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JURISDICTION AND SPATIAL CONTROL IN ISRAEL: THE CASE OF THE LITTLE TRIANGLE

by

Thabit Abu-Rass

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Department of Geography and Regional Development In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY WITH A MAJOR IN GEOGRAPHY

In the Graduate College

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As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Thabit A. Abu-Rass entitled Jurisdiction and Spatial Control in Israel: The Case of the Little Triangle and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy/Geography.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the relations between the state and an ethnic minority in Israel. In focusing upon the Arab region of the Little Triangle, the study analyzes the state's policies and the impact that they have had upon the jurisdictional boundaries and autonomy of Arab local government.

In the ideologically motivated State of Israel, the central-local government relations has been marked by treating Arab local government as agents, carrying out the central government policies. This study found that this agent model of relationships, as proposed by Clarke and Stewart (1989) is no longer applicable in the case of Israel. Israel has followed this model since the inception of the state, which has impeded the development of Arab towns and villages in the study area (and throughout Israel), with subsequent implications for local economic and political development.

This study highlights the uniqueness of Israel as a bi-national state and proposes two models for majority-minority, and central-local government relationships in Israel. At the heart of these models are the granting of relative autonomy to the Arab citizens in Israel, and a move toward changing the essence of Israel from a "Jewish State" to the "citizens' state". These models will promote
stability, cooperation, and understanding between Arabs and Jews in Israel, particularly in border regions, such as the Little Triangle.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This study examines the relations between the state and local government in Israel, focusing on the different means by which Arab and Jewish local governments have been created and now operate. As the Israeli state, following the peace process, moves into a new phase of economic and political development, it is clear that the local state is likely to increase in visibility and that historical differences between Arab and Jewish communities will be thrown into sharper relief.

In the last few years, research on the Arab population of Israel has attracted considerable scholarship, especially that which concentrates on political issues. Lately, more social and economic studies have been conducted (e.g. Haider, 1987; Rosenfeld & Al-Haj, 1990; Khamaissi, 1990; Reiss, 1991; Al-Haj, 1992; Falah, 1990, 1992, 1996; Yiftachel, 1992; Schnell, 1994; Smooha, 1992). Although the Oslo Agreement in September 1993 between Israel and the PLO overlooked the Arab citizens of Israel, the trend within the academy has been one of investigating all aspects of the Israeli Arabs' lives as they are enhanced by the changes taking place in the Middle East, particularly the impact and consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Since its inception the State of Israel has been experiencing a conflict with a dual territorial dimension. The first is a territorial conflict with its Arab neighbors. Israel has a recognized international boundary with Egypt and only very recently with Jordan. The other territorial conflict is internal. This conflict has arisen with the subordinate Arab minority who remained in the country after 1948 and became citizens of Israel.

Since and even before the establishment of Israel, Arab-Jewish relations have been marked by ethnic competition over the control of land. This competition must be understood within the historic context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The issue of Arab municipal jurisdiction* is fundamentally related to the question of the integration of the Arab minority into Israeli society. Arab local governments are administratively, economically, and politically part of the structure of the Israeli local government administration. Although the state of Israel has the same regulations and ordinances for both Arab and Jewish local governments, in practice the central government treats the Arab ethnic minority and its local administrations

* the term jurisdiction refers to the limits or territory within which any particular power may be exercised: sphere of authority.
The principal thesis of this study is that in the centralized state system of Israel, the central government has been dictating policies to the local governments, particularly the Arab local governments. These policies, such as in land and planning issues, are rooted in the ideological and religious nature of the state, and sometimes contradict the Arab local government interests. The agent model, which best describes central-local government relationships in Israel (see Chapter 2), is not acceptable in the case of the Arab local governments of the Little Triangle. It resulted in the impedance of the development and growth of Arab towns and villages and set in motion the Judaization of the Arab cultural region of. The Arab population of Israel often feels its cultural survival is threatened. However, the practices of the central government has often faced local resistance which has tried to limit the damage done to the Arab towns in Israel. Moving toward the empowerment of Arab local governments in Israel will enhance stability, cooperation, and understanding between the central government and the Arab local governments; as well as between Jews and Arabs, particularly in border region, such as the Little Triangle.

This study analyzes how the Israeli central government deals with the Arab minority in Israel in terms of the
decision-making process, the evolution of the jurisdictional boundaries of Arab local governments, and the impact of Arab land reduction. While offering an interpretation of the dynamics of local government in Israel, another contribution of this study is to provide recommendations that may enhance stability and understanding between Jews and Arabs. Specifically, this study focuses on one Arab region of Israel— a border region along the West Bank called the Little Triangle.

**Statement of the Problem**

Israel developed as a Jewish state, creating a "new society" through Zionist endeavors. A unitary state was created from local Jewish communities, which began to be established in Palestine in the 1880s. Prior to the First World War, cooperatively-owned and operated (Kibbutzim) and cooperative smallholder's settlements of individual farms (Moshavim) were established. This was followed by urban construction during and after World War I and, later, the setting up of regional councils, which are a federation of agricultural settlements. The scattered Jewish settlements in Palestine formed a single, countrywide community which later would become a state. Simply stated the Jewish state was created out of the local communities.

Israel is now a highly centralized and hierarchically
organized state. The origin of its centralization can be traced back to the ideologies of its founders who largely adopted concepts of state sovereignty and political traditions from the European countries from which they emigrated. The Israeli state utilized European governments as its model, notably after 1948, the municipal organizations of Britain. Political power is divided along cultural-ideological bases rather than along territorial lines. Israel established its political structure on the concept of a strong centralized government. Local authorities are territorially based and are subordinated to the central government and party.

The British system of government also is highly centralized. However, it differs from the centralized system that exists in France or the decentralized system of the United States. The local governments in France are controlled by a prefect, an official of the French Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, the government of the American city has considerable autonomy in its actions. The British system is idiosyncratic and does not have any clear principles. The British central government dictates how the local authorities are organized and the kind of services they should provide. The Israeli system is largely similar to the British one (Dearlove, 1979, pp.1-20).

Additionally, the state of Israel, which is defined as
"the state of the Jewish people," is ideologically motivated. Absorption of Jewish immigrants was one of the most important goals. Its institutions were created to serve and promote these national goals that had been laid out by the founders of Zionism in the first half of the twentieth century. Extremely important among these institutions were the local governments. Since 1948, local authorities have been a very important tool in absorbing Jewish immigrants and expanding territorially in order to build a new society (Elazar & Kalchheim, 1988, pp.15-24).

Although Arab and Jewish local governments are both controlled by the Ministry of the Interior, their functions are somewhat different. While Jewish local governments were directed primarily toward the national objectives during the 1950s and 1960s, the sparse Arab municipalities concentrated on providing basic services to the people (Rosenfeld & Al-Haj, 1990, p.50). Among other things, Jewish local governments have dealt with issues such as new Jewish immigrants, youths discharged from the Israeli Defense Forces and security matters. These issues are reflected in the budget allocations and general grants from the central government to the local government. The annual number of newcomers to a Jewish town and the definition of a settlement as a "frontier settlement" may increase the central assistance to the local authority as well. Only
recently, and for the first time in 1986, three Arab towns in northern Israel were recognized as "frontier settlements," allowing them to receive some budgetary incentives (Rosenfeld & Al-Haj, 1990, p.123).

Both Jewish and Arab local administrations share specific legal, political and administrative frameworks. However, with regard to the policies that are carried out, the state and state agencies have dealt differently with Arab local authorities (Falah, 1992, p.36; Khamaissi, 1994, pp.9-11). With the appropriation of local authority in Israel, the central government defined the scope of authority of local government. For many of the Arab local governments, the central government has not included all the land belonging to the local population in the Arab towns. Part of these lands have been placed within the boundaries of adjacent Jewish towns. Hence, Arab land owners have been sometimes paying taxes to Jewish local authorities (Falah, 1992, p.36; Khamaissi, 1994, p.12).

In addition, local governments in Israel have been empowered to use the land within their jurisdiction for development purposes. They have been authorized to confiscate up to 40 percent of the remaining private land for public use without any compensation to the owners. In Israel, the owners of private land cannot change the use of land without permission from the local authority. The
Israeli central government, through "gerrymandering" and demarcation of certain boundaries of jurisdiction, transferred resources from Arab to Jewish local governments. By doing so, it blocked the physical growth and expansion of many Arab settlements (Haider, 1995, pp. 28-35; Khamaissi, 1994, p.12).

Yiftachel (1992), and Falah (1992) (in their original studies of the Yechiam Natural Region and Nazareth Area, respectively) demonstrated how the Israeli government, through regional land use planning, concentrated on the Judaization of Galilee in the northern region of Israel. The State of Israel transferred land and resources from Arab to Jewish hands. Mufeed (1995, p.2), for instance, using official data in Israel, found that the area within the jurisdiction of the Jewish municipality of Upper Nazareth (with a population of 35,000 people in 1993) is approximately 7,500 acres, while Arab Nazareth (with a population of 54,000) has a total area of less than 4,000 acres (State of Israel, 1993, pp.37-49). In addition, the Misgav Regional Council, with its 1994 (Jewish) population of 6,000 people concentrated in 27 settlements, covers approximately 42,500 acres; while the five adjacent Arab local governments in the Batuf Area with a 1994 population of 54,000, has only about 13,500 acres (Mufeed, 1995, p.2).

The questions at the core of this study are: 1) What
are the factors and considerations employed by the Israeli decision makers of the central government of Israel when they dictate policies toward the Arab ethnic minority and their local governments? 2) Are these factors and considerations ideologically motivated 3) Do these factors vary over time and space? 4) How do the Arab representatives/leaders in the study area perceive the decision-making process and the building of Jewish settlements in the region? 5) Does the central Israeli government, through the Minister of Interior, use the jurisdiction of local governments as a tool for controlling the Arab minority, and as a mechanism for increasing or decreasing the disparities and the uneven development in the Little Triangle in Israel? and 6) What is the impact of Judaization in the Arab towns and population?

This study deals with political geography; however, there is very little about Israel that is not ideological. Israeli political geography is ideologically motivated. It is hard to position this work within the traditional studies which support the Jewish State. The basic problem of the study is that the literature deals with power and says nothing about local government. In contrast, the literature that deals with local government says nothing about power, state or ethnicity. There is a need to put this in the context of a conflict between majorities and minorities for
resources.

Goals and objectives

The objective of this study is to map the evolution of the jurisdictional boundaries of the Arab towns and how the changes in these boundaries have been one of the principal ways the Israeli government controls the Arab minority. This analysis also examines the impact of the central government's policies on the Arab minority in Israel. I will build on existing theories of state policies toward ethnic minorities in multi-ethnic democracies and examine how these theories apply to the Israeli case. In addition, I will look at the mechanics of the decision-making process involving the apportionment of Arab local governments' jurisdiction and the impact of these policies on Arab perceptions of the Israeli government. Furthermore, I will also provide background on the Israeli decision-making process regarding the Arab minority and land use policies.

The issue of Arab local governments' jurisdiction in Israel is directly related to the land control question. Both Arabs and Jews highly value the land for its economic, political and emotional importance. In addition, the sphere of influence of local government is related to land-use planning which links politics with geography and involves decision making and physical outcomes (Harvey, 1973).
Little has been written regarding Arab local
governments in Israel. Most studies are descriptive in
nature and have concentrated on comparisons with Jewish
local governments. Although some advances have been made in
the subject of local government jurisdiction (Hasson &
Razin, 1990; Falah, 1992; Razin, 1994), there is still
considerable more work needed on this topic.

Contribution

1) This study will contribute to the growing interest
in the role of the modern state and its relation to ethnic
groups and local governments. In addition, this study
attempts to fill a noticeable gap in the scope of political
geography (O’Loughlin, 1988, p.122); that of the linkages
between local, national and global phenomena.

2) This study will rely mainly upon existing Hebrew and
Arabic literature as well as Palestinian and Israeli
historical documents. I intend to introduce this lesser-
known material to English-speaking scholars.

3) This study will enhance the understanding between
Arab citizens of Israel, on the one hand, and the Israeli

* As a native of the study region, which is overwhelmingly
Arab in its population, I am very familiar with the local
issues relevant to the study, as well as with many of its
key players and decision makers. I am also fluent in
Arabic and Hebrew, both of which have been invaluable to me
in my field research.
central government and the Jewish citizens, on the other. This is essential for stability and peace in the state of Israel, especially in the border areas.

4) The literature dealing with Arab-Jewish relations in Israel is concentrated on political and economic factors (Smooha, 1982). However, this literature lacks a geographical dimension, specifically with regards to urban and regional planning and land-use policies. This study will attempt to contribute to filling in this gap in the literature.

5) Unlike the traditional methods of analyzing land use policies from a socioeconomic perspective, this study will analyze the impact of land use policies on political stability in a bi-ethnic country.

Conceptual Framework

This study fits into the framework of contemporary political geography. Recently, the role of the state in dealing with ethnic minorities, the allocation of resources, and the importance of localities have been the subject of geographical scholarship (O’Loughlin, 1988, p.137).

This study investigates the relationships existing between central and local governments, the state and its subordinate ethnic groups, inter-ethnic relations and how these relations can effect political stability. Competition
over land, power disparities and socioeconomic gaps in a multi-ethnic society and on the impact of discriminatory policies on the ethnic group will be primary foci.

**Methodology**

Building on existing theories of central governments' treatment of their ethnic minorities, such as the "control" model of Lustick (1979, 1980) and Lijphart's "consociational" (power sharing) model (1977), this study employs an empirical approach to explore the interaction between the state and an ethnic minority in space. The study also includes the use of questionnaires and in-depth interviews along with research of governmental documents and other published materials.

The principal method of data analysis in this study is the investigation of changes over time. By use of mapping all Arab localities in the Little Triangle prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948 and their present jurisdiction, I will look on the changes that have taken place during five decades. Moreover, I will analyze reports by the Israeli Ministry of Interior, municipal boundary commissions, and the central and local planning committees concerning the nature of decision making on the issue of Arab towns' jurisdictions. I have conducted surveys of municipality mayors and local government heads in addition
to other representatives and professionals in the study area. The survey was conducted by way of questionnaires in the 27 Arab settlements within the Little Triangle. The questionnaire (see Appendix- which was translated to Arabic) concentrated on the perception of Arab leaders in the region in regard to governmental policy toward the Arabs in Israel, and the power relations with the central government and the adjacent Jewish settlements. In addition, I have interviewed decision makers, who have been and are involved in the issue of jurisdiction in both the central and local levels. Primary data were collected during a pilot study to the area in December 1994 - January 1995. The main field work was conducted between December 1995 and April 1996.

Structure

In Chapter II, I lay the theoretical framework for this study within the sub-fields of political, urban and ethnic geography. I pay special attention to the various theories used in pluralistic societies in dealing with central-local government relations and the relationship between the state and its ethnic minorities. Among prominent scholars who have dealt with the subject of Israeli Arabs are Smooha (1990) and Lustick (1980, 1987), each of whom have suggested different models for state-ethnic minority relations. I explain why such theories, as "regime theory" and
"regulation theory", may not be suitable for the Israeli case. The last part of this chapter considers competition over territory at the local level and the role played by the state in dealing with this issue.

In Chapter III, I examine the conditions in Palestine prior to 1948. This background information is essential in order to understand the relationship between Arabs and Jews and the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which have their origin in the competition over land. The economically impoverished and politically disorganized Arabs could not match the well financed and organized Zionist movement. Apart from the competition over land, land policy and land holdings, Jewish immigration to Palestine and settlements will also be considered.

In Chapter IV, I present a background to the State of Israel, its political economy, the Arab minority in Israel and state policies toward the Arabs since 1948. Three different stages in the Arab political development in Israel can be distinguished: 1) the military government regime imposed on the Arabs between 1949-1966, which restricted their movement; 2) the post-1967 War period or the period of building Arab institutions in the State of Israel; and 3) the last stage, which began in the 1980s, the moving from marginality to a more influential position. At the heart of the conflict between the central Israeli government and the
Arabs (and hence, local governments) is the issue of land. Therefore, land policy, regional development, and planning in Israel are considered. It will be shown how the concentration of most of the land in the hands of the State of Israel (93 percent) limited Arab land ownership. Special emphasis is given to the power disparities between Arabs and Jews in Israel, and to the conditions under which the Arab local governments have been created and have operated.

In Chapter V, I discuss the principal study area, the Little Triangle of Israel. In addition to probing into its geopolitical significance and how the area originated, its physical and human characteristics will be detailed. The creation of the Green Line or the border between Israel and the West Bank in 1949 helped to define the Little Triangle as a border region. The Green Line has had a major impact on the populations on both sides of the border.

Since the inception of the State of Israel, two stages of change may be identified in the cultural landscape of the region; first the de-Arabization of the land, which took place in the first decade of statehood; and the second stage, the Judaization of the region, which has been implemented in the last several years. Among the most important plans for Judaization of the region are the Seven Star Plan and the Construction of the Trans-Israel Highway, which are shown on detailed maps and discussed in detail.
In Chapter VI, I document specifically the Arab loss of territory in the study area since the inception of the State of Israel. The confiscation of Arab lands led to the fragmentation of the Arab communities in the Little Triangle and to the creation of four distinct Arab subregions: Kafar Qasem, Taiyba, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, and Wadi A’ra. In this chapter, I examine the attitudes of the decision-makers regarding land issues in general, and the reduction of jurisdiction of Arab towns in particular.

In Chapter VII, I use the Nahal Iron Rural Council as a case study to demonstrate the conflict between the State of Israel, represented by the Ministry of Interior, and the Arab population in eight small villages within the Little Triangle. On December 24, 1992, the Minister of Interior, Aryeh Diri, declared Nahal Iron a rural council. It includes eight different small Arab villages* in the Little Triangle with a total population of over 12,000 people. The Minister included within the jurisdiction of the new rural council only the built-up area and excluded the agricultural land or other land owned by the people. This left the eight villages without any territorial connections. The Arab lands between the eight towns in the area placed within the

* According to the Israeli Ministry of Interior, village refers to a community population of less than 3,000 inhabitants
jurisdiction of the Jewish regional councils of Menashe and Megiddo. The decision to establish Nahal Iron was made by the Interior Minister without any consultations with the local residents. In addition to the Hebrew name of the rural council, the Minister appointed the head and the members of the rural council. All of these were Israeli Jews and none of them lives in these Arab towns (Amara, et. al. 1994, p.15). In this chapter, I demonstrate how the state exercises its power and uses the jurisdiction of Arab towns and villages as an instrument of control and repression, and how the local population resists, successfully to some degree, these governmental attempts.

In Chapter VIII, I analyze the perceptions of the Arab leaders regarding the decision-making process, Judaization of the region, and Jewish-Arab relations--resulting from analysis of the questionnaires and the interviews I conducted in the region. I delineate the consequences of the reduction of Arab local governments' sphere of influence and the impact of Judaization of the Little Triangle on the Arab population. In the last part of this chapter, I examine the urban growth and the obstacles faced by the local Arab governments in their efforts to develop their towns at the same level as the Jewish neighboring towns. It will be shown that economic disparities do exist and the reasons for this persisting disparity will be discussed. Finally,
despite the unfriendly relations between Arabs and Jews in the region, cooperation between Arab and Jewish local authorities is taking place and it will be also examined.

In the final Chapter, Chapter IX, I use my research findings to draw conclusions and suggest some policy recommendations to enhance stability and better relations between the State of Israel and its Arab ethnic minority.
CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to provide a conceptual framework and to review the theories and literature relevant to the analysis of central-local government relations, state and ethnic minorities relations, and the jurisdictions of local governments. This literature draws on political geography, ethnic studies, locality studies and urban politics.

THE STUDY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Several scholars have attempted to define the local state and its status from a variety of perspectives. Cockburn (1977, p. 2) defined the state as an "administrative apparatus of the national tier", and adds that it and the local state serve the interest of capital by "contributing to the capitalist reproduction while the nation-state is in charge of production." While Dear (1980, p. 187) defines the local government as "any government ...having a political and spatial jurisdiction at less than national scale," Duncan & Goodwin (1988, p.34) describe the local state as "an instrument of the higher
tiers of the state." Clark & Dear (1984, p. 133) modifying Dear's earlier definition, describe the local state as "government with jurisdictions less than state or province" and add that it is "not only an apparatus of the state but a democratic institution in itself." Bennett (1989, p. 4) adds that "the local state is only an efficient unit for providing public goods and services."

In the strongly centralized system of Israel, local governments function primarily as caretakers. They are heavily dependent on central government assistance. This fits the first model suggested by Clarke and Stewart (1989), namely the agency model (Table 2.1). The local government is perceived as an agency, implementing central government policies. A second model is the relative autonomy model, in which the relationship between the central and the local is dictated by legislation. Local government has freedom of action and the central government has limited control. In this case, most of the finances comes from local revenues and taxation. The central government exercises control through regulation and the finances come largely from national sources. The interaction model is a middle ground, emphasizing mutual influence. The relationship between central and local governments is complex and mixed. Both parties work together closely in planning and carrying out policies and projects. Money comes from both national
Table 2.1
Clarke and Stewart’s Model of Central-Local Government Relations

Central Government

Power Relations

Agency Model
Central revenues
Implementing Central Government Policies
Local Government

Interaction Model
Central & Local Revenues
Working Together
Local Government

Relative Autonomy Model
Local revenues
Freedom of action for Local Government
Local Government
governmental grants and local taxation.

The local-central relationship literature focuses largely on European countries, particularly the United Kingdom where the central government dominates. Today, local authorities in the U.K. have a statutorily defined range of functions. Since its inception, the State of Israel has borrowed its organization from the U.K.

A major concern of local government everywhere is land use and its regulation (Keating, 1991, p. 15). Land is immovable and cannot be reproduced. In addition, rarely can land be substituted for by other elements in production and consumption. In Israel, all local governments are overwhelmingly dependent on the central government in land allocation (since the state owns almost all land), and they largely implement central governmental policies.

THEORIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS

Most theories dealing with local governments originated in the field of political science. Theories usually treat the state as a whole. Geographers also have the inclination to treat the local state as if they are dealing with the national state. According to Kirby (1987, p. 273), urban geographers have been avoiding the use of the term "local state." In fact, the notion of local state suffers from obscurity in the geographic research (Reynolds, & Knight,
Early works of political geographers in local government concentrated on the role of space as an influence, the variety in local government activities and enhancing efficiency (Johnston, 1985, p. 152).

In the late 1970s, a new topic emerged within radical geography-- the political economy of the capitalist state (Harvey, 1978; Clark & Dear, 1981; Dear, 1986). Poverty, crime and unrest pushed urban geographers and other scholars to confront urban injustice. In the beginning, scholars of urban political economy categorized local-central government functions simply by expenditures. This approach created difficulties because functions and expenditures can be rather different from country to country. In Britain, in the early 1980s, the Greater London Council (GLC) promoted expenditures in the interests of the working class. The conservative Thatcherite government perceived the GLC spending as not consistent with the objectives of the central government and moved to abolish the GLC (Fincher, 1990, pp. 340-3).

Another example of conflict between the central and local government was in Melbourne, Australia. The crisis erupted in 1980 between the municipality of Melbourne on one hand and the economic interests and developers on the other. The argument was over land use and planning in the city. The crisis ended with the central government siding
with the economic interests and the dismissal of the Melbourne municipal government (Fincher, 1990, pp. 343-4).

Similarly, during the 1970s in New York City, there was conflict between local government (which tried to protect the economic interests of public sector employees and the New Yorkers who relied on public services) and finance capital (the creditors of New York municipality). The latter tried to control municipal spending and succeeded after they gained support from state governments (Tabb, 1978, pp. 241-7; Fincher, 1990, pp. 339-40).

From the above examples, it has been argued that conflicts between central and local government stem mainly from class conflict and different class allegiances. On one side, we find the local government representing the working class and recipients of public services, while on the other hand, the capitalists are in alliance with the state or the central government. However, in the Israeli case the conflict between the central government and the Arab local government is mainly bureaucratic, although it does have some Marxist elements.

choice, dual state and social relations. The localist approach is associated with the pluralist tradition, public choice represents conservative and the New Right approach, and the dual state is a mixture of different theories, mainly pluralism and corporatist analysis.

The most comprehensive discussion of state theories in geography was introduced by Clark and Dear (1984). These theories were focused on the function of the state. First, the state is perceived as a supplier of public goods (Clark and Dear, 1984, pp. 18-19). The main concern of these theories was the efficiency of such provision. Second, some scholars theorize the state acts as a regulator and facilitator (Clark and Dear, 1984, p.19). In this case, the state operates macroeconomic policies to strengthen the economy within its territory. Other scholars theorize the state as arbiter, which Clark and Dear consider as the most important one (p.21). In this case, the state regarded to be above the endemic conflicts of society and therefore can act as a neutral force in arbitrating disputes. Finally, some scholars perceive the state as a social engineer. From this perspective the state works to ensure some degree of social justice within its territory leading to the welfare state (Clark and Dear, 1984, p. 20). Johnston (1982, p. 12) combined Clark and Dear's public goods and social engineers theories to suggest the state as protector. By doing so,
Johnston underlies the coercive function of the state. In addition, the marxist theories of the state incorporated some notion of ideology, the class structure and the economic relations of society.

So, we can see that these theories say nothing about local structures, except for local state theory. This is primarily a European, even British approach with focus on party politics, fiscal control and organization structures. This is true of special variants like regulation theory also.

Decentralization has been a major theme in local government literature. Many scholars have questioned the definition of the concept. Conyers (1986, p. 88) defines decentralization as "the transfer of authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from a higher level of government to any individual, organization or agency at lower level". Smith (1985, p. 1) perceives the concept as "delegation of power from one geographical level of government to another". Hudson & Plum (1988, p. 232) distinguished between political decentralization and deconcentration. While the latter refer to "operational process" the former refer to "political process", and their results in increasing efficiency of the state management.

Decentralization is a contemporary phenomenon in many countries. Decentralization has wide appeal regardless of
ideology or theory. According to Smith (1985, p. 2),
decentralization makes many promises. First, it allows
participation which, in turn, eases the resistance to social
changes and development. In addition, democratic
decentralization meets the local needs. It allows
flexibility and makes the decision-making process easier.
Finally, decentralization promotes local democracy which may
strengthen national unity (Smith, 1985, p. 2).

Despite the fact that decentralization is taking place
in many countries around the world, the fact is that the
state power is essentially growing. In Israel, for example,
the state gives more tasks and responsibilities to local
administrations but not real power.

POWER AND RESISTANCE

Research on power exercised by the state and resistance
by the local communities has been increasing in recent
years. However, material dealing with power says nothing
about local government. Local social movements increasingly
challenge the state. Resistance will appear when the state
exercises its power without the ability of the latter to
smash the former (Kirby, 1993, p. 76). Gramsci (1971), in
his theory of hegemony, links civil society, the state and
the economy. He emphasized the role of physical coercion
and the consent of the majority of society in achieving
hegemony. Routledge (1996, p. 512) noticed the multifaced relation between the state and social movements which range from cooptation and cooperation to conflict and can range from individual to collective actions, which takes sometimes the form of social movements. The social movements are located within the boundaries of the state where these movements are affected by the performance and the policies of the state. However, collective actions and resistance can spill over and become regional and even sometimes global.

Foucault (1980) emphasizes the decentered and the multiple character of power and the connection between power and other factors such as production, sexuality, kinship and insurgency. These factors stretch beyond the border of the state. However, Said (1983, p. 246), while accepting the decentered character of power through society, sees Foucault's power theory as too vague, and feels that the role of classes, economics and other factors should not be minimized; he argues that resistance cannot be a real opponent.

The site of resistance against the state is not necessarily a physical place. It can be a physical expression. Different cultures and ethnic groups perceive space in different ways. For example, in Israel, Muslims (of village or Bedouin origin), Christians and Druze
(Schnell, 1994, pp. 84-95) can create their "imagined spaces" (Harvey, 1989, p. 16). Resistance establishes a relationship of movement to spaces. It can be defended, abandoned, used, etc. (Routledge, 1996, p. 520). Finally, Kirby (1993, p. 20), emphasizes the spatial concentration as a strong basis for building resistance.

GROWTH MACHINE AND URBAN REGIMES

The literature dealing with the "growth machine" and urban regimes stand in the center of recent work on urban political economy. The literature is characterized by a strong interdependence between market and politics. It emphasizes the role of bargaining and the formation of coalitions as preconditions to urban development.

The concept of the "growth machine" has been used widely to describe political and economic investment in American urban areas. Logan and Molotch (1987, p. 32) perceive that all urban politics is about land use. Land as a commodity has both use and exchange value. The importance of use-value of a place as a residence is in contradiction with the exchange-value of land represented by entrepreneurs who are dealing with property. Logan and Molotch (1987, p. 85) do not accept Peterson's (1981, pp. 143-7) argument that growth is a benefit for all city residents. Growth at the local level is dominated by a small and powerful elite that
uses the local authority for their benefit. Molotch (1993, p. 31) states that "coalition with interests in growth of a particular place (large property holders, some financial institutions, the local newspaper) turn government into a vehicle to pursue their material goals."

In their analysis, Logan and Molotch (1987, p. 53) highlighted the role played by local governments as fully supportive of the growth machine because they are "primarily concerned with increasing growth." They only tell, however, the story of the American city and the case of American local development. This limited scope has been criticized by several scholars. The American model cannot be applied to all economic systems in the world. It cannot even be applied to different cities within the capitalist system, such as in Japan or the European countries. There are different factors, such as culture, types of institutions, local economic forces, that shape the growth in the country (Strom, 1996, p. 477).

Kirby and Abu-Rass (1997), drawing on the case of Israel, argue that economic development underlined the lack of connection between local states where growth is taking place and the state itself. Unlike the U.S., the central government in Israel plays a crucial role in controlling and commercializing property. Growth in Israel has an ideological meaning within the state apparatus.
In addition, differences in local economic development exist, not only between a federal system such as the U.S and a unitary system such as Israel, but also within different federal systems. Strom (1996, p. 461) noted that the role played by the German central government in growth is far larger than the U.S. case. In Germany, the central government is more interventionist with a "long tradition of public ownership, regulations, and support of industry and financial market." The hegemonic, value free development (Logan and Molotch, 1987, p. 32) in the United States faces some constraints and competitors in Germany as well as other European countries. For example, the German historical experience "left ultimate property rights in the hands of the state (Keating, 1991, p. 15)."

Finally, growth machine theory perceived here insofar as it is about economic development and the appropriation of resources. However, it says nothing about state or ethnicity. The growth machine literature deals with special cases of land use and value. The process of enlargement or expansion of a city limit is perceived as a way of protecting the future base of municipalities. As Liner (1996, p.57) stated, "the process of annexation maybe viewed as a manifestation of decisions by specific groups to protect their future welfare."
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CITY

The entrepreneurial city concept has been among the most important topics occupying the theorists who deal with the transformation of the western city. Scholars argued that since the 1980s, many western cities, particularly in the U.S., have shifted their urban governance away from merely local provision of services (Hall & Hubbard, 1996, p. 153). These cities more and more are initiating operations that were once dealt with only by the private sector. Such operations include: investment, promotion, and risk taking. This mode of urban governance is termed entrepreneurial (Mollenkopf, 1983, p. 4; Harvey, 1989, p. 4). Others see this transition in the urban governance of the western city as a transition from the industrial to the post-industrial city.

The entrepreneurial mode of governance is less concerned with the provision of services and collective consumption; a matter that was perceived as the major role of the traditional city (Castells, 1977, p. 3). Commentators tie entrepreneurialism with broader national and international forces. The economic fortune of a city is connected to global economic trends (Robson, 1989, p. 29; Knox, 1991, p. 203). This process is enhanced by the advancement in technological innovation and the improvement of communications and the incorporation of most of the
world's countries in the capitalist system.

Harvey (1989, pp. 15-6) emphasizes the role of globalization in highlighting the significance of territorial politics as place becomes more important, despite the mobility of capital across boundaries. He added that entrepreneurial politics plays an important role in sustaining unequal development. Harvey suggested that entrepreneurial urban politics should not be seen as a reaction to globalization but a stimulus to new forms of competitive capitalism.

In addition, the entrepreneurial literature emphasizes the role of culture in economic restructuring. The ability to create a new image of the city and to commodify culture is clearly associated with entrepreneurial forms of governance (Goodwin, 1993, p. 149). However, Jackson (1991, pp. 225-7) demands more sensitivity to culture because it is contested and bargained between different social groups.

Some scholars have paid attention to the social inequalities resulting from entrepreneurial policies. They raise the question of the effect of these policies on creating more jobs and improving conditions of inhabitants of the city, regardless of ethnicity, gender, sexuality (Leitner & Garner, 1993, pp. 64-5). Barnekov et al. (1988, pp. 57-9) noted the small impact of such policies in creating jobs. In addition, Hall & Hubbard (1996, pp. 162-
8) observed the failure of the entrepreneurial city in solving social and economic problems. According to them, only the elite groups benefitted from the prosperity generated by entrepreneurial policies. Goodwin (1995) noted that the polarization of London is a mark of the failure of entrepreneurial policies.

URBAN REGIME THEORY

Equally important, urban regime theory is discussed extensively in the urban economic development literature. The theory centers on the role of local governing coalitions in shaping patterns of urban development. It emphasizes the variety of regimes that operate alongside different ideologies and with different political agendas. These regimes are largely influenced by the existence of structural factors such as the existence of anti-growth movements, labor unions or neighborhood organization. These can successfully oppose regime-generated development schemes (Harding, 1994, pp. 357-9). Stone (1989, p. 6) perceives regimes as the informal arrangement by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make decisions. Stone (1989, pp. 231-3) notes that the quality of urban development has varied over time and space; this means that the growth-coalition model does not exist in all urban areas at the same time. Urban coalitions that are
not firmly pro-business can succeed more in city politics; however, when there is disagreement over urban development, the urban regime favor some forms of electoral politics. Earlier, Elkin (1987) in a historical analysis, distinguished between pluralist, federalist, and entrepreneurial regimes. Stone (1989, pp. 6-9) classified regimes in three categories: caretakers, progressive, and corporate. The latter is essentially Elkin's entrepreneurial and Logan and Molotch's growth machine. These regimes are the land-use dominated coalition (Harding, 1994, p. 363). Stone's caretaker is concentrated on providing basic city services, and it is less threatening to business interests. However, the progressive regimes are characterized by anti- or controlled-growth strategies and threaten business interests.

In a cross-national urban regime comparison, U.S. city government has substantial autonomy. There is a high degree of private business involvement in city politics. This is due to the lack of an ideological challenge to pro-business policies and the absence of a strong non-business party in the U.S. In comparison with the United States, Israel is urban as well as multi-ethnic, but the scale is different and the power of the state and its intervention is very different. In Canada, local governments have very limited autonomy. The provincial governments substantially direct
local governments on issues of urban development. In Britain, the country is legally based on a unitary constitution. Local governments were granted statutorily powers. Pickvance (1990, pp. 11-3) noted that the British central government makes policy but local governments are in charge of implementation within the frame of legislation. Historically, the British central government has supported local governments and reduced their dependence on pro-business interests. However, during the 1980s, the conservative central government largely reduced support to local governments. The latter, relatively not open to business interests, turned to increasing local taxes.

REGULATION THEORY

The examination of theories of regulation has been occupying an important portion of the urban economic literature. These theories, which have their origin in Marxism, were primarily developed by French scholars.

The starting point in "regulation theory" was the basic analysis of social relations (economic vs. wage relation) in a capitalist society. These relations contradict each other and bring about rivalries and conflicts among individuals and social groups. The regulation theories were used by scholars in West Germany, Holland and the Scandinavian countries in the 1980s. A series of concepts were developed
to explain "why ... growth and crises assume different intensities and characteristics in different nations and regions, and why ... the character of crises differ from one historical epoch to another? (Dunford, 1990, p. 303)."

A major weakness in the regulation theory literature is its treatment of the state, particularly the local state. Despite the fact that the state is a major factor in determining the mode of the regulation, it is rarely examined. In addition, local governments and local agencies are often the very institutions in which regulation practices are translated and ultimately delivered (Goodwin, Duncan, Halford, 1993, pp. 70-2).

Regulations of political and economic experiences vary between countries. The way in which spatial structure is associated with social relations to produce uneven development differs in different countries because the local conditions and the modes of production and consumption are different (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988, pp. 22-30).

Several scholars have attempted to look at how changes in national policies and changes in national mode of regulation affect the local state but none has looked to changes in the nature of local politics themselves (Goodwin, Duncan, Halford, 1993, pp. 70-2). Florida and Jonas (1991), for example, position the local state between the mode of regulation and regime of accumulation. While Conchrane
(1990, pp. 1293-5) refuses to consider the regulation approach as a key factor in local government change, Chouinard (1990, p. 1304) and Goodwin (1993, p. 148), were in favor of analyzing the role played by the local state in the mode of regulation. After examining the nature of urban politics in three British cities Goodwin, Duncan, and Halford (1993, p. 67) are convinced that the local state has dual roles as both an object and an agent of regulation.

RESEARCH FRONTIERS

This study combines political geography theory, particularly in central-local government relations theories, with theories of ethnicity. It also touches upon the regime and regulation theories and the growth machine model.

I will argue that the model proposed by Clarke and Stewart (1989) (i.e., the "agency model") for describing the nature of the central-local government relations in Israel is no longer applicable in dealing with the Arab local governments of the Little Triangle; they simply refuse to be caretakers. I will suggest another model proposed by Clarke and Stewart (1989) known as the relative autonomy model.

In addition, this study will demonstrate that the policies of the highly centralized, theocratic State of Israel have been leading to ethnic mobilization among Arabs. Resistance to the bureaucratic establishment at the local
level will occur as long as conflict and discriminatory policies exist. The Arab struggle is a legal and procedural one. It is a struggle about state building. It is not a struggle with a nationalistic nature, such as the Palestinian uprising in the Occupied territories (Intifada). Furthermore, the study will show the limit of power that the central government can use in crushing the resistance.

One of the most obvious shortcomings in the urban economic literature is the fact that it deals mainly with the western city. The literature is largely uniform. Northern American and European countries have the same tradition of liberal democracy. There is a need to examine the entrepreneurial economy in a different mode of regulation and governance. Can the entrepreneurial approach work under a different regime, such as Israel? I believe that regime or regulation theory is irrelevant to the Israeli case. These theories better fit the advanced capitalist system and the European development model where a particular phase of state intervention has been witnessed.

There is a lack of attention in the urban literature to how the growth machine or the entrepreneurial regime will function when there is an explicit ethnic dimension to the economy or the urban regime. Will the entrepreneurial approach ease or intensify ethnic identity and mobilize ethnic groups? How can we guarantee that different ethnic
groups and other voices can be heard?

Some scholars have touched upon the issue of social justice in multi-ethnic societies, such as the Canadian case. There is no in-depth research yet on how, for example, the growth machine or entrepreneurial policies lead to marginal identities. So far the discussion of the entrepreneurial approach and the growth machine is strictly from an economic point of view.

Finally, the urban economic literature does not discuss in detail the mechanisms of land allocation. Land is the most important commodity. It is presumed that there is always land for trade. The literature does not go beyond the economic value of the land and property. What is driving the Arabs and Jews in the land issue are the political and cultural gains, not merely the economic gains. This important issue is absent in theories dealing with western cities.

So what is needed is a theory that focuses on the context of rapid economic development; that examine local government in relation to the historical development of the state in a setting of theocratic ideals and ethnic segregation; and that permits the addressing of conflicts based on resources distribution, namely land.

I will argue that in Israel, unlike most places in the world, land has more than economic significance, it is the
cultural and political meaning that has been motivating the Arabs and Jews in Israel.

ETHNICITY AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Ethnicity and ethnic groups are closely connected to the urban political literature as multi-ethnic states comprise the overwhelming majority of the world's political units (Soffer, 1983, p. 80). One of the outcomes of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries was the revival of ethnic conflict. These conflicts have the potential of threatening internal stability and increasing the instability of states' frontiers.

The literature that deals with ethnicity and urban development has two different perspectives. The first approach sees ethnicity as a premodern cleavage which will vanish with modernization. Urbanization is perceived as transcending ethnicity (Geertz, 1963, pp. 105-57). The second approach regards ethnicity as an unavoidable component in urban politics. Other scholars confront the issue of ethnicity in a different way. Ross (1982, p. 440) examines ethnicity as a modern political phenomenon which develops in particular environments and changes with the circumstances. Ethnicity is a collective identity which may appear in different stages of social development and urban growth. Cohen (1965, pp. 174-8) suggests that urban ethnic
groups are interest groups which are involved in struggle with other groups for resources in the public arena. Ethnicity functions in the struggle to provide an expression which advances solidarity as a moral duty.

There are studies of power sharing in ethnic societies from a public administration point of view (Lustick, 1980) but these are poorly linked to state theory, historical development of societies and economic development questions.

THEORIES OF ETHNICITY

Politics of ethnic conflict, majority-minority relations, and ethno-territorial conflict, make up a significant portion of the social science literature. Scholars, mainly through case studies, try to analyze and suggest better ways to understand and approach ethnic conflicts. Among the most prominent scholars who suggest ethnic conflict regulation are McGarry and O’Leary (1993). They suggest a taxonomy of eight methods of ethnic conflict management. These methods could be divided into two major groups. Methods of eliminating differences between ethnic groups. This category includes genocide, population transfer, partition or secession and integration and assimilation. Secondly, methods of managing differences between ethnic groups, including hegemonic control, arbitration, cantonisation or federalism and
consociationalism (McGarry and O'Leary, 1993, p. 4). While Yiftachel (1991, p. 330) suggest two main theoretical perspectives "accommodation and domination" Smooha (1980, pp. 256-7) proposes three approaches, the consensus model, the consociational model, and the control model.

The consensus model is associated with Glazer and Moynihan (1975). At the heart of this model stands the formation of common national culture and identity, and the weakening of traditional ties. To facilitate the above, there is a need for the inclusion of shared core values, crosscutting affiliation, modernization, resource allocation according to worthiness, consensus-building and policy promoting the idea of nation-state, which eventually lead to assimilation (Smooha, 1980).

The consociational or power-sharing model is associated with Lijphart (1977), Daalder (1974), and Mcrae (1974). They suggest power sharing to facilitate ethnic diversity. Lijbhart (1977, pp. 25-52) argues that the consociational system of government, due to its fundamental power-sharing principles, is most suitable for maintaining democratic stability. The model advocates broad participation and a degree of ethnic autonomy. It can operate successfully in all state levels including the local state (McGarry & O'leary, 1993, p. 35). Consociational principles are based on the willingness to accept ethnic pluralism such as in
Canada, Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium. Therefore, the approach aims to maintain ethnic division and to legitimize the ethnic cultures and identities (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 170-4; Smooha 1980, pp. 256-7).

In addition, there are preconditions for successful consociational system: interested ethnic groups must not be committed to the creation of their own nation-state by integrating and assimilating others to their own group. Second, the leaders of all groups must fear the consequences of an ethnic war and promote economic and political stability for the benefit of all. Finally, consociational practices may work to minimize ideological, religious and linguistic differences. If the above conditions are not met, consociationalism will fail as in Lebanon, Malaysia, Cyprus and Northern Ireland (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 681-5).

The control model is the most widespread in dealing with ethnic minorities (McGarry & O'leary, 1993, p. 23). Drawing on the case of the Arab minority in Israel, the model was developed first by Lustick (1979, 1980). It relies on a control mechanism such as strong police and security forces, elite co-optation, economic dependence, political containment and denial of territorial definition. The control model is associated with power disparities and a highly coercive regime. Lijphart (1977, pp. 171-4) calls majorities, which exercise control in handling minorities,
"majority dictatorships". Some of the other countries which belong to this model are Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Malaysia (Smooha, 1982, p. 71 & Yiftachel 1991, p. 331).

Smooha (1980, p. 257) and Esman (1987, pp. 412-6) use the concepts of structural pluralism and conflict pluralism to describe the prevailing diversity of colonial and post-colonial society. Smooha (1980, p. 257) adds that structural pluralists see hegemonic control of the ethnic majority as realistic. He doubts the ability of deeply divided societies to compromise and share power. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, p. 129) argue that multi-ethnic societies cannot develop as true and stable democracies. They add that the tension between democratic values and the plural character of a state can be solved by "the dominant majority configuration". Equally, Esman (1973, p. 56) suggests "institutionalized dominance" as one of four methods for "management of communal conflict". Lustick (1980, p. 77) describes the case of controlling the ethnic Arab minority in Israel by using a "system" which comprises three "components": "segmentation", "dependence", and "cooptation".

The Arabs in Israel are a non-assimilating minority. It is a homeland minority rather than an immigrant ethnic group. Arabs are concentrated in specific areas in Israel, such as the Little Triangle. The control model, suggested
by Lustick to explain the relationship between the Israeli government and its Arab minority during the 1950s and 1960s, is no longer applicable. Different scholars have suggested different theories to explain the relationship between central government and ethnic groups in multi-ethnic democracies, this includes theories such as consociationalism or power sharing and the consensus model. Because of the nature of Israel as largely a theocratic state, I will argue that these models are not applicable. In their place I suggest my own model for changing, in the long run, the essence of the State of Israel from a "Jewish State" to a "state for all of its citizens". In other words, there is a need to eliminate the uniqueness of the state of being "Jewish" and move toward developing greater pluralism within Israeli society. However, in the short run, only some sort of autonomical arrangement may be applicable.

Social and Territorial Justice

According to Rawls (1971), the purpose of a theory of justice is to promote a desirable social order by providing an account of justice on which all people can agree. In his book, A Theory of Justice, he suggests two principles of justice. The first principle is to guarantee fundamental individual liberties, such as freedom of speech and
association, and the second is to ensure social and economic equalities and to offer the greatest benefits to the worst off in society. Rawls stresses that fair equality of opportunity should be maintained. However, Schaefer (1979) notices that Rawls's theory of justice is not concerned with seeking to make inequalities of wealth, status and power agree with inequalities on talent and effort; in fact, its goal is to eliminate inequality itself regardless of its origin. He gives the example of "Affirmative Action" in the U.S. and stresses that the motive behind the promotion of "social justice" by the American intellectuals and professionals is the phenomenon of liberal guilt. For him, guilt is a poor foundation for policy (Schaefer, 1979, p. 107). He accuses the non-minority white advocates of hypocrisy because they are not willing to sacrifice for what they preach. Brian Berry (1973) adds that Rawls theory of justice does not work and that many of his arguments are unsound.

Kukathas and Pettit (1990, p. 123) state that the development in Rawls's thinking, is a response to different criticism of his work in the last two decades. They emphasize Rawls's position of perceiving "justice as fairness" and that his concern is not universal principles of justice, but rather principles appropriate for modern societies, like the United States. In Rawls' later writing

Fisk (1989, p. 89), highlights the role of the state in promoting justice. He introduces the phrase "limits on benefits and losses" that should be established by the state. In addition, he emphasizes that the pattern of justice a state promotes will be one that serve its needs for stability.

In the subject of justice and property, Hobbes saw property as the creation of the state. For him, property is not a private right. There is justification for the intervention of the state if the interference serves the aims of the state. However, Locke believes that state exists to protect property. The state cannot attack the citizen's property without their full consent. Property is at root a private right, which results from the relationship between a private person and nature. For Locke owning something is mixing one's own labor with it.

Fisk (1989, pp. 80-91), believes that the relationship between state and property is more complicated. For him,
both Hobbes and Locke did not take in their account the
element of justice and suggests a middle position where he
introduced the interests of social groups. He sees the
contrast between group and state rather than between nature
and state.

Centralized systems and uniform schemes are often
assumed to enhance territorial equality and justice, that
is, individuals in a society with identical needs will
receive equal treatment (Harvey 1973, pp. 96-118). However,
this hypothesis ignores the nature of the centralized system
and the process of implementation. For Harvey (1973, pp.
96-118), social justices is a normative concept. He has
criticized geographers of not incorporating social justice
into geographical methods of analysis.

Harvey (1973, p. 97), in his analysis of social
justice, defines justice as "a principle (or set of
principles) for resolving conflicting claims". These
conflicts may arise in many ways. For him, social justice
is "a particular application of just principles to conflicts
which arise out of necessity for social cooperation in
seeking individual advancement" (p. 97).

Geographers are particularly interested in the
territorial organization of society. Harvey (1973, p. 99),
highlights the importance of the scale issue. Justice
achieved in the territorial level does not necessarily imply
that justice is achieved at the individual level. For Harvey, a just distribution and allocation of property should take into consideration, three components: 1) the need of the individuals, 2) contribution to the common good—individuals which carry activity that benefit most people in society have higher claim for allocation of property; and 3) the merit of the individual—those who engage in difficult tasks have greater claim than others.

Harvey (1973, pp. 116-7) stresses that to achieve territorial social justice the following two categories should be met:

1) the distribution of income should be such that: a) the needs of the population within each territory are met; b) resources are so allocated to maximize interterritorial multiplier effects; and c) extra resources are allocated to help overcome special difficulties stemming from the physical and social environment.

2) The mechanisms (institutional, organizational, political and economic) should be such that the prospects of the least advantaged territory are as great as they possibly can be.

JURISDICTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Murphy (1989, pp. 414-7) believes that the territorial policies of central governments in multi-ethnic states generally represent the interests of the ethnic majority, and that the latter fears the development of ethnic separation in ethno-regional peripheries. These governments try to minimize the control exercised by ethnic minorities,
but in doing so they increase tensions. Enloe (1981, p. 123) has emphasized the role played by the state in creating ethnic mobilization and intensifying ethnic identities.

Internal boundary disputes and competition over territories at the local level have been the concern of a limited number of scholars. Cox and Johnston (1982) noted that the social science literature at the local level tended to focus on conflicts between classes, ethnic groups and gender and paid less attention to the role of space in generating conflict at this level. Among the scholars that show the connection between local governments' sphere of influence and the national politics are: Rowat, (1980); Barlow, (1981); Hasson and Razin, (1990); Hampton, (1991); Falah, (1991, 1992); Razin, (1994).

Prescott (1978, pp. 176-89) and Barlow (1981, pp. 119-45) suggest three fundamental factors for determining local government jurisdiction. The first factor is that there should be compatibility between the function of the local government and its size and shape. Next, there should be correlation between the local government’s sphere of influence and the dominant pattern of community. Finally, the size of the local government should furnish it with the appropriate fiscal resources to carry out its functions.

Hasson and Razin (1990, p. 56) and Razin (1994, p. 17-8) suggest that boundary systems reveal, not only the
spatial conditions of an area, but also the political circumstances in that country at the time of the determination of the boundaries. The abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1981 by the conservative British government led by Thatcher (O'Leary, 1987, pp. 212-4), and the withdrawing from wide municipal reforms in Canada (Sancton, 1991) are good examples of the ideological-political imprints of the central governments upon the local level.

In addition, beside the political circumstances, the type of political system heavily influences the implementation of municipal reforms. The ultimate legal authority to change the sphere of influence of a given city in the West European countries, such as France, belongs to the central governments. Generally, it is carried out by bureaucratic commissions (Morlan, 1981, pp. 32-3). However, in the American federal system, the process depends on referenda by both the annexing municipality and the annexed people. In the wake of conflict or disagreement, the courts are asked to interfere and solve the matter (Adrian & Press, 1977; Mckay, 1983).

Finally, fragmented municipal structures are viewed by many scholars as a source of inequality, increasing rivalry, and impedance of development (Barlow, 1981, pp. 15-25; Falah, 1990, p. 327 & 1992, pp. 39-40; Morrill, 1991, pp. 7-
10). As a solution, they have suggested the adoption of upper tier metropolitan municipalities, or the formation of a single-tier amalgamated municipalities, such as in Canada and Great Britain, (Barlow, 1981, pp. 134-6).

URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY IN ISRAEL

In the highly centralized urban and planning system of Israel, local economic development has followed formal criteria. Some policy changes that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s contributed to the shift of power between central and local governments (Elazar & Kalcheim, 1988, pp. 34-5). Among these changes were the direct election of the mayor by the inhabitants (starting in the 1979 election) and self-reliance, which has allowed local government a greater autonomy over municipal taxes since 1982.

Prior to 1977, the Labor party and its allies were in power. They followed social-welfare state policies. The shift in power in the same year brought a conservative government to power, headed by the Likud, a right-wing party. During the 1980s, the importance of a local entrepreneurial economy, privatization and ownership surfaced (Razin, 1988, p. 1236). However, general local economic policies continued, through the 1980s and 1990s, to be channeled via the national spatial industrialization
policy (Razin, 1990, p. 700).

Despite some relaxation in this mode of local governance in Israel, it is still largely managerial. The lion's portion of the local government's budget comes from the central government. The local authorities can only suggest budget proposals which must be approved by the central government. The decision-making body for projects in the local level is the central government, which regulates all relations with the lower level.

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the politics of production have been controlled at the national level. An Arab local government has no access to this type of politics in the country; it remains concentrated on the politics of consumption and the provision of basic services to the Arab inhabitants.

The growth machine concept is still in its infancy in Israel because of the nature of the state which is ideologically defined and motivated. Its institutions were created to promote Jewish national goals, such as the absorption of Jewish immigrants (Kirby & Abu-Rass, 1997). Ninety three percent of the total land of Israel is publicly owned and cannot be sold. In addition, an important portion of the housing stock is also centrally controlled. So, there is no real land market in Israel. It is difficult to talk about exchange value and use-value in the American
sense. The intervention of the state is evident in all economic levels and sectors.

However, since the 1980s, local development initiatives emerged in Israel, particularly in the large cities. Entrepreneurial types of businesses had been promoted by local governments (Razin, 1990, p. 688). For example, most of the foreign private investors have come from world Jewry who are investing and at the same time making a political statement.

Arab local governments did not and largely cannot promote entrepreneurial governance. First, Arab (as well as Jewish) local governments closely follow central regulations. So far, the central government promotes local economic development and encourages investors to invest in particular places. Such places include Jewish new towns or developing areas and Jewish frontier settlements. The second reason is the instability in the Middle East and the legally-prohibited relations with prospects investors from the Arab countries particularly, from the Gulf States. Finally, Jewish local governments in Israel, which seek an entrepreneurial type of government, largely promote and commodify culture. The fact that Israel is considered the center of the Jewish people helps in attracting tourists, particularly Jews. Commodifying culture is very difficult for the Arab minority in Israel. Bi-national Israel is a
contested country with two different cultures competing for dominance and hegemony.

Now, having laid down the theories dealing with the issues on examination, and the conceptual framework for the study, my task in the next chapter will be to explain the foundation of the State of Israel. I will do that through examination of the conditions in Palestine before 1948 with regard to land policies, local administration, and Jewish-Arab relations.
CHAPTER III
PALESTINE/ZIONISM: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

The roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict lie in the struggle over the land of Palestine. Global, as well as local, events in Palestine in the first half of the twentieth century were extremely important in determining the future of the country. The occupation of Palestine by British forces in 1917 set in motion dramatic changes, not only in Palestine, but also throughout the whole region of the Near East. Due to its strategic location and religious significance, Palestine had been one of the most important regions in the Ottoman Empire.

This chapter examines the changes that have taken place in Palestine after World War One that have been determinant in the establishment of the State of Israel. Special attention will be paid to Jewish immigration and the establishment of Jewish settlements in Palestine. Zionist policies toward the native Palestinians and the acquisition of land are also considered.

Administrative Division of Palestine Prior to 1948

At the turn of the twentieth century, the land of Palestine was divided into three different Sanjaqs or
districts: Jerusalem, Acre, and Nablus (Figure 3.1). While the Sanjaq of Jerusalem was independent and under the direct control of the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, the Sanjaqs of Acre and Nablus were part of the Ottoman Willayet or province of Beirut (Figure 3.1). The Sanjaqs were further divided into Qazas or sub-districts. In the early twentieth century, there were thirteen different Qazas: Acre, Haifa, Nazareth, Safed, Tiberias, Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, Beersheba, Gaza, Hebron, Jaffa and Jerusalem. Each district was headed by a district commissioner who had full responsibility for all aspects of life, including law and order in his area.

When the British entered Palestine in 1917, there were twenty-two municipalities. These had been established under the Ottoman municipal law of 1877. The municipalities were primarily in large towns such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza, and Haifa. In addition, the Willayet Law of 1846 provided a local government system for the rural areas. However, in both cases, the power of local administrations under the Ottomans was very limited. The real local power was held by the Mukhtars, the central government representatives who monopolized all local functions (Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 128).

Article 3 of the Mandate stated that "the Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local
Figure 3.1: Ottoman Palestine in 1910

Source: Smith 1996
autonomy". This contradicted the centralized Ottoman system of administration where the Turkish governors directly interfered in the municipal affairs.

While the mukhtars continued to have their strong influence during the British Mandate in the Arab areas in Palestine, the British Ordinance of 1921 proved to be a very useful instrument for the development of local administrations in the Jewish areas (Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 128). In addition, The Jewish Agency, the arm of the World Zionist Organization in Palestine, and its representatives had a very strong input in the six local district buildings and planning commissions after the regulation of the Town Planning and Building Ordinance of 1936.

During the British Mandate, the Jewish Agency assumed that it had the right to act independently. The Jewish Agency in Palestine was acting as a quasi government in the development of the Jewish community in Palestine. Jews looked to the Jewish agency as their representative rather than the government of Palestine.

**The British Policy in Palestine**

The occupation of Palestine by British forces in 1917 and the Balfour Declaration in the same year brought a new reality, not only in Palestine, but also throughout the
whole region. The Balfour Declaration of November 1917 was opposed and protested by the Arabs. It stated:

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object. It being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine (Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 1).

This contradicted the British promise of Arab independence made earlier during World War I.

Following the Paris Peace Conference, Palestine was placed under British Administration as a mandated territory in April, 1920 although a British military administration ran the country from 1917. This military administration was known as O.E.T.A South (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration South). Following clashes between Arabs and Jews in 1920 and 1921, a commission of inquiry was formed to investigate the unrest. In 1922, the British government issued "The Churchill Memorandum" stating that "Phrases have been used 'such as that 'Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English'.... His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view....The [Balfour] Declaration referred to does not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish homeland" (Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 18).
The British, who had a dual obligation to the Jews as well as to the Arabs, were however pressured by the well-organized Zionist movement to carry out the Balfour Declaration. Article Six of the Mandate stated:

The Administration of Palestine, while insuring that the rights and position of other sectors of the populations are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in article 4, close settlements by Jews on the land, including State land and waste lands not required for public purposes (Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 5).

The British dual obligations and the attempt to create a modern society containing two national movements with contradicting goals became unrealistic by the 1930s. Despite many developmental projects, the British government concentrated on maintaining law and order in Palestine following the 1929 riots.

Local Administration in Palestine During the British Mandate

The British military administration made frequent changes to the administrative map of Palestine. When civil administration took over, the country was still without official borders. Palestine was redivided into seven districts and the country was administered from two major centers, Jaffa in the south and Haifa in the north (Biger, 1994, p.102). At the end of the British Mandate of
Palestine, there were only six districts in Palestine. These were further subdivided into 18 subdistricts (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2).

The period of British military administration, 1917-1920, was characterized by preserving the Ottoman territorial division, so as not to disrupt local practices. Local administrators were still powerful although their influence was weakened.

The civil administration of 1920 concentrated on the economy and bureaucratic efficiency. One of the goals of the British administration was to develop Palestine and to work for creating "political, administrative and economic conditions as well as secure the establishment of the Jewish national home... and [safeguard] the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine (Mandate, Article 2)." During the British Mandate, there were three types of local authorities in Palestine: municipal councils, local councils, and village councils. Those administrative bodies were empowered by the British Municipal Corporation Ordinance of 1934, the Local Council Ordinance of 1941, and the Village Council Ordinance of 1944. Municipal councils were established in the urban areas, local councils in the smaller townships, and, finally, the village councils were exclusively for the rural villages. By 1947, there were 102
Table 3.1

Administrative Division of Palestine, 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Area sq km</th>
<th>Headquarter</th>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Area sq km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>13,689</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>1,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beersheba</td>
<td>12,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lydda</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>4,334</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>1,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>2,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samaria</td>
<td>3,266</td>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>1,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galilee</td>
<td>2,804</td>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 104)
Figure 3.2: Administrative Division of Palestine, 1944

Source: Based on Ruedy 1971
local authorities in Palestine; 69 were Arab, 28 were Jewish, and five were mixed (Table 3.2). While there are some similarities, Israel did not adopt the British local administrative map of Palestine. After 1948, Israel reactivated only three of the Arab local authorities that had been founded during the British Mandate.

Jewish Immigration and Settlements in Palestine Prior to 1948

According to the Survey of Palestine prepared in late 1945 and early 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, there were 24,000 Jews living in Palestine in 1882. The overwhelming majority of those were concentrated in the ancient towns of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Safad and Tiberias. The year of 1882 marked the beginning of the Jewish immigration to Palestine.

Jewish scholars divide the immigration of Zionist Jews into Palestine into five different waves of Aliya, immigration (Table 3.3). The first Aliya, 1882-1904, was initiated by a Jewish society in Russia and was known as Hovivi Zion or the Lovers of Zion. Jewish newcomers came from Russia, as well as other Eastern European countries such as Romania and Poland.

During the first years of Hovivi Zion activities in
Table 3.2
Local Authorities in Palestine, 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>municipal councils</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local councils</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village councils</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Government of Palestine, 1947, p. 25)
Table 3.3
Jewish Immigration to Palestine, 1882-1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aliya</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Aliya 1882-1904</td>
<td>Russia, Rumania</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Hovivi Zion and Bilu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Aliya 1904-1914</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>labor and social Zionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Aliya 1919-1923</td>
<td>Russia, Poland, Rumania</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>Hehalutz and Hashomir Hazair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Aliya 1924-1932</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>88,450</td>
<td>Mainly refugees who left Poland because of anti-Jewish economic measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Aliya 1933-1939</td>
<td>Poland, Germany, Central Europe</td>
<td>215,222</td>
<td>Youth Aliya, refugees from Nazi persecution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Aliya 1939-1945</td>
<td>All of Europe</td>
<td>62,531</td>
<td>Refugees from Nazi Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Aliya 1945-1948</td>
<td>All of Europe</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>Survivors of the Holocaust</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz, 1980, p. 540)
Palestine, several Moshavot or smallholder agricultural settlements were established. In 1882, the society founded four different Moshavot, the first one being Rishon leTziyyon (First in Zion). By 1890, there were twelve Jewish colonies and the number reached 28 by 1904. Those settlements were built by Hovivi Zion as well as Baron Edmond de Rothschild and the Jewish Colonization Association (Aaronsohn, 1990, p. 147). At the end of the first Aliya, there were around 55,000 Jews living in Palestine, and 5,500 lived in the newly established Moshavot. The establishment of this type of European-style agricultural settlement brought a new element to the traditional landscape of Palestine.

On the eve of the World War I, the number of Jews in Palestine was estimated at 60,000 to 85,000 persons. According to Abu-Lughod (1971, p. 141), who relied on Turkish sources, there were 689,272 persons in Palestine in 1914; 60,000 of them were Jews. Government of Palestine (p. 144) estimates the number to be 84,660. However, the number of Jews was declining during the war and by 1918, there were 56,000 in Palestine (Biger, 1994, p. 222). The decline was due to emigration, epidemics and the deportation of Jews by the Ottoman authorities.

However, the occupation of Palestine by the British resulted in a relaxation of immigration restrictions and
Jewish deportees were allowed to return. Palestine reopened its gates to those who had fled the country during the war (Biger, 1994, p. 31). Following the Balfour Declaration, a Zionist Commission arrived in Palestine to represent the movement. It was granted a special status by the British. The Zionist movement was trying to win greater recognition of Zionist rights to Palestine (Smith, 1996, p. 59).

In 1922, the British Administration conducted its first census in Palestine; there were two other censuses during the mandate period, in 1931 and 1944. Table 3.4 shows clearly the increase of Jewish immigration to Palestine during the British Mandate.

Land Holding Patterns and Policies Prior to 1948

Land System Under the Ottomans

Based on the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, the land in the Empire was classified into five different categories, Mulk, Miri, Waqf, Mawat, and Matruka. Mulk, means "property" and this type of land was privately owned, free of taxes and held without any obligation to cultivate or use it. The second category was Miri, or usufruct land. It was a state or feudal land, and users could benefit from it, but he could not sell it without the approval of the owner. The goal of the Ottomans when allocating this type of land was to ensure the availability of agricultural production and
Table 3.4
Population of Palestine by Religion During the British Mandate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>752,048</td>
<td>589,177</td>
<td>83,790</td>
<td>71,464</td>
<td>7,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,033,314</td>
<td>759,700</td>
<td>174,606</td>
<td>88,907</td>
<td>10,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,739,624</td>
<td>1,061,277</td>
<td>528,702</td>
<td>135,547</td>
<td>14,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1,845,559</td>
<td>1,076,783</td>
<td>608,225</td>
<td>145,063</td>
<td>15,488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 141)
the generation of tax revenues (Granott, 1952). The third category of land was the Waqf or religious endowment. This land, as well as houses and shops, was given to religious or charitable foundations. The fourth type was known as Mawat, "dead", waste and undeveloped land. This category of land, hillsides, woodland, and grazing areas, was not held by a title deed. People who cultivated Mawat land could later gain title if they paid the price of the unimproved land to the state (Stein, 1984, p. 12).

The last class of land was known as Matruka. This type was left for communal use. Although it was not registered in the Ottoman Registrar, Matruka belonged to the state and could not be transferred or sold. Land of this category had various uses such as pasture, woodland, or places for worship. According to Stein (1984, p. 14), it is possible that the Matruka land category did not exist in Palestine. Other classifications of landownership under the Ottoman regime in Palestine were the Mudawara and the Musha’. The Mudawara was held in private and the fellaheen (farmers) had tenancy privileges. However, the Sultan had the absolute ownership. The Musha’ land category was a collective ownership of land area. Each farmer had a share of the land. The land was parcelled out among the fellaheen and redistributed every few years in order to give each shareholder the opportunity to cultivate the more fertile
and productive land within the Musha'. The goal of this system was to promote cooperation among villagers and to prevent land transfer or occupation by strangers (Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 231).

Land Taxation and Registration in the Late Ottoman Period

Early in the twentieth century, Palestinian society was made up mainly of peasants, although the population did not use the land effectively due to political, economic, and social factors. Among the most harmful factors which impeded the prosperity of the Palestinian fellah was the tax collection system. At the core was the tithe or tenth tax; this was equal to one tenth of the value of the produce or commodity collected seasonally by the fellah. The tithe generated a substantial amount of income for the Ottomans each year. In some cases (and for the purpose of maximizing revenues) the Ottomans increased the tithe to 12.5 percent of the value of the produce. Stein (1984, p. 16) estimates that more than half of the Ottoman Empire's agricultural revenue was due to the tithe.

These taxes were not always collected through the Ottoman agencies but rather by influential individuals, such as Sheiks. Sheiks were at the same time creditors and moneylenders and often abused the system of tax collection (Stein, 1984, p. 17). The tax collectors were entitled to
2.5 percent of the tithe for their efforts. This led to arbitrary assessments of taxes. Some fellaheen lost revenues while other farmers lost their lands to the creditors and moneylenders or simply sold the land because of the oppressive taxes. As a result, many farmers became landless laborers.

Prior to the Tabu Law of 1858, land was distributed without any registration. Traditional and local leaders determined the boundaries of village's lands and plots within the village. Many powerless farmers lost their unregistered land after 1858, when land registration became obligatory (although the actual registration of land in Palestine started only after 1871). However, it was in most cases inaccurate because the fellaheen feared that the act of registration would bond them to military service and would force them to pay higher taxes. To overcome these obstacles many fellaheen gave titles to outsiders. Moreover, those who registered declared only a fraction of the land they owned. By 1925, it was estimated that three quarters of all land in Palestine was not registered (Stein, 1984, p. 21).

**Land Sales and Ownership During the British Mandate**

The British inherited the Ottoman traditional system of land ownership and registration, although records of land
registration were very rare in the time of the British occupation of Palestine. While part of the records was taken by the retreating Ottomans, others were destroyed by the locals. The land registration system in Palestine was in total chaos. As a result, one of the first British moves in Palestine was the closure of the Land Registry Office in 1918. Only in 1930 was a British civilian registration office opened; a move that was opposed by the Zionist movement which aimed to control the whole process of land acquisition in Palestine (Biger, 1994, p. 189).

Understanding that the increasing number of Arab landless was one of the causes for the unrest of 1920 and 1921, and in an attempt to promote agricultural development, the British Government issued its Land Transfer Ordinance. It required that "a tenant evicted from lands because of sale must retain sufficient land elsewhere to permit support of himself and his family" (Ruedy, 1971, p. 130).

The British administration in Palestine formed a committee to study land quality, especially land classified as Mahlul (land not cultivated for three consecutive years), Mawat and Musha' during the Ottoman regime. When the British occupied Palestine, most of the rural areas were cultivated under the Musha' system. They attempted to abolish the Musha' and to place the land in the hands of permanent owners. This attempt was rejected by the Arabs as
well as the Jews.

In 1917, the British administration in Palestine inherited some 900,000 dunums* as state land from the Ottoman regime. In addition, the British became responsible for the Mawat or the uncultivated land, while most of the cultivatable land was leased to Arab farmers or Jewish companies. The Zionist movement tried to use the relevant clauses of the mandate, particularly Article Six, which promoted the establishment of Jewish settlements on "State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes" (Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 5). However, the British military administration rejected the Zionists' demand and recognized the former leases issued by the Ottomans (Biger, 1994, p. 192).

The fellaheen's situation deteriorated with the increase in Jewish land purchases and Jewish immigration to Palestine. By 1928, the Jews were controlling over 1.1 million dunums in Palestine (Lehn and Davis, 1988, p. 74). This brought the country to an explosive situation after 1929. To cope with this situation, the British issued the Cultivators' Protection Ordinance. Under this provision,

* Dunum is a unit of land area. The metric dunum was established in 1828. It equals 1/10 hectare, 1000 dunums, or 100 hectares, equal one square kilometer; 2.471 acres equal one hectare; 0.2471 acres equal one dunum.
the mandated authorities prohibited the eviction of any tenant who could prove tenancy for one year. Nevertheless, the landlords subsequently issued leases for only nine months (Hadawi, 1988, p. 57).

In an attempt to organize the country’s landholding, the British administration initiated a Cadastral Survey and began mapping the country. Following the 1921 Land Ordinance and a Land Court Ordinance, a British team started to issue topographic as well as village maps. This survey faced many problems, particularly in the Musha’ land and with regard to proving ownership, and ended in 1930 (Biger, 1994, p. 197). Very detailed Palestinian village and town maps at a scale at 1:1250 were published for the first time during the early 1930s.

Jewish Land Acquisition in Palestine: Policy and Tactics

Political Zionism, as manifested by Theodore Hertzl, was nationalist in its core. The movement made use of religious symbolism to strengthen its appeal, and emphasized the redemption of land and people. Following its first conference in 1897, the Zionist movement created the means for the "return" of the Jews to the "promised land". Although over 80 percent of Jews has always lived in cities, in Europe as well as in Palestine (Ruedy, 1971, p. 127), the possession of the countryside was very important in the
drive to build a Jewish stronghold in Palestine.

One of the most important institutions in carrying out the policy of land acquisition was the Jewish National Fund. Following a resolution of the First Zionist Congress held in Basle, Switzerland in 1897, the J.N.F. was founded in 1901. It mandated the purchase, development and settlement of Palestine by Jews. The J.N.F. continued to carry out these tasks even after the establishment of Israel. Another important institution in purchasing land was the Palestine Land Development Company. The company, which later became the important purchasing agent of the J.N.F., was registered in 1909. It was owned by Baron Edmond de Rothschild. Apart from the above-mentioned institutions, an important portion of the land was purchased by individuals. Out of 1,734,000 dunums owned by Jews in 1947, 933,000 dunums were purchased by the J.N.F., 435,000 by the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA) and 366,000 by individuals (Granott, 1956).

Prior to the occupation of Palestine by British forces in 1917, the Ottoman regime prohibited the purchase of land by foreigners. However, Ottoman citizens, Muslims, Christians, and Jews alike were allowed to own land (Lehn & Davis, 1988, p. 37).

The early Jewish land purchases in Palestine were made mostly by individuals. By 1904, there were 28 Jewish
settlements in Palestine that were founded during the first Aliya. The settlements occupied an area of 235,000 dunums. Most of these lands were purchased with the generous support of Baron de Rothschild (Aaronshon, 1990, p. 154). By 1914, the land purchased by individuals exceeded 400,000 dunums (Stein, 1984, p. 38), while the J.N.F. purchased only 16,266 dunums in Palestine (Lehn & Davis, 1988, p. 37). To overcome the Ottoman obstacles, the Jewish organization, particularly the J.N.F., turned to several new tactics. These included the purchase and registration of the land by indigenous people, Palestinians or Arabic-speaking Sepharadi Jews who were Ottoman citizens. Another tactic included the registration of Arab land under the names of foreign Jews who were living in Palestine but were protected from Ottoman jurisdiction (Lehn & Davis, 1988, p. 37). Intermediaries were engaged in these purchases to protect the Arab sellers' reputation. A common tactic that was used in purchasing land was for the seller to borrow money from the J.N.F. and to fail to pay back the loan, whereby he was "forced" to sell his land to the J.N.F. (Stein, 1984, p. 72).

In the early years of the establishment of the J.N.F., the organization did not have a clear land acquisition policy; it purchased land wherever and whenever land was available (Lehn & Davis, 1988, p. 38). During the 1920s, the J.N.F., having more financial resources and more experience,
developed a clear land policy which was called by Granott' a national land policy" (1956, p. 32). The basics of this policy were 1) the suitability of the targeted area for purchase in terms of size and economic colonization; 2) "above all, its place in the upbuilding and attainment of a Jewish majority (p. 31)"; 3) purchases should not be in isolated areas that would be easy targets for angry Arabs; and 4) the importance of "political" acquisitions which included areas susceptible to loss in possible negotiations. The political purchases tended to enhance territorial continuity between Jewish settlements (Ruedy, 1971, p. 127). The land acquisition efforts in the early years were concentrated on the coastal plain, Beisan area, Jezreel Valley and the Huleh in the north. These areas were the most fertile land in Palestine. Prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, Jews controlled over 15 percent of the cultivatable land in Palestine (Hadawi, 1990, p. 53).

On the eve of the establishment of the State of Israel, Jews had purchased less than two million dunums (less than seven percent) of the mandated area of Palestine, far from their plans to purchase five million dunums by 1925 (Stein, 1984, p. 39). However, the territorial continuity of the purchased land was essential for the U.N. Partition Plan and later for the establishment of the State of Israel (Figure 3.3; Table 3.5).
Figure 3.3: Pattern of Jewish land Holdings as of 1945

Source: Smith 1996
Table 3.5

Jewish Land Ownership in Palestine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>J.N.F.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Total Jewish</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-1920</td>
<td>16,366</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>164,135</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1,019,574</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>278,627</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1,182,944</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>358,380</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1,392,432</td>
<td>5.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>515,950</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1,517,679</td>
<td>5.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>810,657</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>1,588,871</td>
<td>6.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1948</td>
<td>936,000</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>1,734,000</td>
<td>6.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Lehn and Davis, 1988, p. 74)
Arab-Jewish Relations in Palestine

The Zionist Movement’s Attitude Towards the Arabs

The Zionist attitude towards the indigenous population was determined by the movement’s ideology. In the early twentieth century, the Zionist agenda was for free Jewish immigration to Palestine and unlimited transfer of lands in order to reach the ultimate goal of establishing the Jewish state. This attitude was shared by all factions of the Zionist movement. Prior to 1914, Arthur Ruppin, one of the Zionist leaders and representative of the Jewish National Fund (J.N.F.) in Palestine, promoted the concepts of "Jewish Soil" and "Hebrew Labor" as the core of the process of Palestine colonization. Later, the concept of "Hebrew Products" was introduced and became a national duty. The Jewish community in Palestine relied on Jewish workers to cultivate its fields and consumed products that made by Jews.

Prior to the First World War (WWI), the Zionist movement tried to cope with the local ‘Arab problem’ by convincing Arab leaders outside Palestine of the benefits that they would receive by supporting the Zionist agenda in Palestine. They promised to use their power to mobilize outside the country for the Arab national cause. This was the message that the Zionists delivered in the Feisal-Weizman meetings and Ben-Gurion’s negotiations with Arab
leaders. Further, they tried to convince local Arab leaders of the local benefit they would gain from the economic development of Palestine by experienced Jewish newcomers. Weizman was quoted as stating "the Arab peasants will be much better off under a just administration than under a reactionary feudal Arab regime. (Flapan, 1979, p. 66).

However, the riots of 1920, 1921 and 1929 convinced the Zionist leaders that 'modernization' or local economic development could not slow the Palestinian Arabs' national ambitions. The Zionist efforts to promote the general Arab cause did not succeed in detaching Palestine from the wider Arab alliance.

The events in the 1930s, especially the Arab rebellions, the massive Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the acquisition of land, led the Zionist leadership to speak with a single voice that "the Palestinian Arabs do not have national rights in Palestine because they do not constitute a nation and their national rights as Arabs materialized in various Arab states" (Wiemer, 1983, p. 29).

In the late 1930s, facing growing Arab resistance, some Zionist leaders returned to the idea of population transfer. As early as the 1900s, Zionist leaders such as Arthur Ruppin, Israel Zangwill and Leo Motzkin proposed the displacement of Palestinians by re-settling them in other Arab countries (Flapan, 1979, p. 259). In 1936, the Jewish
Agency discussed the concept of Palestinian transfer to Trans-Jordan. Ben Gurion stated that "we are not a state and Great Britain won't do the job for us... but morally, there is nothing wrong with it" (Flapan, 1979, p. 260), and suggested to Emir 'Abdallah of Trans-Jordan and the Peel Commission that they consider the transfer solution for the 'Arab problem'. According to the Peel Commission partition proposal, the Jewish state was supposed to have 294,000 Jews and a large minority of 225,000 Palestinians (Wiemer, 1983, p. 31).

During the early 1940s, an estimated six million Jews were exterminated by the Nazi regime. Despite the immigration restrictions imposed by the 1939 White Paper, thousands of Jews found refuge in Palestine. With the increasingly frequent partition proposals and more Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Zionist movement expanded its demands in Palestine. The Biltmore Program of 1942 in the U.S.A. called for establishing a Jewish state throughout Palestine, which ignored the Arab population in Palestine. However, the international community that emerged after the Second World War (headed by the United States and the Soviet Union) was in favor of peaceful solution in Palestine taking into account the rights of both people. In November 1947, United Nations Resolution 181, which was supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, recommended the
partition of Palestine into seven different parts, three for the Arab state, three for the Jewish state, and Jerusalem as an international zone. The Jewish state was supposed to cover over 56 percent of the total area of Palestine, and the other 43 percent was allocated for the Arab state (Tessler, 1994, p. 259). The suggested territories for the Jewish state incorporated Jewish land holding and the distribution of the Jewish settlements in Palestine. The Arabs rejected the Plan while the mainstream Zionist movement tacitly accepted it. A civil war erupted in Palestine between Jews and Arabs. It was followed by the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 when army units from five different Arab countries came to the aid of the Palestinians. The Arabs lost the war to the well-equipped, financed, organized and motivated Yishuv solders.

Palestinian Arabs' Attitude Toward Jewish Land Acquisition

Following the Balfour Declaration, the Arab leadership of Palestine actively opposed the Jewish land acquisition, mainly because of the political aspect of these purchases. Although several economic and social factors were at work, the clear agenda manifested by the Balfour Declaration was the major factor in this opposition. Arab representatives saw that the survival of Palestine as an Arab country would depend on halting Jewish immigration and land purchases in
Palestine (Ruedy, 1971, p. 129).

Prior to the 1920s, the objections to land acquisition and Jewish immigration to Palestine were minimal and limited to the Arab elite (Stein, 1984. p. 36). However, during the Mandate period, Arabs actively opposed the Zionist attempts. A major factor behind the violence between Arabs and Jews was the intensifying problem of the Palestinian landless. Growing misery in Palestinian rural areas enhanced Arab immigration to the cities, but in turn, this increased the unemployment in the cities.

The first important J.N.F. purchase in Palestine was the purchase in the Esdraelon or Jezreel Valley where thousands of Arab fellaheen were evicted. This action led to the first confrontations between Arabs and Jews in April 1920 and May 1921. Jews as well as Arabs were killed. However, following a British amendment that required that peasants stay on the land in case of purchase, the Jewish brokers conditioned the clearance of all tenants before the purchase of land take place.

Through the 1930s, the Arab Higher Committee, a Palestinian national organization, demanded an end to Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by Jews in Palestine. After a bloody confrontation between local Arabs and the British mandated forces, which became known as "the Arab rebellion of 1936", the British issued the McDonald White
Paper of 1939. The document restricted Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine. In return, this led to confrontations between the British authorities and the Zionist movement, particularly underground forces such as Etzel and the Stern Gang (Smith, 1996, p. 120).

Scholars agree that the majority of Arabs in Palestine did not sell their land. Granott noted that 88.6 percent of the J.N.F. acquisition through 1930 was purchased from "large landowners who did not reside on their land" (1952, p. 276). Only 9.5 percent was purchased from fellaheen. Granott estimates that out of the 1,734,000 dunums held by Jews on the eve of the establishment of Israel, 27 percent had been purchased from fellaheen, 16 percent from "government, churches and foreign companies" and the remaining 57 percent was purchased from large Arab landowners (Granott, 1952, p. 278). Most of the large landowners were living outside Palestine, particularly in Beirut and Damascus. However, Stein (1984, pp. 228-39) noticed deep involvement in land sales of some of the most prominent Palestinian families who led the nationalist cause, especially in the 1920s and early 1930s.

The Little Triangle Before 1948

The history of the study area of the Little Triangle is part of the history of the larger region bounded by Nablus,
Tulkarm and Jenin. These three towns were the major ones in the district of Samaria. In 1944, Nablus, with a population of 23,250, was the headquarters of the district and the center of all economic and political activities in the region. The district covered 3,266 sq. km. with a total population of 191,770 people; 10,000 of whom were Jews concentrated in the coastal area of the district (Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 150). The large families of the three towns were major land owners, especially in the coastal area. Among those families were Toqan, Abdulhadi, Haj Ibrahim and Jarar.

The Little Triangle came into existence only when the State of Israel was established in 1948. The region’s towns and villages were located on the western slopes of Samaria’s hills. Many of the villages and towns were branch villages for the larger towns located further east in the Samaria district. Several Arab towns and villages such as Misskeh, Qaqun, Kafar Saba and Khreash were destroyed during the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war. The inhabitants of these villages fled or were deported during the war.

The region of the Little Triangle was overwhelmingly rural prior to 1948 and had not had any basic facilities during the Ottoman period. At the beginning of World War I, the TulKarm-Rass al-Ein railway was constructed. This was the first transportation facility in the region (Avitzor,
1980, p. 22). During the British mandate, the administration of Palestine improved. Many local administrations were established. Village councils were established in Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Taiyba and Tira in the middle of the 1940s (Government of Palestine, 1946, p. 5). The towns of the Little Triangle were under four different administrative districts. The southern towns of Kafar Qasem and Kafar Bara were part of Nablus district; the towns of Jaljulia, Tira, Taiyba, Qalansawe, Jatt, and Baqa al-Gharbiyye were part of Tulkarm district; Kafar Qara’ was part of Haifa district; and Umm al-Fahm and A’ra’ra were part of Jenin district (Table 3.6; Shmuali et. al., 1985, p. 8). In addition, the first road in the region between Rass al-Ein and wadi A’ra was constructed in 1939. However, at the end of the British mandate there were still no electricity, telephone services, or running water. Furthermore, there was no health care and only a few public elementary schools (Shimo’ni, 1979, p. 177).

The population in the region interacted mostly with the population in the hill towns of the district. This was mainly due to blood ties and economic reasons. However, as transportation became available during the 1940s, more interaction took place with the coastal towns of Jaffa, Tel-Aviv, and Haifa (Shmu’ali et. al., 1985, p. 23).

The population, which was overwhelmingly Arab Muslim,
Table 3.6
Population of the Arab Towns and Villages in 1922 and 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Sub-district</th>
<th>Census 1922</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qari</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A'ra'ra</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>2,290</td>
<td>in 1945 include A'ra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Um al-Fahm</td>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>5,490</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qasem</td>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>in 1945 part of Nablus district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaljulia</td>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tira</td>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyba</td>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>4,290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalansawe</td>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>in 1945 include Zur Musheh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatt</td>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa al-Gharbiyye</td>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Shmu'ali, et al., 1985, p. 18)
doubled between 1922 and 1944. Natural population increase in the region, as well as in the other Arab regions of the country, was very high. In addition, migration from the rural areas to the larger towns took place (Shmua’li et al., 1985, p. 18) (Table 3.6). The shrinking of available cultivated land in the Arab towns and the improved transportation in the area led some young people to leave for the coastal towns of the country.

In the mid 1940s, a process of urbanization had already started in some of the towns of the region. The built-up areas were very dense. The traditional family, clan, and tribal pattern played an important part in the life of the individuals. They provided protection, job opportunity and connections with the authorities. Prior to 1948, the majority of the population was engaged in agriculture, and even in 1950 (two years after the establishment of Israel) 70 percent of the population still worked in agriculture. The Jewish settlements on the Sharon Plain and in the coastal area brought better job opportunities to the region. In addition, the British authorities in Palestine employed some of the region's inhabitants in its facilities (such jobs included maintenance in British camps, and in the railroad and seaport systems in Haifa and Jaffa and clerks in the British administrative offices).

Still, agriculture was the major source of income.
Intensive agricultural activities started during the British mandate. Farmers planted citrus, grapes, and other fruits, in addition to wheat, barley, corn and vegetables. During the 1940s, Jaljulia was the leading town in citrus production. Out of 12,685 dunums, the total area of the town in 1944, 2,600 dunums were planted with citrus and banana trees. The local inhabitants cultivated most of the arable lands. Some of the modern agricultural techniques were adopted from the newly established Jewish settlements in the region.

Conclusion

The conflict between the Zionist movement and the Palestinian people has its origins in the competition over land. The roots of this conflict can be traced back to the rivalry between the two different groups in the late Ottoman regime in Palestine, although the conflict became sharper during the British Mandate. Through massive Jewish immigration to Palestine, purchase of land, and international events, the Zionist movement succeeded in laying down the foundation needed for the establishment of the State of Israel. Facing unorganized and economically-impoverished Palestinians, it transformed Palestine from an Arab area to a country with two national movements. The disorganized and impoverished Arab inhabitants of Palestine
could not match the well-organized and well-financed Zionist movement.

The bloody confrontations between Arabs and Jews led the British to shift their policies several times, especially over the issues of Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine. However, the British were, most of the time, loyal to their commitment to the Jewish people as manifested through the Balfour Declaration of 1917 until the 1939 White Paper.

Most of the Jewish lands were purchased by Jewish institutions and companies, particularly the Jewish National Fund. However, some land was bought independently by individual Jews as capital investment. While during the British Mandate period, the government of Palestine generally did not interfere in the issue of land purchase, this was to be changed following the 1948 when the State of Israel conducted and monopolized everything related to land and reduced the ability of capital investment to the minimum in the State of Israel.

The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce the reality in Palestine before the establishment of Israel. It can be seen that segmentation along ethnic lines, between Arabs and Jews, was started during the British Mandate. Rather than a balance existing between the two groups, one group - the Jewish- was hegemonic, with the help of the
British. It becomes necessary now to continue along these lines and to examine the conditions in Israel, especially regarding the issue of land and planning policies, and to examine the impact of these policies on the Arabs of Israel.
CHAPTER IV
ISRAEL'S LAND/PLANNING POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ARABS IN ISRAEL

Introduction

In the last chapter, it has been shown how the Zionist movement succeeded in the first half of the twentieth century in laying down the infrastructure needed for the establishment of the State of Israel. Jewish political, economic and educational institutions were established. The purpose of this chapter is to provide some background about the State of Israel after 1948; its political economy, its system of planning and its regional development and land policy. These factors have been significant in strengthening and enhancing the Jewishness of the country during the last five decades.

In addition, this chapter examines the development of the Arab population in Israel, giving special emphasis to the political status of Arabs over different periods of time. The establishment of Israel in 1948 was a turning point for the Palestinians as they became a minority in their own land. The state's policy towards the Arabs in Israel is considered here, particularly the issues of land ownership and civil rights. In addition, this chapter looks
at the Arab local administrations, Arab-Jewish relations, and the economic disparities between the two groups.

The recent planning literature has examined four different urban planning strategies in ethnically divided societies. However, traditional planning theories assumed stability of the state and have not dealt with ethnically divided societies (Morely and Schachar, 1986).

In the planning literature, the most widespread methodology of evaluating planning programs by scholars has been labeled as cost and benefit analysis. In this analysis, the anticipated benefits to be generated by a specific program are compared with the expected cost (Schofield, 1987). The costs and benefits are itemized in terms of money. This methodology has a problem of ignoring the social costs and benefits such as beautiful landscape or important historical buildings which cannot be always evaluated in financial terms (Cadwallader, 1997, p.363).

Scott (1980, p. 61) has suggested three methods of state or national planning agencies in urban and local settings. These methods are involve the use of fiscal policies, land regulation policies and development policies. Recently, the criticism of mainstream planning theory has led to the emergence of alternative planning theories which focus on the role of public participation in the planning process and emphasize the fact that planning can be viewed
as a political act of redistribution (Cadwallader, 1997, p.364).

There are four urban planning strategies in ethnically divided societies. The first strategy is the neutral one which is characterized by the de-politicization of the territorial issues to avoid political exclusion and power inequality. In this strategy people are treated as individuals rather than members of an ethnic group (Yiftachel, 1995b).

The second urban planning strategy is called by Yiftachel (1995b) "partisan", because it chooses sides. Here, the decision-makers are members of the dominant ethnic group. The third strategy is that of "equity", which tries to minimize disparities in ethnic states. Allocation of resources is largely based on the size and the need of the ethnic group. Finally, there is the "resolver" urban strategy which promotes mutual empowerment and tolerable co-existence in the ethnically divided societies.

The Political Economy of Israel

Israel has one of the most impressive records of economic growth and state-building in the world. In less than five decades, it has become an advanced country and the most developed economy in the Middle East. The creation of a state apparatus and a centrally directed economy has
defined the context of the growth within the country. Today, Israel, with very limited natural resources, has a gross national product higher than the oil-rich country of Saudi Arabia.

During early statehood, Israel received large-scale investments, for which most of the capital came from the Jewish Diaspora. The capital was invested in all aspects of the economy, particularly in the infrastructure, including new towns. This process led to rapid growth in the first two decades of the economy and related sectors (Table 4.1).

A turning point, resulting in less rapid economic growth for Israel, was the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, and its outcome, the oil crisis. The slow growth continued until the early 1990s, a period marked by the collapse of the Eastern-Bloc countries and the arrival of more than 600,000 Jewish immigrants to Israel, mainly from the former Soviet Union. In addition, the signing of the two Oslo Agreements between Israel and the PLO, along with the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, enhanced the new trend of resumption of growth in the Israeli economy.

Israel is a multi-party democracy. Its economy can be described as a "mixed economy" with a strong tendency toward a socialist economy with central planning. What makes Israel different from other democratic countries in the world is the absence of a free capital market. Since the
Table 4.1
Growth of Real Gross Domestic Products (GDP), Annual Averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1955</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1973</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1974-1989</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Plessner, 1994, p. 7).
establishment of Israel in 1948, the central government has dominated the capital market. It is the main creditor, and the banking system is subordinated to the government (Plessner, 1994, pp. 37-8). All natural resources in Israel are either publicly owned or subject to strict government control by law. Some economic sectors are considered to be only public, such as agriculture, irrigation, and electricity (Plessner, 1994, pp. 66-77), although in the last several years, some privatization has been taking place.

Some laws, especially during early statehood, have strengthened the state's Jewishness. Such laws include the Law of Return, which allows only Jews to immigrate to Israel and live there as citizens, and the Land Authority Law, which allows the concentration of Israeli lands in Jewish hands. The state's symbols, name, national anthem and flag are all in correspondence to its Jewish identity and definition. Israel is still without a constitution which would guarantee the basic rights of all of its citizens.

The Planning System In Israel

The planning system in Israel is divided into two branches, one developmental and one statutory. It is very centralized and is quite powerful, being able to decide the Israeli physical landscape (Yiftachel, 1995a, p. 133).
Public bodies such as the Jewish Agency (JA), the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the Ministry of Housing are the main developmental planning authorities in Israel. They are armed with great power to develop land in the different parts of the state. The JA and JNF are Zionist organizations established early in this century. They act as "quasi-governmental" authorities, supported by the Jewish Diaspora and have dealt only with the Jewish population in Palestine and, later, Israel. These organizations are concerned mainly with developing the rural and the frontier areas of Israel.

The statutory planning authorities are responsible for approving urban and regional development plans. These authorities function under the patronage of the Interior Ministry and according to the Planning and Building Law of 1965. These authorities are comprised of three tiers. The highest tier is the National Planning Committee in charge of the national master plans and overall planning in Israel (Figure 4.1). The second tier is the regional planning committees, responsible for regional planning. There are six different regional committees, one for each of the six districts in Israel. The lowest tier is comprised of the local committees which deal with planning at the local levels, especially the outline plans for the towns. A local planning committee can serve one town or a group of towns.
Figure 4.1: The Three Tiers of the Israeli Planning System

Source: Khamaissi 1991
There are 121 committees in Israel (Yiftachel, 1995a, p. 133).

Land and Regional Development Policy in Israel

Land in Israel is highly valued by both Arabs and Jews, far beyond just its economic value. It is perceived as the basis of national existence by both national groups. Government land policy in Israel has its roots in ideology and has been used as a tool to achieve the national goal of a Jewish state.

The Israeli regional development policy shares some threads with British regional development and planning policy. The latter has been justified by securing social justice and sustaining equal standards of living in different regions of the country. In addition, the British encouraged economic effectiveness; to enable each region in the country to contribute positively to the national economy (Keeble, 1976 & McCrone, 1969). Similarly, in the Israeli case, the regional development and planning policy encouraged social justice at least among Jews. However, it differed from British regional development policy by being highly centralized and the effective role played by the State in planning and regional development. In the case of Israel, the private sector has little input in regional development and planning policy.
One of the earliest Zionist organizations established in Palestine was the Jewish National Fund (JNF), formed in 1901 by the Zionist Congress. The JNF was in charge of purchasing land in Palestine and developing it for Jews. Following the establishment of Israel, most of the land which came under the control of the State (over 90 percent) became publicly owned. The remaining was private land, mostly owned by the Arab citizens of Israel. Public land in Israel cannot be sold, following the Biblical command "The land shall not be sold forever..." (Leviticus, 25:23). In 1960, the government of Israel established the Israeli Land Administration (ILA) and took charge of all public land in the country. By 1995 some 93 percent of the total land of Israel was publicly owned. Most of the private land is located around cities and Arab towns.

Publicly-owned land is leased for 49 years with a renewal clause. Householders, private farmers, industrialists and collective and cooperative settlements have the right to lease from the ILA. Their leases are hereditary and considered to be permanent. According to the Agricultural Settlement Law of 1967 (Restrictions on Use of Agricultural Land and Waters), non-Jews are prohibited from leasing state land (Haider, 1995, p. 8).

Israel is well known as a regional military power. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), in fact, are one of the
principal bodies controlling land in Israel. It regulates large portions of state land, especially that which is mostly inaccessible to civilians. For instance, southern Israel, the Negev, comprises half of the total area of the State of Israel. It is overwhelmingly state land controlled by the military, and only 37 percent of this area is available for non-military use (Zafrir, 1995, p. 17).

The main objective of the second tier of regional development planning is to implement the national goals of the settlement of the country by Jews (Czaminsky & Meyer-Brodintz, 1987). Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, regional development plans have been focused on the distribution and dispersal of the Jewish population from the coastal area to other parts of the country. The balance of the Jewish and the Arab populations in certain areas, such as the Galilee and the Little Triangle, and the Judaization of all parts of the country were some of the main goals of the Israeli settlement policies (Yiftachel, 1991, p. 335). In the first fifteen years of statehood, more than thirty new towns were built, especially in the northern and southern parts of the country (Efrat, 1994, p. 147). The defense of the borders and other security issues have also been among the principal goals of the regional plans. After the 1967 War and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the building of new towns shifted to the Occupied
Territories. Between 1967-1987, almost no new towns were built within the pre-1967 borders of Israel. Only more recently, following the wave of the Jewish Immigrants from Russia and the peace negotiations with the Arabs, has regional development planning refocused within the pre-1967 borders.

The Administrative Map of Israel

Administratively, the area of Israel is divided hierarchically into six regions or districts. Those are: North, Haifa, Central, Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem and South. The districts are further divided into 15 subdistricts, as the intermediary tier (Figure 4.2). The lower tier is the local administrations, which include three types: municipalities (large towns), local councils (small towns) and regional councils (an agglomeration of rural settlements) (Newman, 1995a. p. 497). By the end of 1995, there were 234 local administrations in Israel (Table 4.2). This included 56 municipalities, 127 local councils, 49 regional councils, and two industrial councils. The uneven division of Israel left the six different districts with different loads, especially regarding the provision of services. This division did not follow natural borders, except where there were international boundaries. Some natural regions cross different districts: such a case is found in the Sharon
Figure 4.2: Administrative division of Israel

Source: Efrat 1984
Table 4.2
Local Authorities in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Jewish Sector</th>
<th>Arab Sector</th>
<th>Occupied Territories</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Councils</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Councils</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Local-Councils</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>159</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>256</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: State of Israel, 1995, file no. 6091)
Plains, which are divided the Central and Haifa districts. In addition, the two districts of North and South comprise 17,432,000 dunums or 85.8 percent of the total area of the country (Efrat, 1994, p. 102). Yet, only a small portion of the total population lives in the two districts (Table 4.3). The different Israeli ministries and national agencies have different administrative maps. For example, while the Ministry of Finance divides the country to 11 districts, the Ministry of Agriculture divides it into nine and the Ministry of Transportation recognize three districts. There are fourteen different social security districts in the country (Efrat, 1984, p. 29).

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, several commissions were formed to suggest more compact and efficient administrative divisions for the country. However, only minor changes have taken place in the original administrative map. The control of land and the fragmentation of the Arab minority into different administrative units are some of the most obvious outcomes of the current Israel administrative structure. While the regional councils control over 80 percent of the total land of Israel, they possess only 10 percent of the total population (Newman & Orgad, 1991, p. 10-4).

Despite an increasing population and the building of dozens of new towns since 1948, the Israeli government has
Table 4.3

Israeli Districts, Their Area and Population, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>area in sq km</th>
<th>percent</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>16.43</td>
<td>900,364</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>703,243</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>1,140,106</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1,140,106</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem*</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>628,656</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>14,107</td>
<td>69.40</td>
<td>692,588</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Territories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>122,605</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,325</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>5,327,668</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including East Jerusalem

(Source: State of Israel, 1995)
not made any essential changes in its administrative organization since the establishment of the country. This can be traced partly to the fact that the Israeli international boundaries are not yet finalized (Efrat, 1984). After the occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights in 1967, along with the establishment of dozens of Jewish settlements in these areas, the Israeli government continued to administer separately the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories and the Jewish settlements within Israel (Newman, 1995b, p. 18).

Demographic Characteristics of the Arabs in Israel

As an outcome of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, only 156,000 Arabs remained within the boundaries of the newly-established State of Israel. The Arabs who were granted Israeli citizenship became, some fifty years later, a sizeable minority of almost 900,000 people. Excluding East Jerusalem, this is about 17 percent of the total population of Israel.

The Palestinian Arab minority in Israel has distinctive demographic characteristics, such as a high birth rate leading to a natural increase of 2.9 percent annually, which is almost twice the rate of the Jewish natural increase. With 45 percent of the total Arab population in Israel under
the age of 15, it is a youthful population, like most of the Arab World (Bonine, 1997, p. 3). In addition, Palestinian Arabs have a low rate of emigration. The ratio between Jews and Arabs has remained about the same since the establishment of Israel. The ratio was 1:5 in 1949 and almost fifty years later it is 1:6. The slight change can be traced to the recent wave of Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union to Israel. Otherwise, in the last five decades, the Arab population's natural increase has balanced the total population growth among Jews, which includes considerable immigration.

A second demographic characteristic of the Arab population is the low rate of internal migration. Despite encouragement from the Israeli authorities in the 1950s and 1960s to move to the mixed towns, the Arab population has remained in its own towns and villages. This can be traced to the high cost of living in urban areas, Arab family values and the importance of the extended family. The most significant factor was also the fear of the confiscation of Arab lands by the Israeli government (Khamaissi, 1990, p. 31).

The Arabs in Israel are divided by three religious affiliations: 76 percent are Muslims, 14 percent are Christians, and 10 percent are Druzes (Ghanem, 1993, p. 12). Geographically, the Israeli Arabs are overwhelmingly
concentrated in the peripheral areas of Israel; 60 percent are living in the mountainous Galilee region in northern Israel, 20 percent in the Little Triangle, 10 percent in the Arid Negev region in southern Israel, and the remaining 10 percent in mixed Israeli cities such as Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda and Ramlah (Ghanem, 1993, p. 12).

The Arabs in Israel: 1948-1966

During the war of 1948, most of the Palestinians left or were deported from Palestine. Among these were the most educated and the wealthiest people. The remaining Arabs were powerless and were left without leadership. For two decades, Arabs have lived in fear and uncertainty. Military governors had direct control of Arab lives until 1966, when they were granted Israeli citizenship and they became a sizable minority within the Jewish state. The treatment of the "Arab problem" was extensively discussed among the Zionist leaders. Most of them looked at the problem from a security and military point of view. Different proposals were discussed, ranging from assimilation to expulsion (Wiemer, 1983, p. 30).

Following the war of 1948, the Israeli government faced many major problems, particularly security in the borders and mass Jewish immigration to Israel. The government rushed to enhance the Jewishness of the State of Israel. In
addition to the first act by the Provisional State Council, abolishing all limitations on Jewish immigration and land sales, the government enacted the Law of Return in 1950. This law protected the right of every Jew to immigrate to the newly Jewish state. In contrast, Israel refused to repatriate the Palestinian refugees who left or were deported during the 1948 war.

In the early years of statehood, Arabs in Israel were perceived as a "security problem." They were regarded as a small part of the Arab world and a potential "fifth column" (Haider, 1995, p. 10; Neuberger, 1993, p. 151). The first Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, was quoted as saying "the Arabs have to be judged according to what they could do and not according to what they have actually done (Lustick, 1980, p. 78). As noted, the government of Israel imposed, in 1948, a military government over the Arabs. Their movements were restricted and they were excluded from many aspects of the country's life. At the same time, a series of land laws was enacted to guarantee full Jewish control over the land gained or "abandoned" by Palestinians during the war.

The Military Government

The Military Government (Memshal Tzvai) was formally established in October 1948 and officially abolished only in
1966. During the war of 1948, military governors were appointed over dominantly Arab regions that were conquered during the fighting. This included the areas of Nazareth, Western Galilee, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla, and the Negev. The Little Triangle became part of the military government system in May 1949, after its incorporation into the State of Israel following the Armistice Agreement with Jordan in March 1949.

The system of "military government" was based on the British Mandate Government's Defence Laws (State of Emergency, 1945) and the Defence Laws of 1939. These laws consisted of 170 different articles. They dealt with the following: restriction of movement, censorship, control of freedom of speech and the press. Those who disobeyed the laws were sentenced in military courts. Military governors, as well as military judges, were appointed by the Minister of Defence. Accordingly, the governors had the ultimate power over the local inhabitants. They were empowered to detain or to confiscate an individual's property as well as to expel from the country people who broke the military rules (Jiryis, 1969, pp. 7-8). According to Lustick (1980, p. 123)

Military Government was the most important instrument used by the regime to control the Arab minority. One of the central objectives of the Military Administration was to reinforce the patterns of segmentation on the structural and institutional
levels. In addition, it undertook to destroy any organized attempt by Arabs to overcome either the internal fragmentation of their community or their isolation from Jewish society.

In the early years of statehood, the military governors were not guided by higher military or political leaders in how to deal with the Arabs in Israel. So the treatment was varied and largely depended on the well of the local military governors (Lustick, 1980, p. 52). Besides dealing with the problem of security, the Israeli government attempted to achieve its objective of territorial consolidation, especially in the border areas. This was done through the destruction of compact Arab settlements, mainly in the Little Triangle and Central Galilee (Lustick, 1980, pp. 55-6). The military government restricted the movement of the local inhabitants, and then confiscated their lands that were not cultivated.

One of the most important goals of the restriction of movement was the regulation of the labor market in Israel. Between 1948 and 1954, hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants poured into the country. There was a need to protect the Jewish labor market from the more experienced and cheaper Arab competitors. The goal of the Israeli government was to grant jobs first and foremost to these Jewish immigrants. At the same time, Arab laborers were prohibited from joining the Histadrut, the General Union of

In the political arena, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Arabs were prohibited from forming their own organizations and parties. Other parties in Israel (excluding the Communist Party) limited their membership to Jews. In 1954, MAPAM, a Zionist-Socialist leftist party, was the first to open its doors to Arab members. Only after the end of the military government in 1966 did the major parties consider Arab membership. The Labor Party accepted Arab members in 1973 and the Likud, the right-wing party, followed in 1982. Today, there are several parties, such as Moledet, that still limit their membership to Jews. During the first three decades, the Labor Party formed "satellite" Arab parties to guarantee Arab voters' support. Lustick (1980, p. 139) lists this as one of the factors by which MAPAI, the main party in the 1950s, refused to abolish the military government, aiming instead to monopolize the Arab votes. In contrast, the Revisionist right-wing party, Herut, supported the abolishment of the military government as early as 1959.

The Absentee Property Law of 1950

Following the establishment of the State of Israel, the government moved to control the land gained during the 1948 war. However, it faced the problem of the legality of this action. So the Provisional Government issued a series of
ordinances and laws aiming to confiscate the property of the refugees who had left the country and the land of those who remained inside the border of the state.

The first ordinance was enacted during the war in June, 1948, just one month after the establishment of the State of Israel. This ordinance stated: "any property surrendered to, or conquered by, Israeli forces or deserted by all or part of the inhabitants to be an "abandoned" area thereafter under the control of the Minister of Finance" (Ruedy, 1971, p. 137). The land was placed under the "custodian of abandoned property" and later was leased to the new Jewish immigrants.

However, the most harmful law to the Arab citizens and most sweeping land transfer in Israeli history were the Absentee Property Regulations of December 1948. These regulations later became the Absentee Property Law of 1950. This law empowered the Israeli authorities to declare any property as vacant if the owner was classified as an "absentee". The law stated that:

...(b) the word 'absentee' shall mean the following: 1. Any person who was a citizen of the land of Israel, and left his ordinary place of residence in the Land of Israel at any time between 29 November 1948 and the day in which it is announced that the State of Emergency declared by the Provisional Council of State is abrogated, shall be regarded as an 'absentee' if he left the country (during the above period) to: (a) a place outside the Land of Israel before September 1948, or (b) a place inside the Land of Israel at that time occupied by forces that wished to prevent the
establishment of the State of Israel or fought against it after its establishment.

In other words, if people sought refuge outside their homes but still within the Israeli lines during the hostilities, they were classified as 'absentee' (Ruedy, 1971, p. 137).

Granott (1956, p. 99) believes that the scarcity of agricultural land to build Jewish settlements led the Israeli government to enact the land laws and, in his words:

The former lands of the Jewish National Fund were practically all utilized for settlements and housing and it no longer had any vacant land for disposal by the settlement institutions. The Jewish Agency Settlement Department planned the erection of hundreds of new villages, the implementation of which called for fertile areas.

The Absentee Property Law and the abandoned Property Ordinance led the Israeli institutions as well as individuals to participate in Arab land takeover, as Lustick (1980, p. 57) describes it:

in fact, during the fighting and the months following the end of the war, Jewish individuals (both new immigrants and veteran settlers), Jewish municipalities and collective settlements, the Histadrut, the army, the Jewish Agency, the JNF, various government ministries, and newly formed administrative agencies all participated in chaotic scramble for Arab lands which had been "abandoned" (or which were thought to have been abandoned).

Peretz (1954, p. 403) notes that during the first five years of statehood 370 new Jewish settlements were established and 350 of them were built on land considered as "abandoned".
He added that "in 1954 more than one third of Israeli's Jewish population lived on absentee property and nearly a third of the new immigrants (250,000 people) settled in urban areas abandoned by the Arabs" (1958, p. 143). He estimated that 40 percent of the properties belonging to the Arab citizens of Israel were confiscated (Peretz, 1958, p. 142). The State of Israel acknowledged that at least 250,000 dunums of land whose owners are Israeli citizens were classified as "absentee" property and were confiscated (Lustick, 1980, p. 27). However, Jiryis (1969, p. 60) estimates the number at over one million dunums.

Of the Arab citizens of Israel who were extremely affected by the "Absentee Property Law" of 1950, the population of the Little Triangle suffered the most. Lustick (1980, p. 59), estimates that half of the Arab citizens of Israel were categorized as "absentee" under the term of the law. September 1948 was the crucial date for the definition of "absentee", and was enforced in the case of the Little Triangle, even though this area had become part of Israel only after the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement of March, 1949.

In November 1959, the Israeli government decided to ease some of the travel restrictions imposed on the Arabs under the military government. This was followed by the alleviation of other measures and culminated by the
abolition of the military government on November 8, 1966.

The Arabs in Israel after the Six Days War of 1967

The 1967 Six Day War and its outcomes renewed the connection between the Arabs in Israel and those in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. During the 1970s, the Arabs within Israel proper, now free of the restrictions of the military government, started to form their own organizations and to make demands on the Israeli government. Several autonomous organizations and institutions were established during this decade, including Lajnat Alroa’ssa’, the National Committee of the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities (1974); the Committee for the Defense of Arab Lands (1975); the local and nationwide student committees (1974-78); and Lajnat Almutaba’h, the Supreme Oversight Committee for Arab Citizens (1982). The goal of these organizations has been to gain political power and to rally support for the Arab constituency. The Arab organizations led campaigns against discriminatory policies and they did not hesitate to initiate nationwide strikes and mass demonstrations against governmental policies. A major strike, which is now known as the "Land Day," took place on March 30, 1976, when the Committee for the Defense of Arab Lands declared a major strike against the confiscation of Arab lands in Galilee. In clashes between Israeli security forces and Arab
demonstrators, six Arab youths were shot and killed and hundreds more were injured.

Prior to the 1970s, Arabs voted mainly for the Labor Party and its "satellite" Arab lists. During the 1977 election, the Communist Party and its allies in the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE) received the majority of the Arab votes (51%). The remaining votes went elsewhere, particularly to the Labor Party. The DFPE has continued to be the leading political force among Arabs in Israel. It is worth noting that Arab support for the Communist Party and its allies is not ideologically motivated. The Communist Party, and later the DFPE, have a history of defending Arab rights in Israel.

During the 1980s, the powerless Arabs started to directly influence the political system in Israel. This period witnessed the emergence of two Arab-nationalist parties, the Progressive Movement for Peace (PMP), and the Arab Democratic Party (ADP). The Islamic Movement in Israel, which was also established in the early 1980s and gained support in the municipal elections, even participated in the parliamentary election of 1996. Prior to the 1980s, the Arab vote had no influence on government policies, coalition formation or the shifting power balance between the two major parties, Labor and Likud. In addition, Arab citizens of Israel were not included in pre-election polls
prior to 1981. They were considered irrelevant to the Israeli electoral process (Neuberger, 1993, p. 152).

There are several reasons for the growth of Arab political power during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1977 the Labor Party lost the election to the Likud Party and a right-wing government came to power. Following this election, a two-block system was formed in the Knesset. The Labor Party, who sat in opposition, started to realize how crucial the Arab votes could be for their party to regain control of the government in the future. They started to cooperate with the Arab parties and the Arab members of the Knesset. Another reason for the growth of Arab political power is the very recent introduction of a semi-presidential election system in Israel. Beside voting for the party, the citizens of Israel began in the 1996 election to cast their vote for the Prime Minister directly. Both parties realized that the Arab voters, who make up 17 percent of the vote, could tilt the balance of power in favor of one of the other candidates.

Finally, the atmosphere in Israel, following the peace accords with the PLO and Jordan, has helped to legitimize Arab demands. The Israeli establishment has become more accessible to the Arabs. Although discrimination against the Arabs still exists, the last Labor government (1992-1996) cooperated with the Arab local authorities and
increased support to Arab towns and population.

**Municipal Status of the Arab Localities in Israel**

Prior to the establishment of Israel, the Ottoman regime and the British Mandate in Palestine had fostered the extended family pattern, the *hamulah*, as a core of the local administrations. Each hamulah had a traditional leader, the mukhtar. Few municipalities and local councils were formed. Out of 900 Arab villages and towns in Palestine prior to 1948, only 35 had some official local administration. Their main duties were collecting taxes and maintaining law and order (Rosenfeld & Al-Haj, 1990, p. 22). By 1994, out of more than 150 Arab settlements in Israel, there were only 64 Arab local governments, three of them established prior to 1948. The remaining Arab settlements do not have independent municipal status; they are part of Jewish regional councils. Other Arab concentrations have the status of "unrecognized settlements". These include a few dozen Bedouin settlements in Southern Israel.

The Israeli government declared its intention to establish new local Arab authorities from the beginning. Even though the government aimed to improve the standard of services and to foster relations between the Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel, by creating formal organizations, it also attempted to control and to surveil the Arab
population. When Israel was established in 1948, only three Arab local governments that existed within the territory of Israel reactivated. These are: Shefa A’mir, Nazareth and Kafar Yasif, all of which in Galilee and were all founded earlier during the British Mandate. The Israeli government formed eight new local councils between 1952 and 1955. Fourteen were created between 1956 and 1960, and 13 more were added prior to the abolishment of the military government in 1966. By the end of 1965, 70 percent of the Arab population of Israel resided in recognized towns and villages. Although the majority of Arabs was represented by elected councils and by the traditional leaders, the Mukhtars, the real power was in the hands of the military governors and political parties. The process of establishing new local authorities in the Arab villages and towns has continued until the present. By the end of 1995, out of the 256 local authorities in Israel and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip within Israel proper, there were 75 Arab local authorities: 7 municipalities, 64 local councils, and 4 regional councils. However, there are still more than 100 unrecognized small Arab settlements without any municipal status. They do not receive services from the central government.

In February 1996, the former Interior Minister, Hayim Ramon, appointed a commission to inquire about the
possibility of reducing the number of local administrations by unifying local authorities adjacent to each other and establishing new criteria for forming new local authorities in Israel. The commission has been asked to consider the size of the population, jurisdiction of the town, and the distance from other towns. It has been asked to suggest which local governments need to be incorporated and to plan for their incorporation, focusing on efficiency, responsiveness, accountability, and a high degree of delivery of services. Arab representatives have often rejected the unification of local authorities. They perceive the act as a method used by the Interior Ministry to confiscate lands and to reduce the Arab local governments' jurisdiction. This was the case, for instance, in the unification of 'Ar'ara and 'Ara, as well as Jdaida and Maker.

The number of Arab local governments with city status is very limited (Table 4.4). Although many of the towns are large in size, they are not guaranteed a status of municipality instead being a local council. The Interior Ministry is often reluctant to give municipality status to Arab local governments. Arab leaders have charged that this is because it means bigger budgets, especially the developmental ones, as well as more autonomy for the municipalities.
## Table 4.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of Formation</th>
<th>Population (1993)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Fahm</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>28,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahat</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>24,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyba</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shafa A'mr</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>22,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakhnin</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>17,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa al-Gharbiyye*</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>15,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tira</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Baqa al-Gharbiyye granted a city status in March, 1996.

(Source: State of Israel, 1995).
The Arab local authorities discussed different and varied matters. These matters help in understanding the change in the status of the Arab population and their local authorities in Israel. Although severe land confiscations took place in the first two decades of the state’s establishment, no single local council or municipality discussed the issue of land confiscations. During this period Arab local governments concentrated on local matters such as providing basic services, including education. External matters, such as the celebration of Israeli Independence Day, were raised in discussion by governmental officials. Arab local governments fully engaged in celebrating the event (Rosenfelf & Al-Haj, 1990).

Around the mid-1970s, qualitative and quantitative changes took place in the Arab local governments. There were several reasons behind these changes. First, they stemmed from shifts in the local Arab leadership. Following the Land Day in March 1976 and the election of 1977, young educated Arabs took control of many local authorities. Second, the increase in politicization among Arabs in Israel stimulated change. This occurred with the increasing national ties and pride after the renewal of contact with the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories in 1967. Third, there was increasing frustration among Israeli Arabs as a result of continuing discrimination and land
confiscation. The discriminatory policy was revealed in the Koeing Document (Koeing was the commissioner of the northern district in the Interior Ministry until 1986). He wrote a document entitled "How to deal with the Israeli Arabs" in March, 1976. Classified as top secret, Koeing's document perceived the Arabs in Israel as a "demographic danger." He spelled out a program to counter the "danger." Fourth, like most minorities in the world, the Arabs have no influence in national affairs and at the top governmental levels. They resorted to pressuring Israeli authorities from "below", that is from the legal and institutional level. Finally, the formation of the National Committee of the Head of the Arab Local Authorities (NC) in 1974 brought about a closer relationships among the Arab representatives. The Agenda of the NC included, among other things, political issues, focusing especially on peace between Israel and the PLO (Rosenfeld & Al-Haj, 1990, pp. 39-40).

Regional Planning Policies Toward the Arabs in Israel

Israeli public policy towards the Arab minority has been motivated by two major factors: the preservation of the Jewishness of the State of Israel and the protection of national security (Smooha, 1982, p. 23). Using these policies, the Israeli government has succeeded in its efforts to dominate and control the Arabs. It is not
difficult for the government to define any unwanted action by the Arabs as a "threat to national security."

Israeli land-use policies are also an integral part of the domination and control of the Arab minority (Lustick, 1979, p.336; Falah, 1992, pp. 36-8). Israel has transferred Arab-owned land and property to Jewish ownership, such measures being part of the goal of preserving (and creating) the Jewishness of the state. Since its inception, the State of Israel has owned the largest portion of the land, about 93 percent of the total area. In fact, less than 5 percent of the total area of Israel belongs to the Arab citizens of Israel and their local governments (Borukhov, 1980, p. 506). Peretz (1958, p. 142) estimates that the Israeli authorities confiscated about 40 percent of the total Arab land in the first years of statehood. By enacting more than 30 different laws (appendix A), the Israeli government succeeded in reducing the Arab lands to 547,080 dunums. In 1945, the average land area owned by an Arab was 19 dunums (Haider, 1995, p. 44). Five years after the establishment of Israel, the landownership of the Arab citizens of Israel was reduced to an average of 3.4 dunums and by 1994 this average was less than one dunum per person (Haider, 1995, p. 44).

In addition, the Israeli government enacted a property tax on private land. According to this law, owners must pay
From the Arabs' perspective, this law, enacted in 1961, forced them to sell their lands or to pay its full value to the government every forty years. Furthermore, only Israeli government representatives decided the value of the land (Falah, 1990, p. 329).

The Arab settlements have been ignored or discriminated against in matters of regional planning in Israel. The first national plan prepared in 1949 neglected the Arab settlements and did not allow for any future expansion (Khamaissi, 1990, p. 46). In fact, the National Planning Committee, a body representing different ministries and various geographical areas in Israel, did not have an Arab representative until 1990.

The Planning and Building Law of 1965 requires that a local outline plan be made for each town in Israel in order to supply that town with adequate services, such as water and electricity, or to permit the construction of buildings. The outline plan's aim is to control and regulate the development activities in each specific town. But most Arab towns did not have local planning committees until very recently. The outline plan may be initiated by the local authority or any other interested party. In some cases the Israeli Land Authority, which has an interest in land within the jurisdiction of the Arab towns, has initiated the
preparation of outline plans for Arab towns (Yiftachel, 1995a, p. 133).

The Arab towns have never been recognized administratively as one region. Similarly, the Arab settlements have been excluded from development schemes in areas where the Arabs form the majority of the population, such as in the Little Triangle. The outline plans for the Arab towns were prepared by the Israeli regional planning committees without consultation with the locals. It was only in 1980 that the Interior Ministry finally approved regional plans in areas inhabited by the Arab population. In that year, the National Planning Committee of Israel initiated two plans in the Little Triangle. The first plan included the area of Wadi A'ra with both Arab towns and Jewish settlements, while the second was for the three towns of Tira, Taiyba and Qalanswe (Khamaissi, 1990, p. 64).

It should be pointed out that Arab towns have certain social characteristics and needs that are different from the Jewish populations and towns. Outline plans were prepared mainly by Jewish planners who did not take these specific Arab needs into consideration. They were working under the guidance of the regional and the national planning committees who did not consider such factors.

To distinguish the Arab from Jewish settlements which are of municipal status, the Arab towns are defined as
"villages" while the Jewish settlements are "townships." This is discriminatory and often contradictory because Jewish towns may number less than 3,000 people while the Arab "villages" may exceed 10,000 inhabitants (Newman, 1995a, p. 511).

Although some of the Israeli governments, which refer to the Arab population as the "Arab Sector" or "minority villages," have devised some development plans, these plans are vague, limited to providing infrastructural projects and often are only partially fulfilled (Lustick, 1980, pp. 187-97). The national development plans have not only ignored the Arab settlements, but they have prevented any territorial continuity between the Arab towns. Arab settlements have also been excluded from the national industrial development objectives (Czaminski & Meyer-Brodnitz, 1987, p. 145). At least 70 percent of Arab settlements do not have industrial zones within their jurisdiction. However, there is a growing number of skilled laborers in the industrial labor force of the Arab towns. Despite the absence of public intervention and the basic infrastructure, local industries have developed since the 1970s. For example, there are textile mills, most of which are located in the Arab residential areas (Gradus, et al., 1993, p. 220; Soffer, et al., 1994, pp. 49-50).

In Israel, the central government defines the scope of
the authority for the local governments. In many of the cases which involved Arab local governments, the central government did not include all of the land which belonged to the local population in the Arab towns. Part of these lands was placed within the boundaries of adjacent Jewish towns. In some instances, Arab land owners are paying taxes to Jewish local authorities (Falah, 1992, p. 36).

In addition, the Israeli local governments have been empowered to use the land within their jurisdiction for development purposes. They have been authorized to confiscate 40 percent of the remaining private land for public use without any compensation to the owner. In Israel, the owners of private land cannot change the use of their land without permission from the local authority. The Israeli central government, through "gerrymandering" certain boundaries of jurisdiction, transferred resources from Arab to Jewish local governments (Fallah, 1992, pp.35-6). By doing so, it blocked the physical growth and expansion of many Arab settlements (Haider, 1995, p. 31; Falah, 1991, pp. 36-7)

Jewish-Arab Relations and Socioeconomic Disparities in Israel

One of the most significant roles of the central government is the allocation of resources to the various
sectors within Israel. It controls the flow of foreign as well as local resources. Some sectors within Israeli society are receiving almost all the resources needed; these include the defense and military industry, immigrants, the religious establishment, and some political parties. Groups and interests who do not have political power are economically inferior.

Israeli Arabs are politically and economically disadvantaged compared with other groups in Israeli society. There are many laws and regulations which favor the interests of the majority and give its members greater opportunity to participate in the Israeli economy. Among those are the Law of Encouragement of Investment, the Employment Service Law of Production Subsidies, and the Army Service Law. For example, based on army service, Jewish youths are entitled to better opportunities for receiving assistance in welfare, housing, education and employment. It should be noted that the Israeli Arabs are excluded from the obligatory army services by the Israeli government although they may join the army as volunteers. Certain Jewish groups in Israeli society, such as the ultra-orthodox Jews, do not serve in the army, but they are still entitled to benefits just as those who served in the army.

Because Jews and Arabs do not have the same social and political opportunities, the gap between the two groups has
widened and become institutionalized. Arabs work mainly in blue collar jobs while Jews receive most of the managerial jobs (Table 4.5).

In 1994, the ten most crowded towns in Israel were all Arab towns. While the average housing density in Israel is one room per person, it reached 2.72 persons per room in the Arab town of Jissr al-Zarqa, 2.3 in Umm al-Fahm, and 1.85 persons per room in Nazareth (Shhadeh, 1995, p. 5). In the same year, the unemployment rate among the Arabs was 16.6 percent while among Jews it was 9.4 percent. Arab women largely contributed to this "low" rate because only 12.3 percent of them worked while among Jewish women the participation reached 46.6 percent (Atrash, 1995, p. 18). In 1994, poverty among Arabs was about twice that of the Jewish sector. While 18 percent of the total Israeli population live under the poverty line, the rate reached 42 percent among the Arab population (Shhadeh, 1995, p. 5). In addition, only 0.58 percent of Arabs work as government employees. There are more than 400 Arabs who have Ph.D.s who are unemployed. Only 47 Arab scholars work in Israeli universities, most of them in temporary jobs.

The former Labor Government gave more support to the Arab citizens of Israel. For instance, it increased the development budgets for the Arab municipalities by 260 percent between 1992 and 1996: the Arab local governments
Table 4.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific &amp; academic workers</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other professional, technical &amp; related works</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration &amp; managers</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical &amp; related workers</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural workers</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers in industry, mining, building and other skilled workers</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: State of Israel, 1993a, pp. 390-3)
received 502.6 million Israeli Sheqels in 1992, but received 1,302 million Sheqels in 1995 (Mufeed, 1995, p. 2). However, the Arab leaders have expressed concern about the new regime in Israel as the Likud government may not continue its support of the Arabs as did the former government. The Supreme Oversight Committee for the Arab Citizens, in a meeting held on August 12, 1996, with the new Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, submitted a detailed proposal for "the introduction of a clear policy in favor of full equality for Arab citizens of Israel" (Supreme Oversight Committee, 1996, p. 2). The proposal dealt with all aspects of Arab life, including education, welfare, and Arab local governments' budgets, jurisdiction and taxes.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated land ownership, planning and regional development policies in Israel, as well as treatment of the Arab citizens in Israel by the central government with regard to these issues. Following the 1948 war, Israel has focused its efforts on building the Jewish State which it had struggled for since the early twentieth century. Laws enacted and regulations followed have been to enhance the Jewishness of the State of Israel. Such laws include the Law of Return and the "Absentee" Property Law.

The Israeli style of planning in the Arab towns largely
fits Yiftachel's (1995b) partisan strategy in which the ethnically divided state takes side in favor of the dominant group; i.e., the Jewish people. This strategy also follows Berry's (1973, p.173) "ameliorative problem solving" form, in which nothing is done until the problem crisis proportions.

The concentration of much of the country's land (93 percent) in state hands also has been an attempt to limit Arab land ownership. In addition, the State, through different tactics, including the allocation of jurisdiction to Arab local governments, seeks to control and minimize the remaining land under Arab ownership. This issue will be examined in detail in the following chapters.

The Arabs in Israel passed through three different, distinct stages in their development as citizens of Israel. The first stage extends between 1948 and 1966. This period was characterized by the imposition of the Military Government over the Arab towns and villages and the restriction of Arab movement. During this period, military governors were running the life of the Arabs, including their local governments. Arab local governments were controlled by traditional Arab leaders who totally adhered to the military governors' commands. The second stage followed the 1967 War and continued until the end of 1970s. This period was characterized by relative freedom granted to
Arab citizens. Major Arab organizations were actually formed during this period. The political and economic status of the Arab citizens of Israel was enhanced during the third period which began in the early 1980s. During the 1980s, Arabs moved from a position of marginality in the State of Israel to a more influential role, particularly after the 1992 general election, when they became part of the government-formation process.

Since 1948, however, as has been shown in this chapter, the Arab citizens of Israel remained at a disadvantage, economically and politically, compared to the Jewish citizens. The expanded work opportunities that occurred in Israel in the post-1967 period did not reduce the Arab-Jewish gap. In the 1990s, Arabs in Israel, still suffer largely from discriminatory policies in terms of both occupational and income inequalities. Now, it becomes necessary to examine the development in the study area of the Little Triangle since its inception in 1948.
CHAPTER V
THE STUDY AREA: THE LITTLE TRIANGLE IN ISRAEL

The Little Triangle as a Region

The "Little Triangle" is a relatively new term which has become part of the geographical and the geopolitical lexicon following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. It is part of a bigger triangle between the Palestinian cities of Nablus, Tulkarm and Jenin. The whole area was primarily connected with the major urban center of Nablus.

The study area of the "Little Triangle" is a strip of 27 Arab towns and villages extending along the west side of the "Green Line", which is the border line established between Israel and the West Bank in 1949 (Figure 5.1). The area covers about 250 sq kms and extends 50 km, from Kafar Qasem in the south to Zalafi in the north. However, its width ranges only between 2 and 5 km (Figure 5.2). The Little Triangle is territorially continuous, but this continuity has been punctured by a number of Jewish frontier settlements (Shmuali et al., 1985, p. 9). The region is a rather uniform one. It has a high concentration of Muslim Arabs, who have strong kinship ties with the Palestinian Arabs on the other side of the Green Line. The population, which was 30,000 in 1949, exceeded 150,000 by 1993 (State of
Figure 5.1: The Little Triangle Region in Israel

0 km 50
Figure 5.2: The Arab Towns in the Little Triangle

Source: Based On Newman 1995b
Most of the Arab towns in the Little Triangle were originally established as secondary settlements from the major cities and towns located today in the West Bank. For example, Kafar Qasem, Kafar Bara and Zemer are towns of Massha, Qarawat Bani Hassan and Deir al-Ghosoun respectively (Figure 5.3). The human expansion in Palestine was from the hilly and mountainous area of the East to the plain and coastal area of the West (Shmuali et al., 1985, pp. 10-5).

Physical setting

Physically, the Little Triangle is not a homogeneous region. It has a diverse landscape, which can be divided into three distinct physical sub-regions. First, the southern region, which is characterized by its fertile land, extends from south to north and includes the lands of Tira, Taiyba, Qalanswe, Zemer, Jatt and Baqa al-Gharbiyye. At the national level, the area is part of the most fertile land in Israel, the Sharon Plain. The elevation does not exceed 70 meters above sea level. A good soil of red sand and alluvial plain along with availability of water allows for advanced agriculture that makes the area one of the breadbaskets of Israel. Vegetables as well as citrus are the main agricultural products of the area. The second area is the western hills where the slopes of the Samarian hills
Figure 5.3: The Little Triangle in Israel, Geopolitical Significance

- The Little Triangle in the West Bank
- The Green Line
- Major Arab Towns in the Little Triangle
- Major Arab Towns in the West Bank
- Road

Key:
- The Little Triangle
- Major Arab Towns
- Major Arab Towns in the Little Triangle
- Major Arab Towns in the West Bank
- Road
- The Green Line
rise to an elevation of 200 meters above sea level. It is a narrow strip of one kilometer on the western side the Green Line. The towns of Kafar Qasem, Kafar Bara and Taiyba are located in this area. Finally, There is the Nahal Iron, or Wadi A’ra, area with its two banks, the Menashe Hills and the Umm al-Fahm Mountains. Alexander Peak, in the Umm al-Fahm Mountains with its elevation of 518 meters above sea level, is the highest point in the Little Triangle.

Geopolitical Significance

The elongated shape of the Little Triangle along the Green Line enhances the importance of the area. The region is located in one of the most sensitive areas from a geopolitical point of view. The 1949-67 (Green Line) border with Jordan was very close to the metropolitan area of Tel Aviv and other major Israeli urban centers. The State of Israel has a very a narrow "waist". The distance between the Green Line and the Mediterranean Sea in the Little Triangle region ranges from 16 to 26 km (Figure 5.3). It is crucial to understand the spatial processes that have taken place in this border area since 1949.

Because of its strategic importance, Israel insisted on including the Little Triangle region within its boundaries in the armistice negotiation with Jordan in 1949. Without it, Israel threatened to renew hostilities against Jordan.
The Jordanians, who were significantly inferior militarily, accepted the Israeli demands and ceded the Little Triangle (Morris, 1987, pp. 247-8). This effectively enlarged the width of Israel in the center of the country.

Immediately after its establishment, the Israeli government moved to control the Arab land as much as possible in the Little Triangle. Special laws and regulations were enacted to achieve this goal (see Chapter IV). The annexation of the Little Triangle to Israel separated hundreds of Arab farmers from their land who lived and remained East of the border. However, they continued to enter Israeli territory in the first years of statehood, attempting to cultivate their lands.

Even though the Israeli government controlled much of the land of the Little Triangle, there were still continual border incidents with Jordan at the Green Line. The Israeli government began to establish frontier Jewish settlements in the area. These settlements have a dual purpose: 1) to cultivate the land and 2) to protect the border with Jordan. Five years after the establishment of the state, there were eleven Jewish settlements within the area known as the Little Triangle.

The Creation of the Green Line

Following the defeat of the Arab armies who
participated in the 1948 war, cease-fire negotiations began between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. The negotiations between Israel and Jordan started, at a military officers level, in December 26, 1948. Later, the negotiations expanded to a meeting between King Abdallah of Jordan and Moshe Dayan, a top Israeli military officer. The negotiations moved to the Island of Rhodes in the Mediterranean Sea on March 4, 1949 (State of Israel, 1983, p. 23). They were conducted under the auspices of the United Nations mediator Ralph Bunche. The two parties concluded the negotiations and signed the Armistice Demarcation Agreement on April 3, 1949.

According to the terms of the agreement, the two parties agreed to demarcate a boundary line between the forces. This line separates the area of Judea and Samaria (also later known as the West Bank [of the Jordan River] and politically part of the Jordanian kingdom) from the rest of historical Palestine. The line, which extends for 310 km became known as the Green Line because it was drawn in a green pencil on the map. The area covers 2200 sq km. It extends for a maximum of 55 km from the east to the west and 130 km from north to south (Newman, 1995b, p. 3).

The Green Line starts in the Jordan Valley in the north and extends to the Dead Sea in the south, bisecting Jerusalem, where the line divides the city into two parts,
East and West Jerusalem (Figure 5.4). The northern line begins in the Jordan Valley, running to the northwest, crossing the Umm al-Fahm mountains and then turning to the South crossing the Wadi A'ra Hills and the western slopes of Samaria Hills up to the Latrun area. At that point, the border line turns to the east into Jerusalem. In the south the line starts in the Dead Sea, running to the southwest to a point just 20 km from the city of Beer Sheeba, where it turns north and northeast to encompass the Hebron Hills until it meets Jerusalem. Hebron is the largest city in the southern part of the West Bank, while Nablus is the important center in the northern part of the region.

The Green Line has passed five different stages of physical and functional changes (Table 5.1). Prior to the first Arab-Israeli war and the demarcation of the line in 1949, the whole area of Palestine was one integrated unit under the British Mandate. The Jordan River was the political border between Israel and Trans-Jordan. The demarcation of the Green Line did not follow the exact cease fire lines and the military positions following the war. Between November 1948 and April 1949, Israel pressured Jordan to accept the drawing of the boundary line farther east, especially in the less populated area of Hebron (Morris, 1995, p. 49).

In addition, Israel demanded certain areas to guarantee
Figure 5.4: The Green Line, 1949-1967

Source: Based on Newman 1995b
Table 5.1

Phases of Change in the Green Line Boundary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Characteristic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1948</td>
<td>Absence of boundary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1967</td>
<td>Armistice line Sealed boundary</td>
<td>Spatial reorientation Frontierisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1987</td>
<td>Boundary removal Administrative boundary</td>
<td>Municipal boundaries Non-annexation</td>
<td>Palestinian labor Settler migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-1987</td>
<td>Administrative boundary Curfews and road blocks</td>
<td>Geography of fear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Newman, 1995b, p. 4)
control over major transportation routes which link different parts of the country. Among the most important routes were the Wadi A'ra route connecting central Israel with eastern Galilee, and the road and railway connecting Jerusalem with Tel-Aviv. In addition, Jordan agreed to the Israeli incorporation of the Little Triangle in return for Israel dropping further demands on the Samaria Hills (Pappe, 1992, p. 189).

The demarcation of the Green Line overlooked human and geographical needs along the course of the boundary line. It ended up dividing Arab villages as well as transboundary pasture land. Among the most difficult cases were the division of the villages of Beit Safafa in the vicinity of Jerusalem and Barta'a in the Wadi A'ra region (Brawer, 1990).

Jerusalem was the hottest and most difficult issue in the war front and later in the demarcation negotiations. The disagreement between Israel and Jordan led to the creation of several areas of 'no man's land' between the two parts of the city. In addition, the parties agreed on two enclaves within Jerusalem. Mount Scopus, the home of the old Hebrew University and Hadasa Hospital, was to be under the Israeli control, and Armon Hanatziv was to be under the United Nations control (State of Israel, 1983, p. 410).
The Impact of the Green Line, 1949-1967

The demarcation of the Green Line has had a tremendous impact on the population on both sides of this artificial border. Although they were separated by only a barbed wire fence, many Arab relatives found themselves in two different political identities. Many villages in the hilly West Bank were cut off from their fields in the coastal plain. Others lost their source of employment in the coastal cities such as Tel-Aviv and Haifa. Morris (1987, pp. 247-53) claims that eighty Arab villages lost part of their lands because of the demarcation of the Green Line. Another twenty villages were seriously damaged.

In addition, the sealed boundary line prevented any kind of contact between the Palestinian inhabitants on each side of the border, causing both physical and emotional dislocation (Newman, 1995b, p. 10). The major towns of Qalqilya, Tulkarm, Jenin and Nablus, which were major economic centers in Palestine, became frontier and peripheral towns within Jordan. Amman, the capital of Jordan, became the new major economic focus. The situation changed during the 1970s and 1980s after the occupation of the West Bank in 1967.

The occupation of the West Bank by the Israeli forces following the Six Days War of 1967 marked the beginning of a new stage in the function of the Green Line. The previous
sealed, barbed wire border line now began serving as an administrative line within Israel. Israel did not annex the West Bank, but placed it under military administration, allowing free movement to and from the newly occupied territories. Palestinians from the West Bank crossed the borders seeking employment and Jews moved to live in the newly established Jewish settlements. This situation continued until the eruption of the Intifada, the Palestinian uprising in December 1987. The renewed contact between the Arabs in both parts of the border has had a political as well as a socio-economic impact on the inhabitants. Brawer (1984) found that the Palestinians on the Israeli side of the Green Line have a higher standard of living than their counterparts on the other side of the border. This was due mainly to better job opportunities in Israel. Besides that, the Arab villages on the Israeli side were more developed than the ones in the West Bank. However, the Palestinian community in the West Bank was much more politicized.

The reunion of the Palestinians on both sides of the former Green Line has had its political impact on the Arab citizens of Israel. Many began to define themselves as Palestinians rather than Israelis or simply Arabs. Also, a process of Islamization was imminent especially after the graduation of many Israeli Arab youths from West Bank
colleges.

The Intifada of 1987 reinforced, once again, the Green Line as a political separation line between Israel and the West Bank. Although it continued to function as an administrative border, the Green Line marked the limit of the geographical extension of the Intifada. In addition, the socio-economic interaction between Israel and the West Bank became very limited. This situation relaxed somewhat following the 1993 Oslo Accord between the PLO and the Israeli government.

The Little Triangle: A Part of Israel

The annexation of the Little Triangle to the State of Israel was a truly traumatic event for the population who preferred to be part of the Arab West Bank (Morris, 1995). Most of the political leadership, as well as the wealthy people, left the region during the war in Palestine.

Immediately following the establishment of Israel and the annexation of the Little Triangle, difficult restrictions were imposed on the people of the Little Triangle as well as on other areas of Arab population concentration. All Arab areas in Israel were placed under military government. Three military governors stationed at Taiyba, Baqa al-Gharbiyye and A’ra restricted the movement of the Arab population in the Little Triangle. The
inhabitants of the region were prohibited from entering their own land to cultivate it or to travel anywhere without written permission.

Between 1948-1966, the Israeli government expropriated much of the Arab lands. Although several local Arab governments were established during this period, it was the military governors who had the final word and who were the sole decision makers in all aspect of life in the Arab towns. The 1967 Six Days War was a turning point for the Little Triangle population. The Green line, which was an inaccessible cease fire line between 1949-1967, became an administrative line after the occupation of the West Bank. Social and economic interaction between the residents of the Little Triangle and the West Bank inhabitants were renewed.

The Israeli government terminated its policy of building Jewish settlements in the Little Triangle after the 1967 War. The government shifted its efforts to controlling more land and to building more settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially after the Likud Party came to power in 1977.

Demographically, the Little Triangle continued to be an Arab region with an overwhelmingly Arab population. By 1995, only 40,000 Jews reside in 18 different settlements live in the Little Triangle. However, the government of Israel, which controls most of the land initiated some plans
to create a Jewish majority. Several Jewish settlements were built in the region between 1990-1996. The building of Jewish settlements in the little Triangle since 1948 led to the fragmentation of the region and the creation of four noncontiguous Arab territorial concentrations. Those subregions are, Kafar Qasem sub-region, Taiyba sub-region, Baqa al-Gharbiyye sub-region, and Wadi A’ra (Figure 5.5).

Although geographically it is located in central Israel, the Little Triangle is considered a peripheral and frontier region. Because it is situated along the Green Line, local governments are unable to expand to the east. They are competing over territories among themselves or to the west.

Local Administrations in the Little Triangle

Administratively, the Little Triangle straddles three different Israeli subdistricts, Hadera in the Haifa District and Hasharon and Pitah Tiqwa in the Central District (Table 5.2). There are four municipalities, eight local councils, one regional council and three Arab settlements, all of which belong to the Jewish Menashe Regional Council. Most of the Arab towns were without municipal status prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948. In the towns of Taiyba, Tira and Baqa al-Gharbiyye local administration were established during the British Mandate. However, those
Figure 5.5: Arab and Jewish Jurisdictions in the Little Triangle

- Arab Towns in the Little Triangle
- Arab Towns in the West Bank
- Intersection on Highway 6

Legend:
- Land Under Jewish Jurisdiction
- Land Under Arab Jurisdiction
- Proposed Route of Highway 6

Map areas include:
- Mediterranean Sea
- Israel
- West Bank
- Netanya
- Tel Aviv
- Qalqilya
- Galansawa
- Jaljulia
- Hableh
- Kfar Bara
- Kfar Ossem
- Jinsa
- Umm al-Fahm
- Ar'a'ea
- Barta'a
- Barta'a al-Sharqiyye
- Zemar
- Tulkarm
- Qalansawe
- Taiyya
- Jallulla
- Kahr Oatem
- Ya'bid
- Barta'a

0 km 10 km
Table 5.2

Arab Settlements in the Little Triangle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sub district</th>
<th>Municipal Status 1995</th>
<th>Year of Formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tayiba</td>
<td>Hasharon</td>
<td>municipality</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tira</td>
<td>Hasharon</td>
<td>municipality</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa al-Gharbiyye</td>
<td>Hadera</td>
<td>municipality*</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalansawe</td>
<td>Hasharon</td>
<td>local council</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaljulia</td>
<td>Petah Tiqwa</td>
<td>local council</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar qara'</td>
<td>Hadera</td>
<td>local council</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatt</td>
<td>Hadera</td>
<td>local council</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qasem</td>
<td>Petah Tiqwa</td>
<td>local council</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Fahm</td>
<td>Hadera</td>
<td>municipality</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Bara</td>
<td>Petah Tiqwa</td>
<td>local council</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A'ra'ra</td>
<td>Hadera</td>
<td>local council</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zemer</td>
<td>Hasharon</td>
<td>local council</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahal Iron</td>
<td>Hadera</td>
<td>regional council</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Baqa al-Gharbiyye was granted a status of municipality in March, 1996

(Source: State of Israel, 1995)
institutions were abolished following the establishment of Israel. Those Arab towns obtained new official local administration from the Israeli Interior Ministry in the 1950s. Taiyba, Tira and Baqa al-Gharbiyye received local council status in 1952. They became municipalities in the years 1988, 1994 and 1996 respectively. Other Arab towns and villages acquired their local administration during the 1950s were Qalansawe, Kafar Qara’ and Jatt. The largest Arab town of Umm al-Fahm received the status of a local council in 1960 and became a municipality in 1986. The last Arab towns to receive official local administration were the eight Arab towns of Nahal Iron, which became a rural and then regional council in 1992. The four small Arab villages of Marji, Ibthan, Yama, and Ber al-Sikka split in 1992 from the Jewish Emiq Hefer Regional Council to establish the Zemer local council. The A’ra local council was formed in 1970, as well as the A’ra’ra local council. In 1995, the Interior ministry abolished A’ra’s local council and incorporated the town into the A’ra’ra local council.

In the Arab settlements of the Little Triangle, the Arab local governments constitute the only institutions for the development of the settlements. Because of this, the local governments have become the only venue for the local population to solve their problems. However, with limited
financial resources, the Arab local governments are not ready or able to meet the challenges that they face. This can be blamed mainly on the central government's policies against the Arab local governments (Rosenfeld & Al-Haj, 1990, pp. 41-51), although some blamed the latter for not pressuring the central government (Kalcheim & Rozevitch, 1990, p. 75).

Changes in the Little Triangle: De-Arabization of the Land

Since the establishment of Israel, Arab-Jewish relations have been marked by continuous ethnic competition over the control of the land. This competition must be understood within the historic context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As with the other Arab regions in Israel, the Little Triangle has been faced with various policies promoting the Judaization of its land. Since 1948, Israeli agencies have not hidden their goal of creating an irreversible map -- a new demography of economic and political realities. Two phases of changing realities in the study region can be recognized. The first phase is the de-Arabization of the land, that is the minimization of the Arab landholding in the region. This took place in the first two decades after the establishment of Israel. The second stage, which started in the early 1990s, is the attempt to shift the demographic balance in the region. The
Department of Rural Settlements of the Jewish Agency and the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization, for instance, have stated in a development plan for Nahal Iron (the northern part of the Little Triangle) that they recommend the:

development of strong Jewish settlements as a way to balance the development of Arab homogeneous regions. It is necessary to define the method of development of the Jewish settlements (as separate identity between the Arab settlements or as independent system within the jurisdiction of the Arab settlements (Jewish Agency & World Zionist Organization, 1987, p. 25).

The process of de-Arabization of the land was started immediately after the establishment of the State of Israel. The series of confiscations and transfers of land, along with laws enacted in early statehood (see appendix A), had several impacts on the Arab towns in the Little Triangle. The majority of the Arab land in the region was confiscated and transferred into Jewish hands. Today, out of the 250,000 dunums of the Little Triangle area given to Israel following the Armistice Agreement with Jordan in 1949, only around 40 percent is still under Arab local government control (Figure 5.5). An important portion of this land, including land within the jurisdiction of the Arab towns, is still controlled by the Israeli Land Authority. All Arab towns now have a much smaller portion of the land that they
possessed prior to the establishment of Israel. The average land per person among the Arabs in the Little Triangle has dropped from 19 dunums in 1945 to less than one in 1993 (Table 5.3).

The Building of Jewish Settlements: 1949-1966

All of the land that was confiscated in the early years was passed to the State of Israel. This land later served as a basis for Jewish settlements. Most of the Jewish settlements in the Little Triangle are agricultural communities (Kibbutzim and Moshavim) with very limited population. The goals for establishing these Jewish settlements were both to control land and to promote frontier settlement. The Jewish population enjoys considerably larger portions of land per person in the Little Triangle than the Arab population. The average land per person in the Jewish settlements vary from 4.27 to 34 dunums (Table 5.4), compared to the Arab average of mostly less than one dunum per person (Table 5.3).

The new Jewish settlements of the Little Triangle were incorporated into four different Jewish regional councils: Derom Hasharon, Lev Hasharon, Emeq Hefer, and Menashe. In order to create territorial continuity for the Jewish settlements in the regional councils, the Arab towns and villages were fragmented into four Arab subregions: Kafar
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town's Name</th>
<th>Area* 1945</th>
<th>Population 1948</th>
<th>Area 1993</th>
<th>Population 1993</th>
<th>Dunums per Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Fahm</td>
<td>77,242</td>
<td>6,196</td>
<td>25,323</td>
<td>28,100</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahal Iron</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,069</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A’ra’ra</td>
<td>35,339</td>
<td>2,584</td>
<td>6,169</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qara’</td>
<td>18,093</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>6,441</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa</td>
<td>22,024</td>
<td>2,528</td>
<td>9,009</td>
<td>15,400</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatt</td>
<td>9,631</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>6,866</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zemer</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>3,529</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalansawe</td>
<td>27,496</td>
<td>1,738</td>
<td>8,385</td>
<td>11,200</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyba</td>
<td>40,625</td>
<td>4,842</td>
<td>19,195</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tira</td>
<td>31,359</td>
<td>3,589</td>
<td>11,750</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaljulia</td>
<td>12,685</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Bara</td>
<td>8,059</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qasem</td>
<td>12,765</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>8,473</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* area in dunums, 1 dunum= 1000 sq meters. 1000 dunums= 1 square kilometer

Table 5.4

Jewish Settlements in the Little Triangle, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area in dunums</th>
<th>Land per person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bargay</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>4,710</td>
<td>10.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarhiv</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagor</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omez</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>11.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyal</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>9.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nir Eliyyahu</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yad Hanna</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>17.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahan</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>9.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizzane Oz</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sede Hemed</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sha’r Efrayim</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>7.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mezer</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>5,587</td>
<td>13.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magal</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>4,376</td>
<td>10.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horeshim</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>9.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me A’mmi</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>34.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zur Natan</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>9.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nirit</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Newman & Orgad, 1991; Personal Interviews, Heads of Regional Councils, 1996)
Qasem, Taiyba, Baqa al-Gharbyie, and Umm al-Fahm (Figure 5.5).

The Building of Jewish Settlements after 1967

Following the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Israeli government's efforts to build Jewish settlements was shifted to the new Occupied Territories. Between 1967 and 1986, only one Jewish settlement, Nirit, was built in the Little Triangle. However, a policy change regarding the region came in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s because of the large immigration wave from the former Soviet Union. The Israeli government began to intensify the Jewish presence in the Little Triangle, further altering the demography of the region. It initiated the construction of new Jewish communities and the expansion of already existing ones. The major plan to Judaize the Little Triangle is known as the "Seven Star Plan". During the 1990s, the government of Israel has built new settlements in all parts of the country; however, the Little Triangle has received the lion's share.

Changes in the Little Triangle: The Judaization of the Region

The Seven Star Plan

The Seven Star Settlement Plan, adopted by the Israeli-
led Likud government in 1990, had its origin in an earlier 1970 plan known as the Axis of the Hills Settlements Plan. The original plan aimed at bringing into being a chain of Israeli settlements parallel to the crowded axis of coastal Israeli towns. This plan, however, was neglected during the 1980s due to economic stagnation and the slowed Jewish immigration to Israel. It was revived only in the early 1990s in the wake of the new wave of Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union.

The Seven Star Plan was introduced by Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Minister of Housing. Concentrating on a narrow 80 kilometer strip of land alongside the Green Line, the area extends from Modi'in in the south to Umm al-Fahm in the north (primarily covering the study area of the Little Triangle). The plan aimed to establish seven new major Jewish towns in the area and to expand the already existing Jewish settlements between the Arab towns (Table 5.5). Scheduled to be completed in the year 2005, it will transform the Little Triangle into a predominantly Jewish region. By the year 2005 the Seven Star area is projected to have a population of 555,000, with 393,000 Jews and 162,000 Arabs (as compared to the present population of 40,000 Jews and 150,000 Arabs). The Arabs of the region today make up 71.5 percent of the total population, but will drop to only 36 percent (Adiv & Schwartz, 1992, p. 4). The
Table 5.5
Jewish Settlements of the Seven Star Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town's Name</th>
<th>Year Found</th>
<th>Area (in dunums)</th>
<th>Population 1995</th>
<th>Planned Population 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rosh HaAyin</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sha'r Efrayim</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kochav Yair</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modi'in</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuham</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zur Yiga'1</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tal Iron</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bat Hefer</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Ministry of Housing, 1991; Personal Interviews, Heads of Regional Councils).
Seven Star Plan also designates the construction of 14 industrial zones to provide approximately 75,000 jobs for the new immigrants and settlers, as well as the building of commercial centers and service stations along Highway 6.

According to Elish Efrat, a geographer and urban planner at Tel-Aviv University, one major goal of the Seven Star Plan, which was not publicly acknowledged, is the disruption of the Arab territorial continuity along the west side of the Green Line by intensifying Jewish settlements in the region. Another principal motive is the erasing of the Green Line through the locating of the Jewish population (Efrat, 1992, p. 28).

**Location of Jewish Settlements**

The location of the new Jewish settlements on the Green Line, or immediately to its west side, are designed to alter the region’s demography by creating a Jewish majority. Israeli officials have stated on several occasions that their aim is to push the border line farther east, planning for the time when peace negotiations over the boundary line with the Palestinians begin. (Most Israeli maps, including official ones, already neglect the Green Line entirely).

In addition, many of the new Jewish communities are strategically located. Many face Arab towns on the east side of the Green Line (in the West Bank). This is evident
for the location of Matan, which faces Hableh; Cochav Yair and Zur Yiga’l, which face Qalqilya; Bat Hefer, which faces Tulkarm and Shweiki; and Tal-Iron town, which faces Ya’bid (Figure: 5.3). Furthermore, some of the towns, such as Matan and Tal-Iron, are located at higher elevations than the surrounding area. High topography, in fact, has been one of the important factors in determining the locations of Jewish settlements in much of Israel as well as in the West Bank.

**Shape of Jewish Regional Councils and New Settlements**

Besides the strategic location of the Jewish settlements, the geographical shape of the Jewish regional councils and communities also serve to implement the Israeli goals. Elongated shapes attempt to control as much Arab land as possible in the border area, with the specific intention of fragmenting any contiguous Arab territory. This gerrymandering, attributable to the Ministry of Interior, left some Arab towns (such as Jaljulia and Nahal Iron Regional Council) with very awkward shapes; for instance, the regional councils of Derom Hasharon and Menashe today control great deal of land in the Little Triangle (Figures 5.6, 5.7), even though they are populated with a very limited number of Israeli inhabitants (Table 5.6).
Figure 5.6: Derom Hasharon Regional Council

Source: Based on Dar A-Shararah 1993
Figure 5.7: Menashe Regional Council

Source: Based on Newman and Orgad 1991
Table 5.6

Regional Councils and their Jewish Population in the Little Triangle and Adjacent Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Council</th>
<th>Population 1995</th>
<th>Area (dunums) 1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Derom Hasharon</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>84,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lev Hasharon</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emeq Hefer</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menashe</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Personal Interviews, Heads of the Regional Councils, 1996).
The elongated shapes of the new communities of Matan, Zur Yiga’l, Kochav Yair, Bat Hefer, Tal-Iron (Figures 5.5, 5.6) have dual purpose, erasing the Green Line as well as separating the ethnic-national continuity of the Palestinian Arabs on both sides of the border line. Some of the new communities, such as Matan and Bat Hefer, spill over into the Occupied Territory. They cross the Green Line, up to as much as 150 meters within the Occupied Territory of the West Bank. The Israeli government explains this situation as the need to build an electronic fence between the Arab settlements and the new Jewish towns (Schwartz, 1996, p. 3).

The Trans-Israel Highway

A principal component of the Seven Star Settlement Plan is the construction of Highway 6 or the Trans-Israel Highway, a major roadway which will traverse the length of Israel from south to north. Derived from National Planning Project 31 in 1990, the proposed highway will be the first toll-road in the State of Israel. It will be constructed by private contractors, supported by foreign financing, and the contractors will be granted rights to operate businesses along the highway, such as gas stations, restaurants, and kiosks. (Ministry of Housing, 1990, p. 61). The highway will extend 243 kms, from the Negev in the south to Galilee in the north, be eight lanes wide (100-140 meters), and have
26 intersections. It will cross 75 towns, necessitating the confiscation of more than 55,000 dunums of land (Shwartz, 1993, p. 14).

The Trans-Israel Highway will have a major impact on the geography of Israel. While creating new urban centers, it will succeed in marginalizing others. The highway will cross the Little Triangle, connecting the Jewish settlements with ramps and overpasses. Only a few of the Arab towns, such as Jatt and Baqa al-Gharbiyye, will have direct access to the highway. For instance, the Arab town of Taiyba, with a population of 23,000 in 1993, will not have any direct connection to the highway. In addition, thousands of dunums of Arab private land will be confiscated to construct the highway, leaving other Arab land inaccessible. Many Israeli political and environmental organizations are opposed to the construction of the Highway 6. As Efrat has noted: "the new artery, Israel's biggest bypass, will divert funds that could be spent improving transportation systems along the coast, where the vast majority of immigrants are already live." Efrat warns that the new communities will require considerable new infrastructure, for "... these communities will extend, finger-like into the heavily populated Arab 'Triangle' northeast of Tel-Aviv, breeding unnecessary political factionization over land and development rights" (Flectcher, 1991, p. 20).
The High Tension Power Line

In 1994 and 1995 the Israeli Electric Company constructed high tension power lines across the privately owned Arab lands of Qalansuwe, Taiyba, Tira and Jaljulia. The Arab local governments did not know of, or participate in, the decision-making process for the route of the power lines. These lines are designated to supply electricity to the Jewish settlements in the occupied territory of the West Bank. The power lines run along Highway 6. However, within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Tira, the lines were moved farther west which led to the confiscation of more cultivated Arab land. The right-away for the lines (150 meters wide) have restricted the land use for thousands of dunums of private Arab land. The farmers can use the land, but only to cultivate certain crops. Green houses, as well as, storages or homes cannot be built. Where the lines cross close to their homes, the Arab residents are concerned about their health and the possibility of radiation. A failed legal attempt was made by the local government of Qalansawe, Municipalities of Tira and Taiyba, as well as local farmers, to prevent the passage of the high tension power lines from crossing their land. In their petition the Arab local governments and the farmers claimed that the Israeli Electrical Company planned the power line passage without considering Highway 6. "Had this high-voltage line
been planned so that the no-construction zone overlapped with the 300-meter no construction zone along the road, the damage would have been minimized" (HCJ, 4174/94). This was, however, taken into consideration when the power lines crossed Kibbutz Eyal lands, Highway 6. However, the power lines separated upon reaching the Tira and Taiyba jurisdictions. The Arab local governments then submitted an appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court, but the court also rejected their appeal.

The Impact of the Trans-Israel Highway in The Little Triangle

The Trans-Israel Highway, which will be a total of 300 meters wide with its 'no construction zone' on each side of the highway proper, will have a tremendous impact upon the Little Triangle and its inhabitants. It will not only disrupt the Arab towns' jurisdictions, but it will also lead to confiscation of more than 4,000 dunums of private Arab land (Table 5.7).

The Trans-Israel Highway Bill, which was passed in the Israeli Knesset in 1995, authorized the central government to confiscate lands without a prior court injunction and denied citizens the right to appeal. Within the Little Triangle most of the expropriated land is agricultural and belongs to Arab farmers from JalJulia, Tira, Taiyiba, Zemer...
Table 5.7
Estimated Arab losses by Construction of the Trans-Israel Highway and the High Tension Power Line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab Settlement</th>
<th>Highway 6 (Confiscations) (dunums)</th>
<th>Power Line (Limited Use) (dunums)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaljulia</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tira*</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyba</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalansawe</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zemer</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatt</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa al-Gharbiyye**</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Arab Jurisdiction</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,452</td>
<td>2,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* include Road 557
** include Road 9

(Source: Arab local government heads and mayors in the Little Triangle, 1996).
and Jatt. Agriculture is a very significant source of income for the people in these towns.

The central government has suggested paying compensation to the farmers for loss of their lands. The value will be determined by its agricultural worth rather than by its anticipated business value. The government offered paying U.S. $500 per dunum for rocky land, $3,000 for irrigated land and $5,000 for cultivated plantation land. The compensation committee, which was established to deal with the farmers, is empowered to decide the value rate without showing any evidence to support its estimation of worth. In addition, only 75 percent of the confiscated land will be compensated. While the Jewish farmers demanded an increase in the compensation and an opportunity to participate in the commercial ventures along the highway, the Arab farmers demanded that the highway be built away from their private land or to compensate them dunum for dunum.

Unlike the Jewish farmers (on state land), the Arab farmers of the Little Triangle own their land and it has economic as well as political and cultural value. The Arabs want to keep the land privately-owned for the future, since land is the most expensive component of housing in the study region.

According to professor Hubert Law Yone, an urban
planner at the Technion in Haifa, the construction of Highway 6 is not intended to facilitate transportation in Israel.

The aim of the Trans-Israel highway is to divide Arabs and Jews in the country, in the whole of Palestine, not just in the State of Israel. Most of the Jewish population will be on the western side of the road, and the Arab population will be on its eastern side. Not only that, in addition to Route 6, other roads, such as Route 9 will be built, whose goal is only to prevent Arab territorial and demographic settlements inside a defined area from expanding in the future. The authorities’ declared goal is to compel every Arab community to build its houses and institutions vertically. The authorities claim that Arab building is wasteful due to the fact that they build horizontally not vertically. When the Arabs began to build vertically, they conclude, their demand to expand their jurisdictional boundaries will lessen. The highway’s construction will cause the structuring of two societies, Arab and Jewish, each with a different level of development. In a few years we will see concrete jungles on both sides of the road. Arab villages will become ghettos in the absence of a plan for development and expansion (quoted in Ashkar, 1994, p. 3).

The Impact of the Seven Star Plan on the Little Triangle

The Arab local authorities in the Little Triangle have rejected the Seven Star plan, which was developed without their knowledge or participation. The Arab leaders criticize the motive of choosing the heavily populated Arab region as a target area for absorbing new Jewish immigrants, while adjacent areas are sparsely populated (Adiv & Shwartz, 1992). According to the head of Kfar Qasem’s local government, the Seven Star Plan did not take into
consideration the Arab populations' needs in the region. These government officials note that The Little Triangle is the second largest Arab concentration in Israel after Galilee and, in fact, is overwhelmingly populated with Arab inhabitants and considered a homogeneous cultural region. Following the Seven Star Plan, the Arab region will lose its character and become a Jewish one. The government plans to confiscate more land and minimize the Arab towns' jurisdiction. The land, which will be confiscated, will go to construction of Highway 6 and the building of new industrial zones. Some of the neighboring Jewish towns will be expanded at the expense of Arab towns. The Jewish town of Rosh HaAyin is already expanding to the considerable detriment to the Arab town of Kafar Qasem.

The reduction of Arab land and Arab local governments' jurisdiction will lead to the reduction of land for housing and infrastructure. This issue become very dangerous, with the continuation of a high rate of natural increase and the immigration of nomadic people from southern Israel to the Little Triangle towns. Around 20 percent of the total population of Kafar Qasem are Bedouin who immigrated to the town in the last fifteen years. The price of land, when available, has increased dramatically. Some Arab local governments, such as Kafar Bara, have taken steps to preserve its limited land by preventing "strangers" from
moving into their towns.

The Seven Star Plan will lead to increasing tension between Arabs and Jews. In a survey conducted among representatives in the Arab towns in March 1996, 75 percent of those surveyed perceived the establishment of new Jewish settlements in the Little Triangle as a threat to Arab existence in the region. In addition, 69 percent claimed that the Arab population will not benefit economically from the new towns and settlements.

Urbanization and Urban Growth in the Little Triangle

The Arab towns also have benefitted from the economic growth that Israel has experienced in the last four decades, although not at the same rate as the Jewish population. One of the most striking features of the Arab population in the Little Triangle is that more than 90 percent of the inhabitants dwell in towns with urban characteristics (in contrast to 25 percent in 1948). The process of urbanization has been very rapid. All the towns have passed from a rural stage to tentative integration into the Israeli economy in less than forty years. In the 1950s and early 1960s, most of the population were engaged in subsistence agriculture. When the military government was abolished in 1966, Arabs were allowed freedom of movement. This also meant that the Jewish labor market became more accessible to
Arab workers. For the period of the late 1960s and the first part of the 1970s, the employment was only blue collar, but during the 1980s and the early 1990s, commercial enterprises increased tremendously and the occupations of the Arabs diversified. Corresponding with the developments of the latest period, the built-up urban area has expanded and the agricultural land decreased.

The process of urbanization, which took place in the Arab settlements in the Little Triangle as well as throughout Israel, has led to increases in educational levels and in socio-economic status. These changes have also led to a drop in the birth rate, followed by the shrinking of family size and the growing importance of the nuclear family (Schnell, 1994, p. 341). The population of the Little Triangle, which had an average annual natural increase rate of 4.4 percent between the years 1961-1972, dropped to an average of 4.1 percent between the years 1972-1979. During the 1980s, the decline continued to and the natural increase rate, for instance, was 3.18 percent in the year 1983 (Shmuali et al., 1985, p. 32). In the 1990s the rate of natural increase in the Arab towns of the Little Triangle continued to decline to 2.9 percent in 1993. Nevertheless, it is still much higher than the Israeli national average, which stands at 1.5 percent (State of Israel, 1995).
Land and Housing in the Little Triangle

Land available for housing is a scarce commodity in Israel, especially in the Arab towns and villages of the Little Triangle. The regional planning committees are carefully examining new requests for enlarging the built-up areas in the Arab towns. They are cautious because there is a need to preserve the agricultural land, which makes up a large portion of the jurisdiction of the Arab towns in the region (and which has often been declining in area due to confiscation and restricted use).

Land prices in the Arab towns are very expensive. An average dunum of land costs U.S. $80,000-$140,000 in most of the Arab towns. This is in contrast to an average cost of U.S. $20,000-$30,000 per dunum in the Jewish towns, such as in Qazir, Bat Hefer and Kochav Yair. It should be noted, however, that the cost in the Arab towns is for owning the land, while in the Jewish towns it is for the right to lease the land for 49 years, after which the lease can be extended.

The shortage of land for housing is one of the reasons for the high prices in the Arab towns; another factor is that most of the land for housing is concentrated in the hands of only a few in each town. These owners generally refuse to sell any land. To overcome this problem, some Arab local governments have pressured the Israeli Land
Authority to release part of the land that it owns within the Arab towns for "public purposes." The ILA owns land within each town in the Little Triangle (Table 5.8). The Arab local governments have asked the ILA and the Ministry of Housing to initiate public housing in the Arab towns just as it has in the Jewish towns.

During May and June 1996, the ILA announced in several Israeli newspapers its intention to build public housing in several Arab towns in the Little Triangle: 25 buildings (50 units) in Jatt, 64 buildings (302 units) in Zemer, 64 buildings (147 units) in A’ra’ra, and 24 buildings in Barta’a (54 units). Only the local residents are allowed to participate in the project.

However, the projects failed to attract the residents of the Arab towns in the region for several reasons. According to Ahmad Abu-A’sbih, the head of Jatt local government, the land that was offered in his town by the ILA for lease is more expensive than the private land available in Jatt. Unlike the residents of the Jewish towns, the inhabitants of Jatt who tried to participate in the project were asked to add U.S. $15,000 toward the costs of the development and its infrastructure, such as sewage and water systems.

In Zemer, partly because of the high cost of land, the ILA planned to build vertically, building six units per
Table 5.8
Israel Land Authority's (ILA) Lands Within the Jurisdiction of Arab Towns and Arab Land Outside the Arab Jurisdictions, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab Settlement</th>
<th>Total jurisdiction (dunum)</th>
<th>Land belongs to ILA (dunum)</th>
<th>Arab land outside the town’s jurisdiction (dunum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qasem</td>
<td>8,473</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Bara</td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaljulia</td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tira</td>
<td>11,750</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyba</td>
<td>19,195</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalansawe</td>
<td>8,385</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zemer</td>
<td>3,592</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatt</td>
<td>6,886</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa al-Gharbiyye</td>
<td>9,009</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Bara</td>
<td>6,441</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Fahm</td>
<td>25,323</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahal Iron</td>
<td>4,069</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: mayors and heads of Arab municipalities and local governments, 1996).
half a dunum. According to Dyiab Ghanim, the head of Zemer local government, the ILA prohibited members of the same extended family from purchasing units in the same building. Only a few families participated in the project. The projects in A’ra’ra and Barta’a are not attracting the local residents for some of the same reasons.

Conclusion

The study region of the Little Triangle has witnessed two stages of Judaization. The first one, which mainly took place in the 1950s, was characterized by confiscating and transferring Arab lands to Jewish lands. The second stage started in the early 1990s, following the large wave of Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union and the initiation of the Seven Star Settlements Plan. While the first stage attempted to control most of the land in the Little Triangle, the second stage, besides controlling the land, will change the demographic balance of the region. The Jewish population will be the majority in the study area by the year 2005.

The construction of the Trans-Israel Highway will lead to the confiscation of more than four thousands dunums of Arab private land. The highway will limit the accessibility to several other thousands of dunums. In addition, the passage of the high power tension line will limit the usage
of several thousand dunums more.

Arab representatives have rejected the plans for Judaization of the region and have demanded full compensation for the loss of land. Their demands have been rejected. While the new plans will restrict the expansion of the Arab towns, they will not benefit the Arab population according to Arab leaders in the region.

In this chapter it has been shown that the central government plans were designated to reduce Arab land and to Judaize the Little Triangle. One of the methods of transferring Arab land to state lands has been the reduction of Arab towns jurisdictions. The ultimate power rests in the hands of the Minister of Interior in determining the jurisdictional boundaries of the Israeli towns. This situation is largely affecting the Arab towns in the study area. The next chapter will examine the fragmentation of the Little Triangle and will give a detailed examination of each Arab town’s jurisdictional development.
CHAPTER VI

CHANGES OVER TIME AND SPACE:
THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE LITTLE TRIANGLE

Introduction

Scholars such as Barlow (1981, pp. 15-25) and Morrill (1991, pp. 7-10) view fragmented municipal structures as a source of inequalities, increasing tensions, and the impedance of development. Hasson and Razin (1990, p. 56) and Razin, (1994, pp. 17-8) suggest that the boundary systems of an area reveal, not only the spatial conditions of, but also the political circumstances in the country at the time of determining the boundaries.

The fragmentation of the Little Triangle started soon after its incorporation into the new State of Israel. As mentioned previously (Chapter III), beginning in the early 1950s, a series of laws and regulations provided the legal means for a large-scale expropriation and transfer of land from Arab to Jewish hands. This process continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and the outcome has had a tremendous political impact on the Arabs and their land. The uniform territory of the Arab Little Triangle soon became fragmented, which the majority of the land become Jewish. The establishment and jurisdictions of most of the Arab local governments in the Little Triangle were
determined during this period as well, even though there have been slight changes in jurisdictions during the following decades. Today, the Little Triangle region does not function as one unit, but is divided into four distinct Arab subregions: Kafar Qasem, Taiyba, Baqa al-Gharbiyye and Wadi A'ra (Figure 5.5).

Attitude of the Ministry of Interior and the Regional Planning Committee

Based on an interview with Anna Hazan, director of the Local Governments Bureau in the Israeli Ministry of Interior, the jurisdiction of local authorities in Israel is determined by Ordinance 8 of local government legislation. The Minister of Interior can change the jurisdiction of municipalities by forming a jurisdictional commission to address specific situation. At least one of the commission members should be a non-governmental employee. However, this procedure is not absolutely necessary, and the Minister can change the jurisdiction of a local government without such a commission. But in the case of a regional council, the Minister of Interior must first notify the regional council to receive its feedback. In all cases, the Minister has great power in deciding the shape and future of the local authorities and jurisdictions in Israel.

Hazan agrees that the Minister of Interior is a
political figure with a political agenda, but she believes that the Arab local governments receive the same treatment as the Jewish ones. In 1996, she also stated that the "Arab local governments do not submit many requests for enlarging their jurisdiction; they would rather try to expand their build-up area within the jurisdiction" (Personal Interview, March, 1996). In addition, Hazan repeatedly emphasized that the building of the new settlements in the Little Triangle is taking place on State land and at the expense of the Jewish regional councils in the area. Hence, according to the director of the Local Government Bureau, Arab land was not confiscated for the establishment of Jewish settlements.

The inclusion of Arab lands within the Jewish regional councils is explained by the Ministry of Interior as the need for contiguous territory. "There is no connection between land ownership and jurisdiction of a town," according to Hazan. "A person can own land which is located within the jurisdiction of another town." However, Arab local government leaders stressed that the inclusion of Arab lands within the jurisdiction of a Jewish local authority is a prelude for confiscation. The local authorities are legally allowed up to 40 percent of any land within its jurisdiction for "public purposes." In addition, the land will be subject to municipal taxes which will be channeled
to the Jewish local authority. Hazan does not expect the Arab, or the Jewish towns, to enlarge their jurisdiction. Stating that the "jurisdiction of almost all local governments and municipalities has remained the same since their inception" (Personal Interview, March, 1996). Hazan also noted that the country is small and land highly valued.

There are many jurisdictional conflicts between Jewish local authorities, especially between the municipalities and the regional councils which try to expand at the expense of the agricultural land owned by the municipalities. The determination of jurisdiction, or any changes in the map of a local authority, leads in many cases to petitioning the High Court of Justice. The number of petitions regarding this subject matter has been increasing in the last few years (Personal Interview, March, 1996).

Zvi Herut is the Israeli head of the regional planning committee of Sharonim, which deals with Arab as well as Jewish towns. He has participated in many jurisdictional commissions and is familiar with the conditions of the Arab towns in the Little Triangle. In an interview, he stated that, generally, Arab local governments have enough land for development. He emphasized that the Arab population should build vertically rather than horizontally. "We have to protect and preserve agricultural land in the Arab towns, which have already shrunk tremendously." Herut believes
that the social structure of the Arab towns is an obstacle for urban development. He uses the example of the absence of a free land market in the Arab towns to illustrate this problem (Personal Interview, February, 1996).

Herut rejects the Arab claims that the Jewish settlements are a threat for the Arab population in the Little Triangle. "Most of the new settlements were built without needing to confiscate new lands. The threat to Arab land is minimal. Confiscation took place only for the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway." He further emphasizes that the "inhabitants of the Little Triangle benefit economically from those settlements; they offer them job opportunities" (Personal Interview, February, 1996).

Both Hazan and Herut insist that the Arab population was consulted regarding the jurisdiction of their towns. However, Professor Yossi Ginat, the former advisor for the Prime Minister for Arab Affairs who dealt with jurisdiction of Arab towns, admits that at least in the case of the Arab Nahal Iron Regional Council, the inhabitants were consulted only after the formation of the council and the allocation of the jurisdiction of the council. "The case of Nahal Iron Regional Council shows the inequality between Arabs and Jews; the inhabitants felt humiliated." He states as well that he "recommended the abolishment of the regional council and the establishment of three independent local councils in
Finally, while Hazan admits that there is a connection between the building of new Jewish settlements in the Little Triangle and the existence of the Arab towns in the area along the Green Line, Hirut and Ginat stress that there is no connection at all. Hazan, Herut and Ginat also emphasize the impact of peace on the development of the area. According to them, there are several projects being planning which will benefit the population on both sides of the Green Line.

Kafar Qasem Subregion

The Kafar Qasem subregion of the Little Triangle comprises the three southern Arab towns of Kafar Qasem, Kafar Bara and Jaljulia. While the first two towns are territorially continuous, the town of Jaljulia resembles, with an awkward shape, an island within the jurisdiction of the Jewish Derom Hasharon Regional Council (Figure 6.1).

The subregion is bordered by the Green Line on the east and by the town of Rosh HaAyin to the south. The Regional Council of Derom Hasharon borders the subregion on the west and the north. The building of Jewish settlements in this area has intensified in recent years. The Jewish town of Rosh HaAyin, which was established in 1949, had a population of 17,800 people in 1993; but plans are to transform it into
Figure 6.1: Kafar Qasem Subregion and Adjacent Area

Source: Based on Dar A-Shararah 1993
a city of 50,000 inhabitants by the year 2005. Most of the enlargement of Rosh HaAyin has come at the expense of the jurisdiction and territory of the Arab town of Kafar Qasem.

**Kafar Qasem**

In 1945, the jurisdiction of Kafar Qasem totaled 12,765 dunums. With the formation of the Arab local government in 1959, the Interior Ministry allocated an area of 8,924 dunums as the jurisdiction of the newly formed government. The remaining Arab land was expropriated from the residents of Kafar Qasem and placed under the jurisdiction of Rosh HaAyin and the Derom Hasharon Regional Council. During the 1960s and the 1970s, more Arab land belonging to Kafar Qasem's residents was confiscated and transferred to the Israeli Land Authority (ILA). By 1994 the jurisdiction of the town was 8,473 dunums, of which 2,000 dunums belonged to the ILA (Khamaissi, 1995).

The local government of Kafar Qasem submitted in 1986 a request to enlarge its jurisdiction to include some of the Arab houses which are now under the jurisdiction of Rosh HaAyin municipality. The residents of these homes have, in fact, been receiving services from the Kafar Qasem local government. In addition, the Arab local government requested the annexation of a total of 1,250 dunums located south of the town up to the Trans-Samaria Highway (Highway
The local government of Kafar Qasem justified the request by the fact that most of the land was still owned by Arabs or belonged to the residents of Kafar Qasem prior to the establishment of Israel. In the request, the local government suggested that the Trans-Samarian Highway was the "natural border" between Rosh HaAyin and Kafar Qasem.

In 1987, a jurisdiction boundary commission was formed to investigate this request of the Arab local government. The commission decided in 1989 to turn down Kafar Qasem's request and to keep the area under the jurisdiction of Rosh HaAyin. On this land, a modern industrial zone was established in 1991-2. Some industrial buildings are located less than 90 yards from the houses of Kafar Qasem. The industrial zone soon became an area which encroached upon Kafar Qasem. An appeal by the Arab local government was then partially accepted in 1991, when the commission added 320 dunums to its jurisdiction, including the Arab houses previously requested. An attempt by Kafar Qasem to share the industrial zone with Rosh HaAyin, however, failed.

In 1995, the local government of Kafar Qasem submitted a new request to enlarge its jurisdiction by another 1,332 dunums (Khamaissi, 1995, p. 2). A new boundary commission was formed, but the hopes for the enlargement of the jurisdiction were somewhat dashed because of the 1996
Knesset election and the appointment of a new Israeli Interior Minister. The new Minister of Interior, Eli Suissa, belongs to SHAS, the ultra-orthodox party, which is not in favor of transferring any lands to the Arabs.

Kafar Bara

With a population of 1,200 in 1993, Kafar Bara is the smallest town given the status of local administration in the Little Triangle. Located just north of Kafar Qasem and bordered by the Green Line on the east, the regional council of Derom Hasharon separates Kafar Bara from the third Arab town in this area, Jaljulia. Kafar Bara is surrounded by several Jewish settlements, including Horeshim, Yarhiv, Hagor, Nirit, and Matan (Figure 6.1). It is also bordered on the east by the Jewish settlement of Oranit in the Occupied Territory of the West Bank.

In 1945, the town's area exceeded 8,000 dunums. By 1994 the jurisdiction of Kafar Bara was only 1,892 dunums. This smaller area was allocated to the town when its local government was formed in 1963. In 1988, Kafar Bara, similar to the other Arab local governments, demanded the enlargement of its jurisdiction to include the private land belonging to its residents, as well as land which was confiscated in the early years of statehood. This land is mainly agricultural land, located to the west and north of
the town. Part of this land is without any jurisdictional status while another part is under the jurisdiction of the Derom Hasharon Regional Council. This land comprises a total of 2,000 dunums, including a hilly area east of the town. The residents of Kafar Bara also suspect that the Jewish settlement of Oranit, which is located just across the Green Line, will attempt to expand at the expense of their town.

A jurisdictional boundary commission was formed in May 1990 to consider the request of Kafar Bara. Meeting with the representatives of the Derom Hasharon Regional Council and the Kafar Bara local government, the commission submitted its report in January 1990. It recommended the enlargement of the jurisdiction of Kafar Bara to include the agricultural land to the west and the north of the town. In addition, the commission rejected the request made by the Derom Hasharon Regional Council to annex the area just east of Kafar Bara. The area is state land and has remained part of Kafar Bara's jurisdiction. The commission also recommended the reforestation of the land.

The jurisdictional boundary commission added a total of 600 dunums to the Arab town. Today, with an area of 2,492 dunums and a limited number of residents, the town of Kafar Bara has more land per person than any other Arab town in the Little Triangle. This situation has also kept the price
of land very low. However, the local government of the town has prohibited the selling of land to non-residents.

Jaljulia

Jaljulia, located south of the Arab town of Kafar Bara and just one kilometer west of the Green Line, is surrounded by the lands of Derom Hasharon Regional Council (Figure 6.1). In 1945, the jurisdiction of Jaljulia totaled 12,685 dunums with the town's lands connected with the lands of the Arab towns of Kafar Bara and Kafar Qasem. By 1994, the town remained with an area of only 1,982 dunums, the same total allocated to the town in 1959 when Jaljulia's local government was established. Today, with a population of about 5,000, Jaljulia has the least land per person in the Little Triangle. According to Tawfiq Khatib, a member of the Knesset and head of the Jaljulia local government, Jaljulia has the worst land reserves in the Little Triangle, and the price of land is the highest in the region.

The town lost most of its land between 1948-1952, when the majority of its residents fled the hostilities and went to the West Bank. During that period most of the agricultural land around the built-up area of Jaljulia was confiscated, becoming state land. The residents of the town were replaced by landless Arab refugees who came from different neighboring Arab towns. Today, most of Jaljulia's
inhabitants are not considered indigenous residents. In addition, many Jewish settlements were built in the area because Jaljulia is closer to the major Israeli urban centers, such as Pitah Tiqwa and Tel Aviv.

The local government of Jaljulia submitted several requests to enlarge its jurisdiction, but all the requests have been denied. In addition, most of the land in Jaljulia is still in dispute with the Israeli Land Authority (ILA). The ILA claims ownership of much of the land within the town. The land crisis in Jaljulia is expected to deepen with the confiscation of part of the agricultural land for the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway (Highway 6), and the building of a new high voltage line. Jaljulia is expected to lose 415 dunums of already limited jurisdiction to both projects (Figure 6.1) (Personal Interview, March, 1996).

Taiyba Subregion

The Taiyba subregion comprises the three towns of Tira, Taiyba and Qalansawe. Unlike Kafar Qasem, this subregion is territorially contiguous (Figure 6.2). This is, in fact, one of the largest and most important Arab subregions in Israel. By 1994 more than 50,000 people lived in the three towns. One of the indications of the importance of this subregion is that two of the eight official Arab (town) municipalities
Figure 6.2: Taiyba Subregion and adjacent Area

Source: Based on Dar a-Shararah 1993
in Israel, Taiyba and Tira, are located here. In addition, it was the first Arab subregion to have a regional plan sponsored by the Ministry of Interior. The plan, which was published in 1979, aimed "to prescribe a planning policy which will solve the problems of the region" (Ministry of Interior, 1979, p. Al).

The area is highly developed agriculturally and considered part of the Israeli bread basket. However, recent projects, such as the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway, will have its impact in the subregion. The highway will shrink the agricultural land by more than 1,000 dunums and limit access to another 6,000 dunums.

Although Taiyba and Tira have the status of municipalities, this does not translate into support from the central government's budget. For example, while Taiyba has a very limited and undeveloped industrial zone, Tira and Qalansawe have none at all. This situation forces many Arabs to commute for work to the adjacent Jewish towns.

The Governmental Regional Plan

In 1979, the Ministry of Interior appointed a planning committee to develop a comprehensive regional plan for Tira, Taiyba, and Qalansawe (Ministry of Interior, 1979). Being the only large Arab subregion that is territorially contiguous in the Little Triangle, the goal of the plan was
to design a planning policy which would solve the subregion's problems and cope with future challenges and needs. The plan proposed to create jobs and reduce dependency on outside employment, as well as preserving agricultural land in the three towns (Ministry of Interior, 1979, p. A1).

The plan recommended the allocation of resources, especially for Taiyba, and that it be the center for the subregion's economic development. The plan stressed the need for the creation of a common industrial zone for the three towns, in two stages, 100 dunums by 1985 and then 300 dunums by 1992. In addition, the plan recommended the improvement of roads, electricity, and other services (Ministry of Interior, 1979, pp. A9-A11).

The industrial zone in Taiyba was established in the early 1980s, but without the allocation of any governmental resources for its development. In fact, during the 1980s the jurisdiction of Tira and Taiyba were actually reduced, from 12,664 and 19,322 dunums to 11,750 and 19,053 dunums, respectively. However, the jurisdiction of Qalansawe was slightly increased, by 11 dunums, from 8,374 to 8,385 dunums. While both Tira and Taiyba lost territory to Derom Hasharon Regional Council, Qalansawe made its limited gain at the expense of the Lev Hasharon Regional Council.

According to representatives of the three Arab towns,
the government plan has failed to achieve its goals. The main reason has been the lack of national government economic support. Beside not allocating money, the central government has not encourage businesses to move to the industrial park as it does in similar cases in the Jewish towns. Another obstacle was the desire of the Arab leadership to see each town developed separately instead of cooperating with each other.

Tira

According to the mayor of Tira, early in this century the land which belonged to this Arab town’s inhabitants exceeded 60,000 dunums. In 1945, the total of the town area was 31,359 dunums. Tira’s land was considered among the most fertile land in the Palestine Mandate. Several Jewish settlements, including Ramat Hackovish, Herut and Kefar Hess, were built on land which was purchased from Tira’s residents prior to the establishments of Israel.

Today, the Arab town’s inhabitants exceed 15,000, and its jurisdiction is only 11,750 dunums, being slightly reduced from its territory of 12,664 dunums in 1958. With its population increase of 2.8 percent annually, Tira has made attempts to expand its area in 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1988; all of these requests have been turned down by the Ministry of Interior. Recently, the town demanded the
transfer of an area from the Derom Hasharon Regional Council to its jurisdiction. In addition, the local government of Tira demanded the inclusion of 400 dunums of Arab private land now located within the jurisdiction of the Lev Hasharon Regional Council. The Arab owners have been paying taxes for these lands to the Jewish regional council.

To the east of Tira, the new construction of the urban settlement of Kochave Yai'ar also poses a threat to Tira's land (Figure 6.2). According to the mayor of Tira, the Jewish settlement was built in a very narrow area between Tira and the Green Line. The settlement is planned to be enlarged and double its population by 2005 to 20,000, but there is insufficient land for the expansion (Personal Interview, March, 1996).

Other problems facing the municipality of Tira are the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway, the construction of Road 555, and the passage of the high voltage power line through Tira's jurisdiction (Figure 6.2). The total land that Tira will either lose or be restricted in use because of these projects, is estimated at 1,200 dunums. These lands are very fertile and are presently intensively cultivated by the farmers of Tira. This Arab town itself will not benefit directly from the Israeli projects.

Similarly, Tira does not have an industrial zone. A plan has been submitted by the municipality to the regional
planning committee to establish an industrial zone between the planned highway and Road 444, just east of the town. This area comprises 1,100 dunums. The regional planning committee in 1994 permitted the establishment of an industrial zone on only 84 dunums. However, later, in 1995 the committee abolished its decision because of the construction of the highway.

Taiyba

Taiyba, located four miles northeast of Tira, shares the same problems as its Arab neighbors. The town, with 24,000 people in 1994, is the second largest town in the Little Triangle. It was the first to receive local administration status; its local government was established in 1952 and its jurisdiction was determined in 1954. Taiyba under the British Mandate was known by the extent of its lands. Some of Taiyba’s land even reached a point close to the Mediterranean Sea. The land which belonged to its inhabitants in 1945 was 37,000 dunums, but this area was reduced to 19,350 dunums after the establishment of Israel. By 1993 the jurisdiction of Taiyba had been reduced slightly, to 19,195 dunums.

Taiyba’s locational situation makes it very difficult for the town to expand its jurisdiction. While the Green Line borders the city on the east, two Jewish settlements
restrict it on the north and south. These two settlements, Shaa’r Efrayim and Zur Natan, are planned to be expanded in the future. The only way Taiyba can expand is to the west. However, in that direction Taiyba is already bordered by the two Arab towns of Tira and Qalansawe, as well as two other Jewish settlements, A’zri’l and Kefar Ya’bez, which were built on Taiyba lands (Figure 6.2).

The construction of the Trans-Israel Highway and high voltage power line threaten more land confiscation, as well as limiting access to more than 5,000 dunums of Taiyba’s cultivated land. This latter problem results from the fact that the planned highway will not have any tunnels or bridges to enable Taiyba’s farmers to access their land across the highway.

Finally, Taiyba, which received municipality status only in 1990, has an industrial zone of 450 dunums established in the early 1980s. It is the largest Arab industrial zone in Israel and the first to be recognized by the government in any Arab town. However, the industrial area, with its thirty companies, firms and shops, lacks even the most basic infrastructure, such as roads and sewage systems. There are also half a dozen factories in Taiyba’s industrial zone which are owned by Israeli Jews. Those factories are under the jurisdiction of the Derom Hasharon Regional Council and they, in fact, pay taxes to the
regional council rather than to Taiyba’s municipality.

Qalansawe

Qalansawe, with more than 12,000 people in 1995, is the smallest town in the Taiyba subregion. The jurisdiction of the town was 28,000 dunums in 1945, but the government assigned 8,385 dunums to the town in 1955 when the first local government was established. The town is surrounded by Jewish settlements on all sides except to the east, where Taiyba is located. Most of the Jewish settlements were established in early statehood on Qalansawe’s land. A new Jewish community, Zuran, was built just west of Qalansawe in the last few years to facilitate the absorption of new Jewish immigrants (Figure 6.2). Although the Trans-Israel Highway does not cross Qalansawe’s land, the town is going to lose several hundred dunums of its jurisdiction due to the construction of secondary roads and the building of the high voltage power line through its lands. However, Qalansawe may be able to enlarge its jurisdiction at the expense of Taiyba. In 1994, the local government of Qalansawe submitted a request to annex 200 dunums purchased from Taiyba’s farmers and located at the edge of the town.

So far, the expansion of the built-up area in Qalansawe, as well as the rest of the Arab towns, has come at the expense of the Arab cultivated areas. This situation
is devastating according to the head of the local council, because more than 50 percent of the laborers residing in the town are engaged in agriculture. In addition, the town is still without an industrial zone (Personal Interview. March 1996).

**Baqa al-Gharbiyye Subregion**

The Baqa al-Gharbiyye subregion comprises the three towns of Zemer, Jatt, and Baqa al-Gharbiyye (or simply Baqa). In 1993 the populations of the towns were 3,800, 6,300, and 15,500 respectively (Stat of Israel, 1995). While Jatt and Baqa are territorially contiguous, Zemer is located farther South, separated from the rest of the towns in the subregion by the Kibbutz Maggel (Figure 6.3). Baqa, the largest town in the subregion and considered the center of economic activities, received its local administration status as a local council in 1952 and very recently (1996) became an official municipality.

The immediate threat to the jurisdiction of the three towns is the construction of Highway 6 and Road 9. The route of Highway 6 is very controversial in this area and has been opposed by different political and environmental groups. The National Planning Committee also suggested different routes through this area. Both the three Arab local governments in the subregion and The Jewish Menashe Regional
Figure 6.3: Baqa al-Gharbiyye Subregion and Adjacent Area

Source: Based on Dar A-Shararah 1993
Council, tried to push the route away from their agricultural land. Yet under pressure from the Kibbutz movement (the majority of the Jewish settlements in Menashe Regional Council are Kibbutzim), the route still passes through the jurisdiction of the three Arab towns. Besides the confiscation of several hundred dunums, the new route splits the cultivated land. Similar to other areas of Arab land, there is no plan for tunnels or overpasses for the Arab farmers to reach their land west of the planned highway.

Zemer

Zemer is actually an agglomeration of four different Arab villages: Yamma, Ber al-Sikka, Ibthan and Marji. They were split by Road 574, but were administratively unified in 1988 under one local government known as Zemer (Figure 6.3). Between 1969 and 1988, the four villages were part of Emeq Hefer Regional Council. The residents, unsatisfied with the services provided by the Jewish regional council, demanded secession from the regional council and the formation of local governments in the Arab villages.

Zemer is a border town located between the new Jewish community of Bat Hefer and Kibbutz Maggel. Prior to 1948 the four Arab villages were considered branch settlements for the larger Arab towns of A’til and Dier al-Ghosoun, located
today in the West Bank. The war of 1948 separated them from their towns.

It is difficult to know the precise area of the Arab villages prior to the establishment of Israel. However, the head of the Zemer Local Government estimates that the area which belonged to the residents of his town in 1945 was about 30,000 dunum. Today, the jurisdiction of Zemer is 8,250 dunums.

Zemer, as well as most of the Arab towns in the Little Triangle, suffers from the planned construction of the Trans-Israel Highway. The highway was planned earlier to cross directly through the town, splitting the built-up area of Zemer in two. The Zemer Local Government proposed a different route and threatened to petition the Supreme Court to prevent the construction of the highway because of the inevitable number of houses that would be demolished. The protest by the local government led to the change of the highway route. However, the new route now passes through Zemer's greenhouses and agricultural land. It is estimated that the town will lose around 500 dunums of its fertile land due to the construction of the highway.

Jatt

Jatt, located on a hill in the center of the subregion (Figure 6.3), has had its local council status since 1959.
In 1945, the land belonging to its inhabitants was 18,000 dunums, but most of the land was confiscated in the first decade of statehood. In 1994, the total jurisdiction of Jatt was 6,866 dunums.

The town's major problem is the lack of basic infrastructure, especially the lack of a sewage system and its very narrow streets. The local government provides the basic services to the residents but it cannot keep up with the rapid urban expansion that is taking place. Jatt does have a very small industrial zone of 20 dunums, but only 5 dunums are in use. The Jatt Local Government is working to enlarge it and trying to attract businesses to invest in the area.

The major challenge facing the Jatt Local Government is, not only the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway, as mentioned above, but also the planning of another road, Road 9. While the former will cross Jatt's cultivated land on the west, the latter will split Jatt's land on the north. Highway 9 is designated to connect the coastal area of Israel with the Jewish settlements in the West Bank (Figure 6.3). According to the highway plans, Jatt will lose 1,100 dunums of its agricultural land. The planning maps also do not indicate the construction of any tunnels or bridges to connect the town with its land which will remain on the other side of both highways. In an interview with the head
of the Jatt local government, Ahmad Abu Asbeh, he expressed his fear that "there is an attempt to restrict the jurisdiction and the development of my town by major highways; Highways 6 in the West, Highway 9 in the North, Road 574 and the Green Line in the East, and Kibbutz Maggel in the South." (Personal Interview, March 1996).

**Baqa al-Gharbiyye**

The change in Baqa al-Gharbiyye's status from local council to municipality in 1996 did not indicate any greater development than other Arab towns in the Little Triangle. As with the rest of the towns in the region, the new municipality lacks basic infrastructure and has many problems. Taiyba and Baqa are the only official cities in Israel without a sewage system. In addition, a neighborhood of this Arab town, which is part of Baqa's built-up area with around 500 residents, is located within the jurisdiction of the Jewish Menashe Regional Council. Although the residents are paying taxes to the Jewish regional council, that council does not provide any services. They must come from the Baqa municipality.

Baqa is crossed by the historical Road 574, which was built prior to the establishment of Israel. It has a modest industrial zone of 60 dunums, but which is considered the busiest and the most developed one in any of the Arab towns.
in the Little Triangle.

The Baqa al-Gharbiyye Local Government was established in 1952 and the jurisdiction allocated to the town was 11,000 dunums, considerably less than the 22,024 dunums prior to the establishment of Israel. The area was again reduced during the 1960s, when the Ministry of Interior transferred 2,000 dunums of Arab private land to the Menashe Regional Council.

In an interview, the mayor of Baqa believes that his town suffers the same major problems as Jatt and Zemer. The houses of Baqa and Jatt are just 300 yards from each other, and a major junction which will connect Highway 6 with Highway 9 will be built between Baqa and Jatt. The mayor stressed the irony "that while we Arabs are paying the price of the construction of the highways, the neighboring kibbutzim are rushing to benefit economically from the highways by proposing the building of service stations in the junction area." Arabs, of course, will not be allowed to operate service stations for the new highway (Personal Interview, March 1996).

Wadi A‘ra Subregion

The Wadi A‘ra subregion is the largest in the Little Triangle, both in terms of area and population. The subregion includes the towns of Kafar Qara‘, A‘ra, A‘ra‘ra,
the city of Umm al-Fahm, and the Nahal Iron Regional Council which comprises eight Arab small towns and villages. With more than 60,000 Arabs living in the area in 1994, the largest settlement is Umm al-Fahm which functions as the center of Wadi A'ra. With a population of 32,000, the city is also the largest in the Little Triangle. The subregion expands to both sides of Highway 65, the main route which connects the center of Israel with Nazareth and other important cities in northern Israel (Figure 6.4).

Unlike other areas of the Little Triangle, Jewish settlements here are few. While the government of Israel rushed immediately after the establishment of the state to settle Jews in other areas of the Little Triangle, the first Jewish settlement in the heart of Wadi A'ra was the Jewish settlement of Me Ammi established in 1963. It was followed by Qazir, but not until in 1982. It is true that Barqay was built on the southwestern edge of Wadi A'ra in 1949, but not until the 1970s did the government of Israel put together a plan "to control the Arab urban expansion in the area" (Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organization, 1987, p. 25).

The Arab towns in the Wadi A'ra subregion are faced with harsher Israeli plans to reduce their jurisdiction and to increase the Jewish presence in the area. These plans, according to the mayor of Umm al-Fahm, attempt to fragment the Arab territorial continuity in the subregion. While
Figure 6.4: Wadi A'ra Subregion and Adjacent Area

Source: Based on Dar A-Shararah 1993
reducing the jurisdiction of the city of Umm al-Fahm, the
Ministry of Interior annexed A’ra to A’ra’ra in 1992 without
its agricultural land, and, hence, it was placed under the
control of Haifa District. In addition, the ministry
unified all of the small Arab settlements into Nahal Iron
Regional Council and placed the towns’ agricultural land
under the Jewish Regional Councils of Menashe and Megiddo
(see Chapter VII).

**Kafar Qara’**

Kafar Qara’ is located on the northern side of Highway
65 and is in the western part of Wadi A’ra Subregion (Figure
6.4). The residents of the town owned 18,092 dunums in
1945, but when the local government of Kafar Qara’ was
established in 1958, the central government allocated only
6,441 dunums for the town. By 1996, the jurisdiction was
increased by 850 dunums, but most of this expansion came at
the expense of the Arab town of A’ra.

Although the planned Highway 6 does not cross the
jurisdiction of the town, it does pass on the western edge
(Figure 6.4), limiting the town’s possible expansion. The
town cannot expand in other directions; Highway 65 is to the
south, a newly planned Jewish city of Iron is to the east,
and the existing Jewish settlement Regavim is to the north.
In addition, the Kafar Qara’ local government wants to annex
the area west of the town, because the inhabitants of Kafar Qara' own, or used to own, much of the area.

The town with a population over 12,000 persons in 1995 still does not have an industrial zone. However, in 1996 the local government filed an application for the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the town as well as the establishment of an industrial zone.

A'ra and A'ra'ra

A'ra and A'ra'ra are two Arab towns in the heart of Wadi A'ra, stretched alongside Highway 65 (Figure 6.4). The two towns have many ties and the proximity of the towns has allowed the emergence of common institutions, such as the high school in A'ra'ra. Residents of A'ra and A'ra'ra owned 34,000 dumums prior to the establishment of Israel, but about 15,000 dunums of these lands were lost in 1953, when the government declared a vast area in Wadi A'ra as a "military zone." Large scale confiscation of Arab land took place for "public purposes", especially along the route of Highway 65. Part of this land was also transferred to the newly established Barqay Kibbutz just west of A'ra'ra.

In 1970, the Ministry of Interior announced the establishment of two local governments, granting a jurisdiction of 6,150 dunums for each town. Soon, there was a dispute over a neighborhood known as al-D’hrat. The
Ministry of Interior placed the neighborhood within the jurisdiction of A'ra'ra, because it is located on the same (southern) side of Highway 65. A'ra, located on the northern side of the highway, demanded the neighborhood because of proximity as well as historical and kin relationships between the residents. Finally, the Ministry of Interior placed the neighborhood under the jurisdiction of the Jewish Menashe Regional Council. It also abolished, in 1975, the local government of A'ra because the residents would not cooperate with the appointed local government.

In 1983, a jurisdiction committee was formed by the government to discuss land disputes in the Wadi A'ra subregion. The committee, which was headed by the present Director General of the Interior Ministry of Israel, A'mram Kala'ji, (who then was an official employee of the Ministry of Interior) met with A'ra's representatives in 1987. The committee recommended the annexation of A'ra's residents to A'ra'ra, and since that date the central government has dealt with A'ra as a neighborhood of A'ra'ra.

However, the local government of A'ra'ra, as well as the residents of A'ra, rejected the annexation decision and did not cooperate with the Ministry of Interior in carrying out the decision. Also, A'ra'ra's local government refused to provide services to A'ra's residents; for instance, it returned all of the money allocated for A'ra's elementary
school.

In 1992, after a request of A’ra’ra’s local government to enlarge its jurisdiction, a commission of inquiry was formed. Concentrating on the issue of A’ra’s annexation to A’ra’ra, this commission was headed by Efrayim Lepead, a former general in the Israeli army, and two Ministry of Interior officials. The commission approved the previous recommendation of annexation of A’ra to A’ra’ra. The incorporation includes only A’ra’s built-up area of 1,800 dunums. A’ra’s agricultural land of more than 4,000 dunums was placed under the jurisdiction of Haifa District. A’ra’s annexation to A’ra’ra became a reality following the local government election of 1993. The local competition among candidates forced A’ra’s inhabitants into participating in the election. Today, the local government of A’ra’ra has tried to restore some of the agricultural land placed under the jurisdiction of Haifa District, so far without any success.

During the 1980s, A’ra’ra succeeded in enlarging its jurisdiction by 700 dunums. This took place by adding adjacent Arab lands and houses. However, it still lacks basic infrastructure, including a sewage system and an industrial zone. According to Mustafa Jammal, the head of the local government, the Israeli Land Authority "owns 3,000 dunums within our jurisdiction which are not used, and we
can't use them. These lands sometimes impede the
development of our town, some of them located in very
important locations within the town itself."

**Umm al-Fahm**

With over 30,000 people in 1995, Umm al-Fahm is the
largest Arab town in the Little Triangle. Early in this
century the town and its surrounding villages controlled
over 140,000 dunums. According to the British Mandate
statistics, the town's area in 1945 was 77,242 dunums. Umm
al-Fahm lost most of its land in the first decade after the
establishment of Israel. Although the town was the largest
in the Little Triangle the Ministry of Interior granted it
local administration only in 1960. In that year the
population of Umm al-Fahm was about 7,500 and the town was
given a jurisdiction of 29,000 dunums.

Umm al-Fahm was granted the status of a municipality in
1986. By 1996 the jurisdiction of the town was only 22,360
dunums; about 10,000 of this was state land, which is
usually barren or partially forest. However, the residents
of Umm al-Fahm own around 16,000 dunums outside the
jurisdiction of their town (Law Yon & Vrinsky, 1996). Some
of this land is located within the adjacent military zone
and cannot be used, although the rest is still cultivated by
its Arab owners.
In 1985, the Minister of Interior appointed a committee headed by Yossi Ben Daniel to investigate Umm al-Fahm’s grievances regarding the jurisdiction of the town. After two meetings the committee recommended the reduction of the town area by 8,000 dunums. The committee suggested redrawing a new boundary for the town. All land north of Highway 65 was to be incorporated into the Jewish Regional Councils of Menashe and Megiddo, excluding the neighborhood of En Ibrahim (Figure 6.4). But this recommendation was rejected by the Interior Minister.

In the same year, another jurisdictional boundary commission was established, headed by Professor Elisha Efrat. The commission recommended the reduction of Umm al-Fahm’s jurisdiction by 3,117 and the annexation of an area of 160 dunums of Arab private land to the town. The Minister of Interior accepted the recommendation of the commission in 1991.

In an interview with the mayor of Umm al-Fahm, he stated that the confiscation of Arab land and the reduction of the town’s jurisdiction will probably continue, despite the opposition of the municipality. The municipality has, in fact, demanded the enlargement of the town’s sphere of influence. It contracted with the City and Region Research Center of the Institute of Technology at Haifa to prepare a plan, with several alternatives, for the enlargement of the
jurisdiction of the city. The plan suggests the annexation of Arab private lands belonging to the inhabitants of Um al-Fahm and located outside the jurisdiction of the city, the annexation of several small and satellite towns, and the return of Arab land which had been recently confiscated by the central government of Israel (Law Yon & Vrinsky, 1996, pp.30-2).

Umm al-Fahm is one of the poorest towns of Israel. The natural population increase rate is 3.3 percent a year. Most of its citizens are blue-collar workers commuting to the adjacent Jewish towns, as well as to Tel Aviv and the Haifa metropolitan areas. The city is still without an industrial zone. Although some factories exist and industrial activities are present, they are located within the residential and commercial areas along the main entrance road to the city. Until the present, the Jewish Regional Council of Menashe, through the Ministry of Agriculture, has succeeded in blocking any attempts to build a proposed industrial zone of 80 dunums in the area bordering the Jewish settlement of Me Ammi. The head of Menashe Regional Council claims that the proposed industrial zone will have a negative impact on the environment (Personal Interview, April, 1996).

The city also suffers from the existence of a military camp and installations in the En Ibrahim neighborhood
(Figure 6.4). The municipality demands the relocation of the camp outside the jurisdiction of the city. In addition, part of the 16,000 dunums owned by the residents of Umm al-Fahm, and located outside the jurisdiction of the city, is inaccessible because the land is located in the area declared as a "military area". Another part, estimated to be several thousand dunums, is located within the Megiddo Regional Council.

Arab Villages in the Menashe Regional Council

The three small Arab villages of Umm al-Qutuf, Meser and al-A’ryan are administratively part of the Menashe Jewish Regional (Figure 5.7). While al-A’ryan joined the council only in 1993, Meser and Umm al-Qutuf have been part of the council since the late 1960s. Before 1948, the settlements were branch towns of Umm al-Fahm and Qiffeen, the latter located in the West Bank.

Among the villages, Meser is the largest with 1,300 persons, followed by Umm al-Qutuf with 570 and al-A’ryan with 135 persons in 1995. However, in terms of area, Umm al-Qutuf is the largest with 1,500 dunums, followed by Meser’s 400 dunums and al-A’ryan’s 220 dunums.

The three villages receive their services from the Menashe Regional Council. In interviews, representatives of the towns complained about discrimination and the lack of
basic services in their villages. The budgets that are allocated to the towns are very limited. These complaints confirm the results of earlier research conducted by Abu-Raya (1994), which showed that Arabs in the regional councils in Israel are discriminated against. Abu-Raya's research, which concentrated on four different regional councils, concluded that the Jewish settlements received far better services and developmental projects than the Arab towns.

The three villages are facing an immediate threat to their land due to Jewish settlement activities in the area. Recently, a road to the new town of Harish was constructed across the land owned by the Arab residents of Umm al-Qutuf, despite the fact that other paths on state land were possible for connecting Harish with Road 444. In addition, in 1980, Harish Kibbutz was established within the regional council of Menashe. It comprises an area of 163 dunums, which belonged to the residents of Umm al-Qutuf and was confiscated and transferred to the newly established Kibbutz.

Finally, the town of al-A'ryan became part of the Menashe Regional council in 1993. Prior to that year, the small village was not recognized as an official settlement. Its population even faced the possibility of relocation to Um al-Fahm. Yet, despite being an unrecognized settlement
without local administration, the residents developed their village at their own expense and without any central government assistance. They have provided themselves with running water, electricity, paved road and telephone lines.

Conclusion

The confiscation of Arab land in the Little Triangle following the establishment of Israel has led to the fragmentation of a culturally uniform Arab region. Today the region is divided into four different subregions: Kafar Qasem, Taiyba, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, and Wadi A’ra. Most of the Arab local governments in this region were formed between 1952-1960, when the Ministry of Interior allocated limited jurisdictional areas to most of the towns. Yet, it did not include all the Arab lands within the jurisdiction. Arab local governments received only small portions of the land which had belonged to the people prior to 1948.

The jurisdiction of the Arab towns typically has not increased since their inception in the 1950s and 1960s, despite the high growth rate of population and the demands for land by the Arab local governments. In fact, the area of many Arab towns has continued to decrease.

The central government prepared two regional plans for the Arab towns in the Little Triangle. The first one was in 1979 for the Taiyba subregion and the other in 1984 for Wadi
A'ra's Arab and Jewish towns. The Arab leaders in the study area have particularly expressed their concern over losing more land due to two major projects: The Seven Star Settlements Plan and the construction of The Trans-Israel Highway (see Chapter V).

The government of Israel has continued its policy of de-Arabization of the land. By the 1970s, most of the Little Triangle territory had become state land. The government's current goal and policy are to have a majority Jewish population in the region.

In this chapter, I have provided a detailed examination of the Arab towns' jurisdiction after the establishment of Israel. I have shown that the uniform cultural Arab region was fragmented and most of its lands became state lands. However, the fragmentation of the study area and the reduction of Arab towns' jurisdiction by the central government results, sometimes, in ethnic mobilization and local resistance. Local resistance can reduce the damage brought on as a result of central government actions. This analysis, of power exercised by the state, represented by the central government and the local resistance, will be the object of the next chapter in the case study of Nahal Iron Rural Council.
CHAPTER VII

NAHAL IRON RURAL COUNCIL: A CASE STUDY

Introduction

This chapter examines Israeli central government policy towards the local population in eight Arab villages in the Little Triangle. The aim is to show how the central government works to fragment the jurisdiction of the Arab towns, and the limitations on power that the state can exercise in its efforts to control ethnic minorities, as well as the extent of resistance to state policies on the local level. It uses the case study of Nahal Iron Rural Council, documenting and analyzing the popular resistance by the Arab inhabitants of the area. In addition, the consequences of the governmental policy will be considered.

As early as 1947, Britain's Local Government Boundaries Commission suggested nine elements concerning governmental areas. Among the most important factors were (1) wishes of inhabitants, (2) size and shape of area, (3) community of interest, (4) population characteristics, and (5) financial resources (Douglas, 1968). Two decades later, in Canada, the Ontario Committee on Taxation proposed five criteria for governmental areas. Among the most important criteria was that "a governmental area should be delineated in such a way that is able to perform its functions effectively and
efficiently." and that "a governmental area should possess a sense of community in terms of historical geographical, economic and sociological characteristics" (Barlow, 1981, p.135). Bergman and Jackson (1973) added that the territorial extent of a governmental area should be large enough to comprise a resource base sufficient to accommodate societal needs.

The Eight Arab Villages in Nahal Iron

Located in the northern part of the Little Triangle, the small towns and villages of Zalafeh, Salem, Biada, Mushirfeh, Musmus, Mouawiya, Ein a-Sahla and Barta‘a were built in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Figure 7.1). They are considered branch settlements to larger towns, in the area of Umm Al-Fahm and A’ra’ra. All of these villages were annexed by Israel following the Israeli-Jordanian Armistice Agreement of 1949.

The demographic characteristics of the populations in the eight villages are similar to the rest of the Little Triangle. By 1994, there were about 13,000 persons living within the jurisdiction of the Nahal Iron Rural Council (Table 7.1). With a natural increase rate that exceeds 3 percent, the population is very young; over 45 percent being under the age of 16. The population is entirely Muslim, and some of the settlements, such as Barta‘a and Ein a-Sahla,
Figure 7.1: The Eight Arab Villages of Nahal Iron

Source: Based on Dar A-Shararah 1993
Table 7.1


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<td>260</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>6,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>1,793</td>
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</table>

comprise only one tribal clan. These are communities of close blood ties. Sometimes, the kin live across major borders, such as in the case of Barta'a which is split into two villages, Western Barta'a within Israel and Eastern Barta'a within the West Bank. The town was divided after the demarcation agreement of 1949 between Israel and Jordan. The Kabaha clan resides in both villages and the residents of both villages continue to have close relationships (Amara & Kabaha, 1996, pp. 23-4).

In the early years of statehood the villages were very isolated, without connections to any major roads. They did not have electricity, phones, or running water. Today all the villages and towns are connected with major highways. While some of the villages have sufficient water supplies, none of them has a sewage system or a high school. More than 50 percent of the labor force commutes to adjacent Jewish towns (Amara, et. al, 1994). The local administration in the eight settlements is represented by an appointed traditional leader, the mukhtar, who has limited power.

Establishment of the Rural Council

On December 24, 1992, the Interior Ministry Director-General, A'mram Qala'ji, as a representative of the Interior Minister, declared the establishment of the Nahal Iron Rural
Council. In his announcement, the Director-General stated that the aim of the establishment of this rural council was to improve services and the standard of living of the inhabitants in the eight villages. The announcement included the appointment of five council members. However, all of the members were Jews and none of them lived in the Arab settlements. The name of the rural council is Nahal Iron, a Hebraization of the Arab name of the geographic area, Wadi A'ra. Furthermore, the offices of this new rural council are set up in Hadera, a Jewish city more than 50 kms away from some of the eight villages the council represents.

The map of the jurisdiction of the eight villages which accompanied the declaration did not include most of the lands belonging to the inhabitants of the villages. Only 12 percent of the villages' land area was included in the new jurisdiction and all of the agricultural lands were excluded (Figure 7.1). This jurisdictional map of the new rural council was fragmented and the area was quite discontinuous. All of the cultivated lands belonging to the Arab residents were detached and placed under the jurisdiction of neighboring Jewish regional and local councils.

Local Resistance and Struggle

Resistance by the local population can emerge locally when there is conflict with the national level (Kirby,
The citizens of the eight villages opposed the establishment of the rural council. In the first leaflet distributed in all of the villages, the Arab leaders explained their objections to the council and suggested an alternative solution.

There were six main objections to the establishment of the rural council: 1) no resident had been consulted; 2) there were no longer territorial connections between the villages; 3) there was no common ground for the population of the eight villages; 4) the rural council offices, which were supposed to serve the population, were located outside the jurisdiction of the villages; 5) the council had a Hebrew name rather than an Arabic name; and 6) not all of the residents' land was included within the newly established rural council. The representatives declared their intent to struggle to abolish the Nahal Iron Rural Council. At the same time, they proposed to elect local councils in each of the settlements.

Public Resistance

The local committees established in the eight Arab villages. Villages also started to rally the Israeli public opinion around their cause. In their first press conference in Tel Aviv on February 6, 1993, the local committees pressed the connection between the establishment of the
Nahal Iron Rural Council and the Judaization of their area through the implementation of the Seven Star Jewish Settlement Plan (see Chapter V).

The public struggle by the inhabitants of the area included the distribution of leaflets in both Arabic and Hebrew, petitions to the Ministry of Interior also to the Prime Minister of Israel, press conferences, rallies, demonstrations and strikes (Appendix B). The public resistance, which started in January 1993 and continued until January 1996, can be divided into three different stages.

The first stage of resistance, which is described by Amara, et al. (1994, p. 25) as the "routinization" of the struggle, extended for six months and ended in June 1993. It was characterized by the quiet and local opposition to the imposition of the rural council. Most activities were limited and took place in the area of Nahal Iron. During this period, the local committees formed and attempted to bridge the differences between the representatives about how to approach the issues and rally the support of local inhabitants.

The second stage of resistance started in the summer of 1993 and continued through August 1994. During this stage, the resistance to the imposition of the rural council was intensifi ed. The local committees tried to engage the Arab
population within Israel in their struggle and to make the resistance to the rural council a national one. They called for the enlargement of the local committees to include Arab national figures, representatives of political parties such as HADASH, the Arab Democratic Party, and the Islamic Movement in Israel. The second stage was characterized by an increase in strikes and demonstrations. Many of the demonstrations were outside the Nahal Iron region, some of them in Jerusalem before the Israeli Parliament and the Interior Ministry. The number of leaflets increased and they became more "militant." In two incidents, clashes took place between the representatives of the rural council and local residents, at Zalafeh on August 10, 1993, and at Mushirfeh on January 27, 1994. During this stage, local tensions arose between the overwhelming majority who opposed the imposition of the rural council and the few residents who supported the rural council and cooperated with it. This led to a decision by the local committees to boycott the council and the people who supported it.

During this stage, the Interior Ministry formed three different commissions to investigate the imposition of the Nahal Iron Rural Council and to hear the residents' grievances. The first was the Raviv Jurisdictional Boundary Commission formed in August 1993; the second was the Deray Commission appointed in October 1993, and the third was the

The third stage of public resistance corresponded with other events which took place in August 1994. First, the Ministry of Interior abolished the Nahal Iron Rural Council and replaced it with a regional council with a new head, including two Arab members. This action eased some of the pressure exercised by the residents against the regional council. Second, there was a new Minister of Interior from the Labor Party who was more cooperative with the local population. Finally, the three commissions visited the Arab villages and met with the residents during the 1993 and 1994. They appeared to show an understanding for the Arab concerns.

Parliamentary Resistance

The popular committees, which were established in each of the eight settlements, included representatives of all political factions, young activists, and traditional leaders, such as the mukhtars. These committees tried to rally support in the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) for their cause. They invited Arab and Jewish members of the parliament to their meetings. On February 2, 1993, a member of the Knesset, Abdul-Wahab Drawshi, submitted a query (to ask a question) to the Minister of Interior, Aryeh Deri. Then on March 24, 1993, two Arab members of the Knesset,
Hashem Mahameed and Taleb al-Sanaa, brought the issue as a motion to the agenda of the full meeting of the Knesset. Later, the local committees formed a lobby among the Knesset members who supported their cause. They invited officials, journalists, and ministers to visit the region and to meet with the residents of the Arab villages. Among the ministers who visited the area was David Liba'i, the former Justice Minister. Also visiting were Amnon Rubensteiń, Shulamit Aloni and Yair Zapan, all from the leftist party, MERETZ.

Legal Resistance

Legal attempts to bring about the abolishment of the rural and later the regional council were made by the residents of Nahal Iron. On March 4, 1993, the representatives of the eight villages petitioned the High Court of Justice (HCJ) for an injunction requiring the Ministry of Interior to replace the appointed council with a "more democratic" form of local government and to repeal the establishment of the Nahal Iron Rural Council. The petitioners claimed that the imposition of the council was an illegal act because there is no law or regulation that permits the establishment of rural councils in Israel. They also claimed that the declaration of the council made by A'mram Kalag'y, the Interior Ministry Director-General, was
invalid because it was not made by the Interior Minister himself. The petitioners added that the definition and responsibilities of the rural council were vague. It must be noted that Nahal Iron is the only rural council which had been established in the State of Israel.

The petitioners also claimed that they have the right to administer their own affairs and not to be administered by outsiders. The residents of the eight villages expressed their desire to have their own separate local administrations for each settlement. In their petitions the representatives stressed the fact that none of the council members were residents of the Arab villages and, hence, were not familiar with any of the local problems.

According to the Ministry of Interior criteria, a village should have at least three thousand inhabitants to be eligible for municipal status. The petitioners rejected that claim by bringing forth the example of the newly-established Jewish local council of Tal-Iron, with a population of only 700 people, and, furthermore, that there were 60 other villages in the country that had less than 3000 inhabitants which had municipal status. The appeal to HCJ included the claim of discrimination against the local population because the jurisdictional boundaries of the rural council excluded much of the land belonging to the residents of the eight Arab villages. This exclusion of
private land owned by the residents of the Arab villages and the placement of that land under the Jewish regional councils is an avenue for "corruption and taking advantage" of the Arab Israelis (HCJ-1239/93).

The High Court of Justice rejected the petition to abolish the rural council and accepted instead the recommendation of the Interior Ministry to give the eight Arab settlements the status of a regional council. As mentioned, the change to a regional council took place in August 1994.

The residents of Nahal Iron petitioned the HCJ again in May 1994. The intent of the second petition, known as HCJ-2522/95, was similar to the first one. This was followed by a third attempt (HCJ-2523/95), this time against the newly formed regional council and the head of that council, David Azolai. The petitioners, from Barta’a and Musmus, complained about the function of the regional council and the lack of decent educational services, as well as charging the head of the council with discrimination against the citizens of the two villages. The HCJ rejected this petition as well.

Voting behavior

There was a connection between the voting pattern of the inhabitants of the eight Arab villages of Nahal Iron and
their resistance to the imposition of the rural council. Comparing the results of the 1992 national elections in the area with the recent May 1996 election shows an increase in the voter's support of the non-Zionist parties. Also, there was an increase in the support of parties who backed the residents in their struggle for the abolishment of the rural council, especially the parties of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash), the Arab Democratic Party, and Meretz. Together, these three parties received the majority votes in all eight settlements, ranging from 52 percent in Salem to 93 percent in Musmus (Table 7.2). These results show a drop in the vote for the major political Labor and Likud Parties compared with the 1992 election (Table 7.2). Prior to 1992 the support for non-Zionist parties in this area was very slim.

There is no doubt that the results may have been influenced by a range of political, economic, and social factors. Such factors include a change in voting rules for the Prime Minister, which allowed the citizens of Israel to cast their votes directly for the position of Prime Minister. Over 90 percent of the villages' voters who participated in the recent election voted for the Labor candidate, Shimon Peres, as opposed to the right-wing challenger, Benjamin Netanyahu.

In addition, the results of the 1996 Knesset election
Table 7.2
Voting Results in the Eight Arab Villages in Nahal Iron, 1992 and 1996

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<tr>
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<td>739</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: al-Itihad, 1992, p.2; 1996, p.2)
demonstrate the connection between the appointed Jewish head of the rural council and the support gained by the Ultra-Orthodox religious Party (SHAS). The appointed head, as well as the former Minister of Interior, Aryeh Deri, who was behind the declaration of the establishment of the rural council, are members of the SHAS Party. Both were elected to the Israeli parliament with the support of some Arab voters in Nahal Iron.

SHAS, which received only a handful of votes in all eight villages in the previous elections, received considerable votes in the 1996 election in most of the eight villages (Table 7.2). For instance, SHAS received as much as 15 percent of the votes in Salem and 23 percent of the votes in Barta’a. In fact, SHAS received the support of a total of 79 percent of those who voted for one of the right-wing parties, even though these parties did not support the struggle of the people against the imposition of the rural council. Arabs supporting right-wing parties in Israel is an old phenomenon. Parties used all tactics to encourage this, including paying incentives, solving personal problems, and offering jobs for their supporters (Landau, 1993, p. 132).

The results of the 1996 election in the Nahal Iron support the claims of the people’s representatives in the Arab villages that the head of the rural council and his
aids in the Interior Ministry are using a "carrot and stick" policy against the inhabitants. They are using their jobs to promote personal and party interests in the eight villages.

Policy Change

From the beginning, the local committees of the eight Arab villages have had a clear vision and agenda, and they have been very persistent in their activities. They have used all of the democratic tools that are available to them in the State of Israel. The committees staged a series of demonstrations and strikes, which kept hundreds of children away from schools. They also held many press conferences. The leaders of the villages used these methods to intensify their campaign for the abolition of the rural council. In addition, the local committees threatened to take the issue to the international stage, to ask foreign ambassadors to intervene on their behalf.

Originally, the Ministry of Interior officials perceived the opposition to the rural council as being only politically motivated, headed by a few political activists and not necessarily by the residents of the rural council. When they realized that the opposition to the rural council really was widespread, they made some changes in their policies. The Ministry invested in some villages more than
others based on the degree of opposition to the rural

One of the other indications of the state policy change
in the affairs of the Nahal Iron Regional Council was the
appointment of a jurisdictional boundary commission. The
commission was headed by Dr. Dani Raviv of Tel-Aviv
University, appointed by the Ministry of Interior on August
12, 1993. The commission started functioning only six
months later, with its first meeting on February 22, 1994.
The commission met the representatives of six Arab
settlements between January 1995 and July 1995. The
representatives of the two Arab villages of Musmus and Ein
a-Sahla boycotted the commission.

On October 14, 1993, the Interior Minister Director-
General, A’mram Kalag’y, appointed a commission to
investigate the problems facing the establishment of the
rural council and to recommend solutions to those problems.
The commission, known as the Deray Commission, held hearings
from both sides. It submitted its findings and made some
recommendations for changes, including personnel changes,
the usage of both Arabic and Hebrew when using the name of
the Rural Council, and the change in status of the council
from a rural one to a regional council. In addition, the
commission recommended the election of a local committee
from each village, "to work with full cooperation with the
Regional Council" (Ministry of Interior, 1994, p. 2). Other recommendations included increasing the number of the council seats and giving priority to the villages' residents in being hired for council jobs. Furthermore, it recommended the transfer of the council offices from Hadera to within the council area. The commission overlooked the problem of the eight Arab villages' jurisdiction because "there is a separate jurisdictional boundary committee which was formed to look over the issue of land and to suggest solutions" (Deray Report, 1994, p. 3).

Only some of the recommendations were accepted by the Ministry of Interior. The decision-makers did replace the first appointed head of the council, David Sasson, who was negatively perceived by the Arab inhabitants. He was replaced with another member of the council, David Azolai. In addition, they increased the number of council members from five to seven in order to include two Arab citizens, although these two were not residents of the eight villages. Today, there are a total of four Arab members on the regional council and one of them is the deputy head of the council. However, none of the Arab members live in the regional council settlements. The inhabitants of the eight Arab villages perceive the changes as "cosmetic" and not substantive.

In December 1994, personnel changes took place in the
Israeli government when Uzi Bara’m, a member of the Knesset from the Labor Party, replaced Aryeh Deri, from the SHAS Party as the Minister of Interior. Bara’m, however, remained in the ministry for only a short period, being replaced in August 1995 by Haim Ramon, another member of the Labor Party. Both were known as liberals and supportive of Arab needs. In his meeting with the Arab local representatives in late March 1995, the Minister of Interior encouraged them to cooperate with the jurisdictional commission established earlier by the Ministry of Interior. He decided that the local Arab councils should have only Arab names rather than Hebrew names. In addition, in January 1995 Bara’m decided to form a new investigation commission headed by Professor Yossi Ginat from Haifa University. On December 20, 1995, the commission recommended the abolishment of the regional council and the establishment of three different local councils. The first council would represent the three villages of Barta’a, Ein a-Sahla and Mouawiya, the second council would represent the villages of Zalafeh and Salem, and the last would represent the villages of Musmus, Mushirfeh and Biada. On January 23, 1996, the Interior Minister, Ramon, partially accepted the Ginat Commission’s recommendations. In a press release, Ramon announced the abolishment of the regional council and the establishment of two local councils for the eight Arab
villages. The first council would include the three southern villages of Barta'a, Ein a-Sahla, and Mouawiya, while the second council would include the rest of the villages in Nahal Iron. Ramon ordered the formation of the two councils; meanwhile, the regional council would continue to function until the establishment of the two new local administrations.

On December 12, 1995, the jurisdictional boundary commission concluded its work and recommended the enlargement of the jurisdictional boundary of Nahal Iron and the inclusion of private agricultural Arab land as well as state land within the jurisdiction of each village. The commission did not accept the locals' demand to include all Arab land within the jurisdiction of the Arab villages. However, it stressed that ownership of land does not have to correspond to the jurisdictional boundary. But the recommendations of the jurisdictional commission never reached the Interior Ministry. The commission suspended its mission on January 24, 1996, following the Minister of Interior's press release announcing the abolishment of the regional council one day earlier on January 23, 1995. A letter sent by Dani Raviv, the head of the jurisdictional commission to Amram Qala'ji, the Ministry of Interior Director-General, stated:

Following the decision to abolish the regional
council of Nahal Iron and the establishment of two local councils, we see our mission as ended and unnecessary. The criteria for the determination of jurisdictional boundaries for local councils are different from those of regional councils.

Following the Minister of Interior's decision to abolish the regional council, the local committees in all eight Arab settlements started to cooperate with the regional council, waiting for the establishment of the two local councils. After the parliamentary election in Israel in May 1996, the Ultra-Orthodox Religious party of SHAS returned to control the Ministry of Interior. The citizens of the eight villages fear that the new Minister of Interior will not carry out the decision of his predecessor. In March 1997, the Ministry of Interior abolished the regional council and established two local councils. However, the new heads of the two local councils are Jews who are active in the SHAS Party. According to the Ministry of Interior, the heads were appointed temporarily until local elections can take place. The offices of the councils are located in the Jewish cities of Hadera and A'fula.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined and documented the struggle and resistance of the population of eight Arab villages against the imposition of the rural/regional council of
Nahal Iron. We have seen that residents by taking political actions can make a difference. It also shows the limitation of power that can be exercised by the State of Israel, represented by the Ministry of Interior, over a local Arab population. The central government policies against the Arab community in the eight Arab settlements in the study area led to local resistance by the residents for three years, from January 1993 to January 1996. It concluded with the decision to abolish the rural/regional council and to largely accept the peoples' demands. In addition, the Ministry of Interior reconsidered the jurisdiction of each settlement in favor of the demands of the populations.

The struggle of the inhabitants of the area passed through three distinct stages, and has progressed from ignoring the attitude of the locals by the Ministry of Interior to cooperation with them. The struggle also intensified over time and included the peaceful and legal means allowed in the Israeli society. In only two cases did limited violence erupt, resulting in a few arrests of local activists. The mood of the resistance was influenced by the general political atmosphere in Israel. The Labor Party's ministers of interior, from Uzi Bara‘m, who replaced the SHAS Party's, Aryeh Deri, to Haim Ramon, were more sympathetic to the Arab demands, and were willing to find an equitable solution.
Having pointed to the pattern of resistance in this chapter, it now becomes necessary to evaluate the central government policy and its effect on the lives of the people in the study area. This will be accomplished through in-depth interviews with all Arab local government heads and the analysis of the questionnaire distributed in all Arab towns and villages in the Little Triangle.
CHAPTER VIII
THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE ARAB TOWNS
AND POPULATION IN THE LITTLE TRIANGLE

Introduction

The last two chapters have documented the loss of Arab lands in the Little Triangle. One may expect that the jurisdiction or the land area of Arab towns should increase over time to correspond to population increase and the function of local government. The Arab towns' population have more than doubled since the formation of their local governments. However, this is not the case in most of the Arab towns of the Little Triangle, where their jurisdictions have usually been reduced overtime. The territorial policies of the central government in multi-ethnic states such as Israel generally represent the interests of the ethnic majority (Murphy, 1989, pp. 414-7). In this case, it represents the Jewish majority in Israel.

From the Logan and Molotch (1987) point of view, land use stands at the heart of urban politics. Land, as a commodity, has both use and exchange value. For them, growth at the local level is dominated by a small and powerful elite that uses the local authority for their benefit.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current attitudes of the Arab representatives and leaders concerning the confiscation of Arab land and the Judaization plans and policies discussed in the previous chapters. The perceived consequences of these plans and policies on the Arab towns' jurisdiction, and the impact on Arab-Jewish relations in the Little Triangle is the second task of this chapter.

As this chapter will show, the Arabs of the Little Triangle are very concerned about their cultural existence. They do not trust the decision-making process nor the bureaucracy they are dealing with. They accuse the central government of attempting to sustain the economic and political disparities between Arabs and Jews. The analysis is though questionnaires and in-depth interviews conducted in 1996 by the author with Arab leaders and Jewish leaders.

The Questionnaire

Besides interviewing the Arab mayors and heads of all the local governments in the Little Triangle (see Appendix C), the author distributed a questionnaire among Arab representatives and professionals in all of the 27 Arab towns and villages in the study area. The Arab representatives were councilors or members of local governments, while the professionals were individuals who
have dealt extensively with problems of the Little Triangle, including civil engineers, lawyers, architects, and developers. The number of questionnaires, which were distributed during February 1996, depended on the municipal status and the population size of each town. More questionnaires were allocated to large towns with municipal status such as Taiyba and Umm al-Fahm. There were 263 questionnaires distributed, and the response rate was 84.4 percent (Table 8.1).

The questionnaire (Appendix D), with 37 different questions, can be divided into four sections. The first part includes general questions regarding the land area, the development of the Arab towns and villages, their land status and the Israeli decision-making process. It provides us with objective information (questions 1-19). Asking questions such as: "Who determines the jurisdictional boundaries of your town", or "Does the jurisdiction of your town include all territories that belonged to you before the establishment of Israel in 1948?" will help us understand the status of the Arab land in the past and present. The full awareness of the fate of their lands of the surveyed people is expected. In addition, it is believed that most of the Arab towns were determined by individuals without the consultations with the local residents. The second part
Table 8.1
Questionnaire Distribution and Responses in Arab Towns

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<th>Status 1996</th>
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<th>Number of Responses</th>
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<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiyba</td>
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<td>LC</td>
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<td>LC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa al-Gharbiyye</td>
<td>15,400</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qara'</td>
<td>11,100</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A’ra’ra</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Fahm</td>
<td>28,100</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab towns in Menashe R.C.</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahal Iron R.C.</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>263</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
surveys the Arab leaders' and representatives' attitudes toward the decision-making process which has influenced and/or determined the jurisdictional boundaries for the Arab local governments and land policies in the Little Triangle and Israel (questions 20-25). In this part, it is expected that the Arab representatives will point out to the unfairness in the determination of their jurisdictional towns. The third part (questions 26-32) concentrates on the Arab leaders' attitudes toward the establishment of the new Jewish settlements in the study area. Asking questions regarding the Judaization of the Little Triangle will shed the light on the common belief in Israel that Arabs are benefitted from building Jewish settlements. It is believed that the Arab benefits from the building of Jewish settlements are minimal and that the Arabs are concern to their existence in the study area. The last part (questions 33-37) deals with the attitude of the Arab representatives toward Jewish-Arab relations in general in the study region. It is suspected that the Arabs differentiate between relationship between the two populations and relations between Arab local government. While Arabs perceive the relations between the two ethnic groups as not good and that Jews are against spatial mix, they support common projects between the Arab and Jewish local governments.
The Attitude Survey Among Arab Leaders

-The Decision-Making Process

The results of the questionnaire shows that 85 percent of the Arab representatives believe that the decision making-process is unfair and not acceptable, and 92 percent believe that the Israelis have favored political considerations rather than economic or social ones as the most important factor in determining the jurisdiction of an Arab towns. Furthermore, only 39 percent believe that local Arab claims have any influence on the government's decisions. These results were supported by all Arab local government heads and mayors who showed little trust in the decision makers.

It is believed that the peace process will not have a strong influence on the land policy in Israel. Sixty-one percent of the individuals surveyed in the Arab towns believe that the government of Israel will not change its land policy. The survey in March 1996 was before the election of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party in May 1996, and so the local Arab leaders would most likely be even more pessimistic today. Centralization and concentration of land in the hands of the central government will certainly continue.
-The Building of Jewish Settlements

Most of the Jewish settlements in the Little Triangle were built in the early years of statehood, mainly in 1949-1955. Those settlements were agriculturally oriented and few people inhabited them. These were considered frontier settlements, serving a security function as well. However, within the last few years, an accelerated development of new Jewish building activities has occurred in the Little Triangle (see Chapter 5). These activities are not on the basis of pure market demands, but are due to the intervention of the Israeli authority.

The survey of local Arab leaders shows that they strongly oppose any further Jewish building activities in the Little Triangle. They perceive any new Jewish settlements as a threat to their own existence and culture (Table 8.2). Among the responses, 82 percent acknowledge that they feel building Jewish settlements is a threat to Arab existence in the region. Arab leaders believe the economic benefit of new Jewish settlements to the Arab population is negligible. While only 16 percent considered the Jewish settlements as economically beneficial to the Arab population, 69 percent rejected the statement. This is also true regarding employment. Only 22 percent claim that the new Jewish settlements in the Little Triangle would
Table 8.2

Attitude of Local Arab Leaders on the Building of New Jewish Settlements (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26-The building of new Jewish settlements in the region threatens my existence in the Little Triangle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-The building of Jewish settlements near my town benefits the Arab population of the region economically.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-The establishment of Jewish settlements near my town provides employment for the residents.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-The building of new Jewish settlements in the region is influenced by the existence of Arab towns along the border line.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-The building of new Jewish settlements in the region is connected with the arrival of hundred of thousands of Jewish Immigrants.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-The building of new Jewish settlements in the region is connected with the possible eviction of Jewish settlers from the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-The building of new Jewish settlements encouraged my local government to file a claim requesting the enlargement of its jurisdiction.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1= strongly agree  2= agree  3= no opinion  4= disagree  5= strongly disagree

Note: rows expressed in percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.
provide employment for the Arab population.

According to the responses, most local Arab leaders of the Little Triangle (93 percent) believe that the building of Jewish settlements in the region is largely influenced by the existence of Arab towns being close to the Green Line along the West Bank. In addition, the inhabitants of the region see a connection between Jewish building activities and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants (88 percent). On the other hand, most surveyed people (60 percent) do not see any connection between the building of new Jewish settlements in the region and possible eviction of Jewish settlers from the Occupied Territories.

Finally, one positive outcome from building new Jewish settlements in the Little Triangle, as seen by the responses, is that they encourage Arab local governments to file claims requesting the enlargement of Arab local government jurisdictions. Among the responses, 65 percent supported that statement, which was also supported by most of Arab mayors and heads of local governments during their personal interviews.

Jewish-Arab Relations in the Little Triangle

Most people surveyed support common projects between
Jewish and Arab local governments (81 percent) (Table 8.3). Arabs, in the study region, strongly feel that they are not welcome to live in the new Jewish towns in the area (96 percent). In addition, Arab leaders prefer to have common projects with other Arab local governments (94 percent). However, the majority (55 percent) reject the incorporation with other Arab local governments. Many believe that incorporation and unification of Arab local government will only lead to the reduction of the Arab town's jurisdiction.

Discussion

The study attempts to examine the decision-making process in Israel regarding the issue of allocating land to Arab local governments, the impact of these policies on the Arab population in the study area and the perception of the local population.

The findings of the study support the hypothesis that the decision-making process is unfair and discriminatory. As it appeared from the first part of the questionnaire, most of the jurisdictions of the Arab towns were defined by individuals representing the Ministry of Interior during the military-governed regime in the 1950s and the early 1960s.

The Arab leaders and representatives perceive the decision-making process, regarding the land area of local
Table 8.3
Attitude of Arab Leaders on Jewish-Arab Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33-The relationship</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>with the Jewish</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population living in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Little Triangle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is considered to be</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34-Common projects</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between Arab and</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish local</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governments should</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increase.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-Common projects</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>between my local</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>government and</td>
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<tr>
<td>neighboring Arab</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>local governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should increase.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-The incorporation</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of my local government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with another Arab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local government is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>welcomed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-Arab youth are</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>welcome to live in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the new Jewish towns.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1= strongly agree     2= agree          3= no opinion   4= disagree
5= strongly disagree

Note: rows expressed in percentage may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.
government in Israel, as very difficult and not efficient as well as being discriminatory in the Arab local government cases. While the process of any jurisdictional boundary enlargement request takes many years for the Arab local governments, it takes much less time in the case of Jewish municipalities. Ahmad Abu Asbih, Jatt Local Government's head, gives the example of block 8817 in his town (block is a unit of land in the Israeli land system, generally an area of several hundred of dunums). This block is located within Jatt, but it was somehow excluded within the jurisdiction of the town when the Ministry of Interior formed the first local government for the town in 1959. Jatt's local government has been trying to include the block for more than a decade, but so far its requests have been ignored.

When the Arab local governments were established in the 1950s and 1960s, the jurisdictional boundaries of each town were determined by the Ministry of Interior. No one consulted the local residents in the Arab towns. However, this rather arbitrary process no longer applies. Since the early 1980s, jurisdictional commissions have been established. In most cases, an Arab representative has been included in the commission, when they have dealt with Arab towns. Some Arab leaders quote the case of the Arab Nahal Iron Rural Council to prove, however, that not much has been
changed during the 1990s. In the Nahal Iron Rural Council's case, which was established in 1992, local residents were consulted only after the decision to establish the rural council was made by the Interior Ministry. This was done after and despite local resistance to the establishment of the council and petitioning the High Court of Justice (HCJ) (see Chapter VII).

The fact that jurisdictional commissions are limited to only making recommendations, leaving the ultimate decision in the hands of the Minister of Interior, is another concern for the Arab leaders. Since the establishment of Israel, the Interior Ministry has been controlled by a member of one of the Israeli religious parties for most of the time. Issues related to Arab lands and land in general are treated differently by the Interior Ministry, according to several local Arab government heads. Although both Arab and Jewish local governments can and have petitioned the High Court of Justice against the Minister's decision, Arab leaders believe that the jurisdictional boundaries of a town should be decided by professionals rather than political leaders.

The analysis of Arab leaders' reactions to the Israeli decision-making process has showed clear frustration and at the same time self-assertion. There is growing level of local mobilization (Enloe, 1981, p. 132), as has been seen
in the case of Nahal Iron Regional Council, and there is a growing demand for changing the decision making process toward more participation of the local residents. In this very essential question regarding the land area of the local government, the central government treats the local Arab governments as totally dependent agents, who must accept whatever is allocated to them. I think this conflict between central and local governments is fundamental to the determination of the scope of development at the local level.

Analysis of the part of the questionnaire dealing with Jewish settlement plans in the region shows that Arabs perceive it as a threat to their cultural existence. Radical transformation of the cultural landscape in the region is counter-productive. Continuing Judaization policy and its attempt to bring about a Jewish majority by the year 2005 will lead to rising tension and threaten social order and political stability. In contradiction to some scholars, the Arabs of the Little Triangle enjoy minimal economic benefits from the building of these settlements. In addition, the respondents believe that the building activities in the region are connected to the arrival of hundred of thousands of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union.
As the last part of the survey shows, this has an impact on Jewish-Arab relations. The Arabs have a complex relationship with the Jews, and while the relationship between the two ethnic groups cannot be considered good, Arab leaders demand common projects with Jewish local governments. This can be explained by the belief that the Jewish local governments have better access to the central government agencies. Through common projects, Arab local governments can maximize their development. Additionally, Arab leaders strongly support common project and cooperation with other Arab local government in larger percentage. This attitude can be explained by the need to maintain their national unity in opposition to the central government dealing with them, as individual Arab towns and different ethno-religious groups within Israel.

Finally, based on the findings of the study, Arabs as well as Jews, prefer development of their towns without ethno-spatial mix. However, the conditions in the Arab towns, especially with regard to the issue of land prices and housing, will force Arab youth to seek residence in adjacent Jewish towns, where they feel strongly unwelcome.

Economic Disparities and Obstacles to Growth in the Region

There are several factors that have impeded growth in
the Arab settlements in general, and in the Little Triangle in particular. First, land confiscation in early statehood left only part of the land in the Little Triangle within Arab hands. Most of the confiscations took place before the establishment of the Arab local governments in the mid-1950s and 1960s.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Arabs perceive land as an economic treasure and a measure of social status. Since the establishment of Israel and the reduction of Arab properties, land has become a symbol of survival and political existence in this new state. The sale of land in an Arab town is rare; so rare, that it does not function as part of a free market. Generally, the land belongs to a limited number of clans within the towns. Partly because of this shortage of land, Arabs tend not to sell it; they prefer to keep it for future heirs. In the case of necessity they will sell their land usually only to relatives, in order to keep the land in the wider family and to keep their neighborhood homogeneous. In addition, Arabs cannot buy land outside their towns and villages. Most of the land belong to the state, which can only be leased.

Secondly, from its origins, and unlike many other nation-states, the Israeli government has helped to establish class formation. The state, through its national
distribution of privileges, has structured class inequalities (Carmi & Rosenfeld, 1992, p. 15). The financial resources allocated to the Arab population and their local governments are very limited. These can be divided into external and internal resources. The external, or central government support, is basically the shares that are paid by the different ministries, such as interior, education and others, to the Jewish and Arab local governments. The internal, or local resources, are those that are paid by the local citizens in the forms of taxes and fees. There is a clear gap between the ministries' support of Jewish and Arab local governments. Al-Haj & Rosenfeld (1990) and Abu-Raya (1994) have shown that the central government support provided to Jewish local governments has sometimes been as large as ten times that given to Arab local governments.

Although the Little Triangle's population has advanced in terms of the standard of living in the last forty years, there is a distinctly lower level of economic development in the Arab towns compared to the Jewish settlements. The Arabs' per capita income is half that of the Jewish population (Carmi & Rosenfeld, 1992, pp. 42-6). Certain services and amenities are usually not available in the Arab towns. For instance, there is not a single hospital in any
of the 27 Arab towns of the Little Triangle to serve over 150,000 inhabitants. The Arab population often has to travel over 50 km for simple services. There are some health clinics. In all of the Arab towns, including the largest Arab city of Umm al-Fahm, there is not a single traffic light. Cultural centers, parks and playgrounds are rare in this region. The previous Labor government, which was elected with the support of Arab representatives in the Israeli Parliament in 1992, did increase the financial resources to the Arab local governments. Yet, it never did fulfill a former decision by the Israeli government in August 1991 to equalize the budgets between Arab and Jewish local governments within four years.

The socio-economic profile of the Arab population in the Little Triangle also indicates that the Arabs are worse off than the Jewish population. The high natural increase rate, large families, the high rate of dependent people, and the low rate of employment among women are but a few of the factors which increase disparities between Arabs and Jews in the region. The number of private cars and their age (Table 8.4) illustrates the economic disparity in the region.

The third obstacle to growth in the Arab settlements of the Little Triangle is the lack of an economic base and the absence of private investors. Most of the Arab settlements
**Table 8.4**

Private Cars in the Arab and Jewish Towns and Regional Councils in the Little Triangle and Adjacent Area, 1993.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab Town</th>
<th>Cars per 1000</th>
<th>Average age/ year</th>
<th>Jewish Town</th>
<th>Cars per 1000</th>
<th>Ave. age/year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qasem</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>Rosh HaAyin</td>
<td>259.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Bara</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>Kochav Yair</td>
<td>259.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaljulia</td>
<td>111.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Qadima</td>
<td>195.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tira</td>
<td>116.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Tel Mond</td>
<td>227.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyba</td>
<td>102.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Kfar Yona</td>
<td>206.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalansawe</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Pardis Hanna</td>
<td>203.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zemer</td>
<td>109.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>Kfar Sava</td>
<td>233.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatt</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Derom Hasharon R.C.</td>
<td>241.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa al-Gharbiyye</td>
<td>111.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>Lev Hasharon R.C.</td>
<td>240.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qara'</td>
<td>122.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>Emeq Hefer R.C.*</td>
<td>148.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A'ra'ra</td>
<td>116.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Menashe R.C.*</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Fahm</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Largely cooperative settlements

(source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995)
lack infrastructure and developed industrial zones to attract private investors. Approved industrial zones are very limited in the Arab areas, most of the planned ones being outside the Arab towns (Table 8.5). The central government has largely invested in Jewish settlements by building infrastructure there to encourage industrial firms to invest in Jewish settlements.

The lack of sufficient industry and other economic activities in the Arab towns has led to the daily flow of Arab workers to adjacent Jewish towns as well as the metropolitan areas of Tel-Aviv and Haifa for employment. According to the Arab local government heads, approximately 60 percent of the Arab laborers in the Little Triangle commute daily to the Jewish towns. Their average monthly wage in 1992 was 2,422 New Israeli Sheqels (NIS), while the Israeli average wage was 3,346 NIS (State of Israel, 1995). The Arab worker’s average income in the study area is only 72 percent of the national average.

The lack of companies and industrial firms in the Arab communities also deprives the Arab local governments in the Little Triangle of important possible revenues and resources. Large, modern companies located in the Jewish settlements usually pay rather high taxes to local governments. In his study, Abu-Raya (1994), shows that the
Table 8.5

Planned Industrial Zones in and within a Distance of 10km of the Arab Towns in the Little Triangle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab Town</th>
<th>total dunums</th>
<th>in town itself dunum</th>
<th>in Arab area dunum</th>
<th>in Jewish area dunum</th>
<th>Distance from Haifa or Tel-Aviv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qasem</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>25km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Bara</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>29km</td>
</tr>
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<td>1039</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>27km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tira</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>31km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyba</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>35km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalansawe</td>
<td>444</td>
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<td>00</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>38km</td>
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<td>Zemer</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>47km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatt</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>52km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa al-Gharbiyye</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>55km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafar Qara’</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A’ra’ra</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Pahm</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>40km</td>
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(Source: Bar-el, 1993)
non-residential taxes that were paid in 1991 to Arab local
governments were less than 8 percent of all local taxes,
while such taxes reached 52 percent of the Jewish local
governments revenues (Khamaissi, 1991, p.71) Of course,
military-oriented industries and other high-tech industries
which are highly developed and make an important
contribution to the Israeli economy are completely closed to
Arabs.

The fourth obstacle to growth of Arab towns is both
local and cultural in nature. Like the land, political
power and prestige for Arab citizens of Israel are very
limited. The local governments in Arab towns are the only
institutions where extended families and clans can compete
for political and economic power. An election to the
mayor’s position becomes a struggle for prestige. Lists of
those running in the elections have been and still are
tribally and family-based. Those lists represent, first of
all, an effort to promote tribal interests rather than the
well-being of the entire community. In certain Arab towns
within the Little Triangle, following the 1992 national
election, most of the new employees came from the mayor’s
own tribe. In most local governments, such as in Taiyba and
Qalansawe, blood ties rather than merit have been the key
for getting jobs. Nepotism has been a serious obstacle to
the function of local governments.

Local governments in the Little Triangle have not been exemplary followers of the democratic decision-making process. Despite the decentralization, which has taken place in Israel since the late 1970s, Arab local governments continue to be centralized. They still do not have professional advisors and they have no strategic planning units. Only Umm al-Fahm, the largest Arab town in the Little Triangle, has such a department. Many local-government heads still perceive their jobs as mainly providers of services and, hence, do not necessarily encourage local economic initiatives.

Cooperation between Jewish and Arab Municipalities in the Region

Judging from the in-depth interviews with the heads of the Arab local governments and the heads of Jewish regional councils in the Little Triangle, cooperation between them is quite limited. There are, however, several common projects in the area. These include a sewage treatment plant, which the Arab local governments of Kafar Bara and Jaljulia share with the Jewish Derom Hasharon Regional Council and another sewage treatment plant common to Qalansawe and the Lev Hasharon Regional Council. There are three more shared
sewage treatment plants planned or under construction in the area: plants between the municipality of Tira and Derom Hasharon Regional Council, between the Wadi A'ra Arab towns and Menashe Regional Council, and between Zemer and Emeq Hefer Regional Council.

In addition, the Arab and Jewish local authorities in the study area share several regional services. These services are provided by the central government, and include environmental protection units, police and fire stations, and trash dump locations. Occasionally, cooperation does exist in political matters, such as an Arab-Jewish rally in support of peace and against terrorism, which took place in Beit Lid Junction in March 1996.

Jurisdictional boundary disputes between Arab local governments and the Jewish Regional Councils still do exist. Among the most persistent ones are the disputes between the municipality of Umm al-Fahm and Menashe and Megiddo regional councils, and the dispute between Kafar Qasem and the municipality of Rosh HaAyin. On the other hand, many jurisdictional problems have been solved by compromise; for instance, the case of Menashe Regional Council versus Kafar Qara' and Baqa al-Gharbiyye.

The principal jurisdiction of all Arab towns was decided during the 1950s and early 1960s. During this time
the Little Triangle was under military rule and all the jurisdictions of the Arab towns were decided in consultation between the military governor and the Ministry of Interior without any consultations with the local residents.

Jurisdictional boundary commissions to deal with Arab local governments' grievances were established in the 1980s. Only around this time did the Arab local governments begin to file claims to enlarge their jurisdictions. Boundary commissions now do consult with locals in most cases. This process actually was enhanced by the establishment of Jewish settlements in the region. In the last six years, all Arab local governments have submitted at least one request for enlarging their jurisdictions.

The mode for cooperation between Arabs and Jews in the Little Triangle has increased, following the larger peace process. Cooperation with Palestinian municipalities on the east side of the Green Line in the West Bank has increased as well. There are now several industrial parks which are planned in the study area, including an industrial park common to Jaljulia and the Derom Hasharon Regional Council, Taiyba and the Lev Hasharon Regional Council, Baqa al-Gharbiyye and the Menashe Regional Council. Another industrial park will be shared between the Emeq Hefer Regional Council and the Palestinian municipality of Tul-
Karm. However, following the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the Prime Minister of Israel on May 1996 and the obstacles facing the peace process, most of the planned projects have been frozen.

Additionally, all the Jewish regional council heads and the Arab local government heads reject the idea of any type of municipal unification. While the Jewish representatives claim that the type of developments and cultural differences make the task of municipal unification impossible, the Arab representatives explain their desire to keep their lands private for themselves. They add that the central government has been using unification of Arab local governments as a tool to reduce jurisdiction of Arab local governments and control, and to confiscate Arab lands. Most Arab heads reject the idea of municipal unification of Arab towns as well. They often mentioned the unification between A'ra and A'ra'ra as an example of the loss of Arab land.

The disparities in quality of life between the Arab and the Jewish towns in the study area has encouraged several Arab families to try to move to the Jewish towns. Arab leaders expect this trend to increase, especially with some of the Arab youth, if living conditions do not improve in the Arab towns. This trend is strongly rejected by the four Jewish regional council heads that I interviewed. Nachum
Itzkovitz, the head of Emeq Hefer Regional Council, for instance, was in favor of planning mixed towns for Arabs and Jews, but he opposed the housing of Arabs in already existing Jewish settlements within the region.

The cases of the Jabarin family, from Umm al-Fahm, and the Adel Qi'dan family, from the town of Baqa al-Gharbiyye illustrate the complexity and the dilemmas faced by an Arab family trying to move to an adjacent Jewish town. The Jabarin family were allowed to move to Qazir on January 1995 only after threatening to petition the High Court of Justice.

In April 1995, the Qi'dan Family submitted a request to buy a house in Qazir, a new Jewish community in the northern part of the Little Triangle. The land is cheaper and services are far better in Qazir than any Arab town in the Little Triangle. The local government of Tal-Iron, in which the community of Qazir belongs, refused to sell a house or a piece of land to the Arab family because Arabs are not allowed to live in the new town. Qazir was built in 1982 specifically for Jews, as were dozens of other towns and settlements in Israel controlled by the Jewish Agency. The Agency receives land from the Israeli Land Authority (ILA) and is empowered by the central government to sell homes and lease land only to Jews. The Qi'dan family also demanded
the lease of a piece of land directly from the ILA, but their request was again rejected.

In July 1996 the Qi’dan family, through the Israeli Association of Citizens Rights, a well regarded Israeli organization, petitioned the High Court of Justice asking for an explanation. The family requested a ruling against the Jewish Agency, the ILA and Tal-Iron local government’s decision not to allow them to live in Qazir. In the petition, the attorney who represented the Arab family emphasized the discriminatory policy against her client. "This discrimination contradicts the essence of Israel as a democratic country... [and] based on the basic law of the man’s dignity and freedom, the state should balance between being a Jewish and a democratic state" (al-Itihad, 1996, p. 5). In their response to the petition, the representatives of the Jewish Agency (which is funded internationally), emphasized that it is empowered to build settlements only for Jews. The Agency sees itself as a "vital member in achieving the national goal of settling Jews in Israel. In its response, the Tal-Iron local government also stressed the goal of the establishing Qazir in this area as an effort to "increase the Jewish presence in the Little Triangle. Absorbing Arabs in Qazir will threaten the goal of its establishment and will lead to many Arabs who will follow"
(al-Itihad, 1996, p. 5). As of May 1997, the parties are trying to reach outside court settlement which allows the Qi’dan family to live in Qazir under certain restrictions.

Conclusion

The present analysis concentrates on the impact of Judaization on the Arab towns and population in the Little Triangle. The attitude survey of the Arab leaders and representatives reveals that the Arab population in the study area feels that their cultural and economic existence in the region is threatened. This feeling is mainly an outcome of the reduction of Arab land ownership, the accelerated Jewish building activities, and the fact that this predominantly Arab region is projected to have a Jewish majority by the year 2005.

Arab leaders and representatives believe that the decision-making process regarding jurisdiction of towns is unfair and discriminatory. Set up in a way to reduce Arab land ownership, this process is impeding the development of Arab towns. Arab leaders believe that the jurisdiction of towns should be determined by economic and social factors rather than political ones. Arab towns should not be at the mercy of the Minister of Interior who believes that land should not be sold to non-Jews (as stated by one Arab leader
in the study region).

The findings of the study refute the claim often expressed by Israeli decision-makers of equal treatment for Arabs and Jews regarding the issue of jurisdiction. Furthermore, it contrasts with the assertion of equal economic benefits, especially employment in the Little Triangle. Although the Arab population has improved its economic situation, considerable economic disparities between Arabs and Jews continue to exist. The socio-economic status of the Arabs in the study region is rather less than that of the Jewish Israelis.

The Arab population supports cooperation between Arab and Jewish local governments. The lack of basic amenities in the Arab towns and the better economic development in the Jewish towns encourages Arab leaders to support and sometimes even to initiate common projects. Many believe that through cooperation and common projects with Jewish local authorities the Arab towns can achieve greater development. However, there is more support for projects between Arab towns. This may be explained by the desperate need for better development in all Arab towns.

Despite some common projects and the desire for cooperation, the few Arabs who are seeking a higher standard of living by moving to a Jewish town are not welcome to live
there. Even though the peace process has created a conducive atmosphere for Arab-Jewish cooperation, it has not had a revolutionary impact on the way in which people think on both sides. Arab as well as Jewish local authorities prefer to preserve their independence rather than to be unified or incorporated with other local authorities.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: AN ISRAELI NATION OR JEWISH NATION?

In this chapter, I discuss three issues resulting from this study. The discussion focuses on the issues of: 1) theory; 2) central government policies toward the Arabs in Israel; and 3) Jewish-Arab relations in the future.

Theoretical Implications

This study has shown the existence of a basic theoretical problem. The literature that deals with local government is lacking any link to power, state or ethnicity. At the same time, the material that deals with power has distanced itself from local government.

Evaluating theoretical explanations from the Western point of view, particularly the U.S. perspective regarding central-local government relations or majority-minority relations, encounters some difficulties in the Israeli context. The scale and the degree of central government intervention are quite different. Theories such as "regulation" theory or "regime" theory do not fit the Israeli case. These theories are applicable only to the advanced capitalist countries such as those in Western Europe and in North America. Taking into account all the political development and the democratic processes and
institutions in Israel, a major question remains: can a theocratic state, such as Israel, be a democratic one?

This study has shown that central-local government relations in Israel should be reconsidered. Arab local governments no longer consider themselves as caretakers and agents to carry out central government policies. I believe that central-local government relations should follow Clarke and Stewart's relative autonomy model rather than the agent model, in which the local government has more power (Table 2.1). Local governments should be regarded as political systems with their own political and particular methods for conflict resolution and the discharge of their functions. Moreover, central-local relations should be viewed as a process of exchange in which both enjoy a considerable amount of independent power.

Several models that have been widely cited in the literature to describe policies toward minorities in multi-ethnic democracies include Lustick's model of "domination and control" (1980), and "consociationalism" or power-sharing of Lijphart (1977). These models have been, to a large extent, successful in many multi-ethnic countries.

Lustick (1979, 1980), introduced the "control" model in an attempt to explain political stability over time in societies that continue to be characterized by deep vertical cleavages. The model focuses on the creation and
maintenance of a relationship in which "the superior power is mobilized to enforce stability by constraining the political action opportunities of another segment or segments" (Lustick, 1979, p. 328). Lustick builds his model on the case of the Arab minority in Israel. He analyzed the control of the subordinate group (the Arabs) by the superordinate (the Jews) as a "system" made up of three "components" of segmentation, dependence, and cooptation, and the network of relationships among them. When these components operate in conjunction, they form a "system" that results in the control of the subordinate group (Lustick, 1980, p. 77). This model, which is the most widespread in the academic literature for dealing with ethnic minorities, is associated with power disparities and highly coercive regimes.

Lustick's concept of "segmentation" refers to the marginalization, internal fragmentation and the isolation of the Arab population. "Dependence" refers to the total reliance of the minority upon the majority for the most important aspects of life such as employment, development and other economic and political resources. Finally, "cooptation" is the "side payments" to the elite members among the subordinate group "for purposes of surveillance and resource extraction" (Lustick, 1980, p. 77). According to Lustick, resources were allocated based upon the dominant
majority's interest. Furthermore, the state apparatus is not a neutral force in ethnic conflict but acts instead as "the administrative instrument of the superordinate segment or group" (p. 99).

In his analysis of the Arab minority in Israel, Lustick uses three different levels: 1) structural (historical, cultural, and economic circumstances of the Arabs in Israel); 2) institutional (pattern of segmentation by the Israeli institutions); and 3) the programmatic (specific policies toward the Arabs). He demonstrated the successful control of the Arab minority by the Israeli government in the first two decades of statehood. Although Lustick acknowledges the "decrease in its [Israeli regime] ability to manipulate the Arabs population" (Lustick, 1980, p. 269), he did not go further to examine the changing political circumstances of the Arabs in Israel. Since the 1970s, the Arabs have succeeded in building representative national institutions and they have strengthened their assertiveness and political bargaining. This has led to the deterioration of the control system (Table 9.1). I believe that this model no longer fits the Israeli reality of the 1990s.

Lustick acknowledges the absence of "Jewish leadership committed to changing the fundamental terms of the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel" (1980, p. 271). He predicted that a move toward a consociational or a
Table 9.1

The Control, Consociational, and the Relative Autonomy Models

STATE POLICIES TOWARDS THE ARAB MINORITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lustick's Control Model</td>
<td>Power Disparity, Socioeconomic Gaps, Ethnic Polarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Autonomy Model</td>
<td>Segregation (already exist), Freedom of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lilja's Consociation, Power-Sharing Model</td>
<td>Conflict of Interest, Zionist Ideology, Theocratic State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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- From Jewish State to all Citizens State (Democracy with Constitution)
- Political Stability
pluralist regime would not take place unless there was a mass base political resistance developed in the Arab sector.

The consociational, or power-sharing, model offers an alternative explanation to the existing stability in deeply divided societies. Unlike the control model, however, where stability is maintained through domination, accommodation is used in the case of the consociational model. Lijphart (1977, p.25) suggests four characteristics of the consociational regime: 1) grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the pluralistic society to govern the country; 2) the mutual veto power, which serves as an important factor in protecting minority interests; 3) proportionality in political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; and 4) a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs. Lijphart (1977, pp. 129-34) considered Israel a semi-consociational democracy. However, Lijphart's power-sharing model of Israel disregarded the Arab minority. According to Lijphart, what makes Israel a plural society is its segmental cleavages among Jews. Those cleavages are religious and ideological in nature (Western vs. Eastern Jews and secular vs. religious). While he considers Canada a binational society, Israel is only theoretically a binational state.

In the case of the pluralist or the consociational
model, the initial assumption is that power lies with the people, who organize themselves to present their views, ideas and protest to the government, which then responds to the pressure brought to bear on it. In addition, consociational societies consist of a collection of interest groups competing for control over government action through the electoral process. With this model power is said to be distributed in a diffuse way and guarantees that no one group can dominate any particular segment of society. Having said that, the question that follows is, does this model fits the reality of Israel?

We have seen that these models (Lustick, 1980; Lijphart, 1977) look to power and majority-minority relations from a public administration point of view. These models are poorly connected to state theory or to historical development of societies and economic development questions.

I believe that Israel resembles neither, the consociational model nor is it a semi-consociational country. The Israeli case is a rather unique one. Israel is largely a theocratic, Jewish-Zionist state. The nature of the State of Israel contradicts the consociational promises (Table 9.1). Arabs in Israel cannot identify with its major goal of ingathering the Jewish exile, nor can they associate with the flag or even the name of the State. Israeli affirmation of being the nation-state of the Jewish people
denies the Palestinian Arabs, which make up 18 percent of the total population, the status of a national minority.

Finally, in the issue of social and territorial justice, Rawls (1971, p. 60) stated that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged ... to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged." Harvey (1973, p. 97), added that social justice involve "the division of benefits and the allocation of burdens arising out of the process of undertaking joint labour." These two principles of justice never met in the case of Israel.

So, what we need is a theory that looks at the context of rapid economic development and at local government in relation to the historical development of the state, in a setting of theocratic ideals and ethnic segregation. It should also allow us to address conflicts based on resource distribution, particularly with regards to land issues.

Central Government Policies Toward the Arabs

In this study, I have shown that the Arab citizens of the Little Triangle have lost most of their lands due to the political realities following the establishment of the State of Israel. The 1948-49 War, and its outcome, as well as the massive Jewish migration to Israel, led to large-scale confiscation of private Arab land. Over the years the uniform Arab region of the Little Triangle has lost its
character and has witnessed considerable Judaization of the region.

Since the creation of Israel, the government has managed many aspects of life, through the centrally-planned system and a state economy. All land that was confiscated from the Arab citizens or gained by acts of war was placed under the Israeli Land Authority. Today, 93 percent of the total area of Israel and around 60 percent of the Little Triangle area is considered state land. These lands, under the Israeli Land Act passed in 1960, cannot be sold. Of course, this Act largely restricts the land market in Israel.

Among the other methods which the Israeli government has used to ensure full control of the maximum amount of land has been to leave the ultimate determination of the jurisdiction of local governments in the hands of the Minister of Interior. The Arab citizens of Israel continue to have the largest portion of private land in Israel. In almost all cases, individual Israelis have decided the fate of the jurisdiction of the Arab towns in the Little Triangle. This is the case in the towns of Kafar Bara, Jaljulia, Qalansawe, Jatt and Kafar Qari’. In a very few cases, committees appointed by the Ministers of Interior have made the decisions. In most instances, the decision-making process has overlooked or dismissed the concerns of
the Arab inhabitants of the study area. This has been demonstrated with the cases study of Nahal Iron, Umm al-Fahm, A’ra’ra and Kafar Qasem.

Over the years all of the Arab local governments in the Little Triangle have requested the enlargement of their jurisdictions. Yet, most of them have continued to be reduced, not enlarged. In the early days of statehood, the Israeli government concentrated on consolidating land and building Jewish agricultural settlements in the Little Triangle. Those settlements were inhabited by a very limited number of members and controlled a vast area in the region. In recent years, and especially after the massive Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union, the region of the Little Triangle has witnessed an attempt to create a spatial demographic mixture. The planned building of the Seven Star Settlement Plan and the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway will shift the demographic balance in the region. The plan focuses on the narrow strip of the Little Triangle. Under the terms of the Seven Star Plan seven major Jewish settlements will be constructed in the area. These settlements will lead to further fragmentation of the uniform cultural Arab region of the Little Triangle. According to governmental plans, the area of the Little Triangle will have more Jewish inhabitants than Arabs by the year 2005.
In addition, mapping the location and the shape of the Jewish settlements indicates the connection between the recent peace negotiations, future settlement, and the Green Line. The new Jewish settlements of Matan, Kochav Yair, Zur Yiga'1, Bat Hefer and the city of Tal-Iron are all elongated in shape and located on the immediate western side of the Green Line, and sometimes on the border line itself.

The recent peace negotiations and agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors (in particular, the two Oslo Agreements between Israel and the PLO) have encouraged the Arab citizens of Israel to demand full equality with the Jewish citizens of Israel. All the Arab mayors and local government heads I interviewed acknowledged that there were policy changes under the Labor government (1992-1996), but they also characterized the changes as slow and focused only on financial support. They are not satisfied with the pace and scope of the changes, and, in fact, they demand the reduction of disparities and the elimination of inequalities compared to the Jewish population and settlements. The mayors traced the change mainly to a more peaceful atmosphere in the region and to the political support given to the Labor government by the Arab parties and voters.

The recent Israeli government, however, is going in the opposite direction. In fact, it increased the discrimination against the Arabs and they are targeting the
remaining Arab land in the State of Israel. Yitzhaq Eliyashiv, the General Director of the Israeli Land Authority (ILA), recently stated:

The Israeli Land Authority has decided to pay any price for purchasing non-Jewish land, even if it needs to obtain loans from a bank. Unfortunately, I am not going to obtain loans from any banks because the Arabs are not selling even one centimeter (Ha’aritz, 1997).

Most of the Arab representatives perceive the building of new Jewish settlements in the region as a threat to their culture and separate identity, which will prevent future expansion and development of the Arab towns. The Arab towns and villages continue to be deprived of basic infrastructure for their economic development, while there is continuing development of Jewish industrial zones in areas adjacent to the Arab towns. This causes the Arab population of these towns to be heavily dependent on jobs outside their towns and, of course, provides a cheap labor source for the Israeli industries.

The case study of Nahal Iron shows that the Arab citizens of Israel are able, in some instances, to successfully resist some anti-Arab policies. The declaration that established the Nahal Iron Rural Council in eight Arab villages, in the northern part of the Little Triangle was done without the knowledge and the consultation with the local population. In addition, a Jewish Israeli was appointed to head the council. The offices of the
council were set up in a Jewish city more than 50 kms away from some of the eight Arab villages the council represents. Moreover, the jurisdiction of these villages only included the built-up area. Most of the agricultural lands belonging to the Arab inhabitants were placed under the jurisdiction of neighboring Jewish regional and local councils. The recent announcement by the Minister of Interior to abolish the regional council, to establish two local governments in the eight villages, and the appointment of a committee to reconsider the jurisdiction of all eight Arab villages, shows that local residents can resist somewhat successfully governmental policies in multi-ethnic democracies such as in Israel.

As discussed, construction of the Trans-Israel Highway and other projects will lead to the confiscation of thousands of dunums of agricultural land cultivated by the Arab farmers. The limited financial compensations offered by the government are not desired by the residents of the Little Triangle, compensation, in the form of agricultural land swaps, would probably satisfy farmers and contribute to stability in the region.

Among the most difficult problems facing Arab towns is the availability of land for housing and the building of public housing. Arab officials are demanding full-scale housing projects and the building of new Arab towns similar
to those built for the Jewish immigrants. The Arabs' increasing awareness of civil rights and their search for a higher standard of living may force some of them to move to Jewish settlements. Despite many obstacles, there has been at least one Arab family that has succeeded in moving to, and living in, the Jewish town of Tal-Iron, but only after threatening to pursue its case in the Israeli Supreme Court. So far there is only a spatial mix of population at the regional level in the Little Triangle. We may soon witness a spatial mix at the local level, which may intensify the tension between the Arabs and Jews in the region. The recent results of the fourteenth Knesset (Israeli Parliament) in 1996 shows, among other things, the nationalistic emotions among the Arab citizens of the Little Triangle. Most of the Arab votes in the election were given to Arab and leftist parties that oppose the prejudiced governmental policies toward the Arabs. Although all of the Arab leaders support full integration of the Palestinian population in the Israeli society, this trend in voting, which had never occurred before, may led to potential separatism and may threaten stability in the border region.

In the last five decades, the Arab ethnic minority in Israel passed through several stages of political development. Lustick's control model, which was used by the central government, was successful in the first two decades
after the establishment of Israel. The military government limited the movement and the rights of Arabs. However, the political changes that took place in Israel, as well as in the wider region, have increased Arab awareness. During the 1970s and the 1980s, the Arab citizens in Israel succeeded in building their own political institutions and began to demand their rights vocally. They have demanded full participation in all of the state’s institutions including the Israeli Land Authority, National Planning Committee and other important institutions that were considered out of the Arabs’ sphere of influence.

Several decisions by the Israeli government to incorporate and integrate the Arabs as individuals into Israeli society through 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s never materialized. Security as well the Jewishness of the State have been the major impedance to Arabs cooperation and integration. The Arab-Israeli conflict has helped to sustain Jewish mistrust and legitimize the inferior status of the Arabs in Israel.

**Jewish-Arab Relations in the Future**

This study demonstrates that the residents of the Little Triangle are demanding radical changes in the state’s policies and procedures in all aspects of political and economic life relative to the Arab minority. Because of the
potential for ethnic conflict in Israel, and the new environment of peace between Israel and the PLO and the Arab countries, there is a need to redefine the State's relation with its Arab minority. I am suggesting a two-stage solution to this dilemma. The first stage is the recognition by the State of Israel of its Arab minority as a national one (Table 9.1). This will also redefine the relationship between the central government and the Arab local governments in Israel. It is impossible to speak of Israel as a nation-state such as France or the U.S. (where ethnicity is privatized and retains a neutral position) while ignoring the existence of a non-assimilating group consisting of 18 percent of the population. Israel is a binational and bicultural country.

My model (Table 9.1) suggests the need, in the short run, to grant relative autonomy to the Arabs in Israel. The Arabs can run their own institutions and internal affairs, such as local planning, education and health. This way their minority rights will be protected from unrestricted power of the majority. The Arabs can develop their own opportunities within their own separate towns. This may lead to temporary segregation which, to some degree, already exists. This segregation may benefit the two communities given the fact that there is a great deal of mistrust between the majority and the minority as well as between the
minority and the central government. This first stage of relative autonomy may be called the transitional stage.

The second stage, which will be in the long term, is based upon changing the essence of the State from the Zionist-Jewish state to the people's state or state of (its citizens). This model will bring about heated debate over issues such as the relationship between the state and religion - "is there an Israeli nation or a Jewish nation?" "What is the relation between the Israeli Jews and the Jewish diaspora?" and other questions related to land, which should be tackled by any democratic society. The definition of Israel as a Jewish state does not satisfy the Arab citizens. To prevent discrimination and inequality and promote stability and understanding, particularly in border regions such as the Little Triangle, Israel should reconsider much of its ideological basis.

The recent peace process has already had a positive impact on Jews as well as Arabs in Israel. The Israeli government should ease its land policies. The concentration of most of the land in public hands should be reconsidered. The government should consider dismantling the Israeli Land Authority and permit a free market of land with private ownership. Building public housing only for Jews increases the frustration among the Arabs in Israel and leads to instability for the State. I believe that the Israeli
government should initiate the building of public housing in the Arab towns. There are State lands available within all Arab towns of the Little Triangle. In addition, building a new Arab town, especially in the northern part of the Little Triangle where State land is available, may change the attitude of the Arab people and will help to solve the housing problems in the Arab towns in the region. Besides housing, the Israeli government can build and subsidize industrial zones and direct investors to invest in Arab towns.

Israel and its relations with the Arab minority is a unique case. Despite being largely a theocratic state, Israel granted its Arab population (as part of the Israeli population) some degree of democratic participation. Arabs in Israel can vote in the Israeli Parliament, as well as elect their own local governments, and can express their opinions freely. There is a need to examine more closely the Israeli case and to search for theories which are more appropriate for the Israeli case than the existing theories.

Finally, diffusing the conflict at the national level between Israel and the Palestinian people will shift the focus to the internal conflict in Israel: the conflict with the Arab citizens of Israel. Arab leaders and institutions, particularly local governments, will no longer accept the Israeli-security justification for discrimination. The Arab
population and its leaders will intensify their demand for sufficient resources and full equality in the State of Israel. They already have been demanding fair play in the game. The central government in Israel cannot continue to be a homogeneous decision-maker and be regarded as having a clear, consistent and negative set of policy aims toward the Arab minority in Israel.
ISRAELI LAND LAWS AND ORDINANCES USED TO EXPROPRIATE AND/OR TRANSFER ARAB PRIVATE LAND TO STATE OWNERSHIP

1-The Abandoned Areas Ordinance (1948) empowers the Government of Israel to seize "any land abandoned by all or some of its inhabitants... or any area captured by Jewish armed forces". In addition, the government was granted the power to enact "any regulation which it sees fit in reference to the defence of the State, the public's security, supply services... (including) expropriation and confiscation of any movable and immovable property within any abandoned area". This Ordinance was replaced by a permanent law in 1958 (Yiftachel, 1992, p.313).

2-The "Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Lands" (1948). This law authorizes the Minister of Agriculture to "take possession of uncultivated land, to ensure that it is cultivated," if "the Minister is not satisfied that the owner of the land has begun, or is about to begin, to cultivate it, or going to continue to cultivate it" (Kislev, 1976, pp.23-32).

3-The Emergency Laws (Security Areas) 1949. These series of laws enable the Minister of Defence to declare certain areas as "Security Areas", "Protected Areas" or "Closed Areas". The Law of Emergency Land Acquisition empowered the government to expropriate land whenever it is required "for the defence of the state, the security of its people, to safeguard essential services or to absorb immigrants." No one is allowed to enter these areas without a special permit from the authorities. In addition, "the competent authority may order a permanent resident in a Security Area to leave it" (Kislev, 1976, pp.23-32; Yiftachel, 1992, p.313).

4-The Law on the Acquisition of Absentees' Property (1950). This law has appeared earlier in the form of emergency ordinances related to those who left the country during the war of 1948. Under this law the State of Israel transferred hundreds of thousands of dunums from Arab ownership to state land. The law defined the "absentee" as "Any person who was a citizen of the Land of Israel, and left his ordinary place of residence" during the war of 1948 to "places held at the time by forces seeking to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel". Under this definition, the Israeli authorities determined that more than 50 percent of the remaining Arabs in Israel were...
"present absentees". Most of their properties were confiscated (State of Israel, 1950, p.86; Kimmerling, 1983, p. 139).

5-The Law for the Acquisition of Land (Operation and Compensation), (1953). This Law enacted to legitimate all land transferred in the previous laws between 1948 to 1952. While legitimizing the transfer of the land belonging to the Arabs who left the country during the war it offering "appropriate compensations" to the Arabs who remained in Israel (Jiryis, 1969, pp.75-6).

6-The Law of the Acquisition of Land in the Public Interest (1956) This law empowers the Israeli government to confiscate any lands in the public interests (Security, social, communal or any other purposes). Since most of the Arab land is private and the Jewish land is already state land, this law affected mainly the Arab citizens of Israel (Yiftachel,1992, p.313)

7-The Law of Prescription (1958). By this law the Arab land owners were required to present adequate proof of possession of the land before the establishment of the State of Israel. Any failure to do so resulted in the confiscation of the land. Many Arabs lost their ownership since registration was not made in their areas during the British Mandate (Jiryis, 1969, pp.77-8).
APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY OF THE RESIDENTS' STRUGGLE AGAINST THE IMPOSITION OF NAHAL IRON RURAL COUNCIL

12-31-1992 The appointment of five Jewish council members.
1-4-1993 Meeting between representatives of the eight Arab villages and the Director-General of the Ministry of Interior.
1-4-1993 The formation of popular committees in each village.
1-25-1993 A leaflet distributed by the local committees to the residents updating them of upcoming events.
2-2-1993 Query in the Knesset by members of Knesset Drawshi to the Minister of Interior.
2-6-1993 Press conference in Tel Aviv.
2-21-1993 A leaflet distributed by the local committees to the residents updating them in upcoming events.
2-24-1993 Members of the Knesset, Mahameed and al-Sanaa, suggested a "motion to the agenda" of the Knesset.
3-4-1993 Petition of the High Court of Justice (HCJ) against the Minister of Interior to repeal the establishment of the rural council.
4-3-1993 Public rally at Mouawiya.
6-22-1993 A leaflet distributed by the local committees to the residents updating them of upcoming events.
6-25-1993 Public rally in Mushirfeh.
7-15-1993 A leaflet distributed by the local committees to the residents updating them on upcoming events.
7-25-1993 A leaflet distributed by the local committees to the residents updating them in upcoming events.
7-30-1993 Demonstration against the imposition of the Rural Council at Barta’a conjunction.
8-10-1993 A leaflet distributed by the local committees to the residents updating them with upcoming events.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-10-1993</td>
<td>Clashes between Zalafeh inhabitants and the Rural Council officials and workers. Some locals were arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-12-1993</td>
<td>The Raviv jurisdictional commission appointed by the Ministry of Interior Director-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-14-1993</td>
<td>Demonstration at Maggido conjunction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-21-1993</td>
<td>Meeting with the Deputy of Minister of Agriculture, Waleed Sadiq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-1-1993</td>
<td>Strike in all schools in the eight Arab villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-6-1993</td>
<td>Demonstration at the front of the Ministry of Interior in Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-15-1993</td>
<td>A survey conducted by the local committees among the inhabitants of the rural council regarding their attitude toward the council. 95 percent of the inhabitants opposed the imposed council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14-1993</td>
<td>The Minister of Interior appoints an investigation commission headed by Deray.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-11-1993</td>
<td>Deray Commission meets with local representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-25-1993</td>
<td>Deray Commission meets with local representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-28-1993</td>
<td>Deray Commission meets with local representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-22-1993</td>
<td>A leaflet distributed by the local committees to the residents updating them in upcoming events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-24-1993</td>
<td>Demonstration at Maggido conjunction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1-1994</td>
<td>Demonstration at Umm al-Fahm Junction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3-1994</td>
<td>Strike at all Schools at the Rural Council villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-27-1994</td>
<td>Clashes at Mushrefeh after the appointed head of the council visit to the village.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-30-1994</td>
<td>Ginit Investigation Commission formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4-1994</td>
<td>Demonstration at Barta’a conjunction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-22-1994</td>
<td>The first Raviv Jurisdictional Commission meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4-1994</td>
<td>Demonstration at Maggido conjunction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6-1994</td>
<td>Deray commission of investigation submits its recommendations to the Ministry of Interior Director-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8-1994</td>
<td>Strikes at all schools at the Rural Council villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8-1994</td>
<td>The High Court of Justice rejects the eight Villages representatives' appeal. It dissolves the Rural Council and accepts the Ministry of Interior suggestion to establish a regional council in the eight Arab villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-30-1994</td>
<td>The representatives appeal to the HCJ against the newly appointed regional council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-11-1994</td>
<td>A leaflet distributed by the local committees to the residents updating them in upcoming events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-26-1994</td>
<td>A leaflet distributed by the local committees to the residents updating them in upcoming events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-15-1994</td>
<td>New regional council formed and headed by David Azolai and includes two Arab members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-23-1994</td>
<td>Demonstration at Wadi A'ra conjunction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-25-1994</td>
<td>Meeting between the inhabitants' representatives and the district manager of Haifa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8-1995</td>
<td>Press conference at Haifa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-23-1995</td>
<td>The Minister of Interior Bara'm meets with the representatives of the Arab villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-17-1995</td>
<td>Raviv Jurisdictional Commission meets representatives of the Arab villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-18-95</td>
<td>The Minister of Interior decides to revise the name of Nahal Iron changing it to the Arabic name of Wadi A'ra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-19-95</td>
<td>Raviv Jurisdictional Commission meets representatives of the Arab villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-20-1995</td>
<td>Ginat Investigation Commission recommends the abolishment of the Regional Council and the establishment of three different local councils.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-23-1996</td>
<td>The Minister of Interior, Ramon decides to dissolve the Regional Council of Nahal Iron and to establish two local councils in the eight Arab villages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX C

**LIST OF INTERVIEWED OFFICIALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-22-1996</td>
<td>Anna Kazan</td>
<td>Director of Local Governments Bureau, Ministry of Interior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-28-1996</td>
<td>Yossi Ginat</td>
<td>Former advisor of Arab Affairs for the Prime Minister. Director of Arabic Studies Center-University of Haifa, headed several jurisdictional committees in the Arab towns in the study area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-27-1996</td>
<td>Zvi Herut</td>
<td>Head of the Regional Planning Committee of Sharonim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-12-1996</td>
<td>Itzhak Yeshua</td>
<td>Head of Lev Hasharon Regional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-13-1996</td>
<td>Nachum Itzkovitz</td>
<td>Head of Emeq Hefer Regional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-17-1996</td>
<td>Ilan Sade</td>
<td>Head of Menashe Regional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10-1996</td>
<td>Moti Delg'o</td>
<td>Head of Derom Hasharon Regional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-21-1996</td>
<td>Nisim Izra</td>
<td>Former Head of Zemer Local Government and the Nahal Iron Regional Council advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-11-1996</td>
<td>Abraham Sarsur</td>
<td>Head of Kafar Qasem Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-12-1996</td>
<td>Kamal Rayan</td>
<td>Head of Kafar Bara Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5-1996</td>
<td>Tawfiq Khatib</td>
<td>Member of Parliament and Jaljulia Local Government Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10-1996</td>
<td>Thair Abdulhai</td>
<td>Mayor of Tira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6-1996</td>
<td>'Abdulhamid Abuata</td>
<td>Former mayor of Taiyba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7-1996</td>
<td>Yossef Taqruri</td>
<td>Head of Qalansawe Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3-1996</td>
<td>Duiab Ghanim</td>
<td>Head of Zemer Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3-1996</td>
<td>Ahmad Abu-A'sbih</td>
<td>Head of Jatt Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4-1996</td>
<td>Jalal Abu-Toa'mih</td>
<td>Mayor of Baqa al-Gharbiyye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-28-1996</td>
<td>Tayssir al-Masri</td>
<td>Head of Kafar Qara' Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-25-1996</td>
<td>Raa'd Salah</td>
<td>Mayor of Umm al-Fahm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-21-1996</td>
<td>Husien Assadi</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Nahal Iron Regional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28-1996</td>
<td>Mustafa Jammal</td>
<td>Head of A’ra’ra Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-14-1996</td>
<td>’Abdulrahim Kabaha</td>
<td>Member of Menashe Regional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-15-1996</td>
<td>Hussien Mahamid</td>
<td>Member of popular committee-Mouawiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-13-1996</td>
<td>Raa’d Kabaha</td>
<td>Member of popular committee-Barta’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-11-1996</td>
<td>Hana Sweid</td>
<td>Arab representative in the National Planning Committee in Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D

ARAB REPRESENTATIVES AND PROFESSIONALS: THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The goal of the questionnaire is to survey the opinion of Arab representatives and professionals on the issue of jurisdiction of their towns, building of Jewish settlements in the Little Triangle and Arab-Jewish relations. The questionnaire has been distributed to approximately 200 people from all Arab settlements in the Little Triangle.

1- When was the jurisdictional boundaries of your town determined?

2- What is the extent of the jurisdictional boundaries of your town?

3- Does the jurisdiction of your town include all territories that belonged to you before the establishment of Israel in 1948?

4- Has the jurisdiction of your town ever increased/decreased?

5- Did the expansion/reduction of your jurisdiction affect land prices? How?

6- When was the last time the jurisdiction of your town increased?

7- Did anybody consult with you regarding the determination of the jurisdictional boundaries of your town?

8- If you had been consulted with respect to the jurisdiction of your town, do you think the development of your town would be better?

9- Has the municipality/local government of your town ever requested the inclusion of targeted area to its jurisdiction? What was the outcome?

10- Are there demands by the citizens of your town to enlarge the jurisdiction of your town?

11- Are any neighboring localities demanding any portion of your sphere of influence?
12- Are all lands belonging to the citizens of your town within the jurisdiction of your town?

13- Is anybody in your town paying property taxes to other municipalities?

14- Is there anybody who doesn’t live in your town but pays property taxes to your municipality?

15- Does your town has a recognized industrial zone?

16- The development of my town will be impeded if it is not able to increase its extent?
   A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

17- Land for housing is available in my town
   A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

18- Prices of land in my town are acceptable.
   A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

19- Prices of land and houses in my town will lead to immigration of youth to Jewish towns.
   A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

20- Who determines the jurisdictional boundaries of your town?
   A) a government representative B) a government commission C) other

21- Does the commission include any one from your town?

22- The decision-making process regarding the jurisdiction of my town was fair and acceptable
   A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

23- Rank the following (based in the importance) considerations for determining the jurisdictional boundaries of your town?
   A) demographical B) economic C) land ownership D) political E) social F) other
24- Local claims of enlarging the jurisdiction of my town had some influence on government decisions
   A) strongly agree  B) agree  C) no opinion  D) disagree
   E) strongly disagree

25- Following the peace process, the Israeli government will change its land policy
   A) strongly agree  B) agree  C) no opinion  D) disagree
   E) strongly disagree

26- The building of new Jewish settlements in the region threatens my cultural existence in the Little Triangle
   A) strongly agree  B) agree  C) no opinion  D) disagree
   E) strongly disagree

27- The building of Jewish settlement near my town benefit the Arab population of the region economically.
   A) strongly agree  B) agree  C) no opinion  D) disagree
   E) strongly disagree

28- The establishment of Jewish settlements near my town provided employment for the residents.
   A) strongly agree  B) agree  C) no opinion  D) disagree
   E) strongly disagree

29- The building of new Jewish settlements, in the region, influenced by the existence of Arab towns along the border line.
   A) strongly agree  B) agree  C) no opinion  D) disagree
   E) strongly disagree

30- The building of new Jewish settlements, in the region, connected with the arrival of hundred of thousands of Jewish Immigrants.
    A) strongly agree  B) agree  C) no opinion  D) disagree
    E) strongly disagree

31- The building of new Jewish settlements, in the region, connected with the possible eviction of Jewish settlers from the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
    A) strongly agree  B) agree  C) no opinion  D) disagree
    E) strongly disagree
32- The building of new Jewish settlements encouraged my local government to file a claim requesting the enlargement of its jurisdiction.
A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

33- The relationship with the Jewish population living in the Little Triangle consider to be good.
A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

34- Common projects and cooperation between Arab and Jewish local governments should increase.
A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

35- Common projects and cooperation between my local government and neighboring Arab local government should increase.
A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

36- The incorporation of my local government with another Arab local government is welcomed.
A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree

37- Arab youth are welcomed to live in Jewish towns.
A) strongly agree B) agree C) no opinion D) disagree E) strongly disagree
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