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THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS IN UNIVERSITIES

by

John Frederick Steiner

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1973
I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my direction by John Frederick Steiner entitled The Presidential Selection Process in Universities be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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PREFACE

A significant portion of this study of presidential selection is an in-depth case history of the selection of President John P. Schaefer at the University of Arizona in 1971. I would be remiss if I did not point out that there was some opposition to an undertaking of this nature by individuals who participated in his selection. When it became known in the campus community that events surrounding the selection would come under scrutiny, opposition immediately arose. It would, opponents argued, "damage the university," although the exact nature of this damage was never specified. Later, when the project received the approval of the Graduate Council and I obtained the permission of President Schaefer to proceed, this criticism was muted.

I wish to state here that the contents of this dissertation are not now, and never were, intended to be an expose. In my opinion there are no heroes or villains in this story and no value judgments, expressed or implied, are intended. The case study of selection is presented here not as revelation or muckraking but as a pool of data useful in an application of analytic methods to the study of leadership selection.

The data for the case study were gathered by interviews with participants in the selection process. Forty-six
candidates, administrators, faculty members, and a miscellaneous category of persons all ran the gamut from complete frankness to suspicion of the interviewer's motives.

Since this project is a case study and richness and depth of texture were considered vital, every effort was made to let participants in the selection process tell their own story in their own words. Specific questions were asked as infrequently as possible in an effort to avoid structuring the interviewee's answers and altering their perceptions of events. Broad, general, and even vague questions had the added advantage of permitting the respondent to find his own level of specificity freely rather than under the pressure of pointed, delving questions. The individuals interviewed, of course, were well educated and did not need great prod­ding to organize their remarks and make them coherent.

The unstructured nature of the individual's response was highly valued not only because of considerations relating to the case method, but because utilization of a conceptual framework was contemplated. In Reconstruction and Philosophy the great philosopher and educator John Dewey wrote that,

Conceptions are not proffered for what they may be worth in connection with special historic phenomena. They are general answers supposed to have a universal meaning that covers and dominates all particulars. Hence they do not assist inquiry. They close it. They are not ready-made instrumentalities to be employed and tested in clarifying concrete social difficulties. They are ready-made principles
The interviews averaged approximately one to one and a half hours in length. The shortest was twenty minutes and the longest five hours. All but six were conducted in the interviewee's office during the day. During the interviews varying degrees of willingness to respond to questions were encountered. Many persons talked quite freely and appeared to answer all questions with candor. A small minority was so sensitive about the subject of their actions that they were hesitant to discuss any but the most innocuous topics, and it was not unusual for these individuals to pointedly refuse to answer some questions. An estimated majority were slightly guarded in their comments in some areas but generally anxious to be helpful. Members of the Advisory Committee, for example, were often reluctant to elaborate on the circumstances of the Zumberge endorsement. Most participants, however, seemed to feel that some disclosure of their actions was warranted for the benefit of scholarship. And as one Advisory Committee member remarked, "We didn't murder anybody or anything like that."

Where some reticence was encountered it often proved wise to return for a second interview, when the interviewee would loosen up somewhat and disclose more than he had during the first encounter. Incidentally, the degree of responsiveness to interview questions was unrelated to the group category the interviewee belonged in. Regents, presidential
candidates, administrators, faculty members, and a miscellaneous category of persons all ran the gamut from complete frankness to suspicion of the interviewer's motives.

Since this project is a case study and richness and depth of texture were considered vital, every effort was made to let participants in the selection process tell their own story in their own words. Specific questions were asked as infrequently as possible in an effort to avoid structuring the interviewee's answers and altering their perceptions of events. Broad, general, and even vague questions had the added advantage of permitting the respondent to find his own level of specificity freely rather than under the pressure of pointed, delving questions. The individuals interviewed, of course, were well educated and did not need great prodding to organize their remarks and make them coherent.

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to be imposed upon particulars in order to determine their nature.\(^1\)

In order that this utilization of a conceptual scheme not fall prey to such a telling criticism, interviewees were not asked to think in terms of "non-institutionalized group mobilization" or "preliminary coalition formation." The utilization of a framework like the one used here on non-structured interview data is analogous to a religious conversion. The convert ordinarily exercises the same old personality characteristics, predilections and vices according to a new set of principles, but to the outside observer appears to have become a different person. It is my hope that the framework utilized herein illuminates the conduct of the presidential selection process and promotes understanding by revising the context in which its procedures are perceived.

In the final analysis one question remains: Did the individuals interviewed tell the truth? There is no sure way of knowing the answer and, of course, polygraphs would not be popular in the halls of academia. When I first began to engage persons on campus in conversation about the selection process it was immediately apparent that a tangled web of rumor surrounded the events of 1970 and 1971. Even the participants were unsure of the actions of others. Conspiratorial theories, hearsay about secret meetings, speculation about

candidates' motivations, and other beguiling tales abounded. These elaborate combinations of prevarication and self-deceit shed little light on the conduct of any part of the selection process. After interviewing a large number of persons it became starkly obvious that the mixture of interests, ambitions, and institutions involved was so great and varied that the process was not amenable to the control of any single individual or group. Many participants were, themselves, in the dark about how to explain the events of that year. Members of the Advisory Committee, for example, did not know why the Board of Regents rejected Zumberge at its December 19 meeting. The full story was ultimately pieced together from varied sources, most incapable of deceit or fraud because they were not familiar with the full record.

I wish to extend thanks to my dissertation director, Dr. Conrad F. Joyner, who has been a welcome and valued source of assistance not only on this project but over the span of a graduate student's career. Dr. Joyner was a candidate for the university presidency in 1970-1971. During the preparation of this dissertation he confined his constructive criticisms to matters of organization and methodology. At no time has he endeavored to influence the factual presentation of case material with respect to his candidacy or the candidacy of others. Matters of presentation and judgments
of the relative importance of factual materials in the Arizona case study are entirely my own.

I also express appreciation for the helpful comments of Dr. Donald R. Hall, Dr. Clifford M. Lytle, Mr. Charles Rolfe, and Dr. George A. Steiner. Each of these individuals read all or part of the manuscript and, in their own way, contributed to its refinement and ultimate betterment. I extend a blanket sentiment of gratitude to the 35 persons interviewed during the course of the past six months. Their contributions of time and energy are of inestimable value.

Mr. Stephen E. Auslander of the Arizona Daily Star and Miss Phyllis Ball of the University of Arizona Library were both helpful in assisting my review of newspaper coverage of the selection process. And Mrs. Lois Putzier typed the manuscript. I appreciate greatly the role of these people in helping with the execution of this project. Finally, I accept full responsibility for any errors of fact and interpretation which may be contained in the text.

I ask the reader to accept one caveat here. Throughout the text the University of Arizona is referred to as The University of Arizona. This capitalization should not be construed as provincialism or arrogance on the part of the writer. Rather, it is a stylistic requirement of the Graduate College. I do not wish to imply that the University of Arizona is the only university, the superior university, or the university in the state by using this form.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART I: THE SELECTION OF UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS IN UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of the University President</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Importance of the Presidential Selection Process</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Evaluation of the Selection Process</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nature of Academic Governance</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Typology of Campus and Campus-related Groups</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: The Logic of the Selection Process</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A DESCRIPTIVE EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESSES</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Trends in the Selection of Presidents</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is There an Ideal Mechanism for Presidential Selection?</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification of Vacancy</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Leadership</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory Committees</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of the Outgoing President</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy in the Proceedings of Trustee and Advisory Committees</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A DESCRIPTIVE EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESSES (CONTINUED)</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclical Tendencies and Presidential Leadership</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Qualifications</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering Nominations</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening Applications</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews of Candidates</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Selection</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. A PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP SELECTION MECHANISMS</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem of Leadership Selection</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Procedural Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Leadership Selection</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage I--Group Disequilibrium</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage II--Group Mobilization</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage III--Preliminary Coalition Formation</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage IV--Final Coalition Formation</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage V--Symbolic Legitimation</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Utility of a Procedural Analysis of Leadership Selection</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Group Theoretical Approach to the Study of Political Activity</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Contribution of Group Theory to the Study of Leadership Succession</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Relationship Between Succession Procedures and Leadership Roles</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Succession at The University of Arizona</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART II: PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA: A CASE STUDY IN THEORETICAL CONTEXT</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SETTING THE STAGE FOR SELECTION</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage I--Group Disequilibrium</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage II--Group Mobilization (Direct)</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage III--Preliminary Coalition Formation</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversion to Stage II--Group Mobilization (Indirect)</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Failure of the Preliminary Coalition in 1970</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage III--Preliminary Coalition Formation</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1971)</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage IV--Final Coalition Formation</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage VI--Symbolic Legitimation</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART III: CONCLUSIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>331</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA SELECTION REEXAMINED: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td><strong>332</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td><strong>350</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of how college and university presidents are selected in the United States. The choice of these academic leaders is viewed within a larger context—the selection of leaders for pluralistic human organizations with multiple constituencies. There are analytical similarities between many types of leadership succession mechanisms.

To expedite the analysis of the selection of college and university presidents a procedural framework for the comparative analysis of leadership selection is developed. This framework has five stages: (1) group disequilibrium, (2) group mobilization, (3) preliminary coalition formation, (4) final coalition formation, and (5) symbolic legitimation. It is utilized in specific fashion to facilitate the presentation of a case study of presidential selection at The University of Arizona in 1970-1971. The focus in this case study, and throughout the dissertation, is on the actions of interest groups such as faculty, students, alumni, administrators, governing boards, state legislatures, the news media, and political influentials in the selection process.

Support is built for the thesis that the selection process, although criticized as ad hoc, slow, cumbersome, inefficient, and undemocratic, is a functional and pragmatic
institutional response to both changes in the outside environment and the need to maintain the support of university constituent groups. The selection process performs a stabilizing function in the overall conduct of academic governance.
PART I

THE SELECTION OF UNIVERSITY
PRESIDENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
CHAPTER 1

THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS IN UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

During the past decade, much ink was spilled and thousands of flashbulbs gave their lives to record the so-called "campus crisis." As popular conception had it, the theory of campus unrest was that over the course of the past decade increasingly strident student and minority demands, faculty intransigence, and deepening financial troubles politicized the universities. As a result of this turmoil conservative and anti-intellectual reaction began to encroach upon the university community like the immense slag heaps which surround Welsh mining communities. The precarious relationship between the university and the community-at-large threatened an imminent and disastrous inundation of the university. The newspaper picture of a long-haired college student in rebellion and the continuous reports of jousting between Governor Ronald Reagan and the University of California became minor signs of the times.

The picture of American colleges and universities as institutions in crisis is widely held, but its real significance is less dramatic—although of potentially greater impact. There have, indeed, been major student and faculty
insurrections on university and college campuses about the country. The uprisings at Berkeley, Stanford, Columbia, Harvard, Kent State, Southern University, and Jacksonville are ominous signs that educational institutions have become focal points of heated controversy. But the majority of campuses remain relatively tranquil in the face of vast currents of social and political change. If violence and militancy are the indisputable signs of the "campus crisis," the crisis has not yet become widespread.

Viewed in terms of more durable and underlying regularities in campus-society relationships, the real crisis is a quiet crisis which pervades the academic atmosphere at almost all institutions where unrest has been felt. Riots and faculty strikes and National Guard intervention are signs or symptoms and not causes in themselves. The real crisis facing the university campus is the need for reevaluation of the institutional role and the adjustment of campus goals to keep pace with changing demands made by groups which have a stake in the educational process. Although universities cannot be expected to sacrifice traditionally broad educational goals in the face of cries for "relevance," they all face the need of adjusting to broad changes in society. Some have had to confront demands for change sooner or under more trying circumstances than others; some have been more prepared to undertake such change; but all universities must sooner or
later come to grips with the social problems of the societies of which they are a part, even if they need not necessarily follow election returns or pander to the lowest common denominator of community opinion.

The Role of the University President

Within the college or university milieu the president is obligated to face the challenges and conflicts bearing down upon the campus. He is the salient figure and his role is inevitably controversial because attitudes which the president displays are irrevocably identified with the general principles of the institution he heads.

The responsibilities of the office are accompanied by broad prerogatives. The formal dimensions of the office are often expansive. Martin Meyerson and Stephen R. Gruabard outline in broad form the nature of the duties inherent in the office. In a recent study they suggest that the ideal duties are:

... to represent the general interest of the university as a whole; to be its spokesman; to be sensitive to the educational and intellectual needs and missions of the academic community; to be both a member of the faculty and its leader; to initiate major academic study and reform; to allocate resources to achieve specific educational goals and priorities.¹

If formal instruments of power are available to the president, these duties imply great leverage in the exercise of leadership and maintenance of the institution as a going, viable enterprise. But the nature of presidential leadership is, like all other positions of leadership, not to be inferred solely from formal or statutory grants of authority. Not only does leadership depend upon the individual involved, but as commentators on the office of the United States Presidency have pointed out, it depends upon factors in the environment as well. The college or university president, like the President of the United States, is circumscribed in his exercise of authority by factors quite beyond his influence or control. As universities have grown more complex and less isolated from the larger society, and as they have in recent years been subject to the attacks of various groups in the community as a result of the "campus crisis," the perimeters of authoritative discretion have shrunk. There has been a simultaneous growth in the problems of universities and a decline in the unchallenged authority of the president to handle these problems. J. Victor Baldridge argues that:

The campus leader today is a mediator, a negotiator, and a man who jockeys between power blocs, trying to carve out viable futures for his institution. Unlike the autocratic president who ruled with an iron hand, the contemporary academic president finds that he must play the political role by pulling together coalitions to fight for desired changes. The academic monarch of yesteryear has almost vanished, and in his place has come not the
academic "bureaucrat," as many suggest, but the academic "statesman." 2

Baldridge's argument is echoed by Orley R. Herron:

The president, in a real sense, must develop a politician's thick skin so as not to be sensitive to the overwhelming political pressures that confront him. Political pressures are manifold depending upon the nature of environment of the state and even the nation. The Joe McCarthy era, the loyalty oath proceedings, the beatniks, the civil rights issues, the war concerns, all may affect the philosophical foundations of administrative control. The wise president will learn to interact appropriately to the political pressures and will not be swept under by the waves. 3

The university president has little professional security since there is no tenure granted a president who must serve at the pleasure of a governing board. He and his family dwell in the limelight and his actions are subject to close scrutiny by many parties. He is expected to refrain from undertaking political or controversial activity in combination with his academic functions. 4


4. When presidents have engaged in partisan political maneuvering they have eventually been forced to choose between their office and such activity. President Seth Low of Columbia University, for example, elected to resign from his post because of the governing board's disapproval of his desire to mix mayoralty campaigning with university activities. (He was subsequently elected Mayor of New York in 1900.) In fact, the selection of a college or university president to perform duties unassociated with the academic
duties are monotonous, many of the problems faced seemingly insoluble, and many decisions emotionally draining. Such problems have led M. A. F. Ritchie, President of Pacific University, to remark that the job should not be accepted without "a compelling sense of commitment to it. There are many other jobs that offer most of the advantages of the college presidency without the disadvantages and with better pay."  

5

The Importance of the Presidential Selection Process

Circumscribed or not, the powers of a university or college president are formidable even if he is not the monarch he once was, and the selection of a man to fill the position is a critical decision on any campus. Students of the academic community agree that the selection of a university president is perhaps the most important function that the governing board is called upon to perform. Moreover, whatever its importance, it is a task which boards of trustees have been asked to undertake more and more frequently. Boards perform this function on the average of once every world has often been made with an eye to finding someone of unquestioned impartiality. An example is the appointment of former Harvard president A. Lawrence Lowell to a study board seeking grounds for the pardoning of Sacco and Vanzetti.

eight years and there is some evidence that the tenure of university presidents is declining rather than increasing.

The process of presidential selection is notably cumbersome, ad hoc, and lengthy for most universities. One study indicates that the average interval between the termination in office of a president and the selection of his successor is eight months to a year, and that it is not unusual for the search to last as long as two years with the committee meeting as often as once a week. Despite the frequency with which many boards are called upon to perform the search and selection function few have instituted regularized, streamlined procedures. Most boards go through similar stages in the selection process, but there is no proven procedure which can be utilized under diverse circumstances on campuses across the country.

The premier function of the selection process is, of course, to find a man who embodies the needs of an institution and negotiations for this purpose require the patient persistence of an Oriental marriage broker. The first stage in the process requires an involved development of the nature and goals of a particular institution and the second stage the selection of a man to direct the institution toward those goals. Thus, the objective of the presidential selection

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process is the matching of an individual to an institution in the hope that each will meet the needs of the other at a particular moment in time. As Bowlman points out, "A president who might have been an institution's savior, twenty years ago, may bring about its ruin today. Or a man who would be ideal at the helm of one college or university might nearly cause a shipwreck at another."\(^7\)

For example, for years many Southern colleges and universities have had a special requirement of prospective candidates—their views on racial integration must be "acceptable." An avowed, wild-eyed, civil libertarian at one of these schools could prove as disruptive as a loose cannon on the deck of a storm-tossed warship, if he refused to treat with delicacy the demands of campus and community interests regarding integration.

If alma mater is suffering from a chronic shortage of funds, the trustees may elect to install a man with the capability of becoming a successful fund-raiser. This was, for example, the official justification for the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency of Columbia. As a national hero it was felt that Eisenhower would prove particularly successful at canvassing for funds (an expectation which was not fulfilled). Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles J. Hitch was selected as

\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 1-2.
President of the University of California because of his expertise in budgeting and accounting at a time when the university's Board of Regents expected financial problems.

More obscure value judgments may also enter into the determination of the type of individual best qualified to take the helm. If the campus has been torn with strife in the recent past, trustees may opt for an academic law enforcement official. The California State College Board of Trustees, under the prodding of Chancellor Glenn S. Dumke, appointed Dr. Karl L. Falk, a leading Fresno financier, to come out of retirement and take over the reins at troubled Fresno State College. Falk, who described himself as "just a simple Kraut," informed the community that he had arrived to stop the colleges' drift "straight down the path to chaos"—a condition which he blamed upon student and faculty revolutionaries. Falk proceeded to move against everything from the black studies program to the liberal members of the faculty. Ultimately pilloried by liberals as an institution wrecker and apotheosized by conservatives as having saved the campus from certain take-over by dissident elements, Falk was replaced by Norman Baxter, a man whose forte was solid administration. The priority had become one of retrenchment rather than repression.

Mechanisms for the choice of leaders have been a perennial social problem over the course of recorded history. Neither philosophers nor statesmen have been able to devise a perfectly reliable system. Leadership status may be based upon wisdom, age, wealth, heredity, conquest, election, charisma, or other criteria, but there is no proven method of insuring that leadership status and ability to lead will coincide. Leadership of a college or university is, ideally, the product of objective and conscientious judgement by concerned individuals in consultation with important constituent elements in the institutional environment. There is no guarantee here either, however, that the results of the process will match the expectations of those who participate in it or acquiesce in its results. But ability is certainly one of the basic criteria that governing boards demand in a prospective candidate for the leading institutional role.

The criteria of ability is always mixed with that of suitability. The president is chosen not merely to lead the institution, but to lead it in the direction of goals and objectives established by the governing board. Even the decision to select a continuer, one who will consolidate the existing patterns of university life rather than institute reforms and alterations, is a conscious choice made in the recognition that fortification of past achievements is the institutional response most likely to result in the achievement of educational goals. There is evidence, however, that
trustees use the selection process as a method of sparking change in institutional directions. According to Lawrence Park, an old maxim in education is that: "The quickest way to change a college is to change its leadership."^9 Robert M. Hyde underscores the opportunity which the selection process provides trustees. "It can be a vehicle for providing new insights and understanding of the institution, improving relations with faculty and staff, and promoting increased support from outside sources."^10 J. B. Lon Hefferline presents evidence that colleges and universities which have recently selected a new president are often the most receptive to curricular innovation and change.^^11 And Robert Birnbaum suggests that trustees attempt to minimize disruption at a time of presidential succession by selecting individuals from institutions which are in many respects similar to the universities doing the selection. He also hypothesizes, however, that universities often feel a need to enhance their


10. Robert M. Hyde, "The Presidential Search: Chore or Opportunity," Educational Record, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1969), pp. 186-87. Hyde adds that, "... the search that generates these byproducts has the best possible chance of launching a successful and productive presidency!"

prestige and accomplish this goal through selection of the new executive from a more renowned institution.\textsuperscript{12}

These studies all reflect an underlying consensus that trustees attempt to satisfy more than the minimal need for competent leadership through the instrument of presidential selection. Initiative for institutional change comes when trustees endeavor to fulfill particular and peculiar institutional goals by choosing a man who embodies compatible values and gives promise of promoting desired changes. It is one thesis of this study that presidential selection is a critical response to perceived needs of institutional change which are made necessary by: (1) changes in the relationships of constituent groups within the university environment, and (2) changes in the broader society external to the university.

**Critical Evaluation of the Selection Process**

It has been noted that the process of presidential selection is characterized by a remarkable plethora of methods and procedures. We can assume that results may vary along with procedures. Some colleges and universities have found the selection process to be more of a chore than an opportunity. From the viewpoint of participants, the conduct

of the search may be a very trying personal experience.

Bolman quotes an anonymous chairman of a board of trustees:

I'd resign. I very honestly would never want to live through such an experience again. It was tedious; it was full of conflicts. The press annoyed me incessantly, even to the point of hounding me at home. Exceptional pressures were brought upon members of the board. It was a dirty game, a haphazard game, a game without a rulebook.13

As they search for and measure presidential timber, trustees are likely to encounter five major difficulties: (1) a lack of regularized rules and procedures to channel their efforts productively, (2) the traditional reluctance of candidates to express forthrightly an interest in the job, (3) a shortage of trained, experienced personnel to choose from, (4) conflicting demands made by campus and campus-related groups, and (5) an inability to bring the search and selection process to a conclusion in the predicted time period.

The first, and perhaps most serious difficulty faced by trustees and search committees is a conspicuous absence of rules and planned procedures to channel their efforts. This lack of guidelines is a leading source of frustration and wasted effort and a problem which contributes to other difficulties. It is most in evidence at institutions where the governing boards are suddenly faced with the task of selecting a new chief executive following a sudden death or the announcement of a long-term president that he is about to retire.

13. Bolman, op. cit., p. 3.
The problem stems from the fact that participants in the process are inexperienced in the rituals of presidential selection and in the absence of rehearsed guidelines or shared experience they often lack knowledge of what constitutes accepted and productive practice. By inference, one may assume that this unfamiliarity with the task accounts for at least a few of the bad presidential appointments which colleges and universities have made over the years. M. A. F. Ritchie voices the opinion that, "the choice of college presidents could claim the dubious honor of being the most unscientific process in American life."14 He adds that his selection as a college president in 1954, "appeared to violate most, if not all, the premises of scientific planning."15 Ritchie does not elaborate on the nature of "scientific planning," but his remark implies that the selection process referred to was somewhat disorderly.

A second complication in the selection process is the unstated, inviolable dictum that the job should seek the man, rather than vice-versa. Customarily, candidates presented for consideration are expected to act like reluctant maids about to lose their virginity. In contrast, British universities openly solicit applications for the position of president when a vacancy occurs, but it is the American tradition

15. Ibid.
to compile long lists of names in the initial stages of the selection process without informing the nominees that their names are on the list. Candidates cannot run openly for the presidency as politicians do, nor can they proceed upward to the position in an orderly occupational progression as military officers do. Rather, aspirants must be guarded in the expression of their ambitions and cultivate the impression that they are men who have had "the call," much like those who enter the ministry.

Third, there are no established training schools for the preparation of university presidents and no specialized forms of socialization exist to educate men for the duties of the office. Universities rarely groom promising young men by seasoning them at various levels in the administrative hierarchy. Although many presidents are selected from among the ranks of deans and occupants of other higher administrative posts, this cannot be interpreted as a conscientious refining of young men who may someday feel "the call." The selection processes are too capricious, the chances of selection too remote, to justify lengthy and extensive training in the arts of university governance.

The task of selecting individuals is complicated under these circumstances. The shortage of trained personnel is described by Gerald Burns.

It is unfortunate that college boards, because of shortages of qualified personnel, frequently hire
as college and university presidents persons who are unqualified in experience and unsuited in temperament to the demands of the presidency. It is ironical that these trustees frequently reach into the military establishments for commanders and into the classroom for professors, some of whom have had no experience in academic administration. These presidential candidates take on this specialized task reluctantly, struggle with it unsuccessfully for an average of eight years, and leave it as bitter and frustrated individuals.  

A fourth difficulty in the selection process is the need to reconcile the often conflicting demands and viewpoints of various campus and campus-related groups, many of which have a stake in the selection of the new president and all of which have strong viewpoints about the type of individual best suited to fulfill the current needs of the institution. Participatory demands in the selection process have become more frequent on the part of more and more groups as trends toward increased participation by formerly excluded groups have surfaced in recent years. This phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. Suffice it to say here that such participatory demands may tax the capacities of governing boards and search committees which have little familiarity with their task in any event.

Finally, these four factors all combine to produce a fifth recurrent snag in the selection process—the tendency of search committees to prolong the effort. Lack of

procedures, familiarity, trained personnel, and the participatory demands of groups all contribute to conditions which impede the reaching of a simple and quick decision. The average search lasts for one year and some considerably longer. During this period of time interim leadership may or may not be necessary, facing the participants in the process with an additional problem.

Additionally, each search will give rise to its own peculiar problems for which governing boards must find solutions. Each search will give rise to its own particular trials and tribulations. At some institutions a choice must be made between inside and outside contenders for the presidency. At others there may be a question of the extent of faculty, student, or alumni participation in the process. If questions of group participation arise, the question of whether the board of trustees is the proper body or the best suited body to make the decision is also a potential source of controversy. Sometimes the characteristic secrecy of the process gives rise to conflicts between the governing board and the press.

The Nature of Academic Governance

The process of presidential selection takes place within the overall environment of a particular university. It may be assumed that there is a relationship between the selection process and the institutional setting. Specifically,
it is hypothesized that the nature of the selection process will, within fairly broad limits, be related to characteristic and traditional standards of campus governance at each university. If, for example, there is a prevailing climate of participation, legitimacy, and free access for a wide spectrum of campus constituent groups on a broad range of issues, the influence of organized constituent groups in the process of presidential selection will be enhanced. The extent of democratic participation by campus groups in the selection process is directly reflective of the extent of group participation at other decision-making points within the university environment at the all-university level. If constituent groups on the campus are in broad agreement about institutional goals, then the selection process is less likely to be marked by the contentiousness which could be predicted if groups disagreed on fundamental goals.

The preponderance of literature on the subject of university organizations has typically emphasized one of two popular paradigms: the well-known "bureaucratic model" derived from the work of Max Weber, and the "collegial model." Both of these descriptive models have been used by students of university life to provide a theoretical framework with which to examine the relationships between various elements in the university structure.

Max Weber attempted to describe the characteristics of bureaucracies that differentiated them from other, less
formal, types of work organizations. He suggested that bureaucracies were organized in a way that would promote maximum efficiency and were also based on the principle of "legal rationality." Their structure was distinctly hierarchical and knit together by formal communications systems and chains of command. Herbert S. Stroup, for example, believes that the characteristics of institutional life in a university resemble a Weberian model. He indicates that competence is the criteria which is used for appointment, officials are appointed rather than elected, salaries are fixed and paid directly by the organization, rank is recognized and respected, the career is exclusive and not combined with other kinds of work, life-styles are centered around the organization, security is institutionalized through the tenure system, and personal and organizational property is separated.

The bureaucratic model is, however, subject to substantial criticism as a theory explaining the interrelationships of groups and individuals on the campus. First, it does not adequately account for the exercise of power which is not based on legitimate, formal authority. The existence


of political activity based on threats, emotion, sentiment, and symbolism are nonformal forms of power and influence on most campuses. Second, the bureaucratic paradigm is helpful in explaining the nature of formal structure, but less helpful in contributing to the understanding of dynamic processes within the confines of the formal institutional structure. A description of static institutional arrangements is helpful, but not adequate to explain the institution in action. Thus, the model does not explain institutional change or transformation because it fails to specify the dynamic elements which might cause such changes. And finally, Weber's model does not help to explain how policies are established or decisions are made. It deals with policy implementation rather than policy formulation.

Some writers who have rejected the "bureaucratic model" concentrate their energies instead on a "collegial model" of the university. The "collegial model" presupposes a bureaucratic organization but postulates that hierarchical control is minimal. Supporters of this view describe an arrangement where members and groups within an academic community participate on a democratic basis in the administration of a university within a climate of shared consensus among the various factions. John D. Millett, for example, is a strong exponent of the collegial viewpoint.

I believe strongly that a college or university has little if any resemblance to the generalized
conceptions of organization which may be applicable to certain types of governmental administrative agencies and certain types of business entities. To look to the ideas on organization . . . for guidance in the understanding of a college or university . . . is completely to misconceive the nature of the institution of higher education.

Instead of being organized upon the principle of a hierarchy of authority, our colleges and universities are organized internally upon the principle of a community of authority. Power is shared by four different constituent groups . . . faculty, students, alumni, and administration. In practice, the power of each constituent group is brought together in a community of authority which enables each college and university to pursue its noble purpose.19

The collegial approach emphasizes a community of scholars in an environment where they are free to make decisions unfettered by organizational restraints. This approach may also be a utopian prescription of how the education process should operate. Paul Goodman takes a prescriptive stand and advocates a return to "academic community" as a balm for the increasing alienation of persons in impersonal bureaucratic institutions.20

Two basic criticisms can be made of the "collegial" approach to academic governance. First, the model fails to describe accurately processes at all levels in the university hierarchy. At lower levels, especially the departmental


level, academic decision-making may correspond to a collegial conception, but at higher levels the exercise of authority is often arbitrary and done without extensive consultation among administration, faculty, students, and alumni. In universities where a hierarchical structure is entrenched the structure itself may frustrate attempts to spread responsibility and participation. The input of a hierarchical system may be greater than the input of individuals within it despite the best of intentions to conform to a collegial process of decision-making.21

A second criticism of the collegiate model is obvious. It does not prominently incorporate the possibility of very real and long-lasting conflicts among the constituent elements of the university. It fails to deal adequately with the element of conflict because consensus results only after conflict has occurred and been resolved to the satisfaction of various parties. Furthermore, many decisions are never undertaken in a climate of consensus but imposed by one group or coalition upon another. The myth of academic consensus is

21. Baldridge, op. cit., p. 159. Baldridge points out, for example, that a parallelism develops between faculty and bureaucratic authority mechanisms. "From top to bottom the university has strands of bureaucratic and professional organization: the university senate parallels the central administration, the college faculty committees parallel the dean's staff, the departmental advisory groups parallel the heads and chairmen. One of the most obvious factors in this dual authority system is the layer on layer of academic committees."
not an unpopular one by any means. It may be surmised that such a myth is useful in helping the university to maintain a united front in face of public and other outside pressures. The secrecy imposed by presidential selection committees on their proceedings, for example, is intended both to mask disension and to prevent its spread to unmanageable levels. The ultimate decision appears to be the result of consensus in the university.

If the "bureaucratic model" is inadequate because it deemphasizes the processes and dynamics of an institution, and the "collegial model" is inadequate because it shortchanges conflict, another theory of campus governance is necessary for a more adequate understanding of institutional and extra-institutional phenomena. Baldridge has advanced a "political model" of the university which stresses the dynamics of conflict and the role of interest groups in policy formulation. Baldridge writes that:

... (acts) emerge from the complex fragmented social structure of the university and its "publics," drawing on the divergent concerns and life styles of hundreds of miniature subcultures. These groups articulate their interests in many different ways bringing pressure on the decision-making process from any number of angles and using power and force whenever it is available and necessary. Power and influence, once articulated, go through a complex process until policies are shaped, reshaped, and forged out of the competing claims of multiple groups. All this is a dynamic process, a process clearly indicating that the university is best understood as a "politicized" institution. ... .

This approach overcomes the weaknesses of the bureaucratic and collegial approaches. It focuses upon the dynamic character of the political process in a university arena and emphasizes the existence of conflict. The dynamics of group interaction can be viewed apart from the formal institutional hierarchy of the university and a variety of institutional responses to the need for reducing conflict can be explored. The emphasis is placed upon a fragmented and pluralistic power structure animated by the interaction of contending social elements with diverse goals, values, and interests. The formal and informal mechanisms of university administration and governance are endowed with the purpose of reconciling diverse and competing interests and promoting integration and community of and among the various constituent elements in the university social structure. Presidential leadership can be seen as the exercise of formal authority and informal persuasion for the purpose of creatively resolving campus conflicts and imposing broad goals upon parochial interests. The process of presidential selection may be examined in the same light. It is an institutional response aimed at resolving conflicts between groups and conflicts between group interests and university goals.

The academic kingdom is sundered by numerous cleavages. And a feudal analogy is often made which compares the university to a medieval political structure where campus
dukes and knights preside over their estates in virtual isolation from central authority, cooperating with the king only when necessary. The campus, however, should not be viewed as a Hobbesian state of nature peopled by constantly warring elements. Complete antagonism is no more a proper characterization than complete amity. All factions within the university share a fundamental conviction of the legitimacy of the institution and its broad forms. Disputes are most often over priority of means rather than radically divergent ends. Alumni, faculty, students, administrators, and trustees all share a widespread, sweeping consensus that the purpose of the university is to preserve, transmit, and advance knowledge. Matters which divide them are of instrumental rather than fundamental concern. Debates over the legitimacy of group participation and substantive issues such as tenure procedures, tuition levels, the role of athletics, or academic freedom, no matter how heated, need not always reflect basic schisms over ends although they do reflect divisions over means. It is, in fact, the competition of pluralistic segments in the university over educational priorities which causes conflict. But no internal campus groups seriously espouse anti-intellectualism on campus. It is this consensus on basic goals which is one of the centripital forces keeping various conflicting factions of the university together, just as other social systems are made viable by the existence of an underlying
consensus, common tradition, or external threat to survival. Even though the "collegial model" of university life is inadequate for complete description of institutional activities, the nature of community which is its foundation should be recognized. It is agreement on intellectual goals which maintains the boundaries of the university or college social and political system and makes it distinct from the surrounding environment as an analytic entity.

A Typology of Campus and Campus-related Groups

The college or university president must try to satisfy the interests of diverse groups. The old saw that the president must provide parking for the faculty, sex for the students, and football victories for the alumni does not even begin to reveal either the diversity of groups on campus or the divergence of their interests. In fact, Norman P. Auburn, President of the University of Akron since 1951, believes that the contemporary university president has many more publics than his counterparts in other professions. 23

All major groups associated with the university can be divided into two categories according to the nature of the access they have to the process of presidential

23. Norman P. Auburn, "The University Presidency: Mission Impossible?" Educational Record, Vol. 52 (Spring 1971), p. 147. According to Auburn, the officeholder must, "roll with the punches" and "be bouncy." He adds the personal comment that, "Perhaps I was fortunate, living as I do in the rubber capital of the world."
selection. Access is the juxtaposition of group interest with the decision-making process involved in selection through personal contact by influential or representative group members (this includes direct participation) or the perception of such interests by decision-makers even though no direct communications pass between them. Those groups which have direct access (interest representation through direct contact or participation) will be referred to as constituent groups. Other groups having indirect access (interest representation through interest perception by decision-makers) will be classified as supportive external audiences.

Constituent groups are identified as groups which have statutory access, have traditionally been given a participatory prerogative, or have a prima facie valid claim to legitimate participation because they can demonstrate the direct effects of the selection process on the possibilities of achieving interest related goals. The support of these groups is often essential for the later successful administration of the president-elect because of the large extent of their involvement in university affairs. To a significant degree, authority over the operation of the university and responsibility for the success or failure of programs coincides in constituent groups. The extent of participation by these groups may, of course, vary from campus to
campus. As a general rule, however, each has significant access to the process of presidential selection in educational institutions throughout the United States.

There are five constituent groups involved in the selection process: (1) governing boards, (2) faculty, (3) the governor, (4) students, and (5) alumni.

Governing boards are commonly empowered to undertake such actions as the approval of faculty recommendations on academic policy, approval of rules of student conduct, approval of operating and capital budgets, borrowing of funds, establishment of tuition levels, acceptance of gifts, management of endowed funds, and establishment of other rules and procedures necessary to maintain the university. They are powerful forces in general policymaking, the planning of development and growth, and sometimes even in the day-to-day operation of a college or university. Members of governing boards are not chosen on a Noah's Ark principle: most are professionals, businessmen, or distinguished educators. There are few women, blacks, or union leaders, for example. A few governing boards now have student members as a concession to increasing demands for democratization of university governance, but this is rare. Many members of boards are alumni, of course, but it is not a universal rule that alumni members speak for the interests of organized alumni groups. Boards range in size from under ten members to over a hundred
and in large boards committees frequently perform important functions independently and the full board may convene only infrequently. Governing boards are homogeneous groups representing dominant interests in society and there is little overlapping membership with respect to campus-related groups other than alumni. At the vast majority of colleges and universities they are given statutory authority to select university presidents and selection committees are virtually always dominated by members of these boards.

University faculties are the key element in the academic process. Indeed, there is little justification for the existence and operation of a university save to allow the members of the faculty to carry out instructional and research activities. Faculty members divide their loyalties between the university, their discipline, and even areas of specialization within a discipline. Millett's testimony bears this out.

For most faculty members the closest professional relationships do not occur within a particular academic community but across college or university boundary lines. As a professor of American government at Columbia University, I felt closer ties of kinship with my colleagues in political science at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Chicago, Michigan, and California than I did with my colleagues in English, physics, or medicine at Columbia. This would be true at most colleges or universities.

The faculty is by no means a homogeneous body; it is rent with cleavages. Aside from disciplinary or professional

specialization, faculty members divide with respect to rank. There is a rigid hierarchy of rank through which all faculty members are expected to advance. At each level great equality exists, but in the area of governance hierarchical influence (if not direct authority) exists. Baldridge, in his study of New York University, has found distinctions between levels of interest in university governance, and finds that at the departmental, college, and all-university levels of academic governance apathy becomes progressively greater.\textsuperscript{25} Alvin Gouldner has distinguished between "cosmopolitans," who identify with external disciplinary reference groups, and "locals," who identify with the institution.\textsuperscript{26}

Faculty members have a large role in the process of presidential selection which is usually formally recognized by either including faculty members on selection and search committees or authorizing separate faculty search committees in an advisory capacity to the governing board's committee. Bolman has indicated that the faculty role in presidential selection is growing. In 1939, faculty members were consulted in some fashion by only approximately 30 percent of colleges and universities seeking new presidents. By 1955,  

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\textsuperscript{25} Baldridge, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 179.
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the percentage of institutions providing for consultation had risen to 47 percent. And in 1962, the figure had jumped to 65 percent. Faculty participation in the selection process has been promoted by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).

Faculty members are most concerned with the academic welfare of the institution and at most institutions trustees have delegated a large measure of their authority over strictly academic matters to faculties. In his case study of New York University, Baldridge found that respondents attributed more influence in academic matters to faculty than any other group. According to Millett, faculties are conservative in their attitudes toward change and innovation in academic matters such as curriculum content or degree requirements. This is a notable contrast to the faculty member's pronounced liberalism in his role as a scholar or professional practitioner.

. . . (T)he scholar wants to be left alone in the conduct of the academic enterprise. He does not welcome innovation in instructional procedures, in instructional arrangements, or in the organization and operation of a college or university. Social change in higher education often comes


slowly, as in other institutions. The scholar is conservative in his attitude toward and appreciation of the academic process.\textsuperscript{30}

This conservatism manifests itself in the selection process through faculty concern about the academic stature and attitudes of nominees. A basic qualification for prospective presidents at all major universities is an earned doctorate. The faculty wants a president who was once "one of them." Faculty influence on this point is powerful. Of the 116 recently appointed presidents in Bolman's study, 83 percent held earned doctor's degrees. At Ph.D. granting institutions the figure was 92 percent.\textsuperscript{31} The faculty's role in the selection process is sometimes criticized for leading to a heavy emphasis on academic stature. Although it is possible to rise in the faculty ranks because of critical scholarly acclaim for research, such a career does not necessarily endow a scholar with the capacities needed to head a university. The skills and wisdom needed to lead a major university, it is argued, are not the same as the technical proficiencies which lead to production of great scholarship. But in order for a president to accomplish anything of lasting consequence he must have the active cooperation or, at the very least, the passive consent, of the faculty. Faculty members are jealous of their scholarly

\textsuperscript{30} Millett, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 104.

\textsuperscript{31} Bolman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 25.
prerogatives and resentful toward attempts at administrative control of their activities. Presidential-faculty relationships are therefore of great concern. William W. Jellema has remarked that, "the most generous and liberal of faculties is as prone to suspect the worst about presidential motives as un-American activities committees are to suspect the worst about faculties." 32 Faculty participation in the nomination and final selection of a man to head the institution is valuable mainly as an opportunity to insure a reasonably harmonious initial relationship between the president and the faculty.

The role of the governor is usually a minor one, although the governor's access to the selection process is unquestionably direct at most state supported institutions (the governor is a supportive external audience at private colleges and universities). At many state supported institutions he is an ex officio member of the board of regents and it is not unusual for governors or lieutenant governors to participate in final selection meetings. Governor Ronald Reagan of California, for example, sat in on the University of California Board of Regents meeting in which the decision was made to dismiss Clark Kerr as president and attended a subsequent meeting at which Charles Hitch was appointed as

his replacement. At some schools, according to Bolman, it is necessary to consult the governor for political approval of the prospective president. This is, however, a mere formality in most cases.  

Students are demanding that the university "electorate" be expanded to include them in the decision-making process. And regardless of the merits or drawbacks associated with a broadening of the university polity, educational institutions across the country are responding to student demands by giving them greater access to university decision-making. In past years students exerted influence in the academic community primarily through the sheer weight of

33. Bolman, op. cit., p. 45. Bolman's figures show that the political affiliation of new university presidents was 37 percent Republican, 45 percent Democratic, and 12 percent Independent. Twelve percent were also unaffiliated. This mix does not depart radically from ratios of affiliation in the population at large. In 1964, the year Bolman's study was made, the distribution of voters by party preference was 59 percent Democratic, 34 percent Republican, 8 percent Independent, and 4 percent apolitical or not in any sense affiliated. There appears to be a slight Republican prejudice on the part of trustees in choosing presidents. However, this fact may be adequately accounted for simply by the observation that presidents are usually chosen from groups which are heavily Republican anyway—upper status, upper income, and higher education. Indeed, the greater number of Democrats is somewhat surprising, as is the large number of non-affiliates. A preliminary hypotheses for study is that the heavy number of apoliticals underscores the neutral role expectations of university and college presidents and that trustees shy away from political activists. This hypothesis is based on the observation—made repeatedly in studies of voting behavior—that the strength of partisan preference is strongly and positively related to political interest and activism.
numbers and the force of individual preferences in such things as enrollment in various degree programs. Now, however, student influence is often formally channeled into institutional councils through the placement of student leaders and representatives on faculty, administration, and trustee committees.

Students are a heterogeneous group. Burton Clark has suggested that large student bodies contain four distinct subcultures: the collegiate group centered around sororities and fraternities, an academic oriented group dedicated to the instrumental pursuit of high grades, a vocationally oriented group, and a non-conformist group devoted to an altruistic search for knowledge and social morality. Students, like faculty, vary in the degree of interest and participation they give to university government. With respect to any scale of participation most would be apathetic at the majority of major educational institutions throughout the country. It is not considered unusual, however, for students to be represented in some manner in the selection of new university presidents. In 1970, for

example, Boston University included three undergraduate and two graduate students on its 21 member search committee.

Like the student constituency, the alumni constituency does not always play a large role in the selection of university presidents. In fact, at a majority of institutions alumni have direct access to the selection process only through the instrument of submission of possible candidates' names to the selection committee. It is not considered rare, however, for alumni to participate actively on selection committees or interview nominees. This is notably true at institutions where alumni groups are highly organized and have played a large role in a broad spectrum of university affairs. At some state supported institutions alumni influence in the state legislature is strong and trustees are likely to feel it essential that the alumni participate in such an important process as presidential selection.

Alumni, where they are active in university government, generally exercise influence through the board of trustees. At some institutions trustees are elected or nominated by alumni. For example, at Harvard University the official corporation is made up of seven persons known as the President and Fellows, who are self-perpetuating. But many acts of the President and Fellows require approval by the Board of Overseers, a body of thirty members, five
of whom are elected each year for six year terms by the alumni. Stanford University has three elected alumni trustees and Princeton eight. In any case, governors tend to appoint alumni as trustees of public universities, irrespective of statutory provisions, since alumni can be expected to have a great deal of interest in the university and know something of its affairs. Except in the election or nomination of trustees, however, it is unusual for alumni to have a regular and continuous impact in decision-making. Alumni organizations may meet and pass resolutions, but such resolutions do not have any binding influence on trustees or administrators. 35

The second category of university oriented groups is supportive external audiences. An audience group is important because its favorable attitudes and responses are courted by the university. A supportive audience is one which may provide tangible rewards or deprivations for the university. These groups control resources the university needs and are able to shape the policies of the university by implicit promises to confer rewards. They are important sources of external support and pressure. The need for institutional support from these groups may be an inducement

35. William F. Buckley has made the argument that trustees are responsible for their decisions to previous generations of alumni, in God and Man at Yale (Chicago: Regnery, 1951).
to get certain types of talent into the office of the president. Audience group involvement with the university, however, is not accompanied by responsibility for university conduct and policy. Therefore, although these groups constitute a reservoir of potential reaction to a decision inimical to their interests, justification for their overt and direct involvement in the selection process is tenuous at best—if not nonexistent.

The impact of external groups on the business of the university is, nevertheless, great. Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., President of Michigan State University, believes that their influence on the campus stems from the inability of universities to insulate themselves from the broader social environment. "Today," he writes, "there are sharp divisions of value structures both in society at large and, because of greater size and more heterogeneous programs, within the university. The unique values of academic life are not strong enough to offset the heterogeneity of external societal values with their non-academic focus." 36

The orientation of a university toward its environment will have an immediate and continuing impact on the type and severity of external pressures with which it must contend. Many universities--particularly land grant

institutions—have a pronounced orientation toward public service. Their various colleges such as mines, agriculture, and fishery are responsive in research and instruction to corresponding functional constituencies in the external environment. Public service values vary from school to school. Ivy League schools, for instance, maintain rigid boundaries and are insulated from public service roles to a high degree. At the opposite extreme, many community colleges respond directly to the needs of their external publics. Urban universities in recent years have begun to feel an obligation in helping to solve the pressing urban problems which surround them. Thus, some institutions have open and flexible boundaries, while others have relatively closed ones.

Groups within the university may seek to involve external groups in university affairs. According to Wharton, "When one group fails to get its way in an internal decision, it may immediately invite outside groups to intervene in an effort to overturn the decision . . . ."37 Baldridge relates that in California, ". . . the increased intensity of campus conflict has drawn in not only the chancellor of the local campus but even the president of the state system, the board of regents, the state legislature, and the governor."38

37. Ibid., p. 242.
In any extended conflict on the university campus it is likely that the scope of conflict will expand until all groups with a major stake in the outcome of the issue are included. Any internal problem pushed into the external arena tends to become a political dispute that only external political forces can resolve. For this reason, the university attempts to insulate itself from outside society to avoid outside interference. UCLA Chancellor Charles E. Young, for example, has said that the university, "... is—or should be—basically neutral, standing clear of the clashes and clamors of confrontation."\(^{39}\) In the conduct of the presidential selection process outside interference could be extremely disruptive. This is one reason why secrecy requirements are generally imposed upon the participants until the successful conclusion of the project.

The logic of the system of governing boards was intended to perform this function of maintaining political conflict within the boundaries of the university environment, although governing boards have often served as conduits of external pressures onto the campus. The motivation behind setting up a governing board is the idea that higher education is too important to be left solely to educators and students and requires some surveillance by the greater

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society. Trustees are often effective buffers, keeping annoying or irrelevant pressures from the campus. At the same time, political pressures may be applied to the campus through a governing board.

University orientation, the tendency of internal conflicts to expand across the political boundaries of the university, and the governing board system provide stimuli for the application of external pressures to the university. In the process of presidential selection, each of these factors may cause external pressure to be felt. Furthermore, it may be assumed that members of selection and search committees will many times perceive such pressures whether or not they really exist. They may mentally make broader reference to groups aside from those immediately involved in the process such as alumni, trustees, faculty, and students.

There are five supportive external audiences: (1) taxpayers, (2) state legislatures, (3) educational organizations, (4) federal agencies and philanthropic foundations, and (5) university administrations.

Although support for higher education as an abstract entity is high among the public at large, it is nevertheless accurate to say that the average citizen finds an active interest in higher education neither rewarding nor satisfying. Public opinion about university policy is formed only around very salient or critical issues that have wafted from
the campus onto the front pages of newspapers. The public exercises a latent veto power only over extraordinary types of presidential nominees. For example, if a selection committee wished to appoint an avowed communist to be a university president it would likely refrain from doing so for fear of a ferocious reaction in the community which could vitiate the university.

State legislatures are important reference points only for public supported schools. In these cases it is vital to appoint a president who can work effectively with education and budget committees. It may perhaps be useful to appoint a man with some knowledge of state politics if university programs have been controversial in the legislature. Many legislators may also be alumni, with an active interest in institutional affairs.

Educational organizations vary in the extent to which they are important to the existence of the university. Accreditation organizations give vital approval for instructional activities. Other universities may be important reference points. Some of the constituent groups in the selection process are part of larger peak associations such as the American Alumni Council, the National Association of Governing Boards, or the American Association of University Professors. The AAUP has taken an active interest in the role of faculty members in the selection process. The
organization, however, confines its interest to the way in which presidential selections are made, rather than the kind of decisions which are arrived at. The primary interest of the AAUP lies in the maintenance of academic freedom for faculty members.

Federal departments and agencies such as the United States Office of Education and some private foundations are important for the resources they make available to the university from time to time. Although much of the money made available for research and teaching by public and private sources is negotiated for by individual faculty members and departments, the central administration and trustees may also influence the assignment of a substantial amount of funds. The distribution of these funds is important to all groups because to a certain extent the assignment of grants determines the extent of growth in various segments of the university. As Clark Kerr has noted:

A university's control over its own destiny has been substantially reduced. University funds from tuition and fees, gifts and endowments, and state sources go through the usual budget-making procedures and their assignment is subject to review in accordance with internal policy. Federal research funds, however, are usually negotiated by the individual scholar with the particular agency, and so bypass the usual review process. Thus 20 to 50 to 80 percent of a university's expenditures may be handled outside the normal channels. These funds in turn commit some of the university's own funds; they influence the assignment of space; they determine the distribution of time between teaching and research; to a large extent they establish the areas
in which the university grows the fastest. Almost imperceptibly, a university is changed.40

Whatever the consequences, government support is becoming increasingly important in providing the huge sums of money universities need to carry on teaching and research under modern conditions of large student enrollments and increased public service. Computers, lasers, electron microscopes, reactors, and even survey research are expensive devices which the average university needs assistance to afford.

Although the administration is sustained within the political boundaries of the university it is often not given a direct voice in presidential selection. Administrators are often specialists who are responsive to professional norms as well as educational goals. Theoretically, an administrative hierarchy is pliable to the wishes of any president the trustees select, but the wise selection committee takes into account the vested interests and organizational momentum in the university bureaucracy at the time a presidential choice must be made. As campus advisory committees evolve into more heterogeneous bodies administrators tend to be included on them.

Conclusion: The Logic of the Selection Process

"The true American university," as David Starr Jordan once observed, "lies in the future." The university in America is in a state of flux, buffeted by internal and external cross-pressures to which pragmatic responses are made—a typically American institutional reaction to pressures from without. The university is in a constant state of adjustment to promote a harmonious relationship with its external environment. At the same time it faces the task of maintaining an internal climate of stability and consensus which will permit the achievement of broad, traditional educational goals.

Minor and major changes in university life can be promulgated through the process of presidential selection. The proper individual in a post of institutional leadership can do much to resolve conflict creatively within the university while at the same time promoting a mutually rewarding orientation toward the external world of heterogeneous interests. The selection process, although criticized by some, eventuates in a restudied and perhaps reoriented institutional role toward the society which exists outside the boundaries of the university and a man to guide the institution into this proper role.

41. Quoted by Kerr, op. cit., p. 85.
It is the thesis of this research that the selection process, although criticized as *ad hoc*, slow, cumbersome, inefficient, and undemocratic, is a functional and pragmatic institutional response because it focuses attention on the role of the university and reconciles competing elements both inside and outside the campus political community. In selecting a man, the committee must first ascertain what role the man will have to play before the members can ascertain what talents and qualifications to look for in a nominee. And before settling on the one man who will be future president, the committee must determine that the new president and what he stands for will be acceptable to important constituent and audience groups in the university milieu. In this way, the mechanism for the selection of leadership is related to the specific leadership role.
It is fortunate that the presidential selection processes used in colleges and universities across the United States are not Broadway plays, since acclaim for them is rarely voiced. Vociferous critics unleash broadsides at the apparent irrationality in a procedure which is neither consistently satisfactory in its results nor transparently "democratic" in its conduct. One such critic, former Fresno State College president Frederick W. Ness, has gone so far as to suggest that "of all the capricious, disorganized, unprofessional operations in human society, this one would certainly appear to qualify for some kind of negative award."¹

There is, in fact, no contesting the observation that whim and accident have periodically played a leading role in selection. President Rush Rhees of the University of Rochester ascended to that position as the result of a favorable impression he made upon a trustee's wife at a social when he was a young professor of theology. The wife brought Rhees to the attention of her husband, who in turn put his name before

the selection committee searching for a new president of the university. When three other candidates gave the board's offer a cold shoulder it was extended to Rhees.  

Henry S. Pritchett of MIT was selected following a speech on geodetic surveys that impressed some members of the board who happened to be in attendance.  

Leon Botstein of tiny Franconia College in New Hampshire was "discovered" when he came to the college to visit his brother-in-law who was a student there. In the course of this fortuitous trip he chanced to meet a member of a selection committee who was favorably impressed. When the committee subsequently invited him to say a few words about the job of the college president he spoke non-stop for two hours and was offered the position.  

Walter Adams, a veteran professor of economics at Michigan State University, was visited one morning in his office by the school's board chairman and asked whom he thought might make a good acting president for the university. A few names were discussed in desultory fashion. When informed that he had considerable support Adams, a rank-and-file faculty member, roared with laughter. He was, nevertheless, elected

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less than a week later. And in his account of his years as president of San Francisco State College, John Summerskill shows his contempt for the happenstance which resulted in his selection.

I was nominated for president by someone I had never met, who by absolute chance had fallen into conversation with someone who knew me but had no association whatsoever with the College. Consequently, my name came to the committee by chance and by gossip after their year-long, careful, systematic search. Uninspiring but true.

Despite the criticism of Ness, Summerskill, and a host of others, not all selection processes are disorganized and prey to the whims of fortune. With increasing frequency their conduct is mapped in advance and conducted in a highly regimented fashion. This chapter and the next are devoted to a description of the conduct of selection processes and include examples from colleges and universities across the United States. Chapter 2 focuses on the history of selection procedures, discusses the question of whether there is an ideal mechanism for choosing presidents, and analyzes the composition and institutionalization of advisory, search, and selection committees. Chapter 3 discusses the qualifications of presidential nominees and the procedures used by committees to narrow down large fields of candidates and


ultimately select one man. Both chapters together provide an overview of the conduct of the presidential selection process in a purely descriptive sense apart from the broader theoretical considerations developed in Chapters 1 and 4.

**Historical Trends in the Selection of Presidents**

The first recorded vacancy in American colleges and universities came in 1725 when Reverend Nathaniel Eaton, head of the newly formed Harvard College was summarily dismissed from his position for the dual sins of physically assaulting an assistant and neglecting the students. Before Eaton exited the Massachusetts Bay Colony to avoid the embarrassment of a formal church inquiry into his conduct he departed clandestinely with a portion of the college's operating funds. The college fared no better with its second choice, the Reverend Henry Dunster, who was fired over a dispute involving his allegedly heretical views of baptism. The school's almost perverse streak of bad luck continued when, in 1773, Dunster's replacement, the Reverend Samuel Locke, was forced to resign after confessing to the governors that he was responsible for the expectant condition of a maid in the official residence.  

institution of higher learning were undoubtedly early aware that presidents—like other men—are subject to the lure of an ordinary array of human temptations and failings.

In the years since the firing of Reverend Eaton, the announcement of new presidential searches has occurred with increasing frequency. Not only have many new colleges been founded, but the increasing complexity of American institutions of higher learning and the resulting stresses on their top leadership has led to a shortening of tenure as well. Although in years past men like Charles W. Eliot, Nicholas Murray Butler, and James Hampton Kirkland served terms of 40 to 45 years, tenure has gradually declined to the point where it averages considerably less than 10 years. 8

There have been a variety of methods for selecting presidents and the nature of the process has changed markedly over the years in the direction of greater participation and concern for procedural questions. From colonial times until the passage of the Morrill Act the governing boards of private colleges and universities accepted total responsibility for the choice of presidents. Although boards had formal authority in practice they often responded to the influence of wealthy founders, donors, and alumni. When, for example, the trustees of Bryn Mawr were trying to find a successor for a retiring president, they were reluctant to recognize the candidacy of the Dean of Women, Carey Thomas. But Miss Thomas had a wealthy champion in Mary Garrett, a friend who had been a great benefactor of the college in the past, donating numerous white marble busts and a remarkable collection of books. Miss Garrett offered to contribute $10,000 yearly to the college "whenever Miss Carey Thomas should become President." Although fear was voiced that such a stipulation would make Carey Thomas uniquely independent of the trustees, in the end the offer was too enticing for a small private school to refuse. 9

With the coming of public land grant colleges after the Civil War, the selection process was opened to even more

influences outside the governing boards—particularly political ones. State governors, who serve as ex officio members of governing boards, often dictated their choices to partisan selection committees. At times they even bypassed the boards altogether. In the 1930's, for example, Theodore Bilbo, who at the time was Governor of Mississippi, dismissed the old and appointed new presidents of the state's three institutions in a one hour period. At the turn of the century, Governor Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin launched a new program of university public service—referred to as the "Wisconsin Idea"—which was designed to turn the university into an instrument of social change and a reservoir of knowledge to be available in the formulation of public policy. To advance the "Wisconsin Idea," La Follette in 1903 dictated to the University of Wisconsin board the choice of Charles R. Van Hise, a geologist and personal friend of the governor. Van Hise was in sympathy with the Progressive's move to make the university an instrument of the state. He proved to be a popular president and remained in office even after the Progressives lost control of the state in 1917, becoming independent and even critical of La Follette. Other men have

10. The new presidents were an electric power company official, a real estate salesman, and a school teacher. See Demerath, op. cit., p. 52.

chosen not to swim against the political tide. President Stoddard of Illinois, who had been chosen when Adlai Stevenson was governor, resigned under fire in 1953, indicating that political changes in the state made his position untenable and predicting that politics would play a large role in the choice of his successor.

The early years of the twentieth century also marked the era of the great "president-makers," well-known figures of some renown in the educational world who were frequently asked for recommendations by institutions with vacancies and not infrequently taken up on their advice for filling them. If this was the day of great concentration of wealth in industry and finance, it was also the day of near monopolistic influence in educational administration. John Amory Lowell is rumored to have personally selected no fewer than six successive presidents of Harvard during a period in American history when the post was one of the most coveted in the nation. Andrew S. White, Cornell University's first president, picked two presidents for Michigan, and one each for Indiana, California, and Brown. White also suggested the names of the first presidents of Johns Hopkins and Stanford.

In his memoirs, Nicholas Murray Butler—a kingmaker in his own right—reveals that in 1891 Governor Leland Stanford of California consulted White for suggestions about whom
to install as the first head of Stanford. Acting on White's advice Stanford offered the position to General Francis A. Walker (later to become president of MIT). Walker turned the governor down but suggested Butler's name. Butler (later to become president of Columbia) also refused and so Stanford returned to White for additional advice and council. After further consultation White recommended David Starr Jordan, who became Stanford's first president. When the University of Illinois proffered Butler an offer in the same year he turned it down but recommended Andrew S. Draper, who was elected and served for ten years with distinction. Not only did the giants of the education industry give advice to searchers, but they corresponded with presidential candidates as well, acting as the marriage brokers of educational administration.

During the early years of the twentieth century few governing boards proceeded with a selection without first consulting the Rockefeller Foundation for either advice or discreet approval. In later years the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation became equally important as sources of approval and their officers were also vested with a good measure of power to shape the future of educational administration.

institutions by virtue of the seriousness with which their advice was taken.

The sedulousness of trustees in beating a path to the door of the influentials should not be underestimated. For example, in 1922, when Purdue University was searching for a president, Joseph D. Oliver, the president of the board of trustees assembled a search committee of five (including two faculty members) which, "visited with university presidents in neighboring states and traveled to New York and Washington to discuss possible candidates." Edward Charles Elliott, the committee's first choice had, according to his biographers, "written to a number of his friends in the profession as soon as he had been approached by the Purdue officials. President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia and President Henry S. Pritchett of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching had both written encouraging letters . . . ." The kingmakers had exercised their informal influence once again.

The heyday of the kingmakers has passed into history, and just as large corporations less and less frequently choose their top executives from the families of founders or owners, so universities have instituted more representative processes to select their chief executives. At major


14. Ibid., p. 82.
colleges and universities today the nomination and consider-
ation of prospective presidents is no longer in the hands of a tiny elite with a constrictive monopoly which allows it to pull the rabbit out of the hat time and time again. This change has accompanied a growth in the size and complexity of educational institutions that has significantly altered the job of the president, placing new demands upon incumbents. As the president has become more involved with the interests of groups both within and without the institution, the office has, over the years, become a focal point of group activity. As this has happened, it has come to be more and more appropriate to include these constituencies and audiences in the selection process.

Whether growth in complexity has been the major cause of this "democratization" is a moot question. The fact remains that it exists, and altered job requirements and increasing demands for participation in university life by formerly disenfranchised groups have led to a selection process which is far more open than in the past. As one presidential candidate has written, "of the 2500 or so accredited colleges in the United States, only the most parochial . . . would proceed on a presidential search without a faculty, student, and possibly an alumni committee, working
with a small group of trustees. This overstates the case considerably but accurately assesses a trend. A case in point is Harvard University. Following the student strike in Harvard Yard in the spring of 1969, outgoing president Nathan Pusey appointed a committee to study and recommend procedures for selecting a new president. The committee voiced strong advocacy of a process which was widely participatory, recommending numerous, periodic consultations with important interest groups both inside and outside the university through the selection process. The Harvard Corporation subsequently embarked on the search for a new man by dispersing nearly 200,000 letters soliciting nominations from faculty, students, alumni, administrators, and even university employees. The selection of Derek Bok is reported to have cost the university an estimated half million dollars. But streamlined procedures with provision for


16. Harvard Committee on Governance, Discussion Memorandum Concerning the Choice of a New President, April, 1970. Harvard is not the only institution to formalize participatory selection procedures. The eight-campus Los Angeles Community College District, for example, sends prospective presidential candidates a pamphlet which "Announces Evaluations for Positions as College President" and outlines presidential duties, qualifications, and "evaluation procedures." The latter involve an elaborate interplay of search, screening, and selection committees. The membership of these committees is carefully prescribed.
planned, widespread group access on the Harvard model are still the exception. The trend, however, is toward both formalization and permeability in the selection process.

Is There an Ideal Mechanism for Presidential Selection?

Although selection processes differ widely among universities they remain roughly standardized in procedure. Frederick DeW. Bolman, in a study for the American Council on Education in 1965, drew up a sketch of recommended stages of selection procedure based upon an extensive survey of practice in 112 American colleges and universities. The stages set forth by Bolman are:

1. Appointment of an acting president.
2. Analysis of the institution.
3. Analysis of the president's role.
4. Appointment of a committee of the board to conduct the search.
5. Appointment of a faculty advisory committee.
6. Joint meetings of the trustees and faculty committee.
7. Securing nominations for the presidency.
8. Initial screening of nominees.
10. Initial interviews with "semifinalists."
11. Additional interviews with "finalists."
12. Final recommendation by the trustees' committee and the faculty advisory committee.
13. Final action by the board of trustees.


16. A review of the procedure used, while details are still fresh in mind.\(^{17}\)

Bolman's analysis was intended to set forth an ideal model, although a model based essentially on modal responses from the universities surveyed. The following detailed description of selection processes is not intended to inspire practice, but rather to portray events that typically occur throughout the country each year as universities select presidents and to discuss their significance. Like Bolman's stages it is chronological, but unlike his model no advocacy is intended. What actually happens often falls considerably short of anyone's ideal. Furthermore, no two universities use exactly the same process. Since the process of presidential selection is a response to perceived institutional needs arising out of unique circumstances, conceived of within the context of a variety of cultures of academic governance, and used as a vehicle for reconciling the interests of competing constituencies, the procedure cannot be replicated at institutions which diverge widely in their circumstances. And since the perceived role of the president also differs

from institution to institution the method of selecting him may necessarily differ also. What proves satisfactory at one school may be uniformly inadequate at another. For these reasons, no standardized list is adequate for fulfilling the needs of even a majority of colleges and universities.

**Notification of Vacancy**

There are approximately 2,500 colleges and universities in the United States. Each year more than 200 new institutions are founded and additional numbers of vacancies are created by death, dismissal, and resignation. The implication of these factors is that the need for presidential selection is not rare. Ferrel Heady, president of the University of New Mexico, estimated in 1969 that there were approximately 300 vacancies, including 80 to 100 at the most prestigious institutions. In the same year Francis H. Horn, former president of the University of Rhode Island, suggested that approximately 200 to 250 vacancies exist annually. The situation is not new. Writing in 1947, the former Chancellor of Vanderbilt, Oliver C. Carmichael,


reported that eight of the thirteen Southern state universi-
ties were looking for new presidents.  

Temporary Leadership

While vacancies are being filled—or remain unfilled—interregnum leadership is sometimes necessary. Often the selection of an acting president is provided for in the by­laws of the institution, in which case it is most common for a provost or vice-president to assume such duties. If such succession arrangements are not present, then the board's first duty is to appoint a provisional leader with dispatch. Customarily, the trustees select a high-ranking and seasoned member of an administration, but controversy can arise even here.

When 28 year veteran John A. Hannah announced his resignation as president of Michigan State University in 1969 on short notice, the trustees faced the immediate problem of finding a temporary replacement. Hannah threw his support behind Provost Howard R. Neville. The trustees, however, rebelled against the benign dictatorship of Hannah on the occasion of his leaving and in a five to three vote the Democrats on the board elected the startled Walter Adams, a rank-and-file professor of economics and reluctant savior.  


The job of the acting president is especially difficult. Holding responsibility without real authority, his administration is characterized by an overriding feeling of simply marking time. Acting presidents have been known to receive the full trappings of office at the conclusion of a nationwide search but this is a rare occurrence. Part of the reason is, as Ness remarks, that "the interregnum during which they hold responsibility without real authority normally plays havoc with their acceptability for the permanent post." 22 Joseph M. Ray, former president of Amarillo College and the University of Texas at El Paso, writes that the acting president is a lame duck the moment he takes office and that as a direct result his administration is cursed with "dislocation, disruption, uncertainty, and delay." 23 Trustees are reluctant to give final approval for major, far-reaching projects, lesser administrative officials maneuver to curry favor with state officials, and there may be conflict between the new acting president and old personnel. Since the acting president's probationary period is abortive in the overwhelming majority of cases, the trustees have in effect provided the institution with an anchor rather than


a compass. The lame duck president may be no better off than an acting president. The nature of temporary leadership adds urgency to the task of finding a new man and can complicate later problems of succession.

**Advisory Committees**

In major universities which have been swept along in the current of expanding participation in academic governance the most delicate question to be settled—aside from who the next president will be—is procedural. What groups, if any, should be represented and how? How great shall the weight of formal representation be? Governing boards have solved this problem with varying success in a number of ways.

In virtually all cases formal authority for election of the president rests with the governing board and final responsibility for election resides with the full membership. The importance of the selection of the president to the trustees is not subject to question, since he is the official upon whom they must depend to exert their statutorily based influence upon the institution. They depend on him both for advice and the execution of policy decisions. A president who is at odds with the trustees does not have staying power in his post.

Bolman found that public governing boards averaged slightly more than 10 members (as opposed to private college and university boards which averaged 30 members). Where
there were seven or fewer trustees the entire board commonly took part in the search but this was rare and Bolman found that 87 percent of the boards surveyed utilized a specially appointed committee of trustees for the presidential search. At virtually every institution the chairman of the board included himself in the search group.²⁴

Along with the establishment of a special trustee committee, contemporary orthodoxy calls for the establishment of an advisory body comprised of other interests in the academic environment. The basic genre of such a committee is the faculty advisory committee. A faculty committee—as the name implies—is composed of faculty members selected by the institution's instructional staff. Members are usually elected at large or in caucuses of the academic subdivisions in the college or university.

Giving the faculty some role—formal or informal—in the selection process is an expanding practice, although the extent of faculty participation will depend upon the extent that a tradition of participation by faculty in university-wide matters has been established. If the faculty role is firmly entrenched the faculty committee will be charged with settling on qualifications, gathering nominations, screening candidates, and making final recommendations to the trustees or the trustee committee. There may be joint meetings in

²⁴ Bolman, op. cit., pp. 3-4. The chairman is likely to be an ex officio member of all board committees.
the course of the selection process or communication may be informal. All correspondence and other direct contact with candidates in the early stages is customarily reserved to trustees.

There are several arguments which can be advanced to justify and explain faculty participation in the selection process. First, even if the trustees have no intention of heeding the advice of the faculty, they have invoked the powerful symbolism of democracy and are less open to disruptive accusations of heavy-handed and dictatorial behavior. In the special context of university politics, the establishment of an advisory committee is a concession to the community of scholars—concept—the academic equivalent of motherhood.

A second advantage lies in the fact that possible initial hostility to the president may to a large extent be overcome in the process of selection by admitting faculty views. The president is, in effect, primus inter pares, and as Millett has wisely remarked, "the supposed power of the president to give orders to a faculty member does not exist, or will not long be tolerated in any college or university of intellectual quality." 25 Logan Wilson, in his classic work on faculties goes even further. He writes:

There is the conviction held by many, if not most, professors that the university has but one objective and exists for but one purpose: the discovery and dissemination of knowledge. According to this view, the president and any other administrator should be, not leaders and policy-makers, but servants of the faculty.26

If the faculty harbors resentment against a president who was arbitrarily selected by trustees without prior faculty consultation, the new king of the beasts may find himself in a restless jungle of resentful followers.

Third, faculty participation prevents overt favoritism or domination by a trustee or groups of trustees and guards against the imposition of a president who has limited academic background and hence limited prospects for distinguished educational leadership. Faculty committees are notorious for favoring candidates who were once "one of them" and they look upon non-academic candidates with all the fondness one would feel for a ticking package that arrives in the mail. Even the apparently serious consideration of a candidate who is poorly qualified in this respect can affect the institution adversely. Dodds tells a story which illustrates the possible contribution of a faculty advisory committee.

Not long ago we were consulted by a trustee of a prominent university in search of a new president. In response to the question "What are you looking for?" he began to enumerate the job

specifications as he saw them. His institution was a multiservice state university with a large and diversified staff. Therefore, the new man, he believed, must first of all be a good administrator in the business sense. Next, he must be able to live on good terms with the state legislature, so that it would be liberal with appropriations. He must be able to sustain his popularity with the alumni, so that they would be generous. He should be a good speaker, reasonably religious, etc. We interrupted to ask, "Since the end product of your university is education and scholarship, did it ever occur to you that a man's educational experience and promise as an educational leader were important?"

The reply that bounced back was frank. "Gosh, I never thought of that!" 27

Participation by the faculty may not always be an unmixed blessing. Faculty members without bureaucratic experience may suffer great difficulties with the demands of selection. The organizational problems involved in screening nominations and gathering information on candidates are formidable. They may become disillusioned and bitter when a seemingly arbitrary board of trustees rejects their recommendations. Further conflict may arise if the faculty is not given assurance that its advice is being sincerely sought by the trustees. And because the faculty member has loyalties for his area of specialization which may outweigh his attachment to the institution, schisms can develop

within the faculty along disciplinary lines, for example, the social scientists fighting the humanists or physical scientists.

Faculty may be a handicap when institutional change is desired. Faculty committees are prone to be conservative. The scholar may regard innovation in the academic process with a jaundiced eye. Nevertheless, faculty committees are considered a long-run asset and formal participation is far preferable to informal participation by haphazard soundings or requests for nominations.

As faculty advisory committees have become more and more a fixture of the presidential selection process, so have they metamorphosed into more broadly representative groups at many institutions. Demands for increased participation and openness in academic governance have led to the conclusion that the injection of more interests into the selection process is expedient. The president is no longer a monarch, but as Kerr explains it, a "mediator," and the groups that he must work with demand a voice in his selection. Thus, the faculty advisory committee has evolved into a more representative body. The new creature, the all-university advisory committee, performs the same advisory function vis-a-vis the governing board, but is more heterogeneous than the simple faculty advisory committee.
There are, historically, two approaches to the composition of representative sub-organs. One is the micro-cosmic approach, which refers to the setting up of small replicas of the larger body. Many legislatures, for example the United States Congress, seek to structure their committees as microcosms of the interests found in the larger body to help insure broad acceptance of committee proposals. This is done, albeit imperfectly, on the assumption that the closer and less formal atmosphere of the committee is a more hospitable place to work out the framework of compromise. A second approach is the selective loading approach, which refers to composition that includes group representatives on the basis of particular capacities, responsibilities, interests, or perceived willingness to meet the obligations of membership. The United Nations Security Council reflects this kind of policy.

The microcosmic approach is representative of a more highly evolved climate of representation. Bodies composed in this manner may be expected to be more efficient and effective in pursuing organizational goals where the compromise of competing interests is essential to the functioning of the parent institution, since they tend to dampen the spread of conflict to the full proportions of that institution. With respect to universities, the trend toward more broadly representative search and selection committees is a
formal recognition of the demise of strict hierarchical control in academic governance. The day of the autocratic president has passed, and with it the day of the influential president-makers. The all-university advisory committee, because of its heterogeneity, offers an opportunity to reconcile competing elements both inside and outside the campus political community.

Trustees, as mentioned in Chapter One, are not representative of the larger society and certainly not a mirror of the university community. Boards of governors are selectively loaded bodies, since they are appointed by the governor because of political compatibility, special knowledge or interest in education, or importance in the economic life of the university community. In other words, they are appointed because they represent established interests and rarely are trustees able to voice dynamic solutions for problem situations that demand change. Not only does change often violate established interests, it demands widespread participation—particularly in pluralistic and decentralized institutions such as universities where policy implementation requires broad consensus. Faculty committees are also selectively loaded bodies. Their membership is based on the peculiarly intimate nature of the faculty role in university life. The homogeneity of interests on the faculty advisory committee, like the trustee committee tends to account for at least
some of the conservatism in terms of institutional change that these committees are noted for.

It may be hypothesized that the more heterogeneous the membership of an advisory committee, the wider the range of alternatives that will be considered. Bodies which are selectively loaded may not be as capable as microcosmic bodies of correcting imbalances in the early stages of discussion. They present less of an opportunity for departure from the solidified positions of institutional policy that initially structure debate simply because fewer different opinions are present to be voiced. With more representative all-university committees it is possible that the ultimate choice will be the name that remains when all the candidates of the special interests have been subtracted. But the possibility for innovation in a complex environment remains.

Bennis has recommended that representative all-university search committees—assuming that they are indeed representative—should actually have formal authority to select the president.\textsuperscript{28} It is unlikely that trustees will freely assent to an abridgement of their legal right to elect the new chief executive. But as the "democratic" revolution on the campus proceeds there may be a trend in this direction. It is patently "undemocratic" for a selectively loaded body such as a governing board to overturn the

\textsuperscript{28} Bennis, "Searching . . .," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.
will of a more representative body like an all-university advisory committee. As legalism and hierarchical control continue to wane as tenets of campus governance, the autocratic blunting of the will of the newly enfranchised will not long be tolerated. For this reason trustees have been forced into taking the recommendations of their search committees seriously. The symbolic affront of ignoring their advice could have unsettling results and prematurely damage the prospects of the new president's administration.29

The trend in the composition of advisory committees is moving rapidly toward a microcosmic approach. The membership of all-university committees varies with the political complexion of the campus and the climate of campus governance. In 1967, Boston University trustees for the first time allowed a faculty advisory committee to participate in the

29. Some testimony exists to support this assumption. Joseph M. Ray, for example, says: "I would hazard the judgement, first, that the advisory committee is becoming more nearly standard . . .; and second, that boards of regents are finding it more and more difficult, if not indeed downright unwise, to flout the committees' advice. Thus we have here still another appendage to the academic bureaucracy that is coming to constitute a unique and institutionalized vital portion of the administration process." See Ray, op. cit., p. 128. Edward Kern adds support to Ray's viewpoint. "At private universities it traditionally has been up to the trustees to find a president. But universities have become such complex institutions in recent years that trustees are increasingly incompetent to do it by themselves, and increasingly disabled politically as well, because every interested constituency, on campus and off, demands a say in the choice." Edward Kern, "Quest for a Silver Unicorn," Life, Vol. 70, No. 21 (June 4, 1971), p. 55.
selection of a new president on a second-string basis. When the president selected at that time, Arland Christ-Janer, announced his resignation in 1970, the trustees felt compelled to establish a single Search Committee of 21 members from varying campus groups. On this committee were five trustees, two alumni, four deans, five professors, two graduate students, and three undergraduates.

Penn State in 1970 included nine trustees, four elected faculty members, and three students. When, in the same year, Michigan State was faced with the prospect of selecting a new president for the first time in 28 years the trustees felt compelled to draft a selection process that met with the approval of important interest groups on campus. Its All-university Search and Selection Committee (facetiously called the Search and Seizure Committee) included eight faculty members (one of whom was black), two undergraduates (one of whom was black), a graduate student, an alumni representative, and an administrator with the rank of dean or above.

In 1967 when Washington State University selected a new president, its Selection Committee included one student representative chosen by the student board of control, two faculty members, a representative of the alumni association, and three trustees.
The Los Angeles Community College District currently selects presidents with the help of search and screening committees having carefully prescribed membership. A search committee at the college where a vacancy exists is appointed to seek qualified applicants. (All applications are reviewed by the central Personnel Services Division to see that they meet established criteria.) The membership consists of the vice chancellor for personnel services, the president of the faculty senate, the student body president, an administrator, a community representative, and a trustee. This committee recommends six names to a screening committee, which is composed of the membership of the search committee plus a president from another college in the system, a staff member, a faculty-administrator, a faculty member with classroom duties, two additional trustees, and the chancellor. This committee selects three candidates for the chancellor's consideration. The chancellor then recommends a name to the board of trustees which appoints the new president.

It is revealing to point out that in each of these instances the university includes different groups in different proportions on its committee. Where trustees are not present on the advisory committee a separate trustee committee is present. But differing climates of campus governance dictate the inclusion of groups such as faculty, alumni, administrators, students, and trustees on a varied basis at each of these institutions and others as well.
What is the origin of this trend toward making search and selection processes the function of committees which are microcosms of the interests at universities? In recent years there has been mounting pressure for special interest representation on public school boards, governmental legislative and quasi-legislative bodies, and the boards of directors of private companies. It would be unnatural to expect this trend to remain isolated from university councils. Groups on campus are demanding that the "electorate" in a previously closed polity be expanded to include interests which had formerly been excluded. A major argument is that the distinctive concerns of special interest groups on campus must be constantly considered in the formulation of policy. On racially troubled campuses, for example, it has often proven unwise to make major policy decisions--such as the selection of a president--without the prior consultation of the black community.

Students have become more and more respected as a potentially powerful interest grouping whose desires must be taken into account when presidential transitions are made. At Stanford, when President Sterling announced his imminent retirement, the board of trustees appointed a six-member committee to search for a new president. They then notified the faculty that while their advice was wanted the trustees alone would accept full responsibility for selection. The
faculty appointed a seven-member committee which met jointly with the trustees several times over a year and a half period. The student body, meanwhile, demanded that the names of potential candidates be submitted to a student referendum. When this request was denied the students demanded that a student representative be appointed to the selection committee and this request was rejected also. The students then formed their own search committee and submitted a dozen names to the trustees for consideration, some of which were already being considered. The weight of this input was small. When the trustees ultimately elected Kenneth S. Pitzer, then president of Rice University, the student leaders' sole consolation was that of being notified prior to public announcement. Angered, they continued to demand a referendum and dropped their demands only after an arranged meeting with Pitzer. 30

In instances like the Stanford case, the substantive issue is rarely the critical factor. The cited importance of the surface issue may be simply a pretense for doing battle over the more fundamental issue of participation, or the prerogative of students, faculty, alumni, administrators, or other groups to make their influence felt in the campus political process. The symbolic importance of the office

of the president is so great (whatever its real prerogative) that the issue of presidential selection often emerges as one which engenders conflict over basic questions of democratic style rather than the substantive issues involved. An unsatisfactory settlement of the issue can be ruinous to a new administration. 31

Alumni constitute another interest grouping which frequently demands participation in the selection process. Since many trustees are alumni their interests are generally assured of at least a cursory hearing. Even when trustees are alumni, however, it is standard procedure to consult the leaders of alumni organizations for advice. But alumni are a heterogeneous group and pressure blocs may emerge, organized around such issues as athletics. Trustees are generally able to resist such narrow interests, but it may be undesirable for a board to involve the alumni in a formal manner. If formal involvement is invited the alumni may support a candidate not acceptable to the faculty or trustees. Feeling

31. Ness tells of the importance of student participation. "In the last year the newspapers contained reports of at least two major university presidencies where the incumbent ran into serious and immediate difficulties because the student leadership felt that its views had been ignored by the trustees. In one instance the new president withdrew. In another he accepted the position but encountered so much student opposition that he resigned not many months later. This could have been avoided if the trustees, while preserving their ultimate responsibility, had provided the opportunity for genuine and meaningful participation on the part of both students and faculty." Ness, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
rejected, the alumni may take a hostile attitude toward the
new president.

Bolman found in his survey that alumni played no
role in the selection processes at the majority of institu-
tions examined. Of 113 newly chosen presidents who furnished
information on the question, only 14 percent said they had
been interviewed by alumni other than faculty or trustees. 32
However, the conduct of the selection process takes place in
a particular institutional context. At some colleges and
universities the alumni have established power in the state
legislature and the trustees are unable to ignore them on
important matters of all kinds. At private schools the
alumni are sometimes strongly organized and have tradition-
ally had great influence on university councils. In cases
such as these, bringing the alumni into the selection pro-
cess may be essential in providing the new president with
the necessary political, financial, or loyal support.

The Role of the Outgoing President

The role of the outgoing president and the extent of
his influence upon the selection process is ordinarily small
but there are exceptions. When David Starr Jordan left Indi-
ana for the presidency of Stanford, the Indiana trustees
asked him to name not only his immediate successor but the
next three presidents as well! However, conventional wisdom

dictates that the outgoing president not succumb to the human urge to influence the choice of a successor compatible with his vision of the university's future. If he enjoys a comfortable relationship with the governing board he may be asked to serve as a consultant on procedure and perhaps a source of nominations. Dodds, nevertheless, cautions that, "the less he has to do with choosing his successor, the better," since "his perspective is bound to be warped by a human preference for a successor who will follow out policies which have become dear to his heart, whereas the institution may most need a radically different personality and a new set of policies." 33

Secrecy in the Proceedings of Trustee and Advisory Committees

At the vast majority of institutions trustee and advisory committees endeavor (usually successfully) to keep their deliberations confidential. Strict secrecy requirements are imposed upon participants for the duration of the selection process much to the annoyance of the local press and any excluded constituent groups on campus. 34 There are

33. Dodds, op. cit., p. 263.

34. Prator even goes so far as to suggest that the names of committee members themselves remain confidential. "Before the committee is designated, a public statement should make clear that it will contain representation of the faculty, the alumni, and the board of control, but until the task has been completed, the names should not be announced." Ralph Prator, The College President (Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Research in Education, 1963).
several reasons for this customary action. First, it is important to prevent the names of prospective presidents from leaking to the press since it is possible that these men might remove themselves from the running for fear of embarrassment or damage to their careers if they are not chosen. For example, when the All-university Search and Selection Committee at Michigan State University leaked to the press a list of four finalists which were to be submitted to the trustees for election, vice president and provost of Johns Hopkins University, William Bevan, immediately removed himself from the competition.  

Second, the secrecy requirement is designed to prevent the spread of conflict to unmanageable levels outside the committee and avoid the introduction of new interests at a late stage in the bargaining process. When the MUS committee pulled the wraps off its list of finalists a campaign to secure the post for former Governor G. Mennen Williams went into high gear with the blessing of the AFL-CIO in Michigan. Since the candidacy of Williams was unacceptable to students and faculty alike the Williams effort was doomed to failure and could only cause disruption. There were rumors that labor officials were pressuring Democratic members of the board to appoint Williams even without the assent of the advisory committee. The committee felt compelled to

issue a strong statement calling upon the trustees to adhere to the letter and spirit of the established selection procedure.\textsuperscript{36}

Third, secrecy is necessary to protect an atmosphere on the selection committee where tentative thinking may take place. This is a common function of secrecy in political settings. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787 the Founders chose to adopt a rule of secrecy at the suggestion of Pierce Butler to guard against "licentious publications" of proceedings. The rule was adopted and adhered to by the delegates because crude opinions had to be aired before refined proposals could be constructed. Many views were expressed not out of conviction but experimentation and the delegates wished to be judged by their final, total achievement. There was also a fear that state legislatures might feel obliged to support the dissenting views voiced by their delegates during ratification proceedings. The same considerations apply to the more modern setting of a trustee or advisory committee. In order to avoid premature controversy and protect a climate of freedom to discuss candidates that might be long-shots or controversial, a climate of secrecy is necessary. Imagine the reaction if an erstwhile democrat at Philadelphia had leaked the Virginia plan to the colonial press.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 213.
The provision for temporary leadership, the establishment of advisory committees, the establishment of guidelines for joint activity, and the provision of secrecy mark the end of one phase of the presidential selection process. The participants now turn their attention to the heart of the matter—the selection of one candidate above all others to become president. Chapter 3 discusses the objective traits of presidential candidates and how they are evaluated by trustees and advisory bodies.
Once governing board-advisory committee relations
and other ground rules have been ironed out, the participants
can turn their attention to the core business of presidential
selection—locating a new executive. In this chapter—a con­
tinuation of Chapter 2--discussion focuses upon presidential
candidates in the selection process. In the early stages of
selection questions regarding the nominees themselves do not
invariably occupy center stage. Questions of participation
by various groups, trustee-advisory committee relations, and
formal procedure often hold the attention of involved parties.
After these issues have been settled, however, the evaluation
of individuals looms as the largest task.

The first specific action is to determine the quali­
fications of the desired president so that these can be
matched against qualifications of individuals in the pool of
potential candidates. Such evaluation is, of course, predi­
cated on a more or less specific vision of what the trustees
have in mind for the university and the role the president
must fulfill. Therefore, the qualifications a candidate
must meet are dependent upon either a formal or informal
study of institutional needs and presidential duties. Does
the university need an academic leader, a fund-raiser, a sharp administrator, or a labor relations expert skilled in the art of mediation? The appropriate mix of qualities depends upon the needs of the university and these needs will alter with such variables as size, location, public service orientation, ownership, and educational emphasis. Not surprisingly, presidential qualifications have also altered over time and the following remarks on historical changes in the qualifications of presidential candidates preface a discussion of contemporary qualities and screening procedures.

Cyclical Tendencies and Presidential Leadership

On occasion a survey of institutional needs amounts to little more than an acknowledged desire to select a different type of president. Demerath and associates tell of one president who was chosen because he was the only candidate who had not been associated with a school of education. The board thought the previous incumbent had spent too much money on their university's school of education. At other times it may be more formal. Harold W. Dodds was not even under consideration for the presidency of Princeton University, but when the trustees discovered his survey of the

state's educational system during an analysis of institutional needs they were so impressed they decided he was a suitable candidate for president. Glenn S. Dumke, a former history professor and novelist, was made chancellor of the California state college system following his work on the California Master Plan. During his tenure in that position Dumke has played a decidedly important role in the selection of several college presidents, in some cases dictating his choices to the regents. In fact, one of the first major organizational moves made by Dumke was to appoint presidents for the state college campuses from outside the system to act as agents for bringing about changes which conformed to Dumke's interpretation of the California Master Plan.  

It is not a disputed fact that institutions choose presidents on the basis of current needs. When a president is chosen because he has the prerequisites of an outstanding fund-raiser, empire builder, or academician he is expected to emphasize that particular role during his incumbency. Students of educational administration have attempted to generalize this phenomenon of the selection process into a cyclical pattern common to many universities. According to Demerath, for example:

It has been said that every university undergoes twenty-year presidential cycles. An energetic scholar-administrator is chosen to improve the quality of the faculty, to remove or retire deadwood, to intimidate the too athletics-minded alumni by de-emphasizing sports, to change the curriculum, and to raise standards in general. After several years of alumni rebellion, faculty dissension, and public outcry, this president is replaced by a "morale-building" or a "fund-raiser," who preserves the educational status quo but energetically improves the institution's public relations or its physical plant.  

Ness adds an example from his personal experience.

I think of one university which has had three presidents in its relatively short history. The first was basically a pioneer spirit . . . his successor was basically a builder, third was an educator, a man to carry the institution to greater academic responsibility.  

The temptation is for trustees to choose a man for one season rather than a renaissance man during periods when one problem dominates current administrative needs. The cycle may be perpetuated when this man concentrates on his raison d'être to the relative exclusion of other important duties, and having solved the problem he was put in office to solve, finds that he is replaced by someone with another special expertise who puts his finger in the dam elsewhere. Trustees run the risk of government by fits and starts when they match men to very narrow leadership roles. A president selected to combat problems of intense or immediate urgency

3. Ibid., p. 67.

may be less competent than desired in other areas of responsibility and these areas will reassert themselves over the long run and pose insurmountable problems to the overly specialized president.

Some indirect evidence exists to verify the alleged institution of the stop-gap president and the cyclical administration. First, evidence of declining tenure leads to speculation that the day of the monarch who reigns over an institution for twenty to forty or more years at a time is coming to an end. Studies have repeatedly shown that tenure is shorter in the larger, more complex colleges and universities than the smaller ones with enrollments under 5,000. The more complex—a university, and, therefore, the more specialized its needs, the shorter the tenure of its heads.

Second, a recent spate of proposals calling for a limitation or regularly scheduled review of the presidential term indicates that some governing boards are desirous of setting up institutionalized mechanisms for periodic replacement of the president without appearing arbitrary to groups which may favor his retention. Kingman Brewster of Yale, for example, has proposed that a president's effectiveness as a leader should be reviewed every five or six years and a decision made as to the desirability of his reappointment. This proposal has gained considerable support. The 1970 Report of the Commission on Government of the University
of Toronto recommends limiting the term of the university president to five years subject to a single reappointment.\(^5\) In the fall of 1972 Evergreen State College in Olympia, Washington imposed a twelve year limit on its presidents and in February 1973 State University of New York Chancellor Ernest Boyer announced that the system's 29 presidents would serve five year terms. At the end of each term they would be evaluated by faculty, students, and trustees.

If the day arrives when election is followed by re-election at five year intervals, it will indicate that the university president has become totally dependent upon campus interest groups for his survival and that shifting coalitions and interests on fast changing campuses necessitate a change in the chief executive at regular intervals.\(^6\) Regularly scheduled elections of important representatives in the larger political society signify a similar phenomenon at work.

Insofar as cyclical trends are common to individual schools the tendency is toward formalizing them as an


\(^6\) In a survey of 86 former presidents Paul Cuneo concludes that shorter presidential terms are the result of faster pace of educational change. He argues that presidents go to an institution to fill a need and five to ten years is the longest feasible time to carry out a need. In, "How Long Can a President Serve Effectively," College Management, Vol. 6, No. 11 (November 1971), p. 26.
indirect result of shortening tenure. The implication of fixed tenure proposals is that the president is suspect of having outlived his usefulness to the college after a mere five years, and that he may need to be replaced by someone with different skills as well as greater rapport with university-related interest groups both on and off campus.

A second type of cyclical change has taken place across the entire historical spectrum of colleges and universities in the United States, involving all similar institutions on a more or less equal basis. Wecter, Prator, and Kerr, for example, have taken a broad view of the office of the presidency and found that as institutional functions have evolved the role of the president has changed also. As the role of the president changed there have been consequential changes in the type of men selected. Therefore, it is hypothesized that changing types of presidents reflect important changes in universities themselves.

During the colonial period colleges like Harvard and Yale sprang up primarily for the purpose of training a new minister corps and the typical head of such a college was a minister. Wecter points out that of 288 pre-Civil War

college heads on record, all but 26 were ordained ministers. 8 This type of record continued into the 1940's at such institutions as Baylor University, Boston University, Southern Methodist University, and Vanderbilt University. Today, however, only four percent of all college presidents hold Divinity or Doctor of Sacred Theology degrees. 9 This figure reflects a change in educational priorities throughout the country.

The post-Appomattox era was marked by a decline in the minister president and the rise of the scholar president. These were men of distinguished academic credentials such as Eliot and Lowell of Harvard, White of Cornell, Gilman of Johns Hopkins, Barnard and Butler of Columbia, Angell of Michigan, Van Hise of Wisconsin, Harper of Chicago, and Jordan of Stanford. They placed heavy emphasis on scholarship and academic excellence and the defining characteristic of such presidents was that they emerged from the classroom.

The continued growth in size and complexity of American colleges and universities led to a propensity to select men whose great strength was administration. Many schools selected academic hybrids such as commerce department deans


who set up administrations patterned after the example of big business. In the aftermath of World War II, some colleges rebelled against the staid administrator or academic and chose heroes such as generals and physicists in a search for instant prestige. After VJ Day there were widespread rumors that nearly every four-star general in the field was under consideration for at least one post. Columbia was so anxious to get Eisenhower that the board was willing to wait eight months until he could assume the position after a search that had lasted for nearly three years. Southern colleges in particular have always had a particular penchant for general-presidents. Robert E. Lee retired as the head of Washington College and William Sherman was the first president of Louisiana State University. Places were also found for the new heroes of the atomic age. Physicist Arthur Compton was selected to be president of Washington University as was Detlef W. Bronk at Johns Hopkins.

In the post-war years the business manager and the hero have given way to the public relations expert and the "mediator"--the man with great skill in adjusting relations between competing constituencies. Although a variety of types still abound in institutions of higher education across the country, rare is the president of a major university who can succeed in his other duties without continued attention to the chorus of demands from internal and
external groups interested in higher education on campus. One exception to this general rule exists—the "law and order" president. If the present trend toward selecting presidents for the purpose of cracking down on rebellious students and faculty continues we can look forward to seeing presidents selected from among the ranks of Marine Corps officers, the nation's prison wardens, and FBI agents. The law enforcement specialist is a relatively recent phenomenon which arose in the 1960's as a product of campus disorder. This breed of president is an unusual exception to the rule that the leader must enjoy the confidence of a wide variety of interest groups both on and off campus in order to have a successful administration. For this reason, the process by which he is selected may differ from the ordinary.

The saga of S. I. Hayakawa of San Francisco State College is a case in point. Upon the resignation of President John Summerskill in 1968, the SFS campus was on the verge of major insurrection. Students were ominously close to rioting and the faculty had been threatening a strike. Summerskill had been a popular president with faculty, students, and the black community, and by trafficking on his known liberalness he had managed to retain the confidence of these groups and prevent the trouble that was brewing from breaking out on a massive scale. But Summerskill's posture earned him the enmity of conservative members on the
California Board of Regents and the dislike of Governor Reagan, Chancellor Dumke, and the Superintendent of Public Education Max Rafferty. Summerskill had, for example, openly marched in an anti-war demonstration in downtown San Francisco in violation of the unspoken rule that university presidents should keep their personal views on volatile issues close to the vest. He also wore a lapel button which was not complimentary to Reagan.

The Board of Regents conducted an inquiry into Summerskill's administration and his fitness to retain the post. Although they elected to let him retain his position he subsequently resigned over policy differences. In choosing a new president for SFS the trustees chose to bypass the established selection machinery, thereby ignoring the duly constituted Presidential Selection Committee of the faculty (of which Hayakawa himself was a member). They elected Hayakawa, a professor of semantics, who enjoyed great ideological rapport with Governor Reagan. One of Reagan's pastimes was preparing the voters of California for a campus Armageddon, and shortly before Hayakawa's selection he had declared that "San Francisco State should be kept open at the point of a bayonet, if necessary."¹⁰ With the blessing of Reagan,

Hayakawa was installed to restore a climate of law and order at SFS and keep the campus from closing down.

As Hayakawa assumed office it became immediately apparent that he had mixed backing on the campus itself and that whatever support he needed would have to come from beyond the campus gates. To secure the support of outside interests Hayakawa organized a public relations campaign financed by W. Clement Stone of Chicago, a rich insurance magnate and old friend. His tactics included bringing Mahalia Jackson to the campus to demonstrate Hayakawa's support in the black community, playing music over public address systems when demonstrations were in progress, planting flowers before television cameras, and passing out blue armbands to signify support for his administration.\(^\text{11}\)

Hayakawa's style was direct. He put into effect a system of emergency regulations which prohibited gatherings and ordered faculty to remain in their classrooms. He often acted singlehandedly, directly, and with apparent relish, as when he pulled the wires from an offending sound truck being used by the demonstrators. He kept television cameras and police on campus. And after a riot by 5,000 students he is reported to have said, "This has been the most exciting day of my life since my tenth birthday, when I rode on a roller

\(^{11}\) This campaign reportedly cost $100,000 and was conducted by Mike Teilman, a San Francisco public relations man.
coaster for the first time."¹² It is debatable whether Hayakawa caused greater trouble or controlled an already out-of-control situation with his stern measures. But he was able to take such measures almost with impunity since he did not depend upon campus interest groups such as students, faculty, and the black community for a viable power base. His selection was the result of influences from outside the university demanding a halt to lawlessness and the style of his administration reflected the concerns of the coalition of politicians and frightened citizens who put him in office. The television cameras on campus assured these groups that the situation was being tackled not by an anonymous, faceless bureaucrat, but a man of direct and visible action. The law and order president is the equivalent of the hired gun of the old West.

**Presidential Qualifications**

Some extraordinary views of presidential qualifications exist.

Take Grayson Kirk. Here they got into his room. . . . They burglarized his files. They smoked his cigars. They used his shaving kit. . . . I think it would have been a wonderful thing if Grayson Kirk got mad, grabbed a gun and went out there and gunned them down. I think maybe he would have gotten killed, maybe he would have killed two of them when they were jumping up, but I think he would have saved Columbia. . . .

¹² Barlow and Shapiro, op. cit., p. 264.
What you need are chancellors of universities who have muscle, who love a fight, who, when they get up in the morning, spit on their hands and ask, "Whom will I kill today?" These are the people that will save you.13

Whatever the merits of machismo in university administration, the contemporary candidate is likely to be more sedate, although Ness recalls that one of his acquaintances in that post could "start off an evening by out-vodkaing a cossack, dance a dozen Polish polkas at midnight, and talk German philosophy until dawn."14 If such individuals are rare, the perfect president is even rarer. Wilmarth S. Lewis, a member of the Yale Corporation's nominating committee which was searching for a successor to President Charles Seymour summarized the prerequisites of office as follows:

He must be a good leader—not too far to the right, not too far to the left, and, of course, not too much in the middle. He must be a magnificent speaker and a good writer. He must be a good public relations man and an experienced fund raiser. He must be a man of iron health and stamina, a young man—but also mature and full of wisdom. He must be married to a paragon, a combination of Queen Victoria, Florence Nightingale, and the best dressed woman of the year. He must be a man of the world, and yet he must also have spiritual qualities—a great administrator who can delegate authority. He must be a Yale man and a great scholar—also a social philosopher who has at his finger tips a solution to all world problems, from birth control to Formosa. I don't doubt that you have realized that there is


only one who has most of these qualities but—is God a Yale man?  

Attractive candidates for the office of the president are not overly plentiful and those that do exist are difficult to uncover in a search. Indices of past successes are rarely perfect and indices of future success practically nonexistent. How, then, can a potential president be identified and his future performance estimated?

Most committees rely on the trait approach. They develop a list of desired qualities such as the ones exemplified below:

1. He should be a distinguished scholar.
2. He should have considerable academic training.
3. He should have achieved recognition in his chosen field.
4. He should possess certain qualities that bespeak of educational statesmanship.
5. He should be a person of integrity who will discharge his responsibilities with good conscience.
6. He should have previous experience in a university, preferably administrative experiences as departmental chairman, dean, vice-president, or president.
7. He should be fully cognizant of the threefold mission of a state university: teaching, research, and service.
8. He should have demonstrated executive ability.
9. He should be prepared to head a multimillion-dollar business.
10. He should be able to interpret successfully—to the legislature, to alumni, and to private citizens—the financial needs of the university.
11. He should be prepared to meet the political responsibilities of his office.

12. He should have social skills, as an important part of his job is meeting and entertaining many different kinds of people.
13. He should be skilled in public relations.
14. He should have special skills in public communication.
15. He should enjoy good health.
16. He should, with exception always for the unusual candidate, be in the age bracket of thirty to fifty-five.
17. He should have an understanding of our region's culture. 16

or:

1. The candidate must have a sound education, preferably culminating in one or more earned doctor's degrees.
2. The candidate should have had some training in a scholarly discipline, in pedagogy, and in administration.
3. The candidate should have had some experience as a faculty member and an administrator, hopefully in higher education.
4. The candidate should have done some travel, research, and writing at different sites and possibly abroad.
5. The candidate should have a pleasing appearance, temperament and personality; and be vigorous and in sound health.
6. The candidate should have a well-rounded grasp of the world situation, education generally and higher education specifically; he should know his way around in intellectual and cultural circles.
7. He should have the leadership skills of being able to address, influence and secure action from large and small groups.
8. He should be a man of personal integrity, moral strength, good will, and optimistic outlook.
9. He should be a "man of management" as well as a "man of learning."

10. He should want the job!17

Such checklists are common and certainly noteworthy for the cliches they contain if not for the real practical guidance they give to search committees. The weakness of the trait approach is that it does nothing to facilitate the compromise of interests necessary to assure the new president of the internal and external support from constituent groups at the start of his administration. Additionally, as one former president has remarked, such lists leave one with the impression that if a man exists who can fulfill the requirements and meet the qualifications, "he ought to be canonized instead of saddling him with the duties of a university president."18

Some items on such a list, such as leadership, honesty, and integrity are not subject to analysis within the scope of this paper because of their obvious subjective nature. Other items, such as religious affiliation or residency, are most often related to the particular needs of a single institution. But there are several nearly universal "hard" requirements common to these checklists that can be statistically measured.


First, age is often an important consideration. The trustees will want to find a man who is old enough to have demonstrated scholarly and administrative ability, but young enough to hold promise of at least five—preferably ten—years of service. For this reason, selection committees look within the age range of 45 to 55. Along with age, health is also an important concern, though one less easily measured. The strains in the office are reflected in the number of presidents who die or are forced to resign yearly because of ill-health.

Second, the marital status of the candidate appears statistically to be of exceptional importance to selection committees. Of the 116 presidents who responded to Bolman's questionnaire 114 were married.\(^ {19} \) It is generally true that the candidate's wife will be examined and evaluated along with the candidate himself before the final decision is made and potential candidates are encouraged to bring their wives with them when they arrive to visit the campus and be interviewed. A recent exception to this rule of thumb was Summerskill of San Francisco State who, though still legally married to his first wife, lived with a woman who was later to become his second wife. Although the cohabitation was an open secret, he suffered no public pressure because of it.

\(^{19}\) Bolman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 34.
Third, the academic background of the presidential candidate is always explored very carefully. The president of a major public or private university must—with rare exception—be the possessor of an earned doctorate. If present trends continue such a degree will be absolutely indispensable within twenty years at almost all colleges and universities no matter what their size or academic orientation. The doctorate most highly valued is the Ph.D. rather than one of the other earned degrees. In a survey of 760 presidents of colleges and universities Ferrari found that 73 percent held earned doctorates, with 58 percent holding Ph.D.'s. In Bolman's study 83 percent held earned doctorates, with 61 percent holding Ph.D's. Furthermore, of 26 Ph.D. granting institutions, 24 had Ph.D. presidents. In a study of 295 public university presidents Ingraham found that 80 percent had earned Ph.D.'s.

The emphasis on research capability and scholarly achievement reflected in these figures is a measure of the extent that the president must be acceptable to the faculty and have smooth relations with them during his tenure.


21. Bolman, op. cit., p. 34.

Faculty fear that a president without scholarly or academic background may concentrate his efforts too heavily on non-academic aspects of the office such as fund-raising, speech-making, or physical plant construction while either neglecting educational leadership or delegating such matters to subordinates. Successful educational leadership is a scarce commodity and the scholar is most likely to have it. As Wriston says in his memoirs, "I cannot deny that ministers, lawyers, military officers, bankers, businessmen, and others have occasionally done well. But the sound rule is that the president should be a scholar; all the other essential attributes should be present, but secondary." 23

The rising percentage of presidents with earned doctorates parallels the rising percentage of the number of schools which permit faculty participation in the selection process. When a representative faculty committee is present in the selection process the likely result is that faculty will press for a candidate with a scholarly reputation. Again, the method of presidential selection tends to influence the type of individual chosen.

Fourth, most selection committees, and particularly those at large universities and multiversities, weigh administrative experience quite heavily. One reason why deans,

vice-presidents, provosts, and even department chairmen are chosen as university presidents so frequently is that not only do they hold earned doctorates but they have experience in educational administration as well. Since the liberal arts college of a major public university is often the largest of its subdivisions, deans of liberal arts colleges are often mentioned as presidential possibilities. They are, in effect, already heads of sizable educational institutions and if they demonstrate an ability to grapple successfully with the administrative and academic problems of the deanship their quality as presidential timbre will be enhanced.

The primary consideration, however, continues to be academic experience and competence. Administrative expertise can often be purchased on the open market in the form of a vice-president of finance, a reliable comptroller, or business manager. Vice-presidents in charge of public relations have also become common in the past decade. Training for educational leadership cannot be had anywhere but in the academic ranks. However, according to Ferrari, only 27 percent of all presidents and four percent of all public university presidents had no administrative experience at the time of their selection and the average number of years experience for those who did have some was over ten years in both categories. 24

24. Ferrari, op. cit., p. 101. Ferrari also finds that 19 percent of public university presidents were formerly
Finally, no discussion of qualifications would be complete without some mention of special, unique, and customary qualifications. Many colleges and universities have peculiar requirements which must be met by prospective incumbents. Massachusetts and Nebraska, for example, require their college presidents to be able to furnish bond for faithful performance. South Carolina has a constitutional provision charging that "the board shall take care that the president of the university shall not be an atheist or infidel." Some universities are directed by statute or custom to select alumni as their presidents. For example, since 1766, 11 of the 14 Yale presidents have had one or more Yale degrees. Other schools must abide by legal or customary stipulations regarding state or regional residency, church membership, or administrative experience. It should be noted that some of these innocuous sounding requirements may set up significant barriers to a broad basis for selection—state residence, for example.

The safest observation to be made regarding criteria and qualifications is that there is no general and widespread agreement on essential attributes beyond academic and college presidents, 24 percent academic vice-presidents, and 25 percent college deans. The rest come from a wide variety of sources.

administrative experience, marital status, and age. These qualities do not serve to narrow the field of possible candidates as drastically as is necessary. Selection committees must sometimes winnow out candidates acceptable to particular situations from long lists of individuals with extremely diverse and non-comparable backgrounds. The longer and more specific the list of qualifications, the more difficult it will be to find a president to meet them. A second problem is that the qualifications of a candidate reveal only a general suitability for the post and traits themselves do little to satisfy the competing demands of internal and external university constituencies. The trait approach to candidate selection ignores the dynamic elements of interest group activity present in the selection process. It is conceivable that the least satisfactory candidate in terms of abstract qualifications may be the only candidate acceptable to all the interests represented in the selection committee after the favorite sons of special interests have canceled each other out. With these considerations in mind wise selection committees attempt to keep lists of qualifications to a minimum.

What do the presidents themselves say about experience needed to become a successful leader? From the vantage point of incumbency Ferrari's surveyed presidents divided this way: notable scholar, 18 percent; educational
administrator, 68 percent; and experience in business administration, 14 percent.  

**Gathering Nominations**

College presidents seeking jobs sometimes advertise in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* but this is rare. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is extreme reticence when it comes to making presidential ambitions known to selection committees. The man who covets a college or university presidency must depend upon others to make his case just as a client depends on his lawyer. Direct applications are seldom seriously considered.

When the selection committee finally starts whacking the bushes sources of names are legion. The committee can secure promising leads from educational foundations, other presidents at nearby institutions, prominent donors, faculty, alumni, and students. Some trustees may advance favorite candidates of their own. Educational foundations such as the Independent College Funds of America, governmental agencies like the U.S. Office of Education, and peak associations like the Association of American Colleges and the American Association of University Presidents may prove to be fruitful sources because their professional obligations require them to remain in constant touch with educators throughout the

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country. It is, of course, desirable to look over the natural pool of talent at the hunting institution itself. But despite a large number of sources to guarantee that committees will come up with scores of names, there is never any assurance that most or even any of the promising candidates for the job can be located. 27

One other source of names has assumed importance in the post-war years. In some cases the university selection committee may rely on a consulting firm or placement agency for lists of presidential candidates. These agencies, such as McKinsey and Company and the Chicago firm of Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, are useful for searching out nominees and compiling data on them. One advantage of using a placement agency is that it lessens the chance of trustees or other groups advancing favored local candidates. On the other hand, most colleges and universities look upon this practice as a last resort. Not only are the services very expensive,

27. Dexter M. Keezer, former president of Reed College has suggested that trustees keep informed about presidential possibilities on a continuing basis in "How Long is Too Long for a College President?" College and University Business, Vol. 48, No. 3 (March 1970), p. 46. Ritchie of Pacific University has made the same suggestion, saying that, "it would seem entirely practical for organizations such as the Association of American Colleges, the organizations of presidents in the various religious denominations, the denominational boards of education and the several centers for the study of higher education to have a well annotated listing of prominent people who would make good presidents." Ritchie also suggests that direct applications would be appropriate. M. A. F. Ritchie, The College Presidency (New York: Philosophical Library, 1970), p. 15.
but much of the groundwork is taken out of the hands of interested parties at the university, thereby flirting with the possibility that the list of candidates will be unsatisfactory to local interest groups.

**Screening Applicants**

Once a sufficient number of nominations have been gathered the committee or committees must screen the applicants by matching them against the job qualifications. The list at this point may be long. Some universities have compiled lists of up to 500 names and it is difficult to keep the list under 100. Lists tend to become elongated when committees ask many groups to make nominations as a way of avoiding hard feelings. However, compiling a roster is relatively simple in comparison to the task of weeding out names and shortening the list to a manageable number.

One search committee divided its letters of recommendation into five categories: Most Likely, Likely, Less Likely, Rejections, and Insiders. Another used Outstanding, Serious, Possible, and More Information Needed.

Information on candidates in the early stages of the selection process is sparse. Sometimes the only pertinent sources of data for evaluation are contained in the letter(s) of recommendation and biographical data from such easily accessible sources as Who's Who. In addition, the publications or a representative sample of publications of the
candidate are read by committee members if he is under serious consideration. Information gathered in this form is often not subject to reduction to comparable data and the selection committee must base most of its early judgments on frankly inadequate facts and hearsay opinion. But the list must be shortened somehow. When, for example, a list of 20 candidates is compiled comparative evaluations still require more mental power than the average human being possesses. With 20 candidates 190 pairings are required to match each man against every other.

When the list has been shortened to a manageable level investigation of serious candidates proceeds. Evaluations of the individual's colleagues will be sought out and the committee will delve into the candidates' political views, personal finances, and personal habits. When the selection committee has pondered the available material and ruthlessly pruned its list it is ready to interview the dozen or fewer candidates who might possibly emerge as the new Messiah.

**Interviews of Candidates**

Interviews are used to probe further into the qualifications and opinions of prospective presidential candidates. They allow the committee to investigate the presence and bearing of the candidate, his views on such controversial subjects as gambling, sex, drugs, and foreign policy, his
administrative acumen, and his performance under pressure. They serve the added function of allowing outside candidates to ask searching questions about the situation they might be entering if they are unfamiliar with the institution they could be asked to supervise. Ritchie writes of an interview which must have been revealing to both sides. He had been called to a Southern university and,

... the question of race relations came out and it was perfectly obvious that the committee would wish me to seek to perpetuate the policy of exclusion of Negro students. This I could not agree to do. Also, a trustee asked if I would include study of communism in Political Science. When I told him I would insist upon it since we ought to know very thoroughly the kind of political forces which were most dangerous to us in the world, he became quite upset.28

The interviewees may be asked questions about their views on nearly everything and the conduct of interviews, although often informal, can be a trying experience. They are often long—from two to six hours—and the questions can be hard. The selection committee at Franconia College in 1970 asked each prospective president whether he would rather see his son attend Franconia or Harvard and viewed this loaded question as the acid test for which the candidate was expected to dredge up a respectable answer. Actually, such questions are common. Candidates are often asked to describe their actions in hypothetical situations concerning faculty strikes, student violence and financial

28. Ibid., p. 8.
disaster. Searching questions about the future of the university and higher education in America are also thrown into the candidate's lap. 29

Interviews may be conducted by trustees, members of the faculty, alumni, administrative officials, and student groups. They are, however, generally confidential. It is common practice for universities to conduct several rounds of interviews—each time eliminating more candidates. First round interviews with "semifinalists" are customarily held on neutral grounds away from both the searching institution and the candidates' institutions. Sometimes the interviews are conducted when candidates come to the searching university's campus on some pretext such as a lecture program or professional conference. Only when the list has been reduced to several or fewer "finalists" are interviews commonly conducted on the home grounds. Interviews at that location are postponed for as long as possible to avoid embarrassing rumors and damaging speculation. Therefore, it is not uncommon for groups of faculty and trustees to fly around the nation leaving a wide swath of interviews behind them as they hop

29. John Bunzel, president of San Jose State College, has written that three questions are often asked by selection committees. They are: (1) What are your ideas about academic authority and responsibility? Please be specific about the role of the faculty; (2) What is your attitude toward the police? and (3) What is the future of the university? In, "Answers From a Presidential Candidate," Educational Record, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Winter 1971), pp. 12-16.
along among cities which are strategically located at a compromise distance between their school and the nominees' schools.

**Final Selection**

When the odyssey of the search and selection committee has drawn to an end, formal election of the new president takes place to symbolize majority approval of the candidate and provide him with a "mandate." In those instances where a trustee committee has labored alongside a faculty or other representative committee, the appended committee generally makes formal recommendation of one to five names to the trustee committee, which chooses a nominee and forwards his name to the full board for final election. In cases where an all-university advisory committee conducted the search process and trustees were present on that committee, the recommendation to the full board is almost always accepted.

Either before or after formal election representatives of the university visit the prospective president and formally extend invitation. This occasion may be a cliff-hanger since refusals are uncomfortably frequent and many presidents have been second, third, and even fourth choices.

The candidate may have reservations about the job and may request additional authority or something else from the trustees before formally accepting. Edward Charles Elliott, chancellor of the Montana State Universities and
later president of Purdue University excelled at extracting concessions from trustees. When approached by the University of Montana he specified ten conditions upon which his acceptance hinged, including the proviso that he not be expected to make any public addresses for at least six months after beginning his term in office! Before coming to Purdue, the master negotiator stipulated a list of 14 requests which ranged from his right to exercise control over educational policies to the length of his vacation each year (one month). In both cases he was granted all his requests with the exception of his salary request at Montana and a compromise was reached on that.\textsuperscript{30}

When the regents of the University of Wisconsin arrived in New York in 1925 to offer Glenn Frank the presidency of their school Frank demanded and got a large salary, an expense account, defrayal of moving expenses, a presidential mansion, a chauffeured automobile, an agreement to fulfill his outstanding lecture engagements, and permission to continue writing a daily syndicated newspaper column.\textsuperscript{31}

And in 1971, when John Silber was offered the presidency of Boston University, he asked for and was granted two

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Frank K. Burrin, \textit{Edward Charles Elliott, Educator} (Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Studies, 1970), pp. 54 and 83.
\end{itemize}
prerogatives as conditions of acceptance. They were the right to speculate with a free hand with the university's $12 million endowment; and trustee approval of a $1.5 million deficit to pay for hiring new faculty members with distinguished records. These conditions triggered apprehension in the university but were accepted nonetheless. Neither Elliott, Frank, or Silber, incidentally were first choices.

Before final acceptance it is a tradition at most state schools to seek the blessing of the governor. Frequently the governor's approval is a small formality but politically astute trustees will not overlook this customary obligation. Once approval is forthcoming a formal vote of trustees is taken and the new president elected. Such a vote is often unanimous (one of Elliott's conditions was that the Montana board elect him unanimously) but sometimes divided along partisan lines.

CHAPTER 4

A PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS OF
LEADERSHIP SELECTION MECHANISMS

The ideal accident would be a collision between the man seeking the office and the office seeking the man. But thanks to the law of averages and Western man's aversion to doctrines of predestination (not to mention the unspoken dictum that presidential candidates do not openly seek to advance their candidacy) such happy intersections are not predestined. Since presidential selection is not left to chance or happy accident, some kind of purposeful, organized, and formal process is required. The question which each institution's leadership must ask of itself is: What kind of process should be utilized given the goals and climate of our academic community?

One can envision a number of methods of choosing the president which are superficially plausible but never used. He is not elected by the faculty senate following recommendation by a committee of trustees. He is not put into office by a majority of registered voters in the state or some special college or university district. And he is not confirmed by the state legislature after nomination by the governor. He is, however, likely to be selected by a widely institutionalized presidential selection process which differs
only in its specific details. Despite the diversity of public and private universities with respect to enrollment, funding, academic culture, service orientation, and prestige, the process is, at least outwardly, similar in most cases as indicated by examples in preceding chapters.

Why have so many universities utilized basically similar processes? Is this repetition reflective of sacrosanct custom? Lack of creativity? Incestuous mimicry? Or is there a compelling rationale which explains the recurrent resurrection of faculty and trustee search, advisory and selection committees, recommendations, nominations, consultations, interviews, and formal elections each time a president is chosen? Does not this repetition reveal a remarkable standardization of procedure in an academic universe which is noted throughout the world for its lack of centralized control by a government education agency?

The discussion in this chapter is directed toward providing answers to these and other questions by discussing methods of leadership selection not only for universities but for all human organizations with pluralistic constituencies. First, the similarity of leadership succession problems in such organizations is discussed. Second, a conceptual framework for the comparative study of leadership selection mechanisms is set forth. This framework provides a heuristic basis for the case study of presidential selection and The University of Arizona in Part II. Third, the importance of
middle-range group theory to the deductive percepts of the conceptual framework is explored. Fourth, there is an exploratory discussion of the relationship between succession procedures and leadership roles.

It is an abstract thesis of this chapter that the succession mechanism used in the presidential selection process—as it is manifest at the majority of colleges and universities across the country—is functional because it is wittingly or unwittingly designed to facilitate presidential leadership. It is argued that methods of leadership selection are directly related to the role expectations of the leadership position they are intended to fill because they nurture and stabilize the initial support the leader needs to perform his duties once in office through a process of group mobilization and consensus-seeking. Each college, university, or other pluralistic organization is best suited to choose its selection procedure by virtue of its unique climate of governance. Selection processes in universities, therefore, are remarkably standardized in form because university governance—and particularly the role of the president—is standardized.

The Problem of Leadership Selection

In any political order or organizational hierarchy the problem of succession is unavoidable because all men are mortal. Succession is referred to here as a "problem," since
the type of rule and the way it is secured are inextricably linked to the legitimacy of the order and the accountability of the leader. Also, experience to date with succession mechanisms leaves little room for doubt that foolproof means of leadership succession remain elusive in conglomerate human associations such as nations, corporations, or universities.  

Given an abundance of succession mechanisms is it possible to develop a framework for the study of leadership succession which permits a comparative approach? The answer to this question is a qualified "yes," if we restrict the scope of inquiry to exclude primary groups such as the family, the local Boy Scout troop, or the "experience in group living" at the house down the street. It is possible to point to some universalism in the succession mechanisms of complex human organizations because in such organizations the leadership is accountable to heterogeneous constituent groups which hold the potential for a restrictive veto over the exercise of authority. In particular, the formal and informal procedures of presidential selection in colleges and universities have much in common with procedures of leadership selection used by other complex, pluralistic 

organizations such as nations, legislatures, corporations, peak associations, and international organizations. All such human organizations are prone to display the following five characteristics when engaged in the selection of new leadership.

First, the selection of the leader is a salient, important issue which emerges from a vast welter of on-going problems to assume prominence and engage the attention of a splintered mosaic of vital constituent groups. Selection is a universally prominent issue because the continuity of the transcending order which binds constituent groups together is at stake. The heated battle in the United Nations between ideological blocs over a successor to Dag Hammarskjold illustrates the furor that leadership selection can induce. This argument involved most of the nations of the world and was not so subtly interlaced with cold war

2. The question arises as to what causes some issues to assume such importance. E. E. Schattschneider, for example, has stated that, "there are billions of potential conflicts in any modern society, but only a few become significant. The reduction of the number of conflicts is an essential part of politics." In, The Semi-sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 66; emphasis in the original. Schattschneider suggests that groups must choose among battles because their resources are limited and implies that groups dissatisfied with the status quo are most likely to fight a battle which could alter the existing "balance of forces;" but he suggests no general rule for predicting which potential battles will actually be fought or which decisions contested. It is suggested here that organized constituent groups will contest decisions which threaten group leadership because they provoke internal dissension among the membership.
arguments over the specific role of the Secretariat and the larger role of the United Nations in peacekeeping.

Because such succession struggles inevitably engage the attention of interests which compose the building blocks of a pluralistic organization, a second characteristic of leadership selection is an opening of formal or informal (or both) channels of influence. Such channels of influence differ markedly across a spectrum of political culture but they are universal. If groups are deflected from asserting their interests by stubborn institutions, entrenched oligarchies, or other forms of organizational arteriosclerosis, powerful groups will seek to restructure the decision-making system and relocate the locus of power so that they may participate in or control the policy apparatus of the organization. This revolution is often incremental as, for example, the movement toward increased student participation in campus governance has been. But it can be quite sudden, as Louis XVI discovered.

Third, the succession process is never fully automatic. Although some organizations have constitutions and bylaws which specify the source of new leadership in case of sudden death or resignation, such smooth succession is atypical. Even in monarchies, for example, where succession would seem to be insured by birthright, the actions of various interests with a stake in the new rule have often led to
court intrigue and quite unpredictable turns of events. Serious problems with pretenders and the intricacies of descent, once there does not exist a clear case for the eldest son, suggest that the seeming sureness of lineage as a criteria of leadership selection has proved illusory in many instances.

Fourth, the selection process is closely linked to the role of the leader and his relationship to the interests of the constituency he presides over. All leaders are ultimately accountable to their followers by one means or another. Such accountability may be highly institutionalized, as it is in twentieth century parliamentary and presidential systems. Here the technique of accountability calls for frequent and scheduled elections on a more or less regular basis. Or accountability may be only vaguely institutionalized as was the case in the dynastic politics of pre-modern China. Traditionally, the Emperor of China based the legitimacy of his rule on a divinely bestowed "mandate of Heaven," and until that esoteric favor was relinquished there was no earthly authority to which he could be held responsible for his acts. But in return for the autocratic power conferred on him by Heaven he assumed a responsibility to the Chinese people for the maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity in the Middle Kingdom. It has always proved difficult to interpret the will of divine beings so it became customary to hold the
Emperor accountable for such signs of disease in the body politic as floods, famine, pestilence, increased tenantry, banditry, and foreign invasion. A successful rebellion, spurred by these harsh conditions, was interpreted as a sign that the Son of Heaven had lost his mandate and the right of rebellion was given explicit recognition in early Chinese political theory. Civil insurrection was legitimized as a remedy for a weakened central government unable to preserve domestic tranquility.  

Although civilized nations have substituted elections in place of physical force the principle remains substantially the same—at some point the leader is ultimately responsible to the sheer weight of numbers or the sheer gravity of opposing interests among the led. Walter Lippmann argues that, "the justification of majority rule in politics is not to be found in its ethical superiority. It is to be found in the sheer necessity of finding a place in civilized society for the force which resides in the weight of numbers."  

Formally or informally, then a procedurally adequate process for selecting leadership attempts to gain the consensus of groups which might veto the leader and make


the veto stick. The participation of these groups is maximized in a prevailing climate of over-all participation.

Fifth, leadership selection processes in pluralistic organizations combine formal machinery, group interests, and personal ambitions. The intersection of these three forces may become the scene of a tremendous clash, or may quickly become the arena of consensus. However, leadership selection is the product of multiple causality. Ordinarily, no solitary force predominates the succession struggle which takes place in an environment of fragmented interests and matching institutional mechanisms for their expression.

What follows is a conceptual framework of leadership selection which is applicable to a wide range of arenas for leadership recruitment. It emphasizes the interplay of groups or "interests" rather than formal and institutionalized mechanisms of selection such as councils of elders, majority votes, or parliamentary bodies. Such institutions are assumed to reflect and channel the prevailing climate of group activity as, for example, the American electoral college mirrors and enforces the presence of a two-party system in which each party has strong regional support. The five stages of activity which constitute this framework facilitate a procedural analysis.
A Procedural Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Leadership Selection

Stage I—Group Disequilibrium

Group disequilibrium is defined as a lack of stability in the constituent base of a polity, organization, or community and occurs when continuity is threatened, as it is when succession is non-automatic but necessary and imminent. With specific reference to leadership selection, group disequilibrium commonly results in the following situations: (1) dissatisfaction with the incumbent leadership, (2) death or resignation of a leader, and (3) expiration of a fixed tenure of leadership.

The first condition, that of dissatisfaction with the current rule, arises when the leadership is unresponsive to the political, social, economic, religious, or symbolic needs of important constituent groups in the political or organizational sphere. This condition may impend when the leader has failed to estimate depth of sentiment or because of circumstances beyond his control. One student of leadership has observed that: "There is a natural tendency to associate the leader with the results achieved under his leadership even when these achievements, good or bad, have resulted despite his leadership rather than because of it." 5

Winston Churchill, Nikita Khrushchev, and Lyndon Johnson are

contemporary examples of leaders who have been displaced because important constituent elements in their countries rebelled against their leadership—however closely it approached adherence to a public philosophy. University presidents have faced demands for their resignation as well. George D. Stoddard, former president of the University of Illinois, was dismissed from his post for

... defending "pink professors" (a running conflict with several legislators), refusal to honor a contract bill (a quarrel with a state senator), saying things "hostile to religion" (a criticism of a minister on the board of regents), allowing the university radio to represent public questions unfairly (an intermittent argument with a downstate representative), and too many trips abroad with UNESCO (a conflict with the board chairman).6

It is evident that almost any action (or non-action) can have positive and/or negative consequences in terms of constituency support. As many elected officials in public life have discovered, almost any policy exertion makes the representative both friends and enemies simultaneously.

The second condition, disequilibrium resulting from resignation or death, often arises unexpectedly or on short notice, and when a leadership position suddenly becomes vacant there is an immediate struggle for succession—unless succession is provided for in organizational bylaws or constitutions to provide a steppingstone for the logical heir.

The third condition, expiration of term of office, descends on a forewarned organization. Where fixed tenure prevails the termination of the leader's power is known well in advance. And, as in American presidential elections, the struggle for succession is regularized as nearly as possible. It is hypothesized that succession struggles are moderated and shorter where fixed terms of office prevail. In the United States the struggle among a variety of ambitious presidential contenders in the "out" party lasts approximately a year in its highly competitive stage and can last no longer than four years in any case. In the Soviet Union, however, fixed terms of office do not prevail and both the death of Stalin and the ouster of Khrushchev were followed by much longer struggles to consolidate power in the person of one individual out of an unstable collegial form of rule. There was no accepted formal conclusion to the succession struggle. Khrushchev, for example, became Party Secretary in March 1953 but was unable to eliminate completely the last of his many

7. J. G. Frazer describes what is perhaps the shortest and most literal succession struggle on record: "The people of the Congo believed that if their pontiff, the Chitome, were to die a natural death, the world would perish, and the earth, which he alone sustained by his power and merit, would immediately be annihilated. Accordingly, when he fell ill and seemed likely to die, his prospective successor entered his house with a rope or club and strangled or bludgeoned him to death." In, The Golden Bough (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1959), p. 225.
rivals until Bulganin was eased out of his post as Prime Minister in March 1958, five years later. 8

Stage II--Group Mobilization

Group mobilization occurs in response to a condition of group disequilibrium caused by the imminence of new leadership. Groups mobilize their members and resources to protect or improve their position vis-a-vis competing groups under the new regime. Group mobilization may be either direct or indirect.

Direct or institutionalized group mobilization refers to the mandatory mobilization of interests required where there is established machinery for leadership selection. In American presidential politics, for example, the presidential preference primaries and the national nominating conventions insure that groups and factions within the parties will mobilize. In 1968 the Democratic party invited not only the mobilization of state parties and such traditional supporters as labor unions, but by virtue of the "reforms" of the McGovern Commission invited the mobilization of traditionally non-political groups such as women and homosexuals. Pre-existing ground-rules for leadership selection encourage and channel mobilization by groups with strong interests and

influence (resources). After legitimate channels of influence are opened there is a strong tendency for groups to actively use them. Participation is the maximum possible under the "rules of the game."

Non-direct or non-institutionalized mobilization takes place when tangential or peripheral groups become involved as soon as threats or rewards to their membership become apparent in the selection of a leader. If and when such groups perceive themselves as excluded from the process they will likely demand admission for the purpose of safeguarding their interests and securing symbolic gratification. A case in point is that of the students at Stanford University who were not included in the presidential selection process despite their repeated requests and subsequently insisted on a plebicite on the new president. After an interview was arranged with the new president by the trustees student leaders dropped their demands. Such groups do not

have direct access to the selection machinery and their influence is a function of the legitimacy they accumulate in pressing their demands. This legitimacy, in turn, rests not on ideological justifications but on the ability of the group to demonstrate a capacity to influence the success of the new administration once a leader is chosen.

Stage III—Preliminary Coalition Formation

At some point competing interests and factions must reach agreement over the leadership issue if the continuity of the organization is not to be seriously threatened. Of course, the exact person of the leader may not be the real issue. In the selection of college and university presidents this is accomplished by joint meetings between faculty members and trustees or their respective advisory committees, as well as the solicitation of nominations from groups excluded from formal participation. The tenuous coalition which is formed in the process is protected by an atmosphere of confidentiality designed to prevent the spread of conflict and the sudden appearance of new forces in the equation of compromise. New forces might suddenly endanger that compromise and the "balance of power" achieved by the groups represented in the formal procedure.

In American presidential politics the national party nominating conventions of the political parties perform a similar function of preliminary coalition formation. The
function of these institutions is to mold some measure of unanimity among the diverse elements which coalesce in nominal alliance to form our heterogeneous parties. Specifically, one device used at the convention for this purpose is the party platform. In the early years of party conventions, following the breakdown of the congressional caucus system in 1824, platform committee hearings were used to reveal the relative strength of different factions early in the proceedings of the convention. Today, however, with the advent of improved communications, altered procedures of delegate selection, and scientific polling procedures, the strengths and weaknesses of party candidates and important issue-oriented groupings are known well in advance, and the function of the platform committee has altered. Whereas once the platform was a barometer of factional or sectional strength, it is now a device for placating the weaker factions of the party to insure their adherence to the platform and hopefully to the party nominees as well. It is used as a device to form a preliminary coalition. To avoid divisive and costly floor fights party leaders and candidates attempt to iron out differences at platform hearings and promote the degree of unity necessary to make possible the selection of a presidential candidate. A second coalition-forming function of the platform is that of securing nominal support beyond the delegates themselves. Just as presidential
selection committees attempt to secure nominations from widely scattered sources, the platform committee opens itself to counsel from all directions.

In preparation for the 1964 Republican platform, Representative Melvin R. Laird, resolutions committee chairman, sent 10,000 questionnaires to selected persons. He held many private meetings with prominent Republicans and collected materials from a series of party-to-people programs. A number of position papers were prepared by academicians. Throughout the hearings, dozens of persons from pressure groups . . . (were) brought into contact with the committee and, indirectly, with the party officialdom.10

If contact does promote mutual understanding and support, this is an ideal procedure.

Election campaigns of all kinds are another important mechanism for establishing broad preliminary coalitions. The techniques of campaigning are, of course, influenced primarily by the candidate's perceptions of how to gain the greatest possible support from the most likely sources and form the broadest coalition.

Stage IV--Final Coalition Formation

This stage of the process of leadership selection involves the cementing of the preliminary coalition formed in Stage III and the securing of widespread consent on the new leadership from the entire spectrum of groups and interests involved in the succession procedure. In heterogeneous

polities or organizations institutionalized mechanisms are present to insure the acceptability of the final outcome. It is hypothesized here that the more heterogeneous and pluralistic is the arena of leadership selection, the more powerful and redundant will be the devices for cementing the coalition behind a new leader. In other words, the mechanisms for providing the initial support the leader needs to carry out his assigned role(s) must be equal to the task.

In the American political system, for example, we find such redundancy. A presidential election is held in which a majority or plurality of voters forms behind one of the candidates and a minority behind the others. But because the president is not simply a leader of the American people but a prima donna of a federal system composed of a welter of sectional and state interests, the Founders attempted to insure his ability to lead effectively and convincingly by setting up the electoral college. This institution is a symbolic representation of the federal system and the ultimate arbiter of our national elections. And to further guard against failing to achieve a majority of people and states, the rules of the electoral college (in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution) provide for a possible contingency election in Congress should any candidate fail to get a majority of 270 electoral votes. ¹¹

¹¹. Only once in American history has the redundancy built into the electoral system proved inadequate. In the
In the university and college arena we find that large schools are more likely to set up special committees and include a diversity of groups in the presidential selection process than are smaller schools. As social fragmentation has proceeded in the larger society, so it has in the universities, and they have had to institute new, more formal mechanisms for seeking and insuring consensus in the wake of these changes and the wane of homogeneity on the campus.

Stage V—Symbolic Legitimation

The pomp of ritual and its effect on the members of the human race is sometimes profound. The final stage of the leadership selection process is the symbolic conferral of sanctioned authority on the new leader. This ritual serves to ratify the winning or dominant coalition of groups and interests which have combined in the leadership succession struggle and marks common submission to the person and authority of the fledgling leader. Crowns and other tangible trappings of power are less and less frequently handed out, and rituals are more and more truncated in this modern age of increasing abstraction, but inaugural parades and ceremonies, coronations, oaths of office, and other literal forms of

Hayes-Tilden election of 1876 the electoral college was crippled by disputed electoral votes from four states. The validity of these votes was determined by a special joint committee of Congress and the Supreme Court, thereby cementing the final coalition.
investiture remain as significant formalities for top leadership posts. On these occasions representatives of all important constituent groups are conspicuously present to take political communion with the new leader and lend a spirit of continuity and legitimacy to his administration.

The success of symbolic procedures is sometimes empirically demonstrable, though in a deeper sense any such measurement is inadequate. Greenstein has noted a rallying effect when a new president comes to office. He points out that, "Kennedy was supported by only half of the electorate at the polls, but by the time of his inauguration two months later he was approved by 69% of the electorate."\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{The Utility of a Procedural Analysis of Leadership Selection}

The foregoing framework for the study of leadership selection emphasizes procedural aspects of selection processes and permits a broad, comparative perspective for the examination of the phenomenon as it exists in heterogeneous organizations. There are, however, alternative approaches to the study of the selection of top leaders which merit some attention.

\textsuperscript{12} Fred I. Greenstein, "The Psychological Functions of the Presidency for Citizens," in Elmer Cornwall (ed.), \textit{The American Presidency} (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1966), p. 34. See also Edelman, \textit{op. cit.}, who writes that, "political decisions overtly reached through bargaining are commonly regarded as unsanctioned by an acceptable setting and are therefore unpopular with mass publics . . . unless otherwise rationalized," p. 105.
It would be possible to evaluate leadership selection from the viewpoint of natural law. From this vantage point the final outcome of the selection process would be embodied in the person of a leader who closely adhered to some kind of widely accepted deep force, national interest, or public philosophy. Many rulers of primitive societies and tribes, and most monarchies, have based the succession process on adherence to a divine will which placed the validity of rule beyond the constituent groups of the political system. Political theorists have also based leadership succession and legitimacy on themes of natural law. Plato's philosopher-kings were to guide society toward a more perfect harmony in keeping with a revealed dogma of perfection, knowledge of which was a necessary criteria for selection as a leader. Even Rousseau's instrument for determining public policy, the General Will, was assumed to embody the deep, vital force of society and conform to its common interest, thereby having the capacity to "force" men to be free. But natural law theories of leadership selection, whatever their practical merit in finding adequate leadership and insuring continuity and legitimacy, are inadequate for the study of leadership selection because they fail to concede to the secular constituencies of the ruler the role that in reality they actually play. One need only stop to ponder the role of conflict and consensus in Plato's Republic to discover that it is sterile of political reality.
A democratic theory of leadership selection would emphasize responsiveness to the will of the people. A leader would be installed and legitimized on the basis of his ability to sniff the changing moods of his constituents—at least 51 percent of them—and satisfy their interests or desires. But if natural law theories of leadership selection assume altruistic or divine selectors, a democratic theory assumes equally far-fetched conditions. Ordinarily, each member of the community does not have an equal share in choosing the leader, because the institutions which are generally credited with registering the will of the people distort that will and shield positions of leadership from direct contact with an atomistic mass of constituents.

A procedural conception, on the other hand, assumes that leadership selection is the result of a process of group interaction, emphasizes the existence of conflictual and consensual drives common to all pluralistic political cultures, and rests its legitimacy not on any ideological base but on real strengths of constituent support groups. Such a conception assumes only that when interested groups and coalitions have participated in the process the selection of the leadership is legitimate. Leadership selection is the product of group consent, and the selection process embodies group activity so that selection will not take place until all relevant groups have made their interests
known. Group interests may be defined as conditions of support by participating groups.

This need not imply that, as Arthur Bentley stated, "when the groups are adequately slated, everything is stated." But the group approach provides a basic theoretical framework for the procedural analysis of leadership selection which focuses on the importance of constituent group support in the choice of a potentially successful and accountable leader. A distillation of the main tenets of "group theory" should reveal this.

The Group Theoretical Approach to the Study of Political Activity

Group theory (sometimes called simple group theory, general group theory, vector-sum theory, or referee theory), as manifest in the discipline of political science involves primarily the search for a comprehensive statement of the role of groups in the political process, and secondarily includes a theoretical description and explanation of the political process deriving from the nature of the group phenomenon. Implicit in Bentley, for instance, is the position that politics can and should be studied with sole reference to group affiliation and group interaction. He wrote that, "the balance of the group pressures is the existing state of

society. The political process for Bentley and his followers is adequately conceived of as groups of individuals exerting reciprocal pressures on one another through group interaction.

This conception of politics assumes that groups, either organized or potential, are the fundamental units of activity and should therefore become fundamental units of analysis in the study of politics. Individual activities are to be understood as the products of associational experiences since the individual lives no life apart from his groups. Oliver Garceau indicates that group theory is the . . . effort to develop a theory which would use the idea of the group as the central or even the sole building block. To do this, it is necessary in effect to give the group tag to many different kinds of social relationships and interactions. Such a group theory of politics must deal not only with formally organized interest associations. It must include also the identifications the individual makes with others that do not involve him in formal acts of affiliation.

The existing political structure is likewise to be understood as a reflection or register of group forces, and changes in group interaction explain shifts in political behavior. Charles Hagan, for instance, describes a constitution in the following manner: "A constitution is the


behavior that the dominant groups manifest in the operation of the community. If the groups change then the constitution changes with them. The stability of the constitution is the stability of the underlying group support."\(^{16}\)

The political process is the process of groups competing over the allocation of resources and the subject matter of politics is power rather than the state or its institutions, which are merely the organs through which power is exercised. Thus, the legislative process becomes largely a refereeing activity and must, if we are to believe Latham, be placed "within the larger context of the group struggle of which it is a part."\(^{17}\) The justices of the Supreme Court, according to Bentley, are "responsive to group pressures," and use "their representative judgement to bring those pressures into balance."\(^{18}\) And Truman tells us that, "the accretion of executive functions is in large measure due to . . . the gravitation of interest groups toward government."\(^{19}\)


\(^{18}\) Bentley, op. cit., p. 141.

Group theorists tend to define public policy as the substantive manifestation of whatever unique state of "equilibrium" has been reached in the group struggle at any given moment. Programs and policies are modified continually as relations between groups change. This theory of politics explains public policy as the result of a "parallelogram" of organized interest group forces.\textsuperscript{20} Equilibrium is generally defined as the state when patterns of group interaction are characterized by relative stability and agreement on basic assumptions, values, and rules of the game. It is assumed that the "public interest" emerges predominant over the specialized interest, the dynamics of the group process providing their own internalized checks which prevent the tyranny of one set of interests over another set. The confirmation of this belief is usually seen in the observation that political group actors are rarely completely eliminated from the arena of group combat.

Group theories of politics are indigenous to American political science. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the relatively great harmony of American political experience and characteristic acceptance of a common tradition by political actors in the United States has fostered a unique stress on tactical considerations rather than ideological or doctrinal disputes. For this reason an

\textsuperscript{20} Garceau, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 106.
equilibrium concept has been acceptably close to reality.
Second, the federal system with its many points of access has made it difficult for competing interest groups to eliminate rival contenders from the scene. The result has been a proliferation of very long lived groups, lending credence to the theory that politics in the United States has not been characterized by the periods of crisis and instability found in governments elsewhere in the world. It has been visualized, therefore, as a process or continuing relationship among various elements and institutions in dynamic interaction. Thus, the political structure may easily be seen as the reflection of freely combining and interacting subgroupings. Groups may be viewed as processes rather than simple aggregations of individuals in static consultation. In a general sense, group theory is an affirmation and expression of faith in the American tradition of pragmatic politics. Policy decisions in the United States, it may be argued, are delayed until all relevant interests have been given the opportunity to make their influence felt.

For other reasons, not only group theorists but political scientists of all persuasions have attempted to rise above the study of formal institutions to discover a broader theoretical basis for the collection of data sufficient to describe the operation of government in its entirety. Bentley's contribution is significantly within this
trend away from formalism, legalism, and political philosophy. Bentley sought a reorientation of political science around empirical theory, pragmatism, ethical neutrality, and the dynamics of process. And group theory was early sought out as a way to explain relationships more complicated than those between the voter, the majority, the elected official, and public policy. Scholarly concern with the phenomena of the interest group was an early step toward improvement of descriptive theories about our political process.

Because simple group theory is indigenous to American political science and developed as part of a trend in the study of American politics, it is necessary to acknowledge at the outset that some caution must be taken in its application to non-American political systems and other large-scale human organizations of the type under discussion here. However, scholarly research in recent years has been marked by a trend towards the examination of the "political" in organizations other than nation-states.21 And it is

logical to expect that the number, kind, and behavior traits of groups will be associated with pluralism, habits of formal and informal association, degrees of freedom of association, and the availability or amenability for formal institutional machinery to incorporate group demands upon the system. The relative importance of group activity in any political setting is related to variables of political culture but factious behavior is common to all organizations where differentiation has taken place within the constituent base.

Group theory has been broadly criticized for being deterministic, ambiguous in its definitions of terms, and naturalistic. But the most important weakness of simple scholar of politics, Sheldon S. Wolin, has inveighed against the "... absorption of the political into non-political institutions and activities." Wolin argues that it is most proper to "... identify what is political with what is general to society," but his appeal has been accepted by a minority in the discipline. In Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), pp. 353 and 429. E. E. Schattschneider, in Two Hundred Million Americans in Search of a Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), contends that what makes government unique and universal is the "X-factor," or pressure from the outside world, which is the basic precondition for the existence of "politics;" pp. 34-38.

group theory is that it assumes too much; its inclusiveness is pretentious. It cannot adequately explain important dimensions of political experience. Individual activity, for one thing, cannot be explained by deductions for the general theoretical propositions of group theory and the researcher is left with two equally unattractive alternatives. Either he must venture outside the broad theoretical system to explain a good part of what he observes, or he must systematically restructure (or unstructure) the observed phenomena by pursuing an infinite regression into less and less basic interests. 23


23. One advocate of the group approach, George I. Blanksten, takes the second course. In discussing the Peron coup in Argentina he asks, "... which route to the mainsprings of the area's politics is more fruitful for the scholar—to wait for GOU after mysterious GOU to ambush him, or to seize the initiative in seeking out these groups,
Moreover, the theory that policies and programs merely represent the present focus of conflicting interests would, in the words of Bernard Crick, "lead logically to a completely patternless empiricism: activity without pattern or plan, politics without statesmanship." In fact, the nearer political practice approaches the indiscriminate competition of interest groups, the more concerned and worried political scientists should become from a normative standpoint. This is especially true if one holds the point of view that the job of government is to resolve conflicting claims into compatibility with the public interest through the exercise of leadership. In short, group theory does not prepare for the future or take cognizance of the past. This is why group theory fails to provide an adequate account of the politics of public programs. It is complacent about the necessity of achieving adequate public policy and the problems of achieving that at the appropriate time. For instance, the singular failing of José Batlle's succors in tracking them even to associational and non-associational sources?" In "Political Groups in Latin America," American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 1959), p. 122. Where the question of explaining individual activity arises no rational theory may be adequate. Here we really have the old, inherent contradiction between Freud and Marx which threads its way through much of Western social thought: Are the activities of men determined by their psychic content or their identification with a functional category of material life?

Uruguay was that they were unable to dominate a plethora of groups pressing for endless social and economic outputs from government. The result was, if we are to believe Philip B. Taylor, that, "the political system became one in which no appeal was ever denied, no problem ever solved definitively, no issue ever faced candidly on its merits." If ever group theory were to inspire practice, the end result would bear a close resemblance to this situation.

Such shortcomings lead to the conclusion that group theory is essentially a middle range theory. Its use by Bentley is extravagant; its use by Truman is reasonable. The former sought a "group theory of politics," but the latter, recognizing a neglected area of study, sought a "political theory of groups." Groups constitute a large part of political life, both in nation-states and other forms of "political" organization, but most—if not all—would agree that a mere elaboration of group politics into a general theory will not suffice. This is not to say that in the study of complex organizations group theory should be eclipsed by functional or other theories. Among others, Robert K. Merton has indicated that middle range theories or, "logically interconnected conceptions which are limited

and modest in scope," have place and purpose until such time as less restricted theoretical systems have been developed.  

The Contribution of Group Theory to the Study of Leadership Succession

What Crick has referred to as the "patternless empiricism" of a group theoretical political world is not a visualization fully congruent with the empirical elements which become evident through even the most cursory analysis of public policy formulation or leadership selection. But if the interaction characteristics of groups are conceptually channeled and harnessed within the boundaries of the influence of political, social, or economic institutions we can find merit in the use of group theory to explain processes of leadership selection from a procedural viewpoint. This can be accomplished through an understanding of the role of institutions of all types in the process of leadership selection and their contribution to the direction and methods of group activity. Institutions, particularly electoral institutions, do not simply register the demands of groups like cash registers totaling the demands of consumers. They exert powerful influences of their own.  


27. According to Schattschneider, for example, the losing party in a conflict attempts to expand the scope of conflict to include previously uninvolved elements in the
Institutionalized mechanisms such as university committees, legislatures, or stockholders' meetings are significant because they both facilitate and moderate ongoing conflict inherent in the group process; sometimes performing these two functions simultaneously. The actions of groups in all arenas are both conflictual and consensual. In the conceptual framework utilized here, the first two stages of leadership selection (group disequilibrium and group mobilization) are dynamic and characterized by group conflict and competition at the expense of group harmony, moderation, and consensus. This dynamism is a factor which precipitates change in the organization or polity since the clash of group interests is, in theory, the lubricant which prevents an organization from becoming immobilized by fixed behavior patterns and static goals. When a college or university discovers that it is going to face the necessity of selecting a new president, formal machinery is set up to determine group access to the process on a selective basis. This early elimination of some groups from the conflict is the hope that the balance of forces in the power equation will shift. One implication of Schattschneider's argument is that general group theory is inadequate to explain the role of institutions in the making of public policy (or the selection of leaders). Government--and its institutions--is not simply a register of prevailing group forces and public policy is, likewise, not simply a reflection of these forces. The neutrality of government and of its institutions is a myth. Groups bring their problems to government in the hope that the actions of government will shift policy to one side of a conflict rather than the other. The Semi-sovereign People, op. cit., p. 16.
first hint of an institutionalized drive toward consensus. Within this machinery the first stage of the selection process is usually that of determining the broad goals and priorities of the educational institution. These goals and priorities may be a matter of considerable debate among interested constituent groups like faculty, trustees, students, administrators, and alumni. The discussion process here is educational and may lead to changes or alterations in organizational goals which are in turn translated into the criteria used to pick a new president from a long list of possibilities.

But dynamism leading to change in the organization's nature and operation is only one characteristic of the leadership selection process. Leadership selection mechanisms are simultaneously invested with institutions, institutionalized procedures, and customs which function to buffer excessive partisanship and promote agreement among the competing participants, uniting them behind a new leader in a compromise situation. 28 Thus, succession procedures also

28. Carl Friedrich has remarked that "the entire field of operations involving negotiation and compromise provides occasions for the exercise of power in which constraint and consent are intermingled; here power does not manifest itself in commands, but in proposals, counterproposals and the rest of the instrumentarium of negotiation and diplomacy. Power is matched by countervailing power, and a balance is struck between them for concrete occasions." Op. cit., p. 170. Schattschneider argues that, "the crucial problem in politics is the management of conflict. No regime could endure which did not cope with this problem. All
serve a stabilizing, as well as a dynamic function. The third, fourth, and fifth stages of the framework utilized here (preliminary coalition formation, final coalition formation, and symbolic legitimation) take cognizance of the consensual drives which exist in a constant dialectic with conflictual drives.

In the selection of university presidents the selection mechanism brings advisory committees together for discussions in an atmosphere of confidentiality which is functional only because some groups have already been excluded and is in itself a significant factor in nurturing compromise. The final, public vote unites the participants in a concrete coalition and their common partaking in the inauguration of the new president lends symbolic support to the new administration. Presidential selection machinery, like comparable leadership selection machinery in other arenas, initially serves to mobilize heterogeneous and competing interests to provide the necessary cleavage to make the system move. Subsequently the machinery engages these interests in a situation conducive to compromise, thereby promoting enough consensus to nurture bonds of community and hold the

politics, all leadership and all organization involves the management of conflict." He also notes that, "all forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias." Two Hundred Million Americans . . ., p. 71 (emphasis in original).
system together. Similar conflicting but complementary functions are performed in such diverse institutions as political party conventions, the College of Cardinals, and general elections. In the leadership selection processes of all large, heterogeneous organizations there are institutions which share in common either the promotion or moderation of group conflict and the functions are frequently combined in the same institutions.

Because of the omnipresence of institutions which function to buffer conflict it follows that we need not assume that the result of the selection process is legitimate in either a normative or procedural sense unless all groups have had an opportunity to effectively voice their interests and participate to the fullest extent. Group exclusion is one of the dynamic facets of the group process as well as group inclusion. Groups must either acquiesce in the result of the succession process or be eliminated altogether from the political arena by peaceful or violent means.

In the American political system, for example, the electoral college exemplifies a type of institution which deflates excessive partisanship and heads off extended conflict by selectively excluding groups. It is historically demonstrable that candidates without a territorial base do not score well in the ultimate tally irrespective of their popular vote totals. In the election of 1912, William
Howard Taft received 23.2 percent of the popular vote and got only 8 electoral votes; in 1924, Robert M. LaFollette received 16.6 percent of the popular vote and only 13 electoral votes. This may be contrasted to the showing of George Wallace who, with the solid support of the South in 1968, received 46 electoral votes on the basis of only 13 percent of the popular vote, but Thurmond had strong sectional support in the South and was rewarded with 39 electoral votes as compared to Henry Wallace's failure to receive any. 29

These disparities are given logical clarity if the function of the electoral college in the process of leadership selection is understood as promoting consensus among regional and subregional political units. Although the popular vote may be close in a given election, the distortion of the electoral college generally permits the compilation of a lopsided majority of units in the federal system. It does not reward the same strengths as the general election and this fact highlights a factor of some significance. 30

Effective consensual functions in pluralistic arenas with wide


30. The technical reasons for discrepancy between the popular vote and the electoral vote are (1) the unit rule system, (2) the two "Senatorial" electoral votes granted to each state as part of its political birthright, (3) disproportionate voting turnout from state to state, and (4) the lag between actual population growth or decline and reapportionment.
power disparities are not performed efficiently by majoritarian institutions. This is particularly true where the appeal of democratic ideology is weak, but also true where such ideologies are incorporated into the political culture. Consensual institutions are organized primarily to be sensitive to the disparities of power in the pressure equation. The more heterogeneous the elite or the electorate, the more difficult the construction of a viable coalition becomes, and the greater is the risk of an expanded scope of conflict. Thus, the nations on the Security Council of the United Nations can exercise a veto over the selection of a new Secretary-General, and the university governing board has the final say in the selection of a university president. The electoral college, despite the symbolism of majority rule incorporated within it, still registers the need to gain widespread approval from states and sections which was so necessary in the Founding Fathers' day. Today, by fortuitous circumstance rather than design, the electoral college gains the consent of urban areas and metropolitan interests for the new president, rather than the consent of all the electorate.

Democratic theory emphasizes an undifferentiated mass of equally potent groups or individuals. But reality is seldom organized along ideological lines and effective consensus-building institutions must secure consent to a
"balance-of-power" situation in which the potential veto power of some groups over the new administration is more substantial than others, no matter how evenly balanced popular majorities may be. Institutions designed to cement final coalitions embody more elements of Calhoun's doctrine of concurrent majorities than the democratic doctrines of Jefferson.

The relationship between succession procedures and leadership roles

The character of a society or organization will determine the nature of its electoral devices, which will then be indigenous to that particular arena of leadership selection. A. J. Milnor advances the thesis that, "... a society is suited to make its own choices about the electoral institution by its own character and history." Devices for leadership selection are, if Milnor is correct, the product of a unique and prevailing climate of participation in particular societies, organizations, and polities. But this is not the whole story. It may be shown that electoral institutions (or highly institutionalized succession devices) are the result of a universal need to install leadership which has the firm support of major constituent elements or restrictive veto groups within the task-relevant constituency, whether it be a congressional district, corporation,

university, or nation. If this support is not present in generous quantities the continuity of the organization and its leadership is in danger. Due to the exigencies of providing necessary constituent support the leadership selection mechanism is molded in complementary fashion to the image of the leadership role(s) which must be performed.

Leadership roles, in turn, are determined by the expectations of powerful constituent groups (including constitutions, which are semi-permanent registers of group demands and expectations) and shift when prevailing winds of political, social, religious, and economic change alter the organizational climate. Consequently, the leadership role must eventually alter to insure continued legitimacy for the position. As the role of the leader is altered in either evolutionary or revolutionary fashion the succession mechanism used for leadership selection alters on a parallel course to insure a continuing, firm base of constituent group support.

This argument implies the existence of a circular causal chain (or feedback cycle) in which the leadership role and the selection mechanism are inextricably linked together. The primary energy for the operation of this cycle comes from the dynamics of social change and it operates in the following manner.

Changes in the broad social environment of political structures are not subject to question. Broad social
movements of consequence eventually find their way to government as new problems emerge and problems are taken into the policy-making apparatus of government. The important consideration here is that these changes are reflected in the shifting fortunes of interest groups within organizational and political settings. One of the prime determinants of group power (aside from resources, organizational structure, legitimacy, access, and tactics) is the substantive emphasis on the group. We might hypothesize, for example, that the trend toward increased concern with the welfare state has favored labor-oriented groups all over the world at the expense of business groups. In the United States, urban oriented groups—such as Urban America, Inc., the Chamber of Commerce, the National Alliance of Businessmen, the Urban Coalition, and the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials have increased in power and importance due to broad environmental trends which have simply worked in their favor. In particular, voting trends have become advantageous to the interests of urban groups even without the exertion of conscious efforts to stimulate the election of urban oriented representatives. Congress, and especially the House of Representatives, is becoming more reflective of urban interests as a result of demographic trends within the nation. Ira Sharkansky, for instance, finds that since the time of the 88th Congress over 40 percent of all House
members have come from urban areas and that this percentage may be expected to increase over the foreseeable future. 32

Stephen K. Bailey also finds that in the coming decade Congress will be more responsible to urban needs as the revolutionary process of reapportionment (an alteration of the electoral machinery) continues to make it more representative of the large urban population in the United States. 33

As such changes in the social environment take place the character of the group struggle is changed. As values change the legitimacy of some interests is enhanced at the expense of others. Business interests, for example, have suffered not only from so-called "welfare statism" but from values which are changing from predominantly economic to greater concern for quality of the environment, quality of life, and equality of races. In developing nations,


governmental actions have produced functional cleavages in previously undifferentiated populations living in rural areas. They have brought entirely new interests into existence.

Altered directions in the group process bring new pressures to bear upon the top leadership of nations and organizations. Leaders and representatives of other kinds must respond to the needs of a new group equilibrium. With the passage of time the cumulative effect of this continued saga of challenge and response brings about incremental changes in the leadership role. Although constitutional powers may remain unchanged, the informal parameters of the exercise of power shift. For example, the 20th century has been hard on legislatures all across the world. While there are many reasons for the decline of deliberative bodies one that is almost universally advanced is the growing prominence of the executive in the field of foreign affairs. While the executive has been gaining power from this source, however, his discretion in other policy matters has been circumscribed by the growth of large bureaucracies which exhibit the persistence of gravity along with the brains of apples. Changes in the environment of the leader resulting from shifts in group relationships produce consequent alterations in leadership roles. Changes in leadership roles, in turn, eventually spark changes in succession mechanisms designed to provide
the leader with the group support he needs to successfully fulfill his duties in a climate of modified expectation.

Milnor, nevertheless, makes the assertion that, ". . . once (an electoral) institution is established, as is so often the case with human structures, it is often easier to go down with the ship than to change an institution on which a political system so heavily depends." 34 But this observation is only partially correct. There is, indeed, a tendency toward inertia in major social institutions, electoral and non-electoral. 35 Nevertheless, complex institutions retain the capacity to metamorphose to accommodate to changes in the larger environment. Previously mentioned shifts in the functions of platform committee hearings at national nominating conventions and reforms in delegate selection exemplify significant change. Even more conclusive evidence of change is the observation that the 12th, 14th, 15th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 25th, and 26th amendments to the American Constitution have altered electoral procedures. And considering the difficulty encountered in amending the Constitution and the widespread participation in


35. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 17-24, for a discussion of factors promoting institutionalization. He suggests that complexity, autonomy, and consensus of membership are factors which tend to promote firm entrenchment and inertia.
necessary to do so, it is remarkable that fully ten of the 26 amendments to date—and over half of those ratified after the Bill of Rights in 1791—have dealt with electoral procedure, suffrage, and succession. Such formal changes, when combined with the many informal changes wrought in the American electoral process by social and technological change, accumulate into a profound—if incremental—revolution of the electoral system which parallels changes in the broader political system and ratifies the shifting fortunes of groups in the broader political setting. 36

What, then, is the explicit chain of events connecting changes in society, the relative importance of university constituent and audience groups, altered demands on university presidents, changed leadership roles for the president, and altered selection mechanisms?

During the early years of United States history the first, small private colleges were essentially simple and

36. Jack Dennis has examined changes in the electoral system in a slightly different light. Dennis suggests that, "... elections may be regarded as a well-founded, ultra-stable feature of the American political landscape," but adds that, "on a balance sheet of institutional change," there is "evidence in the United States to suggest development, failure to develop, and decay." Dennis then elaborates on each of these points and concludes that "the institution of elections enjoys a broad base of popular support." The public support Dennis documents for electoral institutions may be interpreted as confirming the hypothesis that changes in electoral institutions have paralleled changes in the political system. In, "Party Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public," American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (September 1970), pp. 819-835.
homogeneous institutions implanted in the new country to train a minister corps and give education in the classics and social graces to the children of the privileged classes in society. Such colleges were characterized by small, tightly knit faculties, limited student enrollment, a modest number of degree programs, and funding from private sources. In these institutions the office of the president was not marked by the high degree of role differentiation that is present today. The president spoke to alumni and community groups, he was charged with the raising of funds, he taught in the classroom, and he meted out discipline directly to students who violated the inflexible and strict university codes of conduct common to the times. During this era in American higher education the president was selected by the external lay body which represented the founders. The governing board had come to rely on the president as their representative and instrument of authority at the institution and he, in turn, relied on the governing board to support his rather autocratic treatment of faculty and students.  

37. The power of the governing board can be traced to a minor but interesting example of the social contract. In the words of Frederick Rudolph, "it had been the clear intention of the founders of Harvard to carry on the English tradition of resident-faculty control. The first compromise with English practice was necessitated by the fact that a company of scholars could not assemble in the woods of Massachusetts without being called together by someone. Harvard had to be founded; it could not simply develop; there were insufficient resources and scholars for English precedent to prevail." In, The American College and University: A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 166.
Although students tended to rebel against the tight rein kept upon them, the role and purpose of the university in society was not debated among internal and external constituent groups and audiences and controversy was minimal.

With the passage of the Morrill Act in 1862 we can trace the beginnings of the modern university in America. Public funding for universities automatically brought new groups into the life of the school, and as institutions grew in size and expanded their functions, student bodies, degree programs, and teaching methods, they became more complex and heterogeneous institutions paralleling a general trend in American society-at-large. The expanding role of the university brought with it more complex administrative problems and the job of the president evolved into a more highly specialized and sensitive one. No longer was a clergyman who could speak eloquently and lecture in the classroom necessarily adequate as a leader. The position took on new dimensions of expertise and presidents in the post-Civil War years were men of academic insight, financial acumen, organizational ability, and proven executive capacity.

An increasingly complex interface between the university and the larger society was also directly responsible for the first diffusion of sole responsibility for selecting the president away from governing boards and founders. It was during the period between the Civil War and World War II
that the selection process initially opened to include powerful interests whose right to participate was legitimized by the potential impact of their influence upon the college or university and, therefore, the success of the new president's administration. Donors, foundations, political interests (as represented by governors), and faculty (the only significantly powerful group on the campus at that time), all began to stake a claim to participation in the choice of the president.

Throughout the time of the growth of universities in size and complexity the twin principles of academic community and academic freedom were more and more frequently advanced and defended as reasons for allowing the universities to continue their pursuits unfettered by the great conflicts and public issues in society-at-large. But the unique values of academic life were, in the final analysis, never strong enough to offset the pressing clamor and heterogeneity of external societal values. So challenges in the outside environment of the university forced the academic community to face the alternative of either becoming selectively open to external influences or face decline, and ultimately, decay. New viewpoints, needs, and political forces pushed their way into the institutions of higher learning and as they came, campus groups began to divide along lines suggestive of the example of the larger society.
Today, the faculty (and particularly the liberal arts faculty) is the last domain of academic isolation and the strongest advocate of academic freedom as well. Governing boards are generally both conduits and filters for political pressures. Students cry for relevance in instruction and research. Administrators are caught in the middle, and alumni press highly selective demands upon the university exemplified by their traditional interest in winning football teams.

As Kerr has suggested, "A university is a group of warring factions held together by a central heating system." 38 Although few would go so far as to accept this as a completely adequate analogy, most would agree with Kerr's conception of the contemporary university president as a "mediator" among campus groups with competing interests. Davis, for example, states that

... perhaps the true measure of leadership is the ability (or lack of it) on the part of the president to create and maintain a working partnership between governing board, administration, faculty, students, and the people of the state and community who support the institution--a partnership necessary to move the university forward. In default of excellence in leadership in any one of these important areas for any length of time, failure or mediocrity is almost a certainty. 39

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And Heady argues that,

... the administrator's duty is not to suppress conflicts, he has to encourage them, and then when they arise he has to take steps to insure that they are resolved. A healthy university ought to be in a state of unstable equilibrium—an equilibrium continually disturbed by forces and enthusiasm generated within the faculty and continually readjusted by the gyroscope of central administration. The power behind the gyroscope is the president. 40

All leaders are in a sense "mediators," because ultimate accountability is universal in pluralistic organizations and even the most dictatorial rulers face the threat of assassination, tyrannicide, rebellion, or displacement by less violent means. 41

What is the connection between increasing pluralism both on the university campus and in its environment and the conduct of the presidential selection process? The selection process has never undergone a revolutionary "sea change" or "democratization" in response to abstract ideals of participation fostered by the myth of academic community internally


41. The presidency is enhanced as a locus for group conflict for two reasons which make on-campus groups an artificially great potential source of conflict. First, campus groups are not voluntary associations and membership is determined by station rather than choice among alternatives. Second, campus groups may tend less to mute conflict than voluntary groups in the larger political arena because they have a low incidence of overlapping membership to promote the moderation of conflict (although there is much interchange between administration and faculty).
and doctrines of democratic ideology in the external political environment. Rather, the standardized form of advisory committees admitting a wide variety of interested groups and constituent elements into the succession process on a selective basis is simply a continuation of the trend manifest following the Civil War. This trend allowed admission to groups which could force the door of the bargaining room open and slip in. The more the successful performance of the presidential leadership role calls for acquiescence of powerful and competing groups within the political environment of the organization, the more democratic (multiply accessed) and open the process of selection will be. Democratization is a direct response to the need to reduce internal strains within the campus political community. The university president has come more and more to govern with the consent of the governed.42

Early in this history of colleges and universities the president was accountable only to the governing board for his actions and ruled in an autocratic manner. His selection by the governing board without widespread consultation among other campus groups was a direct reflection of his authoritarian role as chief executive. In order to

42. In fact, the president is the only person who can be held accountable to the trustees. Faculty members, with their permanent tenure, cannot be held ultimately responsible for the functioning of the institution since there is no adequate instrument to enforce accountability upon them. The president, however, can be dismissed.
exercise power autocratically it is necessary to get it autocratically. Committee chairmen in the United States Congress wield arbitrary power because the method of leadership succession in that legislature—the seniority system—operates to invest power in individuals almost solely on the basis of length of service. The President of the United States, on the other hand, can exercise formal authority but not arbitrary power because his right to the office is a transfer of authority from the electorate, through the electoral system, to an individual for a fixed period of time. Lenin and Stalin were able to exercise personal power from dictatorial positions of strength because their succession was not predicated on the actions of institutionalized succession machinery, but rather resulted from the conquest of a cult of personality over rival factions in a manner which eliminated all opposition and failed to establish a replicable pattern of leadership selection (with the result that they both remained in power until they died). But the power of a university president— or the head of any large, pluralistic, heterogeneous human organization for that matter—is circumscribed and his role as a mediator accountable to constituent groups enforced by the fact that

43. Huntington and Brezezinski suggest that changes in the Soviet electoral system might spark changes in the exercise of power and the role of the Russian top leadership in their relationship to other governmental organs; op. cit., p. 188.
institutionalized mechanisms of selection exist to replace him if he should fail to keep the confidence of the groups which make up the building blocks of the organization and the coalition which conferred power upon him.

The presidential selection process, then, sometimes accused of being prolonged, expensive, ad hoc, and irrational, is actually a functional institutional response to the need to reduce conflict among the constituent elements of the university by engendering agreement on general directions and basic institutional goals through the vehicle of a man chosen for the top job. It is an integrative device whose efficiency is a function of the extent to which it develops and crystalizes support for the new administration in a fluid situation of group disequilibrium. Also, the innate characteristics of the power of an office can be traced to the corresponding succession mechanism, which is effective in determining the parameters of presidential discretion by its very existence. If the president should fail to keep the support of major elements in the campus coalition a means to replace him exists. In other words, electoral institutions and succession mechanisms may be among the most effective anti-authoritarian institutions in countries and organizations where they are firmly entrenched. Just as the enticement of the rewards of being a good citizen are more effective than laws in promoting law and order (the Horatio
Alger theory of law enforcement), so electoral mechanisms are more effective than legal or constitutional provisions in maintaining the limits of authority where top leadership is concerned. To get power through a process of group participation is to perform the role of mediator once in office; to gain the reins of power autocratically is to be unfettered in its exercise short of death or removal from office. The participatory leadership selection process seeks voluntary acquiescence through institutionalized mechanisms in order to avoid the need for coercion later. Since university presidents are not customarily thought of as having the power of the sword a selection process which guarantees the support of constituent groups is vital to the effective exercise of leadership.

Leadership Succession at The University of Arizona

The utility of this conceptual framework of leadership selection and the accuracy of hypotheses suggested by the application of a group theoretical approach to organizational politics within this framework will be tested in Part II by application to a specific instance of presidential succession—the choice of a president at The University of Arizona in 1970-1971.
PART II

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA:
A CASE STUDY IN THEORETICAL CONTEXT
CHAPTER 5

SETTING THE STAGE FOR SELECTION

On Thursday, July 1, 1971, Dr. John P. Schaefer occupied the executive suite at The University of Arizona, replacing former President Richard A. Harvill, who had held the authority conferred by that office for no fewer than 21 years. The choice of Schaefer, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, was the result of a selection process lasting just under one year. This study of the presidential selection process will be a case study of Schaefer's rise at The University of Arizona.

Case studies have both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, cases are advantageous where few data have been assembled on a topic, where research is, therefore, basically exploratory, where analysis in depth is considered desirable, and where the understanding of a dynamic process is important. These advantages are particularly compelling in a study of presidential selection. Very few analyses of the process exist in the literature of academic governance, making research into the process largely exploratory. No holistic view of the process has yet emerged. Because of this, depth research is especially useful. And the process of presidential selection is, of course, dynamic because it
is basically a means of institutional change in many colleges and universities.

Case studies also have their pitfalls. They have been criticized for being unrelated to bodies of theory because the number of cases necessary to confirm or produce a high level generalization would be prohibitive. This is not a problem here because no body of theory exists on the subject of presidential selection and its relationship to the larger educational process. Case studies are often criticized for being unrelated to studies of comparable situations. This again is not a problem because although other case studies of presidential selection exist, they are not studies in depth. All of them are testimonials of disgruntled nominees or relatively brief accounts in the popular press and alumni newsletters. Furthermore, the conceptual framework expatiated in Chapter 4 will be utilized to place this case into a context where it can be compared to other, even superficially dissimilar, instances of leadership selection.

An additional limitation ascribed to case studies is their lack of historical depth. Yet significant elements of tradition can be incorporated into a case study by a researcher when they are of obvious relevance, and the advantage of great latitudinal depth often seems to outweigh the drawback of historical incompatibility. In years past, for example, chairmen of governing boards used to pick presidents
personally and many men fell into the job by fortuitous circumstance. This situation now seems to be only a vague, unreal semblance of present practice, and although analysis of the reasons for increasing systematization of the selection process warrants attention, extensive study of past practice might not illuminate contemporary understanding.

The major weakness of the case method, however, is on the reverse side of the coin. The strength of the method is its emphasis on depth study of a single instance. Without inserting what some scholars would label "unscientific" speculation, the researcher has no way of inferring from the results of his case whether he has examined a unique event which deviates radically from an assumed rubric or mode. There is virtually no way to avoid this problem aside from reasonable care in the selection of a case. However, most cases are selected because they suit the convenience of the scholar. The substantive interests of the researcher and the relative ease of access to empirical data from personal interviews and documents seem to be prominent guiding criteria. Many cases also deal with spectacular occurrences rather than more modal events which are too typical and undramatic to inspire study.

Some question exists about the reliability of the case method; however, there is no difference in principle between the case method, the comparative method, or the
statistical method. The essential difference between these approaches lies not in the data or methods of data collection, but rather in the type of inference which can be made from the evidence obtained. Although the probable validity of generalizations stemming from case studies is lower than those stemming from other types of studies, there is no cause to reject the case method in principle. The purpose of a case study in exploratory research is to stimulate speculation and not to produce eternal verities or profound judgements. Ideally, they may lead to the development of new ideas and interpretations which can be tested by others in different ways at a future date.

The procedural framework of leadership selection set forth in the preceding chapter will be utilized as an analytical tool in this case study of the selection of a president at The University of Arizona. This framework has heuristic capacity which is relied upon to facilitate the reconstruction of individual, group, and institutional activity on the UA campus during 1970 and 1971. First, however, it is necessary narratively to set the stage for selection with a brief description of the institutional environment at The University of Arizona and the nature of three important constituent groups which later involved themselves in the selection process. These groups are the faculty, the student body, and the Board of Regents. The two additional constituent
groups of the university involved directly in the process--alumni and administration--are discussed in later chapters in the context of the actions of individual representatives, as are the actions of important supportive external audiences--the state legislature, the community of political influentials and the news media.

The University of Arizona, located in Tucson, was founded in 1885 by act of the 13th Territorial Legislature in accordance with the provisions of the Morrill Act which encouraged the setting-up of "Land Grant Colleges." When the fledgling institution first opened its doors to 32 students in 1891 its resources were limited to six faculty members, one partially finished building on 40 acres of donated land, and several small grants from the federal government.

In 79 years of continuous operation between 1891 and 1970, the landmark year of presidential selection under study here, the school experienced a tremendous surge of growth common to most state-sponsored institutions in the United States.¹ The university became a giant red-brick stage setting of 120 buildings on 277 palm-dotted acres dominated by a seven story Administration Building. A faculty of approximately 1,800 presided over the education of 29,000 students. The university was formally organized

into 14 colleges and four schools with 97 academic subdivisions and departments and 29 divisions of research and special service.

In 1970 this vast educational enterprise was captained by Dr. Richard A. Harvill, 65, the university's sixteenth president. Harvill had assumed the top position in the summer of 1951 and was nearing 20 years of service--twice as long as any previous incumbent. He was born in 1905 to a farming family in Centerville, Tennessee. At the age of 17 he left home to work on an economics degree at Mississippi State University and four years later, in 1926, graduated with distinction. He went on to receive a master's degree from Duke in 1927. He then taught for one year at each of his alma maters as an instructor before attending Northwestern University for further graduate work.

In 1932 Harvill received a doctorate from Northwestern and after post-graduate study at the University of Chicago came to The University of Arizona as an Assistant Professor of Economics, a position which he held until 1937 when he went to the University of Buffalo as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics. Upon his return to Arizona in 1938 he was promoted to the rank of Associate Professor and taught until 1942 when, at the invitation of professional acquaintances, he left the university and traveled a hundred miles north to work for the Office of
Price Administration (OPA) in Phoenix. Harvill served with the OPA for four years, picking up administrative experience and rising to the position of District Price Executive where he administered rent controls for Arizona. Returning to the university in 1946, he taught for only one semester before being promoted to full professorship and being appointed Dean of the Graduate College. The next year Harvill was appointed to the deanship of the College of Liberal Arts where he served until becoming president of the university in 1951.

Although Harvill arrived at the summit of the university's organizational structure in a series of graduated, logical steps, he viewed his rise to prominence as unintentional. In an interview shortly after retirement in July 1971, Harvill commented that, "You don't plan to become president of a university—you just arrive at the post through a series of chances of which you've been able to take advantage." The formal procedure which resulted in his selection for the presidency was short.

Harvill's predecessor, Dr. J. Byron McCormick, had been Dean of the College of Law for nine years prior to his appointment as fifteenth president on July 1, 1947. On October 26, 1950 McCormick, who liked teaching and had always been a reluctant president, presented his resignation.

to the Arizona Board of Regents and returned to the law classrooms as a professor. The regents appointed a faculty committee to advise them of possible candidates and began the search immediately. Harvill was contacted by the President of the Board of Regents Cleon T. Knapp, a Tucson lawyer, and asked if he would let his name be put in nomination. Knapp indicated that the regents were impressed by reports of Harvill's work with the OPA and his competence as an academic administrator. Harvill was also approached at a university concert by McCormick, who intimated that the job was his if he wanted it. Initially, he brushed aside these feelers saying that he wanted to return to teaching and research, activities which had largely eluded him since his return to the campus. He had taught only one semester after his return to the university in 1946. Both Knapp and McCormick instructed Harvill to contemplate the matter and after doing so he abandoned his reticent posture and threw his hat in the ring.

Ten days later he was invited to the house of Tucson regent William R. Mathews to meet with the regent's selection committee, which consisted of Mathews, Knapp, Samuel H. Morris of Globe, Lynn M. Laney of Phoenix, and W. Ronald Ellsworth of Mesa. Harvill conversed with the regents for an hour and the meeting concluded amicably, with the committee members explaining that they could not offer him the job
without the consent of the full ten member board. After interviewing at least one additional candidate, Robert L. Nugent, Vice President of the university, the board met. Following two votes in which at least two regents held out for Nugent, Harvill's strong support became apparent. In a third vote the regents gave a unanimous endorsement to Harvill. Partly at issue was the marital status of the candidates and controversy arose over whether Nugent, who was a bachelor, could make suitable arrangements for a social hostess. At the next board meeting, on December 16, 1950, Harvill's selection was formally announced. This concluded a selection process of less than two months time.

Harvill took office at a turning point in the history of The University of Arizona. Arizona was the fastest growing state in the union and due to a policy of accepting all qualified Arizona high school graduates in a college or university, student enrollment at The University of Arizona was on the verge of more than doubling in the next decade. During his tenure he supervised the expenditure of $130 million on construction and land acquisition and the buildings added represented two-thirds of the campus physical plant in 1970. The university, as one faculty member put it, "stands as a monument to Harvill's administration." Some 160,000 students attended the university during his presidency and he

conferred 78 percent of the earned degrees granted by the school over the years.

In the early 1950's faculty salaries were on the rise and the Arizona Legislature also improved fringe benefits for faculty members. Harvill proved adept at maintaining friendly relations with the faculty. He was receptive to the expansion of faculty posts and innovation with new programs. He took care of the faculty, attending the funerals of faculty members and looking out for their widows if necessary by putting them on the university payroll for as long as they wanted to work. Some feel that small touches such as these, along with real concern for the broader needs of the faculty, gave him great authority and supplemented his acceptance.

As an administrator, Harvill was persistent and dedicated. One administrative colleague who worked closely with Harvill for many years said:

Harvill worked long hours at his job. He arrived in the office at 7:30 in the morning, left at 5:30 for dinner and then returned to work into the night. Whenever I wanted to reach him on a Saturday or Sunday I always called the office. He had a private line installed there for his people to call him on.  

Harvill had a minute knowledge of the university and its workings. He operated with a broad scope and delegated authority sparingly. He used his long hours in the office to keep abreast of events and, according to some, did not

consult widely with other administrators and faculty before making decisions. Rather, he relied heavily upon the advice of several close advisors who shifted over time. As one department head expressed it, "His consultations were one-sided, but faculty members are disposed to accept autocratic exercise of power if they themselves are taken care of with respect to salary, tenure, and retirement."  

Harvill was also autocratic in his relations with the Arizona Board of Regents, the ten member governing board of the state's three universities. Furthermore, he was the educational leader among the presidents of the other two universities in the state, Arizona State University at Tempe, and Northern Arizona University at Flagstaff. Harvill, for example, singularly led the fight against a disclaimer loyalty oath for faculty members and prevented the imposition of such an oath by the regents. According to one authority, "the other two presidents were against it, but waited to follow Harvill's lead. He was the single most important influence in preventing its application." Harvill also endeavored to keep on friendly terms with a half-dozen state legislators of real influence who could carry the legislature along with them in matters affecting university welfare. He knew prominent people throughout Arizona on a first name

basis and cultivated the strong conservative element in the Arizona Republican party.

Harvill spearheaded a drive for enhancing the quality of the university and securing research funds from the federal government, private foundations, and other outside sources. To this end he brought in a number of outstanding scholars, basing programs of instruction and research around them. He also appointed administrative officials who had official connections with the research establishment to help in the acquisition of funding. The first year he took office the total of sponsored funds was $160,200. His last year in office funding was in excess of $20 million.

This search for money was indirectly responsible for the overall configuration of the university. The availability of research funding in the hard sciences during the late 1950's and 1960's was taken advantage of and by the mid-1960's the university developed a large bulge in the physical sciences. Because of its desert location a multidisciplinary program of arid lands studies was developed. The clear atmosphere of Arizona and the presence of nearby Kitt Peak Astronomical installation made it logical to develop an astronomy program and later an optical sciences program. The chemistry department was one of four departments nationwide to receive a National Science Foundation grant for self-improvement and this funding was capitalized on to greatly strengthen the
department. One of the few non-natural science programs to achieve national prominence was that of anthropology. Because of the wealth of archeological sites in the Southwest left by early Indian settlers a natural backyard laboratory existed for researchers in that field and the university took advantage of its presence by developing a strong department of anthropology.

Because of this bulge in research funding and educational excellence in the physical sciences these departments began to exercise proportionally great informal influence in the academic governance of the university through the strong personalities of outstanding scholars. This represented a change from the pre-Harvill era when the university's colleges of agriculture and mines exercised great authority. These two colleges were set up by law in the 1912 Arizona State Constitution and dominated the political life of the university for the bulk of its existence. The declining influence of the College of Mines, for example, was revealed by the breakaway of the Department of Geology into the newly created School of Earth Sciences in the 1960's. The political life of the university in 1970 was dominated by the College of Liberal Arts, which contained all physical science departments with the exception of those in the School of Earth Sciences. Liberal Arts not only had the greatest student enrollment but was the central core of research.
The wave of student activism which swept across the country in the 1960's came late to The University of Arizona. But the 1969-1970 school year was one of increasing rebellion. Much of the activity on campus was triggered by student outrage with the Vietnam War. The draft lottery was introduced in late 1969 but draft calls were still high. President Richard M. Nixon was beginning a series of troop reductions in Southeast Asia but the lowering of over-all force levels was slight at the beginning of the school year on September 16. Perhaps one mirror of student discontent was registration in the ROTC program, which plunged 70 percent in the fall.

One of the highlights of student anti-war protest was participation in the nationwide National Vietnam Moratorium Week of mid-October. During the week students planted crosses on university lawns and held candlelight vigils in memory of the dead in Vietnam. Some students boycotted classes and, despite a warning issued by the Board of Regents, some faculty refused to conduct them. A climax to the week's activities came when an estimated 7,000 students and faculty marched several miles from the campus to the Federal Building in downtown Tucson to dramatize their opposition to the war. This was the largest demonstration ever held on the UA campus.
Student activism also centered around the civil rights movement. On October 29, the leader of the campus Black Student Union threatened in a public speech to take possession of and burn down campus buildings. Shortly after Christmas vacation, on January 7, 1970, the first violent student demonstrations of the year took place. What was initially planned as a peaceful protest by civil rights groups against the alleged "racist" politics of Brigham Young University and the Mormon Church turned into chaos as 75 of the 3,500 gathered protesters entered Bear Down Gymnasium during the course of an Arizona-BYU basketball game and ran onto the floor. A clash took place between plainclothes policemen, administrators, and students. Although the disruption was short-lived, six demonstrators were subsequently arrested and charged with "rioting" by the Tucson Police Department.

This incident produced an expanding current of discontent which put the entire university community in an uneasy mood. During the week immediately following the disorder the Student Senate passed a motion calling for the resignation of President Harvill; the student newspaper, the Arizona Daily Wildcat, charged the administration had "over-reacted;" the NAACP accused the university of causing the disorder by denying permission for the demonstration prior to January 7; and Republican Governor John R. (Jack)
Williams requested a complete report from Harvill. The president was pressed to drop charges filed against the demonstrators but refused, declining ever to make a public statement. In fact, the university had not brought charges against any of the students; they were filed by the university administrators and Tucson policemen who had been assaulted.

On February 2, 1970, the United Front Organization, a group started by several student senators and claiming to represent student interests issued a list of ten demands to Harvill and about 75 students picketed the Administration Building. Harvill rejected all the demands, but a permanent student committee to meet with the president and discuss campus problems was formed.

On April 30, 1970, President Nixon's "invasion" of Cambodia inspired widespread dissent in the nation's colleges and universities, dissent that ultimately led to the killing of four students at Kent State University in Ohio on May 4. By Friday, May 8, protests throughout the country had forced 136 schools to discontinue classes. At The University of Arizona student rage was not to be denied expression and on the evening of May 5 approximately 100 students occupied Old


8. In a later interview Harvill explained his position on the filing of charges. See *Arizona Alumnus*, Vol. 68, No. 4 (June 1971), pp. 4-5.
Main, the headquarters building for ROTC on campus. Although the protesters left peacefully after 13 hours of occupation demonstrations continued the next morning. An American flag was burned and a crowd of students battered a Pima County Sheriff's car. An estimated 800 students marched downtown to Selective Service headquarters and ransacked a nearby recruiting station. Demonstrations continued for several more days but never again reached the point of violence. There was a quick dénouement when classes let out for the summer late in May.

One of the important legacies of student activism was Arizona Senate Bill 174, passed by the state legislature shortly after the Bear Down Gym demonstrations and signed by the governor following anti-war demonstrations in May. The law was intended to control campus disorder and provided that: (1) no person might enter or remain on school property in violation of any rule or regulation of the institutions, (2) no person might interfere with the lawful use of school property, (3) the "chief administrative officer" of the school could order individuals off school property if he had "probable cause" to believe that they were committing an act of interference, and (4) that any peace officer in the state could enforce the foregoing provisions. Additionally, the legislature threatened to withhold funds from higher educational institutions in the state if the Board of Regents did
not have an operational conduct code for faculty and students which specified offences and defined penalties for infringement by November 11, 1970.

During the 1969-1970 school year there had been increasing speculation in university environs that President Harvill would announce his retirement, since he had reached the age of 65. Harvill, however, kept his plans carefully to himself and so campus prophets were reduced to interpreting fancied portents. The mandatory retirement age for regents and presidents in Arizona is 70, so Harvill was not crowded by statutory limitations. Many people, including members of the Board of Regents, did not expect Harvill to retire for several more years and so his public announcement of retirement in July, though not entirely unexpected, came as something of a surprise.

On July 1 Harvill drove to San Manuel, a small copper mining town 60 miles north of Tucson and the home of the President of the Board of Regents, Wesley P. Goss. Harvill gave Goss the letter of resignation he intended to read at the next regent's meeting in Flagstaff on July 11. Goss expressed surprise and regret at the decision, since the board had expected him to stay in office for at least two more years, but did not strongly challenge it. In the intervening days before the meeting Goss informed fellow regent Elwood Bradford of Yuma, who was chairing the selection
committee charged with choosing a new president for Arizona State University in Tempe. On July 9 Bradford called Harvill in his university office to inquire if the retirement decision was indeed firm. Harvill assured Bradford that it was. On Friday evening, July 10, the regents met in executive session and Goss chose this time to inform the remaining eight board members of Harvill's impending retirement.

Saturday morning at the regent's public meeting Harvill read the following statement:

I wish to present this statement of my intention to retire from the position of president of The University of Arizona on June 30, 1971, and to request that the board act upon this matter in its meeting today.

My decision to retire is occasioned solely by the fact that I have reached what is normally considered to be the appropriate age for relinquishing responsibility of this kind.

Moreover, I have served in the position since 1951, a tenure that is much longer than is typical for American university presidents. I emphasize the reason for my retirement decision because I continue to find the performance of my responsibilities to be interesting and personally very rewarding.

I look forward to another year of service in association with all segments of our society who are concerned actively with education here in Arizona.⁹

Regent Bradford praised Harvill for his personal judgment and administrative skill and moved to accept the resignation "reluctantly." The board continued its meeting with routine matters.

There is little reason to speculate that Harvill's real motives for retiring were different from the publicly stated ones or that he had been driven from his job by student revolt on campus. Indeed, there is some speculation that Harvill would have retired a year sooner had it not been for two important considerations. First, Harvill had been elected President of the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges in 1969 and wished to discharge fully his responsibilities in that position. Second, he wanted to preside over the completion of the university's new medical college and associated hospital. For the past decade Harvill had deeply involved himself in a struggle for the privilege of locating Arizona's only medical school on the UA campus and he wanted to assure proper initial operation.

Whatever the reasons, however, in ultimately deciding to retire Harvill posed the task of choosing a successor to the regents.

The Arizona Board of Regents is a corporate body consisting of the Governor of Arizona and the Superintendent of Public Instruction as ex officio members plus eight members appointed by the governor for staggered terms of eight years each. To insure partial continuity in membership and cushion the universities from abrupt changes in administrative, political, and educational philosophy the terms of the eight appointed members overlap so that every other odd numbered
year two of the member's terms expire. Regents may be reappointed by the governor.

The board functions as a policy-making body for Arizona's three institutions of higher education but meets in plenary session only once a month and, therefore, delegates considerable authority to its university presidents. It retains the power to adopt regulations governing the conduct of administration, the expenditure of funds appropriated by the state legislature, the promotion and salary scales of faculty, the payment of tuition and fees by the student body, and the establishment of curriculum at the universities. It has legal authority to select presidents for the state's three schools.

Although the Board of Regents may be ideally envisioned as a group of informed citizens, educational leaders, and public officials presiding over the conduct of higher education in Arizona, traditional prerequisites of appointment have tended to favor the selection of potential axe grinders. There are two long-standing considerations weighed by the governor when appointing board members. One tends to unify and the other to divide. First, there has been a long tradition of appointment as a reward for partisan involvement. Therefore, unless political fortunes are extremely dynamic the board, like appointed courts and commissions, tends to mirror dominant political coalitions. It has long
been a pastime of university faculty members to hunt for political overtones in the educational policies and decisions of the board. The second tradition, that of regional appointment, contains the seeds of sectional antagonism and parochial division. Such disunity is sometimes activated when, for example, the three Arizona universities compete for construction funds or new programs. Traditionally, two members of the board are appointed from Pima County, two from Maricopa County, and two from Coconino County to represent the local university. Another two regents are appointed at large and one of these has traditionally represented the copper manufacturing industry in Arizona—the state's leading manufacturing concern and a dominant political force since statehood.

The appointment of local regents for each of the state's three universities is functional in terms of dividing the work-load. As one regent put it: "The Phoenix and Tucson regents defer to each other on matters affecting those schools. When matters come up in a local area then regents from that area handle things rather than call a meeting of the full board and other regents defer to their judgements on local matters." 10

But informal arrangements of mutual deference have sometimes led to divisions among board members. Because of

excessive localism. This has been historically most likely when the two large universities, ASU and The University of Arizona, come in conflict because of cross-state rivalries in higher education which have tended to amplify the parochial tendencies of the Board of Regents. The beginnings of this rivalry, friendly on the athletic field and sometimes bitter off it, came in 1933 when Grady Gammage, former University of Arizona student and President of Northern Arizona State Teachers College at Flagstaff (now Northern Arizona University), became president of Arizona State Teachers College in Tempe. Gammage had grand ambitions for the school and set out to turn it into an outstanding university. He directed a process of upgrading for 26 years until he died in office in 1959. There was a fight over the renaming of the school as a university and finally, in an unusual step, a state-wide referendum was held in 1959. The referendum, placed on the ballot at the initiative of the Phoenix Junior Chamber of Commerce and backed by a campaign including not only the Chamber of Commerce but the school's alumni, students, and faculty, carried by a vote of slightly less than two to one.\textsuperscript{11} Residents of the Phoenix area and other

\textsuperscript{11}. The exact vote for Proposition 200, placed on the ballot in the general election of November 4, 1959, was 151,135 in favor of adoption of the name Arizona State University and 78,693 opposed. For an extended chronicle of this election and the politics of higher education in Arizona see Ernest J. Hopkins and Alfred Thomas, Jr., \textit{The Arizona State Story} (Phoenix: Southwest Publishing Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 279-302.
boosters of the Tempe school felt that Tucsonans did not want competition for The University of Arizona and coveted what they considered to be the only university in the state. Indeed, Pima County (which contains Tucson) voted eight to one against the proposed renaming and contributed over half of all the negative votes.

The medical school was also bitterly contested. A dozen years prior to its establishment the legislature had appropriated $40 million for a medical school and the regents were faced with the task of deciding where to put it. An outside consulting firm was called in by the board to study the state's needs for a medical school and where to locate it. The governor appointed blue ribbon commissions throughout the state for further study. The University of Arizona finally captured the school because it was widely felt that although the Phoenix metropolitan area was the population center of the state, supporting academic programs of the UA were of better quality to prepare students for medical school and provide related research capabilities. The Phoenix population was unhappy about the decision and, according to one regent then on the board, "the fight was bitter and divisive." 12

Many in Arizona still feel that The University of Arizona is the only genuine university in the state, despite names. Arizona State University has grown rapidly and will

soon become the largest school because of its location in a metropolitan area. Some regents felt that this growth had taken place too fast and that a moratorium on development was needed, not the addition of new programs. There has been continued conflict over such things as the construction of new buildings and the addition of new programs at both ASU and the UA.

In 1970 and 1971 there was some division among the regents with respect to their local loyalties which would subsequently contribute to difficulties in the UA presidential selection. One Phoenix regent, for example, gave a tongue-lashing to a member of the board's staff for referring to The University of Arizona as "the university." He lamented that, "some people still refer to the 'normal school,' as if there was only one university in the state." The same regent was referred to as "one of the university's big problems" by an administrative official at The University of Arizona.

Officials at The University of Arizona and other friends of the Tucson school have achieved a state bordering on paranoia about the conservative, Maricopa County dominated legislature withholding funds from The University of Arizona in favor of Arizona State University. People in the Phoenix

area suffer from the same psychology in reverse. One Phoenix regent explained it this way:

Tucson legislators get together and prick their fingers and mingle their blood and swear that they will do everything to get funds for the U of A. It is uncanny. In Phoenix we don't do this; we can't develop the necessary unity. If we could we could outvote them every time but they hold the swing vote.  

There is some validity to both points of view. The larger principle is that the board must be responsive to public opinion, lest it incur sanctions from constituent-conscious legislators, whether from Maricopa County or elsewhere in the state. Through the power of appropriation the state legislature holds a significant potential sanction on the board. Because of this sanction, the board must be responsive to public opinion in a general sense. The difficulty lies in discerning a cohesive educational policy which exists independently of the school rivalries. If the Board of Regents is forced to adopt a representative ethic it must contend with divisiveness.

On the date that President Harvill announced his retirement, the Board of Regents consisted of the following members:

The Governor of Arizona, John R. (Jack) Williams, 61, of Phoenix. Williams, a conservative Republican, had been Governor since 1967. He had attended Phoenix Junior College

but never received a degree. His prior political experience consisted of membership on the Phoenix City Council and four years as Mayor of Phoenix between 1956 and 1960.

The State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Republican Weldon P. Shofstall, 67, of Tempe. Shofstall, a former high school teacher, college professor, and Dean of Men at Arizona State University for 17 years, headed the state's newly created Department of Education which functioned to supervise the entire public school system in Arizona. A self-confessed conservative, he had served in public office since 1969. Shoftstall received a bachelor's degree in education at North East Missouri State Teachers College in 1926 and later a master's degree and doctorate (1933) at the University of Missouri.

The internally elected presiding officer, or president, Wesley P. Goss, 71, of San Manuel. Goss, a quiet, introspective Democrat appointed by Governor Goddard in 1963, was president of Magma Copper Company and represented the copper interests on the board. Although he had received a B.S. in mining engineering from the University of California in 1922 and been in mining all his life, Goss maintained a solid interest in higher education.

Arthur B. Schellenberg, 62, of Phoenix. Schellenberg, a chemical engineer, received a bachelor's degree from Washington University in St. Louis in 1930 and entered a profitable business career. Later in life he embarked on a
political course and served seven years in the Arizona House of Representatives before being appointed to the Board of Regents in 1963, by Goddard. In 1967 he was elected president of the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges and by virtue of that position was perhaps the most eminent member of the board at the time. Schellenberg would soon retire for reasons of health.

Elwood W. Bradford, 61, of Yuma. Bradford, active in Democratic party work for many years and a former Yuma County Democratic Chairman, was appointed by Goddard in 1968. He received a bachelor's degree from The University of Arizona in 1930 and pursued a career as an underwriter for New York Life Insurance Company.

Norman G. Sharber, 46, of Flagstaff. Sharber, a Texaco bulk distributor and land developer had served on the board since 1965. He came to Arizona in 1929 and attended ASU for one semester in 1942. A Democrat, he was appointed to the board because he was a close friend of Goddard's. Sharber was widely viewed as a liberal and friend of higher education by university faculty, students, and administrators throughout the state.

Margaret M. Christy, 62, of Sedona. Christy, an active Republican, had been appointed by Governor Williams in 1969. She received a bachelor's degree in French at George Washington University and later attended the University of Berlin in the 1930's when her husband was an agricultural
attache at the American Embassy. Her service to the party included membership in the Verde Valley Women's Republican Club and the Coconino Republican Committee.

Paul L. Singer, 61, of Phoenix. Singer, a urological surgeon, was appointed in 1967 by Governor Williams. He received a B.S. from Loyola University of Chicago in 1933 and an M.D. in 1934. A conservative Republican, Singer served in the Arizona State Senate for one term between 1962 and 1964. He had been extremely active in civic affairs and wrote a column in the Arizona Weekly Gazette, a legal and business newspaper.

James Elliot Dunseath, 65, of Tucson. Dunseath had been appointed to the board in 1969 by Williams to fill out the term of prominent Republican Dean Burch, a partner in Dunseath's downtown law firm. Dunseath was also an active Republican whose party membership helped bring him to his position on the board. He was a close friend of Senator Barry Goldwater and had managed his campaign in Southern Arizona when he first ran for Congress. An alumnus of The University of Arizona, Dunseath received a bachelor's degree in economics and a J.D. (1932) from the school. He was a former member of the Tucson City Council. Part of the reason for his appointment to the board was his legal background. When appointed Williams requested him to work on a codification of board ordinances so that board policies could be systematically compiled.
Gordon D. Paris, 62, of Tucson. Paris, President of Tucson Federal Savings and Loan Association, was a prominent businessman and Republican. He had served as former Director of the Tucson Chamber of Commerce and Tucson Airport Authority as well as President of the Amphitheater School Board.

In July 1970 the board was already deeply engaged in the selection of a university president. In the summer of 1969 G. Homer Durham, President of Arizona State University, had caught the regents by surprise and suddenly announced his resignation--effective immediately--to become Commissioner of Public Education in Utah. Regents Goss and Schellenberg were vacationing in California at the time but hurried back for an emergency session of the board at which Durham was persuaded to stay on a little longer while the regents collected their wits and found a temporary replacement.

By the fall of 1969 the regents had appointed Dean of the College of Education, Harry K. Newburn, President of the University with full executive powers, although the understanding was present that Newburn, who was approaching retirement age, would be replaced within a year or less. One regent said later: "He didn't want it; he wanted to teach in the classroom, but was persuaded to take it." Newburn had not been appointed as an acting president because the regents believed the best organizational wisdom was to avoid the

Next, Goss appointed a selection committee headed by Elwood Bradford of Yuma. Bradford was chosen to head the committee because of his prior experience on the board. He was serving his second term and had participated in the selection of Durham at ASU. The regents read literature on presidential selection compiled by Goss with the help of the National Educational Association. This literature was substantial and the majority of regents spent, in the words of one, "quite a lot of time learning what the experts had to say about how to select a president." As a result of this reading the regents decided to appoint a ten member advisory committee at Arizona State consisting of faculty, administrators, alumni, and a student. Although Bradford expressed opposition to the inclusion of a student because he felt that students lacked the necessary experience in personnel selection to be helpful, he acceded to the judgement of others on the board. The regents also compiled a list of qualifications which presidential candidates had to meet.

To get nominees for the ASU position the regents tapped a number of sources. Some pressure on individual

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.
regents was applied "in behalf of a couple of department heads" at the university but the regents felt from the beginning that there were no competent insiders at ASU. They chose to look outside the institution from the inception of the search for a man of distinguished academic credentials who could upgrade the university. Bradford traveled to Washington and discussed ASU needs with officials in the Department of Education, who suggested that the regents write to university presidents and foundations around the country for suggestions. The regents submitted their list of criteria to the Carnegie Foundation and the National Educational Association and asked for names from them. They also wrote to approximately 50 presidents of universities. They received about 50 names in return, from all sources, many volunteered by friends of the candidates who had heard through the grapevine that a position was open. During the summer of 1970 the regents were in the process of winnowing these names out in cooperation with the campus advisory committee.

The regents subsequently narrowed the applications down to twenty after sifting through data compiled on each candidate. They then sent out questionnaires to get further information from the candidates themselves. They asked the faculty to reduce this list from 20 to 10 and said they

19. The regents felt that a number of men at The University of Arizona were qualified for the ASU presidency. They concluded, however, that the rivalry between the two schools precluded their consideration. Ibid.
would do the same. When this had been separately accomplished a joint meeting took place and the names (which were almost identical) were discussed. A common list of 10 was molded together and these individuals, if interested, were invited for interviews along with their wives. After initial interviews the list was narrowed to four and the candidates were invited back once again. The selection was then made from these four finalists.

The board, therefore, was not unfamiliar with the procedures and difficulties of choosing a university president, even though it had not been faced with the task of choosing a president for The University of Arizona for 20 years. It was, however, the first time in Arizona history that the board had been faced with the task of choosing two presidents at one time.

On Saturday, July 11, Goss appointed a regent's presidential selection committee of five members. In addition to Goss, who as board president was an ex officio member, it included Bradford of Yuma as chairman, Sharber of Flagstaff, Paris of Tucson, and Singer of Phoenix. Goss had picked Bradford as chairman because of his experience in presidential selection and leadership of the ASU selection committee. The entire committee, however, was chosen by Goss to balance carefully sectional interests and prejudice on the board. As a result, it contained one Tucson regent,
one Phoenix regent, and three others who would presumably be neutral in the selection process—Goss, Bradford, and Sharber.
CHAPTER 6

THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS

The procedural framework for the comparative analysis of leadership selection encompasses five distinct stages: group disequilibrium, group mobilization, preliminary coalition formation, final coalition formation, and symbolic legitimation. With the assistance of the framework it is possible to unravel conceptual threads in the process of presenting a case study rather than simply unfolding a stark, chronological exposition of events. Nevertheless, the five stages follow each other in logical procession. Each stage builds on the penultimate one over the passage of time. Group disequilibrium, for example, must be present prior to group mobilization. Because of the necessity for completing one stage of activity before the following one may be successfully undertaken the chronological coherence of this case is largely preserved.

It is theoretically and empirically possible for leadership succession mechanisms to fail. If they fail completely they may be replaced by entirely different mechanisms set forth in new constitutions, edicts, bylaws, or informal agreements. Failure may be intimately associated with the disintegrating viability of a polity. Additionally, partial
blockage of the succession mechanism may occur when tacit or formal coalitions have been shattered by the entry of new interests into the equation of compromise. When this happens the mechanism may revert to an earlier stage. During the course of the selection process at The University of Arizona such partial blockage arose and the process reverted from Stage III (preliminary coalition formation) to Stage II (group mobilization). This atavistic deviation from the developing sequence of events is the only departure from a sequential passage of the stages of group activity. It is explained in greater detail further on in the text.

An effort has also been made to preserve much of the richness and texture of the selection process described here and some incidents only indirectly associated with stages of group activity are included. Although some events related on the following pages may ultimately be classified as unrelated to group activity surrounding the selection process, they are reported here because they inspired discussion at the time. It may be argued, for example, that the passage of a Code of Conduct by the Arizona Board of Regents had no impact on the selection process. However, it had a distinct influence on the perceptions of at least one member of the board and may have structured the perceptions of other participants to a greater or lesser degree.
Stage I--Group Disequilibrium

Group disequilibrium is defined as a lack of stability in the constituent base of a polity, organization, or community and occurs when continuity is threatened, as it is when succession is non-automatic but necessary and imminent. President Harvill's announcement of impending resignation on July 11, 1970 threatened the continuity of the university since the leadership position he held would become vacant within a year unless an individual acceptable to the important constituent elements of the university was found to replace him. Because Harvill had been the educational leader among the state's three university presidents the educational predominance of the UA was subtly called into question. His complete dominance of university political life was also terminated. Although he chose to remain in office for another year the locus of group activity would shift from his office to the regents' boardroom, as the latter attempted to conduct a search and selection process.

The resignation announcement required action by the Board of Regents, which acted immediately by appointing a Selection Committee. The faculty became apprehensive of the regent's motivations and feared for the future of academic endeavor at the university. The persistent rumors of politically conservative candidates and incessant speculation about the chances of various on-campus individuals were
indicative of a state of disequilibrium among faculty members. The supporters of one candidate, Vice President Marvin D. Johnson, were thrown into a turmoil because their on-going plans for a dinner in honor of Johnson were now suspected of being motivated by a desire to elevate Johnson to the presidency. These are the major signs of State I activity at The University of Arizona to be discussed.

On Monday, July 13, the formation of the regent's committee was announced to the press. Tucson's evening newspaper, the Tucson Daily Citizen, reported Bradford as saying that although formal operations wouldn't start until September, he expected names to begin "rolling in immediately." Bradford emphasized that a "nationwide search" would take place. "We're not going to restrict the search to campus," he said. The Citizen also reported that early speculation in the local community centered around Vice President for University Relations Marvin D. (Swede) Johnson, 41, Dean of the College of Law Charles E. Ares, 43, and Dean of the College of Liberal Arts John P. Schaefer, 35.¹

Johnson was never a reticent candidate for the post of university president and had let it be widely known that he wished to be considered. He had literally devoted his life to the university. He received a B.S. in agriculture from The University of Arizona in 1950 and in 1957 received

an M.S. in the same subject. Upon graduation Johnson became Assistant Graduate Manager of the university's athletic program. Two years later, in 1952, he was appointed by Harvill to the position of Director of the Student Union—at the age of 23 the youngest person ever named to manage a major university union. During Johnson's six years of stewardship the annual sales volume of the Union nearly doubled from $443,913 to $735,912. In 1958 Johnson left the Union to become Director of the Alumni Association, a position which he held for five years. As director he met the important alumni in Arizona and other states. Following on the heels of several poor directors Johnson's excellence as an organizer and fundraiser was immediately apparent. When he assumed the office in 1958, for example, total alumni contributions were $15,942. When he left in 1963 they had risen to $71,184.

In 1963 Johnson was elevated to the position of Vice President for University Relations, a position which entailed responsibility for the smooth relations of the university with its constituent groups. One of his primary duties was liaison with the state legislature. He headed the battle in the legislature for procurement of the medical school and later was influential in raising funds for its establishment. During the 1970-1971 school year Johnson was also a vital link between the students and the administration. All
student-related services reported to his office and his personal presence was often influential in forestalling trouble with demonstrating students.

During his long years with the university Johnson had developed a reputation as a tough administrator and, by virtue of his lobbying activities on behalf of the UA and his involvement with the Democratic party, a politician. The faculty viewed Johnson as a non-academic. The people of Arizona associated his name with order on the campus because he was so often pictured in the newspapers in confrontation and dialogue with students.

Dean Ares, like Johnson, was a native of Arizona and alumnus of the university. In 1952 he received a J.D. from the law school and served as a law clerk for Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in the 1952 term, an honor reserved for law school graduates of outstanding caliber. In 1953 Ares returned to Tucson and served as Deputy County Attorney for a year until switching to private practice as a partner in the law firm of Udall & Udall where he remained until 1960 when he left to teach at New York University. Ares returned to Arizona in 1966 as Dean of the College of Law with a reputation as a top legal educator and began to renovate the curriculum of the college. In 1970 he had been dean for four years and was well known in the university community as an outspoken liberal on the subjects of criminal
law and prison reform. His name also found its way into the press at frequent intervals.

Chemist John P. Schaefer, Dean of the Liberal Arts College, was a relative newcomer to the university. A second generation German immigrant and native of New York City, Schaefer had received a bachelor's degree in chemistry at Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn in 1955 and a Ph.D. in chemistry from the University of Illinois in 1958. Following graduation from Illinois Schaefer was awarded a National Science Foundation fellowship for post-doctoral study and spent the 1958-1959 academic year at the California Institute of Technology. After a year as an assistant professor at the University of California at Berkeley he joined the UA Chemistry Department in a similar capacity.

At this time the chemistry department was expanding with the aid of a National Science Foundation grant and by the mid-1960's a great battle of personalities threatened to disrupt it. In 1968 Schaefer was appointed department head because of his apparent neutrality among factions and succeeded in quieting the department. Harvill was so impressed with his performance that when his old friend and Liberal Arts Dean Francis Roy had to retire from the deanship because of ill health Harvill appointed Schaefer to direct the university's largest college. More senior men were considered first by Harvill but declined. However, the fact that
Schaefer was not Harvill's first choice for the position seems relatively unimportant because there was little opposition to him.

At the time of President Harvill's resignation Schaefer had been a dean for only six months. He had already developed a reputation among the college's department heads as a capable administrator who acted rapidly and decisively. Nevertheless, he was not thoroughly known in the university community by virtue of his extremely short tenure in the deanship.

It is not surprising that the names of Johnson, Ares, and Schaefer surfaced so early. Johnson, as already mentioned, had broadcast his aspirations. Ares had been in the news, and Schaefer, as Liberal Arts Dean was, despite his relative youth, a logical candidate for the position because he already headed a college of 8,000 students.\(^2\)

The announcement of Johnson's possible candidacy at such an early date, however, put the vice president in an awkward position. On July 27, Tucson's morning newspaper, the Arizona Daily Star, ran a short news item entitled "Johnson to be Honored at Dinner."\(^3\) According to this story

\(^2\) Since the establishment of the Liberal Arts College in 1915, four of its eight deans had gone on to become President of the University. They were Andrew Ellicott Douglass, Byron Cummings, Francis Cummins Lockwood, and Richard A. Harvill.

a committee of citizens was planning a testimonial dinner on September 28 to honor Johnson's 20 years of service to The University of Arizona and, according to a co-chairman of the dinner committee, local bank executive J. M. Sakrison, "for his skillful handling of student protests during the past year." Speculation immediately arose that this was a kick-off dinner for a "Johnson presidential campaign." Johnson was accused of acting in bad taste by dramatizing his candidacy like a political candidate and manipulating members of the university community who would attend the dinner in an effort to get a bandwagon going.

The real roots of the Johnson testimonial dinner went back to 1964 when several of the people planning the 1970 dinner had approached the then newly appointed Vice President about a similar dinner. Johnson, who had just been elevated from his position as Alumni Director discussed the matter with President Harvill, who suggested that he wait a few years until he had successfully met the challenge of his new job and proved himself as a vice president. Then it would be fine. At that time, and throughout the early 1960's, Johnson and Harvill had enjoyed very cordial, almost father-son relations and Johnson was one of Harvill's closest confidants on university matters. Johnson therefore accepted Harvill's advice as well intentioned and substantially correct and decided to postpone the dinner.
Thus, it came as no surprise to Johnson when the plans surfaced again. On Monday, June 22, Johnson had been invited to lunch by Leon Levy and Philip Vito. Levy, a department store owner, alumnus, and former regent, and Vito, restaurant owner and former President of the Alumni Association, represented a committee of about 25 Arizonans formed to plan and execute a testimonial dinner for Johnson. The committee was composed of professionals, businessmen, and ranchers, most of whom were alumni, and had an inner planning circle of "co-chairmen" which included Sakrison, Levy, Vito, Tucson lawyer Harold C. Warnock, and real estate developer Roy Drachman.

These men appreciated the way that Johnson had been visible in the news media as a calming force on campus during the troubled 1969-1970 school year and wanted to reward him for this as well as his long service. They were also, of course, long-time friends and admirers of Johnson. Prior to the June luncheon, Levy and Vito had gone to see Harvill about their plans and suggested to him the possibility of a testimonial dinner in the fall of 1970. Harvill, however, suggested the dinner be held in the spring and not the fall. This was agreed upon.

Not until June 22 was Johnson informed of the dinner plans. Levy and Vito told him that a committee had been formed and that Harvill had suggested the dinner be held in
the spring. This angered Johnson. During the years between 1964 and 1970 a split had developed between Harvill and Johnson. Their relations were icy and somewhat hostile and Johnson felt that Harvill should not have a major voice in the planning of the dinner. Particularly vexing was the prospect of postponing the dinner until spring. Johnson suspected Harvill of planning to mix the dinner with presidential politics in order to place him in an unfavorable light. He was reaching retirement age and perhaps this was a signal that he intended to publicly announce a decision to leave the presidency. Johnson, therefore, insisted that the dinner be held in the fall for two reasons. First, he felt he might tarnish the saintly image required for a testimonial dinner in a bid for the presidency or tussle with the students. Second, he wanted the dinner to come early so that if Harvill announced his retirement in the fall the dinner could be separated from presidential politics. He did not want to invite charges of crass political maneuvering. Levy and Vito agreed to a fall date and Johnson added that he wanted the dinner before October 10, when the university was scheduled to play football with Brigham Young and Johnson expected trouble.

September 28 was the date finally settled on and the other members of the committee agreed. Planning went ahead for the dinner. On July 5, Sakrison called Laurence M.
Gould, a distinguished professor of geoscience and close friend and advisor to Harvill. Gould, who was later to be closely identified with the anti-Johnson cause and the promotion of another candidate, had the reputation of being something of a wit as a master of ceremonies and Sakrison asked him if he would do the job at the Johnson dinner. Gould returned Sakrison's call three days later and said that he would be happy to serve as master of ceremonies but suggested that the dinner be held in the spring. Sakrison assured Gould that the dinner was not planned as a campaign kick-off for Johnson and on that condition Gould finally consented to preside.

The Harvill resignation threw the dinner plans into a turmoil. On July 9, the day before Harvill announced his retirement, Johnson was sitting in Harvill's office discussing university business when the phone rang and regent Bradford came on the line. Harvill said he would call back later, arousing Johnson's suspicions that something was in the wind. It was the first time in their long, if not always cordial, association that Harvill had ever refused to take a call in his presence. Bradford had called to ask if Harvill was, indeed, retiring.

The next morning Johnson left on a trip to Mexico. Arriving in Guadalajara on July 12 he found a message in his hotel mailbox saying that Harvill had retired. And on July 13, when speculation about Johnson's candidacy first began...
to appear in the newspapers, Warnock telephoned Johnson in Mexico to discuss the dinner plans. The dinner had not yet been publicly announced, said Warnock; what should they do? Was the event still on? Johnson was faced with a dilemma. He looked forward to the dinner. He was also forthrightly interested in the presidency and had not been bashful about saying so for many years. He could not deny his intentions but yet the dinner had not been planned as a campaign opener. He feared rumors of a presidential campaign but finally instructed Warnock to proceed with the plans.

On July 30 the Star printed an editorial entitled, "The University Presidency." Written by David F. Brinegar, Executive Editor, the editorial argued that, "The job is not political or even ideological; it is a scholarly job and an administrative one." The basic message was that a difficult task lay ahead for the regents and the goal was to find the best man for the job. No names were mentioned, since Brinegar felt at this time that interference in the regent's deliberations was unwarranted.

In the meantime, the regents had been mobilizing themselves for The University of Arizona selection and had made the decision to closely adhere to the process they had mapped out for the ASU selection. The first formal step in

this process (excluding selection of a regent's committee) was the choice of an on-campus advisory group.

At a board meeting on August 14 Bradford had indicated that the selection of the campus committee was under way. He noted that "quite a list" of presidential candidates for ASU had been compiled and that some of these individuals might be candidates for the University of Arizona position. He gave the first public hint of the regents' criteria by saying that the candidate eventually chosen would probably be no older than 55. On August 15, the Star added some grist to the rumor mills by speculating that in addition to Johnson, Ares, and Schaefer, former California Superintendent of Education Max Rafferty and UA Medical College Dean Merlin K. DuVal were under consideration. When contacted by the Star, Rafferty said he felt flattered but did not consider himself to be a serious candidate.

Nevertheless, Bradford's offhand remark about possible candidates from the ASU list and sudden speculation about the arch-conservative Rafferty caused some consternation on the UA campus. Some faculty members were insulted by the idea of being saddled with a second choice or cast-off from a school of lesser eminence. Others were certain the regents intended to impose a politically conservative "law and order" president upon the campus as a result of

5. Ibid., August 15, 1970.
student demonstrations the past year. The first issue of the Faculty AAUP Newsletter in the fall gave voice to such feelings editorially.

Strong political pressures are developing around the country and this state to destroy the autonomy of public universities. Many UA faculty feel that the future president will be politically chosen from the State Capitol. Names of such candidates as Max Rafferty, Weldon Schofstall and a host of retired Army generals circulate the rumor mills and give rise to these faculty fears.  

The rumors were without foundation, although one regent later remarked that he had received several calls on behalf of retired military personnel interested in the job. Another added, "If Hayakawa had wanted to come, we probably would have hired him. Law and order was a consideration."

This, however, came at a later stage in the process and during the month of August, with the university advisory committee yet to be selected, nobody could truly be said to be under consideration. The regents were preoccupied with the ASU candidates.

One other important event occurred in August, the replacement of regent Arthur B. Schellenberg by Scottsdale businessman Kenneth G. Bentson, 66. Bentson was appointed by Governor Williams to serve out the remainder of


Schellenberg's term which expired in January 1971. Schellenberg retired for reasons of ill health.

Bentson's career had begun in Silverton, Oregon, where he kept books for a bank. In 1928 he left Oregon for California and kept books for a New York stock brokerage house. During the 1930's Bentson came to Phoenix as a salesman and estimator for a construction company and subsequently purchased Union Rock Company in 1942. He served as its president until retiring in 1968. During his career Bentson had served as President of Associated General Contractors, was a board member of the National Association of Manufacturers, and, significantly, had been chairman of the Republican Finance Committee of Arizona for six years. He had no college or university education. He was appointed by Williams to keep the costs of building construction at the state's three universities down.\(^9\)

The new school year began at The University of Arizona in the second week of September and the students' major concerns seemed to be getting through registration. The Board of Regents, under the leadership of lawyer Dunseath, 

\(^9\) In an interview for The University of Arizona Faculty/Staff Newsletter in April 1972 Bentson stated that, "Education in Arizona costs too much money." And at another time he was quoted as saying, "I look at the universities from a business point of view. I never went to college, so I don't know the workings of the educational process but it seems to me there's inefficiency and wastefulness. I can't prove it but it just has to be there." Arizona Daily Wildcat, May 1, 1972.
was considering a set of regulations formulated in compliance with Senate Bill 174 in order to meet the November 11 deadline for implementation and avoid the withholding of state funds. The inaugural issue of the student newspaper, the Arizona Daily Wildcat, carried the story of Harvill's resignation on the front page and listed the ever expanding tally of rumored candidates. In addition to Schaefer, Ares, DuVal, and Rafferty, S. I. Hayakawa's name appeared for the first time in print, although the paper said his candidacy has been discounted. In addition, the paper mentioned the name of United States Attorney Richard Burke, a man whose name was never considered. The paper made no mention of Vice President Johnson, the first hint of the student journalists' thinly veiled opposition to his candidacy. 10

On September 26 the Board of Regents met and tentatively adopted a conduct code over the sharp objections of Harvill and ASU president Newburn. In a divided vote, the three Democrats on the board--Goss, Bradford, and Sharber--were joined by Paris in voting against the code. Sharber, speaking for the dissenters, called it unconstitutional, illegal, and "the very worst of liberal and conservative doctrinaire approaches to governing the universities." 11 Although seemingly unrelated to presidential selection, one

regent was later to point to this vote as an ominous precursor of the difficulties in the selection process which followed. Passage of the Code of Conduct also sparked controversy over what prospective presidential candidates would think of it.

On the evening of September 28 an overflow crowd of nearly 700 persons attended the testimonial dinner for Johnson in the downtown Pioneer International Hotel dining room. University and state officials in attendance along with friends of Johnson's heard Governor Williams describe Johnson's achievements as an educator and President Harvill label Johnson as a "man of great patience and good judgement" in an office which requires "the patience of Job, the skill of Sherlock Holmes, and the technique of Perry Mason." Arizona congressman Morris K. Udall, a Sigma Chi fraternity brother of Johnson's described Johnson's feats as an undergraduate. Vice Mayor Conrad Joyner presented Johnson with a proclamation recognizing him as an "outstanding citizen of Tucson, the Sunshine City."

Outside, however, the scene was not as friendly. About 115 demonstrators had gathered by the hotel in confrontation with police and sheriff's deputies to protest the adoption of the Code of Conduct. This demonstration was part of an earlier rally on campus called to protest the adoption of the code, which had not been well received by faculty and students. About 500 students had gathered at noon and were
urged to march to the Pioneer Hotel that evening. At the rally, speakers intentionally violated the new code by spewing out profanities (a "minor offense") and counseling a violent protest of BYU racism at the October 10 football game (a "major offense"). The demonstrators huddled on the sidewalk outside the hotel forcing Governor Williams, Dunseath, and some other guests to enter the building through a rear entrance along with Johnson himself. There was no trouble and the rally broke up soon after the dinner began. The students finished by chanting a protest song to the tune of the "Battle Hymn of the Republic." The demonstration itself had been targeted against Williams, Dunseath, and through a process of guilt by association, Johnson. Johnson had played no role in writing or adopting the controversial code.

The month of September ended with all major campus constituent groups but the regents in a state of uncertainty. The faculty was in a state of unrest stemming from lack of concrete knowledge of the regent's activities and plans. Rampant rumor-mongering and ill-grounded speculation prevailed. The students, alumni, and administration waited but took no action.

12. "Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Code. It has burdened down the students with a far too heavy load."
Stage II—Group Mobilization (Direct)

Group mobilization occurs in response to a condition of group disequilibrium caused by the imminence of new leadership. Groups mobilize their members and resources to protect or improve their position vis-a-vis competing groups. The Arizona Board of Regents, which has statutory authority to choose university presidents, chose to mobilize associated constituent groups in an advisory capacity. The regents invited this mobilization for three reasons. First, these groups had a vital interest in the welfare of the university and had sufficient expertise to be valuable in an advisory role. Second, by establishing formal machinery for the participation of these groups and setting forth specific rules to guide their activity the regents could channel the influential efforts of faculty, administration, student body, and alumni. Third, the regents protected themselves from charges of dictatorial behavior and largely insured that they would retain not only the power to elect a president but the full measure of legitimacy necessary to insure support for their choice.

There are two distinct types of group mobilization. Direct or institutionalized group mobilization refers to the mandatory mobilization of interests required where there is established machinery for leadership selection. It was noted in Chapter 4 that preexisting ground rules for leadership
selection encourage and channel mobilization by groups with strong interests and influence (resources). After legitimate channels of influence are opened there is a strong tendency for groups to use them actively. In establishing an advisory panel the Board of Regents invited this direct form of mobilization—non-direct or non-institutionalized mobilization. This second type of mobilization takes place when tangential or peripheral groups become involved as soon as threats or rewards to their membership become apparent in the selection process. If and when such groups perceive themselves as excluded from the process they will likely demand admission for the purpose of safeguarding their interests and securing symbolic gratification. In the short-run the regents successfully forestalled this type of mobilization and sterilized the arena of debate by excluding those groups which did not participate in a formal or "legitimate" capacity. But in the long-run non-direct mobilization proved a barrier to early election of a president.

The first instance of direct group mobilization in the selection process came when the Board of Regents chose its own Presidential Selection Committee on July 11. This five member committee was chosen by Goss to insure that important blocs of interest and prejudice would be mobilized. It contained one Tucson regent, one Phoenix regent, and three regents from outside Pima and Maricopa Counties. The campus advisory body was chosen with similar considerations in mind.
The regents determined the composition of this group and left it up to the university to choose it. On August 12 Albert Gegenheimer, Professor of English and Chairman of The University of Arizona Faculty, received a letter from Bradford requesting that the faculty senate nominate 15 non-administrative faculty members for service on an advisory committee. The regents would choose five from this list for actual committee service. Three administrators, the president of the alumni association, and the student body president would round out the membership at 10.

Since the faculty senate did not meet during the summer months Gegenheimer suggested to Bradford that the faculty Committee on Committees and the elected and prestigious Committee of Eleven meet jointly to draw up a list of nominees. With the consent of the regents such a meeting was held on August 27 and about 20 people attended. Members of the old and new Committees of Eleven and Committees on Committees were there but a large amount of overlap and a number of vacationing members kept the meeting small. At

13. The Committee of Eleven is modeled after a similar faculty committee which first appeared in the Stanford University constitution. Members are elected at-large for one year terms, no more than two of which may be served in a row. The committee reports to the faculty senate or directly to the president. It has a wide scope and may look into all faculty relevant problems from traffic and parking to tenure and promotion disputes. Over the years the committee has become prestigious by involving itself in important matters. Because of its small size it can assemble quickly and act quickly.
the meeting, which was chaired by Gegenheimer, the university was divided into large and small colleges. Two nominees were submitted from each of the larger colleges such as Agriculture and Liberal Arts and one each from combinations of smaller ones such as Medicine, Nursing, and Pharmacy. Some members of the Committee of Eleven, such as Raymond Thompson, Professor of Anthropology, and Conrad Joyner, Professor of Government and Vice Mayor of Tucson, declined nomination to the advisory committee feeling that they might emerge as presidential candidates later.

The names of faculty members selected at the August meeting were dispatched to Bradford, who in turn transmitted them to President Harvill for his suggestions and comments. Harvill also suggested the names of several administrators for committee service. In this manner the committee was picked by Bradford in consultation with Harvill sometime during early September.

In the week following the Johnson dinner faculty and administrators at the university received letters from Bradford announcing that they had been appointed to the Advisory Committee. On Wednesday, September 30, Bradford announced that the committee had been named. He explained that the decision was made to include faculty and other groups "out of courtesy so they would feel involved, have a first chance to meet the candidates, and take advantage of the staff's
experience." The members of the committee which, he emphasized, was solely an advisory body were the following: Dr. Albert F. Gegenheimer; Mr. Harry E. Stewart, Professor of Electrical Engineering; Dr. Leon W. Dewhirst, Professor of Animal Pathology and member of the Committee of Eleven; Dr. A. Richard Kassander, Professor of Atmospheric Sciences and unofficial spokesman for the campus research community; Miss Patricia P. Paylore, Bibliographer and Assistant Director of the Office of Arid Lands Studies in the School of Earth Sciences; Mr. Samuel C. McMillan, Vice President for Planning and Development; Mr. David L. Windsor, Registrar and Secretary of the Faculty Senate; Dr. Herbert D. Rhodes, Dean of the Graduate College; Mr. Jack O'Dowd, President of the Alumni Association; and Mr. Bruce Eggers, student body president.

The committee was composed of four faculty members (Gegenheimer, Stewart, Dewhirst, and Kassander), a staff member (Paylore), three administrators (McMillan, Windsor, and Rhodes), and the special representatives of alumni and students (O'Dowd and Eggers). The committee was heavily weighted in favor of experience and loyalty to the university. The eight salaried, permanent members of the university community averaged 23 years of service each and seven of the ten were alumni (only Gegenheimer, Dewhirst, and Kassander had not been students).

The regents allocated no formal authority to this committee for selecting the president. The members were clearly aware that they served only in an advisory capacity and that the division of labor between the regent's Selection Committee and the campus Advisory Committee would be determined by the regents.

There was no non-direct group mobilization at this time. The most influential constituent groups—regents, faculty, alumni, administration, and students—had gained formal access to the selection process in one broad stroke with the appointment of the advisory body. No reason presented itself to justify factious behavior by elements of these groups. Supportive external audiences, now excluded from formal participation, could not yet legitimize participatory demands.

Stage III—Preliminary Coalition Formation (1970)

Preliminary coalition formation refers to both a process and an event. Through the exclusion of some groups from the deliberations involved in leadership selection the heterogeneity of interests and the scope of conflict over leadership issues is restricted. Where formal selection machinery exists this restriction is an artificial one. The success or failure of the selection process in facilitating group support for the new leader is dependent upon the extent to which the groups that formally participate in the
selection are congruent with the groups which are powerful enough to veto informally the leader and make it stick.

Once constriction of participating groups has occurred the process of preliminary coalition formation may then begin. In the presidential selection process coalition formation is encouraged by committee meetings shielded from the public view and protected by confidential treatment. Within the confines of the meeting room participants begin to develop common frames of reference and a degree of unanimity is molded from the raw materials of group interest and individual ambition. When a sufficient degree of unanimity exists a preliminary coalition has been formed. But the gossamer web of compromise is fragile, as the participants in the presidential selection process at The University of Arizona discovered.

The day following the announcement of the committee's selection by Bradford, the members met for the first time at ten o'clock in the morning. Many of the members had given no prior thought to the selection of a university president and, indeed, were completely baffled at being chosen. None of the members, with the possible exceptions of Gegenheimer and the special representatives, knew why they had been chosen by the regents and were reduced to theorizing about background experiences in their lives which might have prepared them for such duty. Some pointed to their proximity
to retirement and lack of selfish interest in the job. Others mentioned their activity in university affairs on committees and in the faculty senate. A few ventured to guess that their ideological or personal closeness to President Harvill, who was suspected at the time of having influenced Bradford's choice, was responsible for their selection.

The committee members elected Gegenheimer, who held a monopoly of knowledge about the selection process, chairman. He remained in this position throughout the six months between October and April that the committee met. At the conclusion of the process he received passing marks from the others on the committee. He also acted as a liaison with the regents between committee meetings. In several private meetings with board members he conveyed the committee's sentiments and received instructions from the regents. By tacit agreement among the membership Gegenheimer handled press relations along with his other duties.

Gegenheimer explained that the committee had several mandates from the regents. First, it was to discuss the future goals of the university over a ten year period and arrive at general observations which could be conveyed to the regents. Second, the committee was to discuss individuals who might be suited to the attainment of those goals and the qualities they must possess. Third, the committee was mandated to meet with and interview prospective
presidents invited to the campus by the Board of Regents. When this was explained he then passed out a list entitled, "Criteria for the Selection of the New President of The University of Arizona," dated September 24, 1970. These criteria were accompanied by a note from Myron B. Holbert, a staff member of the board, which again described the committee's mandate and emphasized the authority of the board to choose a president. The criteria were modeled after the criteria then in use for the ASU selection.

1. Record of successful accomplishment as an administrator, preferably in a major public university. He should have established a record of attracting strong administrative assistants to whom he assigned responsibility and delegated authority.

2. Ability to communicate with faculty, students, legislators, regents, alumni, and private citizens and maintain their respect. He should be an effective public speaker and a good listener.

3. Understanding of and appreciation for all aspects of university education, including teaching, research, and community services, in both professional and general education.

4. Personal characteristics of honesty, integrity, enthusiasm, warmth, vigor, as well as the courage to make difficult decisions.

15. "Screening of prospective candidates will be done by the Board's Selection Committee and the final selection of a President will be made by the Board of Regents on the recommendation of the Board of Regent's Presidential Selection Committee." Holbert added that, "The Board's Selection Committee will immediately start searching for candidates that meet such criteria by all methods available to them."
5. Good health (certified) and stamina to withstand the demands of the presidency of a large urban university. His age, 55 or under, should permit a reasonable period of service.

6. Understanding of university organization and management, including the importance of participation in the decision-making process by students, faculty, and other administrators.

7. Ability to adapt to changing conditions, to be sensitive to social change, and the capacity to generate, evaluate, and implement new ideas and programs.

8. Capacity to assess accurately available human and material resources and to employ them most effectively, including an understanding of the budgetary and financial processes.

9. Personal and family life that reflects the social skills necessary to meet and entertain people of diverse interests, as required to represent the University effectively.

10. Must have an earned doctorate degree from a recognized institution.

O'Dowd immediately objected to the tenth criteria, that of an earned doctorate, because it discriminated against Vice President Johnson who had none. At O'Dowd's insistence the requirement was formally dropped so as not to exclude immediately a man who might deserve consideration. But some members of the committee did not change their minds about the requirement. As one member later said, "An earned doctorate was not a completely inflexible requirement, but absolutely preferred." 16

The committee did not devote extended discussion to the future development of the university in general terms. There was widespread agreement that the major goal was academic preeminence. The committee members hoped to see the university become intellectually great and build up a prestigious reputation. It was seen as a continuation of forward momentum.

O'Dowd, who spoke out frequently and forcefully, agreed that academic departments must be kept strong. On the other hand, he was deeply concerned about the state of the athletic program at the university. He strongly believed a top flight sports program and strong athletic department would enhance the reputation of the university. He argued that in the eastern United States it was common for people who had never heard of The University of Arizona to know something about Arizona State University because of their successful sports program. He felt that the UA was the disgrace of the Western Athletic Conference and saw no conflict between athletics and academics.  

17. Later, O'Dowd expressed his feelings in writing. In a letter to the alumni magazine he said, "There is no alumnus worthy of the name who favors a 'win-at-any-price' crash athletic program to the detriment of the academic standing of his university, but where is the balance between the intercollegiate athletic program and the academic program? A weak academic phase of the University is not neglected for long, so why not consider prescribing for a weak athletic program the same kind of cure a sick academic program or department would receive?" Arizona Alumnus, Vol. 68
members did not share the opinion that athletic achievement should be emphasized no controversy arose over the state of the athletic program.

Much discussion centered on the qualifications the new president must meet. The committee members discussed a number of criteria. Foremost among the qualifications of a new president was administrative experience. Kassander, for example, wanted to find a man with solid experience, particularly in delegating authority. The committee majority felt the next president would have to delegate authority much more than Harvill had since it was impossible for another man to have Harvill's intimate knowledge of the campus. McMillan wanted to see a man familiar with management concepts who conceived of his role as one of formulating and executing policy. Several members of the committee expressed concern that the president have budgetary competence. Others interjected that they should look for a man with administrative experience at a similar land-grant institution or other large university. "We didn't want someone who had attended a small school of 500, gotten his advanced degree from a similar small school, and then been dean of a liberal arts college of 300 or so," said one member.18

No. 3 (February 1971), p. 1. See also, "Keeping the Balance: Can a University Maintain a Superior Academic and Athletic Standing at the Same Time?" Arizona Alumnus, Vol. 69, No. 3 (June 1972), pp. 12-14.

A second criterion of major importance to the committee members was the ability of the candidate to maintain close relations with the various publics or constituencies of the university. He should, they agreed, be a man of friendly disposition who got along well with students, faculty, and legislators in face-to-face contact. Faculty relations were most important.

A third area of discussion concerned the academic attitudes of a prospective president. Here, the committee membership decided that it wanted an individual of scholarly reputation who was committed to a search for academic excellence at the university.

A few other criteria were discussed. It was decided that the candidate's wife should be acceptable and amenable to a full social schedule. The committee agreed that he should be a good speechmaker. The possibility of a black or female president was briefly considered but the subject was soon dropped. Nothing was said to indicate prejudice against a presidential candidate of either type, but none were ever

19. The wives of candidates at The University of Arizona did not pose any problems for the selection committee or regents. "They, themselves, made good selections," said the regent. In the spring, however, when outside candidates were brought to campus one wife, when shown the president's house, asked if the silver service went with it. The regents' wives frowned on this. One of the ASU candidates was rejected because his wife was domineering. "There was some question," regents remarked, "about who the president would have been." Anonymous interview, February 9, 1973.
seriously considered and there was no occasion for extended
debate on the topic.

The committee also discussed the names of campus
individuals at the first session but did not undertake an
extended analysis because they had not yet met with the
regent's Selection Committee. The members did decide, how­
ever, to explore the availability of on-campus figures.
After the meeting Paylore told a reporter for the student
newspaper that Burke, Johnson, Schaefer, Ares, and DuVal
were all under consideration. 20

For the remainder of the month the selection process
seemed to be in suspended animation. The selection committee
did not meet again until November 5, there were no items of
speculation or lists of names in the press to fuel talk in
the campus community, and the participants, both committee
members and candidates, performed the ballet of presidential
gamesmanship adroitly with no public signs. The regent's
Selection Committee met only once, at the regular October
board meeting, and its activities consisted of reviewing
names that had been submitted for consideration. A number
of candidates on the UA campus submitted their names for
consideration. Names also came from academic administrators
throughout the country who had heard about the opening and

20. Arizona Daily Wildcat, October 2, 1970. This
was the only time a member of the Advisory Committee other
than Gegenheimer made a statement to the press about the
committee's activities.
wished to recommend a friend or colleague. The regents had again written to university presidents asking for their suggestions.

During October, however, members of the faculty committee were exploring the availability of possible nominees and the campus rumor mill was working overtime to separate the serious from the non-serious candidates. Word-of-mouth had it that the regents were considering the imposition of an outsider who would "get tough" with students and faculty. For this reason a large bloc of faculty opinion favored the naming of an insider who was known and trusted. The talk, for the most part, centered around eight men.

A prominent candidate was James H. Zumberge, 47, geologist, former college president, and Director of Earth Sciences at the university. Zumberge had received his doctorate from the University of Minnesota in 1946. He taught as an instructor for a year each at Duke University, Minnesota, and the University of Michigan. He finally settled at Michigan in an assistant professor's slot in 1951 and advanced to the rank of full professor over the course of 11 years before leaving to become the first president of Grand Valley State College.

When the Michigan state legislature decided to create a new college they looked toward the state's other universities for a president. Zumberge was recommended by colleagues at the University of Michigan as an excellent man for the
post. At the time Zumberge was committed to a life of research. Since receiving his doctorate in 1946 he had participated in seven major expeditions to Arctic Alaska, the Antarctic, and Lake Superior. In 1960 the American Geological Society named a physical feature of the Antarctic, Cape Zumberge, after him. He had authored more than 50 books and articles in several related fields of geology. He decided to accept the Grand Valley presidency but stipulated to the legislature he would serve for only four or five years until the college got off the ground and became fully accredited. According to Zumberge's boosters, he did a brilliant job with the fledgling institution. According to his detractors, he botched it and barely escaped with his reputation intact. The fact is that when the first class graduated at the end of four years the school was given full accreditation—the shortest elapsed time possible. He also gained experience working with a governing board and had to lobby the state legislature along with the presidents of the state's other schools.

In 1967 another distinguished geologist, Laurence M. Gould, was named by Harvill to head a search committee and locate a person to head the School of Earth Sciences of which Gould was Acting Director. Gould, who had been acquainted with Zumberge and worked with him in Antarctica, persuaded him to come to Arizona. With the assistance of
Bowen Dees, who was Executive Vice President of the university and had ties with the National Science Foundation in Washington, funding for research in earth sciences was growing. It was felt that the school would soon break with the College of Mines and be given the status of a separate college. Zumberge came with the understanding that when this happened (as it did in 1971) he would be named dean.

Zumberge came to The University of Arizona in 1968. Michigan was sorry to lose him. The state legislature passed a concurrent resolution in 1968 paying tribute to Zumberge for his work at Grand Valley State College and for his scientific contributions in fields of work embracing polar regions, glaciers, lakes, and underground water. At The University of Arizona Zumberge planned to return to research and teaching activities in addition to his duties as Director of the School of Earth Sciences. 21

From the beginning, Zumberge proved to be a competent administrator and an individual who commanded respect and loyalty. He also became the chief victim of a spate of rumors about a "crown prince." Even before Harvill had announced his retirement there was widespread speculation in faculty circles that Zumberge had been imported as his replacement. At the time this seemed plausible for a number of

21. The school included the Geology Department, the Geochronology Department and Laboratory of Tree Ring Research (Dendrochronology), and the Office of Arid Lands Studies.
reasons. First, Zumberge’s patron Laurence Gould was close to Harvill and one of his operatives with the faculty. Second, Zumberge had the credentials of a presidential candidate and had, in fact, been president of a small college. Third, there was widespread suspicion that Harvill would not remain neutral in any selection process. Many faculty reasoned that a 20-year president and man of commanding authority like Harvill would find it impossible to entrust the change of command to a remote process which he had no hand in. Rumors of Harvill’s activities abounded. Fourth, like all theories of a conspiratorial nature, the "crown prince" theory was hard to disprove. In fact, the difficulty of finding factual support for it gave it additional credence in the eyes of some. And fifth, Zumberge was not yet fully known among the faculty. He was a relative newcomer and head of a small, though prestigious, administrative operation.

A second rumored candidate and also a victim of heir apparent rumors was Bowen C. Dees, a former university administrator. Dees, 53, received a doctorate in physics from New York University in 1942. He served as a professor of physics at Mississippi College for a year in 1943 and then left to work on the development of radar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After several years with the military command in the Pacific following World War II, Dees worked for the National Science Foundation for 15 years between 1951 and 1966. In 1966 he was appointed Vice President by Harvill
at a time when research funding in the sciences was getting tighter. Dees had valuable NSF connections. He was installed simply as Vice President, not Vice President of Something, and this immediately aroused suspicion among campus crystal ball gazers. Harvill encouraged Dees to travel around Arizona speaking to groups in small towns and, according to one administration official, when Harvill left he "dumped everything in Dees' lap for the duration of his absence, making him, in effect, acting president."\textsuperscript{22}

Dees served as Vice President for two years and then was appointed Provost for Academic Affairs, a post at which he served for another two years before leaving at the end of the 1969-1970 school year to become President of Franklin Institute in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Dees was well liked at the university but those who knew him well were convinced that he left because he was unhappy in Arizona. "Dees," said one close acquaintance, "was a typical, methodical, Eastern bureaucrat." He did not feel great rapport with the informality of academic and social life at Arizona. The friend suggested that Dees' wife was unhappy in Arizona: "Dees was pressured into leaving by his wife; at least some pressure came from that direction. Dees and his wife liked and were accustomed to more formal Eastern society and never quite got used to the informality of university social life at U of A."\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{flushright}
23. Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Despite such feelings, which may have caused considerable ambivalence in Dees' mind about returning to The University of Arizona, he felt that he owed it to himself to return and examine the situation first-hand. Later in the fall, Dees secretly flew to Tucson to appraise the selection. He was taken to lunch at The Cove, an out-of-the-way restaurant several miles from the campus by Gegenheimer, Rhodes, and Kassander of the Advisory Committee. Dees insisted on secrecy because he felt he would have problems at Franklin Institute if it became known that he was considering the presidency elsewhere. He was briefed on events at the university since his departure and asked to talk to Harvill and other administrators during his short visit. The extent of Dees' interest at the conclusion of his tour is unknown but he did not take his name out of the running.

When Dees vacated the provost's job in 1970 for more straightlaced Eastern society, Harvill appointed Albert B. Weaver, 53, to the position. Weaver was the head of the physics department and an associate dean of the College of Liberal Arts at the time. Rumors immediately arose that since Dees had not worked out Harvill had appointed Weaver to the provost's job as a stepping-stone to the presidency. Weaver, it was reasoned, surely had Harvill's support for the job since he had turned down the deanship of Liberal Arts to accept the provost position. The latter had a weaker
been with The University of Arizona since 1956, was an respected member of the campus community and chairman of the Committee of Eleven.

Thompson, however, had a deep love of anthropology. An honest, sincere, and thoughtful man, he had a genuine drive to fulfill a commitment to keep the anthropology department strong and healthy. The department, one of the strongest and most distinguished in the university, had grown strong and developed a national reputation partly because of a tradition among its faculty of staying with the department. Thompson was not the first to turn down an opportunity to advance up the administrative ladder because of this commitment.

In 1969, when the Liberal Arts deanship had opened up, Thompson was approached by a delegation of the college's department heads who wished to determine his availability for the post. He declined consideration, pointing to his commitment to the department. In September 1970, Thompson had had a conversation with Gegenheimer about the presidency but it ended inconclusively. Shortly thereafter another group of department heads had come to his office to ask him to seek the position. Thompson discouraged interest at this time but later rejuvenated his candidacy when rumors of "law and order" candidates began circulating about the campus, rationalizing that it would be difficult to maintain a strong College of Liberal Arts and Department of Anthropology if the
university president was unpopular or inept. Early in the fall, then, Thompson was available for a draft under vaguely defined conditions.

Because of his well-known interest in the presidency Vice President Johnson's chances were continually weighed by university people. In fact, there was much fear, both feigned and real, among faculty members that he would be appointed. Johnson, more than any other candidate, was the possessor of and ultimately the victim of a well-defined image. He was widely stereotyped as a "political" figure. He was viewed as a pragmatist rather than an idealist, a manipulator rather than a thinker, an administrator rather than an innovator, and a hatchet-man rather than a leader.

A university administrator sketched Johnson's alleged "political" character.

Swede is a man who appreciates power realities. He has no use or sensitivity for the intellectual life or theory. He is not, for example, concerned with the First Amendment freedoms of students to speak or pass pamphlets, but does understand what will cause a riot and what will not. Swede pulled Harvill's chestnuts out of the fire many times and did not deserve the treatment he got. The relative calming of students is attributable to Johnson. Just for example, one time when Vietnam protesters put the flag at half mast Williams called up to demand it be raised again. Swede refused, saying this would cause a riot. The flag was not raised.24

It would be incorrect to say that Johnson had no support among the faculty—he had many friends. But some faculty

members immediately wrote him off because he lacked an earned doctorate. A faculty supporter of Johnson's implies that this was almost a knee-jerk reaction.

Johnson also had support among the faculty but some of the faculty immediately wrote him off because he had a degree in agriculture and because he lacked a Ph.D. This was intellectual snobbery of the first degree bearing no relation to Swede's real qualifications. Some felt Johnson might have been the man for the job 30 years ago but not today.25

A widely purveyed line of argument was that a Johnson presidency would be a disaster to the university and that Johnson, insensitive to academic concerns, would undo much of the quality of excellence that Harvill had labored to infuse into the institution. An administrative colleague of Johnson argued that, "Swede has no sympathy for or understanding of the intellectual way of life."26 A university dean stated flatly that, "Swede probably would not have cared if the faculty had not liked his selection as president and not supported him."27 It was argued that distinguished faculty members would prefer to leave rather than suffer a Johnson presidency—a supposition with little factual foundation.

Many faculty members regarded Johnson as a necessary evil. He was the university's light infantry, ready to leap

25. Anonymous interview, December 8, 1972
into the breach when non-academic problems threatened the disruption of university life. He would dirty his hands by "politicking" with legislators, get tough with rebellious students, and labor under a heavy administrative load. 28

"Harvill appointed Johnson because he needed somebody who could get tough," said one opponent, "but the office became a Frankenstein monster." 29 Johnson was there to take care of the intellectuals' dirty linen, not preside over them, and it was unthinkable that the church janitor should aspire to become minister of the congregation.

Johnson, in fact, had good early support on the Advisory Committee from long-time acquaintances and colleagues who respected his abilities. He also had a large reservoir of good-will among influential people throughout Arizona. Alumni, businessmen, professionals, political figures, and journalists were on the verge of launching a campaign for Johnson's nomination in a spontaneous burst of enthusiasm. Most of the support that Johnson would ultimately receive came from outside the gates of the campus from non-academics, a fact which hurt his cause tremendously among members of an Advisory Committee jealous of their prerogatives.

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Several other names were also getting an airing. Because of his liberal stands on such things as prison reform and student rights, Dean Ares of the law school was considered far too liberal to appeal to the Arizona Board of Regents. His candidacy was considered unrealistic. But Ares was very popular among the faculty because of frequent faculty stands on issues and several friends on the Advisory Committee wished to bring his name into consideration. They were persuaded that this was futile.

Ares, himself, was surprised at the speculation surrounding his name and its continued mention in the newspapers. He did not seek to advance his candidacy, however, because he thought it politically unfeasible and entertained the notion that the office should seek the man. He considered issuing a statement of disclaimer but was dissuaded by friends and colleagues who argued that there were, after all, some advantages to being perceived as a prospective president. He might be more effective as a dean.

Another possibility, Merlin K. DuVal, founding Dean of the College of Medicine, was considered highly qualified. A graduate of Dartmouth and Cornell University Medical College, DuVal had been at the university for six years and enjoyed an excellent reputation stemming from his work in the medical profession.

Sometime after the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, DuVal was contacted by Gegenheimer to determine
his availability. DuVal told Gegenheimer he was not interested. Shortly thereafter, DuVal was contacted again by another committee member, Windsor, who felt so strongly about DuVal's suitability for the presidency that he decided to persist independently of formal committee channels. DuVal and Windsor lunched together at the Arizona Inn and DuVal explained his feelings. A man dedicated to improving medical care, DuVal considered himself totally devoted to the betterment of his profession. He told Windsor, and was subsequently to tell others, that he would consider taking the position only if a unanimous Board of Regents approached him and said, "You are the only man in the United States who could run The University of Arizona." Short of this, he would not allow his name to be placed in nomination and chose to remain in the field of health care.

Another candidate was Conrad F. Joyner, 39, a Professor of Government and Vice Mayor of Tucson. Joyner, a moderate to liberal Republican, had expressed some interest in being considered to Advisory Committee members Gegenheimer and Rhodes. He had also spoken to several regents about placing his candidacy before the board and was widely known to be interested. The Advisory Committee discussed Joyner's name briefly at its first meeting but the members felt that Joyner was too politically oriented to be acceptable to the Board of Regents. In addition, several members of the committee were in agreement that Joyner did not possess the
desired administrative experience. Although as a city official Joyner was partially responsible for the administration of a $44 million budget in 1970 (versus the university's 1970 budget of $54 million) he did not have any academic administrative experience as, for example, a department chairman or dean. For this reason Joyner was never seriously considered by the committee.

On Thursday, November 5, the Advisory Committee met for the first time with the regents' selection committee. This meeting continued the process of coalition formation begun by the Advisory Committee at their first meeting. Goss, Bradford, Sharber, and Paris were present. Singer was absent at this and subsequent meetings. The regents made several points. First, they reiterated that the sole responsibility for selection of a new president rested with the board and they, not the campus committee, would make the selection. Second, the regents impressed the need for complete secrecy upon the committee members. All discussions were to be conducted in absolute confidence and members of the committee were asked individually to state that they would not discuss with anyone outside the room what transpired at the meetings. At this juncture in the proceedings the regents had correctly estimated the possible contagion of conflict throughout the university community and beyond. They attempted to restrict its spread by depriving elements
excluded from the formal machinery of information regarding committee debate. The regents indicated that if anyone could not accept this condition he should withdraw from the proceedings. Third, Bradford explained that the regents wanted to reach a decision by the end of 1970 and for this reason it was necessary to limit consideration to candidates at the UA. There was insufficient time to consider outsiders because the process of gathering data on them and bringing them in for interviews was lengthy. A number of highly qualified individuals were presently affiliated with the university and it should be possible to make a suitable selection from among them. Both Goss and Sharber concurred with Bradford on this matter. The regents explained to the faculty and administrators that it boosted morale to promote from within and lowered it by arbitrarily excluding insiders. This, they said, was the primary emphasis for looking at inside candidates. What they implied, but did not say, was that they wished a selection to be made before January 1971 when the terms of three board members (including Goss and Bradford) would expire.

Bradford then stated that among those mentioned for the post in the campus rumor mills and local newspapers there were two candidates who were unacceptable to the regents. Those two were Vice President Johnson and Vice Mayor Joyner, whose backgrounds were too laced with political involvement
for them to be effective as university president. Bradford emphasized, however, that for appearances sake it was necessary to leave their names in the running and go through the motions of considering each. In Johnson's case it was critical because a statewide campaign for his nomination was already underway.

Following the establishment of these guidelines there was some general discussion of criteria. Although the regents relied on the faculty to develop the goals of the university, they had undertaken some discussions of their own. The majority felt it was the outstanding university in the state and wanted it to have accelerated improvement in quality. At Arizona State they wanted a president to improve departmental standards and raise the overall level of quality to an even plane. At Arizona they wanted someone who could advance and build on established strength rather than consolidate.

30. Johnson had at one time been urged to run in a Democratic party primary for governor but did not. He had never held elected office. It seems likely that Joyner was included with Johnson for appearances sake so that the Vice President's exclusion would not appear arbitrary. Joyner had been an elected city official since 1967, was popular with the electorate, and widely considered to be a possible candidate for the mayor's post in 1971. See the Tucson Daily Citizen, February 9, 1971.

31. One of the Phoenix regents charged that the Tucson board members, Dunseath and Paris, had a weather eye out for the economic welfare of the city. "At the UA they also wanted someone who could do this (improve academic quality) but more than that they wanted somebody who could preside over the acquisition of more money for the Tucson economy and the increased growth of the physical plant and
Dunseath considered the improvement of the athletic program to be an important consideration.\textsuperscript{32} Other members of the board felt this was secondary to academics but, in the words of one member of the Selection Committee, "it was necessary to consider it and keep the people of the state and newspaper writers happy." He recalled that at the time he had received "much pressure" about the athletic program at the university because Harvill had deemphasized it. The regent reported receiving critical letters from influential persons around the state regarding the athletic status quo.\textsuperscript{33}

As the meeting continued, the regents stressed the age consideration as being an important one, saying that since the first few years on the job were spent learning no person over 55 should be considered. One regent jokingly added that the board didn't want to have to go through the process again for at least another 10 years.

The question of individual names then came up. Members of the Advisory Committee were asked to suggest names and within the established framework of considering only insiders the names of Weaver, Thompson, Schaefer, and Zumberge student body. One of the traditional jobs of the university president there is to get grants and bring money into Tucson." Anonymous interview, March 2, 1973.

\textsuperscript{32} Dunseath was a former UA football player on the squads of 1929, 1930, and 1931. He later served briefly as freshman line coach.

were suggested by the faculty. In addition, they asked to be permitted to consider Dees because of his recent affiliation with the school. The regents gave their consent. They also asked to consider some other outside candidates whose names are unknown. About 10 names in all were mentioned.

On Wednesday, November 11 Bradford announced that 15 individuals were being considered for The University of Arizona presidency and said he was optimistic about a January 1 deadline for the selection. He refused to identify individuals under consideration but did say six insiders at Arizona were on the list with several men who were university presidents elsewhere. He added that his own personal philosophy was promotion from within.

Bradford again discussed criteria and expressed the opinion that the new president should be no older than 55. He suggested that anyone under 45 probably didn't have the

34. It is not known who the outsiders were but an educated guess can be made. At precisely this time the regents had narrowed down the field of candidates at Arizona State University to five men, all of whom were university presidents elsewhere. They were: Bryce Jordan, Acting President of the University of Texas at Austin; John W. Schwada, Chancellor of the University of Missouri; Paul Sharp, President of Drake University; Ernest Hartung, President of the University of Idaho; and Harold Enarson, President of Cleveland State University. Interviews were underway at the time and it is likely that Bradford proposed to explore their interest in and suitability for The University of Arizona. In addition, President Carlson of the University of Wyoming was contacted by Regent Singer sometime during the fall to explore his availability for the UA position. Carlson was not strongly interested.
background experience necessary, a remark that seemed to eliminate a number of insiders—Johnson, 41; Joyner, 39; Ares, 43; and Schaefer, 35. In fact, none of the four candidates were viable at the time. Furthermore, "we want a good administrator," Bradford said, "taking into consideration such things as the financial problems of universities. It's got to be someone who can communicate well with all facets of the university—taxpayers, regents, and legislators—and who won't let pressure groups run his university for him."\(^\text{35}\)

He saw no reason to expect division over the choice. The "usual selection process," he indicated, involved the regent selection committee recommending one person who then would be accepted by the 10-member Advisory Committee.\(^\text{36}\)

This was the first of a number of statements Bradford was to make about the progress and conduct of the selection process. Some members of the Advisory Committee were angered as time went on when Bradford revealed confidential information to the press while at the same time swearing them to secrecy. The feeling was aggravated by a pervasive suspicion that the regents were not seriously interested in advice from the campus community and were merely going through the motions with an advisory panel.

\(^{35}\) Tucson Daily Citizen, November 11, 1970.

\(^{36}\) Arizona Daily Wildcat, November 12, 1970.
On November 17 Bradford spoke out again, saying that he expected the choice of a new president for The University of Arizona to come before January 1. "We took considerably more time at ASU breaking ground," he said. "Now we've got information on people we can use and don't have to obtain again." The student newspaper reported Gegenheimer as saying that his group had submitted a list of 10 names to the regents which contained five insiders and five outsiders. "Our job," he reported, "was to go through and select those we thought would be more satisfactory."

These statements imply that at this time the regents still had visions of undertaking the selection in the same insulated way it was being done at ASU, where the advisory committee recommended 10 names to the regents and the regents did the rest of the narrowing down from there. It is instructive to note, however, that in the same *Wildcat* article another member of the regent's Selection Committee, Paul Singer of Phoenix, remarked that, "we are not too far yet" in the selection process.

In fact, a division was beginning to form on the board between the Democratic members of the Selection Committee (Bradford, Goss, and Sharber) and the rest of the board.

37. Ibid., November 17, 1970.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
It was at the instruction of these three (with the concurrence of Paris) that the faculty were told to consider only insiders so that the selection could be made by January 1. Goss' term expired at the end of the year and Bradford, who had been elected to the Arizona House of Representatives in the general election on November 3 was also leaving. Benton's term expired but his reappointment was expected. The three Democrats wanted to appoint a president before Governor Williams had the opportunity to make more "conservative" appointments. The other regents were not aware of the Democrats' plans.

This plan surfaced on November 19 when the Citizen ran a story in which "an unidentified member of the board" alleged that Dunseath and Singer were trying to delay the naming of new presidents at both ASU and UA until Governor Williams could appoint new members. With these appointments Williams would have named all the members of the board except Sharber of Flagstaff. The anonymous regent further accused Dunseath of threatening to delay presidential selection because he had been personally and professionally insulted when Goss, Bradford, Sharber, and Paris had dissented on the conduct code vote of September 26.⁴⁰ The Citizen concluded the article by speculating that Johnson, Joyner,

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and DuVal were "considered high on the list." The following day, November 20, the Citizen carried a follow-up story with comments from Johnson, Joyner, Ares, Schaefer, and, surprisingly, Kassander of the Advisory Committee, whom the paper considered to be a serious candidate. Kassander's name had been mentioned by others on the committee at one point but he was adamant in disclaiming interest. Joyner stated he was "not a reluctant candidate," Ares had "no idea" if he was being considered, and Johnson said he would accept the job if offered. Schaefer declined to make a statement.

The Advisory Committee did not meet again during the month of November and the regents, preoccupied with interviewing candidates for The University of Arizona's northern sister, did not condense the "list of 10" which invariably accompanied Bradford's name in the newspapers. The Selection Committee did not meet.

On Friday, December 4, the Wildcat adopted a shotgun approach and ran a long, front page story listing 12 possible contenders. Johnson, Schaefer, Thompson, Weaver, and Zumberge were listed as the "five men being considered;" and Ares, DuVal, Charles J. Hitch, President of the University

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., November 20, 1970.

43. On November 21 the Arizona Daily Star reported Sharber as saying there were about 10 "frontrunners" and "about half" were from The University of Arizona.
of California, Kassander, Joyner, Windsor, and former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall were listed as "possible contenders."  

In the early afternoon of December 4 the Advisory Committee met for the third time at the request of Gegenheimer. It was to meet with the regent's committee for a second time that evening. Gegenheimer indicated that the chairman of the regent's Selection Committee, Bradford, had told him that if a new president was not named immediately the three new board members appointed by Williams were likely to change the board's composition in such a way as to affect their presidential selection decision. The effect would be adverse. Gegenheimer said that the educational predominance of The University of Arizona would be jeopardized if the regents appointed an outstanding president for ASU before January 1 and an unsatisfactory one for UA after the arrival of new board members in 1971. Although the committee had not conducted extensive deliberations or explored outside candidates, the choice had to be made now in the form of an endorsement which, for appearances sake, had to be unanimous. "The future of the university is at stake," he said.

Gegenheimer requested each committee member to list three names in order of preference on a sheet of paper and


45. Anonymous interview (Advisory Committee member), December 7, 1972.
appointed O'Dowd, the alumni representative, as teller. When O'Dowd counted the votes he saw that they were unanimous for Zumberge in first place and then added his own vote to make it fully unanimous. Windsor, the registrar, was out of town and unable to attend the meeting. However, he had given Gegenheimer a proxy vote for Zumberge in advance of the meeting just in case the matter came to a vote.

The matter was not yet settled. One of the faculty members on the committee objected to the endorsement of Zumberge on several grounds. First, the committee, having met only three times, was not far enough along in its deliberations to make such a recommendation. Nobody had been interviewed. Second, it seemed unwise to support one candidate exclusively and leave the regents with no choice in the matter. Third, he had a strong feeling of being "railroaded." There was little agreement in the rest of the membership that these objections were valid and after 20 minutes of heated discussion the controversy was settled when the faculty member gave in. The committee decided that at the upcoming meeting with the regents that evening each member would individually make a statement on Zumberge's behalf. The holdout member "did so with reluctance," and afterwards felt it was a mistake. "I prostituted myself," he said, "that's what it boils down to." 46

That morning the regent's Selection Committee had convened in the Board of Regents Meeting Room near the president's office in the Administration Building. Its members were interviewing four inside candidates suggested by the Advisory Committee on November 5, plus Johnson. Dees, the other "inside" nominee was not present. The interviews were not searching. They lasted only a half-hour to 45 minutes and were conducted in an informal fashion. One candidate described them as "get acquainted sessions," and at Johnson's interview Bradford led off by saying, "Well, we all know Swede. Anybody got any questions?" Several candidates came away from these sessions feeling that they had not been seriously or deeply probed in an effort to determine their suitability for the position.

Zumberge was asked general questions about his background and administrative experience. One regent asked if he intended to continue his research if made president and he replied negatively. At Schaefer's interview the regents asked a number of open-ended questions which allowed him to express his educational philosophies very broadly. Many questions concerned his administrative background and experience. At this time he was not well known to the board and had done little on his own to advance his candidacy.  


48. He nevertheless had some support. He was Bradford's second choice behind Zumberge.
Provost Weaver was also asked about his educational philosophy. A man of creative mind who gave serious thought to university governance, Weaver made two points. First, he expressed a strong belief in the need for a distinguished faculty, stating that he himself had studied under Fermi and that a tremendous gulf separated a giant like Fermi from scholars at other levels. Students, he said, were unaware of this until they came in contact with a first-rate intellect. He would proceed as Harvill had, taking advantage of opportunities to get such men when they arose. Weaver indicated that the major duty of the president was to make the university academically superior by improving the departments within it. Money should go to strong departments first because it would just be wasted by weaker ones.

Second, he projected a vision of the future. He strongly felt that the university of the future must become even stronger academically. Each region of the country would need an institution capable of synthesizing all the new knowledge produced by the information explosion. A university must be capable of spreading its tentacles all over the world—as The University of Arizona was doing—and fielding the most current and relevant information along the lines of academic disciplines. Weaver wanted to see Arizona become the hub of intellectual endeavor in the Southwest.

Weaver had the impression that the regents were not interested in these observations. They asked him questions
about his background and threw hypothetical questions about student disorders at him. Weaver, in general, expressed the view that administrators should not give in readily to students, but that sometimes it was necessary to bend to great lengths to avoid personal injury. Sometimes there was nothing administrators could do.

Thompson's interview followed along much the same lines. Bradford began by saying, "Tell us something about your background and yourself." They asked questions about the size of the budgets he had handled as a department chairman and museum director. The regents queried Thompson about his reaction to hypothetical instances of student revolt and asked questions about how he would react to dissident faculty members if he were president. Thompson initially tried to equivocate, postulating possible factors which might enter into such decisions but the regents became impatient with answers which were not decisive. At the conclusion of the half-hour interview Thompson told the Selection Committee what he had told Gegenheimer and the Liberal Arts department heads, that he was satisfied in the anthropology field and was a reluctant candidate. He would step in if he was the only man able to do so effectively.

That evening the regents and Advisory Committee members met jointly in the board room for the final time in 1970. At this meeting the committee presented its unanimous
endorsement. Each member was required to say something about Zumberge. The regents made no decision but assigned Paylore, one of Zumberge's great exponents on the committee, to draft a letter in his support for the governor. This letter, dated December 7, was very general.

The University of Arizona faculty committee chosen by the Regents to advise it on the selection of the new president of this institution, arrived unanimously at the decision, already known to you, to recommend Dr. James H. Zumberge. In the expectation that you would want to understand our reasons for this choice, we are setting forth here some of the value judgements we employed in this decision.

Certain criteria, from those established for us in our instructions from the Regents' Selection Committee (attached), were readily seen to be met easily by Dr. Zumberge, for his record of achievements both since he came to the University of Arizona in the summer of 1968 and in the responsible positions held prior to that time in other places, attests to this distinguished career. That he fulfills so many of these criteria so admirably is in itself a great tribute to his character and professional ability. We hope that full documentation on his background and experience has been made available to you, and that you agree with us that it is an impressive chronology indeed.

Here we wish, rather, to speak to you of less visible and recognizable qualities of Dr. Zumberge as we his colleagues have come to understand them in our association with him at the University of Arizona. These include a brilliant intellect, quick perceptive, analytical, that allows him to cut through incisively to the essence of any problem and distill it so that resulting decisions are relevant and sustainable. That he is an unusually personable man is readily acknowledged by anyone who has met him, however briefly. His ability to maintain "grace under pressure" has been ably demonstrated to many of us in the context of our relations with him in a variety of University experiences. This resilience is a useful asset in high administrative positions, where judgements of far-reaching significance
must be made in an atmosphere of composure if they are not to be challenged. And finally, we admire the energy he brings to his work because it is reflected in the energy those under his supervision are willing and happy to bring to theirs. His example inspires those around him, to the benefit of all. These are some of his extra attributes, as we see them, which in our opinion characterize him as a dynamic leader responsive to contemporary needs and able to elicit from his colleagues the same measure of dedication to the job to be done.

Because the quality and stature of an institution such as ours depends in large degree on this factor of successful interaction among all elements involved, we should not want this critical decision of the choice of a successor to Dr. Harvill to be undertaken in any other than an honest and honorable way, with full consideration of the part of all concerned of the qualities required to maintain the proud reputation this institution now enjoys throughout the world. To undertake this decision in any other spirit would risk diminishing that image unnecessarily. This is why we have sought in this gratuitous expression of widespread faculty opinion to let you know that we think Dr. Zumberge can bring to the position the extra dimension that will keep the University of Arizona a distinguished university in which the State can take pride. We hope you will accept this expression in the same spirit in which we offer it.

On December 7 the regents met to examine the University of Arizona's construction requests. Sharber was elected board president. The regents went into executive session for over an hour, but it is not known if the presidency was discussed.

On Thursday, December 10, the Citizen announced that the naming of a new president could come at the December 19 board meeting scheduled at The University of Arizona in Tucson. The Citizen quoted "informed sources" at the UA, saying
the regents had narrowed down the field to two candidates—Johnson and Zumberge. Reached by reporters Zumberge said he was not aware of this constriction in the field. "The regents are apparently getting close and because of this there are bound to be rumors," he said. 49 The Star picked up the story the next morning and reported that "the rumor mill had it that the candidates had been narrowed down to Johnson and Zumberge." 50

Reversion to Stage II--Group Mobilization (Indirect)

The influence of Bradford and the application of peer pressure within the small group setting of the Advisory Committee had led to the formation of a unanimous coalition in support of Zumberge. But this coalition was easily perishable and could not withstand public scrutiny. Like an orchid raised in a desert greenhouse, a coalition formed in an environment of artificially restricted conflict could not withstand removal from its sheltered origins. When rumors of a Johnson-Zumberge deadlock on the Board of Regents appeared in the press they galvanized previously excluded groups into pressing for an influential role in the selection. The news media, the state legislature, and the state's

49. Tucson Daily Citizen, December 10, 1970. Zumberge also stated that he had not been in contact with the regents since his interview the previous Friday. Later he would tell friends and acquaintances that he had been promised the job.

community of political influentials pressed for an influen-
tial voice in the selection process. The alumni split into
two factions.

The failure to restrict the scope of conflict pro-
duced a new, indirect mobilization of groups. The announce-
ment that an even balance of forces existed to the board
tempted the press, the politicians, and the alumni to try
to secure interest gratification by tipping the balance in
favor of Johnson. This attempt elicited a countermobiliza-
tion by groups defending the sanctity of the selection pro-
cess and attempting to once again restrict the scope of
conflict to those constituent groups which had been granted
formal participation.

The newspaper announcements of a narrowing of the
field to Johnson and Zumberge caused a flurry among Johnson
supporters and the ill-starred "Johnson campaign" began to
pick up steam and emerge into public view. There was a
large outpouring of sentiment on behalf of the university
administrator which Johnson did not personally orchestrate.
He knew of some of his supporters' plans and at times offered
explicit or tacit encouragement. On other occasions, how-
ever, he benefited (or was victimized by) expressions of
support which were spontaneous. Indeed, for those who had
long acquaintance with Johnson and were familiar with his
accomplishments in the state for the past 20 years the "cam-
paign" was not a surprise.
Support for Johnson soon surfaced in the form of a page 1 editorial in the Sunday edition of the Star entitled, "Johnson is the man." In order to understand the significance of this editorial it is essential to explore activity on behalf of Johnson which had backdropped the selection process since Harvill's retirement announcement.

Shortly after Harvill had announced his retirement, Johnson was told by friends and regents (or persons close to the regents) that there were two main obstacles standing in the way of a successful candidacy. First, he did not have national prominence as an educator. And second, he had no doctorate. In order to rectify these supposed deficiencies and make his candidacy viable, Johnson decided to take early action in both categories. To achieve national recognition he determined to seek appointment to a presidential commission. Sometime in the fall, therefore, Johnson had gone to Washington, D.C. and met with university alumnus Edward L. Morgan, who was on the White House Staff as a deputy to John Ehrlichman. Johnson explained to Morgan that he was in the running for the presidency and asked Morgan to see if he could secure an appointment to an education-related presidential commission for Johnson. Morgan replied that several possibilities existed. He would see if anything could be done. But in December Johnson had not yet heard from Morgan.

51. Ibid., December 13, 1970.
Second, Johnson decided to search for an honorary doctorate. During the fall a number of his boosters scouted around the country but nothing was located. Additionally, he set out to prove that a lot of university presidents did not have earned doctorates and convince his detractors that such a degree was not an essential prerequisite for success. During the second week of August Johnson had written a letter to G. D. Humphrey, President-emeritus of the University of Wyoming. In the letter, he asked Humphrey to do a study of the degree backgrounds of university presidents. On September 2, Humphrey returned a list of 35 names to Johnson of presidents who did not have earned doctorates. Johnson gave copies of this list to several people, including lawyer Ralph Bilby of Flagstaff.

On Monday, August 17, Bilby called David F. Brinegar, Executive Editor of the Star, who, because of unusual circumstances relating to the health of publisher William R. Mathews, had come in total control of the paper on October 24, 1968--an unprecedented circumstance in American journalism. Bilby, like a number of other Johnson supporters at the time, was outraged. He felt that Harvill had deliberately timed his retirement to make it appear that the testimonial dinner was a kickoff for a noisy presidential bandwagon. He believed that Harvill wanted to control the selection process. Bilby asked Brinegar if he could talk to
him and a closed door meeting between the two took place on Thursday, August 20.

When they were alone, Bilby asked the newspaperman where he stood on the Johnson candidacy. Brinegar, who had been a long-time friend of Johnson's told Bilby that the Board of Regents had the constitutional authority to operate the university and select the president. The Star was not the place to discuss it. Bilby then asked if Brinegar thought a doctorate was necessary for a university president. Brinegar, a close personal friend of Charles J. Hitch—a non-doctorate holder—replied that he did not. Bilby suggested to Brinegar that if he would not support Johnson editorially he might consider using some research that Johnson was producing as the basis for news items. Brinegar accepted the offer and some of the material subsequently appeared in the pages of the Star.

As Brinegar watched the presidential sweepstakes unfold, he became more and more disturbed. Not only did he feel that President Harvill and geologist Gould were operating behind the scenes to manipulate the selection of Zumberge, but he became upset with the treatment Johnson was getting.

In the early stages of the selection process at the University of Arizona I was distressed to hear the most malicious sort of things said about Marvin D. Johnson, who in my opinion was and is an honorable and able man.
"Should a Willcox boy who got a master's degree in meat cutting be named President of the University of Arizona?" was one question rhetorically asked.

Aspersions at the fact he was married to a person of Latin ancestry were made, as though Stella Johnson in some fashion would not make a proper president's wife.

There were many nongermane things pushed into the UA selection process. They were of a nature to eventually cause me to change my mind—I had originally stated that I would not put the Star on record or interfere in any way—and to gradually bring the Star into the process, and then dramatically, in mid-December of 1970, openly ask for Vice President Johnson's designation.  

On December 12, two days after the Citizen had broken an "informed sources" story stating that the regents were close to a selection and the field of candidates had been narrowed to Johnson and Zumberge, Brinegar received information that the board was, indeed, poised between the two. That night, Brinegar wrote an editorial endorsing Johnson but was undecided on the merits of running it in the next day's paper. He talked it over with his wife and she suggested that Brinegar ask Johnson's opinion.

On the phone I said, "Swede, I have an editorial to run tomorrow morning. It might help you; it might hurt you. I thought the best thing to do was to talk to you." He said, "I'll come right over."

He looked at me and he said, "Are you really going to run this? Well, it's going to make things awfully tense. . . ."

When I finally decided to back Swede I said to Swede, "Every politician I have ever known I do not solicit a promise I do not accept a promise. I won't solicit any promise. I won't accept any promise, except one thing. Because of the fact that I'm backing you . . . I want your assurance of the absolute best academic vice president you can get." He said, "I will do so."53

The next morning Brinegar's editorial, "Johnson is the Man," appeared in the paper. He wrote in part:

At a time when the choice was a great deal wider, the Star chose not to enter into any discussion of the University presidency, beyond some broadly general statements which could be applied to several persons under discussion. . . . There have been people of prominence who have not used such restraint, and the pressures to name Dr. Zum-berge quickly and get the whole matter over with have become most unseemly.

Arguments have been made against Vice President Johnson's promotion, but none will hold water.

... The better choice, if narrowing is as indicated, for the University of Arizona presidency is Vice President Johnson. . . .54

The same day Star sports editor, Abe Chanin, issued the lamenting refrain that:

Today there is much activity behind the scenes to get an "athletically oriented" president at the U of A. But there is no indication yet that the move will succeed. The Regents and Governor Jack Williams haven't indicated they are as interested in athletics as in education in studying the list of candidates at both schools.55

Also on the same day, Bernie Wynn, the political editor of

53. Ibid.
54. Arizona Daily Star, December 13, 1970
55. Ibid.
the Phoenix Arizona Republic further fueled the Johnson cause: "From the Tucson grapevine comes word that Regent Elwood Bradford is the lone holdout in the naming of Marvin (Swede) Johnson as the new president of the University of Arizona." 56

Reaction to these newspaper comments came swiftly. Wildcat editor Jackie Becker wrote an editorial on Tuesday attacking "the inept meddling of members of the state's power structure." She criticized Brinegar, Chanin, and Wynn for their "inexcusable" interference in the selection process and concluded that "the University presidency is not a political question." 57

That evening, Johnson picked up formal support from the alumni. On Monday, the day following Brinegar's editorial, Hugh Harelson, a Phoenix television newscaster and vice president of the Alumni Association called a special meeting of the membership to discuss an endorsement of Johnson. 58

The meeting was called without the prior knowledge or consent of alumni president O'Dowd, who represented the association on the campus Advisory Committee. O'Dowd was awakened early


58. The bylaws of The University of Arizona Alumni Association provide that six of the 27 members can call a meeting about a "matter of importance" between regularly scheduled meetings. It was a simple matter for Harelson to reach those few members by telephone and make arrangements.
on the morning of December 15 by a messenger delivering a registered letter to his house. The letter announced that the alumni association would meet in Phoenix that evening to discuss a Johnson endorsement.

An angry O'Dowd flew to Phoenix to chair the meeting. He asked if there were other matters to be discussed and when informed that the endorsement of Johnson was the only one he gave up the chair, went to the back of the room, and sat silently through the debate. When the resolution came to a vote O'Dowd abstained, citing his Advisory Committee membership as a conflict of interest. The statement read in part:

Recognizing that all the candidates are men of high caliber and principles, nevertheless, the board, in light of its close association with Vice President Johnson, a graduate with two degrees from our university and his proven administrative ability, go on record as favoring his candidacy for the office of President of the University of Arizona and urge the board of regents, as we know it will, to give this recommendation its most serious consideration.

Harelson said he "hoped the resolution would have some influence on the regents," while adding that no "pressure move" was intended. "It's only a guideline on how the people outside feel about who should be the next president," he said, adding that the vote was not "anti-Zumberge." 59

59. The final vote was a unanimous 24 to 0. O'Dowd abstained. Harelson also abstained because he was chairing the meeting. One other member could not be reached and was not in attendance.

In the meantime, the regents met in Phoenix on December 15 and relocated their regular meeting on the 19th to Tempe—a signal that the ASU president was to be announced. Speculation continued on the announcement of a UA president.

On Wednesday, December 16, the Star entered the picture again with an editorial addressed to the regents. Brinegar emphasized the importance of administrative ability in a president, bolstering his argument with a quotation from a recent Wall Street Journal article which argued that,

> A blend of management skill with experience in the academic world is ideal but rarely found in one person. In the absence of a candidate with both attributes, preference should be given to the candidate with managerial strengths. The academic background can then be supplied by adding specialists to the president's staff.  

Brinegar then wrote his own feelings.

This week is a critical week in the history of the University of Arizona. The Board of Regents is being pressured to act with unwarranted haste in naming as president a man unfamiliar with the workings of this state and relatively inexperienced in college administration.

The choice is between such a person and Marvin D. Johnson, University of Arizona vice president for university relations. A vicious and malicious attack on Vice President Johnson has been made by a few people on the basis that he has no Ph.D. degree. Such a degree is properly a proud possession of its holder, but it is not an entitlement to more than it describes.

Vice President Johnson has had long experience in university administration. He knows the state thoroughly and has a knowledge of how the

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Arizona legislature works that can be matched by no one in academic circles.

If the present Board of Regents is not inclined to name Mr. Johnson now, it should pursue a path of ordinary consideration and decency, and let the new board choose the president.62

On Thursday, December 17, two days before the Board of Regents meeting in Tempe, the furor surrounding the selection process showed no signs of abating, with candidates jockeying and newspapers editorializing in a flood of rhetoric.

The newspaper campaign for Johnson moved into high gear. Brinegar was "Goddamn mad" at the treatment Johnson was receiving and began to lobby for him throughout the state. He contacted by telephone all the newspaper editors in the state who could be reached and spoke on behalf of Johnson. Through his long journalism career he had met most of these men and come to know them well.

Brinegar called Jones Osborn, editor and publisher of the Yuma Daily Sun, who was an old friend, and asked him if he could influence the feelings of Elwood Bradford. Osborn replied that he did not think he could sway Bradford in his support of Zumberge. Brinegar called others as well. He talked to Jonathan Marshall of the Scottsdale Progress. Marshall was reluctant to get involved because he was not well versed with the situation. Another conversation took

place with C. R. (Dick) Winters of the Mohave County Miner. Waters, who was very influential, promised all the support he could give and subsequently discussed the Johnson candidacy with several state legislators. Brinegar called regents Bentson and Dunseath, Superintendent Shofstall, and Governor Williams to make the case for Johnson. He contacted Goss through a mutual friend and tried to influence Sharber by having other friends put pressure on him. These efforts met with little success.

In addition to strongly worded editorials Brinegar was operating extensively out of the public view to build support for Johnson. A student of the theological and philosophical doctrines of St. Augustine and a reader of Greek history, Brinegar is a firm believer in the concept of destiny. "At times in my life," he says, "when I believed I was operating according to free will I was actually acting in accordance with destiny." He felt himself to be not only a useful force on the selection scene but an inevitable one as well because, "every action creates an equal and opposite reaction." 63

On Thursday Johnson picked up the editorial support of two more papers. William Misslin, editor and publisher of the Arizona Sun in Flagstaff, republished the Star's December 16 editorial which pointed to the administrative

abilities of Johnson. Osborn's Yuma Daily Sun endorsed Johnson in a front-page editorial which quoted the Wall Street Journal to buttress an argument for a person with administrative capacity. On Friday morning the Republic again quoted the Journal to argue for placing administrative skill in a position of top priority and an earned doctorate in second place. The Republic concluded its appeal by evoking Johnson's positive qualities. "Swede Johnson has proved administrative ability, an unexcelled University of Arizona background, and an ability to get along with people. In our estimation it should take a very highly qualified candidate to win the Regents' nod over Johnson."  

The newspaper campaign was fortified by a spontaneous letter-writing campaign by individuals throughout the state. Hundreds of telegrams and letters poured in addressed to individual regents or the entire board collectively. Many were from influential citizens and friends of the public officials. From a member of the House of Representatives to all board members on December 4:

I would like to extend my support to Marvin "Swede" Johnson. It seems to me that we should have an Arizona man for these positions if one can be found who has the necessary qualifications. In my opinion "Swede" has demonstrated capacity over the

64. Arizona Sun, December 17, 1970.  
past few years to meet a wide variety of emergencies with a common sense approach. I recognize that he does not have the academic background that some feel this position should have; however, I am not convinced that this is necessarily that important. It seems to me that other administrative abilities should have a high priority.

From another Representative to Bradford on December 7:

I am writing on behalf of Mr. Marvin D. Johnson. I have known Mr. Johnson . . . and know him to be an honest, and honorable man as well as an educator. . . .

In your capacity as Chairman of the Committee, I hope you will recommend Mr. Johnson for President of the University of Arizona.

From an executive of a large company to Governor Williams on December 8 (who promised in a covering memo to take the matter up personally):

It is my understanding that the Board of Regents is seeking a president to succeed President Harvill upon his retirement. In my opinion, a very strong candidate is Marvin D. "Swede" Johnson, a man who is in many ways looked upon as a president by the University's constituents when Dr. Harvill is out of town or unavailable.

From a Representative on December 9, to Bradford:

I am writing this letter to request your consideration of Marvin D. Johnson for president of the University of Arizona. . . .

Mr. Johnson showed leadership and moral courage during the student unrest on campus last spring. I personally feel that Mr. Johnson has the capability to handle the presidency of the University of Arizona. Thank you.

From a Representative to Bradford on December 10:

While I do not know any of the other men being considered and fully realize that Mr. Johnson doesn't have all the PhD's and letters that, perhaps,
look well behind someone's name, I do know from
direct and personal experience with Mr. Johnson that
I can recommend him highly as someone who does have
the ability to be the president and who has the re-
spect of both faculty and students. In my opinion,
he has the drive and dedication to make the Univer-
sity of Arizona an even greater university.

From a Representative (to Bradford) on December 11, came an
endorsement of Johnson along with a provocative hint of Bradford's intentions.

You indicated that you were going to try to
see that the Board of Regents appointed new presi-
dents before you had to resign. . . .

I would like to recommend that "Swede"
Johnson be strongly considered to head the U. of A.
I have worked with him over the years and I have
found him to be not only a good administrator, but
also completely honest and not afraid to stand up
and be counted.

From a State Senator to Bradford on December 11:

In regards to the appointment of a new Pres-
ident of the University of Arizona in Tucson, I
would appreciate your support of Mr. Marvin "Swede"
Johnson for that position.

I have been personally acquainted with Mr.
Johnson for approximately twenty years. For the
past six years . . . I have worked very closely with
him on matters concerning the University; such as
appropriations, and many other needs that come
through the legislature for our Universities. I
sincerely believe that it has been largely through
his efforts, as Vice-President, that our University
is of the quality that it is today.

From a Tucson physician to Singer and Paris on December 14:
"Several names are now being considered for the presidency
of the University of Arizona. I personally feel Marvin D.
Johnson will make an excellent choice for this most impor-
tant position. He is a man with all the qualifications."
From a Scottsdale resident to Bentson, Singer, Shofstall, Williams, and Dunseath on December 15:

In a matter currently being considered by the Board of Regents, the selection of a President of the University of Arizona, I urge you to appoint Vice-President Marvin Johnson to that position. I strongly feel that Mr. Johnson's background, experience and dedication will assure the University's continued prominence among the nation's outstanding schools.

A telegram from a Tucson booster to Governor Williams on December 15: "AS AN ALUMNAE (sic) OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA HOPE YOU AND THE REGENTS WILL GIVE DEEPEST CONSIDERATION TO MARVIN JOHNSON FOR OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF THAT UNIVERSITY."

On December 17 the El Paso Alumni Association cast their vote for Johnson and sent the following telegram to Bentson:

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA ALUMNI ASSN OF EL PASO CAST THEIR VOTE FOR SWEDE JOHNSON TO SUCCEED DR HARVILL AS PRESIDENT.

WE NEED THE EXPERIENCE AND PROVEN ABILITY OF A DEDICATED MAN LIKE SWEDE.

WHAT A WONDERFUL THING IT WOULD BE TO KNOW THAT THE UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT WAS AN ALUMNI AND NATIVE OF ARIZONA.

Some of the communications on Johnson's behalf were not as diplomatic. On December 17 Bradford reported some harassment by supporters of the Vice President. "Two or three prominent people in the state have hit a little below the belt," he said. The selection had turned into a "cat and dog fight."67 Bradford had received threats directed at

his future effectiveness in the House of Representatives. The pressure was applied by Johnson backers. He was told by state legislators that if he did not support Johnson he would be totally ineffective as a representative.

Bradford also received endorsements from three members of Arizona's national delegation to the Congress: Republican Senators Barry Goldwater and Paul Fannin, and Democratic Representative Morris K. Udall, whose district contained The University of Arizona. The subject of these endorsements is unknown, although no threats or warnings were involved. Johnson had spoken to Goldwater, a Sigma Chi fraternity brother of his, on an airplane flight to Las Vegas in the fall. He had contacted Udall, a second-fraternity brother, as well. Both indicated they would support Johnson's candidacy. A faculty member at the university contacted Senator Fannin on behalf of Johnson. Fannin indicated that he endorsed Johnson. However, members of the state's congressional delegation were also contacted by Joyner, who sought support for his candidacy, and at least one, Udall, indicated support for Joyner as well.

This torrent of support was matched by growing criticism of Johnson, dismay at open political activity surrounding the selection of a university president, and at least
one trial balloon from the Board of Regents indicating that Johnson was not a viable candidate.\textsuperscript{68}

On December 17, the \textit{Wildcat} editorialized that, "The man chosen to succeed President Harvill should be selected for his academic and administrative qualities and not solely on the basis of past associations, personal influence, promises and exchanges of favor. It is appalling," continued the \textit{Wildcat}, "to see people speak of a candidate's alumni status, his long term service to the University or his familiarity with the state's power structure as the only reasons for his selection as president."\textsuperscript{69} This line of argument, containing thinly veiled opposition to Johnson, was an effective means of rejoinder. The best way to oppose Johnson was not a personal attack on his candidacy or endorsement of another candidate, but a show of indignation that the traditionally proper and widely accepted wisdom of choosing a president quietly was being violated wholesale. The selection process was made to appear insulated and gentlemanly. The \textit{Wildcat} concluded with a show of dismay at the entry of political and nongermane considerations into the process. "It is the regents' job, and the regents' job alone, to

\textsuperscript{68} On December 17 the \textit{Phoenix Gazette} reported an "unidentified regent" as saying that, "Johnson is not likely to become UA president despite strong support from UA alumni."

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Arizona Daily Wildcat}, December 17, 1970.
decide. Neither the alumni, the newspapers, the politicians nor even the students have a right to interfere with this final decision."\textsuperscript{70}

The \textit{Citizen} adopted the same tactic on December 18 in an editorial entitled, "Crass Pressure Unfair to Regents." The editorial, written by Paul McKalip, mentioned the alumni endorsement of Johnson, the two \textit{Star} editorials, and the threats received by Bradford. McKalip wrote that, "the \textit{Citizen} deplores this attempt to invade the regents' domain. The rah-rah effort to stampede the regents into selecting a favored individual cannot be condoned and has to be ignored."\textsuperscript{71}

Neither the \textit{Wildcat} nor the \textit{Citizen} mentioned Johnson's lack of an earned doctorate, the widespread feeling that he would not be popular with the faculty, or the fear that he would continue to look outside the university for support if selected. Rather, the two papers confined themselves to a show of indignation like little girls who cluck their teeth at a boy who comes to Sunday school with mud on his clothes.

One additional mobilization should be parenthetically noted. Despite the activism of the previous year and numerous student attacks on Harvill, the student body took little interest in the selection of his replacement. An effort to convene the students in hearings and thereby enhance the

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Tucson Daily Citizen}, December 18, 1970.
impact on student input into the selection process met with little success. On Tuesday, December 1, the Wildcat announced that open hearings would be held for the next several days at specified times and places so that students could convoke and discuss the qualities they wanted to see in a president. Student body president Eggers appointed a three-member student board to conduct the hearings. But no students appeared and the Wildcat ran a petulant editorial entitled, "Hearings Need People" on Wednesday. The editorial called student participation "vital" and listed two remaining hearing times.\footnote{Arizona Daily Wildcat, December 2, 1970.} Chastised, the student body emitted two members to the meetings. One former student wrote a letter. To nobody's astonishment the students agreed that the "university must be headed by a person who can communicate with students."\footnote{Ibid., December 3, 1970.} On the basis of these hearings Eggers compiled a memorandum which was submitted to the regents for their consideration. The document listed 14 points of discussion in a rambling fashion and included such prolix circumlocutions as: "Mentally aware of the problems of the Southwest and be able empirically and analytically to appraise situations so that resulting resolutions are not formed by former pre-conceived ideologies habitually acquired throughout his career."
The Failure of the Preliminary Coalition in 1970

The real situation on the Board of Regents was inaccurately reported by the press. Members of the board ignored the papers, which were guessing about the manufactured deadlock between Johnson and Zumberge. No such situation existed. In fact, the board had assumed a split personality over the selection but Johnson versus Zumberge was not the issue.

Shortly after Harvill announced his intention to retire he transmitted a list of four candidates to Goss and Bradford. The four names on this list included those of Zumberge and Schaefer. The other two names are not available, but it is known that Zumberge was not rated as first choice. In the words of one regent, "Zumberge was not the man Harvill would have chosen." 74 Harvill was also asked by the regents to give information on inside candidates brought up by the Advisory Committee from files in his office. As a regent on the Selection Committee put it, "Over the years he had developed the reputation of a good judge of character, and we would have been fools not to ask him his opinion he knew." 75

Harvill, however, wished to maintain a statesmanlike and neutral stance in the selection process. He informed

the regents that he was willing to give them his opinions but they would have to come to him. He did favor a speedy selection for unknown reasons. His own selection took less than two months and was facilitated by President McCormick.

At some point early in the fall Bradford had decided to select a successor for Harvill before January 1971 and the appointment of several new board members. Accordingly, Bradford instructed the Advisory Committee to consider only insiders because time considerations made it difficult to gather the necessary references on non-university candidates and proceed through a requisite number of interviews. Bradford was also responsible for instituting the requirement that the university president have an earned doctorate. In both these cases he took action without consulting the full membership of the board. Only Bradford, Goss, Sharber, and Paris were aware of the attempt to restrict the search to insiders, a definite departure from the ASU selection procedure which was the model. In the spring, when the rest of the board became aware that Bradford had restricted the Advisory Committee essentially to the consideration of UA candidates the restriction was eased. The requirement of an earned doctorate was also dropped because it was felt that Johnson had been prematurely scuttled by Bradford and deserved serious consideration. Bradford also apked to Gegenheimer who then secured an Advisory Committee endorsement of Zumberge.
The situation on December 18, the day of the regents' executive session, was this. On the agenda was a report on the newly revised Code of Conduct by Dunseath, who had been working with a faculty committee to iron out differences of opinion on the wording and intent of the document. The meeting was held to discuss the code and the selection of a new University of Arizona president was not formally on the agenda either Friday or Saturday. Bradford, however, had notified Zumberge that the decision was to be made. Accordingly, Zumberge traveled to Phoenix with his wife and stood by for the announcement.

That evening at the regents' meeting, Bradford interrupted Dunseath as he was about to begin a lengthy report on the conduct code to ask if he could "bring something up." Dunseath yielded and Bradford, in the words of one regent who was there, "brought in several people to extoll the virtues of Zumberge," including Harvill and Dean Rhodes.76 Ultimately Bradford moved for a vote on Zumberge's selection but some of the other regents expressed displeasure and dissatisfaction with the unexpected suddenness of the move. The ASU selection had only been finalized within the past 30 days and no time had been available for the regents to work on The University of Arizona selection. Faced with obvious

76. Rhodes had come in place of Gegenheimer, whom Bradford had invited as a representative of the faculty. Quotations are from an anonymous interview, March 13, 1973.
dissatisfaction and unwillingness to act, Goss made a motion to postpone the selection and five regents (Dunseath, Christie, Bentson, Singer, and Williams) raised their hands indicating they wanted to wait. Bentson, for example, stated that he would probably vote for Zumberge someday but he thought more time was necessary. Another dissenter said simply: "Bradford thought he had a railroad going but he forgot to count his votes."  

At the conclusion of the vote Bradford excused himself and left the room to telephone Zumberge.

Why did such a disjointed effort to appoint Zumberge take place on the Board of Regents? One regent referred to Bradford as "the head of the Zumberge campaign" and attributed the incident to "excessive egoism."  

Another echoed this by saying that, "one member of the board wanted to be responsible for naming the new presidents and, therefore, make them indebted to him."  

Still another explained that the problems were caused by "a clash of personalities."  

Aside from Bradford's activity, board members advance two additional factors which contributed to the difficulty in appointing Zumberge. First, the Phoenix regents (Singer and

77. Ibid.  
Bentson) were upset and felt it was a slight to ASU to name an insider from Arizona while saying that no capable insiders had been in residence at Arizona State. Singer, in particular, favored the selection of outsiders to head organizations in principle. Second, some of the members were rebelling against Harvill's influence over the board during his lame duck year. These members felt Harvill had used his influence on Bradford in an effort to promote Zumberge. Bradford, on the other hand, blamed the failure to appoint Zumberge on his dissenting vote--along with other Democrats and Paris--on the Code of Conduct. He charged that the conduct code majority of September 26 was seeking revenge and would not back Zumberge because the four dissenters on the code were supporting him.

The "Johnson campaign" was not a factor in the failure to select Zumberge as many suspected at the time. The regents were able to slough off successfully the pressure of Johnson supporters. It was, in the words of one Zumberge supporter, "never really bothersome." 81 During the fall, moreover, no more than two regents supported Johnson's candidacy and only one of them gave his full support. The prevailing feeling on the board was that Johnson did not have the necessary academic credentials and that a faculty backlash might damage the university if he were appointed. Such

81. Ibid.
feelings were academic in any case since selection was not imminent and Bradford was unable to orchestrate a successful campaign to catapult Zumberge to the presidency.

At the regents' public meeting on Saturday, December 19, the board unanimously approved the appointment of Dr. John W. Schwada, Chancellor of the University of Missouri since 1964, to be the new President of Arizona State University. Bradford, angered by the failure to choose a UA head went on to say that the full board had turned down the recommendation of its selection committee, which had voted four to one to name Zumberge immediately to the presidency. The sole dissenting vote on the committee was that of Singer, said Bradford, and in favor were Bradford himself, Sharber, Goss, and Paris.

At this juncture Dunseath interrupted Bradford to say that the regents had only intended to delay the appointment and that the vote was not an anti-Zumberge vote. It had been over the issue of whether to make an immediate appointment or take later action in filling the post. Singer added that he had no objection to Zumberge. "We have no opposition to Zumberge," he said, "He is a man of sterling character. But we took 17 months to choose a president at ASU. Why don't we wait and take a look around outside?"82

He warned that it would be wise to avoid "unseemly haste" in finding a replacement for Harvill.

Goss then indicated The University of Arizona Advisory Committee had unanimously endorsed Zumberge and accused the board majority of not supporting him. "Mr. Goss, that's unfair," Dunseath replied. "There was no name mentioned and we did not vote on the issue of Zumberge," he said. Regent Bentson agreed that no formal vote had been taken on the question of naming Zumberge. At this point, with the bickering showing no signs of quieting down on its own, Governor Williams interrupted the others and said, "I propose that we refrain from argument on this point because we could do irreparable damage to reputations. I suggest we move on."

Bradford concluded the discussion by reading a statement from Zumberge which Zumberge had given him on the phone the night before. In his statement, Zumberge said he would not submit his name in nomination again and that if he was considered it would be at the instigation of the regents. "The Arizona Board of Regents," he concluded, "will be reconstituted after January 1, 1971 and a new presidential selection committee will be formed. I believe that the new

84. Ibid.
selection committee ought to feel perfectly free in assembling its own list of candidates for the president. . . . "

Goss dissolved the old Presidential Selection Committee of himself, Bradford, Sharber, Paris, and Singer. Sharber, the newly elected board president empaneled a new committee consisting of Bentson as chairman, Sharber as an ex officio member, and Christy, Dunseath, and Singer. With the appointment of this new committee the so-called "second go-around" began.

Reaction to the abortive selection was mixed. Many members of the university community, unaware of the true nature of the board's action, did not believe that the regents had only wanted to postpone selection. Johnson and Zumberge supporters were prone to blame the "other side" for their man's failure to be selected. Zumberge's supporters felt that the political pressure of the "Johnson Campaign" had been the downfall of their favorite, that the regents were unable to appoint him because his effectiveness would have been compromised with alumni, the political and business communities, and the press. Johnson supporters, who had been led to believe that their man was on the verge of

85. According to the testimony of his friends, Zumberge was upset by the course of events. "Zumberge wanted to be President," one said. "He wanted it so bad he could taste it. But he was not committed to the U of A; he was committed to success. He had a tremendous ego which was bruised when he was not chosen. At that point the feeling was that he would soon leave to become a university president elsewhere." Anonymous interview, December 14, 1972.
being selected pointed to a last minute push by Bradford and behind-the-scenes machinations by President Harvill as costing Johnson the job. Rumors were rife that there had been secret meetings between Bradford and Harvill in out-of-the-way places, that Harvill had intervened at the last minute and talked Governor Williams out of appointing Johnson, and that Harvill had been laying the groundwork for Zumberge's selection for a long time. Such rumors gained strength from the fact that Harvill and Johnson were not on friendly terms. In fact, it is correct that Harvill took steps to downgrade the Johnson candidacy.

On several occasions in the fall of 1970 and the spring of 1971 Harvill attempted to build opposition to Johnson. One influential faculty member at the university had several conversations with Harvill on the telephone and in person. Harvill argued that if Johnson were president the intellectual life of the university would suffer, many faculty members might leave, and his work would be undone. "After talking to Dick," he said, "I became more active in attempting to point up the shortcomings of Johnson."\(^8\)

An administrator at the university, after having talked to Harvill about his support for Johnson reported the feeling that, "he had been warning me to stay out of the way."\(^7\)


In such ways as this, Harvill had been working against Johnson. In fact, his compulsion for such action indicated a possible misreading of the intentions of the regents. Harvill did not actively support Zumberge, perhaps because he knew his support would be ineffectual with the regents, perhaps out of a feeling that some claim to neutrality should remain in face of his anti-Johnson activities. But at the time it appeared that being against Johnson meant being for Zumberge.

The preliminary coalition established on the Advisory Committee and the regents' Selection Committee proved insufficiently inclusive to be viable in the face of an expanded electorate. Bradford's attempt to ratify and formalize this coalition by a formal vote of the full board met with failure because the Republican membership of the board—an important element in an electoral coalition—had been excluded from the process which led to coalition formation. In addition, the mobilization of new groups had magnified conflict surrounding the selection of the UA president. The storm of controversy surrounding the Johnson and Zumberge candidacies was unprecedented in the experience of members of the board and made the majority cautious. By the end of December no candidate would have been completely satisfactory to all the constituent groups of the university.
Stage III--Preliminary Coalition Formation (1971)

The renewed presidential selection effort that the regents embarked on in 1971 became known as the "second go-around." The December meeting was tacitly accepted as a break with all that had preceeded it and impending changes in the membership of the board made observers cautious about predicting what would transpire. A new start at coalition building was essential. This could not be accomplished until Johnson supporters demobilized. To this end, faculty members attempted to police the process by attacking support for Johnson in the press and Bentson, chairman of the reconstituted Selection Committee, ultimately became tight-lipped about progress and cut off the flow of information regarding progress. Without concrete information that their interests were at stake the supportive external audiences--the press, the state legislature, the political community, and the alumni association--could only advance philosophical justification for their participation in the selection of the new president. Such justification became difficult because these groups had so closely associated their interests with that of a candidate. All efforts to participate in the process were viewed by university constituent groups as attempts to further the Johnson candidacy and rejected.

The Tucson newspapers both editorialized on the failure to select. The Citizen ran an editorial entitled,
"A Wise Delay" in which it argued that, "Whatever the reason for the delay, the regents made a wise decision to resist pressures to make an immediate appointment. . . ." The way was now clear, it said, "for the regents to also look for a UA president among out-of-state possibilities." Several days later the Star printed another editorial which, without mentioning Johnson by name, made it clear that the paper had no intention of discontinuing its support for him.

The discussion over the University of Arizona presidency brought into the open the subject which had its sore points on both sides. Particularized, it is, "Should the University of Arizona president have a Ph.D.?"

The Town and Gown have always needed to recognize each other's values. Each works for the other. Tucson has come long leagues toward true compatibility between the campus and the community. What insularism is left in either sector is trivial. A feeling of awe toward either mere money or mere academic degree is unworthy; but respect for achievement should and can be present in every intelligent mind.

The following day, December 28, the Republic suggested editorially that Johnson be appointed as an interim president. Saying that, "it was obvious . . . that the governing board was being whiplashed by the U of A alumni, who want Marvin 'Swede' Johnson to get the job, and the faculty, which is supporting James H. Zumberge," the paper suggested an "apprenticeship" for Johnson.

One current suggestion deserves consideration by the regents. Since the principal objection to Swede Johnson seems to be his lack of a Ph.D., why not appoint him on an interim basis, say for two or three years, and allow him to set up an academic staff and turn his many other talents to the broad problems of university administration?90

Brinegar again entered the editorial arena on January 3 to present "The Facts in the Case," an editorial which purported to expose a "vicious and malicious personal campaign aimed at Mr. Johnson because he does not have a Ph.D. degree." The leaders of this campaign were not identified but, according to Brinegar, they "ignored his administrative talents, his long dealings with the Arizona Legislature, his intimate knowledge of the state, his outstanding character and his many civic activities."91 The following day radio station KTKT ran a radio editorial in which disk jockey Phil Richardson praised the assets of Johnson and encouraged citizens to write to the Board of Regents asking for his appointment.

This cascade of continued support for Johnson inspired the same kind of opposition it had in the past. Professor Clifford M. Lytle, Chairman of the Department of Government, wrote a letter attacking the Star's continued editorial support of Johnson. This letter was printed in the Star on January 3 and reprinted later in the Citizen and

Zumberge's friend and colleague, Laurence Gould, also wrote a letter taking the state's press to task for its irresponsibility in interfering with the selection process. Gould's letter was published on January 14 in the Citizen, less than a week after Lytle's letter appeared, and was prefaced by an editorial attacking the Star's "fanatical drive" for Johnson. Both Lytle and Gould called for a selection process insulated from non-academic pressures and emphasized the university's urgent need for a leader with outstanding academic credentials. Once again, the attack on Johnson was veiled behind the rhetoric of propriety in presidential selection. In addition to the attacks on Johnson and the Star by university faculty members, the Wildcat on January 6 blasted the state's papers for supporting Johnson and doing "a grave disservice to this school."

By mid-January, however, the controversy in the press had abated. It would not rise again, partly because Brinegar had come to the conclusion that his support of Johnson was doing more harm than good. Another reason for the death of open controversy was a shortage of public announcements from the regents about their progress.

94. Arizona Daily Wildcat, January 7, 1971
On December 29 the new Selection Committee chairman, Bentson, had announced that the regents would give more consideration to out-of-state candidates. "This does not mean that the U of A candidates don't have a chance," he said; "three are still being considered. We may review people interviewed for the ASU presidency. There were three or four who withdrew their names during the interviewing process. They might be more inclined to accept the U of A post, feeling that it is a more prestigious position."  

On January 5 Bentson reported to the *Wildcat* that his selection committee would be interested in a man with "certain qualifications such as a man young enough to stay at the university for 12 to 15 years, a man with experience, a doctorate, administrative experience and the qualities you normally look for, such as public speaking ability, and appearance." Bentson also said he did not know if the board would name a campus advisory group and, if so, whether the same groups would be used again. This was the last public announcement made by Bentson until mid-February when he broke a five-week silence.

While controversy in the press continued to boil over during the first several weeks after the abortive effort to appoint Zumberge, the regent's committee worked

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quietly to get the derailed selection process moving. Their goal was to appoint a new president before Harvill retired in June.

The board had one vacancy. Bentson, the new chairman, had been reappointed by Governor Williams on January 6 to a full eight-year term. The same day Williams also announced the appointment of Sidney S. Woods of Yuma to the board position left vacant by the retirement of Wesley P. Goss. The people of Yuma have traditionally been represented on the board and since Bradford of Yuma was retiring Woods was an appropriate selection. A produce grower, Woods had graduated from The University of Arizona with an education degree in 1939 and in 1958 had served as President of the Alumni Association. He had been active in Republican party politics by managing William's campaign in Yuma County, working on Senator Fannin's campaigns, serving as a delegate to the 1964 Republican National Convention, and chairing the Yuma County Central Republican Committee. Woods was also a good friend of Marvin D. Johnson. He immediately involved himself in the selection process and attended meetings of the regents' Selection Committee in the spring. Williams still had not appointed anyone to fill out the two remaining years of Bradford's second term.

Sometime during the month of January a decision was made by the regents to expand the campus committee. This decision may have been made at the request of the old
committee. That committee convened on January 7 to discuss events of the past month and prospects for the future. The members expressed disappointment and surprise that the regents had turned down Zumberge. Not knowing the full story of what had happened they found it difficult to understand why, as one member put it, "the full board would turn down the recommendation of the faculty committee and its own selection committee." 97 Another said that, "the committee was never really disappointed that he was not chosen, but we were frustrated because we had to go through the process again." 98 Some speculated that the regents might have been afraid of Zumberge because he was such a decisive man and were worried that he would become too independent of them. A faculty member remarked: "Keep in mind that we were all green. None of us had any experience with selecting presidents." 99

There was also some bitterness toward Brinegar for his editorials and anger with Johnson. With the exception of O'Dowd, who was pressured by alumni groups around the country, the members had not been contacted on behalf of Johnson. But they remained incensed by what they felt was interference in the process on his part. Additionally, there was minor bitterness toward Bradford and other regents for leaking

confidential information—particularly their endorsement of Zumberge on December 4. Before the meeting adjourned Gegenheimer tentatively voiced the thought that the committee should resign because its effectiveness had been compromised. Other members disagreed and the decision was made to request appointment of several more members with wide outside contacts in the academic world and unimpeachable reputations.

The board ultimately appointed five additional members—all faculty—to the committee. They were: Dr. Frances Gillmor, Professor of English; Dr. Emil H. Haury, Riecker Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and the occupant of the only endowed chair at the university; Dr. Reuben G. Gustavson, advisor to Harvill, Professor-emeritus of Chemistry, and former president of the University of Colorado; Dr. Maurice M. Kelso, Professor of Agricultural Economics; and Dr. Carl S. Marvel, a chemist with world-wide stature. These individuals were elder statesmen of the university. They restored the committee's credibility because they were respected and distinguished.

The new group met with the old on February 4 for an orientation session and the old members reviewed the events of the previous semester for the benefit of the newly appointed members. There was some discussion of the future of the university, the role of the president, and criteria for his selection, but most of the briefing centered around the names of particular candidates and the conclusions the
committee had reached about them in the fall. It was
decided, however, to begin discussions anew and start with a
clean slate. The cloistered confines of the committee room
were again available for debates leading to consensus and
coalition formation. The regents had removed the prohibi­
tion against consideration of the names of Johnson and Joyner
and the requirement for an earned doctorate was no longer on
the regents' list. They had requested the faculty to explore
possible candidates outside, as well as inside the university
and report to the regents' committee when a list of names had
been gathered.

In the meantime, Johnson's search for an honorary
degree bore fruit. It was announced by Johnson that he would
receive an honorary doctorate in education from Lincoln Col­
lege in Lincoln, Illinois. Lincoln College, established as
Lincoln University in 1865, lost its four-year program and
reverted to a junior college in 1929 by order of the Illinois
State Legislature. It did not suffer revocation of its uni­
versity privileges, however, and was legally competent to
bestow an honorary degree. Dr. Raymond Dooley, president of
the college, was contacted by the local papers and asked why
Johnson had been chosen to receive a degree. "The qualifica­
tions for the recipients are not really definite," he said,
"they're just given to men who are distinguished in their
field. We've known Dr. Johnson for some time and admired his
work, and his lifetime service to the university, and particularly his interest in students."\textsuperscript{100}

Dooley, who was a friend of Johnson, had been contacted by some of Johnson's Sigma Chi fraternity brothers as part of a calculated attempt to further his candidacy. Dooley came to Tucson during the Christmas vacation and had lunch with Johnson and his wife. Shortly afterwards, Johnson received a letter from the trustees of Lincoln College offering him a degree. He accepted and the degree was conferred along with four others at the school's annual Founder's Day convocation on Sunday, February 6.

Intent on continuing his quest for an appointment to a presidential commission, Johnson also returned to Washington, D.C. during February. This time he had lunch with William Muramoto who had been alumni director at Whittier College when Johnson was alumni director at Arizona. He explained the situation to Muramoto. Muramoto called him back at his hotel the following day to say that an appointment was coming up but he would need letters of recommendation from Goldwater, Fannin, and Federal Communications Commission Chairman Dean Burch, a prominent Arizona Republican (and former partner in regent Dunseath's law firm). Johnson secured these recommendations but did not hear from Washington immediately.

On February 11, Governor Williams filled the remaining vacancy on the Board of Regents with the appointment of John A. Lentz of Douglas, a vice president of Phelps-Dodge Corporation. Williams chose to remain within tradition and appoint a regent associated with the copper mining industry to replace the retiring Wesley Goss of Magma Copper. Lentz had been working closely with the governor on the problem of pollution from Phelps Dodge smelters at the time of the appointment. He was an alumnus of The University of Arizona, having gotten a B.S. in mining engineering in 1933. He had received The University of Arizona Alumni Achievement Award in 1969.101

The Advisory Committee met on February 11, 18, and 23 to discuss candidates. Their charge was to examine names given to them by the regents, gather information, and select approximately 10 for the regents to consider seriously. They were, of course, allowed to raise the names of candidates themselves and, in the end, most of the names considered came from the faculty. Discussions were not restricted to outside candidates and all those inside candidates who had been

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101. The Republic reported on February 11 that Williams had been "receiving pressure from many directions for the last remaining appointment on the . . . board this year." Republican State Chairman Harry Rosenzweig, his brother, Newton Rosenzweig, and Lawson V. Smith, Consulting Professor in the UA College of Business and former vice president of Mountain Bell, were mentioned as possible candidates for the position.
considered in the fall were once again considered, although Zumberge would not allow his name to be formally put into consideration.

These and subsequent meetings were very informal. Few formal votes were taken and there was an atmosphere of free give-and-take in the discussions. No cliques or factions ever formed on the committee and no personal antagonisms marred the proceedings. Relations between the faculty and regents were also informal. There were no firm or inflexible rules. Once again, Gegenheimer performed the liaison work.

There was some early concern on the committee that the regents would not take them seriously because, in the words of one member, the regents "were rather far removed from educational considerations and non-academically oriented." These early fears were allayed as meetings progressed and the regents seemed interested in their progress. One of the specific reasons for mistrust of the regents was that early in the year they handed down some names for consideration which the committee "was not too happy about." There were several such names of men who "agreed with the regents' philosophical views" and were "conservative in their educational outlooks."102 The individuals' records were studied with extreme care so that valid and indisputable  

reasons for rejecting them could be found. The faculty was also afraid that the regents were still interested in Johnson.

Despite informal relations with the regents and independent deliberations, the Advisory Committee was determined not to make another error. They decided not to rank the candidates they selected for further consideration by the regents, but rather to list them alphabetically. The faculty would not confront the board with one or two names and appear dogmatic and inflexible in their support. The committee was not worried about faculty support of a new president even if the regents did not choose a name recommended to them because they never intended to make their list public. This resolve was not weakened in the spring and no names ever surfaced as favorites either in the press or through word of mouth.

On February 13, the regents convened in Tempe for their regular monthly meeting and the Selection Committee met in executive session Friday the 12th. After this meeting, Bentson revealed that the regents' committee was considering 20 to 25 applications with only "three to five" from Arizona.103 He observed that approximately 200 universities throughout the country were looking for new presidents and several names had been withdrawn already because these

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individuals had found other jobs. The regents had written to about 30 university presidents asking them to recommend names earlier in the year. The lists that came back were composed mostly of second-in-command vice presidents and others who would be prepared to assume a presidency. These men were seriously considered for two reasons. First, it was a seller's market. Second, the regents were restricted in the salary they could offer the UA president. Some proposed candidates were already presidents of sizable universities and were making $50 or $60 thousand a year along with a house and a car. It was felt they would not want to come to Arizona for the $39,500 that could be offered.

The Advisory Committee met on March 2, 9, 16, and 18 in preparation for a meeting with the regents. It had the specific task of looking over approximately 100 names submitted by professors, regents, its own membership, and candidates themselves. Out of this list of 100, only 30 to 35 men were ever seriously considered and the members adopted the terminology of "front burner," "back burner," and "off the stove" to represent varying degrees of interest in the candidates.

During the February and March meetings no new UA names emerged, but a number of outside candidates were considered. Some who received passing consideration were:

William D. Carlson, President of the University of Wyoming; Philip Hoffman, President of the University of Houston; William H. Peterson, an economist and Chairman of United States Steel's Finance Committee; John Snyder, Professor of History at Westmount College in Santa Barbara, California; and Robert Olds, President of Kent State University.

Some candidates who received at least "back burner" consideration were Robert H. Maier, former UA Professor of Agriculture and an Assistant Dean at the University of Wisconsin at Green Bay; William Pritchard, nationally prominent Dean of the School of Veterinary Medicine at the University of California at Davis; Chet McCorkle, Executive Vice President of the University of California; Daniel Aldrich, Chancellor of the University of California at Irvine and U of A alumnus who had received the Alumni Association's Achievement Award in 1970; Edgar F. Shannon, President of the University of Virginia; Clifford M. Hardon, Chancellor of the University of Nebraska; John Cantlon, Provost of Michigan State University; and Joseph R. Hartley, Vice President and Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of Indiana.

These individuals were all thought to be worthy of serious attention but for a variety of reasons each was eliminated. McCorkle had just moved up to his vice

president's post after having served as Provost at the University of California at Davis and felt a moral obligation to stay in his present position longer. Aldrich was difficult to locate and when Advisory Committee member Kelso finally reached him on the telephone in Manila in the middle of an around-the-world trip he declined consideration because he was touched by scandal and had a bad letter of recommendation. One man nominated by Gustavson, foundation president Joseph L. Fisher of Resources for the Future in Washington, D.C., was vetoed by the regents because his age—56—was one year over the limit.

Ultimately, the faculty pruned down the list until four serious candidates emerged as top contenders. These were: Dees, who had been considered in the fall; Bryce Jordan, Acting President of the University of Texas at Austin, who had been interviewed twice by the regents for the ASU position; Howard R. Neville, former President of Claremont Men's College and at that time Vice Chancellor of Business and Finance at the University of Nebraska; and James A. Robinson, Vice President for Academic Affairs at Ohio State University. Each of these men would subsequently be brought in for interviews by regents and faculty, with the exception of Jordan who was having appropriations problems with the Texas legislature and did not feel he could leave for an interview—although he evidently felt he could leave permanently.
The inside candidates considered by the Advisory Committee during these sessions provoked more controversy. Zumbarge still had strong support. Several members of the committee thought he was charismatic, distinguished, and ideal material for the presidency. DuVal was once again contacted but continued to deny interest. Brief attention was given to the candidacies of Thompson, Ares, Joyner, and Johnson, but there was little strength on the committee for any of them. Thompson was viewed as a reluctant candidate and had little support. This was not a matter of negative feelings toward him but other good candidates existed. Ares was early rejected as a serious candidate because it was felt he might not be acceptable to the legislature or the regents. Some members of the committee would have liked to advance his candidacy but even they conceded he was too "radical." Although Joyner was never a serious candidate he was, according to one member, "discussed at more than cursory length." Some members considered his political involvement to be an asset since he was a Republican in a heavily Republican state, but his lack of administrative experience weighed heavily against him. By mutual agreement Joyner's name was dropped because, like Ares, it was shared opinion

106. It is perhaps a valid supposition that as late as April 7, 1971 the Board of Regents would have named DuVal had his name still been available. It was not.

that his candidacy was "unrealistic." Johnson, of course, was not a viable candidate at all. The members felt "very resentful" of his actions and abhorred the attempt to manipulate and railroad both themselves and the regents that they perceived in his earlier actions.

Provost Weaver's name, which had been struck in the fall, was reinstated in the spring. One of his most outspoken advocates was Richard Kassander, who argued mightily for him and was fond of saying: "To know him is to love him." A basic objection to Weaver, however, was that while he was well known to everyone on the committee and was felt to have the objective qualities, his personality, in the words of one member, "was not warm enough to qualify him for the presidency." It was felt, said another, that "he did not have the warmth and charisma necessary for good personal relations with, for example, a visiting group of legislators, and the student body." He was said to project an impression of distance and aloofness although his underlying nature was not felt to be cool at all by those who knew him well. For this reason Weaver's name was eventually struck and he was not the serious candidate in the spring that he had been in the fall.

The remaining inside candidate, Liberal Arts Dean Schaefer, had been dropped from consideration sometime in the fall and was not immediately reinstated. There was firm consensus on the committee that at 36 he was too young. He had only been a dean for a year and was administratively immature. They preferred an experienced combatant who had been through a few incidents of conflict involving all the varied constituencies of the university. They wanted to know how the prospect handled himself under pressure. There was agreement that Schaefer was young, eager, and ambitious. With several more years' administrative experience he would leave to become a university president elsewhere. This would be a regrettable loss of a fine, young administrator but his selection in 1971 would be premature. Schaefer, however, was discussed at length because he had forceful support from Gustavson. It was eventually decided to report to the regents that Schaefer was an acceptable candidate.

On March 19 the Advisory Committee met with the regents. The precise agenda of this joint meeting is unknown but some discussion of personalities took place as the regents and faculty compared names and tried to narrow down the field. Either at this meeting or through Gegenheimer later in the month the faculty presented the regents with a list of seven names. This list was alphabetical and the regents were told that it represented a panel of candidates,
each of whom was acceptable to the Advisory Committee. The names on the list were: Dees, Jordan, Neville, Robinson, Schaefer, Weaver, and Zumberge.

Throughout the month of March Bentson had issued several guarded statements about progress. On March 3 he said, "We are still considering about 25 candidates including three or four from Arizona. We can't begin private interviews until the field has been narrowed to about ten—it's too time consuming and costly a process. I've communicated with them only by phone or letter."111 On March 6, Bentson said, "It is not as easy as I thought it was going to be but I hope to have a final candidate soon enough to avoid an interrum president or asking Dr. Harvill to stay on a little longer."112 On March 31, however, Bentson announced that the field had been narrowed to eight and that qualifications were to be reviewed at the regents' Phoenix meeting the next day. It was hoped that the list could be narrowed to four. Bentson refused to reveal names because the situation was "very touchy."113

The eight names under consideration were the names of the faculty panel plus the name of Vice President Johnson. The Citizen, however, reported the next day that "UA men


known to be under consideration include Johnson, Zumberge, and Ares. 114 On hearing this report Ares, who realized he was not being seriously evaluated, again considered issuing a denial to the press. He was convinced that his name was being used by the Advisory Committee to convince the university community that a wide range of possibilities on an ideological spectrum was being considered. He decided not to but continued to regard the use of his name as a ploy.

At their April 1 meeting the regents either failed to narrow down the list, never had any intention of doing so, or decided not to try to narrow it down. After the meeting Bentson announced that all eight candidates were still in the running and they and their wives would be called in for interviews in the near future. Bentson said he hoped to have a decision within 30 days.

Ultimately, three out-of-state candidates came to Tucson for interviews. Neville was interviewed by the regents on April 7, given a campus tour and interviewed by members of the Advisory Committee on April 8. Dees was interviewed by the regents on April 8 and given a campus tour and interviewed by the Advisory Committee on April 9. Robinson was interviewed by the regents on April 12, given a campus tour and interviewed by the Advisory Committee on April 13. President Harvill was asked to brief them and show them the

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president's house (unoccupied at the time). In addition to the three outsiders, the regents also interviewed three insiders: Schaefer on April 9, Johnson on April 13, and Zum-berge on April 13.

The regent interviews were conducted in the board room of Tucson Federal Savings and Loan Association in downtown Tucson. They were lengthy and where they lasted through the morning the candidate was taken to lunch by the regents at the Old Pueblo Club upstairs in the Tucson Federal Savings building. When the candidates came from out of town their wives accompanied them and they dined with the regents, Gegenheimer, O'Dowd, and their wives at the Skyline Country Club overlooking the city.

On a large chart-like sheet presided over by Dunseath the regents kept a succinct record of the candidates' characteristics with respect to certain criteria. The categories of evaluation were: (1) availability, (2) age, (3) academic background, (4) steps (indication of how present position was reached), (5) administrative background, (6) public relations (an evaluation of the candidate's personality), (7) reputation and family connections, (8) legislative relationships and fundraising ability, and (9) wife as hostess (included children and their ages).
Although the regents conducted six interviews, the faculty only interviewed the out-of-state candidates. The interviews, which were held in the regents' meeting room on the university campus, lasted for several hours or more. They were entirely unstructured and directed toward determining whether the candidate was open-minded and flexible in his thinking. One member of the committee tried to explain what they sought: "We were looking for a firmness which wasn't authoritarian, flexibility did not mean wishy-washy. We were looking for someone who was not doctrinaire in outlook. We didn't want someone who said the university should absolutely grow or not grow to 50,000."^116

A wide variety of questions were asked. Gegenheimer was fond of asking what the candidate would do in hypothetical situations like campus riots. Kelso and Kassander asked questions about the role of research versus teaching. O'Dowd, the alumni representative, always asked about the presidential contender's views on athletics. Rhodes' queries revolved around the importance of graduate education. He attempted to get the interviewee into a dialogue with himself and others. Haury asked questions regarding the president's obligation to

115. During the entire year of selection the Advisory Committee never interviewed any of the UA candidates. It was felt they were already well known and understood. If members had questions they sought out the man individually to talk to him. O'Dowd, for example, had never met Weaver and went to see him in his office during the fall.

consult with faculty members. Paylore asked questions about the man's views on the woman's liberation movement and professional relations between the sexes. She sometimes startled candidates by simply asking: "What kind of person are you?" Marvel asked very few questions, preferring to sit back and watch how the man handled himself in his relations with the others. Sometimes the candidates were asked substantive questions about their academic disciplines.

Both Neville and Robinson made strong presentations and both had staunch supporters when the interviews were completed. Neville had impressed the faculty with ideas about organizationally altering the university along the lines of a cluster college but told them he had stepped down at Claremont and gone to Nebraska because he was a reluctant college president. Robinson impressed the committee with proposals to reform the university along the more hierarchical lines of universities such as the University of Wisconsin at Green Bay. Many committee members thought he was the most impressive of all the candidates, although O'Dowd felt he was not physically tall enough to be an imposing figure as president.

Dees' interview was not as successful and he left a bewildered and disappointed committee in his wake. Although he was among old friends he appeared to be nervous. He gave a more or less structured interview which the faculty did
not like. At one point he literally pulled a notebook from his pocket and referred to notes made prior to the interview. He summarized the problems and needs of the university and did not appear to have the flexible frame of mind that the committee was looking for. After the interview, the committee agreed that a president should be more agile, mentally well-rehearsed, and able to think more quickly on his feet. Some committee members felt that he had an off day, but one faculty member who knew Dees well was not caught completely off-guard by the performance. "Dees was a man of great, thorough hesitation," he said. "He wanted to explore every alternative before making a decision. On faculty committees he made members do it with the result that sometimes decisions came too late. He wasn't used to the type of quick decision-making on scanty or incomplete information that the presidency required."\textsuperscript{117}

On April 15 the Advisory Committee convened by itself for the final time to discuss the recommendations it would make to the regents the following day. After some discussion the members agreed that, in alphabetical order, Neville, Robinson, Schaefer, and Zumberge were individuals who would be satisfactory presidents.\textsuperscript{118} This preliminary coalition was announced on April 16 when the committee met with the regents.

\textsuperscript{117} Anonymous interview, December 14, 1972.

At that time Bentson announced that the Advisory Committee list of four was identical to the list the regents preferred.

**Stage IV--Final Coalition Formation**

This stage of the process of leadership selection involves the cementing of the preliminary coalition formed in Stage III and the ratification of widespread consent on the new leadership from the entire spectrum of constituent groups involved in the selection process. This process is usually shorter than the processes involved in other stages. For example, the process of coalition forming in American presidential politics lasts a year or more while the actual balloting takes only one day at the polls and two days at most for the electoral college.

The mechanism utilized for finalizing the coalition at The University of Arizona was a vote by the Board of Regents. The board had the formal authority to make the selection and once it voted the coalition was given the sanction of law. The procedure was short.

The regents went around the table and asked each member of the group to speak his mind about the candidates. Most of the committee felt that Schaefer was too young but if it came right down to it he was acceptable. Gustavson, however, rose and talked very vigorously in favor of Schaefer. One committee member felt his speech was effective.
He talked long past the point where he had made his point and went on at the risk of talking too long and alienating his listeners. He called Schaefer a "sleeper" and said he would be an outstanding university president some day. They (the regents) seemed impressed.¹¹⁹

After hearing out the campus committee the regents voted. Following a preliminary vote it became obvious that Schaefer had overwhelming support and he was elected president unanimously.

Why was Schaefer selected? A number of factors contributed to his appeal to the Board of Regents. First, his track record at the U of A had been outstanding. As Chairman of the Department of Chemistry between 1968 and 1970 he effectively put an end to personality conflicts within the department. Although he had been Liberal Arts Dean for only a short time his administrative ability had already begun to reveal itself. During the course of the year, in fact, over 30 department heads in the Liberal Arts College had signed a letter testifying to his competence as dean and forwarded it to Gegenheimer. The regents were particularly impressed by the fact that Schaefer had instituted a program of student evaluations of faculty members. In addition, he compared favorably to Zumberge, who was also touted by the faculty as a good administrator. Said one regent, "Zumberge was

president of a college of 1,200 students. So what? Schaefer had 10,000."\(^{120}\)

Second, Schaefer had proper academic credentials. He had published a number of scholarly papers and taught courses in the humanities as well as his specialty—chemistry.\(^{121}\) He expressed a commitment to intellectual excellence at The University of Arizona. The regents also appreciated that Schaefer had a background in the physical sciences. One of the Republican regents, for example, "felt more comfortable with a hard scientist than a philosophy man or political scientist," because, "all the liberals are in philosophy and political science."

Third, Schaefer was enthusiastic about improving the UA athletic program. Although the majority of regents did not emphasize this Dunseath and Woods felt very strongly about the matter and preferred a man with a desire to see the school excel in that area.\(^{122}\)

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122. Immediately following the announcement of Schaefer's selection he made a number of statements about improving the athletic program. Sportswriters hailed him as a breakthrough for the UA sports program. It was widely assumed that the regents had imposed a commitment upon him as a condition of his hiring. Alumni Association President Hugh Harelson, for example, later wrote that, "Some members of the Board of Regents, heeding the will of the alumni,
Finally, two less tangible factors may have contributed to the selection of Schaefer. His relative youthfulness compared to the other candidates might have become less of a liability after Harvard appointed Derek Bok, 40, as its 25th president in December, 1970. This may have made it acceptable to look to younger men throughout the country since the Ivy League schools' influence established practice in higher education by example. One reason is that public universities are under political pressure and are reluctant to undertake actions which may be controversial. Ivy League schools, on the other hand, cannot easily damage their reputations. They are freer to take actions which cross old barriers and make these actions respectable in the process. The selection of Bok, therefore, might have removed some of the uneasiness of appointing a younger man to the high office. Moreover, relative youthfulness was an asset in student relations and residual fears of student unrest remained in the university community.

He also had little opposition. There was some question about whether the faculty would support Johnson, and

insisted that the new UA president strengthen the athletic program." In Arizona Alumnus, Vol. 69, No. 3 (June 1972), p. 1. It is incorrect to say that Schaefer was told by the regents to build the athletic department. He had an open mandate to do as he wished and chose to take advantage of a favorable climate for improvement. Schaefer's real mandate was to improve the academic quality of the university.
Zumberge's effectiveness was thought to have been compromised by the actions of Johnson supporters and Bradford's December blitzkreig on the board. Other inside candidates had only lukewarm support, but Schaefer's candidacy picked up new backers as committee discussions progressed. He was young and relatively inexperienced administratively but he was competent and had made few enemies. The situation was reminiscent of Lord Bryce's dictum that political parties do not nominate great men for president because they have too many enemies. The prize goes to the man with the fewest debits rather than the most credits.

Before the board met on Saturday, Brinegar was tipped off that Schaefer would be named president and the Star carried the story that morning. Selection Committee chairman Bentson was not present and Christy made the announcement. The revelation of Schaefer's choice was greeted with surprise throughout the university community. Even members of the Advisory Committee were taken aback because they thought the regents would not choose a man so young. One member told his wife not to believe a radio announcement that Schaefer was a favorite candidate. Another received several angry phone calls from friends at the choice of a man so youthful and could not explain why he was chosen. How, it was asked,

could a man in his 30's hold his own with a governing board averaging in the 60's?

In retrospect some committee members felt that the regents had already decided to pick Schaefer by the time of their final meeting. The reaction is probably best summed up by a conciliatory editorial written by Brinegar which appeared in the Star the following day.

Dean John P. Schaefer is an excellent choice for President of the University of Arizona.

The long, tangled and sometimes bitter process of picking a president is over. The past should be dropped.

The friends of Vice President Marvin D. Johnson worked for him devotedly. Primarily they are friends of the University of Arizona.

President-elect Schaefer has an almost unimaginable opportunity ahead of him. He is 36 years old. He has proved himself capable on numerous occasions. He is a warm, personable, practical man who also is resilient, fair, and firm.124

On April 28 Johnson was named one of 15 members of the National Advisory Council on Educational Professions Development. He has remained with the university as have all the other inside candidates with the exception of Zumberge. During the spring Zumberge was considered for the top job at Purdue University but was not selected partly, friends feel, because of the problems he had had with the UA selection. On September 3, however, Zumberge was the

unanimous choice of the Nebraska Board of Regents to become Chancellor of the University of Nebraska. He accepted.

Stage V--Symbolic Legitimation

The last stage of the leadership selection process is the symbolic conferral of sanctioned authority on the new leader. The ritual involved may be elaborate or simple but it universally serves to ratify the winning or dominant coalition of groups and interests which have formed in the leadership succession struggle. The ceremony marks common submission to the person and authority of the fledgling leader.

The formation of a symbolic coalition in the presidential selection process took place during inauguration ceremonies. On October 29, 1971, Schaefer was inaugurated before an audience of 2,000 which included delegates from 500 universities, faculty, students, and alumni. Board of Regents President Norman Sharber placed the "chain of office" around Schaefer's neck, officially symbolizing his leadership of the academic community. Schaefer remarked in a speech that "inaugural ceremonies are the link between the heritage of the past and all of our hopes for the future."125

CHAPTER 7

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA SELECTION REEXAMINED: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There is no such thing as an "average" presidential selection process. The selection of President Schaefer at The University of Arizona took 11 months. Many difficulties were encountered over the duration of a procedure involving participation by trustees, faculty, administrators, students, alumni, politicians, journalists, ordinary citizen-taxpayers and, of course, the candidates themselves. None of the incidents related here are rare enough to be considered extraordinary or bizzare, but the process often takes place in quite different ways and with more or less ease.

In Arizona, for example, the Board of Regents conducted two searches and selections of distinctly different character despite efforts to minimize deviations. The Arizona State University selection was carefully orchestrated from the start and unfolded according to the regents' blueprints with the predictability of simple routine normally reserved for operations of far less complexity. Controversy was reduced to a minimum. At The University of Arizona, however, the "first go-around" in the fall was marked by refractory pressures and finally aborted at the regents' December 19 meeting, which followed a week of incredible
jockeying for support among the candidates and their backers. The selection proceeded more smoothly during the "second go-around" in the spring, but irreparable damage had already been done to some reputations.

Why the marked contrast between the schools? "Tucson is a different breed of cat," explained one Phoenix regent. "The politics there was incredible," he said.¹ And another board member felt that "behind the scenes politics" was "inherent in the nature of the position."² Another pointed to the composition of the board and said simply: "You can't change personalities."³

In foregoing chapters the importance of university constituent groups in the selection process was emphasized. It is now possible to point to the actions of these groups to evaluate the events of 1970-1971 at The University of Arizona. Is the five-stage conceptual framework of leadership succession outlined in Chapter 4 useful? It is helpful to begin with a listing of groups involved and their "interests."

The regents were charged with formal and legal authority for making a presidential selection. They wanted to make an outstanding selection, but aside from interpretations

in literature and experience with past presidents they did not have a concrete vision of the type of individual they were looking for. Beyond general criteria of scholarly reputation and administrative skill they had few expectations and evaluated the candidates as individuals. Each man was studied on his own merits and compared to other candidates, rather than a fixed standard. Even after passing down a list of 10 criteria to the Advisory Committee they depended heavily on the membership to inform them of university goals and faculty-staff expectations of the new president. The most straightforward evaluation of the board's "interest" was given by a UA administrator who described the regents as "well-intentioned." "The regents on the whole don't know much about running a university," he said, "but they sincerely want the best for it." The regents, then, had no fixed set of goals during the selection process and were open to a certain amount of input concerning what "the best" actually was.

The faculty was formally represented on the Advisory Committee and there is no reason to believe that at-large faculty opinion was at odds with the thinking of faculty representatives on the committee. The representative obligations of faculty members on the committee were never fully spelled out. Each member independently determined how best

to represent opinion. Some members felt they represented the college they served in but most believed they had a free and open mandate to represent faculty opinion and "work for the good of the whole university." Specifically, the faculty was interested in improving the university academically and translated this into a firm requirement that the next president have a scholarly reputation and a commitment to promoting intellectual endeavor first. This principle of the priority of academics became the foundation of effective opposition to Johnson.

The administration was also formally represented on the Advisory Committee by senior members whose selection was influenced by Harvill. Although they did not formally represent his wishes on the committee they were loyal to him. When asked what qualities he sought in the candidates one said, "I wanted another Dr. Harvill." Together they strongly argued for a man with administrative experience and provided the committee with expertise on that subject that was useful in evaluating candidates' backgrounds.

The alumni suffered from a split personality. They had formal representation on the Advisory Committee but ultimately felt it necessary to open new channels of access through the news media. The 27-member Alumni Association,  

the executive organ of the alumni population, supported Johnson because of its knowledge and acquaintance with him over the years. Association president O'Dowd, however, felt he represented all alumni, not just the members of the Alumni Association. He defined the interest of the alumni primarily as continued maintenance of strong academic programs at the UA which would enhance the value of members' degrees. He also injected a strong component of concern for athletics and was vocal enough to bring the subject into the open for discussion.

The student body played an important role in the selection process even though they were not actively involved. There was much discussion and concern on the part of other constituent groups about the control of student protest. Johnson was advanced as the candidate who could insure peace on campus. The at-large student body, however, showed absolutely no interest in influencing the selection of Harvill's successor. The student newspaper, under the leadership of editor Becker, joined the chorus of criticism directed at the Star's editorials and was distinctly unsympathetic to Johnson's candidacy even though it carefully refrained from outright opposition. Student government had access to the process through their elected representative Eggers, but when Eggers promoted hearings to bring out student opinion the results were meager.
Finally, the state legislature, the political community, and the journalistic community all involved themselves in the process. And the primary "interest" of all three was the same--the promotion of Johnson. There was no enduring philosophy of the university's future in their actions. Rather, they acted in accordance with the dictates of support for a political candidate. To legislators, some newspapermen, and politicians, Johnson was running for office and they endorsed him as they would a candidate. If any underlying logic was present in their actions it was a feeling that accountability to numbers and source of support was important--even for a university president. They believed that the regents, like an electorate-at-large, would respond to endorsements, publicity, and shows of popularity. It is notable that they never succeeded in creating any climate of public opinion about Johnson. Although a few concerned citizens wrote to the regents and several letters to the editor appeared in various papers, most of the supporters of the Johnson bandwagon were personal and professional acquaintances of Johnson. Public response was far greater when a Tucson zoo proposed in the spring that an elephant be put to sleep.

These groups engaged each other in a process of conflict and consensus which corresponded closely to the stages of selection set forth in Chapter 4 and utilized in the
narrative of President Schaefer's selection. This process of leadership selection exhibited each of the five characteristics which are common to comparable processes.

First, the selection process became a salient issue. The basic reason for its prominence was the fact that organizational continuity was threatened and selection of a leader was mandatory for survival. Thus, even though an attempt was made to shunt the process into the background and foreclose participation to all but those groups on the Advisory Committee it emerged as an important issue. The single issue of presidential selection merged with other on-going issues such as academic reputation, UA educational predominance in the state, Harvill's domination of the board, university-community relations, the Code of Conduct, and the legitimacy of group participation. The confluence of these issues during 1970-1971 is an indication of the basic importance of presidential selection to the university.

Second, the selection process was characterized by the opening of formal and informal channels of influence. The creation of a campus advisory committee opened formal, institutionalized channels to the Board of Regents for faculty, students, administrators, alumni, and staff members. These channels were utilized on a two-way basis. In addition, leaks to the press from several sources invited commentary in the news media. Initial forays on behalf of Vice President Johnson by the Star inspired debate in the
public forum, as opposed to the private forum of the Advisory Committee. Leaks to the press also served an information dissemination function and thereby invited influential attempts by candidate oriented groups in an effort to expand the scope of conflict, alter the balance of forces, and restructure the coalition in favor of Johnson or Zumberge.

Third, the leadership selection mechanism did not perform its function automatically. Although the selection procedure preconceived by the regents was viable at ASU it was not workable at the UA in the fall. Unexpected difficulties were encountered and the disruptive input of individuals and groups participating in the selection process proved to outweigh the equilibrating tendencies of the selection mechanism itself.

Fourth, the process was likened to the role of the leader and his relations with vital constituencies. Presidential accountability to the Board of Regents is the only formal accountability the president must respond to. Appropriately, then, the regents formally elected President Schaefer. But they did so only as the culmination of a process in which major constituent groups of the university had complete access. Audience groups--particularly the news media--were forced to defend the legitimacy of their participation. It is instructive to note that they did so obliquely by trying to show that they could hold the president accountable.
Thus, Brinegar stressed the importance of relations between the university and the broader Tucson community. And state legislators argued that the new president must have the support of the legislature to be effective. Vice President Johnson, who had worked closely with the legislature, they argued, would have excellent prospects. Informal accountability of the leader to a group is strongly associated with the participation of that group in the leadership selection process.

Fifth, the process combined formal machinery, group interests, and personal ambitions. The clash of these ubiquitous forces was not moderated in the fall by any weight of tradition. But in the spring the regents had both a successful model for selection which had functioned satisfactorily at ASU and an unsuccessful model which had failed at the U of A. The lessons learned from these two experiences expedited the "second go-around."

Was the selection process functional in promoting the reconciliation of university constituent groups and revision or reaffirmation of university goals? Was the procedural framework for the comparative study of leadership succession mechanisms useful in pointing out the conflictual and consensual activities of groups within the political arena of the university? A brief recapitulation of the stages of the selection process reveals that the answer to both these questions is affirmative.
Stage I: When President Harvill suddenly announced his intention to retire his complete dominance of university political life was terminated. Although he would remain in office for an additional year he became a "lame duck" and the focus of group activity in campus politics shifted from the president's office to the regents' chambers.

Some groups were immediately thrown into a state of disequilibrium. The regents were faced with the task of choosing a new president. Johnson supporters were unsure of whether to continue the dinner in face of charges that it would be a campaign kickoff. When the dinner was held on September 28 it was widely regarded in that way by faculty members. Moreover, rumors that the regents were considering retired military officers and political conservatives such as Max Rafferty and S. I. Hayakawa circulated through the campus and were defined by faculty members as contrary to their interests.

Stage II: This state of uncertainty led to a mobilization of group forces on institutionalized and non-institutionalized planes. Formally, of course, the Advisory Committee operated to channel the opinions of campus constituent groups to the regents. Informally, leaks by the regents and rumors of a Johnson-Zumberge deadlock spurred audience groups into action at a later date.

People throughout the state began to work energetically on behalf of Johnson. Johnson, himself, defined his
primary goals as a search for academic reputation through appointment to a presidential commission and a rectification of supposed credential deficiencies through acquisition of an honorary doctorate. Zumberge supporters also waged a shadowy campaign behind the scenes for their candidate.

The faculty of the Liberal Arts College mobilized at the instigation of department heads Lytle, Thompson, Browder, and Tomizuka, who were deeply disturbed by the possible incubus of a retired admiral or member of the John Birch Society in the president's office. These men promoted a series of three meetings which were well attended by the department heads in the college. These meetings led to a near-unanimous endorsement of Dean Schaefer for presidential consideration.

When the announcement came on December 10 that the board would select a president at its December 19 meeting and that the field had narrowed to Johnson and Zumberge, it was as if an invitation to mobilize had been issued. Pro-Johnson groups were further incited to activity when the Wildcat reported on December 16 that the Advisory Committee had unanimously endorsed Zumberge on November 4.

A variety of tactics were adopted. Brinegar and other newspaper editors supported Johnson editorially by stressing his service to the state, his alumni status, and his administrative ability. They, along with state legislators, operated through personal contact and third parties to
put pressure on members of the Board of Regents. The alumni called a dramatic meeting to endorse Johnson and issued a statement of support to the news media.

These efforts were countered by those who opposed Johnson or supported Zumberge. The Citizen and Wildcat editorially condemned the public campaign for Johnson and emphasized the impropriety of open politics in the selection of the university president. Faculty members Lytle and Gould wrote widely publicized letters. Their parallel arguments stressed harassment by the newspapers and the need for academic credentials in the president's suite. These and other counter-efforts were an attempt to restrict the ever-widening scope of conflict in the presidential selection process and deny the president's ultimate accountability to an audience wider than that which had formally gained access to the process, i.e., the regents and groups represented on the Advisory Committee. It was inappropriate for any group aside from those in the immediate university community to take part in the selection. The invisible logic behind this assertion was that should Johnson be selected, he would continue to look outside the university for support. He would, it was feared, find his strength in the Tucson and greater Arizona community of political influentials rather than in a solid base of faculty support. Of course, this was pure anathema to the faculty, who attempted to restrict the
selection process—and the scope of conflict—to immediate members of the academic family.

The first two stages were characterized by conflictual relations among the constituent groups. The conflict might have been held to a minimum had the regents and faculty not released names of candidates being considered. The source of the erroneous newspaper release that the field had been narrowed to Johnson and Zumberge is unknown. The reasoning behind it is obscured by illogic. Speculation, however, is that Bradford might well have released Zumberge's name after he was endorsed by the faculty committee and added Johnson's as well, since it had been decided to keep his name formally in the running. This tactic may have been designed to forestall a last minute push by Johnson supporters rather than encourage one. If this is correct, the tactic failed, although elimination of Johnson's name could have ignited an entirely different and more vicious campaign by Johnson backers.

The debate which emerged from the clash of group interests during the fall months preceding the December meeting of the Board of Regents was not one that contributed to mutual group education, redefinition of university goals, and understanding of the president's role because it was predicated on the existence of a mythical status quo. Indeed, the battle was never fully joined. Lines of argument
solidified and debate never proceeded dialectically. Johnson supporters argued that his knowledge of the state, alumni backing, administrative ability, and demonstrated competence should propel him into the office. Johnson opponents and idealists said, in effect, "Leave us alone." This in itself, however, was useful in reconstructing the parameters of the university. During the 1969-1970 academic year the actions of rebellious students had rendered the campus permeable to outside influences. Police patrolled the grounds, angry citizens criticized university administrators, and unsympathetic state legislators called for harsh rules and penalties (exemplified by the conduct code requirement). The university community was able to set aside its internal differences and band together to block the participation of outsiders in the presidential selection process and this may have made outside political forces wary of interfering in the internal affairs of the state's universities in the future. This is ultimately essential to the maintenance of some form of freedom in inquiry. Unfortunately for Vice President Johnson, the stand against outside interference became associated with his candidacy.

The dissolution of the old regents' Selection Committee in the aftermath of Bradford's ill-fated attempt to name Zumberge marked the beginning of a new stage in the selection process. This, along with the appointment of new members to
the board, gave the selection a distinctly different character in the spring of 1971. Bentson, the new chairman, was less prone than Bradford to reveal information on progress to the state's press. No unauthorized leaks occurred. Had new announcements been made about the candidates under discussion the distinction between fall and spring would have eroded and the scope of conflict again widened.

Stage III: The third stage, preliminary coalition formation, began with the meetings of the Advisory Committee in the fall but the coalition formed in December was not strong enough to weather the mobilization of new groups and an accompanying expansion of the scale of conflict. Preliminary coalition formation began again in the spring months when the Advisory Committee and the regents' Selection Committee debated separately and met jointly. The debate did not spill over into the press, giving Johnson backers little opportunity for a public airing of their views. This had the practical effect of reducing the heterogeneity of the relevant electorate. Group exclusion, an essential part of the coalition forming process, had begun.

Members of the Advisory Committee were in substantial agreement on the criteria the new candidate had to meet and it was not difficult to narrow down the list of contenders to four men. Robinson, Neville, and Zumberge all had scholarly reputations and experience in academic administration.
Schaefer was less experienced but became the strongest inside candidate in the spring because of Zumberge's lukewarm interest and compromised effectiveness. He was a candidate who had been mentioned as a compromise choice throughout the year and in the final test it proved easiest for all groups involved to agree to his acceptability. Robinson and Neville were both outsiders and there was a strong feeling on the board that promotion from within the ranks of UA administrators was the best policy. Schaefer did not violate the interests of this group.

Stage IV: Formation of the final coalition took place when the regents voted in a secret meeting. The results of this vote, unanimous for Schaefer, finalized and formalized the selection. The secrecy of the vote gave the added impression that Schaefer was the first choice of all the regents—an incorrect assumption. There was no opposition to him. Mechanisms for cementing the leadership coalition must be strong enough to insure initial support for the leader. Where the coercive aspects of such mechanisms are weak or non-existent—as they were with the Board of Regents vote—the choice of a noncontroversial leader is encouraged. As a candidate for the presidential post Schaefer lacked political piquancy. Unlike Johnson and Zumberge he benefited from a clean slate.

Stage V: The inauguration of President Schaefer took place on October 29, 1971. The selection of President
Schaefer could be criticized as poorly organized in the fall, unresponsive to majority opinion, unrepresentative of campus opinion, or remiss in any number of additional categories. It was *ad hoc*, somewhat cumbersome, lengthy, and shot through with complications. Specifically, it was characterized by a lack of confidentiality, poor communications between regents, considerations of personal aggrandizement on the part of participants as well as candidates, and an Advisory Committee which was not broadly representative of all the elements in the selection equation. Nevertheless, a pragmatic mixture of informal arrangement and formal procedure proved up to the task of reconciling the conflicting claims of legitimacy voiced by a wide variety of interested persons and groups in the fall. The specific strategy contributing most to this accomplishment was stricter confidentiality in the spring proceedings. The fierce reaction of newspapers and faculty members to the Johnson campaign established the legitimacy of a selection process closed to all but regents, faculty, alumni, administration, and students—the immediate university community. This narrowed the field of group participants and restored a climate in which compromise was far more likely. The narrowed field was enforced by arrangements of confidentiality. Open support in the public forum by a group became a liability rather than an asset.
After the announcement of Schaefer's selection as president, the president-elect immediately made a number of statements designed to insure his acceptability to university constituent groups. He predicted that, "The University of Arizona will become one of the outstanding universities in the country in the next five years." He announced he would meet regularly with representatives of student government to keep abreast of student activities and grievances. He stated that he would put the university of Arizona on the athletic map. In addition to his press statements, Schaefer traveled widely about the state meeting influential citizens, alumni, and friends of the university.


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350


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