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THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY
WITH AN EMPHASIS ON EXPERIMENTALISM

by

Peter Winfield Kelly

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF COUNSELING AND GUIDANCE
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1973
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my direction by Peter Winfield Kelly entitled THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY WITH AN EMPHASIS ON EXPERIMENTALISM be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the degree of DOCTOR OF EDUCATION.

Gordon A. Harshman
Dissertation Director

Date

After inspection of the final copy of the dissertation, the following members of the Final Examination Committee concur in its approval and recommend its acceptance:

Roger O. Bullough
Adley Christensen
Reed L. Menden

Date

This approval and acceptance is contingent on the candidate's adequate performance and defense of this dissertation at the final oral examination. The inclusion of this sheet bound into the library copy of the dissertation is evidence of satisfactory performance at the final examination.
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PREFACE

There were two main goals in writing this dissertation. The first goal was to establish some kind of a logical method for examining the many theoretical conflicts in the literature of Counseling Psychology. It has been pointed out that theoretical arguments have become more heated and polemical rather than reasoned and investigative. Because of this tendency, the comparative study of theories becomes more difficult, issues become obscured and conflicts remain unresolved. In view of this condition, some kind of analytical method needs to be established.

The author's personal interest in this area stems from a course in analytic philosophy taken early in his doctoral program. After the completion of the course, the author became aware of assumptive conflicts, logical errors, and illogical connections as he read the literature. As a result, the author took a further course in this area. During that course, the author asked the instructor if he would consider writing a book which would apply a philosophical analysis to psychological theory. He suggested that the author consider the task. While the author was reluctant to attempt such a project, the instructor encouraged him on the basis of a "felt need," suggesting that only one who felt a need would consider attempting such a project. While
many authors in the literature complained about assumptive
conflicts, none of them seemed constrained to attempt such a
project. Since the author was convinced of the usefulness
of such a project, this dissertation was attempted.

The second goal in writing this dissertation was to
establish Experimentalism as a viable alternative conceptual
system for the undergirding of psychological theory. As the
author read the literature, it became apparent that most
counseling theories were primarily based on either a
Realist or an Idealist conceptual system. There was little
or no awareness, it seemed, that Experimentalism existed.
There were occasional references to modern theoretical
physics in the literature, but no systematic examination of
the implications of this position for counseling psychology.
These references to modern theoretical physics were pri-
marily cited by Idealists in their polemical war with the
Realists. There was little awareness that an argument used
to defeat an opposing view also had to be compatible with
the advocate's position.

Since the author felt that counseling psychology
ought to at least have an awareness of Experimentalism as an
alternative conceptual base for counseling theory, the
dissertation was begun. Hopefully, this dissertation will
illustrate the methodology of analytic philosophy as well
as establish Experimentalism as a viable alternative
conceptual system for theory building in counseling psychology.

The author must acknowledge the considerable effort, time, and encouragement of Gordon A. Harshman, Ph. D., the Director of this dissertation and chairman of the committee as well as the members of the committee, Harley D. Christiansen, Ph. D., Roger J. Daldrup, Ph. D., William H. Thweatt, Ph. D., and Reed A. Menke, Ph. D. Special appreciation must also be expressed for the help of Robert L. Wrenn, Ph. D., whose initial help and encouragement was of great assistance to the author. Appreciation must also be accorded T. Frank Saunders, Ed. D., who originally suggested this project and, from time to time, gave invaluable assistance on philosophical issues. Finally, the author wishes to express thanks to Norman Story, M. A., and Karen Quinn, M. S., for reading, commenting, and criticizing during the various stages of completion.

No acknowledgment could be complete without a major mention of my wife, Viola and my two children, Carol and John, for their patience, sacrifice, and protection during the many times when work on the dissertation precluded them from enjoying their lives. Their faith and encouragement was a major factor in my completing this investigation.
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ABSTRACT

This is a philosophical analysis of the assumptions and presuppositions in a selected literature of Counseling Psychology covering the period, 1962 to 1972. The purpose of this study is to investigate the usefulness of a philosophical analysis as a method of: (1) identifying assumption-presupposition conflicts within and between theoretical positions, (2) constructing consistent competing conceptual systems, and (3) determining the viability of Experimentalism as an alternative undergirding conceptual system for Counseling Psychology.

The assumptions-presuppositions relating to the general categories of the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality and the Nature of Knowledge, Truth and Meaning within the defined literature are examined and classified. Mutually discrete sub-categories are developed within each of the general categories. Within the general category of the Nature of Man, the sub-categories are: man as reactive, man as active and man as choosing. Within the general category of the Nature of Reality, the sub-categories are: reality as self-evident, reality as conceived and reality as flux. Within the general category of the Nature of Knowledge, Truth and Meaning, the sub-categories are: Knowledge, as best verified inductively; Truth, as best
verified deductively; and Meaning, as best verified by the use of a shared determinant referent.

Three consistent conceptual systems are constructed by subjecting each of the sub-categories to the demands of developed consistency criteria (Mechanistic Determinism, Conceptual Determinism, and Indeterminism). From this categorical analysis, three logically consistent conceptual systems are generated: Psychological Realism, Idealism, and Experimentalism. The applications, limitations, and criticisms of each of these conceptual systems for counseling are examined. The examination establishes that the systems have separate parameters and are thus competing conceptual systems.

Experimentalism, as one of these competing conceptual systems, is examined to discover if it has consequences for Counseling Psychology which have not been explored in the defined literature. Two such consequences are discussed. The first consequence is the usefulness of Experimentalism in reconciling the demands of the Humanists for a conceptual system incorporating an assumption of free will with the demands of the Behaviorists for a behavioral referent as an index of counseling change. The second consequence is the usefulness of Experimentalism in providing a logical basis for group process. In experimentalism, the group is viewed as an ongoing forum for consensual validation with the individual's behavior being the shared
determinant referent. The implications of Experimentalism in the areas of congruence, active versus passive counselor roles and the distinction between behavior modification and the augmentation of the client's range of modes of behavior, are discussed.

Four conclusions are drawn from the investigation. First, a philosophical analysis can be useful in Counseling Psychology in identifying assumption-presupposition conflicts. It can also provide a systematic basis for theory comparison, building, and use. Second, Experimentalism is a viable conceptual system for Counseling Psychology, providing a conceptual base incorporating the assumptions of free will, the process of change and meaning verification by consensual validation. Third, Experimentalism can provide an undergirding conceptual system for group process. Fourth, there are no consistent conceptual systems which are not subject to criticism from those holding differing assumptions.

The applications of this investigation for the practicing counselor, the counseling student, the counselor educator, and counseling research are discussed. Finally, future research projects involving philosophical analysis, as well as Experimentalism, are discussed.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the characteristics of a science is its use of specialized categories to classify its subject matter. If such categories are to be useful, however, they must in some way be discrete. That is, we must know the categorical distinctions between an apple and an orange in order to make meaningful comments about their differences. Theory functions, first of all, to provide the very rules by which we distinguish categories as well as to show the relationship or the relevance of one category to another.

When conflicting theories emerge, as they have within Counseling Psychology, some organization of systems, some theory of theory, some classification of classification systems becomes mandatory. Without such categories, without a theory of theory construction, it is difficult to make meaningful comments about competing theories. Such a larger set of rules, as mentioned above, allows us to point up meaningful distinctions in comparing one theory with another.

Classification (meaning, in the specialized sense of theory comparison) has traditionally been both a part of Philosophy of Science and of Analytic Philosophy. In contrast, Counseling Psychology (indeed, Psychology in
general) has been reluctant to include such discourse analysis within its purview. According to Wrenn (1959), the reason for this reluctance stems historically from Psychology's fight to separate itself from Philosophy as a separate discipline. Whatever the historical concerns may have been, the present demands of science require Counseling Psychology to include within its subject matter categories of theory comparison to work with the traditional categories of psychology such as learning, perception, motivation, etc.

In view of society's present dissatisfaction with the problems of strife and conflict, Psychology needs to demonstrate that it has relevance to the society that supports it. Relationship problems of all kinds surround us, yet the study of man gives birth to few solutions in terms of viable alternatives. Theories of child raising and of personality abound, yet none of them seem to offer any differential predictions as to the consequences of adapting one mode of behavior as superior to another.

The demand is not that Counseling Psychology be merely an applied science but that it be an applicable one. If man has meaning, then the study of man ought to be meaningful. The need, then is for some theory of theory which will enable psychologists to make meaningful distinctions as well as to allow society as a whole to enjoy some fruits from this labor.
In his article entitled "Dare we take the social sciences seriously?" Boulding (1967) describes the situation thusly:

At the moment neither our theoretical structures, nor our inferences, nor our predictions, nor our perceptual apparatus and instrumentation in the social sciences are in any way adequate to measure up to the complexity of the social system (p. 885).

The Problem

If Counseling Psychology is to remain viable, if it is going to be able to make differential distinctions between one theory and another, if it is going to be able to make differential predictions between one mode of behavior and another, then some larger set of rules needs to be developed so that theories can be compared and so that the consequences stemming from the application of these theories can be predicted and compared. This study is concerned with determining whether or not such a larger set of rules will be useful to Counseling Psychology in terms of theory construction, methodology, and application.

The usefulness of the study to Counseling Psychology can be seen in the answers to the following questions. First of all, is there an integrating system which would help clarify the diverse systematic threads in counseling psychology? Second, would this integrating overarching system provide for the development of some competing conceptual alternatives? Third, would some classification of
the assumptions and presuppositions currently existent in counseling psychology give the systems themselves greater consistency and reconstructability? And, finally, will we then have systems which are more viable and heuristic?

**Significance of the Problem**

Over the past fifteen years there has been a growing awareness that some clarification of the assumption, the presuppositions and the conceptual systems underlying psychology in general, and counseling psychology in particular needed to be articulated and examined. For the most part counselors have failed to delineate any consistent rationale for their counseling behavior. Furthermore, research findings in counseling psychology have rarely lent credence to theoretical formulations or presented fruitful implications for future investigations.

The editors of the past five reviews of philosophy and foundations in guidance and counseling in the *Review of Educational Research* (Moynihan, 1957; Wilkins and Perlmutter, 1960; Miller, 1963; Kehas, 1966; Katz, 1969) have all agreed that, "One of the most noticeable characteristics of the literature . . . is the lack of philosophical criticism," and that, "research in the area . . . still lacks integration in terms of a larger concept or set of concepts" (Miller, 1963, p. 196). Wrenn (1959) contends that present authors in counseling psychology neither examine nor test their
assumptions, nor do they pretend to possess a consistent operating philosophy. The underlying assumption of all these authors is that philosophical analysis and criticism would provide a more meaningful rationale for research in this field and for the application of these findings by counselors and counselor educators.

An examination of the literature of counseling psychology demonstrates this same lack of philosophical analysis. For example, most authors such as Rogers (1966), Beck (1965), Arbuckle (1965), May (1961), to name a few, state explicitly their assumptions: one, that man has free will and two, that this is a lawfully determined universe, without realizing that as stated one assumption denies the other. Since the arguments revolving around the issue of free will versus determinism will be examined in detail in Chapter III, it is perhaps here sufficient to say that two conflicting assumptions such as these cannot be held within the body of a theory or a position unless some attempt is made to qualify the conditions under which each assumption is held. Failure to recognize this assumptive conflict or to deal with it satisfactorily forces one to face the problem that hypotheses generated from philosophical positions containing such conflicts can seldom be tested satisfactorily, either in making successful differential predictions or in yielding significant outcome differences.
Such a lack of differential predictive ability as well as significant differences in terms of measurable outcomes has led London (1964) to assert that there is no difference, at least no determinant difference between the positions of Sigmund Freud and Carl Rogers. London asserts that, since no significant outcome differences have been generated between one form of "talk therapy" and another, one must conclude that no viable differences exist between these two theoretical positions.

Although London's conclusion may be startling to those counseling psychologists who have been accustomed to viewing Freud's and Rogers' counseling positions as poles apart, such an assertion seems consistent with present day experimental cannons. At second glance, however, London's conclusion does not necessarily follow from his premises. That is to say, a lack of differential outcome predictions or of demonstrated significant outcome differences is an expected condition when a theory, or a set of theories, contains assumptions that are mutually contradictory. Such internal theoretical inconsistencies usually render the theories themselves impotent insofar as significant outcome differences are concerned. Thus, both an acceptable and more reasonable conclusion, from an analytical philosophical position, would be that either or both theories must contain internal inconsistencies such that for the present no satisfactory differential predictions can be made.
However, while London may be guilty of overdrawning his conclusion, the thrust of his argument needs to be recognized and examined with care. There is indeed a demand, both internal and external, that psychology clean up its own house philosophically. Moreover such demands point toward further necessary action: that psychology yield some publicly applicable and shareable guidelines relevant to the problems facing present day society.

Normally such a demand for publicly applicable and shareable guidelines is not necessarily incumbent upon the private practitioner. As long as his clients are pleased there are no major demands upon him other than his own ethical concern with being effective. In the public sector, however, where one operates with public money (as does most of counseling psychology), we need to be prepared to demonstrate the relevance and efficacy of our work to the present needs of society as well as society's concern for the future. Although most public services (such as fire protection, police protection, education, etc.) have the general acceptance of society (society, presuming to understand the necessity for and function of such services), yet the need and usefulness of counselors and counseling psychology has not at all been demonstrated to the public at large. In order to demonstrate such a relevance to society's needs, we must assume a posture of internal consistency such that we can demonstrate significant outcome differences.
Nash (1966) summarized the concern, the need, and the significance of a critical philosophical analysis of the problems of counseling and guidance when he stated:

The field of guidance and counseling is undergoing a critical degree of expansion . . . . It is especially at such a time of critical expansion that there is a need for careful, rigorous, and fundamental examination of the directions and assumptions that prevail in the field. There is a dangerous temptation for workers in an expanding field to concentrate upon satisfying exigent, crucial needs and to neglect the less demanding tasks of philosophical clarification. Moreover, it is in exactly such a developing field that rigorous philosophical investigation will bear the greatest fruit (p. vii).

In view of the above, it seems clear that an investigation and classification of the presuppositions and assumptions underlying some of the literature of counseling psychology is both timely and appropriate.

**Hypotheses to be Investigated**

The following hypotheses, which will order and provide direction to the study, shall be investigated:

1. \( H_1 \): A categorical analysis of presuppositions and assumptions in some of the current literature of counseling psychology will demonstrate the incompatibility of these assumptions-presuppositions within any single conceptual system.
2. \( H_2 \): There are competing philosophical conceptual systems within which current assumptions-presuppositions in counseling psychology can be compatibly distributed.

3. \( H_3 \): Experimentalism as one of these competing conceptual systems, has logical consequences for counseling psychology which have not been explored in the literature as defined herein.

Assumptions Underlying the Problem

1. A categorical analysis of the assumptions and presuppositions in portions of the literature of counseling psychology can provide meaningful directions for counseling psychology.

2. The categorical analyses of assumptions and presuppositions performed previously in disciplines such as mathematics, physics, and philosophy possess relevancy for a similar analysis in counseling psychology.

3. In fields such as mathematics, where arguments may not be reduced to non-technical terms, statements by authorities as to the validity of said arguments are acceptable.

4. In a theoretical study, such as this, which generates no empirical data, a non-statistical verification of the hypotheses based on the logical consistency of
the categorical analysis and its attendant conclusions will be acceptable.

Limitations of the Study

1. This study is concerned with a classification of the assumptions and presuppositions in the following categories only: (1) the Nature of Man; (2) the Nature of Reality; and (3) the Nature of Truth, Knowledge, and Meaning, as found in the current literature of counseling psychology.

2. For the purposes of the study, current literature, which provides the study's survey basis, is limited to literature published from 1962 to 1972 in the following areas:

   a. Journals:
      (1) Journal of Counseling Psychology.
      (2) Personnel and Guidance Journal.
      (3) American Psychologist.
      (4) Counselor Education and Supervision.
      (5) Journal of Humanistic Psychology.
      (6) Journal of College Student Personnel.
      (7) The Counseling Psychologist.
      (8) Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology.

   b. Dissertations, philosophical or theoretical as listed in the Psychological Abstracts.
c. Books commonly considered texts in Counseling Psychology.

d. Literature published prior to the period 1962-1972, or in areas other than the limitations stated herein when the inclusion of such materials is deemed pertinent and necessary by the investigator.

3. The assumptions and presuppositions as found in the survey of the literature of counseling psychology will be extracted, summarized, and classified. The classifications will be illustrated with examples selected from authors chosen by the investigator. For the convenience and management of the material involved, no attempt will be made to either exhaustively list all authors making specific kinds of assumptions nor will any specific author be extensively examined in depth.

4. In a theoretical study, such as this, which generates no empirical data, the verification of the hypotheses depends upon the clarity, the meaningfulness, and the logical consistency of the statements developed by the analysis.
Definitions of Terms Used

The following definitions apply to this study.

Assumption— a proposition which is asserted to posed in order to develop certain inferences.

Competing Conceptual Systems— two or more conceptual systems whose limiting parameters and logical extensions dictate different behavioral applications in the same context such as Realism, Idealism, and Experimentalism.

Conceptual System— an interlocking set of assumptions-presuppositions with mutually dependent definitions and selective meanings.

Categorical Analysis— the process of logically separating a statement or series of statements into parts by the use of technical categories for the purpose of developing consistency comparisons.

Determinant Referent— the pointed to object or the consequences of any sequence of thought which can be agreed upon by the open community.

Experimentalism— a conceptual system whose epistemology is based on Pragmatism (Pragmatism holds that meaning for humans can only be verified by a shared determinant referent).

Presupposition— that which must antecedently be assumed if a desired result is to be derived. An implicit assumption,
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

While there is no literature in Counseling Psychology specifically dealing with the categorical analysis of the presuppositions underlying Counseling Psychology or Psychology in general, a considerable volume of literature exists which in one way or another can be considered related to the problem to be studied. First of all, there is literature on the philosophy of science which relates directly to psychology as a science and to research in Counseling Psychology. Part of this related literature can be characterized as theoretical-philosophical or as position statements. One might describe it as expository in nature rather than analytic; it attempts to resolve presuppositional and assumptive conflicts by assertion. There is a second body of related literature which is critical of the present philosophical positions in Psychology and Counseling Psychology and which argues that intensive, critical philosophical investigation is badly needed in all areas of Psychology. Finally, in addition to the above, there is a considerable volume of literature outside of Psychology in other disciplines such as Physics, Biology, and Education which have used the methodology of categorical analysis to
investigate the assumptive conflicts within their respective disciplines. Thus, while there exists no literature within Counseling Psychology specifically dealing with the categorical analysis of assumptions and presuppositions, there is a very considerable body of literature that is to a greater or lesser degree related to the problem under investigation.

The chapter will be divided into four main sections. The first section deals with the problem of the definition and the limitation of related literature. The second section is a selected survey and classification of the expository or theoretical-philosophical literature. The third section is a selected survey and classification of the literature critical both of the present philosophical positions and the lack of philosophical investigation in the literature of Psychology and Counseling Psychology. The fourth section will be a summary of the Chapter.

**Definition and Limitation of "Related Literature"**

The lack of specific literature dealing with the categorical analysis of the assumptions and presuppositions underlying the various philosophical positions in counseling psychology poses special problems for research in this area, both in the design of this study, which will be dealt with in Chapter III, and in the decisions as to what constitutes
pertinent and relevant literature related to the area under study.

This problem becomes critical when one tries to decide just what literature, both inside and outside the field of counseling psychology can be justified for inclusion in terms of relevance and pertinence to the issues under study. Without previous categorical analyses in the field, the researcher lacks the precedents and models normally used to justify the inclusion or exclusion of any piece of literature.

The problem becomes intensified when one uses the methodology of one discipline (in this case analytical philosophy) to attack the problems of another discipline, counseling psychology. Both philosophy as a whole and the methodological applications of analytic philosophy, then, become related to the problem.

The argument can be and has been made that every philosophy is a philosophy of education (Dewey, 1960). This argument, if accepted, could mean by extrapolation that every philosophy contains related assumptions about the psychology of learning, motivation, and personality, all areas having a bearing on counseling psychology. However, the inclusion of the whole of philosophy would make this survey of related literature unmanageable. Moreover, it seems reasonable that while the need to exclude philosophy from this survey appears obvious, the stipulation of its
exclusion is necessary because of a tendency by some psychologists to blur the distinction between philosophy and psychology and to view many philosophers as psychologists. An example is the recent publication, *The Great Psychologists: From Aristotle to Freud* (Watson, 1968).

The methodology of analytical philosophy has previously been applied to the disciplines of mathematics, physics, biology, and education. Since the methodology, as applied therein, is closely related in terms of form to the methodology used in this study, much of this literature can also be considered related.

Thus the definition and limitation of "Related Literature" becomes a crucial issue for this chapter. For instance, a broad definition would open up the possibility (and, in some cases the necessity) of including much of the literature of philosophy as well as the methodological applications of analytical philosophy. Such an inclusion would pose great, if not insurmountable, problems of management and organization for the researcher, not to mention problems of comprehension for the reader. For convenience, then, in limiting the scope of this chapter, Related Literature will be limited solely to the literature of Counseling Psychology as previously defined in Chapter I. However, the excluded literature, whether methodological or philosophical, will be used in Chapter III whenever relevant.
Theoretical-Philosophical Expository Literature

While there has been no specific study into the resolution of the assumption-presupposition conflicts through the use of the methodology of analytical philosophy in counseling psychology, it is not accurate to infer that the whole area has been ignored. A considerable number of authors have tried in one way or another to describe, or reconcile, or to eliminate by definition some of the conflicting assumptions and presuppositions (primarily the conflict between determinism and free will) underlying Counseling Psychology as well as Psychology in general.

The Behaviorists and Determinists, such as Krumboltz (1966), Murray (1963), Pohlman (1966), Skinner (1948, 1971), and Thoresen (1969), have generally tried to resolve the "free will-determinism" conflict either by asserting that "free will" or "choice" was an illusion or by considering it a pseudo-problem.

The Phenomenologists such as Carkhuff, Alexik, and Anderson (1967); Gelso (1970); Isaksen (1967); Rogers (1964); and Combs and Snygg (1959) have quite vigorously asserted that man has "choice." However, they also assert that man's behavior is lawfully determined within the context of his phenomenal world.

Existentialism has been adopted by many psychologists (Beck, 1965; Dreyfus, 1964; Kemp, 1971; May 1961; and others) as a solution to the "free will-determinism" paradox. While
Existentialism's ideas are often appealing and its statements often very moving, no substantive theoretical position nor sustained, systematic argument appears to have been developed. Landsman (1965) has noted that while their poetic use of the language makes their position most appealing, the lack of specific and agreed upon definitions, within the Existential camp, in itself makes their position too elusive to be useful in a determinate sense for Counseling Psychology. Arbuckle (1965) points out that this very lack of an agreed upon definition of Existentialism makes it very difficult to determine who is and who is not an Existentialist.

Finally, there has been a small group (Koch, 1964; Lumpkin, 1970; Malcolm, 1965; Wrenn, 1966) who have hoped and counseled for some sort of reconciliation between the forces of Behaviorism and the forces of Phenomenalism. Wrenn, as early as 1959, anticipated the eventual reconciliation of these two opposing views through the use of Experimentalism as a philosophic base. Beck (1965) held that because no such exposition of Experimentalism as a viable philosophic base had subsequently appeared in the literature at the time of his dissertation, in 1962, that this was conclusive evidence that Experimentalism was not the viable alternative philosophic base for counseling that Wrenn had hoped it would be.
These are a sample of the theoretical-philosophical expository writers, mostly assertive or conciliatory in their attempts to remove or dispel the assumptive conflict they find themselves faced with. It should be remembered, however, that without them, without some assertion of a position by someone, a categorical analysis would be fruitless. It is mainly from their expository assertions that the assumptions and presuppositions, the raw data necessary for a categorical analysis, will be drawn.

**Criticism of Present Philosophical Positions**

There is a very large volume of related literature in Counseling Psychology which is critical of the present philosophical positions in Counseling Psychology as well as Psychology in general. This literature can be classified into three rather broad, but by no means discrete, areas. Very frequently authors who are critical in one area are also critical in other areas as well, either in the same article or in subsequent articles. The three broad areas of criticism are: (1) the present state of philosophical investigation, (2) a concern with the present assumption-presupposition conflict, and (3) the various criticisms of the present methodology.

In general, all statements, e.g., more theory versus no theory, concern with assumptive conflicts, and methodology—good, bad, unproductive, or inconsistent—reflect a
considerable state of unrest and dissatisfaction currently existent in the literature. There is no agreement as to what the problem is or how to solve it. There is even no agreement that there is a problem although this survey shows fairly definitely that most authors feel there is one.

Criticism of the Present State of Philosophical Investigations

Criticism of the present state of philosophical investigation in Counseling Psychology ranges from a rather generalized discontent, usually consisting of statements asserting that something ought to be done, to rather specific criticism of current philosophical investigation and positions.

The general need for a philosophic analysis, for some sort of an organization or integrating concept, has been stated by many authors. Unfortunately, few authors have used the same terminology when expressing this concern. This has probably contributed to the lack of understanding as well as the lack of research in this area. Some of the terminology used has been: Philosophy of Counseling (Arbuckle, 1965; Nash, 1964), Philosophy of Psychology (Maslow, 1965), Philosophy of Guidance (Beck, 1965), Philosophy of Science (Koch, 1964; Madsen, 1971; Smith, 1970; M. B. Turner, 1965), Models of Counseling (Isaksen, 1967 and others), Vocational Choice Theory (Katz, 1969; Osipow, 1968; Tyler, 1961), and Value Orientation (Graves, 1970;

While part of this confusion may have come from a lack of agreed upon terminology, some of it has also come from a misuse of philosophical terminology. For example, Lynch and Kluback as well as Lowe have seen the problem framed in terms of value theory and value choice. However, the study of values is the study of axiology, a division of philosophy, not philosophy itself. This kind of classification error is formally called a "category error" (and will be so labeled in the future). It is this type of category error that a psychologist would vigorously protect if, for example, psychology were to be subsumed under learning, motivation, or physiology.

An example of a category error is found in the following quotation from Lynch and Kluback (1966):

Theories of value be they Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism or Existentialism, are problems to be reckoned with in any philosophy or education and in a philosophy of counseling (p. 753).

Here are four theories, none of which are value theories and not all of which are the same type of theories. "Idealism" and "Realism" are generic philosophic systems, not value theories (axiology). "Pragmatism" is a theory of knowledge, an epistemology, not a theory of value (axiology) nor a philosophic system. To call all of these theories value theories is a category error and renders the statement
meaningless. We cannot know what the authors mean by "theories of value," because their referents lack commonality. (This type of analysis is the function of Chapter III. It was included here to document the previous speculative statements as to the causes of confusion in psychology about philosophy and philosophical investigation.)

More specific criticism of the present state of philosophical investigation has come from Moynihan (1957), Wilkins and Perlmutter (1960), Miller (1963), Kehas (1966), and Katz (1969) (the editors of the past five reviews of the philosophy and foundations section in the Review of Educational Research) as well as Buhler (1971), Dahlstron (1970), and Eacker (1972). They are concerned both with the lack of philosophical investigation and criticism as well as the quality of philosophical criticism. Their specific objection to the quality of philosophical criticism is that it was too narrow in focus, i.e., that it dealt with part theories only and made no effort to develop integrating theories or theory.

During this period (1957 to 1972) only one study of major proportions was reported, Beck's (1965) dissertation and subsequent book, Philosophical Foundation of Guidance. Beck's work, which was based in part on an earlier work by Cribben (Beck, 1965), was an attempt to examine the presuppositions underlying guidance (which, for Beck, subsumed
counseling), with the expectation of finding the one philosophic system that would best fit the majority of the uncovered presuppositions. Cribben's study was, according to Beck, a similar attempt. Cribben's major concern was to demonstrate the compatibility of the assumptions then existent in guidance with Catholic educational philosophy of that period.

Kehas (1966), while commending Beck for both his dissertation and book, was critical of Beck's attempt to find a single system that would fit all the presuppositions in the guidance literature without examining the presuppositions themselves to determine whether or not they were systematically or logically compatible.

The Problem of Conflicts in Assumptions and Presuppositions

The concern with presuppositional and assumtional conflicts has been a more recent development in the literature. With the exception of Wrenn's (1959) pioneering effort, few authors were specifically concerned with the problem of assumtional-presuppositional consistency until 1963. There had been an earlier concern with those assumptions underlying the classification of behavior pathology (Phillips and Rabinovitch, 1961; Davidson, 1958; Szasz, 1960). Prior to this, some of these issues had been raised in the now famous debate between Carl Rogers and B. F. Skinner (1956). The impact of these issues, however, did
not noticeably appear in counseling psychology until the early 1960's (Bugental, 1963).

Despite the fact that the concern with the assumptional-presuppositional conflict has gained steady support (Baron, 1971; Eacker, 1972; Kehas, 1966; Koch, 1964; Maslow, 1965; Thorne, 1967; G. H. Turner, 1965; von Bertalanffy, 1968; Walker, 1970), there still seems to be little general recognition that there is a problem of assumption-presupposition conflicts or that such conflicts are essentially consistency problems (Gelso, 1970). Koch's (1964) statement seems accurate today:

The typical theoretically oriented psychologist, not excluding the behaviorists, still draws sustenance and security from a theory of definition (and more generally of science) over twenty years old and moreover, one which its originators have largely abandoned (p. 23).

Literature Criticizing Present Psychological Methodology

Comments and criticisms of the present psychological methodology are not, on the whole, arguments about technique, but usually either direct or indirect attacks on the assumptions and presuppositions underlying the methodology. Methodology used in this context is the application of a philosophical position. A criticism of the application becomes a criticism of the philosophical position generating the methodology. These criticisms can be considered as
attempts to find alternative defensible philosophic positions.

In general, these critics conclude that a change is necessary in the methodology because of its lack of viable yields, although they are not in agreement as to why the methodology has been lacking meaningful results. Some of the critics are simply dissatisfied, others feel that the methodology is obsolete and a third group feels that the methodology itself contains inconsistencies that render it impotent.

Typical of those who have been dissatisfied with the kinds of yields produced by the present methodology have been Allport (1966), Deese (1969), Kendler (1971), Luce (1972), Meehl (1972), and Smith (1970). Allport (1966) has stated:

We find ourselves confused by our intemperate empiricism which often yields unnameable factors, arbitrary codes, unintelligible interaction effects, and sheer flatulence from our computers (p. 8).

Deese (1969) has reluctantly concluded:

The model of experimenting taken from the physical sciences is useful as an aid in psychological research, but I have reached the conclusion that it no longer belongs in the center of psychology (p. 650).

Thus while the members of this group are clearly dissatisfied with the results of the present methodology, no alternative options are developed and there is no
awareness that the model taken from the physical sciences has been largely abandoned by those sciences.

The second area of methodological criticism shares the disappointment of the first group in terms of lack of viable yields generated by the present methodology. This second group is aware that the model borrowed from the physical sciences is obsolete. In addition, they are cognizant of the more recent relativity-indeterminancy theories developed in physics and mathematics. This position has been supported by: Bugental (1967); Koch (1964); Lachenmeyer (1970); Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960); Shotter and Gauld (1971); Tukey (1969); and Tyler (1970). Tyler's (1970) statement is typical of their position:

We can no longer assert that psychology is totally objective, totally nonmetaphysical, totally empirically based and totally an impersonal search for truth (p. 225).

Very interestingly, this position was earlier stated by Oppenheimer (1956), a physicist, in the American Psychologist.

The third criticism is that the methodology itself contains imbeded inconsistencies which render the methodology impotent (Chein, 1966; Shotter and Gauld, 1971; Silverman, 1971; Smith, 1970). Chien's (1966) statement typifies this position:

The most extreme expression of scientism involves doctrinaire views on the nature of science and proper rules of scientific conduct
and expression. By strict application of some of these rules, a considerable array of sciences, from anatomy to zoology, would be ruled out of the domain of science because they are, in the main, not experimental, not quantitative, not concerned with prediction, and/or not hypothetico-deductive in structure. A work like Darwin's *Origin of Species* would similarly not be expected to make the grade since it promulgates as a theory, propositions that can only be applied on a post hoc basis and do not serve the ends of prediction . . . and Darwin is, by tradition an examplar of the true scientist (p. 333).

**Summary**

This chapter has been concerned with a survey of literature relating to the study of a categorical analysis of the assumptions and presuppositions underlying the current philosophical positions in counseling psychology and to some extent psychology in general. The problem posed by the lack of a previous categorical analysis was discussed and the necessary limitation of "Related Literature" was developed. Attempts at theory building through (1) assertive theoretical-philosophical exposition and (2) philosophical investigation and criticism were selectively surveyed and classified.

This survey shows that there has been a rather widespread, although unsuccessful, attempt to develop defensible philosophic positions in counseling psychology, and psychology in general, that would generate theoretical positions with attendant methodologies that complemented and were consistent with each other. The survey further
indicates that there is a rather widespread discontent with the present philosophic positions as well as the current methodology. This discontent with the present methodology was categorized into three broad areas of criticism: (1) a lack of meaningful yields, (2) the obsolescence of some of the assumptions basic to the methodology, and (3) the inconsistency of some of the assumptions of the methodology. Finally, the survey demonstrates the need for a philosophic investigation with a methodology of rigor sufficient to generate the construction of defensible alternative options.
CHAPTER III

BASIC CONCEPTS OF A PHILOSOPHIC ANALYSIS

This chapter will be divided into five sections. First, the methodology and procedure will be reviewed. Second, the sub-categories necessary to classify the assumptions-presuppositions extracted from the literature will be developed, defined, and illustrated. Third, the consistency criteria necessary for the construction of consistent, competing conceptual systems will be developed. Fourth, internally compatible and discrete conceptual systems meeting the demands of the consistency criteria will be constructed, illustrated, and limiting parameters as well as major criticisms of each system will be examined. Fifth, the chapter will be summarized.

Methodology and Procedure

The methodology and procedures used in this study are developed from and limited by the hypotheses under investigation. For the convenience of the reader, these hypotheses (previously stated in Chapter I) are restated:

1. H1: A categorical analysis of the assumptions and the presuppositions in some of the current literature of counseling psychology will demonstrate the
incompatibility of many assumptions within one conceptual system.

2. $H_2$: There are competing philosophical conceptual systems within which the current assumptions-presuppositions in counseling psychology can be compatibly distributed.

3. $H_3$: Experimentalism as one of these competing conceptual systems has logical consequences for counseling psychology which have not been explored in the literature as defined herein.

The first two of these three hypotheses together with the attendant procedures and methodologies are the subjects of this chapter. The third hypothesis together with the attendant procedure and methodology is the subject of Chapter IV.

The procedure followed for the investigation of hypotheses $H_1$ and $H_2$ consisted of the following steps. One, the literature of counseling psychology, as defined in Chapter I, was surveyed. Very briefly, the limitation was a temporal one generally restricting the surveyed literature to selected journals, dissertations, and textbooks to the period, 1962 to 1972.

Two, within the defined literature, the assumptions and the presuppositions concerning: (1) the Nature of Man; (2) the Nature of Reality; and (3) the Nature of Knowledge,
Truth, and Meaning were extracted. The assumptions and presuppositions thus extracted were summarized and classified. The results of this procedure are the subject of the second section of this chapter.

Three, consistency criteria necessary to order and construct internally compatible philosophic systems will be developed.

Four, internally compatible and discrete philosophic systems meeting the demands of the consistency criteria previously developed in the third section will be constructed, illustrated, and the limiting parameters as well as the major criticisms of each system will be developed. The first hypothesis will be considered upheld if no single conceptual system can subsume all of the assumption-presupposition sub-categories. The second hypothesis will be considered upheld if these competing conceptual systems yield differing parameters as well as differing consequences in the practice of counseling.

Fifth, the results of the second, third, and fourth sections will be examined and summarized.

The Assumption-Presupposition Categories

As previously stated, the general categories used in the classification of the assumptions and presuppositions are: (1) the Nature of Man; (2) the Nature of Reality; and (3) the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning. These
general categories were selected because they are the primary areas of concern in the literature reviewed. Few counseling psychologists, or authors writing in the literature of counseling psychology, are concerned (in the literature, at least) with questions regarding the Nature of God and/or the Universe (metaphysics) or with the Nature of Values (axiology).

However, many of the authors in the literature as surveyed are concerned with questions involving the categories as selected. This is not to say that all authors address themselves to questions regarding all three categories in their writings, because this is not the case. Most frequently authors in the literature, as surveyed, will be explicitly concerned with only one or two of the categories. However, the three categories of: (1) the Nature of Man; (2) the Nature of Reality; and (3) the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning, subsume most of the issues and the questions that concern the authors in the literature. An additional factor in the selection of these categories, although not an overriding one, was that these categories are also the areas of primary interest in the Philosophy of Science.

The Nature of Man

Within the general area of the study of man, the assumptions and presuppositions concerning the Nature of Man
are the central controlling issues. However one chooses
to view man's nature, these assumptions and presuppositions
concerning the basic nature of man very carefully define
the variables that one uses or can use to study man. Like­
wise, the sub-categories one chooses to examine this, or
any, category prescribe and limit the kinds of conclusions
that can be drawn. If these sub-categories are to yield
determinant differences, then the sub-categories must be
discrete, that is, the sub-categories must be mutually
exclusive. An assumption that fits in one sub-category must
not partially fit into another. Unfortunately, many of the
"models of man" (sub-categories) in the literature regarding
the nature of man have not had this property of mutual
exclusiveness.

Within the general category of "the Nature of Man,"
three sub-categories of assumptions-presuppositions can be
constructed which meet this test of mutual exclusiveness.
These are: (1) man as reactive, (2) man as active, and (3)
man as choosing.

The assumption of "man as reactive" is a necessary
presupposition for most of the positions taken by the
Behaviorists. When one asserts that behavior is primarily a
function or a response to the environment and that the
modification of behavior is primarily (or only, as in the
statements of Skinner, 1971) a function of the reinforcement
contingencies bestowed upon that behavior by the environment,
then the necessary presupposition with regard to the nature of man is that of "man as reactive." The behavior is a reaction to the stimuli of the environment whether or not the environment is manipulated. However, within those constructs grouped together under the rubric of behaviorism, there is one notable exception, social modeling theory (Bandura, 1965) which "would appear to involve cognitive learning" (Patterson, 1969). The rest of the behaviorist positions, as well as other positions, where the results are dependent upon some set of reinforcement contingencies from the environment, "man as reactive" seems to be a necessary presupposition. As Hosford (1969) has stated in "Behavioral Counseling--A Contemporary Overview":

Basically, behavioral theory holds that most behavior is learned, i.e., a function of one's environment. Man begins not as innately "good" or "bad," but like a Lochian tabula rosa, upon which Thorndike would say, nothing has been "stamped." Man is . . . a reactive being--reacting to the stimuli he encounters in the environment (p. 1).

Positions similar, if not almost identical to this, are taken by Thoreson (1969), Krumboltz (1966), and Ullmann (1969) to name a few. If "man is a reactive being," then he cannot be active in the sense that as an organism he has in-built, indigenous drives that dictate his behavior.

However, if man is conceived as an "active" being, then he is seen as having drives, needs, purposes, motives, and inner goals which cause him to respond to the
environment in selective ways. Behavior, in this sense, is not a function of the reinforcement contingencies as Skinner (1971) and others have held. It is a function of inbuilt, indigenous drives, needs, or goals. The various terms of goals, drives, purposes, needs, motives, and instincts are used quite interchangeably by those authors holding an "activist" position in regard to the nature of man. For example, Patterson (1969) holds that the goal of self-actualization is "inherent in the organism." Rogers (1966) states, "We have to assume only one drive, the drive to self-actualization" (p. 193). Thus the two positions, man as reactive and man as active would seem to meet the test of mutual exclusiveness. If one assumes that man is reactive, one cannot also assume that man is active. Conversely, if one assumes that man is active, then one cannot also assume or assert that man is reactive.

The third sub-category, "man as choosing" differs from "man as reactive" and "man as active" in terms of choice. Neither the reactive position nor the active position posits any choice in man. Man, and his behavior, is determined, either by the environment according to the reactionists or by his inbuilt, inherent, indigenous drives needs or goals according to the activists. The deterministic aspect of the reactive position is rather apparent. The deterministic aspect of the active position is more subtle
and less recognized. However, the difference between an inherent goal and a chosen goal is rather large.

If it is assumed that man has the capacity for choice, and every author, with the exception of Skinner (1971) does make this assumption in one form or another; if man can choose then he is neither dependent upon nor independent of stimuli, either external (environmental) or internal (inbuilt drives or goals). If man has choice, then he has the option to respond with alternative behavior modes or not to respond at all. Not responding is also a choice. This sub-category of "man as choosing" is discrete from other sub-categories which have as a necessary presupposition "man as non-choosing," i.e., man is either indigenously active or reactive. Thus, the three sub-categories of: (1) man as reactive, (2) man as active, and (3) man as choosing, meet the test of mutual exclusiveness.

Assertions about the nature of man frequently contain dual, mixed, or contradictory assumptions and presuppositions. An example of this is the assertion that "man is active and good," a not infrequently explicitly stated assumption or a necessary presupposition found in the writings of many humanistic authors. The problem with the assertion, "man is active and good" is that it lacks both exclusiveness and consistency. "Good" being a value laden term, lacks the necessary property of exclusiveness, As with most value assumptions, the difficulty lies in the
lack of either a stated or an agreed upon referent. The questions, "good for what?" and "whose good?" immediately arise. "Good" becomes a subjective value individually defined and as such has no property of exclusiveness. No one can know, with any degree of precision, what behavior should or should not be included in such an assumption. This lack of precision makes the assumption useless both for theory building as well as for a categorical analysis.

It is not the intent of this thesis to hold that the sub-categories constructed herein are the only mutually exclusive sub-categories possible within the general category of the nature of man. What we are saying is that here are three mutually exclusive sub-categories which can subsume the assumptions and presuppositions now existent in the literature of counseling psychology. This is not to say that dual assumptions such as "man is active and reactive" cannot be useful. If such dual constructions contain precise instructions (rules) such that one could know under what conditions each component held, then a dual, apparently contradictory, assumption, such as the one stated above could be useful and testable. Unfortunately, at the present time, no one using such a dual construction is positing such rules.

An example of necessary dual presuppositions is found in the existential concept of "self-transcendence." To assert that man has the capability of self-transcendence
suggests that two presuppositions are necessary. First, if man can transcend himself, his basic nature (whatever this may be) then man must be in some sense active, since self-transcendence does not seem to be a reaction. Second, if man can change from non-self-transcendence to self-transcendence, this seems to infer that man is basically evil, animalistic, or reactive and can change to some state superior to this or "good." Unfortunately since no rules are laid out to allow one to determine when or how transcendence occurs, no one can know who has achieved self-transcendence and who has not.

For example, in counseling, does the counselor automatically assume that because of his position that he, as a counselor, has achieved transcendence? If a counselor has not achieved self-transcendence, is this a quality that he can counsel toward without achieving it himself? Does the counselor assume that a client, by virtue of the client's coming to see him, has not achieved self-transcendence? If the counselor is doing his job well, is it assumed that as a result of the counseling relationship that self-transcendence will or does occur? If so, how does the counselor know when this result has been achieved, or for that matter, whether or not he and the client are making progress?

Without any rules, there are just no ways to answer such questions. Without rules, without definitional
systems and referents, one creates what Lazarus (1969) has called a "semantic marshland" where one term is used to define another so that the whole definitional process becomes circular. It is for this reason, a lack of distinguishing rules, that dual assumptions and presuppositions were not included in the constructed sub-categories. Without definitions and referents, they simply defy classification.

The Nature of Reality

The nature of reality presents a more formidable problem for the construction of discrete sub-categories than does the Nature of Man. There has been considerable discussion within the literature of counseling psychology about the various assumptions made about the Nature of Man. These various points of view have usually been referred to as "models of man." While these models (sub-categories) have usually not been mutually exclusive and thus seldom productive, the idea of alternative viewpoints has been established and accepted. No such recognition of alternative "models of reality" has been discussed or established in the literature.

This is not to say, however, that there have not been alternative assumptions-presuppositions about the Nature of Reality made by authors writing in the literature, Skinner (1971), Perls (1969), and Bruner (1966), to name a
few, all have differing viewpoints about the nature of reality. However, since these differing reality positions have not been discussed as such, there are no readily available descriptions of such positions. Because of this, it is first necessary to describe general reality positions found in the literature and from these positions develop sub-categories which will meet the test of mutual exclusiveness.

The dominant view of reality in psychology has been that the world, the environment, that reality existed quite independently of man's knowledge of it. If reality exists independently man's knowledge of it, then the facts, the data, which are all parts of reality, speak for themselves. In analogical form, the argument is usually presented as, "a door is a door," the facts speak for themselves. To think that the existence of a door depends upon my first conceiving the idea of a door and then using that concept to organize the stimuli received so that I can then say, "There is a door," seems ridiculous. The door is there. To go through the door, I simply turn the knob. It is that way today. It will be that way tomorrow. It will be that way whether I am there to see and use the door or not. If the building is demolished, that fact will be self-evident also. To hold any reality position other than the one which says that reality exists independently of the knowledge of
it, is to deny the self-evident. Obviously the existence of the door speaks for itself.

In psychological terms, the stimuli of the door are organized by the form of the object, not by the brain. This is a plausible and powerful argument, particularly when used with simple objects. The sun does always rise in the east. Our home is always there when we go home after work. The tree in the yard is there whenever we go outside to look at it. We assume that it will be there whether or not we are there to observe it. Reality is self-evident. It is there. As Skinner (1971) put it, "No theory changes what it is a theory is about [sic]. Nothing is changed because we look at it, talk about it, or analyze it in a new way" (p. 203).

Although Skinner presents this in an adamant, absolute manner, the statement is an assumption about the nature of reality, not a statement of fact. The assumption is that reality is self-evident.

A second assumption is that reality dictates the form of its perception. Perception precedes conception. The brain does not organize the stimuli emanating from an object. The stimuli emanating from an object dictate or carry with it, its own form and organization. A rose, by any other name, is still a rose. The facts speak for themselves. No interpretations are needed or necessary.

On the other hand, the Gestaltists point to incomplete stimuli which trigger concepts and hold with
equal plausibility that the brain organizes the stimuli. They would argue that the assumption that percept precedes concept holds only for very simple objects and then only if the object is the "figure" and not the "ground." Otherwise, they would hold that the brain organizes the stimuli. For example, the symbol :: insofar as the Gestaltist is concerned, obviously signifies a square. You see a square, I see a square and yet there are only four dots. Thus, the facts do not speak for themselves. Since the four dots do not have the lines of a square emanating stimuli, then (logically) the brain must organize the stimuli it receives. This immediate recognition of a square rather than four dots is considered a natural reaction of the brain.

The assumption is made that all the necessary organizing concepts exist within the brain. As additional evidence, they point to the common experience of individuals who are puzzled as to what to do and then have an "ah ha" experience when they are placed in a climate such that the brain can function normally and naturally. This "insight," this intuitive recognition of the truth is obviously a function of the brain, an emergence of organizing concepts where none existed before and where no eliciting stimuli is present in the environment to produce the concept. The assumption is that these concepts are natural (built-in) to the brain. The concepts are indigenous and available to anyone if they are allowed to experience them.
Now this position sounds equally plausible. Everyone, at least from culture that have within them the concept of squareness, does see a square when presented with \( \square \) (probably even B. F. Skinner). Most individuals have had or have known others who have had "insightful" or "Ah ha" experiences. Intuition, that magical, natural emergent wisdom does seem to occur. People make correct, sometimes remarkable choices without knowing how or why. In counseling, given the conditions that seem to release this natural wisdom, people do appear to have an "ah ha" experience. They apparently recognize, instinctively and intuitively, the correct choice or proper course of action. Under the proper conditions, a natural wisdom does appear to emerge. The "ah ha" experiences seem as natural and normal as the "square" experience.

From this position, two presuppositions can be extracted. First, that concept precedes percept or that the brain makes selections and organizes from the stimuli presented to it. Second, a necessary presupposition to the assumption of "natural wisdom" is that all of the concepts are indigenous. Since the concepts selectively organize the stimuli presented, concepts can not then be acquired from these stimuli. The concepts, thus, must be indigenous. Jung (Ornstein, 1972), for example, spoke of the "collective unconscious," a sort of genetically transferred wisdom. Man is not only endowed genetically with physical
characteristics, but with "natural wisdom" as well. From such assumptions come the concept of the "natural child, unspoiled by culture." This reality position would argue that the facts are not self-evident, that appearance can be deceiving, that data require organization.

A third view of reality is also contained within the literature. This position, while not as well known nor currently as well articulated in the literature, holds with the Gestaltists that concept precedes percept. However, unlike the Gestaltists, this position holds that there are no naturally indigenous emergent concepts, that all concepts are learned. This cognitive approach holds that there is no predetermined stability either in the form of reality (as the Behaviorists hold) or in the concepts used to select and organize the stimuli input (as the Gestaltists hold).

This view, which is coming to be known as a Cognitive view in psychology (Bruner, 1966) holds that man learns or can learn alternative concepts and behaviors. Man can choose to use those concepts and/or behaviors which seem to be most appropriate on the basis of probably outcomes.

For example, "..." can be seen as: (1) a row of dots, (2) a line, (3) the number four (using a base of 10), or (4) the number fifteen (using a base of 2).\(^1\) Clearly,

\(^1\) The reader may be unfamiliar with the binary system, a number system based on two, rather than a number system based on ten. In the binary system, one indicates
"...." as an entity does not speak for itself and unlike :: more than one organizing concept can be applied by the brain to this same input.

This idea is not new. We have been accustomed for some time to the idea that change is inevitable, that the meaning of behavior depends upon its context and that the meaning of words and symbols are variable both over the period of time as well as dependent upon context. We are fond of assuming that "change is inevitable" without realizing that a necessary presupposition to this statement is that nature is flux—changing. As James (1890) said of the world that one is born into, "a big, booming, buzzing confusion" (p. 488). When Wrenn (1962) wrote *The Counselor In A Changing World*, both the title and the thrust of the book dealt with living in a changing world, a flux. Thus the assumption-presupposition, "nature is flux" is not new. What perhaps is new is the assertion that "nature is flux" is a necessary presupposition to most concepts of change

whether a position has a unit or a charge occupying it or whether the position is unoccupied. Let x indicate occupation and let o indicate non-occupation of the position. Then:

\[
\begin{align*}
x & = 1 & oox & = 4 & xxx & = 7 & oxox & = 10 & xoxx & = 13 \\
ox & = 2 & xoxx & = 6 & xoxx & = 9 & oxxx & = 12 & xxxx & = 15 \\
xx & = 3 & oxox & = 8 & xxox & = 11 & ooxx & = 14 \\
\end{align*}
\]

While the binary system has been primarily used for computers, it may have other uses. For example, instead of only being able to count to ten, using the fingers of two hands, by using the binary system, one can count to 1,023,
and/or of choice. As Deikman (1972) has observed, "... we are not the same collection of atoms that we were a year previous," and "... activity, change, process--these are the 'substance' of our bodies, of our world, of the universe" (p. 2). The question is not whether or not it is comfortable to live in a relativistic world, but whether or not such a view of reality, with its attendant assumptions and presuppositions exists in the literature of counseling psychology, and if this is so, what the implications are for counselors and counseling.

This position could be characterized as "chosen concept precedes percept." As Ornstein (1972) has described it:

... each moment we construct a model of the world, expect certain correspondences of objects, colors and forms to occur, and then experience our categories (p. 32).

Reality then, for humans, is a matter of definition (constructions). Man defines his world and in so doing, defines himself and his place in it.

Thus, we have three quite plausible but discrete and mutually exclusive views (sub-categories) of reality within the literature of counseling psychology. These are:

(1) Reality is self-evident, percept precedes concept or the facts speak for themselves; (2) Reality is conceived, concept precedes percept or appearances are deceiving; and (3) Reality is flux, chosen concept precedes percept or man
defines his world (reality) and in so doing, defines himself.

The Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning

This category should be titled the Nature of Epistemology or the Nature of Knowledge. The epistemological title was rejected because of its philosophical derivation. The use of a single term "knowledge" was rejected because in discussing the various aspects of this category, the term "knowledge" would have to be used in differing contexts with differing definitions. This could be confusing. Thus the triple title of "Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning" was chosen.

In the literature of counseling psychology, these terms have tended to be used interchangeably, although different assumptions and presuppositions are made about the terms and different methods are used to verify each term. As with the Nature of Reality, there has been little discussion in the literature as to alternative "models" (sub-categories) of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning.

When we talk about truth, we are talking about something that we believe, something that is logical, something that makes sense. Truth carries with it and within it the notion of certitude. That is, truth is seldom thought of as approximate. An almost truth is a contradiction in terms. Truth also carries with it the notion of endurance, of permanence. A truth, a real truth endures. It is not a
transitory proposition. A truth is not discovered in the sense of empirical verification, although the term "discovered" is frequently used in connection with truth. "Discovered" when it is used in connection with a truth claim usually means "realization." A truth is deduced, not induced. Truths may be logically deduced or intuitively derived and are compatible with other beliefs or truth claims. One can have conflicting knowledge or conflicting meanings, but one cannot have conflicting truths. This is an anomaly.

When we say, "It is logical to assume that . . ." or "I can not believe that . . ." we are making truth claims or truth denials. We are saying that something is or is not logical. Truth is not concerned with referents, correlations, measurement, or methodology. Truth is only concerned with logical consistency. For example, Hebb (1965) says, in reference to C. J. Rhine's experiments in parapsychology:

Rhine has offered enough evidence to have convinced us on almost any other issue where we could make some guess as to the mechanics of the disputed process (p. 194).

Hebb here is not questioning the knowledge or the methodology, etc. He is questioning the logical consistency of Rhine's results with other assumed truths or beliefs that he (Hebb) holds. Hebb is here using a verification method (coherence or logical consistency) different from the verification method that Rhine used. Hebb is saying, in effect,
that he does not care what the data are or how they were selected. He does not care what the method was or whether or not the statistical approach used was appropriate. He is saying that Rhine's conclusions are not true because they do not fit (cohere) with other beliefs that Hebb has assumed to be true. The interesting aspect of this statement is that Rhine was using the verification methodology that Hebb himself prefers.

Rhine was not making a truth claim. He was making a knowledge claim. To know something, to know about something, is not to assert a knowledge of the truth, but to assert a knowledge about a condition or a set of conditions. Knowledge is inductively, empirically verified. Knowledge, as it is most often used, is a knowledge about, but not of, Natural Law. Knowledge is not and cannot be a knowledge of the Law itself, but only an approximation of the Law because of the method of verification. The inductive method, because of the statistical assumptions used, does not produce certitudes. It produces probability statements that in essence read, that the results could happen by chance or accident only once in "x" number of repeated trials. This is not a certitude claim in any sense of the word. It is an approximation claim, a probability claim. Even if the unexplained variance becomes minimal (although it seldom is in psychology), even if ultra precise measurements are used (which seldom exist in psychology), a knowledge claim
is still a proximity statement, a probability claim within closely defined limits.

While knowledge or truth can be arrived at in isolation, i.e., an experimenter can be alone in his laboratory or insight can occur in solitude, meaning, at least the verification of meaning cannot occur in isolation. Meaning is verified, not by deduction (truth) or induction (knowledge), but by the use of a "shared determinant referent." Meaning verification requires an agreement about our symbols, our definitional systems and our referents. Meaning is thus both a choice and an exchange. It is not, as with truth, an attempt to ascertain enduring certitudes, nor does it attempt to, through measurement refinement, approximate more and more closely Natural Law. Meaning is an agreement and by the process of that agreement, an exchange. Meaning is always contextual whereas knowledge is quantitative and truth is conceptual. The contextual demand can be seen in Fletcher's (1969) comments,

A person is sitting in his office and observes a boy running down the hall past his door. He might describe the behavior, but without further information the description is useless (p. 63).

Fletcher is here making a meaning claim. He is saying that the symbol of "running" coupled with the behavior of "running" does not convey meaning. He is contending that symbols coupled with data, but without contexts (definitions) are useless (meaningless). This is a quite different
kind of claim than the knowledge claim of Rhine or the truth claim of Hebb.

For example, if we look at the "assumptions about behavior" that Dinkmeyer (1972) lists in his article "Use of the encouragement process in Adlerian counseling," we can see that these assumptions are all meaning assumptions requiring contextuality rather than truth assumptions or knowledge assumptions. The assumptions are:

1. Behavior is best understood in terms of its unity or pattern.
2. Behavior is goal directed and purposive.
3. Behavior determines the way in which the person strives to be significant.
4. Behavior has social meaning.
5. Each person interprets life in terms of his unique perceptions (p. 177).

Dinkmeyer is not here making any assumptions about the logical consistency of behavior (a Truth claim) nor is he making assumptions about the quantification of behavior (a Knowledge claim). He is making assertions (assumptions) that behavior can be understood in context (a Meaning claim). The assumptions are, in fact, either restatements or qualifications of one basic presupposition, "behavior has (social) meaning."

Thus, we can see that there are three mutually exclusive sub-categories within the general category of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning which are distinguished by
their verification methods. These are: (1) Knowledge with an inductive verification method; (2) Truth, with a deductive, logical verification method; and (3) Meaning with a shared determinant referent verification method.

The differences between these three mutually exclusive sub-categories of belief verification are shown on the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certitude &amp; Permanence</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Definition (Context)</th>
<th>Referent (Data)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Tends toward</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Required Required</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning</td>
<td>Not Required</td>
<td>Required Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen from this chart that no method of verification meets all the demands of the various methods. It is thus always possible to refute one type of verification claim by imposing upon it the demands of another method, as Hebb (1965) did with respect to Rhine. The only commonality that all three verification methods share is their symbolic requirement, that is, the use of language.

**Summary**

An analysis of the presuppositions and assumptions within the general categories of: the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning was made. Discrete, mutually incompatible,
sub-categories were constructed to subsume the existent assumptions and presuppositions in the literature within each of the general categories. These were:

1. The Nature of Man,
   a. Man as active,
   b. Man as reactive,
   c. Man as choosing.

2. The Nature of Reality,
   a. Reality as self-evident,
   b. Reality as conceived,
   c. Reality as flux.

3. The Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning,
   a. Knowledge as inductively verified,
   b. Truth as deductively verified,
   c. Meaning as contextual and verified with a shared determinant referent.

**Consistency Criteria**

One demand made on a theory is that it be, as nearly as possible, internally consistent. By internally consistent, we mean that the assumptions and the presuppositions contained within the theory are not in conflict with each other. The main assumptions that have troubled psychologists, in terms of consistency, have been the assumptions regarding determinism and free will.
Psychology has been faced with reconciling a concept of mechanistic determinism borrowed from brass instrument physics (Koch, 1964) with a concept of Free Will that was a part of the two cultures within which psychology evolved, Christianity and democracy (G. H. Turner, 1965). To risk being labeled prescientific was too threatening, thus determinism (a lawfully ordered universe) was adopted as the corner-stone of scientific psychology. An unfortunate aspect of this drive for scientific respectability was that the conflict between determinism and free will became obscured and/or ignored. Theoretical statements usually either ignored determinism as an issue and did not mention it or else simple statements of belief in a lawfully ordered universe and the existence of free will were made with no recognition of a possible assumptive conflict.

On the other hand, physicists, whose scientific respectability has not been threatened, are and have been concerned that an uncritical acceptance of determinism might destroy any concept of humans as anything other than parts of a well ordered machine. Oppenheimer (1956), for example, has commented on his concern in these matters in the American Psychologist. A recent text in quantum mechanics (Guillemin, 1968) devoted the last two chapters of the text to an examination of this question. The contributors, in these two chapters, were greatly concerned with two questions. First, what are the arguments and evidence in favor of one
deterministic position versus another? Second, what are the effects of these various positions on human freedom?

What seems to have evaded psychology in its quest for scientific status, is that determinism, whatever the form, is not a fact, a rule, or a law. It is an assumption. It is an assumption chosen by humans, not a natural law. Assumptions about determinism, as can be seen from reading Bridgman (1954) or Oppenheimer (1956) and particularly Guillemin (1968) are adopted by physicists for what are felt to be compelling arguments, but not necessarily final ones. The choice of an assumption is nothing more than a stated belief and the compelling arguments nothing more than the rationale to support such a belief.

One of the choices now regarded by many in physics as an acceptable available alternative is indeterminism (G. H. Turner, 1965). Since physics has dealt with a range of deterministic assumptions as available options, we shall also. The point is that one can choose between mechanistic determinism, conceptual determinism, or indeterminism. However, whichever choice is made, that choice must be compatible with the various assumptions that are made regarding the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning. No matter how compelling the arguments may appear to be in support of an assumption about determinism, these arguments do not constitute a verification process. To call "determinism vs. free
will" a "psuedo-problem" (Patterson, 1969) is to attempt to ignore a conflict that will not conveniently go away. Furthermore, to dismiss the "problem" obscures the fact that assumptive choices are available and that some of these choices pose potential conflicts with other assumptive choices.

Many theoretical positions in the literature include a statement to the effect that this is a "lawful, ordered universe." The statement often sounds more like a loyalty oath rather than an assumptive choice since no compelling arguments are given to support the position taken. If one is assuming that this is a "lawful, ordered universe" and that all parts have some degree of interconnectedness, then one is choosing what is known as "hard" or mechanistic determinism. G. H. Turner (1965) has stated:

This is simply the proposition that all psychological events take place according to universal laws, adhered to as a metaphysical presupposition in no sense dependent upon empirical evidence (p. 317).

Such a position obviously makes man a part of this interconnected, lawfully ordered universe and thus subject to the laws controlling it. Thus what would appear to be choice, is no choice at all if all of the interconnected facts were known. This is the position that Skinner (1971) takes. If all of the interconnected facts were known, then apparent choice would be predictable. Briefly, there are two arguments supporting this view. The first argument is
the cause and effect statement that for every effect "y," there is a cause "x." This is somewhat similar to the Newtonian statement that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Secondly, it is argued that if this cause and effect relationship is not true, then there is no intelligibility in the world. That is, that if a variety of causes can produce the same effect that it would be impossible to make logical sense out of the world. This kind of determinism assumes that psychological events (effects) are of the same kind and type as physical events and are thus subject to the same laws.

A second deterministic assumption can be entitled a "conceptual determinism" (Ornstein, 1972). One of the early assertions of this position, perhaps the first, appeared in Plato's "Allegory of the Cave." The assumption reappears in Jung's concept of the "collective unconscious" (Ornstein, 1972), as well as being a necessary presupposition for many Gestalt theorists and is currently a basic presupposition to the work of Chomsky (Hall, 1973).

Conceptual determinism holds that ideas (concepts), logic (Truth), and grammar (Chomsky) are somehow indigenous in humans. This conceptual determinism is sometimes referred to as a natural wisdom, meaning a wisdom that is built into the human organism. When one uses "truth" in the sense of it being internal and potentially emergent, some sort of conceptual determinism must be assumed. It is
the assumption that there is an indigenous, in-built pool of concepts which are not learned, but which are somehow present within every human organism. This assumption is deterministic because the organism has no choice either in the acquisition of these concepts or in the application of such concepts if and when they emerge. For example, "self-actualization" is not a debatable ultimate goal for man (Patterson, 1969). He assumed it to be a built-in end and thus determined:

It should be apparent that the issue of freedom vs. control in psychotherapy becomes irrelevant or nonexistent in the context of the goal of self-actualization. This goal is inherent in the organism . . . (p. 22).

Conceptual determinism has several forms. One of these is the notion of universal symbolism or meaning. For example, when Freud (Jones, 1955) held that certain gratification blocks were represented by specific kinds of symbolism in dreams, this was an assumption of conceptual determinism. Any ascription of a universality of meaning is an assumption of conceptual determinism. How these concepts become incorporated within the organism is not the issue here. The issue is whether or not the organism is assumed to be endowed by birth with certain meanings, concepts, or symbols. If this assumption is made, it is an assumption of conceptual determinism.

The third position is that of indeterminism. This is not non-determinism which would be chaos or anarchy with
no forms, no patterns, or no relationships. Indeterminism assumes that there is no enduring pervasive order either mechanical or conceptual. Indeterminism holds that no one theory, no one assumption can account for all other theories or assumptions. In philosophy, this is known as Russel's Theory of Types. The theory can be stated in the form of an analogy:

All members of the village are clean shaven. The barber shaves everyone in the village who does not shave himself. Who shaves the barber? (Saunders, 1968).

The rule, "the barber shaves everyone in the village who does not shave himself," does not, of course, apply to the barber. Godel (Barrett, 1960) demonstrated this concept in mathematics. His statement was to the effect that no set can subsume every other set. "Set" in this case stands for a theoretical formulation.

Russell's theory has generally been interpreted to mean that no theory can explain itself and this limited explanation has had fairly wide acceptance. Godel's position has been interpreted to: first, confirm Russell's analogy and second, to hold that no theory can subsume all other theories. There is no ultimate theory which can explain everything (Barrett, 1960).

Heisenberg (Cline, 1969) while investigating sub-atomic physics derived what has become known as Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty. This principle holds that one can
determine (measure) either the mass or the velocity of a sub-atomic particle, but not both. A more general statement of his theory, although this extension is still subject to debate, is that one can measure qualitatively or one can measure process, but one cannot measure both. Hume (Durant, 1961) held somewhat the same position when he stated that one could not put one's foot in the same river twice. Heisenberg's concept of process holds that one cannot put one's foot in the same (identical) river once. If Heisenberg's position can be generalized from sub-atomic physics, then it might be quite useful for psychology. This principle applied to the study of man would hold that the quantitative kinds of measurements we have made (such as the MMPI) have little relevance to the process of man's life and thus are not useful in the prediction of process.

Bridgman (1927) stated two similar positions. First, how one choose to view reality determined what instrumentation one used to measure it. Second, that the instrumentation one used, determined the parameters of the results one could expect. Bridgman's positions strictly applied to psychology would hold that the use of an instrument, such as the MMPI, which was developed and validated for use in mental hospital admissions, would not be useful for other than like kinds of measurements. Bridgman's positions might explain why the mass of MMPI correlational
experiments have thus far had such a low yield of useful results. One does not study the stars with a microscope.

Because of the work of Einstein, Bohr (1958), Godel, Heisenberg, Bridgman, and others, physicists began to seriously consider indeterminacy as an acceptable alternative position (Cline, 1969).

For psychology, indeterminism poses none of the assumptive conflicts with "free will" that the other determinism assumptions have posed. If man is neither a pawn of the mechanical fates nor a pawn of the conceptual fates, he can indeed make choices. Change, as well as the process of change, can be dealt with comfortably from an assumptive conflict point of view. However, to assume a total relativistic position has been quite discomforting for some people almost causing them to experience something akin to vertigo. As such, indeterminism has been a difficult assumptive pill for some to swallow.

The differences between mechanical determinism, conceptual determinism, and indeterminism can be illustrated in terms of cause "x" and effect "y." In mechanical determinism, the relationship can be symbolized as "x → y" or for every effect "y" there is a cause "x," a molecular view. However, conceptual determinism holds, for humans, that effect "y" is not a simple molecular response, but a molar response to a grouping of "x's." This could be symbolized as "x_1 - x_2 - x_j + y." The indeterminant
view would be that, for humans, there could be either an, "\(x_1 - x_2 - x_j + y\)" (a habituation response) or "\(x_1 - x_2 - x_j + y_1 - y_2 - y_j\)" the selection of "y" depending upon the availability and the appropriateness of the "y's" (Miller et al., 1960).

These three alternative assumptions about determinism, mechanistic, conceptual, and indeterminism will be used in the fourth section to develop consistent conceptual systems for the sub-categories previously developed regarding the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning. This section cannot be concluded without adding that the outlines of these three forms of determinism are very much of a "bare-bones" type of explanation. An incredible mass of literature has been published, particularly in philosophy, on the subject of "determinism vs. free will." No attempt was made to encompass this literature here. The thrust of this section was to describe the main assumptions and presuppositions now existent in the literature of counseling psychology so that these positions could be used as consistency criteria in the development of some unified competing conceptual systems,

Consistent Conceptual Systems

The intent of this section is, first to construct consistent conceptual systems, that is conceptual systems
which will meet the consistency criteria developed in the third section. Second, to develop the limitations of each system together with the consequences of such a system and to illustrate the major criticisms leveled against each system.

There is a twofold need for this section. These needs stem from the first two hypotheses (of the three stated hypotheses) that are the subject of this dissertation. The first hypothesis states that, "A categorical analysis of the presuppositions and assumptions . . . would demonstrate the incompatibility of assumptions and presuppositions within any single conceptual system." While mutually discrete subcategories within the general categories of the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning have been developed in the second section of this chapter, no conceptual systems have been developed that would either demonstrate or deny this hypothesis. One purpose of this section is to develop such conceptual systems so that the first hypothesis can be tested.

The second hypothesis stated that, "There exist competing conceptual systems within which current assumptions and presuppositions in counseling psychology can be compatibly distributed." The second hypothesis requires the development of conceptual systems in order that it be tested. However, the operating term within the hypothesis is "competing." The testing of the second hypothesis
requires not only the construction of such conceptual systems, but an examination of the consequences of these systems as well. For any conceptual system to be considered "competing," it is necessary to demonstrate that such systems yield differential applications, outcomes, and parameters.

The first hypothesis was developed to test Beck's (1965) assumption that one conceptual system could subsume all of the assumptions and presuppositions within counseling psychology. The second assumption was developed in response to London's (1964) criticism that current conceptual systems yield few if any outcome differences.

To construct the conceptual systems it is necessary to subject the discrete sub-categories developed in the second section to the demands of the consistency criteria developed in the third section. It is not enough that sub-categories be mutually discrete within their own general category. It must also be shown that these sub-categories cannot coexist within one conceptual system. To accomplish this, each of the sub-categories will be subjected to the demands of the three consistency criteria previously developed. The results should demonstrate which sub-categories are compatible, one with another. Such compatible sub-categories can then be viewed as consistent conceptual systems.
Psychological Realism

The first consistency criterion developed in the third section was mechanistic determinism. Mechanistic determinism holds that this is a lawfully ordered universe with interconnectedness, that is, that a resultant effect "y" (of a previous cause "x") becomes in turn the cause "x_1" for a successive effect "y_1," etc.

Within the general category of the Nature of Man, three discrete sub-categories were developed: man as reactive, man as active, and man as choosing. Mechanistic determinism would fit with the assumption of "man as reactive." The reaction (behavior) can plainly be seen as an effect "y" of the cause "x" (environment). Thus the symbolic representation of mechanistic determinism, x → y, would hold and the assumption "man as reactive" is compatible with mechanistic determinism.

The assumption of "man as active" does not fit with an assumption of mechanistic determinism. In the x → y formulation, the effect "y" (active) is not a resultant of a cause "x." It is assumed to be an indigenous factor. The only way that an x → y formulation could hold would be for the cause (of man's indigenous activity) to be a supreme being, a builder of man. While the ascription of a supreme being (a first cause) would seem to satisfy the x → y formulation of mechanistic determinism in that cause x (supreme being) leads to effect y (man as active), this is
really a shift in the context of the $x \rightarrow y$ formulation which is postulated to hold for specific molecular behavior and not for molar concepts. This same argument also holds with the assumption of "man as choosing," where "choice" (instead of "activeness") is a benediction from a supreme being. The assumption "man as choosing" postulates that "$x$" can lead to a selection of "$y$'s." This is obviously incompatible with the $x \rightarrow y$ formulation of mechanistic determinism. Thus, the only assumptive sub-category within the Nature of Man that is compatible with mechanistic determinism is the assumption of "man as reactive."

In the general category of the Nature of Reality, three discrete sub-categories were developed: reality as self-evident, reality as conceived, and reality as flux. Among these three sub-categories, mechanistic determinism is compatible with the assumption of reality as self-evident, i.e., the facts speak for themselves and need no interpretation. The $x \rightarrow y$ formulation (of mechanistic determinism) is not dependent upon either observation for its existence or interpretation for its verification, a position similar to Skinner's (1971) reality position which stated that, "Nothing is changed because we look at it, talk about it, or analyze it in a new way." The assumption that reality is conceptual or that appearance can be deceiving is in conflict with the $x \rightarrow y$ formulation. It is saying, in effect, that $x$ does not always lead to $y$ where $y$ is our
conception of the effect, not the effect itself. This is a conditional interpretation of \( x + y \) and one that is unacceptable to mechanistic determinism which holds that "x" always leads to "y." The reality position that reality is flux is in direct conflict with the \( x + y \) formulation. An assumption of reality as flux denies that for every cause \( x \) there is and will be an effect \( y \). However the assumption of reality as flux does not deny that \( x \) can lead to \( y \). It merely denies that \( x \) always leads to \( y \). This reality assumption does not obviate, for example, an "if-then" statement because this is a conditional statement. However the assumption of reality as flux is in direct conflict with mechanistic determinism. Thus, the only reality position that is compatible with consistency criteria of mechanistic determinism is the assumption that reality is self-evident, that the datum speaks for itself, that percept precedes concept.

In the general category of the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning, both qualitative and verification differences were developed for Truth claims, Knowledge claims, and Meaning claims. Truth claims were described as inferring certitude and permanence. The verification for truth claims was developed as a logical-deductive conceptual consistency with other truth claims and not dependent upon data.

Mechanistic determinism is a data centered notion, not a concept centered notion. Thus, the use of truth
claims with its logical-deductive consistency demands would be incompatible with mechanistic determinism except to deal with mechanistic determinism as a truth claim in and of itself. However, we are not concerned here with mechanistic determinism as a truth claim, but as a consistency demand. Since the verification of a truth claim is a logical-deductive conceptual process depending on ultimate verification in terms of the "fit" of a new truth claim with accepted truth claims, it is not compatible with mechanistic determinism.

Mechanistic determinism would be compatible with knowledge claims and the inductive method of verification used with knowledge claims. Knowledge is not a knowledge of the x's (causes) or the y's (effects) for these are assumed to be self-evident. Knowledge is knowledge about (not of) the degree of interconnectedness (Natural Law) in the data. In the x \rightarrow y formulation, it is knowledge about the "\rightarrow" not the x's or the y's. It is this knowledge, a knowledge about the degree of interconnectedness that is and can be approximate. Thus, knowledge claims and their attendant verification methodology are quite consistent with mechanistic determinism.

Mechanistic determinism is, of course, incompatible with a meaning claim as well as its method of verification. A meaning claim is concerned with conditional statements and is not in the least compatible with a consistency
demand that for every effect "y" that there is one and only one cause "x." Thus, within the general category of the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning, only the assumption of a knowledge claim with its attendant inductive verification method is consistent with the consistency demands of mechanistic determinism.

We can now formulate a compatible conceptual system using mechanistic determinism as the unifying consistency demand. This system would have four basic assumptions:

1. This is a lawfully ordered universe.
2. The Nature of Man is reactive.
3. The Nature of Reality is self-evident and exists independently of man's knowledge of it, that percept precedes concept.
4. Knowledge about the degree of interconnectedness (Natural Law) is best verified by the use of the inductive method.

We have also established, at this point, that the other assumptive sub-categories are inconsistent and in conflict with the assumptions listed above, if mechanistic determinism is used as a consistency demand. Thus, for example, one cannot make an assumption of nor have as a necessary presupposition, any statements about either "man as active" or "man as choosing" without creating an
assumptive conflict that must be resolved if the theoretical position is to remain consistent.

The foremost and perhaps the only theoretical position in psychology that conforms to this conceptual system is the writing of B. F. Skinner. In *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (1971), he escaped the free will-determinism conflict that has bothered other theorists by denying that man has choice or the capacity to make choices. Part of the power and persuasiveness of Skinner's position has come from the persistent logical consistency of his arguments. His position would be viewed, philosophically, as a Realist position, but with two important distinctions. First, in denying that man has choice or consciousness, he has escaped the body-mind dualism (and conflict) that has plagued most other Realist writers, both philosophical and psychological. Second, Skinner has excluded a notion of a supreme being in his writing thus eluding any concerted attack from those who hold differing theological positions.

Applications of Psychological Realism. Before the consequences of a Realist conceptual system for counseling, counselors and counselees can be explored, we must make the assumption, although mechanistic determinism obviates any possibility of man having choice, that man--at least counselors--have some degree of choice available to them. It is necessary that we make such an
assumption because if all events are determined and interconnected, man's fate included, then behavior modification, counseling or therapy becomes some sort of a poor joke (G. H. Turner, 1965).

If everything is determined, there are no options available for either the client or the counselor. Man merely has the illusion of choice and of change. If the psychological realist position (as herein constructed) is to have any relevance for counseling, we must make an assumption that some degree of limited choice is available, at least for the counselor, fully recognizing that we are making this assumption of limited choice only for the purpose of illustrating the application and the consequences of a psychological realist position. If this assumption of limited choice is not made, it would be fruitless—although perhaps inevitable—to write about the consequences of this position for counseling since what will be, will be. This, incidentally, is one of the problems that most writers taking a position of psychological realism fail to realize. There must be some slippage within the deterministic position or else the counselor is as much bound by the demands of determinism as is the counselee.

A counselor's behavior, based on the assumptions of psychological realism, would become a cause "x" and the resultant effect "y" would be the change in the client's behavior. Any investigation of the most effective kinds of
x's and y's would be in terms of the interconnectedness of the counseling behavior "x" to the client behavior "y."

This would produce, and has, a demand that the effects of counseling, the change in the client's behavior "y" be observable (Krumboltz, 1966) and observed. If this is not done, no degree of interconnectedness (effectiveness) can be demonstrated within the verification method that is also a part of this conceptual system. Counselor effectiveness, as well as treatment effectiveness, would be seen in the observed shift from client behavior disfunction to client behavior function. Such a view would not consider areas such as attitude shifts, affective shifts, or conceptual shifts, but only an observed behavior shift from disfunctional to functional. For example, self-reports about a behavioral shift would not be acceptable data unless the self-report itself was the desired objective.

If a teacher referred a student to a counselor because he would not produce the desired self-reports (the behavioral disfunction), then the effect of counseling would be, if it was to demonstrate interconnectedness, an increase in self-reports. If, however, the desired outcome were less disruptive classroom behavior, then the outcome would have to be less disruptive behavior. Of course, "less disruptive behavior" could refer to a multitude of disfunctional behaviors. Without, for the moment, getting into the problem of defining "disruptive" behavior, one of the
problems immediately facing the counselor would be to identify the pattern of disruptive behavior as well as the reinforcement contingencies attending that pattern. This would be necessary in order that the counselor know what patterns of behavior, as well as reinforcement contingencies, needed to be modified so that the counselor could plan a program that would lead to less disfunctional behavior. This identification of disruptive behavior would be necessary in order to demonstrate the interconnectedness (effectiveness) of the counselor's behavior. Thus the demands of an "objective" behavioral outcome criterion are considerably greater than they first appear.

From a methodological standpoint to be consistent to the assumptions of psychological realism, a counselor would need to adhere to the following procedure.

First, disfunctional behavior must be identified, not only descriptively, but behaviorally as well.

Second, a history must be taken so that patterns of behavior as well as the reinforcement contingencies of this behavior can be established.

Third, a baseline for the frequency of the disfunctional behavior would be established;

Fourth, a plan of treatment would be devised to alter the frequency and pattern of the disfunctional behavior reinforcement contingencies.
Fifth, the plan of treatment would be implemented. This could involve the cooperation of parents and/or teachers and might well involve modification of their behavior as well.

Sixth, a new index of frequency of the disfunctional behavior would have to be established so that some assessment could be made as to the efficacy of the treatment.

This derived, methodologically consistent counselor pattern is remarkably similar to the pattern of counselor behavior described by Hosford (1969):

. . . the task of the counselor is to determine:
(1) Which specific behavior patterns require change in their frequency of occurrence, their intensity, their duration or in the conditions under which they occur.

(2) What are the best practical means which can produce the desired changes in this individual (manipulation) of the environment of the behavior or the self-attitudes of the patient.

(3) What factors are currently maintaining it and what are the conditions under which this behavior was acquired (p. 5).

We thus have a pattern of counselor behavior that essentially conforms to the oft maligned (by the behaviorists and others) medical model, complete with a reference to the client as a "patient." The counseling behavior pattern is historically oriented, event oriented, and diagnostically oriented. It must be if specific behavioral patterns are to be identified. The counseling process is treatment oriented and need not involve the "patient" at all since the
recipient of the treatment is assumed to be "reactive," and must react to the proper treatment plan. The primary concern is with remediation, an adjustment to functional (normal) behavior. Finally, the focus of the treatment plan is to produce "observable" change (Krumboltz, 1966), although this demand might be in conflict with Hosford's consideration of "the self-attitudes of the patient" as quoted above unless self-attitudes could be defined specifically in terms of observable behavior. Essentially, every client would be treated as a laboratory experiment with all of the attendant methodological and procedural difficulties that usually attend such experiments.

Limitations of a Psychological Realism. The distinction between "limitations" as used in this section and "criticisms" as will be used in the succeeding section is often blurred. What is a limitation for some is a criticism for others. The distinction that will be used here will be that "Limitations" will be used to denote issues which are logically inconsistent with the assumptions undergirding the psychological realist position (as herein constructed). "Criticisms" will be used to denote attacks, objections, complaints, etc., that are aimed at the methodological structure, the basic assumptions or the implications of those basic assumptions.
Psychological realism makes the assumption that man is reactive, that is, that for every effect "y" (a behavior), there is a cause "x," the environment or a stimulus thereof. The argument used is often labeled the "black box" analogy, the black box being a box which cannot be opened and about which only inferences can be made. The brain, and in some cases the "mind," are held to be analogous to a black box about which nothing can be known (in an inductive sense), only inferred, thus rendering the "black box" inaccessible to observable, quantitative measurement. No knowledge claims can be verified, within a psychological realist position unless some objective measurable data can be generated which can then be subjected to the inductive verification process. Thus, the important thing, because it is observable and can be quantified, is behavior. The consideration of inferences about the black box, such as drives, motives, goals or values are excluded because such constructs are inferences and as such are not subject to observable quantification and verification. Instincts, where used as behavioral description as well as personality types that are based on observable or behavioral determinants would be acceptable where an \( x \rightarrow y \) formulation can be demonstrated.

Similarly, such constructs as consciousness, choice, creativity, feedback (a learning from one's mistakes), or responsibility must also be considered black box type
inferences and as such not available areas for consideration or investigation. Choice, for example, could only be seen as a behavioral response to prior reinforcement contingencies. Responsibility, per se, could only be seen as a meaningless term. How can an organism be responsible or irresponsible if behavior is a function of, a response to, reinforcement contingencies past and present in the environment. Responsibility can only be meaningful in the context of choice. In a system where choice (self-determinate behavior) is assumptively ruled out, the concept of responsibility becomes meaningless.

Psychological realism makes two assumptions: one, that reality is self-evident and two, that every effect has a cause (mechanistic determinism). This position holds that appearances are not deceiving, but that appearances are reality as we know it. Thus, the focus, as indicated previously, is on observable behavior, observable reactions in humans, not on explanations, inferences or contexts. The "why" of behavior is assumed to be a function of the reinforcement contingencies in the environment. History, the past, is only useful to establish patterns of reinforcement contingencies. Similarly, as the present is considered an extension of the prior patterns of reinforcement contingencies, so is the future considered as an extension of the present patterns of reinforcement contingencies. Thus, testing, as a performance indicator, is useful in the
present to indicate areas that have not received adequate reinforcement in the past as well as a predictor of future behaviors, unless patterns of reinforcement contingencies are changed. Inadequate predictive capability is a function, not of change due to individual choice nor of change due to insight, but of imprecise and inexact or limited measurement. All factors, either from lack of precision or scope, are not known and thus predictive quality suffers.

The assumption of mechanistic determinism rules out consideration of logic and emergent truth as well as any serious consideration of indeterminism. Indeterminism becomes an "unthinkable." The statement is usually made that if there is an effect without a cause, then all scientific endeavor would become useless (Gelso, 1970). While this statement is usually asserted as a logically infallable certitude (a truth claim, rather than a knowledge claim inductively verified which it should be to be consistent with the system), it is still only an assumption in assertion form. However, the effect of such an assertion-assumption is to limit psychological realism from considering the work or theories in other fields, particularly physics, which are not consistent with an assumption of mechanistic determinism.

Similarly, the assumption that reality is self-evident, that facts, including behaviors, speak for themselves, has ruled out consideration of contextuality in
observation or the questioning of behavioral descriptions in terms of contextuality. Such an assumption of reality as self-evident limits psychological realism from considering contextuality in the reports of disfunctional behavior as well as the reports of change in disfunctional behavior. Thus, reports, whether from teachers or self-reports, are used in psychological realism as instruments of measurement. Because reality is self-evident, it seems to naturally follow that reports of observations about reality are equally obvious and self-evident. This precludes from consideration questions as to the validity of what was observed. The position does not preclude questions of reliability, the degree with which an observer reports all the instances of a behavior for this "degree" of reliability could be a condition of prior reinforcement contingencies. However, it does rule out validity questions. If realism does not assume the validity of observation, it is then in effect saying that appearances can be deceiving. This is in direct conflict with the assumption that reality is self-evident and cannot be sustained.

A further limitation of psychological realism, if one is consistent with the basic assumptions, would be a ruling out of behavioral modification techniques which depend upon the use of the brain, in part or wholly, as an intervening mediating variable. As was previously discussed, the brain is a "black box" problem. Thus psychological realists,
who are consistent with the basic assumptions of the position, would not use "desentization" which depends upon some sort of mental imagery as well as social modeling techniques such as Bandura's (1965) where the S-R (x → y) formulation "cannot even be guessed at" (London, 1972). This limitation may be confusing unless a distinction is made between psychological realism and behaviorism. The distinction used here is that behaviorism presently seems to subsume all methodologies and counseling techniques which use a behavioral outcome as an index of efficiency, while psychological realism is a conceptual system built on and consistent with its basic assumptions.

In summary, psychological realism precludes the investigation of or the consideration of mentalistic terms such as motives or goals as well as self-determinant concepts such as choice or responsibility. This position, because of its basic assumptions, precludes investigation of predictive inadequacy for anything other than measurement inexactitude or lack of scope as well as any consideration of the questions of indeterminancy. Finally, psychological realism is, because of the basic assumptions, precluded from consideration of questions regarding the validity of measurement of observation or of the use of techniques which involve the use of the brain as a mediating intervening variable because to do so would be in direct conflict with the self-evidential assumption about reality.
Criticisms of Psychological Realism. The criticisms of psychological realism are primarily objections to and arguments against the basic assumptions undergirding psychological realism (as herein developed). Consistency criticisms regarding behaviorism, such as those by London (1972), Mowrer (1969), and Patterson (1969) about desensitization and social modeling, are not examined since these areas were ruled out in the previous section on the limitations of psychological realism.

The criticisms that are pertinent to psychological realism relate to the basic assumptions; the assumption of determinism, the assumption that reality is self-evident and the assumption that the inductive method (as applied in psychology) is the best method of verifying a knowledge claim. However, the criticisms (as stated) have in the main not been directed at the assumptions themselves (with the exception of determinism), but at the logical consequences of the assumptions. These criticisms can be classified as: (1) the "paradox" criticism, (2) the descriptive-measurement criticism, (3) the "triviality" criticism, and (4) the determinism criticism.

As the literature was surveyed, it became increasingly apparent that issues raised by critics of a position were almost never answered by advocates of that position. As was illustrated in the survey of the literature, some of these issues were raised eighteen to twenty years ago.
However, no counter arguments to the criticisms or acknowledgment of the issues raised are to be found in the literature. It is as though a pebble was dropped in a pond and no ripples resulted. London (1972) commented on the fact that the behaviorists in particular seemed to be more concerned with polemics than in dealing with substantive issues. Cogent, powerful and well-reasoned articles, beginning with Bridgman (1954) and Oppenheimer (1956) and continuing with Menzel (1966), Tukey (1969), Smith (1970), Lachenmeyer (1970), Tyler (1970), Silverman (1971), and Shotter and Gauld (1971), passed as if unnoticed, if one assumes citation, response or refutation as an index of impact.

The "paradox" criticisms may, at first glance, seem not to be criticisms. Such criticisms have postulated a belief that man was "free" as well as a faith that determinism was the only view one could assume if one were to engage in a "scientific" examination of man. These statements are criticisms of psychological realism in that they, one, deny the assumption of man as reactive, and two, deny that determinism is an all-encompassing condition. This attitude has not changed substantially over the period that the literature was surveyed. For example, Rogers (1965) stated:

If we choose to utilize our scientific knowledge to free men, then it will demand that we live
openly and frankly with the great paradox of the behavioral sciences. We will recognize that behavior, when examined scientifically, is surely best understood as determined by prior causation. This is the great fact of science (p. 407).

and,

We cannot profitably deny the freedom which exists in our subjective life, any more than we can deny the determinism which is evident in the objective description of that life (p. 407).

Five years later, Gelso (1970) took substantially the same position:

Thus, when human behavior is examined objectively, there seems to be little if any support for the concept of man as being genuinely free from causality. In addition, as scientific findings about human behavior accumulate, the assumption of freedom (from causality) becomes increasingly tenuous (p. 274).

Gelso (1970) went on to state, much as Rogers had that it was also essential for man to be considered as free. Both Rogers (1965) and Gelso (1970) took the position that this paradox was something psychologists had to learn to live with. They saw no escape from the dilemma. However, Rogers (1965) clearly recognized that determinism could not be an all-encompassing condition:

... (the) subjective value choice which brings the scientific endeavor into being must always lie outside of that endeavor and can never become a part of the science involved in that endeavor (p. 398).

However, Myers (1965) saw the assumption of determinism for investigative purposes as one of convenience rather than necessity:
The fact that the deterministic position is old and that it is a convenient assumption for scientific thinking is, of course alone no valid argument for it (p. 366).

The descriptive-measurement criticism is focused primarily upon the assumption that reality is self-evident, although some of these criticisms sometimes spill over onto the assumption that induction is the best form of verifying knowledge claims. Description of behavior is a form, although not the only form of measurement. As Sorenson (1969) has pointed out, bar pressing, bedwetting, snake phobias and other simple kinds of human and animal behavior can be defined and counted quite easily, however, the kinds of clients he typically sees do not complain of such self-evidential kinds of behavior, but of dissatisfaction with the process of their lives. As Hosford (1969), a behaviorist, has stated:

Atypical behavior . . . differs from "normal" behavior not in the way it was acquired, i.e., learned, but only to the extent that the behavior is atypical or normal to observers (p. 2).

Thus, even for Hosford, behavior is an observational judgment and not self-evident. Fletcher (1969) points out in his "boy running" example that data regarding behavior per se is useless in the absence of contexts. Novick, Rosenfeld, Bloch, and Dawson (1966) report on the difficulty of getting observers to agree on what behaviors observed were "deviant" behaviors. Novick et al., in this experiment, were
attempting to minimize "overreporting" and "underreporting" of deviant behavior. They found that even under controlled conditions a considerable number of both types of error existed and could not be eliminated. Portes (1971a) points out that deviant, disfunctional or disturbed behavior is not solely a function of social judgment, but also a function of being observed or caught:

... an individual may be characterized as "deviant" or "disturbed" only because he was "caught," while thousands of others participating in the same activities may continue to lead normal lives. If such a person is brought before a behavior therapist, the latter has no element in his conceptual scheme to question the adequacy of the social judgment. . . . As a behavior technician, the only thing left for him to do is to accept the social label and try to change the behavior "disorder" (p. 305).

As Lazarus (1969) and Ellis (1962) point out, among self-referred clients, the problem frequently is not the behavior of the client, per se, but the client's conception of the behavior. The behavior itself may be quite functional and "normal," but the way the client thinks about the behavior (and himself) is quite uncomfortable and disruptive at least for the client. In these cases, one does not have any behavior, per se, to change. The change needed is in the way the behavior is conceptualized.

These kinds of issues have caused some behaviorists to limit their experimentation to those variables (behaviors) which can be easily identified, Meehl (1972) calls this "simple mindedness."
The simple minded, due to their hyper-critically and super scientism and their acceptance of a variant of operationalist philosophy of science (that hardly any historian or logician of science has defended unqualifiedly for at least 30 years) tend to have a difficult time discovering anything interesting or exciting about the human mind (p. 933).

This lack of significance is generally the justification for the complaints and criticisms that psychological realism had dealt mainly in trivialities. As Lachenmeyer (1970) states:

This is manifested by the familiar tendency to accept as "scientific and good" any and all nomological experiments on the basis of sophistication of experimental design as opposed to the theoretical significance of the hypothesis being tested. The argument that many psychologists and social psychologists are investigating minutae and irrelevant problems cannot be easily denied (p. 618).

Shotter and Gauld (1971) see this "limited view" as the reason psychological realists have not been able to "cope adequately with our linguistic abilities" as well as a "general inability to cope with human rule-following actions" (p. 460). Lazarus (1969) sees this "limited view" as ignoring those exclusively human attributes such as "thinking behavior and symbolic reaction." Portes (1971b) complains that, "the right of hard scientists to remain 'limited' seems easily transformed into the rationale for not dealing with excessively complex or uncomfortable issues" (p. 322). A parable quoted in Ornstein's (1972) The Psychology of Consciousness illustrates this criticism quite nicely:
There Is More Light Here

A man saw Nasrudin searching for something on the ground. "What have you lost, Mulla?" he asked.

"My Key," said the Mulla.

So the man went down on his knees too, and they both looked for it.

After a time, the other man asked: "Where exactly did you drop it?"

"In my own house."

"Then why are you looking here?"

"There is more light here than inside my own house" (p. 187).

The final criticisms to be considered here regarding psychological determinism are criticisms of the assumption of mechanistic determinism itself. Authors such as Daniels (1965), Bugental (1967), Tukey (1969), Tyler (1970), and others who are conversant with the works of Bridgman, Bohr, and Heisenberg in physics hold that the idea of mechanistic determinism is no longer a viable position in modern physics and thus should not be the preferred position in psychology. While they agree with Silverman (1971) that determinism is a no longer viable position, they disagree with his conclusion that:

The result has been a persistent slavist obsession to fit the study of behavior into existent models of other experimental sciences (p. 583).

These authors maintain that the problem is not the "fitting" into an existent model, but of an obsolete model of experimental sciences. As Lachenmeyer (1970) stated:
The determinist position in the philosophy of science was shattered by Heisenberg's principle (of uncertainty) in physics. . . . This principle applies to all measurement (p. 617).

Deikman (1972), Dreikers (1971), and Smith (1970) all cite the work of Bohr (1958) as their rationale for no longer accepting determinism as a viable assumption. Smith (1970) lists four "wrong" premises in the current method:

1. The sample for the investigation will represent the whole.

2. A sample will not be changed by shifting it from a natural setting into the laboratory.

3. The experimenter is only an observer and does not affect the outcome.

4. All variables save that which we wish to experiment, can be controlled.

Let me say categorically that not one of these premises is valid when one comes to experiment on human behavior (p. 972).

Few of these criticisms, particularly those regarding determinism, have been acknowledged in the literature. In general, most of the criticisms of psychological realism are summarized by a statement of Tyler (1970):

We can no longer assert that psychology is totally objective, totally nonmetaphysical, totally empirically based and totally an impersonal search for truth (p. 226).

Idealism

The second consistency criterion developed in the third section (of this chapter) was conceptual determinism. Conceptual determinism is the assumption that there is an
indigenous, in-built pool of concepts which are not learned, but which are somehow present within every human organism and which are potentially emergent.

Within the general category of the Nature of Man, three discrete sub-categories were developed. These were: man as reactive, man as active, and man as choosing. Conceptual determinism would not fit with the assumption of man as reactive. That is, man's behavior is not a reaction to specified stimuli, but rather than such behavior is a function of how the environment is conceived. Behavior is not a reaction to a specific stimulus (the \( x \rightarrow y \) formulation), but is a response to the organization of the stimuli by the brain. In \( x \) and \( y \) terms, this might be formulated as: \( x_1 - x_2 - x_j + y_c \) (concept) \( + y_b \) (behavior). The \( x \rightarrow y \) formulation is a realist formulation and does not lend itself easily to symbolizing conceptual determinism. However, \( x_1 - x_2 - x_j + y_c + y_b \) cannot be said to be an expanded \( X \rightarrow Y \) (where \( X = x_1 - x_2 - x_j \) and \( Y = y_c - y_b \)) since there is no specificity in either \( X \) or \( Y \). Indeed for behavior \( y_b \) to occur, it is only necessary that \( y_c \) (the concept or idea) to occur. Thus while the assumption of man as reactive does not fit with conceptual determinism, the assumption of "man as active," i.e., responding to indigenous concepts within the organism, does fit and is compatible with the assumption of conceptual determinism.
The assumption of "man as choosing" is not compatible with conceptual determinism in that man has no choice in the acquisition of or the application of these indigenous concepts. Natural wisdom, insight or intuition are not deliberate, selective processes. They are emergent processes.

In the general category of the Nature of Reality, three discrete sub-categories were developed. These were: reality as self-evident, reality as conceived, and reality as flux. Among these three sub-categories, conceptual determinism is compatible only with reality as conceived, since it is the concept that is real and not the appearance. Reality as self-evident would be incompatible with the assumption of conceptual determinism in that reality as self-evidential would negate the need for concepts. No concepts or conceptual determinism are needed if reality is self-evident. Thus a reality assumption which negates concepts is incompatible with an assumption of conceptual determinism which is wholly dependent upon concepts.

The assumption of reality as flux, that is a changing, shifting reality would also not comfortably fit with the assumption of conceptual determinism for it would imply a changing, shifting pool of concepts as well, not an indigenous, in-built pool of concepts, a Natural Wisdom. It is one thing to hold that appearances can be deceiving, it is quite another to insist that they are constantly
shifting. If ultimate reality is conceived and the pool of concepts are indigenous in humans, then reality cannot be a flux since that would be inconsistent with the assumption of conceptual determinism.

In the general category of the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning, both qualitative and verification differences were developed for the Truth claims, Knowledge claims, and Meaning claims. Truth claims were described as inferring certitude and permanence. The verification of truth claims was developed as a logical-deductive, conceptual consistency with other truth claims and not dependent upon data. Conceptual determinism is consistent with such an assumption. Truth claims, natural wisdom and insight are compatible. The logical-deductive conceptual consistency is a way, perhaps the only way to verify natural wisdom or truth. Insight and intuition may be in error, but if such insight and intuition are logically and deductively compatible with other accepted truths, then such insights and intuitions must also be truths. A "truth" cannot be compatible with an "untruth."

Conceptual determinism would not be compatible with Knowledge claims and its inductive method of verification. Since knowledge claims are a function of data (self-evident reality) and the induction method is a quantification of such data, the whole process of inductive verification is in conflict with an emergent Natural Wisdom that is not
dependent upon data. Emergent concepts (natural wisdom) are not verified inductively. They are verified by their logical-deductive consistency with other emergent concepts.

Conceptual determinism is not consistent with either meaning claims or their method of verification (consensual validation). Meaning claims are concerned with conditional statements. Conditional statements are not in the least consistent with the concept of emergent Natural Wisdom that is contained within conceptual determinism. Thus, within the category of Truth, Knowledge, and Meaning, only truth claims with its deductive verification methodology can be said to be consistent with conceptual determinism.

We can now formulate a compatible conceptual system using conceptual determinism as the unifying consistency demand. This system would have the following four basic assumptions:

2. The nature of man as active.
3. The nature of reality as conceived, that appearances are deceiving, that concept precedes percept.
4. Truth claims about emergent concepts such as insight or intuition are best verified by the use of the deductive method.
Applications of Idealism. In the psychological realist position, some slippage in the mechanistic determinism had to be assumed since otherwise both the actions of the client and the counselor would be predetermined. If the counselor was to make decisions about the rearrangement of reinforcement contingencies that would alter the behavior of the client, then some slippage in the deterministic position had to be assumed. Otherwise a discussion of counselor and counselee behavior, while perhaps inevitable, would be in essence fruitless since all events were predestined to occur.

A similar type of shift or slippage must also be assumed with conceptual determinism. If man is assumed to be naturally active and if man is assumed to be endowed with emergent natural wisdom, then some rationale must be offered as to why this natural wisdom does not just emerge, why this natural wisdom is blocked or frustrated from emerging. The rationale most often asserted (Patterson, 1969) is that the source of these frustrations is external to the human organism. In short, it is the environment which keeps active man from being naturally wise. It is not the physical environment—nature—which blocks natural wisdom. This would be an anomaly. It is the social environment, the strictures of society, of parents, of authorities, which present the major blocks to the emergence of the indigenous, emergent natural wisdom within man. Thus, therapy or
counseling would consist of putting the client into an environment that would allow the natural wisdom to emerge. Since it is the strictures of society which are responsible for this blockage, therapy would consist in "getting away." Indeed, a commonly found attitude, which has its basis in this idealistic position, is the desire to, "get away from it all," "it all" being social pressures, expectations and responsibilities. Similar beliefs are found in the Bible in the story of Christ's going into the wilderness. "Getting away" in this sense is not a withdrawal from society. It is a placing of the human in a setting which allows the natural indigenous wisdom to emerge unfettered. Thus, the ultimate therapy, that therapy which would have the least potential for blockage of the emergent natural wisdom would be an isolation similar to that experienced by Christ. However, such isolation would eliminate the need for counselors and a discussion of the consequences of an idealist position on counseling would end with such a statement. Thus, just as the counselor in a psychological realist position needed to be somewhat exempt from determinism, so must the counselor in an idealist position be somewhat exempt from being a part of the societal strictures that prevent the emergence of the natural wisdom within the client.

While a rather involved rationale can be constructed to justify counselor and counseling, the justification is
usually that such a "getting away" is just not possible for an overwhelming majority of the people who need or seek counseling. Thus, even though interaction with another human, even a counselor, could represent a potential blockage of the emergent natural wisdom, a counselor can adopt certain measures and attitudes which can minimize such blockage. The idealist position then would consist of a "getting away," if not from the world, at least to the sanctity of the therapist's office to talk and think things over free from societal strictures and pressures. Thus, the counselor's role is, one, to provide a temporary sanctuary within the confidential confines of an office, and two, to furnish a partner reasonably untainted, insofar as the client is concerned, of social strictures. The counselor responses would be, as nearly as possible, "client centered" rather than socially centered or counselor centered. The goal of counseling is the emergence of natural wisdom or insight.

Three main conditions or attitudes have generally been proposed as the necessary attitudes for "client centeredness" on the part of the counselor (Rogers, 1957; Truax and Carkhuff, 1967; Patterson, 1969). These are: (1) unconditional positive regard (for the client), (2) accurate empathic understanding (of the client), and (3) congruence or genuineness (in the counselor). Of these three conditions, certainly the first two can be seen to
logically flow from the basic assumptions of an idealist position. The third condition, that of congruence of genuineness, is not a necessary logical concomitant of the basic idealist assumptions. It is usually argued that congruence of genuineness is necessary since the counselor might otherwise be seen as playing a role and thus be less helpful to the client (Rogers, 1966; Patterson, 1969). However, this is a functional argument, not a logical one and is based on a "meaning claim" not a "truth claim" which it would need to be in order to be consistent with the basic epistemological assumption of an idealist conceptual system. However, the logical consistency of the aforementioned authors is not the issue at this point. What is at issue are the consequences for the counselor and the counselee of a psychological idealist conceptual system. Those consequences are that the counselor provide a temporary private sanctuary for the client, a wilderness substitute, and that the counselor's relationship and responses be focused exclusively on the client's phenomenal world. A counselor's behavior would be catalytic in nature, that is that every action of the counselor is justifiable only in terms of aiding the "natural wisdom" within the client to emerge. As Patterson (1969) states:

Thus, counseling or psychotherapy is a method of behavior change in which the core conditions (of the relationship) are the sufficient conditions for change to occur (p, 20).
There is, of course, a slight difference between Patterson's statement and the statements developed here. Patterson speaks of "change" and "change of behavior." The idealist would hold that an "active" man is active in accordance with the revealed natural wisdom, once this wisdom has emerged and the individual is aware of it. Thus, the change in behavior comes as a response to revealed wisdom or insight. The realist operates from an "act good-feel good" assumption, the James-Lange theory of emotion. The idealist operates from a "revelation or 'ah-ha'" (which is assumed to feel good)-act good" assumption. An idealist would hold that it is illogical to assume that an active man would act in a manner contrary to revealed wisdom. The idealist assumes that actions that are contrary to verified wisdom must stem from a lack of awareness of that wisdom.

**Limitations of Idealism.** As was stated in the "Limitations" section of Psychological Realism, the distinction between "Limitation" and "Criticism" is often blurred. The distinction used here, as it was with Psychological Realism, is that the term "limitation" is used to denote counselor behaviors and counseling procedures which are or would be in conflict with the basic assumptions undergirding idealism. The term "criticism" is used to denote attacks, complaints, objections, etc., that are aimed at the methodological structure, the basic assumptions or
the implications of the basic assumptions underlying the conceptual system under examination. The limitations are contained in this section. The criticisms are contained in the following section.

In the idealist system, no counselor behavior, verbal or otherwise, which is not focused upon producing a climate conductive to the production of insight by the client would be considered as an appropriate counseling behavior. While this is a very limited view, it is consistent with the basic assumptions of an idealist conceptual system (as developed herein). As Patterson (1969) noted, a counselor may become involved in tutoring, information gathering, role playing, skill training, etc. However, these behaviors are as described and labeled. Such behavior is not counseling within an idealist conceptual system. Only those behaviors which are focused upon the reduction of blockage of the individual's emergent natural wisdom can be considered counseling, within an idealist conceptual system.

Such a position, of course, precludes testing or diagnostic procedures since these are external to the client. A very strict consistency with the basic assumptions of an idealist conceptual system would probably prohibit such counseling procedures on the basis that such tests would inhibit the emergence of insight, since the
tests represent social norms and as such, they are or could be social strictures.

The idealist position would also prohibit the use of group counseling procedures of all kinds. This prohibition would have a dual basis. First, the use and contact with additional people would negate the "getting away" concept discussed previously. A client would become involved in problems other than his own frustrations, thus blocking the emergence of insight. Secondly, the client would be subject to and unable to avoid a new set of social strictures, those developed by the group itself. This latter point is a fairly common argument used against groups and it is a perfectly reasonable argument within an idealist conceptual system. By "reasonable" we mean consistent with the basic assumptions undergirding an idealist conceptual system. Gestalt group therapy, which has been described as individual therapy with an audience, would present the least risk insofar as social contamination and potential blockage is concerned. However, the preferred mode of counseling, in an idealist conceptual system, would be individual counseling where the privacy, the "getting away" could be established and protected and the possible blockage or frustration of the emergence of the natural wisdom indigenous to the individual could be minimized and controlled. The goal of counseling would be insight production and the counselor's responsibility would be to
make every effort to provide a counseling climate in which the indigenous natural wisdom could emerge.

At this point it might be useful to briefly point up some of the distinctions between the consequences and limitations for counseling of a realist conceptual system and an idealist conceptual system. Counselors operating consistently within both systems could be said to be manipulating the environment within which the client is in contact with the counselor. However, this is only an apparent similarity since the aim and the manipulation is quite different in the two systems. The idealist would manipulate the environment so that the environment would minimally impinge upon the client while the realist would manipulate the environment so that the environment would maximally impinge upon the client. The idealist would be attempting to provide a climate (environment) which would enhance the emergence of the client's indigenous natural wisdom. The realist would be attempting to design an environment which would reinforce behaviors which were desired and which would not reinforce behaviors which were considered socially disfunctional. The idealist is doing little or no diagnosing or planning since in an idealist system such operations are unnecessary. The client intuitively knows what is best for him if conditions can be such that these wisdoms can emerge. In a realist system, no management of environment could be considered without diagnosis and plans as to what to reinforce, what is
reinforcing, etc. Thus the approach, the process and the goals of counseling would be quite different in one system as opposed to the other.

**Criticisms of Idealism.** A major criticism of the idealist position has been one of definition of terms, of process and of goals. By far, the overwhelming amount of criticism directed at the idealist position has been on this issue. Terms such as "self-fulfillment," "self-actualization" and "self-realization," as well as many others, have been continually criticized for (1) being usually defined circularly and (2) lacking any referent, behavioral or otherwise, which would allow such a quality to be identified and scaled. As Lazarus (1969) has noted, the use of abstract terms such as these create a "semantic marshlands" with each term being defined by another abstract term, with the end of the chain being the term originally being defined:

Question: What is self-actualization?

Answer: Self-actualization is mastery of the environment.

Question: What is mastery of the environment?

Answer: Mastery of the environment is the same as the concept of active adjustment.

Question: What is the concept of active adjustment?

Answer: It is made up of several elements including integration and an accurate perception of reality.
Question: What is an accurate perception of reality?

Answer: It is one of the primary characteristics of self-actualizing people (p. 26).

Krumboltz (1966), as well as others, voiced a criticism of the goals of counseling as well as a correction, a position he has been advocating ever since. The criticism was,

In the past the general approach to stating counseling goals had two characteristics: (1) the goals were stated as broad generalities; and (2) it was assumed that all the goals were appropriate for every client (p. 9).

The correction was,

Thus, my answer to the question is that the goals of counseling must be stated in terms of specific behavior changes desired by each individual client and agreed to by his counselor (p. 10).

The thrust of these criticisms, as well as those by many others including Phillips (1969), Thoresen (1971), Skinner (1971), Hosford (1969), to name but a few, has consistently been focused upon the problem of verification of knowledge. This epistemological question of "how do we know what we want to know?" is a direct challenge to the idealist assumption of "truth" and the deductive method of verification of truth claims. These critics do not deny, at least in print, that deductive verification (logical consistency) works well in mathematics. What they object to, most strongly, is the use of language, particularly
all-encompassing abstractions, without the use of referents.

This criticism has been a major problem for those holding the idealist position not only psychologically, but historically for idealist philosophers as well. However, the demand for "specific behavioral referents" by the realists has also had critics as has been previously illustrated. Meehl (1972) characterized this as a conflict between "the simple minded" and "the muddle-headed."

A second category of criticism of the idealist position concerns the "narrowness" of the definition of counseling (or psychotherapy). To be consistent with the assumptions undergirding an idealist conceptual system, counseling would and could consist only of those procedures designed to enhance the emergence of the indigenous natural wisdom of the individual such as reflection, acceptance, etc. As Perls (1969) has stated, "awareness per se is curative" (p. 17). There are two criticisms of this position: first, that such a position assumes a "unitary" concept of motivation, and second, that such a position ignores individual differences in human beings as well as differences in individual problems. In short, the idealistic counseling position is criticized for holding "one answer" for everyone and for every problem. It is criticized by Mowrer (1969), Bordin (1969), and Phillips (1969) for prescribing a form of "getting away" for all
human problems from psychosis to transient stress reaction, for interpersonal conflicts as well as for intrapersonal conflict. As Bordin states, "Client-centered therapy . . . provides little basis for differentiating persons" (p. 43).

The final major category of criticism of idealism relates to the assumption of conceptual determinism. Conceptual determinism holds that all organizing concepts are indigenous and potentially emergent, an assumption of emergent natural wisdom. The issue is how humans acquire concepts, whether or not concepts are indigenous only awaiting revelation or whether such concepts are learned. If all concepts are indigenous and are within the individual, then the passive, reflective posture of the idealist counselor is a logically correct position and procedure to take. Expansion of awareness becomes insight, the emergence of natural wisdom. Counseling activity would be solely directed at the production of insight.

However, if all concepts are not indigenous but are learned, then expansion of awareness would need to include the augmentation of the individual's conceptual pool as well. A counselor would then need to actively introduce those concepts he felt were necessary as well as encourage the emergence of previously acquired concepts. Glasser (1965), Ellis (1962), and Lazarus (1969) have couched their criticism in "active" or "confrontive" terms; however, the criticism revolves around whether or not organizing concepts
are indigenous or learned. This is a critical issue for those holding an active therapeutic position. If the concepts have not been acquired by the client and such concepts are not indigenous to the client, then no amount of reflective techniques or "getting away" will cause the emergence of concepts which are not present. An active counseling position is both justified and required to present such missing concepts.

Experimentalism

The third consistency criterion developed in the third section (of this chapter) was indeterminism. Indeterminism is not non-determinism, which would insist that there is no form, no pattern, or no relationships. Indeterminism assumes that there is no enduring pervasive order, either mechanical or conceptual. Indeterminism holds that no one theory can account for all other theories, that no one set can subsume every other set.

Within the general category of the Nature of Man, three discrete sub-categories were developed: man as reactive, man as active, and man as choosing. Indeterminism is not consistent with the sub-category of "man as reactive." "Man as reactive" suggests an enduring pervasive order to nature and the behavior of man. Man's nature, as evidenced by his behavior is always the "y" in the "x \rightarrow y" formulation. Indeterminism is not compatible with such a
rigid, absolute demand since indeterminism holds that there is no enduring pervasive order such as an "x \rightarrow y" formulation in its expanded form \((x \rightarrow y(x_1) \rightarrow y_1(x_2) \rightarrow y_2(x_j) \rightarrow y_j)\) would dictate. Such a formulation clearly makes the sub-category "man as reactive" incompatible with indeterminism.

The sub-category of "man as active," in the sense that man is purposive, responding to internal indigenous drives, motives or goals, is also incompatible with the assumption of indeterminism. "Man as active," in this sense, contains the same imperative quality that is present with the sub-category of "Man as reactive," that is, that man "must" respond to or be guided by these indigenous qualities. It is this imperative quality of the sub-category "man as active" that is incompatible with indeterminism which holds that there is no pervasive enduring order in regard to the nature of man, from either external or internal demands.

The sub-category of "man as choosing" narrowly escapes rejection on these same grounds, that of its being an absolute imperative. However, "man as choosing," in the sense that this sub-category was developed in the second section, is a postulation of the capability of man to choose, not an imperative demand that "man must choose." When "man as choosing" is used in this capability sense, no imperative (demand) quality exists. Thus, the sub-category of "man as choosing," in the sense of a capability, is compatible with the assumptions of indeterminism.
In the general category of the Nature of Reality, three discrete sub-categories were developed: reality as self-evident, reality as conceived, and reality as flux. The sub-category "reality as self-evident," in the sense developed herein, that appearances are not deceiving, that percept precedes concept, that stimuli emanating from an object carry with them the organization of form, is in conflict with indeterminism which holds that there are enduring persistent forms. It is the assumption that percept precedes concept, that the form of reality is dictated by the event, that is in direct conflict with the assumptions of indeterminism. Thus, the sub-category "reality as self-evident" is incompatible with indeterminism.

The sub-category "reality as conceived," is less in conflict with indeterminism than the previous sub-category of "reality as self-evident." The general statement, reality as conceived, is not in conflict with indeterminism if there are no emergent, pervasive or preeminent implications. However, the sub-category "reality as conceived" was constructed herein with such implications. When one talks about the "ah ha" experience or the experience of insight, one is talking about the emergence of a preeminent organizing concept. Thus, the sub-category "reality as conceived" in the sense used herein is incompatible with indeterminism.

The reality sub-category "nature as flux" is compatible with indeterminism if "nature as flux" is not
used in an imperative sense of meaning no form, no pattern, or no relationship. Since "nature as flux," as developed in the second section, clearly stipulated that such an imperative sense was not the sense being used here and that "nature as flux" meant, not chaos but simply that there were no pervasive or enduring forms, the sub-category of "nature as flux" is not incompatible with indeterminism and indeed is quite consistent with it.

Within the general category of the Nature of Truth, Knowledge, and Meaning, three kinds of claims were developed, together with their attendant verification methods. These were: truth claims using deductive verification, knowledge claims using inductive verification, and meaning claims using consensual validation for verification. Indeterminism would be in conflict with both the sub-categories of knowledge claims and truth claims, but compatible with the sub-category of meaning claims.

The sub-category of knowledge claims and its inductive verification method might at first glance appear to be consistent with indeterminism since this sub-category, as developed herein, stipulated that ultimate knowledge could never totally be verified since the inductive process carried with it a statistical notion of probability due to the error that occurs in a measurement process. Because of this error, knowledge is always approximate. With greater and greater measurement precision, ultimate knowledge can be
more closely approached. While ultimate knowledge, the enduring pervasive forms can never be totally known, it can be more and more closely approximated. However, to hold that an enduring pervasive form can never be totally known because of the limitations of measurement is quite different from holding that there are no enduring pervasive forms. The former assumes that an enduring pervasive form exists. The latter assumes that there are no enduring pervasive forms. Thus, indeterminism and knowledge claims are clearly incompatible one with the other.

Indeterminism is also clearly in conflict with the sub-category of truth claims. Truth claims, as developed in the second section, carry with them the notion of certitude. It is this notion of certitude that is in conflict with indeterminism, which holds that there are no enduring pervasives. The notion of certitude, which is carried by truth claims, is certainly an enduring pervasive. Indeterminism is thus incompatible with the sub-category of truth claims.

The sub-category of meaning claims with its attendant verification method of consensual validation is not in conflict with indeterminism. Neither meaning claims nor consensual validation carry with them any notions of enduring pervasives nor do they contain any sense of imperative demands. Indeterminism is compatible with the contextual quality of meaning claims as well as its
verification methodology and is thus compatible with the sub-category itself.

We can now formulate a compatible conceptual system using indeterminism as the unifying consistency demand. This system would have the following four basic assumptions:

1. Indeterminism.
2. The nature of man as choosing.
3. The nature of reality as flux.
4. Meaning claims can best be verified by the use of consensual validation.

Applications of Experimentalism. In both the realist position and the idealist position some slippage in the deterministic assumptions had to be assumed, otherwise the logical extension of the consequences of the positions would have been that no counseling was possible. In the realist position this slippage was necessary in mechanistic determinism because otherwise man's fate, including both that of the counselor and the counselees was determined by prior events. In the idealist position this slippage was necessary because otherwise the best therapy would be an absence of social contact which would include a counselor.

However, in the experimentalist position, no such slippage in the basic assumptions need be made. Man's fate is not determined by prior events nor is the absence of societal input necessary for the expansion of the client's
awareness. Social interaction with the counselor is both necessary and desirable for the exchange of meaning in an experimentalist position. Fate, the future, is not pre-determined and thus choice can be exercised by both the client and the counselor. Within the assumption that "nature is flux" was the presupposition that concept precedes percept, at least as the assumption "reality is flux" is developed herein. Thus, the counselor would be concerned with the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool (the sum of his concepts) which can be characterized as an expansion of awareness. This augmentation can take the form of insight, the awareness of concepts (previously learned) that are blocked or temporarily forgotten, overlooked or as not being seen as applicable to the current situation. However, this augmentation of the conceptual pool can also take the form of direct introduction of such concepts by the counselor to the client. Thus, while expansion of awareness would be one of the counselor's goals with a client (as it also is with an idealist), insight production would not be the only technique used in its achievement. Introduction of additional concepts by the counselor, or by other clients if part of a group, would also be a part of the counseling practice and process.

While it would appear that a counselor operating from an experimental position would be as preoccupied with the expansion of awareness as would a counselor operating
from an idealist position, this is not the case. The counselor (experimentalist) is also concerned with the behavior of the client, at least as this behavior has meaning for significant others in the client's life as well as such behavior having meaning for the client, particularly in terms of his self-concept. Thus, a counselor operating from an experimentalist position would be interested in both the expansion of awareness as well as the behavioral patterns which were executed as a result of such awareness.

However, the counselor operating from an experimentalist position is not so much interested in the modification of behavior (as a counselor operating from a realist position) as he is in the augmentation of the modes of behavior. Behavior, per se, would not be seen as dysfunctional, but as a contextual choice. For example, a person conceives a situation to be unsatisfactory, perhaps unsatisfactory to the point of anger. The behavioral expression of that anger would depend upon the context of the situation as well as the consequences of the behavior, both advantageous and disadvantageous. The modification or substitution of one behavioral response for another has not necessarily made the client's behavior more functional or appropriate over the long term of a person's life. Certainly such a change is easily noticed and indexed. However, the modified response may be just as dysfunctional in a future situation as was the old response in the present
situation. Thus, the experimentalist counselor is interested in behavioral augmentation so that the client may have alternative responses available from which to choose, depending upon the context of the situation facing him.

Since situations and contexts change, the meaning of behavior changes also. No one behavior is or can be appropriate (have the desired consequences) for all contexts. Some contexts can leave one with no alternative behavioral choices that will have desirable consequences. In such a case, one has to settle for that course of action which appears to minimize negative consequences. Thus, the counselor's function is not only to help the client augment his conceptual pool (expansion of awareness) as well as to increase the alternative modes of behavioral responses available to the client, but to help him learn to evaluate and make choices as well.

Choices are commonly supposed to be an easy matter once one has all the necessary information. The experimentalist counselor would take the position that all choices are (1) made on the basis of insufficient data (because reality is flux and the future uncertain) and (2) not clearly resolvable into simple decisions of the desirable and the undesirable. Some decisions, the easy ones, will appear to consist of the positive (+) versus the negative (-). However, many decisions, including the difficult ones,
will be of the negative (-) versus the negative (-) or the positive (+) versus the positive (+). Often no clear choice appears, one of the problems of living in an indeterministic world.

The making of choices is not an exercise in situational addition for experimentalists as it would be for realists. Short term choices and goals need to be examined and tested in terms of long term choices and goals. Moreover, choice needs to be seen in terms of "bets on the future." The collection of needed information, its evaluation and organization, and the testing of proximate goals and choices with long term goals do not constitute a guarantee of satisfaction. The process is, in the literal sense of the word, an experimental one. Our realist heritage has led us to think of choice in terms of making the correct choice, the choice best guaranteed to fulfill our desires. It is important for the clients of an experimentalist counselor to understand that there is no correct choice, per se, only a "correct process" for making choices. The choice itself is only a "best guess for an uncertain future." The correct process gives one the "best hope" for making a maximum number of satisfactory best guesses.

Finally, choice is seen, not as the emergence of natural wisdom or insight nor as a kind of situational addition, but as something that only the client can do and for which the client, not society, must assume responsibility.
A choosing model of man makes man, not the environment nor societal input, the responsible agent of change and/or actions taken. If choice is not available, as it is not in certain situations, then man is not responsible. However, if choice is available, then and only then can man act responsibly. The argument is sometimes made that because of limitations, man is not totally free and because man is not totally free, choice is illusionary. Such a position casts freedom, as well as choice, in an absolute deterministic mold. The argument is specious in that "choice," per se, only indicates that alternatives are available, not that all possible alternatives are available. Man certainly does not have choice, at the present time, over certain biological, genetic, and environmental limitations. Age, skin color, sexual differences are, for the present, limitations of a kind. So is location. Presently, one cannot be in two different locations at the same time, for example, the west coast and the east coast. However, such a limitation does not preclude the choosing of a trip from one to the other. The current, and perhaps permanent, limitation on a body being able to occupy one location at a time does not preclude the choice of successive future locations even though no two of these locations can be occupied simultaneously.
Limitations of Experimentalism. An experimentalist counseling position, with its assumption of indeterminism, would not use tests as a predictive measure for the future or as with the case IQ tests, as a measure of indigenous capability. Tests, for the experimentalist, would be seen as performance tests, a measure of the extent of the current development of the individual, not as an indication of potential or as necessarily predictive of the future. Since change and choice are both consistent with the indeterminism position, test results would primarily be seen as performance results and as possible indicators of current strengths or weaknesses. Once a choice of future goals has been made, such results could be used as indicators of competencies to be mastered in order to achieve such a goal.

Unlike a behaviorist, the experimentalist would not regard behavior as self-evident or as self-evidently disfunctional. The act would not carry with it the intent or the meaning intended by the person performing the act. Behavior would not be regarded as disfunctional, per se, but in terms of having consequences that were inconsistent with either the meaning intended to be conveyed or the chosen goals. Since behavior has as many modes as there are contexts and since many behaviors could be functional and appropriate in other contexts, an experimentalist would not be involved in the modification of a specific behavior so
much as he would be interested in the expansion of alternative modes of behavior. For example, a fierce expression of anger is not necessarily an accurate meaning conveyance of irritation. However, such a fierce expression of anger might well be appropriate in other contexts. The goal, unlike that of the realist, would not be to modify, change or eliminate such a fierce anger response, but to add to the individuals' range of behaviors, alternative modes of expression that would be appropriate, in terms of expected consequences, in a variety of contexts. The original behavior might well be left intact since such a behavior might well have value in other contexts.

The experimentalist counselor could not assume that concepts would automatically emerge if the proper conditions are present. The idealist counselor operating under such an assumption is precluded from introducing new (for the client) concepts. The experimentalist counselor operates under no such stricture, but operates from the view that concepts are learned. The experimentalist counselor would not wait for the eventual emergence of concepts once he was fairly certain that such concepts were not available to the client. Non-availability of the concepts (insight) would not be necessarily seen as blockage, but as the probable lack of acquisition of such concepts. An experimentalist counselor would not be limited to reflection and empathy in such a situation, but would introduce such
additional organizing concepts as he (the counselor) felt were necessary. Such behavior would be consistent with the experimentalist's assumptions and for an experimentalist counselor not to do so would be seen not only as inconsistent, but as irresponsible.

The experimentalist counselor would not attempt to be objective in the sense of having no opinions or biases. Since the experimentalist deals in meaning, rather than truth or knowledge, he would be most concerned that the relationship with the client be one that focused upon meaning exchange rather than objectivity. Objectivity and objectiveness are based on an assumption that reality is self-evident. Otherwise, objectivity is logically impossible. Rather than deny or conceal opinion and biases, the experimentalist counselor would share them with the client where such opinions and biases had a bearing. The client could then judge for himself the value of the counselor's responses.

Finally, the experimentalist counselor would not be interested in adjustment, per se, or in societal change, per se. The focus in experimentalism is on meaning exchange, the choice process, the expansion of awareness of available alternatives (concept augmentation) and the behavioral repertoire necessary to implement whatever choices the client had made. Such a position makes evaluation by traditional methods extremely difficult since the choice a
client might make could be quite discomforting for others. A teacher might not appreciate hearing how the student really felt. A parent might not be enthralled with a son or daughter openly making his or her own decisions. Both teacher and parents might see such behavior as defiant, disrespectful, or disruptive. If choice is real for clients, students, spouses, children, etc., it may involve making choices that others do not approve. The goal for the experimentalist counselor is not an "approved choice" but an "examined choice." The experimentalist counselor might not agree with the particular choice of a client. However, if the choice was made with an understanding of the available alternatives together with the attendant projected personal consequences of such a choice, the experimentalist would see such a choice on the client's part as a plus, an examined choice. Evaluation of experimentalist counseling would of necessity then be in terms of implemented examined choices, a quite different standard than those evaluation standards currently in vogue.

**Criticisms of Experimentalism.** Unlike the previous two sections of criticism of realism and idealism which quoted heavily from the literature, such critical quotations cannot be cited in this section since the experimentalist position has not been, up to now, a system that was openly advocated in the literature. However, some of the
assumptions undergirding an experimentalist position have been criticized in the literature of counseling psychology. In addition, criticisms of the experimentalist position have developed in other areas.

The primary criticism of the assumption, "man as choosing," has come from Skinner (1971) in Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Skinner refers to the myth of "autonomous man" and spends a considerable portion of the book blaming the idea of autonomous man for many of what he believes are the current misconceptions about society and education. Skinner does not deal with the implications of an assumption of "man as choosing," per se, but bases his argument primarily on the conflict between "free will" and determinism. Skinner holds that determinism is not an assumption, but a self-evident fact of Natural Law and takes the position that any conception or assumption that is not in agreement with Natural Law is invalid.

The assumption of indeterminism is not directly criticized in the literature of counseling psychology except for two articles, one by Immergluck (1964) and the other by Pohlman (1966). Essentially both articles argue that determinism must be the prevailing order or else one would be accepting the notion that effects occur without causes. The implication is that if one does not accept such a notion, then science and the scientific approach become impossible. Both Immergluck and Pohlman recognize
a conflict between "free will" and determinism. However, both feel that the needs of science and for a scientific approach in psychology are so great, that in a conflict between the two, determinism must be chosen over "free will." There is also a thread of Skinner's argument that determinism is "self-evident" that occurs with both writers.

Outside of psychology, the most famous confrontation between the advocates of determinism and the advocates of indeterminism, were the meetings between Einstein and Bohr in the 1920's. While Einstein is popularly conceived as indeterminist because of his "theory of relativity," this is a misconception. Einstein felt that there was one universal in the universe and that was the speed of light which he represented with "c" (for constant) in his formula $E = mc^2$. Einstein considered the speed of light to be an ultimate and was disturbed with the ideas of the theory of "quantum mechanics" developed by Bohr and others in Sweden. While the details and the form of the argument are unimportant here, Bohr finally posed a question that Einstein could not refute. Einstein is reported to have left the room saying to himself, in German, something to the effect that, "God does not throw dice" (Cline, 1969). While this is one of the few published accounts of a criticism of indeterminism based on a belief in a supreme being, it is easy to understand how an assumption of indeterminism can threaten men's religious beliefs. Many of the arguments used to
justify a belief in a supreme being are based on an assumption that all of the order in Nature could not happen by chance and hence a master designer, a supreme being must be responsible. An assumption that there is no pervasive order threatens those whose belief in a supreme being is based on the self-evident existence of a pervasive order.

In philosophy, where experimentalism is still a relative newcomer, two major criticisms have evolved. These are cited here as an indication of the kinds of criticisms that might logically be expected to emerge if experimentalism becomes a vital philosophical position in psychology. The first criticism holds that if there are no enduring truths or that reality is not self-evident and enduring then man is forced to check and recheck all meaning as well as to repeat the mistakes of the past since history is neither self-evidential nor verifiable. Such a criticism primarily revolves around an assertion that indeterminism is inconvenient.

The second objection to determinism is the assertion that man need stability in his life, a stability that culture and religion have provided through the ages. The assertion is made that religion is basic to man's nature since all cultures have worshipped some sort of a supreme being or beings. The question is raised as to whether or not man can cope with the anxiety of uncertainty generated by indeterminism. This latter argument and criticism is
a descriptive-prescriptive error, according to the indeterminists, and confuses what is with what ought to be. The indeterminists hold that whether or not a condition such as religious worship has existed for hundreds or thousands of years has no bearing on whether or not such a condition should continue to persist. An experimentalist would argue that no one advocates that pain, pestilence or hunger ought persist as a condition of man although these conditions have also existed for an equal length of time.

While the questions of religion and spirituality may seem out of context here, these questions have consistently arisen as criticisms of the experimentalist position in philosophy. Such criticisms would undoubtedly be raised again if experimentalism, with its attendant assumptions, becomes a viable philosophical base for counseling and counseling psychology. Without a doubt, some of the experimentalist assumptions are difficult notions. The idea of no permanently enduring forms, knowledge or truth flies in the face of much of western heritage, culture and tradition in much the same manner as the ideas of democracy flew in the face of the previous tradition of "divine right" two hundred years ago.

Summary

This chapter had two purposes, first to investigate whether any one philosophical system could subsume all of
the current assumptions and presuppositions relating to the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Truth, Knowledge, and Meaning within the defined literature of counseling psychology. Second, to investigate whether these assumptions and presuppositions could be subsumed between alternative philosophical systems and if so, whether these systems had differing consequences and limitations for counselors and counseling procedure. For these purposes, sub-categories of the assumptions-presuppositions relating to the general categories of the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Truth, Knowledge, and Meaning were developed.

The sub-categories developed within the general category of the Nature of Man were:

1. Man as reactive.
2. Man as active.
3. Man as choosing.

The sub-categories developed within the general category of the Nature of Reality were:

1. Reality as self-evident.
2. Reality as conceived.
3. Reality as flux.

The sub-categories developed within the general category of the Nature of Truth, Knowledge, and Meaning were:
1. Truth claims with the deductive method as a means of verification.

2. Knowledge claims with the inductive method as a means of verification.

3. Meaning claims with consensual validation as a means of verification.

Consistency criteria were then developed for use in making a categorical analysis. The consistency criteria developed were:

1. Mechanistic determinism.

2. Conceptual determinism.

3. Indeterminism.

Each developed sub-category of the general categories was then compared with each consistency criterion in order that consistent conceptual systems could be developed. The developed conceptual systems were then examined in terms of their consequences for counseling and counseling procedure, their limitations for counseling and counseling procedure, and the major criticisms of the assumptions undergirding each of these conceptual systems. These conceptual systems, together with their undergirding assumptions were:

1. Psychological Realism
   a. Mechanistic determinism.
   b. Man as reactive.
   c. Reality as self-evident.
d. Knowledge claims with the inductive method as the means of verification.

2. Idealism.
   a. Conceptual determinism.
   b. Man as active.
   c. Reality as conceived.
   d. Truth claims with the deductive method as a means of verification.

3. Experimentalism.
   a. Indeterminism.
   b. Man as choosing.
   c. Reality as flux.
   d. Meaning claims with consensual validation as a means of verification.

Psychological Realism is used to describe the first conceptual system developed to distinguish this conceptual system from a similar philosophical conceptual system. Philosophical realism contains a body-mind dualism which is not a necessary part, either inferentially or logically, of the psychological realism developed herein.

The first hypothesis to be investigated in this dissertation stated, \(^{H_1}\): A categorical analysis of the presuppositions and the assumptions in some of the current literature of counseling psychology will demonstrate the incompatibility of many assumptions within one conceptual
system." The categorical analysis performed herein developed a necessity for three conceptual systems to subsume the developed sub-categories of the assumptions and presuppositions within the general categories of the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Truth, Knowledge, and Meaning. The first hypothesis can be thus considered verified, at least within the context and the confines of the categorical analysis and consistency comparisons performed herein.

The second hypothesis to be investigated in this dissertation read, "H₂: There are competing philosophical conceptual systems within which the current assumptions and presuppositions in counseling psychology can be compatibly distributed." This second hypothesis makes two demands. First, that there are "competing conceptual systems" and second, that such developed competing conceptual systems can compatibly distribute within them the assumptions and presuppositions, in the areas covered by this investigation, in counseling psychology. "Competing conceptual systems" have been previously defined as, "two or more conceptual systems whose limiting parameters and logical extensions dictate different behavioral applications in the same context or situation," in this case, the behavior of the counselor and the process of counseling.

An examination of the consequences as well as the limitations developed for each of the conceptual systems
developed herein (Psychological Realism, Idealism, and Experimentalism) demonstrates that counselors operating consistently under each of these systems would use different techniques and procedures, have different goals and evaluate progress by differing standards. Thus, the first demand of the second hypothesis, a demonstration that the conceptual systems are competing, would appear to be satisfied.

The second demand of the second hypothesis is that such competing conceptual systems can compatibly distribute within them the assumptions and presuppositions in counseling psychology (within the areas under investigation). The categorical analysis and the consistency comparisons performed in the body of this chapter did demonstrate that the mutually discrete sub-categories of the assumptions and presuppositions, as developed within the body of this chapter, could be compatibly distributed within the three competing conceptual systems. Thus, the second demand of the second hypothesis can be considered to be met. Since both demands of the second hypothesis have been met, the second hypothesis can thus be considered to be verified.

In Chapter I, the significance of the problem of a philosophical investigation was discussed and the general conclusion reached was, as Nash (1966) put it, that "it is exactly in such a developing field (counseling) that rigorous philosophical investigation will bear the greatest fruit" (p. vii). However, some delineation perhaps needs to be
made as to what kinds of "fruit," what kinds of yields can be expected from this categorical analysis and the attendant consistency comparisons.

The first "fruit" or yield for a philosophical analysis of this kind should be an awareness that much of the discussion, arguments and polemics (London, 1972) regarding whose approach and what approach is best are disguised assumption-presupposition conflicts which cannot be resolved in terms of "best" or "right vs. wrong." Assumption conflicts, such as a disagreement between mechanistic determinism, conceptual determinism and indeterminism can only be dealt with in terms of persuasive argument, i.e., the delineation on the part of an advocate as why that advocate feels that one assumption is better than another.

As can be seen from the preceding categorical analysis and consistency comparisons, such persuasive arguments can take two forms: (1) evidence in favor of the assumption and (2) negative evidence in the form of a desire to escape the consequences of an alternative assumption. For example, indeterminism might be chosen by an individual as a means of avoiding the consequences of determinism such as an acceptance of the assumption of the Nature of Man as reactive, but not for reasons that a modern physicist might choose indeterminism. It would be hoped that many of the arguments and polemics about theoretical positions could be reduced with an awareness that an assumptive choice is a
value judgment and as such is not subject to empirical validation or logical validation unless a logical error can be demonstrated in the choice process itself.

The second yield from a philosophical investigation of this kind can be that those difficulties emanating from obvious internal inconsistencies between assumptions and presuppositions can be eliminated. If one reads accounts of men involved with Neils Bohr (such as Cline, 1969) in the development of modern physics, one is impressed with the amount of time spent, not in empirical investigation, but in discussion and debate with the specific aim of attempting to eliminate the internal inconsistencies in postulated theoretical positions. Thus, before anything was taken into the laboratory by Bohr and his associates, the theoretical aspects as well as the possible assumptive conflicts were discussed and debated until a consistent and testable theoretical position had been established (Cline, 1969). If one agrees with the criticisms of current methodology summarized in Chapter II, then a similar course of action would appear to be useful in counseling psychology.
CHAPTER IV

TWO LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXPERIMENTALISM FOR COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the third hypothesis. The third hypothesis reads, "Experimentalism as one of these competing conceptual systems (previously developed in Chapter III) has logical consequences for counseling psychology which have not been explored in the literature as defined herein."

The key operational phrases in this hypothesis are "logical consequences" and "explored in the literature." "Logical consequences" are those consequences which develop logical links between positions taken and assumptions-presuppositions made. "Explored in the literature" means the explicit discussion of the development of such logical links in the literature as defined herein.

One of the findings of Chapter III was the establishment of Experimentalism as one of the three conceptual systems necessary to encompass the sub-categories of assumptions-presuppositions existent in the defined literature. Before a conceptual system can be considered viable, it must first establish that it provides a logical home for sub-categories of assumptions-presuppositions that are not logically compatible with other assumption-presupposition
sub-categories \((H_1)\). Second, the conceptual system must establish that it logically dictates operational differences in counseling approaches which differ from the counseling approaches of other conceptual systems. This establishes that the conceptual system is competing \((H_2)\). Third, the conceptual system must demonstrate that there are logical consequences in terms of theoretical-operational linkages which have not been demonstrated by the use of other conceptual systems. If a conceptual system does not generate new theoretical-operational linkages, it has little to contribute to the advancement of science. It is this last criterion for a viable conceptual system which is the subject of this chapter.

This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will be an exploration of the logical consequences of the experimentalism as it applies to the demands of the Humanists for a conceptual system which incorporates an assumption of man having "Free Will" with the demands of the Behaviorists for a behavioral index of counseling change. The second section will be an exploration of the logical consequences of experimentalism as a theoretical base for the use of group process. The third section is an exploration of some of the implications of the first two sections.
The First Consequence of Experimentalism

One of the consequences of Experimentalism is that it can furnish a consistent conceptual system which will reconcile the demands of the Humanists for a conceptual system which incorporates an assumption of "Free Will" in man with the demands of the Behaviorists for a behavioral referent as an index of counseling effectiveness.

Before any reconciliation of the demands of the humanists for a conceptual system that incorporates an assumption of "Free Will" with the demands of the Behaviorists for a conceptual system which uses a behavioral referent as an index of counseling change can be attempted, the demands themselves must be clarified. No incorporation of concepts into a conceptual system can be logically accomplished until such concepts are themselves defined.

The Humanists assert that man has "Free Will." The argument against this position holds that "Free Will" and freedom, defined as the absence of limitations, are essentially the same. This argument asserts that man is not free in the sense of being devoid of limitations. Man is certainly not free to choose his parents, the conditions of his upbringing, the need for food and drink, etc. Thus, these critics argue, how can one insist that man is free when he is subject to limitations. If "Free Will" meant the same as being free, and freedom was an absolute, such arguments would be valid.
However, "Free Will" is not the same as being free or having freedom. Freedom refers to the availability, the multiplicity, and the attractiveness of alternatives. Freedom is not an absolute term. It is a relative term used for the comparison of social contexts. On the other hand, "Free Will" refers to the capacity of man to make choices. The capacity to make choices is not dependent upon the multiplicity, the attractiveness, or the availability of alternatives. "Free Will" (choice) can be exercised when only two alternatives are available regardless of their attractiveness. "Free Will" means that given alternative options as to courses of action, man has the capacity to choose between these options and that such a choice is not the result of a prior causal-effect chain. There is no difference between asserting that man has "Free Will" and the assumption of "man as choosing." Thus, the Humanist demand for a conceptual system that includes a notion of man having "Free Will" is met by the Experimentalist conceptual system which assumes "man as choosing."

The demand by the Behaviorists for a behavioral referent as an index of counseling effectiveness appears, at first glance, to be a reasonable request. The problem lies in defining just what is meant by a "behavioral referent." If behavior is assumed to be self-evident, then the observations of a single observer (Wolpe, 1958) are sufficient and satisfactory. However, as Fletcher (1969) has pointed out
in his "boy running" example, most behavior is not self-evident and requires a context to be understood. The problem of observer bias itself requires multiple observation. Both of these problems, contextuality and observer bias, require some sort of consensual validation through the use of shared determinant referent.

If the demand for a behavioral referent as an index of counseling effectiveness is a demand for a shared determinant referent, a reconciliation of this demand with the Experimental conceptual system is a simple matter. Since both positions require a shared determinant referent for the verification of meaning, they are in this respect identical.

Unfortunately, the Behaviorist literature is not clear as to what assumptions are made with respect to behavior. Wolpe's (1958) study, as well as others similar to it which assume that behavior is self-evident as exemplified by their methodology, are not subject to methodological criticism. This would seem to imply an acceptance of the assumption that behavior is self-evident. On the other hand, the bulk of behaviorist literature follows methodologies which are essentially forms of consensual validation. Furthermore, many of the criticisms leveled by Behaviorists at other investigations of counseling effectiveness are essentially criticisms of a lack of a shared determinant referent.
While the issue cannot be totally resolved, since the evidence is mixed, the bulk of the evidence would seem to require that one assume that the Behaviorists' demand for a behavioral referent as an index of change due to counseling is in effect a requirement for a shared determinant referent. The Behaviorists' objection to the use of personality tests as an index of counseling change, where no linkage between the test and specific behaviors has been established, is exactly the kind of an objection that would be raised by an experimentalist. Both would be asking, "Where is the shared determinant referent?"

On the issue of the need for a shared determinant referent for the verification of counseling change, the Behaviorists and the Experimentalists are agreed, if the use of a shared determinant referent is acceptable to the Behaviorists. Likewise on the issue of "Free Will" or the assumption of man as choosing, the Humanists and the Experimentalists are agreed. Thus, experimentalism can, as a conceptual system, reconcile the demands of the Humanists for a conceptual system which incorporates a notion of "Free Will" with the demands of the Behaviorists for a behavioral referent as an index of counseling change, if the use of a shared determinant referent is acceptable.

It could be argued that this apparent reconciliation has been accomplished by redefining the Behaviorists' demands and carries with it no change in counseling
procedures. Indeed, part of the argument against the Humanist position has been that it produced insight without action (London, 1964). Two issues, which were partially developed in Chapter III, need to be reexamined here as to the effects on the methods and goals of counseling of a reconciliation of the Humanists and Behaviorists demands. The first issue is the effect of assuming that man has "Free Will" on the methods and goals of counseling. The second issue is the effect of assuming that a shared determinant referent is the best means of verifying counseling change on the methods and goals of counseling:

The first question is, "If man has 'Free Will,' what effect does this have on counseling methods and goals?" "Free Will" has been defined as the capacity of man to make choices. Since one can choose only from those options of which one is aware, the counselor's goal would be the expansion of awareness by the client of available options. Such an expansion of awareness of options would increase the client's opportunities to exercise "Free Will," his capacity to choose. Expansion of awareness has generally been thought of by the Humanists in terms of the emergence of awareness.

This position poses a problem for the experimentalist counselor. Since he cannot assume that the client has an indigenous natural wisdom, because of the assumptive conflicts this would cause with the experimentalist
conceptual system, he must be concerned with not only the emergence of those concepts a client has acquired (his conceptual pool), but also with augmenting that pool of concepts. For the experimentalist counselor, the expansion of awareness does not mean solely using a procedure designed to enhance the emergence of awareness, but also of using procedures that are designed to augment the client's conceptual pool. Thus, one of the experimentalist counselor's goals is the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool so that the client can exercise his capacity to make choices from the widest number of available options.

The second issue concerns the effect of assuming that a shared determinant referent is the best means of verifying client changes due to counseling. For the experimentalist, this assumption requires more than searching for a link between post counseling behavior and the counseling itself. The assumption has generally been made by the Humanists that a behavior change would naturally follow from the expansion of awareness. There is, however, no necessary logical link between the acquisition of a concept and the acquisition of the range of modes of expressive behaviors necessary to convey that concept.

For example, the awareness of tender, caring feelings by a rough, tough male with only rough, tough expressive behaviors available to him cannot be verified unless such feelings can be expressed in a mode which is
meaningful to others. Such a person can choose to express such feelings, but the choice cannot be verified if it is not expressed in a mode of expressive behavior which conveys tender, caring feelings to others. No verification of the acquisition or emergence of tender, caring feelings can be made unless there is some mode of expressive behavior exhibited by the client which indicates this acquisition not only to the counselor within the counseling session, but outside the session as well. The counselor's long term goal must include some change in behavior by the client outside the counseling session itself.

The choice of the appropriate mode of expressive behavior is based on the individual's assessment of the context of the situation and the other individuals' probable interpretation of a mode of expressive behavior. If a client has a limited range of modes of expressive behavior available, there is a diminished chance of conveying the desired meaning. From an experimentalist point of view, alternative modes of expressive behavior (skills) must be available if an individual is to be able to implement, and thus verify, a choice. It is only through the implementation of choices that the making of a choice can be verified. Thus, a coequal goal for the experimentalist counselor along with the goal of the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool is the augmentation of the client's range of modes of expressive behavior.
Put in less sophisticated language, an experimentalist counselor cannot assume, as some Humanists appear to assume, that if a client "feels good" that he will automatically "act good." Conversely, the experimentalist counselor cannot assume, as some Behaviorists appear to assume, that a client who "acts good" will automatically "feel good." The experimentalist position does not deny that either an expansion of awareness may lead to appropriate behavior or that appropriate behavior may lead to an expansion of awareness. An experimentalist counselor simply does not assume that positive ideas automatically lead to positive behavior or vice versa.

The social isolate may be fully aware of the need for relationships but simply possess no relationship initiating behavior. Conversely, highly competent people with apparently great success in life may gain no satisfaction from their deeds because of a low self-worth concept which sours all rewards. Other individuals may be neither aware of their alternatives nor have the expressive skills necessary to attain them once their awareness is expanded. The experimentalist counselor is thus concerned with both the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool as well as the augmentation of a client's range of modes of expressive behavior. The client who can only relate by speaking in a loud strident voice is just as limited as the client who can only relate by touching. Both individuals have a behavior
which may be appropriate in certain situations, but not in others. Such clients need to learn the idea of choosing expressive behaviors in terms of their probable interpretation (the augmentation of the conceptual pool) as well as to learn a range of expressive behaviors from which to choose (augmentation of the range of modes of expressive behavior).

Thus, a reconciliation of the demands of the Humanists for a conceptual system incorporating an assumption of "Free Will" with the demands of the Behaviorists for a behavioral referent as an index of counseling change represent more than just a logical-theoretical reconciliation of assumptions. The consequence, for a counselor who adopts an experimentalist position because of such a reconciliation, is attention to both the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool and the augmentation of the client's range of modes of expressive behavior.

This reconciliation of the demands of the Humanists and the demands of the Behaviorists together with the logical links provided between the developed counseling goals and experimentalist assumptions has not been explored in the literature as surveyed herein. The third hypothesis can be considered, at this point, partially upheld.

The Second Consequence of Experimentalism

A second logical consequence of Experimentalism as applied to counseling psychology is that it furnishes a
rationale for group process in counseling. Group process is used here as a neutral term encompassing group therapy, group counseling, encounter groups, sensitivity groups, etc. Koch (1971) among others has characterized group process as an operation in search of a theory. Descriptive accounts of the various kinds of group process abound, however no logical links have been established to tie the process to a theoretical system in the literature as surveyed herein. Social psychology has amassed a considerable amount of information on the coercive effects of certain group situations. What happens or can happen in groups is well documented. The "why" it happens is not clear.

For an experimentalist, group process is an ongoing form of consensual validation. The group furnishes an ongoing forum for the construction of shared determinant referents, the method an experimentalist uses to verify meaning. The group is in essence a meaning verification process for the individuals participating in the group. However, it is important to understand just what the verification of the meaning denotes. Meaning verification does not imply the emergence of truth nor the discovery of knowledge (facts). It is simply that the group members have agreed among themselves as to the meaning of a concept or an act (established a shared determinant referent). There is no implication that future groups will arrive at the same agreement. Meaning verification by means of consensual
validation means only that here and now the group has agreed as to the meaning of a determinant referent. If, in experiments, such as those of Asch as reported in Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey (1962), where the group input was controlled, biased, or distorted then the consensual validation will reflect such distortion. Societies, which can be considered very large groups, have agreed in the past that witchcraft existed, that the world was flat, or that tomatoes were poisonous. The lack of persistence of a consensual validation is not disturbing to an experimentalist who assumes that reality is flux and meaning is variable.

The distortion of input in groups can be guarded against, but not necessarily avoided by having the participants in a group be as free of prior association with one another as possible. This protects the group from individuals agreeing with one another on the basis of prior or present social obligations to one another. However, a completely heterogeneous group is impossible in that all demographic variables cannot be eliminated. Language, for example, carries with it considerable prior agreements. However, the fewer prior agreements possible in the initial composition of the group, the more distortion free will be the input of the group.

Because of the consensual validation aspect of group process, this process has certain advantages from an experimentalist counseling viewpoint. For example, in individual
counseling a client may hold to a low self-worth concept in spite of congruent responses from the counselor to the contrary. This differing viewpoint by the counselor is not shared, as the client views it, by the society the client lives in. Within the counseling session itself, no consensual validation as to the client's self-worth can occur in that the client and the counselor cannot agree. The client views himself one way, the counselor another. The counselor's view of the client's self-worth, a new concept for the client, can be discounted in a number of ways, i.e., "It is your job to make me feel good," "You don't really know me," to name a few. However, within a group, such discounting of conflicting viewpoints becomes more difficult. Participants in the group process do not have an obvious vested interest in each other. How the client feels, the success of the counselor-client relationship, which is of great interest to the counselor, are not critical questions for the participants in a group, at least as they lead their lives outside the group.

The consensual validation process is less suspect and less discountable than individual counseling sessions because of the number of participants involved. The consensual validation process is conceived to be more powerful because of the greater number of individuals agreeing. As a client, who had been in both individual counseling and a group, once commented, "When you said I was O.K., I couldn't
accept it. However, when the group said it, I couldn't
dismiss them all. They couldn't all be lying.* Now, at
least, this client could choose between a low self-worth
concept and a positive self-worth concept. For the client,
a choice now existed where none had existed before.

Such augmentation of this individual's conceptual
pool is, in experimentalist terms, a consequence of consensual validation. The acceptance and incorporation of
"I'm O.K." into his conceptual pool is a direct consequence of consensual validation. Had consensual validation by the
group not occurred, the individual might not have accepted
and incorporated "I'm O.K." into his conceptual pool. Thus,
one of the consequences of Experimentalism as a conceptual
system is this logical linkage between consensual validation
of meaning verification and group process as a means of augmentation of the individual's conceptual pool.

The goals of an experimentalist counselor, as
previously discussed, are the augmentation of the client's
conceptual pool and an augmentation of the client's range of
modes of expressive behaviors. In the preceding example,
the augmentation of the conceptual pool is a direct result of the group acting as a forum for consensual validation.
However, in the process of reaching a consensual validation,
a second kind of augmentation of an individual's conceptual pool can occur,
Every group is made up of individual participants. These participants have differing pools of concepts. As a result, the group as a whole has available within it a broader range of concepts than that possessed by a single individual. In the process of arriving at a consensual validation, differing concepts (ideas, viewpoints) are expressed. While the group may not focus on any one of these diverse viewpoints for consensual validation, the participants in the group are exposed to them. These diverse concepts are thus available to any group participant. While such concepts may not be immediately useful to any participant, they become a part of his conceptual pool and are available for future use. This is also an augmentation of the participant’s conceptual pool vis-à-vis the group process.

The group process also offers consensual validation as to the meanings of modes of expressive behaviors. This kind of consensual validation, usually referred to as "feedback" in the literature, generally takes the form of "When you say (or do) that, it makes me feel ____." Consensual validation in this instance is not necessarily total agreement. Consensual validation here consists of the verification to the participant of the potential risk of misunderstanding posed by the use of a mode of expressive behavior. The group member can then choose to change a mode of expressive behavior on the basis of potential risk of
misunderstanding. If, for example, 30% of the participants of a group agree on a meaning that is highly diverse from the meaning the participant intended, the risk may be evaluated to be too great and a consideration of alternative modes of expressing the meaning may be sought and adopted. A consensual validation of the effectiveness of some alternative modes of expressive behavior can then be sought by the participant.

There is no attempt here to infer that a group is a representative sample of the wider world of the individual participant. However each group does represent one sample of consensual validation of meaning for a participant where none existed before. For the participant, as in statistics, an "N" of one is better than an "N" of none.

Thus group process, in experimentalist terms, provides accessibility to a wide range of concepts and modes of expressive behavior. The group process, in experimentalist terms, provides an opportunity for consensual validation of the appropriateness of concepts as well as the consensual validation of the meaning conveyed by modes of expressive behavior. The "why" of group process, in experimentalist terms, is that the group process is an on-going forum for consensual validation based on a shared determinant referent. The determinant referent is the individual's participation within the group. It is this linkage between the assumptions underlying experimentalism (Man as choosing,
Reality as flux, and Meaning as best verified by a shared determinant referent) and the group process itself which has not been made in the literature as herein defined.

The third hypothesis reads, "Experimentalism as one of these competing conceptual systems (previously developed in Chapter III) has logical consequences for counseling psychology which have not been explored in the literature as defined herein." Two logical consequences of experimentalism have been delineated and the implications discussed. These logical consequences have not been previously explored in the literature defined herein. Thus, the third hypothesis must be considered upheld.

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, a conceptual system, to be considered viable for counseling psychology, must meet three criteria. With the upholding of the third hypotheses, Experimentalism has met these three criteria. This does not mean, however, that Experimentalism is herein asserted to be the only conceptual system. This dissertation was not attempted with that kind of acceptance in mind.

What was desired was that experimentalism be considered as a viable alternative conceptual system equally useful to undergird theoretical positions. The counseling literature primarily consists of theoretical positions which have in the main either Idealist or Realist conceptual systems undergirding them. As one reads the literature it
becomes apparent that Experimentalism has not been considered or at least used as a philosophic base for psychological theory. To justify consideration and use, this dissertation has sought to demonstrate that experimentalism was a viable alternative.

Implications of Experimentalism for Counseling

There are three areas that need to be discussed insofar as the consequences of the Experimentalist position are applied to counseling. The first area concerns the relationship of the concept of congruence as used by the Client-Centered authors with the concept of meaning verification as posed by the Experimentalist position. The second area concerns the problems posed for experimentalist counselors by the goal of the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool. The third area concerns the difference between the concept of behavior modification as used by the Behaviorists and the goal of augmentation of the range of modes of behavior of the experimentalist position.

The concept of congruence, according to Rogers (1965) has become a more central focus for his theoretical position. Briefly, this concept holds that the counselor should be aware of and responsive to his feelings and that he should not play a role with the client. Patterson (1969), and others, agree that congruence is important, but are concerned that this position has been misinterpreted by
some as meaning that "anything goes." Their caution is understandable. Any behavior could be justified on the basis of, "I'm just being open and honest. That is the way I really feel."

For the Experimentalist, however, congruence has a much more limited meaning. Congruence would be defined as the agreement of the meaning intended (by the initiator) with the meaning received (by the receiver). This definition does not involve questions of genuineness, being real or being the person one truly is. Thus, if a counselor was congruently destructive, as Patterson (1969) and others feared, such destructiveness could only be justified, in experimentalist terms, on the basis of intended meaning, an intent that would seem grossly inappropriate as a counseling goal. The experimentalist definition places the responsibility for the meaning received on the counselor.

While placement of the burden of responsibility for the accuracy of the meaning received may seem severe, for the experimentalist such a position is quite logical. It is the initiator who wishes to convey a specific meaning. If this is the initiator's goal, the appropriate goal related behavior requires that the initiator verify the meaning received and if grossly different, take appropriate corrective steps. When there is agreement as to the meaning intended and the meaning received, consensual validation
exists. The meaning intended approximates the meaning received.

One objection to this position is that there can never be an identity between the meaning intended and the meaning received, thus consensual validation is approximate and relative rather than specific and certain. While the experimentalist would agree that meaning is variable and as such the possibility of an identity between the meaning intended and the meaning received is remote, such an objection does not seem to be a persuasive argument against placing the responsibility for the accuracy of the meaning received upon the initiator of the communication.

For the counselor this means that it is the counselor's responsibility to verify the meaning received by the client. To accomplish this, the counselor must relate to the client in terms and on language levels that are meaningful to the client. While such terms and language levels may not be the normal or preferred verbalization style of the counselor, nevertheless a counselor must use those language levels and terms which are meaningful to a client if meaning is to be conveyed and exchanged.

This position requires that a counselor, to be effective, must have a range of modes of expressive behavior. There are several advantages to this position. First, the counselor with a wide range of modes of expressive behavior has an increased probability of conveying a desired meaning
to the client. Second, a counselor with a wide range of modes of expressive behavior can effectively communicate with a wider range of clients. Third, a counselor with a wide range of modes of expressive behaviors can effectively model such behavior for the client. Thus, congruence for the experimentalist means that the initiator conveys the desired meaning as accurately as possible, both conceptually and affectively, in terms of the receiver's meaning system.

With the experimentalist position of placing the responsibility for the meaning received by the client on the counselor, some of the objections to the concept of the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool are diminished. The primary objection to the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool concerns the acceptance by the client of the concept presented by the counselor. The assumption seems to be made that the presentation of a concept to a client by a counselor precipitates some resistance on the part of a client. It is as if the act of presentation itself of the concept conveys a "you ought to" meaning to the client. The experimentalist position does not deny that a concept may be presented with a "you ought to" meaning or that such a "you ought to" meaning may precipitate resistance by the client. The experimentalist position would deny that the act of presentation automatically conveys a "you ought to" meaning. The
experimentalist position would hold that if such a meaning is received by the client, then the mode of expressive behavior chosen by the counselor was inappropriate. Thus, the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool need not automatically precipitate resistance to the presented concept.

The experimentalist position does not, however, provide a logical criterion on which the counselor can decide to shift from primarily emergent techniques to augmentation techniques. The use of emergent techniques is, as has been discussed, initially necessary to assess the client's conceptual pool. By assessing the client's conceptual pool, the counselor can determine how to best convey meanings to the client as well as to assess the client's awareness of available options. The question is, "What criteria does a counselor use to decide when to shift from such emergent techniques to augmentation techniques?" Logically, the experimentalist position does not furnish an answer in the form of specific criteria.

The decision as to when to shift from an emergent technique to an augmentation technique can only be based on an estimate of the risks involved. A premature suggestion may be misunderstood by the client because the counselor does not have sufficient awareness of the client's conceptual pool to accurately convey the intended meaning to the client. On the other hand, some situations are so
pressing that a delay may foreclose the choice of an option. In addition, any delay may only prolong or increase the client's distress. The experimentalist counselor can only follow the determinate choice process that the experimentalist position advocates. That is, one evaluates the consequences of the alternatives, makes a choice on the basis of the desirability of the consequences, and implements the choice. There is, of course, no guarantee that a specific determinate choice will always be the best choice, only that the best process has been used in making the choice.

The final area that needs to be discussed, in view of the previously discussed consequences of Experimentalism in this chapter, is the distinction between the Experimentalist goal of the augmentation of the client's range of modes of behavior and the Behaviorist's goal of behavior modification. The experimentalist counselor is not interested in the modification or the replacement of one behavior with another behavior. The modification or the replacement of a behavior might well deprive an individual of a suitable behavioral choice in another context.

For example, spontaneous verbal behavior on the part of a student in a classroom can be considered disruptive by one teacher. A program can be undertaken by a Behaviorist counselor to change this behavior. Such a program would have the effect of satisfying the demands of
one teacher as well as demonstrating behavioral change. However, if this student is in another class where spontaneous verbal behavior is prized, the student no longer has the capability to so respond, if that behavior has been successfully modified. The behavioral alternatives available to the student have been reduced, not only in the present context, but in future contexts as well. Because of this potential reduction of present and future options available to the client, the experimentalist counselor is not interested in the modification of behavior.

The experimentalist counselor is interested in augmenting (adding to) the range of modes of behavior available to the client. The client can then choose a behavior on the basis of the expected consequences of that behavior. From an experimentalist position, this course of action has two advantages. First, the individual's opportunity to make choices, now and in the future, is expanded rather than diminished. Second, the counselor's behavior is consistent with the assumptions underlying the experimentalist position.

The experimentalist goal of the augmentation of the individual's range of modes of behavior is not restricted to verbal presentations by the counselor. Any process which adds to the sum of the behaviors available to the individual without negating individual choice fits the general rubric of the augmentation of range of modes of
behavior. For example, Bandura's (1965) social modeling theory does not replace or modify individual behavior. Modeling increases the behavioral alternatives available to the individual. As such, Bandura's concepts fit better into an experimentalist paradigm than a behavioralist paradigm.

The incorporation of Bandura's concepts of social modeling into the experimentalist position places an additional burden on the counselor not to model behaviors which would be contextually inappropriate and to model behaviors which are contextually appropriate for the client. The hard nosed confrontive counselor also needs to be able to be soft and accepting and vice versa. Neither behavior is always contextually appropriate. Thus, the experimentalist counselor needs a wide range of expressive behaviors not only to effectively convey meanings with a wide variety of clients but also to be able to model a wide range of modes of contextually appropriate behaviors for the client. Since the choice of a behavior cannot be made independently of the consequences of a behavior, the client additionally needs to understand (augmentation of the conceptual pool) the ideas of behavior variability and contextual appropriateness. This now leads us full circle to the previously stated twin goals of the experimentalist counselor, the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool
and the augmentation of the client's range of modes of behavior.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, APPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section will be a summary of Chapters I through IV. The second section will be devoted to the conclusions drawn from this investigation. The third section will contain suggestions for the application of this investigation. The fourth section will outline suggestions for further research.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to investigate the usefulness of a philosophical analysis as a method of establishing a framework for: (1) identifying assumption-presupposition conflicts within and between theoretical positions; (2) constructing consistent, competing conceptual systems; and (3) establishing the viability of Experimentalism as an alternative, undergirding conceptual system for Counseling Psychology.

Conflicting theories have arisen in Counseling Psychology. Assumptions covering both theory and research methodology have been questioned; however, there exists no way to compare theoretical positions nor to investigate
conflicts. The need for a philosophical investigation as a method for establishing a framework for comparing theories or for investigating assumptive conflicts had been observed by many authors. The comments of Boulding (1967) and others, show their concern, the need and the significance of a critical philosophical investigation of the problems of counseling and guidance. They feel that it is in a field such as counseling where a rigorous philosophical investigation will bear the greatest fruit.

Three hypotheses were developed to test the usefulness of a philosophical analysis as well as to provide order and direction for such an investigation. These were:

1. $H_1$: A categorical analysis of the presuppositions and assumptions in some of the current literature of counseling psychology will demonstrate the incompatibility of these assumptions-presuppositions within any single conceptual system.

2. $H_2$: There are competing philosophical conceptual systems within which current assumptions-presuppositions in counseling psychology can be compatibly distributed.

3. $H_3$: Experimentalism, as one of these competing conceptual systems, has logical consequences for counseling psychology which have not been explored in the literature as defined herein.
Before any investigation of the three hypotheses could be undertaken, a survey of the literature (as defined) had to be undertaken. This survey occupied the whole of Chapter II and had two objectives. First, it was needed to determine what investigations had been attempted or had relevance in this area. While no similar investigations had been attempted, there was much that was relevant in the literature. Secondly, the literature needed to be examined to determine what assumptions-presuppositions existed in the literature related to the general categories of the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning. This survey of the literature occupied the whole of Chapter II.

Chapter III was concerned with the investigation of the first two hypotheses of the three hypotheses ordering the study. The first hypothesis stated that a categorical analysis of the assumptions-presuppositions in some of the literature could demonstrate the incompatibility of these assumptions-presuppositions within any single conceptual system.

A categorical analysis requires that sub-categories be constructed within the general categories under investigation (the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning). The sub-categories within each of these general categories must meet two tests. First, the sub-categories within a general category must be
mutually discrete. If such sub-categories are not mutually
discrete, then the placement of any assumption-
 presumption within one or another sub-category becomes
arbitrary and a philosophical analysis becomes untenable.
Second, the sub-categories must encompass the range of
assumptions-presuppositions found in the literature. Since
few assumptions are explicit in the literature, as Chapter
II demonstrated, the sub-categories are primarily pre-
suppositional.

The first general category to be examined was the
Nature of Man. Three sub-categories were found regarding
the Nature of Man which met the criteria of mutual exclusiveness and encompassed the presuppositions found in the
literature. These were: man as reactive, man as active,
and man as choosing. The second general category examined
was the Nature of Reality. The three sub-categories which
met the stipulated criteria were: reality as self-evident,
reality as conceived and reality as flux. The third general
category examined was the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and
Meaning. The three sub-categories which met the stipulated
criteria were: Knowledge, as best inductively verified;
Truth, as best deductively verified; and Meaning, as best
verified by the use of a shared determinant referent (consensual validation). The analysis thus far established that
there were mutually discrete sub-categories of assumptions
and presuppositions within the selected general categories.
It was now necessary to demonstrate that alternative conceptual systems were necessary to accommodate these discrete sub-categories.

To construct such conceptual systems, it was necessary to develop consistency criteria against which each of the sub-categories could be compared. The consistency criteria themselves also had to be mutually discrete and existent within the literature. The consistency criteria developed were: Mechanistic Determinism, Conceptual Determinism, and Indeterminism.

The sub-categories were compared with the consistency criteria and the following conceptual systems evolved. These were: Psychological Realism, Idealism, and Experimentalism. The term Psychological Realism was used to distinguish this kind of Realism, which did not incorporate a body-mind dualism, from Realism, as used in philosophy, which does incorporate a body-mind dualism. Psychological Realism evolved from the use of Mechanistic Determinism as a consistency criterion and incorporated the assumptions-presupposition sub-categories of: man as reactive, reality as self-evident, and knowledge as best verified inductively. Idealism, evolved from the use of Conceptual Determinism as a consistency criterion and incorporated the sub-categories of: man as active, reality as conceived, and truth as best verified deductively. Experimentalism, evolved from the use of Indeterminism as a consistency criterion and
incorporated the sub-categories of: man as choosing, reality as flux, and meaning as best verified by the use of a shared determinant referent.

The second hypothesis stated that there were competing philosophical conceptual systems within which current assumptions-presuppositions in counseling psychology can be compatibly distributed. If a conceptual system is to be considered "competing," it must demonstrate that the logical extension of such a system, in terms of operational procedures, dictates the use of differing methods and procedures. Otherwise, any such alternative conceptual system is not needed. When alternative conceptual systems proscribe differing methodologies and procedures, both in application and limitation, they can be called competing conceptual systems. Thus, the logical extension of each conceptual system, in terms of the counseling applications and limitations, was examined. In such an analysis in analytic philosophy it is customary to include the major criticisms of each position in establishing such parameters. This is done so that the reader can be aware of the issues generated by each position. This procedure was followed in this section.

The developed parameters demonstrated that counseling consistent with each system would specifically differ in terms of what should be done (application) and what could not be done (limitations). At this point, both $H_1$ and $H_2$ were
considered upheld. That is \( H_1 \), that no one conceptual system could incorporate all the assumption-presupposition sub-categories existent in the literature as defined; and \( H_2 \), that there were competing conceptual systems which could incorporate these mutually discrete sub-categories of assumptions-presuppositions. This analysis occupied the whole of Chapter III.

Chapter IV was devoted to the examination of the third hypothesis. This hypothesis reads:

\[ H_3: \text{Experimentalism, as a competing conceptual system, has logical consequences for counseling psychology which have not been explored in the literature as herein defined.} \]

The third hypothesis is, in effect, an examination of some of the logical implications of the first two hypotheses. One of the criteria for establishing a viable alternative conceptual system is that it furnish a base for the development of new logical-theoretical linkages between or among theoretical positions, operational procedures and/or undergirding assumptions-presuppositions. Two such logical consequences were examined. The first consequence was the reconciliation of the demands of the Humanist for a conceptual system which incorporated an assumption of man having "Free Will" with the demands of the Behaviorists for a behavioral index of counseling change. The implications of such a reconciliation were discussed. From this
discussion were developed the dual experimentalist counseling goals of: (1) the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool, and (2) the augmentation of the client's range of modes of behavior.

The second logical consequence of Experimentalism to be examined was its use as a theoretical base for group process. The rationale of the group as an ongoing forum for consensual validation was developed and examined. The logical link between the group as an ongoing forum for consensual validation and the previous developed dual experimentalist counseling goals of the augmentation of the client's conceptual pool and the augmentation of the client's range of modes of behaviors was examined. Since two logical consequences had been developed which had not been previously explored in the defined literature, the third hypothesis was considered upheld.

Finally, the implication of these consequences for counseling were discussed. These discussions covered three specific areas. First, counselor congruence was defined in experimentalist terms. Second, the issues revolving around the augmentation of a client's conceptual pool were explored. Third, the distinction between the experimentalist goal of the augmentation of the client's range of modes of behavior and the behaviorist goal of the modification of behavior were outlined. The discussion of these implications concluded Chapter IV.
Conclusions

Four main conclusions can be drawn from this investigation. First, a philosophical analysis is and can be useful in counseling psychology. Analysis, such as the one performed herein, can point up assumption-presupposition conflicts in theory building and use. Such conflicts, if not eliminated or resolved, can lead to contradictory goals, methodologies and research applications and yields. While one cannot conclude, on the basis of this investigation, that no use of conflicting sub-categories is possible in theory building, one can conclude that unless logically defensible rules with determinant referents are posited within the theory itself, no use of incompatible assumption-presupposition sub-categories is logically justified. For example, one could assume "man as reactive" until the acquisition of some means of symbolic exchange (language, signs, etc.) on the justification that no meaning exchange can be verified prior to such acquisition. After acquisition of a means of symbolic exchange, one could assume "man as choosing," since meaning exchange is now possible. Such a logically defensible rule, possessing a determinant referent, would allow the use of two conflicting assumptions about the nature of man. However, these assumptions would operate within very precisely defined limits and as such, not be in conflict. A similar rule might also be posited for certain kinds of habituated behavior. The work of
Miller et al. (1960) points toward such a possibility, if a determinant referent could be stipulated to distinguish between mediated (chosen) behavior and habituated (non-mediated) behavior. However, the converse conclusion is equally true. Where conflicting assumptions-presuppositions are adopted without such rules, then no logical linkages within the theory can be established.

A second conclusion is that Experimentalism is a necessary, competing, alternative conceptual system if one is to attempt to logically subsume the assumptions-presuppositions sub-categories of: man as choosing, reality as flux, and meaning as best verified by the use of a shared determinant referent. Since two consequences of heretofor unexplored logical linkages were demonstrated (Chapter IV), Experimentalism must be considered as a viable, alternative conceptual system. Obviously, the establishment of Experimentalism as a viable, competing, alternative conceptual system neither mandates nor guarantees its use for theory building in counseling psychology. However, Experimentalism can no longer be considered as an interesting philosophical system possessing little relevance to counseling and counseling psychology.

A third conclusion that can be drawn from this investigation is that there is no conceptual system, according to this philosophical analysis, which is criticism free. Every system developed herein has positive and negative
aspects. The choice between alternative conceptual systems is not a matter of seeking perfection, but a matter of choosing that system which has the maximum positive aspects and the minimum negative aspects according to an individual's values. There is no best, right or correct conceptual system, assuming that all conceptual systems under consideration are equally consistent, only the preferred choice of a conceptual system.

The fourth and final conclusion that will be drawn from this investigation is that Experimentalism, as a conceptual system, can provide a logical operating rationale for group process (the second consequences in Chapter IV). If the group is conceptualized as an ongoing forum for consensual validation, group process can be viewed as a powerful means of personal meaning verification, both verbal and behavioral (the distinction between "When you say that, I feel _____" and "When you do that, I feel _____"). Consensual validation becomes the necessary hypothetical construct for the explanation and understanding of group process. If one assumes that consensual validation is the best method for verifying meaning, as does Experimentalism, then group process would be seen as the more potent means of counseling for situations requiring such feedback, if some correlation can be established between group size and counseling potency. In this instance at least, Experimentalism furnishes a rationale for group process where none
has previously existed, at least in the literature as defined.

**Applications of the Study**

The results and method of this study can be applied to two groups and in two areas. These are: the practicing counselor, the counseling student, counselor education, and counseling research. All of them must deal with theory in one respect or another. As such, they must all be concerned, to some extent, with the logical consistency of the theory or theories that are being used as well as possible alternative conceptual systems for use in theory building.

The application of this study for the practicing counselor would take the form of providing a method for determining the answers to the following four questions. First, are the procedures the counselor is using consistent with the assumptions-presuppositions that the counselor is making? Second, do new theoretical positions logically fit with what the counselor is currently assuming and doing? Third, are the new theoretical positions advocated in the literature logically sound? Can they stand a logical analysis? Fourth, is the counselor's method for evaluating his work consistent with the assumptions he is making?

Most counselors are concerned with some degree of consistent operating rationale. However, many of them may not be aware of the logical implications of some of their
assumptions-presuppositions or of the logical conflicts between some of their assumptions-presuppositions. The method used in this dissertation illustrates a method for counselors to analyze their assumptions-presuppositions as well as to assess the relationship of these assumptions-presuppositions to their counseling practice.

Several counseling students, as well as practicing counselors were drafted into reading sections of this dissertation. The purpose was to furnish the author feedback on the clarity and readability of these sections. A consistent remark by these helpers has been that they wished that they had had such a course in the Philosophy of Counseling in their counseling training. Many commented that, as a result of exposure to this philosophical analysis, they were able to understand and analyze theoretical statements for the first time. One consistent comment was that these readers could now relate the various theoretical positions as well as be aware of the logical inconsistencies within some of these positions. They could, in short, read and critically evaluate the literature rather than simply summarize it. All of the readers expressed the wish that they had been exposed to such a philosophic overview before they had been exposed to theory itself.

These comments were flattering for the author to hear. The comments also probably have some validity. Whether or not such a philosophic overview should be
provided prior to exposure to theory itself is questionable. All of these readers had been exposed to and puzzled by theory and theoretical conflicts. Much of psychological theory is so persuasive and verbally overpowering that many readers are caught up in the flow of the words without being able to analyze what they were reading. What these readers were saying was that now they could resist such a flow and analyze what they were reading. However, these readers had been exposed to and puzzled by theory before they were exposed to this philosophical analysis. They already had a need and a use for some kind of philosophical analysis. A beginning student with little exposure to psychological theory would probably see little relevance in an early course on the Philosophy of Counseling unless both theory and philosophical analysis were tied together and made relevant to the problems the counseling student expected to encounter. The author feels that it is improper to present theoretical positions to a student without providing a means of analyzing such theoretical positions. Otherwise, theoretical positions tend to be swallowed whole.

It would be understandable if there were some reluctance to provide or require an additional course on philosophical analysis to an already overburdened curriculum. Such courses, where required in Colleges of Education, have been regarded negatively by many of the students, who see little relationship to the art of teaching and the
abstractions of educational philosophy. However, counseling students are exposed to considerably more theory than are prospective teachers. Because of this, some inclusion of the method of philosophical analysis probably ought to be offered to counseling students at the Masters level and certainly at the Doctoral level.

Part of the previous remarks, of course, apply to counseling education. Additionally, where counseling departments require position papers from students outlining their philosophy, so to speak, some criteria ought to be furnished such students outlining the kinds of consistency demands that will be made or ought to be made with regard to these position papers. One solution to this problem could be a chart which would list those aspects of alternative conceptual systems that the faculty found to be logically consistent. If a student were to deviate from one conceptual system to another, he would understand the need to logically justify such a deviation. The construction and use of such a chart might also prove illuminating to the faculty. Counseling education may as well face the problem that if counseling or counseling psychology is to become or remain a science (depending on one's viewpoint), then some attention must be paid to developing and incorporating within the curriculum some elements of either the Philosophy of Science or a Philosophy of Counseling. If this is not done, the ongoing polemical wars (London, 1972)
between one theoretical camp and another will continue to confuse and obscure the real issues.

In counseling research, the method of philosophical analysis has a specific application. If research is to yield meaningful results, the assumptions-presuppositions must be logically consistent. Otherwise, the methodology itself will be flawed and the results probably nebulous. For example, the MMPI is considered by many to be one of the better constructed instruments in psychology. However, the MMPI was developed at a time when mental hospital beds were scarce. It was developed as a screening instrument to more accurately assess the need of a specific individual for hospitalization. The assumptions undergirding the test, its reliability and validity were developed on these assumptions. To use such an instrument outside of the parameters of its assumptions is to foredoom the research expectations. It is analogous to using the evaluation criteria of a truck on a race car. The assumptions undergirding one are not consistent with the other.

An extreme example may clarify this position. One does not use a microscope to study the stars. The assumptions undergirding the research are not consistent with the assumptions undergirding the instrumentation. If this dissertation only succeeds in illuminating this one point, it will have been worthwhile.
Suggestions for Further Research

This dissertation was concerned with only the assumptions-presuppositions underlying the three general categories of: the Nature of Man, the Nature of Reality, and the Nature of Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning. Other categories and areas which would lend themselves to a similar analysis and examination are: the Nature of Values, the Nature of Goals, and the general area of ethical considerations. Such an analysis would expand this dissertation into a comprehensive philosophical analysis of the assumptions-presuppositions underlying the literature of Counseling Psychology.

Certain specific areas of this dissertation, such as the Nature of Man, could be expanded in greater depth and detail to illustrate the relationship of the various assumptions-presuppositions about the Nature of Man with theories of learning and theories of personality. This dissertation, while lengthy, was primarily concerned with the construction of a philosophical analysis. So that the thrust and flow of a philosophical analysis could be preserved, no explorations in depth in these areas (or others) was attempted. However, such explorations need to be done to illustrate the specific relevance of a philosophical analysis to theory construction.

This dissertation was originally conceived as a part of a much larger project. That project was the development
of a test of an individual's conceptual pool using a structured word association test. The dissertation was conceived as providing the logical basis for the construction of such a test. If one considers relationships conceptually as a function of meaning exchange, then the primary, as well as the secondary word associations of an individual could be an important assessment.

With such an assessment, a counselor might be able to determine the probability of an individual successfully relating in a culture or a sub-culture, providing that the necessary structured word association norms were available and current for the culture or sub-culture involved. Such a test might measure one aspect of an individual's conceptual pool with sufficient accuracy so that the test could be used as a pre-post measure of counseling effectiveness, if a suitable correlation could be established between such a measure and actual post counseling behavior. Specific behavioral referents of counseling can change for each counselee. They are difficult to establish unless one concentrates on easily measurable behavior which may not be appropriate to the counselee's concerns or goals. Such a secondary measure could be quite useful in counseling.

This dissertation could also be used as the basis for the development of a comprehensive theory of group dynamics. Some indication of how such a development might proceed was illustrated in Chapter IV. However, the section
in Chapter IV was devoted only to the development of a logical linkage between the operation of groups and the assumptions-presuppositions undergirding Experimentalism. There was no attempt, beyond establishing this linkage, to examine the relationship of the assumptions-presuppositions undergirding Experimentalism on the group process itself, the role of the group leader or the structuring of the group. Such an exploration would be a logical extension of this dissertation.

Finally, this dissertation could be used as a basis for the development of a comprehensive personality theory. Such a theory would not only view man individually, as have most personality theories, but also as part of a continuously shifting meaning verification forum. Experimentalism could furnish the logical undergirding for a personality theory which emphasized man, neither individually nor socially, but which incorporated and reconciled individual dynamics with group and cultural dynamics. While this may seem a rather grandiose scheme, it is an area which deserves future investigation.
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