REGULATING LABOR:
THE FORMATION AND EFFECTS OF A WORLD LABOR REGIME
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

By
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. 7
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. 7
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... 8

## CHAPTER ONE: THE 20TH CENTURY WORLD LABOR REGIME IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY .......................................................... 10
- Economic Globalization ...................................................................................................... 14
- Globalization and Labor ....................................................................................................... 18
- Emergence of Global Institutions of Labor Regulation ...................................................... 18
- Globalization, Labor, and Inequality ................................................................................... 21
- The ILO World Labor Regime in the 20th Century Global Political Economy ............... 24

## CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL SOURCES ................................................................. 27
- Modernization Theory and the Convergence Hypothesis .................................................. 28
- International Regime Theories of International Political Economy .......................... 35
- Global Class Stratification Theories ................................................................................ 38
- World Polity – World Society Neo-Institutionalism in Sociology .................................. 41
- Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 45

- The Genesis of the International Labor Organization ....................................................... 49
- Theory ................................................................................................................................. 51
- Individual and Benevolent Society Sources of the World Labor Regime ...................... 56
- Socialist Organizational Internationalism .......................................................................... 62
- The International Union Movement ................................................................................ 73
- Intergovernmental Organization, Co-operation with NGOs, and Co-optation ............... 77
- The International Association for Labor Legislation ....................................................... 80
- Working Class Organizations during World War I ............................................................ 91
- Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 98

## CHAPTER FOUR: FORMATION OF THE WORLD LABOR REGIME II: STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, REGULATORY OUTPUT .............................................. 100
- The Organizational Development of the ILO ................................................................. 100
- Organizational Mission ..................................................................................................... 100
- Membership ..................................................................................................................... 103
- Organizational Structure .................................................................................................. 105
- Procedure: The Adoption of Conventions and Recommendations ............................ 107
- The Pace of Regulatory Activity ..................................................................................... 108
- The Contours of Regulatory Activity .............................................................................. 117
- The Dynamics of the Articulation of a World Labor Regime ......................................... 120
- World Polity Perspective .................................................................................................. 120
# TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

- Global Class Conflict Perspective ........................................ 123
- Hypotheses ........................................................................... 125
- Methods and Data ................................................................. 130
- Regression Analysis Results .................................................. 137
- Discussion ............................................................................ 141

## CHAPTER FIVE: FORMATION OF THE WORLD LABOR REGIME III: STATE INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD LABOR REGIME ........................................ 143
- Norms and Expectations about States’ Ratifications of Labor Conventions ..................................................... 145
- The Status and Pace of Ratifications of ILO Conventions ........................................................................ 149
- The Dynamics of ILO Convention Ratification ......................................................................................... 160
- Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Research ....................................................................................... 160
- Hypotheses ............................................................................ 172
- World Polity Theory ............................................................... 172
- Global Class Conflict Perspective ........................................ 174
- Data and Methods ................................................................. 177
- Dependent variables ............................................................. 177
- Independent Variables .......................................................... 180
- Results .................................................................................... 190

## CHAPTER SIX: EFFECTS OF THE WORLD LABOR REGIME: LABOR UNREST AND WORKERS’ RIGHTS ...................................................... 193
- The Impact of the World Labor Regime on Labor Protest ........................................................................ 196
- Data and Methods ................................................................. 196
- Results .................................................................................... 199
- The Impact of the World Labor Regime on Workers’ Rights ................................................................. 204
- Data and Methods ................................................................. 205
- Results .................................................................................... 214

## CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION .................................................... 216

## REFERENCES ........................................................................... 227
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Bilateral Labor Treaties, 1904-1915.................................................................84
Table 3.2: Linkages in the 1915 Labor Treaty Network and Convention Network........85
Table 4.1: All and “New” Conventions Adopted, 1919-2003......................................110
Table 4.2: Regulatory Output of the ILO: Annual and Period Totals and Averages, for
Conventions and Recommendations.................................................................113
Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Regression of Adoptions of ILO Conventions,
1919-1990, on Selected Independent Variables..............................................136
Table 5.1: Ratifications of Fundamental ILO Conventions by 2003.........................150
Table 5.2: Average Convention Ratifications, by World Bank Income Group, in
2002..................................................................................................................157
Table 5.3: Average Convention Ratifications, by Van Rossem’s World System
Zones, 2002.......................................................................................................158
Table 5.4: Maximum Likelihood Regressions of Fundamental Convention
Ratifications........................................................................................................186
Table 5.5: Negative Binomial Regressions of Total Annual New Ratifications
of Any ILO Conventions, 1919-1996.................................................................188
Table 6.1: Maximum Likelihood Regression of Labor Unrest on World Labor Regime
Variables, 1919–1996.......................................................................................201
Table 6.2: Maximum Likelihood Regression of Workers’ Rights Gap on
Integration in World Labor Regime, 1985-1996..............................................212

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1: Bilateral Labor Treaties, 1915.................................................................83
Figure 4.1: ILO Membership, 1919-2002.................................................................104
Figure 4.2: ILO Convention Output 1919-2001: Absolute Numbers and Three-Year
Moving Average...............................................................................................111
Figure 4.3: Comparison of All Adoptions with New Adoptions.............................112
Figure 5.1: Density of Fundamental Convention Ratification Matrices, 1931-2002....151
Figure 5.2: Ratifications of Eight Fundamental ILO Conventions, 1931-2002........156
Figure 5.3: Average Annual Ratifications, with 3-Year Moving Average and Trend...159
ABSTRACT

Inequalities in the commodification of labor are constitutive for economic activities that span political borders. Increasing global economic integration at the end of the twentieth century is motivated part by new opportunities to exploit such inequalities. Despite this fundamental characteristic of global economic relations, the twentieth century has also witnessed the evolution of an institutional framework of international labor regulation, produced and monitored by the International Labor Organization (ILO), that aims at reducing inequalities in working conditions and protecting workers from the extremes of economic competition, i.e. decommodifying labor. What factors account for the formation of a world labor regime in the twentieth century? And, given the apparent contradiction between the purpose of the ILO's world labor regime and the roots of economic globalization in inequalities in labor commodification, what effects has the world labor regime had for workers on the ground? This study explores the formation and effects of the world labor regime in the twentieth century. Neo-institutionalist theories of an emergent world culture and world polity provide a useful framework for understanding the diffusion of symbolic constructs and institutional forms on a world scale, but they tend to de-emphasize questions of agency, power and conflict. Global class conflict approaches (world systems theory, dependent development theory, dependency theory) help to situate the formation of the ILO's global labor regime in the context of global patterns of exploitation, stratification, dependence and conflict. Three dimensions of world labor regime formation are examined: the historical roots of the world labor regime in the nineteenth century, the articulation of international labor
standards by the ILO, and the ratification of those standards by ILO member countries, between 1919-1999. This study examines the impact of member countries’ integration in the world labor regime on labor protest, and on workers’ rights. The most important findings concern the dynamic relationships between labor protest and world labor regime formation, and the significant effects of countries’ labor regime integration on the protection of workers' rights. The formation and integration of the world labor regime is in part a co-optive response to the threat posed by working class mobilization; nevertheless, integration in the world labor regime does appear to benefit workers on the ground.
CHAPTER ONE

THE 20TH CENTURY WORLD LABOR REGIME IN THE
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

The regulation of labor is a key issue in contemporary theoretical and political debates about globalization. Inequalities at the national level with regard to labor standards, working conditions, wages and the protection of workers’ rights, are constitutive for economic globalization. Economic relationships that span political borders have always been based in part on differences in the conditions and costs of labor. The rapidly increasing integration of the global economic system over the past three decades, however, has been driven in large part by the emergence of new opportunities to exploit existing inequalities between nations with regard to the direct and indirect costs of labor. Beyond the intensified exploitation of existing inequalities in the wages and conditions of labor, some argue that global economic integration leads to regulatory competition, i.e. active deregulation of markets, including labor markets, as a strategy for enhancing economic competitiveness in an increasingly competitive global economic environment.

Proponents of economic globalization advocate deregulation with the assertion that deregulated national and global markets will foster economic growth from which all participants will benefit. The expansion of international economic relationships will stimulate economic growth for all participants, including wage-earners in all regions of the globe. Globalization, based in large part on the deregulation of markets for all commodities, is thus a positive sum game, a rising tide that will lift all boats.
More skeptical or critical voices view economic globalization as a new and more effective means of organizing the exploitation of propertyless workers by those with economic or political power (Robinson 2004; Ross and Trachte 1990). Increased capital mobility and the more extensive and systematic use of subcontracting networks leads to the closest competition among workers who may be separated from one another by great economic, political, cultural and spatial distances. From this perspective, globalization is thus based on inequalities in the commodification of labor, and contributes to a "race to the bottom" with regard to workers’ rights and protections, and national regulation of labor relations (Faux 1990; Tilly 1995). According to this view, only the yachts are free to float on tides that rise, whereas the boats remained tethered to the bottom, and are enveloped and consumed by the changing economic tides.

The vehemence of this debate about globalization and labor regulation, indeed its very existence, is puzzling in light of the fact that it takes place against the backdrop of a widely recognized institutional framework of international labor standards and protections: a historically and organizationally deeply-rooted world labor regime. The concept of a world labor regime is discussed in greater depth in the following pages, but it can be introduced briefly here. The regime concept refers to the "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner 1983a: 1). This regime concept has been used to study international regulatory institutions governing environmental, monetary, security, and other relations (Keohane 1984; Krasner 1983a; Martin and Simmons 2001; Ruggie 1975). In this study, the concept is applied to the issue-area of labor, i.e. the regulation of labor
markets and the use of labor in commodity production; more generally, the realization of value from labor. In some regards, the case of the world labor regime is simpler than the international regimes that have been the focus of previous research, in that one international governmental organization (hereafter: IGO) has dominated the international issue-area of labor for most of the 20th century – the International Labor Organization (hereafter: ILO), formed in 1919 at the conclusion of World War I. As used in this study, then, the expression 20th century world labor regime refers to the principles, norms and standards articulated by the ILO over the course of its history, and the organizational structures of the ILO that produce and maintain this institutional regulatory framework.

The basic purpose of this world labor regime has been to strive to improve working conditions by regulating and limiting the commodification and exploitation of labor. The parties to the Treaty of Versailles, which created the ILO, stipulated there, as a first principle, that the purpose of the ILO was to set limits to the commodification of labor.1 The decommodification of labor was to be achieved by establishing a set of general norms, standards and policies concerning the conditions and wages of labor, and setting guidelines for the organization and management of national-level industrial relations institutions and government agencies concerned with labor.2 Thus, despite the recognition that “differences of climate, habits and customs, or economic opportunity and industrial tradition” might make “strict uniformity difficult of immediate attainment”

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1 It is noteworthy that the Labor Commission proposed more far-reaching language – that labor was not to be treated as a commodity at all. Cf. Perigord 1926: 288.
2 Esping-Andersen defines de-commodification as “the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation. In the history of social policy, conflict have mainly revolved around what degree of market immunity would be permissible; i.e. the strength, scope and quality of social rights” (1990: 37).
(Périgord 1926: 287), the basic thrust of the regime is towards systematic the reduction of differences in the commodification of labor across varying economic, political, social and cultural contexts. Indeed, a common thread running through the discourse of the era of the founding of the ILO was that the goal of international labor regulation should be to remove labor from international competition (Maheim 1933). The ILO’s mandate was in part inspired by this overarching goal.

The 20th century world labor regime thus presents a puzzle: In the 19th and 20th centuries, the level of global economic integration has varied quite significantly, giving rise to heated debates about the appropriate assessment of the wave of increasing integration that began in the 1970s. Despite these variations, however, transnational economic relationships have rested, at least in part, on differences in the conditions of exploitation of labor. Thus, without inequalities in the exploitation of labor, e.g. labor conditions and wages, without systematic differences in the institutional frameworks organizing the commodification of labor, there would be no expansion and deepening of global economic ties, i.e. no economic globalization. Yet at the same time, the process of economic globalization has been accompanied by a specific process of political globalization – the formation of a world labor regime – the ostensible purpose of which is to reduce differences in the commodification of labor.

There is substantial evidence that the world labor regime has gained legitimacy and become increasingly institutionalized over the course of the 20th century. Virtually all sovereign states are members of the ILO, and most began their membership very shortly after establishing their sovereign status. Other central international governmental
organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, have officially recognized the jurisdiction of the ILO in matters of global labor regulation. Many national and international labor and human rights organizations maintain close relations with the ILO, often striving to obtain consultative status at ILO conferences and meetings. The most important international labor standards of the ILO are very widely ratified by member states. Today, virtually any discussion of international labor standards and the regulation of labor invokes the ILO’s fundamental standards as a widely consensual starting point (Evans 2000; Tsogas 2001).

How can we account for the evolution of the 20th century world labor regime, when the continuing and increasing exploitability of differences in the wages and conditions of labor remains a constitutive element in the integration of the global economy? What sense is to be made of the observed convergence of members of the international community on the organizational and regulatory frameworks that constitute the 20th century world labor regime, i.e. a set of international labor standards that reduce or limit the exploitability of labor, if the increasing integration of the global economy at the beginning of the new millennium is fueled to a significant degree by the intensified exploitation of global inequalities in the direct and indirect costs of labor?

Economic Globalization

As noted above, there has been extensive and contentious debate about economic globalization. Most fundamentally, the question is whether transnational economic activity at the end of the millennium represents simply an expansion of an existing system of international economic linkages, or whether we are instead witnessing a
transition to a new phase in the history of global capitalism, the transition to a new stage in the evolution of the world system.

At face value, data on transnational economic activity indicate rapid growth in the 20th century, particularly after World War II. International trade increased steadily since World War II (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000: 85f., Figures 3 and 4). According to Kenwood and Lougheed (1999), world trade has registered growth in all but three years since 1950. Growth in world trade as a percentage of world gross domestic product (hereafter: GDP) has been almost as consistent (Held et al. 1999). Furthermore, international trade has grown much faster than world income and aggregate production in the second half of the twentieth century (Dicken 1998; Kenwood and Lougheed 1999).

The number and importance of multinational corporations has increased dramatically in the second half of the 20th century. In 2003, the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (hereafter: UNCTAD) reported 63,834 multinational corporations (hereafter: MNCs) operating worldwide in 2002. This represents an increase of more than 72% over the 37,000 MNCs in operating in 1990. In 2002, MNCs accounted for 866,119 foreign affiliates, almost a 400% increase over the roughly 175,000 MNC foreign affiliates in the early 1990s (UNCTAD 2003; cf. Held et al. 1999). In 2002, sales of foreign affiliates of MNCs reached $19,685 billion, roughly a threefold increase over the 1990 values of $5,675 billion (UNCTAD 2003).

The expansion of the role of MNCs has also been reflected in employment patterns of foreign affiliates of MNCs. Whereas foreign affiliates of MNCs employed around 17.5 million workers in 1982, that number had increased to 45.6 million by 2000,
and by 2002, 53.1 million workers, i.e. an increase of 160% by 2000, an increase of roughly 200% by 2002. Employment growth of foreign affiliates increased steadily during the last decades of the 20th century, but virtually exploded in the late 1990s. Whereas the annual employment growth rate of foreign affiliates averaged 5.5% annually between 1986 and 1990, and declined in the late first half of the 1990s, it rose dramatically in the second half of the 1990s, averaging 14.2% between 1996 and 2000 (UNCTAD 2003). For purposes of a rough comparison, it is worth noting that the total economically active population of the world increased only 43% between 1980 and 2000 (ILO 2004).

The dynamics of foreign direct investment (hereafter: FDI) are closely tied to the growth and spread of MNCs (UNCTAD 1997, 2001, 2003). Global FDI inward stocks increased almost 900% between 1982 and 2002, growing from $802 billion to $7123 billion. Inward flows of FDI increased 1100%, from $59 billion to $651 billion over the same period. During the same period, global FDI doubled as a percentage of global GDP. The growth of global FDI stocks between 1986-1995 outpaced global fixed capital formation at a rate of 2-to-1 (UNCTAD 1997). Inward FDI stocks as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation increased almost 300% between 1982 and 2002, and inflows of FDI in relation to GDP increased around 370% over the same time period (calculations based on UNCTAD 2003, table I.1).³

³ It is worth noting that FDI trends reversed themselves very dramatically in 2001 and 2002. The annual growth rate of inward FDI flows went from about 30% in 2000 to - 40% in 2001 (UNCTAD 2003). By the end of 2003, at $653 billion, as compared to $651 billion in 2002, global inward FDI had not yet recovered. UNCTAD attributes this reversal to the dramatic decrease in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD 2004).
These data cast light on the process of globalization of production at the end of the 20th century (UNCTAD 1993; World Bank 1995; Dicken 1998). The above cited trends in MNC growth, FDI, and in particular MNC employment, are evidence of the migration of capital from high-wage industrially developed economies to less developed economies characterized by surplus labor supplies, favorable regulatory environments, and shortages in investment capital. Rapid growth in manufacturing exports among certain newly industrializing countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, provide further evidence for this pattern (e.g. Deyo 1985, 1989). This pattern has been well-documented for the textile and clothing manufacturing, automobile and automobile parts manufacturing, and computer component assembly industries (e.g. Bonacich et al. 1994; Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000; Froebel et al. 1980; Silver 2003; Sklair 1993). The decentralization, or globalization of production, has been accompanied by the increasing centralization and concentration of control (Harrison 1994). Based on empirical evidence of the relocation of German manufacturing facilities a number of industries, Froebel et al. advanced the thesis of a new international division of labor in the late 1970s (Froebel et al. 1980).

As posited above, the globalization of production, for which the preceding paragraphs provided a statistical portrait in broad strokes, is based on differences, i.e. inequalities, in the conditions of production, including the costs of labor. As developments in communications and transportation technology have developed, capital has become more mobile and flexible. The incentive for capital mobility lies in the promise of greater returns to investment, not least of all based on differences in factor
costs, in particular the costs of labor. The costs of labor include, in addition to the direct wage bill and related variables such as the length of the working day and the existence of overtime pay differentials, etc., various non-wage costs related to workers' "benefits" such as insurance, vacations, maternity leave, etc., and also more indirect costs, such as investments in safety equipment, climate control and ventilation systems, adequate space, and other costs involved in providing for a more generally safe working environment (Piore 1997).

Globalization and Labor

Many social scientists have argued that globalization has had serious negative effects for workers. The increase in capital mobility documented in the previous section means that firms can relocate or threaten to relocate, to avoid labor markets characterized by higher levels of unionization, and associated higher wages, greater job security and income protections, and better working conditions (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Moody 1997; Evans 2000; Faux 1990; Tilly 1995; Wallerstein 1995).

Many observers have noted that the increasing flexibility and mobility of capital and the related globalization of production have undermined the power and authority of the state, particularly with regard to domestic economic and social policies (Evans 1997; Faux 1990; Stone 1996).

Emergence of Global Institutions of Labor Regulation

Yet, the same period which has seen an intensified exploitation of cross-national inequalities in working conditions and wages, has also seen, at the level of international institutions, the incremental formation of a global institutional framework designed to
significantly reduce inequalities in the exploitation of labor. The International Labor Organization (hereafter: ILO), founded in 1919 in the course of the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles, represents the organizational center of this global institutional framework. The primary mission of the ILO, as set forth in the constitution of the ILO, is, in essence, to set limits to the commodification of labor, i.e. to institutionalize a certain level of de-commodification of labor. The ILO constitution identifies as “the guiding principle” of the work of the ILO was “that labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce” (Lorwin 1926: 288). The most important parameters of decommodification are also adumbrated in the constitution as including

“...the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organization of vocational and technical education and other measures” (Lorwin 1926: 266).

Since the ILO was founded at the end of World War I, its members have collectively articulated a substantial framework of principles and norms concerning the world of work. This normative framework is codified in over 180 international labor conventions and an equal number of international labor recommendations. The ILO’s regulatory framework of international labor conventions is bolstered by permanent organizational committees dedicated to monitoring members’ adherence to labor standards and organizational procedures (De la Cruz et al. 1996; Ghebali 1989; Haas 1964; Landy 1966; Weisband 2000).
Furthermore, the ILO world labor regime has achieved broad legitimacy and recognition. A consensus appears to have emerged over the course of the 20th century regarding basic elements of a world labor regime: we see a global convergence on a core set of regulatory principles for the protection of workers and the institutionalization of labor markets. These labor regulations aim to render more equal the conditions of labor exploitation, even if it is conceded that, under present circumstances, total equalization of wages and working conditions is unattainable and not necessarily desirable. The ILO has articulated these basic, internationally affirmed norms governing labor exploitation. Four of the ILO’s eight fundamental conventions prohibit forced labor, and discrimination in employment and wages on the basis of sex, ethnicity, race, religion, or nation; the other four regulate the employment of children, and establish workers’ and business’ rights to organize and bargain collectively. These eight fundamental conventions have been ratified by more member countries than any of the remaining 177 ILO labor conventions. The density of ratifications of the eight fundamental labor conventions of ILO are high: six of the eight have ratification levels of 80% or higher, and ratifications of the seventh and eighth conventions - both regulating child labor - are in the 70% range. Beyond the articulation of international conventions governing the conditions and wages of labor, including the eight fundamental international labor conventions, the ILO has also contributed to institutionalizing, at the international level, a number of organizational arrangements – labor statistics collection, labor inspections systems, national cabinet-level labor ministries or departments, etc.
Globalization, Labor, and Inequality

The institutionalization and legitimation of a world labor regime in the 20th century thus appears puzzling in light of the shifts and intensification of economic globalization at the end of the millennium, based as they are on continuing, fundamental inequalities in the commodification of labor. Social scientists document convergence in institutional and organizational forms across societies, yet this process has not been accompanied by significant decreases in wealth and income inequality between or within countries (Meyer and Chase-Dunn 1975). Contrary to the predictions of advocates of free trade, comparative advantage, and unrestricted capital mobility, income inequalities between countries have remained relatively stable over the past 20 years, and inequalities within nations have increased significantly (Firebaugh 2000; Goesling 2001). Increasing within-country income inequality means that the working classes receive a decreasing share of national income. Wage-earning classes have not participated equally in the benefits of economic globalization, and many have experienced declining standards of living, deteriorating working conditions, and heightened economic insecurity.

The increasing economic inequality, and decreases in working classes' shares of national income are in part a function of their decreasing organizational capacity (Esping-Andersen 1990; Przeworski 1985; Stephens 1986; Western 1998). Stratification researchers agree that, net of other factors, working class organizational power decreases economic inequality. Working class organizational capacity has both direct and indirect effects on the distribution of the national product. Where unions are strong, they are able to link wage and benefit increases to productivity gains through collective bargaining,
and thus ensure that the working class participates in the benefits of economic growth. Indirectly, organizational capacity affects workers' collective political power. Strong working class organizations can significantly influence electoral outcomes. Higher rates of union density and working class political power are thus associated with the development of political institutions that redistribute income and wealth more evenly and regulate labor markets to protect workers from market oscillations (Bornschier & Ballmer-Cao 1979; Esping-Andersen 1990; Gordon et al. 1984; Korpi 1989; Przeworski 1985; Rueda & Pontusson 2000; Shalev 1983; World Bank 1995).

The globalization of production tends to undermine working class power, thus undermining labor market and welfare state institutions that reduce inequalities. As noted above, during the post-WWII period, the global economy has shifted from a trade-driven system to one shaped primarily by the expanding global production networks and foreign direct investment strategies of multinational corporations (MNC's) (UNCTAD 1997). Spatial mobility of capital and the strategic development of global production and sourcing networks are key elements in the new competitive strategy of MNC's (Hirst & Thompson 1996; Held et al. 1999; Ross & Trachte 1990). The spread of global production regimes creates a context of "cut-throat competition" among nation-states and sub-national regions for investment and jobs.

The increasing mobility of capital, and the associated globalization of production, have undermined workers' organizational capacity all over the world. The crisis of organized labor is not limited to the Western, industrially developed countries – as recent reports of the ILO and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
document, the scope of the crisis of organized labor is global (ILO 1997, 2002; ICFTU 1998). In the industrially developed countries, the threat of capital flight has become an effective strategy in anti-union campaigns, collective bargaining, and in lobbying for deregulation of the conditions of employment (ILO 1997; Goldfield 1987; Western 1997; Jacoby 1995; Ross and Trachte 1990; Boswell & Stevis 1997; Thomas 1995; Tilly 1995; Moody 1997; Lange & Scruggs 1998). In industrially less developed countries, the integration of the national economy into global production regimes often occurs via export oriented industrialization strategies based on the exploitation of a low-wage, disorganized and unprotected workforce. The absence of unions and protective labor regulations are often seen as contributing to comparative advantage in global economic competition (e.g. ILO 1995; Herzenberg and Perez-Lopez 1990; Deyo 1989; 1990; Bergquist 1985; Bonacich et al. 1994; La Botz 2001). In most non-Western countries for which data is available, the percentage of the workforce that is represented by workers' organizations (i.e. union density) has declined significantly since the mid-1980s. Increases in union density are the exception – the rule is the decline in the presence and power of autonomous workers' organizations. In many countries, the continuing existence of autonomous labor unions is questionable; in many others, their political and economic power has become so weak as render them virtually incapable of effectively representing members' economic and social interests (Frenkel 1993, 1995; Rodgers 1994; Thomas 1995). The expansion of global production regimes has thus contributed to the cross-national decline in working class bargaining power and organizational capacity. In both industrially developed and less developed countries, competition for investment and
jobs results in political pressures to weaken institutional protections of working class power, deregulate markets and circumscribe welfare state redistributive mechanisms.

Independent labor organizations are not only key factors in the determination of the distribution of the social product, they are also the necessary condition for the protection of all other workers' rights (ILO 2004). The implementation of labor rights and regulations has to be monitored up close, on site, by organizations of those workers whom the legal institutions are intended to protect. Where labor unions are weak, non-existent, or not autonomous, not only are wages, benefits, and job security diminished, but working conditions also deteriorate. Anecdotal evidence of worsening working conditions, both in the core countries of the world capitalist system, and in economically less developed countries, abounds (Moody 1997; Ross 1997). Systematic research confirms that impression: at the end of the 20th century, the available evidence indicates a general trend of worsening working conditions, although there are some individual cases of improvements in performance with regard to the protection of workers' rights and standards of working conditions (Boehning 2003; ILO 1997; OECD 1996, 2000).

*The ILO World Labor Regime in the 20th Century Global Political Economy*

In light of these developments, what sense can be made of the 20th century world labor regime articulated and institutionalized in the ILO? Membership in the ILO is virtually universal, and non-members are widely considered to be pariah states; ratifications of the fundamental conventions of the ILO have reached high levels, and recent conventions, such as the 1999 Convention against the Worst Forms of Child Labor, have also achieved relatively high ratification rates (85% ratification of the 1999 Child
Labor Convention 3 years). Other key intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, have affirmed the importance of the ILO's work and its jurisdiction in questions of international labor regulation. In summary, there is substantial evidence that the ILO enjoys wide, continuing legitimacy in the world polity.

Yet, as indicated above, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the world labor regime is, in some regards, completely ineffectual. The primary mission of the ILO has always been and remains the improvement of working conditions and the protection of workers’ rights, and, despite recent shifts in the ILO’s emphasis to give greater resources and attention to technical assistance and educational activities, international labor conventions are still considered by the ILO to be the primary vehicle for executing that mission (De la Cruz 1996; Ghebali 1989; ILO 2004). Of the 185 international labor conventions in which the ILO world labor regime is articulated, the two fundamental conventions addressing the right to organize and bargain collectively are considered the most important (ILO 2004). Yet despite the ILO membership’s wide ratification of these fundamental conventions, independent workers’ organizations are weaker than ever today, working conditions are deteriorating, and the economic gap between the haves and the have-nots is growing, not diminishing, in the early phases of the shift to a truly global capitalism (Dicken 1998; Firebaugh 2000; Goesling 2001; ILO 1997, 2003; Robinson 2004; Ross and Trachte 1990). What role will the ILO play in the transition to global capitalism? Researchers have noted that labor movements have to respond to the problems associated with economic globalization with their own strategy of “counterhegemonic globalization” (Evans 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith,
Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997). Is the world labor regime, with the ILO at its center, an actual or potential locus for counterhegemonic globalization?

This research presented in the following chapters addresses two basic questions: (1) *What factors influence the formation of the ILO world labor regime?* And (2), *what are the effects of members' integration into the organizational structure and regulatory framework of the ILO on working class mobilization and workers' rights?* The first part of this study explores the multi-dimensional process of the formation of the 20th century world labor regime. I explore its 19th century (pre-)history and the context of its founding at the end of World War I (Chapter III), the structure and development of the international organization and the dynamics of the ILO's articulation of a framework of international labor standards (Chapter IV), and the integration of member countries into the labor regime through the process of ratification of international labor conventions (Chapter V). The second part of the study turns to the question of the effects of the 20th century world labor regime, exploring the impact of members' integration into the ILO on national level labor unrest and the protection of workers' rights. These empirical analyses are preceded by an assessment of the theoretical resources for an analysis of the 20th century world labor regime (Chapter II).
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL SOURCES

How can we account for the formation and expansion, over the course of the 20th century, of a world labor regime centered around the ILO? The ILO was formed with the stated objective of decreasing world inequalities in the conditions of labor commodification, an apparent contradiction in light of the constitutive role, for transnational economic activity, of inequalities in the conditions of labor commodification. How can we understand the apparent international convergence on a set of fundamental labor standards over the course of the 20th century when the exploitation of labor remains a key to the contemporary rapid expansion of economic globalization?

In this chapter, I review the theoretical perspectives in sociology and political science that promise to contribute to an explanation of world labor regime formation in the 20th century. Three perspectives are particularly useful for developing an understanding of the processes of economic globalization and the accompanying formation of international institutions and organizations in the 20th century, i.e. the formation and effects of the 20th century world labor regime: the world-polity institutionalist perspective, which focuses on the formation of a world polity, world society and world culture (e.g. Meyer et al. 1987; Thomas et al. 1987); international regime theories developed by scholars in the fields of international relations and international political economy; and the global class conflict perspective, which focuses
on the dynamics of a world economic system (e.g. Wallerstein 1979). In the presentation of these perspectives, I use the heuristic device of setting each in relation to a broadly defined modernization theoretical perspective. None of the key theoretical perspectives discussed here is a direct extension of modernization theory, but it is possible to highlight the most important aspects of these perspectives by discussing the ways in which it distinguishes itself from, or develops a certain aspect of, modernization theory.

*Modernization Theory and the Convergence Hypothesis*

The theories that contributed to the formation of a general modernization theoretical paradigm did not directly address questions of international organizations or institutions, or the relationships between national states and international organizations. The modernization paradigm does however offer two distinct but related arguments concerning the formation of the 20th century world labor regime. First, the evolutionary theme that runs through this paradigm invokes a *dialectic of differentiation and integration* that, when extended to the international sphere, provides a basis for a theory of international organization. Thus extended to the international sphere, the dynamics of social differentiation and integration in industrial society give rise to a *convergence hypothesis* that can serve as a framework for the interpretation of the formation of the world labor regime.

Modernization theories dominated the discussion of national economic development in the early post-World War II years. After World War II, western social scientists had turned to the analysis of the conditions of (the lack of) industrial development in non-western non-European societies, in the context of the postwar
delegitimation of racist imperialism and colonialism, the growing awareness of deep, widespread poverty in many countries of the Southern hemisphere, and the perceived threat posed by the consolidation of the Soviet bloc of communist societies. The modernization theories that emerged in this context took western economic, social, and political institutions and cultural values as normative; the question of national development was formulated as the question of the mechanisms for the development of the kind of capitalist industrialization, political democracy and cultural individualism that characterized the western European and North American societies.

Building on problematic of the emergence of industrial society that gripped classical sociologists such as Marx, Weber and Durkheim, evolutionary modernization theories characterize societal development as the movement from lower to greater levels of social differentiation, and the development of forms of social organization that integrate the increasingly differentiated societal units (role structures, institutional domains, etc.). ¹ Functionalist sociologists like Smelser and Eisenstadt viewed development as a dialectic of differentiation or specialization, on the one hand, and integration of the newly differentiated organizational forms, on the other (Portes 1976).

More social-psychological modernization theories emphasized primacy of the diffusion of values and norms from “traditional”, i.e. diffuse, particularistic, ascriptive, affective, collective orientations, to “modern” orientations towards achievement,

¹ Two or more elements are integrated when each element’s preferences, actions or decisions are based in part on expectations, grounded in shared structures of meaning, about the others’ preferences, actions or decisions (Parsons 1951). Habermas thus distinguishes between the ideal types of “system” and “lifeworld” based on the predominance of different media of integration of action: money or power as dominant media in systemic contexts such as markets and bureaucracies, and communicative media in lifeworld contexts such as friendship, or family (Habermas 1981).
relationship specificity, normative universalism, instrumentalism and rational egoism. The institutional manifestations of modernization, and prerequisites of industrialization and economic development, included the bureaucratization of the exercise and transfer of political power, rational legal institutions, the organizational institutionalization of professions, the bureaucratic rationalization of educational, and the emergence and maintenance of money-based markets (Evans and Stephens 1988; Portes 1976; McMichael 2004).

More or less implicit in these theories is the idea that, as traditional societies modernize and industrialize, they will converge on the social values, institutional structures and organizational forms prevalent in the modern industrial societies of Western Europe and North America. Rostow's stage-theory of economic growth is an influential example of a convergence theory of the evolutionary variety. Economic growth is understood as key dimension of a broader process of modernization, according to which all societies find themselves at one of five stages of economic development: "traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and the age of mass-consumption". The "impulse to growth" diffused via "the intrusion of more advanced societies upon the less advanced", traditional ones (Rostow 1960: 174), and the consequent transmission of new "ideas and sentiments which initiated the process by which a modern alternative to the traditional society was constructed out of the old culture" (ibid: 6). All developing societies are thus expected to converge on the Western, industrial, modern forms of social organization and cultural orientations that characterize the fifth stage, the age of mass consumption.
Not all of the early modernization theorists adhere to such a unilinear concept of industrial development. Clark Kerr and his collaborators, for example, developed a three-level conceptual framework for the analysis of "modernization-as-industrialization" that integrates a universalistic "logic of industrialization" with cross-national patterns of industrial relations that are only "related", and culturally unique patterns of development and organization. In this theory, institutional and organizational convergence is only part of the story; to the extent that development follows a universal logic of industrialization, it is driven by the technological and organizational imperatives of the industrialization process (Kerr et al. 1960: Chapter 1). The imperatives associated with the universal logic of industrialization include the requirement of increasing workforce skill development and occupational differentiation, increasing integration of education and industrial function, increasing occupational and geographic labor mobility; increasing urbanization and expansion of government responsibilities and activities, increasing ideological consensus regarding the positive value of technology, science, education, "progress", being "modern", individual responsibility and work ethic, etc. Although Kerr et al. recognized and addressed the diversity of developmental paths to modern society, they were most impressed by the forces leading to organizational and institutional uniformity. In their view, "it is a contest between ideologies and national traits on the one hand, and technology and the changes that progress brings on the other" (232). Because of the central role of technological imperatives in the process of industrialization, they argued that uniformity or convergence would prevail on a global scale, while diversity would manifest itself in the form of intra-regional, local variations in identities and cultural
forms. Many paths lead to industrial society, but all paths lead to essentially the same industrial society (Kerr et al. 1960: 29).

The modernization-theoretical convergence hypothesis gains plausibility in connection with the functionalist evolutionism of modernization theory. The convergence hypothesis is based on the idea that “modern” social practices and forms of social organization diffuse to, and thus spark development in, traditional, non-industrial societies (Berberoglu 1992). The diffusion of ideas is possible because of complex interdependence. As noted above, evolutionary versions of modernization theory build on the functionalist foundations of classical sociological theory. This variant of modernization theory emphasizes processes of social differentiation, most importantly the increasing division of labor, as the key motor of economic development. The social changes caused by differentiation generate conflicts of collective values and interests that threaten social stability. The processes of social differentiation are only conducive to modernization and industrialization when differentiation is accompanied by the evolution of forms of social organization that serve to integrate the differentiated social functions or social subsystems. At the national-societal level, political subsystems are examples of such integrative forms of social organization.

The brief sketch, presented in Chapter I, of the convergence of ILO member countries on the fundamental international labor conventions might seem to provide support for the convergence hypothesis. The fact that the vast majority of the sovereign states of the world are members of the ILO, and the percentages of ratifications of ILO fundamental conventions are quite high, in the 80-90% range, might seem to be evidence
that countries are converging on a basic set of norms, standards and decision-making procedures.

There are both empirical and theoretical reasons to maintain skepticism vis-a-vis a convergence theory of world labor regime formation. At the level of empirical analysis, this perspective leads to the expectation that member countries' integration into the ILO labor regime hinges on economic and cultural development. As later chapters will demonstrate, this causal hypothesis is not borne out by the data. When other important explanatory variables are included in the analysis, economic development has little effect on the pace of member countries' integration into the ILO.

More generally, a growing number of empirical studies have undermined the hypothesis of the institutional and organizational convergence of developing economies and societies. In an early, wide-ranging empirical and theoretical assessment of patterns of convergence and divergence in development, Meyer and his collaborators identified contradictory trends, namely specific forms of convergence on institutional and organizational forms, and divergence in terms of patterns of distribution of economic opportunities and resources. They drew on a global class stratification framework to interpret these seemingly contradictory findings: "The world market and society produce convergence by subjecting all societies to the same forces; they produce divergence by creating different roles for different societies in the world stratification system" (223). More recent institutionalist cross-national comparative research on capitalism documents extensive divergence in forms of organization of capitalist firms and markets (Hall and Soskice 2001; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Soskice 1999).
Earlier research on the formation of the ILO labor regime was guided by modernization theoretical assumptions regarding national economic and political development, and neo-functionalist perspectives on international relations and international governmental organizations. Although the modernization literature is internally quite diverse and differentiated, these researchers shared a conviction that development could be understood in terms of the diffusion of certain economic and political institutions and organizational forms from the West to the rest of the world, and that this diffusion was leading to economic, political and social convergence. Domestic economic and political factors carried the most weight in the modernization theory perspective. Using qualitative historical analysis and quantitative cross-tabulation methods, this research found that economically and politically more developed European states, along with a few Latin American states, constituted a small “club” that shaped the agenda and structure of the ILO into the post-World War II period, to meet the need of their national industrial and agricultural labor markets. These national level characteristics also determined their leadership in convention ratifications. As the post-war period saw a wave of decolonization and the entry of newly formed states into the ILO, the organization lost its “club-like” character and became a “truly universal” mechanism for institutional convergence, where the participation of authoritarian and socialist states “balanced the power” of the previously dominant European industrial democracies (Landy 1966; Haas 1962, 1964; Dahl 1968; ).

This research suggests that national-level economic, political, and social development determines the timing and pattern of ratifications by member state
legislatures. Research in this theoretical tradition also includes regional variables that correlate roughly with patterns of national economic development. Counts and patterns of ratifications were seen to vary by region, depending on the characteristic level of regional economic development. This approach also suggests that the pre- and post-war periods represent major distinct phases in the formation of the ILO regulatory regime.

*International Regime Theories of International Political Economy*

As noted above, my investigation of the ILO draws on extensive empirical research and theoretical debate among *international relations scholars* concerning *international regimes* (Haggard and Simmons 1987; Keohane 1984, 1985; Krasner 1983a; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Ruggie 1975, 1983; 1998; Martin and Simmons 2001).

International relations theory in political science was dominated through the 1940s by debates between “realist” perspectives and “idealists”, that both borrowed had roots in various strands of modernization theory – realists in the national-level focus of modernization theoretical perspectives on national development, and “idealists” and functionalists, such as Haas, on the functionalism of the differentiation model of modernization. Realist approaches represent a sort of atomistic individualism at the level of international relations: nation-states are the relevant actors, using their various forms of power to pursue their national interests in the international arena. The international arena is nothing other than the anarchy produced by the behaviors of nation-states in their pursuit of their national-interests.
Functionalists in international relations theory were interested in the conditions under which international peace could be achieved and maintained (Mitrany 1966). They held that although international institutions might initially be created to conform to the power-interests of hegemonic state actors, regular interactions between nations would result in international convergence of interests and normative orientations; this would be achieved through progressive extension of the scope of issues and areas with regard to which international interaction and negotiation took place, from relatively technical areas under the jurisdiction of very specialized international agencies, to the great questions of peace and security. Haas' in-depth study of the ILO is considered prototypical of the second, somewhat more realistically oriented generation of functionalist scholarship in international political economy (Haas 1964; Mitrany 1966).

Challenges to the realist perspective emerged in the 1970s, with critiques of a number of important premises and unexamined assumptions underpinning the realist perspective. For our purposes, the most significant of these challenges were those that took the empirical reality of various forms of cooperation at the international level as their starting point for a critique of the model of "zero-sum 'anarchy' of interstate relations" (Haggard & Simmons 1987), that postulates nation-states as autonomous or independent actors pursuing national interests in a normatively unstructured international environment. Challengers were able to point to phenomena such as the gradual consolidation of the European Economic Community - from a realist perspective, such forms of international coordination and cooperation represented a theoretical anomaly, to the extent that they could not be interpreted straightforwardly as "emanations of state
power”. After WWII, the gradual erosion of U.S. hegemony, the dramatic changes in international relations and agreements, and upsets to the balance of power (e.g. OPEC, nuclear competition with USSR, economic resurgence of Europe and Japan) did not systematically result in unilateral, narrowly self-interested behavior on the part of powerful nation-states. Forms of interdependence and international cooperation thus moved to the center of theoretical attention for both realist revisionists (“neo-realists”) and “neo-liberal” challengers to the realist paradigm. In particular, neo-liberal institutionalists argued that, when nation-states identified common interests, neo-realism was too pessimistic about the possibility of cooperation and the usefulness of institutions (Ruggie 1998).

In this context, the concept of international regimes was used to identify a middle range of coordinated behavior at the international level: “neither as broad as international structure, nor as narrow as the study of formal organizations” (Haggard & Simmons 1987: 492). Regimes were understood to be governance structures that states created in order to coordinate expectations and thus render states’ behavior in areas of international interest more predictable. Behavior. “The argument was advanced that regimes continued in some measure to constrain and condition the behavior of states toward one another, despite systemic change and institutional erosion” (Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986: 760). Domains studied from this perspective include international trade, international monetary systems, regulatory frameworks ocean vessels, etc (cf. the articles in Krasner 1983a; Martin and Simmons 2001). The affinity of the international regime concept to
the "integration" side of the modernization theoretical figure of differentiation and integration is evident in this work.

Three main theoretical positions characterize more recent debates about international regimes (Krasner 1983b). Structural realists view international regimes as instruments manifestations of hegemonic power politics (Strange 1983). Constructivists, on the other hand, emphasize how international regimes embody and diffuse norms and principles that transcend national boundaries (Finnemore 1993; Puchala and Hopkins 1985). Liberal or "modified" realists, taking up a middle position between these extremes, are interested in the contexts in which the pursuit of egoistic interests leads to the creation of, or adherence to, efficacious international regimes (Krasner 1983a; Keohane 1983, 1984). As the subsequent discussion reveals, the perspective of constructionist regime theorists overlaps significantly with neo-institutionalist perspectives, while the structural realist position has most in common with sociological global class stratification theories.

*Global Class Stratification Theories*

As discussed above, the developmentalist paradigm associated with modernization theory observed, and anticipated further convergence at the national level, on a single, normative model of societal development. The vast, persistent and growing inequalities between countries, despite evidence of institutional convergence, stimulated a reformulation of the theoretical debate and reinterpretation of the empirical evidence on convergence and divergence in economic and social development. New perspectives emerged that emphasized the shaping influence of *world economic and political power*
structures on national economic, political and social development. Whether via
demonstration effects of successful early developers on recently decolonized societies, or
via more coercive economic and social pressures exerted by dominant global powers,
both symbolic institutional convergence and material divergence in development were
now interpretable, as effects of structural location within a system of unequal economic
and political power (Meyer, Boli-Bennett and Chase-Dunn 1975). More recent research
has developed in two related yet distinct directions.

I use the expression *global class stratification theories* to refer to an extended
family of theoretical approaches in the social sciences that share a perspective on modern
economic, political and social processes as interpretable and analyzable only in the
broader context of a stratified capitalist world economy. All states, and indeed all sub-
and supra-national units of social analysis, are integrated as producing and exchanging
units into a single capitalist world economic system organized by a single complex
division of labor. National-level patterns, events and actions can only be adequately
understood in the context of countries’ structural location in a stratified world economic
system. This orientation is shared by *dependency theory* (Cardoso & Faletto 1979),
*dependent development theory* (Evans 1979), *unequal exchange theory* (Emmanuel
1972), *world systems theory* (Wallerstein 1979, 1984; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985;
Chase-Dunn 1989; Chase-Dunn & Grimes 1995; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977;
Schwartzman 1989), the *Italian school of international political economy* (Cox 1987; Gill
and Law 1988; Overbeek 1993), and *global capitalism theory* (Dicken 1998; Robinson
2004; Ross 1997; Ross and Trachte 1990).
The production and exchange relationships that constitute the world economy create patterns of stratification between nation-states. Between-nation inequality, relative to within-nation inequality, still accounts for the lion's share of world inequality. The world economy thus consists of relations of production and exchange linking powerful economically and politically independent ("core") and weak, economically and politically dependent ("periphery") nation-states and regions in a comprehensive global system of nested exchange networks. The development of domestic economic, political and social structures in the periphery is significantly influenced by periphery countries' structural location in the world capitalist system. A third structural location in the world capitalist system, between the core and the periphery, is occupied by a number of nation-states characterized by both dependent and independent economic and political relations ("semi-periphery") (Wallerstein 1979; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Chase-Dunn 1989; Chase-Dunn & Grimes 1995; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977; Schwartzman 1989).

National level indicators of development and national patterns of social conflict are understood from this perspective as themselves determined by a nation-state's location in the global economic structure. Relational measures such as a variety of measures of economic dependence, including debt dependence, investment dependence, aid dependence and multi-national corporation penetration, have been used analyze national level patterns of economic and social development (Rubinson 1976; Bornschier et al. 1978; Bornschier & Ballmer-Cao 1979; Chase-Dunn 1975; Chase-Dunn & Rubinson 1977; Boswell 1989; Boswell & Dixon 1990; Dixon & Boswell 1996;
Delacroix & Ragin 1981; Alderson & Nielsen 1999). This perspective has also generated research on social movements that links mobilization to shifts in global economic structures (Boswell & Dixon 1990; Silver et al. 1995; Walton & Ragin 1990).

Implicit in the preceding discussion is the thesis that the various theories in the family of global class stratification theories also share a fundamentally relational approach to sociological analysis. The structure of the global economy is a set of relations of dominance and exploitation. This relational orientation has given rise to a growing number of studies that formalize the relational concepts underlying global stratification theories. These researchers test hypotheses about the structure of the world system by using network modeling techniques (for example, block modeling techniques) to identify empirical patterns of relations among countries (Breiger 1981; Kick 1987; Smith & White 1992; Snyder & Kick 1979; Van Rossem 1996).

*World Polity – World Society Neo-Institutionalism in Sociology*

The global class conflict tradition has generated a rich body of empirical and theoretical work, but world systems theory in particular has devoted too little attention to the institutionalization of economic and political power – world systems theorists have not, for example, systematically developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of the relationships between hegemonic cycles and international institutions. As the preceding section suggested, the neo-realist regime theoretical perspective fills that gap from an actor- and national-state oriented perspective. World polity institutionalists in sociology have responded to world systems theory's disregard for the institutional embeddedness of economic exchanges with a constructivist theory of world cultural constitution of
actorhood (Meyer 1980). Meyer's world polity research program issues from his critique of research generated by the world systems approach. According to Meyer, the world systems perspective is characterized by a tendency to economic determinism, and a lack of attention to the organizational dynamics of the politics of the world system. This leads to numerous expectations – organizational instability, increasing division of labor on a global scale, subordination of political to economic entities, increasing political differentiation\(^2\) and differentiation of institutional structure based on position in class structure of global economy - that, in 1980, when this critique was published, appeared to be contradicted by the evidence. In particular, this approach cannot explain the organizational homomorphism and other observable uniformities of state form and development after 1945.

The *new institutionalism* in organizational sociology focuses on the social construction of social entities, actors and relationships. This approach emphasizes the ways in which cultural systems of classification of actors, such as organizations and nation-states, and their relations to one another and to their environments, acquire rule-like status and shape formal organizational structures (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a; Meyer and Rowan 1977). For my research, it is useful to follow recent researchers in this tradition by distinguishing between a variant of sociological neo-institutionalism that emphasizes the *top-down diffusion* of cultural forms (for a statement of this perspective see Strang & Meyer 1993) from a neo-institutionalist perspective that is more attentive to

\(^2\) This concept is not particularly clear; Meyer notes only that economically powerful states would "become stronger in their societies", but weaker peripheral states would become "pastoralized, relative to the expanding world economy"; instead of this what is observed is, that "both rich and poor states expand their share of the resources of their societies at similar rates" (Meyer 1987: 47).
the role of power, interests, and conflict in the creation of organizational isomorphism (e.g. Fligstein 1990; Friedland & Alford 1991; see for a discussion of these diverse strands within neo-institutionalism, Clemens & Cook 1999; Schneiberg & Clemens 2003; Schneiberg & Soule 2003). The latter variant emphasizes that organizations face powerful environmental pressures to adopt formal structures that conform to the dominant cultural concepts that structure their organizational field. Organizational isomorphism may be a necessary condition for access to important resources. These exogenously generated formal structures may or may not be suited to an organization’s local circumstances and exigencies. Where they tend to be dysfunctional with regard to dominant internal organizational routines and programs, formal structures may be symbolically adopted and projected externally, but “decoupled” internally from actual (informal) organizational practices. Once organizational forms and institutions diffuse, however, they may create constituencies and mobilize collective actors that take seriously what was initially intended as a symbolic gesture (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b; Dobbin et al. 1993; Dobbin & Sutton 1998; Fligstein 1990; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer et al. 1977; Thomas and Lauderdale 1988).

Emphasizing processes of diffusion, and de-emphasizing the role of power and conflict, John Meyer and others have drawn on the new institutionalist perspective to interpret formal structures and institutional patterns among nation-states. Internally and externally, states represent themselves as conforming to features of the cultural model of the “rational and responsible state actor”: bounded territory and population, sovereign authority, self-determination, “standardized purposes like collective development, social
justice, and the protection of individual rights", the rule of law, possession of national
natural, symbolic and human resources, etc. (Meyer et al. 1997). Nation-states are also
characterized by the potential for "loose coupling": legitimacy requirements may compel
less developed countries in particular to adopt policies and structures that conform to the
culture of world society, but do not make sense in light of the realities of national history
and political economy. Formal policies may thus be "decoupled" from practices
developed under local circumstances.

The *world society approach* has generated a substantial body of empirical
research documenting the formation of a world society and world polity and the global
diffusion of symbolic content (norms and principles), and institutional and organizational
forms. (Meyer 1980; Meyer et al., 1997; Thomas et al. 1987; Boli and Thomas 1999;
Strang 1990; Strang and Chang 1993). A substantial number of empirical studies have
explored striking cross-national isomorphisms in such domains as education, welfare
states development, the organizational form of the nation-state, the institutionalization of
the rights of women and children in national constitutions, and environmental policies
(Meyer & Hannan 1975; Meyer et al 1977; Thomas & Lauderdale 1988; Boli 1987;

One case is particularly relevant to my research proposal. Meyer, Frank and
others have used the world polity perspective to analyze a case that in some ways is quite
analogous to the world labor regime - the formation of a world environmental regime
(Meyer et al. 1997b). Building on work by international relations scholars on
international regimes, Meyer et al. conceptualize regimes as institutionally or
organizationally supported, supranational collective action frames for a specific domain of human activity. They use counts of intergovernmental environmental association, treaties, and environmental IGOs to measure the formation of a world environmental regime. They find that neither grievances (environmental degradation), nor the actions of dominant states were significant factors in the formation of the world environmental regime. Instead, the most important explanatory variables are the spread of scientific discourse on environment, and the emergence of an international associational framework in which INGOs could advocate world cultural principles relating to the environment (Frank 1999; Frank et al. 2000; Meyer et al. 1997b).

Conclusion

Each of the main theoretical perspectives discussed here can contribute to an analysis of the formation and impacts of the 20th century world labor regime. The world polity institutionalist perspective captures important aspects of the world labor regulatory regime rooted in the ILO’s framework of international labor standards. From this neo-institutionalist world society perspective, the basic function of the ILO is clear. IGOs such as the UN and related agencies like the WHO and the ILO symbolize world cultural principles that “define collective identities and interests of entities, like firms, states, and nations, along with rational organizational forms that are to be adopted by them” (Meyer 1987; Boli and Thomas 1997: 173). The INGOs and IGOs that symbolize and mobilize these world cultural principles are constitutive elements of the modern world polity, i.e. “a system of rules legitimating the extension and expansion of authority of rationalized nation-states to control and act on behalf of their populations” (Meyer 1987; Boli &
IGOs and INGOs are thus the vehicles for the exogenous, top-down processes of diffusion of socially constructed norms and principles of collective identity formation, and organizational-institutional forms.

The ILO, although an IGO, was modeled on world cultural concepts of an international labor organization that had been widely discussed in labor INGOs and international conferences since the mid-1800s (Follows 1951; Ghebali 1989; Lowe 1921; Perigord 1926). The unique tripartite structure of the ILO, discussed above, institutionalizes at the level of international organization, and thus legitimates the identities of labor, capital and the state as collective actors, and formalizes their interdependent relationships, while clearly favoring the nation-state. The ILO labor conventions themselves further construct the responsibilities of states with regard to its working population, and stipulate appropriate rationalized organizational forms, e.g. welfare state institutions and, most importantly, the freedom of association of workers for purposes of collective action. This perspective gives rise to hypotheses about the role of INGOs in the legitimation and diffusion of the world labor regime, and expectations about the pace of regime formation. More generally, this perspective emphasizes the international institutional embeddedness of the relations of power and dominance that are at the center of global class conflict theorists' interest.

The global class conflict tradition and related international regime perspectives in international relations theory, direct our attention to the dimension of power: they emphasize the contested nature of institutional creation and development. These approaches give rise to hypotheses about the role of domestic class conflict in
international institutional formation, and the relationship between fluctuations in the level of centralization/decentralization of political organization of the global system, i.e. "hegemonic sequences" and corresponding phases in the formation of international governance institutions (Chase-Dunn 1989; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977; Krasner 1985; Cox 1977; Haggard & Simmons 1987; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). Hegemonic sequences are defined by the rise of a core state to global dominance in production, finance and commerce, the stable phase in which its institutional and ideological framework actually serves to integrate states by consent into the hegemonic global accumulation regime, and a phase of decline in which shifting and uneven patterns of investment and economic and political development give rise to conflicts of interest within the transnational capitalist class, leading to political and military conflicts. In social movement theory terms, periods of hegemonic instability represent openings in the political opportunity structures at both international and national levels (McAdam 1996; Cox 1977; Chase-Dunn 1989; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; Robinson 1996; Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993).
CHAPTER THREE

FORMATION OF THE WORLD LABOR REGIME I:
THE 19TH CENTURY ORIGINS OF THE 20TH CENTURY WORLD LABOR REGIME

"What can be thought of a town which holds a public meeting to petition that the period of labour for men shall be diminished to eighteen hours a day?" Marx, in Capital Vol. 1, citing a record from a British Parliamentary Hearing on working conditions.

"Socially and industrially the first two or three decades of the nineteenth century form a gloomy period, in which, as Spencer Walpole observes, it took twenty-five years of legislation to restrict a child of nine to a sixty-nine hours week, and that only in cotton mills" (Hutchins and Harrison 1903: 21).

As indicated in the introduction, the ILO dominates the discursive and organizational field of international labor regulation. I also noted there that I analyze the formation of the world labor regime in terms of the contributions from two fields of activity: the organizational behavior of the ILO (delegates, committees, officials and staff) as an international governmental organization, and the behavior of the membership (nation-states, national legislatures). The organizational development of the ILO as an international governmental organization is the focus of this chapter.

November 1918 brought the conclusion of World War I: the German army's Eastern Front was collapsing, the troops on the retreat from Russian territory before the advancing Russian People's Army. In an attempt to save the remnants of the German army from complete disorganization and disintegration, the German Military High Command called for an armistice, signaling the end of hostilities. The Allied Powers formed a Peace Conference that met for the first time in January, 1919, to begin discussing the terms of the peace settlement. The Allied Powers had, however, been engaged in planning for the post-war arrangements since 1916. The need to address, at
an international level, questions of labor protections and labor regulation, had received a significant amount of attention in these preparatory discussions; the British Prime Minister Lloyd George had promised British labor leaders concessions after the war (Riegelman 1934; Van der Slice 1941). Thus, one of the first actions of the Peace Conference was to adopt a resolution, on January 31, 1919, creating a commission “to inquire into the conditions of employment from the international aspect, and to consider the international means necessary to secure common action on a permanent agency to continue such inquiry in co-operation with and under the direction of the League of Nations” (Wilson 1934; Phelan 1934). The membership of the commission was: the British Empire, U.S.A., France, Italy, Japan, and Belgium, with two delegates each, and Cuba, Poland and the Czechoslovak Republic represented by single delegates. This commission, convened by the French Minister of Labor Colliard and presided over by Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) at Colliard’s proposal, went to work to draft the constitution for the ILO.

The Genesis of the International Labor Organization

The founding of the ILO signaled the initiation of a new level of international organization with regard to the regulation of labor, and the beginning of the formation of the world labor regime that is in place today. It is important to grasp the origins of this institution. As historical institutionalists have noted, institutions are structures, in the sense that they constrain the pursuit of some interests, while facilitating the realization of others. It is thus essential to understand the formative moments of institutional creation in order to achieve an adequate understanding of an institution’s structure. In order to
understand the role that organizations like the ILO have played and play today in the
global political economy, it is necessary to understand the situation in which the ILO
was created, the vectors of social forces and interests from whose interaction the ILO
emerged.

The ILO was not created ex nihilo – rather, it is better understood as a new
organizational formation in a sequence of attempts, starting in the early 19th century, to
organize at the international level for the protection of labor. The idea of coordinated
international action to protect workers had been in circulation long before the Allied
Powers met to begin mapping out a plan for the post-war world order. Individual
reformers had circulated calls and proposals for coordinated regulatory action at the
international level since the early 19th century; benevolent associations had passed
resolutions calling for regulation since the 1850s; calls for international coordination and
organization, issued by national and international socialist and workers’ meetings,
associations and organizations, date back to the 1830s or 1840s. Yet no organizational
basis comparable to the ILO was formed until early in the 20th century. What explains the
timing of the formation of the ILO? Why did international organization and coordinated
action to regulate labor occur at the conclusion of World War I, and not earlier?
Furthermore, the specific form given to the central international organization for the
regulation of labor requires an explanation. What explains the shaping of the ILO as an
international organization – specifically its founding ideology, structure and capacities,
and the major shifts in ideology, structure and capacity over the course of the 20th
century?
Theory

The world polity analysis of international regime formation is grounded in a broader effort to undertake a cultural-institutionalist reconstruction of global modernization or development theories. From a world polity perspective, then, the timing of the formation of the ILO is a moment in the Weberian process of Western rationalization and the emergence of the world culture and world polity. This perspective provides an institutionalist account of the constitution of the units which world systems theorists and neo-liberal institutionalists in political science take as their unexamined point of departure (clarify difference between neo-liberalisms). World systems theory thus reduces world system development to stratification processes grounded in economic exchanges between economically determined political entities, i.e. states: “World politics is simply a reflection of world economic relations; a network of economic relations among competing nation-state subunits, along with a few other organizations” (Meyer 1987: 46). World systems theory fails to recognize that, despite the absence of a world state or empire, a world polity has been in formation that shapes exchange:

“...Polities, which are, in a sense, authoritative accounts of justice, construct and restrict exchanges. Many forms of exchange are made possible by the definition of individuals as fundamental units; others are limited by the delegitimation of ethnic primordiality or of slavery. In most of the modern literature, this process is emphasized less: it is generally thought that a main driving force of the modern world system was the spread of exchange around the world. We argue, however, that (a) the spread of rationalized exchange originated in particular institutional structures of the West (e.g. Weber 1961; Collins 1980), and (b) the original institutional structures evolve, shaping the formation of social units within the world exchange system, thereby constituting a world polity defining, controlling and constructing exchange itself” (Meyer 1987: 46).
From this perspective, the ILO is the archetype of such an institutional structure that shapes and defines participants in exchange relations and the organization of these relationships. The ILO is among the earliest of such institutional structures still in existence today. Further, whatever constitutive functions the ILO exercises would go to the very heart of the modern capitalist world system: the capital-labor relationship, i.e. the commodification, control, exploitation and reproduction of labor. In the absence of a world state, international regimes are an important structural element of the world polity.

The world polity account of the process of regime formation emphasizes the meso-dynamics of the formation of world polity organizations and the diffusion of world cultural content. This account emphasizes the role of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the diffusion of a world culture.

"For a century and more, the world has constituted a singular polity. By this we mean that the world has been conceptualized as a unitary social system, increasingly integrated by networks of exchange, competition, and cooperation, such that actors have found it 'natural' to view the whole world as their arena of action and discourse.... Like all polities, the world polity is constituted by a distinct culture — a set of fundamental principles, mainly ontological and cognitive in character, defining the nature and purposes of social actors and action. Like all cultures, world culture becomes embedded in social organization, especially in organizations operating at the global level. Because most of these organizations are INGOs, we can identify fundamental principles of world culture by studying INGO structures, purposes, and operations" (Boli and Thomas 1999: 14f.).

World polity neo-institutionalists describe the world polity development as a process emerging from the dialectic tensions between INGOs and the expansion of the nation-state system, first in the heyday of European imperialism, then much more rapidly after 1945, as the colony as a form of territorial organization of accumulation and
governance disappeared and the ensuing void was filled by the organizational form of the nation-state (Bergesen and Schonberg 1980; Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer in Thomas et al. 1987; Boli 1987; Strang 1990). INGOs then interact with or are co-opted by IGOs.

The meso-analytic focus in the passage cited above is on INGOs, but their framework includes international governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the ILO. The carriers of the rationalization of the world culture and world polity, i.e. carriers of regime formation, are: national level non-governmental organizations (e.g. voluntary associations or social movements), that may join forces with similar organizations in other countries to form INGOs or international social movement organizations. Sometimes, an archaeology of an existing IGO reveals that it was initially founded as INGOs and then, after having established itself organizationally, was co-opted by states. Exactly this scenario describes the final stage of the creation of the ILO (Boli and Thomas 1997: 179).

Meyer and his collaborators' analysis of the structuring of a world environmental regime exemplifies the world-polity institutionalist perspective on regime formation (Meyer et al. 1997b). They view the process leading to the production of a world environmental regime as “starting from the rise of much international nongovernmental association and discourse and leading to interstate treaties and later to intergovernmental organization” (Meyer et al. 1997b: 623). The puzzle from this perspective is, how so much organized collective action around the human society – nature relationship – can have emerged in the absence of a central world state structuring world society. “Our core answer is that this same world is a strong, though stateless, polity increasingly integrated
around a common rationalistic and scientized culture” (Meyer et al. 1997b: 625). They distinguish between the discursive and organizational dimensions of the world environmental regime, and analyze organizational growth as the dependent variable, and discursive development as a key independent variable. “Our main arguments are that the overall rise of environmental organizations occurs with the expansion of a worldwide scientific culture and the creation of a broad world organizational structure, and that the character of the environmental regime shifts over time from informal international discourse and association to more official intergovernmental activity and organization” (Meyer et al. 1997b: 626; italics added).

A similar developmental path is described by Berkovitch in her analysis of the formation of the international women’s movement from a world polity perspective (Berkovitch 1999). She traces the sources of the international women’s movement back to various strands of national level mobilization around women’s issues and the emergence of women-centered discourse and organization in other movements such as the abolitionist movement, the socialist movement, the temperance movement, etc. The development of the international women’s movement is reconstructed as a sequence of three phases: a formative phase from 1880-1919, where nationally based organizations form international associations and “broadened the platform of early transnational movements to include ‘correcting the wrongs done to women’” (Berkovitch 1999: 101); a second phase from 1919-1945, characterized by the creation of the “first broadly inclusive intergovernmental organizations”, namely the ILO and the League of Nations, both of which fostered formalization within the international women’s movement and
cooperation between women’s INGOs and the IGOs, and facilitated the diffusion of
national level women’s organizing; and finally a third post-war phase, marked by the
formation of the UN system and the gradual incorporation of the constructs and
normative content of the women’s movement in IGO organizational structures and policy
orientations.

These analyses of the formation of a world environmental regime and the
international women’s movement both reconstruct the emergence of organizational-
discursive fields in the world polity as a progression from “informal international
discourse” generated by national movements and social movement organizations and
leaders, to increased non-governmental organizing at the international level, to the
integration of INGO content into IGO structures and action, and routine cooperation
between IGOs and INGOs or the co-optation of the latter by the former. I draw on this
framework to outline the 19th century organizational-institutional history of the 20th
century world labor regime. It describes the movement from elite individual activities to
international associations and INGOs, to intergovernmental actions such as bipartite
treaties, to the co-optation of the dominant INGO in the organizational field by a newly
created IGO. But the 20th century history of the 20th century world labor regime is
anomalous, I argue, within the world polity account provided by neo-institutionalist
sociology. Furthermore, crucial turning points, transitions, or outcomes in the historical
account, e.g. the co-optation of INGOs by IGOs, remain exogenous. The world polity
institutionalist framework for regime formation is thus a useful starting point, but
ultimately incomplete; I draw on world systems theory and theories of global capitalism
to contextualize the organizational account in global accumulation and stratification processes.

*Individual and Benevolent Society Sources of the World Labor Regime*

The international discourse concerning collective action to regulate labor dates back to the initiatives and activities of individual intellectuals like the Scottish manufacturer Robert Owen (1771-1858), the Scottish manufacturer and member of parliament from Lancashire, Charles Hindley (1796-1857), the French scholar Louis Villermé (1782-1863), the French economist Adolphe Blanqui (brother of the professional revolutionary Louis Auguste Blanqui), the Swiss-born, resident Alsatian manufacturer Daniel Legrand (1783-1859), and the Belgian Civil Servant Édouard Dupertiaux, to name some of the most important individual figures (Ayusawa 1969; Delevingne 1934; Follows 1951; Lorwin 1929; Lowe 1921).\(^1\) Owen, credited with the “real beginning of factory legislation in England” (Follows 1951: 2), implemented reformist work regulations and social programs in his own mills and in the manufacturing community of New Lanark, Scotland, in the first decade of the 19th century; these reforms attracted visitors from across Europe. He reduced hours of work, improved housing, organized cooperative marketing programs, provided educational and entertainment facilities, and prepared a labor bill for parliament that limited working hours for children in cotton mills. Owen then traveled in France, Switzerland and

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\(^1\) As several authors point out, the Swiss banker, anti-freerader, and finance minister of Louis XVI, Jacques Necker (1732-1804), identified the basic ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ situation regarding national-level protective labor legislation in contexts of international economic competition (Alcock 1971; Périgord 1926). In his *The Importance of Religious Opinions*, published in 1788, Necker wrote: “If one nation gives up Sunday rest, competition will force the other countries to do likewise.” Universal observance was the only way to protect the institution (quoted in Périgord 1926: 51).
Germany, circulating his ideas among the European political elite. He then circulated a pamphlet at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), describing some of the negative consequences of the industrial revolution for the working classes, and calling on the governments of the Concert of Europe to – individually – introduce reform legislation to improve the conditions of their respective working classes.

Owen called for benevolent state attention; Villermé envisioned an international alliance of manufacturers to voluntarily adhere to minimum standards; Hindley proposed international treaties to legislate working conditions. Their proposals concerned maximum workdays, Sunday rest, night work, unhealthy or dangerous occupations, regulation of work of women and children.

Blanqui was the first to focus Owen’s and Villermé’s calls for benevolent state attention into an argument concerning the need for binding international agreements to protect labor. In a lecture delivered in 1838, he argued that the “first fruit” of labor reform at the national level “might be a deadly one; it may bring about, through foreign competition the enforced idleness and therefore the starvation of those who so far have been able to survive. There is but one way of bringing it about: it is to secure its adoption by all the industrial countries which compete with each other. Heretofore, the Powers have signed treaties binding them to kill men, why could they not draw up modern agreements to preserve and enrich human life?” (Périgord 1926: 55). Here, Blanqui responds to an argument against proposals of domestic labor legislation that preceded him and is still standard fare in contemporary debates about labor regulation: protective labor legislation puts domestic industries at a disadvantage in international competition.
Blanqui’s response anticipates the solution to the prisoner’s dilemma situation: coordinated action among the players can, he argues, turn the zero-sum game into a positive sum game, in which each country can improve the conditions of its wage-earning classes without incurring additional costs in the form of lost market shares.

Legrand was the individual activist who took things farthest in this early phase of the formation of the ILO and the 20th century world labor regime, according to Follows. Interestingly, Legrand also anticipates a later key aspect of the formation of the ILO. Legrand’s reformism was motivated in part by the experience of the violent uprisings of the 1830 revolution — reform was the only alternative, in his perception, to social revolution (Follows 1951). As I show in more depth below, the creation of the ILO took place in the midst of an unprecedented wave of social unrest and the threat of social revolution.

Legrand began his active phase with a letter-writing campaign in 1838. In 1840 he directed an appeal to the Swiss and German governments, as well as the delegates of the states of the Zollverein (German Customs Union), who were meeting in Berlin. Legrand suggested extending the Prussian Labor Act of 1839 throughout the German states and Switzerland.

Ducpétiaux was active as a journalist in the cause of Belgian independence from Holland, and was imprisoned for one year as a result. In the aftermath of the Belgian revolution, he became Inspector General of Prisons and Benevolent Establishments, and did extensive research and writing on institutional reform during his 30-year tenure. His
proposals were published as an appendix to his two-volume study of working conditions of child workers (published in 1843). There he echoes Blanqui in identifying international competition as a prime obstacle to reforms of working conditions and labor legislation, and advocates international legislation for "the emancipation of white workers" drawing an analogy to the French-British conventions regarding slavery. His reform proposals concerned child labor, night labor for women and minors, factory inspections, financial and insurance institutions, and annual government reports on working conditions. He also presented a proposal for an international association for labor legislation, anticipating the International Association for Labor Legislation (IALL) founded in 1900. Ducpétiaux was also instrumental in calling together the first meeting of the International Congrès de Bienfaisance at Brussels in 1856. Follows regards Ducpétiaux as the first to propose an international labor organization for the purpose of drafting international labor legislation (Follows 1951: 43). The organization he proposed was an "International Association for the Progress of Moral and Social Sciences", primarily a union of social reformers, with national associations and an international secretariat.

With the meeting of the Brussels Benevolent Congress, the liberal intellectuals' humanitarian and scientific discourse on international labor regulation becomes embedded for the first time in an organizational framework. Despite Ducpétiaux's efforts, however, the question of international labor legislation did not find its way onto the agenda of the Brussels Benevolent Congress (Follows 1951: 53). There was, however, a subcommittee on Factory Reform. Christoph Ulrich Hahn, Protestant Minister and social
reformer who had been exposed to the ideas of Legrand, Villermé, and Ducpétiaux, served on the committee. He introduced the idea of international labor legislation to the assembly, citing Legrand. He proposed an international law on labor limiting the workday to 12 hours between 5 am and 9 pm; prohibition of labor of children under 12 and limit of those over 12 to children meeting educational and physical requirements; prohibiting night work for males under 16 and for all females; mandatory Sunday rest after 6 days of work, for males under 18 and all females.

No direct action was taken on Hahn’s proposal at that meeting, but it was taken up the following year (1857) at the Frankfurt Congress, which entertained a draft resolution in favor of international labor legislation (Follows 1951; Ayusawa 1920).² The spokesperson for the resolution was, however, not Hahn but Amand Audiganne, who was employed in the French Ministry of Commerce (Follows 1951: 54). Audiganne had published a comparative study of industrial conditions in 1856. In that study, he points out differences in national labor laws, and points to “diplomatic law, the law of nations”, as a model that could be applied to labor legislation. Audiganne’s support for the resolution is what we would anticipate from a world polity perspective on regime formation, an example of the interaction, in INGOs, of governmental and non-governmental actors that fosters the diffusion and legitimation of new principles and norms of an emerging world culture (Boli and Thomas 1997, 1998; Meyer et al. 1997b).

With an eye to the simultaneous developments of discourse and initiatives for international labor regulation within the workers’ movements, discussed in the next

² Cf. Périgord 1926: 58, for a somewhat different account.
section, it is important to note the paternalistic spirit of these proposals of the Benevolent congresses. The Program of the Congress of Frankfurt framed the initiative as follows:

“It is desirable that industrial leaders get together and reach an agreement on the application of these measures [measures on maximum workday, medical certificates, regulation of night work, dangerous work, factory hygiene, workshop inspections, etc., recommended by the Brussels Benevolent Congress] to all establishments operating under like conditions. This agreement will show their benevolent and paternal attitude toward their workers. In so using their liberty they will escape the intervention of laws requiring amelioration and guarantees. It is preferable from every point of view that they themselves take the initiative.

As a means of extending the protection offered by Industry to Labour, it would be appropriate that the principal states act in concert to decide upon international measures for the regulation of industry.

In their conventions they should settle upon uniform or identical rules governing the work of women and children, the daily duration of labour and so on, in such a way as to generalize the material and moral benefits of the reform, without invading the legitimate interests of the manufacturers and without transforming reasonable competition between countries into an oppressive competition disastrous to workers” (Follows 1951: 55f.).

This passage documents the taken-for-granted nature of the shared interest of advocates of international labor regulation, in maintaining paternalistic control over workers and the labor process. The model proposed here is very modest: it explicitly disavows any connection to the establishment of an international authority or legislative body that might impinge on the sovereignty of the leading industrial powers. States should merely coordinate their domestic labor protections in order to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes for their working classes, without affecting the status quo in international competition. The resolution was passed by the Frankfurt congress, in only slightly modified form, in September 1857.

According to Follows, the adoption of Hahn’s resolution by the Frankfurt congress of the Benevolent Society marked a kind of transition – for Follows it was a
transition from the phase in which “the idea of international labour legislation was the property of a few isolated protagonists” to one in which the idea “...had become the avowed object of a great number of men, each of whom might go back to his own country and spread it in the papers he wrote, the classes he taught, or the societies in which he declaimed” (1951: 57). The world polity account of regime formation allows for a different perspective – suggesting a transition from the discourse of “enlightened”, structurally located elites, regarding the regulation of labor, to the inclusion of the topic on agendas of international organizations and associations of various kinds. This account also foreshadows the transition to intergovernmental action – one of the key advocates of the proposal for coordinated labor legislation at Frankfurt congress of the Benevolent society in 1857, Audiganne, was a current employee of the French state.

*Socialist Organizational Internationalism*

The world polity framework also emphasizes the importance of national social movements and organizations in the emergence of international collective action in specific policy domains such as environmental regulation (Meyer et al. 1997b), or women’s suffrage (Berkovitch 2000). This emphasis directs attention to the role of the fledgling international labor movement, which consisted of the activities and discourse of a handful of European labor movement organizations and leaders, in the emergence of the 20th century world labor regime. For an adequate understanding of the institutional formation of the world labor regime, however, it is important to note the very different discursive context in which the idea of collective action at the international level emerged among working class organizations and leaders, and the different form that the idea of
international labor protection was given. The decisions, inclusions and exclusions embodied in the form given to the ILO in 1919 can only be understood in the context of an awareness of the alternatives from which it emerged.

Evidence of internationalist impulses in domestic labor movements dates back to the 1830s. This was also the period of "the first modern movement of labor unrest" in America, England and France (Lorwin 1929: 15). Between 1825 and 1832, workers' organizations were being formed in England, the U.S. and France. According to Lorwin, not just occupational identities but also more encompassing collective identities were being formed. "To a marked degree in England and in considerable measure in the United States and France, groups of workers began to think of themselves not as weavers, or carpenters, or tailors, or miners, but as members of a great class which in all countries was "being pushed deeper and deeper into the mire by the power of capital and the power of the law"" (Lorwin 1929: 13). In this period, national level working class organizations were formed in the U.S. (the National Trades Union), in Great Britain (the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union), and secret revolutionary and socialist societies in France.

Simultaneously with the emergence of national labor movements, an internationalist orientation surfaced among the more radical groups. "Utopian" socialists voiced a broad critique of the industrial revolution and emerging industrial society. "They condemned its alleged planlessness and ruthlessness, its pecuniary outlook and competitive individualism, and in one form or another, called for a social reorganization on the basis of associative effort and of economic cooperation. In thought as well as in
action, these men [i.e. Owen, Hodgskin, Gray and Thompson in England, St. Simon, Fourier, Buchez and Leroux in France] ignored political boundaries and national differences, appealing to ‘humanity’ for the reform of ‘society’” (Lorwin 1929: 13). The National Union of the Working Classes of England, in an address to the people of Ireland in 1831, called for unity “of sentiment and action” among the oppressed poor of every country; in France, 1834, the workers of Nantes sent a communication to Grand National Consolidated Trades Union calling for regular communication between European urban centers where workers were concentrated. Calls for international cooperation or collective action were thus heard across a spectrum of working class-oriented national organizations in the U.S., England and France in these early years of national labor movement emergence (Lorwin 1929).

In 1836, the London Workingmen’s Association gave an “International Address” to the “Working Classes of Belgium”, protesting imprisonment of worker Jacob Katz for trying to organize workers. The workers of Brussels, Ghent and Liege replied, and both the English workers’ address and the Belgian replies were published in French radical periodicals. William Lovett was the author of the address and secretary of the London Workingmen’s Association, and previously a member of the National Union of the Working Classes, and of the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union; his address generated voluminous correspondence; in 1838 he published a pamphlet “Address to the Working Classes of Europe” in which he put forth the idea of an international labor organization, albeit of a very different kind than anything proposed by the elite industrialists and intellectuals discussed in the preceding section: “Fellow producers of
wealth! Seeing that our oppressors are united... why should not we unite in holy zeal to show the injustice of war, the cruelty of despotism, and the misery it entails upon our species?” (cited in Lorwin 1953: 4). In contrast to the paternalism that characterized the bourgeois proposals for internationally coordinated action to protect labor, the proposals for international collective action emerging from working class organizations aimed at emancipation.

In France, under the leadership of, above all, Auguste Blanqui (brother of the reformer Adolphe discussed above) secret societies were forming (Société des Droits de l’Homme; Société des Familles; Société des Saisons) and developing the idea that reform was only possible by means of revolutionary dictatorship. The “Federation of the Just”, a secret socialist society founded by German emigrant workers in Paris, associated with the Société des Saisons, then migrated to London in 1840. “By the end of the decade, there were thus in France and in England small groups of socialists, Chartists, Owenites, ‘revolutionary democrats’, and communists who were harboring the project of an ‘international association for the emancipation of the working classes’”. A conference for this purpose was planned for 1839, but never took place, because Lovett and other Chartists were arrested in the course of agitating for the presentation of the “People’s Charter” and the ensuing general strike, and Blanqui in France led an unsuccessful uprising in May 1839 (Lorwin 1929).

A variety of ultimately unsuccessful calls for, and initiatives to establish, standing international labor organizations, surfaced during the 1840’s. In a booklet inspired by English Chartism and published in France in 1843 Flora Tristan called on workers to
organize on a class (rather than trade) basis, without regard to sex, politics, religion, or nation. Correspondence committees were to be set up in all of the major European cities. A workers’ organization in London tried to get Marx and Engels, who were in Brussels with other German expatriots, to join in the attempt to form a communist federation. Attempts to establish communication and cooperation between organizations in Paris, London and Brussels become more frequent in 1846-47, and a Central European Committee was set up in 1846, with ‘correspondence committees’ in Paris and London. This early attempt at standing organizations soon fell apart. In summer 1847 a “conference” was called in London, but it amounted to little more than a gathering of German delegates. This “Communist League” (Lorwin 1929) or “Union of the Communists” (Follows 1951) was an offshoot of the “The League of the Just”, an organization of German exiles in Paris, formed in 1836, that had relocated to London in 1840 (Follows 1951: 58f). In November 1847 another conference was called, which again was attended mostly by German expatriots from Paris, Brussels, and London. At this meeting, Marx and Engels presented a draft of what was to become the Communist Manifesto, with its clear current of working class internationalism. Marx and Engels tried to forge links between the Chartists, the communists, and the “continental democrats” in preparation for the proletarian revolution which they believed would follow on the heels of the bourgeois revolution that they thought poised to sweep over Germany. At an 1847 meeting in London commemorating the 1830 Polish insurrection, Marx denounced the “one-sided fraternity of the free traders” and called for a “congress of working men to establish liberty all over the world” (Lorwin 1929). The congress was
scheduled for September, 1848, but did not take place due to the wave of rebellions and contentious events that swept across Europe in 1847-48 (Tarrow 1994).

In the aftermath of the uprisings of the late 1840s, and in the midst of the economic crisis, the 1850s saw the dissolution or repression of many of the more internationally oriented, radical working class organizations that had been formed in the preceding decades. The Communist League was dissolved in 1852. In France and Germany, where reaction and repression were stronger, workers turned to mutual aid and education models of organizing. In the U.S. and England, the 1850s were characterized by the emergence of trade-based organizations.

Internationalism resurfaced among British trade unionists as a result of both an influx into London of workers from France, Germany and Belgium, after 1850, and especially after the crisis of 1857-58. The material basis of internationalism was provided by the threat perceived by one segment of the British working classes in the spread of capitalism and the use of a common European labor pool (Cohen 1987: 9). The building boom collapsed, wage cuts were imposed, and workers responded with strikes. Contractors responded with lockouts and sent agents to the continent to recruit strikebreakers. The London trade unions organized the London Trades Council in the summer of 1860 to promote common interests. In the course of this work the leaders realized the necessity of establishing ties with workers on the continent, especially after a second strike in the building trades in March 1860 (Olle and Schoeller 1987). Lorwin summarily notes that political events on the Continent pushed workers there in a similar
direction – he refers to this period as “the high water mark of individualist and nationalist liberalism” (Lorwin 1929: 32).

The International Exhibition in London in 1862, at which around 300 French and a dozen German workers were hosted by English workers, provided the setting for rekindling the discussion of an international labor association. Committees in London and Paris also communicated about efforts to help cotton industry workers affected by the dislocations caused by the U.S. Civil War. There were also cooperative efforts between London and Paris in 1863 in support of Polish insurgents. This resulted in an “International Meeting” in London in July 1863 calling for Polish independence. Side meetings occurred at which the London Trades Council and French workers discussed an international labor organization. They agreed that the English workers should write an “Address” to the French workers on the topic. George Odger of the LTC wrote it; it discussed mutual harm caused by allowing employers to pit workers from different countries against one another, due to a “want of regular and systematic communication”. Instead, the workers should strive together to raise lower wages as close as possible to those of the higher paid workers, “and not allow our employers to play us all one against the other, and to drag us down to the lowest possible condition, suitable to their avaricious bargaining” in (Lorwin 1929: 34).

The French response was delivered in person, and the delegation was received at a meeting at St. Martin’s Hall on Sept. 28, 1864. French, Polish, German and Italian workers living in London were present. The French reply called for the creation of an international association, with a central committee in London and branches in all
European capitals. A provisional executive committee of 21 Englishmen, 10 Germans, 9 Frenchmen, 6 Italians, 2 Poles and 2 Swiss was elected to prepare a program and constitution. Karl Marx ultimately wrote the Preamble, the rules, and the inaugural address of the International Workingmen’s Association, or what was later to be referred to as the “First International”.

The First International represented the first stable organizational instantiation of working class internationalism. The central purpose of the International was to be a medium of communication and cooperation between national or local workers’ societies, via a general council elected by “section” delegates, which could be organized nationally or otherwise. The general council would keep members informed about labor markets in each country, make studies of labor conditions, raise awareness and information about common problems, collect statistics, promote the national consolidation of labor organizations in each country, and help members search for work in foreign countries. The primary political goal of the organization was the revolutionary seizure of political power and the means of production; nonetheless, the leadership also felt pressure to propose immediate measures to improve workers’ wages and working conditions. The International’s first congress, in Geneva in September 1866, thus called for states’ recognition of “the general principle of international legislation” (Périgord 1926: 59), and passed resolutions calling on affiliates’ governments to – individually - set legal limits to the length of the workday, child labor, and women’s work in dangerous occupations. The workday was to be limited to eight hours, in orientation on the eight-hour movement in the United States (Ayusawa 1920; Follows 1951; Katz 1992). “In all its subsequent
meetings the association stood as the proponent of international labor laws and issued demands and proposals persistently, which however did not attain fruition until many years later” (Ayusawa 1920).

This organization was initially intended as an association of trade unions, and British trade unionists controlled the founding meeting of the International Workingmen’s Association. In reality, however, the International consisted of individual members of national sections, and collectively affiliated trade unions, predominantly from Britain. Under Marx’ influence an ideological orientation emphasizing working class seizure of political power became dominant over a more moderate faction. But it began to break up in 1871 because the English members withdrew, disaffected by the internecine warfare and alleged involvement of the Association in the Paris Commune uprisings.

After the first three congresses, the association converted to a socialist organization, became known as the First International, and held ten congresses until 1881. After the dissolution of the first International, several other international congresses convened European status quo reform socialists (“Possibilists”) and trade-unionists, in Paris in 1883 and 1886, and in London in 1888. Both Paris congresses advocated international labor legislation, particularly international factory legislation.

The “Second Socialist International” (SSI) emerged from competing socialist and Possibilist meetings, both held in Paris in July, 1889. Both meetings emphasized international labor legislation, particularly with reference to instituting the eight-hour day (Windmueller 1980). The Marxists in particular called for labor treaties that would apply,
at an international level, the labor protections articulated in their resolutions concerning the prohibition child labor for children under fourteen, and of night-work in general, the eight-hour day, weekly rest, measures to protect workers' health, etc. (Lowe 1921: xvii). Membership in the Second International consisted of national political parties; unions thus could not be direct members. The SSI also led to the creation in 1900 of a standing organization, the International Socialist Bureau, which facilitated communication among members between Congresses; the latter remained the primary communication channels (Stevis 1998). In contrast to the First International, the primary mission of the SSI was the attainment and reform of state power at the national level by socialist political parties. This organizational goal eventually displaced the goal of developing international labor politics (Stevis 1998).

The SSI also further institutionalized the practice of regularly convening international working class congresses, and cultivating communication and cooperation. By World War I, the Second International had held eight regular and one special peace congresses. At the Congress of the new International in Brussels in 1891, international labor legislation was the principle topic. The Congress 1893 in Zurich revisited the topic of international labor legislation. The International Socialist Bureau was formed in 1900, and the Socialist Interparliamentary Commission was formed 1904, to enable parliamentary representatives of socialists in various countries to cooperate for realization of aims of socialism; the Interparliamentary Commission had held 5 conferences by 1910 (Lowe 1921; Windmueller 1980).
Throughout World War I, socialists continued to convene international meetings, of varying compositions, not least of all to discuss post-war international labor strategy and policy. Neutral country socialists met in Copenhagen in 1915, socialists of the Allied countries met in London in 1915, 1917, and 1918. In 1918, the Congress went on record as favoring the establishment of a league of nations, the abolition of secret diplomacy, the end of imperialism, and the reduction of armaments. The congress also discussed international means of fighting unemployment. Representatives of socialists from both warring alliances met in Zimmerwald, Switzerland in 1915; the meeting was attended by socialists from France, Italy, Bulgaria, Holland, Roumania, Poland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Germany. Another meeting in 1916 brought together socialists from Italy, Sweden, Russia, and Germany. An international socialists conference was scheduled for Stockholm, 1917, but the Allied governments prevented the meeting. It was held informally under Swedish party chair leadership; in the Fall of 1917 another one was held in Stockholm. In Bern, in Feb 1919, another international meeting of socialists brought together delegates from 25 countries including Germany, Austria, Holland, Great Britain, France, Canada, and Argentina. The meeting discussed the formation of a League of Nations, and a labor section of the Peace treaty. The meeting also called for representation of peoples, not just governments, in the League of Nations, as well as for international labor regulations including the provision of employment bureaus, the eight-hour day for adults, social insurance, the six-hour day for youths; the prohibition of night work for women, weekly rest periods of 36 consecutive hours, compulsory elementary education and free higher education. The meeting also created commission to revive the
2\textsuperscript{nd} International. This commission called meetings in April 1919 in Amsterdam and August 1919 in Lucerne.

\textit{The International Union Movement}

In addition to the organizational developments among socialist parties discussed in the previous section, national labor unions and national union federations also began to form international organizations. The first were the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs). These brought together workers from a number of crafts and industries in sectoral organizations. National printers' unions were the first to take the step towards forming international sectoral organizations; their first international meeting in 1889 was followed by an international meeting of miners' unions in 1890, which gave rise to the International Miners' Federation. Between 1889 and 1914, 28 International Trade Secretariats were formed. The ITS' were strongly influenced by Social Democratic politics, via the German socialist and labor movements, which were more closely intertwined than the French and British socialist parties and trade union organizations. Of the 28 ITS', 24 were headquartered in Germany, at the central office of the respective German national labor union. Each member country was typically represented by only one national organization. Until 1904 the ITS' were composed predominantly of European national labor unions; thereafter U.S. unions increased their participation. Stevis argues that the ITS remained only weak federal organizations, due to Social Democrats' "misgivings" about the ameliorative orientation of the trade union movement, and concerns among other European labor movements that strengthening the ITS' would strengthen the hegemony of German labor unions. The ITS' thus limited their
work to trade union activities, stayed out of politics, and did not pursue cross-national organizing campaigns. They focused on sharing information about national trade conditions and major strikes in relevant sectors, collecting support funds for major strikes, preventing the use of foreign workers as strikebreakers, and promoting the formation of trade unions in countries with lower levels of working class organization (Lorwin 1929; Lowe 1921; Stevis 1998). These organizations were thus not primarily oriented towards intergovernmental action or international labor legislation, but rather towards the cultivation of concrete international cooperation among workers’ organizations.

The international union movement centered around the ITS’ also gave rise to another, more consolidated, standing international organization – the International Secretariat of Trade Union Centers. The proposal for such an organization was circulated first in 1901 at a conference of the ITS’, but it was not carried until the third such ITS conference in 1903 (Lorwin 1929). This organization was intended to fill the gap between the party-oriented Second International and the sectoral structure of the ITS’. European national trade union leaders wished to form an international organization in order to coordinate the interests and activities of the various ITS’. Although the SSI claimed to speak for organized labor at the international level, Lorwin argues that British and French trade union leaders resented the domination of socialists, and even socialist trade union leaders, e.g. in Germany, and supported the idea of an organization solely devoted to the economic concerns of trade unionism. The organization was thus to be independent of the Second International, despite the latter’s claim to be the unified voice
of labor on the international scene. “The Secretariat was formed under the political and organizational shadow of the Second International in order to accommodate both socialist trade unions as well as unions with no parties, such as the French Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) and the AFL, or with weak parties, such as the British trade unions” (Stevis 1998: 57). Ironically, despite concerns about the hegemony of the German labor movement in the international arena, the German reformist Social Democrat and national trade union leader Carl Legien was designated the secretary of the International Secretariat of Trade Union Centers (Lorwin 1953).

The challenge facing the International Secretariat was, to navigate the tensions arising from three fundamentally different approaches to trade unionism among member countries: the reformist social democratic approach exemplified by German unions, which were strong numerically and financially, maintained close ties with the German Social Democratic Party, and tended towards peaceful collective bargaining; the decentralized, more craft-oriented and wage conscious approach exemplified by British and U.S. unions, and the revolutionary orientation and syndicalism exemplified by French unions. Despite the intentions of its founders, the International Secretariat nonetheless remained dominated by the SSI. The organization’s policy of single membership from each country disadvantaged more syndicalist organizations vis-à-vis the socialist unions; the Secretariat’s endorsement of the SSI and rebuke of French “anti-socialist” syndicalism at a conference in Amsterdam in 1905 made clear the actual lines of influence. Not least of all for these reasons, France and the United States did not send delegates to conferences of the International Secretariat until 1908.
Although the Secretariat was thus de facto closely aligned with the SSI, it was decided that it would not address theoretical questions. The primary function of the organization was the collection and dissemination of information. The Secretariat was to focus on promoting communication between national trade unions and, eventually, the ITS', providing strike support, and gathering uniform labor statistics. Nor was international labor legislation a central part of the program of the International Secretariat: there was some occasional discussion of campaigns in support of international regulatory action, such as the 1907 discussion of a campaign to support conventions prohibiting the use of industrial poisons and regulating night work and home work. These were, however, fairly marginal in the larger picture of the Secretariat's activities (Lorwin 1929).

The International Secretariat expanded its membership, bureaucratic structure and budget steadily between 1901 and 1914. The membership grew from eight to 19, with affiliated individual members growing from slightly over two million at the beginning of the century to 7,394,000 affiliated members in 1913. The annual budget of the organization grew from about $260 to about $1,720 in the same time period. By the beginning of World War I, the Secretariat had 12 full-time staff. Strike support activities of the Secretariat included collecting funds (about $700,000 between 1909-1913, most of which went to locked-out Swedish workers), and preventing strike-breakers; the latter were at this time primarily British workers who (in a reversal of the pattern which had stimulated international action in the 1860s), were now undermining organized labor on the Continent. The Secretariat instructed labor delegates to national parliaments to work
toward the passage of national legislation that would prevent the use of foreign workers as strikebreakers, and passed a motion, at the suggestion of the AFL, that favored suspending immigration during trade depressions and strikes. In 1903 the Secretariat commenced publication of the International Reports on the Trade Union Movement, which included reports on union statistics, strikes, and national labor legislation, and in 1913 it began publishing a bimonthly newsletter in English, French and German (Lorwin 1929). In 1913 the Secretariat was renamed the International Federation of Trade Unions, at the request of American representatives.

*Intergovernmental Organization, Co-operation with NGOs, and Co-optation*

The ILO as an international organization was constructed in a sense from one template of the pre-war international non-governmental labor organizations, the International Association for Labor Legislation (IALL), which was formed in 1900. This co-optation of the dominant INGO in the field, by a newly constituted IGO, is considered an important path in world polity development, evidence of the key role of INGOs in the formation of the world polity (Meyer et al. 1997b). This section traces the formation of the IALL and the early European international labor regime of the IALL was the organizational center.

Intergovernmental discourse and action regarding labor legislation began to swell after the 1850s. At the national level, legislators had called for international labor legislation since the 1850s. The Swiss were perhaps the first and most persistent in this field. The Canton of Glarus requested in 1855 that the Council of Zurich take action to achieve the international regulation of certain labor conditions (Lowe 1921).
International labor legislation was discussed in Swiss national legislatures in 1876, 1880 and again in 1881. On the international scene, then, Switzerland was most active, sounding interest in European intergovernmental action at various points throughout the 1870s and 1880s. Discussions also took place in national legislatures in France (1884) regarding the initiatives of the Swiss and international labor law more generally. Bismarck proposed bilateral labor treaties with Austria in 1871, and international regulation was discussed in the Reichstag in 1885 and again in 1889.

It took until the 1890s and the wave of socialist organizing, however, for the first steps towards intergovernmental action to occur. The Swiss calls in 1887/88 for an international intergovernmental conference in Bern on labor legislation were pre-empted by the German government’s convention of an international labor conference in Berlin in 1890. The German Imperial Government was prodded into action by the agitation of the German Social Democratic Party in favor of such an international conference, and the threat of domestic labor unrest. Bismarck took action in response to directives from the German Emperor William II. The paternalism of the initiative is evident in the text of one such directive, which states that protective labor legislation is part of “the task of protecting the less fortunate classes in the spirit of Christian morality” (quoted in Ayusawa 1920: 37).

The 1890 Berlin conference brought together official delegates from France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, England, Holland, Spain, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Denmark, Belgium, Italy and Luxemburg. Bismarck did not extend the invitation to Russia. This was the first intergovernmental meeting convened for the
purpose of coordinating the regulation of labor at the international level (Bauer 1919; Lorwin 1929; Lowe 1921). The conference resulted only in discussion, and resolutions concerning the regulation of mining work, Sunday work, the employment of children and young persons, and the employment of women. It did, however, signal the initiation of a wave of intergovernmental meetings and conferences that culminated in the drafting of the first international labor conventions, and the formation of the International Association for Labor Legislation (IALL), the organizational precursor of the ILO (Ayusawa 1920; Bauer 1919; Lorwin 1929; Lowe 1921).

Between the first intergovernmental meeting in 1890, and the first intergovernmental (bilateral) agreements concerning labor legislation, signed in 1904, were a number of bipartite discussions and unilateral calls, especially from the Swiss, for international action. By 1900, a number of international congresses and conferences had considered the creation of a permanent international labor organization. In 1896, the Swiss government approached – without success - various European governments regarding the establishment of an international office for labor statistics and the collection of national legislation.

In 1897, through the initiative of a congress of Swiss socialist and Catholic workers, the “First International Congress on Labor Protection” was held in Zurich, attended by 390 delegates – primarily workers - from Switzerland, Germany, France, England, the U.S.A, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Poland and Luxemburg and over 180 “special guests”. Most of the delegates were from Social Democratic organizations, but there were also strong Christian socialist
and non-partisan contingents. The congress approved resolutions calling for international legislation on a wide range of topics, including Sunday rest, minimum age limits of industrial employment (15 years), a universal eight-hour day, restrictions on hazardous materials, a 44-hour week for women, strong limits on night work, eight weeks of paid maternity leave, and equal pay for equal work. This congress also concluded with a request that the Swiss federal government make an inquiry among European states about the possibility of establishing an international labor office (Ayusawa 1920; Follows 1951).

*The International Association for Labor Legislation*

Soon after the Zurich Labor Protection congress, an informal meeting of academics, economists and legislators was held in Brussels in 1897. The purpose of the meeting was the general, theoretical discussion of labor protections. A Belgian academic, Ernest Mahaim, was the secretary of the meeting; he would later be Belgium’s representative at the peace-conference commission that wrote the labor sections of the peace treaty, then a Belgian government delegate to the ILO, and finally the chair of the ILO Governing Body. The Germans in attendance included political economists such as Schmoller, Brentano, and Sombart. The largest delegations came from Germany, France and Belgium (Ayusawa 1920). The meeting discussed existing national-level labor protections regarding children, women, and work in mines, and, in more theoretical terms, the problems and potential for international regulation. A proposal to create a standing international organization was presented at the meeting, but not pursued because the invitations had been to a meeting for theoretical discussion (Follows 1951).
Nevertheless, a follow-up committee consisting of the Belgians Mahaim, Duke Ussel, and the Catholic social democratic academic Victor Brants, pursued the idea of a standing organization concerned with international labor legislation, drew up and circulated statutes for such an organization. These were studied in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria by national committees similar to the Belgian committee. From the organizational form of these committees grew the idea that the organization for international labor protection se committees should be given the form of a federation of national committees (Ayusawa 1920; Follows 1951).

The work of these committees led to another meeting in Paris in 1900, at which the International Association for Labor Legislation (IALL) was formed. By 1912, fifteen countries were members of the IALL: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, U.S., Finland, France, England, Hungary, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. The charter of the IALL included a private International Labor Office (established in 1901 in Basel) and national sections (Lowe 1921; Périgord 1926). The work of the Labor Office focused on research and publications concerning national and international labor regulation, including the collection and dissemination of information about the creation and enforcement of international labor conventions (Ayusawa 1920; Follows 1951; Lowe 1921: xxvi).

Although a private organization, the IALL received significant governmental support in the form of subsidies and legitimation, as government representatives were assigned to the national sections (Ghebali 1989). The IALL was the vehicle for the transition to binding intergovernmental agreements regarding the regulation of labor.
The IALL convened two conferences, a technical conference in 1905, and a diplomatic conference in 1906, from which emerged the first draft international conventions regulating labor, specifically night work for women, and the use of white phosphorous in the manufacture of matches. These conventions entered into force in 1912 (Ghebali 1989; Lowe 1921). Lowe evaluates the activity of the IALL as fairly effective – “Governments were led to sign bipartite and polypartite labor treaties making international labor legislation no longer a mere theory but also a fact.” Thus, the IALL was the first standing international organization with the primary mission of fostering the achievement of international labor regulation.

The real first surge of intergovernmental action in the wake of the Berlin conference occurred after 1904. Between 1904 and 1915, twenty-three bilateral labor treaties were signed, as well as two multi-lateral international conventions (Lowe 1921). Of the bi-lateral treaties, over half dealt primarily with mutual obligations of countries regarding accident insurance. The two international conventions concerned the production, trade, or use of white phosphorous, and the prohibition of night work for women in industrial enterprises. By 1915, virtually all of the major European states were linked to a growing network of international labor agreements (Delevingne 1936; Follows 1951; Lorwin 1929; Lowe 1921; Périgord 1926). Table 3.1 shows the bilateral international labor agreements that were in place in 1915, i.e. the full set of pre-war international labor treaties in the years leading up to the creation of the ILO in 1919. The 1915 treaty network is shown graphically in Figure 3.1. The thickness of the lines in Figure 3.1 indicates the number of treaties linking the two countries.
Figure 3.1: Bilateral Labor Treaties, 1915
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France / Italy</td>
<td>French insurance benefits to Italian immigrants; Italy regulates labor of women, children and workday upward towards French levels; Reciprocal facilitation of remittances</td>
<td>1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland / Italy</td>
<td>Reciprocal treatment of immigrants for insurance</td>
<td>1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany / Italy</td>
<td>Reciprocal treatment of immigrants for insurance</td>
<td>1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany / Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>Reciprocal treatment of immigrants for insurance</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg / Belgium</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany / Luxemburg</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France / Italy</td>
<td>Reciprocal facilitation of remittances</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France / Belgium</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France / Italy</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France / Luxemburg</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany / Netherlands</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France / Great Britain</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary / Italy</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France / Italy</td>
<td>Protection of young immigrant workers</td>
<td>1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France / Italy</td>
<td>Pension beneficiaries draw at home on funds accumulated abroad</td>
<td>1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany / Sweden</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France / Denmark</td>
<td>Automatic settlement of disputes on labor protections concerning immigrants at The Hague</td>
<td>1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany / Belgium</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany / Italy</td>
<td>Accident Insurance</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany / Spain</td>
<td>Accident Insurance for Sailors</td>
<td>1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. / Italy</td>
<td>Equal right to legal action by family in case of death resulting from negligence or fault</td>
<td>1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France / Switzerland</td>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy / Germany</td>
<td>Accident insurance</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention</td>
<td>Prohibition of Night Work for Women in Industry</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention</td>
<td>Prohibition of Use of White Phosphorous in Manufacture of Matches</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Lowe 1921.
Table 3.2: Linkages in the 1915 Labor Treaty Network and Convention Network*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Number of Bilateral Labor Treaties</th>
<th>Number of Countries Linked to via Bilateral Treaties</th>
<th>Adheres to convention on use of phosphorous in matches 1= adheres</th>
<th>Adheres to convention on women’s night work in industry 1= adheres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Lowe 1921.

Table 3.2 conveys information about the structure of the treaty networks of important European states in 1915. The second column contains the total number of links that each country has in the labor treaty network, whereas the third column contains the total number of countries to which the country in that row is linked. The fourth and fifth columns show adherence to the two international conventions adopted by the IALL in 1906. France is thus connected to the network via a total of ten bilateral treaties, but is only linked to six other countries via bilateral labor treaties. Italy is linked to the network via 11 bilateral treaties connecting to five countries. Germany appears at first glance to be less integrated into the network than France or Italy, with nine total bilateral treaties; actually, however, with ties to seven other countries, Germany can be considered more
widely integrated into the network. Or, one may consider the two different scores in columns two and three of Table 3.2 as different forms of integration into the nascent European labor regime.

Germany’s position in the network is reflected in a Freeman normalized degree centrality score. This is a measure of actors’ centrality in networks, based on the symmetrical dichotomous matrix of countries by countries, where each cell entry is dichotomously coded for the presence or absence of a tie. The normalized degree centrality is the degree centrality, divided by the maximum possible degrees, expressed as a percentage, where degrees are simply row or column marginals of the symmetrical dichotomous matrix (Freeman 1979; Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002). Considering only the bilateral treaty network (i.e. excluding the ties generated by the international conventions on white phosphorous and women’s night work in industry), the most central country in the treaty network is Germany, with a normalized degree centrality score of .50, followed by France and Italy, with scores of .42 and .35, respectively. Germany accounts for 20.6% of the actual ties in the network, while France accounts for 17.5% of the ties, and Italy accounts for 14.7% of the ties.

In this context, it is important to recall that Germany two key features of German economic and social development. First, the German economy had developed more rapidly since the 1870s then virtually any other European economy. Second, the level of working class organizational strength in Germany was greater than in any other European country.
Between 1870 and 1915, Germany's average annual growth rate of gross domestic product, at 2.8%, was higher than that of any other European country; the closest competitor in growth was Finland, with an annual rate of 2.7%; this comparison is misleading, however, as Finland's GDP in 1870 was only \( \frac{1}{36} \) of the German GDP. Germany's economic growth in this period was well above the rate of growth of leading economy of the 19th century, that of Britain, which averaged 1.9% over the same period. Germany's GDP per capita increased 1.61% annually on average, as compared to 1.01% for the U.K. The only European country with a higher annual average growth rate of GDP per capita in this period was Switzerland, the leader of the international labor legislation movement, with 1.66% (Maddison 2003). In 1900, Germany was producing five times as much electricity as the U.K., although the German population was only 42% larger (Mitchell 1992). Germany's population had also grown much more rapidly in that 43-year period, achieving an annual growth rate of 1.18% as compared to 0.87% annual population growth in the U.K. By 1913, the German economy accounted for 8.7% of the world GDP, surpassing the U.K.'s 8.2%, and second only to the U.S. in the West\(^3\), which outstripped all others with 18.9% of the world GDP (Maddison 2003). Germany's labor force was also more industrial, with 41% of the labor force working in manufacturing, mining, construction and utilities, than all other European economies with the exception of the U.K. (44%). Finally, Germany's labor productivity growth between 1870 and 1913 was higher than that of any other European economy, at an average annual rate of 1.87%, as compared to 1.13% in the U.K. Among the larger European economies, France

\(^3\) China's share of world GDP in 1913 was 8.8%. 
was the closest in labor productivity growth rates, with 1.74% growth annually in this period. Japan and the U.S.A. achieved annual labor productivity growth rates closely comparable to those of Germany, with 1.88% and 1.89% respectively (Maddison 2003). As a late-developing economy, Germany was, however, still trying to catch up to the world leaders in 1913: despite the impressive growth record over the previous quarter century, labor productivity in Germany was still only 68% that of the U.S., and thus trailed the U.K. (86% of U.S. productivity), the Netherlands (78%) and Belgium (70%), and was only slightly superior to Denmark (66%) and Switzerland (63%) (Maddison 2003).

Germany was also the center of the European working class movement during the period in question. Although the claim is not tested here, the organizational strength of the German labor movement was no doubt connected to Germany’s rapid economic development (Ritter 1976). On the eve of World War I, in any case, the German working classes were among the best organized in the world, represented by numerically strong labor unions, and represented in the political arena by the party of Germany’s working classes, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Indeed, in 1914 the SDP received 34.8% of the votes for the German National Parliament (*Reichstag*), although German voting laws at the time meant that this translated into only 27.7% of the seats. Still, the SDP was the strongest political party in Germany (Berlau 1949; Schorske 1955). Party membership maintained an average annual growth rate of 14% between 1906 and 1914, expanding from 384,000 members to 1,086,000, for an overall increase of 180% in eight years (Nipperdey 1961). As noted above, German labor leaders were also the recognized
leaders of the international labor movement, despite some discomfort on the part of British, French and other European labor leaders about the dominance of German organizations and leaders.

Germany, one of the most rapidly developing economies in Europe between 1870 and 1915, the country with the strongest working class movement, was thus also the most central country in the emergent pre-war European labor regime. As subsequent analyses in this study will show, this relationship between international labor regime formation and working class unrest, and more specifically, between state integration into international labor regimes and domestic working class movement mobilization, is not coincidental, but rather structural. The relationship observed here in the pre-war phase of intergovernmental coordination and early international labor regime emergence will repeat itself over the course of the 20th century. In order to understand the formation of the 20th century world labor regime, it is necessary to take into account the level of domestic working class protest.

The turn of the 20th century thus saw the establishment of three different INGOs, related to labor, each intended as permanent organizations: the International Socialist Bureau (ISB), the International Secretariat of Trade Union Centers, and the International Association for Labor Legislation. Each emerged from a different strand of pre-World War I labor internationalism, and each suggested a different path for the development of an international labor regime. The International Socialist Bureau saw its primary function as contributing to the long-term goal of the acquiring political power through socialist party dominance of institutionalized politics. The International Secretariat of
Trade Union Centers maintained close organizational and ideological ties to the socialist movement, but avoided the theoretical and strategy debates that wracked the latter, and turned in its daily routines to practical matters such as the exchange of information about wages and working conditions, employers' strikebreaking efforts, and efforts to foster cooperation and coordination of national unions, e.g. on questions of mutual member recognition, employment information and financial strike assistance (Windmuller 1980).

The IALL’s focus on developing a movement for international labor legislation was thus one of several models that might conceivably have served as the organizational point of departure for an international labor regime. As Stevis emphasizes, the grafting of the ILO onto the IALL thus represents a choice of one from among a number of alternative models. The International Secretariat of Trade Union Centers, and of course the Second Socialist International, were working class organizations, devoted to the articulation (in the case of the SSI) and advancement (in both cases) of working class interests. The IALL model, in contrast, was not primarily a working class organization, although its primary mission was to foster international labor regulation to improve working conditions. The IALL limited the participation of unions in policy-making, and institutionalized the purview of “policy professionals generally not associated with unions[,] and many hostile to them” (Stevis 1998). “The International Association for Labor Legislation was in no sense a labor organization, its national and local sections drawing their membership from all classes of the community” (Lorwin 1929: 115). Some national sections, such as the American Association for Labor Legislation, were supported by government funds; on the other hand, some national sections did strive to
collaborate more closely with local labor movements. These efforts, however, reflected the initiative and orientation of the leadership of national section, not the policy of the international office.

*Working Class Organizations during World War I*

The outbreak of war in 1914 put an abrupt halt to the articulation of a European labor regime that began in the first decade of the 20th century under the organizational leadership of the IALL. Several developments deserve mention here, because of their contribution to the shaping of the constellation of forces that existed immediately after the ceasing of hostilities, when peace negotiations turned to the creation of an international labor organization. First, during the war, all of the belligerents stepped up the level of labor exploitation, rolling back domestic labor rights and labor protections in order to meet the production demands of war: one proximate observer referred to the “concerted attack on protective labor legislation... ushered in by the outbreak of war” Ayusawa 1920: 87; cf. Lorwin 1929; Périgord 1926). The right to strike was suspended or curtailed all over Europe. Standards concerning the length of the working day, Sunday rest, age limits, safety regulations, the negotiation of wages, protections for female workers, and others were lowered or suspended. The devastating effects of the increased exploitation of labor in the early war years, as measured by injuries and increases in absenteeism due to illness were, however, well documented, particularly for the British munitions industry, and circulated among the allied powers (Ayusawa 1920; Bauer 1919).
In part as a result of the need to gain labor's consent to the industrial changes needed to mobilize for war, workers and workers' organizations were drawn into participation in economic management bodies, and national governments of the major European powers invited, even cajoled workers' representatives to accept Ministerial or War Cabinet posts. George Barnes became a member of the War Cabinet when the Labor Party joined the ruling coalition in Britain, and the British Labor Ministry was created in 1916; Whitley councils were organized at the factory, regional and national level; a War Labor Board was created in the U.S. In France, the socialist Albert Thomas, who would become the first director of the International Labor Office, was appointed Minster of Munitions, and labor was represented on munitions production commissions. In Belgium, socialists had joined in the government, and the socialist leader Vandervelde assumed the position of Minister of Justice. In Germany, a 1916 law required all establishments with more than 50 employees to form workers' committees (Alcock 1971; Delevingne 1936; Domhoff 1990; Périgord 1926; Reigelman 1934). In considering the integration of the working classes into wartime economic governance institutions, it is important to keep in mind that participation in government had been a key and contentious issue in the debates among reformist and revolutionary factions in the European social democratic party organizations. "Before 1914 not a single socialist anywhere in Europe served in any government with the endorsement of his party" (Sassoon 1996: 27). This issue was the source of major conflicts within the German Social Democratic Party, and the Germans dominated the international social democratic movement. The integration of social democratic and trade union leaders into factory
councils and regional and national planning boards was a source of increased internal
tensions in the European working class movements.

The war also exacerbated another set of deep conflicts and schisms within the
European labor and social democratic movements. The more radical, committed
internationalists, rejected their national governments’ appeals to patriotism of the
working classes and calls for sacrifice of labor and life. These radical social democrats
were, however, a small minority of the European movement. The majority of the
reformist social democratic leaders and the rank-and-file and unorganized workers
responded to patriotic rhetoric, and delivered their sacrifices on the battle field or in the
factories. The conflicts between the internationalists and the reformists led to deep
conflicts, alienation and splits in the European social democratic movement. The
conflicts over participation in the war were the most severe in the German Social
Democrat Party, which split before the end of the war, but they divided and thus
weakened the British Labor Party, the Italian socialists, the Austrian Socialist Party, and
others.

Finally, the radical polarization of the geopolitical map that occurred with the
consolidation of the political victories of the Russian revolution redoubled the tensions
experienced within the European Social democratic movements. The Russian Revolution
served to further fragment the working class organizations of the European left on the
issue of revolution versus reform. In the presence of a viable organizational alternative,
the Social Democratic position now clearly entailed full and more or less unquestioned
acceptance of bourgeois democratic institutions. The events in Russia essentially
transformed that old controversy within the Social Democratic movement to one to potentially be fought out between competing organizations on the left - social democrats and communists. In the years immediately following the end of the war, communist parties were founded, or split off from socialist or social democratic organizations, all over Europe. In some cases, such as Germany, the hostilities between the Social Democrats and the Communists resulted in internecine bloodshed. These conflicts contributed greatly to the weakness of organized labor vis-à-vis organized capitalist interests and their states.

At the 1914 convention of the American Federation of Labor, a resolution was adopted calling for a world labor congress, to be held at the end of the war, at the same time and place as the peace negotiations. This resolution was endorsed by the French Confédération Général du Travail (Riegelman 1934). The delegations were to consist exclusively of representatives of wage earners; philanthropists, representatives of political parties or other non-labor organizations were explicitly to be barred from attendance. The British General Federation of Trade Unions, Britain's representative in the International Federation of Trade Unions and an offshoot of the Trades Unions Congress, under the leadership of William Appleton, represented the right wing of British labor internationalism. Appleton shared Gompers' voluntaristic attitude towards labor politics. The more radical socialists in Britain were affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress and the Labor Party (Riegelman 1934: 60). At Appleton's invitation, an Allied labor congress took place in Leeds in 1916. The congress articulated international labor rights, standards and regulations that were to be guaranteed directly by the peace treaty.
The Leeds program called for joint committees of workers, employers and government officials that would decide on the need for recruiting foreign labor. Other rights and regulations included the right to work, the regulation of migration, social insurance, a maximum ten hour day, hygiene and safety legislation, and government responsibility for enacting these provision of the treaty; national governments were to be subject to monitoring by an international commission that would also convene future international labor conferences; and an international labor office was to be created to study and report on the development of labor legislation.

German labor organizations were not invited to the Leeds conference. The German labor leader Legien, President of the International Federation of Trade Unions, responded to the Leeds draft with a critique, an invitation to a counterconference, to be held in Berne in 1917, and a draft proposal of what would amount to a transformation of the IALL into an international labor legislative body. Much of Legien’s critique was directed at impracticalities of the Leeds proposal resulting from differences in conditions or existing legislation from country to country. The general thrust of the critique was, however, that “the Leeds demands do not go far enough” (Legien 1917: 36). Legien, proposed, for example, stronger language and measures concerning the recruitment or use of contractually bound foreigners as strikebreakers, stricter controls and more labor influence in regulating international migration, more systematic equal treatment of different racial groups, and so on. Finally, Legien’s proposal foresaw the recognition of the IALL in the peace treaty as the official international organ for the promotion and implementation of labor protection. Among other duties it would convene congresses at
which the contracting states would be represented; the contracting states would be bound by the resolutions of the congresses (Legien 1917: 42). Note that this is quite different from the structure of the ILO, in which, with the exception of several fundamental and very general principles, states must first ratify conventions adopted by the ILO before they are bound by them. Furthermore, the Legien proposals included numerous specific protections and regulations that would enter directly into the text of the peace treaty. The Legien proposals were adopted unanimously, with some modifications, as the resolutions of the Berne Conference of Trade Unions of October 1917; one important modification weakened the authority of the proposed international organization, in that the new language of the adopted resolution only required contracting states to “bind themselves to aid in the realization of the resolutions” of the congresses convened by the international organization.

A third major international Inter-Allied and Labor conference was held in London in 1918. The peace proposals of the AFL formed the basis for the resolutions ultimately adopted by conference. Those proposals stipulated the inclusion of a “Magna Charta for organized labor” in the peace treaty itself. The principles of this labor charter were “less concrete than the resolutions of Leeds and Berne, broader in scope, and drafted without reference to the way in which they should be carried out” (Riegelman 1934: 70). The main elements of the labor charter were to address issues that had been at the forefront of the U.S. labor movement’s domestic struggles: the right to organize, the eight-hour day, protection of maritime workers, and trial by jury in equity cases involving violations of
injunctions against labor. These proposals were thus considerably weaker than those of the Leeds and Berne conferences.

As the war drew to its end, the various labor positions became even more fragmented – when the Labor Party left Lloyd George's ruling coalition in November of 1918, Barnes refused to leave his government post, and thus had to leave the Labor Party; the British Prime Minister nevertheless considered Barnes an appropriate labor representative to peace negotiations. Henderson of the British Labor Party, which had become the primary voice of British labor in international affairs, put more faith in influencing the peace negotiations on labor matters by holding an independent labor conference at the same time as the negotiations, so that labor's voice would not be diluted by being embedded in national delegations. Gompers and the AFL focused on influencing the U.S. delegation to the peace negotiations indirectly through the creation of a labor advisory commission, and acquiring the support of the U.S. government for an independent labor congress, to be held in Paris at the time of the peace negotiations. President Wilson supported the idea of a Paris peace conference, urging Gompers to issue the invitation, in part in the belief that more radical European labor positions would be more marginalized at a U.S. initiated conference in Paris. This conference never took place, in part because the French government refused to allow German representatives to attend; the only labor conference that included German delegates was the International Socialist and Labor Conference held in neutral Berne in February 1919, organized by British socialist Henderson. The labor leaders of the other major allied powers, France (Thomas), Belgium (Vandervelde), and the U.S.A. (Gompers) did not sanction the
conference and did not attend. "Nevertheless, in spite of this split, the group gathered in Berne represented a very large percentage of the organized labor of the world" (Reigelman 1934: 75). The delegations to the peace conference watched the events in Berne closely. In communications with the American delegation to the peace negotiations, Gompers scolded the delegation for the attention it directed towards Berne, and condemned the Berne conference as subject to Bolshevik influence.

At the conclusion of the war, the convention or congress of the IALL passed a resolution calling on the Peace Conference to integrate the IALL into the labor terms of the treaty. The IALL office was in fact converted into the International Labor Office of the International Labor Organization.

**Conclusion**

The framework provided by the world polity institutionalist perspective thus serves to organize the historical material on the organizational prehistory of the ILO, the sources of international discourse and organization concerning the regulation of labor. The movement from national social movement organizations, to the increased creation and activity of INGOs, to their interaction with governments and IGOs, to the absorption of the dominant INGO in the field by a newly formed IGO, fits into the framework underlying key analyses of regime formation and international social movement formation in the world polity (Meyer et al. 1997b; Berkovitch 1999).

Important questions about the prehistory of the ILO, however, remain unanswered by the world polity framework. It does not provide a useful framework for understanding the relationship between the discourse and actions of national and international
organizations that claimed to speak for workers, on the one hand, other more paternalistic
dovement sources of international labor regulation (e.g. benevolent societies), and states
themselves. Thinking about these relationships is important for understanding the
politics of the formation of the ILO, the limits and potential of the organization as it was
constituted during the peace conference, its co-optation of the IALL, and its early
regulatory activity. Too much is thus exogenous from this perspective, and important
turning points in the narrative remain unclear. As the preceding analysis indicated, the
emergence of the world labor regime was a contested process. Relations of domestic and
international economic competition and conflict were pivotal in the process of regime
formation. The organizational form that was ultimately institutionalized, and thus
definitely shaped the nature, limits and potential of the world labor regime, represented
a relatively manageable form of political integration and cooptation of the organized
working classes of the capitalist core countries of Western Europe and North America. It
responded to the threat posed by the mobilized working class organizations of the
European and North American powers by offering them a place at the table.
CHAPTER FOUR

FORMATION OF THE 20TH CENTURY WORLD LABOR REGIME II:
STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, REGULATORY OUTPUT

As previously noted, the formation of the world labor regime is operationalized in the present study in terms of several major dimensions: the long 19th century history of the 20th century world labor regime, the evolution of the regime apparatus (organizational structures, conventions, recommendations), especially the adoption of new conventions and recommendations by the ILO, and the ratification of those conventions by ILO member states. This chapter explores the organizational development of the ILO in the 20th century, and in particular, the adoption of international labor conventions and recommendations by the ILO. In this chapter, I also refer to the adoption of conventions and recommendations as the regulatory output of the ILO, or alternatively, as the articulation of the 20th century world labor regime. First, I provide a brief descriptive overview of the structure of the ILO, and the pace and content of the ILO’s activity in the formation of a world labor regime in the 20th century. Then I provide a causal analysis of the dynamics of convention adoptions by the ILO.

The Organizational Development of the ILO

Organizational Mission

The oldest of the currently active international labor organizations, the ILO was formed with the mission of creating an international labor-regulatory framework that would remove labor from international economic competition (Périgord 1926). The ILO
was formed in 1919 through a special commission created by the Paris Peace Conference. The constitution of a permanent international labor organization, and the basic labor protection principles drafted by the commission, were adopted by the Peace Conference and included in the Treaty of Versailles. The ILO was thus integrated into the League of Nations system of international governmental institutions. Whereas the League itself did not survive the turbulences and crises of the 1930s and the descent into World War II, the ILO was the only institution from the League of Nations framework that remained intact after the war. It is the only remnant of the League system still in existence today.

The ILO’s mandate, to achieve “lasting peace through social justice”, was to be achieved by creating an international framework of labor standards and by gathering, processing and distributing information on labor markets and industrial conditions. The standards take the form of international labor conventions and recommendations. A member country is not bound by an international labor convention until the country has ratified the convention, whereas recommendations are not intended to be binding, but rather guiding instruments, and are thus not subject to ratification by member countries (De la Cruz et al. 1996; ILO 2004). The ILO works towards the ratification of conventions by the national legislative bodies of its member states. The ILO also facilitates the establishment of institutions for implementing ratified conventions, and monitors members’ compliance. ILO committees field complaints by workers’ organizations about violations of international labor standards, and initiate contact with member states to resolve legitimate grievances.
Establishing an international regulatory framework for labor has remained central to the ILO's mission. As of December 2003, the ILO has adopted 185 international labor conventions aimed at protecting workers and regulating the hours, conditions and valuation of labor in a number of important respects. ILO conventions range from the eight fundamental conventions (regarding freedom of association, the right to organize, child labor, minimum age for labor force participation, forced labor, and discrimination in hiring and pay) to more specialized conventions dealing with hazardous materials, conditions of maritime employment, underground work, etc. (Périgord 1926; Morse 1969; Ghebali 1989). Today, virtually any discussion of international labor standards invokes ILO core standards as a widely consensual starting point (Busse 2002; OECD 1996; Raynauld & Vidal 1998; Tsogas 2001; World Bank 1995).

Although the creation of an international labor regulation framework is still a central area of ILO activity, service functions have received increasing resources and organizational emphasis since the ILO became part of the U.N. system (Alcock 1971; De la Cruz 1996; Ghebali 1989). The organization now encompasses 7 major divisions and supports a "global network" of information services offices in 40 member states. The staff of the ILO in 2002-2003 was around 1,900, representing 110 nationalities. The overall budget of the ILO has grown from roughly $4.5 million in 1948 to $434 million for the 2002-2003 fiscal year (Alcock 1971; Cox 1977; Dahl 1968; Ghebali 1989; Haas 1964; ILO 2004).
Membership

The ILO's membership has grown significantly and shifted in composition over the course of its 80-year history. Thirty-six countries sent delegates to the constituting conference of the ILO in Washington D.C. in October 1919. By the end of 1919, 44 countries had joined the ILO. Roughly 70% of the original membership consisted of North American or European countries; 15% were Latin American, 10% Asian, and the remainder "Australasian". South Africa was the sole member from the African continent. By 1937, membership had grown to 61 states, with increasing shares accounted for in particular by Asian, and Latin American states. In 1946 the ILO was integrated into the United Nations institutional framework (Dahl 1968; Haas 1962, 1964). Membership has continued to expand throughout the post-war period. As the decolonization movements gave rise to numerous new states in the southern hemisphere, membership increased steadily, from 81 members in 1959 to 101 in 1961, to around 150 members by the early 1980s. At the end of 2003, there were 177 member states. The regional composition of the ILO shifted correspondingly. Since 1989, the ILO has experienced another influx of new member states. The gradual growth of the membership of the ILO is presented in Figure 4.1.
As the preceding discussion implies, the membership structure of the ILO is affected very significantly by global political developments. The major fluctuations in ILO membership are associated with developments such as the rise of fascist regimes in Europe and Latin America in the 1930s and 1940s, which led to the withdrawal of thirteen countries from the ILO, the consolidation of Cold War blocks after World War II, the wave of decolonization movements that gathered strength from the mid-1950s onward, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its system of dependent states in the late 1980s.
Organizational Structure

Three organizational entities form the core of the ILO: the annual *International Labor Conference*, the *Governing Body*, which functions as an executive committee, and the *International Labor Office*, which provides the staff for the day-to-day operations. In several regards, the ILO is structurally unique among international governmental organizations.

First, with regard to the *annual conferences*, the tripartite structure of representation of member countries is unparalleled among international governmental organizations: as noted in Chapter III, each member country is required to send a four-person delegation, consisting of a labor representative, a "business" (capital) representative, and two government representatives. With regard to the labor and capital delegates, the constitution of the ILO stipulates that they are appointed by the member country’s government “in agreement with the industrial organizations, if such organizations exist, which are most representative of employers or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries” (art. 3, cited in De la Cruz et al. 1996: 11).

This rule becomes a point of conflict when national labor organizations challenge a government’s decision regarding the “most representative organizations”. The ILO constitution requires that a conference committee confirm the credentials of each delegate, and this confirmation process provides an opportunity for challenge. Thus, for example, in 1923 the Italian government appointed a labor delegate from the fascist *Confederazione Nazionale delle Corporazioni Sindicali*. This delegate’s credentials were challenged by the left-wing Italian trade union confederation, *Confederazione*
Generale del Laboro, whose membership had in fact dropped below that of the fascist confederation, but chiefly due to repressive measures directed against the left-wing organization by the fascists controlling the Italian state. Although the conference committee upheld the official delegate’s credentials, they were challenged at every conference until Italy withdrew from the ILO in 1939 (Alcock 1971).

Member representation on the committees and in conferences of the ILO conforms consistently to this tripartite structure. Each delegate must have the freedom to vote independently of the votes of their fellow nationals. Second, the ILO has developed an extensive and, by all accounts, exceptionally effective set of mechanisms for monitoring members’ compliance with the ILO constitution and conventions. Three ILO committees in particular, namely the Freedom of Association Committee, the Conference Committee on Conventions and Recommendations, and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, form the core of the ILO monitoring system (Dahl 1968; Haas 1964; Landy 1966; Weisband 2000). The ILO’s monitoring systems have become the subject of renewed attention in recent years, as activists from a variety of global social movements search for means of monitoring the behavior of states, multi-national corporations, and other powerful global actors.

The Governing Body, the second of the three core organizational components of the ILO, is today comprised of 56 members according to the tripartite distribution discussed above. It is unique among ILO bodies in that ten government seats are
reserved for delegates from countries of ‘chief industrial importance’. It executes the
directives of the annual conference, and prepares the agendas for the conferences. The
Governing Body also appoints and directs the work of the Director-General of the
International Labor Office, and drafts the program and budget of the ILO. In addition,
the Governing Body sets the technical cooperation policy, and is responsible for the
overall functioning of that program. Because its agenda setting functions and its
structural position as the entity to which several monitoring committees report, the
Governing Body is a strategic center of the ILO structure.

The International Labor Office, the permanent secretariat of the ILO, collects,
analyzes, and distributes labor statistics and information about social conditions in the
member countries. It also conducts special in-depth studies on selected topics, prepares
documentation for the Conference, the Governing Body, and other regional and topical
conferences and committee meetings. In addition, the International Labor Office
executes technical cooperation, publishes studies, and provides the secretariat for
meetings.

Procedure: The Adoption of Conventions and Recommendations

As noted in the preceding chapter, the development of a framework of
international labor standards or conventions is the core of the ILO’s mission.
Conventions and recommendations are adopted by the annual International Labor
Conference. The Governing Body typically sets the Conference agendas, although the
Conference itself can decide that items are to be placed on subsequent Conference

1 These countries are currently: Brazil, China, Germany, France, India, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
agendas. Proposals for the agenda are submitted by the International Labor Office, workers' and employers' organizations, governments, and regional conferences.

Decisions of the Governing Body are also guided by reports concerning national law and practice that are submitted by the Office. The Governing Body may also convene technical conferences on prospective conventions and recommendations before making a final decision on inclusion on the Conference agenda. Proposed agendas are discussed at two sessions of the Governing Body before the final decision is made; the Governing Body is voting on the agenda for the Conference session two years in the future. If a government opposes the agenda, the Conference itself makes the final decision by a two-thirds majority (De la Cruz et al. 1996; Ghebali 1989).

Conventions and recommendations are then discussed in committees and in plenary sessions at two successive annual sessions of the Conference. The discussions are based on a total of four separate reports generated by the International Labor Office, including surveys of members to determine existing practice, drafts of the proposed conventions, and revisions of the drafts based on comments by the members. Governments are sent copies of the reports several months before the conferences, and are under obligation to make the reports available to the employers' and workers' organizations. The final adoption of a convention requires a two-thirds majority of the delegates present at the plenary session (De la Cruz et al. 1996; Ghebali 1989).

*The Pace of Regulatory Activity*

With regard to the articulation of a world labor regime, the ILO generates two basic types of normative instrument: international labor conventions, and
recommendations. Although the ILO possesses no material sanctioning power, the ILO conventions are binding instruments analogous to international treaties.

Recommendations are not binding, but are considered as guidelines to which member countries are expected to orient their policies and actions (Alcock 1971; Ghebali 1989; Haas 1964).

A descriptive analysis of the adoptions of new conventions by the ILO reveals several basic patterns. In the 85 years of its existence, the ILO has adopted 185 conventions and 194 recommendations. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the annual numbers of adoptions of new conventions and recommendations. As shown in Table 4.2, on average, the ILO has adopted 2.18 conventions and 2.28 recommendations per year since its founding in 1919. As Figure 4.2 shows, however, the overall trend is one of decreasing rates of annual adoptions of both conventions and recommendations.

This pattern can be further illustrated by dividing the history of the ILO into two major periods, using World War II as a breakpoint, and comparing the average adoption rates of the two periods. The average number of new convention adoptions drops from 3.19 new adoptions per year in the pre-war period to 2.05 new adoptions in the post-war period. This represents a 36% decrease in the average annual rate of new adoptions. This periodization is clearly justifiable based on the significance of World War II for fundamental changes in the institutional framework of the ILO (e.g. the migration from the League of Nations institutional framework to the UN framework, and the entry into the ILO of post-colonial states after World War II), and the dramatic changes in the composition of the membership of the ILO, due to the influx of non-core countries in the

Table 4.1: All and “New” Conventions Adopted, 1919-2003

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>New (minus revisions of prior)</th>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>1946</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</table>

Figure 4.2:
ILO Convention Output, 1919-2001 Absolute Numbers and 3-Year Moving Average
Figure 4.3: Comparison of All Adoptions with New Adoptions
Table 4.2: Regulatory Output of the ILO: Annual and Period Totals and Averages, for Conventions and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of years</th>
<th>Conventions Adopted</th>
<th>&quot;New&quot; Conventions Adopted (Minus Revisions of Previous Conventions)</th>
<th>Recommendations Adopted</th>
<th>Annual Average Conventions Adoptions</th>
<th>Average Annual &quot;New&quot; Conventions Adopted</th>
<th>Annual Average Recommendations Adopted</th>
<th>Ratio of Recommendations to Conventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919-2003</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>1.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919-World War II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II-2003</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-2003**</td>
<td>58 / 60*</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1975</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-2003</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The first postwar conventions were adopted in 1946; the first 'postwar' recommendations were adopted in 1944.

**Excluding immediate postwar years
Dividing the history in this way does, however, obscure important exceptions to the overall decreasing trend in new convention adoptions: in the immediate wake of both the first and the second world wars, the new convention adoptions reached relative highpoints. In the first three years of its existence, the ILO adopted 16 conventions (i.e. an average of 5.33 conventions per year). World War II interrupted the ILO's normal routine: the permanent International Labor Office relocated to Montreal in 1940 for the duration of the war, and activities were drastically reduced as a result of a drop in resources and staff. Conferences were held during the war, but no new conventions were adopted. After the war, the regulatory activity of the ILO was energetically resumed – in the first four years after the war (1946-1949), i.e. in a time period that represents only 5% of the lifetime of the organization, the ILO adopted an average of 7.75 new conventions per year, for a total of 31 new conventions. The regulatory activity in this period thus accounts for 17% of the total number of conventions adopted during the lifetime of the organization (1919-2003).

It thus makes sense to examine the pattern of activity while excluding the first several years after both of the World Wars in order to 'control' for the spate of regulatory activity that accompanied the resumption of activity after the interruptions caused by World War II. The averages for each period are reduced substantially, but the overall decreasing trend remains: adjusted in this way, the average number of new adoptions in the pre-World War II period (1919-1939) is 2.83 new conventions per year, as compared to an average of only 1.62 new adoptions per year in the post-war period (1950-2002). In
fact, excluding these "outlier" years of increased activity only serves to accentuate the overall decreasing trend – a decrease of 43% from the pre-war to the post-war period.

Finally, it remains to note that the new adoption figures for the post-war period may be viewed as, in a sense, artificially inflated, due to the fact that a number of the new adoptions that took place in the post-war period were actually revisions of conventions adopted in the pre-war period. Thus, of the 118 conventions adopted in the post-war period (1946-2003), 20 conventions, or 17%, represented revisions of previously adopted conventions, whereas of the 67 conventions adopted in the pre-war period (1919-1939), only six, or 9%, were revisions of previously adopted conventions.²

Table 4.2 introduces another periodization, dividing the post-World War II period at 1975. This marks the conclusion of the post-war phase of U.S. hegemony, the oxymoronically labeled Pax Americana. As noted in Chapter II, some versions of global class conflict theory argues that the development of international regulatory institutions should follow the rhythms of hegemonic rise and fall. During phases of hegemonic stability, less international regulatory activity is expected, as core countries seek to maximize the opportunities to benefit from international commodities flows (Bergesen 1980).

Ruggie’s theory of “embedded liberalism” refines the global class conflict argument (Ruggie 1983). Building on Polanyi’s distinction between embedded and disembodied economic orders, Ruggie argues that the condition for the postwar

²These calculations do not include conventions such as the Employment Injury Benefits Convention of (1964), or the Convention on Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) (1992), only certain articles of which represent revisions of prior conventions, while other articles cover new issues.
liberalization of international trade was the establishment and maintenance of minimum levels of domestic labor peace and stability through state intervention. The two decades after World War II were the years of the so-called “class compact” between capital and labor in the hegemonic U.S. (Aglietta 1979; Gordon, Reich and Edwards 1982; Lipietz 1987). The Fordist social structure of accumulation erected during and after the war in the U.S., and in varying versions in the other capitalist democracies of Western Europe, was by no means a laissez-faire arrangement; on the contrary, it was based on systematic, even expanding state intervention in the domestic economy and social structure (Meyer, Boli-Bennett and Chase-Dunn 1975; Meyer 1980; Thomas and Lauderdale 1988).

The world labor regime was one of the vehicles for U.S. control of the degree and character of domestic interventionism.

"Indeed, the U.S. would come to use its influence abroad in the immediate postwar years, through the Marshall Plan, the Occupation Authorities in Germany and Japan, and its access to transnational labor organizations, for example, to shape outcomes much more directly, by seeking to moderate the structure and political direction of labor movements, to encourage the exclusion of Communist Parties from participation in governments, and generally to discourage collectivist arrangements where possible or at least contain them within acceptable Left-Center bounds. But these differences among the industrialized countries concerned the forms and depth of state intervention to secure domestic stability, not the legitimacy of the objective" (Ruggie 1983: 210)

Thus, according to this perspective, an increase in the U.S.-dominated articulation of a world labor regime is consistent with the more general expectations of global class conflict theory, i.e. that regulatory activity should decrease, but that the process of liberalization of international markets should remain embedded in social institutions that guarantee the reproduction of the social relations of production. According to the embedded liberalism argument, then, we should not expect a complete deregulation of the
capital labor relationship in the period of U.S. hegemony, but rather the institutionalization of an international social structure of accumulation that allows accumulation on a global scale to proceed on the basis of domestic labor peace in the capitalist core; the latter is achieved by embedding the commodification of labor in social institutions that guarantee levels of labor reproduction acceptable to the privileged sectors of the core working classes.

The interpretation makes sense of the patterns in the articulation of the 20th century world labor regime discussed above, and summarized in Table 4.2. The post-war phase of U.S. hegemony is not characterized by a radical decline in regulatory output, but rather by the consolidation of regulatory articulation at the international level, focused on establishing a basic, consensual framework of labor protections and rights.

The Contours of Regulatory Activity

The content of the regulatory output of the ILO has also changed over the course of the organization's history. As noted above, the ILO itself has identified eight of its conventions as "fundamental conventions" with the status of protections of basic human rights protections. These eight fundamental conventions form the core of the world labor regime. Of these eight, seven were adopted in the postwar period, and five were adopted within the first twelve years after World War II. Only one of the fundamental conventions, namely the Convention on Forced Labor (No. 29), was adopted in the pre-World War I period (1930). In addition to identifying and prioritizing this set of

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3 These are, with the year of adoption: the Conventions on Freedom of Association (1947), the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively (1948), Equal Remuneration (1951), the Abolition of Forced Labor (1957), and Discrimination in Employment and Occupation (1958).
fundamental conventions, the ILO has also developed a more encompassing categorization of its conventions. This scheme includes, for example, "Priority Conventions" and "Other Basic Human Rights Conventions", in addition to a number of other more specific categories of conventions (ILO 2004). Again, all of these conventions were adopted in the postwar period.

This is not to argue that the conventions adopted in the pre-war period were superficial or unimportant. Rather, it is more useful to think of the history of the regulatory activity of the ILO in terms of a learning process. One of the key challenges that the organization faced from its inception, but for which the necessary organizational know-how and capacities developed only with time and the accumulation of collective experience, was to craft international labor standards that would be both substantively meaningful and yet also applicable across a wide range of economic, political, social and cultural circumstances that reflects the increasing diversity of the membership (Alcock 1971; De la Cruz et al. 1996; Ghebali 1989; Haas 1964; Morse 1968). This is reflected in the relationship between the timing of adoption of a convention and the likelihood of its being revised by subsequently adopted conventions. While 55% of the conventions adopted in the pre-war period were revised by subsequently adopted conventions, only 15% of the conventions adopted in the postwar period were subsequently revised. In

4 These are: the Tripartite Consultation Convention (1976), the Labor Inspection Convention (1947), the Labor Inspection (Agriculture) Convention (1969), and the Employment Policy Convention (1964).
5 These are: the Rural Workers' Organizations Convention (1975), Labor Relations (Public Service) Convention (1978), the Workers' Representatives Convention (1971), and the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (1981).
6 To confirm this, I examined the correlations between revisions (coded 1 if subsequently revised, otherwise coded 0) and both the period of adoption (pre-war coded 1, postwar coded 0) and, alternatively, with the year of adoption. The first analysis yields a Pearson's correlation coefficient of .420, significant at
practice, this has meant that many of the conventions adopted in the postwar period
revised previously adopted conventions (cf. Table 4.2).

A more in-depth look at an example serves to illustrate this point. The ILO
adopted eight separate conventions in the pre-war period addressing minimum age limits
of employment, five of which were directed towards distinct economic sectors, industries
or occupations. Three of these were subsequent revisions of the earlier five minimum
age conventions. All eight of these minimum age conventions were subsequently
revised by the adoption in 1973 of the Minimum Age Convention (No. 138), which
applies across sectors, industries and occupations (ILO 2004). The fact that one of the
most recently adopted conventions, the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, adopted
in 1999, again revisits an issue addressed in conventions adopted at the first session of the
ILO in 1919, provides prima facie evidence against any impression that the subject matter
addressed in the pre-war period is somehow irrelevant today.

How does an overview of the regulatory output of the ILO over the course of its
history look when the extensive revisions discussed above are taken into account? Figure
4.2 provides a graphic representation of the pace of new convention adoptions in
comparison with overall convention adoptions. As the comparison of trendlines in Figure
4.3 shows, the pace of the ILO’s regulatory output drops off even more rapidly when
only new conventions are considered.

the .001 level (1-tailed test), the second yielded a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of -.378, also significant
at the .001 level (1-tailed test). A simple bivariate logistic regression of likelihood of revision on year of
adoption confirmed these findings. The year variable was negative and significant at the .0001 level.

These are: the convention on Minimum Age in Industry (1919), Minimum Age (Sea) (1920), Minimum
Age in Agriculture (1921), Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers) (1921), Minimum Age (Non-Industrial
Employment) (1932), Minimum Age (Sea) (Revised) (1936), Minimum Age in Industry (Revised) (1937),
Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) (Revised) (1937).
The Dynamics of the Articulation of a World Labor Regime

The preceding sections provided a descriptive overview of the first dimension of the formation of the world labor regime, i.e. the articulation of a set of international labor standards by the ILO, over the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. What explains the patterns of variation in the regulatory activity of the ILO over the course of its history? In this section, I turn to a causal analysis of the formation of this dimension of the world labor regime.

World Polity Perspective

From the neo-institutionalist world culture/world polity perspective, the basic function of the ILO is clear. IGOs such as the UN and related agencies like the World Health Organization and the ILO, symbolize world cultural principles that "define collective identities and interests of entities, like firms, states, and nations, along with rational organizational forms that are to be adopted by them" (Boli and Thomas 1997: 173; Meyer 1987). The INGOs and IGOs that symbolize and mobilize these world cultural principles are constitutive elements of the modern world polity, i.e. "a system of rules legitimating the extension and expansion of authority of rationalized nation-states to control and act on behalf of their populations" (Meyer 1987; Boli & Thomas 1999; Boli et al. 1999). This perspective thus emphasizes the socially constructed, exogenous, top-down process of collective identity formation and organizational diffusion. A substantial number of empirical studies have documented striking cross-national isomorphism in such domains as education policy, welfare state development, the organizational form of
the nation-state, the institutionalization of the rights of women and children in national constitutions, and environmental policies (Meyer et al. 1977; Thomas & Lauderdale 1988; Boli 1987; Ramirez et al. 1997; Frank 1999; Frank et al. 2000, Meyer et al. 1999).

As noted in Chapter III, Meyer, Frank and others have used the world polity perspective to analyze the formation of a world environmental regime—a case that in some ways is quite analogous to the world labor regime. Regimes, from this perspective, are essentially institutionally or organizationally supported, normative collective action frames for a specific domain of human activity (Meyer et al. 1997b). They use counts of intergovernmental environmental association, treaties, and environmental IGOs to measure the formation of a world environmental regime. They find that neither grievances (environmental degradation), nor the actions of dominant states were significant factors in the formation of the world environmental regime. Instead, the most important explanatory variables are the spread of scientific discourse on environment, and the emergence of an international associational framework in which INGOs could advocate world cultural principles relating to the environment (Frank 1999; Frank et al. 2000; Meyer et al. 1997b).

As shown in the preceding chapter, this theoretical perspective captures important aspects of the world labor regulatory regime rooted in the ILO’s framework of international labor standards. The ILO, although an IGO, was modeled on world cultural concepts of an international labor organization that had been widely discussed in labor INGOs and international conferences since the mid-1800s (Ghebali 1989). It is however important to keep in some of the key finding from Chapter III in mind in the process of
analyzing the dynamics of the articulation of the 20th century world labor regime. There I showed that the specific form which the ILO was given at its founding was not a neutral, natural or predetermined outcome, but rather the interim settlement of a contested process, and reflected the interests of the government representatives of the most powerful states in the world at that time.

The unique tripartite structure of the ILO, discussed above, legitimizes the identities of labor, capital and the state as collective actors, and formalizes their interdependent relationships, while clearly favoring the nation-state. The ILO labor conventions themselves further construct the responsibilities of states with regard to its working population, and stipulate appropriate rationalized organizational forms, e.g. welfare state institutions and, most importantly, the freedom of association of workers for purposes of collective action.

Although the world polity perspective thus appears to offer a very useful approach to conceptualizing the ILO’s labor regulatory regime, very crucial aspects of the history of the regime formation seem at odds with this perspective. Unlike the world environmental regime, the history of the ILO, as sketched in the preceding chapter, suggests that grievances may play a different role in the formation of the world labor regime. The ILO was formed during the years in which global labor unrest was cresting. According to the data on world labor unrest collected by Silver et al. (Silver 1995), the world has not since experienced levels of labor unrest comparable to the 1919-1920 wave. Another decisive moment for the fate of the ILO, namely the post-World War II years, in which the ILO emerged from the suspended animation of 1940-1945 and
affiliated with the UN system, was characterized by the 2nd largest wave of global labor unrest in the 20th century. In 1975, the year widely viewed as marking the beginning of the end of the phase of U.S. hegemony, the U.S. gave notice that it would withdraw from the ILO. These events indicate that the international regulatory regime cannot be adequately understood outside of the context of conflict between collective actors such as states, organizations of capitalists, and labor unions.

**Global Class Conflict Perspective**

Those scholars working within a historical-materialist or global class conflict framework that have written directly about the ILO, have interpreted the organization as an instrument of (U.S.) hegemony (Cox 1977). In particular, such work emphasizes the imprinting of organizations at their founding, to reflect the ideas of the dominant classes of the hegemonic state or states in the capitalist world system (cf. Chase-Dunn 1989; Cox 1977; Keohane 1984; Krasner 1985; Stinchcombe 1965; Wallerstein 1979). More generally, the most powerful states are expected to exercise some degree of control over the policy and activities of international governmental organizations. Such influence may be exercised via the occupation of key positions within the organization, that allow representatives of the most powerful states direct access to policy setting procedures.

With regard to the ILO, the chair of the Governing Body is one of the key strategic policy-making positions. The Governing Body sets the agenda for the International Labor Conferences, and often proposes new conventions for consideration by the Conferences.

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8 The U.S. reestablished ILO membership in the early 1980s.
The analyses of the preceding chapter demonstrated the importance of domestic labor politics in Western and Central Europe for the founding of the ILO – a key purpose of the ILO in the eyes of the heads of state who negotiated its creation was, to co-opt restive and threatening socialist labor movements. As the consolidation of the monopoly phase of capitalism progressed in the 20th century, capital-labor relations in the core countries were institutionalized and thus made predictable and manageable. Various forms of corporatist institutions were created in a number of states, including England, France, Germany and the U.S. The ILO, from this perspective, represents the analog of national corporatist institutions at the international level, and serves a similar function – to bring labor into an institutional framework within which acceptable concessions can be negotiated. The obverse of this function is the responsiveness of the ILO to labor unrest. The specific contribution of the international coordination of domestic labor regulation has been, to reduce the negative effects, in terms of diminished national competitiveness in international markets, that might result from state concessions to domestic labor movements, in the form of labor rights, protective regulation, and welfare institutions. In contrast to the world polity perspective's top-down emphasis on the diffusion of institutional scripts and organizational forms, the global class conflict perspective emphasizes the hegemonic functions of international institutions and organizations, and the potential for contestation and conflict that stable hegemony suppresses and declining hegemony unleashes.

Furthermore, world systems theorists argue that hegemonic powers view conditions of unfettered trade as most conducive to their interests. According to neo-
classical economic theory, i.e. the dominant theoretical framework of core country economic and political elites, labor regulation is antithetical to free trade. Greater trade openness should thus be associated with a slowing of the pace of international labor regulation. As the preceding discussion of embedded liberalism showed, however, the first two post-war decades were not characterized by a radical laissez-faire orientation and deregulatory fervor on the part of hegemonic elites, but rather by an interest in developing, at the national and the international level, social structures that would assure accumulation – an interest in embedding liberalism in an institutional framework that would integrate core working classes still capable of threatening the accumulation process.

Similarly, other authors working within the broad global class conflict framework, i.e. authors in the ‘global capitalism’ school, have emphasized the transformation of the global political economy from the “embedded liberalism” that characterized the period of U.S. hegemony (1945-1975) to the neoliberal agenda of the 1980s onward (Cox 1987; Gill and Law 1989; Overbeek 1993; Robinson 2004; Van der Pilj 1998). From this perspective, the transition to a global neoliberal hegemony is accompanied by the deregulation of labor at the local and national level. At the international level, constraints to the deregulation of labor are greater – at this level, one can, however, predict the slow-down of the development of a regulatory labor regime.

**Hypotheses**

*World Polity Theory* Although world-polity theorists note that “[f]or a century or more, the world has constituted a singular polity” (Boli and Thomas 1997:172), they
emphasize the dramatic increase in the articulation of world cultural principles, and the spread of related rationalized organizational forms, that has occurred since the end of World War II (Meyer et al. 1997a). In addition to the establishment of international governmental organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the immediate post-war period also marked the beginning of a booming phase of INGO formations (Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999). David Frank and his collaborators have shown that this changed international organizational context contributed significantly to the formation of a world environmental regime (Frank 1999; Frank et al. 2000; Meyer et al. 1997b). More generally, the post-war period is viewed as a time of dramatic increase in the structuration of the world polity. This research suggests that the post-World War II period should be characterized by an increase in the activity of the ILO with regard to the articulation of an international labor standards regime.

From a world polity perspective, top-down processes, not responses to grievances, are key in regime formation (Meyer et al. 1997; Frank et al. 1999). As previously noted, research on the world environmental regime found no effects of grievances on regime formation. They explicitly reject explanations emphasizing the role of grievances (Frank et al 2000). Finnemore (1996) also emphasizes the shift introduced by world polity neoinstitutionalism away from a focus on the demands of domestic groups. Based on these previous findings, this perspective gives rise to the hypothesis that labor unrest will have no significant effect on the adoption of international labor conventions.
Finally, world polity theorists perceive the formation of the world polity as a dialectic process that gathers its own internal momentum. This perspective emphasizes the importance of international non-governmental organizations in diffusing the world cultural principles around which world polity regimes are structured, leading to the expectation of an association between the formation of international INGOs and the emergence of a world labor regulatory regime. Increasing numbers of IGOs are also an indication of increasing density of the world polity, and should thus be a predictor of world labor regime articulation. Global class conflict theories do not lead directly to any hypotheses about the effects of INGOs on the formation of international regimes.

_Global Class Conflict Theory_ The world systems perspective suggests some alternative hypotheses. The post-war period marked the beginning of a phase of stable U.S. hegemony, characterized by increasing international economic activity among the core countries of the capitalist world system (Wallerstein 1979a; Chase-Dunn 1989). Phases of hegemonic stability are associated with increases in economic exchanges between nation-states, and a decrease in the need for direct international regulatory activity (Bergesen 1980). _From a world systems perspective, we should expect a decrease in the regulatory output of the ILO in the 1945-1975 period of U.S. hegemonic stability. The 1975-2000 phase should be marked by increasing efforts by international institutions to arrest hegemonic decline through increased regulation in the international sphere._

As noted above, global class conflict researchers emphasize the centrality of conflict in the structuring of institutions of global governance. From this perspective,
institutions such as the ILO exist in order to facilitate exploitation and dominance, i.e., among other things, to diffuse or channel reactions to grievances. From this perspective, labor protest, particularly in the core countries, should lead to an increase in the pace of labor regulation.

The idea of hegemonic sequences also has implications for the expected relationship between global economic processes and regulatory efforts in the international sphere. Periods of relatively strong world economic growth and openness in international economic relations should be accompanied by a relaxation of regulatory constraints (Bergesen 1980). In line with the above hypothesis is the expectation that arises from the global capitalism school of global class conflict theory. This perspective emphasizes the ascendance of a neoliberal ideological apparatus and institutional framework to global hegemony. The deregulation of labor is a central element in the neoliberal accumulation regime. To the extent that regulatory and redistributive institutions are already in place, this approach leads to the expectation that they will be characterized by decreasing regulatory activity and output (Ross and Trachte 1990; Robinson 2004). This perspective thus leads to the hypothesis that world trade openness should have a negative effect on the adoption of international labor conventions. Furthermore, they lead to the corollary hypothesis that the ascendancy of neo-liberalism in the post-1975 period should be associated with a decrease in the pace of international labor regulation.

Regime theorists such as Ruggie (1983) offer a somewhat different hypothesis regarding the relationship between hegemony and international economic and political regulation in the post-World War II period. Ruggie argues that in the post-war years, the
effort, led by the U.S., to re-establish liberal international economic relations, was tempered by an awareness that it was necessary and possible to institutionalize protections against the extremes of market fluctuations. The liberalism of the post-World War II years was embedded in economic and social institutions that also addressed questions of extreme poverty, human rights, and development. From this perspective, the ILO is a component of the post-war embeddedness of market transactions in international welfare institutions and social protections. The theory of embedded liberalism thus leads to the expectation of sustained or increased regulatory output in the postwar years, accompanying the increasing openness of the global economy.

Finally, the various theoretical strands of the global class conflict perspective explicitly postulate that dominant states or groups of states strive to use institutions to maintain or alter their power position relative to other actors. World systems theorists and international regime theorists understand institutions and organizations as vehicles which elites struggle to dominate in their attempts to realize their interests. They are not mere instruments of elites’ will, although the latter may wish they were (Krasner 1985; Wallerstein 1979b). We might thus expect that the policies and activities of international organizations should reflect even more directly the preferences of interested elites when strategic organizational positions are occupied by representatives from those hegemonic states. Since core countries have typically already institutionalized fairly extensive protective labor legislation, it seems likely that, net of other factors, political elites in the semi-periphery may have the strongest interests in controlling the ILO. For these elites, upward mobility in the global hierarchy of states may appear to be a realistic aspiration.
For semi-peripheral economic and political elites, the world labor regime is likely to be a source of frustration, since it reduces states' ability to directly control the labor force, and limits domestic economic policy options and control more generally. This leads to the expectation that when the chair of the Governing Body is filled by a representative from one of the semi-peripheral countries, the pace of world labor regime articulation should decrease.

In contrast, the political elites in semi-periphery countries of the capitalist world system are most likely to be striving aggressively to move their country upward in the global stratification system. Such elites are expected to be reluctant to advance the articulation of international regimes that limit their development strategy options. A semi-periphery chair of the Governing Body should be associated with a decrease in the pace of labor regime articulation.

Methods and Data

Dependent Variable I examine these hypotheses with some basic descriptive analyses and simple regression analyses. As indicated in the introductory chapter, conceptually there are several dimensions of the formation of this framework. The 20th century world labor regime can be analyzed with regard to the activity of the ILO as an international organization. The relevant activity of the ILO with regard to the formation of the international labor regulatory framework is, in this dimension, the adoption of international labor conventions by the ILO. Another key dimension concerns the activity of the ILO member states. Here, the member states' ratifications of ILO international labor conventions are of central interest. A full analysis of the formation of the
international labor regulatory regime must integrate the analysis of the articulation of a regulatory framework on the part of the international organization with the analysis of patterns of member state ratifications. The analyses in this chapter address the first of these tasks. The second dimension of the formation of the 20th century world labor regime is analyzed in the next chapter.

In these analyses, I focus on the dependent variable that captures the first dimension of the formation, at the global level, of the labor regulatory regime of the ILO: the annual number of conventions adopted by the ILO. These data are presented above, in Table 4.1, where annual measures of this variable are shown, from 1919, the year of the formation of the ILO, to 2003. Data for this dependent variable were taken directly (e.g. conventions adopted) from the ILO website (ILO 2004). Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present these data graphically, and in comparison with the adoption of new conventions.

World polity formation. To explore the world polity hypothesis concerning the importance of broad cultural and organizational frames for regime formation, I use annual counts of total INGO and IGO foundings between 1919 – 1998, taken from the Yearbook of International Organizations (UIA 2002). Because the process of adoption of new conventions is lengthy, beginning a full two years before the convention is actually at risk for adoption by the ILO, I use a two-year lagged measure of INGO and IGO foundings.

Labor Unrest. To explore the possible effects of grievances on the formation of the regulatory regime, I use Silver's published indices of world labor protest between 1919 and 1990 (Silver 1995). These data were taken from coded articles from the New
York Times and the London Times. This annual time series dataset consists of a world labor unrest index that is also disaggregated into indices of unrest in the core, periphery and semiperiphery of the world system. The effect, if any, of labor unrest, measured at the world or world system region level is unlikely to be immediate. The final decisions on adoptions of conventions are made at the International Labor Conferences in June, whereas the protest data are based on calendar years. Furthermore, except in times of acute crisis, it is reasonable to expect a lag between labor unrest and reactions by large-scale, complex bureaucratic organizations and bodies such as the ILO’s International Labor Conference and member state national legislatures, particularly since they only convene for a part of the calendar year. For these reasons, I lag the labor unrest variables by two years. I use both the aggregate world labor unrest measure, and, in separate models, the disaggregated measures, in order to gain more insight into the variation in the effects of labor protest in different zones of the world system on the articulation of the world labor regime by the ILO.

Core Trade Openness To examine an economic dominance perspective to the international regulatory regime, I include an annual measure of global trade-openness, using Chase-Dunn’s 3-core country, weighted measure of trade-openness (Chase-Dunn 2000). This measure of core trade openness is calculated from average measures of trade relative to GDP for 3 of the most important core countries of the 20th century – the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, between 1905 and 1995. The measures

9 To examine the economic development perspective on global regime formation, I explored the effects of world GDP/capita, using Maddison’s measure, in analyses not shown here (Maddison 1992). This measure was found to be highly correlated with the INGO/IGO foundings variable; because INGO/IGO foundings represented a more direct measure of a theoretically important hypothesis, I decided to include INGO/IGO variables rather than the GDP/capita measure.
are weighted to control for the population size of the countries (Chase-Dunn et al. 2000).¹⁰

Hegemonic Cycles To test the world systems hypotheses concerning the relationship between hegemonic stability and international regulatory activity, I use a three-level historical period dummy variable. The first period, from 1919 to world War II, captures the early phase of the ILO, a period characterized by the absence of an uncontested hegemon; this was a period of hegemonic struggle. This is the excluded category of the dummy variable. The second period, extends from the end of World War II to 1974, is characterized by the ascendancy of the U.S. as the global economic, military and cultural power. The third period is the 1975-1990 period, a period of declining U.S. hegemony. This is also the period which the global capitalism school emphasizes as the transition from “embedded liberalism” to neo-liberalism. In this periodization, the war years, during which the ILO was inactive with regard to the adoption of new conventions, are divided between the first and second periods: the first period covers 1919-1942, the second period covers 1943-1974.

Controls: Previous Adoptions and Post-War Year As bounded rationality theory in organizational analysis has shown, the information and task processing capacities of organizations are quite limited (Simon and March YEAR). If adoptions of new conventions place high demands on the ILO’s organizational capacities, adoptions may follow a cyclical pattern, allowing the organization to turn to other tasks after process a batch of new adoptions. To control for such intra-organizational dynamics, I also include

¹⁰ The countries used in the core trade openness measure are: France, United Kingdom, U.S.
a measure of adoptions in the year prior to the focal year. I also include a dummy variable for the outlier year of 1946.

Control of the Organization  To test global class conflict hypotheses concerning the effects of organizational control, I coded the national affiliation of the Chair of the Governing Body of the ILO for each year in my time series (1919-1990). The coding is based on the world system zone in which the Governing Body Chair’s home country is located.11 The excluded category is, when the Governing Body is chaired by someone from a core country.

Regression analyses with time series data are subject to problems resulting from serial autocorrelation, i.e. correlation of residuals across time units. I used Durbin-Watson tests and stepwise autoregression tools, both available in the SAS statistical software package, to test the regression models for serial autocorrelation. There were no problems of serial autocorrelation in the models using convention adoptions as a dependent variable.

This dependent variable consists of annual count data that can be assumed to have a Poisson distribution (Allison 1991). For these analyses, negative binomial regression techniques are appropriate. The negative binomial specification is preferable to the specification of a Poisson distribution, because the latter “rarely fits in practice” (Long 1997: 230). This is because, in situations where the dependent variable consists of count data, the conditional variance of count data often exceeds the conditional mean, i.e.

11 The world systems zone country codes were taken from Chase-Dunn et al., Appendix (2000). The information on the country of origin of the chairs of the Governing Body was taken from Ghebali (1989) and De la Cruz (1996).
there is often overdispersion in the data. This leads to inefficient coefficient estimates; the significance of the variables may be overestimated (Long 1997). The negative binomial regression model includes a parameter to correct for overdispersion of the dependent variable (Allison 1991). I thus used the GENMOD procedure in the SAS statistical package, specifying the negative binomial distribution. This procedure uses maximum likelihood estimation techniques.
Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Regression of Adoptions of ILO Conventions, 1919-1990, on Selected Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.183*</td>
<td>1.045*</td>
<td>1.392**</td>
<td>1.316**</td>
<td>1.781***</td>
<td>1.546**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.501)</td>
<td>(0.524)</td>
<td>(0.499)</td>
<td>(0.513)</td>
<td>(0.539)</td>
<td>(0.549)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventions Adopted (t - 1)</td>
<td>0.090**</td>
<td>0.100**</td>
<td>0.087**</td>
<td>0.099**</td>
<td>0.094**</td>
<td>0.099**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periphery Governing Body Chair</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
<td>-0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.238)</td>
<td>(.245)</td>
<td>(.234)</td>
<td>(.238)</td>
<td>(.231)</td>
<td>(.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-periphery Governing Body</td>
<td>-0.366</td>
<td>-0.486+</td>
<td>-0.384</td>
<td>-0.544+</td>
<td>-0.455+</td>
<td>-0.604*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>(.282)</td>
<td>(.295)</td>
<td>(.277)</td>
<td>(.287)</td>
<td>(.270)</td>
<td>(.279)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Labor Unrest (t - 2)</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.005**</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.479)</td>
<td>(3.700)</td>
<td>(3.604)</td>
<td>(3.747)</td>
<td>(4.512)</td>
<td>(4.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiperiphery Labor Unrest (t - 2)</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Trade Openness (t - 2)</td>
<td>0.112**</td>
<td>0.113**</td>
<td>0.096*</td>
<td>0.096*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGOs founded (t - 2)</td>
<td>0.010+</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>0.021+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943 - 1975</td>
<td>-0.825**</td>
<td>-0.941*</td>
<td>-0.789**</td>
<td>-0.971**</td>
<td>-1.995+</td>
<td>-1.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.281)</td>
<td>(.389)</td>
<td>(.294)</td>
<td>(.384)</td>
<td>(1.154)</td>
<td>(1.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 - 1990</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>-0.447</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>-0.395</td>
<td>-6.291+</td>
<td>-8.102*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.364)</td>
<td>(.518)</td>
<td>(.372)</td>
<td>(.490)</td>
<td>(3.754)</td>
<td>(3.741)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for 1946</td>
<td>2.797***</td>
<td>3.182***</td>
<td>2.554***</td>
<td>2.951***</td>
<td>2.430***</td>
<td>2.910***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.469)</td>
<td>(1.627)</td>
<td>(1.477)</td>
<td>(1.599)</td>
<td>(1.433)</td>
<td>(1.614)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Trade Openness* 1943 - 1975</td>
<td>10.317</td>
<td>2.231</td>
<td>10.317</td>
<td>2.231</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Trade Openness* 1976 - 1990</td>
<td>33.796+</td>
<td>39.566*</td>
<td>33.796+</td>
<td>39.566*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Log Likelihood</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>11.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Freedom (vs. comparison)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Model</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio (vs. comparison)</td>
<td>33.34***</td>
<td>30.1***</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>7.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

72 observations, + p<.10, * p < .05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, Standard Errors in Parentheses
Regression Analysis Results

Table 4.3 shows the results of the negative binomial regression analyses of convention adoptions on variables measuring world polity formation, world trade openness and world labor unrest. There are 6 models: Models 1 and 2 vary the operationalization of world polity formation: INGO foundings and IGO foundings are too highly correlated for inclusion in the same models. Model 1 uses lagged aggregate IGO foundings, and Model 2 uses lagged aggregate INGO foundings. Models 3 through 6 disaggregate the world protest variable from Models 1 and 2 into measures of labor protest in the core, semiperiphery and periphery. In addition, Models 4 and 6 include interaction effects of the core trade openness variable with the periods of hegemonic rise and decline.

The most interesting findings in these analyses concern the positive effects of lagged labor unrest, core country trade openness, and the negative effects of semiperiphery chairing of the Governing Body, on adoptions of international labor conventions. In Models 1 and 2, world labor unrest is consistently positive, and significant at the .01 level. The disaggregated labor unrest variables in Models 3, 4, 5 and 6 reveal this effect as completely due to core country labor unrest – labor unrest in semiperiphery and periphery countries has no significant affect on the articulation of a world labor regime. Recent labor unrest in the capitalist core countries, on the other hand, is strongly associated with increased regulatory activity on the part of the ILO to protect workers and improve working conditions. These findings support a global class conflict perspective, and run counter to a world polity perspective that asserts that
grievances are not relevant for the formation of world polity regimes. These findings are also consistent with the historical sketch outlined in the previous chapter – labor unrest appears to be a highly significant factor in the formation of the world labor regime. The ILO appears responsive to core labor unrest and responds with increased offerings to regulate the capital-labor relation. This effect is reversed, but fails to reach significance, for labor unrest in the semiperiphery and periphery.

Core country trade openness has a consistent, significant negative effect on the regulatory output of the ILO, as predicted by world systems theory or global capitalism theory. There is a significant relationship between cycles of international trade and the functioning of the ILO. Based on these measures, it appears that the regulatory activity of the ILO is responsive to the flows of exports and imports from some of the economically and politically most important countries of Western Europe. For the case of the ILO, at least, the global class conflict hypothesis concerning the relationship between international institutions and the maintenance of an open international economy receives some support. As noted in an earlier chapter, inequalities in working conditions and wages are constitutive for the economic benefits of international trade. As core country economies benefit from increasing international trade, international institutions, which global class conflict approaches view as biased towards the interests of the dominant economic classes of hegemonic countries, decrease (after a lag) the pace of labor regulation.

The interactions in models 5 and 6 explore the temporal dynamics of this relationship in more detail. In these models, in the presence of the interaction variable,
the non-interacted core trade openness variable represents the effects of trade openness in the excluded, i.e. interwar period – a strong negative effect of trade on labor regime articulation. Interestingly, in comparison to the excluded interwar period, trade openness has no significant effect on regime formation is the post-World War II period of U.S. hegemonic rise. In the post-1975 period, the analyses show a positive effect of trade openness on regime formation. As the hegemonic position of the U.S. begins to erode in the post-1975 years, higher levels of economic globalization, in the form of core country trade openness, elicit increased regulatory activity.

The period variables also appear to broadly support global class conflict paradigm. This is also consistent with the patterns of regulatory activity discussed above in the descriptive analysis of the dependent variable. World systems theory argues that the postwar decades, a phase of stable U.S. hegemony, should be a period of relatively decreased demand for international regulation; the global capitalism approach asserts that the period of ascendancy of neoliberalism should see another decrease in international regulatory activity. The consistently significant, negative effects of the postwar period dummy variable provide support for the world systems hypothesis. The global capitalism perspective fails to find support in these analyses, as indicated by the lack of effects of the 1975-1990 period variable, as well as the interaction effects discussed above.

The consistent negative effect of semi-peripheral control of the ILO’s Governing Body on regulatory output also supports a global class conflict perspective. This perspective emphasizes the dynamism of the semi-periphery (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Schwartzman 1994; Wallerstein 1979d). Semi-peripheral elites are likely to be
particularly reluctant to accept regulations that limit their ability to control domestic working classes.

The world polity perspective also finds some support in these models. The most central variables in existing research from this perspective pertain to the growth of IGOs and INGOs (Beckfield 2003; Frank 1999; Frank, Hironaka and Schofer 2000; Meyer et al. 1997b). The development of a world civic culture of INGOs is the crucial measure of the formation of the world polity – INGOs act as teachers of IGOs, and disseminators of the world culture. The INGO variables are significant in all of the models in which they are included, although only marginally so in two of the three models. It should be noted, however, that the dependent variable analyzed here is not typical for neoinstitutionalist world polity studies; the dependent variable is, however, not inconsistent with their general argument about the formation and function of the world polity.

The significant positive effects of labor unrest, however, run counter to the expectations of the world polity perspective, which explicitly sets out to argue for the relative unimportance of domestic protest (Frank et al. 1997). As indicated above, Frank et al. find that the formation of the world environmental regime followed a “top-down” logic, and was unresponsive to variation in levels of environmental degradation. Furthermore, the negative period effect for 1943-1974 also fails to support the world polity argument that the post-war period is the phase of increased world polity formation. The ILO is, by all accounts, a world polity institution, yet it shows the opposite developmental trajectory.
Discussion

This chapter analyzed the articulation of the 20th century world labor regime, seeking to identify the factors influencing the development of a framework of international labor conventions. From 1919 until the beginning of World War II, i.e. a period of hegemonic instability, in which international economic activity decreased and countries became increasingly more inward-looking and protectionist, the pace of articulation of the world labor regime increased relatively steadily. Regime formation peaked immediately after World War I, and before and after World War II. These were also periods of intense labor unrest (Silver 2003). In the subsequent post-World War II period, the rise of the U.S. to a global hegemonic power provided the guarantees for relatively uninterrupted accumulation processes. Regulatory activity declined relative to the interwar period, but as the descriptive analyses showed, it by no means ceased altogether. On the contrary, this period is characterized by the consolidation of a core world labor regime, in the form of the fundamental international labor conventions, and a shift in emphasis from binding, if hardly enforceable conventions, to even weaker international labor recommendations. This pattern is not inconsistent with the idea of embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1983), and the application of the concept of social structures of capital accumulation to the international sphere (Cox 1987; Gill and Law 1988). In particular, the post-World War II years saw a massive wave of nationalist struggles to end colonialist domination. Decolonization involves, among other things, the transition from coercion as a basis for the extraction of labor, to market-based forms of labor extraction. Such transitions can be destabilizing, and threaten the accumulation
process. Regulatory output of the ILO stabilized around fundamental principles modeled on existing protections in the core countries. This may have served, as world polity institutionalists would emphasize, as a model for the constitution of states’ relations to working classes in the newly emerging post-colonial states. Semi-peripheral elites have attempted to slow down the articulation of a world labor regime, given the constraints that international labor protections impose on labor-intensive industrialization strategies.
CHAPTER FIVE

FORMATION OF THE WORLD LABOR REGIME III:
STATE INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD LABOR REGIME

As noted above, the formation of the 20th century world labor regime is conceptualized in this study as a multidimensional process. Chapter III addressed the 19th century history of regime formation, the emergence of the organizational and discursive field of international labor regulation, leading up to the founding of the ILO in 1919. Chapter IV analyzed the articulation of the regulatory framework of the world labor regime, i.e. the adoption of international labor conventions and recommendations by the ILO from 1919 to the end of the 20th century. This chapter addresses a third key dimension world labor regime formation: the ratification of international labor conventions by ILO member states. The abstract definition of international regimes offered by international relations and international political economy scholars argues that international regimes are actualized in state behaviors and expectations (Young 1983). Regimes only have reality to the extent that states commit themselves, in one form or another, to the elements of international regimes: commit themselves to participate in the organizations, follow the norms, and adhere to the rules which together constitute a regime for a given issue area or domain (Donnelly 1986; Keohane 1984; Krasner 1983; Ruggie 1975, 1983). The international labor conventions articulated by the ILO are the most basic institutions of the world labor regime, but they only have reality to the extent that they are ratified by ILO member states. Indeed, the
exception proves the rule: conventions that are adopted by the ILO but are subsequently not ratified by at least two member states within a period of three years are "shelved", i.e. declared null and void and withdrawn by the ILO from the corpus of active international labor conventions; they are then no longer open to ratification by member states (De la Cruz et al. 1996).¹

What explains the patterns of timing and content with regard to member states' ratification of ILO international labor conventions? International labor conventions bind states, at least formally or symbolically, to adhere to certain norms that set limits to the exploitation of the domestic labor force of the ratifying state. To the extent, then, that the labor conventions restrict states' policy options vis-à-vis domestic labor markets and industrial relations institutions, ratifications must be viewed as prima facie self-imposed limitations of state sovereignty. The credible claim of sovereignty is, however, as political sociologists from Max Weber to John Ruggie have emphasized, constitutive of states. Which factors might predispose states to limit their sovereignty by formally binding themselves to international labor regulations and standards that constrain their economic development policy-making options?

As Roberts (1996) has pointed out with regard to states' signing of environmental treaties, case studies are the most useful approach to the analysis of the dynamics of individual state decision-making processes. Large-N, quantitative-comparative methods such as the ones used in the analyses of this chapter are, however, useful for identifying

¹ This has been the case with, for example, two Conventions Hours of Work in Coal Mines Conventions (1931, 1939), the 1937 Convention on the Reduction of Hours of Work in Textiles Production, and the 1939 Migration for Employment Convention.
structural factors that may predispose states, net of more specific national characteristics and dynamics, to participation in international regimes.

The chapter is organized as follows: first, I lay out the formal organizational requirements and the normative expectations to which all ILO member countries are subjected. This section demonstrates the institutionalized normative pressures states face to integrate themselves into the ILO regulatory framework, and thus participate in world labor regime formation. The next section provides a descriptive overview of the patterns of ratifications of international labor conventions between 1919 and the end of the 20th century. The third section outlines existing theoretical and empirical research that is useful for developing a framework for a causal analysis of state ratifications of conventions. In the remainder of the chapter I turn to a causal analysis of state ratifications, first describing the data and methods used in the analyses, then presenting and discussing the results, findings, and conclusions drawn from the analyses.

Norms and Expectations about States' Ratifications of Labor Conventions

The ILO imposes certain norms and expectations on member states regarding international labor conventions and recommendations that have been adopted by the international organization. The most important of these are the expectation that all members will ratify the eight fundamental international labor conventions, and the requirement concerning communication about new conventions and recommendations, and consideration of these instruments for ratification by the appropriate national entity or competent authorities, usually a national legislature. (De la Cruz et al. 1996; Haas 1964; Johnston 1970).
Today, universal human rights are most frequently associated with a number of declarations and covenants of the United Nations. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1965), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), or the Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990). Many of the protections set out in these widely known human international rights treaties or conventions had already been incorporated in ILO international labor conventions before they were stated in United Nations covenants or declarations. De la Cruz et al go so far as to argue that key sections of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) were “...in fact condensations of what was already contained in ILO standards” (De la Cruz et al. 1996: 128). Important differences do remain between UN instruments and ILO conventions. The most important of these is the fact that, whereas UN conventions deal primarily with relationships between states and their constituent citizenries and residents or groups of citizens or residents, the ILO conventions govern relationships between governments, employers and employing organizations, and workers and their organizations.

In the mid-1990s, in coordination with the United Nations World Summit for Social Development, held in Copenhagen in 1995, the ILO launched a new program to
designate certain categories of ILO conventions as addressing fundamental human rights. The four categories receiving this designation are conventions dealing with freedom of association, discrimination, forced labor and child labor. The program, launched in 1995, culminated in the 1998 "ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principals and Rights at Work". This declaration identifies these principles and rights as being embodied above all in eight fundamental ILO international labor conventions: 2 conventions concerning freedom of association (Conventions 87 and 98, adopted 1948 and 1949 respectively), 2 conventions concerning discrimination (Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration, adopted 1951, and Convention 111 on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation, adopted 1958), 2 conventions on forced labor (Convention 29 on Forced Labor, adopted 1930, and Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor, adopted 1957), and 2 conventions on child labor (Convention 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, adopted 1973, and Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, adopted 1999). The Declaration of 1998 makes explicit the universal status of these rights, and the expectation that all ILO member states will protect and adhere to the rights and principles embodied in these conventions, regardless of whether or not the member country has ratified the conventions (ILO 2004b). Emphasizing, however, that these conventions apply "irrespective of levels of development of individual member states", and are "the precondition" for all other workers' rights, the ILO does expect each member state to ratify all eight fundamental ILO conventions (ILO 2004c).

This expectation is manifest in the unique reporting obligations to which member states are subject with regard to the eight fundamental conventions. In addition to the
comprehensive members states' reporting system on implementation of ratified ILO conventions, which is used to monitor progress in the protection of workers' rights, member states are also required to report annually on the status of the protection of the rights and principles embodied in those fundamental conventions the state has not yet ratified (De la Cruz 1996; ILO 2004; Landy 1966).

*Communication of Newly Adopted Conventions* According to Article 19 of the original constitution of the ILO, each member is under the obligation to submit new international labor conventions or recommendations to the competent national authority for consideration with an eye to the enactment of national legislation. This is to occur within one year of the end of the last session of the International Labor Conference at which the new convention has been adopted. This is not an obligation to ratify conventions, but rather to create an "opportunity to take up the matter for debate within the legislature" (ILO 2004d; ILO Committee of Experts, cited in De la Cruz et al. 1996: 47). Member states are then required to report annually on whether new but not yet ratified conventions have been communicated to the competent authorities, and on whether debate or review of the conventions has occurred. At the annual International Labor Conferences, the supervisory committees of the ILO present reports on member states' compliance with their reporting obligations, as well as a number of other indicators of performance with regard to compliance with organizational requirements and, more importantly, evaluations of performance with regard to the application of conventions and protections of workers' rights (De la Cruz 1996; Ghebali 1989; Haas 1964; ILO 2004; Johnston 1970; Landy 1966; Weisband 2000).
The Status and Pace of Ratifications of ILO Conventions

Fundamental ILO Conventions  As noted in the introductory chapter, the fundamental ILO conventions have achieved a high level of ratification by member states. Table 5.1 summarizes the percentages of countries' ratifications of the eight fundamental conventions as of December, 2003. The table breaks the ratification percentages down into total percentages for each convention, and regional percentages. Figure 5.1 presents the progress of ratification of the fundamental conventions considered as a group. The figure graphs network densities of an annual series of n-by-m matrices in which the rows are member countries and the columns are fundamental conventions. A matrix was constructed for each year from 1931, when the first fundamental convention was ratified, to 2002, when data collection for this analysis was completed. The cell entries are dichotomous, zeros or ones, a one indicating the ratification by country $n_i$ of convention $m_j$, a zero indicating the absence of that ratification. Matrix densities were calculated, using the network analysis program UCINet, for each of the 71 matrices, generating an annual series of densities which was then plotted as shown in Figure 5.1. With regard to Figure 5.1, it is important to keep in mind that both the numbers of rows and the number of columns change over time: the number of rows change as new members join the ILO, e.g. in large numbers during the wave of decolonizations and new state foundings, or exit the ILO, e.g. in the years immediately prior to World War II; the number of columns...
Table 5.1: Ratifications of Fundamental ILO Conventions by 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Africa (53 Members)</th>
<th>Americas (35 Members)</th>
<th>Asia (44 Members)</th>
<th>Europe (45 Members)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced Labor 1930</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Association &amp; Right to Organize 1948</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Association &amp; Collective Bargaining 1949</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Pay 1951</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Labor 1957</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination 1958</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Labor 1973</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Labor 1999</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

changes as, over the years, the ILO adopts new fundamental conventions. Thus, between 1930, the year in which the Convention on Forced Labor was adopted, and 1948, the year in which the Convention on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize was adopted, there was only one convention that would soon come to be designated as "fundamental"; by 1958, however, there were a total of six such fundamental conventions.

Figure 5.1 shows a pattern of steady progress in the integration of the ILO member states into a regime of fundamental workers' rights. The major dips in the overall positive trend line reflect the adoption of new fundamental conventions – the major decreases in the density of the network of ratifications before World War II reflect the adoption of the 1948 Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize, and the 1949 Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining. After World War II, the two conventions on Child Labor account for the two noticeable declines in network density – the 1973 Minimum Age Convention, and the 1999 Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention. The dramatic dip at the end of the 1940s is thus, in a sense, an artifact – the number of fundamental conventions (i.e. the number of columns in the matrix on which Figure 5.1 is based) increases threefold between 1947 and 1949. The time that elapsed between the adoption of the new fundamental conventions by the ILO and the members’ gradual ratification of these conventions generates the deep trough in the trend line around 1948-1949. Since the child labor conventions are the last two of the eight fundamental conventions, their addition also adds columns initially full of empty cells to the underlying matrix of ratifications. These additions of columns of empty cells to the ratification matrix impact the overall density less, since their additions represent only 16.6% and 14.3% increases in the number of cells, as opposed to the 100% and 200% increases which the additions of the Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Conventions of the late 1940s represented.

The addition of new fundamental conventions does not always generate a dip in the trend line of Figure 5.1, however. Recall that three new conventions (on Discrimination and Forced Labor) were added in the 1950s. These additions resulted only in a slight reversal of the trend line in the early 1950s, and a flattening out of the line towards the end of the decade. This is because many of the decolonized territories that attained statehood and entered the ILO adopted the practice of block ratifications of ILO conventions (Ghebali 1989). As neo-institutional organizational theorists have argued,
new entrants to an organizational field may take rapid measures to signal conformity with
existing norms or conventions to the other, and particularly to the power units in the
organization’s environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b; Meyer and Rowan 1977). The
prevalence of this practice in the mid-1950s had the effect of compensating for the
negative contributions to the density of the fundamental labor rights network resulting
from the adoption of new fundamental conventions and the addition of new members.

As Table 5.1 makes clear, the evidence, at the end of 2003, of a high level of
consensus, at least at the formal or symbolic level, with regard to the eight fundamental
ILO conventions, is tempered by indications of some key patterns of variation in the
levels of ratifications, both among countries and among conventions. Thus, the
ratifications of conventions on forced labor and discrimination are the highest, reaching
around 90%, while the percentages of ratifications of conventions on freedom of
association and the right to organize range in the low and mid-80s. The conventions on
child labor have received, on average, the fewest ratifications.

With regard to regions, Europe clearly leads in fundamental convention
ratifications, while the Americas and Africa vie for the second position, depending on the
convention, and Asia clearly lags behind in fundamental convention ratifications.
Particularly striking are the low levels of ratification of the conventions on freedom of
association and the right to organize and collective bargaining among countries in the
ILO’s “Asia and the Pacific” category. These conventions are of great structural
significance, since they protect workers’ rights to form autonomous organizations. There
is widespread agreement among labor activists and academics that the existence of
autonomous workers' organizations is the key to the protection of the broader array of workers' rights. Protection of the rights articulated in these two fundamental conventions, then, is the necessary condition for the protection of workers' rights in general.

Figure 5.2 shows the pace of ratifications of each of the eight core conventions over time. This graph thus provides an overview of the periods of relatively rapid ratifications of the fundamental conventions, and the periods of relative stagnation in the formation of the world labor regime. Thus, the years between the conclusion of World War II and the mid-1970s were exceptional in several regards. As discussed in the previous chapter, and illustrated in Figure 5.2, the majority of what would come to be designated as the core of the world labor regime, i.e. the fundamental international labor conventions, were adopted in the early postwar years. The new information revealed by this graph, however, concerns the extraordinarily high rate of ratification of these fundamental conventions in this roughly 20-year period. The slopes of the lines for fundamental conventions 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, and 111 are extremely steep in this period, particularly in comparison to the period between 1975 and the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, the slopes of the lines again steepen.

The major increases in the pace of ratifications observed in Figure 5.2 coincide with waves of expansion of ILO membership. As discussed in Chapter IV, in the wake of the 1950s-1960s wave of successful decolonization struggles, and the subsequent formation of new states, the membership of the ILO expanded rapidly, as these states sought to integrate themselves into the international system of sovereign states (Bergesen
1980; Ghebali 1986; Haas 1964; Krasner 1985). The early 1990s witnessed another wave of new entrants to the ILO, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing, often violently executed reorganizations of political-territorial boundaries, led to the formation of a number of new nation-states.
Figure 5.2: Ratifications of Eight Fundamental ILO Conventions, 1930-2002
The pace of ratifications of fundamental conventions can be contrasted to the member countries' ratifications behavior with regard to the whole corpus of international labor conventions. Figure 5.3 tracks the average annual number of conventions by ILO member countries from the founding of the ILO to 2002, i.e. the pace of ratifications of all conventions over the course of the 20th century. The trendlines in particular give an indication of the pace of world labor regime formation, presented here in the dimension of members' integration into the world regulatory framework. Despite the disintegration of the international economy between the world wars (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000; Hirst and Thompson 1996), the pace of ILO members' ratifications shows an increasing trend until the outbreak of war, and that trend resumes after the war. The pace of ratifications continues to increase until the mid-1960, when it reaches its zenith; from 1965 the pace of labor regime integration begins a long, gradual decline, interrupted by rebounds in the early 1980s and early 1990s, and again at the turn of the century.

Table 5.2: Average Convention Ratifications, by World Bank Income Group, in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28.04</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Middle</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40.84</td>
<td>20.72</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Middle</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46.30</td>
<td>26.54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Non-OECD</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38.37</td>
<td>23.08</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High OECD</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73.26</td>
<td>29.57</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High OECD - USA</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>27.11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 break down the current total ratification patterns, stratifying ILO member countries by World Bank income groups, and using world system location codings developed by Van Rossem (1996). As these tables indicate, the economically richer (Table 5.2) and, with regard to economic, political, and military ties, structurally more central countries of the core (Table 5.3) typically ratify more ILO conventions. The U.S.A. is an exceptional case, here as in other questions of social policy and labor institutions, with only a little over half as many total ratifications as the next closest member of its respective groups. If we bracket the U.S.A., it does reduce the variability
Figure 5.3: Average Annual Ratifications, with 3-Year Moving Average and Trend
in the core, or high-income OECD country groups substantially, but it is also clear that a significant amount of overlap remains between the categories. The highest-ratifying countries of the hyperperiphery, or low income country groups, have ratified nearly three times as many ILO conventions as the low-ratifying countries of the world system core, or high income group. Income groupings or world systems locations do serve to illustrate some basic patterns in the data, but they clearly leave a significant amount of variation unexplained.

*The Dynamics of ILO Convention Ratification*

*Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Research*

The preceding section provides a descriptive overview of some of the most important general patterns of member state ratification of ILO fundamental conventions. What explains the patterns of ratifications observed in the preceding chapter? Why do states bind themselves to international labor conventions that limit their flexibility in structuring domestic labor markets and industrial relations institutions?

*Modernization Theory and Functionalist Research*  In his monograph on the ILO as a case study in functionalism and international organization, Haas does not directly analyze the process and logic of ILO convention ratifications, but his passing references to the reasons for states' ratifications emphasize the personality quirks heads of state, or exigencies of domestic politics:

"Many ratifications are deposited for trivial reasons, totally unconnected with a reasoned decision to submit local labor conditions to the upward dynamism of the International Labor Code. During the tenure of Albert Thomas, it was customary to extract ratifications at the end of intimate conversations with national officials and in the course of banquets in which social conviviality prevailed over social consciousness..." (Haas 1964: 260).
Observations such as this one may be accurate at a superficial level, but Haas' own subsequent arguments suggest that the ability to surrender to such "social conviviality" is itself constrained and structured by domestic and international institutions and social forces. Haas notes, for example, that the reporting requirements of the ILO represent a significant burden on member states, and thus gravitate against the practice of frivolous ratifications. Haas also makes a different sort of argument, however, when he points out the influence of domestic political constellations and pressures in politicians' behavior with regard to ILO conventions:

"In more recent years, the minister of a Latin American country, for instance, was anxious to ratify a certain Convention, not because he was interested in implementing it, but to impress his colleagues in the cabinet with his progressive ideas; ratification was undertaken for reasons of immediate prestige of a particularly short-term nature, given the nature of the minister's regime" (ibid).

Here, although the focus is still on the behavior of an individual minister, the account of that behavior rests on more structural conditions, namely incentives structure created by a specific cabinet political constellation. At least, in this latter case, domestic politics matter for the ratification of ILO conventions, although Haas does not go on to specify in more depth the nature of such domestic political influences. He merely notes that some ratifications are pursued by domestic political actors as an attempt to signal their political loyalties.

**Domestic Politics and International Regimes** The rational actor assumptions of much of the realist, neorealist, and neoliberal literature in international relations and international political economy on international regimes trivially implies the importance of domestic politics in states' behavior with regard to international regimes (cf. the
articles in Baldwin (ed.) 1993; Keohane 1984; Krasner 1983b [intro to his ed volume]).

According to this model, international politics is characterized by anarchy because in the international arena, each state makes independent decisions about its actions in the international arena and uses the power resources at its disposal to pursue its self-interests, with the resort to force as a constant option (e.g. Stein 1983).

One important line of criticism of this literature, however, has been that it naively assumes exogenously given, fixed and stable domestic interest structures (Finnemore 1996; McNeely 1995; Ruggie 1998; Chapter 3). Social constructivist theorists like Ruggie have pursued the implications of this critique for a theory of the intersubjective-cognitive dimensions of the construction of expectations, norms and rules of state behavior in the international arena. Other theorists have responded to the critique of the neo-realist assumptions of pre-given, unitary state self-interests with a renewed interest in the link between domestic social conflict and international politics.

The importance of domestic structures and processes is emphasized by Haggard and Simmons in their review of the international relations literature on international regimes (Haggard and Simmons 1987). Their critical review concludes with a call to ‘bring domestic politics back in’ to the analysis of states’ behavior with regard to international regimes. In particular, they point to the role of domestic political conflicts in states’ behavior with regard to international regimes. For example, they argue that the defections represented by the ‘new protectionism’ practiced in the 1980s by advanced industrial countries, i.e. the restricting of imports of certain products from certain developing countries, in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, are the
result of domestic political conflicts in which the government's relationship to international regimes becomes a resource or bargaining chip (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 515f). Although these authors draw on the role of domestic conflicts in their explanation of defections from international regimes, the logic of the argument extends to the understanding of states' participation in international regimes as well. "The central point is that growing interdependence means that groups at the domestic level increasingly have 'regime interests'" (517). These interests may be related to the state's participation in, compliance with, or defection from international regimes, with access of non-governmental actors or NGOs to regime organizations or it may be related to or conditional upon the behavior of other important states (on the question of NGOs and access to international regime organizations, cf. Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997).

**Neo-Institutionalist World Polity Theory**  As shown in the Chapter IV, the turn away from explanations of world polity formation based on domestic politics or domestic economic, political or social factors is programmatic for world polity theory. This theoretical perspective emphasizes, instead, the ways in which states and other actors are themselves exogenously, culturally constituted. Actors are shaped by cultural frames in which they are embedded. With regard to macro-sociological units such as nation-states, the cultural frames are universalistic ontological and cognitive models that define the nature and purposes of social actors. The most important principles concern the concept of rational, purposive agency, and the primary legitimate purposes of action for states concern socioeconomic development, welfare, and individual rights, justice and equality. The research program initiated by John Meyer and his collaborators focuses on the role of
INGOs in the legitimation and diffusion of these principles and models (Meyer, Boli and Thomas 1987; Meyer et al. 1997a; Meyer et al. 1997b; Meyer 2000; Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal 1992; Meyer et al 1977; Boli 1999; Boli and Thomas 1997; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997; Strang and Chang 1993; Thomas & Lauderdale 1988;).

David Frank’s work on state’s integration into a world environmental regime provides a particularly useful illustration of this orientation, since it also focuses on states’ ratification of international treaties. Frank’s study of the social bases of environmental treaty ratification explicitly tests various “bottom-up” views against “a more sociological, top-down alternative”, in the explanation of states’ integration into an international environmental regime (Frank 1999). Accounts of participation in international environmental regimes that emphasize domestic grievance expressions (environmental protest), domestic economic development, domestic scientific interest groups, or open domestic political structures are tested in statistical analyses against a world polity account that emphasizes the density of ties to world society as the best predictors of the “enactment of globally legitimate forms”, i.e. “ratifying international environmental treaties” (Frank 1999: 527). World models of the nation state, its appropriate and legitimate institutions, organizational structures, and activities, circulate in the international discourse of INGOs and “international others”; they are institutionalized at the global level, in IGOs such as the United Nations and its affiliated organizations (including, of course, the ILO) and in international regimes. The states with the densest linkages to the world polity will become most closely integrated with any one of the many specific regimes that constitute that world polity. As Frank himself
notes, the specific case of states’ participation in the world environmental regime is already implied in the general world polity theory of the top-down constitution of states via world models of legitimate state forms and activities: “Once nation-states are conceived in this way – as the outcomes of a world social process – the argument waged here becomes almost tautologous, using a broad measure of global participation (embeddedness in international society) to predict a narrower one (ratification of international treaties)” (Frank 1998: 528). Linkages to world society are operationalized as memberships in INGOs; environmental and non-environmental INGOs are calculated separately, as are memberships in the associated organizations of the International Council of Scientific Unions, in order to be able to distinguish between general linkages to world society, linkages to the international scientific community, and linkages to the international environmental sector in particular. World polity theory thus leads to accounts of states’ integration into, and thus contribution to the formation of, international regimes thus programmatically introduces a turn away from the role of domestic political conflict in explanations of international regime formation. Frank tests these independent variables against measures of domestic grievances, economic development, political openness and scientific capacity, for national ratifications of international environmental treaties between 1900 and 1990. In 14 separate structural equation models, testing world polity linkages against each of the “bottom-up” accounts for four different time periods, he finds support only for the world polity perspective. In only one of the models is any other variable significant (scientific capacity, in the 1973-
Frank thus finds strong support for a world polity account of state integration into a world environmental regime (Frank 1998).

World cultural principles thus diffuse through channels established by INGO memberships, that link national states to the world polity. The idea of the diffusion of social practices and cultural and organizational innovations is thus a key component of the neoinstitutionalist argument (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b; Meyer and Hannan 1979; Strang and Meyer 1993; Strang 1990; Strang and Soule 1998). The analysis of how and why innovative or normative practices and forms spread draws on a wide range of explanatory mechanisms and models, but some of the most influential diffusion analyses emphasize cultural similarities among sources and adopters, the cultural legitimacy of the diffusing norms, forms, or practices, the prestige of the source, and physical proximity (Strang and Soule 1998).

Although the world society perspective thus offers a very useful approach to conceptualizing the ILO's labor regulatory regime, crucial aspects of the history of the regime formation seem at odds with the top-down, diffusion model of world society convergence. Unlike the world environmental regime, the analyses of the preceding chapters suggest that grievances, or working class unrest, plays an important role in the formation of the world labor regime.

As I argued in Chapter III, domestic and global peaks in labor unrest were key proximate causes of the institutionlization and organizational consolidation of the 20th century world labor regime. The ILO was formed during the years in which global labor unrest was cresting. According to the data on world labor unrest collected by Silver et al.,
the world has not since experienced levels labor unrest comparable to the 1919-1920 wave (Silver 1995; Silver 2003). Another decisive moment for the fate of the ILO, namely the post-World War II years, in which the ILO emerged from the suspended animation of 1940-1945 and affiliated with the UN system, was characterized by the 2nd largest wave of global labor unrest in the 20th century. In 1975, the year widely viewed as marking the beginning of the end of the phase of U.S. hegemony, the U.S. gave notice that it would withdraw from the ILO. These events indicate that the international regulatory regime cannot be adequately understood outside of the context of conflict between collective actors such as states, organizations of capitalists, and labor unions. An adequate theoretical framework for analyzing and interpreting the formation of the ILO world labor regime must be able to conceptualize the role of power, dependency and conflict in the regime formation.

Some research within the neo-institutionalist perspective emphasizes the power struggles and conflict that motivate some patterns of institutional diffusion and institutional change (Bartley 2003; Schneiberg & Soule 2003; Schneiberg & Bartley 2001; Bartley & Schneiberg 2002). This perspective gives rise to interesting hypotheses for the analysis of the formation and effects of the world labor regime. Integration into the world culture and world polity should foster the diffusion of dominant organizational forms. Furthermore, the institutionalization of world cultural content may constitute new collective actors who mobilize around contradictions between institutional symbolism and reality, and make demands that political elites redeem the promises encoded in

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2 The U.S. reestablished ILO membership in the early 1980s.
hitherto symbolic legal institutions (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Friedland and Alford 1991; Dobbin et al. 1993; Dobbin & Sutton 1997).

This approach is exemplified by Strang and Chang's research on the effects of ILO integration on members' welfare state development (Strang & Chang 1993). Controlling for other robust predictors of welfare state development, they found significant effects of members' integration in the ILO framework of conventions, on welfare state development in specific cases. They speculate about the possibility that ILO standards are effective under these conditions because they resonate deeply with "agendas of mobilized actors". The authors suggest national welfare state legislation was passed in a gesture of concession to or cooptation of mobilized social movements.

*Global Class Stratification Theories*  As noted in the preceding chapters, I use the expression *global class stratification theories* to refer to a family of theoretical approaches that share a perspective on modern economic, political and social processes as interpretable and analyzable only in the broader context of a stratified capitalist world economy. National-level patterns, events and actions can only be adequately understood in the context of countries' structural location in a stratified world economic system. This orientation is shared by *dependency theory* (Cardoso & Faletto 1979), *dependent development theory* (Evans 1979), *unequal exchange theory* (Emmanuel 1972), and *world systems theory* (Wallerstein 1979; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Chase-Dunn 1989; Chase-Dunn & Grimes 1995; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977; Schwartzman 1989). All states, and indeed all sub- and supra-national units of social analysis, are integrated as producing and exchanging units into a single capitalist world economic
system organized by a single complex division of labor (Wallerstein 1979; Chase-Dunn 1989; Ross and Trachte 1990).

The production and exchange relationships that constitute the world economy create patterns of stratification between nation-states. Between-nation inequality, relative to within-nation inequality, still accounts for the lion's share of world inequality. The world economy thus consists of relations of production and exchange linking powerful economically and politically independent ("core") and weak, economically and politically dependent ("periphery") nation-states and regions in a comprehensive global system of nested exchange networks. The development of domestic economic, political and social structures in the periphery is significantly influenced by periphery countries' structural location in the world capitalist system. A third structural location in the world capitalist system, between the core and the periphery, is occupied by a number of nation-states characterized by both dependent and independent economic and political relations ("semi-periphery") (Wallerstein 1979; Bomschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Chase-Dunn 1989; Chase-Dunn & Grimes 1995; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977; Schwartzman 1989).

National level indicators of development and national patterns of social conflict are understood from this perspective as themselves determined by a nation-state’s location in the global economic structure. Relational measures such as a variety of measures of economic dependence, including debt dependence, investment dependence, aid dependence and multi-national corporation penetration, have been used analyze national level patterns of economic and social development (Rubinson 1976; Bomschier

As noted in the preceding chapters, the emphasis on the world system as the key unit of analysis does not prohibit global class stratification approaches from considering the dynamics of collective action at the national level; on the contrary, researcher drawing on world systems theory and global capitalism theory contend that these theoretical frameworks lead to better understandings of national political dynamics, because they allow the researcher to take into account the ways in which the interests, opportunities and constraints of domestic collective actors are shaped by their location in, and relations to, the global political economy (e.g. Bergquist 1985; Boswell and Stevis 1997; Evans 2000; McMichael 2004; Silver 2003).

From a global class conflict perspective, organized labor in the capitalist core countries made significant relative gains in the over the course of the first two thirds of the 20th century (Gordon, Reich and Edwards 1982). Many of the protections embodied in the ILO labor conventions reflect the successes of relatively strong domestic labor movements in Europe and the Americas in achieving national-level labor protections and legislation. With some notable exceptions, such as the U.S.A., ratifications of ILO conventions by the industrially developed nations of North America and Western Europe
thus often represented the costless symbolic signaling to world society of existing
domestic labor regime standards (De la Cruz et al. 1996; Ghebali 1989).

As observers of all stripes agree, this is not uniformly the case for countries of the
semi-periphery and periphery. In general, these countries tend to depend more heavily on
labor-intensive forms of economic activity, and on the comparative advantages of
surplus, cheap labor supplies (cf. the articles in Bonacich et al. 1994; Gereffi and Wyman
1990; Herzenberg and Perez-Lopez 1990; Sengenberger and Campbell 1994; see also
Deyo 1984, 1989; Dicken 1998). To the extent that domestic economic development
strategies hinge on the exploitation of comparative advantages in terms of abundant, low-
wage, docile and unprotected labor supplies, policy-makers will be disinclined to
undermine their comparative advantage by binding themselves to ILO labor conventions

This general observation does not apply to all semiperipheral and peripheral
countries, however; these world system locations cannot be equated with the absence or
retarded state of domestic labor protections. Some semiperiphery countries, e.g.
Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, developed relatively powerful organized labor movements
in the first half of the 20th century, which left legacies of comparatively advanced
domestic labor law (Bergquist 1986; Collier and Collier 1991; Haas 1964; Koonings,
Kruijt and Wils 1995; Munck 1987). Needless to say, the extent to which formal legal
structures actually influence capital-labor relations varies across social contexts of space
and time, within and between countries. Nevertheless, political elites in countries in
which labor has already achieved relatively advance protections, at least on the books,
may be less hesitant to forgo the legitimacy gains to be had from the symbolic affirmation of their human rights commitments in the world social and political arena, i.e. the ratification of ILO conventions that add little to already existing domestic labor legislation.

_Hypotheses_

_World Polity Theory_

Neoinstitutionalist world polity theory emphasizes the role of linkages to the world polity through INGO memberships as a channel for the diffusion of world cultural principles, norms, practices and organizational forms (Boli and Thomas 1997; Frank 1999; Meyer et al. 1997a). Crises of legitimacy may spur states' efforts to adopt practices or organizational forms that are widely viewed as legitimate, and integrating themselves into hegemonic normative frameworks. Legitimate norms, social practices and organizational forms such as constitute the content of ILO conventions, are thus expected to diffuse to actors whose legitimacy has become questionable. Crises of legitimacy may fuel the diffusion of is viewed as and The programmatic top-down orientation of the world polity perspective leads to an explicit rejection of the notion that domestic grievances play a key role in states' integration into the world polity or world regulatory regimes. This orientation is manifest in the work of Meyer and Frank on the formation of a world environmental regime and states' ratifications of international environmental treaties (Meyer et al. 1997b; Frank 1999; Frank et al. 2000) exemplifies this orientation. Furthermore, as outlined in the preceding chapter, this perspective asserts the rapid increase in the consolidation of the world polity after World War I, as
the UN system provided an organizational framework within which INGOs and transnational social movement organizations could establish the regular social interaction with structurally key state representatives (e.g. delegations to IGOs) that facilitate diffusion of world cultural content (Meyer et al. 1997a; Boli and Thomas 1997).

Regarding the third dimension of the formation of the 20th century world labor regime, i.e. ILO member states’ ratification of ILO conventions, these hypotheses follow from the world polity perspective:

*INGO memberships, measured at the country level, will have a positive affect on the ratification of ILO conventions.*

*Domestic labor protest will have no effect on the ratification of ILO conventions; Measures of national economic development will not have an effect on ratifications of ILO conventions.*

*The ratification of ILO conventions will increase in the immediate post-World War II period.*

*The positive effect formulated in the preceding hypothesis will diminish as a function of time, since the trend in world cultural development is away from collectivist principles and norms, and towards individualist actor models.*

*States will be more likely to ratify conventions in times when their legitimacy is or has become questionable in the eyes of other domestic or international actors, i.e. when states are experiencing legitimacy shortage (e.g. for new members) or legitimacy crisis (e.g. states emerging from periods of intense internal challenges to their sovereignty).*
As world cultural content, such as ILO conventions, becomes more legitimate, states' likelihood of ratifications increases.

Global Class Conflict Perspective

World systems theory directs attention both to domestic politics, and to states' locations in the stratified world economic system. Wallerstein argues that states' role in the capitalist world economy strongly constrain their economic development and political options. Various groups within states face consequences that derive from the state's location in the world economy. These groups then mobilize whatever resources are at their disposal in their attempts to pursue their interests. Powerful actors, in particular, attempt to use nation-states and other "non-market devices" to protect their interests "and avoid the normal operation of the market whenever it does not maximize their profit" (Wallerstein 1979b: 17; cf. 1979c). Reference to the 'use of the state' does not imply a crudely instrumentalist view of society-state relations – Wallerstein explicitly acknowledges the potential autonomy of any organization, once created, as well as the influences on state structures and behavior that result from the competition and compromises between domestic social forces (1979b: 20; for critiques of instrumentalist theories of the state, cf. Block 1977; Skocpol 1981). More specifically, core states will tend to be strong, and, corollary to what was said above about non-market devices, protect certain relatively powerful domestic groups from the exigencies of the market. Peripheral states will tend to be weaker, and to strive to maintain the openness of the domestic economy to world markets (1979c: 21).
The global class stratification tradition and regime theory perspectives in international relations theory, conceptualize fluctuations in the level of centralization/decentralization of political organization of the global system in terms of "hegemonic sequences" and corresponding phases in the formation of international governance institutions (Chase-Dunn 1989; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977; Krasner 1985; Cox 1977; Haggard & Simmons 1987; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). Hegemonic sequences are defined by a phase in which a core state rises to global dominance in production, finance and commerce, a stable phase in which its institutional and ideological framework actually serves to integrate states by consent into the hegemonic global accumulation regime, and a phase of decline in which shifting and uneven patterns of investment and economic and political development give rise to conflicts of interest within the transnational capitalist class, leading to increasingly frequent political and military conflicts. Intra-core wars (i.e. world wars) are expected in periods characterized by the absence of a global hegemon. In social movement theory terms, periods of hegemonic instability represent openings in the political opportunity structures at both international and national levels (McAdam 1996; Cox 1977; Chase-Dunn 1989; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; Robinson 1996; Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993).

The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the beginning of the decay of US hegemony and the entry of the world system into a phase of hegemonic instability (Cox 1977; Krasner 1985; Overbeek 1993). This approach thus identifies several distinct hegemonic sequences that can be expected to affect international hegemonic
organizational structures, including the ILO. From this perspective, shifts in hegemonic stability in the global political economy lead to changes in international governance structures.

The unequal exchange theory of capital accumulation in the modern capitalist world system bears directly on the role of the ILO in the global political economy. As Portes and Walton point out, unequal valuations of labor in the core, periphery and semi-periphery are the ultimate source of all inequalities inherent in global exchange (Portes and Walton 1981). This unequal valuation takes the most direct form of inequalities in real wages, and inequalities in working conditions; these depend significantly on inequalities in protections of workers’ right to organize. From this perspective, the coalition of primary beneficiaries of unequal exchange can be expected to strive to create, maintain, or slow down the reduction of, unequal labor valuations (Emmanuel 1972; Portes and Walton 1981). Since labor standards tend to reduce inequalities in the valuation of labor, I hypothesize that hegemonic shifts are related to the rate of members’ integration into the ILO.

Hegemonic sequences are related to the rate of integration into the ILO. Phases of hegemonic stability represent opportunities for core countries to reap benefits from unequal exchange; in these phases, the rate of members’ integration into the ILO labor regime should decrease, as the dominant powers accumulate capital. Phases of hegemonic instability should increase the rate of ILO integration. The predictions in the preceding hypothesis depend, however, on domestic political constellations. From a global class stratification perspective, agency at the national level matters (Boswell &
Chase-Dunn 2000; Boswell & Stevis 1997; Evans 2000). The above hypothesis should hold when national political elites view their interests as congruent with those of the economic and political elites in the hegemonic bloc. To the extent that national elites face strong demands from segments of their working class, they may be forced to make concessions in the form of increased integration into the ILO labor regime. This hypothesis can be derived from both global class stratification theories and from the “conflict-attentive” versions of neo-institutionalist theory discussed in previous sections.

Data and Methods

The third dimension of world labor regime formation is operationalized as ratifications of ILO conventions by member countries. I explore this dimension of labor regime formation in two sets of quantitative analyses. I analyze ILO member countries’ ratifications of the fundamental ILO conventions, and, in a separate set of analyses, countries’ ratifications of all ILO conventions.

Dependent variables

Ratifications of Fundamental ILO Conventions The first set of analyses concerns the factors affecting member countries’ ratifications of fundamental ILO conventions. The dependent variable here is the dichotomous outcome of ratification or non-ratification of each of seven fundamental conventions. The unit of analysis is the country-year. (The most recent fundamental convention, Convention 182 covering the Worst Forms of Child Labor, was adopted in 1999 and is thus too recent for inclusion in my analyses).
Discreet time event history methods are used to analyze the member states’ convention ratification patterns. Event history methods are appropriate for modeling the effects of independent variables on the timing of event occurrences. These statistical techniques generate estimations of coefficients that measure the effects of explanatory variables on the rate of ratification (hazard rate) of specific ILO conventions by member states’ national legislatures. States enter the risk set for ratifying a given convention when the convention is adopted by the ILO (see Chapter IV). With regard to each “active” convention, states remain at risk for ratification until they either ratify the convention, or leave the ILO (as some states have done, e.g. during WWII), or at the end of the observation period (1999).

The time periods for the analyses depend on the date of adoption of the convention by the ILO. The starting points range from 1930 (date of adoption of the first fundamental convention by the ILO; after 1930, all members are at risk for ratification) to 1973 (date of adoption of 7th core convention). Because of limitations on the availability of covariate data, the last year included in these analyses is 2000. Member countries do not have to ratify conventions in any particular order, and countries, upon becoming ILO members, are at risk for ratifying all hitherto adopted conventions, and each subsequently adopted convention is added to the pool of conventions the members are at risk of ratifying.

The number of countries used in the analyses also changes from year to year, as new countries join the ILO and enter the risk set. For the earliest years, there are as few as 44 countries in the risk set; although currently 177 countries are members of the ILO,
missing data reduces the number included in the analyses (viewed over the whole time period) to a maximum of 134. I model the ratification process separately for each of the seven fundamental conventions included in these analyses. More specifically, I use SAS logistic regression software to model the effects of time-varying independent variables on the dichotomous dependent variable, ratification of a given convention, in a given year. This procedure uses maximum likelihood methods to estimate generalized linear models. My dependent variable is dichotomous, so I specify a binomial distribution of the dependent variable in the model statement. This procedure can handle time dependent covariates, ties, and "class variables" with dummy variables for each value of a categorical independent variable. It allows for correction for non-independence among the independent variable measures and computes standard errors in a manner that allows for conservative coefficient estimates (Allison 1980; 1995; 1999). Because much of my covariate data is longitudinal, country level data, there's a problem of "clustering" (Allison 1991). To correct for this, I use the "generalized estimating equations method" ("GEE" method) discussed in Allison (1991). The GEE method modifies the weight matrix used in the maximum likelihood approach to account for correlated residuals. I use a TYPE=AR statement in my models, which is appropriate for the lag-1 autoregressive structure in my data.

*Ratifications of Any ILO Conventions* In addition to the separate analyses of ratifications of the first seven fundamental ILO conventions, I also analyze annual counts of member countries' ratifications of *any* ILO conventions. In these analyses, the dependent variable consists of annual counts of all new ratifications of ILO conventions
by member countries. The unit of analysis is again the country-year. The data for both
this dependent variable were taken from the ILO website (ILO 2004).

These analyses use negative binomial regression methods, which are appropriate
when the dependent variable consists of count data. Count data used as a dependent
variable may be characterized by overdispersion, which can lead to inflated standard
errors and inefficient estimates (Allison 1999). The negative binomial estimation
approach corrects for this problem. As for the analysis in the previous chapter, I use the
PROC GENMOD procedure in the SAS statistical software package for these analyses.

Independent Variables

Periodization  Both world polity theory and global class stratification approaches
lead to a division of the period under study, i.e. 1919 – 1996, into similar subperiods,
although the theoretical perspectives come to different expectations regarding the
formation of the world polity in these periods. Whereas world systems theory
characterizes the 1919-1945 period as one of intracore conflict and hegemonic
competition, the world polity emphasis on the end of World War II as a critical caesura
leaves the 1919-1945 period as a residual. Both perspectives identify the 1945-1975
period as important, but come to opposing expectations: low levels of ratification on the
part of world systems theory, and increasing rates of ratification on the part of world
polity theory. Finally, world systems theory identifies the period from roughly 1975 to
the present as one of the decline of U.S. hegemony (e.g. Wallerstein 2003, 2004). World
polity theory does not make specific arguments regarding subdivisions of the postwar
period, their analyses are based on data that stop in the mid-1970s, however; furthermore,
their argument about the take-off in ties to the world polity after 1945 is tempered by the rise of individualist world cultural concepts and models of legitimate actors, and the related delegitimation of models and concepts of collective actors (such as organized labor, classes, etc.; cf. Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999).

**World Polity Ties**  Following the neoinstitutionalist world polity literature (Meyer et al 1997a; 1997b; Beckfield 2003; Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999; Frank 1999; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997), I use counts of countries’ INGO memberships to operationalize countries’ linkages to the world polity. Data on national INGO memberships are taken from various years of the Yearbook of International Organizations. I used six years from the yearbooks, starting in 1960 and ending in 1996. Linear interpolation was used to construct an annual time series for these data for each country in my dataset. I extrapolated for the pre-1960 years, and set 1 as a minimum value to avoid the loss of country-years due to missing data.

**Legitimacy**  Two neoinstitutionalist arguments regarding the role of legitimacy in the diffusion of social practices and organizational innovations are particularly relevant to the analysis of states’ adoptions of ILO conventions. As the legitimacy of the innovation increases, the pace of adoption by those remaining at risk is expected to increase. In the analyses of countries’ ratifications of individual *fundamental* conventions, I operationalize this variable as the ratio, at t-1, of countries that have ratified the focal convention, to the total number of ILO member countries. In the analyses of annual *counts* of countries’ ratifications, I operationalize this variable as the overall network density, at t-1, of the two-mode n-by-m matrix of countries-by-conventions.
The second argument concerns legitimacy as an organizational resource subject to conditions of scarcity. A state may thus lack legitimacy or lose legitimacy, vis-à-vis domestic or external publics, in which case the state may take steps to gain legitimacy, e.g. by conforming to norms and behavioral expectations, such as participation in legitimate world regulatory regimes, or the ratification of international conventions and treaties. I conceptualize legitimacy crisis here in terms of state failure, drawing on the dataset developed by Gurr, Marshalls and Jaggers in their extensive empirical data collection project on “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002” (Marshall and Jaggers 2004). I recoded their codings of state policies to create a “state collapse” variable, coding national regimes as in a state of collapse in every year their dataset that was coded as a “foreign interruption” of the domestic regime, or an “interregnum” (i.e. anarchy). I then use a dummy variable that treats the three years immediately following state collapse as a period legitimacy crisis.

I also conceptualize new ILO member states as facing an initial state of legitimacy scarcity. New members are confronted with a large corpus of international labor conventions – countries joining the ILO after the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, were confronted with over 170 conventions. The sheer mass of this body of regulatory instruments is likely to generate expectations about ratifications, prior to any explicit pressure exerted by ILO officials. I capture this process by using a dummy variable coding the first 3 years of a country’s ILO membership as a “liability of newness”.
Regional Diffusion  Neoinstitutionalist theory argues that physical proximity is one of the strongest predictors of diffusion (Strang and Soule 1998). I include a regional diffusion variable, based on the World Bank’s eight regional groupings of countries, in the analyses of countries’ ratifications of the fundamental ILO conventions. The regional diffusion variable, calculated for each country-year, is calculated as the percentage of countries in the focal country's region that have already ratified the focal convention.

World system Location  To code countries for world system location, I use Van Rossem’s (1996) block model coding of countries into world system zones, based on from networks of import, export, weapons trade, foreign troop presence, and diplomatic relations. Van Rossem’s inductive approach generates a four-zone structure of the world system, with a hyperperiphery of virtually completely isolated states, in contrast to the more typical three-zone core / semiperiphery / periphery structure used in previous world systems research. In the analyses present below, the hyperperiphery is the excluded category of the four-level dummy variable.

Labor Unrest  Labor unrest is relevant for both world society and global class stratification theories. To capture the effects of national level labor unrest, in both the analyses of countries’ ratifications of fundamental conventions, and annual counts of countries’ ratifications, I use Silver et al.'s labor unrest data, which covers the period from 1919 to 1996 (Silver et al. 1995; Silver 2003). These are newspaper report data gathered from the New York Times and the London Times. As such, they suffer from well-known biases in newspaper protest data (McCarthy et al. 1996; Swank 2000). Silver

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3 The World Bank regions are: East Asia and Pacific, East Europe and central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, West Europe, North America, Sub Sahara Africa, Latin America and Caribbean.
et al. have, however, conducted systematic comparisons of their data with national case study protest data, and found that their data are relatively good indicators of labor protest waves (Arrighi et al. 1995). Concern regarding the biases in newspaper protest data led Silver et al. to adopt a somewhat conservative inclusion criterion for their dataset construction, excluding from the final dataset all countries that did not receive, on average, at least one newspaper mention of a labor unrest event per year for each year of the period in which the country was at risk for inclusion. Thus, a country that came into existence in 1956 (i.e. at risk for inclusion for a period of 40 years), and received 20 mentions in 1960 and 21 in 1965, and no mentions in the remaining years, reached a total of 41 mentions in the 40-year risk period, and was included in the dataset. In comparison, a country that entered the risk set at the same time, but received 20 mentions in 1960 and 19 mentions in 1965, and no mentions in the remaining years, was not included in the dataset. This is consistent with the Silver et al.’s goal of collecting data that would identify waves of labor unrest, as opposed to representing the minute fluctuations of unrest at the country level from year to year (Silver et al. 1995; Silver 2003). Using the data in this form would have implied dropping a significant number of cases from the analyses. Instead, I first standardized the countries’ annual count scores against the country-means, and then created a three-level dummy variable, coding countries which did not meet Silver et al.’s inclusion threshold as “0” for “low labor unrest” for all years, and country-years for which the standardized score was within one standard deviation of the country mean as “2”, or “mid-level unrest”, and country-years
with scores greater than 1 standard deviation from the country mean as “3” or “high labor unrest”.
Table 5.4 Maximum Likelihood Regressions of Fundamental Convention Ratifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>154 / 2037</td>
<td>152 / 2401</td>
<td>151 / 1915</td>
<td>151 / 2266</td>
<td>151 / 1668</td>
<td>151 / 1999</td>
<td>150 / 2629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.218***</td>
<td>-6.07***</td>
<td>-5.79***</td>
<td>-5.58***</td>
<td>-6.74***</td>
<td>-3.767***</td>
<td>-14.4***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.909)</td>
<td>(.687)</td>
<td>(.764)</td>
<td>(.739)</td>
<td>(1.266)</td>
<td>(.811)</td>
<td>(2.776)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period Dummy</td>
<td>start to 1959</td>
<td>1.424*</td>
<td>1.95***</td>
<td>2.131***</td>
<td>1.168*</td>
<td>2.951***</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.604)</td>
<td>(.544)</td>
<td>(.538)</td>
<td>(.585)</td>
<td>(.660)</td>
<td>(.447)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>1.974***</td>
<td>1.202***</td>
<td>1.282***</td>
<td>0.869+</td>
<td>2.217***</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.455)</td>
<td>(.409)</td>
<td>(.410)</td>
<td>(.470)</td>
<td>(.490)</td>
<td>(.447)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.924*</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>2.619***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.473)</td>
<td>(.392)</td>
<td>(.413)</td>
<td>(.403)</td>
<td>(.479)</td>
<td>(.372)</td>
<td>(.683)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>-0.743</td>
<td>-1.289***</td>
<td>-1.497**</td>
<td>-0.495</td>
<td>-1.241+</td>
<td>-0.538</td>
<td>1.085*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.529)</td>
<td>(.501)</td>
<td>(.553)</td>
<td>(.388)</td>
<td>(.673)</td>
<td>(.375)</td>
<td>(.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Society</td>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ratified</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>2.334***</td>
<td>1.534*</td>
<td>1.436</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>9.887**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.638)</td>
<td>(.733)</td>
<td>(.786)</td>
<td>(.952)</td>
<td>(1.201)</td>
<td>(1.074)</td>
<td>(3.625)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Diff</td>
<td>0.063**</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td>0.080***</td>
<td>0.070***</td>
<td>0.098***</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.320***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Member</td>
<td>1.659***</td>
<td>1.197***</td>
<td>1.370***</td>
<td>0.650*</td>
<td>1.732***</td>
<td>0.681*</td>
<td>1.236*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.284)</td>
<td>(.289)</td>
<td>(.286)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
<td>(.323)</td>
<td>(.319)</td>
<td>(.587)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitim Crisis</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.305)</td>
<td>(.287)</td>
<td>(.312)</td>
<td>(.298)</td>
<td>(.356)</td>
<td>(.289)</td>
<td>(.505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Systems</td>
<td>Core</td>
<td>-0.526</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>-0.358</td>
<td>1.111**</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>1.576*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.679)</td>
<td>(.536)</td>
<td>(.515)</td>
<td>(.412)</td>
<td>(.507)</td>
<td>(.478)</td>
<td>(.762)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-P</td>
<td>-0.245</td>
<td>-0.209</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.912**</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>1.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.557)</td>
<td>(.463)</td>
<td>(.545)</td>
<td>(.373)</td>
<td>(.617)</td>
<td>(.459)</td>
<td>(.745)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Periph</td>
<td>-0.716+</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>1.058*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.435)</td>
<td>(.340)</td>
<td>(.338)</td>
<td>(.315)</td>
<td>(.404)</td>
<td>(.294)</td>
<td>(.540)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Standard Errors in Parentheses; models are not nested.
Table 5.4 Maximum Likelihood Regressions of Fundamental Conventions Ratifications (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Forced Labor</th>
<th>Free Assoc</th>
<th>Free Assoc</th>
<th>Equal Pay</th>
<th>Forced Labor</th>
<th>Discrimination</th>
<th>Child Labor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asian Pacific</td>
<td>0.359 (0.468)</td>
<td>-1.299** (0.509)</td>
<td>-0.705+ (0.413)</td>
<td>-0.906* (0.399)</td>
<td>-0.293 (0.408)</td>
<td>-1.946** (0.678)</td>
<td>-0.843 (0.874)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>0.054** (.019)</td>
<td>0.072*** (.020)</td>
<td>0.055** (.021)</td>
<td>0.003 (.014)</td>
<td>0.063** (.022)</td>
<td>-0.011 (.016)</td>
<td>-0.001 (.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.098 (.273)</td>
<td>-0.010 (.369)</td>
<td>-0.036 (.333)</td>
<td>-0.124 (.347)</td>
<td>0.159 (.326)</td>
<td>0.327 (.311)</td>
<td>-0.277 (.530)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak Unrest</td>
<td>0.349 (.300)</td>
<td>0.834** (.311)</td>
<td>0.287 (.354)</td>
<td>0.627* (.315)</td>
<td>0.570+ (.347)</td>
<td>0.417 (.331)</td>
<td>-0.373 (.512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Unrest</td>
<td>-369.4 (.300)</td>
<td>-350.7 (.311)</td>
<td>-370.8 (.354)</td>
<td>-421.3 (.315)</td>
<td>-311.7 (.347)</td>
<td>-391.3 (.331)</td>
<td>-189.3 (.512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>191.0***</td>
<td>161.2***</td>
<td>139.2***</td>
<td>27.6*</td>
<td>171.4***</td>
<td>57.8***</td>
<td>60.4***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, Standard Errors in Parentheses; models are not nested.
Table 5.5: Negative Binomial Regressions of Total Annual New Ratifications of Any ILO Conventions, 1919-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Period</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries/Observations</td>
<td>64 /1424</td>
<td>116 / 2718</td>
<td>152 / 2950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>-2.736**</td>
<td>-0.957.***</td>
<td>-0.872*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.963)</td>
<td>(.275)</td>
<td>(.382)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period Dummies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1925</td>
<td>0.556 (.699)</td>
<td>0.185 (.394)</td>
<td>0.027 (.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1930</td>
<td>0.668 (.650)</td>
<td>0.568* (.270)</td>
<td>-0.079 (.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1935</td>
<td>1.522** (.613)</td>
<td>0.756** (.240)</td>
<td>-0.199 (.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-1940</td>
<td>1.614*** (.500)</td>
<td>0.522** (.201)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1945</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.381* (.198)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratifications t-1</td>
<td>-0.104*** (.030)</td>
<td>0.026+ (.015)</td>
<td>-0.056+ (.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>NA (-.020)</td>
<td>-0.020 (.019)</td>
<td>-0.047 (.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ratified</td>
<td>1.759+ (1.165)</td>
<td>-2.613+ (1.550)</td>
<td>9.193+ (5.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Member</td>
<td>-0.701+ (.379)</td>
<td>1.192*** (.174)</td>
<td>2.657*** (.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitim Crisis</td>
<td>-0.490 (.309)</td>
<td>0.285 (.223)</td>
<td>-0.088 (.232)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

188
Table 5.5: Negative Binomial Regressions of Total Annual New Ratifications of Any ILO Conventions (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Systems</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>1.216+</td>
<td>0.596**</td>
<td>0.679*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.642)</td>
<td>(.235)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-P</td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.836)</td>
<td>(.197)</td>
<td>(.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periph</td>
<td>0.757</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.417*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.579)</td>
<td>(.161)</td>
<td>(.216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Polity</td>
<td>0.040+</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.050***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak Labor Unrest</td>
<td>0.811*</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.765**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.357)</td>
<td>(.174)</td>
<td>(.287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Labor Unrest</td>
<td>0.835*</td>
<td>0.441*</td>
<td>0.551*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.387)</td>
<td>(.189)</td>
<td>(.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia / Pacific</td>
<td>-0.796</td>
<td>-0.672**</td>
<td>-1.66***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.621)</td>
<td>(.227)</td>
<td>(.347)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>-0.620**</td>
<td>-1.055**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.620)</td>
<td>(.216)</td>
<td>(.357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe / Central Asia</td>
<td>1.115*</td>
<td>-0.290</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.513)</td>
<td>(.297)</td>
<td>(.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>-1.592**</td>
<td>-1.368*</td>
<td>-2.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.660)</td>
<td>(.588)</td>
<td>(.437)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-145.3</td>
<td>339.8</td>
<td>523.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Freedom (vs. baseline)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio (vs. baseline)</td>
<td>215.8***</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>402.6***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<.10, * p < .05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, Standard Errors in Parentheses
Results

Tables 5.2 shows the results of the event history analyses of ILO member countries' ratifications of seven of the eight fundamental ILO conventions⁴, and Table 5.3 shows the results of the negative binominal regression analyses of annual counts of ILO member countries' ratifications of any conventions. With regard to the process of ratification of fundamental conventions, these analyses suggest that the legitimacy and diffusion dynamics emphasized by world polity theory are most helpful. What was described above as the "liability of newness" is significant and consistent across all seven of the conventions: upon entry to the ILO, states feel strong pressure to ratify the fundamental conventions. Particularly in the 1990s, the ILO has deliberately exerted pressure on new member states to ratify these conventions as soon as possible. The process of ratification of the fundamental conventions is also propelled by a fairly strong regional diffusion dynamic - that variable is highly significant in six of the seven conventions. In four of the seven conventions, furthermore, the increasing legitimacy of the ratification, as represented by the percentage of countries having ratified the convention at t-1, also exerts a considerable influence on states' ratification patterns, as indicated by the significant effects of the percent ratified variable for four of the seven conventions.

The global class stratification perspective also receives some support in these analyses. Countries' location in the core / semiperiphery / periphery stratification

⁴ I do not include the Convention Against the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention in these analyses. It was adopted in 1999, whereas 1996 is the most recent year for which I have data on important independent variables such as labor protest.
structure of the capitalist world system appears to have very little effect on countries’
ratifications of fundamental ILO conventions. The consistent negative effects of the
Southeast Asian region dummy variable (significant in four of the seven models), which
run contrary to the convergence emphasis in world polity theory (Meyer, Boli-Bennett
and Chase-Dunn 1975; Meyer and Hannan 1979), are interpretable within the context of
the global class conflict perspective. This perspective emphasizes the segmentation,
control, and repression of organized labor which often accompanies the implementation
of an export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy (Robinson 2004; Ross and Tracte
1990). Deyo’s work (1984, 1989; 1990), for example, has documented this pattern of
labor control as characterizing the transition to and implementation of EOI strategies in
the newly industrializing economies of Southeast Asia in particular.

The period variables send mixed signals regarding the global class conflict
perspective. Bergesen’s work (1980) suggests that periods of hegemonic stability result
in lower levels of regulation on a global scale, and thus can be interpreted as leading to
the expectation of lower rates of ratification in periods such as the 1950s and early 1960s,
when the USA held the position of a relatively unchallenged hegemon. The positive
effects of these period dummies fail to support this interpretation, however. It makes
more sense to interpret these effects in the context of hegemony as convergence on a set
of norms that are propagated by the economically and militarily most powerful country.
This interpretation is also consistent with the world polity perspective, and with the
findings of these analyses regarding world polity theory. While, as the preceding chapter
demonstrated, the pace of overall regulatory output did indeed decrease during the period
of hegemonic stability, these analyses demonstrate a strong tendency towards convergence around the core elements of that regulatory institutional framework. In addition, the consistently negative effects of the 1980s period variable confirms the class conflict emphasis on the role of deregulation of labor in the turn towards neoliberalism.

Finally, these analyses suggest that, contrary to the expectations of world polity theory, domestic politics do matter for this dimension of world polity formation. Furthermore, the measure of the level of democracy in the national polity is also strongly significant in four of the seven models; this suggests that where the domestic political opportunity structure is more open to pressures from civil society, there is a greater likelihood of the ratification of fundamental conventions.
CHAPTER SIX

THE IMPACT OF THE WORLD LABOR REGIME:
LABOR UNREST AND WORKERS' RIGHTS

Part I of this study explored several dimensions of the formation of the 20th century world labor regime – its institutional-organizational founding, its articulation through the process of ILO adoptions of international labor conventions, and its integration through the processes of member state ratifications of ILO conventions. In this part, I turn to the national-level effects of the 20th century world labor regime. The central mission of the ILO is the improvement of working conditions for workers. Has the ILO been successful, over the course of its history, in improving workers’ situation in the ILO member countries? Has the world labor regime developed under the auspices of the ILO in the 20th century been successful at improving working conditions? In this chapter, I explore two measures of workers’ conditions in the ILO member countries: labor protest, and the protection of workers’ rights. The focus of the analyses is on the effects of ILO member countries’ level of integration into the ILO labor regime on labor protest and the protection of workers’ rights at the national level. For these analyses, I use Silver’s data on labor protest, and a new longitudinal, cross-national comparative index of protections of workers’ rights.

The leadership of the ILO has viewed standard setting activity, i.e. the international labor conventions, as the most important vehicle for achieving that mission. After World War II, under the directorship of David Morse, the ILO did execute a certain shift in its focus, from setting and facilitating the ratification and implementation of
legislative instruments, to technical assistance, education and promotional work (Haas 1964). Despite this shift in emphasis, however, standard-setting activity has remained *primus inter pares*, among the activities of the ILO, and central to the organization’s ideology (ILO 2004). Given the centrality of the regulatory dimension of the ILO’s work, the question of the impact of the ILO must engage at this level. Have the ILO international labor conventions had any discernable impact?

Even the most cursory review of contemporary debates on working conditions and workers’ rights provides answers to this question, although the answers are contradictory. In-house impact assessments and surveys are by no means uncritical, but they do reflect a hegemonic institutional perspective that assumes some level of efficacy. The ILO’s journal, the *International Labour Review*, is filled with case studies and case comparisons documenting and evaluating ILO technical, educational and promotional programs and impacts on a regular basis. From this perspective, then, the debate is not about whether the ILO has had any impact, but rather about the extent of the impact and the relationship between program goals and outcomes.

In contrast, the views of academic researchers in the social sciences are characterized by a greater degree of variation in assessments of the ILO’s efficaciousness. This research typically focuses less on specific technical assistance, educational and promotional programs, and more on the task of identifying causal connections, or the lack thereof, between the ILO’s regulatory activities and the protection of basic human rights and the development of social policy and industrial relations institutions in the ILO member countries. Strang and Chang’s work on the
impact of the ILO on national social policy legislation is a good example of this type of work (Strang and Chang 1993). Other academics evaluate the role of the ILO in the context of broader assessments of the development and current prospects for organized labor and other social change movements. Still others arrive at their evaluations of the ILO in the process of assessing the institutional structures and legacies within which contemporary social movements seek to mobilize at the national and global level (Chatfield 1997; Evans 2000; Pagnucco 1997). Finally, world systems theorists evaluate the ILO in terms of an analysis of the institutional dimensions of the transition from a world capitalist system to global capitalism (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000).

As noted in an earlier chapter, the world systems perspective was criticized by world polity institutionalists as losing sight of the fact that all economic transactions are institutionally embedded. Indeed, I argued in Chapter III that the unfolding of the world polity research program can be seen as the effort to recover, through empirical research and theory development, the ground that was lost by world systems theory through that critical lapse of attention. To the extent that world systems theory does attend to international institutions, the focus is placed on the economic institutions that directly regulate international markets and economic transactions – e.g. the Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the more recent World Trade Organization. To the extent that international institutions concerned with broader social justice and human rights issues come under consideration at all, assessments of their efficaciousness tend to be highly skeptical, given the emphasis in world systems theory on the reproduction of global structures of political
and economic inequality. Wallerstein thus notes that the U.N., of which the ILO is an autonomous subagency, is itself too weak to exert real influence on state behavior (Wallerstein 2003). In their assessment of the opportunities and constraints facing organized labor movements in the contemporary and future world system, Boswell and Chase-Dunn consider the possibility that the gradual formation of a world polity and world culture could come to displace hegemonic world orders, but they explicitly describe the ILO in particular as ineffectual (2000: 234).

The Impact of the World Labor Regime on Labor Protest

In the following paragraphs, I examine the effects of member countries’ integration into the ILO regulatory framework on levels of labor protest at the national level. It is important to emphasize that I do not attempt to develop an explanation of the patterns of labor unrest per se with these analyses. I am interested only in the effects of the 20th century world labor regime on the patterns of labor unrest as captured in the World Labor Group dataset.

Data and Methods

With just a few exceptions, including the dependent variable (discussed below), the data used for these analyses are essentially the same as those analyzed in Chapter V; that discussion is not repeated here. Here as in Chapter V, following Isaac and Griffin (1989), I avoid the “assumption of temporal homogeneity” by breaking the overall time period, 1919-1996, into three separate, historically and theoretically meaningful time periods: 1919-1945, 1946 – 1975, and 1976 – 1996. Within these time periods, I use dummy variables for each year to capture unmeasured variation over time.
The dependent variable

The dependent variable in these analyses is based on the labor protest data collected by the World Labor Group (Silver 1995, 2003). To reiterate, these are country-level annual time series data on newspaper mentions of labor protest events. The data cover the period from 1919 to 1996. In Chapters IV and V, these data were used, in a transformed form, as independent variables. There, I standardized the annual country counts of newspaper mentions of labor unrest, and then recoded the standardized scores into a three-level dummy variable, in order to avoid the loss of data that would have resulted from the stringent threshold set by the World Labor Group’s data collection procedures. Here, the level of labor unrest is the dependent variable. Rather than use the ordinal transformation of the labor unrest variable, I use the ratio-level variable of annual country counts, centered on the country-means. For the countries that were excluded from the dataset made available to me by Silver and the World Labor Group because they received fewer than, on average, one mention per year the New York Times and the London Times in connection with labor protest, I substituted a value below the lowest standardized scores for countries included in the dataset. I also include models here that use only the countries that had greater than an average of one mention per year for the time period of the data collection project, and were thus included in the World Labor Group dataset.

Formal integration in the world labor regime

The focus of interest in these analyses is on the impact of the world labor regime on the dynamics of world labor unrest, not on an explanation of the dynamics of world labor unrest per se (for such an account, see Silver 2003). The key independent variables here measure countries’ formal
integration into the world labor regime. I use two such measures of the focal countries' relationship to the world labor regime: the cumulative total number of ILO conventions ratified by the focal member country in the year prior to the focal year, and the number of new ratifications in the year preceding the focal year. These capture different aspects of countries' relationships to the ILO. Some countries, for example, ratified many conventions upon becoming members of the ILO in the 1960s, but have ratified few, or no additional conventions since joining. Other countries exhibit patterns of ratifications that are more evenly dispersed across the period of membership. My measures capture both of these patterns of integration into the world labor regime. I refer to these as measures of formal integration, in order to maintain the ability to distinguish between substantive integration and a merely symbolic form of integration, such as is denoted by the concept of loose coupling. This possibility is the focus of the analyses of the subsequent section of this chapter.

The analyses use the same estimation used in Chapter 5, i.e. the maximum likelihood estimation procedures, controlling for "clustering", i.e. correlated error terms due to the fact that repeated measures are being taken from the same unit over time (Allison 1991). To correct for this, I use the "generalized estimating equations method" ("GEE" method) discussed in Allison (1991). The GEE method modifies the weight matrix used in the maximum likelihood approach to account for correlated residuals. I use a TYPE=AR statement in my models, which is appropriate for the lag-1 autoregressive structure in my data. I also take a panel regression approach in these models, i.e. I
include a one-year lagged measure of the dependent variable as an independent variable in the analysis, to remove trend effects in the dependent variable

Results

Table 6.1 shows the results of the analyses exploring the effects of integration in the world labor regime on labor protest. As noted above, the point of these analyses is not to develop a general explanation of variation in labor protest, but rather to inquire more directly into the effects of an evolving world institutional framework on the workers' situations in ILO member countries. For this reason, I treat most of the variables in these analyses as control variables. The focus is on the measures of world labor regime integration, namely the total number of conventions ratified, and the number of recent ratifications, i.e. ratifications in the previous year.

The analyses in Chapters IV and V revealed an important connection between labor protest and the formation of the world labor regime, both when the latter is viewed understood in terms of the adoption of new international labor conventions and in terms of the ratification of conventions. The processes of world labor regime formation were closely associated with labor unrest, suggesting that the adoption and ratification of labor protections was in part a response by political elites, both at the level of national legislatures (via ratifications) and at the level of IGO action (via adoptions of new conventions) to the mobilization of labor protest, measured at the national and at the global level. One interpretation of that association between labor unrest and world labor regime formation is, that labor regime formation represents a strategy of appeasement and integration of labor, i.e. a direct response to a perceived threat.
If these motives were in fact at work in the formation of the world labor regime, the present analyses suggest that world labor regime formation and integration was not a useful strategy for co-opting and pacifying labor. Two variables capture the effects of countries' world labor regime integration on national labor protest: the total number of conventions ratified by the year prior to the focal year, and the number of new conventions ratified in the year prior to the focal year. New ratifications are not significant in any of the models in Table 6.1, and the total number of conventions ratified is not in the direction consistent with a cooptation interpretation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries / Observations</td>
<td>45/ 1021</td>
<td>65 / 1613</td>
<td>66 / 2307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.212* (.110)</td>
<td>0.122 (.163)</td>
<td>0.161 (.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Exporter</td>
<td>-0.071 (.097)</td>
<td>-0.009 (.066)</td>
<td>0.044 (.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>0.183+ (.096)</td>
<td>0.288+ (.155)</td>
<td>0.204** (.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Periphery</td>
<td>0.172+ (.102)</td>
<td>0.131 (.162)</td>
<td>0.125+ (.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.176 (.138)</td>
<td>0.209*** (.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.023 (.118)</td>
<td>-0.129 (.133)</td>
<td>-0.141 (.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America / Caribbean</td>
<td>0.148 (.118)</td>
<td>0.037 (.094)</td>
<td>-0.117 (.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia / Pacific</td>
<td>0.148 (.184)</td>
<td>-0.289** (.101)</td>
<td>-0.280* (.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>0.005 (.111)</td>
<td>-0.259** (.105)</td>
<td>-0.148 (.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.086 (.082)</td>
<td>-0.225*** (.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe / Central Asia</td>
<td>0.041 (.115)</td>
<td>-0.219** (.074)</td>
<td>0.080 (.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>0.214 (.226)</td>
<td>-0.299** (.119)</td>
<td>-0.509** (.165)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, Standard Errors in Parentheses
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Politics</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Polity</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>-0.009+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Protest</td>
<td>0.453***</td>
<td>0.426***</td>
<td>0.391***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Labor Regime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Association C87</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-0.179**</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.072)</td>
<td>(.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Association C98</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.070)</td>
<td>(.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Ratifications (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Conventions Ratified (t-1)</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-1501.4</td>
<td>-2328.7</td>
<td>-1812.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Freedom</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio (vs. null)</td>
<td>198.4***</td>
<td>251.4***</td>
<td>231.2***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Standard Errors in Parentheses
Higher numbers of ratifications are significant in 2nd and 3rd periods, but they indicate a positive relationship between integration into the ILO's regulatory framework and labor unrest. Furthermore, the significant effects are only found in Models 2a and 3a, i.e. the models that include countries for which an extremely low score has been substituted for missing data. These cases lack all variation on the labor protest variable. In the Models 2b and 3b, which retain the more stringent threshold used by the World Labor Group, there are no significant effects of world labor regime integration at all.

This pattern observed in Table 6.1 does not seem to fit an interpretation that links ratifications of ILO conventions to the cooptation of labor. Instead, it seems more likely that both variables are antecedents of a third, unmeasured variable: strong labor unions. Both cumulative numbers of ratifications and levels of labor unrest are likely to be higher in countries where working classes are relatively well organized. As social movements researchers have demonstrated repeatedly, organization is a key condition for the emergence of many forms of collective action and protest (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1978). Well-organized collective actors are also more likely to be successful in influencing political elites such as the members of national legislatures who vote on the ratification of ILO conventions.

In summary, based on these analyses, I find little evidence that ILO member countries' integration into the world labor regime has a dampening effect on labor protest. This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that political elites pursue world labor regime integration as a strategy of labor appeasement or cooptation; it does suggest,
however, that such a strategy would be misconceived and ineffective, if it were deliberately pursued.

_The Impact of the World Labor Regime on Workers’ Rights_

The protection of workers’ rights is the *raison d’être* of the ILO and its international labor conventions (CITES). By becoming members of the ILO, and ratifying ILO conventions, states explicitly make commitments to honor and protect the workers’ rights and the principles spelled out in the Constitution of the ILO and in the individual conventions. With membership and ratifications, member countries integrate themselves not only into a normative framework, but also into highly developed ILO reporting systems and supervisory and monitoring bureaucracies, all of which create more concrete openings various ILO bodies and other collective actors, such as national or international workers’ organizations, to exert pressure on governments to adhere to the principles of the ILO constitution and protect the rights articulated in the ILO conventions.

As neo-institutional organizational sociologists in particular have emphasized, however, organizations such as state bureaucracies are frequently subjected to various kinds of environmental pressures to adopt policies, organizational structures or forms, or other innovations that key organizational actors view as inconsistent with the their organization’s current situation or organizational goals. Externally mandated or legitimated elements may be inconsistent with local practices or exigencies. In such cases, organizations may take the formal steps of adopting an innovation, policy or structure, and thus signal conformity to the organizational environment, while
simultaneously proceeding with organizational practices in ways that are unaffected by those formal changes. Neo-institutionalists refer to this pattern of disjuncture between symbolic adherence or compliance and practical lack of consequences, as “decoupling” or “loose coupling” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer et al. 1997a).

It has frequently been noted, both by ILO staff and by external observers, that the international labor conventions of the ILO are particularly vulnerable to decoupling in the hands of member countries. As noted in an earlier chapter, the ILO does not possess any material sanctioning powers. Its only real sanctioning power is the public delegitimation of member states’ claims to normative forms of statehood; it is presumably for this reason that more realist-oriented theoretical perspectives such as the global class conflict perspectives tend to view the ILO and other IGOs, including the United Nations, with great skepticism (Weisband 2000; Wallerstein 2003; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Chase-Dunn 1989)

Data and Methods

The dependent variable In this section, I use longitudinal, cross-national comparative data on workers’ rights violations to explore the impact of the ILO labor regime, and the international labor conventions in particular, on workers’ rights. The data for these analyses were gathered by W. R. Boehning, Director of the InFocus Program on “Promoting the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” (Boehning 2003). Boehning has developed a composite indicator of what he refers to as a workers’ rights gap. Since the “gap” is meant to signal the distance between the ideal
state of protections of workers’ rights and the reality “on the ground”, higher index scores for the composite index and its constituent indices mean poorer performance with regard to the protection of workers’ rights. The Workers’ Rights Gap index ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating no gap between the ideal and actual practices, and 100 signaling the worst possible performance. These data are measured at the national level, and cover the period from 1985 to 2002. Because I use the labor unrest data, which stops in 1996, as an independent variable, my analyses in this section address the period from 1985-1996.

The workers’ rights gap index is composed of an adherence gap index and an implementation gap index. The adherence gap index is itself a composite measure, composed of a fundamental conventions component and a Declaration component.

The fundamental conventions component, which ranges from 0 to 100, combines two dimensions: the ratification of fundamental ILO conventions, and the fulfillment of the reporting obligations incurred as a result of ILO membership and the ratification of fundamental conventions. The ratification dimension is deemed much more important than reports, since it is the basis of most of the reporting obligations, and thus contributes a maximum of 88 points to the 100-point fundamental conventions component, whereas the reporting dimension contributes 12 points.

The Declaration component of the adherence gap index addresses member countries’ additional obligations as detailed in the ILO’s “Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” (ILO 2004). The Declaration targets countries that have not ratified all of the fundamental conventions, and essentially binds them to “respect,
promote and realize ILO’s fundamental principles and rights as long as they do not ratify the relevant core convention(s)” (Boehning 2003: 13). The Declaration component of the adherence gap index is thus logically linked to non-ratified conventions: it is scored to “compensate”, to some extent, for adherence gap points accumulated by the failure to ratify fundamental conventions. Since fulfillment of the obligations incurred under the Declaration is not equivalent to the ratification of a fundamental convention, the Declaration component is calculated to reduce, by a maximum of 50%, the adherence gap points generated by the non-ratifications of fundamental conventions. The Declaration component is also multidimensional, consisting of a reporting dimension based on fulfillment of reporting requirements stipulated in the Declaration, and a progress dimension based on substantial progress contained in the reports.

Ratifications of fundamental conventions are weighted much more heavily in the calculation of the Index scores are assigned to each country annually between 1985 and 2002; the scoring is complicated by the fact that the ILO had only adopted seven of the eight fundamental conventions by 1999. The eighth convention, which addresses “the worst forms of child labor”, was adopted in 1999. For the years 1985 through 1999, then, the failure to ratify a fundamental convention is scored as $88/7 = 12.6$; from the year 2000 onward, each non-ratified fundamental convention is scored as an 11-point increase. Thus, if an ILO member country has not ratified any of the fundamental conventions, it would receive a score of “88” on the conventions dimension of the adherence gap index.

The conventions dimension of the adherence gap index also includes a score for countries’ performance with regard to reporting obligations. Member countries are
namely obliged, by Article 22 of the ILO constitution, to report to the Committee of Experts on a regular basis regarding the measures taken to "give effect" to ratified conventions. The Committee of Experts publishes an annual list of reports received and overdue reports.

The implementation gap index is based on information gathered through the work of the key ILO supervisory and complaints procedures (the reports and assessments of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, and the Committee on Freedom of Association, respectively).¹ The implementation gap thus only measures countries' performance with regard to two of the eight fundamental conventions: the conventions concerning freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. The implementation gap ranges from 0 to 43 points, based on weights given to different types of reports issued by these committees and the language used in them. A zero indicates the absence of problems related to supervision or complaints. If the Committee of Experts addressed comments to a member country concerning all of the fundamental conventions, the Committee on Freedom of Association issued many reports on that country, its implementation gap would approach 43. The supervisory components' contribution to the index is weighted more heavily than are the complaints procedures' – the former ranging from 0 to 31, while the latter

¹ The Committee of Experts, a 20-member, multi-national, non-partisan body of technical experts appointed by the Governing Body of the ILO, reviews countries' reports on application of ratified conventions, and submits a report on its findings to the annual International Labor Conference. The Committee on Freedom of Association, a nine-member tripartite organ of the ILO Governing Body, fields complaints alleging violations of the two fundamental conventions on freedom of association (Conventions 87 and 98). Since countries are bound to the principles of the fundamental conventions by virtue of their membership in the ILO, complaints can be filed against any ILO member country, regardless of whether the country has ratified the conventions.
range from 0 to 12. (This index is based not on the content of the reports and observations, but rather on a dichotomous indicator of the presence or absence of various types of reports, mentions of a country in a summary report, or other forms of committee communication with member countries or the International Labor Conference. Only in the case of committee reports or mentions of progress do country mentions not contribute to the implementation gap index.)

Although the adherence gap index ranges from 0 to 88, and the implementation gap index ranges from 0 to 43, the overall workers' rights gap index ranges from 0 to 100. This is because part of the implementation gap (points based on reports of the Committee of Experts) presumes ratification of fundamental conventions, whereas the adherence gap is based to a significant extent on non-ratifications. The maxima of the two indices are thus mutually exclusive – a country cannot be scored with the full weight of the implementation gap index, for example, if it has not ratified all of the fundamental conventions; by the same token, any country which is scored with the full gap in implementation must, by implication, have ratified some of the fundamental conventions, and thus cannot receive the full adherence gap score.

There are obviously serious limitations to the workers' rights gap index, and its two component indices, the adherence gap index and the implementation gap index, as longitudinal measures of the level of concrete protection of workers' rights "on the ground". Thus, for example, implementation gap index does not take into account the content addressed in the reports of the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association. Mentions of a country due to the systematic terrorization of
trade union activists, up to and including the systematic assassination of trade union leaders, are weighted the same as comparatively minor infringements on the right of freedom of association, such as draconic union registration requirements. Furthermore, the work of the Committee on Freedom of Association is based on complaints filed with the committee against member countries (regardless of whether the allegedly violating country has ratified the relevant conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining or not); although complaints can be filed by any member country or by any recognized national or international workers' organization, and the committee thus does not have to rely on complaints by directly affected workers, it is nonetheless well known that the assumption: "no complaint, no problem" is highly problematic, since the circulation of information about violations and abuses may be affected by the level of repression in the political environment. In addition, there may be very significant within-country regional variations in the levels of protections of workers' rights, which are not captured by Boehning's workers' rights gap measure. Thus, for example, previous research has shown that union strength at the local or regional level (which may vary greatly, as the case of the U.S. demonstrates) is closely connected to the variation in collective bargaining outcomes, the implementation and enforcement of protective labor legislation, and the protection of workers' rights more generally. Yet, in the workers' rights gap index, problems with workers' rights in any one region of a country that find their way into the index, go on the account for the member country as a whole. Finally, the data are all endogenous to the ILO as an institution, based on reports and documents of ILO committees, or on behavior with regard to ILO standards. To the extent that the
ILO itself has become implicated in international hegemonic structures, these sources of information are problematic (Cox 1977, 1987).

Despite these limitations, however, the indices developed by Boehning do represent an important piece of evidence in assessing the protection of workers’ rights at the national level. The multi-dimensionality of the measures is a strength, offering the promise that shortcomings on one of the dimensions (e.g. the complaint-driven nature of the work of the Committee on Freedom of Association) will be, to some extent, compensated by other measures, such as the reports of the Committee of Experts. Despite the possibly biased nature of the ILO, as an IGO in an unequal world capitalist system, the ILO nonetheless remains the authoritative, most widely recognized and most widely used source of cross-national comparative labor data of all kinds. Furthermore, the workers’ rights gap index is the only such longitudinal, quantitative, cross-national measure of workers’ rights violations in existence today.

**Formal integration in the world labor regime**  As in the analyses presented in the preceding section, the key independent variables in these analyses are measures of countries’ integration in the 20th world labor regime. Again, formal integration in the world labor regime is operationalized in two ways: as the focal country’s cumulative total number of conventions ratified, in the year prior to the focal year, and as the focal country’s number of new ratifications in the year preceding the focal year. As noted in the previous section, these measures capture different aspects of formal integration into the world labor regime, namely the overall level of formal integration, and recent evidence of integration.
Table 6.2: Maximum Likelihood Regression of Workers' Rights Gap on Integration in World Labor Regime, 1985-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries / Observations</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64 / 725</td>
<td>64 / 725</td>
<td>64 / 725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.097***</td>
<td>2.796***</td>
<td>3.156***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.381)</td>
<td>(.285)</td>
<td>(.321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Member</td>
<td>0.321*</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.404**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.148)</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
<td>(.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.023+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Manufacturing</td>
<td>-0.256</td>
<td>-0.517**</td>
<td>-0.262+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.172)</td>
<td>(.192)</td>
<td>(.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Systems Core</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.225)</td>
<td>(.168)</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Periphery</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.205)</td>
<td>(.169)</td>
<td>(.204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.187)</td>
<td>(.141)</td>
<td>(.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1.103***</td>
<td>0.991**</td>
<td>0.987***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.278)</td>
<td>(.363)</td>
<td>(.273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America / Caribbean</td>
<td>0.492*</td>
<td>0.421+</td>
<td>0.537*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.248)</td>
<td>(.226)</td>
<td>(.232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia / Pacific</td>
<td>1.262***</td>
<td>0.740*</td>
<td>1.155***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.290)</td>
<td>(.296)</td>
<td>(.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.259)</td>
<td>(.246)</td>
<td>(.247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>1.005***</td>
<td>0.821**</td>
<td>0.948***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.252)</td>
<td>(.269)</td>
<td>(.226)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Standard Errors in Parentheses
Table 6.2: Maximum Likelihood Regression of Workers' Rights Gap on Integration in World Labor Regime, 1985-1996 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Coefficient 1</th>
<th>Coefficient 2</th>
<th>Coefficient 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe / Central Asia</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.469+</td>
<td>0.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.292)</td>
<td>(.255)</td>
<td>(.273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1.469***</td>
<td>1.452**</td>
<td>1.272***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.327)</td>
<td>(.464)</td>
<td>(.296)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**World Labor Regime**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Coefficient 1</th>
<th>Coefficient 2</th>
<th>Coefficient 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rights Gap (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Ratifications (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.006*</td>
<td>-0.006+</td>
<td>-0.008*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Protest</td>
<td>-0.026**</td>
<td>-0.026**</td>
<td>-0.043**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Conventions Ratified (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.004+</td>
<td>-0.003*</td>
<td>-0.008***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Polity</td>
<td>-0.019*</td>
<td>-0.012+</td>
<td>-0.019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian*Export Mfg</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.994**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.367)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Protest (t-2)*Democratic Polity (t-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Model Log Likelihood**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Log Likelihood</th>
<th>Difference in Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio vs. null</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio vs. model 1</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio vs. model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>62738.1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>732.8***</td>
<td>745.4***</td>
<td>548.6***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Standard Errors in Parentheses
I use the Workers’ Rights Gap index, and its component indices, to analyze the effects of the world labor regime on the protection of workers’ rights in the member countries. The results of the regression analyses of the Workers’ Rights Gap index on world labor regime integration measures are presented in Table 6.2.

Results

The analyses presented in Table 6.2 provide support for the claim that the ILO world labor regime is effective in some ways. These analyses indicate that ratification of ILO international labor conventions is associated with greater protections of workers’ rights. The significant, negative coefficient for the cumulative number of ILO conventions ratified indicates that larger cumulative counts of ratified conventions are associated with lower values of the dependent variable, namely the measure of the gap between the ideal state of protections of workers’ rights and the real state in the member country. In other words, countries that have ratified more ILO conventions tend to perform better on Boehning’s measure of workers’ rights protections; that superior performance is reflected in lower scores on his Workers’ Rights Gap index. Based on these analyses, it seems that the second measure of formal integration into the world labor regime, i.e. recent ratifications, does not have any beneficial effect on the protection of workers’ rights.

These analyses do not provide definitive evidence for positive impacts of world labor regime integration on the actual protection of workers’ rights. As noted above, it is possible that both the positive performance on the measure of workers’ rights protections,
and higher numbers of ILO convention ratifications, are both traceable to the presence of strong labor unions.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the capitalist world system appears to be entering a period of intensified crisis. One of the most important forces shaping social change in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century was the near-completion of the expansion of the global economic system. As Marx noted in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century, capitalism is inherently expansive; at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, here are few regions of the globe that continue to escape the expansive dynamic of capitalism.

As it approaches completion, the expansion of capitalism takes the form of commodification – the coordination of interaction of all kinds based on market exchanges. One of the most important dimensions of capitalist expansion, as commodification, has been the process of increasing commodification of human labor. The process of commodification of human labor has traditionally been referred to as “proletarianization”, the process by which labor relations are transformed into wage relations (Esping-Andersen 1990; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000).

As social scientists like Polanyi (1944) and Esping-Andersen (1990) have argued, however, in order for market relations to be reproducible over the long term, they have to be embedded in non-market social institutions that cushion the shocks of market fluctuations, even if the level of cushioning varies over time and space. The corporate liberalism of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the New Deal and the Fordist social structures of accumulation, and the “embedded liberalism” of the Breton Woods institutions, are all examples of institutional frameworks intended to secure the expansion and reproduction.
of capitalist accumulation process through social institutions that cushioned the process of commodification (Domhoff 1990; Kolko 1963; Krasner 1985; Lipietz 1989). Particularly with regard to human labor, then, process of commodification is shadowed by a process of decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990). The 20th century world labor regime, centered around the ILO, facilitated both, the commodification of labor and its partial decommodification: the diffusion of norms, rules and organizational forms of labor markets and industrial relations institutions from the core to the periphery and semiperiphery of the capitalist world system, facilitated the transition from coercive to market forms of labor control. By diffusing “modern” constructions of the capital-labor relation, it helped to integrate peripheral and newly decolonized states into the capitalist world economy, and simultaneously contributed to managing the social dislocations caused by the commodification of labor.

The ILO was formed during a lull in the long hegemonic transition, punctuated by two world wars, that sealed the decline of British hegemony and propelled the U.S. to its hegemonic rise. Domestic labor movements in the economically developed and rapidly developing countries of the world system -- Britain, U.S.A., Germany, France, Italy, Belgium -- had gained substantial influence in national politics, both through their increasing organizational capacities, and through the achievement of universal male suffrage. Nationalist ideology was effective for initially gaining working class support for World War I -- in almost all of the European Social Democratic parties, large majorities supported the war effort, if for very different reasons (Arrighi and Silver 1999). As the demands of economic mobilization for war increased, however,
concessions from working class organizations regarding the rollback of protections of the maximum workday, overtime, and working conditions had to be achieved by including workers’ representatives in the process of economic planning and management, and by promising post-war reforms and improvements in labor protections and welfare state institutions. The wave of working class uprisings and revolutionary movements that contested state control in a number of European states at the end of World War I only added a sense of urgency to an awareness on the part of the political elites of the dominant European states that labor concessions would be necessary for the reestablishment of capitalist accumulation. It had long been recognized that the international coordination of domestic labor regulation was a potential means of addressing the chicken-game dilemma that confronted states attempting to compete in international export markets while confronting increasing demands for labor decommodification from domestic working class movements.

With the most powerful European social democratic movement effectively marginalized by Germany’s unconditional surrender and the German Social Democratic Party’s own internal fragmentation, the international labor scene at the time of the ILO’s founding was dominated by the most powerful fractions of the labor movements in Britain and the U.S.A., both of which were decidedly anti-socialist and conservative, compared to continental European labor organizations, on the question of state regulation of the capital-labor relation. The national labor movements that exerted the strongest influence on the formation of the ILO were thus those of the rising and the declining hegemons, the U.S.A. and Britain. Gompers of the AFL chaired the Commission on
International Labor Legislation established during the Versailles peace negotiations, and the work of the Commission, which issued in the organizational charter of the ILO, was based largely on a blueprint developed by British labor leaders, in collaboration with state officials in the British Labor Ministry. The ILO was thus, at its inception, an exercise in the cooptation of the working classes of the capitalist core countries (Cox 1977, 1987; Haas 1964). The institution was designed to allow core capitalist countries to integrate the organized industrial sectors of their domestic working class movements, in part by granting concessions on protective labor legislation, without incurring disadvantages in international competition as a result of increased labor costs.

The analyses presented here provide support for the view that the 20th century world labor regime has continued to be responsive to the threat posed by working class protest, particularly in the core of the capitalist world system. I distinguished between three distinct dimensions of regime formation—the initial formation (Chapter III), the articulation (Chapter IV), and the process of integration (Chapter V) of the 20th century world labor regime. Labor protest was an important contributing factor in each of these dimensions of regime formation. As the previous paragraph emphasized, the level of core labor unrest was probably the primary reason for the initial founding of the ILO. The level of labor unrest in the core countries was an important factor influencing the adoption of new international labor conventions. The pace of states' ratifications of ILO conventions was also strongly influenced by labor unrest. These analyses, taken together, indicate the key role of domestic labor unrest in the process of labor regime formation. Previous research on the ILO has not addressed this relationship between labor unrest and
the formation of the 20th century world labor regime. The analyses presented here thus make a crucial contribution to our understanding of the ILO and international labor regulation.

The research presented here sought to engage the predominant sociological theory of world polity formation in a critical but constructive dialogue. World polity institutionalism is currently the predominant sociological theoretical framework in the study of the formation of global institutional structures such as international regimes. That perspective emphasizes the role of INGOs in the formation of the world polity. INGOs establish links between citizenries, states, and international governmental organizations, and thus facilitate the diffusion of shared cultural concepts and organizational innovations. Because world polity neo-institutionalists are primarily interested demonstrating the culturally constituted nature of actorhood itself, be it at the level of the individual, the organization, or the state, their analyses of world polity formation and international regimes focus on the role of INGOs in the increasing legitimacy of world cultural principles and the observed convergence on organizational and normative structures. World polity neo-institutionalists take as given that the world polity reflects the structures of power and dominance in the capitalist world economy (Meyer et al. 1997a), but that insight is usually without implications for their subsequent empirical analyses. Beckfield’s (2003) work on the inequality of world polity ties is an important exception in this regard, but thus far a lone one.

In particular, this perspective is clouded by deep ambiguities concerning the role of domestic social movements and political conflict in the process of world polity
formation. More historical studies in this tradition are led by the reconstruction of the emergence of INGOs to their origins in the activities of domestic social movements (Berkovitch 2000; Meyer et al. 1997b). Yet the larger theoretical agenda pursued by Meyer and his collaborators, namely that of ‘deconstructing’ the concepts of actorhood in general and the nation-state in particular, at least as they appear in realist social theory, in order to reconceptualize rational actorhood a cultural construction, the trajectory of which is increasingly shaped by an emerging world culture, predisposes the analysis to underestimate the role of domestic social movements and politics.

The findings of the present research are not entirely inconsistent with a world polity perspective; on the contrary, I find, for example, a strong diffusion effect in the process of world labor regime formation, suggesting that as subsets of actors adopt the normative innovations of the world labor regime, the remaining actors are more likely to follow suit. These analyses showed this legitimation effect to be particularly pronounced among regionally grouped subsets of actors. My research thus provides significant support for a neo-institutionalist world polity perspective on the formation of the 20th century world labor regime.

Other findings of the present research, however, are less consistent with a neo-institutionalist world polity perspective. The importance of domestic labor protest has already been mentioned. Furthermore, I find no significant effects of INGOs on the formation or integration of the world labor regime. This finding is ambiguous from the neo-institutionalist world polity perspective. On the one hand, INGOs are the “missing link” in the larger neo-institutionalist research agenda (Boli and Thomas 1999). This is
the most central independent variable in the recent wave of empirical research generated by this perspective. In this regard, then, the absence of significant effects of INGOs in the present research appears to contradict an important piece of the neo-institutionalist argument concerning the formation of the world polity. On the other hand, in their descriptive analyses of the growth and shifts in the population of INGOs, neo-institutionalists note that labor is one of the few sectors that has experienced relative decline in the 20th century, particularly after World War II. Boli and Thomas attribute this to the collectivist orientation of labor organizations, which runs against the individualist current that characterizes the emerging world culture as a whole: "The relative decline of these [collectivist] sectors indicates that individualism has become stronger since the early part of the twentieth century, when these sectors had their largest shares of the INGO population" (1997: 184). That may be an accurate descriptive account, but in the context of a broader societal and social science discussion about economic globalization, changes in the (im-)balance of power between capital and labor, and global inequality, it seems to stop short of a more meaningful and informative analysis of the dynamics of world polity formation.

The neo-institutionalist account of labor in the world polity is problematic in one further aspect brought out by the present research. The neo-institutionalist world polity account is closely linked to expectations about the diffusion of specific organizational forms. Indeed, the first, programmatic empirical research projects generated by this perspective addressed the convergence of all nation-states on a specific western form of organization of the educational sector (Meyer 1977; Meyer and Rowan 1991; Meyer et al.)
1979; Ramirez and Rubinson 1979). As institutionalization of specific world cultural principles proceeds at the world polity level, a constitutive, empirically induced expectation is that diffusion of the relevant organizational form should ensue. With regard to the labor sector of the world polity, the increasing institutionalization of world cultural principles regarding the organization of the capital-labor relation, of which the high ratification rates of the fundamental ILO conventions are evidence, should be reflected in the diffusion of labor unions at the national level. What we actually observe, however, is the opposite – the increasing institutionalization of labor in the world polity is accompanied by an overall trend towards decreasing union presence and influence (Goldfield 1987; ILO 1997; Lange and Scruggs 1998; Ross and Trachte 1990; Tilly 1995; Western 1997).

These findings, which seem somewhat anomalous from the neo-institutionalist world polity perspective, seem less contradictory when one takes seriously what world polity neo-institutionalists concede but do not seem to integrate in their analyses – that the world culture and world polity reflect the power structure of the capitalist world system. The various approaches I have grouped together under the umbrella of a common global class conflict perspective do integrate this insight, which, incidentally, recalls Marxian doctrine on the foundations of cultural structures in the social structures of production.

Wallerstein, for example, refers to states as “the most powerful cultural force in the world” (1991: 193), because the two key cultural dialectics of the contemporary capitalist world system revolve around, and are resolved in favor of, the state: the
dialectic of national and universal (or, in neo-institutionalist terminology: world) cultures, and the dialectic of national and particularistic “minority” group cultures. In the world systems theoretical perspective, although states have a certain degree of autonomy and are thus “not manipulable puppets”, their actions are nevertheless systematically related to the economic interests of powerful economic classes (Wallerstein 1979: 20). This is the case when, for example, capitalists use national barriers to protect themselves from disadvantageous effects of the unregulated operation of international markets (1979: 70; 1995: 26).

The global capitalism variant of global class conflict theory emphasizes that the shift to global capitalism has been accompanied by the rise to dominance of a global capitalist culture of consumerism and individualism, and a global political culture of neo-liberalism (Robinson 2004). This framework allows for a very different interpretation of the contradictions of world polity neo-institutionalism.

From global class conflict perspective, the consolidation of 20th century world labor regime in the post-World War II period represents the formation of a transnational social structure of accumulation. This is essentially the “embedded liberalism” of international regimes outlined by Ruggie (1982). The Fordist class compromises achieved at the national level were reproduced and stabilized at the international level through embedded liberal regimes such as the ILO. The ILO served to integrate the core working classes through the period of their increased disruptive capacity (1919 - 1975). With regard to the periphery, the ILO served to institutionalize capitalist labor markets and industrial relations systems, and thus, at least in theory, smooth the transition from
coercive to market forms of regulation of the capital-labor relation (Cox 1987). The shifts in the balance of power between capital and labor, to the advantage of capital, as a result of changes in the organization of production (transition to post-fordist structures of accumulation) at the beginning of the last quarter of the 20th century, has lessened the threat to accumulation posed by core labor, and thus lessened the need for cooptive measures (Robinson 2004; Ross and Trachte 1990). The decline in union power, and the worsening of the situation with regard to workers' rights and protections, are evidence of this trend (Boehning 2003; ILO 1997; OECD 1996, 2000).

A recent political struggle, carried out within the ILO, and between the ILO and other international institutions, serves to illustrate the current shift in the balance of power between capital and labor, and the role of the ILO in the international political economy. In the 1980s in the U.S., and then worldwide in the early 1990s, a campaign for a "social clause" in multi-lateral international trade agreements gained momentum, fueled both by wage earners' experiences of deindustrialization in the capitalist core economies, and a growing awareness of exploitative labor practices in the periphery and semiperiphery (Tsogas 2001; van Roozendaal 2002). The primary goal of the campaign became the development of a program of joint action between the ILO and the WTO, inclusion of a social clause in the Uruguay round of WTO negotiations in the mid-1990s. As van Roozendaal shows (2002), the supporters of the inclusion of a social clause in WTO agreements were not even able to form a majority coalition within the tripartite Governing Body of the ILO (ibid: Chapter 7). It is hardly surprising that they failed to gain the support of the leadership of the WTO. The invitation to the Director General of
the ILO to address the Singapore meeting of the WTO in 1996 was withdrawn, the issue of connecting trade and labor standards was debated at the meeting, and then shelved, without even establishing a committee to continue to study the issue, as its supporters wished. But they further, subsequent attempts to strengthen the supervisory machinery of the ILO also failed. The bid to strengthen the ILO in response to the new challenges to labor posed by increasing global economic integration failed. Instead of a more rigorous supervisory machinery, the result of the struggle was a symbolic declaration, which explicitly affirmed the benefits of comparative advantage for economic development, and rejected the idea of “arbitrary” unilateral trade sanctions and “protectionist campaigns” (van Roozendaal 2002).

This pessimistic picture should not be taken as suggesting that the ILO serves no purpose other than to co-opt restive labor movements and facilitate the disorganization of labor. The analyses of Chapter VI suggest that, on average, countries that integrate themselves more tightly into the world labor regime are less likely to be characterized by extreme forms of labor exploitation and violations of workers’ rights. The ILO provides another important venue for domestic labor movements in their local and national struggles to secure acceptable wages and working conditions. Even skeptical realists agree that hegemonic institutions become susceptible to influence from antisystemic movements (Wallerstein 2003; Krasner 1985; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000). The analyses presented here suggest that the potential of the ILO to become a site of counter-hegemonic globalization (Evans 2000) is quite limited. Those limits are, however, not fixed, but can be extended in periods of increased labor unrest.
REFERENCES


