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INVESTIGATING THE NATURE OF EMOTIONAL APPEALS: AN EXPECTANCY

VIOLATIONS INTERPRETATION OF THE PERSUASIVE EFFICACY OF

EMOTIONAL APPEALS

by

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DEDICATION

To my wife, Karen...

For her love, her understanding, and her support.

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ABSTRACT

The primary objective of this research was to investigate whether the principles of Expectancy Violations Theory could be applied to the study of emotional appeals so as to gain an alternative interpretation of the persuasive efficacy of affective messages in the social influence process. Central to this approach is the assumption that certain culturally-based norms guiding the expression of emotion exist at a societal level, and that the violations of these expectancy norms carry implications for the efficacy of persuasive attempts. Specifically, the tenets of EVT suggest that when these violations occur, message recipients will look to the perceived rewardingness of the source of the message, and then interpret the violations as positive or negative. It was posited that these evaluations, in turn, would either facilitate (in the case of positive violations) or inhibit (negative violations) the persuasion process.

However, due to a number of methodological confounds in the design of the emotional messages used in this research, this study could not provide a fair test of the predictions suggested by EVT. A significant confederate by actor sex interaction described an experimental situation wherein expectancy violation or confirmation was idiosyncratic to the confederates, which is inconsistent both with the premises of EVT as well as the hypotheses stated in this research. Instead, a series of secondary analyses within confederates was undertaken in an attempt to explore the relationships between source rewardingness and message expectedness on attitude change. However, no significant relationships were found to exist.

The discussion section focuses heavily on an analysis of the confounds that existed in this research, and suggestions are made for providing a remedy for similar situations in future research. Finally, directions for future research using expectancy violations theory and emotion are discussed.

CHAPTER ONE

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Traditionally, the means for producing successful persuasion attempts were articulated by Aristotle and were conceptualized as consisting of three interrelated dimensions: logos, ethos, and pathos. *Logos* consists of a logical appeal to argument and sound reasoning, where the persuasive force is gained from the applied forms of deductive and inductive logic. *Ethos* is the dimension of source credibility, and depends on the audience's perceptions of the speaker's expertise, dynamism, and good intent to carry its persuasive force. Finally, *pathos*, the dimension of emotionality, is the third and final dimension whereby a speaker could seek to persuade his or her audience by playing upon the feelings of the audience (Wisse, 1989).

The dimension of emotionality is perhaps the least well understood of the persuasive dimensions identified long ago by Aristotle. This may appear odd, especially considering the relative ease by which emotion has been found to sway opinions and reinforce existing attitudes (Lulofs, 1991). Certainly, everyday persuasion attempts rely heavily upon the use of emotional appeals to achieve persuasive ends, and the use of emotion is an important resource in realizing these persuasive goals. Implicitly, the dimension of logic has always been favored as the ideal means by which to secure persuasive ends. However, a perfectly constructed logical appeal may appear dull and cold and, despite flawless logic, may fail to significantly alter the attitude of the receiver simply because the message fails to reach the receiver on an emotional level. Indeed, persuasive messages have been found

to be more likely to achieve their persuasive goals if a receiver's emotions are aroused (Arnold, 1985). Hence, whether the use of an emotional appeal is intended to elicit sympathy, instill fear, establish rapport, arouse interest, or foster excitement, it remains an important, powerful and integral part of the influence process.

When compared to the relatively large amounts of literature produced on message design factors and source characteristics, the lack of literature focusing on emotional appeals -- especially from a communication perspective -- is lamentable. Emotion may impact the persuasion process in a number of different ways. An emotional appeal may prompt people to take action or change attitudes by means of eliciting a sympathetic emotional response in the audience. However, emotional appeals may work in other ways as well; for instance, the inappropriate use of an emotional appeal may reduce the perceptions of the source's credibility, thereby reducing the persuasiveness of the source. Or, in a more general sense, pre-existing emotional states in the minds and hearts of the listener have been found to bias the processing of messages (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Schwartz, Bless & Bohner, 1991). Clearly, additional research needs to focus on providing a better conceptual and theoretical understanding of the role emotional appeals play in the influence process.

This research will adopt an expectancy violations approach in order to better understand the perceived effectiveness of emotional appeals when expectancies regarding the appropriate use of emotional appeals are positively or negatively violated. Rather than assuming a direct persuasive effect for the emotional appeal itself, this investigation will instead focus on determining if a link exists between violations of expected behavior

regarding the use of emotional appeals by message sources and perceptions of the persuasive efficacy of those messages. In this sense, this research will seek to develop an alternative model in understanding how emotional appeals may be used effectively in influence situations.

Definitional Issues and General Background

<u>Defining Emotion</u>

The experience and expression of emotion is a fundamental part of human interaction (Buck, 1984, 1989; Burgoon, Buller, & Woodall, 1989). Thus, the expression and sharing of such emotion becomes a central feature in understanding the process of communication. The communication of emotion plays a crucial role in understanding the force of certain kinds of persuasive messages (Dillard & Wilson, 1993; Witte, 1998) as well as the development of interpersonal relationships (Berscheid, 1987; Fitness & Strongman, 1991). Yet, the question of how emotions are best defined conceptually as well as operationally is a question that has no clear answer.

The first step in gaining a more focused interpretation of emotion is to differentiate emotions from the related terms of affect and mood. While some researchers use these terms interchangeably, others have made subtle yet important definitional distinctions between these concepts. Emotions are generally defined to be fairly unique and specific responses to some external stimulus (Isen, 1984; Morris, 1989), whereas emotional states, moods, and affective states may be thought of as being more global in nature (Isen, 1984). Similarly, emotions are presumed to be more fleeting and less persistent over time, while moods and affective states have a longer duration than emotions (Clore, Schwartz, &

Conway, 1994). Furthermore, Ekman and Davidson (1994) argues that moods bias cognition, whereas emotions bias action or behavior. The distinction between emotions and other related terms becomes important when considering the effects of these experiences on information processing and reactions to the environment. Hence, given that the experience of emotion is not synonymous with the presence of a mood or affective state, and given that the difference between emotions and other related terms holds consequences for how information is attended to, processed, and acted upon, the ability to differentiate these concepts from one another becomes an important element in gaining a better understanding of the role of emotion in the influence process.

Few claims of knowledge can be made with any degree of empirical consensus with regard to the study of emotions. The study of emotion is in itself ambiguous; some emotions are defined cognitively, others physiologically, and some are defined as being a mixture of both (Bowers, Metts, & Duncanson, 1985). This difficulty in defining exactly what constitutes an emotion creates further uncertainty when attempting to understand this phenomenon in relation to the influence process. Cognitive appraisal theorists argue that the experience of emotion is best understood as a process of interpreting physiological arousal (Frijda, 1986, 1988; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer, 1984). The emotional experience, from this perspective, is a result of a causal sequence wherein the individual perceives some event or behavior in his or her environment, and then arrives at a judgment based on an assessment of the potential benefits or consequences the event could hold for the individual. The response to this appraisal process coalesces as the experience of emotion (Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990). However, other researchers

insist that the experience of emotion is primarily based on a neurochemical reaction to outside stimuli and is not an interpretative process at all (Buck, 1984). Watson and Clark (1994) attempt to provide a more clearly defined definition of emotion by identifying three differentiable components common to the experience of emotion: (1) a prototypic form of expression; (2) a consistent pattern of autonomic physiological changes with regard to the stimulus; and (3) a distinct, subjective feeling associated with the stimulus event. This approach to defining emotion incorporates both the neurophysiological correlates of emotion as well as allowing for the subjective interpretation of the experience.

Even with the basic elements of the emotional experience defined, the degree to which emotions can be conceptualized and differentiated from each other is also a subject of scholarly debate. One school of thought holds that emotions can be described categorically, where one emotion is experienced distinctly from other kinds of emotions (Ekman, 1971; Izard, 1977; Ortony et al., 1988; Tomkins, 1962, 1963). In this interpretation, the experience of anger, disgust, and disappointment are all qualitatively different emotions. Other researchers demonstrate a preference for understanding emotions not as distinct physiological experiences, but rather as interrelated experiences differentiated by underlying dimensions (Daly, Lancee, & Polivy, 1983; Russell, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). In a two dimensional model, emotions are located in a multidimensional space based on dimensions of valence (positive and negative) and activity (passive or active)(Russell, 1989). In this regard, anger might be differentiated from disappointment on the basis of the activity dimension, or that anger can be considered a more "active" negatively valenced emotion, whereas disappointment might be

considered more passive in comparison. Daly et al. (1983) provide an additional

dimension of intensity (strong versus weak) in the three dimensional model, thereby

providing a model that is arguably both more complete and capable of differentiating

emotions than the two-dimensional model (Frijda, Ortony, Sonnemans, & Clore, 1992).

Understanding the multitude of ways that emotion has been conceptualized is the

first step in realizing the difficulty of defining what constitutes an emotional appeal. The

experience of emotion itself is not fully understood, yet current research has made gains in

identifying the elements that lead to emotional reactions, and such research endeavors

have provided the means to better categorize and describe the resulting emotions and

more clearly differentiate between them. With an increased understanding of the subtle

nuances between different emotions, researchers are better able to focus on the nature of

the relationships between and among emotional experiences. However, with specific

regard to reaching a better understanding of emotional appeals, these conceptualizations

of emotion are important insofar as they define ways to differentiate between the

experience and/or interpretation of emotions. Hence, it is sufficient for the purposes of

this research to say that emotions can be differentiated from each other along a number of

dimensions. A more central question to this research is: How can emotion be effectively

communicated?

Communication of Emotion

Generally speaking, emotion is most effectively conveyed through nonverbal

channels. Adopting the functional approach to nonverbal communication, nonverbal

communication is strategic, goal-driven and employed in the pursuit of achieving

communication objectives (Burgoon, Buller, & Woodall, 1989; Leathers, 1992). The functional approach to nonverbal communication, as applied to the effective use of emotional appeals, is especially relevant with the realization that emotional appeals are strategically used to accomplish persuasive goals. The functional approach also underscores the importance of understanding the interaction between message and context with regard to interpreting emotional appeals, and argues for a provisional understanding of the meaning associated with a given emotional appeal as opposed to an absolute interpretation.

The functional approach itself is governed by three assumptions (Burgoon, Buller, & Woodall, 1989). First, nonverbal communication utilizes multiple channels simultaneously to effectively convey meaning and serve multiple communicative functions. Second, individual channels may contribute to the overall understanding of a message, but the "message" itself is a combination of multiple channels acting in concert. Third, a given nonverbal behavior may take on different meanings depending on the context of the behavior, and hence accomplish a number of different functions.

Each of these assumptions are as equally applicable to the understanding of emotional messages as they are for nonverbal messages. Available research strongly suggests that emotion is primarily conveyed through nonverbal channels, and primarily through facial expressions (Ekman, 1989; Fridlund, Ekman, & Oster, 1986). Nonverbal behaviors such as posture, kinesic behavior, gestures, and paralanguage also aid in the expression of emotion, but their importance in the display of emotion is less well established than is the role of facial expression (Dillard & Wilson, 1993). Lang and

Friestad (1993) provide additional support to the working premise that emotion is best expressed in a visual (i.e., nonverbal) mode by examining differences in verbal and visual memory for positively and negatively-valenced television advertisements. Lang and Friestad's findings generally support the primacy of visual rather than verbal elements in messages, suggesting a reliance on the visual medium for assessing emotion.

This is not meant to suggest that verbal elements are ineffective in promoting persuasion through affective channels. Both verbal and nonverbal channels are capable of successfully conveying emotion. However, previous language-based research into emotional appeals has been plagued by inconsistent or unreliable instantiations of textual or verbal messages. Surprisingly, little research has examined the structural differences in conveying emotions through a verbal- or text-based format versus a "full-channel" approach that incorporates both verbal and nonverbal messages (or, alternatively, visual and verbal elements). Messages that lack the nonverbal or visual channels must compensate by trying to arouse the receiver through text or verbal channels alone.

Regardless of the particular channel used, the communication of emotion can serve a number of different functions. In an effort to clarify the relationship between affect and communication, Dillard (1993) identifies three different forms of communication that better describe the uses of affect in everyday communication interactions: emotion-motivated communication, emotion-manifesting communication, and emotion-inducing communication.

The first of these, emotion-motivated communication, posits that affect may serve as the motivator for initiating the communication process. For example, a rising sense of

anxiety or fear about an upcoming term paper may motivate a student to seek out more specific requirements with regard to the nature of the assignment, or a person may feel compelled to share his or her good news about a much-anticipated promotion with a friend. In this sense, the message is not necessarily "emotional" with regard to the emotional dimension (although it certainly could be), but rather that the experience of emotion prompts the individual to engage in the communication process.

Emotion-manifesting communication, on the other hand, is best understood as emotional displays. When a communicator is engaged in emotion-manifesting communication, information is gained about the internal state and feelings of the communicator. The slamming of a door after a heated argument; the pumping of a fist high into the air after a hard-won victory; the verbal berating given a subordinate after she or he arrives late to work on the third consecutive day; or the grief displayed after the loss of a loved-one are just a few examples of emotion-manifesting communication.

The final way to view the role of emotion in communication is emotion-inducing communication. In this sense, the reception of the message induces an emotional reaction in the receiver. It is important to note here that such an induced reaction might be intentional or unintentional, and may be due directly or indirectly to the message or source. Emotional appeals may act as an emotional contagion, where a target experiences emotions parallel to those of the source, or as a more diffuse sense of empathic concern where the receiver of the message experiences a nonparallel affective response, such as feeling sympathy in response to an emotional plea for help (Miller, Stiff, & Ellis, 1988; Stiff, Dillard, Somera, Kim, & Sleight, 1988). This "direct effect" perspective on

emotional appeals is echoed by Dillard and Wilson (1993) with what they term message-induced affect. Message-induced affect is an emotion (or emotional state) that occurs in direct response to a given message.

Emotion, then, may appear in conjunction with persuasive messages at a number of different points in the communication process, each of which serves a slightly different function or describes a slightly different effect. The experience of emotion may serve as a motivation to communicate; a message which has a highly emotional component may serve as a guide to understanding the affective state of the source of the message; or an emotion may be experienced as a result of the interpretation of the message itself. However, despite the centrality of emotion in the communication process, it is clear that not all messages constitute what may be defined an emotional appeal. What, then, are the characteristics of such an appeal?

Defining Emotional Appeals

The attempt to define strategic emotional appeals, much like the process of defining emotion itself, is somewhat problematic. Depending on one's orientation to communication, emotional appeals can be defined differently depending on the perspective taken. Adopting a source perspective on defining communication behaviors, an emotional appeal consists of any intentional attempt made by the source of a message to convey a given emotion or to elicit a specific emotional response in the audience. From a receiver perspective, an emotional appeal might consist of any attribution and/or experience of emotion by the receiver as a result of a perceived message. Clearly, the two approaches

make different assumptions about a given message's intentionality, emotional content, and purpose.

Similarly, the traditional approach to persuasion identifies the use of emotional appeals as one means of persuasion, while logic and ethical appeals comprise the other methods of producing uncoerced attitude change. This approach is problematic, as there seems to exist an assumption that these means of achieving persuasion are independent of one another. Thus, much research has focused on identifying and explaining the differences between an emotional appeal, a logical appeal, and an appeal to credibility. Clark (1984), for instance, argues that emotions are an internal state, not a message component. Yet such a distinction is in part contradictory, as one cannot distinguish between an emotional appeal and a logical appeal, as the effect of one is purported to affect the other. For example, a student may perceive a purely factual statement made by an instructor ("You are not doing as well in this class as you might be!") to be an implicit threat to devote more time to studying. Hence, the identification of emotional appeals is made more difficult by having to distinguish between emotional appeals and the emotional effects of persuasive appeals.

Furthermore, a number of researchers have conceptualized emotion as being the diametric opposite of logic; hence, the use of logic is a "rational" means to persuasion whereas the use of emotion relies upon "irrational" or "unfounded" appeals. However, others argue that there is a rationality underlying the experience and labeling of emotion. One way to address the problem of distinguishing emotional appeals from logical and credibility appeals is to begin with the assumption that *all* persuasive messages contain

elements of logic, credibility, and emotion. Indeed, recent research into attitude formation and structure has suggested that attitudes are constructed of both affect-based and cognition-based components, which implies that efforts to change such attitudes cannot be explained well be taking a purely cognition versus affect approach (e.g., Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Edwards, 1990). Thus, it is no longer a question of identifying a particular message as one appeal or another, but rather a more global question of which dimension or dimensions (i.e., logic, emotion, or speaker credibility) seem to act as the *primary* means of persuasion. In this sense, an emotional appeal is present when affect is one of the primary dimensions used in a given message to facilitate attitudinal or behavioral change.

In addition to the ambiguity associated with the conceptualization of emotional appeals, there is also a discrepancy in the ways that emotional appeals have been operationalized. This discrepancy may be due in part to the two distinct ways of conceptualizing and defining variations in emotional appeals, and is exemplified in the controversy surrounding the measurement of fear appeals in particular (O'Keefe, 1990). The first method of defining fear appeals is to define the strength of the fear appeal by the properties of the message itself. In essence, a high fear appeal message "is one containing explicit, vivid depictions of negative consequences, while a 'low fear appeal message' is a tamer, toned down version" (O'Keefe, 1990, p. 165). Because this approach to fear appeals adopts a message focus similar to what Dillard (1993) would describe as an emotion-inducing communication attempt, it is important to note that this classification of high versus low fear appeals may or may not yield qualitatively different levels of arousal

in the minds of the listeners. That is to say, the message itself may or may not achieve the level of arousal intended by the source of the message, thus rendering the distinction between "high" and "low" fear appeals somewhat arbitrary. It is probable that the same problematic implications hold true for other emotional appeals as well, for the common problem remains the same: the reliable manipulation of emotional arousal.

The second approach to defining fear appeals involves the measurement of the levels of fear provoked in the audience. This second method differentiates the strength of the messages on the basis of the comparative levels of fear experienced by the audience, with a high fear appeal generating greater levels of anxiety than a low fear appeal (O'Keefe, 1990). Hence, it has proven difficult to reliably manipulate fear appeals using a message orientation (Boster & Mongeau, 1984). It would seem, then, that a carefully composed message using emotional appeals may be designed to arouse a particular emotion and yet fail to do so in any meaningful manner. The desired effects of the manipulation of the message must be confirmed in a post hoc fashion, yielding an approach that is both theoretically tentative and conceptually inelegant. This concern is not limited to fear appeals alone, but is a problem shared by research designs that rely on textual or verbal manipulations of emotion without the additional support of accompanying nonverbal messages. It would seem, then, that focusing on the verbal message alone provides at best an incomplete and potentially misleading interpretation of the efficacy of emotional appeals. If a greater understanding of the effects of emotional appeals on the persuasive process is to be reached, then the analysis of such messages must also include the nonverbal dimensions of the messages.

Emotional Appeals and the Social Influence Process

The study of how emotion relates to social influence is guided by competing

assumptions and is usually undertaken in one of two ways. First, some researchers argue

that emotion is a by-product of the persuasive process, not an integral part of the process

itself. Such positions hold that cognitive reactions to the message form the underlying

basis for evaluating the potential consequences and effectiveness of the message (e.g.,

Beck & Frankel, 1981; Sutton & Hallett, 1988, 1989). This is consistent with Clark's

(1984) view that emotions are internal states, thus forming in reaction to the persuasive

message and not directly attributable to the message itself. However, other researchers

(e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) argue that emotional appeals such as fear are

causally linked to attitude change and are an active part of persuasive messages. This

discrepancy may be due in large part to the orientation adopted by the researchers in

examining this phenomenon. The view of emotional appeals as epitomized by Clark

(1984) appears to adopt a receiver orientation to emotional appeals, where the

effectiveness or experience of emotion is of central concern; the view championed by

Hovland et al. (1953) appears to adopt a source orientation to communication.

Clearly, the experience and expression of emotion plays an important part in the

influence process (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen & Means, 1983; Sypher & Sypher,

1988). Yet the question of how the communication of emotion can be best used to

achieve persuasive goals remains unclear. Building on Dillard's (1993) typology, and

extending the arguments made earlier with regard to the definition of emotional appeals,

emotional appeals encompass both emotion-manifesting and emotion-inducing

communication, as long as such processes are used with the intention of achieving persuasive ends. Although it can be argued that emotion-motivated communication might prompt the attainment of a persuasive goal, the motivation behind the persuasive attempt is of secondary importance as compared to the emotionality exhibited in the message itself.

In summary, then, an emotional appeal can be defined as consisting of both (a) the strategic, intentional display or use of emotion conveyed through verbal and/or nonverbal channels and (b) the strategic use of a message designed to induce or create an emotional state in the mind of the receiver for the purpose of facilitating attitudinal or behavioral change in the target individual. Both cases hinge on the strategic use of emotion by a communicator to facilitate persuasion; the first case attempts to accomplish persuasive goals through a communicator's display of emotion, while the second attempts to achieve persuasive goals by creating a particular emotional state in the mind of the listener and appealing to a receiver's feelings in an attempt to influence the receiver on an emotional level. Although these two faces of emotional appeals are both effective in changing attitudes, the two approaches seem to operate on different levels and by different principles. Hence, a better understanding of how these two uses of emotional appeals work to achieve persuasive goals is necessary.

The Case for a New Approach

The majority of social psychological and communication research into emotional appeals has assumed a perspective that resonates with the second definition of emotional communication described by Dillard (i.e., emotion-inducing communication). This research typically focuses on the cognitive processing preferences of individuals with

regard to emotional appeals as compared with logical appeals under different conditions of argument quality, motivation to process messages, and ability (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b; Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981). This research tradition has led to the development of similar models and theories, all of which make two predictions about the use of emotional appeals: (1) that emotional appeals are less likely to lead to long term attitude change than are logical appeals; and (2) emotional appeals are most effective when the focus on the argument is low.

These predictions, taken together, suggest that emotional appeals are neither as effective in changing attitudes nor as powerful a motivator for attitudinal or behavioral change as logical, argument-based appeals. This seems to contradict evidence that suggests a primary role for affect in changing attitudes (Edell & Burke, 1987; Edwards, 1990; Holbrook & Batra, 1987; Katz & Stotland, 1959). This may in part be due to the way in which emotional appeals have been conceptualized and operationalized exclusively as emotion-inducing communication. Although previous research has certainly used emotional displays to induce emotional states, the focus has always been on the induced feeling state as opposed to the link between the communicator and his or her use of the emotional display. In one sense, previous research focusing on emotional appeals has assumed that emotion-manifesting and emotion-inducing persuasive communication are the same, and that both types of emotional appeals could be subsumed under the same process. Little research has explored the direct impact of strategically displayed emotion on the perceived effectiveness of persuasive messages. A model built on the expectations

people hold of a source who uses emotional appeals, and whether the use of such appeals violates those expectations, might suggest a more balanced role for affect in the persuasion process for two reasons. First, communication (persuasive or otherwise) does not occur in a relational vacuum; the process of communication involves both a source and a receiver, and the interpretation of such messages are in part dependent on the nature of the relationship shared between the interactants. Second, the effectiveness of using emotional appeals may be located in abiding by or violating norms associated with the use of emotion appeals in a given context. Hence, such a focus would accommodate both relational and situational elements more readily than the previously discussed models.

Two competing models of expectancy violations exist that may lend insight into the relationship between the use of emotional appeals and persuasive efficacy: Language Expectancy Theory and Expectancy Violations Theory. Language expectancy theory (M. Burgoon, 1990; M. Burgoon, Dillard, & Doran, 1983; M. Burgoon & Miller, 1985; Miller & M. Burgoon, 1979) is based on the premise that language is a rule-governed system and that people develop expectations about the appropriate or inappropriate use of language to achieve persuasive goals. Expectancy violations theory (Burgoon, 1978, 1983, 1993; Burgoon & Hale, 1988; Burgoon & Walther, 1990) seeks to predict and explain the consequences of violating expected behavior norms in interpersonal relationships. Central to this theory is the concept of expectancies, or the expectations one has about a partner's interaction style based on known communicator characteristics, relationship factors, and contextual elements. These expectations serve as framing devices that help individuals make sense of and interpret their communicative interactions with others.

Both expectancy models hold relevance for the interpretation of the persuasive

effects of emotional appeals. However, due to the different and sometimes competing

assumptions underlying each of the theories, this research will proceed using expectancy

violations theory. The primary rationale for selecting EVT is based on the recognition that

EVT has its origins in nonverbal behavior, and as described earlier, the communication of

emotion is primarily accomplished through nonverbal channels. Although an argument can

be made that language expectancy theory is more predictive of the persuasive effects of

expectancy violations in language use, its narrow focus on the use of language is too

limiting for the purposes of gaining a comprehensive understanding of the effects of

emotional appeals.

Expectancy Violations Theory

In Expectancy Violations Theory, Burgoon and her colleagues (Burgoon, 1978,

1983, 1993; Burgoon & Hale, 1988; Burgoon & Le Poire, 1993; Burgoon & Walther,

1990), predict that communicator characteristics, relational factors, and context combine

to create immediacy expectations. Both the nature of the relationship shared by the two

interactants and the situational characteristics play a role in determining a partner's

perceived rewardingness. EVT posits that when a violation of expected behavior occurs,

it draws attention away from the message or topic and instead focuses on the violator and

the violation. The concept of expectancies in the interpretation of communication

behavior becomes increasingly relevant with the realization that expectancies incorporate

cultural display rules for appropriate and inappropriate use of emotion. Hence, when a

cultural display rule is violated with regard to emotional displays or appeals, the focus of

the receiver is transferred momentarily from the processing of the message to a reanalysis of the speaker's character.

Expectancy violations theory (or EVT) posits a series of sequential phases wherein the violation of expectancies can affect nonverbal behavior. The first phase is *expectancies,* and begins with the premise that people hold expectations about what is to be considered proper and improper communication behavior when engaged in interaction with others. Some behavior might be positively valenced, while other expectancies might be negatively valenced.

A number of different typologies of expectancies have emerged in the literature. One way to conceptually define expectancies is to distinguish between idiosyncratic expectancies and social expectancies. Ideosyncratic expectancies are derived from a previous knowledge of a specific individual's normative behavior patterns, thus allowing the individual to recognize deviations from what might be considered to be a person's "normal" behavior. Ideosyncratic expectations are highly individualized, and rely on such knowledge as a person's personality and psychological states in order to develop a baseline for an individual's behavior patterns (Burgoon, 1978). Social expectancies, rather than being defined and recognized at the individual level, are instead derived from cultural and social knowledge bases and define norms for appropriate behavior at the societal level. Social expectations, learned and reinforced within ones culture from birth, operate subconsciously and generally result in automatic behaviors (Burgoon, Stern, & Dillman, 1995). These normative expectancies serve as a guide for engaging in proper behavior within a given culture.

Additionally, Burgoon and Le Poire (1993) have posited two more expectancy types: a personal attribute expectancy and communication expectancy. The personal attribute expectancy is primarily derived from both traitlike and statelike attributes associated with the source of a message, and include such factors as similar/dissimilar, powerful/powerless, warm/cold, attractive/unattractive, and friendly/unfriendly (Honeycutt 1989; 1990). The communication expectancy is based on the expected norms governing the communicative interaction with regard to the type, style, and content of the anticipated communication event. Hence, communication expectancies might involve predispositions regarding the content, delivery, and degree of emotion present in the message (i.e., whether an argument will rely largely on logic or emotion).

The final way of conceptualizing expectancies is to differentiate between predictive and prescriptive expectancies. Staines and Libby (1986) argue that there is at least two ways in which a given behavior might be considered expected. Predictive expectancies are developed in association with behaviors that have a general tendency to occur; for instance, the sending of Christmas cards to friends and family every year. The behavior becomes expected because it becomes the norm. Prescriptive, or evaluative expectancies, are less concerned with typical or usual behavior patterns and instead are concerned with judgments of the appropriateness and general favorability of the behavior. For example, when one receives a Christmas card from someone, there is the expectation that one should reciprocate the action lest one be viewed as antisocial or lacking in social graces. Predictive and prescriptive expectancies are not necessarily correlated, however; it is

entirely possible that some behaviors are expected even though they may be judged as

inappropriate, and others are unexpected by favorably judged (Staines & Libby, 1986).

The second phase of EVT is *violations*. Violations occur when observed behavior

deviates from what is expected. In EVT, violations are assumed to activate the

individual's attention and interest, and correspondingly increase arousal levels prompting

an effort to cope with the deviation (Burgoon, 1978). Two types of violations exist:

social and personal. Social violations occur when social expectancies or norms are not

followed. These norms can be learned through observation of the environment and the

demographic characteristics of the individuals involved. Likewise, personal violations

occur when the observed behavior of specific individuals is markedly different from their

expected behavior. It is also important to note that violations of expected behaviors need

not always be negatively valenced; it is entirely possible for positive violations to occur as

well.

The third phase of EVT is *arousal*. Following a recognized deviation in the

behavior of an observed individual (whether such a deviation is social or personal), EVT

predicts that the observer's arousal levels are increased. The consequence of this increased

arousal, as argued by Le Poire (1994), is that "arousal change is said to cause an alertness

or orienting response that diverts attention away from the interaction and focuses it

toward the source of the arousal -- the initiator of the violation" (p. 561). Furthermore,

Le Poire (1991) argues that "arousal does not directly alter outcomes. Rather, it acts as a

catalyst for environmental scanning or increased attention to the relationship between the

interactants" (p. 140). Hence, the arousal serves as a motivator to reassess the nature of

the relationship between the violator and the observer, or, more specifically, the nature of the expectation violated.

Interpretation and evaluation enter in at the fourth phase of EVT. In this stage, an interactant's observed behavior is subjected to an assessment consisting of an interpretation of the observed behavior followed by an evaluation of whether the violation of the behavior is desirable or not (Burgoon, 1992). In this sense, people develop evaluations concerning the relative desirability of interactions with others. People can be seen as potentially rewarding (i.e., that further interaction with such people would be in some way beneficial and/or satisfying to the individual) or punishing (i.e., that further interaction would be unpleasant, harmful, or otherwise undesirable). A person's reward valence is based on all the observable information about a message source, including the individual's behavior during the interaction. Factors such as attractiveness, knowledge, personal attributes, and familiarity with the source have been shown to influence perceptions of communicator reward valence (Berscheid, 1985; Burgoon, 1993). Insofar as EVT addresses nonverbal behavior, the interpretation of nonverbal behavior can often have multiple possible interpretations depending on the communication context and the nature of the interactants. It is during the interpretation stage that interactants determine which possible meanings are present in the observed nonverbal act (Burgoon, 1992).

The interpretation of these nonverbal behaviors also carries an associated evaluation of the perceived behavior. Hence, the interpretation of these nonverbal behaviors in an interpersonal setting influences how expectancy violations are evaluated. The evaluation stage assesses whether or not the nonverbal act is considered desirable or undesirable.

When the meaning of a given violation is uncertain, the reward valence of the violator may influence which interpretations of the behavior the receiver selects. In turn, the interpretations and evaluations of a given behavior determines the valence of the violation. Positive violations yield more desirable outcomes and negative violations yield more undesirable consequences (Burgoon, 1993).

The fifth and final stage of EVT is *reciprocity and compensation*. Because of the extensive research conducted on communication outcomes, Burgoon (1993) has sought to extend the utility of EVT and the concept of communicator reward valence to interaction patterns, and specifically to the patterns of reciprocity and compensation in nonverbal behavior. However, since the this research is primarily concerned with the roles of expectancies, arousal, and interpretation and evaluation as it impacts persuasive processes, this part of EVT has no bearing on the present research, and so will not be considered here.

In summary, this research utilizes expectancy violations theory in an attempt to better explain how and why emotional appeals may either facilitate or hinder the persuasion process. Central to this approach is the assumption that certain culturally-based norms guiding the expression of emotion exist at a societal level, and that the violations of these expectancy norms carry implications for the efficacy of persuasive attempts. Thus, the first stage of this research will seek to confirm that these expectancies of emotional expression exist at a cultural level. On confirmation of this assumption, the second phase of this research will explore how expectancy violations impact persuasive efficacy.

Derivation of Emotional Expectations

From an EVT framework, the special case for understanding the use of strategic

emotional appeals begins with the development of expectations guiding the effective use

of emotional appeals. Part of the influence of context on developing expectations of

appropriate communication behavior is that emotional display rules (and by extension, the

rules regarding the use/display of emotional appeals), are culturally and situationally

defined. It should be noted that the terms 'display rules' and 'emotional expectations' are

not always used synonymously. Zeman and Garber (1996) define display rules as being

the "intentional control of emotional expression such that the external representation of

affect differs from the internal affective state" (pp. 957-958). However, for the purposes

of this research, the terms are to be considered interchangeable.

Social expectations are learned and reinforced within ones culture throughout

childhood, operate without conscious thought and generally result in automatic behaviors

(Burgoon, Stern, & Dillman, 1995). These normative expectancies serve as a guide for

engaging in proper behavior within a given culture (Averill, 1982). Ekman and Friesen

(1969, 1975) argue that the norms for appropriate emotional expression for a given

culture are guided by rules stipulating under what conditions such emotional expressions

might be made. These cultural rules specify when certain types of emotional expressions

are appropriate and when they are not. For instance, a given culture might have norms

concerning the expression of affection in public; hand-holding and brief kissing might be

considered acceptable, while more intense kissing or intimate touch would be considered

rude or boorish.

Although the existence of culturally-based emotional display rules is asserted by many, few researchers have attempted to explicitly identify these rules. Situational variables often play a primary role in understanding the deviation from or the adherence to norms of emotional expression, making the identification of relatively global cultural-level display rules difficult at best. However, while specific research pertinent to the derivation of emotional display expectations is somewhat scarce, there does exist a body of research identifying tendencies in emotional expression among different groups. This body of research can most easily be divided into two categories: cultural differences in the expression of emotion, and sex differences in emotional expression.

Cultural Differences in Emotional Expression

Although numerous researchers allude to the assumption that norms for appropriate expression of emotion are culturally bound, few studies have been conducted in an effort to confirm these assertions. Studies conducted by Ekman and Friesen (1969, 1975) and Matsumoto (1990) identified differences in the displays of emotion between American and Japanese subjects. Ekman and Friesen's work compared the differences in the emotional displays of American and Japanese subjects after viewing a highly stressful film. The subjects initially viewed the film themselves, and then in the presence of a higher-status experimenter. Results indicated that when alone, both groups of subjects displayed the same emotions (i.e., disgust, anger, and fear), but when in the presence of the high-status experimenter, the Japanese subjects smiled rather than display the negative emotions in the presence of the experimenter (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; 1975). Similarly, Matsumoto (1990) found differences in the perceived appropriateness of six universal facial

expressions in five social situations. Japanese subjects tended to find displays of anger and fear more appropriate for other cultures/outgroups, and the display of anger more appropriate for low-status others, than did Americans. The American subjects rated disgust and sadness more appropriate to ingroups.

More recently, Matsumoto (1993) attempted to identify differences in display rules based on cultural/ethnic identities within the same country rather than comparing differences in display rules cross-culturally. A sample of American subjects identified themselves as being Caucasian, Black, Asian, or Hispanic. Subjects were then shown photographs of emotional expressions and asked to rate the appropriateness of the emotional displays based on eight social situations. Results indicated that (a) Caucasians rated displays of contempt as more appropriate overall than did Asians; (b) Caucasians rated displays of disgust as more appropriate overall than did Blacks and Hispanics; (c) Caucasians rated displays of fear as more appropriate overall than did Hispanics; and (d) Caucasians rated displays of fear as more appropriate overall than did Blacks or Asians (Matsumoto, 1993). Additionally, Matsumoto found significant differences between the ethnic groups on the display rules associated with given situations posed in the study. Specifically, Matsumoto (1993) found that (a) Caucasians rated displays of emotion in public as more appropriate than did Hispanics; (b) Caucasians rated displays of emotion with casual acquaintances as more appropriate than did Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics; (c) Caucasians rated displays of emotion to lower-status others as more appropriate than did Blacks or Hispanics; and (d) Caucasians rated displays of emotion to children as being more appropriate than did Hispanics.

This research suggests that expectations regarding the appropriateness of emotional displays do in fact exist on a cultural level, but that such expectations are heavily influenced by the social situation. That is not to say that global rules/expectations do not exist, or that display rules are entirely situationally dependent. Within the confines of a given context, such norms of appropriateness are clearly present and differ systematically between cultural groups.

Sex Differences in Emotional Expression

The most significant body of research examining norms for emotional expression is associated with display rule differences based on source sex (Allen & Haccoun, 1976; Brody & Hall, 1993; Johnson & Shulman, 1988; Shields, 1987). The issue of whether or not expectations for emotional expression differ between men and women is of social significance given the common stereotype of women's greater latitude for emotional expression and the negative connotations associated with a reliance on emotionality as opposed to rationality (Stoppard & Gunn Gruchy, 1993). Indeed, the stereotype of women as being more emotionally expressive than men has been amply confirmed by empirical research (Brody & Hall, 1993; Kring & Gordon, 1998).

With regard to sex differences and the use of display rules in the expression of individual emotions, the literature is mixed. Some studies have found that females begin altering their emotional expressions using display rules more often than males as well as at younger ages (Cole, 1986; Saarni, 1984). However, other studies have concluded that no sex differences exist in the emotional responses generated by subjects to hypothetical scenarios (Gnepp & Hess, 1986). One explanation for these contradictory findings may be

that emotional regulation may depend on what type of emotion is being expressed in what situation. Fuchs and Thelen (1988) suggest that boys may be socialized to mask sadness, whereas girls may learn to mask anger. That girls may be more apt to mask feelings of anger more so than boys has gained at least some empirical support (Underwood, Coie, & Herbsman, 1992). Similarly, research by Zeman and Garber (1996) has confirmed that females are more likely to express sadness than boys are. Further research suggests that women tend to display emotions that are related to vulnerability, affiliation, and self-consciousness (such as warmth, happiness, shame, guilt, fear, and nervousness), whereas men may be expected to display emotions such as pride and anger that emphasize competition and minimization of vulnerability (Brody & Hall, 1993).

Research conducted by M. Burgoon and his colleagues also provides evidence that suggests that societal expectations differ for each sex in the expression of certain emotions. In his research on language expectancies, M. Burgoon argues that males and females are expected to use different levels of language intensity, and that violations of these expectations could either facilitate or hinder persuasion (M. Burgoon, 1990). Specifically, females who use high-intensity language are more likely to negatively violate cultural-level expectations than are males (M. Burgoon, Dillard, & Doran, 1982; M. Burgoon & Stewart, 1975). Although M. Burgoon does not define language intensity in terms of emotional content, an obvious parallel exists between the level of language intensity used and the degree of emotional manifestation present in the message itself.

Although the common stereotype of the 'emotional female' may be in part founded in fact, the conclusion that females will *always* enjoy a wider latitude for emotional

expression than males, regardless of the specific emotion, may be premature. Women are generally seen as having a greater latitude to express emotion overall, and are at greater liberty to express emotions such as sadness, disgust, surprise, happiness, anger, and fear than are men (Birnbaum & Croll, 1984; Brody & Hall, 1993; Fujita, Harper, & Wiens, 1980; Johnson & Shulman, 1988; Rotter & Rotter, 1988). Under some conditions, however, women may be at less liberty to express certain emotions than men without seeming socially inappropriate. Research on women's use of emotion indicates that expression of positive affect appears to be facilitated in the presence of familiar others, whereas negative affect appears to be inhibited in the presence of unfamiliar others (Buck, Losow, Murphy, & Costanzo, 1992; Kring, Raniere, & Eberhardt, 1995). Furthermore, Johnson and Shulman (1988) found that women were expected to display positive emotions to a greater degree than men were only when the expressed emotions were other-oriented. For self-oriented feelings (such as pride in one's accomplishment or anger at one's failure) the reverse appeared to be true; men were expected to display more positive emotion than were females (Johnson & Shulman, 1988).

Although it would appear that certain differences in the display of emotion exist between men and women, it is difficult to draw specific conclusions. As stated by Kring and Gordon (1998), "current empirical evidence about women's greater expressivity does not allow for more refined statements about sex differences. Rather, conclusions can be made about differences in global expressivity, positive and negative expressivity, or even individual emotions, but in very few contexts" (p. 698). Hence, expectations regarding the use of such emotional displays by males and females seem to exist at a fundamental

level at the very least, and with slightly more confidence with regard to the use of positive

and negative affect displays and self- vs. other-oriented emotion.

An Expectancy Violations Theory Interpretation of the Efficacy of

Emotional Appeals

Burgoon (1993) argues that the violations of emotional expression expectations

should be readily addressed by EVT. The degree to which a violation might hinder or

facilitate persuasion is in part dependent on the reward valence of the communicator. For

instance, a highly rewarding communicator begins with a larger latitude of expected or

acceptable behavior than a communicator with a lower reward valence. In essence, highly

rewarding communicators, because of the larger latitude of permissible behaviors (i.e., the

range of expected, acceptable behaviors), can make use of a greater range of

communication strategies, and such strategies are likely to be judged more favorably as

opposed to less favorably. However, even with a greater initial range of behaviors that

would be acceptable to the observer, it is still possible for a highly rewarding

communicator to violate these expectations. In the case of a positive violation, the

enacted behavior is seen as more desirable than the expected behavior, thus leading to

more favorable outcomes (i.e., influence and persuasion). For instance, a student who has

failed to turn in a paper on time because of a personal relational crisis might fully expect

his professor to refuse to accept the late assignment. Nevertheless, the student

approaches his professor and, in the process of explaining his situation, breaks down into

tears and asks for leniency (i.e., an emotional appeal geared toward sympathy). The

professor believes the student to be an honest, dedicated student (i.e., high-reward), and

decides that the emotional appeal appears to be genuine and the justification for the lateness of the paper sincere (the violation is perceived favorably). The professor is willing to recognize the student for the hard work that he has put into the paper, and agrees to accept the late paper.

The predictions of EVT should also hold true for a low-reward communicator using emotional appeals. A low-reward value communicator will initially begin with a more constrained set of acceptable behaviors, and the expectations for such communicators tend to be more negatively valenced. Hence, the low-reward communicator has less leeway in his or her choice of emotional expression, and runs the risk of any deviation from the expected behaviors as being interpreted negatively. Both positive and negative violations are still possible, with positive violations leading to more positive outcomes while negative violations lead to less desirable consequences. In the case of a negative violation, however, unexpected behavior can lead to undesirable consequences. To continue the example with the student/professor interaction, a student once again finds himself late with an assignment due to relationship problems, and he decides to present the professor with his late work. However, this time the professor believes that this student has a reputation for missing deadlines, developing excuses, and generally not taking his studies seriously (i.e., the student is perceived to be a low-reward individual). Once again the student breaks down crying and attempts to sway the professor's opinion by using a sympathetic appeal. This time the professor views the emotional outburst as inappropriate (i.e., a negative violation), and not only refuses to accept the assignment, but berates the student for not having his priorities straight and taking his studies seriously.

The degree of appropriateness of a given emotional expression varies based on the cultural expectations regarding the use of that particular emotional display. The degree to which communicators follow these behavioral prescriptions may have a telling effect on the perceived efficacy of these persuasive communication attempts. It is through the positive and negative violations of these expectations, or the meeting of them, that the role of emotional appeals in persuasion might be better studied and understood from a communication perspective.

In summary, an expectancy violations framework used as a means of interpreting and understanding the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of selected emotional appeals would seem to suggest that when emotional appeals violate expectations, the focus of the receiver will shift from the message to a reassessment of the rewardingness of the violator, likely enhancing persuasion if the source of the message is considered to be highly rewarding. In this case, it would appear that the emotional appeal, rather than promoting persuasive efficacy independent of the credibility dimension, interacts with source credibility in such a way as to heighten perceptions of liking and source credibility, thereby facilitating persuasion. However, if the violation is perceived as being negative, then the assessment of the credibility or likeability of the speaker is likely to suffer, potentially inhibiting persuasion. In viewing the use of emotional appeals in this manner, it would appear that it becomes much easier for a person with high communicator reward valence to use emotional appeals to achieve persuasive ends effectively as compared to a violator with low communicator reward valence.

Derivation of Hypotheses

The principles of Expectancy Violations Theory can be applied to the study of emotional appeals so as to gain an alternative interpretation of the persuasive efficacy of affective messages in the social influence process. Furthermore, an expectancy violations approach makes a distinct contribution to the study of communication by providing a means of understanding the differences between emotion-manifesting communication and emotion-inducing communication. Finally, this approach might yield knowledge about how different kinds of emotional appeals can be used more effectively to produce persuasion from a communication perspective.

Expectations regarding the effective use of emotional appeals are in part dependent on source sex. As a cultural norm, if women are expected to be more emotionally expressive than men, they may be viewed as possessing a wider bandwidth of emotional behavior that might be considered acceptable and/or appropriate. Similarly, this logic suggests that strong emotional expressions by men in persuasive situations might be considered somewhat nonnormative, thereby inducing receivers to evaluate the rewardingness of the source and respond favorably to men who are seen as being rewarding (i.e., highly credible), or unfavorably to males who are seen as unrewarding. By contrast, then, women may have difficulty violating cultural expectations concerning the use of emotional appeals, and as a result, the persuasiveness of female sources may not be as affected by the use of such appeals as the persuasiveness of males. That is not to say that women are unaffected by the expectations regarding the use of emotional appeals;

rather, that because of the greater latitude of emotional expression granted to women, it may be more difficult for them to positively and negatively violate expectations.

Given the previous literature on sex differences in expectations concerning the expression of emotion (and by extension, emotional appeals), the following hypotheses are proposed:

H1: Men who use emotional appeals based on vulnerability (i.e., sadness or guilt) will be rated as more unexpected than women using the same appeals.

H2: Women who use emotional appeals based on competition (i.e., anger or contempt) will be rated as more unexpected than men using the same appeals.

H3: Valence of messages will be highest when high-reward sources violate expectations, and lowest when low-reward sources violate expectations.

H4: The relationship between expectancy violations, source rewardingness, and persuasive efficacy will be such that:

a) Persuasive efficacy will be highest when highly-rewarding subjects violate expectations, followed by when expectations are met, and lowest when low-reward subjects violate expectations.

b) When using emotional appeals based on competition, high-reward females will be higher in persuasive efficacy than high-reward males.

c) When using emotional appeals based on vulnerability, high-reward males will be higher in persuasive efficacy than high-reward females.

d) When using emotional appeals based on competition, low-reward males will be higher in persuasive efficacy than low-reward females.

e) When using emotional appeals based on vulnerability, low-reward

females will be higher in persuasive efficacy than low-reward males.

RQ1: Is persuasive efficacy more closely linked with violations of predictive

expectancies or prescriptive expectancies?

CHAPTER TWO

METHOD

The data for this research project was collected in two waves. The first wave was concerned with measuring the relative expectedness of vulnerable and competitive emotional messages coming from male and female sources in order to determine what kinds of messages constituted violations of normative expectations, and thus addressed the first two hypotheses forwarded in the literature review. In this respect, the methods and analysis of the first wave of data is concerned with gaining descriptive information regarding relative judgments of expectedness and evaluation of a number of different emotional appeals made by four different sources. This analysis forms the basis for selecting the messages and sources utilized in the second wave of the data collection.

The second wave of data was collected in order to test the effects of rewardingness and expectancy violation/confirmation on subject's ratings of the persuasive efficacy of a mock public service announcement. The second wave of data was originally intended to be address the third and fourth hypotheses, as well as the research question, using a between-subjects 2 (high reward versus low reward) x 2 (male source/female source) x 2 (competitive vs. vulnerable emotion) factorial design. However, due to confounds between a number of the factors in the initial analyses, coupled with wide variation in ratings of the messages from the Wave 1 data, a valid test of the third and fourth hypotheses could not be constructed. As an alternative method of analysis, four separate 2 (confirmation/violation) x 2 (high reward/low reward) experiments were conducted on attitude change. Two experiments involved a male and two a female confederate. Within

each confederate sex, predictive expectancies were manipulated in one experiment and predictive expectancies in the other.

Wave One

Participants

Participants for the first wave of data collection were 200 undergraduate students from a variety of majors enrolled in sections of the required basic public speaking course at a medium-sized Midwestern university. One hundred males and 100 females were surveyed in the initial wave of data collection. Ages ranged from 18-52, with a mean of 20.50 years (SD: 3.89). The sample was predominantly Caucasian (86%), with 9.5% identifying themselves as African-American, 3.5% as Asian, and 1% as Hispanic/Latino. Students were given extra credit for their participation in this research.

Power

For the two hypotheses associated with the Wave 1 data collection, initial power estimates indicated that a sample size of 26 cases in each group was required in order to attain a power =. 80 for finding large effect sizes in the sample population (Cohen, 1969). The actual sample size was 50 in each condition. Hence, the first wave of data collection possessed sufficient power to identify a medium to large effect size in the sample if such a difference actually existed.

Procedure

When participants arrived at the scheduled time, they were taken in groups of five into a conference room. Once seated, the participants were told that the Department of Communication had been asked by the university to put together a series of public service

announcements aimed at the student population to be aired on a local cable television channel. They were also told that the department had collected a number of short videotaped vignettes over the years of students talking about their personal experiences with issues common to college students, and that the department was currently trying to decide which stories to include in these public service announcements and which ones to ignore. This is where the participants would help. They were being asked to watch a short video clip and then evaluate it using the scales provided. Participants were told not to think too much about their answers on the survey, and that their instinctive, honest, and initial responses to the items would be the most useful in making these decisions.

Following these instructions, each group of participants was shown a single videotaped appeal lasting approximately one minute. At the end of the message, the participants were instructed to complete the survey. Once all surveys had been completed, the surveys were collected and the participants were debriefed as to the actual intent of the research.

Preparation of Messages

Each videotaped message contained an actor making a short emotional appeal about drinking and driving. This topic was selected for the research based on the perception that participants would not find the topic out of the ordinary, and that the cover story would seem plausible. Four acting students (two males, two females) who had prior theatre experience were hired to perform the appeals on videotape. The appeal was classified a priori by the researcher as either a vulnerable (i.e., sadness or guilt) or a competitive (i.e., anger) emotional appeal. In an effort to increase the generalizability of this study, five

different messages were used for each emotion type rather than relying on a single

message instantiation. These messages were created by the author and based on appeals

found at a number of MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving) and SADD (Students

Against Drunk Driving) websites. Each of the actors performed all of the scripted

messages, resulting in a total of 40 different videotaped messages. The texts of the 10

emotional appeal messages used (5 representing vulnerable emotions and 5 reflecting

competitive emotions) can be found in Appendix A.

Ratings of Expectancies

Degree and direction of perceived expectancy violation or confirmation following

the viewing of the messages was measured using several 7-point semantic differential scale

items developed by the researcher. These items were used to measure a number of

different dimensions: predictive expectancy, prescriptive expectancy, and valence. For the

expectancy measures, a "1" indicated unexpectedness while a "7" indicated a high degree

of expectedness. Predictive expectancies, or the degree to which certain behavior has a

general tendency to occur, was measured using a six semantic differential items consisting

of the following adjective pairs: expected-unexpected; predictable-surprising; normal-

different; typical-unique; usual-unusual; and common-uncommon. The scale for

measuring predictive expectancy was found to possess an alpha reliability of .90.

Prescriptive expectancies, or the degree to which a given behavior is judged as appropriate

or not, was assessed by two items: acceptable-unacceptable, and appropriate-inappropriate

(α=.82). The means of these two scales were averaged to form a total expectancy score

on which most of the initial analyses associated with the first wave of data collection were

based. For the tests of the first two hypotheses, expectancy scores were averaged across all message types of a given emotional appeal, resulting in a single mean for a given emotional appeal type (i.e., vulnerable or competitive). Finally, valence was assessed using four adjective pairs including positive-negative, effective-ineffective, good-bad, and harmful-helpful in a 7-point semantic differential format. In this case, the lower the score, the more negative the evaluation. The reliability associated with the valence scale was the lowest of the group but still within acceptable limits with an $\alpha=.73$.

<div align="center">Wave Two</div>

Participants

Participants for the second and final wave of data collection were 352 undergraduate students who were primarily upper-division communication majors enrolled in various courses in the communication department. One hundred sixty-four males and 188 females were surveyed in this wave of the data collection. Ages ranged from 18-35, with a mean of 20.63 years (SD: 2.03). The sample was predominantly Caucasian (86.9%), with 7.4% identifying themselves as African-American, 2.0% as Hispanic/Latino, 1.4% as Asian, and .6% as Pacific Islander. Another 1.7% either did not indicate their ethnicity or indicated that they identified themselves as members of an ethnic group not represented on the survey instrument.

Students were recruited to participate in the data collection in one of two ways. The primary method of data collection involved gaining access to a number of undergraduate public speaking communication courses. The instructors of record were approached and asked for permission to take approximately 15 minutes of class time in which to conduct

the research. If they agreed to the request, then a time was scheduled based on their convenience. On the appointed day, the researcher went to the class. Students were told that, as consumers of communication research, it sometimes fell to them to serve as subjects for ongoing research projects. Additionally, they would receive extra credit for their participation in this research. They were then thanked for their understanding and effort prior to the data collection.

Power

For the hypotheses associated with the second wave of data collection, the goal was to collect a sample large enough to allow for a high probability of finding at least large effects that may exist in the population. The selection of the large effect criteria was based upon the constraining factor of a limited sample population from which to draw the respondents. Initial power estimates indicated that in order to achieve a power = .80, a sample size of 26 cases in each group would be required (Cohen, 1969). Unfortunately, this cell size was not attained in all conditions. The smallest comparative cell size was 20, sufficient for a power = .70 and at least a 70% probability of finding such differences in the sample if they did in fact exist.

Procedure

Once seated, participants were given the pretest instrument and instructed to fill out the first page consisting of demographic and attitudinal information. Once all of the participants had completed this task, the participants were told that the Department of Communication had been asked by the university to put together a public service announcement aimed at reducing the amount of drinking and driving incidents on campus.

The public service announcement would be aired on the local university cable channel. Participants were told that they were about to see a "rough cut" of the PSA, and that the purpose of the research was to gain some initial feedback into the effectiveness of the message/PSA design. Participants were warned that the PSA was a work "in progress," and that they would be primarily seeing a university logo and hearing a voice-over for most of the message, and that appropriate sound and graphics would be added later. It was at this point that the participants received the rewardingness manipulation. The individual classes were told something about the source of the message they were about to see, and either received the high rewardingness manipulation or the low rewardingness manipulation (see "Manipulation of Source Rewardingness" later in this section for a detailed description). Participants were then asked to complete the last section on the pretest survey containing the manipulation check. There was, however, one clarification that was made to the participants prior to their completing the manipulation check. The participants were told that, in responding to the statements rating the spokesperson, the 'spokesperson' referred not to the voice over or to the researcher, but to the person they would see in the short video clip. The text of the manipulation may be found in Appendix B. All pretest surveys were collected after the manipulation check was completed.

Participants were shown a single videotaped message which contained both the core mock public service announcement (which was constant across emotion conditions) and an imbedded emotional appeal segment. The videotape lasted approximately two minutes. At the end of the videotaped public service announcement, participants were instructed to complete the posttest measures assessing attitude change, as well as secondary measures

of appeal expectedness, valence, and perceived persuasive efficacy. Once all surveys had

been completed, the surveys were collected and the participants were debriefed as to the

actual intent of the research, and were instructed not to share any information about what

the research experience entailed until a specified date.

Preparation of Emotional Appeal Messages

Originally, the messages used in the second wave of data collection were intended to

be classified a priori as expectancy violations or confirmations based on the analysis of the

Wave 1 data and previous research which argued that certain emotional appeals used by

specific sources should violate cultural-level expectations (Brody & Hall, 1993; Ekman &

Friesen, 1975; Johnson & Shulman, 1988). However, the analysis of the Wave 1 data

described a wide variability across message variants, between confederates within variants,

and between predictive expectancies and valence within variants. This variability was so

inconsistent as to render it impossible to (a) conclude that vulnerable emotions would

always be seen as a violation for male actors and competitive appeals would always

constitute a violation for female actors and therefore (b) select four message variants for

the Wave 2 analysis that would cleanly test the third and fourth hypotheses without

confounding the manipulation of emotion type and the confirmation and violation of

expectations. As a result of the inability to identify four messages that would allow for an

unbiased test of hypotheses 3 and 4, the second phase of this research opted instead to test

violations and confirmations of predictive expectancies and valence (an indicator of

prescriptive expectancies) within variants. Measures of prescriptive expectancies were

operationalized based on valence scores.

The selection of the message pairs was predicated upon the analysis of the Wave 1 results that are reported in the results section. The pairs of messages to be tested were selected to have the largest differences available from the Wave 1 ratings without confounding variant with confederate. As reported in the Wave 1 results, only one pair of messages was found to be significantly different, although two other message pairs approached significance in terms of differences. Ultimately, four pairs of messages were selected to represent confirmation or violation of prescriptive and predictive expectancies (as indicated by valence). For testing predictive expectancies, the confederate/variant combinations of the first male confederate giving vulnerable variants 2 (high predictive expectancy) and 4 (low predictive expectancy) will be tested in one analysis, while the first female confederate performing competitive variants 2 (higher predictive expectancy) and 1 (lower predictive expectancy) will be tested in the second analysis. Similarly, prescriptive expectancies will be tested by comparing competitive variants 2 (positively valenced) and 4 (negatively valenced) by the first male confederate, while the final analysis will be conducted on the messages consisting of the first female confederate's vulnerable variants 5 (more positively valenced) and 2 (less positively valenced). In the case of the second wave of data collection, valence was assessed using the same four adjective pairs as utilized in Wave 1, but the values were switched so that the higher the valence score, the more negative the evaluation. Appendix C provides the specific texts of the emotional appeals used in the second wave of data collection.

Once the desired messages had been selected, new videotapes of the public service announcements were created. Because the original actors had graduated and were no

longer available, it was decided to use a format wherein the PSA would consist of an

innocuous university logo with a voice-over of the original message, supplemented only

with the desired video clip inserted at the appropriate point. The voice over material was

recorded digitally in a broadcasting facility, and was read by the researcher in as neutral a

voice as possible. The university logo was added in the broadcast editing facility, and

eight copies of the base PSA message were produced. Then, the eight selected message

variants to be used for the second wave of data analysis were edited into the videotapes,

thus completing the creation of the PSA variants. The resulting messages were identical in

form and content except for the inclusion of the specified emotional appeal from the Wave

1 data. The base text of the PSA may be found in Appendix D.

Manipulation of Source Rewardingness

Participants were told that the spokesperson was either a devoted, involved local

university student who had volunteered generously of his/her own free time on a number

of occasions to help with this cause and who was helping the university to address this

problem (high-reward source), or a local, relatively anonymous community college student

(low-reward source). It is believed that the perception of local ties to the spokesperson

and a sense of shared identity, similarity and concern with the university should increase

audience perceptions of source rewardingness. A lack of such identification, coupled with

the suggestion that the spokesperson is associated with a " local community college"

should ideally establish a sense of low reward value for such a speaker. The manipulation

concluded with a stipulation that the rewardingness description pertained to the person

that they were about to see in the short video clip, not to the narrator doing the voice over or to the researcher collecting the data.

As a manipulation check, participants were asked to respond to five Likert-style items after receiving the manipulation. The items included "the message I receive from this spokesperson should be interesting", "the message I receive from this spokesperson should be worthwhile", "this spokesperson sounds well qualified to speak on this topic", "this information will probably be beneficial to me", and "this person sounds like a trustworthy source of information." Agreement with the items was indicated with a score of "1", while disagreement was indicated by a score of "5". Although it may be argued that these particular items appear to assess source credibility rather than a more global notion of perceived rewardingness, the nature of addressing cultural level expectations by definition excludes idiosyncratic or relational bases of determining rewardingness. That is to say, the purpose of this research is to examine broad cultural level expectations associated with the use of emotional appeals, not personally derived expectations. In turn, a conceptualization of rewardingness was necessary that did not depend on prior knowledge of the source or personal preferences and biases in judging rewardingness. Thus, rewardingness in this study was operationalized as source credibility. This scale was found to be reliable at $\alpha = .89$.

The manipulation check indicated that participants viewed the high-reward source ($M=2.14$, $SD=.84$; range=1 to 5.8) significantly more positively than the low reward source ($M=3.51$, $SD=1.12$; range=1 to 6.8), $t(328.618)=13.04$, p<.001.

<u>Dependent Measures</u>

<u>Persuasive efficacy</u>. Likert-scale items measuring participants' attitudes toward the topic following the PSAs were compared to the initial measures of attitude toward the topic as identified in the pretest. Specifically, items geared to assess the perceived severity of the problem as well as the respondent's willingness to contribute time, money and effort toward the cause were used to operationalize attitude toward the topic. The items used consisted of "I, personally, am willing to give my time to help prevent this problem", "I, personally, am willing to give a donation to help prevent this problem", and "I, personally, am willing to do something about this problem." Respondents used a 7-point Likert scale to respond to these items, with "1" indicating strong agreement and "7" indicating strong disagreement with the statement. The reliabilities associated with this three-item scale is reported at $\alpha = .84$ for the pretest measures and $\alpha = .88$ for the posttest measures. Pretest scores were subtracted from posttest scores to yield degree of attitude change. Positive means associated with attitude change could then be interpreted as attitudes becoming stronger with regard to the behavioral/attitudinal objective, means around zero signified little to no attitude change, and negative means indicated a boomerang effect where posttest attitudes were further from the desired behavioral objective than the pretest attitudes.

<u>Valence</u>. The same four semantic differential scale items used in Wave 1 to assess valence (i.e., positive-negative, effective-ineffective, good-bad, and helpful-harmful) were utilized in the Wave 2 data collection. It is important to note that prescriptive expectancy

was operationalized as valence for the Wave 2 analyses. The reliability associated with the

valence scale increased to $\alpha = .79$ for the second wave of data analysis.

CHAPTER THREE

RESULTS

Wave One

The first two hypotheses tested in this research were intended to confirm that

cultural-level expectancies regarding the use of vulnerable and competitive emotional

appeals by males and females existed as suggested by prior research (e.g., (Brody & Hall,

1993; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Johnson & Shulman, 1988). It was predicted that males

using vulnerable appeals would be more unexpected than females using similar appeals,

and females using competitive appeals would be seen as less typical and more unexpected

than males using the same kind of appeals. A 2 (M/F) x 2 (Vulnerable/ Competitive

Emotion) x 2 (Confederate) x 5 (Message variant) ANOVA was run, treating the message

variant factor as a random factor and the others as fixed factors. The dependent measure

was predictive expectancies on the first analysis and valence (a measure of prescriptive

expectancies) on the second analysis. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure

indicated a significant interaction between Actor Sex and Confederate ($F(1,4)$=14.47,

p=.019, η^2=.04), and a significant main effect for Emotion type, $F(1,4)$=67.38, p=.001,

η^2=.03 when using predictive expectancies as the dependent measure. There were no

significant findings for prescriptive expectancies (e.g., valence), either in terms of

interactions or main effects. The significant interaction effect between actor sex and

confederate, combined with a lack of differences in prescriptive expectancies, prompted an

alteration in the Wave 2 data analysis (see Wave 2 Results, discussed below).

The first hypothesis predicted that men using emotional appeals based on vulnerability (i.e., sadness or guilt) would be rated as more unexpected than women using the same appeals. Similarly, the second hypothesis predicted that females using emotional appeals based on competition (i.e., anger) would be rated as more unexpected than males using similar appeals. Unfortunately, due to the significant higher order interaction between Actor Sex and Confederate, the test of the main effect for Actor Sex as called for in the wording of the hypotheses could not be meaningfully interpreted, resulting in an inability to confirm or disconfirm the stated hypotheses.

The confederate/message variant combinations from the Wave 1 data analysis that yielded the most unexpected ratings in the male/vulnerable and female/competitive conditions, as well as a negative evaluation of the unexpectedness, were originally intended to be used to operationalize expectancy violation and confirmation. However, due to the confounds between actor sex and confederate, it was impossible select four message variants (two within each emotion type) that varied only on predictive expectancies while holding message text variant, valence, and confederate constant. This variability in the dependent measures based on confederates, as well as the nonparallel findings between predictive expectancies and valence, rendered the initial plan of selecting combinations of actor sex and message variant as representations of expectancy confirmation and violation unworkable. Thus a valid test of the third and fourth hypotheses forwarded in the rationale was impossible, so an alternative analysis was undertaken in an attempt to test expectancies where confederate and actor sex was held constant.

Pairs of messages were selected on the basis of possessing the largest differences in expectancies available from the Wave 1 ratings without confounding variant with confederate (see Tables 1 and 2 below). Four pairs of messages were selected to represent confirmation or violation of prescriptive and predictive expectancies, allowing a series of 2x2 experiments to test the degree of attitude change associated with high and low expectedness of messages and source rewardingness. First, the male confederate was examined, and then the female confederate. The first Confederate/Message Variant combination consisted of the first male confederate giving vulnerable variants 2 and 4. The differences in the predictive expectancies associated with these two messages approached significance, $t(8)=2.07$, p=.072, r=.59 with variant 2 being more expected (M=4.70, SD=.87) and variant 4 being less expected (M=3.27, SD=1.28). The second pair of messages consisted of the first female confederate performing competitive variants 2 and 1, where competitive variant 2 appeared to have a higher degree of expectedness (M=4.67, SD=1.31) than variant 1 (M=3.60, SD=.71). However, the difference was not significant ($t(8)$=1.60, p=.149, r=.49. The third set of messages paired competitive variants 2 and 4 performed by the first male confederate. These messages were found to be significantly different in terms of prescriptive expectancy/valence, $t(8)$=2.68, p=.028, r=.69, where variant 2 (M=4.75, SD=.73) was rated as being more positively valenced than variant 4 (M=3.40, SD=.86). The final message pair consisted of the first female confederate's vulnerable variants 5 and 2. The difference in the valence associated with these messages approached significance, $t(8)$=2.08, p=.071, r=.59; Variant 5: M=5.35, SD=.29; Variant 2: M=4.45, SD=.93). In subsequent analyses, higher or more favorable

Table 1

Total Expectancy and Valence Means (Standard Deviations) of the
Vulnerable Message Variants by Source

Source of Message

		M1	M2	F1	F2
VULNERABLE EMOTION					
Vulnerable Variant 1					
EXPECTANCY	Mean (SD)	4.82 (.98)	5.05 (1.29)	5.33 (.21)	5.13 (.53)
	N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE	Mean (SD)	3.95 (.84)	3.95 (.82)	4.30 (.80)	4.25 (.64)
	N size	5	5	5	5
Vulnerable Variant 2					
EXPECTANCY	Mean (SD)	5.07 (1.46)	5.30 (.54)	5.28 (.71)	4.38 (2.01)
	N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE	Mean (SD)	4.15 (.88)	4.25 (1.44)	4.45 (.93)	5.35 (.89)
	N size	5	5	5	5
Vulnerable Variant 3					
EXPECTANCY	Mean (SD)	5.00 (.62)	4.20 (1.06)	4.77 (.76)	5.28 (1.01)
	N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE	Mean (SD)	5.25 (.90)	4.25 (1.09)	4.20 (.48)	4.05 (.54)
	N size	5	5	5	5
Vulnerable Variant 4					
EXPECTANCY	Mean (SD)	3.82 (1.42)	4.28 (1.26)	5.60 (.96)	5.77 (.42)
	N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE	Mean (SD)	4.40 (1.33)	5.15 (.82)	4.30 (1.41)	5.25 (.77)
	N size	5	5	5	5
Vulnerable Variant 5					
EXPECTANCY	Mean (SD)	4.90 (.73)	4.63 (1.40)	5.60 (.76)	4.68 (.90)
	N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE	Mean (SD)	4.50 (1.77)	4.75 (1.60)	5.35 (.29)	3.35 (1.55)
	N size	5	5	5	5

Table 2

Total Expectancy and Valence Means and Standard Deviations of the Competitive Message Variants by Source

Source of Message

	M1	M2	F1	F2
COMPETITIVE EMOTION				
Competitive Variant 1				
EXPECTANCY Mean (SD)	4.48 (1.31)	3.15 (1.61)	3.70 (.68)	4.27 (1.13)
N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE Mean (SD)	4.75 (.75)	3.00 (1.35)	4.20 (.86)	3.05 (1.20)
N size	5	5	5	5
Competitive Variant 2				
EXPECTANCY Mean (SD)	4.95 (.95)	4.48 (.66)	4.73 (.99)	4.58 (1.09)
N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE Mean (SD)	4.75 (.73)	4.45 (.62)	4.50 (.90)	4.45 (1.01)
N size	5	5	5	5
Competitive Variant 3				
EXPECTANCY Mean (SD)	5.20 (.80)	4.08 (1.15)	3.57 (.56)	3.52 (.98)
N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE Mean (SD)	4.75 (1.41)	4.05 (.82)	4.10 (.80)	3.60 (1.07)
N size	5	5	5	5
Competitive Variant 4				
EXPECTANCY Mean (SD)	4.63 (.51)	4.32 (1.23)	3.43 (.99)	3.30 (.89)
N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE Mean (SD)	3.40 (.86)	3.70 (1.50)	3.35 (.68)	3.60 (1.36)
N size	5	5	5	5
Competitive Variant 5				
EXPECTANCY Mean (SD)	5.87 (.44)	4.00 (1.06)	4.30 (1.44)	4.10 (1.83)
N size	5	5	5	5
VALENCE Mean (SD)	5.75 (.31)	3.90 (1.21)	5.10 (1.74)	3.95 (1.34)
N size	5	5	5	5

scores were considered to indicate confirmation of expectations, and lower or unfavorable scores violations of expectations.

Wave Two

The redesigned Wave Two analyses tested violations and confirmations of predictive and prescriptive expectancies separately and how they interacted with source rewardingness to affect persuasive outcomes. These tests were performed within male and then female confederates, as well as type of expectancy violation. These tests utilized 2 x 2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).

Violations of Predictive Expectancies

The first ANOVA tested the effects of source rewardingness and predictive expectancy violation/confirmation on attitude change associated with the male confederate. There was no significant interaction between predictive expectancy condition and source rewardingness, $F(1,76)=.702$, $p=.40$, $\eta^2=.01$. Hence, it appears that rewardingness and expectancy confirmation or violation, at least with regard to predictive expectancies associated with a male confederate, has no effect on degree of attitude change.

The second ANOVA focused on testing the effects of source rewardingness and predictive expectancy on attitude change for the female confederate. Once again, no significant interaction between predictive expectancy and source rewardingness was found, $F(1,94)=.08$, $p=.78$, $\eta^2=.001$.

Violations of Prescriptive Expectancies

The third and fourth ANOVAs tested the effects of source rewardingness and prescriptive expectancy condition on attitude change. For the male confederate, no significant interaction emerged for source rewardingness and expectancy condition ($F(1,79)$=1.06, p=.30, η^2=.01; High Reward/Positive Valence M=.38, SD=.88; High Reward/Negative Valence M=.02, SD=.63; Low Reward/Positive Valence M=.23, SD=.46; and Low Reward/Negative Valence M=.18, SD=.67). For the female confederate, the findings were similar; no significant interaction existed between rewardingness condition and confirmation/violation of prescriptive expectancies ($F(1,87)$=.05, p=.82, η^2=.001; High Reward/More Positive Valence M= -.03, SD=.80; High Reward/Less Positive Valence M= -.18, SD=1.36; Low Reward/More Positive Valence M=.12, SD=.96; and Low Reward/Less Positive Valence M=.06, SD=.83).

Relative Contribution of Expectancy Type

The final problem statement posed in this research asked the question of whether ratings of persuasive efficacy were more closely linked with violations of predictive expectancies or prescriptive expectancies. To address this question, two correlations were run for each 2 x 2 design testing the relationship between attitude change and predictive expectancies, and then prescriptive expectancies. In the pair of messages pitting high and low predictive expectancies against each other for the male confederate, there were no significant correlations found between attitude change and predictive (r= .07, p=.55) or prescriptive expectancies (r= -.05, p= .70). The results were similarly nonsignificant for the female confederate (predictive expectancies: r=.10, p= .33; prescriptive expectancies:

r= -.17, p=.10). In the prescriptive expectancy tests, predictive expectancy was found to be significantly correlated with attitude change for males (r=.26, p=.017), suggesting that as messages become more predictively expected (i.e., more typical and/or commonplace), attitude change in relation to those messages increases. The correlation between prescriptive expectancies and attitude change for the male confederate approached significance (r= -.21, p=.053). For the female confederate, no significant interactions were found between expectancies and attitude change (predictive expectancies: r=-.11, p= .28; prescriptive expectancies: r= -.05, p=.66). Hence, predictive expectancies would appear to be the only type of expectancy significantly associated with attitude change, and then only in the case of male sources violating prescriptive expectancies.

CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSION

The primary objective of this research was to investigate whether the principles of Expectancy Violations Theory could be applied to the study of persuasive emotional appeals so as to gain an alternative interpretation of the persuasive efficacy of affective messages in the social influence process. This research argued that an expectancy violations approach can make a distinct contribution to the study of communication by providing a means of distinguishing between emotion-manifesting communication and emotion-inducing communication as they relate to the use of persuasive appeals. In turn, this approach may yield knowledge about how different kinds of emotional appeals can be used more effectively to produce persuasion from a communication perspective.

Central to this approach is the assumption that certain culturally-based norms guiding the expression of emotion exist at a societal level, and that the violations of these expectancy norms carry implications for the efficacy of persuasive attempts. Specifically, the tenets of EVT suggest that when these violations occur, message recipients will look to the perceived rewardingness of the source of the message, and then interpret the violations as positive or negative. In labeling these violations as positive or negative, message recipients may then become more susceptible (in the case of positive violations) or less susceptible (in the case of negative violations) to persuasion attempts.

In an effort to test the relationships between expectations, source rewardingness and persuasive efficacy, three primary objectives were undertaken. First, this research had to establish whether cultural-level expectations regarding the use of emotional appeals

existed as suggested by previous (although limited) research. Second, the relationship between expectancy confirmations and violations and valence was explored. Third and finally, the relationships between expectancy confirmation and violation, source rewardingness, and persuasive efficacy were investigated within male and then female confederates.

Summary of Research Findings

Unfortunately, the effort to test the predictions suggested by EVT in this research fell short in a number of areas, preventing a clear test of the relationships between violations of expectancies with regard to the use of emotional appeals and degree of attitude change. Due to a number of methodological confounds in the design of the emotional messages themselves, this study could not provide a fair test of the predictions suggested by EVT. Most noticeably, the significant confederate by actor sex interaction describes a context wherein expectancy violation or confirmation was idiosyncratic to the confederates, which is inconsistent both with the premises of EVT as well as the hypotheses stated in this research. It must be acknowledged that this research failed to find a norm of emotional displays that was consistent across all four confederates utilized in this research. Instead, this research was forced to resort to secondary analyses within confederates in an attempt to explore the relationships between source rewardingness and message expectedness on attitude change.

While this discussion initially focuses on the meager (and relatively meaningless) findings extracted from this project, it will also consider the confounds in designing messages that were intended to violate emotional norms that proved to be so problematic.

The difficulty in producing believable emotional appeals was neither surprising nor unexpected; the literature reviewed for this study discussed in some length the difficulty of both defining and measuring emotional displays in a reliable manner. Unfortunately, despite the knowledge that emotional appeals are inherently complex multidimensional messages and awareness of the difficulties associated with producing such messages, the operationalization of the appeals in this research failed to control for a number of factors that may have influenced the interpretation of the emotional displays, specifically problems associated with the confederate-specific expectancies possibly associated with attractiveness, verbal message features used to emphasize emotional content, and possible emotion confounds.

The Role of Expectancies

The first goal of this research was to establish whether or not cultural-level expectations regarding source sex and the use of emotional appeals existed as suggested by previous research. The results of this study imply little existence of meaningful cultural-level expectations regarding the use of emotional appeals used by men and women. There was no evidence to suggest that people hold consistently different prescriptive expectations of men and women with regard to cultural-level emotional display rules. This research would seem to suggest that although people may hold expectations with regard to what is generally considered to be typical usage of emotional appeals by males and females, the distinction between sexes does not necessarily translate into clear judgments about the appropriateness associated with such behaviors. Further evidence of this lack of consistency is found in the idiosyncratic confederate effects

discussed earlier. In one sense, it would appear to be considered typical behavior (i.e.,

confirming expectations) for one female to use a competitive appeal whereas another

female would be violating expectations if she used the same type of appeal. This could be

due to changing cultural norms associated with attempts to diminish sex-role stereotypes

by certain individuals, or it may be that expectancies of appropriateness exist at a more

personal or idiosyncratic/relational level as opposed to a cultural level. Staines and Libby

(1986) point out that although predictive and prescriptive expectancies often coincide,

they are not necessarily correlated. It is certainly possible that an unexpected behavior

may be seen as entirely appropriate (such as when a person known for an aggressive sales

pitch makes a friendly, nonconfrontational approach), while an expected behavior might be

interpreted as unacceptable (as in the instance of a person responding in anger to a simple

request). One possible source of these differing perceptions may have been based on

differences in perceived attractiveness between the confederates.

Attractiveness

One area of concern is the potential confound between confederate attractiveness

and the rewardingness manipulation. As described in the methods section, participants

were provided an introduction to and description of the spokesperson without any kind of

supporting visual data in the Wave Two data collection. Hence, participants were asked

to evaluate the rewardingness manipulation based solely on what they were told about the

spokesperson. It could very well be that the actors' appearance in the videotape may have

overridden the rewardingness manipulation. It must be noted, however, that this is

speculation, as no measures of attractiveness were collected for the confederates.

Attractive individuals are often seen as more rewarding than unattractive sources (e.g.,

Burgoon & Hale, 1988), and the physical appearance of the actors used here may have

contradicted the brief rewardingness manipulation.

Furthermore, once the participants saw the spokesperson on videotape, their

impression of the rewardingness of the speaker may have been re-evaluated based on the

visual image of the spokesperson. This is likely, especially considering the limited amount

of information the participants received about the spokesperson. This reassessment may

have occurred quickly and not even consciously with regard to the participant's

awareness. Ambady and Rosenthal (1992; 1993) argue that people's impressions about

others can form very rapidly from very short exposure to nonverbal information. Indeed,

Ambady and Rosenthal explain that these "thin slices" of nonverbal behavior may be as

short as 2 seconds in length and still significantly affect impression formation processes

about the person being viewed. In the case of this research, it is entirely possible – and

even likely – that, coupled with the potentially high degree of uncertainty associated with

the limited descriptions in the rewardingness manipulations, participants may have

independently reassessed the rewardingness of the spokesperson based on attractiveness

and/or other nonverbal cues portrayed by the actors in an effort to reduce the ambiguity

associated with the manipulation, and in doing so formed an impression about the

predicted persuasive success of the actor prior to receiving the emotional appeal.

Ambady and Rosenthal's (1992; 1993) work on thin slices of behavior suggests a

means to prevent similar confounds in the future. If indeed impressions can form as

quickly as two to five seconds as suggested by Ambady and Rosenthal, then it would be

prudent to gather pretest attractiveness ratings from the participants after seeing a visual

depiction of the actor prior to the experimental manipulation. Such a limited exposure to

the visual image of the actor should be sufficient to gain initial attractiveness ratings and

yet not confound idiosyncratic expectancies based on attractiveness with cultural-level

expectancies based on sex differences with regard to the use of emotional appeals. This

would provide a more realistic rewardingness manipulation while simultaneously reducing

uncertainty about the spokesperson.

Verbal Message Features

Beyond attractiveness, the behavior of the confederates may have affected

evaluations of behavior as being expected or unexpected. In the attempt to script

messages that portrayed the desired vulnerable and competitive emotions, it may be that a

number of textual message features used to enhance or intensify the emotion portrayed in

the appeal may have been confounded with the desired emotions. First, mild profanity was

used in some of the competitive emotional appeal scripts to intensify the displayed

emotion. Previous research has identified that males and females have different

bandwidths associated with the use of language intensity, especially with regard to the use

of profane or obscene language (e.g., M. Burgoon & Stewart, 1974). Hence, it may be

that the variability in the expectedness ratings may have been due to the intensity of the

language used, the emotion displayed, or some combination of both.

Similarly, some language elements such as the use of first person pronouns in some

of the variants may have increased perceptions of verbal involvement in some of the

message variants but not for others. The use of such pronouns may have created or

suggested a greater degree of immediacy between the source of the message and the viewer, thus altering the perceived intensity of the emotional portrayal. Cappella (1983) notes that when people perceive others to be highly involved in interactions with them, emotional responses to the interaction tend to be more intense, regardless if the emotion is valenced positively or negatively. Similarly, perceptions of low-involvement yield less intense emotional responses. As stated by Cappella (1983, p. 117) "involvement and intensity of subjectively felt emotions go hand in hand." It is entirely possible that the inconsistent use of first person pronouns between the message variants may have inadvertently introduced additional variance into the appeals above and beyond that which could be attributed to the emotional displays themselves. Future attempts to study emotional appeals should rely most heavily on the nonverbal portrayal of the emotion to convey the intensity of the emotion, as opposed to using language features to accomplish or accentuate similar ends. However, care must be taken with nonverbal emotional cues, as some of them have multiple meanings. This could introduce yet another source of potential variation in the designed messages.

Discrete Versus Mixed Emotions

The final potential confound that may have affected participant's expectations is the issue of whether or not the message variants used in this research portray a single discrete emotion or a compound (or mixed) emotion. As discussed earlier, there are a number of opposing schools of thought as to how to best classify and define emotions. Some researchers (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Izard, 1977) argue that emotions are most effectively studied as discrete phenomenon and that clear

distinctions exist between different types of emotion. Other researchers (e.g., Daly et al., 1983; Frijda et al., 1992) maintain that emotions are best conceptualized as occurring in a multidimensional space that lacks clear boundaries between different types of emotion. From this perspective there exists an infinite number of shades and variations of emotional experience that defy categorization to a limited number of discrete categories.

Whether emotions are best defined in terms of discrete categories or on a number of different dimensions, the question arises as to whether the emotions portrayed in this research were consistently defined as vulnerable or competitive within the same message variant, or whether multiple emotion types might have been present in the performance of a given variant. The question exists of whether it is even possible to create "pure" emotion-type messages. Fortunately, this research progressed from the operationalization of loosely defined groups of vulnerable and competitive appeals, and the derived messages can be readily described as belonging to one of those two classes. However, it would be a far more difficult task to defend a specific emotional appeal as being a representative message of sadness, pride, anger or guilt. The criteria for what constitutes a specific emotional display is based on sometimes fleeting verbal or nonverbal cues potentially resulting in differential labeling of the same emotional display, depending upon which cues were observed or processed. More generalized approaches to defining emotions, such as rating emotions globally on dimensions of intensity and valence, have the advantage of providing greater confidence in the broad categorization of such displays but sacrifices specificity and detail in such classifications. From the standpoint of the operationalization of emotional messages, then, it may prove difficult to reliably define the presence and type

of emotional appeals when such a display is fully embedded in the context of communicative interaction.

In retrospect, it would have been both informative and helpful to utilize coders to assess the emotional appeals prior to their use this research in an effort to insure that the desired emotion or emotions were being portrayed. A number of such coding schemes exist, ranging from self-report instruments focusing on identifying emotional experience such as the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) developed by Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) to observation-based coding schemes such as the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). The use of such coding schemes would be beneficial for eliminating confounds in future research, given that coders could confirm that the emotional messages being nonverbally displayed by the confederates were indeed representative of the desired emotions.

Other Methodological Concerns

The strengths of the present study include a focus on enacted emotional appeals as opposed to purely text-based appeals, as well as a focus on both predictive and prescriptive expectancies. However, the research presented here was also beset with weaknesses. In addition to the confounds inherent in the design of the emotional messages discussed above, three other methodological concerns stand out: the scale used to assess valence, the quality of the videotaped stimuli, and the choice of topic for the mock PSAs. Each of these, and their potential effect on the present research, will be discussed in turn.

Concern with the Valence Scale

Clearly, research utilizing the EVT framework is consistent and compelling in its

findings that violations by highly-rewarding sources are associated with positive outcomes

while violations by low reward sources are associated with negative outcomes (e.g.,

Burgoon, 1978, 1991; Burgoon & Hale, 1988; Burgoon & Le Poire, 1993; Burgoon, Le

Poire & Rosenthal, 1995; Floyd & Voloudakis, 1999). Although recent research has

hinted that, in some cases, negative violations may confer more positive outcomes than

merely confirming expectancies, such findings appear to be limited to situations in which

the valence of the violation is somewhat ambiguous and the source of the message is seen

as possessing positive communicator qualities (Burgoon & Burgoon, in press; Burgoon &

Le Poire, 1993). Hence, the inability to find confirming evidence for the assumptions

underlying EVT in this instance should have had less to do with theoretical issues and

more to do with the methodological weaknesses inherent in this study.

First, there may be some question as to the validity associated with the valence scale

used in this study. Although the reported reliability was low but acceptable ($\alpha=.73-.78$),

there was some confusion expressed by a few of the participants during the second wave

of data collection as to what the semantic differential items were referring to. It is

possible that participants became confused about what aspect of the message they were

supposed to be evaluating. For example, it was apparent in some responses that indicating

"good", "positive" or "helpful" was perceived to be a judgment about the *goals* of the

persuasive effort rather than the message itself. In other words, some respondents may

have interpreted the scales to suggest that additional public service announcements and

persuasive messages about drinking and driving were "a good idea" while ignoring the

content of the messages themselves. It is also worth noting that the means for valence in

both the high and low rewardingness conditions were slightly below the median of the

scale (High Reward M=3.38, SD=1.14; Low Reward M=3.61, SD=1.21), suggesting that

the discriminating power of the scale was less than optimal. It is therefore possible that

something other than the valence associated with the emotional appeal and the source (and

consequently, the violation) may have been inadvertently measured.

Videotape Quality

Another factor that may have inadvertently impacted measures of persuasive efficacy

and valence was the nature of the videotapes used as the stimulus. Although care was

taken in the production of the videotapes in an effort to control for sources of extraneous

variance, the PSAs themselves were clearly not that effective. Even though the logo and

voice-over were broadcast quality, the scripting of the tape with nothing but a logo and a

voice-over may have failed to engage the participants. An attempt was made to explain

the lack of graphics as a desire to focus on the message itself (as described in Appendix

D), but the video may not have been taken as seriously as it might have been because of its

'unfinished' feel. In one sense, these videotapes should not have affected the

rewardingness manipulation, since the manipulation was conducted prior to viewing the

videotape; however, the relative monotony of the videotape may have negatively affected

overall perceptions of the PSAs, thus producing biased measures of valence and

persuasive efficacy. The videotape may also have overridden the manipulation of source

rewardingness. Burgoon, Walther, and Baesler (1992) warned that some types of

communication style differences during interaction might override initial communicator

valence (rewardingness) inductions. In this case, the manipulation check, carried out prior

to exposure to the videotape, may not have accurately reflected respondent's perception

of source rewardingness following the viewing of the message. If the quality of the

videotape negatively impacted perceptions of source rewardingness, then it may also have

negatively affected the attitude change associated with the message. Hence, the degree of

attitude change may have been mediated by the videotape quality.

Topical Choice for the Stimulus

The final limitation noted here is in regard to the choice of an anti-drinking and

driving campaign as the vehicle for this experiment. As noted previously, this topic was

selected on the basis that it would appear to be a legitimate campaign effort undertaken on

behalf of the university and would not arouse suspicion as a stimulus. However, in

retrospect, the topic may have been a little too common. A potential problem of

oversaturation may have occurred. Students are constantly exposed to anti-drinking and

driving messages in fraternities and sororities, public speaking classes, freshman

orientations, leadership conferences, and on-campus organizations. This may have

affected these results in three ways. First, the students' familiarity with the topic and

exposure to numerous anti-drinking and driving messages would inevitably lead them to

compare the experimental messages with other campaign messages they have seen

designed to alter their drinking and driving behavior. Given their brevity and lack of

'polish', the experimental messages simply would not compare favorably with other

similar types of campaign messages. The likely effect of this negative comparison would

be an overall negative perception of the experimental ads, thus making it far less likely for these messages to prompt attitude change in the desired direction.

Second, because of the prevalence of these various efforts, students may have been predisposed to provide ongoing 'encouragement' for such efforts (hence the high valence means explored in the discussion section) while at the same time harboring mild frustration and boredom with the topic due to the repetitive nature of the campaigns experienced. For instance, at one point during the collection of the Wave 2 data, the university hosted an 'emergency drill' that featured a LifeFlight helicopter landing on campus in response to a mock drinking and driving accident. Either or both of these concerns may have potentially biased participants' responses to the stimulus, such that although students may have felt an obligation to acknowledge that anti-drinking and driving messages were socially desirable (e.g., high valence), these particular PSA's may not have been effective in promoting attitude change.

A final issue more directly related to the research itself is that, due to the commonality associated with the stimulus, there may have been preexisting expectations about what the ads would contain. The emotional appeals contained in the mock PSAs may have been less unexpected than the research demanded, in turn rendering the violations less noticeable. If the operationalizations of the violation messages were not strong enough to stand out in this complex of expectancies (i.e., both cultural-level sex-based expectancies as well as expectancies associated with anti-drinking and driving campaign messages), there may have been an adverse effect on the interpretation of the violations. The violations may not have been seen as violating expectancies associated

with such campaigns, even if the sex-based emotional appeals expectancies were seen as having been violated. This may in part explain the lack of effect for violation condition noted in the research.

Implications for Future Research

Although this research failed to provide a valid test of an EVT interpretation of the persuasive efficacy of emotional appeals, it nevertheless suggests a number of fruitful avenues for future research. First, this research focused solely on cultural-level expectations associated with the use of emotional appeals by men and women. While expectations about the typical or common uses of emotional appeals may be technically violated, these violations may not give rise to the arousal increases normally associated with the violation of norms. Expectancies that exist at an idiosyncratic level may carry more personal meaning than global cultural-level expectancies, and thus may be more strongly linked to persuasion processes. The contextual expectancies that may coincide with communication expectancies should not be ignored. Future research would be well advised to focus on both communication and idiosyncratic expectancies in an effort to better understand the link between expectancy violations and attitude change, especially with regard to the use of emotional appeals.

Furthermore, recent research conducted by Afifi and Burgoon (2000) suggests that there may be more than one kind of violation with regard to expectancies. Afifi and Burgoon explored the concept of congruent versus incongruent violations associated with reduction of uncertainty. Congruent violations are defined as behaviors that differ in intensity from previously observed or expected behaviors, whereas incongruent violations

occur when observed behaviors hold an opposite meaning from previously displayed messages. For example, the current study would be best described as focusing on incongruent violations, where males would be expected to react with one type of emotion while female sources would be expected to react with another, and the 'violation' occurs as a result of seeing a different emotional display than what was expected for the sex type.

Extending these concepts to the study of emotional appeals delineates two possible avenues for future investigation. The first avenue of inquiry might investigate congruent violations, or violations that occur because an observed emotion differs in the intensity of what is expected. One need only look to current social problems such as workplace violence and road rage to find examples of such violations. At some point, it might be expected that cutting someone off while driving might engender an angry response, but when that response greatly exceeds what would be normally considered appropriate, then such a reaction would be considered a congruent violation. On the other hand, if a person were expected to react with anger to being cut off in traffic, and instead a person reacts with an emotion other than anger (i.e., sadness), such a display would be an example of an incongruent violation. The concepts of congruent and incongruent violations as they apply to affective displays suggest an interesting agenda for future research on emotion, as they provide an additional level of description in attempting to understand the impact of violations on attitude change processes.

Second, future research should focus on expanding our understanding of the impact of a variety of emotional appeals on the influence process. This study examined broadly defined categories of vulnerable (including sadness and guilt) and competitive (including

anger and pride) emotions, yet this only begins to address the multitude of emotional appeals that are used on a daily basis. Other research, particularly in the marketing field, has focused on fear appeals, sex appeals (appeals to lust), and humorous appeals in the advertising and selling of products (e.g., Chang & Gruner, 1981; Moog, 1991). Appeals of sympathy, jealousy, joy, hate, and anger are just a few of the affective messages that play a large part in everyday compliance-gaining, yet our understanding of these processes is still limited. Future research needs to focus on increasing our understanding of what constitutes violations in each of these individual emotions, and under what circumstances such violations may occur and with what effect. Knowledge of how different emotions operate similarly or differentially is necessary in order to develop a meaningful theory of emotional influence.

Third, emotional appeals should be studied as classes of representative phenomenon, not as single message instantiations. These tests all depended on single message instantiations of the emotional appeals embedded in the mock PSAs. A representative class of exemplar messages rather than a single message would better test the effects of emotional appeals on the persuasive process as well as improving generalizability, as such an effort would provide greater ecological validity. However, this is much easier said than done. Drawing from the experience encountered in conducting this research, the ability to reliably generate an emotional appeal with all of its attendant verbal and nonverbal components is, at best, a difficult task. Trying to generate multiple messages that fall reliably within a given range of emotion type and intensity while avoiding many of the potential confounds discussed herein is a daunting task indeed. Nevertheless, the use of

single message instantiations by a single individual compounds the problem of generalizing to a larger class of emotional behavior. For instance, the way a female and male portray anger may differ markedly; the female may display anger by a rigid body, folded arms, and a scowl, whereas the male may verbally berate the receiver and/or make threatening gestures. Both instances could be categorized as an anger appeal even though they are different in the portrayal of the emotion. Hence, despite the methodological difficulties, future research should seek to use multiple instantiations of emotional appeals in order to provide a reasonable basis for drawing conclusions about a given type of emotional appeal.

The role emotion plays in the social influence process is complex and multifaceted. Previous research has identified the near-unequaled potential of emotional appeals to foster attitude change, and yet our understanding of how and why emotional appeals work the way they do is still in its infancy. The combination of 'huge potential' and 'little understanding' is always a dangerous one. Expectancy Violations Theory represents an important and theoretically useful tool in helping scholars to better understand the role of emotional appeals in the persuasion process. Emotional communication has received more and more scholarly attention in the recent past, and it seems that researchers are finally beginning to wrestle with the difficult yet important challenges inherent with understanding this significant process of communication.

APPENDIX A

Texts of Emotional Appeal Messages

VULNERABLE MESSAGES (Sadness/Guilt)

1) One night in March, 1999, a fellow classmate of mine was at a party with some friends. He had had a few beers, but didn't think much of it. He told his friends that he felt well enough to drive and "only had a slight buzz." He climbed into his car for the short drive to his apartment. He never made it home. Halfway to his apartment, he failed to stop for a stoplight and was hit by a large truck. He suffered fatal head wounds from which he never recovered. If one of his friends had taken the initiative to prevent him from driving that night, he might still be alive today.

2) I just lost a classmate of mine to a drinking and driving accident. He was at a party, had had a few beers, and insisted he could drive home. He couldn't. He ran a red light, and was killed when a truck hit him going through the intersection. Why didn't I stop him from driving home that night?

3) A fellow classmate of mine was recently killed in a car accident because he thought he was sober enough to drive after a party. He had had a few beers, and joked that he could drive better with a buzz than without one. He may have even thought that as the truck slammed into the side of his car when he failed to stop for a stoplight. He was someone I knew, and he's gone now.

4) How many of us can say that we've killed someone? I can. I was at a party with a guy I knew from some classes we'd had together, and we had both had a few beers. Then he said he needed to get home. I should have known he wasn't sober enough to drive, but I let him go. He's dead now, killed when he ran a red light on the way home. I should have realized he was too drunk to drive. Why didn't I stop him?

5) I lost one of my classmates to a drinking and driving accident. We were at a party, he had drunk a few beers, and then he said he needed to leave. No one stopped him. I didn't stop him. Now he's dead. I can't hang out with him any more, or ever talk to him again. Why did it have to happen?

APPENDIX A -- *Continued*

COMPETITIVE MESSAGES (Anger/Pride)

1) One night in March, 1999, a classmate of mine was at a party with some friends. She had had a few beers, but didn't think much of it. She told her friends that she felt well enough to drive and "only had a slight buzz." She climbed into her car for the short drive to her apartment. She never made it home. Halfway to her apartment, she failed to stop for a stoplight and was hit by a large truck. She suffered head wounds from which she never recovered. If one of her so-called friends had taken the initiative to prevent her from driving that night, she might still be alive today. But they couldn't be bothered, or just didn't care. Damn them!

2) I lost a classmate of mine to a drinking and driving accident. She was at a party, had had a few beers, and insisted she could drive home. Well, she couldn't. She ran a red light, and was killed when a truck hit her going through the intersection. Why the hell didn't someone prevent her from driving home that night? If someone had just taken one moment to think that she wasn't OK to drive, she might still be alive today. But no, they had to turn a blind eye. I can't forgive that kind of selfish behavior.

3) A classmate of mine was recently killed in a car accident because she thought she was sober enough to drive after a party. She had had a few beers, and joked that she could drive better with a buzz than without one. She may have even thought that as the truck slammed into the side of her car when she failed to stop for a stoplight. She was a classmate of mine. Damn it, what the hell was she thinking? Why didn't someone stop her from driving? The WASTE of it just pisses me off!

4) One of my classmates was recently killed in a car accident because she was too drunk to drive. None of the other people at the party apparently cared enough to stop her. No, they just had to pretend that she was fine and could drive home. Assholes! I hold them personally responsible for her death!

5) We can't continue to be blind to the deaths that occur because people who drink and drive think they can make it home, because they've done it in the past. We cannot continue to allow it! We figure it's someone else's responsibility, or that we'll look stupid if we show concern. GET OVER IT. It's OUR responsibility to act, not someone else's. Making excuses is just plain cowardice; allowing it is just plain murder. Don't be a spineless idiot; do what's right!

APPENDIX B

Texts of Rewardingness Manipulation

<u>High Rewardingness Manipulation</u>:

The following public service announcement is part of an ongoing campaign by the Western Illinois University Community to address the ongoing problems associated with students drinking and driving. This 'working draft' of the public service message is being given by (Paul/Paula) Jennison, an honors student here at Western Illinois University who has been actively engaged in Student Government, Students against Drinking and Driving, and community action in the Macomb area and here at the university. (Paul/Paula) has volunteered generously of (his/her) own free time on a number of occasions to help the university address this problem, and has once again volunteered to help us with this project.

<u>Low Rewardingness Manipulation</u>:

The following public service announcement is part of an ongoing campaign by the Western Illinois University Community to address the ongoing problems associated with students drinking and driving. This 'working draft' of the public service message is being given by (Paul/Paula) Jennison, a college student currently attending a local community college. (Paul/Paula) has volunteered to help us with this project.

APPENDIX C

Text of Mock Public Service Announcement

For only the second time in ten years, the number of college-aged alcohol related motor vehicle fatalities has risen. That, combined with a rise in the college student population, and an increase in binge drinking on campuses nationwide, sends a loud warning. If action is not taken, the number of deaths will continue to rise.

Your peers who choose to drink to excess and then compound the problem by driving place themselves, you, and all of those in your community at risk. If you don't drink and drive, then it is important for you to help your peers who might be having problems with this issue. Reach out without judgment to those who place us all at risk. It is important that YOU initiate the action.

If you don't take the initiative, then you just might be contributing to the problem. Don't be a student with a story to tell.

(Insert emotional appeal here.)

If we are to succeed in the goal of reducing these kinds of tragic accidents, it depends on you and your friends first accepting the challenge to act. Then reach out and work with the university, law enforcement officials, courts, and community. If we all work together we WILL be able to achieve our goal of reducing and perhaps eliminating senseless injury and death due to drinking and driving.

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