate no sex difference for nonsignificant results).

RESULTS

Descriptive Data

Before turning to the analyses, it is useful to provide an overview of the primary characteristics of the meta-analyzed studies. As depicted in Table 2, these studies have been conducted largely between the years 1985 and 1995, with 1992 as the mode and median year. This is the year after the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearing, in which Anita Hill alleged that Judge Thomas had exhibited behavior toward her which could be considered sexual harassment. The hearings generated furious debate and, therefore, were expected to reduce sex differences by producing greater awareness of sexual harassment by both males and females after the hearings.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

As expected, the studies have been conducted without research funding support. Only 15 studies (19%) reported any outside funding, and many of those were internal, university-based support. This has obvious implications for study samples, complexity of designs, and other study characteristics.

As mentioned above, one major criticism of meta-analysis is the file-drawer problem (Rosenthal, 1991), that is the concern that too many unpublished, contrary-finding studies remain in researchers file drawers, unavailable for meta-analyzing. The results in Table 3 suggest that efforts to overcome this problem were at least partially successful. The database consisted

of 44 published studies (3 of which were identical to dissertations which had been obtained but were excluded as duplicates, and 3 of which produced two studies and two effect sizes), while 26 of the studies were unpublished. Seventeen dissertations (one of which contributed two effect sizes) or master's theses were included, as well as 3 conference presentations, 3 government reports, 2 surveys from popular magazines, and one unpublished manuscript.

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

In terms of the types of studies included in the meta-analysis, 57 were scenario studies, in which respondents reacted to a vignette involving a potential sexual harassment situation, 21 used lists of behaviors as stimuli, while one study included both types of stimuli. Of the 57 scenario studies, 12 were conducted via survey; of the 21 behavior lists, 14 were done via survey. Thirty-two of the studies were factorial designs in which at least one variable was manipulated, (e.g., status of the harasser, target response), and four were factorial survey designs. These are categorized as scenario studies for purposes of analysis.

Table 4 presents the overall number of individual stimuli that were rated by each respondent in each study. For scenarios (or vignettes), which are somewhat longer and generally more detailed than the lists of behaviors, 17 studies included just one, and another 20 presented fewer than 10. Four studies were factorial surveys in which the authors randomly selected from thousands of

possible combinations of stimuli. These studies required respondents to rate 60, 68, 70, and 80 scenarios. Studies asking respondents to rate lists of behaviors (such as, "sexual favors in exchange for promotion," or "comments of a sexual nature") varied substantially on the number of stimuli, with 8 as the modal number, and 5 to 37 representing the range.

[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]

One criticism of the existing research in this area is that sex differences are apparent because researchers are failing to measure other variables that might correlate highly with sex and could account for perceptual differences (Gutek & O'Connor, 1995). Table 5 supports this criticism. While 72 percent of the studies measured age of the rater, fewer than 40 percent of studies measured (or at least failed to report) other demographic variables. Forty percent of the studies did report race data, revealing a clear majoritarian bias in the research on sexual harassment perceptions. In 24 of the 32 studies reporting these data, more than two-thirds of participants were white. Only three studies, one conducted at the University of Hawaii, had more than 50 percent minority participants.

[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]

Table 5 also reveals scant attention to employment or supervisory experience. While 33 percent of the studies report some data on employment, it is largely at the aggregate level, percent full-time employees. Very little

concerns employment history, years in the workforce, gender composition of the workforce, size of employer, or other descriptive information that might inform a rater's sexual harassment judgments.

Only 22 studies asked about prior experiences with unwanted sexual attention, primarily prior sexual harassment experiences, even though prior experience with harassment is provided as the most common explanation for the male/female differences in the Discussion sections of the studies (see Table 6). Forty percent of the studies measured at least one attitudinal variable. Attitudes toward women and toward sexual harassment account for 62 percent of the attitudes measured.

The research on sexual harassment definitions has also been conducted primarily with undergraduate students (see Table 7). Fifty-one studies (64%) used an undergraduate sample (11 of these were combined with graduate students or other university personnel). Educational institutions accounted for 62 of the 79 study populations (78%). Twelve studies were conducted with employees or adults from the community, while three were conducted on military populations.

[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]

Most of the studies were conducted in classrooms or laboratories, 47 of the 79 (nearly 60%) while 27 were surveys (39 percent). For the surveys, response rates are a concern, as shown in Table 8. Thirteen of the 31 surveys

had response rates under 40 percent, although 6 surveys reported response rates over 70 percent. The survey relied upon by the Ellison court, for example, yielded a 25 % response rate (Collins and Blodgett, 1981).

[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]

Nearly every study used written stimulus materials (75 of 79), with more than half of those originally created by each author for purposes of that study. This, of course, makes it more challenging to compare across studies, further justifying the need for a meta-analysis of these studies. Six were copied verbatim from another study, while another 30 were adapted or modified from another study or source.

In examining the substantive underpinning of these studies, it is interesting to note that 49 studies mentioned or discussed at least one theoretical explanation for sexual harassment, yet only 21 studies appeared to test any particular theory (and, most of those examined attribution theory). About half of the studies (n=44) provided a definition of sexual harassment in the literature review, although only 7 provided raters with a definition when asking them to decide whether the behavior was sexual harassment. A number of researchers purposely did not provide a definition to ensure that they were tapping the raters' personal definitions rather than legal definitions. Interestingly, only 32 of the articles mentioned or discussed the law of sexual harassment at all, and few of those in much depth. While the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Meritor

Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) is discussed in eight articles, most articles settle for a mention (two articles) or discussion (20 articles) of the EEOC Guidelines. Eleven articles mention the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases, although only a few discuss it in any depth (see, e.g., Wiener, et al, 1994).

Inferential Data

Sex of Rater Difference. The overall unweighted mean effect size for the 79 included studies was .1635. Since a mean effect size of zero would indicate exactly no difference, this result suggests an overall sex difference (Eagly & Steffen, 1986). As predicted this result indicates a small but significant effect for sex of the rater ($t=12.54$, $p<.0001$). The effect size and homogeneity values are presented in Table 2. The standard deviation is .1158, the median r was

Table 9
Summary of Sex-of-Rater Differences

Effect Size Analysis

Criterion	Values
Unweighted Mean Effect Size (Meta r)	.1635
Standard Deviation	.1158
95% CI for (Meta r)	-.128/.455
Median Effect Size	.135
Mean Weighted Effect Size (weighted by N)	96.2936
75th Percentile	.229
25th Percentile	.08
Maximum Effect Size	.647
Minimum Effect Size	.017

.135, and the 95th Percentile Confidence Interval ranged from -.128 to .455. The range and variability of the effect sizes are also shown in the stem-and-leaf plot in Figure 1.

These overall effect size results do not fully convey the complexity of the analysis of the 79 individual effect sizes, however. Thirty-six of the 79 effect sizes required some amount of recalculation to produce an overall effect size. For 22 individual effect sizes, an average chi square was calculated by averaging the percentages within each of the male and female categories and reconstructing contingency tables of observed and expected frequencies. This value was entered into the data set as the average chi-square value. In an additional 14 studies, an average mean difference was compared to the reported individual mean differences in the existing data. The closest mean difference was selected for comparison purposes and the relevant t-value was retrieved from the t-table based on the appropriate degrees of freedom and p value of the comparison mean difference. This value was entered into the data set as the average t value. Effect sizes were then calculated for the reported values (those taken directly from author reports, e.g., reported Fs, ts, or χ^2 (r = .2068) and for the derived values, e.g., average χ^2 or ts (r = .1143). Since nonsignificant findings are more likely to be reflected in the derived values, it is not surprising that these two values differed significantly ($F(41,36) = 2.40$, $p=.0087$). The overall meta effect size was calculated by combining both sets of r values (r = .1635).

The averaging of results produced a smaller overall effect size, and also inevitably led to loss of information and complexity of the data. Researchers may have chosen not to combine the results on individual stimuli into an overall test of significance because of differences in those individual stimuli. Most studies included stimuli for which the researchers expected to obtain a sex difference and stimuli for which they expected to not obtain a difference (e.g., sexual coercion by a supervisor). Fifty-one of the 79 effect sizes could be examined at the individual stimuli level. Table 10 presents an analysis of the 51 studies which allowed comparisons at the individual stimuli level because they reported significant differences between males and females for each individual stimulus item. In Terpstra and Baker's (1987) study, for example, mean ratings for males and for females on each of the 18 scenarios reveal a significant difference for only one scenario. In total, three hundred and seventy-four individual scenarios or behaviors were included in those 51 studies. Of those 374, only 164 showed a significant sex difference, i.e., 44 percent of the individual items. Moreover, a closer inspection of Figure 2 reveals that while 11 studies reported that males and females differed on each one of the stimuli in that particular study, males and females did not differ on any of the individual items in 13 studies (25%). The distribution of percentage differences displayed in Figure 2 does not support strong or clear sex differences, at least at the

individual item level. A second phase of this meta-analysis is underway which will further scrutinize sex differences at the individual stimuli level.[7]

Study Characteristic Variables. A number of predictions were made about features of the studies that might account for the variability in the sex effect. Only one, year of publication, approached significance ($F(1,77)=2.84$, $p=.0961$). Contrary to predictions, studies conducted after 1992 (and, therefore, after the Hill-Thomas hearings) tended to show a larger sex effect (After 1992 =.1855, Before 1993 = .1420). None of the following variables had any measurable effect on the overall effect size: sex of first author, type of publication (published v. unpublished), presence of discussion of theory, presence of mention of law, type of study (factorial design, ratings of behaviors, ratings, of scenarios, or surveys), setting for study (classroom/lab v. real world), source of respondent population (undergraduate v. graduate v. university employee v. community), or whether the study measured rater attitudes or prior sexual experiences.

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[7] In the second phase of this meta-analysis, each stimulus item for which male/female results are provided is being individually coded, thus treating each stimuli as a dependent variable. The variables to be coded include: Status of the harasser and target, level of detail in the scenario or behavior, context for the scenario or behavior, presence of contested facts, severity and pervasiveness of behavior, and both legal (quid pro quo versus hostile work environment) versus psychological category of sexual harassment (based on work by Fitzgerald, Till, and Gruber). This analysis will allow more insight into the type of information that may produce male/female differences or agreement. It will also avoid the

DISCUSSION

Close inspection of the descriptive data reported in this study suggests that what know about people's definitions of sexual harassment is primarily how young, college students define it. When we know the race of research participants, it is predominantly white. Less than one-third of the studies provided any data on prior work history or prior experiences with unwanted sexual attention, and only two out of five measured any attitudinal variable. Few put the sexual harassment definition task in legal context. These descriptive results lend support to the picture painted by Gutek and O'Connor (1995) of an underfunded body of research that has over-relied on sex sometimes to the exclusion of other potential explanatory variables.

Further confirming the earlier qualitative review of the literature (Gutek & O'Connor, 1995), this meta-analysis produced a small but significant effect for sex of the rater ($r = .16$), such that women have somewhat broader definitions or sexual harassment than men. None of the study characteristics significantly affected that result, with the exception of a trend toward later studies producing more divergent ratings.

This overall finding is consistent with the effect size reported in the only other known meta-analysis performed on the question of male/female

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problem of collapsing information to derive an overall average effect size for each study.

differences in perception of sexual harassment (Blumenthal, 1998). Since it is the only other known meta-analysis on this topic, it will be examined in some detail.

Blumenthal (1998) reported an overall effect size of $\underline{r} = .171$ for the effect of gender on respondents' definitions of sexual harassment. While it is encouraging to see such consistent results, the current study provides a much more precise estimate of the actual differences between male and female respondents in this literature for the following reasons. First, the comprehensiveness of the literature reviews differ substantially between the two studies. Blumenthal (1998) reports computerized searches of PsycLit and PsycInfo (as well as LEXIS and WESTLAW legal databases) as the primary means of identifying qualifying studies (supplemented by reviews of the reference section of each identified article). While the current meta-analysis also relied on computerized database searches, many databases were searched beyond PsycLit, resulting in the identification of studies outside the mainstream of psychological research (such as Barr, 1993, reporting two studies in Sociological Inquiry; Booth-Butterfield, 1989, reporting two studies in Communication Quarterly; and, Carroll and Ellis, 1989, reporting survey results from a faculty sample in Initiatives, none of which are indexed in PsycInfo).

Another indicator of the comprehensiveness of the initial search is the extent to which manuscripts other than published journal articles are retrieved.

Since Blumenthal (1998) relied primarily on PsycInfo/PsycLit, many unpublished reports were not retrieved (see Rosenthal, 1991, p. 44, for a discussion of the importance of multiple literature search strategies and suggesting that reliance on only on or two research indices would "miss an appreciable proportion of retrievable studies"). Of the 68 studies[8] reported in Blumenthal's (1998) reference list as "included studies," only 11 (16%) are unpublished, and all of those are dissertations and masters theses (10 dissertations and 1 masters thesis). Seven of the 10 dissertations were completed in 1994 or 1995, while one other (Jensen, 1982) is a duplicate of another study included in Blumenthal's meta-analysis (Jensen & Gutek, 1982). In the meta-analysis reported herein, 26 (35%) of the 75 total includable studies are unpublished—16 dissertations, 1 master's thesis, 3 conference presentations, 3 government reports, 2 popular magazine surveys, and one unpublished manuscript.

A final measure of the inclusiveness of the literature search is the inclusion of the studies upon which many other studies rely to justify the existence of a perceptual gap between men and women. The most striking exclusions from Blumenthal's (1998) database are Collins and Blodgitt (1981),

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[8] Blumenthal (1998) reports that the effect size for gender was based on a total of 83 combined effect sizes from 111 studies. Yet, a count of the references which are marked with an * (for included study) yields only 68 studies. The analyses

and Gutek, et al (1980), both of which spawned much of the subsequent work in this area and both of which appear to satisfy the criteria for inclusion specified by Blumenthal (1998). Other noteworthy exclusions are Dunwoody-Miller and Gutek (1985)(a large-scale state survey of an adult working sample), Thomas (1995)(Navy report on gender differences), and Tyburski (1992)(large-scale survey of Navy personnel).

A second reason for having more confidence in the results of the current meta-analysis is Blumenthal's (1998) failure to deal adequately with the apples and oranges problem that so often befalls meta-analyses (see, e.g., Rosenthal, 1991; Mullen, 1989). As Blumenthal (1998, p. 40) reports, "[r]epresentative dependent measures from the studies included 'severity of harassment,' 'appropriateness of behavior,' 'seriousness of behavior,' or the 'guilt of the actor about whom subjects read'" (citations omitted). While these dependent measures might satisfy Blumenthal's (1998) own inclusion criteria, which state that the "study had to directly address the effect of [judge's gender]" (p. 37), they are overly broad if the rating of interest is people's definitions of sexual harassment. From a psychological standpoint, this is an apples and oranges problem because perceiving a behavior as serious or as appropriate is a different judgment than labeling a particular behavior sexual harassment. Not only does

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discussed in this section assume that 68 is the correct number of independent studies.

this make intuitive sense, it is supported empirically as well. As discussed in the Methods section, above, a number of studies have reported different results regarding male/female perceptions of the behavior regarding one of these categories and "sexual harassment" ratings. Hippensteele (1991), for example, found that significant gender differences in reactions to scenarios were more prevalent on questions regarding the behavior's appropriateness or sexism than on the sexual harassment rating of the behavior. One study reported gender differences in the relationship between these multiple dependent measures, such that whether women evaluated a particular behavior as inappropriate was unrelated to whether they judged it to be sexual harassment, whereas the two judgments were related for males (Bursik, 1992). Undoubtedly, these variables are related to each other in some fashion. Gervasio (1992) reported a correlation of .68 between perceived sexual harassment and perceived inappropriateness, indicating the two are related, but certainly not identical. Milner (1985) found that perceived seriousness of the behavior was the best predictor of sexual harassment definition. But, until we have a clearer understanding of the nature and form of the relationship between these variables, it is premature and imprecise to equate them.

Additionally, the underlying rationale for Blumenthal's (1988) meta-analysis was to respond to a "need in the legal system, for a quantitative, meta-analytic review of the assumptions underlying decisions about the reasonable

woman standard" (p. 34) as articulated by Frazier, et al (1995) and Gutek and O'Connor (1995). Given that, the dependent measure should more closely correspond with legal decisionmaking in sexual harassment cases.

Closer inspection of a number of included articles in the Blumenthal meta-analysis underscores the dependent measure problem. The current meta-analysis excluded a study by Bill and Naus (1992) on sexist humor which is included in Blumenthal's (1998) meta-analysis. In the study, raters were never asked whether the behavior constituted sexual harassment. Instead, they were asked whether the behavior was sexist and prejudicial or discriminatory. While sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, other forms also exist, and it is not clear from the study whether the participants are equating sex discrimination with sexual harassment. Similarly, raters never provided sexual harassment judgments in a number of other included studies, including Packer (1987)(subjects asked to rate how complimented, offended, pleased, angry and safe a woman feels in a harassment situation), and Reilly, Lott, and Caldwell (1992) and Reilly, Lott, and Gallogly (1986)(respondents completed Tolerance for Sexual Harassment Inventory, an attitudes toward sexual harassment scale containing no definitional items).

Some of the distinctions are more subtle, but can, nonetheless, be made. In Summers (1992), participants were asked to rate a man's behavior (making jokes and comments with a sexual innuendo) as an "unlikely cause" or a "likely

cause" of a woman's complaint. One of the questions focusing on the man and his behavior as the cause of the complaint was "He was committing an obvious act of sexual harassment" (p. 383). Yet, participants themselves never made any judgment themselves about the behavior as sexual harassment, only whether his behavior caused the woman to complain. In the judgment of this researcher, that is a reddish orange growing on an apple tree.

In Jensen and Gutek (1982), which is included in Blumenthal's database, the researchers used LA County survey data from Konrad and Gutek (1986) to examine sex differences in the assignment of responsibility to a victim of sexual harassment. Again, while this may ultimately be related to a sexual harassment judgment, it is not the same as indicating whether the behavior is sexual harassment. The only male/female data reported in Jensen & Gutek (1982) comes from the following question: "When a woman is asked by a man at work to engage in sexual relations, it's usually because she did something to bring it about" (54.5% of males versus 44.7% of females; $X^2 = 9.41$, $p < .001$). This is different in kind than asking whether asking a worker to engage in sexual relations is sexual harassment (see also included study Kanekar & Dhir, 1993, which also assessed victim blame, not sexual harassment).

Another problem arises with respect to Blumenthal's (1998) inclusion of Jensen and Gutek (1982). It appears from the Reference list that both the dissertation (Jensen, 1982) and published article based on it (Jensen and

Gutek,1982) are included. These are identical data sets, and the only male/female data reported in the Jensen articles comes from Konrad and Gutek's (1986) survey, which is also listed as an included study. Blumenthal (1998, p. 43) acknowledges the triplication, but does not clarify how many effect sizes are reported from these three studies.

When the courts are beginning to rely on findings from social science research, as the court did implicitly in Ellison v. Brady, there is room for replication of research findings to ensure reliable results. While this study replicates the reported result from Blumenthal (1998), the two meta-analyses are sufficiently distinct to not be viewed as replications, but as two quite different approaches to a similar problem. Given the expansive search of the literature undertaken in the current study and the precision with which studies were included or excluded, the overall result reached in this meta-analysis should be viewed as more validly indicating male/female differences in definitions of sexual harassment.

Nevertheless, despite this methodological rigor, one overall effect size for sex of the rater cannot adequately capture the full complexity of this line of research. A substantial amount of averaging and recalculating of results to produce an overall r for each study was required, masking potentially more intriguing results. Under closer scrutiny, the results on the individual stimulus items reported within these studies expose a more complex picture.

Recognizing the complexity of their own findings, many study authors tended to downplay the overall sex effect in their own studies. Collins and Blodgett (1981), for example, discussed consistency in male and female ratings on the severe behaviors. After reporting a highly significant F value ($p<.000$), Birkelli (1994) explained that gender was strongly correlated with attitudes toward women and with previous harassment experiences more strongly than it was with perceptions of sexual harassment. Gender accounted for little residual variance in sexual harassment definitions after accounting for variance of other variables on which gender differences were found (but see, Wiener, et al, 1994, sex accounting for 10% of the variance). Taylor and Malkani (1992) reported significant gender differences, but qualified their result by suggesting little practical difference in the way men and women were viewing the situation.

In the 51 studies for which data were available, significant differences between the sexes on individual items were detected in only 44% of the comparisons. In certain studies, significant differences were reported for each item; in others, differences were not found on any of the individual items. This suggests a strong stimuli effect, such that sex differences appear and disappear depending on the particular set of stimuli selected by the researcher.

What do these findings mean for the empirical underpinning of the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases? As Gutek and O'Connor (1995) predicted in their qualitative review, there is a small but

consistent effect for sex of the rater such that women tend to view more behaviors as sexual harassment than men. In a strict sense, then, the reasonable woman standard rests on solid ground in that a perceptual gap between men and women does exist.

Nevertheless, several factors still argue for caution. The appearance and disappearance of these gender effects on individual items of stimuli poses a challenge for interpreting the meaning of the overall effect size. As the descriptive overview confirms, many studies use stimuli that do not reflect facts or patterns that would be found in litigation, particularly the lists of behaviors and the very short scenarios. Terpstra and Baker (1987), for example, report no sex differences on 17 of 18 scenarios and their scenarios are drawn from actual court cases. And, the study populations are still dominated by younger, white undergraduate or other students, who may not be a proper source of wisdom on fundamental sex differences in perceptions of workplace behavior.

Under the influence of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), trial judges will have increased exposure to meta-analyses. They represent a concise, seemingly straightforward, and relatively objective means of condensing a large quantity of detailed information about a set of studies to a manageable result, typically one overall effect size. Courts and legal scholars have begun to discuss the pros and cons of meta-analyses in a post-Daubert world (see, e.g., Blanton, 1985, p. 219, touting meta-analysis as a tool for

synthesizing a number of scientific studies, but also raising concerns about the "apples and oranges" problem and the selection bias in including studies the meta analysis). Courts need to understand how many subjective judgments infiltrate this apparently objective statistical technique. Because study authors were not anticipating having any particular study included in a future meta-analysis, (although perhaps journal editors should begin to view articles in this manner), they carelessly, purposely, or through careful selection present only a portion of the data and analysis. Extrapolating from missing data or trying to pinpoint a precise number of respondents per question are tasks fraught with uncertainty. In a well-documented meta-analysis, each one of these judgment calls, extrapolations, and recalculations should be reproducible. But, the comparison of the two meta-analyses now available on this one, concise research question should be enough to send red flags to any conscientious trial judge.

At a minimum, the following questions need to be asked: 1) How did the meta-analyst identify the universe of studies to be included in the meta-analysis; 2) how did she then select the subset of studies that would satisfy the inclusion criteria—how do the dependent measures in each included study relate; 3) how were missing data problems handled; and, 4) what, if any, recalculations or extrapolations were conducted.

If called upon to testify in a Daubert admissibility hearing based on these results, would we be able to advise the court more competently regarding the need for a separate legal standard to support the female plaintiff's perspective? The answer is certainly yes. We can now specify in detail the precise nature of the research that has been done, the study populations, settings, and questions; we can criticize that body of work based on the failings identified systematically through the coding of these studies; and, we could explain to the court that a small but significant difference does seem to exist between male and female perspectives on sexual harassment definitions.

Yet, more intensive work is needed to understand the circumstances that produce a gender difference and those that produce little or no difference. A second phase of this meta-analysis is underway in which each individual stimuli will serve as a dependent measure. The type of harassment represented by the stimuli (gender harassment, sexual coercion, legal v. not legal, verbal v. physical), among other variables, will serve as important moderator variables as the overall sex effect is subjected to more in-depth scrutiny. Additionally, more consistent research aimed at understanding differences in how people respond to behaviors that might be considered sexual harassment will ultimately be needed before a complete understanding of any sex effect, no matter the size, is achieved (see, e.g, Burgess & Borgida, in press).

At this point, we are left with a small, overall sex effect. Yet, the data are not consistent with the view that under all circumstances this gender gap will appear. To the contrary, under some circumstances no differences appear at all. If men and women always differed, particularly on the types of cases that were likely to appear in court or across a broad spectrum of offensiveness, pervasiveness, or severity, then a new legal standard might make sense. But, if the overall effect is due primarily to a subset of stimulus materials that probably would not meet a legal definition, then it is premature at best to establish a separate legal standard for female victims of sexual harassment.

Table 1. Study Characteristics Coded from Each Study

Study Characteristics	Rater Variables	Article Content
AUTHOR DATA * # of Authors * Sex of 1st Author * # of Male Authors	INDEP. VARIABLES * Any used as IV? - age, status, race, attitudes, prior sexual experience, education, employment	ABSTRACT DATA * Did Abst report sex difference or no sex difference?
PUBLICATION DATA * Year * Type (journal article, book chap, masters, dissertation, etc.) FUNDING DATA * $ provided for study * Source of $ TYPE OF STUDY * Factorial Design * Ratings of * Scenarios * Lists of Behaviors * Survey	DEMOGRAPHICS - did study measure? * Sex * Age * Ethnicity/Race * Education * Employment * Income * Marital Status * Attitudes * Prior sexual experience	LITERATURE REVIEW DATA * Discussion of sexual harassment theory? * Presence of feminist perspective? * Test of any theory? * Hypotheses tested? * Law - specific laws or cases discussed? * Was Reasonable Woman standard discussed? * Definition - of sexual harassment provided * Source of definition
STUDY SETTING * Classroom * Research Lab * Real-World * Survey STIMULUS DATA * Type: Written, Audio, Video * Source: Original creation, Copied, Modified	SOURCE of STUDY POP. * undergraduate * grad/prof'l student * faculty/staff * employees/adults * military	DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION DATA * Statement re M/F difference made? * Statement of no M/F difference made? * Explanation for difference or no difference given? * Relation to prior research discussed? * M/F Agreements discussed? * Within-sex differences discussed? * Within-sex v. Btwn-sex compared? * Other M/F issues discussed? * Was Reasonable Woman standard

discussed?

Table 1. Study Characteristics Coded from Each Study
-continued-

RATINGS DATA
* # of stimulus rated
* # of ratings per stimulus
* Asked whether stimulus is SexH
* S given definition of SexH
* Rating scale
* # of Scale points
* Perspective-taking

METHODS CHECKS
* Equivalence between M/F raters checked?
* M/F experimenters used?

SURVEY STATS
* Response Rate

Table 2
Number of Included Studies by Year
n = 78



Table 3
Types of Manuscript
n = 75

Published Journal Article	44[a]
Book Chapter	2
Published Article based on Dissertation/Master's	3
Dissertation	16[b]
Master's Thesis	1
Conference presentation	3
Government Report	3
Popular journal/magazine	2
Unpublished manuscript	1
Published Total	49
Unpublished Total	26

[a] Three published journal articles reported two studies and produced two effect sizes for inclusion in the meta-analysis; the two studies per article are not double-counted here.

[b] One dissertation reported two studies and produced two effect sizes for inclusion in the meta-analysis; the two studies are not double-counted here.

Table 4
Number of Individual Stimuli per Study

SCENARIOS		LISTS OF BEHAVIORS	
# of Scenarios	# of Studies	# of Behaviors	# of Studies
1	□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□	1	
2	□□□	2	
3		3	
4	□□	4	
5	□□□	5	□
6	□□□□□	6	
7		7	□
8	□□□	8	□□□□□□
9	□	9	□□
10	□□□	10	□□
11		11	□
12	□□□□	12	
14	□	14	□
15	□	15	
16	□	16	□
18	□□	18	□
20		20	□□
24	□□□□□	24	□
27		27	□
30	□	30	
32		32	□
34	□□	34	
37		37	□
60	□		
68	□		
70	□		
80	□		

□ = One Study

Table 5
Rater Characteristics Measured and Reported

Characteristic	# of Studies:	Details of Reports:
Age	57 (72%)	25 studies reported an average * Range = 16.8 - 46.3 yrs * Average X = 25.8 yrs 32 studies reported distributions * Range = Lowest - 18-22 = 78% = Highest - > 40 = 62%
Race	32 (40%)	% of white respondents in those 32 studies:

Percent	# of Studies
100	□□
91-95	□□□□□□□
86-90	□□□□□□
81-85	□□□
76-80	□
71-75	□□□
66-70	□□
61-65	
56-60	□
51-55	
46-51	□
41-45	
36-40	□
31-35	
26-30	
21-25	□
16-20	□

Education	28 (35%)	22 studies report a distribution of education levels *14 report class distribution of undergraduate or graduate sample * 8 report # of years of education or level attained

Table 5
Rater Characteristics Measured and Reported
-continued-

Characteristic	# of Studies:	Details of Reports:
Employment	26 (33%)	14 studies report % full-time workers 7 studies report % part-time workers 6 studies report # of yrs work experience 6 studies report income information 3 studies report supervisory experience
Income	11 (14%)	
Prior Sexual Experiences	22 (28%)	19 studies asked about prior sexual harassment 4 studies asked about prior sexual assault 4 studies asked about prior sexual abuse
Attitudes	32 (40%)	42 different attitudes were measured in 6 categories: Toward Sexual Harassment - 15 Toward Women/Sex Roles - 11 Gender Identity - 2 Locus of Control - 3 Religiosity - 3 Perspective-Taking - 1 Other - 7

Table 6
Explanations provided in Discussion Sections for Male/Female Perceptual Gap
n=37

Divergent experiences with unwanted sexual attention	9
Power analysis/Conflict theory	7
Divergent views of male/female roles	6
Harm avoidance v. Blame avoidance	5
Perspective-taking	4
In-Group identification	1
Gender composition of workforce	1
Ambiguity of social norms	1
Social exchange theory	1

Table 7
Sources of Respondent Population

Sample Source	# of Studies	
High School Students	2	
Undergraduates (total)	40	
-U.S. Samples		38
-Non U.S. Samples		2
Undergraduates & Graduate Students	9	
-U.S. Samples		8
-Non U.S. Samples		1
Graduate Students	2	
Professional School Students	2	
Graduate Students & Faculty	1	
Undergraduate, Graduate, Faculty & Staff	2	
Faculty	4	
Employees	8	
Adults from the Community	4	
Managers & Supervisors	2	
Military Personnel	3	
Other	1	

Table 8
Survey Response Rates

n = 31 (39% of all studies)

Response Rate	Number of Studies
100%	□
90-99%	□□□
80-89%	□
70-79%	□
60-69%	□□□□
50-59%	□□□□□
40-49%	□□□
30-39%	□□□□□□□□□
20-29%	□□□□

Table 10
Overall Percentage of Stimuli Producing Male/Female Differences
n = 51

Overall # of individual scenarios & behaviors rated:	374
# for which significant male/female differences reported:	164
Overall percentage of individual stimuli for which significant male/female differences found:	44%

Figure 1
Visual Display of Data

Variable=META_R

Stem Leaf	#	Boxplot
6 5	1	0
6		
5		
5		
4 8	1	0
4		
3 67999	5	|
3 023	3	|
2 556689	6	|
2 0123334	7	+-----+
1 555666678899	12	| + |
1 0000011112222344444	19	*-----*
0 555566677778888888999	20	+-----+
0 22333	5	|
		----+----+----+----+

Multiply Stem.Leaf by 10**-1

Figure 2: Percentage of Stimuli Producing Male/female Differences per Study (2 views)



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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)













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