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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1997
As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Ng. Pak-sheung entitled The Continuity of Chinese Cultural Heritage in the T'ang-Sung Era: The Socio-political Significance and Cultural Impact of the Civil Administration of the Southern T'ang (937-975) and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

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THIS DISSERTATION IS DEDICATED TO

SIU KUEI PANG

TERCEL
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ABSTRACT

The migration towards the center uprooted the great clans from their local areas and encouraged the rise of local ruffians to power during the late T'ang. This historical background shaped the social and political climate of the Wu regime in South China, which had been characterized by its military flavor. By enhancing the civil administration and adopting various ways of recruiting the literati and encouraging the cultural growth, Hsu Chih-kao and his successors were able to achieve complete bureaucratization of the regime, which in turn diminished the military influence and revitalized the neglected cultural tradition of their domain. South China thus became a haven of culture, and its role was particularly important as the cultural development in North China was subsequently devastated by civil wars and foreign invasions during the Five Dynasties. After the collapse of the Southern T'ang, the preservation of culture in South China allowed it to become a major source in shaping the cultural features of the Sung. Compared with other states, the Southern T'ang enjoyed considerable peace and stability, and scholar-officials had a peaceful and comfortable environment in which to develop a special style of living. Some tastes and habits had a great impact on the daily life of the Sung scholar-officials. However, cultural polices adopted
by the Southern T'ang caused the decline of national strength, for many military clans who underwent the process of civil transformation were eventually deprived of the military vitality necessary to defend the country. Also, because of the cultural inferiority, some of the Sung rulers and scholar-officials were eager to seek revenge by humiliating and oppressing the "subsidiary" officials from the south. Although the Sung adopted repressive and discriminatory measures when appointing "subsidiary" officials, some were in fact employed by the new dynasty due to the heavy demand for qualified officials. Eventually, the "subsidiary" officials could improve their prospects for promotion and favorable treatment by taking the civil service examinations. Their literary ability and knowledge of rituals also enabled them to gain imperial favor, which was vital to strengthening their position in the Sung bureaucracy.
INTRODUCTION:

Both the Wu (907-937) and the Southern T'ang (937-975) regimes were established in the region of Chiang-huai during the Five Dynasties (907-960). The territories ruled by these regimes, generally speaking, included parts of, or entire regions governed by the Military Commissioner of Huai-nan and the Surveillance Commissioners of Hsuan-hsi, the West Circuit of Chiang-nan and O-yueh. These territories are roughly equivalent to present-day Anwei, Chiang-hsi, and parts of Chiang-su and Hu-nan.

As for the rulers of the Wu, Yang Hsing-mi (851-905) founded the Wu, and his sons, Yang Wo (886-908, r. 905-908), Yang Lung-yen (897-920, r. 908-920) and Yang Chuan (?-911-938, r. 920-937), continued ruling until 937, when Hsu Chih-kao (888-943, r. 937-943), established the Southern T'ang. Li Ching (916-961, r. 943-961) and Li Yu (937-978, r. 961-975), Hsu's son and grandson, respectively, continued the regime until it met its defeat in 975.

This dissertation outlines the social and family history of 10th century China, focusing in particular on the regimes of the Wu and the Southern T'ang. In addition, the cultural achievements of the Southern T'ang and their impact on the Sung (960-1279), as well as the careers of former Southern T'ang officials in the new dynasty, will be discussed.

Traditionally, the history of the Five Dynasties has been
largely ignored by historians because of its chaotic, puzzling course and a serious lack of relevant source materials. To my knowledge, only two books, namely *The Structure of Power in North China During the Five Dynasties* and *The Empire of Min*, devote themselves entirely to the history of North China and the Min region during this period. Even recently, as studies of social, family and intellectual history have become prevalent, the history of South China during the Five Dynasties has continued to be neglected. First, none of this scholarship deals with these areas or this period of time. Second, even those scholars who claim to deal with the history of the transitional period between the T'ang (618-907) and the Sung continue to overlook the importance of the Southern T'ang. Interestingly, overlooking the importance of the Southern T'ang is not unique to contemporary scholarship. Rather, this attitude extends back to premodern China. Sung scholar-


2 For example, Peter Kees Bols claims to trace the cultural heritage of the T'ang-Sung period, but he does not discuss the contribution of the Southern T'ang in shaping the culture of the Sung. See "This Culture of Ours": Intellectual Transitions in Tang and Sung China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.
officials always viewed the Southern T'ang with disdain, dismissing it as an obscure and usurping regime. Nevertheless, despite such criticism, Sung scholar-officials were forced to admit that the Southern T'ang had made remarkable achievements in the maintenance and development of Chinese culture.

Broadly speaking, the achievements of the Southern T'ang covered various aspects of culture from court etiquette to everyday life. The institutional establishment derived from the principle of the civil administration was the cornerstone of these achievements. Social and cultural developments during the Southern T'ang enabled the Chiang-huai region to become a major source of well-educated and well-trained literati, who were instrumental in filling vacancies in the bureaucratic structure and serving as the initiators of cultural change in early Sung times. Furthermore, these people were preservers of traditional culture who exerted a good deal of influence on North China, which had been devastated by civil wars and foreign invasions during the late T'ang and the Five Dynasties. Thus, it is clear that the Southern T'ang definitely played a significant role in the cultural heritage of the transitional T'ang-Sung period. This role deserves careful and serious examination before an accurate assessment of the aforementioned phenomena can be made.
This dissertation treats the centralization of the great clans and families during the T'ang which shaped the political and social atmosphere of the Wu and the Southern T'ang, and the goals and the formulation of the basic content and practices of the civil administration, which was responsible for drastic changes in the political regimes as well as in the military clans and families of Chiang-huai. These changes had already begun to take place prior to the establishment of the Southern T'ang. Because the extent of the civil administration's achievements was greatly appreciated after the decline of the Southern T'ang, extending the period covered from the T'ang to the early Sung is essential for a complete understanding of the social and political background of the Wu and the Southern T'ang as well as the effects of the civil administration. In addition, understanding the aforementioned developments which took place during these two regimes is indispensable for a better understanding of the cultural features that originated during the Sung era.

The primary sources cited in this dissertation include chronicles and dynastic histories, as well as other kinds of subsidiary histories of the Southern T'ang compiled by Sung scholars and historians. Moreover, I have used almost two hundred kinds of note books, stories (pi-chi hsiao-shuo) and collected works ranging from the period of the late T'ang
through the Five Dynasties and the Sung. Because many epitaphs and biographies written by Sung contemporaries trace the activities of their ancestors who served as officials in the Southern T’ang, these materials were of great value to this study.

However, the aforementioned primary sources concentrate mostly on the lives and achievements of great historical figures and their clans, while few contain descriptions of individuals or families of average and inferior political and social status. Fortunately, the Chinese genealogies contained in the Family History Library in Salt Lake City, Utah, proved quite useful in this regard. To my knowledge, no previous historians have ever used such genealogies in their research of 10th-century China. Therefore, the present research constitutes a significant contribution to our understanding of traditional Chinese family and social life.

Since using genealogies as historical sources for researching social and family history is a new trend in Sinology, guidelines for examining and judging the validity of the material found in these genealogies are still undetermined, because the use of genealogies is simply too recent for scholars to have defined a commonly accepted methodology. Therefore, one of the goals of this dissertation

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^ As for the criteria of using subsidiary histories, note books and stories in my dissertation, see Appendix I.
is to provide such a methodology.

Throughout this research, I examine the validity and reliability of the genealogical materials by means of textual comparison and analysis. In my tentative opinion, relying solely on genealogies is undesirable, as they record only those activities which relate to clans and families, while generally neglecting to provide descriptions of the relevant historical background. In order to make up for the limitations in the scope of these genealogies, it is necessary to also consider the historical framework provided by the Standard History and other official documents. By including the relevant historical background, our interpretation of the genealogies has a more reliable basis, while the genealogical record fills in the blanks left by ordinary primary sources dealing with social and family life.
CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL SETTING

I, The Migration Toward the Center of Great Literary Clans

The migration toward the center forms the historical setting for this dissertation and, broadly speaking, was the major factor shaping the Wu dynasty (907-931) in Southeast China. The dependency of the great clans upon the centralized government, which plays an important role in giving rise to the centralization of great clans, originated in late Western Chin (265-316). Apart from dynastic upheaval, foreign invasion was vital to the transformation of prominent clans, which dominated society and bureaucracy since the Later Han (25-220). Anticipating that social and political oppression would be inevitable under barbarian rule, many clans followed the imperial flight to the south.

The movement of prominent clans highlighted the limitation

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4 The term "migration toward the center" is borrowed from Mao Han-kuang, to mean the movements of the great clans to the center of the empire, namely Chang-an, Lo-yang, and their surrounding area. (See Mao’s article, "On the Concentration of the Literary clans Emigrating from Their Native Place", included in The Discussion of the Social History in the Medieval China, Taipei: Lien-ching Publisher, 1988, pp. 235-337.) For the sake of convenience, the term will be abbreviated as "the centralization" in the dissertation. The great clans were the main social group involved in the centralization. In spite of some exceptional cases, the means to rise to prominence, and to maintain status and prosperity adopted by this social group were through success in the civil service examinations and civil service career. Definitely, the social nature of this group was quite different from that of the local rowdies and scoundrels which dominated the local administration in late T'ang, as described in the following.
of basing clan prosperity and prestige solely on the long-time practice of dominance in a particular locale, for the moving of the center of political gravity led to a longstanding separation from local affinities of the northern clans. In the face of the separation, the so-called "sojourner clans" shifted their strategy for success in life by focusing exclusively on careers in the officialdom. This eventually resulted in their increasing dependency on the central government and became more and more obvious in the period of the Southern Dynasties (420-589).

The abolition of the Rectifier of the Nine Ranks System (chiu-p'in chung-cheng chih) in the Sui Dynasty (589-618) enabled the central government to recommend and appoint officials, which had long been done by local officials. This institutional change was tantamount to a doomsday pronouncement for the prominent clans because local base and affinity were no longer relevant or effective in insuring that their members would become officials. Those staying in the provinces, regardless of pedigree, would be deprived of the opportunity of entering the officialdom. Only those living in or around the capital would have the opportunity of becoming officials. There is no doubt that the centralization of the authority to recommend and appoint officials was the most significant factor motivating clans in their "migration toward the center".
The evolution in the T'ang civil service examinations only served to intensify the trend of centralization. In early T'ang, the civil service examinations were basically used to recruit commoners into the bureaucracy.\(^5\) As time went by, the situation changed: most participants were no longer commoners and many candidates came from prominent clans. Based on their social and political prominence, many clan members became "presented scholars" (chin-chih) degree holders.

The primary reason for their participation in the examinations, apart from its social prestige and status among scholar-officials,\(^6\) was the concentration of prominent clans in the capital area. Having lost their local bases of power and influence, they became more and more committed to the civil service examinations as a way to maintain clan prestige and to commence a career. Moreover, the power struggle occurring in late T'ang was no longer a conflict between a


\(^6\) As the *T'ang Chi-yen* mentions, those even being promoted as prime ministers, and not having the chin-chih degree would regret this deficiency. This was the reason why examination candidates numbered not less than eight to nine hundred every year. (p. 4.) Hsueh Yuan-ch'ao (622-683) confessed to his intimates that he had three regrets; one of them was that he "did not start his public career by means of a chin-shih degree". (Wang Tang, *T'ang Yu-lin*, Taipei: Shih-chieh Shu-chu, 1962, p. 140.) The social advantage of chin-shih degree was also manifested in its being a convenience for an ideal marriage. See Li Fang (925-974), *Tai-ping Kuang-chi*, (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1961), pp. 3502-3.
"new force" and traditional clans. Instead, it was simply the struggle among various prominent clans.

Owing to the fierce competition within the inner circle of bureaucratic families of high status, prestigious pedigree was no longer an effective guarantee for entry and advancement in public service. Contrarily, success in the civil service examinations as the basis for entry into the officialdom became almost a prerequisite for aspirants to better themselves. It was in this fierce competition in the examination hall that family background could no longer guarantee ascent on the ladder of success.

As shown by the case of Lu Wang, his pedigree and clan reputation were among the best, but he did not pass the examinations after over twenty attempts. Most officials viewed this event as unfair, and voiced regret for him. In addition, the Ta-T'ang Hsin-yu records an anecdote concerning Li Hu-hsiu, who once served as an examiner. One examination candidate was surnamed Tsui. His literary work was not good. After scrutiny, Li told the examination candidate,

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7 The term "new force" refers to chin-shih degree holders of obscure origin, emerging from the period of Empress Wu (623-705, r. 684-705), as well as the mid and the late T'ang through the success in the civil service examinations.


9 T'ang Chi-ven, p. 107.
"Mr. Tsui, you come from the Tsui's of Ch'ing-ho, a first-class clan, and your appearance is not bad. You have both beard and eyebrow as strict and tough as a double-headed lance, and a very high intelligence. The capacity at which you begin your life is assured, why should you get a chin-shih degree?" Li then consoled Tsui for several moments and sent him away. Those hearing this story burst into laughter. 10

Based on the regulations of the civil service examinations, candidate names were not concealed and the chief examiner knew exactly who wrote the examination papers. This was why a literary reputation established previous to the examination could influence the judgment of the examiner grading the papers of the candidates. As a matter of fact, there was a tradition in the civil service examinations that the chief examiner usually acquired information about the candidates and candidates could establish a reputation by practicing wen-chuan, a standardized way of submitting literary composition to the chief examiner. 11

The chief examiner were also subject to the opinions and recommendations given by powerful officials. Therefore, in addition to making a direct approach to examiners, many candidates submitted literary compositions to influential

10 Liu Su, Ta-T'ang Hsin-yu, Ts'ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch'u-pien ed., pp. 82-3.

11 According to Chiao Yen-wei, "during the T'ang, the examination candidates, based on the help of the contemporary notables, submitted their name to the chief examiner. Afterward, they submitted their literary composition to him. Few days after, they did the same thing, and the practice was called wen-chuan." (Yun-lu Man-ch'ao, She-wen Tzu-chiu ed., 8: 3b.)
officals, to elicit their support and garner favor among the circle of bureaucrats. If an examination candidate wanted to get a chin-shih degree, even though he came from a prominent family, he could not avoid following suit. So, for example the various Yangs in the street of Kung-ching (Kung-ching fang) had deep connections with one another, and all had pledged to die for the cause of the Yangs. Their power and influence were conspicuous and could not be eradicated by force.

Yet, Yang Hsi-ku, a member of the Yangs, had to submit his literary composition to a high-ranked official when he started to compete in the examination hall. 12

The Yun-hsi Chu-shih Chi mentions that when Niu Tseng-ju (779-847) arrived in the capital, he lived outside the gate of Chang-an. What he needed to do first was to take his literary compositions to Han Yu (768-824) and Huang-pu Ti. Knowing that his work had been appraised, he then dared enter the capital.

At that time, did the T'ang provide no civil service examinations for which literati could strive? or have no fair opinion to judge literary composition enabling the literati to have self-confidence in their own literary work? Were the literati so eager to do in that way? It was because examination candidates, if unable to get the help of the officials, would not be appreciated in their contemporary period, and their literary work could not be

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The Kuan-yuan Chi also says that during the T'ang dynasty, when examination candidates visited the powerful and influential officials, their attitude was extremely humble and respectful towards the officials. In spite of the deepest submissiveness and humility, they had no fear or shame as such action would bring them with long-lasting benefit. As a matter of fact, examination candidates dressed in poor clothes and entered the capital walking. They could get their reputation in no more than ten years, and from then on, they could enjoy the great fortune of being officials. In other words, they acted humbly when they were poor and wanderers in Chang-an, but could gain the fulfillment of their lives. What would they care and why not act?

 Obviously, the power of deciding who was to be included in the list of successful candidates rested in the hand of influential figures in the capital. Therefore, success in taking the civil service examinations not only rested on personal talent, but also on the image and literary reputation of the candidates in the mind of powerful officials. This is

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13 Hua Chen, Yun-hsi Chu-shih Chi, Szu-k'u Ch'uan-shu ed., 22: 34a.

14 Lu Nan-kung (1047-1086), Kuan-yuan Chi, Szu-k'u Ch'uan-shu ed., 13: 7ab.

15 Sometimes, examination candidates might visit prominent local officials for enhancing reputation, and their wishes could be materialized provided that the officials' recommendation reached the central government. For instance, when Hsiang Shih had not yet succeeded in the civil service examinations, he visited Yang Ching-chi, who was serving in local administration in Chiang-si, to promote his reputation. Hsiang was greatly appreciated by Yang and was given a laudatory poem. "After a short period, the poem reached Chang-an, and Hsiang passed the examination in the next year." (Chien I, Nan-pu Hsin-shu, Ts'ung-shu Tsi-cheng Ch'u-pien ed., p. 2.) Undoubtedly, Hsiang's success should be attributed to the praise of Yang that influenced the officials in the capital.
why the Chin-hua Tze records that the prominent officials in the central government were able to endow feathery wings (yu-i, a way to achieve success) on the candidates. 16

If the candidates were unable to obtain their support, they had to count on their own wit to impress those in power. The Tu I-chi has a story clearly describing the way to establish reputation. Chen Tze-an (661-702, or 656-695), as a pretext to gather respectable figures, purchased a precious musical instrument (wu-ching) and declared in public that he would play the musical instrument in his residence. In the gathering, Chen treated the visitors with hearty meals, and replaced the music playing by presenting every visitor with his own literary work:

Within a day, the capital was filled with Chen’s literary reputation." 17

Chen’s biography recorded in the Chiu T’ang Shu mentions that Chen’s family was wealthy for generations. It is no wonder that Chen could make use of his wealth to commit such noteworthy action. The Chiu T’ang-shu also mentions that:

16 Liu Chung-yuan, Chin-hua Tze, (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1960), p. 53. If the examination candidates were appreciated by influential officials, the nourishment and circulation of their reputation leading to the eventual passing of the examinations, in most cases, would be achieved by such officials. (Ibid.; Kao Yen-hsiu, T’ang Chueh-shih, Ts’ung-shu Tsi-cheng Ch’u-pien ed., pp. 10-11.) Sometimes, the honor of Principal Graduate (chuan-yuan) was even promised before the examinations. (Yu-chuan Tze, p. 15.)

17 Cited by Ta-ping Kuang-chi, p. 1331.
Chen Tze-an was diligent in studying and good at composing. He first composed thirty poems on the sentiments of encounters (Kan-yu Shih). Wang Shih, who served as Personnel Manager in the capital (ching-chao shih-kung), read the poems and said in surprise, "This man should be a literary master of the universe." Chen then became famous because of Wang's praise.  

If the record of the Tu I-chi cited above is correct, it seems probable that Wang Shih was one of the guests in the gathering held by Chen. The case once again indicates that support from powerful officials was indispensable to the promotion of reputation.

The influence of personal relationships became much more significant as unfairness in the examination process became increasingly conspicuous in late T'ang, due to the political decline that had reached a stage beyond repair. Young men who took the examinations became more and more dependent on flattery, even bribery, to get support and recommendations from prominent officials.  

In this atmosphere of pervasive unfairness, the chin-shih degree was almost exclusively monopolized by influential and

---


19 Chueh Tsun-hung, Chin-shih (Presented Scholar) and the Politics of the T'ang Dynasty (618-907), (Taipei: National Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1986), pp. 127-8. In late T'ang, chin-shih degree became purchasable, and the wealthy people could use money to buy a chin-shih degree. (Tai-ping Kuang-chi, p. 2759.)
powerful clans and families. Poor literati could pass the examinations only with good luck. Although some temporary and expedient change in examination policy might enable poor literati to succeed in the examinations, since such cases seldom happened, they provided no significant benefaction to candidates from poor families.

Candidates who were the offspring of officials serving in the central government had more access and affinity to prominent officials and could cultivate their friendship. This was definitely vital to establishing personal prestige and a social and academic image. Lacking the advantages of geographical proximity to and liaison with the core officials,

\[20\] T'ang Chi-yen, p. 13.

\[21\] An Yen-shu, a poor candidate from Su-chou, went to the capital to take the civil service examinations. Probably he did not have the support of influential officials because of poverty, he knew that he had no chance to succeed. Fortunately, he knew a monk who was also from Su-chou. The monk had deep acquaintance with the family of Pei Tan, the chief examiner, and he knew that Pei's sons had already formulated the list of chin-shih prior to the examination. Those included were the offspring of powerful and influential officials. The monk urged Pei's sons to guarantee the success of his fellow countryman, or he would release the secret to the public. Pei's sons had no way, but yielded to the monk's demand. (Yu-chuan Tze, pp. 12-13.)

\[22\] When Hsu-chou was dominated by the rebels in the reign of Emperor I-tsung (833-974, r. 860-874), the central government tried to promote the sense of loyalty and traditional norm and value enhanced by Confucian school. Cheng Hsun, the chief examiner, appointed Yen Piao Principal Graduate, with a view to revitalize the traditional belief essential to bolster up the dynastic existence. As a matter of fact, Yen was not the offspring of Yen Hui (B.C. 521-490) and this mistake became a mockery. (T'ang Chi-yen, p. 88.)
those residing in outer prefectures found it difficult to establish such relationships.

In order to compete, many literati, both from prominent clans and poor families, moved to Lo-yang and Chang-an. There they were able to succeed in the examinations by ingratiating themselves with high ranking officials and other powerful figures.

Moreover, prominent figures in the palace were also the targets of the candidates. Wang Wei (701-761, or 696-759) obtained the honor of Principal Graduate with the aid of a princess. 23 Pei Ssu-chien, under the help of Shou Shih-liang (781-843), a powerful eunuch, became Principal Graduate. 24

Sung people had a lot of criticisms against the unfairness practiced in the T'ang. The Shu-po points out that Pei Ssu-chien and Wang Wei, who counted on eunuchs and princess to obtain the title of Principal Graduate, did not have the sense of morality,

Even though they could get what they desired, how could such deeds be valued, and recorded as important events! 25

This moralistic criticism indirectly highlights the importance


24 Besides Pei Ssu-chien, Huang Hsu and Li Tuan, who were the disciples (men-sheng) of Tien Ling-tze (?-893), another influential eunuch, also passed the examinations. (T'ang Chi-ven, p. 100.)

of cultivating good relationships with influential officials and other kinds of powerful figures to the passing of the civil service examinations.

If one had good luck, he might even have a chance to encounter with the emperor. As recorded in the Pei-li Chi, Emperor Hsun-tsung (810-859, r. 846-895) liked Confucian studies and, in particular highly esteemed the civil service examinations. He also liked wandering in Changan in disguise. When he met examination candidates, he made friends with them and engaged them in conversation. Some candidates passed the examinations because of imperial sponsorship.

In brief, unjust practices in the civil service examinations, arising in a time of political decline, were the main factors tying literati, whether prestigious lineage or obscure origins, to the two capitals and their surrounding areas. Therefore, the capital was the incubator for the gentry (i-kuan), where they sought recognition and fame.

26 Sun Kuang-hsien (900-968), Pei-meng So-yen, Ya-yu-t'ang Ts'ung-shu ed., 8: 4a; Sun Kai, the preface (Hsu) of the Pei-li Chih, Shuo-hai ed., 1a.

27 For example, Lu Wo met Emperor Hsun-tsung, and he was asked to present his poems. When the Emperor met the prime minister in some other days, he ordered the prime minister to include Lu in the list of chin-shih. (Pei-meng So-yen, 8: 4a.)

28 Chang Fang-p'ing (1007-1091), Lo-ch'uan Chi, Ssu-k'u Ch'uan-shu ed., 33: 18b. The description was mainly about the Sung situation, but also valid in applying to the T'ang situation, because of the similar social and political structure in the T'ang and Sung. Besides the two capitals, nearby prefectures were also
The candidates from wealthy clans had no difficulty moving to the capital and the poor did their best to follow. 29

Even after the candidates passed the civil service examinations, they were still required to stay in the capital to take the examinations for selection held by the Ministry of Rites (li-pu) or the Ministry of War (ping-pu). 30 Therefore, the civil service examinations, together with various kinds of examinations pertaining to entry into the officialdom, were

favored by examination candidates. For instance, due to their proximity to Changan, Tung-chou and Hua-chou were ideal residences for candidates. There was a general belief in the T'ang that examination candidates from these areas would pass the examinations without exception. (T'ang Chi-ven, p. 17.) This description has been exaggerated to a certain extent. Sometimes, even those from Chang-an did not pass the examination. Hua Liang-fu did not have clan member able to obtain the chin-shih degree. Hua started studying since he was ten years old. He learned literary composition and the amount he had written was up to a thousand chuan. But he was still rejected by the examiner. He then wrote a letter to blame the examiner, so as to release his anger and disappointment. (Ibid., p. 21.) In any case, it is undeniable that the candidates from these areas had more chances to pass the examinations.

29 Because of the heavy concentration of the examination candidates in the capital, the living cost was high, thus causing much difficulties to the poor candidates. (Chang Ku, Yu-hsien Ku-ch'ui, Yang-shan Ku-shih Wen-fang ed., 2b-3a.) Even though, many poor candidates still tried their best to remain in the capital. According to a confession of An Feng, an inhabitant of Shou-chou, made to his friend: "I was not hardworking in tillage and drilling, but eager to enter the officialdom. I had traveled far from my home and begged for food in Chang-an, but no officials were aware of my merit. Having wandered for ten years, how could I go back to my native village to face my relatives and neighbors in my manhood!" (Hsiao-hsiang Lu, quoted by the Tai-ping Kuang-chi, p. 2727.)

30 Mao, p. 244.
effective in tying literati to the capital. This in turn consolidated the trend of centralization.

In examining the migration of the great clans to the capital, Mao Han-kuang suggests that the moving of burial sites from the original family home areas to the capitals and their surrounding areas is a good indicator of this movement. The research idea and theoretical model built up by Mao, in a certain sense, seem valid and effective in explaining the trend of the centralization. However, the movement of the Hsiaos of Lan-ling, cited in Mao’s article, provides a counter example. Actually the migration toward the center of the Hsiao clan during the Sui was merely the result of the imperial discriminatory measures against the great clans in South China after the collapse of the Chen, but not out of the reason to foster good relationships with prominent officials serving in the central government.

Though the examples of the Hsiaos of Lan-ling, cited in Mao’s article cannot support his assumption, I believe his research is still basically sound. Therefore, to find evidence for the centralization of the great clans from the south is one of the major goals of this dissertation.

The motivation for the migration of great clans from the

31 See Mao’s article, "Examining the centralization of literary clans from the change of their places of origin", p. 235-337.

32 For details, see Appendix II.
Southern Dynasties can not be effectively detected given the policy enforced by the Sui. However, the T'ang reign provides an ideal period in which to examine Mao's theory of centralization. During the T'ang, there was no significant forced migration policy, and the migration of great clans toward the center was basically a free choice.

As for the region of scrutiny, because the geographical scope of my dissertation is the territory of the Southern T'ang, I will limit examples to that area. In addition, I will only use the examples of people for whom we have data on their native places, residences in old age, and places of burial. The families which moved in previous dynasties will be excluded since we cannot determine the reasons for their moving.

Using these criteria, I have discovered twenty valid and relevant examples. Among these examples, there are seven cases of establishing new residence in the north: the first five are examples showing a migration toward the center, while the other two examples indicate that they became teachers in the north when they were old. Such activities imply that they had given up their native place and set up

33 The people who are included in such examples are Hsu Ching-hsien, Hsi Chih (745-799), Chen Ching, Ssu-k'ung T'u (837-908), and Chiang I (747-821). As for the migration history of their families, see Appendix III.
their residence in the northern prefectures. Besides, six cases indicate the moving of burial site to the center. The above thirteen examples of migration toward the center compose approximately 67.5% of the sample. As for the other examples, five cases indicate that the persons involved were forced to return to, or their coffins were returned for burial to their native places, or they returned because of political oppression or war. Only the remaining two cases show that the persons recorded voluntarily returned to, or desired that their remains be brought back to, their home country without external pressure. These two cases compose only 10% of the sample. This indicates that those unwilling to follow the trend of centralization were rare.

Interestingly, the centralization also happened to military men. For instance, Ko Wei-te was a native inhabitant of Ningling, a county in Hsuan-chou. The career of his ancestors was obscure. This implies that Ko was the first person to serve in

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34 They are Li Shan (630-672) and Wang I-fang. As for their biographical data, see Appendix III.

35 The people who are included in this category are Chou Hsi, Hsu shen, Chou Wei, Hsu Yu-shih, Ma Huai-su, and Wei Hung-chien. As for their biographical data, see Appendix III.

36 They are Lai Chi, Wang Shao-tsung, Hsueh Teng, Chung Shao-ching (659-746), and Wang Ch'ang-ling (608-765). As for their biographical data, see Appendix III.

37 They are K'o Ch'u-chin (607-681) and Tai Shu-lun (732-789). As for their biographical data, see Appendix III.
a government post from his family. Ko secured his military career in the capital and died in his residence in Lo-yang in 698. His coffin was temporarily placed at Mount Pei-huan. His wife died in Changan in 720, and in the next year, Ko and his wife were formally buried together in Changan, "in observation of the rites". 38

II, The Migration to South China of Great Literary Clans

The migration toward the center bureaucratized the literary clan and, more importantly, eradicated their regional power and influence in the south. Nevertheless, there were some northern clans moving to the south simultaneously. For example, Tsui.Cheng (?-798) came from Ch'ing-ho.

This branch had been living in P'o-hsing of Chu-chou for generations, and was known as pa-pao Tsui-shih. 39 Geographically, Ching-ho was a county in Pei-chou and the prefecture was located in Ho-pei, while Chu-chou was under the administration of the Circuit of Huai-nan. This example demonstrates the separation between domicile of origin and residence. 40


39 Chin-hua Tze, p. 50.

40 The similar cases can be found in other prominent clans: The native place of Liu Yu-hsi (772-842) was Peng-cheng, but his brother claimed himself as an inhabitant of Shang-chou. (T'ang Yu-lin, p. 27.)
Sometimes, different primary sources may have different records about the place of origin of the same person. This event was most likely due to the discrepancies between the place of origin and residence. For instance, the Chai-hua Lu states that Chiao Ching and Lu Mai, the two prime ministers, were both inhabitants of Chi-chou. According to the Chiu T'ang-shu, the native places of Chiao and Lu were Lung-hsi and Fan-yang respectively. The T'ang Yu-lin records that these two persons were "sojourners in Chi-chou", which reveals the smartness of the author able to differentiate between the place of origin and residence.

As for the reason for such moving, it was probably out of their desire to have a life in recluse. As shown in the case of Tu Sheng (749-825), after he passed the chin-shih examinations in 779, he resided in Liu-yang, a place of Kuang-ling, in where, he set up a cottage and engaged in plantation. He did not look for unjust entry to office, but relied on teaching and writing as a livelihood. He did not leave his place of residence for twenty years.

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41 Cited by the Tai-ping Kuang-chi, p. 1091.
42 Chiu T'ang-shu, pp. 3753; 3775.
43 T'ang Yu-lin, p. 209. Similarly, The Chiu T'ang-shu records that Liu Shan was a inhabitant of Peng-cheng, while the T'ang Yu-lin regards him as "originally an inhabitant of Lien-chou". This is another example of the deviation between the place of origin and residence.
44 Chiu T'ang-shu, p. 4122.
Nevertheless, the most important reason for members of the great northern clans living in the south was owing to economic considerations. Compared with the north, particularly the two capitals and their surrounding areas, the living cost in the south was much lower, thus enabling poor clan members to live rather comfortably in South China. For instance, Li Hsun was a descendent of Li Fei who was entitled as Sir Chen (Shen-kung) in the Northern Wei (386-534). This family was known as the House of Sir Shen (shen-kung fan) in Chiao-chuan. But the Li family "had been living in Sheh-shou of Ching-chou for generations". The Chiu T'ang-shu has a detailed description about the economic situation of Li Hsun's family:

Li Hsun lost his father when he was young. He lived in Chiang-ling. He, together with his younger brother Chien, were complacent with poverty. They collected food by selling clothes and were never tired of learning and practicing. Li Tsao, Li Hsun's brother, in view of the merit of his brothers, managed to maintain the livelihood day by day to enable his brothers to fulfill their aim."

At the first glance, the migration to the southern prefectures by some members of the great clans from the north seemed to have a counterbalancing function, which was instrumental in neutralizing the uprooting effect caused by


46 Ibid., p. 4125. Another example was Tsui Yuan. His native place was Tung-wu Cheng of Ching-ho, but he was poor in his youth and lived in the area amid Chiang-huai. (Tai-ping Kuang-chi, p. 1069.)
the migration toward the center. However, those migrating to the south did not view the southeast prefectures as their permanent home but only as a temporary and economical residence, while they continued their studies. Their ultimate goal was to pass the civil service examinations and to restore the family tradition of participating in public service. When they fulfilled their goals, they left the south and rushed to the capital to enter the career struggle. This is exactly why their places of burial were located in the north. 47

Obviously, under the influence of the migration toward the center, most of the literary clans originating in the south did not view their homeland as a place for permanent residence while, in return, members of the great clans from the north regarded the south as only temporary residence. When dynasty collapsed, many clans and families living in the capital found that they no longer had a regional base to which they could retreat. Their complete decline thus could be anticipated.

III, The Decline of Prominent Clans

The decline of prominent clans, which had long been serving as the core of the T'ang rule, seriously threatened the dynastic existence. Liu Chung-yuan concluded the reasons for their decline, saying,

47 For details, see Appendix IV.
In peacetime, the gantries generally boasted of scholarly refinement and despised the secular emolument. They did not take consideration of the principle of civil and military administration, but indulged themselves in flamboyance and frivolity. When they came into office and rule, had they ever touched the administration? Therefore, law and order were not maintained, while minor defects in administration were not mended. They used to lose the affection of the people and did not face the reality.  

No doubt, the internal decay of prominent clans attributed to their quietus.  

In addition to their extravagant life style, some contemptuous and superficial clan members liked categorizing people based on their origin to highlight the importance of pedigree. The practice of the classification based on 

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48 Chin-hua Tze, p. 55.

49 For instance, many clan members turned to extreme gastronomy. As Kang Pien mentions, during the reign of the Emperor Hsi-tsung, the offspring of powerful officials, who counted on the ancestral protection and inheritance, possessed ample supply of materials. They thus indulged in extreme refinement in clothing and eating, and did not appreciate the importance in "keeping balance of being too much or too scarce". (Chi-tan Lu, Hsueh-ching T'ao-yuan ed., B: 10b.)

50 Some of T'ang scholar-officials were very much concerned about the standard of classifying officials, and always had controversies. The suggestion of applying the principle of pedigree and origin to the promotion standard had been prevailing among some scholar-officials from prominent clans. But the suggestion was always turned down, because it would bring forth the defect that the able laymen would be relegated to inferiority for always, and "it was not a way to encourage such officials to carry out their duty earnestly". For details, see Szu-ma Kuang (1019-1086), Tzu-chih T'ung-chien, abbreviated as T'ung-chien, (Hong Kong: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1971), p. 7939. Another controversy of similar nature happened in 858, when Liu Yuan and Tsui Cheng-yiu had a debate on the way of administration in the presence of Emperor Hsun-tsung. Tsui emphasized the importance of categorizing
"stream and rank" (liu-pien) did bring much trouble to the clan members. Hsueh Po-hsun, an offspring of a prominent clan, found delight in categorizing literati based on the standard of pedigree and origin. "He was addressed as flamboyant in the contemporary." Similar to the father, Hsueh Chao-wei also acted arrogantly. 51

Sometimes, the flamboyancy and general worthlessness of some scholar-officials of prominent clans would stir up trouble to themselves. In peacetime, such conduct might just lead to demotion, as both Hsueh-Po-hsun and his son were demoted because of their frivolity and contemptuousness. 52 In the chaotic period, acting flamboyantly might lead to horrible consequences, including the whole family being massacred.

As demonstrated by the experience of Chen Pan-sou, he was an offspring of scholar-official (i-kuan tzu-ti) and was demoted as Assistant of Teng-chou due to naughtiness. At that time, Liu Chu-yung was Military Commissioner of Hsiang-yang. Liu officials according to their pedigree and origin, but Liu opposed based on the historical fact occurring in the Western Chin that, Wang Yi-fu (256-311) indulged in flamboyance and the worthless principle of classification based on origin and pedigree, in regard to the appointment and promotion of officials. Consequently, his deeds led to the downfall of the empire. "If the T'ang followed suit, it had no way to anticipate the date of achieving perfect administration". After hearing, Tsui "had no way to answer". (ibid., p. 8067.)

51 Pei-meng So-yen, 3: 11b-12a; 4: 9b-10a.

52 T'ang Chi-yen, p. 140.
was a military and did not appreciate the literary ability of Chen. Chen then resigned and sent a letter to Liu's subordinate, stating sarcastically,

I had already left the village devoid of courtesy, and was entering into the land of leisure gradually.

Enraged at the sarcasm, Liu Chu-yung sent soldiers to capture the Chens. Meanwhile the country was in chaotic state and nobody gave the Chens protection, and the Chen family of more than thirty members were humiliated and finally slaughtered by Liu's soldiers. 53

Also, Wang Chu, who was an offspring of a prominent clan, took pride in his lineage. Because he held Wang Kung, who served as Military Commissioner of Shen-chou, in disdain and refused the later's request to be accepted in the array of son and cousin. His whole family was drowned by Wang and their baggages were all robbed. 54 The Chin-hua Tze comments Wang Chu's deed as

weal and woe have no entrance to get in, only people bring upon themselves. 55

The remark signifies that Wang Chu was deserved of the dire consequence.

Owing to the long-term arrogance of the prominent clan

54 Pei-meng So-ven, 9: 8b-9a.
55 Chin-hua Tse, p. 46.
members inflicted on the commoners, many viewed them with enmity and made use of disorder to take revenge. The Pei-meng So-yen records a horrible story that Mr. Lu always ordered boat to go to Chiang-ning when he served as Magistrate of Chi-chiang, a county of Ching-chou. Boatmen were toiled at the task and had a deep hatred against Lu. When Wang Hsin-chi (?-878) started the revolt putting the local administration to extinction, the boatmen made use of the chance to have Lu’s foot sinew cut and him tied to the side of the boat. The boat was then abandoned to the drift and Lu was drowned. The author of the Pe-meng So-yen expressed his view,

The offspring of prominent clans, who had no intrinsic merit, but behaved arrogantly and pretentiously because of their lineage. In the period of the rebellion of Huang Ch’ao (?-884), many arrogant clan members suffered from disasters, and they actually brought disasters to themselves.  

As mentioned before, the clan members, based on their advantages, monopolized the chin-shih degree to perpetuate family fame and fortune. But the way was generally hated by those oppressed or disenfranchised by the institution of the examination hall. As a consequence, there were vicious attacks on scholar-officials with chin-shih degrees by examination losers. The hatred of Huang Ch’ao against scholar-officials was stirred by his experience that he had

56 Cited from Tai-ping Kuang-chi, p. 2090.
failed in the civil service examinations after many attempts.  

A series of political purges, which were started by Chu Wen (852-912, r. 907-912) and his accomplices in late T'ang, were also a great blow to scholar-officials. The purges, to a certain extent, was stirred up by Li Chen who was still a loser after many attempts in the examination hall.  

The T'ung-chien records the political purges on the fifth month in 905 that Liu Ts'an, based on Chu Wen support, acted arrogantly and authoritatively by holding other officials in disdain. Meanwhile there was abnormal astronomical phenomenon appearing, the fortune-teller advised that both the ruler and subordinates were destined to obtain disasters and it was appropriate to engage in massacre, in order to conform to the connotation of the phenomenon. Liu Ts'an listed those officials that he hated most and submitted the list to Chu Wen (852-912), saying,

Such people were those who gathered their supporters and expressed untamed opinions, and it was appropriate to have them executed to conform to the abnormal

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58 As a matter of fact, Many staff serving for Military Commissioners in late T'ang were inimical to scholar-officials in the central government, because of their unhappy experience in the examination hall. See Wang Yung, Yin-i I-mou Lu, Pai-chuan Hsueh-hai ed., 1: 1a.
astronomical phenomenon.

Li Chen then made use of the chance to take revenge on the prominent clans by advising Chu Wen,

The reason why the court could not be ruled perfectly was out of the violation of rule and regulation committed by i-kuan, as well as the flamboyant and fickle officials. Since you were going to do something great, but such officials were all difficult to be tamed in the court. It was wise for you to get rid of them.

After hearing, Chu Wen deeply realized the truth of the advice. Therefore, Tu-ku Sun, Pei Shu, and other five officials were demoted to serve in outer prefectures.

In addition, some other high-ranking officials who started their career by means of pedigree and success in the civil service examinations, and liked distinguishing themselves in terms of reputation and behavioral orientation, were categorized as flamboyant. Consequently, all of them received demotion, and "scholar-officials were emptied from the court".

But the general demotion of scholar-officials did not provide enough satisfaction to Li Chen. Li Chen then "advised" Chu Wen again, saying,

Such people always claimed themselves as "clear stream", and it was appropriate to throw them into the Yellow River, thus making them "dirty stream" permanently.

After listening to Li Chen's words, Chu Wen "laughed and followed Li's request". 59 In the sixth month of the same

year, Pei, all together with over thirsty demoted officials, were gathered in a post-stage in Pai-ma (pai-ma). They were all massacred and their bodies thrown into the Yellow River. 60 Hung Mai (1123-1202) had a comment on this event,

How could only a few evildoers, like Li Chen and Liu Ts'an, cause the calamity of Pei-ma? It was also Pei, Tsui, Tu-ku, and other gentlemen took the consequences of their deeds. 61

Some scholar-officials from prominent clans realized that the drastic social and political change was inevitable, and that pedigree and lineage were no longer useful to protect the clans in time of disturbance and war. Only cultivating goodwill and affinity with those powerful and able people coming from obscure origin was the best way to protect the clans.

As shown by the case of T'sai Ching, he served up to the post of Minister (shang-shu) and was once Military Commissioner of Tien-te Chun. During his military commissionership, both Ku Yen-lang and Ku Yen-hui were his minor subordinates. T'sai had the ability of judging people

60 T'ung-chien, pp. 8642-3. As a matter of fact, those affected by the purges were not just confined to thirsty officials. During the purge, several hundred officials, who were regarded as the supporters of the T'ang or falsely accused of forming an opposite political sect, were demoted or killed. As a result, "the court became empty." For details, see Ou-yang Hsiu (1007-1072), Hsin Wu-tai Shih, (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1974), p. 375.

61 Hung Mai, Yung-chai Sui-pi, Shu-pi, Szu-pu Tsung-kan Shupien ed., 14: 4ab.
(chih-yen chih-chien) and prophesied that the Ku brothers would be prospering in future. T'sai then treated the Ku brothers very well by entrusting his sons to them and giving them good promotion. During the war against Huang Ch'ao, the Ku brothers achieved military merits and the older brother was appointed Military Commissioner of Tung-chuan. T'sai's offspring were treated well by the Ku brothers in return. 62

Similarly, Wei Chou, who also had been prime minister, was assigned to administer Kuang-chou. Liu Chien, a subordinate with junior military rank, was appreciated by Wei. Wei even married his cousin to Liu. Other members of the Wei family regarded that Liu did not belong to the same category of lineage and they worried that the marriage would attract criticism. They inspired Wei's other civilian staffs to stop him. But Wei Chou refused because he thought that Liu Chien was an extraordinary person, and Wei's offspring might count on him some days. Wei's prophecy was correct. 63 These two cases further highlighted the irreversible decline of the prominent clans.

IV, The Route and Site of Refuge of Prominent Clans

The route of the T'ang imperial flight was entirely

62 Pei-meng So-ven, 4: 6b.

63 Ibid., 6: 2ab.
different from that of the Western Chin as the T'ang refuge was basically confined to the western region, while the imperial family of the Western Chin fled to the south. The Western Chin was devastated by foreign invasion from the north, while the south was free from barbarian destruction. Under the circumstances, it was natural for the imperial family, as well as its scholar-officials, to rush southward.

When Pang Hsun (?-869) occupied Hsu-chou in 868 and ravaged its surrounding areas, the inhabitants of Huai-nan were horrified and escaped to Chiang-nan. However, the tranquility in Chiang-nan could not be maintained for a long time, as Wang Hsin-chih rebelled in Po-chou in 874 and Huang Ch’ao joined him the next year. At the beginning, their activities were confined to Ho-nan. From 876 onwards, they

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64 In 783, a military revolt happened in Chang-an, and Emperor Te-tsung (742-805, r. 779-805) was forced to flee to Feng-tien. Chen Shao-yu and Han Fang (723-787), Military Commissioners in Hui-nan and the Eastern and Western Che respectively, had undertaken some special deployments, in preparation of the possible imperial refuge to the south. The deployments included a series of military exercise and construction to strengthen the defensive ability. (T’ung-chien, p. 7378.) However, Emperor Te-tsung did not take refuge to the south, and he only confined the location of activity to the western region during the whole period of exile. Szechwan also seemed to be the favored place for imperial refuge, as Emperors Hsun-tsung and Hsi-tsung (862-888, r. 874-888) had fled there, and many officials with their clans and families followed. When the rebellions were suppressed, some officials returned to the capital, but others stayed in Szechwan permanently. The permanent stay of officials became particularly conspicuous in the reign of Emperor Hsi-tsung, as they anticipated further chaos and unrest in near future with no confidence in T’ang ability to restore peace.

65 T’ung-chien, p. 8136.
extended their operations to Shan-nan and Huai-nan. In 878, Wang Hsin-chih was killed, and the remnants joined Huang’s force. In the same year, Huang began pillaging in Chiang-nan, Kuang-nan, and Shan-nan. Before Huang’s troop advanced to Lo-yang and Chang-an in 880, many prefectures in the South were severely devastated and the administration infrastructure was destroyed. Shortly after the collapse of Huang Ch’ao, Chin Tsung-chuan (?-889) became a formidable figure in Ho-nan and Huai-hsi, and engaged Chu Wen in intensive fighting. Almost all prefectures in Chiang-huai were turned into a battlefield as Yang Hsing-mi (852-905) and other warlords fought over land and power. This was why the central government, as well as its officials, would not consider the south as refuge.

As the Chia-shih Tan-lu mentions, in the period of Emperor Hsi-tsung and Chao-tsung (867-904, r. 888-904), many prominent clans, which originally lived in Chang-an, sought refuge to the mountainous region nearby, which was untouched by war. Though they experienced the chaos and separation from the clan members, the place could avoid them from the disasters of war. Therefore, even in the beginning of the Sung dynasty, there were some of the T’ang clans still living in the mountainous region of O and Tu counties.  

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66 For details, see Appendix V.
67 Chang Chi (933-996), Chia-shih Tan-lu, Szu-k’u Ch’uan-shu ed., 3b-4a.
Scholar-officials also looked to the prefectures in the north for peace and stability. When Huang Ch’ao entered Chang-an, many scholar-officials were forced to avoid disasters by escaping to the north. Wang Ching-ao, who lived in Chang-an and served as Academician Awaiting Orders of Han-lin Academy (Han-lin ti-chao), traveled to P’u-pan, T’ai-yuan, Wei-po, and Sheng-shan. The above regions were domains of Military Commissioners located in Ho-tung and Ho-pei respectively. Wang’s travels served as the occasion framework for understanding the places preferred by scholar-officials as refuge in late T’ang.

In addition to the above regions, Chung-shan and Chao-i were also the good places for prominent clans to seek refuge. Sometimes, the specific sites for these refugees of the great clans were not identified, but they were still within Ho-pei.

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58 As for the details of such regions, see Appendix VI.

69 Tou-Lu Ke was a prominent clan member and took refuge to Chung-shan in late T’ang. When the T’ang was eliminated, Wang Chu-chih, Military Commissioner, appointed him Chief Secretary (chang shu-chi). (Hsin Wu-tai Shih, p. 301.) Besides, Li Te-hsiu, a grandson of Li Chiang (764-830), sojournered in Chung-shan in the early period of Tien-yu (904-907). When Chu Wen intensified the political purge against the opponents, Wang Chu-chih appointed Li to serve the local governments. (Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1727.) Some members of prominent clans sought refuge to Sheng-tang, another address to Chao-i. When Liu Ts’an persecuted scholar-officials, Lu Yu-pi was scared of being involved. He then asked for resignation on the pretext of illness and traveled to Sheng-tang. (Chiu T’ang-shu, p. 4247.)
Apart from the northern prefectures, many scholar-officials and members of prominent clans sought refuge to where close to Kuan-chung and Ho-nan. After Emperor Hsi-tsung returned to Changan, Szechwan still maintained its status as an ideal refuge, particularly during the Chu Wen's political purge. Also, in the chaotic period of late T'ang, "most of the old clans in Kuan-chung were sparsely settled in Ching-hu." 

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70 Li Yu claimed himself as an offspring of Chi-ping Hsi-tsu of Chiao-chun, and his family was engaged in Confucian learning for generations. When Liu Ts'an started the political purge, Li Yu "took refuge to Ho-peī." (Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 891.) Also, Lu Cheng was from a prominent clan, and took refuge to Ho-peī to prevent from being persecuted by Liu Ts'an. His routes covered the regions of Lu-lung, Sheng-shan, Chung-shan, and T'ai-yuan. (Ibid., pp. 886-7.)

71 For instance, Chang Ke was the son of Chang Jui, the former prime minister. Because of being suspected by Chu Wen, Chang Jui was killed. Chang Ke then changed his name and fled to Szechwan. (Ibid., p. 944.)

72 Wang Kuei (1019-1085), Hua-yang Chi, Ts'ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch'u-pien ed., p. 560. The examples below are able to substantiate the statement: 1, Yang Chu, a grandson of Yang Ssu-fu, served as Grand Master of Remonstrance (chien-i ta-fu) when Chu Wen dominated the T'ang court. Afterward, he gave up the post and brought his whole family to seek refuge to Hu-nan. (Chiu-T'ang Shu, p. 4560.) 2, Li Chi served as Censor (yu-shih) in late T'ang. When Emperor Chao-tsung was forced to move to Lo-yang and scholar-officials (i-kuan) generally suffered from prosecution, Li, together with Yang Fen whose native place was Hung-nung, covered up their trace in the region of Ching-chu. (Pei-meng So-yen, 6: 13a.) 3, Li Yuan was a member of T'ang imperial family. When Chu Wen took over the regime, Li was scared of the possible persecution and fled to Hu-nan. Li Yuan served Ma Yin (852-930) as Magistrate of Heng-yang. (Su Sung 1020-1101, So-wei Kung Wen-chi, Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1988, p. 841; T'o T'o 1314-1355, Sung-shih, Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1977, p. 9060.) 4, Chu P'o-kuang and some scholar-officials, like Yen Chun and Li Tao, altogether several ten families went
During the reign of Emperor Chao-tsung, almost all prefectures were dominated by warlords, and only Kuang-nan was governed by Li Chih-jou, an imperial relative. Some scholar-officials viewed the place as an ideal refuge. For instance, Hsu Yen-jo, who was aware of the impending political risk when serving in the central government, asked for military commissionship of Kuang-nan, and his request was approved. When Liu Yin (874-911) came to power, Kuang-nan was still regarded as a preferable place for people avoiding political oppression.

Based on these examples, it may be inferred that Chiang-huai was not a preferred choice in the contemporary mind, and only a few scholar-officials and prominent clan members moved directly to this area from the north in time of war and turmoil.

southward when Chu Wen established the Later Liang. They finally arrived in Heng-yao. (Wen-chuang Chi, p. 28: 2b-3a.)


74 After Liu Chi-shu held Emperor Chao-tsung in custody, Chiao Kuang-i went to Ling-nan to prevent from political persecution. Liu Yin treated him well by appointing him Vice Military Commissioner. From then on, Chiao settled his family in Ling-nan. (Chiu T'ang-shu, p. 4623.)

75 In my understanding, the examples of migration to the south during the late T'ang were very few, compared with those moving to other regions. Liu Chung-yuan was a cousin (Tsung-ti) of Liu Chung-kuei, (Hsu Hsien, Chi-shen Lu, Hsueh-ching T'ao-yuan ed., shih-i, 2a.) and he sought refuge to Chiang-nan after the downfall of the T'ang. (Chin-hua Tze, p. 55.) Li T'ai, Li I-yeh's father, was a fellow grandson of Li We. Li I-yeh fled to the Wu after the
V. The Emergence of Local Rowdies in Southeast China

The decline of central authority in the T'ang led to the disintegration of the administrative structure and, in many places, anarchy. Ambitious adventurers used the occasion to fight for their personal aggrandizement. As the Hsin Wu-tai Shih mentions, those playing the power game were "ching (tattooed), k'un (ancient punishment of shaving the head), to (robber) or fan (peddler)", and it seemed that anyone with political and military ambition was of base and obscure origin. 76

To a large extent, the absence of strong literary and military clans in the outer prefectures, caused by their migration to Chang-an, Lo-yang and the surrounding areas, allowed the emergence of local rowdies and their leaders. These local rowdies and power figures posed as a kind of surrogate authority and appeared when the control and authority of the central government were in decline or disintegration.

downfall of the T'ang. For details, see Lu Yu (1125-1210), Lu-shu, Szu-pu Ts'ung-kan Shu-pien ed., chuan 12: 2b. As for Li Yen, whose name was Chang Po or Chang Hsiu, his going to Wu was on the errand ordered by Chao-tsung, and cannot be regarded as the migration out of his own choice.

76 Hsin Wu-tai Shih, 61a: Yeh Shih (1150-1223) also had the similar opinion, as he regarded that people with humble origin, like robbers and mean people, brought forth the downfall of the T'ang. See Yeh-shih Chi, (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1961), p. 725.
The prevalence of such activities was in direct proportion to the distance between the locale and the center of government and occurred even when the central government was still relatively effective. 77 With the general debacle at the end of the T'ang, a power vacuum was created at the local levels and both bad and good elements attempted to fill it.

The formation of local militia (tu-tuan) was the way enabling rowdies and hooligans to play an important and active role in regional politics. Ironically, the force of local militia, which subsequently torn the country into pieces, was organized and acquiesced by local officials out of necessity when the garrisoned forces of the government were on longer able to ensure local security. 78 After the diminution of rebel violence, local militia was elevated as vital force used

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77 When the T'ang regained its vitality during the reign of Emperor Hsien-tsung (778-820, r. 805-820), Li Hsiang-ku, Protector-general (tu-hu) of An-nan, was slaughtered together with his family members and intimate subordinates by Yang Ch'ing. (Chiu T’ang-shu, p. 3641.)

78 When Chiu Fu was about to pillage Ming-chou in 860 and the local government was powerless to deal with the threat, local inhabitants were aware that if the rebels entered the city, they and their families would become mincemeat and unable to consider the obvious loss of money and valuables. They then voluntarily donated money to enlist brave and militant recruits as local militia and made preparation for invasion. (T'ung-chien, p. 8082.) The appearance of tu-tuan was not limited to only Southeast China long regarded as militarily weak. The role of local militia was also important in Ho-tung at the end of the T'ang. (Ibid., p. 8206.) Reliance on the regular army was not enough to ensure peace and order even happened to Ho-tung, a region traditionally renowned for military strength.
by local officials to fight rebels. Sometimes, local militia was even utilized in offensive operations.

However, grown powerful and led by local strongmen, the village militia was not always beneficial to government supports and often a detriment accelerating the process of regional disintegration. As a matter of fact, the local militia always served as a military and political base, on which ambitious men achieved regional domination.

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79 Tu T'ao, Prefect of Szu-chou, recruited village militia to strengthen the prefectural defense, after he killed the envoy sent by the rebel Peng Hsun to persuade him to surrender. (Chiu T'ang-shu, pp. 666-7.) Another example of one who recruited local militia to reinforce the prefectural defense was Li Fu, Prefect of Hsiang-chou and concurrently Military Commissioner of the East Circuit of Shan-nan. When Wang Hsin-chih's army of several tens of thousand, tried to pillage Shan-nan, Li mobilized village militia and garrisoned them at various strategic points so that Wang's forces could not encroach into his jurisdiction. (Ibid., p. 4487.)

80 When Wang Shih started operations against the main force of Peng Hsun, he incorporated village militia into his forces. (T'ung-chien, pp. 8085-6.)

81 When Peng Hsun started rebellion, Cheng I, a local Hsia-pu rowdy, joined Peng after he was able to gather three thousand troops and provisions. Peng appointed Cheng General and called his troops the Righteous Army (I-chun). Cheng surrendered to the T'ang, only after the military situation of Peng was hopeless. (T'ung-chien, p. 8144.) Li Kuan, another local figure in Peng's army, killed the general charged with the defense of Chi-hsien and surrendered the city to the government when the collapse of Peng's force seemed inevitable. (Ibid., p. 8146.)

82 When Huang Ch'ao ravaged Chiang-nan, people living in Jung-hsing were all relegated to be banditry. Tsui Shao, Prefect of O-chou, recruited those valiant and heroic as local militia. Afterwards, the bandits dared not invade the prefecture. After the death of Tsui, some adventurers, who were originally members of local militia, capitalized on their military strength to make themselves the de facto rulers in the region. This was
Understandably, apart from uprooting the local base of influence and affluence of literary clans in the south, the impact of the migration toward the center also manifested itself in influencing decisions on migration of the military, who also found success in the central government. The uprooting effect was further intensified by the route of refuge in late T'ang.

In the absence of both literary and military clans, the source of regional power was limited only to the local administrative and military structure of the government as well as the local rascals and bullies. They had no background of good lineage or success in the civil service examinations, but were simply able to intimidate and subdue the local people into submission.

When the authority of the local government ceased to exist in the era of late T'ang, these local rascals and bullies capitalized on the opportunity to seize control of local regions by coercion, making themselves the de facto rulers. Since they had the power to recruit their locals, the importance of family standing to political and military

demonstrated when Wu T'ao and Lo Yin occupied Huang-chou and Jung-hsing respectively. For details, see Ou-yang Hsiu and Sung Ch'i (996-1061), Hsin T'ang-shu, (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1975), p. 5485. Also, Chen Yen mobilized a few thousand people to protect their native place, and formed an army styled the "Nine Dragon Army" (chiu-lung chun). With his force, he subsequently replaced Cheng I, who served as Surveillance Commissioner (kuan-cha shih) of Fu-chien. (T'ung-chien, p. 8316.)
dominance was irrelevant. This was definitely the reason why Yang Hsing-mi was not eager to seek the support from families of pedigree and reputation, in his effort to recruit subordinates during his military and expansionary career.
CHAPTER TWO: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL NATURE OF THE WU REGIME
AND THE REIGN OF THE HSU FAMILY

I, The Social and Political Nature of Yang Hsing-mi’s Bloc

The disintegration of T'ang central authority and resultant spawning of petty hegemon shaped the Wu regime set up by Yang Hsing-mi. Yang, an impoverished orphan in his youth, was a native of Ho-fei in Lu-chou. During the reign period Chien-fu (874-9), bandits induced chaos in Chiang-nan and Yang became one. He was once caught but released by Cheng Chi, a local official who was impressed by Yang’s stature and militant appearance. Yang was later enlisted into military service and his military record was replete with accounts of recalcitrancy, trickery and bloodshed.

Before Yang Hsing-mi joined the prefectural army, he had already established his private force of more than a hundred people. These people were brave but behaved savagely without moral constraint. With the support of his own private force, he killed his unit commander because of a personal feud and seized control of Lu-chou. In those times, this kind of usurpation and betrayal was common and totally beyond the T'ang capability to intervene. The central government was forced to recognize reality by conferring governorship of the prefecture on him, thus beginning the fascinating and adventurous career of Yang Hsing-mi, a stereotype for his
According to the available sources, it was clear that it was not just Yang who fought his way out of obscurity to gain power but most of his chief subordinates, both administrative and military, had similar backgrounds. They can be divided into the following groups:

A, Counselors and administrators with literary background

B, Military subordinates with a background as officials

C, Military subordinates with literary background, or who valued culture and modesty

D, Military subordinates from the region of Chiang-huai, and most of them were of humble origin

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84 Only Yuan Chi and Chen Yen-chien (866-905) are qualified to be included in this category. As for their biographical data, see Appendix VII.

85 The subordinates included in this group are Chu Chien-yu (?-899), Liu Wei (857-914), Chia To (?-910), Li Tao (861-932), Tsui Ta-ch'u (866-931), and Kao Li (?-918). As for their biographical data, see Appendix VII.

86 The subordinates included in this category are T'ao Ya (857-913), Ch'ai Ts'ai-yung (864-935), T'ien Chun (858-903), Chin Pei (854-912), Wang Nien (864-929), and Chou Pen, and Li Te-cheng (863-940). As for their biographical data, see Appendix VII.

87 The subordinates included in this group are Chang Hsun, Tai Mung (855-904), Li Yu (?-912), Liu Chin (?-905), Ma Hsun, Chu Ching, Chang Chung, Wang Kuan, Chen Chih-hsin (?-907), Liu Hsin (857-926), Chung Chang, Yang Piao (880-931), Chen Yu, Chu Yen-shou (870-903), Li Chien (861-929). As for their biographical data, see Appendix VII.
E, Military subordinates not from Chiang-huai, and most of them were of humble origin.

Based on the above categorization of Yang Hsing-mi’s subordinates, one can make the following assumptions:

There were forty six major figures in Yang’s group, of which only two performed administrative and counselor functions. The relatively small number of civilian staff revealed the predominantly military character of the bloc.

Although six came directly from T’ang local administrative structure or a family with an official background, it is curious that none was reputed for preserving the T’ang way in administration. Rather, they were brutal and crude warriors. It was as if both officials and their offspring might divest themselves of propriety and scruples if living under chaotic condition or estranged from the strictures of office and official life for a long time. Their official background seemed irrelevant providing no guidance and having no impact on the Wu regime.

Apart from T’ao Ya and T’ien Chun who had a literary background, the others able to offer literary and cultural

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88 The subordinates included in this group are Chang K’e-tsung (861-925), Li Hou, Cheng Po, Liu Chuan, Chen Chang, Liu Chuan (?-920), Ti Ching (865-927), Hsu Wen (862-927), Chu Ching (867-918), Hou Tsan (862-931), Li Shen-fu, Mi Chih-cheng (?-918), An Jen-i (?-905), Li Cheng-ssu (866-920), Shih Yen (?-916). As for their biographical data, see Appendix VII.
embellishment were from humble families. The total number was just six, further indicating the dominant military character of Yang Hsing-mi’s group. Ironically, although having a literary background, the administrative and counselling staff like Yuan Chi and Chen Yen-chien contributed no such embellishment. Rather, Yuan was infamous for his blood-thirstiness. As shown in the Chiu-kuo Chih,

Even though Yuan Chi was vicious, he had his passions or emotions under control. When about to kill, he would invariably humble himself to inferiors and bow to the person to be killed.

No doubt, Yuan Chi’s taking pleasure in slaughter reinforced the image of cruelty and barbarism of Yang Hsing-mi’s group.

The number of subordinates coming from Chiang-huai was twenty-seven, 58.69% of the total. As for the rest, twelve originated from the prefectures of Ho-nan. One came from Ho-pei and two from Ho-tung. There were two barbarians and one of unknown origin. The geographical distribution of their native place indicated that Yang Hsing-mi’s bloc was not as indigenous to Chiang-huai as might anticipate. Rather, Yang was sufficiently astute to transcend geographic limitations and enlist from other places. Surely, this kind of recruitment was essential for him to set up his regime.

89 Apart from T’ao Ya and T’ien Chun, the other four are Ch’ai Ts’ai-yung, Chin Pei, Wang Nien, and Chou Pen.

90 Lu Chen (957-1014), Chiu-kuo Chi, Ts’ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch’u-pien ed., p. 2.
The number of major figures in Yang Hsing-mi's leadership who came from other provinces highlighted the influence of outsiders in Chiang-huai. This was due to a series of large-scale rebellions by Wang Hsin-chih, Huang Ch'ao, Chin Tsung-chuan, and Sun Ju which destroyed the T'ang local administration and left numerous military groups in Chiang-nan, even after the main rebel forces had retreated or were crushed.

Further, when dissension fragmented the Kao Pien (?-887) bloc, most of his subordinates became militarily independent and active, adding to the contenders in Southeast China. The political and military arena in Ho-nan also impacted on Chiang-huai, as many losers, like Chu Ching and Wang Chao (?-898), were forced to take refuge to the south under heavy pressure from their opponents. Military forces and their leaders from other regions, already well-organized and hardened by warfare, were well-qualified to serve under the contenders in the south. In this aspect, the most conspicuous example was Chu Ching. After he was driven to Chiang-huai, he became a prominent general under Yang Hsing-mi.

However, it was also highly possible that outsiders might become formidable foes on indigenous warlords in Southeast China. For instance, Wang Chao was a native of Ku-shih, a

91 Chiu T'ang-shu, pp. 4712-6.
county of Kuang-chou. When his force mainly composed of his fellow countrymen advanced to Min, 92 Wang, being renowned for discipline in administration, was invited to stay as local inhabitants suffered from the atrocities of Liao Yen-jo, who dominated Chuan-chou. Using the prefecture as a base of power, Wang gradually united the whole region of Min. 93 Another example was Chin Yen, who was a native of Hsu-chou but set up authority in Hsun-chou. 94 If indigenous blocs did not want to be eliminated, leaders needed to possess military prowess. For instance, Yang Hsing-mi was allegedly able to lift a weight of three hundred chin. 95 Even those renowned

92 When the Min natives of the Sung traced their ancestral activities in the late T'ang, they always claimed that their ancestors moved to Min from Kuang-chou. For details, see Chen Hsiang, *Ku-ling Chi*, 25: 13a; Tseng Chao, *Ch'u-fu Chi*, 3: 32b; Huang Ch'ang, *Yen-shan Chi*, 33: 10ab. The three books cited are from the Szu-k'u Ch'uan-shu ed. In addition, there are some more data in the following books: So Sung, *So-wei-kung Wen-chi*, (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1988), p. 959; Wang Ts'ao (1079-1154), *Fou-hsei Chi*, (Ts'ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch'u-pien ed.), p. 303.

93 *Hsin T'ang-shu*, p. 5492; *Chiu Wu-tai Shih*, p. 1791. The Wang regime was not favorable to the local people due to nepotism and provincial emotion. Most of the Wang Chao's fellow countrymen obtained political and social privileges, thus enabling them to be dominant and prospering. (Nan-chien Chia-i Kao, p. 413.) Even in the Southern Sung, three hundred years after the collapse of the Wang regime, many prominent families in Fu-chien were the offspring of the Wang Chao's followers. See Lu Yu, *Lu-yu Chi*, (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1976), p. 2312.

94 *Chiu T'ang-shu*, p. 4715.

95 Anonymous, *Wu-kuo Ku-shih*, Shih-pu-tsu-chai Tsung-shu ed., A: 1b. Another good example is Chung Chuan (?-906) who was famous for having once fought a tiger. This extraordinary feat gained him the respect of bandits, and he was subsequently selected as a
for civil administration were gifted with military character and ability and Peng Kan was a vivid example. 96

Apart from individual intelligence and military ability, what potential leaders needed to do to ensure survival and success was to enlist as many military genius as possible. Just relying on nepotism and provincial loyalties and rejecting non-indigenous military talent would only bring self-destruction. 97 In this sense, Yang Hsing-mi seemed to play the game well, as shown by his success in crushing northern invasions and recruiting able generals from other groups who were instrumental in strengthening his military capacity.

II, The Meritorious Generals under the Reign of Hsu Wen

When Yang Hsing-mi seized control of the Chiang-huai region, most of his subordinates were local rowdies who had no appreciation of tradition and discipline. Instead, they indulged in cruelty and killing, thus becoming a source of disturbances and frustration to the people. However, Yang

leader in the period of chaos. (Erh-mu Chi, quoted by the Tai-ping Kuang-chi, pp. 1441-2.)

96 Chiu-kuo Chih, pp. 113-4; Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 6: 3a-4a.

97 Though Yang Hsing-mi enlisted many provincial countrymen, they were worth of conscripts for their military abilities. Also, the reason for Chu Yen-shou being entrusted with important task was by no means out of nepotism. Rather, Chu’s military performance had well qualified him to take the duty.
Hsing-mi was too busy instituting reforms in the direct administration of the region, which helped alleviate the people's plight, to dedicate much time or energy to punishing the generals for their unlawful activities. Generally speaking, Yang Hsing-mi refused to punish the generals unless they rebelled against him personally. Putting an end to the privileges enjoyed by the generals and placing them under the control of the central government was instrumental to the consolidation of Hsu Wen's power.

The superior strength of the central army was an important element that enabled Hsu Wen to suppress the local forces. When Yang Hsing-mi first established the regime, he relied exclusively on the military strength of his countrymen and generals from other regions. However, Yang fully understood that it was unwise to base his authority solely on the cooperation of others. Therefore, after defeating Sun Ju in 892, he incorporated Sun's best generals and soldiers into his own bodyguard. The Chiang-nan Pieh-lu records the formation of the central army in the period of Yang Hsing-mi:

During the rule of Wu Wu-wang (i.e. Yang Hsing-mi), several thousands soldiers were chosen from Huai-nan, called "Black Cloud" (hei-yun) and "Long Sword" (chang-chien). Hsu Wen, their captain, was promoted to prominent positions based on his accumulation of military merits. Together with Chang Ching, Hsu became Company Commander (ya-nei lieh-chiao). 98

The members of the aforementioned "Black Cloud Army" were originally the subordinates of Sun Ju.

Yang Hsing-mi selected five thousand men, boarded them at his house, and generously fed and clothed them. When they were led into battle, all of them strove to be victorious. Their armor was decorated with black silk; hence they were called the "Black Cloud Army".

After a considerable period of consolidation, Yang Hsing-mi's private militia (i.e. the central army) was stronger than that of his subordinates assigned to other prefectures.

Hsu Wen was one of Yang Hsing-mi's most outstanding subordinates, and some sources attribute Hsu Wen's position and reputation to his military achievements. But it would be more correct to say that it was Hsu's cunning and political acumen that enabled him to rise to prominence in Yang Hsing-mi's corps. In 902, Yang Hsing-mi led his troops to attack

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99 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1781.

100 See Tseng Kung (1019-1083), Yuan-feng Lui-kao, Szu-pu Ts'ung-kan Ch'u-pien ed., p. 279. The Chiu-kuo Chih's detailed descriptions attempted to draw a correlation between military merits and promotions, i.e. after each great military achievement, Hsu obtained promotion. (pp. 90-1)

101 The Hsin Wu-tai Shih explicitly states that Hsu Wen did not earn enough great military honors to be able to compete with the rest of Yang Hsing-mi's subordinates. (p. 760.) According to a chronology of Yang's major military activities, he expelled Chin Yen from Hsuan-chou in 887, and captured Chiao-huang in 889. In 891, Sun Yu led his entire army to cross the Yangtze River to attack Yang. But he was defeated and killed the following year because food supplies were exhausted and epidemics swept through his army. In these battles, Hsu Wen did not play an important role in making decisions and giving orders. The only noteworthy incident historians give was that when Yang Hsing-mi entered the city of Hsuan-chou, "while his generals looted gold and silk, Hsu
Chu Wen's territory. His subordinates wanted to transport the food supplies on large ships, but Hsu Wen advocated the use of smaller boats, on the grounds that their route would be blocked with bulrushes and reeds, having been long out of use. As the army advanced towards Shu-chou, heavy rains prevented the large ships with their heavy cargo from going any further. However, the small boats were able to pass through and arrived to feed the hungry soldiers. Yang Hsing-mi was surprised and pleased by Hsu Wen's genius, and from then on he began to seek Hsu's advice on important military affairs. As Hu San-sheng (1230-1302) mentions, this incident was a watershed in Hsu's career, paving the way to his domination of Wu politics.

alone took occupied the granary and made porridge to feed the hungry." Although Ou-yang Hsiu criticizes Hsu Wen's as being a trick, it is undeniable that Hsu earned the goodwill of the Wu people with his benevolence. (Hsin-Wu-tai Shih, p. 671.) This incident reflects that Hsu's manner was different from that of those generals who did nothing but pillage and torture. Adapting his emotions and attitude to those of the populace was part of a long-term strategy to establish his own power and reputation. (T'ung-chien, p. 8388.) Nevertheless, in Yang Hsing-mi's view, this kind of "long-term consideration" was too trivial and not worthy of his attention. In 894 and 895, Yang Hsing-mi took over Ssu-chou and Hao-chou. The first prefecture surrendered to Yang, while the latter was taken by force. Due probably to this military honors he earned in the battle against Hao-chou, Hsu Wen was promoted to Chief Escort Commander (sui-shen tu-chih ping-ma-chih). However, even after this promotion, Hsu Wen was still viewed as a "minor general" by his contemporaries. (Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 90.) Decision making and strategy formulation were the responsibilities of more famous generals like Liu Chin, T'ao Ya, and T'ien Chun.

102 T'ung-chien, p. 8577.
during the reigns of three rulers.  

Hsu Wen’s cleverness was once again manifested in his operation against An Yen-i, as well as his advice that Yang Hsing-mi feign blindness to trick Chu Yen-shou. This deception helped to quash the three rebellions, as Yang Hsing-mi confessed to Hsu Wen that he felt no need to worry about T’ien Chun and An Yen-i, only about Chu. Only by killing Chu would everything be all right.

When Chu Yen-shou was about to visit Yang Hsing-mi, Yang feared that the soldiers following Chu threatened the security of the capital. So he ordered Hsu Wen to prepare against a possible conflict. Hsu Wen’s military career began with

103 ibid.; The Hsin Wu-tai Shih believes that after Hsu Wen assisted Yang Hsing-mi in suppressing the rebellion of Tien Chun and his associates, he was promoted to Commander of the Right Headquarters Troops (yu-va chih-hui chih) and began to participate in decision making. (p. 670.) But this opinion does not explain why Hsu played a key role in murdering Chu Yen-shou.

104 The three rebellions refer to those started by Tien-chun, An Jen-i, and Chu Yen-shou. For details, see their biographies in the Chiu-kuo Chih.

105 Chiu-kuo Chih, P. 38. The blindness pretense was originally suggested by Yen K’e-chiu (?-930), Hsu Wen’s subordinate. (Ma Ling, Nan-t’ang Shu, as abbreviated as the Ma-shu, Szu-pu Tsung-kan Shu-pien ed., 8: 1b.) Of course, Hsu did not admit to Yang Hsing-mi that it was Yen’s idea, so once again Hsu got the credit.

106 See T’ung-chien, pp. 8615-6. According to the Chiu-kuo Chih, the reason Yang summoned Hsu was his suspicion that Chu might have some seditious forces within the central army. Thus, he ordered Hsu to prepare for a confrontation in stealth. Given Ssu-ma Kuang’s reputation for carefully selecting his primary sources and his accuracy in examining them. I am inclined to accept the T’ung-chien’s explanation.
service in Yang Hsing-mi’s bodyguard. And since Hsu began his service in the central army in 892 and the year that Chu Yen-shou was killed was 903, he must have served for a total of eleven years. Unquestionably, Hsu Wen had ample opportunity and time to establish his personal reputation and a good network of alliances within the central army. According to Hu San-sheng, after Chu Yen-shou’s men heard about the murder of their leader, they planned to stage a rebellion. Hsu Wen was sent to deal with the situation, because

Hsu Wen followed Yang to rise to power in Lu-chou. Hsu, together with Liu Wei and T’ao Ya, were called the "thirty-six heros", and it seems that Hsu was able to bring Chu’s army to submission. Therefore, when Hsu ordered them to obey, they complied with his order. ¹⁰⁷

However, Hsu Wen was not one of "the thirty-six heros" and his status among Yang Hsing-mi’s men was much inferior to that of the famous generals like T’ao Ya and Liu Chin. ¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ T’ung-chien, p. 8616.

¹⁰⁸ In 903, Wang Shih-fang (?-908), Military Commissioner of Ch’ing-chou, was invaded by Chu Wen. He asked for help from Yang Hsing-mi, and Yang sent troops to rescue him. "Hsu Wen was a minor general and took part in the operation." (Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1784.) At that time, Liu Chin and Tao Ya had already established their reputations and military merits, and belonged to the "same rank" as Yang Hsing-mi. (Hsin Wu-tai Shih, p. 754.) The Chiu-kuo Chih also records that when Hsu Wen executed Chang Ching (?-908) and took over politically, some prominent generals like Liu Wei, T’ao Ya, and Li Chien "all emerged together with Yang Hsing-mi and earned many military merits and high rank. Because Hsu relied solely on his recently-acquired merits to assume superiority over them, they all rebelled inwardly." After Hsu Wen had put Li Yu and his family to death, and the old generals, out of fear, went to visit the capital as a sign of their submission, Hsu Wen "practiced the same rituals used to honor Yang Hsing-mi." (p. 40.) This meant
The *Chiu-kuo Chih* is quick to stress Hsu Wen's military prowess and courage in preventing Chu Yen-shou's troops from resisting, but Ssu-ma Kuang is far more careful in his treatment of this material. He simply states that when Chu's men began to foment rebellion, Hsu Wen reproved them and they followed Hsu's instructions to cease.\(^{109}\) It is unlikely that Hsu would have been able to get them to obey simply by admonishing them if Hsu had not formed social alliances with them in the past. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the troops brought by Chu Yen-shou were part of the Black Cloud Army, because the Black Cloud Army was not only employed as Yang Hsing-mi's bodyguard, but was also assigned combat duty in other prefectures. Chu Yen-shou had been Prefect of Shou-chou, which bordered on Chu Wen's territory. Due to Shou-chou's strategic significance for the national defense, Yang Hsing-mi had stationed the Black Cloud Army in this prefecture.\(^{110}\)

Although Chu Yen-shou had no suspicions when he went to

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\(^{109}\) *T'ung-chien*, p. 8616.

\(^{110}\) In 895, several ten thousand members of Chu Wen's army were sent to attack Shou-chou, and a portion of the Black Cloud Army was garrisoned there to assist the prefectural army in defending the city. For instance, Li Hou, Troop Leader of the Black Cloud Army, had been under Chu Yen-shou's command. (*Chiu-kuo Chih*, pp. 17-8; *T'ung-chien*, p. 8468.)
visit Kuang-ling, his wife was more perspicacious. She understood that her husband’s fate depended on what would happen during his trip. In other words, she did not know what the outcome of the trip would be. Therefore, probably in an effort to guarantee her husband’s safety during the trip, Chu Yen-shou’s wife selected the best soldiers to accompany him. Certainly, the Black Cloud Army was the most eminent force stationed in the prefecture. Hsu Wen was then able to exert his influence to dissuade Chu’s troops from revolting, and he was promoted to Commander of the Right Headquarters Troops (yu-ya) because of his outstanding performance during the incident. Later, especially after Yang Hsing-mi had suppressed the three rebellions, the strength of the bodyguard became unchallengeable.

Hsu Wen and the generals were not equal in terms of seniority, and he had earned far fewer military merits.

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111 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 38.
112 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 233.
113 T’ung-chien, p. 8616.
114 Hsu Wen was engaged in a power struggle with Chang Ching after the death of Yang Hsing-mi. He was ordered to take the post of Prefect of Jun-chou. However, Yen K’e-chiu told Hsu that if he gave up his command of the Military Commissioner’s bodyguard (ya-ping), disaster would certainly follow. Hsu shared the same thought; thus he was concerned about the possibility. (Ma-shu, 8: 3a.) This shows that only the central army was able to ensure Hsu Wen’s security. Once Hsu had killed Chang Ching, he automatically became the most powerful figure in the country.
Because of his meteoric rise to dominate Wu politics, it was inevitable that Hsu Wen would come into conflict with other generals. Because of the tension between him and the generals, Hsu had to utilize every means to undermine the authority and strength of the generals and to destroy all their attempts to achieve personal advancement.

Among Hsu Wen's many oppressive measures, his bloodiest was outright execution. For example, Li Yu, a famous general who had merely spoken a few insulting words regarding Hsu, was put to death, together with about a hundred members of his family. Witnessing the dire consequences Li Yu suffered, all the other generals were intimidated. Moreover, Hsu made institutional changes as a means of dividing and undermining the authority of the generals. This policy was manifested in the following ways:

1. The power of the chief commander was heavily divided up among his subordinates. In the eighth month of 909, Chou Pen and Lu Shih-pen were sent to attack Wu Yueh and lay siege to Su-chou. But even after a long siege, they were not successful in toppling the city. In the fourth month of the next year, Wu's army was crushed due to the cooperative efforts of internal forces and external forces engaged by Wu.

115 Hsin Wu-tai Shih, p. 760; Chiang-nan Pieh-lu, 2a.
According to an explanation given by Chou Pen after the battle, their defeat stemmed not from the superior strength of the enemy, but from the fact that the chief commander lacked authority, leaving his subordinates to take matters into their own hands.

In 910, when Wei Chuan-feng, Prefect of Fu-chou, led his troops allegedly numbering up to 100,000 to attack Hung-chou, Yen K’i-chiu urged Chou Pen to take up a line of defense. However, Chou requested that if he be appointed Commander-in-chief, no vice commander be assigned to the army by the central government, thus allowing him to have a full authority on decision making during the operation. His request was approved. Consequently, he defeated the invading enemy and took over the territory of Chiang-hsi. However, this was an exception, and does not necessarily imply that Hsu Wen had loosened his control over the generals' commanding authority.

Apart from those prefectures like Shou-chou and Hai-chou who guarded the northern borders, the number of soldiers stationed in other prefectures was greatly reduced. For instance, Hung-chou was a strategic point of defense against the invasion of T’ung-chien, p. 8709.

Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 99.
Wei Chuan-feng, but this threat was minor compared to the military might of the north. Therefore, few soldiers were stationed in this prefecture. The diminished strength of the local regions, as compared to the era of Yang Hsing-mi in which local forces were able to counter-balance the central forces, demonstrates the increasing power of the central government.

3. In order to demilitarize the prefectures, Hsu Wen even tried to ban the people's tradition of practicing their military skills by forbidding the people to bear arms. However, after the ban, criminal activity was much more prevalent. Hsu was forced to abandon this plan, since it was unrealistic to uphold it in such a time of disorder.

4. Because Hsu Wen was determined to undermine the local authority, his control over local areas gradually increased. This trend is reflected in the appointment of high military officers to prefectures in border areas.

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118 In 909, when Wei Chuan-feng launched his attack against the prefecture, only a thousand soldiers were stationed there. (Chiu-kuo Chih., p. 3; T'ung-chien, p. 8712.) Also, in 918, when Wu Yueh invaded Hsin-chou, only a few hundred soldiers were garrisoned there. (T'ung-chien, p. 8833.)

119 As pointed out by Lu Shu, the country was in the midst of war and chaos, and it was appropriate that people learn combat techniques. Furthermore, only docile people abided by the ban out of fear for the law, while bandits continued to make use of weapons. Therefore, it was appropriate to organize a militia and teach them how to fight in order to protect their homeland. (T'ung-chien, p. 8853.)
Since the reign period Ch’ien-fu, the guarding officials of Shou-chou had been renowned for their bravery and military prowess. Their method of dominating the prefecture usually consisted of first establishing their power in an area, and then appealing to the central government to recognize their authority. In 918, Chen Shao, Military Training Commissioner (t’uan-lien shih), died while in office, and the central government sent Wang Ting to Shou-chou with an untitled certificate of appointment to determine who deserved the appointment. Wang was aware that Tsui Ta-ch’u really decided prefectural military and political affairs, but Tsui’s rank was lower than that of Ling Shen-yen, who served as Company Commander (va-chang). After a series of manipulations, Wang managed to confer the certificate of appointment on Tsui without stirring up disturbance and revolt in Shou-chou. 120

At that time, Hsu Wen had already dominated Wu politics and administration for ten years, but he still needed to be cautious in appointing officials in the frontier prefectures. Nevertheless, the measure adopted by Wang Ting also reflects the increased control of the central government. The fact that even though Ling Shen-yen was tricked into losing his military command, he could not stir up unrest within his army and Shou-shou remained peaceful after this incident is strong

120 As for the details of manipulation, see the Chiu-kuo Chih, pp. 76-7.
evidence of this. From then on, the central government had less fear and more power to appoint officials on the frontiers.

After three years of administrating Shou-chou, Tsui Ta-ch’u had lost all admiration and goodwill of the local inhabitants because of his tyrannical manner. Although Hsu Wen wanted to recall Tsui, Hsu Chih-kao, Hsu Wen’s adopted son, tried to dissuade him from doing so, for Shou-chou was a strategic border area, and he feared that Tsui’s recall might lead to disruption if Tsui was not pleased with this arrangement. Instead, Hsu Chih-kao suggested that the central government simply detain Tsui when he came to the capital to pay tribute. Hsu Wen was angry and said,

If I can’t hold one Tsui Ta-ch’u in check, how can I deal with anyone else!

Hsu Wen ended up summoning Tsui to the capital to accept the post of General-in-chief of the Right Hsiung-wu Army (yu hsiang-wu tai-chang-chun). 121 This incident, as Hu San-sheng affirms, shows that Hsu Wen was far more crafty than his adopted son. 122 It also indicates that the authority of the central government had grown to the point where it could act just as it desired in replacing military officials, even in the frontier region.

121 T’ung-chien, p. 8870.

122 Ibid.
On the whole, Hsu Wen's policy of keeping the generals under control basically tended to be high-handed and merciless. However, while harsh despotism and institutional changes maintained political tranquillity for a short time, they were not sufficient for gaining the long-term submission and respect of the generals. Therefore, Hsu Wen needed to use his personal charisma as well as his military and political acumen to instill awe in the generals.

As shown in 918, Liu Hsin, despite having gained many minor victories, was unable to capture Chien-chou. In order to achieve a breakthrough, Liu sent an envoy to persuade Tan chuan-po (834-905), the ruler of Chien-chou, to give hostages and valuables as a sign of his submission. Hsu Wen flew into a rage when he was informed of this event, even flogging Liu's envoy to show that he was flogging Liu Hsin. At that time, Liu Ying-yen, Liu Hsin's son, was commanding a portion of the bodyguard. Hsu Wen assigned three thousand soldiers to Liu Ying-yen, saying,

> Your father took over the upper stream and led an army that was ten times as large as the enemy's, but was not able to capture the city. This was mutiny. You may lead these troops to the area and assist your father in mutinying.

Hsu Wen then assigned Chu Ching-yu, Commander of the Headquarters Troops stationed in Sheng-chou (Sheng-chou ya-nei chih-hui-shih), to accompany Liu Ying-yen. Hsu told Chu,

> The soldiers defending the city for Tan Chuan-po are
farmers. They have been hungry and tired for over a year, and their wives and children are outside the city. If they heard that our army is approaching again, they would certainly flee, and all Tan would guard would be an empty city. We shall conquer the city if we return.

When Liu Hsin heard about the reprimand made by Hsu Wen, he was horrified and led his army to besiege the city again. The defense was completely routed and Tan Chuan-po himself was captured. In this incident, Hsu Wen's knowledge of political manipulation and strategy was once again shown to be instrumental in winning the admiration and awe of the generals.

Hsu Wen would frequently adopt conciliatory measures. In 913, Hsu Wen sent Li Tao to fight Wu Yueh. During the battle, Ts'ao Yun, defected to Wu Yueh's side, thereby causing the defeat of Wu army and Li's capture in battle. Hsu Wen secretly sent a spy to tell Ts'ao,

Though I have appointed you general, I could not meet the needs of your army. It is my fault.

Hsu Wen then pardoned Ts'ao's wife and children from execution and treated them well.

That autumn, Wu Yueh began operations against Ch'ang-chou, and Hsu Wen led his troops to fight the enemy in Wu-hsi. During the battle, Ts'ao Yun, moved by Hsu's words, abandoned

\[133 \text{ Ibid., p. 8836.}\]
Wu Yueh, leading to its defeat. 124 Once Ts’ao had returned to his homeland, Hsu Wen blamed himself for not listening to Ts’ao for three times, and he refused to upbraid Ts’ao for his defection. In addition, Hsu Wen returned Ts’ao’s property and residence, which had been confiscated, and restored Ts’ao to his former military office. As a result, Ts’ao felt repentant and died of shame. 125 Hu San-sheng comments that this is another example of Hsu Wen’s ability to control the generals. 126 In other words, conciliatory policy had been elevated to a tactic that kept the generals under control. Not only could such a policy alter the situation on the battlefield, but it could also effectively achieve execution without having to actually commit the execution.

Cultivating marital ties was also a means of dealing with the generals, as shown in the case of Li Te-cheng, Prefect of Jun-chou. Once Li was making an excursion at night, when a guard stationed in Yang-chou caught sight from afar of the torch Li was carrying. This incident was reported to Hsu Wen, who then was suspicious of Li’s motivation for the excursion. Hsu ordered a group of a thousand soldiers to advance to Jun-chou and have Li transferred to Chiang-chou. Terrified, Li

124 Hsin Wu-tai Shih, pp. 760-1.
125 T’ung-chien, p. 8846.
126 Ibid.
Te-cheng set out for Chiang-chou immediately, without even enough time to bring his tent.

Even after Li Te-cheng had arrived in Chiang-chou, he was still worried over his possible doom. He ordered Li Chi-hsun, his second son, to journey to the capital. When Hsu Wen met Li's son, he couldn't help sighing,

With a son like this, Li Te-cheng cannot be a treacherous person.

Hsu Wen then married his daughter to Li Chi-hsun, and transferred Li Te-cheng to Hsin-chou. 127

Another way marriage was used as a way of lessening hostilities is shown by the case of Chung Tai-chang. Chung had killed Chang Ching who had been the formidable foe of Hsu Wen, but Chung did not think that his reward was enough, and he voiced his dissatisfaction openly. When Hsu Wen heard about it, he sighed, "This is certainly my fault," and bestowed a good promotion on Chung. 128

After Chung Tai-chang became a local official in Shou-chou, he was accused of breaking the law to purchase official horses. Hsu Chih-kao ordered that Chung be demoted from Military Training Commissioner of shou-chou to Prefect of Yao-chou. Subsequently, Hsu Wen recalled Chung Tai-chang to Chining and interrogated him many times; but Chung did not

127 Chiang-nan Pien-lu, p. 2ab.
128 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 25.
respond to the questions. Meanwhile, Hsu Chih-kao tried to bring the matter to trial, and asked Hsu Wen to impose punishment on Chung. But Hsu Wen refused, because he still remembered Chung’s merit.

If it had not been for Chxing, I would have already died by the hand of Chang Ching. Now I am living in luxury. How then could I thus repay his favor!

Hsu Wen then ordered his adopted son to arrange a marriage between Hsu Ching-t’ung (or Li Ching, Emperor Yuan-tsung of the Southern T’ang), Hsu Chih-kao’s son, and the daughter of Chung, as a way to allay Hsu Chih-kao’s enmity towards Chung.

As long as the generals submitted, even if they previously had been at odds with Hsu Wen, Hsu did not cause them trouble based on their past differences. According to the Chiu-kuo Chih, when Yang Hsing-mi fell seriously ill, he consulted Chou Yin (?-907) concerning his successor after death. Chou recommended Liu Wei, a famous general, as Yang’s successor. When Liu learned of this, he was eager to succeed Yang as ruler. After Hsu Wen dominated the Wu administration, Liu Wei was transferred to Chung-ling in where he abused his power of imposing punishments, causing Hsu Wen to plan a military attack against him. Liu was dismayed when he heard the news, and Huang Nei, Liu’s subordinate, advised him:

129 T’ung-chien, p. 8903.
Even though you have been slandered, there is no solid evidence to prove that you were going to start a revolt. If you visit the capital in person, it would surely allay suspicions.  

Not only was Liu Wei viewed with enmity, but T'ao Ya, another general of great fame, was also resented by Hsu Wen. Because of their similar backgrounds, T'ao and Liu joined together to visit Kuang-ling in person. Hsu Wen granted them an audience and treated them courteously by adopting the same rituals as he had used to serve Yang Hsing-mi. This showed that even though Hsu had risen in power, he had not forgotten his humble origins. In addition, Hsu graciously promoted them in title and rank after their visit. Naturally, the generals were pleased with the outcome, and everyone held Hsu Wen in great esteem.

All the measures mentioned above effectively illustrate Hsu Wen's capacity for broad-mindedness, benevolence, and mercy. As Hu San-sheng points out, Hsu's actions, although they probably did not stem from his real feelings, earned him a great deal of political benefit.

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130 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 2. As a matter of fact, the reason why Hsu Wen planned an operation against Liu was not because Liu Wei was abused his authority in Hung-chou. Other prefects, like Chang Chung, was far more infamous for their abusiveness and corruption, but they were still favored by Hsu because of their submissiveness. Therefore, the actual cause of Hsu's hostility was that he was suspicious of Liu's involvement in succession, for which some people took the opportunity to slander Liu.

131 T'ung-chien, p. 8762.
In summary, the combination of high-handed policies and pacifying measures that Hsu Wen used to placate the public were the same means he used to keep the military in check. Undoubtedly, Hsu Wen’s ultimate goal was to undermine the authority of the meritorious generals serving in local governments and to centralize his own power.

In the process of gaining control over the military, Hsu Wen was basically concerned with matters of loyalty and docility and did not care about breaches of etiquette and ritual. This is probably due to the fact that Hsu Wen himself had a military background and did not appreciate how serious the misbehavior of the generals was. In his eyes, violating the law and rituals was trivial and did not need to be taken seriously. Therefore, while Hsu Wen’s policy merely undermined the generals’ authority, he could never completely eradicate the importance of the military under his rule.

III, Changes in the Nature of Administration during The Reign of Hsu Chih-kao

Based on Hsu Wen’s military background, it appears that the Hsu family was covered with military glory, and that his children stuck to the military tradition by rejecting literature and culture. According to biographies found in historical sources, the biological sons of Hsu Wen were all fond of hunting, implying that their lifestyle and behavior
was militarily oriented, like that of their father. The Kuang-ling Chi contains a passage pertaining to the education of Hsu Wen's family.

When Hsu Tien-hsi (a clan member of Hsu Wen) was a child, even though the Hsus had already lost their authority, they still regarded themselves as the descendants of former military family, and never kept close to books. Only Hsu Tien-hsi pursued learning as a career.\(^{12}\)

However, the actual facts are entirely different from what is generally supposed. Although Hsu Wen was illiterate, militant, and did not explicitly urge his sons to pursue literary careers thus leading to inconsistency in the behavior of his six biological sons,\(^ {13}\) he was aware of the importance of treating the literati with grace and courtesy.\(^ {14}\)

\(^{12}\) Wang Ling (1032–1059), Kuang-ling Chi, Szu-k'u Ch'uan-shu ed., 28: 12b. Hsu Tien-hsi got his chin-shih during the reign period tien-hsi (1017–1021). Therefore, the description refers to the early period of the Northern Sung. For more information about the education of Hsu Wen's family, see Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 1: 2b.

\(^{13}\) Apart from Hsu Chih-chien and Hsu Chih-ao, who were renowned for their literacy and refinement, Hsu Chih-hsun, Hsu Chih-hui, and Hsu Chih-cheng did not possess any particular talents for either literature or the military. Hsu Chih-hsun (?–918), the first biological son of Hsu Wen, was self-indulgent, hot-tempered and rowdy. He "learned military strategy and tactics when he was young, but he did not finish his education. He particularly liked games of swordsmanship and wrestling. Relying on the authority of his father, he committed many crimes." (Ma-shu, 8: 5a.) Undoubtedly, recalcitrance and abrasiveness were typical military traits.

\(^{14}\) When Hsu Wen first met Li Chien-hsun, Li's most obvious merits were that he was "fond of studying when young, and his manner was graceful and refined." But Hsu appreciated Li's refinement and scholarly outlook, and married his daughter to him. See Shih Wen-ying, Yu-hu Ch'ing-hua, Chih-pu-tsu-chai Ts'ung-shu ed., 10: 1a.
Therefore, two of his sons, namely Hsu Chih-chien (?-937) and Hsu Chih-o (905-940), were renowned for their literacy and refinement.\(^{135}\)

By comparison, Hsu Chih-kao’s literary inclinations were much more apparent in the arrangements he made for his family’s education based on the guidance of scholars.\(^{136}\) All his sons were renowned for their literary achievements and refinement, as shown by the following examples:

1. Hsu Ching-t’ung (a.k.a. Li Ching)

   The oldest son of Hsu Chih-kao, Hsu Ching-t’ung was required to succeed his father politically. This is why he had

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\(^{135}\) Hsu Chih-chien was refined, docile, and intelligent. He composed literary works. (Ma-shu, 8: 8a.) Hsu Chih-o was fond of purchasing antique books and prints. He was familiar with the Classics and was fond of composing poems and essays. (Yu-hu Ch’ing-hua, 9: 7a.) He collected his literary compositions in ten volumes and titled them the Ko-chuna Chi. (Lu-shu, chuan 5: 1b.) Furthermore, some of Hsu Wen’s grandsons did not appreciate military affairs, but delighted in literary works. The most famous among these are Hsu Ching-liao and Hsu Ching-yu. (Chiang-nan Pei-lu, 5b.) Between the two, Hsu Ching-yu was more celebrated for his literary achievements. He used to discuss the meaning of the Classics with Li Yu. (Lu-shu, chuan 5: 2a.) Therefore, it is obvious that the author of the Kuang-ling Chi probably wished to exaggerate Hsu Tien-hsi’s accomplishments by distorting the literary tradition of his ancestors.

\(^{136}\) When Hsu Ching-chien, the second son of Hsu Chih-kao, took charge of the Wu administration in Kuang-ling, he ordered Chen Chiao (?-958), an intellectual, to assist his son, saying, "I longed to make the acquaintance of virtuous literati when I was young, and now I am old but still able to achieve an understanding of universal affairs. Li Ching-chien is too young to rule the state, therefore, I am anxious to recommend you to the post." (Lu-shu, chuan 6: 4b-5a.) This incident clearly reveals that Hsu Chih-kao was aware of the importance of education to his children.
received political and military training. Yet he liked literature and was already able to compose poems at the age of ten, astonishing everybody with his literary ability. 137

2, Hsu Ching-chien

Hsu Ching-chien was a brilliant youth, able to memorize texts after just one reading. 138

3, Hsu Ching-sui (921-959)

Hsu Ching-sui proved his worth as a gentleman by acting in a polished and refined manner. 139 He was fond of literary composition and invited the literati to feast with him. 140

4, Hsu Ching-ta (925-971)

Hsu Ching-ta was extraordinarily intelligent as a youth, he was interested in spirits and mysticism. But Hsu Ch’ieh (920-974), his secretary, satirized this by writing a "Long Poem on the Description of Fairies" (Shu-hsien Fu). After reading it, Li gave up this interest. 141

5, Hsu Ching-ti (937-968)

Almost all the princes and prominent scholar-officials were fond of Buddhism, but only Li Ching-ti scorned the Buddhist

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137 Ma-shu, 2: 1a.
138 Ibid., 7: 1b.
139 Ibid., 7: 2a.
140 Lu-shu, chuan 13: 5b.
141 Ma-shu, 7: 3ab.
sutra and emphasized the importance of the Six Classics as well as the teachings of the sages. When the magistrate of Kan-hsien died, Shao Chi-liang, the late magistrate's subordinate, ordered music and drinking on the day of the funeral. Li Ching-ti immediately requested the court to dismiss Shao, because what Shao had done was a breach of morality. 142

Hsu Chih-kao's inclination towards literacy and culture also influenced his foster brother. Hsu Wen died when Hsu Chih-o was twenty two years old. 143 From then on, Hsu Chih-kao undertook the role of his adopted brother's guardian, overseeing his behavior. He maintained this role even after Hsu Chih-o was about thirty years old. In 935, when Hsu Chih-o served as Military Training Commissioner of Jun-chou, he liked having improper friendships with vulgar people and canceling administrative functions for the sake of amusement and banquets. He set up a row of bazaars in the western quarter of the walled city (ya-cheng) and engaged in trade. Hsu Chih-kao, angry upon hearing this, summoned Hsu Chih-o and ordered his subordinates to

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142 Ibid., 7: 4b.

143 Hsu Chih-o once told his guests, "A person's life span is 70 years. I was born and raised in a noble family, and have experience all kinds of happiness. Since one day of my life is equal to two of an ordinary person's, will I die when I am thirty five?" (Lu-shu, chuan 5: 1b.) In fact, he did die in 940, at the age of thirty five. (Ma-shu, 1: b.) Hsu Wen had already died in 927. In other words, Hsu Chih-ao became an orphan at about the age of twenty two.
reprimand him. Hsu Chih-o was frightened.\footnote{T’ung-chien, p. 9132.} Thus, Hsu Chih-kao’s role as guardian probably provided guidelines for Hsu Chih-o’s behavior, and was also the basis of his adopted brother’s literary accomplishments.

The already-existing political structure that had been established by Yang Hsing-mi and Hsu Wen, as well as their welfare reforms, were the main reasons why Hsu Chih-kao easily established his rule in Chiang-huai.\footnote{Lo-chuan Chi, 33: 1a; T’ung-chien, pp. 8831-2.} Moreover, he followed his foregoer’s practice of limiting the authority of the military. In 942, he prohibited both military commissioners and prefects from making official appointments.\footnote{Lu-shu, chi 1: 8a.} The authority to appoint officials was thus centralized.

Apart from repressive measures against the military, strengthening the civil administration also enabled him to lessen the importance of the military to the regime. When Hsu Chih-kao began his office as Prefect of Sheng-chou, his viewpoints and way of administration were different from those of his foster father.\footnote{Cheng Wen-pao, Chiang-nan Yu-tsai, Ts’ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch’u-pien ed., 7: 9.} These remarkable differences rested on Hsu Chih-kao’s promotion of literary works and education and his efforts to carry out the civil administration. He
tried to eliminate the fashion of revering valor and militancy, while playing up the value of duty and the teachings of the sages. 148

Meanwhile, North China was in chaos, and many well-known scholar-officials and literati rushed to the south seeking refuge. 149 Hsu Chih-kao sent his henchmen to guard the border, in order to find those who were fleeing from the north. When the guards encountered someone of noble demeanor, they were to bring him to see Hsu. If his speech was worthy of emulation, he would be offered a post on the spot. 150 In this way many notable persons from the north like Han Hsi-t'sai (902-970), Sun Chi (a.k.a. Sun Cheng, ?-956), Chiang Wen-wei (901-952), and Chang Meng-hsi (898-958) were incorporated into Hsu Chih-kao's government, and Hsu was very

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148 When Hsu Chih-kao served as Prefect of Sheng-chou, he was fond of literary composition, and liked inviting literati to discuss with them about the polity. (Shih Hsu-pai, Tiao-chi Lieh-tan, Ts'ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch'u-pien ed., p. 1.) The purpose of his deed, besides improving administrative rules, was to "hold sanctimonious traitors in check", who were referred to the military. (Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 4: 2a.) It was obviously that Hsu tried to use literary force to downplay the significance of the military in the regime. After Hsu was sent to Kuang-ling as a regent, he totally acted contrary to that of his adopted brother by "bending his dignity to pay courtesy and respect, when receiving and waiting upon scholar-officials"; He also "established the Pavilion of Inviting Guests (yen-pin ting) by the side of his residence to wait upon literati from the four corners". (Tiao-chi Lieh-tan, p. 3.)

149 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 1: 5a.

150 Tiao-chi Lieh-tan, p. 3.
courteous to them.

When Hsu Chih-kao was relatively free after administering affairs of state, he gave audience to the literati, and talked with them about everything. In addition, Hsu and his guests would compose poems during the banquet, and they certainly had a most enjoyable time. Under Hsu’s rule, no barriers separated the nobility from the poor. Hsu’s actions enabled him to become familiar with general affairs, including injustices and grievances, and he knew how to promote what was good and abolish what was evil. Furthermore, because his policy invited the northern gentry to seek refuge in the south, Chiang-nan became the center of literary scholarship. 151

Although Hsu Chih-kao was dedicated to promoting education and culture within the country, he was living in a military era and military power was indispensable to the administration of the state. While Hsu Wen was still alive, Hsu Chih-kao could count on him as a source of power to back up his policies. However, when Hsu Wen died in 927 and his troops fell under the control of Hsu Chih-hsun (?-934), the political situation of Hsu Chih-kao was abruptly placed in jeopardy. The major reason for his ability to dominate Wu politics and further establish his empire was certainly not because

he had been Regent for a long time, and he coerced the Son of Heaven to give order to the domain. Nobody dared resist. 152

On the contrary, his position as the adopted son of Hsu Wen

151 Ibid., pp. 3, 15.
152 T’ung-chien, p. 9034.
During the struggle for succession, Hsü chih-kao's most serious problem was that he did not have the support of a mighty army. In the beginning, Hsü Wen entrusted his administration to Hsü Chih-hsun, his biological son. Hsü Chih-hsun was sent to live in Kuang-ling in order to act as Regent and take part in the operation against the Later Liang. (T'ung-chien, pp. 8797, 8807.) In 918, Hsü Chih-hsun was assassinated. At that time, Hsü Chih-kao was Prefect of Jun-chou. Because of his geographical proximity to Kuang-ling, he was able to learn about the incident early, and he led his troops there to put down the revolt. (Hsin Wu-tai Shih, p. 765.) Even though he was the first to arrive at the scene, this was not necessarily a guarantee that he would obtain the post. As a matter of fact, Hsü Wen appointed his adopted son to take the place of Hsü Chih-hsun just because his other biological sons were too young. (Ma-shu, 1: 2a.) After Hsü Chih-kao took over the post of Regent Of Kuang-ling, he was constantly under challenge from various sides. The most serious threat came from Hsü Chih-hsun, another of his adopted brothers. Similar to his biological brother, Hsü Chih-hsun was impolite to Hsü Chih-kao. (T'ung-chien, p. 8828.) As he grew up, he was increasingly discontent with the dominance of Hsü Chih-kao, on the grounds that he was not a real member of the Hsü family. Several times he asked to be able to fill Hsü Chih-kao's position. (Ibid., p. 9010.) In addition, some of Hsü Wen's subordinates also caused trouble for Hsü Chih-kao. For instance, Yen K'e-chiu constantly advised Hsü Wen to replace Hsü Chih-kao with Hsü Chih-hsun. (Ibid., p. 8837.) Hsü Chieh (868-943) also asked to have Hsü Chih-hsun appointed to the post, for Hsü Chih-kao spent money generously to gain the loyalty of the literati, and it was not appropriate to allow him to run the national administration for too long a time. (Lu-shu, chuan 4: 1a.) Hsü Chih-kao was aware of the seriousness of the situation and he, together with Lo Chih-hsiang, sent Yen to govern Ch'u-chou. But Yen was clever enough to excuse himself from serving in the outer prefecture. Hsü then was convinced that he had no way of getting rid of Yen, and so he married his daughter to Yen's son. (T'ung-chien, p. 8837.) Sometimes, Hsü Chih-kao needed to please the henchmen his foster father, so as to get them to adopt a favorable standpoint regarding the issue of succession. When Chen Yen-chen fell ill, Hsü Chih-kao was afraid that Chen would talk about the succession in his last words. "He then sent Chen medicine, gold and silks, and the envoys were sent on their way without delay." (Ibid., pp. 8934-5.) However, Hsü Chih-kao's scheme did not work out as Chen was about to die. "He wrote to Hsü Wen about more than ten matters, and the first item was a request that Hsü Wen be succeeded by his biological son." (Ch'i-yü Chih, p. 78.) Hsü Wen knew that his several biological sons could not match his adopted
Only in 927 when he seized control of the bodyguard of Hsu Chih-hsun, his adopted brother, did he then become the authentic ruler of the Wu regime.  

Having established firm control over the country, what Hsu Chih-kao needed to deal with was neither the problem of son in talent, (T'ung-chien, p. 9010.) and his wife also approved of Hsu Chih-kao very much. She always said, "We raised this son in times of poverty, but were ungrateful to him when we became wealthy. This was not according to the principle of right conduct." (Chiang-nan Pieh-lu, 4a.) However, in the long run Hsu Wen could not resist the persuasion coming from all sides.

In 927, Hsu Wen had planned to lead Prefects and Military Commissioners of various prefectures to Kuang-ling in order to persuade the Wu king to proclaim himself emperor. As he was about to set off, he fell ill and sent his second son to complete the task. It was agreed that when his second son had finished the task, he would stay at Kuang-ling to take over Hsu Chih-kao's post as Regent. Under these circumstances, Hsu Chih-kao realized that the overthrow was inevitable. He drafted a request for a transfer to Hung-chou. But news of the death of his foster father came to Kuang-ling, and Hsu was able to avoid being replaced. (T'ung-chien, p. 9010.) As for Hsu Chih-hsun, he rushed back to Chin-ling when he heard the news on the road, and took over his father's military forces stationed in Chin-ling. However, he was dull and lazy and treated his brothers rudely. Hsu Chieh knew that Hsu Chih-hsun would ultimately be defeated by his adopted brother, and he then shifted his allegiance to Hsu Chih-kao. Deserted by those around him, Hsu Chih-hsun did not even realize the danger at all. He could only saw his power based on his control of the strong bodyguard and Chin-ling, a strategic fort upriver. His adopted brother, though in charge of the Wu administration, controlled no strong military force, so it was easy to hold him in check. Immersed in a false sense of security, Hsu Chih-hsun was unaware of the importance of keeping an eye on his adopted brother. Finally, Hsu Chih-hsun was lured to Kuang-ling by Hsu Chih-kao and his biological brothers. Having arrived, Hsu Chih-hsun was arrested and demoted to Right Campaign Commander (tso tu-t'ung-chun). (Chiang-nan Pieh-lu, 4b.) Hsu Chih-kao took the opportunity to summon the bodyguard stationed in Chin-ling to Kuang-ling. From then on, Hsu Chih-kao was able to achieve real leadership over the country. (Chiang-nan Yeh-shih 1: 5b.)
military revolt nor control over the prefectures, for neither of these posed a threat to his power any longer. Rather, his main aim was to replace the vestiges of the military forces that remained in the regime with the promotion of literary culture. Under the circumstances, even those who wished to discuss military affairs needed to present their opinions in a literary format to demonstrate their military talents to Hsu Chih-kao. 155

Because of Hsu Chih-kao's emphasis on culture and education, it was inevitable that he would be quite severe and critical in his observances of etiquette and discipline. Therefore, he demanded that the behavior of the military comply with traditional rites and formalities. In 927, Ch'ai Ts'ai-yun who dressed in military costume entered the court. He was stopped by Censor (yu-shih), but Chai, counting on his military merit, did not confess his guilt. Hsu Chih-kao then set up the example by himself that he committed a deliberate faux pas by inquiring about the Wu ruler's health from a side

155 For instance, Cha Wen-huai (890-959) liked portraying himself as a chivalrous person who enjoyed discussing military affairs. But he was not military-oriented to begin with. Instead, he was a good student and as a youth could withstand the austere life of a scholar. He had even written part of the classics and history for several hundred chuan, thus gaining him a good literary reputation. His background differentiated him from most of the military, who were infamous for their rudeness and illiteracy. Therefore, when he visited Hsu Chih-kao, Hsu was pleased with his opinions. (Lu-shu, chuan 2: 4b; Lu Ying-lung, Hsien-ch'uang Kua-i Chih, Pai-hai ed., 21b-22a.)
hall. Hsu then interceded himself and insisted on inflicting punishment by depriving himself of one month's salary. Afterwards, "both the inner and the outer became reverential." Undoubtedly, using laws and rituals as a means of regulating the behavior of the generals incurred more restriction and frustration to the military.

Generally speaking, Hsu Chih-kao kept the military at a distance. However, if they were docile, cautious, and unusually capable of complying with laws and regulations in carrying out their duties, they were appreciated and respected by Hsu and success in their careers was guaranteed. Yao Ching, the son-in-law of Liu Chin, was a general. He did not have any special abilities other than his incorruptibility and unswerving loyalty. He was appreciated by Hsu, who appointed him to the post of Military Commissioner of Shou-chou and finally Commissioner-Councilor (shih-hsian). His experience was praised as extraordinary.

Another example was Wang Yen-chou who was originally a

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156 T'ung-chien, p. 9000. According to the Chiu-kuo Chih, Ch'ai Ts'ai-yun was regarded as an eminent general not just because of his military merits, but also for his literacy and refined behavior as well as his awareness of restraint in actions. (p. 13.) However, Ch'ai still committed a breach of etiquette and did not realize that it was caused by his imprudence. This incident shows that arrogance, stubbornness, and noncompliance with rites and formalities still prevailed, and even those generals renowned for being refined and scholarly could not help committing errors.

157 Yu-hu Ch'ing-hua, 10: 2ab.
military officer in Ts'ai-chou. He betrayed his colleagues and killed the prefect, after which he fled to Chiang-huai. Still, Hsu Chih-kao praised him highly and visited his father at his residence. This was because when Wang became Prefect of Ho-chou, he had administrative talent and was good at placating the populace under his jurisdiction. Also, because Wang realized that he had achieved prominence only through his evil deeds, he tried to be reverent and cautious from then on. It is clear from Wang's previous behavior that he was an adept opportunist. The reason why he established a humble and law-abiding image for himself after his arrival in Chiang-nan was that it was a prerequisite for earning promotions in his public career. His decision definitely reflected the needs and desires of Hsu Chih-kao and the contemporary mores.

Moreover, Hsu Chih-kao conscientiously sought out local men of integrity and literacy amid obscurity. When Hsu Chih-kao was stationed in Chin-ling, he searched everywhere for intellectuals, and ordered prefectures and counties to appoint well-known learned scholars. Hsu also placed emphasis on building and repairing schools and collecting books. Even after Hsu Chih-kao had gone to Sheng-chou and assigned Hsu

158 Lu-shu, chuan 5: 3b-4a.
159 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 6: 7a.
160 Ma-shu, 18: 2a.
Ching-t'ung, his son, to act as Regent of Kuang-ling, his respectful treatment of the literati did not change.  

After the establishment of the Southern T'ang, Hsu Chih-kao's attempts to promote cultural endeavors were still carried out without interruption, and he even established the civil service examinations to recruit men of letters into the administration. In 942, one year before his death, he issued an imperial edict ordering the appointment of literati to offices in an attempt to eradicate the remnants of military domination, which had long hampered virtue. The criteria for appointment was primarily based on literary ability.

IV, Local Military Clans and Families Under the Policy of Centralization

The history provided thus far has been mainly limited to the activities of Yang and his important subordinates. The reason for the emphasis on them is that the Standard History and other primary sources, in most cases, concentrated on recording the activities of higher ranked officials and their clans and families. Therefore, the activities of the commoners and their families and clans, who certainly played an important role in the power structure of counties.

161 For example, Hsu Chih-kao set up the Premise of Treating the Worthy Courteously (li-hsien yuan) in his office. He collected books and invited scholar-officials to discuss current affairs with them. (T'ung-chien, p. 9065.)
prefectures, are not recorded. Given only these primary sources, I have no way of explaining how Yang Hsing-mi recruited local strongmen and maintained their loyalty, or his relationship to these forces. In addition, did Hsu Wen and Hsu Chih-kao try to subvert the power of local forces? Fortunately, a number of genealogies help to answer some of these questions.

These genealogies originated predominantly in southeast China, and more than one hundred of them cover the activities of their ancestors dating back to late T'ang and the Five Dynasties. Most ancestors of these clans recorded in genealogies were influential figures in local areas, and they participated, to a certain extent, in the administration of the Wu and the Southern T'ang. Therefore, such genealogies could fill the gap left by the ordinary primary sources. The Hsi-shan Liang-t'ang Tai-shih Tsung-pu (abbreviated as the Tsung-pu) is one of the most useful genealogies. The Tsung-pu contains a detailed description of the Tai clan's rise to prominence. The Ping-ma-shih Shao-chuan (a brief biography of pin-ma-shih) states that

Tai Hu's disposition was stern and courageous, and his personality resembled that of a hero in ancient times. In the first year of kuang-ming (880) of the T'ang, Huang Ch'ao invaded Chiang-nan and engaged in pillage wherever he went. Tai gathered together a strong army to defend the village. At that time, T'ao Ya, who was guarding in Hsi-chou, was endowed with the sole authority of assigning appointments and he appointed Sir Detached Lackey and Vanguard (san ya-ya hsien-feng t'u-ch'ang tu-
san-yuan). Meanwhile, Yu Kung-mei and Wan Yuan were disturbing Wu-yuan, and T’ao Ya and Wang Ying-wu ordered him to lead the army to wipe out the enemy. The inhabitants of the county were then able to live in tranquillity. He was promoted to the post of Vice Campaign Commander (t’u-t’ung fu ping-ma-shih), based on his military merits. 162

Based on this citation, a few important points need to be highlighted:

Tai Hu was a local military man. His personality was chivalrous, and he exerted great influence in the area. Therefore, when war and chaos came to the region, he was able to mobilize his fellow countrymen to form a military force to defend against the invasion. The Tsung-pu contains a collection of several edicts and military dispatches issued by the Wu regime, showing that the Tai family’s entrance into the official realm began with Tai Hu’s generation. Also, T’ao Ya only appointed Tai Hu to a very low ranking position, which highlights the point that the Tais were not a prominent clan, and the history of their service in government only began during the late T’ang.

Tai Hu was a native of I-ch’un County in Yuan-chou, but joined Yang Hsing-mi’s army in Hsi-chou. It was probably out of the reason that Tai Hu was an influential local figure, but his strength was confined to his native land and he had no way

162 Hsi-shan Liang-t’ang Tai-shih Tsung-pu, Ping-ma-shih Shao-chuan, 1a. The Tsung-pu claims that the ancestor of the branch located in Hsi-shan was Tai An, but the first personage to rise from obscurity to prominence was Tai Hu, the grandfather of Tai An.
to defend against the huge army of Huang Ch’ao by himself. Therefore, it is highly possible that he was driven from his original base into exile through Huang’s military pressure. After wandering in search of refuge, he finally arrived in Wu-yuan. 163 This experience, of course, was not limited to Tai Hu. In other words, there were many vagrant groups within the domain of Yang Hsing-mi which lacked a specific local base. Yang Hsing-mi acknowledged the need to draw these groups to his side by granting authority of acquisition and appointment to local officials in various prefectures as a means of incorporating the vagrant forces into the military and bureaucratic structure. This was not only a way to achieve military power, but a means of consolidating the basis of the regime by neutralizing the negative influence of the vagrant forces.

Based on the authority granted by the central government, local officials then accepted or recruited the military groups to the local administration. During the process of acquisition, the local authorities had to prepare a table of ranks in advance, and different ranks were assigned to the vagrant groups according to their differing degrees of military strength. The prefectures then conferred official titles on the leaders of the groups. These leaders were

163 ibid., Tsu-pu Hsu, la.
required to fulfill certain military obligations, but they at least had places where they could settle. In the case of Tai Hu, he was assigned to garrison in Wu-yuan.

According to the *ping-ma-shih Hu-kung-tieh* included in the *Tsung-pu*, Tai Hu was appointed Vice Commander (*fu ping-ma-shih*) on the first day of the eighth month in 904. 164 In other words, Tai’s participation in the battle against Wang Yuan and Yu Kung-mei was supposed to have occurred prior to that date. The *Chiu-kuo Chih* says with respect to this:

Previously, Wang Wu, Commissioner of the Shun-i Army, had assembled some bandits together to occupy Wu-yuan, and Yang Hsing-mi appointed him Prefect of Hsu-chou. Despite the fact that Wu-yuan was a subordinate county of Hsi-chou, Wang had never visited T’ao Ya. When T’ien Chun revolted, Wang engaged in frequent pillaging. By then T’ao had dispatched a declaration that he was going to punish Hung-chou and Yao-chou. The troops set out from Wu-yuan, and Wang, leading more than ten of his brothers and cousins, welcomed T’ao on the road. T’ao signaled to his nearby subordinates, making it known that he intended to capture and kill them. T’ao, remaining on horseback, entered Wang’s camp slowly, and nobody dared move. 165

Compared to the record in the *ping-ma-shih Tieh*, the record in the *Chiu-kuo Chih* seems to be exaggerated, because the force of Wang Wu could not have been suppressed as easily as the *Chiu-kuo Chih* records. Wang Yuan, mentioned in the *Ping-ma-shih shao-chuan*, was probably one of Wang Wu’s clan members. That is, even after Wang Wu had been killed and the majority

164 *ibid.*, *ping-ma-shih Hu-kung Tieh*, 1a.

165 *Chiu-kuo Chih*, p. 4. The exact date of this event, although impossible to pinpoint, probably occurred before 904.
of his forces subdued, his clan still had the ability to "stir up and confuse the emotions of their fellow countrymen". 166 The preceding records reveal that the Wangs belonged to a large and influential clan in Wu-yuan. 167 Even after Wang Yuan's forces were crushed, the power of the Wangs was still evident. The ping-ma-shih Tiao fully reveals the local administration's concerns about the possible resurgence of the Wang clan, for the remaining forces of which were able to hide in the mountains and the wilderness. Therefore, Tai Hu was assigned the task of keeping an eye on the situation. 168

T'ao Ya was sent to serve as Prefect of Hsi-chou in 893. 169 In 904, having governed the prefecture for eleven years, T'ao still was unable to thoroughly and effectively control all the subordinate counties within his jurisdiction. This incident

166 ibid., Ping-ma-shih Tien, 1b.

167 The Wang clan was prominent in Hsi-chou, as shown by the fact that the temple established in the prefecture by clan members was called the Temple of the King of Wang (Wang-wang Miao). See Lo Yuan (1136-1184), O-chou Hsiao-chi, pp. 72-3. During the era of the Five Dynasties and the Sung, the clan had expanded its branches to the surrounding prefectures, like Ming, Yao, and Hsin. As stated in the Kung-kuei Chi, "the clan members had so many places of residence that they almost outnumbered prominent clans like the Wangs and Shihs." For more information about the activities of the Wangs, see Lou Yo (1137-1213), Kung-kuei Chi, p. 1192; Fou-chi Chi, p. 320; Wang Ying-ch'en (1119-1176), Wen-ting Chi, 264; Han Yuan-chi (1118-1187), Nan-chien Chia-i Kao, p. 452. All the books cited are from the Ts'ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch'u-pien edition.

168 Tsung-pu, Ping-ma-shih Tien, 1b.

169 T'ung-chien, p. 8447.
clearly illustrates that when Yang Hsing-mi sent his generals to guard the prefectures, he had already been unable to achieve total mastery of these areas. Rather, the generals he sent still needed to face strong challenges from the powerful local clans. In fact, when Yang Hsing-mi first rose to power, he was surrounded by many formidable foes, and his limited powers were insufficient for him to be able to deploy powerful troops in every prefecture. Therefore, the generals who were sent could not be guaranteed that they would be assigned enough men to accompany them. In this way, acquiring vagrants from the outer prefectures was an important means of supporting local officials in order to bring the local hooligans and bullies under control. Given this background, Yang Hsing-mi was forced to grant the power of appointing personnel to the generals, even though granting them this authority might lead to strengthening the local military, which in turn posed a serious threat to the central government. Tai Hu’s attack against Wang Yuan and Yu Kung-wei was just such an example of how outsiders could be used to subdue the ambitions of the indigenous powerful clans.

Because of the benefits gained by incorporating vagrant forces into the local administrative structure, Yang Hsing-mi tried to maintain this policy. However, the policy could only continue if it was based on mutual benefit. Because the vagrant forces had become an important element in
counterbalancing the local threat to prefectural authorities, Yang was forced to grant them many benefits in return. In his old age, Tai Hu frequently ordered Tai Shou, his son, to take over his responsibilities. Tai Shou was good at administration so that those under his command observed strict regulation and order, and the men of character were kindly treated, the wicked feared being punished. Thus, the territory was capably administered.  

Obviousky, Tai Hu had great control over the territory occupied by his troops and was able to assign anyone, including his son, to assume his responsibilities. When Tai Hu died, Tai Shou took over his father's position and was not ordered to transfer elsewhere. In other words, Yang Hsing-mi adopted the principle of father-son inheritance from the military commissioners of Ho-pei and applied it to his domain.

The above inheritance principle was clearly an expediency that could only be employed under specific political and military conditions. Although welcomed by the local forces, it was abhorred by the central government. Individually, the local forces subordinate to a prefecture were not strong, but they were hard to deal with because there were so many of them. Their long-term survival usually depended on the

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170 Tsung-pu, Chung-shu She-jen Shao-chuan, 1a.
171 ibid., Tsu-pu Hsu, 1b.
support of the local inhabitants. For example, although Tai Hu was not a native of Wu-yuan, he had played an important role in crushing the Wangs. Even though the Wang clan was powerful in Wu-yuan, they did not have popular support, and those participating in its rebellion were "all forced to obey, and did not do so of their own accord". When Tai Hu helped expel the Wangs, thus guaranteeing local security, the local people remembered this good deed and "pleaded him to stay." From then on, the Tais became a new clan with the highest reputation and influence in Wu-yuan.

To the rulers of Chiang-nan, it was necessary to eliminate the political and military privileges enjoyed by local clans and families in order to set up a centralized, authoritarian policy. After considerable effort, the trend of centralization was strengthened, thus putting an end to the local autonomy of the great clans and families. From 904, Tai Hu began establishing his power in Wu-yuan. In 912, Hsu Wen succeeded in purging many ambitious people and bringing the generals of Yang Hsing-mi to submission, but he was not yet able to undermine the authority of the powerful local forces which had originally been under the generals' command. The Tai family, for example, was able to maintain its authority in Wu-yuan.

172 ibid., ping-ma-shih Tieh, 1b.

173 Ibid., 1a. It was very common during the late T'ang for local strong men to establish power base in other areas.
But the situation changed in 926, when Tai Shou was promoted to Tenth General of the Troops of Military Command of the Left Chien-wei Army (tso chien-wei chih-hui-shih ti-wu-tu ti-shih-chiang). The new conferment of official titles on the local leaders implied that all local figures were now to be included in the administrative and military structure newly established by the Hsu family. The symbolic significance of this was strong enough to undermine the local forces' emotional affinity towards the Yang family. Further, the new conferment of titles shows that Hsu Wen had enough power to hold the local strong men in check, and this political device was instrumental in strengthening the control of the central government over the whole country. Certainly the path to complete control over the country from the prefectural level to the county level, was quite long and assiduous, as demonstrated by the fact that Hsu Wen had to spend another fifteen years to achieve his goal after succeeding in placing under his control the powerful generals who were stationed in prefectures.

The new appointment of the leaders of local forces had a tremendous impact on the nature of local politics, as Tai Shou realized that local autonomy had disappeared. According to the Tsung-pu, when the Southern T’ang owned the territory of

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174 Ibid., Chung-shu She-ien Shao-chuan, 1b; Chih Chen-hai Ning-kuo Teng Chun Chieh-tu-shih Chu-tao Tu-t’ung Tieh, 2a.
Chiang-nan, Tai Shou led his subordinates to submit to the central government, and he was granted the title of Secretariat Drafter (*Chung-shu She-jen*). In fact, Hsu Wen had dominated Wu politics and had enforced a policy of centralization for a long time. Initially, this policy mainly targeted the prefectural generals. Thus local county officials were unaware of the seriousness of the situation. Only after Hsu conferred new official titles on them did they then realize that Chiang-nan was firmly controlled by Hsu Wen.

Under the circumstances, submitting to the new ruler was the only way to guarantee political security and benefit for the local clans. Tai Shou considered the situation seriously before making a decision. Perhaps the fact that he made his decision before anyone else explains why he won the favor of the central government. He was granted the honorary titles of Gentleman-Attendant of Militant Assistance (*wu-yih lang*) and Secretariat Drafter, respectively. However, Tai Shou had to sacrifice many political privileges in order to survive and

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175 *ibid.*, *Chung-shu She-jen Shao-chuan*, 1a. This record is an obvious anachronism, because the conferment of new official titles happened in 926, while the establishment of the Southern T’ang took place twelve years later. I believe that this reason for the anachronism was that while Hsu Wen had long dominated Wu politics, he was also the foster father of Hsu Chih-kao, the founder of the Southern T’ang. The dual status of Hsu Wen as father of Hsu Chih-kao and as the actual ruler of the Wu was an understandable source of confusion that led to the Tai family’s misunderstanding.

176 *ibid.*, *Chih-min*, 1a-4a.
gain honor. Tai An, Tai Shou’s son, was ordered to leave his family’s original local base, and was appointed First Inspector-in-Chief of the Left Pao-chieh Army and stationed in Yao-chou (Yao-chou tso pao-chieh chih-hui ti-i tu-yu-hou). From then on, Tai An served in Yao-chou, and was never allowed to return to Wu-yuan before his death. 177 The three generations of the Tai family who served in Chiang-nan are an accurate reflection of the ups and downs of the local clans within the territory of Wu and the Southern T’ang.

177 ibid., Tsung-kung-kung Miao-pei Chi, 1ab.
CHAPTER THREE: THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WU AND THE SOUTHERN T’ANG

I. The Recruitment of Bureaucrats and the Establishment of a Centralized Government

If the ultimate purpose of the civil transformation policy was to get rid of the generals’ intervention in politics and to ensure the political stability of the regime, merely transforming military families and clans into civilians was insufficient. The most effective measure was to set up an organized and efficient bureaucracy, and to fill all existing vacancies in the central and local administrative structure with civilian staff.

However, the chaotic political and social situation, combined with the oppression of regional regimes that occurred after the downfall of the T’ang Dynasty, made this very difficult to achieve, and the policy was eventually overturned. According to the contemporary opinion on the pursuit of civil career:

Nobles were no better than peasants, wealthy men were no better than the poor, being wise was no better than being stupid, and public service was no better than remaining unemployed.

Severe punishments, strict controls, heavy levies and forced labor were imposed by the warlords. Faced with a cruel bureaucracy, prevailing public opinion certainly had a
profound impact on dimming the eagerness of the literati to pursue a career in public service. 178

Abstaining from the civil service was apparently the norm in the Chiang-huai region during this chaotic period, as shown by the experience of Yang Yu’s ancestor, who originally served as Attendant (ts'ung-shih) in Hu-chou, but later resigned and settled in Hsuan-chou.

At that time, during the chaotic period of the Five Dynasties, territories were disintegrated, and there were six or seven people claiming the throne, thus causing a rift between the north and the south. Those who served usurped governments were limited by the confines of their domain, and could not take the whole of China into consideration; thus, they lacked administrative planning and institutional arrangement. Therefore, able and intelligent people were unwilling to serve in the government, and many wished to stay on their farms. After Yang’s remote ancestor arrived in Hsuan-chou, he bought a farm and a house, made improvements to the house and planted orchards. He tilled the soil in the spring, harvested in the fall, and looked after the education of his descendants. He served as an example to the village, and waited for peace under the sun. 179

Similar opinions also appear in the genealogies compiled during this period. The Wu-k'ou Wang-shih Tsu-pu records that during late T'ang, Wang Hsiang, the first ancestor of the Wang clan, and his brothers sought refuge far and wide during the rebellion of Huang Ch’ao. Wang was probably a scholar-official, since the genealogy claims,

178 Chiao Ling-shih (1051-1134), Hou-ching Lu, Chih-pu-tsu-chai Ts’ung-shu ed., 8: 4a.
179 Liu Fen (1023-1089), Peng-cheng Chi, Kuo-hsueh Chi-pen Ts’ung-shu ed., p. 460.
the central plain was in turmoil at that time. All the scholar-officials were concerned about was the pursuit of comfort and security, and the means of preserving their families and clans. How could they have time to achieve prominence by engaging in public service?

Unquestionably, the above citations show the wide acceptance of abstaining from politics among the social and political elite during this period of upheaval.

The civil administration of Hsu Chih-kao produced a change in the nature of military clans and families. Many of their descendants became literati and in turn staffed the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the new civil administration entailed many vacancies in the civil service, which the military clans who had undergone the civil transformation were unable to fill. Under the circumstances, other sources of literati became very important in the implementation of the civil administration.

Fortunately, there were some special and unique advantages to the Chiang-huai region which enabled Hsu Chih-kao to carry out a policy of bureaucratization. Compared with other regimes, Hsu's regime enjoyed a longer period of political and social tranquillity, and scholar-officials soon regained their interest in pursuing a public career. For example, when Wang Hsiang settled in Wu-k'ou of Wu-yuan, he accepted the invitation of the Wu regime to take the post of Adjutant of

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180 Wu-k'ou Wang-shih Tsu-pu, Tsu-pu Hsu, 6a.
the Sector for the People (min-tsao ts’an-chun), and all of his five sons served in the Southern T’ang.  

Another reason Hsu Chih-kao was able to attract the literati to public service was that he claimed to be a descendent of the imperial family of the T’ang, and advocated restoring the dynastic glory and accomplishments of the royal family. This political move lessened the resistance of the remaining officials of the former T’ang, who originally had sought refuge in Chiang-huai. Serving under a new regime was previously regarded as treason, according to the traditional definition of loyalty. To these officials, however, serving the Southern T’ang was not regarded as treason because the new dynasty was allegedly established by the descendants of the T’ang. The Wu-hsi Chi explains why Mao Ying-chuan’s grandfather served in the Southern T’ang as Attendant Censor (shih yu-shih):

When Emperor Hsi-tsung (erroneous for Emperor Chao-tsung) moved to the east, and Chu-liang had usurped the throne, the T’ang empire was relegated to chaos and disintegration, and there not even one person claimed sovereignty. The Li family occupied Chiang-huai and

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182 As shown by the fact that Hsu Chih-kao named the regime T’ang and changed his name to Li Pien.
established its rule, claiming to continue the imperial rule of the T'ang. The deceased ancestor was loyal to those he had served, and thus became an "outer servant" (wai-shen) of the Son of Heaven. 183

However, the availability of literati and scholar-officials in Chiang-huai did not necessarily bring forth the success of bureaucratization, for the rulers had to adopt some ways of recruitment to enable the qualified people to participate in the government. According to primary sources, Hsu Chih-kao, as well as his successors, adopted eight methods of recruiting the literati to participate in the civil service, 184 thus

183 Yu Tsing (1000-1064), Wu-hsi Chi, Szu-k'u Ch'uan-shu ed., 20: 18b. Obviously, Chu Chih-kao was merely a "namesake imitator", but no officials from the former dynasty questioned Hsu's words. Perhaps they wanted to continue their public careers, but they did not want to be looked upon as traitors. While they struggled with this dilemma, Hsu claimed to be a descendent of the T'ang at precisely the right time to solve the problem. This is why they were eager to serve as the "outer servants" of the Son of Heaven, and had no interest in inquiring about the authentic lineage of Hsu Chih-kao.

184 In the primary sources, other methods are mentioned but not outlined in detail. For instance, Yu Kung served under the Wu regime as Vice Director of the Bureau of Equipment (chia-pu yuan-wai-lang) and Participant in the Drafting of Proclamations (chih-chih kao). Yu Chien-yen (912-968), his son, "was an orphan, but assiduous in his studies. He began his public career by serving as Proofreader of the Department of the Palace Library." (Ma-shu, 10: 5a.) Based on this citation, there is no way to know whether the policy of protection or his hard work enabled Yu Chien-yen to gain favor with Hsu Chih-hao, and consequently to be granted an official post. Also, Chang Yi was appointed Commandant of Militant Cavalry (wu-chi wei) by virtue of his being able to answer his questions posed during a public examination (she-t'ze chung-ti) when Hsu Chih-kao resided in Kuang-ling. (Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 9: 3a.) Unfortunately, the record is so brief that it is impossible to trace the details of the process and its relationship to the civil service examinations which appeared later on.
enabling the partial completion of bureaucratization:

1. Recruitment through interviews

Interview became available when Hsu Chih-kao began to establish his authority. When he was Prefect of Sheng-chou, he "invited capable people from near and far", and Sung Chi-chiu (887-959) sought an interview at that time.

The Antecedent Master (Hsien-chu, referring to Hsu Chih-kao) treated him as a guest and a person of remarkable talents by appointing him to a position of trust. Sung was thus granted generous rewards. 186

Another example is Han Hsi-t'sai, who requested an interview by submitting a "Description of Conduct" (hsing-chih chuang). The Kung-kuei Chi states that Han's self-description was replete with the persuasive rhetoric that was used during the period of the ancient "Warring States" (B.C. 475-221). 187 At this time, the rivalry of powerful leaders had torn China apart in a situation identical with that of the Warring States. Therefore, literati who requested an interview needed to distinguish themselves by providing extraordinary opinions about current affairs. In a sense, the "self-descriptive" writing style reflected the contemporary need to impress the ruler.

185 Ma-shu, 20: 1b.
186 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 4: 1b.
187 Kung-kuei Chi, p. 1066; the text of the chuang was included in the Chiang-piao Chi. (Cheng Wen-pao, Hsueh-hai Lui-pien., B: 8a-11a.)
Hsu Chih-kao admired Han Hsi-t’sai’s literary talents, but considered Han too young to be restricted by "duty and the teachings of the sages", and his indulgence in profligate behavior clashed with the policy of propagating law and order. Because of Hsu’s concern for maintaining tradition, he dared not appoint Han to an important post. As a result, Han served in only minor posts at the prefectural level. Even though Han had begun acquiring a literary reputation in Lo-yang earlier, his service differed from that of refugees who came from the north, as most of them were promoted to prominent positions.

The government recruited people from the Huai frontier area

This kind of recruitment, which was adopted during a time when institutionalized way of recruitment was not readily available and Hsu Chih-kao was actively expanding his authority, reveals Hsu’s eagerness to enlist literati from the north.

At that time, disorder and chaos prevailed in the north, and many political refugees fled to South China. Hsu Chih-kao was energetic in taking advantage of the opportunity to absorb them into his government. It became known that Hsu’s henchmen would inform him whenever they encountered northerners who seemed to be intelligent and qualified. Northerners were

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188 Lu-shu, chuan 9: 2b-3a.
invited to meet with Hsu and appointed to positions according to their abilities.

The Chiang-nan Yeh-shih records that Sun Chi was a subordinate of Chu Shou-yin (?-927), Military Commissioner of Pien-chou. Sun assisted Chu in starting a military revolt, but the revolt was suppressed and Chu was killed. Sun then pretended to be a Buddhist monk by having his hair shaved, and he fled to Huai-nan.

Meanwhile, Hsu Chih-kao constantly sent spies to observe passing strangers in stealth. They noticed that the appearance and gestures of Sun were magnificent and sedate, different from that of the ordinary monks. They went to greet him, but he sat in a formal manner and did not reply. They then reported the incident to Hsu Chih-kao. Hsu sent his subordinates to invite Sun to his office, and made courteous inquiry to Sun. Sun answered Hsu's questions honestly. Hsu ordered Sun to grow his hair and don a headpiece.

From then on, Sun Chi gained prominence among Hsu Chih-kao's men. 189

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189 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 5: 1b. The process of Hsu Chih-kao's discovery and appreciation of Sun Chi as recorded in the Lu-shu is different from what is recorded in the Chiang-nan Yeh-shih. There it is recorded that when Sun Chi crossed the River Huai and arrived in Shou-chun, he was met by Liu Chin, Military Commissioner, and was invited to talk with him, but Sun did not reply, pretending to be mute. He stayed with Liu for a few days, when suddenly he paid a visit to the temple of Liu An, King of Huai-nan. Liu sent one of his subordinates to hide under the altar and listen to all of Sun's prayers. Liu then sent Sun to Chin-ling. (Lu-shu, chuan 8: 6b.) However, some fallacies are apparent in the record of the Lu-shu. First, when Sun first met Hsu Chih-kao, Hsu was still in charge of the Wu administration in Kuang-ling. Also, Liu Chin died in 905, (Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 8.) and Sun fled to Chiang-huai around the seventh year of shun-i (921-926) and the first year of chien-ching (927-929). Liu Jen-kuei, Liu Chin's son, began his military leadership of Shou-chou in the early period of chien-ching.
3. Recruiting qualified commoners to public service by offering handsome salaries or other kinds of rewards (Cheng-pi)

Shen Pin was a gifted youth who earned a good reputation for his skill in poetic composition. When Hsu Chih-kao was transferred to Chin-ling, he was eager to find capable and intelligent people who continued to seclude themselves from society, and thus he ordered prefectures and counties to invite such people to serve the central government. Shen was included among the list of invitees. Since Shen was well aware that Hsu wanted to take over the Wu regime, he submitted his "Poem on Watching the drawing of the Picture of Mountains and Water" (Kuan-hua Shan-shui-t’u Shih), stating,

You should know that if your method of drawing is already established, then you don't need to fear difficulties in putting mountains and rivers (shan-ho) in order.

The poem was a metaphor telling Hsu Chih-kao that if he arranged his political affairs well, there would be no difficulty in taking over the Wu regime. Hsu, already impressed by Shen's poetic reputation, had an even deeper admiration for Shen after having read this poem. Consequently, Shen was appointed Assistant of the Palace Library (pi-shu lang), which was regarded as a good entry-

Undoubtedly, Lu Yu mistook Liu Jen-kuai for Liu Chin, and the person who sought out Sun Chi was actually Liu Jen-kuei.
level position by his contemporaries.  

Chiang Meng-sun had extensive knowledge of the classics and history, and his nobility and upright character were manifested in his scholarly behavior. During Hsu Chih-kao’s domination of Wu politics, he tried to promote virtue and morality. Chiang served as a living example of the idealization of the norms and values Hsu wanted to promote. Therefore, when Hsu heard about Chiang’s erudition and virtuous behavior, he offered expensive gifts to Chiang several times to get him to come to his court, and Chiang was eventually induced to accept Hsu’s invitation. As soon as he arrived in Hsu’s office, he was appointed Assistant of the Palace Library and treated with trust and intimacy.

During the reign of Emperor Yuan-tsung, the Southern T’ang had already set up the formal civil service examination system, but the method of chen-pei was still used occasionally. Chen K’uang (whom the Chiang-nan Yeh-shih refers to as Chen Huang), a peaceable man who was not concerned with worldly desires, had been living as a recluse on Lu Mountain for forty years. He was content to exist with few clothes and little food. He exercised his intellectual

190 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 6: 6b-7a.
191 Ma-shu, 15: 1a.
192 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 8: 1ab.
prowess by writing poetry, and his verses were famous far and wide, albeit still only in fragments. \(^{193}\) The Emperor heard about Chen’s poetic reputation and offered money and silks to summon him to the court. He was wined and dined and granted an imperial audience. Although the Emperor tried to appoint Chen to office, however, he refused. Because Chen’s speech was rustic and he did not know the rules of etiquette, the Emperor allowed him to return to Lu Mountain, after bestowing on him grain and silks. \(^{194}\)

Even during the reign of Li Yu, this method of recruitment continued to be used. In 968, Kung Shen-i (910-976), Prefect of Hsi-chou, searched for recluses who were renowned for their literacy pursuant to the order of Li Yu. \(^{195}\)

4. Recommendation by powerful officials

The endorsement of powerful officials grew ever more important in gaining access to a career in civil service. Because Hsu Chih-kao had long entrusted Sung Ch’i-chiu with important affairs, Sung’s approval became essential to those who wished to participate in the official realm.

As recorded in the Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, Chen T’ao took great pride in his own abilities. However, He did not follow the

\(^{193}\) *Lu-shu*, chuan 4: 8a.

\(^{194}\) *Chiang-nan Yeh-shih*, 6: 6a.

\(^{195}\) *Li-shih Chien-chang Chih-pu*, Shih-piao, 2: 1b.
custom of asking Sung Ch’i-chiu to recommend him to office, for he was deeply aware that Sung did not like him. Instead, he made a complete change of plans by setting up residence in Mount Hsi, where he found pleasure in chanting. 196

Obviously, the ability to obtain Sung Ch’i-chiu’s recommendation depended on his favor, and this is why members of Sung’s group were able to rise to prominence. In this way, Chen Chiao, who was a guest of Sung, became the tutor of Li Ching-chien, King of Chu, based on Sung’s recommendation. 197 Cha Wen-hui also obtained the post of Chief Secretary of the Headquarters of the Marshal (yuan-shuai-fu chang shu-chi), and was subsequently promoted to Assistant of the Palace Library thanks to Sung’s recommendation. 198

Sung Ch’i-chiu’s recommendation also enabled minor officials to receive promotions. For example, Wei Yin, who occupied a minor prefectural post, was unable to fulfill his ambition to achieve prominence. Once, he realized that promotions was determined by Sung’s favor, he then tried his best to impress Sung with his abilities. After a series of efforts, Wei was finally succeeded in being appointed Editor (chiao-shu lang).

196 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 8: 4ab.
197 Ma-shu, 21: 1a.
198 Ibid., 21: 7b.
Protection as a means of attaining office had already existed prior to the establishment of the Southern T'ang, and it was still practiced during the reign of Emperor Yuan-tsung. Many descendants of prominent officials received appointments in the bureaucracy through protection. For example, Yen K'e-chiu died when Hsu Chih-kao governed the Wu administration; Yen Shu (910-966), his son, was appointed to the position of Swordsman Guard (chien-niu pei-shen), based on his father's career. In another case, Chen Chiao (?-975) was appointed Vice Director of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (Tai-chang-ssu feng-li-lang) thanks to the policy of protection.

Similarly, during the reign of Li Yu, Pan Shen-hsiu (937-1005) was appointed to the post of Proofreader of the Department of the Palace Library (pi-shu sheng cheng-tzu) based on his father's position.

If a father was a military man and his son was educated, the policy of protection allowed the son to enter the civil service. Liu Yen-ching (?-956) was appointed Case Reviewer of

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199 Ibid., 21: 7a.
200 Ibid., 10: 3ab.
201 Ibid., 17: 2a.
202 Sung-shih, p. 9874.
the Court of Judicial Review (tai-li p’ing-shih) because of
his father’s military rank. Also, Tiao Yen-ning, who
served as Military Commissioner of Chao-hsin Chun, paved the
way for his son Tiao Kan (945-1013) to obtain the post of
Assistant in the Palace Library. Allowing the descendants
of the military to occupy bureaucratic posts was probably
based on the desire of the rulers to encourage and promote
literary within military clans and families. Undoubtedly, this
policy provided the bureaucratic structure with a great number
of educated people.

6. Official positions offered to those who donated books to
the court

Beginning with the rule of Hsu Chih-kao, policies were
instituted in order to promote cultural and literary
development in Chiang-huai. The establishment of schools was
one of these measures. In addition to the need for schools,
books were also used as a means of attracting the literati and
flaunting the refinement and prosperity of the regime. When
Hsu Chih-kao became King of Tung-hai, he established "the
Premise of Treating the Worthy Courteously" (li-hsien yuan)
and collected books up to 10,000 chuan.

203 Lu-shu, chuan 6: 1ab.
204 Sung-shih, p. 13054.
205 Lu-shu, chuan 6: 5a.
Unquestionably, a prerequisite for implementing this policy was an abundance of books. At that time, Chiang-huai had been through a great deal of war and turmoil, and T'ang's official collection of books had been destroyed or had fallen into the hands of the commoners. Hsu Chih-kao encouraged people to donate their books to the government by means of tangible rewards like money and silk. For example, even though Lu Chung-fan was poor, his family had traditionally kept a collection of books on the classics and history. Chia Hao, Prefect of Chi-chou, was ordered by Hsu Chih-kao to collect books from citizens of the prefecture. He brought Lu's books to present to the court and recommended Lu for an official position. Even though Chia did not get a favorable reply from the court, he paid Lu out of his own pocket. This incident shows that those who offered books to the government were usually rewarded.

Moreover, some people were granted offices because they had donated books. Hsia Huan, the grandfather of Hsia Sung (985-1051), was granted the post of Commandant (wei) of Chin-ling because of his donation of books to the Southern T'ang.

7. Official positions offered to those who submitted memoranda to the court (shang-shu yen-shih)

206 Ma-shu, 18: 2ab.

207 Hua-yang Chi, p. 449.
When the literati sent memoranda to the court, they usually concerned state affairs and the welfare of the people. The **Ma-shu** records that Wang Tai-fu was skilled at literary composition and a well qualified assistant to the ruler. When he learned that Hsu Chih-hao had moved to Chin-ling, he sent a memorandum to Hsu that discussed in great detail the pros and cons of enriching of the country and the people. 208

During the reign of Li Ching, Ou-yang Kuang sent a memorandum to the court discussing the political situation in Hu-nan. At that time, the Southern T'ang had conquered Hu-hsia and had moved all the members of the Ma family, the ruling clan of Hu-nan, to Chin-ling. Li Ching also stationed soldiers there. It appeared that Hu-nan was firmly within the grasp of the Southern T'ang. But Ou-yang pointed out five possible disasters that could occur, and recommended that the government select a qualified general to replace Pien Kao, the commander of the garrisoned troops, and send in reinforcements to defend the conquered territory. But the government turned a deaf ear to his request, and Hu-nan eventually was lost, just as he had anticipated. Li Ching was impressed by his

208 *Ma-shu*, 14: 2a; *Chiang-nan Yeh-shih*, 9: 1b. Hsu Chih-kao appreciated Wang Tai-fu's opinion, but Sung Chi-chiu was jealous of his abilities and continually badmouthed him. Finally, Sung had Wang murdered by drowning. After Hsu heard about it, he grieved over Wang's death for a long time.
foresight and granted him an office. 

During the reign of Li Yu, the fate of the country was at stake, and he encouraged officials and commoners alike to submit memoranda discussing current affairs to suggest methods of saving the country. Thus, it is inevitable that the number of people who submitted memoranda would be greater than previously. The *Ou-yang Wen-chung-kung Wen-chi* records that Hsu Ti was especially fond of warfare, and he submitted several memoranda to the Southern T'ang. He was granted the post of Editor.

Quite probably, what Hsu Ti discussed was something concerning the country's military situation.

Some candidates who failed the civil service examinations would send memoranda to the court in an effort to impress the emperor so that he would grant them an office. Wei Yu (944-1001) graduated from Pai-lu Tung Shu-yuan and planned to go to

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209 *Lu-shu, chuan* 7: 8ab.


211 The record does not mention when Hsu Ti submitted this memorandum. The *Hsu-shih Shih-pu*, which is included in the *Lin-chuan Hsien-sheng Wen-chi*, records that Hsu was appointed Investigating Censor (chien-cha yu-shih) at the end of the year he was granted the post of Editor in the Institute for the Veneration of Literature (ch'ung-wen kuan). For details, see Wang An-shih (1021-1086), *Lin-chuan Hsien-sheng Wen-chi*, p. 754. Hsu Ti served as Investigating Censor when Chin-ling was besieged by the Sung army. In other words, Hsu entered the civil service towards the end of the Li regime.
Chin-ling to take the civil service examinations. \textsuperscript{212} He probably did not succeed in the examinations, as he finally resorted to sending a memorandum to Li Yu. This method was successful, as he was appointed Editor of the Institute for the Advancement of Literature (hung-wen kuan). \textsuperscript{213}

Submitting memoranda also became a way of avoiding military service. Kuo Chao-ching was an inhabitant of Ho-chuan in Chichou. At first, the magistrate of Ho-chuan first valued Kuo’s literary reputation and personally visited his residence as a sign of respect and courtesy. But Kuo insulted the magistrate by refusing to meet with him. The magistrate was enraged. Meanwhile, routine reviews of people’s categorizations in the military and construction services took place. In order to take revenge, the magistrate abused his authority by placing Kuo in the category of Hsin-i Army, which required Kuo to undertake military service. Kuo then went to Chin-ling and submitted more than ten essays discussing strategic points pertaining to the national defense of Ts’ai-shih Ti in Chichou, and the feasibility of territorial expansion in the east, i.e. Wu Yueh. Li Yu, pleased with the essays, appointed Kuo to the post of Editorial Director (chu-tso lang). \textsuperscript{214}

\textsuperscript{212} Chiang-nan Yu-t’sai, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{213} Sung-shih, p. 9204.

\textsuperscript{214} Ma-shu, 14: 3b-4a.
Having been granted office, Kuo was able to avoid military service.

8. Official positions offered to those submitting literary works

When Hsu Chih-kao was in charge of the Wu administration, there were some literati who presented their literary works and were granted official posts. For example, Chou Pin, who did not work, but only concentrated on his studies, was blamed by his wife who said,

"Your brothers obtained abundance and prosperity, and did not indulge themselves in playing with old books (ku-chih). What is the use of doing that!" Chou answered his wife with a smile, "Farming the land is not superior to farming the path of righteousness (tao), and you, woman, cannot appreciate its worth."

At that time, Hsu Chih-kao was recruiting literati in Chiling. Chou Pin presented his literary works which were appreciated by Hsu. Shortly thereafter, Hsu took over the Wu regime and sought an appropriate form of invocation used to pray to the gods to conduct a ceremony of imperial sacrifice to Heaven. The prayer written by Chou Pin was selected, and Chou was appointed Inspector of Various Guards (chu-wei hsun-kuan). Chou immediately became a target of recruitment by the princes; Li Ching-t'ung and Li Ching-ta sent him letters of appointment, and he obtained numerous rewards. Chou then requested a vacation in order to return to his native place and visit his mother. He certainly returned home covered in
glory. Chou then displayed the gold, jade, and silk granted him by the court and asked his wife,

*Among my brothers, whose farmland could match that?*

His wife then replied,

*That is a man's business; how could a woman know about that? 315*

By submitting his literary works, Chou was able to begin his public career, which enabled him to jump quickly from humble status to an honorable position.

At first glance, this method of self-recommendation is identical to the seventh way discussed above, for the literati also submitted written works to impress the rulers, in the hopes of gaining an appointment. But the kind of the works they presented was different. In this category, the works presented by the literati consisted of scholarly research on the classics or literature.

As mentioned previously, Kuo Chao-ching had already submitted written works during the reign of Li Ching. At that time, what he presented to the court was thirty chuan of the T'ang-Chun-chiu, written in the style of the Yuan-ching, and fifty chuan of the Chih-shu. Kuo claimed that all his works cited historical facts that served as lessons for the contemporary administration. Also, he discussed all the instructions of the sages. He claimed that the

315 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 7: 4ab; Ma-shu, 14: 5b-6a.
task of praise and censure, as well as denouncing vice and promoting virtue was his own obligation. 216

No doubt, Kuo's written works might touch on current affairs occasionally, but they were mostly scholarly research on the Classics and history. Their nature was certainly different from that of works submitted during the era of Li Yu, which were aimed at discussing current political and military affairs.

Changes in the nature of written works reflected changes in contemporary needs. Before the late period of Pao-ta (943-957), the Southern T'ang was still peaceful and prosperous. Furthermore, Li Ching was fond of literary works. All of these factors enabled the literati to submit their literary works as a means of gaining benefit. The Southern T'ang was faced with the first serious military threat after the late period of Pao-ta, and the rulers had to sacrifice their literary tastes to opinions on political and military affairs. As a matter of fact, Li Yu eagerly looked forward to seeing his subordinates and others present memoranda that discussed current affairs to the court. Kuo Chao-ching was keenly aware of this fact, and he changed the content of his written works in response to the requirements of the times. 217

216 Ma-shu., 14: 3b; Lu-shu, chuan 12: 4b.

217 Though Kuo Chao-ching was clever at rolling with the changes, his relationships with the officials were nevertheless very bad. He initially was not able to gain a position instantly
What should be stressed is that the method of attaining office was still occasionally practiced by the literati during the reign of Li Yu, however, it became no longer as effective as it had been in previous periods. Li Yu admired literary writers and treated poets favorably. Liu Tung presented a hundred of his poems to the court, and Li Yu was pleased with them because of Liu's fame as poet. However, because the Southern T'ang was in imminent danger of being destroyed, Liu's first poem was "Meditating on Ancient Times in Shih-tou" (Shih-t'ou Huai-ku), which stated,

On the old ferry of Shih-t'ou, one couldn't help engaging in infinite contemplation. Many things happened during the Six Dynasties, but none of them was able to stop the river from flowing.

Obviously, the weakness of the Southern Dynasties Liu Tung described was comparable to the current situation with the Southern T'ang. This analogy was so depressing and pessimistic that Li Yu was unhappy for a long time, and did not read the rest of Liu's poems. After waiting two years in Chin-ling for an imperial audience and failing to receive a reply from the court, Liu had to return to Lu-ling, his after having presented his written works to Li Ching because of opposition from the officials, and he was asked to take the civil service examinations. Kuo felt this was unfair, and he submitted a memorandum arguing as much and was granted an imperial audience. Afterwards, he was granted the post of Commandant of Yang-tze. Perhaps because he regarded the post as being too low in rank, he declined to accept the post, and returned to Ho-chuan. (Ma-shu, 14: 3b.)
II, The Civil Service Examinations

The officials who were recruited and appointed by Hsu Chih-kao and the descendants of the military officials who entered the bureaucracy by means of protection generally disdained provincial offices, but coveted positions in the Academies and Institutes (kuan-ko) of the central government. This attitude, which became popular during the Wu regime, caused many vacancies in the minor posts of local administrations. Complete bureaucratization could not be realized if the local administrative positions were not filled by the literati.

In an effort to solve this problem, Hsu Chih-kao forced many central government officials, particularly those he did not favor, to serve in the prefectures and counties. He also recruited the literati who lived in the countryside, and who did not have strong political ambitions, to serve in low-level posts in the local administrations, they were limited to the posts of magistrates and commandants. Posts of higher rank, like those of prefects and military commissioners, were used to reward meritorious officials and their descendants as well as the newly emerging officials.

218 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 9: 4a; Lu-shu, chuan 12: 3b.
219 I have written an article concerning the civil service examinations in the Southern T'ang. For details, see "A Survey on the Chin-shih Examination in the Southern T'ang", to be published in the Han-hsueh Yen-chiu, 15: 1, 1997.
220 As for posts in the local administrations, they were limited to the posts of magistrates and commandants. Posts of higher rank, like those of prefects and military commissioners, were used to reward meritorious officials and their descendants as well as the newly emerging officials.
administrative posts. However, these methods were not made into laws, and thus were unable to permanently solve the problem. Therefore, the establishment of the civil service examination system to recruit eligible people without powerful background to fill minor local administrative posts was definitely useful for the thorough completion of bureaucratization.

When Hsu Chih-kao took over the Wu administration, he began to establish examinations that were patterned on those of the former T'ang dynasty, by which successful examination candidates were selected to serve in local governments. According to the Wen-chuang Chi, Wang Sui, the great-grandfather of Wang Ch'ín-jo (966-1017), sought refuge in Chiang-hsi and did not have an official post. Wang Hsia, the son of Wang Sui, served as Inspector of the Salt and Iron Monopoly Bureau (ven-tieh hsun-kuan) of Chiang-hsi. Wang Yu, his son, took the examination for children (tung-tzu shih) as a means of entering office when he came of age. The first post Wang Yu received was that of Commandant of Hsin-yu, his native area. Later, he worked as a major subordinate in various other prefectures. Wang Yu took the examinations

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211 For details, see my article.

212 Hsia Sung (985-1051), Wen-chuang Chi, Szu-k’u Ch’uan-shu ed., 29: 14ab. Although Wang Yu’s official rank was identical with that of Assistant in the Palace Library and Editor, he was actually responsible for prefectural affairs.
during the early reign of Shun-i (921-927), when Hsu Chih-kao was still in Kuang-ling. Wang Chung-hua, the son of Wang Yu, began his career by means of the examination of the classics (Ming-ching). 223

The ancestral records of Wang Ch’in-jo reveal at least two kinds of tests comprised the civil service examinations prior to the establishment of the Southern T’ang. Also, because they had served in minor prefectural posts, Wang Hsia and Wang Yu were unable to help their sons attain office through protection, nor could their sons expect to be recommended by prominent officials. If they wanted to enter on a public career, taking the civil service examinations was the only way to do so. Because these people had no strong political backgrounds or power to negotiate, they had to accept whatever posts were assigned to them. 224 Thus, the civil service examinations were the main institutional means adopted by Hsu Chih-kao to get the literati to accept the posts in local administrations, thereby bringing about the completion of bureaucratization.

223 Ibid., 28: 9a.

224 Another example is Chang Pin. Chang Yi, Chang Pin’s older brother, served as Surveillance Circuit Administrative Assistant (kuan-cha p’an-kuan) of Chien-chou and Magistrate of Hsi-ch’ang. Obviously, all of them were minor posts which could not bring Chang Pin to enter on civil career by means of protection. Luckily, Chang Pin was familiar with two of the classics and passed the examination for children. He was appointed Commandant of Huang-mei when he came of age. (Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 9: 3b.)
After the establishment of the Southern T'ang, Hsu Chih-kao imitated the T'ang method of setting up the chin-shih examination as a way to recruit literati who were not among the political and social elite. Chen Chi, Li Cheng-ku, and Kuo Peng are recorded as being successful in the chin-

The newly established examination was different from that of the T'ang dynasty in some ways. For details, see my article.

Chen Chi was living in Chi-chun when he was appointed Magistrate of Huang-mei in the middle of the reign period Sheng-yuan (937-943). He was renowned for having executed Chu Yu and his associates during his term of office, and was promoted to Investigating Censor. (Ma-shu, 26: 6ab.)

Li Cheng-ku (?-958) was very poor and wandered far and wide as a youth. (Nan-t'ang Chin-shih, p. 15.) He received his chin-shih degree towards the end of the reign period Sheng-yuan. Meanwhile, Sung Ch'i-chiu was occupied with establishing a political following to consolidate his authority, and Li joined this group. He kept on good terms with Sung, and was appointed to the post of Courtier of Li Ching-ta, King of Ch'i. He was later promoted to Vice Military Affairs Commissioner (shu-mi fu-shih). (Ma-shu, 21: 2a; Lu-shu, chuan 6: 5b.)

Kuo Peng was a native of Ho-chuan, a county in Chi-chou. He took the chin-shih examination during the early period of Pao-ta and advanced to the position of Rectifier of the Court of Judicial Review (tai-li ssu-chih). The wife of Chung Chuan, whose husband was King of Nan-ping, was accused of having illicit relations with a Buddhist monk. Hsiao Yen, who was serving as Chief Minister of the Court of Judicial Review (tai-li ching), suggested that Lady Chung be exiled. But Kuo had a different opinion, saying, "The harshest penalty should be applied first and foremost to those of noble rank." He then broke the law by putting her to death. Everyone regarded the outcome as an injustice. When Sung Ch'i-chiu was purged, Kuo was dismissed from office because he belonged to Sung's party. (Ma-shu, 14: 3ab.) The Chiang-nan Yeh-shih records that Sung Cheng, the father of Sung Ch'i-chiu, collaborated with Chung Chuan to rise from obscurity during the period of Huang Ch'ao's rebellion. The T'ang government was unable to control them. Meanwhile, Kao Ping, Military Commissioner of Huai-nan, recommended that Chung Chuan be Military Commissioner of Hung-chou, and Sung Cheng be Vice Military Commissioner. Sung Cheng died
shih examination. Based on the related sources, one might get the impression that Li Cheng-ku rose from obscurity and that the other two were not of noble lineage, even though the primary sources do not directly state this. In a sense, taking the civil service examinations was the only feasible means for them to launch their public careers. They would have been complacent even with minor posts in local administrations. Although they were only assigned to local governments, if they performed impressively, earned merits, or knew how to please the influential officials, they still had a chance of being promoted to posts in the central government.

In 952, Emperor Yuan-tsun formedally established the chin-shih degree in the examination system. The backgrounds of the candidates and the assignment of posts were essentially the same as those who are mentioned above as having participated while still in office. (4: 1b.) The reason why Sung Ch'i-chiu tried to put Lady Chung to death probably stemmed from the consideration that his father was a good friend and colleague of Chung Chuan. Sung wanted to take revenge on Lady Chung because she had discredited the reputation of his father's good friend. The reason Kuo bent the law to have Lady Chung executed is that he wanted to cater to Sung's whim as a means of returning the favor Sung had shown him by helping to get him promoted.

229 The post assigned to Chen Chi was Magistrate of Huang-mi. This appointment is compatible with my analysis. As for the rest, their recorded positions were not their first posts. But given my line of reasoning, their first posts were most likely in counties. For details, see my article.
in the examinations. In addition, other degrees, particularly the ming-ching, were offered by the civil service examination system. The family background of these degree holders as well as their assignments to official posts, apart from a few exceptional cases, were basically similar to those of the people who participated in the chin-shih examination. Based on related biographical data, we may conclude that a source of literati to fill low-ranked posts in local administrations was guaranteed by the civil service examination system throughout the entire era of the Southern T’ang.

It was commonly believed in the Southern T’ang that if a commoner wished to rise to prominence, the best way to launch his career was to succeed in the civil service examinations. Undoubtedly, the means of climbing the ladder of success was

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230 Candidates who participated in the chin-shih examination are Chang Chi, Lu Wen-chung, Wu Chiao, Chiu Yu, Ou-yang, Lo Shih (930-1007), and Chang Kuan. As for their biographical data, see Appendix VIII. Some of the candidates who failed the examinations had backgrounds similar to those mentioned above. For example, the father of Fan Jo-shui served as Magistrate of Han-yang at the end of the Pao-ta era, and died in office. The family then settled in Chih-chou. Fan Jo-shui took the chin-shih examination many times, but failed every time.

231 Candidates who participated in the ming-ching examination are Liu Shu-tu, Wang Chung-hua, Wu Chu (941-1016), Tu Hao (938-1013). As for their biographical data, see Appendix VIII.
similar to that of the T'ang dynasty. Under the circumstances, competition in the examination hall of the Southern T'ang was naturally and extremely fierce, particularly in the chin-shih examination which gathered a huge number of participants. The Hsiao-hsu Chi explains why there were so many literati in Chiang-nan.

During the T'ang dynasty, those who served in local governments viewed the southeast region favorably. Even after they had served in a prefecture or county, they definitely left their children to reside where they had served. This is because they admired the extraordinary landscape. Until now, the literati living in Southeast China had been the descendants of the traditional clans of the T'ang.

Clearly, this is merely a superficial explanation of why the descendants of the great clans remained in Southeast China. The real reason was that poverty restricted them from returning to the north, or that the families regarded Chiang-

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232 During the reign of the Wu and the Southern T'ang, Yao Ching, a man of humble origin, was possibly the only exception to the rule that the military could be promoted in position and rank, which was sufficient to attract the admiration and jealousy of the literati. Yao was originally Liu Chin's horse trainer, because of his skill in raising horses, in addition to his cautiousness and virtuous behavior, Yao gradually won the trust and goodwill of Liu, eventually becoming Liu's son-in-law. Yao had no particular talents or abilities, but his incorruptibility gained him a good reputation. He served up to the rank of Commissioner-council and died in office at the age of 83. Therefore, Shih Wen-ying, the author of Yu-hu Ch'ing-hua, could not help but sigh, "What is the use of studying?" (10: 12b.) However, Yao-ching's experience cannot be construed as the norm for the literati; the orthodoxical method was to take the civil service examinations.

233 Wang Yu-cheng (954-1001), Hsiao-hsu Chi, Kuo-hsueh Chi-pen Ts'ung-shu ed., p. 422.
huai as an ideal place to acquire knowledge, which would enable them to succeed in the civil service examinations. 234

Another reason causing the abundance of literati in Chiang-nan was that many scholar-officials who were serving in southeast China during late T'ang were unable to return to the north because of war and chaos. They were forced to remain in the prefectures in which they had served. During the Sung, when people traced their ancestral activities back to the late T'ang and the Five Dynasties, they usually linked their family ties to the north. 235

No matter what reasons, many descendants of the great clans did reside in southeast China. 236 Some clans even grew

_234_ For details, see chapter one.

_235_ For example, Liu Shu (1032-1078) claimed that the original homeland of his family was Wan-nien, a county in Ch'ang-an. Liu Tu, his ancestor of the sixth generation, was Magistrate of Lin-chuan, and was unable to return to his native place because of the war. Liu Tu was buried in Yun-chou, and from then on his family claimed that prefecture as its native place. See Fan Tsu-yu (1027-1101), _Fan Tai-shih Chi_, Szu-k'ü Ch'uan-shu ed., 38: 5a. The territory of Yun-chou was originally under the jurisdiction of Hung-chou and Yuan-chou, but was established as a prefecture in 952. The homeland of the family of Liu Yen (1048-1102) was originally in Lo-yang; one of his ancestors had served in Chiang-hsi; and the native place of the family thus changed to An-fu, a county in Chi-chou. For details, see the appendix attached to Liu Yan's _Lung-yun Chi_, Szu-k'ü Ch'uan-shu ed., 4a.

_236_ For example, the T'ang capital was the birthplace of Peng Ssu-yung. At the height of the T'ang rule, one member of the Peng clan served as Prefect of Chi-chou, and the family stayed in the prefecture after he had completed his service. From then on, the members of this clan claimed to be native inhabitants of Lu-ling. See Cheng Hao (1032-1085), _Ming-tao Wen-chi_, included in _Erh-cheng Chuan-shu_, Szu-pu Pei-yao ed., 3: 3a.
prosperous in Chiang-nan; according to the Hsiang-shan Yeh-lu, there were seven clans whose members have been living together for five generations. Hsu Chih-kao placed a mark of distinction on their houses and excused them from taxation and manual labor. Among all the clans, the Chens in Chiang-chou were the most prominent. They were the descendants of Chen Ching, who served as Supervising Secretary (chi-shih-chung) during the reign of Yuan-ho (806-820).

There were seven hundred people in the clan, ranging from young to old. They did not keep concubines or servants, and were thus able to maintain peace and harmony in their clan. They behaved in total compliance with the rules and regulations.

The domestic discipline and family traditions of the Chen clan were so great that their livestock were even affected. Not only did all the clan members eat together, but a hundred dogs raised by the clan also complied with the rule of eating together from a large container.

If one dog would not come, the others would not start eating.

The Chen clan also established a private school, collected books and invited famous scholars to be teachers. Many famous literati graduated from this school.

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Shih Wen-ying, Hsiang-shan Yeh-lu, Hsueh-ching T'ao-yuan ed., A: 22ab. Chen Ching had no son and so adopted a cousin to continue his lineage. Therefore, those Chen clan members living in Chiang-chou were not Chen Ching's biological descendants. Chen Ching was familiar with the rules of etiquette and ceremony, and was included in the "Biography of Confucian Scholars" (Ju-hsueh Chuan) in the Hsin T'ang-shu. (pp. 5710-6.) This might be the
Given the above background, it is no wonder to observe that the contemporaries could have chance to come across with some well-learned scholars even in the countryside of Chiang-nan. Therefore, the reputation of Chiang-nan as a source of erudite literati was not unfounded.

Owing to the abundance of literati, not all those who came from famous scholarly families were able to pass in the civil service examinations. For example, Chang Huan, the father of Chang Te-hsiang (978-1048), was "celebrated for Confucian learning". But he did not pass the civil service examinations and all he could do was to attain the "rank of heaven" (tien-chueh) by remaining at home for the rest of his life.

Although it was difficult to pass the civil service examinations, especially the chin-chih examination which was the most competitive, honorable and enviable among the various degrees of the civil service examinations, not all successful candidates gained as much political benefit in terms of their

reason why his "adopted" descendants were celebrated for abiding by rituals.

238 Li Chi-hsun came across an aged man in the countryside, and was greatly impressed by his refinement and erudition. For details, see the Hsiang-shan Yeh-lu, A: 17b-18a.

239 Lo-chuan Chi, 39: 30b.


241 Sung Ch'i (998-1061), Ching-wen Chi, Kuo-hsueh Chi-pen Ts'ung-shu ed., p. 785.
starting rank and the speed of their promotions as they might have expected.

Many Southern T'ang institutions were patterned after those of the T'ang dynasty. In the T'ang, successful examination candidates were usually required to work in local governments, and this practice was followed in the Southern T'ang. As for the appointment, successful candidates received different appointments based on their performance in the examinations. Those whose performance was outstanding in the examinations were assigned to serve in counties under the jurisdiction of the capital (ch'ih-hsien) as a sign of honor. Those whose examination results were average were required to serve in counties that lay beyond the two capitals.

Generally speaking, those who had powerful backing might obtain some advantages in the appointment process. Wu Shu succeeded in the civil service examinations and married the

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242 For example, Chang Pi was appointed Commandant of Chu-yung because he won first place in the examinations. Chang Chi won third place (t'an-hua) and was granted the same post. (Ma-shu, 7: 5a.) Chu-yung was an "imperial county" (ch'ih-hsien) under the direct administration of Kuang-ling Fu, the west capital. Wu Chiao took the examinations in the same year as Chang Chi, and received the honor of Principal Graduate. But he was appointed to a post in the office of the commanding official (mo-fu) in Hsuan-chou. (Ibid., 14: 5b.) At first glance, Wu's experience contradicts the contemporary policy of official assignment. But the matter is not that simple. Wu Chiao performed outstandingly in the examinations, and Li Yu ordered to his examination paper be carved into stone as an example for the other candidates. Therefore, his being granted the post of mo-fu was a special imperial favor, and whether or not he was close to the capital had thus become a non issue.
daughter of Hsu Hsien (916-991), the chief examiner. He tried to get a position in the capital, but his father-in-law, who was serving as Secretariat Drafter, told him that he had been assigned a post in Tan-yang. Apparently, Hsu Hsien was still unable to attain a position in the capital for his son-in-law. This signifies that the rule that successful candidates serve in local governments was strictly applied. Nevertheless, Tan-yang was a county under the jurisdiction of Jun-chou. Jun-chou bordered on Chin-ling and the county was only two hundred li away from the capital. Apart from its closeness to the capital, Tan-yang was also Wu's native land. Appointing Wu to a position in his native county suggests that Hsu was doing Wu a favor in order to give his son-in-law the honor of "returning home wearing embroidered robes" (i-chin huan-hsian). This arrangement stemmed from Hsu's goodwill and concern for his son-in-law.

On the other hand, those who lacked powerful support were assigned to counties further away from the capital. For instance, Lu Chung-wen was sent to serve as Commandant of Lin-chuan after having received his chin-shih degree. Lin-chuan was a county in Fu-chou, far away from the capital. In

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244 Sung-shih, p. 10340.

245 Ibid., p. 9870.
addition, Lu was a native of Hsin-an, a county in Hsi-chou. Therefore, this assignment did not give Lu the honor of "returning home wearing embroidered robes".

Whether the counties were close to or far from the two capitals, serving in local administration rather than in the Academies and Institutes of the central government (kuan-ko) was looked down upon by the descendants of prominent officials. In fact, the Southern T'ang tended to protect the descendants of prominent officials, particularly through generous first appointments and frequent promotions. For example, descendants of prominent officials could begin their careers by taking positions as Editor or Assistant in the Palace Library, based on protection. In this respect, chin-shih degree holders could not compete with the descendants of influential officials in terms of appointments and promotions. For example, Lu Wen-chung was promoted to Case Reviewer of the Court of Judicial Review after having completed a stint as Commandant of Lin-chuan, but Lu Yen-ching achieved the same high post just at the beginning of his career, due to his father's background.

During the reign of Li Yu, he offered handsome tangible rewards to encourage people to send memoranda to the court

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246 Ibid.

247 Lu-shu, chuan 6: 1ab.
with suggestions on how to save the country. Good first jobs and speedy promotions within the bureaucracy were the rewards received by those who submitted memoranda to the court. In fact, the terms offered to these people were far superior to those obtained by successful examination candidates. Hsu Ti was appointed Editor and promoted to Investigating Censor by the end of the same year that he had begun his public career. The speed of his promotion was totally beyond any expectations reasonable for those who began their public careers by means of earning the *chin-shih* degree.  

Another weakness of the *chin-shih* examination, patterned on the T'ang system, began only in 952, and it lasted a mere twenty four years before the Southern T'ang came to an end. The period of its implementation was too short and too recent, whereas recommendation by prominent officials and protection had already been in use since the Wu regime. Clearly, this short period could not carry very much significance and influence in shaping the political and social features of the regime.

With regard to basing official rank on the total length of service, once again officials holding a *chin-shih* degree were inferior to those who managed to enter public service in other

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348 Chang Chi was regarded as being adept at flattery and an opportunist, but he still needed to complete two terms of office as Commandant before he was promoted to Investigating Censor. (*Ma-shu*, 7: 5b.)
ways. For this reason, during the reigns of Hsu Chih-kao and Li Ching, except for Li cheng-ku who succeeded in passing the civil service examinations, those who occupied the highest positions were the meritorious officials who had made great military contributions and their descendants whose careers had been launched under the policy of protection. During the reign of Li Yu, no great changes occurred in political structure. The only exception to the rule was Chang Chi,

249 For details, see my article.

250 As for Chung Mo (7-960), the reason for his rise to prominence is that he took charge of diplomatic affairs with the Later Chou and was able to take advantage of the strength of the north as the basis for his power.

251 During the early years of Li Yu’s reign, Pan Yu (938-973) and Li Ping (?-973) dominated the court politically. Pan was the son of Pan Ch’u-chang who served as Policy Advisor (san-chi chang-chih) in the central government. It is recorded that Pan Yu was an assiduous student, and could not be bothered earning a livelihood. His writing style was airy and graceful, and he was skilled at conversation and debate. Therefore, his reputation was widespread among the political and social elite. Due to his outstanding literary performance, Pan Yu was admired by Chen Chiao and Han Hsi-t’sai, who recommended him to Li Ching. Consequently, Pan Yu was appointed Proofreader of the Department of the Palace Library. (Ma-shu, 19: 7a.) At that time, Li Yu, heir apparent to the throne, set up the Institute for the Veneration of Literature to recruit the literati. Pan Yu was one of the list of literati to be recruited, and after Li Yu had ascended to power, Pan Yu was entrusted with important duties and promoted to Secretariat Drafter. (Lu-shu, chuan 10: 4b.) Li Ping was another powerful official during the early reign of Li Yu. He claimed to be an expert on spiritual affairs and his knowledge catered to Pan Yu’s taste. Based on Pan’s recommendation, Li received a promotion. Therefore, Li was politically dependent on pan, and this is why Li was unable to avoid persecution when Pan was purged by Li Yu. (Ma-shu, 19: 8ab.) During the siege of Chin-ling, Li Yu entrusted important political and military affairs to Chen Chiao and Chang Chi. He also appointed Hsu Yuan-yu and Tiao Kan Proclamation Carriers of the
who was a successful examination candidate during the reign of Li Ching. When Li Yu came to power, Chang Chi was also appreciated by the Emperor and granted good promotions. Subsequently, he was able to enter the highest level of administration and became one of the major policy-makers. Nevertheless, not every candidate could be so fortunate to have this ability to accommodate, and this is why in general the highest level of administration was still dominated by the descendants of influential officials.

Because of the social significance and preference embodied by the chih-shih examination, successful candidates were always recipients of admiration and praise. So too were the favored sons-in-law of prominent officials. In the opinion of most prominent officials, cultivating marriage relationships

Palace (nei-tien chuan-chao). (Lu-shu, chi 3: 5b.) Chen and Tiao began their careers on the basis of protection; Hsu was a descendant of Hsu Wen and an exalted personage of the court.

Thanks to his ability to flatter and cleverly anticipate the wishes of the emperor brought him to prominence. For instance, when Li Hung-chi, the heir apparent of Li Ching, died in 959, officials suggested granting him the posthumous title of "Promoting Marshal of Merit" (hsuan-wu). Chang, who was serving as Commandant of Chu-yung, submitted a memorandum to the court, saying, "The virtue of the heir apparent was based on serving meals to the emperor and inquiring about the imperial health. But this posthumous title emphasizes military merit and leaves an example to posterity. This is not a good way to guard against small matters before they become big calamities." Chang’s opinion was based on his assumption that Li Ching was still angry by Li Hung-chi’s arbitrary slaughter of the Wu Yueh captives, and his attempt to accommodate the wish of Li Ching. Thus, Li Hung-chi’s posthumous title was changed to "Literary Contribution" (wen-hsien), and Chang was assigned an important post. (Lu-shu, chuan 13: 10a.)
could add prestige to their families and were certainly welcomed. However, this did not imply that the prominent officials would urge their own descendants to follow the path of the civil service examinations. For instance, Yu Chien-yen married his daughter to Yao Tuan, Principal Graduate in the Chin-chih examination, but he still brought his son to enter public service by means of protection. This is probably due to the fact that competition in the examinations was fierce and success was not guaranteed. In addition, the rate of promotion for successful examination candidates was not as great as that of those who entered the official realm on the basis of protection. Having studied the situation, Yu Chien-yen thus decided to bring his son into office by means of the policy of protection, because this method was more secure.

Only a few officials, who had special backgrounds or reasons for doing so, would urge their descendants to take the examinations as a way of launching their careers. An outstanding example is Yen Shu, the son of Yen K'o-chiu. Yen Shu began his civil career based on protection when he was still a teenager. Furthermore, he was married to the daughter of Hsu Chih-kao. The security of the marriage, in addition to

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253 When the Later Chou launched an attack against the Huai region, Wu Yueh broke a peace treaty by attacking Chang-chou, and Yu Chien-yen was sent on a mission to denounce Wu Yueh. However, he wanted to see Yu Sun, his son, receive the rank of Swordsman Guard (chien-niu pei-shen) before he set off on this mission. (Ma-shu, 10: 5b.)
his good promotions, made him "tired of studying". Being poorly educated, therefore, Yen Shu became the butt of his colleagues' jokes, and was satirized in the "Long Poem of the Crab" (Hsieh-fu) by Chiang Wen-wei. The reason he was looked down upon was not because of his entrance into office by means of protection, but because his scant knowledge did not enable him to serve as an intelligent or effective prime minister.

In an attempt to change the circumstances, Yen Shu asked Han Hsi-t'sai, a prominent official and literary composer, to write an epitaph (shen-tao pei) for his father as to glorify his ancestry, in the hopes of enhancing his prestige and position. Even though Yen presented many valuable gifts and a beautiful singing girl to Han, all his efforts were to no avail and he was disappointed with the outcome of the case.

Recalling his previous efforts, Yen Shu realized that depending on others to enhance his family's reputation was fruitless. The only way to gain prestige was to take the civil service examinations because those who succeeded were regarded as erudite. He therefore ordered his children and relatives to receive Confucian education, and over ten members

254 Lu-shu, chuan 10: 8a.
255 Hsiang-shan Yeh-lu, B: 18b-19a.
of his family took part in the civil service examinations. In this sense, urging his descendants to take the examinations was certainly a means of achieving psychological compensation.

Another example of this is Feng Yen-lu, who was widely despised by his contemporaries because his flattery rather than his achievements enabled him to serve in a prominent post. In order to clean up his negative image, Feng gave up an opportunity of becoming Prime Minister based on seniority. Instead, he tried to acquire military merit by taking the risk of beginning territorial expansion.

Taking the civil service examinations was another way of cleansing the stigma of the family. Feng Hsuan, Feng Yen-lu’s son, took the chin-shih examination, and this method was definitely contrary to the usual routine, in which descendants of prominent officials entered public service on the basis of protection. Probably Feng Yen-lu intended to make Feng Hsuan take the examinations with a view to showing that his children possessed enough merit on their own to qualify as officials without having to rely on mere good fortune. As for the difference in promotions between those who succeeded in the

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256 Ma-shu, 10: 4a. However, Yen Shu did not despise those who entered the civil service in other ways, instead of by taking the civil service examinations. Yen still respected and admired those of high literary reputation, even if they did not have the chin-chih degree. Therefore, he married his daughter to Pan Yu because his fame was widely known and he was recommended by some prominent officials to serve in the government.
examinations and those whose success was based on protection, this had already become secondary in Feng Yen-lu’s consideration.

III, The Northerners and the Southern T’ang Bureaucratization

After the military revolt of Chu Yuan in 957, a rumor circulated that the central government had the northerners eliminated by poisoning. Under the circumstances, Han Hsi-t’sai, the northerner, gave himself over to debauchery as a means of avoiding political persecution. The Kung-kuei Chi records,

After the revolt of Chu Yuan, Li Ching was increasingly suspicious of the northerners, most of whom were poisoned by wine. Han Hsi-t’sai was forced to ruin his reputation by himself. 257

257 Kung-kuei Chi, p. 1066. The method of self-discredit adopted by Han Hsi-t’sai was to indulge in sensual pleasures. He did not even prevent his concubines and maidservants from having sexual intercourse with his friends and guests. All his deeds are vividly recorded in the Nan-T’ang Chin-shih, the Wu-tai-shih Pu, the Ch’ing-i Lu, and the Kuei-hsin T’sai-shih. Using poisonous wine to eliminate political opponents was practiced among officials in the Southern T’ang; even Hsu Hsien and Hsu Ch’ieh, respectable scholar-officials, were involved in such affairs. Kuo Chao-ching was proud of his literary reputation, and his arrogance enraged the Hsu’s brothers. Kuo was eventually poisoned. (Ma-shu, 14: 4a.) Li Ching also resorted to such means to deal with those who were badmouthing the government. Wu Yuan-kuei was dismissed due to his abuse of authority. After a few years, the court granted him amnesty, and he went to the capital with the desire to be re-employed, but his request was turned down. He then composed thirty poems full of rebellion and slander, and these poems were widely circulated throughout the country. He was poisoned to death because of these deeds. (Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 9: 3a.) In view of this fashion, it is not surprising to find that the government used the same old method to deal with those who were regarded as
When Chu Yuan served in Chiang-nan, he advocated the strategy that the country should conquer Hu-hsiang, Min, and Wu Yueh to consolidate the nation. He also asked to be entrusted with the military authority to fulfill that goal. However, the officials who were in charge of the national administration, like Wei Yin and Chen Chiao, were hostile to him, because they were afraid of being replaced by Chu someday. They then accused Chu of having a "rebellious countenance" (fan-hsiang), and of being "a person from far away" (yuan-jen). Therefore, what Chu did was merely a plot to seize military authority so as to fulfill his evil intention, namely overthrowing the regime. Curiously, the homeland of Wei Yin was Hun-chou, thus, he was a northerner. Therefore, when he attacked Chu Yuan, he simply accused Chu of being a yuan-jen. This was a way of distinguishing among those who served in the Southern T'ang, regardless of their native places.

Chu Yuan was the son-in-law of Cha Wen-cheng, and Cha was a political ally of Wei Yin, Chen Chiao, Feng Yen-ssu (903-960), and Feng Yen-lu. All of them were prominent officials in the central government, and were referred to as the "Five Ghosts" by the contemporaries. With such a political background, both unreliable and treacherous.

258 Ma-shu, 27: 3a; Lu-shu, chuan 9: 4b-5a.
Wei Yin and Chen Chiao should have been on good terms with Chu Yuan, but the actual case was totally different from what might have been expected. In fact, personal conflicts already existed within the cabal, as shown in the operation against Fu-chou. The member's individual struggle for recognition, as well as their lack of cooperation, led to a severe defeat on the battlefield even though their military power was superior. 259

During the battle of Huai-nan, Chu Yuan acquired substantial military merit. Out of pride, he occasionally acted contrary to the orders of Li Ching-ta. Chen Chiao made use of this opportunity to slander Chu and persuade Emperor Yuan-tsung to replace Chu with Yang Shou-chung, another general. Chu was forced to defect to the Later Chou. Obviously, Chen's dislike of Chu was caused by a conflict of interest and personal malevolence, not regional conflict. Therefore, even though some northerners were purged and killed after the incident, this did not imply a policy based on regional hatred and suspicion. 260

259 Ma-shu, 2: 6b; 21: 5b.

260 Evidence of this lies in the fact that both Li Ping and Chu Yuan were sent to Chiang-nan, and although Li was supposedly Chu's good friend, he was not killed. Contrarily, Emperor Yuan-tsung was afraid that Li would feel uneasy and recalled him to the capital. But officials sent to escort Li misunderstood the order had Li placed under arrest. The Emperor regretted the error and had him set free. Li was consoled by the emperor by being promoted to Vice Military Commissioner in Chien-chou. (Ma-shu, 19: 8a.) Another example that shows the Southern T'ang were not prejudiced against northerners is exemplified in the case of Kao Yueh, an inhabitant
Contrary to popular belief, Han Hsi-t’sai was still treated favorably after the rebellion of Chu Yuan, because "the imperial benefaction towards him was not yet exhausted." The reason Han was forced to resort to discrediting himself was not the fear of being purged politically, but to avoid being appointed Prime Minister just as the country was about to be crushed. In Han’s opinion, serving as the prime minister would be regarded as "a mockery for a thousand years" (chien-ku hsiao-tuan), but he did not have the same opinion about other posts in the central government.

of Yu-chou who defected to Chiang-nan with Lu Wen-chin, his father-in-law. Both Kao Yueh and Kao Yuan, his cousin, were able to enjoy the good life and promotions even after the incident with Chu Yuan. They still served in the Censorate (yu-shih tai) and the Historiography Institute (shih-kuan) respectively, during the reign of Li Yu. (Lu-shu, chuan 6: 3ab.) The government also treated generals from the north very well, and the best example of this is Shen-tu Ling-chien (?-975), who was entrusted with the command of bodyguard by both Li Ching and Li Yu. (Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 10: 7b.)

261 Tiao-chi Lieh-t’an, p. 27.

262 Tsu Wu-tse (1006-1085), Lung-hsueh Wen-chi, Szu-k’u Ch’uan-shu ed., 16: 13b.

263 Lu-shu, chuan 9: 4a.

264 Li Yu had long tried to promote Han to Prime Minister, but this was never successful because of Han’s indulgence in sensual pleasure. Han’s behavior thus enraged Li Yu. Han was demoted to Right Mentor (yu-shu tze), and stationed in Hung-chou. Han sent away all his concubines and maidservants and went to Hung-chou alone. Obviously, Han was trying to gain the imperial sympathy to keep him in the capital. This ruse worked, for Li Yu was pleased by Han’s actions, and the emperor retained him in Chin-ling and restored his official position. Afterwards, many women gradually returned to Han’s residence. Li Yu had no way of stopping Han, but
Unquestionably, his opinion was bizarre and incomprehensible to both the contemporary and future generation.

The reason for his opinion originated in a wager he had made with Li Ku (903-960). When Han Kuang-szu, father of Han Hsi-t’sai, was killed because of his involvement in a military revolt, Han sought refuge in Chiang-nan. Li Ku saw him off in Cheng-yang. Before the departure, they joined in one last hearty toast. Han told Li that if he could become Prime Minister of Chiang-nan, he would take over North China without difficulty. Li replied that if he were appointed to the same post, he could take over Chiang-nan as easily as "taking something from a pocket". In 955, Emperor Shih-tsung (921-959, r. 954-959) of the Later Chou ordered Li Ku, who was serving as Prime Minister, to lead his troops to attack the Southern T’ang. Consequently, Li obtained the Huai region, and Han could do nothing to stop him. 265

Han Hsi-t’sai apparently had lost the bet, but in reality things were not that simple. In 991, Emperor Tai-tsung (939-997, r. 976-997) of the Sung evaluated the contemporary generals and commanders with his officials. Wang Kai (949-991) criticized Li Ku for not acquiring outstanding merit in operations against the Southern T’ang. The Emperor, who had

been with the army at that time, explained that Li Ku kept himself secluded and the military officers rarely saw him. Even if they had the chance to do so, they needed to observe the rules of etiquette. This was quite ridiculous and not practical in dealing with the military. When Li Ku ordered the troops to withdraw, the T'ang army took advantage of the chaotic situation caused by his withdrawal to launch its operation, and the Chou army would have been defeated if they had not obtained the assistance of Li Chung-chin's famous army. Li Ku was relegated to obscurity after the battle of Cheng-yang, and took no active military role thereafter. The acquisition of Huai-nan was due to the efforts of other generals. Therefore, it was certainly an exaggeration that Huai-nan was acquired as easily as "taking something from a pocket".

According to the wager, being Prime Minister was a prerequisite of obtaining military merits. Since Han Hsi-t'sai was not Prime Minister, he was not to be blamed for the territorial loss. On the contrary, Li Ku lost the bet because he could not put his words into practice, even though he was Prime Minister.

After the loss of the Huai region, the downfall of the

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266 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, pp. 1539-40; Li T'ao (1115-1184), Su Tzu-chih T'ung-chien Chang-pien, abbreviated as the Chang-pien, (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1979-1992), pp. 710-1.
Southern T'ang was inevitable. Even if Han Hsi-t'sai could have become Prime Minister, he would have been unable to change this destiny. The only way to maintain his ever-victorious status in the bet was to prevent himself from becoming Prime Minister, because then he could claim that his abilities had no chance to be tested. This is why Han could accept any high posts in the central government but Prime Ministership. Therefore, Han discredited himself because of his own desire to avoid serving as Prime Minister, and this had nothing to do with political persecution caused by regional bias.

On the whole, there were some factional conflicts in the political arena of Chiang-nan, but they were not caused by regional prejudice, and regional differences did not negatively influence the process of bureaucratization. Also, the process of bureaucratization was uninterrupted throughout the rule of the Southern T'ang. Even though the Southern T'ang was forced to encourage military prowess as a

267 The quarrel between Sun Chi and Feng Yen-ssu shows that Feng, who was a native of Chiang-nan, used to hold his colleagues in disdain based on his own literary ability. He once asked Sun, "What kind of ability did you possess that enabled you to become Vice Minister (cheng-lang)?" (Lu-shu, chuan 8: 1a.) But this case cannot be used as an example to demonstrate the conflict between southerners and northerners, because Feng's verbal attack was not limited to Sun but extended to most of his colleagues, regardless of their native places. Also, some of his factional allies, like Wei Yin, were northerners. Even southerners would attack one another should conflicts of interest or personal feuds occur.
means of countering the foreign threat after the loss of the Huai region, the administration was still dominated by scholar-officials, the products of the complete transformation of the bureaucracy from a military to a civilian organization.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MILITARY CLANS AND FAMILIES UNDER CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

I, The Decline of the Families of the Old Generals and the Civil Transformation

The policies of the Hsu family effected great changes in the clans and families of the meritorious military generals under Yang Hsing-mi. As discussed in chapter two, the activities of forty eight generals under Yang Hsing-mi’s command have been recorded in primary sources. Except for Hsu Wen and Chung Tai-chang, whose extraordinary backgrounds caused them to be excluded from the general record, the activities of the descendants of fourteen generals were recorded. The descendants of these generals can be divided into the following categories:

A, Those who continued their family tradition of pursuing a

268 Fourteen generals are recorded: Chang Hsun, Liu Chin, Ch’ai T’sai-yung, Wang Kuan, Liu Hsin, Chu Yen-shou, Li Te-cheng, Chou Pen, T’ao Ya, Li Yu, Chin Pei, Chia Kung-to, Li Chien, and Li cheng-ssu. They were roughly more than a third of forty six prominent generals of Yang Hsing-mi’s bloc. The actual number of the descendants of the generals are more than that stated in the dissertation, but some of them are unknown even their names in primary sources. For instance, Ma Hsun had been Prefect of Shu-chou and Ssu-chou, and died before the execution of Chu Yen-shou. Because of his bravery, the army regretted Ma’s death, and his subordinates pitied his two sons who were now left fatherless. Chu was a good friend of Ma, and he assumed the responsibility of raising Ma’s two sons. After Chu was killed, Yang then took over the responsibility. (Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 10.) Definitely, such a brief record does not enable me to put them in categories based on careers and behavioral inclination.
brilliant military career

B, Those who pursued a military career, but whose performance was far much inferior to that of their ancestors, or not outstanding enough to be recorded

C, Those who maintained a military career, but tended towards civil service

D, Those who pursued civilian careers

E, Unidentified

According to the above categorization of the descendants of Yang Hsing-mi's important generals based on their careers, one can make the following assumptions:

It is obvious that the policies of the Hsu family created

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The descendants of famous generals included in this category are Liu Jen-kuei, Wang Chuan-cheng, Chou Yeh (?-942), and Chu Chun-chin. As for their biographical data, see Appendix IX.

The descendants included in this group are Ch'ai K'e-ching, Liu Yen-ying, Liu Chuan-chung, Chu Kuang-yeh, Li Chien-feng, Chou Tsu (?-956), T'ao Chin-chao, Chia Kuang-hao, Chin Tai, Chu Ling-yun (?-975), Chin Chin-yuan, Liu Fan, Chin Cheng-yu (917-994), and Chang Miao. As for their biographical data, see Appendix IX.

The descendants included in this category are Liu Jen-chan (901-957), Ch'ai K'e-hung (?-956), Wang Chung-wen (?-961), Liu Chung-liang, Liu Chung-chin (?-946), and Liu Yen-cheng. As for their biographical data, see Appendix IX.

The descendants included in this category are Li Chien-hsun, T'ao Ching-hsuan (898-950), Li Jen-i, Chang Pi, T'ao Chung-ting. As for their biographical data, see Appendix IX.

The descendants included in this category are Li Yen-chung, Li Shan, Liu Chung-chien, Liu Chieh, T'ao Chung-liang, T'ao Chung-lun, and Liu Chung-tsan. As for their biographical data, see Appendix IX.
important changes in the nature of military families and clans, namely the way military families educated their children as well as their values and viewpoints had to adjust with the times. As a matter of fact, many generals tried to act humbly and tactfully, since their conformity to civilian norms was essential to the prosperity of families. Their descendants were not only refined in behavior, but also desirous of civilian careers. Under the all-encompassing influence of the central government, even the descendants of the strong-willed generals who remained in the military were unable to withstand the pressure.

Looking at the careers of the second generation of military men, 274 apart from Li Yen-chung and Li Shan, whose careers are unknown, seventeen persons had military careers, while only three served in civilian posts. At first glance, the high percentage (77%) of military careers seems to demonstrate the strong martial tradition shared by the military families and clans. A closer look at the data, however, reveals that among those whose careers were military, only three can actually be regarded as successful in continuing the military

tradition of their ancestors, while the rest displayed a lack of military prowess or even ended up changing careers. Moreover, those three persons who maintained the military tradition had already been warriors prior to the changes in the central government.

The third and fourth generations contain fourteen descendants, and only Chu Chung-chin was regarded as comparable to his forefathers in martial spirit. The rarity of military genius by this time, combined with the erosion of military tradition, symbolized the decline of military values. Such decline can be seen in the practice of protection. Once the young men attained office, their promotion might be based on their length of service and not solely on their personal ability. According to a contemporary observer,

Ch’ai K’e-hung was always gambling with his guests, and indulged in sensual entertainment. Though he was serving in the military, he seldom talked about military affairs. Therefore,

all of Ch’ai’s contemporaries thought him lacking in talent in military affairs.

Such criticism kept him from being promoted for a long time. However, while performance was only one of the criteria for

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275 There are Liu Jen-kuei, Wang Chuan-cheng, and Chou Yeh.

promotion, length of service was also important. Thus, due to his seniority, Ch’ai K’e-hung was eventually promoted to Prefect of Fu-chou. Therefore, the deterioration of the families of meritorious officials does not imply that their descendants should struggle against poverty to seek for livelihood. Rather, it simply implies that most of them were incapable of maintaining their family’s military tradition by possessing military prowess.

In the descendants included in the third and fourth generations, most of the information about them can only be found in private records like epitaphs and in short biographies in anthologies. This is because persons who had not achieved military merit are not recorded in major official documents. For example, the description of Chin Cheng-yu in the Hsiao-hsu Chi is filled with hyperbole concerning Chin’s "merits". When the Sung started its operation against the Southern T’ang, Chin was appointed Military Director-in-chief (ping-ma-tu-chien) of Fu-chou. The Hsiao-hsu Chi claims that this appointment was granted out of the consideration of "selecting an able man to defend against disasters." But Fu-chou did not play any significant military role in the war.

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Ma-shu, 11: 5a; Lu-shu, chuan 3: 3b. Promotion to the position of Prefect without displaying any noticeable merit was not unique to Chai; Chin Tai is another example of a man who was promoted solely on the basis of length of service. (Sung-shih, p. 10163.)
When the army of Wu Yueh attacked the eastern front of Chiang-nan, Chin was appointed Commissioner of the Palace of Longevity and Prosperity (shou-chang tien), and acted as Army Supervising Commissioner (chien-chun shih) of Chien-chou. Wang Yu-ch'eng further mentions that Chin attained numerous merits in defending Chien-chou. According to this source, Lu Chiang (?-976) advanced to Hsi-chou and murdered the local prefect, thus horrifying prefectures far and wide. Lu then stationed his troops in Fu-sha, and invaded against the city of Chien-chou. Chin managed to defend the city through fierce battle, thereby saving the people. When Li Yu ordered the prefectures to surrender, Chin asked Chin Hsi, his son, to present the seal to the court. But the Yang Wen-kung Tan-yuan, cited in I-yuan T'zu-huang, contains the following account:

When Chin-ling fell, Lu Chiang, who collected the routed soldiers, advanced to Fu-chien from the prefectures of Hsuan and Hsi, with a view to restoring the Li regime. As he arrived in Hsuan-chou, Kung I (identical with Kung Shen-i), the prefectural general who had already surrendered to the Sung, closed the gate and did not provide Lu with firewood and water. Lu defeated Kung. As Lu was about to reach Chien-chou, he was defeated in Sung-chi, and his subordinates were routed and fled. The court invited him to submit by offering a military commissionership; Lu then surrendered.  

278 Hsiao-shu Chi, pp. 408-9.

279 Hu Tzu (1082-1143), Shao-chi Yu-yin Tsung-hua, abbreviated as Tsung-hua, (Hong Kong: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1076), p. 315. According to Wu Yen-shen, Sung-chi was identical with Sung-yuan, a county under the jurisdiction of Chien-chou. (Ssu-kuo Chun-chiu
In other words, before Lu Chiang could launch a direct military offense against Chien-chou, his force had already disintegrated due to his own surrender. Lu had never posed any real threat to the prefecture, and the account of Chin Cheng-yu's defense of the city was definitely an exaggeration. Furthermore, the only contact between Lu Chiang and Chien-chou did not involve Chin. Therefore, the Sung-shih, the Ma-shu and the Lu-shu deliberately did not include the activities of Chin Cheng-yu, for his merit was not noteworthy enough to be recorded in major sources.

Sometimes, even private records are quite brief in recounting the activities of the descendants. For instance, the Lo-ch'uan Chi states that Wang Chih was the descendent of Wang Tao and that the Wangs were "a prominent clan in Chiang-

112: 15a.) Apart from Hsi-chou, Lu Chiang did not encounter resistance as he advanced toward Min. In regard to his defeat in Sung-chi, this probable refers to the fact that Lu not only deserted his subordinates, but was also persuaded by his brother to surrender to the Sung court after the delivery of the certificate of imperial guarantee of safety carved on an iron plate (tieh-chuan) sent by Tsao Han (924-992), the Sung commander. (Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 10: 4b.)

Cha Yuan-fang, Controller General (t'ung-pan) of Chien-chou, beheaded the envoy sent by Lu Chiang in Hsi-chou. (Lu-shu, chuan 2: 6b.)

280 Another example is the Chiu-kuo Chih. This book contains the biography of T'ao Ya, but it does not mention his descendants. And the Hsu Chi-sheng Chi contains an epitaph of T'ao Ching-hsuan which, although Hsu Hsien tries to praise T'ao's military achievements and literary talents, reveals T'ao as, at best, a judicious and capable good official, but lacking sufficient merit to be included in historical records.
nan." With respect to the ancestry of Wang Chih, the Lo-ch’uan Chi states,

Wang Kuan followed Yang Hsing-mi to conquer Chiang-huai and earned much merit. Wang Chung-wen, his son, achieved the post of Prefect of Chi-chou.

The activities of the following generation are not mentioned at all, probably because the members of the third generation had no merit worth mentioning.

Curiously, the decline of the families of meritorious officials was not caused by the corruption and harshness of their descendants in local administration, for the national strength of the Wu did reach to its zenith when most of the meritorious generals were still alive. Also, the Wu generals openly belittled the rulers of North China, even in

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282 Indeed, many meritorious officials who served Yang Hsing-mi were cruel and merciless and their atrocities were far more serious than those of Liu Chung-chin and Liu Yen-ching. For example, Liu Hsin was a harsh administrator. He entrusted his henchmen, such as Chi Ku’ang, with exacting money and commodities from the people under his jurisdiction. They installed a box in their office to receive bribes, and every day the box was stuffed to the brim. (Chiu-kuo Chih, pp. 19-20.) Another example is Li Chien, who was "cruel and fond of killing. He demanded valuables from people illegally and all the rich people living in O-chou were bankrupted." (Ibid., p. 12.) Among the meritorious generals, the atrocities committed by Chang Chung were the most notorious. He not only liked collecting money from people illegally, but also indulged in slaughtering people. (Ibid., p. 16; Chiang-piao Chih, B: 6b-7a.)

283 When Yang Hsing-mi occupied the region of Chiang-huai, Chu Wen was at his peak of military strength. But Chu suffered serious setbacks when he launched operations against Yang. During the reign of Hsu Wen, the military was still powerful, and able to sustain any challenge from the north.
the presence of an envoy sent by the north. In 925, Hsueh Chao-wen was assigned by the Later T'ang as an envoy to Fu-chou. Liu Hsin, a famous general, held a banquet to honor Hsueh while Hsueh was passing through Chiang-hsi. At the banquet, Liu asked,

Did Ya Tzu (a pet name for Emperor Chuang-tsung of the Later T'ang, 885-926, r. 923-926) hear about me?

Hsueh answered,

The Son of Heaven had newly acquired Ho-nan, and was not familiar with your name.

Liu then said,

There was Han Hsin in the Han, and Liu Hsin in the Wu. You told Ya Tzu that he ought to come over the Huai to have an archery contest with me.

At that time, Emperor Chuang-tsung had already annexed Ho-nan, and the Later T'ang was at its military zenith, but Liu Hsin did not fear the Emperor at all. In Liu Hsin's belief, though he was not a contemporary of Han Hsin, both of them were eminent heroes. His metaphor might be exaggerated to a certain extent, but his arrogance was well founded as shown by his skill in archery: he did not have difficulty hitting small target from a distance. 284

In fact, the war-worn Emperor Chuang-tsung did not dare to disdain the able generals of the Wu. In addition to Liu Hsin, some other generals, like Chou Pen, were also of concern to

284 Hsin Wu-tai Shih, p. 758.
Emperor Chuang-tsung. When Lu Pin was on a mission to the Later T’ang,

the Emperor inquired about the conditions of the famous Wu generals, and Chou Pen was on the list of inquiry. 285

Unquestionably, the decline of the bloc of meritorious officials was caused by the inferior military performance of their descendants, who were no longer able to maintain the prestige and status of the bloc by successfully defending the country against the northern invasions. As the example of Chin Cheng-yu shows, what allowed him to be recorded in historical source was the fact that Li Ching regretted having moved the capital to Hung-chou after the loss of the Huai region, and was particularly regretful when he looked in the direction of Chin-ling. Chin Cheng-yu, who served as Recipient of Edicts of the Hall of Heart Clarification, always put up screens to block the range of the imperial vision. 286

Another of his "outstanding performances" was a piteous mourning for Li Ching. His actions were totally different from those of Chin Pei, his grandfather, in terms of military valor. This example is particularly significant in light of the fact that the Chin family was a typical military family with no history of civilian career, whose members were

285 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 42.
286 Chiang-piao Chih, B: 3b.
supposed to be as militant as their ancestors. 287

The loss of military vitality was well illustrated in a war which took place in the Huai region. When the Later Chou invaded Chiang-huai, Liu Yen-ching, the son of Liu Hsin, led the main force to defend against the invading enemies. Though born and raised in a military family, Liu Yen-ching only concentrated on practicing martial arts and paid no attention to strategy training. His arrogant disposition only worsened the situation. He impertinently held the enemy in disdain and disregarded the advice of some more cautious generals that he be prudent and not pursue the retreating enemy. Consequently, he met defeat in Cheng-yang, thus paving the way to the subsequent loss of Huai-nan. 288

Even though the descendants of the old generals did not indulge in brute courage, what they could handle was to maintain the public safety, while using strategy to crush their enemies on the battlefield was beyond their capabilities. As an example, both Chu Kuang-yeh and Liu Chuan-chung, although lacking in military merit, were promoted to prominent posts in the bodyguard because of their vigilance

287 T'ung-chien, pp. 9535-6; Ma-shu, 17: 5a.

288 Of course, Liu Yen-ching was not entirely without merit. His father was skilled at archery, and Liu was also good at it. (Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 2: 10ab.) But brute courage alone was not enough to turn the tide.
and caution in guarding imperial security. After Liu Yencheng was defeated, the Southern T'ang suffered a number of military setbacks. When asked by Li Ching how to defend against the invasion, Chu Kuang-yeh replied by reciting a verse composed by Lo Yin (833-909):

As fortune came, both heaven and earth helped with united effort; even a hero was bound when fortune was gone.

Liu Chuan-chung highly praised Chu’s words. As a result, both of them were exiled to Fu-chou and Yao-chou, respectively, because the Emperor was enraged at their crestfallen and lamenting words. Indeed, it is a pity that the offspring of these famous generals are not known for their military merit and strategy, but just for their reliance on their family background in overseeing the bodyguard. Chu Kuang-yeh’s response to the Li Ching’s question revealed that the revitalization of the Southern T'ang could never be fulfilled, if the Emperor only relied on the descendants of the

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289 Chu Kuang-yeh was serving as Commander-general of Shen-wei Army when the northern invasion began. The invasion brought chaos to the Southern T'ang. Robbers and rebels took advantage of the opportunity to start an uprising. Li Ching entrusted the security of the capital to Chu by appointing him Military Inspector inside and outside the court (nei-was hujn-chien shih). Chu was strict and fair in maintaining peace and order by putting some rioters to death. (Lu-shu, chuan 5: 4b.) His talents were completely different from those of his father, who was celebrated for field warfare.

meritorious generals. 291

Definitely, there were still some capable generals from the military families, Liu Jen-chan being the best example. Prior to the operation of the Later Chou, the national defense of Chiang-nan was threatened because a drought lowered the water level of the Huai River. The water was so shallow that people could splash across the river on foot. In addition to setting up farmlands cultivated by soldiers and strengthening the defense for a possible attack, in 955 Li Ching appointed Liu Jen-chan Military Commissioner of Shou-chou because of its strategic significance. Understandably, the appointment was based on Liu's lineage and past military performance.

In 956, the Later Chou launched an operation against the Southern T'ang, and the army rushed to besiege Shou-chou. The garrisoned officers and soldiers were all taken aback, and did not know how to deal with the invasion. Liu Jen-chan displayed his military genius that he calmed the people down by giving an order of deployment as he usually did. Because of his tranquil and imperturbable attitude, the public ceased to panic. Due to Liu's deployment, as well as the physical defensive advantages of Shou-chou, like the height of the wall and the depth of the moat, Shou-chou became a stronghold able to withstand a number of years of siege warfare. Moreover,

291 Lu-shu, chuan 10: 1ab.
Liu's subordinates were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Chou army stationed on the south side of the city. Consequently, Liu became a formidable rival of the Later Chou.\textsuperscript{292}

When Liu Jen-chan fell seriously ill, his subordinates drafted a letter of surrender in his name, allowing the Chou army to enter the city. Liu's military performance impressed Emperor Shih-tsung of the Later Chou, who praised Liu for his dedication to those he served and not being ungrateful to his loyalty. Even compared to the famous officials of previous dynasties, how many of them could be compared with you? In my southward operation, it was the greatest reward that I got you.\textsuperscript{293}

When Liu's subordinates heard the news of his death, they all burst into tears, saying,

Heaven was not kind that it made our father die. What was the use of us being alive?

As a result, several tens of them committed suicide. Lung Kun held Liu Jen-chan in high esteem, addressing him as being able to gain popularity among the army, and his subordinates were glad to devote their life to the task. If Liu were not a good general, how could he do that?\textsuperscript{294}

Only Ch'ai K'e-hung could rival Liu Jen-chan in his contribution to the national defense. When the Later Chou attacked the Huai region, Wu Yueh also started an operation against Chang-chou to hinder the military strength of the

\textsuperscript{292} Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 5: 3a-4b.

\textsuperscript{293} Hsin Wu-tai Shih, p. 352.

\textsuperscript{294} Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 5: 5b.
Southern T'ang. Ch'ai sent a memorandum to Li Ching, requesting that he be assigned an army to establish military merit. The Emperor was pleased with his request and sent him, together with Lu Meng-chin who was Prefect of Yuan-chou, to lead the troops to relieve Chang-chou from the military threat.

At that time, all the best troops were stationed to the north of the Yangtze River; only a few thousand old and weak soldiers were assigned to the command of Chai. Also, Li Cheng-ku, Vice Military Affairs Commissioner (fu shu-mi shih), only allocated old, moldering armor and weapons to the soldiers. Restricted by such limitations, Ch'ai K'e-hung was still able to defeat Wu Yueh and kill 10,000 of its soldiers. Lu Yu highly praises his merits, saying

When the trouble on the frontier became prevailing at the end of the reign period Pao-ta, the merits of defeating the enemy acquired by other generals could not compete with those of Ch'ai, and Ch'ai was promoted to Military Commissioner of Feng-hua Chun. Ch'ai sent a memorandum to the court again, requesting that he lead the troops to relieve the siege of Shou-chun. As he advanced to Tai-hsing, he was afflicted with ulcers, and died after a few days. The people in the Southern T'ang were in deep regret without exception.

Certainly, Ch'ai K'e-hung's early death was a great loss to the Southern T'ang.

Ho Ching-chu (888-964), the son-in-law of Li Chien, although

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295 Ma-shu, 11: 5a.
296 Lu-shu, chuan 3: 4a.
not a blood relative of Li Chien, served in the military as a youth. Having been thoroughly inundated with military sights and sounds, he was easily able to imitate the style and heroic spirit of a general. When the Later Chou invaded the Huai region, Ho was Military Commissioner of O-chou. Hu-nan sent troops to invade the prefect upon the request of the Later Chou, as a means to hinder the military strength of the Southern T'ang. Li Ching ordered Ho to move the people into the city. But Ho ignored the order and cleared the ground of all obstacles, thus making the area outside the city suitable for fighting. Ho claimed,

I am going to fight to the death with all the people and troops, when the enemy comes.

As a result, his determination and bravery were highly praised by Li Ching. 297

Even if Ho Ching-chu is included in the group participating in the war of Huai-nan, the number of generals coming from the military families still totals only three. 298 The scarcity of capable generals vividly demonstrates the decline of the military tradition in the families of the meritorious

297 T'ung-chien, p. 7537.

298 Another descendant of the great generals worth mentioning was Chou Hung-tsu, a son of Chou Pen. Although he could not protect the prefecture under his jurisdiction, he committed suicide as a show of his loyalty to the country. However, his deed did not exert any significant contribution to the national defense, and he is not thus included in the group of Liu Jen-chan.
generals.

The inability to take complete control of major military operations, as their ancestors did, is another sign of the decline of military tradition among the generals' descendants. Instead, they needed to cooperate with, or even rely on, generals outside the bloc of meritorious generals, militia force, as well as those who had defected and surrendered to the Southern T'ang from other countries. 299

After losing land north of the Yangtze River, the Southern T'ang was eager to revitalize its military might. 300 In the process of strengthening the military capacity, the Southern T'ang had to admit that civilian officials could not deal with the northern threat effectively, and that what the country needed most was people of heroic and militant character who would able to meet the military challenge from the north. 301

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299 For details, see Appendix X.

300 Incorporating the militia force into the military structure became an important means for the Southern T'ang to enhance its national strength. For details, see Appendix X.

301 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 10: 1b. Though the Southern T'ang had long been suspicious of the loyalty and reliability of the military men, Li Yu had to promote spirit to cater for the practical need. Under the circumstances, even if somebody had obtained merits by chance, Li Yu still granted them handsome rewards. For instance, the commandant of Tung-ling was too cowardly to have done anything well. He liked drinking, and used to have delirium tremens. He was once drinking with his colleagues on the river, when suddenly, a few enemy ships, which were beating drums and displaying their armaments, began advancing downstream. Unexpectedly, the commandant grabbed his sword, and urged the inhabitants to fight against the enemy. In so doing, the entire enemy was captured.
In order to balance the principles of civil administration with practical need, the government tried to recruit military officers with an educated background. Once Hsu Ch’ieh was summoned by Li Yu at night to discuss current affairs. The topic turned to whether ability or moral character should be stressed in selecting military men. Li Yu initially averred that in time of national weakness, ability was to be first priority in selection. But Hsu disagreed with the Emperor by replying,

Does your Majesty dare to entrust those who are capable, like Han Hsin and Peng Yueh, but who do not have a sense of morality, with 100,000 soldiers?

After hearing, Li Yu had to admit that "it was a good point". 302

In fact, Li Yu eagerly sought educated generals, as a way to achieve balance between ability and a sense of morality. 303

As the situation deteriorated, the government was forced to further sacrifice its goals of civil administration to the

The case was reported to the court, and Li Yu praised his merit. The commandant was granted an official costume and promoted to the post of Magistrate of Tung-ling. Surely, "his accomplishment was luckily obtained because of wine." (Chiang-nan Yu-t’šai, p. 3.)

302 Lu-shu, chuan 2: 4a.

303 The Li-shih Chien-chang Chih-pu records that Li Chung-kao, a clan member, was educated and familiar with military affairs. He was forced to become a military officer at a palisade in Chiang-hsi in 974, even though strongly objected to the appointment. (2: 1ab.)
necessity of recruiting the military elite. 304

Though the generals outside the bloc of meritorious officials filled many important posts in the military structure, it does not mean that the Southern T'ang had deliberately ceased to recruit its military men from the descendants of meritorious generals. On the contrary, the government still had great faith in the descendants of families with a high military reputation. 305 Under the circumstances, it was understandable that even if the descendants of the meritorious generals had meager military ability, they would be recruited by the government. However, the battle of Huai-nan had already exhausted the military strength of the descendants of meritorious generals, and only Chu Ling-yun is recorded in the sources. This certainly reflects a thorough decline in the military strength of the

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304 One way to strengthen the military force was to recruit scoundrels and rascals. As for their military contribution, see Appendix X.

305 Huang-fu Chi-hsun (?-975), the son of Huang-fu Hui, was promoted to a prominent rank because of his lineage, even though his sense of loyalty was open to question. In fact, Huang-fu Chi-hsun had been with his father in the battle of Hsu-chou, and his father fought vigorously against the enemy. When the situation worsened, Huang-fu Chi-hsun tried to abandon his father and flee. His father brandished a spear to strike him, but he was not hurt and was able to escape. Ma Ling had a long discussion about the case: "Alas, one should not treat their relatives badly. If treating them badly, then one would certainly treat the others badly. Huang-fu Chi-hsun fell from allegiance when his father was at death's door, and his way of serving the emperor could be anticipated." (Ma-shu, 19: 4a-5b.)
descendants.

Having absorbed the military elite from various sources, the fighting ability of the Southern T'ang was greatly enhanced, and its downfall was by no means inevitable. Nevertheless, a serious error in the assignment of military tasks proved to be the ruin of the country. As Lu Yu correctly points out:

When Chin-ling was besieged, Li Yu entrusted the duties of defence and reinforcements to Huang-fu Chi-hsun and Chu Ling-yun, respectively. Chi-hsun had already harbored treacherous intentions, and Chu Ling-yun was a youth without the qualities necessary to be an eminent general. It was appropriate for the Southern T'ang to meet the fate of extinction. If Lin Jen-chao was not killed because of wrong policy, Lu Chiang could take the task of attack and defense, Hu Chieh and Shen-tu Ling-chien could render service within the besieged capital. Even the Majesty of Heaven could enter into action. How would the Southern T'ang be extinguished? Therefore, Chiang-nan was weak, but what led to the success of Tsao Pin (931-999) was just that he took advantage of the Southern T'ang's mistake in its employment of personnel.

Curiously, none of the able generals mentioned by Lu Yu include descendants of the military families.

Chu Ling-yun was the only descendant of a meritorious official to be entrusted with important responsibilities during the siege of Chin-ling. Although he was valiant, he

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306 *Lu-shu, chuan 5: 5b*. The treachery of Huang-fu Chi-hsun was again entirely revealed in the siege of Chin-ling; he was interested only in himself and was not prepared to die for his country. His major concern was to preserve his own vested interest. Even if Huang-fu Chi-hsun had not been treacherous, his character and ability would not have qualified him for the task. He was good at local administration, but not military affairs. Therefore, Ma Ling shares the opinion of Lu Yu that it was a grave mistake for Li Yu to have entrusted him with the responsibility of defending the capital. (*Ma-shu*, 19: 4a-5a.)
was ignorant of how to capitalize on opportunity during battle. Prior to fighting, he served as Military Commissioner of Cheng-nan Chun (Hung-chou). When Chin-ling was besieged by Sung troops, Li Yu entrusted the responsibility of reinforcement to him, praising him because his mind did not scheme for his own interests, and could share in my worry for the country.

But Chen Ta-ya, a scholar-official, had reservations about Chu:

Though Chu cared for the nation very much, he did not have a far-sighted stratagem. Rather, he acted obstinately and presumptuously. I was afraid that he had not the talent to solve the problem.

Chen Ta-yu was not a general and had no fighting experience, but he still insisted on dedicating his efforts towards lifting the siege, hoping that he could succeed by chance. In his opinion, "if cooperating with Chu, it was definitely to no avail." Undoubtedly, his words vividly revealed his entire lack of confidence in Chu Ling-yuan's ability to fulfill the task.

After the war with the Later Chou, the Southern T'ang had started a series of constructions in Hung-chou to make the prefecture a base of reinforcements for Chin-ling should there be a war with the north again. Therefore, the army under the

307 Ma-shu, 17: 6ab.
command of Chu Ling-yuan was huge; it reportedly consisted of 150,000 soldiers.

The Sung army did not underestimate the reinforcements. When Chu Ling-yuan led his troops to advance to Chin-ling, Wang Ming (919-991), a Sung general stationed in Tu-shu K’ou, sent his son to the court asking for the construction of 300 additional warships. But Emperor Tai-tsu of the Sung realistically said this was not a way to tackle an emergency. The Emperor even realized that the siege would be lifted whenever Chu’s troops arrived at Chin-ling. The only thing the Emperor could do was to order Wang Ming to set up a number of long poles vertically on islets and river banks, so that they would look like sails and masts from a distance. When seeing this, Chu Ling-yuan hesitated because he suspected that it was a possible ambush. 309

Obviously, Chu Ling-yuan had once had the upper hand in the battle. But he was finally defeated and was forced to commit suicide because of his tactical mistake. When Chu obtained the imperial order for reinforcements, he already realized that the water level was low in the winter and it was not favorable for manipulating large ships. The water level would be higher in the summer because of rainfall, thus enabling the troops of the Southern T’ang to enjoy more advantages in

309 Chang-pien, p. 349.
But Chin-ling was in imminent danger of collapse, having been besieged for quite a while. Chu Ling-yuan was unable to wait for the summer. It is clear that he was not to blame for advancing to Chin-ling, for he had no another alternative.

Chu Ling-yuan's error occurred because although the river was too shallow for big warships, Chu set up the banner of commander-in-chief on his big ship. Such a blunder enabled the Sung army to identify its target of attack and concentrating all its efforts on destroying Chu's ship. The defeat of Chu, therefore, was not the defeat of all his troops, even though his own ship was destroyed. Due to Chu's abrupt death, all his troops were routed without any actual fighting. Clearly, it was Chu Ling-yun's tactical blunder that destroyed the huge strategic forces of Hung-chou, thus making the collapse of the Southern T'ang inevitable. 310

Besides a loss of military vitality, political oppression also played a role in the decline of the descendants of meritorious officials. Certainly, the power of the bloc of meritorious generals and the authority of the central government were incompatible in nature. The local foundation of the descendants was doomed to vanish when the process of centralization was completed. For instance, after Liu Chin,

310 Ma-shu, 17: 5b-6b.
both Liu Jen-kuei and Liu Chung-chin were allowed to rule Hao-chou respectively. However, the monopoly was broken by Li Ching in 944. 311

Moreover, the military officers could not maintain a military commission in local administration for too long. In 946, Liu Yen-cheng was appointed Military Commissioner of Shou-chou. After serving in the prefecture for a considerable length of time, he feared he would be replaced. Thus, he deliberately exaggerated tensions on the frontier as a means of prolonging his term of office. Nevertheless, he was still summoned to the capital to fill the post of Commander-general of Shen-wu Army. 312

The decline of the bloc of meritorious generals was also revealed in politics. Some of the generals' descendants were bullied and insulted by the new civilian officials. The best example is that of Kao Shen-ssu. He served as Commander-general of Shen-wu Army, Military Commissioner of Shou-chou, and concurrent Director of Chancellery (chien shih-chung). Apparently, he simultaneously enjoyed the office and rank of both general and prime minister. His family prospered throughout his lifetime. 313 However, after his death in 946,

311 Ibid., 2: 4a; 11: 6a.
312 Lu-shu, chuan 6: 1b; Ma-shu 3: 7a.
313 Lu-shu, chuan 4: 1b-2a.
Chiang Wen-wei circulated a memorandum attacking the evil deeds of Wei Yin, a prominent official in the central government, and his associates. One of the accusations was that Kao’s descendants were driven from their residence by Feng Yen-chi just shortly after the death of Kao. It seems that Kao’s descendants suffered injustice at the hands of powerful officials.

Under such circumstances, one way for the descendants to live peacefully was to cultivate marriages with the ruling elite. In this regard the family of Liu Chin was quite successful. Liu Chin’s son, grandson, and great-grandson were all married to the daughters of Yang Hsing-mi, Hsu Chih-kao, and Li Ching, respectively. These intermarriages enabled the family to get the upper hand in various political situations.

Maintaining good relationships with powerful officials was also a way to preserve the family. After Liu Yen-cheng acquired a lot of farmland in Shou-chou by both cunning management and forcible seizure, he gained huge profits every

314 Ibid., chuan 7 : 6a. Another example is that of Chai K’e-yung. When Chai complained to Li Cheng-ku about the state of his troops’ armor, Li, who held Chai in disdain, ignored his complaint and sent him away by scolding. (Ma-shu, 11: 5ab; Lu-shu, chuan 3: 3b-4a.)

315 Although Li Ching did not admire Liu Chung-chin, he did not cause him many difficulties because of the marriage relationship. In this way, Liu Chung-chin could still enjoy his wealth and leisure, and Liu Jen-chan was entrusted with the defense of the strategic stronghold.
year. But he did not forget to bribe the powerful officials to consolidate his power and position. Those bribed recommended Liu's ability to Li Ching, and this was one of the reasons why the Emperor appointed him to lead the main forces to fight against the invasion. These means of preserving their families and clans signified that while the descendants no longer had the power to protect themselves, they made sure they could rely on other means to live in prosperity and security.

II, The Civil Transformation Of The Military Men Outside The Meritorious Bloc

Interestingly, the civil transformation was not confined to the families and clans of Yang Hsing-mi's subordinates, but also extended to the generals who started their careers after Hsu Wen rose to prominence.

During the reign of Li Ching, the Southern T'ang started a series of aggressive operations against its neighbors. These military activities, however, were certainly not a sign of military revitalization for the Southern T'ang and would not impose any restrictions on the military men who had undergone the civil transformation. 316 For example, Tiao Yen-neng, a

316 As a matter of fact, while the major planners and executors of the operations included Feng Yen-lu and some other aggressive and militant scholar-officials, most of the prominent generals were not enthusiastic about territorial expansion. In this sense, the
famous general since the rule of Hsu Wen, revealed his literary inclinations that he liked studying, and entrusted the prefectural administration to literary officials.

Also,

he liked literary work, and exchanged poems with Li Chien-hsun.

When this exchange came to the attention of Li Ching, he smiled and said,

I did not know Tiao was a scholar of the west array (hsin-pan, referring to the array for the military men in court audience). 317

Tiao Kan, the son of Tiao Yen-nien, did not treat literary composition as a pastime as his father had done. Rather, he became a "full-time" scholar-official. Because of his literary ability and important role in politics, he was treated intimately by Li Yu. 318 Tiao Kan's refinement and personal integrity were not only famous in his country, but also known in North China, thus making "his reputation shock

expansionary activities could be understood as a means for the scholar-officials involved to consolidate their power and status, as well as a way to suppress their political opponents, but not a sign of military revitalization of the Chiang-huai region.

317 Ma-shu, 11: 1b-2a.

318 Chang-pien, p. 532. Tiao Kan served Li Yu as Assistant of the Palace Library and Subeditor of Academy of Scholarly Worthies (chi-hsien chiao-li). He was also appreciated by the Emperor because of his literary ability. Therefore, he was promoted to Auxiliary in the Hall of Brilliance (ch'ing-hui tien) and authorized to review the memoranda sent to Li Yu by both central and local administrations. (Lu-shu, chuan 3: 9b.)
Tiao Kan, another son of Tiao Yen-nien, was the son-in-law of Hsu Yu, the son of Hsu Wen. Due to the status and authority of his father-in-law, Tiao was able to reside in a magnificent residence and invite Chou Huai-chien, an expert in the *I-ching*, to give lectures. \(^{320}\) His lifestyle was that of a scholar-official.

Another example is Kuo Ting-wei, the son of Kuo Chuan-i. He came to prominence by means of military performance in the reign of Li Ching. Apart from preserving the military tradition of his family, "he liked studying when he was young, and was good at calligraphy." Also, he showed his mother intense filial piety by waiting on her every morning and evening in formal clothing (*shu-tai*), never changing even in extreme cold and heat. His status as a just and capable official was another sign of his civil transformation, as demonstrated his benevolence to the people under his administration. \(^{321}\)

Influenced by the contemporary trend, some illiterate generals tried to catch up by showing an inclination towards refinement and elegance. For instance, Wang Chien-feng was

\(^{319}\) Lo-chuan Chi, 39: 26a.

\(^{320}\) Chiang-nan Yu-t’sai, p. 12.

\(^{321}\) Lu-shu, chuan, 11: 2a.
illiterate and infamous because of his abstinence and viciousness, as well as his barbaric taste for human flesh. But he tried to appreciate culture by following traditional customs.

Because of the heavy emphasis on civil administration, even generals and their family members from other countries who had surrendered soon picked up on and followed the trend quickly and smoothly. When Chen Hui, a defected general from Min, served as Prefect of Chien-chiu, he promoted literacy by constructing schools and employing teachers, and recommending scholars to officialdom. After he was promoted to Military Commissioner of Yung-an Chun, he continued this practice by recommending many literati to the government. This behavior earned him a good reputation.

The influence of civil transformation was not limited to the

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322 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 2: 6b; Ma-shu, 6: 11b, 19: 3a.

323 Wang Chien-feng's cousin composed the Tung-chih Shu, and Wang ordered his scribe to write it down. The Shu has a record about pigeon, but due to a transcription error, the character ko was separated into three parts as jen, jih, and niao. Wang believed in its accuracy blindly and ordered that pigeon as a dish be presented as the first course at banquets on the seventh day of the first month (jen-jih). See T'ao Ku (903-970), Ch'ing-i Lu, Pao-yen-t'ang Pi-chi ed., 2: 35b.

324 Fen Tai-shih Chi, 36: 24a.

325 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 5: 6b. Another example of quick adaptation is Cheng Wen-pao, the son of Cheng Yen-hua who also surrendered from Min. Cheng Wen-po served in the reign of Li Yu, and was chosen to be Secretary for Li Chung-yu, the son of Li Yu, because of his literary accomplishments. (Lu-shu, chuan 12: 2b.)
core group of the central authorities, but also spread to the
military families beyond the core group. Feng Ling-chun was
a military officer in Kuang-ling, but Feng Yen-ssu and Feng
Yen-lu, his sons, were both famous for their accomplishments
in literature and the arts. Their literary reputation enabled
them to enter into the official realm. Some low-ranking
military officers also demonstrated a deep understanding of
literature. Liu Chi is a good example of this. He wrote
300 poems and compiled them into an anthology entitled as the
Tiao-ao Chi, and his poems were praised by Yang I, a
contemporary famous man of letters.

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326 Feng Yen-ssu was appointed Assistant in the Palace Library
by Hsu Chih-kao, and assigned as a companion for Hsu Ching-t’ung;
(Ma-shu, 21: 2b.) Feng Yen-lu served as companion to commander-in-
chief when Hsu Chih-kao dominated Wu politics. (Lu-shu, chuan 8:
3b.)

327 Liu Chi was a local inhabitant of Chiang-nan, and served Li
Yu as Recipient of Edicts (chuan-chao chen-chih). After the
Southern T’ang was annihilated by the Sung, he followed Li Yu to go
to Kai-feng and was appointed Auxiliary for Court Service (kung-
feng kuan). Therefore, he served in the military both in the
Southern T’ang and the Sung.

328 The preface of the Tiao-ao Chi is written by Hsu Hsien,
which signifies Hsu’s recommendation of the poems of Liu Chi.
(Chiang Shao-yu, Huang-chao Liu-yao, Pi-chi Shao-shuo Ta-kuan ed.,
55: 11a.)

329 In fact, Liu Chi’s literary work was used by the Sung
literati to highlight the point that many military officers who
served in the Sung were well-versed in poetry. (Yang Wen-kung Tan-
vuan, quoted by the Shao-chi Yu-yin Tsung-hua, p. 374.) Apart from
poetry, Liu had a profound knowledge of river works. Therefore, he
was assigned by Emperor Tai-tsung of the Sung to regulate the
waters. Meanwhile, Chang Ch’u-hua (938-1006), who served as
Transport Commissioner (chuan-yun shih), decided to inspect the
In addition, the influence of civil transformation spread to the military clans and families living outside the capital. Tai Hu was an influential local military figure, and Tai Shou, his son, maintained the military tradition. However, the trend towards literary culture was displayed in the behavioral inclinations of Tai An, an important figure of the third generation. In a description by Li K'e, Tai An was a man endowed with civil and military virtues, particularly adept at local administration.

Tai An was good at literary composition, as well as riding and swordsmanship. Also, he was an outstanding and stalwart person without fearing of anything. When he was guarding Yao-chou, he served his superior with esteem, and ruled his subordinates with magnanimity. He had a profound understanding of the heavenly way, and concern for the public sentiment. Further, he strengthened the importance of human relationships, and increased its influence by teaching. He also reformed society, and promoted virtue and ritual. Under his rule, there were neither robbers nor locusts ravaging the territory. People respected themselves, and made strenuous efforts on their own initiative. Heaven granted the land with a benevolient official, and those people living here were given serenity without exception. Whenever the order was given, people were happy to follow without hesitation. There were no men of ability discarded, nor corruption practiced among officials. Both marriage and burial were practiced in compliance with water regulation. Chang held a banquet with the water works staff and several people were eating a dish of minced carp. Chang looked around and said that the southerners were living in riverside villages and often ate fish. They did not get sick by its nasty smell. His comment showed his contempt for the southerners. After hearing this, Liu used his erudition to quote many allusions and legends in retort to Chang's comment. Though Chang won the first place in the civil service examinations, he was nonplussed and was unable to return Liu's witty repartee. (Huang-chao Lui-yao, 59: 12ab.)
with ordinary regulations, and no order was given late. People continually abided by filial piety and brotherly love. 330

Due to a lack of additional sources on this figure, I am not able to prove beyond a doubt the reliability of this account. But the record clearly shows that Tai An successfully developed into a competent official, and that his behavioral inclination was totally different from that of his ancestors.

Tai Ching, the elder son of Tai An, continued his family's military tradition by becoming a military officer. 331 Tai Yen, the second son of Tai An, also followed his father to serve in the army and established military contribution by crushing banditry in Hsi-chou. 332 However, the outstanding achievements of Tai Yen were not military. The genealogy of the Tai clan (Tsung-pu) includes a biography written by Pien Hao, a general during the reign of Li Ching, which clearly demonstrates the image of Tai Yen as filial son and hermit:

His disposition was extremely filial. When Lady Lien, his mother, was ill, he personally gave her medicine, and did not take off his clothes for a few months. When his mother died, he did not even drink a spoonful of water, and became thin from bitter

330 Chung-kung Kung Miao-pi Chi, included in Tai-shih Tsung-pu, lab.

331 Tai Ching inherited his father's rank, and was granted with the honorary title of Drafter on Duty in the Secretariat. (Tai-shih Tsung-pu, 10a.) According to the contemporary custom, such title was usually conferred on minor military officers stationed in local region.

332 Hsin-an Tai-shih Chih-pu, abbreviated as Chih-pu, 3: 1b.
sorrow. When his relatives consoled him, all he did was shed tears. Later, the lady's body was buried in Shao Lien-yuan of Huang-tun by imperial order. He then build a cottage on the right side of the grave. He never left the cottage. He taught the Hsiao-ching, and refused to serve in the government, and secluded himself from society. The officials submitted his case to the court, and he was highly praised and granted the title of Mr. Filial Recluse (hsiao-yin hsin-hsien). 333

Tai Yen was also skilled at geomancy, and wrote a book entitled An Intimate of Mountain and Water (Shan-shui Chih-yin). In addition, he composed "A Long Poem on a Beleaguered Dragon" (Ch'iuang-lung Fu). 334 His literary accomplishments were obviously greater than those of his father.

Tai Lu, the eldest son of Tai Yen, served as Gentleman of Militant Assistance (wu-i lang), and Left Policy Advisor (tso san-chi chang-shih). 335 Evidently, he pursued a military career. Tai Jui, his second son, was esteemed by his fellow countrymen for his knowledge of the classics and his virtue and righteousness. He also studied the odes at length. 336

Tai Ching's two sons also succeeded in passing ming-ching and san-chuan in the civil service examinations. In short, among the four members of the fourth generation, only one

333 Yen-kung Chuan, included in Tsung-pu, 1a.

334 Chih-pu, 3: 1b.

335 Tsung-pu, Tsung-chih, 1b. Both Gentleman of Militant Assistance and Left Policy Advisor were most likely honorary titles.

336 Chih-pu, 3: 1b.
maintained the military tradition, while the rest pursued civilian careers.

However, the trend of civil transformation by no means had homogenous effects on all the military clans and families of the local regions. In terms of geography, some families who were located in outer prefectures were unaware of a need to conform.

Chiang Cheng was granted the honorable title of Supreme Pillar of State (shang chu-kuo) and Military Commissioner of Chiang-nan because he gained military merit in fighting Huang Ch’ao in Huang-tun. His two sons also pursued military careers by taking minor posts. During the service of the second generation of the Hsiaos in Chiang-nan, the Hsu family had firmly dominated Wu politics. However, the Chiang family did not appreciate the new political atmosphere and still

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337 Chiang Cheng, the second son of Chiang Cheng, served as Generalissimo (shang chang-chun) in the Southern T’ang, while Chiang Wei, the third son of Chiang Cheng, was granted the title of Grand Master of Court Service (chao-ch’ing tai-fu); his real responsibility, however, was merely to guard Hsuan-chou. For details, see the T’ung-tsung Chi-lich, included in the Chiang-shih Tsung-pu, 5: lb-2a. As for the second generation’s period of service, the Hsiao-chiang Chia-cheng states clearly that this occurred during the Later Liang. (Tzu-tsu Shih-hsi, included in the Hsiao-chiang Chia-cheng, 4: 2a.) But the period of the Later Liang lasted from 907 to 923, when the Southern T’ang had not yet been established. Therefore, “the Southern T’ang” was probably an erroneous substitution for “the Wu”. Also, the recording of Chiang Cheng’s title as Generalissimo in the Tsung-pu was most likely a purely ostentatious title for a low-ranked military officer. As for the reliability of the Hsiao-chiang Chia-cheng, see Appendix XI.
relied on the military as the only career option for the third
generation. To the rulers of the Southern T’ang, the
Chiang family deserved to be forever locked into minor,
relatively unimportant positions.

A similar case is found in the careers of the ancestors of
Chu Hsi. According to the Chu-shih Hui-chien Tsung-pu Hsu,
written by Chu Hsi, the first ancestor of the family was Chu Huai:

In the era of Tien-yu of the T’ang, T’ao Ya was Prefect of Hsi-chou. When he first conquered Wu-yuan, he requested the court that he be authorized to appoint my [Chu Hsi’s] ancestor to lead three thousand troops to station there, and supervise the tax collection. The person appointed was the ancestor who took charge of the tea office (Chih-chih Ch’a-yuan Fu-chun). [This ancestor] was buried in Ling-tung when he died, and his offspring established households there. Chu Huai had three sons, all of whom served in the Southern T’ang and were granted with the title of Attendant-in-ordinary (chang-chih), and Recipient of Edicts. Many members were scattered throughout other prefectures after.

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338 Based on the record of the Hsiao-chiang Chia-cheng, Chiang Cheng died in 952, the tenth year of Pao-tai, and Chiang T’sai and Chiang Ching were members of the third generation. They served primarily during the era of the Southern T’ang: Chiang Ching served as Generalissimo, (Tzu-tsu Shih-hsi, 4: 3a.) and Chiang T’sai served in the post of Grand Master of Court Service. (T’ung-tsung Chi-lieh, included in the Chiang-shih Tsung-pu, 11a.) According to custom, titles like those discussed above were usually granted to low-ranking military officers.

339 I have found the Chu-shih Tsung-pu in the Family Library, which is located in Salt Lake City. The genealogy was confirmed as a reliable record of the ancestral activities of Chu Hsi in the period of the Wu and the Southern T’ang. For details, see Shu Ching-nan, Chu-hsi I-wen Chi-kao, (Chiang-su: Ku-chi Chu-pan-she, 1991), pp. 321-323.

340 Chu-shih Tsung-pu, chuan-shou, 1a.
Based on the contemporary practice, Attendant-in-ordinary and Recipient of Edicts were the titles usually given to low-ranking military officers.

From the third generation onwards, no more clan members from this branch served in the Southern T’ang. This was probably the punishment imposed by the Southern T’ang on those families who acted in a manner contradictory to what the prevailing trend prescribed.

Chu Ching, the younger brother of Chu Huai, served as Area Commander-in-chief (tsung-kuan) in Kao-pu.

He had dedicated himself to capturing robbers, and recovered fifteen prefectures, including Hsuan, Hsi, Chih, and Yao, and was endowed with the title of Surveillance Commissioner (kuan-cha shih) of Hsuan-hsi.

Chu Hsi also mentions the offspring of Chu Ching, saying:

The Chus, who remained in Ling-tung, were the offspring of the younger brother of cha-vuan. They still preserved the official dispatches of appointment issued by the Southern T’ang, and were military officers of the garrison.

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342 Although the Chu-shih T’ung-tsung Shih-pu Hsu mentions that the three sons serving in the Southern T’ang “expanded and encouraged the original prosperity,” (Chu-shih Tsung-pu, chuan-shou, 4b.) this was undoubtedly just a boastful statement with no historical backing. The eighth generation of Chu Huai’s lineage began their civilian careers in Chien-chou, during the era of Hsuan-ho (1118-1125). (Ibid., lab.) Chu Hsi himself was a member of the branch that moved to Chien-chou.

343 Chu-shih Tsung-pu, Chu-shih T’ung-tsung Shih-pu Hsu, 4b.

344 Ibid., 1a.
The record demonstrates that the branch of Chu Ching did not have official dispatches of appointment of civilian posts. Nor, clearly, did the family have any members serving in the civil bureaucracy.

Generally speaking, the civil transformation seemed to have the greatest effect on the clans and families of the Yang Hsing-mi's close subordinates. As core figures in the bloc, they probably had more opportunities to observe and understand the contemporary requirements, as well as the tastes of the rulers. With respect to the peripheral officers, owing to different degrees of geographical distance and understanding of the contemporary needs, the extent of their civil transformation was much different.

Hsu Chih-kao, who was stationed in Kuang-ling, had dominated the Wu administration since 918. He treated the literati with courtesy and grace, and valued literary accomplishments. His tastes became common knowledge among all the officials of different ranks and backgrounds who were serving in Kuang-ling. Due to his geographical proximity to the center of the administration, Feng Ling-chun understood the contemporary trend and was able to respond appropriately. Though the Tai family garrisoned Hsi-chou, as discussed in chapter two, it was entirely aware of the centralization policy of the Hsu family and adopted the trend swiftly.

In contrast, neither the Chiangs nor the Chus grasped the
significance of the political changes, and thus their family members were excluded from the central administration. It is an interesting historical irony that Chu Hsi was renowned for his academic bent and his moral character, but his ancestors were stubborn in showing no interest whatsoever in the pursuit of civil transformation in the Southern T'ang. As a result, the family was relegated to obscurity. Surely when Chu Hsi learned about his family's history, he couldn't help but shake his head with a bitter smile at their short-sightedness.

Under the civil administration, most of the descendants of generals became a kind of living fossil without the ability to adapt to new situation. They could only survive in the established military political and social order. However, new clans or families, particularly from the conquered states, also rose to power in the late Southern T'ang.

Drastic socio-political changes often bring forth opportunities for the newcomers. It is a paradox in political and social history that the strong connection of a clan or a family to the major political and social group, could be either an asset or a liability to the further development of the clan. The connection could serve as a solid basis for good promotions and prestige, but it could turn out to be restrictive, suffocating any initiative essential to improving one's position, particularly when the clan tried to embark on a path that was new or even alien to the norms and values of
the group.

In this sense, the reluctance of the descendants of the meritorious officials in the Southern T'ang to pursue military careers might not simply be caused by the belief that war was a kind of disgrace and contradictory to Confucian values. Rather, it could have been caused by the psychological influence exerted by the elites, who still dominated political and social aspects of the regime. Under these circumstances, the descendants had no choice but to abide by the standards set by the core group, who monopolized the top level of the administration.

Nevertheless, new comers might be free from such restriction in pursuit of glory and fortune. Based on the genealogy of the Kung clan (Kao-t'ien Kung-shih Tsung-p'u), we can see that this new family, which had no involvement with the previous political and social order, was more flexible and capable of satisfying the new demands as a means of uplifting the family.

In spite of the Kung family’s renown for its literary and military excellence, its position as a group of new emigres from Min deprived the family from attaining the power and reputation that other elite military families and their descendants had attained since the reign of the Wu. However, as talented newcomers, they would not be consigned forever to this inferior position. Instead, some kinds of advantages enjoyed by the Kungs were totally beyond reach of the
descendants of the generals:

First, the family was not directly affected by the lifestyles and behavioral norms which were fashionable among the political and social elite in the administration. In other words, the Kung Family had more freedom of choice.

Second, the members of the Kung clan only served in minor posts, and were peripheral to the contemporary political and social core group. No doubt, lacking a connection with the major group prevented the family from achieving good promotions and wealth. But their peripheral position enabled the clan to ignore limitations, and thus the Kungs were able to act in response to reality in a flexible and appropriate manner.

The genealogy records that Kung Yu, an important leader of the first generation, served in a minor civilian post after the family settled in the Southern T’ang. But he was never promoted even after having served in the same post for a long time, based on the fact that he had no connection with any high-ranking officials.

In 944, Li Ching launched an operation against Fu-chien. The Kung family viewed this as a chance to break from obscurity into prominence. As natives of Min, Kung Yu and his father, Kung Chi, were familiar with the geography. This knowledge enabled them to be well-qualified guides in military activities. Kung Yu abdicated his civilian post and, together
with Kung Chi, joined the army of the Southern T'ang against their homeland. Eventually, they earned many merits during the operation. Apparently their performance impressed the central government and increased the prospects of promotion for Kung Yu, and this served as the basis for his success of future career.

Kung Shen-i, a member of the second generation, obtained a chih-shih degree and began a career as a law official in Hung-chou. Like his father, he eventually shifted into a military career when the Southern T'ang invaded Hunan in 950. Obviously, he anticipated a better chance of future promotion by doing so.

The experience of the Kungs highlights the point that in the late Southern T'ang, the administrative structure seemed to be saturated by an overabundance of civilian officials, which made getting promoted within the administrative hierarchy extremely difficult. Under the circumstances, those who were able to obtain promotions not only needed to be successful in fierce struggles with their colleagues, but also had to secure reliable and powerful support from high-ranking officials. In this regard, the Kung family was predestined to be a loser in the competition, because it did not have any solid connections

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345 Kao-t'ien Kung-shih Tsung-p’u, "Tracing Ancestors", 3b.
with the elite clans and families.

In order to outdo their competitors with good backgrounds, the Kung family needed to have skills in areas that the traditional elite families did not or could not excel in. Undoubtedly, taking part in military ventures was the best choice for the Kungs. The choice was timely because Li Ching was eager to enlist good military officers who were badly needed in various operations. By impressing the central government with their military performance, the Kung members could then obtain a guarantee for a brilliant career. To most descendants of the elite clans and families, that the Kungs moved from civilian to military posts was clearly disgraceful, and they would never think of following suit. But the Kung family seemed completely indifferent to this orthodox viewpoint, because as new immigrants, they had not yet assimilated such values.

Following countless military failures and the loss of the entire region north of the Yangtze River, Li Ching finally realized that the military capacity of the Southern T’ang could not match that of the Later Chou, and that only careful diplomatic maneuvering could save the country from extinction. An urgent search was then conducted for diplomats, rather than for men of military background. Again, the Kung family adapted to the new situation swiftly. They found that changes created no setbacks to their efforts to attain upward
mobility. They viewed changes of policy as another opportunity to benefit the family.

In order to satisfy the new need, the family instantly provided the government with a diplomat. According to the Chang-pien, Kung Shen-i first appeared as a diplomat in 960, when he was sent to the Sung court on a tributary mission. In 966, he was sent to deliver a special message, persuading the king of the Southern Han to serve the Sung dynasty as an overlord. Because of swift and appropriate adaptation to contemporary needs, Kung Shen-i advanced to the top level of the country's political elite, even though his family did not have any strong connections with the existing political and social order.

III, The End of the Southern T'ang and the Further Decline of the Southern Families in the Sung

In traditional China, the concept of karma was very

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347 Chang-pien, p. 20.
348 Lu-shu, chi 3: 4a.
349 Cheng Wen-pao includes Kung Shen-i in the category of famous commanders and generals in his Chiang-piao Chi. (c: 2a.) This reveals that Kung Shen-i built up his reputation by means of the military, and some contemporaries continued to identify him with the military group, in spite of the fact that he shifted to diplomacy in his later career. Of course, the military identification of Kung Shen-yi by his contemporaries implies that it was not easy for people to understand the overwhelmingly swift adaptation of Kung.
important. It was believed that blessings fell to the virtuous family, while disaster would fall on the vice-ridden family. 350

Interestingly, karma did seem to affect certain meritorious officials. For example, Hsu Wen and Chang Ching plotted to kill Yang Wo and take over the Wu administration. Chang soon experienced karmic retribution, as he was killed by Hsu Wen. The descendants of Hsu were wealthy and prosperous in the Southern T'ang, but the Hsu family subsequently met rapid decline in the Sung and some family members were so poor that they did not even have the means to be buried. 351

However, the decline of the descendants of the generals cannot be simply explained by karma, since the will of Heaven is difficult to discern. In fact, it was doubted whether Heaven would reward or punish people based on their virtue or vice.

Liu Jen-chan, celebrated for his loyalty, was forced to have his youngest son executed for treason. Although his two other sons were treated favorably by both the Later Chou and the Sung, the Liu family was not prominent in public office and gradually sank into obscurity. Ou-yang Hsiu once visited the residence of Liu Chin, father of Liu Jen-chan, in Ling-hsi:

350 Chiang Lin-chi (1005-1060), Li-chuan Pi-chi, Hsueh-hai Lui-pien ed., B: 15a; Shu-shui Chi-wen, p. 23.
351 Yuan-feng Lui-kao, p. 279.
There were historical relics by the side of the stream and it was said to be the residence of Liu Chin, the former general. Therefore, the uncommon stones laying on the stream were supposed to be his property. Liu was a dignified general in the usurped Wu. He started an insurrection with Yang Hsing-mi in Ho-fei and was known as a member of "The Thirty-six Heros". Liu was originally a fierce military man, but he appreciated the beauty of the unusual rocks and developed an effeminate taste. Could it be that Liu met with a stirring period during which he realized his wishes by achieving a meritorious deed and was thus puffed up with the appetite caused by being rich and noble? Liu anticipated that the pond, pavilion and gallery, as well as the rare plantation of matching rocks on his estate, would continue to be magnificent even today. But Liu's descendants were scattered commoners and some of them were still living by the side of the stream. I feel sorrowful at the transience of human affairs and am sorry that those pleasant rocks were deserted.

The author of the Ching-hsi Lin-hsia Ou-tan speculates that the reason why Ou-yang Hsiu writes about these relics in his essay, the Ling-hsi Shih-chi, is that he is worried that the rocks will be taken by others. Therefore, he cites the story of the Liu family's inability to keep the rocks forever as a moral lesson. Regardless of what motive Ou-yang Hsiu had in his mind when writing the article, it was clear that the Lius were unable to preserve their ancestor's residence, which vividly reflected the decline of the family.

Moreover, the Liu lineage ended during the era of the Southern Sung. The Pin-t'ui Lu records Lu Yu's own account in

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352 Ou-yang Wen-chung Kung Wen-chi, 301.

his Kan-chih Shih that the last descendent of Liu Jen-chan became a Taoist priest and died, childless, away from his hometown during the era of Shao-ching (1131-1162). The lineage of Liu Jen-chan was thus terminated. Lu Yu lamented the misfortune of the Liu family:

Based on the loyalty of Liu Jen-chan, if Heaven was going to reward him, what kind of reward would be appropriate for that? But since his lineage was terminated from then on, the will of Heaven was difficult to know. It was definitely deplorable."

The prosperity of the descendants of Chang Hsun in the Sung, once again, demonstrates that the rise and fall of a clan and family are apparently unrelated to karma. Compared to the descendants of his colleagues, Chang Hsun’s descendants were more prominent, and Chang Pi had long been praised for his generosity in helping his clan members and friends. The author of the Tao-shan Ch’ing-hua once passed through Chang-chou and stopped by the Lane of Chang Lang-chung (chang lang-

354 Chiao Yu-shih, Pin-t’ui Lu, Hsueh-hai Lui-pien ed., 7: 14a. However, the Pin T’ui-lu only mentions the death of the last Liu descendant during the era of Shao-ching, and the information about Liu’s lineage was not conclusive. Lu Yu claimed that he had gone to Shu in the period between the period of Chien-tao and Shun-hsi (1165-1189). In Cheng-tu, he claimed to have seen the certificate of appointment to the post of Military Commissioner of Tien-ping Chun, which was conferred on Liu Jen-chan. The certificate of appointment was collected by Mr. Chin, the magistrate of Tzu-t’ung. Mr. Chin mentioned that one of Liu’s descendants sold vegetables in the market of Hsin-an. Because he died away from his hometown with no children, Mr. Chin obtained the certificate of appointment. In other words, at least to Lu’s knowledge, it was undisputable that Liu’s lineage was at an end. (Lu-shu, chuan 10: 4ab.)

355 Lu-shu, chuan 10: 4ab.
chung hsiang). He saw that

the Chang's residence was magnificent, and the pavilions
and galleries were beautiful, as well as the trees which
rose to the sky. I was impressed by the scenery, and
thus made inquiry about the lineage of the dwellers.

After making this inquiry, he learned that Chang Pi had
followed Li Yu to go to Kai-feng in the early Sung. Chang
served in the Historiography Institute (Shih-kuan) during the
reign of Emperor Tai-tsung of the Sung and many guests
gathered in his house to eat. This event eventually came to
the attention of the Emperor.

One day, the Emperor asked Chang, "Why do you have so
many guests? What subject were you people talking
about?" Chang replied, "Your humble servant had many
relatives and friends sojourning in the capital. They
were poor, and destitute of food. While my salary was
more than enough to support the household expenditures,
my need for food was little. Therefore, they always
visited the house, and what I could provide were just
rice and vegetable soup. I was ashamed of the meager
foodstuffs, but they thought that the soup was good. It
was the reason why they always came, and I could not
refuse their visit." Seven days later, the Emperor sent
a "quick trotter" (k'uai-hsien chai) to go to Chang's
residence, after having observed that it was time for
them to eat. Meanwhile, Chang was eating with his
guests. The person took a place setting provided for a
guest from the table and presented it to the Emperor.
The food was just coarse rice and vegetable soup
contained in coarse earthenware. The Emperor was pleased
that Chang had been honest, and Chang's family was then
called "T'sai-keng Chang-chai" (The Vegetable Soup the
Chang Family). Chang had three sons, namely I-chih, Wen-
chih, and Cha-chih. All of them achieved the rank of
Vice Minister in ministries (lang-kuan). Even now, the
people living in Chang-chou call [the lane of] Chang's
residence Lane Chang Lang-chung (Chang Lang-chung
But Chang Pi's behavior was not beyond criticism. After Chin-ling was captured, Li Yu was so depressed by its collapse that he did not have the desire to amass wealth. He only kept a very few valuables, and bestowed gold on his intimate officials. Only Chang Pi did not accept it. Rather, he brought news of the affair to Tsao Pin and requested that the event be reported to the court. However, Tsao only sent the gold to the authorities because he realized that Chang was far too eager in his quest to gain a reputation for honesty and uprightness, and thus did not consent to his request. Evidently, in order to acquire reputation, Chang Pi had no hesitation to sacrifice his former master's security. Likewise, his visiting Li Yu's grave every Ch'ing-ming festival, donating his salary to Li Yu's offspring and treating relatives and friends to rice and vegetable soup were most likely performances made for the purpose of attaining reputation. Witnessing the prosperity of the Chang family, I can't help but sigh that if the means of preserving the family were correct and feasible, the family and clan would also be brought into prosperity, regardless of morality and loyalty.

A similar case is found in another family which was not

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357 *Chang-pien*, p. 353.
included within the bloc of meritorious officials. Cha Yuan-fang, the son of Cha Wen-hui, served as Palace Censor (*tien-chung shih-yu-shih*), and Administrator of Chuan-chou in the early Sung. Cha Tao (955-1018), his son, was Academician of Dragon Diagram Hall (*Lung-tu-ko shih-chih*).

Cha Tao was a man of honesty and virtue. But the behavior of Cha T’ao (937-1006), his cousin (*ts’ung-hsiung*), was different. Cha T’ao succeeded in the *ming-fa* examination, and served as Administrative Supervisor (*lu-shih ts’an-chun*) of Chang-chou. When the Southern T’ang was collapsed, Cha T’ao was appointed Aide of the Court of Judicial Review (*tai-li-szu cheng*), and from then on served in judicial posts.

He maintained the law without consideration of mercy, and was always unreasonable in applying penalty.

Cha T’ao had been fined one hundred ching of gold for his harshness in punishing criminals. While these two persons

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358 *Lu-shu, chuan* 2: 6b. The *Hou-te Lu* has a detailed record of Cha Tao’s moral behavior and benevolence. When he was going to take the civil service examinations, he was too poor to take the journey. The men of his clan collected thirty thousand cash, and sent him off. When he passed through Hua-chou, he visited Lu Weng, his father’s friend. At that time, Lu had already died, and the family had no money for the burial. In order to solve the hardship, Lu’s daughter was to be sold by her mother and older brother. Cha gave them all the money he had, and married Lu’s daughter to a good person. In another account, Cha’s colleague died, and his daughter was relegated to being a maidservant. Cha redeemed her, and married her to a member of literary clan. (Li Yuan-kang, Pai-chuan Hsueh-hai ed., 3: 16b-17a.) Therefore, "the gentry admired his moral act." (*Sung-shih*, p. 9880.)

359 *Sung-shih*, p. 9880.
were different in personal integrity, they were both concerned with preserving the clan.

The fall of Chin-ling caused many clans to wander. Most of them became poor and lost their office. Only the brothers of Cha tried their best to gather wealth to relieve their clansmen. Those who gathered for food numbered up to a hundred. When they attained protection, they simply transferred the favor to their clansmen. The basis of transfer was seniority, instead of degree of intimacy. Even for those with different surnames, the brothers still helped them augment their salaries and arranged marriages for them. This is why they were always poor. But it also made the Chas a prominent clan of Hai-ling, even in the Southern Sung. 360

Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, the will of heaven is by no means logical, mechanical, or foreseeable. In fact, it is totally beyond the scope of human anticipation. For example, some former officials of the Southern T'ang had tried their best to preserve their clans, but their families could not avoid falling into oblivion. 361

Whether human mistake or the will of Heaven, it was clear that the military clans and families which had risen to prominence during the era of Yang Hsing-mi experienced rapid

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360 Li-shu, chuan 2: 6b. Since Cha Yuan-fang's generation, the Cha family had already moved to Hai-ling.

361 Hsu Hsien used his salary to feed and house his orphaned and poor clan members as well as his friends, but his clan had greatly declined for no clan members served in the officialdom. Hsu Hsien was childless, while Hsu Ch'ieh had a descendent, who, known as Hsu Shih-lang, owned a tea house in Chin-ling. (Wang Chih, Mo-chi, Chih-pu-tsu-chai Ts'ung-shu ed., 30ab.) Evidently, Hsu Shih-lang engaged in a "mean livelihood" which was traditionally held in disdain by scholar-officials. The case was particularly ironic, for both Hsu Hsien and Hsu Ch'ieh were celebrated for their literary reputation and accomplishments.
decline in the Sung, except a few that underwent a profound degree of civil transformation and knew how to protect and preserve their clan members. But the number of such people was so small that even in the middle of the Sung, contemporaries had difficulty tracing the histories of the Wu and the Southern T'ang from the descriptions of the descendants of the great southern families. Once Ou-yang Hsiu visited the battlefield in Shu-chou where Huang-fu Hui and Emperor Tai-tzu of the Sung had fought a fierce war. He could not help but sigh in the Feng-lo-ting Chi,

Within a period of a hundred years, only the high mountain and clear water could be seen, while the "old timers" (i-lao), whom I wanted to ask about the region's history, had all died out. 362

CHAPTER FIVE: CULTURAL IMPACT OF CHIANG-NAN ON THE SUNG AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES OF FORMER SCHOLAR-OFFICIALS OF THE SOUTHERN T'ANG

I, Cultural Disparities Between the Southern T'ang and the Central Kingdom During the Five Dynasties

Traditionally, Chinese politicians stressed practicality, a virtue fully manifested in activities pertaining to dynastic existence and its perpetuation. When considering political systems to be adopted, they were most concerned about the systems' applicability toward and potential efficiency in addressing social and political issues. While changes were introduced in institutions throughout different periods, examples of gratuitous restoration of the past were quite rare. Putative cases of the restoration of ancient systems, in this sense, were basically superficial propaganda.

Conversely, however, the Chinese did exhibit great interest in restoring traditional rites and music, which had no obvious bearing on either current political or military administration. Restorations of the ancient systems were not used purely to fulfill politicians' personal satisfactions and fantasies. Rather, they were deliberate maneuvers designed to demonstrate the continuity of legitimacy (cheng-tung). Hsueh Chu-cheng mentions in the preface of the "Treatise of Music" (Yueh-shih) in the Chiu Wu-tai Shih:
The emperor in ancient times promulgated ritual and music, after imperial rule and accomplishments had been achieved. It was a way to serve both heaven and earth, as well as to harmonize relationships between human beings and their God. Consecutively, traditional rules were maintained.

Obviously, then, successive adoptions of and changes in ritual served to validate dynastic legitimacies.

In the minds of Sung scholar-officials, the period of the Five Dynasties was full of war and disturbance, leading to the decline of ritual and music. Comparatively, cultural development in China once again reached a zenith due to the implementation of the "sacred dynastic administration" (sheng-cheng) of the Sung. As Fan Chung-yen states,

363 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1923.

364 According to the "Treatise of Music" of the Sung-shih, during the chaotic period, "the rituals were out of rush creation, and could not serve as an example for the posterity." (p. 2937.) As for the loss of musical acumen, as well as the way of recital of ceremonial court music (ya-yueh) during the Five Dynasties, see Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1923. Nevertheless, the T'ang regulations and methods of administration did not entirely vanish in the beginning of the Five Dynasties, and people could still abide by some institutional regulations in spite of war and chaos. Therefore, Fei Kun regarded that if the contemporaries could comply with the T'ang institution, how come they could not prolong the dynastic existence? (Liang-hsi Man-chih) Moreover, some customary practices, which did not involve detailed regulations and rule, also survived in the Five Dynasties. Wang P'u (905-959) achieved the honor of Principal Graduate while Wang Jen-yu (880-956) was a chief examiner; Wang P'u then followed the custom of the disciple (men-sheng) traditionally required during the T'ang to pay respect to the chief examiner. Even after Wang P'u became the prime minister, he did not forget Wang Jen-yu: when he was on vacation, he would visit Wang, and they would chat all the day. (Shih-lin Shih-hua, cited in Tsung-hua, p. 166.) However, the small portion of ritual and music preserved by the Five Dynasties was incomparable to that lost during that period.
The royal family emerged at the end of the period of the Five Dynasties. It quelled the huge upheaval and outraced the group of powerful leaders. The territory was expanded on all sides to border ten thousand states. The dynasty then set up rites and regulations and applied them to the universe impartially. Countless people followed the rules submissively without resorting to violence and revolt. There was no more war in North China (chung-yuan) for ninety years.

The term "ninety years" covers the period from the beginnings of the dynasty to the reign of Emperor Jen-tsung (1010-1063, r. 1022-1063). But some "honest" scholar-officials pointed out that cultural achievement was not actually obtained in North China during this period. As Ch’ao I-tao (1059-1129) told Chu Pien (?-1144),

The cultural prosperity of the dynasty, from its establishment to the reign of Chao-ling (Emperor Jen-tsung of the Sung), were all derived from Chiang-nan: the Hsu brothers were famous for Confucian learning; the uncle and cousin of the Yang family (Yang Hui-chih 921-1000, and Yang I 974-1020) emerged to prominence, based on their literary works; Tiao kan and Tu Kao were appointed due to their familiarity with custom and regulations. As for Yen Shu, Prime Minister, and Ou-yang Hsiu, Junior Preceptor of the Heir Apparent (tai-tzu shao-shih), they were sublimely the gate of dragon (lung-men, i.e. champions) among their contemporaries. Law and order, as well as literary composition were brilliantly possessed, which enlarged the aroma of [our] sacred period (san-tai). In the period of Ch’ing-li (1041-1048) it was said that there were many able people, no less than those during the reign of Wu-hsuan (referring to Emperors Wu-tsung and Hsuan-tsung of the T’ang). All of them were from the south of the Yangtze River (ta-chiang, referring to the region of Chiang-nan). It was my profound realization that [in South China] the appearance of mountains and rivers, meandering and magnificent,

365 Fan Chung-yen (989-1052), Fan Chung-yen Chi, Chuan-sung Wen ed., 388: 21. Referring to the meaning of the passage, the term "chung-yuan" seems to cover the whole territories of the Sung.
could really inspire superior talent for the country.  

Thus, while the Sung's brilliant military strategies were instrumental in restoring tranquillity to China, their achievements in instituting rites, music and other kinds of cultural continuity were limited.

Since the Sung was established long after the downfall of the T'ang, the "old way" of administration and rituals had already receded into oblivion. Therefore, most Sung Scholar-officials were ignorant of the antecedent conventions.  

Examples of the absence of official ceremony (kuan-i) were abundant during the reign of Emperor Tai-tsu of the Sung.  

For instance, there were no attendants present during imperial audiences held on the first and the fifteenth days of every month wherein officials were received. When Emperor Tai-tsu worshipped in the ancestral hall during early Sung, ritual ceremonies had not yet been restored and even the traditional writing style of invocation was lost.  

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366 Chu Pien, Ch’u-yu Chiu-wen, Ts’ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch’u-pien ed., p. 8.

367 Ting-chin-kung Tan-lu, 14b.

368 Yao Ko (1183-1234), Kuei-yen Lu, Szu-pu Ts’ung-kan Hsu-pien ed., 1: 6b-7a.

369 Tien K’uang (1003-1061), Yu-lin Kung-i, Ts’ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch’u-pien ed., p. 23.

370 Emperor Tai-tsu ordered officials to compose models for ritual ceremonies and submit them to the court for consideration. The names of authors were concealed, while the texts were
Tai-tsu performed the sacrifice to heaven, there were few guides to follow in the ceremonies. Though some ceremonies had been revived and implemented, they were still insufficient in both quantity and quality. 371

Emperor Tai-tsu, unenthusiastic in promoting culture, further deteriorated the cultural defects in the north. According to the *Huang-chao Lui-yao*, the Emperor

restored tranquillity to heaven and earth by military accomplishment; thus he was not eager to appoint the literati to office. 372

Much to the embarrassment of the literati, Emperor Tai-tsu liked making fun of them. When he was about to extend the outer wall of Kai-feng, he went to the Gate Chu-chueh and drew up the construction plan in person. During the imperial visits, Chiao P’u was with him. The Emperor pointed at the sign over the gate, and asked Chiao,

Why it was not written simply as *Chu-chueh Men*, and what was the use of *chih*?

Chiao replied,

It was an auxiliary word (*yu-chu*).

The Emperor smiled and said,

*Chih, hu, che*, and *yeh*, what kind of affairs could they

transcribed by clerks. For details, see the *Yu-hu Ch’ing-hua*; the record is also included in *Sui-shih Kuang-chi*, compiled by Chen Yuan-tsing, Shih-wen-chuan-lou Ts’ung-shu ed., 14: 10ab.

371 *Yu-hu Ch’ing-hua*, 2: 4a.

372 *Huang-chao Lui-yao*, 1: 3a.
help?

He then ordered the auxiliary word removed. 373

However, Emperor Tai-tsu was an outstanding ruler and his style was quite flexible. Even though the Emperor ridiculed the literati, he appreciated their decorative and embellishing enhancement to the cause of dynastic credibility. 374 Therefore, Emperor Tai-tsu made attempts to restore cultural traditions probably out of political motivation aimed to highlight the legitimacy of the regime.

When Emperor Tai-tsu worshipped in the ancestral hall and saw some strange utensils like pien, fu and kuei, 375 he asked, "What are these?" The courtiers replied that they were ritual containers. The Emperor said, "How could my ancestors know about these?" He ordered the containers put away when

373 Hsiang-shan Yeh-lu, B: 18a; Yun-lu Man-ch’ao, 2: 13b-14a.

374 For example, when Emperor Tai-tsu performed the sacrifice to heaven, Lu To-sun, who served as Academician of Hanlin Academy (Han-lin Hsueh-shih) and concurrent Chief Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud (tai-pu ching), was his expert on ceremonies. Lu was able to give detailed and appropriate answers to questions of procedure and precedence. The Emperor, pleased with Lu’s erudition, said, "I should appoint the literati to be prime ministers." Afterwards, Lu was promoted to prominent position.

375 Pien was a splinter-basket with a cover, used to contain fruits offered in worship; Fu was a basket, square outside and round inside, used to hold boiled grains in state worship; Kuei was a square basket of bamboo holding grains used at sacrifice, feasts, etc. The kuei was also defined as a round vessel of wood and a square or round vessel of metal, although the wood vessel seems more correct. The above description is based on R.H. Matthew, Chinese-English Dictionary, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 287, 536, 721.
presenting ordinary food. After the ceremony, the Emperor told the officials to again set up the ritual containers and let the Confucian scholars practice the ceremony.

Till now, when worshipping in the imperial ancestral hall, ordinary dishes (ya-pang) were first to be presented. Afterwards, the ritual was performed.

Master Kang-chiêh praised the Emperor’s deeds, saying,

The way Emperor Tai-tsu dealt with rites could be said to have met the appropriateness of balancing the ancient and the present.

Besides rituals, Emperor Tai-tsu also paid attention to ceremonial and court music, restoration of which had begun in previous dynasties. Emperor Shih-tsung of the Later Chou had appointed Wang P’u to “implement rituals and music” (chih-li tso-yueh), one of his tasks being to examine and reconfigure the keyed tones. But Emperor Tai-tsu still felt that the keyed tones of ceremonial court music were both too high and unharmonious. He then ordered Ho Yen (933-988) to refit the key tones. The effect, however, was quite limited, because what Ho adjusted was still high by five tones compared with that of the T’ang. Evidently, in the process of restoring cultural traditions, Emperor Tai-tsu was always restricted by

376 Shao-shih Wen-chien Hou-lu, p. 117.
377 Mo-chi, 9b.
378 Sung-shih, 2937.
379 Huang-chao Lui-yao, 19: 1b-2a.
a number of obstacles, and thus unable to achieve optimal results.

Compared with Emperor Tai-tsu, Emperor Tai-tsung's achievements in promoting cultural traditions were much more outstanding. One of his achievements was to "restore the traditional official costume for officials, so as to serve as an example for the posterity". Besides such institutional restoration, Emperor Tai-tsung also encouraged morality in a society which, during the chaotic period spanning late T'ang and the Five Dynasties, had received scant moral teaching. In the early reign period Yang-hsi (984-987), the government ordered officials to observe an official mourning period. Apparently, promoting filial piety was an effort aimed at bolstering societal awareness of moral obligations and of teachings of the sages (ming-chiao).

Even though the Emperors in early Sung tried to restore the cultural traditions, the decline in the development of rites and music continued through the mid-Sung which signified that

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380 The adoption of the "fish pocket" (yu-tai), as a symbol of rank, was an example. (Kuei-yen Lu, 4: 5b-6a.)

381 During the reign period Chih-tao (995-997), an official could not support his mother, the Emperor granted him money and ordered him to support her. Another report indicated that an official from Shu served in North China, but his father, left at the native place, could not support himself. The Emperor, astonished, issued an imperial rescript blaming unfilial officials and ordered the officials to report those unable to support their parents to the court. Consequently, the imperial rescript became a law. (Yuan-feng Lui-kao, p. 314.)
the imperial efforts did not yield good result. 382

In order to remedy the situation, the Sung people sought the lost traditions everywhere (li-shih chiu-chu-yeh). As illustrated in the Sung-ch’uang Pai-shuo,

In the nine prefectures of Yin-yun, the style of capping and coat was similar to that seen in the T’ang. There were many things unchanged, like dice (shuang-lu) in gambling, but dice games had already gone through many changes in China. 383

The prefectures in Yin-yun had been dominated by the Liao which was so formidable in military strength that early Sung had no chance to recover their lost territories.

Another enclave of traditional culture was the Southern T’ang. 384 In the Ma-shu, there is a vivid description of this

382 As Han Chi (1008-1075) wrote, "From the late T’ang and the Five Dynasties, there were successive wars and perpetual chaos, rites and music were abandoned. Therefore, when the families of scholar officials practiced annual worship in the ancestral hall, they just performed whatever was convenient and could not slightly restore the traditional way." (An-yang Chi, Szu-k’u Ch’uan-shu ed., 22: 9b.)


384 Of course, the role played by the Southern T’ang in Chinese history was not just confined to cultural preservation. In 1040, Transport Commissioner-in-chief (tu chuan-yun chih) of Shen-hsi sent a memorandum to the court, requesting that he be allowed to manufacture twenty to thirty thousand suits of paper armor (chih-chia), based on the pattern of the Southern T’ang. Soldiers defending the walled cities in the region under his jurisdiction were to be equipped with this armor. The court, ratifying the request, ordered him to use the outdated account note and book in production. (Shu-shui Chi-wen, p. 130.) Further, the Southern T’ang had played a brilliant diplomatic role in dealing with the Khitans. "When the Chin Dynasty served the Khitan [Emperor] as father, the Khitan [Emperor] served the Southern T’ang [Emperor] as an older
aspect,

Alas! when the Western Chin was ruined, barbarism prevailed in North China while the traditional costume and ritual were all preserved in the South. During the chaotic period of the Five Dynasties, the rites and music were abandoned, and literary works lost. But the Confucian costumes and books were prevalent in the Southern T'ang. Was it the case that the cultural heritage was not actually terminated, and that Heaven had arranged a place for it to have a continued existence? Otherwise, the rites and music of the sage kings would have become extinct. Under successive rulers in the Southern T'ang who were fond of Confucianism, the Confucian school showed a splendid record of prosperity.

Chang Fang-ping also said,

In the chaotic period of the Five Dynasties, China disintegrated into pieces. Chiang-nan was a small domain of usurpation where there were many literary officials. 

brother, for even barbarians recognized the splendor of the T'ang. Therefore, when the Khitans heard that T'ang descendants were in Chiang-nan, they still treated them courteously, and dared not put the Southern T'ang equal to other countries [which submitted to the Khitans]. The Southern T'ang was very proud of this treatment. (Lu-shu, chuan 15: 5b.) In other words, the Southern T'ang enjoyed a diplomatic superiority over the dynasties in North China, particularly that of the Chin, which had been forced to serve the Khitans as its vassal. To most Sung people, the conspicuous achievements of the Southern T'ang still rested on their preservation and continuation of traditional culture, despite the above achievements.

Ma-shu, 13: 1ab.

Lo-chuan Chi, 39: 30b. Among the numerous literary officials of greater and lesser distinction in the Southern T'ang, Han Hsi-t'sai, Chiang Wen-wei, Hsu Ch'ieh, Hsu Hsien, Kao Yueh, P'an Yu, T'ang Yueh, and Chang Chi were undoubtedly the most outstanding. Because of the abundance of famous literary officials in Chiang-nan, some Sung scholar-officials couldn't help but praise, "Within the period of thirty years (referring to the reign period of the Li regime) in Chiang-tso (i.e. Chiang-nan), the culture revealed the aroma of the reign period Yuan-ho (806-820)."
Due to continuing efforts of the rulers of the Southern T’ang, its level of cultural achievement exceeded that of other countries.

In addition to rites and music, the Southern T’ang also preserved certain art forms (tsai-i) not generally found in North China, of which the royal cookery of the T’ang was an example. In terms of variety of foods and their exquisite preparation, the imperial banquet of the Five Dynasties did not compare to even the routine household banquet offered by officials, let alone that of the Southern T’ang court, which inherited the legacy of T’ang imperial cookery.

During the Later T’ang, Hsu Chih-kao invited the northern literati to emigrate en masse to the south. By that time, the T’ang had been defunct for almost twenty years. From among those cultural purveyors to the south, the following two people were most important in shaping the cultural feature of

(Ma-shu, 13: lab.) Yuan-ho is the reign period of Emperor Hsien-tsung of the T’ang, which has long been regarded as the prime time of the dynasty. As for details on how the rulers in Chiang-nan promoted and preserved culture, see Tiao-chi Lieh-tan, p. 15; Chih-hua-tze, p. 35.

387 For example, a royal chef in the late T’ang accompanied an eunuch to Chiang-nan. The eunuch fled when he heard that Tsui Yin massacred eunuchs in Chang-an. The royal chef then stayed in Chiang-nan and served the Wu. When Hsu Chih-kao set up the Southern T’ang, he relied upon the chef for preparation of imperial dishes; all his cooked food had the flavor of the prosperity of the Central Kingdom. (Lu-shu, chuan 14: 2a; Chiang-nan Yu-t’sai, p. 14.)

388 Ch’ing-i Lu, 3: 29b.
Chiang-huai:

Han Hsi-t’sai, a native of Pei-hai, lived as a recluse in Sung Mountain in his earlier years. During the reign period Tung-kuang (923-926), he obtained his chin-shih degree. Han Kuang-szu, his father, had been Vice Military Commissioner of Ping-lu. The garrisoned army expelled Fu Chi, the Military Commissioner, and recommended Han as Deputy Commander (liu-hou). When Emperor Ming-tsung (867-933, r. 926-930) came to the throne, he suppressed the military revolt and put Han to death. Han Hsi-t’sai, his son, fled to Chiang-nan in 926. 389 Since he had served in the officialdom for some time, he was familiar with the rules of administration and etiquette in the north. Thus, in Chiang-nan, most of his opinions were valued by the rulers.

Whenever the breach of etiquette in ceremonies and regulations pertaining to weddings and funerals took place, he would correct them. His writing style for imperial edicts and rescripts was elegant and refined, which revealed the aroma of reign period Yucui. 390

The Ma-shu also records Han Hsi-t’sai’s familiarity with rules of etiquette and formality noting that at the funeral of Hsu Chih-kao, Li Ching appointed Han, who was originally serving as Vice Director of the Bureau of Forestry and Crafts (yu-pu yuan-wei-lang) and Senior Compiler of the Historiography

389  Lu-shu, chuan 9: 2b.

390  Hsiang-shan Yeh-lu, C: 18a.
Institute (shih-kuan hsiu-chuan), to take charge of the rituals by serving as Erudite of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (tai-chang po-shih). At this time, Chiang Wen-wei was in charge of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (Tai-chang Szu). Han and Chiang shared certain views; but the posthumous title and the name of the late Emperor's temple were decided by Han. 391

Chiang Wen-wei, a native of Chien-chou, was renowned for his erudition and literary work. He received his chin-shih degree during the regime of Emperor Ming-tsung, and was appointed Inspector of the Postal Relay Stations (kuan-i hsun-kuan) of Ho-nan Fu. Dismissed due to a coup involving Li Tsung-jung, the son of Emperor Ming-tsung, Chiang then fled to Chiang-nan. 392

At that time, when the Southern T'ang had only rudimentary rules of etiquette and ceremony, Chiang formulated ceremonies relating to imperial audience, ancestral worship, and banquet, and submitted these to the court. Ceremonial regulations were thus established. When Hsu Chih-kao died, Li Ching, deferential to Chiang's familiarity with rites and knowledge of funerals, appointed the latter Vice-Director of the Ministry of Works (kung-pu yuan-wei-lang) and Supervisor of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (p'an Tai-chang Szu), in order to implement standardization of the funeral ceremony. The funeral rite was accordingly worked out by Chiang and his colleagues. 393

The Later T'ang always presented itself as attempting to

391 Ma-shu, 13: 1b-2a.
392 Lu-shu, chuan 7: 4b.
393 Ma-shu, 13: 4b-5a.
revive the rule of the imperial Li family during the T'ang and tried its best to restore T'ang ceremonies and institutions. However, by the time the Later T'ang took control of North China, it had already been almost twenty years since the collapse of the T'ang dynasty, thus making the restoration of the authentic T'ang system of rite and music almost impossible.\(^{394}\)

Moreover, the royal family of the Later T'ang practically originated from the Turkish Shato group. After a long period of structural changes and developments aimed at catering to

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\(^{394}\) While the Later T'ang took pride in continuing old institutions, as well as other traditional T'ang rites and music, most traditional forms were corrupted by contemporaries and were lost. As recorded in the *Chiu Wu-tai Shih*, when Emperor Chuang-tsung of the Later T'ang emerged from the wilderness of the frontier, what he possessed for entertainment was merely the barbarized lewd songs of Cheng which were popular in frontier region (*pien-pu cheng-sheng*). Authentic court music was almost non-existent. During the reigns of Emperors Chuang-tsung and Ming-tsung, no musicians were able to replicate traditional rhythms of musical instruments played in ancestral hall. (*Chiu Wu-tai Shih*, p. 1923.) In addition, court ceremony had become corrupt. In 928, there was a change in ceremonies of imperial audience insisting that all officials, including Prime Ministers supervising the array (*ya-pan tsai-hsia*) , Secretariat Receptionists (*t'ung-shih she-jen*), and attendants taking arms beyond the gate, be required to bow in the imperial audience. (Wang P'u, *Wu-tai Hui-yao*, Shanghai: Ku-chi Chu-pan-she, 1978, p. 93.) But the change, contradictory to traditional ceremony, was criticized by Chang Chao (894-972), an expert on rituals and ceremony, in 944. According to Chang Chao, the responsibility of the prime minister who supervised the array was to stand in place solemnly watching the practice of the court ceremony, to observe whether breach of etiquette occurred or not. If required to bow, how could an official carry out this task? (*Wu-tai Hui-yao*, pp. 93-4.) Therefore, it is comprehensible that what the Southern T'ang obtained from the Later T'ang were not necessarily the most authentic rites and music adopted in previous dynasties.
practical needs, the polity of the Later T'ang became a mixture of barbaric customs and military autocracy. Therefore, although the Later T'ang claimed to restore the old system of the T'ang, the only thing they really restored was court etiquette, which could never affect the existing political and military infrastructure. In other words, the restoration of rituals and institutions was more decorative than functional for the administration. When the former officials of the Later T'ang served in the south, all they brought to the region were distorted replicas of the etiquette rules created by the Later T'ang.

Since Hsu Chih-kao's territory was confined to the Yangtze area, he did not know how the administration of the T'ang dynasty actually functioned. Unable to judge the validity of the descriptions presented by the scholar-officials from the north, he gave credence to what they told him by adopting their opinions as guidelines in running his institutions. Under these circumstances, the distorted and contrived "old system of the T'ang dynasty" obtained a foothold in the South and eventually served as the basis of the "rejuvenation of the T'ang dynasty" advocated by Hsu Chih-kao.

Although the Southern T'ang did not inherit truly authentic traditions or uncorrupted ceremonies, the resulting hybrid of traditional rules with new elements was still better than nothing at all. After the collapse of the Southern T'ang,
Chiang-nan immediately became the resource from which the Sung restored its depleted rituals and ceremonies.

Chiang-nan also contributed culturally in the collection and collation of books. The Southern T'ang's excellence in book collection resulted, in addition to the efforts exerted by the rulers, from the assiduity in literary work by both sojourning and indigenous literati. By contrast, the collection of books in the north, due to civil war and foreign invasion, was far inferior to that of Chiang-nan. As recorded in the Chun-chu Chi-wen,

Since the chaos in the Chin, the Khitans transported valuables and books from North China to the north.

395 For example, Chu Tsung-to, a well-educated person from Ch'ing-chou, liked collecting books. On sojourning in Chin-ling, he wrote 1,000 chuan of the Hung-chien Hsueh-chi, 1,000 chuan of the Chuan-shu Li-ts'ao, and a few chuan of the Chi-shu, all of which were widely circulated. (Chiang-piao Chi, B: 5b.)

396 Cheng Chu, Lin-tai Ku-shih, Szu-k'u Ch'uan-shu ed., 1: 2a.

397 Ho Yuan (1077-1145), Chun-chu Chi-wen, Hsueh-ching T'ao-yuan Pen ed., 5: 4a. "North" refers to the domain of Khitan. Of course, it is unfair to assert that the Central Kingdoms had done nothing worth mentioning here in regard to the circulation of books. Prior to the T'ang, there was no painting, and the books were of a transcribed version. In 932, however, "Feng Tao (882-954) and Li Wei, Prime Ministers, requested that Tien Min, who was serving as Supervisor of the Directorate of Education (p'an Kuo-tzu-chien), be appointed to edit, collate and print the Five Classics, as preparation for their sale. The court approved the request. Therefore, even in the chaotic period, the circulation of the Classics was very wide." (Shao Pai-wen, Shao-shih Wen-chien Hou-lu, Ts'ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch'u-pien ed., p. 29.) But the contribution was only confined to the circulation of the Classics, and it could not solve the problem of the scattering and loss of other kinds of books.
Therefore, the official collection of books was scanty in the early period of the Northern Sung, while the collection remained substantial in Chiang-nan.

The Southern T'ang, which had dedicated itself to the collection of books, eventually lost them to the north. After Chin-ling was captured, Emperor Tai-tsu of the Sung ordered Lu Kuei-hsiang, who served as Librarian of the Heir Apparent (tai-tze hsien-ma), to go there to send the books possessed by the Southern T'ang to Kai-feng. Some primary sources compiled by Sung scholars avoided mentioning this event or diluted the fact about it. According to the Lin-tai Ku-shih,

Emperor Tai-tsung was fond of Confucian learning, and issued successive imperial edicts searching for books. Books from the four corners reappeared and they were collected for the national library in just a few years.

In 988, Emperor Tai-tsung filled up the Imperial Archives (mi-ko), which was newly established in the Historiography Institute, with more than 10,000 chuan of books chosen from the Three Institutes (san-kuan). As for the sources of books collected from the Three Institutes, the Lin-tai Ku-shih claims vaguely that they were obtained by Emperor Tai-tsung's search, but does not mention books conscripted involuntarily

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398 Yung-chai Sui-pi, Wu-pi, 7: 3b.
399 Chang-pien, p. 354.
400 Lin-tai ku-shih, 1: 2a.
from various states. The Lin-tai Ku-shih's description, however, distorts historical fact. The Chang-pien records that during the Chien-lung (960-963) period,

The books collected in the Three Institutes were only around 12,000 chuan. The Sung suppressed various states and acquired all of their books. Most of these books came from Shu and Chiang-nan; the Sung obtained 13,000 chuan from Shu, and more than 20,000 chuan from Chiang-nan. In addition, Emperor Tai-tsung officially encouraged people to contribute their books. Therefore, the books scattered under heaven were again gathered in the Three Institutes, and the official collection of books turned into a job well done.

Obviously, the major source of books was from various subjugated countries. In 978, when Emperor Tai-tsung visited the Institute for the Veneration of Literature to review books,

He allowed princes and prime ministers to read and make inquiries. He also summoned Liu Ch'ang (943-980) and Li Yu to join the gathering, and asked them to read whatever they liked. The emperor asked Li, "I heard that you liked reading when you were in Chiang-nan, and many books here were originally your property. So what have you read lately?"

The record cited above further proves that these books, originally stored in Chiang-nan, played a significant role in the completion of the Sung collection.

In the mind of Sung scholars, the value of books from Chiang-nan was much higher than those from other countries:

401 Ibid., 1: 3b.
402 Chang-pien, p. 422.
403 Ibid., p. 423.
After the conquest of Chiang-nan, Emperor Tai-tsu granted the Han-lin Academy 3,000 chuan of books, all of them published with excellent paper and calligraphy. Most of them were old editions, published prior to the T'ang, and some were collated by Hsu Ch'ieh.  

The Ma-shu also has the following record,

Most of the books collected from Chin-ling were precisely collated, and perfectly edited. They were quite different from the ones stored in other countries. Han Hsuan-tzu traveled in Lu, and realized the essence of the Chou. Lu was not supposed to be able to maintain the Chou rites, yet the rites had been pristinely preserved by Lu. Lu's deeds could be claimed to be close to the "Path of Principle" (tao), and what was the collection of books by the Southern T'ang different from that?  

In summary, Sung culture, in terms of the collection of books, flourished after the conquest of various states, particularly those of Southern T'ang.  

Food, drink and lifestyle from Chiang-nan were appreciated and imitated by the Sung scholar-officials. T'ao Ku, a Sung official, was extremely fond of eating a kind of confectionery named as "Mixture of Cloud and Flower" (yun-ying ch’ao), which was introduced by Cheng Wen-pao, a former official of the Southern T'ang. Since Tea was favored by scholar-officials

404 Chin-p’o I-shih, cited by Huang-chao Lui-yuan, 30: 10ab; 31: 4ab; 50: 1a.

405 Ma-shu, 23: 2a.

406 Fa-tieh Pu-hsi Tsa-shuo, 1a; Shu-wen, p. 19.

407 According to the recipe, the refined part of lotus, water caltrop, taro, seeds of waterlily, water chestnut, caladium, and lily were steamed, then dried out in the wind. Shortly after, the steamed stuff was pounded in a stone-mill, to refine it. Sugar from Szechwan (ch’uan-t’ang) and honey were added, and the stuff
and had already become a daily beverage in Chiang-nan, knowledge about it was refined. For instance, T'ang Yueh, another former official of the Southern T'ang, composed "An Eulogy for Tea" (Shen-pai Sung, shen-pai refers to tea):

> When drinking, there is a feeling of sternness (shen-ian) in one's teeth. After a long time, the feeling of serenity (shen-ian) spreads to the four limbs.

T'ao Ku praised T'ang's description, saying,

> If T'ang's combination of two senses in one term doesn't inspire a transcendent state (ching-chieh) about tea, who else can?" 408

Extravagance in techniques of holding banquets (p'ai-ch'ang) such as the lifting of utensils by human bodies (ju t'ai-pang) enjoyed by the officials in Chiang-nan, were also widely imitated by the Sung. 409 Fashion in the Sung was still

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408 Ch'ing-i Lu, 4: 20a. Owing to the importance of tea, the government of the Southern T'ang assigned Hsu Lu, a prominent courtier, to take charge of the tea bureau established in Chien-yang.

409 Sun Cheng served in Chiang-nan for twenty years, and was promoted to Minister of Works (szu-kung). Being wealthy, he had an extravagant life style. His food was not served on a table, but from maidservants holding dishes individually, waiting on him in a ring. It was called ju-t'ai-pang, and many contemporaries imitated his way. (Hsin Wu-tai Shih, p. 365; Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1733.) The Meng-hsi Pi-tan records that Shih Man-ching (994-1041) once drank with a wealthy neighbor. In the banquet, there were more than ten maidservants holding dishes, fruits and musical instruments. Their costumes and appearance were beautiful and splendid. One
influenced by the Southern T’ang more than a hundred years after the conquest of Chiang-nan. At the end of the Li regime, both officials and commoners in Chin-ling liked green-colored clothes. In the process of dyeing, the cloth was exposed to night dew, thus making the color brighter. Contemporaries called it the "green color of Heavenly water" (tien-shui pi). 410 Curiously, around one hundred and fifty years after the collapse of the Southern T’ang, such kind of color regained its popularity in the Sung, because "the contemporaries were eager to imitate the lifestyle of the Southern T’ang". 411

Since the cultural development of the Southern T’ang was far superior to that of the north, the southern rulers and scholar-officials always held the Central Kingdom in disdain. Li Ching once revealed his contempt to Wang Chung-ling, a northerner serving in Chiang-nan, saying,

From ancient times to now, the number of literati in Chiang-pei (i.e. the region north of the Yangtze River)

maidservant poured wine and presented. After the serving of wine, there was music playing, while the maidservants stood in front holding dishes. After the meal, they stood on the sides. "Those living in the capital called it juan-pang." (Meng-hsi Pi-tan, 9: 5b-6a.) The Pin-t’ui Lu associates the records in Hsin Wu-tai Shih and Meng-hsi Pi-tan with each other, and asserts that juan-pang originated from ju-tai-pang. (Pin-t’ui Lu, 2: 12b.)

410 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 3: 10a.

411 Tieh-wei-shan Tsung-tan, 3: 5ab.
was not as great the number presiding in Chiang-nan.  

Even after the loss of the Huai region and the sharp decline in dynastic strength, scholar-officials in Chiang-nan did not lose faith in their culture. In fact, they were ashamed of adopting the reign title (nien-hao) of the north. Chiang-nan's adoption of the calendar of the Central Kingdom was merely a nominal diplomatic gesture. Rather, the sexagenary cycle (Chia-tzu) as a unit for recording years was widely pervasive in Chiang-nan. Evidence of this is seen in T'ou-to Temple of O-chou, where a stone tablet, erected in 718, of Wang Chien-ch'i of the Southern Ch'i is located. Han Hsi-t'sai composed the inscription on the back of the tablet (pei-yin), and Hsu Ch'ieh wrote an inscription on the obverse. At the end of the latter's inscription, it was stated that the inscription was written "in the year of chi-su of the T'ang". Chi-su refers to the second year of the reign period Kai-pao

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412 Chiang-piao Chi, B: 3a.

413 I-shu Chi, included in the Lu-yu Chi, pp. 2441-2. Abstinence from the use of the reign title of the Central Kingdom was also apparent in the prefectures, which were previously under the rule of the Southern T'ang. As recorded in the Lang-ch'en Tzu, there was a picture of Hsu P'u-t'i (Bodhisattva) in the T'ung-lin Temple located in Lu-chou. The inscription states that the picture was "printed by Wang Han, a woodman, in the year of wu-ch'en," which referred to the first year of the reign period Kai-pao (965). The Lan-ch'en Tzu further states that scholar-officials were ashamed of using the reign title of the Central Kingdom. Therefore, most of the tablets in temples located in Chiang-nan did not use it, but only sexagenary cycle. (Ma Yung-ching, Lang-ch'en Tzu, Yu-hsueh Ching-wu ed., 1: 1b.)
In yet another example of condescension, some scholar-officials in Chiang-nan slandered the natural features of the geography of the north. Chang Chi, sent on a tributary mission to Kai-feng, returned to Chiang-nan where he composed ten poems slandering the scenery of the Sung Capital. Among the poems, there was a sentence inserted to please Li Yu depicting Kai-feng as "a mass of ash". 414

After the downfall of the Southern T'ang, some former officials, still proud of their cultural superiority, despised the Sung. When Hsu Hsien moved to Kai-feng,

He laughed heartily at the scholar-officials wearing fur in winter, saying, "After the war and chaos, the Central Kingdom did not change their fashions. There were many people covering themselves with blankets and wearing furs; it was really horrible." One day, when he went to the court, he saw Wu Shu, his son-in-law, also wearing a fur. When Hsu returned, he summoned Wu and reprimanded him, "You were a scholar-official, why did you imitate that!" Wu replied, "There was heavy frost and it was bitter cold in the morning; many people in the court were wearing furs." Hsu said, "Scholar-officials, who maintain their integrity, do not wear them." He was talking about himself.

Later Hsu Hsien was demoted to Hsin-p'ing, a county of Pin-chou. Although the place was cold, Hsu stubbornly insisted on maintaining his fashion principles. Consequently, he died of diarrhoea in cold weather.

Yang Wen-kung (Yang I) recorded Hsu Hsien's case. Hsu's

414 Huang-chao Lui-yao, 74: 8b.
II, Cultural Admiration and Vindication by North China

Prior to the downfall of the Southern T'ang, Chiang-nan scholar-officials, greatly admired, enjoyed widely circulated literary reputations in the north. For example, T’ang Yueh, serving as Secretariat Drafter, was ordered by Li Ching to compose the inscription on a tablet erected in the Hsiao-hsien Temple of Yang-chou (Yang-chou Hsiao-hsien-szu Pei). Emperor Shih-tsung of the Later Chou stopping at that temple during his military campaigns praised the inscription. Further, during the war, imperial edicts of the Southern T'ang, for the most part composed by T’ang Yueh, were particularly refined, redolent of literary refinement, and situationally appropriate. Whenever Emperor Shih-tsung read them, he showed admiration. At that time, literary courtiers of the Later Chou, like Shen Yu and Ma Shih-yuan, were all transferred to other posts due to their comparatively unsatisfactory performances. After the war, T’ang Yueh, sent as an envoy to present tribute, was treated with additional courtesy by

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415 Anonymous, Ai-iih-chai Tsung-chao, Shou-shan-ko Ts’ung-shu ed., 5: 9a-10b. Hsu Hsien had also revealed his disgust with the bustling noise outside the place where officials waited for imperial audience (tai-lou yuan) caused by the sales of noodles and porridge by peddlers. He frowned and said, "It was really like an encampment!" For details, see Ting Wei (965-1037), Ting-chin-kung Tan-lu, Pai-chuan Hsueh-hai ed., 3a.
Emperor Shih-tsung as a gesture respectful of T’ang’s literary ability. 416

Definitely, the Later Chou obtained military victory over the Southern T’ang, but met a complete defeat culturally. Even the military men of the Later Chou had the similar observation. When told by Emperor Shih-tsung about the victory in Tzu-chin Mountain, Ch’i Ts’ang-chen, a general, replied,

The military merits of Your Majesty is incomparable in recent times, but the literary virtue is not yet glorified.

After hearing, the Emperor nodded signifying the imperial agreement with the comment. 417

Scholar-officials of the Southern T’ang, already well respected in the north, gained even greater popularity and respect during early Sung. When sent as an envoy to Chiang-nan, Li Mu (928-984), a Sung official, met with Hsu Ch’ieh, Hsu Hsien’s brother. Impressed by Hsu Ch’ieh’s scholarly appearance, he could not help but sigh, "He was the kind of

416 Yang Wen-kung Tan-yuan, quoted by the Huang-chao Lui-yao, 40: 8ab. Another scholar-official appreciated by the north was Feng Yen-lu. After he became a captive during the Later Chou, he was appointed as Chief Minister of the Court of the Imperial Treasury (tai-fu ching) During his three years service in Kai-feng, he often amused himself with wine and the exchange of poems with scholar-officials. Frequently, he composed literary works, all of which gained wide circulation. (Hsiao-hsu Chi, p. 279.)

417 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1705.
The literary reputation of Feng Yen-ssu had also spread to the north. His versed essay (tz’u) was extolled as refined, peaceful and mild. Even if it was placed in an ancient collection of tunes (ku yueh-fu), he would not feel abashed.

Further, Tiao Kan was among those appreciated by the Sung scholar-officials:

Though he served in an usurped regime (i.e. the Southern T’ang), his name was widely known in the north because of his refinement and personal integrity.

Once Emperor Tai-tsu of the Sung ordered Li Yu to write a letter to persuade Liu Chang to surrender to the Sung; Li Yu then ordered P’an Yu, his intimate subordinate, to draft the letter. P’an wrote several thousand words in a very

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418 Lu-shu, chuan 2: 4a. Erh-lu refers to the brothers of Lu Chi and Lu Yun, who were famous men of letters in the Southern Dynasties. It is also recorded in the Cheng-shih that the "Three Hsu" (san-hsu) shocked the central kingdom by their erudition. At that time both Hsu Yen-hsiu, his father, and Hsu Ch’ieh, his brother, had already died. As for the erudition of Hsu Yen-hsiu, see the Ch’ing-hsien Tsa-chi (Wu Ch’u-hou, Pai-hai ed., 7: 5ab.) The Yun-lu Man-chao mistakes Hsu Yen-hsiu for Hsu Hsien in the description of the latter’s erudition. Hsu Hsien’s reputation seemed higher than that of his younger brother in the mind of the Sung scholar-officials, because Hsu Ch’ieh died before the downfall of the Southern T’ang while Hsu Hsien served in the Sung. Subsequently, many scholar-officials became Hsu Hsien’s disciples and they thus praised his reputation. (Shih-lin Yen-yu, 10: 16ab.)


420 Lo-chuan Chi, 39: 26ab.
persuasive and refined style. As a result, the letter was praised by Sung scholar-officials as "definitely a contemporary masterpiece". Apart from wide circulation in Chiang-nan, copies of P'an's letter were collected and valued highly by many literati in the Central Kingdom.

After the collapse of the Southern T'ang, scholar-officials from the south exerted an even greater cultural impact on the Sung. Indigenous scholar-officials of early Sung were generally poorly educated. Further, their militant, heroic and barbaric demeanor fell short of the image of refinement and grace of their southeastern counterparts. Thus, the dialogue among prominent officials, full of vulgarisms and ignorance, sometimes embarrassed Emperor Tai-tsu.

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421 Erh-lao-t'ang Tsa-chih, p. 18.

422 Huang-chao Lui-yao, 40: 7a.

423 Hsi-ch'ing Shih-hua, cited by the Tsung-hua, p. 375. I am not going to assert that all scholar-officials in the Central Kingdom were entirely ignorant of cultural tradition and successive changes in rites and music. For instance, Chang Chao was still familiar with the ceremony of offering captives; (Yu-hu Ch'ing-hua, 2: 5b.) Han P'u, the descendent of Han Hsiu (673-740), was erudite and familiar with the matter at court and institutions, as well as the great clans in the T'ang. Because he was well-informed, he was praised as a "contemporary living dictionary" (chin-tai ju-pu). (Huang-chao Lui-yuan, 59: 11b.) Tou I (914-966) was famous for strictly complying with family discipline. (Tsepei Yu-tan, Chih-pu-tsu-chai Ts'ang-shu ed., B: 22b-23a.) Also some clans still complied with the traditional way of rite. The clan of Lady Li was famous for family discipline since the T'ang. It also adopted the traditional ritual and ceremony in worshipping. (Chi-nan Chi, 7: 22a.) However, only a few scholar-officials were able to perform these.
Among these northern scholar-officials in the early Sung, there was a general belief that T’ao Ku and Tou I ranked first and second highest nationally in literary reputation. But these two esteemed persons could not match most southern scholar-officials in terms of erudition. Another indication of the intelligence of Southern T’ang scholar-officials was revealed in dealing with superstitions. Unlike their more gullible northern counterparts, Southern T’ang literati were quick to demystify superstitions.

In terms of the image of refinement and grace, the Sung scholar-officials were once again inferior to their

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424 Ting Chin-kung Tan-lu, 6a.

425 Prior to the downfall of the Southern T’ang, T’ao Ku and Tou I participated unknowingly in a simultaneous competition with scholar-officials in chiang-nan for extent of erudition. When asked about matters such as reign titles, T’ao and Tu knew only that Chien-te had been used in the Later Shu, while the scholar-officials of the Southern T’ang were able to trace back to the period of Fu Kung-yu (?-624). For details, see the Hsi-t’ang-chi Chi-chiu Shu-wen, pp. 52-3.

426 For example, during the T’ang, the idols erected in the temples of Ta-ku Mountain and Hsiao-ku Mountain were beautiful female deities, because people realized that the character "ku" referred to "lady". (Pei-meng So-yen, 12: 4a.) Scholar-officials of the Southern T’ang understood the meaning of "ku" more correctly that it just referred to "solitude." The southern government then replaced the beautiful idols with the ordinary status of local deities (tu-ti). However, the Sung once again returned the female idol to the temple in Hsiao-ku Mountain. (Ou-yang Hsiu, Kuei-tien Lu, Hsueh-ching T’ao-yuan ed., 2: 20a.) In this case, even Sung scholar-officials admitted that the stupidity and carelessness of the Sung "were worse than that of the Southern T’ang". (Neng-kai-chai Men-lu, 5: 14a-15a.)
counterparts in Southeast China, because most of them used to be militant, heroic and undaunted. As a matter of fact, such kinds of image were the point of admiration and even the criteria used to judge one’s acumen and prospect of career in early Sung. When Chang Ch’i-hsien was still a commoner, he was broad-minded and of a free and relaxed manner. Both his appetite and gluttony were so impressive, however, that even bandits couldn’t help, but sigh,

You were really a stuff for the prime minister.
Otherwise, how could you not be restricted by trivial affairs of deportment as such! \(^{27}\)

Because Chang’s immense appetite for food continued after he entered officialdom, people said in astonishment,

Those enjoying immense wealth and rank should be different from the ordinary people. \(^{28}\)

Among the "militarized" scholar-officials in early Sung, Liu Kai (947-1000) was most notorious for his rudeness and barbarism. Because his family was wealthy, he had developed a penchant for selecting acquaintances by means of giving them charity. Perpetually restrained by his paternal uncle who

\(^{27}\) Liu Fu, *Ch’ing-so Kao-i*, (Shanghai: Ku-tien Wen-hsueh Chupan-she, 1958), p. 113.

\(^{28}\) Kuei-tien Lu, 1: 15ab. Another intellectual with militant and heroic image, admired by the contemporaries, is Chang Yung. He was public-spirited in youth and learned the art of fencing and valued impeccable comportment. Driven by his pursuit of perceived righteousness, Chang killed a treacherous servant who threatened bringing the case of bribery before an official as a means to marry his master’s daughter. (*Yu-hu Ch’ing-hua*, 4: 8b.)
meddled in his affairs and took charge of household expenditures, an enraged Liu attempted to burn down the family residence one night. His uncle, appropriately frightened, dared not restrain him any longer. \(^{429}\) Liu Kai's recalcitrance did not subside after he became an official: besides forcing his subordinate's sister to marry him, he also pursued an insatiable craving for human liver. \(^{430}\) Ironically, Liu Kai was included in the "Biography of Literary Circles" (wen-yuan chuan) of the Sung-shih.

Reluctant to embrace the more militant and grotesque elements of their culture, however, Sung rulers seemed rather more influenced by the humane and gentle attributes of their Southern T'ang analogues. For instance, Emperor Jen-tsung of the Sung was benevolent towards animals as was Li Yu. When the Emperor read the story from the Chiu Wu-tai Shih about Emperor Tai-tsu of the Later Chou, who killed a pair of water birds with one arrow as they were happily playing on water, he felt sorrow for the birds and reprimanded Emperor Tai-tsu for his "presumptuousness in relying on that skill to hurt living things". \(^{431}\) Curiously, in the native place of the Sung royal family, Chen-ting, a county within the domain of Cheng-te in

\(^{429}\) Ch'ing-hsiang Tsa-chi, 6: 7ab.

\(^{430}\) Mo-k'o Hui-hsi, 4: 2b-3a; Tieh-wei-shan Ts'ung-tan, 3: 7a.

\(^{431}\) Yu-hu Ch'ing-hua, 5: 3a.
the T'ang, it had been recorded that Wang Wu-chin, Military Commissioner of Cheng-te, conversant in hunting, was also able to "kill two birds with one arrow". Since the region of Ho-pei, which encompassed Cheng-te, had been highly militarized and barbarized during mid T'ang, its local people were adept at martial arts like riding and archery. A fellow native of the Ho-pei region from the county of Yao-shan, Emperor Tai-tsu of the Later Chou also excelled at martial arts. Thus, although sharing geographical proximity and cultural backgrounds, it is interesting to notice that the Sung Emperor, Jen-tsung, did not share a joy of hunting with the Emperor of the Later Chou, but rather seemed to identify with the more distant ruler of the Southern T'ang in his respect and sympathy for living creatures.

Though frequently frustrated in their new careers, some scholar-officials from Chiang-nan gained the respect of Sung officials on the strength of their personal integrity, virtue and good behavior. For example, after Hsu Hsien was moved to the Sung court, he was respected by the Sung officials for his essays and personal integrity.

Some prominent officials, like Wang Pu (922-982) and Wang Yu befriended him, while Li Chih (947-1001) and Su I-chien treated him as a teacher. Li Mu, who was adept at judging people, told the others, "As I observed the scholar-officials from Chiang-nan, only Hsu Hsien was...

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close to being an upright and moral gentleman."

Hsu Hsien, frugal in his personal expenditures, did not even eat heavy meals. His explanation was that his standard of living "was already too high for a mere scholar-official from a subjugated state." 433 His frugality in daily life pervaded other endeavors. For example, as the Yang Wen-kung Tan-yuan mentions, when Hsu Hsien was at home, he simply ate vegetables and recited the Huang-ting Sutra in his studio. 434 The Ting Chin-kung tan-lu also states that Hsu Hsien told various scholar-officials,

"The families of scholar-officials could raise chicken, pigs, fish and turtles, and plant fruits and vegetables." Because Hsu Hsien did not drink the wine and eat the meat brought outside. He held Confucianism in high esteem as such. 435

Hsu Hsien's loyalty to Li Yu was also highly praised by some Sung scholar-officials. When Chin-ling was about to be captured, Li Yu wanted to send an envoy begging for the withdrawal of the Sung army. Most of his prominent officials, however, did not want to take that risk. When Hsu asked for the mission, Li Yu, moved to tears, said,

The true loyalty of subordinates manifests in risky times; you most definitely possess this quality.

Later, Emperor Tai-tsung ordered Hsu Hsien to compile the

433 *Yu-lin Kung-i*, p. 35.
435 *Ting-chin-kung Tan-lu*, 3b.
Chiang-nan Lu. At the end of the book, Hsu did not criticize Li Yu's administration, but only ascribed the downfall of the Southern T'ang to

the moving of the Mandate of Heaven to the Sung, which was beyond redemption by human effort. [After reading], the Emperor was displeased at the assertion very much.  

The reason Hsu Hsien stated thus was that those who were not loyal to the former master would not hold the new master in respect.  

Hsu Hsien's uprightness was also highly regarded. The Kuo-lao Tan-yuan records that Hsu bought a residence after he was escorted to Kai-feng. A year later, meeting with the former owner, who was living in extreme poverty, Hsu asked,

Was the poverty caused by the loss of money when selling your residence? I recently obtained 200,000 cash as the fee for writing an epitaph; I will give it to you in compensation for your loss.

The former owner tried to turn down the offer, but did not succeed, as Hsu ordered his servants to later deliver the money to him.  

Also, Tiao Kan, a prominent official in the reign of Li Yu, was extravagant in his consumption of clothing and food when he served in Chiang-nan. His living style changed drastically after his move to Kai-feng:

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436 Yu-lin Kung-i, p. 35.

437 Chih-ya-t'ang Tsa-chao, B: 22a.

He became renowned for uprightness, placidity and refinement among his contemporaries. Also, he was excelled at conversing pleasantly and playing chess, as well as showing sincerity to acquaintances. Most of the scholar-officials valued him highly. 499

Many Sung literati deeply realized the cultural superiority of the Southern T'ang. Among with their appreciation for and imitation of Ching-nan, some Sung scholar-officials frequently admitted a need to follow examples set by Chiang-nan in order to carry out reforms in society. For example, as stated in the Hsiao-hsu Chi, traditions and customs in the north had been so interrupted during the period of the Five Dynasties that

in order to dissipate customs tainted over the last hundred years, only an invocation filial piety could help to establish a new sense of principle, and only official glorification could cause the people to reform.

Accordingly, the Sung government conferred an honor on the gate of the Hu clan in Hung-chou in South China, whose members had been living together for four generations as a sign of their compliance with the Confucian norms and values. 440

Faced with the obvious cultural superiority of Chiang-nan, and yearning to establish a more northern cultural supremacy,

439 Sung-shih, p. 13054. The family of Tiao Kan had been wealthy because Tiao Yen-neng, his father, served as Military Commissioner for many years.

440 In addition to living together for four generations, the Hu clan was also dedicated to promoting education through establishing a private school and collecting books. For details, see the Hsiao-hsu Chi, pp. 271-2.
some Sung scholar-officials pursued an almost vengeful campaign against the Southern T'ang's cultural credibility.

Apart from generally downplaying the influence and disposition of the traditional institutions, rites and music, humilitating scholar-officials from Chiang-nan culturally was device utilized to neutralize the cultural advantage of the south. For example, Chang Chi, favored by Emperor Tai-tsung,

441 In this aspect, the Sung people were in a dilemma and never unified their viewpoint. On one hand, they praised the well-disciplined scholar-officials of the T'ang. (Lan Chen-tzu, 2: 4a.) On the other, they pointed out defects of the T'ang system and customs, stressing that the Sung did not need to follow old patterns blindly. During the chaotic period of the late T'ang, civilian officials, who served posts of Supervising Secretary (chi-shih-chung) and Secretariat Drafter, as well as military officers, who served as Prefect, were allowed to remain in office by wearing mourning garments. The Sung patterned itself on T'ang mourning practices. Such practices gave rise to controversy, for "the disputants realized that there was no more war at that time, and that it would be all right to have scholar-officials released from office to undergo their period of mourning." (Min-shui Yin-tan Lu, 4: 2b.) Possession of a magnificent body as a standard of selecting officials in the T'ang was also criticized, because bodily appearance did not bear on either administrative talent or personal integrity. (Jung-chai sui-pi, Shu-pi, 5: 6ab.) The excessive conferment of titular office (hsun-kuan) was another point attracting criticism: as Hung Mai mentioned, his ancestors were granted honorable titles, starting from the rank of Grand Master of Imperial Entertainments Embellished with Silver Seal and Blue Ribbon, (yin-ch'ing) to Acting Minister and Chancellor (chien-chiao shang-shu chi-chiu); but all of them, however, named in the placard issued by Lo-p'ing county, were imposed corvee labor and taxation equivalent to that of a village elder (li-chang) The Sung incorporated this defect, as shown in the memorial discussing the official system by Li Ch'ing-chen in the period of Yuan-feng (1078-1086). Li stated that the Sung followed the routine of excessive titular conferment heedlessly, wherein, a petty military officer (ya-chiao) possessed the rank of Grand Master of Imperial Entertainment Embellished with Silver Seal and Blue Ribbon and Captain (tsu-chang) had the honorable title of the Dynasty-founding Duke (kai-kuo kung) with fief. (Ibid., 5: 6b.)
was appointed as Participant in Determining Governmental Matters (tsan-chih cheng-shih). Wang Yu-cheng, Academician of the Hanlin Academy, was given two scrolls of poems written by Chang. Wang thanked Chang in a letter (chi), which states,

Following the footsteps of Chi Cha, you took leave of Wu by thoroughly embracing to national customs (kuo-feng); following Han Hsuan, you came to Lu with a clear perception of the diagrams of the canon of changes (i-hsiang).

The letter implies that Chang Chi could be transformed culturally only after he came to the north. In the eyes of intelligent and well-informed southern scholar-officials, such boasting was definitely a mockery identical with nonsense.

In order to substantiate charges, some Sung scholar-officials undertook scrutiny of the literary work of the south, aiming to excavate defects worthy of criticism. For instance, Chiang Wei had long been regarded as a descendent of Chiang Yen (444-505), a famous writer in Liu-sung (420-479). When studying at Pai-lu-tung Shu-yuan, Chiang wrote a poem on a wall. Li Ching, stopping by the palace, exclaimed about Chiang's poem: "The one, who wrote this poem, should be a noble!" But the Sung people countered first that Chiang Wei was not a descendent of Chiang Yen, and further that

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42 Wang-kung Szu-liu Shih-hua, B: 1a.
43 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 8: 9b.
44 Huang Chao-ying, Tsing-kan Hsiang-shu Tsa-chi, Shou-shan-ko Ts'ung-shu, 9: 4ab.
"the one, who composed the poem, should not be a noble!" The latter comments were tantamount to an indictment of Li Ching's literary credibility and ethical standards of Judgment.

Sung scholar officials, eager to detect any indication of cultural impropriety, meticulously sifted Southern T'ang's literary archives for even the slightest evidence of plagiarized or otherwise counterfeit composition. Li Yu, renowned for his literary composition, was accused by a Sung scholar-official of actually copying his works from the previous dynasty. A line from the Yen-shih Chia-hsun states,

It is easy [for people] to separate from each other, but never easy for them to meet together again.

Li Yu adopted the sentences for his own verse by modifying its syntax, thus opening to speculate his reputation for literary creativity.  

Han Hsi-t'sai, another Southern T'ang scholar-official, was also under Sung criticism for borrowing popular literary allusions excessively. For example, he was accused to repeatedly insert allusions of a lovers' rendezvous (yang-tai) and a fairy-tale island in the Yellow Sea (p'eng-tao), images referring to love affair, to the same poem. As commented by the Tsung-hua, "Why should he cite allusions again and again

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445 Man-sou Shih-hua, cited by the Tsung-hua, p. 175.
446 Fu-chia Man-lu, quoted by the Tsung-hua, p. 318.
as such!" Therefore, the poem was deemed by Sung literati not as good as commonly regarded due to its repetitiousness of using similar allusions. 447

Hsu Hsien was also included in the list of those criticized by Sung literati for his disparate interpretation of stylistic format. The *Shou-chou An-feng-hsien Hsiao-men Ming*, composed by Liu Chung-yuan, was compiled by Hsu in the *Wen-sui*. The statement "Cheng-szu, the servant who was serving as Prefect of Shou-chou" onwards is the essay's preface. According to the stylistic format, "using the memorial as a preface, then, was a kind of a writing style". Rather, Hsu Hsien recorded an engraved inscription (ming) in the first place and wrote a commentary under the title,

\[ \text{together with the memorial of Prefect of Shou-chou was to be attached to the end of the ming.} \]

As a result, the "error" was cited by the Sung literati as evidence of Hsu's ignorance. 448

Sung critics also targeted what they perceived as an intellectual lethargy of the Southern T'ang which manifested a dispirited, weak literary spirit and style (*wen-feng*), Chen Ku, a Sung scholar, commented that a versed essay titled the *Lin-chiang Hsin*, which was composed by Li Yu,

\[ \text{was desolate, repining and hankering, and was really a} \]

447 *Tsung-hua*, p. 127.

tone of being in a subjugated state (*wang-kuo chih-sheng*).  

This weak writing style was not merely confined to Li Yu. Li T’an, a confidant and official of Li Yu, privately presented erotic poems to Li Yu. This was surely an omen of being close to extinction, for the protocol between the sovereign and the subject had already vanished.  

Further, the ruling class of the Southern T’ang were criticized that they did not pay particular attention to the enrichment or military strengthening of their country, but rather that even critical moments, prominent officials, like Han Hsi-t’sai and Hsu ch’ieh, preoccupied themselves with the composition of *pien-wen* (a style in which all the sentences run in pairs). Thus, Sung critics deduced that T’ang ruling elites, oblivious to obvious portents of disaster, pursued what Sung literati construed of as an albeit weak and frivolous literary style. Lu Yu transcribed part of the inscription of the back of the stone tablet erected in the Tou-to Temple, which states,

The Emperor (i.e. Li Yu) revived the products of a culture (*wen-wu*), and his instruction had spread to China and foreign countries. The key of the Buddha was already understood thoroughly, while the literary composition of various periods were not without being integrated. Therefore, the reason for erecting the stone tablet in the temple was comprehensible without saying a word.

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449 *Hsi-t’ang-chi Chi-chiu Shu-wen*, p. 17.

450 *Yu-lin Kung-i*, p. 41.
Lu Yu commented that at the time of the erection of the stone tablet, 969, the Southern T'ang was in grave peril and within only six years of collapse. Han Hsi-t'sai, a high T'ang official who indulged in boasting of Li Yu's cultural achievement, did not seem concerned about the Southern T'ang's impending devastation, however. Critics believed it was absurd for Han Hsi-t'sai to have conveyed such exaggeration and falsehood; his act was definitely a mockery for the succeeding generations. When Han died, Li Yu regretted that he had been unable to appoint Han Prime Minister. Lu then commented,

Both the ruler and the subordinates were absurd as such. Even if they desired to prolong the regime for long, could they? 451

For the Sung literati, the thorough transition from the Southern Tang's weak and base writing style to the Sung style could be materialized only after the appearance of Ou-yang hsiu, Chung Chi and Sung Hsiang (996-1066). 452

Regarding historical compilation, ex-officials from Chiang-nan were also criticized. For instance, the Yu-lin Kung-i praises Hsu Hsien's morality, but points out that when Hsu participated in the compilation of the Chiang-nan Lu, he did not mention that P'an Yu had been forced to commit suicide

451 Lu-yu Chi, p. 2442.
452 The preface of the Wang-kung Szu-liu Shih-hua, 1ab.
because of P’an’s remonstrance to Li Yu. Instead, Hsu brought shame on P’an in the book owing to a personal feud. Consequently, those familiar with the historical facts of the event regarded that Hsu, in concealing same important information, did not apply an unprejudiced pen as a historian.

Wang An-shih also expressed his comments on the case, saying that Hsu Hsien was scared of bearing the crime of being unable to admonish Li Yu as P’an had, thus bringing the country to extinction. Jealous of P’an’s uprightness, and in order to hide his own faults, Hsu’s documentation both concealed P’an’s loyalty and disgraced P’an with other contrived offenses.

If Hsu Hsien really did so, I would say Hsu not only maligned a loyal minister, but also cheated my Emperor.

In addition to criticism on its scholar-officials, Sung officials criticized the profligate administration of the Southern T’ang, which signified that cultural superiority could do nothing in promoting national strength.

The behavior of both rulers and scholar-officials of the Southern T’ang, harshly criticized by Sung scholar officials, was exemplified by the extravagant life style of Li Yu.

453 Yu-lin Kung-i, p. 35.
455 The rate of taxation in the period of Yang Hsing-mi was low, because he was able to get popular goodwill by his benevolence and sincerity. Therefore, the people shed tears when Yang died. The author of the Tu-hsiang Tsa-chih scrutinized the taxation cards issued by the Yang and Li regimes respectively, and found out that
the contrary, the image of their own Emperor Tai-tsu was totally different.

The celestial appearance of Emperor Tai-tsu was magnificent! He had dark brown skin and buxom cheeks, and those seeing him dared not look up. When Li Yu dominated Chiang-nan, a person drew the imperial countenance and brought the portrait to the usurped state. After Li saw it, he was much worried and afraid day by day, for he knew that an "authentic ruler" (chen-jen) was in rule. 

Although himself handsome and of an extraordinary countenance (ch'i-hsiang), Li Yu remained subdued psychologically by the reputation of an idealized imperial august who he had not yet even seen in person.

While the literary skill of Emperor Tai-tsu was incomparable to the erudition of Li Yu, the imperial grandiose spirit and extensive scope far surpassed that of his Southern T'ang analogue. When Chin-ling was besieged, Li Yu sent Hsu Hsien

the rate of taxation in the period of Yang was less by several times than that of Li. Aged people handed down the information that when Li Yu was ruling, he increased the taxation several times due to unlimited extravagance. For details, see Tseng Min-hsing (1118-1175), Tu-hsiang Tsa-chih, Chih-pu-ts'uai Ts'ang-shu ed., 1: 4a. The Mo-chi records another aspect of the extravagant activities of Li Yu, in that when an imperial consort of Li Yu was obtained by a general, she closed her eyes when she saw his lamp, and said, "Smoke!" Having changed to candlelight, she still did so and said, "The [present] smoke is [even] stronger than before." The general then asked her, "Did the palace never light up any candles?" She replied, "In my chamber within the palace, there was a big pearl hanging at night, and its light illuminated the whole home making it as bright as day." The author of the Mo-chi then commented, "Seeing this, then the extravagance of Li was comprehensible." (32a.)

as an envoy to Kai-feng. Hsu, counting on his gift of eloquence, tried to persuade Emperor Tai-tsu to withdraw the troops. During the imperial audience, Hsu Hsien inferred that the Emperor was unpolished, while highly praising Li Yu’s erudition, versatility, and sagacity. After Hsu recited Li Yu’s widely circulated poem titled "The Moon in the Fall" (Chiu-vueh), the Emperor laughed and said,

Those words were from a poor scholar, and I would not say such.

Hsu Hsien did not bow to these taunting. Instead, he realized that the Emperor "pulled the long low", and could be pushed to extremes, so

Hsu Hsien then asked the Emperor to present his own literary work. Officials standing in the hall were startled and exchanged horrified glances. The Emperor said, "When I was still in obscurity, I returned from Chin-chung and passed by the foot of Hua Mountain. I was drunken and slept on the field. When I awoke, I saw that the moon was coming out, and I composed a verse about the moon: 'Before departing from the bottom of the sea, a thousand mountains were still dark; just as it reached the sky, ten thousand states were brightened.'" Hsu was greatly frightened [by its magnificent aroma], and spoke in high terms of the imperial longevity in the hall. 457

The Yu-hsi Shih-hua praising the aforementioned verse by the Emperor, said,

What grandiose words are these! The spirit of putting down rebellion and restoring order is manifest in this

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457 Hou-shan Shih-hua, included in the Hou-shan Hsien-sheng Chi, 23: 1a. It was said that the poem recorded by the Hou-shan Shih-hua had been modified literally. For details, see Chen Yu (?-1275), Hua-yu, Ku-chin Shuo-hai ed., A: 1a.
Chen Shen, a Sung scholar, who made a comparison between Emperor Tai-tsu and Li Yu, drew the conclusion that Li Yu's circle of vision was as "narrow as a bean", because Li Yu behaved like a poor scholar aimed only at luxurious living without any regard for national crisis. 459

After Li Yu was captivated in Kai-feng, Emperor Tai-tsu did not waste the opportunity to tease him by making fun of his literary work frequently. The Emperor had once said,

If Li Yu spent as much time governing the state as he does composing poems, how would he ever be captured by me? 460

Another example is that Emperor Tai-tsu told Li Yu in a banquet, "I heard that you liked composing poems in your country", and proceeded mockingly to order him to recite the parallel sentences which Li regarded as the most elated. After a long hesitation, Li chanted his "Poem of a Singing Fan" (Yung-shan Shih),

When folding the arms, there was a moon in hand; When shaking, fresh breeze was full in the bosom.

The Emperor then asked, "How much fresh breeze was full in the


459 Men-se Hsin-hua, A: 8ab.

bosom?" 461 The question "How much" actually implied "How could it be adorned?" which signified the imperial contempt for Li Yu's inferior acumen. With this remark, Emperor Tai-tsu's pervasive "imperial aroma" (ti-wang chi-hsia) once again captivated an admiring court, whose officials were thus "not without praising" him. 462 Obviously, in the mind of the Emperor, Li Yu totally lacked imperial bearing, and was at best only an eminent academician of Hanlin Academy. 463

Because the Sung possessed such political and military preponderance, many eminent officials from Chiang-nan visiting Kai-feng were subdued in spirit and unable to utilize their diplomatic skills. When Hsu Hsien went to Kai-feng begging to delay military operations, Chiao P'u, weighing Hsu's reputation for eloquence, asked Emperor Tai-tsu several times to select an erudite official to receive Hsu. But the Emperor assigned only a military officer from the Bureau of Lesser Military Assignments (san-pan shih-shen) to the task. Since the officer was illiterate, Hsu's eloquence was superfluous. 464

Some Sung scholar-officials tried to magnify this imperial act. As Yao Ko mentioned, it was not merely the case that the

461 Yeh Meng-te (1077-1148), Shih-lin Yin-vu, Szu-ku Chen-pen ed., 4: 15ab.
462 Wang Tao (1020-1080), Tan-yuan, Li-tai Hsiao-shih ed., 2b.
463 Shih-lin Yin-vu, 4: 15b.
Emperor dared not send scholar-officials to compete with Hsu Hsien in eloquence, for Tao Ku and Tou I, still serving in the court, were both able to surpass Hsu. But the Emperor did not do that because he cared for the preservation of what he considered the dignity and decency of his great dynasty. Also, his deed accorded with his principle of defeating the enemy without any actual fighting, a way regarded as good strategy. 465

As Hsu Chien was about to have an interview with Emperor Tai-tsu, the Sung officials, still worried about being taken advantage of by Hsu, requested the Emperor to prepare well prior to the audience. But the Emperor merely adopted a practical straightforward strategy to deal with Hsu's persuasiveness, saying:

Would you say it is alright to separate father and son into two households?"

His way was effective, as Hsu was unable to answer. 466

Shortly thereafter, Hsu Hsien went to Kai-feng again. Emperor Tai-tsu argued with him over and over again about withdrawing troops from Chiang-nan, but Hsu's arguing persisted. Finally, the Emperor, enraged, placed his hand on his sword, saying,


466 Chang-pien, p. 348.
You did not need to be loquacious, what crime did Chiang-nan commit? But all under the Heaven were [destined to be united into] one family; how would I allow the others to sleep snoring, next to my side of the bed!

Having heard those words, Hsu Hsien, speechless, departed in fear.  

When commenting on the case, Li T'ao surmised that the Emperor had tried initially to reason with Hsu Hsien, but became impatient with the scholar's inexorable discourse. The emperor then

formally imposed august indignation, and [an act] was perhaps appropriate in response to the circumstances.  

Yao Ko praised the response of Emperor Tai-tsu, saying,

How great are his imperial words! Compared with the debate of Hsu Hsien; Hsu's words were like the glow of a firefly trying to compete with that of the sun.  

Lo Pi also exclaimed that the imperial deed was

honest and direct, and did not engage in avoidance or embellishment. Therefore, Chu Wen-kung (Chu Hsi) said that the bearing of the emperor was fair and square, and it was appropriate for him to have such words.  

No doubt, the Emperor's words entirely articulated the principle that "might makes right". Under the premise of "a weak state having no diplomacy", it was anticipated that Hsu Hsien, extremely gifted in eloquence and interpersonal

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467 Ibid., p. 350.
468 Ibid., p. 348.
469 Cheng-shih, 1: 3b.
versatility, could do nothing to save his country from an inevitable extinction.

Curiously, many scholar-officials criticizing the Southern T’ang both came from the prefectures previously under the rule of the Southern T’ang and devolved from ancestors who had served the Li regime. For instance, Ou-yang Hsiu was a native of Lu-ling and some of his ancestors had served the Southern T’ang, but he did not realize that he himself was a remnant (i-min) of that regime. In the Shih-pi, he mentioned that he had obtained an inkstone,

But I did not know it was a relic of the Southern T’ang. An aged person from Chiang-nan said sorrowfully as he saw it, "It was a relic of my native country." He told me about the origin of the inkstone, and I started treasuring it. 471

Obviously, Ou-yang Hsiu perceived a clear distinction between his present state and his ancestral heritage: he valued the inkstone not out of a longing for his native country, but rather out of an appreciation for the high reputation of the inkstone of Chiang-nan.

In fact, in Ou-yang Hsiu’s mind, the Southern T’ang was only an usurped regime and not a yearned-for location, a belief revealed clearly in the Hsin Wu-tai Shih. This is shown by his effusive praise of a heroic and eminent (hsiung-chiieh) speech made by Emperor Tai-tsu when dealing with Hsu Hsien:

471 Shih-pi, included in the Ou-yang Wen-chung-kung Wen-chi, p. 1006.
Alas, how grandiose! How precise was his speech! It was such that in the rise of monarch, all under the Haven should be unified. Those this could be invited were invited; those, who could not be invited were conquered. All abrogators and usurpers were aimed at being wiped out, and that was all! 472

Ou-yang Hsiu’s opinion clearly reflects that he did not have the slightest nostalgia for the Southern T’ang, a case not confined merely to him.

Hsia Sung, born in Te-an, a county of Chiang-chou, whose grandfather entered Southern T’ang officialdom by presenting books, revealed his absence of affection for the Southern T’ang in a preface recorded in the Wen-chiang chu. From the Five Dynasties onwards, he records,

there was abrogation of the warlords, thus leading to a mistake in pronunciation and punctuation in Buddhist sutra caused by dialect." 473

When Hsia Sung pointed out the dialect’s inhibition upon the dissemination of Buddhism, his tone, that of a scholar-official from the Central Kingdom, also reflected a paucity of affection for the south.

Also Chang Wen-chien (1054-1114) from Huai-yin, a county of Chu-chou, violently criticized the cultural attitude of Hsu

472 Hsin Wu-tai Shih, pp. 779-780.

473 Wen-chuang Chi, 22: 1b. After the Sung conquest of the various states, an official language, evolved from the northern language and disseminated. This patois, formerly prevalent in those states, turned to be the object of mockery of scholar-officials serving the Sung. (Hsiang-shan Yeh-ju, B: 3b.) Use of the dialect consequently became an obstacle to a public career for those coming from the south. (Chang-pien, pp. 547-8.)
Hsien. As shown in his remark on Hsu's disdain for wearing fur,

Since Hsu Hsien was not content to be a captive of a subjugated state, he expressed vile language to revile the scholar-officials in the Central Kingdom.

To substantiate his statement, Chang Wen-chien cited examples from the Book of Odes (Shih-ching) as well as from the commentaries of Cheng-hsuan (127-200), documenting that wearing fur was a tradition dating back to the "Three Dynasties" (san-tai). 474

CHAPTER SIX: THE PUBLIC CAREER OF SUBSIDIARY OFFICIALS FROM THE SOUTHERN T'ANG

I, Discriminatory and Preventive Measures Against the Region of Chiang-nan and its "Subsidiary Officials" in Early Sung Times

The term "subsidiary officials" (p'ei-ch'en) usually refers to officials who served foreign countries.

When Chang Fang Ping served as Mayor of the Superior Prefecture of Hsing-t'ien (p'an Hsings-tien Fu), envoys from Koryo passed through the area and the officials were required to perform a ceremony of welcome. But Chang refused to act in accordance with this customary practice, for his official rank was that of prime minister and he ought not bend to a p'ei-ch'en.

The court agreed with his opinion and sent only a Deputy Mayor (shao-yin) to perform the ceremony. 475

Similarly, Shen Ch'i (?-1088) was sent to Liao as an envoy, but his seat was arranged in a way that was equivalent to that of the envoy of Hsi-hsia.

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475 As far as I know, no historians, except Jing-shen Tao, have done any noteworthy research on careers of p'ei-ch'en in a new country. For details, see The Jurchen in Twelfth-century China: A Study of Sinicization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976); "Chin-tai ti Chung-kuo Chih-shih Pen-tzu", included in the Chung-yang Yen-chiu-yuan Kuo-tsi Han-hsueh Hui-i Lun-wen-chi, Taipei, 1981.

476 Sung-shih, p. 10358.
Shen Ch'ī refused to take the seat and protested, pointing out that the Hsia envoy was only a p'ei-ch'en and should not be counted in the same rank as an official of the imperial court (wāng-jen).

After the protest, the position of his seat was elevated to the east side, and this arrangement was made a permanent rule from then on. 477

Obviously, the "officials of the imperial court" were the officials serving in the Central Kingdom, and their position and status were superior to those serving under usurped and barbarian regimes.

The distinction between wāng-jen and p'ei-ch'en was not made only during diplomatic affairs between China and foreign tribes, but also occurred in China during the multi-state periods. With respect to the Eastern Chou, the state of Lu was a vassal. No matter how many achievements the Lu officials realized, they were always considered p'ei-ch'en. Thus, although Confucius was respected as the greatest teacher of all times, he was still referred to as p'ei-ch'en by Sung scholar-officials. 478

In this dissertation, the p'ei-ch'en mainly refers to the ex-officials and people of the Southern T'ang who began or

477 Ibid., p. 10728.

continued their careers in the Sung.

Prior to the war with the Later Chou, the rulers of the Southern T’ang had boasted that they were the royal descendants of the T’ang. Apart from this claim to legitimacy, their national strength, which was based their numerous territorial possessions, also enabled the rulers to be arrogant in their diplomatic relations.

After a series of military setbacks, the Southern T’ang had to adapt to circumstances by demoting itself to be a p’ei-ch’en. As an example, when Sun Cheng was sent as an envoy to the Later Chou, he called himself a p’ei-ch’en and addressed Emperor Shih-tsung as "celestial king" (tien-wang). And when Chung Mo was sent back by Emperor Shih-tsung to Chiang-nan after peace had been restored, he composed a poem as a gift to the Emperor, in which he stated,

A multitude of marquises were brought to submission, after a three-year-long display of martial spirit. The Spring time spread to ten thousand vassal states when the Emperor returned to the capital. No more trouble would occur, as friendship was cultivated between the South and the North. As an old p’ei-ch’en, I am grateful for the imperial favor allowing me to return."  

In the poem, Chung Mo claimed that the Southern T’ang was only one of the marquises and he abased himself by taking the rank

479 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1789.
480 Yu-hu Ch’ing-hua, 10: 7b.
481 Ma-shu, 19: 5b.
of p'ei-ch'en. Clearly, the traditional pride of the Southern T'ang, which claimed to be inheritor of the glory of the T'ang, had ceased to exist.

In order to deal with the new circumstances, the officials of the Southern T'ang were required to modify the way they addressed the Later Chou even in some official gatherings within Chiang-nan. 482

The status of the p'ei-ch'en was finally upgraded to that of the wana-ien after the fall of the Southern T'ang. Nevertheless, for the ruler and officials of the Southern T'ang, their situation was generally much worse than it had been during their days in Chiang-nan. The most prominent example is that of Li Yu, who suffered various humiliations and oppression and was finally poisoned. Also, many scholar-officials from Chiang-nan were held in contempt by their counterparts in the Sung, and their careers were hindered and sabotaged. 483 The commoners who remained in Chiang-nan were subject to various kinds of restrictions based on a discriminatory and preventive policy.

Such harassing and restrictive measures to a certain extent stemmed from the Sung's suspicion of loyal sentiments towards

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482 Lu-shu, chuan 4: 6a.

483 Disdain for the scholar-officials from various subjugated states seemed to be the fashion among the Sung people, and such discrimination was by no means confined to those from Chiang-nan. For details, see Ting-chin-kung Tan-lu, 13ab.
the Li regime. 484 When the Sung army first invaded Chiang-
nan, resistance was fierce. 485 After Chin-ling had been
besieged for two years,

the price of a measure of ten pints (tou) of rice soared
to several thousand in cash and the dead lay piled up one
on top of another, but the people had no rebellious

484 During the operation against the Southern T'ang, Fan Jo-
shui, a turncoat from Chiang-nan, rendered many indispensable
services to Emperor Tai-tsu of the Sung. He not only suggested
building a pontoon bridge across the Yangtze River, but, thoroughly
dedicated to his duty, showed "no affection for his native place"
during the siege of Chin-ling. (Yu-hu Ch'ing-hua, 8: 7b.) Tracing
the activities of his ancestors in the Southern T'ang, Lu Nan-kung
stated that the residence of his ancestors, which was built outside
the wall of Chin-ling, was burned to the ground thanks to Fan's
suggestion to the Sung Commander. (Kuan-yuan Chi, 17: lab.) After
the collapse of the Southern T'ang, Fan made trouble for those who
had been impolite to him when he had lived in poverty out of
revenge. (Neng-kai-chai Meng-ly, 12: 7b; Sung-shih, p. 9394.)
Therefore, it was no wonder people in Chiang-nan hated Fan so much
that "they excavated his ancestral tombs, and threw the bones into
the river." (Tiao-chi Lieh-tan, p. 11.) Also, "the trees planted
around the graves of Fan's ancestors were completely cut down."
(Yu-hu Ch'ing-hua, 8: 8a.) However, Fan's treachery was an
exception, most of the commoners and officials were loyal to the Li
regime during the Sung operations. After the war, many ex-
officials from Chiang-nan were not willing to deal with him. When
Pang Ao served in the Sung as Aide of Palace Administration (tien-
chung cheng), Fan recommended Pang to a higher post, but Pang, was
ashamed to receive his help. Pang immediately asked to resign and
went into hiding as a recluse on Lu Mountain (Lu-shu, chuan 11:
6b.)

485 In this aspect, the best example was Hu Chieh. He had been
a subordinate of Liu Jen-chien when Shou-chou was besieged by the
Later Chou. He further refined his technique of guarding the
walled city of Chiang-chou, and inflicted heavy losses on the Sung
army. Subsequently, the city collapsed after a few years of seize
due to Hu's illness and the absence of reinforcements. But Hu did
not surrender even he was captured. Certainly, this was the reason
Lu Yu praised him as qualified to be Huang-fu Chi-hsun's
replacement in defending the capital. (Lu-shu, chuan 5: 6ab.)
intention.  

A sense of loyalty could also be found among the Buddhist monks. A few thousand Buddhist monks lived in Chin-ling at the time the Sung army besieged the city. They sent a memorial "asking for armor and weapons to fight to the death to prevent a national disaster."  

After the fall of Chin-ling, some prefectures remained loyal to Li Yu and refused to surrender. Besides the case of Hu Tze, other valiant generals like Shen-t’u Ling-chien and Liu Mou-chung, who were guarding Chi-chou and Yuan-chou respectively, pledged to each other not to forsake their leader no matter whether he was alive or dead, and swore to uphold the nation unto death.  

Some local landowners also organized military resistance against the Sung regime. In 976, a year after the downfall of the Southern T’ang, Yang Cha served as Controller-general (t’ung-p’an) of Chien-chou,  

Two local magnates with the surnames of Lai and Lo started a revolt with their gangsters. The revolt was suppressed, and the two leaders were caught and escorted to the capital.  

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486 Chiang-piao Chih, C: 4b-5a.  
487 Ma-shu, 26: 3a.  
488 Lu-shu, chuan 5: 8a. Furthermore, Lu Chiang once tried to occupy Chien-chou to carry on the resistance.  
489 Chang-pien, p. 376.
Even as late as the middle years of Tai-ping Hsiao-kuo (976-984), there remained a few forces of the Southern T'ang who still menaced local regions. 490

Emperor Tai-tsu of the Sung was concerned with firmly controlling the local administration in Chiang-nan during the southern campaign. His most critical move was replacing the original staff with Sung officials. 491 Furthermore, the Emperor worried about the unpredictability of popular sentiment immediately following the annexation.

In order to solve the problem, the Sung stationed imperial forces in Chiang-nan with the aim of controlling the populace 492 and summoned selected Chiang-nan soldiers from the local regions to the capital, thereby undermining the strength of

490 Sung-shih, p. 10163.

491 For instance, Emperor Tai-tsu of the Sung appointed Yang K'e-jang (912-980) Administrator of the Auxiliary Office of Sheng-chou (chih Sheng-chou hsiang-fu) during the operations. When Sheng-chou was captured, Yang was ordered serve as Prefect and concurrent Water and Land Transport Commissioner (chih chou-shih chien shui-lu chi-tu chuan-yun-szu shih). (Sung-shih, p. 9270.) The Sung sent its officials not only to the capital but also to other prefectures in order to take charge of administration. Therefore, Chia Huang-chung (941-996) was appointed Prefect of Hsuan-chou. (Ibid., pp. 9161; 9267.) Chang Chi was originally appointed Prefect of Chiang-chou, but he was transferred to Yao-chou after being falsely maligned by T'sao Han. (Chang-pien, p. 370.) Yao-chou still lay within the territory of Chiang-nan. As for the applicability of the policy in other subjugated states, see Appendix XII.

492 Yen-i T-mou Lu, 5: 6b.
Moreover, many restrictions were imposed on Chiang-nan directly after its annexation, in particular regulations on the possession of weaponry like spears, armor, and arrows. Some of these restrictions were not lifted until almost ten years after the annexation.

Similar to measures adopted by the previous dynasties, forcible removal constituted an important element in the repressive and preventive measures adopted by the Sung in dealing with the newly acquired territories. The Ma-shu mentions that after the downfall of the Southern T'ang, most of the official families were captured and forced to move to the capital.

Among the group of people removed to the capital were many

For example, Yang Cha obeyed the orders of Emperor Tai-tsu by gathering five hundred outstanding soldiers in Chien-chou into one unit and sending them to the capital under escort. (Chang-pien, p. 376.) During the reign of Emperor Tai-tsung, the centralization of local troops continued. (Ibid., p 639.) In addition, Emperor Tai-tsu ordered the demolition of the strategic strongholds and city walls of Chiang-nan, forbade military training in local regions and assigned scholar-officials to take charge of local administration. (Ibid., pp. 1036-8.) All these measures were carried out in order to demilitarize the Chiang-nan region.

Implementation of such a policy of removal was not confined to the Southern T'ang. Whenever the Sung conquered a state, most of the ex-officials serving in the subjugated state would be moved to Kai-feng, in compliance with national policy. (An-yang Chi, 4: 11b.) This policy was continued during the reign of Emperor Tai-tsung. (Ou-yang Wen-chung-kung Wen-chi, p. 480.)
powerful local men. This policy reflected the Sung's profound awareness of the latent danger posed by the political and social elite in Chiang-nan. The only way to ensure security was to undermine their strength by moving them to the Sung capital so as to enable the Sung to supervise them more efficiently and thoroughly.

Criminals were also viewed as trouble makers and "were all taken into custody and sent to the capital." Not all of these criminals had committed very serious crimes. Indeed, most of them had only committed minor infractions. Generally speaking, six to seven out of ten of those who were escorted to the north died along the way from maltreatment and abuse. Because of this, some local officials were sympathetic towards them. For instance, Chien-chou had sent three criminals, together with their twelve family members, to the capital.

Among the measures dealing with undesirable elements who disturbed local tranquillity and order, removal was a common practice in order to "recruit the rascals and bullies from all four corners to be soldiers." (Ch'yu-yu Chiu-wen, p. 69.) This policy also applied to members of official families. As recorded in the Chang-pien, Tai-tsung ordered various prefectures to submit lists to the court of those children of military officials who behaved rudely and licentiously. During the application of this policy, around a hundred people were escorted to the capital, and they were granted with mean posts (chien-chieh) as recipients of edicts of the Palace Army Duty Group (tien-chien cheng-chih). From then on, they were retained in the capital and kept in sight. (Chang-pien, p. 401.)

For details of the policy, see Brian McKnight, Law and Order in Sung China (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
even though they had only committed the minor crime of illegally selling beef, and the person who had killed the cow could not be found. Chang Chi-hsien (943-1014) set their wives and children free.

From then on, the people sent from Chiang-nan decreased by more than half in number. 499

However, leniency towards criminals who had committed light offenses did not imply that the court had ceased to hold the local strong men in check. When Chang I served as Transport Commissioner (chuan-yun shih) of Chiang-nan, there were some great families (ta-hsien) in the region under his jurisdiction causing the disturbances among the commoners. Chang reported this to the court. Emperor Tai-tsung commanded that all the leaders and their family members be escorted to the court, and restricted them to positions in the Three Ranks (san-pan chih-ming). After this incident, "the region south of the Yangtze River was stunned and peaceful." 500

Those having received quasi military training were also under suspicion. When the Southern T'ang collapsed, the militia men, who had been sent back to the countryside, once again became the focus of the interest of Emperor Tai-tsung. In 981, some officials suggested that some good soldiers from the militia force be selected and sent, together with their

499 Chang-pien, p. 507.
500 Sung-shih, p 9416.
families, to the capital. Otherwise, they would be incite rebellion among the commoners. 501

Before Chiang-nan was suppressed,

those crossing the Yangtze River without permission would be executed along with the ferryman.

Only after the twelfth month of 977 was the restriction lifted. 502

Since the Sung rulers were much more suspicious of the former officials of the Southern T’ang than the local magnates and commoners, those officials who had served in Chiang-nan were still forbidden to cross the river. Apart from some exceptional cases, 503 the policy of the Sung was more lenient

501 Chang Ch’i-hsien, Vice Transport Commissioner (chuan-yun fushih) of Chiang-nan Hsi-lu, argued against such a recruitment, because the militia did not have enough training, and such a recruitment would be very disturbing to the people. The court agreed with Chang’s arguments. (Chang-pien, pp. 208-9.)

502 Chang-pien, p. 416.

503 The father of Lady Wai, who served as Proclaimer of Virtue of the Heir Apparent (tai-tzu vu-te) in Chiang-nan, retired from active life by moving to Chang-chou after the collapse of the Li regime. (Lin-chuan Hsien-sheng Wen-chi, p. 1025.) The tai-tzu vu-te was an honorary title usually granted to senile officials. Therefore, the reason he was allowed to move to Chang-chou was probably his senility. Yao Han, who served as Policy Advisor (san-chi chang-shih), moved to Fu-chou together with his family. (Kuan-yuan Chi, 19: 5b.) San-chi chang-shih was also an honorary title, and commoners could purchase it. Therefore, Yao was probably not an official, and the Sung certainly would not stop him from moving anywhere. Kao Yu-hsi, who served as the Judge (t’ui-kuan) of Wuwei Chun, moved to Chang-chou. (Shen Kua, Chang-hsing Chi, included in Shen-shih San-hsien-sheng Chi, Szu-pu Ts’ung-kan Hsu-pien, 5: 37b.) However, Wuwei Chun as a unit of local administration did not appear until 978, after the downfall of the Southern T’ang. Therefore, the "service experience" of Kao was probably fabricated
towards ailing and senile scholar-officials, who were not regarded as a threat to the regime. They were allowed to ignore this command and eventually return to their hometowns. 504

When dealing with the military men, the policy was harsh and vigilant. Li Yin had served in Chiang-nan as Commissioner of the Various Offices (chu-szu shih).

Since he had served in a kingdom, he was prohibited from crossing the Yangtze River. 505

During the reign of Emperor Tai-tsung, the Sung government promoted filial piety in order to reform society. However, although such norms of piety meant that Li Yin should have returned home to wait on his mother in Chiang-nan, he was not allowed to do so, because the government distrusted the p'ei-ch'en who might stir up revolt if they returned to their homeland.

The restriction was much more severe and vigilant when dealing with those renowned for military talent, even though by his descendants.

504 Yang Wen-i, the grandfather of Yang I, served as Magistrate of Yu-shan at the end of the Southern T'ang regime. He was told to move to the capital by the order of the Emperor and local officials, but ultimately he was able to stay home due to his illness. (Yang I, Wu-i Hsiao-chi, Szu-k'u Ch'u-ch'uan-shu ed., 8: 16a.) Meng Pin-yu was allowed to return to his homeland because of his senility and poor health. (Hsiao-hsu Chi, p 284.) Also, Hsiao Yen, who served as Chief Minister of the Court of Judicial Review and concurrently as Supervising Secretary (ta-li ching chien chi-shih-chung), had been escorted to Kai-feng. He was allowed to return to Chiang-nan for the same reason. (Ma-shu, 22: 2a.)

505 Wu-hsi Chi, 19: 16a; Sung-shih, p. 9973.
who claimed disabled because of illness. For instance, Li Yuan-ch’ing could run as fast as a galloping horse and had served as a spy prying into the situations of Kai-feng. Due to his outstanding performance for the Southern T’ang, the Sung would not allow him to remain in Chiang-nan. But Li, not wishing to serve the Sung, pretended that he had become blind. The government ordered him to be examined.

When a sword was brandished and almost touched his neck, his eyes did not blink. He was thus allowed to return to Hao-chou, [his native place].

II, The Public Career of "Subsidiary Officials" Under the Sung Rule

Keeping the p’ei-ch’en in the capital proved too costly for the Sung, for it was not possible for the government to recruit enough qualified officials to fill the vacancies left

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506 After the collapse of Hu-nan, Li Yu ordered Li to serve as Military Commissioner (chih-chih shih) of Yung-hsin because of the city’s strategic significance in defending against a possible Sung invasion from Hu-nan. Every few months, Li did not come in to his office for a few days on the pretext of being ill. In actuality, he made use of his sick leave to probe into military affairs in Hu-nan. Since he carried out this task in disguise, he was never detected. Therefore, he was well-informed of the movements of the enemy and was able to take preventive action. "The frontier was quiet and peaceful for a few years." (Lu-shu chuan 12: 7b.)

507 Ibid. Other cases are not clear enough to judge. For instance, Wang Te-hui, who served as Adjutant of the Palace Guard (yu-lin ts’an-chun) in Chiang-nan, moved to Liu-ho after his country’s defeat. (Peng-cheng Chi, p. 499.) Cheng Chao, Attendant of the Three Ranks (san-pan feng-chih), switched to a mining career in Szu-hu. (Tuan-ming Chi, 39: 13b.)
by the p'ei-ch'en in the south. Therefore, it was necessary to employ the former scholar-officials of the Southern T'ang to serve in civil administration, despite the Sung's continued suspicion and hostility towards the p'ei-ch'en.

In order to reconcile these concerns with pragmatism, the Sung always relegated the p'ei-ch'en to politically disadvantageous positions when giving out appointments. The principle of geographical relocation, based on discrimination and suspicion, was an important means of preventing the p'ei-ch'en from starting revolt in their native lands. According to regulations, the p'ei-ch'en could not be appointed to serve in their native region. This practice

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508 Compared with Szechwan and Kuang-nan, Chiang-nan was generally regarded by officials as a favorable place (shan-ti) to serve. Also, its strategic importance was negligible. Therefore, the government did not need to compromise by appointing local inhabitants to take charge of the administration. For details, see Appendix XII.

509 During operations against the Southern T'ang, some surrendered officials were able to maintain their offices in their original places. For instance, Wei Yu served as Administrative Assistant in Hsiung-yuan Chun. When the Sung army arrived, "Wei surrendered himself to the Sung along with the city. Emperor Tai-tsu promoted him to Secretary of the Heir Apparent (tai-tzu chung-she) and allowed him to keep his original office. But this was only a wartime expediency. After the war, Wei was summoned to the court and sent to be Prefect of Hsing-chou. (Sung-shih, p 9204.) Further, Kuo T'sai-hsing served as Military Commissioner of Chien-chou in the Southern T'ang, and was transferred to Prefect of Hai-chou during the reign of Emperor Tai-tsu. (Chang-pien, p. 376.) Hai-chou was originally a prefecture of the Southern T'ang, but it was taken over by the Later Chou. Also, Ho Mung (937-1013) and P'an Shen-hsiu were appointed Controller General of Lu-chou and Shou-chou respectively, during the reign of Emperor Tai-tsung. (Sung-shih, pp. 9444, 9874.) But because these two prefectures had
was not abolished until after the reign of Emperor Chen-tsung.\textsuperscript{510}

Some primary sources have a positive outlook on the p'ei-ch'en's chances of being appointed. As asserted in the Ou-yang Wen-chung-kung Wen-chi,

[After Chin-ling was captured], those who had served Li Yu followed him to the capital, and all of them were appointed.\textsuperscript{511}

The above statement can be substantiated by historical facts.

Lady Wang's father served Li Yu as Commissioner of the Resembling Capital (ju-ching shih). After the fall of the Southern T'ang,

The Sung reformed and appointed capable officials of the Southern T'ang, and conferred on the father of Lady Wang the rank of Attendant of the Right Duty Group (yu-pan tien-chih).\textsuperscript{512}

In addition, Li Yen served as Commissioner of Various Offices (chu-szu shih),

When Mo-ling (i.e. Chin-ling) surrendered, he was granted the position of Recipient of Edicts of the Palace Army Duty Group, based on rules and precedents.\textsuperscript{513}

Based on these examples, the criteria for appointment of the

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\textsuperscript{510} For example, Ho Mung was appointed to the post of Prefect of Yuan-chou, his native prefecture, in 1015. (Sung-shih, p. 9444.) This was already 42 years after the annexation of Chiang-nan.

\textsuperscript{511} Ou-yang Wen-chung-kung Wen-chi, p. 275.

\textsuperscript{512} Wu-hsi Chi, 19: 25a.

\textsuperscript{513} Ibid., 19: 16a.
**p'ei-ch'én** were obviously based on their previous official title and rank. This became a common practice.

But the actual implementation of this was not that simple. The odds of employment for the **p'ei-ch'én** were by no means favorable. The *Kung-shih Chi* records that Liu Shu-tu served the Southern T'ang as Commandant of *Lu-ling*. After the conquest of Chiang-nan,

Liu followed the others to the capital and received an audience with Emperor Tai-tsu. Liu, together with several tens of people with the same rank and office, were examined by the Emperor one by one. All of them were sent back, and only Liu was appointed to be Commandant of Shang-shui.  

The record reveals that before the appointment of the **p'ei-ch'én**, those with the same rank and office would be grouped together and selected by the Emperor. In other words, previous experience was only a prerequisite for these people to take part in the selection meeting; their previous credentials were also considerations in the selection process. However, their previous service experience did not guarantee employment. Also, only about one out of a several tens of people received an appointment, thus demonstrating how high the failure rate was.

Because of the low rate of success, many ex-officials suffered poverty. For instance, Wu Shu, who had originally

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served as Editor, became "tremendously impoverished" after he relocated to the capital but did not receive a post. In order to continue their careers, some ex-officials who were rejected in the selection process adopted a means of self-recommendation by presenting their literary works to influential people.

Other than a few p'ei-ch'en who had cooperated with the Sung and made contributions to the Sung conquest and who were promoted or allowed to serve in positions of the same grade,

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515 Sung-shih, p. 5353.

516 After Lin Te, who served as Editor in Chiang-nan, went to the capital, he received no appointment during the reign of Emperor Tai-tsu. He presented his essays to Emperor Tai-tsung, and was appointed Commandant of Chang-ko. (Sung-shih, p. 9564.) Hsu Ti, who was Investigating Censor during Li's reign, presented his works to the Sung, and he was allowed to take an examination, on the basis of which he was appointed Commandant of Chi-hsien. (Ou-yang Wen-chung-kung Wen-chi, p. 290.)

517 Some former officials of the Southern T'ang, who had cooperated with the Sung by surrendering their cities, were promoted to posts superior to their original ones. For example, Wei Yu only served as Controller General in the Southern T'ang, but was promoted Prefect of Hsing-chou by the Emperor Tai-tsu. Similarly, Chang O was Controller General of O-chou. He, together with the Prefectural General, surrendered the city to the Sung army. Emperor Tai-tsu granted an imperial audience to Chang, and praised and rewarded him substantially. Chang was appointed Right Grand Master Admonisher (yu tsan-shan ta-fu). When peace had been restored to Szechwan, Chang was selected Prefect of Liang-chou. (Sung-shih, p. 9995.) Some p'ei-ch'en, who provided "special contributions" to the Sung conquest, were promoted. Cha Yuan-fang was Administrative Assistant of the Surveillance Circuit (kuan-ch'a p'an-kuan) in Chien-chou when the Sung invaded Chiang-nan. When Lu Chiang sent an envoy to the prefecture, Cha beheaded him, thus destroying Lu's plan to set up a base of resistance there. The Emperor Tai-tsu praised Cha's deed, and granted him a large promotion as Palace Censor (tien-chung shih-yu-shih) and Prefect of
most of the p'ei-chen appointed were demoted from their original positions, particularly in their first appointments under the Sung. The Yin-i I-mou Lu records that when Li Yu went to the court after the conquest of Chiang-nan, his subordinates were appointed to various posts based on their abilities. Most of the high ranked officials and generals became petty officials, and only those serving in prefectures and counties could maintain their posts. 518

Chang Chi served as Secretariat Drafter and Academician of the Hall of Clear Brilliance (Ch'ing-hui Tien hsueh-shih). He also "took part in decision-making and had the undeniable favor of the Emperor." After being sent to the capital, he was only given the post of Companion to the Heir Apparent (tai-tzu chung-yun), even though Emperor Tai-tsu was impressed by his reply. 519

Occasionally, officials of primary and secondary rank in the Southern T'ang might be appointed to the same post in the Sung. For instance, Hsu Hsien served as Academician in the Han-lin Academy, Censor-in-chief, and Minister of the Ministry Chuan-chou. (Ibid., p. 9877.)

518 Yin-i I-mou Lu, 4: 1a.

519 Sung-shih, pp. 9206-7. Also, Tu Kao had once been entrusted with the task of guarding the Hall of Clear Brilliance, but he was demoted to Assistant Magistrate of Chien-cheng. (Ibid., p. 9876.) As another example, Tiao Kan had obtained much imperial favor from Li Yu. He was originally appointed to serve in the Ch'ing-hui Tien and authorized to examine memoranda sent to the court. However, he was only granted the post of Great Supplicator (tai-chu) of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices.
of Personnel, in that order, during the reign of Li Yu, but he was only appointed Director of the Guard of the Heir Apparent (tai-tzu shuai-keng), a minor post. 520 And while Lu Wen-chung merely served as Case Reviewer of the Court of Judicial Review and was in charge of drafting memoranda for the price, he was appointed to the same post. 521

Sometimes, civil officials might be given military posts. Wang Ts'ao, whose literary reputation was equal to that of Chang Chi, was appointed Palace Attendant. 522

The principle of demotion also applied to military officers. Cheng Yen-hua was a prominent commanding officer in the imperial guards of the Southern T'ang, but he was demoted to General of the Right Personnel Guard (yu chien-niu-wei chang-chun) under the Sung. 523 Offering positions in the Imperial Wards (huan-wei), as a sign of demotion, was also a means of handling local officials from Chiang-nan. For example, Shih-ch'i Chen had been Prefect of Chi-chou and was appointed as Grand General of the Palace Gate Guard (chien-men ta-chang-

520 Ibid., p. 13045.

521 Ibid., p. 9870.

522 Chang-pien, p. 437. Another example is Chiu Hsu who obtained his chin-shih degree and served as a civil official in the Southern T'ang, but was appointed General of Garrison by the Sung (chen-chiang). (Ma-shu, 23: 6a.)

523 Lu-shu, chuan 12: 2a.
Unlike what the Yin-i I-mou Lu describes, local officials of higher rank from Chiang-nan were always demoted. Only low-ranked local officials were granted posts of the same rank in most cases. Thus, Liu Shu-tu served as Commandant of Lu-ling in the Southern T'ang, and was appointed to the same post in Shang-shui by the Sung.

In appointing the p'ei-ch'en, the Tung-hsien Pi-lu states clearly about the criteria of appointment:

When Emperors Tai-tsu and Tai-tsung conquered the various states, their "usurped officials," who were loyal to those they had served, were expressly praised by the Emperors and even appointed to office. Thus, Hsu Hsien and P'an Shen-hsiu all received imperial favor. And even though Wei Yung and Chang Chi talked arrogantly, they were still pardoned. Therefore, even those who had alienated themselves from and been opposed to and the Sung subsequently dedicated their loyalty [to the new dynasty].

Apparently, the material cited contradicts the earlier argument that the Sung discriminated against the p'ei-ch'en.

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525 Emperor Tai-tsu only offered the post of Military Training Commissioner of Chi-chou to Lu Chiang, who had served as Military Commissioner of the Southern T'ang, in order to get him to surrender. (Ma-shu, 22: 5ab.)

526 Kung-shih Chi, p. 607. Another example was Wu Chu. He served as Assistant Magistrate in Peng-tse in the Southern T'ang, and was assigned the same post in P'ing-yin by the Sung. (Ou-yang Wen-chung-kung wen-chi, p. 275.)

527 Wei Tai, Tung-hsien Pi-lu, Pai-hai ed., 1: 3b.
but it actually reveals the Sung pragmatism and flexibility in appointing the p'ei-ch'en. Given the situation that employing the p'ei-ch'en was indispensable to local administration, it was wise for the Sung rulers to stress the principle of loyalty in order to eradicate the impression prevailing during late T'ang that transferring allegiances was as easy and swift as gambling.

Under this principle, many p'ei-ch'en like Hsu Hsien, Cheng Wen-pao, and Liu chi were praised for their loyalty and respect to Li Yu. Some of them received good promotions. For instance, Liu Mou-chung, a famous general, served as Prefect of Yuan-chou in Chiang-nan. Emperor Tai-tsu was impressed by his loyalty to his former master, and thus treated him very well by making him as Prefect of Teng-chou. At that time, the Sung, with a view to the problems of regionalism had caused previous dynasties, tried to undermine the authority of the military commissioners. Therefore, those sent to take charge of local administration in various prefectures were civilians. This was a way to "restrain military power, and stress civil administration". But Emperor Tai-tsu did not follow the rule in appointing Liu, and

528 Shu-shui Chi-wen, p. 8; Tung-hsien Pi-lu, 1: 3b; Sung-shih, p. 9875; Chang-pien, p. 432; and Huang-chao Lui-vao, 55: 10b-11a.

529 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 10: 10a.

530 Hsiao-hsu Chi, p. 504; Lo-chuan Chi, 33:7a.
this was definitely a rare exception.

On the other hand, some disloyal p’ei-ch’en were severely punished. After the Sung conquered Ching-hu, Emperor Tai-tsu ordered the Southern T’ang to provide ships to transport rice from the newly acquired area to the capital. Liu Cheng-hsun, Commissioner of the Palace of Morality and Prosperity (Té-chang Kung shih) and a treacherous man, surmised that Li Yu was unable to uphold his rule. Therefore, he tried to ingratiate himself with the Emperor so that he would benefit if the Southern T’ang fell. He volunteered to take on the task. But Emperor Tai-tsu was aware of his intention and held him in disdain. After the collapse of Li’s regime, Liu Cheng-hsun went to the capital and announced his contribution of transporting rice to the capital. The Emperor replied,

The service was rendered by your master [Li Yu]; what contribution did you offer!

The Emperor then threw him out, and ordered that Liu not be appointed. After Liu had tarried at the capital for a long time and exhausted all his money, he became a beggar and died of cold and hunger. 531

As discussed before, the reason the p’ei-ch’en were able to serve in the new dynasty was not simply good will on the part of the Sung, but also their previous experience in Southern Lu-shu, chuan 12: 7ab. Chang Chi was also a treacherous and disloyal person, but his artful words and flattery gained the imperial favor of both Emperors Tai-tsu and Tai-tsung.

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T'ang bureaucracy, which served as a stepping stone for them to enter the Sung officialdom. Therefore, the p'ei-ch’én were not expected to be immediately loyal to their new rulers.

In order to ensure that scholar-officials were loyal solely to the Sung, the Sung rulers used the civil service examination system to recruit the young literati. Moreover, because the number of p'ei-ch’én who were appointed was rather small, the government needed to recruit more new officials by expanding the civil service examination system. As the Chang-pien records, when Emperor Tai-tsung ascended the throne, due to territorial expansion and an urgent demand for officials, he tried to widely recruit those "hampered and stagnated" (yen-chih, referring to those unable to serve under the old recruitment system) to fill the vacancies. 332

The Yin-i I-mou Lu also states,

At the beginning of the dynasty, the chin-shih examination was still patterned on the T'ang system and only twenty or thirty candidates were recruited every year. In 977, due to the shortage of officials in the prefectures and counties, Emperor Tai-tsung recruited many candidates. The number of candidates was almost five hundred, twenty times more than the past. 333

Compared to Emperor Tai-tsu, Emperor Tai-tsung was much more aware of the function of the civil service examinations in promoting the loyalty of the candidates to the dynasty. To

332 Chang-pien, p. 393.

333 Yin-i I-mou Lu, 1: 4a. Besides filling vacancies, they were used as a basis for the implementation of civil administration. (Yeh Meng-te, Pi-shu Lu-hua, Hsueh-ching T’ao-yuan Pen ed., A: 51b.)
examine the candidates in person and to appoint the literati of humble origins, the Emperor actually bought the loyalty of the candidates. Under the circumstances, the successful candidates would always remember the generosity of the emperor, when they obtained high office and a good salary.

Also, Emperor Tai-tsung seized authority from the local administration in appointing officials. As recorded in the Lo-chuan Chi, during the reign of Emperor Tai-tsu, prefectures still followed a traditional practice dating back to the T'ang and the Five Dynasties, authorizing chief officials to appoint their subordinates. When Emperor Tai-tsung came to the throne, power was concentrated in the central government. In order to ensure a sufficient number of officials available during the process of centralization, the Emperor "increased the number of candidates selected from the civil service examinations".

Emperor Tai-tsung enjoyed flaunting his imperial generosity to subordinates as a means of strengthening a sense of gratitude among them. In a conversation with his close officials in 983, the Emperor stressed that while no able people remained in the countryside, the court was filled with gentlemen. This was the result of his efforts to recruit the

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534 Pan Chung-yen Chi, included in Chuan-sung Wen, 389: 34; Hsiao-hsu Chi, p. 407.
535 Lo-chuan Chi, 39: 44a.
literati. Moreover, Emperor Tai-tsung tried his best to make sure that they had good careers. The Emperor then claimed,

I was nothing but generous to the scholar-officials. \(^{536}\)

In other words, those who were recruited were expected to offer their loyalty to the Emperor in return.

In 988, Emperor Tai-tsung had a conversation with Chang Hung (939-1001), who served as Vice Military Affairs Commissioners. Apart from boasting that his efforts to enlist the literati to serve the government, leaving no qualified people unemployed within the whole territory, the Emperor also told Chang,

You, Lu Meng-cheng (946-1011) and others were oppressed by some prominent officials in the past. If it were not for my own discretion, how could you people have reached this stage? \(^{537}\)

Since they were the "disciples of the Emperor" (tien-tzu man-sheng), the chin-shih degree holders were better than that of those who went through other channels to enter official realm in treatment. During the civil service examinations in 977, 500 candidates obtained the chin-chih and other degrees. They were all given green robes, boots, a hu, \(^{538}\) and a

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\(^{536}\) Chang-pien, p. 547.

\(^{537}\) Ibid., p. 654.

\(^{538}\) A Hu was a tablet, about three feet in length by about three inches in width slightly tapered at the ends, which was constructed of various materials— that of the emperor was made of jade; that of a feudal prince, of ivory; that of a high official, of mottled bamboo ornamented with sharkskin tassels; that of a lesser official, of bamboo bordered with ivory. It was held before the chest at an audience, and was used as a writing tablet. (Based on
banquet held in the Kai-pao Temple, as well as poems composed by the Emperor.

Besides these honors, they were rewarded by being given good entry positions in the official realm. The first and second ranks of the chin-shih and chiu-ching degree holders were appointed as Aides of Director of the Palace Building (chiang-tso chien-cheng), Case Reviewers of the Court of Judicial Review and Controller General of various prefectures. Those included in the categories of Associate Metropolitan Graduate (tung chin-shih chu-shen) and various subjects (chu-k’o) were sent directly to the Ministry of Rite for appointments without further examinations or evaluations by the Ministry of Personnel. Others who had performed fairly well in the examination were appointed Supervisors of the Bureau, Associate Magistrates and District Defenders (p’an-szu pu-wei). Certainly the Emperor was strikingly generous to the candidates. As the Chang-pien states,

the imperial favor was conspicuous, and had been absent in previous dynasties.

Some prominent officials like Hsueh Chu-cheng were against this policy, arguing that there were too many recruited and their appointments were too quick and easy. But Emperor Tai-tsung, who was eager to enhance the civil administration and restrain the power of the military, turned a deaf to these
admonitions. Therefore, when Lu Meng-cheng and other new degree holders bid farewell to the Emperor before leaving for their posts, they were given 200,000 cash as a travel allowance (chuang-chien).  

By entering the bureaucracy by means of the civil service examinations, these candidates were not affected by the policy of geographical relocation. Chen Shu, a native of Hung-chou, was appointed Controller General of his native land when he passed the civil service examinations in 977. This appointment reflects the fact that Emperor Tai-tsung had good faith in those he had recruited himself, and he did not worry about whether they would stir up trouble in their native lands.

In contrast to the "disciples of the emperor," the p'ei-ch'en continued to suffer discrimination. In addition to the demotions mentioned above, they were ordered to wear official green uniforms regardless of how high their rank was, for it was a way to distinguish them from those of the Central Kingdom.

Moreover, they were admonished verbally by the Emperor, a sign of distrust, when they were sent to serve in various

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539 Chang-pien, p. 394.

540 Chen Shu asked for a transfer because he wanted to comply with the policy of relocation. As a result, he was relocated to Li-chou. (Sung-shih, p. 9198.)

541 Yin-i I-mou Lu, 4: 1a.
counties and prefectures. Only some exceptionally good p'ei-ch'en who had gained the trust of the Emperor were able to avoid this verbal warning. 542

Another hardship faced by the p'ei-ch'en was a slow rate of promotion. For example, Liu Wu-i, who served as Magistrate in Chiang-nan, was appointed Magistrate again in Lei-tse by the Sung. He remained in the same post for fifteen years, although he was transferred three times to different counties. While serving in these counties,

Liu Wu-i was exhausted by pointless toil. Living in humiliation, repression, poverty, and disgrace, he was frustrated by the affairs pertaining to death, burial and sickness. His hair turned gray, and his official uniform became dusty. 543

Undoubtedly, relying on one's previous office and rank in beginning one's official career in the Sung was not advantageous with respect to earning promotions.

Under the circumstances, the p'ei-ch'en had to find ways of improving their position in the bureaucracy. Some clever p'ei-ch'en realized that their past experience was an handicap. They tried to show that they had made a new start that meant they had distanced themselves from their previous emotional, social and political affinity to the Southern T'ang. For this reason, Liu Wu-i presented thirty chuan of his literary works

542 Chang-pien, p. 374.  
543 Hsiao-hsu Chi, p 287.
to the court and asked to take a written examination in 990. Thanks to his outstanding performance on the examination, he was assigned to a position as Controller General of Hsiang-yuan.

The position was still low, and the prefecture was small, but Liu Wu-i had obtained it by means of his literary achievements. Therefore, educated people viewed it as an honor. 544

However, the ultimate way to get on an equal footing with the "disciples of the emperor" in the bureaucracy was to become the "disciples of the emperor" one's self by taking the civil service examinations, as shown by what happened in 980:

Liu Chang-yen (942-999), Yen Ming-yuan, and Chang Kuan from Pi-ling, as well as Lo Shih from I-huang, based on their status as officials, took part in the chin-shih examination. But Emperor Tai-tsung considered the title of chin-shih to be an honor and thus did not grant this title. Instead, he appointed them Chief Secretaries (chung-shu-chi) of nearby prefectures. 545

Liu had served Chen Hung-tsin in Chuan-chou; Yen's origin was not known; Cheng and Lo were p'ei-ch'en from Chiang-nan. The reason they participated in the examinations was most likely their desire to improve their chances of promotion and to receive better treatment in the bureaucracy.

However, although Chang and Lo managed to pass the written examination, they were not granted the title of chin-shih

544 Ibid., p. 387.
545 Chang-pien, p. 473.
because the Emperor "cherished honors at examination". During the reign of Emperor Tai-tsu, several hundred chin-shih degrees were granted within a few years, some who were smart and capable, but also to countless to incompetents.

In other words, Chang Kuan and Lo Shih could not obtain the chin-shih degree was out of the imperial prejudice against the p'ei-ch'en.

However, this biased policy did not last long, as shown by the imperial conferment of the chin-shih degree on Lo Shih shortly thereafter. From then on, the civil service examinations became an effective means of enabling the p'ei-ch'en to circumvent such restrictions and improve their positions within the bureaucracy. For instance, Li Yen succeeded in the chin-shih examination and was given the post of Administrator for the Public Order (szu-li tsan-chun) in Ch’u-chou. He was then allowed to cross the Yangtze River and fulfill his filial duties by serving his mother.

Chai Hsiang also started his public career as Assistant

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546 Min-shui Yin-tan Lu, 1: 1b.
547 Yu-lin Kung-i, p. 3.
548 Chang-pien, p. 473. Chang Kuan did not obtain imperial favor, and he got his chin-shih degree only by means of later presenting his literary works. (Sung-shih, p. 9400.) It is unclear why the emperor treated them with partiality.
549 Wu-hsi Chi, 19: 16a.
Magistrate of Lei-hsia and was then promoted to Commandant of Peng-cheng. During his tenure of six to seven years, he was required to stoop to serving in minor posts and living in obscurity. But after 983, when Chai obtained the chin-shih degree, his prospects improved greatly. As the Hsiao-hsu Chi states, scholar officials generally felt that

those who did not start their careers by means of the chin-shih examination would feel ashamed for their entire lives; those prominent officials who did not return to their native places, would be criticized as wearing embroidered robes and sneaking around at night; and those who had official salaries but who could not feed their parents should forsake their positions.

After Chai Hsiang had passed the civil service examinations, he was able to overcome the aforementioned obstacles and had the opportunity to prove his worth and put his ideals into practice. Also, he was no longer restricted by the policy of relocation. As a native of Kuang-ling, he was appointed Retainer (tsung-shih) of his native land. 550

For the literati who had been expelled from the bureaucracy in Chiang-nan because of conduct, the civil service examinations provided them with the chance to begin public careers in the Sung. Peng Ao was loathed by the literati of his home town for his indulgence in drinking and gambling and his utter lack of virtue. Given after he had studied at a private school, the Pai-lu-tung Shu-yuan, he was even more  

550 Hsiao-hsu Chi, p. 288.
wicked than before. As he grew older, his behavior changed and he placed great emphasis on loyalty and piety. However, he was still condemned by the authorities because of his past behavior. Finally he began a career in the Sung by means of succeeding in the civil service examinations. 551

For those ex-officials who were not chosen to continue their public careers, their family members could still obtain status of scholar-officials by passing the civil service examinations. For instance, Liu Yuan-tsai served as Director of the Ministry of Justice in Chiang-nan, but he was not employed by the Sung. However, Liu P’u, his son, succeeded in obtaining his chin-shih degree in 985 and was appointed Judge of the Surveillance Circuit (kuan-cha t’ui-kuan) in I-chou. 552

III, The Functions of "Subsidiary Officials" in Early Sung Bureaucracy

Despite the fact that they suffered many injustices, some p’ei-ch’en were still able to make valuable contributions to Sung.

Good officials in traditional China were expected to offer advice to the rulers, and the p’ei-ch’en performed well in

551 Lu-shu, chuan 11: 6b.
552 Fan Chung-hsuan Chi, 12: 12b.
this respect. When Emperor Tai-tsung was preparing to harshly punish the subordinates of Prince Hsu for their neglect in offering advice and guidance, Wei Yu, a subsidiary official from chiang-nan, dissuaded the Emperor from doing so, citing the case of the "perverse heir-apparent" (li tai-tzu) in the Han. Consequently, "all of those being impeached in the case received light punishment." 553

The p'ei-ch'en were also renowned for their ability to recommend qualified officials to the court. For example, Shih Pi was serious in his recommendations of officials, bowing in the direction of the capital, burning incense and holding the memorandum. Therefore, while the number of candidates he recommended was few, those who he did recommend eventually gained prominence. 554

Moreover, some p'ei-ch'en were experts in regulating the waterways which was an indispensable skill to the Sung. Chen Cheng-chao (896-969) was responsible for constructing the Hui-min and Wu-chang canals. His calculations of the manpower needed for these projects were so accurate that they were off by only five persons. Additionally, he was ordered to dredge a large lake outside the Gate Chu-ming in order to train the

553 Hou-te Lu, 4: 1ab. Shih Pi (950-1012) was also famous for offering good advice, and he gained great favor from Emperor Tai-tsong. (Chang-pien, p. 716.)

554 Tung-hsien Pi-lu, 10: 10ab.
water forces. \[^55\] Later, when Emperor Tai-tsu attacked Tai-yuan, Chen suggested redirecting the waters of the Fen River to flood the city. \[^56\]

Apart from enhancing their reputation, \[^57\] literary works enabled the literati from Chiang-nan to obtain official positions. Although Yang I was a scholar of humble origins, Emperor Tai-tsung appreciated his literary ability and promoted him to a post in the Academies and Halls (kuan-tien). Emperor Chen-tsung also promoted him to Academician of the Hanlin Academy and Director of the Ministry of Revenue (hu-pu lang-chung) and had him participate in drafting proclamations (chih chih-kao). \[^58\]

Literary talent also enabled p'ei-ch'en to strengthen their positions within the Sung bureaucracy. Lu Chung-wen served as Editorial Director (chu-tso lang) during the early period of Tai-ping Hsing-kuo (976-984). Whenever Emperor Tai-tsung

\[^55\] Yu-hu Ch'ing-hua, 3: 4b-5b.

\[^56\] Ibid. Another example is Liu Chi, who had a good reputation in his ability to handle flooding, and whose abilities was well proven in his work at Yun-chou. (Huang-chao Liu-yao, 55: 10b-11a; Chang-pien, p. 523.)

\[^57\] For example, Ch'iu Hsu collected the "wise sayings" (chuan-yu) of ancient wise and sagacious people and compiled them to publication. The collection became widely circulated because it served as subject matters for people's conversation with guests and friends at banquet. Also his poetic and versed compositions reached the T'ang achievement in style, and his style became the model for his followers. (Ma-shu, 23: 6a.)

wished to read ancient inscriptions on stone tablets, he always summoned Lu, Shu Ya (?-1009), Tu Kao and Wu Shu, all of whom were p'ei-ch'en, to read the texts. The Emperor also asked Lu to read for him the Wen-chuan and the Chiang-hai Fu, and rewarded him handsomely. Consequently, Lu Chung-wen was appointed Reader-in-Waiting of Han-lin Academy (Han-lin shih-tu) and served in the Imperial Academy of Calligraphy (yu-shu yuan), simultaneous with his original office. Even though some p'ei-ch'en were immoral, they still gained imperial favor because of their literary skill. Chang Chi, for instance, was a treacherous man who was impolite to Li Yu, his former master, and liked pointing out the faults of others. Nevertheless, he was a skilled flatterer, and his essays were refined and elegant. Therefore, he was able to win the imperial favor of Emperor Tai-tsung for a long time. He even served as a participant in determining governmental matters (tsan-chih cheng-shih). He was the most prominent among the ex-officials of Chiang-nan.

The emphasis on the literary achievements of the p'ei-ch'en

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559 Sung-chih, p. 9871. According to the Chang-pien, the post of han-lin shih-tu was set up in 983. (p. 559.)
560 Sung-shih, p. 9215.
561 Chang-pien, p. 801.
562 Ma-shu, 23: 8b-9a. As for the role and position of the southerners in early Sung politics, see Appendix XIII.
was also revealed in the high number of their appointments to literary posts. As recorded in the Chun-ming T‘ui-chao Lu, in 976, Emperor Tai-tsung ordered T‘ang Yueh, Hsu Hsien, Wang K‘e-cheng, and Chang Chi to serve in the Document Drafting Office (she-jen yuan). "These four gentlemen were all men of letters from Chiang-nan."  

In addition to their literary abilities, most of the scholar-officials from Chiang-nan had extensive knowledge of the Classics. As a matter of fact, providing solutions to difficult problems pertaining to the Classics was also an important skill that enabled the scholar-officials from Chiang-nan to survive under the new regime. During Hsu Hsien’s service as Policy Advisor, Emperor Tai-tsung asked him the meaning of the word kuan-chia. Hsu replied that

the Three Sage Kings (san-huang) all ruled under the sun based on their public spirit, while the Five Sovereigns (wu-ti) ruled out of selfishness. The Kuan-chia thus means the emperor.  

When the Khitans launched massive operations against the Sung in 1004, Emperor Chen-tsung was getting ready to lead an imperial expedition to Shan-yuan amidst public panic. As the imperial entourage was leaving the capital, the army band began to play music. The Emperor was suspicious of this and

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questioned his officials. Tu Kao replied,

When King Wu of the Chou led forces to fight against King Chou of the Shang, there were songs in front of and dances behind the troops.

Emperor Chen-tsung was satisfied with this response and ordered the band to continue playing. "The fears of the populace were thus greatly allayed." 565

Moreover, a number of the p'ei-ch'en understood many of the changes that had taken place in rites and institutions over the centuries. Unquestionably, familiarity with rituals and court ceremonies enabled the p'ei-ch'en to be entrusted and favored by the Sung emperors, and this was the reason they were usually appointed as consultants in rituals and ceremonies. 566 For instance, Emperor Tai-tsung ordered Yang Hui-chih, who was serving as Senior Compiler of the Institute of Historiography (shih-kuan hsiu-chuan), and his colleagues to revise an old diagram of entering the hall of officials in the presence of the emperor. Chang Chi submitted a memorandum outlining the system of imperial audience. 567

During the reign of Emperor Tai-tsung, activities involving the rules of etiquette were not plentiful, and the abilities


566 For example, Chen Peng-nien "attained power because of his knowledge of literary composition and history", and earned the deep trust of Emperor Chen-tsung. (Chang-pien, p. 1788.)

of the literary officials from Chiang-nan were unable to be fully displayed. After Emperor Chen-tsung came to the throne, however, this situation changed drastically because of an increased need to perform rituals to consecrate the sacred mountain (feng-shan) and to worship the ancestors and heaven.\footnote{568}

Among those who were appointed, Chen Peng-nien was most trusted by Emperor Chen-tsung, for he was praised as "erudite and assiduous". In addition to these merits, Chen was also quite knowledgeable about rituals and the law. The presentation of his arguments always logical and eloquent.

Because Chen Peng-nien was widely familiar with the classics, histories, philosophies, and literary work of the past, the Emperor Chen-tsung praised him, saying,

How could he achieve that without having a good memory?"\footnote{569}

As the \textit{Tao-shan Ch'ing-hua} records,

Chen Peng-nien, because of his erudition and powers of retention, was appreciated by Emperor Chen-tsung. Whatever he was asked, there was nothing he did not know.\footnote{570}

\footnote{568} When Emperor Chen-tsung wished to make an imperial sacrifice to heaven on Tai-shan, he ordered Tu kao and Chen Peng-nien to inform ritual officials on the rules of such a ritual. And when the emperor wished to worship in Fen-yin, the same arrangement was made. (Li Yu, \textit{Sung-chao Shih-shih}, Szu-ku Chen-pen ed., 11: 20a.)

\footnote{569} \textit{Chang-pien}, pp. 1830-1. Regarding Chen Peng-nien's performance in answering the emperor's questions and formulating rituals, see p. 2046.

\footnote{570} \textit{Tao-shan Ch'ing-hua}, 27ab.
Indeed, Chen Peng-nien never disappointed the Emperor, thus winning the imperial trust and high opinion.

All affairs, no matter how big or small, must be decided by Chen Peng-nien. In the past, when the court deliberated on rite and ceremony, even though it underwent the examination of the authorities, the decisions were actually made by the laymen and became the fixed patterns. 571

Therefore, Chen's authority on rituals and ceremonies could not be challenged, even when he actually made mistakes. It is recorded in the Mo-k'o Hui-hsi that once, Chen Peng-nien, who was acting Chief Minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (tai-chang ching), mistakenly directed that the imperial carriage to ride on "the ecliptic" (huang-tao). When questioned by the authorities, Chen Peng-nien responded with a straight face that his actions was based on tradition.

The officials of the ritual branch feared of his erudition, and dared not make any further inquiry." 572

Because of his outstanding performance, Chen Peng-nien was treated well by Emperor Chen-tsung, and lavished with several promotions and many great honors. When Chen served in Hanlin Academy, he took on more than ten positions at the same time. All of these positions were scholarly and refined, and his contemporaries called his official title (shu-hsien) as an "icy stick" (i-tiao-ping) which signified the "purity and

571 Chang-pien, p. 1831.
importance" (ch'ing-yao) of his rank and office. 573

In 1013, Emperor Chen-tsung appointed Chen Peng-nien, who at the time was serving as Right Grand Master of Remonstrance (yu chien-i ta-fu), to the position of Hanlin Academician and concurrent Auxiliary Academician of the Dragon Diagram Hall (han-lin hsueh-shih chien Lung-tu-ko chih hsueh-shih). This sharply contrasted with customary practice. As the Chang-pien states,

The practice of allowing academicians to accept other posts concurrently began with this.

The Emperor also bestowed his own poetry on Chen Peng-nien and explained to Hsiang Min-chung (949-1020) that he treated Chen with such great honor and esteem because Chen was "different from ordinary people". 574

Additionally, Emperor Chen-tsung held Tu Kao in great esteem and included him and Chen Peng-nien in the same category, praising their hard work by saying that despite his ages, Tu Kao still refused to give up his books, while Chen Peng-nien wrote ten thousand characters every day. 575

Another p'ei-ch'en Emperor Chen-tsung favored was Lo Shih.

574 Chang-pien, p. 1830.
575 Chang-pien, p. 1673. As for the imperial favor shown to Tu Kao, it is well documented that Tu was almost killed by wine Emperor Chen-tsung had given him. For details, see the Chu-shu Chi-wen, p. 64.
In 1002, the Emperor assigned Lo Shih, who was serving as Vice Director of Bureau of Operations (chih-fang yuan-wai-lang) in the branch office of the west capital (fen-szu Hsi-t'ching), to serve as Aide in the Historiography Institute (chih Chih-kuan). At that time, Lo was over seventy years old. He went to Kai-feng to present a congratulatory memorandum from the regent of Lo-yang, and was granted an imperial audience. As well as being praised by the Emperor as still hale and hearty, he was also praised as diligent and fond of writing. As a result, Lo was appointed to the same post in Historiography Institutes in which he had served before.

Lo Shih and Lo Huang-mu, his son, all served in the Institute of Historiography, and their contemporaries viewed it as an honor.

In order to maintain the Emperor's favor, some p'ei-ch'en had to pay a heavy price to keep up their energy and performance, among whom Chen Peng-nien was a prime example. Because Chen overexerted himself in establishing rules for rituals and ceremonies as well as drafting imperial edicts, he became exhausted and subsequently suffered a nervous breakdown. Ultimately, he died in misery. Undoubtedly,

576 Emperor Chen-tsung also ordered all the books written by Lo Shih to be placed in the Imperial Archives (pi-fu) as a sign of imperial favor. For details, see the Chang-pien, p. 1164.

577 Chen Peng-nien's scattered faculties showed themselves in the following ways. First, he was unable to dress or feed himself properly. He neglected to bathe himself even when he was drenched with sweat in the summer. He could not even remember the names of
Chen's unfortunate experiences illustrate that it was by no means easy for a p'ei-ch'én to survive and distinguish himself under the new regime.

his family members and servants. (Chang-pien, p. 2046.) Because of his obsessive efforts perform well and to gain the emperor's favor, he even disregarded an infection in his foot; moreover, he was too busy to know what kinds of trees and flowers were planted in his garden. (Yu-lin Kung-i, p. 9.)
CONCLUSION

From the mid T'ang onwards, the political and social position of those who had earned the "Presented Scholar" degree gained increasing importance. Success in the civil service examinations relied not only on personal talent, but also on one's acquaintance and connection with powerful officials.

The importance of personal relationships became increasingly conspicuous, especially when unfairness in the examinations caused by the political decline of the late T'ang, reached its peak. Lacking the geographical advantages and the personal liaisons enjoyed by the children of officials living in the capital and the surrounding area, it was difficult for those in the countryside to establish good relationships with prominent officials.

In order to increase their opportunities, many literati moved to the capital, thus leading to the centralization of regional literati. The uprooting of the local base of literary clans in many prefectures in turn diminished their regional influence and authority. The source of power which determined local affairs was then confined to the local administrative and military structure, as well as local hooligans and bullies who, though they lacked good lineage and failed to achieve success in the civil service examinations, nevertheless were able to bring the local people to
When the authority of the local government finally crumbled during the late T'ang, these bullies capitalized on the opportunity to seize control in the prefectures by force, declaring themselves legitimate rulers. Since they had ample power to mobilize people to work in their interest, the importance of a good family background to their political and military dominance was rather marginal. This is the reason Yang Hsing-mi was not eager to seek the support of reputable families, and this historical background explains the military nature of Yang's regime.

When Yang Hsing-mi established his rule, he occupied himself with initiating remedial measures to alleviate the plight of the local people. Because this was a high priority, he lacked the time and energy to check the usurpous activities of his generals, who were assigned to prefectures as Prefects and Military Commissioners. Unless they directly revolted against him, Yang did not impose military sanctions on them.

However, Yang Hsing-mi's leniency towards his generals does not imply that he lacked the military power to control them. During Yang's earliest attempts to establish his rule, he relied completely on the military support of his old friends from his native place, as well as some generals from other areas. But Yang Hsing-mi fully understood that it was unwise to base his authority solely on acquaintances whose only
virtues were the fact that they were from the same area and
the fact that he had known them for a long time. Therefore,
when Yang crushed Sun Ju, he absorbed Sun's best generals and
soldiers into his own bodyguard. After increasing in size and
strength over a considerable period of time, Yang's bodyguard
gained the upper hand over his prefects and military
commissioners.

Putting an end to the privileges enjoyed by the generals and
placing them under the rule of the central government was
instrumental in the consolidation of Hsu Wen's power. In
terms of seniority and military achievement, Hsu was much
inferior to Yang Hsing-mi's old generals. As an usurper, Hsu
Wen naturally stirred up the enmity of the old generals.

Hsu Wen began his military career in his youth as a low-
ranking subordinate of Yang Hsing-mi. Subsequently, he was
promoted to the highest post within the commanding and
administrative structure of Yang Hsing-mi's bodyguard.
Obviously, Hsu's military career enabled him to establish his
influence and authority in the central army, and this is the
reason why he was able to mobilize the army against the
generals.

Among Hsu Wen's various repressive measures, the bloodiest
was outright massacre. He also made use of the structural
changes as a means of dividing and undermining the authority
of the generals. Occasionally, Hsu Wen adopted a conciliatory
policy in order to appease the generals' discontent and enmity. The major facts of this policy were courteous treatment of the generals and arranging marriage alliances for those who willingly submitted to his rule. All of the aforementioned measures served to centralize military and political power.

In the process of keeping the generals under control, Hsu Wen concerned himself only with matters of loyalty and not at all with rules of proper behavior. This is probably due to the fact that he himself had a military background and thus did not appreciate the serious nature of the breaches of rules and etiquette committed by the generals. Therefore, Hsu Wen's policy helped to undermine the generals' authority, but never entirely eliminated the military flavor of the regime.

When Hsu Chih-kao came to power, Yang Hsing-mi's generals no longer posed a serious threat to him. However, he was not satisfied with the situation. To him, the ultimate way to eliminate the military influence inherent in the government since the era of Yang Hsing-mi was to stabilize the regime by introducing a civil administration.

When Hsu Chih-kao first became Prefect of Sheng-chou, he had already distinguished himself from other military men by emphasizing the importance of a civil administration. After he became the actual ruler of Chiang-huai, the civil administration was further strengthened.
According to the cardinal principle of the civil administration, military men should be under the control of civilian leadership and their behavior should comply with regulations and formalities. Under this political atmosphere, many military clans and families underwent a transformation into civilians, and their behavior and inclinations changed tremendously.

The extent of the willingness of the people to adapt to the civilian transformation was related to their prospects of following civilian careers. Under the circumstances, becoming civilians in most cases became a necessity for the meritorious generals and their children who wished to preserve their political and social privileges.

The civilian transformation was not confined just to the generals from Yang Hsing-mi's core group, but also extended to those military officers of middle and lower ranks who were stationed in local areas. Many military families and clans of widely differing regions and ranks underwent the process of the civil transformation, which effectively demonstrates the success of Hsu Chih-kao's civil administration. As for those who remained in military careers and who were reluctant to change in response to the contemporary trend, they were destined to be ousted from their government posts and to sink into obscurity.

If the ultimate purpose of the civil administration was to
rid politics of the military interference of the generals in order to stabilize the government, simply transforming the military families and clans into civilians was not sufficient to achieve this goal. The most effective means was to create a complete and efficient bureaucracy, as well as to fill all vacancies in the central and local administrative structures with civilians.

Nevertheless, while the structural build-up and change required an increased need for literati, the formerly military clans who had undergone a civilian transformation were unable to produce sufficient numbers of qualified personnel. It became vital to turn to other sources in order to implement the new civil administration.

In addition to using a system of rewards to encourage the local literati to serve, Hsu Chih-kao was energetic in summoning and recruiting scholar-officials from the north. At that time, many political refugees were fleeing to Chiang-huai because of the disorder and chaos in North China. Hsu Chih-kao took the opportunity to absorb them into his administration.

But most of such officials were only interested in "pure and important" positions in the central government, viewing regional posts with disdain. If the local administrative structure could not be filled by the literati, the civil administration would never be brought to fruition.
In order to solve this problem, Hsu Chih-kao recruited the literati from the countryside who lacked political ambition to fill the local posts; he also forcibly assigned those persons in the central administration whom he did not favor to local positions.

However, it was also necessary for Hsu Chih-kao to establish an institutionalized method of recruitment. Therefore, setting up the civil service examinations in order to enlist qualified people to serve in the local governments was indispensable to the success of the civil administration.

When Hsu Chih-kao first established the system, it consisted solely of examinations for children and of examinations in the Classics. The examination candidates who took the former type of examination were usually the children of officials serving in local administrations. Since these officials were low-ranking, the policy of protection did not apply to their sons in order for them to become officials. If their children wished to begin a public service career, they needed to take the examinations before coming of age. If they passed, they would obtain a post in local administration when they reached adulthood. The latter type of examinations was provided for those people who lacked any official background or influential friends, and this was basically the only way by which they might launch their civil service career.

When the regime of the Southern T'ang formally began, a few
other degrees such as that of the "Presented Scholar" and a law degree were added to the civil service examination system, so as to meet the needs of people who possessed different interests and talents. Like those who took the examinations for children and examinations in the Classics, most of the examination candidates came from poor families or low-ranking local officials' families. For those candidates who were successful, they were glad to enter the civil administration, even though they were only assigned provincial posts. In this way, Hsu Chih-kao and his successors accomplished the civil transformation of local administrations, which eliminated military domination by Yang Hsing-mi's generals and their descendants.

In order to revitalize the cultural and literary traditions of his domain, Hsu Chih-kao encouraged the members of many clans to stay together for generations by promoting education and collecting books. The goal of such measures was to abolish the militarism which had prevailed in the Chiang-huai region since the late T'ang period.

During the Five Dynasties, North China experienced a long period of war and chaos which caused a decline in almost all aspects of its cultural heritage. In addition, most of the rulers were military leaders and their regimes were strongly militaristic, thus relegating the T'ang's rituals and institutions to insignificance.
Contrarily, beginning with the reign of Hsu Chih-kao, the Southern T'ang made great efforts to recruit scholar-officials from the north. Most of these political refugees came from the Later T'ang and many had been officials in that regime. Consequently, Chiang-nan became an ideal place for cultural preservation.

At the time the Sung regime was established, serious corruption of rituals and music was already underway, and the Southern T'ang naturally became an important source for the Sung to supplement missing parts of their rituals and music. Some famous scholar-officials from Chiang-nan were hired to serve as officials in ceremonies. The rituals and institutions preserved in the south were then brought back to the north by these officials, thus enabling the Sung to play an important role in reviving Chinese cultural heritage.

The contribution of the Southern T'ang was also tremendous in the area of collecting and preserving literature. The number of books stored in Chin-ling was the greatest of all the territories conquered by the Sung. Whenever the Southern T'ang obtained rare books, it usually ordered literary officials to have them collated and annotated. This was why Sung scholars viewed the books edited by the Southern T'ang as superior to those collected from other areas. The Sung government also recruited famous literary officials to take charge of drafting edict and imperial announcements.
Moreover, during the reign of the Southern T'ang, Chiang-huai enjoyed a considerable period of peace and stability. In this peaceful and secure environment, scholar-officials were inspired to develop a lifestyle of grace and leisure. As a result, their way of life and superior culture were admired and imitated by the northerners.

Nevertheless, the cultural superiority of the Southern T'ang also inspired the enmity of Sung scholar-officials. Consequently, they attempted to avenge themselves on the southerners by waging a series of cultural attacks.

The Chiang-nan scholar-officials also had a great impact because of their conspicuous participation in the Sung administration. Although they adopted repressive measures in dealing with subsidiary officials, the Sung were forced to employ some scholar-officials from Chiang-nan due to a heavy demand from bureaucratic need. In their assignment of subsidiary officials, the Sung always showed great suspicion and discrimination against them, as in the policy of geographical displacement, demotions and slow promotions. However, subsidiary officials were nonetheless able to eventually improve their prospects for promotion and fair treatment by taking the civil service examinations. Also, their literary abilities and profound knowledge of ceremony enabled them to gain imperial favor, which in turn consolidated their position in Sung bureaucracy.
APPENDICES

Appendix A: The Criteria of Using Subsidiary Histories, Note Books and Stories

Using note books and stories is a common practice in Sinology. In order to ensure correctness and reliability, only the note books and stories able to meet the following criteria are to be quoted in my dissertation:

1. Those compiled earlier than the standard histories, and having no anachronisms in their texts, or variations from standard histories report about the same events.

2. Those highly regarded by academic circles for their reliable and detailed records on particular matters. For instance, the T’ang-chi Yen is well respected for its abundant records on T’ang civil service examinations, while the Yu-hu Ch’ing-hua is respected for its detailed description of the history of the Southern T’ang.

As shown by The Empire of the Min, Schafer includes Chen Chin-feng Wai-chuan (abbreviated as Wai-chuan) in his basic sources. Though the Wai-chuan was supposed to have been dug up by a farmer in Fukien in the Wan-li period (1573-1620) and be a forgery, Schafer, together with many distinguished Chinese scholars, have not hesitated to refer to it as an original source because the Wai-chuan has "no apparent anachronisms in the text, or variations from contemporary sources when the same events are referred to". Also, the new material recorded in the Wai-chuan, though erotic, is "very colorful" and particularly useful to the description of the court life during the reign of Wang Lin (?-935, r. 926-935), the first Emperor of Min. In addition to Wai-chuan, Ch’ing-i Lu is also quoted by Schafer. It is probable that most of the materials recorded are obtained by direct observation and actual experience of T’ao Ku, and its reliability is thus ensured. (p. 119.)
3. Those records accurately reflecting the social, political, and cultural viewpoints resulting from direct observation by contemporary scholar-officials, which do not involve secret information of historical events absent from or contradictory to the records of standard histories.

In regard to the use of subsidiary histories, I have heavily relied on the Chiu-kuo Chih, Ma Ling's Nan-T'ang Shu, Lu Yu's Nan-T'ang Shu, and the Chiang-nan Yeh-shih. As for the historical value of these books, I would like to describe in the following:

1. **Chiu-kuo Chih**

   Though some of its contents are bizarre and novelistic, "it is reliable on the whole, and the whole story is recorded in detail. It is able to supplement the omissions and incompleteness of the standard histories." 579 This is probable the reason why Schafer praises the Chiu-kuo Chih as "an important source". 580

2. **Ma Ling's Nan-T'ang Shu**

   This is the earliest subsidiary history of the Southern T'ang, patterned on the style of the standard histories, which was handed down from the Sung. Though Ma Ling has long been regarded as the author of the book, it was Ma Yuan-kang, his

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579 See the epilogue written by Chin Hsi-tsu, attached to the Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 129.

580 The Empire of Min, p. 120.
father, who began the compilation. In addition to drawing on the records and documents pertaining to the Southern T’ang that were still available in the Sung, the Ma family had resided in Chin-ling for generations. This advantage enabled Ma Yuan-kang to become familiar with the historical past of the Southern T’ang. His knowledge was further strengthened by the oral history provided by the contemporary scholar-officials and their descendants. Ma Yuan-kang died before the book was completed, and Ma Ling continued his father’s work. The book was finally completed in 1105. From then on, the book has been praised as a major source in the study of the Southern T’ang, and Schafer includes it as one of the basic sources in The Empire of Min.

3, Lu Yu’s Nan-T’ang Shu

Another subsidiary history of the Southern T’ang patterned on the standard histories, this Nan-T’ang Shu has been viewed as an indispensable source to the study of the Southern T’ang due to the careful textual examination done by Lu Yu.

4, Chiang-nan Yeh-shih

This book is criticized mainly for its breach of the style

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581 See the first preface written by Ma Ling, included in the Ma-shu, 1b.

582 The Empire of Min, p. 120.

583 See the preface written by Chiao Shih-yen, included in the Lu-shu, 1a-2a.
of standard histories. Nevertheless, the biographies of some historical figures, like Lin Jen-chao and Sun Cheng, are able to be used for textual comparison with the records included in other sources. Therefore, the Ma-shu has quoted a lot of records from the Chiang-nan Yeh-shih.  

Certainly, no matter what kinds of material are to be used, one principle should be always borne in mind: Careful textual examination is done before giving credence to historical record (kao erh hou-hsin).

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584 Szu-ku T’i-yao, included in the Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 1b.
Appendix B: Discussion on the Theory of Migration Toward the Center Issued by Mao Han-kuang

According to Mao Han-kuang’s hypothesis, the reason for the Hsiaos of Lan-ling to move to the capitals was to foster good relationships with prominent officials serving in the central government. As described, this practice was regarded as a 
\textit{sine qua non} of securing support for clan members aspiring to officialdom. However, the actual reason for the Hsiaos moving north was different from that suggested by Mao. Contrarily, the migration toward the center of the Hsiao clan was caused by the Sui discriminatory policy against prominent clans in South China after the downfall of the Chen.

After South China was taken over by the Sui (581-618), some officials originally serving under Chen rule lost their posts and were allowed to go back to their native places. Generally speaking, these officials were low in rank and from obscure origin. However, the Sui government was fully aware of the influence of the great clans in the south. To prevent the revitalization of the power and influence of the southern clans and preclude future political and military upheaval, the

\textsuperscript{585} For instance, the native place of Lu Te-ming (556-627) was Su-chou, but he was not a clan member of the famous Lus of Wu-chun, for the \textit{Chiu T'ang-shu} does not mention his ancestry at all. Also, he was merely a low ranking official responsible for literary lecture, without having participated in high level military and administrative decision making. (pp. 4944-5.) Because of Lu’s background, he was permitted to go back to his native place.
Sui forcibly moved the clans and families of prominent officials and imperial descendants to the north, thus uprooting the great clans from their local base and enabling the Sui to have more effective supervision and suppression.

Among those to be moved, the most noteworthy were the Chen imperial descendants. This is why Chen Shu-ta, a son of Emperor Hsuan-ti of the Chen, was moved to Sui capital. In addition, the descendants of other Southern dynasties prior to the Chen were also regarded as dangerous and ordered to reside in the north. Hsiao Kuan, a grandson of Emperor Ming-ti of the Liang and a member of the Derivative Branch of the Ch’i-liang House (ch’i-liang fang yen-chih), was forced to move to Lo-yang after the collapse of the Chen. The Sui government was also suspicious of former high-ranking officials, and they with their clans and families could not avoid the fate of being forced to move:

1. Hsiao Te-yen (558-638)

A great grandson of Hsiao Ssu-huà (406-455) who served as Chief Administrator of the Left Sector of the Department of State Affairs (shang-shu tso p’u-yeh) of the Ch’i, his family originally came from Lan-ling. He was sent to Kuan-chung after the downfall of the Chen, thus changing the native place

586 Chiu T’ang-shu, p. 2363.
to Chang-an of Yung-chou.  

2, Yin Chiao

A grandson of Yin Pu-hai (505-589) who served as Chamberlain for the National Treasury (ssu-nung ching) of the Chen, Yin Chiao's ancestors originally lived in Chen-chun. Yin was moved to Kuan-chung after the downfall of the Chen, and subsequently became an inhabitant of O-hsien of Yung-chou.  

3, Yao Ssu-lien (557-637)

A son of Yiu Cha (533-606), who served as Imperial Secretary of the Ministry of Revenue (hu-pu shang-shu) of the Chen. The Yao family was moved to the capital, and changed its place of origin from Wu-ching to Wen-nien.  

4, Kung Shao-an

A son of Kung Huan who served as Imperial Secretary of the Ministry of Personnel (li-pu shang-shu) of the Chen. His family was forced to move from Shan-yin to O-hsien.  

5, Yuan Lang

A son of Yuan Shu (1131-1205) who served as Chief Administrator of the Left Sector of the Department of State of the Chen. His ancestors came from Chen-chun, and the Yuan

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588 Chiu T'ang-shu, p. 4952.
589 Ibid., p. 2301.
590 Hsin T'ang-shu, p. 3978.
591 Chiu T'ang-shu, pp. 4982-3.
family was moved to Changan. 592

6, Hsu Chien (659-729)

The Hsu family was originated in Tung-hai chun and it migrated to Wu-hsien in the Southern Dynasties. When the Chen dynasty collapsed, the Hsu family was moved to Yung-chou. Eventually, the family settled down in Feng-yien in the generation of Hsu Chien. 593

7, Wang I-tung

The Wang family originated in Lang-ya, and moved to the south after the downfall of the Western Chin. The family was forced to move to Wen-nien, as the Sui took over the Chen. 594

Some former Chen officials seemed satisfied with their move to the north, for they could continue their career. 595 Some of them were treated with courtesy or even received promotion. 596 Yu Shih-nan (558-638), an ex-official of the Chen, had been serving some mid-level posts in the local governments discharged by princes. When the Chen rule came to end, he,

592 Ibid., p. 4984.
594 Chuan-T’ang Wen, p. 2465.
595 Chiu T’ang-shu, p. 2578.
596 For instance, Hsiao Kuan received profound respect form the northerners. (Chang Shuo-chih Wen-chi, p. 160.) Wang Shih-pen, the oldest son of Wang I-tung, said that he did not experience disdain from the Sui and was not treated in inferiority as he visited his superior. (Chuan T’ang-wen, p. 2467.)
together with Yu Shih-chi (?-618), his older brother were
moved to the capital. Because of their literary reputation,
the contemporaries viewed them as Lu Chi (261-303) and Lu Yun
(262-303) and held them in profound esteem. Under the
circumstances, it is expected that the Yu brothers could enjoy
a series of promotions in the north. Yu Shih-chi even became
a prominent and influential official, and his advantageous
position enabled his wife to indulge in extravagance, as shown
by the fact that "her costume was as gorgeous as those of the
nobility". But it was absolutely not for the sake of
cultivating good relationships with prominent officials that
the Yus moved to the capital. The Yu brothers had initially
turned down the invitation by the Sui's princes to enter
officialdom on the excuse of their mother's senility. 597

As a matter of fact, the blessing in the officialdom was
neither anticipated nor taken into consideration by the ex-
officials from the Chen, when they were bound for the north.
Such happy endings were coincidental and by no means the
product of careful planning and manipulation. Therefore, many
prominent clans fell into poverty after they had arrived in
the capital. Hsu Wen-yuan, the grandson of Emperor of Yuan-ti
of the Liang, was sent to Chang-an after Chiang-ning was
captured. Without powerful support, the family fell into

597 Chiu T'ang-shu, pp. 2565-6.
poverty. Hsu Hsiu, Hsu's older brother, had to engage in selling books to earn a livelihood. 598

Also, many imperial descendants from the Southern Dynasties were not willing to be captives. Hsiao Sheng, a grandson of Emperor Chung-tseng of the Liang, said:

I was endowed with a fief and entitled as the marquis of I yang (I-yang Hou) in my youth. Shortly after the enfeoffment, the green cover of the imperial carriage was bound for Hsien-yang, and I could not help but heave a sigh upon being relegated to a commoner. 599

To most imperial descendants, the feeling was certainly frustrating to fall from nobility to commoners. Such feelings could not be neutralized by being treated courteously in the north.

Moreover, many imperial descendants from the south had deep feelings about their home country. Some of them desired to flee back to their native places. Hsiao Te-yen, a member of the House of the Imperial Uncle (Huang-chiu Fang), is categorized by Mao Han-kuang as one who wanted to move to the north. 600 However, his moving to Kuan-chung was forced by the Sui policy of discrimination against prominent clans, and not motivated by the desire to cultivate relationships.

He then disguised himself by taking on Buddhist costume and escaped to Chiang-nan in stealth.

598 Ibid., p. 4942.
599 Chuan T'ang-wen Shi-i, pp. 822-3.
600 Mao, pp. 313-5.
Unfortunately, his action was detected and he was sent back to the capital under escort. Aware of the fact that he could never escape, he submitted to reality and served the Sui government as Editor (chiao shu-lang).

Prior to the military operation against the Sui ruler, Hsiao Hsien (583-621), a great grandson of Emperor Hsuan-ti of the Liang, made the following proclamation:

My home country abided by the principle of being an inferior state serving a superior country and it observed the tributary responsibilities without interruption. But the Sui was covetous of my land, and ruined my ancestral hall. Therefore, I feel pain all over me and cannot forbear to redress this humiliation.

Therefore, Mao Han-kuang’s assertion that the move of the Hsiaos to Kuan-chung was to compete for government posts is not substantiated, at least in the Sui dynasty.

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601 Hsin T'ang-shu, p. 5653.
602 Chiu T'ang-shu, pp. 2263-4. Reluctant to be subject to the Sui’s rule was not just confined to the members of imperial families, and many officials from the Southern Dynasties also nurtured the idea of restoring their homeland. For instance, Chou Fa-ming served as Prefect of Pa-chou under the reign of the Chen, and he was demoted as Magistrate of Chen-ting of Ho-pei after the downfall of the Chen. "Submission to the Sui" was only an expedience, and he had never forgot his homeland. When the Sui’s rule was collapsed, Chou made use of the chance to return Huang-kang and organized military force to take over four prefectures, namely Chi, An, Kai, Huang. Later, Chou had probably observed the growing military strength of the T’ang and the unification under the Lis was envisaged, he then surrendered to the T’ang with his four prefectures. For details, see Tu Mu (803-852), Fan-chuan Wen-chi, (Shanghai: Ku-chi Chu-pan-she, 1978), p. 119.
Appendix C, Biographical Data of the Twenty Examples

Pertaining to the Migration Toward the Center

1, Hsu Ching-hsien

His native place was I-ching of Ch’ang-chou. His grandfather was a meritorious official in the reign of Emperor Kao-tsu of the T’ang, who served as Left Senior Record (tso san-ch’i ch’ang-shih) and entitled as the Duke of Chen-ting (chen-ting kung). The Hsu family was then settled in Lo-yang.

2, Hsi Chih

His biography included in the Hsin T’ang-shu records that his ancestors moved westward from Chiao-po to Chang-an. 604 But the Liu Ho-tung Chi records differently that his native place was Chiang-tu. 605 The two records were not necessarily contradictory to each other, for they record the moving history of the Hsis in different period of time. It is probably that the native place of the Hsis was Chiang-tu, when the trend of centralization became prevailing, the Hsi family began to move westward. They first moved to Chiao-po and finally resided in the capital.

3, Chen Ching

603 Hsin T’ang-shu, p. 4464.

604 Ibid., p. 5040.

The Liu Ho-tung Chi states that the Chen family moved from Ying-chuan and settled down in Wen-ning. Ying-chuan refers to Hsu-chou. But the same book also records that Chen's native place was Ssu-shang, another appellation for Ssu-chou. Perhaps the ancestors of the Chen family had been living around the areas of these two prefectures. Eventually, it moved to the capital when the popularization of the centralization took place.

4, Ssu-k’ung T’u

The family of Ssu-k’ung T’u came from Lin-huai. Lin-huai was a county of Ssu-chou and also another name for this prefecture. According to the Chiu T’ang-shu, he had a residence in Wang-kuan Valley of Chung-t’iao Mountain, which was established by his forefather. Chung-t’iao Mountain was located in Ho-chung. As for the period of the establishment of the residence, Ssu-k’ung Yu, Ssu-k’ung T’u’s father, served as Salt Commissioner of the Two Lakes in An-i (An-i liang-chih chueh-yen-shih) in the reign of Emperor Hsun-tsung. Therefore, it is believed that the residence in Chung-t’iao Mountain was set up by Ssu-k’ung Yu. In other words, the centralization of the Ssu-k’ung family was completed during

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606 Ibid., p. 122.
607 Ibid., p. 188.
608 Chiu T’ang-shu, pp. 5082-3.
that period. Probably for this reason, the Hsin T'ang-shu states that Ssu-k’ung T’u was an inhabitant of Yu-hsiung, a county in Ho-chung. 609

5, Chiang I

According to the Hsin T’ang-shu, the native place of the Chiang family was I-ching of Shang-chou, and it moved to Ho-nan Fu finally. The Hsin T’ang-shu does not mention the time of the moving, but states that the first member of the family entering into the officialdom was Chiang Huai, the grandfather of Chiang I. Chiang Huai served as Academician (hsueh-shih) in the Office of the Advancement of Literature (hung-wen kuan) in the reign of Emperor Hsuan-tsung. 610 Undoubtedly, the earliest time for the family to engage in the centralization would be during the generation of Chiang Huai.

6, Li Shan

The native place Li Shan was Chiang-tu of Yang-chou. He served up to the post of Court Gentleman of the Orchid Pavilion (lan-t’ai lang) and was exiled to the region outer Ta-yu Ling (Ling-wai), for being involved in a political purge. He was permitted to return to North China due to imperial amnesty. From then on, he retreated to the area between Pien-chou and Cheng-chou where he taught the Wen-hsuan

609 Hsin T’ang-shu, p. 5573.

610 Ibid., P. 4531.
as a livelihood. 611

7, Wang I-fang

The native place of Wang I-fang was Lien-shu of Ssu-chou. He started his career in the reign of Emperor T'ai-tsing (598-649, r. 627-649), but was demoted by Emperor Kao-tsung (628-683, r. 649-683) because of Wang's using disrespectful language to denounce high officials. After the term of office was ended, Wang moved to Ch’ang-lo where he engaged in teaching. 612

8, Chou Hsi

Chou Fa-ming, his great grandfather, occupied four prefectures at the end of the Sui. After the death of Chou Fa-ming, many clan members became officials in the central government, thus signifying the completion of the migration toward the center of the clan. Chou Chi was buried in the ancestral burial site in Ho-nan Fu. 613

9, Hsu shen

His native place was Tung-hai. Though the fifth generations of the ancestor previous to Hsu Shen had already started his career in the Northern Chou, the Hsu family was recorded as just sojourning in Chang-an in 765 when Hsu was twenty eight

611 Chiu T’ang-shu, p. 4946.
612 Ibid., p. 4876.
613 Fen-chuan Wen-chi, pp. 119, 122.
years old. In other words, the migration toward the center was finalized from the Hsu Shen's generation only.

The Li Wen-kung Chi records that Hsu Shen's mother died in Chiang-hsi, but her coffin could not be brought back because of rebellion. Her coffin was then placed in Hsi-yuan, and Hsu requested an vocation to bring the coffin to Lo-yang for burial. After Hsu died, his coffin was also brought to Lo-yang for burial. Therefore, it is obvious that Hsu Chen's ancestral burial site had already been in Lo-yang, but there is no way to trace the exact year for such arrangement.

10, Chou Wei

The Chou family was originally from Yu-nan, (another name for Ts'ai-chou). The sixth generations of the ancestor served the Sui as Assistant of Huai-yin (Huai-yin chuan ssu-ma, Huai-yin was another name for Chu-chou) and settled there. Chou Wei died in 785, and he was buried in Hou-shan of Lo-yang. As for the exact year of the establishment of the ancestral burial site, it was untraceable.

11, Hsu Yu-shih

His native place was An-chou. Hsu Fa-kuang, his father, occupied Hsia-chou with K'o Hsiang-kuei. Hsu served up to

614 Li Wen-kung Chi, pp. 51-2.

615 Chuan Tai-chih (759-818), Chuan Tai-chih Wen-chi, Szu-pu Ts'ung-kan Ch'u-pien ed., p. 139.

616 Ibid., pp. 136-7.
Minister of the Ministry of Revenue (*hu-pu shang-shu*), and accompanying with the emperor in the burial of Kung-ling.  

12, Ma Huai-su

His native place was Fu-feng. His ancestor followed Emperor Yuan-ti of the Chin to the south and settled in Nan Hsu-chou. This was a sojourning prefecture located in Tan-t’u, a county of Jun-chou. The three generations previous to Ma Huai-su’s father served the Chen, and his father served the T’ang as Aide of Hsin-yang (*Hsin-yang ch’eng*) of Chiang-chou. He later abandoned his post and resided in Kuang-ling, a prefecture in the south. Ma Huai-su served in the central government. He died in 718 and was buried in Lo-yang.  

13, Wei Hung-chien

His native place was untraceable, and the time that his ancestors moved to Chiang-nan was also unknown. Wei served in the central and local government. He died in 804 and was buried in Lo-yang.  

14, Lai Chi

A son of Lai Hu-erh who was a famous official in the Sui, his native place was Chiang-tu of Yang-chou. His family was slaughtered in the late Sui, leaving Lai Chi to lead a

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618 *Chuan-T’ang Wen*, p. 13029.
619 *Liu Ho-tung Chi*, pp. 140-1.
wandering life in his youth. Therefore, the migration toward the center of this family might have completed in the previous dynasty, but it met interruption. Therefore, the family could be regarded as without affinity to the north emotionally.

Lai Chi lost his good terms with Empress Wu, and was again expelled by Hsu Ching-chung (592-672) which resulted in his demotion as Prefect of Ting-chou. When the Turks invaded the prefecture, Lai was in command of the army. During the fighting, he deliberately took off his armor, claiming that he had committed fault and should die for it. No doubt, it was only a pretext, because Lai realized that further political oppression was inevitable and he preferred to die in a heroic way. As a result, he was killed in the battle. He was "endowed a posthumous title as the Prefect of Chu-chou, and granted with a coffin going back to his native place". 620

15, Wang Shao-tsung

His place of origin was Chiang-tu. He was appreciated by Empress Wu and the Chang I-chih’s (?-705) brother. After the execution of the Chang’s brothers, Wang, because of his acquaintance with the Changs, was sent back to his native place where he died. 621

16, Hsueh Teng

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620 Chiu T’ang-shu, pp. 2742-3.
621 Ibid., p. 4946.
His native place was I-ching of Chang-chou. Hsueh Shih-tung, his father, served the Sui as General of the Soaring Hawk Garrison (ying-yang chang-chun), and Prefect of Chuan-chou. Hsueh Teng started his career in the reign of the Emperor Hsuan-tsung (685-762, r. 712-756), and served up to Advisor to the Heir Apparent (tai-tzu pin-k’o). He was sent back to his native place, because his son was impeded. 622

His native place was Kan of Chien-chou. He started his career by serving as Overseer of the Court of the National Granaries (ssu-nung lu-shih), a minor post. Later, he was promoted as Secretariat (chung-shu sheng), because of his expertise in calligraphy.

According to the archeological discovery, Chung’s coffin was brought back and buried in his native place. 623 As for the cause for returned burial, it was most likely that Chung’s relations with other officials were very bad. 624 In view of

622 Ibid., pp. 3136-41.


624 When Chung Shao-ching was dominating the court politics, he resorted to personal prejudice in deciding awards and penalties, thus enraging his colleagues. As a result, he was ousted from the central government, and assigned as Prefect of Shu-chou. When Emperor Hsuan-tsung (685-762, r. 712-756) came to the throne, he recalled Chung to the court and conferred Chung the posts of Minister of the Ministry of Revenue and Supervisor of the Household of the Heir Apparent (tai-tzu jin-shih) respectively. (Chiu T’ang-shu, pp. 3041-2.) However, Yao Chung, the prime minister,
the political difficulty, Chung's offspring deeply realized that even if Chung was buried in the capital, it did not have slightest help for their participation in the officialdom. It was probably this background that Chung body was brought back and buried in his native place. The absence of Chung's offspring to serve in bureaucracy showed that the Chungs had lost all kinds of support in the court which was essential for them to start career.

18, Wang Ch'ang-ling

His native place was Chiang-ling, and he retreated to his native place in the outbreak of the rebellion of An Lu-shan.

19, K'o Ch'u-chin

His native place was An-lu of An-chou. His father and father-in-law occupied Hsia-chou at the end of the Sui, and they eventually surrendered to the T'ang. Ko served as Director of the Chancellery (shih-chung), and died in the reign of Emperor Kao-tsung. He was granted with coffin to go back to his homeland for burial. 625

abominated Chung's personality and behavior. Chung was again expelled from the court, and he suffered a series of demotions in provincial administration. In 727, Chung was finally granted an audience by Emperor Hsuan-tsung. Though the Emperor memorized Chung's merits in the coup and felt sorry for his plight, Chung had already enraged so many officials that the Emperor could do nothing to restore Chung to prominence. What he could do was to grant Chung with some tutelage posts, which implied that Chung was respected but not be entrusted with actual authority.

625 Chiu T'ang-shu, pp. 2799-2800.
20, Tai Shu-lun (732-789)

His family originally came from Chiao-kuo and then crossed the Yangtze River to settle in Tan-tu. Tai's ancestors had been serving in the Southern Dynasties. Tai was appointed Prefect of Yun-chou in 789. He resigned and died at the same year. His coffin was transferred and buried in Chin-tan, the burial site of the Tai family. Both T'an-t'u and Chin Tan were the counties of Yun-chou. That is to say, the place of origin and the burial site of this family were within the territory of Yun-chou. 626

626 Chuan Tai-chih Wen-chi, p. 140.
Appendix D: Discrepancies of Residence Location and Burial Site of Prominent Clans

1, Tsui Cheng

He died in 798 and was buried in Lo-yang county. His late wife was also brought to bury with him. 627

2, Lu Mai

His place of residence in senility was Ho-nan Fu, 628 and Mao Han-kuang put him in the category of the migration toward the center. 629

3, Li Yuan-pien

His family was from Lung-hsi, but he lived in the east of the Yangtze River. After he passed the civil service examinations at twenty seven, he served in the central government. Unfortunately, he died at twenty nine, and was buried in the place outside the east gate of Chang-an by his friend. 630

4, Tsui Shu-ching

His native place was Po-ling, and his father became a hermit after the outbreak of the rebellion of An Lu-shan (?-757). After the death of his father, he took his family members to

627 Mao, p. 255.
628 Chuan T'ang-wen, p. 6533.
629 Mao, p. 270.
go to the South of the Yangtze River. He later accepted the invitation to office offered by Military Commissioners and settled in Yu-chou, in which he was buried in 799. 631

5, Wang Chung-shu (762-823)

His domicile of origin was Chi of Tai-yuan. When he was young, his father died. He, together with his mother, went to Chiang-nan and settled there. He later entered into the officialdom and died in Hung-chou in 823. In the next year, his body was brought back to the ancestral burial site located in Ho-nan. 632

6, Yang Shou

His native place was Feng-yien of Tung-chou. The Chiu T'ang-shu records that his father settled in Su-chou, 633 but the Pei-meng So-yen says that the place of residence of Yang Shou was Chiang-chou. 634 Both Su-chou and Chiang-chou were in Chiang-nan, and it was probably that the Yangs had lived in these two counties respectively, thus leading to such discrepancies in records.

The economic situation of the Yang family was worse. Yang Shou lost his father when he was only seven years old.

632 ibid., pp. 288-9; 308-9.
633 Chiu T'ang-shu, p. 4595.
634 Pei-meng So-yen, 12: 1b.
Fortunately, his mother was educated, and taught his sons in person. After Yang Shou entered into the officialdom and became predominant, he pleaded to the emperor that his father was not yet buried, and the coffin was placed in Shang-chou temporarily. He wished to bury his father in Ho-nan Fu, and his request was rectified. 635

7. Liu Tsung-yuan

The domicile of origin of the Liu family was Ho-tung. From the generation of Liu Cheng, Liu Tsung-yuan’s father, onward, the Liu family moved to Wu. 636 Liu Tsung-yuan initially served in the central government, but was demoted to remote prefectures because of being involved in power struggle. He died in Liu-chou in 819 and his coffin was brought back to the capital. 637

635 Chiu T’ang-shu, p. 4599.
636 Hsin T’ang-shu, p. 5132.
637 Chiu T’ang-shu, p. 4514.
Appendix E: The Issue of the Scope of Huang Ch’ao’s Pillaging

In an article entitled "A Brief Examination of Huang-tuan" (Huang-tun Kao-lueh), Li Jui-kang cites Ch’eng Min-cheng’s idea that the name "Huang" was originally written as "Huang,” because of an abundance of bamboo in the area. When Huang Ch’ao led his troops to Chiang-huai, most of the region was pillaged and destroyed, but some places whose appellations resembled Huang’s name were believed to have escaped these atrocities. Therefore, many people sought refuge there, and were thus able to preserve their families and clans. Gradually, the refugees forgot the original names of these places, and the use of Huang-tun as the name of these places became popular. 638

Similar legends exist in other primary sources, as in the Hou-shan Tsung-tan, which records that when Huang Ch’ao invaded Chin-ling, the local inhabitants pleaded that he halt the operation, on the grounds that because his name was Ch’ao, if he entered Chin-ling, the combination of the two names would be "Chih", meaning being captured and locked up. Huang was convinced by this and retreated. 639

I have discovered some records which seem to validate the preceding story. For example, Chu Pien moved from Wu-chun to

638 Li-shih Ch’ien-chang Chih-pu, Huang-tun Kao-lueh, 1ab.
639 Hou-shan Ts’ung-tan, p. 13.
Huang-tun during the era of the late T'ang. One of Chang-chien's ancestors "had taken refuge in Huang-tun to avoid the disturbances caused by Huang Ch'ao." Because the name of the area contained "Chin," it also became an ideal place for refuges, as demonstrated by Chu Te-ch'ien, who moved from Wu-chun to Chin-hsi during the chaotic period of the late T'ang.

However, some contradictions exist among the primary sources, as shown by Hu Ssu's family, who moved from Chin-ling to Ming-chou during the Five Dynasties. Furthermore, a branch of the Wang clan moved from Huang-tun to Wu-yuan. Moving from Huang-tun as a means of avoiding Huang Ch'ao's pillaging was also adopted by the ancestors of Cheng K'e-i, who moved to Kai-hua. In fact, Ssu-ma Kuang's records indicate that Huang Ch'ao followed no taboos in determining which places were to be destroyed. Therefore, Huang-chou was included among the prefectures he pillaged.

640 Chu Hsi (1130-1200), Chu-wen-kung Chi, Szu-pu Ts'un-g-kan Ch'u-pien, p. 1754.
641 Chiang-hsi Chu-tu Mu-chih Hsuan-pien, p. 81.
642 Lu-yu Chi, p. 2360.
643 Yuan Hsueh (1144-1224), Chi-chai Chi, Ts'ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch'u-pien ed., p. 321.
644 Fou-hsi Chi, p. 320.
645 Ibid., p. 333.
646 T'ung-chien, p. 8193.
Even if Huang Ch’ao had expressed a certain restraint when dealing with places bearing names similar to his own within the domain of the Wu regime. Such places were few in number. To my knowledge, only six places happened to contain Huang’s name, i.e. Chin-ling, Huang-kang, Huang-p’o of Huang-chou, Huang-mei of Chi chou, Chin-t’an of Jun-chou, and Jui-chin of Chien-chou.

In summary, most of the regions of Chiang-huai were clearly in turmoil, and this led to the total disintegration of the T’ang political and administrative structure, which in turn paved the way for the rise of local hooligans and rowdies.
Appendix P: Some Ideal Refuges for Scholar-officials in Late T'ang

1. P’u-pan

P’u-pan was another name for Ho-chung. The mountains within the domain, such as Lei-shou and Chung-tiao, were hard to access geographically. During the rebellion of An Lu-shan, many scholar-officials sought refuge there. 647

In late T’ang, such areas were still popular for scholar-officials to take refuge. When Emperor Hsi-tsung took refuge to Szechwan, Ssu-k’ung T’u, who had a residence established by his ancestor in Chung-t’iao Mountain, resigned and took refuge there. Many scholar-officials came to count on him, and "those who survived were great many". 648

Subsequently, the political climate in Ho-chung was changed. When Wang Chung-jung took the military commissionership, he showed his dislike toward the literati. 649 From then on, Ho-chung lost its attraction to scholar-officials.

2. T’ai-yuan

A military region in Ho-tung, it bordered on Ho-chung.

After the chaotic period, most of the scholar-officials sought refuge to the region around Fen and Chin.

The former belonged to Ho-tung, while the later was a

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647 Shao-shih Wen-chien Chien-lu, p. 535.
648 Sun Kuo-tung, p. 224.
649 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 801.
prefecture of Ho-chung. Certainly, these two military domains were ideal places for scholar-officials to take refuge.

After Wang Chung-jung became Military Commissioner, the situation was changed drastically. As shown by the serving experience of Li Chi-chi, he originally sought refuge to Ho-chung and served Li Tou, who was Military Commissioner, as Assistant Commissioner of the Salt and Iron Monopoly (yen-ti pan-kuán). Li Chi-chi went to T’ai-yuan, as he felt uncomfortable under the rule of Wang Chung-jung. Li was recruited by Li K’e-yung (856-908) to serve in the local government.

Lu Yu-pi, who stayed in Ho-chung previously, also shifted to Ho-tung. Since Lu came from a prominent clan, he was appointed Vice Military Commissioner of Ho-tung. The case shows that the Lis, the ruling family in Ho-tung, held the members from prominent clans in deep esteem and this was the reason why there were so many scholar-officials fleeing to there.

3, Wei-po

Lo Yen-ching, who served as Military Commissioner of Wei-po in late T’ang, treated literati well and recruited many men of

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650 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 801.
651 Ibid., p. 887; Hsin Wu-tai Shih, p. 303.
letters to serve under his rule. But most of the literati recruited were those failed in the civil service examinations owing to the lack of strong support from the prominent officials. Therefore, the most influential literati serving in Lo's government had profound resentment against the scholar-officials, and Li Shan-fu was the best example.

After the Los were eliminated because of internal conflict, Wei-po was ruled by Lo Shao-wei. In the initial period of his administration, he was busy pacifying the rebellious emotion among the army and concentrating his energy in military affair and administration. Wei-po was not yet an ideal place for the literati from the central government to seek refuge.

As time went by, the situation was improved tremendously. Though the Lo family was engaged in military for generations, Lo Shao-wei was fond of literature and cultivating friendship with the literati. Therefore, he set up academic hall by the

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653 When Wang To (?-884), who was appointed Military Commissioner of I-chang, passed by Wei-po, he had a lot of baggages, horses, carriages, and concubines and he did not mind displaying his wealth. Lo Tsung-hsun, Lo's son used to be a vandal without constraint of morality, was covetous of Wang's property and concubines. He asked for the advice of Li Shan-fu, Li failed in civil service examination during reign of the Emperor Hsi-tsung and hated the prominent officials in the central government very much. He then admonished Lo to take action on Wang. As a result, Wang's wealth and concubines were robbed, and Wang and his staff were killed. (Pei-meng So-yen, 13: lab.)

654 Tai-ping Kuang-chi, pp. 1540-1.
side of his office and treated the sojourning literati courteously by gathering them in the hall. When Lo fulfilled his duty every day, he discussed the essence of the Classics with the literati.

In addition, he collected books over 10,000 chuan, and placed them in the library which was also built by the side of his office. Besides allowing literati to read as they liked, Lo liked reading too. Therefore,

among the contemporary military commissioners, Lo was the one able to obtain the highest reputation in literary work. 655

Owing to Lo's policy, many scholar-officials sought refuge there. 656

4, Sheng-shan

It was another address to Cheng-te. Wang Yung was Military Commissioner during late T'ang. Wang Ting-ts'ou, the great grandfather of Wang Yung and the first Military Commissioner in Cheng-te of the Wang family, was a Uighur tribesman infamous for treachery and barbarism. After his death, the Wangs undertook the civil transformation. 657 When Wang Yung succeeded the military commissionership, both the Wang family

655 Lo Shao-wei Chuan, cited from the Tai-ping Kuang-chi, p. 1508.
656 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, pp. 938-9.
and the cultural atmosphere of its domain had already been reputed for grace and refinement.

For the local literati, Cheng-te was their final resort if they could not enter the T'ang officialdom. Moreover, Cheng-te was an ideal place for scholar-officials from other prefectures to seek refuge. When Hsiao Kou was forced to accept the office offered by the puppet government which was dominated by Chu Wen, Hsiao Ling, another clan member scared of being involved in the expected political purge, fled to Ho-pei. Wang Yung treated him courteously by providing him with a residence in Shun-chou.

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658 For instance, Chia Wei, who was an inhabitant of Hou-lu, failed in the civil service examinations. Meanwhile the capital was in chaos, he then retreated to Cheng-te and served in the local government. (Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1727.)

659 Chiu T'ang-shu, p. 4482.
Appendix G: Biographical Data of the Important Subordinates of Yang Hsing-mi

A, Counselors and administrators with literary background
1, Yuan Chi

A native of Lu-chiang, a county of Lu-chou, who was a diligent student in his youth. Though he was good at literary composition, his knowledge was not confined to the orthodox curriculum category and he had a deep understanding of astrology (wei-hsian). Also, his talent in formulating military strategy was fully shown in his career as an officer on Yang Hsing-mi's staffs. Therefore, Yuan was not just a man of letters, but possessed the quality of the statecraft of achieving hegemony (wang-pa chih-shu). This was probably the reason why he played an important role in political and military decision making. 660

2, Chen Yen-chien

A native of Chang-chou, Chen possessed the ability to manage difficult affairs (li-fen chih-shu). When Yang Hsing-mi annexed Chiang-nan, Chen was invited to serve in local government. 661

B, Military subordinates with official background:

660 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 2.
661 Ibid, p. 32.
1, Chu Chien-yu

A native of Ying-chuan, Chu was conversant in military operations. He had been the magistrate of I-ching, a county of Chang-chou. When I-ching was captured, Yang Hsing-mi probably enlisted Chu for his ability. 662

2, Liu Wei

A native of Shen, a county of Lu-chou. Liu had served as a junior layman in the magistracy, showing that he might have had a certain degree of literacy. 663

3, Chia To

He was born in Sheng-chai, and was a grandson of Chia Tan (730-880), a prime minister in the T'ang. However, Chai To was renowned for bravery and strategy, rather than for literary accomplishment and statesmanship as was his grandfather. 664

4, Li Tao

The native place of Li Tao was Chiao Chun. His residence might have been somewhere in the south where he was active early in his career. Li Yuan and Li I were his grandfather and father, and they served as Prefect in Heng-chou and magistrate in Shou-an respectively. Li Tao received literary

662 Ibid., p. 18.
663 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
664 Ibid., p. 21.
training originally. When the popular rebellion became prevalent, Li shifted from a literary to a military career and eventually joined Yang Hsing-mi's army. Li was just famous for military achievement, but his initial training did not gain him any particular reputation worthy of being included in the Chiu-kuo Chih in Lu Chen's judgment.  

5, Tsui Tai-ch'u

He was a native of Huai-hsi. Tsui Liang, his father was Vice Horse Pasturage Supervisor (T'sai-chou chien-mu fu-shih). But it was Tsui Tai-ch'u's martial art that deeply impressed Yang Hsing-mi when he responded to Yang's summon.  

6, Kao Li

He was an inhabitant of Yueh-chou. Kao Shih, his grandfather, was Military Commissioner of Wu-ling Chun; Kao Kuei, his father, was Prefect of Hu-chou. Kao Li first served under the command of Chien Mou, but later turned to Yang Hsing-mi because of being suspected by Chien. Though Kao was raised in an official family, he was entirely barbarized, as he developed a horrible and savage taste for human flesh and blood.  

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666 Ibid., p. 31.  
667 Ibid., p. 33.
Military subordinates with literary background, or who valued culture and modesty:

1. T’ao Ya

According to the Chiu-kuo Chih, T’ao Ya was a native of Ho Fei and raised in a literary family. When the empire was about to disintegrate in the reign of the Emperor Hsi-tsung, T’ao gave up his literary training and joined Yang Hsing-mi’s army. However, the epitaph of T’ao Ching-hsun (899-950), a son of T’ao Ya, included in the Hsu Chi-sheng Chi has a different description about T’ao Ya’s native place and ancestral activities. It states that his original native place was Hsin-yang and the subsequent move to Ho-fei was because of official transfer. Apart from T’ao Fu, T’ao Ya’s great grandfather, who served as General of the Right Palace Gate Guard (yu chien-men-wei chang-chun), T’ao Lin and T’ao Cheng, his grandfather and father, were civil officials, as shown by their posts of Administrative Supervisor (lu-shih tsan-chun) of Chien-chou and Magistrate of Po-chang, respectively. But the Chiu-kuo Chi does not include this record, and the record of Hsu Chi-sheng Chi is thus open to question.

Among Yang Hsing-mi’s generals, T’ao Ya was the one best

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68 Ibid., p. 5.

known for literary accomplishment and refinement. His biography included in the **Chiu-kuo Chih** describes his merits in detail, saying,

T’ao was fond of reading, and did not let his hands free of books. Though he stood in fighting formation, he still dressed in scholarly costume.

Also,

He received and waited upon his subordinates and guests courteously, and treated his father and older brothers with filial piety and esteem. He did not order music if it were not a public banquet. He gave alms magnanimously and venerated men of letters. Therefore, many educated people gave themselves to serve him.

He had been Prefect of Hsi-chou for more than twenty years, and the local inhabitants named their children style as "T’ao" because they were affected by his administration. 

Definitely, what T’ao Ya did was in accord with the norm and values of good scholar-officials.

2. Ch’ai Ts’ai-yung

He was a native of Ts’ai-chou and famous for filial piety since he was a youth. According to the **Chiu-kuo Chih**, Ch’ai was benevolent and refined and acted like a man of letters. Besides observing the principle of humility, simplicity and frugality, he liked reading the **Tso-shih Chun-chiu**, and had never inspected kitchen and stable.

Obviously, he complied with the rule that the gentleman should not be bothered with trivial affairs done by servants (hsiao-

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670 **Chiu-kuo Chih**, pp. 3-4.
3, T'ien Chun

He was a native of Ho Fei. Apart from military talent and meritorious achievement, an involvement in scholarly pursuits was also among his attributes as he read the Classics extensively. His appearance and behavior were scholarly and refined. He also gave alms generously and valued men of letters by treating them with grace and courtesy. Therefore, many literati liked cultivating his acquaintanceship.

4, Chin Pei

A native of Shen, Chin was brave and martial in appearance; he liked hunting since young. He joined Yang Hsing-mi's force when it occupied Ho Fei. Though he rose from the military, he still observed the rite promoted by the Confucian school. For instance, when he returned to his native place after retirement,

He paid a visit to the magistrate based on the rites as a commoner. He bowed to aged people whenever encountered and arranged seating according to age.

5, Wang Nien

A native of Lu-chou, Wang was brave since young. He became a subordinate of Yang Hsing-mi's because of his skill in

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671 Ibid., pp. 12-3.
672 Ibid., pp. 35-7.
673 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
archery and horsemanship. Though Wang was of obscure origin, he liked the Confucian School of learning. Also, he was benevolent and dressed as a scholar.

When Wang Nien was appointed Military Commissioner of Shou-chou, the local inhabitants admired military rule and were strict in enforcing security at night. But Wang was immersed in reading the classics and did not forbear students studying overnight. In a few years, many students from other prefectures traveled to Shou-chou for study. Also, when the school sponsored by the prefectural government started lectures, Wang gave the teachers gifts of monies and good wine. Due to his encouragement of literary pursuits, Shou-chou was able to recommend more than a hundred examination candidates annually to the central government. 674

6 Chou Pen

A native of Hsu-sung, a county of Hsu-chou, Chou was an offspring of Chou Yu (175-210). As recorded in the Chiu-kuo Chih, the temple and tomb of Chou Yu were still in Hsu-sung and the offsprings still bonded to the old land amounted to several tens of households. In the chaotic period of the late T'ang, Chou joined Yang Hsing-mi's army.

Though Chou Pen was illiterate, he respected scholars. Also he treated his staff and subordinates courteously and did not

674 Ibid, p. 17.
interfere with their performance of duties. Therefore, both inhabitants and local officials were pleased with him.

7. Li Te-cheng

A native of Kuang-ling, he first served Chao Huang, Prefect of Hsuan-chou, when young. He shifted to serve Yang Hsing-mi after the defeat of Chao.

Among the subordinates of Yang Hsing-mi, only Li Te-cheng did not have brilliant military merit. He rose to prominence merely because of his tactful and refined personality, as well as because of his family's intermarriages with the Hsu family. Compared to his colleagues, Li's prominence in terms of rank and longevity was extraordinary.

D. Military subordinates from the region of Chiang-huai, and most of them were of humble origin:

675 Ibid., pp. 41-2.

676 Li Te-cheng's daughter was married to Hsu Ching-ta. When the Southern T'ang was established, Hsu Chih-kao and his sons restored their original name of Li. This was problematic for Li Ching-ta's marriage, because no marriages were allowed between people with the same surname. Finally, however, a solution was discovered. Because Li Te-cheng, the King of Nan-ping (Nan-ping Wang) was a veteran statesman, his daughter was not allowed to divorce. But as the wife of Li Ching-ta, she could change her surname to Nan-ping. (Ma-shu, 9: 3b.)

677 Li Te-cheng served as Prefect and Military Commissioner of Jun-chou, Fu-chou, Chien-chou, and Hung-chou. He received some honorable titles, such as Director of Secretariat (chung-shu ling), the King of Nan-ping, and Chao, respectively. He died at seventy eight.
1, Chang Hsun

He was a native of Ch'ing-liu, a county of Chang-chou. Both the Tun-ming Chi and the Tao-hsiang Chi record that Chang Sheng and Chang Yueh, Chang Hsun's grandfather and father, had served as Magistrate of Ch'ing-liu and General of Imperial Insignia Guard (chin-ya-wei chang-shih). 678 Similar to the case of T'ao Ya, the reliability of records is subject to suspicion, as the Chiu-kuo Chih does not mention the official background of Chang Chun. Instead, the appearance and character of Chang Hsun described in the Chiu-kuo Chih are martial. 679 The Chiang-huai I-jen Lu also states that Chang's mouth was big, and his contemporaries gave him a nickname as "Chang the Big Mouth" (chang tai-k'ao).

While Chang Hsun himself was a hero of the common people (t'sao-tse chih-hsiang), his wife certainly was not a lady of gentle refinement, as she was able to practice dream prognostication (pao-meng) and ate human flesh. 680 Even if Chang's ancestors had a literary and official background, this family had already been militarized in Chang Hsun's generation.

2, Tai Mung

678 Tun-ming Chi, 40: 5a; Tao-hsiang Chi, 39: 1a.

679 Chiu-kuo Chi, p. 7.

A native of Ho-fei, Tai served as Commander of Guards in Chin-niu. When Yang Hsing-mi occupied Ho-fei, Tai defected to him. 681

3, Li Yu

A native of Ho-fei, Li started his military career by serving under Yang Hsing-mi’s command. 682

4, Liu Chin

He was a native of Huai-yin. In the reign of Emperor Hsitsung of the T’ang, Chiang-huai was in a great turmoil and Liu followed Li Chang, a prominent local figure, to defend the region of Chu-hsi. He took the command of the force after Li’s death. When Yang Hsing-mi laid siege to Kuang-ling, Liu led his entire force to fight for Yang. 683

5, Ma Hsun

A native of Lu Chiang, Ma was brave and good for stratagem since he was young. He was first a merchant in Chiang-tu, and had once served under the command of Lu Yung-chih when Chin Yen besieged the city. After Yang entered the city, Ma was enlisted as General’s Chief Assistance (p’ien-chang), because Yang had heard of his reputation. 684

681 Chiu Kuo-chih, p. 6.
682 Ibid., p. 7.
683 Ibid., p. 8.
684 Ibid., p. 10.
6. Chu Ching

A native of Huo-chiu, a place in Shou-yang, Chu was originally a local rowdy. When Yang Hsing-mi acquired Huai-nan, he appreciated the strategic significance of Huo-chiu on the frontiers demarcating the south and north. Many bandits gathered there and it was not a location easily protected from disturbance. Yang entrusted the defense of Huo-chiu to Chu, as he heard that Chu was famous for bravery and experience in fighting. Bandits from both the near and far regions held him in esteem. Chu then recruited rowdies and scoundrels as his subordinates, and proved himself effective in keeping the tranquility of the area, as well as defending against northern aggression. 685

7. Chang Chung

A native of Shen, Chang began establishing a record of military merit after he followed Yang Hsing-mi to crush Chiao Huang (?-889). 686

8. Wang Kuan

A native of Lu-chiang, Wang was praised for his bravery and stratagems. In the reign period kuang-chi (885-888), he joined Yang Hsing-mi's army. 687

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685 Ibid., p. 15.
686 Ibid., p. 15.
687 Ibid., p. 16.
9, Chen Chih-hsin

A native of Lu-chiang, Chen began building up his record of military merit and reputation, when Yang Hsing-mi started operation against Pi Shih-to and Sun Ju. 688

10, Liu Hsin

A native of Chung-tu, a county of Yin-chou, Liu was plucky and brave, and good at riding and archery. Originally, he served in the army of Hsu Ch’ing. When Hsu was defeated, Liu joined Yang Hsing-mi. 689

11, Chung Chang

He was a native of Ho-fei. When young, he disregarded the trivial and burned with the ambition of becoming hegemony. After Yang Hsing-mi occupied Ho-fei, Chung was summoned to join the army. 690

12, Yang Piao

He was a native of Shu-chou. Though he was free and easy of manner, he was known for being conversant in stratagem as well as for his riding and archery. Yang Hsing-mi appreciated his talent and enlisted him in the army. 691

13, Chen Yu

688 Ibid., p. 18.
689 Ibid., p. 19.
690 Ibid., p. 25.
691 Ibid., p. 29.
A native of Li-yang, Chen served under Yang Hsing-mi when he was seventeen years old. 692

14, Chu Yen-shou

A native of Shu-cheng, a county of Lu-chou, Chu was a younger brother of Yang Hsing-mi's wife. 693

15, Li Chien

A native of Sheng Ts'ai, Li was initially subordinate to Chiao Huang. When Chiao was surrounded by Yang Hsing-mi and food was almost exhausted, Li surrendered to Yang. 694

E, The military subordinates not from Chiang-huai, and most of them were of humble origin:

1, Chang K'e-tsung

His native place is not known. He went to Chiang-huai to take refuge from the rebellion in the reign period Chung-ho (881-884). Yang Hsing-mi appreciated his bravery and courage enlisting him in the army. 695

2, Li Hou

A native of T'sai-chou, Li served under Yang Hsing-mi early

692 Ibid., p. 30.
693 Ibid., p. 38.
694 Ibid., p. 11.
695 Ibid., p. 28.
in the reign period Ch'ien-ling (894-898). ^

3, Cheng Po

A native of Yu-nan, Cheng had been a subordinate of Chin Tsung-chuan and Sun Yu. Finally, he defected to Yang Hsing-mi when he was sent to garrison in Huai-nan. °

4, Liu Chuan

A native of Chen-chou, Liu was good at fist fighting. He was recruited by Yang and assisted in seizing control of Ho-fei. °

5, Chen Chang

A native of Ying Chuan, Chen was arrogant, obstreperous and unrecognized after serving many leaders. He finally served under Yang Hsing-mi. °

6, Liu Chuan

A native of Hsu-chou, Liu initially served in the prefectural army and joined Yang Hsing-mi's force in 892. °

7, Ti Ching

He was a native of Peng-cheng. Early in the reign period Ch'ien-ling, Hsu-chou was about to fall; Ti Ching led his

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696 Ibid., p. 17.
697 Ibid., p. 29.
698 Ibid., p. 10.
699 Ibid., p. 13.
700 Ibid., p. 31.
whole family to cross the Yangtze River. Having arrived in Chiang-huai, he visited Yang and then joined Yang Hsing-mi's army. 701

8, Hsu Wen

A native of Chu-shan, a county of Hai-chou, Hsu was a rascal when young. Later, he participated in banditry and engaged in the trade of illicit salt. In 882, he joined Yang Hsing-mi's army occupying Ho-fei. 702

9, Chu Ching

A native of Hsia-i, a county of Sung-chou, Chu was a younger brother of Chu Hsun, Military Commissioner of Yun-chou. He himself was Military Commissioner of Yin-chou and was expelled to Chiang-huai by Chu Wen. From that time, he became a prominent general in Yang Hsing-mi's bloc. 703

10, Hou Tsan

A native of Cheng-pu, Hou initially served Chu Ching and then placed himself under Yang Hsing-mi's command in 897, when Chu was forced to rush to Chiang-huai pressed by Chu Wen. 704

11, Li Shen-fu

A native of Ming-chou of Ho-pei, Li was a soldier serving

701 Ibid., p. 28.
702 Ibid., p. 39.
703 Ibid., pp. 25-6.
704 Ibid., pp. 14-5.
under the military commissioner of Chao-i Chun. He later joined Yang Hsing-mi's army when was stationed in Huai-nan.

12, Mi Chih-cheng

A tribesman of Shato, Mi was good at archery and riding, and renowned for bravery. In 897, he defected from Li K'e-yung and placed himself under Yang Hsing-mi's command. 706

13, An Jen-i

Similar to Mi Chih-cheng, An was a tribesman of Shato. He had served Li Kuo-cheng and Chin Tsung-chuan, respectively. Finally, he turned to serve Yang Hsing-mi. 707

14, Li Cheng-ssu

A native of Yen-men of Tai-chou, Li was ordered by Li K'e-yung to rescue Yin-yun. When the military situation became hopeless, Li, together with Chu Ching and Shih Yen, rushed to Huai-nan.

Both Li and Shih were valiant generals and the military prestige of Huai-nan was greatly enhanced after the Huai people received them.

They had assisted Yang Hsing-mi in defeating Liang-troops in Ch'ing-k'ou and killing Peng Shih-ku, a prominent general of Chu Wen. Prior to the battle of Ching-k'ou, Li K'e-yung had

705 Ibid., p. 4.
706 Ibid., p. 27.
707 Ibid., P. 37.
requested Yang Hsing-mi to send Li and Shih back because of their military ability. After the battle, Yang reneged due to their excellent performance. 708

15, Shih Yen

He was Li Cheng-ssu's fellow countryman. Previous to the arrival of Ho-tung's powerful cavalries, the Huai people were good at fighting on water and weak in riding and archery. The situation changed greatly after Shih and Li arrived in Huai-nan.

According to the Chiu Wu-tai Shih, Shih Yen contributed greatly to defeating Liang army in Ch'ing-k'ou, along with Chung Chuan (probably a mistake for Chung Kuang-shih, his son), Tu Hung, and Chien Miu. Both Shih and Li were vital in helping the Yang family to complete hegemony. In return, they were well-treated in Huai-nan, as the concubines, servants, and residences given to them were the best. Because of this, Shih and Li had dedicated their utmost strength in the interest of the Wu regime. 709

708 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 743.
709 Ibid., pp. 743-4.
Appendix H: Biographical Data of Candidates Who Participated in the Civil Service Examinations During the Southern T'ang

Candidates who participated in the chin-shih examination:

1. Chang Chi

   Chang Tien, Chang Chi's great grandfather, served as Commandant of Chen-cheng; Chang Wen, his grandfather, served as Inspector of Transport Commission (chuan-yun hsun-kuan) in Ssu-chou; Chang Hsi, his father, was Administrator of the Law Section (ssu-fa yuan) in Hsu-chou. Chang himself was appointed Commandant of Sheng-yuan after obtaining the chin-shih degree. 710

2. Lu Wen-chung

   Lu Yu, Lu Wen-chung's father, served as Administrative Supervisor (lu-shih tsan-chun) of Hsi-chou. Lu himself was appointed Commandant of Lin-chuan after he had succeeded in the examinations. 711

3. Wu Chiao

   Wu Chiao was unable to take the civil service examinations because of his poverty. However, was finally able to fulfill his goals because fortunately, he was financially backed by a Buddhist monk. He was thus appointed to a position at the

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710 Sung-shih, p. 9208.

711 Ibid., p. 9870.
headquarters (mo-fu) of Hsuan-chou. \textsuperscript{712}

4. Chiu Hsu

Chiu Hsu came from a farming family and engaged in husbandry when he was young. As he became older, he changed to a literary career and took the civil service examinations. He was assigned to serve as Commandant of Hsuan-cheng, his native land. \textsuperscript{713}

5. Ou-yang I

Ou-yang I passed the chin-chih examination and served up to the post of Director of State Farms (tun-tien lang-chung). \textsuperscript{714} Ou-yang I was the older brother of Ou-yang Hsiu's grandfather. The Luan-cheng Hou-chi records that Ou-yang Chung, the grandfather of Ou-yang I, served as Prefect of Chi-chou and his family settled down in that prefecture. \textsuperscript{715}

As for the career of Ou-yang Chung, although it is unknown whether or not he was appointed to his post by the T'ang government, it is necessary to point out that Chi-chou did not

\textsuperscript{712} Ma-shu, 14: 5b.

\textsuperscript{713} Ibid., 23: 5b-6a.

\textsuperscript{714} Ou-yang Shih Tu-pu (abbreviated as Tu-pu), included in Ou-yang Wen-chung-kung Wen-chi, p. 530. Ou-yang Hsiu made many mistakes in researching and recording ancestral activities; thus the reliability and validity of the record is open to question. For details, see Chou Mi (1232-1298), Ch'i-tung Yeh-yu, Hsueh-ching T'ao-yuan ed., 11: 1b-2a.

\textsuperscript{715} Su Ch'e (1039-1112), Luan-cheng Hou-chi, included in Luan-cheng Chi, Kuo-hsueh Chi-pen Ts'ung-shu ed., p. 227.
lie within the jurisdiction of Yang Hsing-mi during his rule, and the prefecture only became a Wu territory in 909. In other words, Ou-yang Chung did not work under the Wu regime and could not have used protection to enable his descendants to enter the civil service. Therefore, how Ou-yang Pin began his public career is a mystery although he probably did not rely on the protection or recommendation of powerful officials to serve the government.

The Tu-pu only discusses Ou-yang Pin's personality, but has nothing to say about his merit or performance in office. It is thus reasonable to assume that he did not have any personal abilities worth mentioning. Also, he was not a descendant of a meritorious official, nor did he have powerful political backing. It is no wonder that he could achieve no position higher than that of magistrate. Because of his low rank, his children could not be helped to obtain office through protection. Therefore, Ou-yang-i, his son, had to pass the chin-chih examination as a way of beginning his career. The Tu-pu records that Ou-yang I's highest achievement was the post of Director of the State Farm (tun-tien lang-chung), but it does not mention what his first appointment was after he had passed the examinations. According to common practice, it was probably a minor position in local administration.

6. Lo Shih

Although Lo Shih was "detained in the examination hall for
a long time", he finally passed the chin-chih examination during the reign of Li Yu. 716 Meanwhile, Li Ching-ta was serving in Lin-chuan and he summoned Lo to accept a position drafting memoranda to the court. Lo was granted the rank of Assistant in the Palace Library, although he still worked in the prefecture. 717

The reason Lo Shih kept trying to pass the examinations most likely that he did not have the protection or recommendation of powerful officials. Taking the civil service examinations was thus the only way for him to launch his career.

7, Chang Kuan

Chang Kuan obtained the chin-shih degree and was appointed Assistant Magistrate of Peng-tse; he served the Northern Sung after the downfall of the Southern T'ang. 718 Although his origins cannot be traced, it is important to note that it was the Sung policy on official appointments mandated that officials from Chiang-nan who were serving at the county level would be appointed Assistant Magistrate. 719 Therefore, Chang probably served in a county before the Southern T'ang was defeated.

716 Lu-shu, chuan 5: 9a.
717 Sung-shih, p. 10111.
718 Ibid., p. 9400.
719 For details, see chapter six.
Candidates who participated in the ming-ching examination:

1, Liu Shu-tu

Liu Shu-tu’s ancestors served in local administrations, but none of them had prominent appointments. Liu obtained the honor of winning first place in the ming-ching examination and was appointed Commandant of Lu-ling. 720

2, Wang Chung-hua

Wang Hsia, Wang Chung-hua’s father, served in various prefectures. 721 Wang Chung-hua passed the ming-ching examination and attained the further honor of passing the Five Classics examination. He was appointed Commandant of Hsin-yu, his homeland. 722

3, Wu Chu

Wu Chu’s ancestors did not serve prominently in the Southern T’ang. Wu passed the ming-ching examination during the reign of Li Yu and was assigned the post of Assistant Magistrate of Peng-tze. 723

4, Tu Hao

According to the Sung-shih, Tu Hao was the son of Tu Chang-
Tu served up to the post of Military Commissioner of Chiang-chou in the Southern T'ang, and his official rank fully enabled him to use protection to help his son. In actuality, however, Tu Hao was not the son, but merely a cousin, of Tu Chang-yeh.  

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724 Sung-shih, p. 9876.

725 Ou-yang Wen-chung-kung Wen-chi, p. 236. Perhaps protection among high officials in the Southern T'ang could only apply to their sons, but not cousins, and this is the reason why Tu Hao took the examinations.
Appendix I: Biographical Data of the Descendants of Yang Hsing-mi's Important Subordinates

A. Those who continued their family tradition of pursuing a brilliant military career:

1. Liu Jen-kuei

When Liu Chin died in 905, his son Liu Jen-kuei inherited his position. At that time, Hsu Chih-kao had not yet been able to dominate Wu politics. Therefore, the increase in Liu Jen-kuei's power was totally beyond the influence of the civil administration. This was probably why he was harsh in administration, a trait common among members of the military.

Liu Jen-kuei married the daughter of Yang Hsing-mi. When Yang Wo succeeded the throne, Liu was promoted to the position of Military Commissioner of the two cities of Kuo-k'ou. Later, he was appointed Military Commissioner of Ch'ing-huai Chun during the early period of Chien-ching (927-9).  

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726 Ma-shu, 11: 6a.

727 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 8. The exact year of Liu Jen-kuai's death is not recorded. However, it is recorded in the T'ung-chien that in 929, Hsu Chih-hsun recommended that Li Yen-chung, the son of Li Chien, succeed his father as Military Commissioner of O-chou, but Hsu Chih-kao appointed Chai T'sai-yung to take the post instead. Hsu Chih-hsun disapproved of this arrangement, saying, "Liu Chung-chin is your relative, and the three generations of the Liu family were allowed to monopolize the military governorship of Hao-chou; Li Yen-chung could not follow suit because he belonged to the clan of my wife!" (pp. 9030-1.) The record implies that Liu Jen-kuai had already died by that time, since Liu Chung-chin, his son, could succeed the military commissionership.
2. Wang Chuan-cheng

Wang Kuan, Military Commissioner of Pai-sheng Chun, died in the early period of Chien-ching. 728 His son, Wang Chuan-cheng, had served as Commander-in-chief (tu chih-hui shih) of Hai-chou and had gained much popularity in the army. In 930, Chen Hsuan, Military Training Commissioner (tun-lien shih) of Hai-chou, returned to Kuang-ling after having completed his term of office. Hsu Chih-kao had promised Wang that he might take over Chen’s post, but Hsu changed his mind and ended up allowing Chen to retain his post and summoning Wang to Kuang-ling instead. Wang was angry at this arrangement and suspected calumny on the part of Chen. Having led his 5,000 men on an attack during which Chen Hsuan was killed and the walls of the city were burned down, Wang Chuan-cheng defected with them to the Later T’ang.

However, Wang Chuan-cheng’s revolt did not bring disaster upon his family. Hsu Chih-kao admitted that the revolt had been caused by his own mistake, and granted indemnity to Wang’s wife and children. At that time, Wang Yu (871-944), Wang Chuan-cheng’s uncle, was Prefect of Kuang-chou. When Wang Chuan-cheng sent a spy with a letter to Kuang-chou, Wang Yu caught the spy and reported the affair to Hsu. He requested permission to resign from his post. However, Hsu

728 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 17.
Chih-kao was unwilling to allow this, because he considered Wang Yu to be prudent and level-headed. Instead, Hsu entrusted Wang Yu with the responsibility of leading the bodyguard of Yang P’u by appointing him Inspector-in-chief of the Imperial Mounts (k’ung-ho tu-yu-hou). 729

3, Chou Yeh

The first son of Chou Pen, Chou Yeh followed in his father’s footsteps by pursuing a military career while still young. He served as a military official in Hsu Chih-kao’s bodyguard, before being promoted to the post of Military Commissioner of Lu-chou.

Chou Yeh died in 942. Although notorious for his stubborn nature, he was praised for his loyalty to the Wu. In particular, his outrage when Yang Mung (?-937), a relative of the Wu, was captured and eventually killed, caused the people to praise his loyalty. In fact, these two characteristics of stubbornness and loyalty to the Wu obviously angered Hsu Chih-kao. But the high status and reputation of his father, as well as his family’s cooperation, prevented his persecution by Hsu Chih-kao. In spite of this, he was still promoted to Military Commissioner of Lu-chou. 730

4, Chu Chun-chin

729 T’ung-chien, p. 9044.

730 Chiu-kuo Chih, pp. 42-3; Ma-shu, 9: 1a-2b; Lu-shu, chuan 3: 1a-2b.
The son of Chu Kuang-yeh (?-966), Chu Chun-chin was well-versed in archery and riding and was particularly adept at striking on horseback. Unfortunately, he died young, and his expertise in the martial arts did nothing to make his family more prominent.

B. Those who pursued a military career, but whose performance was far much inferior to that of their ancestors, or not outstanding enough to be recorded:

1. Ch’ai K’e-cheng

The son of Ch’ai T’sai-yung, Ch’ai K’e-cheng served as the Regent (liu-shou) of the Southern capital (i.e. Hung-chou). There is no record of his career.

2. Liu Yen-ying

The son of Liu Hsin, Liu Yen-ying served as military officer in the bodyguard during the period of Hsu Wen. This, however, was a common job given to the sons of prominent generals. Liu’s son simply followed suit.

3. Liu Chuan-chung

Liu Hsin’s cousin, Liu Chuan-chung served as Commander-general (tung-chun) during a war with the Later Chou. Because

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731 Ma-shu, 5: 3a-4b; Lu-shu, chuan 5: 4ab.
732 Chang-pien, p. 341.
733 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 20.
of his sympathies with Chu Kuang-yeh, he was exiled to Yao-chou by Li Ching. 734

4, Chu Kuang-yeh

When Chu Yen-shou was killed, Chu Kuang-yeh, his son, was still very young. When Chu Kuang-yeh was older, office was bestowed upon him. By the time Hsu Chih-kao dominated the Wu administration, Chu Kuang-yeh had been promoted to the rank of military officer. He then served as Inspector-in-chief (tu-yu-hou) of various armies, Prefect of Hsi-chou, and Commander-general of Shen-wei Army (shen-wei tung-chun).

When the Later Chou initiated war against Huai-nan, Chu Kuang-yeh was exiled to Fu-chou because Li Ching was displeased with his advice. Eventually, however, he was summoned back to the capital and was appointed Commander-general of Shen-wu Army shen-wu tung-chun by Li Yu. In 962, Chu Kuang-yeh was appointed Military Commissioner of Ning-kuo Chun. Upon his death in 966, however his office was still that of Commander-general shen-wei Army, because he had recently been reassigned that post. 735

5, Li Chien-feng

The son of Li Te-cheng, Li Chien-feng followed a military career. His personal integrity was praised because of his

734 Nan-t’ang Chin-shih, p. 8.

735 Ma-shu, 5: 3a-4b; Lu-shu, chuan 5: 4ab.
willingness to die for the ruling dynasty. Unfortunately, no other details about his military performance are available.

6. Chou Tsu

The youngest son of Chou Pen, Chou Tsu was skilled at adapting to whatever the political situation happened to be at that moment. 736

As for his military performance, the Ma-shu and the Lu-shu disagree. While the Ma-shu records that in 956, Chou Hung-tsu deserted Shu-chou and fled, 737 the Lu-shu states that Chou

736 Chou Pen was Military Commissioner of Shou-chou and Lu-chou, respectively. He was granted the honorary title and office of Defender-in-chief (tai-wei), Secretariat Director (chung-shu ling), and the King of Pacifying the West (Hsi-ping Wang). When Hsu Chia-kao was about to replace the Wu regime, Chou Tsung and Hsu Chieh, Hsu's henchmen, had advised Hsu to get the support, at least nominally, of Li Te-sheng and Chou Pen who were influential because of their high position. However, the senile Chou did not approve of the political upheaval. He told his intimate friends that since he was endowed with so much gratitude for the Wu, he would not change his loyalty to the Wu. (Chiu-Kuo Chih, pp. 42-3; Ma-shu, 9: 1a-2b; Lu-shu, chuan 3:1a-2b.) Chou Tsu, however, was of the opinion that their family should act in accordance with the current political trend in order to survive and prosper. He thus signed a petition requesting the enthronement of Hsu Chih-kao for his father. When Yang Mung, who was held in detention in Li-yang, escaped to Shou-chou seeking asylum from Chou Pen. Chou Tsu managed to deter his father from meeting with Yang by closing the gate. As a result, Yang was sent to the capital and killed. Under the ensuing political pressure, Chou was forced to send officials to visit Chin-ling, and "persuade" Hsu Chih-kao to accept the throne. Ashamed of this deed, Chou Pen died a few months later. (Chiu-kuo Chih, pp. 42-3; Ma-shu, 9: 1a-2b; Lu-shu, chuan 3: 1a-2b.)

737 Ma-shu 3: 8b. According to Wu Yen-shen, the person described as Chou Hung-tsu, Prefect of Shou-chou whose existence is recorded in the annals of Emperor Yuan-tsung in Ma-shu and Lu-shu, is identical with the personage of Chou Tsu who appears in the biography of Chou Pen which appears in the same two books. Because
committed suicide by drowning himself after Shu-chou had fallen. 738 Because the Lu-shu was compiled later than the Ma-shu, Lu Yu would have been able to base his opinion on the previous work. The fact that Lu had a different account of Chou Hung-tsu means that Lu could have used some additional primary sources to repudiate Ma Ling's claim. It is reasonable to suppose that Lu's account is reliable, especially as Wu Yen-shen agrees with it.

7. T'ao Chin-chao

In 909, Chou Pen sent troops to fight against Wei Chuanfeng. T'ao Chin-chao, son of T'ao Ya, was sent to lead the troops to invade Yao-chou and Hsin-chou. As a result, two prefectures was captured. However, it is unclear exactly what role T'ao played in the operation. 739

8. Chia Kuang-hao

The son of Chia Kung-to, Chia Kuang-hao married the sister of Chu Yen-shou. 740 He was serving as Military Commissioner of Pei-sheng Chun when Li Ching ascended the throne.

When Chang Yu-hsien (?)-943) invaded Nan-kang, a county

of the resemblance of Chou's name to that of Emperor Kao-tsung of the Ch'ing, Wu changed his name to Chou Hung-tsu. For details, see Ssu-kuo Chun-chiu, (Taipei: Kuo-kuang Shu-chu, 1962), 27: 3a.

738 Lu-chu, chi 2: 9a.

739 T'ung-chien, pp. 8714-5.

740 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 21. Chia Kuang-hao was most likely Chia Hao in the Ma-shu and the Lu-shu.
within his jurisdiction, Chia made the mistake of holding the enemy in disdain and did not prepare an adequate defense. After the enemy had conquered additional counties and the prefectural army did not succeed in crushing them, Chia dared not resist the enemy by closing the city gate. After the war, Chia was demoted to the position of General Of Palace Gate Guard (chien-mun-wei chang-chun) and his military commission was taken up by Li Ao, the then-prefect of Yao-chou.

9, Chin Tai
The son of Chin Pei, Chin Tai served as Prefect of Yao-chou.

10, Chu Ling-yun
A cousin of Chu Kuang-yeh, Chu Ling-yun achieved the post of Military Commissioner of Cheng-nan Chun. In 975, he led a force of 150,000 to the aid of Chin-ling. After having been defeated by the Sung army in Hu-t'sun Chou, he subsequently committed suicide by self-immolation.

11, Chin Chin-yuan

741 Ma-shu 26: 5a.
742 Lu-shu, chuan 2: 7a.
743 Ma-shu, 2: 2b.
744 Hsiao-hsu Chi, p. 408.
745 Lu-shu, chuan: 5, 5ab.
The son of Chin Tai, Chin Chin-yuan was Vice Military Commissioner of Hsuan-chou and was posthumously granted the title of Commandant of the Right Gate Guard of the Palace (yu chien-mun-wei shuai-fu-shuai).  

12, Liu Fan

After the death of Liu Chung-chin, his son, Liu Fan, was unable to inherit the post of his father, which was taken over by Liu Yen-ching. Although Liu Fan was only appointed Prefect of Hsu-chou, it appears that he could not even hold this post permanently. At the time Huang-fu Hui (?-956) retreated to Hsu-chou in 956, the prefect was Wang Shao-yen. There is no more information about Liu Jen-kuai's lineage after this point. It is probable that the Liu branch had sunk into obscurity by this time.

13, Chin Cheng-yu

The son of Chin Chin-yuan, Chin Cheng-yu served as Recipient of Edicts of the Palace (tien-chien cheng-chih) and Attendant of the Imperial Palace (chin-chung shih-tsung) after the Southern T'ang was established.

Upon Li Ching's death in Nan-chang, Chin Cheng-yu asked to serve as guard of the imperial grave. As a result, he was

746 Hsiao-hsu Chi, p. 408.

747 Lu-shu, chuan 12: 3b; Ma-shu, shu 2: 6a.

748 Lu-shu, chuan 7: 3b.
given the post of Director of the Orchid Pavilion (*Lan-tai Ling*). For more than ten years, he swept the Li Ching’s grave every day and wept on the first and fifteenth days of each month, as a sign of profound memorization of the deceased master.

Impressed by his loyalty, Li Yu summoned Chin Cheng-yu to serve as Chief Steward of the Wardrobe (*shang-i shih*) and Usher (*chi-hou*) of the Hall of Heart Clarification (*cheng-hsin t’ang*). The hall was the site of imperial banquets and entertainments, and only those who had earned the complete trust of the emperor were entrusted with these guarding positions.  

14, Chang Miao

The son of Chang Hsun, Chang Miao was appointed Editor, thanks to his father’s influence. Although he was known as serving in Academies and Institutes (*kuan-ko chih-shen*), his actual responsibilities consisted of inspecting the bodyguard.  

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749 *Hsiao-shu Chi*, pp. 408-9.

750 For details, see my article. The *Tao-hsiung Chi* records that Chang Miao served the Southern T’ang. (39: 1ab.) The Southern T’ang was established in 937, while Chang Hsun was transferred to be Prefect of Huang-chou in 910. (Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 7.) According to *Ssu-kuo Chun-chiu*, Chang Hsun had a health problem before the transfer, and died shortly after he arrived in Huang-chou. (5: 6b-7a.) Based on the customary practice, the offspring were eligible to inherit the posts of the deceased generals. Therefore, it was not possible for Chang Miao to wait for twenty years, and then participated in public career in the Southern T’ang. In other words, "serving the Southern T’ang" probably refers to the fact that his career was started from the Wu, and continued to the
Competition was extremely fierce in the Southern T'ang examinations, and Chang Pi, Chang Miao's son, was able to obtain the honor of Principal Graduate. This fact implies that Chang Pi was immersed in the classics and underwent extensive training influence during his youth. In other words, even though Chang Miao served in the military, he paid close attention to the education and civil career of the next generation.

In fact, the period of time that Chang Miao served in the government was exactly the same period that Hsu Wen and Hsu Chih-kao ran the administration. Therefore, Chang Miao had probably realized that the changes in the political regime made a military career unlikely to bring his family into prominence. More reliable for this purpose was the pursuit of academia. In view of satisfying the needs of his children, Chang Miao completely overthrew the family tradition of military training and employed teachers for his offspring. As a result, Chang Pi won the first place in the civil service examinations, and eventually became prominent as a bureaucrat.

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Southern T'ang.

751 Chou Hao (1060-1111), Tao-hsiung Chi, 40: 1ab; Chou Hsiang (1012-1067), Tuan-ming Chi, 40: 5ab. The books cited are from Szu-k' u Ch' uan-shu ed.
C. Those who maintained a military career, but tended towards civil service.

1. Liu Jen-chan

The second son of Liu Chin, Liu Jen-chan served as General of Left Palace Gate Guard (tso chien-mun-wei chang-chun), Prefect of Huang-chou and Yuan-chou, Inspector-in-chief (ch’in-wei-chun tu-yu-hou), and Military Commissioner of Wu-chang.

On the one hand, he seemed able to continue his family’s military tradition that he studied military craft in his youth and demonstrated considerable talent in leading troops. His manner was stern and he was well versed in military tactics and strategy. ⁷⁵²

On the other hand, Liu Jen-chan values were completely different from those of his father and brother. As a general, he held material goods in disdain, but cherished men of ability. Also, “he understood the Confucian classics to a certain extent.” ⁷⁵³ Further, he had a knack for prefectural administration and won support and praise from both the local inhabitants and the members of his garrison. ⁷⁵⁴ The reason that Liu’s behavior was so different from that of his father

⁷⁵² Ma-shu, 16: 2a.
⁷⁵³ Lu-shu, chuan 10: 1a.
⁷⁵⁴ Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 5: 3ab.
and brother was most likely that he had more exposure to civil affairs and policies than they did. 755

2, Ch’ai K’e-hung

Ch’ai T’sai-yung died in 919. Ch’ai K’e-hung, his son, was appointed Commandant (lang-chang). He then served as Military Inspector (Hsun-chien shih) of Hsuan-chou, Prefect of Ssu-chou, and Inspector-in-chief of Lung-wu Army (lung-wu-chun tu-yu-hou).

Ch’ai T’sai-yung was known for his grace and refinement, and Ch’ai K’e-hung inherited his father’s sense of style. 756 When the war in Huai-nan broke out, he was serving as Prefect of Fu-chou. He sent a petition to the court, asking for permission to lead troops to fight for the country. The title of General of the Right Guard (yu-wei chun-chun) was conferred on him, and he inflicted heavy casualties on the army of Wu Yueh in Chang-chou. Because of his outstanding performance, he was promoted to Prefect of Chiang-chou. He died shortly after the promotion. 757

3, Wang Chung-wen

Wang Chung-wen was another of Wang Kuan’s sons. His

755 In 957, Liu Jen-chan died at the age of 58. That is, he was born in 901. His father died in 905, when Liu Jen-chan was only five years old. He basically grew up during the rule of Hsu Wen and Hsu Chih-kao.

756 T’ung-chien, p. 9549.

757 Ma-shu, 11: 5a-6a; Lu-shu, chuan 3: 3a-4a.
disposition, serene and graceful, was completely different from that of his brother. In addition to dressing as a scholar, he had a wide knowledge of Chinese classics and history. 758

In his youth he showed his adroitness and ability as a military officer. He married the princess of Kuang-te and was appointed Prefect of Hsi-chou and Chi-chou. Because the local inhabitants of Chi-chou were argumentative and prone to initiate lawsuits, the prefecture was traditionally notorious for being difficult to administrate. But Wang complied with the law and acted in accordance with his principles and reason. He did not interfere with the daily life of the people, and this way of ruling guaranteed that his administration in the prefecture would be successful. He was transferred to Chien-chou, after Chi-chou was annexed by the Southern T'ang. Due to Wang's peaceful nature and wise policies, the local people quickly recovered from the turmoil they had suffered during their conquest.

Over the thirty years of Wang Chung-wen's public career, he governed several prefectures and eventually became Commissioner-councilor (shih-hsiang). He always wore the costume of a scholar, held banquets, and talked intimately with scholar-officials. His contemporaries held him in high

758 Lu-shu, chuan 5: 6a.
esteem and gladly befriended him, thanks to his grace and tact. Upon Li Yu's ascension to the throne, Wang sent him a memorandum discussing current affairs and the state of the government, as well as offering some advice. Wang died in the eighth month of 961, the month following the Li Yu's accession.

4, Liu Chung-liang

Liu Chung-liang, another son of Liu Jen-chan, served in Chiang-nan as Commissioner of Offering (chin-feng shih). This was a military post in the central army. However, after having undergone the civil transformation, he was able to pursue a civilian career. When he moved to Kai-feng after the downfall of the Southern T'ang, Liu was praised by Emperor Tai-tsu (927-976, r. 960-976) of the Sung as the descendent of a loyal official, and was promoted to the position of Director of the Criminal Administrative Bureau (tu-kuan lang-chung), which was a civilian post.

5, Liu Chung-chin

While Liu Jen-kuai was harsh and merciless in ruling Hao-chou, Liu Chung-chin, his son, took the opposite track by adopting an attitude of benevolence in administration when he

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759 Ma-shu, 11: 6b-7a.
760 Ibid., 5: 2b.
761 Lu-shu, chuan 10: 3b.
first became Prefect of Hao-chou.

After a few years, however, Liu Chung-chin became corrupt and reckless in his behavior. He gathered many scoundrels together and ordered them to cross the Huai River to pillage towns and seize horses and women for his personal enjoyment. Though the people under his jurisdiction were terrified by his atrocities, it was undeniable that his administration was well-regulated. Once he recruited a few hundred horsemen and dressed them in fine armor. The well-armed cavalry was presented to the court as a tribute, with the intention of currying imperial favor. This tactic was successful, as Hao-chou was promoted to honorary Ting-yuan Chun, and Liu was appointed to the post of first Military Commissioner. In addition to this piece of toadying, Liu Chung-ching tried to win imperial favor by cultivating marital relationships with the royal house. Liu Chieh, his son, married the daughter of Li Ching. However, this arrangement did not work out, because Li Ching was disgusted with Liu Chung-chin's personality.

In 944, Yao Ching, Military Commissioner of Shou-chou, died, and Liu Chung-chin sent a handsome bribe to high-ranking officials, asking permission to take up the military commissionership of Shou-chou while concurrently retaining his

[^62]: Ma-shu, 11: 6ab.
original office. Li Ching cleverly pretended to misunderstand his request. Having allowed Liu Chung-chin to transfer to Shou-chou, the Emperor ordered Liu Yen-ching, then-prefect of Chu-chou, to gallop into Hao-chou to replace him. Liu Chung-chin was sorry for this blunder and actually managed to reform his ways and comply with regulations and laws. However, he fell ill shortly after the transfer, and died in 946.  

Liu Hsin died in 927, after having attained the post of Military Commissioner of Cheng-nan Chun. He was harsh in administering his domain and caused a lot of discontent among the people. Hsu Wen was suspicious of Liu Hsin, when Emperor Chuang-tsung of the Later T’ang launched an operation against Hsi-shu, Hsu feared that Liu would use the opportunity to start a revolt against him. He therefore summoned Liu to Chiang-tu and granted him a sinecurist military post. After the death of Hsu Wen, Liu dedicated himself to serving Hsu Chih-kao. This was an important reason why he was able to return to Cheng-nan Chun.

Because Liu Hsin was under such intense pressure for a long time, besides ingratiating himself with the ruling elites, he

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763 *Lu-shu, chuan* 12: 3b; *Ma-shu, shu* 2: 6a.
764 *Chiu-kuo Chih*, pp. 19-20.
had to play down the military background of his family as a way to lessen their suspicion and hostility. Training his sons to become literati, which enabled them to start their career by means of civilian posts, was the best way to ensure survival. Liu Yen-cheng, his fourth son, was a prime example showing the success of this strategy.

Liu Yen-cheng started his career during the period of Hsu Wen’s rule, based on the protection of his father. He received an appointment as Case Reviewer of the Court of Judicial Review, and, after a series of promotions, attained the office of Vice Director of State farm (tun-tien yuan-wei lang). Having observed a period of mourning for the death of his father, Liu Yen-cheng resumed office by taking on the post of General (chang-chun). From then on, he remained in military service and served as Prefect and Military Commissioner of many prefectures, including Hai-chou, Chu-chou, Hao-chou and Shou-chou.

Because Liu Yen-cheng’s previous training had placed such emphasis on the civil aspect, even though he moved into the military sphere, his orientation was still different from that of his military-minded father and earned him a reputation as a civil administrator. He was seen as a good and capable official whose administrative performance was intertwined with

766 Ma-shu, 17: 4ab.
an attempt to incorporate Confucian norms and values.

Like Liu Chung-chin, however, Liu Yen-cheng became corrupt after he was transferred to Shou-chou. He engaged in trade practices which were regarded as conflicting with his rank and duty. But his most notorious misdeed was his encroaching on the land of the people. "When the battle of Huai-nan broke out, Liu led 30,000 soldiers to fight against the invasion, but he was defeated and killed.

The Southern T'ang lost 1,000 li in territory, and the country was almost brought to extinction. This misfortune was attributed to Liu Yen-cheng. Although he died for the dynasty, his contemporaries did not admire him. He was given the official title of Secretariat Director and the posthumous title of "Robustness" (chuang) a few years later. But his descendants were not assigned any official positions by the court."

D. Those who pursued civilian careers:

1. Li Chien-hsun

Li Te-cheng's descendants occupied important posts in both the military and civilian bureaucracies. He had twenty sons,

767 An-feng T'ang in Shou-chou irrigated ten thousand ch'ing (a ch'ing was equivalent to an area of one hundred mow, or 13.7 acres) of land. Because of this sound irrigation system, the prefecture did not experience any drought. Liu Yen-cheng, on the pretext of dredging the moat around the city, drained all the water into the moat. The people's land all dried up, and Liu ordered the collection of stiff taxes. There was nothing the farmers could do but to sell their land and evacuate. Liu then purchased the fertile land at a low price. Then he irrigated the land as before. By doing so he managed to earn a large annual income. (Lu-shu, chuan 6: 1b.)

768 Ma-shu, 17: 4a-5b; Lu-shu, chuan 6: 1a-2b.
the most famous of whom was his fourth son, Li Chien-hsun. Li served as Prime Minister and was renowned for his refinement and grace, which he certainly inherited from his father. Praised for his personal integrity, Li Chien-hsun did not get involved in factional struggles. 769

Li Chien-hsun married the daughter of Hsu Wen. Thanks to this marriage, he was granted a good promotion and attained the post of Vice Director of Secretariat and Manager of Affairs (chung-shu shih-lang ping-chang-shih). Later, he was demoted to the position of Military Commissioner of Fu-chou, although he was recalled later to serve as Minister of Works (ssu-kuang), an honorary title with no actual power. This occurred because Hsu Chih-kao was determined to impose restrictions on powerful officials. However, Hsu’s policy did not affect Li’s extravagant and idle life style. After the demotion,

Li constructed galleries and pavilions in Chung Mountain, and sought enjoyment in the streams and rocks.

The court eventually granted him the title of Minister of Education (ssu-t’u), and allowed him to retire. Finally, he was given the title of Duke of Chung Mountain (Chung-shan Kung). 770

2, T’ao Ching-hsuan

769 Ma-shu, 9: 3ab; Lu-shu, chuan 6: 8ab.

770 Ma-shu, 10: 1ab; Lu-shu, chuan 6: 8b-10a.
There is a detailed record about T’ao Chin-hsuan, the fourth son of T’ao Ya, in the Hsu Chi-sheng Chi. T’ao was appointed Editing Clerk of the Heir Apparent (t'ai-tzu chiao-shu), based on the protection of his father, and was promoted to the position of Aide of Princely Establishment (fu chang-shih). When he was fourteen years old, his father died and he observed the mourning period earnestly. Later, he re-entered official life and served in the central and local governments.

Besides being a good and capable official, he was also famous for his literary works and his musical abilities. He spent his money to help others, and left nothing for himself. He died in 950 at the age of 52.  

3, Li Jen-i

Li Yu served as Military Training Commissioner of Hsuan-chou. During Hsu Wen’s domination of the Wu administration, Li’s family was executed because he had insulted Hsu Wen. However, Li Yen-i, his grandson, who was only a baby when his family was ruined, survived. Eventually, when Hsu Chih-kao came into power, he was appointed Magistrate.  

4, Chang Pi

The son of Chang Miao, Chang Pi began his career during the

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71 *Hsu Chi-sheng Chi*, p. 149.

72 *Chiu-kuo Chih*, p. 8.
During the reign of Li Yu, Chang Pi added to the literary reputation of his family by accepting the post of chief examiner for the civil service examinations. This remarkable honor, which could definitely not have been imagined by his ancestors, shows how the Chang family had successfully changed with the times under the rule of the Southern T'ang.

5, T'ao Chung-ting
The son of T'ao Ching-chao, T'ao Chung-ting served as Director of Granaries (ssu-t'sang ts'an-chun) in Tai-chou.

E, Unidentified

With respect to the beginning of Chang Pi's public career, the Shu-shui Chi-wen records that when Chang Chi was a candidate to take the civil service examinations, Chang Pi had already risen to prominence. (Ssu-ma Kuang, Ts'ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch'u-pien ed., p. 25.) But in actual fact, and contrary to the record, when Li Hung-chi, the heir-apparent of Li Ching, died in 959, Chang Chi, who was then serving as Commandant of Chu-yung, sent a memorandum disputing military overtones included in Li Hung-chi's posthumous title. Emperor Yuan-tsung agreed with Chang's petition. "Chang then became famous; he was transferred to be Commandant of Shang-yuan, and promoted to the post of Investigating Censor." (Ma-shu, 7: Sab.) However, Chang Chi was still Commandant of Chu-yung when he sent a memorandum to the court in 961. In other words, the beginning of Chang Pi's career should be dated later than the beginning of Chang Chi's career. Wu Yen-shen believes that Chang Pi got his chin-shih degree in the middle period of Pao-tai. (Ssu-ko Chun-chiu, 5: 7a. Wu makes a mistake by confusing Chang Pi with Chang Yuan-pi.) However, since Chang Pi was still serving in the county of the capital in the late period of Pao-tai, Wu's supposition is reasonable and logical.

For details, see my article.

Hsu Chi-sheng Chi, p. 149.
1, Li Yen-chung

Li Chien was Military Commissioner of Wu-chang. Hsu Chih-hsun, his son-in-law, illegally retained 2,000 of Li Chien's bodyguard in Chin-ling. He recommended that Li Yen-chung, the son of Li Chien, take over as Military Commissioner of Wu-chang, but the post was filled by Ch'ai T'sai-yung instead.

Shortly thereafter, Hsu Chih-hsun lost his position and authority. Because Li Yen-chung was a relative of Hsu Chih-hsun, he was inevitably oppressed by Hsu Chih-kao politically. This is probably why he did not display outstanding merit or performance.

2, Li Shan

Li Cheng-ssu had served as Military Commissioner of Chu-chou. His descendants were apparently quite wealthy, as indicated by the fact that Li Shan, his youngest son, had a large residence in Hsuan-ping Li of Kuang-ling and could afford to have servants.

3, Liu Chung-chien

The younger son of Liu Jen-chan, Liu Chung-chien lived with his father in the city besieged by the Later Chou. His father

776 Chiu-kuo Chih, p. 12.
777 T'ung-chien, p. 9031.
778 Chi-shen Lu, 4: 10a.
killed him because he tried to negotiate with the Later Chou in order to save his family.  

4, Liu Chieh

The son of Liu Chung-chin, he was also the son-in-law of Li Ching.

5, T'ao Chung-liang; and 6, T'ao Chung-lun

The sons of T'ao Chin-hsuan, T'ao Chung-liang and T'ao Chung-lun are described only as "guarding their reputation earnestly, and abiding by their family's teachings". However, nothing is said about their office or rank.  

7, Liu Chung-tsan

Liu Chung-tsan was the son of Liu Jen-chan. When the Later Chou army entered Shou-chou, he was appointed by Emperor Shih-tsung of the Later Chou Prefect of Huai-chou. The motivation for the imperial gratitude definitely stemmed from the desire to promote a sense of loyalty, which was vital to maintaining the dynasty. From then on, Liu served as Prefect in various prefectures in the Later Chou.

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779 Lu-shu, chuan 10: 3a.
780 Hsu Chi-sheng Chi, p 149.
781 Hsin Wu-tai Shih, p. 352.
782 Chiu Wu-tai Shih, p. 1709.
Appendix J: Military Performance of the Generals Outside the Bloc of the Meritorious Officers

In the wake of their loss of military vitality, the descendants of the meritorious officials in the Southern T'ang were no longer able to protect their country against northern aggression, as their ancestors had done. Under such circumstances, some other generals from outside the bloc of meritorious officers replaced the descendants of the meritorious officers in military significance and function. For example, Kuo Ting-wei and Chang Yen-nien (?-958) played an active role during the battle in Huai-nan.

Kuo Ting-wei was the son of Kuo Chuan-i. Clearly, Kuo Chuan-i did not take part in the expansionary war during the reign of Yang Hsing-mi, and he rose to prominence by means of military career that started during Hsu Wen's rule. At the time the Later Chou invaded Huai-nan, Kuo Ting-wei was Army Supervising Commissioner (chien-chun) of Hao-chou. He rounded up the hooligans of the city, arrested them and imprisoned them in a Buddhist monastery. There the prisoners were fed and ordered to manufacture armaments according to their individual talents. So the invaders, unaware of the military situation within the city, could not take advantage of any weakness in order to capture the city. Kuo inflicted heavy casualties on the Chou Army in Ting-yuan by launching a surprise attack. Although forced to surrender because his
strength was exhausted, he still won praise from Emperor Shih-tsung of the Later Chou.

Since I led this southward expedition, many generals of Chiang-nan have met failure and death. But only you could tear down the pontoon bridge in Wo-k’ou and destroy the stockade in Ting-yuan. Such achievements are quite enough to make you worthy of the national gratitude [granted by the Southern T’ang]. Hao-chou is such a small city. Could Li Ching guard it, even if he himself [took the responsibility of guarding it]?

Chang Yen-nien served as Defense Commissioner (fang-yu shih) of Chu-chou. It was a highly ranked military post, and one which required a long time to attain. Therefore, Chang could only have begun his military career during the reign of Hsu Chih-kao, or even that of Hsu Wen. Emperor Shih-tsung personally led his troops to attack the city, and the struggle grew quite intense. But Chang was not intimidated by the situation. He, together with Cheng Chao-yeh (?-958) who served as Military Director-in-Chief (ping-ma t’u-chien), did their best to defend against the invasion. Both of them, along with their subordinates who numbered over a thousand, fought to the death. But they succeeded in inflicting heavy casualties on the Chou army. Emperor Shih-tsung, enraged at

783 T’ung-chien, p. 9575.

784 The Chiang-nan Yeh-shih makes the vague claim that Chang Yen-nien was a descendent of some famous general or other. (2: 12a.) But the Lu-shu, which appeared at a later date, records that the historian source "had lost the record of his native place and family background." (chuan 11: 2b.) Probably Chang did not come from a prominent family, since his origin is impossible to trace.
their stubborn resistance, ordered the inhabitants of the city to be massacred and their houses to be burned to ground. 785

In addition, many generals who had defected or surrendered from other states played an active role in the resistance effort during the war with the Later Chou.

Although Hsu Chih-kao had been dedicated to transforming the military clans and families into literati, it is not fair to criticize him for not realizing that the nation would decline because of the loss of military vitality and the need to fill military vacancies. As a matter of fact, Hsu Chih-kao had long absorbed generals who had defected from the north. Apart from some exception, 786 most of them were held in high esteem

785 Lu-shu, chuan 11: 2b-3a.

786 Li Ping and Chu Yuan, for example, were sent to Chiang-nan to request the assistance of Li Shou-ching. After Li was killed, they served the Southern T'ang instead. When Wu Yueh invaded Chang-chou, Li Ping claimed that he was a good strategist. Li Ching assigned him to be a general, but he refused to take the post. He was then promoted to Vice Minister of the Court of the Imperial Regalia (wei-wei shao-ching), and was ordered to lead troops to patrol the north of Chang-chiang. Clearly, he ventured too far, but lacked real military talent. At that time, the Later Chou had already taken over Chi-chou, but were unable to hold it. Li Ping took advantage of this opportunity to regain the prefecture, and he was promoted to Prefect of Chi-chou. (ma-shu, 19: 7b-8a; Lu-shu, chuan 10: 7ab.) Therefore, any praise for his military efforts was due to his luck, not his military performance. Also, Hsien Shih-lang (?-956) defected to the Southern T'ang in 949, (T'ung-chien, p. 9407.) He was a courageous fighter but lacked strategy. He was desirous of military glory, but he held the enemy in contempt. This led to his death in battle. (Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 2: 10b; Lu-shu, lu 6: 2a.)
because of their military ability.  

However, entrusting defected generals with important posts might indirectly mean revitalizing the military tradition, contrary to the cardinal principle of civil administration. Under the circumstances, what Hsu Chih-kao did was to place the defected generals in unimportant and non-challenging posts, and their essential contributions to the enhancement of military strength in Chiang-huai were therefore limited.

The experience of Lu Wen-chin in Chiang-huai fully reflected the essence of Hsu Chih-kao's policy towards the defected generals from North China. Before the defection, Lu had already proven himself traitorous to both the Central Kingdom and the Khitans for many years, and was adept in political opportunism and in capitalizing on the chance to better himself.

When Lu Wen-chin defected to the Southern T'ang in 936, he made drastic changes in his behavior by "trying to obscure traces of his brilliance, and striving to act complaisantly and cautiously." Also, he treated the literati graciously, and depreciated himself as if he lacked courtesy and

For instance, Li Chin-chuan (?-950) was renowned for analyzing and predicting the enemy's movements, and was much admired by the military men of Chiang-nan. He died in 950, a few years before the war in Huai-nan broke out. When the Southern T'ang had suffered a series of military setbacks, the people remembered Li's ability and "they all regretted that Li had died early." (Lu-shu, chuan 7: 3a.)
refinement. He no longer discussed military affairs, but only that which pertained to contemporary court etiquette and regulations.  

Lu Wen-chin decided to change probably because he had detected the new literary trend and the contemporary requirements of Chiang-nan. Under this unique political atmosphere, military merit and strategy was no longer sufficient to effectively protect himself. Rather, it would only invite swift disaster. What he needed to do was to project an image of refinement and grace for himself. This change exactly reflected Hsu Chih-kao's suspicions against the military.

Apparently, the court did grant Lu Wen-chin much favor, since he was allowed to join the array of officials at imperial audiences and was granted the full salary of Military Commissioner. But all his posts and titles lacked real power. It is clear that behind this favorable treatment lay suspicion of him. Therefore, Lu's choice to pursue a

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788 Ma-shu, 12: 2a.
789 Lu-shu, chuan 6: 4ab.
790 Lu Wen-chin served as Commander General of Tien-hsiung Army (tien-hsiung tung-chun), as well as Military Commissioner of Hsuan-chou and Jun-chou, but he was never appointed to Military Commissioner on the frontier. He was later summoned to Chin-ling and appointed Generalissimo of the Right Guard and concurrent Secretariat Director (tso-wei shang-chang-chun chien chung-shu-ling) and King of Fan-yang (Fan-yang Wang). All of them were merely honorable titles.
humble and gracious attitude was a wise response to the political pressure.

Although oppressed in their careers in the Southern T'ang, some generals from the north dedicated their efforts to helping out in the battle during the war in the Huai region, the most prominent of whom are listed below.

1. Huang-fu Hui

When the Later Chou invaded Huai-nan, he was appointed Reinforcement Commissioner of the Northward Mobile Brigade (pei-mein hsing-ying ying-huan shih). He joined the Liu Yenching's and Yao Feng's forces to fight against the Chou army. Liu was quick-tempered and impatient, and anyone could have predicted that he would certainly lose the battle. In contrast, Huang-fu Hui was cautious, making "the soldiers glad to under his command", and the Chou army feared him.

When Liu Yenching was crushed and killed, Huang-fu Hui and Yao Feng retreated to fight the Chou army for the mastery of the Gate of Ch'ing-liu. Huang-fu Hui was defeated, but was still able to lead the remains of his troops to retreat to Hsu-chou, fighting all along the way. By the time the army arrived in Hsu-chou, Wang Shao-yen, the prefect, had already fled. Without the benefit of reinforcements, Huang-fu Hui was wounded and captured in battle when he tried to defend against the invaders. He was escorted to Shou-chou to meet Emperor Shih-tsung, and horses and clothes were lavished on him. A
few days later, however, he died from a severe wound for which he refused medical treatment.  

2. Shen-t'u Ling-chien

Defecting to Chiang-huai in 949, Shen-t'u Ling-chien was sent to save Shou-ch'un. He, together with Lin Jen-chao, crushed the Chou stockade located on the south side of the city. He was skilled at martial arts, and was unmatched by any rival on the battlefield. It was his valiance that regained Hao-chou. He was promoted to Inspector-in-Chief of the Shen-wei Army (shen-wei chun t'u-yu-hou) based on his military glory.  

3. Chu Yuan

As the military situation worsened, Chu Yuan presented his own strategy to Li Ching. Since the Emperor appreciated his proposal, he was sent to defend against the siege of Shou-chou with Li Ching-ta and Chen Chiao.

Chu Yuan was good at pacifying the officers and soldiers and persuading them to do his bidding. Whenever he delivered a solemn speech to the army prior to battle, his words were always passionate, and he shed many tears. Everyone who heard his words were willing to defend their country to the death.

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791 Lu-shu., chuan 7: 3b-4a.
792 Ma-shu, 12: 6b-7a.
793 Lu-shu, chuan 9: 5a.
Due to his popularity with the army, he was able to lead his troops to regain many lost prefectures, including Shu, Chi, Tai, Yang, Kuang and Hsu. Chu also built a corridor (yung-tao) from Tzu-chin Mountain to Shou-chun, which greatly ameliorated the military situation of the Southern T'ang. 

Lu Yu believed that Chu Yuan only recovered the prefectures of Shu and Hu at the point when the Chou army was already about to leave, so their recovery was not a great achievement.

However, the best troops of the Southern T'ang had already been annihilated in the fourth month of 956. When Chu Yuan came to the defense in the seventh month of the same year, the Southern T'ang "was almost revitalized". Indeed, Chu became a key figure who determined the failure or success of the Southern T'ang in the struggle against the Later Chou. Thus, Lu Yu had to admit that after Chu Yuan was forced to surrender to the Later Chou,

other generals were totally helpless, and expected only to be taken captive. Consequently, the Southern T'ang lost Huai-nan, and was forced to submit to the Later Chou. Therefore, although the Southern T'ang did not collapse immediately, a trend of failure had already begun.

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794 Ma-shu, 27: 5a.
795 Lu-shu, chuan 27: 3a.
796 T'ung-chien, p. 9553.
797 Lu-shu, chuan 10: 2b.
798 Ibid., chuan 9: 6a.
Apart from North China, some other conquered states, like Hu-nan and Chien-chou, were sources of many of the military elite of the Southern T'ang.

Since the Southern T'ang had never successfully established its administrative structure in Hu-nan, only a few generals from that area served in Chiang-nan, the most famous of whom is Lu Meng-chin. Lu cooperated with Chai K'e-yung to deliver a crushing defeat to the army of Wu Yueh in chang-chou.

After that battle, the Southern T'ang sent Lu Meng-chin to defend Tai-chou. The garrison of the Later Chou could not keep the prefecture, and was forced to retreat. Lu then continued his attack against Yang-chou, and Han Ling-kun was initially forced to abandon the city. Emperor Shih-tsung was angry at this military setback and ordered Chao Kuang-yin and Chang Yung-te to assist the garrison in Yang-chou. When Han heard that the reinforcements were coming, he re-entered the city, and battled Lu's troops. Lu was defeated and captured. Though Lu could not escape his fate of defeat, he had made undeniable contributions to the Southern T'ang.

The Southern T'ang was able to set up a more effective administration in Chien-chou, Ting-chou, Yung-chou, and Chien-chou, after having demolished Wang's rule in Min. An Effective administration enabled the Southern T'ang to recruit

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799 Sung-shih, p. 8832.
more military heroes to render service in Huai-nan.

Li Ching's method of handling the military men who had defected from Min prior to the war with the Later Chou was similar to that of his father's way in dealing with the generals defected from North China. For instance, Li Ching kept Lin-Jen-chao (?-973) and Chen Hui (?-962), the famous generals from the Min region, idle after the conquest of Chien-chou and did not include them in the military structure.

After the military strength had been exhausted and most of the prefectures in Huai-nan had fallen into the hands of the Later Chou, Li Ching then rushed to incorporate military talents from Min by sending P'an Cheng-yu to Chuan-chou and Chien-chou to recruit local skilled military officers. P'an recommended Hsu Wen-shen, Chen Te-cheng (933-972), Cheng Yen-hua and Lin Jen-chao to Emperor Yuan-tsung, and all of them were assigned military tasks in Huai-nan.

Apart from Hsu Wen-shen, the others all earned impressive military honors:

1. Chen Te-cheng

The eldest son of Chen Hui, Chen Te-cheng led a few thousand troops to defend against the northern invasion in response to

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800 Hsu Wen-shen was ordered to rescue Shou-chun and set up camp in Tzu-chin Shan. His military strength seemed impressive at first. But the camp broke down when the Later Chou took advantage of the opportunity to attack the Southern T'ang after the surrender of Chu Yuan. Hsu was captured. (T'ung-chien, p. 9564.)
imperial orders.  801 He was at first under the command of Lu Meng-chin. In 956, when Lu Meng-chin recovered Tai-chou, he stationed Chen in that prefecture.  802 Later, Chen led his troops to liberate Shou-chou and won many battles. Meanwhile, other generals suffered countless defeats, only Chen acquired substantial military merits.  803

When Chu Yuan surrendered to the Later Chou, all the troops stationed in Tzu-chin Mountain were routed, but Chen Te-cheng managed to retreat with all of his troops intact.  804 When he returned to the capital, Li Ching praised his army, and conferred on his army the title of "Ever Victorious" (pai-sheng) as a mark of distinction. Chen was promoted to Prefect of Hu-chou.  805

2. Lin Jen-chao

Lin Jen-chao, together with Liu Jen-chan, launched a surprise attack on the garrison army of the Later Chou, which was stationed in the south of Shou-chou, and inflicted heavy casualties on it. He also garnered honors by recovering the water palisade in Hao-chou, and was promoted to Agriculture

801 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 5: 6b.
802 T'ung-chien, p. 9552.
803 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 5: 6b.
804 T'ung-chien, p. 9566.
805 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 5: 6b.
and Reinforcements Commissioner of Huai-nan (Huai-nan ying-tun ying-yuan shih.)

3. Cheng Yen-hua

Cheng Yen-hua also performed well in fighting the Later chou. He fought over a hundred battles, both great and small, and suffered approximately fifty injuries.

The Min generals were not limited to just these personages which highlights the point that the mission to recruit military geniuses from Min was not only confined to P'an Cheng-yu's recommendations. For instance, Hsieh Wen-chieh bravely crossed the Chang-chiang by wearing armor and forcing his way into the enemy's stronghold. The Wu people referred to him as "iron cage" (tieh-lung).

Moreover, Min became an important source for the Southern T'ang to supplement its ebbing military strength. After losing the Huai region, the Southern T'ang continued their policy of recruiting military officers from Min as a means of making up for their losses during the war with the Later Chou.

During the war, the militia not only fought to protect their

806 Ibid., 9: 5ab.
807 Lu-shu, chuan 18: 2a.
808 Sung-shih, p. 10165.
809 Wen-chuang Chi, 28: 16a.
native lands, but also shared this responsibility with the regular army. As recorded in the T'ung-chien, when Emperor Shih-tsung of the Later Chou led the troops to the west side of Hao-chou city in 957,

on the northeast side, about 18 li from the city, there was a sand bank. The natives of the Southern T'ang (T'ang-jen) built up a palisade on it and strengthened the defense by surrounding themselves with water. They thought that the Chou army could not wade through the water. §10

The Ma-shu has an account of the elements of the garrison in such palisade:

Li Yuan-ch'ing was a native of Hao-chou. When Emperor Shih-tsung of the Later Chou was leading a southward expedition, his father gathered patriots in his native place who used paper to make armor, and they were named as the "White Armor Army" (pai-chia chun). They, together with the government army, guarded the palisade on the water. §11

Later, Emperor Shih-tsung ordered his troops to conquer the palisade. His army used camels to wade through the water, and routed the garrison. §12 The Ma-shu also has a similar record that the Chou soldiers galloped on their camels as a vanguard. The natives of Hao were frightened and retreated without actually fighting. §13

Both the T'ung-chien and the Ma-shu record the same

§10 T'ung-chien, p. 9573.
§11 Ma-shu, 22: 7b.
§12 T'ung-chien, p. 9573.
§13 Ma-shu, 22: 7b.
activities, thus showing that the militia fought against the Later Chou with regular army.

After losing land north of the Yangtze River, the Southern T'ang was eager to revitalize its military might. However, the Southern T'ang was unable to increase its military superiority, even though it had gathered all available resources in the professional armies from both Chiang-huai and conquered states. Li Ching and Li Yu had to turn to the militia force for support, and some outstanding figures were absorbed in the regular army.

When Li Yuan-ch'ing's father, a famous leader of militia, was defeated, Li fled to Chiang-nan and resided in Chin-ling. Li Yuan-ch'ing was an ideal spy, because he was brave and valiant and could run as fast as a galloping horse. Consequently, he was recruited by the government, and frequently went to Liang-sung (i.e. Pien-ching) to pry into the situation of the Later Chou.  

Another militia leader was Chang Hsiung, who had risen from obscurity to become the most prominent militia leader in terms of military merits. He was assigned a position as Chief of Militia. When the Southern T'ang ceded the territory of Huai, he was moved to Chiang-nan, and served as Prefect in Yuan-chou

814 Ibid.
and Ting-chou, respectively.  

As the situation deteriorated further, the Southern T’ang was forced to recruit military elites from scoundrels and rascals. Lu Chiang and Liu Mou-chung were the most prominent generals of this category.

Although Lu Chiang was educated, what he liked most was the art of war and statesmanship. He was unconcerned with laws and regulations, and engaged in gambling and wrestling. After having failed the civil service examinations, he served as a minor officer in Chi-chou. Later, he was forced to escape, because he had stolen gold from a treasury.

Nevertheless, Lu Chiang did have military talent, as shown by the fact that he strengthened the navy and won many battles against Wu Yueh. He believed that Wu Yueh would be a hindrance to the Southern T’ang in the future war against the Sung. Thus, he sent a memorandum to Li Yu, asking for the destruction of Wu Yueh in advance.  

Liu Mou-chung also dabbled in learning. But he did not work for his livelihood and only indulged in careless freedom and heroism. Eventually, he posed a serious threat to the local inhabitants by gathering scoundrels and pillaging his native land. He and his gang members were once captured and barely

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815 *Lu-shu, chuan* 14: 5ab.

816 *Chiang-nan Yeh-shih*, 10: 3ab; *Lu-shu, chuan* 11: 4a-5b.
escaped the death penalty through imperial amnesty.

Afterwards, Liu Mou-chung joined the army and distinguished himself by suppressing some gangs for the government. From then on, Liu became a prominent general in the Southern T'ang, and his military ability was well demonstrated when he was assigned a position as Military Commissioner (chih-chih shih) of Ping-hsiang, a county in Yuan-chou. He was entrusted with the task of defending against the military threat from Hsiang-tan. As he arrived in the county,

he soothed the local inhabitants by setting up laws and ordinances. Also, he had the soldiers and cavalry well trained and familiarized himself with the military situation. 817

Consequently, the local defense was greatly strengthened, and Liu Mou-chung proved himself as an eminent general in fighting against the Sung invasion from Hu-nan.

817 Chiang-nan Yeh-shih, 10: 8a-9a.
Appendix K: Question on the Reliability of the *Lan-ling Huang-tun Hsiao-chiang Chia-cheng*

The reliability of the genealogy of the Hsiao-chiang (*Lan-ling Huang-tun Hsiao-chiang Chia-cheng*, abbreviated as the *Chia-cheng*) is subject to question.

The *Chia-cheng* claims that the first ancestor was Chiang Cheng and that his clan originated from the Hsiaos, a powerful family. Chiang Cheng was probably a local landowner of substantial influence and reputation, but not of noble origin. In its preface, the *Chung-hsiu Chiang-shih Chia-pu Hsu* states:

During the period of Emperor Hsi-tsung of the T'ang, there was a good prime minister named Hsiao Kao. He had seven sons, and the second one was Cheng. Hsiao Cheng was promoted to the post of Military Commissioner of Chiang-nan, thanks to his contributions toward the suppression of Huang Chao. When his father died in the Chu Mei incident, he crossed the river to go south from Lan-ling, and settled in Huang-tun in Hsi-chou. He became the first ancestor of the clan from Chiang-nan, and used Chiang as his last name. He called his clan Hsiao-chiang, to differentiate it from the clan living in Chi-yang.

The *Shih-tsu Shih-hsi: Ti-i Shih* also states,

Hsiao Cheng took refuge at Huang-tun in Hsi-chou during the reign period Kuang-ming. At first, one of Huang Ch'ao's divisions attacked Hsi-chou, and Hsiao Cheng showed his might by defending the location. He cooperated with Kao Pien to suppress the rebellion, and was given the title of "Supreme Pillar of State" (*shang Chu-kuo*), and the post of Military Commissioner of Chiang-nan. Shortly thereafter, Hsiao Kao was killed. Hsiao Cheng abandoned his office and changed his surname. Because he came from the river, he used Chiang as his

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815 *Chung-hsiu Chiang-shih Chia-pu Hsu*, collected in *Chia-cheng*, 1a.
last name. To those people, whose last name was Chiang but who referred to their Hsiao ancestry, Chiang Cheng was their first ancestor. 819

By scrutinizing these two quotations, the following points show the fallacies contained by the records:

There is a clear discrepancy in the records with regard to when the clan moved to Huang-tun. The first quotation refers to Huang-tun as the site where Hsiao Cheng established his military prowess. After his father was killed, he then "abandoned his post and changed his last name". The record does not mention whether he moved to another place or not. The Shih-tsu Shih-hsi: Ti-erh Shih states that Hsiao Tung, his second son, moved from Huang-tun to Hsi-ching in Wu-chou. 820 It also indicates that Hsiao Cheng had lived in Huang-tun. However the second quotation indicates that only after Hsiao Cheng had become Military Commissioner of Chiang-nan and after the death of his father did he settle in Huang-tun.

The second quotation claims that when Hsiao Cheng sought refuge in Huang-tun in the reign period Kuang-ming, he cooperated with Kao Pien, Military Commissioner of Huai-nan, to suppress the rebellion of Huang Ch’ao. Before the fifth month of 880, Kao had maintained the upper hand on the battlefield. But the situation changed drastically after he

819 Ibid., Shih-tsu Shih-hsi: Ti-i Shih, 1ab.
820 Chia-cheng, 2a.
sent back the troops from Chao-i, Kan-hua, and I-wu, and after Chang Ling, Kao's top general, was killed in battle. From then on, Kao could no longer keep Huang Ch'ao in check. Thus, in the seventh month of the same year, Huang Ch’ao crossed the Yangtze River and invaded the prefectures under Kao’s jurisdiction. In the ninth month, Huang even led his troops across the Huai River and advanced westward. He entered Chang-an in the twelfth month. As a matter of fact, however, the T’ang government’s defeat of Huang Ch’ao was based on the efforts of soldiers from the west and Shato, and the military commissioners stationed in southeast China offered no assistance whatsoever. Therefore, southern military forces were totally excluded from those who were rewarded for their services.

The path of promotions recorded in the Chia-cheng is a complete fabrication. First, the quick promotion of Chiang Cheng to the post of Military Commissioner would have been totally contradictory to T’ang bureaucratic practice. Second, according to local T’ang administrators, Emperor Tai-tsung of the T’ang divided the country into ten circuits, and Chiang-nan was one of the circuits. During the reign of Emperor Hsun-tsung, Chiang-nan was re-divided into the Chiang-nan East Circuit, the Chiang-nan West Circuit, and the Chien-chung Circuit. In these three circuits, there was a total of eight Military Commissioners (fan-chen), namely Chen-hai, Che-tung,
Hsu-an-hsi, Chiang-hsi, O-yao, Hu-nan, Fu-chien, and Chien-chung. But Chiang-nan Tung-tao never had a fan-chen named Chiang-nan. We can conclude that the title of Military Commissioner of Chiang-nan was either a fabrication or an honorary title granted by Yang Hsing-mi's bloc.

The activities of Hsiao Cheng also contradicted the records of the standard histories. Before Emperor Hsi-tsung sought refuge in Szechwan, Hsiao Kao was called back to the capital under the title of Vice Director of the Ministry of Rites (li-pu yuan-wei lang) after the execution of Wei Pao-hsien. From then on, he received a series of promotions, finally serving in the post of Vice Minister of the Ministry of Revenue (hu-pu shih-lang) and Recipient of Edicts of Han-lin Academy (han-lin cheng-chih). \(^{21}\) Wei was killed in 874. \(^{22}\) In other words, from the time Emperor Hsi-tsung came to power to the time he sought refuge, Hsiao Kao had a successful career. It does not make sense that the father should prosper in the central government while the son needed to seek refuge in elsewhere.

The style of Hsiao Kao was Te-sheng, \(^{23}\) while the style of

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\(^{21}\) Chiu T'ang-shu, p. 4646.

\(^{22}\) T'ung-chien, p. 8169.

\(^{23}\) The biography of Hsiao Kao in the Hsin T'ang-shu states that his title was Te-sheng (Moral Sagaciousness), (p. 3960.) while his title is recorded as Te-sheng (Obtaining Sagaciousness) in the "Chronological Table of the Prime Ministers" of the same book. (p. 2285.) This discrepancy is probably due to an error in transcription.
his son was Te-hsi. No father and son in the T'ang would have shared the similar style. Also, the description reveals that the compilers had no knowledge of the history and development of the clan. The first quotation states that Hsiao Cheng crossed the Yangtze from Lan-ling. In fact, Lan-ling was only a name referring to the place of origin of the clan (ti-wang), rather than the actual place of residence of the clan members in the T'ang.

Those people whose surname was Chiang and who claimed a Hsiao man as their ancestor, had a different belief about their ancestors' activities. For example, the Chiang-shih Tsung-pu also claims that Chiang Cheng was their first ancestor. However, that record is totally different from the above quotation. The Chiang-shih Tsung-pu records Chiang Cheng's style as Li-li. Furthermore, "Hsiao Cheng first went to Chien-t'ang and crossed the Huai River in 1075. In 1084, he returned to Chiang-nan and changed his surname to Chiang." Curiously, both dates fell during the reign of Emperor Sheng-tsung of the Sung (1048-1085, r. 1067-1085).

In summary, this description of the clan's ancestry was an obvious fabrication. The question remains: who was Hsiao Cheng? It seems that Hsiao Cheng did not have an official

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824 Yung-chai Sui-pi, Shu-pi 11: 3a-4a; Yin-i I-mou Lu, 4: 10b.
825 T'ung-tsung Chi-lieh, 5: 1a.
title in Huang-tun, but was able to gain military recognition by defending the place. If he had no reputation or influence in the region, how could he have mobilized the masses, organized them into an army, and directed them to fight against Huang Ch’ao? There, I believe that Hsiao Cheng was an influential local figure.

Generally speaking, those people who engaged in uprisings in the south during this period of turmoil were local hoodlums without a literary background or a chin-shin degree. The invented story of the Chiang family highlights the point that a local figure whose military strength and influence played an important role in local security, still needed to boast about his origin and portray himself as the son of a purged scholar-official. This phenomenon reflects the fact that the local men of power who dominated southeast China in the late T’ang generally had a strong desire to invent a noble origin for their lineage. Although claiming to have unilateral relationships with a powerful clan would not necessarily bring them tangible military and political advantages, it would still satisfy their desire to belong to an important family and clan.
Appendix L: Limitations of the Policy of Geographical Relocation in Early Sung

During their conquest of other states, the Sung rulers feared the revival of regional power. The government moved captured leaders and the p’ei-ch’en to Kai-feng, and assigned its own officials to take over the local administration of the newly acquired territories.

This policy did not apply only to the Southern T’ang; when Liu Chi-yuan (?-991) of the Northern Han surrendered to Emperor Tai-tsung, the Emperor immediately ordered Liu Pao-hsun (925-986) to serve as Administrator of Tai-yuan Fu. The next day after the fall of Tai-yuan, the Emperor ordered eight Consultants-in-ordinary (chang-tsan kuan) to govern eight prefectures under the jurisdiction of the Northern Han.

But this policy could not be continually maintained effectively, and the relocation policy needed to be adjusted and altered in some areas, particularly at strategic points. The appointments of Yang Yen (?-986) in Tai-chou and Chin T’ sai-hsiung in ch’en-chou, respectively, are good examples of

\[826\] Chang-pien, p. 452.

\[827\] Ibid., p. 452. The actual number of prefectures Liu ruled was nine, and ordering eight officials to take over the prefectures did not imply that the emperor had changed his policy. Four days after Liu’s surrender, Wei Chin and Lu Sui surrendered to the Sung with Fen-chou. (Ibid., p. 453.)
Hsi-shu and Kuang-nan were other places where the Sung government had to sacrifice its relocation policy to practicality. At the time Hsi-shu was conquered, Sung officials who were sent to serve there were not allowed to have their families accompany them. Moreover, the local inhabitants tended to be impetuous and prone to stirring up trouble. Scholar-officials were afraid to serve there because the area was so remote and dangerous. Therefore, the government was forced to appoint local people.

As for the Kuang-nan region, it was generally believed during the T'ang that the "pure and virtuous air" (ch'ing-shu shih-ch'i) of the Central Kingdom (chung-chou) ran out as soon as one reached Ta-yu Ridge. From the ridge southward, the atmosphere was supposedly foul and dirty. Since the ch'i molded the character of the local inhabitants, their personalities naturally were "not as precious as those in the Central Kingdom".

Such beliefs still existed among the contemporaries of the

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828 Tung-hsien Pi-lu, 1: 2ab; Sung-chao Shih-shih, 16: 1b-2b; Chang-pien, p. 464.
829 Shih-lin Yen-yu, 7: 8a.
830 As for the practicing of using local inhabitants to fill posts in Hsi-chuan, see Su Shih, Tung-p'o Hou-chi, included in Tung-p'o Ch'i-chi, Szu-pu Pei-yao ed., 9: 8a; Sung-shih, p. 9434.
831 Hsieh-chai Chi, p. 146.
Sung. Thus people believed that the prefectures that bordered Kuang-nan were undesirable places to govern. Li Kou (1009-1059) once made a comparison between Chi-chou and chien-chou in their production of literati. Although both of the prefectures were located in the south, many gentlemen lived in Chi-chou, and "those serving in the capital followed at one's heel." This was not true of Chien-chou. Li Kou suggested that the reason for this was Chien-chou's geographical proximity to Nan Yueh, which spread its lingering foulness and evil to Chien-chou. Moreover, because the prefecture of Chien-chou was located farther from the capital than Chi-chou, the positive influences of civilization and morality were weaker. Influenced by these bad elements, the inhabitants of Chien-chou were infamous for their guile and were often involved in lawsuits, thereby causing trouble to local officials. Therefore, only the most experienced officials were judged to be capable of dealing with this situation.

Such an impression was not entirely based on fantasy, for people based their opinion on their observation of the climate. The climate in Ling-nan was unpleasant and muggy, and it was particularly bad in Hai-nan.

Between summer and fall, there is nothing which is not

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832 Li-kou Chi, p. 253.

rotten. Human beings are not made of metal and stone; how could we last long? 834

Besides the weather, the greatest danger was posed by poisonous gases in the air, whose threat was "most rampant in intercalary years". Only 20 to 30 percent of the officials who served there were able to return alive. Even if their lives were spared, most of them were poisoned by the pestilent fumes.

Their complexions turned swarthy and they developed symptoms that were difficult to cure and that broke out once every few years. 835

Therefore, when the Sung first annexed Kuang-nan, officials, both civil and military, dared not go there to serve. 836 The central government had no option, but had to adapt to these circumstances by allowing the local officials to continue serving. 837

Some officials criticized the policy of giving local people appointments, for that policy meant that the central government would not be involved with the local administration of Kuang-nan. In response to such criticism, the government changed its policy and encouraged officials outside Kuang-nan

834 *Tung-p'o Chih-lin*, 8: 2a.


836 *Yin-i I-mou Lu*, 2: 4a.

837 *Chang-pien*, p. 281.
to serve there by offering increased salaries and other perks. Given these incentives,

many greedy people wanted to go, and they did not even care they might lose their lives. 838

Greedy officials also turned their attentions toward serving in Hsi-shu, probably because the incentives for serving there had improved. Wang Hua-chi (944-1010) wrote a memorandum in 991 in which he discussed current affairs. One of his concerns was "selecting officials to serve in remote regions". He argued that most of the officials serving in such regions were not virtuous because their dispositions were generally avaricious. If they were entrusted with the responsibility of administration, the people living in those areas would suffer, and "this was not the way to soothe and conciliate people living in distant places." Therefore, Wang recommended that no more officials with criminal records be allowed to serve in Szechwan and Kuang-nan. 839

In the wake of the central government's ever-increasing power in Szechwan, serving there was no longer as risky and horrible venture as it had been in early Sung, and the government was able to better appraise the qualifications of those it appointed.

However, the weather and miasma were the same as they had

838 Huang-chao Liu-yao, 61: 4ab.
839 Chang-pien, p. 723.
been during early Sung times, and the government was forced to enhance benefits in order to attract good officials to serve. Benefits were also improved for military officers. But most officials were still unwilling to risk their lives. Therefore, those willing to serve there were, again, basically covetous and corrupt.

Chiang T'ang (980-1054) addressed this situation during the reign of Emperor Jen-tsung, saying that the threat of miasma was rampant in Kuang-nan, and people were afraid to go there. But Hung Tse, Vice Director of the Bureau of Review (pi-pu yuan-wai-lang), was willing to serve there for three terms. "Why would he do that if he were not greedy?" After the court had accepted Chiang's memorandum, it decreed that the term of service for "those serving in Kuang-nan was not allowed to exceed two terms." 841

Nevertheless, appointing officials to Kuang-nan was always a headache for the central government, since solving the climatic problems was beyond human means.

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840 *Yin-i I-mou Lu*, 2: 4a.

841 *Ch'ing-p’o Tsa-chih*, B: 13ab.
Appendix M: Regionalism in Early Sung Politics

By appointing former officials of the Southern T’ang, the Sung government consistently revealed its discrimination and suspicion, putting the p’ei-ch’en in a disadvantageous position. This practice seemed to be justified by a mystical prophecy that appeared in early Sung and stated, "A southerner should not serve as prime minister." The Tao-shan Ch’ing-hua also states:

Emperor Tai-tsu had once said that he would not appoint southerners to be prime ministers. The veritable records (Shih-lu) and national history (Kuo-shih) all have this on record. T’ao Ku’s Kai-chi Wen-nien Lu and Kai-pao Shih-pu also have a detailed description of this matter. All the books indicate that Emperor Tai-tsu wrote by himself, "The southerners are not allowed to have a seat in my hall." The Emperor carved these words on a stone placed in the Administration Chamber (cheng-shih t’ang).

Among the p’ei-ch’en, Chang Chi was the most prominent in rank and office. However, his highest position was only that of Participant in Determining Governmental Matters (tsan-chih cheng-shih) even after much pleading and flattery; the post was not an authentic prime ministership. Therefore, the preceding story may have some factual basis.

Lu Yu commented the recruitment practices in early Sung, pointing out that before the reign of Emperor Jen-tsung, in selecting able officials, northerners were appointed

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842 Chu-yu Chiu-wen, p 3.
843 Tao-shan Ch’ing-hua, 17a.
in most cases, and K'ou Chun (961-1023) upheld this practice vigorously. Many scholar-officials from the south were thus suppressed.

Lu Yu further claimed that only Emperor Jen-tsung was aware of the problem and modified this practice. 844

The Chang-pien contains some records pertaining to K'ou Chun's geographical prejudices. In 1005, K'ou recommended that Chiang Kai, a native of Ta-ming Fu, be awarded to chih-shih degree, while rejecting Yen Shu (991-1055) from Fu-chou. But Emperor Chen-tsung turned down K'ou's suggestion for geographical reasons, and granted Yen the rank of Regular Metropolitan Graduate (chin-shih chu-shen) and Chiang the rank of Associate Single Classics Specialist (tung hsueh-chiu chu-shen). The Emperor did not follow K'ou's suggestion, because he appreciated Yen's ability to compose meaningful essays quickly. 845 It appears that the Emperor appointed capable people regardless of their origins.

In 1015, another contest arose between a northerner and a southerner. The examination candidates involved were T'sai Ch'i (988-1039) from Chiao-shui and Hsiao Kuan from Hsin-yu, the homeland of Wang Hsin-jo. K'ou Chun had long held Wang Hsin-jo in disdain and used the phrase "the people from the inferior state in the South" to insult Hsiao. The Imperial

845 Chang-pien, p. 1341.
favor was granted to T’sai Ch’i only based on his handsome appearance and dignified manner, but not the opinion of K’ou Chun.  

The absence of geographical bias in the Emperor Chen-tsung’s thinking was also revealed in his appointment of military officers, for the Emperor rejected the suggestion that the court not appoint those from Fu-chien, Ching-hu and Chiang-che, and Chuan-hsia.

As a matter of fact, the political power of the southerners had already been established during the reign of Emperor Chen-tsung; it did not need to wait until the reign of Emperor Jen-tsung to emerge. The so-called "Five Ghosts" (wu-kuei) in the reign of the Emperor Chen-tsung were all southerners:

Wang Hsin-jo: Hsin-yu of Lin-chiang Chun;  
Liu Cheng-kuei: Shan-yang of Chu-chou;  
Chen Peng-nien: Nan-chang of Fu-chou;  
Lin Te: Shun-chang of Nan Chien-chou;  
Ting Wei: Chang-chou of Su-chou.

Though K’ou Chun was dedicated to suppressing the strength of the southerners, ironically, he himself had been ousted by Wang Hsin-jo and Ting Wei, respectively.

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846 Ibid., p. 1920.  
847 Ibid., p. 1402.
Appendix N: Glossary

Ai-ti 安帝
An-chou 安州
An-feng 安豐
An-feng T’ang 安豐塘
An-fu 安福
An-i Liang-chih chueh-yen-shih 安仁義
An Jen-i 安仁
An-lu 安祿
An Lu-shan 安祿山
An-nan 安南
An Yen-shu 安義枢
Cha-chih 查之
Cha Tao 查陶
Cha T’ao 查陶
Cha Wen-huai 查文懷
Cha Yuan-fang 查元坊
Ch’ai Cheng-wu 查成武
Ch’ai Hao 查浩
Ch’ai K’e-ching 查克清
Ch’ai K’e-hung 查克宏
Ch’ai T’sai-yung 查采勇
Chang Chao 張超
Chang Chi 張之
Chang Chi-hsien 張之賢
Chang-chiang 長江
Chang-chien 長 entrevy
Chang-chih 長治
Chang-chou 長州
Chang-chou 長州
Chang Ch’u-hua 張去華
Chang-chun 張俊
Chang Chung 張中
Chang Fang-pien 張方賓
Chang Huan 張煥
Chang Hung 張洪
Chang Hai 張海
Chang-hsing 張新
Chang Hsiu 張修
Chang Hsiung 張雄
Chang Hsun 張軒
Chang I 張一
Chang I-chih 張一之
Chang Jui 張覺
Chang Ke 張恪
Chang K'e-tsxmg
Chang-ko Wei
Chang Kuan 張侃
Chang-lang-chung Hsiang 張郎中
Chang Ling 張謙
Ch'ang-lo 張樂
Chang Meng-hsi 張敏
Chang Miao 張藻
Chang O 張傲
Chang Pi 張彼
Chang Pin 張彬
Chang Po 張播
Chang Sheng 張昇
Chang shu-chi 張書記
Chang Tai-k'ao 張大可
Chang Te-hsiang 張德祥
Chang Tien 張畋
Chang-tsan kuan 張悉官
Chang Tzu 張諸
Chang Wen 張文
Chang Wen-chien 張文鎬
Chang Yen-ching 張彦卿
Chang Yi 張益
Chang Yu 張遇
Chang Yu-hsien 張遇賢
Chang Yueh 張約
Chang Yuen-pi 張元彼
Chang Yung-te 張永德
Ch'ao 翟
Chao-ch'ing tai-fu 朝靜大夫
Chao-hsing Kung 朝敬公
Chao-i Chun 朝臣
Chao Kuang-yin 朝匡胤
Chao-ling 朝陵
Chao-tsung 朝宗
Chao Wang 朝王
Che 清
Che-tung 清東
Chen Chang 清常
Chen Chang-feng 清長方
Chen-cheng 清成
Chen Cheng-chao 清承昭
Chen Chi 清池
Chen Chiao 清喬
Chen Chiao 清霽 清知新
Chen Ching 清京
Chen-chou 清秋
Chi
Chi 鞞
Chi Cha 鞞札
Chi-chiang 棋長
Chi-ching Tu 鞈
Chin Cheng-yu 鞡
Chi-chou 鞙州
Chi-chou 鞲州
Chi-chun 鞗春
Ch'i-hsiang 鞨相
Chi-hsien 鞑縣
Chi-hsien chiao-li 鞈縣校理
Chi-hsien wei 鞈縣尉
Chi-ku chi-shih 鞗古士
Chi Ku'ang 鞠庈
Chi-liang fang yen-chih 鞗梁行史
Chi-ping Hsi-tsu 鞤平史部
Chi-shih-chung 鞯訕
Chi-shu 鞑書
Chi-su 鞯書
Chi-yang 鞋陽
Chia-fa 鞞法
Chia Hsiang 鞯象
Chia Huang-chung 鞱黃中
Chia Kuang-hao 鞱光浩
Chia-pu yuan-wai-lang 鞱部員外郎
Chia Tan 鞩顇
Chia To 鞴陀
Chia-tzu 鞱誜
Chia Wei 鞱維
Chia-yu 鞱予
Chiang-che 江浙
Chiang Cheng 江之
Chiang Cheng 江郯
Chiang Ching 江瀛
Chiang Chou 江州
Chiang-hai Fu 江海賦
Chiang-hsi 江晉
Chiang-huai 江懷
Chiang Huai 江懷
Chiang I 江義
Chiang Kai 江概
Chiang-ling 江陵
Chiang Meng-sun 江夢孫
Chiang-nan Hsi-lu 江南西路
Chiang-nan Hsi Tao 江南西路
Chiang-nan Tao 江南東道
Chiang-nan Tung Tao 江南東道
Chu Chun-te
Chu-chung
Chu Feng
Chu Hai
Chu Hsi
Chu Hsun
Chun-hsun p'an-kuan
Chu Huai
Chu-k'o
Chu Kuang-yeh
Chu-liang
Chu Ling-yun
Chu Mei
Chu-ming Meng
Chu Pien
Chu P'o-kuang
Chu-pu
Chu-shan
Chu-shih Hui-chien Tsung-pu Hsu
Chu-shih tsung-pu
Chu-shih T'ung-tsung Shih-pu Hsu
Chu Shou-yin
Chu-szu shih
Chu Te-ch'ien
Chu-tso lang
Chu Tsung-to
Chu-wei hsun-kuan
Chu Wen
Chu Wen
Chu Wen-kung
Chu Yen-shou
Chu-yung
Chuan-chao cheng-chih
Chuan-chou
Chuan-hsia
Chuan-shou
Chuan-shu Li-ts'ao
Ch'uan-t'ang
Chuan-yu
Chuan-yuan
Chuan-yun fu-shih
Chuan-yun hsun-kuan
Chuan-yun shih
Chuang
Chuang-chien
Chuang-tsung
Chuang-yuan
Chueh Tsun-hung
Chung Chang
| Hsi-yuan | 西原
| Hsia-chou | 夏apeut  
| Hsia Huan | 夏寰
| Hsia-i | 夏伊
| Hsia-pu | 夏浦
| Hsia Sung | 夏空
| Hsiang-chou | 湘州
| Hsiang-kuo | 湘国
| Hsiang Min-chung | 湘敏
| Hsiang Shih | 湘什
| Hsiang-tan | 湘潭
| Hsiang-yang | 湘洋
| Hsiang-yuan | 湘源
| Hsiao-chiang shou-shih kai-hsing yuan-chi | 小江受氏改姓缘起
| Hsiao Hsi Fu | 小氏符
| Hsiao Hsien | 小县
| Hsiao-jen | 小根
| Hsiao Kao | 小考
| Hsiao-ku Shan | 小谷山
| Hsiao Kuan | 小官
| Hsiao Kuan | 小官
| Hsiao Lien-yuan | 小连源
| Hsiao Ling | 小令
| Hsiao Sheng | 小生
| Hsiao shu-lang | 小书郎
| Hsiao Ssu-hua | 小苏华
| Hsiao Te-yen | 小德言
| Hsiao Yen | 小彦
| Hsiao-yin hsin-hsien | 小寅信贤
| Hsieh-fu | 谢符
| Hsieh Wen-chieh | 谢文洁
| Hsien-chu | 新主
| Hsien-ping | 新平
| Hsien shih-lang | 新世郎
| Hsien-yang | 新洋
| Hsin-an | 新安
| Hsin-chou | 新州
| Hsin-i Chun | 新初
| Hsin-p'ing | 新平
| Hsin wang | 新王
| Hsin-wang | 新王
| Hsin-yang | 新洋
| Hsin-yang ch'eng | 新洋丞
| Hsin-yu | 新御
| Hsing-chih chuang | 新枝
| Hsing-chou | 新州
| Hsing-pu lang-chung | 新浦郎中
| Hsiung-chieh | 雄族
| Hsiung-yuan Chun | 雄遠軍
Li Hsun
Li Hu-hsiu
Li Hung-chi
Li I
Li I-yeh
Li Jen-i
Li Jui-kang
Li K'e
Li K'e-yung
Li Kou
Li Ku
Li Kuan
Li-li
Li Lung-chi
Li Mu
Li O
Li Pien
Li Ping
Li-pu
Li-pu
Li-pu shahg-shu
Li-pu yuan-wei lang
Li Shan
Li Shan-fu
Li Shen-fu
Li-shih chiu-chu-yeh
Li Shou-ching
Li T'ai
Li Tai-tzu
Li T'an
Li Tao
Li Te-cheng
Li Te-hsiu
Li Te-sheng
Li Tsaо
Li Tsang-jung
Li Tu
Li Tuan
Li Wei
Li Wei
Li Wen-yuan
Li-yang
Li Yen
Li Yen
Li Yen-chung
Li Yen-i
Li Yin
Li Yu
Nan-chang 南城
Nan Chien-chou 南劍州
Nan Hsu-chou 南徙州
Nan-kang 南康
Nan-ping 南平
Nan-ping Wang 南平王子
Nan-tu 南都
Nei-tien Chuan-chao 內殿傳記
Nei-wai hsun-chien shih 內外巡檢使
Niao 鳥
Nien-hao 千号
Ning-kuo Chun 宁國軍
Ning-ling 宁陵
Niu Tseng-ju 牛僧孺
O 鄉
O-chou 鄭州
O-hsien 鄭縣
O-yao 鄭丘
Ou-yang Chung 欧陽琮
Ou-yang I 欧陽儀
Ou-yang Kuang 欧陽曇
Ou-yang Pin 欧陽彬
Pa-chou 巴州
Pa-pao Tsui-shih 八宝曾氏
P'ai-ch'ang 白壇
P'ai-chia Chun 白藉軍
P'ai-lu-tung shu-yuan 白鹿洞書院
P'ai-ma I 白馬
P'ai-sheng Chun 白勝軍
P'an Cheng-yu 潘承佑
Pan Ch'iu-chang 潘修昌
P'an Hsing-tien Fu 潘承田府
P'an-kuan 潘官
P'an Kuo-tzu-chien 潘國子晨
Pan Shen-hsiu 潘時休
P'an-szu pu-wei 潘素溥
P'an Tai-chang Szu 潘泰常舒
P'an Yu 潘裕
Pang Ao 潘傲
Pang Hsun 潘勳
Pao-meng 鮑夢
Pao-tai 鮑太
P'ei-ch'en 貝臣
Pei-chou 貝州
Pei-hai 北海
Pei-huan shan 北鴨山
Pei-mein hsing-yung ying-huan shih 北畱行宮應援使
Pei-sheng Chun 白勝軍
Pei Shu 麥叔
Pei Ssu-chien
Pei Tan
Pei-yin
Peng-cheng
Peng Hsun
Peng Kan
P’eng-shan Chih
Peng Shih-kung
Peng Su-yung
P’eng-tao
Peng-tse
Pi-fu
Pi-ko
Pi-pu yuan-wai-lang
Pi Shih-to
Pi-shu lang
Pi-shu sheng cheng-tzu
Pien
P’ien-chang
Pien-ching
Pien Chou
Pien Hao
Pien-pu cheng-sheng
Pien-wen
Pin-chou
Ping-hsiang
Ping-lu
Ping-ma-shih Hsiao-chuan
Ping-ma-shih Hu-kung tieh
Ping-ma tu-chien
Ping-pu
P’ing-yin
Po-chang
Po-chou
Po-ling
Pu-i
P’u-pan
San-chi’ chang-chih
San-chuan
San-hsu
San-huang
San-kuan
San-pan chih-ming
San-pan feng-chih
San-pan shih-shen
San-tai
San-tai
Shan-ho
Shan-nan
Shih-ch'i Chen
Shih-chin
Shih-ching
Shih-en
Shih-hsia
Shih-kuan
Shih-kuan hsiao-chuan
Shih-lu
Shih Man-ching
Shih Pi
Shih-t'ou Huai-ku
Shih-tsung
Shih Yen
Shih
Shou-an
Shou-chou
Shou Chun
Shou Shih-liang
Shou-yang
Shu-cheng
Shu-chou
Shu-chou
Shu-hsien
Shu-hsien Fu
She-jen Yuan
Shu-mi fu-shih
Shu-mi-shih
Shu-tai
Shu Ya
Shuang-lu
Shun-chang
Shun-chou
Shun-hsi
Shun-i Chun
Ssu-chou
Ssu-fa Yuan
Ssu-k'ung Ting
Ssu-k'ung Tu
Ssu-k'ung Yu
Ssu-ma Kuang
Ssu-nung Ching
Ssu-nung lu-shih
Ssu-shang
Ssu-ts'ang ts'an-chun
Ssu-tu
Su-chou
Su I-chien
Su Shih
Sui-hsin tu-chih pin-ma-chih
Tai-tzu jin-shih 太子賓客
Tai-tzu pin k'o 太子少師
Tai-tzu shao-shih 太子少吏
Tai-tzu shuai-keng 太子右衛
Tai-tzu yu-te 太子諫德
Tai-wei 太尉
Tai Yen 戴顏
Tai-yuan 太原
Tan Chuan-po 潘合
T'an-hua 潘合
T'an-tu 丹徒
T'ang-chun-chiu 唐春秋
T'ang-jen 唐人
T'ang Kao-tsu 唐高祖
T'ang-nien 唐年
T'ang Yueh 唐悅
Tao 道
T'ao Cheng 陶成
T'ao Ching-chao 陶敬昭
T'ao Ching-hsuan 陶敬賢
T'ao Chung-liang 陶崇謙
T'ao Chung-lun 陶崇詧
T'ao Chung-tin 陶崇盛
T'ao Fu 陶俊
T'ao Ku 陶毅
T'ao Lin 陶琳
T'ao Ya 陶雅
Te-an 德安
Te-chang-kung shih 德昌宮使
Te-hsi 德惠
Te-sheng 德聖
Teng-chou ssu-ma 鄭州司馬
Ti Ching 寇靜
Ti-wang 候望
Ti-wang chi-hsiang 帝王氣象
Tiao-ao Chi 陶敖
Tiao Kan 陶侃
Tiao Kan 陶侃
Tiao Yen-neng 陶能
Tieh-chuan 湯端
Tieh-lung 湯隆
Tien-cheng 天成
Tien-chien cheng-chih 殿前承旨
Tien-chih 殿直
Tien-chueh 殿輔
Tien Chun 殿醇
Tien-chung cheng 殿中丞
Tien-chung shih-yu-shih 殿中侍御史
Tien-hsi 天禧
Tien-hsiung tung-chun 天雄統軍
Tien Min 回敏
Tien-ping Chun 天平軍
Tien-shui pi 天水碧
Tien-te Chun 天德軍
Tien-tzu man-sheng 天子門生
Tien-wang 天王
Tien-yu 天祐
Ting-chou 汀州
Ting-chou 潮州
Ting Wei 丁謂
Ting-yuan Chun 定遠軍
To 盈
Tou 斛
Tou I I
Tou-lu Ke 立路客
T'ou-to Szu 太陀手
Tsa-i 雜色
T'sai-chi 萧齊
T'sai Ching 萧承
T'sai-chou chien-mu fu-shih 嘉州監牧副使
T'sai-keng chang-chai 萧承張家
T'sai-shih Ti 萧石堤
Tsao-chih cheng-shih 曹之誠
Tsao Han 曹翰
Tsao Pin 曹彬
T'sao-tse chih-hsiang 曹澤之雄
Tsao Yun 曹筠
Tsing-k'ang 靜康
Tsing-sheng Chun 曹澄
Tso chien-mun-wei chang-chun 靜勝軍
Tso chien-mu chih-hui-shih ti-wu-tu ti-shih-chiang 立建威指揮使
Tso-chu 曹之
Tso san-chi chang-shih 左殿騎常侍
Tso-shih Chun-chiu 左殿殿秋
Tso tu-t'ung-chun 左殿統軍
Tso-wei shang-chang-chun chien chung-shu-ling 左衛上將軍兼中憲令
Tsu-chang 曹長
Tsui 崔
Tsui Cheng 崔程
Tsui Cheng-yiu 崔煤由
Tsui Liang 崔亮
Tsui Shao 崔詡
Tsui Shu-ching 崔叔清
Tsui Shui 崔猷
Tsui Tai-ch'ü 崔太初
Tsui Yin 崔胤
Ts’ung-hsiung 從兄
Tsung-kuan 总管
Tsung-kung-kung Miao-pei Chi 忠恭公廟碑記
Tsung-shih 從事
Ts’ung-sun 從孫
Tu 相
Tu Chang-yeh 章業
Tu-chi 圖籍
Tu chih-hui-shih 都指揮使
Tu chuan-lien p’an-kuan 都團練官
Tu chuan-yun-chih 都轉運使
Tu Hao 在鍋
Tu-hu 惟朴
Tu Hung 惟洪
Tu-ku Sun 惟孤損
Tu-kuan lang-chung 郡官郎中
Tu Sheng 惟生
Tu-shu K’ou 惟秋
Tu T’ao 惟桃
Tu-tuan 土團
Tu’an-lien shih 團練使
T’ui-kuan 植官
Tun-tien lang-chung 同田郎中
Tun-tien yuen-wei-lang 同田員外郎
Tung 同
Tung chin-shih chu-shen 同進士出身
Tung-chih Shu 勳植疏
Tung-chuan 東川
Tung-chun 統軍
Tung-hai Chun 東海都
Tung hsueh-chi chiu-shen 同學究出身
Tung-ling 銅陵
T’ung-p’an 通判
Tung-p’an chun-chou shih 通判鎮州事
Tung-shih she-jen 通事舍人
T’ung-tsung Chi-lieh 重子試
T’ung-tzu shih 通於成
Tung-wu Cheng 惟武城
Tz’u 詞
Tzu-chin 案金
Tzu-chin yu-tai 案庭宇泰
Tsu-pu Hsu 㕣保
Tzu-tsu Shih-hsi 案世
Tzu-t’ung 梓潼
Tzu-yang Ch’ou-shih Yuan-yuan Hsi-chi 祐陽朱氏源流系紀
Wai-shen 以外
Wang 法
Wang Ch’ang-ling 章齡
Wang Ch’ao 黃巢
Wang Chao
Wang Chien
Wang Chien-chi
Wang Chien-feng
Wang Chih
Wang Ching-ao
Wang Chu
Wang Chu-chih
Wang Chuan-cheng
Wang Chung-hua
Wang Chung-ling
Wang Chung-shu
Wang Chung-wen
Wang-fu
Wang Han
Wang Hsia
Wang Hsiang
Wang Hsin-chi
Wang Hsin-jo
Wang Hua-chi
Wang I-fang
Wang I-tung
Wang Jen-chan
Wang Jen-jen
Wang Jen-kan
Wang Jen-liang
Wang Jen-yu
Wang Kai
Wang Kao fang
Wang Kuan
Wang-kuen
Wang Kung
Wang-kuo chih-sheng
Wang Ming
Wang Nien
Wang-pa chih-shu
Wang Pu
Wang P’u
Wang Shao-tsung
Wang Shao-yen
Wang-shen
Wang Shih
Wang Shih-chih
Wang Shih-fang
Wang Shih-pen
Wang Sui
Wang Tai-fu
Wang Tao
Wang Te-hui
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Abbreviation:

Chih-pu-tsu-chai Ts‘ung-shu (知不足齋藏書) - CPTCTS
Hsueh-ching T‘ao-yuan (學鏡樓) - HCTY
Hsueh-hai Lui-pien (學海類編) - HHLP
Pai-chuan Hsueh-hai (北川學海) - PCHH
Pai-hai (粹海) - PH
Szu-k‘u Ch‘uan-shu (四庫全書) - SKCS
Szu-pu Pei-yao (四部備要) - SPPY
Szu-pu Ts‘ung-kan Ch‘u-pien (四部叢刊初編) - SPTKCP
Szu-pu Ts‘ung-kan Hsu-pien (四部叢刊校編) - SPTKHP
Ts‘ung-shu Chi-cheng Ch‘u-pien (通書集成初編) - TSCCCP

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