INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600
A RHETORIC OF THE SACRED OTHER
FROM ENHEDUANNA TO THE PRESENT:
COMPOSITION, RHETORIC, AND CONSCIOUSNESS

by

Roberta Ann Binkley

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
WITH A MAJOR IN RHETORIC, COMPOSITION,
AND THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH
in the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1997
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA ©
GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Roberta A. Binkley entitled A Rhetoric of the Sacred Other from Enheduanna to the Present: Composition, Rhetoric, and Consciousness and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

[Signatures and dates]

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

[Signature and date]
STATEMENT BY THE AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without specific permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in her or his judgement the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED: [Signature]
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea behind this work originated many years ago, one afternoon in the library of the University of Arizona. It was my dissertation committee and especially my major advisor who helped me bring it to life. Most of all the committee believed in me. There were those times when I lost confidence, and they told me to keep going. Several times when I thought I had reached a dead end, they asked questions and made suggestions that helped me to re-view the project enabling me to see it again and to start anew. As I have learned from my own teaching and working with many writers over the years, the advising of writers is always a delicate intuitive dance of knowing when to step forward and when to step back. My committee members are each masters of this delicate dance. Throughout the project I have had the privilege to work with three people who are among the more stimulating and better minds in the academic world. The weaknesses and lack of clarity in this dissertation are solely my responsibility.

I am extremely grateful to my major professor, advisor, and mentor, Dr. Thomas Willard, who unites two diverse attributes seldom blended so well: he is a man of great learning and enormous creativity. He was able to help me find directions to take this unusual project, nudging me, and frequently suggesting new ways to see and conceive of it. Four years ago I came to him with a vague idea of what I wanted to do. He suggested the sources and possibilities available to shape my
indefinite thoughts. Without his wise mentoring throughout the process of the preliminary exams and the writing of the dissertation, I would not have been able to creatively shape this project nor to have taken it in the directions it has ultimately gone.

Dr. Tilly Warnock has a genius for asking not only the hard questions but also of formulating the query that often lies outside the consciousness of the writer. Her sense of audience was a great gift to me throughout this project combined with her copious knowledge of rhetoric, composition, and pedagogy.

Dr. Janet Jakobsen brought the needed perspective of cutting edge feminist theory to this project. Her incisive mind, careful readings, and abundant comments on the manuscript along with her ability to suggest the right book at the right time helped to widen my angle of vision.

A student involved in the process of earning a Ph.D. cannot survive the years of constant work and effort without a strong support system. Louise Rodriguez Connal and all the other doctoral candidates have been a source of counseling, advice and ready ears for the moans of a fellow graduate student. The RCTE faculty have supported and advised me in the best tradition of academic service. My years of conversations about writing with Sam and other close friends gave me the necessary background to go into the program. My family believed in me, and Boyd was a constant source of support and encouragement. Thank you all.
To Monica and Marissa, for their love and inspiration.

To Lamar for twenty-five years of partnership and support.

to Molly, the dog, who assumed the academic position beneath my desk and computer for endless hours.

Last, but hardly least, to Boyd without whom . . .
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION** .......................................................... 13

**CHAPTER I: INVENTION AND THE SACRED OTHER IN THREE CASE STUDIES: ENHEDUANNA, CICERO, JUNG** ............................. 24

I. **INVENTION AND CULTURE: CULTURAL REFLECTIONS COMPOSING** .......................................................... 26  
   A. The Ziggurat ............................................................ 26  
   B. The Forum .............................................................. 29  
   C. The Tower ............................................................. 34  

II. **INVENTION AND THE OTHER: THE CREATIVE PROCESS AS "OTHER"** ............................................................ 41  
   A. Enheduanna ............................................................ 42  
   B. Cicero ................................................................. 44  
   C. Jung ................................................................. 46  

III. **INVENTION AND THE SACRED OTHER** .................. 48

**CHAPTER II: ENHEDUANNA, HER WORK, AND THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION IN ASSYRIOLOGY** ...................... 51

I. **ENHEDUANNA** .......................................................... 51  
   A. Enheduanna and Sumerian History ................................ 55  
   B. The Exaltation of Inanna ........................................... 58  
   C. In-nin su-gur-ra ................................................... 64  
   D. The Temple Hymns ................................................ 68

II. **THE RHETORIC OF ASSYRIOLOGY** .............................. 70  
   A. The conceptualization of Material ................................ 72  
       1. Text Editions .................................................... 72  
   B. Sumerian Writing and the Methodology of Translation ......... 75  
       1. The Theory Unconsciousness of Translation ................ 76  
   C. The Translation of Nin-me-sara (The Exaltation) by Hallo and van Dijk ........................................ 79
**CHAPTER III: THE RHETORICAL OTHER**

1. **The Rhetorical Structure of**
   *The Exaltation* .................................................. 80
2. Scholarly Critiques by Assyriologists .......................... 83

**III. HOW MEANING IS INTERPRETED AND WHO SPEAKS** ............ 85

**CHAPTER III: THE RHETORICAL OTHER** .......................... 95

I. **FEMINIST RHETORICAL REVISIONIST HISTORY: THE**
   POLITICS OF RHETORIC AND THE USES OF THE PAST .............. 95
   A. Present Feminist Historiography in Rhetoric .................. 98
   B. Susan Jarratt—The Sophists and Feminism ...................... 103
   C. C. Jan Swearingen—Toward an Inclusive Literacy ............... 109
   D. Kathleen Welch—A Psychological Rereading of Classical Rhetoric ........................................... 115

II. **REVISIONARY FEMINIST HISTORIOGRAPHY** ...................... 125

**CHAPTER IV: FEMINIST PSYCHOANALYSIS AND COMPOSITION** ....... 129

I. **MARION WOODMAN** .............................................. 134
   A. The Rhetorical Principles of Marion Woodman ................. 137
   B. The Rhetoric of Woodman's Composing Process—The Spiral .... 139

II. **SYLVIA PERERA AND THE MYTH OF INANNA** .................... 147
   A. The Myth of Inanna ........................................... 148
   B. The Myth in Modern Guise .................................... 149

**CHAPTER V: COMPOSITION AND EXPANDED CONSCIOUSNESS** ......... 157

I. **THE ETHOS OF A BICAMERAL MIND/BODY PARADIGM** .............. 159
   A. The Bicameral Mind Paradigm .................................. 160
   B. Ancient Bihemisphere Epistemology ............................ 161
   C. Feminist Historiographers and an Epistemology of the Bicameral Mind ........................................... 162
   D. Composition, Ethos, and the Bicameral Mind Balance .......... 164
      1. Workshop Structure ........................................ 165
2. Critics Sheets ................................................. 166
3. Psychoanalysis, Consciousness, and Composition ................. 169

II. PATHOS AND THE WISDOM OF THE BODY: THE EMBODIMENT OF DISCOURSE ................................ 170
A. Rhetorical Historiography and the Wisdom of the Body .......... 171
B. Enheduanna, Pathos, and Body Wisdom .......................... 173
C. Psychoanalysis and an Embodied Discourse of Composition ....... 176

III. THE LOGOS OF THE SACRED OTHER ......................... 181

IV. TOWARD A RHETORIC OF THE SACRED OTHER ................ 188

NOTES .......................................................... 195

APPENDIX A: ENHEDUANNA ........................................ 204

I. AN ANCIENT FEMININE ETHOS .................................. 204
A. Titles ......................................................... 206
B. Activities ..................................................... 206

II. THE WORKS OF ENHEDUANNA ................................ 211
A. In-nin sa-gur-ra ............................................. 211
B. The Temple Hymns .......................................... 213
C. The Exaltation of Inanna .................................... 216
D. Additional works ............................................. 224

III. SUMERIAN WRITING ........................................... 225
A. Sumerian Literature ........................................... 227
B. The Scribal Tradition ......................................... 229

IV. APPLYING A RHETORIC OF THE GODDESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY TO ACADEMIC DISCOURSE ................. 231

APPENDIX B: PERMISSIONS TO REPRINT AND REPRODUCE ........ 245

WORKS CITED .................................................... 249
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Calcite disk of Enheduanna. . . . . . . . . . . . . following page 203
ABSTRACT

I examine particular characterizations of consciousness in the Western tradition of rhetoric. These characterizations inform contemporary academic and professional discourse, and they are built upon clearly gendered dichotomies.

I begin by analyzing the metadiscourse of Enheduanna, (ca. 2350 B.C.E.), Marcus Tullius Cicero (d. 43 B.C.E.), and Carl Gustav Jung (d. 1961). Specifically, I examine the commentary of each author as they speak of their composing processes and how their comments reflect cultural conceptions of cognition. Each engenders their creative process as sacred, other, and feminine.

Focusing on Enheduanna both as the oldest known author and on her role as other, I compare her rhetoric to the modern discourse of the field of Assyriology which surrounds and interprets it.

Current perceptions of history effect theory and influence ideology with far reaching consequences. In rhetoric and composition, I analyze the work of three contemporary feminist rhetorical historiographers: Susan Jarratt, C. Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch. I contend that their influence, as rhetorical other, on the current perception of rhetorical historiography, influences composition theory. Their individual reinterpretations of classical rhetorical theory and history not only alter perceptions of the foundational past of rhetoric, but they exert an influence on current theories of the understanding and teaching of composition.
Turning to popular culture, I then analyze how two modern psychoanalytic interpretations of the other as feminine divine in contemporary Western society might also function to alter the teaching and understanding of rhetorical theory and composition. I look at two Jungian feminist psychoanalytic theorists (Sylvia Perera, and Marion Woodman) examining their theories in relation to the composing process.

I conclude by proposing an expanded rhetoric, one that includes the other as an aspect of the unconscious, a rhetoric also inclusive of a deepened, recursive, and reflective consciousness. This rhetoric, I postulate, might work itself out as a more comprehensive way to view composition: ethos expanded to a bicameral mind paradigm, pathos as body wisdom, and a logos of the sacred Other. I finish with a proposal titled, "Toward a Rhetoric of the Sacred Other."
INTRODUCTION

The reproductions of the clay tablets that inevitably appear in the appendices of translations from cuneiform appear monumental. I remember puzzling over the plates accompanying the text of William W. Hallo and J. J. A. van Dijk's translation of The Exaltation of Inanna. It was a hot desert summer day, fifteen years ago, when I stumbled across her poem in the library. Outside, the pavement reflected the 110 degree Arizona heat in shimmering vaporous mirages, while inside the acolytes, dressed in shorts and t-shirts, hunched shivering over their books in the overly air-conditioned library. As I read, the beauty of this ancient story of exile and return awed me.

I finished and sat for a long time holding the book in my hand listening to the resonance of the hymn echoing in my mind. I looked out the window into the mirage of the mythical pools of water on the hot concrete, my eyes floating in the heat-generated illusions of sensual perception reflecting the chimeras of intellectual perception. Then, I flipped to the back of the slim yellow volume. In the appendix there were several pictures and sketches of some of the clay tablets from which the two scholars had translated the poem. I thought, then, that something containing that much writing—an elaborate triangular cross-hatching embedded in clay—must of necessity be huge. The intricate delicacy of the triangular symbols looked as though they required an elaborate process of engraving, one necessitating great space.
When, years later, William Hallo, the scholar-curator of the Babylonian collection at Yale, opened a small box and handed me a clay tablet only slightly larger than the palm of my hand, I was stunned. To me, artifacts from antiquity were mostly museum pieces of substantial size. Still, the pictures of the Sumerian artifacts and clay tablets reproduced in books about Mesopotamia have a haunting presence, and the civilization seems to loom constantly larger as scholars discover new works, uncovering forgotten cultural roots buried for millennia.

Enheduanna, the author of *The Exaltation of Inanna*, weaves in and out of each chapter. Throughout this dissertation I read and respond to *The Exaltation*, as a major literary work, one whose significance extends far beyond its meaning as a textual landmark, and the earliest known attributable work of literature. *The Exaltation* is at once a complex and sophisticated work of literature: one destined to become recognized as a significant rhetorical achievement.

In some respects, I write a personal work as I try to locate the meaning of her life, times, and achievement not in her own historical context (which will always be questionable) but in terms of contemporary historiography, psychoanalysis, rhetorical theory, and the teaching of composition. Obviously, these are broad topics. I cannot offer more than a personal synoptic view of such diffuse areas.

Without detouring into a long discussion of the philosophy, use, and rationale for dissertations, I can say that this study has, for me, become germinal. In what follows, I can only sketch ways that these diverse areas are interrelated thereby
hoping to open up paths for myself and perhaps others that may offer fruitful further
directions for study.

For example, once, at least in this particular ancient situation, a feminine
Other held a position of sacred power. Why and how certain beings, genders, races,
and classes have become designated as "other" and the effect of such roles opens up
some interesting questions in relation to rhetoric, cognition, and composition.

I begin by musing on the Other as it has become manifest in the sense of
sacred (i.e., entitled to reverence or respect) as I study the composing processes of
three figures, each two-thousand years apart: Enheduanna (ca. 2350 B.C.E.), Marcus
Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.E.), and Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961). I look at their
composing processes primarily through their written metacommentaries about their
own writing processes, and I find that each characterizes their process of invention as
both gendered feminine and sacred.

"The question of the relation of self and other is the inaugurating question of
Western philosophy and rhetoric," according to Barbara Biesecker and James P.
McDaniel in the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric (488). They write that in the classical
rhetorical tradition the problematic of self and other determines the relationship
between the speaker and the audience. Continuing, they explain as they extrapolate
from Jacques Derrida that "alterity resides within" and "as the play of an otherness
that inhabits the self" (489). I agree with this definition and extend it to include all
that which we believe we are not. That is, I argue that those parts of self which we
either consciously or unconsciously reject or do not accept are projected onto exterior objects, or beings. This argument is deeply imbedded in psychology and psychoanalysis. Among commonplaces of psychotherapists is the maxim: that which we are unconscious of runs us. I have seen it happen in my own life, and the lives of others.\(^1\) As Plato wrote, for thousands of years carved over the lentil of the temple of the Oracle at Delphi was the maxim, "know thyself." Because our consciousness is multivalent, we are composed of many others, perhaps all others. There is the feminine/Other, the cultural/Other, the national/Other, the racial/Other, and the sacred/Other . . . the list becomes endless. In short the Other is the other side of the binary, that part which is unacceptable or which has been set off against the acceptable. It is at once and simultaneously exterior to self and internalized as when the unconscious is juxtaposed to the conscious. Then the unconscious, often identified with the right side of the bicameral mind and the left side of the body, comes to be characterized culturally, as it has in Western culture, as possessing negative, analogical, and feminized characteristics.\(^2\)

My experience as other has not been racial or class-based but gendered. In what follows, I will most often refer to Other as gendered feminine. This does not imply an exclusivity for Other solely as feminine. Authors such as Edward Said have sedulously documented how Other plays out in the case of Orientalism. Marxists and post-Marxists have carefully traced the Other of class. Hence, when I use the term Other as capitalized, I am using it also in its largest sense as the Other of race, class,
gender, and particularly as those categories become negatively and usually unconsciously internalized.

Other, then, becomes a slippery term symbolizing all that as a single unified being defined by a secular humanism derived from the Enlightenment was once set outside of self. Through the arguments of social constructionists such as Berger and Luckmann, we have now come to realize that we are many others in addition to the Enlightenment humanistic definition of solitary individuality. Exterior otherness reflects interior alterity. Consciously accepting the bicameral reflections of otherness of self, and eventually coming to consider that Other interior part of self as sacred, may become the work of twenty-first century rhetoric, an argument I hope to make in this dissertation.

The immediate question, then, seems to me to be how can an awareness of the past and the present that informs our-selves be incorporated into our lives and concerns as teachers, rhetoricians, and compositionists? That question lies behind a dual examination of both the person and work of Enheduanna and the modern discourse of Assyriology in chapter two. In an analysis of the politics of reading in Assyriology which specifically looks at how the goddess Inanna and feminism are contextualized by Assyriologists, I explore how the ancient other has come to be characterized certainly not as sacred, but most definitely as Other.

This leads me into current feminist rhetorical theory. In chapter three, "The Rhetorical Other: Feminist Rhetorical Revisionist History. The Politics of Rhetoric."
and Uses of the Past," I examine the discourse of current feminist rhetorical theory concentrating particularly on historiography. With changes in the way the past is perceived come changes in present reality. Rereading the classical history of rhetoric through the revisionary works of Susan Jarratt, C. Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch as they write from various critical perspectives of feminine/rhetorical/Other illuminates the alternative narratives of the derivation of that discourse about discourse traditionally known as "rhetoric." After analyzing the historical critiques of Jarratt and Swearingen in some detail, I look particularly at Kathleen Welch's concept of rhetorical unconscious.

In this work I use the term "unconscious" in two ways, one borrowed from Kathleen Welch, who in turn has adopted her usage from Fredric Jameson's definition of the political unconscious. Jameson argues that we can never come to any text without bringing the "sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or . . . if the text is brand new--through the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those inherited interpretive traditions" (9). In short, all our readings are influenced by our social construction and therefore often ideologically unconscious. Welch uses the term "rhetorical unconscious" throughout her articles and book to mean either pre-theoretical or theory-resistant. As Welch uses the term, she implicates reductivities of classical rhetoric that deny its complexity. As an example, she argues that many translations decontextualize terms key words such as pístis using it only in the sense of proof. Pístis has a much broader and more comprehensive sense of persuasion in
its manifestations of proof, conviction, or faith in certain instances. The opposite of unconscious for Welch is a grounded comprehension of contemporary rhetoric based on an understanding that "interiorizes" classical rhetoric. Such a grounded comprehension, Welch has stated in *The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric*, will "help us restore discourse and thought to the center of the rhetoric and composition curriculum" (108). Thus, for Welch consciousness is closely tied to theory which in turn is a product of thought and discourse exhibited as praxis. As she also explains, "no one can have full access to the value system that she or he operates with ... we all tend to find particular belief systems 'natural' and 'normal'" (36). To "gain" consciousness, then, for Welch, is to acknowledge the experience of how belief systems and language form consciousness, to become self-aware of one's social construction. Part of this is to engage in the subjectivity of thinking (interior discourse) rather than the objectivity of texts, an insight that reflects a particular attitude toward composition.

Welch's definition of rhetorical unconsciousness is one aspect of the larger psychological unconsciousness that in the next chapter (chapter four) I examine in the context of the work of two feminist psychoanalysts. There, I expand Welch's concept to include the kind of psychological unconsciousness that deeply affects the ideology that drives one's rhetoric often manifesting as negative projection onto the other, one that reflects the underlying duality of all Western thought.
Psychoanalysis, as a form of discourse analysis, has become a powerful rhetorical tool of contemporary consciousness offering ways to examine cultural manifestations of dualism. Penetrating the discursive collective screen of rationality, psychoanalysis offers a way to comprehend the deeper levels of language and psyche. Psychoanalyst Marion Woodman's theories as well as her personal experience and her work with her analysands utilizes various images of the feminine and masculine, ancient and contemporary. She speaks to the marriage of the masculine and feminine that each individual must undergo within both body and mind. Using the symbology and vocabulary of gender, she transmutes it into the containers of our own consciousness and unconsciousness. Woodman, then, uses "unconscious" in terms of the larger psyche. She perceives masculine and feminine as energies, energies that she says are not gender-bound. However, these energies do manifest in cultural-bound images, the same types of images she utilizes discussing the two concepts. At times she becomes trapped in her own binaries.

I too am aware that the reader will often find a circularity of argument in this work. Binaries are so deeply inherent to the structure of Western thought that they become inescapable. Thus, while not always in complete agreement with Woodman's argument, I find her work useful for the ways that it offers an overview of the complex relationship of consciousness and unconsciousness. While she paradoxically works to expand consciousness, at the same time she advocates living in the body and those parts of self which of necessity remain unconscious. Her formulation of a
broadened view of literacy as an encompassing spiral of expanding consciousness when reading and writing has much to recommend it for compositionists concerned with postmodern theory.\(^3\)

Sylvia Perera's book, *The Descent to the Goddess*, illuminates the underlying genderedness of academic and professional discourse. She also offers possible ways to examine and enlarge that discourse. Perera uses myth as a way to interpret the quest for wholeness, which she defines as "renewal in a feminine source and spirit"(15). In the process of following her thought, I look at Western cultural readings of the myths surrounding goddesses and how they reflect ways that internal and external perceptions of self and Other are interpreted and lived. I conclude by suggesting ways that the myth of Inanna as an ancient image of the goddess suggests ways of uniting above (cognitive consciousness) and below (unconscious drives and desires), and of balancing the two hemispheres of the bicameral mind toward a multivalent consciousness.

In chapter five I hope to illustrate how the bicameral mind functions metaphorically as an interpretative framework to examine the treatment of aspects of consciousness that characterize professional discourse, the language practices of the dominant discourse community in any area, profession, or period, and to be dichotomized as feminine and masculine within the tradition known as rhetoric in Western civilization. As we come to consciously accept the bicameral otherness of ourselves and even eventually to consider that Other part of self as sacred, then in
that acceptance, I posit, will come a new rhetoric and new understandings of the composing process. I explore this in the final fifth chapter.

Also, in the fifth chapter, "Composition and Expanded Consciousness," I suggest that composition pedagogies can be further amplified and expanded by reaching beyond the traditional classical period, back more than two thousand years to a period near the beginning of literacy where a strong feminine consciousness can be read in the work of Enheduanna. I conclude by proposing a more comprehensive way to view composing and the teaching of rhetoric: ethos expanded to a bicameral mind-body paradigm, pathos as the wisdom of the body, and a logos of the sacred Other tending ultimately toward a rhetoric embodying the sacred Other.

I don't hope to provide answers. That would be an act of hubris invoking, if not the wrath of the goddesses and gods, than the censure of the philosophers and rhetoricians. But, to adopt the advice of the Assyriologist William Hallo, at least I want to hazard hypotheses and make suggestions.

As I have worked with Enheduanna over the past few years, I have come to hear that resonant voice from a distance of more than 4,000 years and a continent away. She may speak to you; she may not. But I have found a wisdom and another way of seeing, speaking, being that I think has much to say to us in our illusory contemporary modernism. In this postmodern era, history can no longer be seen as a relentless march into a continually more progressive and positive future. Instead, there may be a more circular and organic movement outside the structures of linear
time, that belief in linearity which Einstein decisively exploded with the theory of relativity.

The past and the present continually mingle like the interweaving strands structuring DNA, commingling in interesting and various ways. Perhaps that is why so many feminine and racially marginal figures are presently being rediscovered and returned to historical consciousness, and why Enheduanna and her comparatively recently rediscovered works are of importance to rhetoric and composition.
Chapter One

INVENTION AND THE SACRED OTHER IN THREE CASE STUDIES:
ENHEDUANNA, CICERO, JUNG

The composing process, the study of which inaugurated the field of composition studies in the early 1970s, is the place I propose to begin this dissertation. My aim, however, is to conduct a postmodern examination of the metadiscourse of three case studies, each more than two thousand years apart, as they come to relate to and then internalize the Other.

By looking at the discourse of three historical individuals discussing their composing processes—their rhetoric of invention—I hope to glean insights into the contemporary Western mind and the cultural expressions of that consciousness. My methodology is simple. I use the metacommentary written about inspiration by Enheduanna, Cicero, and Jung. Their statements, inserted in their work or as asides, provide self-reflective commentary that I use as a tool of inquiry in order to form hypotheses concerning their relationship with the Other. Such commentary offers a way to investigate the self-perception involved in an individual writer's conception of composing and a measure of that writer's relationship to the Other whether secular or sacred. In each of these three cases, I posit, the relationship ultimately becomes one of numinosity; the Other assumes an identity of the sacred.

Reflecting on his life, Jung noted in Memories, Dreams, Reflections that we
are composed of elements "in the ranks" of our ancestors. For Jung, the unconscious, composed partly of ancestral psyches, exists in the past as well as in the present (237). The epoch of Enheduanna (ca. 2350 B.C.E.) reflects an ancient interaction with the divine feminine "other." images that appear to be returning to the present day consciousness of both women and men through dreams and art, and which I will discuss at greater length in Chapter four. Cicero, at the historical midpoint between Jung and Enheduanna, provides a barometer of the psyche near the end of the classical age, the beginning of the Christian era in the West. Jung, a mind of our own time, a physician of the soul, and a seer of the archetypes of the collective unconscious, by means of his theory of the anima and reflections upon his own unconscious processes, provides the nexus through which to view aspects of "our ancestral psyches" in modern consciousness.

In my examination of their composing processes. I begin by looking at the similarities and differences between Enheduanna, Cicero, and Jung. I characterize the cultural periods they represent by the images of the ziggurat, the forum, and the tower. Cicero and Jung, I argue, experienced a Promethean struggle of conflicted creativity in part. I hypothesize, because of their discordant relationship to the sacred Other. Finally, I conclude by hypothesizing how each illuminates the present from a particular historical site.
A. The Ziggurat

When Herodotus visited Babylon in the middle of the fifth century B.C.E., he was awed by the grandeur of the city. In his book, *Babylon*, James Macqueen quotes Herodotus's description of the famous tower of Babylon:

In the middle of the enclosure is a solid square tower with its sides more than two hundred yards long. On top of it there is another tower, and another on top of that, and so on up to eight stages. The staircase to the upper stories winds spirally round the outside, and about halfway up there is a platform with seats where people going up can rest. On the top story there is a large temple in which there is a great couch covered with fine draperies, with a table made of gold alongside it.

This great ziggurat was known as E-Temen-anki, the House of the Foundation of Heaven and Earth. Champdor estimates that it dated from the third millennium (127). This ziggurat became the Biblical 'Tower of Babel,' the most famous ziggurat of the ancient world, but every city had such a structure.

In the one existing representation of Enheduanna, Irene J. Winter explains that "compositionally Akkadian and Early Dynastic seals make an architectural form
appear very small in relation to human or divine figures in scenes" (193). Winters argues that visual evidence suggests that Enheduanna may have been part of a succession of a long line of literate priestesses preceding her by many centuries. Documentation conclusively shows that princess/priestesses followed her for the next five hundred years (196). Exercising secular as well as sacred power they are known to have ruled between kings perhaps maintaining the continuity of an ancient tradition of matrilineal succession upon which had been overlaid a tradition of warrior kings.

Enheduanna's father, Sargon of Akkad, became the first ruler to unite southern and northern Mesopotamia. His claim to the throne, beyond his prowess as a warrior, was that his mother had been a priestess. The story of Moses's abandonment as a baby may have originated with Sargon, who is said to have been abandoned as a child--perhaps the result of an illegal liaison. He was taken and raised as a gardener, an upbringing that echoes the mythical story of Dumuzi and Inanna. Enheduanna's mother, likely a priestess, must have been highly literate for Enheduanna herself was a prolific author. New works continue to surface as the backlog of untranslated material is slowly worked through. William W. Hallo and J.J. A. Van Dijk note in their translation, The Exaltation of Inanna, that she became conflated with the goddess Inanna to whom she writes. One of her works, The Exaltation of Inanna, was copied by scribes for the next thousand years. The ziggurat is as much symbolic for her as the goddess Inanna.

For Enheduanna, as an image of the relationship to her composing process, the
ziggurat is the symbolic representation of the sacred Other. Its stair step pyramidal shape rises to the sacred home of a divine being. The ziggurat represented a mountain at the top of which resided the goddess or god, the meeting place between the divine and the human. In Genesis when Adam and Eve eat the fruit of knowledge they begin the creation of culture, an act fraught with consequences because it exercises the powers of divinity. At the end of Genesis the people come to Shinar (Sumer) to learn how to build with baked brick and construct a great city with a ziggurat reaching toward heaven and divinity. God, fearful of their power, punishes them by separating and scattering them with many languages. In Christian mythology, the ziggurat symbolizes idolatry and the blasphemous for Western religious tradition. Yet for the epoch of Enheduanna, it represents a place of sacred habitation and inspiration.

At the time of her ordination as priestess to the moon god, Nanna, Enheduanna took up permanent residence in the giparu, the inner sanctum of the ziggurat, with the expectation of residing there until her death. In the giparu, she may have lived as the "embodiment of the goddess Ningal" (Westenholz 539). What is certain, though, are her remaining works which comprise over 1300 lines recovered to date and her unusual devotion to the goddess Inanna.

The status of the feminine divine was still strong in the third millennium. I hypothesize that it was stronger and more operative than the prevailing scholarship of Assyriology presently theorizes. In chapter 3, I examine the dominant theoretical
method of translation in the field of Assyriology and critique how meaning is interpreted and who speaks.

If Enheduanna was, as I hypothesize, a uniquely self-aware person for her time and place, then I believe that she exhibits an evolution of consciousness still in its early stages in our own culture. Her relationship to the sacred Other can be read as an example of transcendent bicameral creativity. She characterizes her creativity as a translogical collaborative process, one of creative in-spiriting by the sacred Other symbolized by the goddess Inanna.

In her hymn *The Exaltation of Inanna*, Enheduanna describes her own creative process as the direct result of the in-spiriting of the goddess. She speaks of her own and the creative process itself as collaborative with the goddess.

**B. The Forum**

Cicero’s life reflects the Roman forum, that particular cultural and geographic site upon which his being and intellect centered. The metaphor of the forum is apt for Cicero, who was at once wholly a man of his era, a paragon of Roman culture, but also a conflicted genius whose direct rhetorical influence on Western culture and education exceeded that of Aristotle until the eighteenth century.

The geographical and cultural space of the forum inaugurates Roman history. Horace Marucchi, in his history of the forum, describes Roman legends that attribute the foundation of the forum to the alliance between the followers of Romulus on the
Palatine and those of Titus Tatius on the Capitol. The meeting place of the two peoples, the forum, was the valley separating their villages. It became the center for the greatest events of Roman history. Cicero’s immersion in Roman statecraft and oratory, in the life of the forum, reflected the articulation of the temper and the mind of his time.

While Cicero’s scholarship was both creative and prodigious, his memory too must have been nearly photographic. Supposedly he wrote a commentary on a translation of Aristotle’s *Topics* based entirely on recall. But *memoria* was more than mere recall, she was also the mother of the muses. She (*memoria* as gendered feminine in Latin) existed in a much more complex sense, one connected to the sacred. James Hillman suggests that *Memoria* was considered by Cicero, "among others, following Plato to present evidence for the divine origin of the soul. Through the imagination man has access to the Gods: through *memoria* the Gods enter our lives. A primary way back to the matrix of memory is through her daughters, the muses" (*Myth* 180). The goddesses of the muses represented for Cicero images of the sacred Other. They provided an image, according to Thomas Willard, "of how knowledge was organized at the origin of Western culture" (1). Willard quotes Pierre Boyance observing that the schools of Pythagoras and Plato were both dedicated to the Muses, and explains that "Cicero associates the Muses with the beings one would wish to see first in the afterlife" (10).

Cicero was initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries when he studied rhetoric in
Athens, an experience he characterized as profoundly affecting. The devotion of the Eleusinian mysteries (the cult of Persephone-Demeter) may have provided images for the Muses as sacred Other thereby offering an imaginative way of characterization necessary to Ciceronian invention. The mystery cults were private religions primarily (except for Mithraism) dedicated to various goddess forms. Additionally, as a member of the College of Augurs, Cicero participated actively in this sacred aspect of Roman society's unconscious. His relationship to the Muses, as representative archetypes of the sacred Other, was much closer and more natural than it is for contemporary authors of either gender. So that his conflicted relationship to his own creativity, unlike Jung's, was less a direct struggle with the sacred Other, which still had many living goddess images, as it may have been between the public and private aspects of his life. Although, Jung too never reconciled the problem between public and private as he wrestled with personalities one and two.

In Roman society the division between public and private, between the inhabitants of those spaces, clearly divided along gender and class lines. Women and slaves from the time of the Greeks lived primarily in the private spaces as metaphorical representatives of the dark, subterranean, and intuitive aspects of mind. Citizens, upper class males, inhabited the public space of the forum as participants in law and government. Logos, as reason, argument, and discourse, became synonymous with the public masculine space of the forum. The tool of literacy became reserved primarily for these public ends. Hence composition and the process
of composing had become, two thousand years after Enheduanna, a predominantly male activity, one primarily dedicated to the expression of the logos of Aristotelian rationality. Cicero's process of invention and composing exhibited this conflict. I believe, as one between the public and private aspects of his nature.

Cicero, like most prolific writers wrote obsessively. In the preface to the third book of De Officis he notes that, while Africanus can enjoy his leisure in calm meditation, Cicero finds it necessary to resort to writing (Petersson 585). Again, in the preface to The Nature of the Gods, he tells how at the death of his daughter Tullia he dealt with misfortune by writing. "I was... moved to these studies by my own sickness of mind and heart, crushed and shaken as I was by the great misfortune which I had to bear. So I betook myself to this cure, not knowing what better remedy could be found" (73). Not a life of physical action, but one of creativity and philosophical ideas was his escape. After the death of Tullia during the next eighteen months he wrote most of his philosophical works: Academia, De Consolatione, and De Finibus, De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione, De Fato, De Vertutibus, De Officiis, De Amicitia, De Senectute, De Gloria, Disputationes Tusculanae as well as five books of oratory (Durant 163). This prodigious productivity helps explain his historical venerability.

Torsten Petersson in his biography of Cicero notes that Cicero's philosophical treatises "have had a more profound influence than any other works belonging to ancient Greece and Rome, with the single exception of Plutarch's Lives" (589). In
his consummate prose style, he re-tooled the Latin language, expanding its vocabulary and reach so that it remained the preeminent language of learning for another seventeen hundred years. His rhetorical works determined the shape of rhetoric inherited by the Middle Ages.

Yet beneath the surface of Cicero's public accomplishments, I read a conflicted creativity, the root of which, alluded to above, may be found in the dichotomy between public and private in his life. The age demanded of those who participated in public life an extraverted persona. But writing is an intensely private and very much an interior occupation. While in the Forum, he exhibited a public persona of performance. The creative actuality of his existence occurred in the library of his own home.

In Cicero's home, in addition to family and servants, lived several teachers and a Greek poet. Cicero once said that he could not survive day after day in the Forum arguing constantly if at night he did not refresh himself with study and literature. Literature was central to his thought and creativity. Plutarch says that as a young man Cicero was among the best poets in Rome (313). Yet this is not the public image nor the persona of the histories. The truth of his nature may have been more accurately related to him by the Oracle of Delphi than he understood. The Pythian priestess, through whom the Oracle spoke, according to Plutarch, told him as a young man "that his guide in life should be, not popular opinion, but his own nature" (315). But Cicero became seduced by the roaring of the crowd as when, after
the execution of the Catiline conspirators, he walked through the streets of Rome basking in the shouting adulation of the crowd. Plutarch's estimation of his character was that "he was always too fond and too concerned about what people thought of him; and this very often had a disturbing effect on policies of his which were in themselves excellent" (317). He seems to have always been torn between the Roman leading role of orator as man of action—a part characteristic of the Roman cultural persona, one not noted for intellectual preoccupation—and that of philosopher and intellectual—for Cicero, activities more aligned with his soul or psyche.

Cicero, then, as author represents the summation of the classical period, in which rhetoric reached its apogee as a process of education expressive of the consciousness of the age. Composition and the process of composing were well on their way to becoming the expression of left brain logos, a trend that continued for the next two thousand years of Western culture.

C. The Tower

Jung says in his autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, that words and paper were not enough for him "I had to achieve a kind of presentation in stone of my innermost thoughts and of the knowledge I had acquired ... I had to make a confession of faith in stone" (223). He bought some land on the upper lake of Zurich, land that once belonged to the monastery of St. Gall. The first building was a regular two-storied house. Four years later he felt the need to create his own space
and built a tower-like annex. He explained:

From the beginning I felt the Tower as in some way a place of maturation—a maternal womb or a maternal figure in which I could become what I was, what I am and will be. It gave me a feeling as if I were being reborn in stone. It is thus a concretization of the individuation process, a memorial aere perennius. During the building work, of course, I never considered these matters. I built the house in sections, always following the concrete needs of the moment. It might also be said that I built it in a kind of dream. Only afterward did I see how all the parts fitted together and that a meaningful form had resulted: a symbol of wholeness. (225)'

The initiation of the building as well as his last addition to it are the result of the stimulus of his projections of the Other, in Jung’s case clearly defined as the anima:

Every man carries within him the eternal image of woman, not the image of this or that particular woman, but a definitive feminine image. This image is fundamentally unconscious, an hereditary factor of primordial origin engraved in the living organic system of the man, an imprint or 'archetype' of all the ancestral experiences of the female, a deposit, as it were, of all the impressions ever made by woman. (The Development of Personality 198)

Jung began the initial construction at Bollingen when his mother died in 1922.
The final addition occurred after Emma Jung's death when no changes had been made in the buildings for twenty years. "Jung discovered 'suddenly' that the whole thing was still lacking an essential part . . . the completion of the central section between the two tower structures to left and right" (Wehr 426). Whether the two towers can be said to represent those aspects of his anima projected onto his wife and mother, is, of course, speculative. Yet, in both cases, the loss of the human upon whom the Other was projected stimulated the building in stone.

The image of the tower also provides a reflection of Jung's own thought processes. In our own individualistic era, it becomes a symbol of the "concretization of the individuation process," of the solitary psyches of our particular "towered" egos rising out of the ground of the unconscious Other.

In The Myth of Meaning Aneila Jaffee relates an incident that occurred at an Eranos meeting in August 1940 that offers insight into Jung's thought processes, composing, and bicamerality. By the summer of 1940 Switzerland had become completely surrounded by Axis-controlled territory. Foreign speakers normally invited to the Eranos conference could not travel. Instead Olga Froebe "arranged a symbolic Eranos: she invited a single lecturer, the Swiss mathematician Andreas Spieser, to talk on 'Plato's Unknown God'" (McGuire 34). Jung listened and then silently took a Bible from the library. He sat under a shade tree by the lake making notes. The next morning, Jaffee writes, "[He] surprised the tensely listening audience with a reply. . . . Speaking extempore. . . . In the way that was characteristic of
him, pondering his words and at times hesitantly, he formulated thoughts he had been carrying around with him for years but had not yet put into final shape" (7). This appears to have been the pattern of his composing. Jaffe explains that he wrote only after he had thought for a long time--often years--about a subject and read extensively. He would then write "straight away," allowing the work to take possession of him. She describes his process as not one of revision so much as amplification: "At a subsequent re-reading, it was only technical additions, "amplifications" drawn from every conceivable field of knowledge, that were pasted in the wide margins of the folio sheets on numerous small slips, some of them quite tiny. But the written text as such remained for the most part untouched" (8).

At that particular Eranos meeting, Jung apologized and described his process as being able to formulate his thoughts only "as they break out of me." He used the analogy of a geyser to characterize his creative process. Geysers erupt as the result of embroiled subterranean churning which aptly characterizes Jung's conflicted creativity.

His psychology developed from his own personal conflicts with personalities #1 and #2 and his studies of schizophrenia. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* he describes the powerful impression of his mother and her personality split between day and night. It was the night personality that fascinated him. "Then she was like one of those seers who is at the same time a strange animal, like a priestess in a bear's cave. Archaic and ruthless; ruthless as truth and nature" (50). His own split of
multiple personae manifested early. At the age of twelve while being dressed down by the host of the house he and his parents were visiting, he was seized with rage "that this fat, ignorant boor should dare to insult ME" (33). The ME being insulted emerged as the image of an old man, "an object of respect and awe" (33). This "other" assumed the image of a man living in the eighteenth century who wore a white wig and buckle shoes (34). Later, by the age of fifteen, the "other" appears to have mutated into a less distinct image, but one that remained old, but "skeptical, mistrustful, remote from the world of men, but close to nature, the earth, the sun, the moon, the weather, all living creatures, and above all close to the night, to dreams" (44-5). This play and counterplay of personalities, Jung allowed to run through the rest of his life. Further, he postulated that it existed in everyone, not as a "split" or disassociation "in the ordinary medical sense" but as a basic part of everyone's makeup (45). Yet this personality split, as normal as Jung attempts to make it sound, may arise out of his ambivalent relationship with his mother. It continued to manifest throughout the rest of his life in his own conflicted creativity.

Early in his life a manifestation of this split occurred in his writing. He tells of being unjustly accused of plagiarism for an essay that he had taken unusual interest and pains in writing. The work was so much better than what he had previously done that the teacher could not believe it was his own writing. He was morally outraged and furious for days until a "sudden inner silence" occurred (Memories 65-66). He describes his eventual reconciliation to the incident as though an older wiser self
began to reason with him. This wisdom-self explained that although the teacher was an idiot, he too did not understand his own nature anymore than did the teacher. The coolness of this self-reflection mitigated his anger.

The second early writing experience Jung mentions that stands out for him concerns a second essay written several years later. Again, it was a subject that interested him. He notes that he took particular pains to write the composition. The teacher held it up before the class, recognized the brilliance but accused him of a "slap-dash attitude." "Look at D's paper. He has none of your brilliance, but he is honest, conscientious, and hard working. That is the way to success in life" (71). As a result of this second incident, he learned to cover himself and to forego speaking of esoteric or strange matters with his school mates or in class: "The most painful thing of all was the frustration of my attempts to overcome the inner split in myself, my division into two worlds" (72).

Throughout the recounting of his early years the theme revolves around the schizophrenia of his own personality he labels as #1 and #2. It is the world of #2, to which "belonged everything superhuman--dazzling light, the darkness of the abyss, the cold impassivity of infinite space and time, and the uncanny grotesqueness of the irrational world of chance" (72). The lure of it was so irresistible that he came close to losing his sanity to it as a young man.

Creativity can also express itself as destruction. James Hillman notes that the mythic relation of "Eros and Chaos states what academic studies of creativity have
long said, that chaos and creativeness are inseparable" (99). Jung himself wrote that creation is a much destruction as construction: "A creative person has little power over his own life. He is not free. He is captive and driven by his daimon" (Memories 357). The driving of his daimon led Jung to fear for his own sanity at the particular time he was exploring his unconscious. It was the outbreak of World War I and the global madness all around him that sparked his exploration of the depths of his own psyche. "Often I felt as if gigantic blocks of stone were tumbling down upon me. One thunderstorm followed another. . . . Others have been shattered by them--Nietzsche, and Holderlin, and many others" (177).

During this period he virtually stopped writing and says that his intellectual activity came to a standstill. He could not read a scientific book for three years (1911-14). "The material brought to light from the unconscious had, almost literally, struck me dumb" (193). Once this period came to an end, at the beginning of World War I, he began to write down the fantasies, exploring for the images in the emotions. He speculates that had he not searched for the images concealed in the emotions he would have been torn to pieces by them (177). The images became germinative. Despite the risk of mental chaos and possible insanity that might have resulted from his exploration of the unconscious, Jung benefitted from the prolificacy of images and insights upon which he subsequently built his life's work.

Jung's struggle with the unconscious in order to understand his own psyche frequently took the form of encounters with the anima. He posited that women and
men both possess qualities of masculine (animus) and feminine (anima) in their unconscious. He studied and theorized a great deal about his own anima, defining it in terms of its projection onto the four most important women in his life, his mother, Emma Jung, Toni Woolf, and Sabrina Spielrien. The anima influence of his mother and Emma Jung he later memorialized in the two stone towers he built at Bollingen.

Recent intriguing work by feminist Jungian psychoanalysts examining the images of woman/Other in text, myth, art, anthropology, history, religion, and individual psychology extends and deepens Jung’s theories and reinterprets them in much the same manner as feminist revisionist historians Susan Jarratt, Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch are doing in rhetorical historiography. These analysts work directly with the manifestation of images and dreams produced by their personal psyches and that of their women analysands. Some interesting broad-ranging, theoretical, and practical applications have begun to emerge that may contribute a great deal to composition theory. In chapters three and four, I will examine the work of two psychotherapists, Sylvia Perera, and Marion Woodman, whose theories and experience have had a direct influence on rhetoric and composition theory.

II. INVENTION AND THE OTHER: THE CREATIVE PROCESS AS OTHER"

For all three writers, Enheduanna, Cicero, and Jung, the act of composing and its link to inspiration appears to be one of in-spiriting, a process not without danger
or conflict. Jung's method of writing and his prose were a direct reflection of the discursiveness of his mind. His work with his own unconscious and his struggle with the schizophrenia of his personal creative process resulted in learning to trust the organization of a work as it took hold of him and flowed: "A book of mine is always a matter of fate. There is something unpredictable about the process of writing, and I cannot prescribe for myself any predetermined course" (Memories vi). Instead, Enheduanna seems to have deliberately opened herself to the larger part of her psyche inviting the in-spiriting of Inanna. While Cicero appears to have written from the flowing of his unconscious mind in much the same manner as Jung described his own composing process. Cicero justified his copiousness, Petersson notes, by reasoning that it was not enough to interest—that was easily accomplished by using few words—to instruct it was necessary to elaborate, i.e. amplify (588). The amplification as it was exhibited in Oratore and Brutus was done through collecting examples from the world of the forum and allowing the unconscious to organize and insert them. While representative of cultural expressions of the psyche (the consciousness and unconsciousness) of their epochs, each of these writers also illuminates the psyche of contemporary Western culture.

A. Enheduanna

Enheduanna is at once a mystical and mythical figure, one whose image may be destined to take hold of the popular imagination in an era of emerging feminism
and the reclaiming of ancient feminine images. Her poem/hymn provides an illuminating background not only of ways that ancient Sumerian culture embodied the Other as the feminine divine, but how such images might influence modern composing. Two Jungian analysts who are doing important healing work with women and exploring the feminine Other illustrate alternative modes of utilizing this ancient material.

Psychoanalyst Sylvia Brinton Perera explains that women who have succeeded in the world are usually what she calls "daughters of the father." We are women well adapted to a masculine society and as a consequence become lost to ourselves. "The return to the goddess for renewal in a feminine source and spirit is a vitally important aspect of modern woman's quest for wholeness" (130). She describes the process as one of sacrifice, dying to an old identity as daughters of the patriarchy and a descent into the spirit of the goddess.

For Perera the myth of the descent of Inanna, her death and resurrection, provides a paradigm for a new balanced ego that combines and flexibly balances the polarities of being both active and vulnerable, assertive and empathetic. "I found that by relating to this very early material from an age when the Great Goddess was still vital, I have been able to reclaim some of my own relation to the archetypal feminine instinct and spirit patterns" (139). Perhaps, eventually this will manifest in her language and the format in which she chooses to write as it has in the recent work of Marion Woodman.
Marion Woodman finds that the modern problems of anorexia, bulimia, and addiction are the result of an unconscious femininity rebelling and manifesting in somatic form. "Those who have been brought up in a patriarchal world tend to stay in their heads....We want to live outside the limitations of this poor stupid thing below the neck that can't or won't do what we want it to do" (Interviews 137). The feminine body Woodman finds has been kept unconscious of its own feminine principle. "Only by discovering and loving the goddess lost within her own rejected body can a woman best hear her own voice" (Owl 10).

For both women acknowledging and reclaiming the sacred Other, both internally and as those images manifest in their external aspects, becomes crucial not only for psychic and somatic health, but also in order to speak. something I will explore further in chapter four. Images of the sacred Other are as important to the psychic balance and creativity of men, as illuminated by the stories of composing in the lives of Cicero and Jung.

B. Cicero

While the tower and the ziggurat rise toward heaven and the spirit, the forum rests in a valley at the place where opposing tribes came to meet and unite to begin the practical building of a civilization that eventually conquered most of the known world forging and adapting an intellectual heritage that still influences our concepts of culture, self, and civilization today. Cicero's statesmanlike practicality was outwardly
forged by a culture that centered on the forum and the practical matters of governing. His orations were those of a politician who utilized all the devices of an agonistic rhetoric. Even his scholarly pursuits appear practical—the commentaries and translations of Greek philosophy and rhetoric turned into a Latin prose so seductive that for awhile St. Jerome feared to lose his soul because he could not resist reading Cicero. Such tender considerations would have amazed Cicero who perceived his life as one of service to the state perhaps more than to the Muses. Politicians were often military leaders, and Cicero presided over a military regime governing Sicily under martial law. Outwardly, Cicero appears as a pragmatist—the religiosity of the Middle Ages would have astonished him, and he would no more have grasped the concept of a messiah than he could tolerate the dictatorship of Caesar or follow only one philosophy to the exclusion of others. "At the end of the De Finibus he has one of the speakers suggest that if young Lucius Cicero should follow the opinions of Marcus and master the New Academic doctrine thoroughly, then it would result in his knowing nothing at all" (Petersson 581).

Nevertheless, religious considerations were important to Cicero. He puzzled over the nature of the gods. He laughed at Stoic dogmatism and ridiculed the agnosticism of the New Academics. His was a practical, objective mind that might characterize the best of our present politicians, scientists, and scholars. He also not only accepted but welcomed the mysteriousness of the right hemisphere. He would not be comfortable among the technocrats in the scientific institutions of our world.
The one-sidedness, and purely natural-scientific and technically oriented style of our scholarship would be far too narrow for Cicero. Reading professional discourse today would cause this master of language to wince at the paucity of metaphor, narrowness of expression, and the limitation of imagination. Throughout his life he worked to deepen his knowledge, continually stretching the Latin language searching for ways to express that erudition. His rhetorical treatises such as the Brutus and De Oratore are humane and psychologic discussions of the complexity of rhetoric and texts, Roman institutions, and the Greek and Roman cultures, topics treated with multifarious creativity. Always at the root of his creative process were the Muses in their manifestation of images of the sacred Other, symbolic of the deep richness and ambiguity of the processes of the unconscious mind.

C. Jung

Jung's connection with Rome and the mythology of the Muses appears to be largely unconscious and also conflicted. For Jung, Jaffee noted in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, the "psyche spontaneously produces images with a religious content . . . it is 'by nature religious' . . . that numerous neuroses spring from a disregard for this fundamental characteristic of the psyche, especially during the second half of life" (x). Curiously, Jung traveled all over the world, yet never went to Rome. He notes in his autobiography that he would very much have liked to go to Rome, but that Pompeii, where he did go, "was more than enough: the impressions
very nearly exceeded my powers of receptivity" (287). In fact, a page later he notes, that "questions were posed beyond my powers to handle" (288). So it comes as no surprise that when he finally did resolve to go to Rome—in his old age (1949)—he went to purchase the tickets and could not. As he was buying the tickets he fainted. "After that, the plans for a trip to Rome were once and for all laid aside" (288). The strength of his unconscious reaction also recalls the famous situations Jung mentions when Freud fainted twice with Jung, once after Jung had gone off on a disquisition concerning the peat-bog corpses, and the second time during an argument about Ikhnaton chiseling the name of Amon from the cartouches of his father. In that second situation Freud had maintained that Ikhnaton was creating a new monotheistic religion motivated by a father complex. When Jung pointed out that other pharaohs had felt the right to change names on monuments but had not inaugurated a new style nor a new religion, Freud fainted (157). Later he accused Jung of the desire to kill the father (Freud). Equally powerful unconscious elements may have caused Jung to faint when he was purchasing tickets to go to Rome, but these must remain speculative since he gave no clues as to what motivated such a strong reaction. Yet it would not be stretching interpretation too far to note that the classical world still lived very richly in Jung’s psyche. He says that his father began teaching him Latin at the age of six. His writing was enormously learned, drawing from myths and works throughout the history of civilization, and he continued those studies all his life. Perhaps some understanding of his attitude toward the ancient world can be drawn
from the story he tells of taking a ship in 1912 from Genoa to Naples:

As the vessel neared the latitude of Rome, I stood at the railing. Out there lay Rome, the still smoking and fiery hearth from which ancient cultures had spread, enclosed in the tangled rootwork of the Christian and Occidental Middle Ages. There classical antiquity still lived in all its splendor and ruthlessness. (288)

"Splendor and ruthlessness" as the descriptive adjectives he chose to characterize Rome, a culture that obviously fascinated him while simultaneously repelling him into unconsciousness.

Perhaps his manner of living at Bollingen may offer some insight into this mystery. In addition to his conscious understanding of the reasons that he built the tower and came to inhabit it, the way that he lived there also illustrates his extremely close connection to a past age. He deliberately excluded all the modern conveniences of life such as electricity and running water. He heated the quarters with a fire. It was, he said, a place where a medieval man could have walked in and found everything familiar. In this manner he attempted, both consciously and unconsciously, to maintain a continuous connection with the ageless life of the psyche and the mysterious sacred Other.

III. INVENTION AND THE SACRED OTHER

To paraphrase Jung, our psyches are as much composed of ancient Sumer and
classical antiquity as they are locked in the present moment (Memories 236). Enheduanna, Cicero, and Jung, despite their disparate eras and cultures reflect archetypes of in-spiration characterized by the ziggurat, the forum, and the tower, images lodged deeply and meaningfully in the modern psyche. The era of the ziggurat is one in which the connection with the sacred Other as goddess was clearly an integral part of the consciousness of the En-priestess, Enheduanna. She writes of the relation as the collaborative process of composing The Exaltation to the goddess Inanna; she is simultaneously singer and subject. I posit that the separation of the sacred Other from consciousness two thousand years later in Cicero’s forum manifested as his conflicted division between public and private. While for Jung, four thousand years later, the deep separation of consciousness built on what Hillman calls the "bedrock of misogyny" left a schizophrenic psychic life (Myth 298). Yet part of Jung’s legacy—in addition to his insight and personal participation in the psychic conflicts of the age—is the bringing to consciousness long suppressed aspects of psychic life. By articulating the concept of the anima, he established the connection of the sacred Other to in-spiration, creativity.

But whether goddess, muse, or anima, in each of the three case studies, the authors characterized their creative process of composing in a way that embodied the Other as sacred. This process of how the other becomes characterized in order to be eventually internalized, I hope to show, becomes increasingly important to reinvisioning contemporary rhetoric and composition.
Rhetoric, as a systematic metadiscursive study of the forms and works produced by the conscious mind, traditionally begins with the Greeks and particularly Aristotle, who worked out the first systematic theory. This Aristotelian tradition of rhetoric, has produced a heritage celebrating aspects of consciousness designated as masculine (reason, logic—logos) while denigrating as "other" and feminine aspects of consciousness that appear mysterious or unknowable (intuition, and products of the unconscious such as dreams, stories, mythos—pathos).

In what follows, I will examine how the Other, taking the guise of the feminine, has become a contemporary theoretical tool redefining rhetorical historiography and how that influences the discourse known as rhetoric and the treatment of aspects of consciousness that have come to characterize professional discourse10 and to be dichotomized as feminine and masculine within the tradition of rhetoric in Western civilization.

Specifically, I begin by examining the initial manifestation of a rhetoric of the sacred Other, starting with the oldest known attributable work, The Exaltation of Inanna, written by Enheduanna, circa 2350 B.C.E. As part of my analysis, I look at how historians, (Assyriologists and Sumeriologists) who deal with that period, read and interpret texts—the discursive conventions and the underlying cultural and ideological assumptions of that particular scholarly discipline.
Chapter Two
ENHEDUANNA, HER WORKS, AND THE POLITICS
OF INTERPRETATION IN ASSYRIOLOGY

I. ENHEDUANNA

In the photograph of the disk of Enheduanna, she stands second in a line of four figures, preceded by a nude male priest and followed by two male attendants. She wears a flounced dress and a rolled brimmed turban, the aga, which she refers to in The Exaltation of Inanna as "the true cap/the sign of (appropriate to) en-ship" (l.107). She was the high (en) priestess of the moon god, Nanna.

On the disk, the four figures make a ritual offering to the moon god. Yet among her works so far found, her major work, a hymn--translated in 1968 by William W. Hallo and J. J. A. Van Dijk--is to the goddess Inanna. Apparently her official title was en (high-priestess) to the god Nanna, yet her passionate affiliation appears to have been with the goddess Inanna. Of her five recovered works, two are long hymns to Inanna.

Until the last 150 years Sumerian civilization was only a whispered echo in human memory. The Bible and works of Greek and Roman historians mentioned the Babylonians and the Assyrians. Nothing was known of the Sumerians. Assyriologist Samuel Noah Kramer believes that because the Sumerians built with mud-brick.
unlike the Egyptians who used stone, their civilization disappeared. Rain and annual floods slowly dissolved the mud-brick leveling the towers and the palaces slowly washing away the cities and the memory of the civilization. For centuries huge mounds lay enigmatically untouched in the rural Iraq landscape. Excavations didn't begin until the mid-nineteenth century. Beginning in 1873, archaeologists uncovered enormous numbers of artifacts and records. The Sumerians kept records of everything, accounts, letters, laws, and literature on clay tablets. The tablets were sun dried and sometimes fired. These artifacts have left indelible documents more permanent than the less durable papyrus of the Egyptians and the vellum scrolls of so much of Biblical literature.

Perhaps because the mounds were so commonplace and the clay artifacts so small, the civilizations of Sumeria did not enter historical consciousness until comparatively recently. Yet Hallo believes that these cuneiform texts provide "the most abundant archival documentation [of any civilization] before the European Middle Ages" (1990, 192). However, as Sumerian scholar Tikva Frymer-Kensky explains, the tablets are frequently incomplete, broken, and extremely difficult to read. "They are almost always chipped, particularly at the edges, which, for Sumerian, means at the subject or verb of the sentence. Thus the meaning is often elusive and tantalizing, and our restorations and translations may be inadequate" (4). The record may be abundant, but it remains confused, difficult, and open to the projections of the translator who often unconsciously interprets in terms of Western
cultural norms and expectations. In what follows, I illustrate some ways that engendered interpretations and viewpoints often operate among scholars in the field of Assyriology.

The Sumerian civilization and the works of Enheduanna have a special significance for rhetoric and composition. The uses of persuasive and metadiscourse go back millennia before the formulation of the definition of rhetoric by Aristotle as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. While the Greek classical period is formative for the history of rhetoric, writing and the complexities of composing have preoccupied people since the invention of script. The Other—as linked to the unconscious, the right brain aspects of consciousness, and frequently framed as numinous—impacts teaching, rhetorical theory, composition, and composing in often powerful and frequently unconscious ways. Consciousness of the myths and the cultural constructs of the Other, framed within a rhetorical concept of the Other as sacred and frequently characterized as feminine provides a perceptual viewpoint that has interesting implications for composing and consciousness as I indicated in Chapter one. In this chapter, I analyze some examples of the representative discourse of Assyriology. I look at how meaning is interpreted, who speaks, and how the biases of unconscious gendered interpretation and Eurocentrism underlie the translations and the inevitable interpretations of context. I then analyze at some length how the goddess Inanna and feminism are contextualized by Assyriologists in an analysis of the politics of reading in Assyriology.
I begin by examining the work of Enheduanna locating her in her historical context, insofar as possible, and analyze at some length her best known and most complete work we have to date, *The Exaltation of Inanna*, followed by a summary discussion of her other attributable works, *The Temple Hymns* and *In-nin sa-gur-a*. I locate additional historical material in the appendix.

My particular reading of the poetess, priestess, and princess, is one, admittedly, skewed by my own gender and postmodern context, that of a late twentieth-century feminist rhetorician and compositionist. In chapter 3, following, I examine some of the implications and influences for the discourse of rhetoric, rhetorical historiography, and the practice of composition that result from such a stance, as I look closely at the work of three feminist rhetorical theorists and their recent work in historiography, Susan Jarratt, C. Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch.

Returning to the enigmatic photograph of the disk, a close analysis yields some interesting observations. Harvard art historian Irene J. Winter describes it:

The disk is of translucent alabaster; it measures ca. 25.6 cm. in diameter and 7.1 cm. thick; and is today in the collection of the University Museum, Philadelphia. It was found in several fragments during the course of excavations in the area of the *giparu* at Ur in 1927, and has been heavily reconstructed. (190-192)

Winters explains that on the back, in a column of eleven cases, an inscription
identifies Enheduanna as the "wife (dam) of Nanna [the Sumerian moon god] and daughter of Sargon" (192). Winter continues:

On the obverse, a central frieze of figures is carved in very high and well-modelled relief. At the left, a libation is poured by a nude male "priest" from a spouted vessel into a plant stand set before what has been restored as a four-staged temple tower. Behind (to the right of) the priest is an array of three figures, including a well-appointed woman in turban and flounced garment. (192)

Winter points out that the nude priest pouring the libation and Enheduanna share the center of the disk. She notes that if the restoration is accurate, "only Enheduanna’s head actually touches the upper margin of the frieze--the violation of isocephaly serving to emphasize her dominant position" (192-3).

A. Enheduanna and Sumerian history

Although Enheduanna lived 4300 years ago (ca. 2285-2250 B.C.E), her existence as a historical personage is fairly well established. She was the daughter of Sargon of Akkad, the first ruler to unite northern and southern Mesopotamia. Her mother was a Sumerian, perhaps a priestess. Sargon too was the son of a priestess and is purported to have recorded the following inscription on a cuneiform tablet:

My priestly mother conceived me; secretly brought me to birth: set me in an ark of bulrushes: made fast my door with pitch. She consigned
me to the river, which did not overwhelm me. The river brought me to Akki, the farmer, who brought me up to be his son. . . . During my gardening, the goddess Ishtar loved me, and for fifty-four years the kingship was mine. (qtd in Barnstone 1)

Historical records show Enheduanna as the priestess of the moon god, Nanna of Ur. Her combined roles as princess and priestess may have set a precedent in Sumerian history followed for the next five centuries. William W. Hallo explains that she was a personality "who set standards in all three of her roles for many succeeding centuries..." (Exaltation 1). The names of high priestesses appear in historical lists just as do the names of the kings testifying to interesting political and cultural implications of power, at least of royal women. For the next 500 years between sovereigns, the priestesses provided continuity of government.

What cuneiform scholars find puzzling is that although Enheduanna was a priestess to the moon god, Nanna, her hymns were to the goddess Inanna. Hallo speculates that it may have been partly political. When Sargon began his struggle to unite the two states of Sumer and Akkad, Mesopotamian constitutional organization was based on a system of largely independent city-states united in a loose and primarily cultic league. As the final step in his politico-religious reformation, Sargon equated the Sumerian Inanna with the Akkadian Ishtar, thereby laying the theological foundations for a the empire of Sumer and Akkad, and beginning the "dynasty of Ishtar" (9-10). As a result, the names of Inanna and Ishtar became synonymous.
But the passion of Enheduanna’s attachment to Inanna I read as much more than one of political expediency. Inanna, Sumeria’s most beloved and revered deity, is described by Sumerologist, Samuel Noah Kramer, as the “goddess who outweighed, overshadowed, and outlasted” all the other female deities throughout Sumerian history. Inanna, known as the ‘Queen of Heaven,” “played a greater role in myth, epic, and hymn than any other deity, male or female” (Poetry 71). Storyteller and poet Diane Wolkstein spent three years compiling a representative cycle of hymns to Inanna and at the end of her project concluded:

The world’s first love story, two thousand years older than the Bible—tender, erotic, shocking, and compassionate—is more than momentary entertainment. It is a sacred story that has the intention of bring its audience to a new spiritual place. With Inanna, we enter the place of exploration: the place where not all energies have been tamed or ordered. (xix)

Inanna as a deity of great complexity, deeply engaged the passions of Sumerian civilization and the world’s first known writer, Enheduanna. In fact in several instances Enheduanna is "confused, if not precisely identified" with Inanna. Hallo remarks on her virtual apotheosis in the later theology of old Babylon (Exaltation 5). If her hymn to Inanna is read as autobiographical, Enheduanna’s experience of ostracism and eventual restoration echo the story of Inanna’s own myth of descent, death, and resurrection in the underworld.
Thus, Enheduanna may occupy a poignant historical place on the borderland between Old Europe and the new culture of military empire. Her mother, a Sumerian, may have come from a long tradition of matrifocal culture. Her father’s conquest of Sumer, uniting this already-ancient city state with the more northern, warrior culture of Akkad—a pattern that Gimbutas traces over and over again throughout Old Europe where matristic civilizations, she says, were replaced by patriarchal cultures (Civilization of the Goddess 396-401).

B. The Exaltation of Inanna

The Exaltation of Inanna, translated from the cuneiform by Hallo and van Dijk in a 1968 text edition, runs 153 lines. In the translation it is carefully set up in a format, echoing the cuneiform exemplars, of two column stanzas that can often be read down as well as across. It begins with a 65-line exordium of epithets and descriptions, all carefully selected to illustrate the characteristics of the goddess. These epithets "arranged in a conscious sequence—worthy of the wisdom of an Amos—in which the range of Inanna’s activities is brought ever closer to the (presumable) audience of the poem" (48). Enheduanna then implies Inanna’s equality with An, the senior god of the Sumerian pantheon. Hallo suggests that this is designed to politically equates the Sargonic kings as adhering to Sumerian norms and beliefs "in order to justify Akkad’s imperial designs on Sumer" (7). Next Enheduanna depicts Inanna as disciplining mankind and as a goddess of battle joining the warlike
Akkadian Ishtar's qualities to those of the gentler Sumerian goddess of love and fecundity. She equates Inanna to a great storm bird who swoops down on the lesser gods and sends them fluttering off like surprised bats.

Then Enheduanna herself steps forward in the first person to recite her own past glories, establishing her credibility, and explain her present plight. She has been banished as high priestess from the temple in the city of Ur and from Uruk and exiled to the steppe. She begs the moon good Nanna to intercede for her because the city of Uruk, under the ruler Lugalanne, has rebelled against Sargon. The rebel, Lugalanne, has even destroyed the temple Eanna, one of the greatest temples in the ancient world. Further, he has dared to equate himself as an equal to the new high priestess and--in the most ancient recorded instant of sexual harassment--made sexual advances to the high priestess, his sister-in-law.

Then in the swelling of the "Magnificat"--a liturgy (ll. 122-35) probably sung antiphonally--the long hymn reaches its title theme. Enheduanna recites the me's, divine attributes, of and to Inanna, again exalting her to equal status with An. The hymn moves on to the peroration, a passage "unique to Sumerian literature describing the process of poetic inspiration" (Hallo, Exaltation 62). The poetess characterizes her creative labors as giving birth, i.e. "conceiving the word." Then in the next stanza (ll. 143-50) Enheduanna reverts to the third person as the simultaneous exaltation of Inanna and the restoration of Enheduanna are proclaimed. The concluding three-line doxology conveys the sense of the goddess and her poetess
emerging triumphant.

In The Exaltation of Inanna there is a strong authorial presence that may be unmatched in ancient literary creation until the time of Sappho. She is self-consciously present in the process of writing and in the poem. The "I" of the creatrix, Enheduanna and Inanna, are always at the center. And it is a rhetorical creation of passionate complexity, one of death and birth, destruction and creation—those things that occupy the deepest part of the psyche.

She speaks of both her own creative process near the end of the hymn. Through Inanna, Enheduanna has received the inspiration for the poem.

136 One has heaped up the coals  prepared the lustration
    (in the censer),
137 The nuptial chamber awaits  let your heart be
    you  appeased!

In the lines above she intimates that she has prepared herself to receive poetic inspiration—madness as Plato would characterize it. Enheduanna's creative process is a very purposeful receiving. She heaps the coals in the censer and prepares the lustration to receive her greater self, her transcendent self, the Goddess. Her creative process is one of intimate interaction with the Goddess. For a time in the middle of the night, they become one and out of that union comes the song.

She is at once inspired by the Goddess, a receiver of creative in-spiriting, and at the same time a poetess whose work comes from her own unique being while in a
state of passionate and consuming love for the Goddess.

139 That which I recited to you at (mid)night
140 May the singer repeat it at noon!

to you

Enheduanna's own physical self-image is one of beauty and strength. In line 71, she speaks of her "mellifluous" mouth, and in line 72, she mourns when her "choicest features are turned to dust" (25). She does not doubt her place;

66 Verily I had entered my holy giparu at your behest
67 I, the high priestess, I, Enheduanna!
120 (Yet) I am the brilliant high priestess of Nanna

The persona of Enheduanna is both physical and transcendent. She is a professional, a high priestess who is not only a possessor of the privileges of the rank and office, but she carries the burdens, the responsibilities . . . and the grief of that sometimes terrible role.

105 Like a swallow he made me fly from the window, my life is consumed.

117 (But) my own sentence is not A hostile judgment Concluded. appears before my eyes as my judgment.

82 Let me give free vent to my tears like sweet drink for the
In her personal role and her role as priestess she has had to watch the destruction of people, temple and sacred rites.

(Lugalanne) has altered the lustrations of holy An and all his (other rites).

He has stripped An of (his temple) Eanna. He has not stood in awe of An-lugal

That sanctuary whose attractions are irresistible, whose beauty is endless,

That sanctuary he has verily brought to destruction.

She speaks of her awareness of her own humanity and her limitations.

I cannot appease Ashimbabbar

In the place of sustenance what am I, even I?

But in the end transcendence occurs--and perhaps apotheosis--of both her person and that of her Goddess when she steps back and in the third person describes the sumptuous vestments of the Goddess and her priestess, vestments symbolic of both their spiritual and physical beauty

The day was favorable for her, she was garbed in womanly beauty.

Like the light of the rising moon, how she was sumptuously attired!
Then she explains that:

150 The (heavenly) doorsill called "Hail!"

Mircea Eliade explains the symbolic importance of a threshold in what he calls palaeo-oriental cultures (Babylon, Egypt, Israel). "Thresholds, the doorsill shows the solution of continuity in space immediately and concretely; hence their great religious importance, for they are symbols and at the same time vehicles of passage from the one space to the other" (25). Thus Inanna in the form of her representative, the high priestess Enheduanna, stands at the threshold of heaven and earth, communicating between the two. Finally Enheduanna concludes the poem in praise and exaltation of Inanna.

151 For that her (Enheduanna's) speaking to the Hierodule (Inanna) was exalted.

152 Praise be (to) the devastatrix of the lands, endowed with me's from An,

153 (To) my lady wrapped in beauty, (to) Inanna!

The Goddess and her poet have prevailed. Once exiled, they have been restored to their rightful places and they are both wrapped in the beauty of transcendent feminine energy and power.

Enheduanna's long-forgotten poem--only translated in 1968--foreshadowed her own history and the history of women in religion, literacy, and western civilization for the next 4800 years.

70 They approach the light of day, the light is obscured
about me.

71 The shadows approach the light
it is covered with
of day,
a (sand) storm.

C. In-nin sa-gur-ra

Assyriologists traditionally title works by their first line, hence the title In-nin sa-gur-ra. This work, translated by Ake Sjoberg, and using 29 texts and fragments, was published (1976) as "In-nin-sa-gur-ra: A Hymn to the Goddess Inanna by the en-Priestess Enheduanna." Although, at 274 lines, and the longest work so far discovered by Enheduanna, it exists in a much less complete form than the translation of The Exaltation of Inanna. In all, Sjoberg shows 57 lines missing at important points in the composition. The text breaks off entirely at the point that Enheduanna steps forward: "I am Enheduanna, the en-Priestess of Nanna......, I am the ... Of Nanna" (199). The Sjoberg translation does not begin again until line 243 with Enheduanna still speaking in the first person. When the text resumes, Enheduanna still speaks of her own experience. The translator speculates her punishment may have been sent by Inanna to discipline Enheduanna: "'I have experienced your great punishment'... this statement clearly indicates that Enheduanna had offended the goddess who then had punished her" (163). In a footnote on the same page, he notes that another translation is possible. "'My body has experienced your great
punishment. "...referring to a disease sent against the en-Priestess by Inanna" (163).

In any case, her apparent recovery must have occurred because she ends the hymn praising Inanna: "My Lady. I will proclaim your greatness in all lands and your glory!" (254).

The main theme of the hymn according to Sjoberg is "Inanna’s omnipresent and omnipotent role in human affairs" (163). He criticizes the hymn as containing unnecessary repetition:

49 she turns the midday light into darkness"

177b Turning darkness into light

Sjoberg also explains that "you alone are great" occurs in both lines 182 and 218 and with a variation in line 96. Such a critique is difficult to sustain since as a hymn it would be sung and the echoing lines, it could be argued, might be important in their placement. Sjoberg glosses the literary structure in only a page and three-quarters. Most of that discussion primarily summarizes the contents of the hymn. To critique the hymn for repetition for one-fourth of the section, given the fact that so many lines are missing, seems to me somewhat hasty.

The structure of the hymn is similar to The Exaltation. In lines 1-90 Enhedanna praises Inanna’s power as she speaks in the third person. Here, the author assumes the stance of a distant observer of the goddess and her power: she arranges examples of Inanna’s power to carefully, rhetorically, show her pre-eminence.
She is the august leader among the great gods, she makes the verdicts final.

Her radiance covers the great mountain, silences the road.

The gods of the land are panic stricken by her heavy roar.

Without Inanna the great An has not made a decision, Enlil has not determined the destiny. (179)

Then Enheduanna shows how Inanna's anger becomes reflected in war:

She washes their (?) weapons with blood and gore,.....

Her murderous battle no one can oppose--who rivals her?

(183)

Beginning with line 91 she then speaks to Inanna in the second person addressing her as "you." Again, she notes that Inanna rivals An and Enlil, "You sit on their seat" (187). In each line from 115-172, she repeats the refrain, "are yours, Inanna" carefully detailing Inanna's attributes and her contributions to civilization.

To run, to escape, to quite and to pacify are yours, Inanna. (189)

Information, instruction, inspection, to took closely, to approve are yours, Inanna. (191)

Not until line 219 does Enheduanna step forward in the first person. "I am
Enheduanna, the en-[high] Priestess of Nanna" (199). Here the poem breaks off until line 243 where it begins:

243 Advice (...)
244 Grief, hardship...
245 My Lady,...mercy....compassion....
246 I am yours! It will always be so! May your heart cool off for me,
250 I have experienced your great punishment. (199)

She concludes the hymn:

270 My Lady, Your greatness is manifest,
271 May your heart for my sake 'return to its place'!
272 Your great deeds are unparalleled,
273 Your greatness is always praised,
274 Young woman, Inanna, your praise is sweet!

Although longer than The Exaltation, the rhetorical structure exhibits a close similarity. Hallo believes that "her poetic efforts must have served as a model for much subsequent hymnography" (Exaltation 4). Both works open with an exordium of epithets and descriptions carefully selected to illustrate the characteristics of the goddess. In the Exaltation the opening is 65 lines versus the In-nin sa-gur-ra opening of 90 lines. Both works move from an opening address of Inanna in third person to addressing her in second person. In both hymns there is a section exalting Inanna. In
the Exaltation it occurs in lines 122-135 where each stanza ends with "be it known!" (31-32). In In-nin sa-gur-ra lines 115-172 end with "are yours, Inanna" (189-197).

Since almost the entire section of In-nin sa-gur-ra in which Enheduanna steps forward in first person are missing, twenty-four of the most important lines in the hymn, it cannot be compared to The Exaltation except to say that this section, which is the most personal, contains the reason that Enheduanna speaks to Inanna, why she writes the hymn. It is in this personal section, that Enheduanna seems to explain her motivation and her process. In The Exaltation, she adds her metacommentary that helps to illuminate the meaning of the hymn on a personal, psychological, and universal level. Finally, both works conclude with a doxology to the goddess, once more returning to the theme of exaltation.

D. The Temple Hymns

The Temple Hymns are very different in character from the two works just discussed. Rather than addressing a particular deity, they speak directly to the temples of deities, sacred places. As translated by Ake Sjoberg in collaboration with E. Bergmann, S.J. in 1969, they consist of 42 hymns of various lengths. Each hymn follows the same definite rhetorical structure. The hymn directly addresses the temple in second or third person describing it in epithetical statements. For example the first Temple Hymn opens:

Eunir, which has grown high, (uniting)
heaven and earth.

Foundation of heaven and earth, 'Holy of Holies', Eridu. (17)

Enheduanna concludes each hymn by identifying the temple, naming the city and the god or goddess to whom it is dedicated. The narrative moves from the outside to the inside. In each of the hymns Enheduanna speaks to the holy place describing its significant sacred structure, "you have grown high, binding heaven and earth, fixing the above and the below" (28). She then moves inside to describe the sacred activities "where pure food is eaten" and the holy objects contained within such as the drum or the ovens (17).

At the conclusion of the hymns, Enheduanna steps forward:

The compiler of the tablet (is) Enheduanna

My Lord, that which has been created

(here) no one has created (before). (49)

The Temple Hymns contain several added later by scribes, hymns to temples that did not exist at the time Enheduanna wrote. Thus, her original creation was one that scribes continued to amend in a posthumous collaboration with the author, one who may have become a deity in her own right.

There are two additional works translated by scholar Joan Goodnick Westenholz quoted in their entirety in the appendix, one by Enheduanna that she
apparently wrote on the assumption of the en-ship (office of high priestess) to the moon god Nanna. The second fragmentary work, dedicated to Enheduanna and apparently written by an anonymous scribe, indicates her apotheosis during or immediately after her death, according to Westenholz (539).

She is shining

The en-priestess chosen for the pure "divine offices,"

Enheduanna

may the she bring you your prayer to the abzu.

The one who is worthy for Suen,

my delight/pride... (555)

II. THE RHETORIC OF ASSYRIOLOGY

Assyriology (a term applied to the discipline which studies the ancient history of the near east including Sumer and Akkad) is a relatively young discipline since most of the material the profession works with was not discovered until the late nineteenth century. Sir Wallis Budge, in The Rise and Progress of Assyriology (1925), argues forcefully that Major (later Sir) H.C. Rawlinson was the first to copy and publish translations of the Bihistun Inscription, the great trilingual inscriptions of Darius the Great on the Rock of Bihistun. Rawlinson, according to Budge's account, during the years 1836 and 1837 in "a splendid feat of bravery and athleticism"
scrambled up the rock and copied the inscriptions (vii). Budge explains in his 1925 book that he writes to:

tell the general reader how Rawlinson founded the science of Assyriology, how it was established solely by the Trustees of the British Museum, and to show how the study of it passed from England into Germany and other European countries, and finally into America, where it has taken deep root. (xi)

The extensive collection of cuneiform tablets in the British Museum is among the largest in the world. The dean of American Sumeriologists, Samuel Noah Kramer (1897-1994), wrote in his autobiography, The World of Sumer, a poignant testimony to the size and renown of this collection, he states:

Even more pressing was the urge to translate and edit as many as possible of the British Museum tablets on the transliteration of which I had spent many a London summer. As I now see, carrying out at least part of these compelling tasks has proved to be the breath of life for me, the prolongation of my years, and has enabled me to keep writing at my desk, today, in my eighty-sixth year. (229)

Obviously, the copious materials that make up the museum collections will continue to yield works and discoveries for many years to come. While the scholars working in the field are obviously passionate and dedicated, what they say, how they say it, and to whom they say it, the rhetoric of the field of Assyriology, becomes the inquiry
In this section, I examine the rhetoric of the field of Assyriology as manifested by 1) how the materials of the discipline are conceptualized; 2) how the dominant method of translation is employed and the resulting unconsciousness of underlying methodology and ideology distorts the study of materials; and 3) how meaning is interpreted and who speaks.

Although I will examine the work of Assyriology only in this country, much important scholarship also takes place in England, France, and Germany. Significant scholarship is also being done in Russia and recently Japan.

A. The Conceptualization of Material

1. Text editions

The work of Assyriology assumes mainly three forms: 1) compiling grammars, 2) assembling dictionaries, and 3) issuing text editions. It is this last which represents how language is used and interpreted. The text edition is used as a method to make sense of the numerous tablets upon which a work has been inscribed. The general practice is for scholars to publish for other scholars. This has interesting audience implications that I will discuss in greater detail later. Sumerian, much like Latin in the Middle Ages, became used only as a written script for approximately the last millennia of its use. As mentioned previously there exist an enormous number of
tablets. For example, in a recent book review Piotr Michalowski notes that until quite recently, when a three-volume catalogue was issued, a large unpublished collection of northern tablets in the so-called Sippar Collection of the British Museum existed ("Sumerian" 49). Scholars continue working to merely catalogue tablets long ago excavated, many in the archives from nineteenth-century excavations or purchase collections. There also exist an enormous number of unpublished tablets and fragments in museums in Istanbul, Berlin, Philadelphia, and London (49). In a personal interview, William W. Hallo, mentioned that during the Gulf War there was a brisk black market in artifacts coming out of Iraq.

The extensive existence of scribal schools throughout the history of the ancient world insures that any important work will have numerous copies. For example, Hallo and van Dijk used 50 exemplars to translate The Exaltation. Thus, any text edition must account for many exemplars or representations of the same work by accounting for the numerous tablets which record the same composition. They reconstruct a single composition on the basis of all available evidence proving publication information for all the sources used in the preparation of the text edition. Generally the translator includes hand drawn or photographic reproductions of previously unpublished tablets. Debby Dale Jones explains:

[E]ditors collate these sources, so that text editions record what was actually written on the sources as well as can be verified . . . in the context of the editors’ readings of the reconstructed composition, at
least in part to resolve discrepancies between their reconstructions and what a tablet appears to record. (21-22)

Discrepancies are endemic to the process. "So many aspects of an ancient composition must be guessed at—the gender of the characters, the grammar and conceptual economy of the language, the poetics, the semantic values of words" (131). Because cuneiform characters are multivalent, editors must constantly make decisions as to which reading to give a character.

For example, Hallo and van Dijk in discussing a particularly important line in The Exaltation of Inanna explicate their translation by explaining that Enheduanna has lost both her priestly offices at the cities of Ur and at Uruk which means that she cannot communicate with the gods Nanna or An as a result of the rebellion led by Lugalanne. Lugalanne has turned her functions over to another candidate, perhaps his sister-in-law.

90. Having entered before you as a partner, he has even approached his sister-in-law.

They explain: "that the full import of the crime [l. 90] is difficult to convey in a literal translation, but both verbs [they cite three sources] are used elsewhere in connection with sexual advances to the high priestess or to adultery in general" (57). Then they speculate that the first verb (tab-ku4 var. dab5-ku4) "may be the hitherto unknown equivalent of sutahhu (suta"u), 'to make oneself a companion,' which in omens and other contexts suggests the juxtaposition of two objects in general, and
sexual violation in particular" (57).

B. Sumerian Writing and the Methodology of Translation

The dominant theoretical method of Assyriology appears to be translation. As Jones explains, "it seems appropriate . . . to speak of translation as a primary methodology employed in the preparation of text editions" (23). The implications of translation as the fundamental procedure of Assyriology become significant when translations and text editions give the illusion of transparent reproductions of the original. If not presented that way, translations are quite commonly read that way. For example, Lawrence Venturi perceives that the automatic habits of readers responding to the translation of a foreign text "whether prose or poetry, [is] as if the text had been originally written in their language" (179). In rhetorical historiography, Kathleen Welch critiques the Heritage School (defined as a critical stance that regards classical rhetoric as a series of objective writings) as interpreting the concepts of classical rhetoric "as a series of writings that exist in a more or less objective world of artifacts, knowledge, and retrievable reality" (Contemporary 9). Her primary criticism is that the Heritage School dichotomizes thought and discourse, "severing the interaction of the two . . . in other words the technology of writing . . . did not affect thought" (15). She discusses the ideological underpinnings of such a belief as the belief that there is an objective world "out there," a specifically positivist and unconscious stance. "The writers of the Heritage School have systematically bypassed
translation theory and instead relied on the assumption that a one-to-one correspondence exists between one language and any other language" (12). The result is the simplification and mechanical application of classical concepts. "Sensitivity to the fluidity that necessarily exists within one language and to the semantic problems inevitably raised by translation should be recognized as an underlying premise of classical rhetoric" (12). As an example, she suggests that Aristotle's three "artistic proofs" are better translated as "interior persuaders." Using the concept of key words, Welch argues that fundamental concepts such as "philosophy" or "virtue" need to be explicated for their multilayered meanings in their cultural context and carefully reconceptualized in the target language.

1. The Theory Unconsciousness of Translation

An analysis of the metacommentary of three Assyriologists, Debby Dale Jones, Piotr Michalowski, and William W. Hallo, helps illuminate how the dominant method of translation is used unconsciously without analyzing the underlying conceptions. Because the use of translation has remained largely untheorized in the field of Assyriology, the resulting work, Jones believes, distorts the interpretation of materials.

Jones argues that unexamined methodological biases underlie much of the work of scholars. In her 1993 dissertation, "She Spoke to Them with a Stormy Heart: The Politics of Reading Ancient (or other) Narrative," Jones spends most of
her 290 pages—the most thorough-going, specific critique of the rhetoric of Assyriology I’ve encountered—analyzing the larger theoretical issues of the politics involved in Assyriology’s reading of ancient narrative. Specifically she points to the theory unconsciousness in Assyriology of dealing with texts. The main method of text editing relies on translation which involves at least two languages when a scholar is dealing with Sumerian. Translation inevitably distorts in the ways I elaborated above.

Assyriology is largely theory unconscious because Jones asserts, "the methodological biases and theoretical frames employed within Assyriology are not discussed or even named beyond 'philology'" (19). As a result scholarly translation of Sumerian literature, particularly the common text edition usage of line-by-line philological commentary and correspondence, often misrepresents the work. Jones argues that texts translated by poets, even poets who do not know the language tend to be more accurate in the sense that the original is less distorted. She gives the example of Chinese poetry and Sinology. Sinology, she says, is a field similar to Assyriology in its study of "orientalism." Citing Kenneth Rexroth’s 1961 critique of Sinologists as philologists who don’t see "texts as literature," she agrees that many good "[Sinologist] 'translators'-- Judith Gautier, Klabund, and Ezra Pound did not know the language at the time they made their translations" (75). It can be safely said that expressive and aesthetic qualities, the poetics of Sumerian literature, have not been a priority. They have not been made a conscious part of translation.
Hence, some of the controversy that arose around Diane Wolkstein's presentation of the Inanna cycle.

Piotr Michalowski in a 1980 article, "Carminative Magic," subtitled, "Towards and Understanding of Sumerian Poetics," argued that attempts at formal analysis of Sumerian poetic texts had up until that time been dominated by two tendencies. The first was to analyze structural units and patterns to demonstrate the orality of Sumerian poetry. Scholars were working too much, according to Michalowski, under the influence of the Parry and Lord paradigm of the dichotomy of orality and literacy. The second pattern to which he pointed was a tendency to look primarily at stress and at rhyme (12). Ten years later in his 1990 article, "Presence at the Creation," he pointed out that the interpretation of ancient Mesopotamian texts "is dominated by a strongly anti-theoretical philological tradition that often looks with derision and suspicion at attempts to discuss hermeneutic issues" (381). He expanded on his earlier critique by noting that the predominant mind set of the field remains focused on establishing reliable text editions, dictionaries, and grammars. He suggested that matters of reflection had been postponed until "some mythical time" when another generation of scholars would be able to indulge in what I would term a less prestigious and perhaps therefore "less manly" endeavor such as interpretation. There exists, he said, the basic unrecognized paradox that no text can be approached without matters of interpretation being involved (381).

William W. Hallo, too, in a 1990 article, "The Limits of Skepticism," argued
forcefully the necessity to "hazard hypotheses." Scholars, he found, often refused to connect or interpret. Instead they phrased the questions, but refused to speculate as to possible answers. By "hazarding hypotheses," he felt, they might approximate more accurate knowledge and attempt to read between the lines. "We should not expect to know more than the ancient sources knew, but we can hope to know more than they chose to tell" (189). Thus, every piece of textual evidence must be evaluated not to "limit inferences," but to treat each source as precious and to continually, critically to sift it (199). Thus, Jones, Michalowski, and Hallo each treat the problem--while not explicitly wording the issue as such--of unconsciousness and the necessity of self-reflexiveness. According to which scholar is critiquing, the problem takes different dimensions. For Jones it becomes primarily a problem of the unstated nature (and therefore often unconsciousness) of methodological biases and theoretical frames. Michalowski perceives the problem as one of shaking off the archaic philological tradition that views hermeneutical issues with suspicion despite the fact that all interpretation is involved with such issues. Hallo suggests that the timidity of artificially limiting inferences leads to a reluctance to hazard hypotheses which acts as a brake on the possibilities of scholarship.

C. The Translation of The Exaltation of Inanna by Hallo and van Dijk

The 1968 translation of nin-me-sara, The Exaltation of Inanna (included in appendix A) is an exception to the line-by-line philological translation tradition in
Assyriology. It is the best known of Enheduanna’s works. Another major translation
is underway at the University of Pennsylvania. The 1968 original translation has been
excerpted, adapted, and included in two poetry anthologies. For these reasons I will
treat it in some depth.

In The Exaltation Hallo and van Dijk went to great lengths to consider the
composition as a whole. Both scholars had already worked extensively in field by
1968, and both possessed well-recognized and respected reputations. Their text
edition tried to accomplish several things simultaneously: to render as accurate a
philological translation as possible; to treat the composition as literature; and to place
it in its historical context. In a personal conversation I had with him, Hallo explained
that he had not only attempted to render the poetics of the composition, but the
rhetorical structure. He set up the structure working by analogy to Western poetics in
terms of divisions and headings. The double column translation he devised to echo
the structure of the original and the columns of cuneiform. In this translation the
rhetorical structure appears to have assumed an importance nearly equal to the
poetics.

1. The Rhetorical Structure of The Exaltation of Inanna

Hallo and van Dijk situated the composition within the Sumerian canon as not
only a religious hymn of exaltation to Inanna but also as a political artifact
legitimating Sargon’s rule. Headings and subheadings within the poem key the
rhetorical argument. Hallo and van Dijk explain that they divided the poem into three "rhetorical" parts (45). For example, the hymn begins in the Hallo and van Dijk translation with a 65-line Exordium labeled A. The second major division, beginning with line 66, they label "B. Argument." In this second division Enheduanna steps forward and in first-person recites the personal circumstances of ostracism. She tells of her appeals to the moon-good (Nanna-Suen) and to the supreme god (An). Neither god comes to her rescue. Finally, she appeals to Inanna. In the last major division, "C. Peroration," which extends from line 136 through line 142, Enheduanna begins a personal metacommentary on her own composing process of the hymn and what I have commented on as the intercession of Inanna in her creative process. She concludes this short section with a transition back to addressing Inanna as "you" and speaking of the goddess's anger. Then as the hymn comes to a conclusion she speaks of the simultaneous restoration of herself and Inanna. The final three lines (151 - 153) conclude with what Hallo and van Dijk label as doxology, commonly a short Christian hymn of formula praise to God. Here it becomes the title of Enheduanna's formal closure to her own hymn of praise. Yet, the translators point out: "it has specific overtones beyond the usual platitudes. The divine epithets are again selected with reference to the particular themes of the composition. . . . And the entire stanza conveys the sense of a goddess emerging triumphant from a disputation" (63).

The typology of divine exaltation, Hallo and van Dijk argue in chapter six, is "strikingly parallel" to the "'exaltation of Yahweh' at the Exodus. . . . The Exodus
gains in historical validity . . . by its direct and intimate bearing on the emergence of Israel's God to an unchallenged supremacy in the eyes of his people" (67-8). This comment at the conclusion of the chapter underscores their argument that historical events are often closely related to "theogonic" revolutions (68). In this case they link the exaltation of Inanna that occurs in the poem to the political events of Sargon's reign which tied together Inanna, known primarily as a goddess of fertility in southern Sumeria, with the more warlike Ishtar of northern Akkadian to justify Sargon's assumption power over both north and south. It is in the exaltation section of the poem, from line 123 to 134, that they believe this politico-religious conjunction occurred. They explain:

The comparison of heaven and earth implies at the same time the combination of astral and terrestrial character peculiar to the goddess in later descriptions. Here, in fact is the historical point at which these two contradictory characterizations are first united in the one deity. She owes her astral nature (as the planet Venus) to Ishtar; but her claim to the role of earth goddess is based on her identification, as Inanna with Antum = ki, the terrestrial consort of the Heaven-god. (60-61)

The result is a powerful work of art and a scholarly achievement. However, Hallo and van Dijk have not been without critics.
D. Scholarly Critiques by Assyriologists

In the scholarly community in the area of Assyriology, they have been, for the most part covertly critiqued. This covert, or subtextual critique, takes two forms. The first occurs in Jerrold S. Cooper's 1983 work, The Curse of Agade. A text edition that describes the destruction of Sargon's capital city Agade under his grandson Naram-sin. Unlike Hallo and van Dijk, who do make comments on specific translation problems and who do give an extended literary analysis of the hymn, Cooper's text edition does not comment on his translation strategy. Unlike Hallo and van Dijk, Cooper rejects the assumption that literary documents can be read as literal historical sources. Jones concludes that "The Curse of Agade" can be read as a refutation of the Exaltation of Inanna:

Cooper can be seen to refute the major points of Hallo and van Dijk's argument . . . [from] contesting that a literary composition can be used as a historical source to contesting the legitimization strategy Hallo and van Dijk suggested Sargon used both in terms of the strategy itself and the social situation that is presumed to have given rise to that strategy.

(41-42)

Jones explains, in a long and elaborate analysis, that the fact that there is no mention of any compositions attributed to Sargon's daughter Enheduanna is a significant omission:

The refutation [of Hallo and van Dijk] is done indirectly, without ever
mentioning *The Exaltation of Inanna*. Not only does Cooper never mention Hallo and van Dijk’s text edition in his first chapter review of scholarship, although he does consider other, individually authored studies by these scholars, but he explicitly, although without comment, rejects using the poems attributed to Enheduanna as sources of information about the Agade dynasty. (42)

As a younger scholar, Jones speculates, Cooper may have thought it politically expedient not to directly critique Hallo and van Dijk, but instead allowed his subtext to critique:

> Yet, the explicit discussion of theoretical and methodological concerns is a necessary prerequisite for the development of appropriate theoretical positions. Attempts to conduct such important debates subtextually must necessarily introduce distortions into otherwise fine scholarship. (43)

The second instance of covert criticism takes the form of the reworking the translation into a more popular format in two versions of the poem published in *A Book of Women Poets: From Antiquity to Now*, Aliki and Willis Barnstone, eds. (1992) and *Women Poets of the World*, Joanna Bankier and Deirdre Lashgari, eds. (1983). The first adaptation was done with the help and suggestions of Hallo. In this adaptation the double columns were eliminated and the hymn divided into fifteen
separate poems, each with a heading adapted from the Hallo and van Dijk translation. The translation follows the original quite closely, perhaps clarifying it some, yet loosing, as a result, much of the Sumerian literary antiphonal qualities that made the original translation so interesting.

The second translation in *Women Poets of the World* preserves the double columns and condenses the poem somewhat. The hymn is shortened by eliminating some of the Inanna’s qualities and her relationship to the city of Ebih. Subheadings are eliminated and the hymn is treated as a whole in contrast to the separation into fifteen separate verses in the translation above.

Neither adaptation is superior to the original 1968 translation. Perhaps for purposes of copyright the authors of the anthologies were forced to make the adaptations. As, I noted above, something of the quality of the original is lost in the adaptations.

### III. HOW MEANING IS INTERPRETED AND WHO SPEAKS

When historian Gerda Lerner, an 18th century Americanist, began researching *The Creation of Patriarchy* in the early 1980s, she found unusually rich sources "for the reconstruction of a social history of Mesopotamian society" (7). The problem, she noted, was one that occurs in any history study, that history has been written by men and about men. Events have been selectively recorded. "There is little substantive work on women available, and what there is, is purely descriptive. No
interpretations or generalizations concerning women have as yet been offered by specialists trained in the field" (7). She emphasized that she had the greatest respect for the scholars working in Assyriology. She admired their technical and linguistic abilities, but she continued: "from among their ranks will eventually come a work, which will synthesize and put into proper perspective the largely untold story of women’s changing social, political, and economic status in the third and second millennia B.C." (8). Obviously, there had not been anything approximating such an analysis up to the 1986 date of publication of The Creation of Patriarchy. Lerner’s backhanded compliment to the competence of Assyriologists appears to have been to their technical skill and not to their analytical or critical abilities. How this critique continues to be played out in Assyriology is the subject of the examination of this next section.


I became increasingly disturbed. . . . I had read many texts written for and about goddesses, and had formed some clear impressions of the goddesses of the ancient world. This modern literature on the Goddess was alien to my understanding of the worship of these ancient deities. There was not one Goddess, there were many goddesses; they were not enshrined in a religion of women, but in the official religion of male-
dominated societies. . . . My first reaction was scholarly bemusement: how could people write about goddesses when they couldn’t read any of the ancient literature? This soon passed into a form of territorial protectiveness: goddesses, after all, were my turf: when nonscholars wrote about such matters, not only did they invade my turf, but they excavated with a steam shovel, confusing the issues and making it harder to discern the delicate vestiges of the past. In doing so, they also trivialized and invalidated my area of expertise: if you could discover all you needed to know about the Goddess from inside your soul and your mind, why should anyone study Sumerian and Akkadian? Should not knowledge of the ancient texts be the authoritative ground from which to analyze and critique modern theories about the Goddess? (vii)

In addition to this critique of popular culture from the viewpoint of the academy, Frymer-Kensky details her position as an Assyriologist and her, "natural," initial reaction of protectiveness as one of either/or. Either one takes a scholarly viewpoint or one assumes that knowledge is completely interior which echoes the romantic/expressionist paradigm within a positivist historical tradition. She examines her initial reaction of anger by asking "why wasn’t anyone listening to the scholars? But the anger became directed at myself as I realized that scholars weren’t writing much that was pertinent" (vii). Scholars were talking to other scholars.
Frymer-Kensky describes herself as "an American feminist Jew." She looks at Sumerian literature from a somewhat more feminist viewpoint than her male colleagues. She remarks that although she has never had to overcome prejudice or overt discrimination in the field "by and large, Assyriologists and biblical scholars in America have a considerable feeling of fellowship for each other. If there are deep personal antagonisms and feuds in my fields, I have remained naively and blissfully unaffected by them" (x). She also appears to be blissfully unaware of the taboos surrounding the subject of goddess worship and early matristic civilizations. While she speculates carefully, as a scholar, she does nevertheless broach topics that her male colleagues appear to avoid for the most part. For example, she titles one chapter "The Wisdom of Women: Goddesses and the Arts of Civilization." She also documents the gradual marginalization of the goddess in the polytheistic religions of the ancient world and the eventual disappearance of goddesses in the succeeding monotheistic religions. Her position is one of liberal feminism in that she seeks to broaden the comprehension of monotheism in the established religions of Christianity and particularly Judaism. It is in the concept of the unity of the "one," what she terms "radical monotheism," that "is the primary compelling message as well as the profound essence of . . . religious teaching" (220). Jones critiques her work on the grounds that it is sometimes ahistorical, "she treats gender categories in ancient Mesopotamia as though they were the same as those in the present" (11-2). Nevertheless Frymer-Kensky says that "everyone I have talked to has been supportive
of me," and she adds the qualifying phrase in the extension of that same sentence that this support has existed "even when initially suspicious of the possibility of scholarly work on goddesses" (x). Obviously some topics and approaches are more valuable and "scholarly" than others in the field of Assyriology.

An example of how this plays itself out can be seen in the work of another well-known woman scholar in the field of Assyriology, Joan Goodnick Westernholz. In her 1989 article "Enheduanna, En-Priestess, Hen of Nanna, Spouse of Nanna," Westenholz carefully names and then extricated herself from the controversies around Enheudanna which she delineated as: "whether she was the first to occupy her exalted rank, her relationship to the political policies and philosophies of her father, and the expressions of her private personal relationship with the goddess Inanna" (539). Instead, she cautiously focused on Enheduanna in her public persona, "her role and functions in the cult and rituals of the god Nanna/Suen" (539). She explained in a footnote on the same page that her thesis--Enheudanna was the embodiment of the goddess Ningal, the consort of Nanna--had been previously stated by Thorkild Jacobsen and Hallo and van Dijk. She also carefully notes the one case of dispute (Claus Wilcke). Then, in that same footnote, she thanks Thorkild Jacobsen, Piotr Steinkeller and Marcel Sigrist, all senior scholars, for their criticisms and suggestions of the text. Through the screening sieve of the opinions of well-established scholars in the field, all male, she has carefully outlined and delimited the article to present an assertion of deification that was already generally accepted.
Feminists have not made internal challenges in Assyriology as they have in other areas such as anthropology (di Leonardo, Rosaldo, etc.), or archeology (Gimbutas). The fact that many feminists working with Inanna have not been Assyriologists, or even academics, as Jones says, "has meant that Assyriology has been able internally to discredit feminist interpretations of Inanna and by extension much else of feminist scholarship" (3). The virtually united front presented by Assyriologists reviewing the book produced by the collaboration of Diane Wolkstein and Samuel Noah Kramer is a case in point. Jones found that "for Assyriologists, feminist treatment of the goddess is exemplified in Diane Wolkstein's 1983 collection of Inanna stories entitled Inanna, Queen of Heaven and Earth: Her Stories and Hymns from Sumer" (4). Wolkstein, as an outsider, a storyteller, folklorist and poet by profession, collaborated with Samuel Noah Kramer, one of the preeminent scholars in the field of Sumeriological studies.

Despite her collaboration with Kramer, Wolkstein's adaptations of the Inanna stories were not well received by Assyriologists. Kramer, in his autobiography, says that he was pleased with the outcome of the translation and collaboration. About Wolkstein's part he says:

She arranged, combined and molded their rather raw, literal contents to make them meaningful to the modern reader. On the whole she performed this delicate task with originality, ingenuity, and sensitivity, eliminating clutter repetitions, adding explanatory words and lines when
advisable, restoring broken passages when possible, and skillfully weaving the texts of selected poems into a meaningful whole. She thus succeeded in re-creating a significant group of esoteric tales and songs, long erased from the memory of man, in a form that is imaginative, evocative, and reasonably authentic. (233)

The only thing that displeased him about the book was a chapter entitled "Interpretations of Inanna's Stories and Hymns." Kramer says it was a "hodgepodge of pseudo-metaphysics, Jungian psychology, cabalistic occultism, and sexual symbols, far-fetched midrashic interpretations, and superficial analogies" (233). This chapter, in my paperback copy of the book, is clearly written under Diane Wolkstein's name. In the chapter she explains that she wrote in response to the questions of listeners. "My thoughts are in no way definitive, but rather responses to working with the material" (136). After explaining that she is offering an interpretation, she says: "I had to speak back. I did so, first by trying to take into consideration the Sumerian context for the symbols, both in their literary and cultural aspects, and then by relying on hunch, speculation, and a storyteller's intuition" (137). Wolkstein as a storyteller and folklorist would naturally view the material through different eyes than an established Assyriologist, and yet those are the establishment standards by which she is critiqued.

Jones studied and critiqued five reviews by established scholars of the collection. The critique of all the reviews centered on how Wolkstein interpreted the
stories in her collaborative translation with Kramer. They ranged from mild approbation phrased in the context that at least the book would "help win overdue recognition for Sumerian literature (Hallo 1984; Cooper 1984; Sasson 1984; Civil 1984 in Jones 5). "But Piotr Michalowski accuses Wolkstein of having 'violated the culture that produced the text in which Inanna appears’" (5). Jones discusses this review in detail and cites numerous misogynist passages. She is puzzled that always it is Wolkstein who is critiqued, yet her scholar-collaborator Kramer is never mentioned in any of the reviews. This appears to be a phenomenon similar to what Rey Chow in Writing Diaspora describes as the problem of the "inauthentic native" (2). Chow explains it as a way of projecting orientalism onto the other, a dominant pattern characteristic of current postcolonial discourses. The image of Inanna has been colonized in Assyriology as an interesting artifact of a more "primitive" past from a civilization and culture that are themselves artifacts entombed in a historical process of heritage recovery. Wolkstein by suggesting another interpretation, one that makes Inanna relevant to the modern psyche, threatens the categorization of a finished "artifact" embalmed by common understandings and interpretations in the museum of Assyriological studies.

Jones sees the same issue from the viewpoint of feminist scholarship:

Michalowski, Cooper, and Hallo all use elements of the standard feminist critique of androcentric scholarship—accusations of bias, distortion, sexism -- in their critiques of Wolkstein reinforces the
message conveyed to me by Michalowski’s review, that feminist scholarship cannot expect a fair hearing within Assyriology (10). This harsh summation by a woman working within the field is certainly not unprecedented in the discipline of rhetoric either. For example, Cheryl Glenn in her 1989 dissertation asserts: "women have been systematically and purposefully excluded from the history of rhetoric. My study elucidates the social, religious, political, cultural, and literary ways that women’s voices have been muted--by men" (263). Yet from cuneiform literature, more than seventeen centuries before Sappho and twenty centuries before Plato, Aspasia, and Aristotle, the first known author, a distinctive female voice has comparatively recently been rediscovered. Her works articulate the Other while simultaneously speaking to "other" aspects of literacy and authorship. She gives voice not only to a culturally influenced process of composing, but to how a rhetoric of the sacred other speaks to the internal dynamics of an expansion of consciousness that can function to deepen and amplify the process of invention and composing.

While Assyriologists do have the actual texts: legal, literary, correspondence, administrative, and visual to provide the parameters within which they can interpret, in Rhetoric and composition there exist no texts attributable to the feminine Other in classical rhetoric. Aspasia’s knowledge and teaching are documented in other texts, but her works do not survive. Sappho, a poet, lives in only a few lines. In the next chapter, I turn to the recent work of feminist scholars who are reinterpreting and
revising the historiography of rhetoric. Scholars such as Susan Jarratt, C. Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch, utilizing different feminist theoretical and rhetorical stances consciously and unconsciously, are influencing theories of composing and changing the process of teaching composition.
I. FEMINIST RHETORICAL REVISIONIST HISTORY: THE POLITICS OF RHETORIC AND THE USES OF THE PAST

In rhetoric and composition, unlike the situation in Assyriology, the theoretical and ideological challenges of the "Other," whether that other be politically aligned with the heritage school of history, Marxism, traditional liberalism, or feminist theory has created a lively dialogue and invited perceptual changes. Feminist historiographers such as Susan Jarratt, C. Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch reread the classical history of rhetoric through feminist theoretical revisionary screens. They are illuminating the derivation of the discourse traditionally known as "rhetoric."

The history of rhetoric begins with Tisias and Corax at the headwaters of the originary stream. The stream quickly becomes a river during the Greek classical period with Plato and particularly Aristotle. The Roman era channels the narrative river within an aqueduct of a deeply gendered discipline that Robert Connors defines as "among the most purely 'male' disciplinary systems to come down to us" (65). This river of tradition, inherited through the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and subsequent centuries has remained within a specific twisting channel that, as Connors says, has since classical times "either reflected or defined itself against this earliest theoretical and practical system" (65). But in this century and particularly within the
last twenty years, when more professional and practicing rhetoricians are women than have ever existed, the traditional river way is changing its course, expanding, and even threatening to overflow the gendered banks of tradition.

Rereading the classical history of rhetoric through the revisionary work of Susan Jarratt, C. Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch who write from the critical perspectives of the Other becomes an illuminating experience of the derivation of the discourse traditionally known as "rhetoric." The work of these three scholars has been influential in illustrating the influence of gender on the history of ancient rhetoric and bringing to consciousness the largely unconscious gendering of composition principles based on theories of ancient rhetoric. For example Susan Jarratt's feminist perspective in her recent book, *Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured*, equates the sophists and woman as marginal and historically denigrated. By rereading and refashioning the image of the sophists into new and culturally relevant forms for contemporary rhetoric and a conscious feminism, Jarratt has re-energized an oppositional Other image. The image of the sophists as equated with the feminine Other of an engendered rhetoric challenges and modifies the reception of a traditionally Eurocentered classical rhetorical tradition. As her style has developed, becoming more flexible and poetic, utilizing metaphor and allusion in ways not previously available to her, she illustrates how composition and consciousness interact.
C. Jan Swearingen believes that literacy and rhetoric have been intertwined in a mutually reinforcing tradition that has profoundly influenced Western literacy. She defines rhetoric in this situation as arbitrating the aesthetics of discourse, a role in which it has influenced a particular kind of consciousness as the center of the educational curriculum for two millennia (Rhetoric 13-4). It is Aristotelian discourse, as inherited and interpreted by Western civilization, that Swearingen sees as forming the canons of literacy as "dominant linear-monological-grammatical-logical systems" which marginalize all other discourses. (15) She argues for the inclusion of other ways of knowing, particularly collective knowing and thinking as ways to expand epistemological and linguist subtleties that are invisible to Western culture. Her ultimate aim to reinvision and reinterpret classical rhetoric posits a larger conceptualization of literacy that invites the balancing of the bicameral qualities of the mind.

Kathleen Welch propounds a particularly interesting rereading of classical rhetoric with psychoanalytic implications for composing in her work. She advocates the focus on student texts as the textual center of composition courses and not what she calls "master texts." She explains that empowerment depends upon people finding the relationship between their own ordinary language (interior discourse) and that of "artistic discourse" ("The New Rhetoric" 34). She advocates what she calls rhetorical consciousness, one that stresses the need for an informed understanding of rhetorical theory and how it contributes to consciousness. If the humanities, Welch predicts.
continue to cater to the heritage school of history based on an ideology of master texts, they will assure their continued marginalization and dilettante role in the academy. She argues for the symbiotic relationship between thought and language. Without empowering the inner dialogue, writers cannot speak in their own voices but will continue to follow cultural scripts unconsciously.

Consciously utilizing the guise of the "other," feminist rhetoricians are critically examining received tradition, reinterpreting its acquired meaning, and interrogating historical constructs. With changes in the way the past is perceived, come changes in present reality. Current reinterpretations of history provide clues to the consciousness and culture of the present. Examining the uses of the past as interpreted by feminist rhetorical historiographers in the present illuminates much about the shifts that are occurring in composition pedagogy and rhetorical theory and the increasing influence of the "other" part of consciousness, the right hemisphere of the brain with its intuitive and sensory knowledge.

In this chapter I begin with an overview of the present situation of feminist historiographical scholarship in rhetoric. I then turn to an examination of the recent work of Susan Jarratt, C. Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch as each of these scholars concentrates on classical rhetoric and historiography.

A. Present Feminist Historiography in Rhetoric

of dealing with classical texts that does not deprive them of their "context, fluidity of translation, and epistemology" (84). She cites the work of Ong, Kennedy, Enos, Kinneavy, and Murphy as models to follow, and she critiques Knoblauch and Brannon and the early work of Bizzell and Herzberg in *The Bedford Bibliography* (1987) as coming from a reductivist view that presents classical rhetoric as a series of rules, lists, and dictum.

Since Welch's 1987 article much has happened. The whole area of rhetorical historiography has changed radically not only by the entry of a new generation of younger feminist theorists, including Welch, but by the influence of the critical historiography practices derived from Foucault and Nietzsche as well as post-Marxists such as Gramsci and Althusser. Foucault's historical theory, described by Jarratt as one of "comprehensive and agentless theories of power," involves analysis of the rhetoric of the hegemonic discourse emanating from existing social institutions and the dominant ideologies that support them ("Speaking," 202). Gramsci studies the role of traditional intellectuals as they speak the hegemonic discourse as opposed to "organic" intellectuals as they articulate the emerging discourses of marginalized groups or in their role as specialists speaking for the urban bourgeoisie (185-7).

Carole Blair in her recent article in *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* (1992), "Contested Histories of Rhetoric: The Politics of Preservation, Progress, and Change," argues that rhetorical histories have generally followed two main lines, systems and influence. Both types of history "present radically circumscribed
accounts of past theoretical work" (418). She believes that a concentration on the continuity of "the rhetorical tradition" remains the most pervasive mode of writing. Included in this group of historians are George Kennedy and Richard Leo Enos as well as James J. Murphy's *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*. Systems studies while more pluralistic in contrast to the unifying tendency of influence studies, still operate within a reductionist paradigm. "They mask the diversity they claim to reveal. . . . these histories elaborate no differences within systems" (411). Among rhetorical historians, she mentions particularly the work of Douglas Ehninger and his "elaboration of necessity and progress" (417). Her solution to the inherent problems of traditional "preservative, unitary politics" of influence studies and the "progressive, pluralist stance of systems histories" is critical historiography (417). Critical history as theorized by Nietzsche and Foucault, she says, offers text, particularity, change, and criticism as offsetting methods not only as an antidote to the limitations of these two traditional historical approaches, but as providing other possible views of rhetorical history.

Patricia Bizzell noted in a 1992 *Rhetoric Review* article, "Opportunities for Feminist Research in the History of Rhetoric," that there are three main ways that feminist theory can interact with the traditional historiographical tradition of rhetoric:

1. by redefining rhetoric to include a larger tradition; 2. by critiquing the established historiographical tradition, looking at the gaps and slippages as a resisting reader; and 3. by studying and reviving figures such as Aspasia, lost or marginalized by the
formation of the traditional canon and setting their work in dialogue with the traditional works.

Feminist rhetorical historiography has begun to compile a rich anthology of articles dealing with the situated particularity of women, a study of individual experience within a particular locus and time. Bizzell's 1990 article in a special issue of the *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, "The Praise of Folly," is an excellent example of this kind of writing. In her article Bizzell takes on the male text of Erasmus and shows how the characterization of folly as female still applies to today's women rhetors. Recently the historical figure of Asapia has generated enough interest that her study might be characterized as a cottage industry. Cheryl Glenn and C. Jan Swearingen are among the rhetorical theorists doing studies of her. Their approach, as distinct from Bizzell's, of dealing with the rhetorical construction of a symbolic figure, is one of reconstituting or reconstructing an actual historical rhetorical figure.

Still, there is not total agreement among feminist rhetoricians about how the historiography of rhetoric might be changed as witnessed in the recent Beisecker/Campbell disagreement. In her much reprinted article, "Coming to Terms with Recent Attempts to Write Women into the History of Rhetoric," Barbara Beisecker argued that Campbell's monumental two volume work, *Man Cannot Speak for Her*, is dangerous as an example of female tokenism that nourished the ideology of individualism. First printed in *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, which contained a reply by Campbell in the next issue and a rebuttal by Biesecker, the controversy has
consumed much paper.

As Bizzell says there is much to be done. The discipline of Rhetoric has come much later than other disciplines to benefit from the new viewpoints of critical history and feminist critique. Composition, too, has been slow to utilize feminist principles. Elizabeth Flynn notes in her article "Composing as a Woman," that the first panels at CCCC did not occur until 1988. Even James Berlin rewriting his 1987 landmark article, "Revisionary History: The Dialectical Method" in 1992 for Takis Poulakos's Rethinking the History of Rhetoric, did not see any need to mention the feminist revisionist scholars. Janet Emig and Louise Phelps's eagerly awaited book, Feminine Principles and Women's Experience in American Composition and Rhetoric, has yet to be published. Cheryl Glenn is poised to issue a new book and there are other well-known feminine rhetoricians like Theresa Enos who have books in various stages of production. Flynn (1995) in a recent book review noted that feminist composition has just entered a new phase of development with the publication of book-length studies. She welcomed four recent books: Manly Writing, 1993, Gender and the Journal, 1992; Gender Issues in the Teaching of English, 1992; and Gender Influences: Reading Student Texts, 1993, as the "first extended explorations of composition from a feminist perspective" (201). Composition has lagged even further behind feminist historical revisionist treatments of scholars.

Feminist rhetorical revisionist historiographers Susan Jarratt, Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch--through a screen of feminist theory and critical historiography--
have been influential since 1990 revising the history of ancient rhetoric. They make conscious the largely unconscious gendering of historic rhetorical composition principles. Their re-visions revitalize the "classical" canons and enlarge originary rhetorical theory, one from which to re-theorize composition pedagogy.

The recent attention focused on the sophists by Susan Jarratt is an example of this type of critical history. The feminist perspective of Jarratt's recent book, Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured, and her articles contribute not only a gendered viewpoint, but new provocative perspectives to the recent movement of revisionary rhetorical historiography.

B. Susan Jarratt--The Sophists and Feminism

Susan Jarratt, as she rereads the sophists for what Helene Cixious calls the spaces or silences (that which is not elucidated), reinterprets their oppositional stance in postmodern feminist terms. Over the years as she has worked with the historical construct of the sophists, I see an evolution in her thinking and the ways she has come to characterize rhetoric. Her own composing style has been deeply affected by her sophistical theorizing. When Jarratt equates the sophists and feminists as both marginal and historically denigrated, I see her as challenging the ethos of a patriarchal, monological rhetorical tradition. She displaces this traditional rhetoric with a poststructuralist examination of the historically denigrated sophists detailing how the sophists as myth were constructed historically and then marginalized. Her
that they were paid attests to the value of their services. She speaks of them as the first to teach higher education. Formerly education was an aristocratic enterprise in which a young man apprenticed himself to an older man. The sophists by teaching in groups gave a greater range of citizens the chance to think, discuss and debate the topics important to a democracy. She sees the sophistic method of teaching as distinct from the Platonic. Plato's teaching she characterizes as an expressionistic enterprise dealing only with the individual in a relativistic stance—or, as in current-traditional rhetoric, preoccupied with form. Rather, the ethos of the sophistic teacher for Jarratt is as public intellectual.

However, Jarratt's focus on the sophists as they related to classical rhetoric and equating them with feminine marginalization glosses over the dominance of a Greek patriarchal social order in which they played an important role. Fifth century B.C.E. Greece was a time of the further suppression of women. Jan Swearingen notes that there were women allowed in Plato's academy, but by the time of Aristotle—the next generation—there were no women in the Aristotelian Lyceum. Women were effectively silenced in a culture where speech was the privilege of the male. Even male, non-citizens, as were most of the sophists, were allowed a voice. The fact that Plato's and Aristotle's denigration of the sophists became the accepted historical narrative does not mean that the sophists were silenced in their own time. More information and work of the sophists survives than of Sappho, the main female voice from ancient Greece. The virtual absence of women's voices has left a historical blank, a screen upon which masculine conceptions of femininity and the "other," have been
projected. For example, Page duBois argues that the Freudian myth of the Oedipal theory upon which Freud based the development of his psychoanalysis is a masculine and Victorian characterization of gendering, one projected upon an a historical screen of the past.

While the sophists challenged and lost their version of rhetorical reality to the monological tradition of Aristotle, their challenge was not to the form of the polis. Their advocacy of a relativistic stance was to elaborate viewpoints within a small, elite, citizenry, of like-minded individuals, all property owners. The citizens of Athens are variously estimated to have numbered between 30,000 - 50,000 males. Whether the ahistorical replication of the principles of sophistic dialogue would work in our society, one largely controlled by a media subservient to a very narrow range of political affiliation and capitalist ideology, becomes questionable.

Because composition is taught primarily by women, the ethos of the sophistic public intellectual is difficult if not impossible since these feminine teachers have no voice. Composition teachers, in reality, teach as adjunct faculty without privileges or position or voice, and find themselves always subject to budgets and whims of administration from one fiscal year to the next. While this tenuous position is in some measure similar to the itinerate sophists as teachers, it does not encourage the ethos of public intellectual. Rather the double marginality of being both women and temporary worker facilitates a posture of silence.

Jarratt's conceptual equation of feminism and sophism is one of educating and "empowering" women. Yet characteristic of the feminist movement and sophistic techne, her means to that end are divergent—some
of political affiliation and capitalist ideology, becomes questionable.

Because composition is taught primarily by women, the ethos of the sophistic public intellectual is difficult if not impossible since these feminine teachers have no voice. Composition teachers, in reality, teach as adjunct faculty without privileges or position or voice, and find themselves always subject to budgets and whims of administration from one fiscal year to the next. While this tenuous position is in some measure similar to the itinerate sophists as teachers, it does not encourage the ethos of public intellectual. Rather the double marginality of being both women and temporary worker facilitates a posture of silence.

Jarratt's conceptual equation of feminism and sophism is one of educating and "empowering" women. Yet characteristic of the feminist movement and sophistic techne, her means to that end are divergent—some would argue counter to contemporary mainstream more "pacific" feminist philosophy—and therefore controversial. Jarratt argues that a feminist student-centered pedagogy that encourages individual voices by nurturing those voices is one that encourages mainstream thought with all the inherent inequalities of racism, classism and sexism. A sophistic pedagogy would speak more directly to the multiple forms of power our students represent in the classroom she says. Yet while our students may represent different backgrounds, whether they represent other forms of power can be questioned. Even if they represented other forms of power whether they could articulate those forms of power in the classroom is even more questionable.
However, I read Jarratt’s play with the image of the sophists as a way to reengage with the history of rhetoric. The sophists struggled over questions of representation, history, and authority. Gorgias used the archetypal image of Helen to critique and enlarge the founding myth of the Greeks. He spoke of the power of language to persuade. Jarratt has reread and refashioned the sophist in new and culturally relevant forms for contemporary rhetoric and feminism. She has taken them out of a received historical context, and re-energized the image and mythical oppositional quality of the sophists. By equating them with women, she provides another view of how marginalization occurs and its multiple manifestations.

Working with the concepts of sophism and feminism has caused Jarratt’s own ethos or persona to shift. Earlier in her career, before the advent of feminism in rhetorical theory and pedagogy, she wrote and spoke within the mainstream of rhetorical historiography. In an early Pre/Text article (1987) she wrote of sophistic historiography from a place still situated within an all-male historical tradition. She argued for the use of sophistic historiography as a way to make rhetoric more practical, more useful in the real world—a world still largely gendered male.

I see 1988 as a threshold year for feminism in rhetoric when CCCC's began to add feminist topics to programs. As feminist ideas entered Jarratt’s consciousness, her ethos, reflected by her writing, began to transform. Gradually the theories of feminism came more and more into her work finally to emerge in a Gemini construction with that of the sophists in her book Rereading the Sophists in 1992.
There she reads the sophists largely through the narrative of a feminist screen.

During these past seven years, I've also seen the emergence of a new conceptualization of rhetoric in her writing. The rhetoric she wrote about in 1987 appeared to be gendered masculine. More recently she speaks of rhetoric as being gendered sometimes masculine and sometimes feminine. The growth and fluctuation of her formulation of rhetoric appears to be reflected in her style which has become much looser, more flexible, stronger, and even more poetic. She uses metaphor and allusion more now. In her introduction to the 1992 Rhetoric Society Quarterly special issue on feminism and rhetoric, she exhibited a more strongly present persona in a prose of direct address to the reader. She seemed to play and dance with the words and concepts of feminist criticism with an assurance and grace not available—or at least not exhibited—by the persona who wrote only five years before working within a more strict masculine conception of rhetoric. Partly the change occurred as a result of her additional writing experience, but that alone would not explain the assurance which I attribute to the greater freedom her critique of classical rhetoric gave her through the screen of feminist theory. For Jarratt feminism and an engendered rhetoric are allies that contend with the forces of oppression. Jarratt's image of the sophists challenges and modifies the received classical rhetorical tradition by substituting the tradition of a marginalized group that she reads as recounting a more balanced, gendered, and multifaceted version of rhetorical history.
C. Jan Swearingen—Toward an Inclusive Literacy

--being and not-being have been locked in a dance of death since

Parmenides first named them as a binary opposition rather than as

harmonic complementaries.

---C. Jan Swearingen

In her first major work published to date, Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy and Western Lies (1991), C. Jan Swearingen sets out to reprise history "in order to reform and broaden our understanding of literacy, literature, and language use in contemporary culture both within and outside academia" (vii). Her avowed purpose for writing this ambitious work is to reinterpret the histories of rhetoric and literacy. She concentrates on the period from the Presocratics through Augustine's era. Plato, Cicero, and Augustine she styles from a minority position, one critical of mainstream Western metalinguistics and the uses of literacy which it promotes. She characterizes this mainstream as the "dominant linear-monological-grammatical-logical systems, imparted by those conceptualizations of logic and rhetoric that have come to be known as Aristotelian" (15).

In the final chapter Swearingen jumps forward to the contemporary scene to look at literacy and rhetoric as mutually defining. She sees the dominant "Aristotelian" discourse as forming a binary of oppositeness resulting in rhetoric, irony, and literacy becoming associated with lying. Aristotelian discourse, as interpreted and inherited by Western civilization, formed canons of literacy
marginalizing all other discourses, concepts of self, and ways of knowing with dominant "long-standing models of disputatio and the cult of individual originality" (249). In contrast to this Aristotelian discourse, Swearingen attests that psychoanalytic studies of women and ethnographic studies of other cultures describe ways of knowing and being literate, as collaborative and co-creationist. What emerges in the final chapter is her apparent passion. When she steps forward and speaks in her own more emotional voice, her prose and thought become more flowing. She concludes by quoting Adrienne Rich's question: "How can we connect the process of learning to write well with the student's own reality, and not simply teach her/him to write acceptable lies in standard English?" (252). This is the primary question of literacy. The question is one Swearingen reframes and refines subsequently in her articles following the publication of *Rhetoric and Irony*.

Literacy and rhetoric have been intertwined in a mutually reinforcing, influencing tradition for most of Western history. Rhetoric as the "arbiter of discourse aesthetics" has been at the center of the educational curriculum that disseminated literacy for two millennia. (13-4) This elitist literacy, conducted in Latin, largely excluding women left the vernacular to the uneducated, lower classes, and women. Swearingen argues for a reappraisal of this tradition and broadening of understanding as to what constitutes literacies. She posits that the search for ways of knowing in traditional oral societies, long dismissed as primitive are being investigated by anthropologists and ethnographers "newly sensitive to the possibility
that these ways are rich in epistemological and linguistic subtleties long invisible to Western eyes, and inaudible to ears that have searched for knowledge and language use only in the well-marked packages we have employed for so long" (253).

For Swearingen collective knowing and thinking are basic to the promulgation of new literacies. They exist in contrast to the compartmentalization of thinking and discourse that remain central to the Western tradition and particularly the genre of academic discourse within the academy. This discourse, characterized by detachment, objectivity, and skepticism, has been the hallmark of Western thought. While collective knowing, long existing in other cultural traditions, places high value on "cooperative and reciprocal concepts of truth, meaning, reality, and language" (7). Carol Gilligan documents this epistemology as it is constructed by the women in her study. Decisions are made so that the least hurt occurs. The concept of blind justice is one irrelevant to a social milieu characterized by attachment and affiliation with others. Aristotelian binaries represent a way of thinking, an epistemology that promulgates a rhetorical tradition of detached monological rationality deeply imbedded in the traditions of a male aristocratic class system that educated only the culturally elite.

Literacy arguments, particularly as propounded by both the right, Allan Bloom et. al., and the left, Harold Bloom et. al., Swearingen finds equally manifest, "a scandalous disregard for the epistemologies and voices that students bring with them to academia" ("Bloomsday" 221). She affirms the necessity of theory to acknowledge
praxis and advocates pedagogies that can "both clarify and deepen, that focus and expand" in order to harmonize and affirm "the relations between the best that has been thought and said and the newer voices only recently encouraged by our reading and writing curricula" (223). Thus advocating a middle way, perhaps a more scholarly way, she would tread a difficult course of what she calls the "carefully qualified musings" of Socratic inquiry (218). This advocacy of carefully qualified musings represents a particular kind of academic discourse that for Swearingen includes not only the exchange and exposition of views and ideas, the disciplines of textual analysis and interpretation, but also the articulation of self, a qualified expressionism often denigrated as a feminist mode of language.

The revolt against the excessive rationality of the Western tradition did lead to romanticism which reached its manifestation in expressivism. In her article, "Pistis, Expression, and Belief: Prolegomenon for a Feminist Rhetoric of Motives," Swearingen argues that Kinneavy's treatment of piethe and pistis finds companionable lines of inquiry in recent feminist analysis of gendered elements in thought and language (124). She argues that "the expressive" is often tacitly associated with feminine modes of language and thought. She carefully distinguishes classical pathos from postromantic emotion, but notes that they "bear certain continuities that Kinneavy illuminates in his work. Going beyond Kinneavy she extends these continuities as existing not only in academic approaches to feeling, expression, and belief but also the academy's reception of women (124). She adroitly follows this
argument by noting that there is a double stigma within the academic and scholarly
culture of the past century that denigrates both "that which is studied by women,
along with the study of that which is practiced by women, as of intrinsically lesser
cultural scholarly status" (124-125).

Expressiveness, she ultimately argues, exists as a way of knowing outside the
traditional rhetoric of an inherited classical tradition. It has became encoded as
feminine, weak, passive and nonrational in a way similar to that of persuasion which
has become encoded in rhetoric as seduction. Yet the Christian concept of faith with
its roots in Greek rhetorical pistis (belief) grew out of an earlier rhetorical
conceptualization of a passive audience acted on by a more skilled and knowledgeable
speaker (127). The concept of belief which is intimately tied to expressiveness is one
that when examined bespeaks of a larger tradition.

Although Swearingen notes that expressiveness is often denigrated and
irrevocably tied to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' romantic revolt, I
find it is also deeply imbedded in structuralism with its excessive universalities. She
notes that Kinneavy traces Bergsonian and Nietzschean enthusiasms for emotion into
early existentialism and philosophies of expression and symbolic form that "coincided
with the revival of studies of early matriarchal culture (e.g. Bachofen) and of the
traits of aspects (Neumann) worshipped in the Great Mother" (124). She extends this
observation: "Hesiod, Empedocles, and Parmenides present their teachings within
the frame of having been spoken to or taught by 'the goddess' or the muses. Long
regarded as literary inventions and allegories within classical philology... these frame narratives preserve notions of wisdom and teaching as both feminine and masculine activities, understandings that persisted... throughout the classical period" (129). Oracles and wisdom figures such as Socrates's Diotima were an ancient and well-respected tradition. Swearingen, then, documents many ways that classical rhetorical tradition has been modified and interpreted as "traditional," omitting and forgetting much that existed.

Her scholarly re-reading of aspects of the classical tradition contributes important and provocative material to a larger conception of literacy. In her 1992 article, "Plato's Feminine: Appropriation, Impersonation, and Metaphorical Polemic," her purpose is one of inviting rereading of ancient texts from a number of perspectives. She notes that readings of ancient texts can be dialectical as well as deconstructive "and revisionary without verging too far in the direction of [a] reductive appropriation by modern readers' agendas" (122). While writing is enormously powerful, she argues that readings too can change the world. "Plato's feminine has been deemed an abduction; can it be read as representation--albeit through a glass, darkly--as well?" (122). The positing of this provocative question as part of her agenda to reinvision and reinterpret classical rhetoric opens up the possibility of a larger conceptualization of literacy.
D. Kathleen Welch--A psychological rereading of classical rhetoric

A writer's reality reveals part of her or his construction of reality.

--Kathleen Welch

Kathleen Welch's scholarly interpretation of classical rhetoric is the most overtly psychologically influenced of the three scholars. Welch sees rhetoric as a powerful tool to revitalize learning and the humanities when used as a dialectic between our inner selves and the outer languages surrounding us in a culture immersed and yet illiterate in the symbol systems of a secondary orality. She reads the classical tradition against modern adaptations and finds that much scholarly work either decontextualizes or misreads the classical tradition. She is particularly hard on scholars C.H. Knoblauch and Lil Brannon whose 1984 book, Rhetorical Traditions and the Teaching of Writing, inspired an impassioned critical essay published in the Rhetoric Society Quarterly in the summer of 1986, "A Manifesto: The Art of Rhetoric."

In "A Manifesto" Welch declares, "A writer's reality reveals part of her or his construction of reality" and follows this observation with what she calls a "symptomatic" reading of Knoblauch and Brannon's language. She begins by carefully setting up a three part system of interrogation in which she 1) examines their dictomization of the mechanical and organic; 2) their use of assertions rather than evidence; and 3) their decontextualization of Plato as oppositional to rhetoric (167).
In this early article the tone and themes of her scholarly career thus far—in a very schematic sense—can be found: that most composition is taught by teachers who operate in a theory unconscious world in the sense of pre-theoretical; and that the teaching of composition is primarily a sophistic, technical, rule bound course based on three of the five canons combined with blind adherence to Alexander Bain’s modes of discourse; that classical rhetoric rightly understood as a philosophical dialectic enriches and enlivens composition pedagogy. These themes remain through the rest of the articles and her book I will survey in this section, but they are deepened and expanded by her work with Walter Ong and the concept of secondary orality. Because this appears to be basic to her concept of "rhetorical consciousness" I will analyze her thought and work as it has evolved through her articles and book in a systematic survey by date of publication.

The theme of rhetorical unconscious was again taken up in her article "A Critique of Classical Rhetoric: The Contemporary Appropriation of Ancient Discourse," in the Fall 1987 Rhetoric Review. Here her critique was aimed at rhetoricians she termed members of the Heritage School, Douglas Ehninger; Robert Gorrell, Patricia Bizzell, and Bruce Herzberg whom she accused of the reductivism of classical rhetoric to the five canons and three kinds of speech. "To borrow from Fredric Jameson, we can perhaps claim that the reductivists live with a rhetorical unconscious. Denial, a primary aspect of reductivism, generates formulaic rhetorical criticism" (80). Again, decontextualization comes up as one of her most important
criticisms: "A primary means of decontextualizing is the mistranslation of key words" (80). She cites the usual meaning attributed to *pistis* as proof, but argues that it really means persuasion. She asks whether it wouldn’t be more meaningful to translate the concept of artistic proofs as *interior persuaders* as opposed to inartistic proofs like torture which are external. “The way would then be set for interpreting *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos* with more of the psychological complexity that many scholars believe Aristotle intended (Grimaldi, McKeon, Enos) and that occurs in discourse” (82).

Welch believes that to understand and "interiorize" the complexity of classical rhetoric is basic to a grounded comprehension of contemporary rhetoric. The Greeks were struggling with a shift in consciousness brought on by the dominance of writing replacing that of speaking just as, Welch believes, we are struggling with a culture of secondary orality. Acknowledging the complexity of classical rhetoric, Welch believes, will "lead to more studies grounded in theorizing rather than in two-dimensional finite categorizing” (83). Categorizing for Welch appears to be way of evading the deep thought necessary for consciousness and theory.

The theme of unconsciousness forms the basis of a critique for Welch in another article in 1987. In "Ideology and Freshman Textbook Production: The Place of Theory in Writing Pedagogy," Welch begins her article by saying that of the hundreds of pounds of freshman writing texts produced annually, few actually show any knowledge that composition theory has ever existed. Welch particularly critiques
these books as really presenting unconscious theory (269). Again, she argues, that these texts are based on a "truncated version" of two unacknowledged theories: "a shorthand version of the five canons using only three, invention, arrangement, and style; and the modes of discourse—exposition, description, narration, and argument" (269).

Welch suggests that the discrepancy between composition textbooks and composition theory is based upon an unexamined (and therefore unconscious) ideology that publishers and writing instructors hold in common that can amount to a faith. "Any system of belief can become unconscious and make the objects of the belief appear to be "natural" and "normal" (271). Welch suggests two ways to counter this situation: first, to recognize that writing textbooks are more important to the instructor than to the student; second, to focus on student text production (271). Focusing on student text production discourse, Welch perceives as a way of putting students' lives within a meaningful context. Texts excerpt samples of writing as museum pieces to be studied. "This reverence, the major inheritance of writing instruction from literature instruction, still dominates writing classes and prevents learning language as a medium always filled with possibility" (274). The ideology of "theory-unconscious" current-traditional composition not only encourages rote, but freezes the process of writing as outside of the writer thereby encouraging the belief that texts emerge perfectly.
Welch calls for a freshman writing course that can be "the experimental workplace of the discipline of English, a vital location for the study of the native tongue" (276). She wants to encourage the teaching of language in its multiplicity "with its unique interactive capacity" (274). Further, Welch argues that by enabling the student to discover and use the "available means of persuasion (i.e., creating belief and understanding the structures that constitute the means of persuasion) . . . to move away from Aristotle and over to Burke" will enable experience of how language forms consciousness. Implicit in this argument is that part of gaining consciousness is to participate in the dialectical process of a philosophical rhetoric as opposed to technical prescriptive coding. By placing students' texts at the center of the course and by dealing with whole papers and responses to peer writing, focus is on discourse rather than words and sentences. "Rules for dominant-culture English can be relegated to a pamphlet that not only instructs students in the conventions of this dialect but that explains the implications of power, authority, and social mobility that go with mastery of this dialect" (279). Finally, Welch calls for the kind of holistic writing and teaching that "would be a fulfillment of Plato's conception in Phaedrus: language use that partakes of the "soul" and is organic" (279).

Again, a year later Welch returned to her theme of theory unconsciousness in her article "The Platonic Paradox: Plato's Rhetoric in Contemporary Rhetoric and Composition Studies." She expanded on her belief that the truncated canon used in current-traditional composition was a misunderstanding and simplification of classical
rhetoric and particularly Plato. "An analysis of the results of eliminating two of the classical canons can reveal some of the unconscious uses of language theory....If memory and delivery are ignored, we have effectively ignored much of the contribution Plato made to rhetoric" (5). In this article she explained that the manner in which we historicize Plato is how we historicize ourselves and recursively expanded upon the psychological part of rhetoric by adopting as one of her major tenets that the mutuality of orality and literacy as manifested in Plato was indicative of the significance of powerful language and consciousness changes in his time and our own. Memory. Welch argued is central to discourse. "Moreover, memory does not decrease in importance with the rise of writing dominance, but it changes emphasis, particularly in the formation of consciousness as it relates to technology" (Ong. 1982. 78-116; Welch 7). She quotes David Kaufer’s discussion of how Plato connected rhetoric and psychology. Kaufer found a systematic connection between rhetoric and psychology in the Dialogues in that Plato argued that a way of words affects the soul for good or evil. Welch notes that Plato’s use of rhetoric was deeply psychological because contrary to public rhetoric which was to a largely passive audience. Plato’s individual, dialectical version in the dialogues between two people and an interacting reader is based on an intimate (soul connected) psychological interaction of speaker or writer with listener or reader.

Welch makes one of her most interesting connections between classical rhetoric and contemporary theory. "A major reason for the similarly intense study of
rhetorical theory in ancient Greece and in contemporary America derives from shifts in consciousness—the movement from orality to literacy—set in motion by radical change in the fifth canon (delivery). It is Ong who appears to be a major figure in Welch's own consciousness. His research and theories are constantly cited. She cites Ong's *Orality and Literacy* when she states: "The technology of languages shapes the unconscious and the conscious mind," and she says that it is Ong who connects the "technological struggle of Plato's time with the technological struggle we experience now with electronic media" (14).

The issue. Welch believes, is how consciousness is shaped by the encoding of the method of delivery, the fifth canon. She complains that most contemporary studies of classical rhetoric have neglected psychology. "Psychology, particularly in its relationship to consciousness and language, is an area that most studies of classical rhetoric have ignored. This inattention has led... to a denial of the power we derive from technologically-induced shifts in consciousness" (14). Thus, she advocates a wide-ranging theory of discourse redefining rhetoric as an activity that analyzes the power of the mind to gain meaning from the world to and to share that meaning (15). Like Plato, who advocated a rhetoric of the soul, Welch concludes by advocating a rhetoric that engages whole human beings. This, then comes to form the basis of her advocacy of rhetoric as a powerful psychology.

In 1990 Welch continued to expand on her theme of rhetoric and consciousness. In "Electrifying Classical Rhetoric: Ancient Media, Modern
Technology, and Contemporary Composition.” she explained that modern secondary orality, which is largely electronic, is a cumulative "communication-consciousness form" (23). Here she explores the topic of consciousness and literacy in an extended argument that the humanities have become useless and marginalized because they have allowed the vitality of a rhetorical dialectic of analysis and production of discourse to become just another consumer durable. (37) "Lodged as we are one-hundred years into secondary orality . . . we are in a position to reinterpret . . . in ways that take into consideration radical changes in communication (including interior discourse, or the part of thinking that is in one's primary language or languages)" (24). In an acute observation she notes that the academy has been remarkably resistant to visual texts and that these "newer symbol systems" which are marginalized. Her proof for this is that the "newer discourse technologies" are not integrated into general education requirements (25). As a result there is a clear class system of texts:

Great-Book texts are the aristocrats; some best-seller titles (for example, the books of James Michener) and European art films (the films for instance of Ingmar Bergman), contribute to the large middle class of texts; and television and 'popular' films comprise the proletarian class. The underclass exists in student writing. (25)

She points to the futility of the banking methodology of education inherent in the heritage school and current-traditional rhetoric. The dangerous potentiality of writing becomes neutered in this paradigm by constructing writing classes as passive reading
and imitating classes. Working with student produced texts, texts that have not nor may never, reach the perfection of published examples "requires developing alternative sensibilities. It requires looking at tentativeness, messy lines, and blips of invention that appear to go nowhere" (29). It is, also, allowing order to emerge rather than imposing order, and accepting the realization that order may not emerge.

As one of her major article headings, Welch writes, "The New Rhetoric is the Old Rhetoric." She argues that because rhetoric studies form, it has enormous potential to make people aware of systems based on "reality," that feel "normal" or "natural" (31). Such an enterprise, Welch feels, leads to a rhetorical consciousness. Rhetorical consciousness is vital given a society dominated by what she calls the "consciousness industry" which has assumed so much power that the fifth canon, Welch rightly maintains, has become the most powerful of the five canons. Conversely, it is also the most ignored by writing instructors and institutions (31). Thus, for Welch, as the nineties began, she called our awareness to the fact that to remain unconscious of the media and secondary orality is to be illiterate with the result that "the humanities are given tacit moral superiority in exchange for being relatively useless" (32).

Crucial to her argument is that interior discourse, which constitutes a part of thinking, is ignored by a humanities that focuses on the artifacts of literacy, the "master texts" (33). Interior discourse, she argues, must be recognized in order that "extraordinary uses (artistic or literary discourse) be understood" (33). Empowerment
partly depends on people recognizing the relationship between their own ordinary language—including interior discourse—and that of artistic discourse. Connecting a student’s interior discourse—something that is lived and felt—to a class essay or to a play by Shakespeare acts as an effective means of empowering students" (34). She emphasizes "the importance of the subjectivity of thinking rather than the objectivity of texts" (34).

Undoubtedly she was working on her book published in 1990, as she wrote the articles I’ve just discussed. Many are outgrowths of or became part of The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse. Her purpose, she stated in the preface, was to examine the ways that classical rhetoric had been studied since 1965 and to suggest ways that it might be most usefully appropriated (vii). Her purpose, she emphasizes, is not to write a chronological history, but rather to contribute to the "lively critical conversation that exists now in rhetoric and composition studies" (vii). She has contributed to that conversation in a fundamental way stressing the need for an informed (conscious) understanding of rhetorical theory and how it contributes to composition. For Welch, "the teaching of writing and some of its assumptions are a central concern of the book" (vii). Continued rhetorical unconsciousness will result in the abandonment of one of the most powerful discourse systems ever devised to study texts and their contexts as well as the production of discourse. The result of continued unconsciousness, in the humanities, she argues, will be the continuation of their marginalized,
decontextualized, and dilettante role of catering to the heritage school of history with its ideology of elitism.

Two years later, in 1992, in "The Commodification of Classical Rhetoric and Composition," Welch elaborated her argument of consciousness and unconsciousness tracing what she calls the symbiotic relationship between thought and language from Isocrates' idea of wisdom as "intelligent, effective inner speech... with oneself" to Frank D'Angelo's strategy from depth psychology for a dialectic with oneself (94). She advocates experimenting with different rhetorical stances through theoretical readings informed by theories such as rhetorical, deconstructionist, new historicist, feminist, New Critical, and unconscious/postivist (94). She posits the importance of self deliberation to enact perceptual change and concludes: "classical rhetoric and composition studies can empower logos (in the sense of both outer language and inner language) in all of us" (97).

II. REVISIONARY FEMINIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

Rereading the classical history of rhetoric through the revisionary work of Jarratt, Swearingen, and Welch as they write from various critical perspectives of Other, provides a deeper comprehension of the traditional derivation of the discourse known as "rhetoric." Their reinterpretation has been influential in illustrating the influence of gender on the history of ancient rhetoric. They bring to consciousness the largely unconscious gendering of composition principles based on theories of
ancient rhetoric. For example Susan Jarratt's feminist perspective in her recent book, *Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured*, equates the sophists and women as marginal and historically denigrated. By rereading and refashioning the image of the sophists into new and culturally relevant forms for contemporary rhetoric and a conscious feminism, Jarratt has re-energized an oppositional Other image. The image of the sophists equated with the feminist Other, of an Other engendered rhetoric, challenges and modifies the received classical rhetoric of tradition opening the way to a bicameral balance of a multifaceted version of theory useful to the development of composition and consciousness. Jarratt's development of her own style—which has become more flexible and poetic, utilizing metaphor and allusion in ways not previously available to her—illustrates how composition and consciousness can interact.

C. Jan Swearingen believes that literacy and rhetoric have been intertwined in a way not only mutually reinforcing, but influential upon tradition for most of Western history. She defines rhetoric in this situation as arbitrating the aesthetics of discourse, a role in which it has influenced a particular kind of consciousness as the center of the educational curriculum for two millennia (*Rhetoric* 13-14). It is Aristotelian discourse, as inherited and interpreted by Western civilization, that Swearingen sees as forming the canons of literacy as "dominant linear-monological-grammatical-logical systems" which marginalizing other discourses (15). She argues for the inclusion of other ways of knowing, particularly collective knowing and
thinking as ways to expand epistemological and linguistic subtleties that are invisible to Western culture. Her ultimate aim to reinvision and reinterpret classical rhetoric posits a larger conceptualization of literacy that invites the balancing of bicameral qualities of the mind.

Kathleen Welch propounds a particularly interesting rereading of classical rhetoric with psychanalytic implications for composing in her work. She advocates the focus on student texts as the textual center of composition courses and not what she calls "the master texts." She explains that empowerment depends upon people finding the relationship between their own ordinary language (interior discourse) and that of "artistic discourse" ("The New Rhetoric" 34). She advocates what she calls rhetorical consciousness, one that stresses the need for an informed (conscious) understanding of rhetorical theory and how it contributes to consciousness. If the humanities, Welch predicts, continue to cater to the heritage school of history based on an ideology of elite master texts, they will assure their continued marginalization and dilettante role in the academy. She argues for the symbiotic relationship between thought and language. Without empowering the inner dialogue, writers cannot speak in their own voices but continue to follow rote cultural scripts unconsciously.

Tracing what Welch calls the symbiotic relationship between thought and language from Isocrates' idea of wisdom as "intelligent, effective inner speech . . . with oneself" to Frank D 'Angelo's strategy from depth psychology of a "dialectic with oneself" (94). She advocates experimenting with different rhetorical stances
through theoretical readings informed by theories such as deconstructionism, new historicism, feminism, New Criticism, and unconscious/positivism (94). She posits the importance of self deliberation to enact perceptual change and concludes: "classical rhetoric and composition studies can empower logos (the sense of both outer language and inner language) in all of us" (97).

In a similar way that the three scholars, Jarratt, Swearingen, and Welch, draw upon and reinterpret the classical tradition of rhetoric to enrich composition theory, modern feminist psychoanalysts Sylvia Perera and Marion Woodman utilize myths of the feminine Other from a much earlier heritage in cultural tradition, one Enheduanna represents, as a way to study the unconscious and its manifestations in everyday life.
Chapter Four

FEMINIST PSYCHOANALYSIS AND COMPOSITION

Bringing the inner and outer worlds into harmony is
living one's destiny.

--Marion Woodman

Psychoanalysis—as a theory and practice rooted in gender difference and self-consciousness—helps composition theory speak to aspects of consciousness beyond the cognitive. Page DuBois has called psychoanalysis "one of the most valuable instruments we have for describing the processes of the mind, sexuality, gendering, the production of the unconscious, and the historically specific metaphysical binarism that determines our hierarchical logic" (8). The tropes of psychotherapy can engage the mind and the composing process in a dialectical dialogue toward a more inclusive discourse that includes the body and both hemispheres of the bicameral mind, the cognitive left brain as well as the right (minor, intuitive and Other) hemisphere. In the following chapter, I analyze the theories of two feminist psychotherapists who work with various images of the feminine, ancient and contemporary, personal and archetypal, as they appear in their own and the women with whom they work. I argue that the ancient rhetoric of Enheduanna may offer an alternative, broadened view of literacy beyond academic and professional discourse. Taken together the writings of Enheduanna and the theories of Woodman and Perera foster the possibility for expanding ancient rhetorical concepts in a modern compositional context.
Gender difference and the concomitant representations of the Other on a concrete social level involve aspects of consciousness. In psychology recognition of the feminine component of women and men in the relatively new discipline of psychotherapy began with the theorizing of Freud influenced by his friend Fliess around the turn of the century. Freud's discovery of the subconscious and subsequent development of psychotherapy, one of the great contributions to knowledge, created a new field of scientific inquiry. He profoundly influenced modern culture redefining and altering concepts of what it is to be human. Jung, extending Freud's theories, posited that women and men both possess qualities of masculine (animus) and feminine (anima) in their unconscious, an insight subsequently confirmed biologically by the discoveries of x and y chromosomes. He studied and theorized a great deal about his own anima. For Jung, the recognition by men of this female quality of their own anima (feminine aspect) was necessary to overall mental stability and growth just as was recognition by women of their internal animus. He did not theorize the animus [masculinity in women] as thoroughly as he did the anima, deliberately leaving it to female analysts such as Esther Harding, Emma Jung, and Marie-Louise von Franz to investigate.

Partly because of Jung's relatively recent death in 1961, the charisma of his personality, and the prolific nature of his oeuvre, there has yet to be as much interpretation and reevaluation of his theories as those of Freud, who died in 1939. As Angelika Maeser Lemieux notes, "Jung was engaged in the difficult task of
formulating a theory that would bridge the seemingly disparate domains of matter and mind, of nature and psyche" (32).

Because he probed beyond the physical, visual, and clinically apparent appearances of the psyche, Jungian theory has come to be regarded among many rhetorical and composition theorists as essentialist in an age of post-structuralism. In a period when one of the most devastating criticisms leveled at a theorist is that of essentialism or foundationalism, Jungian theory seems to be deeply contaminated. Yet James and Tita Baumlin argue that Jung's model of the mind complements Freudian, Lacanian and Kirstevan theory: "Jung's \textit{conjunctio oppositorum} looks beyond the tragic fragmentation of a forever-divided self to the possibility of individuation, that wedding or healthful relation between ego and those archetypes which comprise the Self" (258). Unlike Freud, Jung did not hypothesize the disturbances of the psyche as evidence of pathology. Jung did not believe in a "cure" so much as enabling the growth of consciousness to take place in the individual.

"The aim of individuation is nothing less than to divest the self of the false wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and of the suggestive power of primordial images on the other" (123). In the end Jung's theories may come to have as much influence on writing and composition theory as currently fashionable Freudian interpretations of literary theory.

After graduating from medical school in 1900, Jung began some experiments with language that influenced not only the course of his life and work but the history
Experimenting with word association tests, he found that as subjects tired, they ceased to associate words with the objects they referred to, and began to free associate by sound. He surmised the existence of an unconscious relationship between sound and image, one that directly links phonetics with the imagination. On a "deep" level, Jung found that the unconscious links meaning with phonetically related sounds. Paul Kugler explains: "the movement from conscious to unconscious is marked by a shift in the linguistic mode from an ego emphasis on the meaning-concept to an unconscious insistence on sound and image" (99). Kugler goes on to elaborate that the unconscious meaning of phonetic relationship is not "through latent sexuality (Freud), or the grammar of discourse (Lacan), or common origin (Thassen-Thienemann), but through the underlying archetypal image: the syntax of the imagination" (116). Investigating word-sound associations led Jung to discover the psyche and archetypes forming the basis of much of his subsequent theorizing. Archetypal theory is based on the premise that humans no less than animals possess instincts, fears, and desires that manifest on the personal level in dreams and fantasies and on the cultural level as myths and images. As Christine Downing explains, Freud and Jung "have taught us how deeply our thoughts, feelings, and modes of response are informed by mythic prototypes of which we have no conscious recognition" (23).

Psychoanalysis has become a particularly powerful modern rhetorical tool of consciousness. In practice it becomes a form of discourse analysis that sifts through the screening rationality to the deeper levels of the psyche. As the Baumlins’
characterize it: "psychoanalysis has become literally the study of a patient's rhetoric, an explication of one's defensive tropes and schemes" (246).

Recent intriguing work by feminist Jungian psychoanalysts examining the images of woman/Other in text, myth, art, psychology, anthropology, history, and religion holds promise for composition theory. These analysts, working directly with the manifestation of archetypal and dream images in their own personal psyches and that of their women analysands as they explore the psyche not only to heal but to discover some of the deeper possibilities of being. Some interesting, broadranging theoretical and practical applications have begun to emerge that may contribute a great deal to composition studies, and particularly toward a critique of academic and professional discourse. The work of analysts Marion Woodman and Sylvia Perera provide a good example.

Despite the fact that her books are written on a highly intellectual level--Woodman speaks with the vocabulary of both Jungian psychoanalysis and canonical literature--Marion Woodman, a high school English teacher for 24-years, has become a strong emerging voice in popular culture. Her five books have sold more than 200,000 copies worldwide with fifteen editions in seven languages. Obviously, she speaks powerfully through her writing, but she is also a popular lecturer and workshop leader.

Psychoanalyst Sylvia Perera's work invokes a particularly ancient figure of the divine, the image of Inanna, the goddess to whom Enheduanna sings. She utilizes the
myth of Inanna's descent, one of the oldest stories of human history, as a psychological and spiritual quest that most women must make. It is an inner quest necessary to becoming whole, one she sees as reclaiming the power, passion, and expression of the feminine dormant for the past 4,000 years.

Marion Woodman's use of journaling, dance, body therapy, and ethnographic case study, and Silvia Perera's use of the myth of Inanna illustrate the possibility of a more comprehensive way to view literacy. This literacy, which I explore in Chapter 4, a literacy grounded in the ancient rhetorical works of Enheduanna and the feminine divine as a metaphoric Other moves toward an enlarged conception of rhetoric as recursive consciousness: rhetoric as a mind-body, conscious-unconscious inquiry that allows for an enlarged conceptual creation of knowledge and communicating that knowledge. In this chapter I begin with an examination of how Marion Woodman's work has developed and some of the circumstances that have led to the growth of her thought. As one of the foremost spokespersons of the emerging consciousness of this age, what does she say that might be important to rhetoric and composition? I then examine how Sylvia Perera's rhetoric in *The Descent to the Goddess* illuminates some of the underlying genderedness of academic discourse as its taught in first year composition courses and as it exists as academic and professional discourse.

I. MARION WOODMAN

Woodman's work offers the base for a discourse of self-reflection as a way
that encompasses the Other. She is deeply preoccupied with the problem of unconsciousness. An unconscious that I understand to be one of lack of self-awareness. She said in the introduction to *Conscious Femininity: Interviews*, "I am increasingly sobered by the depths of unconsciousness to be overcome and the kind of inner strength necessary to prevail. Is it not inconceivable that in 1992 we tenaciously hold on to an order of society that is in reality enacting its own extinction?" (9). She believes that her own and the collective journey is one of coming to the consciousness of who we are and how we might encompass that within our selves. As she said in *The Pregnant Virgin*, "bringing the inner and outer worlds into harmony is living one's destiny" (188).

Her views are widely disseminated in five books published over the last 16 years. Her published works and interviews show how her thinking has evolved as her composing style has changed since her first published work. Her first book, *The Owl was a Baker's Daughter*, (1980) evolved out of her second dissertation for the Jungian Institute of Zurich. The original dissertation had been on Emily Dickinson and light, but after finishing the first dissertation, she heard a voice in a dream that said, "'Now you can start your thesis.'" She explained: "because I still had not dealt with my own shadow:" she wrote, "I took that dream very seriously, and wrote another thesis on binging and anorexia" (*Interviews* 115). She was one of the first Jungian analysts to deal with eating disorders. Despite that, *Owl* was, in many ways, a product of the patriarchy internalized as a result of her education and profession as a teacher and
probably her training as a psychoanalyst at the Jungian Institute. In a 1992 interview, Woodman reflected back on her first book and explained that it was "just the tip of the iceberg compared to what I know about it [anorexia, bulimia, and addiction] now" (115). The evolution of her writing through four more books to her last book, Leaving My Father's House (1992) represents her growth from the relatively detached scientific voice of Owl with its literary illusions and persona of "author(ity)" to the polyvocality of Leaving. Leaving is composed by the voices of three women interwoven with the mythological fairy tale, related by Woodman, of the golden-haired Alleirauh. In this last book, she uses the voices and ethos of the three women, analysands—all of whom she has worked with off and on for several years. Embedded in Leaving are selected journal entries, dialogues, poetry, quotations, dreams, and descriptions of the everyday occurrences as well as the singular circumstances in their lives that tell the dramatic story of their individual growth into what Woodman calls feminine consciousness.

Woodman's work, from its earliest beginnings, has centered on bringing, what she terms, the feminine to consciousness. For her, it involves an effort of the deepest self-reflexivity, one of invoking and identifying with the Other while at the same time recognizing and removing the unconscious personal projections of the interior Other onto the exterior other. Essential to this process is her work to bring words to the body and to articulate feelings. In their individual narratives, each of the co-authors in Leaving My Father's House learned to listen to the language of their bodies and to
articulate the unconsciousness as it manifested in dreams, images, and signs.

A. The Rhetorical Principles of Marion Woodman

Extrapolating from her writings, interviews, and her self-reflective comments on her personal composing process, I read her rhetoric as a conceptual framework influenced by Aristotelian polarities. Her dichotomy is in terms of the conscious the unconscious. For Woodman the unconscious is that which has yet to be made conscious. A large component of the unconscious is femininity in both men and women, a femininity which Woodman perceives as not bound by gender. She explains in her recent book, Leaving my Father’s House:

We all function with these two different energies. As health and growth depend on both dark and light, so maturity depends on an inner balance between Yin and Yang, Shakti and Shiva, Being and Doing. I prefer to call these energies femininity and masculinity because their biological images appear in dreams and their interaction or lack of interaction reveals harmony or chaos in the psyche. For me these words are not gender-bound. (2)

One of her basic concepts is Conscious Femininity, also the title of a 1993 book of interviews and articles. In Leaving she explains that conscious femininity has to do with bringing the wisdom of nature to consciousness. She perceives that the turmoil of culture world-wide is part of an evolutionary process occurring on the planet, one
of bringing light and consciousness to that which has been unconscious. "For centuries, men have projected their inner image of femininity, raising it to a consciousness that left women who accepted the projection separated from their own reality" (1). In *Conscious Femininity*, she defines the evolution as one of an initiation into puberty:

> People are no longer willing to live by thou-shalt-nots. We are coming into something completely new: a new femininity balanced by new masculinity. The Goddess is coming to light. She is coming through the earth and through our physical bodies, but we have to relate to her with our own individual consciousness. Otherwise we could be sucked back into unconscious matriarchy. (19)

Speaking in mythological terms, she assumes the prehistoric existence, once, of at least what I call a mental matriarchy, one she characterizes as a time of undifferentiated consciousness. As part of the movement up the evolutionary spiral, Woodman explains that the myth of the hero fighting the dragon of matriarchal unconsciousness became the next stage of consciousness, the patriarchy. She believes we are moving beyond these dichotomies, slowly, painfully, into a full individuated consciousness as the next stage of evolution. Whether such a mental matriarchy ever existed or not, I find problematic. However, what I perceive as the development of the *corpus callosum* of the bicaleral mind—that third part of the brain involving interhemispheric communication responsible for associative and creative leaps and
physical and mental well-being—may be similar to Woodman's concept of individuated consciousness.

Woodman believes that not to recognize the creativity of the unconscious nor to acknowledge the slow struggle necessary to bring aspects of the contents of the unconscious up into consciousness has become a matter of life and death, both for the planet and for the individual. The process is one represented by the metaphor of a spiral.

B. The Rhetoric of Woodman's Composing Process--The Spiral

Implicit in Marion Woodman's composing process is what I term a rhetoric of the Other characterized by "feminine consciousness", one that both reflects and elaborates the process of Enheduanna. Enheduanna's composing process, discussed in Chapter one, is one of creative in-spiriting and collaboration, so too is Woodman's process. Woodman's image of the spiral as the metaphor for her process of composing speaks to an ever-deepening reality of consciousness as the process of being continually experienced in fantasies, night-dreaming, and everyday life. This consciousness seems to grow in a natural cyclical time which Western society's emphasis on the linearity of growth, time, and achievement has obviated. In The Pregnant Virgin Woodman explains that we have forgotten the cyclical pattern of death and rebirth: "so that when we experience ourselves dying, or dream that we are, we fear annihilation" (17). It hasn't always been this way nor is it this way in all
societies. She asserts that some third-world societies are close enough to the natural cycles of their lives "to provide the containers through which the members of the tribe can experience death and rebirth as they pass through the difficult transitions" (17).

So too in the Sumerian society of Enheduanna, her work speaks to the eternal in self and society. In the *Temple Hymns* she compiled and composed works to the gods and goddess in both their eternal aspect and their manifestation in the material world within their temples. Her own story of ostracism in *The Exaltation*, and of passing through a sickness in *In-nin sa-gura*, are narratives of transitions in her own life and experiencing death and rebirth more as a spiral than a dichotomy. Woodman also perceives the spiral as a metaphor applicable to awareness.

In her analytical practice she has found that individuals tend to repeat the pattern of their birth experience as they are forced or voluntarily experience a new level of awareness:

As they entered the world, so they continue too re-enter at each new spiral of growth. If, for example, their birth was straightforward, they tend to handle passovers with courage and natural trust. If their birth was difficult, they become extremely fearful, manifest symptoms of suffocating, become claustrophobic (physically and psychically). If they were premature, they tend to be always a little ahead of themselves. If they were held back, the rebirth process may be very slow. If they were breech-birth, they tend to go through life "ass-
If they were born by Caesarian section, they may avoid confrontations. If their mother was heavily drugged, they may come up to the point of passover with lots of energy, then suddenly, for no apparent reason, stop, or move into a regression, and wait for someone else to do something. (23)

As they become progressively more aware of this process with each occurrence, then, with each repetition of circumstances and reaction, they slowly move up the spiral of consciousness. The spiral, then, is a deeply embedded metaphor within her composing consciousness, one that she also uses as a device to tell her own story. For example, in the last chapter of The Pregnant Virgin she begins the story of her near-death experience in India by explaining: "This is the story of passing through a birth canal, dying and being born again" (175). She began her journey propelled by the innocuous experience of being unable to hail a cab:

One cold winter night I was alone in Toronto. I needed a cab. I put out my arm but the cabbies didn’t stop. I was not forthright enough. I had allowed myself to become so dependent on my husband that I could not hail a taxi. "This is preposterous," I thought. "Here I am an adult woman, and I am helpless when I’m alone." I walked through the snow to where I was going that night, and on the way I realized that the "nasty upsets" had produced volcanic muttering. I knew I had to find out who I was when all my support systems were taken away. I
knew I would buy a ticket to India and I hoped I might encounter God in an ashram in Pondicherry (176).

She did not encounter God, "He turned out to be She in India, a She that I never imagined existed in the narrow confines of my Protestant Christian tradition" (176).

Woodman almost died in India of dysentery and culture shock. She interprets her near-death experience as a revelation about her own absence from her body. It can be argued that India as the place of the Other (cultural, sacred, and racial) overwhelmed her almost to the point close to death. Certainly this physical and mental contact with the Other eventually led to a complete change of her consciousness. The experienced did lead her to a year of psychoanalysis in England with A.E. Bennett. Several years later, after a second near-death experience, she ended up in Zurich training as a Jungian psychoanalyst.

Recently at a workshop in Phoenix (2/96) she shared with the audience of over one-hundred people her recent battle with cancer and a third near-death experience. Again, this experience led her back to the wisdom of the body. For Woodman the personal manifestation of the binary Other occurs as the split between mind and body. Healing occurs as a spiral of increasing comprehension between the two.

The metaphor of a spiral encompassing the Other is one Woodman advocates as a strategy of reading as well as providing the example in her writing. For example, in *The Ravaged Bridegroom* she explains that the book focuses on evolving masculinity and femininity "as two energies within each individual, both striving
toward an inner harmony" (9). Yet, she argues "so long as these energies are
projected onto others, we rob ourselves of our own maturity and our own freedom" (9). The solution she advocates is one of self-reflexivity. "Until we take
responsibility for these projections, genuine relationship is impossible because we are
entangled in our own images instead of relating to new possibilities that expand our
boundaries" (9).

How does the reader comprehend a book written as a spiral? Woodman
advocates that one read and reread, each time allowing what wants to come to your
consciousness from the text to come:

Rather than driving toward a goal, I prefer the pleasure of the journey
through a spiral. And I ask my reader to relax and enjoy the spiral
too. If you miss something on the first round, don’t worry. You may
pick it up on the second or the third or the ninetieth. It doesn’t matter.
The important thing is that you are relaxed so that if the bell does ring
you will hear it and allow it to resonate through all the rungs of your
own spiral. The world of the feminine resonates. Timing is
everything. If it doesn’t ring, either it is the wrong spiral or the
wrong time or there is no bell. (Addiction 8).

Each time the text is read, a different understanding emerges. This is a particularly
modern deconstructive strategy. Sharon Crowley in her book, A Teacher’s Guide to
Deconstruction advocates regarding texts as something to be rewritten and
incorporated into the writing process (47). Woodman's style is very much such an incorporation of the Western tradition but from a holistic feminist or Other viewpoint. In interviews, she easily quotes from authors such as Blake, Nietzsche, Shakespeare, and Dickinson their words seem always ready at hand or on the tip of her tongue. Characteristically she places from one to three or more quotations from such canonical literary sources at the beginning of chapters as well as scattered throughout the text.

I also read Woodman as extending the spiral metaphor to include a strategy of polyvocality in her book Leaving My Father's House, a book that in Interviews she explains is about "finding an inner core that values life, takes us into life, rather than has us retreat from it" (141). Anne A. Simkinson, reviewing Leaving My Father's House, also remarks that Woodman appears to have been struggling in her other books with a spiraling writing style "previously, her books," says Simkinson in Interviews, "seem to offer feminine content in a masculine format" (130). The form Woodman found in Leaving "consists of two very feminine elements: collaboration and story" (131). In that same interview with Simkinson, Woodman also talked about honoring the raw energy of the unconscious. "We live with the raw energy boiling underneath. We need to ride it into life instead of toward premature death" (142). This, for Woodman is the spiral of bringing consciousness to unconsciousness. It is a spiral of continually coming to consciousness after falling back into unconsciousness. The unconscious offers the opportunity for growth and self-
realization or death. Each of the three writers whose intimate journals are part of Leaving phrases their battle as one of becoming conscious in life and death terms. Not to bring consciousness to their bodies and their lives is to die to themselves which they each perceive as an eventual physical death.

For Woodman this life/death process on the semantic level, as healing the either/or split, is symbolic on the psychic/somatic level: "by sustaining the tension, each is discovering the third—the crone who is an image of the archetypal mother in whom the opposites are contained. Through Her, each has been reconciled with her personal mother and each, by experiencing the suffering in her body and the cherishing of other women, is beginning to understand Love as a reality in her cells" (363-4).

Love as a cell reality is also apparent in Enheduanna's polyvocality on an individual level. In her hymns the initially remote persona moves gradually forward from addressing the goddess in third person at the beginning of The Exaltation. She slowly moves closer to her audience until she steps forward in her own first person persona and tells her personal story. Then in the doxology, she and goddess Inanna merge, the human and the divine become for a moment one, the Other incorporated into the one in a collaboration at the cell level. It is a collaboration, not of inflation where the ego assumes goddess proportions, but one of allowing inspiration which is beyond the conscious mind. Enheduanna, for example, provides a model of this on the individual level in her collaboration with Inanna, and Woodman in Leaving My
Father's House includes the stories of the three authors woven into a polyvocal collaboration.

After the publication of Leaving My Father's House Woodman expressed the need to take a sabbatical: "I want to drop into my own creative matrix for a while. The last year has taken me into depths I need to honor" (142). She explained that she needed time just to be: "no deadlines, no scurrying to catch a plane, no revving up for a lecture, just living life as it comes and focusing on the inner journey" (142). Such a statement conveys much about her understanding of the composition process. Like Enheduanna, words and writing come out of a deeper state of understanding, of being, for her. She has learned to collaborate with the process of the unconscious. "The unconscious has treasures," she's said in Interviews, "that consciousness has no idea of. If you take your own imagery and allow it to transform as it wants, it will go exactly where it needs to be" (137). And the result of allowing this process to occur for Woodman is part of distilling individual inner truth. "We ground ourselves in the reality of our own imagery. Life lived from our inner truth is not an empty performance. It is living life in a dynamic, moment-by-moment discovery" (Leaving 9).

Rhetoric and the teaching of composition could be one of the most powerful tools of expanding consciousness we have to incorporate the Otherness within and outside of ourselves in the evolutionary human quest toward a collective holistic consciousness. The root of the word holistic is holy, and indeed it is a spiritual
quest, as a race, we seem to be embarked upon, one that is not denominational, but includes all denominations in a holistic understanding of self and Other. People like Marion Woodman and her analysands are pioneers scouting out unexplored geography and bringing back rough maps much as Columbus and the other Portuguese navigators did five centuries ago. Only this time they bring backs maps of consciousness delineating new continents and countries of self and Other perception.

Traditional rhetorical theories are cooptic, generalizing particular aspects of the Western patriarchal mind to cover all genders, races, colors, and civilizations. Despite this rhetoric remains a powerful tool. Once the centerpiece of Western education for more than a millennium, rhetoric needs to be re-perceived as a powerful instrument with the possibility of engendering greater consciousness.

II. SYLVIA PERERA AND THE MYTH OF INANNA

An examination of the rhetoric of Perera's book, The Descent to the Goddess, illuminates some of the underlying genderedness of academic and professional discourse and suggests possible ways to examine and enlarge that discourse. Perera utilizes the myth of Inanna, the Sumerian goddess of heaven and earth to whom Enheduanna sings. Inanna descends into the lower world, dies, and returns in a story of seasonal renewal.
A. The myth of Inanna

Inanna is the most powerful and the most interesting goddess in ancient Mesopotamia. Later she becomes identified with the warrior goddess Ishtar, the infamous "whore goddess" of Babylon in the Bible. Other aspects of her transmute into the Greek goddess Aphrodite and the Roman Venus. Diane Wolkstein compiled Inanna’s story as a significant myth of the feminine psyche, one that psychoanalysts such as Sylvia Perera are rediscovering and using as a mythic paradigm for feminine healing and the balancing of Other. Inanna’s descent into the underworld and her death to her old self—a socially dictated persona—can be read as the story of learning to listen in order to trust instinctual patterns.

The story of Inanna’s descent foreshadows the stories of the Greek Kore-Peresphone and the Roman Psyche. Inanna decides to descend to her sister Ereshkigal’s realm of the Netherworld to witness the funeral of Gugalanna, the Bull of Heaven. She leaves elaborate instructions with her servant Ninsubur and tells her to remind the "‘fathers’ of their daughter" if she does not return (Wolkstein 157). She enters the path to the underworld and as she progresses through each of the seven gates is stripped of articles of clothing which represent her earthly attributes and powers. She is killed and hangs "a piece of rotting meat ... from a hook on the wall" (60). After three days her servant Ninsubar pleads before the fathers but only Enki, the god of wisdom is willing to help her. From the dirt beneath his fingernails he creates two creatures in the guise of professional mourners who sooth Ereshkigal and
bargain for Inanna. Ereshkigal agrees to release her, but only if she finds someone
to take her place. As Wolkstein explains, "a passageway has been created from the
Great Above, the conscious, to the Great Below, the unconscious, and it must be kept
open. Inanna must not forget her neglected, abandoned older 'sister'--that part of
herself that is Ereshkigal" (161). Inanna returns and finds that her husband, Dumuzi,
has assumed her throne and shows no indication of mourning her death. She
condemns him to take her place thereby initiating the story of another myth of
seasonal change.

B. The Myth in Modern Guise

Perera uses the myth as a way to interpret modern women's quest for
wholeness, which she defines as "a renewal in a feminine source-ground and spirit"
(7). In her work she has found that women who succeed in the world are usually
"daughters of the father." Women, who, of necessity, have learned to become
adapted to masculine-oriented culture and its values. We have, she says, "repudiated
[our] own feminine instincts and energy patterns, just as the culture has maimed or
derogated most of them" (7). Cultural icons of sacrality mirror back images of the
predominantly masculine.

As Gerda Lerner learned while she was writing two-volume work on Women
and History, the feminine divine has been virtually erased. She explains in the
introduction to the last volume, The Creation of Feminine Consciousness, that the
The most important thing she learned during the fifteen years she devoted to this project was the significance to women of their relationship with the Divine, and "the profound impact the severing of that relationship had on the history of women" (vii).
The major idea systems of the West, both religious and secular, she claims, incorporate a set of unstated assumptions about gender (vii). The resulting obscurity of the feminine sacred has had a profound effect not only on the history of women, but on the psyche of men.

Western cultural readings of the myths surrounding goddesses reflect ways that internal and external perceptions of self and Other are interpreted. The obscurity of the feminine sacred has had a profound effect not only on the history of women, but on the psyche of men. For instance Mary Ann Cain in her recent book *Revisioning Writers’ Talk: Gender and Culture in Acts of Composing*, posits that the ascendant hero story, the *Bildung* plot of individual inquiry, self-knowledge, and singular identity forms how stories and myths are read. The *Bildung* plot forms the heroic myth of composing, one which becomes a formative part of education. In this myth of composing the "'heroic,'" valorized masculine self signifies a construction of self and identity apart or in isolation from culture, autonomous, self-contained, ahistorical" (44). It is this ascendant hero story that Cain explains as one which dominates reading and understanding erasing the knowledge of the connectedness of goddess stories. In the writing classroom, Cain says, "within a framework of power as connectedness . . . we come to know the Othernesses of students through an
interpretive stance of reading their textual "anomalies" or contradictions as meaningful acts" (187).

One way of looking for the connectedness of these "meaningful acts" is to examine the goddess myth as a descent into the unconscious. Perera's work invokes a particularly ancient figure of the divine Other, the image of Inanna. She utilizes the myth of Inanna's descent, one of the oldest stories of human history, as a psychological and spiritual quest that must be made by a "daughter of the father." and I would add by sons of the father.

Perera situates herself as a "daughter of the father." She identifies with an audience of women who are well-educated, likely successful in the material or professional world, and obviously inquiring. Her book has gained a fairly widespread readership among people interested in Jungian and feminist theory. The inquiring audience, like Perera, sense some lack or dis-ease. Identifying with patriarchal culture, they may have alienated themselves from their own mothers when their mother's weakness and ineffectiveness became apparent. In that process the younger woman also becomes alienated from her own body, its female instincts, and emotions. Physical symptoms such as anorexia, bulimia, and obesity often characterize this feminine alienation from the physical body.

Beyond somatic symptoms are dislocations of the psyche. Unconsciously, patterns of the mother are repeated or relived, patterns in which women grew up. For example, strong women in rejecting a weak, ineffectual mother find themselves
caught in her patterns in other ways. Perera discusses several cases where her
analysands have caught themselves in the mirror of their own lives, reenacting the
drama of their mothers. One woman observed about her mother, "I have always
hated her spoiling envy, but I see I am similar. She takes in stray people and shoves
aside her own children, but I nourish my students and ignore my own needs. It's not
so different" (Descent 48). In another case that Perera cites, a woman observes, "I
thought I was like my father, his favorite. But I see I am like her. She was totally
subservient, belonged to him, lived in servitude. We've both lost ourselves." (48).
These not uncommon situations represent not only the projection of denigration of the
personal mother but also the denigration of personal qualities, qualities that the culture
has socialized as the role of women and that are unconsciously absorbed and acted
out. The healing of both this personal and universal split between the balance of
mind and body, left and right brain hemispheres, and self and Other necessitates, for
Perera, a return to old myths. "I found that by relating to this very early material
from an age when the Great Goddess was still vital, I have been able to reclaim some
of my own relation to the archetypal feminine instinct and spirit patterns" ("The
Descent" 139). She divides her view of the myth of Inanna into four different
perspectives:

1. as an image of the seasonal rhythmic order of nature echoed in the organic
patterning of mind and body interrelationships.

2. as the story of an initiation process into the mysteries. Inanna in the myth
descends, submits, and dies, which "is the essence of the experience of the human soul faced with the transpersonal" (13). The ego must relinquish its control during the descent into the other world of unconsciousness and into other states of consciousness. The everyday ego has to give up its cultural persona of rationality. Contrary to what might be interpreted as passivity, Perera characterizes this act as "active willingness to receive." She further explains it as rediscovering the experience of the unity and nature of the cosmos "inevitably lost through goal-directed development" (14).

3. as a myth providing a model for what Perera calls the "incarnation-ascension" rhythm of the healthy soul, and also of a process to promote healing. "Inanna's descent ... may be viewed as the incarnation of cosmic, uncontained powers into timebound, corrupting flesh, but it is also a descent for the purpose of retrieving values long repressed, and of uniting above and below into a new pattern" (14-15). This unity of above and below on an individual level may ultimately become the balancing of the left and right hemispheres of the brain, integrating all aspects of consciousness—the unconscious, creative, intuitive aspects of the right hemisphere with the rational, linear, logical aspects of the left hemisphere.

4. Finally, as a story suggesting that the return of Inanna from the underworld, the world of death, "engenders a new model of equal and comradely relationship between woman and man." (15) It also presages a new relationship between mind, body, and spirit and hints to a renewed relationship with the earth.
Perera describes the process toward reclaiming the whole self as one of sacrifice. By dying to an old identity within the patriarchy one descends into the spirit of the goddess to reconnect with the myths and images of the feminine and Other exiled for five thousand years. I read her work as significant to the psyches of both women and men, as reconnecting to the right side of the bicameral mind, to the intuitive, nonverbal level of consciousness/unconsciousness and a gestalt of totality, something with which both the sons and daughters of the patriarchy have lost touch.

Finally, her descent and return presage a theme common to women and men dominated for thousands of years by the patriarchy, the search for a home. This search is, Perera notes, a dominant theme. "one of the recurrent dream themes in the analytic work of modern women" (19). A larger metaphoric paradigm suggests that Inanna's return brings spring and renewal, a season of new dynamics in the relationship with the "other" both internal and external. Finally, Inanna and Enheduanna's returns both suggest the healing and rebalancing of bicameral mind with body and spirit into a holistic relationship with the earth, and the initiation of a discourse beyond the cognitive paradigms of professional and academic discourse, an inner and outer dialectic of self and Other.

The myth of Inanna as Perera uses it presents the story of a psychological journey to wholeness. In this myth, Inanna is a larger symbolic feminine figure beyond the merely maternal. "She is never a settled and domestic wife nor mother under patriarchy" (18). Her descent is a way of confirming the connection of all
humans to the seasonal order of nature and to life with its rhythms and organic patterns. The ebb and flow of individual biorhythms, the menstrual cycle, seasonal patterns, and the alternating days and nights reflect the connectedness of body and earth, of self and Other. Inanna descends and dies to her old self, her limited human ego, and then she undergoes an initiation into the transpersonal. As Perera explains: “The return to the goddess for renewal in a feminine source and spirit is a vitally important aspect of modern woman’s quest for wholeness” (130). It is also a quest of consciousness for both genders.

Inanna represents many of the mythical aspects of the Other in the psyche, not only the archaic great mother goddess but also the daughter, the creatrix, and the destroyer. Perhaps the original myth of death and resurrection, Inanna’s descent into the underworld, her annihilation and rebirth take place more than two millennium before the story of Christ. She illustrates an even more ancient story of the healing of mind, body and spirit, the bringing of all these aspects into a new balance for both modern women and men. Her death and resurrection provide a paradigm for a new balancing of the ego that flexibly combines assumed binaries of being such as, activity and passivity, assertiveness and empathy into a larger holistic gestalt. By descending and returning, Inanna also suggests a way of unifying above (cognitive consciousness) and below (unconscious drives and desires), of balancing the two hemispheres of the brain toward a multivalent consciousness. I believe the work of Enheduanna and the psychotherapy of analysts such as Perera and Woodman propounds a rhetoric that
includes the Other as an aspect of the unconscious and a deepened recursive, more reflective consciousness. One of the ways this rhetoric might work itself out is as a more comprehensive way to view composition: ethos expanded to a bicameral mind paradigm, pathos as body wisdom, and a logos of the sacred Other.
Chapter Five

COMPOSITION AND EXPANDED CONSCIOUSNESS

Writing has always been acknowledged as one of the more powerful arts of civilization, one reflective of culture and consciousness. Plato feared that writing would cause loss of memory—perhaps it did. The memory of the storyteller became less important. Plato’s allegory of the cave and consciousness became replaced in Western culture by Aristotle’s even more elaborate hierarchical, classificatory schemas.

The discourses that comprise the historiography around the beginning of writing are instructive. They speak of the invention of writing in terms of its utilization as a tool of commerce much as it is used in our own secular age. The conventional scholarly story is that writing began with the invention of pottery in the neolithic era (8,000 B.C.E.) in the Near East. It was based on a system of clay counters and tokens used to identify and number trade goods. Denise Schmandt-Besserat has extensively documented this argument and it is the most widely accepted theory among scholars.

In contrast there are the historians and archaeologists who argue that writing began for sacred purposes. Marija Gimbutas and other archaeologists have unearthed evidence of the invention of a sacred script used by matriarchal societies in Europe 8,000 years ago and still undeciphered.
It was developed from a long use of graphic symbolic signs found only within the context of an increasingly sophisticated worship of the Goddess. Inscriptions appear on religious items only, indicating that these signs were intended to read as sacred hieroglyph. (208)

However writing came about, whether developed for secular or sacred purposes—probably the truth lies somewhere within both camps—it has always been recognized as enormously powerful and a necessary adjunct of civilization.

For a while in Western history, during the early Middle Ages, writing became the preserve of a few educated monks; even kings were illiterate. Then around 1455 C.E. Gutenberg invented movable type, using it to print the Bible; a gesture indicative of the power of writing not only to reflect but to form consciousness.

With the invention of movable type, slowly literacy began to spread. The underclasses, women, servants, slaves, the Other struggled for centuries to achieve literacy, to gain the knowledge and the power that it was believed mastery of script brought. The history of literacy has been one of the reluctant enfranchisement and initiation of the Other, the other gender, race, and class, into the privileges and practices of literacy. Gradually, as the external Other becomes increasingly literate, there also exists the possibility to turn inward and to use the powerful tool of writing as an instrument to enhance awareness, to critique the conditions and terms of one's own life, to explore the symbiotic internal relationship of self and Other in an internal and external discourse that propounds a rhetoric of a deepened recursive and more
reflective consciousness. This rhetoric, as I've suggested, might work itself out as a more comprehensive way to view composing: ethos expanded to a bicameral mind paradigm, pathos as body wisdom, and a logos of the sacred other.

I. THE ETHOS OF A BICAMERAL MIND/BODY PARADIGM

Honoring and reclaiming modes of consciousness beyond the dominant left hemisphere's cognitive intellectualism has been inherent in the thinking and writing of all the authors I have thus far discussed in detail for the past four thousand years. I began this discussion with an examination of the process of composing of three disparate individuals roughly two thousand years apart, Enheduanna, Cicero, and Jung. Each of these writers in the act of composing framed their process around the sacred Other. As I analyzed their discussions of composing, I discern a pattern of relationship to the sacred Other expressive of their cultural conceptions of cognition and representative of particular cognitive and cultural aspects of the consciousness of each of their epochs.

Enheduanna in her metacommentary about the composition of her hymn "The Exaltation of Inanna" speaks of the creative process as a collaborative act with the goddess Inanna. I characterize her creative process as a translogical collaborative process. It is a sacred collaboration that I hypothesize can be interpreted as a harmonious balance between the two sides of the bicameral mind. Enheduanna both sings to the goddess and is regarded as a deity, the representative of Ninsaba on the
earth, presenting the interesting situation of collaboration with the sacred Other as both sacred and other.

By Cicero's time, more than 2,000 years after Enheduanna, writing had become the exclusive preserve of ruling class males who inhabited the public space of the forum, one dedicated to the expression of left brain aspects of the bicameral mind and logos, law, and government. Cicero experienced a conflicted creativity that manifested itself in the dissidence between his public and private persona, between the logos of the left brain and the muse, the sacred Other, representative of the right-brained intuitive Other.

Instead of the muses, Jung, formulated the concept of the anima. He struggled with the unconscious throughout his life in order to understand his own psyche. Frequently those struggles took the form of encounters with his own anima, described in terms of its projection onto the four most important women in his life. This exploration of the unconscious anima, for Jung, involved the risk of chaos and possible insanity, so divorced had his representative human mind become from the sacred Other and the balance of the bicameral mind.

A. The Bicameral Mind Paradigm

The two cerebral hemispheres of the bicameral mind are a late evolution of the human brain. The left brain specializes in the cognitive, logical process, the traditional logos of Western civilization. While the creative process—the gestalt or
synthesis of bipolarities—operates as a translogical process of the two hemispheres mediated by the *corpus callosum* in what Neurosurgeon Richard Restak describes as an enriched communication between the hemispheres, one of bisociation (*Modular* 166).\(^{14}\)

**B. Ancient Bihemisphere Epistemology**

Knowledge in the archaic past may have included far more than the consciousness of only one brain hemisphere, one intellectual tradition centered in an ethos of rationality. Knowledge came also from dreams, intuition, and the bodily senses, the right so-called minor hemisphere. For example, in her hymn Enheduanna remarks that one of her duties as En-priestess is to interpret dreams, but because of the destruction of the temple she can no longer perform that duty.

\begin{align*}
118 & \text{(My) hands are no longer folded on the ritual} \\
119 & \text{couch} \\
& \text{I may no longer reveal the pronouncements of Ningal}
\end{align*}

Hallo explains that Ningal, "like some other goddesses, is known as a patroness of dream interpretation" (59). This tradition of priestess as dream interpreter continued for the next thousand years. In the *Gilgamesh Epic*, some 800 years later, Gilgamesh's mother, Ninsun, interprets to him the significance of his dream.
Part of reclaiming other types of consciousness beyond that of the left hemisphere's cognitive intellectuality is to reexamine the tradition of academic and professional discourse. This type of discourse has been refined in the West for the past two thousand years. The result of this Western concentration on a culturally defined rational logical discourse becomes an academic language that Beth Daniell recently wrote of as one that "often actually alienates human beings from their own . . . experiences" (240). Like much of Western ideology this discourse focuses on the mental to the exclusion of the emotional, constitutive of an almost exclusively cognitive ethos.

C. Feminist Historiographers and an Epistemology of the Bicameral Mind

Feminist revisionist historians suggest the existence of an expanded ethos beyond the traditional intellectual lineage and rhetorical heritage from Aristotle to the present. Revisionist historians such as C. Jan Swearingen, Susan Jarratt, and Kathleen Welch are changing the teaching of composition. They bring to awareness the largely unconscious gendering of history and historiography in rhetoric. They critique the traditional rhetorical canon as a Western invention, Eurocentered as well as gender and race specific offering instead a vision of ethos expanded beyond those limitations.

In a recent exchange in College Composition and Communication (1994) titled "Interchanges: Spiritual Sites of Composing," C. Jan Swearingen in her article,
"Women's Ways of Writing, or, Images, Self-Images, and Graven Images," discusses a summer workshop on creativity and spirituality she and several other women have been leading for the past five years. By using self-images from journaling and photography exercises as well as images of women in the past, the participants evolve a deeper understanding of their own and other women's creative process. They develop self-images and images of creativity that serve as "antidotes to the deep fear and self-doubt that women, like other marginalized groups, must overcome in order to write the first sentence, paint the first stroke" (253). Deeply imbedded in the process of these workshops, as she describes them, is the epistemology of a knowledge at once intellectual, sensate, and spiritual. She asks: "How can we draw on the power of spiritual conviction and invoke it in the tasks of making meaning, in creating images of self and images of the world for ourselves and our communities?" (252). Her process is one I see as an attempt to arrive at a holistic balance of the bicameral mind, one that recognizes and acknowledges the sacred other.15

The process of deepening consciousness, of an ethos of the holistically balanced bicameral mind, like the acquisition of all education occurs slowly. It requires much patient listening to the ego self and the many other internal voices. Self-knowledge occurs through reflection and slowly teasing out meaning from numerous drafts.

While the techniques of process and rewriting in composition theory have long been used, I'm also struggling to find ways of interpreting these modes coming from
the context of the language of the unconscious and its mythical dimensions. Working
deeply with internal images whether evoked in dreams, meditations, or dialogues
draws upon the inherent resources of both sides of the bicameral
mind.

Perhaps it means combining such rhetorical concepts as the cognitive (language
as a tool for acquiring knowledge), the expressionistic (language as a medium for
inner growth), and epistemic (language as knowledge and knowledge as language) into
an expanded paradigm, one of balance along a continuum instead of the Aristotelian
contrastive bipolarities of mind and body, intellect and spirit, male and female.

D. Composition, Ethos, and the Bicameral Mind Balance

For example, working with student produced texts as the center of the writing
course instead of canonical texts as Kathleen Welch urges "requires developing
alternative sensibilities. It requires looking at tentativeness, messy lines, and blips of
invention that appear to go nowhere" (29). It can also require the careful, often
tentative, exercising of the creative technics used for the interpretation of dreams and
cultural visual images. It includes a recognition of the importance of the subjectivity
of thinking and symbolism arising out of inner discourse, the beginning of a more
inclusive ethos of both hemispheres of the bicameral mind. How can this discussion
be applied to composition theory? What techniques might an ethos that acknowledges
and affirms the bicameral mind bring to the classroom?
In her recent article, "Dialectic/Rhetoric/Writing" in the Festschrift Learning from the Histories of Rhetoric: Essays in Honor of Winifred Bryan Horner, Welch articulates the link between rhetoric and knowledge when she argues that the rhetorical tools of composition serve to create knowledge by producing productive dialectical tensions between dialogues of the interior self and exterior language realities. Such a process must, I believe, encompass an ethos of both sides of the bicameral mind. Welch defines dialectic in the Platonic sense as motion and the interaction of Forms, "the discovery of a oneness in multiplicity" (134). I understand it as more than a mere pairing of opposites, of binaries compromising each other, but a dialectic of energy and insights that becomes more than the sum of its parts creating a larger gestalt of connection.

Welch recasts two pedagogical techniques in a form of dialectics encompassing the conscious and unconscious. I find this interpretation of techniques useful for a composition pedagogy based in a rhetoric that views ethos as operating within a bicameral mind/body paradigm.

1. Workshop Structure

Welch advocates structuring the classroom in the form of a workshop with concentration on student texts rather than traditional canonized literary texts. Students are both writers and readers, "they prod, question, and essentially offer new streams of invention to the writer whose text is the center of attention" (137). By doing so
they come from a position of greater bicameral consciousness simultaneously
addressing the writer in all her complexity of consciousness. The writer/creator and
the critic become simultaneously present in body and text. The resulting dialectical
process empowers both writer and reader.

When the student text--instead of the textbook--is studied. This breaks down
what Welch calls the "monolithic" tendencies of student writers by enabling the
creating of a collaborative situation between writer and readers. It also stimulates the
opening up of new creative possibilities for the writer and new visions for the piece
thus bringing into consciousness the richness of implicit but unconscious meanings,
those images and understandings that forms the complexity of bicameral mind/body
consciousness.

2. Critic's sheets

Welch suggests the use of critic's sheets, defined as a type of revision guide
with "texts written by the instructor to set up avenues of continuous workshop
response" (136). They enable self-reflection in a process that prevents closure and its
accompanying stasis so prevalent in the concentration upon product characteristic of
academic and professional discourse. Thus, text production may become an ongoing,
creative, growing process motivated by the probing questions of critics sheets and the
students' responses.
Welch reconceptualizes these standard pedagogical techniques to, as she says, "embrace the unconscious as a primary aspect of writing" (138). These techniques reemphasize and demonstrate the reality of all language as a "kind of flux" which requires fluidity in the classroom. Her awareness of the larger dimensions of consciousness helps to psychically produce change, articulate multiple perspectives, create a deeper self-consciousness, and thereby introduce new possibilities of being, creating the possibility of a new balance of bisociation and the conditions of coming to voice.

Composition teachers know that voice must emerge from a strong persona. Without self-confidence, without a personal identification of self--some kind of self-knowledge--the writer/rhetor cannot create a persona and ultimately the ethos behind the essay or speech. The personas of Sappho and Enheduanna in their writing speak of their thoughts and their feelings and of their composition. Their voices are authoritative, powerful . . . and personal, voices women need to hear.

In "The Exaltation of Inanna," more complete than the few surviving fragments of Sappho--a picture emerges of teaching and learning, of individuality and community that offers a model of composition and pedagogy among the most ancient in existence. Enheduanna lived, composed, and taught roughly two-thousand years before Aristotle and seventeen-hundred years prior to Sappho. Her work as creator and priestess/teacher offers the view of a strong, powerful ethos. Her ethos is that of a wise woman and a powerful priestess. For Enheduanna, the goddess Inanna's
power equals that of the gods. The feminine, then, is articulated in the ethos of Enheduanna as powerfully equal, necessary, and valuable in that particular world view.

In one of the most powerful passages in ancient history, Enheduanna steps forward and speaks in the first person of her own composing process. She reflects on how she has composed the hymn. At midnight she has heaped the coals in the censor and given birth to the hymn. Her composing process is one I read as collaborative with the goddess. She and Inanna become one for awhile and from that deep collaboration—an in-spiriting or in-fusing—she gives birth to the hymn.

The Other (race, gender, class) has not had the opportunity for even a basic literacy for most of the history of Western civilization. Denied the right to speak in public, to read, even to write for most of our history, as other writers we confront individually our own long-hushed voices struggling to speak authentically. In the classroom we observe our young women students strive to overcome a prolonged tradition of silence. That's why revisionist histories are so important. They provide a way of critiquing an exclusionary past. They offer examples, however few, of the ethos of strong women who managed to somehow step outside the bounds of their cultures and to speak.

Other pedagogical tools that an inclusive rhetoric of the bicameral mind/body might utilize come from psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has become a particularly powerful modern rhetorical tool of consciousness and composition theory. In
practice, as a form of discourse analysis, it helps create a deepening self-reflexivity. Our own words and written discourses as well as that of our students are often pregnant with unconscious meaning. I believe the work of Enheduanna and the psychoanalytic theory of analysts such as Perera and Woodman propounds a rhetoric that recognizes the Other as an aspect of the unconscious and offers composition some ways toward evoking a deepened recursive more reflective consciousness.

3. Psychoanalysis, Consciousness, and Composition

For example, the stories that emerge from journals are not linear, chronological accounts for the most part because the psyche does not perceive our reality as clock reality. The fact that each night, for approximately one-third of our existence, we sleep slipping outside of chronological reality as we have constructed it, indicates that clock-time only partially governs our lives. For Woodman, distilling the images and the metaphors of our stories and dreams into their essential truth for our individual beings is the place where the work must occur in order to live our own individual truths. She uses the story of Einstein’s dream that eventually led to the discovery of $E=Mc^2$ as an example of how powerful inner images can be:

Einstein, for example, dreamed that he was sliding along a sunbeam.

Then he saw himself reflected in a mirror fastened on his feet.

Immediately he realized that he was, in fact, riding the sunbeam. In other words, he was moving at the same speed as light. He was light.
It took him a lifetime of reflection to distill the truth of that image.

The concentration that brought him to E=Mc² has changed the consciousness of the world (9).

For Woodman, the Other part of the bicameral mind, is one of the slow, uncertain, and often painful creation of individual myths expressed outside of chronological time by a cyclical conception of periodicity that creates a story of beingness in process for which the intimacy of a form such as the journal and even the essay best expresses the ethos of a bicameral mind/body paradigm.

II. PATHOS AND THE WISDOM OF THE BODY: THE EMBODIMENT OF DISCOURSE

I proceed, therefore, next, to another essential part of discourse, ... the pathetic; in which, if anywhere, eloquence reigns, and exerts its power.

--Hugh Blair

The narrative mode of pathos, the stories of others and ourselves, the myths we formulate around being, the knowing and experience that compose the personal as it intersects the transpersonal are the stuff of pathos and of life. Pathos, as that which touches our emotions, goes beyond intellectual and rational. For example, I intellectually know that I need to exercise my body regularly. I can reiterate all the reasons that it is good for my health. But unless I am really "embodied," I will not
act on that intellectual knowledge. It took me forty-eight years to find a way to embody that activity in a way that acknowledged my spirit. Finally, I began to develop a love for running that became a way for me to embody and act upon the intellectual knowledge of my need for exercise.

For me pathos also embodies the concept of "gut knowledge," a knowledge that flows from the emotions, often intuitive. It is not the rational, logical, linear self, but rather expressive of a knowledge beyond the cognitive. Nel Noddings and Paul Shore in their book, *Awakening the Inner Eye: Intuition in Education*, use Bergson's example to distinguish between intuition and cognitive knowledge. They tell the story of a man, fascinated by Paris but unable to travel there, who began to collect pictures of the city. Eventually he came to own an extensive collection. But his knowledge of the city and that of someone who lives there are completely different. His knowing, they say, "is cognitively mediated; it is not a product of 'being one' with the streets of Paris" (22).

A. Rhetorical Historiography and the Wisdom of the Body

Narratives of the Other expressed by women's lives in the past who have dealt with the tremendous stresses of their cultures and societies present pictures of lives that can sustain the present day women/Other. C. Jan Swearingen notes that "Women are more prominently represented among the writers, thinkers, and artists of past eras than most of us knew until very recently" (256). Into the 17th century the educated
had greater access to knowledge of women and their works, a body of knowledge that except for a few highly specialized scholars, according to Swearingen, has been lost (257). This is material that needs to be reclaimed as Swearingen herself has done working with such lesser known figures as the 17th-century Mexican nun Sor Juana De La Cruz. "Women’s stories of self and creativity draw together the stories and patterns and meanings that connect the spiritual and the intellectual, the knower and the known, the quest for meaning and the will to make it" (258). Thus, narratives from the past and narratives of the present-day self that explore the internal Other, combine to help invoke the power of spirit necessary to encourage the energy and belief which facilitates the creative process in the ethos of the bicameral mind of society and self and facilitates the narrative mode of pathos as embodied wisdom.

For example, Susan Jarratt’s discussion of Sapphic pedagogy helps to illuminate the even earlier work of Enheduanna and how pathos may once have existed as embodied wisdom. Jarratt’s creative amplification of Sapphic pedagogy based on the few extant lines from Sappho’s poetry illustrate how such early historical figures can be catalysts to create different learning environments in the classroom, and they can expand notions of literacies to include the wisdom of the body.

Using the example of Susan Jarratt’s examination of Sappho as a teacher, I have seen how a broadened examination and definition of pedagogy can be important for a composition teacher. Rhetoric and its theory inform composition pedagogy, and my teaching and interaction with students informs the way I look at theory. When I
read the work of revisionist historians such as Jarratt, and I study how she works with the image of the sophists as she steps outside the inherited parameters of Aristotelian logic and rhetoric, my own notion of possibility becomes expanded. When Jarratt argues that Sapphic pedagogy offers a reinforcing and visionary change of a feminist composition theory, I am freed from a traditional perspective of what is being taught in most traditional composition classrooms. Jarratt’s speculations offer the opportunity to play with theory and practice in a way that traditionalist perspectives such as contemporary-traditional rhetoric do not.

Jarratt’s reading of Sappho’s pedagogy is visionary. She examines the few surviving fragments of Sappho’s poetry and hypothesizes that Sappho was a teacher, that her students were young women, some with whom she may have had an erotic involvement. She presents not only a pedagogy of physical desire, but one of eros. Eros for Sappho is love, perhaps carnal, but also a recognition and affirmation of the beauty and sublimity of both intellect and body. So too Enheduanna both embodies and proclaims pathetic knowledge and utilizes pathos in her works as she moves back and forth sometimes distancing herself from her audience and then stepping forward to move into an intimate closeness.

B. Enheduanna, Pathos, and Body Wisdom

This movement forward and backward from the audience is integral to Enheduanna’s use of pathos. In The Exaltation she begins the hymn with the
exordium of epithets that describe Inanna. On one level they are carefully arranged, as I noted earlier, to illustrate the characteristics of the goddess that will be part of the coming story. The initial lines describe Inanna's radiance and exalted sacred stature as guardian of the seven "me's." The mood initiated becomes one of sacred awe. In the second section, Inanna and An, Enheduanna describes Inanna's terrifying appearance while continuing to bring the formidable power of the goddess closer. Finally, in Section V, Enheduanna describes Inanna's overpowering presence among the other gods, the Anunnas:

34. Oh my lady, the Anunnas, the great gods,
35. Fluttering like bats fly off from before you to the clefts,
36. They who dare not walk(?) in your terrible glance,
37. Who dare not proceed before your terrible countenance.

The power of repeated imagery as singers chant the hymn builds throughout the hymn. The audience and singers grow more and more aware of the great power of Inanna as the hymn progresses. Then Enheduanna describes the power of Inanna's rage manifested directly:

(VI) Inanna and Ebih(?)

43 In the mountain where homage is withheld from you its vegetation is accursed.
44 Its grand entrance you have reduced to ashes.
45 Blood rises in its rivers for you, its people have nought to drink.

Enheduanna describes the devastation moving closer to the

audience's experience:

(VII) Inanna and Uruk

51 Over the city which has not declared
53 You have spoken your holy command,

"The land is yours,"

Have verily turned it back from your path,

54 Have verily removed your foot from out of its byre.

Thus, when Inanna is not worshipped the consequences go far beyond destruction,

also life, sensuality, sexuality, and fertility cease. The poet uses the very personal example of domestic life.

55 Its woman no longer speaks of love with her husband.

56 At night they no longer have intercourse.

57 she no longer reveals to him her inmost treasures.

Then, In this hymn of 153 lines, she evokes all the passions, appeals to all aspects of pathos. She evokes reverence, fear, terror, pain, loss, death, love, sensuality, and sexuality.

Finally, she further amplifies her argument by pathos, at the same time using logical structure, by stepping forward and telling her own story of banishment and her ultimate restoration by Inanna. She concludes with the rapturous lines, "to my lady
wrapped in beauty, (to) Inanna!" (35).

The affect of the hymn, the examples of Inanna’s supremacy, and Enheduanna’s own personal story told in chant and song attests to the supremacy of her argument by pathos. The hymn became part of the cultural myths of Sumeria. For a thousand years it existed as a component of the wisdom tradition of that civilization.

C. Psychoanalysis and an Embodied Discourse of Composition

The myth of the goddess as Sylvia Perera utilizes it, exactly as Enheduanna refers to it, also deals with the dark, repressed levels of consciousness. These dark levels, when slowly raised into conscious awareness by emotional upheavals and grief, become integrated into the personality changing and enlarging consciousness, incorporating a wisdom of the body. How then might the wisdom of the body, its pathos, be incorporated into the teaching of composition?

This is a particularly difficult question because much of the wisdom of the body is preverbal incorporated in the near senses of touch, smell, and taste. Skeletal musculature incorporates the memory of all the traumas and blows the body experiences. As a result, much of our knowledge and a great deal of wisdom are contained in preverbal and unconscious levels of being.

But also part of being in a muted body, I’m coming to realize, is that our culture leaves us in the head. Below the neck senses and feelings are inhibited. Cate
Poynton found that linguistically, in ideologically sensitive areas, there are gaps or misnaming. When children learn the names of body parts, their genitals are either misnamed, or referred to "as down there" (12). At its most extreme, the complete loss of contact with the body characterizes schizophrenia; at its most common, it is represented by the alienation many people feel in the modern world.

When the ego splits from the body, words become used as a substitute for feelings or actions. Psychiatrist Alexander Lowen observes, "The ego with its knowledge is shaky and insecure if it does not stand firmly upon the reality of the body and its feelings" (267). The ego and its counterpart of the intellect cannot exist independently of the body or the unconscious . . . and yet the university, with what often seems an obsessive requirement to colonize students into the use of academic and professional discourse, disregards this knowledge. A clear illustration of the body/mind split occurs daily in the vast lecture auditoriums with their seats bolted to the floor. There, an amplified voice, speaking the logos of left-brained professional discourse, addresses the blurred visages of abstracted, disembodied beings, of the other.

Embodied discourse, one that reflects the ethos of the bicameral mind, utilizes the wisdom of the body as well as the mind in a discourse of pathos. The larger logic of narrative weaves the unconscious equally into consciousness. It does not privilege the irrational at the expense of the rational, but rather calls for a balance of the two hemispheres. For example, psychoanalyst Marion Woodman uses the wisdom of the
body to ground the mind in its individual imagery. "The unconscious has treasures," she said in *Interviews*, "that consciousness has no idea of. If you take your own imagery and allow it to transform as it wants, it will go exactly where it needs to be" (137). And the result of allowing this process to occur for Woodman is part of distilling individual inner truth, one I call developing a logos of the sacred Other. The deeper meaning inherent in personal and cultural symbology slowly becomes manifest. We enter into a dialogic relationship between body, self, and society from the deeper levels of the unconscious reflecting on the conscious.

Arriving at deeper awareness both of self and of issues is often the same process, one of growing and evolving through the emotional experience of problems. The narrative stories of life teach lessons in often painful ways, children that suffer addictions, relationships that end, and accidents and sicknesses that must be endured and healed. So too, the best writing is frequently initiated from a deep emotional and body level often evolving through blocks, incomprehensibility, and numerous rewritings. The chronicling of our stories, our personal myths, in the living moment and as reflective of a particular and personal past means learning to speak the unutterable, that which goes counter to, what George Kalamaras calls "the cultural and economic border of an Anglo, patricentric sensibility" (4). It can also involve the creative use of dialogic forms of journaling.

Dialoguing with aspects of the self, body, and world helps bring to consciousness the inarticulate otherness of self. For example, journaling techniques
that include dialogues with persons, work, society, events, dreams, inner wisdom figures as well as with the body: its organs, limbs, and feelings, can open up sources of individual knowledge beyond the solely cognitive.

Silence too, is as integral to composition as is the actual setting down of words, or of talking out one's ideas. A rhetorical conception of pathos as eliciting a wisdom of the body includes silence. A meditative silence that empties the mind of the cacophony of everyday life, one that seeks a deeper hearing necessary to explore the inner dialogue, can become generative. As Kalamaras explains: "individual perceiving subjects . . . have the power to call particular experiences—even those of a seemingly stable and nonreciprocal physical reality--into form" (179). In a meditative silence, the ego mind, the left side of the bicameral mind is stilled and space is given to the right side, the other half of being.

Journaling can become a key technique to articulate body wisdom. Marion Woodman finds it indispensable to self-knowledge. She keeps her own journal and she encourages—perhaps insists is a better word—that her analysands do too. When someone enters analysis with her, she specifies that they set aside at least an hour a day for themselves: "I tell people I work with to give the body an hour a day and really listen. If you're not worth an hour a day, there's nothing the body can tell you, and nothing I can really do" (Interviews 21). She explains that the body keeps sending messages at different levels of awareness. One telling example of the lack of communication with the body in modern society are the problems of anorexia,
bulimia, and addiction. She says: "the body protects and guides us--its symptoms are the signposts that reconnect us to our own lost soul" (21). Thus, the individual journal provides an important place where communication with the body and the unconscious takes place. For Woodman, the journal is an ongoing process, it mirrors: "seeing, not seeing; naming, unnaming. It is work in process, not product. The process is life itself. The journal becomes a psychic home where the ambiguities that lie at the heart of the mystery are expressed, not explained" (Leaving 351).

The Aristotelian classification and dichotomization of academic discourse, while once important as a way to understand the world and material reality, are not the way of the inner spirit. As Woodman explains, "Storytellers are important individuals in a culture. They take us into a world where we are no longer chopped into the piecemeal facts of life. They hold a vision beyond the literal and physical in an imaginal world where fact is linked with possibility" (5). She remarks that once she was suspicious of this activity and even ashamed of her own participation in it through her journaling process until she read Jung's account of the Pueblo Indians. "He knew that if they ever lost faith in their story, the mystery that held them together as a noble people would vanish" (5). Digging deeper into her own experience, she acknowledges that the times she cut off her own story were times when her life fell apart. Without the stories, which form our individual myths, our lives have no meaning. "In finding our own story, we assemble all the parts of ourselves. Whatever kind of mess we have made of it, we can somehow see the
totality of who we are and recognize how our blunderings are related" (6). We can creatively re-see and re-comprehend ourselves.

Creativity remains a mysterious process, perhaps because of its close connections to the right hemisphere. Basic to creativity, neuroscientists have found from working with split brain patients, is that it requires good communication between the hemispheres. Unlike split-brained patients, creative people are very much in touch with their feelings. The creative process cannot exist without emotion and is best expressed by individuals who are "in touch" with their feelings and express them through their creative productions" (Modular Brain 166). Pathos, then, may be intricately and intimately associated with creativity.

Creativity, listening, dialoguing, silence, and responding are part of the writing process as it has evolved among composition theorists, and as it seems to exist on mythical and individual psychological levels best expressed by the narrative mode of pathos as embodied wisdom.

III. THE LOGOS OF THE SACRED OTHER

Artifice must be "stolen" out of logos so that it cannot be seen by the audience.

--Jasper Neel (speaking of Aristotle)

The concept of a logos of the sacred Other is one I interpret as a larger concept of logos beyond the accepted meaning of being reasonable, rational, or
logical. Although the word logos historically acquired other definitions, George Kennedy explains that after the classical period the concept came to include the word of god in its creationist, redeeming and revealing aspects. Nevertheless, I agree with Neel when he asserts that most teachers of composition equate it with materialistic rationality (128). He states: "we give its name to the very act of being reasonable" (160).

In this section, I deal with the term logos in the more narrowly defined Aristotelian rhetorical sense as the favored rational aspect of the three proofs, logos, ethos, pathos. This sense is deeply imbricated in what Neel has so aptly named, "professional discourse." For if we have not directly inherited Aristotle--and his works were all but lost after his death for several hundred years--professional discourse (the dominant discourse of a profession) and its variation, academic discourse, very much exemplify the rhetorical principles of Aristotle's Rhetoric. For as Kennedy observes in the introduction to his recent translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric:

It has been more studied in modern times than it ever was in antiquity or the Middle Ages. Most teachers of composition, communication, and speech regard it [the Rhetoric] as the seminal work that organizes its subject into essential parts, . . . creates categories and terminology for discussing discourse, and illustrates and applies its teachings so that they can be used in society. (ix)
What kind of rhetoric have we inherited? Neel feels that Aristotle's Voice articulated a rhetoric based on the foundation of logos. "So powerful does that term become that we render it into English as "the speech itself." (160). But at the heart of Aristotle's rhetoric of logos lies the essential contradiction as Neel describes it:

The logos has the authority to use itself to prove itself through an appeal to itself; in the interior of the essence of the essence of rhetoric, the logos finally has a place to be itself completely. If it wishes, since the logos is always in the situation of deciding and disposing, the logos can use an ethical appeal or even a pathetic appeal. This hierarchy gives the logos command of itself by giving it two other manifestations of itself whereby it can recognize itself as a "thing" both to command and to be commanded. (160)

Thus, the term logos is most commonly utilized in its traditional, governing, and defining sense.

How, then, might the term logos be reinterpreted to become the more comprehensive concept of a logos of the sacred Other? I believe that a logos of the sacred Other can be understood as a logos of deeper consciousness, one that I term a recursive consciousness, a self-consciousness in which language, spoken and written, compassionately reflects and objectifies the Other within self. For example, the notion of critical analysis can be conceived on the micro and macrocosmic levels of
self, self-reflexiveness, and world reflection. The concept can be enlarged to encompass projection.

How we project our unconsciousness with its fears and dramas onto our own daily reality, other people, and other countries both distorts and negates the Other. For example, Edward Said has amply documented the designation of Orientalism as producing "not only a fair amount of exact positive knowledge about the Orient but also a kind of second-order knowledge--lurking in such places as the 'Oriental' tale, the mythology of the mysterious East, notions of Asian inscrutability--with a life of its own, what V.G. Kiernan has aptly called 'Europe's collective day-dream of the Orient' " (52). Martin Bernal has extensively documented how eighteenth-century historians constructed the myth of a Caucasian Greece. This denigrated other of self as internal orientalism, misogyny, and Eurocentered classicism, also becomes projected onto situations, the past, and particularly racial and gender groups.

Part of a logos of the sacred Other also involves a realization that the social construction of the individual encompasses how we live out the ways culture, language, institutions, and role expectations as they become projected onto the subject. These projections of the unknown, the "mysterious" or the "idealized images" of a particular interpretation of history become ways of language corruption. They signal the mistranslation of the truths of the psyche using the power of metaphor to project onto a people, culture, or an Other, signifying our own lack of communication with the unconscious.
What then might a logos of the sacred Other include? In Enheduanna, I read a larger conception of logos, one of metadiscourse. Cristmore and Fransworth describe metadiscourse as "The linguistic and rhetorical manifestation of an author’s presence in a text" (118). Enheduanna’s metadiscourse is one of a recursive consciousness as I interpret her work. For example, in The Exaltation she steps forward and tells her own story of ostracism relating it to her praise of Inanna and showing how Inanna intersects the poet’s fate by coming to her rescue:

143 The first lady, the reliance of the throne room,
144 Has accepted offerings
145 Inanna’s heart [Enheduanna] has been restored.

Later in In-nin sa-gur-ra she steps forward at about the same point in the hymn and explains that she has suffered from an illness and Inanna has helped to cure her:

254 My Lady, I proclaim your greatness in all lands and your glory!

In both she tells her audience of her own example, relating her thoughts, feelings, and anguish. She composes at once the narrative of a deity and of a human being and how their lives intermingle in a collaboration of self with sacred other. This syncretization represents the creative bisociation of an ethos of the bicameral mind and a logos beyond the cognitive, one which acknowledges a multivalent epistemology.

A logos of the sacred Other also helps composition theory expand to encompass a broadened discourse of metacommentary. One way this discourse might
manifest between student and instructor might be as a more inclusive discourse of the body and both hemispheres of the bicameral mind, the cognitive left brain as well as the right (minor, intuitive and Other) hemisphere. Kathleen Welch in her book, *The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric*, explains one method: "The instructor response to the student essay begins the dialectic. The exchange of texts that are generated between instructor and student about the text become a metacommentary" (139). This metacommentary can provide valuable material to both writer and instructor.

In my own case, as writer, the exchange of commentary on this work now in its fourth draft has in each case deepened my understanding and forced me to dig deeper into the meaning of what I write. The metacommentary around this manuscript has forced and focused a more probing thoughtfulness. New meaning and deeper understanding have been teased from each draft. Often the process becomes almost painful. At the end of some writing sessions I feel as though I had spent the morning pushing a fifty-ton boulder up a hill—I am both mentally and physically tired. Sometimes an insight emerges buried deeply in the words of an overly long, ungrammatical, and confusing sentence. Or, as at this moment, I realize as I did just now, that Enheduanna has reminded me to choose to step forward and speak in the first person. I am suddenly made aware of how an ancient voice can instruct a modern voice and how they can mix in whole new ways. Beneath this process I sometimes feel my unconscious shifting, and there are moments of creativity when
something new or a thing re-formed in a new way rises to the surface of my consciousness. When a new pattern of thought emerges or different insight, I feel that in its deepest sense the process becomes bisociative. I experience a feeling of harmony and elation simultaneously.

As Welch describes the process, comments and questions carefully posed can enlarge the consciousness of the writer in relation to her ongoing creative writing process as well as her critical analysis of the cultural discourse process. Welch reconceptualizes this standard pedagogical technique by deepening its psychological implications to "embrace the unconscious as a primary aspect of writing" (138).

For me Welch reemphasizes the reality of all language as a "kind of flux" which requires fluidity in the classroom and in my own written work. Her articulation of the larger dimensions of consciousness helps to psychically produce change, articulate multiple perspectives, and create a deepening self-consciousness.

Reclaiming modes of consciousness beyond the traditional intellectual, linear, and logical also means experimenting with ways of bringing a right-brain, left-brain balance into bodily and mental processes that involve revaluing and reevaluating the various stages of the writing process. For example, Peter Elbow, as Brody notes, talks of the final phase of the writing process, editing, as "tough" and "vicious" invoking the paradigm of manly prose. Yet this is really the place in writing where the grace of style is smoothed and honed. Rather than coming from a place of manly will, at this final stage and "cutting," perhaps we could begin to think of it in terms
of a delicate dance between content and style, the place in the process where meaning, form, and voice interweave, become inseparable, and when the work at last reaches final expression with significance far beyond the cognitive.

Perhaps we need compassionate adjectives that evoke images of the writing process as gestative, flexible ... even supple, a process more of love and allowing instead of hacking and cutting. Bisociative metaphors of sculpturing, dance, and genesis may be more apt, metaphors that treat the process not as agonistic but as sacred in the context of a larger logos, a logos of the sacred Other.

IV. TOWARD A RHETORIC OF THE SACRED OTHER

In the *Phaedrus*, Plato speaks of the ideal rhetoric as one that influences the soul, a description I find an apt characterization of a rhetoric of the sacred Other. A rhetoric of the sacred Other speaks to a literacy beyond the academy, a bisociative literacy of balance, wisdom, and compassion that begins with an internal relationship to the Other, however that Other is characterized: as the unconscious, as our individual fears or the shadow part of our being, as that part of ourselves which we refuse to claim, choose to ignore, carry unconsciously, or as psyche. Without an awareness of how this other manifests in our own being, it may be unconsciously projected out into the world as fear or loathing of other races, gender, classes, religions, or nations. Marion Woodman has explained the process as intimately yoked to soul or psyche. "By psyche I mean the presence of the observer in the
things observed, a presence that changes what is observed" (Interviews 40). This perception, the way we perceive determines language. She explains:

> When we see something 'out there' we see an image. This image is constructed at the perceptual center of the brain. The physical object does not enter the eye. What enters are the light waves . . . which become electrical impulses that the brain converts into images. (40)

It is the consciousness of these images that she calls soul. It is not the thing, and it is not bound to the exterior object. "It consists of substituting a subtle body, an image, for the actual one" (41). Thus, only a self-reflexive consciousness, one that can observe the self with a very difficult-to-achieve objectivity can begin to understand Self and soul. "The vast majority of people have never experienced the death of the soul because they have never experienced the living soul—like the whale that has never experienced the ocean because it has never been washed up on the shore" (41).

Thus, the language of metaphor in all its complexity is the language of the soul, and also the language of the unconscious as it works its way into consciousness thrusting its symbols into individual lives through journals or in other symbolic ways via artwork, poetry, free writing, or through the body with its automatic gestures and lapses. A rhetoric of the sacred Other recognizes the alterity of internal otherness and honors the unconscious as it manifests in dreams, myths, stories, and the bodily senses.
A rhetoric of the sacred Other is also one of process. The language of this process, as I mentioned before, is that of metaphor. Peter Elbow describes the structure of metaphor as a three-termed functionality "the hidden or implicit third term by which the two noticed members are functional is the power by which one's grasp can exceed one's reach" (25). Metaphor, then, is a language of images and indirection, a powerfully arresting language, often one seemingly embodying a greater truth when the metaphor emerges of its own accord from the work. Metaphor as a language of the psyche speaks to a larger concept of logos beyond rationality, it bespeaks meaning as constituting both sides of the bicameral mind, a logos of the sacred Other.

A rhetoric of the sacred other can be a dialectic and constant dialogue with internal and external voices. Self dialogues in journal format are an important part of this process rhetoric. Such dialogues, characterized by their neutrality and open-endedness, provide a way not only of personal and spiritual development, but of achieving a greater comprehension of the relationship of events to a life and, more importantly, how one comes to relate to events.

Although many would argue that neither religion nor therapy are a part of the role of the university or the composition classroom, in a recent group of articles, "Interchanges: Spiritual Sights of Composing," James Moffett explains that although it's an anathema to the university to play doctor or priest and thereby dirty its hands with therapy or religion, yet because it has real live students on its hands, young
developing human beings, its hands are already dirty. He argues that "unhealed wounds and undeveloped souls will thwart the smartest curriculum" (261). Thus, a rhetoric of the sacred Other must encompass a logos beyond the cognitive logos as inherited and used in professional and academic discourse.

The multiplicity of voices is central to a rhetoric of the sacred Other. For example, the voices of revisionist historiographers assuming the stance of other like Susan Jarratt, Jan Swearingen, and Kathleen Welch are important to provide alternative ways of perceiving the past. Jarratt's exploration of the marginalization of the discourses of the Other, Swearingen's equation of literacy and rhetoric as intertwining discourses that create a particular kind of consciousness within a linear-monological-grammatical-logical systems, and Welch's discussions of rhetorical consciousness to empower the inner dialogue help create new discourses about the discourse of rhetoric. They suggest ways to a more powerful and empowering pedagogy of composition based on a larger conception of consciousness, one which utilizes both hemispheres of the bicameral mind and which ultimately may become a rhetoric of the sacred Other.

The rediscovered women's voices utilizing other genres now emerging from a feminist inquiry into eighteen-century history, a time when women began to achieve more widespread literacy, are voices that for the most part spoke privately, in genres of autobiography, journals, letters, and poetry. They are genres until recently placed outside the domain of rhetoric. The division between the public and the private has
historically remained firmly in place. The "I" of the other expressed privately has been denigrated and devalued and such works for the most part not preserved. While women and others achieved access to basic literacy, their voices remain muffled.

Rhetoric and literacy have been deeply implicated. Jan Swearingen notes that the advent of literacy in Greece and in most cultures coincided with the rise of rhetoric. Rhetoric was defined as a public function. Now, as composition teachers, we teach the rhetoric of academic discourse, a discourse based on a particular type of literacy often narrowly conceived and articulated as an institutionalized communication specific to professional and academic disciplines. Rhetorically, academic discourse has a long history of elitism, racism, and sexism. Women were not allowed to take a course in rhetoric in any college until 1855. An early rhetorician, Gertrude Buck, was denied her Ph.D. by Harvard despite the fact that she was one of the most brilliant students to study there.

In the recent history of the past century each time there has been an expansion of education, there has been a problem of literacy. Composition first became important when large numbers of students began to enter universities ill-prepared in the last century. Then Harvard decided that high schools were not preparing students adequately and current-traditional rhetoric with its emphasis on correctness gained dominant impetus. Again in the sixties, when open admissions policies brought to universities large numbers of minority and lower middle class students, another crisis in literacy occurred.
Feminist revisionist historians and the way they read the rhetorical uses of literacy are important to composition teachers to elucidate other ways of comprehending the past. Figures such as Sappho and Enheduanna are examples of individuals whose historical existence illustrates that not all women were silenced. Some women wrote and spoke authoritatively in their own time. The ancient example of Enheduanna provides visions of future possibilities of an enhanced consciousness that advocates a more complex inherited literacy of multiculturalism, culture, and individual psychology. Her ethos acts to expand conceptions of the feminine Other and unconsciousness narrowly defined by an inherited patriarchal tradition for the last two-thousand years of Western civilization. The stories of literacy crises, multiculturalism, feminism and composition are also deeply intertwined. How we interpret literacy: academic discourse literacy, critical literacy, readin' and writin' (basic) literacy, and cultural literacy determine who we are and how we teach. My ethos, my rhetorical "stance" as a teacher, as a writer, and as a rhetorician interacts and is informed by all these areas. My consciousness of what has come before and my vision of the future is formed by what I know and the knowledge I have access to.

Language is intimately yoked not only to metaphor but also to soul or psyche, that from which comes metaphor. I believe that the psychoanalytic theory and practice of analysts such as Woodman and Perera propounds a rhetoric that includes the Other as an aspect of the unconscious and a deepened recursive, more reflective
consciousness. I find that the archaic rhetorical principles contained in the work of Enheduanna open the possibility for expanding ancient archeo-rhetorical concepts into a modern composition context and offer a way toward an enhanced rhetoric of the sacred Other.
NOTES

1. Rey Chow begins her recent collection of essays, *Writing Diaspora*, with a discussion of sinologist Stephen Owen's article in *The New Republic* (November 19, 1990: 28-32) in which he reviewed Chinese poet Bei Dao’s recent book, *The August Sleepwalker*. In his review Owen accused Bei Dao of writing in order to be translated and of becoming too Westernized. Chow asks "what kind of cultural politics is in play when a professor from Harvard University accuses the men and women from the "third world" of selling out to the West?" (2). She goes on to analyze Owen's project as one based on a melancholia for the loss of an object of desire, the "native," an object that never existed and one whose present existence is in direct conflict with the "history, in the sense of a detailed, factographic documentation of the local, the particular and the past (understood as what has already happened and been recorded), enjoys such a prioritized disciplinary status in East Asian cultural politics" (5). In the particular case of Owen, Chow says:

For Owen, the inferior poetic skills of Bei dao are, ostensibly, what he considers to be signs of the "third world" poet's inability to rise to the grandeur of his own cultural past. But this moralistic indictment of the other's infidelity masks a more fundamental anxiety. This is the anxiety that the Chinese past which he has undertaken to penetrate is evaporating and that the sinologist himself is the abandoned subject. (4)

2. According to neuromedical scientist Richard M. Restak, M.D. in *The Brain: The Last Frontier*, Dr. Roger Sperry at the California Institute of Technology and other psychobiologist devised tests to analyze the separate capacities of the two hemispheres. They observed that "in the minor hemisphere we deal with a second conscious entity that is characteristically human and runs in parallel with the more dominant stream of consciousness in the major hemisphere" (176). Sperry hypothesized that this "second conscious entity" in the right hemisphere might be Freud's "unconscious" (176).

Based on an interview with Dr. David Galin, of the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute in San Francisco, Restak explained that Galin "thinks the right hemisphere's performance is strikingly similar to the operation of 'unconscious' processes... both the right hemisphere and the unconscious deal with images which cannot ordinarily be verbalized. Second, their functioning depends less on logical analysis than on the perception of holistic pictures, or what psychologists call the *Gestalt*" (176).
3. In *Writing Diaspora*, Rey Chow also talks about the other in terms of "nativism," but her argument is instructive in the search for a way that the difference of the "Other" can be imagined without being collapsed into a particular image or signifier. In her chapter, "Where Have All the Natives Gone?" she says:

Rousseau's savage is, then, not simply a cultural "other," but in Lacanian language, the Other (big Other) that is before "separation," before the emergence of the objet petit, a name for those subjectivized, privatized, and missing parts of the whole. Why is this important? Because it enables us to imagine the native in a way that has been foreclosed by the Manichaean aesthetics in which she is always already cast. (49)

4. James Moffett in his recent book *The Universal Schoolhouse* observes:

Today's concept of "deconstructing" culture catches rather well the efforts of spiritual disciplines to find the hidden "subtexts of the manifest world and to recognize how it seems real or true because we constructed it in the first place. The Hindu notion of the manifest world as maya or illusion has always assumed the "constructionist" view of knowledge that reigns today in cognitive psychology circles . . . that humans make knowledge or meaning, collectively and individually, by putting together their perceptions of the world according to their needs, bents, lights, fears, desires, and circumstances of time and place. Any human version of reality is thus always situational and relative. The antidote is to undo or deconstruct one's personal and cultural conditioning (28).

5. Thanks to Dr. Thomas Willard for suggesting this idea to me in the early stages of writing this dissertation.

6. James Moffet explains that the reason the highest spiritual teaching has usually been secret and exclusive ("esoteric") and never mainstreamed in the churches of any religions is that:

It is potentially very dangerous. The more one understands, the more one can manipulate other people and the rest of nature for one's personal purposes. It is essential that the moral and spiritual nature of a person be awakened to a degree commensurate with the development of the person's intellect and will. Thus the mystery religions of antiquity had in common with other initiatory teaching that
extraordinary revelations were permitted only to those who had demonstrated goodness and self-control in their ordinary behavior. If one's intents derive from the egoistic self and not from the God-being or transpersonal self, that Self of which all else partakes, then knowledge and intelligence become instruments of calamity. (26)

7. In his book, Meetings with Jung: Conversations Recorded During the Years 1946-1961, E.A. Bennet remarks regarding Bollingen:

This is really C.G. in stone, the first part to be built was the round tower on the left; there is a large kitchen and upstairs three room. There is no electric light in the Tower, only oil lamps, and the cooking is done in the open hearth and on an oil stove. The water supply is from a pump in the hall, and below it is a big stone bain. There are many stone carvings. In the wall of the loggia are two very small apertures; through one it is possible to see the path leading to the house, and through the other the path to the front door. (99)

8. In The Jung Cult, Richard Noll attempts to document the argument that a Jung cult formed around the charismatic personality of the master and his writings. Noll describes a cult of personality that mystifies and perpetuates a mythical rather than the actual historical personality. This manifests, he says, "as an institutionalized capitalist enterprise, it includes not only training institutes throughout the world (which parallels the Freudian system), but also hundreds of local psychology clubs ... that sponsor programs and workshops related to New Age spirituality and neopagnism" (7). Noll claims that Jung's autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, "sacralizes" Jung's personality and ideas. "Thus...we do not have the human history of a renowned physician and scientist, but instead the myth of a divine hero, a holy man, a saint, a life produced directly by essentially a religious community, and therefore a biography as 'cult legend'" (15).

But the center of Noll's argument occurs during the period when Jung broke with Freud and for several years afterward. Jung stated in Memories, Dreams, and Reflections that he went through a dark period of about three years: "I could no longer keep up with the world of the intellect, nor would I have been able to talk about what really preoccupied me. The material brought to light from the unconscious had, almost literally, struck me dumb" (193). Aneila Jaffe appends a footnote to that paragraph saying Jung wrote very little and the writing he did were papers in English. She believes this "fallow period" came to an end in 1921 with the publication of Psychological Types. (193, footnote 12)

John Kerr, in his review of Noll's book, explains that "as the pieces of Jung's personality ruptured and split, he was able to observe his own dissolution with
exquisite exactitude, and the observation itself became a kind of therapy" (5). Obviously, at certain points during this period (1913-1916), Jung's personality number two overwhelmed his personality number one. As I discuss in chapter three, it was during this period that Jung was writing for his sanity if not his very life.

While Noll would take off from that period and project onto modern institutional Jungianism the same kind of cultism, the match isn't so perfect. Because Jung did survive the fragmentation and despair of this period. Kerr explains: "he [Jung] naturally hoped that the route he was following might lead him to a deeper truth such as had been widely hinted at in the books of his library--and not simply to the banalities of psychosis" (6). Jung himself seems to have been much more open about his life than his literary heirs have permitted him to be. His autobiography was heavily edited. A chapter he wrote concerning his forty-year relationship with Toni Wolff was removed, and his private journal, The Red Book, is available only to a very select elite.

The importance of Noll's critique and the revelation of the 1916 address to the Psychology Club, is that Jung went deeper into psychosis than he likely knew at the time and than he acknowledged toward the end of his life writing his autobiography with Aneila Jaffe.

9. A.E. Bennet records a conversation with Jung on the 17th of January in 1952:

Yesterday C.G. spoke of the Oedipus complex, that Freud had misunderstood it. Oedipus did not know who it was when he killed his father; he was just a man he met. This whole dogma was built on a misunderstanding (37).

10. I am using "academic and professional discourse" in the sense of academic and dominant culture English often taught within the parameters of the current-traditional model. Current-traditional rhetoric is alive and well judging from my own students in freshman composition and a recent doctoral dissertation. In her 1993 dissertation, Culture, Canons, and Conflicts, Anne-Marie Fish Hall studied first-year college students from English Advanced Placement enrolled in an accelerated Freshman Composition Course at the University of Arizona. She found that they came from scholastic backgrounds focused on an all-white, largely male canon. "The students absorbed the humanist's fantasy that literature must be written, permanent, transcendent" (437).

11. Although I mentioned that neuroscientists estimate that the cerebral cortex evolved 100,000 years ago, Julian Jaynes hypothesizes in The Origin of Consciousness and the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind that consciousness did not begin until the early Greek period of Homer. He defines consciousness as self-
reflexive, the awareness of ourselves as selves. Until approximately 700 or 800 B.C.E., James maintains the whole world was unconscious. The right hemisphere he calls "the hand of the gods" while the "left or dominant hemisphere, like the main side of the bicameral mind, looks at parts themselves" (119). Carefully, painstakingly Jaynes traces the unconsciousness of Mesopotamia and Egypt as "literate bicameral theocracies":

In the bicameral era, the bicameral mind was the social control, not fear or repression or even law. There were no private ambitions, no private grudges, no private frustrations, no private anything, since bicameral men had not internal 'space' in which to be private, and no analog 'I' to be private with. All initiative was in the voices of gods (205).

Jaynes maintains that up until the time of the Odyssey, "men" heard the voices of the right hemisphere as the voices of "gods" and not as a part of themselves.

Laura Moneyham in her 1993 article, "The Origin of Consciousness: Gains and Losses," criticizes Jaynes's work as a "monumental critique of religion." She attributes it to a "quest for a materialistic answer . . . his assertion that all religious impulses are merely nostalgic vestiges of our own bicameral auditory hallucinations, the voices we called gods but which were in reality only emanating from our right hemispheres" (173).

Robert Pattison in On Literacy: the Politics of the Word from Homer to the Age of Rock, offers a much more subtle interpretation of Homer's Agamemnon in the Iliad not as necessarily unconscious, but as illiterate:

Agamemnon is an illiterate in the full sense of the word, and his compatriots know it. One narrative strand of the Iliad deals with the blight of illiteracy as it perverts the actions of men. Homer is as alive as Jaynes to Agamemnon's failure of consciousness. He treats it as one dimension of the human tragedy (17).

But probably the strongest refutation of Jaynes's theory is Enheduanna herself. For only a supremely self-conscious being could write The Exaltation of Inanna. Her self-reflexiveness and consciousness, Jaynes's "analog 'I'," are clearly present and exhibited in this work in which she steps forward in the first person and discusses her own creative process.

I do not claim that she is exemplary of the whole of Sumerian society in 2350 B.C.E., but as with our society and in the history of most societies she stands out as a being of larger than normal consciousness, perhaps a uniquely self-aware person for her time and place.

12. Triune Brain Theory--Neuropsycho-biological theory of the past twenty-five years has evolved a second paradigm of the brain, one of three parts: the reptilian, old, and new mammalian brain. Triune brain theory at first appears to complicate
and perhaps obviate the simple bicameral metaphor of the brain. Dr. Paul MacLean, during his tenure as director of the Laboratory of Brain Evolution and Behavior of the National Institute of Mental Health, hypothesized that the human brain has evolved along three basic patterns:

1. The basic and smallest but deepest part of the human brain evolved from the reptilian brain. This part of the brain is involved in self-preservation and the survival of the species. "Included are such activities as the establishment of territory, growling, foraging, hoarding, greeting, and the formation of social groups" (37). Restak quotes MacLean as postulating that such human characteristics as "ritualism, awe for authority, social pecking orders, even obsessive-compulsive neuroses, may be partially caused by our reptilian brains" (37).

2. The second brain which is larger and covers the first is the limbic brain and occupies the lower one fifth of the brain. Restak quotes MacLean: ""the mentation of the limbic system would appear to involve a process whereby information is encoded in terms of emotional feelings that influence its decisions and its course of action"" (51). Restak notes that Richard Nixon's "siege mentality" precipitated the Watergate Situation. "In the Frost interview Nixon returns again and again to speak spontaneously of paranoia, a correct but belated appreciation of the role that distorted feelings can have on the behavior of otherwise rational people" (53). Despite the fact that his position and physical being were not jeopardized, Nixon's feeling of threat prompted him to act from the mid-primitive level of the limbic brain.

3. The cerebral hemispheres evolved to cover the mammalian brain structures. Composed of seven layers of cortex this is the largest and most evolved part of the human brain. To illustrate the difference between the cerebral and limbic functioning of the brain, the example of xenophobia is useful. The cultural expression of the emotion varies historically and from culture to culture. A non-Athenian such as Gorgias or even Aristotle could never become a citizen nor, indeed, truly accepted, but remained always an outsider and suspect. In a modern high school gangs are often formed on the basis of skin color or simply in response to the Other. The most obvious case that appears daily on the front pages of our newspapers is the situation in Bosnia and the Serbs "ethnic cleansing." Restak explains: "In each case the emotion is mediated by the limbic system. Whatever form it finally
takes, however, depends on the conscious portions of the brain" (58).
The cerebral hemispheres, then, control emotional expression as
modified by culture and the cerebral.

Maclean's research on the triune brain and that of his colleagues has added
much valuable knowledge to neurobiology. It doesn't, however, obviate the
importance of the cerebral hemispheres of the bicameral mind, but rather helps to
explain those cases when mentation remains, as in the Nixon case, locked in the lower
parts of the brain without the mediation of reality and the cerebral hemispheres.

13. Much of the world's population continues to live under survival conditions at a
level unrelated to the cerebral hemispheres. In the United States the poverty of the
inner cities with its concomitant brutal living conditions leaves most of the inhabitants
in a survival mode. Restak explains: "There is little time or place for the
development of such frontal-mediated qualities as ethicality, compassion, and planning
for the future" (108). The most highly evolved states of consciousness depend upon
that part of our brains most recently developed and on civilized living conditions that
stimulate and allow for the use of the frontal lobes.

14. As late as the 1940s an authoritative report stated "categorically" that cutting the
corpus callosum did not result in any changes in mental functioning. (172) Then in
1967, Dr. Roger Sperry at the California Institute of Technology studied the results of
surgical severing of the brain in extreme cases of convulsions, research that
eventually won a Nobel prize. Each of the patients he worked with had experienced
severe seizures. They were classified as "hopeless last resort cases." In each case
the corpus callosum was cut to confine the seizures to only one side of the brain so
that they would then be controllable with antiepileptic medicine. Restak explains that
Sperry reported, "Instead of the normally unified single stream of consciousness,
these patients behave in many ways as if they have two independent streams of
conscious awareness, one in each hemisphere, each of which is cut off from and out
of contact with the mental experiences of the other" (173).

15. As James Moffett recently pointed out in The Universal Schoolhouse, spirituality
is not necessarily allied with religion, but is rather "a way of perceiving reality and a
way of being in the world" (23). He explains that:

There are secular meanings of spiritual and spirituality that don't
necessarily entail belief in God, immortality, the soul, and other
metaphysical realities....Morality comes from mores or customs and
therefore does not depend on religion. Nor do vitality and energy,
mind and wit. The essence of something is abstract and may perfectly
well be understood as purely a mental or psychological category. Morality contrasts with materialism in the sense of selfishness and meanness. Mind commonly contrasts with matter, as does energy in the scientific sense. Philosophers contrast essence with existence. So a concept of immateriality underlies even the secular, material meanings.

Moffett also asserts that the old polarity between spirit and matter may turn out, "like the one between matter and energy, to be a costly habit of mind more than a representation of reality" (31).

16. Among the contradictions that Aristotle embodied not only in his thought but his own life, Jasper Neel in Aristotle's Voice mentions that Aristotle was a life-long Macedonian political agent. He left Athens in 348-47, according to Neel, for two reasons:

"First, Philip wanted him to go to the court of Hermias of Atarneus so he could work as a spy near the Hellespont; second Philip had just enraged the Athenians by destroying the city of Olynthus, and Athens was rife with rumors that Aristotle had given Philip the names of the Athenian sympathizers there, betraying them to certain death. Thus it would have been dangerous for Aristotle to remain in Athens; besides, with his professional stature and his international experience, Aristotle could serve Philip more usefully by planning the invasion of Asia Minor than by trying to spy in a city where everyone suspected him. (99-100)

17. Psyche can be an inclusive term for the soul or the mind in the largest sense as opposed to the brain. In "On the Nature of the Psyche," Jung explained it as the beginning and end of all cognition. He looked upon it as the encompassing both the conscious, the personal unconscious, and the collective unconscious which he explained as consisting "of mythological motifs or primordial images, for which reason the myths of all nations are it real exponents. In fact, the whole of mythology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious" (39).

18. Tikva Frymer-Kensky, a scholar of ancient Near Eastern religions, argues that serious study of the literature of the ancient Babylonians and Sumerians contradicts the usually pejorative meaning of "pagan" as heathen that has existed throughout Western tradition:

Instead of capricious gods acting only in pursuit of their own desires, we meet deities concerned with the proper ordering of the universe and
the regulation of history. Instead of divine cruelty and arrogance, we
find deliberation and understanding. Instead of lawlessness and
violence, we see a developed legal system and a long tradition of
reflective jurisprudence. Instead of immoral attitudes and behavior, we
find moral deliberation, philosophical speculation, and penitential
prayer. Instead of wild orgiastic rites, we read of hymns, processions,
sacrifices, and prayers. Instead of the benighted paganism of the
Western imagination, cuneiform literature reveals to us an ethical
polytheism that commands serious attention and respect. (2-3)
I. AN ANCIENT FEMININE ETHOS

Nan Johnson in her article "Ethos and the Aims of Rhetoric" traced the status of ethos in rhetorical theories of the classical period and contemporary rhetoric to find "that variations in the definitions of ethos correspond to different views of the relationship between rhetorical practice, philosophy, and ethics" (98). These different views may contrast even more deeply between the early Sumerian period of Enheduanna and twentieth century secular society. Perhaps the contrast can best be understood in the difference between the secular and sacred definitions of ethos that Johnson follows from the initial split between Plato and Aristotle. Johnson explains that the pragmatism of Aristotelian rhetorical aims and the function of ethos fulfilling those aims "has tended to dominate the secular rhetorical ars of the postclassical period" (105). Neo-Platonic idealism, according to Johnson, was "incorporated and cultivated as the guiding principle for rhetoric mainly in the sphere of Christian rhetoric" (105). This schism between secular and sacred society she found exemplified in the development of the medieval arts of ars dictaminus (the art of letter writing) and ars praedicandi (the art of preaching). It explains, Johnson says, "the state of coexistence between moral and pragmatic rationales for rhetoric and ethos" that have continued to the present. (105)

Enheduanna's ethos, exemplifying the sacred rhetorical tradition, reverberates powerfully in the works inscribed with her name. Her image also exists on the carved alabaster disk found in pieces in 1927 and heavily reconstructed that Leonard Wooley uncovered during the excavations in the area of the giparu (central temple
area) at Ur. The disk, as I mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, represents a sacred ceremony performed for the moon god Nanna.

Joan Goodnick Westenholz focused on the public persona of Enheduanna and her role in the cult and rituals of the god Nanna/Suen, the moongod. "I hope to prove that Enheduanna was considered the embodiment of the goddess Ningal" (539). She acknowledged the problems of an insufficient data base composed of "limited original inscriptions" and "no contemporary documentation" (539). Westenholz explained that her analysis relied on the comparative richness of literary texts, texts in which Enheduanna proclaims herself as author. (539) Westenholz summarizes, "our conclusions are skewed according to what is preserved and presented by tradition" (541). Yet, what has been preserved is amazing (Hallo estimates 1300 lines attributable to Enheduanna) and given the fact that by the time of Hammurabi (ca. 1700 B.C.E.) Inanna/Ishtar, although still in the pantheon, had been replaced by the god Marduk and the patriarchal rule and the subjugation of women was well entrenched in the ancient Near East.

Westenholz in her survey focused on two areas, titles and activities, that Enheduanna speaks of in her literary works. I will summarize them in some detail as a way of comprehending and articulating her ethos:
A. Titles

En—this title denotes the high priestess or priest of a deity. "In later theological theory, the mother goddess or birth goddess was equally responsible for the birthing of the sacerdotal office of en and the political office of king.... The title en seems to denote the person vested with highest and perhaps final authority in all matters pertaining to the local cult of a particular deity" (541).

zirru. written SA.NUNUZ.ZI NANNA—Westenholz, through an elaborate analysis, argues that the holder of this title, may be understood as Ningal on earth; "there has been an identity-transference....To sum up the evidence, the title EN.NU.NUNUZ.ZI. NANNA relates to Enheduanna in her embodiment of Ningal in her persona as sexual partner of Nanna" (544).

dam—this title denotes Enheduanna as the "proper conjugal wife to the god Nanna with all the entailed rights and duties....The title may reflect the connubial metaphor for the closeness of the religious experience between an immanent deity and a human being" (544). And obviously, the metaphor functioned on the physical level as the enactment of the sacred marriage rite.

B. Activities

chosen by divination—Westenholz explains that the word "chosen" refers to divine selection, "the knowledge of which is usually obtained through the medium of divination by means of extispicy" (544).
ordination and naming ceremony—Westenholz speculates that reading text B is a description "in hymnal discourse" of the ordination and naming-ceremony of Enheudanna. Her name translates as En, "ornament of the heavens" (545). Westenholz explains that a name "can through its ritual adoption change the identity, and thus the nature and innate powers of its owner. She is named four times in the text, in lines 121, 142, 147, and 163. Each passage seems to refer to a different aspect of her role" (545). She is elevated to the en-ship (line 121), she is named as the embodiment of Ningal (line 142). "In line 147, she is called by name possibly in relation to the ‘sacred marriage rite.’ In line 163, she is named regarding her cultic functions, her personal grinding of groats in preparation for offering" (545).

residence—At the conclusion of the naming ceremony, Enheduanna goes to live in the isolated giparu, the inner sanctum of the ziggurat, until her death. She lives a life becomes completely dedicated to her sacred identity. Westenholz notes that lines 97-99 in The Exaltation as translated by Hallo and van Dijk are interpreted as the entire retinue is buried with the priestess to continue to serve her:

Oh lady, the (harp) of mourning is placed on the ground
One has verily beached your ship of mourning on a hostile shore
On account of the (sound of) my sacred song they are ready to die. (27)
However, Westenholz quotes the Kramer and Jacobsen translation of these lines as:

O Lady, lament has become firmly established.

the boat of lament to you (lit. "your boat of

laments") is verily

stranded in enemy regions.

Because of my holy songs I am to be killed. (545)

purification rituals--Westenholz lists five purification ceremonies that

Enheduanna experienced during her ordination:

1. Ablutions upon entering Ekisnugal

"O Ekisnugal, where the lustrations are pure" (text B line 108, 552).

2. Lustrations attendant on her installation as en

"The purification rites of en-ship are prepared" (text B line 117, 552).

3. Ablutions upon entering the giparu

"The purification rites in the giparu [are prepared for her]" (text B line 122, 553).

4. Lustrations with a man and perhaps connected with the sacred marriage rite

"man, who has learned your purification rites" (text B line 150, 554).

5. Purification rites of the cult service and sacred sphere

"in order to keep in order the place of the holy ablutions" (text B line 162, 555).
Purification rituals are listed as me's, those god-given arts of civilization. Such rites are particularly mentioned in relation to en-priestesses. It is interesting to note that they consist apparently of hand-washing ceremonies (the literal translation of su-luh), rather than bathing of the whole body which would have been termed a-nu-a" (546).

**preparation of the meal offering**--Westenholz believes that Enheduanna speaks of herself as the miller who doesn't sleep to grind the groats in the following lines:

> Into the bedroom (Sum.) // to sleep (Akk.)// she does not enter (text B line 153).
> Your barley, in the pure...cloister..., she will grind for you (text B line 154).
> Your miller did not rest in her abode (text B line 155)

**intoning the asila**--Apparently, this function is little understood. "On the basis of the evidence, we cannot make any specific statements concerning the asila intonation within the cult of Nanna" (547).

**the sacred "marriage" rite**--

This rite might be understood as an expression of the fertility aspect of Nanna/Suen in his relation to procreation. On another level of meaning, this symbolic rite connoted a desire for intimate intercourse between the human and divine spheres for the benefit of cultural stability (548).

Westenholz observes in a footnote that the problems surrounding the "'sacred
marriage ceremony’ are very complicated and cannot adequately be treated in this study” (548). She explains that she is currently involved in a project which will define the meaning and functions of the various "sacred marriage" rites. (548 footnote 44).

oneiromancer—This, apparently, was one of the important functions of the en-priestess, dream interpretation. Enheduanna in The Exaltation explains "I may no longer reveal the pronouncements of Ningal to man" (line 119).

poetess—In this role Enheduanna’s work endured for the next millennia, copied by advanced scribes in the scribal schools.

theologian—Her compilation of the hymns to the temples of Sumer and Akkad is a major theological work. "The stimulus that motivated Enheduanna to collect, organize and redact all the hymns of the scattered city-states of Sumer and Akkad is unknown although much scholarly thought has been expended on its being the religious policies of her father" (549).

Upkeep and restoration of temple structure—"[S]he maintained both the physical and spiritual aspects of the sacred sphere" (549). In modern rubric, she acted as business manager in addition to her sacred role. So that her condemnation of Lugalanne in The Exaltation for the destruction of the temple Eanna is doubly heart-felt:

86  He has stripped An of (his temple) Eanna.
87  He has not stood in awe of An-lugal
That sanctuary whose attractions are irresistible, whose beauty is endless,

That sanctuary he has verily brought to destruction. (27)

Her ethos, then, is both that of a divine being and one of a woman who wields enormous political power. A modern Western analogy might be the position of the Pope. At the same time her creative life appears to have been very much a preoccupation. Her works to the moon god Nanna would have been natural extensions of her sacred/political role as En-priestess. However, her passionate exaltation of Inanna--Westenholz speculates that she probably composed more than has been recovered and that many of Enheduanna’s works probably do not bear her name since anonymity is the general rule in Sumerian literature--as I have argued previously, cannot wholly be explained in pragmatic political terms. particularly given the many sacred components that constitute her ethos. (539)

II. THE WORKS OF ENHEUDANNA

A. In-nin sa-gur-ra

Traditionally in Assyriology works are titled by their first line. In this translation by Ake Sjoberg, he titled the hymn “In-nin sa-gur-ra: A Hymn to the Goddess Inanna by the en-Priestess Enheduanna.” In-nin sa-gur-ra is interesting on several accounts. It is longer (274 lines) than The Exaltation (153 lines). Sjoberg reconstructed it from twenty-nine texts and fragments. However, the text contains
many gaps which makes it not only more difficult to read, but the gaps appear at important places. In all 57 lines are missing at important points in the composition yet the personal style of Enheduanna is much the same as in The Exaltation.

Sjoberg explains that the poem begins with an exordium of 90 lines in the third person praising Inanna, reminiscent of her opening in The Exaltation. "Inanna is depicted as a violent and forceful deity; she is the goddess of war, any sign of mercy and love is absent in this part of the composition" (162). Lines 91-114 address the goddess directly followed by 60 lines (115-175) almost each of which ends with "... are (is) yours, Inanna" (163). Sjoberg explains that "the principal theme is Inanna’s omnipresent and omnipotent role in human affairs" (163). I read this section as structured in the same way, at about the same section as the chorus titled "(xv) The Exaltation of Inanna" in The Exaltation.

In line 219 and 220 Enheduanna steps forward in the first person: "I am Enheduanna, the en-Priestess of Nanna, ......., I am the ... of Nanna" (199). Unfortunately the text breaks off entirely until line 243. When the text resumes Enheduanna still speaks autobiographically. She tells of experiencing the great punishment of Inanna. Sjoberg speculates that "[t]he reason why Enheduanna composed this hymn to Inanna may be sought in this offence of the en-priestess against the goddess" (163). In a footnote on that same page he explains that another translation is possible. "'My body has experienced your great punishment,' then referring to a disease sent against the en-Priestess by Inanna" (163 f. 10). Apparently
Enheduanna was healed because in line 254 she says, "My Lady, I will proclaim your greatness in all lands and your glory!", and in line 255 she says "Your 'way' and great deeds I will always praise!" (201). The hymn concludes with the last 19 lines praising Inanna in the second person.

Among the features of the hymn, Sjoberg notes that there is an enumeration of diseases. Beyond that he critiques it as containing some unnecessary repetitions which he lists on page 163.

Apparently Sjoberg chose not to use the Ga text at Yale although he did look at it, for the reason that it was not contemporary with the bulk of the other texts he was using in spite of the fact that it did supply many additional lines. Because so many lines are missing from In-nin sa-gur-ra and the text is so broken, it is difficult to deal with. For this reason, I offer a summary of the hymn, but other than noting the similarity of its rhetorical structure to The Exaltation, I will neither analyze nor deal with it as thoroughly as I have the more complete hymn of The Exaltation.

B. The Temple Hymns

The Temple Hymns are also translated by Ake Sjoberg in collaboration with E. Bergmann, S.J. (1969). Sjoberg in his introduction referred to the collection as a "unique Sumerian literary composition" (5). It is a compilation of 42 hymns addressed to temples which follow the same form. The hymn directly addresses first the temple describing it in epithetrical statements and then the goddess or god: "He/she
(deity) has placed his house on your mus, he has taken his seat on your dais" (5). At the conclusion of the hymns, Enheduanna steps forward:

The compiler of the tablet (is) Enheduanna

My Lord, that which has been created

(here) no one has created (before) (49).

Hallo, in a private interview, referred to this particular collection of hymns as part of the peace cycle while the three extant hymns dedicated to Inanna, (the third hymn to Inanna is being translated) he called the war cycle. The Temple Hymns contain several added later by scribes, hymns to temples that did not exist at the time Enheduanna wrote. However the bulk of the hymns were compiled by Enheduanna. Each hymn is to a particular temple in a city, and each hymn concludes with a similar identification naming the ziggurat and the goddess or god. John Maier in his 1982 article, "The ‘Truth’ of a Most Ancient Work: Interpreting a Poem Addressed to a Holy Place" explains that the rhetorical structure presents "a kind of theology, [that] has at its center the utterly simple but profound pattern: Sacred Place/Divine Dweller" (31). His translation of the hymn speaks more directly to the sacred space of the temple.

A second pattern in each of the temple hymns is the movement of the narrative from the outside to the inside. Enheduanna speaks to the holy place, she addresses it by describing it in cosmic terms "you have grown high, binding heaven and earth, fixing the above and the below" (28). Then she moves inside to describe the sacred
activities "where pure food is eaten" and the holy objects contained within such as the
drum, and the interior space. Finally she describes the goddess or the god who
inhabits this holy space and enables the communication between heaven and earth.

In The Sacred and the Profane, Mircea Eliade explains that the sacred always
manifests as a reality of a different order, a reality more real than natural experience.
"the sacred is saturated with being .... The polarity sacred-profane is often expressed
as an opposition between real and unreal or psuedoreal" (12-3). Eliade further
distinguishes between what he calls "primitive" or "premodern" societies and the
"wholly desacralized cosmos" of the modern world. Eliade points out that it becomes
increasingly difficult for us to discover the existential dimensions of the religious life
or attitude in archaic societies. (13).

The temple was an earthly interpretation of a cosmic model. The Sumerian
ziggurat represented a cosmic mountain. Eliade explains: "The seven stories
represented the seven planetary heavens; by ascending them, the priest reached the
summit of the universe" (40). Eliade also remarks that "Dur-an-ki, 'link between
heaven and earth,' was a name applied to a number of Babylonian sanctuaries
(Nippur, Larsa, Sippara, and elsewhere)" (41) The cuneiform sign for Babylon too
had many meanings Including: "House of the Base of Heaven and Earth," and "Link
between Heaven and Earth" (40). James Moffett in his recent book, The Universal
Schoolhouse observes that the underlying idea of contemplation is "to stake out a
temple, an arena for sacred learning identified with the human head, which is
Reading the temple hymn Maier was struck by what he termed "the terrible anonymity" of the speaker. He characterized her as speaking for us. She doesn't describe the actual visual presence of the temple or its activities in the way or with the detail that a modern author is so careful to explicate in a scene instead "her images are so basic, so primordial" (33). The effect Maier explains are words that "reach to the essence as no actual physical seeing could have given, then or now" (34). The result is the delineation and celebration of sacred space in a way that as a modern reader, I sense the power, but it remains a double mystery. The primary mystery being the inability to see through the eyes of this ancient author, and the second mystery being the mysterious sense of power the ancient thrice translated poem still retains.

C. The Exaltation of Inanna (Nin-Me-Sar-Ra)

A. Exordium

(i) Inanna and the me's

1 Lady of all the me's, resplendent light,
2 Righteous woman clothed in beloved of Heaven and Earth radiance.
3 Hierodule of An (you) of all the great ornaments.
4 Enamored of the appropriate tiara, suitable for the high priest-hood
5 Whose hand has attained (all) the "seven" me's,
6 Oh my lady, you are the guardian of all the great me's!

7 You have picked up the me's, you have hung the me's on your hand.

8 You have gathered up the me's, you have clasped the me's to your breast.

(ii) Inanna and An

9 Like a dragon you have deposited venom on the land

10 When you roar at the earth like Thunder, no vegetation can stand up to you.

11 A flood descending from its mountain
12 Oh foremost one, you are the Inanna of heaven and earth!

13 Raining the fanned fire down upon the nation,
14 Endowed with me's by An, lady mounted on a beast,

15 Who makes decisions at the holy command of An.
16 (You) of the all the great rites, who can fathom what is yours?

(iii) Inanna and Enlil

17 Devastatrix of the lands, you are lent wings by the storm.
18 Beloved of Enlil, you fly about in the nation.

19 You are at the service of the decrees of An.
20 Oh my lady, at the sound of you the lands bow down.

21 When mankind comes before you
22 In fear and trembling at (your) tempestuous radiance,
23 They receive from you their just deserts.

24 Proffering a song of lamentation, they weep before you,
25 They walk toward you along the path of the house of all the great sighs.
(iv) Inanna and Iskur

26 In the van of battle
27 Oh my lady, (propelled) on your own wings,
28 In the guise of a charging storm
29 With a roaring storm
30 With thunder
31 With all the evil winds
32 Your feet are filled
33 To (the accompaniment of) the harp of sighs

everything is struck down by you.
you peck away (at the land).
you charge.
you roar.
you continually thunder.
you snort.
with restlessness.
you give vent to a dirge

(v) Inanna and the Anunna

34 Oh my lady, the Anunna,
35 Fluttering like bats
36 They who dare not walk(?)
37 They who dare not proceed
38 Who can temper
39 Your malevolent heart
40 Lady (who) soothes the reins,
41 Whose rage is not tempered,
42 Lady supreme over the land,

the great gods,
fly off from before you to the clefts,
in your terrible lance,
before your terrible countenance.
your raging heart?
is beyond tempering.
lady (who) gladdens the heart,
oh eldest daughter of Suen!
who has (ever) denied (you) homage?

(vi Inanna and Ebih(?))

43 In the mountain where homage is withheld from you vegetation is accursed.
44 Its grand entrance

you have reduced to ashes.
45 Blood rises in its rivers for you, its people have nought to drink.
46 It leads its army captive before you of its own accord.

47 It disbands its regiments before you of its own accord.
48 It makes its able-bodied young men parade before you of their own accord.

49 A tempest has filled the dancing of its city.
50 It drives its young adults before you as captives.

(vii) Inanna and Uruk

51 Over the city which has not declared
52 Which has not declared

"The land is yours,"
"It is your father's, your begetter's

53 You have spoken your holy command.
54 Have verily removed your foot

have verily turned it back from your path.
from out of its byre.

55 Its woman no longer speaks of love

with her husband.

56 At night they no longer
57 She no longer reveals to him

have intercourse.
her inmost treasures.

58 Impetuous wild cow,
59 Lady supreme over An

great daughter of Suen,
who has (ever) denied (you) homage?

(viii) Invocation of Inanna

60 You of the appropriate me's,
61 Issued from the holy womb,

great queen of queens,
supreme over the mother who bore you,

62 Omniscient sage.
63 Sustenance of the multitudes.

lady of all the lands,
I have verily recited your sacred song!
64 True goddess, fit for the me's, it is exalting to acclaim you.
65 Merciful one, brilliantly righteous woman, I have verily recited your me's for you!

B. THE ARGUMENT

(ix) The Banishment from Ur

66 Verily I had entered my holy giparu at your behest,
67 I, the high priestess, I, Enheduanna!

68 I carried the ritual basket, I intoned the acclaim.
69 (But now) I am placed in the leper’s ward.
70 They approach the light of day, the light is obscured about me.
71 The shadows approach the light of day. it is covered with a (sand)storm.

72 My mellifluous mouth is cast into confusion.
73 My choicest features are turned to dust.

(x) The Appeal to Nanna-Suen

74 What is he to me, oh Suen, this Lugalanne!
75 Say thus to An: "May An release me!"

76 Say but to An "Now!" and An will release me.
77 This woman will carry off the manhood of Lugalanne.

78 Mountain (and?) flood lie at her feet.
79 That woman is as exalted (as he)-- she will make the city divorce him.
80 Surely she will assuage her heartfelt rage for me.

81 Let me, Enheduanna, recite a prayer to her.
82 Let me give free vent to my tears like sweet drink for the holy Inanna!
83 Let me say "Hail!" to her!
(xi) The Indictment of Lugalanne(?)

84 I cannot appease Ashimbabbar.
85 (Lugalanne) has altered the lustrations of holy An and all his (other rites).

86 He has stripped An of (his temple) Eanna.
87 He has not stood in awe of An-lugal

88 That sanctuary whose attractions are irresistible, whose beauty is endless.
89 That sanctuary he has verily brought to destruction.

90 Having entered before you as a partner, he has even approached his sister-in-law.
91 Oh my divine impetuous wild cow, drive out this man, capture this man!

(xii) The Curse of Uruk

92 In the place of sustenance what am I, even I?
93 (Uruk) is a malevolent rebel against your Nanna—may An make it surrender!

94 This city— may it be sundered by An!
95 May it be cursed by Enlil!
96 May its plaintive child not be placated by his mother!

97 Oh lady, the (harp of) mourning is placed on the ground.
98 One has verily beached your ship of mourning on a hostile shore.
99 At (the sound of) my sacred song they are ready to die.

100 As for me, my Nanna takes no heed of me.
101 He has verily given me over to destruction in murderous straits.

102 Ashimbabbar has not pronounced my judgment.
103 Had he pronounced it: what is it to me?
Had he not pronounced it: what is it to me?
104 (Me) who once sat triumphant he has driven out of the sanctuary.
105 Like a swallow he made me fly from the window, my life is consumed.

106 He made me walk in the Bramble of the mountain.
107 He stripped me of the crown appropriate for the high priesthood.
108 He gave me dagger and sword—"it becomes you." he said to me.

(xiv) The Appeal to Inanna

109 Most precious lady, beloved of An,
110 Your holy heart is lofty, may it be assuaged on my behalf!
111 Beloved bride of Ushumgalanna,
112 You are the senior queen of the heavenly foundations and zenith.

113 The Anunna have submitted to you. you were the "junior" queen.
114 From birth on you were the "junior" queen.
115 How supreme you are over the great gods, the Anunna!
116 The Anunna kiss the ground with their lips (in obeisance) to you.

117 (But) my own sentence is not concluded, a hostile judgement appears before my eyes as my judgment.
118 (My) hands are no longer folded on the ritual couch,
119 I may no longer reveal the pronouncements of Ningal to man.

120 (Yet) I am the brilliant high priestess of Nanna,
121 Oh my queen beloved of An, may your heart take pity on me!

(xv) The Exaltation of Inanna

122 That one has not recited as a "Known! Be it known!" of Nanna,
123 "That you are lofty as Heaven (An)"
124 That you are broad as the earth-- be it known!

That one has recited as a "Tis Thine!": be it known!
That you devastate the rebellious land—
be it known!
That you roar at the land—
be it known!
That you smite the heads—
be it known!
That you devour cadavers like a dog—
be it known!
That your glance is terrible—
be it known!
That you lift your terrible glance—
be it known!
That your glance is flashing—
be it known!
That you are ill-disposed toward the...—
be it known!
That you attain victory—
be it known!"

That one has not recited (this) that one has recited it as a Nanna, "'Tis Thine!'"—
(That.) oh my lady, has made you great, you alone are exalted!
Oh my lady beloved of An, I have verily recounted you fury!

C. PERORATION
(xvi) The Composition of the Hymn

One has heaped up the coals (in the censer), prepared the lustration
The nuptial chamber awaits you, let your heart be appeased!
With "It is enough for me, it is too much for me!" I have given birth, oh exalted lady, (to this song) for you.
That which I recited to you at (mid)night
May the singer repeat it to you at noon!
(Only) on account of your captive spouse, on account of your captive child,
Your rage is increased, your heart unassuaged.
The Restoration of Enheduanna

143 The First lady, the reliance of the throne room.
144 Has accepted her offerings has been restored.
145 Inanna's heart

146 The day was favorable for her, she was garbed in womanly beauty.
147 Like the light of the rising moon, how sumptuously attired!

148 When Nanna appeared in proper view.
149 They (all) blessed her (Inanna's) mother Ningal.

150 The (heavenly) doorsill called "Hail!"

Doxology

151 For that her (Enheduanna's) speaking to the Hierodule was exalted,
152 Praise be (to) the devastatrix of the lands, endowed with me's from An,
153 (To) my lady wrapped in beauty, (to) Inanna!


C. Additional Works

Joan Goodnick Westenholz has translated two additional works. They appear in her article "Enheduanna, En-Priestess. Hen of Nanna, Spouse of Nanna." These two additional works relate not to Inanna, but deal with Enheduanna's en-ship, her office of high priestess of the moon god Nanna.
III. SUMERIAN WRITING

Sumerian writing developed primarily as a mnemonic system that never tried to render the language phonetically correct. "The very first stages of writing were pictographic or ideographic in nature . . . rendering only the most important words of an account or a literary text" (Thomsen 20). After the spoken language died out, Sumerian became solely a literary language. The scribal schools over the next 1000 years modified the written language making it less a mnemonic shorthand by adding additional grammatical elements and phonetic complements.

According to French scholar Jean Bottero to decipher cuneiform script becomes an enormously involved process:

"I had to master a writing system with a discouraging complexity. It had between four and five hundred characters that changed in outlines from one century to another, and even became unrecognizable. Each of these characters usually can be read in more than one way . . . I had to be introduced to the mysteries not only of one language but of at least two, both dead and forgotten for millennia: Sumerian and Akkadian. (20)

The minimal vocabulary, he explains, comprises twenty thousand words. He estimates that a gigantic library of at least half a million works exists, 90% of which are what Bottero calls "occasional documents, documents drawn up from day to day
for a particular and ephemeral purpose, linked to the affairs of individual, collective, or political life" (20).

Writing didn't begin with the Sumerians--Gimbutas and other archaeologists have unearthed evidence of the invention of a sacred script used by matriarchal societies in Europe 8,000 years ago and still undeciphered. Gimbutas documents the development of graphic symbolic signs which she has found only within the context of an increasingly sophisticated worship of the Goddess. "Inscriptions appear on religious items only, indicating that these signs were intended to read as sacred hieroglyph" (208).

Sumerologist Frymer-Kensky argues that the earliest impetus to writing was economic echoing the traditional scholarly argument. She thinks writing may have been developed by women who were largely in control of the household and "may have engaged in such transfers or at least kept the record of them, we might speculate that it was these women who developed the technique of drawing the transfer tokens on clay, and thus began the art of writing" (42). Frymer-Kensky goes on to note that "the acts of record keeping and writing, and the wisdom that it enables one to accumulate, are all ascribed to a goddess figure" (42). The goddess Nisaba remained the patron deity of scribes throughout Sumerian and Akkadian history.

Sumerian literacy, the beginning of Western tradition, marks the start of our historical record of literacy. For the first half of five-thousand years of written history, cuneiform inscriptions recorded the main--sometimes the only written--
sources of Western historiography. The Sumerian influence on the Bible was profound from genre forms such as laments and the wisdom-dialogue form of the Book of Job to the stories of the Great Flood and Moses' birth and abandonment. "Sumerian literature can claim distinction on the basis of three remarkable superlatives: it leads all the world's written literature in terms of antiquity, longevity, and continuity" (Hallo 1974, 182). Scholars usually argue that writing began for the purposes of keeping business records in the temples (Schmandt-Besserat 1992). But equally or more important, I believe, may have been the use of writing for cultic religious purposes. As Gimbutas has stated, the earliest forms of writing were sacred script. Writing can also be argued as developing in the temples which were usually dedicated to the Goddess, either the original creatress deity or one of Her aspects. I think that it is probable that a writing system that began as sacred script was adapted to more profane uses, uses which became necessary as the civilization grew more populated, complex, and faced new problems.

A. Sumerian Literature

Literary catalogues were compiled by scribes and of these approximately eight have been discovered; these catalogs list hundreds of titles of works, many of them not yet recovered. All in all, "it is not unreasonable to conclude that this immense literary stock consisting of close to thirty thousand lines of [recovered] text now translated and mostly in poetic form, provides a fairly representative cross-section of
the literary repertoire current in Sumer in the Old Babylonian period" (Kramer 1979, 12).

The basic forms of Sumerian literature appear to be compositions dealing with deities (female and male), kings (male), and scribes (represented as male) in the physical setting of the temple, court or school. Categories of literature included Disputations which were set in the royal palace as a form of courtly entertainment, with the king playing the role of royal or divine arbiter between the disputants. The compendiums of omens Bottero argues were vast displays of systematic thought that extrapolated from and reached beyond actual experience. "In this respect they represent the origins of systematic thought inherited by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle" (Dalley, 24). The epics were directed at a wider audience than the disputations and always involved a male hero, for example the Gilgamesh cycle. Women played limited roles. Epics appear to have originated under royal patronage and "seem to be treated as hymns in praise of the long-deceased royal heroes" (Hallo 1970, 117).

Scribal catalogues also included royal songs to living kings; lamentations e.g. "Lamentation over the Destruction of Ur"; the great cycle of hymns to all the temples of Sumer and Akkad attributed, on the strength of its own colophon (personal symbol), to Enheduanna, the daughter of Sargon." (120). Also catalogued were hymns to deities such as the famous "Exaltation of Inanna," mentioned above, written by Enheduanna and notable as the oldest attributable work of literature. It was copied by scribes for the next thousand years until the Goddess was finally
replaced by male gods and the work eventually disappeared from the Sumerian "canon."

By following the literary genres and measuring their treatment of subjects, particularly the goddess, Mesopotamian literature and culture provide a measure of the organization of society and the place of women. Over millennia, the ancient mother goddess, whose authority was linked with village culture and temple, appears to give way slowly to a plethora of goddesses and gods. When Sargon, the first king to unite Sumer and Akkad, assumed power, his daughter, Enheduanna's, hymn is said to have elevated the goddess Inanna's status to support the notion of a larger Sumer-Akkadian state. The Goddess Inanna became a symbol of Sargon's imperial power, but he still utilized the symbology of a female deity. "Inanna sanctified human efforts to take charge of and change the environment--human and natural" (Wakeman 24). Then over the next 1000 years the Goddess was gradually repudiated and replaced by male gods. For example, by circa 1700 B.C., Hammurabi and the god Marduk had assumed ascendancy in Babylon until the next shift of consciousness became reflected in the succeeding masculine monotheistic canon of Biblical tradition.

B. The Scribal Tradition

Literature was not the sole province of men, nor was writing itself. Yet the scribal tradition also reflects the diminishing role of women and literacy through the millenniums of Mesopotamian history. Thousands of scribes, both men and women,
worked in governmental civil service and in the temples throughout Mesopotamian history. Scribes underwent extensive education in special scribal schools for many years because of the complexity of the written language. Meier states that evidence for female scribes spans the period from the end of the third millennium to the first millennium B.C. but the identification of female scribes is problematic because of the Sumerian language's lack of gender marking. "In the earliest period there was no gender marking in Sumerian to distinguish women from men in occupations which both shared" (541). Scribes did not identify themselves when they wrote letters but they did use formal colophons (signature seals) in literary texts. Most of the information about scribes is derived from literary texts. Several women are known by name. For example, Ishtar-ummi, from the Old Babylon period, simply used the bare form of scribe (dub.sar) but her sister scribes in the same community used the feminine determinative (sal.dub.sar). As mentioned earlier, the initial patron of the craft was the goddess Nisaba who not only superintended the scribes but also carried titles such as "the scribe," "chief scribe of Anu," "scribe of the land" (543). Gimbutas' argument that the original impetus to develop script was for sacred reasons is further borne out by the fact that the patron goddess of Sumerian scribes was initially Nisaba (Oppenheim 242). Later, as the position of women steadily declined in Mesopotamian culture, the goddess was replaced by the god Nabu. In Egypt a female deity--Seshat--invented writing later to be displaced by the male god Thoth.
Scribes became increasingly identified with the male sex and women progressively disappeared from the profession of writing.

IV. APPLYING A RHETORIC OF THE GODDESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY TO ACADEMIC DISCOURSE

Linda spoke hesitatingly, slowly, and almost under her breath. I had to lean forward to hear her. "I'm a pagan," she said.

"A pagan?"

She nodded shyly and blinked.

She looked like the goddess in Botticelli's "The Birth of Venus," this young freshman composition student sitting across from me with her long blonde curly hair. For most of the semester she had sat quietly, anonymously in class while the discussions raged around her between the "Christians" and the one atheist. She loved writing. That was the problem. She wrote poems and stories in a wildly original, disjointed prose. My job was to teach her academic discourse, and I was troubled.

It's easy to dismiss a student such as Linda simply as a flower child. Like old Volkswagon buses with handpainted murals on their sides, such students seem to be remnants inherited from the sixties. In Linda's case her heartfelt sweetness, obvious beauty, and harmless vulnerability make her easy for a busy teacher to rationalize as another mediocre student. Her voice is easily lost in the aggressive arguments
between the "Christians" and the atheist because it is a voice outside the cultural mainstream.

Aristotle's voice, says Jasper Neel, continues to create professional discourse as the type of literacy that as a composition teacher I speak, think, and communicate. "Somewhere between the death of Herodotus in 425 and the death of Aristotle in 322,...written professional discourse emerged in the West, creating the possibility of the culture we now inhabit and at least in some ways, determining how that culture could and would develop" (109). Aristotle theorized rhetoric as the analysis of discourse about discourse. In that process, Neel claims, he stripped "out the magical, the irrational inspiration, and made rhetoric into an analytic mode" (143).

In Manly Writing, Miriam Brody traces the ways good writing has been defined since Quintilian as "manly" while bad writing embodies the characteristics of the "effeminate," "weak," and "womanly." Composition is routinely taught as a gendered study of academic discourse. Student writers, women and men, learn a narrowly defined professional discourse--a type of impersonal, "objective" i.e., agentless writing that Cixous calls the language of mastery. I dutifully teach it explaining, as I do, that it is necessary to master as it would be another language in order to succeed within the academy.

The second major paper of the semester on the theme of text in context--which explores the ways in which society influences the lives of individual authors--at first both scared and puzzled Linda. She sat in the chair across from me, frowning as she
listened to my interpretation. Finally, her brow smoothed, and with the back of her hand she made a gesture that appeared to brush my explanations away.

"I understand all that." She leaned forward, "but my question is what text can I use?" She looked at me, her clear blue eyes determinedly fastened on mine.

I'd asked the students to choose whatever text they wanted. Several of the other women in the class were working with Sylvia Plath and Virginia Woolf.

"I'd like to do something different," she said. "Don't you know about anything else?"

I started to talk about all the works women had written and that had been lost or destroyed. I explained that women writers, as Virginia Woolf explains in A Room of One's Own have, "no tradition behind them....For we think back through our mothers..." (76). Midway through my explanation, my eye fell on the thin yellow book on my desk. I stopped and picked it up.

"This is a hymn written more than 2,000 years before Christ. A moon priestess, Enheduanna, wrote it. Do you want to work with this?" I handed her the book.

She thumbed through it. There was a long explanation of the translation from cuneiform. The actual translation ran only 15 pages, 153 lines. It puzzled her. Her brow knitted into another frown. "I don't know what to do with it?"

I shook my head. "I don't either."
Recently, I became aware of bracketing discourses contained within alternative literacies. One, developed out of the literacy of a civilization more than two thousand years before the Greeks in Mesopotamia, I discovered in the work of Enheduanna (ca. 2350 B.C.E.). She was the En (high) priestess of the moon god Nanna in Sumerian civilization. Her major work, translated in 1968, is a poem/hymn to the goddess Inanna, *The Exaltation of Inanna*, the oldest attributable work so far known.

A second, modern, bracketing discourse, is that of psychotherapy. As articulated in the work of Jungians Silvia Perera and Marion Woodman, psychotherapy may help composition theory speak to aspects of consciousness beyond the cognitive. A rhetoric of psychotherapy works toward a more inclusive discourse of both hemispheres of the bicameral mind, the cognitive left brain as well as the right (minor, intuitive and Other) hemisphere.

For students such as Linda these bracketing discourses help me to conceive of a literacy beyond the academic. The study of this particular ancient rhetoric and applied modern feminist psychotherapy may offer an alternative, broadened view of literacy beyond academic and professional discourse. Certainly, it opens the possibility for expanding ancient rhetorical concepts in a modern composition context.

Tracing writing back to its earliest recorded origins in the Sumerian civilization, seventeen centuries before Sappho, Enheduanna wrote, in cuneiform, her long hymn/poem to the goddess Inanna.
Several years ago on a hot desert day, I stumbled across her poem in the library. Outside the pavement reflected the 110 degree heat in shimmering vaporous mirages while inside the acolytes, dressed in shorts and t-shirts, hunched shivering over their books in the overly air-conditioned library. The beauty of this ancient story of exile and return stunned me, but I became even more entranced by the sophisticated rhetorical stance of the author, Enheduanna.

In *The Exaltation of Inanna*, Enheduanna begins the hymn with carefully arranged epithets and descriptions of the goddess Inanna to illustrate the characteristics of the goddess that become part of the unfolding story. As the hymn progresses she gradually brings the goddess closer and then steps forward in first person to tell her own story of banishment and eventual restoration as high priestess.

Toward the end, Enheduanna also tells of her personal creative process. There is a strong authorial presence that may be unmatched in ancient literary creation until the time of Sappho. She is self-consciously present in the process of writing and in the poem. The collaborative "I" of the creatrix, Enheduanna and Inanna, emerges at the center. Enheduanna describes her creative process as a very purposeful receiving. She heaps the coals in the censer and prepares the lustration to receive her greater self, her transcendent self, the goddess. Her creative process is one of intimate interaction with the goddess. For a time in the middle of the night, they become one and out of that union comes the song.
With "It is enough for me, it is too much for me!" I have given birth, for you.

She is at once inspired by the Goddess, a receiver of creative in-spiriting, and at the same time a poetess whose work comes from her own unique being in a collaboration of the intuitive and cognitive. The myth that Enheduanna tells of her own life intertwined with the story of Inanna I read as enabling a balancing of right and left hemispheres, of the logical, and rational consciousness of the left hemisphere with the intuitive and bodily awarenesses of the unconscious and right hemisphere, of the circumspect and the sacred.

Gender difference and concomitant representations of the Other on a concrete social level involve aspects of consciousness. In psychology recognition of the feminine component of women and men in the relatively new discipline of psychotherapy began with the theorizing of Freud. Freud's discovery of the subconscious and subsequent development of psychotherapy, one of the great contributions to knowledge, created a whole new field of scientific inquiry and profoundly influenced modern culture redefining and altering concepts of what it is to be human. Jung, extending Freud's theories, posited that women and men both possess qualities of masculine (animus) and feminine (anima) in their unconscious, an insight subsequently confirmed biologically by the discoveries of x and y.
chromosomes. He studied and theorized a great deal about his own anima. For Jung, the recognition by men of this female quality, of their own anima (feminine aspect) was necessary to overall mental stability and growth just as was recognition by women of the animus. Admittedly he did not theorize the animus [masculinity in women] as thoroughly as he did the anima, deliberately leaving it to female analysts to hypothesize. Partly because of Jung’s relatively recent death in 1961, the charisma of his personality, and the overwhelming nature of his prolific oeuvre, there has yet to be as much interpretation and reevaluation of his theories as those of Freud, who died in 1939. As Angelika Maeser Lemieux notes, "Jung was engaged in the difficult task of formulating a theory that would bridge the seemingly disparate domains of matter and mind, of nature and psyche" (32).

Because he probed beyond the physical, visual, and clinically apparent appearances of the psyche, Jungian theory has come to be regarded among many rhetorical and composition theorists as essentialist in an age of post-structuralist. In a period when one of the most devastating critiques leveled at a theorist is that of essentialism or foundationalism, Jungian theory seems to be deeply contaminated. Yet James and Tita Baumlin argue that Jung’s model of the mind complements Freudian, Lacanian and Kirstean theory: "Jung’s conjunctio oppositorum looks beyond the tragic fragmentation of a forever-divided self to the possibility of individuation, that wedding or healthful relation between ego and those archetypes which comprise the Self" (258). In the end Jung’s theories may ultimately come to
have as much influence on writing and composition theory as currently fashionable Freudian interpretations do upon literary theory.

Psychoanalysis has become a particularly powerful modern rhetorical tool of consciousness. In practice it becomes a form of discourse analysis that sifts through the screening rationality to the deeper levels of the psyche. As the Baumlin's characterize it: "psychoanalysis has become literally the study of a patient's rhetoric, an explication of one's defensive tropes and schemes" (246).

Recent intriguing work by feminist Jungian psychoanalysts examining the images of woman/Other in text, myth, art, psychology, anthropology, history, and religion holds promise for composition theory. These analysts directly work with the manifestation of archetypal and dream images in their own personal psyches and that of their women analysands as they explore the deeper possibilities of healing and being. Some interesting, broad ranging theoretical and practical applications have begun to emerge that may contribute a great deal to composition studies, and particularly toward a critique of academic and professional discourse. The work of analyst Sylvia Perera provides a good example.

An examination of the rhetoric of Jungian psychotherapist Sylvia Brinton Perera's book, The Descent to the Goddess illuminates some of the underlying genderedness of academic and professional discourse and suggests possible ways to examine and enlarge that discourse. Perera utilizes the myth of Inanna, the Sumerian goddess of heaven and earth, who descends into the lower world, dies, and returns in
a story of seasonal renewal. She uses the myth as a way to interpret modern
women's quest for wholeness, one she defines as "a renewal in a feminine source-
ground and spirit" (7). In her work she has found that women who succeed in the
world are usually "daughters of the father." Women who, of necessity, have learned
to become well adapted to masculine-oriented culture and its values. We have, she
says, "repudiated [our] own feminine instincts and energy patterns, just as the culture
has maimed or derogated most of them" (7).

One way of looking for the connectedness of these "meaningful acts" is to
examine the goddess myth as a descent into the unconscious. Perera's work invokes a
particularly ancient figure of the divine Other, the image of Inanna. She utilizes the
myth of Inanna's descent, one of the oldest stories of human history, as a
psychological and spiritual quest. "The return to the goddess for renewal in a
feminine source and spirit is a vitally important aspect of modern woman's quest for
wholeness" (130). It is also a quest of consciousness for both genders.

Perera describes the process as one of sacrifice, dying to an old identity within
the patriarchy and a descent into the spirit of the goddess to reconnect with the myths
and images of the feminine and Other exiled for five thousand years. I read her work
as significant to the psyches of both women and men, as reconnecting to the right side
of the bicameral mind, to the intuitive, nonverbal level of
consciousness/unconsciousness and a gestalt of totality, something with which both the
sons and daughters of the patriarchy have lost touch.
Perera situates herself as a "daughter of the father." She identifies with an audience of women who are well-educated, likely successful in the material or professional world, and obviously inquiring. Her book has gained a fairly widespread readership among people interested in Jungian and feminist theory. The inquiring audience, like Perera, sense some lack or dis-ease. Identifying with patriarchal culture, they may have alienated themselves from their own mothers when their mother’s weakness and ineffectiveness became apparent. In that process the younger woman also becomes alienated from her own body, its female instincts, and emotions. Physical symptoms such as anorexia, bulimia, and obesity often characterize this feminine alienation from the physical body.

Western cultural readings of the myths surrounding goddesses reflect ways that internal and external perceptions of self and Other are interpreted. The obscurity of the feminine sacred has had a profound effect not only on the history of women, but on the psyche of men. For instance Mary Ann Cain in her recent book Revisioning Writers’ Talk: Gender and Culture in Acts of Composing, posits that the ascendant hero story, the bildung plot of individual inquiry, self-knowledge, and singular identity forms how stories and myths are read. The bildung plot forms the heroic myth of composing. In this myth of composing the "heroic," valorized masculine self signifies a construction of self and identity apart or in isolation from culture, autonomous, self-contained, ahistorical" (44). It is this ascendant hero story that Cain explains as one which dominates reading and understanding erasing the knowledge of
the connectedness of goddess stories. In the writing classroom, Cain says, "within a framework of power as connectedness, ... we come to know the Othernesses of students through an interpretive stance of reading their textual "anomalies" or contradictions as meaningful acts" (187).

How then can Perera's psychoanalytic rhetoric of the feminine divine in the Myth of Inanna's descent and the use Enheduanna's ancient hymn help me teach Linda? It helps me to recognize how Western civilization's readings of the goddess stories are the projection of the misogyny of monotheistic tradition bound with an intellectual inheritance of rational left-brained logocentrism. Finally, how might this help composition teachers reinterpret and revise academic and professional discourse as it's taught to all of our students?

I believe the work of Enheduanna and the psychotherapy of analysts such as Perera and Woodman propounds a rhetoric that includes the Other as an aspect of the unconscious and a deepened recursive, more reflective consciousness, a rhetoric that works itself out as a more comprehensive way to view composition: ethos expanded to a bicameral mind paradigm, pathos as body wisdom, and a logos of the sacred Other.

I am coming to understand that knowledge in the archaic past may have included far more than the consciousness of only one brain hemisphere, of one intellectual tradition centered in an ethos of rationality. Knowledge came also from dreams, intuition, and the bodily senses, the right so-called minor hemisphere. The
ego and its counterpart of the intellect cannot exist independently of the body or the unconscious ... and yet the university, with what often seems an obsessive requirement to colonize students into the use of academic and professional discourse, disregards this knowledge. A clear illustration of the body/mind split occurs daily in the vast lecture auditoriums with their seats bolted to the floor. There, an amplified voice, speaking the logos of left-brained professional discourse, addresses the blurred visages of abstracted, disembodied beings, of an Other.

Embodied discourse, one that reflects the ethos of the bicameral mind, utilizes the wisdom of the body as well as the mind in a discourse of pathos. The larger logic of narrative weaves the unconscious equally into consciousness. It does not privilege the irrational at the expense of the rational, but rather calls for a balance of the two hemispheres. For example, psychoanalyst Marion Woodman uses the wisdom of the body to ground the mind in its individual imagery. "The unconscious has treasures," she said in Interviews, "that consciousness has no idea of. If you take your own imagery and allow it to transform as it wants, it will go exactly where it needs to be" (137). And the result of allowing this process to occur for Woodman is part of distilling individual inner truth, one I call developing a logos of the sacred Other. The deeper meaning inherent in personal and cultural symbology slowly becomes manifest. We enter into a dialogic relationship between body, self, and society from the deeper levels of the unconscious reflecting on the conscious.
The much denigrated "pagan" tradition and its myths whisper of other sources of knowledge outside the tradition of left-brained Western intellectualism. This legacy hints of a larger, more inclusive heritage, one that interblends otherness—other aspects of the conscious and unconscious (Other), of our inner selves and the outside "other." As Gregory Jay recently commented, "Human subjects occupy more than one social or cultural position, and so they have kinds of Otherness inside them. . . . Taking account of that internal diversity may be an ethical as well as political imperative, for it could help mitigate some of the violence perpetrated in the name of identity politics" (26). The deepest dualism within ourselves of Other as the engendering metaphor of the conscious/unconsciousness paradigm of the bicameral mind needs to be acknowledged as basic to composition theory.

As I began to work with Linda, teaching her the discourse of the academy and the forms of professional literacy, I emphasized that her other work was as valuable. I hoped, I told her, that eventually her creative writing abilities, the way she played with language, would enhance her use and thinking in the mode of professional discourse. I explained that the value of academic discourse has been in its cognitive, logocentric emphasis and as a tool of critical analysis.

I'd like to be able to say that Linda was able to reach a new synthesis between the traditional mode of professional discourse and her own feminine/Other mode of a more particularized and personalized style. She didn't. She writes badly in academic prose and less well in her personal style. Nor has my writing improved. I still write
mainly in the pale, disembodied style of the academy organized primarily around the
old forms of argument and thesis.

New discourses, new forms, and especially new perceptions of ancient
literacies--reflections of cultural transformations--evolve slowly. In 1929 Virginia
Woolf projected that within another century there would be a woman's language. I
think she was optimistic. Yet psychotherapists like Perera and Woodman continue to
probe the psyche for its reflecting memories of the feminine and Other, and that
enduring voice of Enheduanna from antiquity persistently resonates . . .
December 12, 1996

Roberta Binkley
Dept. of English
University of Arizona
Modern Languages Building #67
P.O. Box 210067
Tucson, AZ 85721-0067

Regarding: Hallo and van Dijk, Evaluation of Inanna (1968), quotes from the text and the 153 line poem itself for inclusion in your dissertation to be listed with University Microfilms.

Thank you for your letter requesting permission to use the above-referenced material. We are pleased to grant nonexclusive world rights free of charge only for the use stated in your letter, unless special conditions are mentioned under (3) below, and no subsequent use may be made without additional approval. This permission is subject to the following terms:

1. Proper acknowledgement of this reprinted material shall be made, including notice of author (translator or editor), title, Yale University Press as publisher, and full copyright notice.

2. This permission does not include any part of the selection independently copyrighted or bearing a separate source notation. The responsibility for determining the source of the material rests with the prospective publisher of the quoted material.

3. Remarks and additional conditions:

Donna Anstey
Permissions Manager

E-mail: anstey@yalevm.cs.yale.edu
December 30, 1996

Roberta Binkley
The University of Arizona
Modern Languages Building #67
PO Box 210067
Tucson, Arizona 85721-0067

Dear Mr. Binkley:

This letter is written in response to your request to include an image (Neg. #84-139330) of Museum Object CBS 16665 in your doctoral dissertation. Please be informed that use in a doctoral dissertation is not considered "publishing" and, therefore, no reproduction rights form is necessary. Please use the following credit line: "University of Pennsylvania Museum, (Neg. #84-139330)."

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Kline
Photographic Archives
Dear Roberta Blankley:

You must write directly to Yale University Press for permission. AMS has a license to reprint only a handful of library editions. Emphasize that yours is educational/dissertation, that AMS has no objection to your using the material. — John Hopper, AMS Press, Inc.

November 18, 1996

Robert B. Blankley

AMS Press
56 E. 13th Street
New York, New York 10003-4666

Dear Editor:

I have been informed by my graduate college at the University of Arizona that I cannot file my dissertation for graduation without your permission to use quotations, and excerpts from The Exileion of Xerxes by William W. Hallo and J. J. A. Van Dijk. This book was printed by the Yale University Press in 1968.

I would also like to be able to reproduce the whole 133 line poem in the appendix of my dissertation in order that those readers who want to will be able to read the entire poem as a whole.

Since the dissertation will be published by University Microfilms Incorporated a release letter must include the fact that permission extends to microfilming and publication by University Microfilms Incorporated.

I recently corresponded with Dr. William W. Hallo at Princeton where he is on sabbatical. He advised me that he did not object to my using the translation but that it was necessary to obtain permission from Yale University Press and from AMS Press.

I would appreciate hearing from you about this matter. I hope to file my dissertation in early December.

Sincerely,

Roberta Blankley
Works Cited


—. "Composing 'Composing as a Woman.'" College Composition and Communication. 41 (1990): 83-89.


