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SONG GAOZONG (r. 1127-1162) AND HIS CHIEF COUNCILORS: A STUDY OF THE FORMATIVE STAGE OF THE SOUTHERN SONG DYNASTY (1127-1279)

by

Yeong-huei Hsu

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2000
As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Yeong-huei Hsu entitled Song Gaozong (r. 1127-1162) and His Chief Councilors: A Study of the Formative Stage of the Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279) and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Jing-shen Tao

Brian E. McKnight

Chia-lin Pao Tao

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

Dissertation Director Jing-shen Tao
Statement By Author

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Signed: [Signature]
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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to Ms. Shu-fang Liang 梁淑芳, my late mother, who died in January of 2000 during the final stage of my dissertation manuscript. Even at her last moments in the world, she never insisted that I must return to Taiwan for the "final audience", and instead, she urged me to continue my study until its completion. I can never return the favor I owed her and my feeling can only be described by a Chinese proverb which says "The tree wants to stop but the wind does not cease; the son wants to offer but the parent does not wait 樹欲静而風不止; 子欲養而親不待."
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Abstract

In 1126, the Song was invaded by the Jin 金, a northern enemy who sprang up to become a continuing lethal threat to the survival of the Northern Song dynasty (960-1127). The Song people, in the meantime, suffered an unprecedented humiliation when their two emperors were captured and taken as hostages to the north by the invading Jin army. As the Song regime was collapsing, Zhao Gou 趙構 (1107-1187), later referred to by his temple name as Song Gaozong 宋高宗 (r. 1127-1162), strove to ascend the throne and perpetuate the Song regime in the south — known to historians as the Southern Song (1127-1279). The process was difficult not only because the Song emperor himself was relentlessly pursued by the Jin army, but also because the Song itself could hardly decide on an appropriate policy regarding the invaders. It took nearly sixteen years for the Song to finally settle in south China and obtain formal recognition from the Jin as a sovereign state.

This dissertation adopts a method which focuses on studying the interactions between Song Gaozong and his series of ten chief councilors in shaping the future of the Southern Song. The successive chief councilors, appointed by Song Gaozong, are studied based on the Song records with special attention to their interactions with the emperor in discussing important issues. The dissertation evaluates each chief councilor's performance and explains why some chief councilors stayed in power longer than others. The dissertation also expounds how the Song emperor maintained a balance between two conflicting factions and how he struggled to consolidate his power in adverse
circumstances. By consideration of Gaozong and the influence of successive chief councilors, the author depicts a picture showing how the Southern Song was established.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBCSJC</td>
<td>Baibu congshu jicheng</td>
<td>百部叢書集成</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSJC</td>
<td>Congshu jicheng</td>
<td>叢書集成</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GJSH</td>
<td>Gujin shuohai</td>
<td>古今說海</td>
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<tr>
<td>HB</td>
<td>Sanchao beimeng huibian</td>
<td>三朝北盟會編</td>
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<tr>
<td>HYZCS</td>
<td>Hanyunzhai congshu</td>
<td>汗筠齋叢書</td>
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<td>JS</td>
<td>Jin shi</td>
<td>金史</td>
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<td>Juzhenban congshu</td>
<td>聚珍版叢書</td>
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<td>Linlang mishi congshu</td>
<td>琳鄴密室叢書</td>
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<td>SBBY</td>
<td>Sibu beiyao</td>
<td>四部備要</td>
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<td>SBCK</td>
<td>Sibu congkan</td>
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<td>SKQS</td>
<td>Siku quanshu</td>
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<td>SKQSZB</td>
<td>Siku quanshu zhenben</td>
<td>四庫全書珍本</td>
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<td>SKSBCS</td>
<td>Siku shanben congshu</td>
<td>四庫善本叢書</td>
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<td>SS</td>
<td>Song shi</td>
<td>宋史</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWZJ</td>
<td>Shewen zijiu</td>
<td>涉聞梓舊</td>
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<tr>
<td>XJTY</td>
<td>Xuejin taoyuan</td>
<td>學津討原</td>
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<tr>
<td>YL</td>
<td>Jianyan yilai xinian yaolu</td>
<td>建炎以來纂年要錄</td>
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</table>
Introduction:

During the period from 1126 to 1142, the Song people were confronted by the Jurchens (the Jins), a formidable enemy from the north, and faced a critical challenge to the survival of the Song regime. In 1127, the Song Emperors Huizong 徽宗 (r. 1101-1125) and Qinzong 钦宗 (r. 1126-1127) were captured and removed to the north by the Jin army. While the country suffered from that most humiliating action, the Song imperial family was in danger of extinction. Fortunately, Zhao Gou 趙構 (1107-1187), the ninth son of Huizong and younger brother of Qinzong, and later referred to as Gaozong 高宗 (r. 1127-1162), managed to escape from the Jin's pursuit and eventually set up his regime in south China. His regime is known to historians as the Southern Song (1127-1279). The process took great pains and much effort by the emperor himself and his followers, civilian and military. The fate of the new Song regime was not decided until 1142, when the Jin officially recognized its status as a state, and although degraded by the Jin, a peace agreement was then completed between the two states. That peace was to be kept for almost two decades.

For the period of roughly seventeen years we are considering, the Song ruled by Gaozong was continually adjusting itself to ever changing external events resulting from Jin domination. When the Jin attacked, the Song defended; when the Jin asked for peace, the Song responded with amiable gestures and doubts. When the situation was uncertain, as it was for most of that time, the Song managed to react to changes and stay alive. With regard to policy making, the Song did not seem to have a consistent direction
towards the Jin; however, throughout his reign, Gaozong frequently worked for any form of peace settlement from the Jin. During this period, Gaozong appointed a succession of ten chief councilors. Some were reinstated from lower positions and served two terms, while each was given opportunity to develop his talents. All were charged to work towards consolidation of the regime by finalizing an agreement with the Jin either through peaceful or violent means. The ten chief councilors chose different approaches in dealing with the Jin. Some succeeded and others failed in their attempts to fulfill duties they were entrusted with by the emperor. As a result, their success or failure effected not only each chief councilor's career, but also on the national level the relationship between the two states, thereby shaping the future of the Southern Song.

As a new and appropriate approach to understanding the period of history under discussion, the dissertation will focus on Gaozong's interactions with his chief councilors because it was their collaboration which drew the blueprint for the regime, deciding its fate; moreover, the military was eventually excluded from the decision making process. Deserving our special notice is that of the over one dozen chief councilors of Gaozong's reign, only Qin Gui was able to retain his premiership for nineteen years: others occupied the position for only a few years, or even less. Therefore, the case of Gaozong poses an interesting phenomenon: he was capable of controlling the power of chief councilors by frequently replacing them with others; nevertheless, he created one powerful councilor whose influence could not be competed with by his followers. I will also interpret this issue by examining each chief councilor of Gaozong's reign explaining why Qin Gui was allowed to hold power for so long. Of those councilors, roughly divisible into three
groups (hawks, doves, defenders), only Qin obtained an agreement from the Jurchens, not only guaranteeing Gaozong's status as the ruler of the Song, but also ensuring peace between the two states. How he managed to accomplish this is not entirely known to us, but his staying in power was the decision of Gaozong. This leads to another important issue: namely, delegation of power. By delegating powers to his ranking officials, Gaozong allowed them to fully extend their talents in dealing with major issues. But, when any of them stumbled, he always had replacements standing by. Therefore, studying the interactions between the emperor and his chief councilors will allow us to understand how the emperor responded to changes, including the performance of his chief councilors, actions initiated by his enemies, and how he managed to shape the future of the regime. This will further throw light on the broader picture of how the Southern Song was established.

In order to understand more closely the consequences of each chief councilor's performance, it is necessary to carefully study interactions between the emperor and each chief councilor because from the outset the emperor worked closely with them on national affairs. By examining their individual performance and relationship with the emperor, I intend to interpret several matters. First, how the Southern Song was established. Second, why Gaozong shifted chief councilors so frequently. Third, how did the Song manage to attain a peace agreement with the Jin. From the above discussion, I also attempt to find a pattern among the chief councilors under investigation. Finally, I will briefly touch on one of the most interesting topics of the
Song history: namely, whether the power of Song chief councilors increased or decreased.

Each chief councilor, his performance, and interactions with the emperor, will be discussed in an individual chapter except for Huang Qianshan 黄潜善 (?-1129) and Wang Boyan 汪伯彦 (1069-1141): their names are often mentioned together in historical records and they seemed to share common characteristics in their performance. Thus, for practical purposes, they will be dealt with in a single chapter. For those chief councilors who served two terms, their performance in each term will be discussed separately for comparison, and to determine if they made any policy changes or improvement of administrative skills. The discussion will be presented through chronological order while the focus is on the ten chief councilors, major events and other important figures of the time will also be highlighted.

The major source the dissertation relies on is Li Xinchuan's 李心傳(1167-1244) Jianyan yilai xinian yaolu 建炎以來鮮年要錄 (Chronological Records of Important Events since the Jianyan period, 1210, abbreviated as YL), the most important record for studying the history of early Southern Song, supplemented by Xu Mengxin's 徐夢莘 (1126-1207) Sanchao beimeng huibian 三朝北盟會編 (Completion of Documents on the Treaties with the North during Three Reigns, 1194, abbreviated as HB) and other miscellaneous sources. The HB was completed 16 years earlier than YL, thus it is "more primary" than the latter, and is a collection of various sources in their original form. On the contrary, the author of YL provides detailed comparison, critical review, approval and
negation of various sources, including the HB. Unfortunately, YL was lost in the following Yuan dynasty (1279-1368), and its complete version, which has been used for the dissertation, was not put in print again until the middle of Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Accordingly, the authors of major historical sources of the post-Song period did not have access to the YL, thereby making their accounts and arguments less reliable. The above reasons warrant the heavy reliance on YL during the process of writing the dissertation. The dialogues between Gaozong and his chief councilors and other officials, recorded both in YL and HB, are the primary source of historical information for the topic of the dissertation. By interpreting the traditional record, which details the interactions between the emperor and his officials, I intend to answer those dissertation research questions, by developing insight into the history under discussion.
Chapter One: Li Gang 李纲 (1083-1140): The Stubborn Hawk

Li Gang, styled Boji 伯纪, whose origin can be traced to Shaowu 邵武 (in modern Fujian Province), was born in Wuxi 無錫 (in modern Jiangsu Province), where his family had settled since the time of his grandfather. In 1112, Li Gang received his jinshi 進士 degree at the age of thirty sui 歲 (twenty-nine years old). He was later promoted to the position of Investigating Censor (Jiancha Yushi 監察御史) and concurrently Palace Censor (Dianzhong Shiyushi 殿中侍御史). Some of his reports irritated the powerful officials, and as a result, he was transferred to the position of Vice Director of Bureau of Review (Bibu Yuanwai Lang 比部員外郎) and later Imperial Diarist (Qiju Lang 起居郎). In 1119, the capital was inundated with flood; Li Gang reported it with a unique argument saying that the Yin 陰 element was too grand and robberies and foreign threats should be heeded. The Song court disliked his remarks and demoted him to a position responsible for tax affairs of a county. In 1125, he was transferred back to the capital as Vice Minister of Imperial Sacrifices (Taichang Shaoqing 太常少卿). Later in the same year, the Jins 金 (Jurchens) breached their agreement with the Song and invaded China. The court sent edicts to assemble armies to save the throne. Meanwhile, the heir apparent, later known as Qinzong 欽宗 (1126-7) was assigned as Metropolitan Governor of Kaifeng 開封, the capital. Li Gang proposed, by

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1 Hereafter, all the dates recorded in the sources, which were based on the Chinese lunar calendar, have been converted to the dates according to the Western calendar.
2 I am indebted to the late Professor Charles O. Hucker for the translation of official titles in this paper. Please refer to Charles O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, Stanford University Press, 1985.
citing a precedent in the Tang Dynasty (618-907), that Huizong 徽宗 (1101-25), the emperor, should step down and allow the heir apparent to assume the throne. His proposal was accepted and the abdication was soon completed.\(^3\) Huizong left the capital for the south.

After Qinzong announced his succession, Li Gang was summoned by the new emperor for consultation. Qinzong opened their conversation by saying that he remembered clearly Li's report to the emperor concerning floods and foreign threats, and for that, he even wrote a poem. Obviously, their first meeting was agreeable to both. The emperor had shown his appreciation of Li, and Li without hesitation demonstrated his analytical talents in explaining the Jin's requests, of which the most unbearable to Li was to cede territories. Li's clear and decisive position against the Jin earned his new assignment as Vice Minister of Ministry of War (Bingbu Shilang 兵部侍郎), raising the eyebrows of his political rivals at court. The question whether Qinzong should stay in the capital to defend against the Jins or not, triggered a series of arguments between Li and other high ranking officials, the latter suggested that the emperor should avoid confrontations with the Jin and leave the capital. Another question debated was who should lead the army to defend the capital. Li recommended his opponents, who he claimed were scholars yet suitable for the job. This recommendation backfired when his opponents asked back why Li could not be the commander. As a result, Li took the commanding post, requesting for himself a promotion which he thought would be helpful for the new job. Consequently, he was promoted to the new position of Assistant

\(^3\) SS, ch. 358, pp. 11241-2.
Director of the Right of the Department of State Affairs (Shangshu Youcheng 尚書右丞) and concurrently Commander of the Imperial Brigade (Qinzheng Xingyingshi 親征行營使). A few days after Li Gang assumed duty, the Jin army arrived at the capital and launched its first wave of attack. The Jins were initially frustrated by the Song's prepared defense and sent envoys for negotiations. Wanyan Wolibu 完顏斡離不, the Jin army commander, declared the reasons for invasion of China and was willing to resume peace talks only if the Song emperor abdicated. He requested that the Song send a high ranking official for negotiations. Li volunteered to go to the Jin camp but was turned down by the emperor because of his concurrent duty as commander of the army and, most of all, his unyielding personality. Li Gang disagreed that Li Zhuo 李楫, the chosen official, be sent to the Jin camp because he was deemed too soft to deal with the enemy. The outcome proved Li Gang was right. The Song envoy conceded to everything the Jins requested: because his poor performance as a representative of the Song state, the Jin generals began to look down upon their enemy. Despite that, Li Gang anticipated the Jins would not stay around the capital for long and would accept a deal with less concessions granted by the Song envoy. Yet, the emperor was influenced by other officials and eventually agreed all of Jin's requests and sent Prince Kang 康王, his younger brother and later Gaozong 高宗 (1107-1187), and Vice Grand Councilor (Shaozai 少宰) Zhang Bangchang 張邦昌 (1081-1127), as the mandated hostages to the Jin camp. The Jin's greed was not satisfied because the requested ransom could not

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4 HB, v. 1, p. 266.
5 Ibid., v. 1, p. 283.
6 Ibid., v. 1, pp. 284-5.
possibly be assembled in so short a period of stipulated time. Meanwhile, the throne saving armies were approaching the capital and reorganized. Li Gang pleaded to have Chong Shidao 种 師 道 (1051-1126) and Yao Pingzhong 姚 平 仲, the two military commanders who had just arrived back at the capital, under his unified command; however, he was rejected again.

The tensions between the two states became severe as the Jin army engaged in wanton pillages while the number of Song troops grew greater as they neared the capital, encouraging Qinzong to turn his mind from peace. Consequently, a meeting was held at the Song court to discuss military operations. Li Gang proposed to attack the Jins, who were vulnerably short of supplies when they crossed the Yellow River. The emperor approved it and a date was set. At this juncture, an unsuccessful nighttime ambush against the Jins by Yao Pingzhong embarrassed the Song camp. According to Li Gang's personal account, he was not aware of this incident and described it as a disobedient and foolhardy attempt by Yao, who fled after he failed. But this claim of innocence has been accused as false and irresponsible by a modern historian Zhao Tiehan 趙 鐵 寒. By citing evidence to attack Li Gang's claim, Zhao moved one step further in warning students not to trust history easily. Nevertheless, Li Gang was relieved of his duty for the setback. Upon hearing this, over a thousand National University (Taixue 太學) students gathered around the imperial court and pleaded for reinstatement of Li to his duties. This protest was supported by thousands of residents from the capital.

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7 Li Gang 李 嶽, Liangxi ji 梁 豫 集, ch. 171, pp. 774-83. HB, v. 1, p. 300.
Consequently, Li was soon reinstated and his duty was changed to Protecting Commander of Four Walls of the Capital (Jingcheng Sibi Shouyushi 京城四壁守禦使). Meanwhile, other events fared poorly for the Jin. Prince Kang, one of the hostages sent to the Jin, was sent back to the Song for replacement because he was rude. A few skirmishes between the two opposing armies resulted from a Song ambush. Nevertheless, the Jins now held Prince Su 肅 王 as their new hostage, for whom ransom payment remained unfulfilled. At last, they retreated from the Song capital. Li Gang proposed to adopt a tactic, by which the Liao 遼 army was escorted by the Song as it left its territories for fear of pillages along the retreating routes, to prevent the Jin army from committing transgression. Moreover, Li urged that the Song escorting troops attack the Jin army at an appropriate time.

In the meantime, another Jin force led by Wanyan Nianhan 完顏粘罕 (1080-1137) was reported as getting close to Gaoping 高平 District (xian 縣) (in modern Shanxi Province) and besieging the city of Taiyuan 太原. Li Gang argued that Nianhan would retreat and would not cross the Yellow River as soon as he learned of the already completed peace agreement. The army sent to escort Wolibu's troops should continue the mission without distractions. The Song court was not convinced by this argument and hurriedly summoned back the escorting army, wasting a good opportunity to attack the Jin. As a result of this misjudgment, the morale of the Song army was too low for

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9 HB, v. 1, p. 359.
10 Ibid., v. 1, p. 366.
reorganization.\textsuperscript{11} Ironically, Nianhan's army, by which the Song feared imminent attack, did retreat as Li predicted. Now major attention was paid to saving Taiyuan. The Song court assigned Chong Shizhong 种師中 (1059-1126) and Yao Gu 姚古 to rescue and, hopefully, defend the invaded areas. Li Gang volunteered to escort Huizong, who had previously fled to the south after he abdicated, back to the capital. After the Jin army left and Huizong returned, the Song court thought peace was resumed, and hence was indifferent to any potential threats the Jin might impose on China in border areas. Li saw this dangerous sign and proposed to reorganize the national defense and set up Outlying Forts (fanzhen 瀋鎮) along the border to safeguard the capital. Some of his friends at court proposed to discuss and remove misrule, recommending Li to take charge of the job. Their joint effort to improve the government's performance in every aspect did not proceed without resistance. A political reform was planned but not executed.\textsuperscript{12}

Meanwhile, the border conflicts with the Jins continued. The Song army had sustained severe setbacks and the city of Taiyuan was not rescued. One of the three major commanders died, and another requested to be relieved of his duty on sick leave. Geng Nanzhong 耿南仲, Li Gang's political enemy, saw this a great opportunity and recommended Li to replace Chong Shidao, the sick commander. Li refused this new assignment, arguing that commanding troops was not his specialty and his previous duty as defending commander of the capital against Jin's attacks was a compulsory assignment. He knew that this was an attempt of his political enemies intended to force

\textsuperscript{11} SS, ch. 358, p. 11245.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., ch. 358, pp. 11247-8.
him to leave power center of the capital. Despite his protests, Li was persuaded by the emperor to assume the new job as Pacification Commissioner of North and East of Yellow River (Hebei Hedong Xuanfushi 河北河東宣撫使).\textsuperscript{13} Li did not leave soon, in fact, he was stalling because he could not gather all the supplies he wanted and he was not confident of the rescue mission. On the other hand, all kinds of accusations were made against him ranging from arbitrariness to disobedience. Unfortunately, he set out for the mission with only 12,000 troops and limited resources. The emperor consoled him by saying that he was only ordered to patrol the borders and would return after the mission was over. Once Li left the capital, all his proposals of defense measures were altered and half of the recruited troops were disbanded. In addition to the above shortage, Li also complained that he was not authorized with the full power to command the generals since the court directly ordered them with edicts.\textsuperscript{14}

The rescue mission turned out to be in vain. The Song armies marched slowly and Li was stationed in Huaizhou 宜州 (in modern Henan Province) close to the capital yet far from Taiyuan.\textsuperscript{15} The Song court decided to negotiate with the Jin for another truce and Li Gang was summoned back to the capital, ordered to return duty of Pacification Commissioner to the sick commander. The court sanctioned that Li was responsible for the Jin's capture of Taiyuan and demoted him to Prefect of Yangzhou 扬州.\textsuperscript{16} Soon after the demotion, Li's hawkish stance cost him the new position. He was

\textsuperscript{13}HB, v. 1, p. 476. SS, ch. 358, p. 11248.
\textsuperscript{15}HB, v. 1, pp. 512-3.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., v. 1, p. 546.
assigned to a low post, and subsequently punished with another demotion positioning him at a place very far from the capital.\textsuperscript{17} In the mean time, after occupying Taiyuan, the Jins continued its southern expedition and crushed, one by one, the Song defending armies. Having witnessed this impending threat, the Song promptly called up officials to discuss the issue of ceding territories as the Jin requested. Only thirty six of them, including Qin Gui 秦檜 (1090-1155), were against the cession; the rest, seventy in total, including Fan Zongyin 范宗尹 (1098-1136), agreed.\textsuperscript{18} When the Jins besieged the Song capital for the second time, Li Gang was reinstated and ordered to return to the capital. Upon hearing the new assignment and the siege of the capital, Li, who was then in Changsha 長沙 (in modern Hunan Province), led the rescuing forces and headed toward the capital. Before he reached the destination, the Jin had captured the capital and the two emperors were abducted and taken along with a few thousand imperial families, servants by the Jurchens to the north. A puppet regime and a bogus ruler were set up to replace the Song imperial Zhao 趙 family. The Northern Song ended as a tragedy with two emperors taken as captives by foreign invaders. Fortunately, the above mentioned Prince Kang, who was later requested by the Jin to be hostage again, did not reach the Jin camp. He was first supported as Grand Marshal (Da Yuanshuai 大元帥), and later Emperor, whose temple name is Gaozong, often referred to as the first emperor of the Southern Song (1127-1279). Li Gang's political career had since reached a new height because he was seen, in the eyes of the new emperor, as an indispensable asset.

\textsuperscript{17} SS, ch. 358, p. 11250. HB, v. 1, pp. 549-55.
\textsuperscript{18} HB, v. 2, p. 47. YL, ch. 1, p. 16.
As said before, Prince Kang, later called Song Gaozong, was assigned, for the second time, as peace envoy to the Jin camp. However, when he reached Cizhou 磁州 (in modern Hebei Province), the commander Zong Ze 宗澤 (1060-1128) and residents of the prefecture urged Prince Kang to stay there. They had the Prince's deputy Wang Yun 王雲 (?-1126) killed for suspicion of treason.19 A few days later, Prince Kang was encouraged to move to Xiangzhou 相州 (in modern Hebei Province), another prefecture ruled by Wang Boyan 汪伯彦, a future chief councilor and Li Gang's political enemy. When the joint forces of Nianhan and Wolibu arrived in Kaifeng, Prince Kang recruited a rescuing army in Xiangzhou. The Song court heard about Prince Kang's maneuver and appointed him Grand Marshal (Bingma Da Yuanshuai 兵馬大元帥), with Zong Ze and Wang Boyan as deputies. Meanwhile, the Jins requested Prince Kang to be sent back for hostage when they heard about his presence in Xiangzhou. Prince Kang, on the other hand, spread a message throughout the country urging people to save the throne and he himself led the army away from Xiangzhou and arrived in Beijing. The Jin army did not come in time to capture the Prince but they instead seized Wang Boyan's son when they got to Xiangzhou. Later, Prince Kang left Beijing for Dongpingfu 東平府 (in modern Shandong Province) where he was greeted by Huang Qianshan 黃潛善, another future chief councilor of Gaozong's, and Li Gang's opponent. Either because he was not ready to fight or was advised by an edict to standby during peace talks with the Jin, Prince Kang had never confronted the Jin troops.20 After the two emperors were abducted by the Jin to the north, Prince Kang was supported by his followers to ascend the throne. He

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19 HB, v. 2, pp. 64-67.
changed the reign title from Qinzong's Jingkang 靖康 to Jianyan 建炎: not waiting until the first day of the next year to change reign title was a precedent breaking act. One possible reason to this unconventional act was the urgent situation, which threatened the continuation of Song rule by the imperial Zhao family. Another likely reason was that Prince Kang did not officially succeed to the throne, thus the customary practice of changing reign title in the following year became less important. The legitimacy for his being an emperor had been challenged and he had to struggle to stay in power. With this weakness in his mind, he had to choose prestigious and influential people to help him to organize the new government. Li Gang was considered as the number one choice.

On June 12 of 1127 Gaozong ascended the throne in Nanjing 南京 (in modern Henan Province) and became the first emperor of the restored Song. He accepted the abdication and submission of the puppet emperor set up by the Jins, and issued an amnesty to pardon all officials during the Jin's occupation. He even allowed Zhang Bangchang 張邦昌, the puppet emperor, to be the acting chief councilor and to lead officials of all ranks to congratulate Gaozong on his ascension. On June 16, Li Gang was urged to report to the newly established court for the appointment of Chief Councilor of the Right (You Puye 右僕射). Before his arrival, Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan, Li's competitors, had already formed an opposition group against him. They anticipated that Gaozong would reward them for their contributions in helping him to become the emperor. However, when realizing Gaozong had a third choice, Huang and Wang

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20 YL, ch. 1, p. 22.
21 Ibid., ch. 5, pp. 115-6.
decided to challenge this newcomer. Li Gang, on the other hand, did not hesitate to send messages even before he reached Nanjing. He stated that peace was not reliable, defense was not an easy job, and wars could not necessarily bring victories. He wished for the new emperor to learn from the founding fathers of the past. Little had he known, until now, that the court had an opposing bloc awaiting him. Yan Qi 顏歧 (?-1127), then Censor-in-chief (Yushi Zhongcheng 御史中丞), suggested that while Zhang Bangchang should be rewarded more because the Jins liked him, Li Gang should be removed from the new appointment because the Jins disliked him. Yan sent a copy of this message to Li Gang, who was still on his way to the new post. Gaozong, on the other hand, responded to Yan by saying that he was afraid that his ascension was not favored by the Jin either. Yan stepped down from his office. Fan Zongyin, then Grand Master of the Right of the Remonstrance Bureau (You Jianyi Dafu 右諫議大夫), and who had advocated peace with the Jin, reported to the throne that Li Gang’s fame surpassed his actual ability and his prestige exceeded that of the emperor, and thus Li should not be chief councilor. Three submissions of this memorial were kept without reply. On July 11, Li finally arrived and was granted an audience with the emperor. Li refuted Yan Qi’s statement as ridiculous and requested himself to be relieved of duty. Gaozong stated that he had attempted to recommend Li as chief councilor to Qinzong and he was firmly decided to appoint Li to the position. Li, however, did not accept the job right away.

Fan Zongyin’s opposing to Li’s appointment could be seen as political struggle in that Fan's attitude toward the Jin was fundamentally different from Li’s, as dove versus

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22 YL, ch. 5, p. 122.
hawk. However, if we look into Li's performance until this time and his relationship with Gaozong after he assumed the duty of chief councilor, Fan's statement was not altogether without points. First of all, Li Gang did not fulfill his duties under the previous emperors. He was punished for the ambush of the Jin camp, an attack seemingly with his prior knowledge despite his denial. As Pacification Commissioner, Li did not rescue Taiyuan in time; in fact, he had positioned his troops far from the destination for his own safety. People might argue that he had little or no control of the above two incidents; however, he should still have been responsible for both setbacks. When he was removed from office after the unsuccessful ambush against the Jins, thousands of students and residents gathered around the palace pleading for his reinstatement. His fame and popularity were remarkable but quite incommensurate with his achievement. Secondly, he was already forty-five sui (forty-four years old) when summoned by Gaozong, who was only twenty years old. Had it not been for Jin's invasion and the subsequent coincidence, Gaozong, the ninth son of Huizong, would not have been the candidate for the throne. His status as a legitimate ruler had been challenged and his prestige could not be compared to Li Gang, who had already stood out as a famous political figure.

Li Gang insisted that his ten proposals put into practice in exchange of his taking office as chief councilor. Gaozong approved all of them except two major issues concerning punishment for the usurper of the throne, Zhang Bangchang, and the officials appointed by him. For this, Gaozong held a meeting to discuss the matters. Huang Qianshan suggested that Zhang be banished to a nearby place. Li was angry to hear this and threatened to beat him with a hu (a tablet held by officials during an audience with
the emperor for notes keeping) if Zhang was anywhere near the court. Wang Boyan, on the other hand, gave in to Li's insistence, as did the emperor. The final decision banished Zhang far away from the court and officials who accepted his appointment were demoted according to their ranks.\textsuperscript{23} Li Gang was very persistent in pursuing these officials for their due punishment while ignoring advice that suggested tolerance be practiced at the time when a new regime was built.

On July 16, Li assumed the post of Chief Councilor of the Right (You Puye 右僕射), and a concurrent duty of Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment (Yuyingshi 御營使). He proposed two offices be established in circuits east and north of the Yellow River; Pacification Commission (Zhaofusi 招撫司) in north of the Yellow River, Fiscal Commission (Jingzhisi 經制司) in east of the Yellow River. He recommended Zhang Suo 張所 (?-1127) and Fu Liang 傅亮 to be commissioner and deputy commissioner of the two offices respectively. The former recommendation triggered immediate challenges from Huang Qianshan because Zhang Suo was once a censor, and had at that time impeached Huang. Li had to convince Huang that Zhang was not competent as a censor but he could be entrusted with this dangerous duty to expiate his past offence against Huang. Huang approved and Gaozong was pleased. As for Fu Liang's appointment, even though Gaozong was disturbed by Fu's previous blunt statement\textsuperscript{24}, he grudgingly summoned Fu before they departed for the mission. Nevertheless, Li had achieved his goal.

\textsuperscript{23} YL, ch. 6, p. 146. Zhang was later ordered to commit suicide and died on Nov. 1 of 1127. See p. 49.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., ch. 5, p. 121.
Li had some fundamental differences in policy making with his colleagues Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan. For example, Li disagreed with their advocacy of peace with the Jins. Li recommended Zong Ze 宗澤, a hawkish but persistent commander, to administer Kaifeng, the capital very important for the defense. Zong Ze had pleaded very frequently to Gaozong to return to Kaifeng, to bring back the captured emperors and to recover the lost territories. When sending envoys, Li was against showing humble manners in front of the Jins. He proposed that the mission be labeled as "greeting the two (captured) emperors". Li suggested that regions north of the Yellow River (Hebei 河北) be established as Outlying Forts (fanzhen 藩鎮) supplied proportionately with military manpower by the court. The actual practice was to set up marshal offices (shuifu 帥府), important commanderies (jun 郡) and secondary commanderies along the Yellow, Huai and Yangtze Rivers. The strategy was to strengthen regional powers to defend the court. However, Wang Boyan had a different approach. He suggested to increase 500 archers for each district (xian 县) and put them under the magistrate's control. Huang Qianshan proposed to put marshals, commandery leaders under prefects or district magistrates. When there was a war, all the military forces were under the Song court's command. In short, if Li Gang, according to his proposal, was inclined to share power with regional forces, Huang and Wang, on the other hand, were inclined to centralize power at the court. This fundamental difference and other conflicts between them were never compromised and, consequently, they had to resort to the emperor for support.

25 YL, ch. 6, p. 167.
Power struggles between these two groups would ultimately develop into a showdown forcing one group to leave the court. One incident, concerning Li's proposal, accelerated this process.

Li's proposal for national defense included three parts. First, recruiting into the army people of the northwest, who had lost homes or became bandits due to Jin's invasion, by means of using the wealth of the southeast. He suggested assigning officials to recruit 100,000 troops to be stationed in important prefectures, military prefectures and, rotating them to the capital to protect the emperor. Secondly, increasing the number of horses. Li said that the emperor had less than 5,000 horses while facing the Jins who were successful in using cavalry. He proposed buying horses and forbade officials of lower ranks to ride horses. Thirdly, soliciting people to make donations. He proposed using **dudie** 度牒\(^\text{27}\) to reward people who donate money to the government.

However, this proposal incurred immediate criticism from Song Qiyu 宋齊愈, then Grand Master of the Right of the Remonstrance Bureau (You Jianyi Dafu 右諌議大夫). Song argued that horses from the northwest could not be obtained and horses from south of Huai, Yangtze Rivers could not be used. He also argued that extorting people's wealth should not be extensive, and if each prefecture increased 2,000 troops the government would face a very difficult situation financially. Song revealed this comment to his good friend Zhang Jun 張浚 (1097-1164), a future chief councilor, and then

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\(^{27}\) **Dudie** was designed to increase the state's income. It was a certificate issued by the government to allow commoners to become priests and in return the government charged a certain amount of money for it. Therefore, **dudie** had monetary values.
decided to report this to the emperor. Zhang Jun advised him not to refute everything Li Gang proposed since the latter had just taken office and made his proposals. Song did not accept Zhang's advice, thereupon offending Li Gang. As a result, Song was impeached for a severe breach of imperial etiquette; he had revealed the name of Jin puppet emperor, Zhang Bangchang (not a Zhao descendent) to Song officials — an act of total disrespect to the Song imperial family. This act was probably interpreted as treacherous since no other officials, at the time, dared to express their opinion. Song's criticism turned out to be unbearable and it cost him both his job and his life. When imprisoned, Song Qiyu begged Zhang Jun to save him. Huang Qianshan also tried to rescue his life. Despite their efforts, Gaozong supported Li Gang's decision and had Song executed. This incident irritated the anti-Li group and Song's sympathizers.

Another issue pitted Li Gang against his opponents and forced the emperor to make an earlier choice between the two sides. On August 26 of 1127, Gaozong wrote his personal imperial decree (shouzhao 手詔) indicating he was not willing to go to Kaifeng and was prepared to find refuge in southeast China. He promised to return to the capital next spring and ordered the Three Departments (Sansheng 三省) and the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shumiyan 樞密院) to submit workable plans. This decree was issued because Wang Boyan and Huang Qianshan had previously convinced Gaozong to move to the southeast. Li was extremely against this announcement. He argued that rulers of the past who restored the nation all rose up from northwest China and occupied the Central Plain (Zhongyuan 中 原), and for the next step they possessed the southeast. If

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28 YL, ch. 6, p. 169.
one rose up from the southeast he was unable to recover the Central Plain and the northwest, where crack troops and strong horses were from. If the northwest was given up, it would be invaded by the Jins and infested with bandits. The emperor, Li argued, would not be able to return to Kaifeng, let alone defeating the Jins or bringing back the two emperors. He suggested that even if the emperor was unwilling to go to Kaifeng, he should, for the time being, go to Xiang 襄 (in modern Hubei Province), Deng 鄢 (in modern Henan Province) for their advantageous locations for recruiting troops and gathering wealth. Gaozong revoked his decree and ordered Li Gang to confer on the matter with other officials.

After debates between Li and Huang Qianshan, Gaozong promised to go to Nanyang 南陽 (in modern Henan Province). Li had won another battle in the court. However at the same time, Zhang Jun, a good friend of the executed Song Qiyu, was promoted to the position of Palace Censor (Dianzhong Shiyushi 殿中侍御史) because he was esteemed both by Gaozong and Huang Qianshan. Although Gaozong promised Li Gang to go to Nanyang, many officials in the court disagreed. They argued that even though Nanyang was a good location for gathering people from all sides, its economic situation and defense facilities were not reliable. On the contrary, the southeast had plenty of wealth due to a long term of peace; moreover, it had natural boundaries, the Yangtze River for one, favorable for the defense against the Jins who were not skillful in water combat. Therefore, Wang Boyan and Huang Qianshan were joined by many others in opposing Li Gang on this issue.
Under the influence of Huang-Wang group, Gaozong changed his mind and denied most of Li Gang's proposals. In spite of being advised not to insist on his own position to avoid big changes at court, Li did not yield to his opponents. Li remained with the emperor after the court session was over and protested. He argued that Gaozong had been surrounded by mean people and alienated him. He made comments on the incompatibility between gentlemen (junzi 君子) and mean people (xiaoren 小人) and pleaded for Gaozong's total trust in him. Gaozong consoled Li and on September 12 he promoted Li to Chief Councilor of the Left (Zuo Puye 左僕射), the highest official rank. Huang Qianshan, on the other hand, was promoted to Chief Councilor of the Right (You Puye 右僕射), Li Gang's previous position.\(^{30}\) By this promotion, Gaozong expected Li to back down from a tough stance and compromise with other officials, especially Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan. But the power struggle between the two sides had not stopped from heating up.

Zhang Suo, who had been recommended by Li as Pacification Commissioner, was accused of destroying conditions of the area since he assumed the duty. Li argued that the accusation was meant to attack him, not Zhang, since it was false and the accuser must have been ordered to do so by officials of higher ranks. He debated this with Wang Boyan, then Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Zhi Shumiyuanshi 知樞密院事), in front of the emperor. Wang could not utter a word to defend his position against Li. Fu Liang, another important person recommended by Li, was ordered to

\(^{29}\) YL, ch. 7, pp. 184-5.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., ch. 8, p. 198.
follow Zong Ze's command and cross the Yellow River. Fu reported that the other side of the River was controlled by the Jin. If he led the troops, which were still undisciplined and unorganized, to cross the River, the situation would be very disadvantageous. Li pleaded for support of Fu's argument against Huang Qianshan from Gaozong who had been undecided for several days. Li Gang moved one step forward to complain that Huang and Wang had blocked him on purpose despite the fact Li had showed his tolerance since his arrival.

Gaozong approved of Fu's original assignment yet changed his mind the next day. He ordered Fu to return to the capital and dissolved his command for the reason that he did not have sufficient troops for crossing the River. Li Gang tried to change the emperor's decision but his effort was in vain. Meanwhile, Zhang Jun, the Palace Censor and Huang Qianshan's friend, impeached Li Gang for the death of Song Qiyu and his domination of state affairs and abuse of power. Gaozong summoned Li and asked him why he had contended such trivial things. Li argued that appointing commanders was not trivial and he was willing to give up his position if the emperor disagreed with him. He also explained that Huang and Wang disliked him because they thought they had closer relationship with the emperor, but the position of chief councilor was left to him and not them. Li also reported why he disagreed to Gaozong's moving to the southeast despite the fact it was the place where Li was from. All these serious statements did not seem to work and Li had to step down. Gaozong then ordered Zhu Shengfei 朱勝非 (1082-1144), then Vice Minister of Ministry of Rites (Libu Shilang 禮部侍郎) and a future chief councilor, to draft an imperial edict charging Li for all kinds of misconduct. Li
Gang was removed from office, his term lasting only seventy-five days. In fact, all the accusations against Li were forwarded to Zhu by Huang Qianshan. Li Gang was forced to leave the power center and so did the people who sympathized with or supported him.

Why was Li Gang ousted from the court after such a short period time as chief councilor? He did not make major mistakes in policy making; in fact, he was successful in reorganizing the government. Now, it would be interesting to turn our attention to Fan Zongyin's comments at the time when Li Gang was chosen as the candidate for the position of chief councilor before he arrived at the court. Li's fame, as Fan described it, exceeded his real performance. Indeed, Li was too famous to be ignored, especially in the precarious situation that Gaozong was placed. According to the report of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), everybody ascribed the chaos (during Jin's siege of the Song capital) to Li's banishment from the capital. Gaozong had to follow this consensus, and urgently summoned Li to serve in the new regime. However, Gaozong's supporters, in particular Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan, were reluctant to accept Li as their leader. The Huang-Wang faction had started their power struggle against Li even before his arrival.

Gaozong seemed to be in a dilemma between these two groups. However, he wanted to achieve two goals. On the one hand, he needed a person with great prestige to help him put in order this new government; on the other, he had to keep and solicit loyal followers. As mentioned earlier, his ascending the throne was not a clean transition without controversies. In fact, he was not fully prepared to be an emperor, yet he had to

\footnote{YL, ch. 8, pp. 201-3.}
assume the duty. For these reasons, he was put into a situation in which gathering supporters was exceptionally important. With the two goals in conflict, Gaozong had to make a decision to favor one against the other. He had to rely on Li Gang’s work to reorganize the court; however, he did not want to alienate the Huang-Wang loyal group. The decision was hard to make. From historical sources, we see that in order to convince Li Gang to accept the new appointment, Gaozong had shown tremendous tolerance trying to accept every proposal Li made. Li, on the other hand, had pleaded for Gaozong’s full authorization on matters that Li thought important: for example, Li’s insistence on punishing Zhang Bangchang and officials who accepted Zhang’s appointments. To respond to Li’s request, the modest young emperor had to ask that Li personally discuss it with Huang and Wang.34

In general, Li did not share common grounds with his opponents on policy making. Gaozong had to play the role as an arbitrator between them for every issue on which they disagreed. The establishment of Pacification and Fiscal Offices in Hebei and Hedong triggered major factional struggles. The two people Li recommended for the offices had been criticized for their performance soon after they assumed the duties. Li risked his own career to defend them; when his effort was in vain, Li chose to step down to stand by his principles. In spite of his hard work in persuading the emperor that he was the true gentleman who could not share government with the mean people, his intransigent personality backfired and cost him his job. Gaozong did not share the same

33 Ibid., p. 5032.
34 YL, ch. 6, pp. 145-6.
view with Li as how to dispose of these two offices whose leaders were criticized severely. Moreover, he took Li's defense for the two commanders as trivial. From this argument we see that Gaozong had ultimately decided to side with Li's opponents. Meanwhile, Li's killing of Song Qiyu incurred attacks from censors on his position that was supposed to be impartial.\(^{35}\)

Why did Gaozong turn his back on Li Gang at the time when he was seen as indispensable?\(^{36}\) Li, according to Fan Zongyin, whose prestige had exceeded that of Gaozong's, should not be appointed as chief councilor. As mentioned above, Li was forty-four and Gaozong only twenty when they endeavored to set up this new regime. This odd composition was not unprecedented in Chinese history; however, Gaozong's position for ascending the throne was fragile and subject to challenges. Li Gang, who had served under three emperors and enjoyed prestigious reputation, must have imposed great pressure, deliberate or not, on the young emperor. According to the Southern Song philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹, Gaozong had complained that Li Gang saw him as a child (Li Gang 漢視 孖).\(^{37}\) This statement can not be interpreted into a major conclusion; nevertheless, it reveals a volatile tension between them.

On the contrary, Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan did not seem to pose, in form or content, any threat to the emperor. Traditional Chinese historians often blame Huang

\(^{35}\) Li Gang had tried to save some officials who committed serious crimes yet he was not merciful to Song Qiyu. See YL, ch. 8, p. 195.

\(^{36}\) Li Gang 李綱, Liangxi ji 梁谿集, ch. 60, p. 980. Zhou Zizhi 周紫芝, Taicang timiji 太倉織米集, ch. 57. Cheng Ju 程俱, Beishan ji 北山集, ch. 36. Li Xinchuan 李心傳, Jianyan vilai chaoye zaji 建炎以來朝野雜記, p. 373.

\(^{37}\) Li Jingde ed., Zhuzi yulei, p. 5032.
and Wang for harming the restoration of the Song, and sympathized with Li over the loss of his position. Meanwhile, they insinuate their criticism on Gaozong's inability to use Li Gang. In fact, Gaozong's awkward position between Li Gang and other loyal supporters against Li had never been fairly discussed. Soliciting loyal followers and keeping them together, as I have assumed, should have been one of Gaozong's major goals. While relying on a fatherly figure like Li Gang to assist him because he was inexperienced and lacking confidence, Gaozong had to make great effort to secure a large number of followers who would recognize his position as a legitimate successor of the Song. An unprepared twenty year old young man was learning to be an emperor.

Another issue meriting our attention is the discussion among Song officials about Gaozong's future residence. Li Gang insisted that even Gaozong was not willing to go back to Kaifeng, he should at least choose Xiang and Deng areas as the second priority. Li's proposal did not earn the support from most officials, either because they consider it unpractical or they had been influenced by Huang and Wang, or most likely both. Gaozong did not argue with Li on this matter because he did not want to send a wrong message to the nation that he was about to abandon north China. In reality, Gaozong was either not ready or had never attempted to confront the Jin invaders. As mentioned above, Li's hawkish stance against the Jins had not been approved by Qinzong, Gaozong's predecessor. Li dissuaded Qinzong from leaving the capital but he himself was sent away because of his demotion. The outcome was Qinzong's being captured by the Jins. Gaozong's memory of this should still have been fresh at the time since he himself had

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experienced life threatening moments when he was in the Jin camp for the peace mission. When Li Gang urged Gaozong to pay more attention to the north, he was pushing an aggressive measure in dealing with the Jins. The emperor's personality and the decision he made could not match Li's expectations. Their cooperation was doomed to be short-lived and unsuccessful.

Li Gang's political life as chief councilor was ephemeral, his later career was like riding a roller coaster. From a degraded local post he managed to advance to the position of Military Commissioner-in-chief (Anfu Dashi 安撫大使). In September of 1132, when Li Gang was recommended to the emperor, Gaozong expressed his impression of Li, commenting that Li was daring in reporting disasters to the court during the Zhenghe 政和 (1111-1117) and Xuanhe 宣和 (1119-1125) periods and had since obtained good reputation. As a result, he was later promoted as chief councilor. However, as Gaozong indicated, Li was assigned to rescue Taiyuan but had stalled the march and stationed himself safely at a place over a thousand 里 (one 里 = 1/3 mile) away.

Gaozong criticized Li as taking undeserved credits and forming factions, and his being commanded to take charge of a region (Li was appointed Pacification Commissioner 宣撫使 of the four circuits in Huguang 湖廣 areas) was not a trivial duty. Gaozong, with his firsthand experience, was disillusioned with Li's performance. In 1136, Li was granted an audience by Gaozong at Linan 臨安, the temporary lodging

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30 YL, ch. 57, p. 990.
for the emperor, but was denied as an escort when Gaozong traveled later the same year. Until he died in 1140, Li had never returned to the power center again. On one occasion, Gaozong explained to some high ranking officials why he did not want Li Gang to return. He commented that Li Gang was loyal but not competent and the country would be doomed if he was used again. After leaving the court, Li was replaced by his political enemies, Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan. Their performance as chief councilors will be discussed in the following chapter.

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41 YL, ch. 98, p. 1619 & ch. 105, p. 1707.
42 Ibid., ch. 27, p. 531.
Chapter Two: **Huang Qianshan 黃 潛 善 (?-1129) Wang Boyan 汪 伯 彥 (1069-1141): The Emperor's "Babysitters"?**

Huang Qianshan, styled Maohe 茂 和, came from Shaowu 邵 武, the same hometown as Li Gang. He also earned a jinshi degree. At the beginning of the Xuanhe 宣和 period (ca. 1120), he was appointed Gentleman of the Left Office (Zuo Silang 左司 郎). Earthquakes in Shaanxi 陝 西 and Hedong 河 東 caused great topographical changes prompting Huizong to send Huang to investigate damages in Shaanxi. Huang did not, however, report the severity of earthquake damages upon returning to the court. He later received promotion to Vice Minister of the Ministry of Revenue (Hubu Shilang 戶 部 侍 郎). For unknown reasons, he was later still punished and demoted to Bozhou 柘 州 (in modern Anhui Province), and then transferred to the position of prefect of Hejianfu 河 關 府 (in modern Hebei Province). At the beginning of the Jingkang 靖 康 period (1126-1127), the Jin army attacked the Song, whereupon Prince Kang 康 王 set up the Office of Grand Marshal (Da Yuanshuai 大 元 帥 府). Huang Qianshan was ordered to lead troops to Prince Kang's camp for its reinforcement. On May 11 of 1127, Prince Kang, the Grand Marshal, appointed Huang as Vice Marshal (Fu Yuanshuai 副 元 帥). Huang brought information that Huizong and Qinzong had been captured and Zhang Bangchang had usurped the throne. Along with others, Huang urged Prince Kang to assume the throne. They all agreed to issue a declaration of amnesty with great leniency forgiving every official who was involved with Zhang Bangchang and his appointees; it also applied to people not pardoned in a regular amnesty. Because the

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43 SS, ch. 473, p. 13743.
content of the amnesty was drafted by Zhang Bangchang, it incurred criticism from the censors.45

When Gaozong later ascended the throne, he promoted Huang Qianshan to Vice Director of Secretariat (Zhongshu Shilang 中書侍郎). Gaozong sought counsel from Huang and Wang Boyan about how to deal with Zhang Bangchang. Huang suggested that while Zhang's usurping the throne was unforgivable, he was forced to do so by the Jin. He claimed that Zhang had shown his sincerity by returning the imperial seal, stepping down from the throne and allowing Empress Dowager Longyou 隆祐46 to rule from behind the screen after the Jins left. Now that Zhang surrendered to the court, Huang suggested that Gaozong decide by himself as how to dispose of Zhang. Gaozong's response was very interesting. He claimed that he wanted to bestow a noble title on Zhang for fear that if the Jin blamed Zhang's abdication, he could inform them that the people still longed for the Song; therefore, he returned the seal and abdicated only to conform with the will of the people.47 Officials praised Gaozong's view as "farsighted and superb". Huang Qianshan had hitherto formed a bloc with Wang Boyan against anyone who tried to intrude their sphere of influence and to compete with them for Gaozong's favor and trust. Historical records often show their names side by side during the Jianyan 建炎 period and thus they will also be discussed together. Before doing that, it is necessary to briefly sketch Wang Boyan's background.

44 HB, v. 2, p. 293.
45 YL, ch. 4, pp. 112-3.
46 Empress Dowager Longyou was Zhezong's 哲宗 (r. 1086-1100) wife and not Gaozong's real mother. She died on May 12 of 1131. See her biography in Song shi 宋史, ch. 243, pp. 8632-8.
Wang Boyan, styled Tingjun 廷俊, was from Qimen 琪門 in Huizhou 徽州 (in modern Anhui Province). He earned his jinshi degree during the Chongning 崇寧 (Huizong's reign title) period and was assigned to Chengan 成安 (in modern Hebei Province) as the Assistant Magistrate (Zhubu 主簿). As a personal secretary for the Marshal, he was responsible for making plans for military affairs. Because of his good performance, he earned a promotion from Court Gentleman for Instruction (Xuanjiao Lang 宣教郎) to Grand Master for Palace Attendance (Zhongfeng Dafu 中奉大夫). With a series of other promotions, he later earned the post of Vice Director of the Bureau of Forestry and Crafts (Yubu Langguan 虞部郎官). When Qinzong assumed the throne, Wang submitted ten major defense proposals upon being granted an audience by the new emperor. Thereafter, he was promoted as an Academician of Dragon Diagram Hall 龍圖閣 and prefect of Xiangzhou 相州 (in modern Henan Province). When the Jins invaded the Song, Wang was assigned to command a marshal office just recently moved to Xiangzhou. When Prince Kang (later Gaozong) went to the Jin camp as an envoy, he stopped by Cizhou 磁州 (north of Xiangzhou), an area infested with Jin cavalry. Wang Boyan dispatched a letter urging Prince Kang to go to Xiangzhou. When the Prince arrived, Wang greeted him personally. Prince Kang promised to make a recommendation for him to the emperor for a post at the capital. This marked the beginning of Wang's good relationship with Gaozong, a relationship that was to be of lasting trust. Shortly after that, Prince Kang was appointed Grand Marshal and ordered to

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48 Zhao Buhui 趙不悔, Xinanzhi 新安志 in Song Yuan fangzhi congkan 宋元方志叢刊 v. 8, p. 7701.
set up that Office, and the Prince appointed Wang Boyan as his deputy. Having both become lost on the way to Beijing, Wang Boyan offered mutton soup and steamed cake refreshments, and in return he got battle clothing from the Prince because Wang suffered from the cold weather. As Gaozong later remembered, they shared food and water together in a humble cottage.

When the Jin army surrounded the capital, Qinzong dispatched a letter to Prince Kang ordering him to station his troops at his present location and take no reckless actions during the time when the Song and Jin were negotiating peace. Wang Boyan advocated peace and argued with Zong Ze, who suggested that the Song troops get close to the capital lest the Jins attempted other actions. Meanwhile, the Jin army attacked Xiangzhou and Wang's son was captured. On May 11 of 1127, Huang Qianshan was appointed Edict Attendant of Huiyou Hall (Huiyouge Daizhi) and Vice Marshal (Fu Yuanshuai) and Wang Boyan was appointed Edict Attendant of Xianmo Hall (Xianmoge Daizhi) and Marshal (Yuanshuai). On June 8, they were both promoted as Academicians.

After Gaozong ascended the throne, Wang was promoted to Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Tongzhi Shumiyuanshi). Huang and Wang were the two highest officials next only to Li Gang, who was

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49 SS, ch. 473, p. 13745.
51 YL, ch. 18, p. 360.
52 Ibid., ch. 1, p. 22.
about to be appointed as chief councilor. To them, Li Gang's arrival at the court could threaten their common interests and they were displeased to learn that Gaozong had decided to recruit Li as the ranking official. Therefore, their first attempt was to find a way to stop Li from coming to the court. Failing that, they endeavored as a second attempt to negate Li's proposals and policies after his arrival at the court. Their joint effort to rid off Li Gang and to gain Gaozong's favors made their names appear together in historical records. The following is a discussion of their performance in the newly established regime headed by a young and inexperienced emperor.

As mentioned above, Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan had been Gaozong's loyal followers since Gaozong was Prince Kang. Huang augmented the Prince's military strength by leading troops to join him, and later served under him as Vice Marshal. Wang seemed to have a close relationship with the emperor. He had made the right decision by dissuading the future emperor from going northward to the Jin camp. Consequently, he made a great contribution to the continuation of Song's rule. In addition, by sharing hardship with the Prince, their relationship was firmly cemented. When the Prince became Grand Marshal, Wang served as a Marshal and his deputy. Huang and Wang were described, in a sarcastic way, by their contemporaries as protecting the emperor like nannies to a baby. It was natural for them to feel that they deserved the highest positions. Therefore, they tried to keep the position of chief

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54 YL, ch. 1, p. 82.
55 Zhu Xi argued that Huang Qianshan had to conform to the public opinion and thus recommended Li Gang, but at the same time he ordered Yan Qi to present an argument to Gaozong against Li's promotion, attempting to forbid Li's arrival at the court. See Li Jingde 雲 測 ed., Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類, p. 5032.
56 Hu Yin 胡寅, Feiran ji 負然集, ch. 16, p. 3b.
councillor unoccupied for their own sake. But, Gaozong was attracted to Li Gang for his fame. To defend their positions at the court, Huang and Wang played an opposing role against Li.

Whether Huang and Wang were reactionary or not is not entirely clear to us. However, their policies for the new government were fundamentally different from those of Li. Before Li's arrival, Huang headed, deputed by Wang, a new government office named the Imperial Defense Command (Yuyingsi 御營司) which replaced the old Three Commands (Sanya 三衙). They were responsible for handling military affairs, unifying commands and increasing imperial troops. Huang and Wang even set aside 1,000 soldiers for their own use. Strengthening the imperial army was, among others, one of the policies that Huang and Wang advocated that was fundamentally different from Li Gang's fanzhen 藩鎮 policy decentralizing mounting armies to local powers. Huang and Wang preferred peace negotiations with the Jin, intending to define the Yellow River as the boundary between the two states.

After Gaozong ascended the throne, Huang, Wang and others decided to issue a generous amnesty pardoning many people including Zhang Bangchang, followers of his puppet regime, and people unforgiven by the regular amnesty. This amnesty, however, was literally a copy of Zhang Bangchang's earlier version. It proposed that those in the ceded areas to the Jin (north of the Yellow River) should not be covered by the

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57 YL, ch. 5, pp. 123-4.
58 Ibid., ch. 5, pp. 112-3.
amnesties.\textsuperscript{59} Li Gang, on the contrary, later requested these areas, where people were still fighting against the Jins for the Song, should be granted amnesty.\textsuperscript{60}

Having arrived at the court, Li Gang, in his ten proposals, protested against the amnesty, which had been decided before his arrival. He asserted that the amnesty for celebration of Gaozong's ascension to the throne should not be copied from Zhang Bangchang who had headed a bogus regime. Li disagreed with an amnesty forgiving people who committed heinous crimes and pardoning officials who were banished.\textsuperscript{61} He urged Gaozong to choose Guanzhong 閘中 (modern Shaanxi province) as his first priority for the imperial tour (xunxing 巡幸), Xiang 襄 and Deng 鄃, the second, and Jiankang 建康 (in modern Jiangsu Province), the last choice. When Li learned that the emperor intended to go the southeast, he backed down from his insistence and obtained the emperor's promise to go to Nanyang 南陽 (Deng 鄃). Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan, on the other hand, urged Gaozong to move to southeast. After Li was demoted from the court, they escorted Gaozong to Yangzhou 揚州 (in modern Jiangsu Province) located in the southeast. Huang and Wang disagreed with Li on a number of issues and their power struggles could have easily developed into a war. On September 25 of 1127, Li was forced to leave the government, with Huang and Wang replacing him in his position. They reversed all of Li's policies.

\textsuperscript{59} YL, ch. 5, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., ch. 6, pp. 158-9.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., ch. 6, p. 143.
When the news of Li Gang's dismissal spread, National University student Chen Dong 陈东 (1086-1127) and jinshi degree holder Ouyang Che 欧阳澈 (1091-1127) made prostration in front of the palace (fuque 伏闕). In his imperial petition, Chen declared Li Gang should not be removed from office and Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan should not replace him. He further begged Gaozong to personally lead the army to bring back the two captured emperors. After Chen submitted his imperial petition three times, Huang was irritated but nevertheless could not respond to it without a proper cause. Meanwhile, Ouyang Che also sent reports defaming people who were in charge of state affairs, even touching on Gaozong's private life in the palace. Gaozong notified officials that Ouyang's remarks were false. Huang took this opportunity and secretly ordered that both Ouyang and Chen be executed. Without personally knowing Li Gang, Chen Dong had previously supported him during the Jingkang period, and this time sacrificed his life for Li. He died at forty-one years of age. Gaozong later showed his regrets over this.62

After this fuque episode was over, Huang and Wang totally gave up management of the north and prepared to move to southeast.63 They first ordered the Prefect of Yangzhou, Lü Yihao 呂頤浩 (1071-1139), a future chief councilor who had since drawn Gaozong's attention, to repair Yangzhou's walls and moat.64 They often laughed at imperial reports from Zong Ze, who had hitherto been stationed in Kaifeng and constantly pleaded for Gaozong's return. Zong Ze, on the other hand, openly criticized

63 YL, ch. 9, p. 213.
Huang Qianshan as an idler (xiānren 閑人), Wang Boyan as a trifling man (weiren 微人). Zong's effort to maintain a substantial presence in the north by the Song government, and his pleading for Gaozong's return to Kaifeng all were hindered by Huang and Wang. Zong sent altogether over twenty petitions trying to convince Gaozong to return to Kaifeng. Although the emperor was not convinced, Huang and Wang were cynical, Zong served his duty as prefect of Kaifeng until his death. He passed away with his aspirations unfulfilled one year after Gaozong assumed the throne. Shortly before he died, Zong Ze still shouted "crossing the river" and left imperial petitions urging Gaozong to return.

On October 29 of 1127, an edict was issued claiming that according to intelligence reports the Jin army was about to invade Jiang 江 and Zhe 浙 (Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces). The emperor decided to go to the Huai 淮 area (Huaidian 淮甸) temporarily and promised to return to Kaifeng once the defense was consolidated. He ordered the Three Departments (Sangsheng 三省) and the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shumi yuan 樞密院) to arrange the related work of defense. Zhu Shengfei proposed to go to Xiangyang 襄阳 (in modern Hubei Province) because of its strategically advantageous location. Meanwhile, Zhang Bangchang, then living in Changsha 長沙 (in modern Hunan Province), was ordered to commit suicide because the Jin used his abdication as an pretext for the invasion. When Li Gang proposed to kill Zhang, Huang

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64 YL, ch. 9, p. 214.
65 Liu Kezhuan 劉克莊, Houcun xiānshēng daquān ji 後村先生大全集, ch. 98, p. 850.
66 YL, ch. 15, p. 321.
67 Ibid., ch. 16, p. 336.
and Wang objected. But before they went to the south with Gaozong, they decided to have Zhang killed. On November 7, Gaozong left Nanjing (in modern Henan Province), the place he ascended the throne, and arrived at Yangzhou on December 2.

Although possessing Gaozong's favor, Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan nevertheless faced challenges. At the beginning of the second year of Jianyan, a eunuch named Shao Chengzhang 宋成章 officially wrote to the throne accusing Huang and Wang of damaging the country (wuguo 謬國). In fact, the Jin army had at the time invaded Shaanxi and Jingdong 京東 (areas surrounding the capital), and bandits rose up in Shandong 山東. Huang and Wang concealed all such information from Gaozong; worst of all, when the invading Jin army came as near as only 60 里 (1 里 = 1/3 mile) from the emperor's location, Gaozong was still not informed. Gaozong was angered by Shao's memorial and expelled him for not sticking to his duty. About two weeks later, National University student Wei You 魏祐 submitted an imperial memorandum accusing Huang and Wang of ten crimes of damaging the country. The memorial received no response. On September 4 of 1128, Palace Censor Ma Shen 馬伸 (?-1128) indicated that Huang and Wang gained full trust of the emperor; however, they did not fulfil their duties by allowing the enemy to grow stronger and bandits to become unrestrained, thus putting the government in a predicament of diminished authority. He also accused Huang and Wang of choosing censors by themselves (including Zhang Jun); moreover, when

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68 YL, ch. 9, p. 222.
69 Ibid., ch. 9, p. 224
70 Ibid., ch. 12, p. 271. HB, v. 2, p. 547.
71 YL, ch. 12, p. 279.
requested to relieve people from hardship and misery, they often claimed that it was up to
the emperor to decide. As accused by Ma Shen, Huang and Wang denied knowledge of
the Chen Dong incident. Their behavior of setting aside 1,000 troops for personal use
was also impeached. Ma pleaded that Gaozong promptly dismiss Huang and Wang, and
choose worthy people to work on the significant affairs. Gaozong did not accept Ma's
proposal, demoting him twice. Ma boldly refused the new assignment and sent an
official petition to Censorate (Yushitai 御史台) requesting Huang and Wang be
executed. As a result, Ma's accusations were by edict declared as untrue and he was sent
into exile. Ma Shen died on the way to the destination.

In order to consolidate their power, Huang and Wang blocked any access that
would influence Gaozong's decisions or pose threats to his regime. For example, Zong
Ze was thwarted by Huang and Wang because he frequently urged Gaozong to return to
Kaifeng. Zong, by showing his devotion to the country, remained in his post until he
died. He was never able to convince Gaozong to change his mind because Huang and
Wang had played an important role in preventing him to adopt Zong's proposals. Had Li
Gang, who recommended Zong Ze for his position, been supported by the emperor,
history might have run a different course. In addition to Zong's effort, a military
commander named Wang Yan 王彦 (1090-1139) pleaded with Gaozong to launch a
northern expedition: people along the two rivers were anticipating imperial armies, who
would both exterminate Song enemies and recover their lost territories. Huang and Wang

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72 YL, ch. 17, pp. 344-6.
73 Ibid., ch. 17, p. 351.
were greatly irritated by these aggressive suggestions and demoted Wang Yan to a lower post.74

In May of 1128, Prince Zhen 晁送 Ma Kuo 马扩 (?-1152) to Yangzhou asking for reinforcements.75 Huang and Wang held suspicions regarding his identity, but when Ma showed Prince Zhen’s handwriting, Gaozong recognized it was real and rewarded Ma. However, Huang and Wang still had doubts on this and provided him only an undisciplined mob. They even secretly sent edicts to have Ma closely supervised and ordered commanders of all circuits to limit Ma’s activities. Ma realized the situation he was in and stationed himself in Daming 大名 (in modern Hebei Province).76 Meanwhile, Gaozong decreed that he was going to return to Kaifeng for fear that Prince Zhen might cross the Yellow River and challenge his legitimate position as an emperor.77 Li Gang, the number one enemy of Huang and Wang, was banished to a remote area and prevented from getting close to the emperor. Whenever there was an amnesty announced, Li was never included among the people to be pardoned. Huang Qianshan claimed that to negate leniency to Li Gang was to show friendly gesture to the Jin.78

By using their authority to appoint pliant people and expel officials who either were loyal to their political enemies or disagreed with them, Huang and Wang also attempted to remove all dissident opinions. For example, Huang Qianshan promoted a

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74 YL, ch. 18, p. 357.
75 For details of Prince Zhen’s anti-Jin activities, please refer to Tao Jing-shen 陶銘生, "Nan Song chu Xinwang Zhen kang Jin shimo 南宋初信王燁抗金始末," Bianjiangshi yanjiuji 邊疆史研究集, pp. 24-32.
77 YL, ch. 15, p. 316.
78 Ibid., ch. 20, p. 401.
person named Huang Tangchuan 黄唐傳 because he drafted a beautiful announcement for Huang's brother's promotion.\textsuperscript{79} Wang Tao 王翱 (1074-1137) was appointed Censor-in-chief (Yushi Zhongcheng 御史中丞) because he was incapable and easily controlled.\textsuperscript{80} On the contrary, Xiang Ziyin 向子諤 (1085-1152) was removed from his post because he was appreciated by Li Gang.\textsuperscript{81} Yu Ruli 喻汝勵 (?-1186) lost his job because he agreed to Li Gang's position against moving the capital.\textsuperscript{82} Wei Fumin 衛府敏 (1081-1129) was transferred from his position as a remonstrance official because Huang initially envied his frequent submission of proposals.\textsuperscript{83} Wei, however, was later removed from his office by Huang.\textsuperscript{84} Xu Jingheng 許景衡 (1072-1128), then Assistant Director of the Right of Department of State Affairs (Shangshu Youcheng 尚書右丞), who often disagreed with Huang and Wang and argued seriously for his suggestions in front of the emperor, was forced to step down.\textsuperscript{85} These cases tell us that Huang and Wang had consolidated their power in the court and strengthened their relationship with the emperor. The time to their advancement to the top ranks was expected to be very short.

On January 11 of 1129, Huang Qianshan was promoted to Chief Councilor of the Left (Zuo Puye 左僕射) and Wang Boyan, Chief Councilor of the Right (You Puye 右僕射). They both occupied concurrently the position of Commissioner of the Imperial

\textsuperscript{79} YL, ch. 12, p. 272.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., ch. 16, p. 328.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., ch. 9, p. 214.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., ch. 14, p. 299.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., ch. 11, p. 258.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., ch. 13, p. 288.
Encampment (Yuyingshi 御營使). When they showed their gratitude to the emperor, Gaozong praised them by saying that with their governing the country, he did not worry that any affair of the state could not be properly handled. He asked Huang and Wang to make concerted efforts to assist him. Huang and Wang, until this moment, had obviously earned Gaozong's total trust and they believed that they would remain in power if the emperor's patronage continued.

Either because they were misinformed of the reality or they were incapable of dealing with the problem, the Jin's invasion did not worry them too much. According to Li Xinchuan's report, they made no great plans to govern the state and appointed unqualified people to important posts. The intelligence reports delivered to them were often unverified and the reconnoiters were ignorant. Because Huang and others despised the bandit group led by Li Cheng 李成, whose mob had instigated a great uprising in the north, the Jin took advantage of this to falsely claim that the Jin regular armies were the bandits. Gaozong summoned all officials to discuss responding to the situation. Lü Yihao submitted ten defense proposals and Ye Mengde 葉夢得 (1077-1148) urged Gaozong to go to the south, relying on the Yangtze River as a barrier for defense. Palace Censor Zhang Shou 張守 (?,1145) presented six detailed proposals and urged high ranking officials to choose only significant and urgent business as their priority, leaving trivial matters to the bureaucracy. Huang and Wang were angered by his suggestions and asked Zhang Shou to set out to the north immediately to pacify people around the capital.

85 YL, ch. 15, p. 316.
86 Ibid., ch. 18, p. 375.
Zhang Jun, then Vice Minister of the Ministry of Rites (Libu Shilang 禮部侍郞), and his colleagues urged the emperor to prepare for the enemy's invasion. Huang and Wang laughed at their advice to the emperor, and even refused to endorse the warnings Zhang Jun and others had raised. However, Zhang Jun was assigned as Military Consultant of Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment (Yuyingshisi Canzanjunshi 御營使司掌軍事) to train troops from north of the Yellow River. Later on, Wang Tao 王禎 (1074-1137), then Minister of Ministry of Rites (Libu Shangshu 禮部尚書), with his deputies, reported to the emperor concerning the Jin's invasion. Huang and Wang ridiculed their reports as so childish that could be done by a small kid.

The Jin army, in fact, had reached Sizhou 泗州 (in modern Anhui Province), a position near the emperor's location in Yangzhou. Gaozong was shocked when he heard this report, and the Song army hastily spent a whole night, moving the treasury to safer ground. The next day the emperor boarded a ship on the Yangtze River, a move which frightened the residents of Yangzhou. When he was about to cross the River, Gaozong was requested by Huang Qianshan to stay for a small while to await reports. Gaozong's son and other imperial families were in the meantime escorted to Hangzhou 杭州 (in modern Zhejiang Province). Lü Yihao and Zhang Jun were assigned to Song 松 (modern Wusongjiang 吳淞江) and Huai 淮 respectively, for preparations of defense. On the same day, Yangzhou residents struggled to leave the town, resulting in a stampede which trampled many people to death. When asked about how to deal with the situation, Huang

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87 YL, ch. 18, pp. 377-8.
88 Ibid., ch. 19, p. 386.
and Wang replied that they had arranged everything and asked people not to worry. By so comforting each other, officials thought their chief councilors best knew the situation so that they should not hastily move; the people of Yangzhou were likewise convinced.90

Two days later, the Jin army occupied Tianchangjun 天長軍 (in Sizhou 津州, modern Anhui Province) and this imminent threat prompted Gaozong to leave Yangzhou escorted only by six people. When Huang and Wang were informed of this, they wore military uniforms and rushed towards the south. Poor residents of Yangzhou panicked and fought among themselves for passage along the way to exit the city gate. Unfortunately, numerous people were trodden to death. During the riot, one official was decapitated by the mob because he was surnamed Huang and mistaken for Huang Qianshan. Knowing the emperor's whereabouts, Lü Yihao and Zhang Jun pursued and met Gaozong at a town near the Yangtze River. They noted the emperor was not being escorted by imperial guards or accompanied by officials of all ranks. Gaozong regretted that he did not adopt the proposal urging him to go to Jiankang 建康 (modern Nanjing city) because Huang Qianshan was against it.91

The Jin army did not catch Gaozong and Song officials, who had already moved to south of the Yangtze River, joining with the emperor. Gaozong summoned officials to decide on the place for their destination. Supreme Commandant (Du Tongzhi 都統制) 王淵 (1077-1129), who was obviously very powerful at the time, suggested the emperor

89 YL, ch. 19, p. 387.
90 Ibid., ch. 20, p. 389.
91 Ibid., ch. 20, p. 390.
to go to Hangzhou 杭州 where the Qiantang 钱塘 River could be used as a blockade. Huang Qianshan conceded. Lü Yihao volunteered to stay in the north bank of the Yangtze to defend against the Jin. Zhu Shengfei and Zhang Jun took the duties of controlling Pingjiangfu 平江府 (modern Wuxian 吴县 of Jiangsu Province) and Xiuzhou 秀州 (modern Jiaxingxian 嘉兴县 of Zhejiang Province). Meanwhile, the Jins remained in Yangzhou. In order to clear the way for peace negotiations, Gaozong, Huang, Wang, and Zhu Shengfei decided to issue an edict to honor Zhang Bangchang and reinstate his family members' status.

On March 5 of 1129, Gaozong arrived at Hangzhou. He issued an edict, the following day, blaming himself and soliciting frank criticisms, a customary practice for an emperor to repent his wrongdoing. Huang, Wang along with other officials submitted official petitions, requesting punishment. As a result, an amnesty was issued but it did not include Li Gang as one of the pardoned people because Huang Qianshan argued that negating Li's amnesty would please the Jins. In fact, the Jin's invasion could not be stopped by negotiations as the situation was favorable to them. However, Huang and Wang still anticipated a peace with the Jins, while at the same time they continued attacking their political enemies in hope of staying in power. After this big setback in Yangzhou for the Song government, people expected Huang and Wang to be punished. However, they brazenly petitioned arguments suggesting that it was too critical a moment for adopting ordinary practice, requesting their resignation after committing grave errors.

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92 YL, ch. 20, pp. 400-1.
They argued that they would plead for resignation only after the peace was restored. Their argument did not convince the emperor and other officials. A few days later, they were accused of committing twenty crimes and were asked to step down from the office. Huang and Wang were demoted to Grand Academician of Guanwen Hall (Guanwendian Daxueshi 觀文殿大學士). Huang was assigned to govern Jiangning 江寧 (modern Nanjing city in Jiangsu Province), Wang was sent to Hongzhou 洪州 (in modern Jiangxi Province) as prefect. Although they were relieved of duties after only two months of joint service as chief councilors, they escaped accountability for greater troubles their career had created for the Song.

Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan began their relations with Gaozong when the emperor was still a prince of undetermined fate. They played close roles as loyal supporters. Gaozong did not initially assign them the most important duties. Appointment of Li Gang to the highest rank because of his reputation was essential for Gaozong to solicit more followers and consolidate his claim as a legitimate ruler. Although Gaozong decided to entrust Li Gang with the most significant job, he never expected to grant him privileges at the expense of other loyal followers headed by Huang and Wang. When he realized Li Gang’s leadership contradicted his attempt to solicit more followers, Gaozong hesitated. Li’s policies against the Jin, on the other hand, could not be accepted by Gaozong because he did not want to risk his life to face a showdown; he preferred to "pacify" his enemies. Huang and Wang witnessed this situation and

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93 YL, ch. 20, p. 402.
94 Ibid., ch. 20, pp. 404-5.
plotted to regain Gaozong's favor. By speculating on the emperor's intention, they disagreed with Li Gang in many issues. However, they themselves provided very few significant alternative plans.

Li's stubborn insistence on all his proposals to be accepted turned out to be a lethal weapon against himself. He ultimately put himself in a situation that forced Gaozong to choose between him and Huang-Wang bloc. When attempting to ease their confrontations by persuading Li Gang to be more amiable, the emperor almost lost his patience. Therefore, it was mainly because of Li's exclusive political stance permitting no compromises that had shortened his career as chief councilor. Li's failure was partially caused by Huang-Wang's opposition, yet it was Gaozong who decided Li's fate. After taking power from Li Gang, Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan had a difficult challenge switching their role from reactionaries to policy makers. To be on the safe side, they first moved the government to Yangzhou where they thought could avoid confrontations with the Jin. Obviously, they had no great plans for the regime. In order to remain in power, they had to silence dissident opinion either by appointing pliant people or removing opponents from office. They had also tried to control censors. But the most significant factor for their holding power was Gaozong's attitude. One critic commented that Huang and Wang had no special talents but they knew how to please Gaozong. Their concealing of intelligence reports of the Jin's invasion was intended to soothe Gaozong's favored attitude of living in a precarious peace. A modern scholar thought that Huang and Wang were given important assignments because they were
familiar with the Huai River's transportation. However, when Gaozong went to south of the Yangtze River, he removed Huang and Wang from office not only because many officials did not support them, but also because they were not familiar with financial condition of the local areas. Thus, they took all the blame for the military setback.96

Nevertheless, Huang and Wang had their ties broken with the emperor when Gaozong fled from Yangzhou without notifying them. Two reasons may account for Gaozong not meeting with Huang and Wang: (1) he feared their advice would urge further delaying for escape, or (2) uncertainty concerning if he would consult with them in a timely manner in face of the crisis situation. Either way demonstrates that Gaozong had lost his trust in them. After the initial demotions, Huang and Wang were further downgraded to a sacrificial post with nominal duties. Two months later, a censor's impeachment caused Huang to be demoted to Vice Military Training Commissioner (Tuanlian Fushi 團練副使) and Wang, Vice Military Commissioner (Jiedu Fushi 節度副使).97 When Yuan Zhi 袁植, a Remonstrator (Sijian 司諫), pleaded to demote Wang and execute Huang and nine other people, Gaozong replied, with sympathy, that he also blamed himself and would not ascribe the failure solely to high ranking officials. He removed Yuan from his office and assigned him a duty away from the court. Soon afterwards, Huang Qianshan died in Meizhou 梅州 (in modern Guangdong Province).98 Wang Boyan, on the other hand, never returned to the court again.

95 Zheng Xiang 鄭賢, Gujin renwulun 古今人物論, p. 2299.
96 Liu Tzu-chien 劉子健, Liang Songshi yanjiu huibian 劇宋史研究彙編, p. 32.
97 YL, ch. 23, p. 481.
98 Ibid., ch. 24, pp. 497-8.
On the personal level, Gaozong had appreciated Huang and Wang's support when ascending the throne. In a later time, he recalled the difficult moments he shared with Wang. When he was informed of Zhang Bangchang's usurpation, Gaozong admitted that he had to rely on Huang to arrange everything for him. On the level of state affairs, Gaozong preferred policies that Huang and Wang proposed, which were conservative and evasive rather than Li Gang's aggressive and risky approach. When Huang and Wang both assumed the position of chief councilor, Gaozong delivered his best wishes and full trust. Had the Jin not invaded so fast or Huang and Wang been capable of managing imminent crisis, Gaozong would not have fired them. In conclusion, they had earned the emperor's trust but failed at their jobs. After they left office, Gaozong summoned Zhu Shengfei back to the court and appointed him Chief Councilor of the Right (Shangshu You Puye 尚書右僕射).

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100 Historians who study history concerning the performance of Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan may wonder why they were able to help Gaozong to ascend the throne in adverse circumstances. However, they seemed to be very careless in dealing with state affairs, especially when the Song faced the imminent threat from the Jin invaders. Whether there was any bias against Huang and Wang in historical records remains unanswered. Until new evidence emerges, we have to accept the fact that Huang and Wang failed in their duty as chief councilors.
Chapter Three: Zhu Shengfei 朱勝非 (1082-1144) I: An Outstanding Mediator

Zhu Shengfei, styled Cangyi 藏一, came from Caizhou 蔡州 (in modern Henan Province). In the second year of Chongning 崇寧 (ca. 1106), he earned his jinshi degree. In 1126, he assumed the duty of Vice Area Commander-in-chief of the East Circuit (Dongdao Fu Zongguan 東道副總管), and Provisional Prefect of Yingtianfu 應天府 (in modern Henan Province). When the Jins attacked he fled. The next year, Zhu went to Jizhou 濟州 (in modern Shandong Province) to join Prince Kang. He urged the Prince to ascend the throne in Nanjing 南京 because it was the place where Song Taizu 宋太祖 (r. 960-975), the founder of the dynasty, rose up to build the Song. In 1127, he was promoted as Acting Secretariat Drafter (Shi Zhongshu Sheren 試中書舍人) and concurrently Provisional Auxiliary Hanlin Academician (Quan Zhixueshiyuan 權直學士院). Zhu specialized in drafting and had retained his writing style as if the country was in a time of peace. Gaozong had once praised his writings. According to the Song shi 宋史 (dynastic history of the Song), Zhu performed his duty well and dared to present frank statements. In 1128, he was assigned to Assistant Director of the Right of Department of State Affairs (Shangshu Youcheng 尚書右丞). At that time, chief councilors and vice chief councilors abused the system of Protection (Yin 薪), promoting many of their children and relatives. By citing precedents and the old system, Zhu reported the corrupt practice to the emperor and pleaded for a stop to it. He was later promoted to Vice Minister of Secretariat (Zhongshu Shilang 中書侍郎). In 1129, Gaozong assigned Zhu as Controlling Commissioner (Kongeshi 控扼使) and soon
afterwards he was promoted to the rank of Grand Master for Court Service (Xuanfeng Dafu 宣奉大夫), becoming Chief Councilor of the Right (Shangshu You Puye 尚書右僕射) and concurrently held the position of Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment (Yuyingshi 御營使).\(^{101}\)

To respond to a duty call from the emperor, Zhu Shengfei left Pingjiangfu 平江府 for the court and took up the new appointment. He received an unusual honor, a five-ranked promotion, different from the ordinary three-ranked advancement for an official to be appointed as chief councilor.\(^{102}\) Upon assuming the duty, Zhu removed one of his opponents, Ye Mengde, who was then Assistant Director of the Right of Department of State Affairs. Gaozong realized Ye's specialty was finance and assigned him Superintendent of Ministry of Revenue's Monies (Tiling Hubu Caiyong 提領戶部財用). Ye did not accept this new job and left the court. Meanwhile, Zhu accepted Zhang Jun's suggestion and planned to emulate the precedent set up by Taizu 太祖, to institute the place where the emperor was located as the capital: north of Huai River as Frontier Forts (fanfang 藩方), south of Huai River as Prefectures and Districts (Junxian 郡縣). This was the initial blueprint for Zhu's administration; however, it had never been carried out due to too much interfering.\(^{103}\) In fact, his performance in his first term as chief councilor was overshadowed by a military coup that almost placed the regime on the brink of destruction, occurring only four days after he took office.

\(^{101}\) SS, ch. 362, pp. 11315-6.
\(^{102}\) YL, ch. 21, p. 411.
\(^{103}\) Ibid., ch. 21, pp. 413-4.
This famous military coup, later referred to by historians as "Miao Liu zhībian" (A military coup initiated by Miao and Liu)\(^{104}\), took place quite suddenly, leaving Gaozong and his followers unprepared to deal with it; it was mainly precipitated by the court appointing Wang Yuan 王淵 (1077-1129) as Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Qianshu Shumiyuanshi 簽書樞密院事). Military Training Commissioner Miao Fu 苗傅 (?-1129) and Regional Commander (Cishi 刺史) Liu Zhengyan 劉正彦 (?-1129), who headed the only forces protecting Gaozong, resented Wang Yuan's appointment. For Miao, Wang's sudden rise to promise was not fair; Liu was angered because he received only meager awards. They both hated Kang Lü 康履 (?-1129), head of eunuchs, who was corrupt and lived a hedonistic life. Miao and Liu convinced other military commanders to join them for the coup. Upon learning of the military men's rancor over Wang's appointment, Zhu informed Gaozong. As a result, Wang Yuan was ordered not to be involved in the Bureau of Military Affairs. This change did not stop Miao and others from executing their plot. They killed Wang Yuan, slaughtered many eunuchs, and proceeded to the palace where Gaozong was located. Miao Fu complained to the emperor that Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan had caused great damage to the country but they were not banished to remote areas; Wang Yuan did not fight the enemies when they were encountered, yet he received an advancement because he had been associated with Kang Lü. Miao claimed that he had rendered distinguished service but only received the position of Military Training Commissioner.

He told Gaozong that he had killed Wang and many eunuchs, and requested Kang Lü and other two eunuchs be executed. Gaozong argued that eunuchs who committed crimes should be banished to remote islands and urged Miao and his troops to return to their camps. Miao disagreed with the emperor by insisting on killing the three eunuchs. In order to calm down their anger, Gaozong proposed he had promoted Miao and Liu the positions of Supreme Commandant (Du Tongzhi 都統制) and Vice Supreme Commandant respectively, while pardoned all soldiers who were involved in the uprising. Miao Fu did not accept the proposal and insisted on punishing Kang and others. Gaozong conceded.\(^{105}\)

Miao and others previously uttered disrespectful remarks claiming that Gaozong unrightfully ascended the throne and would face a difficult situation if Qinzong later returned to the Song. This rebellious message shocked the emperor. After Kang Lü was killed, Gaozong sent Zhu Shengfei to negotiate with the rebels. Miao requested Empress Dowager Longyou 隆祐 jointly rule the country, and send envoys to the Jin for peace negotiations. Gaozong promised to ask the empress dowager to rule from behind the screen and had an edict delivered to Miao on this point. Miao refused to respect the edict, and claimed there was an heir apparent who could be the emperor. Miao declared there was already a precedent of Huizong's abdication to Qinzong. Officials were stunned by Miao's excessive request and had to decide on a solution to salvage Gaozong's dignity and safety from the crisis. Zhu Shengfei suggested that the empress dowager talk

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to the rebels in order to learn their real intention. In a granted audience, Miao and Liu pleaded with the empress dowager to advocate for the people's welfare. The empress dowager blamed the officials appointed by Huizong for the setback caused by the Jin. To her, Gaozong was sacred and obedient (shengxiao 聖孝) and had not committed any errors; he was merely misled by Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan who had already been banished. In spite of the empress dowager's advice, Miao insisted that Gaozong's son should succeed the throne and argued the point with the empress dowager. Zhu Shengfei could not find a way out of this dilemma, so Gaozong was forced to yield to Miao's request and abdicated. Embarrassed by this situation, Zhu volunteered to sacrifice himself to confront the rebels. Gaozong disagreed. Instead he ordered Zhu to use four principles to restrain Miao Fu: (1) respect the emperor (Gaozong), (2) follow orders from the empress dowager and the succeeding emperor, (3) return the soldiers back to their camps, and (4) forbid killing and arson by soldiers. Gaozong promised to step down immediately if Miao Fu accepted these four terms. When Zhu Shengfei went down to negotiate with Miao's staff members, he received important advice from Wang Junfu 王鉉 who said that Miao and Liu were loyal but not intelligent. Zhu met with Gaozong and the empress dowager to discuss how to eliminate the rebels' suspicion in order to allow officials to see the empress dowager alone. As a result, Miao Fu was the first one granted an audience.

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105 YL, ch. 21, pp. 416-7
106 Ibid., ch. 21, pp. 418-9.
107 Ibid., ch. 21, pp. 420-1.
Meanwhile, an amnesty was issued and delivered to Pingjiangfu where Zhang Jun was assigned to control the army. Soon afterwards, Lü Yihao, who was then in Jiangning, and Zhang Jun were both informed of Miao's rebellion. They decided to summon other military forces to rescue the emperor. Meanwhile, Zhu Shengfei had convinced Wang Junfu as an "inside man" to help him, while Zhu himself had continued to deal with Miao Fu and his followers. Miao Fu requested the reign title to be changed and Liu Zhengyan urged the court to be moved to Jiankang 建康. After consulting with the empress dowager, Zhu and the court compromised with the rebels and changed the reign title from Jianyan to Mingshou 明受, but rejected the proposal of moving the court to Jiankang because its defense was not prepared. On the other hand, Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan were banished to Hengzhou 衢州 and Yongzhou 永州 respectively. During this time, Zhang Jun sent Feng Fan 馮轡 to deliver a message to Gaozong, as well as Miao and Liu. Zhang urged Gaozong to handle important affairs by himself, and asked Miao and Liu to change their mind and not to be stubborn. Meanwhile, Zhang Jun, Lü Yihao and Liu Guangshi 劉光世 (1089-1142) agreed to meet at Pingjiangfu to attempt the rescue of Gaozong. They were later joined by Zhang Zun 張俊 (1086-1154) and Han Shizhong 韓世忠 (1089-1151). In Hangzhou 杭州, Feng Fan continued his negotiations with Miao and Liu for restoration of Gaozong's emperorship. Miao, on the other hand, invited Zhang Jun to Hangzhou for face-to-face
talks. In the meantime, Lü Yihao left Jiangning with 10,000 crack troops and headed toward Hangzhou.

Zhang Jun later sent another letter warning Miao Fu and others that dethroning the emperor would be punished by decapitation. Upon receiving this letter, Miao Fu identified Zhang Jun as the culprit responsible for gathering people against him and decided to kill Zhang. Zhu Shengfei refused to comply with Miao on this matter and tried to convince him only to remove Zhang's military command and turn it over to Lü Yihao. Miao conceded and had an edict sent demoting Zhang Jun to Vice Military Training Commissioner and ordering him to be sent directly to the new post. When Gaozong heard about this information, he spilled the soup he was drinking.¹¹²

A few days later, Zhang Jun met with Lü Yihao near Pingjiangfu. They first burst into tears and then discussed the rescue plans and agreed to risk even their whole families for this high cause.¹¹³ Facing this imminent threat, Miao and Liu summoned Feng Fan to talk about the restoration of Gaozong's position. Feng reported this new development to Zhu Shengfei and suggested that the country should be ruled on horseback (mashang zhizhi 马上治之) during the current difficult times. Feng recommended that (1) Qin zong be placed at the center, (2) since Gaozong had been assigned as Grand Marshal, his title should be retained, (3) the crown prince should be named Royal Nephew (Huangtaizhi 皇太侄), and (4) Empress Dowager Longyou should continue her rule from behind the screen. Zhu ordered Feng to negotiate this proposal with Miao and Liu.

¹¹² YL, ch. 21, p. 443.
They both agreed and Zhu was pleased. Thus, an edict was announced chiefly explaining that the continuous war ravages were due to the enemies thinking Gaozong unrightfully ascended the throne. He should keep his title as Grand Marshal, the incumbent emperor should be called Royal Nephew and Regent (Jianguo 監國), and the empress dowager ruled the government. The purpose for abdication, as the edict declared, was to cease wars by all means available. However, the edict was not announced beyond the court due to objections by some officials, the compromise between Miao, Liu and the Song court had been reached. But, it did not stop the progress of the rescuing armies.

Lü Yihao and Zhang Jun decided to march their troops forward with Han Shizhong as a vanguard aided by Zhang Zun, with Liu Guangshi's personal chosen troops as guerillas, Lü Yihao and Zhang Jun at the center, and Liu Guangshi in the rear. Lü and Zhang Jun proclaimed a manifesto praising the Song emperors for earning the people's support blaming Tong Guan 童貫 (1054-1126), a prominent eunuch in the end of northern Song who advocated cooperation with the Jins, for bringing ravages and foreign invasions. They condemned Miao and Liu for dethroning the emperor and indulging in killing, and called up people of all sides to support their action in entreating Gaozong to resume his rule. In order to encourage Zhang Jun for his leadership, the empress

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112 YL, ch. 21, p. 448.
114 Ibid., ch. 21, p. 449.
115 Ibid., ch. 21, pp. 453-4.
116 Ibid., ch. 21, p. 451.
dowager and Zhu Shengfei managed to promote him to Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Tongzhi Shumiyuanshi 同 知 框 密 院 事).\textsuperscript{117}

Meanwhile, Zhu Shengfei summoned Miao and Liu to negotiate the emperor's restoration. Proofreader (Zhengzi 正 字) Feng Ji 堯 機 (?-1052) presented a letter to Miao and Liu saying that Zhang Jun was approaching the court from Pingjiang and pleaded for Gaozong to be Grand Marshal; however, his real intention was to restore Gaozong's position as emperor. Appointment as Grand Marshal was only the first step towards the restoration of emperorship. If Gaozong assumed the duty again, Feng argued, Miao could not disobey his orders; moreover, he would be placed in the predicament of committing the crime of dethroning the emperor while other people gained merits by attempting restoring the throne. Miao and Liu agreed to this argument and negotiated with Zhu Shengfei for the details of restoration.\textsuperscript{118}

The military pressure from outside and the cajolery inside the court made Miao and Liu humble themselves in front of the emperor. Gaozong promised to forgive them and sent his personally written decree (shouzhao 手 詔) to Han Shizhong explaining that Miao's and Liu's intention was actually for the country, urging Han to attend to the harmony and security for the country. After receiving the decree, Han Shizhong sent a warning that restoration of the emperor's position must be carried out immediately or he would fight for it until death. Miao Fu and others were all horrified by this warning.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117} YL, ch. 21, p. 455.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., ch. 21, pp. 456-7.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., ch. 21, p. 459.
On April 20 of 1129, Zhu Shengfei reported their decision to restore Gaozong's position; moreover, it was approved by the empress dowager. Gaozong, on the other hand, refused to accept it initially, but later he insisted on ruling the country jointly with the empress dowager, who also agreed to this proposal. As a result of this transition, the empress dowager's title was changed from Taihou 太后 (Empress Dowager) to Huangtaihou 皇太后 (Imperial Empress Dowager) designating legitimacy and honor. The crown prince's title was changed to Heir Apparent (Huangtaizi 皇太子). Officials urged restoring immediately the amnesty issued when Gaozong was forced to step down. Two days later, the reign title was changed back to Jianyan.\textsuperscript{120}

Meanwhile, Han Shizhong and his army had reached Hangzhou and defeated Miao's forces in their initial contacts. Both sides were later locked in a stalemate. Seeing the situation unfavorable to them, Miao and Liu requested Gaozong to deliver an oath to guarantee their safety. The prefect of Hangzhou urged Zhu Shengfei to demand Miao and Liu leave with their troops to avoid further confrontations. Miao and Liu fled with 2,000 crack troops in the evening.\textsuperscript{121} The next day, the empress dowager "removed the screen" (chelian 散 簾) and Lü Yihao and Zhang Jun led the rescue army entering the Hangzhou city.

Zhu Shengfei pleaded to resign, and upon Gaozong's request he commented on Lü Yihao and Zhang Jun, the two potential candidates for his replacement. Zhu described Lü as experienced but rude; Zhang liked to volunteer for work but was negligent.

\textsuperscript{120} YL, ch. 21, pp. 463-5.
Gaozong himself thought Zhang Jun, then 32 years old, was too young for the job. Zhu praised Zhang, a former colleague, for his management of military and financial affairs and the major role he played in the rescue mission. Soon afterwards, Zhu Shengfei, with only thirty-three days as chief councilor, was removed from his office and assigned to Hongzhou (in modern Jiangxi Province) as prefect. Three years later, thanks to Lü Yihao's recommendation, he returned to the court. Zhu's performance in his second term will be discussed in another chapter.

As mentioned before, Zhu's first term of chief councilor was overshadowed by the military coup initiated by Miao Fu and Liu Zhengyan. We now turn our attention to the coup itself and its consequences. Although Miao and Liu were both executed three months later, their rebellion caused great impact on Gaozong's thinking and his political orientations. This impact will be further revealed from studying the interactions between Gaozong and his chief councilors discussed in the following chapters. Before doing that, we need to understand why and how the coup started. Let us return to the time when Gaozong fled from Yangzhou. With the regime facing a crisis of disintegration, the Song court made a number of arrangements spreading out military commanders to key posts in order to strengthen its defense against the Jin invasion, leaving only Miao Fu's army to escort Gaozong. This was the prerequisite condition for the coup to be created. Had Gaozong been surrounded by other generals or officials

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121 YL, ch. 22, pp. 466-7.
122 Ibid., ch. 22, p. 469.
with military forces, Miao and Liu would have restrained their ambitious actions. Historical records suggest that the coup was not well planned beforehand and the rebels seemed to act very spontaneously. They did have slogans and proposals to support their actions, but they were not aware how far they might have gone. The coup itself was totally reactionary. It demonstrated and vented the anger of military men led by Miao and Liu against Wang Yuan and the eunuchs. Both previous setbacks against the Jins and the sufferings these military men had to endure, (e.g. separation with their families), were aggravated by the Song court's unsympathetic attitude towards them. The unequal distribution of rewards and the carefree lifestyle the eunuchs had enjoyed gave Miao, Liu and their followers another incentive to rebel. All the rancor evolved into actions challenging Gaozong’s legitimacy as their emperor. The antipathy against the emperor and his regime originated also from their disillusion with the emperor's ability to deal with the Jins either through military means or negotiations. The coup had taught the emperor an important lesson in leadership: military men, without proper restraints, could become a rampant and lethal threat to his rule. The civil officials, on the other hand, were relatively more reliable and consistent with their loyalty. Despite this distinction, Gaozong realized that he had to rely on no one but himself to consolidate his leadership after experiencing challenges to his legitimate position and objections to his policies by his followers.\footnote{YL, ch. 20, p. 399.} Aforementioned issues emergent during the time of the coup formed good instruction why Gaozong could not count on his title as emperor to guarantee his rule.
Zhu Shengfei had played an important role in managing crises during the coup. He kept Gaozong and the empress dowager fully informed of the rebels' intention and their every move. He imposed pressures on Miao and Liu's lieutenants, who later helped him to end the coup in only one month. Without provoking violence, Zhu negotiated with the rebels and provided rational options. For example, he rejected the court's being moved to Jiankang but compromised with the rebels for changing the reign title.\textsuperscript{127} Nevertheless, his loyalty to the emperor was tainted by the controversial proposal, initiated by Zhang Jun's lobbyist Feng Fan, which intended to lower Gaozong's position from Emperor to Grand Marshal. Zhu Shengfei and some officials agreed to this proposal, causing great embarrassment for the emperor.\textsuperscript{128} Not only Gaozong's legitimacy to the throne was challenged by military men, it was also used to bargain with the rebels by civil officials, including the chief councilor. After the coup ended, Zhu hoped his resignation could diminish the punishment he had anticipated for his responsibility in the coup. In addition, the proposal he had agreed to, which was to lower Gaozong's position as an emperor, was strongly opposed by the Censor-in-chief, who was expected to strike a heavy blow on Zhu for his blunder. Gaozong ultimately accepted Zhu Shengfei's resignation and allowed him to leave the power center unscathed. His administration lasted only thirty-three days. Gaozong chose Lü Yihao, one of the two people recommended by Zhu, as the succeeding chief councilor.

\textsuperscript{126} Hsu Ping-yu, "You Miao-Liu zhibian kan Nan Song chuqi de junquan", p. 36.  
\textsuperscript{127} YL, ch. 21, pp. 427-9.  
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., ch. 21, p. 449.
Chapter Four: Lü Yihao 呂頤浩 (1071-1139) I: A Sophisticated Bureaucrat

Lü Yihao, styled Yuanzhi 元直, was originally from Leling 楚陵 (in modern Hebei Province) and his family later moved to Jizhou 濟州 (in modern Shandong Province). In 1095, he received his jinshi degree and was subsequently assigned to Beijing as District Defender (Xianwei 縣尉) of Chengan 成安, and later promoted to Revenue Manager (Sihu 司户) of Mizhou 密州 (in modern Shandong Province). Recommended by Li Qingchen 李清臣 (1032-1102), then Vice Director of the Chancellery (Menxia Shilang 門下侍郎), Lü received a new assignment to Binzhou 郅州 (in modern Shaanxi Province) as Instructor (Jiaoshou 教授). Six years later, Lü was appointed Erudite of School for Imperial Family (Zongzi Boshi 宗子博士). Afterwards, he had assumed the duties of Prefect of Yananfu 延安府 (in modern Shaanxi Province), Tea and Salt Supervisor of Liang Zhe (Liang Zhe Tijuchayan 餘浙提舉茶鹽), Stabilization Fund Supervisorate of East Circuit of Hebei (Tiju Hebeidonglu Changping 提舉河北東路常平), Administrative Assistant of Fiscal Commission of Hebei (Hebei Zhuanyun Panguan 河北轉運判官). Still later, he was appointed as Vice Minister of Imperial Treasury (Taifu Shaoqing 太府少卿), Auxiliary Academician (Zhixueshi 直學士), Vice Commissioner of Fiscal Commission of Hebei (Hebei Zhuanyun Fushi 河北轉運副使), Edict Attendant (Daizhi 待制), Fiscal Commissioner-in-chief (Du Zhuanyunshi 都轉運使).129

129 SS, ch. 362, p. 11319; Ma Guangzu 馬光祖, Jingding Jiankangzhi 景定建康志 in Song Yuan fangzhi congkan 宋元方志叢刊 v. 2, p. 1483.
In 1122, the Song took advantage of Liao's defeat by the Jins, sending an expeditionary army to Yan (in modern Hebei Province) hoping to recover lost territories they had hoped to regain. Lū Yihao followed the army and provided logistic needs for the 20,000 troops under the Liao general Guo Yaoshi, who had recently surrendered to the Song, and a Liao army of 10,000 people. Lū was appointed Fiscal Commissioner of Yanshanfu (modern Beijing). Lū reported to the emperor five urgent matters, pleading to have them discussed by the Three Departments. Huizong was angry and removed Lū's official title but allowed him to continue his duty as Fiscal Commissioner with the army he currently served. In 1124, when the Jin army invaded Pingzhou (in modern Rehe Province), Huizong recalled Lū's official petition and had him reinstated, even promoting him Auxiliary Academician of Huiyou Hall (Huiyouge Zhixueshi). When the Jins invaded Yan, Guo Yaoshi abducted Lū and others to surrender to the Jins. After the peace negotiation between the Song and the Jin was completed, Lū and others were returned. The court resumed his post as Commissioner-in-chief of Hebei. However, he declined the appointment because he was ill, and instead received a duty as Supervisor of the Chongfu Temple (Chongfu Gong), a sinecure position usually awarded to a retired high ranking official.\(^{130}\)

After Gaozong ascended the throne, Lū was appointed prefect of Yangzhou. When Gaozong arrived in Yangzhou, Lū was granted an audience and appointed Vice Minister of the Ministry of Revenue (Hubu Shilang) and concurrently prefect

\(^{130}\) SS, ch. 362, pp. 11319-20; Ma Guangzu, Jingding Jiankangzhi, pp. 1483-5.
of Yangzhou. On February 28, 1129, Lü and Han Shizhong demanded that a notorious bandit, Zhang Yu, surrender to the government. They went into the bandits' stockade (zhai 寨) by themselves and captured the strategist and had twenty-nine lower ranked leaders executed. The bandits were reorganized and put under Han's command. Six days later Lü was promoted to Minister of the Ministry of Revenue (Hubu Shangshu 戶部尚書). During his term, Lü institutionalized the so-called Jingzhiqian 經制錢, a tax revenue which he believed would be helpful for the state's income yet not harmful to people in general. On November 24 of 1129, Lü was transferred to Minister of the Ministry of Personnel (Libu Shangshu 吏部尚書) and his previous suggestion that the imperial treasure be moved to south of the Yangtze River was not carried out.

When the Jins invaded north China and the area was infested with bandits, Lü presented ten major proposals pertaining to national defense. The court assigned Lü and Zhang Jun to train troops from north of the Yellow River. Later the Jin's invasion approached Yangzhou, whereupon Lü was ordered to manage the defense between the Yangtze and Huai Rivers. When Gaozong desperately fled from Yangzhou, Lü and Zhang Jun caught up with him at Guazhouzhen 瓜州鎮 (in modern Jiangsu Province) and found the emperor escorted by no guards or officials. Gaozong later gathered officials in Jiangning and discussed their future destination, Lü volunteered to stay there.

131 SS, ch. 121, p. 11320.
132 YL, ch. 12, p. 277.
133 Ibid., ch. 18, p. 358.
134 Ibid., ch. 18, p. 364.
135 Ibid., ch. 18, pp. 377-8.
to provide moral support for people in north of the Yangtze.\textsuperscript{136} Lü was rewarded a special promotion as Grand Academician of the Hall for Aid in Governance (Zizhengdian Daxueshi 資政殿大學士) and Military Commissioner of Jiang, Huai (Jiang Huai Zhizhishi 江淮制置使). Eight days later when following the emperor, Lü was appointed Associate Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Tong Qianshu Shumiyuanshi 同簽樞密院事) and a concurrent duty as Military Commissioner of Jiang and Huai and Liang Zhe (Jiang Huai Liang Zhe Zhizhishi 江淮兩浙制置使) but his title of Grand Academician was reduced to Academician only.\textsuperscript{137} At that time, the Song court worried about the Jin crossing the Yangtze River and deployed nearly all available troops to significant posts for defense. Consequently, Gaozong was protected only by Miao Fu's army.

When stationing in Zhenjiang (in modern Jiangsu Province), Lü Yihao crossed the Yangtze River to collect tax revenue when he learned of the Jin's retreat. One week later, he reported to the court that Yangzhou was recovered. This performance brought him another promotion, Military Commissioner of East Circuit of Jiangnan (Jiangnan Donglu Anfú Zhizhishi 江南东路安撫制置使) and concurrently Prefect of Jiangningfu 江寧府.\textsuperscript{138} The military coup initiated by Miao Fu and Liu Zhengyan shocked everyone including Lü Yihao, who was informed by his son of this crisis news. When he received the amnesty announcement from the court concerning Gaozong's abdication, Lü speculated about the possibility of a mutiny and secretly sneaked into

\textsuperscript{136} YL, ch. 20, pp. 390-2.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., ch. 20, p. 393 & 399.
Hangzhou to spy on the rebels. He wrote letters to Zhang Jun, Liu Guangshi and requested them to join his forces to save the throne. When Lü met with Zhang Jun personally, he expressed his heroic sentiment by saying that if the action was not smooth the worst expectation would merely be the death for his whole family. He revealed to Zhang his past experience that eunuchs plotted to have him killed when he remonstrated for the border issues; moreover, when he took charge of Fiscal Commission, he encountered an extremely distressed situation that nearly cost his whole family's lives when crossing the Yangtze. Lü told Zhang that it would be a pleasant thing to die for the country. Zhang Jun praised his remarks and they jointly drafted a manifesto to condemn the rebels. Ultimately, Gaozong resumed his emperorship and the rebellion was suppressed. The success of the rescue mission was indebted to Lü Yihao and Zhang Jun for their joint efforts in leading other commanders and planning well in advance. On April 25 of 1129, Zhu Shengfei resigned and Lü Yihao took his place as the chief councilor and concurrently Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment. Following Zhu's precedent, Lü was also promoted five ranks to Grand Master for Court Service (Xuanfeng Dafu 宣奉大夫).

One week after assuming the office, Lü Yihao proposed to change the institution of chief councilors and vice chief councilors by citing a previous request of Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086) to combine the Three Departments. As a result of this change, all chief councilors (Left and Right) were added the title of Jointly Manager of Affairs with

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139 Ibid., ch. 21, pp. 423-5.
the Secretariat-Chancellery (Tong Zhongshu Menxia Pingzhangshi 同中書門下平章事). The positions of Vice Director of the Chancellery (Menxia Shilang 門下侍郎) and Vice Director of the Secretariat (Zhongshu Shilang 中書侍郎) which chief councilors had held concurrently were converted into Participant in Determining Governmental Affairs (Canzhi Zhengshi 參知政事), an equivalent of vice chief councilors. The titles of Assistant Director of the Left and Right of Department of State Affairs (Shangshu Zuoyoucheng 尚書左右丞) were removed from the system of civil service. The chief councilors still held the duty of Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment.\(^{142}\)

To decide on the lodging place for the emperor, Lü Yihao had an agreement with Zhang Jun to escort Gaozong to Wuchang (in modern Hubei Province), half way to the final destination in Shaanxi. They also intended to move people from the Central Plain (north China) to the southeast. Teng Kang (1085-1132), then Grand Master of the Left of the Remonstrance Bureau (Zuo Jianyi Dafu 左諌議大夫), and Censor-in-chief Zhang Shou were both against this proposal. They claimed that southeast China was the foundation of the country. If Gaozong left for a remote place then ambitious scoundrels would scheme to take over the place they were located. Besides, most soldiers were from Shaanxi, and would be glad to have the emperor live in their hometown. This proposal, as Teng and Zhang Shou described, was not for the emperor or the country but for the military men themselves. Gaozong consented to their argument.

\(^{140}\) SS, ch. 121, p. 11321. YL, ch. 21, p. 448.
\(^{141}\) YL, ch. 22, pp. 469-70.
\(^{142}\) Ibid., ch. 22, pp. 474-5. Li Xinchuan 李心傳 provides a concise report of the institutional changes of the chief councilors. See his Jianyan yilai chaoye zaji 建炎以來朝野雜記, v. 1, ch. 10, p. 121.
and promoted Teng Kang to Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs and denied the proposal of moving the court to the west.\textsuperscript{143} Lü Yihao, under pressure from scholar-officials of the Jiang 江 and Zhe 浙 areas, also changed his mind after Zhang Jun left.\textsuperscript{144}

Later on, Gaozong summoned military commanders to discuss where the court should move. Zhang Zun and Xin Qizong 张春宗 urged the emperor to proceed from Yue 湖 (in modern Hubei Province), E 鄂 (in modern Hubei Province) to Changsha 长沙 (in modern Hunan Province). Han Shizhong objected to this suggestion and argued that the country had lost Hebei and Shandong. If the Song also abandoned the Jiang-Huai region then the country would have no territories. Having been distressed by Zhang's idea of withdrawal, Gaozong said to Lü Yihao that Zhang and Xin wanted to retreat to Hunan because they did not dare fight the Jins. The Jins, as Gaozong evaluated, relied on their outnumbered horsemen; however, if the number of cavalry was too great they could not rush around in Zhejiang area, a place full of lakes and rivers. Besides, if the morale of the Song forces was shaken, Gaozong argued that even Chuan 川 (i.e. Sichuan 四川, the west end of the Song) and Guang 廣 (the south end of the Song) would not be safe places for retreat.\textsuperscript{145}

Lü Yihao reported that the Jins used any place that Gaozong was located as the national boundary. In order to escort the emperor to a safe place, Lü suggested to fight and retreat at the same time. He volunteered to stay in Chang 常 (in modern Jiangsu

\textsuperscript{143} YL, ch. 23, p. 481 & 483.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., ch. 27, p. 529.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., ch. 27, p. 532.
Province) and Run 潮 (previous Zhenjiang, in modern Jiangsu Province) to defend till the last man. Gaozong disagreed because he needed the chief councilor to accompany him. As a result, the Song decided to deploy their defending armies along the Yangtze River, so defense of the Huai River was abandoned. Du Chong 杜充 (?-ca. 1140), a future chief councilor, was assigned to deploy his forces in Jiankang 建康 (previously Jiangning), Han Shizhong assumed defensive duty of Zhenjiang, and Liu Guangshi was responsible for Taiping 太平 (in modern Anhui Province) and Chizhou 池州 (in modern Anhui Province). 146

Soon afterwards, Lü Yihao advanced to Chief Councilor of the Left (Zuo Puye 左僕射) and Du Chong, then Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Tongzhi Shumiyuanshi 同知樞密院事), was promoted to Chief Councilor of the Right (You Puye 右僕射); they both received the title of Jointly Manager of Affairs with the Secretariat-Chancellery along with concurrent duty as Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment. 147 Two days later, Du Chong received another concurrent post of Pacification Commissioner of Jiang and Huai (Jiang Huai Xuanfushi 江淮宣撫使) and led 100,000 Mobile Brigade (Xingying 行營) troops to defend Jiankang. 148

Du Chong was not a good commander, while Liu Guangshi and Han Shizhong were both afraid of his harsh leadership. Liu wrote an official report to the emperor explaining why Du Chong could not assume the duty as a military commander.

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146 YL, ch. 27, p. 532.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., ch. 27, p. 549.
Meanwhile, Du Chong took killing as a daily routine and presented no plans for defense. Despite Liu's opposition, Gaozong supported Du and tried to convince Liu to accept Du's leadership. When some officials suggested that Han Shizhong be promoted to a higher post to assume more duties, Gaozong rejected this recommendation in that he worried Han might later compete with Du for the upper hand. Lü Yihao meanwhile volunteered to stay in Pingjiang (in modern Jiangsu Province) to supervise military commanders who had been in charge of the defense, but Gaozong still refused to allow Lü to leave the court.

Two months later, the Jin army under the command of Wanyan Zongbi and the rebel general Li Cheng invaded Wujiang (in modern Anhui Province), a district very close to Taiping (one of Liu Guangshi's defended areas). Some intelligence reports prompted Du Chong to send troops to attack Li Cheng. Realizing arrival of the Jin army, Du deployed 6,000 troops along the south bank of the Yangtze while he stayed behind the secure gate! Seeing that the Song had no unified command, the Jins found a loophole and crossed the River. Du sent Yue Fei and others to fight the Jins. Four days later, Du's military force disintegrated. Upon hearing the reports of defeat, Du tried to rush out of Jiankang but was blocked by the residents. He managed to leave the city the next day, and cross the Yangtze River to the north bank with only 3,000 personal troops. Two days later, the

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149 YL, ch. 27, p. 551.
150 Ibid., ch. 28, p. 553.
151 Ibid., ch. 28, p. 554.
152 Ibid., ch. 29, p. 574.
report of Du's debacle came to the court and worried Gaozong. At this moment, Lü Yihao suggested the emperor escape to the sea to avoid the Jin attack. Moreover, as Lü indicated, the emperor could soon return from the sea because the hot weather in Jiang-Zhe areas would forbid the Jins to stay long. Lü acclaimed the strategy of "they enter we leave; they leave we enter" (bīrú wǒchū; bǐchū wǒrù 彼入我出；彼出我入) as marvelous. After pondering for a while, Gaozong consented and asked Lü to deliberate among his group, hold a meeting, and then summon attendants and censors for more detailed discussion. Gaozong rushed back to his palace in the following day.

Lü assembled a meeting to discuss whether the plan he proposed to the emperor was feasible. One official objected to it, claiming that throughout Chinese history there was never a restoring ruler that boarded a boat in humiliation. Other officials argued that the sea route should not be given up in case there was no other plans. Previously, Attendant Censor (Shiyushi 侍御史) Zhao Ding 趙鼎 (1085-1147), a future chief councilor, also suggested avoiding confrontations with the Jins. In the evening of the same day, Lü reported their discussion to Gaozong; in turn, the emperor decided to give it a try, ordering Lü to search for boats. Lü Yihao proposed that officials below the rank of Attendants leave at their own free will. Gaozong disagreed, arguing that scholar-officials should know the principle of "following their emperor" or the emperor would be like a bandit wherever he went. Many officials below the rank of Langguan 郎官 (unofficial reference to the Director of a Bureau or sometimes Vice Minister in a Ministry) stayed in

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154 Ibid., ch. 29, pp. 578-9.
Yue or returned to their homes. Because Fan Zongyin, then Censor-in-chief and a future chief councilor, and Zhao Ding, then Attendant Censor, both agreed to escape from the enemy's pursuit, Fan was promoted to Vice Chief Councilor and Zhao advanced to Acting Censor-in-chief. Fan also received concurrent appointment as Probationary Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Quan ShumiYuanshi 權樞密院事) because that Bureau had been presided by only one official. 

On January 20 of 1130, the Song established rules for its marine navigation; every boat carried sixty guards, and each could only take two other people aboard. The guards complained that they were forced to choose company between parents and wife. As a result, over one hundred of them blocked Lü Yihao's way when inquiring of their destination. Because of their rude attitude, Lü furiously demanded to know from them if they would die for the country or not. Witnessing the guards attempted to kill Lü, Fan Zongyin helped him by guiding him to enter the palace gate and immediately shut it securely. Gaozong ordered Lü to ambush these guards: ultimately their leader was executed and the rest imprisoned.

On January 26 of 1130, Gaozong boarded a large turreted boat at Dinghai 定海 (a district near the sea) followed only by 3,000 personal troops. On the same day, the Jins captured Linan (previously Hangzhou). On April 26, after three months of retreat, Gaozong had decided to return to Zhexi 浙西 Circuit (in modern Zhejiang and Jiangsu

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155 YL., ch. 29, p. 579.
156 Ibid., ch. 30, pp. 584-5.
157 Ibid., ch. 30, pp. 586-7.
Provinces), where Linan was located. Han Shizhong's struggles with the Jin army under Wanyan Zongbi had meanwhile turned into a deadlock at Huangtiandang (in modern Jiangsu Province). Report of Jin's setback came to the Song, prompting Lü Yihao to plead with Gaozong to return to Zhexi to personally lead the army (qinzheng 親征) to fight the enemy. By acting in concert with Han, Lü believed they could capture Zongbi. Gaozong consented. On May 20, when lodged in Yuezhou, Gaozong proclaimed he would lead the army to fight the Jins. Zhao Ding disagreed because he worried if the intelligence were untrue, then the Song would have to face the returning Jin army. Disputes between Zhao and Lü henceforth began.

Ever since the beginning of Jianyan period, the Song court established the Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment (Yuyingshi 御營使) for unified command headed by the chief councilor who therefore held total control of the military. The Bureau of Military Affairs hardly had a say in any of the military matters. Lü Yihao was especially unrestrained in his power. When Gaozong returned from the sea, Zhao Ding impeached Lü for the errors he had committed. On May 22, Zhao Ding was transferred to the position of Hanlin Academician from Censor-in-chief because he attempted both to impeach Lü Yihao and was against the strategy of Gaozong leading the Song army against the Jins. By citing a precedent, Zhao refused to accept his duty. Six days later, the court gave Zhao a new assignment as Minister of Personnel (Libu Shangshu 郡部尚書).

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159 YL, ch. 32, pp. 630-1.
Meanwhile, Zhao continued to make charges against Lü, submitting ten additional complaints. Succumbing to the pressure, Lü resigned on June 2. Gaozong informed officials that Lü had rendered distinguished and meritorious service and had not caused great damages to the country as had Li Gang, Huang Qianshan had done. Lü was demoted to Military Commissioner of Zhennanjun (Zhennanjun Jiedushi 鎮南軍節度使), Commander Unequalled in Honor (Kaufu Yitong Sansi 開府 儀同三司), and given a sinecure job. Two days later, the court proclaimed that Lü was treated with special courtesy because he had previously advocated rescuing the throne. Fan Zongyin assumed the duty as Acting chief councilor and Zhao Ding resumed his position as Censor-in-chief. At that time, the Song court was in Yuezhou until Gaozong returned to Linan two years later. One week later, Fan Zongyin officially replaced Lü's position as Chief Councilor of the Right.

Two months after his stepping down, Lü Yihao was abducted by Jiang Lian 蒋璉, a bandit from Fenghua 奉化 (in modern Zhejiang Province). In order to save Lü, Gaozong issued a proclamation of amnesty to pacify the bandits, and in the mean time appointed Lü Pacification Commissioner-in-chief (Anfu Dashi 安撫大使) of Jiankangfu and a concurrent duty as Prefect of Chizhou 池州 (in modern Anhui Province). From then on, Lü was responsible for suppressing bandits which coincided with the Song court's setting up Military Commissioner (Zhenfushi 鎮撫使), a title

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161 YL, ch. 32, p. 631.
161 Ibid., ch. 32, p. 633.
162 Ibid., ch. 32, p. 634.
163 Ibid., ch. 32, p. 634 & ch. 33, p. 639.
given to local powers with their influence recognized by the Song court. Over a year later, Lü was summoned back to the court and promoted as Chief Councilor of the Left.

How does one evaluate Lü's performance in his first term? What was Gaozong's impression of him? As discussed above, the military coup provided Lü a golden opportunity to distinguish himself, and his abundant bureaucratic experience also made him qualified for the position as the leader of the government. In addition to these advantages, the timing was perfect for Lü as well. Gaozong's earlier loyal followers from his time as Grand Marshal, as represented by Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan, had been removed from the power center in disgrace. When Zhu Shengfei recommended candidates to Gaozong, Lü was consequently among the two people for the emperor's choice as the succeeding chief councilor. His second good luck came five months later. Without any special achievement, Lü advanced to Chief Councilor of the Left because Gaozong intended to encourage Du Chong to accept the defense mission at the Yangtze River, promoting Du as Chief Councilor of the Right. Naturally, Lü was pushed upward to the top. After taking office, Lü's immediate responsibility was to make arrangements for the defense. While Du Chong went to Jiankang to oversee military commanders, Lü stayed with Gaozong despite having volunteered to go to Pingjiang to lead military commanders in the fight against the Jins. When Du's leadership collapsed and his forces disintegrated, Lü proposed to escape through the sea route. As a result of

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164 YL, ch. 34, p. 666.
165 For details about Military Commissioners, please refer to Huang Kuanchong 黃寬重, "Nan Song dui difang wuli de liyong he kongzhi: yi Zhenfiishi weili Zhongyang yanzhuyuan dierie guoji Hanxue huivi lunwenji 中央研究院第二次國際漢學會議論文集 (June, 1989): 1047-80. Also, YL, ch. 33, p. 640 & 650.
this withdrawal, the Song government momentarily fell apart and the emperor traveled on
the sea with only Lü, vice chief councilors and other six officials and a couple of military
commanders. Gaozong managed to survive, albeit in disgrace, and barely kept his regime.

Lü was right about the escape plan; however, because it was a shame for the Song
emperor to escape by sea to avoid the enemy’s attack, Lü was not rewarded. Meanwhile,
Censor-in-chief Zhao Ding used this golden moment of national disgrace to impeach Lü
for his unrestrained power. Because Zhao also objected to Lü’s proposal of Gaozong
personally leading the Song army into battle against the Jins, the disputes between them
began. Lü ultimately succumbed to the pressure and resigned. In fact, Lü Yihao, as
Gaozong declared, did not make great mistakes. Lü’s stepping down seemed to be a
reaction of an angry, frightened emperor who temporary lost his trust in Lü upon
returning from the sea. However, Gaozong did not forget Lü’s contribution for saving
him from the siege of the rebels. Lü received an honorable discharge. Two months later,
Lü was rescued by the emperor from the bandit’s capture, and promoted to a highly
ranked post. Gaozong promoted him either because the court needed men like Lü to
carry out difficult work such as pacifying or suppressing local powers, or the emperor
wanted to make up for the harsh punishment imposed on Lü. At any rate, Lü’s comeback
was expected.

166 YL, ch. 27, p. 532.
167 Ibid., ch. 30, p. 589.
What of Gaozong's impression on Lü's general performance? The records tell us that Gaozong did not like Lü's use of too many clerks with special talents (caili 才吏) to collect money from the people.\textsuperscript{168} Gaozong also complained about Lü's excessive recruiting of people from his native territory. He argued that chief councilors should recruit talented people from everywhere for the emperor, and it was unfair to be partial to one's home townsmen.\textsuperscript{169} During his term as Pacification Commissioner, Lü requested the court increase the number of his troops to quell Li Cheng, a formidable bandit leader. Commenting on this request, Gaozong said that it could not be contested by other officials that Lü was courageous in disregarding his life to quell the bandits. However, Gaozong criticized Lü, saying that he was inclined to recklessly engage in fighting without considering the strength of both sides.\textsuperscript{170} According to one record, Lü was hot-tempered and treated officials of the Secretariat (tangli 堂吏) with strict discipline. One day, Lü slapped an official's forehead for his disobedience. The official, whose rank was high, felt humiliated among his colleagues. He then confronted Lü by saying that he should be sent to a legal institution for conviction based on the law, but did not deserve humiliation such as slapping on the forehead. He claimed that while his rank was inferior, he hoped Lü would maintain the Song court's dignity. Upon hearing this, Lü flew into a terrible rage and said that they were in a time when the emperor was forced to sail on the sea and ranking officials wore straw sandals walking through flooded places.

\textsuperscript{168} YL, ch. 33, p. 649.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., ch. 35, p. 674.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., ch. 39, p. 740.
Lü argued that the propriety would be observed when they returned to the old capital. This record reminds us of the comment Zhu Shengfei made of Lü when he was requested by Gaozong to recommend a replacement. Indeed, Lü was an experienced bureaucrat yet he was short-tempered and somewhat rude. But before drawing a conclusion about him it is necessary to examine his performance in the second term as chief councilor in a separate chapter. Before doing that, we should examine Du Chong, the chief councilor who surrendered to the Jins, and Fan Zongyin, the youngest chief councilor, and their performance and interactions with the emperor.

171 Lu You 陆游, Laoxuean biji 老学庵笔记, ch. 2, p. 16.
Chapter Five: Du Chong 杜充 (?–ca. 1140): The Surrendering Traitor

Du Chong, styled Gongmei 公美, was a native of Xiang 相 (in modern Henan Province). He was fond of laurels yet had a disposition of cruelty and bloodthirstiness. Nevertheless, he was short of schemes. During the time of Shaosheng 绍聖 (1094-1097), he received his jinshi degree. He later enjoyed a series of promotions in rank as Court Gentleman of the Bureau of Evaluation (Kaogong Lang 考功郞), Vice Minister of Court of Imperial Entertainment (Guanglu Shaoqing 光祿少卿), and Prefect of Cangzhou 沧州 (in modern Hebei Province). At the beginning of Jingkang period, Du advanced to Senior Compiler of Jiying Hall (Jiyingdian Xiuzhuan 集英殿修撰) and Prefect of Cangzhou concurrently. When the Jins invaded Song, Du indiscriminately killed many people who had fled from Yan 燕 to places under his jurisdiction, only because he suspected them as being intelligence collectors. 172

In the first year of Jianyan (1127), Du was promoted to Edict Attendant of Tianzhang Hall (Tianzhangge Daizhi 天章閣待制), Regent of Beijing (Beijing Liushou 北京留守), and Auxiliary Academician of Baowen Hall (Baowenge Zhixueshi 寶文閣直學士). In the second year of Jianyan, Du advanced to Auxiliary Academician of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shumi Zhixueshi 樞密直學士). 173

According to a record, Judicial Commissioner Guo Yong 郭永 (?-1128) had previously

173 Records in the YL were different from those in the SS on the date when Du Chong was promoted as Auxiliary Academician of the Bureau of Military Affairs. According to YL, the year was the second year of Jianyan and it is accepted here as the correct one. See YL, ch. 14, p. 295.
presented three proposals to Du but they remained unreviewed. Guo then confronted him, saying that Du "had the will but possessed no talents; liked the fame yet discarded the reality" (renyoubi er wucai; haoming er yishi 人有志而無才；好名而遺實). With these qualities, Guo argued, it would be difficult for Du to assume great responsibility. Du was embarrassed by these remarks. One day, paper money burnt for the dead fell from the sky to the Song camp and this inauspicious sign was seen as forestalling a setback against the Jins in next morning. Du thus shut the gate and remained inside the city.\footnote{YL, ch. 14, p. 295. HB, v. 2, p. 578. Wang Zao 汪藻, Fuxi ji 浮溪集, ch. 20, p. 12a.} Despite his failure, Du was assigned Regent of Dongjing 東京 (the Song capital) to replace the late Zong Ze, as well as concurrent duty as Governor (Yin 尹) of Kaifeng. According to the record, Du made no attempt for restoration and reversed whatever Zong had done. The forces that had been previously united under Zong's command fell apart during Du's administration.\footnote{YL, ch. 16, pp. 340-1.} Moreover, Du once ambushed one of his subordinates because he was jealous of the latter's military power. Yet, the troops sent by Du were defeated.\footnote{YL, ch. 16, pp. 340-1.}

In the third year of Jianyan, Du Chong moved up to the position of Academician of Duanming Hall (Duanmingdian Xueshi 端明殿學士) and a month later he advanced to Academician of the Hall for Aid in Governance (Zizhengdian Xueshi 資政殿學士) and was ordered to control West Circuit of Jingdong (Jingdong Xilu 京東西路). On June 19 of 1129, Du was assigned concurrent a duty of Vice Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner (Xuanfu Chuzhi Fushi 宣撫處置副使) and his jurisdiction was
extended to south of the Huai River (Huainan 淮 南). He was also given title as Military Commissioner of Xuanwujun (Xuanwujun Jiedushi 宣武 軍 節 度 使), an honorable title usually rewarded to distinguished officials. Du received promotions because the Song court appreciated him for leading troops towards the emperor's place. After settling in the south, Du was assigned as military commander to defend against the Jins. On August 31 of 1129, with recommendations by Lü Yihao and Zhang Jun, Du was promoted to Grand Master of the Palace (Zhong Dafu 中 大 夫), Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Tongzhi Shumiyuanshi 同 知 樞 密 院 事) and a concurrent duty of Vice Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner. He was assigned as the commander of all military forces in south of the Huai River.

Although having been entrusted with duties mainly as a military commander, Du was far from perfect in his leadership. After taking Zong Ze's place, Du could not maintain the same magnitude of military forces, and because he made no attempt to restore the country, he allowed the military forces to disintegrate. He often avoided direct confrontations with the Jin armies. His staying in the north as Regent was merely a coincidence and had nothing to do with his ability. Yet, he was notorious for his cruelty. When Du was assigned as commander of all military forces along the Huai and Yangtze Rivers, generals such as Han Shizhong and Liu Guangshi were all frightened. Liu even sent official correspondence to the emperor explaining in detail why Du could not be

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176 YL, ch. 19, p. 381.
177 Ibid., ch. 24, p. 491.
178 Ibid., ch. 25, p. 516.
their leader. Despite oppositions, Du earned the emperor's trust. Trying to impress Gaozong, in an audience, Du claimed that "Military Commissioners (Shuaichen), under today's adverse condition, should not sit in the tent mapping out strategies; they should personally engage in battles." But, because he was unsatisfied with his rank at the time he was entrusted with the duty of defending the Yangtze River, Du pretended to suffer from a stroke, remaining at home. Gaozong realized Du's discontent and promoted him Chief Councilor of the Right as a reward for his long term service in the north and as encouragement for his new assignment to the Yangtze. Soon afterwards, Du was immediately sworn in the new office.

On September 30 of 1129, Du assumed a concurrent duty of Pacification Commissioner of the Yangtze and Huai Rivers (Jiang Huai Xuanfushi). He led over 100,000 troops of the Mobile Brigade (Xingying), stationed in Jiankang. Although entrusted with such a heavy responsibility, Du did not change his style and continued killing people on a daily basis yet presented no defense proposals. People concerned with current affairs were distressed by his behavior. Some officials worried that Jiankang, the center of defense command along the Yangtze, was located too far from the court and other forces, making coordination of armies difficult. They suggested that Han Shizhong be promoted and entrusted with greater duties.

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179 YL, ch. 27, p. 551.
180 Ibid., ch. 27, p. 532.
181 Ibid., ch. 27, p. 551.
Gaozong disagreed with this proposal because he distrusted military men and worried that Du Chong's position might be challenged by Han. In this case, Du was fully authorized by the emperor because Gaozong was hostile toward military. With Liu Guangshi's advanced protest, the Song court had anticipated some difficulties with Du's ability as a commander. Had Gaozong not supported Du against Liu, Liu would not have accepted Du's leadership. Consequently, Gaozong turned down the proposal of Han Shizhong's promotion.

Du Chong's leadership faced a serious test three months after assuming the office of Pacification Commissioner as the Jin invading forces joined by rebel commander Li Cheng's army approached Jiankang. Intelligence reports prompted Du to dispatch his troops to attack Li's army since it was thought to be vulnerable. Little did he know that the Jins had entered the area in large number. Upon hearing this information, Du deployed 6,000 troops along the south bank of the Yangtze, while ordered the city gate shut and remaining inside its protective wall. In fact, this was not the first time that Du had adopted this strategy. As Regent of Beijing, Du shut the gate after he was defeated by the Jins. Yet, he made a modest change this time by sending troops outside the city wall to fight the Jins while himself remaining safely inside. The Song court was in great fear since the Jins had crossed the Yangtze and Du Chong had presented no reports. Some officials suggested that Gaozong move to Pingjiang to supervise commanders to fight the Jins. And in case of emergency, the emperor could board seagoing ships to

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182 YL, ch. 28, p. 553.
183 Ibid., ch. 27, p. 551 & 553.
avoid the enemy. Meanwhile, Lü Yihao volunteered for the mission. While they remained undecided in this matter, Du’s outdated report reached the court claiming that he was defending the Yangtze. Officials at the court felt relieved by this news, but who could have known that Du had already been defeated and Han Shizhong had abandoned Zhenjiang and fled. In the meantime, Gaozong summoned Han back to the court.184

Realizing the adverse situation was irreversible, Du attempted to sneak out of the city. When blocked by residents from leaving, he lied to them, claiming he was exiting the gate to fight the Jins. The residents, however, were not gullible, and replied to Du that they also wanted to leave the city with him to fight the Jins. As a result, Du was forced to stay. Meanwhile, the commanders dispatched by Du either died in the field or fled to safety.185 The following day, Du managed to cross the Yangtze to the north with 3,000 personal troops. During that time, a eunuch delivered the court’s message, to which Du replied with an imperial report explaining why the war of defense ended up a debacle. He argued that he had previously requested to be commander of all generals not because of his egotism, but his intention was for all generals to become familiar with each other for effective command. Du reported that Liu Guangshi had stayed in location beyond command communication and although Han Shizhong had remained nearby but he refused orders. Moreover as Du complained, if Wang Xie 王 璟 had advanced his troops when Chen Cui 陳 淺 (?-1129) was engaged in battles with the Jins, the enemy would have been defeated. Du vehemently attacked Wang as deserving death many

184 YL, ch. 29, pp. 574-5.
185 Ibid., ch. 29, p. 576.
times. After his report to the throne was presented, Du reached Zhenzhou 真州 (North of the Yangtze River and in modern Jiangsu Province). Meanwhile, the prefect of Zhenzhou urged Du to return to Zhejiang through the coast and promised to go with him. Du refused this suggestion, and the prefect abandoned Zhenzhou and fled to the south.  

Du Chong's report of defeat shocked the court and Gaozong worried that Jin army would chase him and attack his location in Zhejiang. He promptly summoned ranking officials and demanded their plans to solve the urgent crisis. Lü Yihao proposed to escape to the sea. Du later left Zhenzhou for Tianchangjun 天長軍 (in modern Anhui Province), where he was joined by other defeated forces. Du ordered Zhao Li 趙立 (1094-1130) to take charge of the defense of Chuzhou 楚州 (in modern Jiangsu Province). Until that moment, Du was still doing his duty. Meanwhile, the Song kept on receiving outdated or false reports, including Du's plan to gather troops to intercept the Jin army. In response to these reports, Gaozong delivered his personal decree ordering Du to march his troops forward. The court had not put all blame on Du for his failed leadership. Censor-in-chief Zhao Ding pleaded to urge Wang Xie to advance; moreover, by blaming him for not acting in concert with Du, Zhao urged Wang to act with outstanding service to redeem his fault. Zhao also requested Liu Guangshi to intercept the Jin forces or meet with Du Chong at Chu 楚 (Chuzhou) and Si 洙 (in modern Anhui Province). With this strategy being executed, Zhao believed that the Jins would be vexed and think about withdrawal.  

\footnote{YL, ch. 29, p. 578.}  
\footnote{Ibid., ch. 30, p. 593.}
Wang Zao 汪藻 (1079-1154), then Supervising Secretary (Jishizhong 给事中) and Auxiliary Academician and a relentless critic of military men, commented on the unsuccessful defense under Du's command. He argued that deploying Du in Jiankang, Han Shizhong in Jingkou 京口 (in modern Jiangsu Province), Liu Guangshi in Jiujiang 九江 (in modern Jiangxi Province) and subordinating Wang Xie to Du Chong was not a bad arrangement. However, as Wang Zao argued, Han Shizhong had planned in advance for escape: by consolidating his assets in Zhenjiang and placing them in seagoing ships two to three months before the war, he then proceeded to have the city burned down. When Du was fighting the Jins, Wang Xie refused to follow his orders and Liu did not make a move or to lend a helping hand. Wang Zao thus held Han and Wang Xie responsible for losing Jiankang and the Jin's invasion of Liang Zhe Circuits that caused Gaozong great turmoil. He blamed Liu for losing Yuzhang 隗章 (in modern Jiangxi Province) and causing the empress dowager and the imperial families to live "wandering life". Wang Zao proposed to execute Wang Xie as a warning to other generals. He also suggested that the court choose one prestigious official as the leader of all generals, at the same time commanding the emperor's personal troops, and authorized to restrain the military men with laws. The court, as Wang Zao suggested, should select talented military men among secondary commanders and entrust them with certain authorities. After achieving merit, they would be entitled nobility and allowed to replace those major commanders in secret. Wang Zao believed this was the most urgent task to

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188 YL, ch. 31, p. 598.
189 Ibid., ch. 31, p. 605.
accomplish. Du Chong's failure in defending the Yangtze River exposed the problems of leadership over military men. However, Du's personal shortcomings as a commander were not yet seriously discussed.

Only two weeks after Wang Zao presented his proposal, Liu Guangshi reported that Du Chong had been defeated and whether he was still alive or not was unknown; Wang Xie's front army was defeated and scattered; Han Shizhong boarded a seagoing ship and fled. Liu claimed that he led his only force stationing in Nankang (in modern Jiangxi Province) and had delivered summons to all circuits requesting armies to save the throne. He pleaded with the emperor not to confront the enemy, but to wait instead for a better opportunity to fight back. Meanwhile, the worst report came to the court. In fact, while Du left Tianchangjun escaping northward, Wanyan Zongbi, one of the Jin commanders, sent a representative to ask Du to surrender and promised him the land of the Central Plain (Zhongyuan 中 原) and the privileges that Zhang Bangchang was bestowed. After being informed by the prefect of Zhenzhou of Du's surrender, Gaozong did not eat for days. Censor-in-chief Zhao Ding proposed to first remove Du from his office, wait for confirmation of the report, and only then discuss his penalty. As a result, Du was relieved of his duty as Chief Councilor of the Right and the concurrent duty of Pacification Commissioner of Jiang and Huai. He was demoted to Grand

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191 YL, ch. 31, p. 611.
Academician of Guanwen Hall (Guanwendian Daxueshi 觀文殿大學士) supervising Taiping Temple (Taipingguan 太平觀). 192

During a later inspection tour, Gaozong gazed at a district which had been burned down by the Jins, and sadly said that he could not save the people. Wang Tao 王綱 brought up the issue that Du Chong was ordered to defend Jiankang with 40,000 troops and Zhou Wang 周望 led 20,000 troops defending Pingjiang. Wang Tao argued that Gaozong did not carelessly give up Jiang 江, Zhe 浙 and flee to the south; it was Du Chong whose incompetence for the assignment caused all these shameful disasters. Lü Yihao proceeded to say that scholars were often familiar with literature, yet very few of them were versed in military tactics or finance and could thus be used to solve today's problems. In responding to Lü's statement, Gaozong said that when the country was in peacetime scholar-officials would have been criticized as committing blunders if they had rushed around on horseback; they would have been suspected as plotting a revolt if they had stored fine bows and sharp swords. 193

Du Chong's surrender to the Jins left historians no choice but to defame him to the category of seditious officials (panchen 板臣) as demonstrated in the Song shi 宋史. No historical records have reported any good qualities of his as a chief councilor; in fact, he was not a good example according to any moral norm taught in Chinese society. He was and will be labeled as a "traitor" in Chinese history. However, if we focus on the interactions between him and the emperor, we can make a few comments other than mere

192 YL, ch. 31, pp. 613-4.
reproach. First of all, he was immediately assigned to replace Zong Ze after the latter's death and entrusted with the duty of defending north China. He was reported as fond of killing people while lacking strategies. His commanding style was always compared to that of Zong Ze and he was criticized as having no attempt to restore the Song against the Jins. All of Zong's achievements during his term as regent, according to historical reports, were terminated because Du did not follow in his predecessor's footstep in keeping with the magnitude previously established. Nevertheless, if one switches his attention toward Gaozong's intention on "restoration", he is prone to say that Du Chong was actually an opportunist. Unlike his predecessor, Du only urged Gaozong to return to the capital once and was never insistent on the emperor's coming back.\footnote{YL, ch. 31, p. 627.} One month after replacing Zong Ze, he led his troops heading towards Gaozong's location. According to Li Xinchuan's report, as soon as hearing the report of Du's leaving the north for the court, the Song court promoted Du Military Commissioner (Jiedushi 節 度 使) along with a concurrent duty of Vice Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner (Xuanfu Chuzhi Fushi 宣 撫 處 署 副 使) controlling four major circuits and two superior prefectures.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 23, p. 490.}

He was later assigned to defend along the Huai River. It is obvious that Du was seen as an important asset to the Song court for his experience in defensive operations. After arriving at the emperor's lodging, Du was recommended by Lü Yihao and Zhang Jun for another new duty as Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, a
position second only to that of Zhang Jun before his departure for Sichuan. However, Du was not satisfied with this appointment and pretended to suffer from illness. Gaozong thus promoted him to Chief Councilor of the Right. There are very few records about Du's conversation with Gaozong after he arrived. However, Du once said to the emperor that commanding generals, in the current adverse situations, should personally engage in battles instead of mapping strategy in their tents. Either he was bragging about his previous efforts in the north or he was making an advisory comment from his experience. Nevertheless, Gaozong did not agree with his opinion and believed that if civil officials were talented, courageous, experienced in border affairs like Fan Zhongyan (989-1052), it was not necessary for them to engage in battles personally or rely solely on military commanders. With a tone of exclamation and regret, Gaozong subtly blamed Du for not being his ideal type of civil official like Fan (or like Zong Ze). However, the emperor had very few alternatives, and thus had to rely on Du Chong to deal with the most urgent crisis, the Jin's invasion.

Secondly, the authorization of Du's command over the generals faced immediate challenges. Liu Guangshi and Han Shizhong were the two major generals who expressed their fear of Du's leadership. Facing this dilemma, Gaozong had to help Du by

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195 According to Wang Ruihai 王瑞來, *Song zaifu biannianlu jiaobu* 宋宰輔編年錄校補, ch. 14, p. 941, Du Chong left the capital for the south because he ran out of food supply.

196 Fan Zhongyan was an important official in the Northern Song (960-1127). From 1040 on, Fan had fought the Xixia 西夏 (an enemy from the west) for three years. With his talents, Fan managed to obstruct Xixia's invasions. He drilled his troops, reorganized them into separate units, and arranged for them to take turns in fighting. Then he built outlying barricades into forts, supplemented their supplies by having the soldiers farm during their spare time, using new irrigation techniques, and provided ample rewards both for those who fought well and for the families of those who were killed in action. Fan's achievement in border areas was so great that he was often referred to as "scholar general" (ruijiang 儒將). For more details, see Herbert Franke ed. *Sung Biographies*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1976, pp. 321-9.
restraining Liu and limiting Han's power vis-a-vis Du's authority. Although Du seemed to be an inevitable choice, the Song court had anticipated problems with his appointment in advance. Upon encountering the Jin army, Du's forces fell apart and his leadership collapsed. The defense of the Yangtze River was doomed to fail even before the military forces were deployed. Without a unified command and effective coordination, the Song could not possibly obtain a success, although their goal had been limited and conservative and the defense line had been previously moved from the Huai River to the Yangtze with Du staying in the south bank. As a result, Du failed to stop the Jins from crossing the Yangtze and the Song defenses in the south fell apart like dominoes.

Thirdly, Du crossed the Yangtze River heading north after he failed to hold the defense line. In Zhenzhou, he sent a memorial to the emperor explaining his reasons for the setback and blaming everyone but himself. While refusing to return to the south with the prefect of Zhenzhou, Du sent his subordinate to report to the emperor claiming that he wanted to move in haste with his troops to join the emperor but the roads were blocked. Later on, Du proceeded to go even further north to Tianchangjun but still exercised his commanding power and assigned Zhao Li to defend Chuzhou. Meanwhile, the Song court received Du's report that he was in Zhenzhou and ready to intercept the Jins. The communications, in true or false contents, between Du and the court showed the urgency of the situation. On the other hand, Du's hesitation to return to meet with the emperor had made him think about transferring his loyalty to the Jins. Du Chong eventually succumbed to the temptation of Jins offer and surrendered. We are not well informed by

197 YL, ch. 26, p. 519.
the records why he crossed the river to the north immediately after his forces were defeated by the Jins. However, it is possible that he had lost his trust in the Song emperor, his regime and the generals supposed to be under his command. In his memorial to Gaozong, Du mentioned nothing about his own mistakes in commanding the forces. He refused to assume the responsibility for the failure and continued to stay in the north. The roads were not blocked as Du claimed because he had managed to move from Tianchangjun to further north.\footnote{YL, ch. 31, p. 614.} His intention became clear after he continued going northward.

Du Chong's surrender to the Jins was a big shock to the Song court and Gaozong had to remove Du from his position. At the time the Song regime faced a serious threat to its survival, Du assumed the defense mission which was a serious test for his ability and devotion. Although he failed to live up to the emperor's expectation, Du must have been the best choice among available officials for the duty. Before the war started, Gaozong and the court had anticipated problems for his leadership and they had tried to help Du to consolidate his authority. Therefore, it was his surrender not his failure that greatly disappointed Gaozong and other officials.

Two months after Du Chong stepped down from the post of Chief Councilor of the Right, Lü Yihao was also removed from his duty as Chief Councilor of the Left. After being promoted, Fan Zongyin became the only chief councilor at the court. In the
next chapter, we will look into his brief biographical sketch and his performance as the ranking official of the Song.
Chapter Six: Fan Zongyin 范宗尹 (1098-1136): The Youngest Chief Councilor

Fan Zongyin, styled Juemin 觉民, was native of Dengcheng 鄧城 in Xiang Yang 襄陽 (in modern Hubei Province). When he was little, Fan studied very hard, specializing in literature and poetry. In the third year of Xuanhe 宣和 (1121) period, he passed the jinshi exam from the National University. Later on, he was promoted step by step to Attendant Censor (Shiyushi 侍御史), Grand Master of the Right of the Remonstrance Bureau (You Jianyi Dafu 右諫議大夫). In 1126 when Wang Yun 王雲 (?-1126) returned from his mission and claimed that the Jins insisted on getting the three strategic posts (Taiyuan 太原, Hejian 河間, Zhongshan 中山), Fan fell to the ground in prostration during his audience with the emperor, begging him to cede the land and to free the country from calamity. While Qin Gui and thirty-five officials were against this proposal, seventy agreed with Fan. Nevertheless, Fan was removed from his office in the following month by Qinzong's personal written decree attributing the Jin invasion of Song to Fan's advocacy of a peace proposal. After Zhang Bangchang became the puppet emperor of the Jin, Fan was reinstated as Acting Grand Master of the Right of Remonstrance Bureau and was later promoted to Acting Vice Chamberlain for the Palace Revenues (Quan Taifu Shaoqing 權太府少卿). One month later, when

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Zhang pleaded to Prince Kang (later Gaozong) to ascend the throne. Fan was assigned by Zhang to greet Prince Kang at his arrival in Nanjing.  

After becoming the emperor, Prince Kang immediately appointed Li Gang as chief councilor. Fan, an advocate of peace with the Jins, launched an attack on Li for his hawkish stance. Fan criticized Li saying "his fame exceeds his substance" and "his prestige shocks the lord", thus implying he could not be a chief councilor. Fan presented his report to the throne three times on this matter yet received no reply. Because Gaozong supported Li Gang, Fan was forced to leave the power center and demoted to Edict Attendant of Huiyou Hall (Huiyouge Daizhi 徽猷閤待制) and Prefect of Shuzhou 舒州 (in modern Anhui Province). One week later, Fan was removed from his office and assigned to supervise an imperial temple for serving under the bogus regime. Soon afterwards, he was punished and demoted to the position of Vice Military Training Commissioner of Xinzhou 忻州 (in modern Shanxi Province) residing in Ezhou 鄂州 (in modern Hubei Province). During the Miao-Liu Rebellion, Fan was appointed Senior Compiler of Jiying Hall (Jiyingdian Xiuzhuan 集英殿修撰) and Supervisor of Dongxiao Temple in Hangzhou (Tiju Hangzhou Dongxiaogong 提舉杭

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204 YL, ch. 6, p. 141.
205 Ibid., ch. 6, p. 146.
206 Ibid., ch. 6, p. 157. HB, v. 2, p. 484.
207 YL, ch. 18, p. 363.
a job he had been previously assigned. A few months later, he advanced from Drafter in the Secretariat (Zhongshu Sheren 中 書 舍 人) to Censor-in-chief.

When the Song court was facing the danger of the Jin invasion, Fan and Zhao Ding both suggested shunning the Jins. For this proposal, Zhao was promoted as Acting Censor-in-chief and Fan advanced to Vice Chief Councilor (Canzhi Zhengshi 參 知 政 事). When the court was undecided on the emperor's future location, Fan made an important suggestion to Gaozong. Unlike Zhang Jun, who wanted the emperor to first go to E 鄭 and then ultimately stay in Guan 關, Shaan 陝 (in modern Shaanxi Province) areas, Fan proposed the Song court stay in the Lower Yangtze region and gradually move westward to Guan, Shaan. Finally, Gaozong approved of Fan's suggestion and denied Zhang Jun's proposal.

On June 2 of 1130 after Lü Yihao was removed from office, Fan Zongyin was assigned as acting chief councilor and eight days later Fan's position became official. At that time the Song court faced the bandit problems in areas north of the Yangtze, north and south of Jinghu 荊 湖 Circuits where the Song government had no control. For those areas where bandits did not reach, the government used local ruffians (tuhao 土 豪), defeated commanders (kuijiang 潰 將) or officials with provisional assignments (sheguan 撫 官) to defend the areas that had been loosely controlled by the Song. Fan thought

208 YL, ch. 21, p. 426.
209 Ibid., ch. 24, p. 501.
210 HB's record of the date for Fan's promotion to Vice Chief Councilor is different from that of YL and thus it is not quoted here. See YL, ch. 29, p. 579.
211 YL, ch. 32, p. 625.
these people were an undisciplined mob and if the government pushed them too hard they would risk their lives to resist. He suggested to place these volatile forces in divided areas, allowing the bandits to have places to return to, then be gradually contained. Fan thus proposed to resume the method of Outlying Forts (fanzhen 藩鎮) to solve the problem of bandits. According to Fan, the Outlying Forts system was put into practice in a few dozens of prefectures in south of the Yellow River and north of the Yangtze River. The Song government promised to bestow land and authority to people who had assumed the duty for a long time to defend for the court. Many officials were against this idea yet the emperor supported Fan and appointed him Chief Councilor of the Right. Fan was only thirty-three sui 岁 (thirty-two years old) at the time of the appointment and the youngest chief councilor since the Han, Tang until the Song.213

Fan's idea of Outlying Forts was not an original creation. It was previously proposed by Li Gang in 1126. Li had previously proposed to install Taiyuan, Zhending, Zhongshan and Hejian, the four important posts guarding the Jins, as Outlying Forts. The Song court chose Marshals as commanders, whose positions were allowed to be hereditary, and granted tax revenues to the commanders to maintain and train their troops.214 When summoned by Gaozong to the court, Li suggested that the court to redevelop several thousand ruffians as local militia leaders. The court thus dispatched people to contact and pacify them, and then bestowed honorable titles to whoever could defend his prefecture. This was a similar practice which had its precedent in the Tang

Dynasty (618-907). By enabling these people to defend themselves, the Song court attempted to alleviate the threat of Jin's invasion. Li Gang proceeded to have two institutions set up for the job.215

Later on, Zhang Jun also suggested to Gaozong that the areas north of the Yangtze be transferred into Outlying Forts defended by the Song. For areas south of the Yangtze, Zhang deemed it necessary to send officials intimate with the emperor as commanders of important posts and allowed them to act on their initiative; otherwise the areas could not be defended. His proposal was advocated by other officials at the court. Zhu Shengfei, in the meantime, suggested taking appropriate measures in accordance with the actual situation the Song faced. He proposed taking the emperor's location as the capital; north of the Huai River as Outlying Forts; south of the Huai River as prefectures and districts. The suggestions presented by Zhang and Zhu were not put into practice due to the Song court crises with the military coup and subsequent Jin invasion.216

Fan Zongyin's version of Outlying Forts system was different from those of Li, Zhang, and Zhu. He simply recognized the sphere of influence of those local powers and hoped to stop them from being mobile. Therefore, he did not expect the commanders of Outlying Forts to fight aggressively against the Jins and never questioned their military strength.217 On June 30 of 1130, the Song court discussed the issue of setting up Military

214 HB, v. 1, p. 447.
215 YL, ch. 6, p. 151.
216 Ibid., ch. 21, pp. 413-4.
217 Liu Jingzhen & Li Jinyun tr., Nan Song chuqi zhengzhishi yanjiu, p. 90.
Commissioners (Zhenfushi 鎮撫使) as commanders of Outlying Forts. The areas intended to be implemented were the capital and its vicinity, south part of the Huai River, Hubei 湖北, Jingdong 京东, and Jingxi 京西. These areas were to be exempted from taxes for three years and the revenue was left for the commanders to utilize. All the government institutions in the areas, except for those involving tea, salt and the national budget, were to be abandoned. Military Commissioners were granted privileges to nominate officials within their jurisdiction and notify the court for final approval. In times of war, they were allowed to act on their own initiatives. Their status could be inherited if they rendered distinguished service. Gaozong, in his final sanction, thought the inheritance system was too great a reward, yet promised to bestow it only after they could guarantee the defense.

Lü Zhong 呂中, a historian of Southern Song, later compared and criticized Fan's policy of Outlying Forts. He claimed that Fan Zongyin and Li Gang had the same idea about the areas for implementation, but Li proposed to use the incumbent Prefects and Magistrates to defend the areas while Fan entrusted total power to bandits. The Song court, according to Lü Zhong, could not conquer the bandits who occupied these areas yet used honorable titles to reward them. While Li Gang set up institutions to command loose military forces, Fan Zongyin randomly conferred official titles on people without putting them under a unified command. Lü Zhong argued that the weak forces were later

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engulfed by the Jins while the strong ones became trouble for the court as exemplified by the case of Li Cheng 李成.\textsuperscript{220} Although it was not the best way to deal with the simultaneous problem of bandits and the Jins according to Fan's version of Outlying Forts, it did create a buffer zone between the two states; moreover, the forces in the areas were gradually organized under the leadership of the four famous generals: namely, Liu Guangshi, Zhang Zun, Han Shizhong, and Yue Fei. Meanwhile, the Jin set up another puppet regime headed by Liu Yu 劉豫 (1073-1146) to avoid direct confrontation with the Song. The consequent development did not disprove Lü Zhong's viewpoint, yet it did not negate the effectiveness of Fan's version of the Outlying Forts system either. The outcome surpassed the Song court's expectations.

As mentioned above, Fan was the youngest chief councilor since the Han dynasty. His decision on some policies demonstrated his immaturity for governing the country. For example, he had proposed to set up Military Commissioners in E 鄂, Jiang 江 and Chi 池. He argued that Jiankang, where the Military Commission was located, was close to Zhenjiang but was fourteen hundred \textit{li} 里 (one \textit{li} = \(1/3\) mile) distance from Jiangzhou (Jiang). If the Song set up Military Commission at Chi then there would be an equal distance of seven hundred \textit{li} 之间 between the three Commissions. However, the problem was Chi is secluded area and not a good central location. If the Song set up Military Commission there, it would put Jiankang and its vicinity under its command. Officials who discussed on this matter did not agree to Fan's proposal. Location of the post was

\textsuperscript{219} YL, ch. 33, pp. 650-1.
changed twice subsequently. Fan's swift promotion also incurred criticisms of his experience. When Zhu Shengfei, then Military Commissioner of Western Circuit of Jiangnan, memorialized to the throne the current problems, he categorized three causes for the ravage war: the Jins, local bandits, and wandering outlaws. He also reported other problems concerning the livelihood of people. His long report was cut short by Fan who never experienced local administration and moreover, he disliked to hear reports of corrupt practices. He curtailed most of Zhu's report, and replied to it only by claiming that amnesty and ordinance had been announced.

Nevertheless, the Song made a few institutional changes during Fan's term as chief councilor. For example, it removed Imperial Defense Command (Yuyingsi 御營司) and Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment (Yuyingshi 御營使) and returned the power of military command back to the Bureau of Military Affairs which was now headed by Fan Zongyin, the chief councilor. Thus, Fan's concurrent duty was Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs. This step overturned an eighty year precedent: since the Qingli 慶曆 period (ca. 1042-50), chief councilors had not been in charge of the Bureau of Military Affairs. It meant the court had intended to unify military command under one organization, thus involving chief councilors in military matters. Fan also requested to review excessive rewards issued during the reigns of Chongning 崇寧, Daguan 大觀 (ca. 1102-1110). Altogether eighteen categories of

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220 Lü Zhong 呂中, Huangchao zhongxing dashiji 皇朝中興大事記, ch. 1, section of Fan Zongyin xiang 范宗尹相.
221 YL, ch. 33, p. 653.
222 Ibid., ch. 42, pp. 768-9.
As we mentioned above, Fan was advanced to the position of Vice Chief Councilor because he had suggested that the emperor shun the Jins. In Gaozong's memory, Fan's proposal urging Qinzong to avoid confrontations with the Jins was correct and Qinzong regretted not accepting it. Thus, the major reason for Gaozong's support of Fan was that he did not adopt aggressive measures against the Jins. By the same token, his policy of Outlying Forts was objected to by many officials but not by the emperor, chiefly because it was not a confrontational approach to the problems of Jins. One incident demonstrates Gaozong's support of Fan. On September 15 of 1130, Attendant Censor Shen Yuqiu 沈與求 (1086-1137) criticized Fan as too young for swift advancement, as well as unfamiliar with affairs in the world. Shen worried that Fan might delay the execution of national policies. Gaozong at the time still supported Fan and in consequence fired Shen. This impeachment was preceded by the censure of Ji Ling 季陵 (1081-1135), who was accused of making a proposal under Fan's instructions which pleaded to reinstate people who had recently been dismissed from office. Shen and others reminded the emperor that Ji's remarks were not appropriate and Gaozong revoked the announcement. Fan requested Shen and other two officials from the Bureau of Remonstrance (Jianyuan 諫院), who had censured Ji Ling, to present three different explanations.

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223 YL, ch. 34, p. 658.
224 Ibid., ch. 34, p. 664.
reports for the reason that they were from three different divisions of the government. Gaozong disagreed and claimed that policies of the court could be rejected by the Supervising Secretary (Jishizhong 给事中) and the Secretariat Drafter (Zhongshu Sheren 中舍人) before being announced; moreover, if they were put into practice the censors could judge them: it was wrong to divide the combined duty of censors and remonstrators. Although he disagreed with Fan on this matter, Gaozong provided his support to Fan and assigned Ji Ling a sacrificial duty and Shen Yuqiu moved out of the court as a prefect.

Gaozong's support of Fan Zongyin can also be demonstrated by his approval of another proposal which was not popular among officials. For example, on September 21 of 1330, Song officials learned the Jins were in the Eastern Circuit of Huainan 淮南; in fear of invasion, the Song court planned again to escape by sea. Fan singly objected to this idea arguing that dangerous tactics should not be repeated. Fan argued, if the Song court regularly escaped by sea when confronted with invasion then people from far or near would lose their unity as well as rendering the situation beyond resolution. In this urgent situation, Gaozong accepted Fan's proposal and ordered Liu Guangshi's defense along the Yangtze River. Meanwhile, the Song was about to assemble all forces of the Outlying Forts south of the Huai River to intercept the Jin army. Gaozong also ordered Zhang Jun to launch an attack on the Jins in Shaanxi to distract their focus on the

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225 YL, ch. 41, p. 759.
226 Ibid., ch. 36, p. 690.
227 Ibid., ch. 36, p. 688.
228 Ibid., ch. 36, p. 690.
229 Ibid., ch. 36, p. 694.
southeast. Although defeated by the Jins, some scholars have argued that Zhang Jun had successfully drawn their attention away from the location of the Song court. These events demonstrate just how fearful Gaozong was in that crisis situation as well as how supportive he was of Fan's strategies.

Only a month later the Jins were reported to be in the Huai River area and were not retreating. Fan predicted the Jins would not cross the Huai River, while Zhao Ding urged the court to be fully prepared. At this time, intelligence reports indicated that the Jin army had marched through the canal and were heading south. The court was stunned by this report. Zhao Ding warned Fan that if he did not react quickly enough the chaos of Yangzhou would be repeated. Fan argued that the current situation was different because the Song court was located in Kuaiji (Yuezhou 越州) and not in Yangzhou. Zhao consented to his argument.

Five months after assuming the duty of chief councilor, Fan witnessed a very important event, one which affected his own career and the future of Southern Song: the return of Qin Gui. After returning to the Song, Qin was given recommendations to the court by both Fan Zongyin and Li Hui 李回, the latter then Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Qin put forth his famous proposal claiming that if the Song wished to gain peace, then the south had to remain in the south; the north had to remain in the north. He then suggested negotiating peace with the Jins, and pleading to Gaozong to send letters to Wanyan Chang (1139), one of the Jin commanders.
in order to initiate peace talks. Qin Gui's appearance in Song's political stage was not taken as a threat by Fan; in fact, Fan considered Qin as a friend at the court. However, Gaozong was impressed by Qin's proposal and his connections with Wanyan Chang. Gaozong described his feeling as that by obtaining Qin Gui, an extraordinarily sincere and loyal person, made him so delighted that he was unable to sleep. Accordingly, the Song began to mediate disputes and negotiate peace with the Jins upon Qin assuming power.

During his administration, Fan's general performance was not impressive. Accusations against him were made by a few middle ranking officials of the prefectural level: a Surveillance Circuit Judge (Guancha Tuiguan 觀察推官), an Administrator for Public Order (Sili Canjun 司理參軍) and two officials responsible for taxation in Linanfu 臨安府. In support of Fan, Gaozong reprimanded them for slandering a high ranking official and inciting public sentiment. For relieving the financial shortage of the government, Fan proposed to sell official titles below the rank of Court Gentleman for Comprehensive Duty (Tongzhi Lang 通直郎) and Court Gentleman for Cultivating Martial Arts (Xiuwu Lang 修武郎). Gaozong, on the other hand, feared this policy might incur criticism, yet he knew of a precedent of selling the title of Court Gentleman for Fasting (Zhai Lang 斋郎). Li Hui argued that selling official titles was worse than extortive taxes and Gaozong agreed with him. Despite criticism, it was finally decided to

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231 YL, ch. 38, p. 725.
232 Ibid., ch. 39, p. 734.
233 Ibid., ch. 39, pp. 734-5.
234 Ibid., ch. 42, p. 766.
sell official titles below the rank of Gentleman for Fostering Uprightness (Chengzhi Lang 丞 直郎). In another financial concern, Fan proposed selling government-owned farmlands (guantian 官 田) in all circuits: once this was announced, people were so deeply disturbed by it that the government was forced to revoke the policy.

Among all his policies, the most devastating one to Fan's career was his proposal to conduct a review of possible excessive rewards prior to a special sacrificial ceremony called mingtang 明 堂, in which the court expected to grant a large number of promotions to civil officials, military commanders and their children. Gaozong questioned Fan about the feasibility of the review because he did not want to blame his father, the prior emperor, for being abusive of making rewards. Wang Zao, a Hanlin Academician, argued that the court's review of excessive rewards would only affect anyone who received promotions through improper procedure. Wang argued, however, it was not considered appropriate because review of excessive rewards was only carried out in the Ministry of Personnel (Libu 吏 部) while officials appointed by the Secretariat were not subjected to review of their qualifications; thus, such a loophole in the review process was a violation of justice. Wang pleaded that the Ministry of Personnel from then on should be notified of every official appointed by the Secretariat, including required verification to determine if candidates should be subject to a review process.

Fan Zongyin's proposal to conduct a review for excessive rewards incurred retaliation

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235 YL, ch. 44, p. 805.
236 Ibid., ch. 45, p. 811.
237 For description of this ceremony, please refer to Liu Tzu-chien, Liang Songshi yanjiu huibian, pp. 3-9.
238 YL, ch. 46, pp. 822-3.
from civil officials and military commanders who did not obtain their positions through normal procedure. Meanwhile, Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs Li Hui requested that he be removed from office in accordance with the rules of the review. Qin Gui argued that a sweeping review could establish a clean slate regarding bad officials, but it also could easily humiliate virtuous officials.  

Two days after the review decree was announced, Gaozong revoked it by claiming that he did not want to evoke blame upon his father and other officials. Fan insisted on either implementing it or he would resign. Gaozong announced to a group of high officials that one should not insist on everything, and even the emperor permitted censors to criticize him when he made some errors. Gaozong argued that if the emperor abruptly blocked the criticism of censors, he would simply stop them from offering advice; moreover, in that case, who was the one to incur the loss? When the proposed review was first raised by Fan, Qin Gui expressed his strong support; however, when he saw Gaozong disapproved of it he turned his back on Fan, and even tried to expel him from the court. In addition to the review issue, Gaozong was also not pleased with Fan's close relationship with Xin Daozong and his brother, both commanders of Gaozong's personal army who had previously followed him to the sea during the Jin invasion. On August 23 of 1131, Fan Zongyin resigned from his office. He was demoted to Academician of Guanwen Hall and given a sinecure duty. All the excessive rewards since Chongning, Daguan periods were not reviewed, and instead were

239 YL, ch. 46, p. 827.  
240 Ibid., ch. 46, pp. 827-8.
only given token deliberation by the Ministry of Personnel. Two of Fan's followers were also punished for their proposal of the review.\(^{242}\)

As mentioned above, the review was not initiated by Fan; it was first proposed by Hu Shunzhi 胡舜陟 (1083-1143) at the beginning of Jingkang period\(^{243}\) and later attempted again on November 19 of 1128. Such reviews were all stopped.\(^{244}\) On July 17 of 1130, Fan performed a partial review, correcting eighteen items.\(^{245}\) We now ask why the review, that had been intended to rectify corrupt practices in the past, was so difficult to carry out? What reasons triggered many officials to object to this policy, other than their personal interest would have been effected? Lü Zhong provided insight into this problem. He argued that Hu Shunzhi and Fan Zongyin were both advocates of the review, yet they were also appointees of Zhang Bangchang's bogus regime. Lü questioned which of the two crimes was more serious, benefiting from excessive rewards or accepting appointment from a rebel government. As a result, Lü criticized Fan of condemning people who had obtained undeserved rewards since Chongning and Daguan times while excusing officials who had served under the usurper during the Jingkang period. Lü described the situation as "the more Fan tried to cover up his secret, the more it would become known".\(^{246}\) The Song court was also concerned with the possible

\(^{241}\) YL, ch. 30, p. 589.
\(^{242}\) Ibid., ch. 46, pp. 827-8.
\(^{243}\) Lü Zhong呂中, "Ding maoshangling 定冒賞令" in Huangchao zhongxing dashiji 皇朝中興大事記, ch. 1.
\(^{244}\) YL, ch. 34, p. 664.
\(^{245}\) Ibid.
\(^{246}\) Lü Zhong呂中, "Ding maoshangling 定冒賞令"
repercussions that a review would unleash at a time when the Song was threatened by Liu Yu, who was then occupying areas south of the Yellow River.\(^{247}\)

Fan's performance as a chief councilor was not impressive. After he stepped down from office, the court had to reorganize with two Expediting Offices (Cuiqufang 催 驅 房) to facilitate the flow of official business since Fan had detained the process of most of the documents during his administration.\(^{248}\) Two months later, recently reinstated Attendant Censor Shen Yuqiu accused Fan of committing twenty major crimes; in consequence, Fan lost his last official assignment.\(^{249}\) From then on until his death five years later, Fan was irrelevant to Southern Song politics. After Fan was removed from office, the position of chief councilor was left vacant for a while. Taking this opportunity, Qin Gui reported to the emperor that he had two policies to "shock the world" (songdong tianxia 革 動 天下) but he had to be promoted as chief councilor in order to carry them out. Gaozong consented and appointed him Chief Councilor of the Right.\(^{250}\)

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\(^{247}\) Hong Mai 洪 邁, Ronzhai suibi 容 齋 隨 筆, v. 2, pp. 788-9.  
\(^{248}\) YL, ch. 46, p. 833.  
\(^{249}\) For details of the accusations, please refer to YL, ch. 47, pp. 850-1.  
\(^{250}\) Ibid., ch. 46, p. 835.
Chapter Seven: Qin Gui 秦桧 (1090-1155) I: A Peace Maker?

Qin Gui, styled Huizhi 會之, was a native of Jiangning 江寧 (Jiankang or Nanjing in modern times). In 1123, Qin received his jinshi degree and filled in the position of Instructor (Jiaoshou 教授) of Mizhou 密州 (in modern Shandong Province). Later on, he passed another exam which tested writing of imperial announcement and questioning of current affairs. He subsequently held the duty of Instructor Second-class of National University (Taixue Xuezeng 太學學正). In 1126, Qin reported to the throne four issues concerning military strategies: he suggested that the court cede only one circuit to the Jins; he urged the Song to make full preparations for war; he pleaded that all officials should participate in discussions and be informed of the court's policies toward the Jins; he proposed to accommodate the Jin envoys outside the palace, forbidding them to enter either the gate or go into the palace. He received no response. Qin was later promoted to the position of Vice Director of the Bureau of Operations (Zhifang Yuanwai Lang 職方員外郎) and soon afterwards he was assigned to assist Zhang Bangchang as Administrator (Gandang Gongshi 幹當公事). He refused this assignment three times for it was an assignment of ceding land contrary to his previous proposal. The court granted his request.\(^{251}\)

During the Jingkang period, the Song court had deliberated over ceding the three posts (Taiyuan, Zhongshan, Hejian) to the Jins after an unsuccessful ambush attempt against them. Qin Gui, then Acting Vice Minister of the Ministry of Rites, and other
officials were assigned as special envoys to accompany Prince Su 肅 to the Jin camp to discuss details of cession. When the Jin army retreated from the capital, Qin and another envoy returned to the court from Yan 燕. Censor-in-chief Li Hui and Hanlin Academician Recipient of Edicts (Hanlin Chengzhi 翰林承旨) Wu Qian 吳倦 jointly recommended Qin for the assignment. Qin thus advanced to Palace Censor and later Remonstrator of the Left (Zuo Sijian 左司諫). When the Song envoys returned with news that the Jins insisted on getting the land as well as refusing acceptance of the other offers the Song had promised, all the court officials assembled to discuss this issue. As mentioned before, Fan Zongyin and seventy other officials were in favor of conceding the land to the Jins. Qin and thirty-five others upheld their disagreement as the minority. Soon afterwards, Qin was promoted as Censor-in-chief. 252

Due to policy changes of the Song, the Jins could not get the land, thereupon launching their second invasion against the Song. On January 9 of 1127, the Jin army captured the Song capital, began a series actions of extortion and pillage. As a result, the two Song emperors Huizong and Qinzong were abducted to the Jin camp. Meanwhile, Song envoys brought back the Jin's demand that a leader with surname different from that of the Song imperial family name (Zhao 趙) should be made emperor ruling the Song people. Wang Shiyong 王時雍, then acting Regent of Kaifeng, summoned Song

251 SS, ch. 473, p. 13747. HB, v. 1, p. 266.
officials to execute Jin's demand, and supported Zhang Bangchang as the new emperor.\textsuperscript{253}

Wang's proposal intended to recommend Zhang, but did not have Zhang's name on it, causing other officials participating in this meeting to hesitate to sign their names on it. Witnessing this dilemma, Song Qiyu, later executed by Li Gang over this matter, wrote Zhang Bangchang's name, then showed it to other officials to gain their endorsement.\textsuperscript{254} Fan Qiong 范瓊 (?-1129), a military commander later executed by Zhang Jun, helped Wang Shiyong in forcing other officials into silence.\textsuperscript{255}

At this juncture, Investigating Censor (Jiancha Yushi 監察御史) Ma Shen 馬伸 said to the assembly that they should fulfill their duty by arguing with the Jins and not sit there without uttering a word. Qin Gui, then head of the censors, agreed to Ma's statement and volunteered to go to the Jin camp to debate the issue. He himself wrote an appealing paper to the Jins, claiming that he had been the emperor's attendant and a censor who received favors from the court that he had not yet paid back. Facing Jin's military pressure and its insistence on setting up a ruler with different surname, Qin declared that he had to risk his life to argue with the Jins, not only showing his loyalty to the Song but also explicating advantages and disadvantages between the two states. In his pleading, Qin mainly expressed his support of the Zhao family for their benevolent rulership; moreover, he stated his objection to Zhang ascending the throne, arguing he could not possibly gain support of people all over the country who were naturally going

\textsuperscript{253} YL, ch. 2, p. 49.
to be against him. After presenting his arguments, Qin immediately resigned from his office.\textsuperscript{256}

This brave act cost Qin of his freedom. The Jins captured him along with thirty National University students and ten Erudites (Boshi 博士).\textsuperscript{257} On April 20 of 1127, Zhang Bangchang was conferred the title of emperor by the Jins but soon after he pleaded for the return of Qin Gui and other officials who were against his ascension; his pleadings were refused.\textsuperscript{258} On May 13 of 1127, as the Jin army retreated from the Song capital, Qinzong and a few high officials, including Qin Gui, were abducted to the Jin state.\textsuperscript{259} Qin had then spent three and a half years in the enemy's territory. He was assigned to Wanyan Chang by Jin Taizong 金太宗 (r. 1123-1135), the Jin emperor and Chang's cousin, and used as an administrative official (renyong 任用). However, the Jin court praised Qin's virtues and performance during the precarious situation experienced by the Song court. Wanyan Chang also treated him well, and when he invaded the Song he took Qin with him. Qin secretly staged a plan with his wife and managed to take her and his followers to the south. On November 4 of 1130, they sneaked into the Song territory through Lianshuijun 濮水軍 (in modern Jiangsu Province), and when Qin identified himself to the local patrolmen he was suspected as a spy. Fortunately, a person with a

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{254} HB, v. 2, p. 235.
\bibitem{255} Ibid., v. 2, p. 412.
\bibitem{256} Ibid., v. 2, pp. 236-8. YL, ch. 2, pp. 49-52.
\bibitem{257} YL, ch. 2, p. 53.
\bibitem{258} Ibid., ch. 3, p. 83.
\bibitem{259} Ibid., ch. 4, p. 87. The dates recorded in the HB for Huizong and Qinzong to leave the Song are different from those in the YL. We accept YL's record.
\end{thebibliography}
Cultivated Talent (xiucai 秀 才) degree pretended to know Qin and saved his life. Qin managed to return to the Song court through a sea route.²⁶⁰

There were some debates over Qin Gui's mysterious return and the possibility of his executing a mission for the Jin. Of the doubting people, Zhu Shengfei argued that Qin helped Huizong to negotiate peace with Jin emperor when they were in the Jin state. The Jin emperor thus rewarded him heavily and expected him to be the mediator between the two states. Zhu also raised three points of doubt: first, Qin was detained with three other high-ranked officials of the Song but he was the only one who managed to return; secondly, the distance from Yan 燕 to Chuzhou 楚州 was roughly two thousand five hundred li 里, raising questions how Qin escaped undetected throughout the route; thirdly, Qin returned with his wife and left no hostages in the Jin camp. Zhu suspected Qin advocated peace in the Jin court that Wanyan Chang allowed him to return.²⁶¹

When Qin returned to the Song court, he was granted an audience with the emperor. He claimed that he killed his guard and hurriedly escaped with a boat. Fan Zongyin and Li Hui, then chief councilor and Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, both recommended Qin's loyalty to the emperor.²⁶² Qin then presented his famous proposal "Nan zi nan, bei zi bei 南自南, 北自北", meaning that the Song in the south and the Jin in the north should peacefully coexist. He suggested to negotiate peace with the Jins through Wanyan Chang. Obviously, Qin had some sort of mutual

²⁶² HB, v. 2, p. 185.
understanding with Wanyan, if he was not his actual spokesman on this matter. Qin's appearance in the Song court pleased Gaozong, who was probably the only person to understand the whole picture of Qin's plan.\(^{263}\) When Fan Zongyin presented a Letter of State (guoshu 国书) written by Qin to the emperor, Gaozong said that he could not sleep because of the joy of recovering such an honest and loyal person, as well as the information about the two Song emperors and his mother. He then ordered Liu Guangshi to write a personal letter to Wanyan, instead of a Letter of State. Fan recommended Qin's appointment as Participant in the Classics Colloquium (Jingyanguan 经筵官), a counseling position for the emperor. Gaozong preferred Qin to assume the duty of Minister of Rites (Libu Shangshu 礼部尚书) because it required less of a workload. Although the Song court had sent out many envoys to the Jin, it had no consistent policy and vacillated between defense and peace. Of importance to Gaozong was the fact that since Qin's return that the court had focused on peace negotiations with the Jins.\(^{264}\)

After being appointed as Minister of Rites, Qin made his first suggestion to the emperor. He reported the Jin cavalry had stayed north of the Yangtze and possibly gradually crossed the Huai River, intending to reach Haizhou 海州 (in modern Jiangsu Province) then invade Song by the sea route. He urged the court to pay extra attention to reconnaissance work by setting up intelligence network to detect the Jin's activities.\(^{265}\)

On March 2 of 1131, Qin was assigned as Reader-in-Waiting (Shidu 侍读), a duty

\(^{263}\) Gaozong later confessed that when Qin first proposed to negotiate peace with the Jins, he had already made up his mind; however, he was obstructed by popular opinion and could not settle this issue until a long time later. See YL, ch. 158, p. 2564.

\(^{264}\) YL, ch. 39, pp. 733-5. HB, v. 3, p. 185.
providing many opportunities to speak to the emperor; and only two weeks later, Qin was promoted to Vice Chief Councilor. As mentioned earlier, Fan Zongyin's proposal to review excessive rewards since the time of Huizong's rule caused an immense disturbance in the court. Because Fan insisted on putting it into practice, Gaozong was not pleased and accepted his resignation. Having served five months as Vice Chief Councilor, Qin seized upon an opportunity to persuade Gaozong to promote him; one month later, Qin advanced to the position of Chief Councilor of the Right.

After Fan stepped down from his office, Gaozong immediately summoned Lü Yihao back to the court. Two months later, Lü was appointed ahead of Qin as Chief Councilor of the Left. Qin had to share the government with Lü, and the power struggles began at once. They strove to consolidate their powers by promoting and removing officials.²⁶⁶ On occasion, they had common interest in one person: for example, Shen Yuqiu.²⁶⁷ Despite Gaozong's separation of their duties, with Lü and Qin in charge of military and general affairs respectively, their power struggles reached a climax that drew the emperor's attention. Gaozong issued an edict, with Qin Gui as its main target, warning officials against faction forming for selfish ends.²⁶⁸ In the meantime, Lü was appointed Commander-in-chief (Dudu 都督) and prepared to launch an offensive against the Jins. Qin, on the other hand, managed to set up a Governmental Reform Service (Xiuzhengju 修政局), a new office of which he was ordered to take charge. The

²⁶⁵ YL, ch. 39, p. 739.
²⁶⁸ YL, ch. 53, pp. 931-4.
division of duties allowed both men to have their own separate space for bringing their talents into play.

Lü Yihao's attempt to march the Song army northward suffered a big setback. First, his front line commander revolted and escaped, followed by sad news that Sang Zhong, a military commander who prompted Lü to initiate this operation, was reported to have been killed. To avoid further embarrassment, Lü halted the march by claiming himself to be ill and pleading to resign from office. Gaozong did not want to give up Lü and ordered him to return to the court. Qin Gui, in the meantime, was unable to capitalize on Lü's collapse as well as having to face challenges of his own from some officials at court. For example, Vice Chief Councilor Zhai Ruwen, who had been recommended to his appointment by Qin, had a procedural dispute with Qin that ended with scolding each other. Wang Juzheng, then Imperial Diarist (Qiju Lang) and a good friend of Qin, complained to the emperor that Qin neither fulfilled his promise to restore the Song, nor did he administer the government well. Wang pleaded with Gaozong to repeat his words to Qin. Angry to hear this, Qin immediately hated Wang. Lü, on the other hand, accepted advice that Qin should be seen as the leader of his own faction and should be removed from the court. Hoping to topple Qin, Lü formed an alliance with Zhu Shengfei, who was appointed to Associate Commander-in-chief (Tong Dudu). Meanwhile,

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270 YL, ch. 55, p. 972.
271 Ibid., ch. 55, p. 970.
272 Ibid., ch. 56, pp. 979-80.
officials of Qin's faction sent complaints to the throne accusing Zhu of not fulfilling his duty during the Huang-Wang administration resulting in causing the court to cross the Yangtze. Zhu was also criticized as being unfamiliar with military operations. Ten days after his appointment, Zhu was forced to return to his previous position.273

Due to Lü's strong recommendation, however, Zhu was allowed to change his assignment from Prefect of Shaoxingfu to a position very close to the emperor as Reader-in-waiting (Shidu 侍讀).274 Zhu's change of assignment triggered further explicit confrontations between Lü and Hu Anguo 胡安國 (1074-1138), one of Qin's favorite official, who had previously accused Zhu of dereliction of his duty, then followed by an all-out power struggle between Lü and Qin's faction. Hu was removed from his office despite Qin's submission of three petitions begging Gaozong to retain Hu at the court.275 Four days later, a series of dismissal announcements were made removing Qin's faction from the government. The last target would eventually be Qin Gui himself. Qin was accused of concentrating his efforts on negotiations with the Jins while disregarding restoration of the country. Lü Yihao and his followers also criticized Qin in front of the emperor. Gaozong thus summoned Qi Chongli 祁崇禮 (1083-1142), then Vice Director of the Ministry of War, to show Qin's proposal suggesting that people from north of the Yellow River be returned to the Jins, while people of the Central Plain be returned to Liu Yu, a puppet regime leader. Irritated by this statement, Gaozong said to Qi that Qin's strategy that southerners return to the south and northerners return to the north made the

emperor himself, as a northerner, wonder where he should go. Gaozong criticized Qin for not fulfilling his promise of "shocking the world" in the few months after becoming the chief councilor. Qin was forced to step down from his office, demoted to Academician of Guanwen Hall. His term of chief councilor lasted only a year.  

Nevertheless, his first term as chief councilor provided Qin Gui painful but useful lessons to hone his skills in the subsequent power struggles. Qin later returned to the court and henceforth turned into a formidable enemy for any political figure or faction against him. His famous proposal, presented immediately after he returned from the Jin and which provided him a rare opportunity to advance to the second highest position in the bureaucracy, was not put into practice because the Song-Jin relations during the time were not favorable: for example, there were intelligence reports indicating the Jins had built ships and recruited army. The Song court worried that the Jins may have intended to launch attacks, thus Lü Yihao suggested deploying troops at strategic points for interception. Gaozong believed the Song could induce the Jins to attack them. Contrary to general opinion, Qin Gui argued that a truce could be obtained if the Song decided not to fight the Jins. Gaozong disagreed.

Although he remained at the court when Lü attempted his northern expedition, Qin was not the one to direct the Song-Jin relations, so all he could do for then was to strengthen his power base at the court. However, the time was too short for Qin to

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276 YL, ch. 57, pp. 996-7.  
Ibid., ch. 57, pp. 999-1000. HB, v. 3, p. 261. Also, Qi Chongli 謝崇禮, Beihai ji 北海集, ch. 7, pp. 8b-10a.  
277 YL, ch. 57, p. 993.
consolidate his powers because Lü returned to the court only two months after leaving on the expedition. Qin's inability to capitalize on Lü's failure was devastated by Lü's counterattack using the joint force of Lü-Zhu alliance. Gaozong, in the meantime, could not openly support Qin's peace proposal. He confessed sixteen years later that he was obstructed by public opinion, despite agreeing to Qin's proposal, and thus the peace process was delayed. As a result, Qin had to retreat temporarily from the political stage, waiting for another opportunity to sell his peace proposal to the emperor again.

After defeating Qin at the court, Lü Yihao and Zhu Shengfei began to control Song politics. Their performance and interactions with the emperor will be discussed in the following two chapters.
Chapter Eight: Lü Yihao 呂頤浩 (1071-1139) II: An Exhausted Veteran

As mentioned above, Lü was removed from his office as Chief Councilor of the Right on June 2 of 1130, and was rescued by the emperor from the bandits two months later. On July 16, he was appointed Military Commissioner-in-chief (Anfu Dashi 安撫大 使) in charge of Jiankang Superior Prefectures and East Circuit of Jiangnan, and a concurrent duty as Prefect of Chizhou 池 州. Against the background that the Song had just set up their Outlying Forts system between the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, Lü was in charge of defenses along the Yangtze River as well as extermination of brigands. To strengthen his military powers, Lü requested deploying 50,000 troops in the areas around Jiankang with a few Commander-generals (Tongzhiguan 統制官) under his direct command. Moreover, he pleaded for the mission of arresting a few leading bandits. The court granted permission to Lü nearly all of his requests and proposals. His pleading that one of the Pacification Commissioners be put under his command was denied by the emperor because he feared the entire deployment of Outlying Forts (fanzhen 藩 鎮) would be altered, should any the commissioners leave his vital post.

Lü was occasionally defeated by bandits, yet he never stopped his military operations. Gaozong praised Lü's bravery but also criticized him as light-minded in launching attacks without considering his strength versus that of the enemy. Lü, as the emperor indicated, should be ordered to act cautiously after his setback and assisted later

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279 YL, ch. 34, p. 666.
280 Ibid., ch. 37, pp. 701-3.
by reinforcements arranged by the emperor. Obviously, Gaozong had an insight into Lü's strength and weakness and knew how to compensate for it. Lü was successful overall both in pacifying and suppressing the bandits. As a result of Lü's contributions, the Song focused its attention on management of the areas south of the Huai River. Lü and other prestigious officials, such as Zhu Shengfei and Liu Guangshi, were entrusted with concurrent duty as Pacification Commissioner (Xuanfushi 宣撫使) of Huainan 淮南 (south of the Huai River).281 After one year's struggle with the bandits, Lü's hard work paid off. When Fan Zongyin's review of excessive rewards backfired, Gaozong promptly replaced him with Lü. In the meantime, Qin Gui convinced the emperor that he could "shock the world" if appointed chief councilor. However, Lü was appointed Chief Councilor of the Left, one rank above Qin's, and granted the special honor of appointment as Lord Specially Advanced (Tejin 特進) along with concurrent duty of Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs.282

During an audience with the emperor, Lü presented his first proposal suggesting defense against foreign aggressions could be achieved only after suppression of domestic bandits. Based on his personal experience, Lü detailed activities of the bandits still roaming the country and those areas where the bandits would cause the worst damage.283 Lü accordingly prioritized domestic problems, believing that by solving these problems, defense against Jin invasions could be more readily assured. He meanwhile urged the court to decide as soon as possible on the seat of government's location because there

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281 YL, ch. 44, p. 795.
282 Ibid., ch. 47, p. 847.
were still some monstrous bandits around the Yangtze and Huai Rivers. Two months later, Gaozong moved from Yuezhou to Linan. In addition to his serious concerns over matters of strategy and conquest, Lü also demonstrated the pragmatic side of his administration by proposing to have commercial relations with Liu Yu's controlled areas in the north. Moreover, he and Qin Gui jointly suggested utilizing financial resources of the East and West of Guangnan Circuits (Guangnan Dongxilu 廣南東西路) to compensate for shortage of the two circuits of Jinghu 荊湖. Despite Qin volunteering for the assignment, Gaozong appointed Li Gang as Pacification Commissioner of Jinghu and Guangnan circuits, and concurrently as prefect of Tanzhou 潭州 (in modern Hunan Province).

Six months after assuming the post of chief councilor, Lü shifted his attention from domestic problems to a more daring business, the northern expedition. As mentioned before, Sang Zhong begged the court to send military forces to Huainan 淮南 (south of the Huai River) to assist him in recovering the capital. Convinced of Sang's commitment, Lü resolved to dispatch troops to help Shang, subsequently appointing him Commander-general (Tongzhi 綱制). Why did Lü shift his focus when domestic problems, particularly the bandits, were still unsettled? Why did he consider it important to coordinate engagement in the first offensive military operation of Southern Song history with Sang, a military commander without great reputation? Was Lü's change of

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282 YL, ch. 47, p. 848.
284 Ibid., ch. 50, p. 885. HB, v. 3, p. 246.
285 YL, ch. 51, p. 903.
286 Ibid., ch. 52, pp. 926-7.
policy a reaction to Qin's peace proposal, or was it merely a coincidence? A few assumptions must be made to answer these questions.

First, we know that Qin managed to advance to the position of Chief Councilor of the Right only one month before Lü's arrival at the court. According to the records, Gaozong believed that Qin had the ability to "shock the world" and thus promoted him. Moreover, as Gaozong later confessed, upon hearing Qin's proposal, he made his mind up for peace. The implementation process had been obstructed by public opinion, thus moving very slowly. When Lü returned to the court, he must have witnessed Gaozong shared a similar outlook with Qin on the issue of the Jin, despite the fact that he was called by the emperor immediately after Fan Zongyin's removal from office. In addition, Qin was well treated by the emperor not only for his courage during the Jin's occupation of the Song capital, but also for his bringing valuable information from the Jin state — including the condition of Gaozong's families and, more importantly, the intentions of Jin leaders. Despite his meritorious performance in dealing with the bandits, Lü's position was not secure when facing a political enemy like Qin. He had to make a daring attempt to impress the emperor.

Second, it seemed strange that Lü was easily convinced by Sang Zhong, placing himself in a bold attempt even though the domestic bandit problems were unresolved. A possible explanation is that his decision was connected to his personality. Lü was described as foolhardy while experienced in bureaucracy. After a year's actions against

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287 HB, v. 3, p. 256.
the bandits, Lü might have considered attempting something more grandiose and inviting such as "restoration" of the Song. Another explanation is that Lü may have been under tremendous pressure from Qin's faction and was forced to leave the court. However, Li Xinchuan has ruled out this possibility, clarifying that Lü's leaving the court was under Sang Zhong's direction, not the result of the pressure from Qin's faction. Nevertheless, Qin did attempt to topple Lü by forming alliances with prestigious officials at the court, and Gaozong issued a decree warning against factional struggles after witnessing the situation.

Third, it is possible that Lü's rushing into military operations against the northern enemies was a deliberate response to Qin's peaceful approach toward the Jins. Lü's northern expedition was preceded by Song successful creation of a buffer zone through setting up a system of Outlying Forts between the two states. The Jin, on the other hand, had a puppet regime established in north China, a measure taken to avoid direct confrontations with the Song. Lü's northern expedition was in a manner somewhat forced and unexpected. However, if put it in the context of a power struggle, it is highly possible that Lü rushed into action because he did not want the Song-Jin relations to be guided by Qin's proposal. Military action was a strong and self-explanatory statement demonstrating Lü's anti-Qin position. Nevertheless, had Sang Zhong not initiated the action, Lü would not have attempted to launch an offensive against the enemies. Sang's proposal was the catalyst that facilitated power struggles between Lü and Qin becoming

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289 YL, ch. 53, p. 932.
intense and obvious. Without a proper rationale, Lü could not have stood out and clearly revealed his own position in the face of Qin peace proposal. All in all, the northern expedition can be seen as part of that power struggle, despite inexplicit, that led to a showdown between the two factions headed by Lü and Qin.

The outcome proved that Lü's daring attempt was poorly planned, hence vulnerable. First Sang Zhong was killed and then Lü's front force commander revolted.²⁹¹ Lü was forced to declare feigned illness to avoid marching forward. Qin Gui meanwhile established and presided over the Governmental Reform Service (Xiuzhengju 修 政 局) and Zhai Ruwen, then Vice Chief Councilor, was assigned as an associate. Soon after, Zeng Tong 曾 統 , then Vice Director of State Farms Commission (Tuntian Yuanwai Lang 屯 田 員 外 郎), criticized the organization as redundant since the authority of chief councilors already covered everything. Qin turned a deaf ear to Zeng's opinion.²⁹² Meanwhile, Qin also faced challenges from Zhai Ruwen, his colleague. Although their dispute resulted in Zhai's ouster from the court, it was actually a warning signal of Qin's position growing insecure.

Gaozong urged Qin not only to focus on domestic affairs but also on improving military equipment in order to expel the barbarians.²⁹³ Gaozong did not want Qin to limit his responsibilities only to domestic affairs as the organization had been intended to do. Although he expected Qin to assume more duties, at the same time he retained his high

²⁹⁰ YL, ch. 53, p. 933.
²⁹² YL, ch. 54, p. 961.
²⁹³ Ibid., ch. 55, p. 974.
hopes for Lü's performance. Yet Qin's position at the court was so weak that he continued facing attacks from both his colleagues and friends. Wang Juzheng, an Imperial Diarist and Qin's old friend, questioned Qin's loyalty and sincerity in front of the emperor. Other officials even proposed to abolish the Governmental Reform Service to upset Qin. With political climate against him, Lü's setback due to his reckless attempt was not capitalized on by Qin, who was busy dealing with his own problems at the court.

Before returning to the court, Lü was advised by Xi Yi, prefect of Pingjiang, to target Qin as the leader of his faction and establish the final goal of removing Qin from the court. Lü's first step was making an alliance with Zhu Shengfei by appointing him as Associate Commander-in-chief. This move incurred attacks from Qin's faction. Unable to execute his original plan, Lü somehow managed to switch Zhu to the position of Reader-in-waiting, a duty with easy access to the emperor. The result was that all the criticisms against Zhu fell in vain. Anyone suspected of being a member of Qin's faction member was expelled from the court, turning the Song central government into a state of emptiness. Informed of accusations against Qin Gui from all sides, Gaozong ultimately removed him from his office. Qin was demoted to Academician of Guanwen Hall supervising Taiping Temple of Jiangzhou. A few days later, Zhu Shengfei advanced to the position of Chief Councilor of the Right.

After regaining power at the court, Lü recommended Han Shizhong's appointment as Pacification Commissioner of East and West Circuits of Jiangnan stationed in

\[294\] YL, ch. 56, p. 981.
\[295\] Ibid., ch. 57, p. 999.
Jiankang. Fearing the emergence of a potential competitor, Lü denied Li Gang, then Pacification Commissioner of four circuits (North, South of Jinghu and East, West of Guangnan), position and demoted him to Military Commissioner of only one circuit (South Circuit of Jinghu). Li Guang 李光 (1078-1159), whose acclaim for Li Gang as both awe-inspiring and "subduer of barbarians of the four corners", was removed from his office. Lü shared with the emperor the same distasteful feeling against Li Gang, thus was able to negate his return to the court. Three months later, Li Gang was accused of being recalcitrant and removed from his office.

Despite a previous unsuccessful attempt of a northern expedition, Lü continued his pleading to mobilize troops against the enemy during the summer time in order to recover the Central Plain. He provided detailed information about Song generals' forces, comparing current military strength with that of the founder of the Song. Lü described Liu Yu as ignorant and hopeless, and according to intelligence reports the Jins had not been spotted near the Huai River. Lü surmised that they must have been restrained by something. This situation was seen by Lü as a rare opportunity for the Song to advantageously fight back. Besides, all the crack troops were originally from the Central Plain. Lü argued that if they whiled away this advantageous timing, then any mobilizations in the future would be difficult. When Lü's proposal for attacking the enemies was discussed at the court, the majority of officials agreed with Lü, except for

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297 YL, ch. 58, p. 1011.
298 Ibid., ch. 58, p. 1014.
299 Ibid., ch. 61, p. 1047.
Hong Ni 洪栢 (1071-1145), then Minister of Rites. Hong argued that the emperor had in the same year just moved from Yuezhou to Linan and was not settled. Although some military commanders had achieved small victories by interceptions, a thrilling grand triumph was not foreseen. In addition, the current financial condition would not provide a strong support for Song armies engaging in a long range expedition. Hong argued that in their present situation the Song could at most talk about defense, but not about offense. Later in June of 1133, Lü again had an opportunity to dispatch troops, but the Song envoys returned from the Jin and the court decided to halt any military operations. With cancellation of this strategy, Lü was never presented with another chance again for the remainder of his term as chief councilor.

In addition to his performance on the military side, Lü also demonstrated his talents in tapping revenues for the state. For example, he levied 3,000 cash on every bag of salt in the Huai 淮 and Zhe 浙 areas, and henceforth unified the salt revenue laws. To increase income for the central government, Lü revoked the right of brewing wine that had been deferred to local government authority. Furthermore, he changed the laws governing salt administration of Huainan 淮南 (south of the Huai River) while imposing heavy penalty for smuggling. As a result, many families became bankrupt. Lü and Zhu Shengfei created a new tax, the so-called Yuezhuangqian 月倉錢, for supporting armies

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300 YL, ch. 60, pp. 1033-4. Lü Yihao, "Lun jubing zhishi 論舉兵之時," in his Zhongmu ji 忠穆集, ch. 2, pp. 5a-6b.
301 YL, ch. 60, p. 1036.
303 YL, ch. 58, p. 1012.
304 Ibid., ch. 59, p. 1025.
in the various circuits. In many prefectures and districts, when the required amount could not be fulfilled, people were levied unbearable taxation. The tax caused tremendous sufferings for people in southeast China. 305

Lü's most valuable contribution of his term of office was suppression and pacification of bandits. According to one counting, the number of bandit uprisings in various circuits dropped rapidly during Lü's administration. The decrease of uprisings was in proportion to the increasing number of bandits who had been pacified by the Song government. 306 Although unable to achieve distinguished service at the frontline against the enemies, Lü's performance in quelling domestic riots was remarkable. However, without a precise policy towards the Jin or the Qi (the puppet regime headed by Liu Yu), the climax of Lü's political life would soon come to an end. His proposals to the emperor only demonstrated his uncertainties in dealing with the Jin and he did not present a clear guideline to shape policies towards the Qi. 307 He urged the emperor to make arbitrary decisions by himself. 308 It was possible that Lü, an advocate of wars, had realized that Gaozong was inclined to peaceful negotiation, and dared not impose his will on the emperor since that might jeopardize his own career. On the other hand, he was not willing to accept peace as an alternative because he distrusted the Jins and perhaps he did not want to transform himself into a pacifist only to please the emperor. Either option would have placed Lü in a dilemma, and once again tested Gaozong's patience with him.

305 YL, ch. 66, pp. 1120-3.
308 Lü, Zhongmu ji, ch. 2, p. 16a.
Excessive rainfall and earthquakes cautioned Gaozong, following tradition, to heed the warnings of the Heaven. All officials were required to present proposals as how to adapt to the changes and to end these disasters. At first, Lü Yihao and other high ranked officials recommended penalties to the throne. Their recommendation was not answered. Soon afterwards, Attendant Censor Xin Bing 卞炳 reported to the emperor that ranking officials had no fear of Heaven's will and acted as they pleased. Recommendations previously presented by Lü and others, were again reviewed. Lü thus stayed at home waiting for punishment. By feigning illness, Lü pleaded permission to resign in the next month. Gaozong sent the Office Manger of Imperial Dispensary (Yuyaoyuan Ganban 御藥院幹辦) to accompany Lü to his office. Meanwhile, celestial phenomenal changes prompted censors to accuse Lü of his crimes. Because Gaozong did not support Lü's objection to abolishing the Chief Transport Office (Ducaosi 都漕司), Lü requested to leave the court and asked to resign again the next day. Gaozong still sent the Officer Manager of Imperial Dispensary to attend to him. Two days later, Zhu Shengfei reported that he had heard of floods occurring in Quanzhou 泉州. Gaozong told ranking officials that since the beginning of the Song, reports of floods had been presented to the court and were responded to by directives of tax exemption. Gaozong demanded explanation why the court had not been informed of earthquakes in Su 蘇, Hu 湖, and floods in Quanzhou.

309 YL, ch. 67, p. 1139.  
310 Ibid., ch. 68, p. 1143.  
311 Ibid., ch. 68, p. 1145.
Lü's already precarious position at the court was devastated by attacks from the Attendant Censor Xin Bing and the Censor-in-chief Chang Tong (1090-1149). On October 6 of 1133, Lü was removed from office and demoted to Military Commissioner (Jiedushi 節度使) of Zhennanjun and Commander Unequalled in Honor, the same honorable titles he received when previously removed from chief councilor's office three and a half years earlier. He was assigned a sinecure duty of supervising the Dongxiao Temple in Linan. In the meantime, Xin Bing complained the imperial announcement of Lü's removal did not contain any unfavorable comments. Lü, as Xin described, had been appointed chief councilor twice and his notorious fame was known to people of every walk of life; moreover, the emperor had made attempts similar to the last time to cover Lü's crimes by not stating them in the announcement. Xin's complaint resulted in a change of Lü's appointment. Lü's title of Lord Specially Advanced was resumed yet he was demoted to Grand Academician of Guanwen Hall, while his sinecure duty was kept the same. The announcement contained some slight criticisms of Lü's performance.\(^{312}\)

In February of 1135, Lü's honorable titles were restored by the Mingtang 茗堂 ritual ceremony, which customarily included a practice for the court to grant rewards to officials. Two months later, the court issued an imperial decree requesting all ranking officials to present proposals on strategies for offense and defense. Lü raised ten important issues; however, as mentioned earlier, he did not propose any clear-cut policies. Putting Lü's proposal side by side with Zhu Shengfei's, the differences can be easily identified. Zhu presented clear guideline towards the Qi regime, which Zhu

\(^{312}\) YL, ch. 68, pp. 1146-8.
labeled as usurping and bogus. Li Gang also made clear suggestions to the court. He proposed that the court stopped retreating and sending envoys to the Jin. He recommended the emperor establish court in Jiankang and station the three Marshals in strategic points to defend the Song.\(^\text{313}\) Obviously, Lü had lost his insight into future directions for his country. In November, Lü was reinstated as Military Commissioner-in-chief (Anfu Zhizhi Dashi 安撫制置大使) of South Circuit of Jinghu, and concurrently as the Prefect of Tanzhou 潭州.\(^\text{314}\)

In June of 1136, people living in the areas governed by Lü sustained tremendous loss from drought. Lü managed to withhold rice, which was supposed to be sent to the court, and requested a neighboring circuit to transport rice to help feed the people in disaster areas. Lü also used other measures to help resume agricultural activities and extend the deadline for tax payment. Consequently, many lives were saved by Lü.\(^\text{315}\)

During the same period of his office, Lü continued to suppress bandits inside his areas of control. In January of 1137, Lü was transferred to Zhexi 浙西 Circuit as Prefect of Linan and in March he was granted an honorable title as Junior Guardian (Shaobao 少保) and appointed Regent of Auxiliary Palace (Xinggong Liushou 行宮留守).\(^\text{316}\) In March of 1138, Lü was bestowed the titles of Junior Mentor (Shaofu 少傅) and Military Commissioner (Jiedushi 節度使) of Zhennan 鎮南 and Dingjiang 定江. He was also appointed as the Military Commissioner-in-chief of East Circuit of Jiangnan (Jiangnan

\(^{313}\) YL, ch. 87, pp. 1450-2.

\(^{314}\) Ibid., ch. 94, p. 1557.

\(^{315}\) Ibid., ch. 101, p. 1649.

\(^{316}\) Ibid., ch. 107, p. 1746 & ch. 109, p. 1776.
Donglu 江南东路) and the Supervisor of Jiankangfu (Pan Jiankangfu 判建康府) along with a concurrent assignment as Regent of Auxiliary Palace in Linan.\textsuperscript{317}

Despite the heavy responsibility entrusted by the court, Lü declined the appointment because of his physical condition. After begging the emperor, Lü was soon given another sinecure duty. In March of 1139, the Jin promised to return the areas south of the Yellow River, resulting in Gaozong wanting Lü to take over Shaanxi. Lü begged to return to Taizhou 台州 (in modern Zhejiang Province) in order to recuperate from illness. Lü presented a detailed report of the advantages and disadvantages of getting Shaanxi back while warning Gaozong to probe into the Jin's real intention. Lü died in the following month at sixty-eight.\textsuperscript{318}

Lü Yihao had been esteemed highly by Gaozong. When Lü was removed from the office of chief councilor, the emperor was reluctant to make critical censure words in his removal announcement. The emperor had saved his life from the bandits, and since then entrusted tremendous responsibility in him. Lü, on the other hand, did not disappoint Gaozong, having successfully, albeit not completely, removed the threat of bandits terrorizing the country. Unfortunately, when attempting to fight the enemies in the north, Lü had been frustrated first by treacherous subordinates, and then later by the Song court during peace negotiations. Gaozong seemed to know Lü well and realized how to make up for his shortcomings. While having made great effort in trying to restore

\textsuperscript{317} YL, ch. 118, p. 1904.
\textsuperscript{318} Ibid., ch. 127, p. 2061 & 2066.
the Song, Lü had never attempted to impose his own will on the emperor. This was probably the key to their successful relationship.

Why was he removed from the office of chief councilor for the second time? At the first glance, removal seemed to be caused by accusations of Lü's unresponsive attitude towards natural disasters. Gaozong ruled out this assumption for us. On a later occasion he said to Zhao Ding, who demanded punishment for the occurrence of earthquakes, that Lü was not dismissed for same reason. Lü, according to the emperor, had committed other crimes.\textsuperscript{319} To what were the crimes was Gaozong referring? In addition to Lü's inability to shape clear policies towards enemies such as the Qi and Jin, Lü had been accused of making other mistakes during his administration. For changing the tea and salt administration in order to make profits, he was criticized as "treading on the footsteps" of Cai Jing 蔡京 (1047-1126) and Wang Fu 王黼 (1079-1126), the two officials considered responsible for downfall of the Northern Song. As accused by the censor, Lü liked to promote his confidants as censors to strengthen his influence. On the level of personal virtues, Lü was accused of enjoying nightly banquets at which men and women mixed together.\textsuperscript{320} If one examines the ten crimes of which Lü was convicted, which were disclosed by Chang Tong, then Censor-in-chief, none of them constituted a serious problem for his administration. This might also explain why Gaozong was unwilling to see any degrading comments in his dismissal announcement.

\textsuperscript{319} YL, ch. 102, p. 1667.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., ch. 68, pp. 1146-7. The accusation that Lü was fond of wine and sensual pleasure was supported by other records. Ding Chuanjing 丁傳靖, Songren yishi huibian 宋人軼事彙編, v. 2, p. 706.
Was Gaozong influenced by the censors who incessantly impeached Lü? Or were there other reasons? We cannot positively identify the real reasons based on the records left to us. However, one possibility is that Lü did not execute policies according to Gaozong's real intention, that is, to reach a peace agreement with the Jins. Four months before his dismissal, Lü still planned to send troops to the north but the plan came to a halt because the court had just been given hope for negotiating with the Jins. Against this background, Lü situated himself in a dilemma that forbade him from attempting another northern expedition, yet he refused to rush into peace talks with the Jins only to please the emperor. The rapport between Lü and Gaozong had temporarily deviated from the right track. After Lü's removal, Zhu Shengfei became the only chief councilor at the court. In the following chapter we will continue discussing Zhu's political career starting from the year just after he was dismissed from the chief councilor's office for the first time.

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321 Lü Yihao, Zhongmu ji 忠穆集, ch. 2, pp. 16a-b.
Chapter Nine: Zhu Shengfei 朱勝非 (1082-1144) II: Ignorance of Military Arts is not a Bliss

As mentioned before, Zhu Shengfei stepped down from office to take responsibility for the coup. However, there was more punishment to come. Three months later in July of 1129, Zhu, then Grand Academician of Guanwen Hall and Prefect of Hongzhou, was deprived of his prefect duty and assigned a sinecure job supervising a temple. In his dismissal announcement, Zhu was blamed for not saving the throne in time and allowing the reign title to be changed. Obviously, Gaozong could not forget the humiliation he suffered during the coup nor forgive Zhu's compromise with the rebels at the expense of the emperor's dignity. At the end of the year when Zhu was ousted from the court, the Jin army invaded southeast China and the emperor was forced to flee to the sea. As a result, Lü Yihao, Zhu's successor, was impeached by Zhao Ding, then Censor-in-chief, and about to receive punishment.

Against this background, Zhu was reinstated on May 6 of 1130 as Pacification Commissioner of West Circuit of Jiangnan, South and North Circuits of Jinghu. Then residing in Hunan 湖南, Zhu was reluctant to accept the appointment. Two months later his appointment was changed to Military Commissioner-in-chief of Jiangzhou Circuit and concurrently Prefect of Jiangzhou. In the meantime, Lü Yihao was assigned Military Commissioner-in-chief of Jiankang Special Prefect and Circuit and concurrently

323 Ibid., ch. 32, p. 630.
Prefect of Chizhou. Their appointment established a precedent that any official ranked as two (the second highest in a scale of one to nine) as military commander should be appointed the Military Commissioner-in-chief to differentiate them from a Military Commissioner (Zhenfushi 鎮撫使). Upon learning of the new appointment, Zhu Shengfei pleaded to be assigned somewhere near his present location for fear that he was not competent for the new position. Zhu declared he had not built a faction at the court and his behavior was only known to the emperor; therefore, he would commit dereliction of duty if he accepted the appointment; but, if he declined the appointment he would be suspected as avoiding his duty. Either way, Zhu argued he was liable for severe punishment. The emperor denied his request. Gaozong ordered that all the tax money, rice, silk cloth, armor, which should be sent to the imperial treasury, instead be given back to Zhu, then in Guiyang 桂陽 (in modern Hunan Province); moreover, the court also granted him five hundred dudie. All these were given to Zhu for military expenses. In spite of these privileges, Zhu did not report to his assignment until five months later.

On March 18 of 1131, Zhu presented an important report to the throne, indicating that war ravages originated from three groups of people: the Jin army, the local bandits, and the roaming outlaws. Zhu claimed that the Jins had not come to the south since last winter; the roaming outlaws were actually notorious bandits from north of the Yangtze

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324 YL, ch. 34, p. 666. The circuits, which Zhu and Lü were in charge, were under military and strategic division and they were not administrative units. Please see YL, ch. 33, p. 653.
325 Ibid., ch. 34, p. 666. HB, v. 3, p. 145.
326 YL, ch. 36, p. 687.
327 Ibid., ch. 38, p. 723.
and had moved to the southeast since last autumn; the so-called local bandits had caused more and more devastation. Zhu suggested that the problem of local bandits resulted from heavy taxes levied on southerners whose assets were generally scarce. He urged the court to alleviate their tax burden and punish corrupt officials to console the exhausted people. Zhu also suggested that bandits in the east and west should be pacified, while the notorious bandits in the northwest should be appointed as officials. By doing so, Zhu believed, all the wandering people could find settled locations, and the problems would ultimately be solved. Moreover, if the court removed the old, weak and those unwilling to join the army from the captives, it would retain only crack troops who would be distributed among all military units. As for dealing with the local bandits in the Jiangxi areas, Zhu first described the pitiable living conditions witnessed along the way of his travels through those areas. He then suggested that the emperor issue personal leniency decrees to pacify their leaders, who were then to be conferred official titles or recruited into the army; they were then to disband their groups of followers, allowing to return to their old jobs. Unfortunately, Zhu's memorial, which detailed the sufferings of people, was curtailed by the incumbent chief councilor Fan Zongyin, who was unaware of people's hardship because he had never experienced duties in the local government as well as loathing unpleasant reports.328

In addition to the duty of Pacification Commission-in-chief, Zhu Shengfei, Lü Yihao and Liu Guangshi, were also assigned to pacify areas of south of the Huai River.

328 YL, ch. 42, pp. 768-9. HB, v. 3, p. 223. The recorded date of this memorial by both sources was two months apart.
Although the Song court entrusted him with great duties, Zhu was not enthusiastic with the assignment. He did not arrive at Jiangzhou, the location of his new office, until one year after the court’s announcement. Zhu, moreover, complained that his title was serious but not commensurate with the supplies and troops he had possessed, so in reality he was no more than a district magistrate. As a result, Zhu was criticized as procrastinating in his assignment and arriving at his office only after the bandits were cleared away one year after his appointment. A few months later, Zhu was impeached by Palace Censor Shen Yuqiu, who was favored by both then chief councilors Lü Yihao and Qin Gui, for so delaying his rescue of Jiujiang that it was captured by bandits. Zhu was demoted to Grand Master of Palace (Zhong Dafu 中大夫) with his branch office in Nanjing, but was ordered to lodge in Jiangzhou.

Six months later, Zhu was allowed to free himself from staying in Jiangzhou. Under the recommendation of Lü Yihao, then Chief Councilor of the Left, Zhu was reinstated, one month later, as Grand Master of the Left for Court Service (Zuo Xuanfeng Dafu 左宣奉大夫) and assigned both a sinecure duty and concurrently Reader-in-waiting. Less than a month afterwards, Zhu resumed his position as Academician of Guanwen Hall with concurrent duty as the Prefect of Shaoxing 绍興. Step by step, Zhu was able to enter the power center again, becoming an assistant to Lü Yihao in his power struggles against Qin Gui. As mentioned, Lü’s northern expedition was halted by two incidents. Lü sensed that his position as the highest official was vulnerable after that

329 YL, ch. 46, p. 831.
330 Ibid., ch. 48, p. 856.
setback and had to figure a way for removing his chief enemy, Qin Gui, from the court. Based on his consideration of a group to group strategy, Lü recruited Zhu into his faction. Having been called up by the emperor, Lü returned to the court and immediately recommended Zhu as Associate Commander-in-chief and his aide to topple Qin Gui at the court.\(^{333}\)

However, Zhu's appointment caught the serious attention from Qin's faction. Zhu was assailed with all kinds of charges. For example, he was blamed for following every decision Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan had made, and causing the emperor to cross the Yangtze. Zhu also neither rejected Huang-Wang's courteous treatment of Zhang Bangchang, nor did he become a martyr during the Miao-Liu military coup. Based on the foregoing charges, Zhu's loyalty was challenged. As for his ability for the appointment, Zhu was denounced as not versed in military arts and thus not qualified for the position.\(^{334}\) Although Zhu's advancement was denied, Lü managed to resume Zhu's duty as Reader-in-waiting. This incident triggered another round of power struggles involving many people. The result was that Qin Gui and his followers were removed from the court. Qin was labeled as concentrating his effort on peace negotiation and blocking the restoration of the country. Qin was also accused as building a faction, holding total power, and, hence, becoming unrestrained. Among all the charges, the most lethal one

\(^{331}\)YL, ch. 54, p. 951.
\(^{332}\)Ibid., ch. 54, p. 963.
\(^{333}\)Ibid., ch. 56, p. 985. HB, v. 3, p. 259. The date on both records is eighteen days apart.
\(^{334}\)YL, ch. 57, pp. 989-90.
targeted his proposal previously used to solicit the emperor's reward. Gaozong sided with other anti-Qin officials and temporarily sealed Qin's fate.\textsuperscript{335}

After removing Qin from the court, Zhu immediately succeeded his position as Chief Councilor of the Right.\textsuperscript{336} Zhu suggested that chief councilors possessed onerous duty and great power, hence should not be entrusted with military commands. He argued that if the position of chief councilors was occupied by mean people who held both civil and military authority, the situation could become uncontrollable. Zhu recommended that Lü Yihao's concurrent duty of Command-in-chief be removed, and that Meng Yu 蒙庾, Vice Chief Councilor and Acting Associate Commander-in-chief, be given his military assignment.\textsuperscript{337} One month after assuming the role, Zhu proposed managing the areas north of the Huai River. First, he urged the court to send troops to fight the Qi because Liu Yu was imposing a tithe, thereby accumulating revenues to support his army, while the Song was growing closer to a crisis of supply shortage. Secondly, Zhu presented a strategy to distract the rebels in order to capture Liu Yu. Thirdly, while worrying the allying bandits might invade the south, he urged the court to become active in attacking the Qi army. Fourth, he suggested that upon sending troops, all the military commanders should be ordered that all the seized gold and silk be used as rewards. Fifth, local ruffians who could help the Song army should be appointed defense commanders

\textsuperscript{335} YL, ch. 57, pp. 999-1000.
\textsuperscript{336} Ibid., ch. 58, p. 1006. HB, v. 3, p. 262.
\textsuperscript{337} YL, ch. 58, p. 1013.
and equipped to defend against invaders. The Central Plain, as perceived by Zhu, would be recovered in a matter of two to three years. Gaozong consented to his proposal.\(^{338}\)

Zhu's duty as chief councilor was interrupted by his mother's death, resulting in his absence from the court from May to August of 1133. Two months after his return, Lü Yihao was impeached by censors for not reporting the recent disasters to the throne. Feigning illness, Lü begged to be relieved of his duty. Meanwhile, Zhu reported floods occurred in Quanzhou, resulting in unexpected irritation of Gaozong, who, in turn, blamed ranking officials for withholding the information.\(^{339}\) Two days later, Lü was removed from his office of Chief Councilor of the Left along with all concurrent duties. Zhu became the Song's only chief councilor, thus given an opportunity to demonstrate his ability to the fullest extent.

The most important issue faced by Zhu was that of defense against the Jins, especially during the autumn time. At that time, all military commanders maintained large numbers of troops, but were not assigned, by the court, with responsibility for any specified circuits. After assuming the chief councilor's duty, Zhu began to discuss the possibility of dispatching all commanders to occupy key posts and assigning each commander a particular circuit as his fixed responsibility.\(^{340}\) On the other hand, unlike his attitude towards the Qi, Zhu did not want to confront the Jins and prepared for peace negotiations. In January of 1134, a Song official suggested that the court establish Imperial Temple (zongmiao 宗廟) at Linan. This proposal incurred heated debates and

\(^{338}\) YL, ch. 59, p. 1027.
\(^{339}\) Ibid., ch. 68, p. 1145.
was criticized as negating the attempt of restoration. Zhu, a peace advocate, agreed to this suggestion and reported it to the emperor, who ultimately decreed to build the Temple. As part of his rational option, Zhu urged the emperor to abolish the office of Area Command (Dudufu 都督府), headed previously by Lü Yihao and Meng Yu, after completion of the yearly autumn defense to encourage military commanders to render their devotion. The office was abolished in March of 1134 and Meng Yu was ordered to return to the court.

Like his predecessors, Zhu, as the leader of the bureaucracy, could not avoid challenges. As mentioned earlier, Zhu was criticized as being unfamiliar with military affairs. Moreover, he often made no comments on things that incurred contempt from Xu Fu 徐敷 (1075-1141), then Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Later on, when Zhao Ding became prominent at the court, Zhu also sensed a threat from him. When Zhu and Meng Yu, the latter then Vice Chief Councilor, were both assigned to head the Bureau of Military Affairs, the censors claimed that the person who held the reins of government (indicating Zhu) was not versed in military arts, hence Zhao Ding should be informed of the Bureau's business. Zhu became even more jealous than previously. When Zhao was ordered by the court to Sichuan to fill in position Zhang Jun had

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341 YL, ch. 71, pp. 1190-1.
342 Ibid., ch. 73, p. 1213. HB’s record indicates that Zhu was taking on an aggressive approach and planned to take Jing 襄, Xiang 襄 and therefore suggested the court to remove the office of Area Command to encourage military commanders to exert their efforts. See HB, v. 3 p. 317.
343 YL, ch. 72, p. 1206.
344 Ibid., ch. 77, p. 1263.
previously occupied, Zhu first showed his indifference to Zhao's appointment, and then later criticized Zhao's requests for the title and supplies.\textsuperscript{345}

What of Zhu's performance during the time when he was the only chief councilor of the Song? As mentioned above, he was superior to Lü Yihao by showing a clear policy towards the Qi. He suggested launching attacks on the Qi, capturing Liu Yu, and involving the Song in active management of the areas north of the Huai River. To solve the problem of unspecified responsibilities for military commanders, Zhu suggested that each commander be assigned a fixed circuit that should not be changed. While perceiving the Qi as the major target, Zhu's policy towards the Jin was moderate and uncertain. When the joint force of Qi and Jin invaded the Song, Zhu retreated from a decisive position and yielded it to Zhao Ding, a man with more talents in crisis management. He did not leave his performance in the military area a blank sheet. During his term of office, Zhu made an active proposal and put it into practice. He suggested that the Song recover Xiangyang, then occupied by Li Cheng, a former bandit and military commander under Liu Yu. Gaozong and Zhao Ding both favored Yue Fei for the job.\textsuperscript{346} As a result, Yue Fei recovered Yingzhou (in modern Hubei Province), and Xiangyang the following month.

Zhu can be described as a cautious and restrained person who was not fond of faction building or power pursuit. Although not versed in military arts, he had been

\textsuperscript{345} YL, ch. 79, p. 1291 & 1293; ch. 80, p. 1305.
\textsuperscript{346} Ibid., ch. 75, p. 1241. HB, v. 3, p. 334. HB's record gives Zhu credits for setting the military to order yet YL's report sticks to facts and does not relate Zhu's effort to military success of the Song. It is most likely that the impression of Zhu's ignorance of military affairs forbade Li to give him any credit.
entrusted with a burdensome duty as regional commander. Zhu's performance in his assigned region was not the major reason for advancement to the second highest rank in the civil service. It was rather because he accidentally involved himself in power struggles at the court, and was then considered an important ally for Lü Yihao to defeat Qin Gui. Gaozong, on the other hand, seemed to show no objection or reluctance to Zhu's advancement, either because he was under the influence of Lü or because of his personal judgment. If we hark back to the year of 1129 when Zhu was removed from the office of chief councilor, we remember that Gaozong had showed his trust of Zhu by asking for his recommendation for the next chief councilor. Therefore, Zhu's controversial proposal of demoting Gaozong's position to Grand Marshal during the time of the Miao-Liu military coup did not seem to matter that much in a later time. Gaozong had born no grudges against Zhu.

Zhu's political career was supposed to reach its climax as he became the only chief councilor at the court upon Lü's removal from office. However, his influence was gradually phased out from the core of decision making. The first sign was the involvement of Zhao Ding, then Vice Chief Councilor, with the Bureau of Military Affairs over Zhu's lack of military knowledge. When Zhao Ding was dispatched to Sichuan as Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner (Xuanfu Chuzhishi 宣撫處置使), Zhu expressed his bitterness and was reluctant to allow Zhao to possess the privileges as requested. When Zhao was ready to leave for his new post, the Song was threatened by invasion of the joint forces of Qi and Jin. The Song court was shocked by this report, resulting in Gaozong being advised to escape and disperse other junior
officials. Contrary to those frightened officials, Zhao Ding singularly urged the emperor to fight the enemies, arguing that it would not be too late to escape even if Song was defeated. Gaozong agreed to Zhao's proposal. Meanwhile, Attendant Censor Wei Qiang 魏矼 (?-1151) impeached Zhu for his poor performance since assuming the duty of chief councilor, and suggested the court accept Zhu's request to resign. A few days later, Zhu was removed from office and allowed to return home to finish his mourning period.347 Zhao Ding became the succeeding chief councilor and manager of the imminent crisis.

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Chapter Ten: Zhao Ding 趙鼎 (1085-1147) I: An Acclaimed Official

Zhao Ding, styled Yuanzhen 元鎮, was from Wenxi 聞喜 of Xiezhou 解州 (in modern Shanxi Province). At the age of four, he lost his father and was educated by his mother whose surname was Fan 樊. Zhao was versed in the classics, history, and all schools of thought. In 1106, he passed the civil service examination and received his jinshi degree. When responding to the test questions, Zhao condemned Zhang Dun 章惇 (1035-1105) as having damaged the country. After a few promotions, he was placed in Luoyang 洛陽 of Henan as magistrate. The contemporary chief councilor Wu Min 吳敏 (1089-1132) learned of his ability and promoted him to the Levied Service Section (Shicao 士曹) of Kaifeng, the capital. When the Jins invaded Taiyuan, the court discussed whether to cede the three posts to the Jin or not. Zhao argued that the land belonged to the ancestors and thus the issue should not be discussed. Subsequently, the capital was occupied and the emperors were abducted to the north. When the Jin attempted to install Zhang Bangchang, Zhao fled to the National University together with Hu Yin 胡寅 (1098-1156) and Zhang Jun, refusing to endorse the document which petitioned for Zhang Bangchang to be named emperor.348

After Gaozong ascended the throne, Zhao was appointed as Acting Vice Director of the Ministry of Revenue. In April of 1129, under Zhang Jun's recommendation to the

emperor, Zhao was promoted to Vice Director of the Bureau of Merit Titles of Department of State Affairs (Shangshu Sixun Yuanwai Lang 尚書司勳外郎).\(^{349}\)

Zhao later followed the emperor to Jiankang where he presented a memorial detailing advantages and disadvantages of the autumn defense against the Jins.\(^{350}\) The incessant rain prompted Gaozong to request frank remarks. Zhao suggested to remove from the imperial temple the tablet of Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021-1086), a Northern Song reformer who had been deemed responsible for the Song's decline. Gaozong accepted his proposal.\(^{351}\) In July of 1129, Zhao was promoted to Remonstrator of the Right (You Sijian 右司諫).\(^{352}\) In the same month, Zhao was transferred to the position of Palace Censor.\(^{353}\) Gaozong was very satisfied with Zhao's work and claimed that Zhao had made forty proposals since he assumed the duty of remonstrator and censor, and that all of them had been carried out.\(^{354}\) Three months later, Zhao advanced to the position of Attendant Censor because Censor-in-chief Fan Zongyin reported that appointing a Remonstrator as Palace Censor had not been practiced previously, and also because Gaozong appreciated him.\(^{355}\)

In January of 1130, when the Jin army was about to invade the Song, Zhao Ding proposed avoiding direct confrontation with the Jin by escaping elsewhere temporarily.


\(^{350}\) Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji 忠正德文集, ch. 1, pp. 1a-3a.

\(^{351}\) Ibid., ch. 1, pp. 4b-7. YL, ch. 24, p. 494. Zhao in later times had shown even more of his anti-Wang position. He often promoted people who claimed themselves disciples of the so-called Old Party as opposed to Wang Anshi's New Party.

\(^{352}\) YL, ch. 24, p. 498.

\(^{353}\) Ibid., ch. 25, p. 507.

\(^{354}\) Ibid., ch. 26, p. 526.
Then chief councilor Lü Yihao discussed with other officials the possibility of escaping by the sea. Because of this proposal, Zhao received another promotion, filling Fan Zongyin's former position as Acting Censor-in-chief while Fan was promoted to Vice Chief Councilor.\textsuperscript{356} Zhao and a few other officials followed the emperor to sea. When the Jin envoy reportedly entered Mingzhou 明州, Gaozong did not want to expose his location so he assigned Fan Zongyin to return to Mingzhou to meet the Jin envoy. Zhao and Wang Zao, the latter then Supervising Secretary (Jishizhong 给事中) and Auxiliary Academician (Zhixueshi 直學士), were both entrusted with the duty of Consultant of military affairs to accompany Fan.\textsuperscript{357} Du Chong was later defeated at the Yangtze River, resulting in blame of Wang Xie for not acting in concert with Du. Upon learning the Jins were building walls at Jiankang in preparation to remain through the summer, Zhao proposed urging Wang to advance to intercept the Jin army and redeem his crime. He also suggested that Liu Guangshi cross the Yangtze River to checkmate the bandits in Hunan area, and for Han Shizhong to either intercept the Jin or else meet Du Chong at Chu 楚 and Si 洙 to force the Jin army to retreat. If the Jins still occupied Linan and Jiankang, Zhao suggested the Song intercept them during the summer, since that was considered a favorable timing.\textsuperscript{358}

Zhao's political career reached another turning point when he openly opposed then chief councilor Lü Yihao on major issues. After Han Shizhong defeated and

\textsuperscript{355} YL, ch. 28, p. 559.
\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., ch. 29, p. 579. HB, v. 3, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{357} YL, ch. 30, pp. 589-90. HB, v. 3, pp. 89-90. Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch. 7, pp. 7a-b.
blocked the Jin army (who ultimately managed to retreat to the north), Lu urged the emperor to issue a decree claiming he was going to personally lead the army and return to Zhexi. Zhao disagreed to this proposal, arguing that the Jin had just returned to the north, and that the emperor should not return until Zhexi was quiet and all the enemies in Jiankang crossed the Yangtze River. He suspected the report of Han's success and worried that the Jin forces might return and clash with the Song troops.

Furthermore, Zhao argued that Wu and Yue (southeast China) were located at a corner, therefore not a good location for attempting to recover the Central Plain. On the other hand, Jing, Xiang (central China) had for its left side the area of Chuan (Sichuan), Shaan (Shaanxi), for its right side the Hu (Hu area), Xiang (Xiang area), and above it the area of Jing (the capital area). He suggested that the emperor move to Gongan (in modern Hubei Province), stationing the large forces in Xiangyang (in modern Hubei Province) as a protecting shield, and transport rice from Jiang (in modern Jiangsu Province) and Zhe (in modern Zhejiang Province) to support the troops in the Chuan-Shaan region. According to Zhao, this was the only blueprint to manage the great challenge of restoration. He also urged the emperor to forbid Zhang Jun from going too far into the frontline and order his commanders to hold their positions and to assist each other.

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358 YL, ch. 31, p. 605. Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch. 1, pp. 20b-21a. YL's record does not mention Han Shizhong; in fact, it repeats Liu Guangshi twice, which is obviously an error. It should be supplemented and corrected according to Zhao Ding's Zhongzhengdewen ji.
360 YL, ch. 32, pp. 630-1.
361 Ibid., ch. 32, p. 629.
Zhao's position on this issue was similar to that of Zhang Jun, and supported by Lü Yihao before Zhang left for Sichuan. Lü changed his mind because he was influenced by the scholar-officials of Jiang 江 and Zhe 浙 who did not want the emperor to leave their area. Lü later argued that the emperor should stay in Zheyou 浙右 and not attempt to go to Shu 蜀. Gaozong agreed, citing Zhang's report that said Sichuan could only store food for 10,000 people which was insufficient. Lü argued that if Gaozong entered Sichuan, the areas of Huai 淮, Zhe 浙, Jiang 江, Hu 湖 and even Min 閩, Guang 廣 would be captured by bandits. Fan Zongyin meanwhile supported Lü's decision. Although Zhang Jun pleaded for the emperor to at least temporarily lodge in E 鄘 (in modern Hubei Province), from where he promised to escort him to Sichuan; Gaozong denied the proposal.

The contradictions between Zhao Ding and Lü Yihao eventually developed into a power struggle. After the emperor returned from sea, Zhao and his subordinates impeached Lü for committing errors including his unrestrained power over military affairs and his excluding the Bureau of Military Affairs from the decision making process. Zhao also refuted Lü's proposal which had urged the emperor to lead the troops by himself. Upon hearing accusations against him, Lü moved Zhao to the Hanlin Academy. Zhao refused to accept the new appointment by citing a precedent initiated by Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086) who had previously refused such a new assignment by

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362 YL, ch. 27, p. 529.
363 Ibid., ch. 32, p. 625. According to a Song scholar, Lü was criticized as the culprit for urging Gaozong to settle in the southeast, yet Qin Gui was always blamed for this. See Ye Shaoweng 葉紹翁, Sichao wenjianlu 四朝聞見錄, v. 1, p. 37.
claiming himself not versed in the euphuistically antithetical style of writing (pian li zhi wen 骏儼之文).\textsuperscript{365} Zhao was then on sick leave, remaining at home. The court assigned him to another position, Minister of Personnel while Zhao again rejected. Zhao did not passively wait for his fate to be decided, and presented over ten memorials to the throne in accusation of Lü, who ultimately requested to leave his office. As a result, Lü was removed from office and replaced by Fan Zongyin.\textsuperscript{366} Soon afterwards, the court announced by the emperor's personal decree that Zhao was restored to his duty as Censor-in-chief. This prompted Zhao to report to duty immediately. Gaozong praised Zhao for his work and said that every time he heard about loyal remonstrators of the past, he felt regretful for not knowing them in person, yet he saw their qualities in Zhao.\textsuperscript{367}

In June of 1130, Zhao was promoted to Academician of Duanming 端明厅, Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs and concurrently as Acting Vice Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment. Ever since Huang Qianshan and Lü Yihao took the position of chief councilor, all military affairs had been put under command of the office of Commissioner of the Imperial Encampment, so the Bureau of Military Affairs had not had a leader appointed. After reviewing practices of the past, Zhao resumed all functions of the Bureau of Military Affairs, which was often referred to as West Administration (Xifu 西府).\textsuperscript{368} Upon assuming the new duty, Zhao helped restore the imperial guards and their organizations. But the real test to his ability was to find a proper way to deal

\textsuperscript{364} Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch 1, pp. 27a-28a.
\textsuperscript{365} YL, ch. 32, p. 631.
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., ch. 32, pp. 633-4. HB, v. 3, p. 129.
\textsuperscript{367} SS, ch. 360, p. 11287.
\textsuperscript{368} YL, ch. 33, p. 645.
with the Jin's invasion. On September 23 of 1130, the Jins invaded Chuzhou 楚州, a key post for the Song's defense along the Huai River. Zhao proposed to send Zhang Zun to the rescue. Zhang, however, refused the mission because he was afraid of Jin's strong military power. Despite that, Zhao volunteered to accompany Zhang to rescue Chuzhou, but Zhang still turned down the court's order. The court thus sent Yue Fei for the mission and asked Liu Guangshi to dispatch his troops for reinforcement.\textsuperscript{369} Although Zhao made alternative rescue attempts, Chuzhou was ultimately captured by the Jins. Meanwhile, Zhang Jun was defeated at Fuping 富平. The Song court was in a state of crisis.

When the Jin army remained around the Huai River, not retreating, then chief councilor Fan Zongyin reported to the emperor that they would not again cross the Yangtze River. Zhao disagreed with his assumption, arguing that the Song should not count on their not invading, but should be fully prepared for a Jin attack. Zhao also informed the emperor that the Three Departments, working slowly when not under enemy attack, often promoted talented people for the emperor and rectified politics, whereas the Bureau of Military Affairs often restored military discipline and replenished weapons in fear of enemy invasion. Both organizations achieved their intended goals. Gaozong was relieved by Zhao's information. In the meantime, intelligence reports indicated the Jins had moved southward through the grain transport route. The Song court was shocked by the news. Zhao said to Fan that if the court did not react to this in a timely manner, the previous Yangzhou debacle would be repeated. Fan disagreed,

\textsuperscript{369} YL, ch. 36, p. 695.
arguing the emperor's current location was in Kuaiji 會稽 (in modern Zhejiang Province) which was more favorable than Yangzhou. Zhao consented to this statement.\footnote{YL, ch. 38, p. 725.}

Despite his high esteem at court, Zhao also suffered some setback during this period. For instance, Gaozong intended to promote Xin Qizong from Supreme Commandants of the imperial army to Military Commissioner (Jiedushi 節度使) but Zhao refused to endorse this appointment. Displeased with his objection, Gaozong approved Zhao's request to resign. Zhao, with his original official appointment unchanged, was reassigned to a sinecure duty.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 39, p. 733. HB, v. 3, p. 185.} During Zhao's absence from the power center, a number of important things occurred: Fan Zongyin stepped down from the office of chief councilor; Qin Gui returned from the Jin state and was promoted to Chief Councilor of the Right; Lü Yihao was reinstated as Chief Councilor of the Left; and, Qin was ousted by Lü and replaced by Zhu Shengfei.

Almost two years later, Zhao regained his political prestige on November 30 of 1132 when he was appointed Prefect of Pingjiang 平江 Prefecture (in modern Jiangsu Province). On his way to the new post, Zhao's appointment was changed to Military Commissioner-in-chief of East Circuit of Jiangnan with a concurrent duty of Prefect of Jiankang Prefecture.\footnote{YL, ch. 59, p. 1025.} When Zhao arrived in Jiankang for his new duty, Meng Yu and Han Shizhong both stationed their troops inside the prefecture under Zhao's authority; moreover, his upright reputation earned during his term as Vice Chief Councilor and
Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs both fear and respect from the armies. As a result of his effective administration, the people were at peace and businessmen were willing to travel through this area.\textsuperscript{373} Four months later, Zhao was transferred to Military Commissioner-in-chief of West Circuit of Jiangnan and concurrently as the Prefect of Hongzhou 洪州 (in modern Jiangxi Province).\textsuperscript{374} Upon assuming the new duty, Zhao immediately reported the difficulties of providing supplies to the troops inside his circuit, as well as the challenges for a civil official like himself to produce revenue. He pleaded to the court to support him in order to meet both ends. Meanwhile, he also petitioned for dismissal from his duty, using as his excuse that his physical condition could not withstand the damp local weather; but the court rejected his request.\textsuperscript{375}

One month later, Li Heng 李横, a military commissioner, was encouraged by the court to recover Dongjing 東京. Zhao reported to the throne saying that Li led an undisciplined mob, and was forced to send troops because of their lack of food and other supplies. If attacked, Zhao argued, Li would lose Xiangyang to the enemies, the road to Chuan 川, Shaan 陝 would be blocked, and the circuits of Jinghu 荊湖 and Jiangnan 江南 would be shocked. Zhao pleaded the court to provide sufficient supplies to Li to enable him to defend the assigned area as well as forbidding him from attempting small

\textsuperscript{373} YL, ch. 61, p. 1049.
\textsuperscript{374} Ibid., ch. 63, p. 1079. HB, v. 3, p. 292. HB's record ascribes Zhao's advancement to Lü Yihao's recommendation that is not reported in YL. However, after two years of subsidence from the political stage, Zhao's comeback could not have been achieved if Lü had objected. Zhao Ding in his Zhongzhengdewen ji claimed that when he was appointed Prefect of Pingjiang, Lü was the chief councilor again and Zhao's two attempts of resignation were rejected. On his way to the new appointment, he was promoted to Prefect of Jiankang and Military Commissioner-in-chief of East Circuit of Jiangnan. See Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch. 7, p. 18a.
\textsuperscript{375} YL, ch. 64, p. 1085. Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch. 2, pp. 1a-3a.
victories. Gaozong was thus worried after reading Zhao's report. Results proved Zhao was correct; Li fled from a military setback that resulted in Xiangyang's loss to the enemies.

He also proposed to the court that Yue Fei be assigned to station his troops around Yue and after suppression the bandits of Qian (in modern Jiangxi Province), within the circuit Zhao governed. By doing so, Jiangxi's security could be guaranteed and Hunan, Liang Guang could also be protected. Although Yue had a Military Commissioner and an army over 10,000 troops, Zhao warned most of them were undisciplined, insufficiently equipped with weapons, and could not cope with any contingency. The court accepted Zhao's proposal, ordering Yue Fei to wait for a new assignment after the bandits were suppressed. Meanwhile, Li Heng and other military commanders were forbidden to march their troops unless directed by an imperial decree.

After Lü Yihao stepped down from the office of Chief Councilor of the Left, Zhu Shengfei became the only chief councilor in the court. As mentioned above, Zhu, unfortunately, was not versed in military arts. As a result, Zhao's dual role as a regional commander and a consultant to the emperor thus became more important, especially during the time when the Song had clashes with its enemies. In order to increase Zhao's commanding power, the court made an addition of "Zhizhi (Supervisor of) to

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376 YL, ch. 65, p. 1100. Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch. 2, pp. 3a-5b.
377 YL, ch. 65, p. 1109.
Zhao's original title. Yue Fei, in the meantime, was promoted as Pacification Commissioner (Chengxuanshi 順宣使) in charge of a defended area within Zhao's jurisdiction. The two worked side by side, taking charge of defense along the middle Yangtze River: Yue submitted himself to Zhao because of the latter's sincerity. A month later, Li Heng deserted Xiangyang after being defeated by the army of Liu Yu. Li worried that his record of looting for the survival of his troops would not be tolerated by the Song local officials, and thus his requests for aid would be rejected by some prefects along his retreat route. The result was exactly what Li expected, and he was ultimately denied access by the Military Commissioner of Hubei. Li was puzzled and undecided. At this juncture, the food supplies sent by Zhao Ding arrived. Li’s followers calmed down. Because some of his lieutenants who suffered in the same setback with him and headed for Hongzhou had been rewarded by Zhao with money and greeted at the border, Li was happy with Zhao's treatment of his subordinates, leading his troops to Hongzhou.

Zhao’s performance in the local area was outstanding yet he was needed more at court by the emperor. On April 4 of 1134, Zhao was promoted to Vice Chief Councilor. Upon the request of the emperor, Zhao recommended a number of people to the court before his arrival for the new appointment. Zhao gained more importance at the court not only because Zhu Shengfei, then chief councilor, lacked military knowledge but also

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378 HB, v. 3, p. 300. Zhao was entrusted with another concurrent duty as Military Commissioner-in-chief (Zhizhidashi 制置大使) along the Yangtzu River.
379 YL, ch. 68, p. 1152. Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch. 2, pp. 9b-13a.
380 YL, ch. 69, pp. 1172-3.
381 Ibid., ch. 74, p. 1222. HB, v. 3, p. 317.
Zhang Jun, an important civil official with military talents, was removed from his office of Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs in the same month as he advanced to Vice Chief Councilor. During an audience with the emperor, Zhu proposed taking over Xiangyang, which had previously been lost to the Qi state by Li Heng. Having known of Yue Fei's ability, Zhao recommended Yue to assume the duty of recovering Xiangyang. But in the meantime, Xu Fu, then Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs, opposed Zhao's proposal. Xu had often bragged of his military knowledge and despised Zhu and Zhao until the latter embarrassed him on one occasion, ultimately causing him to leave his post. From then on the Bureau was headed by Zhu and Meng Yu, but because Zhu was not versed in military affairs, the court ordered Zhao to become involved in the Bureau's business. Zhu was more jealous than ever because Zhao was entrusted with this great responsibility. The competition between them had, thus, become severe and more obvious.

Soon afterwards, Zhao advanced to a still higher position, yet was placed in an awkward situation. On August 24 of 1134, the court appointed Zhao Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs and dispatched him to Sichuan as Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner of Chuan, Shaan (Chuan Shaan Xuanfu Chuzhishi 川陝宣撫處置使), a duty previously held by Zhang Jun. Despite his attempt to decline this assignment, the emperor insisted that Zhao proceed to his new post because Sichuan was an important location and he was believed to be trustworthy. Gaozong granted Zhao many privileges.

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382 YL, ch. 75, p. 1244.
381 Ibid., ch. 77, p. 1263.
When leaving for the new post, Zhao was accompanied by many famous scholars. For fear that his official title, which involved many duties, was to be confused with those of other commanders in Sichuan, Zhao requested to have a more prestigious title easy to be identified as the supreme commander. The court changed his title to Commander-in-chief of Military Affairs of Chuan, Shaan, Jing, Xiang (Dudu Chuan, Shaan, Jing, Xiang Zhujunshi 都督川陝荊襄諸軍事). When Zhao asked for things which had been previously bestowed on Zhang Jun when the latter was assigned with the same duty five years earlier, Zhu disagreed. Yet, it was due to Zhao's persistent requests that Zhu eventually gave in. Before leaving the court, Zhao petitioned the throne, pleading for its total trust. By citing Zhang Jun's experience, from an initial relationship of mutual trust between the emperor and Zhang to the latter's being criticized and ultimately banished, Zhao anticipated a worse scenario for himself begging Gaozong to be more thoughtful of his situation. Moreover, he provided a detailed listing of resources he requested and the exact amount required.

When it seemed inevitable that Zhao had to leave the court, intelligence reports indicated that Jin's invading forces together with Liu Yu's army had headed for the Song. Some officials advised Gaozong to escape and to disperse all officials. Zhao, on the other hand, urged the emperor to stay and wait for initial reports of military engagements. Zhao argued that it was still not too late to leave even, after the Song was defeated. Gaozong adopted Zhao's proposal. Meanwhile, Zhu Shengfei was impeached.
by an Attendant Censor for lacking plans or their execution, and as incompetent for the
duty of chief councilor. Without defending his own position, Zhu presented eleven items
in pleading for resignation. In the meantime, Zhao reported daily to the emperor of his
plans for the war and secretly asked Zhang Zun to help him. Gaozong was urged, and
then decided, to personally lead the troops against the invading forces. Zhao remained at
the court and his career became more prominent as he was about to be appointed Chief
Councilor of the Right.388

Six days after Zhu stepped down from his office, Zhao replaced him as the new
chief councilor. Many officials celebrated his advancement.389 Having assumed the duty
on the eve of invasion by Jin-Qi joint forces, Zhao was given an opportunity not only to
prove his ability, but also to shape Song's policy towards the Jin. As mentioned above,
Lü Yihao had an uncertain attitude toward the Qi. Although Zhu Shengfei, his successor,
had made up this shortcoming by proposing to launch attacks against the Qi, he had to
ultimately step down from office because he was not familiar with military affairs. While
the Jin had attacked the Song stronghold in Sichuan, and then tried to lure the Song to
accept their arrangement resulting in Song ceding of territories north of the Yangtze to
Qi, the Jin-Qi joint invasion could be seen as a showdown forcing Song to succumb to
the terms demanded by it's enemies. In fact, the Qi had built an alliance with the most
powerful bandit group in the Song to disturb the peace; furthermore, because the Qi was
not confident in its own strength against the Song, so it had to convince the Jin to lend a

388 YL, ch. 80, p. 1313.
389 Ibid., ch. 80, p. 1318.
helping hand. On the other hand, through the effort of Lü Yihao, the Song had successfully suppressed many bandit groups, and leaving only a few remaining forces, like the one allied with the Qi, still roaming inside its territories. Against the background of the Song domestic situation being relatively peaceful, Zhao could pay more attention to foreign affairs, in particular the invasions.\footnote{Liu Jingzhen & Li Jinyun tr., Nan Song chuqi zhengzhishi yanjiu, pp. 111-4.}

While at the top of the bureaucracy, Zhao had to acquire supports from the emperor as well as that of all other groups that would effect the making and execution of his plans. For example, Gaozong once proclaimed with indignant feeling that for the sake of two captured emperors and the long distressed plight of the people, he had humbled himself to request peace. The Jins, however, had initiated yet another invasion, prompting him to decide to lead all forces to the Yangtze to fight a decisive battle. Having acclaimed Gaozong’s statement, Zhao indicated that the Song had for years avoided the enemies, thus fostering their arrogance. Since the emperor had decided to personally lead the troops, Zhao argued all commanders and soldiers thereby would be encouraged and the success would certainly be obtained.\footnote{YL, ch. 81, p. 1321.} While deciding to fight the Jins, Zhao faced challenges from still other officials. During the period when intelligence personnel reported imminent Jin invasion, some Censors and Remonstrators requested Zhao to reconsider his decision: Zhao refused to respond. When Attendants, Censors, and Remonstrators requested an audience with the emperor, Zhao remained with the emperor before their meeting urging Gaozong not to be influenced by the officials he was
about to grant a hearing. Gaozong, on the other hand, reaffirmed his support of Zhao's proposal, with some other officials pleading to follow him. The court, influenced by the emperor's firm decision, suddenly took a tough stance against the invading enemies.

The next group Zhao had to convince were the military commanders. Despite the fact that in normal times military commanders preferred engaging in battles pursuant to promotions, the grave situation at the time was even more complicated since Zhao wanted those commanders to not only support his decision to fight the enemies but to also support his insistence of the emperor's presence leading the frontline. While Zhao was asked to stay due to the alarming grave situation and not to leave for Sichuan, Liu Guangshi wondered why he was entrusted with such great responsibility. In Han Shizhong's words, Zhao was a person daring to venture forward at all costs. Han, however, urged the emperor to stay secluded in a safe place, allowing Han and other commanders to take care of affairs of war. After hearing opinions from military leaders, Zhao again worried that Gaozong's decision would be severely shaken thus he took urgent opportunity to advice the emperor, both keep him informed while preventing him from being misled by unsubstantial gossip.

Court eunuchs, a third influential group, also worried Zhao due to their influence on the emperor's decision making. Zhao pleaded with the emperor to make a timely arrival at the Yangtze River. However, when Zhao left upon obtaining the emperor's approval, eunuchs then tried to stop Gaozong from leaving Linan. Zhao frankly informed

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392 YL, ch. 81, p. 1323.
393 Ibid., ch. 81, p. 1328.
the emperor that military leaders as well as the civilian population all wished for him to lead the troops into fighting the enemy, while the eunuchs opposed. If the emperor arrived at the Yangtze River, all the Song armies would fight with their full strength against the enemy. These eunuchs, as Zhao indicated, failed to see the benefits for the emperor to lead the army to war. He pleaded to Gaozong to command all chief eunuchs to the imperial hall to be treated with a banquet by Zhao. Gaozong consented. Taking advantage of the opportunity, Zhao ultimately convinced the eunuchs to support his proposal and not to impede the emperor.\footnote{\textit{YL}, ch. 81, p. 1337. \textit{HB}, v. 3, p. 381.}

With the problems above described solved, the question following was how to deal at the same time with the two enemies, the Jin and Qi, how to treat them in a reasonable way, and how to determine a proper cause. In order to strengthen his counseling power, Zhao recommended that Zhang Jun be reinstated.\footnote{Zhao Ding, \textit{Zhongzhengdewen ji}, ch. 3, p. 2a.} On October 26 of 1134, Zhang was appointed Academician of the Hall for Aid in Governance (Zizhengdian Xueshi 資政殿學士), supervising Wanshou Temple, while concurrently Reader-in-waiting (Shidu 侍讀).\footnote{\textit{YL}, ch. 81, p. 1337. \textit{HB}, v. 3, p. 381.} To the emperor, Zhao praised Zhang as peerless among contemporary ranking officials and could be entrusted with great responsibility.\footnote{Zhao Ding, \textit{Zhongzhengdewen ji}, ch. 3, p. 2a.} Upon consulting Zhao's opinion, Gaozong promoted Zhang to the position of Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs just one month after his reinstatement. In order to suppress contentions about Zhang's appointment, Gaozong issued a personal decree certifying Zhang's advancement and ordering the Institute of Academicians (Xueshiyuan...
to issue a posted announcement. In fact, Zhao acclaimed Gaozong for accepting his recommendation of Zhang, urging the emperor to make a formal announcement to prevent him from being attacked by the censors.\(^{398}\)

Unlike the Song's earlier attitude towards the bogus regime, in November of 1134 it declared Liu Yu, the leader of Qi, a treacherous leader. Gaozong claimed that he had humbled himself by sending envoys to the Jin pleading for peace, but Liu Yu had sowed discord between the two sides, provoking the Jin to invade Song. The Song court could no longer addressed Liu's regime with the title of Qi and began condemning Liu's crimes.\(^{399}\) The Song had heretofore obviously skillfully avoided confrontations with the Jin. By blaming Liu Yu, the Song implied that it was willing to negotiate peace with the Jin, yet Liu's regime blocked such efforts resuscitating its removal in order to restore direct communication. Zhao Ding also suggested that the court issue an imperial proclamation promising to forgive those who had been officials under the bogus regime if they returned to the Song. Gaozong agreed to this proposal, and also blamed himself for not holding the Central Plain and causing scholar-officials to be insulted by the usurper.\(^{400}\) The imperial proclamation was issued three weeks later and it was aimed at two major targets: Zhang Xiaochun 張孝純, the Qi's Chief Councilor of the Right, and Li Chou 李肇, Qi's Prefect of Gunzhou 児州 (in modern Shandong Province).\(^{401}\)

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\(^{396}\) HB, v. 3, p. 378.

\(^{397}\) YL, ch. 81, pp. 1325-6.

\(^{398}\) Ibid., ch. 82, pp. 1351-2. HB, v. 3, 384.

\(^{399}\) YL, ch. 82, p. 1346.

\(^{400}\) Ibid., ch. 82, pp. 1353-4.

Despite the Song efforts, the Jin and Song were about to confront each other at the lower Yangtze River. Zhang Jun went to Zhenjiang to oversee the troops at a time when the Jins were building boats in Chuzhou (in modern Anhui Province) in preparation for crossing the Yangtze. Zhao Ding, on the other hand, urged the emperor to rush to Chang, Run (both in modern Jiangsu Province and south bank of the Yangtze) to personally lead his imperial army to attack the Jins as they crossed the Yangtze. Zhao suggested that if the Jins could not be checked, the emperor could return to Linan through an alternative route striking a determined defense at Wujiang, thus preventing the possibility of the Jins penetrating deeply into the Song. Zhao assured the emperor that he and Zhang Jun would direct all military commanders to intercept or attack the enemy from the rear, and the constant disturbance would restrain the enemy. Zhao warned, however, the emperor should not retreat when hearing of Jin's crossing the Yangtze, otherwise all military commanders would mind only their own affairs, disregarding coordination with each other, and the great campaign for the state would dissolve. The commanders of Gaozong's imperial army worried about the emperor's safety and discussed it with Zhao, but they could not change Zhao's original plans.

Zhao's efforts in dealing with the joint forces of Jin and Qi succeeded; the Qi army fled, leaving heavy equipment behind. Gaozong praised Zhao for his outstanding performance, whereas Zhao attributed the success to Gaozong's firm resolve. The Song court, moreover, took this opportunity to resume centralized control, at least partially, of various armies which had been previously commanded by Military Commissioners.

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402 YL, ch. 82, pp. 1356-7.
(Zhenfushi 鎮撫使). On May 18 of 1135, the Song summoned Xie Qian 解潛 (?-1149) back to the court and officially abolished all Military Commissioners. Gaozong praised the military commanders for defeating the enemy, who had intended to encroach the Jiang 江 and Zhe 浙 areas, yet he said he would only feel satisfied after recovering the Central Plain and the two emperors. Gaozong proceeded to reward all commanders and officials who had performed meritoriously during this defensive war against the invaders. In February of 1135, Zhao was promoted to Chief Councilor of the Left and Zhang Jun, Chief Councilor of the Right. Zhang was assigned to suppress Yang Yao 杨幺 (?-1135), a bandit leader who had allied with the Qi, causing much disturbance for the Song. Because Zhang was entrusted with military and frontier affairs, Zhao took charge of general affairs, including the promoting or demoting of officials.

As previously mentioned, Zhao was fond of personnel matters. He made a list of candidates he thought deserved promotion, reporting it to the emperor. Because he favored the school of Cheng Yi 程颐 (1033-1107), Zhao often promoted descendants of the Yuanyou 元祐 Party (or the Old Party) members. Unfortunately, some scholars

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403 YL, ch. 88, p. 1466.
404 Ibid., ch. 84, p. 1380 & 1384.
406 YL, ch. 86, p. 1413.
407 Cheng Yi 程颐, younger brother of Cheng Hao 程颢 (1032-1085), was often referred to as Yichuan Xiansheng 伊川先生. During the reign of Zhezong 哲宗 (r. 1086-1100), Cheng was recommended by Sima Guang 司馬光, who had been seen as one of the leaders of the Old Party, and recruited to the civil service. As a dissident, he was later banished from the court.
408 In 1102, Cai Jing 蔡京, then chief councilor during the Huizong 徽宗 (r. 1101-1125) reign, reversed the policies of the previous year and ordered recording of one hundred twenty members of the Old Party during Yuanyou 元祐 period including Sima Guang, Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037-1101) etc. They were labeled as belonging to a traitorous party. Two years later, people considered as members of the Old Party were increased to three hundred and nine and they were persecuted.
who falsely claimed they were disciples of Cheng Yi in order to pursue advancement from Zhao, often had their wishes fulfilled. A group was thus gradually formed, with Zhao at the center, with its major focus on moral standard and righteousness. The slogan during wars against the Jin-Qi joint force was to condemn the Qi as a treacherous regime and clashes with the enemy were upheld as a moral war for the Song people's righteous cause. They skillfully avoided direct confrontations with the Jin for the sake of future negotiations. Putting his moral advocacy into practice, Zhao achieved several goals simultaneously. He had not only defeated the invaders and enabled the Song court to control military men, but also created a scenario of restoration.

Ever since the war against the Jin-Qi invasion, Zhao had shared the government with Zhang Jun and their relationship later became a key point in Zhao's political career. As life of the highest echelon became narrow, so, too, did their relationship become overloaded. A few simple incidents which could have been settled through reconciliation, could now trigger major disagreements. In June of 1135, Meng Yu was appointed Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, upgraded from his previous acting position, without Zhang's being informed in advance. Zhao was then at the court, Zhang was not pleased with the decision since he was not involved with it. Facing his disgruntled attitude, Gaozong issued a personal written directive to console Zhang. The second issue causing Zhang's grudge was the choosing of teachers for the quasi-heir apparent. Zhao had assigned two of his relatives as Moral Mentor (Yishan 善) and

409 YL, ch. 88, p. 1477.
410 Ibid., ch. 89, p. 1490.
Reading Assistant (Zandu 讀讀) and although they were considered the best choices among all scholars, their appointment had, to a certain degree, damaged the rapport between the two chief councilors. For fear of criticisms, Zhao pleaded for Gaozong to remove Fan Chong 范沖 (1067-1141), the newly appointed Moral Mentor and Zhao's relative, from his position. Gaozong denied the request.  

When Zhang Jun was away from the court and assumed the duty of military affairs, he was entrusted with suppressing the bandits with Yue Fei under his command as a major assistant for carrying out the mission. Zhang was also responsible for arranging the defense against the Jin. When Han Shizhong did not follow the original agreement by changing the location of his garrison, Zhang became furious and pleaded to resign. Gaozong did not object to Han's changing position but in order to convince Zhang that Han's decision was not entirely unreasonable, he ordered Zhao to inform Zhang of the emperor's decision. In this case, Gaozong seemed to urge Zhao to improve his communication with Zhang which the emperor felt was not sufficient.  

In the meantime, Meng Yu, appointed previously as Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs without Zhang Jun's prior knowledge, begged to resign for the reason that Zhang's Mobile Office (Xingfu 行府) had interfered with performing his duty. Zhao pleaded to Gaozong for better treatment for Meng after he was removed from office. Meng was appointed Academician of Guanwen Hall and Prefect of Shaoxingfu 響興府.  

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411 YL, ch. 89, pp. 1493-4.  
412 Ibid., ch. 91, p. 1513.  
413 Ibid., ch. 91, pp. 1516-7.
As their duties and locations were different, Zhao and Zhang achieved differing merits, but Zhang's performance more prominent at the time. Whereas Zhao had pleaded to resign since he felt responsible for advocating two corrupt officials, Zhang, on the other hand, in the same month was rewarded the honorable title of Grand Master of the Palace with Golden Seal and Purple Ribbon of the Left (Zuo Jinziguanglu Dafu 左金紫光禄大夫) for his achievement in suppressing the bandits of Dongting Lake.\textsuperscript{414} Although Gaozong was satisfied with their joint performance, his interest had gradually shifted to the area of military affairs that allowed Zhang to have a better opportunity to draw the emperor's attention. After pacifying the bandits of Dongting Lake, Zhang moved from the Central to the Lower Yangtze River where he met the generals to discuss the autumn defense. Because he went straight to Shanyang (modern Jiangsu Province), a place very close to the Song-Qi border, the Qi regime was shocked by his approach. When Zhang returned to the court, Gaozong rewarded his mother and older brother with honors and two of his relatives with official titles. Zhang, in the meantime, presented to the emperor his Zhongxing beilan (Reference for Restoration), his famous proposal in forty-one chapters.\textsuperscript{415} Although Zhao Ding was also rewarded with the honorable title of Grand Master for Splendid Happiness of the Left (Zuo Guanglu Dafu 左光禄大夫) for the completion of the Veritable Record of Shenzong

\textsuperscript{414} YL, ch. 92, p. 1531 & 1541.

\textsuperscript{415} Ibid., ch. 94, pp. 1554-5. Zhang Jun, Zhongxing beilan (Reference for Restoration), SWZJ, 2\textsuperscript{nd} case in BBCSJ, 63\textsuperscript{rd} ser. Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1965-6.
Zhao nevertheless continued demonstrating his wisdom in solving predicaments and playing an auxiliary role for Song politics. In January of 1136, Zhang went to the Yangtze River where he decided to execute an ambitious plan. However, he worried the military commanders might have other ideas. Zhao Ding recognized Zhang's intention and suggested to him to assume a concurrent plan of setting up military colonies (tuntian 屯田), in case his original plan could not be executed. The Song court put the plan for military colonies into practice. Zhang also sent his close councilors to Sichuan and Shaanxi to inform local commanders of his plans and to inspect the border situation. In February of the same year, Zhang requested permission to go to Jing 荊 and Xiang 襄 to inspect the troops and seek opportunities to engage in wars with the enemy. He thought the enemy was not weak, while Liu Yu's occupation of the Central Plain posed an unpredictable threat to the Song. As a prelude to his aggressive approach, Zhang condemned Liu and posted notice of his crimes. Some officials, however, criticized the Song's defense as having many loopholes and insufficient military supplies, therefore aggressive measures were not appropriate at that time. Despite disagreement at the court, followed by a resignation request by the then Vice Chief Councilor Shen Yuqiu, who opposed Zhang's proposal, Gaozong nevertheless supported him and ordered all officials

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416 YL, ch. 93, p. 1547.
417 Ibid., ch. 96, p. 1593.
to bid him farewell. While Zhang focused most on the Song's military strength against the enemy, Zhao's concern was on the effect and use of the military colony.\footnote{YL, ch. 97, pp. 1603-4. HB, v. 3, pp. 425-6.}

In March of 1136, Zhang's Mobile Office of Area Command (Dudu Xingfu 都督行府) announced that military colony would engage in practical exercise around the Yangtze and Huai Rivers.\footnote{YL, ch. 98, p. 1610.} Before leaving for the emperor's location, Zhang ordered the commanding generals to adopt aggressive policies. In fact, without Zhao's assistance at the court, Zhang's efforts in the military area would have been in vain. One month later, Zhang experienced challenges to his leadership. During that time, Zhang attempted to cross the Huai River, relying heavily on Han Shizhong to accomplish that goal. But Han refused to accept the assignment on the reason that he did not have enough troops. With this excuse, Han requested that Zhao Mi 趙密 (1095-1165), one of Zhang Zun's generals, should be put under his command. Zhang Zun denied the request and accused Han of attempting to take his forces. Zhang Jun reported this dilemma to the court, as did Zhang Zun. Zhao Ding supported Zhang's position as chief councilor, helping him solve the problem. He urged the emperor to reprimand Zhang Zun for disobeying order from the Mobile Office as well as his inappropriate report to the court. Zhao recommended that Yang Yizhong 楊沂中 (1102-1166), one of the generals of the imperial army, be sent to assist Han, while the general under Zhang Zun, who then had been requested by
Han, be called back to the court. Zhang Jun was amazed by this arrangement and praised Zhao's wisdom.\textsuperscript{420}

At times Zhao disagreed with Zhang in some major decisions. For example, in July of 1136, Zhang Jun crossed the Yangtze River to patrol the area south of the Huai River and complete new military deployments. He also urged Gaozong to arrive at Jiankang between the autumn and winter to boost the Song army's morale. Zhao opposed the proposal that the emperor go to Jiankang, but he used indirect communication to imply his disagreement.\textsuperscript{421} Although some officials, including Zhao Ding, thought differently from Zhang, Gaozong seemed to like Zhang's idea. Consequently, the three generals moved their garrisons and Yue Fei dispatched his lieutenants to attack the Qi. Intelligence reports, meanwhile, indicated that the Qi had intended to invade the Song. Zhao proposed that the emperor move to Pingjiang, yet he did not want to confront Zhang's differing scheme, and only compared the advantages and disadvantages of his proposal to the emperor.\textsuperscript{422}

Having learned that the Song emperor was about to leave for the frontline, Liu Yu sent urgent reports and requests for assistance to the Jin emperor. However, the Jin adopted a pragmatic approach, becoming less friendly to Liu. A few Jin leaders claimed that setting up Liu's regime was intended to create a safe barrier for the Jin to maintain peace for their people and to stop the warfare. Liu Yu, in the eyes of his patron, did not fulfill his duty as he was supposed to have, but neither could he march forward nor

\textsuperscript{420} YL, ch. 99, pp. 1626-7.
\textsuperscript{421} ibid., ch. 102, p. 1670.
successfully defend against the Song. The Jin emperor thus denied Liu's request and merely sent a marshal to look on the situation at Liyang (in modern Henan Province), a place far away from the frontline. Without the Jin's help, Liu sent his son Liu Lin and other commanders to invade the Song through three major routes. To respond to this emergency, Zhang Jun went to Zhenjiang to inspect his troops.\(^{423}\) Zhao Ding, on the other hand, worried about the Song's disproportionate defense causing many loopholes between the Lower and the Central Yangtze River with their major forces centered on the Lower Yangtze.\(^{424}\)

Zhao advocated defense as his first priority. He argued that it was extremely safe to attempt an offense but only after a strong defense was secured.\(^{425}\) Although Gaozong agreed with Zhao's point, yet he was at the same time very supportive of Zhang's decision. This irony did not last very long since clashes between the Song and its enemy were imminent. In October of 1136, Han Shizhong took an active stance by crossing the Huai River to fight the enemy. Although the record is not clear, Han was obviously frustrated since he later returned to Chuzhou, pleading with Gaozong to return to Linan, while in the meantime urging all military commanders to defend both the Yangtze and the sea. Zhang Jun objected to this proposal, arguing that if the generals crossed the Yangtze to the south, then the area south of the Huai River would be lost and the Yangtze River, a natural barrier, would be shared with the enemy; if the Song lost territories south of the Huai River, then areas south of the Yangtze could not be protected. Moreover,

\(^{422}\) YL, ch. 104, p. 1695.
Yue Fei should remain at Xiangyang, as Zhang insisted, to guarantee the Song's occupation of that area. As a result of the debate, Gaozong ignored the warnings Zhe Yanzhi — then Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs and Acting Vice Chief Councilor, one of Zhao Ding's followers, — instead ordering Lü Zhi, one of Zhang Jun's favorite lieutenants, to supervise Liu Guangshi's army. Nevertheless, Liu Guangshi retreated from Luzhou. This move irritated Zhang, who later dispatched a representative to warn Liu that anyone who crossed the Yangtze would be executed. Liu, himself, was urged to return to Luzhou. To support Zhang's command, Gaozong himself wrote a letter to Yang Yizhong, the general assigned to help Han Shizhong, urging him to march forward or face punishment in accordance with military law.\(^{426}\)

The outcome, the Song's defeat of the Qi, proved that Zhang's strategy was correct. When Yang Yizhong reported victory to the court, Zhao immediately asked to resign. Gaozong did not consent. Zhao thus confessed to the emperor that he and Zhang had been like brothers; however, their good relationship had been sabotaged by Lü Zhi, making them become incompatible. Zhao indicated that Zhang could help Gaozong to bring back the two captured emperors and restore all the lost territories, and because he was very successful in military affairs, he should remain at the court to demonstrate his ability to the fullest extent. Zhao, as he described himself, only followed the emperor's orders to manage general affairs, thus should leave the court. Meanwhile, while Zhang

\(^{424}\) YL, ch. 105, pp. 1711-2.  
\(^{425}\) Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch. 8, p. 10b.
urged Gaozong to take this opportunity to move to Jiankang, Zhao and Zhe Yanzhi proposed the emperor instead go to Linan to take up a defensive measure. This major disagreement represented the fundamental difference between Zhao and Zhang in shaping Song-Jin relations.

Having broken friendly ties with Zhang, Zhao faced the consequences and was impeached on December 25 of 1136. Zhao proceeded to ask to resign, and was allowed to stay in Shaoxing 绍興 for future assignment. Four days later, when Zhang returned from the Yangtze River to Pingjiang to see the emperor, Gaozong urged him to take all the credit for defeating the enemy. Zhao was frightened by this statement and again begged to resign. While Zhao was embarrassed by the situation, Zhe Yanzhi was accused of withdrawing forces during the enemies' invasion, harming the country and sowing seeds of discord between the emperor and his subjects. The court was urged to remove Zhe from his office. When he had an opportunity to see the emperor alone, Zhang proposed taking advantage of the victory to restore the area south of the Yellow River and to capture Liu Yu and his son; moreover, he urged the emperor to deprive Liu Guangshi of his commanding power in return for his arrogant, lazy and noncombatant attitude. Gaozong ordered Zhang to have a discussion with Zhao. Having been informed of these proposals, Zhao objected and replied that Liu Yu and his occupied territory, south of the Yellow River, should not be attempted since the Song would then have to face an unpreventable Jin invasion. Liu Guangshi, Zhao argued, could not be removed

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427 Ibid., ch. 106, p. 1728.
from office because he came from a prestigious military family which had many followers as commanders and soldiers. Zhang was not pleased to hear this but Zhao continued arguing that the Song should take a defensive, instead of an offensive, posture against the enemies.  

On January 2 of 1137, Zhao was ultimately removed from office and demoted to Academician of Guanwen Hall, Military Commissioner-in-chief (Anfu Zhizhi Dashi 安撫制置大使) of Zhedong 浙東 Circuit and concurrently Prefect of Shaoxing Superior Prefecture. Zhe Yanzhi was assigned a sinecure duty of supervising a temple. In the meantime, Zhao's faction and influence were gradually removed from the court. Zhang Jun became the only chief councilor and his performance and relationship with the emperor will be discussed in the next chapter.

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Chapter Eleven: Zhang Jun 張浚 (1097-1164): A Foolhardy Hawk

Zhang Jun, styled Deyuan 德遠, was originally from Mianzhu 綿竹 of Hanzhou 漢州 (in modern Sichuan Province). He was a descendant of a chief councilor's younger brother of the Tang Dynasty (618-907). His father, named Xian 咸, received both jinshi and xianliang 賢良 degrees. Orphaned at age four, Zhang was described as a righteous, honest man who was seen by the knowledgeable as having great potentials. After education in the National University, Zhang received his jinshi degree. In 1027, he was appointed Recorder of Court of Imperial Sacrifices (Taichangbu 太常簿). When Zhang Bangchang usurped the throne in the following year, Zhang Jun fled into the National University; he later rushed to Nanjing after learning that Gaozong had ascended the throne there. He was appointed Junior Compiler of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shumiyuan Bianxiuguan 樞密院编修官) and later Vice Director of the Bureau of Forestry and Crafts (Yubu Lang 廟部郎). When seen and praised by Gaozong for his majestic and serious appearance, and with recommendation by Huang Qianshan, Zhang was promoted to the post of Palace Censor. The execution of Song Qiyu, a good friend of Zhang who had offended Li Gang, prompted him to impeach Li for killing an Attendant on the basis of personal passion, thereby bringing damage to the

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429 Xianliang 賢良 was a recommendation category that first emerged in the Han Dynasty that was still practiced in the Northern Song. The common practice was for some people (first civilians and later officials) to be recommended and considered at the capital for selection and appointment to government posts.

430 Zhang Jun fled into the National University with Zhao Ding. See YL, ch. 2, p. 52.

431 SS, ch. 360, p. 11297.

432 YL, ch. 7, p. 187.
new government through his abuse of power. By detailing Li's other offenses, over ten items in total, Zhang ultimately caused Li to be dismissed from the court. As a result of Zhang's incessant complaints, Li was removed from his sinecure duty and ordered to live only in Ezhou. Later when Gaozong retreated to the southeast, a riot occurred among the Rear Army of the Imperial Encampment (Yuying Houjun). Unable to catch up to the emperor, an Exhorter of the Left (Zuo Zhengyan) confronted the rebels, and was forced to jump into the river where he died. Zhang prosecuted Han Shizhong, who did not participate in the riot but was then commander of the rebel troops, for not restraining his subordinates well, thereby causing the riot. Han was demoted to Surveillance Commissioner (Guanchashi) from his original assignment of Pacification Commissioner (Chengxuanshi).

As a censor, Zhang performed his duty well and impeached people who he viewed as unfit for their assignments. However, he was considered a member of Huang Qianshan's faction until some of his proposals concerning military affairs and national defense irritated Huang. Facing pressure from Huang, Zhang pleaded for an assignment to his hometown. In July of 1128, Zhang was appointed Senior Compiler of Jiying Hall (Jiyingdian Xiu zhuan) and Prefect of Xingyuan Superior Prefecture (Xingyuanfu, in modern Shaanxi Province). Before leaving for the new post, Zhang was detained and appointed Vice Minister of the Ministry of Rites. Gaozong

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435 Ibid., ch. 10, p. 237.
436 Ibid., ch. 10, p. 235.
praised his performance and promised him an exclusive appointment in the future.\footnote{YL, ch. 17, p. 345.} Due to his specialty in military affairs, Zhang was assigned concurrently as Military Consultant of Imperial Defense Command (Yuyingshisi Canzanjunshi 御營使司參贊軍事). As revealed earlier, Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan, the two contemporary chief councilors, presented no plans for the Song’s future and had a poor intelligence work. Although Zhang and his colleagues strongly cautioned the court to pay attention to the Jin’s imminent invasion, Huang and Wang merely responded with smiles assigning Zhang Jun and Lü Yihao, the latter then Minister of the Ministry of Personnel, to instruct Song regional troops.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 16, p. 329.}

As Zhang and Lü were dispatched away from the court, the Song almost incurred its destruction due to lack of preparation for the Jin invasion. Both intelligence reports and advice from other officials did not seem to affect Huang and Wang. When Gaozong decided he must evacuate Yangzhou, Huang urged him to stay to wait for further information. When the residents of Yangzhou sought to escape, Huang and Wang deluded them by claiming that all preparations for their safety were made. Neither the emperor nor the residents trusted Huang and Wang. Upon hearing of the Jin approach, the emperor escaped to a ferry on the Yangtze River where Zhang Jun and Lü Yihao were able to catch up with him, but without notifying his chief councilors.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 18, pp. 377-8.} Zhang later volunteered to assist Zhu Shengfei control Pingjiangfu 平江府 and Xiuzhou 秀州 (later

\footnote{Ibid., ch. 20, pp. 389-90.}
Jiaxingfu 嘉興府, in modern Zhejiang Province) before Gaozong left Pingjiangfu.\textsuperscript{441} When the emperor arrived at Linan he summoned Zhu to the court, while Zhang was ordered to stay and take charge of Pingjiang.\textsuperscript{442}

Zhang's political career faced a turning point when the Miao-Liu Rebellion took place and Gaozong, whom Zhang had supported for nearly two years, was threatened by two middle ranked military leaders. Zhang knew his opportunity had come. When the amnesty reached Pingjiang, Zhang immediately suspected its validity and sent agents to determine the true situation. After realizing a coup had occurred, Zhang sneaked into Linan to collect firsthand information. Lü Yihao's son had meanwhile informed Zhang of the coup's details.\textsuperscript{443} Zhang had since played an important role in saving the throne, actively taking charge of the whole operation. To the rebels at the court, the neighboring military forces with Zhang as one of the commanders, were a threat to their existence. It would be, thus, the first priority for the rebel leaders to assemble these commanders to the court, either by rewards or threat of punishment. As a result, Zhang was promoted to Acting Minister of the Ministry of Rites on April 2 of 1129 and ordered to lead his troops to the emperor's location. Zhang, moreover, sent some gifted debaters to Linan to restrain the rebels, in the meantime stalled in order to gather all commanders.\textsuperscript{444} He meanwhile convinced Zhang Zun, Liu Guangshi, Han Shizhong, three famous generals, to assist him to save the throne.\textsuperscript{445} Zhu Shengfei, then chief councilor at the court, had

\textsuperscript{441} YL, ch. 20, p. 397. HB, v. 2, pp. 609-10.
\textsuperscript{442} YL, ch. 20, p. 407. HB, v. 2, p. 627.
\textsuperscript{443} YL, ch. 21, p. 423.
\textsuperscript{444} \textit{Ibid.}, ch. 21, pp. 431-2.
also deluded the rebels step by step and created a situation favorable to the rescue operation.

After announcing military action against the rebels, Zhang was demoted to the post of Vice Military Training Commissioner but the two generals who had helped him received promotions. By abducting the emperor and sowing seeds of discord among Zhang and other leaders, the rebels tried to stop the operation against them. Zhang did not, however, halt his troops from marching and continued coordinating with his allies, especially with Lü Yihao. The rescuing army headed towards Linan with Lü and Zhang leading the central force, Han Shizhong the front force, Zhang Zun the wing force, Liu Guangshi’s personal chosen troops as guerillas, Liu himself as the rear guard. They pleaded with the emperor to reclaim his position.\(^{446}\) Pressures from both inside and outside the court ultimately compelled the rebels to give in. On April 3 of 1129 Gaozong resumed his reign title and soon afterwards Miao Fu, Liu Zhengyan both fled from the court. Zhang was appointed Grand Master of the Palace (Zhong Dafu 中大夫), and Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs at the age of 32, the youngest Administrator since Kou Zhun (961-1023), a northern Song official who was appointed the same position as Zhang’s in 994 at 33 and famous for his urging the emperor to fight the Liao army in 1004.

After suppression of the military coup, Zhu Shengfei stepped down from his office. The position of chief councilor was opened to all potential candidates, including

\(^{446}\) YL, ch. 21, p. 451.
Zhang Jun. Although Gaozong chose Lü Yihao as the succeeding chief councilor because he thought Zhang too young for the job, Zhang was entrusted with another heavy responsibility. On May 20, Zhang was appointed as Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner with jurisdiction covering the areas of Chuan 川, Shaan 陕, Jingxi 荆西 Circuit and South, North of Jinghu 荆湖 Circuits. Moreover, Zhang was bestowed with many privileges to fully exercise his authority.447

Before leaving for the new post, Zhang volunteered to subdue Xue Qing 薛慶, a bandit leader who led several thousand people and occupied Gaoyou 高郵 (in modern Jiangsu Province and north of Yangzhou). Since Xue requested heavy rewards for his submission, the negotiation caused Zhang to stay at Xue's place for three days. In the meantime, the Song court was not informed by accurate information, instead influenced by hearsay claiming that Zhang had been detained by Xue. In response to this situation, Lü Yihao and other officials proposed removing Zhang from office, and sending Wang Xie to suppress the bandits. Six days later, Zhang returned from Gaoyou and was reinstated.448 Two months later, Fan Qiong, a military commander who had helped the Jin to abduct the two emperors, was summoned to the court. Upon his arrival, Fan requested the court to forgive Miao and Liu, and to put all the roughly 200,000 bandits he had pacified under his command. His unrestrained attitude infuriated Gaozong. Zhang impeached him for committing great crimes, including refusal of Zhang's order to rescue

447 YL, ch. 23, p. 481.
the emperor during the military coup. Zhang had Fan arrested and executed. Soon afterwards, Zhang left the court for his new duty, bringing the emperor's message to people of Sichuan 四川 and Shaanxi 陕西. Zhao Ding reminded one of Zhang's advisors to urge him to report everything to the court to avoid being suspected as holding too much power.

On his way to the new post, Zhang ceased mobilization for the autumn defense of the imperial armies, which were from Jiang-Zhe, Fujian and Hunan Circuits and ordered to station in the six prefectures. When report of this action reached the court, he incurred criticisms from Zhu Shengfei, who argued that Zhang's authority should be exercised when he reached the Chuan-Shaan region. In Xiangyang, Zhang ordered the local government to prepare for the emperor's tour. He also removed the prefect of Tanzhou 潭州 from office, replacing him with another person because he was considered too timid to be on the post. Zhang reported that the former prefect of Jiangzhou 江州 had embezzled public fund during his term of office, leading to an investigation. On December 6 of 1129, Zhang arrived at Xingyuan 西元 (in modern Shaanxi Province) where he reported to the throne urging the emperor to move to the west as soon as possible, promising to have everything prepared for the emperor's arrival. He meanwhile

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449 YL, ch. 25, pp. 509-10 & 512. HB, v. 3, p. 46.
450 YL, ch. 25, pp. 514-5.
451 Ibid., ch. 27, p. 530.
452 Ibid., ch. 28, pp. 551-2 & 555.
rotated assignments of many commanders, and as a result all the posts of Military Commissioners (Shuai Chen) were occupied by military men.\(^{453}\)

Of all the things concerning Zhang, the most important was the plan to make decisive moves against the Jins. Wang Yan, a commander who had followed Zhang to the new post, disagreed to an offensive approach to the Jin, proposing instead to strengthen the defense against the enemy's invasion lest the Song incurred the huge loss of all five circuits. Zhang's staff members ridiculed Wang's opinion, resulting in Wang being forced to resign.\(^{454}\) In order to tap local resources, Zhang appointed Zhao Kai as Army Provisioning Commissioner (Suijun Zhuanyunshi) responsible for Sichuan's finance. Zhao proposed to levy taxes on monopolized goods, changing the laws for liquor. The revenue soon increased six times.\(^{455}\) Zhang also increased the amount of paper money to one million units to subsidize military expenses and set up a monetary office in Qinzhou (in modern Gansu Province) to assist expenditures in the border areas.\(^{456}\)

Meanwhile, the Song court, which was located in the southeast, sustained severe attacks from the Jin army. Du Chong, then chief councilor and commander of the defending forces at the Yangtze River, escaped and the Song's defense collapsed. Unable to stop the Jin invasion, Gaozong moved to coastal area and was prepared to flee by sea. On January 26 of 1130, the Jin invading forces captured Linan. The Song faced danger

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\(^{453}\) YL, ch. 28, p. 563. HB, v. 3, p. 80.
\(^{454}\) YL, ch. 28, pp. 563-4.
\(^{455}\) Ibid., ch. 28, p. 565.
of disintegration with its emperor floating on the sea. The Jin invasion of Shaanzhou (in modern Henan Province), whose commander died in the line of duty, puzzled Zhang and his staff about the Jin intentions, so he reacted slowly to it.\footnote{YL, ch. 29, p. 571.} Having captured Shaanzhou, the Jin army continued its invasion, approaching territory under Zhang’s jurisdiction. The Song defense in the west was under the leadership of Qu Duan (曲端, 1091-1131), a Supreme Commandant (都統制) of Zhang’s Pacification and Supervisory Commission (宣撫使司), and had only mixed results against the Jin army. After a series of battles against the Jin, the Song commanders had only exposed their contradictions against each other. Wu Jie 吳玠 (1093-1139), then Vice Area Commander-in-chief (副總管) and one of Zhang’s favorite subordinate, was punished by Qu for defying orders and demoted to a lower post. However, Zhang promoted him back to Vice Area Commander-in-chief of another circuit and concurrently Prefect of Fenxiangfu (在 modern Shaanxi Province).\footnote{YL, ch. 32, p. 620. HB, v. 3, pp. 127-8.} Upon hearing in the meanwhile that the emperor had decided to personally lead an army to war, Zhang attempted joining up with the emperor to provide for his protection by leading several thousands of troops. But upon arriving at Fangzhou (in modern Hubei Province), Zhang was informed that the enemies had retreated, so he returned home.\footnote{YL, ch. 32, p. 621.}
While leaving the court, Zhang was instructed by the emperor to wait for three years before launching attacks; however, Zhang anticipated the Jin would invade southeast China again, so he decided to open up another theater of war to distract the Jin's concentrated forces which could threaten the emperor's safety. In fact, Wanyan Zongbi and Wanyan Chang, the Jin commanders, were still lingering around the Huai River and had agreed on another invasion of the Song during that autumn. Despite that the majority of scholar-officials objected to an offensive, Zhang had made up his mind. From the angle of military strategy, Qu Duan explained why the war could not be initiated then, and instead he proposed waiting for ten years. Wu Jie also preferred defense to offense since the terrain of the Song's occupied territory was more suitable for defending against attacks. Zhang ignored all arguments against his decision from the military commanders. In the meantime, Liu Ziyu 劉子羽 (1097-1146), Zhang's military consultant, argued by reminding him of the emperor's instructions as Zhang left the court. Zhang, however, refused to change his mind and insisted that actions should not be restricted by fixed rules. He demoted Qu Duan and ordered him to stay at Wanzhou 萬州 (in modern Guangdong Province). The people of Shaanxi relied on Qu were unhappy with this disposition. As a result, Zhang rushed into actions, and restored Yongxingjun 永興軍 (i.e. Jingzhaofu 京兆府, in modern Shaanxi Province), territories previously captured by the Jin army. Seven months later, Qu was tortured to death in jail.

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460 YL, ch. 36, p. 691.
461 Ibid.
462 Ibid., ch. 37, pp. 711-2.
On October 17 of 1130, Liu Xi 刘锡, a Supreme Commandant, was ordered by Zhang Jun to fight the Jin at Fuping 富平 (in modern Shaanxi Province) where the Song had suffered a huge setback. In this famous battle, intended only to distract Jin army away from the southeast to alleviate pressure on the court, the Song incurred tremendous losses, including the territory of Shaanxi which was never recovered again by the Song. The Jins additionally captured many military items. Two weeks later, Zhao Zhe 赵哲, accused of causing the defeat at Fuping, was ordered to be executed by Zhang, who had retreated to Qinzhou 秦州 (in modern Gansu Province).

Why did Zhang ignore advice from both his civil and military subordinates and insist on launching attacks which were not well prepared? One explanation is that Zhang was instructed by the emperor to open up a new war zone to relieve the pressure on the southeast because the Jin army still lingered around the Huai River and had not yet retreated to the north. In fact, when Zhang provoked them, Wanyan Zongbi, the Jin commander who led the invading forces to southeast China, headed for Shaanxi intending to reinforce their offensives. Yamauchi Masahiro, a Japanese scholar, doubts the validity of this explanation. He argues that when Gaozong urged Zhang to distract the Jin invasion by opening up another war zone, the Jins were actually unable to invade the Song even in the southeast due to dissension among Jin commanders. From analyzing other factors, Yamauchi, moreover, concludes that Zhang's insistence on fighting the Jin

464 YL, ch. 37, p. 711.
465 Yamauchi, ch. 37, p. 714.
at Fuping, despite oppositions from both civil and military staffs, could not be altogether
explained by the foregoing argument. Yamauchi argues that the offensive initiated by
Zhang was actually part of his strategy to check the power of military men in Shaanxi.
By launching an uncertain attack against the enemy, Zhang was attempting to unify his
command while extending Song influence in local areas. The result was that Qu Duan
was replaced by Wu Jie in his powerful position.467

Unaware of Zhang’s setback, the Song court still urged him to send crack troops
for the rescue.468 Meanwhile, Zhang retreated from Qinzhou to Xingzhou 興州 (in
modern Shaanxi Province) and Wu Jie withdrew his troops from Fengxiang 凤翔 to
Heshangyuan 和尚原 (in modern Shaanxi Province). Zhang sent Liu Ziyu to reorganize
dispersed commanders and their troops. By placing blame on himself, Zhang was able to
pacify the dispirited people, but he had given up Shaanxi.469 To finance military
operations, Zhang had to tap all available resources in Sichuan. He ordered a tax increase
under the banner of rewarding the army, and doubled a rice related tax that already
existed. People of Sichuan had become impoverished.470 The court, however, did not
know about Song’s setback in the west nor did it stop asking Zhang to send required
money and silk for the court’s urgent needs. Zhang did not comply with the request,
withholding those for the military expenses.471

468 YL, ch. 38, p. 726.
471 Ibid., ch. 42, pp. 764-5.
In April of 1131, Zhang wrote to the emperor pleading for punishment for the defeat at Fuping. Gaozong did not think that Zhang had committed any errors and thus should be acquitted. He urged that an acquittal announcement be quickly issued. Meanwhile Li Hui, then Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, reported to the emperor that Zhang could only be replaced after a better person was identified. Gaozong praised Zhang for his diligent work for the country, announcing that he would not listen to any criticisms against Zhang. All these encouraging messages from the court had made Zhang feel relieved. But the fact was the Song had lost most of its territories in Shaanxi except for five prefectures and two military bases. The defeated Song troops were gradually assembled and Zhang ultimately built a stronghold to defend Sichuan against Jin's encroachment.

In June of 1131, Wu Jie fought and defeated the Jin army north of Heshangyuan. In November of the same year, Zongbi gathered other Jin forces, several thousands in total, and attempted invasion of Sichuan. Zhang ordered Wu Jie to wait for the invading troops at Heshangyuan. Wu Jie and his brother Wu Lin 胡林 (1102-1167) attacked the Jin army by surprise, inflicting a severe blow on the enemy. Zongbi, moreover, sustained two arrow wounds, admitting it was the worst defeat suffered since he entered the Central Plain. Thanks to Wu brothers, Sichuan remained under Song's firm control. As opposed to Song forces under Wu Jie's command, the Jin was left able only to station troops at Fengxiangfu. When news of the victory reached the court, Zhang was rewarded with

472 YL, ch. 43, p. 777.
473 Ibid., ch. 48, pp. 861-2.
the title of Junior Guardian 少保 and Military Commissioner (Jiedushi 節度使) of Dingguojun 定國軍.474

Zhang had spent three years in the Guan-Shaan 關陝 area (i.e. Shaanxi) defending against the Jin with Liu Ziyu as his consultant, Zhao Kai as Fiscal Commissioner-in-chief, and Wu Jie as commander. Although he suffered from the Fuping debacle, Zhang was able to keep Sichuan intact, distracting the Jin concentration of military pressure on the southeast. Consequently, the areas between the Yangtze and Huai Rivers were secured.475 Despite this result, Zhang was accused of the wrongful killing of Qu Duan and Zhao Zhe, and improper appointing Liu Ziyu and Zhao Kai. The criticisms came originally from scholar-officials, who had sought benefits from Zhang but were rejected. Influenced by such slander, the Song court gradually changed its attitude and was prepared to transfer Zhang back to the court. Wang Si 王似 (?-1135), then Prefect of Chengdu 成都, was appointed Vice Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner as an associate to Zhang.476 On January 25 of 1133, the Song announced that Zhang was to be removed from his office but allowed to retain his duty as Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Lu Fayuan 盧法原 (?-1135), then Auxiliary Academician and Prefect of Kuizhou 奎州 (in modern Sichuan Province), was appointed to a position identical to that of Wang Si. The Song court gave Wang ten letters to deliver to the turncoat generals in order to solicit them back to the Song camp. The letters declared that Liu Ziyu was in fact abusive of his power, while the Song court

474 YL, ch. 51, p. 898.
475 SS, ch. 361, p. 11301.
had summoned Zhang Jun back to the court and replaced him by Wang Si. Having
learned of the content of the letters, Zhang pleaded for a sinecure duty but it was not
granted.477

On February 15 of 1133, the Jins captured Jinzhou 金州 (in modern Shaanxi
Province) and Wang Yan, the defending commander, was forced to fall back
westward.478 Upon hearing this report, Liu Ziyu, then Prefect of Xingyuanfu, ordered his
army to set up defense at Raofengguan 饒風關 (in modern Shaanxi Province), an
important military post. Meanwhile, Wu Jie was called up to aid the defense. However,
Wu's strict discipline forced some of his subordinates to flee to the Jin camp and reveal
the condition of Wu's deployment. Six days later, the Jins defeated Wu and captured
Raofengguan. Soon afterwards, the invading Jin army entered Xingyuanfu, a city that
had been previously incinerated by Liu. Wu retreated to Xianrenguan 仙人關 (in
modern Shaanxi Province) where he reorganized the defense. Liu had agreed with Wu to
station their forces together at Sanquan 三泉 (in modern Shaanxi Province) and attempt
no further retreat. Due to their resolve, the Song army regained its spirits.479

Despite the urgent situation, Zhang reported none of these defeats and only
informed the court that Liu, Wu, and Wang had exterminated the Jins at Raofengguan.
Having penetrated too deep into the Song territory, and now worried about being

476 YL, ch. 58, pp. 1013-4.
477 Ibid., ch. 61, pp. 1051-2.
intercepted on their return route, the Jin army returned to Xingyuanfu on April 5. Since the Jin penetration of Song's defense, people in Sichuan were stunned by the imminent threat and had all planned to retreat. Zhang Jun ordered his army to also move to Tongzhou (in modern Sichuan Province), but incurred their strong opposition. It was Liu Ziyu's report indicating that the Jins could no longer march forward that prompted Zhang to stop ordering retreats. Zhang proceeded to order his commanders to restore the lost territories and use the relief granary to feed the troops. In returning to Fengxiang the Jin commander sent agents to persuade Liu Ziyu to surrender, but met refusal. Wu Jie, on the other hand, delivered a message to the Jin commander ordering him to stop his attempts at persuasion.

Although away from the court, Zhang was still involved in its power struggles. During Zhang's absence, Gaozong had switched a few chief councilors and Lü Yihao and Zhu Shengfei were once again in power. When Wang Si, one of Lü's relatives, was appointed Vice Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner, Zhang wrote to the throne objecting to this appointment. He argued that Wu Jie and Liu Ziyu should not be put under Wang's command without due consideration, because they had made great contributions to Sichuan. Angered by his opposition, Lü provoked Zhu to attack Zhang, who ultimately incurred punishment. On July 1 of 1133, all the privileges that had been previously bestowed on Zhang at his appointment as Pacification and Supervisory

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480 YL, ch. 63, pp. 1076-7.
481 Ibid., ch. 64, p. 1089.
482 Ibid., ch. 63, p. 1074.
Commissioner were revoked. Zhang was ordered to return to the court and replaced by Wang Si.\textsuperscript{483}

In fact, Zhang had expanded his power to the extent that it sometimes conflicted with the court's authority. For example, Zhang had levied heavy taxes on the people of Sichuan ever since the area was put under his control, as well as diverting funds allocated to granaries for relief usage. His policies resulted in impoverishment for the local areas.\textsuperscript{484} Unlike administrators of other circuits who followed the court's order, Zhang denied its request for urgent needs keeping the money and silk for military expenses instead of sending those to the court.\textsuperscript{485} In order to increase revenue for military expenses, Zhang had \textit{dudie} printed and sold in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Jingxi Circuits. The Song court was not pleased with his transgression of authority and ordered Zhang to stop.\textsuperscript{486} When salt acquired in the Huai River area could not be obtained, Zhang had the salt made in Daning (in modern Sichuan Province) and transported to Jingxi and Hubei Circuits. Qin Gui, then Chief Councilor of the Right, objected to this policy and issued an official document to ban it. Zhang later requested permission to bring Sichuan salt to the Jingnan Circuit but the court denied it for fear that it might be harmful to the regulations on salt.\textsuperscript{487}

The fact that Zhang's authority sometimes went over that of the court can be demonstrated by a number of cases. For example, Zhang did not notify the court of his

\textsuperscript{483} YL, ch. 65, pp. 1109-10.
\textsuperscript{484} Ibid., ch. 40, pp. 749-50.
\textsuperscript{485} Ibid., ch. 42, pp. 764-5.
\textsuperscript{486} Ibid., ch. 46, p. 822.
decision, appointing Wang Shu 王庶 (?-1142) as Prefect of Xingyuan, in effect, thereby overriding the power of the court which favored another person for the post.\textsuperscript{488} Zhao Kai, the person who had taken financial responsibility for supporting Zhang's army, was appointed by the court as Auxiliary Academician of Xianmo 頤謨 Hall because Zhang had reported to the court of his contributions. Little to the court's knowledge was the fact that Zhao had already been advanced to Auxiliary Academician of Longtu 龍圃 Hall as Zhang had used his special authority to promote Zhao.\textsuperscript{489} Zhang, moreover, appointed a person as prefect superseding the court's decision favorable to a different candidate.\textsuperscript{490} Since Zhang took charge of Sichuan and Shaanxi, all appointments of officials were based solely on his decision and order. Uneasy with Zhang's expansion of his authority, the Song court had gradually attempted to regain its authority in appointing officials. On June 25, the court announced an appointment of Penal Supervisor (Xingyu Gongshi 刑獄公事) with an imperial decree.\textsuperscript{491}

Despite his request to leave the bureaucracy, Zhang was urged to come back to the court as soon as possible. However, Zhang extended the time of his trip not returning to the court until one year after first being summoned. When he reached Jingnan Circuit, Zhang pleaded to resign, only to temporarily stay on until the road to Tanzhou 潭州 was cleared. The court rejected both his requests. Chang Tong, then Palace Censor, complained to the emperor, accusing Zhang of holding a full authority applying to almost

\textsuperscript{487} YL, ch. 54, p. 963 & ch. 71, p. 1192.
\textsuperscript{488} Ibid., ch. 46, p. 823.
\textsuperscript{489} Ibid., ch. 48, p. 866.
\textsuperscript{490} Ibid., ch. 51, p. 912.
half of Song's territory while both failing to complete his mission and his mandated return to the court. Accusing him of showing no respect for the emperor's order, Chang proposed that Zhang be given a warning as well as escorted to ensure his speedy return. Chang's report prompted the court to issue a decree ordering Zhang to move swiftly, as well as initiating resulting accusations against Zhang's errors. But, there was also opinion favorable to Zhang. For example, Wu Shen, a salt tax official, petitioned the throne commenting on Zhang's performance: He mainly argued that Zhang was loyal but short of talents; his contribution to restoring the throne was great while his crime of losing territory was small. Besides, Zhang ably defended Sichuan against the Jins and stopped their advances. Wu concluded his petition by praising Zhang's loyalty and pleaded that Gaozong grant Zhang fair judgment.

On March 23 of 1134, Zhang finally returned to the court. Chang Tong accused him of all kinds of offenses: causing damages to people of Jinghu Circuits by using mean people, the wrongful killing of Qu Duan and Zhao Zhe, unauthorized printing of dudie and making seals to issue amnesties, promotions, demotions and rewards. All those above accusations, argued Chang, were evidence of Zhang's disloyalty. Meanwhile, Xin Bing, then Attendant Censor and hostile to Zhang, also accused him of harming the country and transgressing his authority. He attacked Zhang for killing people unjustly after the defeat of Fuping, for using Zhao Kai to extort and impoverish

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491 YL, ch. 54, p. 953.
492 Ibid., ch. 72, p. 1201.
494 Xin Bing was hostile to Zhang because he had previously been removed from the post of Prefect of Tanzhou by Zhang. See YL, ch. 28, p. 555.
the people of Sichuan, and for abusing power in ruling the two circuits of Jinghu, and using Sichuan's wealth to compensate military expenses in Jinghu. Xin claimed Zhang received swift promotions due to his connection with Huang Qianshan, and fled to Sichuan after learning of the Jin's attempt of crossing the Yangtze. He additionally argued that Zhang's appointing of mean people had caused unrest in Sichuan, his abuse of power, and his delayed return to the court, all deserved punishment; therefore Zhang should be removed from his duty as a punishment and as an example warning other unrestrained officials.  

Gaozong disregarded the accusations, but Xin and Chang presented their combined four petitions to impeach Zhang and cited a memorial previously submitted to the throne by Lü Yihao during his term as chief councilor. Gaozong yielded to their actions. Xin, in the meantime, accused Zhang as reckless in his defiance of the emperor's authority and detrimental to the country. He urged the emperor to sanction due punishment for Zhang. On April 11 of 1134, Zhang was removed from the post of Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs and assigned to a sinecure duty supervising a temple. Nevertheless, Xin continued his accusations of Zhang, pleading for greater punishment. Five days later, Zhang was ordered to live in Fuzhou while his request to borrow land from the government was denied in another seven days. After

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495 YL, ch. 73, pp. 1218-9.  
496 Ibid., ch. 74, p. 1224. Lü Yihao's memorial was intended to urge Zhang to return to the court and Gaozong ordered Zhang to hasten his trip back. See YL, ch. 66, p. 1113.  
arriving at his assigned location, Zhang wrote to the throne warning against peace negotiations with the Jins.498

On October 19 of 1134, Han Shizhong, then Pacification Commissioner of Huaidong 淮東, reported that the Jin and Qi had jointly invaded the Song. Shocked by this news, Gaozong said to ranking officials that he would personally lead the troops to the Yangtze River to fight a decisive battle with the invaders. Zhao Ding, then Chief Councilor of the Right, acclaimed the emperor's decision, recommending Zhang Jun as indispensable to the emperor at that critical time. On October 26, Zhang was reinstated by assignment as a temple Supervisor and a concurrent post of Reader-in-waiting.499

Zhang proposed to send Yue Fei to Huaixi 淮西 Circuit to distract Jin's army in Huaidong 淮東 Circuit, and Gaozong concurred. When asked about his ability in strategy, Zhao reported to the emperor that Zhang was sharp in forming distinctions, as well as having public support, and thus could undertake the task alone. On December 1, Zhang was entrusted with additional duty as Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, a post he had previously held for six years.500 Although his recommendation of Zhang Jun had been approved by the emperor, Zhao worried that his proposal might still incur censure from the censors and remonstrators. Zhang meanwhile hesitated about accepting his new assignment for fear that the crimes he had committed were unforgivable thus making him feel ashamed to face other officials at the court. For these

500 YL, ch. 82, p. 1349. HB, v. 3, pp. 382-3.
reasons Zhao convinced Gaozong to publicly announce Zhang's appointment, a brilliant way to show all officials the seriousness of the emperor's decision.\footnote{YL, ch. 82, pp. 1351-2.}

Upon regaining his authority over military affairs, Zhang Jun went to oversee the troops at Zhenjiang, who were encouraged by his arrival. Han Shizhong, in the meantime, sent people to inform the Jin commander Wanyan Zongbi of Zhang's arrival. Stunned by this information, Jin Vice Marshal Wanyan Chang wrote to the Song requesting a date to fight it.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 83, p. 1364. HB, v. 3, pp. 385-6.} This resulted in the Jin army being restrained by Han in obtaining supplies. As the Jin army's morale grew low, the shocking news of illness having resulted in the emperor's death, further devastated the Jin's fighting spirit. Eventually, both the Jin and Qi forces desperately retreated to the north, leaving heavy equipment behind.\footnote{YL, ch. 83, p. 1370.} On February 26 of 1135, Zhang was promoted to Chief Councilor of the Right, and Zhao, Chief Councilor of the Left. They both were entrusted a concurrent duty of Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs and Commander-in-chief of the military in all circuits (Dudu Zhulujunma 都督諸路軍馬). Zhang was immediately assigned to eradicate the bandits around Dongting Lake, while Zhao became responsible for general affairs at the court, including promoting or demoting officials.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 85, p. 1397. HB, v. 3, pp. 401-3.}

In addition to his duty of eradicating criminal brigands, Zhang was responsible for all military affairs, including especially national defense. Before leaving for the Jinghu Circuits, Zhang went to Zhenjiang to arrange deployment of Song forces. He ordered
control of military supplies for all circuits consolidated under the office of the Area Command (Dudufu 都 督 府), with the Principal Territorial Aide (Shangzuo 上 佐) placed in charge of that duty. This marked the beginning of the Mobile Office of Area Command’s interfering with the command of the Three Departments (Sansheng 三 省).\(^5\) Zhang’s expansion of his authority precipitated protests from Meng Yu and Shen Yuqiu, the two Vice Chief Councilors, who protested that the Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs were only offices following the order of Mobile Office of Area Command. Unlike other officials who had protested, Zhao Ding did not want to haggle over the issue.\(^6\)

To deal with the criminal element around the Dongting Lake, Zhang had decided to demand their surrender, then proceeded to order Yu Fei, then Military Commissioner of Jinghu Circuits (Jinghu Zhizhishi 荊 江 制 署 使), to dispatch troops to the designated area while issuing proclamation forbidding excessive killing.\(^7\) On June 24 of 1135, Zhang arrived at Tanzhou 潭 州. On his way from Jiankang to Tanzhou, Zhang released a few hundred prisoners sent by Yang Yao 楊 么, the leader of Dongting bandits. Zhang ordered delivery his amnesty message to various stockades (zhai 窖) declaring that since the bandits could not keep their farmland, they would starve to death that autumn and winter, thus surrender was their only alternative. Meanwhile, Zhang dispatched Yue Fei

\(^5\) YL, ch. 86, p. 1425.
\(^6\) Ibid., ch. 87, p. 1450
\(^7\) Ibid., ch. 87, p. 1446.
to station troops in a few places to create further pressure with a military presence. In consequence, some of the bandits decided to surrender.\textsuperscript{508}

At first Zhang did not feel confident in launching attacks against the bandits while at the same time following court mandates to arrange for an autumn defense. He, thus, planned to quell the bandits in the following year. At this juncture, Yue Fei promised Zhang he would defeat the bandits within eight days, asking him to wait for result. On July 14, Yue Fei successfully crushed the bandits, accepting surrender from Yang Qin 楊欽, the strongest leader of Yang Yao's gang.\textsuperscript{509} Nine days later, Yang Yao was forced to jump into water and drowned and all his followers were exterminated by Yue Fei.\textsuperscript{510} Zhang ordered Yue to station his troops in Jing 萊 and Xiang 襄 to further attempt at restoring the Central Plain, while he led his troops towards the lower Yangtze from Dongting Lake.\textsuperscript{511} The problem of bandits had been solved, resulting in both Zhang and Yue being rewarded by the court for their victories.

Zhang's power grew with his record of distinguished service, drawing the emperor's attention and worsening his relationship with Zhao. As mentioned earlier, Zhao tolerated Zhang's expansion of authority, deeming it important to Zhang's success. Zhang, on the other hand, was not so broad-minded and showed his first sign of displeasure upon learning that Zhao had recommended two relatives as teachers of

\textsuperscript{508} YL, ch. 89, p. 1484.
\textsuperscript{509} Ibid., ch. 90, pp. 1497-8.
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid., ch. 90, pp. 1502-3. HB, v. 3, pp. 418-9.
\textsuperscript{511} YL, ch. 90, p. 1505.
Knowing of Zhang's achievements outside of court, Zhao did not envy his successes but nevertheless continued in his strong support of Zhang's work. For example, Zhang Jun attempted a decisive move against the enemy but worried that a consensus among the commanders would be difficult to gain, Zhao devised a way to help Zhang out of the predicament by suggesting that he carry out a concurrent assignment of establishing the military colony. According to his plan, if Zhang could not fulfill his goal of gaining a consensus, he would still save face by achieving the secondary goal of setting up a military colony. When Zhang attempted to cross the Huai River, intending to entrust Han Shizhong with the responsibility, Han declared that his troops were of inadequate size and requested that one of Zhang Zun's generals be put under his command. This request caused a stalemate between the two Zhangs. While blaming Zhang Zun for disobeying orders from the Mobile Office of Area Command, Zhao proposed sending a commander of the Imperial Army to assist Han while ordering the general Han had requested to be reassigned to the Song court. The exchange of personnel successfully salvaged some dignity for Zhang, who was surprised by Zhao's wisdom in handling the case.

Neither did Zhang and Zhao share the same style, nor did they hold the same opinion on some major issues. For example, Zhang was aggressive towards the

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512 YL, ch. 89, p. 1494.
513 Ibid., ch. 96, p. 1593.
515 By citing various historical records, Liu Tzu-chien provides a detailed evaluation on Zhang Jun's performance and his status in Chinese history. See Liu, "Cong Ruijiang de gainian shuodao lishishang dui nan Song chu Zhang Jun de pinglun" 從儒將的概念說到歷史上對南宋初張浚的評論," Guoshi shilun
Since the establishment of the Southern Song, only two chief councilors had been strong advocates of restoration: one was Li Gang, the other one was Zhang Jun. As the records have shown, Zhao Ding made many rational choices and suggestions. He could be described as a conservative politician who preferred defense to offense against the enemies. With respect to styles of exercising power, Zhang was more ambitious in doing what he deemed right and that was anticipated by Zhao. Prior to Zhang’s departure for new duty in Sichuan, Zhao advised one of the former’s councilors responsible for military documents, to report to the court as much as he could to avoid suspicion of holding too much power outside of the court. When Zhang was in Sichuan, exercising his special authority, Zhao urged the court to restrict him from raising revenues by changing laws concerning wine and salt which caused immense difficulties for the local people. As Zhang was busy dealing with military affairs outside the court, Zhao was eager to make personnel arrangement in the bureaucracy. Although Zhao, the highest ranked official of the government, had given tremendous cooperation and tolerance of Zhang’s work and expansion of power, their major difference in viewing some major issues had inevitably led to clashes. Their tacit disagreement escalated to the level of explicit opposition between each other when they could reach no consensus in dealing with the Qi’s second invasion.

On February 21 of 1136, Zhang went to Jing and Xiang areas to inspect the troops and review the situation for possibly attempting a military expedition. Zhang
publicly proclaimed Liu Yu's crimes. Song's military deployment was then focused on the Lower Yangtze River region, leaving the long stretch of territory between the Lower and Central Yangtze with many loopholes. Despite this shortcoming and the criticisms it incurred at the court, Zhang insisted that with Song's great concentration of troops at the frontlines, the enemy would not dare to penetrate too deeply into Song territory. Although some officials raised opposing viewpoints and worried about logistic problems, Gaozong fully supported Zhang's decision.\(^{518}\) Zhang thus ordered Han Shizhong to advance to Huaiyang from Cheng, Chu, Liu Guangshi to station himself in Hefei to gather the northern army, Zhang Zun to train troops and then move forward to Xuchi, Yang Yizhong to lead his troops to serve as the rear army, and finally Yue Fei to position himself in Xiangyang to attempt recovering the Central Plain. The national prestige had now risen to its crest.\(^{519}\) As a result, Han Shizhong achieved victory in Huaiyang and Zhang Zun moved forward to Xuchi, where he was ordered to build walls along the mountain. Zhao objected to this decision of Zhang since it required too much labor.\(^{520}\)

Choosing a location for the emperor's capital was another issue in their disagreement. Zhang, who was aggressive in attempting restoration, suggested the emperor move forward to Jiankang which he deemed as having the best defensive terrain in southeast China; moreover, its position was close enough to the north that the emperor

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\(^{516}\) YL, ch. 25, p. 515.
\(^{517}\) Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji 忠正德文集, ch. 1, pp. 30b-31a.
\(^{518}\) YL, ch. 97, pp. 1603-4.
\(^{520}\) YL, ch. 101, p. 1661.
could often be reminded of his mission of national restoration. Linan, on the other hand, was seen as restricted by being in a corner easily causing relaxation; its position was not suitable for calling up people throughout the country and was not connected to the Central Plain. Zhang pleaded to Gaozong to arrive at Jiankang either in the autumn or the winter to boost the army's morale for endeavoring national restoration. Braving the summer heat, Zhang crossed the Yangtze River to inspect various camps. He ordered Liu Guangshi to move forward to Luzhou 庐州 and build a triangular balance of power with Han Shizhong and Zhang Zun, and ordered Yang Yizhong to advance to Sizhou 泗州. Having concealed his disagreement, Zhao was unwilling to openly oppose Zhang's proposal in front of the emperor, instead only insinuating that moving to Jiankang was inappropriate.\footnote{YL, ch. 102, pp. 1668-70.}

In September of 1136, intelligence reports indicated the Qi had attempted to invade the south. Despite of Zhao's objection, Zhang ordered Zhang Zun to establish a station there and build town walls in Xuchi. Zhao Ding did not argue with Zhang strenuously for fear the latter's authority in the Mobile Office of Area Command would be interfered. Zhao urged Gaozong to move to Pingjiang 平江 to review the situation.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 104, p. 1695.} This was similar to an action that Zhao previously directed two years earlier when the Jin-Qi joint forces invaded. Without the Jin's aid, on October 22, Liu Yu dispatched his commanders with 300,000 troops to invade the Song through three routes. While facing the invasion, the previously described Song disproportionate defense preparation left a
big gap between the areas guarded by Liu Guangshi and Yue Fei. While Zhao had expressed his extreme worry about the Song defense; on the other hand, Zhang pleaded to go to the Yangtze River to oversee the army.  

In fact, all three invading armies of the Qi were centered on the Western Circuit of Huainan 淮南, an area guarded mainly by Liu Guangshi, and away from the Lower Yangtze, where the Song had deployed most of its forces. Having crossed the Huai River to fight the enemy, Han Shizhong soon returned without having scored a victory. He urged the emperor to return to Linan and suggested that all Song forces form a defensive line along the Yangtze River. Zhang disagreed, arguing if the Song commanders crossed the Yangtze to the south, then areas south of the Huai River would be captured by the enemy. As a result of this scenario, the Song would ultimately share the Yangtze River with the enemies. If the area south of the Huai River was lost, Zhang argued, the enemies would gain logistic advantages and the area south of the Yangtze would be endangered. Zhang encouraged Song generals to combine their forces to attack enemies in Huaixi 淮西 (West Circuit of Huainan) and proposed that Yue Fei remain at his current position although it was different from what Zhao had suggested. When Yang Yizhong arrived at Haozhou 湖州 (in modern Anhui Province and inside Huaixi 淮西 circuit) to offer his help, Liu Guangshi had already surrendered Luzhou and fled. Zhang warned Liu's troops not to cross the Yangtze or face punishment in the form of decapitation, then ordered Liu

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to return to Luzhou. Meanwhile, Gaozong wrote a letter personally ordering Yang Yizhong to advance or else face punishment according to military laws.  

As a result of Zhang's strict disciplines and Gaozong's firm support, the Song earned a success. The Qi invading forces were defeated, one by one, and the north regime was shocked with great fear. Gaozong praised Zhang's achievement as Yang Yizhong's victory report reached the court. However, this was an embarrassing moment for Zhao, who requested to resign. Although receiving denial of his resignation, Zhao reported to the emperor that he and Zhang were like brothers, yet people such as Lü Zhi 呂祉 (1092-1137) sowed discord between them. Zhao claimed he was unable to work with Zhang in the court; moreover, since the emperor endeavored to restore lost territories and bring back the two abducted emperors, military operations were the most important issue. He proposed that Gaozong allow Zhang to work to the best of his ability to help fulfill the emperor's aspirations. Soon afterwards, the disharmony between the two chief councilors resulted in an impeachment against Zhao, who pleaded to resign again. Gaozong consented to his request, but allowed Zhao to stay only in Shaoxing. Zhao felt even more embarrassed and begged to resign when Gaozong announced during an official audience that Zhang, Chief Councilor of the Right, should be solely credited for the victory. However, it was another major disagreement between Zhang and Zhao concerning whether to destroy Liu Yu that hastened Zhao's removal from his office.

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525 Ibid., ch. 106, pp. 1727-8.  
On January 2 of 1137, Zhao Ding stepped down from his current position to be appointed Pacification and Military Commission-in-chief (Anfū Zhizhi Dashi 安撫制置使) of Zhedong 浙東 Circuit with concurrent duty of Prefect of Shaoxing. Zhang Jun became the only chief councilor at the court and the highest ranked official of the Song government. He recruited Qin Gui back to the court and by changing the system of civil service, Zhang promoted Qin to the post of Military Affairs Commissioner (Shumishi 框密使), a title that had never been used since the reform of Yuanfeng 元豐 period (1076-85). Meanwhile, Zhang pleaded before the emperor to remove Liu Guangshi from his commanding position after reviewing his action in the war against the Qi army. Facing that pressure, Liu requested a sinecure duty. All the emperor's proclamations issued to military commanders were drafted at that time by Zhang, and because Gaozong was very supportive of Zhang's opinion he never changed a word. Naturally, Zhang's insistence on removing Liu's position was consented to by the emperor. After Liu stepped down from his commanding post, his army was divided into six groups which were later put under the command of Lü Zhi, Zhang's military consultant.

Compared to Zhao Ding, Zhang Jun did not seem to have good relationships with military commanders. After removing Liu from his post, Zhang argued with Yue Fei, one of the two military men he appreciated. At a time when Gaozong was in Jiankang and the Song court was preparing for a northern expedition, Yue proposed to the emperor

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528 Ibid., ch. 109, p. 1771.
a more aggressive approach for national restoration. He argued that the Song should not suppress Liu Yu, instead he would volunteer to lead 100,000 troops to intercept the Jin army and to restore the Central Plain. Whereas Zhang disagreed to this proposal, Yue pleaded to command all forces in south of the Huai River and to capture Guan 陝 from Shang 陝 (in modern Shaanxi Province), Guo 虢 (in modern Henan Province) and promised to finish the mission in three years. Gaozong concurred with Zhang in rejecting this proposal. One month later, Yue wrote to the throne claiming he had disagreement with the chief councilor (i.e., Zhang Jun) and begged for permission to leave his post to finish the mourning period for his mother. Without the court's permission, Yue left his post. Zhang thus appointed Zhang Zongyuan 張宗元, his Military Consultant, as Administrative Assistant (Panguan 助) of Yue's Pacification Commission to supervise Yue's army. Yue's protest lasted for almost three months. When Yue returned to the court, Zhang advised him to petition the throne, waiting for punishment.

Although Yue Fei was no longer a problem for the court, leadership of the army previously led by Liu Guangshi became a disputed issue. Qin Gui, then Military Affairs Commissioner, and Shen Yuqiu, Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, were both against the Area Command (Dudufu 都督府) taking command of the army, pleading to entrust it to a military commander. As a result, Wang De 王德 (1088-1155),

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529 YL, ch. 109, p. 1778.
530 Ibid., ch. 109, p. 1774.
one of Liu's favorite generals, was chosen as the new commander of Liu's army and appointed Supreme Commandant (Du Tongzhi 都統制). Lü Zhi, on the other hand, was ordered by Zhang to become situated in Luzhou to supervise all military commanders. When Zhang Jun returned to the court, Zhang Shou, then Vice Chief Councilor, warned Zhang Jun not to recklessly change military administration but he refused to accept the advice.

Even before Liu Guangshi was removed from office, Zhang Shou had advised Zhang Jun that if he wanted to change Liu's leadership he had to find a person who was disciplined and prestigious in order to subdue criticism from Liu's followers. Zhang replied that he had found Lü Zhi as that person. When Liu stepped down from office, Zhan Zhi 詹至 (1073-1140), then Auxiliary Academician, warned Zhang that appointing Wang De would cause him confrontation with Li Qiong 李琼, another commander under Liu and former bandit leader. He urged Zhang to choose a lieutenant who had close connections with Liu's army to assist Wang De. Yet none of these warnings were accepted by Zhang Jun. After Lü returned to the court, Li sued Wang at the Area Command and pleaded not to be put under Wang's command. Unable to get support from the Area Command, Li appealed to Censorate (Yushitai 御史臺). Meanwhile, Wang also accused Li of committing crimes.

532 YL, ch. 112, p. 1813.
534 YL, ch. 111, pp. 1795-6.
The court summoned Wang De to Jiankang and placed him and his troops under the command of the Area Command, and ordered Lü Zhi to go to Luzhou to restrain disputes. Zhang Tao 張燾 (1092-1166), then Secretariat Drafter (Zhongshu Sheren 中書舍人), argued with Zhang Jun that Lü, a scholar who was inexperienced with military life, should not be entrusted with such a mission. Zhang Jun still refused to change his mind. Ye Mengde, then Academician of Hall for Aid in Governance, admonished his friend, who was about to leave for Luzhou with Lü, that Lü did not have the talents to control military commanders especially in a disputed area like Huaixi; thus, he predicted the mission would be dangerous. Unfortunately, this advice was also ignored.

On August 26 of 1137, Li Qiong, furious by Lü Zhi's attempt to remove him and his close attendants, revolted and killed Lü Zhi. With 40,000 troops, Li fled to the Qi and surrendered themselves to Liu Yu. When informed of the incident, Zhang Jun immediately reported it to the emperor and pleaded for permission to resign. Although Gaozong consoled him with encouraging words and Zhang responded by offering rationalized excuses, his career was inevitably shaken by this incident, the so-called Huaixi Mutiny (Huaixi bingbian 淮西兵變). When Zhang again pleaded to resign, Gaozong asked him who would be his proper replacement. Zhang did not reply. However, when the emperor mentioned Qin Gui's name, Zhang indicated that he had recently discovered Qin's dark side. Gaozong then asked Zhang to draft an imperial

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decree to summon Zhao Ding. Qin was shocked by Zhang's betrayal.\footnote{YL, ch. 113, p. 1830.} In days following, Zhang sustained vehement attacks from censors; among them, the most serious and detailed accusation was from Zhou Bi 周秘, then Censor-in-chief. Zhang was impeached for committing twenty crimes ranging from abuse of power, extortion, to causing the recent revolt. Consequently, Zhang surrendered his authority of Area Command to the Bureau of Military Affairs.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 114, pp. 1838-40.}

After the Song's setback in Huaixi, whether Zhang should assume full responsibility or not became a greatly debated issue. Upon the court's request, students of the National University expressed their opinions. They argued that Zhang had contributed greatly to the wars against the Qi in previous year, while the error he made was due to his limited ability in selecting the wrong person. Of all the chief councilors Gaozong had appointed, Zhang was the best, argued the students, followed by Lü Yihao and Zhao Ding. They proposed to set up Commanders-in-chief (Dudu 都督) to lead all of the military forces. For example, Lü Yihao was to command Zhang Zun in the Huaixi Circuit; Meng Yu to command Han Shizhong in Huaidong Circuit; Qin Gui to command Yue Fei in Xiangyang area; Zhao Ding to command Liu Guangshi in Chuan, Shaan area. On top of all these Commanders-in-chief, Zhang Jun should be appointed as Supreme Commander-in-chief (Da Dudu 大都督). They urged the court to carry out the above suggestions as soon as possible to avoid further problems in the military.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 114, pp. 1842-3.}
Despite some favorable opinions, Zhang was removed from his office and demoted to Grand Academician of Guanwen Hall with the assignment of a sinecure duty supervising a Taoist temple in Jiangzhou 江州. Soon afterwards, Zhang was deprived of his title as Grand Academician due to further impeachment by Zhou Bi. This formally concluded Zhang's term of chief councilor which had lasted three years.\(^{540}\) He did not return to the court until twenty-five years later when Xiaozong 孝宗 (r. 1163-89), Gaozong's successor, appointed him as chief councilor again. Unfortunately, even then he failed in another attempt of northern expedition which will not be discussed here.

An evaluation of Zhang's performance in his political career and his interactions with Gaozong is now in order. As discussed earlier, Zhang advanced from a low level official to the highest ranked position in just a few years. His swift advancement was mainly due to his contribution in saving the throne during the Miao-Liu military coup. At thirty-two, he was promoted as Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, the youngest appointee since Kou Zhun. After reaching this high position, Zhang immediately volunteered to go to Sichuan to manage defense against the Jin. He was bestowed with all kinds of authority and privileges for the mission. The Fuping debacle, which was ascribed partially to Zhang's stubborn personality, cost huge losses for the country. As the Song lost Shaanxi, Zhang was summoned back to the court and removed from his position. But, on the eve of the Jin-Qi joint invasion Zhang was reinstated to the duty of military affairs under Zhao Ding's recommendation. As a result, the invasion was checked by the Song forces and Zhang was promoted as Chief Councilor of the Right in

\(^{540}\) YL, ch. 114, pp. 1844-5.
the next year. However, as Zhang became more powerful and obtained the emperor's total trust, it was time for Zhao Ding, his former colleague and best friend, to leave the court. Having been the sole chief councilor at the court, Zhang refused to accept advice from others and soon stumbled in a situation of frontline mutiny, which cost the Song an army of approximately 40,000 troops. Zhang was promptly replaced by Zhao Ding and summarily disappeared from the central government for twenty-five years.

As for Zhang's interactions with Gaozong, the records reveal that they maintained a harmonious relationship. Had he not committed great errors, Zhang would have stayed in power for a much longer time. Zhang began his close connection with the emperor after the attempted Miao-Liu military coup because Gaozong was indebted to him for his effort in the rescue mission. Although he had been entrusted with important duties as well as allowed to exercise tremendous power, Zhang spent most of his time out of the court. He was first appointed as Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner and assigned to a place far from the court. After he was relieved of that duty and ordered to return to the court, Zhang spent more than a year overlooking the country's condition before finally reporting to the emperor at Linan. After his reinstatement, Zhang seldom stayed with the emperor, but was busy inspecting defense forces along the Yangtze River. Gaozong's impression of Zhang seemed to derive from his knowledge of his performance outside of the court rather than a firsthand impression of his personality and working style that would have arisen from working closely together.

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When Zhang Jun was granted an audience with the emperor after the Miao-Liu coup was quelled, Gaozong showed him his hand scalded from hot soup accidentally spilled on it in sudden dismay upon having learned of Zhang's demotion by the rebels.\textsuperscript{542} Zhang's contribution in saving his regime was deeply engraved in Gaozong's memory. When Zhang later pleaded for punishment in taking responsibility for military setbacks at Fuping, Gaozong told ranking officials that there were many talented people who were capable of handling things but Zhang Jun was peerless in his diligent work for the country.\textsuperscript{543} On a few other occasions Gaozong repeatedly complimented Zhang's diligence for the country, his efforts in organizing rescue forces to save the throne, and his patriotic actions in attempting to restore the Central Plain.\textsuperscript{544} During a conversation with Zhang's son, Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133-1180), Gaozong revealed his close relationship with his father, saying to Shi that although the relationship between them was that of lord and subject, he really felt they were like blood relatives.\textsuperscript{545}

Given the fact that he had been close to Zhang Jun, Gaozong was also disappointed with his performance with the three major military setbacks, especially the Huaxi Mutiny. Gaozong intended to give Zhang a heavy punishment. Had it not been for Zhao Ding's persistent help, Zhang would have been banished to a remote place.\textsuperscript{546} When Zhao mentioned Zhang's merits in saving the emperor's throne, Gaozong responded for that he had rewarded Zhang with the position of chief councilor; however,

\textsuperscript{542} Pan Yongyin 潘永因, 宋稗類專, v. 1, p. 84. YL, ch. 21, p. 443.  
\textsuperscript{543} YL, ch. 43, p. 777.  
\textsuperscript{544} Ibid., ch. 58, p. 1006 & ch. 82, p. 1351.  
\textsuperscript{545} Luo Dajing 羅大經, 鈔林玉霑, ch. 13, pp. 6a-b.  
\textsuperscript{546} Zhao Ding 趙鼎, 中正德文集, ch. 8, pp. 15a-16b.
mistakes he just committed could not be offset by his previous meritorious achievements. The emperor also complained to Zhao that Zhang had caused him great damage. Later when the Jin violated its agreement with the Song, it was recommended that Zhang be reinstated. Gaozong replied with a stern face, saying that he would rather accept the downfall of the country than make use of Zhang again.

Zhang Jun, while diligent and patriotic, was criticized as stubborn and untalented. Before stepping down from the office of chief councilor, Zhang spent most of his time away from the court, never stopping his working for the country. He had earned the respect of his enemies and positive comments of his performance in most historical records. Yet his personality caused detrimental effects on both his career and the fate of the country. For example, he refused to accept advice from his subordinates and rushed into an all-out war with the Jins resulting in the Fuping debacle. Unable to convince his followers that he had the ability to make proper decisions, Zhang had Qu Duan, a prestigious military man who opposed to Zhang's foolhardy actions, tortured and killed. A few years later, Zhang committed another great error: having ignored advice from other officials, Zhang created a volatile situation that resulted in the revolt of 40,000 troops in the Huaixi area.

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549 Liu Tzu-chien, in his "Cong Ruijiang de gainian shuodao lishang dui nan Song chu Zhang Jun de pingleun," gives Zhang a favorable evaluation. He blames that Xinian yaoju 薪年要錄 had not been published until mid-Qing period and thus many historians who did not read this chronicle were unable to make a fair judgment on Zhang's performance. See Liu, p. 488.
The most debatable issue is whether or not Zhang had ruined the chances of Song's restoration. As mentioned above, Zhang saved the emperor from rebel control, then immediately volunteered to go to Sichuan to strengthen the Song defense there. The mission to Sichuan was important in that the new regime created by Gaozong had not been expressly recognized by local powers before Zhang's arrival. Military men had not been tamed and financial resources not been fully developed. Zhang's management of Chuan 川 and Shaan 陝 could be seen as an experiment in the policy of the Outlying Forts (fanzhen 藩鎭) system. He recruited talented people to his government, set military affairs to order, reorganized administrative regions, and reformed local economies. After the Fuping debacle, Zhang struggled to hold Sichuan while he effectively checked the Jin's further invasion. After being summoned back to the court and later received recommendation by Zhao Ding, Zhang again assumed the responsibility of military affairs. During this period, Zhang was responsible for suppressing bandits around Dongting Lake. With the help of Yue Fei, Zhang successfully completed the mission. Later when the Song faced attacks from the Qi army, Zhang maintained close supervision by administering appropriate discipline on the Song forces. As a result, the Song achieved its success against the invading enemy.

However, Zhang committed two great errors that were very costly for him — the Fuping and the Huaixi disasters. The former caused loss of Shaanxi, an important territory the Song was never able to retrieve; the latter was more devastating since it influenced, to a certain degree, the emperor's decision to restore north China. Gaozong

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did not greatly complain about the Fuping failure, probably because he felt he also shared partial responsibility since he ordered Zhang to rush into actions against the Jin to distract its invasion in southeast China. Undoubtedly the Huaixi Mutiny was a big disappointment for the emperor, who was tremendously influenced by this incident thereby precipitating his policy changes. As a result, Gaozong made a number of adjustments: first, he appointed Zhao Ding to replace Zhang Jun and later chose Qin Gui to replace Zhao Ding; second, he withdrew from an aggressive approach to the Jin and became conservative; third, he moved back to Linan; fourth, he decided to remove commanding power from major military commanders; fifth, he was more inclined to negotiate peace with the Jin. In an audience with Zhao Ding, Gaozong rejected the idea that moving back to Linan as an action suspicious to people who supported restoration of the Central Plain. He argued that Zhang had spent three years working on the plan and exhausting the national income, but had not obtained any territory for the Song; he instead destroyed the many achievements that had earlier established. While Gaozong had once been aroused to actions against the Jins, he was no longer supportive of any aggressive approach to the Song-Jin relations. This was the situation that Zhao Ding had to face when he replaced Zhang as the chief councilor.

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551 Huang Kuanchong 黃寛重, "Li Qiong bingbian yu nan Song chuqi de zhengji 鄭溫兵變與南宋初期的政局," in Nan Song junzheng yu wenxian tansuo 南宋軍政與文獻探索, pp. 51-104. Also, Jian Ending 简恩定, "Huaixi bingbian yu Song Gaozong de yiwu zhengce 淮西兵變與宋高宗的抑武政策," in Zhanzheng yu Zhongguo shehui zhi bianzhu 戰爭與中國社會之變動, pp. 53-73.

552 Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch. 8, 17b.
Chapter Twelve: Zhao Ding 趙鼎 (1085-1147) II: Loyalty or Principle?

Immediately after the incident of Huaixi Mutiny, Zhao was summoned back to the court and appointed as Supervisor of Wanshou 萬壽 Temple and concurrently Reader-in-waiting. Qin Gui, who thought himself as the incontestable candidate for chief councilor, was not recommended by Zhang Jun, who expressed his distrust of Qin in front of the emperor. Taking advantage of his so being called up by the court, Zhao requested that the emperor appoint and demote officials according to his choice. After Zhang Jun was officially removed from office, Zhao was appointed Chief Councilor of the Left with a promotion of four ranks, an unusual honor to bestow upon an official. The most urgent issue Zhao discussed with the emperor was the Huaixi incident and its consequences. Zhao suggested that the court stay calm when dealing with military commanders lest they became more arrogant and uncontrollable.

Despite that, Zhang turned his back on Zhao for almost a year ago, but Zhao still tried to protect him from being banished to a remote area. Because of his reliance on Zhao as chief adviser, Gaozong compromised with him in giving Zhang a lesser punishment. In the meantime, Zhao insisted that Qin Gui should stay on, while some officials should not share the burden with Zhang only due to their being from the latter's

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553 YL, ch. 113, p 1830. HB, v. 3, p. 520.  
554 YL, ch. 113, pp. 1846-7.
hometown. Zhao pleaded with the emperor to make gracious inquiries of these people as well as saving them from being impeached by censors.555

After the setback of Zhang's aggressive approach to the Jins, Zhao and Qin decided to urge the emperor to return to Linan. This proposal incurred strong protests from Li Gang, then Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner of West Circuit of Jiangnan and the Prefect of Hongzhou. According to all past historical experience, Li argued, retreating was never adopted as a measure to execute military operations aiming at achievements. The Song, he argued, should not be discouraged by one rebel commander and flee. However, Li's protests offended those who controlled the court, and as a result, cost him his political career. He was demoted and assigned to a sinecure duty.556 The first priority for Zhao and his administration, at the time, was to maintain the emperor's safety and to strengthen the Song defense.

Meanwhile, the Song-Jin relations went through a series of changes. Liu Yu, bogus emperor of the Qi, was dethroned by the Jin because he was deemed as not fulfilling his duty. Uncertain about this new development, Song officials discussed the issue at the court. Some suggested that Song forces should be urged to strengthen their defenses; others proposed that it was a proper time to send talented envoys to the Jin.557 At this critical moment, Wang Lun 王倫 (1084-1144), a Song envoy, and others returned, bringing back a Jin peace proposal offered mainly by Wanyan Chang, the Jin Vice Marshal of the Left. Surprised by the Jin's sudden shift of attitude, Gaozong

555 YL, ch. 115, pp. 1857-60.
556 Ibid., ch. 116, p. 1873.
responded by saying that he would make use of any means to trade for the remains of the deceased Huizong, the empress dowager and his brother Qinzong. When he learned from Wang that the Jin promised to return Huizong's remains, the empress dowager and the various circuits south of the Yellow River, Gaozong bestowed Wang with great rewards. Four days later, Wang was promoted and assigned as special envoy to the Jin for retrieving Huizong's coffin.

As the Jin proposal caused great uncertainty to the Song court, it took them only a few months to change from a hawkish stance, previously directed by Zhang Jun, to a pacifist position toward the Jin. Zhao Ding seemed puzzled by this situation in that he did not respond to it with an active proposal. Having retained security as his first priority, Zhao insisted that the emperor move back to Linan despite the opposition. But, because some scholar-officials saw it as an opportune time to restore the Central Plain, he urged Gaozong to assemble high ranking military commanders to gain their advice. Gaozong rejected Zhao's proposal, seeming to have made up his mind that peace was the only alternative for dealing with the Jin. Chen Yuyi 陈与义 (1090-1138), then Vice Chief Councilor, argued that if peace would satisfy the needs of the court it would be better than executing military operations; if peace could not be achieved, then it was still not late for war. Gaozong agreed to Chen's argument.

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558 As Empress Dowager Longyou 隆祐 died on May 12 of 1131, the empress dowager mentioned in here is Gaozong's real mother, Worthy Consort Wei (Wei Xianfei 章賢妃). See her biography in Song shi, ch. 243, pp. 8640-3.
559 YL, ch. 117, pp. 1894-5.
561 YL, ch. 118, p. 1900.
Soon after Gaozong returned to Linan, Qin Gui was appointed Chief Councilor of the Right. Zhao now faced critical challenges. From within he had to figure out a way not only satisfying the emperor but also convincing other officials that his viewpoint was correct. From without he had to face the Jins who had played an upper hand in diplomatic wars against the Song. Qin’s promotion was another variable added to the already complicated situation in which Zhao found himself in. At this juncture, it seemed to be the best policy for Zhao to act according to the emperor’s intentions. When the Jin envoys approached Linan, Gaozong told ranking officials to treat the visitors well hoping to put military confrontation to an end. Zhao concurred with the emperor and argued that without wars the expenses saved would be much greater than the amount of money spent on entertaining the Jin envoys. Gaozong promised to abolish all kinds of excessive taxes levied on his subjects if the war could come to an end. Zhao and Qin both praised the emperor for his sincere remarks.\[562\]

Although peace seemed to be at hand, some officials at the court were not optimistic with such prospects and started to attack Wang Lun for his returning with the Jin message, thus demoralizing the Song anti-Jin sentiment. Wei Qiang 魏矼, then acting Vice Minister of the Ministry of Personnel, refused to accept the assignment to accompany the Jin envoys. Wang Zhidao 王之道士道 (1093-1169), then Court Gentleman for Manifesting Rightness of the Left (Zuo Xuanyi Lang 左宣義郎), wrote a letter to Wei expressing his opinion on the Song-Jin relations. Wang argued that the Jin had since Jingkang 嘉康 period used peace negotiations to mislead the Song resulting in the

\[562\] YL, ch. 119, p. 1930.
capture of the two emperors taken to the north, and the distressing plight of the people; Wang Lun, disregarding these lessons of the past, had ushered the bandits into Song territory again. Wang Zhidao listed nine reasons explaining why he thought peace was not feasible, as well as his belief that peace could be accomplished only if the Jins were sincere with their promises.\(^563\)

As the Jin envoys got close to Linan, Gaozong expressed his concern about the empress dowager and his hope to see her soon. In fact, the emperor had tried to use the pretext of \textit{xiao} 孝 (obedience) to persuade his subjects into accepting peace talks. Meanwhile, Qin Gui skilfully explained the dilemma between the emperor and officials; by humbling himself, the emperor had tried to obtain peace for the sake of obedience; but, officials were angry to see their emperor being servile because of their loyalty to him. Qin argued that the two intentions were not contradictory. Meanwhile, having received Gaozong's warnings Zhao Ding urged the Song forces to cautiously defend areas south of the Yangtze River in spite of the Jin's promise of returning the territory south of the Yellow River.

Other officials continued expressing their worries about the Jin peace proposal. Wang Shu, then Vice Military Affairs Commissioner, suspected the Jins' real intention. He urged the emperor and officials at the court to make a decision on a uniform argument when bargaining with the Jins. He cautioned the court that military commanders, such as Yue Fei and Han Shizhong, had insisted on fighting the Jins in this year or else would

petition to resign. Wang Shu also criticized Wang Lun as facilitating the peace to materialize for his own ends. Zhang Jie 張 戒, the Investigating Censor, provided analysis of acceptable and unacceptable conditions for peace negotiations. He urged the court to strengthen its defense for the arrival of Jin envoys. The ultimate and reliable way to restore the Central Plain, to gain back Huizong’s remains and Qinzong, Zhang argued, was to consolidate both the Song’s national strength and its military forces. He also warned that the Jin’s solicitous proposal should be closely scrutinized because obtaining their promised concessions without making any genuine effort was simply an implausible situation for the Song.\footnote{YL, ch. 120, pp. 1938-41.}

While the Song was puzzled by their intention, the Jin envoys showed an arrogant attitude on their way to the Song capital, refusing to meet with the Song representatives assigned to accompany them. Wang Shu and other officials were so furious that they wrote complaints to the throne presenting their protests and worries about the peace agreement.\footnote{HB, v. 3, p. 571.} For those officials who were against negotiations with the Jin, Gaozong often sternly rejected them and sometimes became greatly infuriated. There was no consensus in the court, and the emperor was in an unprecedented predicament. Zhao Ding, at the crucial moment, demonstrated his wisdom to mediate the dispute. He secretly instructed the emperor concerning how to explain himself away from the dilemma. Gaozong was urged to explain that the reason he insisted on peace talks was to try to retrieve the empress dowager, Huizong’s remains and Qinzong, despite realizing
that a peace negotiation was not a good thing. Officials who were against the peace merely suspected the enemy's sincerity, yet once the Song effected return of their abducted imperial family members, even if they broke the agreement the day after its completion, they still would have achieved much from the peace negotiation. Zhao's instructions turned out to be successful and officials halted their protests.\footnote{YL, ch. 120, pp. 1942-4.}

When the Jin envoys led by Wulingga Simo 刺史慕思謀 arrived at the court, Zhao Ding and other ranking officials were ordered to deal with them. Wulingga's arrogance, shown by insisting on his version of diplomatic practice, was partially checked by Zhao whose poise was impressive. After meeting with the Song ranking officials, the Jin envoys were granted an audience with the emperor. Gaozong was urged by Zhao not to show his sentiment when Huizong's name was mentioned in conversation with the Jin envoys. Yet, Gaozong sobbed when he asked about the empress dowager and his brother. Wulingga also expressed his sympathy and hope for a peace agreement.\footnote{YL, ch. 120, pp. 1942-4.}

After the initial meetings between the two sides were completed, the peace proposal brought by the Jin envoys triggered power struggles in the Song court. Qin Gui, Xiang Ziyin 向子諫, then Vice Minister of the Ministry of Revenue, and Fan Tong 范同 (1097-1148), then Vice Director of Ministry of Personnel, all agreed to negotiating peace with the Jins; but Wei Qiang, Chang Tong, then Censor-in-chief, suspected the Jins were deceitful and Pan Lianggui 潘良貴 (1094-1150), then Secretariat Drafter, requested fighting the Jins. Because of their different viewpoints, Xiang and Pan, former
good friends, became hostile to each other and openly argued in front of the emperor. Pan scolded Xiang for presenting trivial and long reports at the time of Gaozong's presence. The emperor was mad at Pan's insolence. Meanwhile, Chang Tong sided with Pan against Xiang. Gaozong was angry that Chang, who recommended Xiang to his present position, would take sides as well as criticize Xiang for his ornate language. Consequently, all three were removed from their positions.\textsuperscript{568} Zhao Ding involved himself in this nasty dispute, also irritating the emperor.

Qin Gui, on the other hand, took advantage of this opportunity to stir up bad feelings between them.\textsuperscript{569} He urged on Xiao Zhen 蕭 振 (1086-1157), then Attendant Censor, to impeach Liu Dazhong 劉 大 中, then Vice Chief Councilor and Zhao Ding's follower, for disobedience towards his father. Xiao was originally recommended by Zhao but was later promoted as a censor by Qin and had since served him. The impeachment against Liu was, in fact, an indirect attack against Zhao. Meanwhile, Zhang Jie, then Palace Censor, accused Gou Tao 侯 濤 (1083-1141) both as Zhang Jun's follower and for forming a faction. Gou counterattacked Zhang Jie and argued that his impeachment against Gou was executed under Zhao's instructions. He also defamed Zhao as collaborating with censors and military commanders. Gaozong rather agreed to it.\textsuperscript{570}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{567} YL, ch. 120, p. 1946.
\textsuperscript{568} Ibid., ch. 120, p. 1948. HB, v. 3, p. 574.
\textsuperscript{569} YL, ch. 121, p. 1954.
\textsuperscript{570} Ibid., ch. 122, pp. 1967-8.
\end{footnotesize}
While impeaching Liu Dazhong, Xiao Zhen also implied that Zhao should leave his office without being accused of any charges. The rumors of Zhao's removal had henceforth been spread in the court by Qin's faction members. On November 25 of 1138, after Liu's demotion, Zhao was removed from his office and demoted to Pacification and Supervisory Commissioner of Zhedong Circuit and concurrently Prefect of Shaoxing, a duty he had previously held only a year earlier, just before he was called up by the court after Zhang Jun stepped down from his office. Zhang Jie begged the emperor to keep Zhao at the Classics Colloquium (Jingyan). However, because Qin had already convinced Gaozong to humble himself by accepting the peace agreement, Zhao's opposition could not be tolerated and his leaving the court was necessary. Before Zhao left for the new post, Qin volunteered to see him off with other ranking officials. Qin offered a banquet but it was rejected by Zhao, and since then they became mortal enemies.571

Neither was Zhao Ding allowed to return to the court nor was he allowed to enjoy life after being relieved of his duty as chief councilor. On January 4 of 1139, Zhao was removed from his office of Prefect of Shaoxing and reassigned as Supervisor of Liquan Temple, a sinecure duty.572 Two months later, Qin worried that Zhao's presence in Shaoxing could still be a threat, and thus moved him as Prefect to Quanzhou, a remote place far from the capital.573 Unfortunately, power struggles against Zhao did not end there. On May 3 of 1139, Zeng Tong then Grand Master of Remonstrance of the

Right (You Jianyi Dafu 右 諫議大夫), and Xie Zuxin 謝 相信, then Palace Censor, jointly accused Zhao of using his power to form factions. During the bogus regime of Zhang Bangchang, Zhao was alleged to have accepted Zhang's appointment. The accusation also involved Zhao's relationship with Zhang Jun, with whom he had shared his power. Zhao, they argued, had originally helped Zhang forge ahead, disregarding the livelihood of the population and the fiscal administration. By tapping all kinds of resources at the expense of subjects' lives, Zhao firmly consolidated his power and utilized national wealth, in the name of the emperor, to distribute favors for private gains. With such a manipulation, Zhao was more popular than the emperor. However, Zhao later had clashes with Zhang, and clandestinely obstructed the latter's progress. When the Huaixi Mutiny occurred, Zhao blamed Zhang for executing military operations and took advantage of Zhang's setback to replace him as chief councilor. Wang Lun's mission to the Jin had not been opposed by Zhao; however, when the Jin envoys came during Zhao's absence from the court, he instigated influencing popular opinion against peace negotiations. They argued that Zhao should be punished because he always vacillated in his attitude, and placed personal interest on top of loyalty to the country. The memorial which detailing the above accusations was presented to the emperor five times. As a result, Zhao's honorary title of Military Commissioner (Jiedushi 節度使) was revoked but he was allowed to continue his duty as Prefect of Quanzhou.\footnote{YL, ch. 126, p. 2054. HB, v. 4, p. 18.}

\footnote{YL, ch. 127, pp. 2067-8.}

\footnote{Zhao Ding denied this accusation. See detail in Zhao Ding, Zhongzhengdewen ji, ch. 9, pp. 4b-9a.}
On April 21 of 1140, Wang Ciweng 王次翁 (1079-1149), then Censor-in-chief, initiated another wave of attacks, accusing Zhao of unlawful behavior. Qin Gui requested that Wang's memorial be shown to Zhao but Gaozong denied. But because Zhao frequently petition to resign, he was ultimately removed from his office as Prefect of Quanzhou and assigned a sinecure duty. After leaving the post, Zhao enjoyed momentary freedom and had opportunities to go to Shaoxing. His whereabouts caused great anxiety for Qin, and in consequence the latter urged Wang Ciweng to impeach Zhao again. In his accusations against Zhao, Wang not only repeated the charges of Zeng Tong and Xie Zuxin, but also attacked him with accusations of committing embezzlement and lobbying the emperor's relatives. The honorary title of Lord Specially Advanced (特進) Zhao had been allowed to keep provided Wang a good excuse for sowing discord between the emperor and Zhao. According to Wang's accusation, Zhao's followers claimed that because his title (特進) was still equivalent to chief councilor, it showed that the emperor did not altogether want to remove Zhao and left the position of Chief Councilor of the Left open for him to fill. Meanwhile, He Zhu 何鏘 (1088-1152), then Grand Master of Remonstrance of the Right, also impeached Zhao. As a result, Zhao was demoted to Grand Master of the Palace of the Left (左中大夫), Vice Director of the Palace Library (秘書少監) and ordered to live in Xinghuajun 興化軍 (in modern Fujian Province), a place close to Quanzhou. Three days later, both Wang and He continued their attacks on Zhao, who was later demoted to Vice Military Commissioner (節度副使) of

576 YL, ch. 135, p. 2162.
Qingyuanjun 清邁軍, and ordered to move to Chaozhou 潮州 (in modern Guangdong Province), a farther place from Linan than Quanzhou.578

Although Qin Gui was in firm control of the court after the completion of Song-Jin peace agreement in 1141, Zhao was still seen as his major enemy. On October 21 of 1144, Zhao was impeached by Zhan Dafang 詹大昉 (?-1148), then Censor-in-chief. Gaozong ordered Zhao to be moved to Jiyangjun 吉陽軍 (in modern Hainan Province) in the farthest point south in Song territory, lest Zhao's followers were still watching and waiting for his return to the court.579 On May 27 of 1147, an imperial decree was issued ordering Zhao was never to be pardoned nor reviewed by any amnesty agreement.580 Under Qin's incessant persecution, Zhao feared that his very existence was a threat to his family's safety, and thus stopped eating. Consequently, Zhao died on September 8 at the age of sixty-two.581

A general evaluation of Zhao Ding is now in order. Gaozong's appreciation of Zhao Ding's job performance began when he was a remonstrator and censor. According to Gaozong's account, all forty proposals made by Zhao in three months were adopted by the emperor.582 This outstanding record laid a solid foundation for Zhao's being trusted by Gaozong, in particular during times of emergency. When Gaozong was in a critical

577 YL, ch. 136, p. 2194.
578 Ibid., ch. 136, pp. 2196–7. HB, v. 4, p. 113.
580 YL, ch. 156, p. 2531.
582 YL, ch. 26, p. 526.
situation floating at the sea, Zhao was one of the few officials who accompanied the emperor. After Gaozong returned from the sea, Zhao had clashes with Lü Yihao, then Chief Councilor of the Left, because of their differing opinions. Whereas Lü was daring and impatient, Zhao demonstrated his cautious style in dealing with the Jins. Lü urged Gaozong to march forward when informed that Han Shizhong had frustrated Wanyan Zongbi, the leader of Jin invading army. Zhao, on the other hand, presented a different viewpoint, advising Gaozong not to return to Linan until Zhexi Circuit was quiet and the Jin army had crossed the Yangtze River simply because he was suspicious of Han's victory report, worrying that the Jin army might turn back and attacked the Song again.

In addition to the aforementioned differing opinion with Lü, Zhao was also not pleased with Lü's unrestrained power. After the court was established in Yuezhou, Zhao led his colleagues to impeach Lü. At the beginning, Zhao's courage for challenging the chief councilor did not warrant him an upper hand: on the contrary, he was removed from his duty of censor because of Lü's pressure. Moreover, Zhao refused to accept the two new appointments and continued his attacks on Lü. Eventually, his determination paid off as Lü was removed from office and Zhao was reinstated.

Zhao's career reached another climax when he began to involve himself in military affairs. In fact, his position in the Bureau of Military Affairs not only allowed him to exercise his power in commanding forces but also to resume authority of the Bureau

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383 YL, ch. 30, p. 589.
384 Ibid., ch. 32, pp. 630-1.
which had previously been taken along with another appointment.\textsuperscript{586} During his term as Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Zhao urged the emperor to pay extra attention to military administration, the first priority in agenda of the Song founding fathers. Thanks to Zhao, some old military systems, such as imperial guards and army, were restored.\textsuperscript{587} During a critical moment in 1130 when the Jin captured two important prefectures of the Song, Zhao volunteered to accompany Zhang Zun to the frontline because the latter refused to accept the rescue assignment. Despite Zhang's refusal, as a military coordinator Zhao had gained some experience in dealing with military men, who were then unrestrained but indispensable.\textsuperscript{588}

As a neophyte, Zhao had encountered difficulties in giving orders to military commanders. His communication skills were appreciated by the emperor when Zhao was trying to convince Liu Guangshi to lend assistance to the captured cities.\textsuperscript{589} However, when Zhao lost his patience with Liu and drafted a memorial to reprimand the latter for refusing orders to conduct the rescue operation, Gaozong, on the contrary, ordered Zhao to remove his severe remarks from the memorial for fear that Liu would feel uneasy and thus not to achieve distinction. Zhao was given opportunities such as this to learn Gaozong's skills and understanding of controlling the military men.\textsuperscript{590} Despite their personally harmonious and beneficial interactions, some disagreements between Zhao and the emperor could not be easily compromised. For example, when Gaozong intended

\textsuperscript{585} YL, ch. 32, pp. 631-6.
\textsuperscript{586} Ibid., ch. 33, p. 645.
\textsuperscript{587} Ibid., ch. 33, pp. 648-9 & 653.
\textsuperscript{588} Ibid., ch. 36, p. 695.
\textsuperscript{589} Ibid., ch. 37, p. 713.
to promote Xin Qizong, a military commander, to the position of Military Commander (Jiedushi 節度使), Zhao steadfastly insisted on his objection to it, holding that he thought Xin had no meritorious achievement, and thus should not be promoted to such an esteemed position. For a seemingly insignificant issue, Zhao was removed from his office and given a sinecure duty and for almost two years was not allowed to return to the court.

After returning to the court, Zhao was appointed to Pacification Commissioner-in-chief of Jiangdong 江東 and concurrently Prefect of Jiankang. From then on, Zhao had many opportunities to get acquainted with military commanders, and ultimately earn their respect. Zhao was later transferred to the post of Pacification Commissioner-in-chief of Jiangxi 江西 and concurrently Prefect of Hongzhou. During this term of office, Zhao once helped to correct the court's mindset concerning an attempt to recover the old capital. His cautious observation drew the emperor's attention, despite the inevitable military setback due to the court's being misinformed of the situation with regard to both local forces and their leaders. Zhao also made other useful proposals to the court; for example, recognizing Yue Fei's ability and recommending him to assume the duty of defending Ezhou 鄂州, a place located in between the Lower Yangtze and Sichuan as well as a very significant place for the Song's entire defense. Yue Fei ultimately rendered voluntary submission to Zhao.

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590 YL, ch. 38, p. 725.
591 Ibid., ch. 65, p. 1100.
592 Ibid., ch. 65, p. 1109.
593 Ibid., ch. 68, p. 1152.
Zhao additionally showed his ability in reorganizing dispersed forces of the Song. For example, Li Heng, a Song Military Commissioner (Zhenfushi 鎮撫使) fled to the south after he failed in an attempt to attack enemies in the north, causing many troubles for the local Song governments along his retreat route so that he and his followers were seen as bandits. When Li, desperate and about to clash with the Pacification Commissioner of Hubei Circuit, he was reminded that Zhao Ding would accept him and his troops. While Li Heng was hesitating, boats carrying food sent by Zhao arrived and his followers calmed down. Greatly pleased with the arrangement, Li went to Hongzhou to seek help from Zhao. In addition to Li’s army, Zhao also reorganized other forces that were later put under Yue Fei’s command. Zhao’s outstanding performance in local administration earned him a promotion and an opportunity to return to the court.

On April 2 of 1134, Zhao returned to the court to accept the appointment of Vice Chief Councilor. Gaozong ordered him to recommend talented people for the government, and Zhao had many candidates in mind, all of whom were accepted and appointed by the emperor. Zhao’s interest in personnel organization became one of the characteristics of his administration. In fact, he was able to recruit many scholar-officials who were willing to follow him. However, his ability to form new arrangement for the government, according to his wishes, helped him to become a capable leader, but it also made him an easy target for people to accuse him of forming factions. Moreover, Zhao’s

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594 YL, ch. 69, pp. 1172-3.
595 Ibid., ch. 74, p. 1222.
active involvement in arranging personnel did not escape the eyes of the watchful emperor, whose authority had not been consolidated in Zhao's work.

Although his position at the time was Vice Chief Councilor, Zhao was entrusted with the exceptional duty taking charge of military affairs because Zhu Shengfei, then Chief Councilor, was not versed in military knowledge. This was a golden opportunity for Zhao to outperform Zhu, and to create easy access for further advancement. When Zhang Jun was summoned back to the court, the Song deemed it necessary to assign another important official to Sichuan to strengthen its defense. Zhao was seen as the most qualified candidate and all his requests, such as official titles and supplies, were all agreed to by the emperor. At the time when Zhao's career was reaching a turning point, the Jin-Qi joint invasion denied Zhao's original plan to Sichuan, yet gave him another rare opportunity to impress Gaozong, who was then under tremendous pressure from the enemies. Unlike most officials at the court, Zhao insisted on fighting the invading forces, which earned Gaozong's consent and trust, as well as earning a promotion for him.

After Zhu Shengfei was removed from his duty, Zhao became the succeeding chief councilor. Zhao's immediate response to the Jin-Qi joint forces was aggressive. He urged the emperor to personally lead the troops to war. Despite oppositions, Zhao insisted on his proposal and by utilizing his negotiation skills managed to convince people from three major factions who were against direct confrontation with the Jin-Qi joint forces. In order to strengthen his think tank, Zhao recruited Zhang Jun back to the court and helped him to become Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Having
relied on Zhang’s military expertise, Zhao hoped to consolidate his hawkish position against the enemies. As a result, Zhao highly recommended Zhang to the emperor as well as helping Zhang restore his reputation. Later Gaozong's trust was smoothly transferred from Zhao to Zhang. Zhang, on the other hand, did not fail to live up to Zhao's expectation, and moreover, gradually replaced Zhao's important place in the court. Ironically, this evolved into a conflict of interests that initiated their differences and later turned into uncompromising clashes. Although he was later promoted to Chief Councilor of the Left (a rank above that of Zhang's Chief Councilor of the Right), Zhao's role in the Song politics gradually became less important as Zhang's military talents drew the emperor's attention in the following years when the Song faced another menace from its enemies. While Zhao was responsible for general affairs in the court, Zhang frequently went to the frontline to oversee the troops. Compared to Zhao, Zhang was in a much better position to achieve distinction.

As the road to the top became narrow, the gap between Zhao and Zhang grew wider, which seemed to be a natural and inevitable outcome. Despite their friendship, pursuit of fame and advancement easily evolved into a showdown between the two strong competitors. Their clashes could be expected soon with the result that only one would stay in charge of the government. When the Song court's attention was shifted to problems of domestic bandits and the border situation, Zhang drew much more of the emperor's attention than did Zhao. Zhao, on the other hand, not only failed to salvage his relationship with Zhang, but was also unable to demonstrate his talents to convince the emperor that he was indispensable for the position of chief councilor. After the Song
defeated the Qi’s invading army, Zhao was embarrassed because his proposal was not accepte, albeit theoretically correct, and Zhang’s performance was evaluated by Gaozong as deserving all the credit for defeating the enemy. After requesting to step down several times, Zhao was ordered to serve as a prefect in Shaoxing, a place not far from the capital.

When the Huaixi Mutiny occurred, Zhang was removed from his office and Zhao was immediately summoned back to the court. The Song’s big setback caused Gaozong to change his attitude, if not his ambition, of recovering the Central Plain: in consequence he accepted Zhao’s proposal to return to Linan. Although Zhao was reinstated, he seemed to have used up his talents and responded poorly to the changing Song-Jin relations. Meanwhile, under Qin Gui’s strong advocacy, Gaozong ultimately resolved to seek a peace agreement with the Jin. While Zhao’s vacillating attitude towards the Jins became his vulnerability that incurred criticism, Qin’s decisively active policy obtained strong support from the emperor. Although he continued endeavoring to find excuses for Gaozong when facing severe opposition against the peace agreement from some officials, Zhao could not present a clear policy in dealing with the Jins. Therefore, his stepping down was inevitable because he responded to Jin’s diplomatic offensive with rather vague and passive proposals. Stated more emphatically, Zhao could not continue the policy initiated by Zhang Jun because of the recent setback, yet he was unwilling to concur with Qin Gui to rush into a peace agreement with the Jin. Ultimately, he did not cater to the needs of the emperor, who was desperate for a peace under the cloak of obedience. Thus,
Zhao's presence at the court became unnecessary in a changing political situation. Despite that he did not commit great errors, but Zhao's position was nevertheless easily replaced by Qin Gui. Although he was ordered again to remain in Shaoxing, Zhao could not escape Qin's persecution and never returned to the court. Gaozong later seemed to be indifferent to Zhao's life and whereabouts, and did not lend a helping hand when Zhao was under severe attack from Qin. With Gaozong's full authorization in dealing with the Jin, Qin would since hold the position as the sole chief councilor for eighteen years and was unmatched by any other contemporary political figure of his day.

\[596 \text{YL, ch. 116, p. 1875.}\]
Chapter Thirteen: Qin Gui 秦檜 (1090-1155) II: A Loyal Official or A National Traitor?

As discussed in Chapter Seven, Qin Gui, under attack both from Lü Yihao and Zhu Shengfei, retreated from the power center and all his followers in the court were removed. Qin was blamed for his proposal of peace with the Jins which was deemed as unacceptable by most officials at the court. He was also criticized as exaggerating with his promise of claiming that he would "shock the world" in a few months. However, the real reason for his temporary setback was his failure in the power struggle against Lü Yihao. As a result, Qin had assumed a sinecure duty and denied involvement in the Song politics for two and a half years. When Zhao Ding was appointed Chief Councilor of the Left and Zhang Jun, Chief Councilor of the Right, Qin was reinstated as Grand Academician. One month later, Qin proposed to increase the number of bows for the Song military forces, and for that he was praised by Gaozong as caring about national affairs even when he was in charge of supervising a temple, a nominal duty for a former high ranking official. From then on, Qin began presenting more proposals to the emperor, but he was more careful than before not to offend the two chief councilors.

In June of 1136, Qin was appointed Prefect of Wenzhou 温州, and one month later he was transferred to Shaoxing, a place of greater importance as well as closer to the emperor's location. Two months later, he was granted an audience with the emperor, and soon after that he was appointed Reader-in-waiting and concurrently Regent of Auxiliary Palace (Xinggong Liushou 行宮留守) by the recommendation of Zhang Jun, then Chief
Councilor of the Right. Qin was praised by Zhang as deserving to be his colleague since Qin had risked his life by proposing to nominate a member of the Song royal Zhao family as the ruler of China during the siege of the old capital of Kaifeng. In addition, many reputable officials of the time also recommended Qin. On December 25 of 1136, Qin was ordered to report to the emperor for consultation. This was good timing for Qin to act between Zhang Jun and Zhao Ding, the two chief councilors, since they were not congenial with each other. One week later, Zhao left his office and was appointed Military Commissioner-in-chief of Zhedong and concurrently Prefect of Shaoxing. Counting on the appreciation of Zhang, who was then the sole chief councilor in the court, Qin seized this golden opportunity to increase his own power.

In order to recruit Qin to his administration, Zhang made a minor change on civil service system to make Qin's new position, Military Affairs Commissioner (Shumishi 使), compatible with the Song tradition. On February 16 of 1137, Qin was formally appointed and awarded honors identical to that of a chief councilor. He was immediately summoned by the emperor for consultations due to the Song envoys having just returned from the Jin, bringing back shocking news of the death of Huizong and his empress. Due to the changing situation, Qin gradually became an indispensable advisor to Gaozong in matters of Song-Jin relations. His new position allowed him to have a say in important policy making. For example, after Liu Guangshi was removed from his

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598YL, ch. 86, p. 1425.
600YL, ch. 107, p. 1737.
601ibid., ch. 108, p. 1761.
position to Zhang Jun's liking both Qin and Shen Yuqiu, his colleague in the Military Affairs Bureau, were against that Liu's troops being put under Area Command (Dudufu 都督府), headed by Zhang Jun. They proposed to choose a military commander to lead the troops formerly under Liu's command. Thus, the court appointed Wang De 王德 as Supreme Commandant (Du Tongzhi 都统制) to that duty.\(^6\)\(^2\) Zhang Jun, however, reported problems with the court's decision to assign Wang as Liu's successor. As a result, Li Qiong, another favorite lieutenant of Liu, was appointed Vice Supreme Commandant. After the appointment was settled, Zhang ordered Lü Zhi to oversee and pacify the armies in the Huaixi 淮西 area formerly belonging to Liu Guangshi. As mentioned earlier, the power struggle between Wang and Li had ultimately triggered a severe mutiny and Li, after killing Lü, fled to the Qi with 40,000 troops.

Although the mutiny cost the Song a great loss, it created another opportunity for Qin's advancement. Zhang Jun was later forced to leave the court but he did not recommend Qin as his successor. Instead, he consented to the emperor's decision to summon Zhao Ding as a replacement due to his own observation and being warned about Qin's shrewdness by Zhang Shou, then Vice Chief Councilor.\(^6\)\(^3\) Surprised by Zhang's decision, Qin made use of the opportunity to sow discord between Zhang and Zhao.\(^6\)\(^4\) Disappointed but patient with the changing situation at the court, Qin must have had devoted much energy to improving his relationship with Zhao Ding, the new Chief Councilor of the Left and his superior. When asked by the emperor about his

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\(^6\)\(^2\) YL, ch. 111, p. 1791.
\(^6\)\(^3\) Ibid., ch. 113, p. 1830.
organization of officials, which had been of great and important concern, Zhao insisted that Qin should remain at the court. Thus, Gaozong denied Qin's request to be relieved of his duty and informed him of Zhao's decision.  

After the Huaixi Mutiny, which had upset the emperor and most officials, Zhao became more conservative than before toward the Jin and seemed to lose his ability to make decisive policies when facing enemies. The first sign showing this tendency was his agreement with Qin to urge Gaozong to retreat to Linan. For fear that his suggestion would face challenges from other officials, Zhao reported to the emperor of the anticipated criticism against moving back to Linan, describing as showing that the Song had no intention to restore its lost territories. Gaozong replied that Zhang Jun had previously spent three years on his plans for restoration, yet gained no territory at all, but, on the contrary, he exhausted national resources and people's labor. Gaozong seriously refuted this kind of criticism. While Zhao hesitated and could not present a clear policy, Qin was quite persistent in proposing the very peace that had long been the desire of the emperor. As Zhao exposed his shortcomings in policy making, it was natural progress for Qin to replace Zhao as the new head of administration and to assume the duty of negotiating peace with the Jins.

On February 7 of 1138, when Wang Lun and Gao Gonghui, two Song envoys, returned from the Jin and brought back the message claiming peace was intended by the Jin's Vice Marshal Wanyan Chang. Gaozong moved to excitement by this good news.

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604 YL, ch. 115, p. 1859.
605 Ibid.
news, declaring that he would promise the Jins any terms for peace. Wang and Gao were reassigned as the envoys to greet and escort the remains of Huizong. On April 17, Qin was promoted as Chief Councilor of the Right. This appointment worried Yan Dunfu (1071-1145), then Vice Minister of Ministry of Personnel, who claimed that a villain had become chief councilor. This remark was criticized by some officials as excessive since nearly all the officials in the court were celebrating Qin's advancement.

With the new position, Qin acquired more leverage to advocate his own proposals, and most of all, to engage in power struggles against his political enemies. Qin's first step was to remove Zhao's top aides. On October 9 of 1138, Xiao Zhen, then Attendant Censor, impeached Liu Dazhong, then Vice Chief Councilor and Zhao's close attendant, intending to shake Zhao's power base. Xiao was originally recommended by Zhao, however, he was later recruited as censor by Qin, then becoming his follower.

Meanwhile, Zhao disagreed with Qin about succumbing to the Jin's peace proposal and petitioned to resign. Qin, on the other hand, urged Gaozong to discuss the issue with only him, asking the emperor to think it over for three days. When the time was up, Qin asked Gaozong to reconsider the issue for another three days. The result was Qin got Gaozong's full authorization to negotiate with the Jins for peace, and Zhao sustained attacks of disinformation from Xiao Zhen and was ultimately removed from his office. Although he was reassigned to Shaoxing, a place close to Linan with easy access to the emperor, Zhao was never again to return to the court, since he was seen by Qin as
the greatest threat to his career by holding firm control of the court.610 Their relationship became openly hostile when Qin was embarrassed by Zhao at a farewell party. Unlike Zhang Jun who had requested that Qin help him return to the court when Qin was seeing him off, Zhao refused to talk to Qin, only making a bow with hands folding in front.611 Embarrassed by this public scene, Qin attempted to punish Zhao in every manner imaginable. Due to Gaozong's indifference and Qin's severe persecution, in misery Zhao ended his life.

On December 22 of 1138, an imperial announcement declaring that Gaozong wished to humble himself to negotiate peace with the Jin for the sake of Huizong's remains, his mother, the Song imperial families, and the people on both sides suffering without a rest from war damages for over ten years. Gaozong, meanwhile, urged all Attendants (Shicong 侍從) and censors at the court to exhaust their thinking and report their views of the matter to the emperor.612 The preliminary response was that most officials of the court objected to the peace negotiation. Having been opposed by the majority, Goulong Ruyuan 勾龍如淵 (1093-1154) suggested that Qin appoint trusted subordinates as censors to impeach whoever was against the peace proposal. Qin accepted this suggestion and appointed Goulong as Censor-in-chief. Most officials were frightened by this action.613 Despite the threats from Qin and his faction, Hu Quan 胡銓 (1102-1180), then Junior Compiler of the Bureau of Military Affairs, memorialized a

611 YL, ch. 122, pp. 1974-5.
petition to the throne pleading that Wang Lun, Qin Gui, and Sun Jin — the latter allegedly advanced to the position of Vice Chief Councilor because he consented to Qin's proposal — all be executed. In his petitionary memorial, Hu also cautioned Gaozong that the position of emperor belonged to his ancestors just as the land ruled by him also belonged to the Song founding fathers. It was not right, Hu argued, for Gaozong to submit the ancestors' land and imperial position to the enemy. Hu's severe criticisms prompted Qin to plead for his own punishment from the throne. Qin was pardoned while Hu was removed from his office.614

While oppositions against peace continued to grow in the Song court, the arriving Jin envoys referred to the letter they carried the "Imperial Instructions (zhaoju 訂 諫)" and referred to the Song as "Jiangnan 江南", meaning "South of the Yangtze", thus a disdainful title. Moreover, they declared that they intend to confer a title on the Song emperor. Gaozong's initial response to Qin's report of the Jin envoys' announced demands was to deny them both. He also refused to send Irregular Ambassadors (fanshi 泛 使) other than on occasions of New Year and Birthdays of the Jin emperors.615 During this time, most officials uttered their sentiments of objection, albeit under Qin's pressure. Among them, Fang Tingshi 方 庭 實, then Investigating Censor, presented a most interesting memorial which can be seen as an echo to Hu Quan's previous memorial. In his memorial, Fang argued that the land under heaven belonged to China, Song

615 YL, ch. 124, p. 2009.
ancestors, officials and subjects, the armies, and not just to the emperor himself. He wondered why Gaozong suddenly knelt down in front of the enemy when the Song still had the ability to defend itself along the Yangtze River, to say the very least. He advised the emperor to show concerns over China as a whole, the ritual of the preceding rulers, and the common people.616

To deal with pressure from the opposition group, Qin continued appointing his confidants as censors and officials. Among these appointments, the positions of censors drew most attention since officials at the court realized that their fate would face challenges if they continued their denial of peace negotiations with the Jin. While officials in the Song court continued their debate, the Jin envoys were not granted an audience several days. An imperial decree was later issued claiming that the Jin had sent envoys to return Shaanxi 陝西 and Henan 河南, territories previously lost to them. The Jin's peace negotiation, it was claimed, promised to return Huizong's coffin, the emperor's mother and other imperial families. The decree was intended, it claimed, to clarify both people's doubt and rumors.617

But, the Song officials at the court were not at ease and nobody dared take responsibility for the consequences of peace negotiations with the Jin. Impatient with the situation, Gaozong argued that if this had happened at the time when he was pursued by the Jins and fled to the sea, officials would not have felt bothered even he had bowed to

616 Anonymous, Huang Song zhongxing liangchao shengzheng 皇宋中興兩朝聖政, ch. 24, pp. 1493-4. However, Fang changed his attitude after the peace agreement was completed. See YL, ch. 127, p. 2072 & ch. 129, pp. 2089-90.
617 YL, ch. 124, p. 2022.
the Jins a hundred times. He complained that Wang Lun, the Song envoy who brought back the hope of peace, was uncertain about what to do, and that Qin Gui, who had advocated the peace negotiation, came to plead to resign. After seeing Wang Lun the following day, Gaozong decided to order ranking officials to meet with Jin envoys at the guest house and accept the National Letter. After all the troubles and uncertainties, it was the Song emperor who ultimately settled the issue. However, Qin was puzzled as how to explain the whole situation to Jin envoys since the emperor was not going to grant an audience. At this juncture, Lou Zhao 楼炤 (1088-1160), then Supervising Secretary (Jishizhong 给事中), mentioned an old practice recorded in the Classics which said "no talking during the three years' mourning period". Qin suddenly figured out a way to deal with the Jin envoys.

As a result, Gaozong did not show up in the ceremony and Qin, representing the emperor, accepted the Letter from the Jin side at the guest house. Qin humbled himself to save face for the emperor, who had been using obedience (xiao 孝) as a legitimate excuse for his submission to the Jin. After the ceremony, both Gaozong and Qin achieved their common goal, cutting a peace agreement with the Jin state, and an amnesty was announced for celebration. Wang Lun received a promotion and was assigned as envoy to the Jin to escort the coffin, the persons who were allowed to return, and to reclaim territories previously lost to the Jin. In return, the Song promised to pay

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618 YL, ch. 124, p. 2024. Over six months ago, Wang Shu 王訥, in his previous memorial to the throne, had already suggested for Gaozong to use the excuse of the three years' mourning period to avoid seeing the Jin envoys. See YL, ch. 120, p. 1940 & 1942.
an annual tribute of 500,000 units of silk and silver to the Jin.\textsuperscript{619} In the following years, Qin was busy removing his opponents from the court and at the same time recruiting pliant and submissive officials as censors to serve him. Qin paid extra attention to the whereabouts of his chief political enemy, namely, Zhao Ding, and ordered censors to impeach him lest Zhao would somehow find an opportunity to return to the court.\textsuperscript{620}

While the peace process went smoothly as some Song officials had not expected, the peace agreement triggered wholesale power struggles in the Jin court. Wanyan Chang, an amicable friend of Qin and the most important figure lending impetus to the peace with the Song, was removed from the power center and imprisoned.\textsuperscript{621} Political power was returned to the Jin emperor and Wanyan Zongbi, who was later promoted as Chief Military Commander (Du Yuanshuai 都元帥) and became the most powerful military man. The Jin's policy towards the Song changed after Wanyan Chang was executed and all the terms in the previous agreement were also pronounced void. Consequently, Wang Lun's mission to the Jin suffered severe frustration. Dan 豐 (1119-1150), the Jin emperor, confronted Wang by asking him if he realized Wanyan Chang's crimes. The emperor also asked Wang why there was no mention of annual tribute, yet the Song requested return of territories. The Song, as Dan argued, only knew about the

\textsuperscript{619} YL, ch. 125, pp. 2034-5.

\textsuperscript{620} Ibid., ch. 127, pp. 2067-8.

\textsuperscript{621} For details of the Jin's policy towards the Song and Wanyan Chang's contribution to the peace agreement, please refer to Tao Jing-shen, "Wanyan Chang yu Jin chu de dui Zhongyuan zhengce 完顏昌 與金初的對中原政策," in Bianjiangshi yanjiuji 邊疆史研究集, pp. 33-49. Also see YL, ch. 130, pp. 2095-6.
Jin Marshal (i.e., Wanyan Chang) but not about the emperor. As a result, Wang was detained, and the Jin sent back a Song envoy to request discussing issues of annual tribute, the sworn letter, use of their respective calendars, conferring of titles. Moreover, the Jin requested that people who were originally from the east and the north of the Yellow River be repatriated.

In June of 1140, commanding four armies Wanyan Zongbi invaded the Song. Meng Yu, former Vice Chief Councilor and Regent of Dongjing, surrendered to Zongbi. Following the capture of Dongjing, Nanjing and Xijing (in modern Henan Province) were also lost to the Jin army. Amazed by the losing trend in which so many Song officials surrender to the Jin, Gaozong discussed the situation with Qin and announced that whoever could capture Zongbi would be promoted as Military Commissioner (Jiedushi), rewarded with 50,000 units of silver and silk and 1,000 acres of best farmland. Meanwhile, Wang Ciweng, then Censor-in-chief and Qin's best friend at the court, reminded the emperor that the court was previously undecided on national affairs, and when matters had previously undergone small change so had the chief councilors been replaced. He argued that succeeding chief councilors were not necessarily better than the old ones, while factional clashes and recruitment

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622 YL, ch. 132, pp. 2124-5. According to YL's record, before Wang headed for his mission the Song had promised to pay the said amount of annual tribute to the Jin. It is puzzling that the Jin emperor asked Wang about the annual tribute which should have been presented as an exchange for the terms promised by the Jin. There are two possible answers to this puzzle: one is that Wang never mentioned the tribute to the Jin state; the other one is that the Jin was not satisfied with the amount promised by the Song and requested a greater tribute.


625 YL, ch. 135, p. 2172. HB, v. 4, p. 80.
would cause the government several months to settle. He cautioned the emperor to take heed of the problem and avoid mean people from taking advantage of the current situation. Gaozong consented.  

Despite of Qin's crafty maneuver, Zheng Yinian 鄭偃年, Qin's cousin and his allegedly informer who had served in the Qi state, was impeached because he had assured that Jin would keep its promise on peace. Unable to defend himself, Zheng was removed from his office. As Qin's influence at the court was threatened, so his attitude changed. During an audience with the emperor, Qin claimed he was following the recorded wisdom of the past and argued that the reason he urged Gaozong to take over the territory south of the Yellow River was because Wanyan Chang promised to return it for peace negotiation. However, since Zongbi killed his uncle Chang, and denied the previous peace agreement, Qin claimed that he was forced to change his position and thus urge Gaozong to "pacify his people by punishing the wicked". Qin volunteered to go to the Yangtze River to encourage local troops to do their best in quelling the invaders. Having made great effort to assure the emperor that he was still the best choice and the Jin's invasion was not incurred due to his policy making, Qin continued seeking Gaozong's intention regarding to his career. Feng Ji 馮概, then Supervising Censor and Reader-in-waiting, was urged by Qin to inquire about the emperor's decision in face of the Jin's invasion. Feng suggested that Zhang Jun be entrusted again with the military

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626 YL, ch, 135, pp. 2172-3.
627 Zheng Yinian had played an important role in Qin's diplomacy towards the Jin. See Liu Tzu-chien 劉子健, "Qin Gui de qinyou 秦桧的親友," in Liang Songshi yanjiu bian 兩宋史研究彙編, pp. 156-162. Also YL, ch 135, pp. 2174-5.
628 YL, ch. 136, p. 2177.
responsibility to handle the urgent crisis. Gaozong replied that he would rather accept
downfall of the country than use Zhang again. Qin was pleased to hear this comment yet
Feng, for fear that his remarks had irritated the emperor, requested to be removed from
his office.\footnote{YL, ch. 136, p. 2179. HB, v. 4, p. 81.}

Meanwhile, the first Song victory report reached the court and Zongbi, commander of the invading Jin armies, suffered a setback when he confronted Liu Qi 劉
鎬 (1098-1162), Song's defense commander at Shunchang 順昌 (in modern Anhui Province). This military failure forced Zongbi to return to Bianjing 汴京, the northern
Song capital, and he thereafter never mobilized troops to launch offensives again. Qin
Gui, on the other hand, did not take advantage of this victory to further attempt recovery
of the Central Plain, and instead ordered Liu Qi to withdraw his troops.\footnote{YL, ch. 136, p. 2183.} Qin was more interested in reaching a peace deal with the Jins and paying close attention to any
potential threat to his position at the Song court. When Zhao Ding presented a memorial
to the throne, for fear of his return Qin immediately ordered Wang Ciweng, then Censor-
in-chief, to impeach him. As a result, Zhao was banished to a remote area far from the
court. A few days later, Zhao received a greater punishment and was banished to
Chaozhou 潮州, the southern border area, after he was attacked by a remonstrator who
was also one of Qin's followers.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 136, pp. 2194-7. HB, v. 4, p. 110 & 113.}
Despite Qin having intended to prevent Song forces from marching northward, the Song troops continued to frustrate Jin armies in many places. For example, Yue Fei defeated Zongbi at Yancheng (in modern Henan Province); Wu Lin, brother of Wu Jie, beat the Jin army at Fufeng (in modern Shaanxi Province). Zhang Jun, in the meantime, memorialized a petition to the emperor suggesting that an offensive should be considered. He had over 1,000 boats built for attempting a northern expedition through the sea. However, the fruit of victories did not last very long, and immediately after the Song armies retreated, the Jin regained the lost territories. On the other hand, because Qin was prepared to cease confrontations with the Jin, he ordered all major military commanders to retreat and summoned Yue Fei back to the court. As a result, all the commanders moved their forces back to south of the Yangtze and did not send their troops out again. The tension between the two states was temporarily mitigated.

On March 27 of 1141, about five months after Qin ordered Song military to retreat to south of the Yangtze, under the command of Zongbi's lieutenant the Jins invaded the Song again yet were blocked at Zhegao (in modern Anhui Province). The Jin forces, with one hundred thousand cavalrmen and their most powerful weapon, could not defeat the Song army and instead suffered a major setback. The Song court was excited with the victory, which was claimed as the most successful among all confrontations with the Jin forces. All the military commanders involved in the battles received commendations from the emperor and were encouraged to keep the victory from

632 YL, ch. 136, p. 2188.
633 Ibid., ch. 137, p. 2203.
the enemy's desperate fight. One month later, Song intelligence report indicated that Haozhou (in modern Anhui Province) was captured by the Jin army. The major Song forces, without good coordination, were not able to create another victory against the Jin and exposed their weakness in both discipline and cooperation. Yue Fei, in the meantime, refused to rush to the rescue and irritated the emperor, Qin Gui and Zhang Zun. Soon afterwards, the latter two played a major role in harming Yue with trumped-up charges. On the other hand, Zhang Zun and Yang Yizhong, the two major commanders of the Song forces, also bore grudges against Liu Qi, a standout of the military circles since the Shunchang victory. The unrestrained behavior of military men and the Song's decision to negotiate peace with the Jin prompted Qin to develop a scheme to suppress those military commanders.

On May 30 of 1141, Fan Tong, then Supervising Secretary and Auxiliary Academician, presented a marvelous plot to relieve military commanders' authority. In his report to the throne, Fan indicated that Zhang Jun had attempted to incorporate the military forces into his Area Command and put them under the command of scholar-officials, but his plan did not work due to the Huaixi Mutiny. After Zhang left office Zhao Ding was reinstated; moreover, Wang Shu, then Vice Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs, proposed to use deputy commanders (pianpi 使 者) to divide the power of the major commanders. Fan claimed that Zhang Zun detected and rejected this plot against him and the court was forced to give up. With brief review of the past

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634 YL, ch. 137, pp. 2211-2.
635 Ibid., ch. 139, pp. 2234-6.
failure, Fan proposed to appoint major military commanders as Commissioner and Vice Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs in order to terminate their direct command over the military, and thus limit their direct military authority.

Although never attempted before, Fan's suggestion was accepted by Qin Gui, who later secretly reported to the emperor and secured his approval. Han Shizhong, Zhang Zun and Yue Fei were summoned to the court and rewarded for the success at Zhegao. Han and Zhang were appointed Commissioner and Yue, Vice Commissioner. Unaware of being set up, Han and Yue showed their casual demeanor at the court which irritated Qin. Zhang Zun, on the other hand, promised full cooperation with Qin to carry out his plot and even volunteered to surrender his military authority to the court. As a result, Qin successfully achieved his goal in suppressing military commanders. After Yue was imprisoned, Han presented memorials protesting against peace agreements with the Jins but he was later removed from his office and allowed only to keep a honorary title of Military Commissioner (Jiedushi 節度使) with a sinecure duty.

In July of 1141, Qin was promoted to Chief Councilor of the Left, the highest ranking official. One month later, Qin ordered Moqi Xie (1083-1157), the Grand Master of the Right for Remonstrance (You Jianyi Dafu 右諫議大夫) and one of Qin's lackeys in the court, to impeach Yue Fei for alleged crimes that had been committed. In fact, Yue's persistent opposition to peace and his refusal to cooperate with

638 YL, ch. 142, p. 2283.
Zhang Zun, who had prior agreement with Qin, in dismissing Han's commanding power had provoked Qin's anger and decision to have Yue killed.\textsuperscript{639} Because Moqi's initial attack was ignored, Qin order He Zhu, then Censor-in-chief, Luo Ruji 羅汝楫 (1089-1158), then Palace Censor, to impeach Yue simultaneously mainly for his refusal to follow the court's orders during the siege of Haozhou 濱州, and for his remarks about giving up an important military site during his inspection with Zhang Zun at Han Shizhong's former defending area. Meanwhile, Moqi presented his memorial to the throne four times and the former three persons showed the duplicate copies to Yue. Yue thus pleaded for resignation and it was granted.\textsuperscript{640} After being charged with a series of fabricated accusations, Yue was ultimately put into jail and executed.\textsuperscript{641} When confronted by Han questioning the crimes Yue had allegedly committed, Qin replied with vague remarks and argued that the proof to Yue's crimes should have existed. Han protested but could not save Yue's life.\textsuperscript{642}

After removing military authority from the major commanders, Qin continued his purge of political dissidents in the court along with his effort in reaching an agreement with the Jin. Qin sent his messenger to solicit Zhang Jun to endorse his peace deal with a very alluring position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs as a reward. Zhang did not succumb to the temptation and replied that enemies should not be indulged

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{639} YL, ch. 141, pp. 2264-5.
\item \textsuperscript{640} Ibid., ch. 141, p. 2268.
\item \textsuperscript{641} Shi Wenji 石文濟 explicitly criticizes Yue Fei for being unrestrained and committing several crimes. For example, Yue, Shi argues, not only disobeyed the court's orders but also interfered in state affairs and presuming on his merits coerced the emperor. For details, see his Nan Song zhongxing sizhen 南宋中興四鎮, Ph.D. diss., Cultural University of China, 1974, pp. 338-40. Shi also ascribes Yue's execution to Gaozong, Qin Gui and the Jins. See pp. 386-7.
\end{itemize}
and peace should not be settled. Zhang was punished and removed from his current position of Military Commissioner-in-chief and Prefect of Fuzhou 福州. Prior to this event, Zhao Ding made a comment on the difficulties inherent within Qin's taking responsibility of national affairs by himself. He argued that Li Gang and Zhu Shengfei, who were still alive at the time, could not offer help and Zhang Jun was available, yet he could never be allowed to return to the court. The later development proved Zhao's point.\(^{643}\) On the other hand, Yue's imprisonment and execution must have precipitated many complaints and arguments in the court, but whoever showed his resentment would certainly have been punished. Since Qin had full control of the supervising organizations, his lackeys were anxious to compete with each other in establishing cases against whoever might be deemed dissident on sensitive issues, including members of the imperial family.

However, the most important business Qin had to accomplish, not only for pleasing the emperor but also for consolidating his power, was to obtain a reliable peace agreement with the Jin state and to secure return back to the Song of the empress dowager, Gaozong's mother.\(^{644}\) On December 23 of 1141, according to the Song record and March of 1142, the Jin record, the two states reached an agreement. The Song record states that both sides accepted the middle stream of the Huai River as the national

\(^{642}\) YL, ch. 143, pp. 2298-2304. HB, v. 4, pp. 142-50.
\(^{643}\) YL, ch. 142, p. 2293.
\(^{644}\) Request of the return of Qinzong 鈦宗 disappeared from the negotiation agenda as he posed a threat to Gaozong's position. Keeping Qinzong in the Jin state was not only good for the Song, at least for Gaozong, but also allowed Jin to save a bargaining chip for future negotiation. In addition to these concerns, there was a third possible reason never been mentioned before. If Qinzong was allowed to return then it was
boundary. The Song promised to cede the two prefectures of Tang 唐 and Deng 鄴, and pay an annual tribute of 250,000 units of silver and silk respectively to the Jin. The names of the two states were referred to as the Superior State (Shangguo 上國) for the Jin, and the Shabby State (Biguo 敞國) for the Song. In addition to the annual tribute, the Song had to send envoys on special occasions such as the Jin emperor's birthday and new year to deliver congratulatory messages. A Sworn Letter (shishu 誓書) was completed. Gaozong later commented that if the empress dowager could return this year then the Song should observe the agreement faithfully otherwise the Sworn Letter existed in name only.\footnote{YL, ch. 142, p. 2292. SS, ch. 29, p. 551.}

The Jin's record differs from that of the Song in that it kept some humiliating terms for the Song. For example, Song Gaozong was referred to as Vassal and his given name Gou 拓 was addressed explicitly. He Zhu was the Song representative who submitted the Sworn Letter to the Jin emperor. The Jin, on the other hand, replied with a letter of conferment stating that the Jin had spent eighteen years trying to punish the Song for its violation of the agreement. However, claiming that they cared about the people in the south, the Jin accepted surrender from the Song whose ruler was willing to be subjugated as one of Jin's vassals. The Jin dispatched Liu Gua 劉筍 (1094-1151) and others to confer emperorship on Zhao Gou, Prince Kang 康 of the Song, and the Song as national title for the country he ruled. The Song should, according to the Jin's record,
serve in the duty as a vassal state and forever guard its lord.\textsuperscript{646} The Song-Jin peace agreement was ultimately completed that was to maintain almost twenty years of peace between the two states.

On September 12 of 1142, Gaozong greeted his mother at Linping 林平 (in modern Zhejiang Province), forty 里 northeast of Linan. Unable to contain his joy, Gaozong cried when he saw the empress dowager.\textsuperscript{647} Ten days later, Qin Gui pleaded for permission to resign either to draw the emperor's attention by acting pretentiously to show that he was morally lofty, or to detect the emperor's intention so as to know whether he would get his support in the court or not.\textsuperscript{648} The timing was prefect since Gaozong just reunited with his mother, who had provided a major justification for his peace advocacy. While enjoying reunion with his mother, Gaozong was grateful to Qin not only because he was able to obtain a peace agreement with the Jin, but also he could manage to retake military authority from the otherwise unrestrainable military commanders. The central government under Gaozong's rulership had for the first time since 1127 regained the power of controlling all military forces in the country. It was not strange that Gaozong later said to Qin that because the Tang (618-907) was slow in building a system it incurred unrestrained power of Outlying Forts. Since military authority had been retaken by the court, Gaozong claimed that he could change military commanders, and ask them to follow orders just as he did with civilian officials.\textsuperscript{649} Qin's

\textsuperscript{647} YL, ch. 146, p. 2345. HB, v. 4, 187.
\textsuperscript{648} YL, ch. 146, p. 2353.
\textsuperscript{649} \textit{Ibid.}, ch. 147, p. 2372.
request of resignation was denied, and an imperial announcement was issued forbidding the Memorial-forwarding Office (Tongjinsi 通進司) to accept Qin's request for resignation memorial. Qin's families were also prohibited to leave Linan Prefecture.650

On October 6, Qin was promoted to Grand Preceptor (Taishi 太師), the highest honorary title of the Song and conferred as Duke of Wei (Wei Guogong 魏國公). Gaozong praised Qin's accomplishment in bringing back both Huizong's coffin for burial and the empress dowager. The reward bestowed upon Qin, the emperor claimed, could not return even one percent for the favor. He asked Qin not to reject it.651 Qin Gui held power until 1155, the year he died. He was the only chief councilor at the court for seventeen years and the most powerful chief councilor during Gaozong's reign. Throughout Chinese history, most records described Qin as a treacherous subject (jianchen 奸臣) who betrayed the country by negotiating peace with the Jin and humiliated both the country and the emperor who humbled himself before the barbarian state. All these negative comments on Qin will not be discussed here since they have been repeated again and again. A more interesting and appropriate theme concerning the topic of this paper is that of the interaction between Qin and Gaozong. By probing into that theme we attempt to understand and explain why Qin was entrusted with the duty of chief councilor, as well as why he stayed in power for so many years.

Qin returned from the Jin in 1130 as a hero for his courageous behavior during the

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650 L., ch. 146, p. 2353.
651 Ibid., ch. 146, p. 2355.
siege of Kaifeng by the Jin invaders. However, he was also suspected as a spy working for the Jin state because his escape was too miraculous to be accepted. Despite suspicions of Qin's loyalty, as reported in the chronicle *Xinian yaolu* 簡年要錄 by Li Xin chuan 李 心 傳, the famous Southern Song historian, he only cited some records with critical remarks and did not, in any way, label Qin as a conspirator. Gaozong, on the other hand, did not care too much about how Qin managed to escape from the Jin. His major concern seemed to focus more on cutting an agreement with the Jin, the enemy that had hitherto haunted him for four years. Facing opposition from his subjects, Gaozong skillfully concealed his real intention and only revealed it to Qin six years after the peace agreement was reached. If his recall was true, Gaozong had agreed to Qin's proposal from the very beginning, yet he could not openly support Qin because most officials were against peace with the Jin. Moreover, Qin's power in the court had not yet been consolidated during the period of the first two years after he returned. Qin had to deal with all kinds of challenges from contending officials, who obviously had different opinions on the Song-Jin relation.

Besides, Qin's return also created a variable to the power structure of the Song court. Although it was a good timing for him to return to the Song and acquire support from Fan Zongyin, then chief councilor, and a few other officials, he nevertheless encountered problems when replacing Fan as Chief Councilor of the Right because the emperor had later appointed Lü Yihao, on top of Qin, as Chief Councilor of the Left.

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652 YL, ch. 38, p. 721.
653 Ibid., ch. 158, p. 2564.
Having been a formidable enemy of Qin, Lü, with his experienced bureaucratic skills, thoroughly drove out Qin's influence from the court. Qin was not, at the time, competitive with Lü because the latter had previously helped save Gaozong in a crisis event. Qin, albeit with an alluring proposal in hand, could not possibly gather all the necessary support, including that of the emperor, to engage in power struggles against Lü and his faction. Being forced to leave the court, Qin sustained a huge blow to his career yet he also learned a good lesson for facing all power struggles in the subsequent years.

In October of 1132, Qin left his office of chief councilor and stayed away from the power center for a few years. In June of 1136, he resumed his civil service duty and was appointed as Prefect of Wenzhou. During the three and a half years, Qin had little contact with the court, at least according to records I have reviewed. However, his influence was not overlooked because his peace proposal had been identified as similar to one with the seven items of negotiation proposed by the Jin representatives. When the Song envoys met with Jin military commander, Qin's name was mentioned and his whereabouts seemed to be greatly concerned. The Jin's reception official told the Song envoy that Qin, who had once stayed with the Jin army, was a very nice person. Moreover, before the then powerful Jin commander Wanyan Chang sent back the Song envoys, he emphasized that if a peace was intended then a surprise attack would not be beneficial to the peace talks. He claimed that Qin Gui knew about all matters of the Jin

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654 YL, ch. 57, p. 999.
655 Ibid., ch. 72, p. 1199.
656 Ibid., ch. 81, p. 1329 & 1333.
court and thus should be consulted. All these implied that Qin, by building a good relationship with the Jins, had sketched his blueprint for the Song-Jin relations even before returning to the Song. The messages sent from the enemy must have drawn Gaozong's serious attention.

In May of 1135, when he was still holding a sinecure duty, Qin was allowed to express his opinion on general plans of offense and defense against the Jin. By reviewing problems in the past for the Song to deal with the Jin, Qin argued that policies advocated by either hawkish or peace-making groups were all inappropriate. To rule a country, Qin claimed that there were proper rules for guidance. A country, Qin argued, should not put on deceptive shows to demonstrate its strength nor become frightened because of its weakness. He proposed to pacify the strong enemy, namely the Jin, and conquer the traitorous regime, the Qi. In July of 1136, Qin was transferred from Wenzhou to Shaoxing, a much closer place to the capital with an easy access to the emperor. This promotion not only showed Gaozong's serious attention to Qin's role in Song politics, but also marked another beginning for Qin's opportunity to regain his influence in the court. Less than two months later, Qin was summoned by the emperor and promoted as Reader-in-waiting and Regent of Auxiliary Palace. This position allowed him to promote the proposal he had previously introduced. When Gaozong was urged by Zhang Jun to leave Linan for Jiankang, Qin volunteered to accompany the emperor. Qin claimed he knew the enemy well and could serve as an advisor to analyze intelligence reports. Although

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657 YL, ch. 82, p. 1357.
658 Ibid., ch. 104, p. 1696.
his request was denied by Gaozong, Qin had again reminded the emperor that he had more knowledge of the Jin than others and was available for consultation.659

Despite of the advantages of being close to the emperor, Qin could not possibly achieve distinction because he was not holding the reins of the government and had to wait for better timing to demonstrate his diplomatic talents in dealing with the Jin. Qin had skillfully concealed his ambition and built a good relationship with Zhao Ding and Zhang Jun, the two incumbent chief councilors. After defeating Liu Yu's invading armies, Zhao and Zhang, who had once performed high spirit in team work, were eventually unhappy with each other. In order to pressure Zhao out of the power circle, Zhang recommended Qin as deserving to be his colleague.660 While Zhao was demoted to Prefect of Shaoxing, Zhang helped Qin to advance to the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs, a duty equivalent to that of a chief councilor.661 Although Qin was careful in hiding his intentions, Zhang was warned about Qin's virtues allegedly differing from those of his past. However, this warning came too late and Zhang himself was in a greater trouble when the Huaixi Mutiny occurred. Yet Qin, to his astonishment, was not recommended by Zhang this time as his replacement because Zhang had fully discovered that Qin was an opportunist with long harbored ambitions. Consequently, Zhao Ding was promptly summoned back to the court.662

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659 YL, ch. 104, p. 1703.
660 Ibid., ch. 107, p. 1737.
661 Ibid., ch. 108, p. 1759 & 1761.
662 Ibid., ch. 113, p. 1830.
It was obvious that Zhang did not forward his finding of Qin's flaws to Zhao, who had always showed interest in personnel arrangement. When asked and authorized to make his own lineup of administration, Zhao insisted that Qin should not be allowed to leave since he had previously requested to step down from office, a marvelous show successfully staged to convince Zhao of his innocence.\(^{663}\) Although Zhao's return had frustrated Qin's high hopes to become the next chief councilor, it had, in effect, paved the road for his smooth takeover. As mentioned before, Zhao lost his caliber to shape clear policies towards the Jin, and he fully agreed with Qin to urge Gaozong to move back to Linan. After Zhao's disappointing performance in diplomacy, it was Qin's opportunity to sell his peace proposal to the emperor. The Jin's initiation of peace, on the other hand, had also provided Qin an external help.

Meanwhile, the Jin officially dethroned Liu Yu from the position of Qi's emperor. This created a more troublesome situation for the Song in that it suddenly lost a buffer zone and was forced to face the Jin directly. Following that event was the question whether the Song should be hostile or friendly to the Jin. Despite the complicated situation just created, it was undoubtedly a turning point for the Song-Jin relations. At this juncture, Wanyan Chang, the Jin's advocate of peace, sent back the Song envoys and promised to return Huizong's coffin, the empress dowager, and various prefectures in south of the Yellow River. One month after the Jin delivered its gesture of peace, Qin was promoted to Chief Councilor of the Right with Gaozong's prior consultation with Zhao Ding. With the exception of but a few, most officials in the court celebrated Qin's

\(^{663}\) YL, ch. 115, p. 1859.
Three months later, the Jin sent Wulingga Simo, who was previously assigned to the Song for peace talks during Huizong's reign, to show its sincerity in peace seeking. Seeing this as a golden opportunity to settle an agreement with the Jin, Gaozong showed his anxiousness on many occasions.

It was the arrival of Jin envoys that incurred clamor among Song officials, who were then divided in accordance with their differing opinions on the issue of a peace agreement. In the meantime, Zhao's vacillating attitude irritated the emperor. Seeing that the emperor was anxious in securing peace, Qin pleaded for Gaozong's total trust in his dealing with the Jin. As a result, Zhao was removed from his office and assigned to Shaoxing again as prefect. Before his leaving the court, Zhao was invited by Qin for a farewell party. However, Zhao refused to be entertained and showed Qin an unfriendly attitude. The confrontation between them caused a fight to the bitter end and, more importantly, created an uncompromising situation between the hawkish group and its opponents.

In order to accomplish the work of gaining a peace with the Jin for the emperor, as well as consolidating power for himself, Qin showed no mercy in suppressing his opponents. Although he obtained full authorization from the emperor, Qin did not feel secure in his position at the court. Many officials were opposed to negotiating peace with the Jin and saw Jin's promises as deceitful. Qin, on the one hand, had to prove to the emperor that he could reach an agreement with the Jin, and on the other hand, he had to

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664 YL, ch. 118, p. 1911.
show dissidents in the court that he was carrying out a mission for the emperor. Qin had pressure from both sides. As mentioned above, some officials even confronted the emperor by challenging his right to rule the country. As the situation evolved, it demanded teamwork between Gaozong and Qin Gui, who were opposed by the majority of officials and military commanders. Had any one in the team lost determination, the whole deal would have been delayed or cancelled. Obviously granted permission by the emperor, Qin using censorial powers suppressed officials, who Gaozong claimed were prone to instigating disquiet, spreading unfounded statements and whose behavior needed correcting.\textsuperscript{665}

Despite that the emperor and the highest ranked official had resolved to pursue peace with the Jin, and disagreement would incur serious problems, some officials boldly expressed their opinions against the peace. Some criticisms, explicit and ruthless, were mainly targeted at Qin. However, they could hardly affect the peace process. It was instead a more troublesome issue that posed the gravest threat to the agreement: namely, the status of the Song vis-a-vis the Jin. The Jin forced the Song to accept humiliating terms as a prerequisite for peace talks. The controversy also gave rise to more clamors and debates among the Song officials, who emphasized that their emperor's status should not be degraded. All of a sudden, diplomatic formality became the center of dispute and a burdensome task for people who participated in the peace process, especially Qin Gui. The pressure was so great that even Qin, as Gaozong complained, asked permission to resign in order to try to avoid the problem. It was Gaozong's determination to go through

\textsuperscript{665} YL, ch. 123, p. 1995.
the process, resulted in ordering Qin, the chief councilor, and his staff to accept the letter from Jin representatives at the guest house. Qin, on the other hand, managed to fabricate a reasonable pretext to make his presence instead of Gaozong’s acceptable.\textsuperscript{666} Thanks to the joint effort from Gaozong and Qin Gui, the peace agreement was accomplished. Although he had shown hesitation during the process, Qin’s contribution was not ignored by Gaozong. Yet, during a critical moment when the procedural disputes, among others, almost sabotaged the peace agreement, the emperor’s opportune intervention turned back the adverse situation, and thus he deserved more credit than Qin and others in achieving the peace.

After the completion of the peace, Qin Gui then possessed all kinds of power including appointment of censorial officials, who became Qin’s useful weapon to attack his opponents in the court. However, the peace did not last long and only one year later a palace mutiny caused the Jin to renege on its promises in the previous agreement. Worst of all, the Jin launched a series of offensives against the Song in the territory that had recently been returned by the Jin. The Song armies, which had been sent to recover the returned territory, either surrendered or collapsed when attacked. Facing this sudden change of situation, Gaozong tried to avoid an all-out confrontations with the Jin by putting all the blame on Wanyan Zongbi for his arbitrary actions against the Song. On the other hand, Qin, losing Wanyan Chang, his silent contractor at the Jin, was forced to make some adjustment of his original plans, especially when he was under severe attack by other officials in the court who had challenged the Song-Jin peace agreement. Now,

\textsuperscript{666} YL, ch. 124, p. 2024.
Qin urged the emperor to engage in a righteous expedition against the invaders and he volunteered to go to the frontline to encourage all military commanders to make concerted efforts to fight the enemy.\textsuperscript{667}

Meanwhile, Qin tried to detect and influence the emperor's decision through other officials for fear that his position might be shaken. As a result, Gaozong did not change his mind on peace and the Song military successfully defeated the Jin and frustrated the invasions. The favorable situation not only saved Qin's career but also prompted him to execute a bigger plan, namely, removing military authority from those unrestrained military commanders. Gaozong rendered his full support to Qin on this plan. After the major commanders, such as Yue Fei, Han Shizhong and Zhang Zun, had surrendered their commanding power, Gaozong commented that it was a success for the government since he could order military men just like as did civilian officials. The emperor was indebted to Qin for his contributions.

Since we have only covered Qin's political career till 1142, his later performance and interactions with Gaozong will not be discussed here. However, the pattern and style of Qin's later political behavior must have remained the same as his conduct during the period of time that we have so far reviewed. For example, keeping a good relationship with the emperor, maintaining his influence in the court, supervising officials closely lest resistance grew too strong to be checked, and most importantly forbidding influential officials, especially former chief councilors, from getting near to the emperor.

\textsuperscript{667} YL, ch. 136, p. 2177.
Consequently, from 1138, the year he became the only chief councilor of the Song, until 1155, the year he died, there had been no one who could compete with Qin for his powerful position. Although it is beyond the scope of our research, however, from the standpoint of Gaozong, Qin's later activities at the court were so unrestrained that he actually outplayed the emperor's ability to "check and balance" the powers among officials. Consequently, Gaozong had to tolerate Qin until the latter's death.668

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668 For a few examples of Qin Gui's unchecked behavior at the court, please see YL, ch. 156, p. 2538; ch. 157, p. 2549; ch. 167, p. 2733; ch. 171, p. 2808.
Conclusion:

The Song, restored by Song Gaozong and thus often referred to as the Southern Song, went through sixteen years of swift changes, and it was the emperor that encountered many critical moments of life and death in his reign. Gaozong, a young and new emperor, struggled in an unprecedented time, finding his style in the midst of continuing crisis management with a succession of chief councilors. Whether the dynasty could be reestablished or not was uncertain since China's territory had not been controlled by any single, overwhelming force that could decide or draw an eternal blueprint for the perpetuity of political entities within China. The Jins, albeit with the stronger military might, could not entirely conqueror China and had to compromise with the Song people, who promised to acknowledge themselves as subjects of a vassal state. The conquest was nominal, yet it also posed a serious threat to the Southern Song from time to time. The Song people, as their contemporaries would have referred to them, did not eventually recover the lost territories taken by the Jin. The result was that truce became the major form of relationship between the two states, but mixed with wars initiated by ambitious men from both sides, who had been equally unsuccessful attempting to conquer the other side, yet created a disastrous situation for themselves.669

669 For example, Wanyan Liang 完顏亮 (1122-1161), the Jin's emperor, breached the peace agreement and invaded the Song in 1161. However, he was later assassinated by his subordinates in Yangzhou. Han Tuozhou 韓侂胄 (1152-1207), the Song chief councilor, initiated a northern expedition against the Jin in 1206 and failed. In order to plead for peace with the Jin, the Song had Han decapitated and his head was sent to the Jin. For details about Wanyan Liang and the background of his invasion, see Tao Jingshen 陶晉生. Jin Hailingdi de fa Song yu Caishi zhanvi de kaoshi 金海陵帝的伐宋與采石戰役的考實, Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1963.
The current discussion focuses on the early stage of the Southern Song, approximately seventeen years in total, with special interest in examining the ten chief councilors appointed by Gaozong. The study has, one by one, reviewed the political performance of these figures and their interactions with the emperor, hoping to find a pattern to enhance our knowledge of the Song emperor's power and its limitations. As a result, it probably raises more questions than it can answer. However, the direction is still correct since by studying these chief councilors during a critical period we gain an insight into the political aspect of the Southern Song and the political skills utilized by people, including the emperor himself and his appointed chief councilors, all of whom participated in the decision making process. Did the performance of these chief councilors affect the fate of the Song state? The answer is yes and no. As a chief councilor, his success or failure in carrying out a national policy would somehow impact the state's accomplishment. However, to exaggerate or minimize any singular chief councilor's influence on the national policy or its development would lead to arbitrary conclusions. We have to take into consideration a number of things. For example, how much power had the emperor delegated to the chief councilors; through policy making of the Song chief councilors, how much influence could the Song, as a whole country, exert to influence the Jin; how did the ability of each individual chief councilor, in contrast to the strength of the state, affect the general performance of the country. A simple question can easily lead to a complicated answer.

On the level of policy making, the Song's policy towards the Jin, according to the preceding discussion, can be divided into three major directions: war, peace, defense.
The first choice was advocated by Li Gang and Zhang Jun, who were consistent in their hawkish attitude towards the Jin. The second was Qin Gui's proposal since his return to the Song at the end of 1130. The last implies that the Song should neither initiate wars against nor pursue peace with the Jin. The Song, as the policy advocates argued, should defend itself against attacks from the enemy while at the same time see peace as a temporary expedient. Despite its confusion, defense was adopted by Zhao Ding as an appropriate policy. In general, people who supported this policy were unwilling to reach a peace agreement with the Jin, yet as well they were not confident of military confrontations with the Jin.

Li Gang, as a war advocate, was not successful in promoting his ideal since he did not gather all necessary support for his actions. Worst of all, Li did not obtain Gaozong's full trust, while Li's fame, which drew the emperor's attention later developed into a threat to Gaozong's prestige. As a result, Li was removed from office, after occupying it for only seventy-five days, and replaced by Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan, both of whom had made contributions to Gaozong's ascension to the throne. Zhang Jun, on the other hand, was given a few opportunities to demonstrate his talents in pushing his proposals. Two huge setbacks, due to Zhang's arbitrary judgement, ruined his career, leaving him unable to return to the court for a quarter of a century.

Both Li and Zhang were unsuccessful in maintaining a hawkish stance towards the Jin, not only because of their personal reasons, but the overall strength of the Song was also a major factor for their failure. Their choice to become a mortal enemy of the
Jin required a relatively advantageous position vis-a-vis their enemy. It was a difficult job even from the beginning because the Song had been defeated by Jin on most occasions; moreover, the emperor himself had sustained overwhelming psychological trauma as well. As a result, any daring or uncertain attempt was closely reviewed by the emperor and denied. This was one of the reasons that Li, during Gaozong’s reign, never had an opportunity to put his aggressive policy into practice. Li’s performance under Gaozong’s predecessors was affected in large part by Song’s military weakness and was also too poorly formed to convince Gaozong, who himself had witnessed destruction of the Northern Song by the fierce Jin army, that Li’s hawkish policy was workable. Avoiding confrontation with the Jin became the only way to survive for Gaozong and his regime. Later the Song successfully defeated the invading enemies, first the Jin-Qi allied army in 1134 followed by the sole Qi’s invasion in 1136, but the Song court felt it compulsory to regain central control of all its military forces. Facing challenges from its powerful military commanders, even after several attempts, the Song court was unable to achieve its goal of reestablishing control of the military. Without a unified and effective command of all available forces, engaging in wars against the Jin would be a risky business. Zhang Jun knew this problem from personal experience. When busy dealing with an ongoing war, military commanders disobeyed his orders.

Despite both chief councilors having firm resolve, Li Gang was not fully authorized because the Song, in retrospect, did not have superior strength to fight the Jin.

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670 It is said that Gaozong lost his ability to procreate children after he was shocked by the report of Jin’s imminent invasion. See Tao Zongyi 陶宗儀, Shuo fu 說郛, Taipei: Xinxing shuju, 1963, p. 511.
and Gaozong himself was not ready to accept challenges. When the Song had gradually restored its confidence in confronting enemies, and Zhang Jun was given opportunities to mobilize troops against the Jin, some internal problems became apparent. Troubles caused by unrestrained military commanders, which had drawn the court's attention for years now became intolerable. Zhang, unfortunately, had to step down from his office because he directly triggered a mutiny when trying to remove one of the leading commanders from his post. As a result, the hawkish policy Zhang had advocated was forced to a halt.

In addition to the above-mentioned points, the Song's financial condition was also an important factor affecting its policies. Based on the reports of many civil officials, the Song's national income was in large share consumed by military expenses. To continue wars against the Jin was not only a huge financial burden for the Song, but it would also have encouraged military men to expand their very power which was an already deeply-rooted problem. After taking back the power to command from the major commanders in 1141, the Song court increased its income because the revenues which previously went directly to the military was now delivered to the court. Thus, those wishing to stick to a hawkish stance against the Jin had to tackle the problem of financing military expenses. While the outcome of war was uncertain, the Song court had to face its internal problem of an already unrestrained military leadership becoming even more powerful because war with the Jin justified their expansion of military personnel and

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671 For example, see YL, ch. 127, p. 2066.
expenses. Zhang Jun realized this, and attempted to reestablish centralized control of military commands, choosing Liu Guangshi as his first target. Zhang failed, but so did the hawkish officials in the court.673

However, a relatively easier approach to the Song-Jin relations was to negotiate peace. Unfortunately, people who advocated peace were often attacked and labeled as traitors. After sustaining great humiliation from the Jin army, including abduction of their two emperors and imperial families, Song's officials' angry sentiment against the Jins could be easily expressed through their refusal of any kind of peace bargaining. Morality mixed with anti-Jin emotion often clouded their normally pragmatic reasoning. Besides, the Jin's alleged betrayal at the end of the Northern Song was still a fresh image readily serving as a legitimate reason forbidding any possible negotiations with the Jins. Despite the pressure from opposing officials, Gaozong had never stopped requesting peace from the mortal enemy, the Jin, who made a few attempts to destroy both him and his regime. Gaozong frequently sent envoys to the Jin hoping to find a reasonable solution for both states.674 Qin Gui's return to the Song provided fresh hope for an emperor who could not initially express his decision favoring peace due to having to mediate between parties in disputes, as well as compromise over policy alternatives.

672 Han Shizong turned in the property of his army right after he was appointed Military Commissioner. See detail in YL, ch. 140, p. 2251. For the wealth of the army formerly under Yue Fei's control, please see YL, ch. 144, pp. 2316-7.
673 Zhu Xi 朱熹 made a comment on the possibility of recovering the Central Plains and also indicated the problems of unrestrained military commanders. See Li Jingde ed., Zhuzi yulu 朱子語録, ch. 131, pp. 5047-9.
Qin, on the other hand, had a few advantages in pushing his peace proposal. First, he knew the enemy well and, moreover, he had fellow peace advocate Wanyan Chang as his partner in the Jin camp. Whether Qin was assigned by Wanyan to the Song to facilitate peace talks with the Song or not, is less important than the fact that Qin shared the same idea with a powerful Jin commander who could decide on peace negotiations with the Song. Secondly, Qin possessed full authorization from Gaozong, who later explicitly revealed his real intention was peace seeking. For Qin, Gaozong sacrificed Zhao Ding, who had once been his favorite subject and best aide. Thirdly, Zhang Jun stumbled in an attempt to reorganize an army, which was previously under a powerful military commander, and incurred a great loss for the Song. Zhao Ding, the chief councilor who replaced Zhang after the latter's setback in Huaixi, was unable to deliver a clear and appropriate policy towards the Jin. This allowed Qin a rare opportunity to promote peace again. Although the Jin's political turmoil, which occurred soon after a peace agreement was completed, frustrated Qin and almost sabotaged the prospect of peace between the two states, Gaozong's intervention at the right time became the deciding factor for the Song to reach an peace agreement with the Jin. With all kinds of resistance ahead of them, Gaozong and Qin Gui, working as a team, successfully adopted the peace approach.

The policy choice between war and peace was the so-called defense, a vague yet accepted Song approach to the Jin.\(^{675}\) Zhao Ding, who was originally a peace

\(^{675}\) Although this approach, mentioned in the memorial of Zhang Jie 張戒, was as vague as it could be, it was supported by Gaozong and Zhao Ding. It says that the Song should see peace as superficial and defense as the real content and the war as the last alternative. See YL, ch. 122, p. 1970.
supporter, switched his attitude at the moment when Qin Gui urged Gaozong to humble himself for the peace. His position could be described as one between Zhang Jun, a war advocate, and Qin Gui, a peace advocate. Zhao, with his choice of the third option, did not escape from criticism. Wang Shu, for example, criticized Zhao as vacillating between choices, and contributing no benefits to the emperor and the country. In fact, Zhao had helped Gaozong find legitimate excuses to humble himself before the Jin for a peace agreement. Zhao's argument was that officials who opposed peace negotiation to prevent Gaozong from being subservient were justified by their loyalty to the emperor. However, to humble himself for peace, Gaozong was actually intending to get back his mother, his older brother and his father's coffin, and hence was justified by his sense of obedience. Officials who protested against the agreement should be tolerant with the emperor because he was obedient and sincere.

Why did Zhao turn away the option of peace was not entirely known to us. Yet, thinking of this question provides us an opportunity to ponder the concept of "loyalty" (zhong). It can be argued that because the momentum of Zhao's political career

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676 According to Gaozong's statement, Zhao supported peace with the Jin and was assigned to wait for the Jin envoys during the invasion of 1129. For this argument, Gaozong even cited a witness. See YL, ch. 124, pp. 2011-2. Zhu Xi also described Zhao as advocating peace yet he differed from Qin Gui on the items of territories and diplomatic formality. See Li Jingde ed., Zhuzi yulu, ch. 131, pp. 5039-40.
677 A Song contemporary scholar argued that Zhao originally advocated war against the Jin but later chose defense as his agenda. See YL, ch. 124, p. 2029.
678 HB, v. 3, p. 598. YL, ch. 120, p. 1944. Zhao was described by Wang as the mouse in the front has two options to choose (shou shu liang duan 首鼠兩端), a common idiom in the Song used to describe people who hesitate between options.
679 YL, ch. 120, p. 1944.
680 Yue Fei, a loyal general who was executed by the Song, provides another interesting case for the study of "loyalty". Obviously, Yue was more loyal to his country than his ruler, which might not have been fully acknowledged by his contemporaries. For details about the evaluation on Yue, see Liu Tzu-chien, "Yue Fei", in Liang Songshi yanjiu huibian两岸史研究彙編, pp. 185-207.
shifted when Qin intervened and presided over the peace process, Zhao had to distinguish himself from Qin to struggle for his position with a revised agenda such as "defense". However, there is another possibility that Zhao changed his mind because he was influenced by a set of different moral codes other than conservative principles, which restrained a Confucian scholar-official to devote himself only to the emperor as an individual and negated the bigger concept of rendering loyalty to the country, a higher authority, as some officials such as Fang Tingshi and Hu Quan have proposed. If this had been the case, Zhao's shifting policy was not just a matter of his career concerns in the face of Qin's threat, and could just as well be a struggle between his personal moral values. As a result, the link between Zhao and the emperor was broken and Zhao had since been denied to return to the court. The price that Zhao had to pay either for competing with Qin or for standing by his own principles was very huge.

The concept of loyalty created problems for officials in Imperial China. The above-mentioned memorials presented by Fang Tingshi and Hu Quan have drawn our attention to the dilemma between loyalty to the country and to the emperor himself. The performance of the ten chief councilors as we have so far discussed them also presents interesting examples for us to elaborate on this topic. Is there a compromise between these two kinds of loyalty? Or do they have to be contradictory to each other? There are no easy answers to both questions since individual cases are varied. For example, Li Gang emphasized the importance of managing the north and suggested using an aggressive approach to the Jin. He overlooked the personal feelings about his plan by

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681 Hu Quan 胡錫, Danan wenji 澤南文集, ch. 2, p. 1b.
Gaozong, who was then a young emperor. Li rendered his loyalty more to the country and less to Gaozong himself. The complaint of "treating me like a child" carried more than its literal meaning. Fan Zongyin had accidentally created a contradiction between his loyalty to the country, as expressed by his insistence on reviewing excessive rewards for a better government, and his loyalty to the emperor: since the review necessarily would involve misconduct of Gaozong’s father and brother, thereupon would have humiliated Gaozong himself.

Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan only paid attention to their loyalty to Gaozong to such an extent they were often derided as baby sitters caring for the child. However, their imprudent judgment of intelligence reports nearly cost the emperor's life. Their loyalty to the emperor never transcended to the level of loyalty to their country. Du Chong's case is easy to analyze because he had failed to fulfill his loyalty both to the emperor and the country when he served as chief councilor. The case as presented by Qin Gui is somewhat troublesome for a clear-cut analysis. Qin was consistent in his policy choice, peace with the Jin, from the moment of returning to the court until he died. Despite complications beyond his control, Qin ultimately helped the Song in reaching peace with the Jin. Undoubtedly, his overall performance on the peace agreement is considered as fulfilling his loyalty to the emperor. However, Qin has been criticized throughout Chinese history as a traitor who betrayed his country and misled his emperor. As a peace advocate, whether Qin helped or damaged the Song is debatable. Yet, it is highly possible that he had tried with great effort to combine the two kinds of loyalty together. It is also possible that Qin had thought that peace was beneficial to the Song as
well as the Jin, and it was particularly important to Gaozong, who himself had anticipated a peaceful solution with his enemy for years.\(^{682}\)

Although there was contradiction occasionally between the two kinds of loyalty, most officials devoted themselves to the country through their loyalty to the emperor. However, on the eve of Song-Jin peace agreement, loyalty became a concept that needed to be broadly interpreted. Having objected to peace agreement with the Jin, some angry officials challenged the emperor's decision by citing a higher source of authority, such as the Song ancestors. Yet, one wonders why similar remarks were never expressed by the above-discussed chief councilors. This leads to another question: i.e., what was the power of chief councilors vis-a-vis that of the emperor? Scholars who studied this topic have not yet reached a consensus on whose power was growing greater.

Some historians have argued that chief councilors in the Song possessed less power than their counterparts in the previous times. This statement, pioneered by Qian Mu 钱穆, a famous scholar, has been echoed by other Song scholars who emphasized the institutional changes as the proof of their argument. For example, the powers of Song

\(^{682}\) Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 provides a unique way of observing the cooperative relationship between Gaozong and Qin Gui on the issue of peace agreement towards the Jin. He argued that Gaozong rushed into peace negotiation because he wanted to relieve the powers from major military commanders. Qin, on the other hand, wanted to resolutely defend a peace agreement and in result had to relieve military authority from those commanders. Their different approaches interacted and somehow they fulfilled both goals. See Wang Fuzhi, *Song lun* 宋論, p. 163. Ye Shi 萧庭, a Song scholar, indicated that the reason Qin was subservient to the Jins and promised everything they requested just for peace was because he worried about the difficulties of recovering military authority from those commanders. Qin, as Ye argued, anticipated that the Song was not only unable to restore the north it was also not capable of maintaining order in the south. Thus, Ye thought that Qin's main concern was on recalling military authority from military men. See Ye Shi, *Shuixin bieji* 水心 別集 in *Ye Shi ji* 萧庭 集, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1961, ch. 12, p. 783 & ch. 14, p. 817.
chief councilors had been divided and they were not authorized to deal with military affairs, national finance, or appointing officials. Moreover, chief councilors were restrained by censorial powers and all were deprived of the privilege of being granted a seat during an audience or having long discussion with the emperor. However, other scholars have raised different evidence. For example, although the Song founders intended to divide the power of chief councilors, in actual practice, chief councilors of the Song had exercised their authority in important areas and not been restricted by any institutional device that was intended to restrain their powers. In fact, to limit the power of chief councilor sometimes proved to be impractical. Consequently, none of the above restrictive measures was effective, nor actually put into practice. On the contrary, the Song chief councilors' power had grown so large that they sometimes hampered the authority of the emperor. Thus, there was a big gap between the institutional design and the actual practice.

If one puts their arguments into perspective and evaluates the ten chief councilors under Gaozong, there would be a mixed picture. There were some strong chief councilors and some weak ones. All of them were authorized to deal with military affairs despite each individual having different talents and achievements. Li Gang did not have the opportunity to execute his plans in managing the north through military

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reorganization. Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan, Li's successors, were unable to handle chaotic situations and slow in responding to the invading forces. However, because they were specialized in transportation management along the Huai River, their appointment, although incurring criticism, was deemed as necessary for Gaozong. When the Song court was forced to move to the south of the Yangtze River, their expertise could not be used in the local situation and thus became dispensable. Besides, they were held responsible for Gaozong's shameful escape. Zhu Shengfei later took the position held by Huang and Wang, but was unlucky to encounter a military coup. Although he was helpful in mediating disputes between the court and Miao Fu and Liu Zhengyan, the two rebel leaders, his lack of military expertise hampered his career during a critical time when the Song had to confront the Jin on many occasions. Zhu and Lü Yihao were famous for their ability for tapping resources for national income. As an experienced civil official, Lü had both administrative and military talents. However, his setback in attempting to launch a northern expedition and his old age prohibited him from achieving more merits and staying in power for a longer time. Fan Zongyin, the youngest chief councilor, distinguished himself at an amazingly young age yet stepped down only one year after he took office. His career was just like the night blooming cereus. Du Chong, a civilian official often assumed military duty, was given the title of chief councilor as a reward for his contributions in defending the Jins. However, when assigned to direct the military commanders in arranging defense along the Yangtze River, Du failed his mission and cowardly chose to become a traitor.

685 Liu Tzu-chien 劉子健, Liang Songshi yanjiu huihian 兩宋史研究彙編, p. 32.
The most capable and powerful chief councilors, according to my judgment, were Zhao Ding, Zhang Jun and Qin Gui. Zhao began his career as a prominent censor and had drawn Gaozong's attention. Almost all of his proposals were adopted by the emperor. Zhao showed great interests in personnel management; however, he did not seem to have firm control over the censors. He was capable of mediating disputes with intelligent communication skills. Nevertheless, he was unable to present clear policies when the Song was confronted with changing situations. His ability and performance in the military area was overshadowed by Zhang Jun, his good friend and successor, who was more talented and aggressive. Zhang enjoyed tremendous power when assigned to Sichuan and when he was appointed chief councilor he intended to expand his power. His major concern was the military over which he had hoped to have firm control. However, his ultimate failure as a chief councilor was also caused by his mismanagement of the military. Despite possessing full authorization from Gaozong for his aggressive approach to the Jin, Zhang was unable to finish his mission and worst of all he triggered another mutiny and brought about huge loss for the Song.

Qin Gui never advocated a hawkish attitude towards the Jin except in a situation when he responded to their violation of peace agreement by showing his determination to fight the enemy. His first term of chief councilor was not successful because he did not have enough time to consolidate his power base in the court, although he had pleased the emperor by advancing a peace proposal. He was successful later not only in gaining back his former position after stepping down from office, which lasted merely a year, but also in holding the absolute power, shared with no other officials, for another seventeen years.
The secret for his success was his catering to the favor of the emperor, who had eventually given up his hope in adopting an aggressive approach to the Jin after Zhang Jun stumbled in his management of the military. Realizing that censorial power was useful to him, Qin extended his control over censors and fully used them as a weapon for his power struggles and personal gains. The ultimate challenge to his career came from the military, but because he and the emperor had a common interest of restraining powerful military men, Qin was able to meet the challenge successfully and regain control of the military for the Song central government. After removing the three major military leaders from their commanding posts, Qin had, in effect, dominated all military men.

All in all, we see a pattern here in our discussion. Qin was a powerful chief councilor and had stayed in power for eighteen years in total, until his death. The other nine chief councilors were removed or reinstated at Gaozong's disposition. The whole political show was manipulated by the emperor's delegation of power to his chief councilors and his maintaining a balance between factions. Gaozong tried ten ranking officials, one by one, until he found the one fittest for a long delegation. When he had two factions competing for the upper hand in the court, Gaozong was able to compromise and achieve a balance between them. Each chief councilor was allowed to use his position to open up a new situation for the emperor and his regime. The length of office was conditioned by each one's ability to manipulate resources in achieving merits and to please the emperor. Nevertheless, even though he was the most powerful chief councilor, among the ten, Qin had never surpassed or challenged the power of his supreme leader.
and master. Gaozong had delegated his authorities to Qin until the latter's death because Qin's approach to the Jin worked very smoothly and Qin played an important role in the peace process between the two states. Yet, Gaozong could easily negate Qin's son, who intended to succeed his father, of his attempting the position of chief councilor or any other post.

In conclusion, Gaozong, a fledgling new emperor, faced the unprecedented challenge of Jin invasion and internal problems all at once. His mission was to reestablish a centralized form of government solidifying under a strong creditable emperor, thereby restoring the Song. To meet this end, Gaozong was forced to rely upon as well as experiment with a succession of chief councilors. The general pattern of policy making of these chief councilors presents no consistency or continuity. It is rather contingent upon a number of factors: the emperor's influence, the external threat from the enemies, the various internal problems, the power struggles between chief councilors at the court. Nevertheless, Gaozong was successful in restoring the Song regime. As for the ten chief councilors who had served under Gaozong, only one enjoyed staying power for a long time; the other nine were ephemeral in their political life. Gaozong, the ninth son and never raised to become a ruler, was the ultimate winner in the political game.
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