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**BUILDING SOLIDARITY: THE PROCESS FOR METROPOLITAN
CHINESE MUSLIMS, 1912-1949**

by

Sandra Aili Green

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES**

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SIGNED: *Sanley J. Green*

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ABSTRACT

In the midst of revolution as the Qing Dynasty faded into the twentieth century, metropolitan Chinese Muslim leaders took initiatives in their communities, which shaped change. As a result, a process was set in motion, one that effected the identity of urban Chinese Muslims in more ways than one -- within the new political scene nationally, internationally, and in regards to other Muslims in China. The process stimulated a self-awareness among Chinese Muslim urban populations, which promoted new perceptions of their identity as Hui. The process also triggered a debate among Chinese Muslim intellectuals in which ideas of minzu-ness, ethnicity, and religiosity were argued. The process fostered a sense of solidarity among the urban Muslim communities.

Chinese Muslim activities paralleled those of other Chinese. Chinese Muslims took part in the New Culture Movement, many joined the army. At the same time they focused attention on improving their communities. This dissertation examines the activities of urban Chinese Muslims: the creation of study groups and associations, the revamping of Muslim schools; and the publishing of books and periodicals. The dissertation is a look at strategies used in adapting to change. The goal has been to illustrate that the Chinese Muslims accepted change, even welcomed it, but in so doing altered perceptions of themselves and their religion.

The metropolitan Chinese Muslims got swept up in the enthusiasm of the early republican era. Many influential members of the community endorsed the Nationalists' revolution and the new republic. Chinese Muslim urbanites welcomed modernization and nationalism, seeing them as vehicles that would facilitate their efforts, and protect them. Chinese Muslim motives were nationalistic, as Chinese they wanted a strong China. Their motives were also parochial. They wanted a strong local community, and they actively set out to improve conditions. By strengthening their communities they could insure the survival of Chinese Muslim culture, just as a strong China would insure the survival of Chinese culture.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1912 the founders of the new Republic of China adopted a flag that consisted of five horizontal strips (red, yellow, blue, white, and black), each said to represent one of China's five major groups, partners in a common enterprise. Sun Yatsen had acknowledged the existence of four distinct minority groups -- Muslims, Mongolians, Manchus and Tibetans -- in addition to the majority Han Chinese. The groups essentially mirrored the groups the Qianlong emperor had designated on the map of the Qing Empire.¹ The Han, living in China's heartland provinces of the Pearl River, the Yangzi, and the Yellow River basins constituted the vast majority of the population. The traditional homelands of the other groups were regions beyond the central Han domain. The Muslims were the Turkic-speaking tribes of Xinjiang. Mongolian lands extended along the northern borders of the Qing Empire. The Manchu homeland was in the far reaches of the Northeast. That of the Tibetans centered in the massive plateau beyond the southwestern provinces.

The strategy to name five nationalities was hardly subtle since the republic laid claim to the same domain as the Qing. After a century of foreign encroachment, the

¹ See James Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 197-203.

Chinese hoped to maintain the vast regions of Xinjiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Tibet, both for protection and strength. The Nationalists rallied the people of the former empire to unite in the formation of a new nation-state. The dynastic system would be replaced with a modern republican government asserting a leadership of citizens, who unlike imperial subjects of old, would enjoy new rights and opportunities, and would take on a political role. Sun Yatsen promised the republic would satisfy the needs of all groups, and unite them in a single cultural and political whole.²

Soon after the establishment of the republic Sun Yatsen admitted that China was really one race, and the non-Han peoples were small in number, thereby suggesting that his promise required assimilation on the part of the minorities. The Guomindang Manifesto of 1924, said to be the words of Sun Yatsen, stated, however, that the government should help “and guide the weak and small racial groups within its national boundaries toward self-determination and self-government.”³ The contradiction between assimilation and self-determination was not explained, but in 1927 the Guomindang, GMD, changed the national flag, replacing the five barred flag with a design that was a variation of the 1895 Guomindang flag.

The new flag, a white sun in a blue sky over a red ground, was endowed with symbolism, too. The sun’s twelve points represented the twelve-hour periods of the day, and stood for a “forever-progressive spirit.” The colors collectively represented

² June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 16-17.

³ Chinese Ministry of Information, comp. *China Handbook, 1937-1945* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1947), 74.

Sun's Three People's Principles (*Sanmin Zhuyi*). Blue stood for equality, white for fraternity, and red for liberty.⁴ The changing of the flag, however, symbolized a retreat from the ideal of the union of different groups, and was underlined by the adoption of an explicitly assimilationist policy."⁵ Although the Manifesto had reiterated the right of self-determination, and autonomy if a group chose, the GMD chief goal was to maintain the union. State-nationality (*guozu*) and Chinese nationality (*zhonghua guozu*) implied fusion of all groups into one nation.⁶

Dreyer notes Sun disregarded, or did not know about, the numerous small minorities that can be found in the Southwest and elsewhere. At the same time, it is curious that Sun did not include the Chinese Muslims, today known as the Hui, among his minority groups. The Chinese Muslims of the Northwest were a sizable population, and their inclusion would have fit the pattern of China's different groups uniting. The Chinese Muslims were sinophones, however, and Sun apparently did not consider their religious difference grounds to acknowledge them as a separate group.⁷ This is assuming the Muslims Sun referred were the *Huibu*, the Turkic-speaking Muslims of Xinjiang, the Uyghurs. The term *Huibu*, however, did leave room for ambiguity. The words, *hui* and *huihui*, meant Muslim in general, and there were more Muslim groups than Uyghurs and Chinese Muslims alone.

⁴ Chinese Ministry, *China Handbook*, np.

⁵ Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, 16-17.

⁶ Colin Mackerras, *China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994), 53-58.

⁷ Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, 16-17.

The term Hui was used to designate being Muslim. The term's definitional base was religion, and culturally distinct groups who shared a belief in Islam would be referred to as Hui regardless of their differences. Muslims dwelt in all parts of China, and thus, people as culturally diverse as Turkic-speaking Muslims of the Northwest and Chinese-speaking Muslims in Shandong were all be referred to as Hui. More specific terms were often used by locals to distinguish between various Muslims. For example, in the Tarim Basin, *Chantou Hui* (Wrapped head Hui) referred to the Uyghurs. Other more specific ethnonyms included the *Dongxiang Hui* of Gansu and Xinjiang, the *Sala Hui* of Qinghai and Gansu, and the Chinese-speaking *Hanhui* living throughout China proper.⁸ In the People's Republic of China (PRC) today, however, the term Hui has more specific cultural and linguistic boundaries: it does not refer to followers of Islam but only to the Chinese-speaking Muslims, the Hanhui (also called the Sino-Muslims). Others who had previously been included in the broader definition of Hui are now known by other names.⁹

A number of names had been used historically for Muslims. By Yuan times (1260-1368 AD) the terms *Huihui*, or *Huihui ren* were used to designate those who were Muslims. The origin of the term Hui, or Huihui, is not clear. One theory traces the earliest use of the term to the Liao Dynasty (915-1125 AD) where it appears in Jin documents in reference to foreigners that traded along the China coast who were

⁸ Jonathan Lipman, "Hui-Hui: An Ethnohistory of the Chinese-speaking Muslims" in *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 11:1 and 2 (1987), 112-113. Also see Dru Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1991), 19-20.

⁹ Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 16-20.

followers of Islam.¹⁰ Another theory suggests that the term *Huihe* was used as a Chinese transliteration for Uyghur, who happened to be Muslim. Song officials (960-1279 AD), however, applied the term to any believers of Islam, which would have expanded the application of the term to make it synonymous with being Muslim. Some scholars speculate that the character *hui*, to return, was used because of the Islamic practice of the pilgrimage to Mecca -- the return to the holy center. In the same vein, others suggest that the ritual of turning to Mecca five times a day for prayers may have promoted the use of the word *hui*, which can also mean “turn back.” The terms *Huihui ren*, *Huihui*, or just *Hui*, were applied to those who had embraced Islam, regardless if they were Arab and Persian merchants, or Turkic-speaking peoples of Inner Asia,¹¹ and varied populations were named co-religionists although they could hardly be seen as cultural kin.

Islam itself became known in China as the religion of the Hui, or *Huijiao*, and Chinese Muslims were also referred to as *Huijiao ren* or *Huijiao tu*, the believers of *Huijiao*. Chinese called the *Sanjiao*, the three major beliefs (Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism), *Dajiao*, the Big Faith. Islam in turn was referred to as *Xiaojiao*, the Little Faith. Among themselves, however, Chinese Muslims referred to Islam as the “Pure and True Religion,” *Qingzhen Jiao*. In addition, Muslims have transliterated the word Islam into Chinese, creating a number of terms which include *Yisi lan*, *Yisilan jiao*, and *Yisa lamu*. In the same vein there are additional terms to mean Muslim, *Musi lin*, *Mushi lin*,

¹⁰Bai Shouyi, *Huizu, Huijiao, Huimin Lunji* [Essays on Hui Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationality] (Zhongshan Tushu Gongsu, 1974), 73.

¹¹Bai Shouyi, *Huizu, Huijiao*, 73.

and *Mumin*. This last term is derived from an Arabic term meaning “the faithful.”¹²

The PRC identifies fifty-six nationalities (*minzu*), one being the majority, the Han Chinese nationality, and the other fifty-five being minority nationalities (*shaoshu minzu*). The Hui are now one of the fifty-five minority nationalities. The government does not consider religion a factor in the classification of nationalities. Instead the PRC’s State Commission for Nationality Affairs (SCNA) still applies Stalin’s four criteria when defining nationality: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture.¹³ Ten of the present-day officially recognized nationalities can also be identified by their religion, Islam (the Hui being one of them). The other nine nationalities, as already noted, formerly grouped together as Hui or “Muslim,” include Turkic-speaking Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kirghiz, Salar, Uzbeks, and Tatars; and Persian-speaking Tadjiks; and Mongolian-speaking Baoan and Dongxiang.¹⁴

The traditional homelands of these nine groups are to the north and northwest of China proper. In these regions Han Chinese have never constituted the majority (although present-day Han migration may be transforming population figures in a number of these areas). Most of these other Muslim minority nationalities, did not live under the suzerainty of the Han Middle Kingdom for centuries at a time, and they were able to retain distinctive non-Chinese cultures. The Hui, in contrast, reside in China

¹²Barbara Pillsbury, *Cohesion and Cleavage in a Chinese Muslim Minority* (Phd dissertation, Columbia University, New York), v.

¹³Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 66.

¹⁴Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 18-21.

proper where they have coexisted with their Han Chinese neighbors for some thirteen centuries. Hui cultural identity, in contrast to other Muslims in the PRC, has evolved amidst the greater Han Chinese society.

It is intriguing that even where the modern Hui seem to be assimilated into the Chinese mainstream, they are still officially and popularly considered a separate nationality. Attempts to define this minority nationality, however, remain a challenge, where historical perspectives clash with ideological criteria, as it were. Although the Hui were one of the first nationalities to be recognized by the Communists in the early fifties, Hui traits do not fit the Stalinist model. Regardless of official or non-official categorization, Hui and non-Hui alike do not seem to dispute the validity of today's Hui shaoshu minzu classification. Hui identity seems to be rooted in the minds of all Chinese, regardless of academic or political dogma. Anthropologist Barbara Pillsbury suggests that being Hui implies "membership in both a religious group and in a large, highly self-aware ethnic group."¹⁵ After centuries of residing in China differences that were once pronounced may have faded, but the Chinese Muslims remain imbued with a deep sense of Hui identity. That identity may confound anthropological definitions, but cannot be denied.

All cities have Chinese Muslim populations. In fact, the Hui constitute the largest percentage of the minority nationalities in major cities. Over two thirds of Beijing's minority population is Hui, and in Shanghai and Tianjin, nearly ninety percent of

¹⁵Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, 63-74.

the minority population is Hui.¹⁶ The Hui usually lived in communities not unlike Chinatowns or Little Italys in the United States. Some communities are referred to by their mosque, such as the Oxen Street district for the Oxen Street Mosque in Beijing. The entrance of the main streets of Muslim districts were sometimes marked by pailou-like archways. Sometimes plaques were posted that announced “meat from outside not allowed inside” (*wailai rou buneng jinlai*), or carry the term *jiaomen* (meaning religious teaching, or Islam).¹⁷

Historical records trace the entrance of Muslims -- from merchants to mercenaries -- into China at different times and places. As a result Chinese-speaking Muslims can be found throughout China, and their stories are not all the same. Hui ancestors who came to China by sea migrated inland from coastal cities. Those whose ancestors came overland into China now reside in the Northwest. By far the largest percentage of Chinese-speaking Muslims reside in Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai, which have been referred to as China’s Muslim Belt. Qinghai and Ningxia were deliberately created regarding the Muslim population.¹⁸ Chinese Muslims constitute the majority population in parts of northern and western Gansu province, and the southern section of the capital Lanzhou is exclusively Chinese Muslim. There are also sizable Hui populations in Guizhou, Sichuan and especially Yunnan.

¹⁶Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 174.

¹⁷James Hutson, “The Sz’chuan Moslem” in *Moslem World* 10 (1920), 252.

¹⁸Dreyer, *China’s Forty Millions*, 26-29.

Hui reside in all parts of China and their livelihoods and life styles are as diverse as those of their Han neighbors, which are as diverse as the physical geography of China.

... divergent identities reflect a wide variety of Hui Muslims in China from Sufi fundamentalists to urban workers, from northern wheat farmers to southeastern fishermen, from noodle-makers to Party leaders, from smartly dressed “Western” urbanities to veiled north-western melon-sellers, from imam to cadre, *hajji* to atheist, these people all call themselves Hui, and are identified by the state as such, and strongly resent all attempts to regard them otherwise as an insult to their heritage. That all these different peoples could see themselves as one ethnic group wreaks havoc on modern ethnicity theory; that they have united together as one national unity with a growing population, connections to the Middle East, and political clout, makes Chinese Communist cadres give serious consideration to many of their demands and requestion Marxist dogma about the fading of national differences in socialist societies. It is in the particularities of their differences, and the shared imaginings of their similarities, that their identity is to be located--not in any reified notion of what a “Hui Muslim” is, or an assumed construction of “Chinese-ness.”¹⁹

How does one go about locating Hui “particularities” and “shared imaginings?” Where do these imaginings come from? Is there a trajectory that can be traced, which will reveal sources and formulae for a modern Hui national identity? Did the Chinese-speaking Muslims think of themselves as a *minzu* before the People’s Republic so designated them?

When the Qianlong emperor identified the five peoples (or nations, *guojia*) of the empire more than a century earlier, Hui was used to designate the Muslims of

¹⁹ Gladney, *Chinese Muslim*, xi.

Xinjiang.²⁰ But when Sun Yatsen beseeched the “Hui” to join the Nationalists, Muslims in other parts of China had fair reason to believe that Sun addressed them, as well. As confused and vague as the appellation Hui was, it had never been used solely to mean the Turkic-speaking Muslims of Xinjiang. The label was still mired in ambiguity in the first half of the twentieth century before the term found its present-day minority nationality, shaoshu minzu, status in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).²¹ The term Hui and the idea of Hui identity would be transformed as China moved into the twentieth century.

New terms and concepts were introduced, which raised new questions about identity, from cultural to national. A process of change was set into motion. Questions of nationalism and ethnicity and race reflect the socio-political chaos that riddled the subcontinent. When the ROC united China, albeit nominally, the government laid claim to the territory of the former Qing Empire not only for international reasons of strategy, but also to promote nationalist pride.²² The Nationalists relied on nationalism and patriots for support. Nationalism was used to inspire action, but it was not the sole domain of the GMD. Patriotic slogans and propaganda were common themes in the movements and literature of the day. The environment invited iconoclasm. A public forum emerged which allowed new voices to be heard, and progress became a buzz word.

²⁰ For a discussion of Manchu concepts of nation/country, see Mark Elliott, “Manchu (Re)Definitions of Nation in Early Qing” (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Annual Symposium in Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1995). For discussion on five nations in the Qing Empire see Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 197- 203.

²¹ Bai Shouyi, “Huihui Minzu de Xingcheng” [The Nature of the Hui Nationality] in *Guangming Ribao* 17 February 1951.

²² The maps in Taiwan, the present-day ROC, still include Mongolia (Outer Mongolia).

The demise of dynastic rule altered everything. A modern new public sphere emerged allowing China's city dwellers to actively explore the prospects of modern representative government. Like their Han Chinese neighbors the Chinese Muslims sought ways to participate in the creation of a new and improved society. Muslim leaders, like Han Chinese, were intellectuals, students and scholars, and, in the case of the Chinese Muslims, religious leaders. The life of Chinese Muslims dwelling in cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Nanjing was unlike that of the Muslims in other parts of China. Chinese Muslims in regions of the Northwest and Southwest, for the most part, lived in rural settings and were poor. The life style and culture of metropolitan Muslims was quite different. That is not to say they were well-off. Poverty and illiteracy were common, as was the case among all Chinese. Muslim urbanites, in contrast to rural populations, however, were exposed to new ideas and change.

This study focuses on Chinese-speaking Muslims who lived in Beijing and other cities with predominantly Han Chinese populations during the opening decades of the Republic of China. In materials produced at that time, the Chinese-speaking Muslims used the terms Hui -- Huimin, Huizu or Huijiao ren (Muslim citizenry, Muslim nationality or Muslim religionists). The same terms were used when referring to all and any Muslims, that is not only other Muslim ethnic groups in China, but to Muslims outside of China, in addition to the Chinese-speaking Muslims. The usage could be in broad, general terms, but the metropolitan authors usually distinguished other Muslims in ways that indicated

that the subject was outside of the author's community. For example, "our Muslim brothers in Xinjiang (*women hui tong xiongdi zai xinjiang*)."²³

This dissertation centers on metropolitan Chinese-speaking Muslims, Sino-Muslims.²⁴ They are Hanhui or Chinese Muslims, and I will use these terms in my discussion, since the term Hui had not yet been reduced to mean the Chinese-speaking Hanhui exclusively. Muslims other than Chinese Muslims will be further identified by contemporary names if need be. During the republican period the meaning of terms combined with "hui" play a significant role in the dialogue that surfaces in the Chinese Muslim communities.

The hypothesis of this dissertation is that in the midst of revolution as the Qing faded into the twentieth century, metropolitan Chinese Muslim leaders take initiatives in their communities, which shape change. As a result, a process is set in motion, one that effects Chinese Muslim identity in more ways than one -- within the new political scene nationally, internationally, and in regards to other Muslims in China. The process stimulates a self-awareness among metropolitan Chinese Muslims, which promotes new perceptions of their identity as Hui. The process also triggers a debate among metropolitan Chinese Muslim intellectuals in which ideas about ethnicity, minzu-ness, and religiosity are argued. They do not resolve the debate, but it fosters a sense of solidarity among Chinese Muslims.

²³*Huiwen Baihua Bao* 5 (1913).

²⁴Lipman presents several discussions about the use of terms, such as Sino-Muslim and Chinese Muslim, see References; also see Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, v-vi.

I think the process crystallizes in the urban centers of the eastern and coastal regions, and parts of Yunnan. The vast majority of Chinese Muslims, however, lived in Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia, but their involvement comes later. The lag time was due to a number of factors, from geography to politics. The prevailing warlord conditions certainly played a role in separating the Northwest from the East. The activities of the urban Chinese Muslim communities, in contrast to the Northwest, also reflect the politicization going on in Chinese cities.

Beijing's Chinese Muslim community, for example, becomes a forerunner of progressive projects that included forming associations and new schools, and producing publications, but these activities are duplicated in a number of cities. The design was to extend projects to Hui communities throughout China, and the goal was met with varying degrees of success. The process instilled a consciousness in urban Chinese Muslim communities that otherwise could have been overshadowed by Han Chinese culture. By the 1940s Chinese-speaking Muslims had developed a sense of Hui-ness, which fortified their identity. I suggest that the PRC would not have so easily perceived the metropolitan Chinese Muslims as an official minority nationality in the early 1950s if the process of change had not already galvanized the Chinese Muslim community.

The voice of the urban Chinese Muslim community, like that of non-Muslim Chinese, reflects China's struggle to become a modern nation-state. Both peoples in words and deeds expressed the questions and issues facing all early twentieth century Chinese as they attempted to redefine themselves and their country. Many Chinese-speaking Muslims in Beijing and cities such as Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing and

Guangzhou appear to have embraced the young republic. Its flag was emblazoned on their publications and hung in Chinese Muslim meeting halls during those years. A number of Muslim periodicals heartily endorsed the Nationalist government. More importantly Chinese Muslim discourse in these urban communities subscribed to the proposition of becoming citizens in a democratic society. But what did that mean in the context of the time? What did nationhood and citizenship mean in the Chinese environment?

Sun Yatsen and the Nationalist Party entreated the people of China to unite to form the new Chinese nation-state, and former subjects would become modern citizens. For the Party the modern state rested on nationalism (*minzu juyi*), which conditioned a strong China and improved human well-being. This state would have a special character as a modern “nation-state” (*guojia*) comprised of citizens who were “nationals” in two dimensions: as members of the state at large and also as members of a subordinate ethnic “nationality.” Members of these ethnic nationalities would have to accept the greater nationality of the nation-state in order for the latter to survive. The modern nation-state would require the consensus of its citizenry -- of all the groups comprising it.

Nations are often made up of a number of ethnicities, as was the case of the Republic of China. When citizens accept the nationality of the nation-state, they do not assume they will lose their ethnicity in the name of a greater national identity. Thus, if the pact is made, the ethnic identity of the citizen should be insured by the modern nation-state. Defining nationalism and nationality in early twentieth century China became

part of the process of defining modern China and what it is to be Chinese. In this context how did Chinese Muslims perceive themselves?

Different terms are defined in the first three decades of the republic, *minzu*, *guojia*, race, *qun*, *zhonglei*. *Minzu*, for example, is used as an enticement by the Nationalists in their rallying the people of China to unite. But the term hardly had a set definition. Chinese identity was being re-perceived, discovered, and invented.²⁵ The formulation of modern identities (intentionally or not) is a theme running through this dissertation.

This paper will first look at an overview of the history of Muslims in China. The focus is on the Chinese heartland where Muslims became not only sinophones, but Chinese. Chapter Two looks at nationalism and citizenship in the new republic, and their impact on Chinese Muslims. Chapter Three describes metropolitan Muslim organizations, and activities that set a process of change into motion. Chapter Four looks at publications and the translations (especially that of the Qur'an), demonstrating topics of concern in the Chinese Muslim community. The fifth chapter elaborates on the ethnicity of the Chinese-speaking Muslims. Revolutionaries and reformers raised questions of ethnicity and race, in seeking to interpret modern theories, and to come to terms with traditional concepts. Chinese Muslim scholars also questioned perceptions of ethnicity and identity in their communities.

²⁵For discussion on "invention of tradition." in the formulation of nationalism, see Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1990).

This dissertation centers on the activities of a subgroup, a subaltern group, within a dominant culture, and analyzes the group's ability to adapt to the context of the early twentieth century when China moves to modernize amid socio-political chaos. The major theme is that the process of change leads to a heightened sense of Huiness for Chinese Muslims.

I have used materials published during the republican period as my primary source materials for this dissertation. The richest archival collection I used was the Chinese Islamic Literature Collection compiled by Isaac Mason, which is housed at the New York City Public Library. Mason, a member of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, lived in China for thirty-three years, from 1892 until 1925. He was a Christian missionary and scholar who directed his efforts to preparing materials in Chinese and Arabic for use in Christian efforts to convert Chinese Muslims. During that time Mason amassed over three hundred samples of Chinese Muslim published materials, and became the foremost western scholar on Islam in China. The collection was bought by the New York City Public Library from the Royal Asiatic Society in 1940. I was also able find a number of Chinese Muslim periodicals at the Library of Congress, and the Hoover Institute. Another source of materials from the period is a compendium, *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao shi cankao xiliao xuan bian*, of reprinted articles from the period edited by Li Xinghua and Feng Jinyuan.

There is a large body of scholarly work on Muslims in China by Chinese Muslims that I have also consulted. Chinese Muslim historians cover Hui histories in a

number of ways. Marxist historian, Bai Shouyi, of the People's Republic of China, is one of the most prolific of the Hui scholars writing on Muslims in China. His career spans the years from the 1930s into the 1990s. Other PRC historians, include Ma Qicheng, Gao Zhanfu, and Ding Hongzhu.²⁶ Jonathan Lipman warns, however, that a number of other historians of the PRC write histories, or *jianshi*, that are limited to the PRC's "minzu paradigm."²⁷ Other Hui scholars, such as Zhao Chenwu, Sun Sheng-wu, Ma Songting, Fu T'ung-hsien and Wang Jingzhai, were writing during the republican period. These men were participants in the activities from the 1920s on, and their writing are firsthand accounts, albeit with their respective slants. Sun Sheng-wu, Fu T'ung-hsien and Chin Chi-t'ang, for example, went to Taiwan after the communist victory, and their writings, like present-day writers in Taiwan reflect the voice of non-Marxist writings of the Republican period.²⁸ Materials from the 1930s by Sun Sheng-wu and Fu T'ung-hsien continue to be reprinted in Taiwan.

There has been extensive scholarship done in English by historian Jonathan Lipman, and anthropologist Dru Gladney. Lipman's recent book, Familiar Strangers, centering on Chinese Muslims of China's Northwest examines the military conflicts of the nineteenth century but demonstrates misconceptions about subaltern groups of the Northwest. Gladney's research focuses on the Hui minority nationality of the present-day

²⁶See References for examples of these authors works.

²⁷See Jonathan Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), xx-xxv. Lipman and Gladney both argue that the concept of minzu is not fully realized until the PRC.

²⁸See, for example, articles in the magazine *Zhongguo Huibao* [Islam in China], published by the Chinese Muslim Association of Taipei, Taiwan.

PRC. Anthropologist Barbara Pillsbury did groundbreaking work in her study of the Hanhui of Taiwan. All three scholars have looked at the question of Hui identity. Other materials in English come from Christian missionaries who were in China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many directed their proselytizing to Muslims in China, believing that since Muslims were monotheists already, they would be more open to the Christian message. Like Mason, a number of the missionaries developed a sincere interest in Chinese Muslim activities and their accounts provide another window on the scene. Claude Pickens, for example, left a large body of material.

Members of the Grand Mosque in Taipei that was established by Chinese Muslims from Beijing in 1948 kindly welcomed me. Staff members gave me copies of current studies by members of the community. The Islamic Association in Taiwan publishes a bimonthly journal that continues the tradition of Chinese Muslim periodicals which began at the beginning of the republic.

CHAPTER ONE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ISLAM IN CHINA

In 1935 there were more than 42,000 mosques in China, with over three dozen in Beijing itself.¹ Muslims lived throughout the country. In 1910 Broomhall observed that figures for the Muslim population were uncertain, with some estimates putting the figure at 70,000,000 in contrast with others that put the figure at 15,000,000.² According to the 1937 China Handbook, a government publication, Muslims numbered some forty-eight million, or ten percent of the population.³ The 1990 census more accurately counted the population of the ten Muslim shaoshu minzu at 17,599,268.⁴ The Hui minority makes up half that figure with over eight and half million people. The Uyghurs are the second largest Muslim nationality, with over seven million people.⁵ Even though the total number of Muslims is less than two percent of the population of China, Muslims still constitute a large number of people.

At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Zhou Enlai stated that Muslims constituted twelve percent of the nation's population.⁶ Zhou's figure, although inflated,

¹ Sun Sheng-wu, *Huijiao Luncong* [Comprehensive Essays on Islam] (Taipei: Zhongguo Wenhua Yanjiu Suo, 1963), 145.

² Marshall Broomhall, *Islam in China: A Neglected Problem* (New York: Paragon Press, 1910), 193-195.

³ Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, 9.

⁴ States Nationalities Affairs Commission Economic Office and State Statistical Bureau of Comprehensive Statistics for the National Economy, comp. *Zhongguo minzu tongji nianjian (1994-1994)*, (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1994), 155-156.

⁵ Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 20.

⁶ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979), 9.

demonstrates an understanding of the importance of the Muslim population in China, not only vis-a-vis the international community but in matters of domestic stability. A blend of tenacity and tolerance on the parts of host and guest cultures alike seems to have allowed for the survival of Muslims in China.

In some places Muslims assimilated to Chinese culture, failing to maintain separate traits, but, by and large, Muslim communities maintained cultural distinctions. By the nineteenth century a once thriving Chinese Jewish community had greatly dwindled in number, and no comparable communities of Christian sects existed, although various groups had also made inroads into China in the past. Muslims hardly entertained a position of great importance before the twentieth century. In the big cities, for example, acculturation to the greater Chinese culture meant that Chinese Muslims coexisted with non-Muslim Chinese without much contention or portent. The modern era altered the traditional environment, and with it came shifts in thinking about Islam and Chinese Muslim identity, on the part of Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Hui writers chronicle Chinese Muslim history a number of ways. Educator, Sun Sheng-wu, a prominent Chinese Muslim scholar active in the early republican period, divides Hui history into a chronology of four periods, reflecting the change of dynastic houses and concomitant events dating from the seventh century to the early twentieth century.⁷ Fu T'ung-hsien was another Chinese Muslim scholar and a contemporary of Sun Sheng-wu's. In 1937 Fu's narrative identifies three "stages" in Hui "evolution" as he

⁷ Sun Sheng-wu, *Huijiao*, 142-145.

calls it.⁸ The first stage marks the establishment of Muslim communities during Tang (620-906 AD) and Song (960-1279 AD) times, which is characterized by trade and commerce and Muslim economic success. In Fu's second stage, from Yuan (1260-1368 AD) into Ming (1368-1644 AD) times, Muslims experience more sociopolitical involvement and influence. In Fu's third stage, spanning the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912 AD), Muslim society falls into decline but moves into a renaissance period as the twentieth century unfolds.⁹ Sun Sheng-wu, like Fu T'ung-hsien, sees the present (that is the 1930s, when they are writing) as a renaissance period for Chinese Muslims. The idea of rebirth prevails among Chinese Muslims in the Republican period, and this stance colors the historical narratives of the Chinese Muslim writers of the period. There are more recent methods of analyzing Muslim history in China. Joseph Fletcher, for example, traces religious movements, or currents, in his research on Sufism in Northwest China.¹⁰

Following Sun Sheng-wu's convention the first chronological period, the period of expansion (*chuanru shiqi*), marks the earliest spread of Muslims living in China. The period corresponds to Tang times.¹¹ Many Hui mark 651 AD as the date that Islam was introduced to China because of an account in the *Jiu Tang Shu* (The Ancient Record of the Tang). It tells of a mission sent to the Tang court in Chang'an in 651 AD from 'Uthman, the third caliph. The emperor is said to have declared Islam "compatible with

⁸ Fu T'ung-hsien, *Zhongguo Huijiao Shi* [A History of Chinese Muslims] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshu Guan, 1996, reprint), 230.

⁹ Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 230.

¹⁰ See Joseph Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China" in Beatrice Manz, ed. *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia* (London: Vaiorum, 1995). See also works by Jonathan Lipman listed in References.

¹¹ Sun Sheng-wu, *Huijiao*, 144.

the teachings of Confucius,” and although he declined to convert to Islam he gave the Arab delegation his permission to propagate their faith and ordered the construction of a mosque.¹²

In the *hadiths* Muhammed (570?-632 AD) is quoted as telling his followers to go to China to carry the message of Islam. The Muslims, however, were merchants not missionaries. They practiced their faith, but there is no notable history of Muslims proselytizing. Arab and Persian merchants had a long history of trading along the coast of China, even before Muhammad. As Islam spread, the traders adopted the religion carrying it with them. Commerce flourished in Tang times. Middle Eastern merchants gained prominent positions in the counting houses of the import-export business that thrived in Guangzhou.¹³ Arab and Persian merchants were active in other cities along the coast, and allowed to reside in foreign communities (*fanfang*). The foreigners were granted virtual autonomy, and policed themselves, therefore the Muslims could abide by Islamic laws. The Muslims were allowed to build mosques and marry local women and many of the traders stayed.¹⁴ The autonomy in the enclaves may have well served to reinforce the foreign culture.

In addition to emissaries and seafaring merchants, Muslims arrived in Tang China overland. The Islamic empire expanded as its armies conquered the crumbling

¹²Dawood C.M. Ting, “Islamic Culture in China” in *The Straight Path: Islam Interpreted by Muslims*. Ed. Kenneth Morgan (New York: Ronald Press, 1958), 344. See also Broomhall, *Islam in China*, Chapter One.

¹³Ting, “Islamic Culture,” 346.

¹⁴Bai Shouyi, *Huizu Huijiao*, 71-73; Ma Qicheng, “A Brief Account of the Early Spread of Islam in China” in *Social Sciences in China* 4: 4 (1983), 98-102.

Byzantine and Persian empires. Within decades its domain stretched across North Africa into Central Asia. Islamic forces threatened to invade China from the Northwest, approaching along routes that silk traders and Buddhist missionaries had followed in the past. One tale explains how Chinese diplomacy managed to ward off invasion. After being defeated in 713 AD by the Muslim general Qutaiba at the Battle of the Talas River, the Tang emperor sent four royal princes, gifts, and a wagon loaded with dirt from the Chinese hinterland. The story says that Qutaiba danced victoriously on the soil of the Middle Kingdom while Tang royalty bowed to him. It is unknown if the general would have been satisfied with a dance alone, however. He might have continued his advance into China, if the death of Caliph Walid I had not required his return to the capital at Bagdad. Subsequently rival factions weakened unity in the Islamic world. The general was assassinated, and Islam never entered China in the wake of victorious armies. This does not, however, mean that war played no part in the advent of Islam to China.¹⁵

Muslim soldiers entered China as friend, not foe. In 755 AD the Emperor Su Zong appealed to the Caliph Abu Ja'far for help to put down the An Lushan Uprising. The caliph responded by sending 4,000 troops who aided the emperor in subduing the rebels. Emperor Su Zong is said to have built barracks (*ying*) and a place of worship for the troops, and they stayed in China.¹⁶ Centuries later some Muslim villages in the Northwest were called *ying* or *fang*, the terms used for barracks or quarters, which might

¹⁵M. Rafiq Khan, *Islam in China* (Delhi: National Academy, 1963), 2-3.

¹⁶Sandra Aili Green, *Islam in China* (Masters Thesis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1981), 7.

be a holdover from military forefathers.¹⁷ Like Muslims residing in the coastal cities, the soldiers were allowed to marry Chinese women and to practice Islam freely. Many Hui in the northwestern and northern regions believe their ancestry goes back to the Muslim soldiers.

Sun Sheng-wu's second historical period is called the period of florescence (*dingsheng shiqi*) and spans the tenth to the seventeenth centuries. From the Five Dynasties through Song times, Muslims migrated inland from coastal enclaves and the number of cities with Muslim communities grew.¹⁸ Song administrative regulations mention "China-born guests" and "fifth generation guests" in reference to the Muslims. The government's recognition granted a legitimacy to Muslims who were permanent residents.¹⁹ The Islamic way of life was integral to the administration of the Muslim enclaves, and mosques were integral to the Islamic way of life. Many mosques were erected in numerous cities during this period, examples include the *Huaisheng* (Cherishing the True God Mosque) in Guangzhou, the *Zhenjiao* (True Religion) in Hangzhou, and the *Niuji* (Oxen Street Mosque) in Beijing. Muslim foreign-guest (*fanke*) communities could be found throughout China, from north to south, indicating that the Muslim sojourners had found means to adapt to the Chinese world.²⁰

¹⁷Wing-tsit Chan, *Religious Trends in Modern China* (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 208.

¹⁸Sun Sheng-wu, *Huijiao*, 145.

¹⁹Bai Shouyi, *Zhongguo Yisilan Shi Cungao* [Collection of Essays on Chinese Muslim History] (Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 134.

²⁰Ma Qicheng and Dru Gladney, "Local and Muslim in China: The Making of Indigenous Identities among the Uygur and Hui" (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Annual Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Honolulu, Hawai'i, 1996), 4-5.

Cities had Muslim districts. The merchants fared well, and Fu T'ung-hsien points to the commercial successes, in his first stage of Hui development.²¹ The *Qingling* (Clear and Clean) Mosque was built in Quanzhou in the early eleventh century. Quanzhou became a booming port and the center for Arab trade from Song times into the early Ming times.²² Ibn Battuta visited the city and spoke of its wonders, and it was the port Marco Polo set sail from on his journey home. Quanzhou rivaled Guangzhou at its height, but when the Ming court turned its attentions to its northern borders and the hinterlands, and Japanese pirates ransacked China's coast Quanzhou fell victim to history. Centuries later the stele erected in 1310 would be a reminder of another time, one in which a thriving Muslim community contributed to the prosperity of the city.²³

Fu T'ung-hsien's second stage of development emerges with the Yuan Dynasty, and Fu sees it as a time of influence, political and social for Muslims in China. Under Mongol rule many Muslims enjoyed favor and rose to high positions.²⁴ The Muslim population also increased during the Yuan. A 1348 monument inscription in Hebei reads, "The Hui are distributed all under heaven . . . from capital to the provinces afar, there are over 10,000 mosques . . . [Muslims] all worship westward . . . and the [Buddhist] temples are empty."²⁵

²¹Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 173.

²²Ma Qicheng, "Local and Muslim," 4.

²³Claude Pickens, "China and Arabia Prior to the T'ang Dynasty (618 AD)" in *Moslem World* 32 (1942), 205-209.

²⁴Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 174.

²⁵Ma Qicheng, "Local and Muslim," 6.

With the Mongol empire spanning the Eurasian continent a Pax Mongolia, like the Pax Romana of Rome, allowed for another overland influx of Muslims into China from western and central Asia. The Yuan court invited astronomers and mathematicians from Bagdad and other Islamic centers to come to Beijing where they enjoyed great prestige. The court created an intermediary bureaucracy of non-Han administrators and merchants, collectively known as *semu guan* (officials of various categories) who were in charge of keeping the peace and collecting revenues.²⁶ Many of the *semu guan* were Inner Asian Muslims and earned an unsavory reputation among the Han Chinese, which may have contributed to negative stereotypes about Muslims.

The recent arrivals also established the *ortaq*, a kind of commercial association. Unlike the guest merchants of earlier dynasties, the Muslims learned Chinese. Some became accomplished literati, painters and poets in addition to officials. The Muslims, even more than their Mongol overlords, adapted to China, thereby firmly reinforcing the Muslim presence.²⁷

Not all Muslims who entered China at this time were of the elite and privy to the court. Many were conquered people who had been forced from their homelands. In China they were foreigners, but they were from widely varying cultures. Ma Qicheng suggests that Islam became the bond for these different groups, and the religious community (*jiaofang*) provided the social organization that unified otherwise diverse people.²⁸ During the Yuan Muslim foreign guest communities grew in size and number,

²⁶Bai Shouyi, *Zhongguo Yisilan*, 134.

²⁷Lipman, "Hui-Hui," 116-117.

²⁸Ma Qicheng, "Local and Muslim," 8.

centering around a mosque. Mosque communities (*sifang*) varied in size. Some were small with the number of families a few scores, while others might consist of hundreds of families.²⁹ Residency in a mosque community was virtually inherited. A family's attachment to its mosque carried a sense of belonging ascriptive kinship, and the communities functioned not unlike Chinese clan villages.

When Mongol rule was successfully put down by the Chinese, the new Ming Dynasty regarded foreigners with increasing suspicion. Christians were expelled, and foreign missions were packed off to Macao. The Chinese Muslim population was still regarded as different, but unlike others, they entertained benevolent praise from the court. Some believe the Chinese Muslims won allegiance because of their active participation in the overthrow of the Mongols. Another explanation is that one of the wives of the first Ming emperor was Muslim. The story led some proud Chinese Muslims to claim that the emperor himself embraced Islam.³⁰ Steles and edicts from the time suggest there was respect and tolerance for the religion and its followers.

. . . fifty ingots of silver and two hundred pieces of cotton cloth be given to each family of the Mohammedan faith; that two mosques be built at two places, one at . . . Nanking . . . and one in the province of Shensi; that they be allowed to repair their mosques should they fall into ruins, and be free to travel and trade in all districts, prefectures, and provinces, as well as to pass through customs and ferries without hindrance . . . inscribed . . . the third year of the reign of the Emperor Yung Lo.³¹

²⁹Ma Qicheng, "Local and Muslim," 8.

³⁰Raphael Israeli, *Muslims in China* (London: Curzon Press, 1980), 223.

³¹Broomhall, *Islam in China*, 91.

During the Yongle Emperor's reign (1403-1425 AD) there was a short lived age of exploration. The Admiral Zhenghe led a huge Chinese fleet to Arabia and the east coast of Africa. Zhenghe himself was a Muslim, and it appears that he also went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, as the Ming histories include a lengthy description of Arabia. Mecca and Medina in particular are described. The Ka'aba is described in great detail, along with a discussion of the Qur'an and Islamic customs.³² The court, however, feared invasion by pastoral peoples to the north or Inner Asia, and grew increasingly xenophobic. Within a generation the great age of exploration ended and the massive shipyards of the Yangzi closed down. Arab embassies, like all other foreigners, were restricted to Macao.³³ The Chinese Muslims were no longer exposed to Muslim travellers from afar, and they would remain isolated from the greater Muslim world for centuries to come. During that time Chinese Muslim ethnicity would coalesce.

After generations of intermarriage and interaction with the Chinese, the Muslims increasingly acculturated into Chinese society. By Ming times Chinese Muslims became sinophones.³⁴ Among themselves Chinese Muslims still used Arabic and Persian terms, and a kind of Hui patois evolved, *Huihui hua*. Han women entering Hui households brought with them not only Han languages, but also customs. Families began to wear Chinese clothes and adopted Chinese cooking methods and the use of chopsticks.³⁵ Eating pork, however, remained taboo. Outwardly the Hui had taken on

³²Broomhall, *Islam in China*, 35-36.

³³Broomhall, *Islam in China*, 35-36.

³⁴Bai Shouyi, *Huizu, Huijiao*, 38.

³⁵Ting, "Islamic Culture," 350.

the trappings of the Han Chinese environment. The Chinese Muslims retained their own traditions, but also absorbed Chinese ways.

Chinese Muslims took Chinese surnames. Most chose surnames that sounded like their personal Arabic names, or least the first syllable. Ma is a very common name among Muslims and it is likely because many Muslims were named Muhammad. Some surnames are almost exclusively Hui, such as Pu, Na, Ha and Tie.³⁶ In some cases when a Hui man married a Chinese woman, he adopted his wife's family name. Chinese Muslims did continue to give babies Arabic names, as Muslims around the world do, and Hui today likewise, still have Arabic and Chinese personal names and Chinese surnames.

Chinese Muslims continued to be successful in business, and were reputed to have a penchant for acting as middlemen in imperial times. Even today the percentage of Hui involved in commercial businesses far exceeds that of other nationalities. Many Chinese Muslims became jade merchants (*shibao huihui*). Shanghai's Hou House and Minguo Road, for example, came to have a strip of Chinese Muslim run curio shops (*guwan pu*) and Beijing's jade market (*chongdong yu shi*) became Muslims run. Nanjing's Fuzi district of curio shops was also Hui run.³⁷

Islamic dietary laws drew a large number of Muslims into the restaurant and inn keeping business. Muslim run restaurants and inns displayed signs with blessings written in Arabic, stating that no pork contaminated the establishment. The signs also commonly carried illustrations of a pitcher used for ablutions and the characters jiaomen,

³⁶Chin Chi-t'ang, "Huijiao Minzu Shuo [Hui Nationality]" in *Yugong* 5:11 (1936), 32-35.

³⁷Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 174.

like seen marking Muslim districts. Other names that referred to Islam used on plaques included *kaitian gujiao* (the religion that has existed from the time of creation) and *zuichu miaozhong* (the most ancient and nameless).³⁸ Any Muslim, literate or not, seeing a sign with the ablution pitcher would know the business followed Islamic dietary laws and was therefore *halal*, or *qingzhen* (pure and true). Non-Muslims, too, found the establishments dependable, and Chinese Muslims became successful proprietors.

Chinese Muslims would also dominate certain other occupations, such as the tanning industry and beef production. The network of wool traders across northern China was also a Chinese Muslim domain.³⁹ The Mutton Guild in Beijing was Muslim run, and unlike other guilds that honored certain gods or legendary founders of their craft, the Mutton merchants worshipped in Islamic fashion only.⁴⁰ Following in the footsteps of their respective ancestors, many Chinese Muslims pursued military careers. Muslims had a reputation of being excellent horsemen, too. Others adopted an agrarian lifestyle, and whole villages grew up entirely Muslim.⁴¹

Sun Shengwu's third historical period stretches from the end of Ming times to close of the Qing, and is called the period of weakness (*shuaitui shiqi*).⁴² For many Chinese Muslims in China there was great strife during the years of Qing rule. Violence

³⁸James Hutson, "The Sz'chuan Moslems" in *Moslem World* 4 (1916), 252.

³⁹See James Millward, "The Chinese Border Wool Trader of 1880-1937" in Dru Gladney, ed. *The Legacy of Islam in China: An International Symposium in Memory of Joseph F. Fletcher* (Conference volume, Harvard University, 1989).

⁴⁰John Stewart Burgess, *The Guilds of Peking* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), 180-181.

⁴¹*Huizu Jianshi* [A Brief History of the Hui] (Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chuban She, 1978), 3-4.

⁴²Sun Sheng-wu, *Huijiao*, 145.

erupted in the Northwest and Southwest where Muslim constitute large percentages of the population. In these regions, far from the capital, fighting became endemic from the late eighteenth century well into the nineteenth. In many cases, the violence was internal feuding among Chinese Muslim and/or sometimes other groups. Conventional Han Chinese and western histories refer to the fighting as the Muslim Rebellions, but most violence was not directed toward the government or Han Chinese. The conflicts were sometimes over power and control within a community, and sometimes over religious issues.⁴³

In contrast to the strife experienced in the Northwest, in the metropolitan Chinese Muslim communities of China proper, Chinese Muslim lived increasingly acculturated existences. From the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries Chinese Muslim scholars became not only experts in Islamic studies, but were also accomplished Confucianists, capable of advancing through the official system on a par with their Han Chinese peers. With all the outward signs of assimilation, however, there was concern among scholars that their Muslim heritage would be lost. They began writing treatises on Islam that illustrated how Islam was compatible to Confucianism.

Although the apologetic voice of the writings suggest that the scholars hoped to appeal to a Han Chinese audience, the readers of the works essentially were the Chinese-speaking Muslim community. The collective writings became known as the *Han*

⁴³See Jonathan Lipman, "Ethnic Conflict in Modern China: Hans and Huis in Gansu, 1781-1929" in Steven Harrell and Jonathan Lipman, eds. *Violence in China: Studies in Culture and Counterculture* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991); and Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*.

Kitab, the Chinese Muslim classics. The earliest known work was five volumes by Wang Daiyu (1580- 1650?) of Nanjing. Published in 1642, it was entitled True Explanation of the Correct Religion (*Zhengjiao Zhenquan*). Ma Zhu (1639?-1709?), of Yunnan, lived in Beijing, and is most famous for his book, The Compass Guide to the Pure and True Religion (*Qingzhen Zhinan*). Perhaps the most prolific of the apologetic writers was Liu Zhi (fl 1720s), also of Nanjing. His most famous work was a biography of the Prophet Muhammed, *Tianfang Zhi Sheng Shilu Nianpu*, The True Annals of the Prophet of Arabia.⁴⁴

The apologia of the Han Kitab illustrates a strategy that emerged in the metropolitan Chinese Muslims communities. The origins of Chinese Muslim religion and customs were foreign, but the apologists were able to create a legitimate Chinese identity for Muslims, raising their way of life from a barbarian one. It suggests a recognition that Chinese characteristics were now a part of Chinese Muslim culture, and that could occur without fear of blasphemy or irreverence. Rather than deny their Chinese characteristics the apologists sought to syncretize Chinese traits with their Muslim heritage. The reasoning of these scholars would play an influential role among urban Chinese Muslims. The syncretistic attitudes of the Han Kitab writers, however, was only one approach to Islam for Chinese Muslims. In the Northwest, for example, a number of different schools of thought arose.

⁴⁴Joseph F. Ford, "Some Chinese Muslims of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" in *Asian Affairs* (New Series) 2 (1974), 145-153. Also see Ludmilla Panskaya, *Introduction to Palladii's Chinese Literature of the Muslims* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1979).

There had been a ban on travel to the Middle East, but once Xinjiang was under Qing control, the ban could hardly be enforced, if it ever strictly was, and more Chinese Muslims went on hajj.⁴⁵ In their travels, Chinese Muslims were exposed to the different practices of Muslims outside of China, and many of the pilgrims pondered the state of Islam in China, in comparison. Some said interpretation of the Qur'an and Islamic laws had grown lax, and they decided to correct religious practices among their fellow Chinese Muslims. Islam needed to be revitalized. The new teaching, or new school, (*xinjiao*, *xinpai*) emerged, or more accurately the new teachings, plural, as more than one school appeared.⁴⁶ Existing practices were referred to as the old teachings, or old schools (*laojiao*, *laopai*). The new teachings were more orthodox, and deemed the old schools to be heterodox. Confusion over the schools was compounded since any effort to improve on the old teachings became known as a new teaching. Sufi orders, too, would be referred to as *xin jiao*. In an effort to make clear what was the newer, teachings then became known as the new new teaching, or *xinxin jiao*, but attempts to differentiate between new and old teachings grew more baffling.⁴⁷

Joseph Fletcher's approach of identifying currents, or influences, in religious beliefs helps to clarify Islamic practices in China. The first tide would refer to the traditions of the earliest Chinese Muslim communities, which became known as the Gedimu (derived from *qadim*, Arabic for old).⁴⁸ As noted above the community center

⁴⁵Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya."

⁴⁶*Jiao*, or *pai*, have sometimes been erroneously translated as "sect."

⁴⁷Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 48; and Israeli, *Muslims in China*, 150-188.

⁴⁸Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 37.

was the mosque, and the *ahong*⁴⁹ and elders the community leaders. Dietary laws and religious practices could be observed and old teachings maintained in Muslim enclaves. Major outside influences were not felt for centuries. Three waves evolving over the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, however, had an impact on Muslim communities throughout China. The currents come from Central Asia and into the Northwest. The first is Sufism, the second is scripturalism, and the third can be called Muslim modernism.⁵⁰

By the eighteenth century Sufi orders gained power among the Turkic-speaking Muslims in the Northwest. As Sufi influence spread some Chinese Muslims also joined the orders, and “went west” to seek teachers and texts, returning home with not only new religious practices but reformist zeal.⁵¹ Chinese Muslim Sufi numbers grew, and their movements gradually became more institutionalized.⁵² The first Sufi leaders were honored like saints, and many of the orders were established by their descendants. These orders were known as *menhuan*, or saintly descent groups. Unlike traditional *ahongs*, Sufi leaders were attached to their respective mosques and became permanent residents. The orders united disparate Chinese Muslim communities in the northwestern regions, and leaders accrued large land holdings. Sufis were regarded with suspicion by Qing officials and other Muslims alike. The discord arising among some of

⁴⁹The term *ahong* refers to the religious leader and mosque head. It is believed that the word is derived from the Persian *akhun[d]*, meaning teacher.

⁵⁰Jonathan Lipman, “Hyphenated Chinese: Sino-Muslim Identity in Modern China” in Gail Hershatter, Emily Honing, Jonathan Lipman, and Randall Stross, eds. *Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 103-107.

⁵¹Lipman, “Hui-Hui,” 122.

⁵²Gladney, “Muslim Chinese,” 42.

these groups caused some of the violence in the 1800s.⁵³ The orders held power and influence outside of the spiritual realm, and would play instrumental roles in the northwestern provinces well into the warlord period.

The second current, scripturalist fundamentalism, arrived at the end of the nineteenth century. Renewed interest in Islam had generated new teachings before the twentieth century, as Chinese Muslims learned more about Islamic practices elsewhere. In the late nineteenth century, Ma Wanfu, of Gansu, for example, had gone overland on pilgrimage to Mecca, where he learned of the Wahhabi movement of Arabia. Ma returned to Gansu enthusiastic and intent on ridding Islam in China of non-Muslim (Chinese) customs and heterodox influences from Sufism. He preached “spiritual and institutional purification of Islamic life.” Ma Wanfu relied on Arabic and Persian scriptures. The group adopted the name *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, or *Ahl as-Sunna*, the Muslim Brotherhood, from an Egyptian group. In Chinese the name became *Yihewani*. The teachings were designed to be an anti-assimilationist, anti-Sufi “solution” to what Ma perceived as the “decline of Muslim values and orthopraxy.”⁵⁴

Ma Wanfu’s followers continued his effort, although the movement transformed considerably from his original intent. Within a generation of Ma's death the movement was transformed into one that embraced progressive ideas. It did not shy away from educational and political policies that Ma Wanfu would have bemoaned for being acculturationist. Supporters grew in number and the movement spread throughout China

⁵³Lipman, “Hyphenated Chinese,” 104-105.

⁵⁴Lipman, “Hyphenated Chinese,” 106.

proper, nurturing a growing sense of belonging among Chinese Muslims. The Yihewani movement spread and transformed at the same time the Chinese nationalist movement was growing. The new Yihewani voice advocated supporting the Nationalists' party, the Guomingdang. Yihewani continued to maintain its anti-Sufi polemics and to advocate scripturalist orthodoxy, but unlike Ma Wanfu, the group relaxed its stance vis-a-vis assimilation.⁵⁵

An amalgamation of a number of the many new schools also took place, and a merger of ideas and methods resulted in the third current, Muslim modernism. It did not have distinctive roots like the Yihewani, or even the Sufi orders, but was derived from a combination of sources. The modernists were influenced by secular nationalism in Turkey and India, by European educated Middle Eastern intellectuals, and non-secular (especially scientific) non-Muslim Chinese educators.⁵⁶ Modernists also turned to the works of the Han Kitab.

Ma Fuchu (1794-1875) of Yunnan, for example, was an accomplished student of Chinese, as well as Arabic and Persian. He admired Chinese philosophy and its sense of moral integrity, as he did the purity of Islam. In his own scholarship he strove to integrate these beliefs, he has been referred to as the master of syncretism. He had gone on hajj, and when he returned he sought to apply the Qur'an and Islamic practices in ways suitable to the Chinese environment. He maintained that interpretation of the scriptures

⁵⁵Jonathan Lipman, "The Third Wave: Establishment and Transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood in China," *Etudes Orientales* 13/14 (1994), 89-105.

⁵⁶Lipman, "Hyphenated Chinese," 106.

had to be flexible. His liberal teachings were important underpinnings in the new new teachings that evolved into Muslim modernism.⁵⁷

Chinese Muslim leaders in metropolitan China embraced the modernist movement, and adopted the nationalist stand. The modernists advocated western dress and progressive ideas, and became advocates of secular education, especially the sciences. Leaders promoted new new teachings which encouraged improved education and social well-being in the Chinese Muslim communities.⁵⁸ Ahong and scholar, Ma Songting explains that Chinese Muslims had “endured 200 years of repression under the Qing.” As a result they had altered their outward behavior and practices, and had “turned inward and passive.” Gradually Chinese Muslims gathered their “strength and moved to change the weaknesses” in their community.⁵⁹ They were concerned with social ills as well as spiritual flaws, and maintained that the spirit of the Qur’an must be followed, rather than the literal word. Thus begins the period of rebirth for Chinese Muslims, corresponding to Sun Sheng-wu’s fourth historical period, the renaissance (*fixing shiqi*), which also complements Fu T’ung-hsien’s description of the period. It begins with the demise of the Qing dynasty and the start of the republic.

Beijing grew increasingly important geographically for Chinese Muslims in the early twentieth century. Historically Muslims in China could be roughly split into dominant geographical areas: the Turkic groups of Xinjiang; Chinese Muslims of the

⁵⁷Harold D. Hayward, “Chinese-Moslem Literature: A Study in Mohammadan Education” in *Moslem World* 23 (1933), 356-377.

⁵⁸Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 230.

⁵⁹Ma Songting, “Zhongguo Huijiao yu Chengda Shifan Xuexiao” [Chinese Islam and Chengda Normal School] in *Yugong* 5: 11 (1936), 15.

Northwest; Chinese Muslims of the Southwest; the Hanhui of China proper, rural and urban. Many Chinese Muslims regarded Gansu as the religious center of Islam in China. Hezhou in Gansu, for example, had long served as a destination for pilgrims, who could not make the trip to Mecca.⁶⁰ When Beijing became the capital of the new Republic of China, however, the community there became an increasingly important center of Chinese Muslim activities. Being in China's political heart had an impact on the Chinese Muslim community, and its importance grew as reform and revolution effected everyone.⁶¹

On the national level, the Beijing community held a prominent position, but links to other Chinese Muslim communities were ongoing. The Chinese Muslim population was easily forty thousand, with a large population in the country around the city. Chinese Muslims in other cities were equally involved in the renaissance. Tianjin Chinese Muslims were closely involved with those in Beijing. Tianjin had thirteen mosques, and some twenty thousand Muslim families. Jinan, the capital of Shandong, was home to an active Chinese Muslim community that became increasingly involved with other Muslim centers. The railroads helped link the communities to one another.

⁶⁰Jonathan Lipman, "Ethnicity and Politics in Republican China: The Ma Family Warlords in Gansu" in *Modern China* 10:3 (1984), 292.

⁶¹Muslims were among the first residents of Beijing when the Mongols made it their capital. A 1259 AD census counted 2,953 Muslim households, which at an average of 5 people per house, put their number near fifteen thousand. At that time much of the Muslim population consisted of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Muslims who had entered China during Mongol rule. In Ming times, however, large number of Hui migrated to Beijing. Judging from the most common Hui surnames in Beijing (Liu, Li, Ma, Jin, Huo, and Hu, all surnames common in the South), Liu believes that migrants came from the South. See Liu Shenglin "Beijing Huizu [Beijing's Hui Nationality]" in *Zhongguo Huizu* (Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), 12-13.

Nanjing had a large Chinese Muslim population, with more than two dozen mosques. After the republic moved its capital to Nanjing in 1928 the population was drawn into the political arena even more. Shanghai's Chinese Muslim community was influenced by activities in the foreign settlement, and was also the target of many visiting Muslims from abroad. Guangzhou's Muslim population numbered twenty-five to thirty thousand. Yunnan became a major center of innovation and members of its community were involved with radical activities from the start. The Chinese Muslims of Chengdu in Sichuan had suffered from the civil strife of the nineteenth century, but were struggling to recover. Xi'an being one of the oldest Islamic centers remained prominent, as did Lanzhou in Gansu, but both were farther from the political drama unfolding in the larger metropolitan areas to the east.⁶²

Activities in the urban Chinese Muslim communities and writings from this period extoll the awakening of the Hui people.⁶³ Many leaders seem to have been encouraged by Nationalist ideology. A 1913 article written for Chinese Muslims approves of the new "judicious republic" that provides freedom of speech and religion. The piece goes on to applaud the union of the people, "if it is not Heaven's will how then could it have happened so quickly?" Now it will be possible for the nation to advance. "We Muslim Chinese *women huijiao zhongren* . . . are one of the five nationalities" for whom all the benefits will be equally bestowed.⁶⁴

⁶²F.H. Rhoads, "A Survey of Islam in China" in *Moslem World* 11 (1921), 63-65.

⁶³Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 233; and Sun Sheng-wu, *Huijiao*, 144-145.

⁶⁴*Huiwen Baihua Bao* 7 (1913), 12-14.

CHAPTER TWO: NATIONALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

*China's five peoples, our Han, Manchu, Mongolian,
Muslim, and Tibetan nationalities, unite in cooperation to
establish the Republic of China, united together to share in
harmony, the five nationalities establish their country's
flag of five colors to dazzle the world. How grand !
How grand ! !*

¹ *Huiwen Baihua Bao* 7 (1913).

The Chinese were repeatedly humiliated in their encounters with foreigners, who rather than valuing the Chinese as possessors of the civilized culture, viewed them as backward. After decades of foreign encroachment, a fear prevailed that the country would be claimed by the imperialists and China would be reduced “to a mere geographical expression.” In response an impassioned nationalism had emerged, one that fervently declared its mission to save China. Saving China became the strongest element of the “Chinese revolutionary ideology of the twentieth century . . .” and the “burning desire to ‘save the nation’ *jiuguo* spawned passionate, patriotic sentiments among the military, the working class, the peasantry, and the merchants, as well as the intelligentsia.”²

The dynasty’s inability to respond to domestic strife and foreign aggression reflected the inadequacies of the imperial system. Attempts to reform the system and thus save the monarchy came too late, but revolutionaries and reformers alike concurred that what mattered was saving the country. Indeed, throughout the twentieth century the call to save China, or protect the country (*baoguo*) would remain the rallying cry, regardless of political affiliations or aspirations. From the 100 Days Reform of 1898 to the May Fourth Movement in 1919, through the years of the Japanese Occupation to the Beijing Spring of 1989, Chinese have passionately repeated this mandate. Nationalism took on the proportions of religious passion, and the incantation to save China, became a major mantra of Chinese nationalism. Believers, or nationals, all uphold this tenet. People might

² Tu Wei-ming, *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), vi.

exhibit their faith in a variety of ways, but this shared commandment has served to unite Chinese citizenry in the twentieth century.

New terminology and perceptions of identities emerged as the Qing Empire broke down and a new Chinese nation-state was taking form. Concepts of nation and nationality, of patriotism, race and ethnicity, as well as concepts of citizenship and individualism became increasingly important. When Sun Yatsen and his revolutionary colleagues sought to form a modern nation-state they explained that it would unite all the peoples of China, all the groups or *minzu*. The origin of the term *minzu* can be traced only to the mid 1890s. *Min* historically referred to the people, and in Qing times it was non-banner people, or civilians. Charlotte Furth suggests that *minzu* “was not intended to indicate minority peoples, but majority peoples, . . . the ‘nation’ of the nation-state, . . . the (han) Chinese of China. The combined term *minzu* itself was new, derived from the contemporary Japanese word *minzoku* that was translated as people or nationality.” The new word related to concepts of nationality and nationalism that were fundamental to the building of a modern nation-state.³

Revolutionaries like Sun Yatsen pointed to nationalism because of its importance to other nations.⁴ Tsang, writing in 1932, felt the Guomindang was convinced that China needed a foundation in modern nationalism in order to establish its place in the “accepted world,” where nationalism would serve as a stepping stone to

³ Charlotte Furth, “The Sage Rebel: The Inner World of Chang Ping-lin” in Charlotte Furth, ed. *The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 131.

⁴ For examples of the quantity and range of scholarship on nationalism see anthology by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds. *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1994).

internationalism and world brotherhood.⁵ Tsang saw Chinese nationalism as the “sum total of thinking, feeling, and acting, based upon belonging in a group which is thought to be the Chinese nation,” which induced loyalties to the national group.⁶ In order to succeed as a modern nation-state, the republic presented an alternative system of government, and nationalism was used to fuel support. The Chinese had to replace the dynastic system, but their mythic Central Country still functioned symbolically in nationalistic rhetoric. But values of the past had to be disposed of if they could not be updated for the modern age.⁷

It is important to clarify what is meant by nationalism. One of the first scholars to examine nationalism, Carlton Hayes, observed that nationalism was synonymous with patriotic passions that produced not only pride for ones country but a willingness to die for it.⁸ Van der Veer adds that nationalism functions like a kind of religion of the modern nation-state.⁹ Kedourie notes that nationalisms demonstrate that humanity is divided into nations “naturally” and nations are recognized by certain characteristics, and a national self-government is the only legitimate type. In response,

⁵ Tsang Chiu-sam, *Nationalism in School Education in China* (Hong Kong: Progressive Education Publishers, 1967, first published in 1933), 4. Tsang was a returned student who had studied under Carlton Hayes at Columbia University.

⁶ Tsang Chiu-sam, *Nationalism*, 9-10.

⁷ For discussions on nationalism in China see Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1995); Jonathan Unger, ed. *Chinese Nationalism* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁸ See Carlton Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1960).

⁹ Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 15-16.

Waldron stresses, when political power does not equal national power, such as the case in colonial scenarios and traditional kingdoms and empires, nationalism becomes the force that demands change.¹⁰

Nation building in the modern era has been coupled with democracy, and the ideas of self-government and self-determination and self-awareness. Nationalism, however, is not necessarily or simply equated to these modern concepts. Connor suggests that nations have always existed, and modern institutions and ideas are not requirements for nationality or nation. He argues these constructs exist before modern terminology has been created to describe them, but that there was a “self-consciousness of nation” that emerged in the nineteenth century that altered perceptions.

Nations were always there: they had indeed been there for centuries. But it is not the things which are simply ‘there’ that matter in human life. What really and finally matters is the thing which is apprehended as an idea, and as an idea, is nested with emotion until it becomes a cause and a spring for action. In the words of action apprehended ideas are alone electrical; and a nation must be an idea as well as a fact before it can become a dynamic force.¹¹

Harrison notes that pre-modern China was a place with a distinct awareness of itself, “. . . a *culturalism*” which embraced shared beliefs and a rich heritage, but its structure was “not equal to a nation-state.”¹² Waldron illustrates that the process

¹⁰Waldron, *From War*, 269.

¹¹Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4.

¹²James P. Harrison, *Modern Chinese Nationalism* (New York: Hunter College of the City of New York, 1969), 2.

of modern nation-state building for China has been a question of putting adequate (new) institutions into place. Unlike Europeans, he suggests, Chinese did not need to concentrate on creating nationalism. The sense of China's nationhood already was firmly existent (for millennia).¹³

Nevertheless, in the decades that followed “an unpredictable dialectic between old and new, Chinese and foreign, avant-guard and popular cultural strands” appeared in a plethora of new publications.¹⁴ A desire for self-improvement paralleled desire for an improved nation.¹⁵ China was still seen as being exploited and threatened by foreign powers, but to see China as a victim unified people and created a sense of collective identity. Sun Yatsen’s united five minzu was brilliant propaganda. Nation-building would set the stage for a common culture, but a group’s identity could remain unique even though the groups shared a common identity with others in a greater union.¹⁶

The baoguo slogan worked well for the advancement of nationalism. China’s survival had been in peril both from the decay from within and the threat from outside aggression. In the decade prior to the 1911 Revolution, Liang Qichao, for example, had observed that people in China saw themselves as different groups (*qun*), formed by region, clan and custom, but, he stressed, the survival of every *qun* was in peril. Unity was the necessary tactic in order to save the country. The Nationalists likewise

¹³Waldron, *From War*, 271.

¹⁴Carol Lynne Waara, *Arts and Life: Public and Private Culture in Chinese Art Periodical, 1912-1937* (PhD Dissertation, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1994), 80.

¹⁵Waara, *Arts and Life*, 94.

¹⁶Murata Yujiro, “Dynasty, State, and Society: the Case of Modern China” in Joshua A. Fogel and Peter Zarrow, eds. *Imagining the People: Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890-1920* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 113-141.

explained that the union of all the people was the formula for saving China. Many Chinese Muslim leaders were attracted to idea. In 1908 Ding Zhuyuan, a Chinese Muslim journalist, implored his fellow Muslims that it did not matter what one's religion was in the effort to save China. He wrote that to defend the nation meant the same as defending one's religion, "to cherish the nation is to cherish oneself." Ding elaborated that without a nation-state, no religion could be preserved.¹⁷

Liang Qichao felt it imperative that the Chinese come together "in the face of external enemies." One's group, large or small, could be sustained only with "clear regulatory provisions" that enforced the rule of the majority.¹⁸ Liang asserted that survival of ones group was possible by agreeing to majority rule.

"If one is not subservient (*nuli*) to the dictates of one's *qun*," Liang warned, "then one will inevitably have to be subservient to the dictates of another *qun*." Obviously, in this world of fierce and perpetual struggles, the rationale of following the majority or their representatives was, quite simply, "to prevent the downfall of one's *qun*."¹⁹

Chinese Muslim intellectuals like Ding Zhuyuan promoted saving China first. They agreed that they could not afford to consider only matters of Islam or their *qun*, the Chinese Muslims. The Chinese Muslim intellectuals realized the importance of religious freedom,

¹⁷Ma Shouqian, "The Hui People's Awakening from the End of the Nineteenth Century to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century" in Dru Gladney, ed. *Legacy of Islam in China: An International Symposium in the Memory of Joseph F. Fletcher* (Conference volume, Harvard University, 1989), 6.

¹⁸Michael Tsin, "Imagining 'Society' in Early twentieth-Century China" in Joshua A. Fogel and Peter Zarrow, eds. *Imagining the People: Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890-1920* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 215.

¹⁹Tsin, "Imagining," 215.

but that meant tolerance toward other beliefs. The Chinese Muslims should “seek common ground while preserving differences . . . stressing unity and mutual understanding.”²⁰

Chinese Muslims had joined the ranks of Sun's Revolutionary Alliance, and numbered among the “72 Martyrs” who died in the aborted uprising in Guangdong just six months before the revolution finally succeeded in November of 1911.²¹ The Qing quietly abdicated and the ancien regime fell into shadow. China, however, remained to be renamed a nation-state. Slogans of unity and harmony provoked imagery of the past: the Chinese all were descendants of the Yellow Emperor. Chinese Muslim periodicals, too, celebrated the union with fellow Chinese compatriots “of the same womb” (*tong bao*).²² The Chinese had become citizens overnight. Liang Qichao wrote:

When a nation can stand up in the world, its citizenry (*guomin*) must necessarily possess a unique character. From morality and laws to customs and habits, literature and aesthetics, these all possess a certain unique spirit. When the ancestors pass them down and the descendants receive them, then the group (*qun*) is united and a nation-state is formed. This is truly the basic wellspring of nationalism (*minzu zhuyi*) . . .

In ancient times, we Chinese were people of villages instead of citizens. This is not because we were unable to form a citizenry but due to circumstances. Since China majestically used to be the predominant power of the East, surrounded as we were by small barbarian groups and lacking any contact with other large states, we Chinese generally considered our state to encompass the whole

²⁰Ma Shouqian, “The Hui People’s,” 15.

²¹For accounts of young revolutionaries refer to Ma Qicheng, Gao Zhanfu and Ding Hongzhu, eds. *Huizu* [Hui Nationality] (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1995), 45-63.

²²*Huiwen Baihua Bao* 7: 2 (1913).

world. All the messages we received, all that influenced our minds, . . . all that our ancestors passed down qualified us to be individuals on our own, family members, members of localities and clans, and members of the world. But they did not qualify us to be citizens of a state. . . . in an age of struggle among nations for the survival of the fittest while the weak perish, if the qualities of citizens are wanting, then the nation cannot stand up independently between Heaven and Earth.²³

A 1913 article entitled “The Principle of United Strength” appeared in a government periodical that was designed for a Muslim audience. The publication reiterated the need for the Muslims of China to unite together with all the Chinese people in the face of outside enemies, “the united strength of the people can easily succeed.”²⁴

Chinese Muslim historians explain that their society was impoverished by the end of the Qing, but with the sense of renewal and the birth of the Republic of China, Chinese Muslim leaders envisioned plans of improvement. The setting inspired thoughts of development and progress, in which they exalted Chinese Muslim culture, “If we bring our religion to life to motivate our people, there is no limit to the work we can do.”²⁵

Ding Zhuyuan celebrated the 1911 Revolution at the time, “With one stroke the despotic monarchical kingdom of several thousand years is turned into a democratic republic!”²⁶ By the late nineteenth century, the concepts of the modern nation-state and all its promises of popular sovereignty and equity had been debated

²³Chang Hao, *Liang Qichao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 164.

²⁴*Huiwen Baihua Bao* 7: 1&2 (1913).

²⁵Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 240.

²⁶Ma Shouqian, “The Hui People’s.” 26.

among Chinese. Ideas such as “legal limits and definitions of kingship and the state, . . . institutional framework including parliaments and elections” coupled with “civic virtue, national unity, [and] social progress proved enormously appealing.”²⁷ Integral to it all would be an active press and an environment that allowed for public opinion.

New ideas such as democracy were imbued with modern western concepts of a citizenry that called for activism and autonomy and political responsibility.²⁸

Dissanayake observes that once people understand political ideologies such as democracy and republicanism, they will opt for the modern nation-state.²⁹ Chatterjee argues that nonwestern cultures could not simply import western constructs in order to create a modern nation-state.³⁰ The task was not only one of translating and adapting new ideas and methods, but one that required psychological and intellectual shifts in order to embrace new concepts. The new polity carried a promise of liberation, and invited the participation of the disenfranchised. By participating, people develop self-awareness and a sense of agency, with the potential to remodel traditional institutions and authority-- the old orthodoxy.

For individuals, citizenship meant a change in status that promised new possibilities. The nation-state would change the relationship between the ruler and the

²⁷Zarrow, “Citizenship,” 3.

²⁸Joan Judge, *Print and Politics: “Shibao” (the Eastern Times) and the Formation of the Public Sphere in Late Qing China (1904-1911)* (PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1993), 181-195.

²⁹Wimal Dissanayake, ed. *Colonialism and Nationalism in Asian Cinema* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), viii.

³⁰Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed Books, 1986).

ruled. The people would no longer be subjects, subordinate to the ruler, and as citizens they could expect certain rights and opportunities in the modern arena. The new relationship would be a two-way street. The state by definition would expect political participation on the part of the people, and the people, in turn, would expect the state to enforce a code of rules and to protect citizens' rights. The political nature of citizenship instilled the new found sense of empowerment for people.

Citizenship as such was a modern phenomenon found only in the modern nation-state, "Citizenship was not an abstract ideal but a part of a dialectic between morally autonomous individuals and constitutional orders . . . there could be no citizens without a nation-state, just as the nation-state would collapse without true citizens."³¹ Citizenship by being fixed to the state, became a kind of "coercive bargain" and a way of "organizing commitments among strangers."³² The modern nation-state transformed the many qun or minzu of China into a Chinese citizenry. Sun's invitation to all minzu to join in the formation of a Chinese nation-state, was both guaranteeing the rights of the separate groups to be different, while entreating them to accept a greater union, in which all would benefit.

Chinese Muslim ahong and scholar, Ma Songting explains that with the founding of the ROC metropolitan Chinese Muslims experienced a new sense of importance. Sun Yatsen's Three Principles promised equity for all the Chinese

³¹Peter Zarrow, "Citizenship in China and the West" in Joshua A. Fogel and Peter Zarrow, eds. *Imagining the People: Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890-1920* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 6.

³²Zarrow, "Citizenship," 8.

nationalities. Sun observed that the Chinese Muslims had “suffered difficult times in the past,” and he summoned them to join in the revolutionary movement for the “liberation of nationalities.” Many Chinese Muslims felt their status has been elevated in the Republic of China.³³ In reality the benefits under the new regime would wax and wane with the whims of politicians, and turns of events, from the inception of the republic to the communist victory three and half decades later.

The new century brought a new awareness of the international community. China was not alone in its concerns about foreign encroachment. Chinese Muslims learned that many Muslim countries -- such as Turkey, Persia, India, Afghanistan, and Arabia -- had been struggling to resist European imperialism, too. The Islamic link put Chinese Muslims in a unique position, and some Chinese Muslim leaders saw themselves as the middlemen who could bridge relationships between China and countries of the Middle East.³⁴ The Chinese Muslims were in a position to learn first hand from fellow Muslims' experiences in their respective struggles against foreign imperialists in parts of South and Southeast Asia as well, and they made an effort to maintain communications with Muslim groups from Singapore to Cairo.

The Sultan in Istanbul sent scholars to Muslim centers in China. Urban Chinese Muslim districts became destinations for many foreign Muslim travelers. During the decade before the revolution, missionaries and traders had come from Turkey, Arabia, India and Afghanistan. Turkish missionaries tried to establish schools for the teaching of

³³Ma Songting, “Zhongguo Huijiao,” 3.

³⁴Ma Songting, “Zhongguo Huijiao,” 3-4.

Arabic in some parts of China.³⁵ Exchanges would continue through the coming decades. King Farouq of Egypt, for example, encouraged Chinese Muslims to come to Egypt and awarded scholarships to Chinese Muslim students to study at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo.³⁶

The Chinese Muslim relationship to Muslims outside of China was first centered around the pilgrimage to Mecca and Islamic concerns. Once Chinese Muslim students started to travel and study in the Middle East, however, the relationship was transformed. Once the republic was formed the government saw their Chinese Muslim population as an important emissary to the Muslim world. The government recruited Chinese Muslims who had studied in the Middle East and assigned them positions in the Arab section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China. The government also turned to the Chinese Muslim community in Beijing with the design that they would become a link not only to foreign Muslims, but to other Muslims within China. It would be the beginning of a political role for Chinese Muslims that has continued in the PRC and on Taiwan to the present day.

Events in the Muslim communities around the world could not be ignored. In the Middle East, the young Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, launched the Pan-Islamism movement. Islam's theocratic concepts strengthened the movement, regardless of the fact that the Caliphate ended in the early twentieth century. In 1912, The National Review of Shanghai featured an article that explained that Europeans were unaware that friendly

³⁵ Anonymous, "El-Azhar University and Reform" in *Moslem World* 2 (1911), 343-344.

³⁶ Zhao Chenwu, "Sanshi nianlaizhi zhongguo huijiao wenhua gaikuang" [Thirty Years of Chinese Muslim Culture] in *Yugong* 5:11 (1936), 19.

relations between Turkey and East Asian powers were growing, not only between leading statesmen, but also between the “masses of the Islamic and Buddhist and Confucian worlds . . . a friendlier feeling has developed . . . The more China feels menaced, isolated, and in need of alliances due to the aggression of foreign powers,” the article continued, “the more the government considers the idea of a treaty of alliance between Peking and Constantinople.”³⁷

Pan-Islamism could have given the Chinese government reason to pause. The movement had been born in response to the threat of foreign encroachment, like many nationalist movements, but it encouraged an allegiance of Muslims disregarding national borders. The potential existed to see Pan-Islamism as a source for sedition if Chinese Muslims had chosen to affiliate themselves with fellow Muslims abroad before China. Pan-Islamism did not appeal to the urban Chinese Muslims, however, nor did the kind of fundamentalism that won followers in other Muslim countries.

In 1908 members of India’s Muslim Federation came to China and appealed to the Chinese Muslim community. While nationalism fomented differently for Indian Muslims than Chinese, religious identity was an operative issue. Turkish missionaries appealed to Chinese Muslims in the same period. Curiously, neither Indian nor Turk, won much of an alliance with the Hui. A similar pattern was repeated when the Japanese solicited Chinese Muslims, (not to mentioned Christian missionary failures). The

³⁷Anonymous, untitled article in *Moslem World* 5 (1914), 190-191.

Chinese Muslims seem to have repeatedly placed themselves as Chinese first vis-a-vis non-Chinese, regardless of possible religious affiliations.

Nationalism can be customized for an amalgamation of various nationalities, or sub-nationalities. Nationalism has to be tempered so that diverse sub-nationalities can embrace the nationwide nationalism. In the case of China, where the Han majority vastly outnumbers other groups, Han nationalism per se became the nationwide nationalism. There are so many Han sub-nationalities at the local level that there can be no one definitive Han nationalism. Nevertheless nationwide nationalism, or *Chinese* nationalism, comes out of Han Chinese culture, which is inflicted on and shared with other sub-cultures. For a group like the Chinese Muslims, it could embrace (Han) Chinese nationalism, but a duality developed as the Chinese Muslim styled their own Chinese Muslim nationalism.

CHAPTER THREE: ORGANIZATIONS AND EDUCATION, 1912-1937

Over the course of change and great hardship in recent Chinese history, Hui spirituality and consciousness may have altered for the sake of survival. It seems that Chinese culture and civilization has lost its center of gravity, and the Chinese people's consciousness is very scattered today. The Hui share that problem and in present-day China have the same ambitions as other Chinese. Chengda's objective is to enrich learning and religion . . . [and] through education . . . successfully build up our human resources . . . with the aim of saving China.¹

¹ Ma Songting, "Zhongguo Huijiao," 6.

In 1908 Abd-ul-Rahman Wang Haoran (1848-1918), a *hujum* and *hajji*, returned to the Oxen Street Mosque district in Beijing after years of study and travel in the Middle East. Some believe the Sultan of Istanbul had made him a Grand Mufti.² Wang Haoran was one of the first of dozens of Chinese Muslims to study at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo and in Istanbul. Two Turks sent by the Sultan, Ali Rizza and Hassan Hafiz, arrived in Beijing with Wang Haoran. The Turks came to observe and advise on the state of Islam in China.³ They did not remain in China long. Wang Haoran, in contrast, had returned home with a mission to improve conditions in his community. He became perhaps the most influential Chinese Muslim leader in the early twentieth century. In 1999 he remains the subject of Hui discussion and admiration.⁴

Wang Haoran and other Chinese Muslims now could freely travel to the leading centers of Islamic learning, in Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and India. On their travels, Chinese Muslims discovered vibrant political, religious and cultural movements in full swing, from shari'a-oriented renewalism, nationalism, pan-Islamism, anti-imperialism, to Islamic modernization. The leaders of modern movements in the Middle East shunned Sufism and mystical Turco-Iranian practices. Instead leaders turned to Arab origins and Arabic purity of Islam, but keeping an open-mindedness to modernity.⁵ Chinese Muslims

² Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, 23 .

³ There was an idea that the Turks were going to help the Chinese purify Islam in China, a process referred to as sunnification. Chinese Muslim leaders were able to take on the task themselves as their renaissance took form.

⁴ "Remembering Wang Haoran" in *Zhongguo Huibao* 243 (1997).

⁵ Joseph Fletcher, Mary Ellen Alonso, and Wasma'a K. Chorbachi, "Arabic Calligraphy in Twentieth-Century China" in Dru Gladney, ed. *Legacy of Islam in China: An International Symposium in Memory of Joseph F. Fletcher* (Conference volume, Harvard University, 1989), 6-8.

returned to China proper enthusiastic about purifying Islamic practices, and yet embracing ideas of progress. In contrast, Muslims in Xinjiang still related to other Turkic-speaking Muslims of the Central Asian. As Uyghurs they were trapped in the traditions Turco-Iranian tradition that were seen as superstitious and backward by the Arab revivalists in the Middle East, and now the Chinese-speaking Muslims of China proper, too.⁶

Wang had been deeply impressed by the Islamic modernists movement and set out to improve Islamic education in his homeland.⁷ Wang Haoran would inspire the next generation of Chinese Muslim leaders who followed in his footsteps. Among them were Ma Songting who founded the Chengda Normal School in 1925, and Wang Jingzhai who translated the Qur'an from Arabic into Chinese in the late twenties. Other scholars and educators such as Sun Sheng-wu, Ma Jian, Fu T'ung-hsien, and Chin Chi-t'ang were among the prime movers in what they called a renaissance, and were all motivated by ideas of progress.⁸ They reasoned that their community could not survive if it did not step up to the challenges of the modern age.

The leaders set out to implement a three pronged agenda, calling for religious, educational, and social reforms, and they met with admirable successes.⁹ Accomplishments could be tallied in five areas. The first area of success was that of the creations of organizations. The charters of most of the associations that Chinese Muslims

⁶ Fletcher, "Arabic Calligraphy," 6.

⁷ John O. Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Bolder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 266.

⁸ Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 15-28.

⁹ See Ma Qicheng and Gao Zhanfu and Ding Hongzhu, *Huizu* [Hui Nationality] (Beijing: MinzuChuban She, 1995); and *Yugong* 5: 11 (1936); and *Yugong* 7: (1937).

formed during the ROC stated a goal to organize and unite Muslims, because Chinese Muslims hitherto had lived in dispersed communities among which there had been little or no exchange. The second feat was the development of new and improved schools. The third area of progress was publishing and communications, from the publication of books and periodicals to radio broadcasting. The fourth achievement was in translation, most importantly that of the Qur'an into Chinese. The fifth target was to fight discrimination against Muslims and advance Chinese Muslims' sense of being a part of China.. Many Chinese Muslim leaders considered that the republic could provide the possibility (if not the reality) to break down "mental barriers" that caused non-Muslims to misunderstand Muslim ways.¹⁰

Many urban Chinese Muslims believed modern concepts ought to be applied to revitalize a languishing Muslim culture. The need for development was interpreted as the means of survival. Echoing social Darwinian ideas of the survival of the fittest, Chinese Muslim leaders professed that developing education was crucial if Hui youth were to join the work force competitively. Fitness would allow the Chinese Muslims to work better and to enrich their community. Hui industry would then grow, as would Hui glory. Chinese Muslims then would be recognized for their contribution to national power and prosperity. Progress was the answer, it would save the Chinese Muslim culture, it would save China.¹¹

¹⁰Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 239-241. See also Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 24-27.

¹¹Ma Songting, "Zhongguo Huijiao," 1-4.

Modernity and nationalism were imbued with ideas of human progress, but progress also meant changes in attitudes and a revamping of traditional institutions. Lee observes that as the twentieth century began to unfold there was a sense that China had entered a “new epoch” of world history “which rendered its destiny no longer separate but an integral part of [hu]mankind . . . and twentieth century consciousness contained a temporal imperative that stressed the rapidity of world change and the need to keep up.”¹²

Judge explains that the original infrastructure for the late Qing public sphere was laid when three new “institutions” -- new-style schools, study groups, and publications -- were created. The institutions produced networks that in turn, intertwined with and reinforced one another, marking the beginning of modern public opinion in China.¹³ Study groups and new schools were propelled by mandates that sought ways to save China and make it prosper. The groups and schools were both the subjects and the audiences, and sometimes the creators, of the print media. The media fortified the emerging public forum. Organizations and secret societies were nothing new, but the combination of an increasingly politicized setting, coupled with the new media, stimulated a new activism in organizers.

Urban Chinese Muslim consciousness would grow increasingly politicized. The scholars and intellectuals in the Chinese Muslim communities were schooled in

¹²Leo Ou-fan Lee, “In Search of Modernity: Some Reflections on a New Mode of Consciousness in Twentieth Century Chinese History and Literature” in Paul Cohen and Merle Goodman, eds. *Ideas across Cultures: Essays on Chinese Thought in Honor of Benjamin I. Schwartz* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1990), 110-111.

¹³Judge, *Print and Politics*, 49.

Qur'anic scriptures, as their non-Muslim compatriots were imbued with the Confucian classics. Many Chinese Muslims were deeply religious, so the prospect of modernizing and yet retaining authentic faith presented a sensitive challenge. The modern public forum provided a testing ground where issues could be debated and examined.

At the beginning of the century, Chinese Muslim like their non-Muslim neighbors, went to Japan study. In 1908, for example, there were more than two dozen Chinese Muslim students in Tokyo studying modern subjects ranging from engineering to commercial shipping, from political science to medicine, and teacher training. The students also gained hands on experience in the public sphere. They organized Muslim associations and study groups, and even published newspapers and periodicals. One early group was the Muslim General Educational Association of East Asia.¹⁴ Students also formed the Society of Muslim Students in Japan (*Liudong Qingzhen Jiaoyu Hui*) and began a magazine, *Muslims Awake* (*Xing Hui Bian*).¹⁵ These groups were short-lived but the experiences of organization and addressing issues of the day signaled a politicization that came with participation in a public forum. The efforts inspired self-awareness and seminal Hui nationalism, linked to an underlying sense of Chinese citizenship.

Dozens of Chinese Muslim organizations were formed between 1912 and 1949. For the most part they focused on matters that fell into one of three categories: mosque affairs, education, or social well-being.¹⁶ Associations that were concerned with

¹⁴Ma Shouqian, "The Hui People's," 2-4.

¹⁵Derk Bodde, "Japan and the Muslims of China" in *Far Eastern Survey* 15:21 (1946), 312.

¹⁶Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 201.

social issues or education cast broad nets, and often their mandates overlapped. Many groups formed with the hope of gaining nationwide membership, and often statements of purpose sounded identical. The similarities suggest shared concerns among Chinese Muslims around the country. If that was true, however, Chinese Muslim communities were not particularly aware of shared sentiments. Activities in the republican period change that. Chinese Muslim leaders took steps toward improving their communities. A look at a dozen of the Hui organizations illustrates changes in approach and perspective over the years.

Chinese Muslim study groups had existed before. In the days of the Guangxu emperor a Tianjin ahong, ahong Yang Zhongming, established the Pure and True Education Society (*Qing zhen Jiaoyu Hui*). Its high aspirations were not realized but in the years that followed new study groups and associations appeared.¹⁷ Individual mosques already had their own internal organizations, *neibu*, which addressed the administrative concerns of the mosque. The internal organizations collected fees, and made sure abidance of Islamic laws was maintained. The *neibu* saw that the main prayer halls were kept simple, free of chairs or exhibits. They made sure prayer mats were ample and that the washrooms for ablutions were in order.¹⁸ The administrators also coordinated social activities of the mosques.¹⁹

¹⁷Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 24.

¹⁸Over time Chinese Muslim mosque architecture had assumed the style of traditional Chinese temple complexes, with courtyards, screen walls and pavilions. Beams and pillars were often decorated with colorful designs and front gates would be adorned with *duihua* (rhyming couplets). The main prayer halls, however, remained decoration-free, like mosques worldwide.

¹⁹Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 201-202.

In 1917 Zhang Deming of the Oxen Street community registered a new group, the Pure and True Society (*Qingzhen Xuehui*). The group's mandate was to promote the study of religious teachings and to encourage progressive studies. The group also stated in their guidelines the responsibility of members to explain Muslim ways to non-Muslims, and to make every effort to avoid provocation and arguments when meeting with prejudice and insults.²⁰ Branches of the Pure and True Society were established in mosques throughout Beijing, and appear to have functioned as an offshoot of existing *neibu*.²¹ The Pure and True Society denounced discrimination and negative stereotypes of Chinese Muslims. The society sought to gain respect for Muslims in the non-Muslim community, but the ability to act on problems was limited. A decade later, however, the ability to monitor acts of defamation moved beyond local incidents (see Chapter 5).

In 1912, the first year of the Republic of China, Wang Haoran and scholar Hou Songquan, along with the ahongs and elders of the Oxen Street Mosque and the Jiazi Hutong Mosque created the *Zhongguo Huijiao Jujin Hu*, the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association, known simply as *Jujin Hui* (Mutual Progress Association)[also translated as the All Advance Society or General Forward Movement].²² The founders were perhaps the first to voice the concern that China's Muslims did not have a centralized

²⁰Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 23-24.

²¹Xun Zhen, "Beiping Qingzhen Side Diaocha" in Li Xinghua and Feng Jinyuan, eds. *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao shi cankao xiliao xuan bian* (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1985, first published in *Zhengdao* [Justice], 1931), 409-411.

²²Bai Shouyi, *Zhongguo Yisilan*, 43; Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 206; Samuel Zwemer, "The Fourth Religion of China" in *Moslem World* 24:1 (1934), 5.

association, but one was needed. Such an organization could be used for consultations on religious matters and for the development of Chinese Muslim occupations and welfare.²³

The Jujin Hui was concerned with social issues, and to that end the major thrust of the group was to advance modern education. The goal was to establish Pure and True elementary schools in all communities in order to make a universal education available to all Muslim children. Wang Haoran stressed improving the quality of Arabic studies, but the educational program was not limited to Islamic studies. The Jujin Hui's aim was to rally Muslims throughout China. The society's creators followed progressive methods endorsed by the modernist teachings.²⁴

Wang Haoran was made chairman of the society, and Hou Songquan vice-chairman. Other founding members include Wang Zixin, Li Yunting, Ma Songting, An Jingxun, Chang Zixuan, and Sun Yanyi.²⁵ The group organized a conference to which they invited ahongs and leaders from Chinese Muslim communities in the eighteen provinces of China proper. The organizers expressed their concern about the state of Islam. One fear stated in the conference program was that with the demise of the Qing dynasty "there has been a falling off generally on the part of all the Chinese in observance of customs." Chinese Muslims, too, needed to be alerted to shortcomings in heeding Islamic ways. The purpose of the conference was to sponsor unification of Muslim customs and laws and to make known the advantages of Islam. The conferees sought cooperation from Chinese Muslims in order to make the Mutual Progress Association a

²³M.E. Botham, "Chinese Islam as an Organism" in *Moslem World* 14 (1924), 263 & 267.

²⁴Chan Wing-tsit, *Religious Trends*, 189-191.

²⁵Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 206.

strong body. "We will not be doing our duty if we do not cause the truth to be spread . . . make the principles of our faith known to all . . . we devote ourselves exclusively to religious matters, avoiding all political question."²⁶

The society proclaimed their responsibilities to include:

- 1) preparation of treatises in order to enlighten the members of the society;
- 2) translate important scriptures, to make doctrine known;
- 3) improve grammar schools and teaching methods thus strengthening our people;
- 4) establish normal schools and develop teacher training;
- 5) emphasize the importance of lectures -- to exhort the people, and disseminate knowledge.²⁷

The topics for upcoming papers pertained to religious matters and Islamic practices. Among the group of scholars who would be making contributions were Wang Haoran, Wang Jingzhai, Li Yunting, Zhang Zuwen, Ma Qunyi, and Sun Sheng-wu. Titles included "Words of Muhammad" and "The Life of Muhammad," "Most Important Muslim Laws" and "History of the Saints." But there were also less theological subjects, such as sanitation and hygiene. Members of the organizing committee of the conference included Zhang Dechun, Wang Ruilan, An Zhen, and Li Zongqing.²⁸

The society opened branches in mosques in the capital cities of the eighteen provinces. By 1923 they claimed some 3,000 branches. Mosque doorways were adorned with plaques painted with the characters *Jujin Hui*, and the association had its own Hui

²⁶M. E. Botham, "Modern Movements among Chinese Mohammedans" in *Moslem World* 13 (1923), 294-295; and Charles L. Ogilivie, trans. "Mohammedan Conference at Peking, 1916" in *Moslem World* 6 (1916), 304.

²⁷Botham, "Modern Movements," 295.

²⁸Ogilivie, "Mohammedan Conference," 306-307.

nationality flag created. The Hui flag bore a star and the crescent moon, like the flag of the Ottoman Empire.²⁹ Where the five-barred design of the ROC's flag symbolized Chinese nationalism, a separate Hui flag created a symbol for Hui nationalism. By the 1910s the star and crescent would adorn the cover of numerous Muslim publications and the flag hung in meeting halls, providing a symbol of Muslim heritage. But the Mutual Progress Association hung the five barred flag, too, in a show of allegiance to the Republic of China. In another symbolic action, the association encouraged its members to cut off their queues.³⁰

Different branches of the society met with varying degrees of success. In some provinces mosques were seen to display Jujin Hui plaques, but showed little evidence of activities associated with the movement. A mosque in Sichuan, for example, bragged of its reading room, but upon inspection, the room was found to be a dusty storage room.³¹ Mosques in Beijing, in contrast, became a centers where ideas of social reform and modern progress were discussed. The Beijing branch of the Jujin Hui started production on a bimonthly periodical, Muhammed's Light (*Mu Guang Ban Yuekan*), in addition to holding meetings and lectures.³² The Jujin Hui's program expanded to

²⁹Botham, "Modern Movements," 295. It is interesting to note that the star and crescent (emblems of the Ottoman Empire) became the flag design chosen by Islamic states around the world in the years to come. A foreigner researching Islam had observed no evidence of the star and crescent design while traveling in China before 1910 suggesting little exchange with the Middle East, see H.M.G. d'Ollone, *Recherches sur les Musulmans Chinois* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1911), 374.

³⁰Derk Bodde, "China's Muslim Minority" in *Far Eastern Survey* 15:18 (1946), 283.

³¹M.E. Botham, "Chinese Islam as an Organism" in *Moslem World* 14 (1924), 267.

³²Fu, "Zhongguo Huijiao," 206.

include questions of health and sanitation, and a commitment to combat the problem of opium.³³

The All Progress Association endorsed the new republic and acclaimed the advantages of the nation-state for Chinese Muslims.³⁴ Such applause, however, was as much a cautionary measure as anything. The association claimed to be apolitical, but it was impossible to avoid politics in China in the 1910s. There was a law that organizations (*minzhong tuanti*) register with the government. Organizations were required to submit copies of the organization's constitution and by-laws, a list of officers, and a list of at least forty-five members to the local police station (which in the ROC houses government civil service offices). When Chinese Muslim leaders registered newly formed societies their statements of purpose stressed goals to enrich the lives of Chinese Muslims "for the good of society and the country."³⁵

Coping with the governmental requirements of organizations, put Chinese Muslims in a balancing act. Sometimes lip service would be paid officials in order not to jeopardize activities. For example, in the opening years of the republic, the Jujin Hui endorsed Yuan Shikai. The alignment put the association on shaky ground following Yuan Shikai's attempts to restore the monarchy. Nevertheless the society did not disappear, contrary to some accounts.³⁶ By the mid 1930s the Jujin Hui proclaimed that it was "in accordance with the directives of Beijing city's social office (*shehui ju*)." They

³³R. W. Thwing, "Islam in China To-day" in *Moslem World* 7 (1917), 76.

³⁴*Huiwen Baihua Bao* 5 (1913), 1-3.

³⁵Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 25.

³⁶Voll, *Islam: Continuity*, 266-267.

continued to open branches throughout the country, and added some branches in Qinghai by the late thirties.³⁷ The society was responsible for establishing elementary schools and taking charge of education in communities around the country.³⁸

Organizations were formed in other cities, too. In Nanjing a Chinese Muslim Federation was formed in 1912. In 1925 the *Zhongguo Huijiao Xuehui* was formed in Shanghai. The name has been translated as the Chinese Muslim Teaching Society and the Chinese Muslim Literary Society, or Study Society. Hajji Jelaluddin He Decheng was a famous scholar who had studied in India and Egypt and knew Arabic, Persian, Urdu, and English.³⁹ When he returned from studies abroad, He Decheng observed that Chinese Muslim religious studies needed to be improved. He Decheng along with He Shafu, Ma Ganghou, Sha Shanyu, Ma Jinqing, Ma Yitang, Yang Jiashan, Da Pusheng, Jin Ziyun and Wu Tegong organized the Literary Society.⁴⁰

The society concentrated on Islamic education and encouraged the study of the Qur'an and the hadiths.⁴¹ The society's list of projects included the establishment of a Muslim teachers' college, elementary schools, and Arabic classes. The group opened reading rooms and established religious libraries, and created scholarships for high school students.⁴² The society published a monthly periodical, *Huijiao Xuehui Yuekan* (Chinese Muslim Literary Society Monthly) which focused on spreading the doctrine of Islam, and

³⁷Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 206-207.

³⁸Finlay G. Andrew, *The Crescent in Northwest China* (London: China Inland Mission, 1921),67-68.

³⁹Ting, "Islamic Culture," 365.

⁴⁰Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 208.

⁴¹Voll, *Islam: Continuity*, 267.

⁴²Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 208.

also began a project of translating the Qur'an into Chinese. The society also hope to increase exchanges with Muslims of other countries. Indian Muslims traveling and proselytizing in East Asia participated in the activities of the society.⁴³

In 1929, also in Shanghai, He Shafu, Ma Yitang, Sha Shanyu, Wu Tegong, Da Pusheng, and Sun Yanyi formed a new group, *Zhongguo Huijiao Gonghui* (Chinese Muslim General Association) with the profess purpose of drawing together Muslims around the country. The organizers included in their statement the usual desire to aid and assist the nation.⁴⁴ Five main goals were to train ahongs, expand efforts to establish schools, organize vocational education, invite prominent people to give public lectures, and create a hospital. The group expanded the agenda from that of the Literary Society, of which many were members. In the end, however, financial difficulties led to the association's demise.

In 1928 in Beijing, Chinese Muslim university students formed the Beiping Islamic Friendship Association, also translated as Brotherhood, (*Beiping Yisilan Xueyou Hui*). Their roster included members from fifteen provinces, with eighty-nine men and seven women.⁴⁵ Members included Xue Wenbo, Lin Baoshi, Yang Jingzhi, Yang Xinmin, and Yu Weihua. They established branches in colleges and high schools, with the hope to extend the brotherhood nationwide. The group held discussions on religion, education and research, hoped to promote scholarly lectures and international exchanges.⁴⁶

⁴³ Anonymous, "The Moslems of China through Indian Eyes" in *Moslem World* 18 (1928), 307-308.

⁴⁴ Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 207.

⁴⁵ Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 26.

⁴⁶ Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 209.

In 1931 in Nanjing the Chinese Muslim Young Student Association (*Zhongguo Huijiao Qingnian Xuehui*) was established. Some of the founders and early members of this group include Wang Yi, Wang Cengshan, Wang Yuebo, Hu Jiaoru, Tang Kesan, Sun Yanyi, and Ma Jizhou. The group also sought to unite Chinese Muslim students around the country, and promote research and universal education. The members also committed themselves to social services and the improvement of Chinese Muslim lifestyle. Their projects expanded on earlier student groups to include: the study of science and its relationship to Islam; vocational training for Chinese Muslim students; the collection and compilation of books and journals relevant to Muslim communities; and the study of Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles.⁴⁷

The number of youth groups grew, and in 1933 an amalgamation of these groups was formed and called the Chinese Muslim Youth Association (*Huizu Qingnian Hui*).⁴⁸ Although the name implies a membership of youthful students, members were all ages, most in their twenties, thirties and forties.

The Society for the Promotion of Education Among Muslims (*Zhongguo Huimin Jiaoyu Cujin Weiyuan Hui*) was created in Nanjing in 1931. Sun Sheng-wu, Wu Tegong, Shi Zizhou, and Jin Shihe were among the original group. The society was dedicated solely to the promotion of universal education. Members sought to coordinate their efforts to complement the government's new policy. In the effort to bring Xinjiang into the republican fold, the government advocated a plan of bringing (male) students from

⁴⁷Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 209.

⁴⁸Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 26-27.

border regions, specifically Xinjiang, to study with Han boys. The plan promised to reward students with the opportunity to pursue advance education.⁴⁹

In 1934 a new version of the short-lived Chinese Muslim General Association (*Zhongguo Huijiao Gonghui*) of 1929, noted above, was revived and renamed when Ma Zizhen, Liang Renfu, Chen Jiang, and Ma Liang gathered in Jinan, Shandong and created the Chinese Muslim National Association (*Zhonghua Huijiao Zonghui*). The group organized a large scale meeting in Nanjing of Chinese Muslim leaders from different provinces to initiate the proceedings. The assembly drew up laws and regulations and the new association was formally established. The success of this group proved that Chinese Muslims could organize at the national level. Representatives opened provincial branches, which included not only Henan, Shandong, Hubei, Jiangsu, but also Shaanxi and Gansu.⁵⁰

Also in 1934, in Shanghai, Ma Tianying, Wang Yi, Lu Zhongxiang, Ma Fuguo, and Fu Tongxian (Fu T'ung-hsien) established the *Zhongguo Huijiao Wenhua Xiehui* (Chinese Islamic Cultural Society). The members desire was to examine and enrich the state of Chinese Muslim culture. It was a new direction, moving beyond religious matters and education. The efforts were directed toward the compilation and publication of Muslim cultural literature, including non-Chinese Muslim cultures.⁵¹

Most every organization stated goals to improve education and Chinese Muslim well being. The earlier groups such as the All Progress Association and the Beiping Student's Brotherhood focused expressly on education. But the later groups such

⁴⁹Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 210.

⁵⁰Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 207; and Chan Wing-tsit, *Religious Trends*, 191.

⁵¹Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 211.

as the Chinese Muslim National Association and the Chinese Islamic Cultural Society indicate that members began broadening their aims. This is a shift from 1912. The idea of creating hospitals, and vocational training, and cultural centers indicates that leaders saw their role as one that was not limited to religious matters. The original effort of the Jujin Hui, to link Chinese Muslims around the country began to be realized.

The local branches offices of most associations were housed in mosques.⁵² In addition to the prayer hall, a mosque might house lecture halls, conference rooms, study rooms, and offices, depending on the size of the mosque. In 1930 there were 34 mosques in the center of Beijing, and well over 40 counting the outlying districts. The Oxen Street and Jiazi Hutong mosques lay outside the old city walls to the southwest. A look at the mosques in Beijing in 1930 exemplify the activities going on in different mosques. A list of some of the groups and activities include: a branch of the Jujin Hui; a branch of the Pure and True Society; a local branch of the Anti-Smoking Association (*jiayan hui*); and winter charity rice bowl committees. The publication of the bimonthly, Muhammed's Light (*Mu Guang*) was done on mosque grounds. The Jujin Hui established some twenty elementary schools in the city's Muslims districts, as well as the Northwestern public high schools. Mosques also housed chapters of the Union of Traveling Mutton Salesmen and the *Huimin Gonghui*.⁵³

⁵²Mosques had long been called *Qingzhen Si* (Pure and True Temples). In the 1930s a number of Chinese Muslim communities began to use the terms *Libai Tang* or *Libai Si* (Worship Hall, or Temple).

⁵³Xun Zhen, "Beiping Qingzhen Si," 409.

Traditional Chinese Muslim schools, *jingxue*, were attached to mosques. The name came from the fact that the schools focused on Quranic studies, *gulan jingxue*. Students studied the Qur'an and Arabic and Persian languages and literature. For most Chinese Muslims that would have been the only education they would ever receive. If students had studied Chinese they did so outside of the mosque schools. Traditional mosque education was limited to religious subjects, essentially training students to become religious leaders.⁵⁴ By the end of the nineteenth century curricula generally were courses in Arabic that consisted of the Qur'an and theology, and language and literature. Subjects in Persian included religious doctrine and philosophy. In many cases Chinese Muslim students spent years laboring over Arabic texts, only to have the lessons committed to memory, but never mastering the language. Their actual linguistic abilities were often poor. Passages of the Qur'an were memorized with no sense of the meaning.⁵⁵

Chinese Muslim students were not forbidden from studying Chinese or in Han schools, but it was not customary. There were accomplished Chinese Muslim scholars who followed the arduous path to officialdom in dynastic times, but, for the most part, it was a difficult career choice if one hoped to be true to the tenets of Islam. The social and ritualistic importance of dining in China, for example, placed a Muslim who followed strict dietary laws in a compromising position. By the close of Qing times, very few Chinese Muslims were literate, in Chinese or Arabic.⁵⁶ New schools, with modern curricula were growing in number, but Chinese Muslims were reluctant to attend, again

⁵⁴Bai Shouyi, *Zhongguo Yisilan*," 45.

⁵⁵Ma Jian, "A Comprehensive History of Islam in China" in *Yugong* 5:11(1936) 72-73.

⁵⁶*Huiwen Baihua Bao* (1913)

because of the dietary problems as well as a concern that students would get no religious instruction, so Chinese Muslims set about establishing their own new schools.⁵⁷

In the following decades Chinese Muslim educators would institute three kinds of schools: teacher training schools, or normal schools (*Huimin shifan xuexiao*); mosque schools (*siyuan xuexiao*); and new general education schools (*putong xuexiao*). Mosque schools set out to raise the standards of Islamic studies, and also add courses in Chinese language, and history, geography and math. The community would allocate funds for education, and in some cases the government of the republic would also contribute to Chinese Muslim schools.⁵⁸ Chinese Muslims educators tried some innovative methods, such as the use of volunteer instructors. At the beginning of the republican era there was great optimism about the advancement of education.⁵⁹ Three of the best known schools founded for religious education include Chengda Normal School in Beijing, the Islamic Normal School in Shanghai, and the Mingde High School in Kunming.⁶⁰

Ma Songting came to prominence with his work in setting up Chengda Normal School, *Chengda Shifan Xuexiao*, in 1925 in Jinan in Shandong province. The school was housed on the grounds of Mujia Chemen mosque, with a mandate to produce “robust and strong” teachers who would promote “Hui citizenry’s knowledge and enlarge the field of Muslim culture and teachings, and to renew staunch Islamic spirituality.” Originally courses were traditional courses in Arabic and Chinese. Arabic course work

⁵⁷Zhao, “Sanshi nianlai,” 15-18.

⁵⁸Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*,

⁵⁹Ma Shouqian, “The Hui People’s,” 20.

⁶⁰Ting, “Islamic Culture,” 372.

included language classes, Qur'anic studies, and Islamic studies ranging from moral, ethics and philosophy to Muslim society and history.⁶¹

The normal school curricula were created due to contemporary concerns and problems “facing the Chinese Muslim community,” and was perceived of as a “progressive means for enabling nationalism.”⁶² Chinese course work included Chinese literature, history and geography, and society. As the school grew the methods and courses adjusted to suit the demands of contemporary society. There were also courses in the natural sciences and math, as well as courses in education. The student body steadily increased. There were scholars and students visiting from Egypt, too.⁶³

The school was moved to Beijing and became the foremost Chinese Muslim teacher training school. In Beijing Chengda continued to thrive. By 1929 the school published magazines, books and teaching materials.⁶⁴ It began publishing a monthly magazine, *Yue Hua*, which eventually became an independent operation. The school also published *Chengshi Shao Kan*, the campus magazine that focused on school services and student work.⁶⁵

One of the first modern schools was established in Zhenjiang in Jiangsu by Tong Zhong who had studied in Japan, where he had belonged to the Chinese Muslim

⁶¹ Ma Songting, “Zhongguo Huijiao,” 1-5.

⁶² Ma Songting, “Zhongguo Huijiao,” 4-6.

⁶³ Liu Shenglin, “Beijing Huizu,” 28. After the establishment of the PRC, Chengda and two of the middle schools set up by in the 1910s were joined together to form the Hui Institute (*Hui Xueyuan*). In the years after 1963 it changed again into a middle school, with its name changing with the times.

⁶⁴ Ma Songting, “Zhongguo Huijiao,” 12-14.

⁶⁵ Ma Songting, “Zhongguo Huijiao,” 13.

General Education Association of East Asia, mentioned above. Another one was established by An Ming in Wanping County of Beijing. Ma Linyiu opened the Muslim Jiejing Primary School in Shaoyang, Hunan. A Chinese Muslim language normal school and the first Muslim public primary school were established in Beijing by Ma Linyi and Wang Kuan.⁶⁶

Wang Haoran came from Shandong, as did Ma Songting. Shandong Chinese Muslims had had a reputation of being liberal among the study groups in Japan before the revolution, and their attitudes became influential in education in the years that followed.⁶⁷ Wang Haoran and Wang Yousan worked together with the ahongs of the Oxen Street and Jiazi Hutong mosques under the auspices of the Jujin Hui, and established Pure in True Elementary schools in mosques throughout Beijing. They also were able to transform the Northwest High schools.

Under the republic Chinese Muslims founded more than a thousand elementary schools and several high schools for general education.⁶⁸ They added modern subjects to the list of traditional courses of Islamic doctrine and literature. The efforts marks the beginnings of new style Chinese Muslim schools. Chinese began to used for teaching in the classroom with the goal that it would be used for general education. The target established was to create elementary schools in all Chinese Muslim neighborhoods and thereby achieve universal education.⁶⁹

⁶⁶Ma Shouqian, "The Hui People's," 20-22.

⁶⁷Pang Shiqian, "Zhongguo Huijiao Siyuan Jiaoyu zhi Yangge ji Keben" [Church Education in Chinese Islam] in *Yugong* 7: 4 (1937), 101.

⁶⁸Ting, *Islamic Culture*, 373.

⁶⁹Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 15-16.

Some conservative Chinese Muslims maintained that the use of Chinese in schools and the study of Chinese books betrayed their religion.⁷⁰ Others claimed reading too much would lead one away from religion. Older ahongs held on to more conventional methods, and shunned modern curricula contending that traditional learning was an important factor in preserving the self-identity of the faithful amidst Chinese society. The older faction was behind the times,⁷¹ however, and their influence all but faded when Wang Haoran and others like him introduced new schemes. The modernists explained that it was not more reading that would damage religion, but the opposite. Study, and progressive education, was the best way to promote religion.

Modernists stressed the need to incorporate useful everyday Chinese learning in the curriculum, so that students would have better opportunities. An article appearing in a 1913 magazine in Beijing underscored the need for Chinese Muslims to study Chinese. "While the Han people (*hanzu*) are able to reach high honors in their scholarship, we Hui people (*women huiren*) are also able to, . . . our vested rights are equal . . . but we cannot read Chinese books; it is a great weakness."⁷²

For Chinese society on the whole, revamping the educational system did not come easily. The formation of new schools ignited anti-foreign sentiments in a number of people, but, as in the Chinese Muslim community, the progressive voices prevailed. An article appearing in the newspaper *Shibao* in 1906 argued that universal education was mandatory for China because "a minority of citizens were not capable of

⁷⁰Bai Chongxi, "Zhongguo Huijiao" in *Huijiao Wenhua* 1 (1957), 3.

⁷¹Hayward, "Chinese-Moslem Literature," 367-368.

⁷²*Huiwen Baihua Bao*, 7 (1913), 23.

revitalizing the nation.”⁷³ Tsang explains that schools became centers for developing and promoting nationalism. In 1912 the ROC promoted practical courses and there were still ideas of “moral education” that breed “wholesome and balanced personalities.”

Educators became more sensitive about nationalism after World War I. The first modern educators were strongly influenced by thinkers like John Dewey, who advocated separation of politics and education, but popular education was believed integral to democracy.

When Chiang Kai-shek took the reins and moved the capital to Nanjing the government’s stance on education shifted. The Nationalists figured that education was to be used to national ends. The system could be designed according to the Nationalists’ program, and Sun’s Three Principles. It would become the model of Guomindang styled education (*dangfa jiaoyu*).⁷⁴ The GMD regarded education as a means to facilitate the government’s policy of assimilation, and school curricula were laden with courses about Han Chinese history and culture.⁷⁵ The government helped fund Chinese Muslim schools but not because of ideals about self-determination and religious freedom.

In 1927 the Nanjing government decreed that all schools, like organizations and publications, should register with the government, and any religious curriculum was proscribed.⁷⁶ The government had already instituted a modern curricula for elementary and high schools. The Chinese Muslims educators had been executing that program in

⁷³Judge, *Print and Politics*, 221.

⁷⁴Tsang, *Nationalism*, 30-54.

⁷⁵Dreyer, *China’s Forty Millions*, 17-18.

⁷⁶Elizabeth Pickens, “Moslems in China” in *Moslem World* 34 (1944), 255.

their new local schools, but they also had retained courses in Islamic studies and Arabic and Persian languages and literature. When the ban on religion went into effect, Chinese Muslims saw no recourse but to close their schools. Students could attend Han Chinese schools, but the old problems of dietary laws upset many, and they sought another solution.

General Omar Bai Chongxi, had been a member of the Guangxi Clique, one of the serious military contenders to the Nationalists. Bai was a Chinese Muslim. When he sided with the Nationalists it was much to their advantage. Chinese Muslim leaders had appealed to the government to grant them freedom to include religious studies in their educational programs. One story goes that Chiang Kai-shek needed to propitiate General Bai Chongxi, and so Chiang conceded to the demands of the Chinese Muslims. Bai, in turn, remained a loyal and most trusted general.⁷⁷ When the government moved to Taiwan Bai continued to have a prominent career in the ROC's government, and was held in high esteem by Chinese Muslims there.⁷⁸

When the ban on religion was lifted, Chinese Muslims students once again attended Chinese Muslim schools. Students studied modern curriculum in the mornings and received religious instruction in the afternoons. Leaders claimed that by expanding education it would benefit "the foundations of the work force" which would "benefit

⁷⁷Pickens, "Moslems in China," 254.

⁷⁸When General Bai died feuding arose as to how to proceed with his funeral. Many felt that the general ought to lie in state because he had been an important government figure, but others maintained that such ritual was highly inappropriate for a Muslim. It created quite a rift. In the end the general's body was embalmed and displayed in a Han funeral parlor (contrary to Muslim custom), before finally being laid to rest in Muslim fashion a week late. See Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, 185-195.

society.”⁷⁹ By the mid 1930s efforts to modernize education included schooling for girls. Students and disciples in Beijing also created an educational network between mosques. For example, they picked a central location where teachers and masters could participate in joint seminars.⁸⁰ By the 1930s many Muslim communities could boast Pure and True elementary schools and more high schools opened.

Educational improvements came from within the community. A major imperative had been to improve and modernize educational facilities for every mosque in the land. A further aim was to use Chinese for instruction. At the same time Chinese Muslim schools still taught Arabic and Persian and Islamic studies.⁸¹ Leaders shared the belief that it was imperative for Chinese Muslims to study Arabic. The modernists and Yihewani followers alike had been impressed by Arab renewalism in the Middle East, and they reckoned that true appreciation of Islamic culture required Arabic.⁸²

The experiences of leaders such as Wang Haoran, Wang Jingzhai, Ma Hongdao and Ma Songting, who traveled and studied in Egypt and Turkey recognized that Islam was important.⁸³ Islam was important not only because it was their faith, but because it was the faith of so many millions of people in the world. With that knowledge Chinese Muslims understood that their faith was not just a “little teaching” (*xiao jiao*) as it had been called in China, but major religion of the world. Islam was on a par with

⁷⁹Ma Songting, “Zhongguo Huijiao,” 7.

⁸⁰Zhao, “Sanshi nianlai,” 18.

⁸¹Liu Shenglin, “Beijing Huizu,” 27.

⁸²See Ma Songting, “Zhongguo Huijiao,” 1-15; and Isaac Mason, “Arabian Stories for Chinese Readers” in *Moslem World* 11 (1921), 70-76.

⁸³Zhao Chenwu, “Sanshi nianlai, 18-19.

Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Christianity. In the same vein, Chinese Muslims were on a par with their fellow non-Muslim Chinese brethren. Chinese Muslim identity had been expanded by the modern age, and the opportunity to explore beyond Beijing.

CHAPTER FOUR: PUBLICATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS

The route for Muslims going on pilgrimage to Mecca shifted. In the past pilgrims traveled overland by caravan through Central Asia. It was an arduous journey that took many months. Modern steamers, in contrast, could carry pilgrims from the coast of China to the port of Jiddah much quicker. The change prompted an increase in the number of Muslims going on hajj. Between 1923 and 1934 some 834 pilgrims sailed from Shanghai to Mecca. Others made their way to Southeast Asia and departed from Singapore¹. It was costly, and many Muslims were poor, nevertheless hundreds made the journey.

Returning pilgrims brought back sacred waters from the well of Zamzam, but more importantly they brought with them stories of new experiences and books.² Chinese Muslims were eager to learn about the Middle East and other Muslims, and there was a large demand for Arabic and Persian books and materials. Muslims in China had copied old copies of old Arabic and Persian materials over the centuries, but after years of little contact with the Middle East, Chinese Muslims were eager to get different and updated

¹ Claude L. Pickens, "The Challenge of Chinese Muslims" in *The Chinese Recorder* 68 (1937), 414-417.

² Virginia Vacca, "The Views of a Chinese Moslem" in *Moslem World* 24 (1936), 71

materials.³ At once, modern technology brought the Middle East closer, and teachers and students could get new dictionaries and textbooks. At the same time, modern print technologies also had arrived in China, and the urban centers experienced a flood of publishing.

Modern print technology was readily embraced in the land which had produced the earliest printing presses. Yet Chinese print technology had not undergone the kind of mechanization seen in the West, nor had the media been a force outside official circles; the introduction of foreign publications and their genre, however, stimulated changes. “The journalism of the West, the technical, commercial and financial press, and the notion of free political discussion, all corollary to the whole Baconian philosophy, were ushered with it into China.”⁴ As the nineteenth century closed Chinese publishers had begun to borrow from the foreign format at the same time that new political concepts took root as traditional ones lost their luster

Print technology began to change in all ways, from production and distribution, in addition to content and format. As Dirks observes, “The movement from annals to chronicles to historic narrative is the progression from different forms of kingship to the rationalized reality of the nation-state.”⁵ The change in printed materials themselves reflects the ongoing changes in society, and how people perceive themselves.

³ Shi Chenzhong, “Hailifa Bixu Hui Zhizhi Xiejing Hua Baba Xiejing Zui Chuming” in *Zhenzong Bao Yuekan* (1939), reprinted in Li Xinghua, *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao*, 1088-1089.

⁴ Roswell S. Britton, *The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800-1912* (Taipei: Cheng-wen Publishing, 1966, original edition Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1933), 16.

⁵ Nicholas Dirks, “History as a Sign of the Modern” in *Public Culture* Spring (1990), 25-33; see also Lydia Liu *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity, China, 1900-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

The print media do not present formal historical narratives, per se, but provide records of the process and some of the dialogues of the time. The media become a forum for public discourse. At the same time as a human construct, the media constitute artifacts that become tools used in society's reconstruction, and serve to influence attitudes, which alter cultural institutions.⁶

The power of the press grew. There was a push to create a solidarity by repeating that the Chinese were 400,000, 000 (*si wanwan*) that are "uterine brothers" (*tongbao*). Articles hammered away at the problem of the Great Powers, and they delivered a barrage of international news. The influence in the cities was tremendous. "In China readers rule. It matters little that few can read. Those who can inform those who cannot, and sooner or later the masses know what the classes have learnt."⁷ The Chinese newsstands increased as the of number periodicals and dailies swelled. In the opening years of the republic an average of one hundred periodicals were started annually, and this trend continued.⁸ Throughout China, "it was a day for the popularizing and broadcasting of ideas and slogans, and for the production of vast quantities of propaganda literature of all kinds."⁹

⁶ For discussion about modern publishing in China see Britton, *The Chinese Periodical Press*; and Lin Yutang, *A History of the Press and Public Opinion in China* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1936).

⁷ Charles Bone, "The Secular Chinese Press: Its Tone and Teaching" in G.H. Bondfield, ed. *China Mission Yearbook, 1912* (Shanghai: Christian Literature Society for China, 1911), 346.

⁸ P. deVargas, "Some Elements in the Chinese Renaissance" in *The New China Review* 4:3 (1922), 243.

⁹ Harold D. Hayward, "Chinese-Moslem Literature: A Study in Mohammedan Education" in *Moslem World* 23 (1933), 366.

In 1919 some 400 magazines appeared as the New Culture Movement flourished. While most magazines were produced by students and short-lived, they represent the pulse of the times. It can "truly be called a magazine movement."¹⁰ Non-Muslim writers such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Lu Xun and Hu Shih were intensely nationalistic, and they sought to make a new China. Their discourse was full of political nationalism coupled with cultural iconoclasm. People were rethinking Chinese tradition, and little escaped attack. There was a backlash in the 1930s that regaled the past, but China would never be as it was, and it was impossible to not think of the country and its place in the modern world.¹¹

The print media wrestled with the juxtaposition of elements that upheld cultural values of the past that were carried into the present, and those elements that enforced the imperatives of the present. New Chinese printed materials emerged, hybrids of inherited art forms and newly introduced methods. Publications could reach a broader audience and be of greater influence. Traditional newspapers experimented with change. The Peking Gazette (*Jingbao*), for example, was a late Qing official news page that was inserted in modern newspapers, such as the *Shenbao*. By changing the "environment" of the paper, the traditional state was forced to enter into the public arena.¹² Experimentation did not require rejection of the past, as in cases like the *Jingbao* just the juxtaposition of traditional media with the modern altered their stature, and periodicals

¹⁰deVargas, "Some Elements," 244.

¹¹Harrison, *Modern Chinese Nationalism*, 27-29.

¹²Barbara Mittler, "Making the Chinese State Go Public: Peking Gazette (*Jingbao*) Reprints in the *Shenbao* (1872-1912)" in *Association for Asian Studies : Abstracts of the 1996 Annual Meeting* (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 1996), 52.

took on a new voice. Dissanayake's comments about cinema in Japan could just as easily be said of Chinese printing materials; "... the imported art ... was very quickly transformed into an indigenous medium ... capable of representing various facets of the national experience and sensibility," which soon would be "inscribed with cultural legitimacy."¹³

The idea of progress and rebirth was not unique to the Chinese Muslims. The names of Han Chinese newspapers and journals demonstrate the same sentiments. When the students at Beijing University published a magazine in 1918 they named it *Xinchao* (The New Tide), but they chose The Renaissance as their title in English. New magazines were printed on stronger paper that could be printed on both sides, unlike the thin old-fashioned paper. By 1920 the vernacular (*baihua*) and modern punctuation were used in magazines, and sometimes texts would be printed in horizontal lines from left to right.¹⁴ Technology and technical changes all contributed to the sense of progress.

A few years before the revolution, Chinese Muslim students in Tokyo published the magazine, Muslims Awake (*Xing Hui pian*), which, like their study groups, addressed educational and religious concerns. The students who returned from overseas played a crucial role in the progressive activities in their communities. In 1904, for example, Ding Baochen returning from studies in Japan, founded the Orthodox Patriotic Magazine (*Zhengzong Aiguo Bao*) in Beijing. His brother, Ding Zhuyuan, started the *Zhuyuan Baihua Bao* (Zhuyuan Vernacular Magazine) in Tianjin three years later. Both

¹³Dissanayake, *Colonialism*, xv.

¹⁴deVargas, "Some Elements," 244-245.

used slogans of the day such as “truth will save the nation” (*zhenli jiuguo*) and “education will save the nation” (*jiaoyu jiuguo*). At the same time, an effort was made to utilize the vernacular in order to reach a larger audience.¹⁵

Anderson suggests that print languages lay the basis for “national consciousness” by creating a sense of unity -- “unified fields of exchange”-- for fellow-readers who would be connected through print, thereby forming “the embryo of the nationally imagined community.”¹⁶ He illustrates, for example, that early European nationalists came from lesser gentry and academics, and were tradesmen and businessmen who were not versed in Latin, the language of the literati. The use of colloquial languages -- the vernacular -- served to build a sense of belonging for linguistic groups, and literacy opened the door to belonging to a larger community. Linguistically a group shared a heritage, “myths, poetry, newspapers, and ideological formation . . . [as well as] money and marketing.” Anderson calls these fellow-readers “missionaries of nationalism,” whose numbers increased with literacy.¹⁷

The growing acceptance of the use of *baihua* among Chinese writers promised larger audiences as well as greater literacy. In the Chinese Muslim community the use of the vernacular coupled with the educational drive made the public forum more accessible. Periodicals, newspapers, and a variety of printed materials were available in shops in Chinese Muslim districts. At the same time associations like the Jujin Hui, the Chinese Muslim Literary Society, and the Chinese Muslim National Association were

¹⁵Ma Shouqian, “The Hui People’s,” 6.

¹⁶Anderson, *Imagined*, 47.

¹⁷Anderson, *Imagined*, 76-77.

setting up reading rooms and libraries.¹⁸ Chinese Muslims were given the opportunity to read about their heritage, one shared with fellow Chinese Muslims who lived in other communities around the country.

Anderson suggests that the new style global imperialism that grew out of industrial capitalism gave rise to the wave of nationalist movements seen in the twentieth century, and capitalism gave rise to a commercial press. Modern economic changes, socio-scientific discoveries and changes in communications led to a “new search for ways to link fraternity, power, and time . . . and the emergence of print capitalism” in which people could find new ways to see themselves and their relationship to others. Within such a setting a nation becomes popular.¹⁹ The printed word becomes a source of information and the creation of popular vernacular. This leads to what Anderson identifies as popular-vernacular based nationalisms that undermine the old dynasts and their “official nationalism.”²⁰ Such a setting allows for a group to reexamine their past culture as well as their future politics.

An article in a Hui magazine entitled “The Usefulness of Newspapers” explained that China was not only the birthplace of printing and moveable type, but of newspapers. The art flourished in China, but it was essentially used by the courts. In time however, the west learned from China, and took advantage of the media. Now the progressive West utilized the newspaper as a major means of communication and people

¹⁸ Zhao, “Sanshi nianlai,” 24.

¹⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991, revised and expanded version of 1983 text), 40-41.

²⁰ Anderson, *Imagined*, 127-128.

read papers daily. It is, the article continued, essential for Chinese to borrow this habit (that is indirectly of Chinese origin) in order to understand progress and to participate in the modern world. The piece could have appeared in any Chinese publication of the period. It both reflected admiration for China's rich heritage and the need to adjust society and peoples' attitudes.²¹ The message complements Hobsbawm's discussion that nationals use the past to invent traditions that will apply to the present in the efforts to fortify nationalism.²²

Few Chinese Muslims were literate before the drive for universal education. There is no known existent Chinese Muslim body of literature prior to the seventeenth century. Aside from a few stele and monuments found on mosque grounds, there is no written record to speak of before the seventeenth century.²³ No record of any Chinese Muslim literature exists that predates the writings of the Chinese Muslim apologists, dating from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. Their works, the *Han Kitab*, constitute the Chinese Muslim classics.

Isaac Mason spent thirty-three years in China. The last ten of those years he spent in Shanghai where he prepared materials in Chinese and Arabic for Christian missionaries who worked among Chinese Muslims. Mason also collected Chinese Muslim published materials and amassed a collection amounting more than three hundred items.²⁴

²¹*Huiwen Baihua Bao*, 1913.

²²See Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*.

²³See Ford, "Some Chinese Muslims," 144-156; and Ludmilla Panskaya, *Introduction to Palladii's Chinese Literature of the Muslims* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979).

²⁴Isaac Mason, "The Future of Islam in China" in *Moslem World* 40 (1940), 84.

The collection contains a sampling of materials from the late 1800s, but most of the publications come from the period between 1904 and 1925. A cursory read of the collection's catalogue indicates that most of the works pertain to religious topics. There are books about Islamic history, religious practices, myths, and accounts of pilgrims and Mecca. Most notable, however, is there are scores of reprints from the classics, the Han Kitab.

There are reprints of Wang Daiyu's A True Explanation of the Correct Religion of 1642. There are numerous reprints and rewrites of the works of Liu Zhi (fl. 1720), and more than two dozen reprints of Ma Fuchu's (d. 1875) works and those of his pupil, Ma Anli. The rewrites were shortened and simplified versions of the classical works, translated from the classical Chinese into the vernacular. There are also dozens of magazines listed, but Mason notes that in half the cases the publications are short lived. The collection also includes calendars and charts.²⁵ The Mason collection illustrates the array of publishing going on in the urban Chinese Muslim centers.

Chinese Muslims set up their own publishing houses. In Beijing one company listed some 76 books in Chinese and bilingually in Chinese and Arabic, along with stock of over 125 titles in Arabic and Persian.²⁶ Beijing became one of the most important Muslim publishing centers. Other important centers included Shanghai, Nanjing, Changsha, Chengdu, Kunming, and Tokyo. The new schools created the need

²⁵Isaac Mason, "Notes on Chinese Mohammedan Literature" in *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 54 (1925), 172-215. Also refer to the listing for the Collection of Chinese Islamic Literature (New York City Public Library).

²⁶Botham, "Modern Movements," 296.

for new teaching materials (*zuopin*) for the variety of new course work. Publishers set out to meet the demands of compiling and editing texts, and new science materials.²⁷

Chinese Muslim publishing houses experimented with new technologies. Among the most successful were the Shanghai United Prosperity Company (*Shanghai Xiexing gongsi*), the Shanghai Chinese Muslim Books Company (*Shanghai Zhongguo Huijiao shuju*), the Shanghai Muslim Classic Books Company (*Shanghai Mumin Jingshu Ju*), and the Beijing Chengda Publishing House (*Beiping Chengda Shifan chubanbu*). Companies imported dictionaries and books from India, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. Students returning from the Middle East brought back Arabic and Persian volumes and books about Islam. Many were reprinted by the new publishing houses.²⁸

Compilation of Chinese and Arabic dictionaries also meant importing of Arabic typesetting. Companies also provided photo lithographic copies of western books, and reproduced old wood cuts. Beijing's Chengda Publishing House made photo lithos of original dictionaries and records, as well as its most recent works on Chinese Muslim culture. Other important publishing houses were *Chengdu Jing Shu Liu Tong Chu* in Sichuan, *Yunnan Chang Xue She* in Yunnan, *Beijing Qingzhen Shu Bao She* in Beijing, and *Xi'an Moushu She* in Shaanxi.²⁹

The companies published a wide range of books from easy to understand Arabic readers and Arabic grammar texts, to Sacred and Holy Meanings. The Chinese

²⁷Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 19.

²⁸See Charles L. Ogilvie, "A Classified Bibliography of Books on Islam in Chinese and Chinese-Arabic" in *Moslem World* 6 (1918), 74-78.

²⁹Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 20-22.

Muslim practice of translating and compiling started from Ming times, and during the early republic, the practice continued. Translations of important Islamic works, for example, included titles such as Haqigut ad-Diyana al Islamiyya by Hussain al-Jisr, and Outline of Islamic Monotheism by Muhammad Abduh, both translated by Ma Jian. Ma Jian also had studied in Egypt, and in 1936 he began work translating Chinese classics into Arabic for Muslim audiences in the Middle East.³⁰ Ma Jian became widely acclaimed for his erudition. Works by contemporary Chinese Muslims also hit the presses, and subjects included histories of Islam in China, Islamic rites, Arabic astronomy, Arabic grammar.³¹

The market for leaflets and booklets of twenty to thirty pages, and “sheet” pieces such as illustrations and diagrams thrived. Half of the literature produced by the modernists was of this genre. One example of charts was a genealogical chart of the descent of Muhammed from Adam, another is a chart of the Ka’aba (*kaerbai tu*).³² One sheet piece produced by the Oxen Street Pure and True Book Publishers was called an “amulet.” The amulet is an illustration of Noah’s ark, which had “theophoric power, as it consists of Allah’s message and the words of His Prophet Mohammed. In true Islamic style the drawing of the hulk, masts and sails is made up of calligraphic arabesques -- quotations from the Qur’an are drawn with elongated strokes, in order to form the contour of the boat.³³ The Oxen Street Muslim Bookstore carried large numbers of the popular small books. These editions were often digests and written in the vernacular.

³⁰Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 239.

³¹Zhao, “Sanshi nianlai,” 21.

³²Mason, “Notes on Chinese,” 214.

³³Samuel M. Zwemer, “A Chinese-Arabic Amulet” in *Moslem World* 25: 3 (1935), 217.

They were an important contribution, for they provided easy to understand versions of difficult classical works.³⁴

In the opening decades of the republic scores of Chinese Muslim periodicals were also published. A list compiled in the mid 1930s provides a sample of over sixty titles, a third of which came out of Beijing.³⁵ In some cases no more than one or two issues of a given magazine were even produced, although some publications lasted for years, like *Yuehua*. Distribution was never large, but the voice became an important mechanism in the Chinese Muslim community. Many of the associations published their own journals and those would be avail at branch offices housed in mosques, where in many cases there were reading rooms.

The regular Chinese Muslim monthly magazines and journals (*dingqi kan wen*) offered a wide variety of topics. Articles fell roughly into four categories. One type focused on religion, and emphasized promoting Islam. A second group was dedicated to Muslim culture, which covered topics ranging from history to short stories. A third variety centered on “specialized research” on the non-metropolitan Muslims of China, and the border regions. The fourth category concentrated on educational issues.³⁶ Chinese Muslim periodicals not only targeted local matters like education and religious doctrine,

³⁴Hayward, “Chinese-Muslim,” 365-366.

³⁵Zhao, “Sanshi nianlai,” 22-24. Lowenthal puts the total at one hundred, with a third of those coming out of Beijing, see Rudolf Lowenthal, *The Religious Periodical Press in China* (Beijing: Synodal Committee on China, 1940), 211-250.

³⁶Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 226-227.

but they also became a source of information and disseminated important news and current events.³⁷

Covers usually carried titles in both Arabic and Chinese. Some examples of titles include *Mu Sheng Ribao* (Muslim Voice Daily), *Muyin* (Sound of Muhammad), *Huijiao Qingnian Yuebao* (Muslim Youth Monthly), *Huijiao Wenhua* (Muslim Culture). The names of two magazines, *Yiguang* published in Tianjin, and *Huikuang* of Shanghai can both be translated as Light of Islam. “Pure and True” (*Qingzhen*), being synonymous with “Islam,” became a popular title for at least a half dozen magazines, one example was published in Yunnan, *Qingzhen Yuebao* (Islamic Monthly). A few other titles reflect popular topics of the times, not exclusive to Chinese Muslims: *Gaizao* (Reconstruct) and *Rendao* (Humanitarian), both published in Shanghai. A successful Nanjing monthly was *Chenshan* (Morning’s Virtue).³⁸

The *Huiwen Baihua Bao* is an intriguing magazine for a number of reasons. It appears just as the republic is taking form. The title can be translated as Arabic Colloquial Magazine.³⁹ Each article is written in Chinese and Arabic, while the Arabic versions were written in the vernacular, the Chinese text was still written a classical *wenli* style and not in the vernacular (*baihua*). Instead of a modern typeface the publication utilized what appears to have been a wood block typeface done in a traditional elegant calligraphic style. The Arabic, too, had an elegant calligraphic face. Sections were

³⁷Zhao, “sanshi nianlai,” 22.

³⁸Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 230; Zhao, “Sanshi nianlai,” 22-24; Zwemer, “The Fourth Religion,” 1-12.

³⁹Isaac Mason, “Notes on Chinese Mohammedan,” 195.

separated by traditional still life renderings, and every page was bordered with decorative designs. The cover was adorned with a pair of the striped flag of the republic crossed over the bilingual title and masthead. The artistic elements of the publication bore a distinctive flavor of the belle époque in China. It exemplifies how the years just prior to WWI were on the cusp of traditional and modern.⁴⁰

The magazine was published by the government ministry, the *Meng Zsang Yuan* (the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau). The publication was directed to China's Muslim population and the voice of the articles was presented as a Chinese Muslim one. The essays and reports featured a wide variety of subjects. Each issue includes essays about the new republic, explaining it embodied freedom and that it was compatible with Islam. An article in 1913, for example, explained that the new Republic of China advocated equality, and it was against slavery, concubinage, smoking and gambling. "Of all the laws, . . . not one is incompatible with Muslim doctrine."⁴¹ The writers lauded the definitions of citizenship enhanced with the promise of equity. "We Muslims know . . . [that this] is a judicious republic, . . . in accord with a harmonious citizenry."⁴²

The magazine received an endorsement from the Jujin Hui. One issue was devoted to the newly formed government and the inauguration of Yuan Shikai. The magazine called for a harmonious union of the nationalities of China. Issues usually included pieces about fellow Muslims in Xinjiang and Mongolia, and the publication also

⁴⁰See issues of *Huiwen Baihua Bao*, 1913-1916.

⁴¹*Huiwen Baihua Bao* 5 (1913).

⁴²*Huiwen Baihua Bao* 7 (1913), 13.

had a question and answer section, and featured short stories. Articles also discussed the need for modern education and encouraged daily reading, and its importance in the modern age.

Another early effort that appeared in 1916, was a periodical called The Canons of Islam in Translation (*Qingzhen Xueli Yizhu*), edited by Wan Pingwan. It was intended to have been a monthly, but like many periodicals, it only appeared once. It openly approved of Yuan Shikai's attempt to become emperor, describing it as "one of the fruits of the wise policy of allowing equality to the races and religions of China" and a proclamation was given respecting the monarchy and "promising to care for the liberties of the races." The muddled reasoning suggests that the publication may have received funds from Yuan's quarter. Another article tells of the difficulty of translating the Qur'an, explaining that the chief problem was the ahongs. Another piece countered some arguments put forth by Christians, and some important regulations of the Faith are included. Muslim hygiene and diet are also written about.⁴³

Perhaps the most successful Chinese Muslim periodical was *Yue Hua* (Lunar Corona). *Yue Hua* was not affiliated with the government or any politicians. Originally it was an organ of the Chengda Normal School in Beijing, but functioned independently after a few years. The magazine enjoyed a long life, well into the 1940s, and was the most widely distributed and successful Chinese Muslim periodicals. *Yue Hua* articles presented a great array of discussions about Muslim culture and civilization.

⁴³*Qingzhen Xueli Yizhu* (1916), Isaac Mason, comp., *Collection of Chinese Islamic Literature*, Book 73 (New York: New York City Public Library, 1940).

Some articles discussed the evolution of Chinese Muslim culture, history, and discussions about Islam. There was news about current events, and excerpts from works of the Han Kitab.

Well known scholars contributed to the periodical. There were a series of articles about Chinese Muslim communities in different locales. Wang Mengyang, for example, wrote about the condition of Islam in Beijing. Mu Yigang contributed an article about Chengda and Chinese Muslims in Tianjin, and Shi Yang wrote about Muslims in a district in Hebei.⁴⁴ Chin Chi-t'ang wrote numerous articles, one of which, for example, was entitled "Miscellany on the Teachings of Islam" (*Jiaomen Zazhi*).⁴⁵

Mingde Yuekan (Bright Virtue Monthly) published in the mid-twenties came out of Tianjin. It serialized "The History of Muhammed" (*Zhisheng Muhan mode Shi*) that was translated by Wang Jingzhai. Another issue contained an article that declared the world is round, in order to edify those who still believed other wise. Another article opposed the practice of having many wives, and went on to explain, "Muslims must follow the movements of the times; as the times change, religion must also change; moreover the law of a country is greater than the laws of a church; if the law of the country does not allow a man to several wives, then he should discard the rule of his church and observe the law of the country."⁴⁶ Articles such as these sought to attack

⁴⁴See examples: Mu Yigang, "Tianjin Huimin Gaikuang" [Hui People's Situation in Tianjin]; Shi Yang, "Cangxian Huimin Gaikuang" [Hui People's Situation in Cang District]; and Wang Mengyang, "Beijingshi Huijiao Gaikuang" [The Condition of Islam in Beijing] all in *Yue Hua*, reprinted in Li Xinghua, *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao*, 1322-1355.

⁴⁵See for example Chin Chi-t'ang, "Jiaomen Zazhi" [Miscellany on the Teachings of Islam] in *Yue Hua*, reprinted in Li Xinghua, *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao*, 320-327.

⁴⁶Mason, "Two Chinese," 385. See *Mingde Yuekan* [Bright Virtue Monthly Magazine] 4

parochial and outdated customs, and like so many of the Chinese publications of the time, the voice was progressive.

Like Bright Virtue, the magazine was deemed radical by older, conservative Chinese Muslims. It was progressive in outlook, “lamenting the somnolent condition of Chinese Moslems, and hoping to stir up activity in the Far East, and carry the campaign into Japan and Korea.” Articles surveyed the history of Islam, which was a popular topic. Attention was also paid to events in Muslim lands, and conditions of Muslims in Europe and North America. One issue, for example, notes that the greatest opponents to Islam in the past had been the white race, but now there were mosques in all the capitals of Europe. One account claims that a mosque in London, England now boasted 15,000 worshippers.⁴⁷

Another fairly successfully Beijing Chinese Muslim magazine, *Zhengdao* (Justice), featured a range of topics. An issue from 1933, for example, carried leading article discussing religious education in primary schools. A short editorial warns Muslims about associating with *kafirs* (infidels), who include not only “idolators” but also Christians. In a question and answer section, a prospective pilgrim asked if there would still be merit in his pilgrimage if he combined the trip with business. The pilgrim was told that “trading is permitted, so the pilgrimage would be meritorious.” Another question wondering if it were permissible to use a toothbrush and other brushes for ablutions that were bought on the street, was told if the brushes were made of vegetable bristles or horse

(1924), Mason, *Collection*, Book 36/218; and *Mingde Bao* [Bright Virtue Magazine] 2 (1924), Mason, *Collection*, Book 37/219.

⁴⁷Mason, “Two Chinese,” 386.

hair, they were acceptable. If any doubt lingered about the toothbrush, however, the user need only rinse out his mouth after using it. Boar bristles, of course, were forbidden. There was also an article about unrest in Xinjiang which explained that the people feared pressure from Soviet Russia and Japanese encroachment at the same time.⁴⁸

The Light of Islam, published in Shanghai, first appeared in 1924. It was an organ of a group going by the name of the International Muslim Association in the Far East. In keeping with its international claim, the magazine carried articles in Japanese and English as well as Chinese. The editor of the magazine was Sakuma Teijiro, a Japanese who had converted to Islam. At the same time he established an organization in Shanghai, the Light Society. The group was mandated to promote Islam. Sakuma wrote that organizing Muslims in China was the first step in creating a pan-Islamic union, that would put a check on Russian Communism expansion. Sakuma implored Chinese Muslims to seize political power, and to proselytize in Japan. Muslim missionaries had come to Japan in 1906, from Egypt, Iran and Turkey, and Sakuma's ideas reflect some of the stirrings in these other countries.⁴⁹

There is some question as to how much of a free agent Sakuma may have been, or remained, as the Japanese government did send Japanese Muslim missionaries to China in the hopes of promoting support for the Japanese Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity cause.⁵⁰ By the late thirties a number of magazines were produced in Beijing

⁴⁸Zwemer, "The Fourth Religion," 7.

⁴⁹ Anonymous, "An International Moslem Association in the Far East" in *Moslem World* 16 (1926), 192-193; Mason, "Two Chinese," 385-387.

⁵⁰Bodde, "Japan and the Muslims," 311-312.

under the auspices of Muslim organizations that had been created by the Japanese occupying forces. Some publications include *Zhenzong Bao Yuekan* (Awe Inspiring Religion Monthly), *Huijiao Yuekan* (Muslim Monthly), and *Zhongguo Huijiao Zonglian* *Hehui Nian Bao* (All China Muslim League Weekly).⁵¹

Many articles and all the editorials strongly praise the Japanese intentions in Asia. A number of the articles, however, were contributed by well known Chinese Muslims scholars, which allowed for a number of apolitical articles about Islam. Tang Zhenyu wrote a piece called “Collected Talks on Chinese Islam” (*Zhongguo Huijiao Congtan*) that discussed various Islamic teachings that had arisen in China. Tang Zongzheng authored an article about Beijing mosques, *Beijingshi Qingzhensi Diaochaji* (“Facts about the Mosques of Beijing”).⁵² One issue devotes a whole section to passages of the Qur’an in Chinese and Arabic, while another includes an article about the pilgrimage to Mecca with photographs.⁵³

There were a number of Chinese Muslim newspapers. The *Musheng Zhoubao* (Sound of Muhammed) was published in Beijing in the mid 1920s. It was a four-page newspaper that was issued every Friday, the Islamic Sabbath. The paper appeared at the same time that there were anti-Christian demonstrations in Beijing, and the paper contained pieces upholding Islam and attacking Christianity. The newspaper

⁵¹Copies of these publications can be found at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC.

⁵²See Tang Zhenyu, “Zhongguo Huijiao Congtan” [Collected Talks on Chinese Islam] in *Zhenzong Bao Yuekan* 5:4 (1939) reprinted in Li Xinghua, *Zhongguo Yisilan*, 778- 784; and Tang Zongzheng, “Beijingshi Qingzhensi Diaochaji [Facts about the Mosques of Beijing] in *Huijiao Yuekan* 6 (1938) reprinted in Li Xinghua, *Zhongguo Yisilan*, 414-423.

⁵³See *Zhenzong Bao Yuekan* 4 (1938) and 6 (1940).

also included articles on events in Turkey and Egypt, as well as education and industry.⁵⁴

The importance of the written word for Chinese cannot be overstated. Literacy and scholarship have been held in the highest esteem throughout the history of the civilization. The very word for civilized, *wenhua*, utilizes *wen*, the character for “literary.” The civilized man -- the cultured gentleman -- was one who was literate. Growing understanding of early cosmological uses of the Chinese characters complements the traditional admiration of the writing system’s complexity and beauty, and contributes to the aura of mystery that the written language evokes. In a similar vein Arabic is revered by Muslims. For Muslims the Arabic language -- in both its spoken and written forms -- is regarded as sacred because it was the language used by Allah when revealing the Holy Qur’an to Muhammad. For Muslims around the world both written and spoken Arabic remain hallowed, and for Chinese Muslims both Chinese and Arabic are laden with symbols of the sacredness.⁵⁵

For centuries translation of the Qur’an was considered taboo by Muslims around the world. Ever since translations were made, translators were the first to state that theirs was a vain attempt, for it is deemed impossible to duplicate the glorious beauty of the original text delivered in Arabic. A long tradition of copying the Qur’an in the original Arabic existed among Chinese Muslims. An ornate gilded paper was used in

⁵⁴*Musheng Zhoubao* (1925), Mason, . *Collection*, Book 40/226.

⁵⁵Christian missionaries found that anything in Arabic sold like “hot cakes” to the Chinese Muslims, and the missionaries translated many of their tracts into Arabic. One missionary alleges that an Arabic version of a bible was missing after an ahong was seen admiring it at length. See Botham, “Moslem Women of China,” 8.

prized editions.⁵⁶ The Qur'an was venerated, but few Chinese Muslims had a command of simple Arabic, much less the formal Arabic of the Qur'an.

One of the most notable accomplishments of this period is the translation of the Qur'an into Chinese. Ma Fuchu is believed to have worked on a translation, but all that survived into the twentieth century were five of twenty units. Many scholars believed the existent Ma Fuchu translation was of questionable scholarship and must have been the work of Ma's students or some lesser scholar. Nevertheless the Chinese Muslim Literary Society (*Zhongguo Huijiao Xuehui*) published the pieces in 1927 under the title *Hanyi Baoming Zhenjing* ("Chinese Translation of the Divinely Decreed True Scripture").⁵⁷

The first completed version, *The Qur'an (Kelan Jing)*, was by Li Tiezheng, a non-Muslim of Beijing, and was published in 1927. Li did not translate from Arabic into Chinese, he relied on a Japanese version of the Qur'an translated by Sakamoto Kenichi and Rodwell's English version. A year later one S. A. Hardoon, a wealthy British Jew residing in Shanghai, sponsored a translation that was managed by Ji Juimi, a Buddhist scholar. The translation was published in 1931 as *Han Translation of Koran (Hanyi Kulan Jing)*, and was translated from Arabic and English versions.⁵⁸

The first complete translation by a Chinese Muslim was by Wang Jingzhai of the Oxen Street mosque community. His first effort was a translation into colloquial Chinese. In 1926 instead of publishing it, however, Wang Jingzhai began another version, this time translating the Arabic of the 1608 Constantinople edition into Classical Chinese.

⁵⁶Shi Chenzhong, "Hailifa Bixu," 1088-1089.

⁵⁷Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 222.

⁵⁸Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 226-231; Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 19.

The Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association published the translation in Beijing in 1932 under the title, *Gulan Jing Yijie*, and it was well received. Another version translated from Arabic was by Tian Zhen of the Chinese Muslim Literary Society in Shanghai. Sections of Tien Zhen's translation were published in magazines in 1928. In Tianjin Yang Zhongming began work on a version in auspices with the Taiyuan Islamic Buddhist Association (*Taiyuan Yisilan fudao hui*).⁵⁹ In 1945 Wang Jingzhai made another translation into colloquial Chinese, also called *Gulan Jing Yijie*. Ma Jian also produced a version in colloquial Chinese in the late forties.⁶⁰

The dual nature of the publications -- the concrete and the abstract -- are intertwined. Examination of both aspects reveals cultural traits and historical experiences, and provides illustrations of the process of modernization and redefining the nation. In addition to reportage, accounts of events and beliefs and ideas, publications provide an array of symbols and imagery. The tangible, material artifacts are at once aesthetic art forms as well as vehicles of information. As an art form the print media includes artistic choices. Visual messages are replete with decorative images as well as symbolic ones, all of which constitute cultural choices.

Chinese Muslim publications were adorned with images that are distinctively Chinese Muslim. An array of the covers of a dozen magazines illustrate some of the characteristics. Titles were always written both in Arabic and Chinese. Common

⁵⁹Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 19-20.

⁶⁰Chan, *Religious Trends*, 196.

images were scenes of the pyramids and people on camels and domed mosques with tall minarets. The illustrations suggest that the Chinese Muslims felt that the Middle Eastern imagery relayed an aspect of their Muslim heritage. The use of Arabic calligraphy carries a deeper meaning than that of aesthetics. In addition to the religious importance of Arabic for Muslims, there was also its symbolic tie to the ancestral homelands. In this regard the use of Manchu in the Qing court comes to mind.

For a minority like Chinese Muslims or Manchus, the ancestral written word could carry powerful symbolism. A 1934 article in a non-Muslim magazine, *Meishu shenghuo* (*Arts and Life*), expounded on the importance of art and beauty in the fortification of people's spirit. The author explained that the decorative arts are a means by which civilizations express their greatness and glory, and can be seen as important contributions to national pride.⁶¹ The calligraphic arts constitute high art in China, and the entitlement to the use of a non-Chinese script, replete with an aesthetic beauty on par with that of Chinese, can provide a powerful source of pride for a sub-nationality. The court's use of Manchu symbolically strengthen their authenticity. Having a separate language, as Anderson observes above gives members of a linguistic group a sense of belonging. Arabic provided a source of authenticity for Chinese Muslims. The use of Arabic in prayer and Huihui hua within the community also furnished a distinctive trait, and a symbolic source of solidarity.

As a vehicle of information and knowledge, printed artifacts function as a record of ones heritage. They can serve to illustrate, perpetuate and authorize existing

⁶¹Waara, *Arts and Life*, 227.

traits. The media can also transmit new concepts, thus helping to forge new perceptions and create new traits. People are able to communicate and reflect upon their beliefs and feelings through the media, making them a wellspring of images of ethnic and cultural identity. By providing a forum for thoughts about China and being Chinese, the media can be used to trace sources of nationalism and national identity.

CHAPTER FIVE: DEFINING ETHNICITY

In the late 1920s a (non-Muslim) paper in Nanjing published an article that described the ancestors of Chinese Muslim as pigs. Chinese Muslims leaders protested to the government and got results, the paper was closed down and the editor punished.¹ Eliminating non-Muslim misunderstanding of Muslim ways was a major goal that had been expressed with the founding of many Chinese Muslims associations. The Pure and True Society was not alone in mandating the effort to fight defamation.² Sometimes examples of slander were trivial, but the subject was not. The fact that such incidents occurred was a reminder that aside from apologetic eloquence and patriotic fervor espoused on the part of Chinese Muslims, and aside from political slogans of harmonious minzu heralded on the part of the government, Chinese Muslims were still regarded as different.

Muslims had been the subject of ridicule in the past. One persistent story is that Muslims refrained from eating pork because their ancestors were pigs and they worshipped pigs. In 1936 a Chinese Muslim periodical enumerated twenty-four instances of slander against Muslims and Islam, which had appeared over the years in numerous (non-Muslim) Chinese publications. Chinese Muslims were able to obtain public apologies

¹ Elizabeth Pickens, "Moslems in China" in *Moslem World* 36 (1944), 256.

² Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 201-202.

and formal withdrawals of the remarks in eighteen of the cases.³ As long as the government maintained a pledge of equity and justice, Chinese Muslims could demand recourse when attacked.

The goal to feel a part of China, came out of the modernist camp.⁴ There had been a fear of assimilation in the past, but the modernists believed the fear unfounded. The urbanites who had joined the Yihewani movement no longer retained Ma Wanfu's anti-acculturation stance.⁵ The popular demand for the works of the Chinese Muslim apologists suggests that many in the metropolitan Chinese Muslim community were comforted by the syncretistic reasoning of the Han Kitab. They could be Chinese and they could be Muslim simultaneously.

The urban Chinese Muslim identity emerges centuries ago, and their ethnicity developed in the process. The interpretations of their history by Chinese Muslim scholars in the twentieth century reflect ethnic pride. Hui scholars are quick to point out that Muslim scholars contributed to mathematics, medicines, and the study of astronomy in China.⁶ Hui narratives explain how the Chinese Muslim way of life has been compatible with that of non-Muslim neighbors. On the one hand, Chinese traits became part of the Chinese Muslim make up. On the other hand the Chinese Muslims celebrate their foreign, Muslim ancestry.

³ Bodde, "China's Muslim Minority," 282.

⁴ Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 239-241.

⁵ Lipman, "Hyphenated," 106.

⁶ Ma Qicheng, "Local and Muslim," 20.

In her study of Subei people, Honing explains that through a historical process a people gain a common heritage, but that ethnicity depends on context. Who are the players and under what circumstances do they live? There is no ethnicity if a group does not perceive cultural distinctiveness. That distinctiveness emerges due to the “exigencies of survival and the structure of opportunity in the environment.” A group forms solidarity, thus producing agency and the ability to respond in relationships of dominance and subordination.⁷ In the case of the Subei people, Honing observes that if there had been no Shanghai, there would be no Subei.⁸ Chen Yongling argues that “Islam exists, the Huihui exist; if Islam becomes extinct, so do the Huihui.”⁹

Shanghai does not equal Islam, but can the process Honing describes that is triggered by experiences of Subei people in Shanghai be likened to the process triggered by experiences of Muslim foreign guests who took up residence in China? Islam alone did not define the Chinese Muslims. The practice of Islam, however, was a source of the “exigencies of survival” for Chinese Muslim forefathers. The “structure of opportunity” in the Chinese environment did provide a setting in which a historical process unfolded that led to the formation of Chinese Muslim ethnicity.

By the time the Guomindang invited China’s minzu to unite, Chinese Muslims shared a sense of group that concurs with definitions of ethnicity. Amid the

⁷ Emily Honing, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850-1980* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 8-9.

⁸ Honing, *Creating*, 14.

⁹ Chen Yongling, “The Significance of the Hui Nationality: Origins, Formation, and Development within Islam and Their Special Evolution as an Ethnic Identity in China” in Dru Gladney, ed. *The Legacy of Islam in China: An International Symposium in Memory of Joseph F. Fletcher* (Conference Volume, Harvard University, 1989), 9.

debates over the definition of ethnicity, Steven Harrell presents a definition that may satisfy most arguments. In the case of the Chinese Muslims, Harrell's description serves aptly. Ethnic consciousness is the awareness of belonging to an ethnic group. An ethnic group can be defined as having two characteristics.

First, it sees itself as solidarity, by virtue of sharing at least common descent and some kind of common custom or habit that can serve as an ethnic marker . . . Second, an ethnic group sees itself in opposition to other such groups, groups whose ancestors were different and whose customs and habits are foreign, strange, . . . to the members of the subject group.¹⁰

A Jesuit missionary at the close of the Ming made the following observation.

There is no occasion to speak of the Mohammedan sect, settled above years ago in divers [sic] provinces, where they live in quiet, because they take no great pains to extend their doctrine and make proselytes. In ancient times they increased their numbers solely by the alliances and marriages they contracted; but for some years past they have made a considerable progress by help of their money. They everywhere buy up children, whose parents, unable to educate, . . . sell them. During a famine which wasted the province of Shantung they purchased above ten thousand. They marry them, and either buy or build a considerable share of a city, and even whole country towns to settle them in. Hence, by little and little, they are grown to such a head in many places as not to suffer any to live among them who goes not to Mosk; by which means they have multiplied exceedingly within these hundred years.¹¹

¹⁰Steven Harrell, *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 28.

¹¹Broomhall, *Islam in China*, 7.

The tone of the Jesuit's comments might well give grist to the mills of discrimination against Chinese Muslims, but on the whole the Chinese response to Muslims was often indifferent. It is the recognition of the Muslims as a thriving element in the Chinese landscape, however, that is significant.

The Han Chinese environment tolerated the diasporic communities which gradually began to absorb Chinese ways. The Gedimu mosques developed into unique organizations. Community elders and members picked their ahongs for three year terms. The ahongs in turn became the mosque's top leader. The ahong were itinerant in theory, "a monk comes from afar to chant the scriptures (*wailaide heshang hui nian jing*)," but leaves local affairs of which he is ignorant to local elders (*xianglao*).¹² Commonly ahongs did remain longer with a given mosque, and with the local leaders resided over the affairs of state as well as religion in the Chinese Muslim neighborhoods without interference from the Chinese government.

What emerged was a mixture of Chinese and Muslim ways.¹³ Ma Qicheng calls the process the "indigenization" of the Hui. The process included a diffusion and development of Islam in China, which played a key role in the formulation of Chinese Muslim identity.¹⁴ Islam served as the glue for Muslims who came to China from different places. They shared a socio-political environment in China, and their common

¹²See Chapter One, 34-35.

¹³Ma Songting, "Zhongguo Huijiao," 1-3.

¹⁴Ma Qicheng, "Local and Muslim." 1-4.

religion promoted a "psychological ethnic consciousness."¹⁵ Chen Yongling says there was an amalgamation allowing Chinese Muslims to develop a "stable ethnic identity" and enjoy an improved economic and political situation.¹⁶

In the Muslim world a mosque is an independent unit. Islam as a religious institution has no church hierarchy. Local leaders do not answer to a central church or head priest. Given the absence of a church infrastructure that would dictate procedure, coupled with an overall tolerance toward religion in China, ahongs and local elders were free to develop their own methods.¹⁷ Thereby the Chinese Muslim system that evolved over the centuries was allowed to function in, and at the same time enabled by the Chinese environment.

Chinese Muslims had retained distinctive customs. Community leaders settled community matters from marriage to property according to Islamic law. The mosques were important centers for everything from social congregation and the dissemination of information to arbitration and religious functions. Ma Qicheng observes that mosque communities were able to adapt to Chinese society, and yet retain Islamic practices. Religious rites and practices became "symbolic ties" for Muslims, which promoted a sense of group among Muslims in China.¹⁸ Muslims travelers and traders could find mosques throughout China, which enabled them to abide by Islamic customs

¹⁵Chen Yongling, "The Significance," 2-4.

¹⁶Chen Yongling, "The Significance," 4.

¹⁷Ma Songting, "Zhongguo Huijiao," 1.

¹⁸Ma Qicheng, "Local and Muslim," 9.

and rites when on the road. Mosques also provided shelter and members took care of fellow Muslims.

Imperial edicts such as one that appeared in 1720, promoted tolerance and respect for Chinese Muslims.

They [Chinese Muslims] are accordingly all children of our country and discrimination against them is not to be tolerated.

For some years past men have submitted Memorials stating that the Muslims are all adherents of one religion, speak a strange language and wear strange clothes, are fierce, perverse and lawless; and it has been requested that they be strictly punished and placed under restraint.

I am mindful that the religion of the Muslims was bequeathed to them by their ancestors. . . . the Muslims' use of mosques, different clothes and a different language should be regarded as arising from different custom. Anything such as the religion of Muslims which is not traitorous, lawless or seeking to delude and lead people astray, need not give cause for concern.¹⁹

The edict notes that Chinese Muslims were fulfilling the dictates of Confucian filial piety by upholding the Islamic practices of their ancestors, such piety would prevent them from losing their Muslim heritage.

The tolerance encouraged above, however, had been motivated in part because the Chinese Muslims were the target of ridicule. Although they had adapted to Chinese ways, they retained differences that puzzled non-Muslim Chinese, prompting insults such as the Muslims performed ablutions because they were dirty. Unlike followers

¹⁹Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, 58.

in Muslim societies elsewhere, Chinese Muslims did not pray in public, which might have spared them the attention of an undesirable audience. Even the written word was not free from rudeness, an offensive practice had taken hold of altering the character hui by adding the radical element for dog to it. When the same sort of prattle reappeared in republican publications, Chinese Muslims responded. That response, as Honing suggests, came out of a “solidarity” that had been developing over time.

The display of urban Chinese Muslim solidarity in response to slander took place amid ongoing debates about the Chinese race and what it meant to be Chinese. When the republic was first established ideas of ethnicity or race were part of the new concepts brought to the fore in the public sphere. The Nationalists decried that the Chinese had limited their loyalties to their families and clans, for it was time to pledge loyalty to the nation as a whole. Sun Yatsen elaborated in his lectures and writings that China had been developing a single state out of a single race since the Han Dynasty -- the Chinese people were the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs. Thus it was time to extoll love of country and form a Chinese nation-state.²⁰

The white race had become the strongest and wealthiest race, dominating more of the world than any other. But it was infused with the poison of imperialism. Sun explained that China had to restore its ancient virtue and superior wisdom and ability. Nationalism was the means, he elaborates:

²⁰C. Martin Wilber, *Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 200-204.

We shall 'govern the country rightly and bring peace to the world.' To do this we must first restore our nationalism and our national standing, and then unify the world on the basis of our distinctive morality and peace, and create a government of Great Harmony.²¹

With allusions to a classical utopia (*datong*) modeled on traditional Confucian principles²² coupled with ideas of modern nationalism, Sun's cultural pastiche represented an early attempt at a rational transformation of a civilization out of place with twentieth century demands.

Dikotter explains that the revolutionaries touted a byproduct of modern western science, "racial nationalism." Once western science and ideas encroached on the Middle Kingdom, the idea of race (*zhong*, or *zhonglei*) were taken very seriously by a number of scholars. With Darwin's ideas being tossed around, people developed all manner of theories about race in the name of science. The pseudo-science of eugenics, and the social-Darwinian ideas of the fittest, coupled with ideas of nationalism, caused a redefinition of ideas of race and superiority for many in China.²³ The guidelines for defining nationality and minority nationalities would not formally be delineated until the People's Republic adopted Stalin's model. Nonetheless, variations of these concepts were

²¹Wilber, *Sun Yat-sen*, 204.

²²For discussion about utopia see Kung-chuan Hsiao, "In and Out of Utopia: K'ang Yu-wei's Social Thought" in *The Chung Chi Journal* nd, 101-149.

²³Frank Dikotter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (London: Hurst and Company, 1992), 97-126.

examined and played a significant role in defining the Republic of China, and what it meant to be Chinese.

According to traditional thinking, race and ethnicity were intrinsically linked to culture and civilization. During the imperial age learning and behavior were the paramount gauges of one's standing and identity. This yardstick was no longer adequate in the nationalist arena, where it was asserted that Chinese-ness could be measured scientifically, as some people twisted foreign theories for their purposes. One such exercise in empirical reasoning gave China a new place in the international scheme of things, a place for the yellow race vis-a-vis the white, black, brown, and red races. One's standing and identity were adjusted to a racist paradigm of the superiority of whites over other races. As one interpretation explained, the yellow race had once been white but was defiled by brown people, to make it yellow; yet it was closer to the white race than all the others and thus superior to them.²⁴

Not all Nationalists embraced this racist philosophy, nevertheless Chinese self-perception was tested and altered as the discourse unfolded. The lexicon had changed. It was no longer enough to have grace and erudition, and "good breeding" took on a whole new meaning with the borrowed scientific concepts of race and ethnicity. Science even reinforced the ancient foundations for the New China as archaeology and anthropology opened old vistas anew. Archaeological findings such as Peking Man and the Shang Dynasty archives fortified national pride. China's rich history grew richer still

²⁴Dikotter, *The Discourse*, 80-82.

with the new discoveries. Nonetheless, the idea that the Chinese are the prodigy of the Yellow Emperor, for some, would mean more than inheriting an ancient culture.

Tu examines the changing meaning of being Chinese. While being Chinese is cultural, that “encompasses and transcends” the ethnic, territorial, linguistic and religious boundaries that normally define Chineseness. Tu argues that a salient feature of being Chinese is to belong to a biological line traceable to the Yellow Emperor. At the same time by being born in the “Central Country” and sharing the same progenitor, implies the ability to speak the language, and hence one can:

participate in the Chinese linguistic world . . . [which] implies the practice of a code of ethics . . . [with] common ancestry, homeland, mother tongue, and basic orientation . . . race may be a biological reality, but ethnicity, as experience and consciousness, is mediated by a complex of social and political factors, and thus cannot be reduced to mere empirical facts. Similarly, territoriality in itself may be seen as a solid, objective reality; but [when] it is experienced or imagined as fatherland, it can engender great psychic energy. The potential for language especially in its incarnation as the mother tongue, to evoke sympathetic responses or great indignation is even stronger.²⁵

Sun preached that the Han Chinese had developed over the centuries into one race, one pure blood. Nevertheless, he appealed to five separate minzu of China to unite to rebuild a strong China. Later Chiang Kai-shek repeated the sentiment, but not without reworking it. Chiang asserted that all the minzu shared Chinese blood. The minority nationalities were not different races, but simply practiced different habits and

²⁵Tu Wei-ming, *The Living Tree*, v-vi.

customs due to religious differences and varying geographical environments.²⁶ When the Nationalist government was in Chongqing during the Japanese Occupation, on occasion Chiang Kai-shek presided over meetings of the Muslim organization, the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation (*Zhongguo Huijiao Jiuguo Xiehui*), and he elaborated on earlier party policies. In 1939 Chiang explained that the government would no longer call Muslims the Hui minzu (Hui nationality), but instead would call them the Huijiao ren (Hui religionists). Chiang suggested that to use the term minzu implied racial differences, but he had explained that all the people of China were Chinese, regardless of habits and beliefs, and therefore there could be no separate Hui nationality. The republic considered the Hui to be Chinese by blood and race.

The importance of one's bloodline, of course, predates the eugenicists' post-Darwinian discourse on race. In the Muslim world, for example, the sayyids are people who claim to be descendants either of the Prophet Muhammad or of the first generation of his followers, known as the Companions of the Prophet. Sayyids enjoy prestige because of their bloodlines. Many Chinese Muslims think that a domed tomb in the graveyard of one of the mosques in Guangzhou is that of a Companion of the Prophet, Said Ibn Abi Waqqas, who some believe headed the first delegation from the Islamic empire to China in 651 AD. Although Arab historians maintain that Said returned to Medina where he died, Chinese Muslims claim that Said died in Guangzhou and was buried there.²⁷ Whether or not the grave in Guangzhou is really Said's becomes a moot

²⁶Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny, and Economic Theory* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947), 39-40.

²⁷Broomhall, *Islam in China*, 111-115.

point. It is the story of a noteworthy sayyid coming to China just two decades after the death of the Prophet that is important. It adds prestige to the origins of Chinese Muslim ancestry and, at the same time, legitimizes Chinese Muslim historical identity. The tomb becomes a symbol of venerable ancient origins.

Lineage also plays a crucial role in families. Traditionally, for Han Chinese and Chinese Muslims alike, a woman would become “part of a lineage . . . by virtue of giving birth to a male child who, at birth, is automatically part of the lineage.”²⁸

Anthropologist Pillsbury suggests that Chinese Muslims developed an idea of “Muslim blood.” Chinese Muslim marriages, like those in the Middle East, were preferably endogamous, unlike the Han Chinese who normally adhere to exogamous marriages. Chinese Muslim women are still strongly urged only to marry other Chinese Muslims. Pillsbury suggests that the lack of widespread proselytizing may have led Chinese Muslims to feel more exclusive than Muslims in other parts of the world by encouraging an idea that being Hui is not just a religious identity, but rests on an inheritance by which identity is transmitted in the blood passed down from esteemed ancestors.²⁹

Keyes suggests that the sources of ethnicity can be located in two ways. One is found in the cultural heritage shared by a group. The second is the form of social organization that functions to achieve certain common ends of a group. He observes that there are certain “givens” at birth: locale, gender, and physiological features. These provide one with biological inheritance and social links with forebears. Ethnicity is

²⁸Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, 74.

²⁹Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, 27 and 74.

derived from a cultural interpretation of descent, or shared descent. Cultural characteristics are not predictable, and those which serve to define one group may not apply when defining another group. Cultural characteristics depend upon what Gladney refers to above as “shared imaginings,” that is the memories and interpretations of the experiences and actions of mythical ancestors and/or historical forebears.

Well into the twentieth century when asked, “Where is your hometown, or homeland, *laojia*?” many Chinese Muslims would reply *Dashi*. In Tang annals Muslims were called *Dashi*, a name for a foreign land to the west. Some scholars believe the term applied to Arabia, while others conclude that it was the name created for the Abbasid Dynasty (750-1258 AD).³⁰ Hajji Yusuf Chang explains that one of the first emissaries to the Tang court came from Ta’if, a city near Mecca, and a transliteration of the city name may have been *Dashi*. Other possible sources of the term may have been a Persian word for trader (*taguir*), or the name of the Central Asian people, the Tadjiks.³¹ The variety of western Asians that *Dashi* could refer to illustrates the variety of foreign ancestors that Chinese Muslim believe constitute Hui forefathers. Chinese Muslim scholar Chin Chi-t’ang observes that there were numerous ancestral countries of origin for Chinese Muslims, which only strengthened the belief of the uniqueness of Chinese Muslims, and

³⁰John Lawton, “Muslims in China: The People” in *Aramco World Magazine: Muslims in China, A Special Issue* 36: 4 (1985), 45.

³¹Hajji Yusuf Chang, “Chinese Islam and the Hui Minority: Past, Present and Future” in Dru Gladney, ed. *The Legacy of Islam in China: An International Symposium in Memory of Joseph F. Fletcher* (Conference volume, Harvard University, 1989), 2-3.

“Hui blood.”³² The reply “Dashi” exemplifies a shared belief, imagined or not, among Chinese Muslims.

A group’s history and shared experiences form the wellspring of the group’s cultural heritage -- from customs and traditions, to artistic expression and distinctive symbols. Ritual grows out of one’s heritage, and serves to access and to preserve the cherished practices and traits through the use of symbols. Once the symbolic is “appropriated and internalized by individuals” it becomes a major source of ethnic identity, manifested in life’s cycle, rites of passage and crises.³³ Shared bonds and beliefs become the foundation for a group, and the symbolic becomes intrinsically linked to the group’s identity. Thus the flag with crescent and star that the Chinese Muslim’s chose for themselves, images of camels and minarets in magazines, along with the continued study of Arabic, all contribute to symbols of Chinese Muslim ethnicity.

Another inherited symbol for Chinese Muslims was a phrase, “*Tianxia Huihui shi yi jia* (all Muslims under heaven are one family).” The Islamic faith concludes that all Muslims are brothers and sisters in a great egalitarian family. Common membership forms a bond between them. Thus one Chinese Muslim will render assistance to any member of this family who is in need, regardless of social status or reciprocity. The concept echoes the tenets of ‘*umma*. ‘Umma is the community of Islam, which is opened to all who embrace Islam. Muhammad defined the conditions for a universal brotherhood on the basis of faith. In seventh century Arabia this was designed to replace,

³²Chin Chi-t’ang, “Huizu minzu Shuo” [Hui Nationality] in *Yugong* 5: 11 (1936), 29-30.

³³Charles Keyes, “The Dialectics of Ethnic Change” in Charles Keyes, ed. *Ethnic Change* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 7-9.

or displace, old blood-ties and tribal loyalties. Anyone is welcomed to be a Muslim; Muslim identity recognizes no border, no race, no clan, and the concept of 'umma became an important principle of solidarity for Muslims.³⁴ During a campaign in 1958 Communist officials pointed to the expression as evidence of Hui "local ethnocentrism." As a result "nationalities unite" (*minzu tuanjie*) replaced "tianxia huihui shi yijia" in the PRC.³⁵ The Communist Party's reaction suggests that the concept does reflect more than religious beliefs. As Pillsbury suggests above, the religious trait became an element in group identity (and solidarity) for Chinese Muslims and thus served as an ethnic marker.

A basis of ethnic classification depends on perceived differences between people who live in proximity to one another.³⁶ Constable illustrates that Hakka ethnicity thrives in a Christian Hakka community in Hong Kong, but that members of the group do not demonstrate, or promote, "differences" vis-a-vis the Punti, or local Cantonese population. Rather, the differences are exclusively observed among the Hakka themselves.³⁷ Barth notes that identity is in the minds of the holder, and not the beholder. Thus it is possible for a seemingly assimilated group to retain a separate ethnicity.³⁸ Keyes expands the possibilities by observing that a person can belong to more than one ethnic group just as he or she might belong to more than one descent-defined kin group.

³⁴Rahman, *Islam*, 25.

³⁵Yitzhak Shichor, "The Role of Islam in China's Middle-Eastern Policy" in Raphael Israeli and Anthony H. Johns, eds. *Islam in Asia* vol. II (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 305-317.

³⁶Keyes, "The Dialectics," 4-7.

³⁷Nicole Constable, *Christian Souls and Chinese Spirits: A Hakka Community in Hong Kong* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 15-20.

³⁸Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Differences* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969),

The duality that Keyes refers to is worth remembering when trying to define Chinese Muslim ethnicity. Seemingly conflicting layers of such a definition for Chinese Muslims led to numerous opinions. The writings of the Han Kitab had already shown how Chinese Muslim scholars reasoned that Islamic ideas of virtue and morality complemented those of Confucianism. The scholars demonstrated that Chinese Muslims had not only been able to embrace Chinese civilization without denouncing their Islamic heritage, but had done so without fear of assimilation. Syncretism could be seen as a means of survival for Chinese Muslims, not of annihilation. While there were shared cultural traits between Chinese Muslims and Han Chinese, this does not mean that among themselves the Chinese Muslims were quick to reinvent themselves as synonymous or unquestionably compatible with Han Chinese culture.

Metropolitan Chinese Muslim intellectuals debated terminology and theology in defining what it meant to be “Hui.” Writers in Chinese Muslim periodicals referred to Han Chinese as *Hanren*, and to themselves, Chinese Muslims, as *women huijiao ren* or *huiren* or *huimin*. Throughout the republican period a debate continued about whether Chinese Muslims were the Hui nationality or Hui people (*huizu* or *hui minzu*) or believers of the Hui religion (*huijiao ren* or *huijiao tu*). The discourse included discussions of nationality and race, but at the time the question of religion still played an operative role.

In an article in Muslims Awake, the publication of one of the Chinese Muslim student groups in Japan before 1912, Huang Zhenpan argued that the name Hui was a religious designation and that it was not suitable to use as a nationality name. At

the time of the Revolution of 1911, Ding Zhuyuan observed that when the Nationalists used the expression, Hui minzu, they probably meant the “*Huibu*” or Muslim “tribes” of the Northwest that the Qianlong emperor had labeled as one of China’s five groups. In which case, the believers of Islam (*xinyang yisilanjiao de ren*) who dwelt in China proper could hardly be grouped with the various ethnicities of Xinjiang.³⁹ Many other urban Chinese Muslim, however, felt Hui applied to them. They used the term Huimin -- Hui people -- in reference to themselves. In the decades that followed an argument had developed that supported the Hui minzu concept for the urban Chinese Muslims.

In 1936 Chin Chi-t’ang articulated the position in support of minzu-ness. Chin explained that the Chinese Muslims did constitute a separate nationality as Hui minzu. He stressed that the Hui minzu were not the non-Chinese-speaking Huihe (or Huibu) of Xinjiang, but the sinophones of China. At the same time the Hui minzu ought not be considered Han people who simply believed in Islam. Chin Chi-t’ang claimed that the Hui could not be the same as the Han Chinese race because the ancestors of Chinese Muslims had come from many foreign lands to the west. The diverse backgrounds meant that the origin of Hui people emerged from many races. Hui origins could not be regarded as being from one sole race, much less the Chinese race with only Chinese blood. Only after centuries of coexisting in China, did the coreligionists coalesce into group.⁴⁰

The minzu argument explained that religious beliefs alone did not lead to the creation of a nationality. No one considered the idea of a Buddhist, Daoist, or

³⁹Ma Shouqian, “The Hui People’s,” 16-19.

⁴⁰Chin Chi-t’ang, “Huizu minzu Shuo,” 29-30.

Confucian minzu. The Hui minzu did exist in part due to dictates of the Islamic way of life, but fundamental to that was Chinese Muslims' foreign heritage. The problem with the point was that Chinese Muslims, for the most part, hardly appeared to be foreign, and supporters of this line of reasoning had to go to great lengths to stress their foreign forefathers. One example illustrated that no non-Muslims had certain strange surnames that many of Chinese Muslims have because the names had been fabricated at the time that Muslims changed their foreign names to Chinese surnames during the Ming.⁴¹

When Sun Yatsen invited the Hui to join the republic the political motive was to secure control over a unified China.⁴² In his Sanmin Juyi Sun explained certain criteria for minzu status, and those supporting the idea of Hui minzu status argued that Chinese Muslims fit all the criteria, such as common blood and distinctive habits in the areas of food and clothing. A distinctive language was another qualifier, Huihui hua and the Chinese Muslims' continued study of Arabic fit the bill. Sun Yatsen's requirement of a distinctive religion, and unique *fengsu xiguan* (customs and habits) were easily defended.⁴³

⁴¹Chin Chi-t'ang, "Huizu minzu Shuo," 30-34.

⁴²Crossley demonstrates that Manchu ethnicity took form when Chinese nationalism emerged in the final years of Qing rule. Her argument suggests that the Chinese attack on the Manchu dynasty did much to instill separate "racial histories" for the Manchu and the Han Chinese peoples. The Manchu court had fashioned a sense of a "grand unified culture and racial identity," but a true source of Manchu unity and identity came from "internal strength" in urban Manchu communities and can be regarded as a product of imperial disintegration. When Manchu commoners faced the downfall of Qing rule and its repercussions, they discovered an "ethnic consciousness" (*gongtongxinli suzhi*). By targeting the Manchu, Chinese revolutionaries promoted Chinese nationalism, but the method also promoted Manchu identity. See Crossley, "Thinking about," 10-11.

⁴³Chin Chi-t'ang, "Huizu minzu Shuo," 31-34.

When Chiang Kai-shek insisted that the Hui were just Chinese with special customs and habits, however, many Chinese Muslims concurred, or acquiesced. They agreed that Chinese Muslims were Chinese who believed in the Hui religion -- Huijiao ren or Hui religionists, and a number of periodicals and organizations changed Huimin in their names to Huijiao. The ROC no longer officially considered a Hui minzu. Nevertheless the government still exacted compliance from Chinese Muslims with claims of equality for sub-nationalities.

The Chinese Muslim public voice supported the government. That voice is exemplified in the rhetoric of General Bai's response to overtures from Muslims in India who were seeking to form Pakistan, a separate Muslim state in South Asia. The Indian Muslims invited Chinese Muslims to visit in support of their cause, but the general responded on behalf of the Chinese Muslim organization he headed.

[Our federation] has its twofold objective the salvation of the nation and the propagation of Islam, but for the present the nation comes first. There can be no religious freedom to speak of when the freedom of the nation is not assured.

Bai explained that two million Chinese Muslims had participated in the nation's dual task of resistance and reconstruction.⁴⁴ The government, of course, encouraged the nationalism.

An article by a Chinese Muslim appearing in Chongqing reiterated Hui loyalty to the central government, however, the writer went on to state that fellow Chinese

⁴⁴Pickens, "Moslems in China," 257.

Muslims among themselves were “not fully satisfied with present conditions.” Chinese Muslims felt that the government had a few Hui figureheads that it could show off, but government support in education and training within the Chinese Muslim community was lacking. Furthermore the prominent General Bai had made proposals that the government had approved, but failed to implement. Some Chinese Muslims leaders had tried to institute a Muslim political party, but the government refused.⁴⁵

In 1946 government promises to the Chinese Muslims were formalized in a special clause that was added to the republican constitution. The clause designated the Hui as a *shenghuo xiguan teshudi minzu* (a people with special habits and lifestyle). The constitution guaranteed seventeen positions in the National Assembly and some in the Legislative and Control Yuans.⁴⁶ In the Republic of China, Taiwan, today, the Chinese Muslims are still considered Huijiao ren, Chinese who are adherents of Islam.

In contrast to the Nationalists’ legacy in Taiwan, by the early 1950s the leaders figuring the PRC criteria for minzu status, reasoned that Chinese Muslims do constitute the Hui ethnic group, or nationality. The religious faith of the Hui was not unique to them, however, and therefore did not factor into their ethnicity. Djamal al-Din Bai Shouyi explained that Islam ought to be transcribed as *yisilan jiao*, and no longer be referred to as huijiao. The Hui are believers of Islam, *yisilan jiao*, not the religion of the

⁴⁵Yang Ching-chih, “Japan -- Protector of Islam,” in *Pacific Affairs* 15: 4 (Winter 1942), 479.

⁴⁶Pickens, “Moslems in China,” 257. In the late 1940s thirty-six State Councilors were Chinese Muslims, and two were in the Legislative Yuan.

Hui, *huijiao*. Furthermore, one could be Hui in the People's Republic, and yet not presumed to be a Muslim.⁴⁷

Keyes explains that cultural formulations are essential in the establishment of ethnic identity, but in inter group relationships cultural traits are not sufficient in and of themselves to maintain ethnicity. In social activities, ethnicity can be seen as a provider of survival tactics vital to the preservation of a group.⁴⁸ As social interaction between Chinese Muslims and non-Muslims increased over the centuries, the Chinese Muslims residing in urban areas increasingly assimilated to Chinese society. Chinese Muslims made accommodations, and by modifying strategies, Chinese Muslims could function as both Chinese and Hui. Not all ethnic groups have survived close contact with the predominant Han population. China has seen the demise of ethnic groups that arrived in China from other lands, as well as groups whose territories were absorbed by Han expansion. Yet while some groups faded away, the Chinese Muslims have endured.

⁴⁷Bai Shouyi, "Huihui minzu," 134.

⁴⁸Keyes, "The Dialectics," 9.

CONCLUSION

The publishing flurry seen during the early years of the republic was dampened in the late thirties, due in part to the war and in part to a disillusionment that crept in as the Nanjing Era aged. Habermas theorizes that the public sphere is radical in the beginning, only to become bourgeois with time, losing the vitality that characterizes it in the beginning. Waara suggests that that is what happened to publications by the end of the thirties.¹ By 1936 half the Chinese Muslim periodicals Zhao Chenwu tallied had ceased publishing, and a third of those had never produced more than two issues. Several of the publications that continued were organs of the Japanese puppet government in Beijing. At the same time, Chinese Muslim journals coming out of Chongqing guardedly sang the praises of the Nationalist government.²

Masud warns that the press is often controlled by governments and thereby dependence on it as a source is suspect.³ So it is necessary to question how authentic the printed voice is. In Qing times, for example, publications had been limited and censored, but Judge argues that as the dynasty weakened, official governmental controls slackened.

¹ Waara, *Arts and Life*, 230.

² Zhao, "Sanshi nianlai," 22-25.

³ Muhammed Khalid Masud, "The Limits of Expert Knowledge" in Dale F. Eickelman, ed. *Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Direction in Cross-cultural Analysis* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 196.

This opened the door of opportunity for freer speech, encouraging a new genre of public opinion.⁴ The emergence of the new press, schools, and organizations would suggest that early Republican China also enjoyed ample freedom of expression, but magazines and organizations did have to register with the government. Although the 1910s and early 1920s saw unfettered demonstrations, the mechanics for enforcing censorship were well forged by the Nanjing era. China's civil society had fostered a public sphere, which allowed for many voices, "each embracing the press in an attempt perhaps to produce their own hybrid . . . in a creative attempt to define themselves and the state of change in China."⁵ But the free flow of opinion and ideas seems to have met blockades by the late 1930s. Internal strife and foreign aggression again marred the progressive efforts of the previous decades.

By 1938, in Beijing for example, the Japanese occupation altered the setting. Organizations soon reflected the change. The Japanese sponsored the All China Muslim League (*Zhongguo Huijiao Zonglian Hehui*). The Japanese curried favor with the Chinese Muslims. The Japanese feared the advance of the Chinese communist forces that had gained a footing in the northwestern regions, and they feared the advance of the CCP's ally, the Russian Communists, into the Far East. The strategy of the Japanese was to ally with the Muslim groups of China, and in turn, Central Asia, with the idea of creating a Muslim buffer state, or region.⁶ The league's publications, such as *Huijiao*

⁴ Judge, *Print and Politics*, 65-68.

⁵ Waara, *Arts and Life*, 95.

⁶ Derk Bodde, "Chinese Muslims in Occupied Areas" in *Far Eastern Survey* 15:21 (1946), 330.

Yuekan and *Zhenzong Bao Yuekan*, which promoted the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity touted by Tokyo.⁷

In 1938 the league sponsored a youth corps, the Chinese Muslim Youth Corps (*Zhongguo Huijiao Qingnian Tuan*) in Beijing. The corps attended classes at Northeastern University, and by 1942 there were five hundred Chinese Muslim graduates. Chinese Muslim males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five who had at least a smattering of elementary education, were eligible for admission. The organization was essentially militaristic. The students wore uniforms and were drilled in the same fashion as the Japanese army. The training was imbued with anti-Communism and ideas of Pan-Islamism. Once out of the academy, however, the corps' responsibilities were meager policing and more perfunctory than meaningful.⁸ The Japanese effort seems to have been riddled with propaganda in an attempt to gain Muslim allegiance, as seems the case with the Nationalists and the Communists.⁹

By the 1930s the Nationalists, the Japanese and the Chinese Communists were all wooing Chinese Muslim populations. But it was not until the government moved inland to Chongqing that the Nationalists really got alerted to the Muslim Belt of the

⁷ A number of issues of each of these magazines can be found at the Library of Congress.

⁸ Bodde, "Chinese Muslims," 331.

⁹ Japanese finagling in Muslim organizations was not new. From 1931 to 1937 Manchuria had been their base for activities in China. They actively recruited Chinese Muslim participation in Manchuria, from the beginning of the setup of Manchuguo. In 1932 they created the Islamic League (*Yisilan Xiehui*) in the capital, and established over 160 branches in Manchuria. They even founded an educational organization, the Institute for Islamic Culture (*Huijiao Wenhua Xueyuan*), and they produced a number of periodicals. The crowning moment came when the ill-fated Emperor Puyi's cousin, Pu Guang converted to Islam, news of which made it to a Cairo weekly. See Bodde, "Japan and the Muslims," 313.

Northwest.¹⁰ The Communists, Japanese and Russians, all were vying for influence in the region, and its strategic importance became increasingly apparent.¹¹ The Communists and Nationalists both touted religious tolerance and promises of autonomous rule for Muslims in their drive to control the Muslim Belt.¹² The contenders met with varying degrees of success in the region, but their efforts went on in the midst of preexisting domains of local warlords and religious factions. The three all tried allying with the warlords, but allegiances were seldom to be trusted, and the common people had little choice.

In addition to promises of autonomy and freedom of religion, the Nationalists and Communists both used education as a means of indoctrination. The government in Chongqing did manage to direct funds for education to the region. In Qinghai, for example, over a thousand elementary schools were established.¹³ Even so there were leaders who saw the government's involvement as an extension of Pan-Hanism (*Dahan zhuyi*), and they feared the government efforts would lead to absorption into Han culture. The Chinese Communists achieved increasing success in recruiting local Chinese Muslims closer to the apex of their operations in Shaanxi. The region was poverty

¹⁰Once in Chongqing the strategic importance of the Northwest became clear to the ROC, thus control of the Muslim Belt was important. But Chinese were largely uninformed about Chinese Muslims. Their importance was not lost on historian Gu Jiegang who devoted two complete issues of his magazine, *Yugong* [Chinese Historical Geography], to the subject of Chinese Muslims.

¹¹For discussions of China's Muslim belt during the republican period see A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 181-194; Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, 18-29; Lipman, "Ethnicity and Politics," 285- 316; Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), 305-323.

¹²Not only did both the CCP and the GMD continue to uphold Sun Yatsen as the Founding Father of modern China, but it is noteworthy how similar the rhetoric pertaining to minorities was coming from the two opponents.

¹³Barnett, *China on the Eve*, 186.

stricken and far from the events in the East. Most of the recruits had no knowledge of Japan, and all they learned in the communist training camp schools was that the Japanese were foreign interlopers.¹⁴

In the East, metropolitan Chinese Muslims had long been inculcated with the idea that the Communists were atheists and would have no tolerance for religion freedom, which caused urban leaders to favor the republican government.¹⁵ In 1937 in response to looming events Chinese Muslim leaders in Zhangzhou organized the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation (*Zhongguo Huijiao Jiuguo Xiehui*).¹⁶ Chinese Muslim representatives from provinces around the country met in Hankou in 1938 and expanded the federation, largely supplanting all previously established Chinese Muslim organizations. From its inception, the federation received direct support from the Nationalist government. General Omar Bai Chongxi, who had become the Minister of National Defense of the ROC, served as chairman of the federation.¹⁷

Many Chinese Muslims of the northern and coastal regions fled to southwestern provinces as the Japanese advanced into China. Some leaders from Beijing's branch of the Jujin Hui moved to Guilin, in exile. Other Chinese Muslims went to Chongqing. With the course of events, the Chinese Muslim associations were forced from local concerns to national policies. The energy that had inspired the community twenty years earlier shifted. Nonetheless some leaders found ways to keep alive earlier

¹⁴Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), 312-316.

¹⁵The Japanese had also used this tactic when endorsing Islam and encouraging Pan-Islamism. See Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, 27-28.

¹⁶Chan Wing-tsit, *Religious Trends*, 191.

¹⁷Bodde, "China's Muslim," 283.

programs. During the war some leaders tried radio. They broadcasted educational programs and religious lectures (in Arabic and Chinese) out of Shanghai and Chongqing. Innovative as the move was, however, it is questionable how many Chinese Muslims had radios, much less had an opportunity to hear the shows.¹⁸

The government seems to have maintained a conciliatory posture toward the Chinese Muslims after the problem of the ban on religion in schools, and the defamation scandals of the late twenties.¹⁹ In 1939 the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation successfully petitioned the government to make the study of Islamic culture a regular feature in the curricula offered in Chinese universities.²⁰ Special classes in Islam and Arabic language were introduced at Beijing University, the Central University, Yunnan University, and Zhongshan University.²¹ The prominent scholar, Ma Jian, was one of a half dozen Chinese Muslims who became professors of Islamic studies in Chinese universities. Chinese Muslims also opened the Islamic Theological Seminary in Chongqing.²²

In 1938 the government, in the name of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation, dispatched a Chinese Muslim Near East Goodwill Mission to visit Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. The mission reached Mecca in time for the Haj, where the members joined with a million Muslims from around the world. Members

¹⁸Fu, *Zhongguo Huijiao*, 236; Pickens, "Moslems in China," 256.

¹⁹Pickens, "Moslems in China," 254-260.

²⁰Chinese Ministry, "Mohammedanism," 27.

²¹Ting, "Islamic Culture," 373.

²²Hughes, Ernest Richard, *Religion in China* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1950), 109.

also visited Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran and India. In 1939, another mission was sent to the South Seas and visited Malaya, India, Iran and Arabia. The mission campaigned on the part of the republic's government against Japanese aggression.²³ The diplomatic role contrasts with the scholarly and cultural exchanges of Chinese Muslims in the previous decades when students traveled on their own to the Middle East.

In 1943 the amalgamation of societies that constituted the federation changed its name to the Chinese Muslim Association (*Zhongguo Huijiao Xiehui*). In 1949 a Chinese Youth League (*Zhongguo Huijiao Qingnian Hui*) was established in Quanzhou. It took a hard anti-Communist stand, in line with ROC government, and after the civil war, thousands of Chinese Muslims fled mainland China. Twenty thousands went to Saudi Arabia, and some 6,000 Turkic-speaking Muslims went overland to Turkey. Twenty thousand Chinese Muslims fled to Taiwan with the Nationalists, making the official Hui population there 40,000.²⁴ Today versions of the association exist both in Taiwan and the mainland. The association goes by the name the Chinese Islamic Association (*Zhongguo Issulan Jiao Xiehui*) in Beijing, and the Chinese Muslim Association in Taiwan.

Wang Jingzhai, the prominent scholar and ahong from the Oxen Street Mosque, went to Taiwan in 1948 hoping to establish a mosque and an organization. The Li Shui Street Mosque, also known as the Grand Mosque was established under Wang's

²³Chinese Ministry of Information, comp. "Mohammedanism" in *China Hand Book, 1937-145* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1947), 27.

²⁴Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, 72.

leadership, but he found conditions in Taiwan wanting at best in the late 1940s. Wang became disillusioned, and his health was failing. He returned to mainland but died shortly thereafter. Ma Songting followed him to Taiwan, but met with similar disappointment. Ma moved on to Hong Kong where he presided over the large multinational community of Chinese, Pakistanis, Indians, and Sri Lankans in the colony. After a few years, the Communists managed to persuade Ma Songting to return to Beijing. Ma was appointed Deputy Chief of the Chinese Islamic Association and Deputy Superintendent of the Chinese Islamic College, only to be purged in the late fifties.²⁵

The metropolitan Chinese Muslims got swept up in the enthusiasm of the early republican era. Many influential members of the community embraced the Nationalists' revolution and the new republic. The leaders' motives were nationalistic, as Chinese they wanted a strong China. The leaders' motives were also parochial, they wanted a strong Chinese Muslim community, and they actively set out to improve local conditions. By strengthening their communities Chinese Muslim leaders could insure the survival of Chinese Muslim culture, just as a strong China would insure the survival of Chinese culture. Chinese Muslims leaders welcomed modernization and nationalism seeing them as vehicles that would facilitate their efforts, and protect them.

Chinese Muslim activities paralleled those of other Chinese. Chinese Muslims took part in the New Culture Movement, many joined the army. At the same

²⁵Pillsbury, *Cohesion*, 156-157. Ma Zhenwu, a former leader of one of the Sufi schools, the Jahriyya was also among those purged.

time they focused attention on issues unique to themselves. For example, what would the role of Islam be in a modern society. As Muslims how would they react and adapt to the changes? This dissertation has examined the activities of urban Chinese Muslims: the creation of study groups and associations; the revamping of Muslim schools; and the publishing of books and periodicals. This has been a look at strategies used in adapting to change. The goal has been to illustrate that the Chinese Muslims accepted change, even welcomed it, but in so doing they altered perceptions of themselves and their religion.

Under dynastic rule Chinese Muslim districts had functioned with a degree of autonomy. Through the centuries a process of indigenization took place in the Muslim communities. The apologists elaborated on a syncretism that allowed for a fairly untroubled coexistence for metropolitan Chinese Muslims and non-Muslims. But the twentieth century brought upheaval to the former system, and with that Hui leaders reassessed Chinese Muslim status. Modern changes in the material and political world did not necessarily bode ill for the spiritual realm, and if change had advantages, the leaders sought to exploit them thereby enriching their communities.

The Chinese Muslim seem to have accepted the republic for more than one reason. The new government granted them equity and respect, it guaranteed religious freedom, and it acknowledged Chinese Muslim differences without antagonism. If Chinese nationalism sparked faith in the nation like a religion, then Hui nationalism could work similarly for the Chinese Muslims. Hui nationalism would allow Chinese Muslims to practice their rituals and translate Hui symbols to the modern environment. In so doing a

network of communications, through organizations and publications, served to enrich a sense of Hui solidarity.

As China struggled to create a nationalism that fortified the nation-state both in the international community and in the eyes of the Chinese people, the Chinese Muslims had a variation of that project in the formulation Hui consciousness. By creating the Mutual Progress Association and the Pure and True Society Chinese Muslim leaders offered their communities new opportunities, which helped to promote a strong image of being Chinese Muslim. In the same vein, a translated version of the Qur'an promised to make the sacred text more accessible, while the new schools and the drive for literacy offered power to the people, and the chance to take advantage of the modern age.

While metropolitan Chinese Muslim scholars and clergymen embraced progressive programs, they did not lose sight of the fine line between assimilation and annihilation. If Chinese Muslims acquiesced too much, they would forfeit their own identity, and jeopardize their way of life. So in their writings and studies, Chinese Muslims scholars did not ignore their religion nor did they ignore their heritage. The message of the apologetics was still applicable in twentieth century China. The Chinese Muslims could be both Chinese and Hui, simultaneously. But as Jun Jing put it, memories of the past are conceived and developed within the existing social structure, not "mechanically retrieved but . . . permeated with present-day concerns" and influences along the way.²⁶

²⁶Jun Jing, *The Temple of Memories: History, Power, and Morality in a Chinese Village* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 4.

The Chinese-speaking Muslims concentrated in the large cities became the most articulate segment of the broader Islamic minority in the first half of the twentieth century. The urban Chinese Muslim population had coexisted for centuries with the Chinese host culture, peacefully and successfully for the most part. The basis of the coexistence, however, had been the host's acceptance of Chinese Muslim distinctiveness, and a tolerance of minority interests. The Chinese Muslim could accept membership in the Chinese state and its host culture to that extent.

Twentieth century history exemplifies the evolution of their two-way relationship as traditional institutions and civilization have been swept by revolution and transformed, through stages to the present. In this process, Chinese Muslim intellectuals experienced their own “nationality” -- their cherished cultural identity and religion which defined their community. They did so in response to the transformative upheavals engulfing them. As a result, the Chinese Muslim built a new sense of themselves and of the conditions essential for a comfortable membership in the Chinese world.

Throughout the century politicians redefined the Hui identity to suit their platforms, and the dialogue promoted Chinese Muslim self-examination. The Republic of China designated Chinese Muslims as Chinese people with religious differences and special habits and lifestyles. The People's Republic of China prescribed the shaoshu minzu formula, making the Chinese-speaking Muslims a minority nationality, but, ironically, denying that religion was an element in the Hui make-up. Whatever labels were and are devised, however, the Hui have survived and prospered on both sides of the Taiwan

Straits, and with their own sense of identity, with all their shared imaginings and particularities.

Nationalism and modern nation-state building have characterized the twentieth century. But nationalism, like the roster of nations, has changed over the course of the century. Marx, Lenin and Mao were wrong to believe that once diverse people were united they would in time amalgamate into one. Rather, the reverse has appeared to be the norm, and as the century comes to a close, nationalism has spawned more nationalities. While many cultures have been obliterated by the encroachment of other cultures, human diversity survives. It survives in cultures, ethnicities, races, and nationalities. These identities overlap, and defining them can become tautological, but the concepts serve to illuminate identities. At the same time, identities do change and adjust, and in the nation-state in which people are defined as nationalities, their identities do not remain stagnant. Nor does that of the nation.

If one seeks a lesson from these emergent tensions applicable to the Chinese situation, perhaps the lesson is that such tensions represent the exit point from the earlier willing entrance into an experiment of building a multinational community. Certainly contemporary China has experienced recurrent ethnic tension, particularly from the Great Leap era of the late 1950s that was stimulated by periodic ethnic assimilation policies.²⁷ Aside from the Tibetan example -- a reaction to conquest rather than to the souring of a partnership -- other ethnic tensions suggest the conditional nature of this multinationality state. Even the Chinese-speaking Muslim population who have long lived

²⁷Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, 159-171.

in the midst of the Han Chinese world require tolerance from the majority as enticement. Chinese Muslim tolerance for the Chinese state depends upon its tolerance for them. It is subtle and not easily discerned, but the metropolitan Chinese Muslim communities have managed to mix in the Chinese world and yet remain pure and true.

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