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THE "RESCUER" ROLES AND THEIR
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

by

William Francis Mentzer

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF COUNSELING AND GUIDANCE
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
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In the Graduate College
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G. F. Meutzler

PREFACE

Investigation of the "rescuer" as a prototype personality has produced a synthesis of theory and practice with deep philosophical and psychological roots. The inquiry started with empirical findings and proceeded inductively to the nature of basic human behavior-- intentionality. The experience from there on was at once challenging, fascinating, and at times frightening and quite threatening. Investigation of the concepts of potency and act led the author into fundamental problems of ontology, cosmology and the nature of man. The application of the human potential movement to intentionality brought the writer face to face with philosophical and epistemological problems of how the subject of human behavior affects and is affected by the known object to produce the knowing process. The inquiry presented problems that philosophers, psychologists and theologians have grappled with for centuries. Looking for a cohesive synthesis of great minds with opinions bearing on the problem was often a threatening experience that tended to become discouraging. For this investigator, it was like walking through a dark tunnel wondering if he would ever see light at the end. The need for meaning, the need to achieve a creative gestalt of personal, academic and practical experience in the world of flesh and blood; the need to find some explanation to the problems presented by the authoritarian Rescuer during a lifetime of inter- and intra-cultural experience encouraged the writer to go on with the task.

In this search for meaning, the writer was encouraged by O. C. Christensen, Ph. D., Director of the Dissertation and Committee Chairperson as well as other committee members. I especially wish to acknowledge the many services and advice of Jean Kunkel, M. Ed. Her encouragement and help were always present when most needed. I also wish to acknowledge the services of Charlotte Cox, who furnished research materials and much understanding and valued advice. Also Anne Larsen, M. S., George Mayo, Ph. D., Teresa C. Campbell, M. A., J. D. and Judy MacMullin for their kind assistance.

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ABSTRACT

It is generally agreed that the understanding of personality is useful for understanding problem behaviors. Many past and current human problems center about the helping relationship; they arise when the helper ("rescuer") forces values on the helpee in a manipulatory way that defines reality for him. This type of behavior appears to be basic and consistent in human relations. The purpose of this dissertation is to determine from selected humanistic literature: 1) whether the Rescuer and rescuer are true personality types; 2) whether they are prototype personalities; and 3) whether the social implications of the "rescuer" confirm the above findings. It is hoped that these three areas of investigation will yield fresh knowledge for the solution of "rescuer" problems in inter- and intra-national as well as individual relations.

Consistent behaviors characteristic of any identity arise from conscious or unconscious awareness. Awareness underlies and presupposes choice processes which constitute the psychological movement of intentionality. Analysis of intentionality shows it to consist of three essential elements: 1) a choice process, 2) an object of choice and 3) a choosing subject. Intentionality is investigated in the selected humanistic literature according to these three elements to determine: 1) What psychological movement constitutes the "rescuers"? 2) Does this movement constitute true personality types according to

given criteria? 3) If so, are these personalities prototypes? 4) What are the social implications that test these findings?

These procedures entail a synthesis of philosophical-psychological theory and practice--authoritative evidence woven together by the common thread of intentionality. This "warp" of intentionality longitudinally directed to the problem and purpose of the investigation, horizontally touches upon the "woof" of associated implications. Finally the inquiry deals with some of these major implications which follow on a summary of the investigation and conclusions derived therefrom.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Significance of the "Rescuer" Issue

The role of the "rescuer" and his influence on the independence of those he "helps" is a timeless and timely issue. For the present we will define the "rescuer" as one who assists another human being who is being victimized by some other person (e.g., holdup man) or thing (e.g., earthquake).

Jung (1959a) attests to the perennial significance of the topic by listing the "rescuer" as a timeless archetype. The Bible, as Jung (1959a) indicates, refers to Christ in terms of an everlasting Redeemer who is the archetype of the "self". Genesis presents Satan, the prototype of Antichrist, as a Rescuer. He promised to free Adam and Eve from their limitations as creatures by making them "like God". In every age history records heroes and villains who professed to help others in the cause of freedom. Various ages have had their Churchill, Joan of Arc, Moses, Hitler, and Napoleon. The timeless social nature of man is the source of transactions with others which either encourage or inhibit their exercise of personal freedom and responsibility. Mythology and folklore have given enduring popularity to rescuing gods and goddesses, fairy godmothers and the benevolent prince charming. Throughout the ages, theologians, philosophers and psychologists have

shown great interest in the rescuing situation and its effects on human freedom. The "rescuer's" effect on human freedom is a timeless issue.

It is also a timely concern. The help afforded by the "rescuer" will be constructive or not depending on the preservation of the helpee's right to make responsible choices, a respect for his internal locus of control. According to Rotter (1975, p. 56):

Research involving perceived internal versus external control of reinforcement as a personality variable has been expanding at a rapid rate . . . estimates of published articles dealing with some aspect of internal versus external control of reinforcement sometimes referred to as locus of control vary. But it is clear that there are well over 600 studies. Most of these studies have been published within the last fifteen years. And there seems to be an active if not increasing interest in the topic.

Recent work done by Rotter (1975) and Coan (1974) on internal-external locus of control scales emphasizes the growing interest in variables that influence the phenomenon of free responsible choice. Recent shocking disclosures, for example: Watergate, C. I. A. intrigue, corruption in free world institutions (the Royal family of the Netherlands, Gulf Oil, Lockheed), have indicated serious problems in the current political, economic, and social order relating to the "rescuer" and his influence on freedom and responsibility. The current break-up of the family unit is being studied increasingly from the viewpoint of "power struggles" and "games" in which Rescuing parents educate their children to powerlessness, dependence and failure. In view of this fact, modern cognitive developmental psychologists as well as educators (Dewey 1933, Piaget 1973, and Furth and Wachs 1974) have stressed the role of the school to help children to think creatively--to solve

problems. Philosophers (Whitehead and W. James) and psychologists (Adler, Maslow, and G. Allport) have emphasized the same need. Periodicals have popularized the problem our school and family "rescuers" have--to help our children be more analytic, actively creative, independent. Bicentennial commemorations emphasize the timeliness of the "rescuer" role by continuous remembrances of heroes and heroines in our Nation's history. The role of the "rescuer" in helping others to achieve independence through responsible choice is a timely topic.

It would appear that there are two basic "rescuer" types--one a hero, the other a villain. It seems that these two types are prototypes of other types which have given rise to the above problems. For the sake of clarity the former will be called rescuer (r underlined); the lower case r will appropriately indicate the dedication to the needs of the helpee. The latter villain type will be referred to as Rescuer (R underlined). The upper case R will appropriately indicate the exaggerated dedication to his own needs. Both types will be referred to as "rescuer" (with quotations marks) to denote the generic rescuer. This brings us to an investigation of the nature and characteristics of these two significant types; this initially demands a treatment of the purpose and problem of the inquiry.

Purpose

The purpose of this investigation is to examine representative humanistic literature for evidence of the "rescuer" as a prototype personality and the social implications of the various types that evolve from the "rescuer".

The timelessness and timeliness of the "rescuer" issue suggests several important questions: 1) Is the "rescuer" a true personality type? 2) Is the "rescuer" a prototype personality? If so, 3) What are the "rescuer's" roles in this capacity? 4) What are the social implications of such roles?

Problem

Do the dynamics underlying the "rescuers" constitute personality types from which other types develop? Does this movement meet accepted criteria for personality formation?

The following method will be used in an attempt to answer this problem.

Methodology

According to Dubray (1943, p. 280), science employs deduction and induction in mutually supportive roles, "Some sciences are chiefly deductive; others, chiefly inductive; other, like politics, political economy, ethics, make frequent use of both processes." The author explains deduction thus (p. 128), "When it (the general principle) is the starting-point or the reason, the reasoning process is called deductive." He explains induction, "When the general principle or law is the goal reached or the conclusion, the reasoning is inductive."

In this investigation the inductive method will be used in a way complementary to a foregoing deductive process. The preliminary purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the "rescuer" is a personality type. It is also meant to discover whether the "rescuer" is a

prototype. This investigation will attempt to answer these questions by discovering whether the "rescuer" meets the qualifications of personality and prototype. It will do this by comparing the characteristics of the "rescuer" with the components of an accepted definition of personality and of prototype.

An accepted definition of personality (the genus of "rescuer") will be analyzed into its components (deductive process). These components will then be investigated empirically using the Rescuer and rescuer as defined reference points.

The definition of personality selected is that of the "dean" of American psychologists, G. Allport. According to this outstanding authority on personality (1937), personality is, ". . . the dynamic organization within the individual of those psycho-physical systems that determine his unique adaptation to the environment." The definition of prototype selected is that of English and English (1958), ". . . an early (or the earliest form) found in an evolutionary series with which later forms are compared; by extension, the earliest form of a response pattern regarded as evolving."

The investigation will proceed inductively in an effort to see if a definition of the "rescuers" as prototypes (as explained) can be established. This inductive process will use the deduced elements of personality as avenues for investigation in the following order:

1. The "rescuer" is an individual who develops
2. a dynamic organization of

3. psycho-physical systems that effect
4. his unique adaptation to his environment.

Duductive validation of conclusions inductively arrived at as well as social implications of the "rescuer's" roles will then be sought by an inquiry into such roles in the areas of: 1) psychotherapy, 2) politics and economics, and 3) the social order.

The criterion for selecting the humanistic sources for this investigation will be taken from another work of G. Allport (1955). In this reference, the author lists philosophers and psychologists who base their personality theories on the premise of an active, creative intellect determining personality development. References for this investigation will be taken from philosophers and psychologists who subscribe to this premise. This investigation does not have an experimental design. It is meant to be descriptive and heuristic in nature, a creative effort to give a meaningful and stimulating solution to the problem as stated.

This methodology based on a definition of the "rescuers" as personalities is problem centered rather than mean- or technique-centered. Authoritative justification of this methodology follows:

Justification of Methodology

According to Maslow (1954, pp. 13-14):

. . . many of the weaknesses of orthodox science and particularly of psychology are consequences of a means of technique-centered approach to the defining of science.

Inevitable stress on elegance, polish, technique, and apparatus has as a frequent consequence a playing down of meaningfulness, vitality, and significance of the problem

and of creativeness in general. Almost any candidate for the Ph. D. in psychology will understand what this means in practice. A methodologically satisfactory experiment, whether trivial or not, is rarely criticized. A bold, groundbreaking problem, because it may be a 'failure,' is too often criticized to death before it is ever begun. Indeed criticism in the scientific literature seems usually to mean only criticism of method, technique, logic, etc. I do not recall seeing, in the literature with which I am familiar, any paper that criticized another paper for being unimportant, trivial, or inconsequential.

The tendency is growing therefore to say that the dissertation problem itself does not matter--only so it be well done. In a word, it need no longer be a contribution to knowledge. The Ph. D. candidate is required to know the techniques of his field and the already accumulated data in it. It is not usually stressed that good research ideas are also desirable. As a consequence it is possible for completely and obviously uncreative people to become 'scientists' in spite of the fact that an uncreative scientist is as self-contradictory as a mute orator.

To support his arguments for problem-centering rather than the (Rescuing) "ritualization" (sic. Maslow) of mean-centering, Maslow (1954, pp. 21, 195, fn. p. 21) quotes Albert Einstein: "The formulation of a problem is far more often essential than its solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science."

Maslow (1954, p. 20) further defines the role of the scholarly psychologist:

The proper place for the scientist--once in a while at least--is in the midst of the unknown, the chaotic, the dimly seen, the unmanageable, the mysterious, the not-yet-well-phrased. This is where a problem-oriented science would have him be as often as necessary. And this is where he is discouraged from going by a means-stressing approach to science.

The methodology in this investigation will follow the goal or problem orientation indicated by Maslow. The problem centers on the existence of two opposing personality types as prototypes. The methodology will then consist in investigating the nature of personality and personality developments in selected humanistic literature to see if the "rescuers," as defined above, exist there as prototypes.

G. Allport (1937) defines personality in terms of being and becoming, ". . . dynamic organization within the individual of those psych-physical systems that determine his unique adaptation to the environment."

Maslow suggests what sort of problems are worthy of the scientific and scholarly investigator:

. . . it (means centering) also tends to block the asking of many questions, on grounds that the reader might well expect by now, that such questions cannot be answered by currently available techniques, e.g., questions about the subjective, questions about values, questions about religion. It is only such foolish grounds that make possible that unnecessary confession of defeat, that contradiction in terms, the concept of the 'unscientific problem,' as if there were any question that we dared not ask, and try to answer (Maslow 1954, p. 19).

The problem selected here for investigation centers on values, viz.: 1) What happens to the individual identity when it has the abiding desire to force its own values on others in the helping relationship? 2) What happens to the individual that helps others define and pursue their own values in the helping relationship? 3) What happens to the identity of the helpee in these transactions?

Selection of G. Allport's Definition
as Criteria of the "Rescuers"

The choice of the above definition as criteria of the "rescuers" is not an arbitrary but a purposive one. The reasons for this selection are as follows:

1. G. Allport is a leading value psychologist who has been called the "Dean of American Psychology."

2. His definition of personality has been widely accepted. Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 264) state, "The care and detail with which Allport developed his definition of personality are reflected in the frequency with which other theorists and investigators have borrowed from it." Further, G. Allport's definition of personality in terms of psychological movement is essentially the same as that of Adler who defines "life style" as "typical psychological movement." This typical movement was described by St. Thomas Aquinas as "intentionality" (Summa Theologica 1952).

3. G. Allport has a reputation for integrating his work with tradition. Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 291) state:

We have already mentioned the fact that Allport represents one of the few theorists who provides an effective bridge between academic psychology and its traditions on the one hand and the rapidly developing field of clinical and personality psychology on the other hand. This continuity not only serves to enrich each of the subdisciplines with the insights of the other but also helps to maintain an intellectual continuity that is important for the long-term development of psychology.

The need to research tradition in the study of personality is emphasized by Hall and Lindzey in the following excerpts from Theories

of Personality (1970, pp. 1),

. . . there is an obligation to place these theories (i.e., of personality) in a general context relating them to what has gone on historically in psychology as well as locating them in the contemporary scene.

This body of theory is manifestly a part of the broad field of psychology. (p. 3).

A comprehensive view of the development of personality theory must surely begin with the conceptions of man advanced by the great classical scholars such as Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. An adequate account would also be obligated to deal with the contributions of dozens of thoughtful individuals, for example, Aquinas . . . Locke . . . whose ideas are still to be detected in contemporary formulation (p. 2).

After evaluating the relative influence of the various disciplines, i.e., natural science, biology, social science, and the humanities in the evolution of personality theory, G. Allport states the following in Personality and Social Encounter (1960, p. 5): "Tardily the psychologists have arrived on the scene. One might almost say they're beginning 2000 years too late. The psychologists' work, it might seem, has been done for him and done most brilliantly [by philosophers and literati]."

In Becoming (1955) the same author specifies the influence of philosophy on the development of personality theory. He presents two dichotomous traditions in this development: 1) the Locke-Hume or tabula rasa tradition which holds that man is merely reactive and 2) the "Kant-Leibnitzian tradition" which holds that man is active and creative by nature. In this same work he further specifies this relative influence on the evolution of personality theory (1955, pp. 12-13),

"Aristotle's doctrines of orexis and entelechy anticipated the spirit of Leibnitz, as did the doctrine of intention in St. Thomas Aquinas."

In researching the origins and development of the "rescuers" this investigation will follow G. Allport's logical, traditional approach. The logical dichotomy between the "rescuer" presupposes the Kant-Leibnitzian admission of an active, creative intellect underlying personality development. Aristotle's theory of orexis and Aquinas' teaching on intentionality are both expressions of the active, creative intellect of the individual striving "to find a place in the world" (Adler 1956) through personality formation.

Intentionality then is the vehicle or means to personality formation. In its broadest form as defined above it is the movement of the mind toward reality. It is the bridge between the individual and reality. May (1969) calls it "an epistemology, a way of knowing reality." As a conscious movement, intentionality includes planning, decision, conscious choice, intent and creative purposive striving. The importance of intentionality in personality formation within the "Kant-Leibnitzian tradition" has already been stated above. May (1969, p. 225) emphasizes its importance in the following: "The concept seems to me so important, and has been so neglected in contemporary psychology, that I ask the reader to go with me into an exploration of its meaning. Its roots are to be found in ancient thought: Aristotle said, 'What is given to the eyes [in our terms, what is perceived] is the intention of the soul'."

G. Allport was among the modern psychologists who recognized the importance of intentionality in personality formation. According to Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 290):

Beginning with an interest in an appropriate unit for the description of personality that led to his conception of the trait, and a simultaneous concern over the developmental transformation that motives undergo, which culminated in the concept of functional autonomy, he has progressively modified the theory so as to place increasing emphasis upon intentionality and ego (proprieate) functions.

Dreikurs (1971, p. 7) emphasizes the importance of intentions (conscious intentionality), "We may know our thoughts and feelings; use them to 'explain' our actions. But the real reasons for our actions--our intentions--remain unrecognized most of the time, particularly if we try to justify inadequate actions or deficiencies."

Thus far our investigation has arrived at the following conclusions: 1) The above authoritative sources are the basis for the assumption that intentionality is the vehicle of psychological movement in the formation of personality. 2) This psychological movement underlies awareness and behavior. It is assumed that this intentionality also gives rise to the "rescuer" roles. 3) A comparative investigation of this psychological movement in the formation of personality vis-à-vis the formation of the "rescuers" is expected to demonstrate how the role of the "rescuers" relates to personality. 4) These conclusions are congruent with G. Allport's criteria for personality. Thus our problem is: Is the "rescuer" intentionality the psychological movement of personality? Is this basic movement a source construct of other specifically and individually differentiated personalities? In pursuit

of answers to these two questions we will further investigate the literature in the area of the "Kant-Leibnitzian tradition". We will start by tracing the origins of the "rescuer". This will be done through a focus on the nature and dynamics of intentionality.

This investigation then is an inquiry into the psychological movement or intentionality of the "rescuers" to find out if this movement constitutes prototype personalities.

Assumptions

1. Psychology (psyche or mind and logos or study) is essentially a study of the mind and primarily a matter of awareness. It considers environmental and somatic variables as conditioners of behavior.

2. Man has an active creative intellect with which he can determine his behavior.

3. The fictional self-ideal is the product of this creative intellect. It is an abstract universal concept that cannot be reduced to a particular or any combination of particular realities.

4. The fictional ideal is abstracted from particular realities by the activity of the creative intellect known as the agent intellect by Aristotle. According to the Moderate Realistic theory the abstract fictional ideal exists as such only in the mind but exists fundamentally in (i.e., abstracted from) external reality.

5. The "rescuers" are fictional self-ideals as personality types.

Definition of Terms

The following definitions apply to this study:

Competition: Striving to achieve by putting others down.

Achievement on "useless side of life."

Helping Relationship: Any situation in which one human (helper or "rescuer") assists another (helpee or "victim") with some problem (person or thing "persecutor") that afflicts him.

Independence: Freedom to decide one's own destiny with regard to the self-actualizing needs as presented by Maslow (1968) in Toward A Psychology of Being. Includes specific emphasis on the right to decide the use of one's psychological and natural resources.

Ontological Evil: Evil affecting the very being of a subject.

Rescuer: The helper who answers his own needs by defining reality for the helpee. His prime, and often exclusive, motivation is to gain personal advantage from the helper role.

rescuer: The helper who does for the helpee what he cannot do for himself. He helps the victim define reality for himself by helping him to independence through responsibility.

Responsible Choice: A choice made with conscious awareness and free will. The subject makes such a choice because he himself wants it because it has meaning and value for him.

Symbiosis: Mutual dependency relationship between Victim-Rescuer, and/or Persecutor.

victim: Bona fide oppressed, e.g., victim of robbery or the poor of developing nations who are disadvantaged through no fault of their own.

Victim: The helpee who assumes the role of being oppressed to gain personal power.

CHAPTER 2

SEARCH OF THE LITERATURE

Source of Psychological Movement and Identity: Dynamic Organization of Intentionality

According to Humanistic theories, observable behavior is dependent on an antecedent awareness which is capable of experiencing self and external reality. Awareness itself is not observable but it is the main source of observable behavior; it makes known the reality, the particular objects of choice underlying observable behavior as well as personality (e.g., Adler 1954; G. Allport 1960; Berne 1961). Any particular behavior requires a choice process to select it from all other possible behaviors.

Awareness not only leads to choice. According to Jung (1964), it also presupposes choice. We could not be aware of anything unless the psychological movement terminating in awareness bracketed out all other possible objects of awareness and was directed toward or focused in on a certain object or limited number of objects.

A simple experiment will demonstrate the phenomenon of choice underlying awareness. A person makes the decision to "get in touch with" his body sense starting with the top of his head proceeding on to the tip of his big toe. In carrying out this exercise he will note that his awareness will successively be directed to one part of his body to another bracketing out in succession other parts of his body. There

can be no awareness without this choice of direction, a focusing in on one area of sense awareness and blocking out others.

This choice process tends toward (i.e., "intends") reality. St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica and other works refers to this global name of intentionality. Intentionality is the basic human behavior that terminates in awareness and observable behavior. According to May (1969), intentionality cuts across conscious and unconscious; it embraces the cognitive, connotative, and emotional. The same author (1969, p. 225) asserts the following: "Two kinds of intentionality were made distinct: intensio primo, referring to knowing particular things--that is, objects which actually exist; and intensio secundo,¹ the relations of these objects to general concepts--that is, knowing by conceptualization."

St. Thomas deals in some detail with the difference between intentio prima and intentio secunda especially in treating differences between animal and human intentionality (Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 12, a. 5). He stresses the teleological foundation of intentionality here as elsewhere. This differentiated intentionality is the basis for his theory of knowledge and ethics found in the above work. May (1969) calls intentionality a "bridge" between the subject and reality, an epistemology by which the subject knows reality.

Adler (Dinkmeyer and Dreikurs 1963; Dreikurs 1971) refers to the life style, the core of personality as a "typical psychological

1. The disagreement in gender of modifier with nouns is that of the author, May.

movement" which establishes a hierarchical value system. Mosak (1972) explains how these values are global convictions about the self (self-concept, the world; Weltbilt), Ethical Ideal (the dominant shoulds of society) and the Self-Ideal (the personal should to which one must conform to find a place in the world). G. Allport calls this hierarchical value system, constituting the core of personality, the proprium; a "value schemata." Seven centuries prior to these modern humanists St. Thomas' Summa Theologica (Brennan 1941) held that psychological personality was constituted by intentionality. Assuming that personality consisted in a unified consistent movement of intentionality, we need ask a few questions germane to this investigation: 1) Are there prototype intentionality-"rescuer" movements meeting the criteria requirement of personality; a dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determines his unique adaptation to the environment? 2) Do these prototypes give rise to other personality types?

The inquiry will address itself to the questions by investigating the origins of intentionality and comparing its innate movements and tendencies to those of the "rescuer." Then the intentional movement of personality will be compared to typical "rescuer" movements according to the stated personality criteria. The application of these criteria to generically and specifically distinct "rescuers" should determine whether the "rescuers" are prototypes.

As has been seen, intentionality is a psychological choice movement underlying and terminating in awareness, conscious as well as

unconscious. Any choice consists of three essential elements: 1) a chooser or subject who chooses, 2) the choice process, and 3) an object of choice.

Subject of Intentionality

Existence. As has been stated, both choice process and subject of such choice are a matter of empirical fact. Dubray (1943) explains how human experience and institutions testify to a persistent center of attribution for behavior. The phenomena of memory, guilt, merit, punishment, innocence testify to a lasting identity underlying these variables. We experience the continuous child-relation to parents. Adoption and inheritance laws attest to this lasting relationship.

G. Allport (1955) states why the subject of intentionality has not been dealt with extensively in modern psychology (pp. 36-37).

Since the time of Wundt, the central objection of psychology to self, and also to soul, has been that the concept seems question-begging. It is temptingly easy to assign functions that are not fully understood to a mysterious central agency, and then to declare that 'it' performs in such a way as to unify the personality and maintain its integrity. Wundt, aware of this peril, declared boldly for 'a psychology without a soul.' It was not that he necessarily denied philosophical or theological postulates, but that he felt psychology as science would be handicapped by the petitio principii implied in the concept. For half a century few psychologists other than Thomists have resisted Wundt's reasoning or his example. Indeed we may say that for two generations psychologists have tried every conceivable way of accounting for the integration, organization, and striving of the human person without having recourse to the postulate of a self.

W. James has tried to explain the phenomena of center of attribution by his theory that a subsequent thought assumes responsibility

for the one it follows. A pragmatic psychology of becoming is thus rendered possible by this theory. Brennan (1941) gives an extended treatment of W. James' teaching.

The Locke-Hume tradition as explained by G. Allport (1955) denies the existence of a creative subject of intentionality. They hold that the mind is an empty inert mass from which environmental stimuli like "cookie cutters" cut their appropriate responses.

G. Allport (1955) emphasizing the importance of ontological personality uses Boethius' definition of ontological personality, "Substantia individualis rationalis naturae" (the individual substance of a rational nature) to bolster his contention that rational activity is a "proprie function" of psychological personality (p. 46):

Many philosophers, dating as far back as Boethius in the sixth century, have seen the rational nature of personality as its most distinctive property. (Persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae.) It may seem odd to credit Freud, the supreme irrationalist of our age, with helping the Thomists preserve for psychology the emphasis upon the ego as the rational agent in personality, but such is the case. For whether the ego reasons or merely rationalizes, it has the property of synthesizing inner needs and outer reality.

As noted by G. Allport and specified by this investigation above, modern psychologists other than the Thomists employ the concept of a psychological agent or ontological personality to explain psychological phenomena. G. Allport's position does make a point stressed by Jung (Jacobi 1973), that modern psychology emphasizes empirical phenomena as its proper object. The "physical science" approach to psychology with its stress on observable, and measurable variables amplifies this opinion.

Nature. As stated above Kant regarded man's core being or substance as the "thinking I" or "soul". Aristotle and St. Thomas taught that this persistent center of attribution consisted of an actualizing principle (substantial form) and essentially limiting principle (prime matter). They arrived at this conclusion from the a posteriori reasoning that the operation or behavior of a subject gave an indication of its nature (operatio sequitur esse--operation follows being). They regarded man's behavior as both actualizing and limited; thus, man's being must consist of an actualizing and limiting principle. As with Adler (1956) there were no absolutes in man's nature.

According to Hall and Lindzey (1970, p. 127): "The creative self is the active principle of human life, and it is not unlike the older concept of soul." The same authors state: "The creative self is the yeast that acts upon the facts of the world and transforms these facts into a personality that is subjective, dynamic, unified, personal, and uniquely stylized. The creative self gives meaning to life; it creates the goal as well as the means to the goal" (p. 127). Adler (1935, p. 7) himself makes the following statement regarding man and the creative self: "Heredity only endows him with certain abilities. Environment only gives him certain impressions. These abilities and impressions, and the manner in which he 'experiences' them--that is to say, the interpretation he makes of these experiences--are the bricks, or in other words his attitude toward life, which determines this relationship to the outside world." For Adler then, the "creative self" is

the subject of the psychological, human potential movement traditionally known as intentionality.

For Jung the entity underlying and encompassing the whole of personality is the "self": it is the psyche's center of authority; he referred to the self as "the centre and foundation for psychic being" (Jacobi 1973).

The persistent identity that results from this individualized composite of matter and form is the central core of our being or ontological personality. Psychological personality develops as dependent being or "accidentally"² through the creative meaningful activity of intentionality of the underlying core being. As explained by Hall and Lindzey (1970), the archetypes of the collective unconscious are "latent memory traces." They are predispositions to have the same order of experiences as our ancestors. This corresponds to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Aristotle held that the human soul preexists the body and is infused into prime matter which was conditioned to receive it. According to the Thomistic tradition "matter signed by quantity" (materia quantitate signata) or the genetic factors (DNA--Dioxyribonucleic Acid) in conception occasions the individuation of the substantial form as it is received into prime matter (Brennan 1941). The solitary core being or subject of intentionality results.

2. "Accident" for Aristotle is that category of being that cannot exist by itself but needs substance or independent being in which to inhere.

On Death and Dying and other works by Kübler-Ross (1969)

present experimental evidence that supports the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory on the subject of intentionality: that the human form or soul is a co-substantial and of itself incomplete substance that can pre-exist and survive union with its quantified body; that it is the source of psychic energy that vivifies holistic psychophysical systems and unifies them. The experimental findings of Dr. Kübler-Ross support this humanistic tradition subscribed to by Adler (1954) and Jung (1959b) which holds that the human psyche transcends the limitations of space and time determining the operations of man's quantified body. It can consciously reflect, be aware of its awareness, get out of itself as an observer of its psychological, physical, and composite psychophysical operations. Thus as will be seen in more detail later, this substrate ontological personality can through reflexive intentionality form self-concept and view of the world--reflexive I-me, I-thou relations that constitute its "psychological," "accidental," or "operative" personality.

The Jungian position on the "self" agrees with the Adlerian and Aristotelian positions in that the subject of psychological movement inherits potentials that influence this psychological movement. Rank has made observations about a transcendent psychology and a psychological agent. In Death and Rebirth of Psychology, Progoff (1973) relates Rank's conviction that psychology leads man to a search for a soul beyond psychology. In investigating the psychological dynamics of conscious and unconscious choice this inquiry has necessarily been led

into metaphysical considerations about the chooser or subject of intentionality. Adler (1956, p. 142) explains such necessity in this manner:

I must admit that those who find a piece of metaphysics in Individual Psychology are right. Some praise this, others criticize it. Unfortunately, there are many who have an erroneous view of metaphysics, who would like to see everything eliminated from the life of mankind which they cannot comprehend immediately. But by doing so, we would interfere with the possibilities of development, with every new thought. Every new idea lies beyond immediate experience. Vice versa, immediate experience never yields anything new. It is only the synthesizing idea which connects the data of immediate experience. Whether you call it speculation or transcendentalism, there is no science which does not have to enter the realm of metaphysics. I see no reason to be afraid of metaphysics; it has had a very great influence on human life and development. We are not blessed with the possession of the absolute truth, and on that account we are compelled to form theories for ourselves about our future and about the results of our actions.

Maslow (1954, p. 289) quoting G. Allport, enumerates three levels of psychological movements:

Gordon Allport stresses strongly and correctly that 'being' is as effortful and active as is striving. His suggestion would lead us to contrast striving-to-make-up-deficiencies with striving-to-self-actualize rather than striving with being. This correction also serves to remove the too easily acquired impression that 'being,' unmotivated reactions and purposeless activity are easier, less energetic and less effortful than coping with external problems.

Maslow (1968) makes clear the first two movements he speaks of here. That purposiveness and striving as found in the first two movements here, 1) i.e., to answer deficiency needs, e.g., for food, shelter, etc., and 2) to meet goals, e.g., discovery, invention, etc. are a matter of taking means to an end. This is the psychology of use of Adler. The third movement is that of the self-actualized person

enjoying "peak experience." This movement is toward answering "being needs" and toward the goal as already acquired (not to be acquired) through pursuit of means to the goal. The object of intentionality in "peak experience" is pursued for its own sake. This "effortful," energetic but non-striving, purposeless psychological movement is further described by Maslow (1968, p. 288), "This strength and health have been ordinarily produced in our society by early chronic gratification of safety, love, belongingness and esteem need. Which is to say that these aspects of the person have become functionally autonomous, i.e., independent of the very gratifications that created them." As we will now see, this movement by which "being seeks Being" (Heidegger 1962) in its initial stages is energetic and ontologically purposive or teleological.

The Choice Process of Intentionality

We will now investigate the process of choice in intentionality to see if this teleological search for being produces the patterned identities of the "rescuers" and if so how these are formed. Can they be considered prototypes that are differentiated into specifically and individually distinct "rescuer" personalities?

Thus far we have seen certain authorities subscribe to a unified center of attribution underlying psychological behavior. Our focus will now be: Are these behaviors dynamically organized into unified "rescuer" prototypes; identities that have self-consistent behavior arising from their innate human potential?

We will first investigate the characteristics of intentionality which will be related to the generic traits of the "rescuers". Next we will go on to see if these basic identities are conditioned to become specifically and individually distinct.

The Choice Process: General Characteristics

Intentionality: A Human Potential Movement to Perfection. May states that intentionality is an "I can" movement. Assagioli (1973) quotes him as follows, "an important recognition that Rollo May makes is the close connection between intentionality and identity. 'It is in intentionality and will that the human being experiences his identity.' 'I' is the I of 'I can.' What happens in human experience is 'I conceive,' 'I can,' 'I will,' 'I am.' The 'I can' and 'I will' are the essential of identity.' This is in full agreement with Cizkowski and Aveline."

As mentioned above, the subject of choice, the substantial identity, is the center of attribution of behaviors to which May refers. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of personality these "I can," "I will" behaviors create the "I am" psychological personality.

In his Politica, Aristotle states that the nature of human potential (as well as potential generally) is to tend to actualization which is its perfection or completion.³

3. The concepts of potency and act are basic to Aristotelian thinking. For Aristotle they reconciled the opposing theories of Parmenides (permanence is the only reality) and Heraclitus (change is the only reality). For Aristotle things change (i.e., have "potency") and have permanence (i.e., have "act"). This has far reaching

For Adler (1956) the upward movement to perfection is man's basic striving. This striving is a movement from "negative" (potential) to "positive" (actualization). Human potentials such as social interest are termed "bricks" or "equipment" by Adler (1956). This "psychology of possession" is actualized in the upward movement to perfection by a "psychology of use." Acquired physiological, cosmological, and social inferiority feelings are most often referred to as the source of the upward movement to perfection from a minus to a plus position. However, the following reference from Adler (1956, p. 115) makes it clear that the basis for the upward movement is man's basic potential or "psychology of possession," "Included within it (the framework of the inferiority feeling) was also the goal of perfection as inducing an inferiority feeling, which in turn 'presses towards its own conquest.' In this sense then the inferiority feeling came close in meaning to what Lewin called a quasi-need, that is, a tension system, effected by a purpose."

For Jung (1959b) man's basic striving was for completion. Archetypes such as the hero, redeemer or villain are inherited potentials or predispositions for the same order of psychological movement or intentionality as one's ancestors created to cope with reality. These potentials are actualized by being integrated with the ego in the individuation process.

implications for philosophy and psychology. In psychology those who consider awareness (hence intentionality) as a becoming process only (e.g., W. James, Perls, Bergson and pragmatists generally) have revived the teaching of Heraclitus. Adler, Jung, G. Allport, and Maslow like Aristotle subscribe to a psychology of being and becoming (Dubray 1943).

St. Thomas likewise subscribed to perfection as man's basic striving (S.T., I-II, a. 1-5). Both Aristotle (Politica) and St. Thomas (S.T., I, q. 77-78) saw potential as both active and passive. Shostrom (1967) regards this distinction as basic for the development of the manipulator into active and passive types. As will be seen the same distinction will account for the genesis of the "rescuers" into basic active and passive identities.

As a result of man's active and passive potential he can influence and be influenced, act and be acted upon in the upward movement toward perfection. This "I can" movement has an object. Its object is participation.

A Reciprocal Participation. As May (1969) notes, St. Thomas held that through intentionality we participate in reality and reality participates in us. The sculptor's mind that molds the clay is in turn molded by the potentialities, limitations, and other qualities of the clay. St. Thomas held that the agent intellect (the active side or power of our human intelligence) abstracts the "intentional or impressed species" from particular reality. This intentional species is impressed on the possible intellect (or passive intellect) from which emerges the expressed species (species expressa) or universal concept (Brennan 1941). May comments on this teaching of St. Thomas in Love and Will. Underlying this process of "informing" and "being informed" is the active and passive potentials of human faculties. This concept underlies St. Thomas' teaching regarding matter (passive potential), form (active potential) and the constitution of substance (the "subject" of

intentional choice as explained above). Its role in intentionality is a congruent foundation to his cognitive theory consisting of agent intellect (active potential) and possible intellect (passive potential) (Brennan 1941). As will be seen these two potentials are the psychodynamic source of the basic specific difference between the manipulator and actualizer in the helping relationship--the "rescuers". Without this basic character of active and passive potential in intentionality; without the subject's ability to participate or share in reality and be participated in by reality and thus build an epistemological bridge between himself and the outside world; without the pressure of his potential teleologically seeking reality for its actualization in the upward movement to perfection, there could be no competition to differentiate the "rescuers". Competition implies an active informing potential and a passive informable potential.

It is clear from May's commentary on St. Thomas why the former calls intentionality a "bridge" and an epistemology. It is to be noted that this concept of participation differs markedly with the Neo-Platonic Kantian view of abstract cognition through the "categories". Kant made the mind, the "categories" terminative of cognition. For him the mind did not know things (noumena) it only knew phenomena (or accidentals like color, size, shape, etc.) (Dubray 1943). For Aristotle and St. Thomas individual things were terminative of abstract cognition and truth (i.e., the agreement of mind and reality--convenientia mentis et rei). Aristotle's rejection of Plato's innate subjective forms and his adherence to the role of individual empirical

things was a factor contributing to the break with his illustrious mentor. According to Kerferd (1967, p. 153): " in the period after 335 B. C., Aristotle was feeling his way toward a type of thinking based on a wholly new principle, that of empirical science; and by the end of his life he had come to reject all the essential features of Platonic otherworldly metaphysics . . . the search for the ideal Form is for Aristotle a search for actuality, and this involves consideration of concrete individual cases." G. Allport (1955, p. 53) clearly expresses his opinion on the role of empirical reality in cognition: "We not only know things, but we know (i.e., are acquainted with) the empirical features of our own proprium." It will be shown later how this moderate-realist view in contrast to the extreme subjectivism of Kant affects psychological movement of intentionality.

Theories of Participation. There are several views regarding psychological movement according to the way in which intentionality participates in reality. Theories of intentional participation can be divided into active and passive.

Passive participation is that sharing process in which intentionality is determined from within or without. According to Freud's biological determinism, psychological movement is driven from within. Energy behind this drive of instinctual forces is generated by metabolism and body chemistry. It activates the "id" and that part of the "id" closest to society the "ego". According to this view any participation of psychological movement is ultimately determined by the internal physical environment. According to Ultra-realists

(e.g., Democritus) and associated schools--Positivists, Associationists, and Behavioral Learning theorists (e.g., Skinner) the mind is a tabula rasa which passively receives sensation from the environment. G. Allport (1955) represents the activity of environmental variables of this view as a "cookie cutter" which stamps out appropriate responses. The mind, says G. Allport, is like a mass of dough from which the environment stamps out its product. According to this view any participation of psychological movement in reality is determined by the outside physical environment.

Active participation is either ultra or moderately subjective. According to Kant the mind does not know things or essences directly. The categories of the mind like "cookie cutters" stamp out abstract or universal concepts. This is conceptional determinism. According to the moderate subjective or moderate realists view of Aristotle and St. Thomas the mind participates in reality (knows things) and in turn is participated in by reality. In St. Thomas' view the mind becomes what it knows through the intentional species (S.T. I, q. 84; Brennan 1941) (i.e., things stripped of physical characteristics or accidents). May (1969, pp. 225-26) comments on this reciprocal participation of St. Thomas:

For St. Thomas Aquinas, intentionality is what the intellect grasps about the thing understood. He states, in language unfortunately not made easier for us by the translator, 'The intellect through a species of being informed in the act of intelligence, forms itself some intention of the understood thing.' We note the words 'being informed' in the passive voice, followed later by form in the active voice. I take this to mean that in the process of knowing, we are in-formed by the thing understood, and in the same act, our intellect simultaneously gives form to the thing we understand. What is

important here is the word 'in-form,' or 'forming in.' To tell someone something, to inform him, is to form him--a process that can sometimes become very powerful in psychotherapy by the therapist's saying just one sentence, or one word, at the right moment.

The effect of Kant's idealistic view of intentionality's participation in reality is reflected by Shostrom (1967, p. 141): "For those whose manipulative habits in business have brought them to my door, I can at least offer Kant's extraordinarily creative suggestion: Be yourself; find your creative ethic within (as this book has been proposing). However, let it be possible that your inner ethic is capable of serving as a norm for mankind as a whole!" It is to be noted that 'objective' for Kant referred to what was consensually validated by the opinion of others (Ency. of Philosophy 1967). The subjective Platonic idealism of Kant and evidently Shostrom as well was based on the fact that we cannot know things (the nature of extra-mental objective reality) but only phenomena. All law then must be a product only of the mind.

For Aristotle and Aquinas objective things and their natures as a source for relations was the basis of law and ethics. For St. Thomas while a person is judged for responsibility, guilt or merit according to his subjective ethics, he knows and participates in things and the law of nature based on the nature of things. However, the norms of morality are conscience and law. Over all the nature of the objective act, the intention, and circumstances are what influence behavior and its morality. For example, in prewar Germany the killing of Jews and other political prisoners was convalidated by the Nazi Party and other sympathizers. According to Aquinas' view such convalidation even if

extended to the whole world, as was slavery at one time, could not make it morally right. The dignity of man is based on objective values arising from the objective reality of his rational nature. This nature with all its essential implications is the source of the subjective respect due it. A manipulator Rescuer parent may think it fit to force a child to go to school or church, more often than not as a source of power for his own Critical Parent. This is currently convalidated by countless other parents and school systems. Insofar as this goes against the nature of the mind to seek meaning and the will to be enlightened and free, this is against the core being of the child. Intentionality and human behavior are influenced by circumstances as intended. The environmental circumstances of the who, what, where, how, when, as well as consequences of behavior, influence intentionality and help motivate behavior. St. Thomas uses the example of striking a dignitary (such as a bishop, S.T., I-II, q. 7). Circumstances influence the intentionality of the striker. For example, it is not the same as striking a thief who steals your wallet. The circumstances of who, when, where, what, and the possible consequences influence the intentionality, behavior, and ethics of this act according to St. Thomas. These realities participate in the intentionality and ethics of one's behavior. This opinion has its application not only to modern psychology but also to the nature and development of the "rescuers."

Rotter (1975) has stated that human behavior can be predicted from (and hence is determined by) three variables: expectancy, the value one places on the reinforcer, and the reinforcing situation

itself. The expectancy and value of the reinforcer would be subsumed under Thomistic intention; the reinforcing circumstances would embrace the reinforcing situation.

According to Adler (1956) heredity and environment are "hard determiners" of behavior. Choice and free will are soft determiners. There is an interaction between these three variables to produce behavior. Environmental consequences as perceived by the individual can be considered "hard determiners." A child who refuses to put his hand in the fire does so because he has learned that fire by its very nature is something that burns. As will be seen the evaluation of the environmental situation adds values that determine the nature and operation of "rescuers."

Jung (1964) indicates that the experience of knowing as in the Biblical sense is like the intimacy of intercourse. In this sense the Virgin Mary is referred to as having not known man. As May (1969) notes the psychological movement of intentionality embracing the cognitive process and involving a shared participation of being with being is indeed similar to the physio-spiritual act of love. Through it the mind penetrates reality and is molded by it. The shared participation is complete. For the act of love to be complete there must be a sharing, a spontaneous giving of one to the other. If there is lack of giving through control and manipulation the transaction will not be fulfilling and spontaneous for either partner. The helpmate Rescuer is a poor lover. His competitiveness will not allow him to be shared or shared in. Such behavior as in the case of Ernest Hemingway who was

impotent at fifty-nine can mean defeat for the bully lover. Competitiveness is a counter intentional movement, an inhibitory process stimulated by environmental fears that make one ego-centered. It is deadening because it inhibits the vital spontaneous movement from within toward a fresh experience of reality. Using a particular modality as a compensatory "ego-trip," the Rescuing therapist becomes fixated in his approach to problem solving. He cannot perceive his approach to therapy in relation to the broad field of psychological and philosophical truth; he cannot be spontaneous and have fresh experience of reality. To the degree he is fixated he will be dead, incapable of the richness of the shared participation inherent in intentionality. He will control his and the helpee's ability to experience and be informed by reality. He will also be most surprised if told he is controlling. His lack of awareness will not allow him to share in the reality of his deadness and Rescuing tendencies. His fear of failure leads to dishonesty as a tool in his competitive endeavors. He easily rationalizes his manipulations thus: "I'm doing this because it's my duty," "I'm only doing it because I love you," "This is harder on me than it is on you," etc. The "I-was-only-trying-to-help" game comes easy to the Rescuer. These rationalizations make spontaneous insights of intentionality ever more difficult.

G. Allport (1960, p. 196) insists on self-determined active participation in programs affecting one's destiny:

When the ego is not effectively engaged (evaluating, choosing) the individual becomes reactive. He lives a life of ugly protest finding outlets in complaints and strikes and above all in scapegoating. In this condition he is ripe prey for a

demagogue whose whole purpose is to exploit the outbursts of a non-participating ego.

Half a century ago psychologists characteristically ascribed to the personality certain governing agencies: the will, the soul, the self, the moral sentiment, or some other ruling faculty. Subsequent emphasis on the motor processes especially in America resulted in a psychology of entropy for personality. Being deprived of its self-policing function personality seemed to dissolve into endless cycles of motor activity, controlled by stimulus or by habit. Like a taxi cab its successive excursions had little relation to one another. Then gradually some principles of self-regulation returned to psychology under the guise of integration, vigilance and homeostasis. Ego functions, too, were introduced to provide for a recentering of personality with an increase in its stability.

In the same vein Fromm (1956) states that independence leads to loneliness. One can seek to overcome this loneliness either by committing oneself to authoritarian structure or becoming involved in relations of intimacy.

According to Adler, one can compensate for feelings of inferiority either by authoritarian competitiveness or by social interest. The previous compensation is marked by an effort to achieve security by putting others down. This is an ego-centered vertical movement. Social interest on the other hand is a horizontal movement which seeks to achieve security by reaching out to others. Subjectively social interest implies a feeling of oneness, respect, and intimacy with others. Objectively, social interest allows one to achieve "on the useful side of life" by cooperating with others in performing the three life tasks of work, love and friendship. As will be seen, the feelings of oneness, respect and intimacy practically implemented by cooperation are among the characteristic qualities of the rescuer. This movement of

intentionality implies finding meaning and a "place" in reality. For Frankl (1963) the search for meaning is a fundamental striving of human nature. According to Adler (1956) the psychological movement of life style seeks power to compensate for inferiority feelings and meaning of "psycho-logic" to give one the security of "place in the environment." The psychological movement to the "guiding fiction" or "self ideal" is a holistic striving involving all functions.

Intentionality is holistic. May (1975, p. 133) subscribes to the holism of intentionality in the following:

Kant proposed that our understanding is not simply a reflection of the objective world around us, but it also constitutes this world. It is not that objects simply speak to us; they also conform to our ways of knowing. The mind thus is an active process of forming and re-forming the world. . . . I asked myself whether there is not on a deeper and more inclusive level in human experience something parallel to what Kant was talking about. That is, is it not only our intellectual understanding that plays a role in our forming, and re-forming the world in the process of knowing it, but do not imagination and emotions also play a critical role? It must be the totality of ourselves that understands, not simply reason. And it is the totality of ourselves that fashions the images to which the world conforms.

Elsewhere May (1969) describes how intentionality cuts across the unconscious and the conscious, the cognitive, connative and emotional. St. Thomas Aquinas explicitly states the holism which May finds analogous or parallel to the teachings of Kant. In his Summa Theologica (e.g., I, II q. 17, art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) he expresses the interaction that takes place between the various faculties in the process of intentional choice. Assagioli in The Act of Will (1973) presents ten psychological laws governing this holistic interaction. Law eight describes how intentionality can move from the conscious to

the unconscious, "Law VIII--All the various functions, and their manifold combinations in complexes and subpersonalities, adopt means of achieving their aims without our awareness, and independently of, and even against, our conscious will" (p. 58). These dynamics are reminiscent of the function of the Jungian complexes in the "personal unconscious" as well as the relation of the Adlerian "guiding fiction" and "psychologic" to the "ethical ideal." Dreikurs (1971, p. 53) refers to holism as an "orchestration of emotion, mind and body":

It is customary to assume that there is a sharp division between intellect and emotion, as if our intelligence would show us one direction and our emotions would drive us in another. Actually, both are interrelated and integrated, serving the same goal in different ways. Bodily functions, reason, and emotions do not 'affect' each other, as a mechanistic viewpoint suggests; they present different aspects of the same process. The body 'adjusts' itself to the emotional pitch to which the individual may bring himself on the basis of a conscious or unconscious reasoning process. Every process in the individual shows concomitant movements in all three areas of bodily activity: physical, intellectual, and emotional. The unity of the personality is always preserved, for each individual is a holistic unit. Mind and body are inseparable; they are only parts of the whole individual, who can use all his functions for whatever goal he has set for himself. The 'whole' individual uses his body and his mind as he sees fit, as he can use each one of his hands in a different way and still coordinate their movement for a common purpose.

The author continues (p. 63), ". . . emotions can serve as guides for insight, since they too have a goal and purpose and are directed toward or against somebody or something. We cannot fight against our emotions because they represent our actual selves, our real intentions."

This Adlerian view on holism is in keeping with Thomistic interaction of functions and the nature of the intentional subject as a substantial psychophysical composite of matter and form. According to

St. Thomas, the function takes its character from the nature of the subject (operatio sequitur esse--operation follows the concrete essence). Intentionality as an operation of a psychophysical subject would itself then be psychophysical, i.e., embrace concomitantly rational, connative, emotional and bodily function. In striving for any particular reality as a goal all of these potentials would be elicited as a means to attain the goal.

Holism and the Guiding Fiction. For Adler (1956) the self ideal was a product or "fiction" of the mind. It was a universal concept and conviction of what one should be to win a secure place in the world. It had the meaning of "psycho-logic" vs. that of common sense of the ethical ideal to justify its existence. Thus, e.g., an aging wife Bertha becomes threatened and fears the weakness of loss of control over her family and her immediate environment. Her "ethical ideal" tells her she must be strong and not allow herself to be controlled by this environment. To effect this control she feigns weakness and sickness of all sorts to maintain control. She presents herself as the victim, playing "games" of "Poor Me," "Kick Me," "Hassle," "Help Me," "See-how-hard-I-try" and other substructures to the NIGYSOB "mistaken goal" intentionality.

The "psycho-logic" of control may involve feelings of depression, anger, scorn, revenge, and somatic movements leading to spastic colon, colitis, and duodenal ulcers to achieve sympathy and power. As can be seen from this example the Adlerian "will to power" evolved a "will to meaning" with emotional and somatic support. This

understanding of Adler does not support Frankl's (1963, pp. 153-154) stereotyping of will to power:

Logo-therapy, or as it has been called by some authors, 'The Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy,' focuses on the meaning of human existence as well as on man's search for such a meaning. According to logotherapy, the striving to find a meaning in one's life is the primary motivational force in man. That is why I speak of a will to meaning in contrast to the pleasure principle (or, as we could also term it, the will to pleasure) on which Freudian psychoanalysis is centered, as well as in contrast to the will to power stressed by Adlerian psychology.

Where this universalizing process is a compensatory authoritarian reaction to inferiority feelings it leads to stereotyping. Thus, in the case of Bertha, inferiority feelings lead to convictions of generalized victimization and reactive control. The error of over generalization is an element in one's "biased apperception" and "psycho-logic" that contributes to a distinct personality.

Summary. The radical source of unity in the personality is the subject of intentionality. For Kant it is the "thinking I," the substantial soul. For Jung the "self," which mediates between the conscious and unconscious to give organization and unity to the personality in the process of individuation. For Jung the "self," an archetype, is the final authority in the personality. For Adler the ultimate source of holism, organization and unity is the "creative self" which he called "the yeast." For Aristotle and St. Thomas the organizer and source of holism was the co-substantial form or soul which operates "in and through the body." It is essentially limited in being by a co-substantial principal, prime matter. To overcome this imbalance, imperfection and incompleteness the substrate subject

strives for "perfection" or "completion" by "creatively, actively, and effortfully" orienting its being and functions to reality. Its perfecting contact with reality involves a mutual sharing or participation. This "upward movement" to perfection through tending to reality is a human potential movement involving all the functions--holistically. How the subject uses the various faculties to attain reality teleologically can be seen from the relation of reality to the subject.

Intentionality is a tending to being as good. According to Aristotle good is that which all things seek (Id quod omnia appetunt, S.T. I-II, q. 8, a. 1). Heidegger notes as did Aristotle that "being seeks Being." Thus we can conclude that Being (universal reality) as a goal for seeking is good. For Aristotle Being, the Good, the One and the Beautiful are interchangeable. Man tends to being through intentionality because he regards it at first through sensation then through conscious perception--as good.

Form-Quality of Intended Being. According to Husserl, the founder of modern phenomenology, intentionality is the meaning of the mind.⁴ Reality is sought as true by the intellect; it is the good that perfects reason. Thus, intentionality is at once the human potential upward movement to perfection (St. Thomas, Adler) and the basic striving for completion (Jung) and meaning (Frankl). Reality as both the object and content of intentionality has a form quality which regulates the input the faculties exercise in its attainment. The sight of a

4. According to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, his teacher Brentano introduced the Scholastic terminology, intentionality.

distraught mother weeping over her dead child naturally elicits more emotion than the prospect of writing a doctoral dissertation to meet the singularly non-affective criteria of the average graduate school. We have seen above how the object of intentionality informs the subject through "shared participation" and how this participation on the part of the subject is holistic. The informing, dynamically organizing quality of the perceived object is described in more detail by St. Thomas in relating reason--will to emotion and reason to will.

Reason--Will and Emotion. Within the holistic movement in intentionality human reason must seek being as true for meaning and the will by its very nature must seek reality (presented to it by reason as good). Man cannot not seek his own happiness. This is of the very essence of the intentional or human act (actus humanus) of St. Thomas for the functions to seek "apparent" good. The necessity perceived and presented to them by reason accounts for their teleological dynamics as well as holistic humanness. As will be shown, this teaching indicates the dynamics of the "spoiled" or "rebellious child," social conflict, neurosis, psychosis, the manipulator, Rescuer, as well as demonstrating the psychological movement of the self-actualizing rescuer. Thus, it might be considered the foundation of humanistic psychology.

Historical Perspective. St. Thomas following Aristotle differed sharply with Plato who considered the emotions as "wild horses" to be controlled and repressed. His teaching also differed with the

Neo-Platonist Kant⁵ who held that emotions were to be avoided as undesirable. The battle being waged today between the proponents of determinism and free will was perhaps even keener in Aquinas' day. The voluntarists of seven centuries ago were loathe to admit of a passive potential (discussed above under intentionality as a human potential movement) of the will. Despite this strong voluntaristic movement later espoused by the Suarezians, Aquinas courageously held that the will has an active potential by which it moves the emotions and also a passive potential by which it is moved by the emotions. Reason influenced by prudence gives dynamic organization and direction to this holistic intentional process. Prudence performs its role in the optimum personality with the help of an encouraging habit of fortitude, a balancing habit of temperance, and the social habit of justice. The Platonic influence in Augustine, and Kant and the voluntarism of Suarez has managed to obscure St. Thomas' teaching in Christian tradition. For a better understanding of this very important teaching and its implications in psychology and psycho-therapy we need a closer look at the dynamics of will-emotion relationship as they relate to the "rescuer" intentionality.

5. The writer sees this teaching coinciding with Dreikurs' (1971) statements on the humanness of emotions. For him (the writer) the teleology, holism and humanness of emotions are basic Aristotelian teachings found in Adler. To this extent Adler's psychology of use if basically Aristotelian. The writer says this with a realization of the Vaihinger-Kantian elements in Adler's epistemology of the guiding fiction. In contrast Mozak states: ". . . Little Aristotelian influence occurs in Adler's writing. . . . In the context of early philosophy, Adler exhibits his affinity with the philosophy of stoicism" (Corsini, 1973, p. 35).

Will--Emotion Relationship. Baars⁶ (1974) has presented a treatment of this relationship entitled "The Christian Anthropology of St. Thomas Aquinas." He notes that the authentic Thomistic teaching stressed the humanness of emotions by including them as a principle of the actus humanus (human act) of intentionality. St. Thomas defined his actus humanus as "an act done with full knowledge and with full and free consent of the will, qui ex voluntate de liberata procedit quorum homo est dominus." However, he held that an act⁷ could be human in two ways: 1) essentially (per essentiam) or 2) by participation (per participationem), i.e., by participation in the active intentional human act of reason and will as described above. Baars (p. 30) states St. Thomas teaching:

What is human, rational, voluntary and free in man has a two-fold aspect--per essentiam and per participationem. Thus Thomas introduced man's emotional life as a principle part of his moral life. In other words, Thomas Aquinas explicitly stated that not only reason and will but also the appetitus sensitivus are principles of the human act. Directly contrary to ascetical literature's fearful belief that the emotions are an extrinsic threat to man's moral life, Aquinas stated explicitly that they have an innate need to listen to the voice of reason--passio nata est obedire rationi, insofar as the emotions participate in the activity of reason prout substat rationi. Thus he considered man's emotions as typically human positive principles which contribute moral value to the human act. (However, the emotions do not participate in the activity of reason and will in the repressive neurotic. Rather, the repressing emotion wedges itself

6. Dr. Baars, Dr. Anna Terruwe, M. D. of the Netherlands and other European scholars have been clinically investigating Thomistic theories on neurotic repression.

7. Like Dreikurs (1971) and Adler (1954) Aquinas considered internal acts of thought, will, emotion, etc. as human behavior. They need not be observable.

between reason and will on the one hand and the repressed emotions on the other.)

Baars (pp. 30-31) relates the teaching of St. Thomas to that of Kant:

THOMAS AQUINAS' STRONG CONDEMNATION OF THE STOIC EXILE FROM THE MORAL LIFE OF THE EMOTIONS AS DISEASED ENTITIES AEGRITUDINES ET MORBI ANIMAE STANDS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE LATER TEACHINGS OF EMMANUEL KANT WHO CONSIDERED ALL FEELINGS AS PATHOLOGICAL (Emphasis author's own). His claims, of course, have influenced generations of Christians until most recent times. Most of us recall the impact of such widely held beliefs as--when you do something good when you do not like it or you do it with great effort and intense self control--then your act is truly moral and what counts is that you will the good actus internus and do it actus externus no matter how you feel. Emotions do not exist for the purpose of being extinguished or repressed. This in spite of Thomas Aquinas' explicit teaching that there is in man something more closely related to reason and will than the act which proceeds from the will, namely the emotions, the feelings. Having a feeling, a liking for the good, Thomas continued, definitely adds something to the moral value of the will act. . . . Accordingly, just as it is important that man should will the good and do it in his external act, SO ALSO DOES IT BELONG TO THE PERFECTION OF MORAL GOOD THAT MAN SHOULD BE MOVED UNTO GOOD (emphasis author's own) not only in respect to his will, but also in respect to his sense appetite (IaIIae, 24, 1) . . . Thomas thus provided another signum (for morality) namely the pleasure, the joy which man finds in the good or the evil that he does.

Adlerians who tend to emphasize the influence of Kant and the Stoics on Adler should consider what repression and control of emotions and the work-hard-drives advocated by these philosophers does to mental health. These teachings are in direct contradiction to Aristotelian views represented by St. Thomas as well as the Adlerian approach expressed by Dreikurs above. Baars (p. 31) continues:

The one-sided emphasis in the text book on reason and will represented in respect to the emotional life and negative attitude which was fear-inspiring and defeatist at one and the same time. Fear of one's emotions we now know is at the root of man's fear neurosis, scrupulosity, phobias, obsessions and compulsions. In these pathological states fear not reason

determines the activity of the will. Fear makes the will a despotic suppressive ruler. . . .

St. Thomas considered the will a moved mover which democratically respected the emotions as principles of human behavior. Some of the textbooks Baars refers to above were written by Thomistic commentators eager to counteract determinism and Suarezian voluntarism. G. Allport (1955, p. 6) indicates neo-Thomists' excessive emphasis on the rational nature of man, ". . . the neo-Thomists see the human person as both a striving and rational being approaching toward, or departing from, an ideal of perfection according to his exercise of freedom." May (1975, p. 133) stresses the function of our total being in structuring reality through intentionality:

That is, is it not only our intellectual understanding that plays a role in our forming and re-forming the world in the process of knowing it, but do not imagination and emotions also play a critical role? It must be the totality of ourselves that understands, not simply reason. And it is the totality of ourselves that fashions the images to which the world conforms. Not only does reason form and re-form the world, but the 'preconscious,' with its impulses and needs, does so also and does so on the basis of wish and intentionality. Human beings not only think but feel and will as they make form in their world.

Aquinas uses the term "appetite" rational (will) and sensory (emotion) in expressing the "upward movement" of intentionality to being as good of perfection.⁸ The term expresses hunger for being as form which in its holistic teleology as a human potential movement is beautiful in its harmonious relation of parts to whole. That is, the

8. The word "conation" was first given prominence by Sir William Hamilton in his well-known trichotomy of cognition, feeling, and conation (Brennan, 1941).

totality of the movement expresses the splendor of order "splendor ordinis." This holistic process then is an upward movement to being which is at the same time true, good, and beautiful form.

May (1975, pp. 133-134) describes this "upward movement" in even stronger terms in calling it a "passion for form":

This is why I use the word passion, the sum of erotic and dynamic tendencies, in the phrase 'passion for form.' Persons in therapy--or anybody for that matter--are not simply engaged in knowing their world: what they are engaged in is a passionate re-forming of their world by virtue of their inter-relationship with it.

This passion for form is a way of trying to find and constitute meaning in life. And this is what genuine creativity is.

In summary, intentionality is a human potential movement. It is an "upward movement" from "minus" (potential) "to plus" (actualization) which perfects the individual by a reciprocal participation. This process is a mutual sharing in which reality informs the individual and the individual forms reality. This shared movement produces a "dynamic organization within the individual of psychophysical systems." Both of these systems are "actively" and "effortfully" attracted to reality as good. Being as true is the good of reason: being as a rational good is the object of will, and being as sensory good is the object of the emotions. The emotions by nature do not tend to extinction or repression. Rather their role in the intentional "upward movement to perfection" is to participate in the humanity of reason and will. They naturally tend to be moved by the will in the direction indicated by reason and in turn move the will in the direction

of the voluntary good. Reason thus gives harmony and unity to the psychophysical systems.

Intentionality--A Vital Social Interest Movement. The movement above is a movement from within to reality without. It is a vital movement which tends to unite the subject with reality. It is a positive conjunctive movement tending to unify and integrate the "I" with the "me" and "thou" and "it." As an innate process intentionality is an unintentional, unreflexive and unevaluated movement of social interest. Other experimental observations that this is a social interest movement are the following:

1. Intentionality is a social movement going from a "minus" to "plus" position toward the other.

2. Shortly after birth the infant instinctively begins to pucker and begins to suck. Its breast feeding is a cooperative function that relieves pressure on the mother caused by the milk.

3. The infant is born into a family, the basic social unit.

4. The child soon comes to elicit the social smile which indicates the child's positive social orientation to life. G. Allport (1955, p. 25) states, "according to Spitz and Wolf, if the emotional relations between the child and its mother are seriously disturbed, the social smile fails to develop or shows abnormalities even within the three to six months' period."

5. Intentionality is a vital existential movement, i.e., a movement from the subject within to others without.

6. M. James (1973) notes that the infant needs the intimacy and cooperation of stroking. Otherwise miasma and death may ensue. We all need strokes according to Transactional Analysis theory.

7. Recent research by Trevarthen (Harvard-1967, University of Edinburgh-1971) indicates signs of pre-speech in newborns. In an article in the National Observer, July 24, 1973 (Young, 1977) this researcher presents experimental evidence showing that the infant brain is not "soft plastic" to be moulded by the environment. Trevarthen regards his findings as evidence that infants are born with a creative tendency for speech even though language development depends on each individual's life experience.

8. For Jung (1959) the "Redeemer" (rescuer) is the prototype of the "self" the organizing subject of intentionality. In Christian tradition the Redeemer's work in the "Mystical Body" is to inspire each member to work for the greatest good of the greatest number of members comprising that Body. Intentionality tends towards this rescuing relationship as envisioned by Adler's cooperative community (1956).

Steiner (1974, p. 175) states:

I believe that people are by nature cooperative and have a deep felt need to work together and help each other. Situations where one person is in need of help and another person is capable of offering it are common in social groupings, and when one person helps another it can be a joyful, profoundly satisfying, cooperative experience.

These theoretical and empirical observations are evidence that innate intentionality has the characteristics of social interest. This social interest intentionality with its positive "I can," creative, spontaneous and harmoniously holistic characteristics is the

psychological movement of the "Redeemer" rescuer. We are conceived and born to be free beings; free and oriented to helping others to be free according to the above literature.

As defined the rescuer is a non-manipulator. According to Shostrom (1967) the non-manipulator in contrast to the manipulator is a self-actualizer who is aware, honest, free, and trusting. The self-actualizer according to Maslow (1954) is characterized by social interest, object-centeredness, peak experiences, a democratic personality structure, acceptance, effective relation to the environment, spontaneity.

We will now address these questions: 1) Does intentionality establish personality? 2) Does it constitute prototype "rescuer" personalities? If so, how? 3) How do these prototypes give rise to other specifically and uniquely distinct "rescuer" personalities?

Object of Intentionality

Intentionality can tend to the "me," the "it," and the "thou." If we were to give a basic classification to all reality in the universe it would fall into these three categories.

Intentionality and Personality. According to May (1969) intentionality is an "I can," "I will," "I am" movement which is the proper function of identity. According to Jung this search for identity is the first phase of the individuation process leading to eventual integration of self with the ego and the universe. Erikson's developmental psychology subscribes to the broad categories of this model.

Intentionality tending toward the "me," the "thou" and the "it" establishes personality. According to Mosak (Nikelly, 1971) the personality consists of global convictions: the self concept, weltbilt (view of the world), ethical ideal, and self ideal. It is the typical psychological movement of an individual according to Adler which constitutes such values. For example: a diminutive five foot, two inch individual would regard himself as dwarfish (self concept). This is the "me"--object of intentionality. Looking about the world he sees big people as well as giant objects; in comparison to these he is inclined to consider himself a cipher (weltbilt). These giants--people and things--are the "thou"- "it"-objects of his intentionality. This intentionality confronted by the "me" imposes shoulds and "should nots" on the diminutive individual; it tells him that he should be big, he should not be small (ethical ideal)! He compensates for ensuing feelings of inferiority by bold manners, loud speech and other efforts to control others (self ideal). Common sense suggests to him that his size is an insignificant matter compared to his worth and potential as a person. However, his "psycho-logic" tells him that to find a place in the world he must control to counter the ethical ideals of a giant society. The abiding conviction that he must not lose control but must always control the "thou" and the "it" is generated for security and to maintain self-esteem as well as the esteem of others. His intentionality focuses and becomes fixated on the need for him to be a controller. This self-ideal becomes a guiding fiction and a self-fulfilling prophecy. In Aristotelian-Thomistic context it becomes the

"apparent good" toward which his will chooses to orchestrate his psychophysical systems. Even in helping others he feels threatened and experiences the need to control and manipulate "thous" or "its". He thus becomes the Rescuer. This set fixation of his intentionality becomes the valued central core of his personality, his "proprium" or life style.

"I-It," "I-Thou" Relation. As has been shown intentionality is a conjunctive existential movement tending to actualize the will and its holistic entourage of psychophysical systems through love. Its proper participation in the "thou" is effected through dialogue which respects the autonomy of the other as well as that of oneself. Shostrum describes this as "contact." Buber (1965, 1970) explains how manipulation is an "I-it" rather than an "I-thou" relation. Shostrum (1967) holds that the manipulative or "gamey" relationship is an "it-it" one. He sees manipulation as a deadening experience that controls the manipulator from without. This movement on the passive potential of the Rescuer will be considered more in depth later.

G. Allport (1960) holds that philosophers and literateurs dealt expertly with personality long before modern psychologists came on the scene. Their works emphasize the unity and self-consistent behavior of personality. Three recent artistic productions demonstrate dramatically how this view applies to the Rescuer. The best seller, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (Kesey 1962) portrays the self-consistency of the Rescuer-"Big Nurse" Ratched and rescuer McMurphy. Both types portray the cohesiveness of behavior of the manipulator and self-actualizer in

the helping relationship. Even more dramatic is a play just off Broadway, "Sizwe Banzi Is Dead." The whole narrative of this play centers around the single central theme: how natives of South Africa are given a passbook for their identity by the Rescuing Anglo minority, i.e., how they are treated as "its" by fellow humans who protest that such treatment is civilizing.

Development of "Rescuer" Differences: Conditioning
of rescuer Intentionality to Specific and
Unique Adaptation to the Environment

Thus far search of the literature has shown how the "rescuers" develop as identities through the process of intentionality in its human potential upward movement to perfection. Their basic difference arises through their orientation to the "thou" as a person or as an object to be manipulated.

Our investigation will now concentrate on how the individual's dynamically organized intentionality is conditioned to "rescuer" types that are specifically and individually distinct. From our findings we can draw two conclusions which are necessary to understand specific and individual differences to be dealt with: 1) The "rescuer" movements are not dichotomous; they can exist side by side with either of them assuming the dominant role according to circumstances. 2) The controller Rescuer and autonomous rescuer are abstract guiding fictions, self-fulfilling prophecies. As such they are generalized human potentials that tend to self-actualize according to the subject's habitual intentional evaluation of reality. Any "rescuer" is an individual who has traits in common with other "rescuers." The guiding "rescuer"

fiction is common to other "rescuers" only as an abstraction for study and classification. As we shall see the abstraction as it is actualized in the subject himself is highly individualized. We have seen how the "rescuer" is differentiated basically by his approach to other humans as "thous" or "its." We shall now see how this development occurs and whether it gives rise to other "rescuers" who are specifically and uniquely distinct personalities.

The "Rescuer" and Parenting to Powerlessness

Berne (1961) dramatically describes how we are born "princes" but are turned into "frogs" by Parental (witch) messages. Such parenting is traditionally symbolized in fairy tales describing the plight of princes being turned into toads by wicked witches to await the rescuer love of the fairy princess. This symbolic representation can be considered an archetypal way of describing how an individual can be warped and later restored by the appropriate hero rescuer. Steiner (1974) explains how this is done through "banal scripting" in which the child is educated to powerlessness. These scripts rob him of his power to love, think for himself, and to experience himself, especially his feelings. The power the child is stripped of is his human autonomy, his power to make "responsible choices." It deprives him of his personhood, his "thou" reality and makes him an "it" ("frog").

St. Thomas, Adler, Dreikurs, and others hold that the personality while being determined by the environment ("hard determiner") is also a matter of free choice ("soft determiner"). We can choose to remain and develop as a "prince" or we can choose to become a "frog"

under the parenting we receive. According to the Intentionality Model we have used for this investigation it is a matter of how the "I" relates to the "thou." We can let the "thou" (parents and other authority figures) manipulate us as an "it" (object, puppet, automaton). This competitive relationship is a deadening counter intentional movement that discourages the vital encouraging "I can," "I will," "I am" movement. It is self-defeating as it inhibits the self-actualizing rescuer intentionality which tends to accepting and being accepted by others in a cooperative social interest, "I'm O K--You're O K" dialogue. Or we can choose to be the "prince" or "princess" we were destined to be by holding on to our "I can" potential. Even after much parental conditioning to powerlessness we can choose by "redemption" not to be "frogs." Whether or not we allow authoritarian parenting to discourage our innate "I can" movement tending to stroke and be stroked by others depends on how we use our radical power of choice.

Inferiority Feelings and the "Rescuer" Movement

According to Adler (1956) we acquire a three-fold inferiority after birth. 1) Biological: in comparison to others of the animal genus the human infant is comparatively powerless. 2) Cosmological: the infant soon learns to feel insignificant in comparison with the vastness of the universe; being enveloped by the immensity of darkness can terrorize him. 3) Social: he is born looking up at legs--table legs, chair legs, and human legs. His early conditioning

can help influence him to continue as a rescuer "prince" or become a Rescuer "frog" depending on how he lets it affect his inferiority feelings. According to Adler he can compensate for them either by cooperating with others in a respectful social interest, in which case he maintains and nourishes his autonomous "I--thou," "I'm O K--You're O K" existential position. Or, he can compensate for these inferiority feelings by competing with others. He can try to gain stature, security and meaning to life by putting others down through an "It--it" relationship. In this way he will be trying to achieve on the "useless side" of life which undermines a cooperative "I--thou" community relationship. According to Adlerian theory, overcoming inferiority feelings and discouragements necessitates helping the child to achieve a sense of order. He acquires a respect for the rights of others as well as his own potential through proper feeding habits, toilet training and by substituting cooperation for sibling rivalry and the four competitive mistaken goals of behavior (inappropriate attention getting, competitive power struggle, revenge and assumed disability). With this conditioning he is encouraged to make responsible choices and becomes an autonomous, constructive member of his community. This cooperation means achieving on the "useful side of life" (Dreikurs and Grey 1968). Pampering or neglecting produces a "spoiled child." Such parenting discourages a child rather than encourages him to responsible choice and autonomy. Parenting the child to make successful choices that are of value and meaning to him in the light of consequences compensates for inferiority feelings fostered by

the competition of misguided goals. This encouragement gives him a feeling of acceptance and the security of a place in his group. Parental directives such as "Be Perfect" do not allow the child to be responsible and lead to the insecurity of anxiety neurosis (Dreikurs 1971).

The "spoiled child" has been taught by the modeled behavior of his parents that he can only "find a place" in society by authoritarian means. He either adapts to this modeled behavior of the pampering, "I'm not O K," spoiling, critical ("gamey," persecuting) or nourishing ("gamey," Rescuing) parent or he rebels against it. Either way he becomes an adaptive and controlling individual unless his rebellion leads to a redecision to make "contact" with others through social interest rather than isolate himself from them through competition. Encouragement through positive, unconditional stroking can help him realize that he can have a place in the group without the insecurity of competition. Continued competition and the discouragement of not being able to achieve positively on "the useful side of life" can only lead to further discouragement and insecurity of not belonging.

All of the authorities cited above agree that parental messages and other childhood training can educate the child to powerlessness. On the other hand, psychologically paced encouragement can assist him to become a responsible, cooperative member of society. In other words parents can encourage their children to become rescuers or discourage them to become Rescuers.

Generic and Specific Types of "Rescuers"

In investigating the "subject" and "process" of intentionality this search of the literature found that the concepts of active and passive potential were basic to the Aristotelian-Thomistic system. For present purposes active potential is the ability or power to achieve actualization; passive potential is the capacity to receive actualization. These concepts are important ones for the humanistic tradition. They played a significant role in Aristotle's resolution of the polarities in the problem of the One and the Many, Being and Becoming. They are of intrinsic value in Aristotle's explanation ofhylomorphism, matter and form, essence and existence, substance and accidents, etc. The process of actualization (including self-actualization of the rescuer) depends on adaptation to the dispositions of passive potential. "Whatever actualization is received is received according to the dispositions of the receiver." We have observed how this Scholastic axiom applies to the concept of Adlerian biased apperception. We have briefly explored how active and passive potential was applied to the "agent" and "passive" intellects by St. Thomas in his theory of knowledge. We have seen the implications of this for intentionality as a mutual participation process which culminates in the formation of personality. Development of these concepts now leads us to a differentiation of the "rescuer" identities.

Active--Passive

Shostrum (1967) states that the manipulator is differentiated by two basic categories, active and passive. The Active Manipulator is

the assertive "Top Dog" who wins by winning. The Passive Manipulator is the suffering unassertive "Under Dog" who wins by losing. In the rescuing role by reason of his human condition or by contractual agreement the manipulative Rescuer is also basically active or passive. The mother who for the good of her teenage son insists that he go to Oregon State rather than The University of Arizona without consideration for his wishes is an Active Rescuer. The alcoholic's wife who gets "crooked strokes" by complaining incessantly about how hard it is to keep the family together because of her husband's drinking is a passive manipulator. These examples bring us to a subdivision of the "rescuer" which is also based on the "it--it," winning losing relationship.

Rescuer--Victim, Rescuer--Persecutor

Karpman (1968) has drawn a "Drama Triangle" from Berne's work which explains the dynamics of all "games" as variations of the competitive "win-lose" game described above. Steiner (1974) applies the three positions of the triangle, viz., Victim, Persecutor, Rescuer to the Rescuer and rescuer. Implicit in this application is the differentiation of the "rescuers" into "Rescuer-Victim," and "Rescuer-Persecutor." For example, Jackie, a woman who has felt the insecurity and threat of rejection may habitually intend or seek the symbiotic (mutual dependency relationship) of the Rescuer role. Her "tricky child" ("Little Professor") tells her that if she can make a man need her she can compensate for the insecurity feelings and hold on to him at the same time. When he resists this controlling maneuver she may do

one or both of two things--play the Victim by telling him, "How hard I try," or resort to Persecutor anger, ridicule, revenge or other disjunctive emotions. She mistakenly thinks that these Victim and Persecutor power tools will eventually get him to accept her Rescuer dependency relationship. Her Victim and Persecutor roles are in the service of her Rescuer.

The rescuer, too, can be active or passive--victim-rescuer or persecutor-rescuer. For example, the policeman who loses his life is a persecutor and victim to the thieves. For the sake of helping them to be responsible and society to be responsible and law abiding, he fills the role of active rescuer in protecting society from violence. On the other hand, the parent who seeks to rescue her attention-getting son from deviant attention-getting mechanisms by passively ignoring these behaviors, may be rewarded by a victimizing and persecutory onslaught for her efforts.

In the Rescuing operation there is always a discounting of the Victim. This is done either through negative recognition or a denial of recognition and its purpose is to achieve passivity in the Victim by defining reality for him. Such passivity implies a discouragement or conviction that one cannot make responsible choices for oneself, cannot define reality for oneself. As in the case of Jackie above, grandiosity or a purposive exaggeration of reality may be used as a means of discounting to maintain the passivity and symbiotic relationship. Jackie's grandiosity took two forms. She minimized her ability to achieve on the "useful side of life" by achieving a social interest

intimacy relationship. She discouraged herself with feelings of inadequacy and sought competitive control of the Rescuer to avoid being rejected and force her man into needing her. Secondly, she maximized his shortcomings to prove to him that he needed her to help him set things straight. She went into a rage when he refused to cooperate. Schiff and Schiff (1971) follow the Adlerian explanation of "game" ("mistaken goal") dynamics when they state that a sense of inadequacy underlies grandiosity and the competitive control it fosters.

Shostrum (1967) subdivides the Active and Passive Manipulators into: Bully, Dictator, Weakling, Nice Guy, Clinging Vine, Bitch, and associated sub-categories. All of these can be subsumed under the above types of Rescuer--Rescuer-Persecutor, Rescuer-Victim--according to the active or passive means they use to control in the helping relationship.

Rescuer "Drivers" and Converse Values

According to the humanistic tradition we have been following in this investigation of the literature, personality is a value schemata (G. Allport 1955, Adler 1956, St. Thomas). Personality formation then is an education to values. According to G. Allport (1960) personality is a unity which consists of patterned behaviors leading to stimulus-response equivalency. Personality behaviors show a cohesiveness resulting from their self-consistency.

The following paradigm shows how "driver" values give such consistency to the "rescuer" identities.

Sanford (Adorno et al. 1950) notes how the authoritarian personality is a conformist; he has a "pleaser driver." All of the other drivers have an underlying "pleaser" since they conform to parental messages. This compliance of the Rescuer in all his "driver" values is indicated by the diagram. Like all other "rescuers" the "drivers" are non-dichotomous, two or more can motivate the same Rescuer. The Rescuer has had the "drivers" modeled by the "not O K" nourishing Parent of one or both parents. He in turn tends to impose them on the Victim in the helping relationship.

The following diagram illustrates the Rescuer "drivers" and their converse rescuer values:

<u>Rescuer</u>	<u>rescuer</u>
Please me	Makes responsible choices
Be perfect	Courage to be imperfect
Hurry up	Paces activity
Work hard	Spontaneous and object-centered
Be strong	Experiences and constructively orients feelings

Fig. 1 by Kahler and Capers (1974) illustrates the self-consistency of Rescuer behaviors.

Individual Psychology of "Rescuer" Types:
Unique Adaptation to the Environment

The source of individuality for the subject of intentionality is two-fold. His unique adaptation to the environment can be considered from the innate (hereditary) or acquired point of view.

	Compliance (Inner Feelings)		Important Behavior				
	Physical	Psychological	Words	Tones	Gestures	Posture	Facial Expressions
		Internal Discount					
DRIVERS:							
1. Be perfect	tense	"you should do better"	"of course" "obviously" "efficacious" "clearly" "I think"	clipped righteous	counting on fingers cocked wrist scratching head	erect rigid	stern
2. Try hard	tight stomach tense shoulders	"you've got to try harder"	"It's hard" "I can't" "I'll try" "I don't know"	impatient	clenched moving fists	sitting forward elbows on legs	slight frown perplexed look
3. Please me	tight stomach	"you're not good enough"	"you know" "could you" "can you" "kinda"	high whine	hands out- stretched	head nodding	raised eye- brows-- looks away
4. Hurry up	antsy	"you'll never get it done"	"we've got to hustle" "let's go"	up and down	squirms taps fingers	move quickly	frowning eyes shifty
5. Be strong	numb rigid	"you can't let them know you're weak"	"no comment" "I don't care"	hard monotone	hands rigid arms folded	rigid one leg over	plastic hard cold

Fig. 1. The Miniscript Chart

Source: Kahler and Capers, 1974.

Innate

When one considers innate human potential from the Aristotelian and Jungian standpoint the various possibilities for a variety of unique combinations can be mind-boggling. Each individual inherits the unique ways in which his animal ancestors have adapted to the environment. Each individual is heir to the manner in which his rational animal ancestors have creatively adapted to the environment. At the moment of conception only one of millions of sperm impregnates one of the ovum with unlimited genetic possibilities. The D N A encoding of chromosomal structure has been shown to be most intricately complex and uniquely patterned. Our core being with its psychophysical systems is the unique product of millions of years of individual and collective adaptation to the environment.

Acquired

According to G. Allport (1955), there are more differences between one man and another than there are differences within the whole animal kingdom. Each individual brings these innate and acquired differences to bear on executing his role of "rescuer" in the helping relationship.

This search of the literature has developed thus: the goal of behavior is a good which dynamically orients psychophysical systems toward goal attainment. St. Thomas states this process axiomatically-- the goal or end specifies the act. Dreikurs describes this holism as an "orchestration of mind, body and emotions." We have seen how St. Thomas, under fire from the voluntarists and determinists of his day,

held that enlightened will moved the emotions but was also moved by them. Their human potential movement was under the enlightened will's command (imperium) to be used in the attainment of the goal. In this way the emotions participate in the humanity or rational nature of man. In the process the emotions participate in the rational expectancy of goal attainment. The guiding fiction of the "rescuer" is the object of such orchestrated movement and expectancy. The "guiding fiction" or life style is a self-fulfilling prophecy; it is an abiding good which intentionality expects and seeks to attain.

Thus, we can now see why the "guiding fiction" driver Rescuer is followed by behaviors that have a patterned unity. These behaviors share a direction, a consistency of a nature determined by their "guiding fiction." G. K. Chesterton once remarked that one of Thackery's characters should have been an alcoholic but Thackery didn't know it. (G. Allport, 1960, comments that the self consistency of the personality in question demanded that she be an alcoholic.)

According to the Aristotelian-Thomistic system then, a valuing of the external situation as to its usefulness as a means of attaining the desired goal (e.g., "rescuer," "guiding fiction") will determine the intentional choice of behaviors as means to the goal. As with Rotter (1975) the expectancy in any given situation determines behavior. Hence, a Jimmy Carter might act as a Rescuer in one instance and as a rescuer in another according to his valuing and expectancy of the situation.

The "biased apperception" of each "rescuer" is determined by his evaluation of particular situations as reinforcing for self-ideal goal attainment. It is therefore highly individuated by this unique adjustment to the environment.

CHAPTER 3

FINDINGS

Informal experimental observation uncovers a host of "rescuing" operations. The "rescuer" is the solicitous parent who tells her "powerless" child what clothes to wear, what friends to choose, how to face difficulties without crying, when to go to bed and what college to choose. The "rescuer" is the "good" parent who would feel guilty if he were not deciding things for his child. She is the dutiful wife who buys luxury items on the sly because she knows that informing her husband would "only disturb the peace of the family."

The "rescuer" is the helpful but indifferent manipulator six-month-old baby who favors you with her seductive attention only to reject you in disdain in a junior citizen type of "gamey" "rapo." He is the seventy-year-old senior citizen who informs his wife Sadie that he has "really tried to keep the marriage together, but he knew from the start that it wasn't going to work." He secretly feels that this indifferent manipulation has kept the marriage together by keeping Sadie insecure. It is the helpful saleswoman who tells you that you would look "perfectly stunning in pink" (because she has an excess of pink dresses in stock that have to be moved). He is the car salesman who thoughtfully informs you the special Grand Prix you want is the last of its kind in inventory. He is the policeman and fireman who protects your life and property even at great personal risk. It is the

"rescuing" counselor who sympathetically takes responsibility for his client by defining reality for him by telling him "he must not listen" to this or that person about his drinking problem, "he must get a divorce," "he ought to go to church," "he should know better." The "rescuer" is legion and ubiquitous.

In all of these "rescuing" operations there is one thing in common--a typical psychological movement, a unique way in which the mind of the "rescuer" addresses or tends to reality. It is the purpose of this chapter to evaluate the findings of this investigation of the literature to see if this common movement of intentionality meets the requirements of a prototype personality.

Search of the literature has yielded 1) findings directly related to the problem of this investigation and 2) "spin-off" implications indirectly related to the problem. These implications will be considered in the next chapter. In an effort to find an answer to the problem of this investigation the present chapter will evaluate the "rescuers" as prototype personalities according to the criteria given in the methodology adopted for this inquiry.

Before applying these criteria a word of explanation is in order. According to Hall and Lindzey (1970), G. Allport qualified his definition of personality by stating that it signifies that personality "is" something and "does" something. In other words it involves a psychology of being and becoming. This caveat explanation was meant to emphasize the active creative nature of personality and the constant change it undergoes. This investigation with its intentionality

orientation has taken into account both the being and becoming elements of the "rescuers" to see if they meet the requirements of prototype personality status. For example, it has considered the following: the elements of "rescuer"--the subject and object of intentionality as essences, the traits and patterns of intentional movement as sources of self-consistent behaviors. Examples of "do" elements investigated are: intentionality as a human potential movement, changing orientation of this movement from an inherent "I-thou" to a conditioned "It-it" dynamic goal direction giving rise to differentiated "rescuers," the changing self-concept and other global convictions constituting "rescuer" roles.

Criteria I--Personality Is a Dynamic
Organization Within the Individual
of Psychophysical Systems.

The following findings are germane to the above criteria: 1) awareness presupposes and underlies choice processes. 2) These choice processes form an "I can," "I will," "I am" psychological movement that constitutes personality as well as the "rescuer" identities. 3) This human potential upward movement to perfection is innately a social interest, non-evaluated rescuer movement. 4) A counter "I can't" intentional movement is introduced into this "I can" movement by "parenting to powerlessness." This is a discouragement movement that compensates for inferiority feelings by "gamey" competition. This passivity producing compensation constitutes the dynamics and roles of the Rescuer. 5) Both "rescuer" movements consist of a dynamic organization of psychophysical systems within the subject of intentionality.

This organization is a result of goal direction treating others as "its" through competition or as "thous" through social interest.

Search of the literature has proceeded from an empirical basis through systematic induction to show how the "rescuer" movements meet the first criteria of personality. We will now trace this inductive process in more detail so as to make its cogency and any implications more discernible.

Awareness Presupposes and Underlies Choice Processes

This phenomena is a matter of empirical experience as well as authoritative testimony. As such it was thought a sound basis from which to begin a systematic inquiry. Awareness presupposes a focusing of the mind on one or more specific objects. Contrary to the attestations of some Zen-Buddists we cannot be aware of nothingness. The Thomistic term "intentionality" rather than "psychological movement" has been selected to signify this process for several reasons. 1) Its etymology. It comes from two Latin words, in and tendere, meaning to stretch to. Thus, it aptly expresses the choice process of stretching to a selected object. 2) It describes well the natural orientation that all psychological movement undergoes. 3) The middle term of this word, viz, "tend" means to care for. As will be seen, all psychological movement is toward being sensed or perceived as good. When applied to the rescuer's "thou" orientation or social interest contact, the term gains even greater significance. 4) The term conveys the notion of effortful activity as well as purpose. These characteristics are

essential to psychological movement. Intentionality is an active purposive movement of the mind to reality. It is a discriminating process that addresses itself to certain realities while bracketing out innumerable others of which it could become aware. 5) Intentionality is a traditional term. Great minds have studied psychological movement under the concept of intentionality. It is the intent of this inquiry to synthesize their findings with their tradition in modern psychology.

Intentionality: Human Potential
"I Can" Movement

There is growing experimental as well as theoretical proof that a permanent center of attribution (self, creative self, solitary or composite substance) underlies psychological movement and behavior. Its existential movement to the other realities through intentionality is an upward human potential movement to perfection. This actualizing process occurs through a mutual participation in which the intentional subject informs reality and in turn is informed by reality. The subject moves to reality as a goal because it is perceived as a "good." It is a means of escaping the insecurity of his potential as well as the loneliness imposed by the freedom of this potential and solitary individuality. Traditionally the emotions were termed sense "appetites" and the will a rational "appetite" which moves the subject in this human potential "good" goal orientation. The emotions can serve three roles in psychological movement. 1) They can "hang out" or operate antecedently to responsible, "prudent" ("adult") choice of enlightened will orientation. In this way they seek an anarchistic divisive

goal of their own. This consumes vital energy that could otherwise be used to achieve the goals of "responsible choice." It thus creates an enervating psychological split of contrary motivational systems. For example, an alcoholic who lets his sensitive appetites "all hang out" without concern for the consequences debilitates his sobriety goal-orientation. 2) Emotions can be repressed to allow man's higher nature, intellect and will, to reign supreme. This Platonic and Neo-Platonic "Victorian Will" has done much to foster neurotic repression and its far-reaching pathology. 3) The emotions can be used to follow the direction of the will and in turn move the will in that direction. In this way the emotions participate in the rational human nature of the will's "fiat" or command. Only in this way can they participate in the human potential movement of intentionality. In the other alternatives given above in numbers one and two they become an "I can't" movement that is self defeating.

Berne subscribed to this Thomistic-Adlerian view. He graphically described it by drawing the ego states with perforated perimeters. These semi-permeable membranes indicated that psychic energy could flow freely from a "prudent" "adult" to monitor and regulate the feeling functions of the Child as well as the valuing functions of the Parent. For him the Adult performed the functions of "prudent" responsible choice." He diagrammed this monitoring action as shown in Fig. 2.




Fig. 2. Ego State Monitoring

It would seem that humanistic psychologists generally would agree with May that the movement of intentionality is an "I can, I will, I am" movement although they apply this tenet differently in their various systems. It's central to the theories of personality espoused by St. Thomas, Adler, and G. Allport. The subject of intentionality moves to or "intends" reality and forms central values about it which consistently determine his behavior. With this observation we have embarked on our next characteristic of intentionality in this inductive process. At this stage of our investigation of the literature it was seen that the "rescuer" identities are established by the way in which their respective intentional movements addressed other humans, i.e., as "thous" or "its." A Person's "psycho-logic" (called "magic" in Transactional Analysis) justifies one's life style or the way one habitually addresses reality. The next point describes in

detail the nature of the "rescuer" identities, the sets of their movement toward reality.

Innate Intentionality: An Unevaluated Social Interest Movement

This human potential upward movement to perfection is innately an unevaluated social interest rescuer movement. As defined in Chapter 2 the rescuer is an individual, a non-manipulator who helps others to responsible choices that are meaningful and of value to them. The Rescuer on the contrary is a helper who manipulates others and treats them as "its" by inducing them to accept his values. Search of the literature showed that intentionality is a conjunctive, caring, cooperative movement. It naturally tends to other humans as "thous" who dialogued in a mutual sharing "participation." According to St. Thomas this "participation" was effected according to the perceived autonomous natures of the object of intentionality. It was a forming and informing process that respected the autonomous nature of the "thous." This "contact" of "thous" involving a sense of belonging, acceptance and cooperation is a social interest intentionality. According to Adler, by nature a man is his brother's helper. He is a rescuer. However, we have noted above many observations of Rescuer's in many areas of daily living. How, then, does the rescuer change? How does the Rescuer develop?

Discouraging "I Can't" Rescuer Movement:
Parenting to Powerlessness

Soon after birth the "I can" movement of the self-actualizing rescuer is adversely affected by authority figures demanding conformity to their values. These commissars of conformity refuse to let the child make responsible choices. They "banal script" him by not allowing him to think, experience, or make friends for or love himself. This inhibits the rescuer human potential movement. By lack of proper education to responsible choices, e.g., in weening and toilet training, the spoiled child has been conditioned to lack of respect for order and the rights of others. He learns to react in an ego-centered way to acquired inferiority feelings. He learns to compensate for feelings of insecurity which have been reinforced by sibling rivalry and modeling of authoritarian behavior by parent figures. He has been discouraged from positive achievement through "contact" with other "thous" in the intimacy of social interest. So he chooses to achieve on "the negative side of life." In his social relations he is afraid of losing out in the esteem of others. Because he is a "pleaser" he also fears losing out in his own self-esteem. Thus, he compensates for inferiority feelings by seeking to force his values on others in competitive games. He mistakenly thinks he gains status and security by Rescuing with grandiosity and other discounts that keep him as well as his Victim in a state of passivity. He becomes dependent on his Victim in a mutually dependent ("symbiotic") relationship, just as he is dependent on his "Please me" parental figures. This competitive behavior arising from

discouragement leads to more discouragement and insecurity. There is a consistency and order in these dynamics.

"Rescuer" Movements: Dynamic Organization
of Psychophysical Systems

Search of the literature has uncovered such dynamic organization of psychophysical systems in: 1) the nature of the intentional subject ("self," "creative self," "soul") as an organizer and unifier. 2) Orientation of psychophysical potential to its goal actualization. 3) Holistic nature of rescuer intentionality. 4) Orderly succession of Rescuer movement of inferiority, discouragement, competition, and passivity. On the other hand encouragement of the rescuer identity to responsible choice leads to feelings of security and social interest that compensate for inferiority feelings.

The "rescuer" intentionality is a "dynamic organization within the individual of psychophysical systems."

Criteria II--"Rescuer" Intentionality is
Dynamically Organized to Adapt
Uniquely to the Environment

This adaptation has been shown to be twofold--innate and conditioned.

Innate

Search of the literature in the area of the subject of intentionality has shown that the human potential is uniquely organized in the psychophysical organism. The D N A encoding of chromosomal structure is indicative of this. The subject of intentionality is an

individualized product of millions of years of individual and collective coping with the environment. This uniquely patterned potential will determine how the various psychophysical systems constituting the organism will address reality. Adler relates the "psychology of use" of the life style to this "psychology of possession" in stating that the latter consists of "bricks" from which a limited number of things can be constructed. Man's inherent potential can be actualized according to the unique limitations and assets of the potential.

Conditioned

According to Adler the "creative self" as a "soft determiner" uses its innate potential to interact with the environment ("hard determiner") to produce a "typical psychological movement." This theory is in keeping with the teachings of St. Thomas according to which "intention" or expectancy (which is the product of an evaluation of the environmental situation) determines behavior. If the situation is evaluated as one that is reinforcing or conducive to fulfilling the demands of the "guiding fiction," e.g., "rescuer" self-ideal, then it will trigger off the behavior that will actualize this "self-fulfilling prophecy." Qualifications of the self-ideal, e.g., "Active Rescuer," "Passive Rescuer," "Please Me Rescuer," "Hurry Up Rescuer" will be fulfilled according to these same general dynamics. The "rescuer's" expectancy and behavior depend on how he evaluates a particular situation to fulfill his specific self-ideal. Motivation of the will to act in any environmental circumstance depends on all three factors-- environmental situation, valuing of experimental situation and

expectancy. Search of the literature has uncovered some values such as the above that qualify the "rescuer" and change the valuing of situations and expectancy that motivate him. Patterns of intentionality and external behaviors change to meet the demands of these qualifiers of the self-ideal. In other words these values alter the dynamic organization of psychophysical systems that determine a unique adjustment to the environment.

Chapter 3 has considered finding from search of the literature relating to the "rescuer" as a prototype personality. Chapter 4 will inquire into the implications of these findings in various areas of social relations. This inquiry will further test the validity of the findings.

CHAPTER 4

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL RELATIONS

The world has always sought and glorified its hero-rescuer. In the early Christian Era it was the saint and martyr. In the Middle Ages it was the warrior knight. With the advent of Newtonian physics and increasingly with the rise of colonialism, industrialism and technology it has been scientific man. Even psychology has felt the tremendous influence of scientific methodology. Freud developed a biological reductionist model of psychology and therapy that looked to scientific man as the great rescuer. Watson and Skinner, following the positivistic lead of Democritus, have also glorified scientific methodology.

Adler, Jung, Rank, and others broke with Freud in defense of their purposive behavior and free will theories. We have lately witnessed the phenomenon of behaviorists like Krumboltz and Rotter championing the cause of human freedom. Various new therapies based on the need for clients to take responsibility for their own behavior are gaining in popularity. As G. Allport indicated even physical science itself is turning a purposive face toward reality (Dinkmeyer and Dreikurs 1963, p. 7):

Up to now the 'behavioral sciences,' including psychology, have not provided us with a picture of man capable of creating or living in a democracy. These sciences in large part have imitated a billiard ball model of physics, now of course outmoded. They have delivered into our hands a psychology of an 'empty organism,' pushed by drives and molded by environmental circumstances. What is small and partial, what is external and mechanical, what is early, what is peripheral and

opportunistic--have received the chief attention of psychological system builders.

This investigation, defining rescuer intentionality as a purposive human potential movement to perfection, would seem to be in accord with this spirit of the times. In pursuing our problem we have freely drawn authoritative evidence from Aristotle and his disciple Thomas Aquinas. This has been found not only appropriate but necessary. These tremendous minds focused on the same basic human behavior of intentionality that humanistic psychologists find so important today. Many approaches to this most significant reality are superficial in dealing with the outcome of intentionality or awareness. For the most part they content themselves with peripheral characteristics of awareness moving along its descriptive horizontal lines instead of proceeding vertically to the psychological movement that gives it birth, meaning and direction. Awareness and encounter groups, which have exploited the observable manifestations of awareness often with less than a therapeutic outcome, have flourished through the '60's and early '70's. Rank, "the boy genius" of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association, has stated that psychology tends beyond itself. This is in line with the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition forming the central thrust of this investigation. This inquiry started with the empirical data of psychology, dipped into the metaphysical assumptions beyond psychology which underlie human behavior, then proceeded full circle to their outcome in empirical and observable data of current therapeutic modalities. Hopefully the treatment is a coherent whole which does not lack intrinsic consistency.

This chapter will investigate human relations in five major areas for evidence testing the validity of the above findings: 1) therapy, 2) science, politics, economics, 3) social-religious order.

An important part of this treatment of "rescuer" intentionality is validation by application to actual therapeutic settings. The following case is presented in an effort to fulfill this need.

Case of Beth

Beth K. is a 72 year old housewife from the Midwest. She is the last of four children forming one family constellation. Brother Bob was six years older than she, Irma four years older, and Mary two years older. They came from a small provincial town of three thousand population which we will call Millford. In Millford there were strong social expectancies and a lot of "keeping up with the Joneses." It was the type of town in which the "Music Man" would have thrived. Beth's family felt the impact of this atmosphere. They were sensitively aware of "what the neighbors might think" and had strong cultural prejudices.

Beth's father ruled the family as a severe moralist according to his strict German Catholic upbringing. Mother and children conformed to this strong discipline. However, Mother K. was often sick and spent much time ill in bed. Irma became psychotic in her late teens and has been institutionalized for most of her life. Mary was the only rebel in the family. She left home at an early age, became a nurse, and joined the armed forces. After her marriage to John C., she often took ill and had to be waited on hand and foot. Beth likewise often took ill, was seldom without a pain with accompanying moans and

groans. At times she would get out of her bed in obvious pain, try valiantly to make her way across the bedroom floor to the bathroom, then fall swooning in the middle of the room. On such occasions her husband would run solicitously to her aid. Beth took to brandy "to ease the pain." The amount of pain-killer she imbibed gradually increased. Her husband sympathetically purchased the brandy for her until he became startingly aware of the amount she was consuming.

Beth loved to talk, would often interrupt other speakers and once "getting the floor" would go on interminably with her stories. She never tired of telling them. She often contradicted her husband, frequently made unfavorable comparisons between her family and his. When events proved him or others wrong, she consistently observed, "See, I told you so." She boasted frequently that it was she who had pulled the family through the depression years. It was she who had laboriously preserved for and managed finances so that the family could survive. She had suffered much misery for these efforts and for giving birth to her four children. She often let them and others know about it. It was also she who had seen them all through their many illnesses even though her own health suffered much for her efforts. She professed much insomnia and lack of appetite because of her poor health. However, it was learned that she always took a snack to bed for eating during the night and often snacked during the day. She also often slept during the day. Beth would often ask people for advice about her poor health and then would tell them later that she had followed their advice but that "it didn't work." Sometimes this "Yes, But" game took

another turn. When advised that she should take a walk every day, she had "tried hard" and succeeded in walking but that it was too much for her. Her complaining tone of voice told her advisor that "it is all your fault!" When members of her family told her with regrets that they would have to leave her alone, she would emotionally blackmail them with, "You can go, but you'll be sorry when I'm gone. You just don't appreciate all that I have done for you and the family!"

Beth's family and significant others were advised to ignore her moans and groans and other attention-getting behaviors. She was encouraged for doing little positive things--for the way she dressed or wore her hair, for speaking positively about people and events, for any little thing she did about the house. It had become apparent how much she needed approval and how she discouraged herself with fears of not getting it. She was given unconditional strokes especially for just being herself and encouraged for all her positive efforts. The counselor "spit in her soup" by confronting her manipulative Rescuer-Victim behaviors. She was informed that she had a need to be sick so as to get attention and put people into her service. At first she felt a loss of face and bitterly criticized "these dumb modern counselors" to almost everyone she met. When confronted with this negative response to counseling, she was helped to the awareness that she would have to take responsibility for her behavior if she wished to continue improving. She at first grudgingly, then freely admitted that counseling had helped her. She was helped to structure her time and encouraged for the many ways in which she did so. Her strong good will has paid high

dividends in a short time. Within four months she has stopped putting others down as "its" with her Rescuer-Victim behaviors. Her drinking problem has disappeared completely; the loss of considerable edema in face and legs has disappeared. She no longer complains about loss of appetite, insomnia, and incessant pain. Her day is now filled with positive values: sewing, reading, viewing T. V., hiking, etc. She now states that she finds life a challenging adventure. Her family continues to give her encouraging responses to her pursuit of new found values, especially for her strong cooperative will. Her need for environmental support has increasingly been replaced by self-encouraging internal support.

Evaluation

This investigation has focused on a problem that has vast implications. Its scope in both theory and practice is deep and broad. In an effort to synthesize theoretical and experimental findings from the literature, labels encapsulating key concepts will continue to be used. One of the major implications of this inquiry is that modern psychology tended to "throw the baby out with the bath water." Its "Not O.K. Critical Parent" abounded in prejudices against religion and philosophy. As a result, the wisdom of ages has until quite recently been neglected and rejected by modern psychology. Concepts of will, soul, freedom, responsibility, etc., are again gaining--appearing onto the psychological scene and increasing in popularity. The case of Beth allows us to synthesize many of these concepts as well as other theoretical and experimental findings uncovered in the literature search.

Aristotelian-Thomistic "Appetites" and Modern "Hungers".

Intentionality is basic human behavior. It is essentially a choice process. We go through life seeking what we like, avoiding what threatens the objects of our likes. Heidegger states: "being seeks Being" and Aristotle adds: "being seeks Being perceived as good." This is why we make choices--because we perceive being as good. We have seen also that this characteristic of being is the source of the "upward" potential movement, holism, the "rescuers" as well as all personality types. It is also the source of all human needs as defined by Maslow (1968) and others as well as the human "hungers" as defined by Berne (1961). Berne's selection of the word "hunger" for this phenomena of human needs is most congruent with Aristotle terminology, "appetites," for the will and emotions; these latter purposive movement to intentionality. We will now see how all of this applies to the case of Beth.

"Appetites" and "Hungers". Berne (1961) enunciated several "Hungers": stimulus hunger, recognition hunger, stroke hunger, leadership hunger, etc. Beth's case showed that she was starved for these "goods."

Recognition Hunger. Beth was heavily into the "four misguided goals" of behavior; she used "assumed disability" to get attention and power. When her attention-getting mechanisms did not work she got angry and revengeful. For fear of not getting the attention she desired when family members proposed to leave the house she would typically resort to emotional blackmail: "After all I've done for you,

you don't care a bit for me. So, that's alright. It won't be long now. You'll be sorry when I'm gone." She would also threaten sickness to keep family around her. She had many tactics for getting control of conversation and once getting it would go on ad infinitum with stories of the past, embellishing them with interminable details. She often interrupted others and made use of contradictions to "get the floor." Stories of the past often centered around the ways she had "rescued" the family by her undying devotion. Beth hungered for recognition. Her intentionality habitually sought this "good". Encouragement to appropriate "contact" behaviors by other "thous" helped reinstate innate "I can" intentionality.

Structure Hunger. As has been shown, innate "rescuer" intentionality naturally seeks holistic orientation in its awareness contact with the "me," "thou," and "it." It naturally seeks order and structure. Disorder is introduced into the personality by discouragement and competition. Discouragement is an "I can't" movement that runs counter to the rescuer "I can" movement of innate intentionality. It has a deadening affect on the vital awareness process and it fears to risk the effects of "contact" with "thou": i.e., respect, intimacy, belonging, acceptance. When Beth learned to respect the "thou" in significant others, she not only experienced the unconditional acceptance of their encouragement, their acceptance, and the belongingness of their intimacy, she also began to find new values in life. The encouraged vital movement led to her structuring her time with activities and intimate relationships that made life challenging and

worthwhile. Her social interest increased with these responsible choices. Her "Free Child," "Adult," and "O.K. Nourishing Parent" functions increased as her "Adapted Child" and "Not O.K. Critical and Nourishing Parent" behavior decreased. Thus, "gamey" competitive time structuring increasingly diminished.

Stimulus Hunger. According to Beth's "biased apperception," she was neglected and rejected. She got stroked by nobody. She discouraged herself by this so much that she wanted to die. She began talking about suicide. Immediately before counseling began she had been brought to Tucson by air in a wheelchair and immediately took to bed. She was suffering from stimulus hunger; the hunger that underlies all other hungers. The treatment of encouragement, responsible choice time structuring (all of which are a part of social interest) nourished all of these hungers and left her a healthy cooperative member of society.

Respect-Intimacy. Two experimental findings germane to this relation emerge from the case of Beth: 1) intimacy can only follow a respectful non-manipulative "I-thou" relationship, and 2) "gamey" competition will not allow one to risk intimacy. Feared loss of esteem and lack of the control that gives one power and meaning of "place" prevent one from making "contact." This is often complicated by fear of rejection. This experimental data is in keeping with theoretical findings related to "rescuer" intentionality.

Purpose-Spontaneity. These variables are often mistakenly represented as being mutually exclusive, as having a negative

correlation. The case of Beth showed that the more she became committed to the habitual purposive intentionality of Rescuer-Victim the more frequent, spontaneous, and shrewd were her "tricky child" behaviors in this direction. The more she saw the need for and practiced rescuer behavior, the more spontaneous they became. There appeared to be a positive correlation between purpose and spontaneity.

In brief, the experimental evidence afforded the case of Beth and others not mentioned here, support theoretical findings uncovered in the literature.

"Rescuer" dynamics seen in the case of Beth will now be investigated as a collective psychological movement in the areas of science, politics, and economics.

Science, Politics, Economics

The popular science fiction T.V. series, "Star Trek" gives two evaluations of futuristic science: 1) it can be used for destructive purposes (as by the perfidious Klingons) or constructively (as by Capt. Kirk and the Federation). 2) Science, devoid of human element, is cold and undesirable. Despite his "fascination" for scientific discovery, Mr. Spock must admit that in the final analysis even he prefers the company of the human scientist rather than that of the exclusively "Adult" scientific personality.

This popular view of science is the outcome of centuries of partisan polarization and compromise. The Greek philosopher Democritus enunciated the positivistic theory that all reality including universal concepts is composed of particulars. Plato, on the other hand,

conceptualized an extreme opposite view that glorified a world of universals. His disciple Aristotle, seeing the need for a physical science of particulars as well as a philosophy of concepts abstracted from this physical science of particulars, broke with his master. Platonic theory dominated the thinking of such great minds as St. Augustine and European thinking generally for a thousand years. Then the Ethics of Aristotle became known and through the efforts of St. Thomas and his teacher Albert the Great, Aristotle became more widely known throughout Europe. Missionaries going to the Middle East translated Aristotle from Arabic manuscripts they found. These were forwarded to Aquinas who taught Aristotle at the University of Paris and saw the teachings of the great Stagyrte disseminated throughout European centers of higher education. He suffered much abuse for his efforts from other schools of thought, determinists and voluntarists as well. Outside Thomistic circles and the theological camps opposing them, the psychology of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition emphasizing internal locus of control for therapeutic growth received little recognition. Modern psychology began with a pronounced anti-religious and anti-philosophical bias. As has been noted, Freud in a negative way and Adler in a very positive way have furthered the cause of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Buber and Rotter have also done much to further this tradition. Their efforts have emphasized the influence of concrete reality and particular essences on human behavior. This is a basic postulate which contrasts sharply with extreme subjectivistic views held by many humanistic Neo-Platonic Kantians. May, while

extolling Kant, seems to be unconscious of the incongruity of his views on the holism of intentionality with the Kantian doctrine.

About 1600, Democritus experienced a rebirth with the scientific euphoria heralded by Francis Bacon. Newtonian physics added impetus to this movement even though Newton himself did not know that the sun he populated would consume its inhabitants. Colonialism, nationalism, and the industrial revolution have helped make a rescuer god out of "sci-tech." Futurists have been glibly promising that the scientific paradisaal apple, making men like gods, would solve all of their problems. However, this apple has proven to be full of worms. Many dreamy wonders of science have turned out to be nightmarish blunders.

The role of science as a Rescuer was emphasized in telling detail by an article in Time (Trippett 1977) entitled, "Science: No Longer a Sacred Cow." Dyes that give foods a cosmetic appearance have caused cancer; detergents that make dishes gleam, kill rivers; pills that make sex safe threaten health; cyclamates, D.D.T., estrogen, thalidomide, and saccharin are some of the scientific wonders that have produced worms in the apple of technology. Babies born without limbs and mothers suffering from intra-uterine cancers have made the scientific apple unpalatable for today's layman.

Science and Politics

Biologist Barry Commoner in Science and Survival (1966) documented the erosion of scientific integrity. In this work he denounced official secrecy and lying about nuclear fallout. This was merely an

early ripple in a subsequent tidal wave of muckraking that has washed away the image of the scientist as some kind of superman. Scientists are progressively assuming the image of the Rescuer, appearing as fallible and dishonest as the politicians with whom they increasingly consort. Physicist Primack and environmentalist von Hippel (1974) in Advice and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena demonstrate the tendency of many scientists to look the other way when the government wants to lie about scientific matters. In the Pentagon of Power Louis Mumford (Trippett 1977) exposes and inveighs against the intimacy of the scientist-politician relationship. According to Mumford, the scientists until lately have "been criminally negligent in anticipating or even reporting what has actually been taking place" (p. 72). Scientists themselves have been increasingly condemning science's callous use of human guinea pigs. The National Institute of Health researchers have been found guilty of injecting live cancer cells into unknowing subjects. Washington neurologist Dr. R. M. Restak, writing about this incident in the New York Times (Trippett 1977, p. 73), stated: "Do we need yet more horrors to bring home the truth that science is too important to be left to the scientists?" For many scientist as well as laymen the hero rescuer science has at times become a villain Rescuer. He has typically been motivated by a value system that refuses to make responsible choices based on natural and logical consequences. In the Rescuing role he has ruthlessly defined reality for millions of unsuspecting victims. In doing this he has put his own selfish need for prestige and economic gain to achieve ascendancy over the needs of the

fellow humans whom he is supposedly dedicated to help. For him they are not autonomous "thous" but convenient automatons, puppets, exploitable "its." He is becoming an increasing embarrassment to the many dedicated rescuer scientists within his ranks.

Science and Finance

According to Time (March 7, 1977) federal subsidy for scientific research for 1977 is a whopping \$24.7 billion, up 67 percent in eight years. Much of this funding in the past has gone into Rescuing operations diametrically opposed to our democratic ideals. Given an inevitable status quo powered by vested interests the scientific rescuer will probably not gain control of the "rescuing" dynamics of science for some time to come. West, author of River of Tears (1972) has documented how a goliath mining company, Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation has used technology for exploiting the "thou." He outlines how its Rescuing operations predate the Christian Era. Its "democratic" "rescuing" operations as West points out have given it Rescuing control over economic, political and social orders on five continents. Recent disclosures of multi-nationals, intrigue in the energy crisis, the sale of aircraft and other weapons and price fixing on a national and international scale betrays a collective Rescuing intentionality or life style among the multi-nationals. Such movement has been undermining freedom and democracy in foreign economic and diplomatic policy. In an address to the U. S. Congress in February, 1977, the President of Mexico, Jose Lopez-Portillo pleaded with American leaders to right this Rescuing operation by asking them to take United States diplomacy out

of the hands of the multi-nationals. This would reverse the expressed conviction of Calvin Coolidge that "the business of the United States government is business." According to the ideals of our Republic it would seem that the business of the United States government is rescuing rather than Rescuing.

Social--Religious Order

According to the "rescuer" intentionality theory found in the literature, the subject of intentionality becomes what he knows; his personality is the central values that he pursues. Buber is outstanding among modern rescuers who exemplify these principles. In his private and public life as well as in the theories he has created and espoused Buber is a rescuer par excellence.

Buber's work is essentially within the parameters of Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. For St. Thomas innate intentionality intends people as "thous." According to Freidman (1955) Buber's "I-thou" epistemology avoided the extreme subjectivism of the Kantian categories. This is demonstrated in Buber's work Between Man and Man. Here he expresses the need to view others as "essences" distinct from ourselves; only then in true dialogue does human speech achieve its fulfillment. In this same work Buber takes issue with Kierkegaard on the matter of celibacy and here again he is in accord with St. Thomas. Buber disagreed strongly with Kierkegaard's contention that he (Kierkegaard) should not get married asserting that such a union would ipso facto hinder the solitary service and love he has bound to give God. According to Kierkegaard man must decide between God and the

world. Buber responded that we serve God through loving dialogue with our neighbor. This is in accord with the Thomistic stand on celibacy which holds that celibacy can afford one the freedom of loving and serving God's people, the Church, better than the married state. Buber's respect and consequent loving service to the "thou" gives him a place among the most important rescuers of his time.

A contemporary of Buber who exemplified the "I-thou" relationship in his life as well as in his work was Pope John XXIII. He was trained in moderate realistic philosophy and theology at an early age. It has been shown in the search of the literature how this system tends toward respect for others as autonomous essences distinct from oneself. As pope, Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli braved authoritarian opposition within the Catholic Church to convene Vatican Council II which initiated a more respectful and loving attitude toward people of every race and persuasion. He did much to further ecumenism.

Throughout his life Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli gave evidence of the empathetic, respectful and courageous intentionality of the rescuer. As Papal Nuncio to Turkey during World War II the man was grieved by the war; he was a man of peace. He was indignant at the many brutalities caused by the war. Once the Germans declared war on Russia, the German ambassador to Turkey suggested to the archbishop that perhaps now that the Germans were fighting atheistic communism, the pope might give the Germans moral support. The archbishop retorted, "And what shall I tell the pope about the millions of Jews the Germans are murdering in Poland and Germany?" On yet another

occasion a boat load of Jewish children who had escaped from Germany docked in Istanbul. Because of its neutrality, the Turkish government ordered the children be returned to Germany. The Archbishop was horrified at hearing of the order, knowing that returning the children was a certain death sentence. Through his determination and influence the Turkish government rescinded the order and agreed to transfer the children to another neutral country. Archbishop Roncalli, thus, helped to save the lives of hundreds of Jewish children. Throughout the war, the Archbishop assisted many Jews who had left countries conquered by the Nazis to reach Palestine.

In attitude and behavior Pope John XXIII proved himself respectful and loving towards all. The Rescuer typically subverts the social order to the political and economic orders. As a rescuer Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli perceived the political and economic orders as servants of the social order and higher values.

The experimental data given above has limitations with regard to sex, age, chronology, location and areas of social relations. The treatment of implications for social relations could have extended interminably by investigating the rescuer Joans of Arc, Ralph Naders and Jerry Browns as well as Rescuer Idi Amins, Mao Tse Tungs and Adolph Hitlers. Obviously space and time considerations prevent this.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

We go through life seeking things we like (volition) and avoiding those we dislike (nolition). These choice processes are the dynamic element of intentionality, a human potential movement that existentially relates us to others as "thous" or "its". We innately tend to relate to others as "thous" in a respectful, social interest movement. An authoritarian society conditions us as children to relate to "thous" as "its" in a competitive "gamey" movement. This is done through education to powerlessness--a neglect of needs for encouragement "strokes" and orderly responsible choices. Encouragement to responsible choice helps structure our lives to consistent social interest intentionality, i.e., social interest rescuer rather than competitive Rescuer. The "rescuer" has been shown to be differentiated specifically and individually by the values he pursues.

Conclusions

These findings from the literature validated by implications from the areas of 1) therapy, 2) science, politics, economics, and 3) religious-social order allow for the following conclusions:

1. Innate intentionality is a rescuer movement which is dis-oriented by treating "thous" as "its" into Rescuer movement.

2. These "rescuer" movements are: a) dynamic organizations within the individual of psychophysical systems. b) These dynamic organizations determine the "rescuer's" unique adaptation to the environment. c) In fulfilling these criteria the "rescuer" is a personality type. d) It has been shown that the "rescuer" habitually moves toward specifically and individually distinct values that differentiate his basic personality. The "rescuer" is thus a prototype.

Recommendations

Throughout this investigation the investigator has focused his inquiry on the problem: "Is the "rescuer" a prototype personality?" As a result he has had to treat somewhat superficially many philosophical and epistemological problems related to psychological theory and practice. The limitations of this problem-centered focus were further complicated by strictures of space and time to which the writer was subject. As a result there are many areas of unresolved investigation touched on by this synthesis. Some of the most important ones are as follows:

1. Problems of separation and habits of intentionality. Throughout the investigation of "rescuer" psychological movement it was obvious to this investigator that problems of "denial," "bargaining," "mourning," and "identity crisis" associated with separation by death of loved ones, divorce and severe handicap are basically problems of habitual intentionality. The subject achieves a sense of power, meaning, security and "place" in the environment with the consistent

orientation to reality that his existential human potential movement gives him.

2. Love-respect. The "need for intimacy" in modern psychotherapy has produced many interesting phenomena: nude marathons, nude swimming, client "permissions" given by counselors for a divorce or to experience extramarital sex (including with the counselor). We have witnessed such prestigious figures as Koch referring to some transparency, self-disclosure groups as "psyhic whorehouses".

The central thrust of this investigation has been respect for the other as an autonomous "thou." Social interest of the rescuer begins with respect and leads to a deepening cooperative intimacy. Where eros takes over from agape there is lack of due respect. In this regard there can be adultery even in the marriage bed. There is need for greater research into the relationship between respect and love. There seems to be a great need, especially in training programs, to emphasize the antecedent position respect has in relation to intimacy.

3. Spontaneity-purpose. There is a prevalent belief that spontaneity and purpose are mutually exclusive, are negatively correlated. It has been shown how greater purposive commitment to the "guiding fiction" leads to a more spontaneous response to situations which can help fulfill the "guiding fiction". This is a spontaneity proceeding from habit. According to Thomas Aquinas man thinks mostly in universals. Adler seemingly supports this with his thesis that life style behaviors fulfill the "guiding fiction" (a universal concept). However, St. Thomas also asserts that behavior proceeds from potency and

habit. Fresh experience of reality arising from the human potential is also spontaneous. How does this spontaneity relate to the spontaneity of habit? What are its implications for therapy? These questions need further research.

4. Psychodynamic Source Therapy. According to the findings of this investigation therapy essentially consists in becoming aware of destructive "gamey" habitual intentionality and reprogramming oneself to constructive rescuer intentionality. This investigator has been researching and experimenting with a therapy that allows the client to get in touch with his "core being", the subject of his intentionality. From this vantage point he is led to become aware of destructive Rescuer intentionality and reprograms himself to self-actualizing rescuer intentionality. Change of consciousness, concentration, and desensitization exercises are systematically used to help the client achieve this movement.

It is the writer's respectful wish and hope that others might be led by this investigation to inquire into the above areas as well as others suggested by this treatment of the "rescuers".

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